Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China: Process Dynamics and Outcomes 9811959234, 9789811959233

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Xiaowei Gui

Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China Process Dynamics and Outcomes

Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China

Xiaowei Gui

Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China Process Dynamics and Outcomes

Xiaowei Gui School of Sociology Wuhan University Wuhan, China

ISBN 978-981-19-5923-3 ISBN 978-981-19-5924-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgements

This study would not have been possible without the help and inspiration of the local officials and residents in grassroots China. I would therefore like to thank, from the bottom of my heart, all the interviewees who contributed to this book. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors. It was Prof. Wang Xigen who in 2003 first guided me on the difficult path of academic research and who has since provided valuable ongoing help in both my life and with my studies. His patience, insight, encouragement, and guidance, as well as his ability to afford me the freedom to think, were essential aids in the completion of my study. Then it was Ms. Thella Hatla who invited me to Denmark in 2008. Her generous support has been instrumental in allowing me to fulfil my long held dream of studying abroad. Finally, special thanks are also due to Prof. Jørgen Delman for his stimulating input on nearly all aspects of thesis writing, as well as his carefully balanced criticism and support. I am also deeply grateful to my Chinese contact, Prof. He Xuefeng, without whose assistance I would never have been able to meet so many contributors in the field. At conferences and workshops around the world, Stig Thøgersen, Cui Zhiyuan, Wu Yi, Lianjiang Li, Cai Yongshun, Kevin O’Brien, Gunter Schubert, and Christian Göbel, among others, provided constructive and penetrating comments and suggestions. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of my friends and colleagues in China, including, but not limited to, Sun Guodong, Luo Zhida, Deng Yanhua, Chen Baifeng, Guo Liang, Tian Xianhong, Lu Dewen, Yang Hua, Liu Yanwu, and Gui Hua. Their communications are always pleasant and knowledgeable. I am indebted to those journals and publishers that generously gave their permissions of reusing my articles in this book, which include Chinese Sociological Review (Taylor & Francis), China: An International Journal (NUS Press), Rural China: An International Journal of History and Social Science (Brill), and China Perspectives (Centre d’étude français sur la Chine contemporaine).

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Finally and not least, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to my dear wife, two sons and to my loving parents. Their enduring support, belief, and encouragement carried me through all the difficulties and moments of doubt that I had to face on my academic journey.

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Success of Unyielding Complaints in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Theoretical Approaches of Protest Handling and Life Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 A Fieldwork Less Than Sedaka, More Than an Interview . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Organization of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 2

2 Fieldwork in the Y District and Elsewhere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Selection of Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Engagement with the Neighborhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Collection of Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 In-Depth Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 On-Site Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Archive Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Media Coverage and Secondary Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Supplementary Fieldworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Analysis of Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Limitations of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13 13 15 17 21 21 24 26 28 29 30 32

3 Handling Contention in China: A Framework to Scrutinize the State’s Position More Meticulously . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Research Puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 State-Centric Explanations on Challengers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Social Grievances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Contention Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Key Factors Increasing Social Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 State-Centric Explanations on Political Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Bureaucratic Divisions Within the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 State Response to Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Local Officials’ Handling of Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Contents of Protest Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35 35 37 37 38 40 41 41 43 46 47

3 6 8

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4.2 A Strategy for Research on the Handling of Protests . . . . . . . . . . 5 A Theoretical Framework for the Handling of Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Changes in State Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Tensions Among Different Dimensions of State Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Contradictions in the Xinfang System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Divisions Among Elites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 State-Society Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 State Strategies in Response to Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48 49 49

4 Selective Implementation in the Offline Xinfang System . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Selective Policy Implementation in the Xinfang System . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Structural Contradictions in the Xinfang System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Unbalanced Xinfang System Facilitating Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Irresistible Incentives on the Handling of Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59 59 62 64 69 74

5 Institutional Absorption in the Online Xinfang System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 China’s Online Xinfang Channel and Its Theoretical Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Field Diversion from Offline Agencies to Online Platform . . . . . . . . . 3 Transparent Processing Through Standardized Procedures . . . . . . . . . 4 Lawful Termination Combining Soft and Hard Measures . . . . . . . . . . 5 Performance Evaluation Balancing Procedure and Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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51 52 53 54 55 57

78 81 83 86 89 91

6 How Local Authorities Handle Unyielding Complaints and Why Concessions Are Made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Contention of Unyielding Complainants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Process of Handling Unyielding Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Nipping Every Element of Instability in the Bud . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Concerted Efforts at Intercepting “Petitioning Beijing” . . . . . . . 2.3 Finding a Way Out of the Impasse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Rationale for Compensating Unyielding Complainants . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Decline of Local Authorities’ Repressive Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Differentiated Interest Among Petition Cadres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Contradictory Signals from Above . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Buying Stability in the Chinese State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95 95 99 100 104 108 114 114 114 115 116 117

7 How Local Authorities Negotiate with Nail Residents and Why Concessions Are Made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Protests of Nail Residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Precaution and Loopholes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Persuasion and Procrastination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

121 121 123 125

Contents

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4 Demolition and Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 5 Concessions and Backfire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 8 Life Politics of Unyielding Complainants and Their Contention . . . . . 1 Significance of Life Politics in Explaining Unyielding Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 How “Power-Interest Networks” Shape Unyielding Complaints . . . . . 2.1 The Handling of Capable Individuals’ Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Handling of Ordinary Individuals’ Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Handling of Marginalized Individuals’ Complaints . . . . . . . 2.4 The Implications of Power-Interest Networks on Protest Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 How Protesters’ Social Circles Shape Unyielding Complaints . . . . . . 3.1 The Social Circles of Unyielding Complainants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Experience Communication Among Unyielding Complainants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Determination Reinforcement Among Unyielding Complainants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Mutual Assistance Among Unyielding Complainants . . . . . . . . . 4 Social Exclusion and Unyielding Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9 Unyielding Complaints in China’s Eclectic State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 China’s Eclectic State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Limits of Elite Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Hidden Rational of Unyielding Complaints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Blend of Hope and Risk in China’s State Building . . . . . . . . . . . .

171 173 176 178 180

140 142 143 146 149 151 153 154 156 158 160 163 168

Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Chapter 1

Introduction

Unyielding complainants (shangfang dingzihu 上访钉子户) are shrewd and stubborn individuals who have endured countless ordeals and indignities in order to trigger a favourable response from above (Li & O’Brien, 1996, p. 30; Li et al., 2012, p. 315). I first noticed their persistent complaints in the summer of 2011, when I was conducting fieldwork on popular resistance in a county-level district in Henan, China. These complaints differed from collective actions in that most of the latter were individual or household based. These complaints were also distinguishable from social movements, since they were usually weakly organized and limited in terms of leverage (e.g., leadership and resources). In addition, rather than seeking to create disruption, these complaints tended to be depoliticized and aimed to negotiate a better bargain with the state on specific socioeconomic issues. While lacking the key factors (e.g., scale, organizational base, leadership, resources, and disruptive ability) assumed to be necessary to make a contention sufficiently forceful (McAdam, 1999, pp. 43–48), these complaints often successfully pressured the local government into making expedient concessions. Their “success” was puzzling even from the perspective the state, which understands clearly the risk of concession-making, rarely underestimates the challenge posed by social unrest, and has the determination and capacity to crush any challenge threatening its rule. My finding is not exceptional, since other scholars have also identified this phenomenon in their fieldwork (Chen, B., 2011; Sun et al., 2010; Tian, X., 2010, 2012b). One must question, therefore, how and why these small-scale complaints, which lack social strength, can persist and even succeed in the Chinese authoritarian regime? What implications does their success carry? These two closely related questions constitute the central theme this book seeks to tackle. In order to clarify these issues, I have conducted a cross-disciplinary case study in which I operate in four different fields, viz. China studies, political science, sociology and anthropology. Instead of entering into debates around comparative politics, I

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0_1

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focus on the narrow topic of small-scale Chinese protests and stick to “close-to-theground generalizations” about what their fate might mean for China (O’Brien, 2011, p. 535). Thus the book is a specialized research in China studies. Moreover, in order to better understand the fate of these small-scale protests, I delve deeply into the role of societal and state protagonists. To this end, the book is integrated into the field of Chinese politics and I expect it will contribute to theories on both state-society relation and contentious politics in China studies. In addition, in order to conduct a substantial fieldwork on this sensitive topic, I have made great efforts to embed myself into the neighborhood and collected multiple sources of materials including in-depth interviews, on-site observations, archival materials, as well as media coverage and secondary studies. In other words, I have carried out an in-depth fieldwork that is less than Sedaka, but more than an interview (Read, 2010). Thus methodologically, this study is partly anthropological and partly sociological. Next I give a brief overview of the book.

1 The Success of Unyielding Complaints in China The book mainly focuses on two representative types of unyielding complaints: the contention of “nail residents facing eviction” (chaiqian dingzihu 拆迁钉子户) and “nail complainants” (shangfang dingzihu 上访钉子户). “Nail person” (dingzihu 钉子户) literally refers to stubborn “nails” on a plank of wood that cannot be easily hammered down (Hess, 2010, p. 908). In existing literature, the term “nail person” is generally used to describe “shrewd and unyielding people” who, by refusing to carry out government tasks and by retaliating against local officials, become tigers blocking the road of local authorities (Li & O’Brien, 1996, p. 30). According to Li Lianjiang and Kevin O’Brien, few nail persons opposing tax collecting and family planning policies succeeded in resisting state demands in 1990s (Li & O’Brien, 1996). However, in recent years nail persons have been increasingly successful in pressuring local authorities into buying them off in order to bring an end to their contention. As previously stated, the buying off of nail persons is a puzzling phenomenon. How, therefore, we account for their “success” in China today is a theoretically interesting question. Before digging more deeply into this enigma, it is also necessary to clarify the socalled “success” of nail persons. To be more precise, the “success” discussed in the book refers to the state’s expedient concessions to complainants. It is true that such concessions in China are not always fair or right. For example, few residents facing eviction can successfully prevent local officials from arbitrarily demolishing their homes. It is also rare for complainants to achieve justice through lodging complaints. What they strive for in the process of demolition or petitioning is to negotiate a better bargain with the state. However, this does not mean their contention is in vain. In order to properly evaluate nail persons’ “success,” we need to understand their demands. As existing

2 The Theoretical Approaches of Protest Handling and Life Politics

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scholarship has clarified, most of the Chinese protests, especially those in rural areas, can be considered as “interest articulation” (liyi biaoda 利益表达) rather than political claims (Cai, 2010; O’Brien, 2009; Wu, Y., 2007a; Ying, 2007). Therefore, the state’s expedient concessions to their specific economic demands, even where unjust, still reflect their “success” to a certain degree. In addition, it is also necessary to take time into consideration when examining nail persons’ “success.” As a township leader told me, “We hardly had a nail resident before 2005. At that time, buildings on a street could be demolished within a month. Few residents dared to stand up, seriously challenging the government.” Nail petitioners had similar experiences in the early years. They were often threatened and repressed. Most of them could not obtain any decent concessions from local authorities. On the other side, the state is never satisfied with the status quo and is thus continually seeking adaptation to accommodate and even facilitate social protests. In recent years, the Chinese government has implemented a series of policies to pressure its local agents to handle contentious actions promptly and adequately, but meanwhile has tightly restricted their capacity to repress such action. Accordingly, protesters acquire additional opportunities to persist and even succeed in their contention. The state and the society are thus more likely to reach a “non-zero-sum” situation through contentious bargaining (Lee & Zhang, 2013). Therefore, while we should not applaud nail persons’ “success” or the state’s expedient concessions, we cannot deny either that such “success” or concessions imply significant clues regarding the interactions between the state and society in China today. Yet, neither small-scale contention nor state strategies in response to it have been amply explored in existing literature. Clarification of these issues has thus both empirical and theoretical significance.

2 The Theoretical Approaches of Protest Handling and Life Politics This book mainly adopts two theoretical frameworks. One is protest handling that aims to clarify the fate of unyielding complaints from the perspective of state responses to them. The other is life politics that tries to uncover the hidden rationale behind these complaints from the perspective of complainants’ everyday life. The first is the main analytical framework used in my doctoral dissertation, the second stems from my further research on this issue after graduation. During the process of writing my doctoral dissertation, I found that existing literature on Chinese protests cannot properly provide an answer to the “success” of small scale, unyielding complaints. Briefly, the current studies can be generally attributed to two theoretical approaches: the state-centric approach on protesters

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and the state-centric approach on political opportunities.1 The first approach examines the dynamics and outcome of contention from the perspective of challengers, including primarily social grievances, contention tactics, and key factors that increase social strength. However, each of them alone is limited in its ability to explain the success of unyielding complaints in China. In particular, while the gravity of a grievance can influence the determination of complainants, a grievance-based approach is still incapable of answering the question as to why some complainants can succeed while others cannot, when the seriousness of their grievances are similar. Similarly, contentious tactics, such as “boundary-spanning” strategy (O’Brien, 2002, p. 53; Ying, 2007, p. 17) and “troublemaking acts” (Chen, X., 2009), can be employed by most of the complainants, yet only some of them succeed. By contrast, some key factors, embracing extra leverage from officials or journalists, strong social ties, adaptive leadership, unifying frames, and ample finance and time, can effectively increase complainants’ bargaining power, and thus help to clarify their success (Deng & O’Brien, 2014; Kuang & Goebel, 2013; Li & O’Brien, 2008; Shi & Cai, 2006). However, whether these findings are replicable or not is still questionable, since much Chinese complaints, as stated above, tends to be small scale, weakly organized, non-disruptive and limited in terms of leverage. Actually, even if the aforementioned key factors are replicated elsewhere in China, this may still be not enough to explain the persistence and success of Chinese complaints, because the state plays a more crucial role in shaping contention under authoritarian regimes as compared to democracies (Zhao, D., 2010), and the response of the government normally outweighs the strength of challengers in determining protest outcome in China (Cai, 2010, pp. 2–8). Some studies thus champion the state-centered approach, which mainly examines the roles of bureaucratic divisions and state strategies in shaping Chinese protests. Existing scholarship highlights bureaucratic differentiation in both vertical and horizontal dimensions as an aid to explaining the dynamics and outcomes of Chinese protests (Bernstein & Lü, 2003; Cai, 2006, 2008b; Chen, X., 2012; Mertha, 2008; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Shi & Cai, 2006; Sun & Zhao, 2008; Ying, 2001). However, vertical and horizontal bureaucratic divisions within the state are still insufficiently nuanced to interpret the success of nail persons. No matter how meticulously scholars disaggregate bureaucratic divisions within the state, they still cannot convincingly explain why only some complainants can create and exploit these divisions. As mentioned above, nail persons normally lack key social factors but share similar tactics; logically speaking they should not have distinct bargaining powers to exploit political openings within the state.

1

I distinguish between these two approaches only for analytical convenience. Theoretically, most protest outcomes are the consequence of ongoing give-and-take between societal and state protagonists. Thus “an interactive understanding of outcomes” is necessary and any either-or questions about the impetus behind change may threaten to impoverish our understanding of outcomes (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 98).

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State response to protest is another important factor determining the consequences of contention. Such responses in existing scholarship primarily embrace suppression (Bernstein & Lü, 2003; Cai, 2008a), tolerance (Cai, 2010, p.45), procrastination (Chen, B., 2004, pp. 234–235; Chen, X., 2012, pp. 83–85), persuasion (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 83–85; Lu, 2012), and concessions (Cai, 2010, pp. 6–7; Chen, X., 2009; Su & He, 2010; Tong & Lei, 2010). Yet, most of the studies only focus on one, or at most a few, state responses. Few of them systematically analyze all the possible responses in the whole process of protest handling. Moreover, many of these studies aim to identify the factors making certain responses possible, while the details of implementing these responses, which may deepen our knowledge about protest outcome, have not yet been amply explored. Digging deeper, an important reason why these two state-centric explanations are insufficient to resolve the puzzle outlined above is because they still primarily focus on protesters advocating change (e.g., how they can create and exploit bureaucratic divisions or force the state to make concessions) rather than the officials handling them. Therefore, this book redirects our attention away from protesters and towards officials, and develops a framework for analyzing the handling of Chinese complaints based on six analytical dimensions, viz. state capacity, state legitimacy, state institutions, state structure, state-society links, and state strategies. In particular, the book proposes to delve more deeply into the state’s role in shaping contention based around mechanism-process research from a macro structural standpoint. This means, when exploring the role of the state in shaping contention, it is necessary to scrutinize the state at its macro, intermediate and micro levels. State legitimacy and state capacity are two decisive mechanism-shaping structural factors which determine the nature of state structure and state institutions, as well as the practice of state strategies and the dynamics of interaction between the state and society. The work of examining the state’s position more meticulously can take us “beyond informative but incomplete understanding of the Chinese state” (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1054), and shed further light on the dynamics and outcomes of unyielding complaints in China. However, as the study progressed further after graduation, I came to realize that protest handing is still an external factor in understanding the fate of unyielding complaints. In order to better understand the rationale behind these complaints, it is also necessary to know stubborn complainants in the first place. However, as illustrated above, the dominant theories of Chinese protests are state-centered, “carried over from the structural sociology that underlies social movement studies, and in particular its focus on the external aspects of opportunities”. These theories have a certain “what would I do if I was in this situation” deductive logic, which usually reason from interests and assume a fairly straightforward weighting of costs and benefits by prospective protesters (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1052). They are overly rationalistic, fail to comprehend the psyche of the common man, and thus can not adequately understand Chinese protesters and their reality (Brandtstädter, 2006, p. 712). However, the attitudes and behaviors of protesters largely determine the origins, dynamics and outcomes of contention. Understanding Chinese protesters is thus theoretically significant, helping us to better understand what drives their contention, how they

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1 Introduction

negotiate a better bargain with the state, and what consequences the process has on both themselves and the state. On this point, a social-centric, “little tradition” proposed by James Scott and Benedict Kerkvliet provides us with another theoretical perspective to understand Chinese protesters, that is the importance of life politics (Scott, 1985, 1989; Scott & Kerkvliet, 1973). As Scott points out, a vast realm of peasant “everyday resistance” is habitually overlooked by the state-centric, “great tradition”, because it is neither openly declared “politics”, nor constitutes collective action as normally understood (Scott, 1989, p. 4). However, these activities should most definitely be considered political. Any account that ignores them is often overlooking the most vital means by which subordinate classes manifest their political interests. By contrast, the advantage of the social-centric, “little tradition” is its ability to reveal what actually motivates subordinates while executing their off-stage actions, which, they can employ to test the limits of what is permissible on-stage (Scott, 1989, p. 30). Based on these actions, one can then better understand “who they are, how they live and what they think” (Brandtstädter, 2006, p. 712). This book thus uses “life politics” as an important theoretical lens that can help us move away from state-centeredness, towards a richer understanding of the statesociety communication in China today. According to Kerkvliet, politics can be categorized as conventional politics and life politics. The former mainly focuses on the activities of state agencies, government officials, political parties and their organized efforts, and thus leads to the marginalization of some other positive and constructive aspects of political behavior (Kerkvliet, 2009). In fact, by the broadest definition, politics is about who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1958). How ordinary individuals make a living, raise their families, wrestle with daily problems and interact with others is all tied up with politics. Such life politics permeates every corner of our lives, which not only helps us reveal how ordinary individuals deal with big pressures in their lives, but also allows us to reflect on how their daily practices influence the political systems of which we are a part (Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott & Kerkvliet, 1973). Life politics thus can help us locate a fruitful conduit to an understanding of stubborn complainants. A clear advantage of the approach is to move us away from viewing complainants as “isolated individuals” (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1052) and instead to understand their behavior in the context of their specific socio-economic environment (Little, 1989, pp. 168–174). It thus makes an “anthropology of the state” possible by observing the “daily battles” at the interface between state and society (Migdal, 2001, pp. 117–118).

3 A Fieldwork Less Than Sedaka, More Than an Interview My research design is an “ongoing process”(O’Brien, 2006, p. 28), in which I gradually select my field, collect my data, identify my theoretical puzzles and then go back to the field to supplement what I missed in the first place. In specific, my fieldwork is also divided into two main phases. The first phase was the fieldwork

3 A Fieldwork Less Than Sedaka, More Than an Interview

7

I completed in Henan during my doctoral study, which focused mainly on protest handling. The second phase was the fieldwork I conducted in Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai, Shaanxi, Hubei and Guangxi after my work, where I began to consider seriously about the significance of life politics on complainants. I firstly carried out a single case study in the Y District in Henan from July to November 2011 and from June to August 2012. The main reason why I selected the Y District in Henan Province was that I had good access there. Giving the sensitivity of the research topic, Chinese specialists are confronted with various constrains on their fieldwork (Chen, X., 2010; Svensson, 2006). Good access is thus the key for the author to obtain valid and detailed information. This made it considerably easier for me to collect data from local officials and complainants. Moreover, due to limited time and resources, I could not properly balance breadth and depth at that time. Rather than extending this research to a multiple case study, I decided to get a rich and valid understanding of protest and protest-handling in one single unit. Since the characteristics of small-scale complaints and state strategies in response to them are quite similar in different places in China, I venture to suggest the findings in the Y District are applicable elsewhere in the country. Valid and detailed information is more likely to be obtained through a patient approach to building trust and gathering data over time, rather than a single visit or a short conversation. Thus it is very important to establish trust and familiarity with a fieldworker’s research subjects and the institutions in which he is embedded (Read, 2010, pp. 151–153). However, since many research subjects were still reluctant to engage in conversations of any sensitive topics with me, an in-depth fieldwork that is “more than an interview, less than Sedaka” was still necessary (Read, 2010). I am not an anthropologist and this work is not based on long-term ethnography. Nevertheless, I carefully followed local customs in order to gradually move my status from “outsider” to “insider”. Given the time limit, I do not believe that I successfully became a part of community life and thus achieved a completely meaningful participation observation, but I made great efforts to embed myself into the neighborhood and collected multiple sources of materials including in-depth interviews, on-site observations, archival materials, as well as the media coverage and secondary studies. The first fieldwork not only allowed me to obtain fruitful data of protest handling, but also kept prompting me to think about the question of what kind of individuals these unyielding complainants are. As illustrated above, one crucial reason is that the dominant theories of Chinese protests are overly rationalistic, fail to comprehend the psyche of the common man, and thus cannot adequately understand Chinese complainants and their reality. The second phase of my fieldwork thus began to focus on life politics of these complainants and used it as a breakthrough to unravel their action logic. For this purpose, I later conducted supplementary fieldworks in Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai, Shaanxi, Hubei and Guangxi, completing dozens of detailed interviews and on-site observations, and viewing dozens of archival materials from 2013 to 2020.

8

1 Introduction

Finally, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 216 interviewees in order to learn about small-scale complaints and the state strategies in response to them. They range from village/street cadres, township cadres, district officials, and police officers to petitioners, residents facing eviction, and ordinary local individuals. Owing to the sensitive nature of the topic, the interviewees were chosen using snowball sampling techniques. I conducted multiple rounds of interviews with about half of my interviewees. In order to avoid information bias, I attempted to crosscheck interviewees’ statements to the extent this was possible. Meanwhile, I made use of other sources as far as possible. The second source of data used in the book is on-site observation of complaints and complaints-handling. This includes 38 complaints and complaints-handling events in local settings, 5 petitioning hearings in Henan and Hubei, and other activities of local officials in their non-protest-handling time, such as private discussions on complaints-handling and their negotiations with higher-level authorities. On-site observation provided me an opportunity to experience events I was studying, and thus helped me to better understand the motivations and behaviors of my research subjects. With good access to both local officials and complainants, I also collected archival materials. These included (1) policy documents concerning petitioning work; (2) periodic summaries and analyses of petitions; (3) investigation report by petitioning officials; (4) statistical data compiled by the petition bureaus; and (5) other documents related to petitioning work, such as minutes of meetings, speeches by local and higher-level officials, working diaries of local officials, and petition letters provided by petitioners. These valuable data provided me with clues to assist the formulation of my inquiries and also helped me frame my questions more effectively. Fourth, the study collected protest events from government-sanctioned websites, books, magazines and newspapers published by presses both in and outside of China. Books and magazines were chosen on the basis of availability, and newspapers were chosen with the intention of embracing as many provinces as possible. These materials help to avoid the bias of a single case study by presenting different or similar explanations of the same issue.

4 The Organization of the Book Chapter 2 covers the methodological aspects of the book. I describe how I structured my fieldwork and argue why I believe the data gathered to be applicable to the study. In particular, I firstly clarify the motivation behind the study. Then, I elaborate in concrete terms the approach to conducting the fieldwork, which embraces the selection of field, the effort of building trust with research subjects, the collection of materials and the analysis of data. At the end, I explore the limitations of the research design.

4 The Organization of the Book

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Chapter 3 is the theoretical core of the book. The main goal of this chapter is to review the current “state-centric” explanations on Chinese protests and identify their limitations with regard to interpreting the fate of small-scale unyielding complaints. Digging deeper, an important reason why these lines of research are insufficient to answer the aforementioned question is because they still primarily focus on the protesters lodging protests rather than the officials handling them. Therefore, the chapter redirects our attention away from protesters and towards officials, and develops a framework for analyzing the handling of small-scale protests based on six analytical dimensions, viz. state capacity, state legitimacy, state institutions, state structure, state-society links, and state strategies. The next four analytical chapters concentrate on four specific issues from the perspective of protest handling: the mishandling of offline complaints, the institutional absorption of online complaints, the handling of unyielding complainants, and the negotiation with nail residents. All are important in order for us to uncover the dynamics and outcomes of small-scale protests in China. It is worth mentioning that each of the four phenomena could only be properly explained by considering together, at the same time, two or more of the theoretical propositions identified in Chap. 3. Thus, rather than a series of chapters, each describing the importance of one of my theoretical propositions in shaping small scale contention in China, I have chosen instead to devote a separate chapter to each of the phenomena, setting out all of the applicable theoretical propositions and demonstrating their roles in explaining that phenomenon. Chapter 4 illustrates how and why offline complaints are mishandled. Petitioning, also known as “letters and visits” (xinfang 信访), is the primary form of claim making in China, and most contentious activities take place in this form. This makes the xinfang system (xinfangtixi 信访体系) the most important state institution to be considered when attempting to understand the role of the state in shaping contention in China. As clarified in this Chapter, the mishandling of offline complaints can in the first instance be attributed to the two structural contradictions within the xinfang system. One is to simultaneously facilitate and control complaints. The other is to supervise local officials through the information flowing from complaints, while at the same time relying on the same officials to handle these complaints. While these contradictions have existed in the xinfang system since it was established in 1950s, they have been exacerbated in recent years, partly because of the changes to the balance of power and resources between the state and society, partly because of the contradictory official ideology and its correspondingly institutional arrangements, and partly because of the irresistible incentives offered by higher-level authorities to their subordinates. Chapter 5 clarifies the practice and rationale of the new and important online xinfang channel which, despite accounting for more than half of the nationwide xinfang, has not to date been amply examined. By integrating offline communication methods with the new online format, this channel achieves a more sophisticated form of managed participation through field diversion, standardized settlement and balanced evaluation. It improves the balance between citizens’ desire for participation and an appropriate level of institutionalization, and thus partly corrects the

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1 Introduction

offline xinfang channel’s heavy reliance on non-institutionalized tactics to maintain stability. However, the same structures that enable public participation may also be manipulated to reinforce a regime rule. Therefore, as long as xinfang still operates at the intersection of law and politics, the question of how to balance citizens’ desire for participation and an appropriate level of institutionalization remains a noteworthy issue, since stability is only achieved when these two elements are in equilibrium. Chapter 6 explores how and why local authorities cannot stop unyielding complainants from reaching Beijing and thus have to buy them off in order to make a temporary peace. It suggests that three constraints of state power can help explain this phenomenon. The decline of local authorities’ repressive tools has significantly weakened their capacity to control complaints. This results in the divisions among local officials when they are strongly pressurized to reduce the number of complaints reaching Beijing. Yet the contradictory signals from above leave them with limited room to maneuver. Determined complainants thus acquire additional avenues to force local authorities into buying them off in order to bring an end to their contention. This study casts further light on these three dimensions of political opportunity, which have not yet been amply examined in current studies. At the same time, it enriches our understanding of the protest control toolkit by setting out the whole range of complaint-handling tactics and its operational rationale. Chapter 7 explores how local authorities handle the protests of nail residents, and why concessions are made. First, bureaucratic divisions within the state provide the necessary political openings that residents can exploit. Second, effective antidemolition tactics help residents to complete their unapproved constructions, to create difficulties for local authorities’ thought work, and to increase as much as possible local authorities’ risk during the forced eviction process. Thirdly and most importantly, the state-society bonds reveal why only some of the residents can successfully use the aforementioned openings and tactics in their protests against local authorities, and thus negotiate a better bargain with the latter. Specifically, the low “infrastructural power’ of local authorities makes them incapable of penetrating as deeply as they once did, but their high “despotic power” makes them capable of holding sway over people having considerable interaction with them. The “half-opened” statesociety bonds explain how the limits and the strength of the state exert an influence on protest outcome, and why residents with weak ties to local authorities have better opportunities for resisting official pressure than residents with strong ties to them. Chapter 8 provides a nuanced, contextual understanding of unyielding complaints by identifying the role of the “power-interest networks” and petitioning social circles from the perspective of complainants’ life politics. First, the analysis of “powerinterest networks” suggests that the allocation of resources based on the closeness of personal ties is a crucial factor determining the life politics of unyielding complainants. However, the networks pose constraints on complainants who depend on them, but not for others who are self-sufficient. While unyielding complainants fail to use connections to enrich themselves, this has offered them bigger manoeuvring space when they have to face the pressure of local authorities. However, unyielding complaint is like a double-edged sword. When nail-like complainants are determined to use extreme ways to defend what they think is worthy of cherishment, they

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have to pay the price of jeopardizing their social and family connections. Second, while paying the price, nail-like complainants are not without gain. Along the path of contention, they have met many like-minded people and form their own social circles, which have also affected their complaining trajectory to a certain extent. Relying on the role of learning, comparison and assistance, petitioning social circles not only help unyielding complainants to be more sophisticated and determined, but also provides them with a lot of material and spiritual support, thus functioning as a beam of light that illuminates the path ahead. Finally, the pull and push produced by the two kinds of social connections together change the life trajectory of unyielding complainants. Although this life-oriented research cannot replace the analysis of the state-centredness, it does provide us a nuanced perspective to perceive unyielding complainants in a contextual rather than a deductive way. Chapter 9 is the conclusion, in which I summarize the various contributions to the book. In existing literature, neither small-scale contention nor state strategies in response to it have been adequately explored from an empirical standpoint. The book seeks to fill this gap using detailed empirical data. Theoretically, the book underlines a more meticulous examination of the Chinese authoritarian state. This supplements the previously informative but incomplete understanding of the state, and broadens our understanding of political opportunity structure. Furthermore, by delving more deeply into the role of complainants’ life politics in shaping contention, the book also sheds light on the dynamics and outcomes of small-scale contention in China, especially the hidden political order established by the ruling class and its impact on the subjective experience and repertoire of subordinates.

Chapter 2

Fieldwork in the Y District and Elsewhere

Very few case studies will end up exactly as planned. Inevitably, researchers will have to make minor or even major changes when unanticipated events occur (Yin, 2003, p. 61). As a budding researcher, my case study is, of course, not an exception. Actually, my research design is an “ongoing process” (O’Brien, 2006, p. 28), in which I gradually select my field, collect my data, identify my theoretical puzzles and then go back to the field to supplement what I missed in the first place. Even now, I am not sure that I have selected the most appropriate material for the study. Therefore, instead of stringently arguing this, I describe here how I did my fieldwork and argue why I believe the data gathered to be applicable to the study. In particular, I firstly clarify the motivation for doing the study. Secondly, I elaborate on the concrete approach to conducting the fieldwork, which embraces the selection of field, the effort of building trust with research subjects, the collection of materials and the analysis of data. At the end, I explore the limitations of the research design.

1 Motivation Before going to Denmark, I was a graduate student at Wuhan University. My major was legal philosophy, a field rarely related to empirical study. I first came to Denmark in 2008. At that time I was working on the project of reviewing rights discourse in western and Chinese literature under the supervision of Hatla Thelle, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for Human Rights. In this process, I gradually realized that Chinese people have a very different understanding of what rights are, but that most of the Chinese literature has failed to explore the issue in any depth. Thus I contacted Professor Jørgen Delman at the University of Copenhagen and expressed my interest to explore the way in which Chinese people perceive rights when negotiating with the state. However, this was still a very general plan and the topic could be approached from various angles. Later, after I got the Ph.D. fellowship from the University of Copenhagen, I decided to go back to China in 2010 to narrow © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0_2

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my research and make it more feasible. It was in a seminar that I first met my Chinese contact, Professor He Xuefeng. Our conversation was surprisingly successful and he showed great enthusiasm for my work. While my first trip to China barely helped me to identify my research project, I had successfully built the connection with my contact, which later helped me significantly when conducting the fieldwork. From July to November in 2011, I carried out my first fieldwork in the Y District in Henan Province. After a year of study in Copenhagen, I had evolved a clear intention to focus my project on complaining, a good perspective from which to explore statesociety relation in China (Cai, 2004; Chen, X., 2008; O’Brien & Li, 1995). With my contact’s help, I obtained easy access to the petition bureau of the Y District in Henan. Later, following my contact’s departure in August, I stayed on to continue my fieldwork. This was the first time I realized that the contention of “nail persons” (dingzihu 钉子户) was very interesting. The term “nail person” is generally used to describe “shrewd and unyielding people” who, by refusing to carry out government tasks and by retaliating against local officials, become tigers blocking the road of local authorities (Li & O’Brien, 1996, p. 30).What surprised me most was how different they were to the weak individuals portrayed by the media. Contrarily, nail persons often succeed in reaching Beijing to pressure the local government. By contrast, local officials often had no better way to cease their complaints other than to buy them off in many instances. I thus resolved to delve more deeply into this puzzling phenomenon. At that time, due to my limited knowledge of contentious politics in China, I was far from being able to illustrate the clear theoretical propositions. However, this was not altogether bad, since I could unconsciously avoid theoretical traps that might lead to a bias and capture the dynamics between complainants and local officials as comprehensively as possible. I returned to the Y District from June to August 2012. Due to the trust and acceptance I had developed during the first visit, I succeeded in collecting even more materials, especially from the side of local officials. I gradually realized that the role of the state in response to complainants was the key to understanding their persistence and even success in contention. Later in 2013 I met Lianjiang Li in Hongkang and Kevin O’Brien in Germany, the two leading scholars in China studies who had first analyzed the protest of nail persons (Li & O’Brien, 1996). Based on my fieldwork findings as well as their suggestions, I realized that, at least at this stage, how complainants understand rights is highly unlikely to be convincingly illustrated (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1059). While complainants sometimes talked about democracy and rights, such political rhetoric was usually used to mask their more substantial claims on specific socioeconomic issues. When necessary, they often resorted to extra-institutional, troublemaking acts to negotiate a better bargain with the local government. Logically, it was tricky to argue what these complainants really believed in: their legal rights or their not-so-legal troublemaking power. In this sense, in order to answer this question convincingly, it is necessary to understand complainants’ everyday life and really know “how they live, who they are, and what they think” (Brandtstädter, 2006, p. 712). At the same time, in order to make this understanding general, it is not enough to conduct fieldwork just in the Y district, but also to go to more places and interview more complainants. In addition,

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in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of their thoughts, a few months are not enough, and a relatively long period of time is needed. Based on the aforementioned considerations, I had to temporarily abandon this idea during the writing of my doctoral dissertation and focus my efforts mainly on the exploration of nail persons’ contention from the perspective of the state and looked to contribute to both theories on contentious politics and state-society relations. As clarified in the next Chapter, existing scholarship still leaves many gaps which can be addressed by more meticulously scrutinizing the role of the state. After finishing my doctoral dissertation and returning to work at Wuhan University, I gradually began to rethink this unfinished problem and conducted supplementary research in Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai, Shaanxi, Hubei and Guangxi from 2013 to 2020. Therefore, my fieldwork mainly consists of two parts. Next, I will firstly explain in greater details why I selected the Y District and how I conducted my fieldwork for the study, and then describe my supplementary fieldworks.

2 Selection of Field I selected the Y District in Henan Province based on three criteria. Before going to the Y District, what concerned me most was how to select a place which was more representative or at least less special, even though I knew that “claims to representativeness are always problematic, especially in China” (O’Brien, 2006, p. 27). The Y District is a county-level district in the Z City, Henan Province, China. In order to protect my sources, I will not give a detailed description of the Y District. In general, the Y District includes a number of streets and some villages. Some parts of these streets are located in the urban–rural fringe between the Z City and the proper rural areas. Other parts of the streets, as well as all the villages are still in truly rural areas. In recent years, most of the streets and villages have, more or less, been involved into the process of urbanization and land development. Consequently, demolition and land seizure were the main reasons leading to contention. In addition, people there protested against the government for reasons connected with judicial injustice, irregularities in village elections, and other misdeeds of local officials. As elsewhere in China, petitioning was still the primary form of lodging complaints, and most contentious actions take place in this form (Chen, B., 2012; Chen, X., 2005, pp. 5, 146). Due to the increase in social mobility, many peasants, laid-off workers, and various kinds of self-employed individuals from different places of China have moved to the Y District. At the same time, many local people, especially the younger generation, have left their homes and gone to the big Chinese cities in search of a better job. Consequently, the social structure of the Y District has been significantly changed. In addition to some big families with same grand or great-grand parents, there were also many outsiders. Meanwhile, these big families were not as active as they once were since many young members of the families had become migrant workers who

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were often not at home. As a result, most of the protests were family or individual based small-scale ones. As existing literature clarified, such unorganized, small-scale contention is quite common in China (Chen, X., 2009; O’Brien, 2009, p. 27; Ying, 2007). Furthermore, I found that people in the Y District were less defiant and thus less likely to engage in contentious action. I have insufficient data to allow me to compare this phenomenon with other provinces in China. However, based on limited information, I found that protesters in some provinces are more defiant and more likely to lodge collective action. For example, Hunan is a province which in modern Chinese history is particularly famous for revolutionary activities and it has contributed more revolutionary leaders than other provinces. According to Yu Jianrong’s study, the current contention in Hunan province is also very active (Yu, J., 2004). Guangdong is another province which has seen many famous contentious activities in recent years.1 By contrast, Henan lacks such a famous reputation, and in this regard cannot be seen as a unique example. Thirdly and most importantly, during my fieldwork I gradually realized that local officials’ response to contention is the key shaping its dynamics and outcome in China (also see Cai, 2010, pp. 2–8; Zhao, D., 2010). How local officials deal with protests is largely determined by the pressure they receive from upper-level authorities. Usually this pressure is transmitted from Beijing all the way down to local cadres through various kinds of laws, policies, and regulations issued by the central government. Accordingly, local officials’ responses to protest in different places in China are likely to be similar. Based on the aforementioned three reasons, I venture to suggest that the findings in the Y District in Henan are in no way special and are thus applicable to many other places in China. My second and more important reason for selecting the Y District is because I have a good access there. In China, many topics on state-society relations are regarded as “sensitive” by the government, especially those related to social contention. Consequently, researchers are confronted with various constraints on their fieldwork (Chen, X., 2010; Svensson, 2006). Thus the Y District seemed to me like a “lucky draw”, which would allow me to study the reality of protests and the state response to them. I first gained this impression from a meeting with the head of the petition bureau of the Y District. At that time, I was still living in a village, interviewing villagers and observing their daily life. My contact made an appointment with the head of the petition bureau, and invited me to participate. It was a very pleasant conversation. From him I heard many vivid details of nail petitioners, which were different from those I gleaned from petitioners themselves. I was immediately aware that this was a good opportunity to collect data from both sides and to avoid bias. After the meeting, I asked the head to allow me to stay in the petition bureau to continue my research. For the sake of my contact, the head promised help with my study. The next day, at a 1

For examples of latest famous protests that have taken place in rural Guangdong, see “China’s Wukan village stands up for land right,” available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asiachina-16205654, accessed on 2ed, November, 2014; Also see “China Maoming environmental protest violence condemned,” available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26849814, accessed on 2ed, November, 2014.

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farewell dinner for my contact, he formally introduced me to the party secretary, the most powerful person of the Y District. The secretary expressly welcomed my further research. While this was merely a nice gesture, it had significant symbolic meaning for the other officials at the dinner. When my contact had left, I was allocated an office in a township government building close to the petition bureau. From then, I believe I had a privileged opportunity to obtain details of contention and contentionhandling which are rarely made available to other scholars. This “revelatory” fact was thus the most decisive rationale for selecting the Y District as my field.2 The third reason for choosing the Y District as a single case is that I could not properly balance breadth and depth due to limited time and resources. I clearly understand the risk of putting all my eggs in one basket, and a multiple case design would make my case study less vulnerable and more substantial (Yin, 2003, p. 53). Actually, I discussed the feasibility of doing a multiple case study with some of my Chinese friends. As they explained, they had already conducted around 400 days of fieldwork in many provinces in China by the time they set out to write a thesis. Based on such rich experience, some of them might well choose a multiple case study. Obviously, I did not have enough time to do this. Maybe a skilled fieldworker with an excellent case research design could effectively collect the data within such a limited timeframe, but as previously stated, I was a complete novice in the design and conduct of a fieldwork. Furthermore, I only had one good Chinese contact at that time. As he explained, the Y District was his strongest contact. He could introduce me to persons in other places, but there was no guarantee that would allow me to successfully collect the “sensitive” data on protest-handling. Meanwhile, I also felt uncomfortable with drawing too much on my contact’s resources. Finally and most importantly, as I will explain in the next section, getting a valid and rich understanding of each unit is time-consuming work, even though I had good access in the first place. Therefore I finally decided to stay in the Y District to make an in-depth single-case study of protest and protest-handling.

3 Engagement with the Neighborhood Valid and detailed information is more likely to be obtained through a patient approach to building trust and gathering data over time, rather than by a single visit or a short conversation. Thus it is very important to establish trust and familiarity with a fieldworker’s research subjects and the institutions in which he is embedded (Read, 2010, pp. 151–153). Hence James Scott spent two years in Sedaka, observing, interviewing, and taking part in village life (Scott, 1985). Not being an anthropologist, this work is not based on long-term ethnography. However, since many research subjects were still reluctant to engage with me in conversations on any sensitive 2

As Robert K. Yin stressed, revelatory fact is an important reason for selecting a field when a researcher has a chance to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation (Yin, 2003, p. 42).

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topic, an in-depth fieldwork that is “more than an interview, less than Sedaka” was still necessary (Read, 2010). Given the time limit, I do not believe that I successfully became part of community life and thus achieved a meaningful participation observation, but I did make every effort to gradually cross the boundary that separates “insiders” from “outsiders.” Being sophisticated is especially important when a fieldworker is trying to achieve a rapport with Chinese officials. As previously stated, I had very good access to the Y District. However, this was still far from sufficient to achieve a substantial fieldwork. In order to build acceptance and trust with local officials, I followed certain criteria. For example, when I met senior local officials, I sat on the edge of my chair as a way of showing my respect. When they offered me a cigarette, I always tried to refuse. If I could not, I accepted it, but never smoked in front of them. By contrast, contact with ordinary cadres was more relaxed. Even here, though, there are still some rules to be followed. For example, rather than taking their cigarettes, I preferred to invite them to smoke mine. When they invited me for a welcome or farewell dinner, I would accept the offer; to do otherwise would be impolite. However, I never of my own initiative sat in “the seat of honor” (i.e., the seat facing the entrance) (zhuzuo 主座). When I could not refuse this seat, I never sat down while any local official remained standing. If an official arrived when I was already seated, I would stand up again in order to show my respect. I never voluntarily ordered dishes. If local officials insisted on me doing so, I normally ordered relatively cheap ones, even though I knew the bill was covered by public expenses. In addition, I never made a request to my local contact which I believed would mean extra trouble for him, even though he had been told to take care of me while I was in the Y District. For example, the air conditioning in my office was out of order, but instead asking him to repair it, I brought in an electric fan. During my fieldwork, I did many such subtle but very important things, and as a result my behavior left a good impression on local officials. I got this feedback during my second stint of fieldwork when I was more familiar with local officials. As one told me, they had observed me closely when I first came into the field, and they appreciated my efforts to build good relations. In order to help me better understand his point, the official gave me another example. They received another Ph.D. student when I left the field the first time. This student also had very good access, but lacked social skills. For example, he asked to see the accounts of a village the first time he talked with the secretary of that village, an unwise request that immediately irritated the secretary. Later when the student was invited to a welcome dinner, he sat directly in the seat of honor without observing the situation around him. He also ordered a few dishes without first asking other people’s opinions. Inevitably, his naïve behavior adversely impacted his fieldwork. While many officials did not express their unhappiness publicly, they privately refused to talk with the student, making various kinds of excuses. Actually, this student’s behavior was not unacceptable, since he had been told in advance to make himself at home. His mistake was to take this courtesy too literally and to show insufficient respect to local officials. This is extremely important, especially for young Chinese fieldworkers. By contrast, local officials may be more tolerant of a foreign researcher, because they do not expect him to be sensible

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of Chinese customs. It is also worth mentioning that being sophisticated could not guarantee a substantial conversation with local officials. For various reasons, many of them were reluctant to talk with me and their answers were sometimes vague and evasive. However, as the example of the student showed, appropriate behavior by a fieldworker can definitely help him to develop acceptance and trust with Chinese officials. This can further greatly increase the possibility of doing successful fieldwork. Compared to local officials, it was much easier to communicate with protesters, since most of them were very eager to find listeners for their stories (also see Chen, X., 2005 p. 30; Svensson, 2006). Even so, it was still necessary to obtain their acceptance and trust. To this end, honesty was the first step. Thus I typically went into detail to explain that I was a Ph.D. student rather than an official in disguise or a journalist, and that my purpose was academic research rather than “telling on them” to the government or reporting their grievances to the public. I also informed them that their participation was entirely voluntary and their privacy would be respected. In order to convince them, I gave them my contact details and asked them to call me any time they had concerns. Consequently, most protesters believed that my study would not bring them trouble. While my honesty sometimes dispelled their hope of seeking extra leverage, it also helped me to reduce some bias that might be generated from interviews.3 Furthermore, being thoughtful was important in establishing acceptance and trust with protesters. As Marina Svensson admitted, it was impossible to be completely neutral when facing grieved protesters (Svensson, 2006). I also met the ethical dilemma of choosing whether to be neutral or active. I clearly knew the risk of offering help to protesters. It could perhaps reinforce their insistence on continuing with contention and thus influence the validity of my research. It might bring trouble to local officials and made me feel remorseful. However, I also felt uncomfortable if I completely ignored their grievances. In addition, such an attitude would alienate me from protesters and make a substantial conversation impossible. My solution was to be a thoughtful person who cared for protesters, but not a consultant who tried to give them advice. I believed this was an appropriate way to keep a comfortable distance between me and protesters, and thus to avoid potential bias of data collection. For example, I spent around one hour listening to a petitioner’s sufferings arising out of petitioning Beijing; when she cried, I cried too. I also gave her some suggestions on how to educate her granddaughter. However, when she asked me how to solve her problems, I said there was nothing I could do and I was really sorry about this. Sometimes, when I could not simply refuse petitioners’ requests, I told them honestly that I did not want to make trouble for local officials since I was their guest. Most of them could understand my dilemma because of my efforts to first try and understand their issues.

3

As noted in existing literature, a fieldwork’s presence in China often raises protesters’ hope and thus might bring bias for data collection. This factor should be taken seriously during the fieldwork, also see (Chen, X., 2005, p. 31; Svensson, 2006).

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How to thank those individuals whose cooperation had made my research possible was also very important for me in my efforts to become embedded in the neighborhood. My first strategy was to invite them for a dinner. At the beginning, I tried twice to invite some group of officials (e.g., the officials in the petition bureau) for a dinner. They accepted my offer, but would not allow me to pay the bill. On one occasion an official even threw his arms around me in order to physically prevent me from doing so. Later I finally understood the reason behind this strange behavior. When I invited them as a group, they represented their unit and if they let me pay the bill, it would reflect badly on their unit.. Besides, in such situations, the bill would be covered by public expense rather than by themselves. So I adjusted my strategy by inviting some officials privately. By contrast, inviting grassroots officials (e.g., village/street cadres) and ordinary individuals was less complicated. When having a dinner with my research subjects, I cautiously controlled the budget. Rather than finding an expensive restaurant, I often chose some roadside snack bar. In order to make them more comfortable, I also found some excuse for the invitation, such as I was glad to have someone accompanying me, since eating alone was boring. In addition, I seldom talked about my research during the dinner, trying instead to raise some topic in which they might be more interested. I also brought some small gifts from Denmark and Wuhan. The prices of these gifts were carefully calibrated according to the particular research subject. I believed this was necessary since it was inappropriate to give a senior local official and a villager the same gift. Meanwhile, I also considered the needs of my research subjects and chose thoughtful gifts. For example, a pack of Danish cigarette worked well for a smoker and a box of Danish chocolate was more popular to a people who had kids. By using all the aforementioned tactics, I believe I largely crossed the boundary that separates “insiders” from “outsiders,” and successfully developed a comfortable relationship with my contributors. For example, I occupied an office in a township government building during my first fieldwork. While it was close to the petition bureau, I still had to take time to travel between the two. In my second fieldwork, when I was more familiar with petition cadres, they offered me an office in the petition bureau which was next to the room receiving petitions. I thus acquired better opportunities to closely observe petitioning and petitioning-handling. Meanwhile, my good relationship with petition cadres also helped me to easily access any written materials I needed. In addition, the communication with my contributors became more substantial. Rather than getting vague and evasive answers, I started to collect more details of protest and protest-handling. All these changes significantly facilitated my fieldwork. However, getting close to my research subjects may also bring negative impacts to my research. As Elisabeth Wood stresses, a fieldworker may gather data that suffer from unrecognized selection bias by cultivating ongoing contact with persons with whom they feel more comfortable (Wood, 2007). On this point, fieldworkers should always try to balance involvement with detachment. I was clearly aware of this, and tried to reduce this source of bias during my fieldwork. In particular, rather than overly relying on my key informants, I collected multiple sources of evidence, and

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used them to construct the validity of my case study. The next section will discuss this issue in greater details.

4 Collection of Materials In order to analyze the complicated interactions between protesters and local officials, this study requires data suitable for research from various perspectives, with various techniques. Evidence for this study primarily comes from four sources: in-depth interviews, on-site observation, archival materials, as well as the media coverage and secondary studies.

4.1 In-Depth Interviews As one of the most important sources of case study, interviews play a significant role in this study. Given the familiarity and trust established with my research subjects, the accessibility to my interviewers was not difficult. Even so, certain techniques are still necessary in order to make an interview substantial. Next, I discuss these techniques in time sequence from the beginning to the end of my interviews. The first step was to choose my interviewees. Owing to the sensitive nature of my research topic, they were chosen using network-based “snowball sampling” (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Browne, 2005; Goodman, 1961). In particular, the sampling process was implemented in the following way. Firstly, I recruited some interviewees as the initial “seeds.” These seeds were introduced non-randomly by my local contacts: a village secretary I first met in the field, a petition cadre, a township cadre as well as a district cadre who were later told to help me in my fieldwork. I asked them to draw the seeds from various streets, villages and government agencies (e.g., the petition bureau of the Y District and the petition receiving offices of different townships). In this way, I got seven initial seeds including both protesters and local officials. Since my local contacts were officials, I looked to avoid bias by developing my own seeds in both non-random and random ways when I became more familiar with the neighborhood. I purposely contacted some protesters of whom I had heard in fieldwork or read of in governmental archival materials, especially those that local officials suggested I did not meet. For example, I met a barefoot lawyer and some persistent petitioners who had a famous reputation in the Y District. I also randomly talked with individuals whom I met in local settings. In this way I made some contacts of petitioners and residents facing eviction. After talking with my initial seeds, I asked them to introduce their friends, neighbors, classmates, and colleagues as the second chain-referral wave. Through the continuity of this process, I finally recruited dozens of interviewees ranging from village/street cadres, township cadres, district

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officials, and police officers to petitioners, residents facing eviction, and ordinary local individuals. As previously outlined, before an interview formally began I explained in detail my identity and purpose, as well as the potential risks and benefits of being a research subject. I also stressed that I would not record the conversation, since I believed it would make my interviewee uncomfortable and thus jeopardize the validity of my work. In order to make my interviews more informative and sensitive to local specifics, I would read a broad range of written materials about protest and protesthandling in advance. They included event reports, speeches, meeting minutes, and case files in the petition bureau, working diaries of local officials, private materials of petitioners, as well as the media coverage and academic articles. I also quickly reviewed the major questions that the interview should cover before conversation starts, by which I mean the structure of the inquiry rather than actual questions to be asked (Yin, 2003, p. 74). During the conversation, I raised the questions in understandable language. Normally, my questions were fluid rather than rigid, since specific information that might become relevant to my study was not readily predictable. Thus, if possible, I encouraged interviewees to recall and discuss their concerns freely, and I tried merely to be a listener guiding the interview in an unbiased manner. I primarily employed four types of techniques to guide my interviews. The first was using a “how” rather than a “why” question. Posing a “why” question may create defensiveness on the interviewee’s part. By contrast, a “how” question can lead him to address a “why” question in his preferred way during the conversation (Becker, 1998, pp. 58–60; Yin, 2003, p. 90). In this way, I often got some unexpected data. For instance, a petitioner complained about her under-compensation on fees related to a house demolition, but she was reluctant to tell me why she signed the agreement with the government so early and thus missed the opportunity to get more compensation when the government later raised its offer. I instead asked her how the government had convinced her to do so. She incautiously mentioned that, in addition to local officials, her son exerted huge pressure on her, since he worked in a government agency. I immediately saw this as an interesting piece of information. Later, when I continued to delve into the social ties of residents facing eviction, I found that residents having little interaction with the government have better opportunities for resisting official pressure than residents having considerable interaction with it. My second strategy was to be patient and flexible. Rather than stick to my schedule, I often catered to the interviewee’s schedule and availability. If the interviewee was a good talker, I would prolong my interview. For example, I had a seven-hour conversation with a district cadre who used to be a township party secretary but now was transmitted to a post with very little for him to do. While I was extremely exhausted when our conversation ended at midnight, I also got many vivid revelations of how and why the government deals with contention by any means possible. Being patient and flexible also means never posing questions recklessly. My interviews often did not go as smoothly as I desired, partly because I was not familiar with my informants, partly because they were distracted by some other issue at that moment. In this situation, I politely ended the conversation, and made another appointment with them

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later. If I kept annoying them, I reasoned, I might lose the chance to get the answers from them, since if they refused me once, it was quite easy for them to do it again. Therefore, being patient is very important, especially for fieldworkers who have the time. Employing this strategy, I did multiple rounds of interviewing in around half of the cases, and most of the subsequent interviews worked better than the initial ones. Thirdly, role-shifting conversation was also very useful. When I was tired of interviewing, I often let my contributors interview me. This strategy helped me to understand the perspective from which the interviewee was seeing the world. For example, my interviewees typically raised two topics in these conversations: the social situations in China and in Denmark. They often complained about social injustice in China, such as the corruption of local officials and their own suffering. They even sometimes gave suggestions on government supervision and protection of human rights and invited my comments on these suggestions. While our conversations on these issues often went nowhere, I could still feel a so-called “rights consciousness” rising from my research subjects. However, when we turned to the topic of the Danish situation, their questions often gave me an opposite impression. When I talked about the welfare system in Denmark, such as how unemployed individuals can receive social benefits from the government, with few exceptions their first reaction was to enquire about loopholes in the system and the consequences for people misusing the system. When I correlated their questions with their acts in daily life, such as their construction of unapproved buildings to add value to homes facing eviction, or bribing local officials to get more compensation from them, I started to realized that they had been deeply embedded into an unjust social environment which was unconsciously changing their way of perceiving the world, making them more cynical, and destroying their faith in rights and public rules. My fourth strategy was use of roundabout questioning. Interviewees were sometimes reluctant to answer my questions, especially when the topic was sensitive and affected them personally. As previously stated, development of trust could help to improve this situation, but it was sometimes not enough. My strategy therefore was to use roundabout questioning, which included three basic steps. The first was interviewing the opposite party of the interviewee. For example, I asked petitioners about the misdeeds of petition-handling, and then crosschecked their answers with local officials. The second was posing questions in a general way. Specifically, rather than asking my interviewees to talk about their experience of protest or protest-handling, I encouraged them to describe such issues generally without reference to any specific persons involved. This strategy not only helped me to understand the background and details of my research, but also provided many important clues to guide my later interviews. The third was interviewing informants who were knowledgeable but not currently involved in my cases. For instance, retired or semi-retired cadres (i.e., who were still in position but waiting for retirement) were valid research subjects. By contrast, protesters were not suitable for this tactic since they were more interested in the actions they were still engaged in. While interviews were very helpful to my research, they could also result in the bias of data collection. Fieldworkers need to be cautious about becoming overly dependent on some key informants, although the latter often provide important

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insights into certain occurrences (Yin, 2003, p. 90). They should avoid substantiating a preconceived position and remain open to contradictory explanations during a conversation (Yin, 2003, p. 61). They should also exercise caution when different interviewees appear to be echoing the same answers (Yin, 2003, p. 91). In order to avoid these pitfalls, I normally employed the following techniques in the fieldwork. The first was to focus more on facts rather than opinions. Specifically, my questions were primarily concentrated on the factors that facilitate or constrain protest or protest-handling rather than the sufferings of protesters or the pressure of local officials. The second was to search for other contrary explanations as carefully as possible. I deliberately crosschecked some interviewees’ statements with others, especially those holding different explanations on certain issues. Thirdly, I used “focused interviews” to corroborate certain facts that I had already established (Merton et al., 1946). I did such interviews at the later stage of my fieldwork or by telephone after my return to Denmark. In order to avoid guiding the interviewees, I usually sought advice from them rather than giving them my preconceived answers in advance. The last technique was to rely on other sources as much as I could. As I will discuss later, this study also collected other materials. The observation of reallife situations and the inspection of archives provide necessary information to orient my interviews and better judge the answers of my interviewees.

4.2 On-Site Observation Observational evidence adds new dimensions for understanding either the context or the phenomenon being studied, and helps to convey important case characteristics to outsider observers (Dabbs, 1982; Yin, 2003, p. 93). This study used on-site rather than participation observation. Next, I explain why I chose this kind of observation, what I had observed and what roles observation evidence played in the study. My good access greatly facilitated my observation of contention and contentionhandling. As previously stated, I occupied an office in a township government building. This provided me many opportunities to observe how protesters lodged complaints there and how local officials dealt with them. Since my office was close to the petition bureau of the Y District, it was also possible for me to see the appeals there. Later, my ability to closely observe these events was further enhanced by my move to the office next to the reception of the petition bureau. Meanwhile, I was allowed to join in many events taking place in the petition bureau, such as a hearing for petitioners and an on-site working conference for petitioning-handling. In addition, I could go into the sites of demolition and land acquisition. Only once was I stopped by a local official and after I showed him a group photo with the party secretary of the Y District, he allowed me to proceed. In general, I had a large degree of freedom to observe the many ongoing events in the Y District. Even so, rather than conducting participate observation, I chose on-site observation. Doing participate observation would mean that I was not merely a passive observer and might play a certain role in on-going events (Chen, X., 2005, p. 29;

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Yin, 2003, pp. 93–94). My involvement might thus complicate the situation, produce potential bias and jeopardize the validity of data collection. In addition, I would feel regret if my participation resulted in any trouble for the local government. Therefore, I always tried to be a neutral observer when joining in an ongoing event. I mainly conducted two kinds of on-site observation in the field. The first involved dozens of protests and corresponding protest-handling events4 in front of the Y District government and some township governments, as well as in the sites of demolition, with participants ranging in number from several to dozens of persons. Most of such events were triggered by land acquisition. The second was dozens of cases of individual or collective petitioning, corresponding petitioning-handling events, and two petitioning hearings in the petition bureau of the Y District and petitioning reception offices of some township governments. In addition, since I had offices in both a township government building and in the petition bureau of the Y District, I also had plenty of time to observe how local officials worked in non-protest-handling time, such as their private discussions on protest-handling and their negotiations with higher-level authorities. My observation evidences primarily played two roles in this study. Firstly, it provided me with a chance to experience the events I was studying, and thus helped me to better understand the motivations and behaviors of my research subjects. As James Scott argues, “human agents may provide contradictory accounts of their own behavior, or they may wish to conceal their understandings from the observer or from one another” (Scott, 1985, p. 46). On this point, interviews alone are not enough to fully uncover the motivations of protesters, especially when they try to distort information by lying or by pleasing the interviewer. By contrast, observation provides a different perspective to better understand our research subjects through their actions rather than their expression in certain context. For example, when I interviewed petitioners, they often talked about rule of law and human rights. However, their contentious performance revealed that what they really believed in were various kinds of non-institutionalized, trouble-making acts, such as blocking traffic, disordering government operation, intercepting cars transporting local leaders, and lodging appeals in “sensitive time” (e.g., 2008 Olympic Game) in Beijing. Such observation evidence thus helped us better understand the rationale shaping their contention. On-site observation was also useful in providing additional information about my research. In particular, it offered some clues for the later interviews, the inspection of written materials, and the understanding of secondary studies. One example was how local officials bribed their superiors in the process of petitioning-handling. I had read about this kind of phenomenon in existing literature before going into the field, but found few willing to discuss the subject when asked. This changed, however, after I become privy to numerous negotiations of this type between officials and their superiors and the subject was no longer a secret. Specifically, when some petitioners 4

People in the Y District often lodged complaints because of the large number of land acquisition and demolition. I cannot remember the exact number of observations since in the later stages of my fieldwork I had become weary of seeing so many protests, but I am fairly certain the number was less than one hundred.

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reached higher-level authorities to voice their grievances, the latter would pressure the local government to deal with their problems. Accordingly, local officials often had to negotiate with their superiors to cover things up. Sometimes, when it was urgent, they had to respond immediately even if I was present. I thus had an opportunity to learn more about this phenomenon, went back to read related archive materials and later posed my questions to these officials.

4.3 Archive Materials State-generated documents, when used in conjunction with other sources, can help us open the black box of the bureaucratic system, and shine a bright light on many of the dark corners of China’s politics (Diamant, 2010, p. 38). Since the state plays a more crucial role in shaping contention in China (Cai, 2010, pp. 2–8), government materials, if available, often provide the best sources for the study of contentious politics in China (Chen, X., 2010, p. 15). When collecting and using state-generated data, accessibility and reliability are two important issues. I discuss them in greater detail next. At the end, I explain the benefits of government materials to this study. The accessibility of state-generated materials was my first concern in the field. In order to properly collect state-generated materials, two things are very important. The first is to develop and cultivate ties with archive officials (Diamant, 2010, p. 36). As previously stated, I had good access in the Y District. At the same time, I also made great efforts to build trust with local officials. Even so, it is still necessary to be patient when accessing government materials (Diamant, 2010, p. 36). Therefore, I adopted a strategy by which I progressively cultivated connections with local officials and meanwhile remained patient. In particular, I only asked to read less sensitive (e.g., government reports on petitioning work) and less private (e.g., petitioning policy documents) material at the early stage of my fieldwork. With the development of mutual trust between me and local officials, I requested access to more sensitive (e.g., statistical data compiled by the petition bureau) and more private (e.g., working diaries by local officials) documents. This strategy worked very well, because I rarely met restrictions in checking government documents at the later stage of my fieldwork. My second concern was the reliability of state-generated data. The materials collected from the government may be particularly susceptible to error and bias, since officials have a stake in how the event is portrayed (Earl et al., 2004, p. 73). However, we should not exaggerate the unreliability of governmental data, since certain changes have occurred which have significantly ameliorated the information distortion of state-generated materials. First of all, the procedures for compiling petitioning materials have been substantially improved and standardized in recent years (Chen, X., 2010, p. 29). Moreover, in addition to local petitioning agencies, petitioners are more likely to send information directly to upper level governments in China today. This also weakens the motivation of local authorities to hide and distort information (Chen, X., 2010, p. 25).

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Even so, it is still necessary to treat state-generated data with special caution. In particular, I had collected five types of government materials, which included (1) policy documents concerning petitioning work; (2) periodic summaries and analyses of petitions; (3) investigation report by petitioning officials; (4) statistical data compiled by the petition bureaus; and (5) other documents related to petitioning work, such as minutes of meetings, speeches by local and higher-level officials, working diaries of local officials, and petition letters provided by petitioners. These materials could be roughly categorized as raw materials, partially processed materials, and well-processed materials (Chen, X., 2010, p. 21). Petitioning policy documents, minutes of meetings, speeches by local and higher-level officials, working diaries of local officials, and petition letters provided by petitioners were considered raw materials. These raw materials were more reliable, since they were usually unedited and uncensored. Periodic summaries and analyses of petitions as well as investigation reports by petitioning officials were considered partially processed materials. Therefore, they were less reliable when compared to raw materials. However, these two kinds of materials were never intended for outsider eyes. Therefore, they were less likely to be edited. In addition, rather than basing my discussion solely on these materials, I mainly used them to guide my interviews and to frame my questions. This further reduced the risk of data bias. Statistical data compiled by the petition bureaus were well-processed materials and least reliable. However, I had strong reasons to believe that the two kinds of statistical data used in my study were reliable. The first was the number of petitioning cases received by higher-level authorities. I got two kinds of numbers: the “registered” (dengji de 登记的) and “real” (zhenshi de 真实的). The registered number related to the petitioning cases finally registered by higher-level authorities. This number was a fake and much lower than the real one. In order to get a good evaluation of petitioning work, local officials often bribed their superiors in higher-level authorities to cancel petitioning cases from their computers before they generated permanent records. By contrast, the real number represented the petitioning cases received by higher-level authorities. Usually this number was only presented to local leaders in order to make them clearly aware of the situation on petitioning work of the district. As we can see here, if local officials wanted to hide something from me, it did not make sense to give me the registered and real number simultaneously. The second kind of statistical data was the list of petitioners receiving petition relief and the amount of relief they had got. Local officials were unlikely to lie about this data for two reasons. Firstly, these data were sensitive and never intended to be seen by outsiders. Secondly, these data were concrete and thus highly unlikely to fool me since I could easily check them by contacting petitioners. Actually, I did randomly call some petitioners on the list and their answers proved that the government did not lie about the data. In addition to the aforementioned examples, I also had opportunities to collect other items of archival materials. However, for different reasons I did not take them for my study. The first was petitioning policy documents provided by petitioners. As Xi Chen points out, these documents were sometimes useful for researchers (Chen, X., 2010, p. 19). However, thanks to my good access, I could find all the documents

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provided by petitioners in the petition bureau of the Y District. Besides, the documents provided by petitioners were often poorly printed with many spelling mistakes. By contrast, the ones I got from the government were of much better quality. The second was government publications, such as local gazettes and yearbooks. They may be important to some studies (Thøgersen, 2006), but were not useful to my research. An important reason was that many government publications contain very old and incomplete information concerning petitioning work. The state-generated data were useful to my study for two reasons. First of all, stategenerated data can bring the state into focus and help scholars better understand the government as an actor in contentious interactions (Chen, X., 2010, p. 17). This state perspective was illuminating to my study, since the local government normally played a more decisive role in shaping contentious activities in local settings. Furthermore, state-generated materials can provide a variety of information about protest events, such as the number and identify of participants, their forms of action, ways of framing and tactics of protest, as well as corresponding government responses (Chen, X., 2010, p. 19). These rich messages were of great assistance to my interviews. Firstly, they gave me clues for my inquiries. For example, with the rich information of a protest, I could easily select and locate interviewers. Secondly, government materials also helped me frame my questions more effectively. According to my experience, the better I had a grasp of an issue, the more likely it was that I could conduct a substantial interview with my research subjects (also see Chen, X., 2010, p. 17). For instance, local officials tended to avoid some key but sensitive topics during conversation (e.g., the details of how they handle petitioners). This situation could be largely improved, when I had become familiar with the topic and showed them related documents during the interview with them. When they realized that they could no longer fool me, they often talked more about these issues. This strategy worked well especially once I was more familiar with local officials.

4.4 Media Coverage and Secondary Studies This study also embraced media coverage and secondary studies on contentious action in China. The Chinese Internet is becoming a treasure trove of new information that can contribute to our understanding of many topics on China’s politics (Carlson & Duan, 2010, pp. 88–106). Compared to government archival documents, journalists’ reports and secondary studies collected from internet may be more reliable, since journalists and scholars usually lack any strong motivation to distort information. Meanwhile, journalists’ reports and secondary studies collected from different places of China are more likely to avoid bias on data that is based mainly on a single case. Therefore, many scholars have used newspaper data rather than governmental materials, since the former are often better in terms of reliability and scope (Tilly et al., 1975, p. 16). However, journalists’ reports and secondary studies also have their disadvantages. Firstly, these materials can hardly be used in a systematic way since most such events

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happened in settings that are unrelated (Chen, X., 2010, p. 19). Secondly, these data are often confined to high profile events, and thus may ignore some other important messages which exist in normal protest events. By contrast, government archival data of lesser scope may provide richer information about contentious activities and government responses to them (Chen, X., 2005, p. 38, 2010, p. 19). Thirdly, the media in China are still under strict constraints when reporting popular contention, their reports thus being often partial and incomplete. Fourthly, the identity of journalists often becomes a barrier for them to effectively collect data from research subjects. Specifically, a journalist is often taken as an ally of protesters but an enemy of local officials. This identity may lead to bias when the journalist is trying to collect information from both sides. Despite the aforementioned disadvantages, journalists’ reports and secondary studies are still useful to my study, since they help to avoid the bias of a single case study by presenting different or similar explanations of the same issue. To this end, this study also collected some protest events from government-sanctioned websites, books, magazines and newspapers published by presses both in and outside of China. Books and magazines were chosen on the basis of availability, and newspapers were chosen with the intention of embracing as many provinces as possible.

5 The Supplementary Fieldworks Understanding the attitudes and behaviors of activists can help us better understand what drives their contention, how they negotiate a better bargain with the state, and what consequences the process has on both themselves and the state. However, as illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, methodologically, it is far to be enough to reveal the profiles of protesters just based on my first fieldwork in the Y District. Inspired by Doug McAdam’s research on the biographical consequences of movement participation, I believe that at least three methodological criteria are worthy of my attention in the subsequent supplementary fieldworks, in order to better understand protesters’ life politics about “how they live, who they are, and what they think” (Brandtstädter, 2006, p. 712). Specifically, the depth of the study delivers a profound investigation of the origins, dynamics and outcomes of movement participation. The length of the study, meanwhile, ensures sufficient time for an adequate assessment of the impact of such movement participation. The breadth of the study provides a sufficiently wide geographic area to allow for the generalization of results and a diverse research subject that permits the establishment of a behavioral or attitudinal baseline to judge the effects of movement participation (McAdam, 1989). Following these criteria, I had conducted supplementary fieldworks in Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai, Shaanxi, Hubei and Guangxi from 2013 to 2020. I firstly visited Beijing in 2013. As the capital city, Beijing is naturally the focal point for all the unyielding complainants. They can be seen concentrated around the State Bureau for Letters and Visits (SBLV, 国家信访局) or living in “complainants’ villages” (shangfang cun, 上访村) on the outskirts of Beijing. A visit to these places has thus

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become essential to a complete understanding of Chinese complainants. Meanwhile, my investigations undertaken in the other regions adds geographic diversity and empirical richness to the study. My first fieldwork experience has laid a solid foundation for the smooth development of the subsequent fieldworks. The first and foremost experience is to establish trust and familiarity with research subjects and local authorities in which I am embedded. Keeping this experience in mind, I had carefully followed local customs to gradually cross the boundary that separates “insiders” from “outsiders”, and successfully developed a comfortable relationship with my contributors. The second experience is to learn the processes of interaction before and after the events, and to communicate with different types of people, regardless of whether they are involved or on the sidelines. Thanks to both personal and professional connections, I obtained permission to visit aggrieved complainants and their neighbors and friends, learning about their living situations and points of dissatisfaction, talking with officials at different levels, and accompanying them when protests and negotiations took place. In order to avoid information bias, interviewees were chosen using snowball sampling and attempts were made to perform some crosschecks between interviewees. Meanwhile, in order to avoid involvement and jeopardizing the validity of empirical materials, I always sought to adopt the role of a neutral on-site observer when joining in these ongoing events. By communicating with both parties, I was able to explore protesters’ actions and mindsets before, during and after their contention, and to communicate with different types of people, regardless of whether they were involved or on the sidelines. Such investigation not only increases the depth of the study through a comprehensive reconstruction of events, but also deepens our understanding of protesters by comparing nonactivists, ordinary complainants and “old-hand” complainants, all of which increases the breadth of the study. My good relationship with contributors allowed me to conduct supplementary investigations by phone and WeChat for many years after the actual fieldwork, thus enabling the study’s desired timespan. Good access to both local officials and protesters also facilitated collection of the extensive archival materials. These included official regulations, investigation reports, and meeting minutes on stability maintenance, as well as some private material provided by protesters.

6 Analysis of Sources Through the aforementioned fieldworks, I have completed a total of 216 detailed interviews and 38 on-site observations, and viewing several hundred pieces of archival materials from 2011 to 2020. How to analyze these materials becomes the focus of the following discussion. As stated in Chap. 1, the explanations in the book are mainly targeted at advocating a different approach, namely to demonstrate the dynamics and outcomes of small-scale protests in China by more meticulously scrutinizing the role of the

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state. In particular, the book suggests redirecting our attention away from protesters and towards officials, and provides a vision-enhancing framework for analyzing the handling of Chinese protests based on six analytical dimensions, viz. the changes in state capacity, the tensions between different dimensions of state legitimacy, the contradictions in the xinfang system, the divisions among elites, the state-society links, and the state strategies in response to protests. To this end, the six analytical dimensions are the theoretical propositions of the book which generally define the priorities for what to analyze and why. Delving more deeply into these propositions can further assist in answering the questions as to “how” and “why” small-scale protests are more likely to be sustained, and may even succeed in China today. In order to better demonstrate the aforementioned “how” and “why” questions, a general analytic strategy of the book is to take structure, agency, and time into account. Specifically, this study fully stresses the significance of structural changes (Chen, X., 2005, p. 25). The changes in state capacity, state legitimacy, the xinfang system, and the state-society links have significantly shaped the interactions between local officials and protesters. In addition, the book also pays great attention to the preferences, interests and strategies of agencies. As Xi Chen stressed, the agencies need to be constructed at different levels of abstraction (Chen, X., 2005, p. 26). The actors in the book are sometimes the local government and their upper-level authorities, and sometimes specific individuals, embracing party leaders, ordinary officials, grassroots cadres, the allies of elites (e.g., thugs, informants, and black guards), as well as protesters. Finally, time is an essential factor in determining the interplay between structure and agency. This study thus examines the changes in institutions and strategies over time and tries to specify the sequences of the changes for each element (Chen, X., 2005, p. 27). In addition to the general analytic strategy defining priorities for what to analyze and why, the book adopts the analytic technique of “explanation building” in each chapter by focusing on a specific phenomenon. As Robert Yin stressed, to explain a phenomenon is to stipulate a presumed set of causal links about it. A good case study is one in which the explanations have reflected some theoretically significant propositions (Yin, 2003, p. 120). In particular, the book includes five main analytic chapters. Each of them concentrates on a specific phenomenon. Chapter 4 illustrates how and why local officials mishandle offline petitions in the xinfang system, Chap. 5 explores how and why the new online petition platform can be used as a sophisticated governance tool to absorb grievances through institutionalization. Chapters 6 and 7 respectively discuss how local authorities negotiate with unyielding complainants and nail residents, and why concessions are made. Chapter 8 discusses the influence of “power-interest networks” and petitioning social circles on complainants’ behaviors from the perspective of their life politics. There are two reasons why I organize the book according to these specific issues rather than the six theoretical propositions identified above. Firstly, based on my fieldwork, I believed that these issues are important for us to uncover the dynamics and outcomes of small-scale protests in China. As Chap. 4 demonstrates, petitioning is the primary form of claim making in China, and most contentious activities take place in this form. Thus the xinfang system is the most important state institution to be

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considered when attempting to understand the role of the state in shaping contention in China. On this point, how and why local officials respond to petitions in the xinfang system is the key to understanding the dynamics and outcomes of Chinese protests. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the contention of unyielding complainants and nail residents. Together they are the most typical small-scale Chinese protests, not just in the Y District but elsewhere in China too. However, how and why they can sustain and even succeed in China has not received enough attention. Secondly, according to my fieldwork, I found that each of these phenomena could only be properly explained by considering together, at the same time, two or more of the theoretical propositions identified above. In other words, if I organize the book according to my theoretical propositions, each of my chapters is not enough to answer any of these phenomena. For example, I found that the success of unyielding complainants could be primarily attributed to four factors: the state’s contradictory ideology, its low “infrastructural power” and high “despotic power,” its bureaucratic divisions, as well as its conditional, risky, or ineffective strategies when responding to complaints. Therefore, rather than a series of chapters, each describing the importance of one of my theoretical propositions in shaping small scale contention in China, I have chosen instead to devote a separate chapter to each of the phenomena, setting out all of the applicable theoretical propositions and demonstrating their roles in explaining that phenomenon. Finally, in order to conduct a high-quality case study, two principles are also necessary. The first is to attend to relevant evidence as much as available. The second is to exhaust major rival explanations for each phenomenon (Yin, 2003, p. 137).

7 Limitations of Research While I believe I made every effort in carrying out the fieldwork, I recognize that my relative inexperience as a researcher means that this study has some limitations. Firstly, this study mainly chooses a single rather than a multiple case study. While the phenomena discussed in this study are quite common in China, and although I tried to make my single-case study as deep as possible, my case study is nevertheless open to accusations that I have put all my eggs in one basket. In addition, my fieldwork was carried out from 2011 to 2020 and most of the interviews and observations were conducted within this time period. Therefore, I had to depend largely on interviewees’ memory and archival documents to collect the data of the events that happened before 2011. This, without doubt, does not fully reflect the characteristics of the events. Meanwhile, I could not personally collect the data of the events that occurred after I left my fieldworks. In order to counter this weakness, I carried out some subsequent telephone interviews with a number of interviewees, and asked local officials to provide me with relevant government documents. However, since I was not in the field, the reliability of these data is less certain than the ones I collected personally. Secondly, given the sensitivity of the research topic, I had to make great efforts to cultivate connections with my research subjects in order to maximize collection

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of relevant materials. However, I may have thus gathered data that suffers from unrecognized selection bias by overly relying on some key informants (Wood, 2007). While I adopted several techniques to balance involvement with detachment, such as searching for other contrary explanations as carefully as possible and collecting multiple sources of evidence as comprehensively as possible, I am still not certain that I successfully overcame this limitation. To do more participant observations may be a solution in the future, since the interview-based approach could be augmented by an ethnographic approach. However, when doing so I also need to avoid being a passive observer, since this may produce new bias. On this point, how to balance closeness with distance in the process of data collection is a tough challenge for a fieldworker looking to ensure the validity of his case study. Thirdly, as previously stated, my research design is an ongoing process, in which I gradually select my field, collect my data, identify my theoretical puzzles and then go back to the field to supplement what I missed in the first place. In other words, as a novice investigator, I had a difficult task in order to collect data and formulate an explanation. While I made great efforts to join the empirical and the theoretical, I realize that as a result of my limited experience in both areas, this study does contain room for further improvement and refinement. For example, I need to pay more attention to the alternative explanations of each phenomenon discussed in the book and collect relevant evidence supporting or challenging these rival explanations as comprehensively as I can. I can only repeat that explanation building is a gradual process in which the case study evidence should be repeatedly examined, and theoretical positions should be repeatedly revised (Yin, 2003, p. 122). Only in this way can a budding researcher, by completing a good case study, acquire the experience necessary to move on to more difficult topics in the future. I see my current work as part of an important learning process and in this spirit I welcome all constructive criticism.

Chapter 3

Handling Contention in China: A Framework to Scrutinize the State’s Position More Meticulously

While the study of contention in China has become a “rapid-growth industry,” existing explanations cannot convincingly account for the positive outcome of numerous small-scale Chinese complaints, many of which lack the social strength required to succeed in contention. Based on a systematic review of these studies, this chapter finds that an important reason is because they still focus primarily on the complainants advocating change rather than the officials handling them. Accordingly, they pay too much attention to the factors increasing social strength, and ignore far more interesting clues on the side of the state that can also influence contention. The chapter thus redirects our attention away from complainants and towards officials, and provides a vision-enhancing framework for analyzing the handling of Chinese small-scale complaints based on six analytical dimensions, viz. the changes in state capacity, the tensions between different dimensions of state legitimacy, the contradictions in the xinfang system, the divisions among elites, the state-society links, and the state strategies in response to complaints. This more meticulous examination of the state’s position is thus able to supplement the previously informative but incomplete understanding of the Chinese state and shed further light on the dynamics and outcomes of Chinese small-scale complaints.

1 Research Puzzles Over the past few years I have seen many stubborn complainants successfully forcing local authorities to buy them off in order to bring an end to their contention. My finding is not exceptional, since other scholars have also identified this phenomenon in their fieldwork (Chen, B., 2011, p. 230; Sun et al., 2010, p.10; Tian, X., 2010, 2012b, pp. 189–193). At first sight, the buying off of complainants in the authoritarian Chinese regime is quite puzzling. First, Chinese complaints can be considered a special case in that they are usually small-scale, weakly organized, non-disruptive and limited in terms of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0_3

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leverage (Chen, X., 2009; O’Brien, 2002, 2009, p. 27; Ying, 2007). Such contention is assumed to be too weak to seriously challenge the state since it usually lacks key factors (e.g., scale, organization base, leaders, disruptive ability, and resources) to make their contention sufficiently forceful (McAdam, 1999, pp. 43–48; McAdam & Su, 2002). Second, as one of the most successful and experienced authoritarian regimes still in existence, it is highly unlikely that the Chinese government does not clearly understand the risk of buying off complainants. Yet, such modest concessions, as Goldstone and Tilly suggest, can be fatal to the regime. One reason for this is that while minor changes made by the regime advertise its illegitimacy, they do not fully correct that illegitimacy, and thus can lead to greater demands for elimination or transformation of the regime. The other is that such concessions highlight the weakness of the regime and encourage others to believe that they too can extract more from the regime (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001, pp. 188–189). Third, while the state often tolerates and even compromises on contention, this does not imply that the state cannot maintain its formidable coercive power. Actually, the Chinese state still remains determined, and has the power, to crush any serious challenge to its rule (Tong, J., 2002; Wright, 1999). Finally and most importantly, the state rarely views social unrest as an insignificant challenge that can be easily dismissed. Indeed, the state always considers social stability its top priority and has since the 1990s made great efforts to pressure its agents to handle complaints promptly and effectively (Chen, X., 2012, Chap. 4; Gui, X., 2017a; Tian, X., 2012b, Chaps. 4, 6). Therefore, how and why can small-scale complaints, which lack social strength, persist and even succeed in the face of China’s authoritarian regime? What implications does their success carry? These two closely related questions constitute the central theme of this chapter. However, when I returned to my office from the field, I came to realize that existing literature on Chinese complaints cannot properly provide an answer to my puzzle. Briefly, the current studies of contention in China generally follow one or the other two theoretical approaches. The first, a state-centered approach on challengers, explains the dynamics and outcome of contention from the perspective of complainants. Yet, as previously stated, many Chinese complaints lack social strength and do not carry distinct bargaining power, why are some able to take full advantage of opportunities within the state to make their contention persistent and successful while others are not? The other, a state-centered approach on political opportunities, emphasizes the significance of the contradictions and ambiguities within the state hierarchy, ideologies and institutions in shaping contention. While this line of research presents many illuminating insights, it is still not nuanced enough to explain the fate of unyielding Chinese complaints, since almost all complainants are easily able to learn troublemaking techniques, why is it that only some of them are sufficiently determined to exploit the tactics in such a relentless manner?

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An important reason why these two lines of research are insufficient for solving the puzzle is that they both focus on the protesters lodging complaints rather than on the officials handling them. Therefore, this chapter redirects our attention away from complainants and towards officials, and develops a framework for analyzing the handling of Chinese complaints based on six analytical dimensions: state capacity, state legitimacy, state institutions, state structure, state-society links, and state strategies. Based on this framework, the chapter analysis and seeks to account for the fate of Chinese small-scale complaints. It is worth stressing that this chapter distinguishes between the state-centric explanations on challengers and the state-centric explanations on political opportunities only for analytical convenience. Theoretically, the outcome of most complaints involves ongoing give-and-take between societal and state actors. This thus requires “an interactive understanding of outcomes”—asking either-or questions about the impetus behind change does little to enhance our understanding of protest outcomes (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 98). Furthermore, the state-society interactions must be discussed in a dynamic process, since the actual state is shaped by its image and practice. This “state-in-society approach” offers a better, more grounded way to conceive of the state: how it is “constructed and reconstructed, invented and reinvented, through its interaction as a whole and of its parts with others” (Migdal, 2001, p. 23). The remainder of this chapter discusses in greater detail the arguments set out above. First, it reviews the limits of the two kinds of state-centric explanations in explaining the fate of Chinese small-scale complaints. Second, it clarifies the theoretical significance of how complaints are handled. And third, it presents a theoretical framework of complaints handling in order to delve more deeply into the state’s role in shaping Chinese complaints.

2 State-Centric Explanations on Challengers Over the last twenty years, almost all major theories on contentious politics have been applied in some way to explain complaints in China. State-centric explanations on challengers, which illustrate how protesters exploit the new political opportunity structure in a variety of ways, have received the greatest attention. The following subsections review the key areas within these studies relating to social grievance, contention tactics and key factors increasing social strength.

2.1 Social Grievances The grievances of protesters are a necessary factor leading to contention in the first place. Grievance-based explanations are frequently used to illustrate contention in

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transforming societies, since large-scale socioeconomic changes, such as industrialization, marketization, and urbanization, often result in widespread social grievances. If such nationwide grievances cannot be handled properly, they may lead to social disorder and political instability. This is in line with the thinking of both Durkheim and Huntington (Durkheim, 1951; Huntington, 1968). Since contemporary China is undergoing a deep socioeconomic transformation, society is replete with conflicts and contention. Over the last three decades, tax riots (Bernstein & Lü, 2003; O’Brien & Li, 2006), strikes by laid-off workers (Cai, 2002, 2006; Chen, F., 2003; Lee, 2007), NIMBY protests (Jing, 2010; Stern, 2013; Sun & Zhao, 2008; Ying, 2001), and anti-demolition or land seizure resistance (Cai, 2003; Geng, 2013; Yu, J., 2005a) have all been closely related to the grievances of these contesting groups. Some Chinese specialists thus emphasize the significance of social grievance in explaining the dynamics of Chinese protests (Chen & Wu, 2014; Hurst & O’Brien, 2002; Ying, 2011). While social grievances are a necessary condition for the emergence of contention (Zhao, D., 2006), they alone cannot explain the development and the consequences of Chinese complaints for two reasons. First, grievance-based explanations cannot properly explain why different complainants with diverse grievances usually adopt similar strategies in their contention. For example, when petitioning Beijing, complainants with different demands often have taken the same actions, such as wearing shirts emblazoned with the over-sized character “wronged” (yuan 冤), intercepting cars transporting national leaders to deliver petitions, and even setting themselves on fire (Li et al., 2012, p. 322). As existing literature has clarified, a key factor shaping these kinds of actions is the central-local division rather than complainants’ diverse grievances (Cai, 2010; Chen, X., 2012; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Ying, 2001). Second, grievance-based explanations cannot convincingly explain why some complainants can succeed while others fail to do so. It might be true that the gravity of a grievance can influence how determined a complainant could be. For example, residents who suffer serious economic loss through land seizure may be more unyielding than those who suffer less. Even so, such explanations are still incapable of answering the key question as to why some complainants can succeed while others cannot, when the seriousness of their grievances are similar. In order to unravel these puzzles, it is necessary to examine other key factors that impact Chinese complaints.

2.2 Contention Tactics Tactics are very important in revealing the development of contention (McAdam, 1983). Following this theoretical approach, the scholarship in China studies has identified three representative contention tactics. The first is “policy-based” and “boundary-spanning” strategy. “Policy-based resistance” (Li & O’Brien, 1996) or “rightful resistance” (O’Brien, 1996) is “a form of

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popular contention that operates near the boundary of authorized channels, employs the rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power, hinges on locating and exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on mobilizing support from the wider public” (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 2). It “entails the innovative use of laws, policies, and other officially promoted values to defy disloyal political and economic elites” (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 2). “Rightful resistance” is also a kind of “boundary-spanning contention,” which is neither transgressive nor contained, but is a type of “partly-sanctioned, partly institutionalized contention” (O’Brien, 2002, p. 53; Ying, 2007, p. 17). By sophisticatedly exploiting “rightful” and “boundaryspanning” contention, protesters can protect themselves from state repression by citing the state’s own laws, policies, commitments, and ideologies to protest against it, and at the same time exert a pressure on the state though troublemaking rather than obviously law-breaking actions. The second tactic is troublemaking contention, which is a nuanced analysis of “boundary-spanning contention.” While many studies mention this tactic, Xi Chen gives a systematic and in-depth discussion of it by summarizing four kinds of troublemaking acts. The first is “publicity tactics,” including primarily banners/slogans, sit-ins, marches, and handbills. The second is “performing persuasive tactics,” such as kneeling in supplication, self-inflicted suffering, carrying of victims, begging, wearing of costumes, and singing of revolutionary songs. The third is “disruption of social order,” mainly involving blocking traffic and strikes. The fourth is “disruption of government operations,” such as creating a commotion and blocking entrances/cars (Chen, X., 2009). Complainants usually use these troublemaking tactics in an opportunistic way. That is to say, they employ troublemaking acts rather than obviously law-breaking ones to increase their strength, but they also tend to balance defiant activities with actions and statements that show their obedience. In other words, troublemaking tactics strengthen protesters’ bargaining power, and obedience makes their contention less risky and more persistent (Chen, X., 2012, Chaps. 5, 6). The third tactic is “issue-linkage,” which involves protesters exerting multiple pressures on local officials by relating their grievances to other issues which may be of even greater concern to the government (Cai, 2010, p. 70; Ying & Jin, 2000). For example, complainants often connect their individual problems with more serious issues (e.g., social stability and state legitimacy), and in this way seek to push local officials to respond to their demands promptly and adequately (Ying, 2001, pp. 317– 320; Ying & Jin, 2000). They may also threaten to reveal to higher-level authorities any misdeeds of local officials, in order to pressure these local officials into making concessions (Cai, 2010, p. 70). In these ways, the tactic of “issue-linkage” strengthens complainants’ bargaining power and increases their chances of success. Over the last few years, Chinese specialists have also identified some other contention tactics, such as “the tenacious weapons of the weak” (She, 2008), “using the identity of the weak to protest” (Dong, 2008), “using bodies to protest” (Wang, 2010), and “using poems to protest” (Huang, 2012). However, these tactics are mainly offshoots of the three representative contention tactics. Therefore, this chapter will not go into their details.

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The aforementioned tactics greatly enrich our knowledge of how the weak can protest against the powerful by employing low-risk and easily implemented strategies. However, this insight creates a further enigma. Since these tactics can be explored by almost all challengers, why is it that only some of them can succeed?

2.3 Key Factors Increasing Social Strength Compared to the routine contention repertoires that almost all protesters can employ, some key factors, such as group solidarity, communication network, leadership, and resources are relatively difficult for all protesters to access. This can help explain why some protesters in possession of these key factors can sustain and even succeed in their contention while others cannot. The role of key factors increasing social strength has received a great deal of attention in the research of the politics of contention (Gamson, 1990, Chaps. 4, 5; McAdam, 1999, pp. 43–48; Tarrow, 2011, Chap. 6). Inspired by these studies, scholars of China studies also find that extra leverage from officials or journalists (Shi & Cai, 2006), strong social ties (Deng & O’Brien, 2014; Kuang & Goebel, 2013), adaptive leadership (Kuang & Goebel, 2013; Li & O’Brien, 2008), unifying frames (Kuang & Goebel, 2013), and ample finance and time (Deng & O’Brien, 2014) are important factors making protests persistent and successful. However, while these factors can explain why some protesters are able to succeed while others cannot, whether these findings are replicable or not is still questionable, since many Chinese protests, as stated above, tend to be small scale, weakly organized, non-disruptive, and limited in terms of leverage. First, group solidarity is a key factor that increases the bargaining power of protesters. However, as some recent studies reveal, strong social ties which work as the glue holding a diverse contesting group together are more likely to be found in South China. By contrast, such ties in North and Middle China are much looser (Gui & He, 2012, 2013, 2017). Furthermore, in the current political environment, other key factors, such as good leadership and ample financial support, may be rare rather than common assets that only some challenging groups can exploit. For example, contention in poor rural areas in China may be less likely to have ample financial backing. Additionally, protest leaders who keep contention on the right track by using their prestige and knowledge may also be rare due to the high risk of “being a bird that pokes its head out” (qiang da chu tou niao 枪打出头鸟). While Yu Jianrong claims that current China protesters tend to be political and organized (Yu, J., 2004), his findings are also seriously challenged by some other studies which argue that protesters still face a crisis of legitimacy when organizing contention (Ying, 2007), and their contention is at the same time also constrained by the local state’s power of distributing valuable resources, since this power still hold considerable sway over their daily lives (Wu, Y., 2007a).

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In addition, the conditions for successful contention may be less favourable in grassroots China. For example, compared to big cities or developed areas in China, the governance in grassroots China is less formalized and more arbitrary (He, 2013; Wu, Y., 2007b; Yu, J., 2010; Zhao, S., 2010). Moreover, local authorities, especially in poor areas, are more predatory because of heavy financial burden coupled with limited economic resources (Cai, 2003; Hsing, 2010; So, 2007; Zhou, F., 2006, 2007). These factors may largely influence the consequences of contention. Therefore, the key factors increasing social strength may exist randomly in some cases, but in any event they cannot convincingly explain the fate of a large number of Chinese complaints, which normally lacks such factors.

3 State-Centric Explanations on Political Opportunities Actually, even if the aforementioned key factors have been replicated elsewhere in China, they may still not be enough to explain the persistence and the success of contention, because the state plays a more crucial role in shaping contention under authoritarian regimes than in democracies (Zhao, D., 2010), and the response of the government normally outweighs the strength of challengers in determining the outcome of protests in China (Cai, 2010, pp. 2–8). Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li thus propose “an interactive approach to outcomes.” This approach emphasizes that “most consequences of contention are the result of an ongoing give-and-take between forces in society and forces in the state” (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 98). Thus “it is unwise to fix on isolating the independent effects of contention or disentangling the role of societal and state actors” (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 113). To this end, the theoretical significance of this interactive approach is to set aside overly society-focused predilections and redirect our attention away from those contesting social power to their relationships with the state (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 99). In response, current studies have widely examined the roles of bureaucratic divisions and state strategies in shaping Chinese protests.

3.1 Bureaucratic Divisions Within the State Divisions among elites are an important political opportunity structure in the theories of the politics of contention. It has been argued that they exert a significant influence on the fate of contention (McAdam, 1999, Chap. 3; Tarrow, 2011, Chap. 8; Tilly, 1978, Chaps. 3, 4, 6; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 57). Elite divisions have also received a great deal of attention in China studies. Existing scholarship has firstly stressed the significance of the central-local divide in explaining the development and outcome of Chinese protests (Bernstein & Lü, 2003; Cai, 2006, 2008b; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Ying, 2001). However, when delving further

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into the state’s position, it is important to disaggregate it vertically and horizontally (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1054). Some recent research has identified the horizontal bureaucratic divisions that influence contention (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 144–162; Mertha, 2008; Shi & Cai, 2006; Sun & Zhao, 2008). Studies of bureaucratic divisions in both vertical and horizontal dimensions, however, are still insufficiently nuanced to account for the success of Chinese protests. No matter how meticulously scholars disaggregate such divisions, they still cannot convincingly explain why only some protesters are able to create and exploit these divisions while others fail to do so. As stated above, protesters normally use similar contention tactics and at the same time lack key social factors that would increase their strength; logically speaking, they should not have distinct bargaining powers to exploit such divisions within the state. An important reason for this failure is that the explanations of bureaucratic divisions mainly portray the state as a multi-layered, divided power structure. However, the state is actually more complicated than this simplified understanding. First, the theories of bureaucratic divisions note the strength of elite power, but ignore the limits of such power. Specifically, elite power theory assumes that “wealth and power are concentrated in the hands of a few groups, thus depriving most people of any real influence over the major decisions that affect their lives”. Given the huge advantage of elites, the key for challengers to succeed in contention lies in “mobilizing sufficient political leverage” to create and explore the divisions among elites (McAdam, 1999, pp. 36–37). Based on this assumption, when scholars try to explain why some protests succeed but others fail, they often fall back on the factors increasing the social strength of challenging groups, and thus meet the same representative problem mentioned above (Cai, 2010, Chaps. 5, 6). Actually, in addition to the strength of elite power, the limits on such power can also influence protests. For example, many recent studies have noted that the decline in the Chinese state’s capacity to penetrate society undercuts its ability to handle grassroots protests (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 60–62; Lu, 2009; Shen, 2009; Tian, X., 2012b, pp. 82–106; Wu, Y., 2007a). This line of research, however, has not been amply explored. Furthermore, bureaucratic divisions mainly exploit the political openings within the state, but neglect the openings that may also exist at the interfaces between state and society. As Neil Diamant emphasized, it is necessary to explore the state from the bottom up, “in places where state and society actually faced one another (in the physical, not abstract sense)” (Diamant, 2001, p. 473). This approach may provide a nuanced perspective which will help clarify local specifics that are crucial in revealing the fate of Chinese contention. For example, current studies focus on the divisions among the authorities at different levels, with few noting the differentiation among local officials and their allies. How such openings influence Chinese protests warrants more attention in the future. In addition, the contradictions and ambiguities within state ideology and institutions also constitute political openings that protesters can exploit (Chen, X., 2012,

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p. 196). A good example of such openings is the xinfang system,1 which is designed to simultaneously control and facilitate contention. However, this line of research too has not yet been amply pursued. Digging deeper, a crucial reason for perceiving political openings simply as bureaucratic divisions is that most of the current studies still explore the state-society interactions from the perspective of protesters rather than officials. The focus of these studies is on how protesters can create and exploit bureaucratic divisions by strengthening their bargaining power. Accordingly, the state is often simplistically portrayed as a multi-layered, divided power structure. Therefore, it is necessary to take the state rather than challengers as the focus, and examine the state’s position more meticulously from the perspective of how its agents handle protests.

3.2 State Response to Protests State responses to protest are another important factor determining the consequences of contention. When a protest occurs, government leaders usually have three quite obvious options: “they may ignore it; they may employ punitive measures against disruptors; or they may attempt to conciliate them” (Piven & Cloward, 1977, p. 27). Accordingly, state responses to protest can be briefly categorized into three basic modes: tolerance, repression, and concessions. Previously, scholars in China studies tend to emphasize the hard form of repression as the state’s typical response to protests (Bernstein & Lü, 2003; Cai, 2008a; Tong, J., 2002; Wright, 1999). Recently, the soft forms of state responses have received more attention. These include tolerance (Cai, 2010, p. 45), procrastination (Chen, B., 2004, pp. 234–235; Chen, X., 2012, pp. 83–85), persuasion (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 83–85; Lu, 2012), institutional absorption (Gui & Luo, 2021), and concessions (Cai, 2010, pp. 6–7; Chen, X., 2009, 2012, pp. 74–76; Su & He, 2010; Tong & Lei, 2010). However, many of these studies still focus on identifying the factors that make certain state responses possible rather than the details of how such responses are implemented. For example, Yongshun Cai simply defines concessions as citizens’ demands being met, while some or all participants are punished or tolerated (Cai, 2010, p. 5). By contrast, Cai makes great efforts to explain how protesters can secure concessions through sophisticated tactics (e.g., issue linkage) and skillful use of resources (e.g., social networks) (Cai, 2010). However, in reality concession-making may be much more complicated than depicted by Cai. As stated above, local authorities often buy off protesters who use only routine contention tactics and at the same 1 Petitioning, also known as “letters and visits” (xinfang 信访), refers to people bypassing local authorities to reach higher-level authorities in order to report problems and request their solution (Minzner, 2006, p. 110). Petitioning is the primary form of claim making in China, and most contention takes place in this form (Chen, B., 2012; Chen, X., 2005, p. 5). Thus the xinfang system is the most important state institution to be considered when attempting to understand the role of the state in shaping contention in China.

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time lack social strength. In this case, how local officials handle these protests may be the key to whether they succeed or fail. Such a simple understanding of concessions also characterizes Xi Chen’s study, which roughly defines concessions as mentioned above and then turns to the details of how protesters exploit their “troublemaking” tactics to make these concessions possible (Chen, X., 2009). As analyzed above, these studies still take protesters rather than officials as their focus. They thus ignore many interesting details in the process of protest handling that can deepen our knowledge of how and why contention can succeed. By contrast, some recent studies have paid more attention to the details of state strategies in dealing with contention. For example, Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong Zhang identify three mechanisms for managing conflict in an authoritarian environment, which are “protest bargaining,” “legal-bureaucratic absorption,” and “patronclientelism” (Lee & Zhang, 2013). Among them, “protest bargaining” is the key mechanism that in turn embraces five component processes. When a protest breaks out, local authorities first evaluate its seriousness and dispatch the appropriate officials to pacify protesters. Then local officials ask protesters to select representatives with whom they can negotiate individually. If possible, local officials fragment these representatives and seek their cooperation by exploiting their conflicts of interest. After that, local officials make efforts to transform protesters’ imagined legal rights into ones that are realistic and feasible in the circumstances. During the process of rights construction, local officials may resort to the use or the threat of police force, which is the fourth strategy. Based on these moves, local officials at the end try to negotiate what Lee and Zhang term a “non-zero-sum bargain” with protesters (Lee & Zhang, 2013, pp. 1485–1495). In another piece of research, Yanhua Deng and Kevin O’Brien find that local officials frequently employ “relational repression” to demobilize protesters (Deng & O’Brien, 2013). When a protest occurs, local officials investigate protesters’ social ties, recruit individuals who are closely attached to the protesters, form them into a work team, and then dispatch these individuals to conduct “thought work” (sixiang gongzuo 思想工作). These teams are expected to use their personal influence to persuade protesters with whom they have strong ties. Those who fail are subject to punishment (Deng & O’Brien, 2013, pp. 536–541). The effectiveness of “relational repression” depends largely on how much sway local authorities hold over thought workers and the strength of the ties between thought workers and protesters (Deng & O’Brien, 2013, pp. 541–546). Both of the aforementioned studies make significant contributions to our knowledge of protest handling. Lee and Zhang’s work convincingly illustrates how the state depoliticizes social unrest and maintains its authoritarian domination. Deng and O’Brien’s study broadens our knowledge about the soft techniques that the state utilizes to control contention.2 This is highly important, especially when pressures 2

Scholars in the politics of contention have also identified some other kinds of soft techniques that can be used to demobilize protesters, such as surveillance (Cunningham, 2007; Walby & Monaghan, 2011), ridicule and stigma (Ferree, 2004; Linden & Klandermans, 2006), mixed signals (Stern & O’Brien, 2012; Cunningham, 2009), and control parables (Stern & Hassid, 2012).

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are growing to preserve social order without resorting to force. However, while these two works reveal many important details of how the state responds to contention, they do not explain why the state uses these strategies rather than others when confronting contention. The latter is also an important question which can deepen our understanding of protest outcome. Some other studies provide useful insights on this issue. They not only reveal the details of the state responses to protests, but also try to uncover the rationale behind these responses from the angle of the state. Among these studies, Ying Xing identifies three component processes of protest handling. The first, “pulling out nails” (ba dingzi 拔钉子), refers to stopping unyielding activists with overt (e.g., reeducation through labor or sentence) or covert (e.g., the use or the threat of violence) measures. The second, “opening the box” (kai kouzi 开口子), involves cautiously making limited concessions to protesters in order to avoid a ripple effect. The third, “removing the cover” (jie gaizi 揭盖子), refers to selectively disciplining relevant officials in order to warn the others, which is vividly captured in the popular Chinese saying, “Killing a chicken to scare the monkeys” (sha ji gei hou kan 杀鸡给猴看) (Ying, 2001, pp. 91–265, 324–327, 391). In addition, Ying also goes into the factors that explain why the state uses these strategies rather than others when handling protests. In specific, the practice of these strategies is shaped partly by the strength of protesters (e.g., effective contention tactics and good leadership), partly by the operation of the state’s control system, the cadre management system, and the xinfang system, and partly by the decline of the state’s capacity to penetrate the society and the transfer of its central task from revolution to economic development in reform China (Ying, 2001, pp. 317–320, 332–335).3 Ying’s analysis, which embraces the state-society interactions at the micro-level, the institutional practice at the intermediate-level, and the changes in state capacity and state legitimacy at the macro-level, provides important clues to our understanding of the fate of Chinese protests. However, his work is still not sufficiently nuanced and can be improved on in a number of respects. First, Ying’s discussion of the transfer of the state’s central task from revolution to economic development implies the state has based its legitimacy primarily on performance rather than ideology. However, his analysis of the changes in state legitimacy is still superficial. It fails to distinguish the different dimensions of state legitimacy (e.g., ideology, procedure and performance), and thus ignores the contradictions within state legitimacy and the impacts of these contradictions on state responses to protests. Second, the state’s capacity to penetrate society has become even weaker today due to a series of reforms, such as the dismantling of state-owned enterprises in urban areas and the cancellation of taxes in conjunction with the maintenance of long-term stability of existing land contract relations in rural areas. At the same 3

Actually, Xi Chen also takes the similar approach when analyzing the dynamics of contention in China (Chen, X., 2012). However, as this book will show, both Xi and Ying’s analyses can be advanced in some aspects.

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time, the cadre management system and the xinfang system have also been reformed to a certain degree. How these changes shape the state-society interactions in China today deserves an in-depth analysis. Third, Ying’s analysis of state-society interactions at the micro-level is also insufficient. For example, he argues that the state’s suppression inhibits the development of Chinese protests. However, as Wu Yi illustrates, the sociopolitical ties between local authorities and protesters is a preexisting factor that largely influences the outcome of contention (Wu, Y., 2007a, p.22). In recent years, scholars from the Research Center of Rural Governance of China (zhongguo xiangcun zhili yanjiu zhongxin 中国乡村治理研究中心) have further examined the state strategies in response to contention and the factors shaping these strategies. They have found that, with the decline of Maoist ideology and shrinking governing resources, the local government has lost much of its power to manage conflicts. Concomitantly, the central government keeps pushing its local agents to respond to contention without resorting to force through a series of irresistible incentives. Consequently, in many instances local officials feel that they have to buy off protesters. Sometimes, in order to avoid punishment, local officials even make concessions to protesters’ unreasonable demands. This encourages even more protesters to pressure local authorities through repeated complaints, and thus makes handling protest even more difficult (Chen, B., 2011, 2012; Gui, X., 2016, 2017b, 2017c; Lu, 2012; OuYang, 2011; Shen, 2010; Tian, X., 2010, 2012b). An important contribution of these studies is to clarify the dilemma of local authorities in handling protests. This is a necessary precondition for us to understand their responses to protests. However, this line of research can also be enhanced in various ways. First, these studies suggest there is a need for increasing the authority of local officials to control protests, but they ignore the fact that such authority is exactly the reason behind many such officials’ misdeeds. How to deal with this contradiction is an important question that warrants more attention (Li, Q., 1998). Moreover, this line of research also suggests that state ideology should be reconstructed in order to guide unreasonable protesters, but it overlooks the fact that the socialist rule of law has become an important source of state legitimacy. On this point, how one should understand the tension between the new ideology and the Maoist heritage remains an unanswered question.

4 Local Officials’ Handling of Protests Until now, this chapter has reviewed the two state-centric theories on Chinese protests. Among them, the explanations of social grievance, contention tactics, and key factors increasing social strength are the theories focusing on protesters advocating change. While many other studies emphasize the role of bureaucratic divisions and state responses in shaping contention, their focus is still on how protesters can create and exploit such divisions or how they can force the state to make concessions. These studies thus fail to achieve a nuanced understanding of the state’s influence

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on contention. By contrast, some other studies contribute more interesting details of how and why the state responds to protests. However, as illustrated above, these studies can still be developed in some respects. To this end, this chapter redirects our attention away from protesters and towards officials, and develops a theoretical framework of protest handling, a framework that delves more deeply into the state’s role in shaping contention. This section firstly clarifies the contents and the research strategy of protest handling, while the next develops a theoretical framework of protest handling by scrutinizing the state’s position more meticulously from six aspects.

4.1 The Contents of Protest Handling In the 1970s, in his work on state-society interactions from the perspective of state agents’ handling of protests, Charles Tilly identified two theoretical approaches to explain the dynamics of contention: the opportunity/threat to challengers, and the facilitation/repression by authorities (Tilly, 1978, Chaps. 3, 4, 6). Beyond that, large sections of literature began to analyze the repression, control and policing of protests implemented primarily by the police (Davenport, 2000; Davenport et al., 2005; Della Porta, 1999, 2006; Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004; Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; Earl, 2003, 2006, 2011). In China, “handling” (ying dui 应对) is a better description than “repression” (zhen ya 镇压) of how the state actually responds to contention. The Chinese authoritarian regime has been quite adaptive and resilient (Cai, 2008b; Heilmann & Perry, 2011; Nathan, 2003). This allows for more diversity in state responses to protests. As mentioned above, such responses embrace much more than simple repression. “Controlling” (kong zhi 控制) is also not an accurate description of the state responses to protests. As an ambitious authoritarian regime aspiring to provide good governance, the Chinese government not only controls but also facilitates contention. For example, since the 2000s, the state has implemented a series of policies to facilitate petitions. These policies not only pressure local officials to respond to complaints promptly and conscientiously, but also restrict their authority to use force (Chen, X., 2012; Gui, X., 2017a; Tian, X., 2012b). Moreover, in China local cadres rather than the police bear the main responsibility for pacifying protesters and maintaining social stability. One reason for this is that they are the ones most frequently targeted by protesters. In addition, they are told to handle protests according to the principle of “territorial jurisdiction” (shudi guanli 属地管理) (Cai, 2006, Chap. 6, 2008b, p. 416, 2010, p. 4; He, 2011). Although in recent years, police have started to play a more important role in the handling of protest (Lin, H., 2022; Tanner, 2004). However, even in the cases when police get involved, the ultimate decision on how to handle contention, with few exceptions, is made by the government or their top leaders rather than by the police (Cai, 2010, p. 8). Additionally, while local officials’ superiors sometimes get involved in handling protests, their intervention is selective. Small-scale contention lacking social strength

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is not likely to prompt them to act (Cai, 2010, p. 7). Therefore, they too do not constitute the authorities that regularly handle protests. Third, studies of protest handling in China should examine not only collective protests but also individual or household contention. As stated above, Chinese protests are in some ways unique and different from social movements in democracies. Existing literature thus uses the term “collective action” (jiti xingdong 集体行 动) rather than social movements. However, collective action is also insufficient to describe Chinese protests. One reason is that collective action normally assumes a deductive, overly rational understanding of protesters, and thus suffers from a lack of “peasantness” (Brandtstädter, 2006), but Chinese protesters usually have particular targets in mind and follow a logic based on concrete local specifics (Chen, F., 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016; Chen & Yuan, 2010; Gui, H., 2012, 2017, Gui, X., 2017c; Jiao, 2010; Li, Z., 2012; Tian, X., 2012b, 2015; Wang, D., 2011; Wu, Y., 2007a; Ying, 2007, 2011; Yang, H., 2011). Moreover, collective action cannot embrace individual or household contention, but the latter are also an important part of Chinese protests which often persist and even succeed in challenging the state (Gui, X., 2017a, 2017b; Li et al., 2012; Lu, 2009, 2012; Tian, X., 2010). Therefore, it is necessary to take this too into consideration.

4.2 A Strategy for Research on the Handling of Protests Exploring the state’s role in shaping contention of course requires an appropriate research strategy. To this end, this study proposes what Dingxin Zhao terms “macro-structurally informed mechanism-process research,” corresponding to the mechanism-process analysis of contentious politics (Zhao, D., 2010, p. 470). The mechanism-process analysis, widely used in current studies, is well suited to uncovering the play of far more interesting and contingent mechanisms masked by a structural analysis. This analysis can be further enhanced by the inclusion of some indicators that can serve to prepare the researcher for what is to be revealed later. Doug McAdam’s calls these types of indicators intermediate-level “structural propensities,” holding that the real action in protests takes place at some intermediate level between the macro and the micro (McAdam, 2003). However, the mechanism-process analysis also has its limits. In the first place, in addition to intermediate-level “structural propensities” (e.g., bureaucratic differentiations), some macro-level structural factors can influence contention. As mentioned above, state legitimacy and state capacity are both important factors shaping Chinese protests. Therefore, it is not enough to focus only on intermediate-level “structural propensities” when explaining Chinese protests: “The more we know about mechanisms and their various ramifications, the more we see trees instead of the forest” (Zhao, D., 2010, p. 468). Furthermore, and more importantly, intermediate-level structural factors are not the crucial variants that distinguish the features of one state from others. For example, bureaucratic divisions exist in every state, but such divisions may be particular to each state based on its capacity to institutionalize

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contention. Bureaucratic divisions in states based on legal-electoral legitimacy may also differ from those based on performance legitimacy. Therefore, Zhao suggests linking the mechanism-process analysis with the macrostructural factors of authoritarian states. This he calls “macro-structurally informed mechanism-process research” (Zhao, D., 2010, p. 470). Zhao explains that state legitimacy and state capacity are two decisive mechanism-shaping macro-structural factors that not only trigger the working of various kinds of mechanisms and shape the relationships of the mechanisms involved, but also determine the relative importance of the mechanisms involved in explanations of the dynamics of contentious politics in authoritarian states (Zhao, D., 2010, pp. 468–471). Since there exist “countless opportunities to discover new mechanisms and explore the working of the known mechanisms under various conditions,” linking the mechanism-process analysis with macro-structural factors of authoritarian states is thus very important (Zhao, D., 2010, p. 468). However, Zhao does not provide an example of the application of this analytic strategy in the study of contentious politics (Zhao, D., 2010, p. 470). Herein lies the task undertaken by this study.

5 A Theoretical Framework for the Handling of Protests Inspired by Zhao’s approach, this chapter develops a theoretical framework of protest handling that aims to better capture the dynamics of the Chinese authoritarian regime and its significance in shaping protests. As Table 1 shows, this framework contains six dimensions: (1) two macrostructural factors: the changes in state capacity and the tensions among different dimensions of state legitimacy; (2) two intermediate-structural factors: the contradictions in the xinfang system and the divisions among elites; and (3) two micro-structural factors: the state-society links and the state’s responses to protests. Among these factors, the changes in state capacity and the tensions among different dimensions of state legitimacy play the most crucial role. They not only influence the contradictions in the xinfang system and the divisions among elites, but also impact the state-society links and the state’s strategies in response to protests. Below, I sequentially discuss how these factors can be applied in order to explore the dynamics and consequences of Chinese protests.

5.1 Changes in State Capacity The influence of changes in the state’s capacity to deal with contention has been discussed by some researchers. As they point out, China’s socioeconomic transformations since the 1990s have weakened the state’s capacity to penetrate society. Ordinary people thus have more channels than before to access resources. They are

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Table 1 A theoretical framework of protest handling in China Key factors

Components

Changes in state capacity

“Despotic power” of the state

Tensions between different dimensions of state legitimacy

Ideology legitimacy

Contradictions in the xinfang system

Facilitating or controlling complaints

“Infrastructural power” of the state Structural legitimacy Performance legitimacy Supervising or relying on local officials Divisions among elites

Vertical bureaucratic divisions Horizontal bureaucratic divisions Differentiation among individuals involved

State-society linkages

Protesters with strong ties to local authorities

State response to protests

Profile of protagonists: by state or private agents

Protesters with weak ties to local authorities

Degree of force: soft or hard strategies With or without legal basis: covert or overt strategies Source Author’s summary

less dependent on local authorities, and thus less fearful of protesting against them (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 60–65; O’Brien, 1996, p. 42; Ying, 2001, p. 324). However, their analysis of state capacity is not sufficiently nuanced. Michael Mann divides state capacity into two categories: “despotic power,” referring to the “distributive power of state elites over civil society,” and “infrastructural power,” meaning “the institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions” (Mann, 1993, p. 59). According to Mann’s framework, the contemporary Chinese authoritarian regime has a relatively low degree of “infrastructural power”, but this does not mean its “despotic power” is also lower than that in Maoist time. Actually, many studies have found that the state still has a high degree of “despotic power” to distribute value resources in local settings (Chen, F., 2013; Chen, B., 2016; Wu, Y., 2007a). On this point, the current state may simultaneously have a low “infrastructural power” and a high “despotic power.” This is different from Mann’s assumption that an authoritarian regime usually has a high degree of both “infrastructural power” and “despotic power” (Mann, 1993, p. 60). How the limitations and strengths of the current state influence Chinese protests is therefore a significant question that deserves further attention.

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5.2 Tensions Among Different Dimensions of State Legitimacy The impact of state legitimacy on contention in China has also been widely discussed in the literature. A common argument is that the benevolent center cares more about legitimacy than do local authorities. It has thus invested a great deal of effort in fighting against local officials’ misdeeds, and thereby has created political opportunities for protesters (Cai, 2008b, p. 417; O’Brien, 2009, p. 27; Perry, 2008, pp. 46– 47, 2009, pp. 17–20; Ying, 2001, pp. 336–337). However, most of these studies primarily view state legitimacy as a whole. Few explore the tensions among different dimensions of state legitimacy and the impact of such tensions on Chinese protests. Actually, a state almost never bases its rule on a single source of legitimacy. The Chinese authoritarian rule relies on three dimensions of legitimacy: “ideological legitimacy,” “structural legitimacy,” and “performance legitimacy,” respectively justified by a particular value system, state laws, regulations and policies, as well as the sort of good governance that the state aspires to provide (Schubert, 2008, pp. 194–199; Zhao, D., 2000, p. 1607, 2009, p. 418). Specifically, the legitimacy of the Chinese state today is different from its legitimacy in the Maoist era when an articulated, utopian ideology as the first priority (Zhao, D., 2009, p. 422), or from that in democracies, which base themselves mainly on the rule of law and competitive election (Zhao, D., 2010, p. 471). While the state has invested a great deal of effort in improving its socialist rule of law (Schubert, 2008), it still keeps its centralized power structure and refuses to countenance free elections. Thus the state is unable to benefit from the “procedure-based legitimacy” enjoyed by democracies, and hence has to legitimize itself by its performance and its ideology. That explains why the “mass line” (qunzhong luxian 群众路线) ideology still plays a significant role in managing conflicts in China today (Chen, X., 2005, p. 97; Ying, 2004, p. 60). The mass line aims to pursue a special version of socialist democracy through “a vanguard system with meaningful participation of the masses” (Frakt, 1979, p. 690). This ideology not only stresses that the party must meet the people’s demands through facilitating their participation, but also emphasizes that the party must educate some laggards among the masses in order to lead them along the right path (Feng, S., 2012, pp. 30–31). However, the current mass line ideology is “de-politicized” when compared to that in the Maoist era. It still serves to facilitate public participation, but it has lost much of its power to reeducate some protesters by labelling them as laggards, because all individuals must be treated equally before the law. Since there are many tensions among different dimensions of state legitimacy, clarifying how these tensions influence the operations of state instituions, the divisions with the state’s structure, and the practice of state strategies may provide important clues as to the fate of Chinese protests.

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5.3 Contradictions in the Xinfang System As previously stated, most contention in China takes place as petitioning. This makes the xinfang system the most important state institution through which the state manages social unrest. The xinfang system is broader than xinfang bureaus alone. The latter, established at or above the county level of government, are responsible for the work regarding complaints. The entire xinfang system, however, includes not only xinfang bureaus, but also other state agencies and state agents routinely involved in the handling of complaints (Chen, X., 2005, p. 6). The xinfang system is an important part of the mass line politics of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Chen, X., 2005, p. 97; Feng, S., 2012, p. 30; Ying, 2004, p. 60). As mentioned earlier, the mass line ideology represents a special version of socialist democracy combining a vanguard (the party) with meaningful public participation. Accordingly, the xinfang system serves as an important channel through which the party and the state promote democracy, accept supervision, learn about people’s concerns, and keep in contact with the masses.4 However, this ideology also results in two structural contradictions in the xinfang system: it simultaneously facilitates and controls complaints, and it simultaneously supervises local officials through the information flowing from complaints, while relying on the same officials to handle these complaints. Although these two structural contradictions have existed in the xinfang system since it was established in the 1950s, their impact on handling complaints may be different in China today due to the changes in state capacity and state legitimacy. As illustrated above, marketization and de-collectivization have significantly weakened the state’s capacity to penetrate society. Therefore, ordinary people are less dependent on local authorities, and less fearful of protesting against them. At the same time, the development of socialist rule of law has significantly challenged the mass line principle. Consequently, local officials have lost much of their power to “reeducate” individuals by labelling them laggards and mobilizing mass criticism against them. Furthermore, some state apparatus (e.g., the system of reeducation through labor) which served as a formidable tool for social control were abolished, since they were in contradiction with rights discourse. Additionally, the state has also implemented a series of policies to facilitate complaints in order to protect citizens’ lawful rights and interests. All the aforementioned changes may significantly influence the operation of the current xinfang system. For example, while the xinfang system still serves to facilitate complaints, its role in controlling them has been largely weakened because of the decline of the state’s “infrastructural power” and the improvement of socialist rule of law. At the same time, while local officials cannot effectively manage conflicts as they once did, their superiors continue to prod them to act through a series of See 加强信访工作, 关心群众疾苦 (Jiaqiang xinfang gongzuo, guanxin qunzhong jiku, Reinforcing the Xinfang Work and Taking People’s Grievances Seriously, Xinhua News Agency), issued in Xinhua News Agency, available at: http://www.people.com.cn/item/ldhd/zhurongj/1999/shicha/ a1020.html, accessed 25th February 2018. 4

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irresistible incentives. Consequently, the unbearable pressure both from contention and higher-level authorities may force local officials to employ any means possible to stop protesters, or to deceive or bribe their superiors in order to avoid punishment. Both of these options can have a significant impact on the fate of contention. To this end, it is necessary to examine the structural contradictions of the xinfang system, and its impact on handling complaints in China today.

5.4 Divisions Among Elites As mentioned above, divisions among elites provide important opportunities which protesters can exploit to sustain and succeed in their contention. Many studies have considered such divisions as reflecting China’s central-local divide. Actually, horizontal bureaucratic divisions can also influence contention, since territorial levels of government are not unified either: “they have as many divisions and conflicts within them as they have with superiors above and subordinates below” (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1054). Besides, the differentiation among individuals involved in conflict management is another important factor that can shape social protests. However, the last two kinds of elite divisions have not yet been adequately explored in current research. First, the horizontal divisions among local authorities, the judiciary, the police, the media, and some other state organizations deserve more attention. It is true that the state still effectively controls most of the aforementioned agencies. However, the boundary between the state and these agencies is more resilient than before, since the “mixed signals” sent by the state often make its bottom line unclear (Stern & O’Brien, 2012, p. 174). How to understand such ambiguities is thus a key to understanding the divisions between the government and the agencies. On this issue, the changes in state legitimacy provide a useful perspective. First of all, the state has made its performance the top priority. This means that the state has to simultaneously maintain social stability, respond to complaints, and manage the malpractice of its local agents. The media are thus more of an independent voice than before. Actually, the state allows and even encourages many criticisms against government, and uses them as a way to supervise its wayward agents (King et al., 2013). Moreover, in order to provide good governance, the state has initiated a massive legal reform to improve its structural legitimacy. This gives more distinctive identities to the judiciary and the police. Many legal forms and procedures set further restrictions on government intervention. In addition, it is more difficult for local authorities to order local police to arbitrarily use administrative punishment to put an end to contention. Moreover, in order to maintain its rule, the state still retains some socialist values. For example, it promises to serve the people wholeheartedly and takes their welfare as an obligatory responsibility. This official ideology gives some agencies the power to refuse to cooperate with others when they believe the others’ acts are not politically correct.

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Second, the differentiation among individual elites rather than state agencies also provides a more nuanced perspective on the role of elite divisions in protests. In an analysis of the “anthropology of the state”, Migdal identifies four levels of the state organizations. “At the bottom of the state hierarchy, in the political trenches, stand the officials who must do daily battle with other social forces” (Migdal, 2001, pp. 117–118). These local elites provide a close-up view of state-society interactions in places where both sides actually face one anther (Diamant, 2001, p. 473). In the handling of protests in China, such local elites primarily include local party leaders, ordinary officials, grassroots cadres (e.g., street/village cadres) and the allies of these local elites (e.g., informants, thugs, and black guards). In order to explore their roles in handling protests, it is necessary to know the rewards and punishments local elites must be cognizant of when managing conflicts. To clarify this, one also needs to understand the state’s priorities when responding to protests. Specifically, due to its overly emphasized task of maintaining social stability, the state’s criteria for promoting or disciplining its agents are more practical today. Accordingly, an official’s competence in solving difficult conflicts rather than his political integrity is the key to determining his career prospects. At the same time, an official cannot arbitrarily resort to any means to handle a protest, since his or her effectiveness is also restricted by the state’s efforts to pursue performance and structural legitimacy. This means that when settling a conflict, a wise option for local officials is to make protesters feel satisfied, or to stop their contention without resorting to obviously law-breaking measures, or if both fail, to avoid trouble as far as they possibly can. Such practical criteria may significantly influence local elites’ acts when handling protests. Main party leaders may tend to make concessions to complainants if such efforts can temporarily mollify the latter within their period of tenure. Ordinary officials with unpromising career prospects may choose to avoid trouble as far as possible when handling protests. Grassroots cadres may also deal with contention with a negative attitude, partly because they lack career incentives, and partly because they face ethical pressure from protesters with whom they are familiar. The allies of local elites may choose to ignore or even encourage protests, since the latter can be an opportunity to do business. All these divisions should be amply investigated, since they may provide important openings for protesters to sustain their contention and even succeed.

5.5 State-Society Links State-society links are another important factor that influences the dynamics and outcomes of Chinese protests. On this subject there are two representative viewpoints. Some studies claim that China’s socioeconomic transformation since the 1990s has significantly shifted the balance of power and resources between the state and society. Therefore, the state cannot penetrate as deeply as it once did, and ordinary people are less dependent

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on local authorities, and less fearful of protesting against them (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 60–65; O’Brien, 1996, p. 42; Ying, 2001, p. 324). Another view argues that local authorities still control the distribution of most of society’s valuable resources and thus can have a significant impact on people’s daily lives. Accordingly, individuals in grassroots China today still live in a patron-client network, as was previously the case.5 Such a network largely restricts their contention (Wu, Y., 2007a). However, in view of the distinction between “despotic power” and “infrastructural power,” both analyses are partial and incomplete. The first ignores the strength of “despotic power” and the constraints it imposes on the protests of people with whom officials interact. The second argument overlooks the state’s weak “infrastructural power” and the incapacity of local authorities to control the protests of people with whom they have little interaction. On this point, when exploring the role of the state-society links in contention in China today, it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of protesters according to the strength of their social ties with local authorities. Doing so can help us to clarify the fate of different protesters.

5.6 State Strategies in Response to Protests State strategies in response to protests are also an important factor shaping Chinese contention. As previously mentioned, scholars have paid a great deal of attention to the issue. However, many studies explore the factors that make certain state strategies possible, rather than the details behind the implementation of these strategies. As for research that does investigate the details of state strategies, most only focus on one or, at most a few strategies. Few of them systematically analyze all the possible strategies in the whole process of protest handling, nor do they demonstrate how these strategies are implemented or what factors cause them to succeed or fail. Additionally, most research concentrates on the role of state agents in shaping contention, even though our knowledge of the impact of private agents (e.g., informants, thugs and black guards) on the process is still limited. In order to better understand the state’s strategies in response to Chinese protests, this chapter presents a typology based on three key dimensions: whether tactics are, based on the degree of force, soft or hard; whether or not tactics are banned by state law, regulations, or policy, and hence are covert or overt; and, based on the profile of the protagonist, whether tactics are implemented by state agents or private agents. By combining these dimensions, this typology basically embraces all the possible state strategies in response to Chinese protests.6

5

For the discussions about the patron-client relation between local authorities and local people in Maoist era in urban and rural China, see (Oi, 1985, 1991; Walder, 1986). 6 This typology has been inspired by Jennifer Earl’s typology of repression. For more details, see (Earl, 2003, pp. 48–49).

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Table 2 The local strategies for handling of protests in China Soft

Hard

Overt

Covert

Overt

Covert

State agents

Procrastination Persuasion Petition relief

Surveillance Secret concessions

Detention Sentence

Blackmail by using complainants’ weaknesses “Stabilizing” complainants somewhere

Private agents

Persuasion

Surveillance

Negotiations according to law

Use or the threat of violence

Source Author’s summary

As shown in Table 2, this typology provides eight kinds of state strategies in four categories: (1) soft, overt strategies; (2) soft, covert strategies; (3) hard, overt strategies and (4) hard, covert strategies, respectively implemented by state agents or private agents. For example, persuasion is an overt tactic which does not contravene state laws. Tailing a protester, on the other hand, is a covert tactic that does. Both of them are soft tactics lacking the force to stop contention and can be used by state or private agents. By contrast, sentencing a protester is a hard, overt tactic that can halt contention but can only be used by state agents. The use or the threat of violence, such as beating or blackmailing a protester, are both hard tactics implemented by state or private agents, but they are covert and against state laws. The typology can thus assist us to identify all the possible strategies in the process of protest handling. Yet, in order to better understand the fate of Chinese protests, we also need to know the effectiveness of these strategies and the risks involved in using them. To this end, it is also necessary to combine the analysis of the typology with the changes in the state’s capacity and legitimacy. For example, persuasion might have halted most protesters in Maoist time when the state’s “infrastructural power” and “despotic power” were both high. By contrast, this tactic may now only work for protesters with strong ties to local authorities, since the state today has high “despotic power” but low “infrastructural power.” It might also have been easier to use a criminal sentence to stop contention in Maoist time, but using this tactic is becoming more difficult today due to massive legal reforms. Additionally, local officials might have frequently beaten protesters in order to deter their contention in the Maoist era, but this tactic is becoming riskier now, partly because of the government’s effort to forbid such law-breaking acts, and partly because of the increased freedom of the press. Based on this in-depth analysis of the strategies outlined, we can better understand the factors that affect the fate of protests in China.

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6 Conclusion The huge socioeconomic changes entailed in China’s simultaneous market reforms and urbanization have unavoidably resulted in social grievances and popular contention (Cai, 2008b, p. 429; Feng, S., 2015). The study of Chinese protests thus becomes a “rapid-growth industry” (Perry, 2008, p. 37). However, as discussed above, few of these studies can convincingly explain the fate of many Chinese protests which are usually small scale, weakly organized, nondisruptive and limited in terms of leverage. In order to unravel this puzzle, the study develops a theoretical framework of protest handling based on the review of the current studies on the subject of Chinese protests. In brief, many studies primarily explain the fate of contention from the side of challengers. Their analyses of social grievance, contention tactics, and key factors increasing social strength have made a significant contribution to our knowledge of Chinese protests. However, these explanations cannot properly explain the fate of many Chinese protests which normally lack the social strength to make their contention successful. By contrast, some other explanations look to answer the same question by clarifying the roles of bureaucratic divisions and state responses in shaping Chinese protests. While these studies present many illuminating insights, they are still not nuanced enough to explain the fate of small-scale Chinese protests. Digging deeper, an important reason why these two lines of research are insufficient to resolve the puzzle outlined above is because they both still primarily focus on the protesters lodging protests rather than the officials handling them. Therefore, this study redirects our attention away from protesters and towards officials, and develops a framework for analyzing the handling of Chinese protests based on six analytical dimensions, viz. state capacity, state legitimacy, state institutions, state structure, state-society links, and state strategies. Specifically, there is a need to delve more deeply into the state’s role in shaping contention based around mechanism-process research from a macro structural standpoint. This means that when exploring the role of the state in shaping contention, it is necessary to scrutinize the state at its macro, intermediate and micro levels. State legitimacy and state capacity are two decisive mechanism-shaping structural factors that determine the nature of state structure and state institutions, as well as the practice of state strategies and the dynamics of interaction between state and society. The work of examining the state’s position more meticulously can take us “beyond informative but incomplete understanding of the Chinese state” (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1054), and shed further light on the dynamics and outcomes of protests in China.

Chapter 4

Selective Implementation in the Offline Xinfang System

This chapter illustrates how and why offline complaints are mishandled. Complaining, also known as “letters and visits” (xinfang 信访), is the primary form of claim making in China, and most contentious activities take place in this form. This makes “the xinfang system” (xinfang tixi 信访体系) the most important state institution to be considered when attempting to understand the role of the state in shaping contention in China. The operation of the system constrains the overall interactions between officials and protesters and is thus the key to understanding the dynamics and outcomes of small-scale protests in China today. However, while existing studies have widely explored instances of policy mis-implementation in Chinese bureaucracy, few of them specifically discuss examples within the xinfang system. In brief, the mishandling of complaints can in the first instance be attributed to the structural contradictions within the xinfang system. One is to simultaneously facilitate and control complaints. The other is to supervise local officials through the information flowing from complaints, while at the same time relying on the same officials to handle these complaints. While these contradictions have existed in the xinfang system since the point of inception, they have been exacerbated in recent years, partly because of the changes to the balance of power and resources between state and society, partly because of the contradictory official ideology and its correspondingly institutional arrangements, and partly because of the irresistible incentives offered by higher-level authorities to their subordinates.

1 Selective Policy Implementation in the Xinfang System Xinfang is known broadly as an effort of “appealing to those at the top to clear up problems left unresolved by local authorities” (Li et al., 2012, p. 315). This practice has a long history in China (Fang, 2009; Ying, 2001; Wang & Chen, 1987), and it remains a popular channel for Chinese citizens to redress injustice (Cai, 2004; © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0_4

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Lorentzen, 2013; Tian, B., 2010). When discussing the xinfang system, the State Bureau of Letters and Visits (SBLV) is the most important state agency that needs to be known in the first place. The SBLV accepts appeals and complaints filed by people all over China against local authorities. Commonly, grievances involve mainly irregularities in village elections, corruption and asset-stripping in ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, land seizure, housing demolition and environment pollution. Given local authorities were either responsible for many of these problems or were unwilling to address them, more and more aggrieved individuals have little choice but to bring their complaints to Beijing. Such activity is called “petitioning Beijing” (jinjing shangfang 进京上访) (Li et al., 2012). Petitioning Beijing has brought huge pressure to the “centre” (zhongyang 中央) in recent years. In response, the SBLV began in 2005 to issue monthly circulars ranking all provinces by the number of “abnormal petitions”1 (feizhenchang shangfang 非正常上访) against them, and used the number filed as a measurement in a provincial leader’s performance evaluation during his period of tenure. Correspondingly, every province also ranked prefectures based on the number of registered petitions in Beijing. Through this “petition ranking system” (xinfang paiming zhidu 信访排名制度), pressure was transmitted from Beijing all the way down to local cadres (Cai, 2004, p. 438; Li et al., 2012, p. 324).2 “Registration cancellation” thus becomes the last resort of local authorities when they fail to stop petitioners from appealing to Beijing. This means bribing staff members at the SBLV in order to delete registered complaints from their computers before such registrations generate permanent records (Li et al., 2012, p. 331; Tian, X., 2012a).3 Theoretically, “registration cancellation” is a kind of unfaithful policy implementation. As previously stated, the “petition ranking system” is designed to pressure local officials to handle petitions promptly and adequately. However, to minimize adverse career impacts, local officials adaptively use this system to bribe staff members at the SBLV in order to cover the real registered number of people petitioning Beijing. Unfaithful policy implementation is a widespread phenomenon in Chinese bureaucracy, vividly captured in a popular Chinese saying, “From above there are imposed 1

“Abnormal petitioning” in Beijing means petitioning Beijing with disruptive activities or in nonreception areas, such as Tiananmen Square, Zhongnanhai and foreign embassies. 2 The SBLV stopped openly ranking provinces by the number of petition cases against them from the end of 2013. This action was considered a great relief by local officials. However, while the SBLV cancelled the “petition ranking system,” it still notifies each province of the registered number of petition cases. The provinces in turn then notify each city of the registered number of cases that occurred within its jurisdiction. Meanwhile, local main party leaders will not be criticized by name in government circulars, but will be ordered to report the situation on their xinfang work if the numbers of petition cases in their jurisdiction are too high. Through this “point-to-point bulletin” (dian dui dian tongbao 点对点通报), pressure is still transmitted from Beijing all the way down to local authorities. 3 Also see 宪政改革与中国政治发展 (Xianzheng gaige yu zhongguo zhengzhi fazhan, The Constitutional Reform and Political Development of Contemporary China), written by 于建嵘, 李连江 (Yu Jianrong, Li Lianjiang), available at: http://www.aisixiang.com/data/16564-16564.html, accessed on 16th, July, 2014.

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policies, and from below there are evading strategies” (shang you zhengce, xia you duice 上有政策, 下有对策) (Zhou, X., 2010, p. 48). This phenomenon has received a great deal of attention in existing literature. One line of research argues that higherlevel authorities have difficulty coordinating their subordinates’ behaviors (Bernstein & Lü, 2000; Wang, S., 1995). They thus lack capacity to ensure faithful implementation of their popular policies (O’Brien & Li, 1999). Another viewpoint claims that the failure of some policies lies in the centre’s priorities rather than its inadequate control over the bureaucracy (Edin, 2003). Some other studies state that inappropriate performance measures in the cadre responsibility systems (Whiting, 2004) or the conflicts between the cadre responsibility systems and legal norms (Minzner, 2009) are the reasons behind unfaithful policy implementation. Zhou Xueguang, by contrast, understands unfaithful policy implementation as informal but highly institutionalized practices related to the centralized, highcapacity regime and its high-powered incentives. Such practices could be “corrective” adaptive implementation or “countervailing” goal displacement. Zhou’s study encourages more attention to the institutional environment of the Chinese bureaucracy and the unbearable stress of local officials in such an environment, rather than their quality or ability (Zhou, X., 2010). However, the aforementioned studies generally analyze unfaithful policy implementation in the Chinese bureaucracy, with few of them specifically discussing this type of phenomenon in the process of handling complaints. Clarification of the issue is theoretically significant for two reasons. First, many complaints in China are small scale, weakly organized, non-disruptive and limited in terms of leverage (O’Brien, 2002, 2009; Ying, 2007). It seems difficult for such complaints alone to seriously challenge a powerful authoritarian regime. An understanding of the irresistible incentives of local officials in handling these complaints may thus provide important clues regarding their fate. Second, the state has implemented a series of new policies in recent years to pressure local cadres to deal with complaints, but their impacts have not yet been systematically and amply discussed. Based on semi-structured interviews, on-site observation, and archival materials collected in the Y District in Henan from early July in 2011 to late July in 2012, and several subsequent telephone interviews with key interviewees conducted in 2013, this chapter demonstrates that the mishandling of complaints can in the first instance be attributed to the two structural contradictions within the xinfang system. One is to simultaneously facilitate and control complaints. The other is to supervise local officials through the information flowing from complaints, while at the same time relying on the same officials to handle these complaints. While these contradictions have existed in the xinfang system since the point of inception, they have been exacerbated in recent years. Reasons include the decline of the state’s capacity to penetrate society, the contradictory official ideology and its correspondingly institutional arrangements, and the irresistible incentives offered by higher-level authorities to their subordinates. As a result, local officials are forced to use all means possible in order to halt unyielding complainants, or alternatively may have to cheat or bribe their superiors in order to avoid punishment. Either way, their mishandling of complaints undermines the xinfang system itself.

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The remainder of the chapter discusses in greater detail the reasons behind the mishandling of complaints and the implications of this phenomenon.

2 Structural Contradictions in the Xinfang System “Petitioning the emperor” (gao yuzhuang 告御状) to redress injustice is a deepseated tradition in imperial China (Fang, 2009; Hu, 2000; Ocko, 1988). It remains the primary form of lodging claims in China today, and most contentious actions take place in this form (Chen, X., 2005; Chen, B., 2012, pp. 5, 146; Wang, K., 2013; Zhao, X., 2005; Zhou, B., 2006). Xinfang bureaus established at or above the county level of government are responsible for the work regarding letters and visits. However, the xinfang system discussed in this chapter is a broader concept which includes not only xinfang bureaus, but also other state agencies and state agents routinely involved in handling complaints (Chen, X., 2005, p. 104). The current xinfang system has inherited and built on the tradition of appealing to those at the top to clear up problems left unresolved by local authorities (Li et al., 2012, p. 315; Wu, C., 2012a, 2012b, 2015). Despite the similarity, however, current state-society interaction in the xinfang system has been expressed through a totally different discourse. Petitioning is claimed as a “democratic” right (Lin, Z., 2009; Lin, H., 2011; Tong, Z., 2011). Accordingly, handling petitions by authorities is propagated as an effort to establish a close communication between the party and the masses (Chen, X., 2005, p. 58; Fan, 2014; Feng, S., 2016; Gui & Luo, 2021; Xiao, 2014). In existing scholarship, the xinfang system established by the Communist Party of China (CPC) has two main functions: For the people, the system helps address their specific problems or violation of their rights in the absence of an effective legal system. For the government, it serves as a channel of information flow through which authorities at higher level can obtain comprehensive and timely information on the social situation and about local officials, and thus create uncertainties for these officials if they ignore or fail to protect the interests of the people (Cai, 2004, pp. 435– 440; also see Minzner, 2006; O’Brien, 2002; O’Brien & Li, 1999; Ying, 2004; Yu, J., 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, Zhang & Li, 2012). However, the functions of the xinfang system are more complicated and contradictory than previously stated. To clarify this, it is necessary to know “the mass line” (qunzhong luxian 群众路线) of the CPC. Regarding the mass line, Mao Zedong has given an elaborate description: In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily from the masses, to the masses. This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study, form them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again take them to the masses so that the ideas are persevered with and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas

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becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time. (Mao Zedong, quoted by Frakt, 1979, p. 691)

In short, Mao’s mass line policy embraces three elements: the first is to elicit raw data from the masses about their own needs; the second is to guard against bureaucratic and elitist behaviour by exposing leaders to the masses; the third is to educate the masses so that someday they will need no leadership (Frakt, 1979, p. 696). Therefore, Mao’s mass line represents a special version of socialist democracy, which combines “a vanguard system with meaningful participation of the masses” (Frakt, 1979, p. 690). The current xinfang system is an important part of the mass line politics of the CPC (Chen, X., 2005, p. 97; Feng, S., 2012, p. 30; Wang, X., 2008; Ying, 2004, p. 60). Accordingly, the mass line ideology exerts a significant influence on xinfang work. The xinfang system thus has two structural contradictions. First, the system is designed to simultaneously facilitate and control petitions. According to the mass line ideology, “ideas” must always come from the people the leaders are to serve, even though they “systematize” and “propagate” the ideas. Accordingly, the leaders must develop the proper attitude to communicate with the people, in order to maintain correct leadership (Frakt, 1979, pp. 691, 693). Mao thus emphasized the need to “handle letters and visits from the people seriously, and meet the people’s demands” (Mao Zedong, quoted by Feng, 2012, p. 30). However, Mao also pointed out that the mass line cannot be properly implemented if leaders rely too much on popular demands, and are excessively responsive to the people. Mao therefore rejected such extreme democracy for current China and stressed the importance of party leadership (Frakt, 1979, p. 695). As Liu Shaoqi further explained, there always exist “advanced elements” (jiji fenzi 积极分 子), “intermediate elements” (zhongjian fenzi 中间分子), and “backward elements” (luohou fenzi 落后分子) in the people. To a certain degree there are contradictions on some issues between the party and the people. Given that the vast majority of the people are ‘intermediate and backward elements’, the mass work has to listen to their demands, even the unreasonable ones. Otherwise, the party will be divorced from the masses. Having said that, the party, as the vanguard, cannot “simply accommodate the people’s wrong opinions.” It should “take responsibility to lead the masses in a right and promising way.” Otherwise, the party will be also divorced from the masses (Liu Shaoqi, quoted by Feng, 2012, pp. 30–31). This feature of the mass line determines the first structural contradiction of the xinfang system, which is to facilitate and address peoples’ complaints, while at the same time controlling and even reeducating some petitioners if necessary. Second, the xinfang system has to simultaneously supervise local cadres through the information disclosed by complaints while having to rely normally on the same officials to handle these complaints. As Mao stated, the party “should be supervised by the people and must never go against their will. Its members should be among and with them and must not set themselves above them” (Mao Zedong, quoted by Frakt, 1979, p. 693). Mao thus stressed that we “should take this issue (i.e., handling complaints) as a means to strengthen the interaction between the party and the people,

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and cannot treat it lightly and ignorantly with a bureaucratic attitude” (Mao Zedong, quoted by Diao, 1996, p. 32). In this way, the xinfang system places constraints on any local official who would ignore or violate the interests of the people. While the xinfang system enables the people to expose the misdeeds of local cadres to higher-level authorities, it has to depend, in most cases, upon these cadres to clean up their own misbehaviors. Specifically, higher-level officials normally transfer most complaints to lower-level governments, demanding that they deal with these problems and report the results (Cai, 2004, p. 437; Chen, X., 2005, p.116). However, most complaints are themselves caused by the malpractice of local authorities (Cai, 2010, p. 4; O’Brien & Li, 1999). Local authorities, in turn, become the judges of their own cases.4 In Chinese bureaucratic system, petitioners can pressure higher-level authorities to discipline malfeasant local officials, but they have no rights to remove them from office. The key to make the xinfang system work as designed is a question of how the two “slices” can hold the “middle” (O’Brien & Li, 1999, p. 180). Such sandwich-like interactions among higher-level authorities, lower-level authorities and the people thus define the second structural contradiction of the xinfang system, that is to monitor local cadres through information flow, and meanwhile to depend upon them to deal with their own misdeeds. The two structural contradictions largely determine the institutional environment of the xinfang system. With a series of policies implemented by the center in recent years, the impacts of such contradictions on handling complaints have been exacerbated.

3 Unbalanced Xinfang System Facilitating Complaints Before the mid-1990s, the xinfang system worked as designed. Petitioners had channels to voice their complaints, but the forms and effects of their participation were tightly controlled (Cai, 2004). Since then, however, this system has gradually got out of the state’s control. 1993–2004 saw twelve years of continuous growth in the number of complaints lodged in China (Yu, J., 2005b, p. 71). While the total number started to go down from 2005, the situation of petitioning did not get better. In 2103, the number of “abnormal petitioning of Beijing” cases reportedly reached its highest point in seven years.5

Also see 宪政改革与中国政治发展 (Xianzheng gaige yu zhongguo zhengzhi fazhan, The Constitutional Reform and Political Development of Contemporary China), written by 于建嵘, 李连江 (Yu Jianrong, Li Lianjiang), available at: http://www.aisixiang.com/data/16564-16564.html, accessed on 16th, July, 2014. 5 信访改革“坚冰”撬动, “非正常进京访”不再通报排名 (Xinfang gaige jianbing qiaodong, feizhengchang jinjingfang buzai tongbao paiming, Canceling Ranking Provinces by the Number of Petition Cases against them: A Significant Breakthrough of the Xinfang System Reform), available at: http://www.infzm.com/content/96624, accessed on 7th April 2014. 4

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When I asked local officials in the Y District about this phenomenon, a senior township cadre succinctly summarized his feeling, “We are less authoritative than we used to be. Complaints are thus not afraid of us anymore” (Int. 5). To dig deep, some officials emphasize mainly the material aspect of authority. As a village head explained, We cannot re-adjust the use of collective lands, since these lands had been contracted to individual peasants and the state promised them long-term stability of their existing land rights. Nor can we collect rural taxes from peasants, because the state has cancelled them. We have therefore lost some resources and power when dealing with complaints. (Int. 7)

As another village cadre added, “It is not to say that we simply use these ‘bargaining counters’ (chouma 筹码) to bully petitioners into giving up their demands or to deny our faults. Sometimes, their demands are absolutely ridiculous. If they know they still have to ask us for something in future, they will balance their immediate and long-term benefits. Then it is easier for us to reach an agreement” (Int. 3). What these cadres mentioned is a widespread phenomenon in grassroots China today. Marketization and de-collectivization have significantly shifted the balance of power and resources between the state and society. As a result, local authorities cannot penetrate as deeply as they once did. By contrast, ordinary people have more channels than before to access resources. They are less fearful and less dependent on these authorities (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 60–62; O’Brien, 1996, p. 42). Other officials, however, primarily stressed the ideological aspect of authority. These officials admitted that they are less powerful in handling petitions because they lack resources that can exert a significant influence on people’s life, but they also highlighted the fact that current official ideology is contradictory, largely constraining their work but facilitating popular appeals. As a township cadre complained, “It is difficult to do mass work now. When you ‘stress politics’ (jiang zhengzhi 讲政治), they start to ‘emphasize law’ (jiang falv 讲法律). When you adhere to law, they begin to talk politics” (Int. 6). Stressing politics used to be an effective way to stop petitioners from lodging complaints in Maoist times. As previously stated, xinfang work is an important part of the mass line politics of the CPC, which advocates a socialist democracy with party leadership and public participation under centralized guidance. The party is assumed to truly represent the interests of the people and serve the people wholeheartedly. By contrast, some people are laggards who are prone to paying attention to immediate, partial and personal interests rather than long-range, national and collective interests. The party, as the vanguard, must constantly provide lively and effective political education among the people during the period of socialist construction. Such ideology thus “legitimizes” a cadre’s act of reeducating and even controlling petitioners when necessary (Chen, B., 2011, pp. 235–238). Some officials admitted that they often cited Maoist sayings in dealing with complaints before the 1980s, such as “It is ‘politically incorrect’” (zhengzhi bu zhengque 政治不正确), “We are guidling you onto the correct path”, or “You should change your thoughts, otherwise you are not a ‘socialist new people’(shehui zhuyi xinren 社会主义新人)”. (Int. 1, 3, 6, 8)

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If complainants refuse such thought work, they may face forceful measures. As Mao stated, There are… a small number of people…They may take advantage of our policies and distort them, deliberately put forward unreasonable demands in order to stir up the masses, or deliberately spread rumours to create trouble and disrupt social order. We do not propose to let these people have their way. On the contrary, proper legal action must be taken against them. (Mao Zedong, quoted by Schram, 1969, p. 312)

As my interviewees confirmed, few people had tried to confront this ideology, which had stong legitimacy before the 1980s (Int. 1, 2, 3, 5, 9). Compared to the domination of Maoist ideology, current official ideology includes two contradictory parts. First, the socialist rule of law has become a new kind of official ideology. Accordingly, state agents are required to comply with the law, and Chinese citizens are granted more rights (Lubman, 2000, pp. 384–389; Peerenboom, 2002, p. 10; Schubert, 2008, pp. 196–198). Furthermore, the mass line ideology still plays a significant role in xinfang work. This ideology still serves to facilitate lowbinding petitions, but it can no longer be used to control and reeducate petitioners, since all petitioners must be treated equally before the law and none may be labelled as laggards. This mixed, contradictory ideology significantly influences xinfang work, and thus provides openings for petitioners to exploit. On the one hand, the state abolished some institutions which worked as formidable instruments for controlling petitions. “The custody and repatriation regulations” (shourong qiansong 收容遣送制度) was one such state institution. It was an administrative system by which the police in Chinese cities could normally detain people if they did not have a “resident permit” (hukou 户口) or “temporary living permit” (zanzhu zheng 暂住证), and return them to the place where they could legally live or work. This system was designed to control and expel some kinds of individuals, including vagrants, beggars, and petitioners. It served effectively as a formidable tool for control of population flows until it was abolished in 2003 (Chen, X., 2005, pp. 150–151). As many scholars have argued, this system violated the “Administrative Punishment Law of the People’s Republic of China” (zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng chufa fa 中华人民共和国行政处罚法), because the law states that administrative punishments restricting personal freedom may only be authorized by laws passed by the full Congress, while “the custody and repatriation regulations” had been adopted by the State Council of the PRC.6 “The system of reeducation through labor” (laojiao zidu 劳教制度) is another now abolished coercive instrument designed to control and reeducate petitioners. It was a system of administrative detention generally used to detain persons for minor crimes such as petty theft, prostitution, and petitioning. Sentences under reeducation through labor were typically for one to three years, with the possibility of an additional one-year extension. They were issued as a form of administrative punishment by See 孙志刚事件 (Sun Zhigang shijian, Sun Zhigang Incident), available at: http://baike.baidu. com/view/5799464.htm, accessed on 24th April 2014. 6

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police, rather than through the judicial system.7 Many complaints in the Y District complained to me that they had suffered this punishment or were threatened with the use of it by local officials (Int. 4, 9, 10). This system was abolished by the state in 2013, since it contradicts several items in the Constitution, the Criminal Procedure Law, and the Legislation Law.8 Additionally, some other state apparatus serving to control complainants, such as the unit system, the railway system, and the food rationing system, were also abolished by the state for similar reasons.9 On the other hand, the state has implemented a series of policies in recent years in order to enhance the mass work and protect lawful rights and interests of petitioners. The first is the opening of more channels to facilitate petitions, which include livelihood hotline, online petitioning, receiving visitors through video, and the green (i.e., simplified, safe and fast) channels for letters.10 In addition, higher-level authorities dispatch supervisory groups on either a regular or a random basis to oversee the xinfang work of lower-level authorities. Normally these groups are required to solve a certain amount of difficult xinfang cases, which brings opportunities for petitioners to seek justice (Int. 5, 11; Doc. 1). In my fieldwork, at least two petitioners had their problems resolved after talking with supervisory groups (Int. 4, 14). The second is to improve transparency and public participation in the policymaking process. A hearing must be openly held for difficult xinfang cases, in order to ascertain the facts and clearly distinguish the responsibilities through inquiry, debate, appraisal or judgment by a collegiate group.11 Furthermore, local authorities are ordered to have an assessment of the risk to social stability before any major public decisions are taken.12 They are required to take suggestions from civil organizations, professionals and the public, and to accept their supervision.13 While these policies are still general and vague and are sometimes misused by local authorities, 7

See Re-education through labor, available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Re-education_thr ough_labor, accessed on 24th April 2014. 8 Ibid. 9 For the role of these systems in controlling petitions, see (Chen, X., 2005, pp. 149–152; Ying, 2001, pp. 396–397). 10 Up until the end of 2013, 29 provinces, 275 cities, and 1831 counties had established the platforms of online petitioning. Among them, 19 provinces have achieved the intercommunication among the platforms at the provincial, prefectural and county levels. See 网上信访系统建设时间表出炉 (Wangshang xinfang xitong jianshe shijianbiao chulu, The Timetable of Building Online Petitioning System), available at: https://world.hebnews.cn/2014-04/12/content_3878766.htm, accessed on 3rd May 2022. 11 See 信访条例 (Xinfang tiaoli, Regulations on Letters and Visits) issued in 2005, available at: https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%BF%A1%E8%AE%BF%E6%9D%A1%E4%BE%8B/798 9150, accessed on 3rd May 2022. 12 See 关于创新群众工作方法解决信访突出问题的意见 (Guanyu chuangxin qunzhong gongzuo fangfa jiejue xinfang tuchu wenti de yijian, Opinions on Innovating the Methods of the Mass Work and Solving Prominent Xinfang Issues) issued in 2014, available at: http://baike.baidu.com/view/ 12240701.htm, accessed on 3rd May 2014. 13 See 关于进一步加强新时期信访工作的意见 (Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang xinshiqi xinfang gongzuo de yijian, Opinions on Further Strengthening the Work of Handling Letters and Visits) issued in 2007, available at: http://baike.baidu.com/view/2976310.htm, accessed on 3rd May 2014.

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they at least give ordinary people more opportunities to complain about undesirable decisions. For example, one petitioner refused to accept the decision at her hearing because her lawyer was not allowed to participate. She later used this as an excuse to initiate petitioning (Int. 4). In another case, a group of residents collectively appealed to the provincial capital because the Y Government had tried to build a waste processing plant without first hearing their points of view (Int. 5, 8, 16). The third is to strengthen leaders’ serious involvement in handling petitions. One way of doing so is to implement “the system of jointly receiving visitors by party leaders” (lingdao da jiefang zhidu 领导大接访制度). In the Y District, the government arranges for 31 leaders, including the district party secretary, the district head and main leaders of other different departments to receive petitioners in the xinfang bureau. Each of them is asked to do this one day per month (Doc. 2).14 Their names, positions, and times of receiving petitioners are notified in advance on a board in the xinfang bureau in order to facilitate petitioners’ visits (Int. 4, 9, 11). In addition to receiving petitioners personally, main county leaders are also ordered to once a month visit a petitioner in his living place, as well as hold a conference for solving a difficult xinfang case and check up on the xinfang work in his jurisdiction (Doc. 2). In practice, these leaders often avoided their duties, citing different excuses. However, they do run the risk of being disciplined as a result of random checks from above. For example, a vice district head was found by a provincial supervisory group not to be attending to his duty on such a reception day and was later criticized by name in a provincial monthly report (Int. 17). In another case, a vice township head was barred from promotion within the next year for the same reason (Int. 11). Finally, and most importantly, the state still views xinfang work as an important part of the mass line politics and encourages low-binding participation. Compared to a lawsuit, complaint is cheap and possibly quicker. It does not have strict requirements regarding evidence or limits on jurisdiction, and it is possible for any issues to be addressed. Therefore, many individuals who are incapable or unwilling to pay legal fees, who cannot stand long judicial procedures or who have insufficient evidence for their lawsuits, choose petitioning as a more advantageous option (Chen, X., 2005, pp. 145–146; Ying, 2004, pp. 66–68). In the Y District, a woman initiated a petition in 2005 because a push from a village cadre in the 1970s resulted in the abortion of her pregnancy. She was seeking 6 million Yuan compensation for her unborn child (Int. 13). However, there was no evidence to support her claim and besides, her case was out of prescribed period of litigation (Int. 12). In another case, a woman complained that her son had occupied her house and kicked her out. When the government helped to get her house back, she asked the government to send her son to prison, claiming that otherwise she still did not dare live there (Int. 11, 14). In practice, local officials 14

Party leaders at different levels are told to fulfill this duty differently. Provincial leaders must allocate 1 day in every half year to receive visitors. Correspondingly, leaders at prefectural, county and township-levels must allocate 1 day of every quarter, every month, and every week. See 关 于创新群众工作方法解决信访突出问题的意见 (Guanyu chuangxin qunzhong gongzuo fangfa jiejue xinfang tuchu wenti de yijian, Opinions on Innovating the Methods of the Mass Work and Solving Prominent Xinfang Issues) issued in 2014, available at: http://baike.baidu.com/view/122 40701.htm, accessed on 3rd May 2014.

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have to deal with many such low-binding and even “unreasonable complaints” (wuli shangfang 无理上访).15 As a xinfang cadre complained, Some cases are unqualified according to law. Some are unreasonable demands which cannot be met by any government. Yet, we cannot simply refuse them, because the party promises to serve the people wholeheartedly and to satisfy them. If you adhere to law, they will use such official rhetoric to condemn you. (Int. 17)

Local officials even find themselves handcuffed by reasonable appeals. As a village cadre explained, “Petitioners can sophisticatedly use official laws, policies, or rhetoric that suits them. By contrast, we cannot use old ways to stop them, but we do not know how to use new ways to do so either” (Int. 3). As previously stated, the “old ways,” including exploiting ‘bargaining counters’ (e.g., land or tax) to reach a compromise with complainants, reeducating them by resorting to Maoist ideology, and using formidable state apparatus to control them, are banned by the state in the process of building socialist rule of law. The “new ways,” such as opening more xinfang channels, improving transparancy and public participation in policy-making processes, and strengthening leaders’ serious involvement in handling complaints, are designed to serve the people and to facilitate rather than control their appeals. When local officials lose their material, ideological and institutional resources and complainants meanwhile acquire more openings to protest, the xinfang system becomes increasingly unbalanced.

4 Irresistible Incentives on the Handling of Complaints While higher-level authorities want to hear the voice from the bottom, they cannot accommodate too many complaints. Therefore, they have to pressure their subordinates to manage this tough situation. Before the 2000s, there was few institutional arrangements to support leaders’ incentives for handling complaints (Bo, 2012; Chen, X., 2005, p. 108; Feng, S., 2012; Wu, C., 2009). This situation has started to change in recent years with the rising tide of petitioning. The state firstly stipulated the principle of “territorial jurisdiction” (shudi guanli 属地管理), in order to clarify main party-leaders’ responsibility to solve complaints in their jurisdiction. The state used to adopt the principle of “proper jurisdiction from beginning to the end” (guikou banli 归口办理) to handle petitions. However, “proper jurisdiction” is a vague expression, since a wide range of agencies at different levels may have overlapping functions to handle a xinfang case. When a petitioner lodges a complaint, he could possible appeal to all the agencies involved. This provides the agencies with an excuse to avoid their duty and “pass the buck from one to another” (tipiqiu 踢皮球), thus causing confusion and inconvenience to the petitioner (Int. 12). The principle of “territorial jurisdiction” is designed to avoid this phenomenon. 15

“Unreasonable petitions” is a widespread phenomenon in China. For examples elsewhere in China, see (Li et al., 2012, pp. 327–328; Tian, X., 2012b, pp. 189–193).

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According to this principle, major party-leaders must take “overall responsibility” (zongze 总责) for the xinfang work in their jurisdiction.16 In the Y District, the district party secretary and the district head must sign a “responsibility commission” (zeren shu 责任书) related to xinfang work on an annual basis. In the 2011 commission, they were told by their superiors to achieve the following main targets: No “abnormal and collective petitioning of Beijing” … Controlling of “abnormal and individual petitioning of Beijing” to within 1/100,000 of the population … Controlling of “normal and repetitive petitioning of Beijing” to within 2/1000,000 of the population … “Ending” (banjie办结) (i.e., solving petitioners’ problems and keeping them from returning to Beijing) 85 percent of the petitions assigned by higher-up leadership… (Doc. 3)

The two leaders then transmit downward pressure by “contracting” (bao an 包 案) difficult xinfang cases to individual cadres.17 Normally, a unit accountable for a case, such as a township government, establishes a work team for that case. Such a team usually comprises a main county leader, some township leaders and some village/street cadres (Int. 12, 18; Doc. 4). Bound by a signed contract, the designated cadres are firstly ordered to educate petitioners and stop their petitioning by resolving their problems. However, as previously stated, educating targeted petitioners rarely works, since local officials lack ideological resources to do so. It is also difficult to solve the problems of these petitioners, partly because some of their unreasonable demands cannot be met by any government, and partly because local authorities are themselves responsible for many of these problems, and may be unwilling to address them. If some complaints end up in Beijing, local officials responsible for such malfeasance face punishment from above. Usually it is the township and village cadres who are more likely to be disciplined. For example, according to the punishment decisions issued by the Y Government and its superiors at the prefectural and provincial levels from 2007 to 2010.18 Most of them were used to discipline township and villages officials. An important reason for this is that these cadres are ordered to play a more important role than their superiors in the handling of complaints. Therefore, they carry a greater degree of responsibility in the case of failure. As a vice township head explained: See 关于进一步加强新时期信访工作的意见 (Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang xinshiqi xinfang gongzuo de yijian, Opinions on Further Strengthening the Work of Handling Letters and Visits) issued in 2007, available at: http://baike.baidu.com/view/2976310.htm, accessed on 3rd May 2014; 关于创新群众工作方法解决信访突出问题的意见 (Guanyu chuangxin qunzhong gongzuo fangfa jiejue xinfang tuchu wenti de yijian, Opinions on Innovating the Methods of the Mass Work and Solving Prominent Xinfang Issues) issued in 2014, available at: http://baike.baidu.com/view/ 12240701.htm, accessed on 3rd May 2014. 17 Contracting difficult petition cases to individual cadres is a widespread practice of Chinese local authorities (see Li et al., 2012, p. 326; Tian, X., 2012a). 18 These documents were all I could obtain from a cadre who is charged with accountability for petition documents in the xinfang bureau of the Y District. As she explained, some documents had been lost by accident, but she did not intentionally conceal something from me, since disciplining rather than covering for cadres for mishandling petitions is a positive act of the government (Int. 14). 16

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A township party secretary and a township head, as “the main leadership of the party and the government” (dangzheng lingdao banzi 党政领导班子), take “overall responsibility” for failure. A vice township head or a vice township party secretary, as a leader contracting a case, take “main responsibility” (zhuyao zeren 主要责任). A village party secretary and a village head, as team members personally handling a case, take “direct responsibility” (zhijie zeren 直接责任). While main county leaders take the same kind of responsibility as we do, they have more leeway to shift the responsibility to us. By contrast, being the lowest level of government, we have little room to do the same. (Int. 12; Doc. 5)

This has been clarified by Cai Yongshun and Zhu Lin’s study. As they stated, a cadre’s role in a failure and the consequences of the cadre’s failure in solving conflict are two factors determining a punishment (Cai & Zhu, 2014, p. 98). Their findings are mainly based on large-scale, disruptive protests with obviously serious consequences (Cai & Zhu, 2014). By contrast, complaints are often small-scaled, non-disruptive conflicts. Yet this does not mean grassroots officials are less likely to be disciplined for mishandling complaints. In addition to the scale and disruption, the location, frequency, and timing are also factors defining the severity of the consequences. For example, a township party secretary was disciplined by “veto power”19 (yi piao foujue 一票否决) only because a petitioner appealed to Zhongnanhai, the resident place of top leaders (Int. 5; Doc. 6). In another case, certain main leaders in a township were also punished by “veto power” since they were responsible for a few instances of “collective petitioning of a provincial capital” and “individual petitioning of Beijing” in one year (Doc. 7). Additionally, the provincial government once disciplined the main leaders of some townships by “veto power” in a decision in 2008, the very sensitive Olympic year (Doc. 8). No such serious punishment was meted out in any of the other decisions. The aforementioned multiple factors largely increase grassroots officials’ risk of being punished. These cadres thus have strong incentives to do whatever possible to deter trouble-making complaints. Compared to their subordinates, county leaders are less likely to be disciplined. In the punishment decisions I have collected, county leaders were only disciplined a few times. Most of these punishments were merely a “circulating notice of criticism” (tongbao piping 通报批评). However, this fact does not in itself mean they are less pressured than their subordinates. First, when the consequences are severe enough, county leaders will still be punished by serious sanctions, such as “vote power” or even “removal from office” (chenzhi 撤职). For example, the main leadership of a township was punished by “vote power,” because some petitioners in the township spread leaflets in Tiananmen Square during the period of the “two meetings” in 2008 (Doc. 9). In another case, a petitioner in the Y District complained about the forced eviction from his home. Following a few unsuccessful attempts at petitioning Beijing, he tried to make a forced entry into Zhongnanhai after downing a whole bottle of white spirit. While he was immediately pinned to the ground by a plain-clothes policeman before crossing the warning line, he nevertheless successfully triggered a response from above. The 19

It means that “the main leadership of the party and the government” will be deprived of entitlement to any title of “the advanced” (xianjin 先进) and the opportunity of promotion and transfer within one year.

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vice county leader contracting his case was removed from office and the county party secretary was given a sanction of “major demerit” (ji daguo 记大过) (Int. 17). In China, petitioners often resort to such trouble-making actions in order to draw attention from an unresponsive centre (Li et al., 2012, pp. 312–323). Their efforts, in turn, create uncertainty for local leaders’ careers. As one county leader complained, “Some of the petitioners are ‘the barefoot’ (guangjiao de 光脚的) who fear nothing, but we wear ‘shoes’…We feel like we are sitting on a volcano without knowing when it might erupt” (Int. 19). Second, while leniency exists in the disciplining of cadres, this does not mean a related official will not pay a price for being punished. As existing scholarship clarifies, re-appointing disciplined cadres is quite common in Chinese bureaucracy (Cai & Zhu, 2014, pp. 116–118; Ciqi & Margaret, 2014, pp. 90–92). This phenomenon also exists in the Y District. For example, the vice county head who was removed from office because of that gate-crashing case mentioned above, was later reappointed as a vice director of the district people’s political consultative conference (Int. 17). This might, however, have taken considerable effort on his part, and compared to a vice county head with real power, his new job was much less important. Finally, even though some county leaders have never been punished, it is nevertheless true that “not to advance is somewhat to go back” (bu jin ze tui 不进则退) in the very competitive Chinese bureaucracy. As a xinfang leader explained, Xinfang work is an important criterion to select and promote leaders at county level. If you find a county’s xinfang work suddenly goes to a low rank from a high one, more often than not some main leaders in that county are seeking promotion. Given his rivals may exploit his bad performance of xinfang work, he has to pay extra attention to avoid jeopardising his career…You should always remember ‘a mill cannot grind with the water that is past’ (ji bu ke shi, shi bu zai lai 机不可失 时不再来) If you miss a good opportunity, you may miss all of the rest, because you are older and less competitive when the next one comes. (Int. 11)

Therefore, almost every main county leader takes xinfang work seriously. In order to avoid severe consequences resulting from trouble-making complaints or to show a good performance on xinfang work, they have strong incentives to stop targeted complainants. As the superiors of county cadres, officials at the city and provincial levels are highly unlikely to be punished for malfeasance in xinfang work (Int. 10, 11). However, even higher-level officials who are charged with xinfang work, such as a vice head or a secretary of committee of political and legislative affairs, have pressure to pay attention to xinfang work. As a county leader explained, Xinfang work is only one of many criteria determining their political careers, but a high rank may sometimes bring small trouble to them. It is like a mouse who tries so hard to squeeze its body into a small hole, but leaves its tail outside. (Int. 19)

Against this background, the sandwich-like interactions among higher-level authorities, lower-level authorities and petitioners tend to evolve into local collusion between the authorities at higher and lower-levels. However, such collusion is conditional, given authorities at different levels face different career hazards. Village and township leaders have the strongest incentives

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to deter targeted petitioners, since they face the highest risk of sanction for failure. County leaders tend to cover for their subordinates, since they are highly likely to be punished if targeted petitioners make serious trouble when petitioning Beijing. By contrast, prefectural and provincial leaders are highly unlikely to be disciplined for malfeasance in xinfang work, but they still depend on their subordinates to obtain a good rank of xinfang work. Their collusion with their subordinates therefore is conditional. On the one hand, they often turn a blind eye towards their subordinates’ measures to stop trouble-making petitioners. On the other hand, if their subordinates go too far, they tend to punish rather than protect them. Such conditional collusion causes local officials to further “stabilize” (wenkong 稳控) targeted petitioners by resorting to less risky measures. They firstly tend to use those measures which are not banned by state laws, regulations and policies. Local officials can detain a petitioner for “abnormal petitioning of Beijing.” However, detention usually lasts 7–14 days, and thus cannot effectively stop determined petitioners (Int. 5, 11). Besides, many persistent petitioners are old or have health issues. In practice they are exempted from detention, since they are physically vulnerable and may thus bring trouble to local authorities (Int. 11, 12). Re-education through labour used to be an option to stop trouble-making petitioners, but the state cancelled this punishment in 2013. Local officials sometimes send a petitioner to a mental hospital or even to jail. However, only few petitioners have serious mental health problems or have committed obvious law-breaking acts which can be used as a reason to do so (Int. 3, 12). Therefore, local officials have sometimes to resort to covert measures which are forbidden by state laws, regulations and policies. Local officials have sometimes locked up “veteran petitioners” (lao shangfang hu 老上访户) for a period in a “legal education school” or a “black jail”. Yet they cannot control these petitioners indefinitely. The latter may still find their way to Beijing once they are freed (Int. 10, 13, 14, 20). Violence is still another way to keep petitioners away from Beijing. However, this measure is seldom now used by local officials. As a xinfang cadre explained, Violence is strictly forbidden by higher-level authorities. Besides, petitioners are much smarter today. They may secretly capture such rule-breaking acts and expose them on the internet. They may contact the media or a lawyer to complain about us. So it is too risky for us to beat them. By contrast, failing to stop them is quite usual. Normally we will not incur serious sanctions for such a common fault (Int. 17).20

In practice, local officials often hire black guards to deter petitioners. The latter sometimes use violence if necessary (Int. 10, 13). However, petitioners are not stupid; they rarely confront the tough with toughness. Besides, it is not necessary for them to do so. As a persistent petitioner explained, “Their job is just sending us back, not 20

As previously stated, local cadres may still incur some sanctions for their malfeasance. However, we should be aware that local cadres who are asked to beat petitioners are ordinary cadres who lack opportunities to get promotion. They thus care about their jobs rather than a good performance on xinfang work. If their violence in beating a petitioner is exposed, they may be removed from office. By contrast, if they only fail to stop them, it is unlikely they will incur such punishment.

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stopping us from returning to Beijing again. They may feel happy if we go back and bring business to them. So why should I fight against them and bring trouble upon myself” (Int. 13). Ultimately, local officials only have two soft measures to stop petitioners. One is to buy them off. From 2009 to 2011, the Y Government had spent several million Yuan on dozens of petitioners in the name of “petition relief” (xinfang jiuzhu 信 访救助), on the condition that they stop petitioning for good (Doc. 10). However, negotiating with petitioners, especially persistent ones, is maddeningly difficult since some of their demands are unreasonably high. As previously stated, a woman asked 6 million Yuan compensation for her unborn child. In another case, an old man raised a demand of 3 million Yuan, because he was wrongly dismissed by his unit in the Cultural Revolution (Int. 13). Besides, these petitioners often use “petitioning Beijing” as a “weapon,” threatening to head for Beijing if local officials refuse to meet their demands (Int. 5, 11, 12). In order to protect their careers and at the same time negotiate a better bargain with veteran petitioners, local officials have to resort to another soft measure, “registration cancellation.” Cancelling registration can effectively reduce the real numbers of petitioning Beijing. For example, in 2009, 2010 and 2011 there were some cases of “collective petitioning of Beijing” in the Y District (Doc. 11). However, none were registered (Doc. 12). By this method, local officials can largely avoid punishment from above. “Registration cancellation” also plays a role in exhausting a petitioner’s patience and lowering his expectation of compensation. For example, a woman in the Y District finally decided to give up petitioning and accepted 200,000 Yuan compensation, even though she believed that the man who killed her daughter should be sentenced to death rather than a life imprisonment. She told me by way of summary, “I am so tired of living like this” (Int. 10). By contrast, some determined petitioners continued to insist on petitioning up until the time I left the Y District. Their efforts, in turn, induce local officials to again cancel their filed petitions or buy them off with a better offer.

5 Conclusion Unfaithful policy implementation has attracted great attention in existing scholarship (Bernstein & Lü, 2000; Edin, 2003; Minzner, 2009; O’Brien & Li, 1999; Wang, S., 1995; Whiting, 2004; Zhou, X., 2010). However, most of the research generally analyses selective policy implementation in the Chinese bureaucracy; few of them specifically discuss such phenomena in the xinfang system. As analysed above, this chapter has demonstrated how and why local authorities adaptively deal with petitions in practice. Specifically, the existence of selective policy implementation is not because the beneficent centre lacks capacity to control its malfeasant agents (O’Brien & Li, 1999), since it can still effectively drive local cadres to respond to complaints through irresistible incentives. Nor is it that the state puts some priority assignments first but

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ignores the others (Edin, 2003). Actually, the state has invested a great deal of effort to maintain social stability and at the same time improve its performance through proper handling of complaints. Besides, it is also questionable that local collusion can simply be solved through some institutional reform, such as making fine-tuned performance measures (Whiting, 2004) or replacing them with legal norms (Minzner, 2009). As an ambitious authoritarian regime that aims to provide good governance but keeps its one-party rule, it has to struggle with multiple and even self-contradictory tasks simultaneously. Some studies thus suggest paying more attention to the “institutional environment” of China bureaucracy (Zhou, X., 2010) and the “unrealistic policy targets and intents” within it (O’Brien, 2010). As this chapter demonstrated, the xinfang system established by the PRC has been significantly influenced by a special version of socialist democracy, the mass line politics, which combines a centralized party leadership with low-binding public participation. Accordingly, the xinfang system serves as “an important channel through which the party and the government promote democracy, learn about people’s conditions, accept supervision, and keep in contact with the masses”.21 However, this system in the Chinese authoritarian regime has two structural contradictions. One is to simultaneously facilitate and control complaints. The other is to simultaneously supervise local officials through the information flowing from complaints, while relying on the same officials to handle these complaints. While these two structural contradictions have existed in the xinfang system since point of inception, the impacts of these contradictions on handling complaints have been exacerbated in recent years for the following reasons. First, marketization and de-collectivization have significantly shifted the balance of power and resources between the state and society. Therefore, the state cannot penetrate as deeply as it once did, and meanwhile ordinary people are less fearful and less dependent on local authorities. Second, the contradictory official ideology which combines the socialist rule of law and the mass line has largely influenced xinfang work in China today. As this chapter shows, the development of socialist rule of law has significantly challenged Maoist ideology. As a result, local officials can no longer use Maoist ideology to force individuals to change from “laggards” to “socialist new people.” Meanwhile, some old state institutions which are in contradiction of rights discourse have been abolished. Furthermore, the state has implemented a series of policies to facilitate petitions. However, the socialist rule of law is different from the genuine rule of law enjoyed by democratic states. The Chinese authoritarian state thus has to legitimize itself by ideology and performance. To this end, the mass line ideology and its low-binding public participation are still necessary for the state to keep its rule. Yet, the mass line ideology in China today is “de-politicized” when compared to that in Maoist time. In other words, the mass line ideology still serves to encourage See 加强信访工作, 关心群众疾苦 (Jiaqiang xinfang gongzuo, guanxin qunzhong jiku, Reinforcing the Xinfang Work and Taking People’s Grievances Seriously, Xinhua News Agency), issued in Xinhua News Agency, available at: http://www.people.com.cn/item/ldhd/zhurongj/1999/shicha/ a1020.html, accessed 25th February 2018. 21

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low-binding popular appeals, but it loses much of its political power to control or reeducate some petitioners by labelling them as laggards, because all petitioners must be treated equally before the law. Consequently, the xinfang system is becoming unbalanced, with local authorities lacking material, ideological and institutional resources to handle complaints, while in the meantime complainants are acquiring more opportunities to initiate protest. While local authorities cannot effectively handle complaints, their superiors continue pushing them to do so through a series of irresistible incentives, such as signing a “responsibility commission” with main local leaders, contracting difficult xinfang cases to individual cadres, and regulating strict criteria to discipline them when they fail to deter trouble-making complainants. However, the unbearable pressure from higher-level authorities and the persistence of many complainants cannot always achieve the goal of resolution by lower-level authorities. On the contrary, higher-level authorities and lower-level authorities often resort to collusion in attempts to deter trouble-making complainants. Their measures include detention, commitment of a complainant to a mental hospital, jail, legal education school or black jail, and even include beatings. Yet, these measures are conditional, risky, or limited in their effectiveness to prevent determined complainants from appealing to Beijing. Therefore, local authorities tend to bribe their superiors to cancel the registered cases of persistent complainants or buy them off if possible. Consequently, their mishandling of complaints undermines the xinfang system itself. The mishandling of complaints discussed in this chapter has several empirical and theoretical implications for the dynamics and outcomes of small-scale protests in China. First, the xinfang system, as the most important state institution shaping contention in China, constrains the overall interactions between the state and society. Clarification of the operation of the xinfang system thus provides the key to understanding the fate of small-scale contention in China today. Furthermore, the state has made great efforts to institutionalize the contentious activities in the xinfang system. However, the impacts thereof have not previously been fully and systematically discussed. The chapter offers an in-depth analysis of how local officials and complainants try to outmaneuver each other. This discussion of the interplay between petitioning and petitioning-handling further serves to improve scholarly understanding of Chinese local politics. Finally, as illustrated in Chap. 3, state response to contention is more influential than the strength of challengers in determining protest outcome in China. While the understanding of the state’s role to be found in existing scholarship is informative, it is nevertheless incomplete. The chapter supplements our knowledge of the state by demonstrating how the changes in the state’s capacity, the tensions between different dimensions of state legitimacy, and the contradictions in the xinfang system are crucial in determining the interactions between local officials and complainants in the xinfang system.

Chapter 5

Institutional Absorption in the Online Xinfang System

As illustrated above, the xinfang system seeks to achieve its function mainly through the intervention of Party leaders, rather than the authority of legal norms (Minzer, 2006). Due to time and resources limitations, such intervention is often used selectively to settle more serious troublemaking situations rather than moderate appeals (Chen, X., 2009; Cai, 2010). This may ultimately result in the escalation of citizen complaints and deeply entrap the system in a vicious circle: “the more it is obsessed with social stability, the less it will have of it” (yue wei yue buwen 越维越不稳). Our elucidation of the “online xinfang channel” (wangshang xinfang xitong 网 上信访系统) is presented against this exact background. Relying on information and communication technologies (ICTs), the Chinese government is committed to establishing an online platform to accomplish xinfang collection, settlement and evaluation in a more accessible, effective and accountable manner. With this type of performance, it hopes to deliver an improved state-society interaction in the digital era.1 Could this channel help to overcome the destabilizing tendency inherent in the xinfang system? What are the structural potentials and limitations associated with its implementation? These two closely related questions constitute the central theme this chapter seeks to tackle. Drawing on detailed interviews and archival sources conducted in the X County in Hubei Province from early June to late August 2018 and several subsequent telephone interviews with key interviewees in 2019 and 2020, this chapter clarifies the practice and rationale of the new and important online xinfang channel which has not, to date, been amply examined. By integrating offline communication methods with the new online format, it achieves a more subtle form of managed participation through field diversion, standardized settlement and balanced evaluation. It improves the balance between citizens’ desire for participation and an appropriate level of institutionalization, and thus partly corrects the offline xinfang channel’s heavy reliance 1 信息上网, 阳光信访 (Xinxi shangwang, yangguang xinfang, Updating Xinfang Online, Handling them Transparently), issued on 13th September 2017, available at: https://www.sohu.com/a/192173 181_772160, accessed on 5th September 2021.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0_5

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on non-institutionalized tactics to maintain stability. However, as long as xinfang still operates at the intersection of law and politics, the same structures that enable public participation may also be manipulated to reinforce a regime rule.

1 China’s Online Xinfang Channel and Its Theoretical Significance Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have been increasingly used by governments to communicate with citizens.2 China is obviously no exception. Unlike other socialist states that seek to limit the impact of the Internet, China takes it as something that can be configured while at the same time exploited to promote public participation and regime responsiveness (Kalathil & Boas, 2003). Since early 1990s, China has invested trillions of Yuan in government online projects (Zhang, J., 2002; Yong, 2003). The “online xinfang channel” (wangshang xinfang xitong 网上信访系统) is a significant example, allowing citizens to lodge complaints and receive responses through an online facility. Clarification of the structural potentials and limitations associated with its operation is important for both practical and theoretical reasons. First, when measured in the first half of 2018, the number of online xinfang nationwide was found to have exceeded 50% of total xinfang.3 Yet this new and demonstrably important xinfang channel has been accorded relatively little attention in academic circles, with some studies only discussing it in passing (Min & Heng, 2009; Distelhorst & Hou, 2017). One exception is the research on “mayor’s mailbox” (Hartford, 2005). However, “mayor’s mailbox” is only a small part of the online xinfang channel and thus cannot provide the whole picture of its institutional arrangements. Second, the institutionalization of China’s xinfang system is a significant issue from a theoretical standpoint. It determines the quality of state-society communication, which in turn dictates the effectiveness of stability maintenance, the highest goal of the system. Yet existing literature focuses more on how instability is generated from the angle of protesting strategies (Chen, X., 2009; Feng & He, 2018; O’Brien, 2003; Su & He, 2010) and bureaucratic divisions (O’Brien & Li, 2006; Shi & Cai, 2006; Cai, 2010; Chen, X., 2012), and less on how it is mobilized or constrained by xinfang institutions. While some exceptions exist (Luehrmann, 2003; Cai, 2004; O’Brien & Li, 2004; Ying, 2004; Minzner, 2006; Feng, S., 2012), they primarily concentrate on the offline rather than online xinfang institutions.

2

United Nations Online Network of Public Administration and Finance, issued in 2006; From Egovernment to E-inclusion.” Global E-government Readiness Report issued in 2005, available at: http://www.unpan.org/, accessed on 28th August 2020. 3 网上信访量占比过半 (Wangshang xinfangliang zhanbi guoban, The Amount of Online Xinfang have E-xceeded 50% of Total Xinfang), issued on 27th July 2018, available at: http://legal.people. com.cn/n1/2018/0727/c42510-30173593.html, accessed on 5th September 2020.

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This study attempts to fill the academic void by analyzing in depth the institutionalization of the online xinfang channel. As Huntington suggests, political stability “depends upon the ratio of institutionalization to participation” (Huntington, 1968, p. 79). This means that “the greater the gap between participation and institutionalization, the greater the likelihood of political instability” (Sigelman, 1979, p. 210). The modern Chinese xinfang system, as “the most important mode of political participation” (Cai, 2004, p. 427) which also “sets social stability as its highest goal” (Minzner, 2006, p. 136), thus provides a suitable perspective from which to observe Huntington’s illuminating insights. In reality the xinfang system has attracted much attention in contemporary studies. They find that the system plays an indispensable role in monitoring the misbehaviors of local officials, addressing the grievances of injured citizens, providing useful information for policy adjustment, and assisting the regime to maintain social stability (Luehrmann, 2003; Cai, 2004, 2010; Ying, 2004; Minzner, 2006; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Thireau & Hua, 2006; Feng, S., 2012; Chen, X., 2012; Chen, J., 2016). These findings greatly enrich our understanding of the system’s multiple contributions to regime maintenance. However, the issue they fail to address in detail is the inherent contradictions between these functions and the challenges they have brought to the institutionalization of the system. In order to achieve a balance between regime responsiveness and social stability, the system must facilitate citizen complaints while at the same time restricting them to an acceptable upper limit. In order to motivate local officials to perform their duties, it must tolerate a certain level of misbehavior while imposing appropriate disciplines where necessary. In order to ensure adequate information flow with limited energy and resources, it tends to frustrate routinized appeals while sophisticatedly rewarding disruptive ones. These tensions between law and politics have created abundant contradictions and ambiguities within the xinfang system, and thus provided opportunities for petitioners and officials to maximize their own interests through noninstitutionalized tactics. How to balance these contradictions has therefore become the main focus of xinfang reform. On this point, strengthening legal channels can help in institutionalizing state-society relations (Yu, J., 2005b), but at least for now it cannot completely replace the multiple functions undertaken by the xinfang system. Differentiating the various types of complaints may help in resolving them in a more standardized manner (Chen, B., 2012), but how to formulate criteria to achieve this goal is still an issue that requires comprehensive analysis. Establishing “a fair procedure” could be a possible solution (Chen, J., 2016, p. 169), but such procedure should run through the entire settlement and evaluation process, rather than just involving parts of it (e.g., risks assessment and public hearings). In this sense, the online xinfang channel, as a brand-new facility built with the help of new ICTs, may provide us with the appropriate framework in which to continuously study the institutionalization of the xinfang system. The channel was firstly launched by Shenzhen in 2000. Then in 2005 the National Xinfang Regulations formally adopted e-mail as a new form of appeal, which greatly encouraged the development of online xinfang across the country. From 2005 to 2010, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Hubei, Guangdong and other places successively established their online xinfang channels (Zhang et al., 2016; Si & Huang, 2014). In 2013, the “Third Plenary

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Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Party (dang de shiba jie sanzhong quanhui 党的十八届三中全会)” officially upgraded online xinfang construction from “local practice” to a key task of the Central Government. On January 1, 2015, the National Online Xinfang System was established and initiated into service. By 2017 the system had achieved its targeted five levels of connectivity with all provinces, cities, and counties, as well as more than 80,000 townships across the country.4 Yet this new and demonstrably important xinfang channel has been accorded relatively little attention in academic circles, with some studies only discussing it in passing (Min & Heng, 2009; Distelhorst & Hou, 2017). One exception is the research on “mayor’s mailbox” (Hartford, 2005). However, “mayor’s mailbox” is only a small part of the online xinfang channel and thus cannot provide the whole picture of its institutional arrangements. Drawing on detailed interviews and archival sources,5 this study attempts to fill the academic void by analyzing in depth the institutionalization of the online xinfang channel. The findings suggest that, by integrating offline communication patterns with the new online format, the online xinfang channel establishes a more subtle form of social control through field diversion, standardized settlement and balanced evaluation. First, an online platform facilitates upward flow of information while reducing the upward flow of petitioners, thus easing the pressure on local officials to maintain stability and offering them greater institutional space to perform their duties. Second, standardized processing and lawful termination together regulate their responses, by establishing formalized specifications across the entire handling process. Finally, a modified evaluation mechanism tells them how their efforts will be assessed, with the emphasis on balancing procedural and consequential indicators. These elements together shape a rationale that absorbs online appeals in a structured manner. It improves the balance between citizens’ desire for participation and an appropriate level of institutionalization, and thus partly corrects failings of the offline 4

Ibid. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 52 informants in the X County in Hubei from early June to late August 2018, and several subsequent telephone interviews with key interviewees in 2019 and 2020. The interviewees ranged from village cadres, township cadres and county officials to petitioners and ordinary local people. Owing to the sensitive nature of the topic they were chosen using snowball sampling. With good access to both local officials and petitioners, archival materials were also collected. These included official policies and regulations on online xinfang work, the messages of the online xinfang channel’s interfaces, work diaries, meeting minutes and xinfang reports written by local officials, plus internal monthly reports and yearly reports of petitioning in the X County. In order to avoid information bias, attempts were made to crosscheck some interviewees’ statements with others. This was supplemented with information on online petitioning from the media and academic articles. Actually, local authorities’ responsiveness to online xinfang in different places in China is likely to be similar, given that it is largely determined by the various types of laws, policies and regulations issued by the Central Government. Even so, collecting more local experiences can make our findings in the X County less specific and therefore more applicable to many other places in China. In order to better understand the changes associated with the online xinfang system, this study also utilizes a piece of analysis that allows comparison with “the offline xinfang channel” (chuantong xinfang xitong 传统信访系统). The empirical sources of the latter stem from our fieldwork in Henan, Hubei, and Guangdong over the past few years, and the data collection follows the method described previously.

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xinfang channel, which relies heavily on non-institutionalized tactics to maintain stability. However, its aim of defending citizen legal rights is but one element of a larger focus on how to effectively rule the state. While this remains the case, the same structures that enable citizens to participate may also be used to retain an authoritarian governance.

2 Field Diversion from Offline Agencies to Online Platform The most significant change introduced by the online xinfang channel is the establishment of an information platform, connecting upwards to Beijing and downwards to townships, thereby moving the communication between state and society from offline agencies to an online platform. This field diversion is designed to replace the “upward flow” of petitioners with an upward flow of information. In this way it hopes to alleviate the anxiety of petitioners and to ease the pressure on xinfang cadres to control offline visits, stimulating them to devote more energy to the institutionalized operations of online appeals. Online registration is the first step to achieve these goals. With the help of new ICTs, it has delivered improved accessibility and reliability, laying an indispensable foundation for the implementation of the whole design. The first advantage of online registration is to enable submission through multiple channels. In order to complete an online submission, it is necessary firstly to access the County Government home page and locate the County Magistrate’s prominently displayed mailbox. It is then necessary only to click on the “I want to send mail” icon and follow the prompts to fill in the required information, including name, phone number, home address and principal elements of the complaint (Int. 49).6 All these operations can be easily completed at home. Even petitioners without internet skills or keyboard experience can complete registration with the help of relatives or friends (Int. 50, 51). Meanwhile, the online channel also allows for appeals that leapfrog administrative levels, termed “skip-level xinfang” (yueji shangfang 越级上访). This behavior is tightly controlled in the offline channel, since unfettered visits may carry huge political risks for higher-level authorities. By contrast, “The flow of information alone will not cause social instability and therefore it is meaningless to ban skip-level online appeals” (Int. 53). This means that petitioners can report problems to the online platform at any level, or at different levels concurrently, thereby greatly facilitating their participation. Some unyielding petitioners even launch appeals simultaneously through multiple channels in order to immediately involve higher-level authorities in their complaints. For example, a retired teacher, with the help of her daughter, reported her problems via the online channels at all levels on an almost weekly basis over an extended period of time (Int. 52). Prior to the advent of the online 6

By and large these procedures are common across the country. For more details, please also see (Hartford, 2005, pp. 225–230; Distelhorst & Hou, 2017, p. 186).

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channel, petitioners could also lodge complaints through letters and telephone calls, thereby avoiding travel hardships and bypassing interception by grassroots officials. However, to quote one disillusioned petitioner, “Given that visits are often ignored, the chances of these gentler complaints receiving a response is rare. Most of the time they are like pebbles dropping in the sea” (Int. 68). By contrast, another advantage of online registration is reflected in the establishment of a traceable electronic file for each case. In practice, every registered case is automatically assigned a number, upon entry of which all case information immediately appears on the interface of X County’s online platform. This will include name, contact, ID card number, home and email address of the petitioner, the contents of his appeal, and the “registration unit” (dengji danwei 登记单位) and “processing unit” (zeren danwei 责任单位) of his case. Utilizing this extensive data, relevant agencies at all levels can interrogate the case at will. Furthermore, relying on new ICTs, online registration is also capable of documenting some cases which the offline channel would normally choose to ignore. One example is “re-registered cases” (chongfang 重访), a fairly common occurrence because of skip-level appeals. Usually, superior agencies will firstly identify whether or not an appeal is re-registered based on keywords research (e.g., name, contents of an appeal). If it is, it will be marked as such, but this will not cause it to be rejected. These agencies then assign them to local agencies, the latter only handling one of the registrations while passing over the others. In the past petitioners relied mainly on the tactic of persistent visits to bring renewed attention to these cases. Now the system will automatically accumulate their repeated online submissions and provide the necessary visibility. As the petition said, Although one re-registered case may be disregarded, the residual record it leaves on the system is not without utility. When the superiors come down to inspect the work, they often give priority to these old, difficult to resolve cases accumulated in the system (Int. 53).

Some petitioners were acutely aware of this opportunity, jokingly observing that “Doing something is always better than doing nothing. Since there is no cost for reregistration, why not give it a try?” (Int. 68, 69). Another example is simple cases: Due to limited manpower, grassroots agencies in the past rarely filed simple cases after they had been resolved, but documenting these cases becomes easier now with the help of new ICTs. Realizing that this could be an opportunity to showcase governance achievements, superior agencies, by making it an important performance indicator in subordinates’ year-end assessments, began directing them to focus more closely on the task (Int. 55).

For the same reason, the online channel also files those cases carrying incomplete information, such as incorrect contact details or an unclear claim. Rather than directly rejecting these cases, the online channel will temporarily retain them for future improvement (Int. 54). The use of new ICTs allows the xinfang system to transfer its workplace from offline agencies to an online facility. This enables local officials to establish traceable electronic files for all cases, thereby providing the necessary precondition for them to respond to citizen complaints in a more transparent and reliable way. However, to

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achieve a benign state-society interaction, field diversion is only the basic premise. Transparent processing though standardized procedures is the next crucial step.

3 Transparent Processing Through Standardized Procedures As illustrated above, the channel allows for skip-level and re-registered cases. It also files simple cases and cases with incomplete information. This means that the channel hardly sets rigid standards for the submission of cases. It means too that it is impossible for the channel to make absolute rules for the rejection of cases. As long as a petitioner is allowed to repeatedly lodge online complaints, the accumulation of his cases sooner or later will trigger intervention from above. Consequently, any regulations regarding inadmissibility will always have an exception. Such ambiguity is also reflected in the fact that there is no clear standard for “successful resolution”. As the famous saying goes, “a big disturbance leads to a big solution, a small disturbance leads to a small solution, and no disturbance, no solution” (danao dajiejue xiaonao xiaojiejue bunao bujiejue 大闹大解决, 小闹小解决, 不闹不解决) (Cai, 2010, p. 112). This is actually a common dilemma encountered by both the offline and online channels. The difference is that an online facility with its standardized operations is more capable of tackling the issue. The channel first calls for disclosure of the entire handling process of every case. At the interface of X County’s online platform, the relevant details of each case can be easily seen, including date of xinfang, time of acceptance, processing unit, handling options, relevant documents and delivery status. This transparency enables petitioners to view the progress of the cases without leaving home and can thus partly alleviate the anxiety caused by unclear information (Int. 56). It also places constraints on the irregularities of xinfang cadres, forcing them to deal with appeals in a more standardized manner. The channel further advances cases through three types of standardized processes: “simplified procedure” (jiandan chengxv 简单程序), “conventional procedure” (putong chengxv 普通程序) and “specialized procedure” (teshu chengxv 特殊程 序). These three kinds of procedures are used to handle three types of cases respectively. “Simple cases” normally include mediation of small neighborhood conflicts, clarification of ordinary policy questions and correction of common administrative omissions. “Conventional cases” mainly embrace corruption of village cadres, salary arrears owed by enterprises to employees, and unreasonable compensation for illegal construction. The main issues resulting in “specialized cases” include the failure to determine jurisdiction, the lack of a policy basis for settlement, the inability to trace evidence from history, and the impossibility of reaching a compromise with paranoid petitioners. These cases are often issues left over from history, and have already been handled by relevant agencies. However, because the petitioners remain dissatisfied with the resolution, they continue to lodge online complaints with superior agencies;

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the latter then hand them over to local agencies via the channel. It is worth mentioning that the boundaries between the three types of cases are not fixed. The working style of xinfang cadres and the personal attitude of petitioners may evolve a small issue into a major concern, and vice versa. Even so, “exposing them to the sun is much better than hiding them in the shadows.” On this point, appropriate procedures may be an effective way to reduce conflicts. The following content thus focuses on the two procedural elements of the three types of cases: processing time and formalized requirement.7 For simple cases, the processing units must decide within 3 working days whether to accept them and must find a solution within the next 10 working days (Doc. 30). The cases handled through conventional procedure are relatively complicated and often require a longer period of investigation, hence the time limits for acceptance and resolution are 15 and 60 days respectively, and the resolution time can be extended by another 30 days if necessary (Doc. 30).8 Specialized procedure is mainly used to handle persistent complaints where petitioners continue to be dissatisfied despite years of ongoing processing. The time limit for this procedure is the same as that for conventional procedure, but it may be cycled many times between assigning unit and processing unit in the recognition that most are extremely difficult to resolve. The requirements of the simplified procedure are not very strict. Processing units need only determine their options on how to proceed, communicate these to petitioners in person or telephonically, and then enter the details into the system to establish a basic record (Doc. 30). By contrast, conventional procedure requires uploading of an “acceptance notice” (jieshou tongzhi 接受通知), “handling option” (chuli yijian 处理意见), and “deferred notice” (yanqi tongzhi 延期通知), and the handling option must be delivered to the petitioner in writing (Doc. 30). If targeted cases are about to reach their processing deadline, the system will give the processing unit an “overdue warning” (chaoqi jinggao 超期警告). If they have exceeded the deadline, the system will document them separately as “unaccepted cases” (buyu shouli anjian 不予受理案件), so as to flag the need for inspection by higher-level authorities (Doc. 30).9 In the case of specialized procedure, in addition to the documents required by conventional procedure, the processing unit also needs to upload “investigation reports” (diaocha baogao 调查报告) and “summary reports” (shenjie baogao 审结报告). The former is the response to the County Xinfang Bureau, which must provide detailed investigation and handling options (Doc. 31). The Bureau then 7

Before discussing these procedural elements in depth, it should be emphasized that the handling process involved in the three types of cases actually consists of two parts: One is the resolution of appeals offline. The other is the online submission of the results and relevant documents. The first is not much different from traditional operations. The key distinction lies in the second part. As will be illustrated, it allows local officials to be more cautious and at the same time provides clearer work direction, because the transparency and traceability that it strives to achieve acts both as a deterrent and a protection for these officials. 8 Similar time limits are also found in Zhejiang (Si & Huang, 2014). 9 Similar practices also appeared in Huaian, Jiangsu. The local government set red, yellow and green signs in the online xinfang channel to remind the processing unit to handle the case in a timely way (Zhang et al., 2016).

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reviews the handling procedure, policy basis, and literal expression of the report. Those not meeting the requisite standard will be returned for revision. As a xinfang cadre added, In many cases, it is difficult to meet the requirements of these procedures at once. The upside is it gives the responsibility unit extra time to do a better job, at the same time helping its employees to improve their vocational skills on normalized issues. (Int. 49)

For those that qualify, the Bureau will make a summary report containing the same information and submit it to an “assigning unit” (jiaoban danwei 交办单位), who then conduct a formalized check of the report, followed by telephonic contact with the petitioner (Doc. 31). Where the petitioner is dissatisfied with the result, the assigning unit will often try to deflect attention from their unwillingness or inability to resolve the issue by focusing instead on documental and procedural enhancements within the system. As a xinfang cadre explained, Superior agencies, at this stage, also mainly focus on procedural issues. Their main purpose is to further improve the professional skills of their subordinates. Although this process will inevitably breed sloth like administration, superiors later will come down to resolve these accumulated cases in person, so the current work is still necessary. (Int. 52)

In practice, most cases are handled through simplified or conventional procedures. In 2018, for example, X County received a total of 2255 online appeals, 2235 of which were processed through these two channels, and more than 90% were resolved successfully (Doc. 32). While most of appeals were already resolved smoothly through the offline channel, the advantage of the online channel lies in the fact that, by leaving a record in the system, it not only allays the worries of petitioners but also exhibits an exemplary role to the public. It thus encourages greater public participation and alleviates the pressure exerted on the offline channel. As for the small number of complex cases, standardized procedure can also ease petitioner’s anxiety to a certain extent. Not only that, its more important role is to restrict the irregularities of xinfang cadres and strengthen their motivation to standardize (Int. 49, 52). As one leader added, Before the use of the online channel, we had to employ some non-institutionalized means to intercept visits, but now the channel provides an alternate path to achieving a good job, namely, to complete relevant operations online in accordance with the specifications. (Int. 57)

However, local officials also use standardization to evade responsibility, thereby spawning lazy administrative practices. As one official admitted, Our work is boring but safe; to continuously replenish various kinds of documents, upload them to leave traces, and then use it as a strategy to hold petitioners down. (Int. 58)

Petitioners, however, will certainly not accept this situation without complaint. Some petitioners told me privately that, These cadres test our patience by deliberately building delays into the procedures, but since they are operating in accordance with the regulations, it is difficult for us to get the goods on them. (Int. 70, 71)

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Even so, petitioners still have their own countermeasures. The first is to continuously launch online appeals; the other is to make targeted visits to higher-level authorities. The former action helps to elevate their cases into “accumulated cases” (jian 积案) (i.e., old, difficult to resolve cases warranting greater focus), the latter serves as a supplementary measure to further exert pressure on local authorities (Int. 59, 69). By using these methods in tandem, more often than not they will capture the attention of superior officials. Veteran petitioners know clearly that these are the rules of the online xinfang game. As most have exhausted all the avenues available via the offline xinfang process, it provides them with a welcome new option (Int. 59, 72). However, even if the two sides reach a type of tacit agreement, how to avoid the escalation of conflict is still a significant issue. To this end, it is necessary for lawful termination to be anchored in the rationale of a structured process.

4 Lawful Termination Combining Soft and Hard Measures How to deal with repeated complaints has always been the biggest headache for local officials. The offline xinfang channel often adopts a set of non-institutional tactics to frustrate persistent petitioners, ranging from repression to filtration to concession.10 The process nevertheless brings great suffering. Only those with a huge amount of courage and determination are capable of seeing this lengthy appeal through to the end. However, local officials are equally exhausted by the process, even though they might sophisticatedly manipulate expedient concession to give the appearance of an acceptable result. What is even worse is that unprincipled compromise, regardless of size, will simply encourage more pestering behavior (Minzner, 2006). By contrast, the online xinfang channel aims to halt stubborn petitioners through lawful termination, combining soft and hard measures, and meanwhile warning others against trying to reap benefits through troublemaking acts. This process, termed “tackling accumulated cases” (jian huajie 积案化解), is led generally by higher-level authorities and coordinated by local governments. A distinctive feature of the action is the continuous implementation of the idea of institutionalization. This can be demonstrated by its two elements: online improvement of documents and offline settlement of accumulated cases. The online improvement of documents, at this stage, is just an upgraded version of the specialized procedure discussed above. Its principal concern is to ensure the input 10

Local officials first repress some petitioners by exploiting their minor mistakes, or their ties to relatives and friends (Deng & O’Brien, 2013; Gui, X., 2017b). Although these tactics can be effective, their scope of application is limited since many petitioners do not possess such weaknesses. Local officials may then filter out other petitioners by means of surveillance, interception, retrieval, and detention (Li et al., 2012). Although these tactics may largely exhaust petitioners’ patience and diminish their confidence of success, some unyielding ones may still choose to persist despite the difficulties involved. Local officials ultimately have to make concessions to this residual body of individuals through secret compensation or petition relief in order to achieve a temporary peace (Gui, X., 2017a; Lee & Zhang, 2013).

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information is complete, the acceptance is timely, the reply is clear, the applicable regulations are appropriate, and the relevant documents are uploaded and meanwhile delivered promptly to petitioners (Doc. 30). In many cases, the focus of this work is to review the form and content of the investigation report and summary report. Superior officials first ask their subordinates to conduct self-examination and then put forward suggestions for further improvement. As a cadre elucidated, Since these cases are too complicated to be resolved satisfactorily, a more fruitful strategy is to continuously showcase our performance through this superficial formalized work. (Int. 58)

In addition, superior officials must visit local agencies to listen to reports, check files, meet with petitioners and then hold on-site seminars to deal with these cases as appropriate (Int. 49). This is termed offline settlement of accumulated cases. Its working guidelines are summarized as “three appeasements and one punishment” (san daowei yi chuli 三到位一处理) (Doc. 33). Superior officials and their subordinates must first seek to appease the petitioners through “meticulous thought work” (anfu daowei 安抚到位), “diligent policy interpretation” (jieshi daowei 解释到位), and “requisite life assistance” (jiuzhu daowei 救助到位). Consistent with these, they must also “punish the petitioners strictly in accordance with the law” (chuli daowei 处理到位) if they do commit illegal acts. Based on the aforementioned description, the soft measures entailed in ending accumulated cases mainly include perfecting documents online and appeasing petitioners offline. Most measures were used previously in the offline channel, but the online channel have enabled a greater degree of institutionalization and a concomitant opportunity to reduce non-institutionalized operations to a significant degree. First, although the offline channel also attempts to “procedurally end a case” (chengxv xing jiean 程序性结案) through reexamination, review, and verification (Doc. 28), it cannot disclose relevant documents to petitioners without the help of new ICTs. Its work therefore is not as transparent and traceable as the online channel, which further weakens xinfang cadres’ motivation to adhere to standardized operations (Int. 17). Second, the offline channel has considerable flexibility in the use of xinfang relief, but every expenditure of the online channel must have a clear policy basis. Sighing with emotion, a township cadre explained, “We have less available funding than before with which to appease petitioners. I cannot even get a petitioner an additional subsistence allowance. This constraint is preventing me from resolving cases satisfactorily (Int. 60). The procedure for awarding compensation has also become much stricter. Both officials and petitioners must now provide necessary certificates. As another xinfang cadre complained, Following the introduction of the online facility we have expended a lot of energy on these boring aspects. All the relevant certificates must be uploaded for review by superior agencies. Therefore, our working principle now is to be as cautious as possible so as not to allow any loopholes. (Int. 61)

With the full completion of the aforementioned soft measures, the online xinfang channel hopes to achieve two goals. One is to urge xinfang cadres to do their work as

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meticulously as possible by recording their performance online. The other and more important goal is to provide a reasonable justification for the tough measures that the government may take next by clearly demonstrating to petitioners its performance to date. According to a veteran petitioner, This is actually a sophisticated governance technique, saying in effect that, even if I cannot really solve your problem, then at least I have shown you my efforts in a transparent and traceable manner. If you are continuing to pursue your grievance, without sufficient basis, then don’t blame me for being tough. (Int. 59)

However, in order to prevent the abuse of one-punishment, higher-level authorities have also formulated a series of institutional constraints. First, local officials must have a sufficiently legal basis if they want to jail petitioners for their unlawful behavior. For example, X County sentenced a petitioner who repeatedly knocked on the gong to sow chaos in the Xinfang Bureau and smashed the window glass several times, seriously upsetting order in the office. All his acts were videotaped and submitted to the court. One petitioner said ruefully, We all sympathized with him. The government had not addressed his problem properly, causing him to lose control of his emotions. However, his behavior was illegal. The government used to condone such behavior, but now it has become much tougher. It is a lesson to us all. (Int. 65)

A similar situation unfolded in another case where two defendants were convicted of extortion. Not only did the government present their faked certificates to the court, it also produced the recordings of phone calls they had used to threaten xinfang cadres (Doc. 34). Second, relevant responsible persons must bear “lifelong responsibility for misjudged cases” (cuoan zhongshen zheren 错案终身责任), which also has a certain restrictive effect on the use of sentencing. A local leader told me, Lifelong accountability removed my term limit. Even if I left, I might be prosecuted because of the previous problem. Therefore, I must strictly examine the procedural and substantive issues of the case before I give approval to send it to the court. These considerations are equally applicable to judges, and more importantly, the mutually shared restraints will make the final outcome of the case more reliable. (Int. 57)

Third, since it is difficult to meet the above two conditions simultaneously, the sentence is mainly used as a warning. This can be verified from our fieldwork. Both in Guangdong and Henan the strategy was used only sparingly during the first two years following its introduction (Int. 62, 65). The overall xinfang situation has subsequently been significantly improved and need for it greatly diminished once the populace clearly came to understand the government’s boundaries. Finally, by adjusting its evaluation mechanism, the online xinfang channel also seeks to weaken the motivation for local officials to violate regulations. This is the final key step in understanding its institutional logic.

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5 Performance Evaluation Balancing Procedure and Consequences The focus of the offline xinfang channel has always been on strictly controlling the upward flow of petitioners determined to carry their grievances all the way to Beijing and provincial capitals (Doc. 5). This result-oriented evaluation mechanism not only discourages local officials from performing institutional operations, it also encourages them to resort to non-institutional solutions, since under the current political environment the latter is their rational choice for resolving a predicament (Li et al., 2012). By contrast, the online xinfang channel has transferred the interactive field of state and society to the Internet, which greatly eases its pressure to intercept offline visits and allows it to devote more energy to standardized online operations. Its evaluation mechanism thus aims to find a balance between emphasizing results and stressing procedure, and assigns a considerable weight to the assessment of four measurements, viz.: “acceptance rate” (shouli lv 受理率), “completion rate” (banjie lv 办结率), “participation rate” (chanping lv 参评率) and “satisfaction rate” (manyi lv 满意率). Of these, acceptance rate and completion rate are used to assess whether “initial visits” (chufang 初访)11 are accepted and have traversed the whole handling process within the prescribed time limit, and whether relevant documents are uploaded in timely fashion. Participation rate refers to the ratio of initial visits that have been evaluated to the total of all initial visits. These three rates are calculated by xinfang agencies and used mainly to measure if xinfang cadres have completed the formalized requirements of the handling process, regardless of whether or not petitioners are satisfied with the consequences. Satisfaction rate refers to the ratio of initial visits rated satisfactory by petitioners to all initial visits included in the assessment data. It depends on the evaluation of petitioners and can only be submitted and revised by themselves through the system (Int. 49, 53; Doc. 35).12 In recent years local authorities have attached great importance to the four measurements making up the evaluation process. Taking X County’s “Assessment Method of Xinfang Work” (xinfang gongzhuo kaohe banfa 信访工作考核办法) in 2018 as an example, the score of the four measurements account for 60% of the total score, of which acceptance rate and completion rate each account for 20%, while participation rate and satisfaction rate are each worth 10% (Int. 65; Doc. 36).13 In addition, all of the complex cases must be uploaded online. Those not processed through the prescribed procedures and at the same time evaluated by petitioners as unsatisfied, will attract a further two-point deduction (Doc. 36). As one xinfang cadre stressed, 11

Since repeated appeals will only be counted once, the system just evaluates the handling of initial visits (Int. 53). 12 Assessments that focus on procedural matters of online xinfang handling also appear in Jiangsu (Zhang et al., 2016). 13 The situation in Guangdong is similar. The weight of the “four-rate” accounts for 50% in 2018.

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5 Institutional Absorption in the Online Xinfang System The two conditions here must be met at the same time. This means that if the result is uncontrollable, we can still work on the procedural issues to demonstrate our efforts. This has been our general mentality since the adjustment to the assessment mechanism. It allows us not only to complete the tasks assigned by superiors, but also to protect ourselves from punishment. (Int. 61)

On this point, the assessment of four measurements has further strengthened the institutionalization of the online channel, and meanwhile provided local officials with another stage upon which to exhibit their performance. First, acceptance rate and completion rate are both formalized assessments, together accounting for 40% of the total. This means that processing units can easily achieve these scores as long as they complete the relevant procedures within the prescribed time limit (Int. 66). In practice, the almost 100% achievement of the combined target in X County provides ample proof of this assertion (Doc. 32).14 Second, participation rate is still a formalized indicator. In order to increase the rate, X County asks all processing units to allocate priority to the simple cases, input them into the system in a timely manner, and then mobilize petitioners for evaluation. This actually plays a role in improving the standardization of registration and handling processes. As a community leader explained, Neither we nor the masses are stupid. Unless we ourselves are confident, we will not let them assess our work. Similarly, if our work is not good enough, their participation will only increase the bad reviews. (Int. 67)

However, one petitioner gave us the other side of the story: Xinfang cadres called us to evaluate their work if they believed we were satisfied with it, but deliberately omitted to do so if they were unsure of our attitude. At that point we take the initiative to register a negative review. (Int. 71)

Third, although satisfaction rate primarily evaluates the consequence of a case handling, it also pays attention to the procedural issues related to the production of this consequence. This to some extent also promotes the standardization of the online channel. As some cadres noted, When a petitioner clicks the dissatisfaction option, the system will automatically pop up a number of options from which he can choose, such as whether the response is timely, whether the relevant decision has a legal basis, whether this decision has been fully implemented and whether local officials have exhibited arbitrary behavior during the implementation process, etc. The petitioner must tick one or more options before submitting his evaluation. Higherlevel authorities will then verify the so-called “irregularities.” If they are considered valid, the relevant parties will be held accountable, otherwise they will support their exemption from blame. Local officials must therefore be extremely cautious in their behavior in order to avoid disciplining from above. (Int. 49, 53)

This phenomenon is also found in Jiangshu (Jiang & Yang, 2016). For more details, also see 淮 安阳光信访: 在新形势下化解群众难题 (Huaian yanggguang xinfang: zai xin xingshi xia huajie qunzhong nanti, Online Xinfang in Huaian: Solving People’s Problems Properly in the New Age), issued on 14th April, 2014, available at: http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0414/c383447-248 92704-2.html, accessed on 5th September 2020. 14

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We did encounter this type of case during our fieldwork. According to a petitioner’s recollection, a cadre insulted and shoved him during the conversion. After he had submitted relevant evidence online, the cadre was removed from his position (Int. 70). Emphasis on the four measurements does not imply that the online channel has shifted focus away from the control of petitions, or that local officials are no longer concerned that failure to maintain stability will result in punishment. However, by placing greater stress on procedure, it is indeed diluting the pressure on stability maintenance arising out of excessive emphasis on consequences. More importantly, the assessment of four measurements establishes a coherent evaluation mechanism that strengthens the logic of institutionalization. In this sense, it acts as a critical institutional incentive that ensures the implementation of field diversion, transparent processing, and lawful termination discussed in the last three sections.

6 Conclusion This study enriches our understanding of the online xinfang channel by clarifying its working mechanism and institutional rationale. By integrating offline communication methods with the new online format, the online xinfang channel achieves a more sophisticated form of “managed participation” (Cai, 2004) through field diversion, standardized settlement and balanced evaluation. We call this process “institutional absorption” (zhidu hua xina 制度化吸纳), as opposed to the non-institutional strategies often employed by the offline channel to reduce the volume of accumulated petitions. This does not mean that the offline channel as a whole is non-institutionalized. In fact, its institutionalization has made obvious progress in many respects (Cai, 2004; Minzer, 2006; Feng, S., 2012). However, these advances cannot conceal the fact that the offline channel is descending into an increasingly unstable state as a result of its internal contradictions. In order to better understand this viewpoint, it is necessary to firstly clarify the evolution of the xinfang system as shaped by the tension between law and politics. During the days of imperial China, the system was viewed as a governance tool designed to assist the emperor in ruling of the nation rather than as a specialized judicial organ (Minzner, 2006). The post-1949 xinfang system basically inherits this tradition of politics over law, but differs from the earlier version in that it adopts a more pro-people ideology, namely the Party’s mass line. The xinfang system thus aims to wholeheartedly serve the people by facilitating their participation and using it in a way that best showcases the advantages of socialist democracy (Chen, X., 2012). It is in this sense that xinfang is regarded as a kind of low-binding participation. Individuals who are incapable of paying legal fees, or who have insufficient evidence for their lawsuits, choose xinfang as a more advantageous option to redress their grievances (Ying, 2004). However, due to limited governance resources, it is impossible for the state to solve all these demands, and this limitation gives rise to the risk of social instability. It thus needs to invent a set of “filtering mechanisms”

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(guolv jizhi 过滤机制) to resolve the facilitation-control dilemma. In the Maoist era, the ideology of class struggle and a series of formidable institutions undertook the role of managing complaints (Feng, S., 2012; Ying, 2001). In order to protect its legitimacy, the state has since introduced rights discourse and abolished some coercive apparatus that contradict this ideology. These efforts have reduced the cost of lodging complaints and meanwhile enlarged the repertoire of protesters (Thireau & Linshan, 2003; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Chen, X., 2009; Zhang & Liu, 2020). However, when thousands of petitioners come to Beijing encouraged by this pro-people gesture and when their troublesome actions come to be regarded as a threat to stability, the system shifts from facilitation to control. It makes the containment of complaints to Beijing a point of focus. Local officials are thus strongly incentivized to reduce the number of persistent complaints lodged in their jurisdiction (Li et al., 2012). In the end, when local authorities’ tough measures directed at stopping appeals have resulted in an outcry among petitioners, the system issues a number of directives to strictly forbid the use of force. The contradictory signals involved in xinfang facilitation, stability maintenance and violence prevention compel local officials to sophisticatedly strike a balance between repression, filtration and concession. They first repress some petitioners by exploiting their weaknesses, then filter out others who cannot endure the sufferings associated with long-term petitioning, and finally buy off the rest in order to achieve a temporary peace (Gui, X., 2017a). A more in-depth examination indicates that the root of these contradictions lies in the eclectic nature of the state. “Eclectic” here means the state still resolutely rejects a fundamental change of its political system to a “western-style democracy,” but is almost never satisfied with the status quo and is thus continually seeking adaptation within the existing overall boundaries (Shambaugh, 2008). Specific to the xinfang system, the state still refuses to abolish the system through an overhaul of the judiciary (Veg, 2019). Certainly, the system can help it maintain close connections with the people and thus improve its governance performance, but it also wants to properly manage the low-binding participation facilitated by the system in a more institutionalized way. Accordingly, a more sophisticated form of “institutional absorption” strategy adopted by the online xinfang channel is a continuation of this expedient reform. As illustrated above, a well-functioning online platform firstly eases the pressure on local officials by facilitating upward flow of information while reducing the upward flow of petitioners, thereby offering them greater space for standardized processing. This runs through all the links, from registration to handling to termination. Local officials must register all cases, display the handling status for each, and upload relevant documents strictly in accordance with specifications. The process ensures that simple cases, rather than being processed and forgotten, maintain visibility as exemplary achievements. This in turn encourages more petitioners to choose the online channel and one of the positive spin-offs, as greater xinfang volume moves online, is a reduction of pressure on the offline channel. For complex cases, the process serves as a buffer to minimize face-to-face confrontation between the two parties. It not only avoids petitioners’ disruptive tactics prompted by inadequate response to their travel, but also reinforces local officials’ normative motives

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by discouraging arbitrary behavior on their part. More importantly, a set of transparent and traceable procedures also provides the necessary prerequisite for the tough measures that may follow. Even so, when some cases finally are elevated to the level of “accumulated cases,” local officials must exhaust all available standardized online and offline procedures to appease petitioners before they are allowed recourse to force. They also need to provide legally convincing evidence when they actually take the case to the court and bear lifelong responsibility after the sentence has been passed. Based on these rigorous restrictions, the process attempts to demarcate clear boundaries for offenders rather than expand the scope of punishment. In the end, the assessment of four measurements attempts to further stimulate the institutionalized motivation of local officials through its emphasis on formalized requirements. It uses three rates of acceptance, completion and evaluation to assess whether all the procedural elements of a case handling process have been strictly enforced, regardless of the outcome. Although it uses satisfaction rate to evaluate petitioners’ attitude towards the results, petitioners must simultaneously clarify the procedural flaws they view as justification for a negative review. If relevant parties have performed their duties properly, they will not be responsible for the negative result. Although this does not mean that local officials will escape being disciplined for failure to maintain stability, it does provide them with another approach to display their work, exempt them from liability, and thereby lay an indispensable foundation for them to handle appeals in an institutionalized manner. My findings suggest a promising solution to better ease the inherent contradictions within the modern Chinese xinfang system. With the help of new ICTs, the online channel is capable of accomplishing xinfang collection, settlement, and evaluation in a more accessible, effective, and accountable manner, thereby creating an institutional environment that the offline channel cannot match. It first provides local officials with an institutionalized channel to perform their duties through field conversion, then shows them exactly how to efficiently carry out this job utilizing standardized processing and lawful termination, and finally tells them how their work will be assessed based on four measurements. These elements thus form a logically consistent rationale that helps the online xinfang channel to achieve a more sophisticated form of “managed participation.” For local officials, a set of coherent rather than contradictory procedures help to hold them accountable without limiting the standardized exercise of their authority. They have greater autonomy to resolve simple cases, improve ordinary cases, and finally adopt tough measures against accumulated cases, thus delivering complete “institutional absorption” in an orderly manner. In this sense, the online xinfang channel offers them the “means of strengthening personal protection without jeopardizing public policies” (Chen, J., 2016, p. 169). For citizen petitioners, these arrangements have addressed most of their simple demands and shown sufficient attention, at least ostensibly, to their more complicated requirements, thereby emphatically demonstrating the government’s determination to resolutely implement full standardization, even if by coercive means, so as to reduce anxiety resulting from paucity of response, and at the same time eliminate their motives to reap benefits through troublemaking actions. As a result, the online channel may generate a positive ratcheting up effect for both local officials and citizen petitioners,

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and thus foster a benign state-society relationship. However, technologies are not innately participatory or emancipatory. They are embedded in particular political environments and may amplify and facilitate negative effects as well as positive ones (Min & Heng, 2009). As demonstrated above, local officials may sophisticatedly filter out petitioners and even suppress their complaints by misusing standardized procedures and tough measures. On this point, the same structures that enable public participation can also be manipulated to reinforce an authoritarian rule. Even given its advantages, the online channel is, at least for now, only an alternative option that cannot completely replace the offline channel. Its practical effect still remains to be fully assessed. The Chinese government, because of its ruling commitment, continues to bear unlimited responsibility and treat xinfang as a political tool for stability management rather than a legal mechanism for dispute resolution (Yu, J., 2005b). Its aim of defending citizen legal rights is but one element of a larger focus on how to effectively rule the state (Minzner, 2006). While this remains the case, the xinfang system has to operate at the intersection of law and politics, and disappointed petitioners will sooner or later return to the old path of xinfang. In this sense, the question of how to balance “the citizenry’s aspiration for political participation” with “an appropriate level of political institutionalization” (Truex, 2017, p. 353) remains a noteworthy issue within the subject of xinfang in China, since stability is only achieved when these two elements are in equilibrium.

Chapter 6

How Local Authorities Handle Unyielding Complaints and Why Concessions Are Made

This chapter explores the reasons as to how local authorities handle unyielding complaints and why concessions are made. The goal of unyielding complaints is to appeal to Beijing and to use petitioning of Beijing as a way to pressure local authorities into resolving their problems. Therefore, Clarification of the tactics of stubborn complainants and the state responses to them can provide significant clues regarding both the fate of small-scale Chinese protests and the role of the state in shaping them. According to existing theories, persistent complaints in China are highly unlikely to succeed. However, drawing on detailed case studies conducted in the Y District in China, this chapter explores how and why local authorities cannot stop unyielding complainants from reaching Beijing and thus have to buy them off in order to make a temporary peace. It suggests that three constraints of state power can help explain this phenomenon. The decline of local authorities’ repressive tools has significantly weakened their capacity to control compplaints. This results in the divisions among officials when they are strongly pressurized to reduce the number of complaints reaching Beijing. Yet the contradictory signals from above leave them with limited room to maneuver. Determined complainants thus acquire additional avenues to force local authorities into buying them off in order to bring an end to their contention. This study casts further light on these three dimensions of political opportunity, which have not yet been amply examined in current studies. At the same time, it enriches our understanding of the protest control toolkit by setting out the whole range of complaint-handling tactics and its operational rationale.

1 Contention of Unyielding Complainants Petitioners who are determined to sustain their complaints in the face of difficulties are termed “nail complainants” (shangfang dingzihu 上访钉子户). I first noticed naillike complainants, when I was doing fieldwork in the Y District in China. From 2009 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0_6

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to 2011, the Y Government had spent several million Yuan on dozens of complainants in the name of “petition relief” (xinfang jiuzhu 信访救助), on the condition that they stopped petitioning Beijing for good (Doc. 10). One of them, a woman, received tens of thousands of Yuan because she believed that her miscarriage in the 1970s should be attributed to a push on her from a village cadre (Int. 15). An old man also got an offer of tens of thousands of Yuan, since he was wrongly dismissed by his unit during the Cultural Revolution (Int. 14). My findings are also supported by some other studies which found that local authorities elsewhere in China often bought complainants off when they failed to stop them (Sun et al., 2010, p. 10; Chen, B., 2011, p. 230; Tian, X., 2012, pp. 189–193).1 Literally, nail complainants refer to stubborn “nails” on a plank of wood that cannot be easily hammered down (Hess, 2010, p. 908). Theoretically, the term “nail persons” is generally used to describe “shrewd and unyielding people,” who, by refusing to carry out government tasks and by retaliating against local officials, become tigers blocking the road for local authorities (Li & O’Brien, 1996, p. 30). Lianjiang Li and Kevin O’Brien have made a nuanced distinction between “recalcitrants” (i.e., nail persons) and “policy-based resisters” (diaomin 刁民) (Li & O’Brien, 1996). They argue typical nail persons react forcefully to cadre demands and state extraction with threats to disrupt rural governance. When confronted, many engage in violent acts in order to test whether impassioned defiance will lead to suppression or go unpunished (Li & O’Brien, 1996, pp. 35–52). Typical policybased resisters pursue a path between quiescence and individual impetuous resistance. They resemble nail persons only in some aspects, as they challenge cadres’ misdeeds by using laws, polices, and other official communications (Li & O’Brien, 1996, pp. 40–52). However, the distinction between nail persons and policy-based resisters is often too rigid to reflect the flexibility of the repertoire of contention in China. As some Chinese scholars have convincingly illustrated, Chinese protesters normally act near the boundary of authorized channels. Their contention may be reasonable or legal in some instances, but unreasonable or illegal in others (Lu, 2009; 2012; Qiang, 1998; Ying, 2001; 2007). Therefore, O’Brien and Li later use the term “boundaryspanning” to describe popular protests in China. This signifies partly institutionalized 1

Given the sensitivity of the issue, it is impossible for me to accurately prove how widespread the phenomenon is. Still, some messages can help estimate how common this buying-off solution maybe. Firstly, the higher-level authorities support the use of petition relief in solving special and difficult petitions. The government of H Province (i.e., the superior government of the Y government) issued “The Tentative Method of Using the Special Fund to Solve Special and Difficult Petitions” (jiejue teshu yinan xinfang wenti zhuanxiang zijin guanli zanxing banfa 解决特殊疑难信访问 题专项基金管理暂行办法) in 2010 (Doc. 37). Through “Google” it is also easy to find similar documents issued by many other provinces. Secondly, local authorities have strong incentives to misuse petition relief to pacify unyielding petitioners. As a local leader explained, “If one leader used such funds to make peace with a nail-like petitioner, other leaders had no choice but to follow the same strategy. Otherwise, their relatively poor performance on petition work would jeopardize their career advancement” (Int. 21). Obviously, it is highly unlikely to avoid such a chain effect, since the description of “special and difficult petitions” is quite vague and flexible, and meanwhile local officials are strongly pressured to contain nail-like petitions that occur within their jurisdiction.

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contention, combining “lawful tactics with disruptive but not quite unlawful action” (O’Brien, 2002, p. 53; O’Brien & Li, 2006, Chap. 3). Based on the aforementioned discussions, this chapter will not make a clear distinction between nail persons and policy-based resisters. Instead, nail persons are defined as those considered in Chinese society to be shrewd and unyielding persons. Before the 1990s, few nail-like persons succeeded in resisting the state demands of tax collecting and family planning policies (Li & O’Brien, 1996, pp. 38–39). Why then, in recent years, have many of them been able to wring handsome concessions2 from local authorities. How and why are unyielding complainants more likely to succeed in China today? What implications do their successes carry? Clarifying these issues is important for two reasons. In reality, most Chinese protests take place in the form of petitions, many of which are individual-based appeals. The fate of these small-scale protests thus deserves more attention, but is often ignored by the studies on collective action. In theory, individual-based petitions are assumed to be too weak to effectively challenge an authoritarian regime since they normally lack scale, organizational base, disruptive ability and resources to make themselves forceful (McAdam, 1999, pp. 43–48). The state’s concessions to them, even if expedient, still reveal some significant clues to its constraints in shaping protests in China today. Few specialists have lost sight of the state, since it plays a more crucial role in shaping contention under authoritarian regimes when compared to democracies (Zhao, D., 2010, p. 459), and the response of the government normally outweighs the strength of challengers in determining protest outcome in China (Cai, 2010, pp. 2–8). To this end, it is necessary to “set aside overly society-focused predilections and to redirect our gaze away from those contesting power to their relationships with the powerful” (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 99). For a long time, state responses have been primarily perceived in China studies as the hard form of suppression (Bernstein & Lü, 2003; Cai, 2008a; Tong, J., 2002; Wright, 1999). Recently, the soft forms of state response have received more attention. These include tolerance (Cai, 2010, p. 45), procrastination (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 83–85), persuasion (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 83–85; Deng & O’Brien, 2013; Lee & Zhang, 2013), and concessions (Cai, 2010, pp. 6–7; Chen, X., 2009, 2012, pp. 74–76; Lee & Zhang, 2013; Su & He, 2010; Tong & Lei, 2010). However, most of the research concentrates on state response to collective contention rather than individual-based protests (Cai, 2010; Tong & Lei, 2010; Lee & Zhang, 2013). While some studies do identify one or two face-to-face state tactics designed to stop protesters individually, few systematically analyze all the possible state actions in the long process of protest control (Cai, 2008; Deng & O’Brien, 2013; Chuang, 2014; Habich, 2015; Deng, 2016). Meanwhile, most pieces of research 2

Concession means that the government meets part or all of a petitioner’s demands (Chen, X., 2012, p. 179). In China, most of the state’s concessions are expedient monetary compensations rather than true justice (Lee & Zhang, 2013), but most of the petitions are also interest articulation rather than political claims (Cai, 2010). On this point, concession is still an appropriate concept for this study, but it requires further justification. I thus use “expedient concessions” to describe such monetary compensations.

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concentrate on the role of state agents in shaping contention, and our knowledge about the impact of private agents on the process is still limited. Furthermore, many of these studies aim to identify the factors making certain responses possible, while the details of implementing these responses, which may deepen our knowledge about protest outcome, have not yet been amply explored. In addition, existing literature has clarified how judges (Su & He, 2010; Chen & Xu, 2012), policemen (Zhou & Yan, 2014), and housing officers (Chuang, 2014; O’Brien & Deng, 2015) manage protests, but the operational patterns of petition cadres have not yet been fully discussed. One exception is research by Li et al. (2012), which explores most of the local strategies for containing complaints. However, this work attempts to explain how local authorities, under the pressure from above, turn to coercion to stop complainants, and thus does not offer sufficient details about their accommodation of these individuals. The state, as a political opportunity structure (POS) which shapes protests, has also been extensively analyzed by Chinese specialists. Existing scholarship stresses firstly the significance of the central-local divide in shaping Chinese protests (Bernstein & Lü, 2003; Cai, 2006, 2008b; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Ying, 2001). However, when delving further into the state’s position, it is important to disaggregate it vertically and horizontally (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1054). Some recent research begins to identify the horizontal bureaucratic division which influences contention (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 144–162; Mertha, 2008; Shi & Cai, 2006; Sun & Zhao, 2008), but few of them notice the differentiation among individuals involved in conflict management, which also has an impact on protest outcome. Actually, bureaucratic divisions in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions are still insufficiently nuanced to interpret the success of nail petitioners. This line of research suggests that, given the huge advantage of elites, the indigenous resources of aggrieved individuals are inadequate to sustain an overt contention (McAdam, 1999, pp. 36–37). Size of contention, publicity about complaints and level of disruption are thus significant factors for protesters seeking to exploit gaps within the state hierarchy (Cai, 2010). Obviously, this standpoint cannot properly explain the state’s concessions to individual-based complaints. No matter how meticulously scholars disaggregate such divisions, they still cannot convincingly explain why only some petitioners can create and exploit these divisions. As stated above, nail petitioners normally lack key social factors; logically speaking they should not have distinct bargaining powers to exploit such divisions within the state. Scholars thus move away from bureaucratic differentiation to other kinds of political openings within the state. Some studies argue that, with the decline of its capacity to penetrate the society, the state cannot tightly control petitioners as it once did (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 60–62; O’Brien, 1996, p. 42; Tian, X., 2012b, pp. 82–106). Yet these studies ignore the fact that the state still effectively controls valuable resources in China today and thus may hold sway over individuals tightly attached to it. Xi Chen highlights another type of POS, “the contradictions and ambiguities within state ideologies and institutions” (Chen, X., 2012, p. 196). Yet Chen aims to seek the institutional roots of protests in such contradictions within the state, and thus does not present enough information about how these contradictions influence the practice of protest control. Furthermore, he ignores some other constraints of state power

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(e.g., the state’s weakened capacity to control the society). McAdam aims to bring greater analytic clarity to the concept of POS by addressing three key dimensions: the relative openness or closure of the political system, the presence or absence of elite alignments, and the state’s propensity for repression (McAdam, 1996, p. 27). However, he touches only briefly on these topics and presents no precise specification of how they work together in shaping the actions employed by the state to control contention. This chapter draws on interviews and archival sources to considerthe state’s concessions to nail-like petitions.3 It starts with an in-depth analysis of the whole process of handling persistent petitions. It then clarifies the rationale for compensating unyielding petitioners. It suggests that three constraints of state power can help explain this phenomenon. The decline of local authorities’ repressive tools has significantly weakened their capacity to control petitions. This results in the divisions among officials when they are strongly pressurized to reduce the numbers of “petitioning Beijing” (jinjing shangfang 进京上访). Yet the contradictory signals from above leave them with limited room to maneuver. Determined petitioners thus acquire additional avenues to force local officials into buying them off in order to bring an end to their complaints. This study casts further light on these three dimensions of political opportunity, which have not yet been amply examined in current studies. At the same time, it enriches our understanding of the protest control toolkit by setting out the whole range of petition-handling tactics and its operational rationale.

2 Process of Handling Unyielding Complaints Appealing to higher-level authorities to redress grievances is a deep-seated tradition in imperial China (Fang, 2009; Hu, 2000; Ocko, 1988). In order to trigger favourable intervention from a wise emperor or his loyal and upright underlings, complainants must “endure numerous ordeals and indignities of the capital appeal process, often braving torture or death” (Li et al., 2012, p. 315). By contrast, while “petitioning Beijing” in China today is less risky, successful complainants still have to overcome many obstacles or difficulties set by local authorities, since the forms and effects of petitions were tightly controlled before the 1990s (Cai, 2004). Since then, however, it seemed that complaints were often out of the state’s control. 1993–2003 saw eleven 3

I conducted semi-structured interviews with 82 informants in the Y District from early July in 2011 to late July in 2012, and several subsequent telephone interviews with key interviewees in 2013 and 2014. The interviewees ranged from village cadres, township cadres, district officials, police officers to petitioners and ordinary local people. They were chosen using snowball sampling owing to the sensitive nature of the topic. With good access to both local officials and petitioners, I also collected archival materials. These included official policies and regulations on petition work, work diaries, meeting minutes and petition reports written by local officials, internal monthly reports and yearly reports of petitioning in the Y District, and some private material provided by petitioners. In order to avoid information bias, I attempted to crosscheck some interviewees’ statements with others. This was also supplemented with information on petitioning from the media and academic articles.

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years of continuous growth in the number of complaints lodged in China (Yu, J., 2005b, p. 71). In order to clarify local leaders’ responsibility to resolve complaints in their jurisdiction, the state stipulated the principle of “territorial jurisdiction” (shudi guanli 属地管理) in 2005. It then set concrete targets to evaluate their petition work, among which controlling “petitioning Beijing” was the most important. The state further ranked the petitions and used the numbers as a significant criterion to determine a leader’s career advancement. With the “petition ranking system” (xinfang paiming zhidu 信访排名制度), the state transmitted pressure from Beijing all the way down to local leaders (Li et al., 2012, p. 324).4 These leaders then transmitted further pressure by “contracting” (bao an 包案) nail-like petitions to individual cadres (Tian, X., 2012a, p. 173). The implementation of these steps established a stability maintenance system which was ready to focus all efforts on containing targeted petitioners. The story of petition handling in my field conformed precisely to this scenario.

2.1 Nipping Every Element of Instability in the Bud Actually, as outlined earlier, complainants usually lack the social strength to sustain and succeed in their protest. Therefore, the clues to their success are more likely to be discovered from the side of the state. On this assumption, how local authorities respond to petitioners largely determines their fate. Persuasion, if it worked well, served to properly nip the risk of instability in the bud, since it could break a person’s will to resist without resorting to force (Deng & O’Brien, 2013). It thus became the first option of the Y government in the process of handling complaints. Persuasion used to play a significance role in solving conflicts in Maoist time (Lindblom, 1977; Walder, 1986). It is still used extensively in the reformed China (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 76–83), and is becoming increasingly important in recent years, with growing pressure to maintain social order without resorting to force (Deng & O’Brien, 2013, p. 534). In practice, the Y Government primarily used two kinds of persuasion when handling complaints. One was persuasion through political education. The other was persuasion through cost–benefit analysis (Int. 1, 5, 11, 12; also see Chen, X.,

4

From the end of 2013, the SBLV stopped openly ranking provinces by the number of petition cases against them. This action was considered a great relief by local officials. However, while the SBLV cancelled the “petition ranking system,” it still notified each province of the registered number of petition cases. The provinces in turn then notified each city of the registered number of cases that occurred within its jurisdiction. Meanwhile, local leaders would not be criticized by name in government circulars, but would be ordered to report the situation on their petition work if the numbers of petition cases in their jurisdiction were too high. Through this “point-to-point bulletin” (dian dui dian tongbao 点对点通报), pressure was still transmitted from Beijing all the way down to local authorities.

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2012, p. 78). However, both of them were limited in their effectiveness to deter complainants. Political education was effective in handling complaints in Maoist China because of the domination of the mass line ideology. This ideology was designed to pursue a special version of socialist democracy through “a vanguard system with meaningful participation of the masses” (Frakt, 1979, p. 690). On the one hand, the mass line ideology stressed that the party must meet the people’s demands through facilitating their participation and used it as a way to keep in contact with the people and maintain correct leadership (Diao, 1996, p. 32; Feng, S., 2012, p. 30). On the other hand, it emphasized that the party could not “simply accommodate the masses’ wrong opinions,” and must “take responsibility to lead the masses in a right and promising way” (Liu Shaoqi, quoted by Feng, S., 2012, pp. 30–31). To this end, this ideology served to legitimate the party leaders’ act of educating and even punishing “laggards” (luohou fenzi 落后分子) who were prone to paying attention to immediate, partial and personal interests rather than long-range, national and collective interests. As my interviewees confirmed, few people had tried to confront this ideology, which had strong legitimacy before the 1980s (Int. 1, 2, 3, 6, 9). With the development of the market reform, the Chinese government has, since the 1990s, started to emphasize the significance of the socialist rule of law. According to this new ideology, state agents are required to comply with the law, and meanwhile Chinese citizens are granted more rights (Lubman, 2000, pp. 384–389; Peerenboom, 2002, p. 10; Schubert, 2008, pp. 196–198). However, the socialist rule of law is different from the genuine rule of law enjoyed by democratic states. The Chinese authoritarian state thus has to legitimize itself by ideology and performance. To this end, the mass line ideology is still necessary for the state to keep its rule. The contradictory official ideology largely constrains local authorities’ thought work but facilitates petitioners’ complaints. First, the mass line ideology in China today is “de-politicized” (qu zhengzhi hua de 去政治化的) when compared to that in Maoist time. It still serves to facilitate popular appeals, but it loses much of its political power to control and reeducate some complainants by labelling them as laggards and mobilizing mass criticism against them, because all complainants must be treated equally before the law. Second, with the abolition of “the custody and repatriation regulations” (shourong qiansong 收容遣送制度) and “the system of reeducation through labor” (laojiao zidu 劳教制度) which were in contradiction to rights discourse, local officials have lost some “bargaining counters” (chouma 筹码) when persuading complainants to stop appeals (Int. 1, 3). As some complainants admitted, they gave up petitioning to higher-level authorites partly because they were afraid of being punished by these institutions (Int. 2, 9). Finally and most importantly, given the coexistence of the “de-politicalized” mass line and the socialist rule of law, complainants obtain alternative avenues to negotiate with local officials. By contrast, local officials often find themselves handcuffed by these official ideologies. As a township cadre complained,

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It is difficult to do mass work now. When you “stress politics” (jiang zhengzhi 讲政治), they start to “emphasize law” (jiang falv 讲法律). When you adhere to law, they begin to talk politics. (Int. 6)

As some other cadres further explained, Some cases are unqualified according to law, but we cannot simply refuse them, because the party promises to serve the people wholeheartedly and to satisfy them. If you adhere to law, they will use such official rhetoric to condemn you. However, if you resort to Maoist ideology or some other socialist values to educate them, they will use rights discourse to defend their lawful rights and interests. (Int. 3, 12, 17)

In addition to political education, local officials also used cost–benefit analysis to convince complainants. They firstly explained the situation of policy implementation, the difficulties of the government regarding specific issues, and even the significance of local social stability and economic development (Int. 3, 6, 12, 19; also see Chen, X., 2012, pp. 80–82). However, these “general principles” (da daoli 大道理) were not convincing, since most of the grievances could be attributed to local officials’ corruption and distorted policy implementation. As a petitioner complained, “I am not a three years old kid. There is no way to make me pay the bill for their faults” (Int. 10). In order to force complainants to stop contention, local officials often combined persuasion with coercion. In practice a common coercion was to resort to petitioners’ social ties to stop their complaints (Int. 1, 3, 4, 13). As Deng and O’Brien note, protesters’ acceptance of persuasion is a result primarily of “emotional blackmail” that local authorities exert on protesters through thought workers (Deng & O’Brien, 2013). Actually, in addition to emotional pressure, socioeconomic benefits are also a factor leading to the compliance of protesters. Before the 1990s, local officials could use their overall control of resources to persuade stubborn protesters to cease contention (Oi, 1985; Walder, 1986). As a village head explained, As long as we still have power to distribute collective land and collect rural taxes, protesters will balance their immediate and long-term benefits, and it is much easier for us to reach a compromise. (Int. 7)

However, the allocation of power and resources between the state and society has been significantly changed due to marketization and de-collectivization. As a result, ordinary people have more channels than before to access resources. Local cadres thus have less power over them when handling their complaints (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 60–62; O’Brien, 1996, p. 42). However, while local authorities cannot penetrate as deeply as they once did, they still control the allocation of most of the valuable resources, and thus can hold sway over people who have considerable interaction with them. In the Y District, party members and leaders, civil servants, and street/village cadres would be disciplined if they lodged complaints. In addition, they took responsibility to persuade their close relatives to stop complaints and would receive punishments when failing to do so (Int. 11, 12; Doc. 5). As some of my interviewees explained,

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In practice, the aforementioned people with strong ties to local authorities were less likely to sustain their complaints, partly because they might have shared interests with local authorities, partly because they might have weaknesses (e.g., corruption) seized upon by local authorities, and partly because they worried about their stable salaries or decent jobs. (Int. 3, 5, 7, 11)

Their considerable interaction with local authorities thus facilitated the latter’s socioeconomic coercion of them. For example, I met a woman who complained about the low compensation for her demolished house, but she did not plan to appeal to Beijing (Int. 9). As her neighbor later explained, the woman’s daughter worked in the civil affair bureau. Therefore, the woman worried about bringing trouble upon her daughter if she went too far (Int. 13). In another case in Hubei, while some gravel pit owners took their complaints all the way to Beijing, they still cautiously avoided irritating local officials due to their considerable interaction with the latter (Wu, Y., 2007a). By contrast, local authorities could not effectively persuade complainants who have little interaction with them. Such complainants in the Y District consisted of primarily ordinary peasants, laid off workers, street vendors, and other kinds of self-employed and unemployed individuals. In my field, most of the stubborn complainants were ordinary individuals such as this who barely had any valuable ties with local authorities. This fact largely facilitated their persistent complaints.5 As a petitioner confided, “We have little to lose through contention and thus do not fear repercussions from authorities” (Int. 14).6 Local officials also tried to intimidate complainants by “exploiting their other weaknesses” (zhao ruodian 找弱点). For example, a complainant’s son was found to have cheated on a physical examination for army recruitment (Int. 21). Yet, as some people explained, The number of nail-like complainants involved in such misdeeds was small and the chance of local authorities identifying them even smaller, given they mainly lived on their own and seldom interacted with the authorities. (Int. 5, 14, 15)

5

Based on my fieldwork, an important reason why the government had considerable say over some petitioners was because these petitioners directly or indirectly had close connections with the government. For example, they or their families and close relatives worked in state agencies, local schools or state enterprises. In this situation, the government could directly intimidate these individuals into stopping contention or indirectly force their families or close relatives to cease their protests, since these individuals’ lives directly or indirectly depended on the government (Int. 3, 5, 12, 15, 21). By contrast, the tactic was less effective in the case of nail-like petitioners, since they were normally marginalized individuals who mainly depended on themselves and barely had any connection with the government. On this point, I understand this as a kind of state tactic which works through its control of valuable resources. However, due to marketization and de-collectivization, the government cannot penetrate the society as deeply as it once did. Thus its control through resources is limited, working for individuals who still depend on it but not with others who are self-sufficient. 6 Deng and O’Brien also find that local authorities in Zhejiang Province could not effectively coerce protesters with weak ties to them into stopping contention (Deng & O’Brien, 2013).

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2.2 Concerted Efforts at Intercepting “Petitioning Beijing” When the aforementioned strategies failed, local authorities had to focus all efforts on intercepting “petitioning Beijing.” Given that the Y Government was less likely to stop petitioners with weak ties to it, it had to prevent them from reaching Beijing. In normal times, the government’s scrutiny was often of little worth, since it did not have enough people to continuously tail targeted complainants (Int. 1, 3, 5, 8). In “sensitive times”7 (mingan shiqi 敏感时期), complainants were more likely to appeal to Beijing, since their acts could exert more pressure on the “centre” (zhongyang 中 央). In response, the government transmitted downward pressure by “contracting” these complainants to individual cadres. A work team usually included a main county leader, some township leaders and some village/street cadres (Int. 12, 18; Doc. 4). If necessary, local officials also recruited informants and policemen to help them (Int. 12, 17). The government then established three lines of defense to place targeted complainants under control (Int. 12, 18). The first line was a complainant’s residence. Local cadres were ordered to keep every targeted complainant under 24-h surveillance and to report his whereabouts every four hours during the daytime (Int. 1, 3). When a complainant got away from his home, grassroots cadres had to report this to the district “emergence response office” (yingji bangongshi 应急办公室) within 5 min (Doc. 27). The office then immediately alerted the second and the third lines of defense, which included work teams at the railway and long-distance bus station in the district, and the local liaison office in Beijing. Officials, and sometimes policemen, in these locations then checked individuals who fitted the description of the complainants in an attempt to prevent them from reaching Beijing (Int. 10, 11, 14).8 However, it was not difficult for targeted complainants to break through these lines of defense. In practice, complainants often caught a bus many stops along the road, alighted somewhere else, and from there took a train or a bus to Beijing. They thus easily escaped from the cadres in the train or long-distance bus stations in the Y District who tried to block their way (Int. 3, 5, 12, 17). However, if local officials could keep targeted complainants indoors or tail them no matter where they went, they might have a chance of stopping them from reaching Beijing. Village/street cadres and their informants were ordered to take this job. However, they often failed to do so, primarily for two reasons. First, village/street cadres and their informants faced ethical pressure when deterring complainants. As a township leader explained, Many complainants are the friends, neighbors and even relatives of village/street cadres. Therefore, these cadres tend to avoid upsetting their acquaintances if possible. (Int. 5)

“Sensitive times” primarily include national day, the “two meetings” (lianghui 两会), and some other sensitive times, such as the Olympic year in 2008. 8 For similar measures taken by local authorities to stabilize petitioners in elsewhere in China, see (Li et al., 2012, pp. 330–331; Tian, X., 2012a, pp. 179–183). 7

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In another case, an informant told a township head that some targeted complainants planned to appeal to Beijing in the next few days. As this head explained, He probably knew the specific date, but he declined to divulge the details. In this way, he sold information to us, and meanwhile avoided offending his friends. (Int. 12)

Moreover, village/street cadres lacked the enthusiasm to monitor complainants because of the high difficulty and low rewards (e.g., unpromising career and poor salary) of their work. As a street secretary complained, “My salary is only 350 Yuan per month. Why should I spare no effort to do this tough job” (Int. 8). These grassroots cadres thus often turned a blind eye to complainants. As a persistent complainant confirmed, On one occasion, I just left my house through the front door. Three cadres sat at a table 20 or 30 meters away playing “mahjong” (麻将). I was not sure if they noticed me or not, but none of them asked me where I was going. (Int. 10)

Even if the aforementioned individuals reported the whereabouts of targeted complainant in a timely manner, the officials waiting in the bus and railway stations were often incapable of stopping these complainants. As a township cadre explained, Many complainants are very cunning. They pretend to withdraw their appeals and then try to find some other opportunity to escape from us. Even a tiger has its naps, not to mention us. (Int. 6)

Local officials even found themselves handcuffed when some pestering complainants insisted on contention. As some cadres admitted, It was true that they were told to use violence in such situations, but this was illegal. If their acts were videotaped and exposed to the media, they might lose their jobs. By contrast, even if they failed on this occasion to deter these complainants, they nevertheless had a chance to make amends later on. Therefore, they often followed the complainants to Beijing while awaiting some other chance to stop their complaints. (Int. 3, 8, 26)

Local officials adopted this tactic primarily based on a calculation of their own interests. First, the cadres doing this work normally had decent jobs and stable salaries. It was not worth taking a risk to beat pestering complainants, especially when they had demonstrated considerable effort by tracing them to Beijing. Furthermore, as I will analyze below, they might have a chance to reap benefits from complaints handling when targeted complainants reach Beijing. Therefore, letting these complainants off and catching them later was not a bad option for the cadres. Finally, even if these cadres were later disciplined for failing to deter these complainants, since they were normally ordinary cadres with little chance of promotion, such punishment would not significantly jeopardize their careers (Int. 3, 17). By contrast, local policemen were more authoritative than ordinary cadres in deterring complainants. However, these local policemen were usually dispatched to deal with large scale, collective complaints rather than this kind of ordinary task (Int. 22, 23, 24). Additionally, they were more independent than local cadres. Only main

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county leaders, such as a secretary of a committee of political and legislative affairs, could, when necessary, order them to handle complaints (Int. 5, 21, 22). As a result, many complainants did arrive in Beijing. Local officials then needed to seek them out, keep them away from state organs and prevent them from making trouble in public places in Beijing. However, many loopholes also existed in this process that complainants could exploit. The first step was to locate the places where targeted complainants live in Beijing. There are many small hostels near the State Bureau for Letters and Visits (SBLV)9 which accommodate complainants. These hostel owners often received contacts from local officials from different places in China. They might call a cadre if they encountered a complainant under his jurisdiction (Int. 4, 10, 14, 20). In order to convince the complainant to leave Beijing, the cadre would normally pay his accommodation fee.10 Usually such fee (e.g., 80–120 Yuan per day) was higher than that (e.g., 30– 50 Yuan per day) set by the hostel for complainants (Int. 17). Therefore, the hostel owners had strong incentives to cooperate with local officials. In order to increase the potential to make more money, the hostel owners often intentionally covered up complainants’ whereabouts for a few days. Some local officials might also get involved into such a deal, although none of them would admit to it.11 Given this personal interest in the case, it is therefore understandable why these officials might react negatively to retrieval of complainants sat an early stage and why they might prefer to await later opportunities to stop the complainants.12 Local officials could also locate targeted complainants by asking Beijing policemen to trace their ID records. However, local officials seldom used this measure, partly because they could not order these policemen to comply, and partly because they had to pay them for such a favor (Int. 17).13 Additionally, in order to avoid surveillance, some veteran complainants often chose to live in some place without recording their ID. Local officials thus had no way to locate them (Int. 13, 20). 9

It was more difficult to stop a petitioner at the site of the SBLV. As a county cadre explained, “When we find a petitioner who is queuing up for petitioning there, we can only talk to him in order to change his mind. If we drag him from the line and thus create a conflict, we may get into trouble, since there are many guards and surveillance cameras there” (Int. 17). 10 Covering a petitioner’s expense of petitioning Beijing is a pre-condition to persuade them to go back. In some cases, local officials even bought staffs for petitioners or accompanied them to visit some scenic spots in Beijing (Int. 11, 13, 19, 20; also see Tian, X., 2012b). 11 The following reasons could support my assumption. Firstly, all the expenses of retrieving petitioners were covered by local finance rather than by local officials themselves. Secondly, the fees paid by local officials were unreasonable higher than the normal expense. It did not make sense that local officials did not get a kickback from hostel owners. Thirdly, some petitioners told me that they overheard this kind of bargain between hostel owners and local officials (Int. 10, 13). 12 As I will analyze below, local officials still had many other opportunities to deter targeted petitioners and avoid jeopardizing their careers, such as cancelling their registered cases or hiring black guards to send them back to their residences. Therefore, their secret deals with hotel owners would not definitely lead to serious consequences. 13 Since local officials still had many other options as mentioned above, they did not want to now ask Beijing policemen for this help.

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The second step was to intercept targeted complainants before they accessed national-level organs to voice their grievances. However, local officials’ efforts in this regard were often hampered by two factors. First, local officials were short of resource to carry out this task. Normally, each county only had a few cadres in Beijing who were on duty to retrieve complainants. By contrast, there were many state organs in Beijing to which complainants might appeal. Therefore, all the officials from the same city established a work team. The team leader then arranged for these officials to stop targeted complainants at the sites of different state organs (Int. 17). The strategy often resulted in loopholes for complainants. For example, a cadre from county A might not know a complainant from county B. Meanwhile, the cadre who knew this complainant might be on duty in some other place (Int. 17). Furthermore, stopping a complainant at the site of a state organ was tightly forbidden by the centre. As a county cadre explained, When we find a complainant who is queuing up for petitioning, we can only talk to him in order to change his mind. If we drag him from the line and thus create a conflict, we may get into trouble, since there are many guards and surveillance cameras there. (Int. 17)

In addition, local officials had to prevent targeted complainants from making trouble in some sensitive places in Beijing, such as spreading leaflets in Tiananmen Square, trying to make a forced entry into Zhongnanhai and Xinhua Gate, and holding up banners before foreign embassies and organizations. By these means, complainants could shame the centre into acknowledging their grievances (Int. 11, 12, 17; also see Li et al., 2012, p. 322). However, many of such acts happened at random, meaning that it was extremely difficult for local officials to stop them in advance. For example, a complainant made a forced entry into Zhongnanhai after downing a whole bottle of white spirit (Int. 17). In another case, a complainant was taken away from Tiananmen Square by Beijing policemen because they found petitioning materials in his bag, even though he had merely come to see a flag-raising ceremony (Int. 20). The third step was to retrieve targeted complainants after they were found in the hostels near the SBLV, the sites of the state organs, or the “Majialou Distribution Centre” (Majialou fen liu zhongxin 马家楼分流中心).14 Complainants often refused to go back, especially if they had not yet voiced their grievances to the centre. Local officials thus hired “black guards” (hei baoan 黑保安) to do the job. Black guards might temporarily put these complainants into “black jails” (hei jianyu 黑监狱) prior to departure or bring them back immediately. Usually the price of accommodation in a black jail was 200–300 Yuan per day, and the price of repatriation was 4000– 5000 Yuan per person (Int. 13, 17, 20).15 The huge benefits associated with this 14

The centre established in 2004 was used to temporarily accommodate petitioners who were caught for abnormally petitioning Beijing. These petitioners were bused to Majialou, where they were required to fill out a registration form acknowledging they had participated in “abnormal petitioning”. Local authorities were later notified to come and pick them up (Li et al., 2012, p. 324). 15 For a detailed report of this business, see 安元鼎: 北京截访“黑监狱”调查 (Anyuanding: Beijing jiefang heijianyu diaocha, Anyuanding: An Investigation of the Black Guards Retrieving Petitioners in Beijing), available at: http://www.hongqi.tv/wybl/2018-11-14/13739.html, accessed on

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business largely determined the acts of black guards. They sometimes beat pestering complainants in order to carry out their task, but they also cautiously controlled their violence since they did expect these complainants to return (Int. 10, 13, 14). Additionally, local officials often reminded black guards not to ruin this business because they too sometimes obtained a kickback from it (Int. 10, 13, 20). Understanding this, complainants seldom confronted the toughs with aggressive behavior. As a veteran complainant explained, Their job is to retrieve rather than stop us. They may feel happy if I come back and bring them business. So why should I fight against them and bring trouble upon myself. (Int. 13)

2.3 Finding a Way Out of the Impasse The last stage of petition handling was to find a way to prevent stubborn complainants from repeatedly petitioning Beijing. The tactics of persuasion, surveillance, and retrieving complainants, as illustrated above, were ineffective in preventing persistent complaints. However, local officials might still use them as a way to raise determined complainants’ cost of sustaining contention. Among other tactics, “procrastination” (tuoyan 拖延) was ineffective in deterring determined complainants. The tactic could temporarily pacify targeted complainants and meanwhile help local officials to earn more time (Int. 1, 11). It also served to distinguish determined complainants from others by increasing the cost of complaining (Int. 1, 6). However, many persistent complainants knew this trick well. They might abstain from contention for a while, but they would start petitioning again when they were not met with a promised response (Int. 2, 4, 9, 14). “Intimidation by threats and violence” (baoli weixie 暴力威胁) was another kind of blackmail implemented by thugs. This tactic was effective, but it was also very risky and thus seldom used by local authorities. As a district official explained, “thugs do not have decent jobs as we have. Therefore, they are more likely to get out of control when dealing with conflicts. Besides, if they make trouble, we have to clean up the mess for them” (Int. 18). “Ending a case” (banjie 办结) was a feasible way to keep a complainant from returning to Beijing. In practice, local authorities could terminate a complainant’s case by responding to his demands substantially or procedurally. The first was to properly solve a complainant’s problems. This was difficult because some complainants’ unreasonable demands could not be met by any government. Furthermore, local authorities were unwilling to address many grievances caused by their own misdeeds. Additionally, some cases involved authorities in a second province. This fact made officials in their home province incapable of redressing these cases, even if they were 5th September 2021; For a latest report of this phenomenon, see 贵州驻京民警借遣返访民敛财17 万被判刑 (Guizhou zhujing minjing jie qianfan fangmin liancai 17wan bei panxing, A police in Guizhou Province was Sentenced for Seeking Benefits from Retrieving Petitioners), available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-11-22/015931184163.shtml, accessed on 22th November 2014.

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willing to help. Some cases were linked to incidents that happened a long time ago, making it difficult to collect and verify evidence about them (Int. 12, 17; also see Li et al., 2012, p. 328). The second way of ending a complainant’s case was to go through the routine procedure of “handling” (chu li 处理), “reexamining” (fu cha 复查), “reviewing” (fu he 复核), and “verifying” (ren ding 认定). Specifically, if a complainant was not satisfied with the decision made by the Y Government, he could request the reexamination authority at the next higher level to recheck the matter. If he still refused to accept the decision after reexamination, he could request a review from the review authority at the next higher level.16 If the complainant could not present new evidence, his case was then sent to the “joint meeting at the provincial level” (sheng lianxi huiyi 省联席会议) for verification. The final decision was also reported to “the office of the joint meeting at the national level” (zhongyang lianxi huiyi bangongshi 中央联席会议办公室) (Doc. 28). After these four steps, the complainant’s case was procedurally ended and the same complaint would form no part of the “evaluation” (kaohe 考核) of a leader’s performance during his period of tenure (Int. 17; Doc. 28). Anticipating this, complainants often avoided ending their cases (Int. 13, 14, 20). However, the government could also activate this procedure when they believed a complainant had misused his complaints to realize unreasonable demands (Int. 11, 13; Doc. 28). It thus became an excuse that local officials often exploited to avoid their responsibility related to handling complaints. However, the strategy often failed once persistent complainants realized they were being fooled, and started again “petitioning Beijing”. As a district leader explained, While the SBLV will not register a complainant’s case which is procedurally ended, he can still lodge his complaint in public places in Beijing in order to gain the attention of an unresponsive centre. Therefore, the SBLV may give us some time to handle stubborn complainants, but its ultimate goal is to force us to resolve the trouble locally. Therefore, if a complainant keeps petitioning Beijing, the SBLV will re-register his case sooner or later, and use this as a tactic to pressure us. As a result, we still have to take responsibility for such trouble-making acts. (Int. 11)

Therefore, local officials needed to adopt some other tactic to stop unyielding complainants from carrying out their actions. Among the tactics designed to serve this purpose, “detention” (juliu 拘留) normally lasted 7–14 days, and thus could not effectively deter unyielding complainants (Int. 5, 11). Furthermore, many stubborn complainants were old or had health issues. They were often exempted from detention even if they lodged complaints in public places in Beijing, since detention might worsen their physical situations and bring trouble to the government (Int. 11, 12). Additionally, only local policemen had authority to implement this penalty. As previously stated, it was difficult to pressure them to get involved in such a troublesome option. See 信访条例 (Xinfang tiaoli, Regulations on Letters and Visits) issued in 2005 (hereafter Regulations 2005), available at: https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%BF%A1%E8%AE%BF%E6%9D% A1%E4%BE%8B/7989150, accessed on 3rd May 2014. 16

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“Re-education through labour” (laojiao 劳教) used to be an option to stop stubborn complainants, but it was cancelled by the state in 2013. Actually, even before its abolition, the penalty was seldom used by the government. An important reason was that “re-education centres” (laojiao suo 劳教所) also sought to avoid the trouble of accommodating complainants who were either a nuisance or physically vulnerable. Local officials could not force these centres, which were under the jurisdiction of higher-level authorities, to receive complainants. They could turn to their superiors for help or bribe the leaders of these centres, but that greatly increased the cost of using the measure (Int. 11, 12). By contrast, “sentence” (panxing 判刑) was a cheaper option. However, veteran complainants understood clearly how to lodge “boundary-spanning” (O’Brien, 2002) rather than law-breaking complaints. Therefore, it was difficult to identify unlawful acts which were serious enough to warrant sending them to prison (Int. 11, 14, 17, 20). Local officials then took alternative actions to “stabilize” (wenkong 稳控) unyielding complainants, such as confining them in a “legal education school” (falv xuexi ban 法律学习班), a mental hospital, or a hotel. However, few complainants had serious mental health problems, which could be used as an excuse to send them into a mental hospital (Int. 3). It was easier to instead confine them in a legal education school or a hotel. Yet the government could not control them indefinitely, once freed they still found their way back to Beijing (Int. 10, 13, 14, 20). “Registration cancellation” (xiaohao 销号) remained an option when all the aforementioned efforts were in vain. This means the bribing of staff members at the SBLV, Maojialou, and policemen working in sensitive areas in Beijing to delete registered petitions from their computers before such registrations generate permanent records (Li et al., 2012, p. 331). This tactic could effectively reduce the real numbers of those petitioning Beijing. For example, in 2009, 2010 and 2011 there were actually some cases of “collective petitioning of Beijing” in the Y District (Doc. 11), while none were registered (Doc. 12). However, registration cancellation was only a strategy to exhaust complainants’ patience, to frustrate their confidence of success and finally to pressure them to accept a solution proposed by the government. In other words, it was a measure to approach a solution, but it was not the solution itself. As a township leader explained, “Unyielding complainants cannot be stopped solely by receipt of their payoff from petitioning. Our job is to undercut their offers by as much as we possibly can” (Int. 12). This cadre’s words explained why there were still some stubborn complainants who insisted on petitioning, even though their filed cases had been repeatedly canceled (Int. 11, 13, 14, 17, 20). Besides, it is extremely sensitive and risky now to use registration cancellation since many staff members of the SBLV were investigated for such corruption in 2013.17 See 国家信访局来访接待司数人去年已被查 (Guojia xinfangju laifang jiedaisi shuren qunian yi beicha, Many Staff Members of the State Bureau for Letters and Visits have been Investigated in Last Year), available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-06-30/022030440992.shtml, accessed on 7th October 2014.

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Consequently, when all the aforementioned tactics failed, local officials had to turn to their last resort, “buying off complainants” (shu mai shangfang ren 赎买上访 人). Theoretically, buying off complainants can be understood as a kind of concession in which complainants’ demands are partly met (Cai, 2010, p. 5). However, these concessions are an expedient which serve to deter unyielding complainants rather than solve their problems. In practice, local officials mainly used two kinds of expedient concessions. One was “secret concessions” (sixia jiaoyi 私下交易). The other was “petition relief” (xinfang jiuzhu 信访救助). The first usually included monthly “subsistence allowance” (dibao 低保), “low-rent apartments” (lianzufang 廉租房), or work opportunities in local enterprises (Int. 14, 17, 20; also see Chen, B., 2011; Chen, F., 2013; Tian, X., 2010). Local officials often privately misused these resources to seduce targeted complainants into giving up their contention. For example, a street secretary promised to give a complainant, his wife and their elder daughter each an individual monthly “subsistence allowance” if he would stop complaining (Int. 20). In another case, a township cadre offered a petitioner a low-rent apartment in exchange for his commitment to cease contention (Int. 14). However, these secret concessions with limited value were normally incapable of appeasing veteran petitioners who had been lodging complaints for years. Petition relief thus became necessary to appease the most stubborn complainants. This relief was actually designed to solve “particular and difficult petitioning issues” (teshu yinan xinfang wenti 特殊疑难信访问题) (Doc. 29). Given the description was quite vague and flexible, petition relief was often misemployed by local officials to halt contention. As a district leader explained, Generally speaking, all the complaints lodged by persistent petitioners are particular in their nature and difficult to solve. Even though a petitioner’s demand might be unreasonable, if he insists on it for a number of years, his case too becomes special. (Int. 11)

From 2009 to 2011, the Y Government spent over a several million Yuan on dozens of complainants in the name of this relief, on the condition that they permanently ceased petitioning (Doc. 10). Up until the time of leaving the field, few complainants had broken their “petition termination agreements” (tingfang xisu xieyi 停访息诉协 议) and restarted the petitioning process (Int. 11, 12, 19). This contradicts existing literature which claims that buying off complainants is maddeningly difficult because of their unreasonably high demands (Cai, 2010, p. 7; Li et al., 2012, p. 327), the mutual distrust between local authorities and complainants (Li et al., 2012, p. 329; Wu, Y., 2007a), and the ripple effect of concession-making (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 109; Ying, 2001, pp. 105–107). It was quite common for complainants to propose impractical requests. For example, an old man raised a demand of 3 million Yuan, because he was wrongly dismissed by his unit during the Cultural Revolution (Int. 14). In another case, a woman initiated a complaint in 2005, seeking 6 million Yuan for her unborn child because she believed that her loss should be attributed to a push on her from a village cadre in the 1970s (Int. 13). For their part, local officials also had measures to screen such requests and limit the scope of their concessions. First, as previously stated,

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local officials adopted many tactics at different stages of the petition-handling process to frustrate complainants. While these tactics could not effectively stop unyielding individuals, they nevertheless created many difficulties for complainants seeking to sustain their contention. Furthermore, this painful process greatly disrupted the lives of determined complainants and exerted psychological and economic pressures. As a petitioner complained, “My daughter-in-law forbade my granddaughter to see me, because she felt ashamed to have a pestering mother-in-law and worried that I may be a bad example to her daughter” (Int. 13). In another case, a man threatened to divorce his wife, since she wholeheartedly concentrated on her “career” of petitioning, completely ignoring her duty to make money for the family (Int. 10). Additionally, with the passing of time, many complainants became older and more physically vulnerable. This fact often made it easier for the government to reach a compromise with them. As the old man who requested 3 million Yuan compensation worried, “I am over 70 now. I am not sure how long I can still live. If I die suddenly, I cannot get anything from the government”. He thus planned to accept an offer proposed by the government (Int. 14). The woman who asked for 6 million Yuan compensation was later bought off by a petition relief of tens of thousands of Yuan and a work position with a monthly salary of a few hundred Yuan (Int. 13). As I saw the complainants who were compensated by the government, the relief in many cases was below ten thousand (Doc. 10). The expenditure of a several million to terminate these determined complainants was seen as an acceptable bargain from the government’s point of view. It was also true that mutual distrust might ruin an agreement between local officials and complainants. Local authorities often stopped negotiation when complainants were ready to accept their offers. As a district leader explained, “It is a kind of stalling tactic. Through this, complainants may become impatient and we can take advantage of the opportunity to buy them off cheaply” (Int. 18). Complainants also hesitated to sign an agreement, even when local authorities decided to reach a compromise with them. As a complainant worried, “Once I surrender my ‘weapon’ of petitioning Beijing, I lose the power to force the government to keep their promises” (Int. 4). In practice, complainants often used repetitive petitioning of Beijing to force the government back to the table. As previously stated, it was feasible for complainants to do so, even if it entailed suffering. Furthermore, complainants became more determined and tenacious when approaching a closure. Additionally, at this time their complaints were more reasonable since the government broke its promises first (Int. 10, 13, 14, 20). On the other hand, local authorities were often suspicious about complainants, since they might take the money and lodge a complaint on another matter. As a district leader complained, “Some complainants were greedy and untrustworthy. Once you give him an inch, he will want a yard” (Int. 11). However, local officials also had methods to avoid this phenomenon. First, they never made easy concessions to complainants. As mentioned above, a painful process of petitioning significantly frustrated complainants’ willingness to reinitiate contention. Furthermore, local officials normally paid for petition relief through monthly or yearly installments and if a complainant broke his promise they could

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easily withhold payment. For example, a complainant was compensated by tens of thousands of Yuan paid in monthly installments, receiving a few hundred Yuan every month. If she stopped petitioning, she would receive all the relief in the next few years (Int. 12, 13). In another case, a petition was also compensated in annual installments. The aim was to guarantee that she would not lodge a complaint again for the next few years (Int. 10, 17). Finally and most importantly, “the cadre evaluation system and exchange system” (ganbu pingjia he jiaoliu zhidu 干部评价和交流制度) largely facilitated local officials to buy off complainants. In the Y District, major leaders (i.e., party secretaries and government heads) were ordered to take full responsibility for solving complaints in their jurisdiction. Their performance on this measure was considered a core determinant of career advancement (Doc. 5; see also Li et al., 2012, p. 326). However, in order to control regionalism, virtually all main party leaders are periodically rotated. Therefore, they only have a short and fixed term of office (i.e., 3–5 years) in one locality (O’Brien & Li, 1999, pp. 175–176). This system helps main local leaders to avoid punishments if they only succeed in temporarily stabilizing targeted complainants within their period of tenure, because they may be transferred to another locality by the time these complainants start petitioning again (Int. 11, 12, 18). To this end, the government normally paid for petition relief through monthly or yearly installments and used it as a way to avoid a complainant going back on his complaints within a period of time (Int. 5, 14, 15, 20). The third issue causing concern to local officials when making concessions was the need to avoid a ripple effect. As a township leader explained, Veteran complainants from the same place often shared their experiences of contention. They also became associated with complainants from elsewhere in China during the process of petitioning Beijing. Therefore, when we or our colleagues in other places make concessions to a complainant, it may result in chain reactions. (Int. 11, 12)

In practice, local officials mainly adopted the following measures to avoid this. They firstly used all the tactics discussed above to frustrate persistent complainants, and made them and the public understand clearly that sustaining contention would result in continued suffering (Int. 17). They furthermore set a principle of isolating one case from the other, thereby preventing comparisons among complainants. Since different regions had different economic conditions, and individual cases had specific facts, local officials could easily make every case unique (Int. 11). Thirdly, local officials had much more funds than before to buy off complainants. As stated above, the government received a several million Yuan earmarked for the specified purpose of handling particular and difficult petition cases from 2009 to 2011, a resource the government lacked before 2009. Therefore, concession-making was more likely than before, with local officials able to control it and at the same time having more funds to cover it.

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3 Rationale for Compensating Unyielding Complainants Based on a detailed analysis of handling nail-like complaints, this chapter elaborates next the rationale behind the compensation of unyielding complainants. It suggests that three constraints of state power can help understand the phenomenon.

3.1 Decline of Local Authorities’ Repressive Tools The first is the decline of local authorities’ repressive tools to control the society. Before the 1990s, local authorities were more likely to halt nail-like complaints by means of a series of formidable instruments. First, they could force complainants to withdraw their appeals by legitimately stigmatizing them as “laggards” (Chen, B., 2011, pp. 235–238), or repressing them via the overall control of resources (Walder, 1986; Oi, 1991). If some petitioners still insisted on lodging complaints, local authorities could obstruct them with the help of a number of formidable institutions. Work units for example performed an effective surveillance function since they involved extensive interaction between individuals and state agents within a very limited space (Chen, X., 2005, p. 149). The food rationing system and railway system further served to limit social mobility (Chen, X., 2005, p. 149). The custody and repatriation system and the labor education system (until they were abolished in 2003 and 2013 respectively) were used as punitive tools to control and expel petitioners (Ying, 2001, pp. 396–399). If a complainant still managed to avoid these obstacles and successfully reached Beijing, local authorities could exact revenge upon their return. For instance, they could allocate them poor quality land or deliberately make things difficult by applying more stringent standards in tax collection (Int. 3, 4, 12, 27). The state has since implemented, however, a series of policies which have largely weakened its agents’ capability of containing complainants. With the introduction of rights discourse, local authorities lose much of their ideological authority to discipline complainants. Due to marketization and de-collectivization, local authorities lose much of their material authority to intimidate complainants. With the abolition of the coercive apparatus, local authorities lose some of the options with regard to use of institutionalized violence to repress complainants. As a result, complainants are presented with additional avenues to justify their claims, and meanwhile feel more free and secure to lodge complaints.

3.2 Differentiated Interest Among Petition Cadres Facing a high tide of petitioning, brought about by Beijing itself, the state has increased its agents’ awareness of their role in stopping determined complainants. However, this is by no means an easy task, especially when the state has given

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complainants greater autonomy and meanwhile weakened its agents’ capability of keeping them under control. Petition cadres thus find their own ways to deal with the dilemma. This results in the second constraint, which I have termed “divisions among petition cadres.” This study notes the influence of vertical and horizontal bureaucratic differentiation on contention, outlined in current literature. For example, the central-local division is the prime power which drives complainants to voice grievances in Beijing. The horizontal differentiation among local authorities, police bureaus, and reeducation centers also restricts local officials’ tactics when dealing with complaints, and serves to assist complainants to sustain their protests. Moving the understanding forward, however, this study presents a more nuanced analysis of elite divisions from the angle of differentiated interests among petition cadres. In his analysis of “anthropology of the state”, Migdal identifies four levels of state organization. “At the bottom of the state hierarchy, in the political trenches, stand the officials who must do daily battle with other social forces” (Migdal, 2001, pp. 117–118). These officials provide a closer window on state-society interactions in places where both sides actually face one another (Diamant, 2001, p. 473). The individuals involved in the process of petition handling primarily embrace local leaders, ordinary officials, grassroots cadres (i.e., street/village cadres) and the allies of these local elites (e.g., hostel owners, thugs, and black guards). The allies of local officials often choose to ignore or even encourage complainants to lodge complaints, since the latter can mean business opportunities for them. Grassroots cadres, as informal officials, frequently show their demotivation in their work of intercepting complainants, partly because they lack career incentives, partly because they face ethical pressure from complainants who are familiar to them. Ordinary local officials with unpromising career prospect and low salary tend to avoid trouble when handling complaints, while often reaping benefits from their work. By contrast, main party leaders are willing to make expedient concessions to complainants only if such efforts can temporarily stop them within the leader’s period of tenure. The divisions among these individuals thus offer many opportunities for complainants to sustain their contention.

3.3 Contradictory Signals from Above Confronted with the continuous pressure brought by stubborn complainants, local authorities are eager to find a way out of the impasse. However, the contradictory signals from above leave them with limited room to manoeuvre. It is rare for a dominant class to share a coherent ideology (Scott, 1985, p. 341). The Chinese state thus often sends “mixed signals” on certain issues (Stern & O’Brien, 2012). Specific to the handling of complaints, local authorities’ activities are simultaneously shaped by three kinds of contradictory signals from above. The state firstly stresses that local authorities must serve the people wholeheartedly by facilitating

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their participation and using it as a way to show the advantages of socialist democracy (Chen, X., 2005, p. 97). Consequently, a huge number of aggrieved individuals who are unwilling to pay legal fees, who cannot stand long judicial procedures or who have insufficient evidence for their lawsuits, choose petitioning as a potentially more advantageous option to redress an injustice. When local authorities cannot solve their problems promptly and adequately, many disappointed complainants turn to “petitioning Beijing” in order to gain the attention from above. The state then shifts from facilitation to control. It makes containing complaints in Beijing a “hard target” (ying zhibiao 硬指标) and warns local leaders that they will be disciplined if they fail to do so (Tian, X., 2012a, p. 178). As previously clarified, local leaders struggling for promotion in a highly competitive bureaucratic system are very sensitive to such penalties. They are thus strongly incentivized to reduce the number of nail-like petitions that occur in their jurisdiction. Later, when the state realizes that local authorities’ tough measures directed at stopping petitions have caused an outcry among complainants, it issues a number of directives to strictly forbid the use of force, unless there truly is no other option.18 While these orders will not always work completely as expected, they will go a long way to limiting extent and costs of suppression. Local officials who resort to force too quickly (or unsuccessfully) are often disciplined with salary reductions, demotions or even imprisonment (Li et al., 2012, p. 325; O’Brien, 2017). The contradictory signals involved in petition facilitation, stability maintenance, and violence prevention compel local authorities to sophisticatedly get the balance right among repression, filtration, and concession. As elucidated above, they firstly repress some complainants by exploiting their weaknesses, then filter out others who cannot endure the sufferings associated with long-term complaining, and finally buy off the rest in order to at least achieve a temporary peace.

3.4 Buying Stability in the Chinese State With the help of Table 3 this section provides a brief summary of how the aforementioned constraints together shape the operational patterns of petition handling, ranging from repression to filtration to concession. Regarding the tactics of repression, when local authorities cannot penetrate the society as deeply as they once did, they cannot always effectively halt nail-like

See 国务院办公厅关于进一步严格征地拆迁管理工作切实维护群众合法权益的紧急通知 (Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jinyibu yange zhengdi chaiqian guanli gongzuo qieshi weihu qunzhong hefa quanyi de jinji tongzhi, Urgent Notice on Strictly Managing Requisition and Demolition to Protect the Masses’ Legal Rights and Interests released by State Council General Office), issued in May 2010, available at: http://www.xichang.gov.cn/ztzl_15908/jczwgksdzl_15920/zsjttd zdbc_15921/zcfg_15924/201710/t20171017_769919.html, accessed on 21th June 2017; also see (Zhou & Yan, 2014, p. 10). 18

4 Conclusion Table 3 The three types of strategies employed in petition handling

117 Tactics of repression

Intimidation by exploiting petitioner weakness Labor education Sentencing Hiring of thugs to halt petitions

Tactics of filtration

Surveillance Interception Retrieval Stabilizing of petitioners Registration cancellation Detention Procedural termination of a case

Tactics of concession

Secret compensation Petition relief

Note The table is based on the author’s summary

complainants by exploiting their weakness, especially where these marginalized individuals have little interaction with them. Nor can they arbitrarily send a complainant to jail or labor education center, since these two agencies are relatively independent of them. They also seldom hire thugs to stop complainants while other options are still available, because it is at odds with the state’s prohibition on the use of violence. Regarding the tactics of filtration, local authorities cannot always effectively stop “petitioning Beijing” by means of surveillance, interception and retrieval because of the decline of these repressive tools and the differentiated interests among petition cadres. While they can use “stabilization,” “registration cancellation,” “detention,” and “procedural termination of a case” to exhaust complainants’ patience and diminish their confidence of success, these tactics are liable to failure as long as local authorities cannot prevent them from again reaching Beijing. Often local authorities resort ultimately to “secret compensation” or “petition relief” to halt stubborn complainants and to achieve a temporary peace for themselves. This tactic superficially meets the state’s contradictory incentives, and is thus an acceptable option for local leaders.

4 Conclusion Drawing on the interviews and archival sources documented in a district in China, this chapter explains how local authorities handle nail-like complaints and why concessions are made. It concludes that three constraints of state power can enhance our understanding of the situation. The first is the decline of local authorities’ repressive tools. In order to improve its performance, the state initiated a series of policies which have largely weakened its agents’ authority to utilize political education, resource distribution and institutionalized force to control complainants. Faced with the high

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tide of petitioning which Beijing largely brings upon itself, the state has increased its agent’s awareness of the need to manage complaints through the petition system. This further results in the differentiated interests among petition cadres when they lack effective measures to contain the tide. Yet the state’s contradictory incentives, aimed at balancing accommodation and control, leave its agents with limited room to maneuver. Expedient concessions thus become their last resort in order to make a temporary peace with unyielding petitioners. This finding does not mean that nail-like complainants necessarily win the battle against the state. It is still difficult for them to achieve true justice through the lodging of a complaint. Even if some complainants finally wring expedient concessions from local authorities, the process nevertheless brings great suffering. Only those with a huge amount of courage and determination are capable of seeing this lengthy appeal through to the end. Nor does this finding deny the strength of state power, which still has many levers to achieve its ends. Local authorities can halt some complainants by exploiting their weaknesses. They can also use various tactics to frustrate complainants in their quest to sustain contention and thereby reduce the cost of buying them off. Even if they do sometimes make expedient concessions to unyielding complainants, such tactic normally serves to temporarily absorb grievances rather than actually resolve them. Therefore, what stubborn complainants receive from the state can be viewed as a “reward” for their routine protests, which up until now has not been considered a serious challenge to the state’s rule (Perry, 2010, p. 28). Nevertheless, by illustrating how a muscular state unexpectedly makes concessions to individual-based complaints, this chapter enriches our understanding of the state-society interactions in China today. First, it goes beyond simply ratcheting up the use of coercion and provides a systematic, flexible, and coordinated manner of protest control. Local authorities sophisticatedly and flexibly use the tactics of repression, filtration, and concession to withstand pressure of dealing with complaints, acting either directly or through their allies as the circumstances require. Compared to the aforementioned studies which elaborate one, or at most a few, soft or hard control tactics, this chapter helps better understand the toolkit of protest control and the rationale of its operation. Second, it enriches our perception of POS by examining three constraints of state power. Our current understanding of POS, which primarily focuses on bureaucratic divisions and contradictions within state ideologies and institutions, loses sight of some significant elements of the political environment and thus cannot properly explain the persistence of individual-based protests. By contrast, this chapter provides in-depth details to enrich this line of research. McAdam seeks to enhance understanding of the POS concept through an analysis of the three principle elements, relative openness or closure of the political system, presence or absence of elite alignments and state propensity for repression (McAdam, 1996, p. 27). As illustrated above, the three constraints of state power (i.e., decline of local authorities’ repressive tools, differentiated interest among petition cadres, and contradictory signals from above) fall well within these dimensions of POS. Furthermore, this chapter not only identifies these elements, but moves the discussion forward by describing the

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mechanism by which they work together to shape the dynamics and outcomes of petition handling. The chapter also presents some implications for further research. On the positive side, the current state does have the willingness and capacity to institutionalize complaints, which has created more democratic spaces for protesters to defend their rights. How such efforts will re-shape the landscape of Chinese protests deserves further attention. On the negative side, buying off complainants is chipping away at the roots of domination. A “bargained authoritarianism” is turning authority and rights into commodities (Lee & Zhang, 2013, p. 1494). While expedient concessions to nail-like complaints seem less risky, at least for now, “the vast aggregation of petty acts” could also possibly lead to a “shipwreck” (Scott, 1986, p. 8). Therefore, how this commercialized state-society relation will affect complainants’ consciousness and actions becomes an important subject for further research.

Chapter 7

How Local Authorities Negotiate with Nail Residents and Why Concessions Are Made

This chapter explores how local authorities handle the protests of nail residents, and why concessions are made. As stated in Chap. 1, the contention of nail residents is a representative small-scale protest in China. Yet, neither the contention of nail residents nor state strategies in response to it have been amply explored in existing literature. Clarification of these issues has thus both empirical and theoretical significance. Based on the case study of resistance against demolition in the Y District in Henan, China, the chapter demonstrates that the “success” of nail residents can be attributed to three factors. First, bureaucratic divisions within the state provide the necessary political openings that residents can exploit. Second, effective anti-demolition tactics help residents to complete their unapproved constructions, to create difficulties for local authorities’ thought work, and to increase as much as possible local authorities’ risk during the forced eviction process. Thirdly and most importantly, state-society bonds reveal why only some of the residents can successfully use the aforementioned openings and tactics in their protests against local authorities, and thus negotiate a better bargain with the latter. Specifically, the low “infrastructural power’ of local authorities makes them incapable of penetrating as deeply as they once did, but their high “despotic power” makes them capable of holding sway over people having considerable interaction with them. The “half-opened” state-society bonds explain how the limits and the strength of the state exert an influence on protest outcome, and why residents with weak ties to local authorities have better opportunities for resisting official pressure than residents with strong ties to them.

1 Protests of Nail Residents With urbanization driving the current land development boom, “demolition” (chaiqian 拆迁) has become a hot issue throughout China. Demolition in China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0_7

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is a highly conflict-laden process, often characterized by improper land grabs of local authorities and subsequent contentions of angry “residents facing eviction” (chaiqian hu 拆迁户). Exacerbating this conflict is a weak legal framework, poorly managed public participation, and predatory grassroots administrations seeking to boost budgetary revenues through land seizure (Hsing, 2010, pp. 93–121, 155–180). However, even when confronted by a muscular state, some residents continue to sustain their dissension and thus become tigers that block the road of local authorities (Erie, 2012; Ho, C., 2013). Studies on contentious politics in China have focused on three theoretical approaches that explain the effectiveness and outcomes of contention. The first emphasizes the significance of “boundary-spanning” and “troublemaking” contention tactics (Chen, X., 2009; O’Brien, 2002; Ying, 2001; 2007). However, these tactics alone are not enough to explain the success of nail residents, since almost all nail residents know how to exploit these tactics, why is it that only some of them can sustain their altercation? The second approach assesses the importance of various key factors that can effectively increase the bargaining power of protesters. These include extra leverage derived from state officials or journalists, strong social ties, adaptive leadership, unifying frames, and ample financial and time resources (Deng & O’Brien, 2014; Kuang & Goebel, 2013; Li & O’Brien, 2008; Shi & Cai, 2006). However, these factors too are limited in their ability to explain the persistence of nail residents’ contention since they usually lack the above leverage. While the success of nail residents is widely attributed to media support, they usually receive media attention because of their persistence in the first place (Lu, 2012). Nail residents also lack support from officials because social connections with authorities more often than not demobilize their contention (Deng & O’Brien, 2013). Furthermore, successful nail residents seldom resort to disruptive action. On the contrary, disruptive action often gives local authorities the advantage, leading to the failure of the contention.1 Finally, nail residents’ contention tends to be on a small scale with a weak organizational base because of different requirements in different situations (e.g. house location, materials and decorations, and various kinds of difficulties in life). Given their differentiated economic interests, it is relatively difficult for nail residents to maintain solidarity and cooperation. The third approach highlights bureaucratic differentiation in both vertical and horizontal dimensions as an aid to explaining the development and outcomes of protests in China (Bernstein & Lü, 2003; Cai, 2006; 2008; Chen, X., 2012, Chap. 3; Mertha, 2008, Chap. 2; Shi & Cai, 2006; Sun & Zhao, 2008; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Ying, 2001). However, vertical and horizontal bureaucratic divisions within the state, as key political opportunity structure (POS), are still insufficiently nuanced to explain the 1 Many nail residents have failed in their contention by resorting to violence. see 宜黄自焚事件 (Yihuang zifen shijian, Yihuang Self-immolation Incident), available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Yihuang_self-immolation_incident, accessed on 20th, October, 2013; Also see 唐福珍事件 (Tang Fu-zhen shijian, Tang Fuzhen Self-immolation Incident), available at: http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Tang_Fu-zhen_self-immolation_incident, accessed on 20th October 2013.

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persistence of nail residents. No matter how meticulously scholars disaggregate bureaucratic divisions within the state, they still cannot convincingly explain why only some resident can create and exploit these divisions. As mentioned above, nail residents normally lack key social factors but share similar tactics; logically speaking they should not have distinct bargaining powers to exploit political openings within the state. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, on-site observation and archival materials, this chapter demonstrates that the success of nail residents can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, bureaucratic divisions within the state provide the necessary political openings that residents can exploit. Secondly, effective anti-demolition tactics help residents to complete their unapproved constructions, to create difficulties for local authorities’ thought work, and to increase as much as possible local authorities’ risk during the forced eviction process. Thirdly and more importantly, state-society bonds reveal why only some of the residents can successfully use the aforementioned openings and tactics in their protests against local authorities, and thus negotiate a better bargain with the latter. Specifically, the socio-economic transformations since 1990s have significantly shifted the balance of power and resources between local authorities and local people. Local authorities cannot penetrate as deeply as they once did, but they still control the allocation of most of the valuable resources, and thus can hold sway over people having considerable interaction with them. Correspondingly, residents can be categorized as either capable residents or ordinary residents according to their degree of interaction with local authorities. Capable residents are predominantly people who work in government offices, public organizations, and state-owned enterprises or who have close relatives working there. Capable residents are more likely to avoid contention because of their strong ties with local authorities. In contrast, ordinary residents are usually peasants, laid-off workers, street vendors, self-employed and unemployed people who have little interaction with local authorities. These weak links serve to facilitate their action since they have little to lose through contention and do not fear repercussions from authorities. Ordinary residents are thus more likely to succeed in their protests and their success, in turn, stimulates contention from other residents. By exploring the four stages of the state-society interactions in a dynamic process of demolition, the remainder of the chapter discusses in greater detail how and why some residents become nail residents, succeeding in their protests, and the implications of their success.

2 Precaution and Loopholes The Y District is a county-level district in Henan Province, China. Over the past few years demolition has become a commonplace feature of the Y District’s landscape as a result of various land development projects. As elsewhere in China, the history

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of demolition in the Y District is marked by social conflicts because of the general problems surrounding it. The first issue the government in the Y District (hereafter the Y Government) faces during the demolition process is preventing residents from using unapproved constructions to add value to their homes. This widespread behaviour is called “zhongfangzi” (种房子), meaning the creation of unapproved buildings, or unapproved extensions to buildings. As a street cadre confided, “almost every household has created unapproved constructions” (Int. 8). This allows residents to maximise their compensation from the Y government (Int. 1, 2, 3, 16). Therefore, preventing residents from creating unapproved constructions is the Y Government’s focus before demolition actually starts. To this end, regular patrols are implemented primarily by village/street cadres and “urban management officers” (chengguan 城管). However, this patrolling is often of little worth. Village or street cadres tend to “turn a blind eye” (zheng yizhi yan bi yizhi yan 睁一只眼 闭一只眼) to unapproved construction work for three reasons. First, their families, relatives, and friends also want to create unapproved constructions. If they prevent the general populace from pursuing such work, those close to them cannot be easily ignored (Int. 27, 28). Second, regardless of personal interest, they tend to avoid upsetting their acquaintances if possible (Int. 3, 8). Third, considering the aforementioned reasons, it is difficult for township officials to seriously pressure village or street cadres to prevent unapproved constructing work. As some township officials explained, they cannot easily manage street or village cadres, since the latter are just quasi-state agents with relatively poor salary and unpromising career. More importantly, they tend to fear losing these cadres’ support on other important issues if they push the latter too hard on this work (Int. 6, 26).2 Urban management officers also cannot effectively stop residents from carrying out unapproved construction work for two reasons. First, urban management officers are short of time and capacity. As an urban management officer complained, These households stop unapproved constructing work when we are there, but when we leave, they started doing it again. We are short of staff. It is impossible for us to stay there all the time. (Int. 3)

Second, given the high difficulty but low rewards (e.g., unpromising career and poor salary) of their work, urban management officers tend to reap benefits from fining unapproved constructing work instead of stopping it. As a township leader confided, We know they exploit the situation by benefiting from fines on unapproved constructing work, but we have no better way to improve their incomes. We cannot let the horse keep running without letting it eat. (Int. 12)3 2

The relations between township officials and street or village cadres are delicate not just in Y District but also elsewhere in China. For detailed analysis of this issue, see (Ouyang, 2009; Wang & Wang, 2009; Wu, Y., 2007b, pp. 614–618; Zhao, S., 2010, pp. 191–195). 3 The dilemma of Chengguan in managing unapproved constructing work is also ubiquitous in China. See (Duan, 2010; Liang, 2012; Ni, 2012).

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The Y Government’s inability to manage unapproved construction work provides opportunities for residents to exploit this weakness. However, unapproved constructing work is illegal and may bring trouble for residents. Therefore, it is still important for residents to use appropriate tactics when undertaking such work. Residents normally adopt the strategy, “Take advantage of others’ power” (jieshi celue 借势策略), in order to successfully complete unapproved constructing work. Usually, capable residents can easily exploit local authorities’ power due to their considerable interaction with the latter. By contrast, ordinary residents with weak ties to local authorities do not have such advantage, but they sophisticatedly use existing unapproved constructions as an excuse to justify their own constructions. As one confirmed, “I just follow these cadres and their relatives when I’m building onto my house. If it works for them, it works for me” (Int. 16). Usually urban management officers fine these residents and turn a blind eye to their unapproved constructing work, since it is unreasonable for them to do a “favour” (renqing 人情) for some residents but not for others (Int. 3, 4, 29). Consequently, many ordinary residents successfully complete unapproved constructing work before demolition takes place.4

3 Persuasion and Procrastination The most important task for the Y Government when they commence the demolition itself is to persuade residents to make way for the demolition. They do this through “thought work” (sixiang gongzu 思想工作). Specifically, the Y Government gathers information about a resident’s social networks, and recruits people with social ties to that resident onto a work team to serve as “thought workers.” The Y Government then motivates these workers to persuade residents to vacate their homes before the upcoming demolition (Int. 6, 11; Doc. 13). Usually, “thought work” on capable residents with strong links to local authorities is highly effective. In the Y District, most of the capable residents, such as public servants, SOE’s employees, schoolteachers, and their close relatives, signed demolition agreements with local officials (Int. 3, 6, 11, 19, 28). Deng and O’Brien note the effectiveness of thought work rests largely on the strength of social ties between local authorities and protesters (Deng & O’Brien, 2013, p. 542). However, they perceive the compliance of protesters as a result primarily of “emotional blackmail” that local authorities can exert on protesters through thought workers (Deng & O’Brien, 2013, p. 534). What they have not yet amply explored, however, is the compliance of protesters in return for benefits. The shared interest distribution between local authorities and some capable residents is the first reason for the compliance of the latter. The market reform and a 4

The tactic of creating unapproved constructions after some residents take the first step is also adopted by residents elsewhere in China. For more details also see (Wu, J., 2011, pp. 191–195; Wu, Y., 2007, pp. 270–282).

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series of preferential agricultural policies have created numerous new opportunities and resources in the Y District. However, most of them have been controlled by the Y Government. Capable residents thus have better opportunities to reap benefits from the government by exploiting the strong ties between the two.5 However, such shared interest distribution also reinforces capable residents’ dependence on the government, and leads to their compliance with the latter in the cases of demolition (Int. 3, 7, 12, 20).6 Moreover, it is not uncommon for capable residents to have committed misdeeds, such as taking or receiving bribes. Such misdeeds become the “weaknesses” (ruodian 弱点) that local authorities can exploit. For example, I overheard a district leader telling a township cadre, “Let him (a capable resident) know, if he still refuses to leave, we can investigate his brother-in-law. I doubt that as a prosecutor who has served for years he is free of corruption problems”.7 In another case, a township head threatened a village head in front of some residents: “If you do not sign the demolition agreement today, tomorrow I will send people to investigate the accounts in your village” (Int. 13). Even capable residents who have not committed any misdeed might still have to consider their or their close relatives’ stable salaries and relatively promising career prospects, which may be heavily influenced by the suspension of duties, transfer of positions, and even removal from office (Int. 17, 19).8 The Y Government also has to confront a large number of ordinary residents, who include ordinary peasants, laid off workers, street vendors, and other kinds of self-employed and unemployed people. They rarely have any valuable ties with local authorities. This fact can help facilitate their action, which at this stage of the demolition process focuses on resistance to the persuasive pressures of local authorities. First, ordinary residents risk little by refusing local authorities’ thought work, since they primarily rely on themselves. Therefore, a street vendor aptly summarized his position, I am just a street vendor selling sundries. I do not have stable job or a fixed stall. My wife is a housewife. My son and daughter are self-employed workers. Therefore, the government cannot find my weakness. (Int. 30)

Local authorities might sometimes find an ordinary resident with a weakness making him vulnerable to blackmail. For example, a resident’s son was found to 5

It is very sensitive to discuss corruption and rent-seeking acts with my interviewees. Only some officials who were unhappy with their situations were willing to discuss this issue with me (Int. 3, 10, 11, 18). 6 The compliance of capable resident with local authorities due to the particularized interest distribution between two parties has also been observed elsewhere in China (Chen, B., 2013; Chen, F., 2013; Wu, Y., 2007a). 7 I accidently overheard this conversation in an office in the District Petition Bureau. Although they did not mention the name and stopped talking when I came into the office, I nevertheless recognized what they were talking about from my fieldwork at that time. 8 These sanctions are also quite common elsewhere in China. See (Deng & O’Brien, 2013).

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have cheated on the physical examination for army recruitment (Int. 11). However, as an official explained, the number of ordinary residents involved into such serious misdeeds is small and the chance of local authorities identifying them even smaller, given they mainly live on their own (Int. 12). Second, ordinary residents do not face intense psychological pressure if they give thought workers the cold shoulder. Given an ordinary resident’s poor social network, local authorities can normally only recruit his friends, classmates, former colleagues, or merely strangers to apply thought work pressure (Int. 3, 6, 11, 12). Due to the weak ties between thought workers and ordinary resident, local authorities normally assume that thought workers have limited influence over the targets, and thus seldom discipline them for their ineffective work. This would not be the case, though, for those who fail to persuade their close relatives (Int. 1, 6, 12, 19). Correspondingly, ordinary residents find it much easier to refuse their non-relatives’ requests, compared to the requests emanating from their family members (Int. 7, 19, 27, 32).9 Consequently, ordinary residents are better positioned than capable residents to employ “procrastination tactics” (tuoyan celue 拖延策略). Specifically, ordinary residents may lie to thought workers, for example by pretending that they are not home or are too busy to meet the workers. Or they might lock their doors, or refuse the thought worker entry to their houses, or even scold them to their face (Int. 2, 3, 6, 19, 30). In the event a thought worker finally attempts persuasion, ordinary residents might tearfully pour out a tale of woe, continuously change their offers for home compensation, or try to exploit loopholes in the demolition procedure by requiring thought workers provide related documents and certifications to justify their actions in demolition (Int. 1, 11, 13, 28).10 By making these moves, many ordinary residents can effectively place obstacles in the path of thought workers and thus delay demolition as long as possible.

4 Demolition and Protests Following the stages of persuasion and procrastination, many residents successfully maintain occupancy. These residents then have to confront a further series of demolition tactics by the Y Government. How they react to these tactics largely determines the outcomes of their protests against demolition. For analytical convenience, this section firstly examines all the possible demolition tactics adopted by local authorities, and then analyses the tactics of residents fighting against them. Table 1 is a typology of the demolition tactics of local authorities in China based on three key dimensions. First, based on the profile of the occupant, the demolition 9

Scholars also find that the weak ties between thought workers and resident tend to fail in thought work elsewhere in China (Deng & O’Brien, 2013; Li, Z., 2012). 10 The aforementioned procrastination tactics are also adopted by resident elsewhere in China (Lu, 2013).

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Table 1 The demolition tactics of local authorities in China Soft

Hard

Overt

Covert

Overt

Covert

State agents

Persuasion

Concessions

Detention Sentence Legally enforced eviction’

Blackmail by using resident’ weaknesses Forced eviction

Private agents

Persuasion

Harassment

Formalized negotiation

Intimidation by threats and violence Forced eviction

Source Author’s summary

tactics could be implemented by state agents or private agents. Second, based on difficulty to resist, the demolition tactics could be categorized as soft and hard. Third, according to whether or not the demolition tactics are banned by state law, regulation, or policy, the demolition tactics could be categorized as covert and overt. By combining these dimensions, this typology basically embraces all the possible demolition tactics of local authorities in China.11 Next, I examine the effectiveness of the demolition tactics from soft to hard. Regarding the soft demolition tactics, “persuasion” (quanshuo 劝说), as illustrated above, is ineffective in preventing opposition to demolition. “Harassment” (saorao 骚扰) by thugs is also ineffective. Many residents complained to me that they or their neighbours had been harassed by thugs, such as making noises around them, or breaking their windows. However, few of them gave up their contention easily as a result of such pressure (Int. 13, 20, 28, 31). Therefore, the Y Government has to find better ways in order to avoid making “concessions” (tuoxie 妥协) to residents. Among the hard demolition tactics, “detention” (juliu 拘留) is not effective in preventing residents from contention because of its short term and narrow scope of application. Detention is primarily used to punish residents who impede demolition by obstructing local officials in their duties, obstructing the passage of vehicles for demolition, and forcibly breaking through a warning belt or area set up by local authorities. In practice, residents were normally detained for five to ten days for impeding demolition (Int. 11, 12, 19; Doc. 15). This penalty thus cannot effectively deter contention, especially by stubborn and unyielding individuals. Some residents openly claimed that they were unafraid of this penalty (Int. 3, 13, 30). A woman even refused to go out after her detention was over, and asked local officials to compensate her for loss of earnings (Int. 20). Besides, children and elderly are normally exempted from detention, since they are physically vulnerable and thus may bring trouble to local authorities. Anticipating this, residents tend to use elderly or children to delay demolition (Int. 1, 12, 20, 35).

11

This typology of the demolition tactics of local authorities in China has been inspired by Jennifer Earl’s typology of repression (Earl, 2003).

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“Sentence” (panxing 判刑) is more effective than detention in preventing opposition to demolition. However, residents normally know how to be troublemakers without being law-breakers. Therefore, it is difficult to identify unlawful acts serious enough to send them to prison (Int. 13, 20, 31). I only heard of one resident who was sentenced to two years in prison because of his disruptive protest against the Y Government (Int. 12). “Legally enforced eviction” (yifa qiangchai 依法强拆) may be effective, but it is not a practical demolition tactic for local authorities, at least at present, for three reasons. First, most of the instances of demolition have procedural defects, which put local authorities at a disadvantage in court. As a township official confided, it was quite common for the Y Government to start a project of land development, but to only complete the legal formalities of such project during the process of demolition (Int. 12; also see Doc. 22). Second, local courts are still under the control of local authorities, which makes residents doubt a local court’s judgement when it is unfavourable to them (e.g., a decision of forced eviction). One homeowner’s words are quite evocative, They (i.e., the government and the court) wear the same pair of pants. Since I cannot get a fair chance to defend myself, why should I follow the decision made by them. (Int. 13)

Third, it takes a long time to go through the whole procedure of “legally enforced eviction.” Normally, few authorities want to bear the cost of delaying land projects. Therefore, local authorities tend to find an adapted solution, if possible (Int. 12, 19). “Formalized negotiation” (yifa xieshang 依法协商) between developers and residents may be effective, but it is mostly an “ideal” demolition tactic, which rarely takes place in practice in China today. An obvious reason is that local authorities always use rule-breaking measures to seek to boost benefits from land projects in dealings with developers. The latter thus have to use similar tactics to recoup their money. As a homeowner incisively analysed the situation, “The wool comes from the sheep’s back. We are the poor sheep” (Int. 4). “Blackmail by using residents’ weaknesses” (zhaoruodian 找弱点) is effective. However, as outlined earlier, this tactic works primarily on capable residents rather than on ordinary residents, since the latter have only limited interaction with local authorities and thus rarely have weaknesses that could be exploited by local authorities to blackmail them. In contrast, “intimidation by threats and violence” (baoli weixie 暴力威胁) implemented by private agents (e.g., thugs) is risky. As a district official explained, Thugs do not have decent jobs as we have. Therefore, they are more likely to get out of control when dealing with conflicts. Besides, if they make trouble, we have to clean up the mess for them. (Int. 19)

“Forced eviction” (qiangchai 强拆) is the last resort for local authorities to avoid making concessions to residents. However, forced eviction has been very risky in recent years because of pressure from above. The central government has issued a series of policies since 2010, aimed at strict prohibition of forced eviction by

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local authorities.12 Consequently, local authorities have become more cautious than before in resorting to forced eviction. The Y Government only successfully used it once during my fieldwork (Int. 12). Forced eviction has also been tightly restricted elsewhere in China over the past few years. According to the notices issued by the Minister of Supervision of the PRC (zhongjiwei jianchabu 中纪委监察部) in 2012 and 2013, the nationwide instances of forced eviction declined sharply from 1480 in 2012 to 427 in 2013.13 In summary, “blackmail by using residents’ weaknesses” is the only demolition tactic that is highly effective and low risk. However, it tends to work on capable residents rather than on ordinary residents. Forced eviction works on ordinary residents, but is also risky. Therefore, how to increase local authorities’ risk associated with forced eviction is the primary target of the rest of residents while trying to sustain their protests. The anti-demolition tactics of residents can be categorized as “reactive” (fangyu xing 防御型) or “proactive” (chuji xing 出击型). These tactics work together to increase local authorities’ risk with forced eviction. Table 2 provides a summary of these tactics. Regarding the reactive tactics adopted by residents, the role of “procrastination tactics” in delaying forced eviction has been explored above. “Performance tactics” (biaoyan celue 表演策略) covers the actions to stop forced eviction by using slogans, posters, banners, costumes and revolutionary songs and poems in order to highlight protesters’ grievances, attract the public’s attention, For some of the documents in prohibiting forced eviction, see 禁止非法强拆紧急通知 (Jinzhi feifa qiangchai jinji tongzhi, An Emergent Notice to Forbid Illegally Forced Eviction) issued in May, 2010, available at: http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/157609256.html, accessed on 20th October 2013, and 国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例 (Guoyoutudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli, The New Regulation on the Dismantlement of Urban Houses) issued in January, 2011, available at: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-01/21/content_1790111.htm, accessed on 20th October 2013. After that, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC and Minister of Supervision of the PRC (zhongjiwei jianchabu, 中纪委监察部) issued a notice in March, 2011 which required each Province to make further efforts in institutionalizing the activities of land expropriation and house demolition, and to summarize rewarding experience of lawful demolition (yifachaiqian, 依法拆迁), transparent demolition (yangguang chaiqian, 阳光拆迁), and harmonious demolition (hexiechaiqian, 和谐拆迁), available at: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6b2a9f9 f0101al00.html, accessed on 20th October 2013. In September, 2011, the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC also issued 最高人民法院关于坚决防止土地征收, 房屋拆迁强制执行引发恶性事 件的紧急通知 (Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu jianjue fangzhi tudi zhengshou, fangwu chaiqian qiangzhi zhixing yinfa exing Shijian de jinji tongzhi, Urgent Notice on Firmly Guarding against the Triggering of Vicious Incidents by Land Expropriation and Forced Housing Demolition and Relocation), available at: https://baike.sogou.com/v76638833.htm, accessed on 20th October 2013. 13 For details, see 去年查处违法、违规强征强拆案427件, 其中437人受到追责 (Qunian chachu weifa , weigui qiangzheng qiangchai an 427 jian, qizhong 437ren shoudao zhuize, 427 Instances of Illegally Forced Eviction Identified Last Year, 437 Individuals Disciplined), available at: http://cpc. people.com.cn/n/2013/0109/c164113-20141977.html, accessed on 21th October 2013; 中国查处 违法、违规强拆问题1480个,其中509人被追究责任 (Zhongguo chachu weifa, weigui qiangchai wenti 1480ge, qizhong 509ren bei zhuijiu zeren, 1480 Instances of Illegally Forced Eviction Identified in China, 509 Individuals Disciplined), available at: https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2012-01-08/ 144223765453.shtml, accessed on 21th October 2021. 12

4 Demolition and Protests Table 2 The anti-demolition tactics of residents in China

131 Reactive tactics

Proactive tactics

Procrastination

Appeal

Performance

Extra leverage

Defense

Offensive actions

Source Author’s summary

arouse their sympathy, and even mobilize their support. These tactics are widely exploited by residents not only in the Y District (Int. 2, 11, 13, 20, 30, 31), but elsewhere in China.14 “Defense tactics” (fangyu celue 防御策略) are also widely used by residents to fight against forced eviction. Residents often use their bodies to achieve this end, including actions such as impeding the passage of vehicles for demolition, using elderly and children as human shields in or around targeted houses, and even threatening to make trouble by drinking pesticide or committing acts of self-immolation (Int. 1, 3, 7, 11, 12, 19; Doc. 14, 15, and 21). Residents also use animals or employ other measures to effect delays. For example, residents often use dogs to defend against eviction (Int. 2, 12, 13, 20). An old man even used “fake cannons” (jia dapao 假大炮) in his struggle.15 All the aforementioned defensive tactics are also found elsewhere in China.16 Among the proactive tactics used by residents, “appeal” (shangfang 上访) to higher authorities is the most common proactive tactic used by residents to pressure local authorities to deal with their problems. During my fieldwork I saw many residents appealing to Beijing (Int. 13, 20, 30, 38). One resident appealed to Beijing six times between February and July, 2009. He later successfully pressured the Y Government to meet his requirements (Int. 8, 12; Doc. 26). Usually it is not difficult for residents to appeal to Beijing. On the contrary, how to stop them from doing so has become very difficult in recent years (Li et al., 2012; Tian, X., 2012a, 2012b). Seeking “extra leverage” (waiyuan 外援) from the media, the internet and intellectuals is another proactive tactic frequently adopted by residents. While it is still difficult for residents to get help from the media, it is easy for them make the appeal. There are many reports about resident’s performance tactics. For a good example, see 重庆钉 子户事件调查 (Chongqing dingzihu shijian diaocha, An Investigation of the Best-known Nail Residents in Urban Chongqing), available at: http://www.infzm.com/contents/9631, accessed on 29th December 2013. 15 For details of this news, see 老人自制大炮模型抗拆 (Laoren zizhi dapao moxing kangchai, An Old Man Protests against Demolition by Resorting to Home-made Fake Cannons), available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/s/p/2013-12-24/032129063019.shtml, accessed on 16th March 2014. 16 The aforementioned defensive tactics are widely reported by the media. For one example of the defensive tactics by using human bodies, see 宜黄自焚事件 (Yihang zifen shijian, Yihuang Self-immolation Incident), available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yihuang_self-immolation_i ncident, accessed on 29th, December, 2013. For one example of the defensive tactics by using certain things, see 钉子户养狗防强拆 (Dingzihu yanggou fang qiangchai, A nail resident’s protest by using dogs), available at: http://news.sohu.com/20130828/n385216225.shtml, accessed on 29th December 2013. 14

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For example, residents can easily use their smart phones to capture local officials’ rule-breaking conversions and behaviors during a demolition process. They can then expose the officials on the internet. Even if a resident’s internet posts are deleted by local authorities, or fail to receive immediate attention from the public, continued attempts can serve to exert a degree of pressure on local authorities (Int. 1, 12, 13, 28). Some villagers in the Y District successfully used this tactic to pressure the local government to delay its plan to demolish their houses (Int. 7, 33, 38). Furthermore, it is fairly easy for residents to seek aid from lawyers. Residents can even learn to be legal experts themselves, such as the “barefoot lawyer” (chijiao lvshi 赤脚律师) in the Y District who provided legal services to many residents (Int. 11, 12, 20, 28). “Offensive action” (gongji xingwei 攻击行为) is the last resort for residents in their fight against forced eviction. However, as mentioned above, offensive action is more likely to result in the failure. Hence residents rarely choose this strategy, given they have the many other options I have just described (Int. 2, 4, 13, 28, 32). In summary, this section has sought to clarify two points. First, the anti-demolition tactics discussed above are easy for residents to exploit. Second, local authorities can effectively prevent capable residents from using these tactics, but struggle to stop ordinary residents from doing so. Readers may question the effectiveness of the anti-demolition tactics, since if these tactics are effective enough we should see more nail residents in China than those reported by the media. However, nail residents in the media are very stereotypical, extreme examples, and narrowly defined. If we understand nail residents more widely as residents who just want to extend their tenure in order to maximize their interests as much as possible, the phenomenon of nail residents is in fact more prevalent than we might expect.

5 Concessions and Backfire Since it is very difficult for the Y Government to blackmail the rest of residents by taking advantage of their weaknesses, or to force them to make way for land development by resorting to forced eviction, concessions become a government option. Concessions are feasible if the Y Government is able to make concessions to only a small number of nail residents privately. This is called “squeezing toothpaste out of a tube” (jiyagao 挤牙膏), “toothpaste” here meaning “hidden compensations” (anbu 暗补). The rationale of squeezing such “toothpaste” is that “the longer a resident can persist, the more hidden compensations he may receive from the government” (Int. 12; Doc. 17, 18). Usually, local officials start to make concessions to residents at the stage of persuasion. As a township leader explained, thought workers never do their work with “empty hands” (liangshou kongkong 两手空空). They have to offer residents certain hidden compensations in order to persuade them to sign demolition agreements (Int. 1, 6, 7, 11, 12, 19,). Residents normally can get “the bonus for signing a demolition

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agreement” (chaiqian jiangjin 拆迁奖金). Besides, residents may also get the privilege of choosing “resettlement apartments” (anzhifang 安置房) which they believe are suitable for them (Int. 11, 12, 13, 19, 20). However, the hidden compensations at the early stages of demolition are limited. As the demolition process develops, the Y Government raises hidden compensations correspondingly (Doc. 16). In addition to the aforementioned, residents may receive hidden compensations for their unapproved constructions, or sometimes even use their unapproved constructions in exchange for resettlement apartments (Int. 3, 20). Besides, residents may also receive some special hidden compensations from the government, such as monthly “subsistence allowance” (dibao 低保), “low-renting apartments” (lianzufang 廉租房), or work opportunities in local enterprises (Int. 13, 20; Doc. 19, 20, 23). In order to avoid a ripple effect of concessions, local officials tend to cover up hidden compensations they have offered to some residents by “mixing gentle and tough ways” (ruanying jianshi 软硬兼施). The tough measure is threatening to cancel some hidden compensations if the prospective recipient cannot keep the details secret. This measure can be effective, especially if the compensation is not a one-off payment (e.g., a monthly subsistence allowance), which the local officials can cancel if necessary (Int. 3, 6). The soft measure is to work with residents to find an acceptable way to conceal a hidden compensation. For example, as a street party secretary said, A work team “accidently” pulled down one wall of a house in order to provide a good reason to compensate the household’s “loss”, after the household had made a private deal with the work team to do the job. (Int. 8)17

However, it is often not difficult for others to discover the hidden compensations that some residents have received from local officials. As one homeowner said, “Walls have ears, especially in a small world” (Int. 28). The spread of information regarding hidden compensation results in dissatisfaction among the uncompensated, triggering many residents and the wider public to learn from nail residents. A petitioner complained to me that, He had signed an agreement of demolition with the Y Government in the early stages of demolition. However, he discovered ten months later that his brother, who was also his neighbour, had used his unapproved construction as means of exchange for a resettlement apartment from the government. This petitioner estimated he had been deprived of around 200,000 Yuan based on the value of his unapproved construction and the market value of a new apartment of the same size. (Int. 28)

Also, some other residents complained to me that their relatives, friends, and neighbors received far more compensation than they themselves did in the later phase of demolition (Int. 2, 4, 28, 33; Doc. 24, 25).

17

Hidden compensations are a widespread phenomenon elsewhere in China. For a very detailed and latest analysis of how to use this tactic in Hubei Province, see 拆迁谜题之我解 (Chaiqian miti zhi wo jie, Disclosing the Puzzle of Demolition), available at: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4dc4 629501014gmv.html, accessed on 25th December 2013.

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Given that the relative deprivation (or the hidden compensation) residents may lose during a demolition are sizeable, many residents put significant effort into sustaining their protests. One resident’s words typified this attitude, I have always been a loser, which has meant a tough life for my wife and children. Demolition may be the best opportunity in my whole life to make a fortune. I will not let it go. (Int. 31)

Due to the potential for “becoming rich through demolition” (chaiqian zhifu 拆 迁致富), some residents who had suffered relative deprivation appealed to the Y Government for compensation for their loss (Int. 2, 4, 11; Doc. 22, 23). Furthermore, some residents who had not even been involved in the demolition commenced unapproved constructions as an investment (Int. 28, 32, 33). Remarkably, some public servants even gave up their stable incomes and chose to become nail residents (Int. 11).18

6 Conclusion This chapter has clarified, by exploring the interactions between local authorities and residents at the four stages of demolition, how and why nail residents can succeed. By confronting local authorities’ actions of precaution, persuasion, demolition and concessions, some residents, especially ordinary residents who have little interaction with local authorities, have successfully sustained their contention. They have thereby maximized their economic interests through unapproved constructions, procrastination, protests, and hidden compensations. The success of nail residents can be attributed to multiple factors. First, various kinds of anti-demolition tactics play a significant role to their success. At the stage of precaution, nail residents build their unapproved constructions after some residents have taken the first step, using this already commenced works as an excuse to justify their own action. This is the tactic of exploiting others’ power. At the stage of persuasion, nail residents use procrastination tactics to avoid meeting thought workers, and to create difficulties for them after negotiations between the two parties have commenced. At the stage of demolition, nail residents adopt various kinds of sophisticated anti-demolition tactics, trying to increase as much as possible local authorities’ risk during the forced eviction process. The aforementioned tactics greatly improve nail residents’ possibility of succeeding in their contention. Bureaucratic differentiation within the state is a second important factor, providing the necessarily political openings for nail residents to succeed. As this chapter illustrates, the pressure from the central government in recent years has greatly increased 18

Public servants who gave up their positions and became nail residents were also found elsewhere in China. For a latest example, see 南京两公务员买违建成钉子户 (Nanjing liang gongwuyuan mai weijian cheng dingzihu, Two Public Servants had Bought Unapproved Buildings and Become Nail Residents in Nanjing, their Nail Houses had finally been Demolished after Two Years of Protests), available at: http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0726/c70731-22335385.html, accessed on 25th December 2013.

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local authorities’ political risk associated with the use of violence in demolition, and thus provided increased political opportunities for nail residents to protest against local authorities. However, both of the factors are limited in their ability to explain the success of nail residents. First, it is not difficult to adopt the aforementioned anti-demolition tactics, so why do only some residents become nail residents? Second, the political opportunities created by the central-local division are open to every resident, so why do only some residents exploit these opportunities? The chapter indicates that the state-society bonds in China today is the decisive factor and explains why only some of the residents are able to exploit anti-demolition tactics and political openings in their protests against local authorities. Mann’s distinction between “despotic power” and “infrastructural power” can help us to clarify this (Mann, 1993, pp. 58–59). On the one hand, the socio-political transformations since 1990s have weakened local authorities’ “infrastructural power” to penetrate the society. In urban areas the reconstruction of state-owned enterprises resulted in numerous state workers losing their jobs. Their shift into private sector employment decreased their dependence on local authorities. In rural areas there has been the cancellation of taxes in conjunction with the maintenance of long-term stability of existing land contract relations. Local authorities thus have less sway over ordinary peasants. On the other hand, the monopolistic power structure of local authorities has survived the market reform. Therefore, local authorities still have considerable “despotic power” to distribute valuable resources in a particular way in daily life, to undertake the actions of demolition without routine negotiation with residents, and to effectively influence local people tightly attached to them. Consequently, capable residents, who have considerable interaction with local authorities, are more likely to be hampered in their contention. By contrast, ordinary residents, who have little interaction, are more likely to succeed in their protests since their weak ties with local authorities become an enabling factor. Their success in turn encourages more residents to follow their example. Existing literature has also noted the significance of state-society bonds in explaining popular contention in contemporary China. Some studies claim that people in the Post-Mao era have more channels than before to access resources. They are less dependent on local authorities, and thus less fearful in protesting against them (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 60–65; O’Brien, 1996, p. 42). Another viewpoint argues that people in grassroots China today still live in a patron-client network. Such a network largely restricts their contention (Wu, Y., 2007a). However, both discussions are partial and incomplete. The first view ignores the high “despotic power” and its constraints on the protests of people tightly attached to it. The second argument overlooks the low “infrastructural power” and the incapacity of local authorities to control the protests of people loosely linked to them. By contrast, this chapter reveals that the state-society bonds in China today are “half-opened,” which has been simultaneously shaped by the high “despotic power” and the low “infrastructural power” of local authorities. Such special bonds explain how the limits and the strength of the state exert an influence on protest outcome,

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and why residents with weak ties to local authorities have better opportunities for resisting official pressure than residents with strong ties to them. While the role of such state-society links alone is not enough to explain the “success” of nail residents, it is a vital factor that reveals why residents with weak ties rather than strong ties to local authorities have better opportunities to exploit bureaucratic divisions and contention tactics in their protests against local authorities, and thus negotiate a better bargain. Finally, while this chapter confines itself to examining the role of the “half-opened” state-society bonds in explaining the success of nail residents in grassroots China, it is possible that these factors may also facilitate or inhibit other kinds of protests in urban China. This is a question that could be fruitfully explored in the future. The “success” of nail residents discussed in the chapter has several empirical and theoretical implications. First, as a representative small-scale protest in China, neither the contention of nail residents nor the state responses to it have been amply explored. The chapter offers an in-depth analysis of how local officials and residents facing eviction try to outmaneuver each other in a whole process of demolition. Clarification of this issue further provides significant clues regarding both the fate of small-scale contention and the role of the state in shaping it. Second, this chapter illustrates that the state-society bonds, as a key political opportunity structure (POS), is different from bureaucratic divisions within the state, and thus provides a nuanced perspective for understanding the possibilities and difficulties of popular contention in China. On the one hand, the theories of POS focusing on divisions among elites are derived from the elite power theory (McAdam, 1999, pp. 36–37), but ignore the limits of elite power. In contrast, the state-society bonds reveal how the strength and the limits of elites simultaneously exert an influence on protest outcomes. As previously stated, the high “despotic power” and the low “infrastructural power” of local authorities have simultaneously shaped the “half-opened” state-society bonds in China today. This facilitates the contentions of those protesters loosely attached to local authorities, but inhibits the contentions of others tightly attached to them. On the other hand, bureaucratic divisions mainly focus on POS within the state, but neglect local specifics that may be crucial to understand the reality of people involved in protests. In contrast, the state-society bonds reveal how local specifics can help us to exactly understand protesters, “how they live, who they are, and what they think” (Brandtstädter, 2006, p. 712). Since local authorities still retain control of most of the valuable resources in grassroots China today, local people are already embedded into a monopolistic power structure before they become involved in protests. Their protests thus more or less have to be influenced by their dense or thin transactions with local authorities. As mentioned above, the strength of residents’ ties with local authorities and their potential for reaping benefits from the latter largely determine their tactic adaptation and protest outcomes. However, if we only focus on bureaucratic divisions within the state, we may ignore the aforementioned local specifics and their significance in explaining protest outcomes.

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Third, by providing a nuanced analysis of how the limits and the strength of the state shape protest outcome, this chapter deepens current knowledge of the biographic impacts of contention in China studies. There are two representative viewpoints about the biographic impacts of contention in China studies. O’Brien and Li argue that protesters’ interest articulation in China today implies a nascent “rights consciousness”, which could “evolve into a more far-reaching counter hegemonic project” (Li & O’Brien, 1996, p. 55; O’Brien & Li, 2006, pp. 121–126).19 In contrast, Elizabeth Perry believes that popular contention in China today reflects a much older “rules consciousness”, “in which savvy protesters frame their grievances in officially approved terms in order to negotiate a better bargain with the authoritarian state.” Such routine protests driven by rules consciousness imply no major challenges to the Party-state (Perry, 2008, pp. 46–47; 2009, p. 20; 2010). While the two viewpoints are exactly opposite, both of them actually take the central-local division in China as the premise of their arguments. Specifically, the state in their viewpoints is simply assumed as a multi-layered power structure designed to contain popular contention. The designed central-local division further exerts impacts on protesters’ consciousness. Their differences lie in that rights consciousness emphasizes the proactive side of protesters in exploiting the central-local division, but rules consciousness stresses the reactive side of protesters in confirming the rule of the party-state before they exploit the division (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 2; Perry, 2009, p. 20). However, as this chapter illustrates, the state at least has two images. On the one hand, the state is still a powerful state with a multi-layered power structure designed to contain popular contention. This state is more likely to encourage or reinforce protesters’ rights consciousness or rules consciousness. On the other hand, the state is less powerful at its grassroots level due to its high “despotic power” but low “infrastructural power.” This state thus has to frequently resort to concessions to handle unexpected consequences (e.g., the protests of nail residents), when it tries to use its high “despotic power” to dominate the allocation of the valuable resources, but its low “infrastructural power” makes it incapable to keep protests under control. The state-society bonds thus are “commodified and depend so heavily on marketlike exchange of compliance for benefits, there is no authority in authoritarianism, no noncontractual elements of contract” (Lee & Zhang, 2013, p. 1505). Consequently, such bargain may reconstruct protesters’ intents and make them more complicated than simply defined rights consciousness or rules consciousness. As this chapter illustrates, nail residents are more like protest opportunists who try all sorts of tricks to gain their ends, no matter these tricks are legal or not, or their ends are rightful or not. Revealing the complexity of protesters’ intents can help us to realize the complexity of Chinese political environment, and to properly estimate the political 19

For other studies with similar arguments, also see (Goldman, 2005; 2007; Yu, J., 2004; Zweig, 2003).

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development of China in the future. On this issue, protesters who are rights conscious may bring a promising democratic future, protesters who are rules conscious may confirm one party rule, and protesters who are protest opportunists may make the future political development of China quite unpredictable.

Chapter 8

Life Politics of Unyielding Complainants and Their Contention

According to Kevin O’Brien’s feedback, James Scott asked a vexing question about whether rightful resisters are sincere or cynical after reading the first article on rightful resistance (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1057). However, faced with Scott’s query, O’Brien is unable to give a definite answer, and can only state that the consciousness of a protester is neither static nor one-dimensional, he or she may simultaneously have both impulses (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1057). Actually, both Scott and O’Brien may be right on this issue, since the clarification of protesters’ motivations is very difficult, especially when we know “very little about the peasants involved in these protests and their reality: how they live, who they are, and what they think” (Brandtstädter, 2006, p. 712). This chapter thus redirects our attention away from the state-centric theories and towards the society-centric theories, and develops a framework to more meticulously scrutinize the significance of local particularities in shaping the action logic of protesters. Specifically, this chapter finds that the “power-interest networks” (quanli liyi wangluo 权力利益网络) in local settings and the “social circles” (shenghuo quanzi 生活圈子) of protesters are two key factors that are both theoretically important in understanding the rationale of protesters’ actions. The “power-interest networks” originate from an institutional setting in which local authorities have been the largest resource grabber and where personal ties mainly determine decisions of resource allocation. Such networks thus serve as pre-existing tools for protest control that govern protesters’ behavior when they embark on any contention against the state. However, the protest control brought by the “power-interest networks” is half-opened, that seems to work for protesters who have the capability of using the networks to reap benefits, but not for others who fail to use these connections and thus have to live on their own. In addition, protesters’ social circles also play a significant role in shaping the dynamics and outcomes of protests. On the one hand, unyielding complainants who are excluded from normal social circles (i.e., the “power-interest networks”) have to struggle in the quagmire of contention. On the other hand, these complainants themselves have formed a lot of social circles that provide them with the skills and supports they need to resist, thereby making © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0_8

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them more determined to sustain their contention. Ultimately, the pull and push produced by normal and abnormal social circles together change the life trajectory of unyielding complainants. Next, this chapter will analyze in detail the significance of “power-interest networks” and protesters’ social circles in shaping the dynamics and outcomes of unyielding complaints from the perspective of protesters’ life politics.

1 Significance of Life Politics in Explaining Unyielding Complaints The state-centric theories on contentious politics mainly focus on the importance of political opportunities in shaping the fate of protests. Accordingly, local society exists in this line of research “neither as context nor as history.” As a result, protesters are more like “the profit-maximizing, isolated individuals, who exploit the new political opportunity structure and engages in tactical escalation to win big” (Brandtstädter, 2006, p. 712). However, as illustrated above, political opportunities within the state hierarchy, ideologies and institutions are open to every protester, why do some of them decide to take full advantage of these favorable conditions? As Kevin O’Brien has stated, “isolated individuals” are often not the best unit of analysis to understand protesters (O’Brien, 2014, p. 1052). Instead of imagining a rather simple mapping of opportunities onto action, it is necessary to situate protesters deeply in a specific socio-economic context. On this point, life politics in local settings is an important theoretical lens that can contribute to our knowledge about contentious politics.1 A clear advantage of this approach is to identify the local specifics that are crucial to understanding the logic of protesters’ actions. Specific to this chapter, the advantage of viewing life politics in local settings under a theoretical lens inspires the author to question how and according to what principles do the particularities of local society determine the distribution of resources. As Harold Lasswell has stated, politics is about who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1958). For individuals living in local settings, resource allocation is their most important politics. From this perspective, we can better learn who they are, how they live, and what they think. Therefore, this chapter emphasizes the importance of “power-interest networks.” Although the networks cannot entirely explain the dynamics and outcomes of protests, it does provide us a nuanced perspective to perceive protesters in a contextual rather than deductive way. To understand protesters in a contextual manner is theoretically significant. As clarified by James Scott, most subordinate classes “are far less interested in changing the larger structures of the state and the law than…working the system…to minimize disadvantage” (Scott, 1985, p. XV). In this regard, protesters are more interested in their own “politics of survival” determined by local particularities and

1

The role of local politics in shaping protests has been explored by Theda Skocpol and Elizabeth Perry. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see (Little, 1989, pp. 168–174).

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protesters’ subsistence needs (Scott & Benedict, 1973). Obviously, the “powerinterest networks” provide us with a valid perspective on the life politics of protesters, since almost all of them live in interdependent networks of instrumental-personal ties shaped simultaneously by economic benefits, monopolistic state power and social ties. These networks thus serve as pre-existing tools for protest control that governs protesters’ choices and actions when they embark on any dispute with local authorities. In addition to the “power-interest networks,” protesters also have their own social circles. These circles also play a significant role in shaping their contention. In specific, the “power-interest networks” are the networks that exist in everyone’s normal daily life. Whether an individual is involved in protest or not, he will interact with the networks. The difference is that capable individuals who have the capability of using connections to operate via the back door thus get ahead, while ordinary individuals who are incapable of using connections tend to lag behind. As a result, the networks pose more constrains on the subsequent protests of capable individuals, and meanwhile offer ordinary individuals bigger manoeuvring space when they have to face the pressure of local authorities. In other words, not everyone can take full advantage of the networks. By the same token, not everyone’s contention can be constrained by the networks. For those who are not bound by the networks, the social circles they have formed before, during and after their protests are another key factor that can influence their choices and actions. After all, as social beings, most of individuals cannot live independently of society, but will find a sense of belonging and a meaningful existence through their interactions with others. These social circles thus can help us better reveal the profiles of protesters. This is theoretically important, since individuals with different mindsets may assess and respond differently to the same external stimuli (Zhuang, 2020). To clarify the effects of these social circles on protesters thus become an important task of this chapter. The study of “power-interest networks” and protesters’ social circles belong to a social-centric, “little tradition”, which is different from a great, state-centric tradition used in the last four chapters. In specific, conventional political studies mainly concentrate their investigation on the issues of the activities of state agencies, government officials, political parties and their organized efforts. This results in the marginalization of some other positive and constructive aspects of political behavior (Kerkvliet, 2009). Actually, politics permeates every corner of our lives; how ordinary people make a living, raise their families, wrestle with daily problems and interact with others is all tied up with politics. All these activities fall under the study of life politics. As Kerkvliet clarified, the most studied form of life politics is resistance, which varies from organized rebellion, through noisy petitions, to subtle confrontations (Kerkvliet, 1986, 2009; Scott, 1985). On this point, life politics provide us with a fruitful conduit to an understanding of Chinese protests. At the same time, the “power-interest networks” and protesters’ social circles are a suitable entry point for the study of life politics, through which we can learn how ordinary people deal with big pressures in their lives. This further allows us to explore how their daily practices influence the political systems of which we are a part (Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott & Kerkvliet, 1973).

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James Scott also stresses the significance of life politics in his study of everyday resistance. As he stated, a vast realm of everyday resistance is habitually overlooked by the state-centric, great tradition, since it is neither openly declared “politics”, nor constitutes collective action as normally understood. However, these activities should most definitely be considered political. Any account that ignores them is often overlooking the most vital means by which subordinate classes manifest their political interests (Scott, 1989, pp. 4–5). A clear advantage of the society-centric, little tradition is to move us away from viewing protesters as isolated individuals and instead to understand their behavior in the context of their specific socio-economic environment. It thus avoids “a lack of peasantness” (Brandtstädter, 2006, p. 712) and helps to reveal what actually motivates individuals while executing their off-stage actions (Scott, 1989, p. 30). Using detailed interviews, archival sources and on-site observations, this chapter presents a nuanced, contextual interpretation of Chinese protesters by positioning their contention in the context of the world within which they live. First it clarifies the theoretical significance of the “power-interest networks” to an understanding of the action logic of Chinese complainants. It then illustrates the role of protesters’ social circles in shaping the dynamics and outcomes of their contention. The chapter concludes by summarizing how and why protesters exploit these ties to sustain their contention and thus convert their social disadvantage into political advantage.

2 How “Power-Interest Networks” Shape Unyielding Complaints Despite the fact that China’s transition from a planned to market economy has weakened the state’s redistributive power and also given Chinese citizens’ greater autonomy over their own lives, the basis of clientelist politics has not been eliminated (Oi, 1985; Walder, 1986). The state is still the largest resource grabber and personal ties mainly determine decisions of resource allocation. Such a phenomenon is even more widespread in grassroots China because of the relatively poor development of the market economy and the rule of law. The weak institutional setting therefore promoted the “power-interest network”. In specific, China’s state-led market reforms over the past three decades have created various kinds of opportunities and resources in local settings. Local individuals have more channels to access resources than before, thus providing them opportunities to be independent and circumvent the state’s overwhelming control. However, most of the valued resources are still controlled and allocated by the state in a particularistic way. The state’s particularistic resource allocation has inevitably driven local individuals to make the best of their hard lives by means of interest-maximizing tactics. As a result, Chinese complainants actually live in a specific socio-economic environment in which the state is still the largest resource grabber and where personal ties

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are the main determinant in decisions concerning resource allocation. These “powerinterest networks” serve as pre-existing tools that govern their behavior before they embark on any contention against the state (Gui, X., 2017a). Those who have the ability to use their connections to operate via the back door are thus able to get ahead, but this has also constrained their subsequent protests. By contrast, those who lack connections lag behind in their daily lives, but this emboldened them to reject complying with the state’s demands. As a result, the state’s control through resources allocation in China today is half-open, which seems to work for individuals who have intensive interactions with local authorities but not for others who are selfsufficient. Eradicating the “power-interest networks” will be difficult so long as the state controls most of the valuable resources, the officials have wide personal discretion in the distribution of these resources, and individuals expect to reap benefits from these officials. However, current studies have failed to clarify this point, either claiming simply that protesters today are less fearful of a fight against the state (Chen, X., 2012; O’Brien, 1996), or suggesting generally that they are all restricted by the patron– client network, as was the case previously (Wu, Y., 2007a). By contrast, this chapter provides a nuanced analysis by categorizing individuals in local settings as capable, ordinary, and marginalized based on the strength of their connections with local authorities.2 Capable individuals refer to those who are related to influential cadres holding leadership positions or important offices in the political system. Ordinary individuals refer to relatives of ordinary cadres. Marginalized individuals are mainly disgruntled laid-off workers, dispossessed peasants, street vendors and self-employed and unemployed people who are unsuccessful in reaping benefits from local authorities. Next, this chapter elaborates on how the “power-interest networks” shape the action logic of these three types of individuals.

2.1 The Handling of Capable Individuals’ Complaints In order to soften protesters’ demands and minimize award of concessions, local authorities often adopt a tactic known as “persuasion by implicating relatives” (tongguo guanxi zuo sixiang gongzuo 通过关系做思想工作), which entails dispatching government agents to exert pressure on their relatives to persuade them to stop contention, and threatening the relatives with adverse consequences if they fail to cooperate (O’Brien & Deng, 2015). However, not all agents are the same, and thus the government’s hold over them varied (O’Brien & Deng, 2015). Different state agents, depending on their position in the political system, have differing capacities 2

It is noteworthy that the three types of individuals do not encompass and represent all of the individuals in the local settings. For example, some public servants themselves became involved in complaints. As their actions were, by logic, usually similar as their relatives’, this study will not further discuss their contention in order to avoid duplication. There is also another group of individuals who successfully accumulated wealth with their own capability. Notwithstanding, the majority of individuals can be classified into the three categories.

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of enriching themselves and their relatives through the privilege of mobilizing funds, personnel and materials within the political system. This has significantly influenced the effects of their thought work on the targeted individuals they approach. Usually, capable people are more receptive to this kind of ideological work because of their intensive connections with influential cadres. The current Chinese political system still prohibits equal access to goods and resources; influential cadres are thus the most privileged group in the system (Smith, 2015; Shih et al., 2012). They not only enjoy higher wages and more generous subsidies, but also prospective grey income. With an access to scarce resources and opportunities, they have used their positions as leverage to enrich their families (Hillman, 2010; Smith, 2013). Capable individuals, with the help of their influential relatives, normally have extensive interaction with the government. This influenced, to a large extent, their choices when bargaining with the government. In order to successfully persuade capable individuals to give up contention, local authorities mainly use tactics like “verbal warnings” (koutou jinggao 口头警告) and “interest exchange” (liyi huhui 利益互惠). Local authorities will first warn its agents, especially those working in influential offices, to keep in line with its policy, and then dispatches and tasks them to convince and exert pressure on their relatives to stay calm (Int. 6, 42; Doc. 13). Very few influential cadres and their relatives would resist local authorities’ demands. By way of example, a manager of a state-owned enterprise was sent to pressure his mother-in-law, who accepted the government’s offer of demolition without much hesitation since she did not want to jeopardize her son-in-law’s career (Int. 28). In another case, a young police officer was asked to talk with his grandparents, and the old couple later accepted the request of relocation despite their reluctance to do so (Int. 28). The effectiveness of verbal warnings could largely be attributed to local authorities’ supporting tactic, i.e. the interest exchange. The first kind of interest exchange pertains to the “resources and opportunities within the political system” (tizhi nei ziyuan 体制内资源). The government-led market reform had created various kinds of desirable resources over the last few decades. These included the much soughtafter positions in the political system, collectively owned properties capitalized by de-collectivization (e.g. woodlands and reservoirs), and opportunities brought about by land development and village projects (e.g. recycling of demolition wastes, roadbuilding, garbage collection and repairs to cultural facilities) (Int. 41, 42; also see Chen, B., 2016). However, the state’s monopolistic power structure also survived the market reform. Therefore it still has considerable power to distribute resources in a particularistic way (Int. 20, 25; also see Zang & Chen, 2015). As a result, influential cadres and their relatives could reap handsome benefits in their daily lives through their close connections with local authorities, but such instrumental ties have also reinforced their dependence on them, thus leading to their compliance in contention. A village secretary’s family being the first few to accept the Y government’s offer of demolition in the village is a case in point. A villager shed light on this, He and his brother have contracted two projects from the government. No one knows exactly how much kickbacks his family gets from the projects. I noticed that he bought a new car last year worth 250,000 yuan but his salary was just 350 yuan per month. (Int. 32)

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In another case, a canteen contractor signed an agreement with the Y government at the early stage of the demolition process. A neighbor of this contractor told the author this information, Rumor has it that he got his post with the help of his cousin, the vice head of the government. I know no more about it, but he bought a big apartment in the city and moved out of the village last year. (Int. 33)

In fact, frequent interaction between local authorities and influential cadres and their relatives greatly increased the possibility of misdeeds perpetuated by them. Therefore, few cadres would dare to refuse orders of local authorities, which could hold their weakness to ransom and exploit it at an opportune time. In this case, “exemption from punishments” (mianyu chufa 免于处罚) is the second kind of interest exchange utilized by the government when negotiating with capable individuals. The author gathered this point in an overheard conversation between a district leader and a township cadre: “Let him (a capable resident) know, if he still refuses to leave the house, we can investigate his brother-in-law, who I doubt, as a prosecutor for years, is free from corruption problems.”3 The resident finally caved in to the government’s demands. One of his neighbors told the author that this resident’s son almost went to jail two years ago because of his involvement in an affray, and the resident settled the case out of court with the help of the prosecutor, i.e. his brotherin-law (Int. 32). In another case elsewhere, a township head threatened a village head in front of a group of residents: “If your family does not sign the demolition agreement today, I will send people tomorrow to investigate the accounts in your village (Int. 34).” The head capitulated to the demand a few days later. A petition cadre confided that he had come across the village head’s “sinister materials” (hei cailiao 黑材料) in the Y District Petition Bureau that showed he had privately sold collectively owned “house sites” (zhai ji di 宅基地) to outsiders and pocketed part of the profits (Int. 44). The third case involved a cigarette and wine shop owner who left the demolition site after a talk with his brother, a tax officer. A resident told the author: “I cannot tell how much he paid in taxes, but I know that if you do not evade taxes, you can barely earn enough money from such business” (Int. 20). Even those capable individuals who have not yet to seek a favor from influential relatives are careful to avoid jeopardizing such a desirable contact, since they might need to call upon them sometime in the future. To this end, the third kind of interest exchange employed by local authorities to stop capable individuals is “investment for expectant benefits” (yuqi touzi 预期投资). A resident jokingly said to me that, Having a capable relative can transform many aspects of your life, such as a promising job, a younger, well-connected spouse, and a desirable school for your children. Even a silly rabbit has three openings to its den, not to mention people. (Int. 16)

This resident later signed a demolition agreement with the government. One of his neighbors disclosed to me that, 3

The author accidently overheard this conversation in an office in the district petition bureau. Although they did not mention names and stopped talking when the author entered the office, the author nevertheless sensed who and what they were talking about from his fieldwork at the time.

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His brother is the vice principal of the key municipal primary school and his grandson is five years old. That is all I can say. Please use your head to find the answer. (Int. 45)

Almost everyone in local settings actually knows the art of investing in capable relatives, that is, “casting a long line to catch a big fish” (fang changxian diao dayu 放长线钓大鱼). A township cadre summarized it well: “Do not embrace Buddha’s feet in your hour of need. It is embarrassing and useless” (Int. 37). Understanding this, a resident sought to comfort her son-in-law who was dispatched by the court, assuring him that she totally understood the tough situation he faced and suggested that he put it behind him and pursue progress in his work (Int. 8).

2.2 The Handling of Ordinary Individuals’ Complaints Ordinary individuals refer to relatives of ordinary cadres. Compared to influential cadres, the amount of salary ordinary cadres get is largely determined by their status. Some are fully funded civil service workers, while others are partially funded. Yet, there are others, who even work outside of budget as temporary workers. This is not uncommon, especially in public hospitals, public schools and urban management offices (Int. 19, 25; also see Smith, 2015). Ordinary cadres also lack the capability to reap significant benefits from local authorities. Whenever possible they might provide their relatives some small help, such as temporary, low-income employment (e.g. safeguarding jobs, cleaning and gardening) in work units; reduced fines for violation of birth control policy; manipulation of age or health factors for successful army enrolment; or securement of subsistence allowance for unqualified candidates (Int. 37, 39, 41). As these are trivial advantages, relatives of ordinary cadres have little enthusiasm to cultivate ties but neither do they want to cut ties with their ordinary cadre relatives (Int. 7, 8, 28, 48). Thus ordinary cadres and their relatives have limited connections to local authorities, and thus more manoeuvring space in dealing with the demands of the latter. Local authorities, in response, would escalate its “organizational discipline” (zuzhi chufa 组织处罚) from issuance of warnings to suspension, transfer or even removal from office, meanwhile increasing the concession amount. By implementing a mix of tough and soft measures, local authorities hope to compel ordinary cadres to persuade relatives to stop contention. Verbal warnings remain the first primary tactic of local authorities. This has worked effectively with three kinds of individuals. The first type of individuals are ordinary cadres who aspire to move up to a higher status in the future or who are content with the status quo. Local authorities thus utilize institutional resources to stimulate demonstration of cadres’ loyalty in thought work, and their dedicated persuasion have oftentimes left these cadres’ relatives poorly positioned to resist governmental pressure. A resident complained about the ploy: “Few people could say no upon seeing a relative desperately begs him, because it would mean severing relations with that person and his whole family (Int. 28).” The second type of individuals are those who, with the help of their ordinary cadre relatives, have reaped some

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benefits from local authorities. For example, a man obtained a gatekeeping position in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) through his brother-in-law, who also owed his superior a favor as a result. Therefore, both of them found it very difficult to refuse the government’s offer put forth by the superior. The man with a gatekeeping job at an SOE explained: “I know this is not a good deal, but when you get something from others, you have to cater to others (Int. 30).” Finally, the government also capitalized on individuals exhibiting vulnerabilities. For example, a resident whose daughter was found to have cheated in the occupational skills test for hospital enrolment had to later sign an “agreement” so as to ensure that his daughter would not face further trouble of being exposed (Int. 25). Many ordinary cadres, besides those aforementioned, lack the capability, resources (e.g. funds and powerful backing), or age advantage required for promotion. These cadres usually lack the motivation to urge relatives to stop contention, since this would strain their family relationship without materially improving their marginalized positions in the unit. The government exerts pressure on these half-hearted cadres to get them involved in stability maintenance by suspending their current work and transferring them to relevant working groups. The cadres are usually told that they have to shoulder the ultimate responsibility of “carrying away their own children” (gejia gu hao gejia de wenti 各家顾好各家的问题) (Int. 19, 44; also see O’Brien & Deng, 2015, p. 6), meaning that their suspension and transfer would not be lifted as long as their relatives refuse to comply with the demands of local authorities. Suspensions and transfers are therefore mean that local authorities use to spur on laggards. A cadre complained: “My job is like a chicken rib—meaningless but not considered too bad or worthless to be discarded” (Int. 47). Local authorities have essentially exploited half-hearted cadres’ hesitant attitude to push them to work harder for its cause. However, it is clear to local authorities that such divided loyalty alone will not be sufficient to conduct an effective thought work. In the words of a township leader: “Their butt directs their brain. You cannot expect a cadre who has abandoned the hope of promotion to work wholeheartedly to please the government” (Int. 26). Such mentality also applies to relatives of these cadres. A villager said, Talking of family ties, it is necessary to consider both the emotional and instrumental dimensions. This is particularly applicable to people living a hard life. They will not value family ties highly if they see little prospects of reaping benefits from these ties. (Int. 34)

Local authorities, having considered these factors, give these cadres more “bargaining counters” (chouma 筹码) to lessen their embarrasment or awkwardness when negotiating with relatives.4

4

In reality, some ordinary individuals also adopted certain contention tactics in order to force the government to increase its compensations. However, their contention was moderate compared to that of marginalized individuals, who are even more remotely connected to the government through their relatives. Furthermore, their contention tactics are similar to those adopted by marginalized individuals. In order to avoid duplication, this chapter will go into the details of these tactics in the next section of stopping marginalized individuals.

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One of the most common types of “bargaining counters” is “hidden compensation” (an bu 暗补). For example, during the process of demolition, how to compensate “unapproved construction” (weizhang jianzhu 违章建筑) involves the use of “hidden compensation”. Unapproved construction refers to buildings or extensions to buildings that are privately built by residents without grant of official permission (Int. 45). Since these constructions are illegal, affected residents obtain a much lower compensation compared to the standard package for approved construction (Int. 25, 28; Doc. 16). The difference in value between the two compensations thus provides some manoeuvring room. A common practice is to legalize a portion of floor area of an unapproved construction and then compensate the said area according to the standard of approved buildings. For example, a thought worker privately made a deal with a resident by accounting a self-constructed hut in his yard an approved building (Int. 20). Another resident had his newly built garret passed off as a legal construction after he agreed to vacate his house (Int. 48). Another kind of “hidden compensation” often employed by local authorities is recognizing and solving complainants’ problems and difficulties in life. For example, a thought worker helped a couple apply two quotas of monthly subsistence allowance on condition that they agreed to relocate (Int. 20). In another case, the government offered a job opportunity to a resident’s daughter in an enterprise which would later be built on the demolition site (Int. 41). In a third case, an affected resident, whose primary concern was his family’s poor living conditions during relocation, received the option of a low-rental apartment (Int. 36, 37). In addition to the aforementioned concessions, local authorities also exploit their agents’ fear of retaliation to push them work harder on the handling of complaints. A leader counselled his subordinate, Don’t push your luck. Otherwise, the government will keep giving you “tight shoes to wear” as long as you still work here. How horrible it would be if your family suffers a double loss (i.e. job and house) instead of making a gain. (Int. 42)

Most of the remaining ordinary cadres’ families, upon understanding the implication, caved in and accepted the terms being offered. For those who still refuse to give in, local authorities raise the ultimate punishment to dismissal from job. A district leader stressed this point, Don’t play hard to get with the government. The government is not a tiger that is untouchable, but neither is it a puppet which can be manipulated at will. It is unacceptable to eat the government’s food and then smash its cooking pots. (Int. 42)

Strong headed cadres and their relatives therefore have to make a decision between compliance and confrontation. As far as I knew, at least five residents in my study finally relinquished their positions: two were SOE employees, two were contract hospital workers, and one had chosen to suspend his duties two years ago to take up a job opportunity in another city (Int. 20, 25). All of them had a common sentiment that they had become an excessive headcount in the office, which consequently reinforced their determination to break with the system. However, as explained in the next section, being marginalized unexpectedly empowers complainants’ contention since they have little to lose and thus do not fear repercussions from local authorities.

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2.3 The Handling of Marginalized Individuals’ Complaints The most difficult stability maintenance task for local authorities is having to force marginalized individuals to stop contention. Marginalized individuals are mainly disgruntled laid-off workers, dispossessed peasants, street vendors, and self-employed and unemployed people, who are unsuccessful in reaping benefits from local authorities. Since these marginalized individuals barely have any connections with local authorities, they have to fend for themselves and make the best out of their hard lives.5 In reality, many marginalized individuals do not get deeply involved in confrontations with local authorities, partly because they were too timid to resist, and partly because they found the entire process truly draining. They thus preferred to get their life back on track with the help of an acceptable offer (Int. 7, 20, 25, 41, 44). However, there also exist some stubborn individuals who steel themselves to protest against the government. Unlike individuals who have capable and ordinary cadre relatives, marginalized individuals lack alternative means of enrichment and therefore regard complaints as an important opportunity to convert their social disadvantage into political advantage. This is the primary incentive driving them to spare no effort to sustain their protest (Int. 34, 44, 48). Marginalized individuals’ lack of connections with local authorities, in this case, becomes an enabling factor, which not only emboldens them to stand up and fight back in dealing with contention, but also poses difficulty for local authorities to find appropriate thought workers to stop them. A tug of war therefore ensues between local authorities and marginalized individuals before a compromise is reached. The preferred tactics of local authorities are still persuasion combined with threats and inducements. Yet marginalized individuals risk very little by refusing the government’s thought work since, as discussed earlier, they are essentially self-reliant. A street vendor aptly summarized the situation: “I am just a street vendor selling sundries. My wife is a housewife. My son and daughter are self-employed workers. Therefore, the government cannot find my weakness” (Int. 30). Local authorities may sometimes intimidate a complainant into submission by exploiting his/her other weaknesses. In one case, for example, a complainant’s son was found to have cheated during a physical examination for army recruitment (Int. 42). The number of marginalized individuals involved in such misdeeds is, however, small and the chance of local authorities identifying them is even slimmer, due to their limited interactions with the authorities (Int. 25, 34). Furthermore, marginalized individuals do not need to endure intense emotional pressure when giving thought workers the cold shoulder. Given that marginalized individuals have weak social networks, local authorities could only recruit their friends or former colleagues, or sometimes even strangers to pressure them (Int. 6, 41). Considering these recruits’ limited influence over the targeted individuals, local authorities seldom take disciplinary action 5

It is noteworthy that some capable or ordinary individuals should also be considered as marginalized individuals after cutting all ties with the government.

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against them for their ineffective work (For those recruits who fail to persuade their own relatives, this is however not the case). As a result, marginalized individuals are better positioned than capable and ordinary residents to employ tactics of procrastination. For example, they would normally first lie to the thought worker that they are not at home or pretend to be too busy to meet the worker. When the latter insists on a visit, they often deny the thought worker entry into their house, or even scold him or her in the face (Int. 6, 32, 33, 41). The usual scenario a thought worker would encounter if he or she manages to reach the persuasion stage is: The targeted individual usually pours out his or her woeful tale, then repeatedly change the proposal for compensation, or attempt to exploit the loopholes in the procedure of complainthandling by demanding thought workers produce related documents that justify their actions. (Int. 39, 41, 45, 48)

These are the moves that many marginalized individuals have effectively taken to obstruct thought work and thus delay compromise for as long as possible. In response, local authorities have to escalate its action from persuasion to harassment. An effective form of harassment is to mobilize the masses to pressure targeted individuals. This usually happens during the process of demolition. However, this kind of harassment is effective if most of the residents in the same demolition site expect a relocation and have strong impetus to remove the “nails” (ding zi hu 钉 子户) blocking their way (Deng, 2017). It is, however, less applicable in situation where most of the residents are disagreeable to the demolition. This situation is not uncommon in grassroots China, which potentially has high value appreciation but offers low compensation for relocation. Another option for local authorities is to resort to mobilizing thugs to do the harassing. Some complainants complained about being harassed by thugs, who disturbed the peace by making loud din, throwing obnoxious things on the walls and doors, breaking windows with stones, and even intimidating them face to face (Int. 20, 30, 48). However, these bluffs alone are ineffective in deterring unyielding complainants. A complainant said: “Since what they did is just an empty show of strength, why should I fear a toothless tiger” (Int. 34). Local authorities also realize it but have to choose the lesser of two evils. A district official explained the rationale: “Thugs do not have decent jobs like we do. Therefore, they are more likely to get out of control when dealing with conflicts. If they make trouble, we too cannot get away from it” (Int. 19). As a result, local authorities have cautiously reined in violent thugs over the past few years. Actually, the real intention of local authorities is to use harassment as a means to push targeted complainants into accepting its subsequent offer. Marginalized individuals, having seen through local authorities’ ploy, seek every possible means to increase the risk of harassment in order to negotiate a better bargain with local authorities. One of such proactive tactics employed by marginalized individuals is “petitioning Beijing” (fujing shangfang 赴京上访). Usually, it is not difficult for strong-headed individuals to travel to Beijing to complain. But in recent years,

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local authorities find it challenging to stop them.6 The author has witnessed many unyielding petitioners lodging complaints to Beijing. One of them did petitioning many times in a few months. He later successfully pressured the government to meet his requests (Int. 25). “Seeking extra leverage” (xunzhao waiyuan 寻找外援) is another proactive tactic, which because of the advent of the internet has greatly expanded marginalized individuals’ information channels. A middle-aged complainant told the author: “Local officials can no longer easily fool me since I am more knowledgeable than before about challenging their preposterous arguments” (Int. 30). Marginalized individuals could also turn to journalists for help. Journalists, despite still facing the dilemma of censorship, enjoy greater independence than before in reporting local officials’ misdeeds, since the top leaders view this a supervisory check on their wayward agents (King et al., 2013). A woman, as a result, wrung a handsome compensation from the government when a newspaper reported her anti-demolition story (Int. 42). If journalists refuse to provide an assistance, marginalized individuals would seek support from public intellectuals as an alternative. A woman’s persistence in writing her grievances on the message boards of many public intellectuals’ microblogs finally yielded results when one of them forwarded details of her sufferings to a wider audience. The government was forced to halt eviction and restart negotiations with her (Int. 44, 45). In addition, marginalized individuals can also make videos and upload them onto the internet. Although many of these videos are deleted by relevant authorities and thus fail to receive immediate public attention, continuous repeated attempts could succeed in putting local authorities in a difficult spot (Int. 7, 25, 46, 48).

2.4 The Implications of Power-Interest Networks on Protest Control In sum, capable individuals and their influential relatives usually have extensive interaction with local authorities. This gives them an improved chance to reap handsome benefits from the state, but at the same time reinforces their dependence on the state. As a result, most of the capable individuals tend to follow the demands of local authorities under pressure exerted on them and their relatives. In achieving a compromise with local authorities, capable individuals and their relatives not only exempt themselves from punishment but also retain their privileges. Ordinary individuals and their ordinary relatives usually have limited connections with local authorities, therefore making them less vulnerable to state pressure in general. On delving deeper, however, it is found that individuals react to the state’s demands in varying degrees depending on their relatives’ loyalty to local authorities. Some ordinary cadres have strong motivation to induce their relatives to stop contention, partly because they expect to be promoted, and partly because they have received some favors from local authorities. On the other hand, there are 6

For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see (Gui, X., 2017a; Li et al., 2012).

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some who perform their thought work half-heartedly because they have abandoned hope of career advancement. Their relatives also pay little attention to their requests since these frustrated cadres can do little to assist in their wealth enrichment. Local authorities thus escalate pressure on these cadres, while increasing the offers for compromise. Weighing the heavy price of cutting ties with the state, most cadres and their families ultimately cave in to the pressure, with only a few continuing to hold out. Given that marginalized individuals have sparse connections with local authorities, they thus have little to risk in initiating protests against them. By contrast, local authorities are unable to find suitable thought workers who can come under their control and are capable of influencing these individuals. More often than not, both sides engage in a seesaw battle before coming to a peaceful compromise. As discussed earlier, most of the measures adopted by local authorities are conditional, risky, or have limited effectiveness in stopping unyielding protesters. By contrast, marginalized individuals have many simple and practicable strategies to choose from in tackling the state once they are freed from “relational repression”. It is not difficult to see that different individuals’ space for protests is inversely related to their ties with cadres in positions of power. As elucidated earlier, individuals actually live in an interdependent network of instrumental-personal ties shaped simultaneously by economic benefits, monopolistic state power and social ties. This “power-interest network” serves as a pre-existing tool of protest control that governs individuals’ behaviors when they embark on any contention against the state. Some individuals are more likely to be hampered in their contention because they are still very dependent on the state. Others are more likely to sustain their contention because their marginalized status becomes an enabling factor, offering them a bigger space to protest against the state. Investigating the influence of “power interest network” on protest control deepens our understanding of contentious politics in China today. In specific, “power-interest network” clarifies that “relational repression” operates not only through sanctions and sentiments but also by benefits. Existing literature focuses mainly on the role of social ties in facilitating contention from the perspective of protesters (Kuang & Goebel, 2013; Shi & Cai, 2006). By contrast, some recent studies argue that social ties can draw protesters together in contention, but can also push them away from it. These studies therefore tend to highlight the role of social ties in controlling contention from the perspective of the state (Deng & O’Brien, 2013). Evidently, sanctions imposed on unit members (through work units) and emotional pressures exerted on homeowners (through family ties) can effectively thwart a protest before it begins (O’Brien & Deng, 2015). These studies have nevertheless neglected to recognize the interest exchange through social ties and its role in shaping protests. It is virtually impossible to separate benefits from emotions in social ties discourse, since capitalizing on personal ties to pursue one’s interests is so widespread in China (Wang et al., 2014).

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3 How Protesters’ Social Circles Shape Unyielding Complaints As illustrated above, unyielding complainants are often marginalized individuals in the “power-interest networks.” They are the losers in the aforementioned particularistic power-interest game, and thus lack the visible means to enrich themselves (Gui, 2017b). However, this does not mean that they do not have a yearning to achieve a better life. When witnessing others to enrich themselves through instrumentalpersonal ties, few marginalized individuals can remain indifferent to the powerinterest game. However, these marginalized individuals more often than not are from poor and uneducated backgrounds, short of professional skills, unable to find a decent job, and live mainly as disgruntled laid-off workers, dispossessed peasants, street vendors, self-employed and unemployed people. They lack the necessary opportunity to develop good relations with local authorities in the hope of thereby reaping benefits. As a township cadre explained, Such plight has made them more vulnerable and helpless especially when they have lost something worth cherishing in their lives, and meanwhile have no better means to make up for it. (Int. 53)

The huge gap they see between a desire of living a better life and a pressure of lacking institutional approach to achieve it often makes them exasperated, anxious and helpless. They have, therefore, to focus on fending for themselves and making the best of their hard lives. On top of this, local officials do not always treat them kindly, instead rubbing salt into their wounds through the perpetration of malpractices (Gui, 2017a; Li et al., 2012; O’Brien & Li, 2006). All of these elements form the deepseated instincts that drive their contention. Their marginalized status, at this time, becomes an enabling factor that not only emboldens them to protest against local authorities, but also poses difficulty for the latter to find appropriate ways to stop them. At the end, the disillusioned individuals in these power-interest games choose complaining as a shortcut to recovery from an unfavorable situation. As a kind of low-binding participation, complaining is especially favorable for marginalized individuals looking to convert social disadvantage into political advantage. On the one hand it does not require fees or cumbersome procedures; nor does it necessarily require legal evidence or a policy basis (Gui & Luo, 2021; Minzner, 2006). On the other hand, their marginalized status also offers them greater maneuvering space, since “They have hit rock bottom and thus risk little in initiating contention against the state” (Int. 73). In order to take full advantage of this shortcut, the social connections that have been developed during the complaining process become an important breakthrough point.

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3.1 The Social Circles of Unyielding Complainants As social beings, marginalized individuals, like everyone else, also need to discover a sense of belonging and meaning in their lives. If possible, they also want to develop good connections with local authorities and then use them to pursue a better life. This explains why the saying, “Officials in remote mountain areas have distant relatives” (fu zai shenshan you yuanqing 富在深山有远亲) is so popular in local settings (Int. 41). They also know that complaining against the government may add certain unexpected risks to their lives. That is why almost every local people agree with the statement, “Ordinary people should never fight with officials unless there is no other way out” (bu dao po bu de yi min mo yao yu guan dou 不到迫不得已 民莫要与官 斗) (Int. 40). Based on the aforementioned viewpoints, no one wants to be a nail-like complainant, unless he or she cannot find a way out of the predicament in their lives. For example, I had interviewed a former village party secretary who had lodged more than 30 complaints in Beijing, in a two-year period, around an issue arising out of a conflict with the current secretary. When I finally spoke to him on the phone, however, he breezily told me that “The dispute has long since been turned around; I am now busy contracting another project and have no time to see you” (Int. 40). In another case, the owner of a small mine tried to resume his mining rights through complaint. The reason is that he obtained the rights through a previous leader and was then stripped of the rights by the government following the change in leadership. There is no doubt that it is difficult for him to get his rights back by protesting, because “Every new sovereign brings his own courtiers” (yi chao tianzi yi chao chen 一朝天子一朝臣). The owner thus changed his request into at least receiving an acceptable compensation. However, he did not get what he wanted on this issue as well. For the sake of his dignity, he finally decided to shed all pretense of cordiality and became a nail complainant (Int. 63, 64). As these two cases illustrated, if possible, complainants, more often than not, might weigh up the cost of cutting their valuable social ties, choose to ignore the injustice of specific events and seek other means of restoring their wealth, since cutting these connections means “kicking down the ladder” (guo he chai qiao 过河 拆桥), and maintaining these connections means they still have opportunities to “get back on the roundabout, even if they have lost on the swings” (shi zhi dong yu shou zhi sang yu 失之东隅收之桑榆) (Int. 36). This further means that complainants who choose to hold out are often those marginalized individuals who either see little value in ties of mediocre strength, or can no longer get their demands satisfied. During my fieldwork, many of the unyielding complainants have similar experiences, and this becomes the basis for them to form their own social circles. Specifically, there are two main types of social circles: those that are pre-existing and those that are formed during the process of complaining. Many unyielding complainants know each other before embarking on the contention against local authorities. In reality, these complainants might be families, friends and colleagues.

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For example, a veteran complainant often visited Beijing. He later began to teach his sister to use this method to pressure the government. Both of them eventually became well-known nail complainants in the county (Int. 74). In another case, a female resident often shared her anti-demolition experience with several “majiang friends” (pai you 牌友). One of her friends later also became a nail resident just like her. The two of them often lodged complaints in Beijing and thus became a big headache for the local government (Int. 75). The third case is about a village teacher (xiangcun jiaoshi 乡村教师) who often went to Beijing to reflect on his treatment together with his colleagues from several nearby villages (Int. 76). In addition to the group of villager teachers, another representative petitioning group is the veterans (tuiwu laobing 退伍老兵). Both of the groups form social circles because of their collegiality. Compared with the complainants who have known each other before, more complainants have gradually become acquainted during the process of petitioning. The social circles they have formed during this process can be categorized as floating and relatively stable ones. Floating social circles consist of random complainants who do not know each other before. They just come together in a specific time and space and then go their separate ways afterwards. Stable social circles can be formed in two ways, either the complainants know each other before, or they establish relatively stable social connections during the process of complaining because of certain common needs. In reality, complainants have many opportunities to communicate with each other during the process of petitioning Beijing. Complaining offices set up by nearly all national-level authorities in Beijing become their first focal points. For example, complainants who are next to each other often cut their teeth while waiting to be received at the entrance of the SBLV or the reception halls of other state organs. They thus have many chances to know each other and get information about complaints that might be useful (Int. 77). Other common meeting areas are small hotels, restaurants and copy shops near the SBLV (Int. 61, 78). In specific, there are many small hotels specializing in receiving complainants near the SBLV. This kind of hotel generally is just a suite in a residential building. In order to accommodate more complainants and earn more money, a hotel owner normally uses partitions to divide a suite into many cubicles, and places two or three bunk beds in each cubicle. Through this way, a cubicle can live five or six complainants and the whole suite can accommodate around thirty complainants. Although this living environment is very poor, it also facilitates communication among complainants (Int. 79, 80). Around these small hotels, there are also some small restaurants, canteens and printing shops that provide related supporting services for complainants. In reality, many complainants like to visit the print shops around the SBLV to purchase the latest policies and regulations, and the complaining guide with the contacts of national-level authorities. Some complainants even hire experienced lawyers to write complaints on their behalf. These places thus provide the necessary space for complainants to exchange information with each other (Int. 81, 82).

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Furthermore, holes in the overpass near the SBLV and villages in the suburbs of Beijing become favored locations for complainants who do not want to be easily found by the government. As a stubborn complainant explained, A significant advantage of these places is that ID cards are not required. Once your ID card information is known to a hotel owner, he or she is likely to call a local cadre to take you back to the place of residence. Since the local cadre normally will cover the accommodation of the complainant, the hotel owner has a strong incentive to do so. (Int. 83)

Even the small buses used for retrieval often serve as a place for them to become acquainted with each other (Int. 21, 40). A complainant once told me that he was scared the first time he was retrieved, and then another complainant told him that, As long as you do not cause trouble for these people, they will not come after you. They take this retrieval as business, and their aim is to take us back to our places of residence rather than stop us from petitioning Beijing. Therefore, it will be fine, if we stay calm and do not bring trouble upon ourselves. (Int. 84)

In addition to these face-to-face contacts, they can also interact at any time through media such as telephone, WeChat, and QQ (Int. 61, 85). These new ways of staying connected, together with some older ones (e.g., family, friends, and colleagues), provide complainants with the spaces and opportunities to form their social circles. As this chapter will illustrate next, these social circles play an important role for unyielding complainants to sustain their contention through experience communication, determination reinforcement, and material and spiritual assistance.

3.2 Experience Communication Among Unyielding Complainants With the help of experience communication, complainants become increasingly sophisticated about how to sustain their contention in a more effective and less risky manner. As illustrated above, complaints can obtain various kinds of information on how to lodge complaints from many channels. The first key point is involved in identifying the most opportune time to initiate a complaint. Compared to “normal times” (zhengchang shiqi 正常时期), complainants are more likely to appeal to Beijing in “sensitive times”, because their actions at that time may receive more attention from the “center”. For example, a veteran complainant often lodged complaints at “sensitive times”, such as 2008 Olympic Game, national day, the “two meetings” (i.e., National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress), and some other significant national events (Int. 61). In another case, an unyielding complainant specifically lodged complaints, choosing the period when local leaders were seeking promotion. He thus had successfully pushed the government to initiate relevant procedures to take his appeal seriously (Int. 86). These two people are wellknown complainants in local settings, and their deeds were frequently mentioned by

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my interviewers during the fieldwork. There is no doubt that these messages have exerted an impact on the behaviors of other complainants. A second skill involves cleverly avoiding interception. As illustrated in Chapter Six, in order to stop targeted complainants from visiting Beijing, local authorities establish three lines of defense in their residences, the railway and long-distance bus station in local settings, and the local liaison office in Beijing. However, complainants still have ways to escape these controls. A common method is to catch a bus many stops down the road, then alight at some point from which she caught another train or bus to Beijing. In this way a complainant can successfully elude the cadres on the local train or in the long-distance bus stations who are attempting to block her journey (Int. 61). Another way is to go to other cities near Beijing first, and then transfer trains or take buses to Beijing from there. In short, complainants can always come up with various evasion methods, and they will exchange these experiences with each other (Int. 87). Almost every petitioner recognizes the significance of “boundary-spanning” and “troublemaking” tactics. Yet the more important issue is to have a deeper understanding of exactly what these strategies should be employed by whom and under what circumstances. This is precisely where the advantage of petitioning social circles lies, since they can help complainants more genuinely appreciate the practical differences and effectiveness of these strategies through the sharing of firsthand experiences. As some stubborn petitioners summarized, contention tactics can be roughly categorized as moderate, radical and sophisticated. Moderate strategies refer to behaviors that are designed to gain sympathy by making oneself look pathetic, such as wearing shirts emblazoned with the over-sized character “wronged” (yuan 冤), and sitting or kneeling in heavy rain to supplicate for justice. However, such personal performance alone is difficult to produce obvious effects, it is mainly an ancillary strategy that needs to be exploited together with other strategies. Radical tactics are those that create chaos in an extreme manner and thus put pressure on the government, such as intercepting cars transporting leaders to deliver appeals, disordering government operation by knocking on the gong or smashing the office glass, and spreading leaflets in Tiananmen Square or crashing the Xinhua Gate. These tactics, while useful, carry a high level of risk. By contrast, sophisticated tactics are behaviors that both exert pressure on the government and make complainants appear non-aggressive, thereby rendering the government impotent. For example, one woman became accustomed to staying in a small hotel around the SBLV and inviting the local cadres to come over. In order to persuade her to return home, these officials not only paid for her accommodation and round-trip fare, but even took her on a tour of the Great Wall.7 As the woman further explained, if the government refused her request, she would lodge complaints and maintain her deterrence again. The case of asking the government to cover

7

In many cases, covering a petitioner’s expense of petitioning Beijing was a pre-condition to persuade them to return home. Sometimes local officials even bought gifts for petitioners or took them on visits to scenic spots in Beijing (Int. 75, 88).

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expenses falls exactly into the category of sophisticated tactics. It causes trouble to the government without spending a penny. In another case, a villager deliberately wandered around Tiananmen Square carrying material relating to his appeal in his pocket because he knew there were many experienced plainclothes police who could identify him, but he also knew he could play dumb and tell the government he was only a visitor. In this way he avoided the punishment of knowingly lodging a “non-normal complaint. (Int. 21, 40)

Both of the complainants gained these tricks through chatting with other complainants in small hotels and print shops around the SBLV. Examples of sophistication can be seen even among complainants who have been identified and are being repatriated. As an old complainant put it, The job of “black guards” is to retrieve rather than stop us. They even feel pleased if we come back and bring them business. Therefore, the best option is to “Respond compliantly to the toughs, return smoothly, and find the right opportunity to make a comeback. (Int. 40)

These strategies are also open secrets in complaining circles, and assist complainants to better protect themselves while exerting pressure on local authorities. Eventually, sophisticated tactics stand out from repeated comparisons and verifications and become the mainstream choice of complainants, because only in this way can the government be entangled firmly and thereby taking their demands more seriously. The most important thing in this process is not being an honest person, but doing things to help yourself, even in a willfully troublemaking way.

3.3 Determination Reinforcement Among Unyielding Complainants Determination reinforcement is the second function of complainants’ social circles. It not only strengthens their confidence, but also raises their expectations, thereby making them more determined. Confidence comes first from a positive interpretation of the political environment. In order to get the balance right among petition facilitation, stability maintenance, and violence prevention, the government often releases contradictory signals. This highly flexible discourse itself is a governance strategy. It not only retains hope for complainants, but also paves the way for controlling them. Yet complainants tend to selectively believe the positive messages and meanwhile filter out the negative ones. As some complainants illustrated, “This is due to human nature. No one is willing to deny his choice easily, especially after enduring numerous ordeals and indignities” (Int. 74). As a result, the positive interpretation becomes the mainstream culture of their social circles. As a complainant explained, “Although we keep hearing that the state will strengthen its control over complaints, everyone still believes that he will be the lucky one who can carry the day” (Int. 84). Consequently, whether it is pessimistic or optimistic stories they are hearing, they always find a way to transform them into

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positive energy. With the help of this screening mechanism, complainants who are optimistic about the political situation finally hold the dominant discourse, since that is what people love to hear. Those negative messages, even if presented, are quickly ignored and drowned out. Ultimately, the elastic political discourse, the reluctance of self-denial, and the circle’s rejection of dissenting views together helps optimists achieve the dominant discourse, boost the confidence of waverers, and crowd out doubters who cannot fit in. It is not rigorous logical reasoning but a wishful, onetrack optimism that supports this mentality. While it may be difficult for onlookers to understand, for complainants it is a “good medicine for comfort” (Int. 89). Confidence is also strengthened through the comparison of personal circumstances. This comparison begins with the discovery that many other people are also struggling to persevere in the same way as they are, thus allowing them to believe in their choices. In specific, this comparison can be based on positive and negative incentives. As one complainant explained, Positive motivation means that those whose situation is worse than mine are still persisting, so I should be full of hope and keep trying. In contrast, negative motivation means that those whose situation is better than mine have still not yet succeeded, then I should not be discouraged and try to move forward. (Int. 84)

For example, a complainant had a serious stomach problem and often could not eat when it hurt. Later, in a small hotel in Beijing, he met several complainants whose physical conditions were even worse. One of them even had just finished chemotherapy. He was suddenly inspired and thought that he should not give up easily. After all, if the heart disease was not resolved, the body would not get better (Int. 90). In another case, a complainant blamed the court for the lack of enforcement in a traffic accident when the perpetrator refused to completely fulfill his obligation. He later ran into another complainant in a repatriation journey whose son was also a victim of a traffic accident, but the perpetrator has not been found yet because the police did not handle the case well. The complainant thus felt that he was still relatively lucky and should continue to lodge complaints with a more positive mindset (Int. 91). As some local cadres summarized, The circumstances that complainants use for comparison are not limited to the case itself, but include all the other factors (e.g., physical conditions, petitioning ordeals, and family changes) that contribute to their positive mindsets. What supports this comparison is their blind, paranoid, and even illusory optimism. (Int. 92, 93)

A crucial reason behind this is still the reluctance of self-denial. It is not uncommon for complainants to fail or give up, but they always stare at those who succeed and gullibly believe that they will be one of them. As stated above, the comparison conducted by complainants tends to collect all the positive signals while ignore the negative ones. Following this irrational logic, complainants’ demands might not always stay within a reasonable range, but would continue to increase with the escalation of the comparator. In this sense, the comparison also has the function of raising the expectations of complainants. In practice, there are a wide variety of references that can be used for comparison. Some of them actually have certain validity. One is the same type of cases, such

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as the issues of village teachers’ treatment and veterans’ placement. For example, a village teacher in Hubei had reached a compensation agreement with the government, but a Jiangsu complainant she knew before told her that several new subsidies had recently been added in Jiangsu, which rekindled her expectations and pushed her to lodge complaints again (Int. 76). In another case, a veteran from Henan had stopped appealing for two years, but his comrades from Shandong recently received a new resettlement policy, which also raised his hopes and made him go back to the government to ask for a better treatment (Int. 85). Even different cases, if they occur within the jurisdiction of the same government, often cause a backlash from complainants. A teacher had already negotiated a compensation agreement of hundreds of thousands of Yuan with the government regarding his wrongful dismissal. However, a stubborn complainant he had known for many years received a higher compensation from the government because of a medical malpractice dispute. This made him so unbalanced that he dropped the agreement with the government (Int. 40, 63). In fact, every case is special, even similar cases in the same area are not comparable. However, complainants do not analyze the problem so rationally, but instead use emotions to smooth out the differences. In other words, they will regard any ordeal experienced during the petition process as a cost that needs to be compensated. A local official once persuaded a woman to accept hundreds of thousands of petition assistance, and told that there were no such good conditions for others, while she suddenly lost her emotion and said, “I have complained from the age of 20 to 40, how should my youth be compensated?” (Int. 85). The same situation happened to a teacher who refused a handsome compensation: After more than 20 years of complaining, my body broke down, my wife passed away, and my son dropped out of school. Shouldn’t these losses be compensated. (Int. 84)

The reason why complainants are unwilling to just call it quits is because too much has been sacrificed. And the more reluctant they are, the more they have to persevere, especially when others have reaped more benefits through this way. In this sense, the comparison itself is not only the result but also the inducement of their persistent contention. Their social circles in this process provide the necessary field for the generation of this comparison.

3.4 Mutual Assistance Among Unyielding Complainants Mutual assistance is first reflected in the activities directly related to petitioning. For example, the experience communication discussed above is a form of mutual assistance. However, the content of mutual assistance is much richer than experience communication. Specifically, complainants often cover for each other’s whereabouts. A complainant once deceived local cadres that he did not know the itinerary of another complainant, but in fact they had planned to appeal to Beijing together (Int. 84). Complainants also help each other evade interception by local officials. Once several cadres came to a bridge hole to look for a complainant who happened to

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be out shopping for groceries. Suspecting that these cadres were going to take her home, her companion lied to them that she did not know where she had gone and quietly texted her not to come back (Int. 85). When necessary, complainants even personally participate in stopping such interception. An official recalled that he and a colleague finally blocked a complainant, but the woman quickly called three burly men. They seemed to be on good terms with the woman, as they affectionately called her sister. To avoid further confrontation, they had to suspend the operation (Int. 94). In addition, complainants also back each other up to strengthen their momentum. Sometimes they do this purely for money. In Beijing, for example, some people specially organize such protests in front of state agencies and foreign embassies. Each person is paid 100 to 200 Yuan a day and lunch is included (Int. 95). But sometimes, complainants do this out of empathy. As a complainant lamented, She was too pitiful. We just helped her pull a banner and cried out a few times. It’s no big deal. Can every one warm up only if they all hug together. After all, everyone needs others at some point. Only in this way can we demonstrate more strength and thus receive more attention from the government. (Int. 96)

Digging deeper, the reason why complainants engage in such petition-related mutual assistance lies in the fact that they have cultivated trust and formed relatively solid social circles through their daily interactions. In other words, the petitionrelated assistance is just an extension of their everyday assistance, while the latter is precisely the foundation of the whole story. Specifically, complainants’ everyday assistance can be divided into two main types: material assistance and spiritual assistance. Material assistance is first manifested in the sharing of life information, such as where to pick up free clothes, buy cheap vegetables, rent a suitable house and find a casual and easy job. These messages are especially necessary for complainants who are new to Beijing and meanwhile in financial distress. As a complainant described, “She was in possession of only a few hundred Yuan on her arrival in Beijing. A fellow complainant took her to live under a bridge, where a bed cost just ten Yuan a night. The Samaritan also showed her how to pick up free vegetables in a nearby vegetable market. He even introduced her to a role as a cook on a small construction site, although this she refused because it was too tiring (Int. 85). In addition to sharing information, complainants also provide more practical help to their companions within an acceptable range. A landlord in a petition village on the outskirts of Beijing told me that, When a new complainant arrives and stays temporarily for a day or two, he would advise the tenants to squeeze in and make room for him, otherwise it is a bit unkind to lock him out. If he thinks it’s a good place and willing to stay, we are considered friends and thus reach a tacit understanding of mutual assistance. Once, when I got sick, another complainant ran a long way to buy me medicine. On another occasion, a complainant passed away. Many complainants went over to help, the women comforted his wife, the men dealt with his afterlife. That’s the atmosphere here, everyone maybe in trouble someday, and helping others is also helping yourself. (Int. 97)

Along with material assistance, emotional interactions will inevitably develop among complainants longing for a sympathetic person upon whom they can unburden

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themselves. A complainant often poured out his misfortunes after a few glasses of wine, such as the government seizing his coal mine and causing him to go bankrupt, and his wife divorcing him after years of unyielding complaints. He even swore some dirty words when getting extremely angry, but after sobering up the next day, he returned to a cheerful and enthusiastic appearance (Int. 64). His companions had become accustomed to this, since they also had the need to relieve depression by unloading the anguish onto friends. Due to emotional resonance, complainants sometimes involuntarily change from a listener to a comforter, thus putting more energy into the teller. An old woman, whose only daughter died in an accident, had appealed for many years together with her granddaughter, suffering untold hardships during the journey between home and Beijing. She had several good friends in a complainants’ village. They not only encouraged her to be positive, but also bought her granddaughter snacks and toys from time to time (Int. 98). With frequent material and spiritual interactions, some complainants become more and more intimate and began to get along in the name of sisters, brothers, mother and daughter, and father and son. For example, the old woman mentioned above recognized a daughter whose father died in a traffic accident, and the perpetrators have not been found yet because of police inaction (Int. 98). Some other complainants even started living together like a couple. For example, the aforementioned bankrupt complainant abandoned by his wife later lived with another woman. They even opened a variety store in the house they rented (Int. 91). However, many of these close relationships are not as ideal as they seem to be. Just like the bankrupt complainant, he still has good financial acumen, so more than one female complainant is willing to be his girlfriend in the petition village (Int. 99). The mother-daughter complainants also had their little calculations. The daughter expected the mother to help her integrate better into petitioning social circles, while the mother needs the daughter to offer her some life care. They both had a grudge against each other’s insatiable expectations (Int. 80). A worse example is a young female complainant who was cheated by a middle-aged man for her feelings and money, and thus became more stubborn and socially hostile (Int. 73). The third spiritual need of complainants is to seek recognition and meaningful existence from petitioning social circles. Due to years of complaining, unyielding complainants normally live in a marginalized state. They are often ignored and excluded by people around them, and thus feel distress, anxiety, anger, sadness in ordinary lives. However, they also have the need of belonging and meaningful existence. If possible, they still attempt to behave in ways that facilitate re-inclusion and thus relieve their social anxiety. Petitioning social circles, at this time, happen to provide them with such an opportunity. As some complainants illustrated, many of them are socially anxious individuals, and only in complainants’ villages do they feel that they are not so special (Int. 100). Yet, complainants cope with this anxiety in distinctive ways because of personality difference. Introverted ones tend to express their emotions in a more restrained manner. One complainant rarely talked to others. When pressed repeatedly, he only said that his son was beaten to death, the defendants were not punished justly, and his son’s body was hastily cremated. After that, he just shed tears in silence (Int. 101). His

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introversion made it difficult for him to fit into petitioning social circle. Although everyone sympathized with him, they could not provide him with more help. In contrast, some complainants chose to help themselves find recognition through the aforementioned material and spiritual assistance. However, it should be noted that their integration is mainly instrumental, serving the purpose of complaining. Finally, there are some other complainants who have more thoroughly integrated into petitioning social circles and have begun to see it as a new way of life that can provide meaning in life. A man, who used to be a chef, opened a small restaurant in a complainant’s village. As the business got better and better, he took his wife over to help him (Int. 78). A few women worked part-time in nearby factories and construction sites. They only went home every year when the farming is busy, and lived in a complainant’s village the rest of the time. They often gathered together to play cards at spare time. They even set up a square-dancing group and posted the dancing videos on TikTok. These hobbies had helped them find the long-lost happiness (Int. 100). There was also an old woman who used to lodge complaints together with her husband, but later her husband passed away, and her son was unwilling to take her in. She thus lived under a bridge hole all year round, picking up rubbish to get by. As she explained, She was all alone at home, but there are still people here who understood her and talked to her. Although these people still lodged complaints occasionally, they had shifted most of the energy to the new life and found a sense of belonging from it, which had alleviated their social anxiety. (Int. 102)

4 Social Exclusion and Unyielding Complaints As illustrated above, unyielding complainants actually live in two kinds of social networks. One is the “power-interest networks” that exists in normal life. The other is petitioning social circles that are formed by complainants during the process of complaining. According to James Scott, most subordinate classes “are far less interested in changing the larger structures of the state and the law than…working the system…to minimize disadvantage” (Scott, 1985, p. XV). Unyielding complaints, as this chapter demonstrated, are obviously not an exception. Therefore, what unyielding complainants care most about is more likely their real-life experience, with self-preservation as the primary goal. In order to achieve this goal, their first shortcuts entails achieving a better life through instrumental-personal ties. However, as stated above, unyielding complainants are the disillusioned ones in these power-interest games. They either have tenuous instrumental-personal ties in the first place, or sever these ties to pursue more valuable aspects of their lives. Such plight has made them more vulnerable and helpless especially when they have lost something worth cherishing in their lives, but have no better means to make up for it. As a kind of low-binding participation, complaint thus becomes almost the only effective tool they can rely on. Their

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marginalized status, at such times, happens to be a favorable weapon that can be sophisticatedly exploited, since they have hit rock bottom, which instead makes them dare to devote everything to defending their losses. They thus burst forth with great strength and turn their social disadvantages into political advantages. However, complaining is like a double-edged sword that can further exacerbate their situations when they have tolerated countless ordeals and jeopardized various kinds of social ties. This is because the purpose of unyielding complaints is to cause difficulties for the government through the artful use of their weak position, so as to push it to satisfy their demands. Yet this process is not without cost for themselves, because making the government embarrassed also means damaging their relationship with it. In some cases, when their claims are directed at other individuals, and the government is merely an intermediary coordinator, such pestering contention can also harm their connections with those people. Meanwhile, the government often persuade nail persons to stop appealing through their relatives and friends, and their refusal can also damage their relationship with each other. In this sense, the essential feature of stubborn complaints is to achieve the goals by embarrassing the other party, whether it is directed to the government or other people, and this embarrassment in turn makes nail persons deteriorate their social relations and be ostracized by the people around them. However, this result does not create any psychological burden to unyielding complainants who have already lived in the marginalized status. This is partly because they already have a lot of negative emotions due to social exclusion, so they just want to embarrass others and thus give themselves a sigh of relief. The more important reason is that these unyielding complainants do not really have any valuable social ties that need to be carefully maintained, which gives them little social restraint and thereby making them free from weighing the feelings of others. These two reasons allow unyielding complainants to sustain their contention with a relatively relaxed mindset. A middle-aged villager was bullied by her neighbor due to her lack of social connections. She had married a man from outside of the area and in addition her husband had no brothers in the village. By running around topless in front of the government office she succeeded in forcing the government to demolish her neighbor’s house, merely because the house encroached slightly on her road. Without the existing grudge she would most likely have ignored this trivial dispute with the neighbor, or at least pursued it in a more dignified manner (Int. 103).8 In another case a middle school teacher, aggrieved at not having been awarded a professional title, slept for an entire week on a futon placed in front of the principal’s door in order to embarrass him into action. It is difficult for a school to please everyone in its title review process, but few teachers express their dissatisfaction in such an extreme manner. Although the teacher eventually achieved her desired outcome, she was ostracized by colleagues due to her eccentric personality (Int. 28, 104). 8

As an acknowledged expert in the field, the first author was invited to participate in the hearing of her case, which was held in a district petition bureau in Henan in October, 2011. The author was thus able to assemble a relatively complete account of the case, aided by input from the village party secretary and the township cadres in charge of the case.

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Even if some complainants are not socially ostracized before petitioning, the unyielding contention will push them to keep destroying their previous social connections, eventually turning them into marginalized individuals. A farmer was at odds with the government because his farm was rudely demolished and many chickens and ducks were frozen to death. He tried to get a reasonable compensation from the government through his friends, while the government recruited his old leader to do the thought work. This leader also helped his daughter find a job. After a fierce mental struggle, he rejected the leader, and thus was labelled as “forsaking good for the sake of gold” (wang en fu yi 忘恩负义) by his neighbors (Int. 85). Another village clinic owner went bankrupt due to medical malpractice. He kept appealing because he thought the government had enforced the law differentially in similar cases. The government eventually found his aunt to stop him who worked at the health bureau and had helped him start the business, but he shut the door on her aunt since he believed she turned the elbow to the wrong side. He might have his own reasons, but being so unapproachable also made other onlookers turn away from him (Int. 105). In addition to social exclusion, persistent complaints also result in the alienation from family members, which in turn strengthens their determination of unyielding contention. Some complainants were estranged from their families before petitioning. In many cases, this was even a major cause leading to their complaints. A middleaged woman was kicked out of the house by her son because of family conflicts. She successfully sued her son in court for the return of her house. The son, however, threatened to kill her if she dared to move in. She then demanded that the government arrest her son and continued to vigorously appeal when the government refused to accede to her request. Later her husband passed away, but still her son refused to take her in. She became a willful troublemaker, using the excuse of her various life’s difficulties to demand money from the government (Int. 77). Another woman petitioned the government for a dispute with her sister-in-law over the allocation of the homestead, and the reason is that the two people have long been at odds over family matters. She then continued to complain because of a dispute with her motherin-law over land acquisition money, and divorced her husband as a result. After that, she moved out of the village and became a stubborn complainant (Int. 85). By contrast, many more complainants have become more and more alienated from their families after petitioning. First, complainants consume a lot of time and energy, making them unable to concentrate on work or even give up work for this reason. This not only leads to a sharp decline in family income, but also makes them no time to accompany their families. The aforementioned farmer barely had time to take care of the family’s breeding business after petitioning. As time went by, his wife became exhausted because of the pressure to take care of the children and business. Their relation also became worse and worse after repeatedly persuading the farmer to give up to no avail (Int. 106). In another case, a village clinic owner had complained for several years because of the unfair treatment of a medical incident. The clinic was thus closed and his wife had almost nothing to say to him (Int. 106). Second, some embarrassing behaviors of complainants cause criticism from people around them and bring distress to their families. The topless streaker was

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rejected by her daughter-in-law, who refused to let her take care of the grandchildren, fearing that she might adversely affect their development. Nor did the son speak up, because he too felt ashamed and disgusted by his mother’s controversial behavior (Int. 103). The teacher who slept at the principal’s doorstep for a week was also abandoned by her husband, since he felt unable to change his wife and became increasingly more reluctant to endure the ridicule of the people around him (Int. 88, 104). The disgust of family members in turn makes complainants more difficult to communicate and get along with others, and ultimately reinforces their determination of unyielding contention. In contrast, an important reason why some stubborn complainants give up contention is because they can return to their original lives that offer them the opportunity of happiness and self-fulfillment. An old woman whose daughter was stabbed to death had campaigned for many years, together with her granddaughter, against what she saw as a miscarriage of justice. They sought a death penalty for the perpetrator even though this was not proscribed under the law. She finally agreed to end the complaint in return for hundreds of thousands of Yuan compensation payment. Wearily she explained, “I have already lost my only daughter. I cannot now risk losing my only granddaughter; I am her only hope. If the complaint continues, I will ruin her life” (Int. 75). The previously described woman who streaked naked in front of the government office also ceased her complaint, partly because the government gave her a temporary job as a cleaner, but more importantly because her daughterin-law finally agreed to let her take care of the grandchildren, which offered her a chance to re-establish a meaningful life (Int. 107, 108). Third, complaining can also lead to the retaliation from local authorities, bring harm to the family’s future development, and thus lead to the breakdown of family relations. One student failed the political censorship test of the military academy because of his father’s pestering complaint. He finally chose a university far away from home, and was reluctant to talk to his father for several years (Int. 90, 109). In another case, a man accepted hundreds of thousands of Yuan by way of petition assistance.9 However, within a year he had violated the agreement and rekindled the complaint process based on a new reason (Int. 84). His controversial behavior caused his sister to be criticized in her work unit. In order to avoid jeopardizing her career, she chose to have little contact with her brother from that point on (Int. 84, 92). As illustrated above, unyielding complainants who suffering ostracism are socially anxious individuals, who have virtually nothing to entice them back to a previous normal life. They thus feel distress, anxiety, anger, sadness, and low levels of belonging and meaningful existence. These negative emotions generated by social exclusion make them more likely to choose extreme ways to protect themselves against being exploited or rejected any more. However, just when they feel at their most desperate, the complaining experience opens up the opportunity for a fresh start. With the help petitioning social circles, many unyielding complainants start to run some small business, make some new friends, cultivate some new hobbies, and even 9

This message came from the investigation report of his case provided by a county petition bureau in Hubei in July, 2018.

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find a new life partner in complainants’ villages. For example, a complainant who ran a variety store together with his girlfriend falls into this category. As he explained, after he lost his farm and initiated his complaint, his wife ran away with another man and his friends alienated him. “Instead of being ridiculed in my hometown, it was better to start again over here” (Int. 91). The aforementioned women who had set up a square-dancing group in a complainants’ village exhibited a similar mentality (Int. 110). Although these complainants still cannot go back to their previous lives, they have found a new life through complaining and entered a relatively normal state of life. Although they still occasionally lodge appeals, they have shifted much of the energy to a new life and effectively alleviated their distress by finding a sense of belonging and social recognition. There are still, unfortunately, those unyielding complainants who have failed to find meaning or a sense of belonging in either their old lives or in the new complaining life. For this group contention become their principal raison d’etre. Yet the more they struggle, the deeper they sink into the quagmire. Their mentality, in these case degenerates from self-preservation to self-abandonment. Self-abandonment can be described as a “what-the-hell” (poguanzi poshuai 破罐子破摔) choice. Stubborn complainants who take this path are often completely detached from family and social ties, thus blocking their route back to normal life. As a result, some stubborn complainants choose to seek benefits through unreasonable complaints. The woman who had sued her son in court for the return of her house falls exactly into the category. Later her husband passed away, but still her son refused to take her in. She became a willful troublemaker, using the excuse of her various life’s difficulties to demand money from the government (Int. 77). In another example, a worker was dismissed from a factory after he fell from a roof, permanently injuring himself, while stealing cables. He claimed that the factory’s mishandling of the case had tarnished his reputation and was behind his failure to get married. The man subsequently launched a career as a perennial complainant, threatening to lodge complaints in Beijing whenever he needed money (Int. 111). Others choose to retaliate against the government in extreme ways, or exhibit a heightened risk of reacting violently at any moment. One resident continued to demand more compensation for the demolition of her home. At some point she fainted in a small hotel in Beijing and was rushed to hospital by local cadres. Unexpectedly, the examination revealed that she was pregnant, shameful news given that she had been apart from her husband for several years. Unwilling to accept the shame, he abandoned her and moved to Guangzhou with their children. Now desperate, she chose to violently confront government representatives, resulting in a prison sentence which completely ruined her life (Int. 61). Another woman had been complaining from the age of eighteen. She blamed the police for failing to apprehend the perpetrators of the motor accident in which her father had been killed. Her obstinacy caused her fiancé to break off their engagement; then a man she had met while complaining deceived her romantically and financially, all of which served to exacerbate her hostility towards society. Although she had not yet engaged in extreme behavior, she had become like a volcano that threatened to erupt at any moment (Int. 112).

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5 Conclusion Investigating the significance of life politics, this chapter provide a nuanced, contextual understanding of unyielding complaints by identifying the role of the “power-interest networks” and petitioning social circles. The analysis of “power-interest networks” suggests that the allocation of resources based on the closeness of personal ties is a crucial factor determining the life politics of unyielding complainants. However, the networks pose constraints on complainants who depend on them, but not for others who are self-sufficient. Unyielding complainants are often the latter type of persons. While they fail to use connections and thus lag behind in daily lives, this has offered them bigger manoeuvring space when they have to face the pressure of local authorities. Meanwhile, stimulated by the surroundings, they have a yearning to achieve a better life. Both of the reasons derive them to use complaining as the favored weapon to defend their losses and to find another way out their predicament. However, unyielding complaint is like a double-edged sword. When nail-like complainants are determined to use extreme ways to protect themselves against being exploited or defend what they think is worthy of cherishment, they have to pay the price of jeopardizing their social and family connections. This is because the xinfang system has invented a set of “filtering mechanisms” (guolv jizhi 过滤机制) to solve its facilitation-control dilemma. The system thus encourages the escalation of citizen complaints by sophisticatedly rewarding disruptive appeals while discouraging routinised ones. While unyielding contention helps complainants receive a government response, it often costs energy, worsens relationships, and exacerbates grievances, thereby leading to them being ostracized by those around them. As a result, unyielding complaints make it more difficult for them to get along with others. While paying the price, nail-like complainants are not without gain. Along the path of contention, they have met many like-minded people and form their own social circles, which have also affected their complaining trajectory to a certain extent. Relying on the role of learning, comparison and assistance, petitioning social circles not only help unyielding complainants to be more sophisticated and determined, but also provides them with a lot of material and spiritual support, thus functioning as a beam of light that illuminates the path ahead. Even so, this road is still full of hardships and unknowns. Only a few lucky ones eventually get the justice they want, while the rest, as social beings, still have the need of seeking belonging and meaningful existence. Some of them eventually find an appropriate outlet to reconcile with themselves by returning to original life or integrating into petitioning life, while others are still stuck in this agonizing process, lose their life destination, become increasingly desperate and extreme, and finally escalate their contention from self-preservation to self-abandonment. Ultimately, these self-abandoned complainants either end up as unreasonable profit-seekers, being sentenced for violent violations, or they continue to degrade themselves and leave themselves open to unknown risks.

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In sum, while nail-like complainants are excluded from normal social circles (i.e., the “power-interest networks”), they are supported by the social circles formed during their contention. Ultimately, the pull and push produced by the two kinds of social connections together change the life trajectory of unyielding complainants. Although this life-oriented research cannot replace the analysis of the state-centredness, it does provide us a nuanced perspective to perceive unyielding complainants in a contextual rather than a deductive way.

Chapter 9

Unyielding Complaints in China’s Eclectic State

Only two decades ago, few people expected that small-scale contention could succeed in the Chinese authoritarian state. Even today, the success of this contention is still puzzling. For their part, small-scale contention normally lacks the key factors (e.g., scale, organizational base, leaders, and resources) to make it sufficiently forceful. On the other side, the state understands clearly the risk of concession-making, rarely views social unrest as an insignificant challenge, and still has the determination and capacity to crush any challenge threatening its rule. How, therefore, can we account for the success of small-scale contention in China today? The existing explanations in China studies still focus primarily on the protesters advocating change rather than the officials handling them. Accordingly, they pay too much attention to the factors increasing social strength, and ignore far more interesting clues on the side of the state that also influence contention. This book thus seeks to direct our attention away from protesters and towards officials, and render a vision-enhancing framework for analyzing the handling of Chinese protests based on six analytical dimensions, viz. the changes in state capacity, the tensions between different dimensions of state legitimacy, the contradictions in the xinfang system, the divisions among elites, the state-society links, and the state strategies in response to protests. Compared to the situation before the 1990s, the state currently has a low “infrastructural power” but a high “despotic power.” Socio-political transformations since the 1990s, such as the reconstruction of state-owned enterprises and the cancellation of taxes, have weakened local authorities’ “infrastructural power” to penetrate the society. By contrast, the monopolistic power structure of local authorities has survived the market reform. Thus local authorities still have a high degree of “despotic power” to distribute valuable resources in local settings. The current state legitimacy is also different from that in the Maoist era, which relied mainly on a utopian ideology and a charismatic leadership. While the state has invested a great deal of effort in improving its socialist rule of law, it still keeps its centralized power structure and refuses free elections. The state is thus unable to benefit from the “procedure-based legitimacy” enjoyed by democracies, and has to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0_9

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legitimize itself by performance and ideology. To this end, the “mass line” (qunzhong luxian 群众路线) ideology still plays a significant role in managing conflicts in China today. However, the current mass line ideology is “de-politicized” because of the socialist rule of law. It still serves to facilitate low-binding participation, but loses much of its power to control and reeducate protesters. The changes in state capacity and the tensions between different dimensions of state legitimacy are two key macro structural factors which determine the nature of state institutions and state structure, as well as the state strategies in responding to contention and the interactions between state and society. The xinfang system, the most important state institution contributing to an understanding of the state’s role in petition handling, still facilitates petitions. However, it cannot effectively control them as it once did, partly because of the decline of state capacity to penetrate the society, and partly because of the contradictory official ideology and its corresponding institutional arrangements. However, the higher-level authorities still pressure their subordinates to deal properly with petitions and effectively maintain social stability. Consequently, local officials have to cheat or bribe their superiors in order to avoid punishment, or have to make expedient concessions to unyielding petitioners when they have no better way to stop them. The divisions among elites also differ from those witnessed before the 1990s. Since that time, the central government has been initiating a massive institutional reform in order to simultaneously maintain social stability, solve social conflicts, and manage malfeasant local agents. These efforts have created many vertical and horizontal bureaucratic divisions. In addition, the multiple priorities of the state often lead to self-contradictory incentives. Due to the unbearable pressure from above, individuals involved in the handing of protests become cynical of their work. Main party leaders, ordinary officials, grassroots cadres, “urban management officers” (chengguan 城管), and their allies (e.g., informants and blackguards) all spare no effort to maximize their benefits and avoid trouble based on their differentiated interest calculation. All the aforementioned divisions produce more openings for protesters to persist and succeed in their contention. The state-society links have also changed as result of the state’s low “infrastructural power” but high “despotic power.” While local authorities cannot penetrate as deeply as they once did, they still control the allocation of most of the valuable resources. Correspondingly, protesters can be categorized as either capable or ordinary according to their degree of interaction with local authorities. In practice, local authorities can still halt the protests of capable individuals with whom they have considerable interaction, but often fail to stop ordinary individuals with whom they have little interaction. These “half-opened” state-society links thus facilitate ordinary protesters to persist and even succeed in their contention. Based on all of the aforementioned factors, it is not difficult to clarify the rationale of the state response to contention. As discussed above, soft strategies are most frequently exploited by local officials and their allies. However, persuasion normally works with protesters who have strong ties to local authorities rather than those with weak ties. Surveillance often fails due to the patchy coverage of the different individuals involved in conflict management. Registration cancellation serves to exhaust

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protesters’ patience, to frustrate their confidence, and to pressure them to accept a solution, but it is only a tactic to approach the issue rather than the solution itself. Before making concessions, local officials also employ some hard strategies to undercut the cost, including overt ones such as detention or covert ones such as “stabilizing” (wenkong 稳控) protests in certain places. After a protester has endured all this suffering, local authorities then make expedient concessions to him in installments in order to prevent him taking the money and lodging a complaint on another matter. While this process is full of uncertainties and risks and the “success” of protesters is definitely not always a certain outcome, local officials and protesters at least reach a “non-zero-sum” situation at the end through contentious bargaining (Lee & Zhang, 2013). In continuation of this, the examination of the buying off of protesters in China presented in the book has several important empirical and theoretical implications. Empirically, neither small-scale contention nor state strategies in response to it have been amply explored in existing literature. Chapters 6 and 7 fill this gap with detailed empirical data. They focus on two representative types of small-scale contention: the contention of “nail residents facing eviction” and “nail petitioners”, and the state’s responses to them. Theoretically, the book calls for a reevaluation of the state-society relationship in the authoritarian Chinese regime. It underlines a more meticulous examination of Chinese authoritarian state. This supplements the previously informative but incomplete understanding of the Chinese state, and broadens our understanding of political opportunity structure by identifying three types of limits to elite power: the contradictions within state ideology and institutions, the “half-opened” state-society links, and the differentiation among individuals involved in the conflict management process. By delving more deeply into the state’s role in shaping contention, the book also sheds light on the dynamics and outcomes of small-scale contention in China, especially the hidden political order established by the ruling class and its impact on the subjective experience and repertoire of subordinates. The latter makes Chinese protest more complicated than simply defined rightful or routine contention and thus helps us to speculate on the future of “China’s eclectic state”. The remainder of the conclusion discusses in greater detail the theoretical propositions set out above.

1 China’s Eclectic State To many people, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a typical authoritarian regime that rejects democratization and muddles through modernization in its own way. How such a regime behaves when confronting widespread contention has thus received great attention. In recent years, Chinese specialists use “adaptive” (Chen, T., 2010), “contentious” (Chen, X., 2012), or “bargaining” (Lee & Zhang, 2013) authoritarianism to account for the regime’s strategies in responding to social unrest, and its durability. However, few of them define clearly the feature of the Chinese

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authoritarian regime. This is a very important question, especially if we admit how resilient an authoritarian regime can be and how complicated democratization is. In their study of democratic transition, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan identify five ideal types of modern states viz. democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian, posttotalitarian, and sultanic. Different regime types have different paths and tasks in the process of democratic transition (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 38–54). Most relevant to this book are the authoritarian regime and the post-totalitarian regime. Line and Stepan refer to an authoritarian regime as a political system that has no elaborated and guiding ideology, but has limited political pluralism and quite extensive social and economic pluralism. By contrast, a post-totalitarian regime, a decayed form of the totalitarian regime, is still officially committed to an elaborate ideology. It has almost no political pluralism because of the state’s overwhelming presence, but it has a certain social and economic pluralism (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 44–45). As discussed in the book, the authoritarian Chinese regime is distinguishable from both of them. On the one hand, a guiding ideology still exists officially and is a part of the social reality. On the other hand, the regime has limited political pluralism, yet still a certain level of social and economic pluralism. Therefore, the Chinese authoritarian regime is a hybrid regime which shares some characteristics with both the authoritarian and the post-totalitarian regimes. Andrew Nathan thus uses “resilience” to describe the Chinese authoritarian regime and reminds us of the need to take this “viable” regime form more seriously (Nathan, 2003). For the same reason, Kenneth Lieberthal makes a useful distinction between “static stability” and “dynamic stability”. The former means no adaption is undertaken by the leadership. By contrast, the latter acknowledges the necessity to continuously adapt and change and thus reach a kind of stability (Lieberthal, 2001). As David Shambaugh stresses, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recognizes that “dynamic stability” is the only way forward, and spares no effort to adapt and transform itself from a classic Leninist party into a new kind of hybrid party: “China’s eclectic state” (Shambaugh, 2008, p. 181). “Eclectic” here means the Chinese state still resolutely rejects a fundamental change of its political system to a “western-style democracy,” but it is almost never satisfied with the status quo and is thus continually seeking adaptation within the existing overall boundaries. The book clearly demonstrates how “China’s eclectic state” is growing through a cautious and incremental process of institutionalizing social contention without fundamentally changing its political system. Firstly, the state bases its legitimacy on multiple sources rather than a dominant ideology, but it also has to struggle with the tensions between these sources due to its rejection of liberal democracy. In the Maoist era, the state overwhelmingly highlighted the significance of an elaborate, utopian ideology and took this as the symbol of socialism’s superiority (Laugesen, 2009, pp. 53–56; Weatherley, 2007; Zhao, D., 2009, p. 422). While the state also stressed the importance of performance (Perry, 2008, pp. 40–41), its achievement in that regard was far from completely satisfactory. As discussed in Chaps. 4 and 5, the state later makes an adaption, basing its legitimacy not only on ideology but also on socialist rule of law and performance. However, the state’s effort to improve the socialist rule of law is in conjunction with its refusal to

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accept separation of power and competitive elections. The state is thus incapable of benefitting from the “procedure-based legitimacy” enjoyed by democracies, and has to largely legitimize itself by ideology and performance. Consequently, the mass line ideology still plays an important role in the handling of protests. However, due to the socialist rule of law, the current mass line ideology is “de-politicized” and loses much of its power to control and reeducate protesters. As James Scott points out, dominant classes quite rarely have a “well-defined and coherent ideology” (Scott, 1985, p. 341). Obviously, CCP is not an exception. However, what is different here is that “China’s eclectic state” also creates such contradictions through its adaptation and change. Accordingly, the conflicts within state ideology and legitimacy provide opportunity for the contention of subordinates. Secondly, the state allows the society more autonomy, but it also cautiously limits such autonomy through its centralized power structure and the control of valuable resources. The society was tightly controlled in Maoist times because of the “unit system” (danwei zhi 单位制) in urban China (Walder, 1986) and the “commune system” (gongshe zhi公社制) in rural China (Oi, 1985; 1991). However, such organized dependence is significantly changed because the market reform has shifted the balance of power and resources between state and society. As discussed in Chaps. 6 and 7, ordinary individuals are less fearful of protesting against local authorities due to the little interaction they have with the latter. At the same time, local authorities still control most of the valuable resources and thus can hold sway over capable individuals tightly attached to them. On this point, while the state’s “infrastructural power” is relatively lower, its “despotic power” is still high. Accordingly, the state-society relation today is “half-opened.” The state is no longer an overwhelming presence in the society, but it still has a relatively high capability of absorbing the risk of social unrest. Thirdly, the state installs new institutions and improves existing ones to institutionalize contention, but its effort in doing so also delivers non-institutional results because of its incomplete reform. The xinfang system discussed in Chap. 4 is a typical example. As a special version of socialist democracy combining a centralized party leadership with low-binding public participation, the xinfang system has two preexisting structural contradictions. One is to create a balance between facilitating and controlling petitions. The other is to supervise local officials while at the same time relying on them too to handle petitions. Instead of cancelling the xinfang system, the state chooses an eclectic way to maintain its function of facilitating low-binding participation, while preventing local officials from mishandling petitions by introducing a series of new institutions. Consequently, while the state partly meets its aim of facilitating participation, it also has to face increasing petitioning facilitated by itself. The state thus has to push its agents to work harder through irresistible incentives and meanwhile conditionally tolerate their misbehaviors related to petition handling. This expedient measure can largely keep petitioning under control, but it also continuously undermines the xinfang system as well as state legitimacy. In addition, as mentioned above, the elite divisions and the state strategies in response to contention are also significantly changed because of the state’s proactive

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but limited adaptation to accommodate social protest. This explains why smallscale contention is more likely to force the state to make expedient concessions in China today. While we cannot applaud such “success”, which is often embittered and indignant, we cannot deny either the state’s efforts to improve public participation, even though its priority is to maintain one-party rule rather than empower its people through democracy. Therefore, “China’s eclectic state” is the key to understanding the Chinese authoritarian regime. On the one hand, the Chinese state still resolutely rejects a fundamental change of its political system to a “western-style democracy.” On the other hand, it is almost never satisfied with the status quo and is thus continually seeking adaptation within the existing overall boundaries. Such “dynamic stability” not only effectively helps the state to maintain its one party-rule, but also continuously creates democratic space between state and society. These contradictory but interdependent processes further contribute to our knowledge of political opportunity structure, especially in the subject of China studies.

2 The Limits of Elite Power In China studies, political opportunity structure (POS) has been primarily understood as a product of the vertical (Bernstein & Lü, 2003; Cai, 2006; 2008; O’Brien & Li, 2006; Ying, 2001) and horizontal bureaucratic divisions (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 144– 162; Mertha, 2008; Shi & Cai, 2006; Sun & Zhao, 2008). However, as clarified in the book, bureaucratic divisions are still insufficiently nuanced to interpret the fate of Chinese protests, especially small-scale ones. An important reason is that the theory of bureaucratic divisions is based on the assumption of elite power. Accordingly, the key for protesters to create and employ such divisions is to increase their social strength by “mobilizing sufficient political leverage” (McAdam, 1999, pp. 36–37). However, the reality is that many Chinese protests lack key factors (e.g., scale, organizational base, leaders, and resources) to make their contention sufficiently forceful. On this point, the success of many small-scale protests in China can broaden the theories of POS primarily based on European and American cases. As Elizabeth Perry stresses, “Although these theories have certainly not ignored the role of the state…the Chinese experience argues for acknowledging a larger, more pro-active role for the state” (Perry, 2002, p. xxi). Xi Chen further argues that existing research of POS is either too narrow or too general. Too narrow because it heavily focuses on the divisions of elite power but ignores the limits of that power. Too general because it lacks “precise specification” about what exactly those limits are. Chen thus suggests an important perspective to explore POS, the limits of elite power (Chen, X., 2012, pp. 194–198). However, Chen only identifies one type of limit to elite power, “the contradictions and ambiguities of state ideology and institutions” (Chen, X., 2012, p. 196). By contrast, the book clarifies three types of such limits. In addition to the contradictions within state ideology and institutions, the “half-opened” state-society links and the

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differentiation among individuals involved in the conflict management process are also two significant POS which protesters can exploit. Furthermore, Chen primarily adopts an institutional approach to analyze the limit of elite power in China. By contrast, the book begins its discussion from a macro structural standpoint, and highlights the changes of state legitimacy and state capacity in shaping these limits of elite power. Firstly, the contradictions in state ideology are a result of the state’s effort to consolidate its legitimacy on multiple fronts. To address this concern, the state not only emphasizes the significance of socialist rule of law, but also maintains the mass line ideology. Meanwhile, the state also initiates market reform in order to improve its performance legitimacy, which leads to a decline in its capacity to penetrate the state. All these changes exacerbate the inherent structural contradictions of the xinfang system. Consequently, the xinfang system still serves to facilitate lowbinding participation but loses most of its power to control and educate petitioners. As we can see here, the present changes in state legitimacy and state capacity are “volatile” POS. By contrast, the inherent structural contradictions of the xinfang system are “stable” POS.1 Both of them together produce political opportunity for contention. Secondly, the “half-opened” state-society links are simultaneously shaped by the state’s low “infrastructural power” and high “despotic power.” The former means that the state cannot control protesters who have little interaction with it. However, the latter means that the state can still hold sway over protesters who have considerable interaction with it. This POS is simultaneously shaped by the limit and the strength of the state. Thirdly, the differentiation among individuals involved in the conflict management process is also a consequence of the changes of state legitimacy and state capacity. On the one hand, due to its multiple priorities, the state not only drives its agents to deal with contention with irresistible incentives, but also handcuffs their threat or use of violence. On the other hand, local officials lose much of their authority to persuade protesters to stop contention by resorting to the mass line ideology or socioeconomic coercion. Under such unbearable pressure, local officials and their allies are incapable of handling protests by following the state’s self-contradictory orders. They thus choose to maximize their benefits and avoid trouble as far as they possibly can. Their cynical attitude furthermore leaves many loopholes for protesters to exploit. By delving more deeply into the state’s role from a macro structural standpoint, the book identifies three key POS from the perspective of the limits of elite power. While the limits of the state do not deny its power, they do help us to better understand the complexity of “China’s eclectic state” and its influence on contention.

1

For the distinction between “stable” and “volatile” POS and its significance, see (Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, 1996).

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3 The Hidden Rational of Unyielding Complaints The “success” of small-scale contention in “China’s eclectic state” also contributes to our knowledge of the characteristics of Chinese protests. Scholars refer to three primary forms of resistance to portray the contention in China. The first is “everyday forms of resistance” (Scott, 1985). Rather than seeing “open, organized, political activity,” James Scott identifies other “quiet and anonymous” peasant actions in a Malaysian village, such as “foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on”. Scott calls these less visible but significant acts “everyday forms of resistance” (Scott, 1985, pp. xv–xvii). For safety’s sake, “everyday forms of resistance” avoid any direct confrontation with authority or with elite norms. Meanwhile, it requires little coordination or planning, and is used by both individuals and groups. In addition, it is rooted in everyday material goals, and is normally opportunistic and selfish (Scott & Kerkvliet, 1986, p. 6). As some studies illustrate, most of the peasant actions in China before the 1980s closely resemble this form of resistance (Kelliher, 1992; Yang, D., 1996; Zhou, K., 1996). The contention of nail persons discussed in the book also displays some characteristics of “everyday forms of resistance.” It is private and unorganized rather than collective and organized. It is opportunistic and selfish rather than principled and selfless. Most of the nail persons’ demands are economic rather than political. However, nail persons’ resistance is no longer quiet and invisible. It is both noisy and visible and tries to oppose, rather than avoid, unresponsive elites by whatever means available. Actually, most of the contention in China today is noisy and open, seeking rather than avoiding elites’ attention. Seeing this, Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li develop the second form of resistance, “rightful resistance” (O’Brien & Li, 2006). As they elucidate, “rightful resistance entails the innovative use of laws, policies, and other officially promoted values to defy disloyal political and economic elites” (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 2). While rightful resisters are still opportunistic and often unorganized, they do not think that “the state and its laws are typically inaccessible, arbitrary and alien” as “everyday resisters” did (O’Brien & Li, 2006, pp. 3–4). On the contrary, they learn to employ the state’s ideology, laws and policies to justify their contention. Therefore, rightful resistance is “a product of state building and of opportunities created by the spread of participatory ideologies and pattern of rule rooted in notions of equality, rights, and rule of law…and a sign of growing rights consciousness and a more contractual approach to political life” (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 4).2 Obviously, nail persons’ contention also share some features with “rightful resistance.” They are both noisy and open, but opportunistic and unorganized. Like rightful resisters, nail persons also know how to sophisticatedly exploit officially approved channels and established values to justify their claims. Therefore, they both have certain “rights

2

For other research with similar arguments, see (Gallagher, 2006; Goldman, 2005; 2007; Heimer, 2006; Lee, 2007; Liebman, 1998; Yang, G., 2002; Yu, J., 2004; Zweig, 2000, 2003).

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consciousness.”3 However, nail persons also purposely violate state laws and policies in order to maximize their interests. As illustrated in the book, they create unapproved constructions to add value to their homes. They choose troublemaking, but not seriously law-breaking action, to force the state to meet their demands. Sometimes, they even use unreasonable petitioning to seek benefits from the government. Ironically, their success is sometimes based on how good they are at employing these extra-institutional acts through officially approved terms and channels. Elizabeth Perry thus questions if Chinese protesters today articulate a rising rights consciousness (Perry, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010). As she illustrates, “what we are seeing in China today reflects a much older ‘rules consciousness,’ in which savvy protesters frame their grievances in officially approved terms in order to negotiate a better bargain with the authoritarian state” (Perry, 2009, p. 20). Such “routine protest” is more likely an indication of politics-as-usual which has existed in China for centuries rather than a sign of some new state-society relations (Perry, 2010, pp. 27–28). Perry does not suggest that China has remained unchanged since imperial days, stressing instead that the historically similar “routine contention” driven by “rules consciousness” can strengthen rather than weaken the political system, and thus it implies no serious challenge to the authority and durability of the state (Perry, 2007, p. 21, 2008, pp. 46–47, 2009, p. 20, 2010, p. 28). Perry’s analysis of “routine protest” and “rules consciousness” is insightful, but she ignores a very important fact, viz. that there actually exist two kinds of rules in the state-society interaction. One is onstage, public rules that are promulgated and publicized by the state, such as state ideology, laws and policies. The other is offstage, “hidden rules” (qian guize 潜规则) that go against commonly accepted ideas of justice. They are openly forbidden by the state, but are privately recognized and used by the ruling class and subordinates.4 As we can see in the book, protesters are often rewarded for their troublemaking or mild non-institutional acts. The better they are at doing this, the more benefits they can obtain. By contrast, whether or not their demands are justified becomes less decisive in determining their “success”. This is vividly captured in a popular Chinese saying, “a major ruckus leads to a major resolution, a small ruckus leads to a small resolution, and no ruckus leads to no resolution” (da nao da jiejue, xiao nao xiao jiejue, bu nao bu jiejue 大闹大解决, 小闹小解决, 不闹不解决). The rationale behind such contentious bargaining is a very typical “hidden rule”. Obviously, the resistance encouraged by the “hidden rule” is more risky than that driven by public rules. Even though it is not an immediate threat, such resistance will, in the long run, undermine rather than underpin the state’s power. In summary, the contention discussed in the book carries some features of the three forms of resistance mentioned above, but it is also distinguishable from all of them. The contention is unorganized, opportunistic and selfish in its interest articulation, but it is noisy and public. The contention uses some officially promoted values to 3

Lianjiang Li defines “rights consciousness” as “a combination of awareness of the necessity for protection from central rule-making authorities and eagerness to acquire such protection through direct or indirect participation in rule-making” (Li, 2010, p. 54). 4 I borrow the concept of “hidden rules” from Wu Si (Wu, S., 2009, pp. 193–194).

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justify itself, but it also ignores and even violates others which stand in its way. The contention is not an instant threat to the state, but it continuously undermines its domination. The contention reflects protesters’ rights or public rules consciousness, while encouraging their hidden rules consciousness. I call this contention “the hidden rule constraining resistance.” As we can see, the “hidden rule” helps to supplement of our knowledge of the state-society relationship in China today. It is not surprising that protesters employ troublemaking acts to negotiate a better bargain with the state, since contention is a kind of extra-institutionalized act used by excluded groups in order to get back into the political arena. The difference here is that the state’s effort to institutionalize protests achieves the opposite result, rewarding and encouraging non-institutionalized ones. This distinguishes “the hidden rule constraining resistance” from “everyday forms of resistance,” “rightful resistance,” and “routine protest.” Given the overwhelming presence of the state in Maoist China, there was little space for contentious politics. People thus often used everyday resistance to express their dissatisfaction. By contrast, protesters in China today have many more officially approved terms and channels to voice their grievances. This encourages rightful or routine protests. However, these two forms of resistance primarily focus on the state’s capacity to institutionalize contention rather than its limits in this regard. Generally, the state is still capable of keeping social unrest under control. However, as mentioned above, the incoherent ideology, low “infrastructural power,” and self-contradictory institutions of the state also make it incapable of achieving a desired goal according to its expectations. Consequently, the state has to make expedient concessions to protesters in order to maintain a “dynamic stability.” Such response not only indicates the state illegitimacy but also increases perceptions of state weakness. Many protesters thus believe they can extract more from the regime through troublemaking acts. In this way, the contention ironically reinforces their recognition of “hidden rules.” On this point, hidden rules also restrict their contention. While protesters continuously use rightful or routine protests in an attempt to convert the political system and make it more institutionalized and responsive, the political system also converts them, making them more cynical and less confident of rights and public rules.

4 The Blend of Hope and Risk in China’s State Building Predicting the future is difficult, especially for China, a large nation with a long history and special political culture. Therefore, there is no straightforward answer to the question as to whether the China’s state building can succeed. However, the book provides some clues to this issue based on the discussion of “China’s eclectic state” and “resistance constrained by hidden rules.” If we do not stick to a narrowly defined democracy, “a system of multiple parties holding office in rotation” (Bao, 2011), there does exist an expanding “democratic space” between state and society in China today. As a township leader told me, “It

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barely had nail residents before 2005. At that time, buildings on a street could be demolished within a month. Few of residents dared to stand up, seriously challenging the government” (Int. 103). Nail petitioners had similar experience in the early years. They were often threatened and beaten. Most of them could not get any concessions from local authorities.5 By contrast, the book portrays a quite different picture of their fate over the past few years. As previously discussed, “China’s eclectic state” is the key concept to explain this phenomenon. In order to rescue the atrophying regime, the party initially makes adaptation. Accordingly, protesters get more opportunities to persist and even succeed in their contention. The state and the society are thus more likely to reach a “non-zero-sum” situation through contentious bargaining (Lee & Zhang, 2013). While such contentious bargaining is full of not-so-legal or extrainstitutional behaviors on both sides and thus encourages the growth of “hidden rules,” it still helps to maintain a “dynamic stability” of the regime by providing more terms and channels for the society to release its discontent. The contentious bargaining distinguishes the current Chinese state from those dynasties found in China’s history. One the one hand, China today has greater willingness and capacity to institutionalize contention. As Samuel Huntington stresses, a changing society often faces a challenge to simultaneously institutionalize increasing political participation and avoid social instability (Huntington, 1968). Therefore, a regime’s survival “rests upon its capacity to curb and channel threatening social forces” (Perry, 2007). As the book illustrates, the party spares no effort to install new institutions or improve existing ones in order to maintain its one-party rule. By contrast, most of the atrophying dynasties died as a result of either becoming too frightened to take actions or else becoming satisfied with the status quo. On the other hand, the Chinese society today is becoming more autonomous owing to the state’s adaptation. While the society is far from reaching a state of extensively pluralist autonomy, it is partially changing the existing political order. On this point, China is showing itself capable of significant adaptation in order to institutionalize contention. Whether or not this adaptation will be sufficient to lead to a more democratic China remains an open question that deserves more attention in the future. However, considering the widespread existence of hidden rules in the contentious bargaining process, China’s state building is also risky. On this point, I disagree with both Perry and O’Brien and Li’s predictions regarding China’s political development. Perry argues that “there is little evidence at present of any of the elements whose explosive combination would portend a serious threat to political stability” (Perry, 2010, p. 28). She is right if we only focus on those factors which could lead to bigscale, organized political activity. However, as Scott highlights, “the vast aggregation of petty acts” could also possibly result in a “shipwreck.” He thus calls attention to subtle acts (Scott & Kerkvliet, 1986). The everyday nail persons’ contention is an exact example of such petty acts. As discussed above, the state often rewards such contention based on how good it is at making trouble. This, in the long run, could For an example of this, see 中国信访制度困境和出路 (Zhongguo xinfang zhidu kunjing he chulu, The Dilemma and Hope of the Xinfang System in China), available at: http://www.china-review. com/lafi.asp?id=31036, accessed on 23th October 2014. 5

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reinforce protesters’ recognition of hidden rules, weaken their confidence in rights and public rules, and further undermine the state legitimacy. The other consideration making the situation even riskier is that “resistance constrained by hidden rules” happens at the same time when the state mends its ways but does not fully address the reasons for the illegitimacy (Tocqueville, 1955). Therefore, when more protesters start to believe that they too can extract more from the regime by employing not-solegal acts, and the state can no longer afford the increasingly expensive concessions, contentious bargaining between two parties could be escalated at any time. However, when everyday subtle acts are actually escalated, it is also questionable that they could “evolve into a more far-reaching counter hegemonic project” as O’Brien and Li anticipate (O’Brien & Li, 2006, p. 126). As previously discussed, O’Brien and Li primarily focus on the state’s efforts in institutionalizing contention and the corresponding “rightful resistance” of protesters What they do not fully explore is the state’s limits in this regard and the corresponding protesters’ “resistance constrained by hidden rules”. The latter may solidify protesters’ hidden rules consciousness rather than rights consciousness and furthermore turn their contention into unorganized “anger-venting” (xiefen 泄愤) acts. Therefore, whether or not social contention can bring a better future for China is still not yet clear. If the state succeeds in institutionalizing contention and avoids social instability, it may create a new statesociety relation. Alternatively, if the state fails to achieve its objective, it may lead China into chaos.

Appendix A

Interviewees List 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

Village team leader, Henan, September 2011. Villager, Henan, July 2012. Village party secretary, Henan, September and August 2011. Petitioner, Henan, July 2012. Vice township head, Henan, July, August and September 2012. Township cadre, Henan, September 2011. Village head, Henan, October 2011. Street party secretary, Henan, October 2011. Petitioner, Henan, September 2011. Persistent petitioner, Henan, September, October and November 2011. Leader of a petition bureau, Henan, September, October and November 2011. Vice township head, Henan, September, October and November 2011. Nail resident, Henan, September, October and December 2011. Persistent petitioner, Henan, July 2012. Persistent petitioner, Henan, July, August and September 2012. Resident, Henan, September 2011. Cadre of a petition bureau, Henan, September and October 2011. District leader, Henan, August and September 2011. District leader, Henan, August, September and October 2011. Barefoot lawyer, Henan, June and July 2012. Leader of a petition bureau, Henan, July, August and September 2012. Police leader, Henan, September 2011. Police officer, Henan, October, 2011. Police officer, Henan, September 2011. Vice township head, Henan, July 2012. Township leader, Henan, August and September 2011. Villager, Henan, August 2011. Resident, Henan, July 2012.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0

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29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

Appendix A

Leader of an urban management team, Henan, July 2012. Nail resident, Henan, September 2011. Nail resident, Henan, September 2011. Villager, Henan, August 2011. Villager, Henan, October 2012. Persistent petitioner, Henan, July, August and September 2011. Resident suffered forced eviction, Henan, July 2011. Resident, Henan, October 2011. Township cadre, Henan, July 2012. Protest leader, Henan, July 2012. Village team leader, Henan, September 2011. Petitioner, Henan, August 2011. Village party secretary, Henan, July, August and September 2011. Leader of a petition bureau, Henan, July, August and September 2011. Persistent petitioner, Henan, June and July 2012. Cadre of a petition bureau, Henan, September 2011 and July 2012. Petitioner, Henan, July 2012. Protest leader, Henan, July 2012. Cadre of an urban management team, Henan, July 2012. Persistent petitioner, Henan, October 2011 and July 2012. Leader of a petition bureau, Hubei, June, July and August 2018. Petitioner, Hubei, July 2018. Petitioner’s son, Hubei, August 2018. Petitioner’s daughter, Hubei, July 2018. Cadre of a petition bureau, Hubei, June, July and August 2018. Vice township head, Hubei, June 2018. Petition cadre, Hubei, June 2018. Petitioner, Hubei, July 2018. County leader, Hubei, August 2018. Petition cadre, Hubei, August 2018. Persistent petitioner, Hubei, July 2018. Township cadre, Hubei, July 2018. Cadre of a petition bureau, Hubei, July 2018. Leader of a petition bureau, Henan, December 2016. Cadre of a petition bureau, Henan, August 2011. Owner of a mine, Henan, August 2011. Community leader, Guangdong, July 2018. Leader of a processing unit, Hubei, August 2018. Community leader, Hubei, July 2018. Persistent petitioner, Hubei, August 2018. Persistent petitioner, Hubei, July 2018. Petitioner, Hubei, June 2018. Petitioner, Hubei, August 2018. Persistent petitioner, Hubei, June 2018. Cadre of a petition bureau, Guangxi, June 2019.

Appendix A

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

Petitioner, Guangdong, August 2018. Petitioner, Hubei, July 2018. Village teacher, Hubei, July 2018. Cadre of a petition bureau, Henan, December 2016. Petitioner visiting Beijing from Liaoning, Beijing, June 2013. Petitioner visiting Beijing from Hunan, Beijing, June 2013. Cadre on duty in Beijing from Henan, Beijing, June 2013. Petitioner visiting Beijing from Henan, Beijing, June 2013. Cadre on duty in Beijing from Hubei, Beijing, June 2013. Petitioner visiting Beijing from Hubei, Beijing, June 2013. Persistent petitioner, Hubei, July 2018. Petitioner, Henan, November 2016. Persistent petitioner, Guangxi, September 2019. Street cadre, Guangdong, August 2018. Leader of a petition bureau, Hubei, July 2018. Persistent petitioner, Shanghai, December 2016. Persistent petitioner, Shaanxi, October 2020. Petitioner visiting Beijing from Shandong, Beijing, June 2013. Village party secretary, Hubei, July 2018. Township cadre, Hubei, July 2018. Cadre on duty in Beijing from Liaoning, Beijing, June 2013. Street cadre, Shanghai, December 2016. Petitioner in a petitioners’ village, Beijing, June 2013. Landlord in a petitioners’ village, Beijing, June 2013. Persistent petitioner, Hubei, July 2018. Petitioner visiting Beijing from Henan, Beijing, June 2013. Petitioner visiting Beijing from Hebei, Beijing, June 2013. Petitioner visiting Beijing from Gansu, Beijing, June 2013. Persistent petitioner, Henan, November 2016. Township leader, Henan, September 2011. Middle school teacher, Hubei, July 2018. Village clinic owner, Henan, November 2016. Petitioner’s wife, Henan, December 2016. Township leader, Henan, November 2016. Persistent petitioner, Henan, November 2016. Street cadre, Shaanxi, October 2020. Petitioner visiting Beijing from Hebei, Beijing, June 2013. Cadre of a petition bureau, Guangdong, August 2018. Cadre of a petition bureau, Guangxi, September 2019.

185

Appendix B

Documents on file with the author 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

2011 年Y区关于监督和落实信访工作的实施意见 (2011 nian Y qu guanyu jiandu he luoshi xinfang gongzuo de shishi yijian, Opinions on supervising and implementing the xinfang issues in the Y District in 2011), Henan, July 2011. 2011 年Y区关于领导干部大接访和集中治理信访突出问题的实施意见 (2011 nian Y qu guanyu lindao ganbu da jiefang he jizhong zhili xinfang tuchu wenti de shishi yijian, Opinions on receiving visitors and solving prominent xinfang issues in the Y District in 2011), Henan, September 2011. 2012 年Y区信访工作目标责任书 (2012 nian Y qu xinfang gongzuo mubiao zeren shu, Responsibility commission of the xinfang work of the Y District in 2012), Henan, August 2012. 2011 年Y区领导包案一览表 (2011 nian Y qu lindao baoan yilan biao, List of contracting xinfang cases to individual party leaders in the Y District in 2011), Henan, November 2011. 2011 年Y区信访工作责任追究办法 (2011 nian Y qu xinfang gongzuo zeren zhuijiu banfa, Measures of disciplining cadres for mishandling petitions in the Y District in 2011), Henan, November 2011. 2011 年关于处理Y区C镇主要领导的决定 (2011 nian guanyu chuli Y qu C zhen zhuyao lindao de jueding, Decision of disciplining the main leaders of the Y District C Township in 2011), Henan, October 2011. 2011 年关于处理Y区E镇主要领导的决定 (2011 nian guanyu chuli Y qu E zhen zhuyao lindao de jueding, Decision of disciplining the main leaders of the Y District E Township in 2011), Henan, October 2011. 2011 年Y区关于信访工作失职问题处理一些县乡主要领导的通知 (2011 nian Y qu guanyu xinfang gongzuo shizhi wenti chuli yixie xianxiang zhuyao lindao de tongzhi, Notice of disciplining the main leaders of some counties and townships for their mishandling of xinfang issues in the Y District in 2011), Henan, November 2011.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 X. Gui, Handling of Unyielding Complaints in China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5924-0

187

188

9.

10.

11.

12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

Appendix B

2011 年关于处理Y区W镇主要领导的决定 (2011 nian guanyu chuli Y qu W zhen zhuyao lindao de jueding, Decision of disciplining the main leaders of the Y District W Township in 2011), Henan, October 2011. 2009-2011 年Y区信访救助金使用情况一览表 (2009–2011 nian Y qu xinfang jiuzhu jin shiyong qingkuang yilan biao, Account of using petition relief of the Y District from 2009 to 2011), Henan, July 2012. 2009-2011 年Y区赴省进京上访的实际数字 (2009–2011 nian Y qu fusheng jinjing shangfang de shiji shuzi, Number of petitions of the Y District received by authorities at provincial and national levels from 2009 to 2011), Henan, August 2012. 2009-2011 年Y区赴省进京上访的登记数字(2009–2011 nian Y qu fusheng jinjing shangfang de dengji shuzi, Number of petitions of the Y District registered by authorities at provincial and national levels from 2009 to 2011), Henan, August 2012. Working diary of a vice township head, Henan, October 2011. Working diary of a petition bureau leader, Henan, July 2012. Investigation report of a xinfang case, Henan, September 2011. 2011 年Y区X项目拆迁补偿标准 (2011 nian Y qu X xiangmu chaiqian buchang biaozhun, Standards of compensation and resettlement of X Project in the Y District in 2011), Henan, October 2011. Petition letter, Henan, November 2011. Petition letter, Henan, August 2011. Petition letter, Henan, September 2011. Petition letter, Henan, July 2012. Investigation report of a xinfang case, Henan, August 2012. Petition letter, Henan, October 2011. Petition letter, Henan, October 2011. Petition letter about forced eviction, Henan, September 2011. Petition letter about forced eviction, Henan, October 2011. 2009 年Y区信访情况通报 (2009 nian Y qu xinfang qingkuang tongbao, Notice of the petition work of the Y District in 2009), Henan, October 2011. Y区关于 2010 年全国两会期间妥善处理赴京信访案件的应急预案 (Y qu guanyu 2010 nian quanguo lianghui qijian tuoshan chuli fujing xinfang anjian de yingji yuan, Contingency plan of the Y District for properly handling the cases of petitioning Beijing during the period of national two meetings in 2010), Henan, October 2011. 中央联席会议关于依法妥善终结信访案件的建议 (Zhongyang lianxi huiyi guanyu yifa tuoshan zhongjie xinfang anjian de jianyi, Opinions of properly ending xinfang issues according to law issued by the Joint Meeting at the National Level), Henan, August 2012. Z市解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理暂行办法 (Z shi jiejue teshu yinan xinfang wenti zhuanxiang zijin guanli zanxing banfa, Interim measures of managing the special fund for handling particular and difficult xinfang issues in the Z City), Henan, August 2012.

Appendix B

189

30. 湖北省处理网上信访问题工作办法 (Hubei sheng chuli wangshang xinfang wenti gongzuo banfa, Working rules for the handling of online xinfang issues in Hubei Province), Hubei, July 2018. 31. 湖北省关于进行网上信访工作规范化检查的通知 (Hubei sheng guanyu jinxing wangshang xinfang gongzuo guifan hua jiancha de tongzhi, Notice of conducting standardized inspection on online xinfang work in Hubei Province), Hubei, July 2018. 32. 2017 年X县网上信访工作年度总结报告 (2017 nian X xian wangshang xinfang gongzuo niandu zongjie baogao, Annual summary of the online xinfang work of the X County in 2017), Hubei, July 2018. 33. 2017 年X县关于妥善化解信访积案的会议纪要 (2017 nian X xian guanyu tuoshan huajie xinfang jian de huiyi jiyao, The meeting minutes of properly handling accumulated cases of the X County in 2017), Hubei, July 2018. 34. Investigation report of a xinfang case, Hubei, July 2018. 35. 2017 年X县关于妥善考核网上信访工作的说明 (2017 nian X xian guanyu tuoshan kaohe wangshang xinfang gongzuo de shuoming, The notes about properly evaluating online xinfang work of the X County in 2017), Hubei, July 2018. 36. 2018 年X县信访工作考核办法 (2018 nian X xian xinfang gongzuo kaohe banfa, The assessment methods of xinfang work of the X County in 2018), Hubei, July 2018. 37. 河南省解决特殊疑难信访问题专项基金管理暂行办法 (Henan sheng Jiejue teshu yinan xinfang wenti zhuanxiang zijin guanli zanxing banfa, The tentative method of using the special fund to solve special and difficult petitions in Henan Province), Henan, August 2012.

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