Handbook of US-Middle East Relations: Formative factors and regional perspectives 9781857434996, 9780203859377

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Handbook of US–Middle East Relations

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Handbook of US–Middle East Relations Formative factors and regional perspectives

Editor: Robert E. Looney

First published 2009 by Routledge Published 2014 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informabusiness © Taylor & Francis 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be photocopied, recorded, or otherwise reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN 978-1-85743-499-6 (hbk) ISBN 978-0-203-85937-7 (ebk) Europa Development Editor: Cathy Hartley The publishers make no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may take place.

Typeset in 10/11.5pt Baskerville by Taylor & Francis Books

Contents

List of figures List of tables List of contributors Preface

viii ix x xvii

PART I

Overview/setting

1

1

3

Introduction ROBERT E. LOONEY

2

International relations

8

JOHN TIRMAN

3

Beyond Iraq: lasting issues for the US in the Middle East

25

LAWRENCE J. KORB AND DANIEL DE WIT

4

The US foreign aid policy to the Middle East

38

HILTON L. ROOT, YAN LI, AND KANISHKA BALASURIYA

5

US relations with international organizations

51

RODRIGO TAVARES AND MICHAEL SCHULZ

6

War in the Middle East

66

DANIEL MORAN

7

Globalization as a mediating force in US–MENA relations

80

ANOUSHIRAVAN EHTESHAMI

8

Proliferation in the Persian Gulf and Middle East: challenges for US policy

92

JAMES A. RUSSELL

9

US relations with Islamic groups in the Middle East

109

HEATHER S. GREGG

10 The US and the geopolitics of Middle Eastern oil ANAS F. ALHAJJI

118

vi

Contents

11 The Middle East and US energy security

128

ANAS F. ALHAJJI

12 Peace process

135

STEPHEN ZUNES

13 US economic and governance reform efforts in the Middle East: conceptual difficulties and practical realities

151

ROBERT E. LOONEY

PART II

Perceptions

165

14 The Arab Street

167

STEPHEN GLAIN

15 Right of return, independence, and the “peace process”: the view from Palestine

176

NASEER ARURI

16 US–Jordan relations: the King Abdullah II era: an analytical study

189

ADNAN M. HAYAJNEH

17 Pakistan’s perceptions of US Middle East policy

210

SHAHID JAVED BURKI

PART III

217

Country studies North Africa

217

18 The US and Algeria: hostility, pragmatism, and partnership

219

YAHIA H. ZOUBIR

19 The US and Morocco: the long-lasting alliance

237

YAHIA H. ZOUBIR

20 The US and Tunisia: model of stable relations

249

YAHIA H. ZOUBIR

21 The US and Libya: the lengthy road to reconciliation

262

YAHIA H. ZOUBIR

22 US relations with Egypt: an overview

281

MICHAEL COLLINS DUNN

The Levant

295

23 Turkey and the US

297

LENORE G. MARTIN

Contents 24 US foreign policy in Lebanon

vii 310

ANNE MARIE BAYLOUNY

25 Missed opportunities: co-operation and confrontation in the US–Syrian relationship

324

DAVID W. LESCH

26 US–Jordan bilateral relations

343

JOMANA AMARA

27 Who lost the Middle East? The collapse of the neoconservative-led US–Israeli hegemonic project

355

LEON HADAR

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries

375

28 Close allies, ambivalent partners: the role of the UAE in US Gulf policy

377

CHRISTIAN KOCH

29 US relations with Qatar

391

JILL CRYSTAL

30 US–Saudi Arabia diplomatic relations: an evolutionary process

403

DAVID E. LONG

31 The Sultanate of Oman and the US

417

JOSEPH A. KÉCHICHIAN

32 US–Bahrain relations

434

JEFFREY B. NUGENT

33 Kuwait–US relationship—a small state alliance with the major power: from hesitant to strategic alliance

450

ABDULLAH ALSHAYJI

Iraq, Iran, Yemen

465

34 Opting for the lesser evil: US foreign policy toward Iraq, 1958–2008

467

ABBAS KADHIM

35 Missed opportunities and political blunders: the tale of US–Iran relations

484

MANOUCHEHR DORRAJ AND HAMID ZANGENEH

36 The United States and Yemen: a history of unfulfilled expectations

502

J. E. PETERSON

Index

513

Figures

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 9.1

Total US economic and military assistance (in millions constant 2006 US$) US economic and military assistance by region Total US aid per capita (US$) US aid composition (FY2006) Composition of US assistance to MENA Average polity score (1950–2004) Regional comparisons of education conditions Average of country Gini coefficient by region Military personnel as percentage of total labor force Historical crude oil price 1970–2002 (in nominal dollars per barrel) Concentration of world crude oil production US foreign aid to MENA (in millions constant 2006 US$) and crude oil imports (in million barrels) Percentage of US military assistance to Israel and balance MENA US aid to MENA (in millions 2006 constant US$) and the region’s polity score (1950–2006) Two largest recipients of US assistance in MENA (excluding Israel) Means and goals of Islamic organizations

39 39 39 40 40 41 42 42 43 43 44 45 46 47 47 111

Tables

13.1 13.2 13.3 26.1 26.2 26.3 26.4 26.5 26.6 26.7 26.8 26.9 28.1 32.1 33.1 33.2

Greater Middle East Initiative countries: governance–economic freedom group comparisons New second world countries: probability of group placement New second world/advanced countries: governance–economic freedom group comparisons Estimate of Jordanians working abroad Value of Jordanian workers’ remittances (current year millions of dollars) US assistance to Jordan (current year millions of dollars) US Jordan cash transfer program (current year millions of dollars) USAID program budget for Jordan (current year millions of dollars) US Jordan imports, exports, and balance (current year millions of dollars) Employment in QIZs Jordan exports to the US by export program (current year millions of dollars) Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Jordan (current year millions of dollars) US–UAE trade (all figures in millions of US dollars) Merchandise trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between Bahrain and the US (millions of dollars) Oil production US trade with Kuwait: 2008

155 159 161 344 344 347 347 350 351 352 352 352 385 447 460 460

Contributors

Robert E. Looney is Distinguished Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He received his PhD in Economics from the University of California, Davis. He specializes in issues relating to economic development in the Middle East and has published twenty books including: Economic Development in Saudi Arabia: Consequences of the Oil Price Decline with a Foreword by Raymond Mikesell (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1990); The Economic Causes and Consequences of Defense Expenditures in the Middle East and South Asia (with David Winterford), with a Foreword by Steve Chan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Manpower Policies and Development in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1994); Industrialization in the Arabian Gulf with a Foreword by C. A. Sinclair (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1994); The Economics of Third World Defense Expenditures with a Foreword by Charles Wolf (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1995); The Pakistani Economy: Economic Growth and Structural Reform (Praeger Publishers, 1997) and Iraq’s Informal Economy: Reflections of War, Sanctions and Policy Failure (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2007). He is currently working on a book forecasting alternative futures for the Iraqi economy. Dr. Looney is the chief editor of The Open Areas Journal and is on the board of editors of International Journal of World Peace and Journal of Third World Studies. In addition, he has over 250 articles appearing in numerous professional journals including: Journal of Development Economics, Middle East Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, Orient, OPEC Review, World Development, Middle East Journal, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Journal of Energy and Development, American– Arab Affairs, Iranian Studies, Challenge, World Development, Pakistan Development Review, Modern African Studies, International Organization, South Asia, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, and Contemporary South Asia. As an international consultant, Dr. Looney has provided advice and assistance to the governments of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Mexico, Panama and Jamaica as well as the World Bank, International Labor Office, Inter-American Development Bank, Stanford Research Institute, Rand Organization and the International Monetary Fund. Anas Alhajji is Chief Economist at NGP Energy Capital Management in Irving, TX. He wrote the oil chapters in this volume while on sabbatical from Ohio Northern University where he was a faculty member before joining NGP. Dr. Alhajji has more than 500 papers, articles and columns to his credit in the fields of energy economics, macroeconomics and international economics. He has addressed various national, international and academic organizations, institutions and conferences and serves on the board of several academic journals and publications. Prior to joining NGP, he served as a Professor of Economics at the University of Oklahoma (1995–97), the Colorado School of Mines (1997–2001) and, most recently, Ohio Northern University (2001–8), where he held the George Patton Chair of Business and Economics and taught courses in energy economics and policy, and international economics. Abdullah K. Alshayji is a Professor of International Relations and the Chairman of the American Studies Unit at Kuwait University. He is a specialist in Gulf and US politics. He

Contributors

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served as Special Advisor to the Speaker of the Kuwaiti Parliament and to its Foreign Relations Committee from 1992 to 1996. He acted as Counselor and Head of the Kuwaiti Information and Media Bureau at the Kuwaiti Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, from 2001 to 2004. Dr. Alshayji has a lecturer at the Kuwaiti Army Staff and Command College since 2005. Dr. Alshayji holds a PhD from the Government Department of the University of Texas at Austin, USA (1988). He received his Master’s and BS in Political Science from Oklahoma State University, USA. He is the author of Kuwait: Ceaseless Quest for Survival in a Hostile Environment. Dr. Alshayji has also published numerous articles in both Arabic and English in academic journals on issues related to elections and the Kuwaiti parliamentary experience, democratization, and the Kuwaiti National Assembly, the external and internal factors affecting political reforms in the GCC states and Gulf security and US foreign policy. Jomana Amara is Assistant Professor of Economics at the Defense Resources Management Institute and Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. She has researched and written on international economics, defense economics, health economics, and the economics of the public sector. Dr. Amara has provided technical assistance in the form of short courses on topics related to public budgeting and defense resource management. In addition, she has provided an assessment of required technical assistance to various ministries of defense and interior in the area of public finance, budget systems development for longer term defense plans, accountable financial planning and defense reform issues. Dr. Amara is a member of the American Economic Association and a registered professional engineer. Naseer Aruri is Chancellor Professor (Emeritus) of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth. He is Chair of the Board of Directors of the Trans-Arab Research Institute (Boston) and a member of the Palestine Center Committee (Washington, DC). Born in Jerusalem, he holds a PhD from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and served on the faculty of the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth (1965–98). His many publications include The Palestinian Resistance to Israeli Occupation (1970), Enemy of the Sun: Poems of Palestinian Resistance, with Edmund Ghareeb (1970), Occupation: Israel Over Palestine (1983), The Obstruction of Peace: The US, Israel and the Palestinians (1995), Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return (Pluto, 2001), and Dishonest Broker: The US Role in Israel and Palestine (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, March 2003). An Italian edition was published in Bologna in April 2006, a Spanish edition was published in Buenos Aires in 2006, and an Arabic edition was published in 2007 in Beirut. He has also published numerous articles in scholarly journals and magazines, which appeared in various languages. Kanishka Balasuriya is an attorney-at-law from Sri Lanka and is currently pursuing his PhD at the School of Public Policy in George Mason University. Anne Marie Baylouny is Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, specializing in Middle East politics, social organizing, and Islamism. Baylouny received her PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, and completed a book manuscript (in press) on social and political organizing resulting from new economic policies. Her publications include an analysis of violence in the Oslo Accords, Hezbollah’s media, new identity organizing, and ungoverned spaces. She has travelled extensively in the Arab East, living in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan for long periods. She speaks Arabic along with several romance languages. Her current project is Hezbollah’s media and the influence of constituencies in Hezbollah. Shahid Javed Burki was educated at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar and at Harvard University as a Mason Fellow. He received advanced degrees in economics from both universities. He was at the World Bank for twenty-five years, from 1974 to 1999, where he held a number of senior positions including Director, China Department, and Vice-President,

xii

Contributors Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1996–97, on leave of absence from the World Bank, he served as Pakistan’s Finance Minister. After retiring from the Bank, he served as CEO, EMP Financial Advisors, a Washington, DC-based private sector advisory agency. He is currently Chair of the Institute of Public Policy at the Beaconhouse National University, Lahore, Pakistan. He has written extensively on China, Latin America and Pakistan. His recent books include Transforming Socialist Economies: Lessons for Cuba and Beyond (with Daniel Erikson) and Changing Perceptions, Altered Reality: Pakistan’s Economy under Musharraf, 1999–2007.

Jill Crystal is a Professor and the Associate Director of the PhD program in the Department of Political Science at Auburn University. She received her PhD from Harvard University. She is the author of several journal articles, chapters and of two books on the Gulf: Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge University Press) and Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Westview). Her research interests include Gulf politics, authoritarianism and democratization, and police and law. Daniel de Wit is a political science student and Marine Corps Officer Candidate at Vanderbilt University. Manouchehr Dorraj is a Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University. He is the author of From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Iran (Rienner, 1990), editor of The Changing Political Economy of the Third World (Rienner, 1995), editor of Middle East at the Crossroads: The Changing Political Dynamics and the Foreign Policy Challenges (University Press of America, 1999), and the co-editor, with Mehran Kamrava, of Iran Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Islamic Republic, two volumes (Greenwood Press, 2008). Michael Collins Dunn has been editor of The Middle East Journal since 1998. The Middle East Journal has been published since 1947 by the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. Dr. Dunn, who first lived in Egypt in 1972 and has been a student of Egyptian affairs ever since, has taught at Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and at Utah State University. From 1989 to 2007, he was also editor of the newsletter The Estimate, and has contributed to a wide range of publications. Anoushiravan Ehteshami is Professor of International Relations and also Dean of Internationalization at Durham University. He was Head of the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University (2004–9) and has also been a Fellow of the World Economic Forum. He was Vice-President and Chair of the Council of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES) 2000–2003. His many book-length publications include: Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies (co-editor) (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008), Globalization and Geopolitics in the Middle East: Old Games, New Rules (New York: Routledge, 2007), Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives (with Mahjoob Zweiri, London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), The Middle East’s Relations with Asia and Russia (co-editor, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (co-editor, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (co-author, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), Iran and Eurasia (co-editor, Reading: Ithaca Press, 2000), The Changing Balance of Power in Asia (Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, 1998), Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (with Ray Hinnebusch, London: Routledge, 1997), Islamic Fundamentalism (co-editor, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (London: Routledge, 1995), From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game (editor, Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1994), Iran and the International Community (co-editor, London: Routledge, 1991), and Nuclearization of the Middle East (New York: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1989). Stephen Glain is a weekly business columnist for the English-language Abu Dhabi National. He has been a journalist for twenty years, beginning with his first job as the transportation reporter for the Nashville Business Journal. In 1987, Glain moved to Hong Kong, where he

Contributors

xiii

was hired as a business reporter for the local South China Morning Post. In 1991, he joined the Wall Street Journal, which assigned him to cover South Korea. He remained as a journal foreign correspondent for the next decade, covering Asia and the Middle East from bases in Seoul, Tokyo, Tel Aviv and Amman. In 2001, he wrote Dreaming of Damascus: Arab Voices in a Region of Turmoil (John Murray, UK). Its updated, US edition, published under the title Mullahs, Merchants, and Militants: The Economic Collapse of the Arab World (St. Martin’s Press), was named the best book of 2004 by online magazine The Globalist. Glain’s articles on US foreign policy, East Asia and the Arab world have appeared in Newsweek International, The New Republic, The Atlantic Monthly, The Nation, the Financial Times, Gourmet Magazine, Smithsonian Magazine, Institutional Investor, The Globalist and Survival. Heather S. Gregg is an Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Department of Defense Analysis. Prior to joining the faculty at NPS, she was an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation. She earned her PhD in political science in 2003 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she focused on international relations and security studies. Dr. Gregg also holds a Master’s degree from Harvard Divinity School, where she studied Islam, and a BA in Cultural Anthropology from the University of California, Santa Cruz. In addition to academic experience, she has also spent time in several regions of conflict, including Palestine/West Bank, from July 1998 to July 1999, and Croatia and Bosnia, from August 1994 to March 1996. She most recently completed a three-month stint in Doha, Qatar, where she worked on post-secondary education reform for the Qatari government. Leon Hadar is a Research Fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC, and is the author of Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Dr. Hadar is a regular commentator on global affairs for major American and international media. Adnan M. Hayajneh is Professor of Political Science and the Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the Hashemite University, Jordan. He received his PhD in political science with emphasis on international relations and research methodology from the University of Arizona in 1995. He received his MA in political science from California State University, Chico, and his BA from Yarmouk University, Jordan. He also received a Diploma in Conflict Resolution and Peace Making from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Uppsala, Sweden. He has published more than forty papers and books in Arabic and English in leading journals, and has participated in more than sixty international conferences. He has served on many national committees in Jordan. He has conducted regular interviews with leading media stations including Al-Jazeera (Arabic and English), BBC World, Jordan TV, Kuwait TV and many international newspapers: The New York Times, The Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Australian and Defense News. Abbas Kadhim is an Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School teaching Middle East History and Islam. He received his PhD in Near Eastern studies with a concentration on Islamic thought from the University of California at Berkeley, 2006. He is the author of Shia Renaissance: The Politics and Theology of Imami Shia in Baghdad in the 11th Century (under review) and Shia Sects (translation with introduction and notes, London: ICAS Press, 2007). His current project is the 1920 Revolution and the creation of the Iraqi state. His awards include: The Sultan Fellowship 2005, 2006; and Research Initiation Program, NPS 2006, 2007. He is currently a Visiting Scholar at the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies and a Visiting Assistant Professor at the History Department, Stanford University. He is also a fellow at the American Academic Research Institute in Iraq (TAARI). Joseph A. Kéchichian is an author specializing in the Arabian/Persian Gulf region. Dr. Kéchichian’s latest book is Faysal: Saudi Arabia’s King for All Seasons (Gainesville: University

xiv

Contributors Press of Florida, 2008). He has also published Power and Succession in Arab Monarchies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), The Just Prince: A Manual of Leadership (London: Saqi, 2003) and Succession in Saudi Arabia (New York: Palgrave, 2001). His publications on Oman include: Political Participation and Stability in the Sultanate of Oman (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2005) and Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995), where an earlier version of the essay first appeared (pp. 139–58), which has been revised for this Handbook.

Christian Koch is the Director of International Studies at the Gulf Research Center located in Dubai, UAE. Prior to this, he worked as Head of the Strategic Studies Section at the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi. Dr. Koch received his PhD from the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany, and also studied at the American University in Washington, DC, and the University of South Carolina. He is the editor of Unfulfilled Potential: Exploring the GCC–EU Relationship (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2004), the Gulf Yearbook (2005–8 editions) and co-editor of Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century (Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, 1997) and A Window of Opportunity: Europe, Gulf Security and the Aftermath of the Iraq War (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2005). He is also a regular contributor to edited volumes, magazines and newspapers as well as Jane’s Sentinel Publications on Gulf issues. In January 2007, he joined the advisory board of the German Orient Foundation. Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior advisor to the Center for Defense Information. Dr. Korb served as assistant secretary of defense (manpower, reserve affairs, installations and logistics) from 1981 to 1985. David W. Lesch is Professor of Middle East History at Trinity University in San Antonio, TX. His most recent books include: The Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History (Oxford University Press, 2007); The Middle East and the United States: An Historical and Political Reassessment (editor, Westview Press, 2007); and The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria (Yale University Press, 2005). Yan Li is currently pursuing her PhD in economics at George Mason University. She has worked for Capital One, Procter & Gamble, Booz Allen & Hamilton and Bain & Company. Li received a BA from Tsinghua University and an MBA from the University of Pennsylvania. David E. Long was a career Foreign Service Officer specializing in the Middle East and in anti-terrorism. He has also had an academic career as an adjunct professor at a number of universities including Georgetown University, where he was the first Executive Director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, the University of Pennsylvania and the US Coast Guard Academy, where he served as Acting Head of the Humanities Department. He is the author of numerous books on the Middle East and Saudi Arabia, including The Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia (Greenwood, 2005). Lenore G. Martin (PhD, University of Chicago) is Professor of Political Science at Emmanuel College in Boston, and is co-Chair of the Middle East Seminar and of the Seminar on Turkey in the Modern World (formerly Seminar on Modern Turkey), both co-sponsored by Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. Professor Martin has written books and numerous articles analyzing national security in the Gulf, the larger Middle East and Turkey, including: The Unstable Gulf: Threats from Within (Lexington Books, 1984), New Frontiers in Middle East Security (edited, St Martin’s/ Palgrave, 1999 and 2001) and The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, co-edited with Dimitris Keridis (MIT, 2004). Daniel Moran is professor of international and military history at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, where he directs the curricula in Middle Eastern and European/

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Eurasian Security Studies. His most recent books include The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2003), Wars of National Liberation (Harper-Collins, revised edition, 2006), and (with James Russell) Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management (Routledge, 2009). Jeffrey B. Nugent is Professor of Economics at the University of Southern California where he teaches development economics. As a researcher in this field, he has worked on a wide variety of issues, problems and analytical techniques and in and on a variety of countries from Latin America, Africa, South and East Asia and especially the Middle East and North Africa. In recent years, much of this work has focused on trade, foreign investment and income distribution issues making use of new institutional economics, political economy and econometric perspectives. He has served on the board of the Cairo-based Economic Research Forum, the Middle East Economic Association, for which he served as Executive Secretary for four years and President for three, and the Western Economic Association, and serves on the editorial boards of eight scholarly journals. J. E. Peterson is a historian and political analyst focusing on the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf, and has published a dozen books and some four dozen scholarly articles on the region. He has taught at various American universities and been associated with major international affairs institutes in the US and abroad. He spent ten years in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defence of the Sultanate of Oman. He is presently based in Tucson, Arizona. Hilton L. Root is a Professor at George Mason University’s School of Public Policy. He previously taught at Stanford University and the University of Pennsylvania, and has served as adviser to the US Treasury and the Asian Development Bank. He is the author of eight books including Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World (Brookings, 2008) and Capital and Collusion: The Political Logic of Global Economic Development (Princeton, 2006). James A. Russell is Managing Editor of Strategic Insights, the bi-monthly e-journal published by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He also serves as Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he teaches courses on Middle East security affairs, terrorism and national security strategy. Michael Schulz is Associate Professor in Peace and Development Research at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He has published extensively on issues concerning the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Middle East. His recent publications include “Reconciliation through education—Experiences from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”, in Journal of Peace Education (2008); “Hamas Between Sharia Rule and Democracy”, in Amer, Swain, and Öjendal (eds), Peace Building and Globalization (London: Anthem Press, 2007); and Democratization and Civil Society in the Middle East: Case Studies of Palestinian Self-rule Areas and Iraqi Kurdistan, published by the Centre for Middle East Studies, University of Gothenburg, 2006. Rodrigo Tavares is Research Fellow at the University of Gothenburg and Associate Research Fellow at United Nations University (UNU-CRIS). His peer-reviewed articles have been published in Contemporary Politics, Asian Journal of Political Science, African Security and Journal of International Relations and Development. His latest book is Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations (Routledge, 2009). He has been educated at University of Gothenburg (PhD), Harvard University and University of California, Berkeley. John Tirman is Executive Director and Principal Research Scientist at the MIT Center for International Studies, where he also heads the Persian Gulf Initiative. His most recent book, on American attitudes toward war, will be published by Oxford University Press.

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Contributors

Hamid Zangeneh is Professor of Economics at Widener University, Chester, Pennsylvania. His publications have appeared in, among others, Applied Economics, Public Budgeting and Financial Management, Middle East Policy Journal and Iranian Economic Review. He co-edited (with Cyrus Bina) Modern Capitalism and Islamic Ideology (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992) and edited Islam, Iran, and World Stability (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). He has served as the treasurer and executive director of the Center for Iranian Research and Analysis (CIRA). He is currently the editor of the Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis. Yahia H. Zoubir is Professor of International Relations and International Management and Director of Research in Geopolitics at EUROMED Management, Marseille School of Management. Before joining EUROMED, Dr. Zoubir taught in the US at the American University in Washington, DC, and the American Graduate School of International Management (AGSIM) in Phoenix, Arizona. He was Managing Director of AGSIM’s overseas campus near Geneva, Switzerland, from 1998 to 2005. He has recently published a coedited book, North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation (Routledge, 2008). He is the editor and main contributor of North Africa in Transition—State, Society & Economic Transformation in the 1990s (University Press of Florida, 1999); co-editor of L’Islamisme Politique dans les Rapports entre l’Europe et le Maghreb (Lisbon: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1996); and coeditor and main contributor of International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict (Praeger Publishers, 1993). His articles have appeared in Middle East Policy, Mediterranean Politics, Journal of North African Studies, Canadian Journal of History, and Democratization, among others; he also contributed numerous chapters to various edited scholarly books internationally. He is currently preparing a book, entitled Global Security Watch: The Maghreb, for Praeger’s Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues (CMSSI), as well as a book on Algeria. Stephen Zunes is a Professor of Politics and Chair of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco. Dr. Zunes serves as a senior policy analyst for the Foreign Policy in Focus project of the Institute for Policy Studies, as associate editor of Peace Review, and as chair of the committee of academic advisors for the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. He is the author of numerous articles for scholarly and general readership on Middle Eastern politics, US foreign policy, international terrorism, social movements and human rights. He is the principal editor of Nonviolent Social Movements (Blackwell Publishers, 1999), the author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003) and the co-author, with Jacob Mundy, of Western Sahara: Nationalism, Conflict, and International Accountability (Syracuse University Press, 2009).

Preface

Drawing on the insights and experiences of many of the leading experts in the field, the thirtyfive essays in this volume examine US–Middle East relations from a variety of perspectives. The first section provides a broad overview of many of the key issues and policies that have helped, either directly or indirectly, to shape US relationships with the region as a whole. The second section examines US–Middle East relationships from various perspectives, both inside and outside the region. Finally, the third section focuses on the unique aspects of the US relationship with each of the region’s eighteen countries. All and all, the essays in this volume cover the whole spectrum of US–Middle East relations. Hopefully, they will help shed light on this vital, yet still often misunderstood, region of the world. The book does not represent any particular political or ideological position. Instead, each author has sought to objectively seek a deeper understanding as to the complexity and subtlety of forces that have all too often eluded US policymakers. Clearly, a book of this scope and sheer length could not have come to completion without the contributions of many individuals. In addition to the volume’s many contributors, special thanks go to Major Angelique (Alex) Brown who provided invaluable editing and assistance in preparing the final manuscript. Heather Hynd’s good cheer and professionalism through the copy-editing phase were all an editor could ask for. Most of all, thanks go to Cathy Hartly, Europa Development Editor, who conceived of the original study, provided on-going guidance and, most importantly, provided positive encouragement throughout. March 2009

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Part I

Overview/setting

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1

Introduction Robert E. Looney

Historically, the United States has enjoyed close relations with most countries in the Middle East. US economic and military assistance has played a major role in supporting the growth and security of regional states such as Egypt and Jordan. Traditionally, the oil-rich kingdoms in the Persian Gulf region have maintained close economic and security relationships with the US—supplying that country with essential energy supplies while being a major market for US military equipment. Over the years, these ties have created an elaborate network of organizational relationships, official and personal contacts, bilateral economic and military commissions, and joint commercial endeavors between the US and key countries throughout the region. Despite this extensive co-operation, serious tensions have often marred US relations with Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East, at both governmental and popular levels. Some governments and sub-national groups in the region are avowedly hostile to the US, oppose its policies on a broad spectrum of issues, and seek to undermine US interests in the region, sometimes through violence. This is particularly the case of those governments that the US State Department identified as supporters of international terrorism, as well as a number of militia-type groups that the State Department lists as foreign terrorist organizations. Even friendly governments in the region are often ambivalent in their relations with the US, either because they disagree with specific aspects of US policy (such as the Arab–Israeli conflict) or because they are constrained by anti-US sentiment simmering within their own populations. Popular attitudes are even more complex and difficult to assess. Regional views of the US as a land of freedom and opportunity often co-exist with another image of moral decadence and hostility to Islamic society. These conflicting images can lead to wide swings in popular attitudes towards the US. The friendliness that many Americans encounter through personal and commercial contacts with ordinary citizens of Middle Eastern countries can turn quickly to hostility and, on occasion, to violence when the US adopts a policy perceived by locals as acting contrary to Arab or Muslim interests. As the Obama administration settles in, one of its main tasks will be to improve America’s image in the Middle East region. During the previous Bush administration, US relations with most countries in the region declined to an all-time low. In many countries considered central to the war on terror, the general public deeply distrusts the US. Even in countries such as Kuwait that have long been considered relatively pro-American, support for the US image has declined dramatically. What drives these anti-American sentiments? In large part, it is opposition to American foreign policy rather than value divides or religious-based enmity. The war in Iraq both solidified antiAmericanism in the Arab Middle East and extended it to other parts of the Muslim world. But it is not just Iraq—other key features of American foreign policy are widely unpopular. Most of the Muslim world overwhelmingly opposes the US-led war on terrorism. That includes countries such as Pakistan, Egypt and Jordan, usually considered key partners in the fight against al-Qaeda and like-minded groups. Specifically, many Muslims think Americans’

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fears about terrorism are simply overblown. Similarly, perceptions of US policy in the Israeli– Palestinian conflict also feed anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East. Large majorities of citizens in most Arab countries feel that American foreign policy is too pro-Israel. But concerns about the US go beyond any single policy. To a large extent, America is disliked in the Muslim world because of its power—and especially because of the manner in which it is perceived to be wielded. Unrivaled since the end of the cold war and on the offensive since the 9/11 attacks, the US is seen as a menacing giant, using its considerable strength without regard for others. Muslims also worry that America’s military strength might someday be directed at them. This sentiment has prevailed even in Turkey—a country that has been a NATO ally of the US for over half a century. The notion of a US military action on Turkey may seem far-fetched to many Americans, but in 2004, Turkish authors Burak Turna and Orkum Ucar tapped into these fears with great commercial success. Their novel Metal Storm was one of the fastest selling books in the country’s history. It was reportedly widely read in the Turkish Cabinet and Foreign Ministry. In short, American power is deeply resented across the Middle East. Many feel as though there is no real check on US power. Due to its status as the sole superpower, when the US decides to carry out a policy, the region must simply live with the consequences. There is also considerable distrust of American intentions. Numerous surveys report that majorities in several countries feel the US-led war on terrorism was not a sincere effort. Instead, sentiment was that the US had a range of ulterior motives: controlling Middle Eastern oil, protecting Israel, targeting unfriendly Muslim governments and, most ominously, dominating the world. Finally, many do not even trust American explanations regarding the event that led to the war on terror—the 9/11 attacks. Suspicion of American motives runs so deep that many now question al-Qaeda’s responsibility for the tragedy. US foreign policy is only one source of anti-Americanism. Many Muslims tend to believe that the US is inconsistent when it comes to democracy. Here the feeling is that the US promotes democracy whenever it can or mostly where it serves its interests. Accounts of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have added to the perception that America does not always practice the respect for the individual rights it espouses. Another source of resentment toward the US is globalization, a process often seen as American inspired and driven. There is growing concern about the gap between rich and poor, a process many in the region see as associated with globalization. Another downside to globalization is the risk to the environment posed by economic growth. Rightly or wrongly, many in the region generally think the US is doing more to harm the environment than any other country. A final concern about globalization is its impact on traditional cultures. On this issue, globalization equals “Americanization.” Vast numbers of Muslims worry about losing their traditions. In particular, they worry about having their traditions supplanted by American customs and ideas. People feel like they are getting a little too much America in their own communities and lives. In short, because of to its role as the dominant power in the world, politically, militarily and culturally, the US bears the brunt of international frustrations about the negative features of a globalized world. Despite these negative patterns, improving America’s relations with the region is not impossible. However, as in many situations, once trust is lost, it takes time and effort to restore. Also, as long as the US remains the world’s dominant power, there will always be some trepidation about its intentions and actions. Still, because of the unpopularity of President Bush, the new Obama administration is likely to be given a fresh look by many Muslims. Clearly, however, before significant progress can be made in US–Middle East relations, a necessary first step is a deeper understanding of the sources of past frictions and mistrust. With this in mind, the chapters that follow are divided into three main parts. In the first part, broad

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issues impacting on US–Middle East relations are examined. In particular, Lawrence Korb and Daniel de Wit (Chapter 3) assess many of the themes and issues currently affecting US– Middle East relations. Many of these are assessed in detail in the chapters that follow including: (1) the rise of militant Sunni extremism; (2) the increasingly militant activism of the Iranianinspired Shi’ite Islamists in Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere throughout the greater Middle East; (3) US oil security and US dependence on Middle East sources of oil; (4) the Israel–Palestine conflict; and (5) the final problem that the US faces in the region, and one that which in many ways exacerbates the difficulties posed by the others, the chronic economic and political underdevelopment throughout much of the greater Middle East. As they note, how the US responds to these challenges will shape, for better or worse, the US role in the region. As they conclude, “the confluence of these issues in this strategically vital region of the world means that US policy must be broad based and made with a view towards long-term success rather than short-term solutions that only postpone problems that must be eventually resolved if regional peace and prosperity is to take hold.” Moreover, they stress a reality often neglected by policymakers outside the region: “each of these issues is closely linked with the others. Because this interdependence has often been overlooked by US policy makers, their actions taken to resolve problems in one area have often served to exacerbate difficulties elsewhere.” Korb and de Wit’s final challenge for the US, the region’s chronic economic and political underdevelopment, has been the focus of aid efforts over the years discussed earlier by Root, Li, and Balasuriya (Chapter 4). In the post-Saddam era, economic and political reform has taken on increased importance. Broad programs such as the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMEI) have been well designed to address many of the region’s long-standing deficiencies in governance and economic freedom. As the analysis of US reform efforts (Chapter 13) suggests, these efforts, through encouraging improved economic freedom and governance, have the potential to jump start many of the region’s poorer economies and, in doing so, lift many to a higher stage of development. Unfortunately, as is often the case in the Middle East, well-intended outside ideas are treated with suspicion and mistrust. Until the US is able to attain more credibility with broad segments of Middle Eastern populations, major movements toward more liberal economic and political systems are highly unlikely. In the end, therefore, perceptions, especially in the post-Saddam era, are likely to play an increasing role in shaping US–Middle East relations. Doubters of US initiatives, especially in the reform areas (Chapter 13), fall into three distinct groups: (1) Cautious optimists. This group sees the US reform initiatives as a positive project in principle with the potential to help the region modernize itself politically and economically, but only if certain preconditions are met—these involve acceptability of the core concepts of the regional actors. Just as importantly, participation would be wise only with the understanding that each country has its own special needs and aspirations and that these must be respected. (2) Pessimists. This view dismisses the project as unwise and undoable. A foreign-made project designed to transform Muslim countries through foreign social engineering will trigger deep regional resistance. (3) Rejectionists/ conspiracy theorists. This group is largely composed of Islamists who believe that the GMEI is simply another ploy by Western imperialists designed to destroy their culture and identity. Because of the important role of perceptions in affecting the success or failure of US actions and initiatives throughout the region, the next section starting with Chapter 14 on the Arab Street provides a more detailed sample of views both within the region and in neighboring countries. Clearly, the Arab Street is one of those constructs that means different things to different people. As Stephen Glain, who has walked these streets for many years, knows “they provide invaluable insights to the mass views most of the region’s leaders would just as soon sweep under the rug.” Glain sadly concludes that leaders in the West have not listened carefully to the Street and thus missed the insights needed to appreciate the complexity throughout the region. As he

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notes: “More often than not the Street has only provided material for crackpot theories about Why Arabs Hate Us. It is invoked by pundits and Mideast ‘experts’ who typically have spent little time on the Street.” Many of the broad themes developed in the overview and perception chapters are followed up in more detail in the final section including the individual country case studies. For convenience, the Middle East countries are divided into several groups, mainly along geographic lines. These include: North Africa, the Levant, the Persian Gulf kingdoms and those countries in the eastern part of the Middle East. Each chapter in this section details the evolution of US relations at the country level. As viewed from the country level, the future for US relations appears somewhat brighter than the picture often painted in the broader overviews. Still, a number of notable obstacles remain. Morocco remains the pillar of US foreign policy in the Northern Africa region. However, Yahia Zoubir (Chapter 19) finds that, while this relationship may be mutually beneficial at official levels, below the surface he senses a different reality: “Support for the US policy agenda may elicit praise for the monarchy, but Moroccans may see their country as a sub-contractor for perceived US attempts to subjugate the Arab and Muslim worlds.” The consequences of years of tranquil US–Moroccan relations may be a growing undercurrent of anti-Americanism. The Levant is an area of extremes which, over the years, has provided US policymakers with striking success as well as discouraging failures. It is a region of diverse countries, each with a unique and largely separate relationship with the US. The one bright spot has been Turkey. As Lenore Martin notes (Chapter 23), the strength of the US–Turkish relationship has been built on the assistance that the US provides Turkey against two long-term threats: (1) A resurgent Russia that could disrupt energy supplies moving to and through Turkey; and (2) a nuclear-armed Iran that could bully the states in the region, including Turkey, without a US nuclear umbrella. However, as she suggests, “even here there is an underlying stress that could change the dynamics of the relationship at any time.” For some time, US relationships with the GCC countries (the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait) have largely revolved around the energy provided by the countries themselves and security provided to them by the US. Still, this relationship is more dynamic than is commonly believed. As the individual country chapters suggest, however, even though they remain close-knit, these relationships are in a state of flux, with the recent oil boom providing several countries with perhaps the means and inclination to assert a greater degree of independence. US–Iraqi relations are currently and will for some time be in a great state of flux. Still, one can gain a sense as to where things might evolve by carefully examining the historical record. As Abbas Kadhim notes (Chapter 34), “unlike all other Arab regimes in the Middle East, Iraq represented both a major oil producing country and an uncooperative regime from a US foreign policy perspective. Therefore US policy toward Iraq has been more complex than any other Arab country in the Middle East.” Kadhim finds post-Saddam policy not fundamentally different than the pattern over the past fifty years—opting for the lesser evil. He concludes, that being the case, “US–Iraqi relations are unlikely to be based on transparency or even shared democratic values.” The volume, perhaps appropriately, ends with Iran, the country that has produced the most frustration for US policymakers over the last thirty years. No doubt future US–Middle East relations will be greatly affected by developments in the US–Iran relationship. Yet, as Manouchehr Dorraj and Hamid Zangeneh observe (Chapter 35), “after almost three decades of interminable and tumultuous interaction with the countries of the region and for that matter the world, Iran is still at square one.” At the other end of the spectrum, so is the US. “The irony is that both the US and Iran know that they can succeed in achieving their goals in pursuit of their national interests in the region much more easily and with less costly consequences if they simply reconcile their differences.” Their assessment probes into the factors

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impeding rapprochement. Why did the US policymakers think that their policy of coercion would work? Why has Iran missed some of the opportunities for rapprochement? Why do neither the US nor the Islamic Republic pay attention to the aspirations of their people for normalization of the relationship? In the end, the volume’s chapters offer rays of hope for future US–Middle East relations. That said, the various chapters are all in agreement that there are no simple solutions or quick fixes. As nearly all the chapters suggest, the difficulties in trying to resolve the various problems throughout the region are compounded by the fact that each depends on what happens to the others. A comprehensive approach is needed. This will mean re-examining many past ideas and preconceived notions. The stakes are high, warranting a significant investment of time, effort, analysis and political creativity.

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International relations John Tirman

Two simple and compelling events have focused global attention on the Middle East: the early twentieth-century discovery of petroleum in Saudi Arabia and Iran and, by mid-century, the establishment of the state of Israel and its ongoing conflict with Arab states and peoples in the region. Little else has mattered in the evolving relationships between states near and far. As the global economy became increasingly reliant on petroleum, natural gas, and petrochemicals, the central significance of the region in global politics became indisputable. War has also roiled the region, as have revolution, political oppression, foreign intervention, cultural clashes with the West, and a growing interest in weapons of mass destruction. In short, the vast expanse from Morocco to Iran has witnessed simmering rivalries internally while earning extraordinary attention from the major global powers. The forms of those internecine rivalries and outside attention are the stuff of international relations. In this chapter, the frames used to study international relations will be applied to the region’s recent history—that which follows the Second World War—as a way of understanding that period in the Middle East as well as the behavior of the major states that have so frequently been involved, particularly the US. No single theory of international relations can account for this history or has guided the policies of the principal players. That the signal events of the region cannot comprehensively be explained by the usual explanatory implements of international relations (IR) theory is itself noteworthy. Ethnic and sectarian or religious conflicts, revolution and other social mobilizations, domestic politics in the many countries involved, and various dimensions of globalization, among other forces, have been at work in the post-war history of the region. IR theories do not adequately account for all such influences and, indeed, it can be said that the history of the Middle East in particular may underscore the thinness of IR as a discipline that can adequately explain, guide, or predict.

Relevant theories of international relations The two great camps of international relations theory use different lenses to understand the interactions among states: interests and norms. The first is the realist or neorealist school, and the second is liberal internationalism. Several variations on these, or analytical approaches that tend to be associated with one or another, are also used—rational choice and constructivism being the most prominent analytical tools, and the “radical” tradition, Marxism, and critical studies (e.g., feminism) being less used alternatives. Because realism and its progeny have been so dominant as the searchlights of US policy in the Middle East, they deserve the status of first among cogent and useful intellectual equals. Of the six principles of political realism articulated by Hans J. Morgenthau in his 1948 classic, Politics Among Nations, the most durable and significant is that “the main signpost that helps political realism find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interests defined in terms of power.” This, he says, sets politics apart from other spheres such

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as ethics, economics, or religion.1 Realism sees global politics as a raw competition for power and resources, a Hobbesian world, as it is so frequently described, in which rules are less important than the exercise of power for survival. This is both descriptive and prescriptive in intent. History is explainable by the restless search for advantage, using every element of power, by states against other states. As a result, the wise foreign minister will act accordingly. Realism was shifted over time to account for changes on the global scene and to evolve intellectually. The neorealism of Kenneth Waltz refined Morgenthau’s treatment, particularly with how states aligned themselves (balancing against powerful states).2 The end of the cold war brought on new challenges to the realist paradigm, particularly with the rise of global civil society and other non-state actors (such as transnational corporations, the news media and Internet, and, more perniciously, violent groups such as al-Qaeda) as primary determinants of events. Nonetheless, as global institutions and law, to say nothing of conceptual predispositions, are organized by and for states, the value of realism as an analytical lens remains potent. The cold war was kind to the realist school, given the sizable alliances and obvious maneuvering of the two superpowers over four decades, a structure of global interactions that was neatly amenable to the power-and-interests understandings of Morgenthau and his progeny. Realism as a paradigm triumphed over the seemingly weaker school of liberalism, or liberal internationalism, which was, in contrast, idealist and apparently battered by events, notably the Second World War and the cold war both. Liberalism in international relations is most strongly associated with Woodrow Wilson, whose programs of multilateralism (via the League of Nations) and self-determination for colonized nations galvanized the global imagination but failed, by most accounts, to become a viable way of understanding how global politics worked or how foreign affairs could be managed. The main proposition of this school over time is that forces other than self-interest actually shape the way the world works—economics, values, and culture among them. As Wilson himself put it, “we are depending primarily and chiefly upon one great force, and that is the moral force of the public opinion of the world.”3 The realists’ disparagement of liberalism was premature and unwise. Just at the time of Morgenthau’s retort, for example, was the formation of the ambitious agenda of Franklin D. Roosevelt via the Atlantic Charter and the Bretton Woods Agreements, with the result being influential international organizations of vast scope and functionality. These were liberal internationalist mechanisms, and however uneven their performance over time, they continue to proliferate and demonstrate the viability of institutions as a form of global governance and the manifestation of values. Near the end of the cold war, an emphasis on institutions began to take hold, regarding them broadly defined as rules of action—some seeing this as a new means of states to compete (helping to solve a collective action problem), others regarding it as the embodiment of or vehicle for the enactment of norms in global society.4 Norms are central to liberalism. Notably, at the end of the cold war, the focus on the power games of the US–Soviet rivalry shifted to a search for a new organizing principle, a search that in the US and elsewhere settled upon democracy. This renewed interest was occasioned in part by a “democratic peace” thesis that enlivened academic debate and policymaking—the notion that democracies do not make war with each other—and led to a growing emphasis on “democratization.”5 A parallel interest in traditional notions of human rights, the realization of norms through law, and emphases on new formulations of “human security”—i.e., that the security, rights, and well-being of individuals and communities should be as important as those of states—was evident in the discourse of global politics,6 although its impact on theory and practice was likely blunted by the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent focus on terrorism, instability in the Middle East, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other disruptions. Still, the emphasis on “values,” not only their power as organizing principles of action but as sources of conflict between nations or even civilizations, had re-entered global politics with unmistakable importance. Indeed, one persuasive argument regarding the way the cold war

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was brought to an end held that norms and multilateral institutions (typically embodied by the Helsinki process), as well as civil society organizations, played a significant and possibly decisive role, though none of it deriving from the Middle East.7 The foregoing claims about the end of the US–Soviet competition emerge in a relatively new analytical frame, constructivism, which bears some greater resemblance to liberalism than realism, but has its own pedigree and epistemology. As described by one of its principal interlocutors, Alexander Wendt, constructivism theorizes that “international structure consists fundamentally in shared knowledge, and that this affects not only state behavior, but state identities and interests as well.”8 Thus, the story of international society with shared and formative norms is central, a frame excluding neither states acting on interests nor the significance of liberal ideas in history, but posits that a complete and explanatory narrative of global politics is more interactive than either realism’s or liberalism’s account. The socially constructed reality of norms, interests, identities, institutions, etc. is dynamic and can more readily account for change as well. Constructivism accounts for “the emergence of constitutive rules, the evolution and transformation of new social structures, and the agent-related origins of social processes,” notes Emanuel Adler, who argues that change is often the result of agents who are non-state actors and mechanisms that “involve the institutionalization of people’s novel knowledge, practices, and discourses.”9 The traditions of radical critique have been less potent in the IR discipline, if nonetheless a popular polemical technique. Marxian analysis of international relations has mainly pivoted on notions of neocolonialism or imperialism. In simpler articulations, the use of “imperialism” as a structural form or attribute of the world system is linked to contemporary, transnational capitalism, typically as a system of exploitation of the developing world. More nuanced ideas, such as Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, have particularly informed political discussions of US assertiveness in the post-cold war era. As defined in one scholarly treatment, “A world hegemony … is an outward expression of its internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class. The economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad.”10 It is universal, comprehensive, and rule-making, all supporting a mode of production. Such themes echo in the critiques by Noam Chomsky of US foreign policy, among others, rely to some degree on materialist conceptions, and can be said to inform post-structuralism and its interrogation of foundational concepts such as sovereignty, law, and regimes.11 Marx and his many offshoots are important to the Middle East, not least because of its struggle with colonialism. International relations theory, in this brisk summary, lends some frames for understanding the politics of the Middle East, both as an object of great power affections and as the regionally internal machinations of states and other actors. States vying for advantage, frequently violating the very sovereignty they constructed for their own advantage some years previously, is one lengthy narrative. Nationalism and other post-colonial outbursts, including revolution, is another common story, even as nationalism as an organizing principle is alien to the region and fitfully embraced. More recently, a resurgent political Islam, sometimes borrowed and insinuated into organized political violence by non-state groups, has roiled global politics. At the root of all action are resources, oil mainly, which has a weak pedigree in academic theory. These, among other aspects of the Middle East, challenge the discipline of international relations and defy our capacity to predict, one of the tests of successful theory.

The growth of nationalism The creation of nation-states and the “imagined communities” that bind them politically and culturally has been an ongoing world project at least since the eighteenth century. The advent of nationalism in the Middle East goes hand-in-hand with colonialism, as the geographical definition of states was a colonial construction, frequently as a result of war. It also quickly

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evolved into an ethnic nationalism project, as Arabs sought to unify or confederate under that banner. While nationalism itself is frequently studied as a European phenomenon, it has certain universal dimensions, among them its roots in culture, economic exchange, and language.12 It is perhaps ironic that the basis of realism—the nation-state (and its behavior)—itself owes its existence mainly to cultural phenomena. This is especially worth noting with respect to the Middle East, where culture (religion, most prominently) episodically destabilizes state formation, and the most potent forms of secular nationalism were culturally grounded. The model for anti-colonial, or post-colonial, nationalism and state building was Atatürk, the hero of Gallipoli, who shook Turkey out of its torpor following the disastrous First World War. Not only did he lead a successful revolt against the weak and capitulating sultanate, but he fought a war against occupying European forces and established an independent Turkey. Atatürk created a strong central state and a distinct ideology of modernization and nationalism, all of which bore resemblances to Fascism but never descended to its excesses.13 The lesson for future leaders—Reza Pahlavi in Iran, Nasser in Egypt, Musharaf in Pakistan, among others— was that strong states, with centrally managed economies, secular modernization, a powerful security apparatus, and an exclusionary stance toward clerics and minorities alike, were a route to success. Notably, and also in contrast to Mussolini, Atatürk was non-expansionary: in his famous phrase: “Peace at home, peace abroad.” Following the Second World War and the rapid period of decolonization by France and Britain, pan-Arab nationalism took root, accelerated by the catalyst of the Zionist movement to create the state of Israel. This triumph for the Holocaust-battered Jews and the trauma to the humiliated Arabs have defined much of the politics and international relations of the region for the sixty years since. Pan-Arabism was as much an anti-imperialist effort as it was anti-Israel, although both were bundled in many eyes. Because the establishment of Israel and the colonial powers in the region were European (or American, in the former case), panArabism gravitated over time toward the Soviet Union and adopted a form of socialism as its development and governance model. Its universalism appealed to Arab nationalism, which always insisted that there should be one Arab state.14 As a result, international relations pertaining to the region by the 1960s had bifurcated into the cold war mold, with the major states of Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq identifying increasingly with the “East” and the Gulf monarchies, including Iran, plus Turkey and Israel, allied with the “West.” The NonAligned Movement occasionally played a role in defining or shaping Arab demands, but was less significant over time as their major states aligned with Moscow. The outliers of Turkey and Iran have their own attributes in this story. Turkey, following Atatürk, sought to become a European nation, in effect, and was increasingly treated as one by the US, in particular during the cold war (through its membership in NATO and other European institutions). Apart from its sometimes bumptious relations with its neighbors, and its oppressive treatment of its Kurdish population, Turkey essentially leaves the region it so dominated, opting for Europe, in the post-war period. Iran, like Turkey, had never been formally colonized by Europe, sustaining the Qajar monarchy until the coup in 1923 that eventually led to the establishment of another monarchy, that of the Pahlavis. In the post-war period, Iran’s nascent democracy elected a mildly leftist, but essentially nationalist and modernizing prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, who attempted to end Britain’s grip on Iran’s economy, particularly its oil, and was ousted by the CIA as a result. Among other consequences, the 1953 ouster of Mossadegh demonstrated the link between oil resources and nationalism, the one reinforcing the other, and both complicating the relations sought by Europe, the US, the USSR, and other industrial powers. Nationalism, anti-colonialism, and political reform all progressed fitfully in the aftermath of the Second World War as a project that could be in part attributed to the Wilsonian ideas that gripped the region in the interwar period. Self-determination and liberal democracy were

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linked ideas in that context, and while the Allied powers failed to deliver on self-determination until many years after the Versailles conference, if at all, this expectation stirred many elites in the region, particularly in Egypt, including some who later drifted toward either more millenarian or socialist/authoritarian doctrines.15 For the most part, they were not successful as democrats, however. The major states of the region wrested independence from the European impositions—many from the machinations of 1919–20 that included monarchs from foreign tribes or lands—which led into a political hornet’s nest. Revolts in Syria prompted a UN demand that France quit the country in 1946; Nasser and other military officers ended the Egyptian dynasty in 1952–53; Iraqi nationalists in 1958 ended the monarchy imposed on the country; and Algeria won independence from France in a bloody civil war in 1962. In all, these were not only anti-colonial, but introduced forms of governance that were militant and frequently oppressive. Democratic development under these circumstances was retarded. The nationalism that grew in the Arab world was significantly authoritarian, aligned with Moscow, and increasingly corrupt. The very definition of “the nation” has remained contingent, however, as religious identity grew in importance and the East–West global divide disintegrated. As a result, in a fundamental sense, nationalism and nationhood remain “under construction,” if not contested, one of the problematic variables of the region. This challenge to the nation-building project, once manifested in the overthrow of monarchies (the last that fell was Iran’s in 1979) and the flirtation with pan-Arabism, now appears as an insurgency from a militant form of political Islam—universal in claims, pre-modern, outside the international system. That challenge has not prevented the emergence of a state system in the region, however, which brought a certain order to the dealings with the major powers and made possible the inter-state mechanisms, diplomacy, commerce, alliances, and so forth that are the political idiom of the West. In fact, the ironic result of the 1956 Suez Crisis, when Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt after Nasser’s nationalization of the canal, was that Arab nationalism was strengthened and neocolonial interference appeared to be suddenly and drastically curtailed—a pattern repeated later in other abrupt events, for example, the oil price hikes after the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, and the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Pan-Arabism, however, declined over time, unsustainable in political arrangements, notably the attempt to create a United Arab Republic, which did briefly join (1958–61) Syria and Egypt, and almost Iraq. As a result, the central importance of the nation-state essentially as drawn by the European powers after the First World War held sway, however evolving and troubled, and nationalism followed this arrangement.16

The establishment of Israel Among the most significant nationalist outbursts was the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. A highly unusual set of events, including Jewish insurgent groups using political violence against the British authorities, led to the 1947 UN resolution to partition the British Mandate that had been Palestine into a Jewish homeland as well as Transjordan. A war was immediate, which Israel won, and the ensuing sixty years has witnessed three other major wars (1956, 1967, 1973) and smaller confrontations (such as the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982), as well as peace agreements, most notably and successfully the Camp David Accords of 1979 and, more tenuously, the Oslo Accords of 1993. The birth of modern Israel is in some ways a triumph of norms and global opinion, or, more narrowly, of remarkably successful lobbying in major Western countries that was doubtlessly aided by the horror of the Nazi extermination camps. International institutions (Balfour Declaration of 1917, a League of Nations resolution, the UN resolution) were instrumental in legitimating the militant Zionists’ aims in Palestine. The fact that the Soviet Union voted for the 1947 UN partition signals how popular this action was, and the cultural

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resonances in the West were notably strong. The boldness of establishing state sovereignty for a religious group is nonetheless striking. The robustness of the bundle of ideas enabling this new sovereignty ran contrary to interests, at least in the calculation of many in US, set against America’s nascent relationships in the region. Secretary of State George C. Marshall was among those opposed (along with most of the “wise men” of the State Department), citing relations with the Arabs and the region’s oil wealth; the Joint Chiefs also expressed caution on the basis of growing Soviet influence.17 That Truman prevailed and recognized Israel instantly was a victory for moral convictions. The conflict between Arabs and Israelis, an intense and bitter dispute from the start, became more acute after the 1967 war when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza (and Sinai), which was not only a blow to Arabs emotionally, and created a second wave of displaced Palestinians, but also became a brutalizing experience for occupiers and occupied alike, itself a source of animus. The conflict was a centerpiece of the cold war, with Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and others increasingly aligned with the USSR, and the US scrambling to sustain relations with the oil-producing states of the Gulf. In this dilemma—worsened considerably by the October 1973 war and the oil embargo and oil price hikes resulting—the US had three objectives that could not readily be reconciled: its long-standing, and growing, commitment to Israel; the access to oil; and the rivalry with the Soviet Union. The latter two could be understood as self-interested objectives, but the first could not. As the condition of the Palestinian refugees and occupied territories worsened (as measured by economics and human rights), the US support for Israel appeared as driven less by the lofty sentiments of the late 1940s and more by the Israel lobby in the US, and as detrimental to both US interests (oil) and to long-term stability for the region.18 Among the outgrowths of the Arab–Israeli conflict was the presence of political violence first from the Palestine Liberation Organization and later from more religiously based groups, Hamas and Hezbollah. The failure to resolve the conflict—to provide the Palestinians with a viable state, most prominently— had remained a source of grievance and anti-Americanism, and this inability for any of the parties to reach an agreement was often attributed to Israeli intransigence backed by their allies in the US, a plausible if incomplete story. However one apportions blame for the festering sore of the conflict, however, it has been and remains a centerpiece of international relations for the region. The Soviet Union adroitly exploited Arab anger, which built upon anti-colonialism and the Soviets’ advantages on that score. Soviet arms shipments to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq spurred greater US involvement and provision of arms and other forms of aid to Israel, accounting for an enormous share of US foreign military and economic assistance year after year. The Americans’ backing of Israel, moreover, has caused friction with others in the developing world and even European allies. A more controversial narrative has this steady US support extending to war making against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and saber rattling against Iran since 1979. Because of the significance of both for oil production and their place in the Muslim world, the reverberations are monumental. Within the region, the Arab–Israeli confrontation has defined much of the foreign policies of each and has shaped inter-Arab relationships as well. The pan-Arabism discussed earlier had as a major raison d’être the destruction of Israel, but this took intemperate forms, particularly before the 1967 war, and posed a threat to the conservative regimes that also tended to be aligned with the US, most prominently Saudi Arabia.19 So the problem posed by Israel was a source of both unity and chronic discord among the Arab states (and by extension to Turkey and Iran). When push came to shove—the 1967 war, the Israeli bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, its sometimes brutal suppression of Palestinians, the “summer war” of 2006 in Lebanon, and the assault on Gaza in the winter of 2008– 9—Israeli provocations failed to unite the Arab states effectively or even stir a formidable protest. Egypt and Jordan sustained their peace agreements, for example, the Saudi, Kuwaitis, and others sustained their oil relations with the West, and so on. One of the supposed Arab

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narratives—that the US has long sought to divide the Arab world to protect Israel—appears less likely as a defining objective when viewing the results of Arab internecine fractiousness. For its part, Israel’s foreign policy has been focused mainly on strong defense, negotiations with willing Arab states, alliances or friendships on the periphery (Iran before 1979, Turkey, Europe, etc.), and exceptionally well-cultivated relationships with successive US administrations, each seemingly more supportive than the last.20 Israel has developed a sizable nuclear weapons capability, itself a source of tension (and emulation in Muslim states), but one that has not earned rebukes from most of the major powers. It is also economically vibrant and committed to democratic governance, both aiding stability and continuity in international relations. Its attitudes toward the Palestinians, particularly the lands continuously occupied since the 1967 war, are gradually evolving, partly as a result of global norms and domestic pressures, even as a final settlement is elusive.21 The indispensable participation in the peace process by outside powers is apparent, however, not only as mediators but as guarantors and financial contributors, and in this the US remains paramount, though erratic.22 The role of the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, while important in certain limited ways (the peacekeeping force of the UN was significant for several years), has been circumscribed by US insistence on its own leading role. America’s domestic constituencies, particularly Jews, thereby have even more leverage than would be expected of a diaspora, as they can be enablers or spoilers. The same could be said of some other outsiders, e.g. those that support politically violent actors among Palestinians— Syria and Iran among them. The Oslo accords were essentially undone by rhetorical opposition from diaspora Palestinians and timely terrorist attacks, including the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a right-wing Israeli Jew. So the peace process, fitful and Potemkinlike as it sometimes seems, is continuously utilized to gain certain advantages for regional actors, whether as a necessary precondition for continued foreign assistance and legitimacy, or as an object of disruption. No stone is left unturned in the Arab–Israeli standoff. It could be argued that the Israeli state is itself an experiment in idealism; given the continuous and voluble criticism of US support by neorealists, such an argument seems apparent. But Israel’s own conduct as an occupier, its alliances, its nuclear stance, its position in the cold war and the global war on terror lift it out of the realm of ideals and set it unmistakably in the terra firma of realpolitik.

The Islamic Revolution The 1979 upheaval in Iran that quickly brought to power Ayatollah Khomeini and established the Islamic Republic stunned the US and indeed the entire region as few single events have since the Second World War. The rapid decline of the Pahlavi regime, the apparent popularity of Khomeini, and the rapidity with which he and his cohort excluded rivals created a strong backwash of recriminations and realignment. The success and fervor of the Islamic Revolution also emboldened political Islam generally, accelerating a new challenge to secular Arab states and even those conservative regimes that were viewed by militants as insufficiently devout. In the calculations of the international community and the major powers, much of the ensuing three decades have revolved around Iran’s theocratic state. The Pahlavi regime fell in part because of its own excesses borne of oil wealth and its exalted status of regional hegemon, the latter conferred by President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger as components of the Nixon Doctrine after the British withdrew from the region in 1971. This status was meant principally to counter Iraq as a Soviet client (and the USSR itself), which became the fulcrum of regional balancing—Iran v. Iraq, Iraq v. Iran. When the Pahlavi regime fell, the twenty-five-year campaign against the political left in Iran— another balancing scheme to exclude Soviet influence—had so depleted the country of secular, modernist alternatives to the power of the clerics that the most militant elements quickly

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overwhelmed the democratic opposition. State building was soon aided by Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September 1980, which enabled Khomeini to consolidate power, as war so often does, and to eliminate residual opposition among former anti-Pahlavi forces. The war with Iraq lasted eight years and took between 600,000 and one million lives, to that point the deadliest war in the region, and its reverberations remain aquiver. Iraq attacked possibly as a pre-emptive move against a traditional rival who appeared weak from the rebellion. Iran repelled the incursion by 1982, declined a settlement from Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, and prosecuted the war with nearly complete success. The major powers essentially sidelined themselves, apart from reaping a windfall in arms sales. The US came to the aid of Iraq in 1982 and steadily escalated its support—in military equipment, political legitimacy, $5 billion in agricultural credits, and, most crucially, real-time intelligence—prior to its most public show of support, the reflagging of oil tankers in the Gulf in 1987 to protect them against Iranian attacks. The bizarre arms-for-hostages deal that sent missiles to Iran notwithstanding, the US policy gradually but firmly sought to balance against Iran, a stance sought not only by Iraq but the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf.23 During the war, Iran supported the new resistance group, Hezbollah, in Lebanon as a counter to the Israeli occupation. This signaled a willingness to act on behalf of religiously based insurgents far from its sphere of influence; in this case, moreover, the insurgents proved formidable and at the outset were aiming to create a state modeled after revolutionary Iran.24 Perhaps more than any other such group, Hezbollah demonstrated the transnational character of a new security threat—it had strong roots in the Da’wa Party based in Najaf, Iraq, which re-emerged in the post-Saddam era as a key player in Iraqi governance, and had over the years strong links to Iran and Syria. Hezbollah, supported by Iran and Syria, continues to exert unusually strong pressure—an excellent case of asymmetry—on Israel, as it demonstrated in the summer war of 2006, and remarkable political adeptness, gaining a nearly decisive edge in non-violent political competition in Lebanon. Iran’s role in Hezbollah’s success is a matter of some dispute, but it is clearly an attempt to counter Israeli power and sustain a militant Shia presence in the Levant—something more than a balancing, but less than the permanent revolution Khomeini envisioned. The strength of political Islam in Iran also affected great power calculations in Afghanistan: in some accounts, the Soviet policy in Afghanistan was predicated on fear of an Iranian-style uprising, leading to imperial overreach and its disastrous war and occupation. While mainly a Central or South Asian affair, the rise of the mujahidin and particularly the apocalyptic al-Qaeda, which was mainly composed of Arabs, is rooted in the Afghan resistance to the Soviets. The rise of al-Qaeda, the pluperfect transnational terrorist organization, has been anathema to Iran, as has the Taliban in Afghanistan, but should be seen in part as a result of the Islamic Revolution. Indeed, the rise of “Islamism” in its various political forms is a triumph of norms and cultural outburst. Because the industrial West has acted with great caution or outright hostility toward Islamist movements and governments, Islamism is a self-constraining force in the international system, one that—at least in the case of Iran—cannot practice normal politics. This renegade status is mitigated by Iran’s long-standing existence as a nation-state (and its oil and gas reserves), but it does raise the specter of disrupting the state system, as panArabism once so threatened, with a different reference point for sovereignty, identity, and political organization, and networks of solidarity globally. Another consequence of the Iran–Iraq war, in which Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran, along with Saddam’s nuclear program, has been a calculation in Tehran about nuclear development that has apparently had the country on a track to nuclear weapons capability. While disavowing this intention, Iran still reaps the balancing benefits of nuclear ambiguity, but is paying a high penalty in international opprobrium and sanctions.25 The US and Europe are united on this front, seeking a solution to prevent Iran from sustaining nuclear weapons capability by effectively utilizing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Non-Proliferation

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Treaty, and the UN Security Council, a case of finding multilateralism a convenient instrument when others are not at the ready.

The puzzle of Iraq The patchwork of Iraq, an awkward product of great power state building after the First World War, has been central to the region’s politics and increasingly important as a focus of international relations. Its imposed monarchy fell in 1958, and a series of coups finally brought to power the Ba’ath Party in 1968. Its pan-Arab socialism, alliances with Syria and Egypt, large reserves of oil, rivalry with Iran, voluntary allegiance to Soviet foreign policy, and stew of ethnicities and repression kept it pivotal to calculations of the cold war.26 With the ascent of Saddam Hussein to head the state in 1979, Iraq suddenly turned to aggression against its neighbors and thus entered the global stage as never before; thirty years on, it has not left it, although Saddam has. The invasion of Iran in 1980 was both a mistake that nearly brought Saddam’s regime down and a gambit that brought the US and some in Europe—UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher particularly27—to his side. The survival of Saddam’s regime may have misled him into believing another such incursion would be tolerated, but his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 misinterpreted what had been a balancing act by the US, Britain, and others. Kuwait, a Western-oriented monarchy like the Saudis, is close to Saudi oil fields and thus the invasion brought those assets into play, with the consequence of stout resistance by the US to Saddam’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Why Saddam invaded remains contested, but the economic devastation of the war with Iran seemed to be one driver. Whatever the causes of the invasion, President George H. W. Bush operated adeptly through the UN Security Council to demand a roll back of the invasion and backed it up by mobilizing an international coalition and an enormous US force based in Saudi Arabia and other parts of the region. The resulting 1991 war—Operation Desert Storm—quickly drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and threatened the Iraqi regime, though it was spared in a crippled form. A crisis in the north led to a protected status for Iraqi Kurdish areas. Along the way, the war and its consequences proved traumatic for the Arab world, which was both drawn to and repelled by Saddam; the failure to resolve the inter-Arab conflict was another blow to its deteriorating pan-Arabism, solidarity, and diplomacy.28 The wholesale co-operation of the Saudi monarchy—using Saudi Arabia as a base of operations for the US military—proved to be controversial among many Muslims, and was used subsequently in extremist propaganda, including that of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. For the US and its partners, the war heralded a “new world order,” in the famous words of President Bush, which in rhetoric and practice had burnished collective security. The co-operation with the Soviet Union, then in its final year of existence, was one of the causes of such celebration, but perhaps more significant was the international community’s capacity to act decisively against an unambiguous case of cross-border aggression. That it was led by one superpower and not opposed by the other declining one, and was manifestly based on the need of the industrial nations to protect oil supply, seems in retrospect to render the effort less noble. It was followed under President Clinton by a policy of “dual containment,” the duo being Iran and Iraq, containment with occasional skirmishes and a high cost, estimated at $50 billion annually, but did contain Iraq from further cross-border aggression.29 Although defeated and truncated, its nascent nuclear weapons program destroyed, and its economy strangled by sanctions, the Iraqi regime hobbled into the next decade seemingly unbowed. The international community never adequately solved the puzzle of Iraq. The reluctance to take down the regime in 1991 later proved prescient, but it did leave in power a cornered dog, and Saddam acted the part—threatening neighbors, repressing Iraq’s Shia majority ruthlessly, pretending to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs,

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supporting Palestinian terrorists, and so on. The containment and sanctions period (1991– 2003) is fraught with disagreement about its effectiveness and remains a counterpoint to the more unambiguous success of sanctions against the South African apartheid regime, but the consequences internally were harsh—up to 500,000 excess deaths were attributed to the deprivations resulting from the sanctions, Saddam’s regime was weakening and opening up new opportunities for religious militancy, and that, along with dissolution generally, may have created a situation that made resistance to the US invasion and occupation in 2003 more likely and durable.30 The decision by the US to invade Iraq and depose Saddam remains shrouded in its own mystery. The specter of a nuclear or biological weapons program, the alleged support for terrorist organizations, the unfinished business of Desert Storm, the relative ease of toppling Saddam compared with the difficulty of coping with al-Qaeda after 9/11, the vast oil reserves, protecting Israel, and balancing Iran—all of these rationales, and more, have been elaborated by officials and policy professionals. In any case, a new presidential doctrine was promulgated asserting the right of the US to initiate a “preventive war” against states harboring terrorist groups that threaten the US, or “rogue” states that so threaten America themselves. President George W. Bush claimed that old military strategies of containment and deterrence, typically associated with the cold war, were no longer adequate to meet these security challenges, which include WMDs in the hands of terrorists.31 On the face of it, then, it was this logic that compelled the invasion in March 2003, without the authority of the UN Security Council; although undertaken with the support of the UK, Italy, and a smattering of other allies, the action was largely unilateral in conception and execution. It created a sense of crisis for those who see multilateral decision making as an essential pillar of global stability, particularly as the action skirted both the UN Security Council’s refusal to authorize action and the findings of the IAEA that Iraq’s weapons program did not constitute an imminent threat.32 It was opposed as an unnecessary distraction by many prominent neorealists.33 While scarcely averse to seeing Saddam Hussein undone, the surrounding states were alarmed by some of the war’s implications and consequences—not least Iraq’s post-invasion scale of violence, displacement, intra- and inter-communal fighting, and roiling instability in politics, economics, and governance. The number of dead and displaced indicated the depth of disarray, with “excess” mortality in the first five years of the war from all causes certainly more than 500,000, and the displaced estimated at 4.5 million.34 This chaos sent chills through the region. Turkey saw the autonomous Kurdish region as posing a threat of creating a new state that would inevitably seek unification with Turkey’s large Kurdish population. The Turkish General Staff thus moved to a kind of brinksmanship against Iraqi Kurdistan and especially the possible incorporation of Kirkuk, with its significant Turkmen population,35 into the Kurdish entity. Syria and Jordan, having fitful links to Saddam Hussein, were not supporters of the war and yet suffered an influx of refugees numbering up to two million between them. Saudi Arabia reportedly supported Sunni insurgencies in Iraq covertly, fearing Iranian influence and the chance that their own sizable Shia minority would become restive. Iran seemed the one clear winner, with a friendly regime in Baghdad, their regional influence greatly enhanced, the US enterprise battered, and oil prices escalating.36 In all, the region was transformed, as President Bush said it would be, but the details of the transformation were quite different from what his administration intended. Among the changes—in addition to Sunni–Shia rivalry, the dead and displaced, and a run-up in oil prices—was a gradual turn to the East (particularly China, Japan, Indonesia, and India) for markets, trade, and possibly even security. Balancing threats, containment, alliance making, sanctions, regime change, and war—all were applied to Iraq in its post-colonial phase, and all produced results of dubious value. Few consistent rationales were applied apart from the tangible odiousness of Saddam, or the equally decried regime in Tehran. Pro-war officials and intellectuals even dusted off their Wilsonianism to apply to Iraq and the region as a whole, arguing for the democratic benefits

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to accrue from the removal of Saddam, benefits that by decade’s end were proving elusive. But the two most likely consequences of the 2003 invasion are the end of balancing (balance of power or balance against threat) in the Gulf, unless it is balancing against the US, and the reduced capacity of the US to shape behavior and events. The “unipolar moment,” as one columnist described US power in the wake of the cold war, may have passed away in the ruins of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny.

The challenge of terror The growth of political violence in the region has been a long time coming. Terrorism as an instrument of political mobilization and change has been utilized for centuries and all over the world, but it has become associated with the Middle East in recent years, not without cause. The Zionist campaigns in British Palestine, the Algerian war of independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s actions in Egypt from the 1940s, among others, demonstrate the long history of non-state, politically violent groups in the region, many of which succeeded at least partially in achieving political goals. In the post-colonial period in the Middle East, most non-state terror was initially associated with the Palestinian cause, particularly after the 1967 war and occupation. While it is arguable how effective Fatah (PLO) and Hamas, among other violent groups, have been in forcing the Israeli state to negotiate, that they have been a key factor in the conflict is beyond dispute. The Palestinians, many or most of whom are not sympathetic to political violence, argue that the “state terror” of occupation is a worse offense. The international community has been split on this, with a majority sympathetic to the Palestinian plight and offering various forms of economic assistance. The US has almost always sided with Israel, and much of the rhetoric and strategic thinking applied to post-9/11 terrorist issues derives from the Israeli experience. Within Israel and the Palestinian territories is a microcosm of the evolution of the groups practicing political violence. Many of these groups of the immediate post-war period were largely secular, nationalist organizations trying to expel colonial rulers. They were working within the idiom of “national wars of liberation,” some allied with the Soviet Union, but most autonomous and indigenous. Later, when the colonial era had largely passed, the violent groups increasingly tended to be religiously inspired, and targeted regimes that were too secular, too Western oriented, or corrupt (or, of course, Israel). Both such phenomena are addressed by social movement or mobilization theory, although the literature shows considerable disagreement about the relationship between mobilization and violence.37 Among the key issues are: the role of grievances, particularly economic deprivation; the “clash of civilizations” or a cultural explanation, occasioned in part by globalized media and social norms; the role of religion, which varies in time and space; the particular provocations of occupation forces, and the tactics of war and insurgency.38 Revolution, rebellion, insurgency, and terrorism all become international issues when more than one country is involved, and the contemporary “jihadist” networks are by nature global or at least multi- or transnational. Thus, real or perceived repression in Egypt or Saudi Arabia or Algeria or Chechnya or Palestine results in radicalized men frequently joining a transnational organization, such as al-Qaeda, to wage war against regimes or occupiers they identify as enemies of the militant form of Islam they practice. So the networks themselves are nearly global in scope, as are the targets. Internet communications have greatly aided these networks and help to enable their transnationalism; the universality of religion is also a factor in defining them as different from nationalist struggles. In terms of US national security, the Bush administration generally ranked the defeat of terrorism as its top priority. “Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends,” in the words of the 2006 National Security Strategy. More specifically:

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In the short run, the fight [against terrorism] involves using military force and other instruments of national power to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any nation; prevent them from gaining access to WMD; and cut off their sources of support. In the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas, for it is ideas that can turn the disenchanted into murderers willing to kill innocent victims. For the second, “long-run” objective, democratization above all else has been proposed. The connection between tyranny and terrorism is explicit: democracies will not be the political culture that stimulates the growth of political violence.39 So the response to the 9/11 attacks and the political violence in various parts of the Middle East are remedied, in this view, by military action (removing tyrannies in Iraq and Afghanistan), intelligence and law enforcement (the preferred method of the Europeans), and promoting ideas of freedom and democracy. It is this latter element that has placed the mantle of Wilson on Bush and the neoconservatives that seem to be driving this vision, although an assertive Wilsonianism cannot be exclusively attributed to the right wing.40 Whatever its twenty-first-century origins, this militant form of liberal internationalism has little empirically to recommend it, even as its application has been exceptionally faulty (denying a democratic victory to Hamas, for example, or not insisting on democratic rights in friendly Arab regimes). Indeed, the opposite may be the case—violent actors appear more in democratic states.41 Much of the recent research on terrorism, moreover, indicates that some of the very actions of the global war on terror are aiding the recruitment of new, self-styled “jihadists,” many of which are scarcely knowledgeable about Islam but use this as a mobilizing frame of action; they are far more likely to be spurred by the occupation of Muslim countries, the mistreatment or unnecessary killing of Muslims, and other sources of rage.42 In the words of a former US official, the invasion of Iraq, done as part of an anti-terrorism campaign, “took the pressure off al Qaeda in the Pakistani badlands and opened new doors for the group in the Middle East. It also played directly into the hands of al Qaeda leaders by seemingly confirming their claim that the US was an imperialist force, which helped them reinforce various local alliances.”43 There is also the question of how large a threat terrorism actually is in relation to other traditional concerns of international relations—its power is to disrupt, to create fear and overreaction, more than to threaten the stability or interests of states, apart from the already weakened “failed” or failing states. Despite all contrary evidence that it is a minor irritant, terrorism is now ensconced in national security ideology as a primary threat; how it squares with the inter-state system of neorealism, the idealism of liberal internationalism, or the social contextualizing of constructivism remains to be seen: none of the theories as yet possesses the explanatory power to locate transnational, essentially nihilist, terrorist organizations, much less predict how they will continue to influence international relations.44 One safe prediction, however, is that such influence will exert most forcefully in the Middle East.

The centrality of oil While the enormous reserves and production of petroleum in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, and other countries have shaped the politics and international relations of the region for 100 years,45 this overwhelming fact is often subsumed in discussions of interests and values. Secretary of State James Baker was blunt in describing the reasons for America’s stout response to Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990, but the political establishment in the US, including many opinion leaders, tends to downplay the centrality of oil in US foreign policy calculations. Much scholarship holds otherwise, although there is considerable debate about the extent to which oil does or should play in international relations.46 Like water or food, oil is treated instrumentally in IR theory, without differentiation, and enters discussions descriptively rather

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than as foundational concept for theory building. As a rule, then, resources are largely absent as a key consideration of international relations.47 They are part of the package of anarchy, interests, institutions, and ideas, it seems, in varying quanta and with varying importance, but they do not change the basic dynamics of global politics in IR debates. Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, notes oil’s importance and how great powers embark on “the establishment of spheres of influence giving them exclusive access to the oil deposits of the [Near East],” but ranks it only with industry or agriculture as a component of national power, and much less important than military power.48 That military power might be necessary primarily to gain access to oil is not a widely shared notion. Yet oil is integral to understanding Middle Eastern politics, particularly the ways in which the haves and have-nots relate to each other, and how each relates to the industrial powers. Among the more interesting dimensions is the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. It was Iran, under the Pahlavi regime, which began the price hikes in the early 1970s that then accelerated rapidly as a response to the 1973 October war between Israel and its neighbors, demonstrating OPEC’s pricing and cartel dominance and its linking of market power to political goals.49 Oil has also proved to be problematic in several states that suffer from “Dutch disease,” the supposition that resource wealth causes corruption and underdevelopment of other industrial capacity, and this has international implications when the attention of a restive population is diverted to other issues (such as Israel). The industry as a whole involves pipelines and other transport with security implications (such as the sea lanes of the Persian Gulf); labor migration and remittances; economic development decisions; and the arms trade, which has been a lucrative side business protected by a patina of energy security. The arms trade, for example, links the buyers to the major industrial states in a petrodollar recycling system, an arrangement complicated by the Charybdis of corruption and the opprobrium in the West of selling arms to human rights violators, both of which have international impacts. Iran’s Pahlavi regime was thus isolated from Western allies due to his lavish lifestyle excesses and human rights record, an isolation that was a clear triumph for social movements, in fact, but with unexpected consequences for Iran, the region, and the relationships with Europe and the US. More apparently, oil is the be-all of the industrial powers’ interest and interests in the region (apart, perhaps, from the establishment of Israel). The relations between these powers and the major oil-producing states are inextricably bound to petroleum to the extent that trade, diplomatic attention, military aid and alliances, balancing, and war have all exacted high costs for these outside powers and have been pursued mainly to sustain relationships providing access to, if not control of, the oil resources of the region. The centrality of oil pivots on a simple and compelling need for Europe, Japan, China, and the US to have steady access to petroleum. This “interest” drives all else. Norms, alliances, security—all are subservient to this logic. This is not a world of anarchy—oil production, marketing, and consumption constitute a highly rational and orderly system (if increasingly irrational on ecological grounds), and global in scope—nor of ideals or norms. In the Middle East, oil is the organizing principle of reality, and for international relations, all else follows.

Conclusion While the internal dynamism of the region—a process of modernization, for the most part, however fitful—has forced the US and other industrial states to pay close heed, the fundaments of the international relations of the Middle East rest on petroleum and Israel. Virtually every policy issue can be viewed through those binoculars, and, within the US, are so viewed, with perhaps the more recent lens of terrorism added. In the post-war period, Britain and France gradually withdrew as major powers in the region; the US and the Soviet Union used the region as a terrain of the cold war; the US

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post-cold war posture focused on a settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict and war against Iraq, balancing against Iran, and sustaining the stability of the other oil giants. Japan and China, Europe, and others who depend on imports of petroleum pursued almost entirely commercial relationships with the oil states. The Gulf states, in particular, shaken by the long periods of war, sanctions, and saber-rattling, are turning ever more clearly toward Asia, possibly signaling the decline of US influence. The region as a whole—while noting it is very difficult to consider it uniformly—has gradually but awkwardly conformed to the international system. In many ways, its progression since 1945 is similar to other developing regions, marked by anti-colonialism, revolution and rebellion, a form of state-centered planning and politics, uneven application of global rights norms, some unity among them but more and more identification of individual state interests, slapdash economic development, and, as a result, quite uneven, sometimes bumptious, relations with the industrial world, others in the global South, and with each other. The anti-colonial struggle, the establishment of Israel, and oil politics have been especially formative. While US behavior can be plausibly considered a realist redoubt—the pursuit of interests, the balancing and alliances, the demonstrations of power—the establishment of Israel as a normative project contradicts such a narrow reading. Over time, too, identity politics and nationalism, at times violent, have played important roles that were often formed independently of inter-state competition or idealism. What perhaps is most striking about US policies, however, is a cumulative irrationality about oil (the dependence, the high cost of defending access, etc.) and a stubborn loyalty to Israel that transformed from a normative gesture to utilizing Israel as another component of balancing. For IR theory, the Middle East is a formidable test, one rarely met successfully, reminding us that the innards of global politics requires many tools to see and understand.

Notes 1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th edn (New York: Knopf, 1973): 5. 2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979). 3 Wilson was addressing the third plenary of the peace conference, February 14, 1919. Cited by Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005): 68, itself an excellent account of the power of FDR’s liberal imagination. See also John Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 4 Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stephen Krasner are prominent among the first group. See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Of the latter group, an influential contribution linking global civil society, domestic politics, and international organizations is Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also Martha Finnemore’s writings, particularly in the journal International Organization. 5 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, No. 110 (Spring 1998): 29–46, explains this succinctly. See Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998). 6 The UN has promoted the human security paradigm, which is still evolving; see, for example, Kevin M. Cahill, ed., Human Security for All (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004). On norms through law, see Thomas J. Biersteker, Peter J. Spiro, Chandra Lekha Sriram, and Veronica Raffo, eds, International Law and International Relations: Bridging Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006); and Andrew Hurrell, “Norms and Ethics in International Relations,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds, Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002). 7 See especially Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); and Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization, 48: 2 (Spring 1994): 185–214, among others. One key to these arguments is that neorealism cannot explain the kind of structural change represented by the end of the cold war, and as a result presents one of the more penetrating critiques of realism and neorealism. 8 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 31. 9 Emanuel Adler, “Constructivism and International Relations,” in Carlsnaes et al., op. cit.: 102.

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10 Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: an Essay on Method,” in Stephen Gill, ed., Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 61. 11 See, for example, Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (New York: Holt, 2004). Many scholars agree that hegemony is present and, in the first two decades post-cold war, the United States is the hegemon; but they disagree about its utility, morality, and consequences. See Jack Snyder, “Myths of Empire and Strategies of Hegemony,” in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin Moore, eds, Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power (New York: The New Press, 2006). On the post-structuralist contribution, see especially Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), which uses Foucault as the analytical fulcrum. 12 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd edition (New York: Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Isaiah Berlin, “The Bent Twig: On the Rise of Nationalism,” in H. Hardy, ed., Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991): 238–61. 13 Lord Kinross, Ataturk (New York: Morrow, 1969); Jacob Landau, ed., Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey (Boulder, CO: Westview/Brill, 1984); John Tirman, “Ataturk’s Children,” Boston Review (December 1997). 14 There is a large literature covering this area: see, for example, A. I. Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd edition (London: Routledge, 2004); Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics: State Formation and Development (Cambridge: Polity, 1994); William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 3rd edition (Boulder: Westview, 2004); and Youssef Choueiri, Arab Nationalism – A History: Nation and State in the Arab World (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Avraham Sela, The Decline of the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998). 15 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 16 Mustapha Kamil Al-Sayyid, “The Rise and Fall of the United Arab Republic,” in Michael Hudson, ed., Middle East Dilemma: the Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). See also the useful history, David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: the Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 2001). 17 Papers of President Truman, www.trumanlibrary.org/israel/palestin.htm. See the brief account by Richard Holbrooke, “Washington’s Battle over Israel’s Birth,” Washington Post, May 7, 2008. 18 The argument is elaborated in John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2007). 19 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 20 Shibley Telhami, The Stakes: America and the Middle East (Westview Press, 2003); Mearsheimer and Walt, op. cit. 21 Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European Journal of International Relations, 5:1 (1999): 5–36. 22 Avi Shlaim, “The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process,” in Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 23 Steve A. Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict (London: Routledge, 1991). 24 Jeroen Gunning, “Hizbollah,” in M. Heiberg, B. Oleary, and J. Tirman, Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts (Philadelphia: Penn Press, 2006). 25 For example, see Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses,” Congressional Research Service, November 1, 2006; or Scott D. Sagan, “How to Keep the Bomb from Iran,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006. 26 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), and Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Tripp notes that Saddam Hussein and “his dictatorship are the manifestations of a particularly potent narrative in the history of the Iraqi state: – a narrative in which exclusivity, communal mistrust, patronage and the exemplary use of violence constitute the main elements, woven into a system of dependence on and conformity with the will of a small number of men at the center of the state in the name of social discipline and national destiny” (p. 194). 27 David Leigh and Rob Evans, “How £1bn was Lost when Thatcher Propped up Saddam,” The Guardian, February 28, 2003; Alan Friedman, Spider’s Web: Bush, Saddam, Thatcher and the Decade of Deceit (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1995). The Scott inquiry in the UK revealed much of the covert weapons support of the Thatcher government to Iraq. 28 Louise Fawcett, “Alliances, Cooperation, and Regionalism in the Middle East,” in Fawcett, op. cit. 29 Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” Foreign Affairs (March/April, 1994). Lake was then national security adviser to Clinton. The concept of dual containment was the invention of Martin Indyk in 1991–92 when he was a director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an Israeli-backed think tank. Several key Clinton administration figures-to-be were on a study group that urged containment of Iraq; Indyk then moved into the National Security Council (NSC) and articulated the concept in front of a Washington Institute conference shortly thereafter; he based his optimism on alliances in the region (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt) and a favorable balance of power. See John Tirman, Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America’s Arms Trade (New York: The Free Press, 1997): 218–20.

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30 On sanctions, the UN head in Iraq has been one of the most devastating critics: see H. C. von Sponeck, A Different Kind of War: The UN Sanctions Regime in Iraq (Berghahn Books, 2006); on the rise of religion during the sanctions period, see Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (London: Hurst, 2006): 111–12. 31 Jeffrey Record, “The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq,” Parameters (Spring 2003): 4–21. 32 D. Newman, R. Thakur, and J. Tirman, eds, Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International Order, and Structural Change (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2006). 33 A notable group of neorealists—Stephen Walt, Stephen Van Evera, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and others—opposed the war, going so far as to take an advert in the New York Times in September 2002, on the grounds that Iraq posed no threat to the US and that a war would distract from the more important task of subduing al-Qaeda. 34 See the website, “Iraq: The Human Cost,” which has the various sources of mortality estimates; the Iraq Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization’s survey held that, as of June 2006, 400,000 excess deaths had occurred. Other surveys had higher numbers. http://mit.edu/humancostiraq. 35 Turkmen outnumbered Kurds in the 1957 census, the last pre-“Arabization” census of the city. For a good exploration of the current issues, see Saad Naji Jawad, “The Kurdish Question in Iraq: Historical Background and Future Settlement,” Contemporary Arab Affairs, 1:1 (2008): 25–41. 36 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006). 37 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998) is a classic account; more applicable to war and conflict is the debate about greed v. grievance stirred by Paul Collier and most recently articulated (with Nicholas Sambanis) in Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis (Washington: World Bank, 2005); Mats Berdal and David Malone, eds, Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); and see also Quintan Wiktorowicz and Mark Tessler, eds, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003). 38 The growing literature on terror reflects uncertainty and is undertheorized. See, among others, Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century (Philadelphia, PA: Penn Press, 2008); Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins, 2003); Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006); John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), among others. See also Nichole Argo, “Transnational Violence in the Persian Gulf,” Workshop Report, MIT Center for International Studies, April 20–21, 2006, and Nichole Argo, “Human Bombs: Rethinking Religion and Terror,” Audit of Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center for International Studies, April 2006. 39 National Security Strategy, especially Section III, online at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionIII.html. For a discussion of the democratization urge in the context of Arab politics, see Richard Augustus Norton, “The Puzzle of Political Reform in the Middle East,” in Fawcett, op. cit. 40 Tony Smith, A Pact With The Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise (New York: Routledge, 2007); see also his condensation of a conference presentation on this, Tony Smith, “Wilson, Bush, and the Evolution of Liberal Foreign Policy,” Audit of Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center for International Studies, April 2008. 41 Erica Chenoweth, “Democratic Pieces: Democratization and the Origins of Terrorism,” in William R. Thompson and Rafael Reuveny, eds, Coping With Contemporary Terrorism: Origins, Escalation, and Responses (Buffalo, NY: SUNY Press, 2008). 42 This point is made, among many scholars of political violence, by Sageman, op. cit. 43 Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2007). Online www.foreignaffairs.org/20070501 faessay86304/bruce-riedel/al-qaeda-strikes-back.html. 44 It is worth noting that the Handbook of International Relations (2002, 2006) does not mention terrorism, and the volume, International Relations of the Middle East (2005) mentions it only in passing. One would think constructivism would at least weigh in on the social construction of fear of terrorism as a domestic political pillar of the global war on terror; this has, unconsciously, been done in Susan Faludi, The Terror Dream: Fear and Fantasy in Post-9/11 America (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2007), which draws on Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence (1973) and feminist theory; see also John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New York: The Free Press, 2006). 45 The standard history remains Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). See also Michael B. Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941–47 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980); Morris Adelman, The Genie Out of the Bottle: World Oil Since 1970 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). 46 Michael T. Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Oil (New York: Macmillan, 2005) has been one persistent voice on this in the radical tradition, as is Chomsky, op. cit.; Irene Gendzier, “Oil, Iraq and US foreign policy in the Middle East,” Situation Analysis, 2 (Spring 2003): 18–28, among many others. For another view, see Walt and Mearsheimer, op. cit; Baghat Korany, “The Middle East since the Cold War: Torn between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics,” in Fawcett, op. cit., among many others. The scholarly treatment of resources is mainly the domain of economists and historians. 47 This statement naturally depends on what a “key consideration” is. Energy is sometimes seen as a mix of domestic structures that influence foreign policy (Peter J. Katzenstein “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” International Organization 30:1 (Winter 1976): 1–45); as a

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potential source of conflict when the system is thrown out of sync (A. H. Westing, Global Resources and International Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)); or as an important goal or variable in diplomacy (L. Carl Brown, ed., Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers (London: I. B. Taurus, 2004)). But, in all such cases, among others, other commodities could replace oil as an independent variable. 48 Morgenthau, op. cit., 117–18. 49 Alice Amsden credits OPEC with bringing down the “first American empire.” See her Escape from Empire: The Developing World’s Journey Through Heaven and Hell (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).

3

Beyond Iraq Lasting issues for the US in the Middle East Lawrence J. Korb and Daniel de Wit

Introduction In his State of the Union Address on January 25, 1980, President Jimmy Carter stated that, “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” This declaration, which has since become known as the Carter Doctrine, stated in plain and forceful terms that the Middle East is a region of critical importance to US national security. In the intervening years, the region has only grown more important for American security concerns. For example, since the Carter Doctrine was first announced, US petroleum imports have nearly doubled, from 1.9 billion barrels in 1980 to 3.7 billion barrels in 2007.1 Petroleum, or oil, imports from the Persian Gulf alone have increased by 600,000 barrels per day.2 Clearly, the Middle East remains central to the US and world economies, and threats to the region’s security and stability can affect nations across the globe. Yet the Middle East is also a region in the midst of tremendous change and uncertainty, presenting numerous challenges for the US both in the present and into the future. The Middle East will be a region with which the US will have to be engaged for years to come, regardless of whether President Obama brings about a swift end to the American troop presence in Iraq or whether the US abides by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq, which states that all US troops must be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. US leaders cannot ignore the region, and navigating the proper course through all of the challenges it presents will require American engagement using all of the tools at the nation’s disposal, as well as a broad, balanced, and coherent strategy for policy in the region. While the US will face many issues in the Middle East in coming years, the most serious challenges will come from five key areas. First among these is the rise of militant Sunni extremism. It is becoming increasingly clear that this threat has come to take the form of an insurgency stretching across much of the Eastern Hemisphere, from East Africa through the Middle East and South Asia to Indonesia and the Philippines. While the ideological embodiment of this insurgency is most readily identified with the al-Qaeda terrorist group, violent Sunni extremism is really a much larger and more diverse movement. This fact presents both challenges and opportunities for US efforts to confront the jihadist threat. In order for the US to prevail, its leaders must have a solid understanding of the movement’s motivations, intentions, ideological appeal, and decentralized organization. They must also be willing to employ all of the tools available to them over the long term, with the full understanding that military power alone cannot defeat the insurgency, and that the war cannot be won with a quick and decisive victory. The second major challenge is the increasingly militant activism of the Iranian-inspired Shi’ite Islamists in Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere throughout the greater Middle East. The US overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 eliminated two of Iran’s greatest strategic threats in its immediate neighborhood. After the US

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spurned its efforts to negotiate in 2003, Iran became far more active in attempting to expand its “Islamic Revolution” and assert its hegemony throughout the greater Middle East. Not only have Iran’s efforts threatened stability in Iraq, where tensions between Shi’ite and Sunni groups are the source of much of the violence still plaguing the country, they are a serious impediment to political reconciliation and governance. Unless the US can counter this threat, militant Shi’ite activism will also be a major cause of instability and insecurity in the Middle East. The third issue that will tie the US to Middle Eastern affairs well into the foreseeable future is that of oil security. For better or worse, oil remains the driving force behind the global economy. While the US does not import the majority of its oil from the region, the Middle East supplies such a large amount of petroleum to the entire world that a disruption in the oil flow would be devastating not only to US economic interests but to economic stability around the globe as well. Since the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine, the US has committed both its diplomatic influence and its military might to ensuring the free flow of oil from the Middle East. Given the increased importance of oil to the world economy since the inception of the Carter Doctrine, this is a commitment which the US cannot afford to scale back. Thus, the US government must develop a comprehensive strategy that makes use of all of the instruments of national power to secure the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, particularly with the new threats that the region now faces. The fourth major challenge is the Israel–Palestine conflict, which remains a source of anger, resentment, and instability in the region and indeed among Muslims the world over. Israel’s position as the closest American ally in the Middle East, and the centrality of the Arab–Israeli conflict as a critical source of anti-American sentiment, necessitates a renewed US engagement to attempt to bring about a lasting, equitable peace agreement that is brokered between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The fifth and final problem that the US faces in the region, and one which in many ways exacerbates the difficulties posed by the others, is the chronic economic and political underdevelopment throughout much of the greater Middle East. The states in the region have by and large failed to integrate themselves into the globalized economy, and thus many of them suffer from serious poverty and economic stagnation. This is compounded by the fact that nearly all of these states are ruled autocratically. Although their leaders have been able to amass incredible wealth through oil exports, the majority of people in much of the Middle East are forced to live in conditions of abject poverty. At the same time, globalization has led to an infusion of Western culture and a breakdown of old cultural and social norms, leaving many in the region feeling as though their very society is under attack from the West. To counter this trend, the American leaders will need to be open and honest in their calls for political reform in authoritarian states with which the US has long been allied. Because countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been allies of convenience for the US, most American leaders have failed to press firmly for political reform in these countries and throughout the region. This must change if real progress is to be made. The confluence of these issues in this strategically vital region of the world means that US policy must be broad based and made with a view towards long-term success rather than short-term solutions that cause more problems later on. Moreover, each of these issues is closely linked with others, a fact which US leaders must take into account, lest the actions they take to resolve problems in one area exacerbate the problems elsewhere. This means that US policy towards the Middle East must take into account the weak political and economic environment and use all of the elements of national power in an integrated manner to resolve these issues as part of one unified strategic package. Rather than focusing only on narrow goals such as “fighting terror,” US leaders must craft policy options that will advance US national security and foreign policy objectives, with the understanding that simply going from one crisis to another without an overall strategic framework to guide policy planning will, in the long run, only breed more threats to American interests. Without such a strategic concept guiding the

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policymaking process and a focus on more than just terrorism or oil, the US will only create more problems than it solves and will never truly be able to interact with Middle Eastern states in a normal, peaceful, and mutually beneficial manner.

The global Islamist insurgency For more than seven years, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, countering the threat of another violent attack by militant Sunni extremists, usually labeled simply as “terrorists,” has been the central focus of US policy in the Middle East. Soon after the attacks, the administration of President George W. Bush made it clear that terrorist groups would be treated as an enemy to be fought through force of arms rather than simply a criminal element to be arrested and prosecuted. This campaign became known as the “global war on terror.” The US began by targeting the al-Qaeda network, the group which had perpetrated the attacks of 9/11, attacking its base of operations in Afghanistan, where it was sheltered by the extremist Taliban regime. Through the combined application of precise air power and special operations units fighting on the ground with indigenous forces, the Taliban were routed in a matter of months. Their sanctuary destroyed, al-Qaeda’s leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri fled across the Pakistani border into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with many of their followers. It initially seemed as though the enemy had been dealt a decisive defeat, and was all but completely destroyed. However, the US government was soon distracted preparing to invade Iraq, giving al-Qaeda and its allies much needed breathing room. At the same time, the US invasion of Iraq inflamed anti-American sentiments among Muslims the world over, and seemed to validate al-Qaeda’s primary message, which claimed that the US was at war with Islam itself.3 Among Muslims, sympathy for al-Qaeda skyrocketed, and the group was given a new lease of life. Consequently, it was able to morph from a covert network into the umbrella organization for, and public face of, a global Islamist insurgency.4 The distinction between global terrorist network and global insurgency may seem inconsequential. However, it goes to the heart of the nature of the Islamist threat. When al-Qaeda was a terrorist group in the strict sense, it had a networked organizational structure with distinct leaders and followers. This structure still exists to a very limited extent inside Pakistan’s FATA region, and the group is still able to operate as a terrorist network, albeit a smaller one.5 However, it is now more important and more threatening in its ability to provide ideological and inspirational support to like-minded groups across the Islamic world. These affiliated groups collectively represent a global Sunni Islamist insurgency: a popular movement that seeks to radically change the political status quo through extraordinarily violent means.6 They inspire one another through their actions, and they support each other logistically and with ideas on producing innovative weapons and effective tactics. Terrorism is one tactic that they use to advance their goals, but it is not the only one. Crucially, no one group directs any of the others. The connections between insurgent cells across the world are ad hoc and tenuous.7 The fact that this is, like all other insurgencies, a popular movement means that simply targeting the leadership will not yield meaningful results. Until people can be persuaded not to support it, new leaders will constantly fill the void when old ones are killed or captured.8 In fact, forceful efforts to kill or capture terrorist leaders may prove to be extremely counterproductive if they generate sympathy for the insurgency among ordinary people and lead them to either join its ranks or provide it with support and sanctuary. Yet the fact that it is a popular movement provides a different sort of key to defeating it. The distinguishing feature of insurgencies versus other rebel and terrorist movements is that they survive and thrive by co-opting, through both intimidation and persuasion, the support of the populace in the region in which they operate. If the counterinsurgent force can separate the insurgency from the general population, and then persuade the population to support peaceful political systems

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rather than violence, it can cut off the insurgency’s support system and the movement will be unable to operate effectively. This requires an integrated approach that combines development assistance, political reform, security, and, crucially, information operations to change the perceptions of the people.9 Traditional military power, or “kinetic” power, is useful only if employed in a limited fashion to provide security for the general population from insurgent intimidation and to precisely target insurgent leaders when doing so won’t evoke sympathy for insurgent groups.10 If done successfully, such efforts will allow US forces to build close relationships with the people, producing goodwill and driving a wedge between them and the insurgents. In many cases, such relationships will yield far more intelligence on insurgent activities than can ever be found with all of the technologically advanced surveillance tools at the disposal of the intelligence community.11 This kind of operation needs to be employed by small teams of integrated military and civilian units wherever these militant groups are actively trying to base their operations and co-opt the support of local populations. Examples of such operations being employed in the real world include the activities of Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. By employing these kinds of integrated operations, the US may prevent the Islamist insurgency from taking root among vulnerable populations around the world, thereby preventing the Islamists from spreading their beliefs and limiting the number of enemies that the US faces. At the global level, these operations need to be combined with efforts to sever the links between the various Islamist insurgent groups around the world. By interdicting these connections, the US and its allies can “disaggregate” the global insurgency into smaller local insurgencies that cannot benefit from each other’s support.12 Cut off from outside support, these localized insurgencies will be far more vulnerable to integrated counterinsurgency operations of the sort described above. Additionally, the US can use the vast informational tools at its disposal to exacerbate tensions within and between various Islamist groups in order to splinter them further from each other and weaken them individually.13 Once an insurgent group is cut off from the others and separated from local Muslim populations, it will be both unable to operate effectively or spread its ideology, and extremely vulnerable to kinetic force applied precisely by American or allied military units. Then the US will be better able to more easily capture or kill those militant Islamists still committed to using violence, and in the long run undermine the global insurgency.

The rise of Shi’ite extremism While the US has been focused on the global insurgency composed of Sunni extremist groups, another source of regional instability, and a threat to US interests, has emerged in the form of Iranian-led and -inspired Shi’ite extremism. The threat to US interests from Shi’ite extremists first emerged in 1979 with the Iranian Revolution. However, in the intervening decades, the threat from Iran was largely contained by US military power, and in no small part by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, with which it fought a devastating eight-year war. Since the US invasion of Iraq, Iran has become far more active in its pursuit of regional power. Iran has accelerated its nuclear program, in defiance of not only the US but the European Union (EU) and the UN Security Council.14 There is also evidence that it is supporting radical Shi’ite groups in Iraq by providing money, weapons, and training. In fact, US military commanders in Iraq have stated on numerous occasions that the most deadly weapons being used against American and Coalition troops are of Iranian origin.15 Iranian-supported Shi’ite extremism is not confined to the Persian Gulf area. In Lebanon, the Shi’ite group Hezbollah, which is simultaneously a terrorist group, an elected political party, and a social support network, has become increasingly active in its efforts to secure political power and to confront Israel. While Hezbollah has a long history of terrorist attacks against Israeli and American targets from Saudi Arabia to Argentina, Iranian funds, arms, and

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training have allowed the group to increase its operational capabilities dramatically. Rather than only carrying out bombings of civilian and military facilities, Hezbollah has now developed the capability to wage open guerilla warfare against Israel’s strong conventional military, which it did in 2006. More recently, the group has taken Lebanon to the brink of a second civil war by using its well-armed and trained militia to advance its political goals. Iran also supports and arms the Palestinian group Hamas, allowing that extremist group to take a more forceful stance against Israel than would otherwise be possible, including launching rockets into Israel from Gaza. Thus, Iran has been able to undermine the peace process and enflame anti-Israeli sentiments throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Tensions between Sunni and Shi’ite elements in the Middle East are quickly becoming one of the greatest sources of instability in the region. This is most clearly visible in Iraq, where, similar to the situation in Lebanon, violence between sectarian groups nearly plunged the country to the brink of civil war in late 2006.16 In another similarity to the situation in Lebanon, many of the Shi’ite militias in Iraq are, like Hezbollah, fighting as Iranian proxies. Iran wants to end the US occupation on terms favorable to itself, which means weakening the US as much as possible, and ensuring that the new Iraqi government is Shi’ite led, and in lockstep with Iranian interests.17 It has sought to accomplish this by aiding and arming the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), the militia of Iraq’s extreme Shi’ite leader, Muqtada al-Sadr. The resulting violence has likely claimed far more lives than the anti-Coalition insurgency. And while the new Iraqi government has recently succeeded in challenging al-Sadr and his group, sectarian tensions remain the biggest source of insecurity, and the most serious impediment to Iraqi political progress.18 Until Shi’ite and Sunni groups can come to some form of meaningful political reconciliation, lasting political progress in the country will not be likely. On a broader level, Iranian actions have alarmed many of the Sunni states in the region, especially as Iran continues to enrich uranium, and as the Iranian regime has continued to support Shi’ite militias in Lebanon and Iraq. Throughout the Middle East, Sunni governments fear that Iran is bent on regional hegemony and expanding its “Islamic Revolution,” and may use force to advance these ends. Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, it may well step up its activism even further, confident that its nuclear capability will prevent neighboring governments, and the US, from using force against it. These many challenges can be resolved only through renewed US diplomatic engagement in the region. The US must be willing to talk with all parties, including Iran, in order to reconcile tensions and disagreements between Sunni and Shi’ite parties in the region. As Iran is an important power behind Hezbollah and the more militant Shi’ite groups in Iraq such as the Jaysh al-Mahdi, engagement with the Iranian regime can provide the key to dealing with these groups. Given Iran’s ability to foment violence and instability in Iraq, it is unlikely that the US will be able to resolve Iraq’s many problems and bring its troops home in the near future without dealing with Iran’s involvement in the country. Direct engagement provides the quickest and cheapest way to accomplish this end. This does not mean that the US must bend to Iran’s every wish. Indeed, it will be critical that the US protects its own vital interests. That being said, negotiating with Iran and finding points of common ground should be possible. In the long run, Iran will not benefit if Iraq becomes a failed state. It therefore has a stake in ensuring that a stable, viable government is formed within its neighboring country. The US can begin by engaging with Iran on this point, and moving forward from there. Direct talks with Iran, without preconditions, will be difficult and frustrating, but, in the long run can result in the Iranian regime playing a more positive and constructive role in the region.

Oil security Before the collapse of many of the world’s economies, the price of oil per barrel reached record highs. In fact, some analysts were predicting that it would go as high as $200 per

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barrel. While these record high prices were felt by consumers every time they put gas in their cars, they also had a serious impact on other sectors of the economy. For example, the airline industry was hit hard by the skyrocketing prices in aviation fuel, resulting in higher transportation and travel costs, as well as cutbacks in airline services.19 The rise in domestic food prices was also due in part to the rising costs of transporting produce to markets.20 Still, oil remains central to the world economy, and disruption to the flow of oil would have a devastating ripple effect, impacting economies around the world and making economic recovery more difficult. Thus, the secure flow of oil from the Middle East remains a crucial national security priority for the US and its allies. US efforts to maintain oil security are even more important in light of the chronic instability affecting the region in recent years. While the Carter Doctrine has guided the US commitment to Middle Eastern oil security throughout the cold war, it was originally geared toward countering potential Soviet aggression in the region. In the three decades since the Doctrine’s inception, the threats to the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf have changed and grown far more complex. Today, the greatest threats to US oil interests come in the form of terrorist attacks from Islamist militants, as well as the possibility of aggressive action by an Iranian regime intent on expanding its power in the region. The Carter Doctrine, which ensured a US commitment to oil security, through military force if necessary, remains relevant. However, the nature by which the Doctrine is employed must change to keep pace with the times.21 The US military presence in the Persian Gulf will remain critical well into the future. The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain, is the centerpiece of this force.22 The Fleet maintains at least one Carrier Strike Group (as the old Carrier Battle Groups have come to be known) in the Gulf at all times. Additionally, the Fleet maintains a Marine Expeditionary Unit—Special Operations Capable (MEU—SOC). These highly mobile units from the Marine Corps are specifically designed to maintain a forward presence and respond quickly to a crisis.23 With these forces stationed in the region, the US has a significant forward presence and can easily deter conventional aggression from Iran, target terrorist groups should US leaders obtain actionable intelligence on their whereabouts, or respond to a sudden crisis should one occur. These are all important missions, but to be truly effective in countering the threats currently facing oil interests in the region, the US military will have to undertake new and unconventional roles that can better counter the asymmetric threats in the region.24 The US military forces in the region are well positioned to take on new roles that can build relationships with regional militaries as well as increase US standing among the regular Muslim population.25 Known in the military as “Phase 0” or “shaping” operations, these missions can take the form of humanitarian assistance, combined training exercises, and military-to-military diplomacy.26 As discussed above, the critical factor in isolating the Islamist insurgents threatening US interests, and thus securing oil flow for the US and the world, is the ability of the US to sway the general populations in strategically vital regions to its side. Recent history has proven that “shaping” operations are incredibly effective in this regard. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the US Navy sent the hospital ship USNS Comfort to the coast off of Banda Aceh, Indonesia, in order to deliver much needed medical supplies. This resulted in a dramatic improvement in American standing among what had previously been a population with a very negative view of the United States.27 Similarly, the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa has conducted shaping operations in combination with kinetic counterterrorist operations that have proven highly effective.28 These “Phase 0” operations comprise development missions (using naval engineers to dig wells and build medical clinics and schools), medical civil action programs, and combined training operations with host nation militaries. Oil security will also depend to a great extent on renewed diplomatic activity. While aggression from “rogue states” and terrorist groups threatens to disrupt the flow of oil, there is also the danger inherent in the growing competition for the world’s petroleum reserves.

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Specifically, as China’s economy grows, it demands more and more oil, which it is finding primarily in the Middle East and Africa. European countries and Japan also buy most of their oil from these regions. Given the fact that oil consumption is absolutely critical to the continued prosperity of each of these countries (not to mention the US), there is the very real possibility that conflict could break out over access to Middle Eastern oil reserves. In order to prevent this, the US should seek to bring these countries into a co-operative international framework to secure the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.29 China is rapidly increasing the size of its navy, which could in the long run lead to a major confrontation over access to the Gulf and to major shipping routes. Bringing China into a co-operative agreement to use its military capabilities in a positive manner could forestall such a future confrontation. In the long run, an international framework for oil security would give countries around the world a stake in peaceful access to oil, and be a disincentive to taking it through force of arms. Establishing such a framework will require much more active use of American diplomatic tools to engage relevant partners, and the continued presence of the American military in the region, as a deterrent force and as quick first responder in a security crisis, should other avenues fail.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict The long-running conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors has been a source of violence, anger, and instability in the Middle East for over sixty years. Since the mid-1980s, the fighting has been transformed from conventional warfare between Israel and Arab states to irregular warfare between Israel and various Palestinian militant groups, especially Hamas. Yet this has not resulted in a meaningful increase in stability throughout the region. Indeed, the fighting between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization has had a direct destabilizing effect upon both Lebanon and Jordan at various points in recent decades. The UN Development Programme’s 2002 Arab Human Development Report calls the conflict one of the most pervasive obstacles to security and progress in the region geographically (since it affects the entire region), temporally (extending over decades) and developmentally (impacting nearly all aspects of human development and human security, directly for millions and indirectly for others).30 The conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians undermines US interests in several ways. To begin with, since the attacks of 9/11, it has become clear that serious instability, even on the other side of the world, and especially in a region as important as the Middle East, can be a major threat to US interests. Lasting tension and violence only breed hatred and extremism. The Gaza Strip in particular has, since the Hamas takeover in the summer of 2007 and the ensuing Israeli blockade, become a cesspool of poverty, desperation, and extremism.31 While food and supplies are able to enter the Strip, there are few prospects for economic selfimprovement or social mobility. Even well-educated people have great difficult finding jobs or opportunities to better themselves.32 Thus, people from every level of society share a similarly bleak existence in which they have little hope for their futures. This is exactly the sort of situation that breeds hatred and religious extremism, especially when the local authority is already a religious party identified as a terrorist group by both the US and the EU.33 The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been used on numerous occasions by Islamist groups as a propaganda tool. Harping upon it draws recruits and brings legitimacy to their causes. In 2007, some 70 percent of Palestinian people polled in a Pew Global Attitudes Survey said that suicide bombing, even against innocent civilians, can be justified.34 In Lebanon and Jordan, some 34 percent and 23 percent, respectively, supported such tactics.35 Clearly, if the US is serious about decreasing support for terrorist groups in the Muslim world, resolving the

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Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and thus drying up this immense source of support for extremist groups, should be an absolute priority. US involvement in resolving the long-running dispute is important for other reasons as well. Not least among these is that Israel is an important American ally in the region. Therefore, the US government has a very real interest in ensuring Israel’s security. At the same time, ending the plight of the Palestinian people and enabling them to live normal lives, free of violence and in a politically independent state, is a moral imperative for the United States. Since the collapse of President Clinton’s peace talks at Camp David in 2000 through the end of the Bush administration, US efforts towards resolving the conflict have been halfhearted and ad hoc at best. President Bush initially stated that his administration would stay out of the conflict entirely. This changed after 9/11, when US leaders finally began to correlate the regional instability and anti-Americanism bred by the conflict with specific security concerns. President Bush then took the major step of putting US diplomatic support behind a two-state solution that would guarantee a sovereign Palestinian state. Yet his administration’s “Road Map for Peace” failed to produce any meaningful results. In November 2007, the Bush administration tried to renew the peace process by hosting a major conference in Annapolis. For the first time, a two-state solution was jointly agreed upon by both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. However, it also met with heavy opposition from right-wing Israeli parties,36 and Hamas called for a boycott of the conference altogether.37 By the time President Bush left office, the Annapolis Conference had accomplished very little. Moreover, on December 27, 2008, the Israelis responded to Hamas’ firing rockets into Israel with a four-week campaign of launching air and ground attacks against Hamas and its followers in Gaza. The Bush administration also did not get involved when, in the summer of 2008, Qatar began mediating talks between Israel and the Palestinians, while Turkey began mediating between Israel and Syria. Yet this should not be taken as a sign that a US role is not important. US diplomatic influence, specifically with Israel, will be critical in bringing the sides together in order to develop a lasting peace agreement.38 In particular, US leverage is necessary in managing the complex negotiating process with countries throughout the region. This leverage cannot be exercised sporadically at major summit conferences as has been the case in past years. Rather, the US should have skilled diplomats on the ground in Israel and the Palestinian Territories working constantly to bring the sides together to find some way in which the core issues separating these two parties can be resolved.39 The Obama administration took a good first step by appointing a high-level diplomatic envoy, former Senator George Mitchell, to work directly and continuously with the parties in the region. Sustained close diplomatic engagement, instead of large conferences held only on an irregular basis, will be critical if the US is meaningfully to aid in the process of resolving the conflict, or at least prevent it from getting worse. By engaging more closely and substantively on these issues with state leaders throughout the Middle East, Senator Mitchell can also begin to rebuild the United States’ shattered image among so many of the people throughout the region. Renewed and sustained diplomatic engagement will prove invaluable not only for the immediate goal of ending the conflict and establishing a viable Palestinian state at peace with Israel, but also for advancing US national security and foreign policy goals well into the future.

Chronic underdevelopment Perhaps the biggest challenge that the US faces in the Middle East, and one which is, in many ways, a causal factor for other problems, is the serious political and economic underdevelopment faced by nations throughout the region. As Marwan Muasher, the former foreign minister of Jordan, points out in his new book, The Arab Center, regional stability and US interests are threatened by the presence of poverty and the lack of good governance, political reform, women’s rights, religious and cultural diversity, access to education, and economic opportunity for millions of individuals across the Middle East.40

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The Arab Human Development Report makes a similar point by illustrating the often debilitating lack of economic development throughout the Middle East.41 According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP), this situation is in many ways due to the dearth of participatory democratic governments throughout the region (which the report characterizes as a state of political underdevelopment). The Programme’s report points out that “the predominant characteristic of the current Arab reality seems to be the existence of deeply rooted shortcomings in the Arab institutional structure [which] are an obstacle to building human development.”42 Underdevelopment is, ironically, often felt most strongly in states where autocratic rulers have access to great wealth in the form of oil revenues.43 Because these autocratic governments are able to amass their own personal fortunes through the sale of oil, and are under no pressure from the US or the international community to share the revenues nationally or invest in any sort of human capital for their people, the economies in their states stagnate while they are able to live comfortably. As Fareed Zakaria put it in The Future of Freedom, “easy money makes it unnecessary to do the hard work of creating a modern society.”44 The result is that the majority of the population in these countries is forced to live in poverty with few marketable skills and little hope for self-improvement or social mobility. According to the UNDP, some 65 million adult Arab men are illiterate, a rate that is much higher than even much poorer countries.45 At the same time, the region is showing a “youth bulge,” with some 38 percent of the population under fourteen years of age.46 This means that, even if states do provide for good educational programs, national economies will be unable to absorb their talents, and they will be unable to find jobs commensurate with their skill levels. In combination, these factors lead to incredible frustration and anger, as people’s very lives seem stagnant and hopeless. These problems are compounded by the common sentiment that the Islamic cultural heritage, to which a majority of people throughout the Middle East belong, is under attack. This sentiment is in many ways tied to the rise in the last decade of globalization and the increasing volume and speed of information flows across the world. Globalization in its fullest sense means interconnected markets and increased trade, bringing incredible economic potential. However, this process requires major investment in both human and physical capital, which autocratic governments, even when they become rich from escalating oil revenues, are often unwilling to provide. Furthermore, integrating into a globalized economy entails relinquishing some control, which these autocrats are unwilling to do.47 Moreover, the internet and satellite TV have brought in a massive influx of Western culture, and at the same time allowed Middle Easterners to learn about the dramatic economic growth taking place around the world, from which they themselves remain disconnected.48 The result is the sense that their very culture is under threat from Western values and cultural norms, which traditionalists see as decadent and corrupt. They find themselves confronted with what they see as truly negative aspects of globalization, without seeing many of the benefits. In years past, this situation would have been viewed by many simply as a matter for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to deal with: a sad fact of life in the modern world but not one meriting the full engagement of the entire foreign policy establishment. More recent events have proven that the chronic underdevelopment and deep-seated feelings of frustration and even hatred that ensue are related directly to the greatest challenges that the US will face around the world in the coming decades. As such, the problem of underdevelopment merits the full attention and resources of US leaders. Sarah Sewall, a noted human rights and foreign policy expert from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, summed up the new global security paradigm by paraphrasing James Carville’s famous comment about the 1992 presidential election, writing: “It’s stability, stupid.”49 To begin with, US policymakers must develop policies that will combine the tools of development projects and direct investment with the more traditional national security instruments of intense diplomatic engagement and military activities. This sort of “sustainable

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security” will seek to build up the Middle East and enable regular people in the region to lead more productive lives in which they have hope for their own improvement and that of their children.50 This will require making development a major pillar of the US national security and defense strategies. It will also require major reform to disentangle the complex foreign aid system in order to make it more manageable and allow policymakers to better use foreign aid programs in conjunction with other tools to advance major strategic goals.51 At the same time, the US government must begin to engage more closely with like-minded governments in the region and elsewhere in order to press for long-term political reform. Too often in the past, US leaders have remained close to autocratic Middle Eastern regimes in the name of securing American access to oil. This trend has continued recently as many autocrats have allied themselves with the US in the so-called global war on terror. The US must stop turning a blind eye to the nefarious actions of many autocratic Middle Eastern regimes if meaningful and lasting change in the region is to be realized. Rather, American leaders must use the need that many of these regimes have for US military assistance to begin to push slowly but firmly for political reform within dictatorial states so that the many problems bred from political underdevelopment can be alleviated. When it comes to autocratic states that do not directly align themselves with American goals, the US has seen democratization as the “long-term antidote”52 to terrorism, and has pushed for elections in Egypt and the Palestinian Territories. However, this often results in the elections of groups inimical or even openly hostile to US interests. Fareed Zakaria has pointed out that states, which quickly democratize and focus only on elections without first developing a functioning civil society or liberal political institutions, become “illiberal democracies;” that is, states with governments elected through democratic means that nonetheless rule autocratically.53 Avoiding this outcome will require political reform to liberalize societies— developing strong civil societies and protections for civil liberties—before pushing for elections. Such “liberal autocracies” have a much easier time transitioning into modern liberal democratic states than do those that democratize quickly without having an open, free social system first.54

Conclusion: working through the complexity As troubling as each of the above issues may be, the real danger lies in their complex interconnectedness. Each of these challenges is related in some way to the others, and working to resolve one should inevitably involve dealing with the others. For example, securing the flow of oil has in the past meant aligning ourselves with the dictatorial rulers of oil-rich nations. This has, however, only strengthened the hand of these rulers and led to heightened anti-Americanism, which can in turn breed recruits for Islamist insurgent groups. Likewise, countering those insurgent groups will require resolving the developmental problems in the region. Unless the US government can develop a strategy to deal with all of these challenges in a co-ordinated way, the nation will only make more problems for itself. Developing an integrated strategy towards the Middle East will require the ability to comprehend not only the issues and the interplay between them, but also the Middle Eastern culture and social history. Decision makers on the ground must be able to understand the way in which people in the region view the US and American policies, and be able to explain our goals to people in the region. This does not mean that the US must calibrate its policies specifically to suit the wishes of Middle Easterners, but rather that US leaders understand the culture of the people of the Middle East, and be able to advance US goals through measures that take cultural issues into account. More than 2000 years ago, the Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu said that the key to victory lies in knowing both one’s enemy and oneself. This is a lesson for both diplomats and military commanders, and is no less true today than it was when it was written.

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A broad strategy for Middle East policy will require a number of concrete steps, both in Washington and abroad:  First, President Obama must take strong steps to reform the organizations responsible for foreign assistance and diplomatic engagement. In recent years, the Defense Department’s (DoD) stake in development assistance for foreign governments has increased from about 5 percent of overall spending to more than 20 percent.55 This is in part because of DoDled efforts to combat the Islamist insurgency through attempts to “build partner capacity,” or bolster the abilities of friendly states to counter terrorist groups within their own territories.56 However, it is also due to the fact that the DoD has more resources and a far better operational capacity than USAID and the State Department, the civilian agencies normally tasked with development programs and on-the-ground diplomatic engagement.57 The result is that the US military, rather than the civilian diplomatic corps, has become the face of the US around the world, especially in the Middle East. The Obama administration and Congress can begin to redress this deficiency by giving the State Department and USAID the funds they need for requisite staffs and resources for their projects. This does not mean that the DoD should be forced out of the process entirely. Capacity-building programs are important, but they should not be undertaken at the expense of development and diplomatic engagement activities.  Second, in order to co-ordinate the many activities that a broadly based strategy would entail, reforms to the interagency process are necessary. As advancing US strategic goals can no longer be accomplished through either purely diplomatic or military means, but must rather employ a combination of the two in conjunction with development programs, military and civilian elements from a variety of agencies need to be able to work together in a co-ordinated manner. The DoD has begun this process with its new Africa Command (AFRICOM), which, although a combatant command, has been expressly organized in order to facilitate co-ordination between military and civilian agencies. Indeed, one of the two principal deputies reporting to the AFRICOM Combatant Commander will be a diplomat of ambassadorial rank.58 This sort of interagency structure should be expanded to the Central Command, which is responsible for operations in the entire greater Middle East.  Third, more authority should also be given to the diplomatic country teams operating out of each US embassy. These interagency teams, led by an ambassador or chief of mission, provide the US government with the ability to closely co-ordinate policies for a specific country across numerous civilian agencies as well as the military (each country team includes at least one military attaché, who reports to the ambassador but co-ordinates with the regional combatant command).59 By making the country team the main operation element or “command post” (as one Senate Foreign Relations Committee report put it),60 the US would not only put the State Department firmly in charge of foreign policymaking during peace time, but would also allow close co-ordination between multiple parts of the government when engaging with foreign countries. On a broader level, the absolute key to developing a broad Middle East strategy designed for long-term success is the understanding that US policy cannot focus solely on the immediate threats to American security and vital interests abroad. The government must retain the diplomatic and military capacity to respond effectively to a crisis, but it must also be able to do so in a way that will not jeopardize long-term foreign policy goals. Since 9/11, the overriding focus has been on “fighting terror” and securing access to oil. Indeed, oil security has been the guiding principle of US policy toward the Middle East since the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. But, by focusing only on such narrow goals and implementing quick fix solutions, US policymakers have managed to help create many of the challenges that the nation faces today. The only way to avoid continuing this dangerous trend is to develop an integrated,

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long-term strategy designed to engage with the Middle East along the entire spectrum of mutually important issues. Until America’s leaders develop such a strategy, the US will never move past the crisis of the moment, and serious, long-term progress for both US interests and the Middle East more generally will stagnate.

Notes 1 Energy Information Administration. “U.S. Crude Oil Imports from All Countries.” http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ dnav/pet/hist/mcrimus1a.htm. 2 Energy Information Administration. “Total U.S. Crude Oil Imports From Persian Gulf Countries.” http://tonto. eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/mcrimuspg2a.htm. 3 Fawaz Gerges, “Assessing al-Qaeda Performance and Threat,” Proceedings on Strategy, Analysis, and Technology: 2006 Unrestricted Warfare Symposium. Johns Hopkins University: APL/SAIS, March 14–15, 2006: 128. www.jhuapl.edu/ urw_symposium/previous/2006/pages/proceedings.htm. 4 Lt Col (Dr.) David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, November 30, 2004: 15. http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf. 5 Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grassroots Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008. 6 Kilcullen, op. cit. 7 Kilcullen, op. cit. 8 Lt Col Michael F. Morris, USMC, Al-Qaeda as Insurgency. US Army War College Strategy Research Project, March 18, 2005: 6. 9 T. X. Hammes, “Information Operations in 4GW,” in Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp, and Regina Karp, eds, Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict. New York: Routledge, 2008. www.jhuapl.edu/urw_symposium/previous/ 2006/pages/proceedings.htm. 10 Sarah Sewall, “Crafting a New Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Foreign Service Journal, September 2007: 34. 11 Hy Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare. Newport, RI: US Naval Institute Press, 2006: 102. 12 Kilcullen, op. cit. 13 Thomas Mahnken, “A Strategy for a Protracted War,” Proceedings on Strategy, Analysis, and Technology: 2006 Unrestricted Warfare Symposium. Johns Hopkins University: APL/SAIS, March 14–15, 2006: 57. www.jhuapl.edu/urw_symposium/ previous/2006/pages/proceedings.htm. 14 Joseph Cirincione and Andrew Grotto, Contain and Engage. The Center for American Progress, March, 2007: 1. 15 Greg Bruno, “Backgrounder: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 25, 2007. www.cfr.org/publication/14324/irans_revolutionary_guards.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F458%2F. 16 Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “At Least 51 Are Killed in Blast at Baghdad Market,” The New York Times, June 18, 2008. 17 Vali Nasr, “Iran on Its Heels,” The Washington Post, July 19, 2008. 18 Brian Katulis, Lawrence J. Korb, and Peter Juul, Strategic Reset. The Center for American Progress, June 2007: 4. 19 “It’s an ill wind … ,” The Economist, June 5, 2008. 20 Robert Gavin, “Surging Costs of Groceries Hit Home,” The Boston Globe, March 9, 2008. 21 For a more detailed analysis of US policy for oil security in light of modern threats, see Lawrence J. Korb and Ian Moss, Moving Beyond the Carter Doctrine. The Century Foundation, July 24, 2008. 22 Korb and Moss, op cit. 23 Send In The Marines: A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept To Meet An Uncertain Security Environment. Headquarters: US Marine Corps, 2008: 15. www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/thelongwarsendinthemarines.pdf. 24 Korb and Moss, op. cit. 25 Korb and Moss, op. cit. 26 Derek S. Reveron, ed., Shaping the Security Environment. Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2007: 3–4. www.nwc. navy.mil/press/newportpapers/newportpapers.aspx. 27 Korb and Moss, op. cit. 28 Steven A. Emerson, “Regional Security Initiative: Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa,” in Derek S. Reveron, ed., Shaping the Security Environment. Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2007: 79–80. http://www.nwc. navy.mil/press/newportpapers/newportpapers.aspx. 29 Korb and Moss, op. cit. 30 United Nations Development Programme. Arab Human Development Report, 2002, p. 1. 31 Taghreed El-Khodary, “Life in Gaza Today,” The Middle East Bulletin, June 12, 2008. http://middleeastprogress. org/2008/06/12/. 32 El-Khodary, op. cit. 33 US Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism, April 30, 2008. www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm 34 Pew Global Attitudes Survey. A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World, July 24, 2007. http://pewglobal.org/ reports/display.php?ReportID=257. 35 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, op. cit. 36 Isabel Kershner, “Israelis Press Plan to Block the Division of Jerusalem,” The New York Times, November 15, 2007.

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37 “Haniya urges Conference Boycott,” BBC News, October 6, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 7031651.stm. 38 Brian Katulis and Mara Rudman, “Reviving U.S. Leadership in the Middle East,” The Middle East Bulletin, June 19, 2008. http://middleeastprogress.org/2008/06/reviving-us-leadership-in-the-middle-east/. 39 Frederic C. Hof, “Neglected Diplomacy,” The Middle East Bulletin, May 5, 2008. http://middleeastprogress.org/ 2008/05/05/. 40 Marwan Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008. 41 United Nations Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report, 2004, p. 1. 42 United Nations Human Development Programme, p. 3. 43 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom. New York: W. W. Norton, 2003: 260. 44 Zakaria, op. cit.: 260. 45 United Nations Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report, 2002. p. 3. 46 Maj (USA) Brian A. Payne, Redefining the Global War on Terrorism: Developing a Clear Picture of a Fuzzy Objective. Ft. Leavanworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2005: 14. 47 Payne, op. cit.: 13. 48 Payne, op. cit.: 13. 49 Sewall, op. cit.: 34. 50 Gayle E. Smith, In Search of Sustainable Security. Center for American Progress, June 2008: 5. 51 Smith, op. cit.: 17. 52 The White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. February 2006: 9. 53 Zakaria, op. cit.: 120. 54 Zakaria, op. cit.: 261. 55 Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2007: vi. 56 Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, p. 1. 57 Smith, op. cit.: 19. 58 Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, p. 29. 59 Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly, The Frontline Country Team. The American Enterprise Institute, June 2008. 60 Excerpts of this report appear in “Embassies as Command Posts in the War on Terror,” Foreign Service Journal, March 2007: 53–60.

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The US foreign aid policy to the Middle East Hilton L. Root, Yan Li, and Kanishka Balasuriya

The political economy of US assistance to the MENA region The double curse With 63 percent of the world’s proven petroleum resources and 37 percent of its natural gas, it seems highly ironic that the Middle East and North African (MENA) region is also the largest recipient of US foreign aid. In addition to fossil fuels, the region is also well endowed with many other minerals and plants providing it with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) twice as high as the average of developing countries, higher even than former socialist transition economies. Poverty is relatively low in MENA: only 1.6 percent of its population earns less than $1 per capita a day. Infrastructure is relatively well developed: 88 percent of its population have access to improved water sources, and 91 percent to electricity.1 From the perspective of poverty reduction, MENA’s needs for economic assistance from the developed world are by no means as pressing as those of poorer regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, yet MENA is the largest recipient of US foreign assistance since 1973. In 2006, the region received 39 percent of US foreign aid. In this chapter, we will argue that two types of strategic interests essential to the welfare of the US population are prevalent in the region and may be the explanation for the showering of assistance in this unlikely location. First, the US and its principal trading partners have grown ever more dependent on fossil fuels to keep their economies running. Second, a strong bias exists in US strategic thinking that favors balance of power politics to maintain peace. This means the US is committed to ensuring relative military parity between Israel and its hostile neighbors. Unfortunately, there are unforeseen social and political consequences of US aid that may have long-term effects for US security. Natural resources, we know, not only bring good fortune, but have negative side-effects, sometimes known as the resource curse or “Dutch disease.” In this chapter, we will argue that abundant allocations of US aid have political consequences akin to the economic consequences of the resource curse. Hence, MENA suffers a double curse. We will refer to these consequences as the “alliance curse.” In this chapter, we will suggest that a perverse relationship exists between the level of US assistance and the degree of autocratic control in the region. Aid can facilitate autocratic control by serving as a discretionary fund for the recipient country’s leadership. Such external sources of funding, we argue, will then prevent the emergence of democratic accountability. Nevertheless, it may be easier for the US to use foreign aid as a means to gain political leverage over an autocratic regime than over a democratic one. Unlike democratic leaders who tend to rely on democratic means to resolve internal conflicts, autocratic leaders tend to rely on foreign assistance, especially foreign military assistance, to resolve internal conflicts.

An overview of US foreign aid to MENA While overall US foreign aid has declined since the early 1970s (Figure 4.1), MENA’s share of total US foreign aid took a sharp rise following the Yom Kippur war between Arab–Israeli

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$60,000

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Figure 4.1 Total US economic and military assistance (in millions constant 2006 US$) Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook 2006). 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30%

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Figure 4.2 US economic and military assistance by region Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook 2006).

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Figure 4.3 Total US aid per capita (US$) Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook 2006, US Census Bureau, and the authors’ calculation).

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H. Root, Y. Li, and D. Balasuriya

forces, and peaked in the late 1970s, constituting nearly 60 percent of total US overseas assistance. The aid level to the region has gone down but still constitutes about 40 percent of total overseas assistance (Figure 4.2). At a per capita level, US assistance to the MENA region has far exceeded what is distributed to the rest of the world (Figure 4.3). The MENA region has received more per capita support than other regions yet governance- or poverty-related assistance plays a smaller role than in other parts of the world. Outside the Middle East, US assistance programs generally included support for public sector reforms, democracy, and governance. Despite the high degree of US involvement and support for regimes such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority, essential public sector reforms did not receive priority in US assistance programs.2 The bulk of aid to the Middle East is distributed under the “Economic Support Fund” (ESF)—formerly known as “Security Supporting Assistance”—allocated primarily towards achieving the US’s strategic interests (Tarnoff and Nowels 2004). Figure 4.4 illustrates the different composition of the US’s aid for MENA compared with other regions. During the last thirty years of the twentieth century, US military assistance has dominated economic assistance to the MENA region (Figure 4.5).

Non-MENA

Economic Support Fund (ESF) 9% Military Assistance 12%

MENA

Economic Support Fund (ESF) 11%

Other (Developmental, Health, Food, Humanitarian) 28%

Military Assistance 61%

Other (Developmental, Health, Food, Humanitarian) 79 %

Figure 4.4 US aid composition (FY2006) Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook 2006). $ 20,000

100 % 90%

$ 16,000

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Figure 4.5 Composition of US assistance to MENA (in million constant 2006 dollars) Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook 2006).

1986

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A social, economic and geopolitical analysis of MENA as the primary recipient of US foreign aid A primary theme for the allocation of US aid is the promotion of global democracy. Democracy promotion has been a pillar of US foreign policy since the time of Woodrow Wilson and has been championed by most subsequent US administrations as a primary objective of US foreign policy (Goldstone et al 2008). Yet, MENA, the largest recipient of US foreign aid since 1973, has been and remains more autocratic than the rest of the world (Figure 4.6). When we consider the perspective of social development measured by the human development index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the region’s development prospects appear even more somber.3 Despite its status as a middle-income region, MENA features some of the weakest scores on human development in the world. For instance, the level of female education in MENA is on par with that of sub-Saharan Africa, and is much behind the rest of the world (Figure 4.7). Especially disconcerting is the status of the region’s women, who perform far worse than men on all education indicators. Even in Morocco, where women have made important strides towards confronting tradition, the illiteracy rate among women is still estimated to be 42 percent in urban areas and 82 percent in rural areas. Income equality is another criterion of development in which MENA lags other regions (Figure 4.8). It is among the most unequal places in the world. Income inequality exists both within countries and between countries in the region. This inequality reflects the lack of both regional integration and social cohesion within countries and is a source of domestic and regional instability. Social bifurcation adds to risks of domestic instability, which in turn justifies the need for authoritarian governance. The region clearly lacks suitable policies to alter the fundamentally unequal endowments of its populations. Economic growth rates are among the most stagnant in the world. During the 1980s, the region as a whole experienced negative growth in per capita income, although Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia were notable exceptions. While per capita incomes began rising in the 1990s, this increase was markedly slower than that experienced by Latin America and South Asia, not to mention East Asia (Noland and Pack 2004). Income inequality is one of the reasons democracy has faltered in the region as social relations are predicated on the economic dependency of the majority. Regional governments have generally been unresponsive to the inadequate social assets of their populations. “Free resources,” in the form of either natural endowments or aid transfers,

6

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-6 -8 -10 Figure 4.6 Average polity score (1950–2004) Source: Polity IV and the authors’ calculation.

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H. Root, Y. Li, and D. Balasuriya a) Average Years of Schooling

b) Percentage of Higher Education

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Figure 4.7 Regional comparisons of education conditions Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (2007). Notes: Adv: Advanced economies; Asia: Developing Asia; CEE: Central and Eastern Europe; CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States; LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA: Middle East and North Africa; NIEs: Newly industrialized Asian economies; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa

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Figure 4.8 Average of country Gini coefficient by region Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (2007). Note: Country coverage and years shown are limited to maintain constant country coverage.

may have reduced the pressure for regime modernization, reducing the imperative for sitting governments to develop accountability mechanisms to their own people. Natural resource endowments generate rents to incumbent regimes that have no substitute such that whoever is enjoying them would make significant investments to protect their entitlements. Unearned endowments can be enjoyed by any group that controls the repressive apparatus of the state and do not depend on the effectiveness of institutions, business models or investment strategies. Thus, the incentives to protect existing sources of entitlement rather than creating new sources of wealth may partly explain the relative stagnation of the region’s growth. As most government revenues are derived from the natural resource sectors, there has been little incentive to equip the population with the skills needed to succeed in the global economy. Moreover, most economic activities are state controlled or depend on political access.

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Military in politics and large governments The military plays a prominent role in the MENA region (Figure 4.9). Both domestic rent protection and regional conflict resolution call for strong military support. Military expenditures come at the expense of the budgets for human and social development, trapping the region further into a low-growth path. Public sector employment as a proportion of total employment is higher in MENA than in other regions. Government constitutes more than 10 percent of total employment. As an employer of last resort, the government has considerable leverage over the welfare of the population, but a bloated civil service prevents effective government. Indiscriminate hiring weakens civil service discipline and impedes the delivery of public services, undermining policy credibility. Information asymmetry is a means of exercising and maintaining power. Power, control, and information are highly concentrated in the executive, which produces deep structural inefficiencies in the performance of public administration. Security attained via central control becomes more important than good governance in building a strong effective state. The gap between administrative performance and people’s expectations causes Middle Easterners to “perceive their public institutions as corrupt and oppressive entities that only serve their political masters” (Kalantari 2005).

Military personnel (% of total labor force)

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Figure 4.9 Military personnel as percentage of total labor force Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2008). $45

First major fighting in Iran-lraq War $40

Operation Desert Storm began

$35 $30

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Figure 4.10 Historical crude oil price 1970–2002 (in nominal dollars per barrel) Source: 1970–1995 was originally published by the Department of Energy’s Office of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Analysis Division. Updates for 1995–2002 are from the US Energy Information Administration.

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This impression is compounded by the absence of developmental administrative practices. Co-ordinated efforts at building up a viable economy by incorporating multiple stakeholders matter less than appealing to militant nationalism. For example, it is unlikely to find East Asian-style business councils that improve the co-ordination of public and private sectors. There is little commitment to wealth sharing as a means to reduce social tensions. Without dividends to economic growth to distribute, regional leaders may have to be even more responsive to a resurgent nationalism, stoking the population’s hostility to an independent Zionist state on what is considered to be Arab territory. Initially, US foreign policy kept an arm’s length distance from the state of Israel providing it with limited assistance before 1973. But US priorities changed dramatically after the Yom Kippur war when political uncertainty and conflict in the MENA region had a powerful inflationary impact on the world economy.4 Until the recent Iraq war, every military crisis in the MENA region resulted in significant upward price shocks to the world’s energy market (Figure 4.10). Foreign aid as an insurance premium on the oil price With 55 percent of the world’s crude oil reserves, the Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) accounted for only 28 percent of the world’s crude oil supply in 2006, up from its lowest point of around 20 percent in the mid-1980s, and down from its peak around 38 percent in the mid-1970s. The Gulf’s crude oil supply plays a crucial role on the world’s energy price. The region’s price-setting power is further enhanced by its controlling share, between 55 and 68 percent, of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which contributes 44 percent of the world’s crude oil supply today. At its peak in the 1970s, OPEC supplied more than half of the world’s crude oil (Figure 4.11). Into the twenty-first century, OPEC’s price-setting power is weakened by Russia and some African up and coming oil-producing countries. US imports of crude oil have risen sharply since the early 1970s from 1.3 million barrels per day in 1970 to 6.6 million barrels per day in 1977 (Figure 4.12). In the 1990s, about 20 percent of US gross crude oil imports were from the Persian Gulf. In 2006, US imported, on average, 10.1 million barrels per day in total, of which 17 percent was from the Gulf. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is more dependent on the Gulf’s supply, sourcing 31 percent of its net crude oil imports from the region.

80%

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Figure 4.11 Concentration of world crude oil production Source: US Energy Information Administration and the authors’ calculation.

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Figure 4.12 US foreign aid to MENA (in millions constant 2006 US$) and crude oil imports (in million barrels) Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook 2006 and US Energy Information Administration).

The Arab–Israeli war of 1973 and the subsequent oil price hike resulting from the OPEC oil embargo along with growing demand from the industrialized countries had greatly increased the economic risk for the United States. From this point on, US foreign aid policy became an integral part of its economic policy. The Arab–Israeli war of 1973 was the event that convinced US policymakers that political stability in MENA could directly influence global economic security. US aid to MENA hence took a sharp rise in response to the rising influence of the region over the world economy (Figure 4.12). If all US aid to MENA were to be treated as an insurance premium for keeping oil prices stable, the “hidden cost premium” on the total US net oil imports5 would be 100–200 percent before the Arab–Israeli war, falling to 20–60 percent in the 1970s after the crisis, falling again to between 10 and 30 percent in the 1980s and the 1990s, and again to barely 10 percent today.6 This drastic reduction in the hidden cost premium came hand in hand with a drastic increase in US total assistance to the MENA region. Thus, this policy can be perceived by US policymakers as a contributor to relative price stability at lower cost to American taxpayers over time. But this policy inevitably incurs other costs of a political economy nature that have long-term implications for US security. Balance of power US policy reflects the recognition that an almost inelastic demand for conflict exists among Arab populations. This is because Arab populations side predominately with the Palestinians against the Jewish population of the region. In a 2007 PEW Global Attitude Survey, nine out of ten Egyptians, Jordanians, Moroccans, and Kuwaitis expressed sympathy only for the Arab side of the dispute. American public opinion takes a contrasting view. More than four-to-one (49 percent against 11 percent) Americans say that they sympathize only with Israel rather than only with Palestinians, a balance held largely unchanged for years. While the non-Arab world believes a way can be found for Israel and Palestinian rights to co-exist, the outlook among the Arab populations within MENA is less friendly to the well-being of the Israeli state. More than seven out of ten Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians, and Kuwaitis believe “the rights and needs of the Palestinian people cannot be taken care of as long as the state of Israel exists” (PEW 2007). As a strong bias exists in US strategic thinking that favors balance of power politics to maintain peace, US policymakers concluded that a preponderance of force on one side or the other could precipitate further conflicts creating instability in energy markets, and adversely

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H. Root, Y. Li, and D. Balasuriya 100 % 90 % 80 %

Israel 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 %

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Figure 4.13 Percentage of US military assistance to Israel and balance MENA Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook 2006).

affecting the industrial economies. From that time onward, US policymakers made military parity between Arabs and Israelis (Figure 4.13) a priority of US foreign policy.7

The alliance curse Contrary to the image of the US as a champion of global democracy, US assistance to MENA peaked during the region’s most autocratic era (Figure 4.14). Egypt and Jordan, the two largest recipients of US assistance in the MENA region after Israel, are both autocracies. US assistance to both countries peaked as they became more autocratic (Figure 4.15). Instead of embracing the idea that Arab leaders must be accountable for their own populations, the US extended support to leaders who are estranged from their societies and who employ repression and harsh security measures. Fiscal deficits funded by loans from international lenders, external assistance or oil enabled sitting regimes to postpone or ignore governance reforms. The deficits caused economic conditions to deteriorate, increasing the dependency on external assistance, and making the region more prone to crisis. Often, as such funds constitute a payment to the leadership of the recipient country to deliver on the donating country’s strategic interests, a commitment is lacking from the leadership to effect social or institutional reforms beneficial to the receiving country. Such an external source of funding could stymie the development of democratic institutions within the country because the leadership is not beholden to popular support to stay in power. In effect, this aid can become a source of discretionary funds for the recipient country’s leadership. The leadership can use the external revenue to provide private goods to “buy” the political support they need. The more external support that is allotted to autocratic allies, the easier it becomes to exclude the many from sharing in power, diminishing prospects for reforms and a more inclusive, democratic orientation. The authoritarian status quo thus receives a boost from the infusion of donor funds. Historically, when anti-Western governments such as those in Algeria and Lebanon were expected to prevail at the polls, the United States and other Western allies undermined democratic processes. US aid has helped autocrats in Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to remain in power, which only lends credence to Islamist rhetoric. In June 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told a large audience at the American University in Cairo, “For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the

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Figure 4.14 US aid to MENA (in millions 2006 constant US$) and the region’s polity score (1950–2006) Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook 2006 and Polity IV).

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Figure 4.15 Two largest recipients of US assistance in MENA (excluding Israel) Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook 2006 and Polity IV).

expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East … Now we are taking a different course.” When Rice returned in February 2006, many of the democracy advocates she inspired were under investigation by the secret police, and others were in jail. In 2005, pressure from Washington led Egyptian leader Mubarak to promise multiparty elections. Democracy activism flourished, the media blossomed, and demonstrations were frequent. But when it became clear that the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood would win a large block of seats in parliament, the regime changed course, harassing voters, closing polling stations, imprisoning political opponents, and the democracy movement ended up as “a hollow exercise.” Ayman Nour, a lawyer who was second to Mubarak in the presidential vote, was rewarded with a five-year prison sentence for challenging the dictator. First propped up by Washington, Nour, like so many others who spoke out, was ultimately dropped.8 The democracy agenda quickly faded from subsequent US diplomatic exchanges with Egyptian leaders. The perception that rights for military bases and cheap resources are acquired by the West from friendly tyrants nourishes extremism and disillusionment among those countries’ citizens. A long history of aiding autocrats, who failed to promote self-governance, while disregarding all democratic processes and values, is one reason that America today finds itself confronting indignant populations across the Middle East. Why is there such a misalignment between US rhetoric that favors self-governance and democracy and actual practices that bolster incumbent

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autocrats? When formulating foreign policy, incumbent US politicians need not look beyond how their domestic audience values the consequences of their actions. Their ratings do best domestically when they are seen as effective in gaining policy compliance from foreign leaders. Poor governance in client regimes rarely receives the attention of the US domestic audience because domestic priorities, primarily security, are more effectively addressed when authority emanates from the executive. If a president believes or convinces Americans that their wellbeing or security is at stake, the pliability of a foreign partner will matter more than its popularity among its own citizens. Because fewer concessions can be made by democratic recipients of aid, the motivations of democratically elected leaders at home are more difficult to align with those of democratically elected leaders overseas. Outsiders seeking influence in the region find it cost-effective to back autocratic leaders who built support for their regime by selectively distributing aid to ensure that the well-being of an influential few depends on connections to the regime. The external assistance that can still make a key difference in securing an autocrat’s hold on power would only marginally improve the fortunes of a democratic leader, who depends on broad-based support. The very exclusivity of autocratic regime constituents makes them targets for alliance building by wealthy democracies. Enriching a handful of influential families is the best and easiest way to ensure the political loyalty of such governments. This regularity of Middle Eastern politics is generally not the result of US machinations. But US policymakers have learned to manipulate local politics to keep autocratic regimes in power and be assured of dependable allies when America needs favors such as military bases, UN votes, or scarce natural resources. Ensnaring foreign elites in a web of entitlements that secure their loyalty and dependency is a proven way to gain the policy concessions that Americans covet. In a democracy, leaders depend on public support to stay in power. Therefore, the interests of the leadership will coincide with those of the constituents, and their best chance of political survival depends on their ability to provide public goods to satisfy the needs of the general population. However, access to discretionary funds offers leadership the option of “buying” loyalty instead. This can have a crippling effect on democratic institutions (Mesquita and Root 2000). If the leadership is able to draw on an external source of funding (such as political foreign aid) to secure its hold on power, it depends less on public legitimacy, therefore, is less sensitive to public needs. This will break the accountability link between the regime and the general population, sustaining an authoritarian instead of a democratic orientation.

Lessons and unforeseen consequences of the US foreign aid policy to the MENA region Thus the region is subject to an alliance curse in which an authoritarian dictatorship is actually better suited to fulfill the strategic interests of a donor country (Root 2008). During the cold war and the oil crisis, the US funneled huge amounts of foreign aid to the MENA region to safeguard its strategic interests. An enormous bad governance overhang in client regimes results from these alliances with leaders of small winning coalitions in the Middle East. This manipulation of MENA political vulnerabilities comes at a price. Accommodating odious regimes causes general disillusionment if not the outright hostility of the population to US motives, which reduces options for future co-operation and creates many vulnerabilities in the long run that can be exploited by extremists. As noted, authoritarian regimes are better able to comply with US interests than regimes that must seek popular support before delivering on US goals. This creates a situation in which US strategic interests both demand and engender partnerships with autocrats. Unfortunately, foreign aid driven by the strategic considerations of the donor country is not necessarily beneficial to the recipient country. Although such “bribes” could be quite effective in achieving the strategic goals of the donor country, the stated goals, democracy promotion or economic development, are

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often frustrated, and the recipient regime does not feel accountable to remedy deficits in domestic governance or inequities in the distribution of services. The donor easily overlooks these lapses as its focus is achieving its strategic goals. Also, as the funding does not come out of the pockets of citizens, the recipient leaders do not face domestic pressure to achieve such goals either. Therefore, with no compelling reason to pursue stated goals such as democracy and economic development, such aid becomes a discretionary fund for the recipient country’s leadership. Although dictatorial regimes can be useful allies who can sustain the US’s strategic interests in the short run, there are hidden costs to sustaining unpopular autocracies in the long term. The perceived duplicity of the US—advocacy of democracy on one hand while bolstering harsh, dictatorial regimes on the other—often creates deep-seated animosity among the population toward the US. Public hostility against local dictators takes an anti-American tone. In a poll for the PEW Global Attitude Survey, the US image is tarnished in most Muslim countries in the Middle East and Asia, contrasting with the generally favorable or neutral views held in the rest of the world. More than three in four Palestinians, Egyptians, and Jordanians express unfavorable opinions about the US. After the cold war, Islamists were generally the only civil society or non-state alternatives to the extreme centralization of sitting pro-Western regimes. Fear of Islamic fundamentalists made the Western governments receptive to the claims of the region’s sitting autocrats that they alone could stem the tide of civil unrest and prevent revolutionary chaos that would bring anti-Western factions to power. Playing on US national security fears allows autocratic partners to dictate their interests to the United States. These dynamics are at the root of many of the problems faced by the US in the MENA region—including the terrorist threats. Unfortunately, by continuing to funnel aid to prop up compliant dictatorial regimes, animosity towards the US is nurtured. A legacy of resentment and bitterness results and makes it likely that reformist leaders will be compelled to prove themselves through anti-American postures. Democracy itself suffers a setback: being interpreted as too American, it falls out of favor. These outcomes occur because democratic idealism blinds us to a very inconvenient reality: the private incentives of democratically elected US politicians align with the private incentives of autocrats overseas. The results are alliances that sustain small winning-coalition systems facilitated by the assistance that America gives to their police and armed forces. US policymakers conceive foreign aid as a way of ensuring US security and economic interests by contributing to the stability of the region. But in the end, by ignoring the link between social and political development, it may have compromised both US security and the long-term stability of the MENA region.

Notes 1 World Bank Millennium Development Goals website: http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2& menuId=LNAV01REGSUB4 (accessed February 25, 2009). 2 The World Bank has been more active in comparison with other donors in governance-related initiatives but, like bilateral US programs, it is less active in governance-related assistance than in other parts of the world. The World Bank has concentrated on fiscal management, procurement, and civil service reform. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been active in agriculture, health, education, and public works. Overall, US engagement focuses on security, the Europeans on fiscal reforms. The US displayed limited interest in reform before 2002. 3 Country coverage and years shown are limited to maintain constant country coverage. 4 On October 17, 1973, the members of Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC, consisting of the Arab members of OPEC plus Egypt and Syria) agreed to suspend oil to nations that had supported Israel in its conflict with Syria and Egypt (the United States, its allies in Western Europe, and Japan). 5 We have used the US total oil imports, instead of imports from the MENA region, as the basis for the unit hidden cost calculation because of the price setting power the Gulf has had for a large part of the twentieth century. 6 Data source for the analysis:  US assistance to MENA from US Overseas Loans and Grants (USAID Greenbook 2006).  Average international crude oil import costs from the International Energy Agency.  Volume of US crude oil imports and US Energy Information Administration.

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7 Richard Nixon’s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strongly believed in balance of power politics to reduce the likelihood of war. 8 Rice canceled a visit to Egypt in 2005 to protest at the detainment of Nour.

References Goldstone, Jack, Garber, Larry et al. (2008). Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research. National Research Council. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. IMF World Economic Outlook (2007). Globalization and Inequality, Chapter 4, October, 2007. Kalantari, Behrooz (2005). “Eastern Public Management: A Cultural Approach to Development Administration.” Public Organization Review 5(2): 125–38. Marshall, Monty and Jaggers, Keith (2007). “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2004.” Center for Global Policy, School of Public Policy, George Mason University, October 24, 2007. Available from www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2006.pdf (accessed October 28, 2008). Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de and Root, Hilton L. (2000). Governing for Prosperity. New Haven: Yale University Press. Noland, Marcus and Pack, Howard (2004). “Islam, Globalization, and Economic Performance in the Middle East.” SAIS Review XXIV(2). Root, Hilton L. (2008). Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Tarnoff, Curt and Nowels, Larry (2004). “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs and Policy.” CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. USAID Greenbook. “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations.” Available from http:// qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/index.html (accessed October 28, 2008). US Energy Information Administration. “Official Energy Statistics from the US Government.” Available from www. eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/info_glance/petroleum.html (accessed October 28, 2008). World Bank (2008). The World Development Indicators. Book and CD.

5

US relations with international organizations Rodrigo Tavares and Michael Schulz

Introduction At the beginning of the twentieth century, President Woodrow Wilson attempted to put the United States and the world on a new footing—one that would prevent future wars—and devised a plan that included the promotion of collective security through international organizations. One century later, President George W. Bush had similar strategic interests, but he shaped a plan with a proclivity to eschew international organizations, namely the United Nations. In the present context, in which global relations have reached an unprecedented magnitude of institutionalization, the United States has often not resisted the temptation of capitalizing on its superpower status by acting unilaterally. Building on this dichotomy, this chapter assesses how US policies on the Middle East have been influenced by international organizations. We analyze both the organizations with which the US has a direct formal relation, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but also an indirect relation, as in the cases of the League of Arab States (LAS), Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Organization of Arab Petroleum and Economic Cooperation (OAPEC), Organization for Petroleum and Economic Cooperation (OPEC), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), or the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The two overarching questions are hence:  In what way have the relations between the US and international organizations changed US policies in the Middle East, including Afghanistan and Iraq?  What impact have international organizations’ actions and policies had on the US stance in the Israel–Palestinian conflict? Our analysis is divided in three parts. First, we provide an overview of the literature and describe the main variables that inform US behavior towards international organizations. Second, we assess the US’s relations with the international organizations operating in the Middle East. Third, we provide a critical overview of the impact that these organizations have on the formulation and implementation of US foreign policy in the region.

Literature The literature on international organizations is fairly comprehensive. The realist tenet underscores that international organizations are created and financed by great powers in order to spread their ideals and values throughout the international system and to solidify their grasp on power. Mearsheimer, for instance, argues that NATO “was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat” (1994/1995: 14) and adds that “cooperation among states has its limits, mainly because it is constrained by the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of cooperation can eliminate” (1994/1995: 9). This position is generally refuted by constructivism which underscores that political institutions

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(including both political organizations and stable/recurring patterns of behavior) influence actors’ behavior by shaping their “values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs” (March and Olsen 1989: 17). Interestingly, a study conducted by Karns and Mingst (1990), which attempted to measure change in America’s use of international organizations as instruments of policy and change in the nature of the constraints imposed by, and the influence of, multilateral bodies on the US, suggested that the international distribution of power did not especially matter—refuting also the realist postulate. In a similar vein, Solingen notes that “US power hardly explains their [regional organizations] emergence and evolution, or why they were able to ‘anchor’, ‘tame’, or coopt would-be hegemons (China in the ARF, Egypt in the League)” (2008: 290). Drawing from a similar paradigm, liberal institutionalism advocates that institutions provide several benefits, namely the promotion of transparency and monitoring, the provision of information about other’s preferences, intentions and behaviors, the establishment of liabilities, the shaping of collective identity and compliance, the lowering of transaction costs, the avoidance of negative outcomes from interdependence, and the creation of mechanisms for policy co-ordination (Keohane 1989; Simmons and Martin 2002). In a seminal article, Abbott and Snidal show that the reasons why states use international organizations as vehicles of cooperation revolve around the centralization of collective activities through supportive administrative apparatus, and on the organizations’ independence, i.e., their ability to act with a degree of autonomy within defined spheres (1998). The literature specifically on the Middle East is almost non-existent. But intuitively, we are led to believe that this general literature provides some pointers on US policies in the region.

US behavior towards international organizations There are a variety of factors that explain US positioning vis-à-vis international organizations. Drawing from Foot, MacFarlane, and Mastanduno (2003), these factors are both internal and external. From a domestic perspective, interest groups play an important role. Indeed, the US is idiosyncratic in this regard, and lobby groups enjoy significant access to Congress and federal institutions. In 2008 alone, approximately 17,100 lobbyists were active, and the total lobbying spending reached $1.6 billion.1 It was Polish-American groups who successfully persuaded the Clinton administration to enlarge NATO in the 1990s. A second domestic factor is the configuration of the US’s political system. Both the Executive and Congress share decisionmaking authority in the realm of foreign policy, and there have been cases where Congress uses foreign policy as an instrument of partisan politics. The rejection in 1998 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the Republicans in the Senate was a means to embarrass President Clinton. The Republican-controlled Senate had the same purpose when it refused to support US participation in the League of Nations on President Wilson’s terms (Patrick 2002: 9). Foreign policy is also shaped by the color of the party in the White House. For instance, former US President Clinton signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shortly before leaving office, but the prospects for ratification were dashed as soon as George W. Bush was inaugurated in 2001. Another important internal factor is centered on the political culture of the US. Culture refers to a set of attitudes and self-perceptions that are so ingrained in society that it can afford to shape foreign policy. American political culture is to a large extent pivoted on the idea of individual liberty. Luck argues that America is also influenced by what he describes as a deeply ingrained sense of American exceptionalism (2003). As far as the external dimension is concerned, Foot, MacFarlane, and Mastanduno (2003) argue that at least four factors might influence US behavior towards multilateral organizations. The first, as discussed before, is centered on the international distribution of material capabilities: international organizations may either be overshadowed by the great powers that can afford to act unilaterally and arbitrarily, or be used to institutionalize the positions of a dominant state (Ikenberry 2000). US foreign policy over the last decade has resembled both,

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seeking for example Organization of American States (OAS) support in Latin America, but castigating the UN when it served as an obstacle to the US ability to take rational, self-interested decisions. The US’s stern opposition to the UN reform on the eve of the UN World Summit (2005) or the country’s declining financial contributions to most organizations (in the late 1990s, it was in arrears to several of them) are paradigmatic. In another example, in 1984–85, the United States refused to abide by the findings of the International Court of Justice that America was violating international law by mining Nicaragua’s harbors. The second important factor is the international normative context—the existence of norms of behavior that shape states’ policies. With globalization and the increasing interdependence between states, unilateral acts are generally restrained and regarded as unsuitable in a context of common interests. Multilateral organizations are the epitome of this international norm. Aware of this constraint, the US has tried to avoid international criticism by constructing international coalitions of allies—as happened with the Iraq invasion of 2003. The coalition of the willing, operating outside the UN frame, proved to be insufficient, and the US was severely criticized internationally, even by citizens of the states that partook in the coalition (e.g., Spain, Italy, or the UK). Nye makes a strong case in the same direction asserting that “military power alone cannot produce the outcomes we want on many of the issues that matter to Americans” (2002). The various aspects of soft power must be part of any effective foreign policy—and multilateralism is essential for the development and maintenance of the attributes of soft power. Learning “to define our national interest to include global interests will be crucial to the longevity of our power and whether others see hegemony as benign or not” (Nye 2002). Third, US behavior may be influenced by the diplomatic efforts of other governments, particularly US allies, who have easier access to the decision-making apparatus. For instance, in 2002, American allies lobbied against US plans to construct a national missile defense system. On his first visit to Europe since winning the presidency, Bush traveled to a handful of European countries and attended a NATO and an EU Summit where European leaders reiterated their concerns with US plans and warned the United States against pushing ahead alone. Finally, US behavior might be shaped by the performance of international organizations, or how that performance is perceived in the United States. In 1984, the United States formally withdrew from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), protesting about the organization’s “excessive politicization, long-term lack of budgetary restraint, and poor management.” Although the United States continued to support UNESCO’s mission to foster international co-operation in education, science, and culture, American policymakers decided that these goals could best be achieved by working outside the UNESCO bureaucracy (Rosenthal 1990). These factors explain American positioning vis-à-vis international organizations. Unlike the popular view, it would be unfair to say that the US has a historical tradition of repudiating multilateralism. In fact, America is a member of hundreds of multilateral international organizations and is party to hundreds of treaties (Patrick 2002: 12). Some of the most prominent organizations today, such as NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), or even the African Union, are dependent on American political or financial support. But given its sole superpower status, several policy options are available to the US—ranging from unilateralism to bilateral arrangements, temporary coalitions, or supranational institutional engagement. The US weights the attraction of these institutions as a means to ensure predictable and legitimate policy orientations against the reduction of its own policy autonomy and ability to use power (Ikenberry 2003). The United States and the United Nations American President Roosevelt saw the United Nations as the crowning achievement of his political career (Moore and Pubantz 2006: 46). But shortly after its foundation, the cold

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war between two Security Council veto powers engendered the operational paralysis of the organization. The only two major exceptions were on Korea and Iraq. The relations between the US and the United Nations—or between the sole great power and the only global multilateral organization mandated to legitimize the use of force—has been strained almost since the inception of the UN. The first major defeat for the United States was Resolution 2758—the admission of the People’s Republic of China and the removal of the Republic of China (Taiwan) against US wishes in 1971. Equally controversial was the General Assembly Resolution 3379 of 1975 equating Zionism with racism, which triggered a major public debate in the United States. Resolution 3379 was eventually negated in 1991 by Resolution 4686, but only after years of increasingly strained relations. As we saw, under the Reagan administration, the US withdrew from UNESCO and began to deliberately withhold its UN dues as an effective tool for asserting US influence in the UN. By far, the US continues to be the state levied most heavily by the UN. As of mid-2008, UN members’ arrears to the Regular Budget reached $1.2 billion, of which the United States alone owed $846 million (68 percent of the regular budget arrears).2 In 1994, the issuing of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) by US President Bill Clinton was another blow to the universal aspirations of the UN. In the follow-up to the disastrous mission in Somalia, the Directive prevented the US from using peacekeeping operations as the centerpiece of its foreign policy. The most recent crisis was, however, over the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which some authors describe as a multiple assault on the foundations and rules of the existing UN-centered world order (Thakur and Sidhu 2006). To accentuate the crisis, shortly after, George Bush appointed John Bolton, one of the most vocal critics of the United Nations, as US ambassador. He was appointed on the eve of the World Summit of 2005—a moment when the UN was in the final negotiating period of dramatic institutional changes. But Bolton’s ballistic behavior turned boldness into flatness, and most of the reforms were dismissed (Traub 2006). Alongside America’s hesitation over the role of the UN, the United States has consistently used its veto power in the Security Council with respect to resolutions condemning the actions of Israel. This has been a major source of friction between the US and the General Assembly where developing and Muslim countries enjoy a preponderant presence. Washington asserts that resolutions condemning Israel are rarely accompanied by measures deploring terrorism against the Jewish state (Lansford 2007). In fact, in June 2005. the United States House of Representatives passed a bill (H.R. 2745) to reduce funds to the UN in half by 2008 if it does not meet certain criteria on the grounds that the UN had become a forum of expression of anti-American and anti-Israeli policies. The bill failed to pass Congress, however. If the UN cannot succeed without strong and constructive US leadership, it is also true that the US “needs the UN to manage and promote a fair international division of labor and burden-sharing arrangements on security as well as development issues” (Luck and Gati 1992: 46). American relations with European organizations As noted by Alfred Grosser, there is no “year zero” in relations between Europe and the United States (1980). The influence of Europe in the creation of the United States of America and the influence of the US in the development of European integration is long-lasting. In fact, “in each important phase of the history of European integration until now the American– European connection has played an important role” (Paemen 2007: 171). But why did the United States opt for multilateral security co-operation with European allies at the onset of the cold war? Haglund argues that first it had to do with the cost–benefit calculation of a country whose leaders understood such co-operation to be required, and not just convenient; and the second “inhered in the kind of country America was imagined to be by foreign policy elites” (Haglund 2003: 221). The contemporary history of the relations between the US and the EU has gone through three main phases.

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In the first phase, covering the first two decades after the end of the Second World War, strong encouragement and support by the US have alternated with some political hesitation over the increasing autonomization of Europe. In the 1940s and 1950s, America created the Marshall Plan to restore stability and economic growth in Europe and strongly supported the first steps towards economic co-operation. For the US, European integration was an effective way to lock in West Germany to the Western sphere, to contain the expansion of communism, and to stimulate the creation of a large market for American goods. The creation of NATO in 1949 further consolidated the transatlantic linkage. But the first smoke of tension appeared with the adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1962, which threatened economic interests and global market liberalization. Aware that Europe was gradually drifting away, President Kennedy called for a “Declaration of Interdependence” between Europe and America, adding that the United States anticipated the day when Europe would develop sufficiently to engage in a true partnership of equals. But Europe was more focused on its internal affairs. This second phase of US–EU relations was characterized by some tension and disappointment. In 1966, France withdrew from NATO’s integrated command structure and vetoed UK membership of the European institutions, European governments and public opinion became hostile to the US intervention in Vietnam, and there were divergences over America’s support for anti-communist opposition movements in developing countries (e.g. Nicaragua, Angola). Kissinger still proclaimed 1973 the “year of Europe,” but Europeans were not very touched with the unilateral gesture and dismissed it as an American attempt to increase its influence on European decision making (McGuire and Smith 2008: 21). The only impact that it had was to serve as a catalyst to a stronger European identity, which was reflected in the communiqué at the end of the European Community Summit in 1973, where Europeans noted that the ties between Europe and the US are “mutually beneficial and should be preserved,” but they also asserted that these ties “do not conflict with the determination of the Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity.”3 The current phase of the bilateral relation is marked by the emergence of the EU as a global political power and the gradual autonomization of Europe, even in security issues, from the US. Even if America has perceived Europe as a crucial ally, “this perception was widely but not completed shared in the EU itself, and fed into the key debates about the EU’s appropriate world role that came to characterize much of the 1990s and beyond” (McGuire and Smith 2008: 31). The gradual transformation of the EU into a strong actor in foreign affairs is regarded with uneasiness in the US. The important question is, hence, how to transform an asymmetric partnership of fifty years into a balanced relationship without resorting to political rivalry. Chris Patten, former European Commissioner, has expressed his European stance, saying that he is “not attracted by the idea of aspiring to be America’s global adjutant, obedient acolytes who do more less what we are told, like it or lump it” (2006: 240). In the 1990s, President Clinton attempted to mend the strained relations, and several co-operation agreements were signed, such as the Transatlantic Declaration (1990) and the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) with a Joint Action Plan (1995). But with President’s Bush invasion of Iraq. relations turned sour again. In fact, an analysis of twenty-five core international treaties in security, environment, and human rights reveals that the differences between the EU and the US in their voting patterns are greater than the differences between the EU and either China or Russia. Unlike the EU, the US has either not ratified or not signed up to over half these treaties, including treaties on the abolition of the death penalty, the Kyoto Protocol, the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, elimination and discrimination against women, or the status of refugees (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 313). America’s relations with the EU cannot be disassociated from the relations of both with NATO. Since it was founded in 1949, the Alliance epitomizes the American presence in Europe. It is a multilateral infrastructure that helped in keeping European states together and was instrumental in deterring the USSR. Thus, it is difficult to discern major trends in US–NATO

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relations because, ultimately, the Alliance has always been an expression of American power, and its policy formulation has often reflected America’s policy equations and interests. Indeed, although the US has consistently demanded greater burden sharing by its NATO allies, and both the EU and NATO were able to negotiate successfully the “Berlin Plus” agreement in 2002, which allowed the EU to draw on some of NATO’s military assets in its own peacekeeping operations, the US “has not always supported an institutional or operational expression (at the EU level of elsewhere) of such increased European capabilities” (Smith 2004: 201). The wide capability gap between the United States and its NATO allies is indeed a reflection of America’s prominence inside the Alliance. The US is currently superior to any combination of its European allies in its ability to plan, conduct, and sustain theater-wide expeditionary operations. The gap is hence an aggregate of many gaps—in technology, investment, and procurement—that add up to US superiority (Yost 2003). Yet, since its creation, NATO has faced, and been able to survive, various crises sparked by major breaches of opinion between the United States and the rest of the Alliance members. Recently, NATO was hit by major crises over whether to provide defensive measures to protect Turkey in the event that Iraq decided to attack, or over George Bush’s decision to act without NATO to retaliate for the 9/11 strikes. But the past is also prolific in crises in transatlanticism. These include the 1956 Suez Canal crisis; the French withdrawal from NATO integrated military command in 1966; and President Ronald Reagan’s decision to bomb Libya in 1986. The Vietnam War, the Soviet invasions of Afghanistan, Germany’s Ostpolitik, or the US military interventions in Grenada and Panama have also reflected serious political differences. But despite these political challenges, NATO is still dependent on America’s military assets and political support to assist the Alliance in transforming itself from being a twentiethcentury collective security provider in Europe to becoming one of the twenty-first-century peace and security providers in the world. American relations with Arab organizations The United States enjoys a varying degree of closeness with the Middle Eastern organizations— such as LAS, OIC, OAPEC, OPEC, GCC, and AMU—and therefore it would be unfair to expect America’s foreign policy to be at odds with the ambitions and interests of these mostly Arab or Muslim organizations. Whereas with some organizations, namely the Arab League or the AMU, diplomatic contacts are erratic and distant, with others, the US enjoys some degree of political common ground and exchange. The relations with the Arab League have been cold ever since the League was founded in 1945. In 1948, whereas the US reacted to the Israeli declaration of independence by immediately recognizing it, the League intervened militarily to reverse it. Contingents from Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, and Syria, as well as a small number of troops from Saudi Arabia and Yemen fought under the League’s umbrella. The intervening forces peaked at around 25,000 troops with the majority being drawn from the Egyptian army (around 10,000). The Arab League also sponsored and supported the Arab Liberation Army, a military corps made up of volunteers coming from different Arab countries. But the 9/11 attacks had an effect not only on the US but also on the Arab world, and the League is today more resigned to accepting and dealing with Israel as long as Palestine independence is part of the political menu. As noted by Kalpakian, although the latest League document, the Tunis Declaration, “includes the usual litany of Arab identity-driven political demands from Israel and the United States, these demands are a far cry from the Khartoum summit’s pronounced hostility to the Western world” (2007: 227). Not surprisingly then, the Arab League Secretary General has even ventilated the idea of increasing co-operation with US–Arab organizations and opening liaison offices in several US states for the Arab League. Despite these deviations, the overarching characteristic of the relationship between the League and the US is still aloofness. The same could be said about the Arab Maghreb Union.

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With the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an institution that groups fifty-seven member states, the US is gradually attempting to forge diplomatic links. In June 2007, President Bush announced that the US would establish, for the first time, an envoy to the OIC in order to “listen to and learn from representatives from Muslim states” and to “share with them America’s views and values.” This is the result of the Bush administration’s endeavor to subdue the negative perceptions of the US in Muslim countries. Indeed, on several other occasions, the United States took the initiative to underline the common ground between America’s policies and the OIC. For instance, in 2005, the White House issued a statement, in the follow-up to an OIC Summit, welcoming the “valuable statements from the OIC regarding the common fight against terrorism and extremism” and praising “the OIC for the support it extends to Iraq as it completes its transitional political process and elects a full term government under its new democratic constitution.”4 With the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a body formed in May 1981 and composed of key American allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain, the US enjoys easy informal access to its decision-making structures. Actually, the formation of the GCC was suggested by the US as a strategy to curb the spread of fundamentalism in the wake of the Islamic revolution of 1979. The proposal was welcomed by the Gulf states, which were increasingly willing to host US forces for their own protection against two aggressive regional powers—Iran and Baa’thist Iraq (Marr 2008: 14). Even today, the GCC is in tune with America’s intentions to contain Iran. For instance, in April 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice attended a Council meeting to press for support against Iran’s nuclear program. In September, the Council condemned Iran for opening offices on the disputed Tunb islands in the Gulf, which are claimed by the United Arab Emirates with broad Arab backing. Yet, in 2006, the GCC announced plans to start the construction of its own nuclear plants; a plan strongly supported by Russian President Putin who visited the region and promised to assist the GCC in this endeavor. According to Russell, this might epitomize a new dynamic and the region might hence stand “on the brink of an era of strategic insecurity” (2008: 36). But the organization that can afford to have a larger impact on the United States is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Since its inception in 1960, OPEC has drastically altered not only the petroleum production industry and its market, but also the geopolitical economies of the world. The political power of the organization was mostly discernible during the 1973 oil embargo, causing price hikes and inflation rises in the United States. Today, as the largest consumer of oil in the world, the United States is still influenced by the supply and market policies of OPEC countries.

The impact of international institutions on US Middle Eastern policies As a superpower, the US has the capacity to formulate its own strategies and policies for the Middle East—a region that it regards as of vital geopolitical importance. Its interests in the region are varied. First, the US aims to guarantee the steady supply of energy from the oilproducing countries. Second, it supports Israel as a strategy to counter Arab nationalism and radicalism, a trend that became more salient in the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s (Surratt 2005), But if during the cold war, the US also aimed at using the Middle East as a containment theater, after the cold war, the region continued to be of strategic importance, primarily due to the ongoing policy of global counterterrorism. Indeed, in order to enhance its political capital in the region, the US has signed arms deals, free trade agreements, and cultivated diplomatic relations with moderate Arab states. Yet, in an institutionalized global order, America’s interests often stumble on international organizations’ policies. Below is an analytical and historical inventory of the impact these international organizations had on US policies for the Middle East.

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The influence of the United Nations The UN has been involved in the Middle East since it was established in 1945 and became involved specifically with the Israeli–Palestinian question one year later. But as a strongly intergovernmental organization, the capacity of the UN was conditioned by the will of its member states—first the permanent Security Council members, but also the two superpowers (during the cold war). Yet, the global body was still able to play an important role in several crises that hit the Middle East, such as the Suez crisis of 1956, the June/Six-Day war of 1967, as well as the Yom Kippur/October war of 1973, namely through the stationing of UN forces. Since the first operation deployed in the region—the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) of 1948—composed of military observers with a mandate to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, and prevent isolated incidents from escalating, the UN has deployed nine missions in total and three are currently active (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force/UNDOF in Syria; United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon/UNIFIL; and the original UNTSO). The UN room for maneuver in the region and the capacity to influence US policies is also very much conditioned by the way it is regarded by the local major players. Israel has an inclination towards skepticism of the UN, and several episodes might have accentuated the idea that the UN was biased towards the Arab positions. The first is the General Assembly’s decision to equate Zionism with racism in 1975. The last was probably an incident in 2001, when three Israeli soldiers were kidnapped by Hezbollah across the UN “blue line,” a moment videotaped by UNIFIL soldiers and not properly reported either to the UN or to Israel. The Arab states have a more sympathetic position over the UN. Even if in the 1970s they blocked an attempt to deploy a UN peacekeeping force at the Egyptian–Israeli border, because of the much criticized Egyptian participation in the Camp David Accords,5 more recently they have lobbied on different occasions in favor of UN deployment in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. They did so for the first time in the follow-up to the 1994 Hebron massacre when an Israeli settler killed twenty-nine Palestinians in the Ibrahimi mosque. The US and Israel refused to allow UN forces to be established in Palestinian areas, but accepted the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). The second occasion came as a result of the outbreak in 2000 of the Al-Aqsa intifada between Palestinians and Israel. Israel only accepted the formation of a US-led commission, the so-called Mitchell Commission. The third occasion came after Israel re-entered the Palestinian cities on the West Bank, and in particular the city of Jenin. The Palestinians claimed that a massacre had taken place and requested a UN presence. The major force against these requested peacekeeping missions was the alliance between the US and Israel. Given Israel’s increased skepticism of the UN, the US has vetoed the deployments and hence prevailed over the UN. In fact, the most important diplomatic forum through which the UN intervenes in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict—the Quartet—is dominated by the United States. Indeed, the speed of implementation of the roadmap has been utterly dependent on the political will of Washington. Actually, Kofi Annan has been charged with toeing the US line on the Middle East, refusing to visit Iran, and—in an unprecedented move seen by many as a violation of the conditions of the international civil service itself—travelling to Washington to brief the US Congress. Although the UN and the US are not always in tune where the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is concerned, they often share the same view concerning other important issues in the region. There is harmonization of views on the need to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, on the problem of terrorism (even if the strategies to mitigate it might diverge), and on the obligation to ensure that Iran remains a nuclear-free state. Not surprisingly then, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad often accuses the UN of being under the control of big powers such as the US and its allies.6 In Afghanistan, both the US intervention and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were UN sanctioned. The fairly good

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co-operation between the US and the UN is vindicated by the deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in 2002 tasked to provide a wide range of peace-building activities. However, with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, relations turned cold again. As the intervention was not sanctioned by the Security Council, the global body was legally surpassed by America’s unilateralism. Presently, however, even if the intervention is still criticized by some UN member states, the institution itself has been involved with peace building through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) established in 2003. The co-operation between the UN and the US in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan, the Israeli– Palestinian conflict, and in the broader Middle East has revealed two trends. First, when the positions of the US and the UN (or of its member states) are not in tune, the United States has generally considered that the gains from acting unilaterally should prevail over the losses that will result from the lack of international consensus. Second, although the UN has not been able to directly shape American foreign policy towards the Middle East, it has been able to indirectly unveil the limitations of the only superpower. In Iraq and in Afghanistan, US military preponderance has not been leveled by similar capacities in post-war reconstruction. Indeed, these two interventions have showcased the limitations of American power in terms of peace-building policy formulation, ethnic power distribution, and technical assistance in reconstruction. In these cases, the UN has been called upon either to provide the required assistance or to supply the legitimacy that would stop the escalation of international criticism. The influence of NATO and the European Union With the adoption of the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO mutated from a traditional collective defense alliance into an organization devoted to a broad approach to security. Its geographical frame of reference has also expanded from Europe to virtually every region where its resources may be necessary. Such is the case with the Middle East. In 2004, NATO adopted the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which targeted the broader Middle East region. Its aim is: … to enhance security and regional stability through a new transatlantic engagement with the region. This could be achieved by actively promoting NATO’s cooperation with interested countries in the field of security, particularly through practical activities where NATO can add value to develop the ability of countries’ forces to operate with those of the Alliance including by contributing to NATO-led operations, fight against terrorism, stem the flow of WMD materials and illegal trafficking in arms, and improve countries’ capabilities to address common challenges and threats with NATO (para 5). The Initiative has resulted, for instance, in the signing of security agreements with Gulf states (e.g., Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates), which allow the exchange of “classified” security and defense information between NATO and these states. This Initiative is complementary to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, which was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council involving seven non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. In January 2009, NATO’s Secretary General paid a visit to Israel and Jordan, but it resulted in no tangible solution to halt the Israel–Hamas intervention. But when NATO’s role moves from the diplomatic to the military sphere, the situation becomes more challenging. The most significant test case of NATO’s expanded mandate is currently in Afghanistan where the Alliance took charge of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force, an international force of some 50,000 troops that assists the Afghan authorities in extending and exercising its authority across the country, creating the conditions

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for stabilization and reconstruction. Given the distance from Europe, the technical complexity, and the operational environment, ISAF would have been an unimaginable mission just fifteen years ago. Nevertheless, it is still marred with problems: insurgency is spreading, the country is still politically fragmented, and opium production has reached alarming and unprecedented levels. There is still resentment among European leaders that the United States has abandoned its commitments in Afghanistan to focus on an unpopular war in Iraq, leaving to the Europeans the difficult task of pacifying the thorny political situation (Tavares 2009). The second NATO operation in the Middle East is in Iraq, where the Alliance created the NATO Training Mission in Iraq in 2004 mandated to support the development of the country’s security institutions and to co-ordinate the delivery of equipment. To some extent, both interventions personify NATO’s need to intervene out-of-area to prevent possible spillover security problems into-the-area (e.g., terrorism, spread of WMD, migration flows to Europe, energy competition). Indeed, Adler argues that NATO has been part of a “practical transformation into a cooperative-security institution in the 1990s and its subsequent efforts to expand the security community further” (2008: 197). But they also symbolize NATO’s member states’ (namely Germany’s) growing apprehension with the detrimental impact that the US failure in Iraq might have on them. From a US perspective, however, NATO is seen—similarly to the UN—as a provider of legitimacy and technical and political assistance. Under the NATO umbrella, even if the US controls the decision-making apparatus, the United States is able to portray itself as an advocate of multilateralism. The Alliance thus has no direct impact on the formation of America’s foreign policy. Ultimately, it serves only to complement these policies—pointing at the limitations of US unilateral actions (indirect impact)—or it serves to catapult America’s strategies under a more legitimate banner. The role of the EU is quite different. But what has been its influence? Most studies underline the EU’s weak role as a diplomatic actor in the Middle East and particular the Israeli– Palestinian conflict (Tocci 2007; Miller 2006; Dachs and Peters 2005; Hollis 2004; Kemp 2003/4; Blackwill and Stürmer 1997). In Aoun’s words, “a careful assessment of the European record during the 1990s demonstrates that Europe has been of little influence in the monitoring of the Arab–Israeli peace process and the management of the numerous crises that emerged and currently hinder the whole process” (2003: 289). Even if the EU is regarded more as a payer than a player in the Middle East, it is important to take a bird’s-eye look into the most significant EU actions and assess whether they impacted on US policy formulation. The origins of the EU’s foreign policy towards the Middle East may be traced back to the Euro-Arab dialogue developed in the 1970s. The Dialogue was a success story of the emerging European political co-operation, which allowed the European Community to pursue its clear interests in improving trade with the Arab OPEC states in the 1970s. In 1980, this common policy led to the adoption of the Venice Declaration, signed by the nine European Community members. The Declaration “went further than the United States was prepared to go in recognizing the right of the Palestinians to a homeland” (George 1996: 265), and it also used strong language against Israel stressing “the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967” (para 9), and underscored that the European Community is “convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East” (para 9). The Palestinians’ right to selfdetermination has been continuously emphasized ever since, but the EU has never been able to make a strong case for itself in the region. Because, in the eyes of Israel and the US, the EU has a tendency to adopt a pro-Palestinian position (Dachs and Peters 2005; Dieckhoff 2005), the US has been unwilling to let the EU play an important role in the conflict. For instance, at the 1991 Madrid conference, co-sponsored by the US and USSR, the EU was very much sidelined. In reality, the process became an American “high politics” affair, and the EU was only allowed to participate in the multilateral track7 (dealing with economics, environment, refugees, arms control, and water) and only due to its experience with economic integration.

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Nevertheless, in 1993, when Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Norwegian-brokered Declaration of Principle, the EU immediately came to the fore as a provider of economic assistance to the forthcoming Palestinian Authority (PA) that was established in July 1994. During the entire Oslo peace process, which finally collapsed with the eruption of the al-Aqsa intifada, the EU made several attempts to play a more important role as mediator between the parties, thereby challenging the US role (Gomez 2003: 138). On several other occasions, the EU endeavored to have a robust role, but it has never been able to bring Israel to change its policies. Over the last decade, its most substantial soft policy plan to bring about change in the Middle East is the European Neighborhood Policy and its complement, the Union for the Mediterranean, which brings together Israel and a very large number of Arab countries. President Sarkozy, the champion of the idea, has publicly declared that he sees the initiative as an indirect way of promoting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.8 Other missions in the Middle East, namely the police missions in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN), the Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point, or the Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, have a small scope and have not resulted in any major shift of events. It could be argued, however, that the EU role, although “soft” and “indirect,” has been very significant. For instance, the most widely accepted proposal to solve the conflict—the two-state solution—was been put forward by the EU in the 1980s, long before the United States accepted it (in 2001). Hence, the EU could be seen as taking an important pre-diplomatic role, often preparing the political ground for future bold decisions. It is unquestionable that the US has much more room for maneuver in relations with both Israelis and Palestinians. But it is also undeniable that, over the years, the EU has forged economic ties with all the major parties in the conflict, which provides some leverage to balance the American position vis-à-vis the parties. Ultimately, it is the way Europeans and Americans interplay at the global level that will set the terms of their bilateral co-operation. As Nicholas Burns, the US Undersecretary of State for political affairs, said in 2006, “US–European relations are increasingly a function of events in the Middle East, Asia and Africa” (cited in Daalder and Goldgeier 2006: 109). The somewhat established idea that the EU is a weak second-range player in the Israeli– Palestinian conflict seems to be only accurate when the focus is placed on the diplomatic arena. Indeed, the US is still the most important actor vis-à-vis the Israelis and the Palestinians. However, it is also true that the EU has counterbalanced the American position, seen as proIsraeli, by putting forward also the needs of the Palestinians. Thus, the EU could play a very important role by taking a diplomatic mediating role between the US–Israel and Hamas, and at best bring them closer to the negotiating table. In comparison with the US, the EU, with its better credibility to understand the Palestinian needs, is much better equipped for that role and could thereby contribute to induce a shift in US policies. The influence of the Middle Eastern organizations Generally speaking, the US has been more influenced by single Middle Eastern states than by any regional or sub-regional organizations. The most notable exception has been OPEC and OAPEC. As mentioned earlier, the 1973 oil crisis sparked by the Arab–Israeli war had a profound impact in the economies of the West. Still today, oil has been used as a political bargaining chip towards the West in order to force them to change their position vis-à-vis the parties and the issues in the conflict. Other organizations, however, instead of being able to influence US policies are utterly influenced by them. In the aftermath of the 9/11 2001 attacks, the OIC, for example, has reacted by somehow incorporating the Western agenda of counterterrorism and democratization. In March 2008, in Dakar, the OIC adopted unanimously a new charter set to replace the 1972 version that includes the principles of democracy, good governance, and human

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rights. The new charter creates new institutions to promote economic co-operation and mandates the establishment of an independent permanent commission on human rights. Even if the new document will not immediately create respect for human rights, especially the rights of women, in OIC member countries with autocratic regimes, the new document is a shift in the previous conduct. At an extraordinary meeting in the Mecca summit of 2005, the OIC also agreed to combat extremism and condemned the unjustifiable use of suicide attacks as barbarous and indiscriminate (Ahmed 2008: 128). As far as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is concerned, the OIC has mostly supported the Palestinian Authority, but it has also stressed the need for both parties to comply with UN resolutions and has made an effort to get the two parties to negotiate and implement a peace process. Since December 2006, it has been active in bridging the gap between Hamas and the intifada, addressing the issue of factionalism. The impact these initiatives have had on US policy formulations is, however, negligible. In fact, the organization’s Secretary General, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, has argued that the peace process in the Middle East has not succeeded so far because of lack of commitment, particularly by the United States, to see the process through.9 In the same vein, the traditional Arab League policy of boycotting Israel, a strategy that has been in place since the foundation of Israel until the turn of the millennium, has had no major effect on the US policy of providing compelling assistance to the Jewish state. However, in 2002, the LAS adopted the unprecedented Arab Peace Initiative, which offers Israel normalization of relations and comprehensive peace agreements with Arab countries in exchange for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the “occupied territories” including the Golan Heights, and the recognition of “an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.” From the outset, the Arab Initiative could be seen as a concession to the peace proposals advocated by the Europeans (since the Venice Declaration) and by the US (the two-state solution defended by the Quartet). From the Arab perspective, however, the Initiative is a sign of political maturity and pragmatism—an aching step that they are willing to take on behalf of peace. Yet, the Initiative is strongly conditioned by US policies. To start with, the major trigger for the Initiative was America’s lack of commitment in the Middle East during the Bush administration, as acknowledged by the LAS Secretary General (Moussa 2008). Second, the Initiative is strongly dependent on US political will to assist in its implementation. As the Bush administration has not been very forward, it took five years until the Initiative was first debated at an international gathering with Israeli and American presence—the Annapolis summit of 2007. In the words of the Secretary General of the LAS, “American promises made at Annapolis have not been fulfilled and only with new leadership in Washington will we be able to take the necessary bold steps” (Moussa 2008). Recently, the Arab Initiative was reinforced at the 2007 LAS Riyadh summit and at the 2008 Doha Forum on Democracy, Development and Free Trade. But the Initiative will always remain that, an “initiative,” until the US embraces it as a real plan. In fact, at the first Arab Economic, Social and Development Summit held in Kuwait in January 2009, Moussa said he was requesting US President Barack Obama to play the role of a fair mediator in the Middle East to solve the Palestinian crisis.10 Finally, other sub-regional organizations, such as the GCC and AMU, have also had very little influence, despite the fact that these organizations have had higher political ambitions (mostly the AMU) and reached a higher level of internal cohesion and regional integration (mainly the GCC). The GCC, for example, has developed a Gulf identity that was accentuated in the aftermath of the Iraq–Kuwait war at the beginning of the 1990s. However, the US bilateral involvement in the Gulf has created some tensions between the members, illustrated for example by the decision of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to boycott the 2004 GCC summit in protest at the US–Bahrain bilateral free trade agreement (Legrenzi 2008: 122). In conclusion, Middle Eastern organizations have not yet been able to have a strong impact on US policies. This derives to a large extent from the distribution of power and America’s

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capacity to act alone but, to a smaller extent, it is also due to political rivalries inside these organizations. For instance, the Arab League has not been capable of playing a robust role in Iraq mostly because the 2003 war badly split the League along the same lines that the Arab world divided during the Gulf War of 1990–91. The states of the Gulf, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Bahrain, supported, or at least refused to publicly object to, the US intervention, whereas Syria and the Palestinian Authority were opposed. As the UNDP Arab Human Development Report noted, acting as a group would “empower the Arabs and allow them to secure rights and legal claims in international agreements” (UNDP 2002: 122), and it traced the fragility and ineffectiveness of Arab regional institutions to “too many regimes [that] cater to powerful entrenched interest groups” (UNDP 2002: 121).

Conclusion United States behavior towards international organizations seems to be more influenced, as realists suggest, by the international distribution of material capabilities than by the international normative context, the diplomatic efforts of other governments, or by the performance of international organizations. Indeed, whereas the normative context tends to repudiate unilateral interventions (e.g. Russia’s 2008 intervention in South Ossetia), the United States has afforded to turn its back on institutions within which it cannot have its way. But, as pointed out by Kupchan, when management of the international system depends on consensus and compromise rather than on American leadership, “the United States will lament that it taught by example norms of self-interest rather than norms of reciprocity” (2002: 295). US behavior is not shaped by the performance of international organizations either. Even if that could be a justification not to rely on politically biased and administratively weak organizations such as the LAS, the OIC, or the AMU, it is hardly the case with the European Union, the most robust regional organization. Finally, the policies of the US have not been conditioned by the opinion of its major allies. In fact, where Iraq and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are concerned, the policy of US allies—such as Germany, France, Japan, or the Gulf states—has hardly any similarity to US policies largely based on unilateralism and staunch support for Israel. The incentives towards unilateralism certainly stem from the current hierarchy of power in the international system, but they also derive in part from the political context of the Middle East. The region is a minefield of political, religious, ethnic, and national divides, which associated with the economic interests at stake makes multilateralism less appealing than bilateralism or unilateralism. But although the US marginalizes international organizations in the Middle East, as its unipolar moment passes, the United States will likely find itself turning to precisely those institutions that its unilateralist behavior is now undermining. If anything, the Iraq war of 1990–91 showed not only that the time is past when the president has a blank check to act unilaterally abroad in a complex situation, but also that there are serious financial and economic constraints on major military operations (Rubinstein 1994: 220). The Bush administration did not build on earlier experiences. Only time will tell whether the Obama administration will do so.

Notes 1 See “Lobbying Database,” Center for Responsive Politics. Available at www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php (accessed October 22, 2008). 2 See “UN Finance.” Available at www.globalpolicy.org/finance/index.htm (accessed October 26, 2008). 3 Communiqué of European Community Summit Meeting, Copenhagen, December 15, 1973. 4 Statement issued on December 12, 2008. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2005/12/20051212. html (accessed October 24, 2008). 5 The US decided to establish the non-UN Multinational Forces Observers Sinai (MFO in Sinai) instead. 6 See “Iran’s President Challenges Arab League Over Gaza,” Radio Free Europe, December 31, 2008. 7 Fearing the possibility of separate bilateral deals between any Arab state and Israel (splitting the Arab world), a multilateral track approach was suggested. Israel preferred bilateral tracks nevertheless. Hence, at the Madrid

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Conference, both sides’ needs were fulfilled by having multiple bilateral tracks: one Israeli–Lebanese, one Israeli– Syrian, and one Israeli–Jordanian. The Palestinian representatives were included in the Jordanian delegation, a pre-request from Israel who did not want the Palestinians to have a separate delegation; however, in practice, an Israeli–Palestinian track soon evolved as well. 8 See “Sarkozy’s Proposal for Mediterranean Bloc makes Waves,” International Herald Tribune, May 10, 2007. 9 www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080922_OIC.doc.htm (accessed November 2, 2008). 10 See “Moussa: Arab League to Coordinate Funds for Gaza Reconstruction,” China News, January 20, 2009.

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Marr, Phebe (2008). “US Strategy Towards the Persian Gulf: From Rogue States to Failed States,” in Markus Kaim, ed., Great Powers and Regional Orders: The United States and the Persian Gulf. Aldershot: Ashgate. Mearsheimer, John J. (1994/1995). “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 19(3): 5–49. Miller, Rory (2006). “Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel,” Israel Affairs, 12(4): 642–64. Moore, John Allphin and Pubantz, Jerry (2006). The New United Nations: International Organization in the Twenty-First Century. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Moussa, Amre (2008). Keynote Speech on the Role of the Arab League and the European Union in the Middle East Peace Process. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Annual Middle East Workshop. Brussels, 5 November. Nye, Joseph (2002). The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Paemen, Hugo (2007. “EU–US: From Godchild to Partner?” Studia Diplomatica, 60(1): 171–90. Patrick, Stewart (2002). “Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of US Ambivalence,” in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds, Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Patten, Chris (2006). Cousins and Strangers: America, Britain and Europe in a New Century. New York: Times Books. Rosenthal, Joel H. (1990). The Withdrawal From UNESCO: International Organizations and the US Role (case study #10). New York: Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. Rubinstein, Alvin Z. (ed.) (1994). America’s National Interest in a Post-Cold War World: Issues and Dilemmas. New York: McGraw-Hill. Russell, James A. (2008). “Charting US Security Strategy in the Persian Gulf,” in Markus Kaim, ed., Great Powers and Regional Orders: The United States and the Persian Gulf. Aldershot: Ashgate. Simmons, Beth and Martin, Lisa (2002). “International Organizations and Institutions,” in Walter Carlsnae, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, eds, Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage. Smith, Karen E. (2007). “Promoting Peace in the Backyard?” The International Spectator, 42(4): 594–96. Smith, Michael E. (2004). Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Solingen, Etel (2008). “The Genesis, Design and Effects of Regional Institutions: Lessons from East Asia and the Middle East,” International Studies Quarterly, 52(2): 261–94. Surratt, Robin (ed.) (2005). The Middle East, 10th edition. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Tavares, Rodrigo (2009). Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations. New York and London: Routledge. Thakur, Ramesh and Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh (2006). The Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural, Institutional and Normative Challenges. Tokyo and New York: United Nations University. Tocci, Nathalie (2005). “Conflict Resolution in the Neighbourhood: Comparing EU Involvement in Turkey’s Kurdish Question and in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict,” Mediterranean Politics, 10(2): 25–146. ——(2007). The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard. London and New York: Routledge. Traub, James (2006). The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American Power. London: Bloomsbury. United Nations Development Program (2002). Arab Human Development Program. New York: UNDP. Yost, David S. (2003). “The US–European Capabilities Gap and the Prospects for ESDP,” in Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, eds, Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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War in the Middle East Daniel Moran

The history of the modern Middle East is usually reckoned from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, whose dismemberment after the First World War required the reconstruction of public order over an area extending from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean, and from the Tigris to the Sahara. That Ottoman energies had been flagging since long before the final collapse is famously true. The empire, already much diminished from its zenith two centuries before, had been dubbed the “sick man of Europe” by the Russian Tsar on the eve of the Crimean War (1854–56). What European statesmen called “the Eastern Question” was basically an extended meditation on what to do to keep the peace and promote reform once the sick man died. Yet when the end came, the puzzle had not been solved. This chapter considers the consequences of that failure in the military field, along with America’s efforts to manage them. The political and social prospects of the Middle East since the First World War have been defined by the cycles of violence the war set in motion. In this, the region is not exceptional. The same can be said with equal or greater force about the rest of Africa and Asia, not to mention Europe itself. All have been transformed by the dismantling of the Eurocentric world order that seemed so firmly in place at the dawn of the twentieth century. In the Middle East, however, episodes of large-scale fighting have lacked the transformative effects that have been seen elsewhere, so that its political geography retains much of the shape that was imparted to it by the victors in 1918. A map of the region in the mid-1920s bears a striking resemblance to one today, surprisingly so, given that the lines drawn on the blank slate created by the Ottoman defeat were laid down exclusively with reference to the interests of outsiders. The appearance of stability is mere cartographic illusion, although it does tell us something important about the region: that it has been dominated by governments whose political ambitions have outstripped their military capabilities—the chief exception being Israel, where the opposite is true. This pattern is partly an inheritance from earlier times. The last two centuries of Ottoman rule were also marked by a tendency to overreach strategically, while simultaneously underestimating the risk of choosing war. Yet there is reason to believe that such immemorial bellicosity may have begun to fade, as it has long since in Europe, so that the true costs of war are now weighed more accurately by most of the region’s major states. One reason for this is that the costs have become so high as to be unmistakable to all but the most blinkered narcissist. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Middle East was but a secondary theater in the European struggle for empire. At the turn of the twenty-first century, it has become the cockpit of world history, whose resources fuel the global economy. Its squabbles and animosities have become matters of concern to most powerful countries on earth, and especially to the United States, whose recent and far-reaching engagement may change the region in ways that bear comparison to the demise of the Ottomans. It is not our purpose to anticipate what those changes may be. As of this writing, they are anyone’s guess. But the circumstances that have brought American forces so prominently into the Middle East are worth recalling, as is the general history of armed conflict by which the region has been shaped up to now. For better or worse, these earlier experiences will provide a large share of

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the memories, the mythologies, the unspoken assumptions, and the “lessons learned” (or not) by which future strategic decision making in the Middle East will be governed. The discussion that follows is organized around three such decisions, which collectively account for a great deal of the fighting the Middle East has endured over the last century. They may also serve as benchmarks by which America’s expanding commitment in the region can be traced. The first, to which the United States was no more than a dismayed bystander, was the decision by the Ottoman Empire to enter the First World War. The second, whose consequences would gradually draw the United States more deeply into the politics of the region, was taken by the leading members of the Arab League in the fall of 1947, when they decided to forcibly resist the partition of the Palestine Mandate. The third, also descending from the first, but with independent roots in the ancient rivalry between Arabs and Persians, was the decision by Iraq to seize the petroleum-rich Iranian territory around the Shatt al-Arab. It was this action that finally shifted American engagement in the Middle East from the political to the military sphere. The selection of these episodes as nodal points around which to construct a survey of war in the Middle East is not meant to suggest that other choices did not matter. Nor should these three be mistaken as moments in which the hand of fate might have been discerned. Such perceptions only exist in retrospect, and even then they are mostly illusory. On the contrary, the decisions whose consequences are considered below share the common characteristic of having been taken by men who believed they were in control of events, and in command of the relevant facts. None thought they were doing anything that could not be undone. People hardly ever step off a cliff they can see.

The wars of the Ottoman succession The most important strategic decision made in the Middle East in the twentieth century came in July 1914, when the Ottoman government, whose senior members were known as the Young Turks, launched their country into what would soon be called the Great War. It was a routine choice. The Ottoman Empire was a warlike state. It had fought the Russians on average once every twenty years for the past two centuries. It was now about to do so for the last time, albeit on better-than-average terms, thanks to the assistance of another old rival, Austria– Hungary, plus that of a true Great Power, Germany, a state with no history of involvement in the region, but with a strong interest in overturning the political order elsewhere in Europe. The Young Turks hoped to profit from Germany’s anticipated success, with minimal risk to themselves and in the hope that the defeat of Russia might provide compensation for the prestige and territory they lost when they were driven out of the Balkans a few years before.1 Like almost everyone else, they believed the war would be short. The failure of events to unfold as they expected doomed their regime, although their army fought well enough, and was still intact and in the field after Russia’s had dissolved in the maelstrom of revolution. It was Russia’s erstwhile allies, Britain and France, who would be the executors of the Ottoman estate, a role in which they have been vilified for having embraced too many cross-purposes, and for having failed to take sufficient account of the wishes of the empire’s inhabitants. There is much truth in this, though nothing was done that fell outside the not-yet-discredited practices of European imperialism. Those practices were now being overlaid by a new set of principles, however, whose watchwords were “democracy” and “national self-determination,” which the victors claimed to embrace, and whose advancement they had institutionalized in the League of Nations. It was the League that was supposed to supervise the new states assembled from the ruins of empire, and assist their transition to a stable and prosperous modernity. The American view of these arrangements was agnostic, although tinged with ambivalence and disappointment, as was true in all matters touching the First World War. The United

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States had gone to war against Germany and Austria–Hungary in 1917, but retained its neutrality in the Middle East, where its interests were entirely economic and philanthropic, and where it was scarcely able to project military power anyway. America’s neutral status meant that its representatives were well placed to witness the outstanding atrocity of the age: the systematic massacre of Armenian Christians, carried out by the Turks upon a pretext of military necessity, and in the expectation that the fog of war would conceal what American observers regarded (too optimistically) as the crime of the century.2 The butchery of the Armenians was continuously publicized by American newspapers while it was going on, a service whose impact on the post-war settlement should not be underestimated. The Ottoman lands were already famous for massacre before the war, and whatever impulse the victors may have felt to extend the blessings of self-determination to the Sultan’s former subjects could not survive this new reminder of what it might mean to just let the chips fall where they may. The United States had no quarrel with the League Mandates put in place at the San Remo Conference in 1920. Nor did it have any share in them, having abandoned the League the previous year. Despite America’s perennial resentment of European imperialism, the US was happy to see American missionaries and economic interests under the protection of Western powers, even though the latter were also rivals for control of the region’s natural resources. The First World War had not only broken the Ottoman Empire. It also stimulated the ambitions of its local elites, who wished to compete to fill the vacuum of power created by the Sultan’s defeat, and looked to the ideal of national independence to legitimize their efforts. The result was a new kind of political–military struggle, which could not be managed by the traditional expedients of imperial governance—co-optation, divide-and-rule, exemplary violence, and so on. The Mandate system may not have been a recipe for failure, but its maintenance required more energy and determination than those responsible for it could muster. Even had the United States remained in the League, it is hard to imagine it could have supplied the additional will and resources required to execute the immense custodial responsibilities the League’s leading members had assumed. The first hint of how things would go came in Turkey, the designated successor to the Ottoman state, which had been compelled, like the other defeated powers, to cede large chunks of territory and pay monetary reparations in exchange for peace. These terms were not acceptable to the outstanding Turkish officer of the war, Mustafa Kemal, who assembled an army around the cause of Turkish nationalism, and used it to overturn the settlement. By 1923, he had driven all foreign forces from Anatolia. Of these, the most important was a large Greek army of occupation, whose presence had been engineered by the British, but which had then been left to fend for itself. It was ultimately put to flight along with hundreds of thousands of Greek civilians it was meant to protect. The Greek–Turkish war was conducted with indiscriminate ferocity on both sides, but to greater effect by the winners, who fought not merely to achieve a military result, but to alter the social landscape beyond restoration. Their success was codified in the Treaty of Lausanne, by which the frontiers of modern Turkey were settled. Lausanne is also the first international agreement to require the compulsory transfer of civilian populations. Under its terms, something over a million Anatolian Greeks and about 350,000 mostly Macedonian Turks were rounded up and deported to their ostensible homelands, places which most of them had never seen, and whose language many did not speak.3 It was an ominous precedent, though a strangely ambivalent one. It is difficult to argue, in the cold light of historical retrospect, that the murder and expulsion of Armenians and Greeks, conducted with a cruelty that would be more vividly remembered, had they not been overshadowed by even more lethal campaigns of genocide and “ethnic cleansing” yet to come, has contributed a good deal to Turkey’s emergence as a stable and responsible actor on the international stage. Historians are fortunate that their discipline is not a branch of moral philosophy, else it would be hard to know what to say.

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Turkey thus became the first state to alter the post-war order in the Middle East by force. Others would follow suit, capitalizing on the general inability of the Western powers to commit the military resources required to sustain the political settlement they had imposed. In 1924, Britain’s most important client in the Arab world, Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca and lately King of the Hejaz, was ousted from his throne by the armies of his long-standing rival, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, a victory which created the modern state of Saudi Arabia.4 In Syria, the independent kingdom established by Hussein’s third son, Faisal, in 1920, was overthrown by the French after Faisal refused to co-operate in their execution of the Mandate granted them by the newly formed League; an act that left Syria in a state of incipient upheaval until 1936, when something like an independent republic was finally allowed to emerge. Faisal, having been ousted from Damascus, was later set on the throne of Iraq by the British. Their conquest of the territory then known as Mesopotamia had given rise to fierce (if disorganized) local resistance, the control of which required considerable force, including the first large-scale application of air strikes to support counterinsurgency. Faisal’s monarchy, which originally consisted of the Ottoman vilayets of Basra and Baghdad (Mosul was added in 1926), was created in tacit acknowledgment of the impossibility of direct rule from London, and proved, as in Syria, to be a half-way house toward independence. This was achieved in 1932, although the British retained a military presence there until after the Second World War.5 Whether the sporadic and internecine fighting of the Mandate period amounts to war is perhaps a matter of opinion. If it did not, it is only because in these new states recourse to violence was mostly confined to narrow indigenous elites, whose ambitions had been set free by the Ottoman defeat. Neither Britain nor France was prepared to commit the forces required to suppress these conflicts, because they had no obvious interest in doing so, any more than Britain had an interest in standing between the Greeks and Turks in Anatolia. Overall, the results were less disastrous than might reasonably have been feared. The main effect was to insure that political authority was everywhere dependent upon the loyalty of the army, and increasing wielded by military personalities—a common enough pattern throughout the post-colonial world, and one that the tutelage of the League did nothing to avert. The decision to answer the Eastern Question by dissolving the Ottoman Empire and placing its constituent parts under international receivership had not included any firm vision of what would come next. As a consequence, it proved to be less an answer than a step toward reformulating the question in terms of managing relations among the successor states. Their internal power struggles and intermural rivalries have dominated the region ever since. Even had such a vision existed, the capacity of the victors to make it stick was destined to decline rapidly once the post-war settlement in Europe came undone. The collapse of the world economy following the American stock market crash in 1929, and the National Socialist ascendancy in Germany four years later, insured that, from the mid-1930s onward, the new states of the Middle East would be left increasingly to their own devices, as the Mandatory Powers prepared to confront another round of global war.

The Palestine wars Nowhere in the Middle East were the consequences of the Nazi seizure of power more serious than in Palestine, a place that did not exist before 1920 except in the imaginations of Jews and Christians, who used the name to refer to the Holy Land of Biblical times. Jews regarded Palestine as their native place, and in the last decades of the nineteenth century they began to migrate there in modest but appreciable numbers. Britain extended its official protection to Zionism (as the movement was known) during the First World War, in order to appeal to the political sympathies of Jewish communities in Russia and America, and by way of claiming an interest in a part of the Levant whose control would enhance the security of the Suez Canal.

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Palestine became a Mandate under the auspices of the League, and when the British assumed responsibility for it, there was no reason to suppose the influx of Jews (whose right to a “national home” the League guaranteed) would lead to war. That the new immigrants inspired resentment and incidental violence by Palestinian Arabs did not initially shake the British belief that the two populations would learn to rub along together well enough, particularly after they had learned the habits of democratic self-rule the Mandate was supposed to inculcate. These expectations were dashed by the rise of the Nazis, whose murderous intentions toward Jews turned what had been a trickle of immigrants into a flood of refugees, and shifted the outlook of Arab elites from uneasiness to alarm. Between 1936 and 1939, Arab attacks against Jews acquired a methodical and determined quality they had previously lacked, and they were met with equally determined repression by the British. But even so, the uprising succeeded in persuading the British that their vision of a multinational Palestine was untenable, and that Jewish emigration had to be checked.6 In acceding to this demand, however, the British were also obliged to confront the question of what to do about the Jews who were already there. To this, they responded by floating a series of schemes by which the Mandate might be partitioned. No such scheme was acceptable to Arab opinion; and while Palestinian Arabs lacked the means to contest the issue, the Arab world as a whole did not. In April 1947, Britain laid Palestine at the feet of the newly created United Nations. A final plan of partition followed, together with a design for an economic union between the proposed Jewish and Arab states, and for international custodianship of Jerusalem. This announcement inaugurated a final round of intercommunal violence between Jews and Palestinian Arabs, whose outcome was never in doubt. Over the course of the Mandate, the Jews in Palestine had developed good means of self-defense against their Arab neighbors. Toward the end, they had also embarked on a campaign of insurgency against the British, whose conduct many regarded as a betrayal.7 Nevertheless, when weighed against the collective might of the surrounding Arab states, Jewish military resources appeared sufficiently paltry to encourage more extensive resistance. That Palestinian Arabs would fight to hold territory they regarded as theirs is perhaps self-evident. The willingness of neighboring governments to do so is not. In the end, Israel’s Arab opponents chose war from a combination of self-confidence and apprehension, rather than zealous sympathy for the Palestinians, whose territory some of them also coveted. By the end of the Second World War, the successor states to the Ottoman Empire in Arabia appeared to be on the verge of a new political maturity. In March 1945, six of them—Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia—combined to form the Arab League, an association to promote good relations among its members and give more coherent expression to Arab national identity. The Arab League was not a military alliance, but it had a military committee that provided a framework for common action. The partition of Palestine provided a cause by which such action might be justified. Public opinion in the Arab world resented the ease with which Europeans (and now the UN) felt entitled to dictate the terms of their politics. Arab governments feared that, if they were to stand aside while Palestine was dismembered, their own legitimacy would be cast into doubt. Yet they also continued to harbor obscure rivalries that hampered their co-operation. Jordan’s King Abdullah, for instance, dreamed of making himself head of “Greater Syria,” a prospect that threatened the interests of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestinian Arabs almost as gravely as those of the Jews. In the end, none of Israel’s opponents wished to fight alone; or to be left out in the event of an Arab victory; or to take disproportionate risks in the event of an Arab defeat; or to subordinate themselves to a common plan of action. The result was a coalition of the mutually suspicious, whose members lacked the robust common purpose required to support a war whose aim was the complete destruction of the enemy.8

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Israel’s survival in the face of the resulting onslaught has been remembered as a miraculous deliverance. That it was a deliverance is true: it is hard to imagine a significant Jewish population remaining in Palestine if Israel had lost the war. Yet the odds of success were not as long as they appear, owing to the debilitating cross-purposes of Israel’s opponents, and to the inefficiency of their armies, none of which was able to bring more than a fraction of their available manpower to the battlefield. Israel’s assailants also underestimated the new state’s military potential, although the mistake was an honest one in its way. The Jews in Palestine had survived in the face of Arab hostility by virtue of British protection, not on the strength of their own armed forces, which existed as shadowy underground organizations until shortly before the final showdown. The Israelis also benefited from the extended support of Jewish communities elsewhere, which provided funds for the purchase of weapons and assisted in evading the arms embargoes by which Britain and the United States sought to damp down the war. The significance of the Arab decision to go to war in 1948 has been most keenly felt in its stifling effect upon the politics of the Arab world. The material stakes in the Palestine wars have always been small—the area is poor in resources—and have been far outweighed by the psychological impact of the initial Arab defeat. None of the states that attacked Israel in 1948 was prepared to make peace afterwards: the fighting ended in a series of bilateral ceasefires, which could only be read as a promise on the Arab side to resume fighting on better terms later on. It would be thirty years before any of them would feel sufficiently secure to change their mind. The immediate consequences of having gone to war for credibility, and having reaped humiliation instead, were high. In 1951, Jordan’s King Abdullah was assassinated by an agent of the Mufti of Jerusalem, notional head of the Palestinian state whose existence Abdullah and his allies had failed to vindicate. The governments of Egypt and Syria were overthrown by military coups, which brought in new men whose claims to authority were rooted in a pledge to finish with the Israelis. In Israel, the armed forces became the most admired institution of the new state, a liberal democracy to be sure, but one in which military values, personalities, and institutions have loomed unusually large. The reluctance of Israel’s opponents to make peace was not matched by real eagerness to resume fighting. This disinclination was reinforced by the gap in military capability that would increasingly separate Israel from its Arab neighbors. The rhetorical commitment to Israel’s destruction remained, however, and the struggle continued on different lines. In the early 1950s, all of Israel’s neighbors supported surreptitious campaigns of what would now be called “state-sponsored terrorism,” conducted mainly by Palestinians who had fled or been expelled during the war.9 In 1956, Israel’s determination to bring an end to this sort of thing produced a second major war, fought in concert with the French and British, who had become incensed at Egyptian plans to nationalize the Suez Canal.10 Their combined efforts to overthrow Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, failed thanks to the intervention of the United States and the Soviet Union, whose cold war confrontation had reached a sufficiently chilly impasse that they were unwilling to risk having it destabilized by a last gasp of imperial adventurism. In military terms, the 1956 war merely confirmed that the tactical proficiency of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) would require Israel’s enemies to make very dramatic improvements in their armed forces before they could contemplate another attack. It also marked a new and decisive step toward American engagement in the region. The United States had generally maintained an attitude of detachment toward the Zionist enterprise. It had insisted upon the partition of Palestine in 1948, as the only solution to a problem rendered intractable by the British failure to stem the violence of the Mandate period. Its outlook acquired a new layer of moral sympathy for the Jews following the revelation of the Holocaust in Europe, which seemed to create an unanswerable case for a Jewish state. By then, Zionism had become a popular cause among American Jews, whose financial

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support contributed to Israel’s survival in the 1948 war. Yet the United States had shown no inclination to intervene on Israel’s behalf, and in the years that followed, it had lent itself to a number of schemes designed to appease Arab hostility by extracting concessions from the Israelis.11 In the end, it was the inexorable logic of the cold war that drew the United States and Israel together. It made even stranger bedfellows of the Soviets and the Arabs, whose ideological affinity for communism was limited, to say the least. Nevertheless, the determination of countries such as Egypt and Syria to carry on the struggle with Israel forced them to look outside the region for military assistance, a need the Soviets were glad to fill by way of gaining a foothold in a part of the world where they had previously counted for little. The Americans accordingly came to regard Israel as a natural ally, an outlook that was strengthened by the predictable affinity of two commercial democracies. In reaching out to the Israelis, the United States did not intend to burn its bridges to the Arabs. Having intervened to save Nasser in 1956, Eisenhower’s government thought its guarantee of the resulting settlement would be recognized as constructive neutrality by all concerned. Until the 1960s, Israel’s most important military partner was not the United States, but France, which sold Israel high-performance aircraft and assisted in the development of its nuclear program, an effort of which the Americans disapproved. It was mainly because the French became concerned that their collaboration with the Israelis would tarnish their reputation in the non-aligned world that military co-operation between Israel and the United States intensified.12 This budding relationship was put to the test in the spring of 1967, when a series of escalating border and aerial clashes between Israel and Syria inspired an extraordinary exercise in brinksmanship orchestrated by Syria’s ally, Egypt. Nasser demanded the removal of UN observers placed in the Sinai after the 1956 war, then massed his army on Israel’s frontier and closed the Strait of Tiran, a crucial sea lane linking Israel to the Red Sea. The United States (along with the UN, Britain, and France) had guaranteed that this strait would remain open. When challenged by Israel to make good on this pledge, the Johnson administration proposed an international conference instead. Rather than wait upon such an uncertain process, Israel launched one of the remarkable military campaigns of modern times, by which the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were shattered and driven off, and large chunks of Arab territory in the Sinai, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Golan Heights were seized. A good deal of uncertainty surrounds the onset of the Six Days’ war, not least what Nasser had in mind in confronting Israel with a lethal threat that he seems to have had no means to execute.13 The United States tried to finesse its guarantee of passage through the Strait of Tiran mainly because its military experts did not believe the aggressive posture of the Arabs was credible—a judgment that, at a minimum, failed to take account of the hysterical state of Israeli opinion at the height of the resulting crisis. There is less mystery as to the outcome, although it proved less conclusive than military appearances suggested. Israel had again succeeded in humiliating its opponents, effectively reinforcing the psychological conditions created after 1948. Once again, the risks of negotiation would be judged greater than those of continued belligerency. Israel expected to exchange the bulk of its conquests for a peace agreement, but when no one appeared on the other side to close the deal, it began instead to settle its own population on the captured land, a policy intended to put pressure on its adversaries, and to appease that portion of Israeli opinion that, like their Arab opponents, saw no necessity to share the former Mandate with anyone.14 In contrast to 1948, however, both sides now possessed access to military resources that made a rapid resumption of major fighting almost inevitable. The Soviets were more than willing to resupply their Arab clients, calculating that their desperation would bind them more closely to Moscow, while perhaps underestimating the extent to which any subsequent defeat would cast Soviet patronage in a bad light. The United States became more open backers of Israel, which it now regarded as a bulwark against Soviet penetration of the Middle East.

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When war resumed in October 1973, it seemed to be yet another round in a conflict that would go on forever. Yet in reality, the terms of the engagement between Israel and its Arab neighbors had now shifted in ways that would make at least a partial settlement possible. First, the flow of Soviet arms to Syria and Egypt had shifted the military balance in their favor—not enough to defeat the IDF outright, but sufficiently to create an appearance of limited military success. Such a success would only matter, however, if there was someone on the Arab side willing to seize it as a basis for negotiation. Such a figure had now appeared in the person of Anwar Sadat, who had succeeded Nasser as President of Egypt following Nasser’s death in 1970. Nasser had personified the struggle against Israel, and in so doing had insured that Israel’s destruction remained the litmus test of Arab national greatness. His passing created conditions in which, for the first time since the Arab Revolt of 1936–39, these aspirations might be adjusted in light of military reality. The task was made easier by the increasing radicalization of Palestinian politics. The war of 1948 made most Palestinian Arabs into refugees, who fell under the protection of the governments that lost the war. They thus became hostages and symbols of the continuing struggle. Except for Jordan, no Arab state was prepared to extend rights of citizenship to Palestinians, nor to absorb them into the general population. To do so would have been to admit that the results of the war were final. Palestinian resistance movements nevertheless felt they had no choice but to subordinate themselves to the policies of their hosts, on whose armed forces they relied to restore them to their lost homeland. The scale of the Arab defeat in 1967 altered this calculation. Palestinian Arabs grew more determined to regain control of their own fate, which they had effectively lost twenty years before; and their relations with Arab governments began to deteriorate accordingly. This was particularly true of relations between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had been gathering the main threads of Palestinian political leadership into its hands since the late 1950s.15 Following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the PLO moved to Jordan, where its efforts to assert its authority over Palestinians living there threatened to undermine the government in Amman. The crisis came in September 1970, when PLO agents attempted to assassinate Jordan’s King Hussein, and Jordan’s army responded by expelling the PLO and its adherents from the country—a ferocious operation in which thousands of Palestinian Arabs were killed. “Black September,” as this episode is known, altered the moral calculus that had surrounded the partition of Palestine since the 1930s. Although the grievances of the Palestinians have retained their place at the center of Arab politics to this day, Arab governments have no longer felt so obliged to risk their own fortunes and the lives of their soldiers to redress them. This new reality was reflected in the strategic calculations that produced the 1973 war, which was not a war to liberate Palestine, but one to reassert a modicum of military balance, which the 1967 war had too conspicuously overturned. The crucial operation of the 1973 war was the seizure of the east bank of the Suez Canal by Egypt, a feat of arms relative to all previous encounters between Arab and Israeli forces. By virtue of its limited aim, it was also a crucial signal that this was not a war to destroy Israel. This inference was muddied for a time by the simultaneous attack by Syria, whose armored divisions fought their way into the clear at the bottom of the Golan Heights, only to turn around and go back up again.16 Afterward, both fronts stabilized, to the advantage of the Israelis, whose superior tactical proficiency gradually asserted itself; although in contrast to 1967, neither the Syrian nor the Egyptian armies broke under the pressure. The result was two weeks of hard fighting, which reached an unexpectedly dangerous climax when the Soviet Union threatened to intervene directly, rather than tolerate the destruction of an Egyptian army the Israelis had isolated east of the canal. The United States responded by ordering its armed forces onto heightened alert worldwide—a dangerous development indeed, whose net result was to impress everyone with the advantages of accepting a UN-mediated ceasefire.

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The last days of the 1973 war were the most perilous moment in the history of the Arab– Israeli conflict—it is never a good thing when the warships of two nuclear-armed superpowers are actively targeting each other.17 Yet the crisis provoked by Soviet intervention did mean that, when the dust settled, Egypt’s forces had retained their hold on the canal. This fact could be represented as a kind of victory, the more so because the measures required to disentangle Egyptian and Israeli forces included a general pull-back by the IDF. This was sufficient for Sadat’s purpose, which had been to create the political and strategic capital required for negotiations. His efforts bore fruit in the Camp David Accords of 1978. Under their terms, Egypt abandoned its thirty-year belligerency toward Israel in return for regaining the Sinai—the status quo of 1949. For Israel, the Accords marked the end of the military threat to its existence from surrounding Arab states, none of which could contemplate war against it without Egyptian support. These were substantial achievements, although they fell short of American ambitions. The United States had hoped for a comprehensive solution to the Palestine question, a Grand Bargain that would bring in the Syrians and the PLO as well as Egypt, and would be underwritten by the Soviets along with the US. It was Sadat’s realization that the military results he had achieved would not support such a bargain that made a more limited peace possible. Camp David was dependent on American guarantees that Egypt and Israel would both be provided with sufficient arms to insure their mutual security, but the basic structure of the deal was created by Sadat’s decision to embark on secret bilateral negotiations with the Israelis, rather than trust his country’s future to the good offices of the PLO, the Soviets, and the Syrians.18 Egypt went to war in 1973 not to renew the struggle of 1948, but to lay down the burden of its strategic commitment to Israel’s destruction. Sadat held out hope at first that the chastening experience of hard fighting might compel some Israeli concessions on behalf of the Palestinians, but in the end he settled for a vague promise of Palestinian autonomy based on future talks, rather than give up the opportunity to withdraw Egypt from a struggle on which it had embarked a generation earlier, with no real understanding of the costs involved. “Camp David Accords” is plural because there are two of them: one establishing a firm peace between Israel and Egypt; the other creating what has proven to be a tenuous and much traduced “peace process” between Israel and the Palestinians. The Accords did not end the Palestine wars, but they did bring an end to the threat to Israel’s existence created by the Arab decision to contest the partition of Palestine in 1948. To that extent, they provide a useful vantage point from which to judge the consequences of that decision. Israel has fought two major military campaigns since Camp David, both in Lebanon, both against “non-state” adversaries—the PLO in 1982, and Hezbollah in 2006—that have sought to carry on the struggle against the Jewish state on their own.19 On the Israeli side, neither of these campaigns achieved the kind of success that has come to be expected from the IDF; but then the requirements of success are much reduced from what they once were. In military terms, Israel is unquestionably the strongest state in the Middle East, a fact that none of those currently prepared to take up arms on behalf of the Palestinians can alter. Meanwhile, Palestinian politics remain locked in a struggle to accept a military defeat that occurred over sixty years ago. It is painful to consider that those who advocate a “two-state solution” to the Palestine question, brokered by the United States and other powerful outsiders, are in fact proposing precisely the course of action that gave rise to the 1948 war.

The oil wars One consequence of the Camp David Accords was that Egypt lost what had long seemed to be its natural position as the leading state in the Arab world. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, and Sadat’s perceived treachery toward the Palestinians resonated throughout the region, energizing calls for more determined leadership.20 Among those who aspired to

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answer the call was an Iraqi general, Saddam Hussein. In 1979, Hussein succeeded to the presidency of Iraq, having already filled that role de facto for some years by virtue of his position as secretary general of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, a secular, pan-Arabist, militarist, and modernizing movement cut from the same cloth as, and rival to, the Free Officers Movement that brought Nasser to power in Egypt. It was Nasser’s role as the pre-eminent public voice of the Arab world to which Saddam aspired; and like Nasser, Saddam recognized that the road to such a position could only be paved by war. The object of his ambitions would be Iran, rump of the ancient Persian empire, and hereditary rival of the Ottomans and their Arab successors. A pretext for fighting was readily available, in the form of a long-standing border dispute over the Shatt al-Arab, an estuary formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Not all the international borders in the Middle East are the product of great power manipulation. The one separating Iran and Iraq has scarcely moved in 500 years, although it had been much argued about even before it became apparent that it transected an ocean of oil.21 It was not that Iraq did not have a sufficient share of oil, but rather that the Shatt formed its only access to the Persian Gulf. In the early 1970s, Iraq sought to smooth its access to the Gulf by unilaterally declaring that its rights in the Shatt extended all the way to the Iranian shore, a claim it was obliged to abandon in the Algiers Accord of 1975, which declared the border to be the deep-water line in the center of the channel. Iraq’s retreat at Algiers was no more than a reflection of strategic reality: Iran was (and is) a larger and stronger country than Iraq and, in 1975, it also enjoyed a close relationship with the United States. In 1979, however, revolution swept the American-backed Shah of Iran from power, and established an Islamist regime equally inimical to Iraq and the US. Saddam had good reason to fear this development: Iraq’s secular Ba’athist state was anathema to the theocrats in Tehran, who made no secret of their intention to spread their revolution throughout the region. At the same time, however, Saddam calculated that the turmoil of revolution had weakened Iran militarily, even as it deprived it of American protection. It was on this basis that he decided to launch what he believed would be a war of limited liability, designed to seize the Shatt al-Arab and some oil-rich Iranian provinces beyond it. Success would enrich Iraq, chasten the Islamists, and mark Saddam as the new champion and natural leader of the Arabs.22 This was a miscalculation of considerable proportions. Although Saddam was correct in judging that the Iranian Revolution had evened the military odds between Iran and Iraq, he had not reckoned on the difficulty of making peace with a revolutionary government. The war, which began in September 1980, was barely a month old when Iraq first proposed a ceasefire, and barely three when it declared a unilateral end to its offensive operations. But all such gestures toward a negotiated settlement, which were repeated periodically in years to come, were rebuffed in Tehran, where the war had been declared an assault on Islam, and embraced as a tool of revolutionary mobilization. Support for the war became the ultimate test of loyalty and commitment, by which dissent would be purged, and all the essential threads of economic and social control accumulated in the hands of the new leadership.23 In military terms the Iran–Iraq war gradually devolved into a wavering tactical stalemate reminiscent of the First World War. It lasted as long as it did—just short of eight years— primarily because its continuance served the internal purposes of the Islamic Revolution. Conversely, its gradual escalation, to include aerial bombardment of cities and attacks on oil infrastructure and neutral shipping, was chiefly owed to Iraqi efforts to find a way out of the impasse that their initial smash-and-grab attack created. Neither of the belligerents had much reason to expect outside assistance. The nature of their quarrel simply did not match up to the ideological requirements for a “proxy war” between the superpowers. In January 1980, the United States had declared that it would use military force to defend the world’s access to Persian Gulf oil; but this policy was inspired by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and was not calculated to deal with anything so unexpected as war between two members of

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the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The US did not want Iran to win: the overthrow of the Shah had been an affront to its policy, and the humiliation had been compounded when American diplomats in Tehran were taken prisoner and held hostage for over a year. Yet the US could not easily side with Iraq, the obvious aggressor, particularly as American material interests were not immediately at risk. Those interests were brought into play beginning in March 1984, when Iraq embarked on what became know as the “tanker war,” a campaign to exclude neutral shipping from Iranian ports in the northern Gulf. Both Iran and Iraq had attacked each other’s ships since the start of the war. By expanding the maritime war to include neutral vessels, Iraq intended both to cut off remaining Iranian oil exports, and to inspire some kind of escalatory response from Tehran that would pull the major oil-consuming states into the fighting.24 The Iranian leadership had promised as much, declaring early on that any threat to Iran’s oil exports would cause the whole world to lose access to Gulf oil. In the event, however, the Iranian response was initially confined to a few retaliatory attacks on vessels bound for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, whose financial backing had helped keep Iraq in the war. The fact that Iraq’s attacks did not inspire Western retaliation was nevertheless a crucial discovery for Baghdad, which recognized that it had been given leave to increase its pressure on Iran without restraint. By the end of 1986, Tehran’s self-discipline had crumbled, to the point where the Kuwaitis felt sufficiently beset to request American protection. The United States responded by extemporizing a policy of “neutral intervention,” under which Kuwaiti vessels were “reflagged” as American and escorted through the Gulf by US warships. America’s action was not expected or intended to turn the tide of the war. Yet its threadbare pretence of neutrality could scarcely conceal the fact that the larger world was lining up behind Iraq. For many in Tehran, the writing was now on the wall, although it remained obscure to a clerical leadership that had become enthralled by an ethos of sacrifice without limit. In July 1988, however, the USS Vincennes accidentally shot down an Iranian airliner, killing all 290 people aboard—an appalling mistake that was represented in Iran as deliberate murder by a state whose power was too crushing to resist. Under such circumstances, the decision to accept a ceasefire could be portrayed as a kind of sacrifice in itself, and it was behind this fig-leaf of selfabnegation that Iran was finally able to climb down from a war that had shifted irretrievably against it. Fighting ended two weeks later, on terms that did no more than re-establish the pre-war status quo. This is not to say that what would soon be known as the First Gulf War was without result. On the contrary: it was the war that confirmed the grip of Islamist radicalism in Iran, whose revolution had originally embraced a wide range of non-clerical opposition forces based in the urban middle and working classes, all of which were driven to the margins of Iranian politics, where they remain to this day. The war also left Iraq in an especially dangerous state: by far the strongest military power in the Gulf, with a ruined economy and an exaggerated sense that its self-assigned role as bulwark against the Islamic Revolution had earned it the approbation of the Arab world and the West. Like all major wars, the Iran–Iraq war was fought mainly with borrowed money. Iraq’s chief backers had been Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, traditional dynastic states whose disdain for Saddam’s crude autocracy had been outweighed by their fear of the even more dangerous forces embodied by the mullahs in Tehran. Neither was prepared to forgive their loans, nor to connive to inflate oil prices so that Iraq could pay its debt more easily. Saddam thus faced a desperate choice. Diverting oil revenues to service war debt would postpone Iraq’s economic recovery for years, if not decades, during which his hold on power would surely fail in the face of seething social unrest. Renouncing the debt would be equally fatal, as Iraq’s reconstruction depended on its ability to borrow additional money and attract foreign investment. Like the Arab League’s campaign to stifle Israel at birth (or, for that matter, the attempt by the Young Turks to grab the coat tails of the Central Powers in 1914), Saddam’s invasion of Iran had

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been a war of choice, an attempt to seize an opportunity created by unique circumstances. Once again, however, initial failure seemed to foreclose future choices. From Saddam’s perspective, the economic consequences of the First Gulf War had placed his own political survival at risk. He could see no escape except through another war. Iraq occupied Kuwait in August 1990, an operation that is barely remembered as an act of war, so paltry were Kuwait’s means of resistance.25 Saddam had preceded his demarche with an escalating series of threats directed at Kuwait and the Saudis, and it is likely that the moderation with which these were received contributed to Saddam’s confidence that he knew where he stood: by the 1990s, the routine bellicosity of Middle Eastern politics had created conditions in which statements that would cause pandemonium if put in the mouths of Western or Asian statesmen were greeted with smooth complacency when uttered by Arabs or Iranians. In any event, Saddam had once again misjudged the odds. Kuwait was not a pariah state like post-revolutionary Iran, but a member in good standing at the United Nations, whose Charter is especially emphatic in forbidding the naked transgression of international frontiers. That Kuwait controlled an appreciable share of the world’s known oil reserves, and was on excellent terms with the major oil-importing states, also counted in favor of a rescue. Worst of all, Saddam had chosen a moment at which the United States, having shed the restraint imposed by its long confrontation with the Soviets, enjoyed exceptional freedom of action. No veil of neutrality would be required this time. Thus America’s president declared that Saddam’s action “will not stand,” and so it did not.26 In military terms, Iraq’s defeat in the Second Gulf War was so overdetermined as scarcely to require explanation. Saddam’s hold on Kuwait lasted as long as it did (the last Iraqi soldiers departed on February 27, 1991) only because of the time required for the US to assemble a suitable array of coalition partners, which it judged necessary to legitimize the war politically (and which also eased its financing). The resulting delay provided ample opportunity for Saddam to withdraw his forces—there was never any question military action would be required to liberate Kuwait—and the fact that he did not do so is suggestive of how far war had become normalized in the region. Saddam may have been an outstandingly bad judge of how the world works, but he had a shrewd appreciation of the local requirements for his own political survival. He calculated that it would be easier to play the great man in the wake of defeat than to avoid defeat by giving way. Saddam’s attitude of militant defiance in the face of American power served him well for a time. It allowed him to weather the many measures—economic sanctions, no-fly zones, weapons inspections—that were put in place after the war to prevent Iraq from again threatening its neighbors; measures that might easily have ruined a regime less adept at the politics of bluster and fear. There is a risk, however, that perpetually rattling a broken saber may persuade people that the saber has somehow been mended, particularly if their overall level of anxiety has been heightened in the meantime. Some such dynamic seems to have been in play in the run-up to the Iraq war of 2003, by which Saddam’s government was overthrown, and Iraq occupied by the armed forces of the United States and a (rather modest) assortment of allies. Still, it is difficult to draw a firm line between Saddam’s defeat in 1991 and his destruction twelve years later. The most palpable connection runs through the continued deployment of substantial American forces in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States following Iraq’s defeat. Their lingering presence would later be cited by al-Qaeda as one of the reasons for its attack upon the United States in September 2001. But this would not in itself explain a further war against Iraq, whose alleged involvement with al-Qaeda has not stood up to careful scrutiny. Neither has the more central claim—which became the war’s chief justification—that Iraq had developed a clandestine nuclear weapons program of sufficient maturity to threaten the United States and its allies. The origins of the Iraq war remain too politically contested to allow any sort of dispassionate judgment to be attempted. The war’s most bitter critics hold that it was, in essence,

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a product of deliberate deception calculated to strengthen America’s grip on Middle Eastern oil; while its most adamant defenders declare that the details of Saddam’s conduct are largely irrelevant, given the incontestable evil of his regime, and his proven record of reckless violence, which could not be tolerated in a world living in the shadow of Islamist terrorism. Even those who regard the war as simply a mistake disagree on whether the mistake was an honest one—the product of flawed intelligence or a bad “decision-making process”—or one born of culpable carelessness and credulity, as exemplified by the exaggerated trust placed in the self-interested tales told by Iraqi exiles.27 The one thing of which we can be sure is that the future historiography of the Iraq war will turn on a question whose answer cannot now be guessed: is it the last of the oil wars, or merely a step toward their further escalation? That the Iraq war is about oil is beyond argument: an American army is now camped astride the Tigris only because of that ocean of oil whose future Saddam cast into doubt when he attacked Iran in 1980. Sorting out whatever fears and demons may have finally pushed the US over the brink will prove far less important than the arrangements for that oil’s reintegration into world markets—a process that, needless to say, represents the only path to recovery for the Iraqi people as well. It is the protection of those markets that is America’s chief interest in the Gulf. The United States does not require cheap oil, nor dear. What it requires is oil whose price is set by an uncoerced market in which the interests of buyers and sellers are represented sufficiently well that all parties are willing to accept the result without recourse to violence. That it has itself chosen violence to achieve this end is disconcerting to other market participants, however, and it will be their reactions that ultimately determine the success or failure of the whole venture. So far, those reactions have been muted, except in Iran, where the embers of its dying revolution have been rekindled in the form of a revived nuclear program that neither the United States nor Israel seems inclined to tolerate. The Iraq war is widely thought to have diminished America’s standing in the world; but it is well to remember that that standing was very high to begin with, and that, despite widespread disillusionment, no concerted efforts to restrain or punish the US have emerged. Nevertheless, if the history of war in the Middle East has any general meaning, it is that the consequences of war can accumulate for a very long time, in ways that are impossible for belligerents to anticipate or manage. The Iraq war is far from over, and its full consequences will not become apparent until long after the last shot is fired.

Notes 1 Efraim and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): 105–38; and David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Avon Books, 1989): 54–76. 2 On American attitudes and experiences, see Michael Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007): 325–50. The authoritative account of the Armenian genocide is Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995). 3 Norman Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press): 42–56. 4 Gary Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa’ud (London: Frank Cass, 1976). 5 On the British exercise of its mandate in Iraq, see Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 30–77; and Reeva Spector Simon, Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins of Tyranny (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 6 Yehoshua Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, 1930–1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1986): 162–75. 7 John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency from Palestine to Northern Ireland (New York: Palgrave, 2002): 3–30. 8 The best accounts of the 1948 war are David Tal, War in Palestine 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2004); and Benny Morris, 1948: The First Arab–Israeli War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 9 See Benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 10 See Michael Oren, The Origins of the Second Arab–Israeli War: Egypt, Israel, and the Great Powers, 1952–56 (London: Frank Cass, 1992); and David Tal, ed., The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East (London: Frank Cass, 2001).

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11 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, op. cit.: 510–17. 12 See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998): 1–99; and Warren Bass, Support any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.–Israel Alliance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 13 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 33–169. 14 Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War of Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967–2007 (New York: Nation Books, 2007). 15 On the genesis of the PLO, see Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): 71–242, and the “genealogical diagram,” xliii. 16 This seemingly unmotivated retreat has caused speculation that Syria was responding to an Israeli threat of nuclear retaliation. See, for instance, Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1998): 232. 17 The Soviet–American confrontation during the 1973 war has been compared, with reason, to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. See Robert Weinland, “Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War,” Professional Paper No. 221 (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, June 1978); online at www.cna.org/search. aspx?catalog=publications&keywords=disposition&pubSearch$begin= 18 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, op. cit.: 539. 19 On the first Lebanon war, see Trevor Dupuy and Paul Martel, Flawed Victory: The Arab–Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon (Fairfax, VA: Nova Publications, 1986); and Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970–1985, rev. edn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). On the 2006 war, see Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 20 PLO leader Yasser Arafat was not alone in calling for Sadat’s assassination, which was accomplished in 1981 by an Egyptian member of Islamic Jihad. See Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982): 291–314. 21 See Peter Hünseler, “The Historical Antecedents of the Shatt al-Arab Dispute,” in M. S. El Azhary, ed., The Iran– Iraq War: An Historical, Economic, and Political Analysis (London: Routledge, 1984): 8–19. 22 On the origins and course of the war, see Stephen Pelletierre, The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum (New York: Praeger, 1992); and Efraim Karsh, The Iran–Iraq War, 1980–88 (London: Osprey, 2002). 23 See Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (London: Touchstone Books, 1990). 24 Martin S. Navias and E. R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping During the Iran–Iraq Conflict, 1980– 88 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996): esp. 70–101. 25 Kuwait’s army numbered about 16,000 versus perhaps one million Iraqis. It is nevertheless odd that even good histories sometimes speak of the war beginning in 1991. See, for instance, Alastair Finlan, The Gulf War 1991 (London: Osprey, 2003). The best general account is Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–91: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 26 President George H. W. Bush, Remarks on the South Lawn of the White House (August 5, 1990), online at www. margaretthatcher.org/archive/displaydocument.asp?docid=110704. 27 No one can say which among the multitude of early accounts of the Iraq war will stand the test of time. Obvious candidates would have to include George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005); Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006); Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008); and Dexter Filkin, The Forever War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008).

7

Globalization as a mediating force in US–MENA relations Anoushiravan Ehteshami

Introduction In the aftermath of the cold war and 9/11, regional Middle East and North Africa (MENA) politics have changed substantially, which at one level has widened the strategic arena of the traditional Middle East and Arab regions to incorporate the Caspian region as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. This greater Middle East will remain at the heart of global strategy for some decades yet; this is indisputable, for a ‘new strategic map’ is said to be emerging ‘that assures that the Middle East will remain a prize in an emerging international system whose future contours are not yet clear’.1 Developments and events in this wider region will therefore continue to cast a long shadow over much of the global order in the twenty-first century, disrupting and challenging it in equal measure. In this, at least, little has changed since the last century. In terms of its geopolitical worth and the vast hydrocarbon deposits it harbours, the greater Middle East will continue to leave a direct mark on the workings of the international order and by the same token on the progress and effects of globalization. It is for these reasons that the region will form a core area of the international system. Add to this the geopolitical effects of the region’s own political and security idiosyncrasies – from the strategic consequences of a nuclear Iran, competing interests of the Arab and non-Arab actors of the area, rise of Islam in the political process, to the spread of inter-religious strife from Iraq – and one is faced with an intricate set of potential problems emanating from these Eurasian crossroads. Thus, says Cohen, the Middle East forms a primary ‘shatterbelt’ region, crushed ‘between outside interests’ while also lacking unity of action.2 It is thus also highly penetrated. Brown noted in 1984 that the ‘diplomacy of the region is characterized by an exaggerated conflation of seemingly minor issues and major international concerns. The boundaries dividing local, national, regional and international are blurred’.3 What an astute observation. The blurring of these boundaries creates direct links between the ‘seemingly minor issues’ (say the victory of Hamas in Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006) and the big issues (say the impact of this victory on regional politics and on the West’s ability to manage the implementation of the 2003 ‘road map’ as the only viable plan for the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict). But it is also partly because of the impact that the region has had on the smooth operation of the international system, in geopolitical ‘heartland–rimland’ face-off fashion. We must note the ways in which its internal dynamics have come to play an important or even a pivotal role in determining global power relations, whether at crucial junctures in the period 1900–45, during the cold war itself,4 or in the context of post-cold war developments in which the new era’s first inter-state conflict (that of occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990) marked its first watershed. This event led directly to the largest American military action since the Second World War and the arrival of what President George Bush referred to in March 1991 as a New World Order of ‘justice and fair play’. Far from the region losing its strategic shine after the cold war, as was anticipated by some commentators, it can be argued that

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indeed the reverse has happened. As will be shown, security-related and wider socio-economic developments in the region have in fact enhanced its strategic significance, leading to the centralization of its importance in global terms since 9/11.

Globalization and the Middle East Globalization is defined here as a dynamic and on-going process of rapid change. It is a ‘leveller’ at the same time as a ‘differentiator’; a reducer of time and space. But it is also a fragmenter of regions, nation-states and communities; a global force that can at the same time touch every individual on the planet; a powerful transborder force in the face of the territorial state; and a ‘villagizer’ of the world without a predetermined agenda; a force that can be ridden but not necessarily controlled. Globalization therefore has been seen as a powerful force that is bringing with it the momentum for change in the MENA region. It is evident that this force will bring in its wake some radical and quite possibly rather destabilizing transformations. It may be too premature to claim that globalization may undo the state structures as developed since the 1920s. But it is not too far-fetched to argue that existing state forms will be challenged by globalization. It may weaken the grip of ruling elites on political levers of power, or even brush some aside if their feeble resistance fails to mount a constructive challenge to the forces unleashed by globalization. The MENA region has many deep socio-economic and political problems, which are being compounded by the force of globalization and the region’s geopolitical vulnerabilities in terms of penetration and domination by outside powers. The key outside actor in this region is of course the United States, which for some years now has acted as a local MENA power, having established a deep military, economic and political presence in the region. But the US is also the main engine and driver of globalization, a champion of it. Its globalizing role has tended to complicate even further the US’s relationship with the Middle East – a region that is still rather shy of globalization. The region’s relationship with the outside world has been further complicated by 9/11 and what followed the terrorist attacks – most notably, the US’s new security paradigms of democratization in the Arab world and the war on terror. Globalization has exposed the region’s economic weaknesses, posing serious challenges to its leaders in terms of finding workable strategies for effective competition in today’s globalized market.5 The introduction of some economic reforms, notes Looney: has resulted in many key [MENA] countries being exposed to some of the competitive rigors of international competition, while at the same time not possessing the domestic institutions capable of enabling the countries to take advantage of opportunities opened up by increased integration into the world system. This has resulted in a negative perception of globalization throughout most of the region.6 Globalization also has exposed the distance that they have to travel in order to be able to climb up the international ladder of economic success and prosperity. But at the same time, globalization has challenged the very roots of many MENA societies, shaking to their foundations the region’s dominant socio-economic structures and cultural norms. In one respect, globalization has challenged the patriarchal foundations of the MENA region’s Muslim societies, questioning, for example, the legal–judicial subordination of women in society. In doing so, cultural norms are being threatened, but so too are the very economic frameworks of social and labour organization. Globalization has also challenged the étatist, rent-driven states of the region. The reason being that globalization is challenging a peculiar form of MENA political economy in which the state has become the central controlling force in society. Not only does the state enjoy a virtual monopoly of coercion, it also has a vast economic power base as the

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‘owner of the basic industries, source of all major investments, only international borrower, and provider of essential services’, to quote Hisham Sharabi.7 Thanks to the rapid accumulation of rent from the 1960s onwards, the state began to closely mimic the bourgeoisie – indeed slowly replacing the traditional bourgeois forces in many Muslim societies – thus becoming the largest employer in more than a dozen MENA countries, the main player of the political arena and also the monopole of political power. A ‘state bourgeoisie’ came into being, tightening its grip on power through the bureaucracy and the armed forces. In Barakat’s words, ‘instead of protecting the big traditional bourgeoisie, modern armies [i.e. the state] became the instruments of its elimination in several Arab countries’.8 In the same process, the state became the new dominant social force, also acquiring independent powers over civil society. The balance had been tipped in favour of the corporatist state. It is this large corporatist state and the interests that sustain it which is threatened by globalization.

Between globalization and the United States Over recent years, it can be argued, globalization, helped along by the Bush administration’s regional reform agenda post-9/11, has come to challenge the Middle East state’s grip over civil society in very direct ways. Although globalization’s presence might have been seen as inevitable and ultimately one of ‘benign presence’ to be managed somehow, President Bush’s sweeping agenda could hardly have been seen as anything but active intervention in the region. And indeed, this is how it was seen by even Washington’s close Arab allies. The US’s push for the introduction of reforms in the Muslim Middle East, even more heavily trailed in President Bush’s second term than his first, was consistent with the much feared globalization push. Combined, they have proved to be as destabilizing as any force the MENA region has been exposed to since the early 1900s. After 2002, President Bush was very consistent in his message to the region and the wider world: reform or be forced to change. He spelt out his message on many occasions during his presidency, most notably in his high-profile presentation at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, in the final few months of his first term in office: Our strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror, especially in the broader Middle East. Parts of that region have been caught for generations in a cycle of tyranny and despair and radicalism. When a dictatorship controls the political life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from their social and economic failures, dictators place blame on other countries and other races, and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This status quo of despotism and anger cannot be ignored or appeased, kept in a box or bought off, because we have witnessed how the violence in that region can reach easily across borders and oceans. The entire world has an urgent interest in the progress, and hope, and freedom in the broader Middle East. The advance of hope in the Middle East requires new thinking in the region. By now it should be clear that authoritarian rule is not the wave of the future; it is the last gasp of a discredited past … It should be clear that economic progress requires political modernization, including honest representative government and the rule of law. And it should be clear that no society can advance with only half of its talent and energy – and that demands the full participation of women. The advance of hope in the Middle East also requires new thinking in the capitals of great democracies – including Washington, DC. By now it should be clear that decades of excusing and accommodating tyranny, in the pursuit of stability, have only led to injustice and instability and tragedy … It should be clear that the best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance and hope kindled in free societies.9

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In pursuing reform, the president was indeed wishing to cure exactly what intellectuals and activists in the region had been diagnosing for some time as the region’s grave disease, namely that: Arab citizens have been rendered powerless because they have been excluded from the political process. Marginalized, and isolated from the human and material resources civil society should place at their disposal, the people of the area suffer from state tyranny over society … the affairs of the community and society have ceased to be their own.10 The Bush administration in effect was trying to undo the very étatist and corporatist structures and systems that Barakat, Sharabi (and many others) have identified as the key causes of the MENA region’s problems. Globalization, for all its dangers, can however offer a way through the rather bleak picture gleaned from a political economy study of the region. Instead of reinforcing the impasse in the Arab and Muslim Middle East, globalization can be the crossroads of opportunity for the region, and it can be so in so far as it does encourage the empowerment of the individual in society. In this, women can become full partners in the social contract, and civil society can be helped to grow. But a precondition would have to be for the region’s articulated modes of production – being a mixture of pre-capitalist and capitalist structures – sufficiently to become more capitalist as to enable independent socio-economic actors (women, a bourgeoisie free of state control, etc.) to forge the expansion of civil society. This could happen with more globalization of the region and not less. Nazih Ayubi has cautiously noted that ‘what has tilted the balance towards more democracy in recent years [in the Middle East] has been the growing globalisation and undisputed ideological hegemony of the “West” following the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe’.11 But at the same time, he has warned that democratization through globalization is not inevitable in the Middle East, and that it will be difficult, to say the least, to remove the clientalization of society to the ‘producer–distributor’ state.12 His prediction, sadly, has come to pass, and we now see that democratization is proving to be a difficult process to internalize in the MENA region. Furthermore, the notion of an independent bourgeoisie that can grow in the shadow of the state could prove to be less than a championing class for civil society. Inevitably, any independent MENA bourgeoisie will remain dependent on the state for prosperity and for protection against foreign competition, even if offered in a limited form. Thus, while the comprador bourgeoisie, aligned to the state, may seek ways of using globalization and American pressure to prize open the state sector, so long as its commercial operations remain located in the international orbit, it will be unable to midwife a new political economy at home. It is in effect at arm’s length from the national economy. The real irony is that the social force that is ready and waiting to undertake this role is the Islamist parties, which are of course closely associated with the besieged traditional middle classes across the Muslim Middle East. They not only support small businesses but also the traditional values of Muslim societies. In Iran, the alliance between them and the radical section of the religious establishment generated an unstoppable revolutionary force in 1979. Elsewhere, this alliance may be more opaque but equally real, and its power visible just beneath the veneer of the state. Although not anti-capitalist, they are, by persuasion, largely anti-globalization. How this force may face up to the challenge of the ‘modern woman’ in a more liberalized social and political environment, of course, marks another of the unique challenges facing the Middle East. Furthermore, based on its historic legacies, the MENA region should not find interaction with other cultures and polities difficult, or even threatening. It has a long history of engagement with the outside world – from China to the heart of Europe, from southern Africa to the Iberian Peninsula. Before Islam, its empires ruled the modern world and, after the rise of Islam, it assimilated other peoples and cultures to build monumental towers of knowledge and

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science. The arts and literature, as symbols of a confident social order, flourished. From the sixteenth century, of course, it was the Europeans who arrived in force, slowly taking control of the region’s destiny. In spite of the Middle East’s rejection of colonialism, the region did adapt to European ways – Mohammed Ali in Egypt, Kamal Atatürk in Turkey, Reza Khan in Iran, and Habib Bourgiba in Tunisia – were the pioneers of the assimilation process, often making very lasting impressions as one looks at these countries today. The Europeans also located and provided the means for extracting the region’s most valuable and sought after commodity, petroleum. In more recent times, thanks to oil, the region has had intensive interaction with the outside world, and the geopolitics of oil put the Persian Gulf at the forefront of these interactions. Indeed, the Gulf sub-region has emerged as the Middle East’s most dynamic economy since the late 1990s, and the oil monarchies of the Gulf have since led the globalizing tendencies of the region, in the process sucking in some economic sectors of other Arab countries (construction, financial services, tourism and telecoms in Egypt, Syria and North Africa are prime examples) as well. To be sure, the region has adopted modern ways in politics, economic relations, planning and the fundamental systems of social renewal. In education, training, public administration, public policy, public health, etc., the MENA states have scored notable successes, often easily mirroring developments in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Yet today, the region is weak on the inside and exposed on the outside. Its economies are in urgent need of rapid and comprehensive reform, its public organizations need overhaul, its political systems need to become more open and transparent, and its leaders more accountable and receptive. The regional states need to find employment for their large armies of unemployed, and need to keep their many hundreds of thousands of young people engaged. The regional states need to relearn the art of scientific enquiry; need to replenish their cultural reservoirs and need to give their people hope and a brighter future. Into the midst of these fundamental problems has come globalization as a powerful, corrosive, destabilizing and imposing force, challenging the region’s political orders, its economic foundations and its cultural underpinnings. As a dam-busting force, globalization is showing its ability to threaten the jealously guarded territorial state – ‘having … come to terms with the modern territorial state … Muslims now must readjust to the decentralizing pressures of globalization’13 – which can unwittingly loosen the grip of the power elite on the polity. The elite is feeling the chill and is seemingly grappling to respond to the challenges as creatively as it possibly can. But what it feels comfortable in attempting may be too limited in terms of the depth and dimensions of the problems it faces. This will be partly due to the role that security has come to play in this region. We have seen that post-9/11 (in)security, defined in a geopolitical context, has overridden the implementation of the many urgent reforms needed for riding the globalization tiger. Yet, without the reforms, the ability to achieve long-term and durable security, in its social as well as political contexts, may prove impossible. The vicious circle of crisis management will not be broken without fundamental reforms of the region’s very basic socio-economic systems. There is nevertheless widespread recognition of the task ahead. Indeed, even the original 2004 Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) of the Bush administration acknowledged the difficulties to be overcome. Yet, the region itself remains seemingly paralyzed in its ability to deal with its many problems. While its leaders object to what they regard as outside interference, they consistently fail – as a group – to articulate a coherent response to the political, socio-economic and security dilemmas facing the region and, by extension, virtually every member of the MENA sub-system. Ironically, in their collective paralysis, they leave the door wide open for outside forces to pile on the pressure.

GMEI: old message in a new bottle? One result of the region’s profound problems will be that MENA elites will probably find it increasingly difficult to provide economic (and physical) security nets for their citizens in return

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for their acceptance of political apathy, tolerance of corrupt practices and the exercise of economic power by ruling circles. This is so despite the rapid rises in oil prices since 2004. As Cordesman notes with reference to one of the richest oil states of the last 100 years: Saudi Arabia is no longer ‘oil wealthy’ in the sense that its present economy can provide for its people. The doubling of Saudi Arabia’s population and worldwide cuts in real oil prices have reduced its per capita earnings from petroleum exports from $24,000 in 1980 to $2,300 in 2002 … It no longer can provide social services, modernize and expand its infrastructure, and diversify its economy without major economic reform and foreign investment. Such reform and investment is critical to Saudi internal stability, but it requires US support.14 Despite relatively high prices since 2002, to a large extent, the picture that Cordesman has painted does still hold true for, as Malik and Niblock note, reforms and high oil prices will not remove the need for a new ‘social contract … between the state and the population, encompassing political and economic dimensions’ of the Saudi state’s role in society.15 The same story can be repeated for four other oil-rich MENA states: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. In Iran’s case, the conservative Heritage Foundation’s 2003 ‘economic freedom’ index pointed out that, among 155 countries, Iran came in at 148 for its economic standing in the world.16 Since 2005, of course, and the Ahmadinejad administration’s mismanagement of the economy and the country’s international relations, the situation has gone from bad to worse – if that were possible – and has turned Iran into one of the weakest economic entities in the entire region. Algeria, Iraq and Libya, alongside many other Arab states, are either beginning the long process of transition or still contemplating it. All four countries, however, need massive injections of foreign capital and know-how if they are to remain big players in the oil market in the twenty-first century, despite the heady oil prices of over $100 per barrel mid-decade. Iraq is slowly but surely responding to these challenges, and Libya and Algeria are poised to reconnect fully with Western corporate partners – a reality that Secretary of State Rice’s August 2008 trip to Libya was designed to underline. But all three face severe problems of a political nature and at its heart the problem is one of continuity beyond the current leaders. Socio-economic and political problems will of course be compounded as population growth begins to outstrip economic performance and overrun each country’s plans to generate the millions of new jobs needed each year.17 This is not a passing problem, for new data suggest that the population of the region is exploding beyond the control of the states to manage its impact. By 2050, Saudi Arabia is set to have a population of 50 million (doubling between 2005 and 2050), Yemen is set to grow to 71 million (rising by 243 per cent), Egypt is to grow to 126 million (from 74 million in 2005), and Iraq is projected to reach 64 million (rising by 121 per cent between 2005 and 2050).18 The three small Gulf Arab states of Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE are to see their populations grow from 7.9 million in 2005 to 17.5 million in 2050. The Arab world needs to generate some 100 million new jobs over the next two decades to cope with the current population bulge, let alone trying to manage and cope with the numbers that are to come through by the mid-twenty-first century. As a consequence, and in the course of the predictable tensions, some countries will close up, adopting a defensive posture, while in others reforming elites will break rank and openly pursue a more liberal and forward-looking approach. But, as was indirectly asked earlier, can such schemes as the United States 2004 ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ help in advancing the cause of reform, or do they hinder it? The initiative, first brought to light by Vice President Dick Cheney at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos in January 2004, was called ‘the most ambitious U.S. democracy effort since the end of the cold war’.19 Its existence was made public a year after the Arab world’s own ‘Arab Charter’, which Saudi Arabia tabled in January 2003. The charter, which was seen as a revolution of sorts in its own right, had called for ‘internal reform and enhanced political participation in the Arab states’.20 The later US plan, in contrast, had encompassed a

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wide range of diplomatic, cultural and economic measures. The GMEI had deliberately moved the agenda on by calling for the United States and its European allies and partners (in the G8 Group, NATO and the EU) to press for and assist free elections in the Middle East (through support for civic education, the creation of independent election commissions in MENA countries and comprehensive voter registers), foster the growth of new independent media there, press for judicial reforms, help create a ‘literate generation’ by helping to cut regional illiteracy rates in half by 2010, train ‘literacy corps’ of around 100,000 female teachers by 2008, finance the translation of Western classical texts into Arabic to foster better understanding of the West among Muslims, establish a European-style Greater Middle East Development Bank, an International Finance Corporation (IFC)-style Greater Middle East Finance Corporation to assist the development of larger enterprises, and give $500 million in micro-loans to small entrepreneurs, especially women, in order to spur 1.2 million small entrepreneurs out of poverty. As reform of the region became a high US priority after 9/11, the launch of the GMEI should arguably be seen in the context of Washington’s desire to fast track and develop the reform process in the region. The concern from the region, however, was that the 2004 US initiative, as with its predecessor in 2003, tried to explain its logic in purely Western security terms. It stated, for instance, that ‘So long as the region’s pool of politically and economically disenfranchised individuals grows, we will witness an increase in extremism, terrorism, international crime and illegal migration’.21 Furthermore, there was a concern that the initiative perceived the region in largely cold war terms. For example, it spoke of creating MENA security structures based on the 1975 Helsinki process and NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. It anticipated that a complex set of security structures could bring six Middle East countries, including Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar and Israel, into partnership with NATO. But, leaving such prominent regional players as Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia out of the proposed regional security arrangements was always likely to fuel discontent, creating new divisions and breeding further instability across national boundaries. In the context of globalization and MENA fears of a political–cultural and economic invasion of the region, drawing parallels with the East–West Helsinki process did nothing to assuage fears; indeed, it accomplished the very opposite! On more than one occasion, regional policy makers stated that the Helsinki process first ended the alternative (Soviet-led) power bloc to the West and then caused an internal collapse of the Soviet Union. The concern raised by several leading Arab (and Iranian) policy makers is, ‘What’s in store for the Muslim world as well with this initiative?’.22 Also, how much notice the initiative would take of the situation on the ground in the Middle East, and how much attention it would give to the legitimate concerns of the region’s ruling regimes was another important concern.23 It was precisely because of the ambiguities attached to the original proposal that President Husni Mubarak of Egypt ‘denounced with force the ready-for-use prescriptions proposed abroad under cover of what are called reforms’.24 As he headed home from a meeting with the late King Fahd and the then Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, President Mubarak told Egyptian journalists: we hear about these initiatives as if the region and its states do not exist, as if they had no sovereignty over their land … these kinds of initiatives do not deserve a comment, [but] need to be confronted by scientific and convincing answers from thinkers, so as not to leave people to fall prey to misleading impressions and misconceptions disseminated by such initiatives. In Riyadh, an official Egyptian–Saudi statement noted that: imposing a certain model of reform on Arab and Islamic states from the outside is unacceptable … [Arab countries are] progressing on the road to development, modernisation and reform, but in a way that is compatible with the needs, interests, values and identities of their peoples.25

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The voices of some other Arab leaders, including those from Jordan, Morocco, and Syria, were added to this objection, all rejecting the plan as an external imposition as the news of it began to filter out in February 2004. It was consequently editorialized that: no matter how well-intended the Americans and Europeans say their initiatives are, it will take more than words to comfort sceptical Arab rulers and a worried Arab public. The regimes see many signs suggesting that the United States is determined to enforce change or ‘reforms’, while the public—initially desperate for real reforms—suspect that the foreign calls for democracy are only an excuse to interfere in the region and redraw it in accordance with the West’s own interests. The occupation of Iraq and the disinterest in Palestinian suffering have reinforced those fears.26 Former US National Security Advisor and a respected strategist, Zbigniew Brzezinkski, added that: There is no question that the [US] administration has its work cut out for it. For starters, the democracy initiative was unveiled by the president in a patronizing way: before an enthusiastic audience at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington policy institution enamored of the war in Iraq and not particularly sympathetic toward the Arab world. The notion that America, with Europe’s support and Israel’s endorsement, will teach the Arab world how to become modern and democratic elicits, at the very least, ambivalent reactions. (This, after all, is a region where memory of French and British control is still fresh.)27 Yet, as the initiative provided the first indication of a concerted drive to reform the region, many civil society groups and liberal voices in the region came (albeit quietly at first) to welcome the GMEI, with the proviso that it must enjoy ‘high local content’. According to the Al-Ahram newspaper in Egypt, at least one opposition leader welcomed the initiative, noting that, ‘sadly enough, it was only this kind of pressure that forced [Egypt’s ruling party] to finally relinquish its 22 years of stubborn refusal to embrace any kind of political reform, establish a human rights council and allow a remarkable amount of press freedom’.28 The German partner of the GMEI had this factor in mind when he presented its content to the Egyptians in terms of the two highly critical Arab Human Development Reports (AHDRs).29 It is said that ‘by 12 February, German ambassador to Cairo Martin Cobler had given Osama El-Baz, President Mubarak’s chief political adviser, a copy of the new US–EU transatlantic initiative’. He had told officials that the initiative aimed at securing a full partnership between the transatlantic coalition and the greater Middle East, ‘in the light of US and European consensus that reforming the Middle East must be a top priority’. He is reported to have said that this is so ‘because reform is the basic measure required for uprooting terrorism, which is a danger to both the West and the Arab world’. Cobler had also explained that, in order to achieve the objective of reforms, the GMEI would attempt to adopt recommendations made by the two AHDRs, which he said ‘discuss educational reform programmes, democratisation and human rights schemes, as well as the need to strengthen the region’s entrepreneurial and economic capabilities’.30 But a sceptical commentator soon questioned the integrity of the linkage being drawn with the AHDRs. It was stated that ‘any honest reading of the report(s) would show that [they] … said that the Israeli occupation is the greatest obstacle to human development in Arab countries’, and using the UN reports in this context is ‘like a drunkard leaning on a lamppost, to save himself from falling, and not for enlightenment’.31 Not surprisingly, the GMEI initiative in its ‘American format’ was soon shelved, to be replaced with a much more ‘regional friendly’ package adopted at the Sea Island, Georgia (USA) G8 summit in June 2004, which was again endorsed at the NATO summit in Turkey later that same year.

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The title shift from the ‘greater’ to the ‘broader’ Middle East was the signal that the new initiative was not as sweeping and geographically encompassing as was first envisaged.32 The new document was significant in one other way as well, and this is important in terms of testing the US’s moral standing in the Middle East, for the focus of the initiative shifted rather dramatically also. Now the initiative was leaning towards building regional structures, much more in keeping with the EU’s outlook, and away from the US’s initial reordering of the regional agenda outlined above. Despite the dramatically milder initiative, however, and the Arab League’s endorsement of the calls for region-wide reforms at its Tunis summit in May 2004, Washington continued to press on with its own democratization agenda for the region, openly pressing ally and foe alike to open up or accelerate the pace of reform. This again featured heavily in 2006, forming a main plank of the President’s State of the Union address in January. He again drew a strong link between terrorism and reform, stating that: Ultimately, the only way to defeat the terrorists is to defeat their dark vision of hatred and fear by offering the hopeful alternative of political freedom and peaceful change. So the United States of America supports democratic reform across the broader Middle East. Elections are vital, but they are only the beginning. Raising up democracy requires the rule of law, and protection of minorities, and strong, accountable institutions that last longer than a single vote.33 To be fair, President Bush’s vision was consistent with earlier US attempts to change the world in America’s image. Soon after the start of the cold war, and well before President Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ typology of the 1980s, the right had begun a wide-ranging assault on Marxism. By adopting a Marxian lexicon for referring to the expansionist zeal of the Soviet Union (calling it imperialist for example), these forces slowly but surely made of the Soviet state and its successor states their own allies in the globalization process. As Stephen Ambrose noted, those Americans who ‘wanted to bring the blessings of democracy, capitalism, and stability to everyone [advocated that] the whole world … should be a reflection of the United States’.34

Globalization and the MENA region crossroads A main fear in the region since 9/11 has been that the West’s plans for the region are halfbaked at best. The case in point has been developments in the Arab–Israeli arena. The initial EU–US plans have been seen in the Arab world as putting the cart before the horse, particularly as they seem to correspond with the long-held neoconservative view that reforming the Arab world would somehow create a magical solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Within the region, the reverse argument is the one that holds true. As a senior member of Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (Mohamed Abdellah) and an American ally have put it, ‘The Bush administration’s talk of peace, democracy and freedom in the Arab world will be pointless as long as Israelis and Palestinians remain committed to slaughtering each other every day’.35 The same view has been expressed in European capitals too. The French Foreign Minister of the time (later prime minister of the republic), Dominique de Villepin, echoed the same concern when he said: ‘If we want to be credible, we can’t ignore the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Re-creating a dynamic for peace is an indispensable condition for any initiative in the region’.36 We can go back to the start of President Bush’s re-engagement with the issue and see that, although the G8 and NATO summits of 2004 did mention the need to resolve the Israeli– Palestinian conflict, it was not until the death of the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, in November 2004 that real momentum in their bilateral relations was in evidence. But without outside, in particular US, commitment, the road map did not by itself lead to the establishment

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of the state of Palestine or final peace. Indeed, within fourteen months of the Palestinian leader’s death, the reverse had seemed to be in progress. In January 2006, the rejectionist Islamist group Hamas had entered the Palestinian parliament as its largest bloc, had formed the authority’s new government and fundamentally challenged the very basis of the road map, and also the foundations on which the whole peace process had been built since the Madrid discussions of 1991. The Annapolis (Maryland) peace summit in the autumn of 2007 was to end all the doubts, bringing together the Quartet (EU, US, Russia and the UN) with the Israelis and Palestinians as well as Saudi Arabia and Syria and a host of other Arab countries to negotiate the ‘final status’ of the territories. It was announced then that, by the end of 2008 (and the end of the Bush presidency), the two states of Israel and Palestine would be living side by side and in peace. Although the parties present may have believed this timetable, few pundits familiar with the region took this initiative seriously and, sadly, it is the realists who have been proved right as we saw the hope of a viable Palestinian state die with the Bush administration. Thus, without durable peace in this arena, the realization of alternative and better futures for the Middle East remains distant. Thus, it is ultimately to this geopolitical logjam that the Middle East crisis can objectively be reduced. Thus, we can discuss at length the many alternative futures awaiting the Middle East, and those dreamed up by the West, but the one initiative – over all others – that can surely unlock the region’s energies and help in releasing its tremendous spirit of enterprise is the resolution of the century-old Arab–Israeli conflict, and at its heart the creation of two secure and viable states in territories formerly known as the Palestine Mandate. For all the forward surges that globalization generates, in the strategically significant and still fragile MENA sub-system, it is the past that continues to haunt its future. Local and dominant outside powers alike must share responsibility for the region’s current predicament, and also bear the burden of freeing the region from decades of violence and insecurity. The historic irony is that without a ‘democratic peace’ in the Arab–Israeli conflict, and of course the other political fundamentals in place, globalization’s impact will probably continue to remain peripheral to the main forces shaping the region. As we have seen, globalization is certainly already felt across the region, but its force has not changed, transformed, the region. Few ‘tigers’ have ever emerged from this part of the world, and none is to be found over the horizon. De-globalization, therefore, could come to define the region’s exceptionalism (of its rich culture, religions and history) if that debate were to continue into the twenty-first century. Many observers would regard globalization’s inability to fundamentally change the MENA sub-system as the ultimate nightmare scenario to be avoided in the region, even if this was to be achieved at the cost of retaining American forces in the area. For them, neglect by the global forces of change is worse than engagement through force. Looking at the options, all that the MENA states have to do, it seems, is to find a mechanism for balancing the destabilizing force of globalization against the destabilizing impact of US domination. This is an act which few of them have ever mastered, or are likely to be able to do any time soon. But in the meanwhile, globalization marches on, and on, and on. Returning to the National Intelligence Council’s 2003 assessment (discussed in Chapter 8) finally – its conclusions that globalization will destabilize the region, that channels of communications and information transfer will ease the spread and adoption of extremist ideas, that war will remain a main feature of the region, and that the United States will remain a cause of tension in the area – do not, as a whole, bode well for those seeking to deepen the influence of the more extrovert, peaceful, and integrative tendencies in the region.37 Instead of playing a dangerous game by old rules, as Carl Brown has suggested, it is perhaps more appropriate today to suggest that, when it comes to this region, it is arguably many of the old games that are being played by new rules. In the context of such a gloomy diagnosis, while the inevitability of change and dynamism cannot be questioned, its direction and end-product certainly ought to be. In a globalized

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world of perpetual motion and uncertainty, the greater Middle East, and within it the MENA regional system, will be more than any other part of the world exposed to the dangers of stagnation at home and the frictions arising from a shrunken global time and space continuum. As Bahgat Korany notes, ‘in the globalisation era, MENA’s international relations cannot any longer be separated from type of regime and society’s good governance’.38 Against all the odds and despite the huge opportunities present, the patterns of the previous 200 years could well be repeated, stifling the region and setting back the clock for another generation or more.

Notes 1 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997): 349. 2 Saul Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided (New York, NY: Random House, 1963): 233. 3 L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984): 16. 4 Fred Halliday, ‘The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War’, in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, eds., The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): 6–26. 5 Clement M. Henry, ‘The Clash of Globalisations in the Middle East’, in Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 105–29. 6 Robert Looney, ‘Why has Globalization Eluded the Middle East?’ Strategic Insights, Vol. III, Issue 12, December 2004: 10. 7 Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988): 60. 8 Halim Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and the State (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993): 157. 9 ‘President Discusses War on Terror’, Speech delivered at the National Defense University, Washington, DC, 8 March 2005. 10 Ibid, p. 271. 11 Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995): 402. 12 Ayubi does however foresee a situation in which ‘defensive’ democratization – say in response to US and EU pressures since 9/11 – coinciding with ‘the need for positive and pro-active democratic transition’ at home come together to forge a proper democratic framework. Ibid, p. 414. 13 Simon W. Murden, Islam, the Middle East, and the New Global Economy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002): 205. 14 Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Ten Reasons for Reforging the US and Saudi Relationship’, Saudi-American Forum, 1 February 2004. 15 Monica Malik and Tim Niblock, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Economy: The Challenge of Reform’, in Paul A. Arts and Gerd Nonneman, eds, Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs (London: Hurst, 2005): 110. 16 ‘Iran’s Stagnant Economy’, IranMania.com, 12 January 2004. 17 According to Cordesman, ‘The US Census Bureau estimates that Saudi Arabia’s population has climbed from 6 million in 1970 to 22 million in 2004. Even if birth rates decline significantly in future years, it is expected to rise to 31 million in 2010, 42 million in 2020, and 55 million in 2030. The number of young Saudis between 15 and 24 years of age will nearly double from 3.6 million in 2000 to 6.3 million in 2025. This is in a society where the government estimates that unemployment for native Saudi males is already 12%, and many experts privately estimate that real and disguised unemployment is in excess of 20%’. See note 37. 18 Figures are drawn from Nicholas Nesson, ‘The Next Generation’, Arabies Trends, May 2006: 60–68. 19 Robin Wright, ‘U.S. Readies Push for Mideast Democracy Plan’, Washington Post, 28 February 2004. 20 Arab News, 17 January 2003. 21 Ibid. 22 Author’s conversations with officials from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. 23 To address such fears, US Secretary of State Colin Powell told the US-funded Al-Hurra Arabic satellite television that ‘I agree with the Egyptians and the Saudis that reform can not be imposed from outside, and that it has to be accepted from within. The initiative must be acceptable to all the countries in the region’. Quoted in Gamal Essam El-Din, ‘Asserting Home-grown Reform’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 4–10 March 2004. 24 Robin Wright, op. cit. 25 Gamal Essam El-Din, op. cit. 26 Khaled Ezzelarab, ‘Everyone Else Wants Reform’, Cairo Times, 26 February–3 March 2004. 27 ‘The Wrong Way to Sell Democracy to the Arab World’, New York Times, 8 March 2004. He further added that, ‘There are other reasons to be wary of the administration’s plan. Democracy, impatiently imposed, can lead to unintended consequences. If the Palestinians were able to choose a leader in truly free elections, might they not opt for the head of Hamas? If free elections were soon held in Saudi Arabia, would Crown Prince Abdullah, a reformer, prevail over Osama bin Laden or another militant Islamic leader? If not genuinely accepted and reinforced by traditions of constitutionalism, democracy can degenerate into plebiscites that only add legitimacy to extremism and authoritarianism’.

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28 Gamal Essam El-Din, ‘Reform and Reformulating’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 19–24 February 2004. 29 In terms of a sequence of events, in January, American and European officials met in Washington to work out the project’s details. For EU diplomats, the meeting had clarified an ambitious post-Iraq war idea being debated by the US administration. It was German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer who announced on 7 February 2004, however, that the US–EU GMEI was based largely on linking the existing NATO Mediterranean dialogue with the European Union’s Barcelona process (the former includes Israel, Egypt, Jordan and four North African states, while the latter also adds Syria and Lebanon). Fischer announced in several briefings that NATO would offer a security partnership, while the Barcelona process would lay the foundation for an economic partnership and a free trade area beginning in 2010. 30 Gamal Essam El-Din, op. cit. 31 Nader Fegani quoted in Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright, ‘Arabs and Europeans Question “Greater Middle East” Plan’, Washington Post, 22 February 2004. 32 The importance of the difference is highlighted by Völker Perthes, ‘America’s “Greater Middle East” and Europe: Key Issues for Dialogue’, Middle East Policy, Vol. XI, No. 3, Fall: 85–97. 33 ‘President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address’, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 31 January 2006: 3. 34 Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1985): xviii. 35 Ibid. ‘We don’t deny that the Arab world is still a long way from being a complete democracy, but we think it is the conflict with Israel that basically breeds terrorism and undemocratic politics’, added the Chairman of the Egyptian parliament’s Arab Affairs Committee. 36 German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, speaking at a conference in Munich in February 2004, underlined the same point: ‘The key regional conflict, namely the Middle East conflict, should neither be set aside nor allowed to block this initiative from the outset’. Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright, ‘Arabs and Europeans Question “Greater Middle East” Plan’, Washington Post, 22 February 2004. 37 CIA National Intelligence Council Discussion Paper, from the December 2003 Commonwealth Conference: ‘The Middle East to 2020’, MERIA News, Vol. 8, Issue 2, February 2004. 38 Bahgat Korany, ‘The Middle East Since the Cold War: Torn Between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics’, in Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 75.

8

Proliferation in the Persian Gulf and Middle East Challenges for US policy James A. Russell *

The new administration in Washington must confront many on-going problems from the start. Certainly topping the list of international issues is Iran’s continued march towards achieving a nuclear capability. Just as serious are the potential ripple effects throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf if Iran’s program is not significantly slowed or stopped. There are many bad outcomes to the situation, including the prospect of an Israeli military strike on Iran’s sites that could be a trigger to a wider regional war. Also near the top of any “bad outcomes” list is the prospect that, if Iran’s ambitions are not forestalled, then Saudi Arabia will feel compelled to take corresponding steps to ensure its deterrent capacity—just as it did in during the Iran–Iraq war when it acquired CSS-2 missiles from China. In conversations with American diplomats in Riyadh in early 2008, Senate researchers found that: “These diplomats repeatedly emphasized that an Iranian nuclear weapon frightens the Saudis ‘to their core’ and would compel the Saudis to seek nuclear weapons.”1 This report followed research in 2007 suggesting that, while other Gulf states take a somewhat less alarmist view about the prospects of an Iranian bomb, their equanimity becomes markedly less so in the event of corresponding Saudi action in response to Iran.2 The Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East today sit precariously perched on an uncertain nuclear threshold that may cause a variety of regional states to reconsider their nuclear status. A variety of issues frame the nuclear decision-making calculus for the region’s governing elites. Iran’s continued standoff with the international community over its refusal to honor its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty forms an overriding component of the strategic framework around which states are viewing the security environment. Another element is Israel’s nuclear program and its policy of preventing any regional state from threatening the Jewish state with nuclear weapons. Israel’s October 2007 strike against an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor provided only the latest reminder of Israel’s commitment to maintaining its regional nuclear monopoly. Another complicating element in the strategic framework is a resurgent interest in nuclear energy. During 2006 and 2007, thirteen states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region unexpectedly announced plans to pursue nuclear energy.3 Some of these plans admittedly represent a minimal proliferation threat. Various regional states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have all indicated that their programs would not include an indigenous uranium enrichment capability—a critical building block for a weapons program. Despite assurances by Middle Eastern regional leaders that their programs will represent “models” for other states seeking peaceful nuclear programs,4 however, many fear that these programs create opportunities for clandestine nuclear programs and a new and destabilizing nuclear arms race.5 Last is the uncertain status of the security guarantees associated with the US strategic nuclear umbrella, which, while clearly extended to Israel, are on more uncertain footing relative to America’s Gulf and Middle Eastern partners. What is the security policy community to make of these dynamics in which proliferation, deterrence, extended deterrence, and conflict escalation are all interacting in a complex

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inter-state bargaining framework? When the region’s resurgent interest in nuclear power comes amidst an unstable strategic environment, policy makers should be justifiably concerned. When Iranian, US, and Israeli nuclear saber rattling is combined with the potential for a series of new regional nuclear programs, it is not so difficult for policy makers to imagine conditions leading to a cascading series of destabilizing steps as the region slips into an uncertain nuclear future.6 It should be emphasized that developments in the region come amid broader concerns that global efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons have failed and that the international regime to control the spread of nuclear weapons—the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—is in danger of becoming irrelevant. Reflecting this fear, some believe that the international system today sits precariously perched at a nuclear “tipping point” where states will abandon normative restraints against developing nuclear weapons, resulting in a “proliferation epidemic” and a world of many nuclear powers.7 The Middle East could today be at that tipping point. This chapter focuses specifically on the potential that the regime’s governing elites will seek to acquire their own nuclear deterrent in the event that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are not successfully forestalled. Policy makers and security studies scholars must deconstruct the dynamics of the unfolding situation as a first step in building policies to prevent the region from careering into an alternative future that features a dramatically altered and more dangerous nuclear posture. How are they to accomplish this? This chapter answers the question by applying a series of competing theoretical explanations for nuclear proliferation and assessing the implications they offer for policy prescriptions. The chapter argues that any successful approach to controlling proliferation and preventing a new nuclear arms race must recognize that the security dilemma of Middle Eastern states has been altered—perhaps permanently— by the US invasion of Iraq, the increased political influence of Iran, and the continued violent spiral in the Arab–Israeli dispute. These three factors have combined to create new internal political pressures on regional regimes while at the same time creating a new and disturbing regional distribution of power that is shaping the region’s approach to nuclear issues.8 Hence, this chapter argues that the regional approach to proliferation is being shaped simultaneously by two complementary forces: (1) changing internal political dynamics and (2) perceptions of a changed regional distribution of political and military power. Recognizing these forces is the crucial first step in developing policies that can mitigate the prospect of the further spread of nuclear weapons in the region.

Explanatory frameworks Political scientists apply a variety of theories to explain nuclear proliferation. These theories emphasize, on the one hand, forces external to the state, such as states’ pursuit of their security in the anarchical international system. Other arguments point to the importance of factors internal to the state, such as leader perceptions, behavioral norms, domestic and organizational politics that shape the decision-making calculus of leaders in ways that encourage them to pursue nuclear weapons.9 Political science has traditionally emphasized some variant of realist international relations theory to explain proliferation. Realism argues that states are primarily motivated by self-interest and exist in an anarchical, self-help system.10 The modern form of realism, the so-called “neorealist” paradigm developed by Kenneth Waltz, holds that actions taken by states to protect and enhance their security in turn create insecurity for surrounding states that causes states to balance and counterbalance each other in a never-ending cycle.11 Under this theory, the security dilemma of states and the relative distribution of power in the international system are a driving structural dynamic governing the interactions of states. States pursue security through a combination of arms buildups and political–military relationships with other strong states in alliances. Pursuit of nuclear weapons—the ultimate guarantor of state security—and/or nuclear partners is explained under realist theory as a

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logical result of states’ quest for security. That quest for security is operationalized by states’ political leadership using a rational decision-making process that apportions available resources to mitigate threats to the state. Waltz argued in 1981 that the underlying dynamics of the international system would inevitably result in a world of many nuclear states. He controversially suggested that nuclear proliferation would not necessarily lead to a more unstable international environment, as possession of nuclear weapons would make the costs of war unnecessarily high for states and would thus naturally weight the decision-making cost–benefit analysis of leaders against war.12 Other political scientists such as John Mearsheimer have offered variations on Waltz’s theme, noting that controlled proliferation could in certain cases stabilize international politics.13 Scott Sagan summarized the arguments behind this explanatory framework for nuclear proliferation as the “security model” for nuclear proliferation.14 Under neorealist theory, calculations about the relative balance of power between states form part of the explanatory logic of the paradigm as applied to nuclear proliferation. Kurt Campbell argued that the hegemonic power of the United States and the nature of its security policy constituted the most important factors for states in deciding whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons. Campbell stated unequivocally: Perhaps the most important ingredient in a new international attractiveness – or perceived necessity – of acquiring nuclear weapons is the question of the future direction of US foreign and security policy. For decades US friends and allies – such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Egypt and others – have come to depend on several aspects of American policy when making calculations about their own security and the question of foreswearing nuclear weapons. These aspects include the stability of the American nuclear deterrent and US security guarantees; US rhetorical commitment to, active pursuit of, and participation in global non-proliferation policies and regimes; American restraint in publicly contemplating the use of nuclear weapons, particularly against a state that does not possess weapons of mass destruction; and US commitments not to decouple US security from that of its allies through the development of defensive systems.15 Campbell’s logic draws upon the neorealist argument by emphasizing the role that US hegemonic power plays in the calculations that states make to ensure their security. Using Campbell’s neorealist logic, it follows that states will exercise nuclear restraint as long as they believe that the distribution of power in the international system remains heavily weighted in favor of the United States. The second half of the equation is equally important—that US hegemonic power be credibly operationalized through a security policy that provides security guarantees backed by a full range of military tools, including an extended nuclear deterrent.16 Stated differently, states will exercise restraint and regard US commitments as credible so long as they believe that the United States continues to exercise preponderant power relative to other actors. The opposite is also true under the argument, i.e., that a structural change in the global balance of power that undermined American power would lead to a decline in the credibility of the US extended deterrent posture, thereby removing a restraint to nuclear proliferation. While Campbell nods in the direction of other variables, such as a breakdown in the NPT, the erosion of regional or global security, domestic imperatives, and the availability of technology, he sides with the neorealists with his assertion that “[m]isgivings and concerns about the longterm direction of US policy on global strategy and nuclear policy are, and will continue to be, the single most decisive factor guiding the direction of would-be proliferators – both rogue and responsible.”17 In a variation on the neorealist theme, Benjamin Frankel argued in the early 1990s that nuclear proliferation was all but inevitable, suggesting that post-cold war structural dynamics would give added impetus to nuclear proliferation.18 Frankel argued that cold war nuclear

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guarantees extended by the United States and the Soviet Union represented a systemic and artificial restraint on the global demand for nuclear weapons. Frankel believed that the end of the cold war would force a reversion of the international system back to its truer anarchical form, a shift that would exacerbate the security dilemma of all states. States’ pursuit of security would inevitably take place within an international framework featuring increased technology flows that would spread weapons material and know-how around the world more easily than was the case during the cold war. The result, Frankel argued, would be an acceleration in the proliferation of nuclear and other unconventional weapons and the inevitable erosion of the NPT.19 An enduring critique of the realist and neorealist explanatory framework for proliferation (and other state behavior) is the short shrift the theory accords to internal factors such as domestic politics, organizational and bureaucratic dynamics, and leadership perceptions in shaping state responses to security threats.20 Scott Sagan drew upon these critiques in his argument that the explanatory power of the security model is incomplete: “Nuclear weapons, like other weapons are more than tools of national security: they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity.”21 Sagan proposed an additional “domestic politics model” of nuclear proliferation that partially draws upon the research of Morton Halperin, Graham Allison, and others, which explains state actions as the result of an intra-governmental bargaining process between and among civilian and military organizations.22 As noted by Sagan, domestic political actors and communities can coalesce around interests and positions that can shape the policies and programs of states in ways that can reinforce internal demand to acquire nuclear weapons.23 Acknowledging that the domestic politics model is incomplete and lacks theoretical depth, Sagan nonetheless encourages researchers to embrace an added layer of complexity introduced by these considerations into an explanatory framework of nuclear proliferation.24 Neoliberalists reject the realist characterization of the systemic anarchy that drives the dynamics of the security dilemma that inexorably propels states into friction in an environment governed by the balance of power and conflict. Neoliberals argue that systemic anarchy can in certain circumstances lead to co-operation and international regimes that can constrain competition and conflict.25 Neoliberals adopt some of the ideas of the constructivist school of political science, which holds that shared values and norms are the product of co-operation, and their resulting normative-based regimes such as the NPT can serve as useful vehicles to reduce the incentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons. Glen Chafetz articulated this point of view when he stated that “ … the pacifying effects of democracy and complex interdependence mean that the number of states fearful or ambitious enough to seek nuclear weapons will decline rather than increase as a result of the end of the cold war.”26 Chafetz argued that the development of behavioral norms within established democracies would manifest themselves in the form of political structures and ideologies that would make like-minded states less apt to fall prey to the neorealist bare-knuckle struggles for power and survival. These norms, Chafetz argued, would make states less drawn to nuclear weapons.27 Sagan offered up a third causative model for nuclear proliferation—“the norms model”— which emphasized the role of factors internal to the state, such as shared beliefs, symbols, and identity.28 As noted by Sagan: “According to this perspective, state behavior is determined not by leaders’ cold calculations about the national security interest or their parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international relations.”29 In a variation on this theme, Peter Lavoy points to the importance of “myth makers” in the elites of states in helping to create belief that nuclear status can help solve a state’s security problems.30 Etel Solingen argues that, in the Middle East, domestic processes and institutions may play an important role in shaping the region’s approach to nuclear weapons.31 She offers the hypothesis that “ … ruling coalitions pursuing

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economic liberalization are more likely to embrace regional nuclear regimes than their inward looking, nationalist, and radical–confessional counterparts.”32 In building a model focused on internal determinants affecting proliferation, others describe the argument as the “idealist” or “constructivist” proliferation framework, in which the key variable that determines whether states proliferate is the perception by the state leadership of the usefulness of the bomb and the symbolic role that nuclear weapons can play in state identity.33 These perceptions are shaped by international and domestic forces, but the “idealist” framework generally emphasizes the role that domestic political, economic, and cultural factors play in shaping leaders’ perceptions and the resulting cost–benefit calculus that frames decisions on whether and/or when to pursue nuclear weapons or, alternatively, to subscribe to a nuclear regime.34

A changing regional nuclear posture? In September 2006, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s son and presumed successor, Jamal Mubarak, announced Egypt’s intentions to revive its dormant nuclear program abandoned in 1986 with ambitious plans to build three nuclear power plants by 2020 that will generate 1800 megawatts of electricity. The first of these plans is to be located in the city of Al-Dabah. Mubarak’s announcement followed several forceful statements by the regime’s opponents calling for Egypt to develop its own nuclear deterrent. In July 2006, Dr. Hamdi Hassan, spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary caucus, stated: “We are ready to starve in order to own a nuclear weapon that will represent a real deterrent and will be decisive in the Arab–Israeli conflict.” Other prominent Muslim Brotherhood leaders have openly called for the development of nuclear weapons, ridiculing the Mubarak regime’s policy of trying to have the Middle East declared a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone.35 Egypt currently operates two nuclear research reactors. Its newest reactor became operational in 1997, with construction and design assistance provided by the Argentinean company Investigacion Aplicada (INVAP). Egypt is a signatory to the NPT. In November 2006, Algeria announced intentions to expand its own nuclear energy program—an announcement immediately followed by an offer extended by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to assist in Algeria’s program. Tehran faces stiff competition for the business. In January 2007, Russian Minister of Industry and Power Viktor Khristenko visited Algiers, where he concluded an agreement governing co-operation on developing nuclear energy. According to Khristenko: “We have agreed within the framework of the memorandum to begin contacts between experts in the two countries to study the possibilities of bilateral cooperation and to determine the areas of possible cooperation in this [nuclear] context and I hope that we can begin this work soon.”36 Algeria also reportedly approached South Korea for nuclear co-operation in mid-2006.37 Algeria has been operating two research reactors under International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) supervision since the mid1990s. The Argentine firm INVAP provided a one megawatt reactor that became operational in 1989; a second fifteen megawatt reactor provided by China is located near Birine at Ain Oussera in a remote area of the Atlas Mountains about ninety miles south of Algiers. Discovery of sophisticated surface-to-air missiles at the site in the early 1990s led to suspicions that Algeria was developing nuclear weapons at the site. Under pressure from the United States, Algeria acceded to the NPT and placed its facilities under IAEA safeguards in 1992.38 Morocco first indicated its intention to expand its nuclear power program in April 2006— plans that received a boost during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Rabat in September 2006. During the visit, a Russian spokesman indicated that Russia’s nuclear export agency, Atomstroiexport, would join in the bidding for Morocco’s first nuclear power station that Rabat hopes to become operational by 2016.39 Morocco currently operates a small two megawatt reactor provided by the United States operated under IAEA safeguards.

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Joining the cacophony of announcements, in December 2006, member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced plans to develop their own nuclear power programs under IAEA supervision.40 In early 2007, GCC Secretary General Abderaham Al-Attiyya indicated that preliminary plans call for the beginning of nuclear power plant construction by 2009, an ambitious timetable given the lack of a nuclear infrastructure in the Gulf. Saudi Foreign Minister Saudi al-Faisal told reporters: “It is not a threat … It is an announcement so that there will be no misinterpretation of what we are doing. We are not doing this secretly. We are doing it openly.”41 Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 2007 visit to Saudi Arabia—the first ever official visit by a Russian head of state to the Kingdom—signaled that the GCC and the Saudis would find a ready supplier for all their nuclear needs from Russia. Of the GCC member countries, only Saudi Arabia is known to have an active nuclear research program, and none is believed to have nuclear reactors. All are NPT signatories. Last but not least, Jordan’s King Abdullah announced in the Israeli press in January 2007 that Jordan will join its Arab neighbors in pursuing a nuclear power program. Following the announcement, a spokesman for Jordan’s Energy Ministry announced the formation of a committee to begin studies on the construction of a 600 megawatt reactor. Pakistan has publicly offered to assist in the development of Jordan’s program. The government’s announcement received widespread praise from such diverse sources as the Jordanian Communist Party and the Islamic Action Party—the Jordanian arms of the Muslim Brotherhood.42 Like other regional states, Jordan promises to observe IAEA-administered safeguards.

Theory and reality collide: recent regional history Do these theories help unravel the nuclear dynamics of the region’s strategic environment and can they guide those seeking to build policies that can prevent a regional nuclear cascade in response to Iran’s quest for the bomb? This chapter argues that neorealist balance of power considerations offer particularly powerful explanatory logic when applied to state behavior during recent history. The idealist, or constructivist, view also provides interesting insights, as will be detailed later. The logic of neorealism seems powerfully evident in deciphering the state response to the ascendancy of the three regional hegemons (Israel, Iran, and Iraq) over a twenty-five-year period and the conventional, unconventional, and nuclear capabilities in their respective arsenals. Regional states simultaneously moved along what could be thought of as four logical lines of operation: (1) acquired equivalent military capabilities; (2) formed regional alliances against or with the hegemons; (3) sought security guarantees from (an) outside power(s) to offset the military advantages of the hegemons; and (4) sought to create a collective security framework to mitigate the threat and influence of the regional hegemons. As realist theory would predict, the unstable and conflict-ridden regional environment created incentives for states to arm themselves through purchases of military equipment. Not surprisingly, the region has constituted the largest market for conventional arms in the developing world over much of the last twenty-five years. Recent figures illustrate this trend. According to the Congressional Research Service, the Near East region led the developing world in arms purchases, signing arms contracts valued at $75.5 billion during the period from 1998 to 2005.43 The realist paradigm accurately predicted this behavior. However, viewing arms purchases simply as a logical extension of state responses to their respective security dilemmas represents only part of the picture. Throughout the Middle East, the security dilemma of regional states has always been more complicated than the realist paradigm would suggest, a complication that is applicable to the region’s changing nuclear posture. There is almost universal agreement that arms purchases throughout the region have not created credible conventional military capabilities. This is no accident. It can be argued that, while Middle Eastern leaders spent lavishly on conventional arms, those arms were never primarily intended to provide credible conventional military capability to mitigate external

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threats to state security. With the exception of Israel, the region’s conventional militaries historically have been noted more for their incompetence rather than their military prowess.44 Regional regimes were motivated by a more important consideration than protecting their states against external aggression. They were instead motivated by the overriding domestic political imperative to keep their conventional militaries weak as a way to mitigate coup threats from their militaries.45 Instead of protecting regimes from external threats, arms purchases served as vehicles to co-opt potential internal regime opponents while simultaneously addressing a more important purpose of cementing political relations with outside powers. Saudi Arabia’s $65 billion in military equipment purchased from the United States under the foreign military sales program is the quintessential example of this regional phenomenon. Throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf, state responses to external threats were systemically shaped by the contradictory objective of protecting themselves from internal threats as well as external adversaries. Regional regimes almost always chose to treat internal threats more seriously than external ones. One result of this calculation was that regional states lived in a perpetual military imbalance in relation to the regional hegemons. Regional states similarly failed to see the value in co-operation as tool to manage their security dilemmas—a behavior that should have logically followed from the neoliberal paradigm. The explanation for this also partially lies with the overriding salience of internal threats to regional regimes. Had the regimes acted in accordance with neoliberal theory to address their insecurity, they would have established a collective security framework as a vehicle to coopt and balance the hegemons. During the 1980s, fractious inter-state disputes and rivalries prevented Middle Eastern and Gulf states from creating effective political–military partnerships to address the systemic military imbalance created by the three regional hegemons. In the Levant, the Arab League never became an institution capable of unifying the states against common threats. In the Gulf, the Gulf Cooperation Council created in 1981 similarly failed to mobilize member states into an effective balancing mechanism to counter either Iran or Iraq. Political scientist Greg Gause argues that, during the period 1971–91, the cost–benefit calculations driving decision making on alliances in the Persian Gulf were driven by perceived ideological and political threats and not strictly by military power.46 This calculus drove states into a complicated, dynamic series of inter-state relationships that lacked foundation and fluctuated according to regional circumstance. While the Gulf States acted as loyal allies to Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war, they quickly found the tables turned less than two years after the war ended when they found themselves on the receiving end of Saddam’s wrath. Interestingly, the most enduring regional partnership of the period has proved to be Iran’s alliance of convenience with the secular Ba’ath regime in Syria. That partnership served as a means to further Iran’s objectives in Lebanon and helped consolidate Hezbollah’s capabilities to be used as a tool against Israel and the United States. Over this complicated regional dynamic, most regional states simultaneously also sought and received security guarantees from the United States (or the Soviet Union prior to 1989)— particularly after the First Gulf War. While Jordan bucked the trend by aligning itself with Iraq during the First Gulf War, it rectified the situation soon after the conclusion of the war. At the end of the First Gulf War, regional states generally relied upon security guarantees from the United States to address external threats—actions that are consistent with the neorealist paradigm. The United States subsequently operationalized these guarantees through a series of bilateral defense co-operation agreements throughout the region with Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. A series of similarly structured agreements built up over the years between the United States and Saudi Arabia formalized the security partnership between these two states. These agreements committed the United States to the defense of these countries, permitted US use of host nation military facilities, addressed the legal status of US military personnel deployed in their countries, made provisions for pre-positioned military equipment, and set up a framework for arms sales and

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military exercises. During the 1990s, the United States built up a military infrastructure in the Gulf to operationalize these guarantees and implement the policy of dual containment. Under the framework, the US Navy built up its headquarters elements in Manama; the Air Force in Qatar; and the Army in Kuwait. With the exception of having to buy US arms and bear some of the monetary costs associated with basing infrastructure, the security guarantees extended by the United States constituted politically cost-free arrangements for the regional states and allowed them to concentrate on their more serious internal threats. The first overt signs that the terms and conditions surrounding the security guarantees were not as politically cost-free as the regimes had hoped first appeared in Saudi Arabia. Following attacks on US military facilities in 1995 and 1996, domestic pressure began building on the regime to end the presence of American military personnel at Prince Sultan Air Base—pressure that finally resulted in the departure of US operational forces from the Kingdom in 2003. In many respects, the House of Saud acted in ways that were consistent with the arguments of this chapter—that internal threats and internal political dynamics played important shaping roles in the response of state leadership to their respective security dilemmas. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the removal of these US forces and the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks have formed part of a more complicated political framework between Saudi Arabia and the United States that has undermined the nature of the security guarantees extended by the United States to Saudi Arabia that date to the 1950s.47 The domestic imperative of the region’s security dilemmas was most interestingly revealed in Saddam Hussein’s successful efforts during the 1990s to convince the international community of the continued existence of his chemical and biological weapons programs. One of Saddam’s primary target audiences for his deception program was internal regime opponents. Saddam perhaps correctly perceived that revealing he had actually disarmed would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and would embolden his internal opponents.48 The relevance of behavioral norms and bureaucratic politics appears to have relatively limited importance in shaping the response of regional elites to their security dilemma. With the exception of Libya, none of the states ever developed significant internal bureaucratic or political constituencies (such as India and Pakistan) that provided an added impetus to push governments towards robust nuclear programs.49 This would obviate the logic of Sagan’s domestic politics model throughout the region. Egypt actually abandoned its small nuclear program in 1986 following the Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Union. The dynamic security dilemma of regional states is reflected in the regional states’ treatment of their respective nuclear postures. A surprising feature of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is the comparative restraint exercised by states for the last fifty years despite being at the center of the globe’s most persistent and enduring conflict and three major regional wars.50 Regional states have lived under the threat of nuclear weapons at least since 1968 when it is believed that Israel achieved a nuclear capability.51 Other nearby states also boast nuclear weapons, with India exploding a device in 1974 and Pakistan in 1987—yet this development also did not spur regional proliferation. The realist paradigm accurately predicted the states’ response to the regional environment—they opted to outsource their “strategic” security to outside powers as a way of balancing against each other and the region’s nuclear power (Israel). The historical context for regional restraint remains rooted in the outsourcing of “strategic” security by states to outside powers that resulted in a series of cross-cutting security guarantees extended by the United States and the Soviet Union, which date to the 1950s–1970s. During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union carved up de facto regional alliance blocs glued together by nuclear guarantees. It is no exaggeration to note that various parts of the region have been under an implied nuclear umbrella for the last fifty years, which is one reason for the restraint at least in the nuclear realm.52 As states demonstrated restraint in developing nuclear weapons, however, that restraint did not extend to other unconventional weapons. The period from 1970 to 2000 saw Syria, Iraq, and Iran all develop/acquire

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chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles that were directed at a wide variety of different regional adversaries. Yet the existence of these programs and the actual use of unconventional weapons in the Iran–Iraq war and by Saddam against his internal opponents did not prompt a rush of regional states to the nuclear bar. Last, but not least—while Iran’s march towards nuclear weapons appears to have accelerated during since the spring of 2007,53 its nuclear ambitions as manifested by the very visible development of a redundant and sophisticated nuclear infrastructure have been transparent to all regional states for the last thirty years.54 Much is made of the region’s rhetorical embrace of support for declaring the region a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ)—an idea advanced at a variety of UN fora.55 It is difficult, however, to see that the embrace of this regional regime by the regional states constituted anything other than a political vehicle to publicly criticize Israel and, more recently, Iran. Stated differently, states embraced the rhetoric of the NWFZ but did not necessarily adopt and internalize the non-proliferation norms implicit in the regime. Iran, for example, embraced the NWFZ proposal as early as 1974 even as it sought its own nuclear capability under the Shah. The NWFZ proposal has provided recent political cover for Saudi Arabia and Egypt in their calls for restraint in Iran’s nuclear program. It is hard to argue that the rhetorical embrace of this idea represented a meaningful endorsement of non-proliferation norms as states such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya all at various times pursued their own nuclear weapons programs.56

Back to the future: realism and proliferation This chapter unsurprisingly argues that each of the theoretical frameworks offered to explain proliferation by regional states offers strengths and weaknesses when matched against state behavior throughout the region. The realist-driven security model interestingly explains regime actions driven by a security dilemma that featured a decision-making calculus systemically weighted towards addressing internal as opposed to external threats. The neoliberal model demonstrates poor explanatory logic, as regional states have never embraced or shown enduring interest in normative-based institutional structures as tools to manage their security. The model emphasizing internal government politics is similarly lacking, as none of the regional states developed internal organizations, bureaucracies, or other constituencies that exercised meaningful roles in national security considerations. All these issues remained the purview of the region’s ruling elites. The model emphasizing the importance of behavioral norms in shaping leadership decisions is also lacking. There is little evidence that the regional domestic political constituencies forced the nuclear issue into a wider public consciousness and elevated its symbolic importance to make it somehow associated with national identity. The Muslim Brotherhood’s statements in July 2006 calling on the Mubarak government to develop a nuclear deterrent, however, may mean that the norms/domestic politics model is building some explanatory power in Egypt’s case.57 This chapter argues that the neorealist paradigm with insights from the other explanatory frameworks can provide strong explanatory logic in explaining the region’s response to the Iran nuclear program. A compelling case can be made that a series of internal and external factors suggested by these paradigms has now combined to create a new “critical mass” surrounding the nuclear issue. Owing to changes in the global, regional, and intra-state environments, Middle Eastern states are now presented with a series of incentives that may militate against a position of nuclear restraint. Ironically, these changes are forcing states to confront the logic of the realist security dilemma that had been artificially held in check by their willingness to depend on security guarantees from outside powers.58 While these security guarantees are far from being discarded, they are now being buttressed by the need for regional regimes to factor changing domestic political dynamics into their decision-making calculus.

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This chapter argues that perceptions of a changing regional distribution of power featuring a number of critical external and internal elements are pressuring regional governing elites from Rabat to Muscat:  The perceived decline in US global military power and political influence.59  The decline in US political influence throughout the region as a result of the Iraq invasion and its abandonment of constructive involvement in the Arab–Israeli dispute.  The emergence of an alliance of powerful state and non-state actors: Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, and various Shi’ite-based militias and political organizations in Iraq.  Various of these actors have successfully inserted themselves into the position of representing a “successful” resistance to Israel and the United States in Iraq, Lebanon, and the occupied territories. The new-found public legitimacy and popularity of these actors represents a profound challenge to the established ruling elites.  Iran’s so far successful defiance of the United States and the international community in what looks like an inexorable march towards a nuclear capability.  Strengthened Islamist political movements that must be accommodated in various ways by regional regimes.  Regional petroleum producers that, while still dependent on US military protection, are actively building political, economic, and military partnerships with outside powers such as India, China, Russia, and Pakistan.  A public that is virulently anti-US and anti-Israel and which increasingly sees little distinction between either actor. All of the characteristics of the new regional distribution of power have combined to create circumstances that are reducing the incentives for states to show nuclear restraint and increasing the attractiveness of embracing a more ambiguous nuclear posture. The altered distribution of power features external and internal dynamics that have combined to force leaders to address external threats in ways that are now inexorably being shaped by internal politics. Where before, these two competing priorities could be pursued independently by regional elites, it is now no longer possible for states to keep the external and internal threats separated. This new dynamic is being shaped by a variety of forces. At the global level, there is a general perception that US power and influence is on the wane. Polling data over the last five years indicate the steady erosion of popular support for the United States around the world—a critical factor limiting the ability of the United States to exert global leadership.60 Reflecting this decline, states around the world and most particularly those in the Middle East confront significant domestic political costs in maintaining a supportive relationship with the United States. This phenomenon is vividly on display in Iraq, in which no regional state has accepted a direct role in trying to stabilize the country. Instead of demonstrating US strength and power, Iraq is undermining it and the credibility of the security guarantees that have been relied upon by Middle Eastern states as their primary instrument for protection against external adversaries. The perceived decline in US power has combined with a domestic political environment that is virulently anti-US throughout the region. A 2006 Zogby/University of Maryland poll drawn from Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan revealed that approximately 70 percent of all respondents believe that the United States and Israel represent the most serious threats to regional security.61 Another particularly chilling indicator for regional elites: the same polling data indicated that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has become the most popular leader in the Middle East.62 Shorn of the protective security umbrella provided by US guarantees and facing a restive and anti-US/Israel public, regional regimes simultaneously confront a threatening external environment that consists of an unstable Iraq, a potential nuclear-armed Iran, and an Iranianheaded regional alliance of state and non-state actors ranging from Baghdad to Beirut.

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Regional elites also see the prospect of an Iranian-allied state in Iraq after the US inevitably departs and the creation of a powerful nexus of non-state Shi’ite and Sunni militias looking for other regional climes in which to ply their destructive trade. The military prowess shown by Hezbollah against Israel in Lebanon in August 2006 and the military capabilities of various non-state insurgent groups in Iraq provide a stark and threatening contrast to the traditional conventional military incompetence in the surrounding states. Embracing the prospect of peaceful nuclear energy provides regional regimes with a lowcost step towards embracing a more ambiguous nuclear stance. Taking this step addresses the new regional distribution of power in a number of important ways by signaling a variety of different actors with a variety of different messages:  It reinforces the message to Tehran that regional states are not prepared to stand by idly and see a nuclear-armed and regionally dominant Iran establish a coercive political–military framework to intimidate the region. The region’s new nuclear posture must be seen as a hedged response to Iran.  It signals to outside powers such as Russia, China, and India that the era of US regional hegemony is drawing to a close and that outside powers now have an opportunity to build political, military, and economic partnerships in which co-operation on nuclear programs can be one supportive element in a broader integrated relationship.  It sends a variety of messages to the United States: (1) the overriding importance of forestalling Iran’s march towards nuclear weapons and the potential consequences of not stopping Iran; (2) plainly demonstrates the region’s exasperation and displeasure with US regional policy under the Bush administration; (3) signals that it may not be possible to revert to the “business as usual” approach between Washington and regional capitals; (4) simultaneously, signals that Washington has time to try and resolve these issues since it will be five to seven years or longer before these nuclear programs can be realistically established.  It demonstrates to domestic political constituencies that the regimes are publicly distancing themselves from Washington and are no longer necessarily prepared to either accept a US security guarantee or exist under a threatening nuclear shadow emanating from either Tel Aviv or Tehran. The pursuit of nuclear programs has the potential to become an important symbol of national identity and prestige throughout the region.  Moving to a latent nuclear status signals to Israel that the region will have the capability to achieve nuclear capability on short notice, representing an end to Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly.  Administering their nuclear programs under IAEA supervision allows the regional states to cloak their programs in an aura of legitimacy, which means they can continue to use Israel’s and Iran’s continued non-compliance with the NPT to political advantage in the international arena. Each of the explanatory theoretical frameworks thus offers insights when used to analyze the current situation in the Middle East. The realist framework places the embrace of a new nuclear posture in the context of an altered distribution of power that mitigates against a position of nuclear restraint. States are reacting to this altered distribution of power and the erosion of US power exactly as the realist paradigm would suggest: the Sunni states of the Gulf and the Middle East are collectively taking steps to signal to both the intra-regional hegemons—Israel and Iran—that they are prepared to respond in kind if necessary. They are also signaling to the outside provider of security—the United States—that they have lost confidence in Washington’s security guarantees. Interestingly, consistent with the neoliberal model, instead of proceeding down a path of developing programs outside of international oversight, as the realist paradigm would suggest, the states are embracing the non-proliferation regime as the vehicle to establish their program

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and supporting infrastructure. Here the lessons of the Libyan program may be important. One of the lessons from the Libyan case for surrounding states has to be that it is extremely difficult for states to covertly develop the human capital and physical infrastructure to develop a nuclear program. Regional states looking at the Libya case could reasonably come to the conclusion that the obstacles to developing a covert program are too great. Further, that there is no reason to undertake a covert program when all the capabilities can be provided by the IAEA. The public face of the programs is politically important for regional regimes because of the signals these programs provide to internal and external actors. As the neoliberal paradigm would suggest, states are drawn by the benefits of co-operation to address their security problems and are using institutions such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as the mechanism to co-ordinate their collective response. One useful outcome of the process is that institutions such as the GCC may be usefully invigorated to serve the purpose for which they were originally intended. The norms/internal politics model also offers analytical insight into the motivational structure of states that are changing their nuclear posture. For example, in announcing Egypt’s plans to restart its nuclear program, Gamal Mubarak gave credence to norms-based motivations when he stated: The whole world – I don’t want to say all, but many developing countries – have proposed and started to execute the issue of alternative energy. … It is time for Egypt to put forth, and the party will put forth, this proposal for discussion about its future energy policies, the issue of alternative energy, including nuclear energy, as one of the alternatives. … We do not accept visions from abroad that try to dissolve the Arab identity and the joint Arab efforts within the framework of the so-called Greater Middle East Initiative.63 Mubarak consciously couched the rationale for Egypt’s program in the context of identity and resistance to outside powers, both of which are powerful domestic political metaphors. The changed domestic political dynamic throughout the region provides all regional states with a more complicated series of challenges in maintaining their hold on power.

Policy implications The neorealist security model suggests a complicated series of factors that are shaping the security environment and perceptions of an altered regional distribution of power. The analysis presented here argues that neorealism offers powerful explanatory logic in predicting regional responses to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and that internal issues of religion and culture, for example, are not particularly important forces in shaping regime decision making. It also suggests that attempting to stop Iran’s accession to the nuclear club is the critical variable in preventing a regional nuclear arms race. If Iran is not stopped, the logic of the argument suggests that states will face significant pressure to take corresponding steps to ensure their own deterrent capability. The neorealist logic suggests a number of policy options for regional states, the United States, and the wider international community as they attempt to stop Iran’s program and mitigate the prospect of a regional nuclear cascade. A first task is to address perceptions of a changed distribution of regional power by ensuring states that Iran will be unable in any circumstances to create a coercive bargaining framework leveraged by nuclear weapons. This can be accomplished by reconfiguring the region’s security umbrella to reduce the visibility of the United States and by drawing in active political and military participation by a variety of regional and outside powers under a co-operative, alliance-like framework.64 Such an arrangement would help to reinforce perceptions that the balance of power had been restored and would simultaneously ease the domestic political

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problems experienced by the regimes as a result of their close ties to the United States. This approach addresses the chapter’s main argument that regional regime decision making is being shaped by a changing security dilemma that is forcing them away from outsourcing their external security to a single hegemon—the United States. A policy approach that emphasizes national and international components satisfies the domestic needs of regimes to demonstrate increased political independence while also cloaking this independence within the auspices of an international co-operative framework. The framework must have political and military dimensions. On the political side, it might be time to reinvent the Arms Control and Regional Security working groups used during the 1990s as part of the Middle East peace process. A useful model to draw upon for the military side might be the on-going maritime security operations in which a wide variety of regional and global naval powers are jointly patrolling the waters around the Gulf under the auspices of Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150). Operational command of the task force rotates on a routine basis among the task force participants. While critical command and control support is provided by the United States Navy through its Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain—that support is importantly cloaked in a multilateral framework that provides political cover for regional regimes. Saudi Arabia recently agreed to join the CTF—an important step in building regional military buy-in to the effort. The CTF 150 model could be extended to combined air patrols in which regional militaries would jointly patrol air space throughout the region. These kinds of arrangements would provide regional regimes with political assurance from outside powers while simultaneously addressing their domestic pressures to become more involved in providing for their own security. Another aspect of the reconfigured security umbrella would involve a rethinking of the functions of deterrence and extended deterrence from outside powers such as France and the United Kingdom. A reconfigured security umbrella could include explicit security nuclear deterrent guarantees by outside nuclear powers as another way to militate against the prospect of states seeking their own deterrent capability. The United States, for example, has sought in recent years to invigorate its regional security partnerships through the Gulf Security Dialogue launched in May 2006. The initiative repackaged on-going activities such as arms sales, military exercises, military training, and basing issues as one way to highlight the continued US commitment to regional stability.65 That dialogue could be broadened to draw regional militaries and interested outside powers such as India, France, and Great Britain into an integrated political–military partnership with the regional states. Concurrently, efforts should be mounted to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime through encouraging more widespread adoption of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol and additional steps to strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime as one way to restore transparency and confidence in the NPT by regional states. All efforts to strengthen the existing regime should be supplemented by concerted efforts to better regulate uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies—which are currently unrestricted by the NPT.66 A re-energized NPT can be an important component in providing assurance to regional states that the NPT regime can be one element in a comprehensive framework to place regional security on a more secure footing. A way must be found to bring discussion of Israel’s nuclear program as well as its legitimate security concerns under the auspices of a wider regional security dialogue that includes all regional states. A return to the 1990s forum knows as the ACRS—arms control and regional security—may be in order as a basis to increase transparency and confidence between regional states. While this analysis suggests that the norms/domestic politics model may be less important than balance of power considerations, policy makers must be aware of the serious implications suggested by this model. The pursuit of nuclear power programs in the region represents only the beginning of internal political and governmental debates over the direction of the

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respective programs in each of the states. As part of this process, internal constituencies will form on various sides of the issue. As Sagan suggests, bureaucracies and other internal organizational structures will inevitably become vested in the nuclear program, which will provide bureaucratic momentum pushing the program forward. Perhaps most dangerous, however, is the degree to which the nuclear programs take on symbolic importance. Should the general public embrace the state’s nuclear power program as some sort of symbol of national identity, there is little chance of outside powers affecting the final outcome. If Egyptian public opinion comes to endorse the position of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Dr. Hamdi Hassan that Egyptians “are ready to starve in order to own a nuclear weapon that will represent a real deterrent and will be decisive in the Arab–Israeli conflict,”67 then outside powers can only delay but not stop the program. The same calculus is true for all regional states. The United States and other interested parties are presented with the opportunity to affect the internal debate in all these regional states, but this window will not remain open indefinitely.

Conclusion This chapter argues that established strands of international relations theory can provide useful insights to policy makers as they seek to prevent the Middle East from careering down a path into a new nuclear arms race. While this analysis argues that neorealism offers a particularly valuable tool to policy makers, it would be a mistake to assume that the alternative approaches should be excluded as analytical tools. The Middle East today regrettably offers a rich environment to test all these approaches and their implications for security policy. The judgment presented here is that regional states are re-examining their nuclear postures as a result of changes in the regional distribution of power, which features powerful and new domestic political forces that must now be accommodated by the regimes as they address external threats to state security. Policy prescriptions flowing from this analysis imply that outside powers and regional regimes must forcefully address perceptions of the changed regional distribution of power by creating a new and more stable regional security framework to forestall the possibility of a new nuclear arms race. One of the implications of the analysis is that no one state can undertake this monumental task—it must involve a variety of global actors.68 The answer to the question posed in the chapter’s title is that the region is not necessarily at a nuclear tipping point in which it can be expected that all the regional states will inevitably seek to develop and/or acquire nuclear weapons in response to Iran’s actions. The United States and the international community must realize that a Middle East with a series of new nuclear states is not inevitable and that steps can be taken to keep these states from proceeding down the nuclear path. Reinforcing non-proliferation norms in combination with a mix of policies aimed at the internal and external dynamics shaping the regional security environment can successfully prevent the nuclear cascade that many fear is about to engulf the region.

Notes * The opinions and analysis in this chapter are the author’s own and do not reflect any position of the Department of Defense or the Naval Postgraduate School. 1 Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, S. Prt. 110–34, 110th Congress, 2d Session, February 2008: viii. 2 As argued in Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbors,” Survival, 49(2): 111–28. 3 As noted in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East (London: IISS, 2008): 7. 4 As asserted by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal in Mariam Hakeem, “GCC’s Nuclear Programme Will be a Role Model,” Gulf News, January 14, 2007 at http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/01/14/10096775.html. 5 Joby Warrick, “Spread of Nuclear Capability is Feared,” Washington Post, May 12, 2008: A1. 6 Perhaps the best summary of the competing arguments is Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There A Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 2006: 43–60.

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7 As forcefully stated by Mitchell Reiss, “The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for a World of Many Nuclear Weapons States,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, Mitchell Reiss, eds, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 3–18. 8 As argued by Shibley Telhami, “America in Arab Eyes,” Survival 49(1), Spring 2007: 107–22. 9 Perhaps the best summary and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these frameworks is contained in Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1996: 43–60. See also Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” International Security 21(3): 54–86; Zachary Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds, The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (London: Frank Cass 1993); and Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, op. cit.; John Deutsch, “The New Nuclear Threat,” Foreign Affairs 71(41), Fall 1992; Steven M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984); Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 10 Some of the classic works that provide the basis for today’s various schools of realism are: E. H. Carr, The TwentyYears Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939); Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 6th edn revised by Kenneth Thompson (New York: Knopf, 1985); Rienhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Sribner’s, 1947); George Kenan, American Diplomacy, 1900–1950 (New York: New American Library, 1951); George Kenan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954). 11 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). 12 Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Why More May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). 13 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72(3) Summer 1993. 14 Sagan, op. cit.: 57. 15 Kurt M. Campbell, “Reconsidering a Nuclear Future,” in Campbell, Einhorn and Reiss, op. cit.: 20–21. 16 Problematic application of the reconfigured US strategic deterrent in the Middle East is covered in James A. Russell, “Nuclear Strategy and the Modern Middle East,” Middle East Policy 11(4), Fall 2004: 98–117. See also Kathleen J. McInnis, “Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East,” Washington Quarterly 28 (3), Summer 2005: 169–86. 17 Campbell, “Reconsidering a Nuclear Future,” op. cit.: 29. 18 Benjamen Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” in Davis and Frankel, op. cit.: 37–78. 19 Ibid: 37, 60–61. A similar conclusion is made by John Mearsheimer in predicting nuclear proliferation in Europe in “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15(1), Summer 1990: 5–56. 20 Ogilvie-White also notes theoretical weaknesses stemming from the assumptions that the state is a unitary actor and that the state is a rational actor. Ogilvie-White, op. cit.: 45. 21 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” op. cit.: 55. 22 Ibid: 63–64. For explanations of the impact of bureaucracy on state behavior, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn (New York: Longman, 1999); Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1974); Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics, Spring 1972. 23 Sagan forcefully argues this point in “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18(4), Spring 1994: 66–107. 24 Sagan, “Why Do States Develop Nuclear Weapons,” op. cit. 25 A distinction covered by Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46(2), Spring 1992: 391–425. Robert Jervis challenged an underlying premise of the neorealists with his argument that the dynamics of the security dilemma need not inevitably lead to conflict in “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30(2), January 1978: 167–214. For more on the realist–neoliberal divide, see Robert Powell, “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: the Neoliberal Neorealist Debate,” International Organization 48(2), Spring 1994: 313–44; Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security 24(1), Summer 1999: 42–63. 26 Glenn Chafetz, “The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation: An Alternative to the Neorealist Perspective,” in Davis and Frankel, op. cit.: 128. 27 Ibid: 138. 28 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons,” op. cit.: 73–74. 29 Ibid. 30 Peter Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Proliferation,” Security Studies 2, Spring/Summer 1993. 31 Etel Solingen, “The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East,” International Studies Quarterly 38(2), June 1994: 305–37. 32 Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” International Security 19(2), Autumn 1994: 136. 33 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field,” Nonproliferation Review 13(3), November 2006: 455–65. 34 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics, op. cit.: 126–69; Etel Solingen, “The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures: Influencing ‘Fence Sitters’ in the Post Cold War Era,” Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Paper 8, October 1994. 35 Details drawn from Sammy Salama and Gina Cabrera-Farraj, “Renewed Egyptian Ambitions for a Peaceful Nuclear Program,” WMD Insights, November 2006; Sammy Salama and Khalid Hilal, “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Presses Government for Nuclear Weapons,” WMD Insights, November 2006.

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36 “Algeria Trades Gas for Russian Nuclear Energy,” January 24, 2007, World Tribune.com at www.worldtribune. com/worldtribune/07/front2454125.1611111113.html. 37 Daniel Pinkston, “Algeria Seeks Nuclear Cooperation with South Korea as Seoul Prepares New Nuclear Plans,” WMD Insights, June 2006. 38 Details of the program drawn from “Weapons of Mass Destruction; Algeria Special Weapons,” GlobalSecurity.org at www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/algeria/index.html. 39 Sammy Salama, “Moroccan Nuclear Energy Programs Gets Boost from Russia,” WMD Insights. 40 Raid Qusti, “GCC to Develop Civilian Nuclear Energy,” Arab News, December 11, 2006 at www.arabnews.com/? page=1§ion=0&article=89863&d=11&m=12&y=2006. 41 As quoted in Qusti, op. cit. 42 Khalid Hilal and Leah Kuchinsky, “Jordan Joins List of Arab States Announcing Nuclear Energy Programs; Pakistan Promises Help,” WMD Insights, March 2007. 43 Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 1998–2003, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, October 23, 2006, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. For reporting purposes, the Near East region is composed of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 44 I am not arguing that regional sub-state actors have not developed credible military capacities—a variety of groups have demonstrated credible capabilities in asymmetric warfare. Hezbollah, for example, demonstrated credible semi-conventional military capabilities during Israel’s August 2006 invasion of Lebanon. Arguments that regional militaries have not developed credible conventional military forces are summarized in Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). 45 As noted by Barry Rubin, “The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 5, no. 1 (March 2001) at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue1/jv5n1a4.html. 46 Greg Gause, “Balancing What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf,” Security Studies 13(2), Winter 2003/4: 273–305. Gause argues that “ … [Gulf] states overwhelmingly identified ideological and political threats emanating from abroad to the domestic stability of their ruling regimes as more salient than threats based upon aggregate power, geographic proximity and offensive capabilities” (p. 274). See also Darryl Priess, “Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council,” Security Studies 5(4), Summer 1996: 143–71. 47 James A. Russell, “Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: A New Security Dilemma,” op. cit. 48 See Kevin W. Woods, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command, 2008): 25–33; online at www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2006/ipp.pdf. 49 Comprehensive treatment of Libya’s program can be found in Wyn Bowen, “Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink,” Adelphi Papers 46(380), April 2006. 50 For background, see Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). 51 Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 52 Application of the US nuclear deterrent in the Middle East is explored further in James A. Russell, “Nuclear Strategy and the Modern Middle East,” Middle East Policy 11(3), 2004: 98–117. 53 On May 14, 2007, IAEA inspectors found that Iraq is enriching uranium on a far wider scale than had previously been realized. Details in David Sanger, “Inspectors Cite Big Gain by Iran on Nuclear Fuel,” New York Times, May 15, 2007 at www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/world/middleeast/15iran.html. 54 The history and motivations of regional states’ involvement in the development of chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles is covered in James A. Russell, ed., WMD Proliferation in the Middle East: Directions and Policy Options in the New Century (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006). See also Sami Hajjar “Regional Perspectives on the Causes of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,” Comparative Strategy 19(1), January/March 2000: 35–56; Gawdat Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel,” Contemporary Security Policy 26(1), April 2005: 25–43. 55 History and recent developments summarized in Claudi Baumgart and Harald Muller, “A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East: Pie in the Sky?” Washington Quarterly 28(1), Winter 2004–5: 45–58; online at www.mitpress journals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/0163660042518125?cookieSet=1. 56 Endemic problems in the NWFZ proposals in the Middle East are discussed in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East, op. cit.: 158. 57 Sammy Salama and Khalid Hilal, “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Presses Government for Nuclear Weapons,” WMD Insights, November 2006. 58 As argued by Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” in Frankel and Davis, eds, op. cit. 59 A perception not just shared in the region, but within the US intelligence community. See Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, “Reduced Dominance is Predicted for US: Analyst Previews Report for Next President,” Washington Post, September 10, 2008: A 2. The article reports on the findings of the National Intelligence Council’s forthcoming report entitled Global Trends 2025. 60 A representative sample is polling done under the Pew Global Attitudes Project at http://pewglobal.org/reports/ display.php?PageID=801. 61 Zogby International Annual Arab 2006 Public Opinion Survey at http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/2006%20Arab %20Public%20Opinion%20Survey.ppt.

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62 Ibid. 63 As quoted in “Egyptian President’s Son Proposes Developing Nuclear Energy,” Associated Press, September 19, 2006. 64 For background on the main elements of the system of regional security and a summary of alternative frameworks, see Michael Kraig, “Forging a New Security Order for the Persian Gulf,” Middle East Policy 13(1), 2006; James A. Russell, “Searching for a Post Saddam Regional Security Architecture,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 8(2), 2004; Richard Russell, “The Collective Security Mirage,” Middle East Policy 12(4), 2005; Kenneth Pollack, “Securing the Gulf,” Foreign Affairs 83(4), 2003. 65 Summarized by Christopher M. Blanchard, “The Gulf Security Dialogue and Related Arms Sales Proposals,” Congressional Research Service, Report January 17 2008; posted at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34322.pdf. 66 This and a variety of initiatives to strengthen the NPT are detailed in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East, op. cit.: 151–62. 67 As quoted in Salama and Hilal, “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Presses Government for Nuclear Weapons,” op. cit. 68 As generally argued in George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirrincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and John B. Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2007); online at www. carnegieendowment.org/files/univ_comp_rpt07_final1.pdf.

9

US relations with Islamic groups in the Middle East Heather S. Gregg

The Muslim world is going through a political and social awakening in which Islam is playing an integral role. This transformation is known by several names, including the call (da’wa), the renewal (tajdid), reform (islah), and Islamic activism.1 The awakening has produced a variety of organizations, particularly in the Middle East, that champion causes ranging from women’s rights to Jihad and revolution. Not all of these Islamic groups are bad for the United States and its interests. Some groups are challenging militant Islam with alternative interpretations of the faith. However, many of these groups are also very critical of the United States, making it difficult for the US government to work with these groups for positive change. This chapter aims to offer a framework for considering which Islamic organizations in the Middle East may be useful to the United States and its interests, and which ones may be a threat. It argues that the use of violence alone is insufficient for understanding which groups challenge stability in the Middle East; it is also necessary to investigate the goals for which these groups are striving. Islamic organizations that seek to impose a narrow, strict interpretation of the faith—such as Salafis—and that aim to do so by seizing the power of the state, are the groups most threatening to the United States and its interests. The chapter has three parts. The first section proposes a framework for investigating Islamic organizations in the Middle East and the potential threats and opportunities various groups present to the United States. The second section builds on the framework to offer examples of groups that are dangerous, those that are helpful, and those that provide a mixed picture for the United States. The chapter concludes with policy implications for the United States and its relationship with Islamic organizations in the Middle East.

A spectrum of Islamic activism Islamic activism has produced a spectrum of organizations that seek to change the social, political, and religious landscape of the Middle East. While all organizations aim to change the status quo, not all aim to do so in a violent or destructive way; some are seeking to improve life in a way that is consistent with US foreign policy in the region. Islamic organizations, in fact, present a very useful means through which the United States government can work for positive change in the region. Local organizations have the advantage of understanding the social and cultural dynamics on the ground and can frame debates in a way that their constituents can understand. Moreover, Islamic organizations offer an authentic voice that is important for inspiring social, political, and religious change. This section offers a framework for thinking about Islamic organizations in the Middle East, including their political, social, and religious goals and the means by which they are striving to change the status quo. Islamic activism has its antecedents in the colonial era, when movements and organizations formed in a variety of regions with the aim of strengthening Islamic identity and, in several cases, violently opposing colonial powers. The creation of these groups has persisted throughout the Muslim world following the end of colonialism and independence. The Muslim

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Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, became one of the first organizations that aimed to create a transnational social and political awakening in the Middle East and the Muslim world more broadly.2 The Islamic awakening took on increased impetus following the resounding defeat of Arab nationalism in the 1967 Six Day war with Israel; new and existing organizations called for a return to Islam as the authentic identity of Muslim nations.3 The aftermath of the Six Day war also caused a rift in groups over means for achieving the awakening: some believed that a bottom-up “grassroots” approach for transforming society was the best way to transform the Muslim world, while others argued that a top-down revolution that seized the power of the state was necessary in order to truly bring Muslims back to the right path. This split was particularly acute in Egypt, where the Brotherhood embodied the former approach and the Islamic Jihad the latter.4 The Islamic awakening gained further momentum following Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979. The creation of a modern Islamic state inspired reformist and revolutionary movements throughout the Muslim world in both Sunnis and Shias.5 The 1980s saw the rise of several militant organizations—Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Hamas in Palestine—with the aim of violently overthrowing governments. The armed Islamic struggle also included the rise of mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan and “Arab Afghans” committed to waging Jihad against the Soviet invasion.6 Alongside these militant Islamic organizations, non-violent groups with social and political goals also took shape, including groups that aimed to reform governance practices and Sharia law in Algeria, Morocco, Iran, Palestine, and Egypt.7 These groups were often overshadowed by their violent counterparts, but they have served an important role in shaping the debate about modern Muslim society, politics, and faith. The Islamic awakening, therefore, represents a wide spectrum of means and goals. At one end of the means spectrum, Islamic activist groups employ a “grassroots” bottom-up approach, aiming to activate and reform society at the community level, independent of the state. At the other end of the means spectrum are revolutionaries who aim to seize the state and use the state’s resources to change society from the top down. For goals, groups can be distinguished by those, at the one end, that aim to impose one interpretation of the faith on society; and those at the other end that see Islam as the source of social and political activism, but are not aiming to impose one interpretation of the faith on society (see Figure 9.1). In addition, it is important to note that there are groups within the Muslim world that are seeking political and societal change, but are doing so independently of Islam. These groups are important catalysts for change, but because Islam informs neither their motivations nor their goals, they are not considered in this chapter. Within Figure 9.1, there are types of movements and organizations worth describing in greater detail. Following 9/11, academic and policy attention has been paid to Wahhabis or Salafis, Muslims who identify with a narrow and rigid interpretation of the faith. Quintan Wictorowicz defines Salafis as: … united by a common religious creed, which provides principles and a method for applying religious beliefs to contemporary issues and problems. This creed revolves around strict adherence to the concept of tawhid (the oneness of God) and ardent rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire. Salafis believe that by strictly following the rules and guidance in the Qur’an and Sunna (path or example of the Prophet Muhammad) they eliminate the biases of human subjectivity and self-interest, thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth of God’s commands. From this perspective, there is only one legitimate religious interpretation; Islamic pluralism does not exist.8 Wictorowicz argues that Salafis are not unified actors, but that three sub-sets exist based on differing views of how to achieve a pure, Islamic society: jihadis, politicos, and purists. Jihadis see force as a useful and necessary means for overthrowing the state and imposing their

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One interp. of faith “M ost Problem atic”

Al Qaeda Moqtada al Sadr (?)

Brotherhood HuT

Grass Roots Control State “ Allies”

“M ixed Bag”

Tariq Ramadan Amir Khaled

Hamas Hizbollah

Means

Adaptable interp. of faith

Goals

Figure 9.1 Means and goals of Islamic organizations

interpretation of the faith; politicos seek to impose their interpretation of the faith to the “political arena,” but not by force; and purists, who are also non-violent, believe that politics is divisive and distracting from the true goals of the faith.9 Not all Salafis, therefore, are jihadis and see violence as necessary; neither are all political. Salafis’ strict and unidimensional interpretation of the faith, however, makes them prone to conflict both with other Muslims and with non-Muslims. Distinct from Salafis, Mohammad Hafez notes that there are Islamic nationalist organizations that employ a mixture of religious and nationalist ideology and goals; in other words, these organizations are not purely religious in their motives.10 Hafez cites, as an example, the Palestinian organization Hamas, which—unlike the PLO—names the creation of an Islamic state as its ultimate goal. However, similar to Fatah and the PLO, Hamas is also committed to ending Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, and to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Hamas, therefore, represents a mixture of religious and nationalist goals that distinguishes it from both Salafis and secular nationalist organizations such as Fatah.11 There are also Islamic organizations that do not aim to create an Islamic state, but rather see Islam as the guiding force behind social and political reform. Abdeslam Maghraoui outlines four major movements within the Islamic awakening committed to social and political change: civic Islam, Islam and democracy, legal reforms within Islam, and Muslims in the West.12 Civic Islam includes groups and movements committed to organizing the public to advocate for change in society and government. Maghraoui notes, as examples, women’s organizations that see their Islamic identity and faith as the foundation for advocating greater rights for women in society and politics. Maghraoui also points out that there are Islamic organizations and political parties fighting for democratic reform in the Muslim world, and that these groups’ desire for democracy stems from their understanding of their Muslim faith, not in spite of it. Organizations and individuals are also offering fresh interpretations of the faith, particularly Sharia law, with the aim of harmonizing the faith with the modern world. And, finally, global migration has placed sizable Muslim populations in the West, including the United

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States and Europe. Many of these Muslims, Maghraoui argues, are leading the way as examples of Muslims who practice their faith in harmony with Western society, democratic practices and values; these diasporic Muslims are inspiring change in the non-West.13 This discussion shows that not all Islamic organizations are violent or seek to impose an Islamic theocracy in a state or region. When considering allies in the global war on terror, it is important for the United States to consider not just the means that Islamic groups are using but also the goals for which they are striving. The following section builds on this premise and briefly describes several prominent Islamic groups in the Middle East, ranging from the most problematic to the most useful—and the challenges and opportunities they present to the United States.

Examples of Islamic organizations The Islamic awakening has produced a variety of organizations aimed at changing the social, religious, and political landscape of the Muslim world. Many of these organizations are calling for a greater inclusion of the faith in government and politics, something that is antithetical to America’s interpretation of democracy. Many of these groups are also highly critical of the United States, particularly its foreign policy actions in the Middle East. Despite these seemingly intractable differences, many of these same groups are potential allies of the United States in the global war on terror because they are highly critical of al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. This section briefly describes a few of the main Islamic organizations associated with the Middle East, dividing them according to the previous section’s criteria and the threats and opportunities these organizations provide to the United States. Most problematic organizations Building on the criteria from the previous section, the most problematic groups for the United States and its interests are organizations that espouse an exclusionary ideology and aim to seize the state in order to impose that ideology. The most obvious Islamic organization that fits these criteria is al-Qaeda, which is the primary target in the global war on terror. Al-Qaeda is a direct threat to the United States because of its stated goal of wanting to attack the United States and compel its withdrawal from Muslim territory.14 Al-Qaeda is also a threat to the United States because of its desire to overthrow what it claims to be corrupt Muslim governments that are failing to uphold the tenets of Islam, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia; these revolutionary goals would be regionally destabilizing and affect the United States’ interests in the region.15 Al-Qaeda is an obvious threat because of its use of violence—against civilians, government and military targets—to achieve its goals. Perhaps less obvious, but also problematic to the United States, is its desire to impose an exclusionary, Salafi interpretation of Islam on the Muslim world and to seize the state in order to achieve this ultimate goal. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, have attacked not only foreign elements in the Muslim world, such as US forces, but have also attacked Muslims whom they define as impious.16 Al-Qaeda, therefore, is a threat for its attacks against the United States, but also for its goal of creating a unified, Salafi superstate that aims to impose an exclusionary interpretation of Islam on the Muslim world. Violence is not the only means through which extremists attempt to seize the state and impose their interpretation on populations. Another possible means of seizing the state is to work through the political system; this is particularly true in fledgling democracies. The selfproclaimed Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in Iraq may be an example of an extremist who is using the democratic system to seize the state and impose his interpretation of Islam on the population. Iraq’s democracy is young and its people have, so far, voted primarily along ethnic and sectarian lines; as the numerical majority in Iraq, Shias hold considerable sway over the political process.17 A mature democracy with a healthy civic society and citizens who

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understand their limits, rights, and responsibilities would probably safeguard against extremists capturing the system in order to impose radical concepts; Iraq, however, does not have the necessary institutions that undergird their democracy system. The democratic process, therefore, could be a non-violent means through which extremist organizations could impose their interpretation on a state’s citizens and possibly be regionally destabilizing. Mixed bag organizations There are also Islamic organizations that may not have the goal of seizing the state to impose an extreme, exclusionary interpretation of the faith, but yet still hold the potential of being destabilizing, either because they are threatening to existing regimes, or because they may be a half-way house for radicalization. Hamas and Hezbollah are two Islamic organizations in the Middle East that present a complicated picture of means and goals. Both organizations were founded with the aim of establishing Islamic states in Palestine and Lebanon respectively. However, both organizations have used a mixture of violence, social outreach, and political activism to serve their constituents. Over the course of their twenty-plus years, both groups have modified their ideological goals and have shown signs of compromise in their aims of establishing an Islamic state, particularly after creating political parties and running in elections. Both organizations have also won over populations by offering services that their respective states were not providing, including health care and education, and are reputed to be uncorrupt, also in contrast to their respective governments. Both groups have also, however, maintained armed struggles against the state of Israel, their security and ideological foe, in addition to fighting their own governments at certain points in time. Both organizations are believed to have state sponsors, particularly Hezbollah and its relationship with Iran; but both groups also have popular backing and are legitimate in the eyes of significant numbers.18 The mixed means and goals of Hezbollah and Hamas present several challenges for United States foreign policy. Thus far, the United States has rejected these groups as legitimate, constructive organizations in the Middle East, defining both as terrorist organizations and denouncing their electoral success.19 However, it appears that both Hezbollah and Hamas are addressing legitimate grievances in their respective societies and have a popular base of support. Attacking these organizations does not address these grievances and may further legitimate the leaders and their causes. Furthermore, shutting down these organizations may create a vacuum in public services, which could anger and radicalize populations. Directly embracing these groups is equally as problematic for the United States. Both Hezbollah and Hamas maintain an active, armed struggle against Israel and engage in tactics that are illegal, such as kidnapping, suicide terrorism, and targeting civilians. Furthermore, both organizations espouse anti-US rhetoric that would make directly embracing these groups difficult, if not impossible. Groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, therefore, do not offer an easy policy path for the United States. There are also more grassroots-oriented organizations that present an equally murky picture in their threat to stability in the Middle East and US foreign policy. The Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest transnational Muslim organization in the Middle East, offers a similar challenge to the United States. Founded in 1928 and tied to the 1952 coup in Egypt and, later, two assassination attempts against President Nasser, the Muslim Brotherhood officially abandoned violence and direct confrontation against the state for a more society-focused program.20 The Muslim Brotherhood aims to bring Muslims back to the faith through da’wa, or a calling based on preaching and spreading the word.21 Despite the seemingly apolitical aim of the Brotherhood, the organization functions as an opposition group to governments in several countries, particularly in Egypt, and has been a destabilizing force in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.22 In 2005, they ran in elections in Egypt, securing 20 percent of the seats in parliament.23 It is also

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unclear how tolerant their message is toward non-Muslims and Muslims who embrace other interpretations of the faith. Similarly, the Hizb’u Tahir (HuT) is an organization that presents a complicated picture in means and goals. The group officially denounces violence and claims to be in opposition to al-Qaeda. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, it aims to bring Muslims back to the right path of the faith through grassroots teaching and preaching. It ultimately aims to re-establish the one, unified Caliphate. HuT, however, has been banned in several European countries for its antiJewish and anti-Israeli posture. HuT has also been fingered as a possible half-way house for Muslims on the path to radicalization and violent action, and as such is a group that should not be praised solely for its non-violent posture.24 Allies of the United States Finally, there are Islamic organizations that are clear allies of the United States and its foreign policy aims. Most notably, building on Maghraoui’s categories, there are groups committed to strengthening civil society, and advancing the rights of women and human rights more broadly. A few examples include the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo and the Arab Organization for Human Rights, founded by Saad Ibrahim, which aims to pressure the Egyptian government for greater civil liberties.25 Another example is the lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi and her organization, the Iranian Children’s Right Society—winner of the Noble Peace Prize in 2003—which aims to improve children’s and women’s rights in Iran.26 There are also groups and individuals who aim to offer fresh interpretations of the faith in light of modern circumstances. Sheikh Qaradawy, an Egyptian-born, Qatari-based religious scholar, hosts a weekly show on Al Jazeera that aims to help Muslims live out their daily lives, with all their modern complications, in a way that upholds the faith. Qaradawy is critical of al-Qaeda, and condemned the 9/11 attacks, but he also supports Palestinian insurgents and their right to fight the state of Israel.27 In Egypt, Amr Khaled has emerged as a religious leader who preaches tolerance and love, arguing that Islam is compatible with modernity and the West. His growing fame has earned him the title of “televangelist” of Islam.28 The Middle East also has organizations, including political parties, that aim to work legitimately through the political system to affect change and to reconcile Islam with democracy. In order for these groups to be vehicles for positive and legitimate change, they need to agree to the rules of the system and respect the basic principles of democracy, such as minority rights, freedom of thought, and checks and balances on power. The success of Islamic political parties may therefore be as dependent on the strength of the system as it is on the goals of the party. As noted earlier, Hamas and Hezbollah may have the potential of moving in this direction and becoming legitimate political parties that seek to represent their constituents in their countries’ governments and work through the system for change as opposed to overthrowing the system. Finally, there are Muslims in the West who are examples of individuals that have reconciled their faith with modernity, democracy, and Western society. These individuals are generating interpretations of the faith that stress Islam’s ability to adapt to different cultures, and the need for reforms in rigid theology. A proponent of this approach includes the Egyptian-born legal scholar Abou El Fadl, now a professor at UCLA in America, who writes extensively on Islam, including the theological, political, and social threats posed by al-Qaeda and other extremist movements in the faith.29 In Europe, Tariq Ramadan—the great-grandson of the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder Hassan Al Bana—has written on similar topics, offering fresh discussions on the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad as examples of tolerance and compassion in modern-day life.30 Muslim scholars in the West are particularly important because they are able to write and express their thoughts freely; their books have been translated into Arabic

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and Farsi, and are flowing into the Middle East. While most of these individuals have not formed organizations, their ideas may inspire groups already in existence and may prompt the formation of new groups with the aim of affecting social and religious change in the region. These examples of Islamic organizations demonstrate that the awakening runs the gamut of groups that aim to apply faith to modernity and change the social, political, and religious status quo. At one extreme, militant organizations such as al-Qaeda seek to impose a narrow interpretation of the faith that is binding on all Muslims and uses force to achieve this goal. At the other extreme are individuals that stress Islam’s tolerance and adaptability to circumstances across time and space. These myriad organizations present both challenges and opportunities for the United States and its foreign policy actions in the Middle East.

US policy options toward Islamic organizations in the Middle East The spectrum of Islamic organizations in the Middle East suggests several important foreign policy implications for the United States. First, Islam is not de facto an impediment for the United States; Islam, in fact, is an important ally for change and has inspired organizations that are committed to social and political progress. It is worth noting that religion has played an important role in shaping the United States’ social and political landscape. Faith-based organizations—Christian and Muslim—were critical in affecting change in the civil rights movements and produced one of the most influential leaders in US history, Martin Luther King, Jr. Likewise, religion will continue to shape the destiny of the Middle East. As with US history, Islam and Islamic organizations have the potential to be a vehicle for positive social and political change. The importance of Islam for social and political change in the Middle East suggests that the United States should not fight militant or extremist Islamic groups with secularism, but rather by encouraging other interpretations of the faith. If Salafis—violent or otherwise—aim to impose one narrow interpretation of the faith on the Muslim community, then allowing Muslim organizations with other interpretations to be heard challenges this very goal. Religion, in other words, is an ally against militant and extremist Islam, not an adversary. Certain Islamic organizations are therefore helpful in this fight. Ultimately, the United States’ goal regarding Islamic organizations in the Middle East should be to encourage groups that help move populations to the more pacific and tolerant side of the spectrum and, in doing so, to isolate the extremists, making them more identifiable and more susceptible to various countermeasures. The United States, however, faces some important challenges in embracing Islamic organizations in the Middle East. Some analysts have suggested that the best policy for the Untied States is to support moderate Muslims who are pushing for Islamic renewal as the best means of fighting Islamic militancy.31 However, embracing advocates of Islamic renewal, through either diplomacy or monetary support, fails to seriously consider the United States’ unpopularity in the Muslim world. With such unpopularity, what would supporting these moderates actually do for their success? US policy makers should consider that their embrace may actually discredit these movements instead of offering encouragement and growth. In other words, directly supporting these groups would be the kiss of death. Moreover, many of these advocates would probably not accept American support if it were offered. For example, reformists such as Qaradawy are anti-al-Qaeda, but they are also anti-American; he most likely would not partner with the Untied States. Rather than promote these groups directly, the US government would do better to help create the necessary civic space in which these movements could take root and grow. Specifically, the United States could hold accountable the governments of the countries in which these fledgling moderates exist, using their influence and leverage to discourage governments from cracking down on these movements and imprisoning their leaders.

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This approach would have two positive benefits for the United States. First, it would give these individuals and organizations the necessary public space to present their ideas and, hopefully, promote dialogue, debate, and tolerance within the faith. Second, making governments accountable for the standards that the United States holds dear—freedom of speech, assembly, and association—would make it look more consistent in our message of supporting democratization abroad and could offer much needed improvement in its image and credibility within the Muslim world.

Notes 1 John O. Voll, “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah,” in John L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983): 32–47; John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995): 8; Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, “American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, No. 164, July 2006; Quintan Wictorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006). 2 For more on the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, see Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement: 1928–1942 (Ithaca: Ithaca Press, 1998); Ziad Musnon, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” Sociological Quarterly, 42(4), 2001: 487–501; Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 3 Esposito, Islamic Threat, op. cit.: 12–13. 4 Esposito, Islamic Threat, op. cit.: 131–39; Gilles Kepel, The Prophet and the Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). For other examples, see Meir Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2002: 13); Glenn Robinson, “Hamas as a Social Movement,” in Quintan Wictorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004): 119–20. 5 Esposito, Islamic Threat, op. cit.: 19–22. 6 See, for example, Anonymous, Through Our Enemy’s Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam and the Future of America (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002); Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9–11 (New York: Knopf, 2007). 7 See, for example, William Raymond Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Asra Nomani, “Amr Khaled,” Time, April 30, 2007. Available online at www.time.com/ time/specials/2007/time100/article/0,28804,1595326_1615754_1616173,00.html (accessed February 18, 2008); Amr Khaled website (in English), www.amrkhaled.net/acategories/categories79.html (accessed February 18, 2008). Governments have also initiated positive change, including the King of Morocco, who instituted progressive legal reforms in 2004 that modify the traditional Sharia practices regarding women and their right to choose their husband, inherit property, and divorce. See Maghraoui, op. cit.: 3. See also “Family Law Reform,” Moroccan American Center for Policy. Available from www.moroccanamericanpolicy.com/subject_area.php?sub_id=2 (accessed February 18, 2008). 8 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29, 2006: 207–39. 9 Wictorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” op. cit.: 208. 10 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Suicide Bombers (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2006). 11 Hafez, op. cit.: 46–47. 12 Maghraoui, op. cit.: 1–4. 13 Maghraoui, op. cit.: 1–3. 14 “Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans,” Al-Islah, (London-based Arabic newspaper), September 2, 1996, FBIS translation, pp. 1–12. 15 “Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans,” Al-Islah (London-based Arabic newspaper), September 2, 1996, FBIS translation, pp. 1–12; Ayman Al-Zawahiri, “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner” Parts 1–11, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London-based Arabic newspaper), December 2001, FBIS translation. 16 Wictorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” op. cit.: 229–31. See also Mark E. Stout, et al, The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008). 17 Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks,” CRS Report for Congress, October 25, 2007. 18 For overviews of Hezbollah, see Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). For Hamas, see Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 19 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, October 2005. Available from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (accessed February 18, 2008). 20 Esposito, Islamic Threat? Op. cit.: 119–40. Kepel, op. cit.: 70–102. 21 Ibid. 22 See, for example, Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, The Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001).

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23 “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or Integration?” International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa Report No. 76, June 18, 2008. 24 Sandra Laville, “Banned Groups With Roots In UK Appeal to Disaffected Young Muslims,” Guardian, August 6, 2005; Jane Perlez, “From Finding Radical Islam to Losing an Ideology,” New York Times, September 12, 2007. 25 Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies website, www.eicds.org/ (accessed February 18, 2008). 26 Iranian Children’s Right Society website, www.iranianchildren.org/index.php (accessed June 19, 2008). 27 Baker, op. cit.: 235–37, 252–55. 28 Asra Nomani, “Amr Khaled,” Time, April 30, 2007. Available from www.time.com/time/specials/2007/time100/ article/0,28804,1595326_1615754_1616173,00.html (accessed February 18, 2008); Amr Khaled website (in English), www.amrkhaled.net/acategories/categories79.html (accessed February 18, 2008). 29 See, for example, Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam From the Extremists (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2005); Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002). 30 See, for example, Tariq Ramadan, In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life of Muhammad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 31 For example, see Cheryl Benard, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources and Strategies (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004); Angel Rabasa et al, Building Moderate Muslim Networks (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007); and Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, “American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal,” USIP Special Report No. 164, July 2006. Available from www.usip. org/pubs/specialreports/sr164.html (accessed August 17, 2007).

10 The US and the geopolitics of Middle Eastern oil Anas F. Alhajji

Introduction A quick review of circumstances that have influenced petroleum prices since the early 1970s indicates that political events in the Middle East have affected oil price volatility and, at times, substantially increased those prices. According to conventional wisdom in the West, oil prices went up in 1973 after the October “Arab” oil embargo. They did so again in 1979 after the Iranian revolution, and continued to increase in 1980, when Iraq attacked Iran and started a war that lasted eight years. And the prices jumped yet again when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. But if we look closely, we see that oil prices have also been influenced by daily political events such as tensions between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the UN in the 1990s, and problems between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The buildup to the US invasion of Iraq increased prices greatly. Although prices decreased after the invasion, some experts insist that the occupation of Iraq contributed to the spectacular oil price increases between 2004 and 2008.1 The standoff between Iran and the West over its nuclear program has also affected oil prices in various ways. In the light of these events, would the impact of higher oil prices on the US be any different if the US imported no oil from the Middle East? The answer, literally, is no. The impact on the US would have been the same, regardless of the import dependence level. Many in the West attributed these sharp price increases to a hostile and unstable Middle East. In the 1990s, this perception led the US to shift its dependence on oil imports from the Middle East to Latin America. The result was disastrous: the rise of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and various leftist parties throughout the continent. Then the US turned its attention to West Africa. The result was several devastating wars that crippled the oil industry in West African nations. When the US looked to Russia as an alternative source for oil, it got Putin. While these maneuvers were taking place, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait provided the world with badly needed additional oil, and Qatar provided a massive amount of natural gas in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). When non-Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production failed to meet expectations, capacity expansion in Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries mitigated the effects of this failure. The broad gap between perception and reality raises some pertinent but uncomfortable questions. Why did a large number of Arab oil-producing countries impose an embargo on the US and the Netherlands in October 1979? Why did oil prices not retreat to pre-embargo levels after the embargo officially ended in March 1974? The Iranian revolution cut Iranian oil supplies at the beginning of 1979, but why did the revolution occur in the first place? Why did most Iranians hate the Shah, yet why did Iranian revolutionaries direct their anger at the US? Why did Saddam Hussein start a war with Iran? Who financed him and provided the weapons? Why did Saddam invade Kuwait? Why did the US occupy Iraq? The answers shed much needed light on the geopolitics of Middle Eastern oil. While this chapter will not answer these questions, they are listed to emphasize an important fact: people in the Middle East view these

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events from a different perspective. They believe that none of them would have occurred if foreign powers had not interfered in the region’s affairs. Misperceptions about the Middle East and the contradictions that follow from them have generated serious problems for the US and the Western world. We need to agree on objective measures that help us assess the threats to energy supplies from various oil-producing regions. Will the Middle East top the list? Africa? Latin America? Russia? Central Asia? Or is it just oil itself—the plain old oil curse that vexes all decisions about the production and consumption of this indispensable commodity? This chapter offers a point of view not commonly found in discussions on the geopolitics of oil in the Middle East and US–Middle Eastern relations. The Middle East is large, and most of its states are oil producers. It would be difficult to cover every country in a single chapter. Therefore, our focus will be on the two hot spots in the Middle East, Iraq and Iran. But first, it is important to examine recent developments in US attitudes toward oil in general and oil producers in particular.

The Middle East, oil, and the politics of fear Recent data indicate that Iran and the Arab countries in southwest Asia hold about 755 billion barrels of oil, 61 percent of the world’s proven reserves. The countries also contain 73.21 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, about 41 percent of the world’s proven natural gas reserves.2 The region accounts for about 31 percent of world oil production and more than 12 percent of world gas production.3 As markets react to changes in production capacity and actual production rather than changes in reserves, it is important for policy makers in the US to realize several facts about Middle Eastern oil. First, while the Middle East producers control 61 percent of world oil reserves, they produce only 31 percent of the world’s oil. In fact, the list of the top ten producers in 2008 contained only four countries from the region: Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, and Kuwait. The UAE and Kuwait moved up the list recently after the oil production decline from the UK and Norway. Recently, Russia became the number one oil producer in the world. Second, US dependence on oil imports from the region is relatively low, and is certainly not sufficient to merit the inflamed rhetoric of politicians and the media regarding US dependence on Middle Eastern oil. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the statistical arm of the US Department of Energy (DOE), US oil imports from the Gulf region amounted to 18.2 percent of total US oil imports in the first nine months of 2008. The Middle East accounts for only 10.4 percent of total US oil consumption and less than 4 percent of total US energy consumption. These percentages include increased imports from Iraq, which have reached about 700,000 barrels per day in 2008.4 Third, most of the time, the top three exporters of oil to the US do not include any Middle Eastern country. Those top three are Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela. Fourth, all large oil producers in the region, except for Iran, are friends of the US. The US imports oil on a regular basis from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. It does not import any oil from Iran. Fifth, the importance of the Middle East oil does not stem from the amount of its production, but from the ability of some of these countries to change their levels of production. Russia has recently become the world’s largest producer, but Saudi Arabia remains the most influential one because it can easily adjust its production. Sixth, while all these countries (except Iran) are friends of the US, they all oppose Israel. The last point is of special importance. Most of the time, the US views the Middle East from the Israeli perspective. Let me again emphasize that, as of this writing, Russia is the world’s largest producer of both oil and gas. Yet most public animosity in the US is directed toward “Middle Eastern” oil. As the US imports no oil from Iran, this hostility is reserved for “Arab” oil.

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The numbers show that the US dependence on oil imports from its friends in the Middle East, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, amounts to less than 4 percent of its total energy consumption. This is a strikingly low figure, in light of the level of animosity toward “Arab” oil. In fact, given the need for import diversification to enhance US energy security, the level of dependence on Middle Eastern oil is also strikingly low. How do we account for this state of affairs? Reducing dependence on Middle Eastern oil is an old policy, and the more recent fear of terrorism has intensified the feelings of the US public and its politicians toward the Middle East. Israel is part of the equation, but it cannot be all of it. The answer is that the target of Middle Eastern oil has provided an opportunity for various political groups to promote their own agendas. Despite the claims of politicians, Washington politics are no longer related to energy security. Fear has driven policy making, not the issues, and politicians have played on the public’s fears. Terrorism and global warming lead the list. Republicans capitalized on the fear of terrorism in 2002 and 2004 to win national elections. Democrats chose the fear of global warming, and they have experienced political success with it. Strangely enough, riding that platform of fear, both groups come to the same conclusion: oil is the enemy. For Republicans, oil finances terrorism. For Democrats, oil causes global warming. For both, dependence on oil is an on-going calamity. A third group, mostly (but not exclusively) Democrats with neoconservative attitudes—let’s call them Republocrats—has also called for eliminating dependence on oil to foster democracy in the Middle East. They believe that doing so will lower prices and decrease the flow of money to the coffers of Middle Eastern governments. According to this view, lower oil revenues will force governments to be more democratic. The three groups that dominate American politics now have a single enemy: oil. All three believe that, if you eliminate dependence on oil, you solve the world’s most pressing problems: terrorism, global warming, and dictatorship. Fear of these problems, and consequently of oil, has allowed politicians to spend billions of dollars to promote substitutes for oil, which in turn has created new and powerful industries that thrive as long as their oil-bashing supporters are in power. Amazingly, even the private sector has launched a war against oil. Demonizing oil fits into many agendas and covers many enemies, from Chávez in Venezuela to Putin in Russia, and might include any leader of a country that produces oil. Therefore, US–Middle Eastern relations have evolved in recent years, not only because of the US occupation of Iraq and the Iranian nuclear standoff, but also because of the new attitude toward oil in general and Arab oil in particular. The problem is that Middle East policy makers in the US have to juggle several agendas while they attempt to minimize contradictions among various priorities: energy, foreign relations, and the environment, to name a few. Under such circumstances, something has got to give—most likely energy issues.

The US occupation of Iraq: does oil matter? This section deals with two questions. Did the US occupation of Iraq fit the objectives of the Bush administration’s energy policy? And if not, what is the role of oil in the on-going occupation? The answers are critical to future US–Middle East relations. The Middle East is more than just oil. Eliminating US dependence on Middle Eastern oil does not end US involvement in the Middle East, nor end US energy problems. Political commentators, economic analysts, working politicians, scholars, journalists, and even artists have argued that the US occupation of Iraq was part of a deliberate scheme to reassert US control over the second largest oil reserves in the world. They have claimed that the US intends to increase Iraq’s oil production in order to lower oil prices, destroy OPEC, and ensure cheap oil supplies to meet its ever-increasing demand for oil. If true, these claims would constitute a drastic change in US energy policy and a departure from the principles

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that have dominated US energy policies in the last thirty years. It would also be a departure from Bush energy policy itself, which was unveiled in the spring of 2001. Established US energy policy does not require the US to control Iraqi oil supplies. It is an unfounded claim that the desire of oil interests to control the second largest oil reserves in the world is what motivated the US occupation of Iraq. And claims that the US intends to increase Iraq’s oil production in order to lower oil prices and ensure cheap oil supplies have also proven baseless. US energy policy has not changed with the invasion of Iraq. In fact, US control of Iraqi oil does not fit the objectives of long-established US energy policies. Lowering oil prices and increasing US dependence on Iraqi oil will not contribute to the realization of well-established US goals of diversity of energy sources and petroleum imports, lower dependence on foreign oil imports, and reduction of oil price volatility, and may even detract from those goals.5 Therefore, US control of Iraqi oil fields was not intended to satisfy the American thirst for oil. If the Bush administration’s objective was to ensure stable, secure, diverse, and cheap oil supplies, it could have done so by lifting the embargoes imposed on Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan. If the US were after cheap Iraqi oil supplies, would it make sense for US companies to invest billions in Iraq to lower oil prices and profits, especially if doing so affects their operations in other parts of the world? Indeed, Iraqi oil is not quite as cheap as some experts have claimed. Iraq is nearly land-locked. Shipping its oil through diverse pipeline routes makes the crude more expensive than Saudi Arabia’s and Kuwait’s. Even with a government chosen by the US, Iraq’s oil contracts would not be as lucrative as some experts think. A democratic Iraqi government will not give away Iraq’s oil wealth. Lower oil prices are not in the interest of the US. Several studies have shown that lower oil prices threaten its domestic energy production and national security. Lower oil prices reduce US oil production, increase its dependence on oil imports, increase domestic demand, and increase pollution. They led to the loss of more than 200,000 jobs between 1998 and 1999.6 Alhajji and Williams (2003) presented evidence on the inverse relationship between oil prices and US dependence on petroleum. For example, the increase in oil prices in the late 1970s had reduced US import dependence (measured as a percentage of total consumption) by the early 1980s. The decrease in oil prices in the mid-1980s reversed that trend and increased US import dependence substantially.7 Therefore, lowering oil prices by invading Iraq would not have contributed to US energy security. If the US invasion of Iraq contradicts the US energy policy objectives, how can we explain US policy in Iraq? How do we account for the fact that the US Army took control of oil production facilities in the first few hours of the invasion, in advance of almost every other strategic target? How do we explain the contracts that the US government signed with oil service companies even before the invasion? One way to understand these actions is to focus on the contradictions between the objectives of US energy policy and US foreign policy. Foreign, economic, and environmental considerations have historically overridden declared energy policies. The US government has frequently viewed some foreign, environmental, and economic policy objectives as more important than the “declared” energy policy objectives; consequently, an “actual” energy policy has been practiced. However, it is unfortunate that governments, including the Clinton and the Bush administrations, failed to consider the impact of these deviations on the US energy industry and world oil markets. The result was record oil prices and record price volatility. Foreign policy objectives range from protecting human rights to fighting international terrorism. The Bush administration added new elements to US foreign policy that include preemptive military attacks, ousting leaders of rogue nations, and nation building. One dominant tool of foreign policy is the imposition of economic sanctions that are used to cut off oil supplies from targeted countries. The use of such tools contradicts the declared energy policy objectives. Environmental policy objectives aim at reducing the environmental dangers of fossil

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fuel by instituting new laws that prevent the development of oil fields in some areas. This policy contradicts the established policy of increasing domestic supplies of energy. Economic policy objectives are concerned with budget deficits and economic growth, which are ultimately “political objectives.” Balancing the budget in the mid-1990s led to the sale of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). Such a sale contradicts the well-established US energy policies that called for building up the SPR. Historical evidence suggests that “actual” energy policy has deviated from “declared” energy policy, especially during the Clinton years. For example, the Comprehensive National Energy Strategy (released in April 1998) calls on the country to be more energy efficient, to support domestic natural gas and oil production, to encourage diversity of global petroleum supplies, and to develop new energy technology, yet the Clinton administration did exactly the opposite. The State Department, not the Department of Energy, seems to have been dictating the “actual” energy policy. While various “declared” energy policies focused on conservation and oil alternatives as benefits of higher oil prices and lessening US dependence on foreign oil, Clinton’s actual energy policy may have resulted in lower oil prices in 1998 and 1999. The invasion of Iraq and its occupation can be viewed in the same manner: the foreign policy objectives of the Bush administration have overridden energy policy objectives. This contradiction explains the role of oil in the invasion of Iraq. The role that the Bush administration assigned to Iraqi oil was geopolitical. While US energy policy did not require the control of Iraq’s oil, US foreign policy objectives decidedly did require it. Oil was the source of the enemy’s strength. US control of the oil fields weakened the enemy and stripped it of this source of power. In addition, the US expected to use oil revenues to shoulder the burden of financing regime change in Iraq. Control of oil would allow the US to exclude groups it deemed unfit to rule Iraq or to participate in such rule. Whoever controlled Iraqi oil controlled Iraq’s destiny. Oil is the main source of power in Iraq. Control of the oil resources enables the holder to exert pressure on the rest of the population through threat, intimidation, and lavish spending on regime supporters. Control of the world’s second largest oil reserves was the source of Saddam’s power domestically and internationally. Saddam understood perfectly that oil is the key to power in Iraq. Thus, when the US invasion was imminent, he threatened to burn the Iraqi oil fields. Much of the destruction and looting of Iraqi oil facilities and pipelines reflected the widespread realization that control of oil means control of Iraq. Every time the Iraqi government has spoken of potential oil exports from the north through the Ceyhan pipeline, Iraqi pipelines in the region have been attacked. The US planned months before the invasion to secure the Iraqi oil fields in order to strip Saddam of his main source of power and ultimately establish and solidify a new Iraqi government. The Bush administration intended to use oil revenue to establish a regime of its liking, a government that would propagate the neoconservative agenda. Therefore, oil was not the invasion’s objective, but rather the main tool to achieve geopolitical objectives, which include building a stable, friendly regime in Iraq.

Iran, oil, nuclear, and the US For the foreseeable future, the nuclear standoff between Iran and the West will continue to influence world oil markets and US relations with various Middle Eastern countries, especially Iran’s neighbors. The politics of Iranian oil has been among the major causes of oil supply disruptions since the 1940s. Iran, one of the world’s largest exporters of oil for the last ninety years, has varying degrees of influence over its oil-producing neighbors. Iran nationalized its oil assets in the early 1950s. Its oil exports dropped significantly when the oil majors boycotted Iranian oil (Danielsen 1982). The world lost all Iranian exports during the Iranian oil-workers’ strikes at the end of

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1978 and the Islamic Revolution in early 1979. When the dust had settled, the revolutionary leaders decided to cut oil production by half and maintain it at that level (Seymour 1981).8 During the Iraq–Iran war, each country attacked the other’s oil facilities. The world lost a large amount of production capacity, but the impact on oil prices was negligible (EIA 2006). The impact of Iranian disruptions on world oil markets has varied in line with the excess capacity level in other oil-producing countries. A loss of Iranian production during the first half of 2008, estimated at around 4 million barrels per day, would have a larger impact on the market than the loss of the same amount during the fourth quarter of 2008 or during the Iran–Iraq war in the mid-1980s. At the beginning of 2008, excess production capacity in OPEC members was less than one quarter of that in the mid-1980s (EIA 2007). Toward the end of 2008, the excess capacity was about double the amount of Iranian oil exports. The US and Iran have been at loggerheads since the Islamic revolution in early 1979, but the two have never fought each other directly. Instead, they fight through proxies.9 The US, along with the UK, supported Iraq in its war with Iran, has supported various opposition groups within Iran, and supports Israel, the dominant power in the Middle East. Iran is financing Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. It has strengthened its relations with Syria, interfered in the Caspian region, and intervened in Iraq.10 In addition, the US is dealing with Iran through European and UN proxies. The US has monitored and influenced all of the European and UN negotiations with Iran. The US pressed hard on UN Security Council members to impose sanctions on Iran in December 2006 and for even tougher ones in 2007 and 2008 (BBC 2006; Reuters 2008). This history of indirect confrontation suggests that both the US and Iran would be willing to use the “oil weapon” in several indirect ways. Any action along these lines by either of the two would jeopardize world energy security.  Iran’s supporters might sabotage oil facilities in Iraq and other neighboring countries. The mere threat of sabotage is enough to have an impact on oil prices and upstream investment in the region.  The US and its allies might limit upstream investment in Iran with several economic and political measures.  The US might pressure gasoline exporters to stop gasoline and natural gas shipments to Iran.  The US might pressure Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to stop oil swaps with Iran. Even the continuation of the current political situation threatens world oil supplies. Without the standoff, oil prices would have been lower in 2007 and 2008, and Iran’s oil production and future production would be higher. In short, even without a production cut, indirect hostilities and the persistence of the current US–Iran standoff have had a negative impact on world energy security. Those who call for additional sanctions to cripple Iran’s energy sector must consider the long-term effect of the decline in Iran’s oil and gas exports on their own countries. Their efforts are counterproductive from an energy policy point of view. Nuclear power generation in Iran will divert oil and gas from domestic consumption to international markets and thus increase Iran’s oil and natural gas exports, even if Iran does not increase its production capacity. It will also reduce Iran’s energy imports and redirect these quantities to the international market as well. Nuclear power will increase efficiency and reduce wastage of fossil fuel. The availability of cheap electricity in Iran will contribute to political stability and stabilize the movement of the Iranian population. In addition, it will reduce the greenhouse emissions of inefficient Iranian utilities. Current data indicate that Iranian cities suffer from severe air pollution, especially Tehran, which experienced an environmental crisis in the late 1990s. Most of these problems relate to the burning of fossil fuel by utilities, factories, and cars (EIA 2002). The world’s energy security will plainly benefit from Iran’s nuclear power generation.

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The Iranian government is now under economic and political pressure to supply electricity to its growing population and fragile economy. The government fears that electricity shortages, slow economic growth, and high unemployment will turn the Iranian people against it. Social tensions will increase, and political turmoil will follow. Iranian experts argue that, in the light of the threat of sanctions and attacks on nuclear facilities, the Iranian government has to choose between “domestic” security and “international” security (Zahrani 2006). The population boom, the high proportion of youth in the population, and changes in culture and lifestyle in the last two decades have increased the demand for electricity in a way that has never been seen before. Under such circumstances, the choice is clear: to continue building the nuclear reactors. Domestic pressure could very well bring down the regime, but international pressure will not. History is on the side of the Iranian government. The Islamic Revolution has survived a brutal war, economic sanctions, and massive international pressure. However, despite international support for the Shah’s government, domestic pressure forced him to flee in 1979. (Even the US, his best friend, refused to allow him entry for cancer treatments.) Therefore, the Iranian government has no choice but to develop nuclear energy. Nonetheless, the Iranian nuclear program, even if it is peaceful, has become a threat to world oil supplies. Some Western governments do not trust the Iranian regime, and conversely, the Iranian regime is convinced that some Western governments, especially the US, will do anything possible to undermine it. If a peaceful nuclear program has all the advantages mentioned above, then it is a stabilizing factor that would empower the current regime, something the US would not like to see. Therefore, from the outset, it does not matter whether the Iranian nuclear program is peaceful or not. The US and its allies perceive a peaceful Iranian nuclear program as a threat as long as it contributes to the stability of the regime in Iran. Unfortunately, foreign policy goals on both sides trump energy policy goals. When it comes to energy security, all parties are losers. However, it is unlikely that Iran will cut off oil supplies to Europe and Asia to force its agenda or even to retaliate against UN-sponsored sanctions. Iran will not benefit from imposing an oil embargo on any country or group of countries. The history of the oil embargoes of 1956, 1967, and 1973 shows that none succeeded in achieving their objectives. In particular, these oil embargoes failed to coerce targeted nations into altering their policies toward Israel (Alhajji 2005). To this day, none of the embargoes’ objectives have been met. The Arab–Israeli conflict continues, Palestinians still live in refugee camps in several countries, the US and its allies continue to supply Israel with weapons and advanced military equipment, and the Arab world still lacks the technology and expertise necessary for economic development. Moreover, the 1973 embargo awakened nationalism in the US. Americans were willing to endure hardship rather than capitulate to Arab demands. Americans viewed the oil embargo as a threat to their sovereignty, integrity, and way of life. The lesson from 1973 applies to Iran today. A UN-sponsored embargo will not force Iran to comply. A cut-off of Iranian oil exports will not force other countries to yield to Iranian demands. The populations of both the Western countries and Iran would stand behind the decisions of their elected leaders, making it even harder for leaders to meet and negotiate. Iran cannot inflict pain on the US and its allies through a halt in production, especially after the recent increase in excess capacity, mostly in rival producers such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The US does not import any oil from Iran. Should Iran’s oil exports decrease, the only impact on the US would be an increase in world oil prices. The US and its allies could even mitigate the effect of a cut-off in Iranian oil exports by releasing oil from the SPR. In fact, they have enough oil in strategic and commercial storage to compensate for several months’ halt in Iranian oil, while Iran would struggle to feed its own people.11 The bottom line is that Iran’s dependence on oil exports is distinctly higher than US dependence on oil imports from all the oil-producing countries combined—which do not include Iran. In short, there are several economic and political factors that prevent Iran from

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using the oil weapon. The stability of the current regime depends on subsidies to the Iranian people, and only a steady stream of oil revenues can provide the money to afford these subsidies. In addition, Iran needs foreign investment and Western technology to develop its vast oil and gas resources. Using the oil weapon would prevent Iran from getting that investment and technology. To conclude, it does not matter whether Iran’s nuclear program is for civilian use or military use. Any US administration will be keen to stifle even a peaceful nuclear program as long as this program empowers the Iranian regime. Programs and projects that stabilize the regime in Tehran will be viewed by any US administration as threats to its interests. The US insistence on imposing harsh UN sanctions against Iran, in addition to US sanctions, proves this point. It is unlikely that Iran will cut off or reduce its oil exports. It is not in its interest under any scenario to decrease exports, let alone to halt them. In the light of the threat of sanctions and attacks on nuclear facilities, the Iranian government has to choose between “domestic” security and “international” security. Domestic pressure can very well bring down an Iranian regime, but international pressure does not. However, domestic pressure, a sense of nationalism, and the need to improve its bargaining power with Western countries might force the Iranian government to retaliate. The question is, how? As the only benefit from announcing an oil production cut would be to calm the Iranian public and prevent radicals from attacking oil facilities and pipelines, the government might announce a symbolic cut or embargo, which would have little impact on world oil markets. The Iranian government has other effective options if it intends to pressure or hurt the US and its allies. Given the high economic and political costs of using the oil weapon, Iranian supporters in Iraq might cripple Iraqi oil exports from the port of Basra instead of reducing Iranian oil exports. This option, which would reduce world oil supplies by about 2 million barrels per day, would damage US plans for Iraq while boosting Iran’s oil revenues. In addition, its operatives in Iraq might limit the availability of fuel to the US Army by attacking roads and bridges, especially the main route used to import fuel from Kuwait, the Kuwait City–Baghdad highway.

Conclusion Conventional wisdom in the West associates the Middle East with political instability. This fails to factor in the role the West plays in producing this instability. Nor does it consider how oil contributes to political stability in any oil-producing country that is heavily dependent on oil exports, not only in the Middle East but also in Africa, Latin America, or even Russia. US dependence on Middle Eastern oil is already low. Eliminating oil imports from the Middle East will not enhance energy security. It will not end US involvement in the Middle East. The fact that oil-producing countries are more dependent on oil revenues than the US is on oil imports gives the US the upper hand. There is more to the Middle East than oil. The US occupation of Iraq is a case in point. The US did not occupy Iraq to satisfy its thirst for oil. US energy policy does not require the control of Iraqi oil: US foreign policy does. Loss of control over oil contributed to ending Saddam Hussein’s regime. Control of oil helped, and continues to help, finance the new government in Baghdad. The standoff with Iran is another case in point. If the US were after oil, it would not have imposed sanctions on Iran and impeded investment by non-US oil companies there. US energy policy does not require sanctions on Iranian oil imports: US foreign policy does. The Iranian nuclear standoff will continue indefinitely, and its impact on world oil markets will linger. The US not only opposes the development of nuclear weapons but is also against any program that contributes to the stability of the regime in Tehran, including a civilian nuclear program for power generation.

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Iran understands the power of oil in domestic and international politics. To wield oil as a weapon in international politics would mean less money to support its domestic politics. Therefore, Iran will not use the oil weapon. Any announcement to do so will be symbolic, to mitigate the Iranian people’s anger against the US and its allies. While the standoff will put upward pressure on oil prices, the inability of Iran to actually use the oil weapon will prevent prices from getting out of hand. For all parties, oil remains as important in foreign policy making as in energy policy making.

Notes 1 See, for example, Emmott, Bill “Who Wins in Iraq,” Foreign Policy, March–April 2007. 2 BP Annual Statistical Review, 2008. 3 Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2009, Monthly Energy Review. Available from www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ mer/contents.html. 4 EIA, 2009. 5 For more details, see “The US Energy Policy and the Invasion of Iraq: Does Oil Matter?” World Oil, June 2003. 6 For more details, see Alhajji, A. F. “What Have we Learned from Lower Oil Prices?” OPEC Review, September 2001. 7 Alhajji, A. F. and James Williams “Measures of Petroleum Dependency and Vulnerability in OECD Countries” Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. 46, No. 16, April, 2003. 8 Some experts viewed this action as a significant threat to energy security, especially as the decision was based on religious beliefs that excessive income will corrupt the Iranian people. They believe that the current Iranian administration subscribes to the same thinking as the Revolution of the late 1970s. They claim that the current government wants to reduce oil production. Other experts argue that the decision to reduce output was technical, not religious. They argue that this decision to cut output enhanced world energy security. They strongly believe that had the Shah’s policies of maintaining production at 6 million barrels a day continued into the 1980s, they would have led to disaster. The decline rate would have been high. Iran’s oil production would have been less than what Iran is producing today. Regardless of the nature of the decision to cut output, it is clear by now that it helped maintain Iranian oil production. 9 Numerous articles have focused on this point. See, for example, de Borchgrave (2006). The issue has been widely discussed in the media. See, for example, NPR (2007). 10 House Bill 1324, March 5, 2007, asked the Congress to designate the Quds Force, a unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, as a foreign terrorist organization. The Bill cited reports that “indicate that the Quds Force, using a variety of tradecraft, collects intelligence and organizes operations of Shiite armed elements against United States military forces in Iraq.” 11 In an interview with French BFM radio, the International Energy Agency (IEA)’s executive director Claude Mandil stated: “If ever, for whatever reason, there was a loss of supplies from Iran, which represent around 2.7 million barrels per day (mb/d), strategic stocks managed by the IEA would be able to compensate for those lost 2.7 mb/d for a year and a half.” For details, see IEA top stories at www.iea.org/journalists/topstories.asp.

References Alhajji, A. F. (2006). “Iran’s Weakest Link: Gasoline.” Energy Tribune, December. ——(2006). “Will Iran’s Nuclear Standoff Cause A World Energy Crisis?” Middle East Economic Survey, XLIX(14), April. ——(2005). “The Oil Weapon: Past, Present, and Future.” Oil & Gas Journal, 30(2), May. ——(2004). “The Failure of the Oil Weapon: Consumer Nationalism vs. Producer Symbolism.” Bridges, Spring/ Summer. ——(2003). “The US Energy Policy and the Invasion of Iraq: Does Oil Matter?” World Oil, June. ——(2001). “What Have we Learned from Lower Oil Prices?” OPEC Review, September. Alhajji, A. F. and Williams, James (2003). “Measures of Petroleum Dependency and Vulnerability in OECD Countries.” Middle East Economic Survey, 46(16), April. Amuzegar, Jahangir (2007). “Iran’s New Energy Picture.” Middle East Economic Survey, XLIX(5), January. BBC (2006). “US Demands UN Sanctions on Iran.” October. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 6086084.stm. Danielsen, Albert (1982). The Evolution of OPEC. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. de Borchgrave, Anaud (2006). “War in Lebanon: A Proxy War for US and Iran.” Newsmax.com, August. Available from www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/8/7/135122.shtml. Emmott, Bill (2007) “Who Wins in Iraq.” Foreign Policy, March–April. Energy Information Administration (2007) “Short Term Energy Outlook.” March. Washington, DC: EIA. Available from www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/contents.html. ——(2006). “Iran Country Analysis Briefs.” August. Available from www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Background.html. ——(2002). “Iran: Environmental Issues.” May. Available from www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iranenv.html.

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International Monetary Fund (2007). “Islamic Republic of Iran: 2006 Article IV Consultation.” March. Available from www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07100.pdf. Isenberg, David (2005). “The Fuel Behind Iran’s Nuclear Drive.” Asia Times, August 24. Available from www.atimes. com/atimes/Middle_East/GH24Ak02.html. National Public Radio (2007). “U.S., Iran Find a Proxy Battleground in Iraq.” January. Available from www.npr.org/ templates/story/story.php?storyId=7102233. Reuters (2008). “World Reserves can Offset Iran Oil for 18 Months.” ——(2007). “World Reserves can Offset Iran Oil for 18 Months.” March 23. ——(2006). “World Reserves can Offset Iran Oil for 18 Months.” October 3. Seymour, Ian (1981). OPEC: Instrument of Change. New York: St. Martin’s Press. United Nations Security Council (2007). “Security Council Toughens Sanctions Against Iran, Adds Arms Embargo, with Unanimous Adoption of Resolution 1747.” March. Available from www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ sc8980.doc.htm. ——(2006). “Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1737.” December. Available from www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm. Zahrani, Mostafa (2006). “Challenges to Security: The West Asian Experience”, a presentation by Mostafa Zahrani at the IDSA’s 8th Asian Security Conference: “Changing Security Dynamic in West Asia: Relevance for the Post 9–11 Systemic.” January 30–February 1, 2006. New Delhi, India. ——(2004). “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Fact and Fiction.” July. Available from www.american-iranian.org/pubs/ aicupdate/03242005.html#zahrani.

11 The Middle East and US energy security Anas F. Alhajji

Introduction The quest for energy security is as natural as any other human behavior. When this search is politicized, however, it loses its natural character and takes on several meaningless, misguided, and contradictory qualities. US politicians, calling for eliminating dependence on petroleum to “improve energy security” yet at the same time wanting to drill in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and offshore areas and increase the size of the US strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), ignore the contradictions in their proposals. They want to eliminate dependence on oil imports from the Middle East, but ignore the impact of such policies on the future of friendly governments in the Gulf region, including Iraq, and the effect on Israel should these governments collapse. They cite the impact that oil nationalism in oil-producing countries has on US energy security, but ignore the fact that talk about energy independence and elimination of dependence on Middle Eastern oil imports is yet another face of oil nationalism, one that could easily contribute to energy insecurity. They criticize oil-producing countries for refusing to give international oil companies (IOCs) access to oil reserves, but have banned IOCs from drilling in oil-rich areas of the US. Paradoxically, calls to limit Middle Eastern oil imports to enhance energy security result in energy insecurity. Fear of lower oil exports and lower oil prices force oil-exporting countries to invest less on maintenance and capacity expansion. Countries with huge oil reserves have built, and continue to build, energy-intensive industries to export oil embedded in other products such as petrochemicals, steel, and aluminum. Such reactions by oil-exporting nations will result in a worldwide energy crisis. It is certain that oil exports will decline long before the world sees meaningful increases in energy production from alternative sources. These contradictions are among the many that make the concept of “energy security” elusive and hard to define. This elusiveness has given US politicians a license to bend the concept to their purposes. Some of them associate energy security with the elimination of energy shortages, or the reduction of their effect. Others associate it with low oil prices. Some believe that federal and state governments should intervene in the energy business to enhance energy security. Others believe that free markets will do the job. Despite these differences, it is clear that few understand the relationships and the contradictions among energy security, national security, economic security, and environmental security. They also ignore the role of monetary and fiscal policies in energy security. This common disregard for fundamental relationships and difficult contradictions makes it possible to focus on eliminating dependence on oil from the Middle East. It is an easy, natural, and even necessary substitute for objective analysis and informed policy formation. The US has neither a clear definition of energy security nor measures to assess its own energy security. For example, US politicians cannot explain why dependence on 30 percent of oil imports in 1970 was better than today’s 60 percent. If increasing dependence on Middle Eastern oil imports is a threat to national and economic security, what is the explanation for

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the economic miracles of Japan and Germany after the Second World War, despite their complete dependence on foreign oil, mostly from the Middle East? Let the politicians explain India’s and China’s recent impressive rates of economic growth, despite record high oil prices and higher dependence on oil imports, especially from the Middle East. They also need to explain the impressive US economic performance between 2003 and 2006, a period that witnessed record oil prices and record imports. While they are at it, they might consider the fact that power shortages in California, gas shortages in the US, and the oil production decline in the Gulf of Mexico have nothing to do with the Middle East. The objective of this chapter is to define and measure energy security and to explain the contradictions faced when energy policies are designed. This will enable us to view the US– Middle East energy relations in a different light. Our purposes will be to understand and counter the political manipulation of energy security, and to determine whether the growing animosity toward oil in general (and the oil-producing countries in the Middle East in particular) enhances US energy security.

Dimensions of energy security US energy security, like that of any country, has six dimensions: economic, foreign policy, environmental, social, technical, and security. Balancing these dimensions within an energy policy is a difficult task. The weight given to each dimension differs from one politician to another and from time to time. The interaction among these dimensions also varies over time. Therefore, the concept of energy security is a protean concept at best, continually changing its shape and dimensions. Likewise, energy security can differ greatly among countries. Ironically, most of these dimensions relate, both directly and indirectly, to the oil-producing countries, which means that interdependence, not independence, is the key to energy security. The economic dimension This dimension ensures that higher energy prices do not stall economic growth, increase inflation, raise unemployment, weaken the balance of payments, or reduce the value of the dollar.1 However, the enhancement of this dimension of US energy security has little to do with energy policy, hinging rather on fiscal and monetary policies. For example, among the main reasons that high oil prices did not affect US economic growth between 2003 and 2006 are low interest rates and the massive increase in US government spending.2 The US might fear that a sharp increase in oil prices could cause an economic downturn, but becoming energy self-sufficient will not shield the US economy from higher prices that result from political problems in oil-producing countries, and not just those in the Middle East. The oil market is global. When oil prices increase, they increase everywhere, including countries that do not import oil. Therefore, monetary and fiscal policies are more important in mitigating the effect of high oil prices than reduced dependence on oil from the Middle East. US politicians who want to eliminate dependence on oil and those who want to reduce dependence on oil imports from the Middle East need to answer several questions. What will happen to the US export sector when the oil-producing countries go bankrupt? What will happen to the world trade and financial systems when these countries become poor? What will happen to the world financial system if trade in the most widely traded commodity, oil, comes to a halt? As oil is traded in US dollars, what will happen to the US dollar? Does economic hardship in the oil-producing countries enhance economic growth in the US? Answering these questions correctly yields the following conclusion: enhancing the economic dimension of the US energy security requires co-operation with oil-producing countries and diversification of oil imports. In a global economy, the health of the US economy is dependent on the health of the world financial system and the economies of other nations, which includes oil producers in the Middle East.

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The foreign policy dimension Oil and politics are inextricably intertwined. The evidence of this connection abounds. As the significance of natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) in international trade has increased, gas has developed a similar relationship. Two issues stand out in discussions of US foreign policy and oil. First, dependence on oil imports puts the US at a disadvantage when it negotiates with oil-producing countries. Fear of oil shortages might force the US to co-operate with oilproducing countries or support regimes that it would not do otherwise. The need for oil might lead the US to make foreign policy decisions that would compromise important principles, especially those related to human rights and the environment. Second, US dependence on imported oil might limit US foreign policy options in dealing with enemies from the oilproducing countries during periods of high oil prices. Therefore, it is no surprise that US politicians have linked oil security to strategic and defense considerations, an indication that they realize the foreign policy dimension of US energy security. Oil-producing countries might not play the oil card when they negotiate political and economic issues, but their politicians understand that the other side sees all the cards, including oil. Explicitly or implicitly, even powerful countries such as the US have oil on their minds when they negotiate political and economic issues with the oil-producing countries. The need for oil affects US foreign policy and its international decisions, even without pressure from oil producers. However, as oil is the main link between the Middle Eastern oil producers and the US, oil imports might take on special significance in US–Middle East relations as a subject that keeps both parties communicating. Given the known risks of dependence on imported oil, the solution is not for the US to eliminate its dependence on oil from the Middle East, but to diversify its energy sources and its energy imports. Experts can build an energy portfolio that maximizes this dimension of US energy security. In this case, imports from the Middle East enhance US energy security when they become part of a diversified portfolio. The environmental dimension As the environmental impact of producing, transporting, and burning fossil fuels has health and economic consequences, several countries, including the US, have incorporated environmental objectives into their energy polices. It is obvious that a reduction in energy use will decrease pollution. However, this comes at the expense of the economic dimension of energy security, and might jeopardize US interests in the Middle East as the region becomes poorer with the subsequent decline in oil demand. Only efficiency improvements in cars, equipment, and machines can reduce pollution and ensure economic growth and sound foreign policy. Therefore, the environmental dimension of energy security is not related to energy resources per se, but to the technologies that use (and produce) these resources. To ensure energy security, the US should integrate its industrial and technological policies into its energy policy. Such policies will improve efficiency, but they will also affect fuel choice, which may result in contradictions with other dimensions of energy security. Low energy prices may benefit the economic dimension, but they worsen the environmental dimension. Higher oil prices may not contribute as much to the environment as some people think. Some environmentalists contend that increasing energy prices through taxes will reduce energy consumption and consequently reduce pollution. This approach not only contradicts the economic dimension of energy security, but also the environmental dimension itself. Low-income families will be unable to purchase the heavily taxed fuel. Instead, they will burn wood, coal, and animal dung, leading to deforestation, increased pollution, and other environmental degradation. Therefore, taxation and higher energy prices do not necessarily enhance energy security. The government push to use certain fuels to enhance the environmental dimension (and reduce dependence on Middle Eastern oil) will not necessarily reduce pollution from a national or

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global view. For example, electric cars might reduce pollution where they are used, but pollution will increase where that electricity is generated. Ethanol does not reduce pollution if the environmental impact of the full production cycle, from planting corn to making and transporting ethanol, is calculated. The amount of fresh water used to make ethanol is also an environmental threat. When all factors are considered (including market forces and the dominance of oil as a main energy source in the US), less dependence on Middle Eastern oil has no environmental impact if the US continues to import oil from other countries and China imports the Middle Eastern oil that the US used to take. It is in the interests of the large oil producers in the Middle East to maintain oil as one of the main sources of energy. The US will continue to depend on oil imports. Based on the Energy Information Administration (EIA) predictions, cooperation on carbon dioxide (CO2) sequestration between oil producers in the Middle East and the US enhances the environmental dimension of US energy security. Middle Eastern countries can provide the capital and the storage needed, while the US can provide the education, experience, and technology. The social dimension Unfortunately, most of the energy security debate has focused on external factors, such as security of supplies and political unrest in oil-producing countries. The only internal issue that has gained attention recently is the environmental impact of burning fossil fuel. Energy policies have historically ignored domestic political problems that may arise when the gap increases between the “energy rich” and the “energy poor.” Countries strive to ameliorate social tension through various policies, which include reducing inequalities of income and energy. Scholars view factors that cause these differences as a threat to a society. Higher energy prices might at times increase disparities in both income and energy access. The social dimension of energy security does not directly relate to the availability of energy resources, but rather to the ability to obtain these resources, which explains price controls and subsidies in many countries. The larger the proportion of a country’s population that lacks access to energy resources, the more energy insecurity that country experiences. Ironically, Hugo Chávez, the president of Venezuela, tried to capitalize on the social dimension of energy security when he started shipping fuel oil to the poor in some northeastern US cities.3 Most energy policies do not focus so pointedly on the social dimension. However, the social dimension becomes part of the energy debate any time that a country, including the US, experiences an energy crisis. When energy prices are high, the gap between the rich and the poor becomes more obvious. The rich can afford to heat their homes and drive their cars, while the poor suffer from the cold and are forced to walk or use public transportation. While schools in rich areas remain open during frigid seasons, schools in poor areas have to shut down. The result of such an “energy gap” could well be political unrest and reduced economic growth. Low energy prices for all might not enhance the social dimension of energy security. Low prices of petroleum products could well end up helping the rich who own several cars and homes, with little benefit to the poor. The government can enhance the social dimension by adopting fiscal policies that reduce the energy gap between rich and poor: by increasing economic growth, training people for better jobs, and eliminating all energy subsidies, especially to the rich. As the world market is global, and the level of independence on oil imports has nothing to do with oil prices, it is hard to argue that eliminating dependence on Middle Eastern oil will enhance the social dimension of US energy security. However, those who remain concerned will discover that import diversification will fit their objective better than an import concentration that results from eliminating dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

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The technical dimension Energy has another eternal partner beside politics: technology. When it comes to energy security, policy makers must be aware of this relationship in order to balance the various dimensions of energy security. A government’s push to improve energy security by supporting technologies that facilitate the production of renewable energy resources may actually lead to energy insecurity, especially if the country becomes hostage to spare parts from other countries. For example, fuel cell technology requires the use of palladium, exported by only two countries in the world, Russia and South Africa. In some cases, supporting certain technologies might inadvertently switch demand from domestic to foreign energy resources. New energy technology may require imports of the very energy sources that the new technology is intended to replace, if this imported source is necessary to operate the new technology. For example, the development of clean coal technology would require importing additional quantities of oil and gas. Supporting a new technology may also increase energy prices, which in turn would affect the economic and social dimension of energy security. A country that adopts a new technology that improves energy security may end up with energy insecurity if it has to import the skilled labor to operate it. On the other side, adopting new technologies might improve energy security. Biomass energy in electricity generation and heating has proven to be very successful, especially during periods of high oil prices. As low oil prices undercut these power plants and heating systems, low oil prices do not always benefit the US. Indeed, low energy prices kill certain technologies. It is ironic that when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries cut production to increase oil prices, this dimension of US energy security is actually enhanced. The technology that enhances US energy security is the one that enhances all dimensions at the same time. As market forces have chosen fossil fuel as the main source of energy, technologies that enhance the recovery of fossil fuels and reduce their environmental impact will most likely enjoy the support of those same market forces. Therefore, the US government can enhance energy security by eliminating barriers to market forces and supporting technologies that enhance all dimensions of energy security, such as CO2 sequestration and CO2 flooding of oil fields. The security dimension While the foreign policy dimension focuses on diplomatic and trade relations, the security dimension deals with two internal issues: the physical security of energy installations and the energy needs of the military and police. Threats to the physical security of energy installations include terrorist attacks, human error, natural disasters, and technical malfunctions. It is beyond this chapter’s scope to discuss ways to protect energy installations, but it is important to acknowledge that protecting energy installations in the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries is as significant as protecting them in the US. Measures of the security dimension include the degree of concentration of domestic energy resources and installations. They also include the geographic location of energy resources and installations relative to (1) the location of the market, (2) the locations of religious, ethnic, and political groups, and (3) areas prone to natural disasters. In addition, these measures include the frequency and timing of attacks relative to the daily rhythms of energy usage and the seasonality of energy consumption. It is important for US policy makers to realize that security problems are universal, and that they also affect oil-producing countries in the Middle East. Oil supplies require domestic stability. Supporting one group over another in producing countries will only fuel instability and result in energy insecurity. Energy security measures are also related to energy consumption by the military and police, as well as the security of their supply lines and the speed with which energy sources can be delivered to them.

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Eliminating or reducing dependence on oil, including oil produced in the Middle East, does not enhance the security dimension of energy security. In fact, history tells us that the US cannot simultaneously be the world’s sole superpower and energy independent. It has to choose one or the other. As military superiority is the logical choice, US energy security is enhanced by interdependence, diversification of energy sources, and diversification of oil imports. Oil must be part of the US energy portfolio, and oil imports from the Middle East must be included.

Low oil prices and energy security One issue overlooked by most policy makers is the impact of low oil prices on energy security. US politicians become especially complacent when oil prices decline. Low oil prices not only plant the seeds for the next energy disruption, they are the single most serious threat to energy security. In fact, low prices would be extremely harmful should they lead to political instability and chaos in oil-producing countries, especially in the Middle East. The US gains some economic benefits from low oil prices, but these are short-lived. Oil revenues are the main income source for the Middle East and therefore one determinant of stability in the region. The US cannot allow low oil prices and their short-term economic benefits to drive long-term policy. The very real threats to US energy security from lower prices outweigh the limited gains in the economic dimension. An energy policy that aims at eliminating dependence on the Middle East or at lowering oil prices contradicts US foreign policy. Low oil prices decrease US domestic oil production and increase oil demand. As oil prices decline, so does the profitability of US oil companies. They lay off hundreds of thousands of US workers. Low oil prices increase US dependence on oil at the expense of other energy sources. They reduce production in high-cost areas around the world and force the US to concentrate its imports in a few countries, a situation that increases its vulnerability and jeopardizes its energy security. Historical data indicate that low oil prices in the mid-1980s and late 1990s choked off the growth of other energy sources such as coal, natural gas, nuclear, solar, wind, and various renewable energy sources. Such trends stand against declared US energy policies that call on the nation to diversify its energy sources to avoid energy shocks in case of supply disruption. Data indicate that lower oil prices disrupt the markets in alternative energy sources and affect the stability of these sources. Lower oil prices increase oil consumption and consequently reduce efficiency and increase pollution. Technology has improved substantially over the last twenty-five years, which has reduced the environmental impact of burning fossil fuel, especially in the transportation sector. Still, the transportation sector’s continuing dependence on oil and the decrease in efficiency gains during periods of low oil prices raise concerns among environmentalists worldwide. The recent decline in oil prices is no different. All of the gains in energy security in 2007 and 2008 will be wiped out if prices remain low for several months. The inevitable result of such low prices will be another spike in oil prices that will affect the economic dimension of energy security. If we look at energy security as a portfolio that we can maximize, we need an optimal price for each energy source within that portfolio. Nothing is more damaging to that portfolio than low oil prices and increased price volatility.

Conclusions Based on the dimensions of energy security discussed above, we can define energy security as the steady availability of energy supplies in a way that ensures economic growth in both producing and consuming countries, with the lowest social cost and the lowest price volatility. This definition encompasses the above six dimensions and concentrates on energy interdependence’s role in enhancing energy security. The world is a better place when both

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oil-producing and oil-consuming countries enjoy economic growth with the steady availability of energy supplies, while reducing pollution, income gaps, and costs. The world will suffer if energy independence becomes the mantra of US politics. This chapter has provided a general framework that identifies six dimensions of energy security. A critical problem is the lack of timely data to measure and assess the energy security situation in most consuming countries. Without measurement and assessment, decision makers cannot make the correct policy recommendations to avoid an energy crisis. While a free energy market is among the best tools to enhance energy security, the US government can pursue policies that can improve market competitiveness and correct for market failures. The social dimension of energy security might require the government to intervene to reduce the energy gap between rich and poor. Fear of oil shortages might also force the government to build strategic petroleum reserves. Building strategic oil and gas reserves for use during energy shortages is an effective tool only if building strategic reserves does not replace the build in commercial stocks. Energy independence might improve some aspects of US energy security, but it does not shield it from energy shocks. The petroleum market is global. Any shortage in any part of the world will increase petroleum prices worldwide. Eliminating dependence on oil imports from the Middle East does not enhance energy security, especially as it will concentrate US oil imports. US energy security is nested in interdependence and co-operation, not isolation and selfsufficiency. Therefore, policy makers in the consuming countries can enhance energy security by fostering interdependence rather than agonizing about dependence on foreign producers. The US is well off when the oil-producing countries in the Middle East are well off. The US must view oil from the Middle East as one source in a balanced strategy of oil import diversification and development of other sources of energy. In doing so, the US will help to maintain a level of economic growth in the Middle East that prevents the region—and perhaps the world—from falling into an abyss of uncertainty and chaos.

Notes 1 For example, as oil supplies decrease, oil prices increase. This increase in oil prices increases the US trade deficit, which in turn decreases the value of the US dollar. For more on the topic, see “How Does the Weak Dollar Affect Oil Prices?” Available from www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/alhajji5. 2 For more on this topic, see Alhajji, A. F. “High Oil Prices Have Not Affected Economic Growth – Yet.” Oil & Gas Journal, 102(31), August 2004. 3 The President of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, started providing heating oil to poor neighborhoods in northeastern US free of charge in late 2006. The program stopped in early 2009 after the sharp decline in oil prices. For more, see www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/21/AR2006092101115.html and http://article. wn.com/view/2009/01/06/Venezuela_halts_program_that_gives_free_heating_oil_to_US_po/.

12 Peace process Stephen Zunes

There is a widespread assumption in the United States that resolution of the conflict between the Israelis and their Arab neighbors is an extremely complex issue and that the United States is an “honest broker” that has been and is the best hope for peace. The view from the Arab world and much of the rest of the international community is quite different, however. Since the late 1960s, the United States has been the primary international supporter of the Israeli government and its occupation forces while at the same time playing the role of mediator in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Maintaining these contradictory roles is in large part responsible for the on-going Israeli–Palestinian violence, which has brought neither justice for the Palestinians nor security for Israel. It has also contributed to the dramatic rise of anti-American sentiment, not just among Palestinians, but among Arabs and Muslims in lands well beyond Palestine. For nearly thirty years, the international consensus for peace in the Middle East has involved the withdrawal of Israeli forces to within Israel’s internationally recognized (pre-June 1967) boundaries in return for security guarantees from Israel’s neighbors, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a shared Jerusalem as the co-capital of both states, and a just resolution for the Palestinian refugees. During the same thirty-year period, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which served for many years as the Palestinians’ de facto government-in-exile, along with independent Arab states, evolved from openly calling for Israel’s destruction to supporting this international consensus for a two-state solution. The PLO had hinted at a willingness to accept a small Palestinian state living in peace alongside Israel as far back as the mid-1970s, made it official in 1988, and formally repealed sections in its charter calling for Israel’s dissolution in 1996.1 The United States, however, rejected the international consensus for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. A UN Security Council resolution reflecting this international consensus, which had the support of virtually the entire international community— with what appears to have been the quiet support of most Arab states and the Palestinians—was put up for a vote as far back as 1976, but was vetoed by the United States. This strident opposition to Palestinian statehood finally shifted when President Bill Clinton, toward the end of his presidency, and President George W. Bush, in a more direct way in the fall of 2001, declared that the United States would support a Palestinian state in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, both administrations made clear that the United States would not support anything beyond the very limited sovereignty and severely circumscribed boundaries that the nation’s Israeli occupiers were willing to offer, restrictions that would make Palestine an independent state largely in name only. Furthermore, the United States has largely endorsed Israel’s annexation of greater East Jerusalem in violation of a series of UN Security Council resolutions, only partial Israeli withdrawal from parts of the West Bank still under Israeli military occupation, and no right for Palestinian refugees to return. Nor has the United States been willing to demand an end to Israel’s illegal policies of confiscating Palestinian land and constructing Jewish-only settlements and roads within the occupied territories as called for in a series of UN Security Council resolutions and a landmark 2004 advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice.

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The Palestinians, through the PLO, effectively recognized Israeli control of over 78 percent of historic Palestine—the territory within Israel’s internationally recognized borders—in the Declaration of Principles agreed to in Oslo, Norway, in 1993. Israel redeployed its forces from parts of the remaining 22 percent of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which they seized in the 1967 war) in a phased withdrawal between 1993 and 1997. At that point, about forty percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including most of their towns and cities, was placed under the rule of the newly established Palestine National Authority and divided into dozens of non-contiguous zones wherein the Palestinians could exercise some limited autonomy. American opposition to a comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors goes back for at least three decades. Officially, the United States has backed UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338—which call for Israel’s withdrawal from the territories seized in the 1967 war in return for security guarantees from Israel’s neighbors—as the basis for peace. However, as far back as 1969, US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger passed on to the Israelis the advice that they ignore the Rogers Plan—crafted by US Secretary of State William Rogers—which would have required Israel to return, with some minor alterations, to its 1967 borders in return for peace with the Arabs. The Nixon administration did not even encourage the far more modest Allon Plan, proposed by Israel’s foreign minister soon after the war, which would have led to an Israeli withdrawal from most of the occupied territories outside of the Jordan Valley. Instead, Kissinger encouraged the Israeli government to hold on to its captured Arab lands. When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made peace overtures towards Israel in 1971, Kissinger successfully advised the Israelis to ignore it. As a result, Egypt—along with Syria—attacked Israeli forces in October 1973, advancing into Israeli-occupied territories in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights before a massive US resupply operation enabled Israel to mount a successful counterattack. Only after the war did the United States support disengagement talks, and then only under American auspices. In a series of efforts that became known as “shuttle diplomacy,” Kissinger helped orchestrate a limited disengagement agreement between Syrian and Israeli forces in the Israeli-occupied Golan region during the summer of 1974 and a withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from the western part of the occupied Sinai Peninsula of Egypt soon thereafter. The United States has never pursued peace plans brought forth by the Europeans, the United Nations, or even the Arab states, including such Saudi initiatives as the 1981 Fahd Plan and the very similar 2002 Abdullah Plan, which essentially reiterated the principle of land for peace as encapsulated in Resolutions 242 and 338. In the common lexicon in the United States, the “peace process” refers only to efforts initiated by the US government. The United States has consistently rejected an international peace conference that would lead to a comprehensive all-parties peace settlement. Instead, the United States has pushed for a succession of bilateral arrangements that could maximize American influence in the region, such as the 1978 Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt. The treaty led to a complete withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from Egyptian territory in return for strict security guarantees and full diplomatic relations with Israel. In many respects, however, it was also a tripartite military pact. Its provisions included more than $5 billion in military and economic aid to the two signatories. It was originally designed as a one-time payback to the two parties for agreeing to sign the accords. However, each year since, the United States has continued allocating this sizable military and economic assistance package to the Israeli and Egyptian governments. Since 1978, Egypt has received approximately $1.2 billion annually in military assistance, while Israel has gotten at least $1.8 billion annually. Furthermore, by neutralizing Egypt—by far Israel’s biggest military rival—in the Camp David agreement, Israel was emboldened to invade its northern neighbor Lebanon in 1982 and redouble its colonization of occupied Palestinian territories. Similarly, the US-brokered peace treaty between Israel and Jordan brought a formal end to conflict between these two nations along with full diplomatic relations. Following the signing of

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the 1994 peace agreement the United States sent an additional $200 million in arms to Israel and an additional $75 million to Jordan, as well as training and support for modernizing the Jordanian armed forces that had been cut off five years earlier. In addition, a free trade pact between the United States and Jordan took effect not long afterwards. These side agreements apparently helped persuade the Arab monarchy, which had resisted signing a separate peace agreement with Israel without further resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, to agree to the US-brokered deal.2

The Syrian track Following the convening of the Madrid Summit in 1992, Israel and Syria began negotiations under US auspices. The two countries came very close to a peace agreement in early 2000, when the Israeli government of Prime Minister Ehud Barak agreed to withdraw from Syrian territory occupied since the June 1967 war in return for Syria agreeing to strict security guarantees, normalized relations, the demilitarization of the strategic Golan Heights, and the cessation of support for radical anti-Israel groups. Only a dispute regarding the exact demarcation of the border, constituting no more than a few hundred meters, prevented a final settlement. With the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad later that year and the coming to power of the right-wing Likud Bloc in the subsequent Israeli election, talks were suspended indefinitely. Assad’s successor, Bashar al-Assad, called for the resumption of talks where they left off, but both Israel and the United States rejected the proposal. The Syria Accountability Act, passed by an overwhelming bipartisan majority of the US Congress in 2003, demanded that “the Governments of Lebanon and Syria should enter into serious unconditional bilateral negotiations with the Government of Israel in order to realize a full and permanent peace.” Congress and the administration insisted that Syria enter new talks “unconditionally” rather than resume them from the two parties’ earlier negotiating positions, which had brought them so close to a settlement three years earlier after many years of painstaking negotiations and major concessions by both sides. In so doing, the US government effectively rejected the position of the more moderate Israeli government of former Prime Minister Barak and instead embraced the rejectionist position of the then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. It was also unclear as to how the US demand that Syria enter into such negotiations with an occupying power that at that time categorically refused to withdraw from its conquered land will “realize a full and permanent peace.” Indeed, under President Bush, both Congress and the administration appeared to want to force Syria to capitulate entirely and accept Israel’s annexation of its Golan region. Furthermore, Congress and the administration insisted that both Syria and Lebanon enter into bilateral negotiations with Israel instead of multilateral negotiations. Such multilateral negotiations, called for by UN Security Council Resolution 338, would make particular sense given the interrelated concerns of these three nations. In any case, prior to President Bush signing the Accountability Act into law, President Assad announced Syria’s willingness to accede to US and Israeli demands and resume talks with Israel unconditionally. In response to these initiatives, Israel announced at the end of 2003 that it would double the number of Jewish settlers in the occupied Golan region of Syria.3 According to Agriculture Minister Yisrael Katz, who also chaired the government’s settlements committee, “The aim is to send an unequivocal message: the Golan is an integral part of Israel.”4 This renewed colonization drive is also a direct violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits any occupying power from transferring its civilian population onto territories seized by military force, and UN Security Council Resolutions 446, 452, 465, and 471, which call on Israel to refrain from building additional settlements and to withdraw from existing settlements, but there appeared to be little objection from Washington. Within Israel, however, there was a growing awareness that returning the Golan Heights to Syria would not jeopardize Israeli security. While maintaining the high ground may have

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constituted a strategic advantage forty years ago, it is far less important in an era when the principal threats to Israel’s security come in the form of suicide bombers and long-range missiles. Israeli army chief Lt Gen Moshe Yaalon observed that, from a strategic perspective, Israel could cede the Golan Heights in return for peace and successfully defend Israel’s internationally recognized border.5 With Syria calling for a resumption of peace talks, pressure was growing within Israel to resume negotiations, with polls showing that a majority of Israelis supported such efforts. Alon Ben-Meir, a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University, argued for the need to engage with Syria, otherwise the Bush administration “will forfeit another historic opportunity to bring an end to the Arab– Israeli conflict, however remote that prospect may now seem.”6 Beginning in 2005, with the knowledge of their governments, private Israeli and Syrian negotiators began crafting a draft treaty to end the decades-long conflict between the two countries. The Bush administration, however, downplayed the talks’ significance. Following Israel’s 2006 war in Lebanon, several prominent members of the Israeli cabinet—including Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Internal Security Minister Avid Dichter—called on their government to resume negotiations with Syria. Although Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni appointed a senior aide to prepare for possible talks, such initiatives did not get any support from Washington. According to the Jewish Daily Forward, it appeared that “Israel would be prepared to open a channel with Syria but does not want to upset the Bush administration.”7 Indeed, when Israeli officials asked Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about pursuing exploratory talks with Syria, her answer, according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, was, “don’t even think about it.”8 Similarly, the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth reported that Israeli government officials “understood from President Bush that the United States would not take kindly to reopening a dialogue between Israel and Syria.” Such pressure worked initially. Olmert reportedly expressed concern that it would be inappropriate to counter President Bush at a time when his policies were being seriously challenged at home, as he has such a “clear position on this issue” and he is “Israel’s most important ally.” Similarly, Israeli Vice Premier Shimon Peres was quoted as saying, “The worse thing we could do is contradict the United States, which opposes negotiating with Syria.” Interior Minister Ronni Baron told a television reporter, “When the question on the agenda is the political legacy of Israel’s greatest friend, President Bush, do we really need now to enter into negotiations with Syria?”9 Such pressure from the Bush administration on Israel to reject Syria’s offer for negotiations and the Israeli government’s willingness to give in to such pressure led to widespread resentment in Israel. According to the normally hawkish Maariv columnist Ben-Dror Yemini, “We’ve always said that our arms are extended in peace. That is, unless the Americans twist them.” The eminent Israeli novelist Amos Oz asked, “Why should Israel suspend one of its paramount national interests—peace with its neighbors—for the sake of the pleasantness or unpleasantness of its relations with a foreign government?”10 Debra DeLee, head of the liberal pro-Israel group Americans for Peace Now, noted how “it takes a lot of chutzpah to tell Israel not to even talk about peace with its neighbor,” arguing that it was “outrageous … for the President to pressure Israel not to negotiate.”11 By 2008, unable to get the United States to participate in a peace process with Syria, Israel began limited talks with the Damascus government through the government of Turkey.

The Palestinian track The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), like most Arab governments, initially ruled out any negotiations with Israel. By the mid-1970s, however, the Palestinians began expressing their desire to be included in the peace process. Both Israel and the United States refused to include them, however. The United States insisted that the Kingdom of Jordan—a US ally

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that had controlled the West Bank between 1948 and 1967 and was host to a sizable population of Palestinian refugees—would serve as the Palestinians’ representative. Given the traditional hostility between Jordan and the PLO—including a bloody civil war in Jordan during the early 1970s in which large numbers of Palestinian refugees were killed—few Palestinians felt the Hashemite monarchy could fairly represent their interests. The US position was that the PLO could participate in the peace process only on three conditions: (1) they recognized Israel’s right to exist; (2) they recognized UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of the peace talks; and (3) they renounced terrorism. While most observers believed these conditions were in themselves reasonable, what seemed to be unreasonable was that the United States refused to insist that Israel reciprocate: Israel at this time was refusing to recognize Palestine’s right to exist and also rejected Resolutions 242 and 338. Furthermore, only the PLO was asked to renounce terrorism, even though Israel’s armed forces were responsible for far more civilian deaths than were the various Palestinian militias. For more than a decade, the PLO unsuccessfully tried to convince the United States to call for reciprocal declarations in support of the UN resolutions and against violence directed against civilians. Most crucially, the PLO called for a mutual and simultaneous recognition of Palestine and Israel. However, both the Carter and Reagan administrations refused and, in 1988, the PLO finally relented and agreed to those three provisions without any reciprocity by Israel. Despite this, the United States still refused to allow the PLO into the peace process, limiting official contact with the PLO to no higher than the US ambassador to Tunisia, where the PLO had relocated its offices following its ousting from Lebanon by invading Israeli forces in 1982. These talks were broken off within two years when the United States determined that the PLO had not sufficiently criticized an attempted terrorist attack against Israel by a small Palestinian splinter group. Continuing to reject calls for an international conference under UN auspices, the United States set up a major peace conference in Madrid in 1991. While some meetings were to take place on a multilateral basis, the United States determined that the real negotiations were to take place bilaterally with a strong American presence. While most Arab nations were invited to participate, the United States explicitly excluded the PLO from taking part. The United States allowed for Palestinian participation only if they came as part of the Jordanian delegation and their delegates were from neither the Palestinian diaspora nor Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem and they had no affiliation with the PLO. This may have been the first time that the convener of a peace conference granted itself the right to choose the delegation from one of the participants.12 Real progress was made on the Israeli–Palestinian track only when the Israelis did an end-run around the restrictive US formula and met in direct talks with the PLO secretly in a third country in 1993. These were the talks that resulted in the Declaration of Principles, also known as the Oslo Accords, which—while failing to recognize the Palestinians’ right to statehood and imposing other limitations—did provide a framework in which more substantive progress towards Israeli–Palestinian peace might result. During that summer, unaware of the secret Israeli–PLO talks in Norway, the United States put forward what it called a “compromise” proposal for Palestinian autonomy. However, the Israeli negotiating proposal being put forth at the same time, which was largely incorporated in the Declaration of Principles, was actually more favorable to the Palestinians than the US version. Palestinian officials described the US proposals as “closer to the Israeli Likud position,” referring to the Rabin government’s right-wing predecessors. This was one of more than a half dozen occasions during the past twenty years when the United States actually took a harder line towards Israel’s Arab adversaries than did the ruling Israeli Labor Party and/or Israeli public opinion. Indeed, while Israel was secretly negotiating with the PLO that summer, the Clinton administration, Congress and both major American political parties were on record as opposing the inclusion of the PLO in the peace process. Peace talks resumed in Washington in the fall of 1993 within the Oslo framework. Under the more moderate Labor Party, elected to office in 1992, Israeli negotiators recognized

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that—in terms of domestic Israeli politics—the peace movement did not have as much political clout as the right wing. As a result, it was difficult politically for the Israeli government to take the necessary steps for achieving peace, such as bringing Israel into compliance with UN Security Council resolutions and granting Palestinians their independence within viable borders. As a result, members of the Israeli negotiating team in Washington privately asked US officials to openly push the Israeli government to compromise further so as to give the prime minister sufficient political cover to make the needed concessions.13 The Clinton administration, however, refused. Over the next seven years, the United States brokered a series of Israeli–Palestinian agreements that led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. Some of the areas came under control of the PLO-led Palestinian Authority, giving the Palestinians a degree of self-governance in their own country for the first time. The majority of the West Bank and about 20 percent of the Gaza Strip remained under Israeli military occupation or some kind of joint administration. During this period, the Israeli government severely limited the mobility of Palestinians within and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and dramatically expanded its expropriation of land in the occupied territories for colonization by Jewish settlers. In addition, the Israelis refused to withdraw from as much territory as promised in the US-brokered disengagement agreements. Meanwhile, the increasingly corrupt, inept, and autocratic Palestinian Authority—under the leadership of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat—had alienated much of the Palestinian population and proved itself unable to suppress the growth of radical Islamic groups, which saw the Palestinian Authority as an entity designed to suppress resistance against the on-going Israeli occupation. On more than two dozen occasions between 1994 and 2000, Islamic extremists engaged in terrorist attacks against civilian targets inside Israel. From the beginning of the talks following the signing of the Declaration of Principles negotiated in Norway, it became apparent that the two sides saw the process very differently. The Palestinians saw the Oslo process as a means to end the occupation and establish a Palestinian state on the lands seized by Israel in June 1967— the West Bank (including Arab East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. In contrast, the United States and Israel apparently saw it more as a way of maintaining an Israeli occupation of major sections of these territories. In this scenario, the Palestinian Authority would be in charge of administering most major Palestinian population centers and co-operating with Israel in protecting Israel and its settlements in the occupied territories. The Palestinians, in signing the Declaration of Principles, worked on the assumption that the agreement would result in concrete improvements in the lives of those in the occupied territories, that the interim period would be no more than five years, and that the permanent settlement would be based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. They trusted that the United States, as guarantor of the agreement—signed in the White House on September 13, 1993—would be able to pressure Israel, upon which it had considerable influence, to insure co-operation. However, none of this came to pass.

Countering the threat from the United Nations Having renounced armed struggle and unilaterally recognized Israeli control of most of Palestine in the 1993 Oslo Accords, the strongest tool left at the Palestinians’ disposal was a series of UN Security Council resolutions reconfirming principles of international law that applied to their conflict with Israel. The Palestinians assumed that, as guarantor of the Declaration of Principles, the United States would pressure Israel to make the needed compromises later, based upon UN Security Council resolutions that the United States, as a Security Council member, was obliged to uphold. However, both the Clinton administration and the subsequent Bush administration insisted that the United Nations no longer had any standing in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, arguing that the UN resolutions had been superseded

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by the Oslo Accords. According to Madeleine Albright, when she served as Clinton’s ambassador to the United Nations, “resolution language referring to ‘final status’ issues should be dropped, since these issues are now under negotiations by the parties themselves. These include refugees, settlements, territorial sovereignty and the status of Jerusalem.”14 This attempt to unilaterally negate the authority of the United Nations, however, has not been shared by the international community. No UN resolution can be rescinded without a vote of the body in question. Neither the UN Secretary General nor any other member of the Security Council has agreed with the US assessment discounting the relevance of the resolutions. Furthermore, no bilateral agreement between two parties can supersede the authority of the United Nations Security Council. This is especially true when one of the two parties (in this case, the Palestinians) has made it clear that such resolutions are still very relevant. The United States barred the PLO from participating in the US-sponsored peace process for nearly twenty years, in part because the PLO refused to accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of negotiation. As the resolutions did not recognize Palestinian national rights, however, the PLO initially rejected them. When the Palestinians formally accepted the resolutions as the basis for peace talks in 1988 anyway and were finally allowed into the peace process five years later, the US essentially dropped these resolutions as the basis of the peace talks.15 This follows a pattern seen in successive US administrations: following a concession made by the Palestinians or another Arab party, the United States, in effect, then moves the goal posts. For example, Security Council Resolution 242 underscores the long-standing principle of international law, reiterated in the UN Charter, of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.” Both Israel and the United States are signatories to the UN Charter and are thereby legally bound to abide by its provisions. Palestinian and Syrian demands for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242, related resolutions, and other long-standing canons of international law were dismissed by President Clinton, however, who insisted that the talks be based instead on what he termed “creative ideas.” The so-called creative ideas ended up being a US position paper designed to undercut these long-standing legal principles. According to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the only caveat for Israel’s complete withdrawal from the territories occupied in the 1967 war is security guarantees from Israel’s Arab neighbors.16 This was generally interpreted to mean promises of non-aggression by neighboring states, presumably enforced by some kind of combination of arms control, demilitarized zones, early warning systems, and international peacekeeping forces. The United States has dramatically expanded this interpretation, however, now insisting that the resolution essentially requires that the physical safety of every Israeli citizen must somehow be guaranteed. In effect, the United States argues that Israel is under no obligation to withdraw from the occupied territories unless there is a total halt to attacks by suicide bombers or other terrorists. As most of these come from underground terrorist groups that are beyond the effective control of any government, particularly a disempowered Palestinian Authority under siege by Israeli occupation forces, this effectively means that the Israelis need not be obliged to withdraw.

The US role in the collapse of the Oslo process Throughout the Oslo peace process, the Clinton administration seemed to co-ordinate the pace and agenda of the talks closely with Israel, ignoring Palestinian concerns. In an episode that revealed the partisanship of the US role behind the façade of even-handed peace broker, a top Israeli negotiator admitted that, throughout the peace process, Israel and the United States worked closely with each other on their respective proposals prior to presenting them to the Palestinians. For all intents and purposes, these were largely joint efforts,17 hardly the stance of an impartial mediator that the US projected itself to be.

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In a similar vein, the United States appeared to be treating Israeli security as the primary focus of the negotiations, not equally legitimate Palestinian concerns as well. The US assumption has always seemed to be that only Israel has a security problem. While there is no question that Israel has legitimate security concerns that need to be addressed, the United States has never seemed to recognize that the Palestinians might also have security concerns at least as pressing. It is the Palestinians whose territory is under foreign military occupation, whose cities have repeatedly been attacked and placed under siege, whose political institutions have been overrun and ransacked, and who have suffered far more casualties. During the summer of 2000, the Clinton administration unsuccessfully attempted to forge a final peace agreement between the two sides at a summit conference in Camp David, Maryland, site of the historic Israeli–Egyptian peace talks hosted by President Carter in 1978. President Clinton’s summit failed in large part because neither side was ready for a final agreement. He naively thought that he could pressure Arafat to accept Israeli terms even though negotiations up to that time indicated the two sides were still far apart on some key issues. President Clinton’s insistence to then jump to final status negotiations without prior confidence-building measures, such as a freeze on new settlements or the fulfillment of previous pledges to withdraw, led the Palestinians to question the sincerity of both Israel and the United States. Arafat and other Palestinian officials repeatedly warned both Israeli and American officials of the growing resentment among ordinary Palestinians resulting from the dramatic growth of settlements and other Israeli policies. Furthermore, they argued that the previously agreed upon withdrawals needed to take place before the more difficult issues of the rights of refugees and the status of Jerusalem could be addressed. The Palestinian side certainly contributed to some of the misunderstandings during this period as well through the lack of effective communication between Arafat and some of his negotiators. However, both the United States and Israel insisted on moving directly to a summit on the final status issues, even though they had only begun to be addressed in earnest during the previous eight weeks of what had been a more than seven-year process.18 Arafat pleaded that they needed more time, but Clinton pushed Arafat to come and try anyway, promising “If it fails, I will not blame you.”19 However, Clinton did not do as he promised. Not only did he put enormous pressure on Arafat to accept the Israeli proposals, he did blame Arafat for the collapse of the talks when the Palestinian leader rejected Barak’s peace proposals on the grounds that they fell way short of Israel’s obligations under international law. At the news conference at the close of the talks, Clinton declared that “Prime Minister Ehud Barak showed particular courage, vision and an understanding of the historical importance of the moment,”20 while insisting that it was Arafat who had been unwilling to compromise.21 American media pundits and both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill claim to this day that Barak made an extremely generous offer to the Palestinians at Camp David. An actual examination of the proposal reveals otherwise: Barak’s proposal presented at Camp David did not include an Israeli withdrawal from all of the occupied Palestinian territories. In the 1993 Oslo agreement, the Palestinians essentially recognized Israeli control over 78 percent of Palestine, the part generally recognized as being within the international boundaries of Israel. This was a major concession from the longstanding Palestinian demand for all of Palestine or even the 43 percent of Palestine set aside for them in the 1947 UN partition plan. The negotiations since 1993 have been on the fate of this remaining 22 percent, which the Palestinians assumed—rightly, by virtually every international legal standard—should go to them. However, the United States and Israel have steadfastly insisted that the Palestinian demand for that remaining 22 percent is too much and that the Palestinians should be willing to give up even more. This is understandably difficult for even Palestinian moderates to accept, as Palestinian Arabs—whose families have lived on the land for centuries prior to the advent of Zionism—were the majority throughout all of Palestine as recently as 1948. Counting refugees, Palestinians today outnumber the Israelis by

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at least a 3:2 ratio. More fundamentally, Israel took over this remaining 22 percent of Palestine by military force in 1967. Throughout the US-managed peace process, the United States worked on the assumption that Israel would not need to give up any of its internationally recognized territory or sovereign rights for peace, but that the Palestinians would. Robert Malley, special assistant to President Clinton for Arab–Israeli affairs and director of Near East and South Asian Affairs for the National Security Council, acknowledged in March 2001 that Israel stuck to positions clearly unacceptable to the Palestinians in the full knowledge of US support. Furthermore, he noted, there was a clear bias towards the Israeli negotiating position. The US position substantially departed from UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which the Palestinians had been promised would be the basis of the negotiations. Malley further charged that, instead of judging the Israeli proposals on these terms, the Israeli government was instead rewarded for taking extreme positions initially as a tactical maneuver then partially backing off from them. When Barak had inched away from the hard line of his predecessors on some issues, Clinton gave these so-called “concessions” undue significance. Progress was based on relative movement from previously held positions, not on substance; missing from the negotiations were international legal requirements and simple notions of reasonableness and equity.22 Initial reports, encouraged by US officials and repeated in the American media, indicated that Barak was willing to hand over a full 95 percent or more of the West Bank to the Palestinians. Yet Israel presented no maps to show precisely what lands they were including in the offer. It now appears that this widely quoted percentage did not include greater East Jerusalem, which includes not just the Palestinian-populated eastern half of the city, but also encompasses a series of Palestinian villages and rural areas well to the north and east. (Israel effectively annexed the area in 1967 and no longer considers it as part of the West Bank, although the United Nations and virtually the entire international community insists that it is indeed part of the occupied territories.) Nor did this figure include much of the Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea coast, and parts of the Judean Desert, which Barak insisted be leased to the Israeli military for exclusive use for an indefinite period. Taking these additional areas into account, this offer totaled not the 95 percent claimed but only slightly more than 80 percent of the West Bank, forcing the Palestinians to relinquish land needed for their development and the absorption of refugees. Barak also insisted on holding on to sixty-nine Jewish settlements in the West Bank, where 85 percent of the settlers live. Therefore, even though Israel is legally required—under the Fourth Geneva Convention and four UN Security Council resolutions—to completely evacuate the settlements, Barak offered to remove only 15 percent of the settlers. Furthermore, under Barak’s US-backed plan, the West Bank would have been split up by a series of settlement blocs, bypass roads, and Israeli roadblocks, by some interpretations dividing the new Palestinian “state” into four non-contiguous cantons. This would have required Palestinians to go through Israeli checkpoints to go from one part of their state to another and would have allowed the Israelis to restrict the movement of both people and goods. In addition, Israel would have supervision of border crossings between the new Palestinian state and neighboring Arab states. Israel would also control Palestinian airspace, its seacoast, and its water resources. Altogether, these restrictions would make a viable independent Palestinian state impossible. The Israelis also rejected the right of Palestinian refugees expelled from what is now Israel in the 1948 war to return to their homes, despite international treaty obligations concerning the right of refugees to return. According to Barak’s plan, the Palestinians would have only very limited administrative authority over Arab neighborhoods and Muslim holy sites in occupied East Jerusalem, which would be cut off from the rest of the Palestinian state. In response to Palestinian demands that they be allowed to establish their capital in East Jerusalem, the Israelis agreed only to allow them to set up their new government in Abu Dis, a West Bank village not far from the city’s outskirts that could be annexed into greater Jerusalem, thereby allowing the Palestinian Authority to also claim Jerusalem as their capital. In return, the

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Palestinians would be required to recognize Israel’s annexation of virtually the entire remainder of the city. It is not surprising that Arafat should reject such a limited proposal. The claims by Clinton’s team of negotiators that the parties were “so close” at Camp David failed to acknowledge the substantial gap between the two parties and seemed more designed to discredit the Palestinian side than to be an adequate reflection of what actually transpired at the negotiations. Even if Clinton had forced Arafat to capitulate, lack of support among Palestinians would have prevented the agreement from being viable. An unsustainable peace would have been even worse than no peace. Despite this, President Clinton declared on Israeli television that the Israeli prime minister “was more creative and more courageous”23 than Arafat, and the White House leaked a series of accusations blaming the Palestinian leader for the breakdown of talks. This decision to criticize Arafat’s alleged lack of flexibility while praising Barak made the ramifications of this failed summit far worse than they otherwise might have been. According to Palestinian negotiator Nabil Shaath, “I personally pleaded with President Clinton: ‘Please do not put on a sad face and tell the world it failed. Please say we broke down taboos, dealt with the heart of the matter and will continue.’ But then the president started the blame game, and he backed Arafat into a corner.”24 Such disappointment over Clinton’s role was shared by Israeli negotiator Shlomo Ben-Ami, who noted, “At the end of Camp David, we had the feeling that the package as such contained ingredients and needed to go on. But Clinton left us to our own devices after he started the blame game.”25 While Barak’s offers did go further than any previous Israeli government, they fell well short of what Israel was required to do under international legal standards and a series of UN Security Council resolutions. This is significant, as the Palestinian refusal to give in to these demands was therefore completely within their prerogative, given Israel’s obligations under international law. Furthermore, as Malley noted, from the Palestinian perspective, “The notion that Israel was ‘offering’ land, being ‘generous,’ or ‘making concessions’ seemed to them doubly wrong—in a single stroke both affirming Israel’s right and denying the Palestinians’. For the Palestinians, land was not given but given back.”26 Despite this, the US House of Representatives, with only thirty dissenting votes, adopted a bipartisan resolution that claimed that Israel had “expressed its readiness to take wide-ranging and painful steps in order to bring an end to the conflict, but these proposals were rejected by Chairman Arafat.”27 Despite an outbreak of violence in Israeli-occupied territories that fall, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators pressed on. In late December, in a major address, President Clinton presented for the first time an American proposal for a permanent Israeli–Palestinian peace. It was only a marginal improvement over Barak’s proposal in July, but still managed to move the peace process forward. The Palestinians formally rejected the Clinton proposal in early January, and hopes that the United States would convene a new summit did not materialize. At this point, the United States ended its active involvement. However, both the Israelis and the Palestinians recognized that they were closer than they had been at Camp David and resumed talks in Taba—an Egyptian town on the north end of the Gulf of Aqaba—and the nearby Israeli town of Eilat. There, Israel presented new proposals and the Palestinians responded favorably. Despite Barak’s claims after Camp David that Israel could go no further, these Israeli proposals six months later were found by the Palestinians to be a distinct improvement. Israeli negotiators significantly modified long-standing territorial-based security demands and its settlement-related requirements, effectively disaggregating Israeli security issues from the territorial and settlements issues. For example, the Israelis would limit their security posts in the Jordan Valley to more discreet and limited outposts that no longer required control of large stretches of Palestinian territory. These late Israeli offers were more generous than the supposed “compromise” proposal offered by President Clinton the previous month. Meanwhile, the Palestinians made a number of concessions, agreeing to allow Israel to annex large settlement blocs in the West Bank in return for some Israeli territory in the Negev Desert south of

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the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians further agreed to Israeli sovereignty over eleven Jewish settlements in and around greater East Jerusalem that surrounded historically Arab-populated areas, as well as the Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City. This was the first time the Palestinians presented a map that acceded to Israeli annexation of West Bank territories. Both sides discussed and appeared to be getting close to an agreement on the difficult refugee issue that would meet both the Palestinian demand for justice and the Israeli concerns regarding the demographic implications of repatriating large numbers of returning Palestinians. The idea was based upon an Israeli acknowledgment of the right of return combined with financial incentives that would entice most of the refugees to settle in the new Palestinian state and a quota on the number of refugees actually allowed to resettle within Israel. However, as the February 7 Israeli election got close, the new Israeli proposal was abruptly withdrawn, and hopes for a follow-up summit in Stockholm in which a final peace agreement could be signed never materialized. Barak lost the election to right-wing leader Ariel Sharon, and the new Israeli government refused to return to the bargaining table. The fact is, however, that peace did come tantalizingly close. Yet this near-breakthrough was not at Camp David in July with strong US pressure on the Palestinians, but at Taba in January without an American presence and nearly five months after the Palestinian uprising began. In fact, top US officials apparently had never seen the Taba maps that—despite some remaining obstacles—had the two sides within striking distance of a final peace agreement. Most international observers have recognized that the Palestinian participation in negotiations after the failed Camp David summit and their willingness to offer some major concessions was demonstrative of their interest in peace. Despite this, the leaders of both political parties in Congress insisted that the failure of Arafat to capitulate at Camp David was evidence that the Palestinians were not interested in a negotiated settlement and were only interested in pursuing their demands through violence. US officials have roundly criticized Arafat for refusing to sign a peace agreement when the two sides were still far apart at Camp David, but have never criticized Barak from backing away from a peace agreement when the two sides were quite close at Taba.

The road map Upon assuming office in February 2001, the newly elected Prime Minister Ariel Sharon rejected the previous Israeli government’s premise that it is important to make territorial sacrifices to end the conflict with the Palestinians. Meanwhile, the Bush administration, which came into office a few weeks earlier, dismissed Clinton’s peace proposal from the previous December. The Palestinian leadership still called for a resumption of negotiations, but the Israeli government refused. The Israelis insisted—with American support—that there be a total end to Palestinian violence for an extended period before talks could resume. This, however, gave Palestinian extremists beyond the control of the Palestinian Authority who opposed the peace process altogether an incentive to launch terrorist attacks and other acts of violence to make sure that the talks would not resume. The motivation to suspend armed resistance in order for negotiations to reconvene was further hampered by Prime Minister Sharon’s insistence that his government would take an even more uncompromising position than the already rejected proposals of the previous Barak government. The overall Bush administration position was based on the premise that the two parties needed to work things out among themselves, which had little chance of success given the Israeli refusal to negotiate. Furthermore, the Bush administration insisted that both sides needed to compromise, thereby implying that the territorial demands of an occupying power were equally legitimate to those whose lands were under occupation. Furthermore, bilateral negotiations between a government representing the strongest economic and military power in the region with a weakened and corrupt leadership of an occupied people can hardly be considered fair. Ignoring the gross asymmetry in power between the Palestinians and their

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Israeli occupiers simply favored the status quo, namely continued occupation, repression, and colonization from the Israeli side and rioting, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism from the Palestinian side. Indeed, terrorist attacks by Palestinian extremists against civilian targets in Israel increased during the next two years, and a major US-backed Israeli military offensive in the spring of 2002 severely damaged the civilian infrastructure in the West Bank and cost hundreds of lives. The growing cycle of violence and the failure of the Bush administration to move the peace process forward led the international community to increase its pressure on the United States to co-operate in restarting the peace process in some manner. Representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia began working with US officials to put together what became known as “a performance-based road map towards an Israeli–Palestinian peace.” Reaching consensus between the four parties of the plan, which became known as “the Quartet,” was initially difficult due in part to the US insistence on downplaying international law and UN Security Council resolutions and stressing the need for ending Palestinian violence against the Israeli occupation over Israel’s legal obligations as the occupying power. US concerns were largely incorporated into the road map by late 2002, although the Bush administration insisted that the plan should not be formally released until after the Israeli elections in the spring of 2003, fearing that it might hurt the US-backed right-wing incumbent prime minister Ariel Sharon’s re-election chances against the left-leaning Labor Party challenger Amran Mitzna. The road map was based on the principle of Israeli support for the establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel following democratic reforms by the Palestinian Authority and the end of Palestinian violence against Israelis. It was to comprise three goal-driven phases with the ultimate goal of ending the conflict by 2005. As a performance-based plan, progress was dependent upon the good faith efforts of both parties to comply with their obligations at each stage. Provisions called for in Phase I, which was originally hoped to have been completed within months of the road map’s unveiling, included an end to Palestinian violence, Palestinian political reform (including free elections), Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian Authority areas reconquered since 2001, and a freeze on the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Phase II, originally projected by the end of 2003, included the creation of an independent Palestinian state and the convening of an international conference and international monitoring of compliance with the road map. Finally, Phase III, initially projected to take place as early as 2004–5, included the convening of a second international conference and a permanent status agreement and end of conflict, including an agreement on final borders, the status of Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, and of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. At this point, it was assumed that the remaining Arab states that had not yet agreed to formal peace agreements with Israel would make peace with Israel at that time. The Palestinians were disappointed that the road map appeared to backslide on some of Israel’s obligations under international law, such as the complete removal of settlements, but the Palestinian Authority nevertheless accepted the road map without conditions. In contrast, the Israelis reluctantly accepted the road map and only after insisting on fourteen reservations, a number of which contradicted its key provisions. Although some observers saw this as essentially a rejection of the plan, the Bush administration argued that Israel was in fact on board. US interpretation of the Phase I requirements appeared to favor Israel’s interpretation over that of both the Palestinians and other members of the Quartet. For example, although dismantling the terrorist infrastructure was just one of twenty-four steps required by both sides in Phase I, a series of Congressional initiatives supported by an overwhelming bipartisan majority insisted that it was actually the first and most important step in the road map. According to this argument, Israel was not required to fulfill any of its obligations until this provision was

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fully satisfied, effectively challenging the assumption of most other independent international observers, who had assumed that both parties needed to pursue their obligations simultaneously. The Palestine Authority (PA) had already formally banned the armed wings of the militant Islamist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which had been responsible for scores of bloody terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. However, they were hampered in enforcing the ban by several factors, including that the PA’s security infrastructure had not recovered from the devastating Israeli military offensive in 2002, an action supported by the very US critics who subsequently criticized the ineffectiveness of the PA in cracking down on extremists. More problematic, Hamas’ non-terrorist components enjoyed widespread support in the occupied territories in reaction to popular resentment at the corrupt, ineffective, and sometimes brutish PA administration and the failure of the PA’s efforts to end the Israeli occupation and colonization of the West Bank by diplomatic means. As a result, “dismantling the terrorist infrastructure” would have required the use of force, likely resulting in Palestinian civil war unless there was evidence that Israel was actually taking steps that would finally end the occupation and allow for the creation of a viable Palestinian state. Citing the PA’s failure to take such unilateral action, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and his successor Ehud Olmert refused to negotiate with the Palestinians on any other aspect of the road map with no apparent objections from Washington. Meanwhile, in violation of the road map, the Israeli government increased its colonization of the West Bank through the construction of additional housing for Jewish settlers as well as Jewish-only highways and other infrastructure without apparent objections from Washington. In reaction, growing numbers of Palestinians gave up on the peace process, and terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists continued.

The Geneva Initiative Meanwhile, leading Israeli and Palestinian political figures involved in the nearly successful Taba talks in early 2001, joined by other former officials of both governments, continued unofficial talks toward putting together a draft peace agreement. In contrast to Washington’s insistence on focusing upon the unsuccessful confidence-building measures described in the road map, the architects of the Geneva Initiative went directly to the issues at the heart of the Israeli– Palestinian conflict and developed a detailed outline for a permanent status agreement. These non-governmental Israeli and Palestinian leaders signed the draft accord on December 1, 2003. Actively promoted by the Swiss government and with the support of other Europeans, the fifty-page document addressed the rights and security concerns of both peoples. It was endorsed by such prominent international figures as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, former Polish President Lech Walesa, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, long-time German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and former South African President F. W. DeKlerk, as well as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and his predecessor Boutros Boutros-Ghali. According to the agreement, Israel would withdraw from the Gaza Strip and virtually all of the West Bank, which were seized by Israeli forces in the 1967 war, as well as from most of its settlements in these occupied territories. Jerusalem would be the co-capital of both Israel and Palestine, with Israel controlling the important Jewish holy sites (as well as the Jewish quarter of the Old City) and Palestine controlling the major Muslim and Christian holy sites as well as Arab neighborhoods in the formerly Jordanian-controlled eastern part of the city. The new Palestinian state would be demilitarized with strict international guarantees for Israeli security, including the disarming and disbanding of private militias and terrorist groups. There would be full diplomatic relations between the two countries, with the Palestinians recognizing Israel as the homeland for the Jewish people. The exception to a full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories would be the Latrun area in the West Bank and a swathe of land around

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East Jerusalem where a large number of Jewish-only settlements have been built over the past three decades in return for Israel ceding an equivalent amount of largely uninhabited land south of the Gaza Strip into the new state of Palestine. In perhaps the most significant concession from the Palestinian side, their negotiators waived the right of return of Palestinian refugees and their descendants into what is now Israel, despite such guarantees under a series of United Nations resolutions as well as the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and other international treaties. It appears that, even with such major concessions, the agreement garnered the support of most Palestinian leaders. The head of the Palestinian negotiators was Yasser Abed Rabbo, a close associate of Arafat and a former minister in the Palestinian Authority. He was joined not only by former ministers Hisham Abdel Razeq and Nabil Kassis, but also young Fatah militants such as Qadoura Fares and Mohammed Khourani, as well as top security officials from the Palestinian establishment. The Israeli negotiators were led by Yossi Beilin, a former Israeli justice minister who—as deputy foreign minister ten years earlier—played an instrumental role in drafting the Oslo Accords. Other top Israeli officials in the negotiations included such prominent Knesset members as former Labor Party leader Avram Mitzna and former Knesset speaker Avraham Burg. A scientific public opinion poll sponsored by the James Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University revealed that a majority of both Israelis and Palestinians supported the outline of the agreement. A differently worded survey by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz showed somewhat less support on the Israeli side, but still indicated a significant plurality in support. While the Palestine Authority failed to explicitly endorse the agreement, Arafat wrote a letter that was read at the signing ceremony in which the Palestinian leader called it “a brave and courageous initiative” which “opens the door to peace.” Haaretz reported that Arafat, former Palestinian prime minister (and future president) Mahmoud Abbas, and the then current prime minister Ahmed Qureia approved the details of the agreement. In contrast, Israeli prime minister Sharon denounced the initiative, with his deputy and future Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert referring to it as “shameful,” “pathetic,” and “very grave.” Despite Arafat taking a far more moderate position than Sharon, the Bush administration insisted that Sharon was “a man of peace” and that Arafat was the chief obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Bush administration continued to provide large-scale military, economic, and diplomatic support for Sharon’s occupation policies while demanding that Arafat be marginalized or deposed. Similarly, the entire Democratic Party leadership in Congress signed a public letter three months earlier declaring that “Time and time again, the Israeli people have shown their willingness to take risks for peace” but that “The Palestinians have at best been ambivalent about their willingness to accept Israel’s existence.” Washington was not supportive of the Geneva Initiative, however. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher dismissed this breakthrough as “a private effort,” arguing that it was premature to talk about the substantive issues as they should be reserved for the latter stages of the US-led peace process, which could not even begin until there was a complete cessation of Palestinian violence. Principal Israeli negotiator Beilin stated that he was resigned to the fact that “The Geneva Initiative will not be accepted by Washington.” The Geneva Initiative did demonstrate that a comprehensive, negotiated peace between Israelis and Palestinians was possible, however. The question remains whether the United States will ever allow it to happen.

Sharon’s disengagement plan In response to the widespread support in Israel to the Geneva Initiative, Prime Minister Sharon came to Washington in April 2004 with what became known as “the convergence plan,” which was strongly endorsed by President Bush and an overwhelming bipartisan

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majority of Congress.28 This unilateral initiative led to dismantling of the illegal Israeli settlements from the occupied Gaza Strip, but—far more significantly—would incorporate virtually all of the illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank into Israel, leaving the Palestinians with a series of non-contiguous and economically unviable cantons, each surrounded by Israeli territory, collectively constituting as little as 10 percent of historic Palestine. Even regarding Gaza Strip, this declaration allowed Israel to continue to control the borders, the ports, and the airspace, as well as the right to conduct military operations inside Palestinian areas at will. In a letter endorsing the plan, President Bush declared that “the United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan.” According to Israeli press reports, Sharon brought four separate disengagement plans to Washington requiring various degrees of Israeli withdrawal, but President Bush and Congress ended up endorsing the one that allowed Israel to annex the largest amount of Palestinian territory. This marked a formal end to US support for “land for peace” as outlined in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, with a number of observers noting how it constituted an effective renunciation of the post-Second World War international system based upon the premise of the illegitimacy of the expansion of a country’s territory by military force. At a summit meeting organized by the Bush administration in Annapolis, Maryland, in December 2007 between Israeli and Arab leaders, the United States sought to further undermine international contributions to the peace process. Although the road map was originally put together in 2002 as an international effort—with the United Nations, Russia, and the European Union (which take a more balanced approach to the conflict) on equal footing with the United States—the Annapolis agreement formalized the United States as being in charge of monitoring the process, declaring “implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the road map, as judged by the United States” (emphasis added). President George W. Bush added that “The parties further commit to continue the implementation of the ongoing obligations of the road map until they reach a peace treaty” and “The United States will monitor and judge the fulfillment of the commitment of both sides of the road map.” Given that the United States has consistently sided with Israel, the occupying power, throughout the peace process in its disputes with the Palestinians, it gives little hope that Palestinian concerns will be adequately addressed. This has raised alarms among international observers, such as Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal, who stressed that it was “absolutely necessary to establish an international follow-up mechanism that monitors progress in the negotiations among the parties, as well as the implementation of commitments made” (emphasis added). As a result, it appears that, as long as the United States insists upon remaining as the primary facilitator and monitor of the peace process, the prospects for an end to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict will remain remote.

Notes 1 This came in a vote by the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Gaza on April 24. This was confirmed in a PNC meeting on December 18, 1998 in the presence of visiting US President Bill Clinton and was formally accepted by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu. 2 See Stephen Zunes, “The Israeli–Jordanian Peace Agreement: Peace or Pax Americana?” Middle East Policy, III(4), Spring 1995. 3 Ben Lynfield, “Amid New Peace Bids, Israel Stays Tough,” Christian Science Monitor, January 2, 2004. 4 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3358797.stm. 5 www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2004/08/14/israel_could_cede_golan_heights_army_chief_says/. 6 www.americanchronicle.com/articles/12214. 7 www.forward.com/articles/1443/. 8 www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/829441.html. 9 www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2007/01/03/EDGB8NBN0J1.DTL. 10 www.peacenow.org/hot.asp?cid=3317.

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11 www.peacenow.org/pr.asp?rid=&cid=3058. 12 Despite these restrictions, the Palestinian delegates—consisting primarily of respected West Bank intellectuals— were, in practice, able to operate separately from the Jordanian delegation and work in close co-ordination with the PLO. 13 Background briefings, Washington, DC, March 21, 1995. 14 US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, letter to the United Nations General Assembly, August 8, 1994. 15 In a June 30, 1993 paper to the delegations in the Washington peace talks, the United States—for the first time— would not recommit to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, long considered the basis of Arab–Israeli peace. 16 Supporters of the Israeli occupation sometimes claim that the resolution spoke of “territories” rather than “the territories,” implying that there is no obligation for a full withdrawal. However, the resolution’s text in French (the other official language of the United Nations) does use the definite article. Furthermore, the authors of the original resolution—the American and British ambassadors—explicitly stated that they were thinking only in terms of minor and reciprocal adjustments of the jagged border that was based upon ceasefire lines in the 1949 armistice agreement. 17 Phil Reeves, “Humiliation of Palestinians Triggers Rush to War: Dying Peace Process,” The Independent, October 9, 2000. 18 Edward Cody, “Israel’s Grinding Presence Fueled a Festering Palestinian Rage,” Washington Post, October 27, 2000: A30. 19 Deborah Sontag, “And Yet So Far: A Special Report: Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed,” New York Times, July 26, 2001: A12. 20 White House Office of the Press Secretary, President William J. Clinton, “Statement on the Middle East Peace Talks at Camp David,” The White House, Washington, DC, July 25, 2000. 21 Jane Perlez, “Impasse at Camp David: The Overview; Clinton Ends Deadlocked Peace Talks,” New York Times, July 26, 2000: A1. 22 Robert Malley, “Former Peace Team Member Discusses US Failures under Clinton Administration,” Lecture at the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, Washington, DC, March 7, 2001. 23 William J. Clinton, Interview of the President by Israeli Television, The White House, Washington, DC, July 27, 2000. 24 Sontag, op. cit. 25 Ibid. 26 Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, “Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors,” New York Review of Books, August 9, 2001. 27 House Concurrent Resolution 426, 106th Congress, second session. 28 The US House of Representatives, in an overwhelming bipartisan vote, endorsed right-wing Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon’s efforts to colonize and annex large sections of the Palestinian West Bank, seized by Israel in the June 1967 war. House Concurrent Resolution 460, sponsored by right-wing Republican leader Tom DeLay, “strongly endorses” the letter sent by President George W. Bush to the Israeli prime minister in April supporting his so-called “disengagement” plan. The vote was 407 in favor of the resolution and only 9 opposed. This came despite public opinion polls which indicated that a majority of Americans—including a majority of American Jews—support a peace plan comparable to the Geneva Initiative over the Bush-backed Sharon plan so overwhelmingly endorsed by Congress. The resolution does not even make mention of the once highly touted “road map” for Israeli–Palestinian peace that the United States drew up with representatives of Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations. The “road map” demanded that any growth in the settlements be frozen and that the remaining outstanding issues, such as borders and the status of Palestinian refugees, be left for negotiations between the two parties.

13 US economic and governance reform efforts in the Middle East Conceptual difficulties and practical realities* Robert E. Looney

Introduction Leading up to the war and especially after the swift military defeat of Saddam Hussein’s regime, optimism was running high among many Iraqis and American planners that the country would be quickly transformed into a free, democratic nation with a liberalized market economy. Yet even nearly eight years later, these goals are still illusive. In general, US hopes to bring economic gains and democracy to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as a whole have also been thwarted and with them strained relations with many key countries throughout the region. The original idea of revitalizing the region arose in response to 9/11 and the growth of Islamic extremism. At that time, the US authorities began to realize that the lack of democracy and freedom, economic stagnation, and widespread unemployment were driving many young people in the MENA region towards extremism and terrorism. The existence of pro-American, yet autocratic, regimes was no longer a guarantee for lasting stability. But since the time when a first draft of the reform plan for economic and political liberalization, dubbed the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI),1 was leaked in February 2004, Arab reaction has been less than enthusiastic. Many of the generalities found in discussions concerning the wisdom and viability of USbacked Middle East reforms are of little value in assessing the outcome of these efforts. Clearly, many Middle Eastern countries are highly skeptical of the US approach to reforms and motives for change in the region, so implementation is very problematical. But even with broad acceptance throughout the region of the need for reforms, a number of daunting obstacles remain. The current state of affairs is best summed up by Anthony Cordesman: Broad, vacuous US calls for region-wide change are the last thing needed in a climate of such deep regional distrust; they only aid the cause of terrorism. Washington instead should work steadily with its G8 partners, friendly Arab governments and local Arab reformers to create reform initiatives tailored to a given country’s needs that inspire confidence that the US wants reform for the country’s sake rather than for its own political ends. It should also be recognized that the US cannot succeed without fully funded nation-by-nation efforts tailored to the economic, social and political needs of given countries.2 More fundamentally, the objectives of the reforms often proposed are too vague—a market economy, democracy, and so on. On a technical level, some reforms are no doubt much more effective than others in creating a positive environment of growth and stability. Yet even in most high-level discussions of the US initiative, the likely linkages between reforms and outcomes are never made clear. In fact, this quantitative dimension is almost totally disregarded in the on-going debates, no doubt contributing even further to the widespread ambivalence, suspicion, and skepticism concerning reforms that is pervasive throughout the region.

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The sections below attempt to address the quantitative dimension of reforms through developing a framework for identifying country needs and sequencing strategies. Which countries are in the greatest need of reforms? Which reform mix appears most effective given the existing state of affairs in each country? How can reforms be efficiently sequenced to fit in to a long-term strategy of increased stability and prosperity?

Background The GMEI was inspired in part by the 1975 Helsinki Accords, signed by thirty-five nations (US, the former Soviet Union, and most European states). That pact was designed to recognize disputed post-Second World War borders and establish a mechanism for settling other disagreements. Human rights and fundamental freedoms became key parts of the treaty, and the West promoted and protected dissident groups in the Soviet bloc and urged greater freedoms for its residents. In a similar fashion, the Initiative consists of a statement of principles about “human dignity, freedom, democracy, rule of law, economic opportunity, and social justice” and the establishment of Forum for the Future, a framework for regular ministerial-level meetings on political and economic reform in the broader Middle East and for parallel meetings of civil society and business leaders. In short, the plan is based on the assertion that stopping the growth in “the region’s pool of politically and economically disenfranchised individuals” will slow the trend towards rising “extremism, terrorism, international crime and illegal migration” in the region. The Initiative addresses topics such as open markets, free elections, press liberty, and support for human rights organizations. In terms of scope, the Initiative covers the twenty-two nations of the Arab League, Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. According to the official statement released by the G8 at its June 2004 meetings, the Initiative (or Partnership) will focus on three areas: Political. In the political sphere, progress toward democracy and the rule of law entails instituting effective guarantees in the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which notably imply respect for diversity and pluralism. This will result in co-operation, the free exchange of ideas, and the peaceful resolution of differences. State reform, good governance, and modernization are also necessary ingredients for building democracy. Social/cultural. In the social and cultural sphere, education for all, freedom of expression, equality between men and women as well as access to global information technology are crucial to modernization and prosperity. A better educated workforce is a key to achieve participation in the globalized world. We will focus our efforts to reduce illiteracy and increase access to education, especially for girls and women. Economic. In the economic sphere, creating jobs is the number one priority of many countries in the region. To expand opportunity, and promote conditions in which the private sector can create jobs, we will work with governments and business leaders to promote entrepreneurship, expand trade and investment, increase access to capital, support financial reforms, secure property rights, promote transparency, and fight corruption. Promotion of intra-regional trade will be a priority for economic development of the of the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMEI). The plan to support reform is focused on the need to deepen democracy and broaden public participation, build a knowledge society, and promote economic development. In part, these objectives are to be met through a series of initiatives. These include a microfinance

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initiative to help small entrepreneurs, a project to enhance literacy, and support for training programs for business and entrepreneurship. In the aftermath of the G8 meetings, it was not clear how these activities would be financed. The vagueness of the statements adopted, the generalities concerning the objectives, the possible absence of financial support, European ambivalence, and Arab government concern over outside interference in their internal matters have led many to suggest that the Initiative will not turn out to be the catalyst for reform envisaged by the United States.3 While it is too soon to tell what role the Initiative will have in assisting modernization in the region, few would deny that reforms must be undertaken in one form or another if the region is to have any hope of providing an improved standard of living for its rapidly expanding population.

Areas of reform The reforms often suggested for the Middle East by US officials fall into two broad categories: (1) those intended to develop efficient market-based economies, with increased economic freedom and (2) those related to democracy and improved governance. Economic freedom At the time of the initiation of the GMEI, both the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal’s Index of Economic Freedom4 and the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World5 provided good measures of the relative progress made by countries in moving to a deregulated, limited government, free market environment. Because the Heritage Foundation data set included more of the Middle Eastern countries, it was used for the analysis that follows. The Heritage Index reflects the absence of government constraint or coercion on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services. Stripped to its essentials, economic freedom is concerned with property rights and choice. To measure economic freedom, the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index takes ten different factors into account: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Trade policy; Fiscal burden of government; Government intervention in the economy; Monetary policy; Banking and finance; Capital flows and foreign investment; Wages and prices; Property rights; Regulation; Informal market.

Implied in these measures is the notion that economic freedom also requires governments to refrain from many activities. They must refrain from actions that interfere with personal choice, voluntary exchange, and the freedom to enter and compete in labor and product markets. Economic freedom is reduced when taxes, government expenditures, and regulations are substituted for personal choice, voluntary exchange, and market co-ordination. Restrictions that limit entry into occupations and business activities also retard economic freedom. The index provides a framework for understanding most of the objectives of US reform efforts in the region: how open countries are to competition; the degree of state intervention in the economy, whether through taxation, spending, or overregulation; and the strength and independence of a country’s judiciary to enforce rules and protect private property. Some countries may have freedom in all factors; others may have freedom in just a few. One of the most

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important findings of research carried out using the index is that economic freedom is required in all aspects of economic life. That is, countries must score well in all ten of the factors in order to improve their economic efficiency and consequently the living standards of their people.6 Governance The other main area of US reform efforts, democracy and governance, is increasingly seen as essential for long-run economic growth and prosperity. In fact, some dimensions of governance now sit at the center of academic and policy discussions of economic development.7 While the ranking of countries on the basis of their relative progress in attaining improved governance is inherently subjective, a recent World Bank study8 provides a set of rankings incorporating the full extent of our knowledge about this phenomenon. More precisely, the World Bank data set presents a set of estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Voice and accountability. This variable measures various aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which the citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. Also included in this variable are indicators measuring the independence of the media. Political stability and absence of violence. This governance cluster combines several indicators that measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown. Government effectiveness. This variable combines aspects of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. Regulatory quality. This aspect of governance is more focused on the policies themselves. It includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. Rule of law. Included in this dimension of governance are several indicators which measure the extent to which the citizens of a country have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Control of corruption. This dimension of governance measures perceptions of corruption. By this measure, corruption is defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. It is often a manifestation of a lack of respect of both the corrupter and the corrupted for the rules which govern their interactions, and hence represents a failure of governance. As a whole, the BMEI countries have lagged considerably behind other major groupings of countries (Table 13.1). The high-growth (so-called “catching-up”) developing countries9— Malaysia, Thailand, Mexico, etc.—have made considerably more progress in nearly all of the major areas of reform. In turn, there is a comparable but generally smaller gap between the various reform measures of the catching-up and advanced countries. The reform gap between the BMEI countries and those catching up to the advanced economies is particularly evident in the main dimensions of governance (lower values in Table

Political stability

Fiscal burden

Wages and prices

1.34893 0.288472

1.70471 0.373612

1.27189 0.364115

2.45400 0.588025

3.27302 0.834108 3.12830 0.714370 2.42633 0.609504

3.06491 1.186112 2.66494 0.805735 1.24044 0.409115

Regulation

3.10698 0.955559

2.49234 0.598365

Property rights

2.46959 1.435857

3.47632 0.765516

Monetary policy

0.46249 0.415176

0.28211 0.511180

Government intervention

–0.41027 1.096394

Regulatory quality

–0.17018 0.720173

Government effectiveness

1.37444 0.585709

3.27387 0.783671

3.37690 1.367260

Informal market

1.90178 0.531872

2.51254 0.498750

3.22105 0.987222

Foreign investment

1.74568 0.331339

0.26696 0.521825

–0.01853 0.859818

Rule of law

1.84731 0.443233

0.15342 0.544002

–0.17146 0.673571

Control of corruption

Notes: governance data, average values 1996–2002; economic freedom data, average values 1995–2004.

Source: Compiled from Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002 (Washington: World Bank, June 30, 2003); Index of Economic Freedom Rankings (Washington: Heritage Foundation), various issues.

Broader Middle East Initiative countries (20 countries) Mean 3.35380 3.12339 Std deviation 1.053723 0.830339 Catching-up economies (37 countries) Mean 2.76156 2.59512 Std deviation 0.585669 0.570191 Advanced economies (25 countries) Mean 2.00000 2.07278 Std deviation 0.745632 0.329991

Banking and finance

Broader Middle East Initiative countries (20 countries) Mean 3.87135 3.55462 Std deviation 1.131846 0.886989 Catching-up economies (37 countries) Mean 3.16592 3.39094 Std deviation 0.953574 0.648153 Advanced economies (25 countries) Mean 1.94089 4.01658 Std deviation 0.289542 0.797321

Trade policy

Broader Middle East Initiative Countries (20 countries) Mean –0.91802 –0.37126 Std deviation 0.470583 0.989188 Catching-up economies (37 countries) Mean 0.48504 0.35871 Std deviation 0.581143 0.622755 Advanced economies (25 countries) Mean 1.27878 1.15325 Std deviation 0.396079 0.446343

Voice

Table 13.1 Greater Middle East Initiative countries: governance–economic freedom group comparisons

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13.1 represent a worsening of governance). While the gaps between the BMEI countries and the catching-up countries are not as great in the economic freedom area, they are still fairly consistent (higher values in Table 13.1 for these variables signifies a worsening of economic freedom) across all ten dimensions with the exception of monetary policy. Finally, the standard deviations of nearly all reform dimensions are relatively high across the board for the BMEI countries. This suggests considerably more diversity of reform experiences within this group of countries relative to those found in the catching-up and advanced economies. The various dimensions of economic freedom and governance provide a good gauge of the progress made by the BMEI countries in reforming their economies and political systems. However, to fully appreciate the contribution made by these reforms, one needs to see them in a broader context. Which combinations and levels of reforms appear to be associated with higher levels of development and modernization? Which reform strategies appear most efficient in placing a country on the path to sustainable levels of prosperity? What is a reasonable period of time to assess a country’s progress in creating an environment capable of supporting a process of on-going growth and development? As both the catching-up and the advanced economy groupings are defined largely on their member countries’ overall economic performance, sub-groupings of the BMEI countries also based on an economic performance/modernization criteria should provide a more insightful framework for assessing each country’s reform progress to date as well as the tasks that lie ahead. As with the catching-up and advanced groups of countries, one approach is to examine subgroups of BMEI countries based on their relative development or stage of economic progress. A stage approach is hardly new. For several centuries, historians and philosophers have been attracted by the possibility of expressing the historical process as a sequence of stages instead of a simple chronological succession. Examples of such attempts include Marx’s wellknown pattern by which feudalism gave way to bourgeois capitalism followed by socialism and then communism. This stage approach was especially influential in German historiography. Karl Bucher discussed the evolution of the “household economy” of antiquity into the “town economy” of the late Middle Ages, and thereafter into the “national economy” of modern times. The common aim of stage theories is to design a model of the historical process by specifying and isolating a limited number of factors that characterize and identify the different stages. Such models are illuminating and justifiable if they identify genuine key variables and reveal otherwise unexpected relationships. Their suitability for prediction is especially significant. Most models implicitly or explicitly claim to explain or predict through postulated changes in the key variables. These changes are in turn derived either from a priori reasoning, or on the basis of empirical data. Without the specified changes, development from one stage to another will not occur, or will occur only exceptionally. If a model can successfully identify the key variables and significant changes in them propelling a country to a higher level of development and modernization, then a power tool of explanation and prediction will have been created. In this regard, several modern stage theories hold out the potential for providing a useful framework for assessing the role of reforms in advancing the BMEI countries. The Rostow framework Of the modern stage theories, that developed10 by W. W. Rostow is by far the most widely discussed. Rostow, an economic historian, was interested in explaining why some countries became advanced developed economies, while others remained mired in poverty. His framework draws on observations taken from the histories of developed countries, which he contended reveal a considerable degree of uniformity with regard to patterns and processes of development.

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Based on these observations, he divided the modernization process into five stages: (1) the traditional society, (2) the preconditions for take-off, (3) the take-off stage, (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of high mass consumption. His basic classic argument was that: (1) all societies, sooner or later, will pass through the same sequence of five economic stages, (2) the world’s poor societies are simply those that have not passed beyond the first two states, and (3) development is a process whereby traditional values are replaced by a spirit of individualism and a scientific attitude that encourages economic growth and technological progress. For each stage, Rostow specified a number of distinguishing characteristics. The preconditions stage was characterized by him as a period of dramatic increases in agricultural productivity, political stability, massive migration to the cities, substantial development of transportation and other forms of social overhead capital, and increasing capital goods imports financed by capital inflows as well as by raw material exports. The take-off state is characterized by a jump in the rate of productive investment from 5 percent or less to 10 percent or more of national income, the development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors with high growth rates, the existence or quick emergence of a political, social, and institutional framework “which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external economy effects of the take-off and gives to growth an on-going character.”11 Furthermore, the time required for the take-off period should be relatively short, no longer than twenty to thirty years. Finally, the post-take-off stage is characterized by a shift of leading sectors, an eventual smoothing out of the growth rates, and less and less structural change. While appearing straightforward, Rostow’s approach to modernization/development has come under relentless attack.12 Academic careers have been made by simply finding holes and inconsistencies in his approach. One line of criticism contends that Rostow’s theory failed to recognize that developing countries are surrounded by a quite different international economic system than the system that surrounded the advanced countries at the time when they began to develop. As proponents of dependency theory indicated, the economic positions of the developed and underdeveloped countries of the world are linked historically and cannot be understood in isolation from one another. Other valid criticisms surround Rostow’s use of stages. A closer look at his framework suggests that many of the stages are not defined by a set of unique variables—high rates of savings and investment were probably necessary to complete the preconditions stage, especially where extensive infrastructure was required. On a more fundamental level, it is clear that the building of a classificatory system does not, by itself, constitute a stage theory. As noted above, the theory must also explain how and why any particular country moves from one stage to another. In that respect, Rostow’s efforts appear incomplete and unsuccessful. For example, in explaining the transition to take-off, Rostow suggests that industrialization and take-off may be induced by a favorable shift in the terms of trade resulting from the rise in agricultural productivity in the preconditions stage. However, capital imports, urbanization, education, entrepreneurship, the opening up of foreign markets, and numerous other factors provide alternative explanations. Finally, implicit in the Rostow model is the notion that countries advance from one stage to another, yet there are numerous examples noted below of countries that appeared to take off, but later fell back rather than advancing to the drive-to-maturity stage. In retrospect, Rostow greatly underestimated the force of negative factors created during the growth process—factors that often became strong enough to retard or even stop the growth/modernization process. In sum, when using Rostow’s approach, one has great difficulty formulating a demarcation rule for deciding whether at a finite point in time a specific country can be classified in one stage or another. Nor is it clear the precise manner in which a country advances to the next stage. Because the mechanisms of stage placement and advancement are vague in Rostow, the model has proved to be of very limited value in policy discussions. In effect, it is a tautology— countries take off when they satisfy the conditions for take-off.

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The New Second World framework No doubt benefiting from the insights provided by Rostow’s critics, Jennifer Bremer and John D. Kasarda have recently constructed13 a stage theory taking into account many of the growth-depressing elements Rostow overlooked forty years earlier. They term their main conceptual construct “The New Second World.” This is a group of countries that have reached middle-income status over the past two decades and that are now in the midst of the critical economic and political transitions from third world to the first. The New Second World transition has three phases. The first, or early, phase typically begins with a low-income country starting to industrialize rapidly, launching an agrarian– industrial transition and the complex transformations—urbanization, income growth, economic diversification—that accompany it. In a process similar, but not identical, to Rostow’s, take-off occurs if growth continues for a decade or more. In that case, the country reaches the middle New Second World phase. In the second phase, industrial production per capita may now be around three times what it was when the transition started, and growth in low-value-added manufacturing is rapid and sustained. Incomes rise and a middle class begins to emerge. Bremer and Kasarda note that, if this middle phase continues for ten to twenty years, the country would likely reach the advanced phase, often a time of recurring economic crisis and political turmoil. Countries currently in this advanced group include Argentina, Brazil, and Poland. As many of the key Middle Eastern countries are in the first stage or “failed take-off stage”—Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan (included in the US GMEI14), our attention is focused mainly on the problems encountered by that group. These countries have failed to move forward to the middle stage largely because of growth-limiting policies and institutional rigidities. As Bremer and Kasarda note: History suggests that failure to make steady progress through the New Second World transition’s early phase to the middle period is extremely dangerous. If the transition stalls here – as it did in post-World War I Russia, and as it has now in much of the Middle East – failure can lead to revolution and Al Qaeda-style international violence. In fact, terrorism and environments that breed it are central to Bremer and Kasarda’s model. Terrorism is one of the negative side-effects neglected by Rostow and no doubt responsible for that model’s poor predictive capabilities. The one thing that the nations stuck in the early phase have in common is slowness in adopting choice-based systems. Bremer and Kasarda define “choice-based” systems as encompassing both market-based economies and democratic political institutions and organizations. In sum, the Second World country groupings identified by Bremer and Kasarda, should be able to be defined (profiled) largely in terms of their attainment of the various economic freedom and governance reforms listed above. If this is the case, their framework lends itself to the country placement in stages and the requirements for their succession to higher stages that eluded Rostow.

Stages of reform in the BMEI countries Based on Bremer and Kasarda’s characterization of Second World Development, a sample of countries was selected, with each country broadly meeting the profile of one of their unique stages. Sixteen countries were initially deemed first-stage or “failed take-off countries, six countries were placed in their second stages, and twenty-five were classified as stage 3 countries. A fourth group of countries, normally considered “advanced developed countries,” was also included in the analysis.

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A statistical technique, discriminant analysis,15 was then performed16 to determine whether the countries were “correctly” grouped. That is, is it possible for the six governance and ten economic freedom variables to define four sets (corresponding to the three New Second World and one advanced developed) of unique reform environments? If this is the case, countries possessing a particular set of reform attainments would be classified with a high degree of probability in one of these groups. In this case, the discriminant procedure would generate a

Table 13.2 New second world countries: probability of group placement Country

Failed take-off

Second-stage countries

Third-stage countries

Advanced countries

First stage: failed take-off countries Albania 0.81522 Armenia 0.69037 Azerbaijan 0.89012 Bosnia 0.71194 Iran 0.94391 Iraq 1.00000 Kenya 0.63930 Libya 0.99809 Moldova 0.97864 Nigeria 0.98742 Pakistan 0.55815 Russia 0.98121 Saudi Arabia 0.90513 Syria 0.88671 Tajikistan 0.99980 Venezuela 0.98188

0.18458 0.30953 0.10988 0.28806 0.05609 0.00000 0.36070 0.00191 0.01240 0.01258 0.44185 0.01784 0.09411 0.11329 0.00020 0.01802

0.00020 0.00009 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00896 0.00000 0.00000 0.00095 0.00076 0.00000 0.00000 0.00010

0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000

Second-stage countries China Egypt India Indonesia Mexico Turkey

0.99288 0.99061 0.69351 0.95616 0.99381 0.97284

0.00000 0.00000 0.02215 0.00000 0.00057 0.00001

0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000

0.00000 0.02556 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00088 0.00004 0.00075 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00055

0.99999 0.89893 0.99954 0.99994 0.99909 1.00000 0.99269 0.99871 0.99877 0.99992 0.99889 0.99772 0.98683 0.99995 0.99831 0.99994 0.99661

0.00000 0.00000 0.00046 0.00006 0.00091 0.00000 0.00731 0.00129 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00228 0.01317 0.00004 0.00169 0.00006 0.00000

0.00712 0.00939 0.28433 0.04384 0.000562 0.02715

Selected third-stage countries Argentina 0.00001 Brazil 0.07550 Chile 0.00000 Czech Republic 0.00000 Greece 0.00000 Hong Kong 0.00000 Hungary 0.00000 Israel 0.00000 Latvia 0.00035 Lithuania 0.00004 Malaysia 0.00035 Poland 0.00000 Singapore 0.00000 Slovak Republic 0.00001 Slovenia 0.00000 South Africa 0.00000 UAE 0.00283

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numerical function, indicating, for each country, the reforms necessary and the extent to which they would have to be improved if they wanted to advance to the next stage. Summarizing17 the main results, the analysis found that the relative country attainment in only five reform areas (in declining order of importance)—government effectiveness, voice, regulation, regulatory quality, informal markets and fiscal burden—were sufficient to correctly place all of the sample countries in their anticipated stages of development (Table 13.2).18 As in any good stage theory of development, there is a gradual improvement in most indices as one moves from lower to higher stages.19 This pattern is particularly evident in the governance area (Table 13.3). The first-stage countries score particularly low in this general area of reform. Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, and Tajikistan most closely fit the profile of first-stage countries. On the other hand, Pakistan, Armenia, Bosnia, and Albania show some of the characteristics often associated with the second-stage group. In the context of Bremer and Kasarda’s theory, the first-stage countries are unable to sustain their take-offs because of diminishing returns caused by poor regulation, corruption, ineffective government, and the lack of democracy. The high rates of investment and industrialization noted by Rostow were not sufficient to overcome the barriers imposed by these institutional shortcomings. As noted, a large number of BMEI countries were profiled in this group: Iran, Iraq Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria (Table 13.2). While improvements in the sixteen areas of reform eventually occur as countries move to higher stages, progress in government effectiveness and political stability appear particularly critical for the advancement of the first-stage countries to the second stage. Based on the large gap in discriminant values between the first and second groups, with the exception of Pakistan, most of these countries have a long way to go before reaching second-stage status. A realistic timeframe for this transition, assuming persistent efforts at reform, is at least ten years. As Bremer and Kasarda suggest, stage 2 is likely to be a fairly long and peaceful period of growth and consolidation. Egypt and Turkey are well profiled to be in this group, with India best positioned to advance to the next stage. To advance to the third stage, however, several areas of reform appear critical. While significant strides have to be made in a number of reform categories, voice, regulation, and foreign investment are the areas in need of special attention. Taiwan appears to be the country currently best placed to reach advanced country status. Of the sample Middle East countries, only the UAE falls in this group. A wide variety of reforms appears essential for advancement including: fiscal burden, informal markets, voice, monetary policy, and property rights. In sum, the findings presented above are quite encouraging. Usually, significant progress in only several key reform areas at a time is necessary to produce significant results. In this regard, great flexibility exists. In the case of movement from the first to the second stage, progress is critical in government effectiveness and political stability. However, equal efforts are note required in both areas. Depending on internal political constraints, some countries might want to opt for relatively more effort in the effectiveness area, while others might feel more comfortable in the political stability area—both strategies have the potential to be successful in elevating a particular country to the next stage.

Constraints on BMEI reforms While an honest effort at reform appears to pay extremely high dividends in terms of economic progress and stability, initiating serious action in this area in the BMEI countries will be another matter. As noted above, few in the Middle East appear neutral when it comes to US reform initiatives. While many appear to feel economic and political reforms are necessary and overdue, many are highly skeptical over those proposed by the US. Doubters fall into three distinct groups:20

0.68582 1.71920

0.65898

1.23800

2.40689 2.43864

3.30339

4.17066

3.77639 3.11667 2.11833 1.22778

3.46766

3.00000

2.41944

2.08725

Property rights

2.75000

3.54167

Wages and prices

3.49628

3.54233

Government intervention

–0.07078

–0.46558

Fiscal burden

–0.77738

Government

–0.72836

Political effectiveness

2.55720

2.54278

3.81667

3.88740

Regulation

1.18169

2.73433

3.33333

3.76974

Monetary policy

1.32688

0.77153

0.05316

–0.90270

Regulatory quality

1.30505

2.71800

3.92500

4.34444

Informal market

2.01566

2.23411

2.83333

3.54792

Foreign investment

1.77151

0.70353

–0.15717

–0.72285

Rule of law

1.86632

0.59154

–0.33948

–0.77003

Control of corruption

Notes: governance data, average values 1996–2002; economic freedom data, average values 1995–2004.

Source: Compiled from Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002 (Washington: World Bank, June 30, 2003); Index of Economic Freedom Rankings (Washington: Heritage Foundation), various issues. Variables significant in the discriminant analysis in order of importance: government effectiveness, voice, regulation, regulatory quality, informal markets, fiscal burden. Correct placement: failed take-off 100.0%, secondstage countries 100.0%, third-stage countries 100.0%, advanced countries 100.0%. Overall, 100.0%.

First stage: failed take-off countries Mean 3.76379 Second-stage countries Mean 3.33333 Third-stage countries Mean 2.52800 Advanced countries Mean 1.99545

Banking and finance

First stage: failed take-off countries Mean 4.07391 Second-stage countries Mean 3.71667 Third-stage countries Mean 2.68378 Advanced countries Mean 2.02374

Trade policy

First stage: failed take-off countries Mean –0.87747 Second-stage countries Mean –0.54797 Third-stage countries Mean 0.67524 Advanced countries Mean 1.40100

Voice stability

Table 13.3 New second world/advanced countries: governance–economic freedom group comparisons

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Cautious optimists: This group sees the US reform initiatives as a positive project in principle with the potential to help the region modernize itself politically and economically, but only if certain preconditions are met—these involve the acceptability of the core concepts to the regional actors. Just as importantly, participation would be wise only under the understanding that each country has its own special needs and aspirations and these must be respected. In Iraq, this group is represented by many of the returning expatriates as well as a fairly large number of technocrats from the former regime. Pessimists: This view dismisses the project as unwise and undo-able. A foreign-made project designed to transform Muslim countries through foreign social engineering will trigger deep regional resistance. The Initiative will only create greater instability. In Iraq, the inability of the US neoliberal economic reforms21 to date to produce tangible results in the form of job creation and economic growth has resulted in large segments of the population subscribing to this interpretation. Rejectionists/conspiracy theorists: This group is largely composed of Islamists who believe that the Initiative is simply another ploy by Western imperialists designed to destroy their culture and identity. A very casual reading of regional newspapers suggests that most observers fall in the second group. Still large segments of the populous subscribe to the third position. Significantly, however, the United States’ two main allies in the region fall in the first group. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saudi Arabian King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah are on record to the effect that Arab states proceed on the path of development, modernization, and reform in keeping with their people’s interests and values.

Assessment The analysis above demonstrates the basic soundness of the US BMEI initiative. Perhaps more importantly, the findings suggest that an operational strategy of addressing deficiencies in the reform structure of countries tailor-made to their different stages of development is likely to be an effective tool in reducing the conditions often conducive to the growth and spread of terrorism. Still, unless the US finds a way to work within the set of parameters noted above by the cautious optimists, US reform initiatives in the region will have little chance of improving the living standards of and providing a stable environment for large segments of the local populations. For their part, the governments of BMEI countries must reorient their thinking toward the general acceptance of market solutions. In particular: Allowing markets to prevail requires having a set of cultural values that emphasize the virtue of competition, the ability to create and gain in a socially acceptable way, the legitimacy of profits and the importance of freedom of transaction. Spreading a market culture in the region is therefore not only an exercise in economic restructuring but also an acceptance of the basic values and standards that make the system work.22

Notes * This chapter is a revised and updated version of an earlier paper, “Middle East Reform Initiatives: A Stage Theory Perspective,” published in International Journal of World Peace, XXII, 1 March 2005: 13–34. 1 The original GMEI was a set of US-sponsored policies aimed at democratizing and developing the Middle East through the creation of liberal market economies. However, it was perceived by many in the region as an attempt by the US to impose, by force if necessary, its worldview on the region. The Broader Middle East Initiative (BMEI) is intended to dispel this notion. It also incorporates the main concerns of the European contingent at the June 2004 G8 meetings.

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2 Anthony Cordesman, “The West is Mired in a Losing Battle,” Financial Times, July 21, 2004. 3 Cf. Marina Ottaway, “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: A Hollow Victory for the United States,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2004. 4 See, for example, Marc Miles, Edwin Feulner, Mary Anastasia O’Grady, and Ana Eiras, 2004 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2004). 5 Available from Global Economic Software, Ltd, www.globaleconomicsoftware.com. Cf. Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Economic Transition: The Neoliberal Model and its Role,” The Middle East Journal 57(4), Autumn 2003: 568–87 for an application of this data set to the Middle East. 6 Ana Isabel Eiras, Ethics, Corruption and Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, December 9, 2003). 7 Herbert Kitschelt, “A Review of the Political Economy of Governance,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 3315, May 2004: 1. 8 Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002 (Washington: World Bank, June 30, 2003). 9 As defined in Jeffrey Sachs, “Globalization and Patterns of Economic Development,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 136 (4), 2000: 581. Sachs considers these countries to be narrowing the income gap with the higher technology and richer countries through a process of technological diffusion and capital flows from the leader to the follower. 10 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 11 Ibid: 284. 12 Earlier criticisms are summarized in Stephen Enke, “Economists and Development: Rediscovering Old Truths,” Journal of Economic Literature, 7(4), December 1969: 1125–39. 13 Jennifer Bremer and John Kasarda, “The Origins of Terror: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy,” The Milken Institute Review Fourth Quarter, 2002: 34–42. 14 Other BMEI countries in the sample, Egypt and Turkey, were grouped as stage 2 countries, while the UAE was placed in stage 3 (along with Israel, a non-BMEI country). 15 A discussion of this technique together with several examples is given in “Discriminant Analysis,” in SPSS Base 10.0 User’s Guide (Chicago: SPSS Inc., 1999): 315–22. 16 Based on the data sets, the period of analysis was 1995–2002. 17 A full set of tables and statistical results is available from the author upon request. 18 The one exception was Mexico, which was originally classified as a phase 3 country, but was placed in phase 2 by the discriminant program. 19 High values for the governance variables are best, while low values for the economic freedom variables indicate high levels of attainment. 20 Following Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “The Greater Middle East Initiative, A Turkish Perspective,” Dar al Hayat, June 13, 2004. 21 Cf. Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Economic Transition: The Neoliberal Model and its Role,” The Middle East Journal 57 (4), Autumn 2003: 568–87; and Robert Looney, “The Viability of Economic Shock Therapy in Iraq,” Challenge, September/October 2004: 86–103. 22 Henry T. Azzam, “Changing the Legacy of Failure in the Arab World,” Arab News, May 17, 2004.

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Part II

Perceptions

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14 The Arab Street Stephen Glain

I came upon The Arab Street fairly late in my career. After a decade covering Asia for The Wall Street Journal, I was assigned to the Middle East, a region I knew little about. It was 1998, and the three years I covered the beat was, in retrospect, the buildup for the cluster of crises and quagmires it is today: lingering optimism from the 1993 Oslo peace accord between Israelis and Palestinians was vanquished by the Second Intifada. Iraq had completed its devolution from a prosperous dictatorship in the 1980s to an isolated kleptocracy in what would turn out to be the twilight of the Hussein era. Egypt, once a fountainhead of Arab culture and scholarship, was slumping its way into authoritarian irrelevance. In mid-2001, I returned to the US to write a book about the Levantine Middle Eastern economy. Weeks after my arrival in Washington to begin a writer’s fellowship, al-Qaeda unleashed its 9/11 assault on America. On September 20, US President George W. Bush declared in an address before Congress a war on “terror”—the first time in history a head of state had vowed to end a political–military tactic—and terrorists who “hate us for our freedoms … [our] way of life.” By laying out so broad and ill-defined an objective, Bush set the terms for an unwinnable world war. And by refusing to acknowledge the political motives behind the attacks—no one who knew anything about radical Islam believed they were about American values—he made the war eternal. On that calm autumn evening, the fate of millions of innocent Arabs was sealed. Over the next seven years, I would stumble over the rubble of their lives.

I The Arab Street is a cobblestone pathway that runs from the open-air markets of Hebron in the Palestinian territories to a Jewish settlement in the heart of the old city. During the early days of the Second Intifada in 2000, young Palestinian men spent their days hurling stones at Israeli soldiers guarding the settlement. They are part of a lost generation of Palestinians who will know nothing but occupation, violence, and economic and cultural decay.

Authenticity is a rare quality in the Arab world, requiring as it does distinctiveness and integrity—traits that are incompatible with autocrats who corrupt those who submit to them and destroy those who do not. Authentic revolutionaries, needless to say, are all but extinct. Not since the charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser galvanized the Middle East more than forty years ago has an Arab leader earned a popular mandate to lead on a national, if not transnational, scale. The Middle East’s leadership deficit, which does not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or religion—just ask the Israelis—is one of the most enduring troubles for a troubled land. It makes all the more serious the offense of neglecting a legitimate, credible, and respected leader when one does emerge, which brings us to Marwan Barghouti, currently the most famous occupant of Israel’s Hadarim Prison.

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Barghouti, 49, is serving a life sentence for the murders of five civilians, crimes in which he denies involvement. Once an aide to the late Yasser Arafat and a senior official in Fatah, Arafat’s political movement, Barghouti was a fervent believer in a negotiated peace with Israel, but abandoned the process in response to the relentless expansion of Jewish settlements on Palestinian land. When the Second Intifada erupted in fall 2000, Barghouti emerged as the intellectual and political architect of its operations in the West Bank. He was unapologetically militant and was closely identified with the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade and the Tanzim, Fatah’s armed wing, which stunned his pro-peace friends and supporters in Israel. Barghouti speaks fluent English and Hebrew, the latter of which he learned during earlier stints in Israeli jails. Before his arrest in 2002 he enjoyed bantering with foreign journalists. During the first few months of the Second Intifada, with Palestine and much of the Middle East simmering around him, he was garrulous, unhurried, and rakish in his trademark leather jacket and well-trimmed moustache. “The Israelis have revealed themselves to be insincere in their talk of peace,” he told me in early 2001. “They negotiate even as they expand settlements. They leave us no option but to defend ourselves, which is our right.” There is an indelible image of Barghouti being led into an Israeli courtroom on the first day of his trial. He is wearing a brown jumpsuit and his beard has grown out. His hand-cuffed fists are raised over his head and his eyes are defiantly, almost mischievously, bright. From that day forward, Barghouti would become the most respected and influential of Palestinian leaders, routinely outpolling both Islamist and secular politicians in public opinion surveys. From his prison cell, where he reads the morning papers in three languages, Barghouti manages to shape Palestinian politics and policy. After breaking with Fatah in 2005, he nearly contested the 2006 vote from jail by forming his own party led by the younger guard of Fatah leaders. Despite polls that showed he would have won an overwhelming share of the popular vote, he backed down at the last minute for the sake of Palestinian unity. The election ended in a victory for Hamas, the Islamist group that refuses to recognize Israel and Fatah’s bitter rival. The results shocked Israel and the US but came as no surprise to everyone else, and while the election was declared free and fair by monitors, the two allies vowed to isolate and eventually oust Hamas. In early 2007, I was in the Palestinian territories reporting a story about Mohammad Dahlan, a powerful Arafat protégé who was supported by both the US government and Israel in their covert war against Hamas. After several days of travel through the West Bank and Gaza, it became obvious to me that Barghouti, not Dahlan, represented the future of Palestinian politics. While the Israelis were unlikely to allow me to meet Barghouti himself, I was able to meet with Fadwa, his wife, thanks to Sa’ad Namr, who heads a worldwide campaign for Barghouti’s release. Fadwa Barghouti is a lawyer who serves her husband as counselor, gatekeeper, courier, and spousal confessor. We gathered late one evening over tea in Sa’ad’s office in Ramallah, the West Bank’s unofficial capital city. The newspapers that day had led with stories of Secretary Rice’s latest visit to reignite a stalled peace process. Although Fadwa dismissed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s efforts—“marketing ploys,” she called them—rumors that the Israelis might consider swapping Barghouti and dozens of other Palestinians jailed in Israel for a kidnapped Israeli soldier leavened the atmosphere. “Marwan is in high spirits,” she said. “He is not demoralized and he sees a steady stream of people, including senior Israelis who believe a prisoner exchange is a good idea.” Fadwa is allowed twice-monthly visitations with her husband. “The whole process is humiliating,” she told me. “We get up very early and meet with members of the Red Cross, then we board a bus with other families of prisoners that takes us through Kalandia [a Palestinian refugee camp along the main Jerusalem–Ramallah road]. The process is so chaotic that family members often abuse each other. It is 20 hours of torture, and then you get 45 minutes with

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your loved one with a plate of glass running in between and a phone that often doesn’t work and by the time you get it fixed your 45 minutes are up.” Israeli jails are like political finishing schools for much of the Palestinian leadership, particularly its younger generation. Few within its ranks, however, are held in as ecumenically high regard as Barghouti. Having spent much of his career either in Palestine or in exile in Jordan, he is unassociated with the corruption that soiled Arafat and his inner circle after their own return from exile after Oslo. Barghouti is fiercely secular but modest in his habits—unlike Dahlan and other Arafat cronies, many of whom live in lavish villas and drive luxury cars—which appeals to the Islamists. As a member of the Nationalist–Islamist Coordination Committee, he brokered a hudna, or temporary truce, with Israel in June 2003 that lasted 152 days—something Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas was unable to do. He helped draft and ratify the Prisoners Document of May 11, 2006, a compact signed by secular and Islamist Palestinian leaders that was widely regarded as a foundation for a unity government between Hamas and Fatah. It called for a two-state solution and implicit recognition of Israel by Hamas, which agreed to support Abu Mazen, as Abbas is commonly referred to, in his negotiations with Israel. “Marwan wanted to give Hamas the chance to come closer to Fatah,” Fadwa told me. “He told them if you’re interested in the democratic process, you must compromise. It so happened that many Hamas leaders were in the prison with him, and they would meet during the two hours of exercise they got out of their cells in the morning and the 90 minutes they had in the afternoon. It took them nearly a month to hammer out the pact and then it was circulated to leaders in other prisons. Mazen saw it as the basis for a referendum and gave it his immediate support. Here you have Hamas giving a Fatah leader a mandate to negotiate with Israel, which is something they never gave Arafat.” Neither the US nor Israel showed any interest in the Prisoners Document. Within six months, fighting broke out in Gaza between Hamas and Fatah. With the Palestinians on the brink of a civil war, Abbas sent an envoy to seek a truce with exiled Hamas leader Khaled Mashal in Damascus, but Mashal refused to talk. When Barghouti dispatched Qadura Fares, his long-time ally, to see Mashal, he was welcomed warmly and an agreement was quickly hammered out. On February 8, 2007, a deal for a Palestinian unity government was struck in Mecca under the imprimatur of Saudi Arabian King Abdullah II. The US and Israel studiously ignored it. In June, fighting resumed in Gaza, and Fatah, despite nearly $90 million in US aid to bolster its security forces, was quickly overrun. Dahlan, whom President Bush once described as “our guy” in Gaza, fled and is thought to be living in Cairo. The Gaza Strip remains under Hamas’ authority. Rumors that Barghouti may be freed as a concession by Israel circulate occasionally. Statesmen from former US Secretary of State James Baker to ex-Israeli deputy defense minister Ephraim Sneh have pushed for his release, if nothing else as a counterweight to the still-popular Hamas. They realize, as so many in the policymaking circles of Israel and Washington do not, that spurning the current generation of Arab leadership always makes the next one more hostile and the price of a peace deal more expensive. In the 1950s, the US government managed to chase Western-oriented, Islamist-hating Arab nationalists such as Nasser into the arms of the Soviets and got the Ba’ath Socialist Party in return. It then rejected the Ba’athists, which laid the groundwork for an Islamic revival and the rise of political Islam. It has refused to deal with moderate Islamist leaders such as ex-Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, who was succeeded by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Now it tries to destroy Hamas. One muses what kind of harvest success might reap. It is no wonder the average Arab on the average Arab Street believes the US and Israel prefer war to peace. I was in Jerusalem’s Old City when Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh announced his support for the Mecca accord, and the enthusiasm was galvanic. Surely Washington could not ignore such a compromise, I was told, particularly one so heavily invested in by King Abdullah, America’s close ally. Not only did Washington do just that, it was well into a plan to

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turn Fatah loose on Hamas with American weaponry, a gambit every bit as foolish as it was irresponsible. Under Arafat, Israel was often justified in complaining there was no one on the Palestinian side willing to negotiate a lasting peace. Today, the reverse is true. As Matti Steinberg, an adviser to three Shin Bet security service chiefs and a leading authority on the Palestinian national movement, puts it: “When people claim that [the Palestinians] are not a partner … this is meant to hide the fact that we are not a partner.”

II The Arab Street laces together the headquarters of Islamist parties from Morocco to Kuwait. Over the last three decades, they have become the closest thing to an authentic opposition movement in a region ruled by inept and corrupt elites. The region is theirs to lose.

In the spring of 2006, Abdel Khaleq Street in downtown Cairo was a crucible of dissent. Waves of riots and demonstrations had been triggered by the arrest of two judges charged with “insulting the Egyptian judiciary” for reporting that fellow jurists hand-picked as election monitors by the state had overlooked incidents of vote fraud. Their case became a cause célèbre for civil rights activists and human rights groups, as Egypt’s relatively independent judiciary is considered the last check on President Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian rule. In late April, thousands of protestors linked arms around the Judges Club, a Victorian-era salon, and demanded the magistrates’ release. Over the next few weeks, nearly two dozen people would be killed in clashes with riot police, and thousands of demonstrators, many of them leaders of Egypt’s pro-democracy movement, were imprisoned under state security laws in place since 1981, when Mubarak assumed power after Anwar Sadat’s assassination. Among those imprisoned was Mahmoud Hamza, a 35-year-old judge who had invited me to his home in Heliopolis after his release in mid-May. He answered the door to his modest second-floor walk-up with a cast on his right arm, which security agents had broken as he filmed the crackdown on protesters. The cast was covered with signatures and get-well greetings. Hamza had received me courteously but warily. He told me his apartment was under surveillance and his phone was tapped. While in detention, he said, the police took his mobile phone and probably tapped its SIM card to identify people with whom he had recently communicated. “The riot police didn’t know who I was,” Hamza said. “But they knew I was a judge.” Hamza’s apartment was tidy and well lit. Freshly laundered clothes hung on a rack in the living room where we sat. Hamza, who was stockily built and looked young for his age, was dressed in a T-shirt and jeans and he radiated a coiled intensity. Scuffling with security forces was unworthy of a jurist, he told me. His father had been the equivalent of a circuit court judge, and he had nurtured a deep respect for the law as his family traveled from one district to the next. “I looked up to him when the judiciary was held in even higher regard than it is today,” Hamza told me. Egypt has a long and enviable tradition of a competent and uncompromising judiciary. A legacy of Britain’s colonial bureaucracy, Cairo’s independent court system prides itself as a bulwark against the excesses of Mubarak and his circle. So when Mubarak enlisted a handful of pliant jurists to monitor parliamentary balloting in 2005, resulting in widespread fraud, it was considered an assault on one of the country’s last respected institutions. Hamza served as a monitor during the election’s first round of balloting. He was assigned to a polling station at a secondary school near Zamalek, an up-scale district in the heart of downtown Cairo. The independent candidate contesting the election was a businessman, he recalled, and his opponent, a member of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), was an

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ex-senior official in internal security and a friend of the interior minister. Supporters of the NDP arrived at the station with cards instructing them how to vote. Those without a card, Hamza said, were either detained or locked out of the balloting. In the early afternoon, said Hamza, “thugs entered the classroom. They were led by a plain-clothes security agent, someone I once worked with during a trial. They started stuffing the ballot box with completed ballots that had the stamp of the local district, which indicated complicity at a very high level.” Hamza immediately reported the incident to the head of the General Committee of Election Supervision as well as the Judges Club. Those results were annulled, but reports from human rights groups and civic organizations of similar disruptive acts were ignored. “Government interference has become an habitual feature of our elections,” Ehab Sallam, a human rights worker, told me not long after the elections. “I was responsible for overseeing voting throughout Egypt, and one of our monitors was in tears after finding himself in the middle of a battle between police and religious voters. Between shooting and tear gas canisters, 11 people were killed.” Mubarak was re-elected handily. But the regime could not prevent the Muslim Brotherhood, the closest thing Egypt has to an opposition party and the world’s most influential Islamist political movement, from adding to its already sizable bloc of seats in parliament. Days before my interview with Hamza, Gamal Mubarak, the president’s 42-year-old son, had met secretively at the White House with US Vice President Dick Cheney, national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, and Secretary Rice. News of the meeting was first reported by alJazeera and later confirmed by a White House spokesman. According to the Egyptian ambassador to Washington, Mubarak assured his hosts that Egypt remained committed to democracy and characterized the regime’s crackdown on protesters as a “normal consequence of the opening-up process.” I asked Hamza if the judiciary would continue to challenge the government. “People who are protected – I have my father to protect me – are likely to speak out,” he said. “Others who are exposed are afraid. But the judiciary has not changed. What has changed is the use of the judiciary by the regime to legitimize its elections. We are all that remains between the people and another ‘triple nine’ election results,” a reference to the 99.9 percent re-election plurality commonly enjoyed by Arab leaders. Sixteen months before Gamal Mubarak was hosted at the White House, President George W. Bush made the following declaration during the swearing-in ceremony of his second inauguration: It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In March 2007, the Egyptian parliament passed a series of constitutional reforms the government said would help pluralize the country but which human rights activists and opposition groups warned would only entrench Mubarak’s dictatorship. In June, ahead of legislative elections, hundreds of members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested and its candidates were effectively barred from campaigning. It is widely accepted in Egypt that Gamal Mubarak will succeed his father as president by fiat.

III The Arab Street connects war-torn Iraq with its huge refugee population. Some two million Iraqis live on the margins of society in cities like Damascus, Amman, and Cairo, and while some have returned due to improved security at home or because they can’t find work in exile, the vast majority remains huddled together in ghettos of dispossession.

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Ahlam Al Jaburi arrived for our reunion in tears. She had left her cold Damascene apartment that morning at 5:30 am to reach the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees when their offices opened at 7:30 am. By the time she arrived, there was a crowd of hundreds of Iraqi exiles, their asylum requests and related documents bundled under their arms, pushing and shoving to protect their place in line. For the next eight hours, she was referred to one administrator after the other, none of whom had the authority to advance her case. When the offices closed for the day at 3 pm, she was still one of several million Iraqis ensnared in an awful limbo created by the war. It was February 2007. I was touring the Middle East for a series of stories I was writing on Iraqi refugees, the largest population of displaced peoples in the region since the 1948 Arab–Israeli war. Ahlam had first submitted her application, along with a request for protection against forcible return to Iraq, two months earlier and she had heard nothing since. Like most Iraqi refugees in Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere, she lived in constant fear of the local authorities. “Some of us have cards that give us protection for six months but the Syrians don’t always recognize them,” Ahlam told me, sobbing. “One day they came for me at the apartment but fortunately I was out.” I had first met Ahlam nearly a decade earlier through her brother, Samir, in Baghdad. This was before year zero, when the US invasion of Iraq changed everything. Back then, reporters were taken straight to the Al Rashid Hotel, where most foreign visitors were concentrated, and a sub-culture of hangers on—drivers, fixers and translators, merchants and prostitutes—would prey on deep-pocketed visitors. A generation earlier, before Saddam Hussein’s disastrous invasion of Kuwait and the US-led trade embargo that followed, many of these same men and women were members of Iraq’s legendary class of white-collar professionals—doctors, engineers, college professors. Now they were driving cabs and turning tricks in an isolated, tyrannical wasteland. A scrum of men surrounded me as I disembarked from the GMC I’d hired for the sixteen-hour drive to Baghdad from Amman. I waved them off and they reluctantly parted to reveal Samir Ahmed Mahmoud Al Jaburi in faded khaki pants and a polo shirt. He was standing ramrod straight as he strolled over and casually extended his hand. “Welcome to Iraq,” he said. “May I be of assistance during your stay?” There wasn’t a trace of servility in his voice. I liked him immediately. “You’re hired,” I said. For the next several days, we were inseparable. It was 1999. The occasion for my visit was a ratcheting up of tensions between Iraq and the US, and I was to get as much anecdote and color as possible to file as string to my colleagues in Washington. Saddam had responded by mobilizing the people’s militias, so Samir and I spent a day watching aging and well-fed Iraqi men awkwardly forming ranks at several reporting stations. When word got out that an American correspondent was on hand to capture the glorious event, several of the militiamen sought me out to tell me how fondly they remembered getting advanced degrees in engineering and cardiology at elite US universities. Later, I asked Samir what he thought of the militia’s performance. “That?” “Yes.” “Fuck.” With a single, spare obscenity, Samir had revealed a contempt for the regime that was shared by so many other Iraqis but was rarely expressed openly, particularly to foreigners. There was no turning back.

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Samir, a Sunni Muslim, invited me to dinner that night at his home in Al Kadhimiya, a largely Shi’ite suburb of Baghdad. He lived in a concrete blockhouse on an acre or two of farmland along the Tigris River. On the way over, he asked me if I liked to fish. “Yes,” I replied, though I hadn’t been fishing for some time. “We fish for our supper,” he said. I asked him what kind of reel he used. “Reel?” I nodded. “What kind of rod and reel do you use when you fish?” “No rod or reel,” he said. “We use electric-city.” Samir then explained that he and his brothers catch fish by extending a metal wire into the Tigris River and electrocuting it with a car battery. “That’s not very sporting,” I said. Samir looked at me as if he was beholding a pinhead. “We don’t want sport,” he said. “We want fish.” I met Ahlam at Samir’s home along with the rest of his extended family. She baked flat bread by pressing parchment-thin disks of dough on the inside of a clay furnace heated by an open fire. Occasionally, she would burn herself and giggle. She had a degree in business administration from the British Council, she explained, and she had never thought she’d have to bake bread the way her mother and grandmother did before her. But because of the rationing of cooking oil and other commodities under the embargo, there was no choice but to prepare meals primevally. The fishing expedition was a bust, yielding only a handful of minnows not worthy of the family cat.1 Fortunately, Samir’s wife had provisioned against such an outcome, and she laid out a magnificent spread of mezza, roast chicken, lamb, and masgouf, a huge carp split in two, slowly roasted over a wood fire and served on a bed of rice with tomatoes and onions on the side. In May 2003, a month after US forces conquered Iraq, I returned to the country and was welcomed by Samir at the Al Hamra Hotel, where most correspondents were living and working. Samir, a proud Iraqi nationalist, was opposed to the occupation from the start. But Ahlam had supported the invasion and even worked as an interlocutor with American GIs. Each week, she would interview war victims at a US civil–military office in Al Kadhimiya, type up her notes, and file them to the American authorities. Empowered by her experience, she even became a member of the Kadhimiya Municipal Council. On July 2, 2005, Ahlam was kidnapped by an al-Qaeda-related group when she was waiting for a cab-ride to get to work. She didn’t recognize her assailants, some of whom were hooded. Onlookers were powerless to help as the well-armed men locked Ahlam into the trunk of a car. Five hours later, she was pulled out, blindfolded, and held inside a building where she sat, still blindfolded, for four days. She was told she’d be killed if she didn’t admit to being a spy for the American military and provide information about their base. They abused her verbally and beat her with rifle butts. Her only concession to her tormentors was a plea that they not throw her body into the river, where the remains of so many other kidnapped victims had ended up. Samir, acting through an intermediary, bought Ahlam’s freedom with $50,000 lent him by his tribal elder from the Sanduk Ashira, literally, the “tribal box.” But her kidnappers ordered

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her to leave Iraq and never return. After spending several unhappy months in Jordan and Egypt, she settled in the Zeinab district of Damascus, once heavily populated by Palestinian refugees and now an enclave for Iraqi exiles. Exactly a month short of the first anniversary of her kidnapping, Ahlam’s eldest son complained of severe back pain. She and her husband rushed him to a hospital, where he died fifteen minutes later of massive internal bleeding. He was eleven years old and in good health. Ahlam’s husband never recovered from his grief, and their marriage began to unravel. “My husband no longer works,” Ahlam told me in her unheated and dimly lit Zeinab apartment. “Without my brothers I would be lost.” The bright-eyed woman with the sing-song voice I had first met a decade ago baking flat bread now had a dark, vacant look. She stared at the unfinished, concrete floor as she told me her story, which was tragically common among her fellow residents of Zeinab. Ahlam was dressed in a well-worn black coat—she was still in mourning for her son—and her body shuddered from a deep, wheezing cough. Her two surviving children—daughter Al Kayam, 9, and son Abdullah, 2—and Samir sat silently alongside her. The room was silent except for her raspy, weary voice and the metallic whir of a flickering fluorescent tube. Ahlam wiped away the last of her tears. Despite everything she’d been through, she said, the invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam had been worth the price. “Somehow things will calm down and there will be a democracy,” she said. “Iraq will be a beautiful country like it once was. I missed the work I was doing there. We were helping people. Sunnis, Shi’ites, Christians. It made no difference to me.” Not long after our reunion, Samir had given up trying to find work in Syria and returned to Baghdad, leaving his sister behind. Although her marriage was collapsing, things had improved for Ahlam. She had joined a non-governmental organization (NGO) involved in women’s issues, and she was invited to a conference in Europe to share her experiences. She had applied for a US residency permit and had expressed confidence to me in an email that she would be issued one. In June 2008, I received a call from Samir. Ahlam had been arrested by Syrian security agents who accused her of being an American spy. She’d been picked up not long after leaving the US embassy in Damascus, where she had been interviewed as part of her residency permit application. Samir dispatched his brother, Salem, to plead for her release. In response, the authorities in charge demanded $20,000 in bribe money. When Salam refused to pay, they briefly detained him. I made inquiries and was told getting the US embassy involved would only make things worse for Ahlam. The only thing to do, Samir told me over the phone the next day, was to bargain the Syrians down, hopefully by half of what they were demanding. “This has happened to many, many Iraqis in Syria,” Samir told me. “It’s like Iraq under Saddam. I would rather die here in Baghdad than live like a beggar in Damascus.” Prior to the US invasion of Iraq, a statement like that would have been hyperbole.

IV Blind faith is the end of Wisdom. Wisdom begins with doubt. Clarence Darrow

The Arab Street is a myth, an abstraction, a Rorschach test for crackpot theories about Why Arabs Hate Us. It is invoked by pundits and Middle East “experts” who typically have spent less time in Arab cities, where there are no shortage of streets, alleyways, and avenues from which to fulminate, than they have in the hearing rooms and cable news studios of Washington. As a reference point, it has no counterpart. There is no “street”—a device that implies intellectual, social, and political conformity—for, say, the United States, Europe, Asia, Zionists,

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or Christian evangelicals, and for good reason. These are places and movements familiar to the West and appreciated for their diversity and sophistication. Understanding the Arab world, on the other hand, demands intimacy with its people and history, thoughtful inquiry, and above all, empathy. It means exposing your presumptions to an unwieldy and often hostile truth. And who needs that? Better to leave the Arabs to their street, as an expedient, facile metaphor. A handmaiden to Arab Street reductionism is something called “moral relativism,” a frequent watchword in the columns and commentary of right-wing thinkers. Generally, it refers to the process of employing history and culture, rather than a set of universal values, to divine the motives of an individual or group. The debate over moral relativism, or “moral equivalency,” as it is also known, always struck me as odd. For a journalist, as for anyone tasked with understanding or anticipating the conduct of someone else, there is no other way to interpret the world around you. Some might find offensive the suggestion that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom-fighter, but as anyone who is familiar with the tactics of militant Zionist groups of the 1930s and 1940s knows, it happens to be true. To identify a single standard for truth and morality against which all behavior should be judged is to erect intellectual walls between one group and another. To steel those walls requires a willful ignorance about the people on the other side. Empathy, that purest form of human expression, becomes a subversive element to be eradicated. To wonder aloud “What would I do if I were them?” becomes an act of treason. Soon, the intellectual walls are replaced with real ones. Nearly eight years after President Bush declared his intention to remake the Middle East, and despite an enormous investment there of human, financial, and diplomatic capital, the Arab world—its mythical “street”—remains for most Americans the stuff of caricature. An honest and accurate appraisal of the region can only begin with an appreciation of the welfare and aspirations of its people, not the demands of US domestic politics. To acknowledge that the two are incompatible is to question the very foundations of American Middle East policy. And as that is unthinkable, the alternative is to create a narrative that validates policy at the expense of truth. Crucial to the narrative is conflict, an endless struggle between us and The Other—those who oppose us lethally and absolutely and who cannot be appeased. And if God can be woven into the script, so much the better. Thus, America’s support of Israel’s most hawkish and expansionist constituencies and its ambition to secure oil and the sea lanes through which it is transported becomes a morality play, a liturgical melodrama that has little to do with the lives and realities of the people caught on the business end of the tale. Within the context of US Middle East policy, the Arab Street and its self-indulgent conceit is prime real estate in the debate over moral relativism, which is itself a gateway to racism, bigotry, and intolerance. As a pundit’s crutch, The Arab Street offers reassurance and familiarity. As a co-ordinate for policymakers, it can be a cul-de-sac for disaster. For the rest of us, for those fueled by a hunger to know for the sake of knowing, comes the journey. It is an excursion along many streets leading to many destinations—some familiar and welcoming, others strange and unsettling. It is a journey without presumption. It is a journey without end.

Note 1 For security, Samir also owned two dogs, which he kept cruelly on a short chain. Dogs are considered unclean throughout much of the Arab world, although the Saluki, a desert hound, is prized among Bedouins for its stamina, intelligence, and loyalty. Samir’s dogs appeared to be mongrels. He named them Oday and Huday, after Saddam’s sons.

15 Right of return, independence, and the “peace process” The view from Palestine Naseer Aruri

The US endeavor to impose its hegemony on the Middle East, which predates the 1967 war, reflects the consensus of US politicians on all sides of the spectrum. With the departure of the former colonial powers—the United Kingdom and France—US planners decided the Middle East would be recolonized by the United States. In an era of decolonization, Arab nationalist ideas and concepts, such as Arab unity, Arab socialism, non-alignment, Arab security, Arab defense, return and restitution for Palestinian refugees, and indeed Arab–Israeli parity were considered anathema in Washington and Tel Aviv. The various US doctrines for the Middle East—starting with the Truman Doctrine all the way up to the Carter Doctrine and Reagan Codicil, and beyond—were part of the US policy of containment.1 That policy was intended to contain Arab nationalism just as much as it was directed against the Soviet Union. The Arab world had to be kept at bay and subordinated to Israel, which was assured, since the Nixon presidency, of a “margin of technological and military superiority over all of her Arab neighbors combined.” That assurance, which was made by President Richard Nixon, who was widely considered to be an anti-Semite, was upheld by every succeeding president and has been respected by presidential candidates from the two major parties all the way through to George W. Bush and Al Gore Jr. in 2000 and Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and John McCain in 2008. That is how powerful the US consensus on Middle East policy has become. For four decades, US administrations were able to hold firm to this consensus, but there were adaptations and stylistic changes along the way, meant as a sort of cosmetic surgery to make the policy less objectionable to conservative Arabs. This is the significance of the numerous “plans” presented by and named for either presidents or secretaries of state, most of whom adhered to an Israeli consensus that rejected withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, the right of return for refugees, Palestinian independence, contiguity, and the concept of parity. Israel had to remain above the law by refusing to abide by United Nations Resolutions 242 (on withdrawal), 181 (on partition to two states and internationalization of Jerusalem), and 194 (on return, restitution, and compensation for the refugees). Israel also had to maintain military superiority and the capability to invalidate by force and diplomacy any Arab attempts at deterrence. Looking back at all these US plans, they were either camouflaged to appear even-handed, and thus evoke a prompt Israeli rejection, or openly pro-Israel, so that they would be turned down by the Arabs. Peace requires Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights; an independent contiguous Palestinian state alongside Israel; mutuality, parity, and equality. Oslo represents a departure from the past inasmuch as the Arabs have yielded on their consensus, and the Palestinian leadership accepted a peace process outside the framework of international legality. Together with other components of the Palestine question, the refugee issue was relegated to a negotiable item that would suit Israel’s “security” needs and ideological predilections. After the destruction of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, the Arab states and the Palestinians from the Occupied Territories met in Madrid, Spain, and in effect accepted the US as

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the sole arbiter and catalyst for peace. From there on, US diplomacy became an effective substitute for international law.

US policy and the refugee issue Between the time Israel was established on 78 percent of Palestine in 1948 and the time it occupied the rest of Palestine in 1967, the main issues that constituted what became known as the Palestine question were four: the fate of the refugees, the status of Jerusalem, the water issue, and the state of war between the Arab states and Israel. First, we will take up the refugee issue. After 1967, the Arab–Israeli conflict acquires additional issues, most of which relate to problems arising from that war: the fate of the Jewish settlements, final borders, and additional refugees. In 1948, more than 800,000 Palestinians (about 83 percent of the population) became refugees. An additional 235,000 Palestinians became refugees as a result of the 1967 war. There are today 5 million refugees, of whom 3.6 million are registered with the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA). During the 1940s, US Palestine policy can be described as inconsistent, if not altogether incoherent, vacillating between acknowledging self-determination for the Palestinians and, at the same time, justifying its denial by colonial–settler Jews and a Palestinian Jewish minority. Until 1947, the State Department acknowledged the rights of Palestinians to self-determination. The US, however, lobbied strongly for the partition plan, which denied that right, by giving the Jewish community, constituting less than one-third of the population, more than 50 percent of Palestine. But by 1948, the US began to float the idea of replacing the partition plan with a UN trusteeship under Chapter XII of the UN Charter. When the partition plan failed to materialize and the Zionist militias prevailed over the Palestinian resistance and whatever organized Arab fighters came to their defense, US policy began to shift towards a Jordanian takeover of the 22 percent of Palestine that did not fall under Israeli control. Jordan was also encouraged to absorb most of the refugees who were the victims of Zionist ethnic cleansing in 1948. Yet, at the same time, the US took an active part in drafting General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 11, 1948 stating that those “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date … .” That resolution, which also called for compensation and restitution, established a UN agency to secure implementation, to help in economic rehabilitation, and to provide legal protection. That agency was the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine (UNCCP). Israel’s response was predictably negative. A comprehensive settlement in the region was to precede any discussion of the refugee question. Despite the fact that Israel’s admission into UN membership was made contingent on its implementation of Resolution 194, Israel simply created its own condition, and the US accommodated that position. There were disagreements along the road and, at certain times, it seemed as if the US was threatening Israel for a major reassessment of its policy but, at the end of the day, Israel was able to get away with making its own rules, as we shall see.

The Truman administration and the refugee issue President Harry Truman, who gained a reputation for having recognized Israel eleven minutes after it was declared a state, was for the most part caught between two competing factions. His personal advisors and White House confidants were always urging an accommodating approach to Israeli wishes. Their advice and counsel were rooted in domestic politics, thus making the administration responsive to the lobbying efforts of American Zionist organizations.

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On the opposing side, there were inputs from the State Department, the intelligence community, and the Pentagon, who almost succeeded in reversing the US position on the partition of Palestine. The latter group urged that economic assistance be extended to the refugees, and after the failure of the UNCCP to persuade Israel to repatriate the refugees in 1949, in accordance with Resolution 194, Washington attempted to convince Israel to accept 225,000 refugees, hoping that the rest would be absorbed by the Arab states. Israel would only consider limited repatriation as part of a family reunification program. Truman was in fact so upset by Israel’s attitude towards repatriation that he told Mark Ethridge, the US representative to the UNCCP at the end of April, 1949: “I am rather disgusted with the manner in which the Jews are approaching the refugee problem. I told the President of Israel in the presence of his Ambassador just exactly what I thought about it. It may have some effect. I hope so.” In the end, however, it was Truman who had to approve an Israeli plan to repatriate about 100,000 on the basis of family reunification. And it was Truman who attempted to settle about 100,000 Palestinian refugees in Iraq. Allowing Israel to set the pace in the Middle East had, in fact, begun during the Truman administration, and succeeding US presidents who threatened reassessments were ultimately forced to toe the line. Resettlement of the refugees in Arab countries became effectively an American policy goal, despite a pro forma endorsement of Resolution 194 on an annual basis at the General Assembly. That pattern was largely set by the inability of US decision makers to perfect a formula that would reconcile the strategic imperatives of US policy with the requirements of domestic politics. To claim, however, that US Middle East policy was shaped exclusively by the Zionist lobby would be an oversimplification. Arguing, on the other hand, that global considerations relating to the vital national interest and the threat of regional destabilization have been the catalyst in shaping that policy would be rather erroneous. For the most part, succeeding US administrations tried in vain to reconcile the global and the domestic imperatives but, ultimately, Israel prevailed. For Israel’s worldview and that of its US domestic supporters have coincided, with minor exceptions, with that of the powerful US lobbies that shaped America’s global policy. By late March 1949, the Truman administration announced that the refugee problem was “a likely channel for Soviet exploitation,” that could jeopardize the “stabilization of the Near East,” which was “a major objective of American foreign policy.” And yet, the administration failed to input that concern into the imperatives of its Middle East policy, which remained virtually dependent on Israel’s voluntary compliance.

The Eisenhower administration and the refugee issue Despite an unambiguously stated objective of pursuing an “even-handed” policy in the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration did not fare better than its predecessor in striking a healthy balance between the competing underlying factors influencing their approach. Again, the same cautionary statements about the prospects of destabilization and the strategic imperatives of a superpower in a crucial region were sounded, but no progress was reached by the end of the decade. Secretary of State Dulles spoke publicly about US responsibility to ward off “deep resentment” against the US from the Arab side and to allay Arab fears that the US “might become the backer of expansionist Zionism.” But he appealed for concessions from “both sides,” while paying lip service to repatriation and compensation, which can only be made by one side. Such a cliché seemed to have penetrated the idiom of American policy, lasting right up to the current period. Similarly, another trait that was ushered into US policy at this time was the realization that the US can have its cake and eat it too. As long as the Arabs have remained loyal to the US in its conflict with the Soviet Union, and dutifully refrained from exercising any pressure on

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Washington to affect UN resolutions, the US felt no obligation to make the necessary adjustments in its bias in favor of Israel. The overarching principle of the Eisenhower–Dulles policy in the Middle East was the maintenance of an anti-communist coalition, which combined the Jewish state together with Arab–Islamic states. Although Israel was not formally a member of the Baghdad Pact, and was subjected to an arms embargo dating back to the general embargo imposed by the Truman administration, the idea of a defensive wall against communism was quite entrenched during the Eisenhower period. Thus, long before Israel was proclaimed as a US strategic asset and a close ally during the late seventies–early eighties, Washington had effectively treated it as such, and was willing to overlook its legal and moral transgressions. Eisenhower’s policy on the Palestine refugee issue can be summarized as follows. The meaning of Resolution 194 was altered to effectively denote limited repatriation, and even that was scaled down to “family reunification,” a familiar Israeli phrase by then. The return of 100,000 refugees discussed in the closing days of the Truman administration was reduced to 8,000 by 1953. Meanwhile the terminology was toned down with benign phrases such as Israel ought to “consider” repatriating refugees, instead of Israel is obligated to repatriate refugees. To that end, a UN-written, yet a not so subtle, policy emerged favoring integration of the refugees in the host countries. Consequently, the Eisenhower administration would explore a joint development plan involving Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria to utilize the River Jordan for irrigation and hydro-electric projects. That way, it was reasoned, the refugees would be resettled without imposing any economic or social burdens on the host countries. The Johnston Plan, named after Eisenhower’s special envoy, was an economic solution to a political problem, and it thus failed. Clearly, the Arab states and Israel were technically in a state of war; therefore, joint economic development was like putting the cart before the horse. Moreover, even if the plan had materialized, it would have helped no more than 100,000 refugees, less than 15 percent of the total. At no point did the Eisenhower administration feel impelled to threaten Israel with sanctions for non-compliance with Resolution 194, as it had successfully done when Israel began to divert water for its own use from the River Jordan near the Syrian border in September, 1953. In fact, the Eisenhower administration threatened to stop its aid of $26 million unless Israel ceased and desisted. The project was “temporarily” halted, and aid was restored. In contrast, the refugees did not have a state advocate, nor was their plight seen as a destabilizing factor in the broader strategic context.

The Kennedy administration and the refugee issue John F. Kennedy came to the presidency with a new slogan of a “national commitment” to Israel and a huge debt to American Jews, who gave him 80 percent of their vote. In the meantime, however, he had been on record in support of repatriation and compensation for the Palestinian refugees. Although he was the first president to launch a military aid package to Israel, he seemed resolved to seek a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict within the framework of the UNCCP. Security and borders were to be based on the partition resolution (Resolution 181), and the refugee question was to be resolved in terms of Resolution 194, a proposal not to be resurrected by any of his successors in the White House. In August 1961, the United Nations dispatched Kennedy’s appointee to the UNCCP, Joseph Johnson, President of the Carnegie Foundation, whose mission was to discuss a solution to the refugee problem with the government of Israel and the concerned Arab states based on Resolution 194 and the element of choice between repatriation and resettlement. But although the Kennedy project seemed to proceed with more vigor than Eisenhower’s half-hearted initiative, the end result revealed no improvement.

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Israel considered a return of the refugees a clear and present danger to its security, and thus responded with an outright rejection backed by a formal Knesset resolution. Meanwhile, the Arab states failed to use that initiative in the proper manner, some of whom arguing that the refugee problem and the border/security issue were inseparable, while others, such as Jordan, were suspicious that the element of free choice for the refugees in the Johnson Plan could burden them with the problem, and that the whole effort could lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity. Meanwhile, Israel’s firm stand against Resolution 194 and the Kennedy initiative, together with an Arab stance ranging between ambivalence and rejection, led to Johnson’s resignation on January 31, 1963. Such US failure, in the face of open Israeli defiance, did not seem to have had any impact on Kennedy’s on-going efforts to cultivate a special relationship with Israel in the context of the US global strategy in the Middle East. Whatever commitments Kennedy felt for the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians paled against Israeli intransigence and the priority that the Arab states had assigned to their own narrow interests.

The Johnson administration and the refugee issue By the time Lyndon B. Johnson acceded the presidency, the refugee question had ceased to be a matter of genuine concern for US policy makers. In fact, the Israeli position of “resettlement” was incorporated into the platform of the Democratic Party on which Johnson was elected in 1964. The important new reality affecting US policy towards the refugee question was the war of 1967 and the new issues created by that war. The defeat of Arab armies in but six days elevated the role of Palestinian resistance to new heights, and shifted the focus away from the refugee issue, now deemed a charitable–humanitarian matter. Instead, the national rights of the Palestinian people—the right of self-determination and the right to designate there own representative (the Palestine Liberation Organization, PLO), together with inter-state relations— were highlighted in the discourse and diplomacy of the Middle East. From that point on, any proposals emanating from Washington would address the refugee question in a mere ritualistic manner, endorsing Resolution 194, but in fact expending diplomatic efforts in pursuance of the requirements of Resolution 242. The impact of that approach was to relegate the whole Palestine issue to the sidelines while trying to find an acceptable Arab–Israeli formula based on land for peace. Consequently, the Palestinian right of return was subordinated to resolving issues that divided states in order to minimize the chances of a wider conflict with global ramifications. And yet, the official US position on repatriation remained as it has been since the Truman period.

The Nixon administration and the refugee issue Richard Nixon’s policy towards Palestine was an enigma. His first Secretary of State, William Rogers, announced a plan for resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict in 1969 based on land for peace, in accordance with Resolution 242. The Rogers Plan not only recognized the centrality of the refugee problem, but also emphasized the need to take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees themselves, including those from 1948 and 1967. Nixon was also the first president to win with hardly any debt to Jewish voters, having received less than 15 percent of the Jewish vote. He was also the first to call explicitly for “more even-handedness” (a phrase coined by his envoy to the Middle East, Pennsylvania governor William Scranton) in dealing with the Arab–Israeli conflict. And yet, by the end of his presidency, he qualified as the most pro-Israel president up to that time. These apparent contradictions can best be explained in terms of his conservative demeanor, hawkish attitude towards the Soviet Union, admiration of Israel’s military prowess, and the pre-eminent position held by Henry Kissinger in his administration. Having acquired William

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Rogers’s job as Secretary of State, in addition to also being National Security Advisor, Kissinger enjoyed a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. US aid to Israel reached a staggering new height ($2.4 billion), in accordance with the Nixon–Kissinger Doctrine, whereby the US supplied the “hose and water,” while her proxies such as South Vietnam, Iran, and Israel would supply the “firemen.” Such was Nixon’s myopic worldview depicting social transformation in the third world—as fires to be put out. Although Richard Nixon has developed a reputation of being an anti-Semite, he left Israel an important legacy, having committed every succeeding president to a policy of no talk with the PLO until the latter met Israel’s conditions. Ironically, one of these conditions (accepting Resolution 242) has now become one of the PLO’s principal conditions as both the US and Israel have moved away from it despite Oslo. Nor did the document prepared by Under Secretary of State Harold Saunders, referring to the “legitimate interests” of the Palestinian people and to Palestine as the “heart of the conflict,” amount to anything. In fact, Zionist and Israeli criticism of the language used in that document forced both Nixon and Kissinger to disavow the document and dismiss it as an “academic and theoretical exercise.” If such a benign phrase as “legitimate interest” was regarded as intolerable by Israel and its US lobbies, any attempt to reaffirm the right of return for the Palestinian refugees would have created a major crisis that neither Nixon nor Kissinger was ready to face. With the US emergence as Israel’s foremost diplomatic backer, bankroller, and protector, items such as the right of return seemed to disappear even from the lexicon. Nixon and Kissinger favored a step-by-step approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict (rather than the Palestine question), and that conflict was seen primarily through the prism of the cold war.

The Carter administration and the refugee issue Unlike his two Republican predecessors, Jimmy Carter preferred to reach a comprehensive Arab–Israeli agreement via a Geneva conference. He began his reassessment of Middle East policy with a specific reference to the Palestinian people and their need for a home during a visit to Clinton, Massachusetts, in February 1977. He publicly cautioned Israel’s leaders against sabotaging his efforts to reach a comprehensive international accord, but he ended up with a Camp David agreement inspired by Menachem Begin’s notion of Palestinian autonomy rather than self-determination. His Camp David peace redefined the refugees’ right of return, in the words of the late Fayez Sayegh, as a selective privilege of readmission. The proposed “self-governing authority,” together with Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, was empowered to decide on the modalities for admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. As for the 1948 refugees, Camp David merely called for a “just solution,” with no mention of what that might entail. The Palestinian dimension of Carter’s Middle East policy was obviously abandoned in favor of a separate peace between Israel and Egypt, and the step-by-step approach of Henry Kissinger was effectively restored. Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, dismissed the PLO with his famous phrase “bye-bye PLO,” thus making it clear that the general Palestine question, and not only the refugee issue, was not on the active US agenda.

The Reagan and Bush administrations and the refugee issue Despite the passing of more than a decade in which the PLO gained acceptance as the representative of the Palestinian people, whose struggle for national self-determination was supported by a global consensus based on UN General Assembly resolutions, Ronald Reagan considered Palestine as a problem of mere refugees. It was only after the PLO was evacuated from Lebanon in September 1982 that he made a cursory amendment to that view. He also considered the PLO as a terrorist organization, enrolled in the service of the “evil empire.”

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From the outset of his administration, Reagan exempted Israel from most of the responsibility for the plight of the refugees, having assigned Jordan 80 percent of the burden of redress, with Israel assigned 20 percent. His calculus reflected a well-known revisionist Zionist assumption that the UN-designated Palestinian state was Jordan, notwithstanding the fact that the UN had divided Palestine, west of the River Jordan, in 1947 into a Palestinian Arab state and a Jewish state. According to revisionist Zionist thinking, the former Palestine mandate included Transjordan, which constituted 80 percent of the whole. Reagan’s Middle East policy was clearly influenced by Menachem Begin’s expansionist notion that “Western Eretz Israel will never be divided again,” just as his broader foreign policy was inspired by Begin’s right-wing interventionist counterparts in the US, which included people such as Joseph Churba, Alexander Haig, and Richard Allen, among others. The Reagan Plan, which was enunciated on September 1, 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, envisaged a solution of the Palestine problem through Jordan. Sovereignty in the West Bank was denied to both Israel and the Palestinians. The only reference that Reagan made to the question of refugees in his 1982 plan was a single sentence: The departure of the Palestinians from Beirut dramatizes more than ever the homelessness of the Palestinian people. Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of refugees. I agree. Despite that superficial agreement, however, Reagan ordered his UN ambassador to vote “no” on a General Assembly resolution three weeks later (September 24) condemning the massacres in Sabra and Shatila, and resolving that the Palestinian people should be enabled to return to their homes and property, in accordance with previous resolutions. The US was joined with one other state, Israel. The only other move made by the Reagan administration on the refugee issue was an attempt by the State Department to study their situation in Lebanon, doubtless motivated by regional “security” considerations in the summer of 1983. Upon hearing of that, Israeli leaders counseled Secretary of State George Shultz that such security required the dispersal of the refugees in south Lebanon to other countries. According to Juliana Peck (The Reagan Administration and the Palestine question, p. 105), Shultz made believe that the Israelis were motivated by a humanitarian impulse and, in response, he considered a plan to resettle 10,000 Palestinian refugees in the US, but that plan was soon abandoned. The Reagan administration was much too preoccupied with the “strategic consensus,” “regional influentials,” “Rapid Deployment Force,” and such instruments of a new cold war to really care about a single aspect of the Arab–Israeli conflict, which was deemed peripheral. With the advent of the Bush administration, all attention was focused on Iraq and subsequently on the Madrid Conference of October 1991, with much of the emphasis being placed on an Israeli–Palestinian deal based on the Camp David notion of Palestinian autonomy. Throughout the four years with Bush and Baker at the helm, a rather deceptive confrontation between them and Prime Minister Shamir gave the impression that the US and her strategic ally were on a collision course. Nothing was further from the truth. Israel was able to supply the framework for a settlement, later described by Baker as “the only game in town.” That “game” had nothing for the refugees, except the implied resettlement policy adopted by the US since Nixon.

The Clinton administration and the refugee issue Clinton continued the policies of Bush and Baker, but went further than any other previous president in embracing Israel’s conditions, which he swallowed bait, hook, and sinker. The Oslo arrangements concluded during his tenure were flawed, and the built-in gridlock was

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utilized by Israel to obtain strategic objectives under no-war conditions. The most that the Palestinian refugees expected from the Camp David summit meeting was a token “repatriation” to the contemplated Palestinian entity, but not to their own homes and property in today’s Israel, as UN Resolution 194 dictated. That routing would only be open to token numbers, and strictly in accord with what Israel would designate as family reunification. The numerous structural flaws of Oslo, including the deferral of the refugee question, have finally led to the eruption of the second Intifada (uprising) in the occupied territories, thus rendering Clinton’s initiative rather fruitless. And, despite the fact that Clinton devoted more hours to the Palestine–Israel conflict than any other president in the past, his time, efforts, and the prestige of the presidency have helped neither the Palestinian people nor the Israelis who aspire for a just, lasting, and credible peace.

The peace process In fact, the real function of the “peace process” has been to shelter Israel from the threat of peace. The peace process has enabled Israel to escape its obligations to the Palestinian people under international law. Instead, such obligations have been effectively replaced by Israeli decrees presented as American peace initiatives. Not only has the US succeeded in regularizing this forty-year occupation, but it also engaged in diplomatic outsourcing, thus consigning part of the diplomatic façade to the European community, the Russian Republic, and the United Nations—and so a new term is added to the diplomatic vocabulary—the Quartet, which is Washington’s way of enlisting others in support of the US–Israeli positions. This new façade is then given the name, the international community. Thus, the Zionist movement’s designs are Americanized and later internationalized. The international community which declared the 1967 occupation illegal has now become an accomplice of Washington and Tel Aviv in supporting politicide. All in all, ending the “occupation” will continue to be a formidable task because combating politicide has produced an unequal conflict, in which the occupation has been sustained militarily, bureaucratically, propagandistically, politically, economically, and diplomatically. Do the Palestinians have options to deal with politicide? How did Washington manage to act as judge, jury, and prosecutor in the service of politicide? And on top of that, how did it manage to enlist the international community? How did it manage to promote the Israeli agenda without being held to account? During the past few decades, Israel and the US have pursued policies that dealt a crippling blow to the two-state solution, which would have created an independent Palestinian state and terminated the Israeli occupation. This derailment was accomplished through futile but focused diplomatic efforts invested by US presidents from Nixon to George W. Bush. Forty-one years have elapsed since the 1967 occupation; fifteen years since Oslo; eight years since the Mitchell Report; seven years after Taba, eight years since the Zinni mission; and five years after the road map, peace has remained hopelessly illusive, but nevertheless monopolistic. The US diplomatic monopoly has continued to keep out all would-be peacemakers and honest brokers in the interest of geopolitics. Placed in that context, pretending to be peacemaker, while supporting politicide, America’s most recent diplomatic accolades have helped accomplish Israel’s strategic goals and those of the Zionist movement. Only a single sovereignty would exist in the land lying between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea (Israel). Between the signing of Oslo in 1993 and the present (mid-2008), the number of illegal Jewish settlers in the occupied territories has more than doubled. Meanwhile, the US and Israel managed to remove the Palestinians from the so-called negotiating table. On April 14, 2004, George W. Bush declared settlements as “facts on the ground,” thus rendering his much touted vision of a sovereign, contiguous Palestinian state a mere rhetorical exercise.

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The Oslo process sealed the fate of Palestinian statehood, and the subsequent “war on terror” made it possible for Bush to grant Sharon a new Balfour declaration in April 2004. Ironically, that might have left the vision of a single state for two equal communities as the only dignified solution.

Oslo and the demise of the two-state solution The Oslo Accords have dealt a crippling blow to the foundations of the global consensus. As an agreement to reach agreement, Oslo had in reality enabled Israel to conquer territory, to oppress, to displace, and to dispossess, without being held accountable. Even if these agreements were to succeed, the maximum gain that seemed possible for the Palestinians would have been a fractured collection of some 120 small Bantustans, non-contiguous enclaves, on about 40–50 percent of the West Bank (11 percent of pre-1948 Palestine). Under optimal conditions, something called the state of Palestine might have emerged, but would have been only nominally independent. Genuine independence had already been ruled out by the agreement between Labor and Likud in January 1997, which insists on but a single sovereignty (Israeli) in the area between the river and the sea. The Palestinians in the occupied territories would be residents of enclaves “separated” from each other and from Israel, but functionally part of a “greater Israel”. “Separation is the equivalent of Apartheid in the language of the Afrikaan.” Ehud Barak emphasized it and Sharon and Olmert implemented it with the so-called separation fence and unilateralist policies. Barak was able to convince Clinton to skip Israel’s obligation to conduct a third redeployment and pushed for moving directly into the final status negotiations, which brings us to Camp David in July 2000. Clinton and Barak forced the Palestinian Authority (PA) to accede to a premature (as Arafat insisted) trilateral summit presided over by Clinton himself.2 There were a number of problems with the way that summit was conducted. First, UN Security Council Resolution 242, which stipulates the exchange of conquered land for peace, was simply ignored by the US in the Camp David negotiations. Second, every proposal that was presented by the American mediators to the Palestinian side already had Israeli clearance. On practically every issue—especially on Jerusalem and the refugees—the American team simply adopted and argued for the Israeli position. This view is bluntly corroborated by Aaron David Miller, a senior negotiator on the Clinton team at Camp David and an Orthodox Jew. Miller publicly revealed that, rather than serve as a true mediator in peace negotiations, successive US administrations including Clinton’s have acted as “Israel’s attorney.”3 Writing on the Washington Post op-ed page in May 2005, Miller admitted that Clinton and his team followed Israel’s lead “without critically examining what that would mean for our own interests, for those on the Arab side and for the overall success of the negotiations.” The Clinton team’s practice of running everything past Israel first “stripped our policy of the independence and flexibility required for serious peacemaking. Far too often … our departure point was not what was needed to reach an agreement acceptable to both sides but what would pass with only one – Israel. The result was utter failure … .” Third, in its “generous offer” with regard to land, borders, and security, Israel effectively sought to consolidate and legitimize the gains it made in the 1967 war. This was a true example of committing politicide through diplomacy. However, the “greatest failure” of the Camp David summit was over the issue of the Palestinian refugees. With regard to the right of return, Israel offered to return only a few thousand refugees over a ten-year period in the context of a family reunification plan. In return, the Israelis demanded an “end of the conflict.” This of course would release them of any and all further claims. It is interesting that this Israeli policy towards the Palestinian refugees has remained unaltered from 1948 until 2008. Back in June 1948, Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, told the Knesset that repatriation of the Palestinian refugees was rejected on the assumption that “a wave of returning

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refugees might explode the state from inside … .”4 He said, “They will not return. This is our policy, they shall not return.”5 Sixty years later, this policy remains untouched. On November 20, 2006, the current Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, urged the world community, especially the Arab countries housing refugees, to annul the right of return. She issued her command in a lecture she was delivering at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Remarkably, she used the flawed logic that the right of return, which is enshrined in international law, is not mentioned in the road map, as if the dilapidated plan superseded international law. Livni’s abrogation of international law had been tried earlier by Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State, who issued an edict in 1993 directed to all UN member nations, asking them not to make reference to UN resolutions affirming the basic rights of the Palestinian people, chief among them was Resolution 194, which recognizes the right of the refugees to return and/or receive compensation. She described these resolutions as “irrelevant, contentious and obsolete.” As for Jerusalem, the PA was offered “custodial sovereignty” over the Holy Places, but sovereignty on the grounds of the Haram Al-Sharif was vested in Israel. The offer to return 94 percent of the occupied territories was not only hype, but was also a falsification. Let us not forget that Israel defines Jerusalem as that area that has twenty-eight Palestinian villages, all of which were occupied in 1967 but do not enter the calculation of occupied territories as they are regarded as part of “greater Jerusalem.” This manipulation of figures and ratios is yet another example of bolstering politicide. To the credit of the PA, it refused to accept the so-called “generous peace offer.” After all, it was not only far below the minimum aspirations and the internationally guaranteed rights of the Palestinian people, but it also contravened existing international law and UN resolutions. The occupation would have remained intact but reconfigured or repackaged.

Why has peace been such a threat to Israeli leaders? And what are the salient features of the post-Oslo period—that of Sharon and Bush? What has been Israel’s secret agenda? For Israel, the danger of a permanent peace emanates from a perceived “demographic threat.” Sometime between 2005 and 2010, Palestinian Arabs living under Israeli control will become a majority between the Jordan and the Mediterranean for the first time since 1948. At present, the number of Palestinians living between the river and the sea under Israeli control is approximately 5.2 million, compared with 5.1 million Israelis. Short of giving the Palestinians equal rights in one state, Israel is left with three options: acquiescing in the establishment of a separate sovereign Palestinian state, expelling much of the Palestinian population, or keeping them confined in apartheid-style cantons, which in essence is Sharon’s plan of 1981, and which was effectively chosen by George W. Bush in his meeting with Sharon on April 14, 2004. At that meeting, he released Israel from its legal and moral obligations to the Palestinian people and to the requirements of international law. He said the settlement blocs were “facts on the ground.” Thus, the occupation is here to stay. Bush has, in effect, recognized a permanent Israeli occupation of the remaining 22 percent of what Israel did not conquer in 1948. Indeed, Bush did what has become accepted practice over the past few decades. Israel provides the framework, just as it did in 1978 (Camp David) and in 1993 (Oslo) and in 2000 (Camp David), while the US signs off on the plan. Sharon has sold Bush a recycled version of his 1981 plan to keep at least 50 percent of the West Bank, relegating the Palestinians to three fragmented entities (Jenin and Nablus in the north, Ramallah in the center, and Hebron/ Bethlehem in the south). In conceding final status issues, such as boundaries, refugees, settlements, and Jerusalem, Bush seemed either unaware of or oblivious to what his predecessors had offered on the table of negotiations at Camp David I, Camp David II, Taba, or the Clinton January 7, 2001

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speech in New York. Instead of adhering to previous American plans (which are essentially Israeli in any case), the peacemaker/honest broker has become a messenger on top of having been a bankroller, arms supplier, and diplomatic backer. America’s pretense to the role of honest broker is finished. It was conclusively finished in January 2006, and the reason was Hamas’ electoral victory. The US and Israel have been determined to undo that victory, first by the embargo and attempts at starvation and now by abducting the top Hamas leadership and smashing its infrastructure while attempting to drive a wedge between the movement and that segment of the Palestinian population who gave Hamas their votes. The crux of the US–Israeli strategy is based on the faulty assumption that Hamas is part of the Middle East component of the bad guys engaged in global terror. So, as long as Hamas is engaged in resistance, the diplomatic and economic embargos will continue and US military aid will be extended to anti-Hamas Palestinian factions exactly as the US sponsored the Contras in Central America during the 1980s. In fact, America’s principal architect of the Contra project is presently the point man in George W. Bush’s foreign policy in the Middle East. And what he is doing in Palestine today is the most recent example of supporting politicide. Abbas, Olmert, and Bush have colluded to bar Hamas from assuming actual power, thus causing a bloody war among certain sub-factions of Fatah and Hamas. Despite the formation of a government of national unity in the Mecca agreement, neither the US nor Israel is now willing to revive a peace process and pursue negotiations in good faith. The US and Israel have effectively declared the so-called peace process as something that belongs to a bygone era. Increasing voices among the Palestinians are calling the peace process a fraud. They are saying no to a two-state solution designed to create Bantustans. At the end of March 2007, when twenty-one Arab heads of state convened in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to relaunch their peace proposal, which had already been ratified in Beirut in 2002, Condoleezza Rice asked them to “reach out” to Israel, but Israel wanted their peace offer amended, particularly on withdrawal, on Jerusalem, and on the refugees. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told the Jerusalem Post on March 30, 2007 that the return of any Palestinian refugee was “out of the question.” “I’ll never accept a solution that is based on their return to Israel, any number.” It was hardly a revival of a peace process. Neither Israel nor the US has presented a peace proposal. The only proposal on the table was the retread of the twenty-one Arab states. And because diplomatic failure has been imbedded in the peace process, we began to witness the beginning of a new discourse about a single state based on the equal protection of the law. A declaration calling for the recognition of a single state between the river and the sea was adopted by two conferences attended by Israeli and Palestinian scholars/activists, the first in Madrid (July 2007) and the second in London (October 2007). It is in these circumstances that President George W. Bush convened the Annapolis conference of forty-two nations to look for a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict in early December 2007. On November 23, 2007, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz wrote: “Behind closed doors, President George W. Bush has hinted that Israeli–Palestinian progress will make it easier for him to rally a determined international front against Iran.” Referring to the impending Annapolis meeting, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the assembly of the United Jewish Community on November 13: what is at stake is nothing less than the future of the Middle East. Violent extremists with the government of Iran in the lead are doing everything in their power to impose their hate filled ideologies on the people of the Middle East. This makes the two-state solution more urgent than ever.

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But the killing of Palestinians and the siege of Gaza continues. According to a coalition of Israeli organizations, Israel has increasingly restricted passage of people and goods to and from the Gaza Strip, leading to severe hardship and a drastic curtailing of the basic sources of sustenance and health of the population causing shortages in water, fuel, medications, essential equipment, raw materials and thousands of other essential commodities. In November alone, 13 patients died after Israeli authorities denied them access to medical care that is unavailable in Gaza. The Israeli problem in Gaza is not the Qassam rockets, but the very existence of Palestinian resistance to the occupation. The veteran peace activist Uri Avineri described it this way: The Israeli strategic aim in Gaza is not to put an end to the Qassams. It would still be the same if not a single Qassam fell on Israel. The real aim is to break the Palestinians, which means breaking Hamas. The method is simple, even primitive: to tighten the blockade on land, on sea and in the air, until the situation in the Strip becomes absolutely intolerable. The total stoppage of supplies, except the very minimum necessary to prevent starvation, has reduced life to an inhuman level. There are effectively no imports or exports, economic life has ground to a standstill, the cost of living has risen sky-high. The supply of fuel has already been reduced by half, and is planned to sink even lower. The water supply can be cut at will. Military activity is gradually increasing. The Israeli army conducts daily incursions, employing tanks and armored bulldozers, in order to nibble at the margins of the inhabited areas and draw the Palestinian fighters into a face to face confrontation. Every day, from five to ten Palestinian fighters are being killed, together with some civilians. Every day, inhabitants are being abducted in order to extract information from them. The declared purpose is attrition, to harry and wear down, and perhaps also to prepare for the re-conquest of the Strip … The army chiefs hope that by tightening all these screws they can push the local population to rise up against Hamas and the other fighting organizations. All Palestinian opposition to the occupation will collapse. The entire Palestinian people will raise their hands in surrender and submit to the mercies of the occupation, which will be able to do as it pleases – expropriate lands, enlarge settlements, set up walls and roadblocks, slice up the West Bank into a series of semi-autonomous enclaves. In this Israeli plan, the job reserved for the Palestinian Authority is to act as subcontractors for Israeli security, in return for a stream of money that will safeguard its control of the enclaves. At the end of this phase of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the Palestinian people are supposed to be cut to pieces and helpless in face of the Israeli expansion. The historic clash between the unstoppable force (the Zionist enterprise) and the immovable object (the Palestinian population) will end with the crushing of Palestinian opposition.6 On December 4, 2007, shortly after Annapolis, the Israeli government issued a tender for the construction of 307 apartments in the Har Homa neighborhood near Jerusalem, signaling—in the face of coming negotiations—its intent to resist the dismantling of settlements while creating new “facts on the ground.” Washington’s response was a tepid expression of unhappiness. In October 2007, a bipartisan group of leading establishment figures led by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lee Hamilton, and Brent Scowcroft called upon Bush and Rice to take “bold steps” for a two-state solution, saying the projected conference “should set in motion credible and sustained permanent status negotiations under international supervision with a timetable for their completion.” While demands upon US policymakers to become constructively engaged

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in peacemaking are essential, the call for international supervision of the process with full engagement by major players (the European Union, Russia, China, all the Middle East states including Iran and Syria, etc.) is also essential to assure the integrity of the process and the political muscle to guarantee a settlement that is just to all parties.

Conclusion Any honorable alternative to the now defunct Oslo Accord, the road map, and Sharon’s socalled disengagement plan must guarantee the removal of incapacities inflicted on Palestinians in three spheres (those living in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, those inside Israel, and those in the far-flung diaspora). That would require a determined systematic and protracted struggle, combining the three segments of the Palestinian people jointly with Israeli Jews who wish to be neither master of another people nor privileged in an apartheid system, colonial settlers denying the existence of the indigenous natives of the land or wishing their disappearance. This kind of struggle may sound unrealistic, and the goal idealistic or utopian, but it certainly has more prospects for success than the whole range of the “peace process,” which has already been rendered to the dustbin of history. The single state will not happen in the short term, but it is the only dignified alternative to apartheid.

Notes 1 See Naseer H. Aruri, Dishonest Broker: The US Role in Israel and Palestine (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2003): 7–8, 27–28, 64–65. 2 See H. Ashrawi, “Barak’s Political Exports: Used Goods to Arafat and a Snub to Clinton,” Miftah, available at www.miftah.org. See also R. Malley, “Fictions About the Failure at Camp David,” New York Times, July 8, 2001. 3 See Kathleen Christison, “Anatomy of a Frame-Up: Camp David Redux,” Counterpunch, August 15, 2005. Available from www.counterpunch.org/christison08152005.html. 4 Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987): 223, citing Record of the Knesset, vol. 1, 1949, session 43. 5 Michael Palumbo, The Palestinian Catastrophe: The 1948 Expulsion of a People from their Homeland (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1987): 145. Available from http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/ 1198361773/Uri Avnery. 6 http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1198361773/Uri Avnery.

16 US–Jordan relations: the King Abdullah II era An analytical study* Adnan M. Hayajneh

Introduction This chapter aims to analyze US–Jordan relations under the leadership of King Abdullah II from 1999 to 2008. This period has witnessed two different American administrations, the Democrat Bill Clinton and the Republican George W. Bush, while the third one is approaching under Obama’s administration. These bilateral relations are analyzed at a time when international relations witnessed radical developments that changed the way international relations are handled. Some of the most important changes that concerned US–Jordanian relations include the 9/11 events, the Palestinian Intifada, the collapse of the Arab–Israeli peace process, as well as the Israeli aggression against Gaza, internal changes in Jordan related to the development of democratic life, the American war on Iraq and the continuation of chaos in Iraq without real improvement, building the separation wall and the Israeli policy to bury the peace process, internal changes in Arab countries, especially those that are connected to terrorism and calling for political reform, American security arrangements for countries of the region and the decline of the strategic importance of Israel, and the global financial crisis including the economic recession in the US. This chapter intends to review and analyze US–Jordan relations in the last decade. It will try to answer the following questions:  What is the reality of relations between the US and Jordan? The focus will be on political, economic, and military aspects and the progression of changes in relations between both countries during the study period.  What is the impact of domestic factors in both Jordan and the US on the bilateral relations? In other words, how have domestic developments in Jordan and the US affected these relations especially after the democratic transformation in Jordan, the Palestinian Intifada, and final status issues for example refugees in Jordan, 9/11 events, and American public opinion and decision-making processes in the US.  What is the impact of regional factors in the Middle East on US–Jordan relations? The focus will be on the issue of Arab–Israeli conflict, the American war on Iraq, and the war on terrorism.  What is the impact of international changes on US–Jordan relations? The focus will be on the impact of the international American system and the marginalization of the role of international organizations especially the United Nations.  What are the most important achievements in these relations? And what are the best ways to develop these relations? It can be argued that a correlation can be found between regional, domestic, and international factors and US–Jordan relations. This is the reason why we find it difficult sometimes to distinguish among what is domestic, regional, and international. The importance of this study is related to analyzing the development and achievements in these relations and the means to

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develop the paths of these relations in the future. It is considered a reference for decision makers, researchers, and those who are interested in this field. US–Jordan relations have witnessed relative successes on the economic and political levels to some extent. However, some developments relating to Jordan’s national interest tainted these bilateral relations when Jordan decided to review its relations with the US after Bush’s letter to Sharon, which changed the road map basis of achieving peace, and American support for the building of the security wall, which constitutes a huge threat to Jordan. These changes led to postponing King Abdullah’s summit with President Bush at the end of April 2004. The summit was held after a couple of weeks, and Jordan was given a letter of guarantee which analysts interpreted differently compared with what was given to Israel. Thus, it can be said that, despite the strategic importance of US–Jordanian relations for both parties, they are sometimes a subject of fluctuation as a result of many factors, specifically the role of Israel in these relations. For this reason, it is necessary to study bilateral relations so as to know how to improve them and to avoid factors that would affect them negatively. The study includes the following parts:        

Goals of Jordan and the US in the bilateral relations. Historical developments of US–Jordan relations. Jordanian domestic environment and US–Jordan relations. US domestic environment and US–Jordan relations. Jordan regional environment and US–Jordan relations. International environment and US–Jordan relations. Jordanian regional role and US policy. Conclusion which includes: the results of US–Jordanian relations: future and horizons.

The Jordanian perspective The Jordanian perspective of international relations and of its relations with the US might be interpreted from a pragmatic point of view. This is because the political system in Jordan is aware of the fact that Jordan is a pivotal power in international relations in the Middle East. It acts in accordance with its national interest, realizes the distribution of power in the international system, and believes in the importance of international organizations and international law. However, it also believes that Jordan’s power and maintaining this power are the basis. In this respect, Jordan also believes that the US is acting from the perspective of its national and international interests in its behavior on account of the large military, economic, and technological power it has compared with other powerful countries (see Hayajneh 2003a, 2004). It can be noticed that, in terms of Jordanian conduct, the Jordanian government believes that necessary acts and behaviors must be taken in the short term that might not be acceptable at the public level in order to achieve great goals. This can be noticed in the attitude of the Jordanian government towards issues that concern the US in the region, such as the situation in Iraq. This is because the Jordanian government supports reform and change in the Palestinian approach for the sake of achieving a greater goal, namely creating a Palestinian state. In Iraq, the Jordanian government welcomed the formation of an interim government, and is dealing with it so that this will put an end to the existence of occupation forces in the region. The Jordanian government, however, cannot declare this in public because of negative reaction from Jordanian public opinion, which sometimes does not realize the Jordanian pragmatic dimension and perspective. For example, former prime minister Faisal Al-Fayez declared that Jordan is willing to end its relations with the US provided that one of the Arab countries would provide the aid that the US offers Jordan. It is worth noting that Jordan received more than $600 million from Saudi Arabia in 2008, which is much higher than the total sum of US aid to Jordan.

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There are a number of points of view regarding the international interest in the Arab region in the Middle East. Some believe that powerful countries, especially the US, must withdraw from the region, as they have brought nothing but trouble for the region from their point of view, especially the American war on Iraq, which is devoid of any international or legal legitimacy (see Ehlert 2003; Kagan 2003). The American war on Iraq resulted in having more than 150,000 soldiers in the area as well as imposing reform projects that would serve American interests, such as the Greater Middle East project. Others believe that international interest has advantages that could provide the region with positive outcomes. This is because disinterest in the region would mean the decline of the importance of the region. The region needs support and care from the world to help it deal with the challenges it is encountering. On this basis, the Jordanian leadership wanted to maintain US interest in the region because of the active American role in the region in various domains, some of which are the peace process, resolving Arab–Israeli conflict, political stability in Iraq, and fulfilling development goals. Countries cannot alter their geographic location and would have to adapt to that location and fit in the region. It seems that geographic Jordan, which cannot change its location adapted to that fact and tried to benefit from it, especially in terms of the negative aspects by viewing them as advantages that can be built upon in Jordan’s relations with the US. For this reason, it relied on the importance of its geographic location in many aspects, including the Jordanian regional role and political role. Therefore, this chapter presumes that the geographic location of Jordan is not a negative factor but a positive one with regard to US–Jordanian relations.1 Jordan dealt with this fact to strengthen US–Jordanian relations, especially as the US has strong relations with Israel and it is a security neighbor to Israel and Iraq. It has huge interests in Jordan’s strategic neighbor, Saudi Arabia, in addition to the greater role the US is expected to play in the Arab–Israeli peace process, as well as the greater Middle East project where Jordan is considered a reformatory model for Arab and Islamic countries concerned in this project. Jordan realized this formula perfectly in dealing with the US, and its relations with it and the US realized Jordan’s important role and that it can work with American interests. The US has a large strategic interest in the Arab world, which is manifested in the form of a number of projects that are separate externally such as democracy, human rights in the Arab world, economic development, finding a free Middle East market, political reform, and fighting terrorism. However, it constituted an integral project agreed upon by all influential powers in US foreign policymaking (Powell 2004); even if there were different points of view concerning the mechanism of realizing it. Therefore, Jordan has understood these American tendencies beginning from the US national security strategy which was published in September 2002. King Abdullah II suggested considering a “Marshall” Plan for the Arab region which includes all the elements that the US is describing. However, in the researcher’s talks and interviews with a number of decision makers and former US ambassadors, their main concern was who was going to fund this plan? In this respect, it is worth mentioning that a “Marshall” Plan, which was carried out to rebuild Europe and Japan after the Second World War was not merely an economic plan but a political plan as well. Its main goal was to establish similar political regimes in all targeted countries, built on a democratic basis. It was based on an institutional process with individual’s participation in policymaking as well as building these countries economically according to American standards such as the free market economy.

The American perspective This is illustrated by realists (hawks and pragmatism), that any American president can rely on American public opinion, and especially it is the result of studies indicating that American

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public opinion prefers pragmatism and hawks and is not keen on isolation, as was discussed by Asumus, Everts, and Isernia (2004: 75–76). The American perspective was embodied in the US National Strategy, 2002. Generally speaking, if we consider American attitudes towards the Arab Islamic world since the events of 9/11, we can see the following (Hayajneh 1999, 2003a: 250–52):  Full support for the Israeli government in occupying the Palestinian land, and in its aggressive policy towards Palestinians in its security, political, economic, and social forms.  Not interfering actively in what is called the Arab–Israeli peace process except in maneuvers and diplomatic protocols and, finally, the road map, which is being postponed so as to use it afterwards in Arab negotiations in the post-war state in Iraq, just as happened in the peace process after the First Gulf War, 1991.  The occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and using all kinds of weapons against a country that is economically, politically, and socially unstable, which did not happen to other countries that violated international law.  Blackmail used against the regime in Pakistan and blackmail used in Arab and Islamic regimes directly and indirectly using all forms of economic and political pressure.  Overlooking of Muslim massacres in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Philippines, and elsewhere in return for abandoning countries such as China, Russia, India, and others with attitudes that do not agree with American policy concerning Arab Islamic countries.  Gathering military forces in the Arab Gulf region following the occupation of Iraq and the occupation of the region (as it is not possible to gather all these forces to change a regime that has been besieged for more than ten years). It seems that the US is preparing for a world war on Arabs and Muslims and that the issue will not end in Iraq.  Supporting opposition groups in most Arab countries, offering them support, and meeting them publicly to pressure Arab regimes.  Pressuring Arab and Islamic governments to arrest and trace Islamic opposition that believes in political action and refuses armed struggle under the pretext of Islamic violence, imprisoning them, and seizing their money, which would have a negative impact on the legitimacy of these political systems.  Seizing Arab and Islamic funds in American and Arab banks for many charitable Islamic organizations.  Pressuring Arab and Islamic countries to change the curricula of schools and universities in a way that would fit the current American political agenda.  Gathering old friends of the US in a self-defense corner, especially what happens to the US’s friend, Saudi Arabia, and accusing everyone of supporting terrorism until they are proven innocent.  Inciting American public opinion against Islam and Muslims through what is broadcast and published in the American media about Muslims and Islam.  Underestimating Islamic public opinion inside and outside the US through formal activities of the American president, such as attending the Iftar banquet in Ramadan for Muslims in the US, and doing the opposite on the level of the American policy towards Islam. It can be said that US–Arab relations are governed by the categorization of Arab countries by the US, which is the standard through which the US deals with these countries. These countries might be categorized according to the American description into (see Hayajneh 2001, 2004):  Friendly and co-operative countries to the West: It seems that their number is decreasing, and they usually have strong bonds with the West headed by the US as they receive economic, military, and moral support from the US so as to maintain the governing regime there.  Rogue states (outlaw states): They are countries that adopt political and economic attitudes that antagonize the US, especially in relation to the peace process with the Israeli entity.

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The latter is the most likely in categorizing these countries. These countries usually receive military strikes and economic pressures such as penalties and economic boycotts in an attempt to change their attitudes and to threaten friendly countries indirectly through them. The policy of the US towards countries that are described as outlaws is considered a means to pressure friendly countries, as these countries can change into outlaw countries if the American support element disappears. It seems that the basic element throughout the early experience in US–Arab relations is the degree of accepting or refusing the peace process by Arab countries, that is to say Israel’s satisfaction about it. Therefore, countries that accept the peace process and the Israeli entity usually fall under the category that guarantees Israeli contentment and, accordingly, the American, but not vice versa. The best example of this theory is the latest American attitude towards getting rid of the late president of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat. Finally, the US has gotten rid of outlaw countries using “the axis of evil,” which the George W. Bush administration created, that is to say, the attitude of countries towards terrorism. There is a practical correspondence between countries which fell under the preceding categorization (the outlaws) and the new categorization as they are now considered “the axis of evil.” This is strongly related to the attitude of any country regarding what is so-called international terrorism. Thus, the Arab rush for many countries to support the attitude of the US in support of the war on terrorism is nothing but an indication that the American classification and the privileges expected from it would continue to exist. There is no other theory that would explain Western attitudes except for this one.

I Goals of Jordan and the US from bilateral relations This part of the chapter discusses the goals of both Jordan and the US from their bilateral relations and analyzes their goals within these relations. Goals of Jordan It can be argued that the most important goals of Jordan’s foreign policy in its relations with the US are as follow. 1 Political and security aspects These include maintaining the stability of the political situation in Jordan through US–Jordan security co-operation and joint US–Jordan relations. This would lead to consolidating bilateral relations and guaranteeing American economic and military aid, which covers part of Jordan’s expenditures that are required for the country to continue working and to maintain an accepted level of effectiveness, which is considered to be strongly related to the legitimacy of the political system. This aspect also includes enhancing Jordan’s security future and maintaining the national interest through participating in finding an independent Palestinian state through negotiation processes between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority. Jordan attempts to take part in founding a Palestinian state through Washington. Presenting the road map initiative, which was originally Jordanian, was a strategic Jordanian goal that was adopted by the US and internationally because of US support. Jordan believes in the American role as essential and pivotal in realizing the foundation of the Palestinian state, as not establishing it would constitute a direct threat to Jordan, especially the application of the “transfer” project and the application of the theories of the extremist Israeli right wing. The Likud Party believes that Jordan is Palestine as about 50 percent of the

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population of Jordan is of Palestinian origin. Jordan also believes that any solution to the Palestinian question should not be at the expense of Jordan. In addition, building the security wall practically threatens the foundation of the Palestinian state. In fact, it makes it impossible and Jordan would be the substitute country, something that Jordan rejects at all levels. 2 Economic aspects Jordan has been trying to move from an economic regime depending on foreign aid to an economic regime that depends on foreign investments. Thus, we can see that the leadership of Jordan concentrates on the economic aspects in its relations with the US. Appointing ambassador Karim Kawar, from an economic background, is an indication of the importance of the economic dimension in US–Jordanian relations and of the importance of US–Jordanian economic relations, which were started by signing the American Free Trade Agreement and connecting economic relations to political ones especially the dual connection in Jordanian– Israeli relations through establishing Qualified Industrial Zones. We should also indicate that the issue of activating the Free Trade Agreement is still in the first stages as the Jordanian economic team is unable to promote the Jordanian market. This is what the king points out on many occasions in relation to benefiting from this agreement in encouraging foreign investments. The effectiveness of the role of governments, however, is still limited in this case despite the apparent increase in Jordan’s exports, as the American market is considered one of the largest markets internationally. 3 Regional role Attempts have been made to convince the American side to adopt Jordan’s position in American foreign policy in the Arab region so as to retrieve the Jordanian regional role. It is apparent that Jordan, playing a regional role, is the source of Jordanian survival over the last decades. Therefore, Jordan’s balanced credibility and diplomacy enable it to play an influential regional role that provides Jordan with many advantages especially after the destabilization of US–Egyptian relations after the events of 9/11, the gap in US–Arab relations, and the confused relations between the US and Saudi Arabia, the closest country to the US. For this reason, Jordan believes that it can improve the attitudes of Arab countries towards it through the US, especially after the deterioration of Arab–Jordanian relations following the First Gulf War in 1991 (see Jreisat and Freij 1991; Reed 1990). Accordingly, these goals that the Jordanian side is attempting to achieve constitute a strategic dimension in Jordan’s relations with the US. Some of these goals, as this chapter is going to reveal, were achieved, while others are considered continuous goals that require Jordanian decision makers and diplomats to reconsider some strategies in order to implement them under an international system governed by the US. The goals of the US Some researchers believe that the most important goals of US foreign policy in its relations with Jordan are to:  Maintain Jordan’s significant role as a moderate country in the region and as an essential partner in the security of the region.  Fulfill mutual interests with the US in the Arab region as Jordan is considered an important component in the formula of the region.  Maintain Jordan’s integral role in fighting terrorism and maintaining security co-operation with the US in pursuing terrorists.

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An American report that deals with US–Jordan relations points out a number of important and pivotal issues for Jordan regarding the US, including (Prados 2003):  US–Jordanian co-operation in security and other issues, regionally and internationally, without having formal agreements between both countries, which gives Jordan credibility.  Jordan’s moderate policies throughout Jordan’s modern history.  Jordan’s adoption of policies that are in harmony with those of the West.  The stability of political leadership and the political system in Jordan despite regional crises and troubles.  The developed level of Jordan’s population, which contributed to building the Arab region, especially the Gulf countries.  Jordan’s participation in the security and stability of the region and the development of Gulf countries.  The critical and influential role of Jordan in the peace process in the region (Talhami 1993). Accordingly, Jordan is considered a country of strategic significance for the US. On the basis of the basic principles of international relations, having these mutual goals is considered a necessary factor but not sufficient if not accompanied by additional efforts to build and strengthen bilateral relations based on fulfilling mutual interests. Thus, US–Jordanian relations are based on fulfilling mutual interests that serve both parties, as each party attempts to trade the privileges it has so as to achieve its goals. The significant role of the Arab–Israeli conflict is observed as a pivotal factor in and interpreter of US–Jordanian relations.

II Historical development of US–Jordan relations This section demonstrates the development of US–Jordanian relations during the period of the study. American economic and military aid to Jordan and the development of political relations between the two countries will be discussed and analyzed. American economic and military aid to Jordan Jordan has strengthened its relations with the US since gaining its independence, especially after the decline of the British role in the region. The internal, economic, and political circumstances played a major role in Jordan’s dependence on foreign aid and strengthening its relations with powerful countries (see Brand 1994; Satloff 1994). Several studies indicate that Jordan has received economic and military aid from the US beginning from 1951. The total sum of support reached $3.9 billion in the period between 1951 and 1997 (Prados 2003: 8). It was divided into $2.1 billion as economic aid and $1.8 billion as military aid. American aid to Jordan has increased since the fiscal year 2003,2 as American aid to Jordan in the period between 1998 and 2002 ranged from $75 to $150 million dollars a year. However, an important point must be mentioned, namely that the efforts of the Jordanian leadership in dealing with the US have succeeded beginning from 2003, as the size of American aid to Jordan has doubled. During King Abdullah II’s visit to the US, he received a majestic reception in Washington. The king’s schedule during the period May 16–22, 1999 included meetings with all parties of the American policy establishment including the President, Congressional leaders, Secretary of State Madeline Albright and the Secretary of Defense. The previous details were mentioned to illustrate a number of important issues, some of which are:  Listening to the ideas of the king.  A comprehensive review of US–Jordanian relations and the situation in the Middle East.

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 The strategic importance of Jordan in international policy in the region, especially regarding the policy of the US in the Middle East.  Testing the directions of approach of the king.  Building bridges of trust and personal acquaintance between the king and members of American policy of different parties. This visit, although the first, was not a start of new relations but a start to consolidate relations that started a long time ago. It seems that the first visit was considered a pattern for the visits that followed in terms of communicating with members of the political process in the US. This expresses a deep understanding of the way American foreign policy is structured. Therefore, we will find that the process of US–Jordanian co-operation achieved huge successes, which were embodied in increasing American aid for Jordan. The summit, which was cancelled in Washington during the king’s visit to the US on April 20, 2004 and was reprogrammed in order to clarify the American attitude regarding the road map, is considered a significant stage in US–Jordanian relations as it accompanied Bush’s commitments to Sharon and the assassination of Hamas leader Dr. Abdel Aziz Al-Rantissi. Rami Khouri, one of the political analysts, commented on postponing the summit by saying that it was important that King Abdullah II conveyed to the American administration that Arab leaders are in a crucial situation, as their people are angry with the US and Israel, that the Jordanian leadership is considered a friend to the US, and that what the American administration is doing has put these countries in an embarrassing situation. Khouri also described Bush’s conduct towards the region as arrogant, as the diplomatic American message used to say to Arabs and Arab leaders that the US and Israel were acting individually without regarding the Arab role (cited in NPR 2004). This is what King Abdullah II rejected and what led to postponing the US–Jordanian summit. This attitude is on the Jordanian policy’s side, as it proved that the Jordanian interest is what matters. This reflects the impact of pragmatism on Jordanian foreign policy. The analysis shows the important stages in US–Jordanian relations during the period 1999 up to July 2008 (Hayajneh 2005). It can be noticed that:  Jordan has dealt with two American administrations, President Clinton’s administration and President Bush’s administration. Relations with both parties did not differ despite the different political parties that govern the US.  The king has visited the US on average three or four times a year and has held many summits with the American president, most of which were with President George W. Bush. These meetings were devoted to discussing bilateral relations. In addition, other summit meetings were held as part of international meetings in Jordan, the US, and elsewhere. Significantly, during each visit, there were meetings with American political figures at formal as well as public levels. There was also apparent media coverage for the Jordanian leadership in the US, which is considered a first in the history of bilateral relations between the countries.  The American attempt to revive Jordan’s regional role, especially after the Aqaba Summit, occurred when the American president visited Jordan for the first time.  Concentrating on the economic dimension in Jordan took place at the beginning of King Abdullah II’s reign. This was reflected in the outcomes of US–Jordanian relations, which resulted in signing the World Trade Agreement and the Free Trade Agreement with the US.  After the road map, the influential Jordanian role in the peace process was restored.  The attitudes of some of Jordan’s successive governments, especially in dealing with Hamas politically, led Jordan to lose an extremely important role and led to the decline of its regional role especially in the peace process, while Egypt took up that role, which the US was not content with. Jordan has recently been retaking its role with Hamas meetings in Jordan during the summer of 2008.

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 The first bilateral relations era, especially the era of President Clinton, was focused on the economic aspect more than the political one without overlooking the latter.  In the relations of President Bush’s era, the political dimension was more focused than the economic one. This can be justified in the sense that Jordan’s political role is the main factor in increasing economic aid to Jordan.  It can be noticed that, through the database, the king has built strong relations with the American media, chiefly the main television stations which have the largest number of viewers, as these stations reach every American house and do not need cable like other stations.  The king’s visits took place before the American fiscal year which starts at the beginning of October. The focus of these visits was on committees specialized in monetary aid so as to explain Jordan’s situation and its need for American economic support.  The different schedules of visits which made the king’s visits distinct from visits by Arab and non-Arab leaders who have only forty-five minutes protocol with the American president and a press conference for several minutes. Thus, the king’s visits to the US include dimensions and pre-organized programs in a scientific way that would fit Jordan’s interests and the common mentality in the US and the world. In all formal visits that the king made to the US and his meetings with American politicians, we can notice that the focus in US–Jordanian relations is on the following:  The Palestinian question and the importance of establishing a Palestinian state.  Bilateral economic relations and the need to support Jordan economically.  Security and military relations and the need for American aid to upgrade the Jordanian military forces.  The situation in Iraq before and after the war, and the damage that Jordan suffered during and after the war.  The image of Islam and fighting international terrorism.  Security co-operation and logistic military support from the US. Through analyzing the contents of visits and meetings, Hayajneh (2005) found that they include all previously mentioned dimensions and all spheres of American policy from political, economic, and cultural dimensions. This can be seen in King Abdullah’s meetings with all parties which led to a strengthening of US–Jordanian relations.

III Jordanian internal environment and US–Jordan relations One cannot discuss the impact of the Jordanian internal environment on US–Jordan relations with regard to the developments in King Abdullah II’s era only. This is because many important changes played a role in the domestic arena in the period prior to King Abdullah’s succession to the throne, especially the last ten years prior to his succession. This included very important changes particularly with regard to their impact on US–Jordan relations. A number of researchers indicate that the last ten years before King Abdullah assumed his constitutional authorities were of a great significance (see Curtis 2003). The decade from 1989 to 1999 was preceded by a very significant change. Political and economic events played a significant role in King Abdullah’s political and economic heritage in addition to influencing the centers of US–Jordanian relations. Jordan has started concentrating on two pivotal issues in its relations with the US, namely Jordan’s economic situation and the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Issues of significant impact on the Jordanian internal environment and its effects on US–Jordan relations must be discussed. The focus is going to be on three important and interrelated issues that constitute the essence of the Jordanian internal environment.

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Democratic transformation and political reform It seems that the period of the governments of Abdel Raouf Rawabdeh and Ali Abu Ragheb have witnessed deterioration in terms of democratic transformation especially after dissolving the House of Representatives and approving temporary laws to restrain public freedom. This was followed by a stage of reconsidering the issue of political development especially after the American war on Iraq and after Faisal Al Fayez was asked to form the government, which followed the parliamentary elections that were suspended for a relatively long period of time. Some of the indications of non-liberal practices which started in the summer of 2001 include:  The absence of the Jordanian parliament after dissolving the House of Representatives.  Implementing more than 200 temporary laws, especially the law of public meetings and the elections law in 2001, and the adjustments of penalty laws which minimized political freedoms.  The trials of civilians such as Tojan Faisal in military courts, which created an atmosphere of fear for citizens, journalists, media, and civil society institutions that any criticism of the government would result in penalty, imprisonment, and arrest. According to Greenwood (2003), “Former acts which Jordan did for strongly allying with the policy of the US in the region have made the country with the largest American aid, and the fourth country to sign a free trade agreement with the US.” Greenwood adds that Jordan has risked for the sake of maintaining the political interests of citizens, by continuing to have a strong alliance with the US, and that this risk was successful to a great extent. This is because US–Jordanian co-operation before the war in Iraq did not cost Jordan much. King Abdullah pointed to the largest amount of aid in the history of US–Jordanian relations, which was more than $1 billion in 2003. The issue of maintaining the system, which American researchers focused on, in King Hussein’s and King Abdullah’s reigns, despite its external importance, is empirically unexplained. This is related to a main cause, namely the legitimacy of the political system and Jordan’s Hashemite leadership, which everyone in Jordan agrees upon whether oppositionists or loyalists. The Israeli theory, however, is apparent in American writings, namely that it does not want Jordan to survive. Some also indicate using the issue of Arab– Israeli conflict to impose the legitimacy of the political system and postponing the stage of comprehensive internal reform which applies to all Arab countries that host Palestinian refugees (see Sasley 2002a). Economic reform program This program had positive as well as negative effects on Jordanian conduct in its relations with the US. On one hand, this program had negative effects on public support for governmental economic policies when these adjustments required decreasing governmental aid on commodities offered to people, especially the poor. This led to the increase in citizens’ economic problems and the ratios of poverty and unemployment under privatization projects, which were publicly criticized, especially that the average of economic growth and improvement which the government called for because of the economic reform program was not reflected positively on Jordanian citizens. The ratios of unemployment and poverty in Jordan are still high. The program also presented an economic reform program that qualified it to join the World Trade Organization and the Free Trade Agreement with the US from the government’s point of view. The whole program, however, was not acceptable at the public level and was used in a way that affected the image of US–Jordanian relations in the sense that the Jordanian government receives economic orders from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which the US controls.

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Palestinian question, refugees, and Jordanian–Palestinian relations The Palestinian question is considered a domestic factor for Jordan as a result of the historical relations between the two people, the large number of Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, and the social and cultural attachments (see Khazandar 2000; Abu-Odeh 1999). This has made the Palestinian question an important internal factor in US–Jordan relations. For this reason, what happens in Palestine is immediately reflected and echoed in Jordan. Jordan has attempted to maintain a balance in another dilemma between most of the population of Palestinian origins, the relationship with Israel, and the relations with the US. This was not easy as some might expect, as Jordan stood by the Palestinian leadership at a time when it faced harsh criticisms from Washington, especially in 2002. In addition, Jordan, which was neglected because of the Egyptian role in the negotiations at Camp David during President Clinton’s administration, did not stop full support for the Palestinians. However, internal events, which were connected to the Al-Aqsa Intifada and resisting normalization, had impacts on relations with the US, and Jordan had to maintain a balance among all those factors. Greenwood (2003: 108) indicates that the non-liberal attitude of the governments of Rawabdeh and Abu Ragheb had played a great role in strengthening US–Jordanian relations. Regional and international factors influenced the local environment and the attitudes of the “conservative” government of Abdel Raouf Rawabdeh and the “liberal” government of Ali Abu Ragheb to a large extent. They adopted attitudes aimed at controlling the domestic arena because of its impact on US–Jordanian relations. Greenwood and others greatly emphasize the importance of these regional factors (see Frisch 2004), which had acceptance and effects on the Jordanian public, namely Al-Aqsa Intifada and the war on terrorism. It can be noticed that the economic team in Jordan’s governments is fixed regardless of the prime minister. This could mean two things: first, the continuation of the economic approach and economic policies regardless of changing the prime minister and, second, that changing the prime minister is for political and not economic reasons. It can be suggested that the internal environment plays an important role in US–Jordanian relations. This is not represented in ministers of foreign affairs but in prime ministers who implement governmental agendas that would enhance US–Jordanian relations. As for the role of domestic factors in US–Jordan relations, we can notice that Jordanian public opinion towards the US (Talhami 2004) is a hostile opinion that opposes American policies, which constitutes a challenge for decision makers in Jordan (see Lucas 2004; Greenwood 2003; Kornbluth 2002).

V American internal environment and US–Jordan relations Jordan realized that American foreign policy does not change in terms of principles by changing the American president,3 that dealing with both Democratic and Republican parties is part of Jordan’s welfare, and that it is unwise to take one side at the expense of the other. It can be argued that the Republican and Democratic parties are two branches of one party, namely the American party, especially regarding American foreign policy in the Middle East. The Jordanian leadership also realized the mechanism of decision making. It is not a one-man show. The players in decision making include Congress, public opinion, lobbies, and personal and public relations as well as the president. Therefore, there is not a single visit by King Abdullah II that is devoid of conducting interviews with important media stations and meeting decision makers and opinion leaders as well as attempts to make personal relations so as to serve Jordanian interests. We find that there is a good impression regarding the Jordanian leadership and the Jordanian role in regional affairs. One of the reporters once asked King Abdullah about security in Jordan; he answered that Jordan is safer than Washington, DC. This incident indicates that the king knows that Washington is considered one of the safest American cities with regard to violence levels.

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Jordan realized well that foreign policymaking in the US regarding the Middle East does not take place in the State Department and that the US Secretary of State is one of the participants, but only on a certain level, at least since the events of 9/11. The importance of the Middle East makes it a case in the hands of the American president and his counselors in the White House. On this basis, Jordanian visits to the White House, where the new conservatives rule, increased (see Ehlert 2003) in security institutions such as the National Security Council and Department of Defense. In addition, the role of the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs disappeared except for co-ordination processes, as Jordan realizes that the American president is the one who runs foreign policy towards the region. Domestic factors of influence in US foreign policy include understanding the directions of American public opinion: Jordan was represented in the changes that took place in American public opinion towards the Middle East especially after the events of 9/11 to express having a moderate Arab member as success story for the American administration and a role model in the Arab world. Jordan was the first Arab country to take the initiative in condemning what happened, and King Abdullah was the first Arab leader to meet the American president after these events. In addition, American public opinion became more aware of what is happening and the issue of terrorism became an important issue in contrast to what happened in the past, as well as the division in American public opinion. This was shown in American public opinion surveys especially the Washington Post and New York Times. The king’s presentation of the image of Jordan in relation to education, openness, free trade, investment, and renouncing intolerance contributed to reducing the intensity of American public opinion towards the Islamic world.

VI Jordan regional environment and US–Jordan relations The war in Iraq within an American national security strategy played an influential role as a result of the events of 9/11 and led into pre-emptive war where Arab countries had to choose between being with or against the US. Accordingly, an essential transformation appeared in American strategy, beginning with classifying countries to the mechanism of dealing with these countries (Hayajneh 1999, 2003a, 2004). Jordan might be one of the countries that realized at an early stage the changes in the international system that were reflected in the regional environment of the Middle East to reduce the Arab pressures that were practiced in the past. The international system is an American system that is clearly embodied in absolute dominance of the world’s affairs before and after the war in Iraq on security, military, political, economic, and cultural levels (see Hayajneh 2004). Arab dimension Jordan’s tendency to rely on its foreign relations, especially with the US, came about as a result of pragmatic reading of Arab reality, which cannot be heavily relied on. This is because the Arab system does not provide a security system that can be relied on in political, security, and economic aspects. In addition, Jordan has its heritage of Arab interventions in its internal affairs that makes trusting Arab systems risky (see Mufti 2002; Hinchcliffe 1997; Shwadran 1960). Constant skepticism can be noticed in Jordan’s attitudes and policies by Arab parties. It can be seen in the following (see Sasley 2002b: 42):  Trying to join the US in the affairs of the Arab world especially the peace process between Syria and Israel. Jordan sent clear messages to the American side indicating the importance of the American role in the stability of the Arab region and finding a solution for the Arab– Israeli conflict at all levels.

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 Jordan attempted to maintain the national dimension in its Arab relations without sacrificing the American role, especially in the direction of the new king, which is based on the economic dimension and focused on economic development aspects which attempted to reduce dependency and reliance on the Arab world.  Arabs, especially Palestinians, have found that Jordan and its influential role can be invested to convey their points of view to the American side, as Jordan has the credibility that no other Arab country has. The historic speech of the king before a joint a session of Congress was heavily dominated by the Palestinian question and the need for US involvement to find a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The king rarely mentioned the private interests of Jordan. This was clear in Saudi–Jordanian–Egyptian co-ordination in preparation for the initiative of Prince Abdullah, the then Saudi Crown Prince. Even though the US was not eager for it for political reasons, such as the fact that Bush’s administration did not want to start a new peace process separate from what Clinton’s administration had reached (Bahgat 2003: 143), and because the initiative was connected with an attempt to improve the Saudi image in international relations, especially what follows from these relations as negative impacts after the 9/11 events. However, the Arab initiative, which the Crown Prince presented in an article in the New York Times in February 2002 and which was officially issued in the Arab Summit Convention, was used directly in the road map which the American administration suggested was created by Jordanian design.4  Thus, Jordan adopted a clever strategy to maintain a balance among all parties in the region in view of its relations with the US. Jordanian–Israeli dimension Jordan has followed a balanced policy in dealing with Israel,5 the Palestinians, and the American side. On one hand, it did not criticize the Israeli conduct directly; Jordan used to talk to Israel as a friend, supported Palestinian attitudes, rejected terrorism, and stressed the importance of the American role in the peace process. This dimension has had impacts on US–Jordanian relations. The Palestinian uprising played an influential role in US–Jordanian relations. The antinormalization process weakened Israeli–Jordanian relations as a result of Israeli policies and the decline in Jordanian enthusiasm for the peace process at the public level, which did not help Jordan politically or economically (see Kornbluth 2002; Astorino-Courtois 1996). Therefore, King Abdullah, who went through King Hussein’s steps, rearranged the priorities of Jordanian relations in the region, especially with Israel, so that they would take place through the US as King Abdullah did not view Israel as genuine in the peace process. Rearranging Jordanian priorities by focusing on economic aspects to handle the negative economic situation in Jordan led the king to concentrate on economic aspects through signing the Free Trade Agreement with the US in October 2000. In addition, the Israeli–Jordanian factories had the aim of exporting goods to the US (see Lucas 2004: 110–11; Glain 2003). Arab–Israeli conflict The Palestinian question is one of the important issues that influence US–Jordanian relations as this case is strongly connected to all aspects of Jordanian interests. Moreover, the American role in this conflict is strategic in light of the nature of US–Israeli relations, as there is no doubt of the importance of Israel to the US and the strong relations between both parties. Despite the importance of US–Jordanian relations, it cannot compete with US–Israeli relations, as Israel is another important “state” of the United States. Political leadership in Jordan believes that the Arab–Israeli conflict is the main conflict in the region and has its impacts on most aspects of life in the Middle East (H.M. King Abdullah

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II 2004). Therefore; the Palestinian question greatly influences both parties, despite the fact that its influence on the Jordanian party is much bigger than other parties. This is related to the fact that Jordan is strategically threatened if Palestinians are transferred to Jordan (Muasher 2004) and Jordan’s national interest is threatened if the Palestinian state is not established. Jordan also believes that any solution other than an independent Palestinian state where people can live would be at the expense of Jordan. Thus, it is to Jordan’s benefit to follow an approach that does not seem publicly acceptable but is an important strategic necessity. Jordan was ready for security co-operation in training forces for Palestinian security in case Israeli forces withdrew from Gaza on the basis of the road map. Jordan was also willing to approve American demands to remove all obstacles on the Palestinian side and to deal with the deficiency at the security level.6 It welcomed assigning a Palestinian prime minister, and it supported a reform process for the Palestinian Authority. Jordan believes that it is one of the American conditions to play an active role to implement the road map. Thus, the reason for the attitude of the Jordanian leadership towards the US and postponing the king’s meeting was that Jordan felt that the US abandoned the road map and that American approval for Sharon to keep part of the West Bank and support the establishment of the security wall were direct threats on Jordan. For this reason, the visit, after which Jordan gained the support of the US to maintain security in Jordan during King Abdullah’s meeting with Bush, was postponed. In addition, studies that examined relations between Jordan and Israel since 1948 came up with the result that Jordanian–Israeli relations cannot be settled unless the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is solved through establishing an independent Palestinian state that is not united with Jordan in any way (Reuveny and Powers 2002: 396–98). In addition, the preceding study indicates that the stability of Israeli–Jordanian relations is due to the American factor and to a third party in the conflict. It also indicates that the stability of relations between Israel and Jordan is threatened if some developments take place in the region, especially establishing a Jordanian–Palestinian state, and under Jordanian and Palestinian public opinions that oppose Israel.7 Moreover, the Jordanian experience with Israel is clear in this respect, and it requires the American role to minimize the role of the Israeli administration in any act against Jordan. For example, opening the tunnel in Al-Aqsa Mosque took place without informing Jordan, although the advisor to the Israeli prime minister, Netanyahu, was on a visit to Jordan on the day prior to the Israeli decision to open the tunnel, which Jordan is considered itself to be a supervisor of, as well as the assassination attempt on Khaled Mashaal, the Hamas leader, on Jordanian territory, and passing Jordanian sovereignty and other incidents that took place in the last stage of King Hussein’s reign added to losing Jordan’s trust in Israel. Thus, Jordan found that Israel cannot be trusted and that it must be dealt with and, more importantly, that this should be done through the US (see Lucas 2004: 96–97). Jordan hosts the largest number of refugees and was negatively influenced as a result of economic and social care that led Jordan to offer a lot of its financial resources, which should be taken into consideration in final status negotiations, one of which is compensating Jordan. Negative attitudes dominate Jordanian public opinion as a result of US attitudes, especially that the US does not practice the same policies with the Palestinians, which affected the success of any governmental initiative of which the US is part. In addition, the political instability that Jordan might witness would be a result of the attitudes of political opposition parties which adopt one case, namely the Palestinian question. It seems that the official Jordanian attitude suffers a number of interrelated dilemmas in relation to the Palestinian question, such as public opinion in Jordan represented in non-normal political participation, which embarrassed the government’s attitudes, strategic relations with the US and, finally, the way to solve the conflict. Thus, it is not surprising to find that decision makers in Jordan concentrate on playing an important role in the Palestinian question through interpreting Jordanian attitudes to the Americans (see Frisch 2004). This is because Jordan attempts to convey to the US the idea

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that there is no hope for any American initiative in the region to succeed without reaching a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict, namely the creation of a Palestinian state.

VII International environment and US–Jordan relations In relation to American foreign policy, we have noticed in the past few years that they are years of successive initiatives. For this reason, Jordan suggested at the highest levels “Marshal’s initiative” to the American administration. Some researchers have also suggested including all initiatives in one initiative (Hayajneh 2004). In addition, the US is a predominant country in the international regime and its outputs, and all countries have to understand that and to deal with this systematic structure which governs international relations whether they like this fact or not (Hayajneh 2004). Jordan’s relations have witnessed a number of important issues on the international level that have impacts on these relations. Some of these issues were mentioned previously, but they are mentioned again for their importance in international relations and interrelations between Jordan and the US. These issues include the events of 9/11, American strategy in Iraq, comprehensive political reform project of the Arab world and the new Middle East, and the war on terrorism. Post-9/11 events stage The events of 9/11 played an important role in US–Jordanian relations. Jordan was a strategic partner for the US through fighting terrorism to a large extent, and King Abdullah was one of the initiative leaders in the world to condemn these painful events. Jordan did not stop at this, but the king was the first Arab king to visit Washington at the end of September 2001 and meet with the American president. In a joint press conference on September 28, 2001, the king expressed full support for the US in its war on terrorism. In addition, a number of resources that are concerned with US–Jordanian affairs mentioned that Jordan took a number of practical steps in support of the US. In December 2001, Jordan sent a military hospital of fifty beds and a military medical crew of almost 200 to Mazar Al-Sharif city in Afghanistan. The hospital provided health care for 68,811 patients, most of whom were civilians, and conducted 798 operations up to June 6, 2002, according to a report of the American Department of Defense. Mine clearance teams also cleared an area of 70,000 m². Sources in the US Department of Defense confirmed that Jordan allowed American forces and coalition forces to use Jordanian bases in its war against the Taliban (see Prados 2003:4). Similarly, Jordan is co-operating with the US in fighting terrorism in many other areas. American political reform project in the Arab world A political reform project which resulted from the G8 meeting in Sea Island city in Georgia at the beginning of July 2004 is considered one of the most important results that contributed to changing American foreign policy towards the Arab world in general and Jordan in particular. Without going into the details of this program (see Muravchik 2004; Haass 2003; Ottaway 2003), we find that the most important notes on it are:  What Europe is offering the region is the same as what the US is offering, but without the American cane (Abu Taleb 2004).  The American approval of Arab conditions which Arab countries, especially Jordan, presented. These conditions include recognition of individuality8 for each Arab country, solving the Palestinian question as being the source of conflict in the region, which was mentioned by King Abdullah II on many occasions, especially in what the king presented at the Conference on

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Security in Munich, Germany, in February 2004, and the need to consult governments with regard to political reform. Despite all this, the US suffers a credibility crisis regarding the Arab region. As for its relations with Jordan, the US does not respect either the individuality or the promises given to Arabs concerning the issue of the Arab–Israeli conflict. In addition, it did not offer material guarantees that would prevent the Israeli dangers towards Jordan especially with regard to “the transfer” process, building the security wall, and the continuation of the security situation without actual interference from the US. Many researchers indicate that the political elite in the Arab world is incapable of political reform as a result of many factors that lead to the issue of who would undertake political reform in the Arab world. In addition, many Arab intellectuals who criticized American reform projects are attempting to bring liberalism to Arab societies without democracy. Some in the Arab world might explain this as an aim for the US to lose and melt Arab and Islamic identity. This can be noticed in Arab television stations which do not express their societies; rather they present programs that deal with an American form of culture. Although American culture believes in pluralism, those responsible for TV administrations in most Arab societies believe in bringing out the American culture model as a general model that they encourage in normalizing their societies, which could prove to be a false strategy in the coming years. The US Al-Hura is supposed to be closed after its failure in achieving its objectives.

VIII Jordanian regional role and US policy What is noticeable many times in Jordanian delegations participating in meetings of Jordanian and American parties is the participation of the king’s advisor for security affairs, the Director of General Intelligence, which indicates a security dimension in negotiations between both parties.9 Jordan has been affected by regional events since the beginning of establishing the Arab regional security system, which Jordan has endeavored to influence by security realization of the future of the political system. The characteristics of the Arab regional system and the role of Jordan in it include the growth of the Arab nation-state interest along with building the Arab regional system, which is considered unique in modern history,10 as establishing the Arab League took place at the beginning of forming the countries that constitute that Arab regional system. When nation-state was building itself economically, politically, and militarily, and was building its power, this came along with building the regional system. One of the most distinguished defects of the Arab League is that it was established to protect and maintain the nation-state and not the Arab regional security system. At present, we can see that Arab countries, including Jordan, are facing a similar dilemma after the occupation of Iraq and the continuation of the Arab–Israeli conflict, namely maintaining the inside instead of the outside so that they repeat or continue the experience of the past five decades of the twentieth century. Thus, introducing the “Jordan first” slogan in King Abdullah II’s era can be interpreted as going in the direction of building the country before playing a large role in the Arab regional system, although Jordan keeps an open eye on what happens in the region and calls for establishing a regional security system but after defining a number of significant demands, namely establishing the Palestinian state. Hence, the importance of the American role in the events of peace and stability in the region appears (Sasley 2002b). Therefore, one would find a strategic dimension in King Abdullah’s concentration on the American role in bringing peace and stability to the region. Thus, we can realize the importance of US–Jordanian relations in the Arab regional system and building the Arab country. For this reason, the king used the concept of building democratic, Arabic Islamic countries on various occasions.  The overwhelming role of foreign powers in building the regional system. Some believe that the Arab League would not have existed without the influential support and role of

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Britain. In addition, conflict between the East and the West has been reflected in an influential role in the Arab world as the latter was divided into allies of the West or the East. However, the Arab world at the present time is facing a new international agenda with or against the US. For this reason, we find that Jordan did not change its relations but continued to be on the Western side without showing enmity to others.  The influential role of the Arab–Israeli conflict, which affected the categorization of Arab countries: front countries and support countries. Because of its geographic situation, Jordan was considered a front country and the most influenced by the Arab–Israeli conflict. In addition, the peace process has influenced the attitudes of Arab countries, such as Jordan, and its relations with the US, as previously illustrated. These regional events played a significant role in the Jordanian regional role, especially Jordan’s benefit from these regional events in light of the decline of the Egyptian regional role. This came after the summit of the Arab security system in 1973, when all Arab countries were gathered in one military unit in the 1967 war. International estimates considered Arab countries the sixth strongest military power in the world. However, after 1975, the Arab regional system started collapsing for the following reasons (see Susser 2003): Sadat’s visit to Israel, signing a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, which led to isolating the largest Arab country from the Arab situation. As a result of isolating Egypt, the idea of the new Middle East and implementing Shimon Perez’s ideas appeared. The second collapse came after the invasion of Kuwait and the failure of the Arab system to find an Arab solution. The third collapse came after the events of 9/11 when the Arab system became the main convict in these events. Jordan has found itself in a collapsed Arab regional system and its national interests forced it to play an influential Arab regional role and to strengthen its strategic relations with the US. We can say that Jordan concentrated on the following factors:  Reconsidering internal conditions in the Arab world for reforming the Arab regional system. Jordan has felt that the call for reform started to change from an American idea to an international idea especially after the G8 summit which Jordan attended.  Reconsidering the definition of the Middle East area, as Jordan understood the American Western approach regarding the area of the Greater Middle East, namely mingling the Islamic world with the Arab world. This reveals that there is an international reconsideration regarding the powers of Islamic directions.  The importance of the cultural system as an international request in making changes in educational and informational systems especially the issues of human rights and women’s rights. The Jordanian regional role is based on a number of basic themes and invariables:  Not establishing the Palestinian state would mean that Israeli dangers which threaten Jordan would remain, especially the issue of a substitute country.  A balance must be maintained in Jordan’s international relations, and the one ally approach should also be reconsidered.  The priority became for national issues, with acting together on not ignoring regional issues.  Jordan should be constantly moving on all levels and should adopt an approach that would get along with and not cause the wrath of Washington.  Jordan managed to accomplish huge successes in its regional role in which it served the interests of the US so as to fulfill its interests. Some of these successes are Jordan’s role in the war on Iraq, the peace process, the war on terrorism, the political reform process, and presenting a civilized image of Islam.

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Conclusion: the results of US–Jordan relations: future and horizons The previous analysis indicates the most important results in US–Jordan relations and the factors that affect them. Despite the relative success of Jordanian diplomacy in securing and increasing American military and economic aid and increasing the rates of exports to the US, the chapter points out neglecting the political and security aspects as follows: 1 The US failure in a security role in its relations with Jordan. Jordan has had strong security relations with the US, represented by the military support of Jordanian forces to modernize them. It participates with the American forces in joint military training operations, both bilateral and multiple with the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Jordan and Egypt. Jordan has had strong security co-operation relations in the field of fighting terrorism.11 Despite that and Jordan’s connection with Israel in the peace process, Jordan still feels the security dangers resulting from Israeli conduct towards Jordan, and the US has not provided Jordan with a feeling of security yet. In addition, King Abdullah threatened to use military powers to stop Israel if it tried to send the Palestinians to Jordan, which indicates that the US did not provide a feeling of security regarding Israel. The attitude of the US towards the security fence, which threatens Jordan and Jordan’s security interests, reveals that the US does not pay attention to Jordan’s security, as the decision of the international court in Lahai issued in July 2004, which stated the illegitimacy of building the fence, was criticized by the US and only one (the American judge) of fifteen judges voted against that decision. Opposition in Jordan criticizes the US–Jordanian security cooperation, which adds another dimension to the dilemma of US–Jordanian security relations. Former advisor to King Abdullah, Adnan Abu Odeh (Al-Arab Alyoum 2004: 4) pointed out an extremely important issue: “Why do we—Jordan—get assurances and Israel gets commitments?” This opinion that Abu Odeh expressed came after the letter of assurances that the American President George Bush sent after King Abdullah II’s meeting with him in a meeting that was previously postponed because of the US policy towards the peace process and the unlimited American support for Israel. Taher Masri, former Jordanian prime minister, agreed with what Abu Odeh said, whereas official sources represented by the official spokesman of the government, Asma Khader, have shown that time is sufficient to judge American intentions. 2 The lack of American support for Jordan in the peace process has weakened the public attitude to the government inside Jordan (Lucas 2004; Kornbluth 2002), especially the fact that Jordan did not receive economic and military aid in an amount that is even close to what Israel and Egypt received after signing the “Camp David” agreement. This weakened the attitude of successive Jordanian governments, as the economic support did not surpass Jordan’s exemption of $200 million from $700 million, the size of American debts during the Jordanian–Israeli peace treaty. The government of Abdel Salam Majali has promised that peace would bring advantages to Jordan through investments, tourism … , etc. Accordingly, this has increased opposition to the peace process especially from professional unions and committees of anti-normalization, which influenced the democratic process to a great extent, despite the fact that public support then was 82 percent that it would play a positive role in the economic aspect according to a survey done by the Strategic Studies Center at the University of Jordan (see Lucas 2004: 106–8). 3. The limitation of Jordan’s effect in convincing the US of the priority of solving the Arab– Israeli conflict before starting political reform and the Greater Middle East projects. Americans did not reach agreement on this issue and on reaching a specific point based on the road map and establishing a Palestinian state. Instead, they viewed the process as a group of infinite processes. This is what the then Jordanian foreign minister, Marwan Muasher,

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pointed out: “Arab governments believe in the need to concentrate on putting an end to Arab–Israeli conflict before beginning the reform process.” This is what Egyptian president and former Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmad Maher, pointed out (MacFarquhar 2004). American existence in the region is a permanent existence especially in Iraq. In addition, the interests of the US in the region are interests that will not fade in the short term, and solving the Palestinian case is a long-term event and will not take place at the speed required. It is important to keep in mind, however; that there is a long-term American strategy in the Middle East “grand strategy” represented in a comprehensive reform process in the Arab region for serving American interests in the region. Thus, the importance of US–Jordanian relations will increase in the coming period for the following reasons:  The continuation of the direct threat to Jordan in light of Israeli designs in the region, especially in relation to Israeli demographic theory.  The increase in the danger from the security situation in the Middle East especially the phenomenon of terrorism, which is connected to hitting American interests in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and the lack of desire or ability of most other Arab countries, such as Qatar and Egypt, to play an important role in assisting the American strategy, which makes Jordan an important choice for the US. Jordanian public reaction which antagonizes the US cannot be changed without dealing with the economic situation in Jordan. Thus, the US may play an important role in addressing Jordanian economic problems by assisting the Jordanian leadership to continue US–Jordanian relations of co-operation. It seems that all that is American is rejected by most people except a small group that would benefit personally and does not represent any political weight in Jordanian society. This chapter endeavored to analyze US–Jordanian relations in the past decade. It studied a number of important issues, and dealt with the impact of a number of factors on US–Jordanian relations. This study, which is considered one of the first studies in the field of US–Jordanian relations from a Jordanian academic point of view, offered the opportunity to illustrate a number of issues that require research and more examination for decision makers to benefit from. It can be argued that some of the most important questions that are still not answered include: the efficiency of the Jordanian embassy in the US compared with the American embassy in Amman? Did the foreign ministry follow up what the king had reached in his meetings with American officials through the Jordanian embassy in the US? Are there scientific data to prove that? What has been illustrated in this chapter can be considered a significant start and a beginning to more studies to deal with the failures in bilateral relations and enhance achievements.

Notes * Many parts of this chapter are based on Hayajneh (2005). 1 This is different from the common belief that the geographic factor is a negative one, and this is what appears in the Jordanian local press and American writings (Glain 2003). 2 The amount of aid offered to Jordan in the years 2004 and 2005 was approximately $450 million a year. 3 For more information on the doctrines of presidents and American foreign policy, see Kegley and Hermann (1997). 4 Jones (2003) believes that the road map plan was a Jordanian idea that King Abdullah offered during his meeting with President George W. Bush, as he said: “What is required is the road map”. Bush answered by asking the American Assistant Secretary of State, William Burns: “the King wants the road map. Can we give him (the King) a road map?” 5 Regarding theoretical analysis of Jordanian participation in the peace process, see Cunningham (1998). 6 Then Jordanian foreign minister, Marwan Muasher, hinted in an interview he made on the Al-Arabia channel (June 11, 2004) at the fact that suitable circumstances must be created for implementing the road map and that

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each party must take responsibility for its role and play that role, so that security authorities are handed over to the prime minister because, according to the Jordanian foreign minister, the continuation of circumstances that are not suitable for establishing a Palestinian state would affect the Jordanian interest and would constitute a great danger to Jordan. It seems that Foreign Minister Muasher had read the future of Palestinian security relations scenario, which took place in the middle July 2004. See Reuveny and Powers (2002: 396–98). The issue of individuality is an extremely important issue as Arab Islamic individuality does not necessarily mean contradicting general human goals such as freedom and progress. The Chinese experience would be a clear example when a communist system was established on the Chinese way. This is refuted by the idea of the secular directions in the Arab world, which does not believe in an Arab Islamic individuality. This direction, which dominates the media in the Arab world, began to lose credibility on the American side and has no public credibility in the Arab world because of its suspicious relations with Israel and the US and as a result of abandoning its doctrines to please the US, which found eventually that there is no benefit from dealing with it as the US tends to deal with moderate Muslims. The role of intelligence directors and security departments in Jordan was not public and not political to some extent. In addition, the role of intelligence directors was clear in the Jordanian media. The participation of intelligence directors, however, is clearly noticeable in these negotiations, which indicates a security dimension in negotiations. This is considered a development in Arab foreign policy as the Egyptian intelligence director is playing political roles in a security dimension and that would substitute for the role of foreign minister. We can see that Mr. Omar Suleiman, Egyptian intelligence director, is playing an active role in Israeli and Palestinian files. Notes for Dr. Osama Ghazali Harb on the war of 2004 during his remarks at the Cairo Conference, 2004. Former foreign minister, Marwan Muasher, pointed out the nature of the strong intelligence relations between the two countries in fighting terrorism as an answer to a question during a seminar in the Council of Foreign Affairs. Muasher said: “We have helped the US in many cases during the past ten years, including explosions in Tatrania and Kenya and the attempts to enter the US from Canada. … .” He added: “What I can say is that we have and will continue to have intelligence cooperation with the US in this issue—the issue of al-Qaedah terrorism” (Djerjian 2002).

English references Abu-Odeh, Adnan. 1999. Jordanians, Palestinians & The Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Process (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press). Astorino-Courtois, Allison. 1996. “Transforming International Agreements into National Interest: Marketing Arab– Israeli Peace in Jordan,” The Journal of Politics, 58(4): 1035–54. Asumus, Ronald, Philip P. Everts and Pierangelo Isernia. 2004. “Power, War, and Public Opinion: Looking Behind the Transatlantic Divide,” Policy Review, 123(Feb/Mar): 73–88. Bahgat, Gawdat. 2003. “The New Middle East: The Gulf Monarchies and Israel.” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies. 28(2): 123–52. Brand, Laurie. 1994. Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of alliance Making. New York: Columbia University Press. Cunningham, Karla J. 1998. “The Causes and Effects of Foreign Policy Decision Making: an Analysis of Jordanian Peace with Israel,” World Affairs, 160(4): 192–201. Curtis, Ryan R. 2003. “Political Liberalization and Monarchial Succession in Jordan,” Israel Affairs, 9(3): 129–41. Djerjian, Edward. 2002. “Remarks by Dr. Marwan Muasher at the Council on Foreign Relations,” Washington, DC, September 23. Ehlert, Allison. 2003. “Iraq: At the Apex of Evil,” Berkley Journal of International of Law, 21: 731–70. Frisch, Hillel. 2004. “Jordan and the Palestinian Authority: Did Better Fences Make Better Neighbors?” The Middle East Journal, 58(1): 52–71. Glain, Stephen. 2003. “Jordan: The Consequences of Peace,” Survival, 45(1): 167–82. Greenwood, Scott. 2003. “Jordan, The Al-Aqsa Intifada and America’s ‘War on Terror’,” Middle East Policy, X (3): 90–111. Haass, Richard N. 2003. “Toward Greater Democracy in the Muslim World,” The Washington Quarterly, 26(3): 137–48. Hayajneh, Adnan M. 2004. “Governments: Security and Concerns, Priorities and Policies,” Paper presented at the Conference on “Arab Perspectives on Regional Governance and Security,” June 26–28, 2004. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Al-Aharm Center for Political & Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt. ——2001. “US–Arab Relations between American Realism and Arab Idealism: Issues and Perspectives in the Present and the Future,” in US–Arab Relations Book. University of Jordan. Hinchcliffe, Peter. 1997. “Jordan’s Relations with her Neighbours: Victim of War or Casualty of Peace,” Asian Affairs, 28(3): 343–48. H.M. King Abdullah II. 2004. “Speech at the 40th Munich Conference on Security Policy.” Available from www. securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php? menu_2004=&menu-konfer (accessed June 20, 2004). Jones, Nathan. 2003. “Bush Administration Unfolds Israeli–Palestinian ‘Road Map’.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 22(5): 8–10. Jreisat, Jamil E. and Hanna Y. Freij. 1991. “Jordan, the United States, and the Gulf Crisis,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 13 (1/2): 101–17. Kagan, Robert. 2003. “Looking for Legitimacy in all the Wrong Places,” Foreign Policy & Carnegie Endowment Special Report: From Victory To Success: Afterwar Policy in Iraq: 70–72.

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Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Margaret G. Hermann. 1997. “Do Doctrines Make a Difference? The Impact of Policy Declarations on U.S. Military Interventionism, 1947–1996.” Paper presented to the International Studies Association Convention in Toronto, March 18–22. Kornbluth, Danishai. 2002. “Jordan and the Anti-Normalization Campaign, 1994–2001,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 14(3): 80–108. Little, Richard. 1996. “The Growing Relevance of Pluralism,” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, eds, International Theory: Positivism & Beyond, Cambridge University Press. Lucas, Russell E. 2004. “Jordan: The Death of Normalization with Israel,” Middle East Journal, 58(1): 93–111. MacFarquhar, Neil. 2004. “Arab Leaders Seek to Counter US Plan for Mideast Overhaul,” The New York Times, March 4: A.9. Mufti, Malik. 2002. “A King’s Art: Dynastic Ambition and State Interest in Hussein’s Jordan,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 13(3): 1–22. Muravchik, Joshua. 2004. “Bringing Democracy to the Arab World,” Journal of Current History, January. NPR (NEWS). 2004. “Analysis: Bush Administration’s Policy on the Middle East Angering Many in Arab World; King Abdullah Cancels a Meeting with Bush,” All Things Considered, April 20. Ottaway, Marina. 2003. “Promoting Democracy in the Middle East: The Problem of US Credibility,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, no. 25. Powell, Colin L. 2004. “A Strategy of Partnerships,” Foreign Affairs, January/February. Prados, Alfred B. 2003. “Jordan: US Relations and Bilateral Issues,” Congressional Research Service (Issue Brief for Congress). Reed, Stanley. 1990. “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, 69(5): 21–35. Reuveny, Rafael and John R. Powers. 2002. “Set for Instability: Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation between Israel and Jordan,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25: 383–401. Sasley, Brent E. 2002a. “Using International Relations for Internal Consumption,” Paper presented to International Studies Association Convention in New Orleans, March 24–27. ——2002b. “Changes and Continuities in Jordanian Foreign Policy,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 6(1): 36–48. Satloff, Robert B. 1994. From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition. New York: Oxford University Press. Shwadran, Benjamin. 1960. “Husain Between Qasim and Nasir,” Middle Eastern Affairs, 11(2): 330–45. Susser, Asher. 2003. “The Decline of the Arabs,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall. Talhami, Ghada. 1993. “Jordan: The Ubiquitous Partner—in the Jordanian Option Resurrected,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 15(3): 47–62. Talhami, Shabli. 2004. “Interview with the Al-Arabia Satellite TV,” June 11.

Arabic references Abu Taleb, Hasan. 2004. Comments on the paper entitled: “The Main International Powers: Demands and Pressures,” presented to the Governance and Regional Security Conference: “Arabic Vision”. Al-Ahram Center for Political Studies, Cairo, June 26–28. Al-Arab Alyoum. 2004. “Jordanian Step for Peace and Building on Outcomes,” Seminar of Al-Rai Center for Studies and Information, May 20, 2004: 4. Al-Arabia Channel. 2004. “Interview with King Abdullah II,” August 3, 2004. Harb, Osama Ghazali. 2004. Comments on the paper entitled: “The Suitable National Frame in The Middle East,” presented to the Governance and Regional Security Conference: “Arabic Vision”. Al-Ahram Center for Political Studies, Cairo, June 26–28. Hayajneh, Adnan. 2005. “Jordan–American Relations under King Abdullah II: 1999–2004,” in Hayajneh, Adnan and Hadi Al-Shobki, eds, Jordan–US Relations: 1956–2005. Al-Rai Center, Amman, Jordan. ——2004. “War on Iraq and International Balance of Powers,” in Mohammed Hzat and others, eds, Occupation of Iraq: Goals–Outcomes–Future. Beirut: Center for Arab Studies. ——2003a. “American Power and the Future of Relations with the Islamic World,” in The Future of the Islamic World: Challenges in a Changing World: An Annual Strategic Report, published by Al-Bayan Journal: 243–58. ——2003b. “The Future of Palestinian Refugees: The Basis of Dealing with International Presentation and Rules,” Social Sciences Journal (University of Kuwait), 31(4): 839–55. ——2001a. “The Level of Analysis and Methodology in Arabic Studies in International Relations: An Analytical Study 1995–96,” Dirasat Journal (University of Jordan), 28(1): 11–99. ——2001b. “International Relations Issues Between Realism and Globalism: Empirical Analysis: 1990–97,” Social Sciences Journal (University of Kuwait): (7–30). ——1999. Diplomacy of Great Powers and the New International System towards the Arab World. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Khazandar, Sami. 2000. Confederation and the Final Settlement of the Palestinian Issue. Beirut: Arabic Organization for Studies and Publishing. Muasher, Marwan. 2004. Interview with “Daif wa Hewar” program. Alarabia Channel, June 11.

17 Pakistan’s perceptions of US Middle East policy Shahid Javed Burki

Pakistan’s relations with the US are passing through some very difficult times. There have been crises before in the relationship between these two countries, but none was more complicated than the one the leadership in the two countries faces at this time. There are new leaders in both Washington and Islamabad with little experience of dealing with one another. If the latent conflict between the two capitals intensifies, it will have serious consequences for both countries. On previous occasions when these relations hit a difficult patch, it was Pakistan that really suffered. This time around, the US could also end up paying a heavy price. What is at stake for Pakistan is the integrity of the country, the type of governance that evolves, and the future of the economy? However, if Pakistan is seriously destabilized, it could create a haven from which terrorist groups could begin to hurt the US. How US–Pakistan relations are shaped will depend on a number of factors that could be influenced by public policy in Washington. Among the issues the administration headed by President Barack Obama must address are the way the growing Islamic militancy in Pakistan’s northern areas is tackled, the way the Pakistani economy is helped not only in coming out of the crisis in which it finds itself at this time but also in the way it develops over the medium and long run, and the way Washington deals with restiveness in the Middle East. It is the last issue that is the subject of this chapter. Several surveys, including those by the Pew Center, provide incontrovertible evidence about hostility towards the United States from the people of the Muslim world, in particular the citizens of Pakistan. “True dislike, if not hatred, of America, is concentrated in the Muslim nations of the Middle East and in Central Asia,” said Andrew Kohut of the Center in a testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December 2001. This statement was made three months after the terrorist attacks on the US. Subsequent surveys carried out by the same agency have shown that these attitudes have persisted, and the US continues to be viewed in an unfavorable light by Muslims around the globe. Why is there such a great deal of ill-feeling towards the US in the Muslim world at this time? Why is this case the in Pakistan when it has had a close relationship with the US for more than half a century? Should it worry Washington that the people of such a large Muslim country view it with such hostility? Pakistan, with 165 million people in 2009, is the second largest Muslim country in the world, after Indonesia. It is located in a troubled region of the world that is under pressure from Islamic radical groups who are benefiting from the negative perception of the US. Why have the people of Pakistan developed such a negative opinion about the US, a country that has provided them with considerable economic assistance for at least half a century? What are the main reasons for the increasing public displeasure with the US in Pakistan? How important in this context are the US policies in the Middle East? Will the new administration of President Barack Obama be able to reverse the recent trend and usher in a period when the people of Pakistan starting looking once again with favor at the United States? Is this because of the policies pursued by the US in the Middle East, in particular its strong support of Israel? Could the treatment of the various Muslim diasporas in the US be a contributing factor?

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Could the newly inducted administration led by President Barack Obama change the way Muslims look at the US? I will attempt to answer some of these questions in this chapter. The chapter has three sections. In the first, I will provide a quick overview of Pakistan’s relations with the US since 1947, when the former country gained independence. In the second, I will explore how Islam and the pursuit of various Muslim causes have influenced Pakistan’s relations with the outside world. In the third, I will assess how the policies likely to be pursued by the Obama administration may improve the image of the US in the Muslim world, in particular in Pakistan.

US–Pakistan relations Pakistan’s relations with the US have been turbulent, fluctuating between warmth and suspicion.1 Pakistan’s reasons for seeking a close strategic relationship with the US have changed over time. Initially, the country, deeply suspicious of India’s intentions towards its survival as an independent state, sought external alliances that would help balance the perceived Indian threat. The first generation of Pakistani leaders, mindful of their military weakness, looked for a security umbrella. They were convinced that India was working to smother Pakistan economically before it had learnt to walk as a nation-state. That this may have been the case was borne out by a series of actions taken by the government headed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. In September 1947, a month after the birth of Pakistan, New Delhi refused to release to its sister state the latter’s share of the money that was owed it by Britain for British India’s war effort. The money was lodged in India’s treasury. It was badly needed by Pakistan, which was desperate to obtain foreign reserves to run the infant economy. Later in 1948, India threatened to stop the flow of water into some of the canals in Pakistan’s vast irrigation system. It could do that because it controlled the headworks that supplied water to some of the canals in Pakistan. In 1949, not happy with Pakistan’s decision not to devalue its currency with respect to the US dollar—a decision taken by all members of the British Commonwealth including India—New Delhi halted all trade with its neighbor. At that time, India was Pakistan’s largest trading partner. Pakistan was dependent on India for the supply of most basic manufactures for its population. And added to all this was the dispute over the state of Kashmir which both countries claimed to be theirs—India because the ruler of the state decided to accede to it, and Pakistan because the population of the state was predominantly Muslim. There was therefore reason for Liaquat Ali Khan, the country’s first prime minister, to visit Washington in 1950 in search of a security umbrella. President Harry Truman heard the prime minister’s pleas but did not promise any help. At that time, the cold war was only just beginning and Washington had not begun to think of building alliances to contain the spread of communism to the parts of the world that had not been touched by it. Washington’s attitude towards Pakistan changed with the advancement of the cold war under President Dwight Eisenhower, President Truman’s successor. John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, was passionate about containing communism. He was anxious to build a fence around the Soviet Union and China, the world’s two major communist powers. Pakistan was ready to become a link in the fence especially after General Ayub Khan threw out the civilian government and became president. For half a dozen years, from 1959 to 1965, a great deal of economic aid and military assistance flowed from the US to Pakistan. Pakistan benefited enormously; it also became very dependent on US economic support. During the period in office of President Ayub Khan, 1958 to 1969, Pakistan’s economy grew at the rate of 6.1 percent per annum and income per head of the population increased by 3.5 percent a year. From a country that only a decade earlier was considered to be economically unviable, Pakistan began to be seen as a model of economic success. Much of this turnaround was due to support from Washington.2 However, the war with India in September 1965 delivered the first of many jolts that were to mark Pakistan’s relations with the US. By 1965, the Democrats were in the White House, a

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party that was traditionally warm towards New Delhi. The Americans did not appreciate Pakistan’s adventure in the disputed territory of Kashmir that had resulted in all-out war between India and Pakistan. All military aid came to a stop and economic aid was severely curtailed especially after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became prime minister. Bhutto was more inclined to follow a neutral approach towards the world’s great powers, a policy that was not appreciated by Washington. From the early 1970s to the present, economics rather than concern about India’s perceived intentions towards Pakistan became the main reason for Islamabad’s strong desire to cultivate a strong relationship with Washington. Policymakers in Islamabad realized that, without support from the US, the economy would not be able to grow at a reasonable rate. To the desire for US economic support, President Zia ul Haq, the country’s third military ruler, was able to add ideology to cultivate the US. The Soviet Union’s invasion of neighboring Afghanistan gave the military ruler the chance to combine the need for US money with his strong desire to make Pakistan an Islamic state. The Americans needed a motivated group of fighters to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. These were provided by a string of madrassas that were established all along Pakistan’s long border with Afghanistan. These semi-educational institutions produced a large number of jihadis who succeeded in pushing the occupying Soviet forces out of Afghanistan. Over time, their success was to create serious problems not only for the US which had first inspired them to use Islam for political and strategic purposes.3 The rise of militant Islam was also to pose a serious problem for Pakistan. Now into the seventh decade of independence, Pakistan is faced with a number of serious problems that can only be redressed by a close relationship between Washington and Islamabad. Pakistan needs America’s helping hand to overcome the severe economic crisis the country faces at this time. US assistance is also needed to overcome the challenge posed by the rise of Islamic extremism and militancy. However, for a working relationship to develop between the two countries, Pakistani people’s perception of the US must improve. This is important for a country that is struggling to create a democratic structure of governance. People’s perception would improve if Washington is able—and prepared—to change its stance towards the Middle East.

Pakistan and the Middle East While the US government’s response to 9/11 contributed to the ill-feeling against the United States, the Pew Center maintains that it had existed even before that event: “ … a majority in the Islamic countries told us that the US support of Israel is the top reason that the people in these countries dislike America.”4 In Pakistan, both its leaders and its people have had a strong interest in the way the US has approached the Middle East. This interest is the direct consequence of what some historians have called the idea of Pakistan. According to this, Muslims, no matter where they live, constitute a separate nation.5 As such, they deserve to be governed by their co-religionists. It was this idea that prompted Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the country’s founding father, to campaign for the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslim population of British India. Jinnah came up with what he called the “two nations theory,” according to which India was inhabited not by one Indian nation but by two, a Hindu nation and Muslim nation. The notion that religion was a legitimate basis for interaction with people and states around the world was to inform the making of foreign policy from the time of Pakistan’s emergence as an independent state. Initially, basing foreign policy on religious affiliation was a weak motive. It has become stronger because of the way Islamic groups have increased their presence in the country. Islam as a motivating factor now inspires both the citizenry as well as those who govern the country. The initial push for a foreign policy that factored in religion came from the Jamaat-e-Islami, the most important religious group in Pakistan before the arrival of radical Islam. The Jamaat did not favor the idea of Pakistan; however, once Pakistan came into existence, it began to advance

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Islamic internationalism. As the Jamaat was an important force in the country’s large cities, Pakistan’s rulers had to take notice of its stance. The party adopted politics of agitation to advance its agenda. It chose both domestic and external issues to build support for itself, in particular in the urban areas. In 1954, it brought its members out onto the streets of urban Punjab to agitate against the Ahmadiya community, a sect of Islam founded in the Punjab in the early twentieth century, as un-Islamic. The Jamaat wanted the government to declare that the Ahmadiyas were not Muslims. The government did not accept the demand. The protests became violent and most of the Punjab was put under martial law, a move that gave the military a taste for politics. The first time a development outside the country’s borders agitated the Pakistani population was two years later, in 1956, when the moves by Britain and France against Egypt, which had nationalized the Suez Canal, led to what came to be called the Suez Crisis. The demonstrations against the actions by the European nations in the Middle East caught the government in Pakistan by surprise. The Jamaat was behind the demonstrations. The fact that the US government under President Dwight Eisenhower moved decisively against the Europeans resulted in the creation of a favorable impression about America in Pakistan. That did not last long once Washington declared support for Israel to be in its strategic interest. Since then, Islamic parties in Pakistan have moved even further away and become more radical in their thinking and the ideology they espouse. This has happened for a variety reasons including the way the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan was negated and also the close economic and social links that were to develop between Pakistan and the Middle East. These links were there initially because of the way in which Pakistan was created as a state for the Muslims of India. By emphasizing religion as the basis of nationhood, Jinnah had implicitly created a link between Pakistan and the Muslim world. This link was strengthened because of the high respect in which Abdul Ala Maududi was held in the Arab world. Maududi was the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami and was its leader until his death. His copious work focused on many aspects of Islam, in particular the religion’s political side. He was of the view that those whose faith was Islam had to be governed by Islamic ways; that Islam could not be kept apart from economic management and governance. In Islam, there was no separation of state and religion. These ideas resonated well in many parts of the world, in particular Egypt. At the time Maududi was doing most of his work, Egypt was in the process of freeing itself from colonial rule and Western influence. Maududi also had influence in Saudi Arabia, which had developed its own Islamic ideology, Wahabism, which overlapped in many respects with Maududi’s thought.6 The influence of Wahabism and Maududi came to Pakistan via the country’s temporary migrants to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Millions of Pakistanis migrated to the Middle East after the fourfold increase in the price of petroleum engineered by the Muslim oil-producing nations of the area. The first increase took place in 1974 when the Arabs, disturbed by the unequivocal support for Israel by the US, decided to increase the price of oil. Five years later, there was another increase, this time provoked by the Iranians following the Islamic Revolution in that country led by Ayatollah Khomeni. These increases in the price of oil resulted in windfall gains by the oil-producing and -exporting countries. Middle Eastern governments in receipt of this money spent part of it on construction. Millions of construction workers needed for these projects came from Pakistan, in particular from northern Punjab, the Northwest Frontier Province (the NWFP), and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. These workers went for fixed contracts, never more than five years. They went without their families, lived in workers’ camps, and came under the influence of the religious teachers who led prayers at the camps and gave sermons on Islam. How Islam was under threat by the West was a common theme of these sermons. Once back in Pakistan, the workers brought with them the conservative version of Islam and also a deep concern for the Palestinian cause. Their thinking was to have a profound impact on Pakistani society and politics. According to Olivier Roy, “In the cases of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Islamo-nationalism seems to have been superseded by radical Islamic-transnationalism.”7

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Basing foreign policy on religion has set Pakistan apart from most other Muslim countries. Roy wrote, “If neo-fundamentalist movements, conservative or radical, have spread among a part of the Muslim population, it is partly because the Islamist parties of the 1980s have subsided as an international and revolutionary force.”8 Most of the Muslim world, in particular the countries in the Middle East, moved from an attachment to international Islam and came to espouse nationalism. This did not happen in Pakistan.

The Obama administration and its evolving approach towards the world of Islam Barack Obama, while a candidate for the US presidency, was put on the defensive by the conservatives in his country who vehemently opposed his candidacy. There were rumors that Obama was a “closet Muslim” and that he would turn the US against Israel. At one rally for Senator John McCain, a woman shocked the Republican candidate by saying that she was very afraid of Obama because he was an Arab. “No, ma’am,” responded McCain, “he’s not; he is a decent man, a family man,” perhaps implying that an Arab could be neither. This exchange illustrated how low the discourse on Islam had sunk in some segments of US society. It was clear that, once elected president, Obama had to undertake a massive repair job on the frayed relations between the US and the Muslim world. Obama began to signal a change in US policy towards the Muslim world right from the day he assumed office. In his much anticipated inaugural speech, he said, “To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” America was well equipped to deal with a diverse world, “for we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness. We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus, and nonbelievers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth.” But, at the same time, Obama was anxious to underscore that, by reaching out to the Muslim world, he would not weaken his country’s resolve to fight terrorism inspired by the extremist elements in its societies. We will not apologize for our way of life; nor will we waver in its defense. And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You cannot outlast us and we will defeat you. On 27 January, President Obama chose an Arab TV station, the Saudi-financed but Dubai-based Al Arabiya network, for his first interview with a foreign news group. He said, “My job is to communicate to the American people that the Muslim world is filled with extraordinary people who simply want to live their lives and see their children live better lives,” signaling that he believed that the Muslim faith did not mean that those who followed it were any different from those of other religions. “My job to the Muslim is to communicate that the Americans are not your enemy.” The relationship between America and the world of Islam was a two-way street on which both sides needed to travel. These are early indications that there will be more substance in the way the Obama administration will approach Muslims, including those who are citizens of the US. The US president was rightly putting considerable emphasis on tone. He repeatedly used the words “respect” or “respectful” in the Al Arabiya interview, saying the US had to drop many of its misconceptions and preconceptions. Now that the elections are over, he had no hesitation in admitting that “I have Muslim members of my family” and that he had spent four formative years of his life in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim nation. “It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this [change in tone] after a Bush administration that thought public diplomacy was a bolt-on that could be supplied by Madison Avenue, which would

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rebrand America and win back market share from the jihadis,” wrote the Financial Times in an editorial after the Al Arabiya interview. “Mr Obama, more grounded in reality, has long realized one of his main tasks as president would be to restore America’s reputation in the world at large and in the Arab and Muslim worlds in particular. He has made a good start.”9 But it is obvious that repairing the damage done by the administration of President George W. Bush will take more than a change in tone. It will involve a change in policies with respect to the Middle East and such non-Arab Muslim countries as Afghanistan and Pakistan, where not only the US but also the rest of the world are confronting problems created by the rise of Islamic radicalism and militancy. While the US government’s response to 9/11 contributed to the ill-feeling against the US, the Pew Center maintained that it had existed even before that event: “ … a majority in the Islamic countries told us that the US support of Israel is the top reason that the people in these countries dislike America.”10 Quite properly, the new American president recognized that he would be judged by the Muslim world, “not by my words but by actions.” One of the actions came in the form of the dispatch of George Mitchell to the Middle East and Richard Holbrooke to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both special envoys had impressive dossiers. Mitchell had helped in the settlement of the Irish problem while Holbrooke was the man who pushed the “Dayton accord” that brought peace to the Middle East. Obama’s approach towards the Muslim world seems to have three elements. He wants to demonstrate that he and other senior leaders in his administration will show real respect for the Muslims and their faith. He wishes to change the way the US government is handling the problem created by the rise of radical Islam and its consequences for the US and other Western countries, and he seems to be interested in being somewhat more even in approaching the Palestine–Israel conflict. The new American administration began by changing the rhetoric concerning Islam and the Muslim world and appointing a senior person to be its envoy to the Middle East. The first indication of change came in the inaugural address on 20 January. But a great deal will depend on how the real problems that face the Muslim world in the Middle East and West and South Asia are addressed. One way of tackling the problem that Pakistan and the world faces in that country’s mountainous regions is to show an even hand in the Middle East by removing the widely held perception in the Muslim world, in particular in Pakistan, that both sides in the Palestine–Israel conflict have rights as well as obligations.

Notes 1 Relations between Pakistan and the US have been the subject of serious academic inquiry for some time. The first book on the subject appeared in 1963. See W. Norman Brown, United States and India and Pakistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). More recent work is by Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947– 2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 2001). 2 Pakistan’s economic success during the period in office of President Ayub Khan was the subject of considerable inquiry. See, for instance, Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan’s Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). 3 The story of Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan conflict is well told in Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York, The Penguin Press, 2004). 4 “American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World”, remarks by Andrew Kohut to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, February 27, 2003. 5 See, for instance, Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004). 6 See Vali Reza Nasr, Jamaat-e-Islami: The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994) for a detailed and authoritative account of the influence of the Jamaat-e-Islami on Pakistan’s political development and also on other Muslim countries in the area. 7 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004): 65. 8 Roy, op. cit.: 58. 9 “Obama brings New Tone to the Mideast: President’s Interview with Arab TV could be Turning Point”, Financial Times, January 28, 2009: 10. 10 “American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World”, remarks by Andrew Kohut to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, February 27, 2003.

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Part III

Country studies North Africa

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18 The US and Algeria Hostility, pragmatism, and partnership Yahia H. Zoubir

Introduction Unlike relations with its Moroccan and Tunisian neighbors, US relations with Algeria have been rather complex. While they did not reach the level of enmity that characterized relations with Libya until recently, US relations with Algeria have often been on a collision course. The primary reason derives from the determinants of Algeria’s foreign policy, which have been shaped by the geopolitical (regional) context, the country’s historical experience, ideological imperatives, as well as the economic choices imposed by post-colonial conditions.1 Good or bad relations between Algeria and any country are gauged against the position that that country adopts vis-à-vis these determinants and the perceptions that Algerian policymakers have about the intentions and actions of the outsider. Thus, co-operation or conflict will depend on how the outsider acts toward what Algerian policymakers feel is favorable or unfavorable to the country’s national interests. Furthermore, one element which has remained relatively constant in Algerian foreign policy is to decide on the type of relationship it will adopt toward the outsider based on the latter’s either close or more neutral links with the (challenging) country or countries, especially regional actors (namely, Morocco) whose interests are hostile to Algeria’s. Undoubtedly, up to now, the close US relations with Morocco, to the detriment of Algeria’s perceived interests, have prevented closer ties between Algeria and the US and forced the US to seek a virtually impossible balance in its relationship with the two regional rivals. Perhaps the most salient factor that affected US–Algerian relations, especially during the first three decades following Algeria’s independence from France in 1962, was Algeria’s historical experience and the role that the US played during the country’s war for national independence. The war experience has greatly impacted Algerians’ perceptions of the outside world and their attitudes toward various countries. Long after independence, Algerians remembered which countries supported them in their struggle and which did not. For example, while they appreciated the young senator John F. Kennedy’s speech in 1957 in which he supported their country’s independence, Algerians were resentful of President Dwight Eisenhower’s support for France’s war in Algeria.2 Thus, Algerians paid tribute to Kennedy and named a square in Algiers after him, but they continued to view the US as a country that supported France’s war against them and NATO as an alliance that assisted colonial France in its destructive actions in their country. The option that Washington preferred in the late 1950s was for the French to reach the same kind of successful compromise with the Algerian nationalist leaders as they had with those in Morocco and Tunisia. The problem, though, is that, although Americans doubted the National Liberation Front (FLN) was a communist organization, as the French claimed, Algerian nationalists, unlike their counterparts in Morocco and Tunisia, did not elicit as much sympathy from Washington because of hesitations about the FLN leaders, who became increasingly more radical as the war, which caused tens of thousands of victims, dragged on.

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For its part, the FLN leadership had arrived at the conclusion that the US would not put the necessary pressure on France to conclude an agreement with the nationalist movement because of France’s key importance in the Atlantic Alliance and the anti-communist containment strategy. Clearly, although US–Algerian relations have improved considerably in recent years, the perceptions formed during those years still continue to influence, albeit at a much lesser degree, the relationship between the two countries. Furthermore, the US, for its part, failed to understand that the foreign policy that Algerian policymakers pursued after independence was genuinely non-aligned3 and that the affinities it might have had with the USSR, revolutionary movements, and China drew from the war experience and from the moral, financial, military, and diplomatic support that Algerian nationalists obtained from these countries and groups. The US also could not understand what an American scholar understood early on: “Algerian leaders … judged others only by their comportment toward the Algerian cause.”4 Therefore, following the country’s independence the country’s elites felt that they owed a moral and ideological debt toward those who either supported them or were under colonial domination and played a leading role in organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the non-aligned movement (NAM), which supported independence and self-determination. Algeria’s support for national liberation movements was genuine; the country committed to those anti-colonial struggles by providing military, political, and financial support. However, with respect to those so-called moderate third world countries, such as Tunisia or Morocco (especially under Hassan II, who inherited the throne in 1961), which maintained cozy relations with the West following their independence, they elicited suspicion, if not disdain, in the eyes of Algerians. Moreover, one of the early constants of Algerian foreign policy was not only to secure political independence but also to achieve economic independence, which obviously required elaborate commercial, technological, and financial co-operation with the Western world, without, however, falling into the trap of dependency. Algeria’s main foreign policy objectives thus consisted of securing national independence and national sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency through a restructuring of international economic relations, as well as the establishment of equitable bilateral economic relations, especially with France, the former colonial power, and with the US, the world superpower, to guarantee internal development. To achieve this goal, Algerians sought the decoupling of economic relations from ideological and political issues. Algeria’s economic pragmatism reached it peak in the 1970s when the leaders decided to lay the foundations for national economic take-off. This was a difficult task for, while they instituted “neutral” commercial relations with their foreign partners, they remained nonetheless attached to their fundamental principles of non-alignment, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, and national independence in their political–strategic interface with their partners at the multilateral level, the best illustration being the struggle for a new international economic order (NIEO) in which Algeria took a leading role in the 1970s.

Hostility and pragmatism in US–Algerian relations Despite many attempts to win over Algerian nationalists in the 1950s and officials in the administration who nudged France to extract itself from its colonial policies and thus grant Algeria its independence, the US failed primarily because of its continued backing for France, an important NATO ally which was courted by the USSR. The support the USSR provided to Algerian nationalists, albeit cautious and limited, led to closer relations between postindependence Algeria and the USSR, America’s primary contender for world hegemony. Owing to the nature of its confrontation with France, the attitude of the West, and its own ideological choices, Algeria took radical positions on foreign policy that served its perceived national interests regardless of whether they displeased a major power such as the US. Support for national liberation movements and the struggle against Western “imperialism”

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became the sine qua non of Algeria’s foreign policy, which earned the country a great deal of credibility and influence in the NAM, the OAU, and other international organizations. This position of leadership complicated matters in US–Algerian relations, especially in the first few years after independence. In 1962–63, the US had hoped to develop the same type of ties with Algeria it had entered since the 1950s with Morocco and Tunisia, Algeria’s more conservative neighbors. But, in spite of its noteworthy geopolitical and strategic location, the central Maghreb region, i.e., Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, never held the same significance for the US as the Near East has. On the whole, the US sought to prevent communist influence in the region and to promote Western interests. France was left with the task of guaranteeing that the region remains closed to Soviet penetration. With respect to Algeria, US policy was articulated by Dean Rusk, explaining that the objective was: 1/To prevent significant influence or control within the bounds of Algeria or over Algeria’s external policies by communists or any other powers hostile to the United States; 2/To gain sufficient continuing influence in Algeria to prevent adoption of policies or actions on its part inimical to US interests and to promote those which directly or indirectly support our interests; 3/To extend and strengthen Algeria’s ties with the free world.5 Algeria’s agenda, however, was different and ran counter to US objectives and ideology. Even though staunchly non-aligned, Algeria’s privileged relations with America’s arch enemies led the two countries on a collision course. The mutual mistrust and misperceptions that followed President Ahmed Ben Bella’s visit to Cuba in 1962, especially his joining Fidel Castro in condemning the presence of US bases in Guantanamo Bay,6 had lasting effects. Indeed, the impact was such that “the image of Algeria’s becoming a second Cuba was frequently evoked in US policy circles.”7 From then on, the perception in Washington was that Algeria was the “bad guy,” contrary to Morocco and Tunisia, which were viewed as the “good guys.”8 The problems between the two countries were exacerbated as a result of the role Algerians believed the US played during the Moroccan–Algerian conflict in fall 1963. Moroccan irredentism was at the origin of the conflict, but the confrontation took the form of an ideological confrontation between a country closely associated with the West, especially the US, and one that prided itself on being revolutionary, albeit non-aligned, and antagonistic to “imperialistic” maneuvers in the region. Whatever the exact role it played during that conflict, Algerians were truly convinced that the US provided logistical support to the Moroccans.9 Furthermore, Algerian leaders were persuaded that the US was intent on rolling back their revolution and preventing that experience from being emulated in other third world countries. US refusal to sell them, that very same year, badly needed military equipment for the ill-equipped National Popular Army (ANP)10 helped confirm Algerian suspicions vis-à-vis US intentions, despite the economic assistance that President John F. Kennedy was still trying to provide to Algeria. In November 1963, the Soviets agreed to supply modern military equipment to Algeria,11 a decision which irritated the US.12 The mutual distrust led to a closer political and military relationship between the Soviet Union and Algeria, an association that has continued with Russia to this day. The deterioration in US–Algerian relations—which incidentally did not displease the French, always suspicious of the intentions of their American ally in the region—was aggravated by Algeria’s nationalization programs, which directly affected US companies and contributed to the development of closer relations between Algiers and Moscow. Algerians’ anti-imperialist discourse, however, coincided only marginally with Moscow’s; rather, it emanated from their own historical experience. This meant that Algerians were also suspicious of Soviet intentions, the best illustration being Algerians’ categorical refusal to grant the Soviets any military or naval bases13 and their critical attitude toward Moscow in 1967, charging the Soviets with treason vis-à-vis their Middle Eastern friends, and in the 1970s, accusing them of having sacrificed the Vietnamese in the name of détente with Washington.

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Under the rule of Ahmed Ben Bella (1962–65), relations between the US and Algeria were mediocre; the regime’s policies were confused. Ben Bella, whose close circle included all kinds of “revolutionaries,” did not pursue a consistent foreign policy, even if he enjoyed great support in the third world and in communist countries. Therefore, when the Minister of Defense and his cohort overthrew Ben Bella on June 19, 1965, US officials were hopeful that relations with Algeria would improve.14 However, those hopes were short-lived, and relations continued to worsen until they were finally broken during the Israeli–Arab war of June 1967; they were renewed seven years later. The Palestinian question, in particular, so dear to the Algerian state and society, and the Middle East in general, have remained major issues of contention between Algeria and the US, whose support for Israel greatly disconcerted Algerians. Incidentally, Algeria’s unequivocal position on the Palestinian cause also brought it at loggerheads with most Middle East countries, which sought, through various schemes, to control the Palestinian movement, whereas Algerians, drawing from their own experience, supported an autonomous Palestinian organization, which explained its unambiguous support since 1974 for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people—a recognition that allowed Yasser Arafat to address the United Nations in the same year. Today, they call for the unity of the Palestinian movement (PLO, Hamas … ). In response to Algeria’s increasing power not only in the North African region, but in international affairs in general, the US decided in the 1960s to strengthen the military capabilities of Algeria’s Maghreb neighbors, Tunisia and Morocco. This was stated publicly by a US official who argued that, as Algeria “has aroused the fear and suspicion of its neighbors … we have therefore responded with minimal programs for Morocco and Tunisia designed purely for defensive purposes.”15 This attitude did much to strengthen the distrust between Algeria and the US. Other competing foreign policy objectives prevented any betterment in political relations: Algeria’s staunch support for the Palestinians, the Vietnamese, and other “anti-imperialist” causes ran counter to US policy and interests. American policymakers were increasingly concerned about the supply of Soviet weaponry to Algeria and feared that the strengthening of Algerian military capabilities would represent a threat to Israel and to pro-US Arab states. As put by Dean Rusk, “now, the intrusion of major arms into the Middle East by the Soviet Union in such countries as Egypt and Syria and Algeria raises problems not only affecting the security of Israel but also affecting the security of neighboring Arab countries.”16 What is clear, however, is that Algeria’s involvement in the Middle East, particularly the close relationship that developed between Saudi King Faisal and Boumedienne displeased the US, which saw its interests threatened by the two leaders’ firm positions on the Palestinian and other Arab questions. Notwithstanding Algeria’s pragmatism, non-alignment, and its cautious relationship with Moscow, Americans still, quite erroneously, perceived Algeria as a proSoviet, radical state. This image of Algeria17 persisted well into the 1990s, despite the shifts that Algerian foreign policy underwent in the 1980s. Despite their close military and political relations, Algerians pursued goals that often conflicted with those of their Soviet counterparts. Algeria’s resolute non-alignment was indisputable, but a close relationship was developed with the Soviets as a counterweight to the country’s considerable economic ties with France and the US. Tumultuous relations with France also led Algerians to turn to the US—despite the absence of diplomatic relations—for technological know-how with which they were fascinated. For its part, the US was interested in improving relations with Algeria for fear that a deterioration in Franco-Algerian rapport would lead to greater Soviet influence in Algeria, thus creating a destabilizing situation in Morocco and Tunisia. The interesting evolution of US–Algerian relations was in the area of economic exchanges. The American private sector displayed a strong interest in the Algerian hydrocarbons market, especially in the field of natural gas.18 Within a few years, trade between the two countries grew at a rapid pace, making the US Algeria’s main trade customer. The signing in fall 1969

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of an agreement between the El Paso Natural Gas Company with the Algerian state-owned petroleum corporation, SONATRACH, seemed to augur a new era.19 Pragmatism underlined the new rapport. For the US, the agreement was meant not only to fulfill its needs in energy supplies, but also to entice Algerians to move away from the Soviet camp. For the Algerians, the need to diversify their exchanges and to obtain the most modern technology for its industrializing efforts dictated the new pragmatism. However, as the US was soon to find out, pragmatism did not signify an abandonment of revolutionary convictions regarding world affairs; Algeria’s radical position in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), its leadership in the NIEO, and its militant position in the NAM illustrated the continuity of its positions and convictions in international affairs. These convictions were antithetical to US interests, to say the least. Algeria’s solidarity with Vietnam was so unshakable that it even led to conflict with the Soviets over their policy of détente with the US, which Algerians felt was being made at the expense of progressive third world regimes.20 The situation in the Middle East created even further tensions between the US and Algeria due mostly to American support for Israel during the October 1973 war; Algeria subsequently favored the Arab oil embargo and eventually joined, along with Syria, Libya, and other so-called “radical states,” the Front of Steadfastness opposed to “normalization” of Arab states with Israel. In the 1970s, pragmatism prescribed that the absence of diplomatic relations with the US, which was on the verge of becoming Algeria’s main trading partner, was abnormal. Hence, in November 1974, the two countries restored diplomatic ties, although Algeria did not send an ambassador until 1977. In 1974, relations between Algeria and the US seemed to have been at a turning point due to the near end of the Vietnam war—a major bone of contention in US–Algerian relations21—but also to other critical world events. Even before the oil embargo, US officials had already recognized the need for multiple sources of supply. In 1971, a US official highlighted the importance of the North Africa region in general and of Algeria in particular: North Africa is a significant area of the world, at the hub where Europe, Africa, and the Middle East meet. It lies on our route of access to Southern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. It is a significant source of energy for Europe and will increasingly become so for us. We have, without forgetting our friends, adapted to change in North Africa. We see its nations as individual entities. … We see our relations with them as important to our own interests. We can preserve those interests so long as we are prepared to continue an active role in the area and to find foundations for our relationships built genuinely on common interests.22 The perception grew in the US that Algeria was a state to be reckoned with not only economically, but also politically. Algeria’s pivotal role in international politics was acknowledged by Henry Kissinger, who recognized that this nation ought to be included in the Arab–Israeli peace process if the latter had any chance of success. As William B. Quandt reported, once Kissinger had obtained Algeria’s support for the Geneva conference, in Algiers in December 1973, “Boumedienne would thereafter be kept well informed on the peace negotiations, for Kissinger believed Algeria’s endorsement of his strategy would make it easier for both [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat and [Syrian President Hafez] Asad to resist radical Arab pressures.”23 Obviously, Kissinger recognized that Algeria’s credentials as a credible revolutionary state could influence recalcitrant radical Arab leaders. His second visit in 1974 and Boumedienne’s meeting the same year with Richard Nixon in Washington not only highlighted Algeria’s importance in US Middle East policy but also paved the way for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. Earlier hopes for an improvement in US–Algerian relations, however, were dashed following the eruption in 1975 of the conflict in the former Spanish colony, Western Sahara, which

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pitted the Algerian-backed independence Sahrawi movement, POLISARIO Front, against Morocco, which claimed sovereignty over the territory. The period when the conflict broke out coincided with a polarization in the Middle East, but also with greater Soviet involvement in Africa due to the break-up of the Portuguese colonial empire. Algeria’s interests in Africa overlapped with Soviet objectives, thus bringing the two countries into greater co-operation. The US, which, according to Kissinger, could not allow “another Angola on the Atlantic,” put pressure on the Spaniards to cede the former colony to the Moroccans and in fact gave the green light for the latter to invade the territory.24 Thus, promises of betterment in relations even under President Carter were short-lived on account of the US pro-Moroccan position on the Western Sahara.25 The question of Western Sahara greatly poisoned relations between the two countries in spite of the fact that this was a regional rather than an East–West issue. The conflict brought the US and Morocco closer, especially in the area of military and political co-operation. The greatest blow to the Algerians was the US decision to sell offensive weapons to Morocco. Owing to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration had shifted its position from a regionalist approach to the Middle East and Africa to a globalist course. This became even more pronounced under the Reagan administration, obsessed with forging a “strategic consensus” in the Middle East to contain what was perceived as a global Soviet threat. Algeria’s decisive role in helping to free the American hostages in Iran did nothing to induce Americans to change their attitude toward Algeria. Although some officials did not necessarily see Algeria as a Soviet client state, they nonetheless believed that all-out support should be given to Morocco. The overwhelming perception was—and still is—that Morocco is a stable kingdom and a reliable friend of the US. As Richard B. Parker, who served as ambassador in both Algeria and Morocco, put it, “the United States has over-identified itself with Morocco … in the pervasive perception in Washington that King Hassan (1961–99) is an Arab ally, and he serves as a surrogate for the United States by protecting US interests throughout Africa and the Middle East.”26 Obviously, the perception of Algerians is one of “under-identification.” Regardless of the change of regime in Algeria, following Boumedienne’s death in December 1978, and the emergence of a more pragmatic Algerian foreign policy, the Reagan administration showed no particular predisposition toward Algeria, whose image as a radical state and a Soviet ally remained as strong as ever. Insensitive to the positive mediating role Algerians had played in resolving the Iranian hostage crisis, the US showed no gratitude. The US decision, under strong support from Secretary of State Alexander Haig to sell 108 M-60A3 tanks to Morocco,27 in spite of proclaimed US neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict, was greatly resented by the Algerians who interpreted it as an affront. Notwithstanding Algeria’s greater pragmatism, military co-operation between the US and Morocco intensified in the 1980s, an occurrence which deepened the mutual distrust between Algeria and the US. Clearly, US perceptions of Algeria showed little sign of change despite public statements regarding Algeria’s importance and its independence. For instance, one official insisted that: Algeria is an important country [that] has great influence in international forums. It wields influence far beyond what its wealth, population, and its political power ordinarily would warrant because it is consistently well-prepared to make its mark on key North– South issues. It makes effective use of its revolutionary credentials, and it steers a course which avoids becoming beholden to a single state.28 However, the traditional view prevailed. In policy terms, this meant that conservative, proWestern Tunisia and, more particularly, Morocco—which was incorporated into the “strategic consensus,” designed to link the Rapid Deployment Force (later Central Command) with the local armies with which the US established joint commissions—should be given support.29

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A rapprochement between Algiers and Washington, during President Ronald Reagan’s first term, was quasi impossible because of the deep incongruities in the two countries’ foreign policies: Grenada, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Libya, and, of course, the Middle East. With respect to the last mentioned, Algerians felt that the close US strategic alliance with Israel left no choice to the Arabs, especially those of the Front of Steadfastness (Algeria, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and the PLO), but to turn to the Soviet camp to offset US–Israeli power. Algerians perceived the signing of the Camp David accords as Egypt’s capitulation to “imperialism and Zionism.” A number of factors in the 1980s, however, led to a relative warming in relations: the appointment of George Schultz as US Secretary of State, growing US concerns with Libya in the region, Vice President George Bush’s visit to Algeria in 1983, and, most importantly, President Chadli Bendjedid’s official visit to the US in April 1985,30 the first of its kind for an Algerian president. Bendjedid’s visit resulted in various trade and cooperation agreements in many sectors (hydrocarbons, agriculture, aeronautics, and—albeit insignificant—military, etc.) and in better communication between the two countries. By the late 1980s, the US perception of Algeria had improved. Even though Morocco continued to hold a privileged position in the region, the US progressively displayed a relatively more neutral attitude toward the conflict in the Western Sahara and supported the United Nations secretary general’s efforts for a negotiated solution. The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Algeria in 1988 (broken in 1976), the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, Bendjedid’s economic liberalization, and the decline in Soviet power were some of the factors which allayed the concerns that US policymakers may have had with regard to the Maghreb region. The value of this relatively long historical background is to better understand the factors that shaped the perceptions that Algerians and Americans have of each other, but also the ambiguity that characterized US policy toward the Algerian crisis in the 1990s. Before discussing that crisis and the US response, one must make a few points in order to better appreciate the evolution of US policy in the Maghreb, a region which, until recently, Americans seldom considered as being a vital area for the US.31 Naturally, during certain periods, the US showed greater economic and political interest than was customary, e.g., the Second World War, the decolonization period in the 1950s and 1960s, the conflict in the Western Sahara, and the “global war on terror” since 9/11. Whatever one might think about the close political and military relationship with Morocco, for instance, the geostrategic importance of that country was never critical for US strategic concerns.32 For better or worse, and despite more conspicuous US presence since 9/11, France remains the key player in the region. This, however, does not mean that the US is oblivious to the events taking place in the Maghreb. The stability of the region has always been of primary significance to the US, as instability could potentially impact upon European affairs, especially around the northern Mediterranean shores, as occurred in the mid-1990s during the Algerian crisis. Although aware of the socio-economic and political problems characteristic of each Maghreb country, US policymakers in fact downplayed the potential consequences of cyclical riots in the Maghreb and doubted that they would threaten the survival of the incumbent regimes. Furthermore, in the late 1980s, they were not troubled by the rise of radical Islamism in Tunisia and Algeria, having great confidence in the capacity of the Maghreb leaders to contain the problems. In other words, the emerging Islamist movement was not seen as a regional, let alone an international, menace. In that same period, the US attitude toward Algeria was much more positive than it had ever been. Both the Reagan and Bush administrations were impressed with Algeria’s efforts to liberalize the economy. In particular, they had great esteem for President Chadli Bendjedid, whom they considered a pragmatic man capable of carrying out liberal reforms that could prepare the ground for US investments.33 This partly explains why they implicitly supported the Algerian regime for fear that it might be destabilized following the

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October 1988 far-reaching riots and abstained from criticizing the brutal way in which the authorities handled those riots, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people, mostly youngsters. A few major regional and international events in the late 1980s minimized even further the importance of the Maghreb to the US: the slow end of the cold war, the rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco and the resumption of diplomatic relations, and the potential resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. With respect to Algeria, although pleased with it, the Bush administration paid little attention to the liberalization process which began in 1989. Officials at the State and Defense Departments were encouraged by the evolution of the situation in Algeria: The United States is aware that Bendjedid is caught between conservatives and reformers, and under pressure from fundamentalists. We see real change happening in Algeria and we would like to see more serious moves toward liberalization. There is a lot of progress in Algeria—both economically and politically and we hope that it will bring good results.34 Another official concurred with this assessment and hoped that “Algeria could provide more incentives for investments.”35 The views in the Defense Department were basically similar: “The things happening in Algeria are the type of things we like to hear, market economics, democratization, and so on. If this succeeds, it will be great for Algeria, but also for US– Algerian relations. Algeria is the most important country in the Maghreb.”36 However, despite the niceties in these speeches, the US failed to extend any support to strengthen the process of liberalization in Algeria in the critical years 1989–91.37

The US and the question of Islamism in Algeria The two questions of Islamism and terrorism constituted a major factor of disagreement between Algerians and Americans. On the first question, the US has exercised flexibility toward the phenomenon which derives from the fact that there is no one American definition, but several “definitions” of Islamism, as well as ambivalence vis-à-vis Islamism that has marked US policy for decades. Hence, US policy depends on the category in which a given Islamist movement has been classified.38 This ambivalence was reflected in the diverse positions regarding Islamism within the US government between those defined as “accommodationists” and those depicted as “confrontationists.”39 The first saw no danger emanating from “moderate” Islamism perceived as a natural progression in Muslim societies; they also envisaged the possibility of moderate Islamists compelling authoritarian regimes to democratize and open up the political system to various forces. They made the serious mistake, however, of practically confusing Islamism with Islam, thus overlooking the important fact that Islamism is a political phenomenon that exploits the Islamic religion, to which it gives a new interpretation, in order to achieve the movement’s political and ideological objectives. Be this as it may, the main rationale for accommodationists’ support for Islamists was part of the democratization process which, in their view, should integrate Islamists. For their part, “confrontationists” saw Islamism as a threat to Western interests in general and US interests in particular. Thus, the US government should support the incumbent regimes in eradicating the phenomenon. The US and Algeria also had differing positions on terrorism. Whereas Algerians distinguish between legitimate armed struggle and revolutionary violence against occupation, the US tends to lump all groups under the same appellation. Algerians, who fought a revolutionary war against the French, using violence as an instrument of struggle, would never characterize the PLO and its armed branch Fatah as a terrorist organization and neither would they demonize Hamas because the group is seen as a movement of resistance. For Algerians, these organizations not only have the legitimate right to fight occupation but they must do so to free themselves. This explains why, although Algerians support an international convention on terrorism,

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they warn against “any position or proviso which would undermine the legitimate peoples’ struggle to recover their freedom or to discredit a particular religious community.”40 This call that Algeria’s foreign minister made at the United Nations in October 2008 is obviously made in reference to the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance to Israeli occupation and to the attacks suffered by Islam because of the behavior of some extremists. American officials have difficulty understanding Algerians’ unshakable position on this issue which is the natural extension of Algeria’s historic experience. As mentioned earlier, with regard to Islamism, the US did not perceive its rise in Algeria (and in Tunisia) as a threat to its interests; the main perceived menace to US interests in the region continued to be Libya (terrorism, chemical plant, etc.). The overwhelming victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the Algerian municipal elections in June 1990 took the US by surprise, but there was little concern about the consequences of such a triumph by the FIS. The main area of concern for the US in summer 1990 was the Gulf, following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops on August 2, 1990. Undoubtedly, US policymakers were aware that the support that the FIS showed for Saddam Hussein was troublesome in that it meant that the FIS in power would not uphold US interests; but, from an American perspective, this was not any worse than the incumbent regime’s opposition to US intervention and its call to solve the problem within a regional context, namely through the Arab League. In November 1991, a State Department official declared that “Libya voted 14 percent of the time with the US at the United Nations, Algeria voted only 7 percent!”41 Algeria’s image as a state whose foreign policy goals threatened US interests prevailed. In fact, to this day, Algeria has voted 74 percent against US positions at the United Nations.42 Although such votes are no different from those that most Arab countries, even those close to the US, cast at the UN,43 the US gave greater significance to Algeria’s because they were seen as the votes of an influential state intent on undermining US interests. Before the fateful Algerian legislative elections of December 26, 1991, the US still seemed unconcerned with the development of the situation in Algeria. A State Department official argued that “In general the United States is paying more attention to the Maghreb [because of the problems of democratization, human rights, economics, etc.]; but, we have asked Europe to look more into the region and to provide help.”44 However, he admitted that, in the Tunisian case, “fundamentalism” represented a “challenge to the United States.” A very senior White House official candidly admitted that, We had little focus on Algeria; Algeria was not a preoccupation for us. There was not much discussion besides the big fear that an extremist Islamist group would come to power and would then export terrorism like Iran did. But, we knew there was not much we could do with respect to Algeria. We had no real policy. I remember Brent Scowcroft [Bush’s National Security Advisor] telling us that there was some trouble in Algeria, but there was not much discussion about it.45 In summary, up to the cancellation on January 11, 1992 of the second round of the legislative elections, scheduled for 16 January, the US lacked a clear policy toward Algeria. There is no indication that the US saw the FIS as an extremist party that should be barred from coming to power. But this does not signify that all officials in the US government were not concerned over the rise of radical Islamists and the possibility of their coming to power. In fact, the victory of Algerian Islamists in the first round was seen by some policymakers as confirmation of the latent power of Islam in African and Middle Eastern politics.46 The fact that Algeria was never vital to US strategic, economic, and political interests and that the US had only insignificant influence in that country provides part of the explanation as to why Washington pursued an ambivalent policy during the civil conflict that destabilized Algeria throughout the 1990s.

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Energy and the war on terror47 The civil unrest which arose in the early 1990s compelled the US government to pay closer attention to the evolution of the situation in Algeria; this overlapped with a period during which US policymakers felt that radical Islam had become a threat to America’s interests. Nonetheless, insofar as Algeria was concerned, influential groups in Washington (within and outside the government) believed that conceivably the accession to power of “moderate” Islamists, provided they were not opposed to US interests (acceptance of Israel, free flow of oil, and the liberalization of markets), might be profitable to US interests. Those favorable to moderate Islamists coming to power felt that such happenstance would result in the democratizing of the authoritarian regime in Algeria—as well as in other countries in the Arab world. Undoubtedly, at least a fair section of the US government contemplated using Algeria as a laboratory for a “moderate” Islamist regime and establishing good rapport in the hope of “revamping our [US] image in the militant Islamic world.”48 It was precisely in that period that not only was exiled FIS leader Anouar Haddam allowed to speak freely in Washington, but US officials also consulted the leader of the genuinely moderate Islamist Movement of a Peaceful Society (formerly HAMAS), Mahfoud Nahnah. A nemesis of the FIS, Nahnah was a candidate in the November 1995 presidential election. US officials asked him about his party’s program and position on various issues. In 1995, Nahnah held talks with Martin Indyck at the National Security Council; those contacts have remained, even after the passing of Nahnah in June 2003.49 The forces who supported the idea of using Algeria as a laboratory or model pressed the Algerian government to search for compromise with the FIS, perceived in Washington as a “moderate” party. They encouraged such compromise on the premise that it would not only isolate Islamist extremists but would also bring an end to the bloodshed that spread through Algeria. While encouraging a compromise between the regime and the FIS, the US government put pressure on the Algerian authorities to carry out market reforms, to respect human rights, and to establish a more democratic system; they felt that the Algerian government’s failure to carry out such actions prolonged the civil conflict. Furthermore, although apprehensive about the Islamist movement, some US policymakers interviewed during that period downplayed the possibility of an Islamist domino effect in the region. This opinion was certainly not shared by the majority; other policymakers believed that, on the contrary, it would be a tragic mistake to allow Islamists to come to power in Algeria. Indeed, in April 1995, a hearing in Congress illustrated this evolution, and is quite reminiscent of the arguments the neoconservatives and others made after 9/11. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who needs to be quoted at length, stated unambiguously that: The crisis in Algeria … is but a microcosm of a larger problem. There are many US policymakers, some perhaps at the State Department, who emphasize that Islamic extremism is too diffuse to be called a movement … They must not be listening to the statements made by these Islamic militant groups. They may not answer to a single individual; however, they do have a common theme, a cause which drives them to take any risk necessary to achieve their end … They will always remain one entity. They are sworn to fight the “Great Satan America” for the global supremacy of Islam. In this context, it is clear that Islamic extremism and militant groups pose a direct threat to regional stability, to the fragile democracies of the African continent, and to US security interests. They overtly challenge US leadership and that of its allies by making them primary targets of their hatred and their hostility. For those who state that this is not an international problem, that the United States is beyond the reach of these terrorist groups, I can only respond by saying—remember New York! Remember the World Trade Center! For those who reiterate this is not a problem in Africa, I can only remind them that a majority of the defendants in the New York bombing trials are from African countries.50

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Nevertheless, even those opposed to Islamists blamed the Algerian government for the conditions that gave rise to the instability in the country. But a variety of factors, namely the presidential election in Algeria in November 1995, the brutality of radical Islamists, fears of the neighbors as well as inside NATO, the belief that the armed Islamists were no longer able to bring down the regime which the population now preferred as a lesser evil to Islamists, and the successes the security forces scored in the fight against the insurgency, persuaded the US government to provide “positive conditionality” to the authorities in Algiers as long as they implemented the reforms called for by the US.51 In sum, they encouraged a policy of reconciliation with and inclusion of “moderate” Islamists.52 It was inconceivable in the 1990s for any policy expert to predict the reversal in US–Algerian relations, especially since 9/11. No doubt, in addition to the factors referred to above, the oil discoveries in Algeria in the mid-1990s rendered Algeria strategically important for the US. Bouteflika’s policy after his election in 1999, despite a trying beginning, also helped better US– Algerian ties. However, this is still not enough to explain the considerable standing that Algeria currently holds in US policy in the region. Indubitably, 9/11 and the subsequent “global war on terrorism” are the main factors that set US–Algerian relations off on a new course at all levels, although signs of a new course became apparent shortly before 9/11, the best illustration being President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s official visit to the US in July 2001. Besides the success of the policy of civil concord, which the US strongly supported, Algeria had gained other good marks in Washington. Even with respect to the Middle East, Washington sensed that Algerians were not putting up hurdles to Palestinian–Israeli negotiations and thus nudged them to establish lines of communication with Israel. The most important development, however, was US recognition of the necessity of co-operating with Algeria on matters of global terrorism; in fact, Algerian security services had already enjoyed close co-operation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Security Agency (NSA) well before 9/11.

Security, political, and economic co-operation The 9/11 attacks on the US brought Algeria and the US closer together, particularly with regard to security co-operation. Beyond unequivocally condemning the attacks, the Algerian authorities joined the US-led international coalition against terrorism; they handed Washington a list of hundreds of suspected Algerian militants on the run in Europe and the US and offered their assistance in security and intelligence matters. President Bouteflika visited Washington again on November 5, 2001. His objective in meeting President Bush was to persuade him that US–Algerian relations should be strengthened, but also to share with him the view that the fight against terrorism would be in vain unless the roots were dealt with, that is the poverty and inequality that, in his opinion, globalization exacerbated. This paralleled the view of even the neoconservatives who made democracy and economic prosperity one of their mottos; in fact, the Bush administration had until 2006 made the promotion of democracy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region a national security priority, arguing that greater political freedom would weaken radical Islamism and its ideology. With respect to the fight against terrorism, the CIA, FBI, and NSA have continuously sought and obtained assistance from their Algerian counterparts who have acquired significant experience in this area. More importantly, although it was reluctant to sell Algeria lethal weapons, to avoid upsetting the military balance with Morocco, the US decided to provide Algerian security forces with effective equipment to assist them in eliminating the “remaining pockets” of armed militants. This decision is a logical result of the objectives stated in the National Security Strategy 2002, which stipulates that: We will continue to encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists. Once the regional campaign localizes the threat to a particular state,

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Y. H. Zoubir we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task.53

In October 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs William Burns, during his two-day visit to Algiers, declared that “Our bilateral relations never were so strong in the last forty years [i.e., since Algeria’s independence] as they are today.” With respect to security and military co-operation, Burns stated that “the United States supplied non-offensive military equipment to Algeria,” while emphasizing that “military cooperation has witnessed continuous and stable growth.” Burns acknowledged that co-operation between the two countries has been not only “remarkable” and “of great value,” but that “Algeria’s assistance [to the United States] helps in saving American lives and we are grateful.” As to the American side, “we are doing our best to help Algeria put an end to the terrorist phenomenon which has devastated Algeria for 10 years.”54 Soon after Burns’ trip to Algiers, Colin Powell paid a visit to Algeria—during his tour of the region—to discuss issues of military co-operation and economic exchanges. This was a reversal of the policy in the 1990s, when the US, similarly to other Western nations, refused to supply weapons to Algeria, which was then confronted with a savage guerrilla war. Indeed, a quasi arms embargo had been imposed upon Algeria, forcing her to seek alternative suppliers, such as Spain, Turkey, the former Eastern Bloc countries, South Africa, and to a lesser degree France.55 Powell’s trip in 2003 confirmed Algeria’s status as a credible partner in the region; undoubtedly, the geostrategic transformations that 9/11 caused contributed greatly to the strengthening of Algeria’s role in the Mediterranean. Thus, US–Algerian security relations have taken on considerable dimensions. The security relations had begun at the multilateral level with Algeria’s adherence to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue in 2000; Bouteflika himself paid visits in 2001 and 2002 to NATO’s headquarters in Belgium. Algeria has since participated in numerous joint military, mostly naval, exercises, such as “Active Endeavor” on the high seas. Given its geographical location and its geopolitical importance, Americans repeat ad nauseaum that Algeria is “an exceptional partner of the United States in the global war on terrorism.” Algeria has also been drawn into a regional security arrangement which includes not only the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—Libya has yet to be formally part of it), but also the Sahel states, such as Chad, Mali, Senegal, Niger, and even Nigeria. Under the pretext that thousands of al-Qaeda troops had moved to the desert astride the Maghreb–Sahel region, the US launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2002, later replaced by the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, which brings these countries together to combat terrorism in a region that has now been dubbed the “new Afghanistan.” Thus, the armed forces of the Maghreb–Sahel countries participate in military maneuvers, known as “Flintlock 2005” and “Flintlock 2007” and held every two years. Burkina Faso, the UK, the Netherlands, and France also took part in “Flintlock 2007.” The close bilateral security and military co-operation, unthinkable hitherto, developed after 9/11. Obviously, terrorism and the need to identify its components and “eradicate” them is what brought together the security services of the two countries. According to some sources, Algeria and the US set up a secret, CIA-led structure, Alliance Base, in 2005 to perform such task.56 This structure is similar to the ones that the CIA has established with other Western and Arab countries. The bilateral military co-operation was evident on the ground as US and Algerian troops worked closely together in the Algerian desert.57 Yet, the amount of US military assistance to Algeria remains insignificant. In 2007, the US provided Algeria with $806,000 within the International Military Education and Training program and a mere $731,000 in counterterrorism assistance.58 The question of US bases in the Algerian desert—to allegedly combat Islamist groups affiliated to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb—has been most interesting, and even puzzling, as both sides deny their existence. A close analysis of US military objectives in the region,

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however, demonstrates that the US military does not require permanent bases as happened in the past, or that those bases be identified as American bases. What is important is that US troops can utilize those bases whenever the necessity arises.59 In November 2006, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Peter Rodman, during a visit to Algiers, corroborated the above analysis: The United States does not want military bases in Algeria. We wish to increase the capacities of the local forces, not to open bases. We are interested in a strategic and military partnership, the training of officers and security cooperation, joint military exercises, exchange of information, purchase of military equipment, and exchanges between our officers.60 Off the record, though, some US officials admitted the existence of at least one such operational base in southern Algeria that fits this profile. But following the announcement on February 7, 2007 by the US of the creation of AFRICOM,61 the regional command for the Maghreb–Sahel, Algerians made it plain to this date that they would never agree to the establishment of foreign bases on their soil, for this would be, as Foreign Minister Mohammed Bedjaoui put it, “incompatible with Algeria’s sovereignty and independence,” and Algerian territory would not be integrated in this command.62 Algerians have argued consistently that the African Union has the necessary collective security mechanisms to deal with security issues on the continent.63 However, this did not reduce US resolve to pursue the creation of such a command in October 2007 and planning on making it operational by October 2008 at the latest. In July 2007, unofficial reports suggested that the US was negotiating with Morocco to establish AFRICOM in the kingdom. Moroccan officials, of course, can see that, if AFRICOM were established on their territory, it would terminate the Sahrawi independence movement, the POLISARIO Front, which it has sought unsuccessfully to associate with al-Qaeda, and to weaken Algeria’s role in the region. However, Moroccans have not agreed to host it because, like many other countries in the region, the monarchy is well aware of the negative domestic backlash that this would produce, not just from radical Islamists but from large segments of society. Undoubtedly, Algeria’s influence in convincing other African countries not to host AFRICOM created some unease in US–Algerian relations. But, in view of Algeria’s strong nationalism and non-alignment, this should have been no surprise to US policymakers. In any event, US determination to multiply security arrangements in the region and to have a distinct command for Africa has been counterproductive as it cast suspicions on real US intentions.64 Indeed, many in the region now argue that the US amplified the terrorist threat in order to impose its military hegemony in Africa, including the Maghreb, to control the natural resources, mainly hydrocarbons, and counter China’s growing economic ambitions in the continent. The US has failed thus far to convince any African nation to host AFRICOM’s headquarters. The command operates out of Stuttgart, Germany. Regardless of these political considerations, security relations between Algeria and the US are stronger than imagined. There has been much speculation regarding US supplies of weapons to Algeria. Many US officials, including Donald Rumsfeld, who visited Algeria in February 2006, indicated American willingness to consider Algerian arms purchases from the US. However, there is no evidence that Algeria is interested in large purchases from the US other than sophisticated night-vision equipment and specific types of radar. After the conversion of its debt with Russia in 2006, Algeria spent $7 billion to buy arms from Russia, including MiG29 aircraft, tanks, and other lethal weapons to revamp its armed forces, a process that began in 2007. Despite the undeniably close co-operation with the US, two points need to be made: (1) Algerians are not willing to have too close a military co-operation with the US that is conducted on US terms,65 and (2) Algeria refuses to become dependent on the US, or any other power for that matter, for its military hardware, which explains the diversification of its arms purchases from Russia,

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China, France, South Africa, the US, the former communist bloc, and Turkey. Furthermore, the close US alliance with Morocco, Algeria’s immediate challenger in the region, perpetuates Algeria’s suspicion vis-à-vis the US. Although the question of Western Sahara has not been an obstacle to the expansion of US–Algerian relations, Algerians resent US alignment with Morocco. Furthermore, Algerian officers also resent US attempts to involve them with the Israelis, using special sessions at NATO to induce Algerians to participate alongside Israelis.66 In other words, although they no longer take radical positions on Arab–Israeli issues, Algerians refuse to “normalize” relations with Israel until the Palestinian question has been satisfactorily resolved and until Israel has returned Arab lands to Syria and Lebanon. This being said, US–Algerian relations have developed considerably in the last few years. Despite their annoyance with some of Algeria’s positions on a variety of foreign policy issues, the US is quite pleased with its relations with Algiers. The US no longer seems to make an issue of the obvious resurgence of authoritarianism in Algeria. The strong co-operation in the security field has allowed not only Algeria but also other authoritarian states to collect dividends from their security co-operation with the US.67 In her tour of the region in September 2008, Condoleezza Rice spoke about the good security co-operation with Algeria and the “strong ties” between the two countries. She insisted that “there is always more that you can do to tighten sharing of information, to make sure you have all the right channels to give technical support in terms of the terrorism threat.”68 Rice listed the topics that she discussed with President Bouteflika: We have talked about broadening our economic ties. We have a very good science and technology agreement that we have signed, and we want to broaden our ties to diversify our economic ties. Also, to diversify the ties between our people … And we have talked about our strong interest in fighting terrorism and counterterrorism cooperation … Finally, I have had the opportunity to benefit from President Bouteflika’s wisdom about the region. He is truly one of the wise men of the region, one of the statesmen of the region, both in the Maghreb and in the broader region, and it has been very good to discuss a number of issues, including the Annapolis process, and the effort to bring peace between Palestinians and Israelis.69 However, she said nothing about democracy promotion, an omission which certainly pleased the incumbent regime. Economic relations between Algeria and the US have also witnessed considerable expansion. During Bouteflika’s American visit in July 2001, the two countries signed a Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment. The accord instituted a consultative procedure on trade and investment that will eventually result in a bilateral investment treaty, mutual trade benefits, and a double taxation arrangement, and effectively opened up Algeria’s profitable oil and gas resources more broadly to multinational corporations. The objective of the agreement is to double the volume of exchanges and to allow US companies to take a greater share of the Algerian market, especially in hydrocarbons—the US being the largest investor in that sector. In recent years, US businesses have displayed some interest in other economic sectors.70 Indeed, US businesses made some investments in such hot sectors as finance, banking, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, seawater desalination, aviation, and computers. Bilateral trade between Algeria and the US has grown continuously; statistics from the Department of Commerce show that the volume of exchanges has surpassed $12 billion. The State Department asserts that, in 2006, US direct investment in Algeria totaled $5.3 billion, mostly in the hydrocarbons sector, dominated by US companies. It puts Algeria as the US’s third largest market in the MENA region. US exports to Algeria totaled $1.2 billion in 2005, a growth of over 50 percent on the 2003 figure, while US imports from Algeria increased from $4.7 billion in 2002 to $10.8 billion in 2005, predominantly in oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). In

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March 2004, President Bush designated Algeria a recipient of duty-free treatment under the generalized system of preferences (GSP).71 However, in spite of this positive evolution in US–Algerian economic relations, US investments outside the hydrocarbons sector remain relatively small; in fact, North Africa in general has an insignificant world share of foreign direct investment (FDI), estimated at $5 billion annually, and 75 percent of those investments come from EU countries. In the economic sphere, Algeria has great expectations from its relations with the US. A certain naiveté pervades Algerian officials who believe that it is up to the US government to persuade US businesses to invest in Algeria.72 Such a belief derives from the experience with France, where the government can entice the business community to invest in a given country for political and economic reasons. The principal hurdle, however, to attracting non-hydrocarbons US investments has indisputably been the red tape, the corruption, and the lack of transparency that characterize the Algerian market. In spite of the relative liberalization of the economy, doing business in Algeria is often too difficult an exercise for US businesses regardless of the lucrative potential. Given US energy dependence, Algeria will remain, however, a strategic market for the US in the years to come because, according to the CIA, Algeria has the eighth largest reserves of natural gas in the world and is the fourth largest gas exporter; it ranks fourteenth in oil reserves.73

Conclusion US–Algerian relations have shown remarkable expansion. This growth has been such that the French feared that the US had supplanted them in what France considers its sphere of influence. While one cannot be sure about the veracity of such an observation, one thing is certain: US–Algerian relations are no longer what they used to be. Undoubtedly, the question of terrorism has resulted in astounding rapprochement, but relations in all other areas have been developing at as fast a pace. There have been countless official visits to and from the US. However, the major question is to what extent the US will influence Algeria’s foreign policy orientation, especially as regards the foundations that compose it: non-alignment, nationalism, support for the Palestinian and other Arab and third world causes. In other words, to what extent are Algerians willing to pursue pragmatic approaches to fulfill their interests? Will they be willing to offer the US as much room to implement its policy objectives as their regional rival, Morocco, has been? So far, it does not seem that Algerians are willing to give up their support for the Palestinians or for the Sahrawis, but in view of the competition they face not only from Morocco but also from a rehabilitated Libya, the regime may decide to operate shifts that would help in reaching what it sees as the national interest. Until then, though, there are still major policy issues dividing Algerians and Americans. Whether and how the two countries overcome those issues will set the stage for the new era in US–Algerian relations.

Notes 1 Seghir Rahmani, “Algerian–American Relations (1962–85): The Study of Algeria’s Anti-Imperialist Foreign Policy and its Impact on Algerian–American relations,” PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 1985: 3. 2 For an analysis of Algerian nationalists’ attitudes toward the US in that period, see Yahia H. Zoubir, “US and Soviet Policies towards France’s Struggle with Anticolonial Nationalism in North Africa,” Canadian Journal of History/ Annales canadiennes d’histoire, 30(3), December 1995: 439–66. See also, Samya El Machat, Les Etats-Unis et l’Algérie: de la méconnaissance à la reconnaissance (The United States and Algeria: from lack of comprehension to recognition) (Paris: l’Harmattan, 1997). 3 On Algeria’s non-alignment, see Assassi Lassassi, Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy (Vermont: Gower Publisher, 1989). 4 Charles F. Gallagher, The United States and North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963): 216. 5 Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, National Security Action Memorandum No. 211 of December 14, 1962: Discussion of Strategy and Action Plan for Algeria (Washington, DC: National Archives, Declassified Documents No. 1591, 1985): 3–4.

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6 See Nicole Grimaud, La Politique extérieure de l’Algérie, 1962–1978 (Paris: Karthala, 1984): 146. It should be noted, however, that Ben Bella was not aware of the presence of Soviet missiles on the island. He later refused to take a position on the issue in order to avoid breaking solidarity with a fellow revolutionary. 7 William B. Quandt, “Can We Do Business with Radical Nationalists? Algeria, Yes,” Foreign Policy, 7, Summer 1972: 114. 8 Lisa Anderson, “Friends and Foes: American Policy in North Africa,” in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Africa in the 1990s and Beyond: US Opportunities and Choices (Algonac, MI: Reference Publications, Inc., 1988): 169. 9 Grimaud, La Politique extérieure de l’Algérie, op. cit.: 147; Quandt, “Can We Do Business?” op. cit.: 115. 10 David and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1970): 158. In fact, the US decision not to offer Algeria a military assistance program (MAP) was made the previous year. American policymakers were of the opinion that Algeria should address its request to France and, if the latter refused, “We should urge them [Algerians] to limit their military program to one oriented toward civic action, progressive reduction of armed forces, and internal security, and offer to help them along these lines.” National Security Action Memorandum, No. 211, December 14, 1962. 11 M. J. V. Bell, “Military Assistance to Independent African States,” Adelphi Papers, 15, December 1964: 8. The major deliveries, however, did not begin until 1964 and 1966. 12 See Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s statement in his news conference of November 8, 1963, Department of State Bulletin, hereinafter DSB, November 25,1963: 817. 13 See Yahia H. Zoubir, “Soviet Policy toward the Maghreb,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 9(4), Fall 1987. 14 The US perceived Boumedienne, an anti-communist, as a potential friend: “We’ve been holding up $14 million in voluntary agency requests until the Algerians indicated that they wanted US aid in general. Moreover, Boumedienne seems at least marginally better than Ben Bella, and we don’t want to get him sore at us just before the potentially quite important Afro-Asian summit conference scheduled for 5 November [1965] in Algiers. So, there’s a good case for treating Algeria for one of the good guys until it demonstrates otherwise.” R. W. Komer, “Memorandum for the President,” September 3, 1965, Declassified Documents No. 2734, July 30, 1984. 15 Joseph Palmer II, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, “The Other Africa: The Maghreb,” Address made in the Walsh lecture series at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, May 9, 1967, DSB, May 29, 1967: 811. 16 Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, News Conference of July 19, 1967, in DSB, August 7, 1967: 160. 17 On the concept of image as applied to Algeria, see Azzedine Layachi, The United States and North Africa: A Cognitive Approach to Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1990). 18 See Grimaud, op. cit.: 150; Layachi, The United States and North Africa, op. cit.: 36 ff. 19 See Philip H. Trezise, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, “The Outlook for Energy Supplies,” DSB, October 26, 1970. On the gas deal and the problems it encountered later on, see Belaïd Abdesselam, Le gaz algérien – Stratégies et enjeux (Alger: Bouchène, 1989). 20 See, in particular, Yahia H. Zoubir, “Soviet Policy toward the Maghreb,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 9(4), Fall 1987: 403 ff. 21 Grimaud, La politique extérieure, op. cit.: 151. 22 David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “North Africa: Lessons from the Past and Future Directions,” Speech at Princeton University on November 18, 1971, DSB 65–1671: 683. 23 William B. Quandt, Peace Process – American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and Berkeley & Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1993): 195. 24 See Jacob Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of the Spanish Sahara,” The Journal of North African Studies, 11(3), September 2006: 275–306. 25 For detailed analyses of US policy toward the Western Sahara conflict, see Yahia H. Zoubir, “Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality,” Middle East Policy, 14(4), winter 2007–8: 158–77; Yahia H. Zoubir and Daniel Volman, “The United States and Conflict in the Maghreb,” Journal of North African Studies, 2(3), 1998: 10– 24; Stephen Zunes, “The United States in the Saharan War: A Case of Low-Intensity Intervention” and Richard B. Parker, “US Strategic Interests and the War in the Western Sahara,” both in Yahia H. Zoubir and Daniel Volman, eds, International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). See also Claudia Wright, “Journey to Marrakesh: US–Moroccan Security Relations,” International Security, 7(4), Spring 1983. 26 Parker, “US Strategic Interests,” op. cit.: 97. 27 Harold Nelson, ed., Morocco: A Country Study (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1985): 354. 28 Morris Draper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, “Arms Sales to Morocco: Western Sahara Conflict,” DSB, June 1981: 146. 29 Ibid. 30 Ben Bella’s and Boumedienne’s visits in 1962 and 1974, respectively, were part of their sojourn in the framework of the United Nations. 31 Yahia H. Zoubir, “The United States, Islamism, Terrorism, and Democracy in the Maghreb: The Predominance of Security? in Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah-Fernandèz, eds, North Africa: Politics, Region and the Limits of Transformation (New York and London: Routledge, 2008): 266–293. 32 On this point, see Richard B. Parker, “La Politique des États-unis au Maghreb,” in Bassma Kodmani-Darwish, ed., Maghreb: les années de transition (Paris: Masson & IFRI, 1990): 367, 369. 33 Ibid.: 373. 34 Interview with State Department official, Washington, DC, February 1990. 35 Interview with State Department official, INR, Washington, DC, February 1990. 36 Interview with Department of Defense official, March 5, 1990.

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37 For a similar point of view, see Robert A. Mortimer, “Les États-Unis face à la situation algérienne,” Maghreb-Machrek (Paris), 149, July–September, 1995: 4. 38 On this point, see Yahia H. Zoubir and Louisa Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, “The United States and the Maghreb: Islamism, Democratization, and Strategic Interests,” The Maghreb Review (London), 31(3–4), 2006: 259–92. 39 Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam, Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 40 Yasmine Djaber, “L’Algérie plaide pour une convention générale de lutte contre le terrorisme,” toutsurlalgerie, September, 2008. Available from www.toutsurlalgerie.com/L-Algerie-plaide-pour-une-convention-generale-de-luttecontr_4948.html (accessed October 5, 2008). 41 Paper presented by Thomas Miller, Director of the North African Desk at the US Department of State, at the Middle East Studies Association Conference, Washington, DC, November 24, 1991. 42 Sonia Lyes, “ONU : l’Algérie vote souvent contre les USA,” toutsurlalgerie, October 17, 2007. Available from www.toutsurlalgerie.com/algerie-onu-1389.html (accessed October 18, 2007). 43 www.snopes.com/inboxer/outrage/unvote.asp (accessed October 3, 2008). 44 Ibid. 45 Interview with senior White House official, Phoenix, Arizona, February 18, 1997. 46 See the New York Times, January 1, 1992. 47 The following are revised and updated sections from my chapter, “The United States, Islamism, Terrorism, and Democracy in the Maghreb: The Predominance of Security?” in Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam AmirahFernàndez, eds, North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation (London and New York: Routledge, 2008): 271–77. 48 Edward G. Shirley, “Is Iran’s Present Algeria’s Future?” Foreign Affairs, 74(3), May–June 1995. Edward Shirley is the pen-name of a former CIA official. 49 Author’s interview with Abdelkrim Dahmen, Deputy, member of MSP parliamentary group and member of the party’s national leadership in charge of foreign relations and emigration, January 24, 2007. 50 The Threat of Islamic Extremism in Africa. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, April 6, 1995 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995): 1. 51 For a detailed analysis, see Yahia H. Zoubir, “Algeria and U.S. Interests: Containing Radical Islamism and Promoting Democracy,” Middle East Policy, 9(1), March 2002: 64–81. 52 “US policy toward North Africa,” statement made by Robert H. Pelletreau before the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Africa on September 28, 1994. Available from www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi_m1584/is_n40_v5/ai_15889460/. 53 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002 (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002). 54 H. B., “W. J. Burns se prononce sur la prochaine présidentielle,” Le Jeune Indépendant (Algiers), October 26, 2003. 55 See Daniel Volman, “Foreign Arms Sales and the Military Balance in the Maghreb,” in Yahia H. Zoubir, ed., North Africa in Transition: State, Society, and Economic Transformations in the 1990s (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1999). Algeria’s arms imports had decreased by 50 percent in the 1990s due not only to the embargo but also to Algeria’s near bankruptcy. 56 Adlène Meddi, “La CIA a une ‘Alliance Base’ à Alger – La coopération entre les services s’intensifie,” El Watan, July 6, 2005. The information has apparently been reported in the Washington Post. 57 See Robert D. Kaplan. Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts – The American Military in the Air, Sea, and on the Ground (New York: Random House, 2007). 58 These figures are taken from FY 2009 International Affairs (Function 150) Congressional Budget Justification. Available from www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2009cbj/. 59 See Anthea Jonathan, “US eyes North Africa,” Politics, March 10, 2004. Available from www.news24.com/ News24/Africa/News/0,2-11-1447_1496197,00.html; Giles Tremlett, “US sends Special Forces into North Africa,” The Guardian, March 15, 2004. 60 Fayçal Oukaci, “Washington disposé à armer l’ANP,” L’Expression, November 11, 2006: 2. See also Carmen Gentile, “US eyes Algeria as Key Partner in War on Terror,” ISN Security Watch, December 15, 2006. Available from www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17052. 61 Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Army Lt. Gen. Walter L. Sharp, Director, Joint Staff briefing, in US Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Transcript, February 7, 2007. Available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/ library/news/2007/ 02/mil-070207-dod02.htm. 62 Ghada Hamrouche, “M. Mohammed Bedjaoui l’a affirmé hier ‘Pas de bases militaires étrangères sur le sol algérien’,” La Tribune, March 4, 2007. Former US Ambassador to Algeria Robert Redford declared that the US has not asked Algeria for a US military base there. See Fayçal Oukaci, “Washington n’a pas demandé à établir une base militaire en Algérie,” L’Expression (Algiers), March 5, 2007: 3. 63 Fayçal Oukaci, “Divergences entre Alger et le Pentagone sur l’Africom,” L’Expression (Algiers), June 12, 2007: 6. 64 Shashank Bengali, “The Pentagon’s new Africa Command raises Suspicions about U.S. motives,” McClatchy Newspapers, September 29, 2008. Available from www.mcclatchydc.com/world/story/53234.html. 65 Interview with high-ranking Algerian officer, December 2006. 66 Interview with high-ranking Algerian officer, December 2006.

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67 On this point, see Clement M. Henry, “Reverberations in the Central Maghreb of the ‘Global War on Terror’,” in Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah-Fernàndez, eds, North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation (London and New York: Routledge, 2008): 294–310. 68 Sue Pleming, “Rice seeks Closer Maghreb Counter-terror Links,” The Washington Post, September 6, 2008. Available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/06/AR2008090600863_pf.html (accessed September 6, 2008). 69 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks after Meeting with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika,” Algiers, Algeria, September 6, 2008. Available from www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/09/109230.htm (accessed September 10, 2008). 70 “US Encourages Opening of Algerian Economy,” Deputy Secretary of Commerce Bodman’s Press Conference in Algiers, September 25, 2002. Available from www.usinfo.state.gov. 71 www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/8005.htm. 72 This was revealed to Yahia Zoubir by a Deputy Secretary of Commerce in the Clinton administration. 73 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html#Econ.

19 The US and Morocco The long-lasting alliance Yahia H. Zoubir

Introduction Although the central Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) has gained great importance since the end of the cold war, and especially since 9/11, US–Moroccan relations have remained steady. The US considers the kingdom of Morocco as a friend and ally. Even though US– Tunisian relations have been close and those between Algeria and the US have witnessed evolution, neither Tunisia nor Algeria has reached a status in US policy nearly as high as Morocco’s. Most US official documents repeat ad infinitum that “Morocco was the first country to seek diplomatic relations with the Government of the United States in 1777, and remains one of our oldest and closest allies in the region. Formal US relations with Morocco date from 1787, when the two nations negotiated a Treaty of Peace and Friendship.”1 This constitutes the Treaty of Marrakesh, which has remained the oldest unbroken treaty in US foreign relations. Already, in the early years of the republic, the US had called on the king of Morocco, Sidi Mohammed III, to intervene on its behalf with Tripoli and Tunis to secure free passage for US merchant ships then under attacks from these two regencies.2 In a letter dated December 1, 1789, George Washington wrote to Mohammed III, whom he referred to as his “Great, Magnanimous Friend,” that, … It gives me pleasure to have this opportunity of assuring your majesty that I shall not cease to promote every measure that may conduce to the friendship and harmony which so happily subsist between your empire and these. Within our territories, there are no mines of either gold or of silver, and this young nation, just recovering from the waste and desolation of a long war, has not, as yet, had time to acquire riches by agriculture and commerce. But our soil is beautiful, and our people industrious, and we have reason to flatter ourselves that we shall gradually become useful to our friends … . Moroccans, too, have valued their relationship with the US and miss no opportunity to reiterate the very same depiction highlighted by American officials. For instance, when President George W. Bush designated Morocco as an important non-NATO US ally, the king’s foreign minister reiterated in practically identical terms US statements regarding the relations between the two countries.3 In January 1943, following his dinner conversation with President Franklin Roosevelt, Sultan Mohammed bin Yusuf (Mohammed V), whose country was still under the French Protectorate (1912–56), shouted “a new future for my country.”4 Indeed, the sovereign had secured US support for Morocco to this date. While he, like other North African nationalists, had hoped, vainly, that the US would help them secure their independence from France’s colonial yoke, he learned the valuable lesson of playing the American card against France. And, while the US did not seek to supplant France in the region, it nonetheless nudged France to initiate reforms that would prevent North Africa from falling under Soviet/communist

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influence. However, the US progressively saw that decolonization was inevitable, and therefore encouraged the French government to prepare for that transition by introducing reforms and by creating the conditions for future Franco-Moroccan co-operation. It was the procrastination in Paris that led Washington to stop aligning its policies automatically with those of its European ally, a strategy that allowed it to establish economic and military co-operation with post-independence Morocco. It was precisely the anti-communist card and the moderation of the monarchy that appealed to the US. Thus, in 1956, the US decided to provide the Moroccan and Tunisian governments—which had become independent that year—with foreign assistance to ensure their stability and moderation. The objective was to keep them within the Western camp. This marked the development of strong bilateral relations with the two countries, and with Morocco in particular.5

Morocco in US foreign policy A chapter alone cannot do justice to the intensity of US–Moroccan relations. However, one can point out some of the major factors that have created such strong ties and made Morocco today a valuable ally of the US in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Morocco has a population of about 35 million (2008 estimate), making it the second largest Arab county after Egypt. Even though Morocco is not a petroleum-producing country, it boasts important mineral resources.6 The kingdom is strategically located in the northwest corner of Africa, bordering both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean coasts, including the Straits of Gibraltar; it was this geographical location that made it so strategic for the US— which maintained military and naval bases there—until the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and the long range B-52s. President Dwight Eisenhower visited Morocco in 1959 to discuss the contentious issue concerning the US bases—nationalist forces, with the added influence of Nasserism, as well as the US intervention in Lebanon the previous year, sought their evacuation. While Mohamed V and Eisenhower agreed on their closure by December 1959—the US Strategic Air Command continued operating from Moroccan bases until 1963— the US presence in Morocco ended officially only in 1978, but the war in Western Sahara led Morocco, under the leadership of King Hassan II (1961–99), to grant military facilities to US forces. Indeed, in 1982, the US signed a bilateral defense co-operation pact with Morocco that gives US air and naval forces emergency transit, staging, and refueling rights at five Moroccan air and naval bases.7 No matter the geopolitical changes, the strategic importance of Morocco witnessed little waning because, since its independence, Morocco has played a key role on behalf of the US in various areas. This explains why Morocco has, since the late 1950s, received more US aid than any other Arab country, except for Egypt and Israel, which have a particular deal with the US. Following the war in Western Sahara, which Morocco invaded in 1975, Morocco had obtained more than one-fifth of all US aid to Africa by 1990, totaling more than $1 billion in military assistance alone, while economic assistance amounted to $1.3 billion.8 That figure has tripled since. In fact, it is primarily the support from the US (and France) which allowed Morocco to reverse the war over Western Sahara in Morocco’s favor through large-scale economic and military assistance, military advisors, and logistical support. In 1978, when war in Western Sahara was raging, US military aid to Morocco was multiplied twentyfold to reach more than $99.8 million from a mere $4.1 million in 1974.9 With the end of the cold war, American economic and military assistance had decreased considerably due to congressional budget restrictions. However, Morocco managed to regain its position as an important ally shortly afterwards. In terms of aid, one can cite a few recent figures: in 2002, Morocco received 72 percent of total US assistance to the three Maghreb countries, while in 2005, the figure amounted to 81 percent, i.e., $58 million.10 In 2006, military aid rose to $20 million in order to help Morocco not only to stop clandestine immigration but also, and above all, to be

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able to protect its borders and to continue the fight against terrorism. In fiscal year 2007, the Department of State authorized the export to Morocco of defense articles and services valued at $87,475,761.11 This continuous aid to Morocco can be explained by the support Morocco provided to US strategic planning during the cold war. Morocco also served as an important surrogate for US interests in Africa and the Middle East, even dispatching its troops to troubled countries and giving the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) wide latitude to operate. King Hassan II had established solid contacts not only with US officials at all levels, such as Henry Kissinger or Vernon Walters, but also with Israeli officials. Even though Morocco sided with the Arabs, and even sent troops during the 1967 and 1973 wars, the king took advantage of Kissinger’s tour of the region in late 1973, which incidentally began in Morocco, to seek a role in Middle Eastern diplomatic negotiations. His real objective was eventually to obtain US support for his own designs over Western Sahara; playing the Israeli card would obviously facilitate the execution of such a plan. Unlike Algeria, for instance, Morocco has mostly supported US foreign policy objectives in the Middle East by promoting the Arab–Israeli peace process. Hassan II was the first Arab leader to receive a visit from an Israeli prime minister; he secretly met Yitzhak Rabin in Rabat in October 1976. The following year, he, again secretly, invited Egyptian and Israeli officials to the kingdom for direct discussions that eventually paved the way for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s November 1977 visit to Jerusalem.12 Undoubtedly, the issue of Western Sahara, which served the monarchy at a time when its survival was at stake domestically, resulted in greater US interest and presence in the Maghreb region.13 Even though the conflict was in no way part of the East–West confrontation,14 the US, which then perceived Algeria—the Sahrawis’ main supporter—as a close Soviet friend, sided with Morocco, despite proclaimed neutrality. From 1976 to the late 1980s, US–Moroccan relations were dominated by that conflict: while the United States provided the necessary support to maintain its conquest of the territory, Morocco served US interests in Africa and the Middle East.

The United States, Morocco, and conflict in the Western Sahara In theory, Washington supports the right to self-determination as guaranteed in the UN Charter; this would have required that Spain hold a referendum on self-determination. However, political, military, and economic interests have determined the US position: steadfast support for the Moroccan monarchy, a reliable ally in the Arab world. Like France, the US has sided with Morocco since the start of the conflict, and it was also instrumental in Morocco’s colonization of the territory.15 A close associate of Kissinger apparently suggested to Hassan II to undertake the so-called “Green March,” during which 350,000 carefully selected Moroccans, many of whom were soldiers in civilian clothing, “peacefully” invaded the former Spanish colony.16 At the height of the cold war, the US feared Soviet expansion into sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the fact that the Soviets never supported the Sahrawi nationalist movement,17 Washington worried about the potential emergence of a pro-Soviet state in the Maghreb region. Throughout the cold war, American preoccupation with the survival of the pro-Western monarchy—as the guarantor of US and Western presence in the area— overrode other regional concerns. In August 2004, James Baker corroborated this point by stating that US support for Morocco was justified because “in the days of the cold war [ … ] the POLISARIO Front was aligned with Cuba and Libya and some other enemies of the United States, and Morocco was very close to the United States.”18 Not only that, but Morocco played the role of proxy in Africa on behalf of the West in fighting nationalist forces that received backing from the Soviet Union. For instance, in 1977, and again in 1978, the US airlifted Moroccan troops to Zaire, where they helped defeat insurrections against the pro-Western

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tyrant ruler Mobutu Sese Seko. Moroccans also helped equip and train the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) forces of Angolan rebel Jonas Savimbi and supported him (along with South Africa and the US) in his struggle against the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), supported by various third world countries, as well as by the Soviet Union. Support for Morocco in the US Congress is also significant, not least because Morocco is one of the few Arab countries that are friendly to Israel. A brief review of the policies the successive US administrations pursued toward the conflict show consistent support for Morocco because, unlike its eastern neighbor, Algeria, it has always been willing to serve US interests in the Middle East and North Africa. The Carter administration was initially reluctant to be directly and openly involved in the conflict. Neither did it recognize Moroccan claims over the territory nor did it agree to allow Morocco to use US arms outside its internationally recognized borders (under the 1960 agreement); besides, the US Arms Export Control Act restricts the utilization of weapons by recipients of US military aid to defensive purposes. However, under pressure from friends of Morocco in the US as well as the work of the expensive lobbies Morocco had hired, the Carter administration, with the approval of Congress, agreed to sell weapons to Morocco, which definitely violated the terms of the abovecited agreement. Although in 1980, Andrew Young, known for his concerns for human rights and international legality, had visited the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria and established informal contacts with the Sahrawi nationalist movement, POLISARIO, fears that the latter’s victory would result in the collapse of the monarchy (as happened to the Shah of Iran in 1979) eliminated all hope of a balanced US policy toward the conflict. Furthermore, the supply of Soviet weapons to POLISARIO by Algeria and, for a time, Libya provided another pretext for the heavy shipments of all kinds of weaponry to Morocco. It became clear that, henceforth, the US would deny victory to POLISARIO in its daring war against Morocco; the various battles that POLISARIO forces won provided further rationale for arming Morocco. The election of Ronald Reagan as president came as a blessing for Morocco. The policy his administration would pursue was made crystal clear early on. Indeed, the ambassador to the kingdom, Joseph Reed, stated unequivocally that: Morocco is at the strategic straits of the Mediterranean. It is clear how Morocco is important to the survivability of Europe. My mandate is to illustrate to our friends around the globe that the Reagan Administration wanted to single out Morocco as the primary example of how America supported a proven ally and friend.19 The Reagan administration was true to its word. Arms’ sales to Morocco increased dramatically.20 The US decided to sell 108 tanks to Morocco shortly after inauguration and after Algeria had played a key role in the freeing of the American hostages held in Iran. This insensitivity toward Algeria—the tanks were sold to Morocco to allegedly protect it against Algeria—delayed the improvement in relations with the US that Algeria was seeking under the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid, who was less radical than his predecessor Houari Boumedienne. What is important to note, however, is that US support to Morocco, far from enticing the monarchy to negotiate a settlement, has in fact prolonged the war and convinced Morocco that the US has acquiesced to its conquest of the disputed territory, a conviction that is as valid today as it was in the 1980s. By 1989, the standard US justification for its pro-Moroccan tilt was diminishing, with the waning of the cold war, a more moderate and less authoritarian Algeria, and the belated acknowledgment that the POLISARIO could not be completely defeated militarily. The US began quietly nudging Morocco to find a compromise solution on the Western Sahara and undergo needed economic and political reforms. George Bush, as both vice president and president, asked European leaders to encourage the king to accelerate the process on a referendum

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for Western Sahara. The dramatic decline of Marxist–Leninism in Africa lessened the need for Morocco as a surrogate. There were also growing concerns about what was apparently official acquiescence to drug trafficking and corrupt state-centric economic institutions. Algeria’s importance as a regional power with which the US had considerable economic interests, especially in the energy sector, became increasingly apparent. In fact, one can argue that, already in 1985, following Bendjedid’s state visit to Washington, relations had begun to improve. Furthermore, Morocco’s Oujda Treaty with Libya (1984–86), the US “bête noire” at that time, disappointed American officials, even though the king’s move was aimed against Algeria. However, King Hassan was able to overcome the situation; among other things, he invited Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Perès to visit Ifrane, Morocco, in summer 1986. In view of the influence of the Israeli lobby in Washington, this event carried heavy significance and Morocco could expect dividends. While military and economic assistance was somewhat reduced at the close of the 1980s, Morocco has since rebounded as a major ally of the US, which meant that support for its occupation of Western Sahara would continue, and it still does even more so today due to its participation in the “global war on terror.” A number of factors in the 1990s explain such a rebound. The first important factor was Moroccan backing for the Gulf War, including the stationing of Moroccan forces in Saudi Arabia. Morocco was the only Maghreb country to do so, and it did this despite previous collaboration between the Moroccan and Iraqi governments, widespread sympathy for Iraq within the Moroccan populace, and the striking parallels between Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara. Second, the civil unrest in Algeria provided Morocco with a new status as a stable country in a volatile region. Not only had the Algerian regime’s fight for its very survival limited its influence as a counterweight to Moroccan ambitions, but the specter of a radical Islamic revolution in North Africa once again placed Morocco in the role of the moderate rampart against extremist anti-Western forces. King Hassan’s success in curbing radical Islamic movements in his own country, partially due to his religious role (“Commander of the Faithful”), and his co-optation of moderate Islamism and its institutionalization, as envisaged by the US,21 made him a particularly useful barricade against such forces. Third, with the presence of a UN-brokered peace plan (1990) and ceasefire (September 1991), the stalemate in the peace process clearly worked to the POLISARIO’s disadvantage and lessened the urgency to pressure Morocco to compromise. Algeria’s distraction with its internal difficulties, combined with the diplomatic weakness of POLISARIO’s other third world allies resulting from the debt crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union, reduced US need to force the issue. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs John R. Bolton acknowledged that Morocco had been “unhelpful” in the peace process, but that Morocco’s role in supporting US foreign policy had to be taken into account in determining the US response.22 Indeed, there was a prevailing assumption in diplomatic circles in Rabat that King Hassan would lose his throne if he lost the referendum,23 which many analysts believed to be the likely outcome. This assumption still prevails and explains why the US, France, and now Spain would push for a political solution, one favorable to Morocco. Fourth, Morocco’s role in US-led “peace” initiatives, ranging from the Arab–Israeli peace process to the sending of peacekeeping forces to Bosnia and Somalia, made it clear that Morocco could still play an important role in supporting US strategic interests, giving an important third world cover to such policies. With respect to the Middle East, in the aftermath of the Oslo accords between the Israelis and Palestinians, Morocco was quick to initiate the process of normalization between the Arab countries and Israel. In fact, King Hassan played a key role as an intermediary between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in the secret negotiations that produced the September 13, 1993, Israeli–Palestinian Declaration of Principles, which the two parties signed in the White House. Thus, in September 1994, Morocco set up a liaison office in Tel Aviv which was a quasi diplomatic representation. Even

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if the office was closed in fall 2000 following the second Palestinian Intifada, official contacts with Israel were never interrupted. It would be no exaggeration to argue that this active involvement in seeking to integrate Israel in the region is what earned Morocco outstanding support from the Clinton administration, which explains why the Clinton administration supported Morocco’s position in Western Sahara. In fact, officials in the Department of State and Department of Defense admitted that integrating Western Sahara into the kingdom of Morocco might be the best solution, although they maintained that a UN settlement agreed to by the warring parties might be less costly politically.24 These views eventually became the standard position under the George W. Bush administration. All attempts, even those of James A. Baker, who became Kofi Annan’s personal envoy for Western Sahara (1997–2003), failed to materialize because the US would oppose the holding of a referendum that most people agreed would result in an independent Western Sahara. The US refused to impose a solution, such as the 2003 Baker Plan II, which was accepted by POLISARIO and Algeria, despite its being favorable to Morocco as the settlers were allowed to partake in the envisaged referendum.25 In view of such failure to force the implementation of the plan, Baker resigned from his position, a decision which further delayed the prospects for a definitive resolution of the conflict. Morocco was not worried about a backlash to its rejection of the Baker Plan, for it could count not only on the lobbies in Washington, but, more importantly, on the neoconservatives in the administration, especially Elliot Abrams at the National Security Council, who were firm supporters of the Moroccan monarchy. It should be pointed out, however, that the US has not, like all countries in the world, recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara—although it does recognize its administration of the territory and even a de facto recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty. And neither did the US include Western Sahara in the free trade agreement with Morocco in 2004,26 which “will cover trade and investment in the territory of Morocco as recognized internationally, and will not include Western Sahara.”27 This was mostly due to some outspoken members of the US Congress who support self-determination for the Sahrawi people and the upholding of international legality.

The Maghreb, the US “global war on terror,” and regional imperatives The US had great hopes from the succession in Morocco; the new king, Mohammed VI, seemed to be reform-minded, and the Americans hoped that the flagrant human rights violations in Morocco and in the occupied Western Sahara would cease. There was also hope that the new king would be less radical on Western Sahara. However, while Morocco has made substantial advances, the position on Western Sahara—where human rights abuses have not ceased—has not changed an iota. Quite the contrary; Morocco’s inflexible position has resulted in the poisoning of relations with Algeria,28 thus shattering US hopes of Maghreb regional integration. In the post-cold war era, the US supported development of the states in the Maghreb region within a framework outside of which economic growth could not be sustained. By 2000, officially, the US declared that it “seeks the stability and prosperity of North Africa” and “to strengthen our relations with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria and to encourage political and economic reform.”29 Because the Maghreb was not as important to the US as the Gulf region, the objective was not to control the Maghreb politically following a model similar to the one it has established in the Middle East and Gulf area. The main US interest was primarily economic; the clearest indication was the so-called Eizenstat Initiative, as well as the multiplication of US–Maghrebi chambers of commerce.30 Indeed, in 1999, the US launched the US–North Africa Economic Partnership or Eizenstat Initiative, named after its main advocate Stuart Eizenstat, Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs. The objective of such an initiative—renamed the US North Africa Economic Program—was:

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to link the United States and the three countries of North Africa much closer together in terms of trade and investment, to encourage more trade between our countries, to encourage more US companies to invest in the region and create good-paying jobs … and to encourage the reduction in internal barriers among and between the countries of North Africa which has impeded the normal trade flows between those countries.31 Implicit in this statement was encouragement for the three Maghreb countries to revive the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)—dormant since the mid-1990s—and the reopening of the Algerian–Moroccan border closed since August 1994.32 The Eizenstat Initiative remains a constant reminder that the US wishes to look at the Maghreb as an integrated whole, which could potentially expand eastward.33 Today, Eizenstat seeks to reinvigorate the initiative by including Libya and Mauritania, not initially included in the project: I recently have begun work on a new, broader initiative that includes all countries of the region: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as Libya and Mauritania. This initiative has a dual focus. First, it is intended to encourage closer economic integration among the countries of the region. Second, it is intended to promote closer economic ties between the region and the broader world economy, in particular the United States and European Union. I am particularly pleased that the new diplomatic reality allows the inclusion of Libya and Mauritania. This is an important development.34 This initiative is not purely economic as it intends, according to its framer, to address the challenge presented by the rise of terrorism in the region. The initiative has so far fallen under the Middle East Peace Initiative (MEPI) that the Bush administration launched in 2002 in response to the events of 9/11 for the same reasons. The objective of the MEPI was to inaugurate reforms in the MENA in order to help “democracy to spread, education to thrive, economies to grow, and women to be empowered.”35 What is noteworthy, though, is the role attributed to Morocco in this process. The US administration, President Bush included, praised Morocco for the democratization process that the young king had launched since coming to power. Evidently, US aid increased substantially in order to assist Morocco in implementing those reforms. The idea of a free trade agreement was launched during the king’s meeting with Bush in April 2002. This was part of Bush’s intention of creating a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013.36 Because the US wishes to use the reforms in Morocco as a model for democratization and liberalization in MENA, it has granted Morocco financial support through various channels, such as MEPI, the Millennium Challenge Account, US AID, and the Broader MENA Initiative. This support is exclusive of the considerable military and economic assistance that Morocco receives regularly. The assistance to help ensure the success of the reforms in various areas (health, education, job creation, and women’s rights) has the double effect of backing the reforms but also of alleviating the severe socio-economic problems which may derail the process of change. Of course, given the closeness of its relationship with Morocco, the US has sought gradual reforms that do not jeopardize the stability of the monarchy. Morocco benefited from most assistance programs in all areas because: Funding is critical and will support public promises by high-level US visitors of increasing engagement with Morocco and help to maintain US credibility, critical at a time when King Mohammed VI is providing significant support for the President’s reform agenda. The country is a liberalizing, democratizing, and moderate Middle East nation undertaking broad political, social, and economic reforms.37 One can cite ad infinitum the business programs initiated to develop the Moroccan economy, programs38 that have resulted in the establishment of major US corporations in the kingdom. In sum, the US proclaimed its resolve to assist Morocco at every step of the way.39

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In the citation above, the word “moderate” is important, for, as an observer astutely put it, the highest accolade the United States can bestow on a regional ally is that it is ‘moderate’ … Although the United States has consistently spoken in favor of increased democracy in the region, being labeled moderate was enough to ensure good relations with the United States. If forced to choose, the United States has proven itself willing to favor moderation over increased democracy.40 While it is true that Morocco has engaged in major reforms, the picture is not as rosy as US officials repeatedly claim.41 In fact, the State Department Human Rights Annual Reports accurately evoke human rights violations, as well as the limitations of those reforms. However, with such inflated support for Morocco, one can hardly expect the US to abide by international legality in solving the conflict in Western Sahara, the rapprochement with Algeria notwithstanding. At the diplomatic level, the Bush administration still maintained that Morocco was a key actor in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, despite the absence of relations between Israel and Morocco, although senior Israeli officials, such as former foreign minister Sylvan Shalom, visited Morocco in 2003 and sought to restore the relations suspended in 2000. As head of the al-Quds [Jerusalem] Islamic Committee, the Moroccan monarch is expected to serve as a bridge between the two communities. Morocco was also entrusted with the organization in December 2004 of the meeting of the First Foundation for the Future (part of the BMENA) that emerged out of the G8 meeting in Sea Island, Georgia, USA, held in June 2004. The aim of the project is to promote democracy, an open market economy, human rights, the rule of law, and civil participation,42 an idea that most Arab regimes rejected, even if various meetings have taken place subsequently. The May 2003 jihadist attacks in Casablanca increased US determination to protect Morocco. In October 2003, William Burns announced, … our intention to more than quadruple our non-military assistance to Morocco … We will seek to provide approximately $40 million in assistance, a number we will look favorably to augmenting in the years ahead. These monies will help strengthen Morocco’s efforts to open up greater economic, educational, and political opportunities for all its citizens. Some of these monies will also assist Morocco to enhance its fight against terrorism. He also announced US “intention to double our Foreign Military Financing to Morocco to reach $20 million next year … to increasing Morocco’s abilities to update its equipment and police its shores.”43 While economic and diplomatic initiatives have been important, the most critical relations since 9/11 have revolved around security arrangements to fight terrorism in the region. In fact, as with Algeria, co-operation in the intelligence domain had begun well before. Press reports indicated in 2002 that the Moroccan secret services supplied Americans with important intelligence regarding al-Qaeda cells based in the kingdom; apparently, this co-operation between the intelligence services of the two countries thwarted the execution of planned terrorist acts against ships sailing through the Strait of Gibraltar. Morocco is also part of all US initiatives in the region, such as the Pan-Sahel Initiative and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership which superseded it. The close security co-operation extended to Morocco’s involvement with NATO, along with six other southern Mediterranean countries, Algeria, Mauritania, Jordan, Israel, Tunisia, and Egypt. Moroccans pride themselves on hosting the first meeting in April 2006 between the twenty-six NATO members and the seven southern countries. For Moroccans, the meeting highlighted the importance of the special status the kingdom holds in NATO’s dialogue. The

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kingdom has also sought to transform this dialogue into genuine partnership, at both bilateral and regional levels, between NATO members and the southern Mediterranean countries. However, as a NATO observer remarked astutely, Morocco’s approach is to differentiate itself from the other actors in its relations with Western countries and organizations, an objective that could not be attained because “Morocco cannot establish the same relationship with NATO that is as strong as the one it has with the United States, especially since NATO does not have the vocation or the means to grant financial assistance, which limits the extrapolation of the American–Moroccan relationship,”44 even if the relationship with NATO is a de facto extension of that with the US and will allow Morocco to receive more sophisticated American weaponry. Indeed, in June 2004, Bush designated Morocco as a major non-NATO ally in Presidential Determination No. 2004–35. This being said, although Morocco still holds its position as an important US ally anchored in the Western camp, it now faces serious competition. Indeed, the events of 9/11 brought a new situation in the Maghreb. Although US–Algerian relations had begun to develop before the terrorist attacks, 9/11 has strengthened US–Algerian relations considerably (see Chapter 18 on US–Algerian relations). Undoubtedly, although Algeria has not developed the type of relationship that Morocco has historically developed with the US, American policymakers are now careful in taking Algeria’s views into account, for Algeria is not only a major partner in the “global war on terror”, but is also a major energy producer. Thus, Rabat watches with suspicion any close rapprochement between Algiers and Washington and seeks reassurance from the US, which, of course, responds by granting Morocco deals, such as the Free Trade Agreement or the major non-NATO ally status. This situation has deepened Morocco’s dependency on the US, which can extract more demands from Morocco. Furthermore, Moroccans have repeatedly demanded that the US impose the Moroccan solution in Western Sahara, which Morocco has elevated to the top priority in its relations with the US. But the US, regardless of its power and the help it has provided on the question, cannot deliver without destroying one of the foundations of international law. The US has tried several ways to circumvent the referendum on Western Sahara, namely the so-called “third way,” which today is known as the “autonomy plan” that Morocco has offered the Sahrawis, as if Morocco holds sovereignty over the territory.

Conflict in Western Sahara since Baker’s resignation45 Following Baker’s resignation in June 2004 the US seemed to share France’s position that Morocco and Algeria should work for rapprochement “as a means to create an environment conducive to settlement of the issue.”46 As other parties do not always trust Morocco, the US calls for a political solution but still makes reference to the United Nations, repeatedly asking that Morocco make a serious proposal to help solve the conflict. Gordon Gray, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs, declared in 2006 that, with respect to Western Sahara, The United States continues to seek an acceptable political solution, within the United Nations framework, and has no desire whatsoever to impose a solution [. … ] The Moroccan government has recently expressed its willingness to write up an autonomy plan for Western Sahara; the United States encouraged Morocco to present a credible proposal so that all parties can analyze it.47 When Morocco proposed the autonomy plan in April 2007, the US gave it full support, describing it as “a serious and credible proposal to provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara.”48 The US also encouraged direct negotiations between the two protagonists without preconditions. Assistant Secretary of State David C. Welch asserted during a hearing in Congress

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that he had “worked with them [Moroccans] on it [the autonomy plan].” While he asserted that the Moroccan proposal “represents some serious efforts,” he downplayed the Sahrawi proposal, stating that it “does not seem, in our judgment, to contain new ideas by comparison.”49 The paradox is that, while Welch rejects the Sahrawi plan because it reiterates the right to self-determination and remains attached to the Settlement Plan, he also says that “any settlement of the Western Sahara must also take into account the concerns of the Sahrawi people and be consistent with their right of self-determination.” This is precisely the contradiction in which both the US and the UN have found themselves. The ruse in Welch’s statement, however, is in the fact that this right would be the prerogative not of the UN but of Morocco, which “has said its proposal would be subject to a vote by the Sahrawi people.” This is implicit recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed territory. The deputy permanent representative of the US, Jackie Wolcott Sanders, confirmed the US parti pris for Morocco’s “initiative” when she declared, following the first round of direct talks, “We believe a promising and realistic way forward on the Western Sahara is meaningful autonomy. Morocco’s initiative could provide a realistic framework to begin negotiations on a plan that would provide for real autonomy contingent on the approval of the local population.”50 Following the second round of negotiations between Moroccans and Sahrawi nationalists, the State Department reiterated the belief that, “meaningful autonomy is a promising and realistic way forward and that the Moroccan initiative could provide a realistic framework for negotiations.”51 This, in fact, is also the argument that Moroccans sought to impose upon the Sahrawis. Indeed, during the talks, Moroccans declared that the Sahrawis should accept their “autonomy initiative” because it enjoys the support of the US and France. This, again, is clearly in contradiction with UN Resolution 1754, which urges the parties to engage in talks without preconditions. The US dilemma is one it has faced since the inception of the conflict: how to reconcile international law with geopolitical interests, namely the protection of a traditional ally. While the US fully backed Morocco because it served as a bulwark against communism during the cold war, in the post-9/11 era, it serves as an ally in the global war on terror. The US would be setting an extremely dangerous precedent: recognizing, albeit implicitly, Morocco’s sovereignty amounts to condoning the illegal acquisition of territory by military force. Indeed, the support that Morocco has obtained in the US Congress for the autonomy proposal is indicative of a US temptation to breach international norms and legality to suit the interests of its ally. But, despite US alignment on Morocco’s position regarding Western Sahara, the US has kept the question within the UN house and does not seem to want to impose a solution that does not obtain the acquiescence of Algeria and the Sahrawis. Withdrawing the Sahrawi dossier from the UN would amount to destabilization of the region with unforeseen consequences, especially with the volatile situation prevailing in the Maghreb–Sahel region where al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, no matter how insignificant, would exploit any situation to establish its presence and make it a recruiting field for the victims of the socio-economic difficulties in the region. It remains to be seen whether the new UN Special Envoy, Ambassador Christopher Ross, whose appointment was confirmed in January 2009, will have the backing of the Barack Obama administration in resolving the conflict in a manner consistent with international law. Moroccans insist that they will only negotiate their own “autonomy plan.”

Conclusion The kingdom of Morocco remains the pillar of US foreign policy in the Maghreb region. The US has appreciated the pro-Western and “moderate” positions that Morocco has pursued for decades. However, the dividends that Morocco has obtained from the US, such as the Free Trade Agreement or the major non-NATO ally status, may not be perceived by the population at large as beneficial to the country. Despite the claimed democratization of the kingdom, the monarchy, like most other Arab regimes, is oblivious to public opinion. Support for US

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policy agenda may elicit praise for the monarchy, but Moroccans may see their country as a sub-contractor for perceived US attempts to subjugate the Arab and Muslim worlds. Close security co-operation with the US, especially after the invasion of Iraq, Guantanamo, AbuGhraib, and support for Israel in its war against the Palestinians in Gaza in December 2008– January 2009, could only inflate an already high level of anti-Americanism in the region. True, the election of Barack Obama may change the population’s attitude, but it is certain that for now there is a discrepancy between the regime and its public opinion with respect to the US. Furthermore, as suggested earlier, Morocco has elevated the question of Western Sahara so high in its priorities that it has become not only dependent on the US but has gained so much confidence in being protected by its Western allies that it has failed to find the necessary ingredients to devise a realistic, acceptable solution to the conflict that could result in a profitable Maghreb integration. Unless the question of Western Sahara is resolved, there is no chance of that happening.

Notes 1 www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm. 2 Letter of George Washington to Sidi Mohammed (Muhammed) (December 1, 1789). Available from www.consource. org/index.asp?bid=582&fid=600&documentid=60832 3 www.maec.gov.ma/fr/f-com.asp?num=1847&typ=else (accessed November 30, 2008). 4 Cited in L. Carl Brown, “The United States and the Maghrib,” Middle East Journal, 30(3), Fall 1976: 287. 5 For detailed analyses of the 1950s, see Paul J. Zingg, “The Cold War in North Africa: American Foreign Policy and Postwar Muslim Nationalism 1945–62,” The Historian, 39(1), November 1976: 40–61; Yahia H. Zoubir, “US and Soviet Policies Toward France’s Struggle with Anti-Colonial Nationalism in North Africa,” Canadian Journal of History/Annales d’Histoire Canadiennes, 30(3), December 1995: 439–66; Samya El Machat, Les Etats-Unis et le Maroc: Le choix stratégique, 1945–1959 (Paris, 1996); Charles F. Ghallagher, The United States and North Africa—Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). 6 Morocco produces phosphates, iron ore, manganese, lead, zinc, fish, and salt. Nearly half of the world’s known phosphate reserves—an important source for fertilizer which may be in short supply in coming decades—comes from Morocco. With the assistance of US companies, Morocco began to develop its vast oil shale deposits, some of which are in the disputed Western Sahara, which it has occupied since 1975. There are also deposits of antimony, zinc, lead, coal, and at least some oil. 7 Claudia Wright, “Journey to Marrakesh: U.S.–Moroccan Security Relations,” International Security, 7(4), Spring 1983: 168–69. 8 Stephen Zunes, “Morocco and Western Sahara,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 3(42), December 1998. Available from www.fpif.net/briefs/vol3/v3n42mor.html; see also John Damis, “Morocco and the Western Sahara,” Current History, April 1990. 9 The New York Times, July 7, 1979, cited in Stephen Zunes, “The United States in the Saharan War: A Case of LowIntensity Intervention,” in Yahia H. Zoubir and Daniel Volman, eds, International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993): 55. 10 These figures were calculated from the statistics provided by the US Department of State Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005. 11 www.state.gov/t/pm/64727.htm. 12 James Phillips, “King Hassan’s Morocco: A Valuable U.S. Ally,” The Heritage Foundation, Paper 1023, March 13, 1995. 13 Stephen Zunes, “The United States in the Saharan War: A Case of Low-Intensity Intervention,” in Yahia H. Zoubir and Daniel Volman, eds, International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993): 53–92. 14 Yahia H. Zoubir, “Moscow, the Maghreb, and Conflict in the Western Sahara,” in Zoubir and Volman, eds, International Dimensions, op. cit.: 103–25. 15 Jacob Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of the Spanish Sahara,” The Journal of North African Studies, 11(3), September 2006: 275–306. 16 Ignace Dalle, Les trois rois—La monarchie marocaine de l’indépendance à nos jours [The Three Kings—The Moroccan Monarchy since Independence] (Paris: Fayard, 2004): 427. 17 Yahia H. Zoubir, “Soviet Policy toward the Western Sahara Conflict,” Africa Today, 34(3), 1987: 17–32. 18 “Former U.S. Secretary of State, and former Personal Envoy of the U.N. Secretary General to Western Sahara, James A. Baker III, discusses the protracted conflict in Western Sahara with host Mishal Husain” PBS TV, August 19, 2004. Available from www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/shows/sahara/transcript.html. 19 The New York Times, February 1, 1983. 20 For a detailed treatment of arms sales to Morocco under the Reagan administration, see Zunes, “The United States in the Saharan War,” op. cit.: 52–65.

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21 Yahia H. Zoubir and Louisa Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, “The United States and the Maghreb: Islamism, Democratization, and Strategic Interests,” The Maghreb Review, 31(3–4), 2006: 266. 22 Barbara Crosette, “Congress Scrutinizes Peacekeeping Test Case,” New York Times, March 1, 1992: 9. 23 Kim Murphy, “Moroccan Throne Appears at Stake in a Historic Western Sahara Vote,” Los Angeles Times, November 9, 1991: A16. 24 Author’s interviews with US officials, Washington, DC, May 1996 and January 1997; February 1999, May 2000. 25 Yahia H. Zoubir, “Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality,” Middle East Policy, 14(4), Winter 2007: 166–67. 26 Ibid.: 170. 27 Letter from Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, to Congressman Joseph Pitts, July 20, 2004. Author’s personal file. 28 Yahia H. Zoubir, “Algerian–Moroccan Relations and their Impact on Maghrebi Integration,” Journal of North African Studies, 5(3), Autumn 2000: 43–74. 29 U.S. National Security Strategy Document. The White House. Washington, DC, February 7, 2000. 30 Cécile Jolly, “Ambitions américaines en Méditerranée,” Arabies, September 1999: 35. 31 Stuart Eizenstat interviewed by Doris McMillon on WorldNet “Dialogue,” June 8, 1999, in United States Information Agency (Washington, DC), June 16, 1999. See also Stuart E. Eizenstat, Undersecretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs. Third Annual Les Aspin Memorial Lecture (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 8, 1999). 32 See, Zoubir, “Algerian–Moroccan Relations … ,” op. cit. 33 Interviews Y. Zoubir conducted with US officials at the Department of State and Department of Commerce, Washington, DC, May 2000. 34 “Maghreb Integration and the World Economy,” Remarks by Stuart E. Eizenstat at the Maghreb Center’s Annual Meeting on Maghreb Development, Strategic Resources, and the Environment in a Globalized World, Washington, DC, April 21, 2008. Available from http://209.85.129.132/search?q=cache:IiJSaUSbo4IJ:maghrebcenter.org/ Eizenstat.doc+Eizenstat+initiative&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=8 (accessed December 1, 2008). 35 http://mepi.state.gov/. 36 Raymond J. Ahearn, “Morocco–U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS21464, updated April 13, 2005. 37 http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/c21508.htm. 38 On US programs to support Moroccan reforms, see Haim Malka and Jon B. Alterman, Arab Reform and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Morocco (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006): 62 ff. 39 William Burns declared that, “The historic steps Morocco has taken toward political, economic, and social modernization demonstrate its strength and reinforce its standing in the community of nations. The United States will continue to be the closest possible partner and ally to Morocco as it takes the necessary steps to ensure peace and prosperity for the future generations in this region.” Press Conference, Ambassador William J. Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs at Villa America Rabat, Morocco, October 28, 2003. Available from www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/2003/november/110402.html. 40 Christopher Hemmer, “US Policy toward North Africa,” Middle East Policy, 14(4), Winter 2007: 60. 41 See Gregory W. White, “The ‘End of the Era of Leniency’ in Morocco,” in Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah-Fernández, eds, North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation (London and New York: Routledge, 2008): 90–108. 42 Available from www.foundationforfuture.org/files/Brochure-ENG.pdf (accessed December 1, 2008). 43 Press Conference, Ambassador William J. Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs at Villa America Rabat, Morocco, October 28, 2003. Available from www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/2003/ november/110402.html. 44 Abdennour Benantar, “Relation d’alliance Americano-marocaine et jeu d’équilibre entre le Maroc et l’Algérie,” in A. Benantar, ed., Les Etats-Unis et le Maghreb—Regain d’intérêt? (Alger: Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée pour le Développement, 2007): 272. 45 This section draws from my article, “Stalemate in Western Sahara: Ending International Legality,” op. cit.: 170–71. 46 Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, July 9, 2004. Available from www.state. gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/34290.htm (accessed July 10, 2004). 47 Gabriela González de Castejón, “Entretien avec Gordon Gray,” Revue Afkar/Idées, 9, Winter 2006: 15. 48 US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Media Note, Western Sahara, 2006/274, April 11, 2007. 49 C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, US Policy Challenges in North Africa, Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, June 6, 2007. Available from www.globalsecurity. org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/070606-welch.htm. 50 Patrick Worsnip, “Les discussions sur le Sahara occidental s’achèvent sans accord,” Reuters, August 12, 2007. 51 See US Department of State, “Office of the Spokesperson, Question Taken at the August 13 Daily Press Briefing,” Washington, DC, August 13, 2007. Available from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/aug/90870.htm (accessed August 14, 2007).

20 The US and Tunisia Model of stable relations Yahia H. Zoubir

Introduction Tunisia is a small, yet relatively prosperous country, in spite of its limited resources. Pressed between two powerful regional states, Algeria to the west and Libya to the east, Tunisia is militarily vulnerable, a reality that has led Tunisians to pursue a cautious, moderate foreign policy. This condition of vulnerability compelled Tunisia, ever since its independence from France in 1956, under the leadership of the very charismatic Habib Bourguiba, to adopt a pro-Western stance without however showing any particular animosity toward the communist bloc throughout the cold war era. This explains why, despite its pro-Western stance, Tunisia joined the non-aligned movement (NAM) and played an active role of “positive neutrality” in it. Bourguiba was averse to communism, yet he believed that balanced relationships would allow his country to achieve a reputable status in the international system.1 This pragmatic, non-confrontational foreign policy elicited respect from the two opposing blocs during the cold war but also from most third world countries. Thus, in spite of its small size and limited resources, and despite the rivalry with Nasserite Egypt in the 1960s, Tunisia succeeded in playing an active role in the Arab League, whose headquarters it hosted in Tunis from 1979 to 1990, and the Organization of African Unity (renamed the African Union in 1999). The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had established its headquarters in Tunis from 1982 to 1993. This was done at the behest of the US and France following the PLO’s expulsion from Lebanon. The US has always been attracted not only by Tunisia’s pro-Western position, but also by what US policymakers perceive, as in the case of Morocco, as a voice of “moderation and realism” in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In particular, US officials have always appreciated Tunisia’s “moderation” in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Certainly ahead of his times, President Bourguiba had urged Arabs in 1965, i.e., before the June 1967 Arab–Israeli war, to recognize Israel, advocating a two-state solution whereby a Palestinian state would co-exist alongside an Israeli state, an idea that Arab leaders severely criticized in that epoch. Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser, the leading figure of Arab nationalism, went as far as to accuse Bourguiba of being an American stooge. Obviously, this was further proof for the US that Tunisia constituted a rampart against radical nationalist/Nasserite and socialist/communist forces in the MENA region, thus preventing the erection of a homogeneous pan-Arab front under Egypt’s leadership. Because of its structural vulnerability, Tunisia has sought to play a mediation role within its regional environment where rival, bigger powers—Algeria, Morocco, and Libya—seek to impose their hegemony. Aware of their vulnerability to the threats and ambitions of external, mainly regional, powers, Tunisians have developed a foreign policy whose main objective is to curtail their geopolitical and security weaknesses.2 Given that the mediation role is not enough to contain the potential threats from its more powerful neighbors, Tunisia has established solid relations with the West, the US in particular, without however entering into formal security

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arrangements. In the 1960s, Tunisians believed that besides Egypt both Algeria and the Soviet Union were the main threats to their security.3 Tunisia’s moderation, lack of regional ambitions, as well as the absence of any enduring conflict, such as the one that has characterized Algerian–Moroccan relations for decades and has forced the two countries to demand assistance from the superpower, are the main factors that have allowed this nation to deal with the US from a comfortable position, with rare shortlived setbacks. In fact, the main characteristic of US–Tunisia relations is constancy—which explains why there is not much academic writing on these relations. Whenever events, such as the 1985 Israeli bombing of the PLO headquarters, the Israeli assassination of PLO official AbuJihad at his home in Tunis, or the Gulf War in 1990, affect the serenity of US–Tunisian ties, both sides are quick to repair them, thus highlighting the importance of the reciprocal attachment of the two governments. However, like other Arab leaders eventually did, Bourguiba understood that being a strategic Arab ally of the US, and enjoying its protection, is no guarantee against an attack from Israel, as was evident during the Israeli attacks against targets in Tunisia, in violation of Tunisia’s sovereignty and international norms. But, Tunisia, aware of its vulnerability, could not allow the 1985 and 1988 incidents to jeopardize its relations with the US. Owing to its weaknesses, the Tunisian leadership devised a foreign policy which allowed it to transform its “geopolitical weakness into a strategic asset.”4 Both President Bourguiba (1956–87) and his successor Zine al Abidine Ben Ali (1987–present) have, with the exception (no protection against Israel) noted earlier, secured strong support from the US, which views Tunisia as a strategic partner in the region despite the regime’s impenitent authoritarianism. The partnership between the two countries was strengthened in the wake of the 9/11 events; Tunisia wasted no time in joining the US-led “global war on terrorism.”

The shaping of US–Tunisian relations US–Tunisian relations date back to the early years of the American republic. After years of being subjugated to attacks from the “Barbary states,” the US secured a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Tunis in 1797 and, subsequently, signed other political and commercial treaties; the first US consulate was established in Tunis in January 1800. Relations between the two countries have remained cordial ever since. During the colonial period (1882–1956), which made Tunisia a French Protectorate, the Tunisian nationalist movement, which rose to prominence in the 1930s, enjoyed good relations with Washington, owing mostly to its moderation and its pro-Western orientation. Tunisian nationalist leaders’ unequivocal opposition to the Axis powers and their support for the West despite being under France’s colonial yoke elicited admiration in the US and Europe.5 The nationalist movement, like other nationalist movements in North Africa, also obtained support from the powerful labor organizations in the US. What is remarkable is that Bourguiba, to France’s exasperation, toured the US several times in search of support for Tunisia’s peaceful anti-colonial struggle. Similarly to their Moroccan counterparts, Tunisian nationalist leaders appealed to the US for support in their dispute with France, an attitude that alienated the Soviet Union until the de-Stalinization process launched after the XXth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956; the process overlapped with the recovery of Morocco and Tunisia’s independence.6 The Dwight Eisenhower administration was anxious that, unless the US paid greater attention to the newly independent nations and extended considerable economic aid, Soviet involvement would weaken American interests and influence, especially at a time when the Soviets had adopted more pragmatic policies and sought amicable relations with third world regimes. Owing to Tunisia’s pro-Western policies, the US succeeded in building friendly ties with the newly independent Tunisian state. Eisenhower was particularly impressed with Bourguiba’s pro-Western sentiments. In March 1957, Vice President Richard Nixon visited Tunisia, where he declared that the US had no intention of supplanting France in the region;

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Nixon also held the view that the US should not support colonialism in Africa, a declaration that pleased Tunisians, who were calling on the US to nudge France to grant independence to neighboring Algeria as a way of securing Western interests in the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia). In order to keep Tunisia within the Western camp and to prevent it from succumbing to Soviet influence, the US, under the Eisenhower Doctrine to which the newly independent state fully subscribed, provided economic and technical assistance; a bilateral treaty to that effect was signed in March 1957. Bourguiba, who had met President Eisenhower in November 1956, made clear his pro-Western, anti-communist orientation7 and his opposition to radical nationalism, which resulted in the breaking off of Tunisia’s relations with Egypt in 1958, a decision that delighted the US government. Bourguiba’s ideology contrasted with the radical Nasserite nationalism which represented a threat to his rule. Already, the fierce French–Algerian war was a major destabilizing factor, with Tunisia having agreed to host on its territory not only Algerian refugees fleeing French repression, but also nationalist combatants, a decision that greatly antagonized France. The 1958 French bombing of the refugee camps in the western Tunisian town of Sakiet Sidi-Youssef, using American-made airplanes that killed scores of civilians, mostly school children, damaged the image of the Western world to which Bourguiba was close. This resulted in a major Franco-Tunisian crisis for the next five years, that is until the evacuation of French bases from the country—close to 5,000 Tunisians died in 1961 while trying, unsuccessfully, to forcibly evacuate the base in Bizerte.8 While France suspended all financial and technical aid to Tunisia, the US and Great Britain, both France’s allies, continued to provide assistance to Tunisia. US assistance, through the Agency for International Development, USAID (until 1994), was instrumental in helping Tunisia continue its socio-economic development—USAID provided more than $2 billion worth of funding in the framework of foreign assistance. This co-operation concerned infrastructural developments, housing, education, industrial projects, as well as agriculture. Furthermore, close to 2,500 Peace Corps Volunteers served in Tunisia (1962–96); in fact, Tunisia was the first country to welcome such volunteers when the program was launched under the Kennedy administration in 1962. Following the failure of the statist economic path, worsened by the 1986 fall in petroleum prices, Tunisia decided to pursue a more liberal economy in 1987 with the assistance of international financial institutions. The US contributed to Tunisia securing an extended fund facility in 1988 and helped it with the implementation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s structural adjustment programs. Although the public sector remained quite important, Tunisia succeeded in undertaking effective macroeconomic reforms which made the country creditworthy, earning great respect in the international financial institutions.9 During President’s Ben Ali visit to Washington, in 1990, the US and Tunisia signed a treaty for the promotion of investments. The US was optimistic that Tunisia would become an attractive market for US businesses. While Algerian nationalists drew different lessons from US support for France against its existing and former colonies, an assessment that would impact considerably upon post-independence Algeria’s relations with the United States (see Chapter 18 on US–Algerian relations), Bourguiba remained attached to the idea that securing the Tunisian state against external threats necessitated compromise and even making large concessions, if that meant guaranteeing the security of the state. Therefore, not only did he seek strong ties with the US, but also with France, for which he had great affection as well as admiration for its modern values, values that he sought to inculcate in Tunisians to enter modernity. This partly explains Bourguiba’s desire to keep Tunisia away from the tumultuous politics of the Arab east.10 The quality of US–Tunisian relations owes a great deal to Bourguiba’s pragmatism. Unlike most of his Arab counterparts, Bourguiba set Tunisia on a pro-Western course the objective of which was the modernization and gradual secularization of the country. He did not allow US anti-Arab actions, such as Washington’s partiality toward Israel, even when the latter invaded Arab countries (Lebanon in 1978 and 1982), or US attacks on Libya in 1986, to adversely

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affect Tunisia’s attachment to the West. As seen earlier, this attachment did not preclude the establishment of excellent commercial relations with the communist world. Tunisia’s foreign policy was, and still is, characterized by a high dose of realism which, in essence, means that the country can do business with countries that have a totally opposite ideological orientation as long as the dividends resulting from the dealings with these nations are beneficial to Tunisia’s national interests and socio-economic progress. Thus, when Tunisia initiated a short-lived socialist economy in the 1960s under the direction of Minister of Planning Ahmed Ben Salah, such a decision did not derive from any predilection for Eastern/Soviet ideology. Rather, the objective was to lessen the country’s economic dependence through a policy of import substitution, in vogue in the third world in that period, but also to lay the economic foundations for modernization and better redistribution of national resources. When this policy failed, the Tunisian state shifted gear to purportedly make private sector entrepreneurs the “masters of the country,”11 although, in reality, the state was in full control of most sectors, including the economy. Indeed, the political liberalization that ensued ended as fast as it had started. Tunisia’s foreign policy objective has always rested on the necessity to alleviate the economic and security vulnerabilities of the country. This means that, “even the pro-Western political alignment was as much about the latter’s ability to contribute to Tunisia’s modernization as it was about any congruence of values or aspirations.”12 But, from a US perspective, Tunisia’s unequivocal anchorage in the Western camp, especially during the cold war period, and the espousal of many of its values, were the factors that made Tunisia so attractive.

Continuity in US–Tunisian relations Undoubtedly, constancy typifies US–Tunisian relations. Indeed, up until today, despite US discomfort with Ben Ali’s outright violation of human rights, Tunisia has had a privileged position on the list of countries friendly to the US. The serenity of the US–Tunisian partnership has only been truly upset once: the October 1985 Israeli bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis, which caused scores of civilian casualties (the US had foreknowledge of the attack and basically condoned it). Bourguiba was furious and considered, probably in a moment of great anger, severing diplomatic relations with the US.13 Tunisia’s sustained pro-Western stance proved extremely attractive, as did its model of political, economic, and social development. President Zine al Abidine Ben Ali did not deviate much from the footsteps of his predecessor (1956–87). The main difference between the two was Ben Ali’s obsession with domestic security, threatened by the emergence of Islamism, as opposed to Bourguiba’s alliance politics to counter external threats to Tunisia’s security.14 The preoccupation with domestic issues was the direct result of the era of political stagnation and social unrest that characterized Tunisia during Bourguiba’s fin de règne from the late 1970s to his removal from office in November 1987 for “medical reasons.” Bourguiba’s disinclination to loosen his grip on power, coupled with unrelenting authoritarian, stationary politics, resulted in the emergence of a powerful Islamist movement which found sympathy among the population at large. The secular values, the national consensus, and the social tolerance that Bourguiba had succeeded in gradually instilling in Tunisian society were now in jeopardy. This also meant that the new regime had to pursue a foreign policy that would be much more sensitive to its public opinion than under Bourguiba, without however shifting away from the pro-Western, pro-American policy that had characterized Tunisia hitherto. Under nudging from the US and France, Tunisia was in fact to be more active in the Arab environment; they anticipated that Tunisia’s participation in Arab politics would result in more moderation, especially as regards the Arab–Israeli conflict. Thus, Tunisia was quite active in the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union in February 1989. But, although Tunisia condemned the invasion of Kuwait, it opposed the US-led war against Iraq in 1991, not least because US sanctions and the war had an impact on the Tunisian economy.15 Unlike what happened in the 1967 and

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1973 Arab–Israeli wars, the position of the government and that of the opposition converged. President Ben Ali espoused the public sentiment—perhaps to better control the Islamists who could have exploited the situation to their own advantage as did their counterparts in neighboring Algeria—and obtained unanimous support from the legal opposition parties.16 However, as has become customary, displeasure with the US was a passing cloud, as illustrated by Tunisia’s enthusiastic support for the Oslo accords. This is not to say though that Tunisia does not distance itself, as it did in the Kosovo case, from US policy, urging instead that the United Nations play a greater role to avoid US hegemonic power from acting unrestrained. With respect to Libya, although Tunisia did not violate the restrictions imposed by the UN sanctions, it clearly did not approve of US policy toward Libya and did in fact seek to improve its relationship with its eastern neighbor, which happens to be its most important partner in the MENA region. While this may not have pleased the US, it did not affect the relationship because Tunisia apparently encouraged Libya to give up its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which the latter eventually did. Because of its non-alignment and its close relations with the Western world, the end of the cold war did not have traumatic effects on Tunisia, as it did on Syria or Libya, which were now confronted by a hegemonic superpower without an ally that could deflect its weight. If anything, the new, post-cold war environment was favorable to Tunisia: the US maintained its commitment to Tunisia because Libya now qualified as a “rogue state,” whose relations with the US had taken a new turn for the worse with the Lockerbie affair (see Chapter 21 on Libya) and was still viewed as a threat to Tunisia. Like Morocco, Tunisia was seen in Washington as a pole of stability in the Maghreb that should be protected against the threat from the Libyan “rogue state.” Tunisia should also be shielded against the potential spillover emanating from the civil unrest in Algeria which pitched security forces against Islamists.17 Therefore, arms sales to Tunisia continued to flow, half of which came from the US.18 Obviously, the Tunisian regime used the situation in Algeria as a scarecrow against potential internal opponents and to justify the crackdown on its own Islamists, even though the latter were quite peaceful compared with the radicals who threatened the existence of the state in Algeria.

Tunisia, Islamism, and US democracy promotion From the 1970s onward, the Tunisian regime chose a particular interpretation of what the dialectical relationship between Islamism and democratization should be. For the regime, especially Ben Ali’s, democratization is contingent upon stability, which in turn presupposes strict control, or rather eradication, of Islamists. Yet, among the North African states, Tunisia enjoyed the most moderate Islamist movement. The Islamic Tendency Movement (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique, MTI), founded in 1979, and also known as En-Nahda (Renaissance), is in fact Tunisia’s main political opposition party, even while leading a clandestine life. Unlike what occurred in neighboring Algeria with regard to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the Tunisian authorities refused to grant En-Nahda official recognition, even though the organization has clearly been non-violent. The movement constituted the main challenge to both Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s authoritarian, albeit modernist, regimes. The objective of En-Nahda, under the leadership of Rached al-Ghannouchi, a moderate Islamist thinker who truly shaped the ideology of the party, was to accede to power to establish a genuine Arab–Islamic society. Ghannouchi, a Sorbonne-educated philosophy teacher trained in the Zaytouni tradition as well as in Arab nationalism,19 and his followers in no way intended on promoting a popular uprising, as the FIS did in Algeria, for instance. Despite the transformation of their cultural discourse into a political one, the En-Nahdists did not intend to seize power through violent means or to take over the state and replace it with an Islamic state. As Ghannouchi put it, “I remain totally hostile to a theocratic state, attached to the sacred nature of the human body, strongly opposed to capital punishment, decided to promote as far as possible, both in

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the texts and in social practice, equality between man and woman … .”20 More interesting is Ghannouchi’s assertion that “Islam is indeed my religion and a component of my culture; however, it cannot be the foundation of the state, for it would only be an alibi for power struggles and the pretext for a new totalitarianism.”21 Thus, the goal of MTI’s Islamists is to attain power through a legal, democratic path. No matter what their true intentions might have been in the 1980s and 1990s, it is clear that they pursued a reformist approach similar to the one espoused by the Algerian Movement for a Peaceful Society, MSP, also known as HAMAS (not to be confused with the Palestinian movement that bears the same name). Unlike the FIS, which did not have a well-articulated ideology and rejected democracy outright as a foreign imitation alien to Islamic societies, Tunisia’s Islamists espoused, at least in rhetoric, the fundamentals of democracy; in fact, they believed that their program would lead to a genuine, prosperous democratic society. The conspicuous emergence of Islamism in Tunisia occurred during the 1984 riot, at a time when the government, similarly to in Algeria in the 1980s, was encouraging the involvement of Islamists in the educational and cultural sectors to counter the leftist opposition and when President Bourguiba’s senility had worsened. In this turbulent context, Islamism spread from social organizations into the state security institutions (army, police, and administration). Even the trade union federation, a traditional government ally, witnessed an increasing Islamist influence. The response to this quasi chaotic situation came from General Ben Ali, then Minister of the Interior and the regime’s strongman, who forced Bourguiba to resign in a “medical coup” in November 1987. The new government initially sought “reconciliation” with the opposition in general and Islamists in particular through a policy of appeasement. The “reconciliation” was promoted by way of co-optation of the Islamists who were offered a seat in the High Islamic Council, permission to participate in the legislative election of April 2, 1989, and the legalization of their General Union of Tunisian Students and their newspaper al-Fajr (the dawn). The regime also launched a new religious policy to promote Islam as a major element of national identity by restoring the autonomy of the prestigious al-Zaytouna University, reintroducing the call to prayer on the radio and TV, and creating the Center for Islamic Studies in 1989.22 However, this policy was short-lived and soon the Tunisian regime consistently pursued an unrelenting strategy of obliteration of the Islamist movement, in spite of the movement’s nonviolent approach. Ben Ali, a resolute enemy of political Islam,23 sought to counter En-Nahda through an economic modernization program and mobilization of the middle class. Basically, the staunchly secular regime used ruthless repression against Islamists, portrayed as backward and violent, and exploited their existence as a scarecrow against the middle class, which, unsurprisingly, accepted authoritarian rule in exchange for economic benefits.24 Because of the unnerving political evolution in neighboring Algeria, where growth of the FIS was stunning, combined with MTI’s impressive electoral results in the legislative elections of April 1989, Ben Ali decided that the MTI must be eradicated as a party of opposition. The regime proceeded with a terrifying witch-hunt throughout the country, while Ghannouchi had already gone into exile. The regime imprisoned and tortured thousands of En-Nahda sympathizers. Using two atrocious incidents allegedly involving En-Nahdha followers, the government decided to finish off the “liberalization” process that it had promised Tunisians. The Ben Ali administration has had absolutely no tolerance for any type of dissent, secular or Islamist, ever since. In contrast with what happened in Algeria, the Tunisian government obtained support from the US and France for its policy of eradication of Islamists.25 The regime waved the flag of an “Islamist threat” to justify its repressive measures against a movement that always refuted violence even when subjected to it by the state, and to justify the status quo. Today, the regime holds the Islamists up as justification for restrictions upon democracy and civil liberties. The US government, until 1990–91, presented the Tunisian Islamist movement as a moderate group. In fact, to the annoyance of the Tunisian authorities, American officials had met

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“unofficially”26 with Ghannouchi in the late 1980s. But the determination of the Tunisian government to eradicate the Islamist movement, coupled with the warlike situation in Algeria, led the US government to abandon Tunisia’s Islamists and to stop contacts with Rashid Ghannouchi and his moderate En-Nahda movement. This attitude contrasted with that toward Algeria, where the US urged the authorities to integrate Islamists in the political system.27 In fact, US officials, such as Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau, who had urged Algeria to seek compromise with the FIS in the 1990s, were conspicuously silent about the repression that Ben Ali conducted against the more peaceful Islamists in Tunisia. This, of course, took place at a time when the US and Algeria did not enjoy the ties that they have developed since 9/11 (see Chapter 18 on US–Algerian relations). At that time, Algeria was still perceived as unfriendly to the US and as a former ally of the Soviet Union.28 Yet, continued US support for Tunisia’s authoritarian regime, especially after 9/11, discredited the Bush administration’s efforts to promote democracy in the MENA region. Following 9/11, the Bush administration had put political reform and promotion of democracy on its agenda. In the American conception of democracy, democratization and religious freedom are closely associated. Actually, the core idea of the US project is to think about Islamic countries like any other countries that can change political rules, and adapt them to liberalism without upsetting the local culture and sacred religious values. As President George W. Bush put it, “The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes.”29 Furthermore, US policymakers are aware that democratization in North Africa, as in the rest of the Arab world, will most certainly result in Islamists coming to power; they are also aware that the status quo that served the US so well for decades is no longer tenable and, in fact, may have been one of the root causes of 9/11. Undoubtedly, they realized that support for authoritarian regimes breeds the very same instability that the US seeks to thwart. The US is quite cognizant of this reality, which explains why, at least in rhetoric, there was such a push for democratization until 2005–6. Indeed, President Bush himself declared that, Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe—because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo.30 The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States document reiterated that “the advance of freedom and human dignity through democracy is the long-term solution to the transnational terrorism of today.” This includes “moderate,” “tolerable” Islamist parties, and curtailing clandestine immigration. The US sounded quite serious about bringing about democratic change. As one White House official put it, “the old bargain of choosing stability over change is now off; we’ve opened the conversation about the need for change.”31 While this rhetoric worried the incumbent Arab regimes, especially after the toppling of the Iraqi dictator, the objective of spreading democracy in the MENA region was confronted with the necessity of a more salient strategic interest: keeping these regimes as part of the “global war on terror;” their collaboration is perceived as essential for US interests. This is reminiscent of US policy during the cold war when it supported dictators because it considered their collaboration in the containment of communism and of nationalist forces more important than upholding the ideals of freedom and democracy. In the Tunisian case, the US government, especially the Department of State, genuinely tried to nudge the regime to bring about political reforms and show greater respect for human rights. Thus, during his visit to Tunisia in November 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell felt uninhibited and criticized the violations of human rights in the country. Such criticism was

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reiterated by President Bush, who, in February 2004, told a baffled Ben Ali that it was necessary for Tunisia to undertake reforms in the areas of freedom of the press and of the legislative system, both legal and electoral. In looking at the history of US–Tunisian relations, one can assert that this was one of the very few instances in which a US administration criticized the Tunisian authorities so blatantly. However, apart from these specific reprimands, Tunisia has continued to benefit from Washington’s leniency and tolerance of its authoritarian regime.32 In fact, right after criticizing Tunisia on the freedom of the press, Bush added that “Tunisia can help lead the greater Middle East to reform and freedom, something that I know is necessary for peace for the long term.”33 Thus, it is not surprising that today Tunis hosts one of the two Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)’s regional bureaus, which is “responsible for coordinating MEPI activities in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia in close co-ordination with the American embassies in those countries.”34 Furthermore, Tunisia, where freedom of information is practically non-existent, hosted the November 2005 UN-sponsored World Summit on the Information Society in its capital Tunis. Not only did the authorities muzzle civil society, but they also intimidated foreign journalists during the conference. In sum, even when the US government, and Europe for that matter, especially the European Parliament, criticizes the Ben Ali regime for human rights abuses, political repression, and total absence of democracy, they seldom take concrete actions that could induce the regime to change. The financial and other instruments to compel the regime to alter its policies have not been used. Although Tunisia has had an Association Agreement with the European Union since 1995, it has only occasionally responded to demands, typically by freeing prominent opposition figures from jail, while many, unknown others were incarcerated for speaking up against the authoritarian nature of the regime. And when Europe does not cooperate with the regime by, for instance, refraining from extraditing Tunisian Islamists based on the continent, Tunisia turns to its neighbors, especially Algeria, to fight the Islamist menace. Ben Ali also convinced most Arab countries, including the Arab League, in adopting anti-Islamist legislation that ensures that states abstain from helping Islamist terrorists by any means.35 As to the US, Washington has not used any tangible means to punish the regime for its violations and abuses of human rights. On the contrary, it continues to reward the government through economic co-operation. In fact, Tunisia may soon have a Free Trade Agreement similar to the one the US signed with Morocco in 2004—although negotiations are stalling at the moment36 for technical, not political, reasons. Tunisia and the US already have a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement signed in 2002, which resulted in the establishment of a United States–Tunisia Council on Trade and Investment. The country also receives funds through the Millennium Challenge Account. During his testimony on May 3, 2006 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Ambassador to Tunisia, Robert F. Godec (2006–present) acknowledged Tunisia’s poor human rights record. However, in merely mentioning the issue of freedom of the press and of association during an interview with the Tunisian newspaper La Presse,37 in which he lauded the country’s great achievements, Godec was accused in the government-controlled newspapers of “interference” in Tunisia’s domestic affairs. However, one should not expect that mild criticism from US officials would greatly impact upon Ben Ali’s authoritarian policies. One might ask why the US has not done more to promote democracy in Tunisia. The answer is that the West in general holds the view that this little state is an ally, an archetype of moderation, and an inspiring model of economic success, although it owed a great deal of its success to US assistance through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and through the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT)’s General System of Preferences. US officials, however, praise Tunisia for having “graduated” in 1994 and no longer needed assistance from USAID. Truly, US appreciation for Tunisia, in both the executive and the legislative branches of government, extends beyond the usual praise for moderation and pro-Western stances in international affairs. US officials view favorably what they perceive as a

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secular Arab society, unlike the overwhelming majority of MENA countries. They appreciate the country’s attitude toward women and the high literacy rate among Tunisian women, an attitude which has, in their view, contributed to the low birth rate, and has helped save Tunisia from the severe overpopulation and unemployment problems experienced by so many developing countries. However, the most important factor explaining why the US refrains from putting too much pressure on Tunisia derives from the role that the country plays in the realm of security and, today, in the “global war on terror.”

US–Tunisian security relations Security relations between the US and Tunisia were established shortly after Tunisia’s independence, the US being the first country to recognize the newly independent state. FrancoTunisian tensions in the aftermath of independence—due to the situation in Algeria and the continued presence of French bases on Tunisian territory—allowed the US to build a strong military co-operation. The US, and later France, became the de facto guardians of Tunisian security. Many Tunisian officers, including Ben Ali himself, were trained in US military schools. In addition to the hardware received from the US, the two countries hold numerous joint military exercises annually, employing naval, air, special warfare, and amphibious forces from both countries. The most recent maneuvers were held in Bizerte, 60 km north of Tunis in May 2008, in the presence of General William E. “Kip” Ward, head of the Africa command (AFRICOM). Military co-operation was strengthened during the Algerian crisis in the 1990s. Although US financing for the Tunisian military was ended in 1994, Tunisia has remained eligible, to this date, for excess defense goods and military education programs. Tunisia has also received anti-terrorist assistance which increased after 9/11. The US supports the Ben Ali regime against its perceived domestic and foreign enemies because Washington sees Tunisia as an important security partner, especially in the post-9/11 era. Tunisia enjoys particularly strong support in the Defense Department, whose leaders wish to maintain Tunisia on the side of the US. As an official at the State Department put it, “The Department of Defense serves as a lobby for Tunisia in Washington, DC; here at State, we were serious about putting pressure on the Ben Ali regime, but DOD persuaded the White House otherwise.”38 Like most other Arab governments, Tunisia benefited from the events of 9/11 and their aftermath and thus succeeded in obtaining support from the US through its participation in the “global war on terror,” help to Iraq, recognition of the Iraqi Council of government, and participation in peacekeeping operations. Of course, Tunisia, along with Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, and Algeria, is an active member of the US interagency Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (“Initiative” was later replaced with “Partnership”), launched in 2005, which expanded the Pan-Sahel Initiative (launched in 2002). According to the Department of State, TSCTP is, A multi-faceted, multi-year strategy to combat violent extremism and defeat terrorist organizations by strengthening individual-country and regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security and intelligence organizations, promoting democratic governance, and discrediting terrorist ideology. The overall goals are to enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to confront the challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the trans-Sahara, and to facilitate cooperation between those countries and our Maghreb partners (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia).39 TSCTP officially kicked off with the Flintlock 2005 exercise under the auspices of the US European Command (EUCOM).

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The security relationship is paramount; the US has consolidated its military co-operation with Tunisia, whose armed forces are equipped more than 70 percent with US weaponry. In 2005, the US authorized the export of defense articles and services worth $25,397,490 to Tunisia.40 During his visit to Tunisia in February 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the US and Tunisia were “working on a Status of Forces Agreement, a SOFA, and that’s moving along, and that would create a situation where we would be able to do more things, exercises and that type of thing.”41 The SOFA usually specifies the terms under which the foreign military operates in a given country. As of yet, it is not clear whether or to what extent Tunisia will allow the stationing of US troops on its soil—although it is known that it hosts US training facilities, as well as landing rights. What is certain is that the US is keen on strengthening its military co-operation with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. This co-operation is also maintained through Tunisia’s participation in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, which Tunisia joined soon after its creation in 1995. Naturally, for Tunisia, this is a way of expanding its security network, in addition to its powerful security ties with the US and France. In fiscal year 2007, the US committed to help Tunisia to enhance and modernize its military counterterrorism program by providing individual monitoring equipment (night vision capabilities) and modern communication and surveillance systems, in addition to assisting with mobility and systemic maintenance and logistical shortfalls … [to] enhance its [Tunisian military’s] capabilities to apprehend and defeat indigenous and transnational terrorist elements and combat trafficking by increasing border monitoring using a combination of air support assets, maritime patrol and tactical ground surveillance and response capabilities, furthering Tunisia’s value as an ally in the global war on terrorism.42 This was reiterated in fiscal year 2009. Tunisia also receives funding through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and other interagency programs. However, it should be pointed out that, despite this close co-operation, Tunis, like the majority of African capitals, refused to host the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), a sub-unified command under US European Command, which became operational in October 2007. No matter how authoritarian the Tunisian regime is, it cannot totally ignore its public opinion. Indeed, Tunisians would resent the presence of a formidable US organization on their territory, especially at a time when anti-Americanism is prevalent in the region, owing to the war in Iraq, US support for Israel in its destructive war in Lebanon in summer 2006, the brutal Israeli incursion in Gaza from December 2008 to January 2009, and the lack of any prospect for peace between the Palestinians and Israelis. During her tour of the region in September 2008, Condoleezza Rice urged the North African states (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco) to strengthen their security co-operation with the US. She stated, “We talked about internal matters here in Tunisia and about the course of reform and we have been very clear that we would hope that Tunisia would do more.”43 The rhetorical reference to “internal matters” could barely conceal the predominance of security issues over issues of democracy and good governance.

Conclusion Tunisian leaders have, since their country’s independence, succeeded in eliciting support from great powers. They have succeeded in entering a strategic relationship with a superpower without however losing sight of their country’s national interests. Their biggest success is in projecting an image of themselves that has been accepted by others as reality. Indeed, pronouncements from US officials in all the branches and agencies of the US government use the same components of this image to justify their admiration and support for Tunisia. In May

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2008, for instance, General Ward described Tunisia as a model in the region, not only in terms of the fight against terrorism, but also in terms of religious tolerance, woman’s emancipation, and education.44 This is the image that prevails in Washington. From an American perspective, Tunisia is a success story where free market reforms have borne fruit. Although they recognize the “very slow pace of political reform and poor performance on human rights,” US officials continuously emphasize that “Tunisia has been a regional leader in social and economic reforms, with the strongest non-petroleum economy in the Middle East and North Africa, including rates of growth that have averaged 5% or better for the last 10 years. It also has the highest GNP per capita in the region, while boasting North Africa’s lowest poverty and unemployment rates.”45 Overall, this assessment is correct, but it still does not excuse US lenience vis-à-vis the regime’s grave human rights violations and the restrictions on civil liberties. The US government itself reports these grave violations; the 2007 Country Report on Human Rights states that, There were significant limitations on citizens’ right to change their government. Local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported that security forces tortured and physically abused prisoners and detainees and arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals. Security forces acted with impunity sanctioned by high-ranking officials. Lengthy pretrial and incommunicado detention remained serious problems. The government infringed on citizens’ privacy rights and continued to impose severe restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. The government remained intolerant of public criticism and used intimidation, criminal investigations, the court system, arbitrary arrests, residential restrictions, and travel controls to discourage criticism by human rights and opposition activists.46 The Tunisian regime has played the card of stability and moderation to elicit support from the US, which has embraced the image that Tunisian leaders have of themselves. It has also exaggerated the Islamist threat from within and from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), present mostly in Algeria. The regime has also been astute in attenuating US criticism not only through close security co-operation but also through consistent support of US initiatives in the Middle East (support for the Peace Process, Oslo accords) and North Africa (PSI, TSCTP, US North Africa Economic Partnership). Of course, the Tunisian leaders have also used their quasi normalization with Israel as a way to curtail criticism of their human rights record. Its non-confrontational, quasi friendly attitude toward Israel plays admirably well in the US Congress, and Tunisian officials understand that reality quite well. Thus, in February 2005, they invited Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to come to Tunis; though he could not, the media effect was already there. Inviting Sharon was a courageous act when one knows the hatred the former prime minister elicits among Middle Easterners. The US and Tunisia have had a long-standing, smooth relationship. Well before independence, the charismatic Bourguiba had decided that his country would be anchored in the Western camp and that the US would be the country’s main protector, without however alienating the former colonial power which serves as second guarantor of Tunisia’s national security interests. The brilliance in Tunisian foreign policy began early on; not only had it established strong ties with the US while the country was still colonized, but at the same time it maintained cordial (and later close) relations with France, an important US ally. The US, for its part, knew when to support Tunisia without damaging its relationship with France (Sakiet Sidi Youssef in 1958) and when to take a neutral posture (the Bizerte crisis in 1961). The continuity in the relationship has been remarkable; although Bourguiba’s successor has paid greater attention to Tunisia’s Arab and Muslim environment, he ensured that the US continues to preserve Tunisia’s security. He managed to do that while withstanding US pressure for him to open up the political system, arguing that change should be very incremental

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to avoid the negative consequences of a hurried liberalization. He resisted that pressure knowing that Tunisia has become an important junior, regional strategic partner of the US, which, despite all the rhetoric about political reforms and human rights, is happier to accommodate an incumbent authoritarian regime than contemplate the alternative to it.

Notes 1 See Yahia H. Zoubir, “Soviet Policy in the Maghreb,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 9(4), Fall 1987: 399–421. 2 For a similar point, see Emma Murphy, “The Foreign Policy of Tunisia,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002): 235. Nicole Grimaud’s La Tunisie à la Recherche de sa Sécurité (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1995) provides the best account of Tunisia’s conception of security. 3 See Memorandum of Conversation 566t1. April 3, 1969. US–Tunisian relations. Participants Habib Bourguiba Jr., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs … Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs … Declassified PA/HO Department of State E.O. 12958, as amended September 6, 2007. 4 Abdennour Benantar, “Etats-Unis et Tunisie: Singularité tunisienne,” in Abdennour Benantar, ed., Les Etats-Unis et le Maghreb: Regain d’intérêt? (Algiers: CREAD, 2007): 180. 5 For a good account of US–Tunisian relations from the 1940s to Tunisia’s few years after independence, see Samya El Machat, Les Etats-Unis et la Tunisie: De l’ambiguïté à l’entente, 1945–1959 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996). 6 Yahia H. Zoubir, “US and Soviet Policies Toward France’s Struggle with Anti-Colonial Nationalism in North Africa,” Canadian Journal of History/Annales d’Histoire Canadiennes, 30(3), December 1995: 439–66. 7 Habib Bourguiba, “Nationalism: Antidote to Communism”, Foreign Affairs, 35, July 1957. 8 Kenneth J. Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 142. 9 Robert J. King, “Regime Type, Economic Reform, and Political Change in Tunisia,” in Yahia H. Zoubir, ed., North Africa in Transition – State, Society, and Economic Transformation in the 1990s (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1999): 65. 10 Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia, op. cit.: 142; Murphy, “The Foreign Policy of Tunisia,” op. cit.: 238 ff. 11 King, “Regime Type, Economic Reform, and Political Change in Tunisia,” op. cit.: 64. 12 Murphy, “The Foreign Policy of Tunisia,” op. cit.: 241. 13 The US Ambassador to Tunisia during that period, Peter Sebastian, told the author in 1987 in Washington, DC, that President Habib Bourguiba was on the brink of breaking off diplomatic relations with the US. In Sebastian’s words: “I used all my talent as a diplomat to dissuade him from doing so.” 14 Benantar, “Etats-Unis et Tunisie: Singularité tunisienne,” op. cit.: 186. 15 Murphy, “The Foreign Policy of Tunisia,” op. cit.: 247. 16 Yahia H. Zoubir, “Reactions in the Maghreb to the Gulf Crisis and War,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 15(1), Winter 1993: 81–101. 17 Yahia H. Zoubir, “Algeria and U.S. Interests: Containing Radical Islamism and Promoting Democracy,” Middle East Policy, 9(1), March 2002: 64–81. 18 See Daniel Volman, “Foreign Arms Sales and the Military Balance in the Maghreb,” in Zoubir, North Africa in Transition, op. cit.: 224. 19 Rached Ghannouchi lived in Syria and taught in the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters; this is where he developed his Arab nationalist tendency. As he put it, “I had always understood being an Arab and being a Muslim as inseparable realities, such as it is understood among our people in North Africa.” See Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent – Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997): 69. For an excellent, thorough biography of Ghannouchi, see Azzam S. Tamimi. Rachid Ghannouchi – A Democrat within Islamism (London: Oxford University Press, 2001). 20 Cited in Moncef Marzouki, “Islam – démocratie ou la conciliation nécessaire,” July 5, 2004. Available from http://oumma.com/article.php3?id_article=1132 (accessed April 3, 2009). This was excerpted from Marzouki’s book, Le Mal arabe (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004). 21 Ibid. See also Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi … op. cit.: 93–96. 22 Aziz Enhaili and Oumelkheir Adda, “State and Islamism in the Maghreb,” Middle East Quarterly, 7(1), March 2003. Available from http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a6.html. 23 A minister close to President Ben Ali, who still held an important official position in the government (2005), told the author that Ben Ali “is allergic” to Islamists and their ideas. He said that, if it were up to him, all Islamists should be executed. Although initially conciliatory toward the MTI, Ben Ali turned against its members in 1989 in the aftermath of the legislative elections in which MTI had a remarkable showing and proved to be an opposition party to be reckoned with. See Shahin, Political Ascent, op. cit.: 101. Ben Ali was also furious and felt betrayed when the Algerian authorities recognized the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). 24 The ideas presented here are based on Zoubir’s research on Tunisia since the 1980s. For more detailed views on the En-Nahda movement and its condition in the Tunisian context, see Lise Garon, Dangerous Alliances – Civil Society, the Media, and Democratic Transition in North Africa (London: Zed Publications, 2003): esp. 30–33; 113 ff. 25 John P. Entelis, “Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non-Violent Dimension,” in John P. Entelis, ed., Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997): 49.

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26 This is how a US State Department official described the meeting when interviewed by the author in Washington, DC, in 1990. “Unofficially” simply meant that the officials met with Ghannouchi outside the State Department’s building. 27 Yahia H. Zoubir and Louisa Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, “The United States and the Maghreb: Islamism, Democratization, and Strategic Interests,” The Maghreb Review, 3(3–4), 2006: 259–92; see also Zoubir, “Algeria and U.S. Interests,” op. cit. 28 Zoubir, “Algeria and U.S. Interests,” op. cit. 29 President George W. Bush’s statement during a speech he gave to graduating seniors at West Point in June 2002. Louisa-Aït-Hamadouche, “Les Etats-Unis à l’aube d’une nouvelle doctrine stratégique?” La Tribune (Algiers), November 19, 2002. 30 “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East,” Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, Office of the White House Press Secretary, November 6, 2003. 31 Michele Durocher Dunne, “Integrating Democracy Promotion into US Middle East Policy,” Carnegie Papers, 50, October 2004: 7. 32 Shortly after criticizing Tunisia, Powell praised it for the changes that were taking place there. See Colin Powell on “Fox News Sunday,” March 14, 2004. Available from www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,114159,00.html. 33 “President Bush Discusses War on Terrorism with Tunisian President,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, February 18, 2004. Available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040218–2.html. 34 www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/t/47575.htm. 35 Murphy, “The Foreign Policy of Tunisia,” op. cit.: 250. 36 “Tunisie–USA: Impasse dans les négociations sur un accord de libre échange ?” May 23, 2007. Available from www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=8392. 37 La Presse, October 22, 2007. Available from www.lapresse.tn/index.php?opt=15&categ=1&news=58776 (accessed September 4, 2008). 38 Interview with the author, Washington, DC, May 2004. 39 US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism. Country Reports on Terrorism-Africa Overview, April 30, 2008. Available from www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103705.htm. 40 www.state.gov/t/pm/64779.htm. 41 Al Pessin, Rumsfeld, “Discusses Expanding Military Ties with Tunisia,” February 11, 2006. Available from www. globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/02/mil-060211-voa03.htm. 42 “Congressional Budget Justification 2007,” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60641.pdf. 43 Glenn Kessler, “In Tunisia and Algeria, Rice Asks for Cooperation,” Washington Post, September 7, 2008: A19. Available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/06/AR2008090600777.html. 44 “La menace d’Al-Qaïda est ‘réelle’ en Afrique du nord, selon le général américain Ward,” Associated Press, May 28, 2008. Available from http://tunisiawatch.rsfblog.org/tag/G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral+William+Ward. 45 C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, “U.S. Policy Challenges in North Africa,” Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, June 6, 2007. Available from www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/congress/2007_hr/070606-welch.htm (accessed April 3, 2009). 46 Tunisia-Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007. Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 11, 2008. Available from www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100607.htm.

21 The US and Libya The lengthy road to reconciliation Yahia H. Zoubir

With the exception of the enmity toward Iraq during the fin de règne of Saddam Hussein, no other Middle Eastern country suffered such bad relations with the US as Libya from the mid1970s to the early 2000s. Indeed, relations between the US and Libya were quite inimical, resulting in the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986 and the shooting down of Libyan aircraft over the Libyan coast in 1989. Before 2003, it was hard to imagine the staggering improvement in relations witnessed since. The normalization process in fact began in 1999 following Libya’s decision to hand over to the United Nations its two accused officials in the Lockerbie affair. A combination of important factors engendered the normalization process: effects of the US and UN sanctions on the Jamahiriya, domestic discontent with the regime’s political and economic policies, the emergence of jihadist groups in Libya, Libya’s isolation regionally and internationally, effective secret diplomacy, sanctions’ fatigue, fears of retaliation from the US following the 9/11 attacks on US soil, lobbying in the US Congress from major American petroleum companies, the decision to definitively resolve the Lockerbie affair, Libya’s decision to forsake terrorism, and Libya’s decision in December 2003 to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. The objective of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the factors enumerated above that have led to the normalization of US–Libyan relations, characterized hitherto by mutual hatred for three decades. However, a review of US–Libyan relations is necessary to grasp not only the enmity between the two countries, but also the recent changes that have opened the door to normal, friendly relations that might change the regional order.

History of US–Libyan relations1 Following its independence in December 1951, Libya established close relations with the US and Great Britain, both of which having continued hitherto to administer the three territories (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan) that federated in 1952 to make up today’s Libya. The Libyan monarchy developed close ties with the West, mainly Britain and the US, in order to gain some protection against world communism forces as well as Nasserite radical groups in the region.2 Thus, Libya called on Great Britain and the US for its security; it signed treaties with these powers in 1953 and 1954, respectively, for the establishment of military bases. As a result, the US enjoyed a commanding presence in Libya through the Wheelus Air Force Base (renamed Ukba ben Nafi Air Base), a vital link in Strategic Air Command (SAC) war plans for use as a bomber, tanker-refueling and recon-fighter base. In return for the use of the airfield, impoverished Libyans—oil exports only began in 1961—received an average of $2 million per year beyond other assistance the US was already providing. From 1959, when Libya became an important oil producer, until 1986, US oil companies, such as Esso had an imposing presence in Libya and made considerable profits. However, the country’s new wealth—oil represented, and still does, more than 98 percent of Libya’s revenues—did not benefit Libyans at large; King Idris I’s authoritarian government was quite corrupt and had little concern for

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the deprived Libyans. The king’s cautious policies, particularly his close relationship with the West, his aloofness to Arab nationalism, and the non-participation among Arab forces in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war resulted in the radicalization of the youth, particularly among the armed forces. Thus, on September 1, 1969, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and nationalist officers who later created the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) led a bloodless coup that ousted the weak 79-year-old king. The US showed little concern for the change of regime; in fact, US policymakers viewed positively Qaddafi’s aversion to international communism, especially “Soviet imperialism.” Thus, from Washington’s perspective, Qaddafi’s seizure of power would not adversely affect US–Libyan relations whose future looked rather bright. However, as Qaddafi’s son and apparent heir, Saif Aleslam Qaddafi, pointed out in 2003, “Trouble [in US–Libyan relations] began … when the new government under the direction of Colonel Qaddafi, seeking to assert national independence, expelled American military bases from our territory.”3 The loss of the Wheelus base in September 1970 was insignificant for the US—the development of nuclear missiles having made bomber bases less critical—although for Libyans, especially the RCC, the removal of foreign bases signaled the first move against imperialism. The US was much more interested in Libya’s oil and the lucrative revenues it brought US companies than in bases that were becoming largely obsolete. The Libyans’ decision to renegotiate oil contracts and its threat to nationalize the major oil companies unless they agreed to some of the new regime’s conditions were further indications that the RCC would be less accommodating to Western interests than the king. Similarly to what happened in US–Algerian relations in the 1970s,4 for instance, Tripoli and Washington were also on a collision course because both Algeria and Libya endorsed “rejectionist” positions on the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. Whereas Libya and Algeria supported Palestinian national rights, the US was unshakably on the Israeli side. Thus, initial US optimism toward Qaddafi’s regime soon faded, and various events took place that would eventually poison relations between the two countries for the next three decades. Qaddafi’s Libya remained America’s bête noire although, by 1990, Iraq had become the new target of US policy in the Middle East. Even if most US officials argue that the confrontation between the US and Libya resulted from Libya’s support for terrorism, the contention in this chapter is that one of the major factors that triggered the deterioration in relations was Libya’s determination to exercise control over its natural resources, such as Qaddafi’s decision in the 1970s to partially nationalize the country’s oil wealth. Even though US oil companies eventually resolved their differences with Libya, hostility or suspicion between the two governments persisted until they completed the process of normalization in 2008. Of course, while the partial nationalization of oil companies was the trigger to the enmity between the two countries, there were also other fundamental sources of disagreement, which related to ideological and international political issues, ranging from Libya’s support for Palestinian resistance groups to its close political and military relationship with the former Soviet Union. American policymakers wrongly viewed Libya as a “Soviet satellite”5 and Qaddafi as a Soviet puppet, a portrayal which, at the height of the cold war, made any country an enemy of the US with all the consequences that resulted from such notoriety. Ideological differences, such as Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism, made the Libyan leader almost always automatically back governments and movements of national liberation that were on Washington’s black list, while the US did all it could to weaken and destabilize the Libyan regime. Hostile relations between the two countries reached their peak in the 1980s under the Reagan administration. The US sought to overthrow Qaddafi, including through assassination attempts.6 Reagan characterized Libya as an “outlaw state,”7 a precursor of the rogue state doctrine carried out under the Clinton administration, and called Qaddafi the “mad dog of the Middle East.” Throughout the Reagan years, the US devised various ploys to rid Libya of its leader.8 Libya represented an easy prey for the US not only because the country was weak

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and not so close to the rival superpower, but also because Qaddafi’s attempts to retaliate provided further justification for actions against Libya. There is evidence that US officials, through collaboration with allies, such as Egypt or Israel, made deliberate attempts to provoke Qaddafi into taking actions that would justify “legitimate” US retaliation.9 In 1981, the Reagan administration severed relations with the Jamahiriya (state of the masses) by closing the Libyan People’s Bureau and expelling more than two dozen diplomats. In that summer, the US Air Force shot down two Soviet-made Libyan fighters over the Gulf of Sidra. The US government ordered American citizens residing in Libya to leave the country. In 1982, Reagan imposed an embargo on oil imports from Libya and banned technology transfers to the North African nation. In early 1986, the US severed economic ties with and imposed a series of economic sanctions against Libya. Because the oil industry in Libya rested primarily on American technology and know-how, those sanctions were particularly damaging.10 Manifestly, the Reagan administration acted vehemently against the Qaddafi regime and sought to punish Libya relentlessly. Some US officials admitted that “we wanted to provoke Qaddafi into responding so we could stick it to him, and we knew he would oblige us,” that “we’re aching for a go at Qaddafi,” and that, if Qaddafi “sticks his head up, we’ll clobber him; we’re looking for an excuse.”11 As those officials anticipated, Muammar Qaddafi fell into the traps set by the US government, especially in 1986. US response to improper Libyan acts was quite disproportionate and resulted in the death of many innocent civilians in the April 15, 1986 bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. Given that Qaddafi’s adopted daughter was killed during the air raids, there is little doubt that the Libyan leader himself was the target of those attacks. Although the US hoped that those actions would help topple Qaddafi’s regime, the result was, on the contrary, the strengthening of his power. In the eyes of his people, and of those of many third world nations at that time, Qaddafi, no matter his deeds, emerged as the victim of American bullying and hegemonic power. US policy toward Libya quieted down following the bloody incidents of 1986, a lull resulting from US domestic politics (Iran Contra affair), but also from Qaddafi’s avoidance of further confrontation with the world superpower. Another potential attack on Libya was averted in early 1989, i.e., only days before Reagan left office. This occurred over Libya’s alleged construction of a facility for the production of chemical weapons in Rabta (outside Tripoli). The US threatened to destroy the pharmaceutical factory unless Libyans halted its completion; European governments eventually succeeded in convincing Qaddafi to comply with Washington’s wishes,12 at least for a while. Under Bill Clinton’s presidency, the rogue state doctrine had become the canon of US security policy. Thus, in 1994, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake fleshed out that policy, arguing that rogue (or “backlash”) states are those “recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family of nations [now committed to the pursuit of democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets, the peaceful settlement of conflict and the promotion of collective security] but also assault its basic values.”13 Even though they lack the resources of a superpower, the behavior of those states, he says, is “aggressive and defiant.” Despite the absence of any evidence, he contended that the rogue states were developing ties among themselves allegedly to curb the “global trend to which they seem incapable of adapting.” Lake felt that it was Washington’s role “to contain the influence of these states,” the majority of which were, incidentally, Middle Eastern, “sometimes by isolation, sometimes through pressure, sometimes by diplomatic and economic measures.” Further, he urged the international community to partake in such efforts at containment. In other words, the US expected the rest of the world to isolate rogue states by severing commercial ties, imposing multilateral sanctions/ embargoes, and hampering the military and technological potential of those states. Certainly, in order to isolate or replace rogue regimes, the US would use punitive tools, such as military force and covert actions. In fact, even before Lake elaborated on the rogue state doctrine, Libya had already been subjugated to a range of punitive actions that the US government had imposed.

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While attention was focused on Iraq in 1991, during that same period a legal process had been undertaken in the US and Great Britain against two Libyans for their suspected involvement in the bombing in December 1988 of Pan Am flight 103. This issue was to dominate US policy toward Libya throughout the 1990s. The Lockerbie bombing on December 21, 1988 was seen as Libyan revenge for US air strikes on Libya two years earlier. On September 19, 1989, the explosion of a French UTA airplane over Niger was also blamed on Libya by both the French and the British, who had conducted separate investigations. While the UTA case was indisputably the work of Libyan agents, the same cannot be said about the Lockerbie bombing. In spite of the three-year investigation into the Lockerbie attack, and the conviction of one of the suspects by a Scottish court in 1999, the case has remained controversial. Apparently, there exist documents that demonstrate the involvement in the bombing of Ahmed Jibril’s People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command.14 There have been questions as to the evidence presented against the suspects. In summer 2007, the Swiss president of an electronics firm asserted that a major piece of evidence had been fabricated in order to implicate the Libyan regime in the Lockerbie affair.15 In June 2007, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC), an independent public body, accepted the appeal of Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, arguing that it had enough evidence from the defense team, as well as from its own investigation, that there was miscarriage of justice and that the case should be brought to the Scottish High Court of Judiciary for review.16 This will certainly have implications for the new US–Libyan relations should al-Megrahi be proven innocent, a likely possibility. But, the fact that secret discussions have taken place regarding the possible transfer to Libya of al-Megrahi for humanitarian reasons17—he is suffering from terminal cancer—would eliminate such complications. The UTA and Lockerbie affairs had adverse, fateful effects on Libya. The immediate result was the rapid end of the process of liberalization, mostly at the economic level, which the Libyan regime had undertaken in the late 1980s in response to popular grievances, mismanagement of the economy, and failure of military actions abroad, as well as annoyance from the immediate neighbors (Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria). However small those domestic reforms (islahat) and the modest process of liberalization (infitah) launched in 1987, they nonetheless highlighted the regime’s willingness to make changes, albeit cosmetic, to preserve the political system, but also to sustain the welfare state that benefited most Libyans;18 it also helped renew a degree of legitimacy to the Qaddafi regime. In addition, the emergence of armed Islamist groups in 1989,19 coupled with the UN- and US-imposed sanctions in 1992,20 were additional factors that compelled Qaddafi to put an end to reforms, without much turmoil domestically. United Nations sanctions, combined with low oil prices, certainly had a negative impact on the Libyan economy, substantially reducing investments in the oil sector. They also harmed Libya’s hitherto impressive advances in health care, education, and economic equality.21 While Libyans paid a heavy price because of the sanctions, the United States experienced a setback because it failed to convince European allies and others to broaden the embargo to include the purchase of Libyan oil. Europeans argued, despite the then favorable oil supplies, that their dependency on Libyan oil prevented them from expanding sanctions to the hydrocarbons sector.22 European pragmatism/realism prevented the sanctions from being more effective in bringing regime change; in fact, the sanctions placed Qaddafi in his preferred position: that of a “beleaguered revolutionary, standing firm against the forces of imperialism and neocolonialism.”23 The regime continued for quite some time to refuse to turn in the suspects in the Lockerbie bombing; Libyan refusal to hand them over, while resting on valid legal grounds, also stemmed from fears that the attack would be linked directly to and blamed on Qaddafi himself. Furthermore, Libyans were convinced that the two suspects were only scapegoats while the real US target was the Libyan regime; they were convinced that the US’s real objective was

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simply the overthrow of Qaddafi and his replacement by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-trained opposition,24 a well-founded suspicion. On April 5, 1999, Libya finally surrendered the two accused in the Lockerbie case, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, to the United Nations to face trial in the Netherlands, an impartial location that the Libyan authorities had requested all along. According to many diplomats, it was Britain who assured Qaddafi that the evidence would only be used against the two suspects and not against senior members of the Libyan government. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced that UN sanctions against Libya would be suspended and could be lifted after ninety days, as provided in UN Security Council Resolution 1192 (1998).25 Yet, the suspension of UN sanctions did not imply that the unilateral US sanctions would also be suspended, let alone lifted. Quite the opposite, the US government made it plain that these would remain in force because the US wanted “additional concerns alleviated.”26 The interesting question, of course, is why Libya agreed to hand over the accused and why the US agreed to the arrangement at that precise point in time? The multifaceted answers to this problematic reveal some of the underlying rationale of the subsequent decisions that Libya has made since the 1990s to return to normal relations with the Western world, in general, and with the US, in particular. The deteriorating socio-economic conditions were obviously an important factor. But, undoubtedly, American and British decisions to allow the trial of the two suspects to be held in an impartial country was the key factor that allowed for the extradition of the two Libyans. Obviously, Qaddafi also hoped that the handing over of the accused officials would result in the definitive lifting of sanctions and an end to Libya’s international isolation. For the US, the ineffectiveness of the sanctions, and the backlash they caused in neighboring Canada and among the European allies, explain the gradual shift in policy.

The gradual shift in US policy toward Libya Unquestionably, the US agreed to hold the Lockerbie case trial in the Netherlands because support, even among Western allies, for US policy toward Libya had run out. In truth, the imposition of sanctions upon various countries, combined with efforts to impose rules of extraterritoriality to non-US companies doing business with so-called rogue states, faced stiff resistance outside (and even inside) the US and was failing miserably. Under pressure from major business groups and anti-sanctions trade associations, members of Congress, such as Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), Lee Hamilton (D-IN), and Philip M. Crane (R-IL), worked on a proposed law that would not end the sanctions as a tool of foreign policy but would alleviate their harmful consequences on the US economy. For its part, the Executive Branch created a “sanctions team” to scrutinize the rationale, extent, cost, and efficacy of sanctions already in place and seek to work out standards for the future.27 In the clash over the imposition of sanctions, the Europeans won the battle; the US granted waivers that would keep sanctions from being forced upon European companies doing business with Cuba, Iran, and Libya. In exchange, the European Union accepted some restrictions.28 Clearly, international support for sanctions had died down; complaints from abroad and from Clinton himself suggested that the US had become “sanctions happy.” Progressively, US officials had become aware that attempts to instigate an oil embargo on Libya would elicit no support at the United Nations, even in the Security Council, which would certainly have weakened the value of international sanctions, in general. Indubitably, this realization is what led the US administration, under nudging from Egypt, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia, to consider the Libyan proposal of holding the Lockerbie trial in a third country.29 Libya expected, quite naively, that once it had turned over the two accused there would be some softening of US policy. A tripartite meeting between the US, Libyan and British representatives to the United Nations under the auspices of Kofi Annan took place on June 11,

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1999. This meeting, which the US had initiated,30 marked the first official direct diplomatic contacts with Libya since diplomatic relations had been severed in 1981. In view of the fact that Libya, according to Annan, had declared that it “definitively renounces all forms of international terrorism of whatever origin,” observers anticipated that the US would consider lifting sanctions, especially as US officials had admitted publicly that Libya was no longer involved in terrorist activities, Libya having expelled the notorious Abu Nidal organization and distanced itself from other “Palestinian extremist organizations opposed to the Middle East peace process.”31 However, it soon became obvious that the US had no intention of allowing UN sanctions to be lifted. Officials insisted that Libya had to fulfill other conditions: co-operate with the investigation and trial; pay appropriate compensation to relatives of the victims in the Lockerbie bombing; end and renounce all forms of terrorism; and acknowledge responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials. Obviously, from a Libyan perspective, it was unreasonable to impose such demands before a verdict had been reached on the two accused.32 Notwithstanding the position of its allies in the Security Council, US officials were unwavering on their policy toward Libya. Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk declared, “We are aware … that many Security Council members are anxious to close the chapter of Libya sanctions and might be prepared to accept Libyan assurances instead of actions. We are not. … [We] are prepared … to veto a resolution lifting sanctions if it is presented before we are satisfied with Libyan actions.”33 Moreover, the US government stated firmly that unilateral US sanctions against Libya would be maintained. The only exception to the sanctions was commercial sales of food, medicines, and medical equipment, which the administration introduced in May 1999 as a result of the sanctions reforms.34 Thus, Libyan fears that the US would oppose the lifting of UN sanctions and would maintain its own were well founded. Disregarding the improved relations between Libya and the EU, including the UK, which reestablished diplomatic relations in July 1999, severed since 1984,35 the US threatened to impose its veto in the Security Council.36 Undoubtedly, the decision to maintain the sanctions infuriated the business community, especially the oil companies, in the US, as Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and other European countries benefited from the situation. Despite the two pieces of US legislation (Helms–Burton and Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)), the US could not stop Europeans from investing in countries targeted by those laws, e.g., France’s Total, Russia’s Gazprom, and Malaysia’s Petronas, which had a $3 billion investment in Iran.37 Although reluctantly, the US provided a waiver to both laws38 so that the deal could go forward without creating a major conflict with France, in particular, and with the EU, in general. A policy shift toward Libya seemed to be in the making in fall 1999. The clearest signal came through Deputy Secretary of State Ronald Neumann, who provided a more positive assessment of Libya.39 Although he reiterated the various US demands on Libya, Neumann recognized that the Jamahiriya had taken important steps against terrorism. From Neumann’s perspective, “Libya’s reintegration into the international community will continue whether we like it or not, so long as Libya avoids new terrorism and blatant challenges to the international order.” He declared that change, though not imminent, could now be imagined. The other significant statement was his assertion that, unlike its policy in Iraq, the US does “not seek to maintain sanctions until there is a change of regime in Tripoli.” But Neumann raised two major concerns. The first relates to Libya’s “inflammatory rhetoric”: the “Libyan leadership may be fundamentally anti-American, that is, committed to opposing American interests and an American policy agenda simply because they are American.” The second US concern was that “Libya continues to pursue programs for the acquisition of WMD and missiles, which would threaten US interests.” Mixed signals emanated from Washington concerning Libya. While officials continued to acknowledge change in Libya’s actions, they still labeled Libya a sponsor of terrorism, a term applied to Libya since 1973. Most officials claimed that the sanctions had worked, resulting in

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Libya’s surrender of the two accused, and that it was the sanctions that forced the Libyans to abandon support for terrorism. Nonetheless, the administration continued to label Libya a “rogue state.” Undoubtedly, the important differences of views within the government underlie the contradictory signals that the US was sending. Libya, for its part, endeavored to improve its political image internationally; it did so by focusing on Europe and Africa, where the country enjoys a great deal of respect among governments on account of the foreign assistance it provides. The regime also offered incentives to foreign businesses and sought the return of US oil companies. In February 2000, the US government allowed four oil companies, Conoco, Occidental, Marathon, and Amerada Hess, to dispatch agents to the Jamahiriya to inspect oil fields they had to forsake when the Reagan administration imposed sanctions on Libya in the 1980s.40 Undoubtedly, some US officials were convinced that non-US businesses were the main beneficiaries of the inevitable rehabilitation of Libya and that, unless the US took some initiatives, Europeans and others would flood the Libyan market. Beyond doubt, European firms were strengthening their presence in the country, especially in the hydrocarbon sector, in anticipation of a US return. It is probably in this context that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright authorized a four-member consular visit to Libya to evaluate safety conditions for US citizens and to determine whether to lift the restriction on the use of US passports for travel to the North African state,41 in place since December 11, 1981. Although a shift in policy was clearly in the making,42 American officials continued to deny it. They insisted that the consular visit had no relationship to the Libyans’ extradition of the accused in the Lockerbie trial. For their part, the Libyans reiterated their wish to normalize relations as long as the US respected Libya’s full independence.43 The Clinton administration aimed at normalizing, albeit very slowly, ties with Libya. It proceeded cautiously in order to avoid hurting the sensibilities of the families of the Lockerbie victims who were quite vocal and had strong support among members of Congress and among pro-Israeli media.44 This partly explains the administration’s hesitant moves toward speedy normalization. Yet some in Congress and in other departments of the Executive Branch, including the Department of State’s Counterterrorism Bureau, headed by Michael Sheehan, staunchly opposed even incremental moves.45 Furthermore, in the Department of Defense, the urge to develop a National Missile Defense system needed justification. Indeed, Defense Secretary William Cohen argued that the necessity for a Star Wars system was genuine because of the potential near-term threat from “rogue states.” He insisted, “the intelligence shows that by the year 2005, the North Koreans, and then following that, the Iranians and possibly Iraqis or Libyans, would be in a position to have an intercontinental ballistic-missile capability that could threaten the United States,”46 a far-fetched statement to say the least. In sum, although US policymakers dropped the appellation “rogue state concept,” substituting instead the term “states of concern,” which applied to Libya among others, the forces opposed to changes in policy toward Qaddafi’s regime still had the upper hand.

Libya’s arduous path toward normalization Contrary to the view propagated in Washington, Libya’s quest for normalization of relations with the US began in the late 1980s and continued through the 1990s,47 not in 1999. Qaddafi had proposed early on to turn over the two suspects in exchange for such normalization provided some reasonable legal arrangement could be found. Libya had its own reasons for seeking to normalize relations and initiate co-operation with the West in general and with the US in particular. The impact of the UN and US sanctions, coupled with the repercussions of some of Libya’s senseless and costly policies of the past, including military interventions, compelled the regime to re-evaluate its political choices at home and abroad.

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The internal situation Although the sanctions were not as harsh as those imposed upon Iraq—Libya was allowed to sell its oil in the world market—the Qaddafi regime was undeniably confronted with severe economic difficulties. True, the sanctions were mostly felt among the population at large,48 especially as before the sanctions Libyans had enjoyed very comfortable revenues compared with all their neighbors. The prices of consumer goods reached historic highs. The sanctions led not only to widespread discontent against members of the regime who benefited from them owing to their control over resources and over the population, but also to the strengthening and eventual radicalization of the Islamist movement.49 While the regime effectively repressed the movement in the most brutal way, there was fear that civil strife such as that in neighboring Algeria might happen in Libya. Furthermore, there was genuine alarm that a potential alliance between Islamists and the disgruntled military could evolve into a potentially lethal force capable of ousting the Qaddafi regime.50 Consequently, the regime could ill afford to combat enemies domestically and at the same time alienate its neighbors in the region, let alone the US, the only undisputed superpower on the world stage. Subsequent to the suspension of the UN sanctions, the regime decided to overhaul the country’s infrastructure, which it estimated would require a $35 billion investment for the period 2000–2005. As Martinez rightly put it, “the economy was now conceived as a diplomatic weapon capable of overcoming the American embargo.”51 The regime’s calculation was justified for foreign companies began flocking into the country and European governments were quick to amend relations with Libya. The international arena The handing over of the two suspects in the Lockerbie trial brought dividends to the Qaddafi regime. Great Britain agreed to renew diplomatic relations, severed in 1984 following the lethal shooting of a policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, from inside the Libyan embassy compound, provided Libyan authorities assisted in the investigation of the killing, which they effectively did. The Libyan government admitted responsibility for the killing perpetrated by one of its agents and agreed to pay compensation to the family of the victim.52 France, for its part, eventually resolved its conflict over the bombing of UTA flight 772 and resumed its considerable commercial interests in Libya. The French also sought to entice the Libyan regime, faced with domestic Islamist guerrillas, to partake in the fight against terrorism. But, while relations with European powers, such as Italy, France, the UK, Germany, and Russia, improved considerably,53 no such far-reaching evolution occurred in US–Libyan relations. This was due primarily to opposition in the US from the families of the Lockerbie victims, who constituted a powerful lobby inside Congress, and pro-Israeli groups. Thus, the US extended ILSA for a five-year period and even imposed harsher sanctions, which were decried by Washington’s European allies and Canada, as well as US companies. On the international front, the most salient objective for the Libyans was to bring closure to the whole Lockerbie affair, to normalize relations with the US, and to revamp the country’s image worldwide. In spite of Libya’s support for the US following 9/11, American policymakers were unyielding.

Post-9/11 and US–Libyan relations The verdict of the Lockerbie trial, far from ending US–Libya differences, created potential for further conflict. On the eve of the verdict, Secretary of State Colin Powell made it clear that “regardless of the outcome that will be announced … there are other things that the Libyan government will be expected to do with respect to the other elements of the UN sanctions.”

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Powell insisted that “there are sanctions that predate the UN sanctions that are not affected by the outcome of this trial.”54 In other words, should UN sanctions be lifted, US unilateral sanctions will remain in place. On January 31, 2001, the Scottish judges found Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi guilty, while acquitting Lamen Khalifa Fhima. For US oil companies and for most Europeans, this verdict should have ended the Lockerbie affair and turned a page with Libya. For the US, now under the George W. Bush administration, which showed early on that force, not diplomacy, would drive its policy toward the “states of concern,” Libya not only had to accept responsibility for the act, but also to pay compensation to the families.55 While Libya had made it known that it would compensate the families if the defendants were found guilty,56 the Libyan state was quite reluctant to accept responsibility for the deed. In April, concerns about US energy security compelled Americans to review sanctions on Libya. Some members of the Bush administration, aware of the need for energy investments in Libya and Iran, were convinced of the ineffectiveness of sanctions and sought to influence Congress not to renew the ILSA for another five years. US oil companies, too, lobbied the administration and Congress to allow them to renew their activities in Libya, Iran, and Iraq. The pro-Israeli lobby and its allies, however, were intent on keeping the sanctions in place.57 Although President Bush sought a two-year extension of ILSA, on July 26, Congress, under strong pressure from the pro-Israeli lobby, overwhelmingly extended the sanctions for a fiveyear period. Under this law, the US government can levy penalties on non-US companies that invest more than $20 million in Libya or Iran. Objectively, the Libyan regime had already in 1998, through Interpol, warned the international community against the threat that al-Qaeda posed to the world.58 In fact, Libya had begun to use its familiarity with terrorist organizations to advance its own state interests. For instance, in summer 2000, during the hostage crisis in Jolo Island in the Philippines, Libya’s mediation role was decisive in the freeing of the hostages who had been detained for months by the extremist Abu Sayyaf group. Libya also extradited hundreds of Islamist militants and suspected Islamist terrorists, mostly South Asians and North Africans, back to their countries of origin. Naturally, following the 9/11 attacks on the US, Libya was among the first countries to condemn the acts as “horrific and destructive,” showed unequivocal understanding for the US, called on Libyans to “donate blood” and assist relief efforts in the US, and acknowledged the right of the latter to retaliate against the terrorists and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which harbored them.59 Qaddafi announced that he wished to “eliminate the common dangers of international extremism and terrorism.”60 The Libyan government offered the services of its underground agents to participate in the US-led “global war on terrorism.”61 Qaddafi even dispatched the head of Libya’s external security, Musa Kusa, to hold meetings in London with Assistant Secretary of State William J. Burns and US intelligence officials. Although the meeting was about the Lockerbie case, US officials admitted that it was also an opportunity to seek intelligence.62 Aware that the US might attack countries that harbored terrorist groups, even in the distant past, Qaddafi tried hard and genuinely to distance the country once and for all from the business of terrorism and to normalize relations with the US, an objective he had tried unsuccessfully for years to achieve. Thus, he declared on August 31, 2002, in a speech celebrating the thirty-third anniversary of his seizure of power, “We must comply with international legality even though it’s been falsified and imposed by the United States, or we will be slaughtered.”63 In other words, Libyans ought to avoid providing any excuse for the US to strike the Jamahiriya. Indeed, knowledgeable analysts revealed that some forces in the US government, especially among the neoconservatives, using the 9/11 attacks as a pretext, contemplated punishing Libya for its past deeds. Furthermore, active Libyan opponents in the US lobbied the Bush administration for harsher measures against the Qaddafi regime.64

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Despite the tepid contacts between the two countries, the US did nonetheless solicit Libya’s assistance in the fight against terrorism. In mid-October 2001, a CIA agent, Ben Bonk, a former classmate of Musa Kusa, head of Libya’s intelligence, told Kusa: “Two things. We’re going to need you to give up your destructive weapons. And, most importantly, we’ll need assistance to fight the terrorists.” Apparently, that very same evening, Kusa gave Bonk a list of key al-Qaeda operatives.65 The Libyan regime provided its unequivocal and full co-operation in the global war on terrorism. The US not only acknowledged Libya’s close co-operation but Bush himself, in his speeches in 2002, omitted Libya as part of the “axis of evil,” which included North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. This in itself was a victory for the Libyan regime. Truly, after 9/11, Libya did all it could to arrive at an arrangement with the US regarding not only the issue of compensation for the Lockerbie victims’ families, a sine qua non for the US government to loosen the grip on Libya, but also other questions Washington set as conditions for normalization with Tripoli. There is no doubt that 9/11 constituted the real occasion that allowed Libya to progressively lose its pariah status. Its professed expertise in the war against terrorist organizations and the amount of information that its authorities held about various foreign terrorist groupings became the strongest selling point for the Libyan regime. The US had basically recognized that Libya had moved away from the business of terrorism; however, it also wished to see Libya abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. This issue seemed to be the last hurdle for the normalization of relations, although the administration also expressed “concern” about human rights and democratic governance. Regarding WMD, Libya was ready to discuss the issue as far back as 1989 and again in 1992.66 Libya reiterated that willingness in 1999, but it was Washington that postponed such negotiations until the Lockerbie affair and the question of terrorism had been resolved.67 Those questions were more pressing than the unconventional weapons, which did not represent a threat. Libya’s willingness to pay compensation for the victims’ families and the Libyan state’s recognition in April 2003 of the civil—not criminal—responsibility of its officials in the Lockerbie bombing contributed a great deal to the process of normalization, which resulted in the definitive lifting of UN sanctions a month later. The Libyans had sent a letter to the United Nations in which they admitted formal responsibility for the actions of their officials in the Lockerbie bombing. For Libyans, the admission of civil responsibility was just a way of ending sanctions and persuading the US to normalize relations. As Foreign Minister Muhammad Abdul Rahman Chelgham put it, “the issue was not compensation, but the purchase of the annulment of the sanctions.”68 More recently, Saif Aleslam Qaddafi was even more explicit, saying, “Without that letter we would not be able to get rid of the sanctions at all … I admit that we played with words.”69 Convinced that Libya was not guilty, and that it would be proven so in the future, Saif Aleslam Qaddafi was correct in asserting that this was the only way to improve relations with the West, particularly with the US. One must admit that this was rather astute as the regime came out unscathed from this affair; sacrificing one Libyan and disbursing $2.7 billion for the national interest was a small price, especially as, after normalization, Libya may be proven innocent of the crime for which its official was wrongly convicted. This, of course, will have to wait until the Scottish High Court for the Judiciary returns its verdict.

Libya and the WMD issue While attention was focused on Iraq, neoconservatives, such as John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, also pointed the finger at Libya, accusing it of developing chemical and biological weapons. Most of his accusations proved to be exaggerated and inaccurate.70 Most experts agree that Libya’s WMD programs represented no real threat, consisting principally of chemical warfare agents that a leading expert described as “very low-quality weapons designed with poor fusing lethality.”71 Assertions that Libya was just a few years from becoming a nuclear-capable power proved totally groundless,

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even though Libya’s nuclear program had been underestimated by the intelligence community. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that Libya’s nuclear program was years from producing a nuclear weapon and important pieces of equipment were now largely dismantled and stored in boxes.72 Regardless, the Libyan authorities stated unequivocally many months before the formal announcement on December 19, 2003 that the country was willing to abandon all WMD programs and would open its sites to the IAEA, provided that the US would not seek other pretexts for hostile policies toward Libya.73 In fact, in September 2003, American and British inspectors had been given access to the covert sites of unconventional weapons.74 The effectiveness of secret diplomacy Contrary to the celebratory neoconservative contention, Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD programs was not the result of the war in Iraq. As pointed out earlier, Libya’s endeavor to normalize relations with the US, and discussing all contentious issues, began in the late 1980s. Libyans had been genuinely hopeful—and, as it turned out, naively optimistic—that the end of the Reagan presidency and the election of George H. W. Bush, close to oil interests, would open an era of new opportunities for US–Libyan relations. Thus, in early January 1989, Qaddafi called on the new Bush administration to engage in negotiations over disarmament. More importantly, he said that Libya was favorable to opening its weapons factories for inspection, provided other countries, including the US and Israel, were willing to do the same.75 These offers were followed by a variety of Libyan gestures to entice the US to begin talks for the purpose of normalizing relations. The only Libyan demand was that those relations be based on mutual respect and without US preconditions, a demand repeated by Libyans ad infinitum. Unfortunately for the Jamahiriya, the new Bush (George H. W.) administration had no intention of releasing pressure on Libya, seen as a major sponsor of global terrorism. Instead of welcoming Libya’s overtures, the US imposed more sanctions and sought to further isolate Libya diplomatically, politically, and economically. Despite unrelenting US pressure, the Libyan regime continued to seek normal relations. Thus, in 1992, Libyan operatives approached former Senator Gary Hart (D-CO) to relay to the Bush administration their country’s wish to establish constructive dialogue. Hart reported that “the Libyans said that they would turn over the two Pan Am bombing suspects … in exchange for a commitment … that preliminary discussions would begin within a reasonable period of time regarding the lifting of sanctions and eventual normalization of relations between our two nations.”76 Libyan attempts led nowhere, for the US was not interested in opening discussions, even if Libya surrendered the two suspects. Although Hart could not provide an explanation as to Bush’s rationale for rejecting Libya’s overtures, he did conclude that “this account suggests, and strongly so, only one thing: We might have brought the Pan Am bombers to justice, and quite possibly have moved Libya out of its renegade status, much sooner than we have. At the very least it calls into serious question the assertion that Libya changed direction as a result of our preemptive invasion of Iraq.”77 What Gary Hart probably knew, but would not say, is that the US had no desire to engage in a dialogue because Libya was listed as a “rogue state” and that the rogue state doctrine served a purpose: it allowed the administration in Washington to justify particular domestic (promoting defense programs) and international (isolating regimes opposed to US hegemony) policies.78 As a result of “sanctions fatigue” and failure to convince Europeans and others about the rationality of its policy toward Libya, the second Clinton administration shifted course and adopted a less stringent policy toward the Qaddafi regime. Libya’s handing over of the two suspects worked favorably upon the new approach. Thus, in mid-1999, the US opened secret talks with Libyan officials. As Martin Indyk reported in 2004, the talks in 1999 were made possible by Libya’s acquiescence to US conditions—that “Libya cease lobbying in the UN to

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[permanently] lift the sanctions”79 and that “the bilateral dialogue be kept secret.”80 In their first meeting with US officials in May 1999, “Libya’s representatives [led by chief of intelligence Musa Kusa] were ready to put everything on the table, saying that Mr. Qaddafi had realized that was not the path to pursue and that Libya and the United States faced a common threat from Islamic fundamentalism. In that context, they said, Libya would actively cooperate in the campaign against al-Qaeda and would end all support for Palestinian ‘rejectionist’ groups, endorse US peace efforts in the Middle East and help in conflict resolution in Africa.”81 With respect to WMD, mainly the issue of chemical weapons, Libyan officials showed preference for a multilateral framework, consenting not only to open their facilities to inspection but also to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, a measure that Libya eventually fulfilled in January 2004 and, three months later, it signed the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Libyans reiterated their offer on chemical weapons and agreed to participate in Middle East multilateral arms control talks taking place at that time.82 American officials admitted that they did not wish to pursue the WMD question; terrorism and the resolution of the Lockerbie case were their top priorities. Furthermore, Libya’s chemical weapons did not represent an imminent threat, and the nuclear weapons program was thought to be in its early stages. But, the US did communicate to the Libyans that, even if the Lockerbie and terrorism issues were resolved, US sanctions would not be lifted until after the WMD concern was satisfactorily settled. The secret talks were deferred until after the presidential election. Officials in Washington believed that a potential leak of those talks at such a critical period would create a political scandal, especially at a time when the Lockerbie victims’ families were awaiting a resolution to the tragedy. With the conviction of the two Libyan agents in January 2001 and the upholding of the verdict by an appellate court hearing in March 2002, the Lockerbie case found some resolution, especially as the Libyans had promised to provide compensation to the victims’ families should Libyan officials be found guilty. But this did not result in the permanent lifting of UN sanctions, let alone US sanctions. In a joint communiqué issued on February 23, 2001, George W. Bush and Tony Blair “call[ed] on the Libyan government to comply with the requirements of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.”83 However, prior to that joint statement, Libyan, British, and US officials had met the previous month with Libya’s permanent representative to the United Nations, presenting Libyans with a “script” pointing out “what they needed to do and say to satisfy US requirements on compensating the families of the Pan Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the actions of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the case.” They also laid out the steps that Libya needed to take in order for the UN sanctions to be definitively lifted.84 Despite a continued ambiguous posture on Libya, the Bush administration carried on the dialogue with Libyan officials that had been started under the Clinton administration. In October 2002, Libyan Foreign Minister Muhammad Abdul Rahman Chalgham corroborated the fact that a number of meetings with US officials had been held since January 2001, with most of the discussions at the level of US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs William J. Burns.85 In March 2003, a few weeks before the US invaded Iraq, Libyans sounded out the British government on talks with both the US and Great Britain to discuss ways of dismantling Libya’s WMD. Prime Minister Tony Blair confirmed that “Libya came to us in March [2003] following successful negotiations on Lockerbie to see if it could resolve its WMD issue in a similarly cooperative manner. Nine months of work followed with experts from the US and UK, during which the Libyans discussed their programs with us.”86

Libya’s relations with the US since 2003 Libya’s decision in December 2003 to abandon its WMD programs was a turning point in the history of US–Libyan relations. After Libya announced that it had decided to give up its

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WMD programs, the White House and other members of the administration, despite Tony Blair’s statement, were quick to claim credit, suggesting that it was the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 that convinced Qaddafi to surrender unconventional weapons. This was echoed in articles in the US press by pro-Israeli opinion makers, such as New York Times columnist William Safire.87 These affirmations do not correspond to the facts;88 however, it is interesting to analyze the reasons that elicited Qaddafi’s decision on WMD. The Libyan leader explained in an interview with the French daily newspaper Le Figaro that the WMD program had been initiated a long time ago, when it was fashionable to engage in an arms race. But, for him, the world has changed and so have coalitions; new challenges have emerged, which compelled Libya to reconsider its programs: If a country like Libya makes the nuclear bomb, what would it do with it? Furthermore, Libya ran the risk of launching itself in the production of weapons that were not up to its level … And in which area would one use this weapon? In which theater of combat … ? We don’t have an enemy that is well-defined enough for us to be able to say, “We will use this weapon against it.” Also, our program has created fears among our neighbors. Thus, the best decision, the most courageous decision, was to dismantle it.89 And by deciding to dismantle, Libya forced the international community to pay more attention to the sole credible nuclear power in the Middle East, Israel, which has not only nuclear but also chemical and biological capabilities.90 Qaddafi was quite ingenious in trading what, after all, were obsolete WMD in exchange for the rehabilitation of the regime and the reinsertion of the country into the community of nations. In sum, the abandonment of the WMD programs was not very costly and yet it paved the way for ending Libya’s long-time pariah status. But Libya was also hopeful that, by giving up its WMD programs, relations with Washington would improve considerably and open the door to close co-operation in different areas. In spite of that concession, Libyans complained that the rewards were inadequate. A year after the decision, Qaddafi protested, “We were disappointed by the reaction of Europe, the United States and Japan. They haven’t really rewarded us for our contribution to world peace.”91 More specifically, Qaddafi complained that Libya had not received guarantees as to its national security, i.e., that the international community should prohibit the use of nuclear or chemical weapons against the country that decided to abandon WMD. From his perspective, Libya had not obtained any assistance in transforming its military arsenal into civilian use. The state-controlled Libyan press had called on Israel immediately after the announcement of the decision on WMD to dismantle its own WMD arsenal.92 Libyans expressed their wish to see US sanctions lifted no later than May 12, 2004, which would allow American oil companies to return to Libya and also see the release of $1 billion in Libyan assets frozen in banks in the US. Libyan Prime Minister Shukri Ghanim urged the IAEA, in co-operation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, as well as US and British experts, to dismantle all Libyan WMD so that Bush could convince Congress to lift the sanctions swiftly.93 Libya’s objective in seeing a prompt comeback of US oil companies was believed to be instrumental in fulfilling its ambition to double the production of its high-quality “sweet” crude from 1.5 million to 3 million barrels per day by 2010, a level that Libya surpassed in the 1970s. American oil companies, aware that the concessions in Libya were due to expire in 2005, lobbied the White House and Congress to see the sanctions lifted so they could return to Libya, where non-US oil companies, mainly Spanish, French, and Italian, were quite active. The immediate result of such lobbying was the visit members of Congress made to Libya in late January 2004; the delegation met with Qaddafi, the prime minister, and other dignitaries.94 In February, the US lifted travel restrictions to Libya for American citizens, and extended an invitation to Libya to open an interest section in Washington—the US having

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already set up a two-person Liaison Office in Tripoli in June 2004, ostensibly to oversee the work of its WMD inspectors, and the Libyans opened a Liaison Office in Washington the following month. The lifting of the travel ban was obviously welcomed by US oil companies, which could now travel to Libya to negotiate contracts. In March, Tony Blair visited Libya, followed by an important US delegation headed by William Burns, as well as National Security Council officials to discuss the subsequent moves to deepen security, diplomatic, and commercial relations.95 The visit signaled US willingness to normalize relations and “turn the page.” Libyans stated their wish to attract foreign businesses and investments as soon as possible. They revealed that the country needed about $30 billion over the coming ten years to expand the oil sector; they also asked the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to allow an increase in Libya’s oil production quota.96 Libya boasts the world’s eighth largest—and third largest in Africa—proven oil reserves, estimated at more than 36 billion barrels. Libya has suggested that, in fact, its potential is three times those reserves.97 On April 22, 2004, President Bush partially lifted sanctions on Libya, a move that allowed American citizens to conduct business and invest in Libya. Most sanctions were finally revoked in September 2004; in exchange, Libya disbursed the second payment to the victims’ families. This allowed the return of US oil companies; hence, in January 2005, Occidental and Chevron secured eleven of the fifteen contracts in Libya’s first open competition for oil contracts.98 In December 2005, Exxon Mobil Corp signed agreements for the exploration for and production of oil with the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC). But the US still refused to remove Libya from the list of states that sponsor terrorism. Although the annulment of US sanctions did not result in the export of military equipment to Libya, it did not prevent European arms traders from turning to Libya for new opportunities. Indeed, in September 2004, under nudging from Italy, the EU decided to lift the arms embargo on Libya, purportedly to fight illegal immigration coming from sub-Saharan Africa. The decision came into force on October 11, 2004 and practically vested Libya with a new role: protecting Europe from illegal migrants. Furthermore, in view of recent developments in North Africa, particularly the fight against the presence of jihadists in the Sahel region, Libya will inevitably have a role to play within the context of the US-led Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), whose purpose is to fight against al-Qaeda-linked groups in the region. Thus, General Charles Wald, Deputy Chief of the US European Command (EUCOM), declared in April 2005 that the re-establishment of military relations with Libya would greatly assist the US in its efforts to counter the forces of instability in North Africa.99 The improvement in relations resulted in a US decision in May 2006 to upgrade its diplomatic presence to ambassadorial level, and full diplomatic relations were restored on May 31, 2006. However, it was not until July 2007 that Bush appointed Gene Cretz, former ambassador to Israel, as new ambassador to Libya. Cretz did not take up his post until December 2008; up till then, it was held by a chargé d’affaires. On May 15, 2006, the US announced the process of removing Libya from the list of countries that support terrorism, to which it had been added in 1979, and excluded Libya from the annual list of countries not fully co-operating with US anti-terrorism efforts. On June 30, 2006, the US repealed Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, to the great satisfaction of the Qaddafi regime. Undoubtedly, Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD programs and the subsequent improvement in relations came at an opportune time for the US to exploit this evolution and use Libya as a model. As Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch put it on May 15, 2006, “today’s announcement demonstrates that when countries make a decision to adhere to international norms and behavior, they will reap concrete benefits. Libya serves as an important model as we push for changes in policy by other countries such as Iran and North Korea.”100 Furthermore, the US could also brandish Libya as a “rogue state turned good fellow” or a “sponsor of terror turned to example partner.” Following those positive developments, there remained some contentious issues in US– Libyan relations with regard to the final payments to the victims’ families as well as compensation

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for the victims of La Belle Disco and other terrorism-related cases. The US Congress passed the Libyan Claims Resolution Act (P.L. 110–301), signed into law by President George W. Bush on August 4, 2008, which would basically prevent full normalization between the US and Libya until the issue of terrorist-related compensation was settled definitively. During the negotiations, Libyans too made claims against the US for the victims, all civilians, of the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 in retaliation for La Belle Disco. Negotiations between the two parties resulted in the signing in Tripoli on August 14, 2008 of the Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement: The agreement is designed to provide rapid recovery of fair compensation for American nationals with terrorism-related claims against Libya. It will also address Libyan claims arising from previous U.S. military actions. The agreement is being pursued on a purely humanitarian basis and does not constitute an admission of fault by either party. Rather, pursuant to the agreement an international Humanitarian Settlement Fund will be established in Libya to collect the necessary resources for the claims on both sides. No U.S. appropriated funds will be contributed, and any contributions by private parties will be voluntary. Each side will be responsible for distributing the resources it receives to its own nationals and to ensure the dismissal of any related court actions.101 The new agreement was perceived as the last hurdle for the two countries to expand and strengthen ties. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had been reluctant to travel to Libya hitherto, announced that she would pay a visit to Tripoli during a tour of the Maghreb in the first week of September 2008. Condoleezza Rice’s trip was the first by a US Secretary of State since John Dulles’ visit to King Idris I in 1953. In a speech on September 1, a few days before the visit, Qaddafi declared that “We have no ambition to be friends of America … We only want them to leave us alone.” On the other hand, Rice described her visit as “a historic moment.” The trip was a way to recompense Libya for abandoning its WMD program and for the Jamahiriya’s finalizing payments to the victims of the Lockerbie incident. Issues of human rights, however, did not make the top of Rice’s agenda. Despite the highly publicized case of Fathi al-Jahmi, a Libyan pro-democracy advocate who remained in jail regardless of his poor health, his case was not raised during the talks with Qaddafi. Once contentious issues with the Libyan government were resolved and Libya made the remaining payments in October 2008, the new US ambassador Gene Cretz was finally confirmed by the US Senate and joined the US Embassy in Tripoli in December. Rice’s visit seems definitely to have turned the page on the enmity between the US and Libya and begun a new page in their history. There have already been reports in January 2009 of a security agreement between the two countries. Indeed, according to Libyan opposition groups in Washington, Libya’s Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of American Affair, Ahmad Fituri, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for co-operation with Pete Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security at the Department of Defense. Apparently, the MOU includes defense contacts and co-operation. What remains to be seen is whether, under the Barack Obama administration, there will be continuity in US policy in which security issues predominate and support for authoritarian regimes involved in the “global war on terror” prevails or whether the change represents an opportunity to move to the next stage and address issues of human rights and good governance that are so lacking in Libya.

Conclusion In the last decade, Libya embarked on a process of rehabilitation of its regime on the world scene. The best way to achieve that objective was to mend fences with the US. The collapse of

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the Soviet Union, recognition of US hegemonic power, international isolation, and acute domestic conditions (economic decline, rise of a potent Islamist opposition, bankruptcy of the Jamahiriya system) compelled Qaddafi’s regime to abandon many of its previous policies. The emergence of more pragmatic leaders, including Qaddafi’s son, Saif al Islam, helped in paving the way for rational, realistic choices taken by the Libyan leadership to convince the US, through the mediation of Tony Blair, to abandon America’s long-standing hostility toward Libya and to persuade Washington that co-operation, rather than conflict, would be mutually beneficial. The decision to recognize in a judicious way the responsibility of its officials in the Lockerbie bombing, to compensate the families, abandon terrorism, join the global war on terrorism, completely dismantle WMD, and promise to bring about domestic reforms constituted the main factors in the rehabilitation of the country. The US, aware of Libya’s considerable oil wealth, as well as Libya’s strategic location and the existence of potential bases—including the Ukba ben Nafi Air Base (formerly Wheelus)—could not keep Libya isolated indefinitely. Muammar Qaddafi, whom Ronald Reagan had dubbed the “mad dog of the Middle East,” has now become not only a partner in the global war on terrorism but a potential ally capable of serving US interests in the region. However, this promising relationship seems already only to have strengthened Qaddafi’s authoritarian power. Regardless of US rhetoric about democratization, good governance, and human rights, other, mostly security, considerations have remained the driving force in US–Libyan relations. So far, the US has shown far more interest in oil wealth, security issues and the war on terrorism, and investment opportunities. The normalization of relations with Libya, without any real pressure on the regime to democratize, demonstrates that the US is no longer making democracy a sine qua non for its relations with autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, as it had claimed after 9/11. Only time will tell whether US policy under Barack Obama will be different and whether the US will put pressure on autocrats to initiate genuine processes to democratize their societies.

Notes 1 For detailed background on US–Libya relations, see Ronald Bruce St John, Libya and the United States—Two Centuries of Strife (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); Yahia H. Zoubir, “The United States and Libya: From Confrontation to Normalization,” Middle East Policy, 13(2), Summer 2006: 48–70; Yahia H. Zoubir, “Libya in U.S. Foreign Policy: From Rogue State to Good Fellow?” Third World Quarterly, 23(1), February 2002: 31–53. 2 Tim Niblock, “The Foreign Policy of Libya,” in Raymon Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds, The Foreign Policies of the Arab States (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002): 215. 3 Saif Aleslam al-Qadhafi, “Libyan–American Relations,” Middle East Policy, 10(1), Spring 2003: 36. 4 See Yahia H. Zoubir and Stephen Zunes, “The United States in the Maghreb,” in Yahia H. Zoubir, ed., North Africa in Transition—State, Society, and Economic Transformations in the 1990s (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1999). 5 Mahmoud G. El Warfally, Imagery and Ideology in U.S. Policy Toward Libya, 1969–1982 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988):155. 6 Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Aborted 1983 Trap Set for Libyan Forces,” The Washington Post, July 12, 1987: A1, A25; Bob Woodward, “CIA Anti-Qaddafi Plan Backed,” The Washington Post, November 3, 1985: A19; Seymour M. Hersh, “Target Qaddafi,” The New York Times Magazine, February 22, 1987: 74. 7 See, for instance, R.W. Apple, “U.S. Said to Hope Clashes Prompt Moves in Libya to Oust Qaddafi,” The New York Times, April 3, 1986: A8. 8 See, for instance, R. W. Apple, “US Said to Hope Clashes Prompt Moves in Libya to Oust Qaddafi,” New York Times, April 3, 1986: A8. 9 Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, “The Secret Poll Behind the Libya Raid,” Washington Post, February 28, 1988: C7. See also Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), which contains important information on US covert actions against the Libyan regime. 10 Libyans themselves admitted this. See Milton Viorst, “The Colonel in His Labyrinth,” Foreign Affairs, 78(2), March–April 1999: 71. 11 Quoted in Michael Rubner, “Antiterrorism and the Withering of the 1973 War Powers Resolution,” Political Science Quarterly, 102, Summer 1987: 210. 12 Thomas F. O’Boyle and Terence Roth, “Pressure Grows On Bonn Over Plant in Libya—Report Suggests Officials Ignored Tips for 2 Years; First Arrest Made in Case,” Wall Street Journal, January 13, 1989. 13 Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” Foreign Affairs, 73(2), March–April 1994: 45–55.

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14 Al-Bayan (United Arab Emirates), cited in Arabicnews, April 16, 2001. In fact, discussions with various diplomats and analysts tended to corroborate that allegation. 15 See “Attentat de Lockerbie: un Suisse jette le doute sur la responsabilité de la Libye,” August 28, 2007. Available from www.afrik.com/breve11184.html (accessed August 27, 2008). 16 See “The Truth behind Lockerbie,” in Alarabiya, March 27, 2008. Available from www.alarabiya.net/views/2008/ 03/27/47511.html (accessed August 20, 2008). See also “Libyan wins Right to New Lockerbie appeal,” Reuters, June 28, 2008. Available from http://asia.news.yahoo.com/070628/3/341yo.html (accessed 20 August 2008). 17 Lucy Adams, “Secret Talks on Deal to Return Megrahi to Libya,” The Herald, January 15, 2009. Available from www.theherald.co.uk/news/news/display.var.2481827.0.Secret_talks_on_deal_to_return_Megrahi_to_Libya.php (accessed January 15, 2009). 18 On the reforms undertaken in the 1980s, see Dirk Vandewalle, “Qadhafi’s ‘Perestroika’: Economic and Political Liberalization in Libya,” The Middle East Journal, 45(2), Spring 1991: 216–31. 19 The radicalization of the Islamist movement and its actions against the regime are detailed in Yahia H. Zoubir, “Contestation islamiste et lutte antiterroriste en Libye, 1990–2007,” L’Année du Maghreb 2008 (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2008): 267–77; and Yahia H. Zoubir, “Libye: Islamisme radical et lutte antiterroriste,” Revue Maghreb-Machrek, 184, Summer 2005: 53–66. 20 On the effects of the sanctions on the regime and the populations, see Tim Niblock, “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East—Iraq, Libya, Sudan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001): esp. 60–92. 21 Kate Clark, “Sanctions and Insurrections,” The Middle East, December : 11. See also United Nations, Letter dated 15 January 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1998/201, 6 March 1998. The Annex contains the Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the Secretary-General (December 13–18, 1997). 22 Robert Greenberger, “Washington Insight: Clinton Misses Opportunity in Oil Glut to Punish Libya for Pan Am Bombing,” Wall Street Journal, February 28, 1994. 23 Robert Waller, “Qadhafi Ahead on Points,” Middle East International, 23 June 1995: 20. US officials concur on this point (author’s telephone interview with US Department of State official, July 24, 1997). 24 Author’s interviews with Libyan diplomats in the 1990s. 25 United Nations, Letter dated April 5, 1999, from the Secretary General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/378, April 5, 1999. 26 James Rubin quoted in www.CNN.com, April 5, 1999; Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1999: A28; Financial Times, April 6, 1999: 12. 27 Thomas W. Lippman, “U.S. Rethinking Economic Sanctions – State Dept. Team Weighs Costs, Impact of Trade Restriction,” The Washington Post, January 26, 1998. 28 “U.S., EU Settle Dispute Over Trade Sanctions,” www.CNN.com (web posted), May 18, 1998. 29 John Lancaster, “Compromising Positions; Susan and Daniel Cohen Feel Twice Victimized—Once by the Terrorists Who Killed Their Daughter over Lockerbie, and Once by the Government That Has Failed to Punish Those Responsible. But Maybe the Bureaucrats Have a Point,” The Washington Post, July 9, 2000. 30 The Boston Globe, April 8, 1999. 31 “Compromising Positions,” The Washington Post, July 9, 2000, op. cit.; see also Adam Zagorin, “Why Libya Wants In,” Time, 155(12), March 27, 2000: 66. In 1998, the US Government reported, “There is no evidence of Libyan involvement in recent acts of international terrorism.” US Department of State. Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998. 32 “U.S. Policy Toward Iraq, Libya and Iran,” Speech at Middle East Forum by Bruce O. Riedel, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, National Security Council, April 23, 1999. See also “US Breaks Ice with Libya,” BBC Online, June 12, 1999. 33 Martin S. Indyk, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. Testimony, House International Relations Committee. Washington, DC, June 8, 1999. 34 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, and Rick Newcomb, Director of Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury Department Press Briefing on Economic Sanctions, Washington DC, April 28, 1999. Released by the office of the spokesman. Eizenstat explained that “Sales of food, medicine and other human necessities do not generally enhance a nation’s military capabilities or support terrorism. … Our purpose in applying sanctions is to influence the behavior of regimes, not to deny people their basic humanitarian needs.” This was obviously the result of pressure from people in Congress, such as Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN.), who pushed for the Sanctions Policy Reform Act of 1999 (S. 757). 35 Warren Hoge, “New Libyan Cooperation Leads to Renewed Ties with Britain,” The New York Times, July 8, 1999. Libya recognized its responsibility in the killing in 1984 of policewoman Yvonne Fletcher outside the Libyan Embassy in London and agreed to pay compensation to her family. Furthermore, Libya co-operated with British intelligence concerning the Irish Republican Army, which Libya had supported for many years. See “Compromising Positions,” op. cit. 36 Colum Lynch, “U.S. Threatens to Veto Lifting Libyan Sanctions,” The Washington Post, July 8, 1999; Farhan Haq, “U.S. Resists Move to Lift UN Sanctions” Inter Press Service, July 7, 1999; “U.S. Opposes Lifting UN Sanctions on Libya,” CNN Online, July 1, 1999. 37 Susan Quinn, “Unilateral Sanctions Reform Debated,” U.S.–Arab Tradeline, September 18, 1998. 38 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement on “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA): Decision in the South Pars Case,” London, UK, May 18, 1998, as released by the Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State.

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39 Ronald Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Middle East Institute, Washington, DC, November 30, 1999. The speech can also be found in Ronald E. Neumann, “Libya: A U.S. Policy Perspective,” Middle East Policy, 7(2), February 2000: 142–45. 40 Colum Lynch and John Lancaster, “U.S. Considers Easing Restrictions on Libya,” The Washington Post, February 27, 2000: A29. 41 US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. Consular visit to Libya. Press statement by James P. Rubin, March 21, 2000. 42 Jim Hoagland, “Stealthy Shift on Libya,” The Washington Post, March 26, 2000. 43 “Libya: Foreign Minister Says Normal Ties with U.S. Possible,” Associated Press, March 28, 2000; see also Al-Sharq al-Awsat (in Arabic), March 28, 2000: 4. 44 See, for instance, Lawrence Kaplan, “Engagement Ring,” The New Republic, July 24, 2000. See the statement that the pro-Israeli Anti-Defamation League issued in New York on May 18, 1998: “Concerned by United States’ Intention to Waive Sanctions against Companies Doing Business with Rogue Nations.” 45 Bill Nichols, “House Measure Would Loosen Embargo GOP Leaders Oppose Plan for some Sales,” USA Today, June 15, 2000. 46 Kenneth R. Bazinet, “Uphill Battle for Prez in Putin Talks,” Daily News (NY), 29 May 2000, p. 6. 47 For a good treatment of Libya’s quest for normalization with the US, see Ronald Bruce St John, “‘Libya Is Not Iraq’: Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy,” The Middle East Journal, 58(3), Summer 2004: 386–402. 48 On the impact of the sanctions, see Tim Niblock, “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East—Iraq, Libya, Sudan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001): esp. 60–92. 49 Zoubir, “Contestation islamiste et lutte antiterroriste en Libye,” op. cit. 50 See Ray Takeyh, “Qadhafi’s Libya and the Prospect of Islamic Succession,” Middle East Policy, 7(2), February 2002: 155. 51 Ibid. 52 See Ronald Bruce St John, “Libyan Foreign Policy: Newfound Flexibility,” Orbis, Summer 2003: 470. 53 See Yahia H. Zoubir, “Libya and Europe: Economic Realism at the Rescue of the Qaddafi Authoritarian Regime,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Special Issue, Europe and North Africa, Spring 2010, forthcoming. 54 US Department of State, Press Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary Jorge Castaneda Gutman. Washington, DC, January 30, 2001. 55 President Bush said, “The United States government will continue to pressure Libya to accept responsibility for this act and to compensate the families.” John Lancaster and Alan Sipress, “A Muted Victory against Terror,” The Washington Post, February 1, 2001: A1. 56 United Nations, Report of the Secretary General Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 883 (1993) and Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1192 (1998), S/1999/726, June 30, 1999. 57 Peter Behr and Alan Sipress, “Cheney Panel Seeks Review of Sanctions. Iraq, Iran, and Libya Loom Large in Boosting Oil Supply,” The Washington Post, April 19, 2001: A13. 58 Carlos Echeverria Jesús, “Radical Islam in the Maghreb,” Orbis, Spring 2004: 7. See also Moncef Djaziri, “La Libye: les élites politiques, la stratégie de ‘sortie’ de crise et la réinsertion dans le système international,” Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord 1999, 38 (Paris: CNRS, 2002). 59 Peter Slevin and Alan Sipress, “Tests Ahead for Cooperation on Terrorism; Several Countries on Blacklist Have Helped US, But Only Marginally So Far,” The Washington Post, December 31, 2001; Donna Abu-Nasr, “Gadhafi Seeks Image Makeover,” Washington Times, November 28, 2001. See also Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Maghreb States and the United States after 9/11: A Problematic Relationship,” in Sigrid Faath, ed., Neue geopolitische Konstellation im Nahen Osten nach dem 11 September 2001 (Hamburg, Germany: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 2003): 177. 60 Cited in Daniel Williams, “Gaddafi Seeks to End Hostilities with U.S. and Revive Economy Hobbled by Years of Sanctions and Isolation,” The Washington Post, December 27, 2003: A13. 61 William H. Lewis, “The War on Terrorism: The Libya Case,” The Atlantic Council of the United States Bulletin, 13(3), April 2002: 2. 62 Slevin and Sipress, “Tests Ahead for Cooperation on Terrorism,” op. cit. 63 Cited in Agence France Presse (Tripoli), August 31, 2002. 64 Author’s interviews with Libyan opponents of the regime based in Washington, November 2002. These opponents asked the Bush administration to apply the same pressure that the administration exerted upon the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. 65 Ron Suskind, “The Tyrant Who Came In From the Cold,” Washington Monthly, 38(10), October 1, 2006. 66 Author’s interviews with Libyan officials in London, February 2006. 67 St John, “Libya Is Not Iraq,” op. cit. 68 Interview with A. Chelgham to Al-Jazeera, cited in de Salies, op. cit.: 29. 69 “Gaddafi Son says Lockerbie families were Greedy,” Reuters, August 29, 2008. Available from www.reuters.com/ article/latestCrisis/idUSLT428533 (accessed August 20, 2008). 70 For a detailed analysis, see Jean-François Daguzan, “De l’ennemi no. 2 au premier de la classe, abandon réussi d’une politique de prolifération,” Maghreb-Machrek, 184, Summer 2005: 67–80. See also St John, “Libya Is Not Iraq,” op. cit. 71 Anthony H. Cordesman, Transnational Threats from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc? (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999): 106, cited in Boucek, “Libya’s Return to the Fold?” op. cit.: 6. 72 Patrick E. Tyler, “Libya’s Atom Bid in Early Phases,” The New York Times, December 30, 2003.

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73 George Joffé, “Libya: Who Blinked, and Why,” Current History, May 2004: 223. 74 Peter Slevin and Glenn Frankel, “Libya Vows to Give Up Banned Weapons,” The Washington Post, December 20, 2003. 75 St John, Libya and the United States, op. cit.: 154. 76 Gary Hart, “My Secret Talks With Libya, And Why They Went Nowhere,” The Washington Post, January 18, 2004: B05. 77 Hart, “My Secret Talks with Libya,” op. cit. 78 Zoubir, “Libya in U.S. Foreign Policy,” op. cit.; Stephen Zunes, “The Function of Rogue States in U.S. Middle East Policy,” Middle East Policy, 5(2), May 1997: 150. 79 Martin S. Indyk, “The Iraq War Did Not Force Gadaffi’s Hand,” The Financial Times, March 9, 2004. Reprinted at www.brookings.edu/opinions/2004/0309middleeast_indyk.aspx (accessed April 3, 2009). 80 Martin S. Indyk and Edward S. Walker, “What Does Libya’s Disarmament Teach About Rogue States?” Middle East Institute Brief, April 7, 2004. Available from www.mideasti.org/articles/doc192.html. 81 Indyk, op. cit. 82 Indyk and Walker, op. cit. 83 www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/print/20010226.html. 84 Flynt Leverett, “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb,” The New York Times, January 23, 2004. 85 St John, “Libya Is Not Iraq,” op. cit.: 394. 86 “PM Welcomes Libyan MWD Announcement,” December 19, 2003. Available from www.number-10.gov.uk/ output/Page5077.asp. 87 William Safire, “I Remember Muammar,” The New York Times, December 22, 2003. See also Yehudit Ronen, “Qadhafi’s Christmas Gift: What’s Behind Libya’s Decision to Renounce WMD?” The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies—Tel Aviv Notes, 93, December 24, 2003. 88 The Guardian stated that arguments that the war in Iraq prompted Libya to dismantle WMD were “sad, shabby stuff.” The paper suggested that the Libyan promise to disarm “was not achieved by military power, by invasion, by shredding international law, by enforced regime change or by large-scale bloodshed”; rather, the decision was the result of diplomacy initiated by former British Foreign Minister Robin Cook and continued by Jack Straw, who succeeded him. “Washington’s bellicosity formed a worrying backdrop, not a spur.” In fact, Colin Powell himself stated in an internal State Department publication, unlike his other public statements, that “American power formed the essential backdrop to Libya’s decision. There can be little doubt about this. But that backdrop was not enough. It took American and British persuasion to turn a Libyan impulse into a victory for all sides. So, in this case, as in most others, power is a necessary condition for foreign policy success, but it’s usually not a sufficient one. … Diplomacy is neither the opposite of force nor the same as force. Diplomacy without power is just naked pleading and power without diplomacy is often unavailing.” Secretary Colin L. Powell, “Diplomacy Properly Understood,” State Magazine, May 2004: 2. Available from www.state.gov/documents/organization/32314.pdf. 89 “Muammar Kadhafi, “Que fait l’armée française en Afrique?” Le Figaro, November 24, 2004. Available from www.lefigaro.fr/cgi/edition/genimprime?cle=20041124.FIG0022 (accessed November 25, 2004). 90 See Peter Preston, “If Libya Can Do It, Why Not Israel? We Can No Longer Turn a Blind Eye on the Fifth Largest Nuclear Power,” The Guardian, December 22, 2003. 91 Le Figaro, November 24, 2004. 92 “Libya Press Hails Arms Decision,” Associated Press, December 22, 2003. 93 Patrick E. Tyler, “Libya Presses U.S. to Move Quickly to End Sanctions,” The New York Times, January 2, 2004. 94 “U.S. Visit Heralds Thaw in Libya Ties,” The New York Times, AP, January 27, 2004. 95 Robin Wright, “State Dept. Official Meets Gaddafi on Relations,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2004. 96 Carola Hoyos, “Libya ‘Needs $30 Bn’ to Expand Oil Sector,” Financial Times, March 30, 2004. 97 Olivia Marsaud, “Libye: les affaires reprennent,” www.afrik.com, April 26, 2004. Available from www.afrik.com/ article/7236.html (accessed April 28, 2004). 98 Willa Thayer, “Libya Awards Oil Contracts,” Associated Press, December 20, 2006. 99 Robert Burns, “General: U.S. Gains From Ties with Libya,” Associated Press, April 21, 2005. 100 C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs; Coordinator for Counterterrorism Henry A. Crumpton; Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance and Implementation Paula A. DeSutter On-theRecord Briefing Washington, DC, May 15, 2006. Available from http://malta.usembassy.gov/briefing_on_issues_ related_to_united_states_relations_with_libya_.html (accessed April 3, 2009). 101 www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/August/20080814150458eaifas0.3271601.html&distid=ucs (accessed on April 3, 2009).

22 US relations with Egypt An overview Michael Collins Dunn

Introduction Since the 1970s, the US and Egypt have had close, if sometimes difficult, relations, with the US as Egypt’s major aid provider, strategic partner and, at times, critic. From the perspective of Washington, it may sometimes seem as if the history of US–Egyptian relations began with the Henry Kissinger shuttle diplomacy of 1973–75, or Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the subsequent Camp David Summit. Egyptians, with five millennia of history behind them, tend to take a longer view, and have longer memories. Many of the rough spots in US–Egyptian relations in recent years are rooted in earlier periods of difficult relations or none at all, or in memories of Egypt’s less-than-ideal experience of British rule. While many accounts of the recent ups and downs of US–Egyptian relations begin with the 1970s, this chapter will take a rather longer historical view. The author of this chapter is a historian by training who first lived in Egypt in 1972, a time when the US and Egypt had a very different relationship than they have today: had, in fact, no diplomatic relations. Yet even then, in the heart of Cairo, on Tahrir Square, stood the American University in Cairo, never closed or seriously molested even during the nadir of US–Egyptian relations. It is a reminder that the US and Egypt have had a long, if sometimes tempestuous, relationship, one that is best understood if the difficult periods are considered alongside the smooth ones. A historical narrative is followed by an analysis of the present issues in the relationship.

Prologue: the US and Egypt before the Second World War US relations with Egypt prior to the Second World War were primarily limited to the commercial, cultural, archaeological, educational, and missionary spheres, but activities in these areas were at times intense. By 1919, there was an American University in Cairo; US missionaries had been active since the 1850s among Egyptian Christians; and US merchants, archaeologists, and high-profile travelers regularly visited the valley of the Nile. Political relations were generally treated as first an Ottoman and later a British concern. But long before the US began to interact with Egyptian governments in the political sphere, there had been a long-standing American presence in Egypt. While it is tempting to turn to cliché and say that Egypt is one of the oldest countries in the world and the US one of the younger ones, in fact the US has had some interest in Egypt since the early nineteenth century, if not before. US merchants had traded with the Mediterranean world even before American independence, and while the US did not have a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire in the early years, by the 1820s, the US had a consul at Smyrna. Finally, in 1830, the US successfully negotiated a commercial treaty with the Ottomans. In 1831, the US named a representative to the Sublime Porte, Commodore David Porter, and the following year Porter named a British merchant resident in Alexandria as the

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first US consular agent for Alexandria. Although Muhammad Ali Pasha’s government in Egypt was de facto functioning independently (and even fighting wars with Constantinople), Egypt was still legally Ottoman territory and the Alexandria consulate subordinate to the US Representative to the Porte. The first consular agent, David Gliddon, was well received, but the fact that he was appointed by the US Representative in Constantinople at a time when Muhammad Ali had in fact been waging war on the Sultan was something of an anomaly. Egypt’s lack of formal independence (until 1922) prevented full diplomatic relations, but the country’s de facto autonomy meant that some sort of diplomatic exchange was necessary for the protection of US nationals in the country. In 1834, the US Department of State sent William B. Hodgson, dragoman of the US Diplomatic Service in Constantinople, to Alexandria to explore commercial prospects in Egypt. Hodgson recommended the appointment of a Consul-General for Egypt, Syria, and other territories under Muhammad Ali’s de facto rule, though continuing to acknowledge Muhammad Ali’s legal status as a viceroy owing fealty to the Ottoman Sultan. Gliddon, the British national who had been the US Consular Agent, became the first US Consul at Alexandria in 1835. In 1848, this was made a Consulate-General. Only in that year was an American national appointed Consul-General, Gliddon and his son-in-law, both British, having previously held the post. The Consulate-General’s functions in Alexandria (and, from 1876, in Cairo) were not limited to commercial affairs; in addition to being Consul-Generals, the consuls were also “agents” with diplomatic functions, although this was limited by the awkwardness of Egypt’s semi-autonomous status, with the khedives seeking to function as sovereign leaders but the Porte continuing to insist that all diplomatic representation in Egypt (and Syria) be under the authority of Constantinople. Among key functions was the protection of American citizens in Egypt, initially mostly traders but, as the century progressed, increasingly also missionaries and educators. The US was the only major Western power not to send an official representative to the lavish celebrations the Khedive Ismail staged on the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The US offered its good offices during the financial crisis which led to the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, to little avail. While American merchants were active in Egypt, the fact that Egypt’s major export, cotton, directly competed with exports from the southern US after the Civil War meant that major trade was unlikely. The aftermath of the US Civil War did, however, have another curious resonance in Egypt, as former Union and Confederate officers were recruited for the Egyptian Army. Beginning in 1870, former Union General Charles P. Stone served as Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Army for the Khedives Ismail and Tewfiq. Other veterans, from both sides, served in the Egyptian Army in that era. The French, who had previously provided military advice, objected to the American presence, but the US government insisted that the Americans did not represent an official US military mission and were there as private citizens. Most went home after the British and French effectively took over the Egyptian finances in 1876; Stone left after the arrival of the British in 1882. Other areas of early American presence were in the missionary field, with Protestant missionaries arriving as early as 1854. As elsewhere in the Middle East, the legal, political, and practical obstacles to preaching to Muslims in a Muslim country led the American missionaries to concentrate on the conversion of local Christian populations. This led to friction with the Coptic Church, sometimes resulting in violence and missionary demands for consular protection; most of the Copts, preserving an ancient Christian tradition claiming to trace its roots to Saint Mark the Evangelist, did not feel the need for conversion to Protestantism. But there were successes, which provoked resistance from the Coptic Patriarch and hierarchy. Although a number of European churches also had mission presences in Egypt, the American Mission was under the United Presbyterian Church of North America, which remained dominant. One legacy of the American Mission is the Evangelical Church of Egypt, sometimes

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called the Coptic Evangelical Church, a Protestant denomination initially composed of Egyptian converts. The American Mission, as the missionary presence was called, also was active in founding schools, open to Muslims as well as Christians. One product of the educational missionary tradition was the foundation in 1919 of the American University in Cairo, which would remain a landmark presence in the heart of the Egyptian capital even during the worst periods of US–Egyptian relations. Another major early presence was archaeological. Although US egyptologists would be more visible in the twentieth century than the nineteenth, the transfer of an obelisk, “Cleopatra’s Needle,” to New York’s Central Park from Alexandria in 1879 (matching one given to London two years before) deserves mention, and several American scholars did pioneering work that would be followed in the twentieth century by major US expeditions. Tourism was also growing, though then of course a privilege of the wealthy; a number of prominent Americans visited the Nile as part of their Grand Tours. Among these were former President Ulysses S. Grant, future President Theodore Roosevelt as a boy (he would return in 1910 after his presidency), and other prominent figures. US attitudes towards the British occupation after 1882 were somewhat ambivalent. The fact that Egypt was still nominally a Turkish territory, but had now been transformed from a de facto independent viceroyalty into a de facto British colony meant that the US diplomatic presence remained anomalous. That situation continued until the First World War when, with Turkey’s entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, Britain declared a Protectorate over Egypt, proclaiming the Khedive now a Sultan. At the end of the war, Egyptian nationalists led by Saad Zaghlul and his Wafd or “delegation” movement sought to assure an Egyptian presence at the Paris Peace Conference. They looked to the US, and Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, to offset British resistance to Egyptian independence. But the British, although eventually allowing Zaghlul to travel to Paris, won American recognition for the continued British Protectorate, to the extreme disappointment of Zaghlul and the Wafd. But the end of the First World War did increase US awareness of events in the Middle East, although Wilson’s own illness ultimately kept the US out of the League of Nations. In 1922, following years of uprising and agitation in Egypt, the British unilaterally (and with sharp conditions) declared Egypt independent and Sultan Fuad its first king. Thus Egypt had gone in a matter of less than a decade from a Khedive to a Sultan to a King, from a Viceroyalty to a Protectorate to a nominally independent Kingdom, all the while remaining, effectively, under British control. The US recognized Egypt, and its long-time diplomatic agents finally achieved the rank of ambassador. Otherwise, the interwar years were relatively uneventful for US–Egyptian relations, as the US continued to see Egypt as very much in the British sphere of influence, and remained primarily concerned with issues such as the Suez Canal and the safety of American missionaries, educators, archaeologists, and others in the country. Although the US presence remained considerable in Egypt, it was transformed dramatically by the US entry into the Second World War.

The Second World War and after Even before the US entered the Second World War, Egypt had become a major theater of the war, with British forces seeking to protect the Suez Canal and the shipping lanes across the Mediterranean and on to India against German and Italian expansion. British operations in the Western Desert (first against the Italians, then against the Afrika Corps under Erwin Rommel), in Palestine and Syria, and in Somalia and later Ethiopia were all co-ordinated through Egypt, and with the entry of the US into the war in December 1941 and the American

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landings in Morocco and Algeria in 1942, Egypt became a focus of US–British co-operation. Although Britain had signed a treaty with Egypt in 1936 granting a much more genuine independence than its proclamation of 1922, with the war Britain tightened the reins once again, guaranteeing itself a military free hand but also spurring Egyptian nationalist sentiments. As part of the allied effort in the Second World War, a significant US presence developed alongside the British in Egypt, including major supply and intelligence operations and a USoperated air base. The US also sought to develop relations with Egypt independently of those of Great Britain as part of growing US interests in Middle Eastern petroleum resources, the importance of the Suez Canal, and general power projection as the cold war evolved. Egypt was twice the scene of major summit diplomacy during the war. In November 1943, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and Chinese leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek met at the Mena House Hotel near the Pyramids in the Cairo Conference, code-named Sextant. Two days later, Roosevelt and Churchill proceeded to Tehran to meet Josef Stalin, who had declined to come to Cairo. Again, in February 1945, Roosevelt and Churchill, returning from the Yalta Conference in the USSR, met aboard a US warship in the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal with King Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman had been supporters of decolonization efforts generally, although increasingly in the post-war period the emerging cold war bipolarity tended to color US perceptions of local independence movements. US and British talks in 1947 led to an agreement under which the US would increase its economic and security presence in the Middle East, but would support a continued British presence in the Suez Canal Zone. There were some overtures made by Egypt for possible US military training assistance as early as 1947, but a combination of continued recognition of a British sphere of influence in Egypt and US reluctance to provide arms to either side in the emerging Palestine conflict prevented any major progress at this stage. The outbreak of the Palestine War (the Israeli War of Independence), and US recognition of the Israeli state immediately upon its proclamation, cast a shadow over US–Arab relations generally. But the fact that the Arab combatants of 1948 were mostly rather conservative regimes, and the emerging Israeli government had a European socialist cast to it, prevented that first Arab–Israeli war from becoming a cold war surrogate (in part, too, because the Soviet Union had recognized Israel as well). The “disaster” (nakba) of the 1948 war not only affected the Palestinians. The poor performance of the Arab armies (with the exception of Jordan’s Arab Legion) weakened the participating Arab regimes, Egypt’s among them. The Palace and the military leadership were accused of corruption, failure to supply the army, and disastrous management. Ironically, the one bright spot in Egypt’s performance in 1948, the so-called “Faluja Pocket,” which held out until the armistice, was commanded by Muhammad Naguib with the assistance of a young officer named Gamal Abdel Nasser, two figures who would thereby see their stars rise in the army after the war. Already in the late 1940s a pattern was emerging under which the US almost reflexively saw its relations with Egypt as part of the larger cold war strategic picture, in which it would co-ordinate with its ally Britain while encouraging decolonization efforts, but continuing to support a British presence in the Suez Canal Zone. For Roosevelt and Truman, decolonization was a personal preference, but the cold war was increasingly an imperative concern. The burning of key institutions in central Cairo on “Black Saturday,” January 26, 1952, prompted a visit by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s Middle East chief, Kermit Roosevelt, a grandson of Theodore Roosevelt. In the context of early 1952, it was obvious that revolutionary sentiments were at work and that a variety of radical organizations, from the Muslim Brotherhood to the communists, were maneuvering for position. Recognizing that some sort of reform was essential, the US quietly welcomed the military coup of July 23, 1952, and sought to establish relations with the new military leadership.

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1952 to 1958: from the revolution to the Eisenhower doctrine The initial enthusiasm of some in the US for the Egyptian military coup and the overthrow of King Farouk was derived in part from the US’s own identification with revolutionary change, and with a cold war recognition that moderate reform by a government led by nationalists and the military might be less of a danger to US interests than a government of more radical provenance, whether of right or left. Representatives of the US CIA courted the Free Officers in the first years after the revolution. But the initial enthusiasm did not last. In part, this was due to the gradual radicalization of the new Egyptian regime, as Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as the strongman and eventually replaced Muhammad Naguib as president, and as the new regime moved to ban political parties and otherwise limit political expression. In part, too, it was due to a somewhat naïve, almost blundering innocence among some of the Americans, starting to feel their way in the region as a newly arrived superpower. Adding to the changing relationship was the transition of the US from twenty years of Democratic presidential leadership after the 1952 elections, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower replaced Harry S. Truman and, perhaps more strikingly, John Foster Dulles replaced Dean Acheson as US Secretary of State. Dulles was determined to pursue a policy of containment of the Soviet Union, and his chosen method was the erection of a system of alliances and pacts around the margins of Europe and Asia, with those participating seen as part of the free world and those not participating as part of the system seen as tacit supporters of the Soviet bloc. It was not a worldview that had much room for the emerging Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), of which Nasser would be a founding figure; its “who is not for me is against me” approach made few distinctions between Arab nationalism and international communism. (Egyptian communists, who were systematically jailed by Nasser, would have understood the distinction.) If the main US interest in international affairs was the containment of the Soviet Union, the primary national interest of Egypt as led by Nasser related to the withdrawal of the remaining British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. At the moment that Egypt was seeking to end the remnants of British power in the region, the US was seeking to forge the Baghdad Pact, a strategy of allying the “Northern Tier” of Middle Eastern states against the Soviet Union. That strategy called for strengthening Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan and, to fill the gaps, the Hashemite-ruled kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan, where considerable British influence endured (although Jordan would not join the Baghdad Pact). As the US began its project to forge an anti-Soviet bloc in the Middle East, Egypt signed a “Heads of Agreement” with the British in 1954 providing for British evacuation from the Canal Zone, but with provisions for the reintroduction of British troops to protect the Canal in the event of an attack by an outside power on an Arab country or Turkey. The US initially saw the agreement as cementing Egypt into its broader anti-Soviet project. Nasser, having finally achieved British agreement on withdrawal, saw it as a nationalist victory and an opportunity to pursue Egypt’s regional interests, in particular towards Sudan, Israel, and increasing Egyptian influence in other Arab states. The very differing perceptions between the US strategy for the region and Egypt’s increasingly nationalistic and inter-Arab approach quickly set Cairo and Washington on a collision course. The events of 1954–56 have been studied extensively and need not be rehearsed in detail here. Nasser was one of the key figures at the Bandung Conference, which brought together Asian and African leaders in April 1955 in Indonesia, leading to the foundation of the NAM. The presence of the People’s Republic of China at Bandung naturally set off alarm bells for Dulles. The efforts to form a military alliance in the Northern Tier and reticence about providing military assistance to Egypt, along with growing tensions with Israel fueled in part by Arab nationalist posturing on Egypt’s part, led to a widening rift with the West and, in September 1955, Egypt signed an agreement to purchase arms from Czechoslovakia, opening

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a supply line of Soviet bloc arms to the region and undercutting the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, under which the Western powers had agreed to limit arms sales to either Israel or its neighbors. The Czech arms deal led to alarm in Israel and an increasing conviction on the part of Dulles that Egypt was slipping into the Soviet camp in the cold war. Egypt had for some time been contemplating the need for a High Dam at Aswan, one of the major engineering projects of all time, and was seeking international financing and expertise. While the US had been in discussions with Egypt on financing the dam, the Soviet Union had also offered to participate. Dulles sought to link financing to an Egyptian repudiation of future arms from the Soviet Union, and even held out hopes that the Czech deal might be cancelled. The US and Britain nevertheless offered a financing plan in December 1955 that did not require cancellation of the Czech arms deal, apparently in a realization that they could not afford to force Nasser to turn to the Soviets. But other terms of the deal were unacceptable to Nasser, and throughout the early part of 1956, Nasser sought to play the US offer against the Soviet one. As 1956 began, matters began to spin out of control. The Baghdad Pact (officially the Middle East Treaty Organization), originally intended as a barrier against the USSR, increasingly seemed to be an attempt to encircle Nasser’s Egypt. The US was not formally a member but set up military liaison with the Pact, and thus US policies came to be associated more closely with Britain’s in many Arab eyes. Israeli concern about the Czech arms deal was mounting, leading to pressures from Congress on the administration in Washington. And Nasser continued to be playing Washington off against Moscow. In May, Nasser recognized communist China, in defiance of Dulles. On July 19, the US announced that it was withdrawing the offer to finance the Aswan Dam. On July 26, Egypt’s National Day, Nasser announced the freezing of the Suez Canal Company’s assets and plans to nationalize it. The result was the international standoff which led to the Suez War of 1956. The US sought to avoid war and when, in response to an Israeli attack into Sinai and drive for the Suez Canal, Britain and France intervened to seize the Canal (ostensibly to protect it from the opposing armies, but in fact with prior agreement from the Israelis), the US refused to support the Franco-British intervention. While there was support in the US for the French, British, and Israeli action, President Eisenhower recognized that the Suez Canal Company was a private company and that the intervention would be seen as a renewal of colonial control in the region. The US insisted on full withdrawal from Sinai and the implantation of a United Nations Emergency Force to keep the peace on the Sinai border. For a brief time after Suez, the US enjoyed a new popularity in the Middle East. Eisenhower (though not Dulles) saw streets named after him in some Arab cities. The brief honeymoon did not endure, however, as the British continued to build up the Baghdad Pact as a means of limiting Nasser’s influence. Concerned with the results of the Suez War and of Soviet threats to intervene directly at the time of the war, Eisenhower announced the so-called “Eisenhower Doctrine” in January 1957, announcing that the US would intervene to support any friendly country threatened with overthrow or intervention by the Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, following the Suez War, Nasser’s popularity in the Arab world increased dramatically, as he had seemingly defied the combined forces of Britain, France, and Israel and survived. Arab nationalist sympathies increased in many countries, and early in 1958, following a coup in Syria, Egypt and Syria announced that they were united in a United Arab Republic (UAR). Muslims in Lebanon agitated against Christian President Camille Chamoun for not breaking relations with the West over Suez. When in 1958 Chamoun sought another term as president, Lebanon spiraled to the brink of civil war. At this critical moment, military officers in Iraq overthrew the Hashemite monarchy on July 19, with the king and much of the royal family being killed in the aftermath, and a similar plot was uncovered in Jordan. Fearing a pro-Nasserite series of coups in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq to follow on the Egyptian–Syrian

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union, the US intervened in Lebanon and Britain in Jordan, with the US citing the Eisenhower Doctrine as its justification. The US intervention brought about a negotiated settlement in the Lebanese crisis and the immediate sense of impending disaster abated. The new Iraqi regime proved independent of Egypt, and a heavy hand by Egyptian officials in Syria led to that country’s chafing under the UAR; Syria finally seceded in 1961, although Egypt retained the name United Arab Republic until 1971, after Nasser’s death.

The Kennedy and Johnson eras John F. Kennedy’s presidency (1960–63) sought a different approach to Nasser and the Arab world. Kennedy had drawn applause in the Arab world for his open support of Algerian independence during his time in the Senate, and he sought to improve US relations in the region generally and with Egypt in particular. As ambassador, he named John S. Badeau, a former president of the American University in Cairo and a long-time Cairo hand who had spent much of his life in the country. A major issue during this period was the civil war which erupted in Yemen in 1962, leading to Egyptian intervention on the side of the Republicans and Saudi support for the former monarchy. The US remained relatively aloof from the Yemen war despite considerable attention by some members of the administration. Nasser was reportedly fascinated by Kennedy, an interest perhaps enhanced by his friendship with Badeau. Kennedy was assassinated November 22, 1963, and succeeded by Lyndon Baines Johnson; Badeau stepped down in 1964, being replaced as ambassador by Lucius Battle. The year 1964 saw several dramatic turns in US–Egyptian relations. Following a USbacked rescue mission in the Congo, African students in Cairo burned the US Information Service Library. Although Egypt claimed the demonstration had gotten out of control, there was natural suspicion in Washington that the police had deliberately not intervened. The library was burned to the ground. The date was the US Thanksgiving holiday. Three weeks later, an aircraft belonging to John Mecom, an oilman and friend and supporter of President Johnson, entered Egyptian airspace on a flight from Libya to Jordan and was shot down by the UAR air force. The pilot and a passenger were killed. Soon after this, Nasser, in one of his trademark stemwinding speeches at Port Said, denounced US criticisms of Egypt’s actions in these events, and led the crowds in a chant that the US could “drink the sea,” an Egyptian expression essentially dismissing the US complaints. He also referred to US policies as “gangsterism by cowboys,” presumably a reference to Johnson’s Texas origins. Adding to the tensions were the visit of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to Egypt to mark the first stage of the Aswan High Dam project. Finally, in early 1965, Congress voted to cut off all aid to Egypt, which at this point primarily consisted of Public Law 480 food aid under the Food for Peace Act. That provoked further rhetoric from Cairo, although Johnson sought to restore some food aid at a later date. Food aid was not completely ended until 1967 when, in the run-up to the 1967 war, Egypt withdrew its request for further US aid. The 1967 war marked the nadir of Nasser–Johnson relations and, with the breaking of diplomatic relations with the US, the nadir of US–Egyptian relations to date. Although Johnson sought to pursue an active international diplomacy to prevent the outbreak of the war, the Israeli pre-emption of June 5, 1967 ended those efforts, and the war ended with diplomatic ties broken with Washington by much of the Arab world.

War to war: 1967 to 1973 During the period between the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israeli wars, the US was represented in Cairo by an Interests Section headed by US diplomats under the Spanish flag, although one formal US presence, a naval medical research unit, continued to operate at the military

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hospital in Maadi near Cairo, and the American University in Cairo, although technically subject to an Egyptian Government Sequestrator, continued to function as usual. Nasser, clearly chastened and weakened by the 1967 defeat, concentrated on rebuilding the Egyptian army and air force from the wreckage of the war, almost entirely with Soviet equipment and advisers. From 1967 to 1970, Egypt and Israel, confronting each other across the Suez Canal, engaged in what is known as the “war of attrition,” a war of raids and artillery exchanges which left the canal cities of Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez in ruins, and saw Soviet pilots flying at least some missions for the UAR Air Force. Nasser concentrated on rebuilding relations with the Arab world as well as this on-going confrontation with Israel. The election of Richard Nixon to the US presidency in the 1968 elections did not immediately bring major changes to US relations with the UAR, which now consisted only of Egypt. The US was wholly preoccupied with Vietnam, and despite the diplomatic skills of US National Security Advisor Henry S. Kissinger (later Nixon’s Secretary of State), Kissinger generally concentrated on negotiations with China and Vietnam and left the Middle East to the State Department under Nixon’s first-term Secretary of State, William P. Rogers. Rogers’ diplomacy led to what came to be known as the “Rogers Plan,” aimed at ending the “war of attrition.” The Rogers Plan basically aimed at ending active belligerency to avoid a major East–West confrontation, while referring to the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, calling for Israeli withdrawal in exchange for peace. Egypt and Jordan agreed in July 1970 to accept the initial plan for a ceasefire in place, and the ceasefire went into effect on August 7, 1970. Although Israel would soon accuse Egypt of violating the ceasefire by moving surface-to-air missiles into the ceasefire zone, events would soon overtake preoccupation with the Rogers Plan. In September 1970 (later “Black September”), following a series of aircraft hijackings by Palestinians to Jordan, Jordan moved against the power of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) inside Jordan. The threat of Syrian intervention in Jordan led to both Israeli and American military movements and a general crisis in the region. Following the crisis, Nasser hosted an Arab Summit in Cairo. After seeing the Arab leaders depart from Cairo airport on September 28, 1970, Nasser was stricken with a massive heart attack (he had suffered from a hereditary form of diabetes) and died. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, the US sent a delegation to Nasser’s funeral, one of the largest and most emotional in the history of the modern Middle East. Nasser’s Vice President, Anwar Sadat, succeeded to the presidency. Many expected that Ali Sabri, the head of the single party, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), would likely emerge as the real power, with the party having more influence than the presidency (Nasser had headed both). But on May 15, 1971, Sadat struck at Sabri and his allies and emerged as the sole leader. Sabri had a closer identification with the Soviet Union than did Sadat, who had flirted with both the political right and the Muslim Brotherhood before the revolution. Sadat gradually distanced himself from the policies of the Nasser era. Many political prisoners were released (although later Sadat would himself jail many enemies); an economic opening was proclaimed and gradually implemented; and in July 1972, Egypt sent thousands of Soviet military advisors home. Although there was still some Soviet presence, Egypt (which also dropped the styling “United Arab Republic” in favor of “Arab Republic of Egypt” after Sadat’s accession) eliminated the large-scale presence under Soviet command not only of Soviet advisors but of Soviet operational units and pilots under direct Soviet command. Unlike Nasser, who never wrote an autobiography, Sadat wrote too many—at least three in Arabic and two in English, with a fourth under way in the form of magazine interviews when he died—so discussions of his motives are dependent on which of his sometimes varying narratives one accepts. But it does seem clear that he concluded early in his presidency (if not before it) that the excessive dependence on the Soviet Union was not in Egypt’s interest, that an opening to the other superpower was imperative, and that Egypt should abandon

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unrealistic notions of a major military victory over Israel and seek, instead, a change in the military status quo that would force Israel to negotiate. At the time, the international press had been given a great deal of publicity about the “Bar-Lev Line,” named for the Israeli Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev, which ran along the east bank of the canal. This Middle Eastern version of the Maginot Line was supposedly impenetrable; in fact, as the Israelis eventually admitted, it was undermanned and as much an exercise in public relations as fortification. Egypt pursued a two-pronged policy. The Egyptian military prepared for a cross-canal operation that would breach the Bar-Lev Line and change the status quo on the ground, while Sadat sought to begin a dialogue about some sort of final settlement with Israel. His national security aide Hafiz Ismail met with US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in Paris in February 1973, but apparently was unhappy with the results. Even before this, Sadat had given an interview with the US news weekly Newsweek (February 22, 1973 issue), in which he explicitly stated that he would accept peace in exchange for Israeli withdrawal. Thus, Sadat had already laid the groundwork for bringing the US into the peace process; but the Ismail– Kissinger discussions of February also reportedly included a Kissinger reluctance to intervene so long as Egypt remained essentially a defeated power. The war that began on October 6, 1973 led to Egypt establishing a salient east of the Suez Canal (Syria was also conducting an offensive in the Golan), but ended in an Israeli force crossing to the west bank of the Canal and cutting off the Egyptian Second Field Army. Egypt had changed the psychological basis of the conflict but was itself caught in a military bind with one of its two field armies trapped. For the first time since the 1948 war, Egyptians and Israelis met at the same table in the field at “Kilometer 101” on the road to Cairo—a location that reminded both sides of Israeli forces’ proximity to the Egyptian capital. But those talks were quickly escalated into Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” between Egypt and Israel (and eventually Syria as well). The US was drawn fully into the peace process. In November, the two countries re-established diplomatic relations, and both participated in the initial Geneva Peace Conference of December of that year, co-chaired by the US and the Soviet Union, which convened but went no further.

Peace process: from 1973 to Sadat’s assassination The US–Egyptian relationship changed dramatically after the 1973 war, although it would be several more years before Sadat’s willingness to finalize a peace with Israel locked the US into a long-term relationship that at times has been little short of an alliance. Kissinger’s continuing shuttle diplomacy brought about the first Sinai disengagement agreement in January 1974. In June, President Richard Nixon, deeply beleaguered by the Watergate scandal (he would resign in August), made a visit to Egypt, the first sitting American president to visit while in office. The succession of Gerald R. Ford as US president was followed by the second Sinai Disengagement Agreement in September 1975, under which Israel withdrew beyond the Sinai passes. American preoccupation with the aftermath of the collapse of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the Mayaguez affair, and the run-up to the 1976 US presidential elections distracted Washington from events in the Middle East for most of the rest of 1975 and 1976. The election of US President Jimmy Carter in 1976 seemed to be an opportunity, although the withdrawal of Henry Kissinger from the scene removed the central diplomatic negotiator of the previous three years. In the meantime, in 1975, Egypt reopened the Suez Canal to international traffic for the first time since 1967: if nothing else, an expression of confidence that the Sinai withdrawals would hold. Sadat visited Washington and met with Carter in April 1977. The following month, Israel’s Labor Party lost power for the first time and Menahem Begin’s Likud took over. Sadat continued to seek some avenue for beginning negotiations. When, on October 1, the US and the Soviet Union called for renewed efforts to reconvene the Geneva Conference, a move that

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would have internationalized the process, it acted as a spur to Sadat to try to find a breakthrough towards bilateral talks. On November 9, Sadat told the Egyptian People’s Assembly that he was prepared to go to the Knesset in Jerusalem if need be for talks Israel. Ten days later, he did exactly that. The shock of Sadat’s Jerusalem visit transformed the stalled peace process, but it also created a bilateral approach that excluded the rest of the Arab world, including the Palestinians. Egypt was suspended from the Arab League and isolated by its neighbors, further pushing it into a close relationship with the US. The succeeding years led to the Camp David Accords of 1978, the signing of the Egyptian– Israeli peace treaty in 1979, and profound involvement of the US in securing and preserving the peace. From 1979 onward, Israel and Egypt became the largest recipients of US aid, and within a few years, the US went from broken diplomatic relations to maintaining one of the largest US Embassy compounds in the world in Cairo. The US organized and helped maintain the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) deployed in Sinai, and the US replaced the Soviet bloc as the primary supplier of military hardware to Egypt. American tourists, scarce in the Nasser era, flocked back to Egypt from the late 1970s onward. Sadat’s popularity in the US was not generally matched at home, and Egypt’s ostracism from the Arab world led Sadat to depend more and more on the US relationship. In August 1981, he met US President Ronald Reagan in Washington at a time when he was already cracking down on opposition domestically. In subsequent weeks, the crackdown intensified, and on October 6, 1981, while reviewing a military parade on the anniversary of the 1973 war, Sadat was assassinated. Sadat’s funeral was dramatically different from Nasser’s. Nasser’s had attracted some five million Egyptians in a mass outpouring; Sadat’s, instead, was heavily attended by foreign leaders (including former US presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, as well as Menahem Begin and senior Israelis), necessitating tight security and affording little visibility to the Egyptian public. The contrast was much commented upon by Egyptians at the time.

The Mubarak era The assassination of Sadat on October 6, 1981 brought Vice President Husni Mubarak to power. As this is written, Mubarak has served as president for twenty-seven years; if he completes his current term (which expires in 2011), he will have served longer than Nasser and Sadat combined. In May 2008, Mubarak turned eighty years old. The dramatic shifts in the US–Egyptian relationship in the Nasser and Sadat years were replaced, throughout the Mubarak decades, by a relatively stable strategic alliance and aid relationship, punctuated with periods of tension and mutual criticism, in which certain common interests shared by Washington and Cairo have been balanced by stresses and strains brought about by US policies in the region or US criticism of Egyptian domestic policies. Still, despite the difficulties, the relationship has been maintained and has survived the strains of several regional wars. While the roots of the huge aid relationship and the emerging strategic co-operation lay in the Sadat era, the early years of Mubarak saw military co-operation deepen at a significant pace. The Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war in 1980 had already altered the strategic environment in the region, and the election of US President Ronald Reagan in 1980 had intensified the rivalry between the US and the Soviets. Even before Sadat died, the US was becoming Egypt’s primary military patron, and that relationship intensified in the Mubarak era. Events in Iran, Afghanistan, and the Gulf led the US to seek new basing arrangements in the region, and while it was never able to achieve a formal base in Egypt, it received access to Egyptian bases during regional crises, joint maneuvers with the Egyptians, and close co-operation on strategic matters.

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Beginning in 1980, the US and Egypt carried out joint military maneuvers; by 1983, this had evolved into a major international deployment known as Operation Bright Star, to be held every two years. As the 1980s wore on, Bright Star became even bigger, with joint naval and air operations and major deployments from the continental US to Egypt, attempting to send a message to the region of US rapid deployment capabilities; it was the nucleus of what was to become the US Central Command (CENTCOM), responsible for the Middle East. Bright Star has continued, usually every two years (although annually in tense periods); it today receives much less publicity than in earlier years because of local sensitivities about US policies in the region. Despite the deepening relations and strategic interdependence, there were still issues between the two countries. When the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked by Palestinians in 1985, Egypt allowed the ship to dock in Port Said, and sent the hijackers to Tunis on an Egyptian commercial airliner. When the US learned that a US citizen had been killed during the hijacking, it intercepted the Egyptian airliner and forced it down in Italy, leading to Egyptian protests. US–Egyptian military co-operation dominated the era of the 1980s, although economic and commercial ties were also deepening. In 1987, Egypt was restored to membership of the Arab League, and the League soon returned from Tunis to its historic home in Cairo, giving Egypt an enhanced role once again as the largest Arab country in inter-Arab affairs. Although Egypt had sought to co-operate with Iraq in the wake of the Iran–Iraq war, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was strongly opposed by Cairo, and it was one of the first Arab countries to send troops to participate in Operation Desert Shield to defend Saudi Arabia. In the subsequent war, Operation Desert Storm, Egypt provided a corps consisting of a mechanized division, an armored division, a commando regiment, an airborne brigade, and auxiliary units. It headed the Joint Forces Command North, one of the two main Arab bodies in the coalition. Egypt’s participation in Desert Storm led to a strengthening of its links to the West and the US, including widespread debt cancellation. During the 1990s, Egypt confronted a serious internal challenge from Islamist groups, and its sometimes harsh measures to defeat them increased international criticism of Egyptian human rights policies. Despite ups and downs, relations remained relatively stable during the decade. Egypt supported the Oslo Accords and the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, and offered its own security services to assist in security negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The head of Egyptian General Intelligence, General Umar Suleiman, one of the most powerful men in the country but virtually unknown to the Egyptian public, emerged into public view as a mediator on Israeli–Palestinian issues in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The election of George W. Bush in the US in 2000 shifted the ground beneath US–Egyptian relations, or more precisely, the terrorist attack on the US on September 11, 2001 did so. Egypt strongly supported the US war on terror from the beginning, identifying the US effort with its own attempt to combat radical Islam domestically. (The deputy leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is an Egyptian physician who had been imprisoned in the Sadat assassination plot, but eventually released. He remains the most wanted man in Egypt.) Egyptian and US intelligence co-operation intensified. The two countries parted ways to some extent, however, over the US war in Iraq beginning in 2003. Profoundly unpopular in the Arab world, including Egypt, the war provoked anti-US demonstrations in Cairo as elsewhere. Although Egypt formally distanced itself from the war, it tacitly continued to permit US military passage through the Suez Canal without interference, as well as US military overflights of Egyptian airspace. The Bush administration’s new policy of pursuing democratization in the Middle East, however, proved a major stumbling block. The US pressed Egypt and other autocratic regimes to liberalize their political systems. In 2000, Egypt arrested Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a prominent sociologist and democracy advocate; Ibrahim has dual US and Egyptian citizenship and an American-born wife, and the US protested his detention. Although Ibrahim was released

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on appeal in 2003, his case became a cause célèbre in US human rights circles. (Ibrahim was again charged in 2008 and sentenced in absentia; at this writing, he is living in exile in the West.) The US also criticized the arrest of opposition leader and former presidential candidate of the Al-Ghad Party, Ayman Nour, arrested in 2005 shortly after running for president and being placing second after Mubarak. The 2005 Egyptian People’s Assembly elections saw the government allow the participation (as independents) of the Muslim Brotherhood, which proceeded to win eighty-seven seats in the 444-seat assembly. Many observers suspected the government allowed the Brotherhood to do so well in order to send a message to the US that the alternative to the present regime might be political Islamists. After Hamas subsequently won the Palestinian Authority elections the following month (January 2006), US pressure for democratization in the region noticeably declined. During the presidential campaign, there had been times when President Mubarak appeared to be running against the US, particularly when he portrayed Ayman Nour as a creature of the American democratization efforts. Another element separating the two countries in recent years has been the issue of Palestinian smuggling across the border into Gaza, coupled with Congressional efforts to cut aid to Egypt if more is not done. Egypt, which had been limited by the Peace Treaty with Israel to a relatively small police presence on the border, was permitted by agreement of the Israeli Knesset to increase that presence to stem smuggling of arms and other goods into Gaza. Nevertheless, the US Congress passed limitations on aid to Egypt unless the administration would certify that Egypt had stepped up its efforts. The fiscal year 2008 restriction was waived, but Egypt continues to object to the US making aid levels contingent on Egypt pursuing certain policies. The breaching of the Rafah border crossing by Hamas in January 2008 served as a reminder that the issue of border security can threaten Egypt internally as well.

Common interests: an overview Underpinning the longevity of the US–Egyptian relationship is a constellation of shared interests, although the relationship has periodically come under fire when the two countries’ interests diverged significantly. Among the key interests held in common are: 1 The Egyptian–Israeli peace. The Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1979 was the first treaty between Israel and an Arab state and the model for the subsequent treaty with Jordan and the Oslo Accords with the PLO. It remains a key underpinning of the entire peace process. Despite frequent complaints from Israel that it is a “cold peace,” it has never been in serious jeopardy, and has endured through Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and subsequent occupation, two Palestinian intifadas, the succession of conflicts in the Gulf, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to attack Hezbollah in 2006. Egypt has been an active mediator between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, has provided mediation as well in the Palestinian conflict between Hamas and Fatah, and has provided intelligence and border security coordination with both Israel and the Palestinians. At the same time, Congress has frequently sought to limit aid as a means of pressuring Egypt to enhance security along the Gaza border. 2 General strategic co-operation. The Suez Canal is a crucial chokepoint in international sea lanes, and a critical link in US supplies to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The strategic location of Egypt and its role as the most populous Arab country has made the US quasi alliance a critical factor in US strategic planning throughout the region. Egypt supported the coalition during Desert Storm and, while critical of the war in Iraq, has not sought to block US military access to the canal or to Egyptian airspace. 3 The war on terrorism. Egypt and the US have quietly co-operated in the war on terror, and continue to do so. The fact that Ayman al-Zawahiri and other senior al-Qaeda figures are Egyptian means that Egyptian intelligence has one of the best dossiers on such individuals.

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4 Economic development. US aid has sought to develop and diversify the Egyptian economy, helping to bring it from a near basket-case to a potential regional power capable of significant growth. Economic downturns and Egyptian reluctance to reform as rapidly as the US might like threaten to create a major economic crisis in Egypt.

Areas of tension While the above common interests have generally dominated the US–Egyptian relationship during the Mubarak years, several other areas have created major stresses: 1 Human rights. The Ibrahim and Nour cases, reports of incidents involving Egyptian Coptic Christians and Baha’is, and other human rights questions have led to US criticism of Egyptian policies and deepening Egyptian resentment of such criticism. 2 Democratization. Although US pressures for rapid democratization have eased since the Muslim Brotherhood successes in the 2005 elections, the issue remains a divisive one and may take center stage again as the issue of the succession to the octogenarian Mubarak picks up between now and the end of his term in 2011. Evidence that he wants his son Gamal to succeed him suggests that the succession may be manipulated by the ruling party. 3 Regional policy differences. The issue of smuggling into Gaza has eased somewhat following the breach in the border in early 2008 but remains a divisive one, especially in the US Congress. 4 Economic reform. Although reforms have made progress and Gamal Mubarak in particular seems genuinely committed to them, economic setbacks and the global economic downturn again threaten the security of government bread subsidies, which have always been untouchable; US pressures for reform have often been resisted. 5 Personality clashes. There is some anecdotal evidence that President Mubarak had a personal dislike of George W. Bush; whether Bush’s departure from office will alter the relationship remains to be seen. Examples of the difficult relationship were evident in 2008: at the World Economic Forum meeting in Cairo in May, Bush arrived late for Mubarak’s speech; in apparent response, Mubarak skipped Bush’s speech. The new US ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, also had to wait until just before the US July 4 holiday to present her credentials, leading to speculation that she might not be able to formally host Egyptian officials for US Independence Day. While these apparent snubs are anecdotal rather than clear-cut controversies, they are indicative of the difficulties in the relationship in recent years.

The future Since Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the US–Egyptian relationship has been remarkably stable despite interludes of difficulty. The long tenure of Mubarak has in part been responsible, as he has been a cautious and careful figure reluctant to engage in the dramatic gestures that characterized Sadat. But the calendar guarantees that Mubarak will leave office through either health issues or the expiration of his term in 2011,when he will be eighty-three. His son Gamal, a possible successor, was educated at the American University in Cairo and worked for the Bank of America; he would likely continue good relations with the US if he is able to succeed and establish himself. But the succession could produce surprises and potential instability, especially if the economy continues to worsen. Although US–Egyptian relations have been remarkably stable for more than three decades, something like the turbulent relations of the 1950s and 1960s could conceivably return if there is dramatic change in the leadership.

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The Levant

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23 Turkey and the US Lenore G. Martin

Introduction Turkey’s relations with the US since the end of the Second World War have been summarized diplomatically in the welcoming remarks made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the Turkish President in April 1967. He stated that Turkey and the US were close friends and allies who independently tried to protect their national interests.1 That friendship and alliance has endured over the past forty or so years, at times punctuated by moments of great stress. This chapter will examine the reasons for both the strengths and stresses of the US–Turkish relationship, focusing on the interaction of their national interests in the Middle East. The first part of the chapter will examine the development of the alliance since the start of the cold war through mid-2008. The second part of the chapter will consider the continuing sources of strength of the relationship from their mutuality of interests in the Middle East and the issues that induce a more independent pursuit of their sometimes incompatible national interests.

The cold war years: 1945–1989 The end of the 1940s The Soviet Union catalyzed the foundation of the modern US–Turkish alliance by making a series of threats against Turkey’s territorial integrity towards the end of the Second World War.2 These included the Soviet renunciation of the 1925 Treaty of Friendship with Turkey and Stalin’s demands to renegotiate the Montreux Convention concerning the passage of ships through the Dardanelle Straits, demands for free passage of Soviet warships through the Straits and the closure of the Straits to non-Black Sea states, establishment of Soviet bases at the Straits, and the return of Kars and Ardahan in eastern Anatolia that had been ceded to Turkey in 1921. In response to these threats and the threat of a communist takeover in Greece, the Truman administration issued the Truman Doctrine resisting Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean. President Truman eventually persuaded a Republican Congress to grant a $400 million aid package to Greece and Turkey, of which Turkey received $100 million. Turkey also received $183 million of economic aid from the US Marshall Plan and another $200 million in US military assistance.3 The 1950s As the cold war took hold and the US and Europe formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to resist communist expansion in Europe, Turkey pushed hard to be included within the Western alliance. Washington supported Ankara’s membership over British and other European objections. The US shared the Turkish view of the Soviet Union as a worldwide threat and recognized Turkey’s importance in the defense of the West. After sending a brigade of troops to join the UN forces in the Korean conflict, Turkey ultimately became a member of

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NATO in February 1952. At Washington’s urging, Turkish troops were placed under NATO’s Southern Command defending Europe, rather than under the Middle East Command where Britain would have preferred them to be placed in order to help defend the Middle East. For Turkey, this was a welcome sign of US support for Turkey as a Western country. During the 1950s, Turkey actively participated in the building of the Western anti-communist bloc. Ankara entered into a number of military co-operation agreements with NATO, including the installation of bases in Turkey for stationing air forces, naval visits, communications, and intelligence collection.4 Ankara also helped the UK to co-ordinate a Middle Eastern alliance against the Soviets: the Baghdad Pact of 1955 with Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq. Arab states strongly criticized this alliance, and it failed in 1958 following a republican coup in Iraq. It was succeeded by the CENTO alliance of the same states without Iraq. Turkey under Prime Minister Menderes remained a strong supporter of US policy in the Middle East. Thus, Turkey allowed the US to use Incirlik to support its intervention in Lebanon in 1958, even though this was not a NATO operation. Ankara also signed a secret “Periphery Pact” in 1958 to obtain military and technical assistance from Israel and link Turkey with two other US allies in the region, Iran and Ethiopia.5 The 1960s The first clear sign of tension between the US and Turkey resulted from the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. Without consulting Ankara, President Kennedy resolved the Crisis in part by agreeing to remove Jupiter missiles that had recently been installed in Turkey.6 Turkey owned the missiles but could not arm them or use them without US consent. Ankara resisted their removal, notwithstanding the US assertion that Polaris submarine-launched missiles would offer greater protection for Turkey, being more accurate and less vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Washington’s unilateral actions sowed seeds of suspicion within Ankara that their superpower ally might not be depended upon to provide protection to Turkey if the US determined that its own national interests diverged from Turkey’s. The most serious potential rupture of the US alliance occurred over the unresolved status of the Turkish and Greek populations on Cyprus. It remains a continuing source of tension within the Western alliance generally. In 1963, there were communal clashes in which the Turkish Cypriots suffered the most. As the suffering increased and the UN intercession was too slow, the Turkish military planned to invade Cyprus in June 1964. US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent President Inönü of Turkey a famous letter in June 1964 stating that it was not clear that the NATO allies would protect Turkey in the event of Soviet intervention on behalf of Greece, and forbidding the use of US-supplied arms in an invasion.7 The letter deepened Turkish suspicions that they could not necessarily depend upon the US coming to their aid in a showdown against the Soviet Union. These concerns ultimately led to the renegotiation of bilateral military assistance treaties between the US and Turkey in the form of the Defense Co-operation Agreement of July 1969. In that agreement, Ankara reasserted Turkish control over US military installations, including the right to restrict their use in a national emergency. The 1970s Tensions between the US and Turkey heightened again over Cyprus in the summer of 1974, when the Turkish military invaded Cyprus to protect the Turkish Cypriot population in the north of the island.8 Responding to pressure by Greek-Americans, Congress, despite the Nixon administration’s objection, imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. Ankara retaliated by suspending the Defense Co-operation Agreement of 1969 and other bilateral agreements, restricting operations at base facilities to NATO use. Turkey also negotiated economic assistance agreements with the Soviet Union. The Soviets supported the Turkish position on

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Cyprus. Ankara also signed a Declaration on the “Principles of Good Neighbourly Relations” with Moscow in 1972 and 1978 to demonstrate its independence from the US.9 However, after Congress lifted the arms embargo in 1978, Washington and Ankara eventually restored the military co-operation program in an updated Defense and Economic Agreement signed in March 1980.10 The urgency for a new agreement was impelled no doubt by US and Turkish concerns over the Khomeini Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both of which erupted in 1979. The loss of Iran as a key US ally in the Middle East left Turkey as the only Western ally with a listening post for Soviet Union military moves in the region and the only platform from which to secure the Persian Gulf. The 1980s The potential threats to the security of the flow of Persian Gulf petroleum from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the aftermath of the Khomeini Revolution led to a boost in military assistance and co-operation between the US and Turkey. The Reagan administration sought ways to modernize the Turkish military notwithstanding the 7:10 ratio of US assistance to Turkey and Greece that the Congress had imposed in response to Greek-American and Armenian-American lobbying.11 Disputes between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean during this period stimulated NATO and US intervention to prevent their escalation into open conflict. All of this added to the tensions over Cyprus. The mid-1980s also saw the rise of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), an originally Marxist, Kurdish, separatist group that engaged in terrorist operations in southeast Anatolia. The PKK had havens in northern Iraq, and Syria gave sanctuary to its leader Abdullah Öcalan. Syria was playing the “PKK card” in its search for Turkish concessions over the control Turkey exerted over the water from the Tigris and Euphrates.12 Syria also hoped to recover the province of Alexandretta that was ceded to Turkey by France following a 1939 referendum and renamed Hatay by the Turks.

The post-cold war years 1990–2003 The collapse of the Soviet Union that ended the cold war also restructured the international politics of the Middle East.13 With that collapse, Iraq and Syria lost the benefit of the Soviet ability to check US participation in regional politics and created an opportunity for both the US and Turkey to play larger roles in the new Middle East. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 and the US formed an international coalition to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait, President Turgut Özal, despite the objection of Turkey’s military,14 opened up Turkish air space and allowed US and coalition forces the use of the Incirlik air base for non-NATO combat.15 Turkey also cut off the flow of oil through the pipeline from Kirkuk in Iraq to Yumurtalık in Turkey. The Republic temporarily absorbed a large number of Kurdish refugees who fled across the border at the conclusion of the war. Turkey estimates its losses from the Gulf War at about $40 billion as a result of the economic embargo and the war-related expenses that were never fully compensated.16 Furthermore, the US and UK campaigns to contain Iraq that followed the 1990–91 Gulf War created additional risks for Turkey that have not yet been abated—essentially the risks of creating cross-border havens for the PKK and an irredentist independent Kurdistan. The first campaign, named Operation Provide Comfort, was designed to allow Kurdish refugees who fled across the border from northern Iraq into Turkey during and after the war in fear of Saddam Hussein’s Kurdish genocide to return to northern Iraq. The Operation was mounted from Turkish air bases. It became Operation Northern Watch in 1997 and denied Saddam Hussein the use of Iraqi airspace north of the 36th parallel, thereby continuing to protect the Kurds of northern Iraq. Also during this period, the PKK made raids into Turkey from bases in northern Iraq. It is estimated that the 1984–98 PKK conflict claimed over 30,000 lives.17 The Turkish military

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attempted to eradicate the PKK by cross-border incursions during the 1990s. This created tensions in the US–Turkish relationship over the rules of engagement for Turkish forces in northern Iraq. Tension also arose from Turkish perception of US unwillingness to share intelligence information that would help in the anti-PKK campaign and led to Ankara’s imposition of restrictions on the use of Turkish air bases.18 While the two major Iraqi Kurdish factions, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), under Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), under Jalal Talabani, were at loggerheads, Turkish concerns over the creation of an independent Kurdistan in the north of Iraq could be abated. The US helped negotiate a truce between the factions in 1998, and they agreed in Ankara that Turkey could continue to mount cross-border military incursions against the PKK.19 Still, Ankara remained concerned that, under the protection of the US air force, the Kurdish factions aimed to create an independent Kurdistan that might sow unrest among the millions of Turkish Kurds across the border. Another impact of the end of the cold war was the auguring of the possibility of a process to achieve peace between Israel and much of the Arab world, including with the Palestinians. This was evidenced by the Madrid Conference in 1991 which included the US and the Soviet Union and later by the Oslo Accords in 1993.20 This new era of potential Arab–Israeli peace negotiations facilitated the reconciliation between Turkey and Israel that reached a high point with the conclusion of a series of military co-operation and trade agreements between the two states in the mid-1990s. The military co-operation agreements permitted the Israeli air force to train in Turkey, provided training for Turkish pilots, established joint manufacture of missile defense systems and other weaponry, and exchange of intelligence. Turkey also recognized the value of engaging the pro-Israel lobby in Washington to counter the opposition to Turkey engendered in Congress by the Greek-American and Armenian-American lobbies. While not a formal arrangement for mutual security, the Turkish–Israeli military co-operation was congruent with the Middle East policies of the US, which had a “special relationship” with Israel. Moreover, Turkey’s new co-operative relationship with Israel may have played a factor in Syria’s decision to expel Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, from Damascus when confronted with Turkey’s threat to invade Syria in 1998. His expulsion ultimately led to his capture in Kenya with the assistance of US intelligence21 and his subsequent imprisonment in 1999. This in turn cleared the way for Ankara to mend relations with the Hafiz al-Assad regime in Syria, which could no longer count on Soviet support for its anti-Western policies. Finally recognizing their mutual concerns over Kurdish separatism emanating from northern Iraq, the two neighbors embarked upon a new program of reconciliation involving boosting trade and exchanging high-level diplomatic visits. Turkey’s relations with Iran during the post-cold war period were for the most part congruent with those of the US that were antipathetic to the regime in Tehran. During the 1990s, the Turkish military was concerned about radical Iranian influences on Turkish domestic politics. The military moved tanks into Sincan, a suburb of Ankara, in 1997 after an address by the Iranian ambassador who advocated the adoption of the Sharia legal system in Turkey and was perceived as anti-US and anti-Israel. As a result, both countries ultimately recalled their ambassadors.22 The two neighbors were, and still are, on opposite sides of the Armenian–Azerbaijan dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, with Iran supporting Armenia and Turkey Azerbaijan. However, in the 1990s, Ankara was most concerned about Iran’s surreptitious support of the PKK by allowing PKK bases across the Turkish border in Iran.23 The Turkish air force bombed the bases in 1999. Eventually, the two neighbors agreed to implement their security agreement in a common front against the PKK.24 On the other hand, during the brief tenure of the Welfare Party coalition government, Prime Minister Erbakan did conclude a significant deal with Tehran for the building of a gas pipeline from Tabriz to Erzerum, which was a snub to the US efforts to restrain Western economic relations with Iran, in part through passage of the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.

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Other significant energy deals have since followed and have laid the basis for considerable co-operation between the two neighbors in supplying oil and gas to Europe.

The US invasion of Iraq, 2003 to mid-2008 By March 2003, on the eve of the decision of the Bush administration to invade Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power and democratize that country, a new moderate Islamist party had recently been elected in Ankara. This was the Justice and Development Party (AKP), headed by Recip Tayyip Erdog˘ an.25 The fateful vote of the Turkish parliament on March 1, 2003 to reject the US request for Turkish assistance in the invasion created the most recent serious strain on the US–Turkish alliance. The parliamentary vote capped intense negotiations between Washington and Ankara over the conditions for permitting 60,000 US troops to open a northern front against Saddam Hussein in the invasion.26 From the American perspective, Washington believed that it could satisfy Turkish concerns by offering a financial package that would allay Turkish fears concerning its potential economic losses from the invasion, recalling that Turkey had sustained huge losses after the 1990–91 Gulf War. From the Turkish perspective, Washington could not satisfy Ankara’s concerns that the invasion would result in instability in Iraq and encourage Kurdish independence with its irredentist risks for Turkey. The rejection of the US call for assistance from its Turkish ally had a severe negative impact on the relations between the two states, leading some to question whether the alliance would survive. Indications that the bonds between the countries were frayed but not broken appeared with the willingness of the Erdog˘ an government to permit supplies to move through Turkey for US and allied forces.27 Still, the American detention of Turkish special forces in Kirkuk in June 2003 set off a wave of anti-Americanism among the Turkish populace.28 After the PKK renounced its 1999 ceasefire in 2004 and created havens for its leadership and bases for cross-border raids in the Qandil Mountains of northeastern Iraq, the Turks became more frustrated with the US for not permitting them to root out the PKK, as had been done in the 1990s. Ankara had supported the NATO invasion of Afghanistan to remove the Taliban and capture Osama bin Laden following the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. The Turks could not understand why the US did not support their own war on terror against the PKK. From the US perspective, American forces were tied down in trying to stabilize central and southern Iraq. The Kurdish-dominated northern Iraq was the only relatively stable area in the country. The US was concerned that Turkish forces entering northern Iraq to attack the PKK would destabilize the north. The governments of both states tried to repair the damage done by the Turkish refusal to cooperate with the US in the invasion of Iraq by instituting “structured dialogue” announced in a “Shared Vision” statement by the US Secretary of State and the Turkish Foreign Ministry in July 2006.29 One of the structures established to resolve the PKK issue dividing the US and Turkey was a Tripartite Commission with a retired US general, a Turkish representative, and a representative of the Iraqi government. However, this diplomatic effort failed, and the Turkish frustration escalated into threats by the military to invade northern Iraq without US consent in the fall of 2007. A summit meeting in Washington between President Bush and Prime Minister Erdog˘ an avoided the crisis in the relationship. The US agreed to share actionable intelligence on the PKK with Turkey and permit limited attacks on PKK havens in northern Iraq. The Ankara Coordination Center was established for this purpose.30 The Turkish military subsequently mounted a co-ordinated air and ground strike against the PKK in northern Iraq in February 2008.

Strengths of the US–Turkey alliance An assessment of the strength of the US–Turkish alliance should begin by examining the basis for the mutuality of their national interests. The foundation for their friendly relations is a

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shared perception that Turkey lives in a “tough neighborhood.”31 From the US perspective, threats to Turkey’s “national security” from its non-European neighbors constitute threats to the “energy security” of the West.32 While never considered part of the Persian Gulf, Turkey sits atop the Gulf’s two most powerful states, Iran and Iraq. Turkey has also become a critical pathway for oil and gas pipelines to Europe from the Caucasus and Central Asia. The US certainly supports this development, as evidenced by its encouraging the creation of the Baku– Tblisi–Ceyhan pipeline which provided alternative routes to pipelines under the control of Russia and Iran. The Turkish alliance therefore provides the US with a commanding strategic location for safeguarding energy security. While the threats to Turkey’s territorial integrity during the cold war from a nuclear-armed and dangerous Soviet Union have abated, Russia still maintains substantial military capabilities. Military planners in both Washington and Ankara cannot discount the possibility that an assertive, nationalist government in Moscow could revive threats to the Bosphorus and the Black Sea or could revive its Armenian ally’s territorial claims in eastern Anatolia. The US alliance, operating both within NATO and bilaterally from their mutual national interests, provides Turkey with the security commitment from the only global power capable of deterring the Russian use of its superior military capabilities to threaten Turkey. In addition to their NATO commitments, the two allies have built upon their foundation of mutual national security interests a large military co-operation program and institutionalized inter-state dialogue beyond the customary diplomatic exchanges of ambassadors and consular officials. The US has become or has been bidding for the role of the major supplier to the Turkish military for its thirty-year $150 billion modernization program.33 Included in these sales and sometimes co-production of US advanced weaponry are: sophisticated fighter jets; missile air defense systems; heavy lift and normal lift helicopters; and ship-based vertical launched systems.34 As noted, in the “Vision Statement” of July 2006, the two allies agreed to expand and more tightly structure their high-level US State Department and Defense Department interchanges on a regular basis with their Turkish counterparts.35 Still, the foundation for the alliance does not have a strong economic base. Turkey’s trade with the US, the total of imports and exports, was less than $14 billion in 2007, compared with some $140 billion with the EU.36 Nor is there a large Turkish-American community in the US to lobby Congress for strengthening the US–Turkish relationship at the grassroots.37 The relationship of the two states therefore remains vulnerable to rupture if the GreekAmerican and Armenian-American lobbies succeed in persuading Congress to pass declarations or bills that Turkey views as inimical to its interests, such as condemnation of Turkey for engaging in an Armenian genocide in the First World War.38

Interplay of the US and Turkish national interests in their relations with the major Middle East states While the mutuality of many of their national security interests provides a strategic foundation for the enduring US–Turkish alliance, it does not guarantee total compatibility of their policy decisions. This is evident in the often independent pursuit of their national interests in their respective relations with the major Middle Eastern states of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states of Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman. Iraq Washington and Ankara, while differing over the wisdom of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, do espouse a common concern for Iraq to emerge from the conflict as a unified state with a stable central government. In addition, they do share common interests in developing the Iraqi

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post-war economy. Turkey already benefits from cross-border trade with Iraq and would benefit even further from the resumption of the free flow of oil and cross-border trade with a peaceful neighbor and a growing Iraqi economy. The US also wants Iraq to realize its potential as a major supplier of Gulf oil so as to increase global supplies and restrain price rises. Washington and Ankara both want the Baghdad central government to shoulder the economic responsibilities for the country. This includes enabling the Iraqi central government, as opposed to its provincial governments, to control the granting of contracts for oil exploration, production, and distribution, as well as to control the allocation of proceeds from oil and gas production and export. Where Washington and Ankara do part company is over the extent to which they are willing to accept a relatively autonomous Kurdistan in the north of Iraq. For Turkey, an autonomous Kurdistan loosely linked to a federated state of Iraq represents a clear risk of a potential irredentist state destabilizing southeastern Anatolia. For the US, there is a willingness to tolerate a larger measure of Kurdish autonomy because it relieves the US from having to divert forces into the north in order to stabilize that sector. Kirkuk is a potential flashpoint for this divergence of views. Turkey opposes the possible absorption by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of oil-rich Kirkuk into Kurdistan. Kirkuk would give the KRG a significant means of attaining economic independence for a politically independent Kurdish state. Washington appears to remain ambivalent on the issue. It has not interfered with the Arabization program in Kirkuk implemented by the KRG in order to swing a referendum on the fate of Kirkuk in favor of Kurdish control. Moreover, Ankara also may harbor concerns that, after a US pull-back of forces generally from Iraq, Washington may want to maintain some forces in northern Iraq or at least support a relatively independent Kurdistan as a counterweight to a Shi’ite-controlled central government heavily influenced by Iran. This has led, as noted, to a sharp difference in Turkish and US policies and perspectives on dealing with the PKK havens in northern Iraq. The Turks have been facing bombing incidents linked by government officials to PKK terrorism in Istanbul and other parts of Turkey, as well as cross-border guerrilla attacks from northern Iraq.39 Ankara wants to use maximum force to expel or destroy the PKK leadership in northern Iraq. Washington wants to limit the Turkish strikes into northern Iraq so as to avoid alienating the Kurdish leadership in the KRG. The KRG has been unwilling to eject the PKK, as fellow Kurds, to avoid a popular backlash within their northern Iraqi constituencies. Iran With respect to dealing with the PKK, Ankara appears to be closer to Tehran than to Washington. Turkey and Iran have been co-operating more closely on controlling the PKK and the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), the Iranian Kurdish counterpart of the PKK. Following the US invasion of Iraq, Iran and Turkey normalized their relations and co-operated to protect their common borders from attacks by these Kurdish separatists.40 The widest divergence of policies over Iran between Ankara and Washington occurs over Turkey’s independent pursuit of close economic ties with Iran.41 Ankara has not supported Washington’s policies of economic embargo on Iran in order for Turkey to obtain the benefit of Iranian energy supplies. As noted, Turkey and Iran concluded their first major gas pipeline deal in 1996. Turkey upset Washington again with a memorandum of understanding it signed with Iran in July 2007 to build pipelines across Turkey to carry gas from Iran and Turkmenistan, and to develop three gas wells in Iran’s South Pars Field.42 Turkey followed that up in August 2007 with a deal to help construct a hydroelectric plant in Iran and purchase electricity from Iran.43 Because of the amicable economic relations between Turkey and Iran, Turkey has been nonconfrontational with Iran in responding to reports of Iran’s potential development of nuclear

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weapons.44 In this, Turkey has favored the EU’s approach of engaging with Iran diplomatically, rather than the US approach, which has included the possible threats of military strikes. At the same time, Turkey has revived plans to develop its own civilian nuclear power.45 When the Turkish government issued tenders in early 2008 for the construction of its first nuclear power plant, the Bush administration and Turkey implemented the US–Turkey Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. The agreement sought to confirm Ankara’s commitment to non-proliferation in order to enable US bidding for transfer of nuclear technology to Turkey.46 If Iran does develop nuclear weapons in the future, there may be greater strategic co-operation between the US and Turkey in order to deter Iran’s use of those weapons. This will more closely align US–Turkish interests in the region. Syria Turkey has developed an amicable relationship with Syria which manifests a pursuit of its national interests that is independent of the US. Washington’s relationship with Syria since the end of the cold war is far more ambivalent than amicable. The US welcomed Syrian forces into the coalition that ousted the Iraqis from Kuwait in the First Gulf War. However, since then, the US has also opposed the Tehran–Damascus–Hezbollah axis that has been a threat to Israel, as occurred in the Israel–Lebanon war of 2007. Washington views Damascus as supporting Hezbollah, which the State Department lists as a terrorist organization. The US also suspects that Damascus has allowed the passage of Islamic jihadis to enter Iraq and join anti-US terrorist groups. The US harbors suspicions that Syria was behind the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. It also suspects that Damascus will continue to influence Lebanon notwithstanding the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon after the assassination. Ankara, on the other hand, has been able to cultivate friendly relations with Syria after the military showdown in 1998 in which the PKK leadership was ejected from Damascus. Various high-level diplomatic exchanges since then appear to have erased the rancor that had typified relations between these neighboring states.47 Instead, the two states have increased their crossborder trade and made common cause in opposing Kurdish separatism that would also create unrest among the sizable Kurdish population in Syria. As a result of their friendly relations, Ankara was accepted as the honest broker in peace talks proposed between Jerusalem and Damascus in 2008.48 Israel Ankara, remarkably, has been able to achieve the role of honest broker in Middle East disputes because, to some extent, Turkey manifests independence in its national interests from those of the US. This also applies to Turkey’s relations with Israel. The US continues to maintain a close alliance with Tel Aviv, amounting to a “special relationship” that guarantees the security of Israel. That policy has included substantial economic aid and military assistance packages over many years, including joint weapons development programs, training exercises, and intelligence sharing. On the other hand, Turkey prefers to hold out the Israeli relationship as one of military co-operation without any mutual security guarantees. This leaves Ankara with more leeway to build friendly relations with Arab states. The interests of the US and Turkey in creating stability in the Middle East generally do coincide on the issue of trying to promote peace negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians as well as between Israel and the neighboring Arab states. Using its leverage with allies in the Arab world and globally, the US has achieved some success, most notably the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt at Camp David in 1978 and that between Israel and

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Jordan in 1994. US efforts have as yet failed to achieve any peace treaty between Israel and Syria or Israel and the Palestinians, despite President Clinton and Ehud Barak’s three-way negotiations with Yasser Arafat at Camp David in 2000 and President Bush’s promotion of the road map for peace in 2003. The Turkish population is over 90 percent Muslim and has been sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians. In February 2006, soon after Hamas took power in the Palestinian parliamentary elections, the AKP government invited the Hamas leader, Khaled Mishal, to visit Ankara. This was viewed with dismay by Washington and the West who were intent on isolating Hamas. Nevertheless, Ankara has used its relationship with the Palestinians and Israel to step in as an honest broker in trying to mediate the Palestinian–Israeli dispute.49 However, even with the moderate Islamist government of the AKP in power, there has been no obvious retrenchment from the military co-operation agreements between Israel and Turkey. Ankara remains interested in acquiring Israeli missile defense systems, upgrading its fighter jets, and obtaining unmanned aerial vehicle systems, spy satellites, and military electronics.50 That policy is congruent with the US interest in enhancing the military capability components of the national security of two key allies in the region, Turkey and Israel. Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states The US has also committed itself to providing security assistance to its other important allies in the region, the GCC states. These commitments have been cemented through a series of bilateral treaties, installation of military bases except in Saudi Arabia, co-ordinated weapons sales, training programs, and other forms of military assistance. Furthermore, when the US invaded Iraq in 2003 and inserted over 150,000 active US military forces into a neighboring state, Washington clearly demonstrated its intent to maintain military predominance in the Gulf. The presence of US forces, both in Iraq and on bases in the Gulf, has increased the concerns in Tehran over potential American military strikes to destroy Iranian development of enriched uranium. On the other hand, Tehran’s retaliation against any US military strikes need not be only in the form of military measures. As noted, Iran could also promote subversion among the Shi’ite populations in the Gulf monarchies and engage in acts of terrorism seeking to destabilize the GCC states. Ankara has supported US efforts to co-ordinate security measures for the Gulf monarchies within the NATO framework by hosting the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in 2004. Saudi Arabia declined to join the ICI, as has Oman.51 The AKP government has nonetheless used its Islamic character and the personal experience of then Foreign Minister, now President, Abdullah Gül, of working in Saudi Arabia for eight years before entering Turkish politics, to enhance diplomatic exchanges with the Kingdom and its GCC neighbors.52 This diplomatic initiative in 2005 and 2006 resulted in an increase in foreign direct investment in Turkey by Gulf Arab states, a significant agreement to import natural gas from Qatar beginning in 2011, and the commitment to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and the GCC states.53 On the other hand, by mid-2008 Ankara had not gone so far as to publicly offer Turkish security assistance to the GCC states, notwithstanding Turkey’s large conventional armed forces that are a match for Iran’s. Still, Turkey, with its strong conventional military force and strategic location, could be of great assistance to the US in providing security to the GCC states.54

Conclusions Since the end of the cold war, the US and Turkey have converted their alliance relationship in NATO into a security partnership that operates to enhance their mutual interests in safeguarding Turkey’s territorial integrity generally and gives Turkey a shared role in preserving energy security for oil and gas supplies emanating from the Gulf or transiting through Turkey

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to Europe. Just as their NATO alliance has withstood the two Cyprus crises of 1964 and 1974, it is expected that their security partnership in the Middle East will withstand the rupture of their relationship caused by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. This is because Turkey still looks to the US for security assistance against two long-term threats. One is a resurgent Russia that could disrupt energy supplies moving to and through Turkey. The other is a nuclear-armed Iran that could bully the states in the region, including Turkey, without a US nuclear umbrella. On the other hand, this fundamental mutuality of interests between the US and Turkey in protecting the security of Turkey and Middle East energy has not been sufficient to completely align their policies in the region. This is clear with respect to their relations with Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and Syria. This independent pursuit of their national interests creates tension from time to time in the otherwise friendly relations between Turkey and the US. However, if properly managed, this critical geostrategic alliance will enable both states to address the national security challenges created by an evolving international system.

Notes 1 Cited by Nasuh Uslu, The Turkish–American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003): 34. 2 Turkey had remained neutral during the Second World War and only declared war on Germany at the end of the war in Europe in order to participate in the United Nations. William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000): 102. 3 Hale, op. cit.: 116. 4 By June 1976, NATO had some sixty-one military bases in Turkey. Uslu, op. cit.: 61. 5 Hale, op. cit.: 129. The Israeli alignment did not survive Menderes’ overthrow in 1960. Turkey remained neutral in the Arab–Israeli war of June 1967 and denied the US the use of Incirlik for combat supply in that war and other Middle East crises in the 1970s. Hale, op. cit.: 170. 6 The Kennedy–Khrushchev exchange over the removal of missiles from Cuba and Turkey was not publicly known at the time. It was revealed only after the publication of Robert Kennedy’s memoirs in 1968. Hale, op. cit.: 135. 7 See George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: Norton, 1982). 8 Other disputes between Turkey and Greece in the mid-1970s over territorial boundaries in the Aegean increased the risk of war between the two members of NATO and complicated the US relationship with Turkey. See Hale, op. cit.: 160. Another irritant in the US–Turkish relationship in the late 1960s until 1971 arose from the Turkish cultivation of opium. The US applied mainly diplomatic pressure to induce Ankara to stop the practice—which was banned by governmental decree in 1971. When a new government in Ankara permitted licensed cultivation of opium poppies in 1974, Washington again applied pressure on Ankara to prevent the production of opium from these poppies. See Uslu, op. cit.: 219–51. 9 Hale, op. cit.: 151 and 162. 10 Under the new agreement, the US had the use of twelve bases in Turkey, including Incirlik, and Turkey recovered thirteen bases. Hale, op. cit.: 165. 11 The Turkish government, nevertheless, was frustrated by US resistance to their requests for more aid, as well as by the unwillingness of Washington to relax the quota on the importation of Turkish textiles. See Uslu, op. cit.: 255– 57 and 262. 12 See Lenore G. Martin, “Turkey’s National Security in the Middle East,” Turkish Studies, 1(1), Spring 2000: 90–91. 13 There was also a restructuring elsewhere such as in the Balkans. In the Balkan crisis over Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey supported the fellow Muslim population of Bosnia, pushed for NATO intervention, and co-operated with the US resolution to the crisis. Ilhan Uzgel, “The Balkans: Turkey’s Stabilizing Role,” in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kiris¸çi, eds, Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power (Istanbul: Bog˘ aziçi University Press, 2002): 69–72. 14 Clyde Haberman, “Mideast Tensions; Turkey’s Top Officer Quits, But Only Hints Why,” New York Times, December 4, 1990. Available from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE7DD143CF937A35751 C1A966958260. 15 President Özal’s new “activism” in the Middle East was also motivated by a desire to improve Turkey’s standing with its Western allies. Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000): 118. 16 Author’s interviews at Turkish Foreign Ministry in the summer of 1999. Turkey received from $3 billion in compensation from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1991–92. Hale, op. cit.: 225. 17 CIA World Factbook (Turkey), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html. 18 Ian O. Lesser, “Beyond Suspicion: Rethinking US–Turkey Relations” (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars—Southeast Europe Project, 2007): 21. Lesser views the US–Turkish interaction during Operation Northern Watch as sowing the seeds of distrust between their two military and intelligence establishments. 19 Hale, op. cit.: 227.

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20 As a result of the Madrid Conference, in 1991, Turkey restored its relations with Israel to the ambassadorial level and also upgraded its relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to that level. 21 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York University Press, 2007): 278. 22 Turkey suspected Iran of supporting radical Islamicist terrorist groups operating within Turkey such as Hezbollah and Islamic Great Raiders. Turkish Daily News, July 13, 2000; FBIS-NEU-2000-0819, 0827, and 0829; Cumhurriyet, August 10, 1996: 1 and 6. Hezbollah had an estimated 20,000 sympathizers and activists in Turkey in 1999, Turkish Daily News, June 23, 1999: A3. Its members have been implicated in multiple murders, personal attacks, abductions, and bombings (New York Times, January 23, 2000), with differing estimates as to the numbers of crimes, such as 1,000 crimes since 1991 (FBIS-WEU-2000-0212) and 2,000 murders in the southeast since the late 1980s (Turkish Daily News, January 31, 2000). See also additional reports of Hezbollah activities. Turkish Daily News, June 4, 2002. 23 See Lenore G. Martin, “Turkey’s Middle East Foreign Policy,” in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, eds, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004): 174; Marcus, op. cit.: 120–123. 24 The first security agreement had been concluded in 1993 when Turkey agreed to deny sanctuary to the Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedin-i-Khalq, which had launched terrorist attacks in Iran, and the Iranians agreed to deny sanctuary to the PKK. Hale, op. cit.: 314. 25 However, Erdog˘ an himself was not officially installed at the time as a member of parliament or prime minister. He had been banned from taking office because of an earlier jail sentence for reciting a poem deemed to incite “religious hatred.” It took a constitutional amendment to allow him to be seated in parliament and take office. 26 Lesser believes the Turkish rejection of the US was a product of mutual misunderstandings. See Lesser, op. cit.: 22–23. For an in-depth Turkish analysis of the rejection vote, see Idris Bal, “Turkey–USA Relations and Impacts of 2003 Iraq War,” in Idris Bal, ed., Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era (Boca Raton: Brown Walker Press, 2004): 135 – 142. 27 An estimated 70 percent of military cargo for Iraq flies through Turkey or uses Incirlik. David S. Cloud, “Military Seeks Alternatives in Case Limits Access,” New York Times, October 12, 2007. Available from www.nytimes.com/ 2007/10/12/world/europe/12military.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Incirlik%20%20October%2012%202007&st=cse&oref =slogin. 28 Anti-US sentiments in the Turkish population have continued through the US prosecution of the war in Iraq. See John C. K. Daly, US–Turkish Relations: A Strategic Relationship Under Stress (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, February 2008): 13–15. 29 “Turkey, US unveil shared vision document,” Turkish Daily News, July 6, 2006. Text available from www.state.gov/ r/pa/prs/ps2006/68574.htm (accessed February 7, 2009). Included in the structure are the already existing HighLevel Defense Group, Economic Cooperation Partnership Council, and Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. Added to the structure were consultations at the “expert level” and among “policy planning” units, plus annual reviews by both states’ Under Secretaries. There are also institutional interchanges as part of the military co-operation of both states, including the biannual Combined Planning Conference hosted by the Turkish General Staff. See “US and Turkish officers meet in Ankara,” December 10, 2007. Available from http://www. eucom.mil/english/fullstory.asp?=1509 (accessed February 7, 2009). 30 Stephen J. Flanagan and Samuel J. Brannan, “Turkey’s Shifting Dynamics: Implications for US–Turkey Relations (A Report of the US–Turkey Strategic Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2008): 21. The US has also proposed to “harmonize” Turkish and American laws on counterterrorism to increase their cooperation in combating the PKK. “US seeks harmonized laws to fight PKK.” Available from www.todayszaman. com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=134548. 31 For the origins of the concept, see Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991): 47, note 1. 32 The focus of this chapter is on external threats to “national security”. For a broader definition of “national security” that considers internal threats and integrates the military capabilities of a state with four other variables (political legitimacy, ethnic and religious toleration, economic capabilities, and the availability of essential natural resources), see Lenore G. Martin, “Towards an Integrated Approach to National Security in the Middle East,” in Lenore G. Martin, ed., New Frontiers in Middle East Security (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998/Palgrave, 2001): 3–22. 33 Even though Turkey has been diversifying its military procurement, 80 percent of its defense-industrial activity is with the US. Stephen Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008): 27. 34 See Testimony for Mr. Daniel Fata, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO, before the US House of Representatives House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 15, 2007; “US approves $227 mln Lockheed arms sales to Turkey.” Available from www.reuters.com/article/companyNews/idUSN0938198620080409 (accessed February 7, 2009), Reuters, April 9, 2008, 5:52 EDT; “Umit Enginsoy and Burak Ege Bekdil, ‘Fighter Buys Top Turkish Shopping List’,” Defense News, April 28, 2008. Available from www.defensenews.com/story.php? i=3505501&c=FEA&s=SPE; Ümit Enginsoy, “Turkey plans to buy US heavy lift helicopters,” Turkish Daily News, May 7, 2008. Available from www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.pjp?enewsid=103762. 35 See note 23 above. At least two commentators have advocated more interagency exchanges and other interactions at the civil society level in order to strengthen the alliance. See Lesser, op. cit., and Flanagan and Brannan, op. cit. 36 “Foreign Trade Statistics,” US Census Bureau. Available from www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4890. html#2007; http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradec_113456.pdf (accessed February 7, 2009) (using a conversion of US$1.5 to 1€).

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37 The small Turkish-American community needs a lot more political assistance to get heard in Congress compared with the larger Greek-American and Armenian-American communities. See also Henri J. Barkey, “The Endless Pursuit: Improving US–Turkish Relations,” in Morton Abramowitz, ed., The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003): 220–23. 38 For the impact of the so-called “ethnic lobbies” on Turkey’s relations with the US, see Morton Abramowitz, “The Complexities of American Policymaking on Turkey,” in Abramowitz, op. cit.: 160–71. 39 Reuters, “Turkish Police foil Kurdish PKK Bomb Attack – Agency,” Reuters, March 15, 2008. Available from www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL15509059; “Turkish General vows to Rout PKK,” August 29, 2006 (referring to bomb attacks in Istanbul and Marmaris). Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 5294438.stm; Sarah Rainsford, “Turkey faces Bombing Aftermath,” July 28, 2008 (referring to major bomb attacks in an Istanbul neighborhood in which the PKK was suspected as being implicated, notwithstanding PKK denial). Available from http://bbc.news.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7530118.stm (accessed February 7, 2009). 40 Nashuhi Güngör, “Ahmedinejad’s Visit to Turkey: Two Neighbors Oscillate between Threat and Friendship,” SETA Policy Brief, 23, September, 2008: 3. The two states have a long-standing arrangement to discuss crossborder security issues regularly in the form of a High Security Commission and sometimes sign memoranda of understanding on co-operating on security issues. “Absence of Trust hinders Turkish–Iranian Security Cooperation,” Zaman, April 21, 2008. Available from www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=139648. This has led to some joint operations. Bill Samii, “Kurds Shelled by Iran and Turkey,” RFE/FL Iran, 9(31), August 22, 2006. 41 In 2007, Iran followed after the US in the ranks of Turkey’s trading partners with some 6 billion euros of trade versus 9 billion euros for the US. See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradec_113456.pdf (accessed February 7, 2009). There are reports of a substantial increase in trade between Iran and Turkey in 2008, where in the first seven months, it reached $6 billion (approximately 4 billion euros if converted at the ratio of $1.5=1€). “Iran–Turkey Trade Increases by 37%,” PressTV, September 3, 2008. Available from www.presstv.ir/ detail.aspx?id=68315§ionid=3510213. In addition, Interior Ministry officials from both countries reported the volume of Iranian tourists in 2008 reached 1.5 million. “Absence of trust hinders Turkish–Iranian security cooperation,” Zaman, April 21, 2008. Available from www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=139648. 42 “Turkey–Iran Gas Deal Marks New Stage in Energy Cooperation,” Business Intelligence Middle East, July 31, 2007. Available from www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=12078&t=17c=33&cg=4. 43 “Turkish Iranian gas deal takes shape,” Turkish Daily News, April 11, 2008. Available from www.turkishdailynews. com.tr/article.php?enewsid=101459 (accessed February 7, 2009). 44 Hakki Uygur, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions and Turkey,” SETA Policy Brief, 7, February, 2008): 6. 45 Mustafa Og˘ uz, “Political Realities Fuel Nuke Option,” Turkish Daily News, August 29, 2008. Available from www. turkishdaily news.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=113957 (accessed February 7, 2009). 46 US Department of State, “US–Turkey Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123Agreement).” Available from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/105496.htm (accessed February 7, 2009). “Turkey Aims for Nuclear Power; Bush Pushes for Turkish–US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” TUSIAD, January 21–27, 2008. 47 Indeed, the visit of President Necdet Sezer to Damascus in April 2005 was perceived in Washington as a snub to the US. Washington and Europe at the time were trying to isolate Syria in order to pressure Damascus to pull Syrian troops out of Lebanon. The Turkish president’s visit appeared to be supportive of the Syrian position. “Turkey defies US with Syria Visit,” BBC Home, April 13, 2005. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world/middle_east/4440183.stm. 48 Turkey also contributed soldiers to the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon monitoring the ceasefire after the Israel–Hezbollah conflict in the summer of 2006. “Turkish Peacekeepers join UN Force in Lebanon,” Reuters, October 20, 2006. Available from www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L20568568.htm. 49 As one example of this, Ankara invited Palestinian National Authority President Abbas and Israeli President Peres to address the Turkish Grand National Assembly. “Ankara hosts Historic Visit by Peres and Abbas,” Turkish Daily News, November 12, 2007. Available from www.turkishdaily news.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=88374 (accessed February 7, 2009); Barak Ravid, “Abbas in Ankara: US must Pressure Israel to reach Accord with PA,” Haaretz, November 19, 2007. Available from www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/923974.html. 50 “Ankara rediscovers Israeli arms suppliers,” Turkish Daily News, May 10, 2005. Available from http://gbulten.ssm. gov.tr/arsiv/2005/05/10/01.htm; Yaakov Katz, “Israel may sell Arrow and Ofek to Turkey,” The Jerusalem Post. Available from www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?c=JPArticle&cid=1192380787827&pagename=JPost% 2FJPArticle%2FShowFull; Xinhua, “Cooperation between Turkey, Israel Contributes to Mideast Peace: Turkish DM,” February 13, 2008. Available from http://english.cri.cn/2947/2008/02/13/[email protected] (accessed February 7, 2009). 51 It is not clear how much the GCC state members of ICI are committed to working within the proposed security framework. The UAE preferred in January 2008 to grant France a small naval base rather than grant the rights to NATO. 52 President Gül worked during 1983–1991 at the Islamic Development Bank whose headquarters was in Jeddah. His diplomatic efforts resulted in a visit by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to Turkey in August 2006, which was the first by a Saudi monarch in forty years. 53 The Free Trade Agreement was expected in 2008 to take two years to negotiate. Associated Press, February 6, 2008. See www.ap.org http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/080206/qatar_turkey.html?v=1 (accessed February 7, 2009).

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54 Turkey’s potential as a strategic ally for the GCC states has not been lost on influential commentators. Faruk Logoglu, the former Turkish Ambassador to the US and former Under Secretary at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, commenting on the “Manama Dialogue” in Bahrain, held in December 2007, organized by the IISS, sees Turkey as “poised to become a security enhancer in the region, provided it is willing to take up the challenge.” Faruk Logoglu, “The Manama Dialogue: Gulf Security and Turkey,” Today’s Zaman, January 7, 2008. Available from www.iiss.org.uk/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/january-2008/the-manama-dialogue-gulf-security-and-turkey/ (accessed February 7, 2009). Similarly, commenting on King Abdullah’s visit to Turkey in 2006, Jihal al-Zayn wrote, “Abdullah wants to unite the Saudi prestige in the Arab world, with Turkey’s military and diplomatic experience as a European Muslim country. This coalition will balance Iran, who wants to play the leading role in the region.” Jihal al-Zayn, “Turkey knows how to intervene,” Al-Hayat, August 15, 2006.

24 US foreign policy in Lebanon Anne Marie Baylouny1

For Americans, Lebanon conjures up images of terrorism and Israeli invasions. More recently, Lebanon’s mass demonstrations to rid the country of its Syrian occupation swept the media in 2005. Often called the Cedar revolution, the West saw contrasting images of Western-looking women and black-clad Islamists. The perspective of Lebanese politics neatly divided into two—one western, Lebanese, and democratic, the other Islamist, non-Lebanese, and antidemocratic—has permeated US perspectives of the country. Moreover, this divided view of Lebanese domestic politics is usually equated with international and regional alignments and conflicts. Domestic actors here are viewed as reflecting regional ambitions and not their own political priorities. Throughout Lebanon’s history, actors have been seen to represent the opposing forces in the cold war, civilizational divisions, or neighboring hostile states. These lenses, obscuring the domestic players’ interests, transmit a skewed interpretation of Lebanese politics and hinder a complete understanding of the effects of US foreign policy in Lebanon. In this chapter, I describe US policy during its various phases. I begin with the common petroleum and business interests of the post-war era. I then analyze US intervention in Lebanon during its first civil war of 1958, interpreted as a fight between pro-Soviet and proAmerican groups. In the 1980s, President Reagan entered Lebanon’s civil war in force, resulting in the bombing of American facilities as the US took sides. From that time, US personnel in Lebanon have been scarce and American policy informed even more by its Lebanese allies than previously. Support for business elites continued as Syrian forces occupied Lebanon after the civil war. In 2003, US policy in Lebanon focused on combating Syria and Iran. The US demanded the disarmament of Lebanese Islamist group Hezbollah’s militia. US support for the 2006 Israeli–Lebanese war and the Israeli bombing of Lebanon was driven by this desire to eliminate Hezbollah militarily. The intense split that resulted after the war between the opposition groups (including Hezbollah) and the government saw the US on the side of the government during the most current phase of US policy. Throughout the description of these phases of US actions in Lebanon, I address the other themes that constitute the foundation of US policy. I analyze the influence of Israeli priorities and the US response to Israeli actions, US support for Lebanon’s military and the actions of the military, and the persistent view of Lebanese domestic actors solely as pawns of regional actors. Despite the differing stages of US policy, I argue that the basic orientation of the US toward Lebanon has remained constant. US policy in Lebanon is founded on support for Lebanon’s ruling elite who ally with US interests. The common priorities of both this ruling elite and the US include an open economy and business with the US. The resulting US foreign policy stance embracing the status quo necessarily commits the US to propping up a traditional elite and the confessional system that returns it to office. To rationalize its support for a Lebanese political system that institutionalizes traditional and religious distinctions, US officials depict confessionalism in Lebanon as peaceful multiculturalism.2 In this story, problems in Lebanon are attributed to external actors; the Lebanese people themselves constitute a harmonious system of religious co-existence. Following this interpretation, the opposition

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must necessarily be portrayed as controlled by other countries or antagonistic to Lebanon’s working democracy. Thus, as the Lebanese opposition expresses reservations toward US policy preferences, Washington stands against groups calling for a secular, non-religious system. US actions in Lebanon have proceeded through several phases. Prior to the 1950s, the US was involved in Lebanon through support for Western, mainly Christian, business elites and US oil pipeline priorities. Cold war battles overlay these business and oil concerns from the 1950s to 1980. In the 1980s, during the Lebanese civil war, Israeli interests became dominant. After the civil war, backing for Western business elites continued while the US played a background role, acquiescing to the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Regional animosities took pride of place when Syria opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the US shed its lowkey policy for activism once again. Since that time, US policy has focused on countering Syrian and Iranian influence, particularly as that influence is believed to be represented by the Islamist group Hezbollah. As a result, the US supported Israeli military action against Hezbollah, most notably in the 2006 war, and continued to actively back the ruling government against its domestic opposition. Running through these various phases were some constants: the concern for Israel, the influence of strong links to Westernized Lebanese business elites, and interpretations of Lebanese politics as controlled by regional actors. As a solution to these issues, the US maintained a long-standing policy of building a strong Lebanese military and aligning with military actions in Lebanon against groups affiliated with regional enemies of the US. Old friends were supported while Lebanese soil was used to send messages to hostile countries. These US policies have not generated positive results for the US. US policy has not maintained Lebanon as a friendly to the US or combated regional enemies in Lebanon. US support for Israeli attacks in Lebanon turned increasing numbers of Lebanese against the US. The policy of siding with unpopular ruling elites prevented compromise between those elites and opposition groups, resulting in potentially violent domestic tensions and political standoffs. Further, US aid to Lebanon’s military as a method of achieving US policy goals is flawed. Bolstering the military is founded on the assumption that a strong Lebanese military would control the country, enforce the rule of the pro-Western elites in government, and act as a bulwark against domestic militias and external countries alike. The Lebanese military has not fulfilled this government-supporting role, but instead avoided conflicts with all but unarmed domestic demonstrators and some unpopular foreign groups. The Lebanese armed forces act in accord with Lebanese public opinion and have tacit agreements with the actors that the US wants them to disarm, such as Hezbollah. In the most favorable of interpretations, ignorance is responsible for misdirected US policies. The US has inadvertently taken stances in domestic Lebanese conflicts while believing itself neutral. Viewed on the ground as partisan, the US and its officials have been attacked as participants in on-going conflicts. By itself, Lebanon is a minor player in US foreign policy concerns.3 Lebanon’s importance to the US today comes not through waterways or oil assets, but through the country’s relation to other conflicts and actors of importance.4 Lebanon’s geographical position on the front lines of the Arab–Israeli conflict, and its domestic opposition movements, allied to the Soviet Union or Iran, have continually returned the country to the attention of US policymakers. Building on the Islamist groups and enemies of Israel operating in Lebanon, larger regional and international conflicts dominated the interpretation of Lebanese politics for the media and international community. US policies furthered this minimization of domestic Lebanese factors in politics. As Lebanon alone was of little interest to the US public, US officials portrayed Lebanon’s fate as linked to important issues of oil and relations with the Gulf in order to generate foreign policy interest.5 Local grabs for power appeared to be religious battles of Muslims against Christians, or Western civilization under threat from world communism. The Lebanese themselves are complicit in this perception, emphasizing international actors over Lebanon’s domestic groups. For their own purposes, some Lebanese have translated their

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politics into terms easily digested in US policy circles: Christian versus Muslim, Communist versus Western. The US appeared to comprehend the difference between rhetoric and reality when its officials were on the ground in 1958. Since then, information about Lebanon has increasingly arrived with US intelligence already packaged and interpreted by others with their own interests, interests that often conflict with those of the US.

The Lebanese domestic political structure A brief outline of the Lebanese domestic political structure is necessary to interpret US foreign policy, as US actions continually intersect with the differing factions in Lebanon. France created Lebanon from the Ottoman territories of Greater Syria, expanded from a small mountain area to include the surrounding grain-producing areas. The League of Nations, predecessor to the United Nations, granted France a mandate to rule the country, ostensibly to guide the country to independence and democracy. The jerry-mandered drawing of Lebanon’s borders generated a slight majority of Christians along with Sunni, Shi’a, and Druze populations. This slight numerical superiority of the Christian population was established in the country’s only census of 1932. The country’s democracy was based on confession or religious identity, and all political institutions were based upon these identities. Upon independence in 1943, the informal National Pact provided that the president would be from the dominant Christian sect, Maronite Catholic, the prime minister would be a Sunni, and the parliament led by a Shi’a. A complicated formula similarly allocated government positions and representation by sect. The other element of the understanding reached between the Christian and Muslim elites at independence was that Lebanon would not lean either Eastward or Westward: it would not bind itself to the West as the Christians wanted, nor to the Arab world as the Muslims wanted. The communities agreed to disagree. The precarious nature of the new state meant that it would continue to be dependent upon France and subject to repeated battles for leadership and changes in government policy. Government mainly functioned as a sinecure for traditional notables from the different communities, while funding a patron–client system. Electoral rules return communal politicians to office, and many political posts are inherited. The formula dividing positions by religious sect forestalled real change in government policy, solidifying a minimalist state in a country with large rural and underdeveloped areas. The problem of underdeveloped rural areas has persistently nagged at all subsequent Lebanese governments. Two main trends arose from the divisions embodied in the National Pact. Out of the Christian, pro-Western side, the trend of “Lebanists” emerged, those wishing to side openly with the West and eschewing their Arab heritage and connections. They insisted on Christian domination of Lebanese politics. The early institutional manifestation of this political trend was the right-wing Phalange or Kata’ib political party, later a militia, inspired by the fascist parties of Europe in the 1930s. This trend became identified as separatist, desiring to split a portion of Lebanon off from the Muslim rest of the country. The second, looser grouping has been more typical of the Muslims and often pro-Arab, siding with the Palestinians and Arab nationalists at different times. Despite the apparent religious nature of the divisions, these political trends were not split along religious lines but cut across them. The Phalange with its overtly Christian philosophy was overwhelmingly Christian, but Christians were present in large numbers in other anti-Phalange political and military groups. Lebanon’s conflicts were not about religious dogmas or hostility toward other religions per se, but were battles for control of the country that largely fell along the differing perspectives of the religious groups. The sides are more aptly described as rightist versus leftist. As the conflicts progressed, polarization along religious identity did occur, and massacres and ethnic cleansing were directed at religious and ethnic groups in themselves.

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Oil transit, business elites, and initial US interests US interests in Lebanon in the 1940s and early 1950s were dominated by the importance of petroleum interests and commerce. Washington sought to acquire the oil needed to meet postwar requirements, establish US businesses as prominent or dominant in Middle East trade, and secure the US politically over European countries. These goals were undertaken through direct diplomacy and covert actions. The consequences of US policy priorities in Lebanon at this time set an enduring American pattern of endorsing the confessional religious system against detractors. In the post-war era, Lebanon, or more precisely its capital Beirut, became a trading center between East and West. Lebanon of this time has been referred to as the “Switzerland” (or Paris) of the Middle East. Democratic freedom, respected institutions of higher education, free markets, and a Western elite existed in a regional sea of coups, counter-coups, revolutions, and bolstering war rhetoric. US oil companies, airlines, and businesses found Lebanon an important site for profit in the region. To oil companies and US oil interests, Lebanon was central to the oil pipeline that ended in the Lebanese city of Sidon.6 The pipeline, TAPLINE (Trans Arabian Pipeline Company), owned by several Western oil companies, pushed Beirut to be a commercial center joining Eastern Arab countries with Western business representatives. Lebanon was a gateway not only for oil and gold to reach the West, but also for Western goods to head East. ARAMCO and Pan American Airways were heavily involved in Lebanon. American airlines set up shop in Lebanon seeking supremacy over air routes to the Gulf states.7 Underneath the pleasant appearance of this commercial hub was the confessional system— political rule built upon religious identity—that constituted the foundation for continued business and policy aligned with US interests. American officials were intertwined with both business interests from their own country and the Lebanese commercial elite who ran the country. The confessional system kept those elites in power that had like interests with the US, namely that Lebanon remain an economy unconditionally open to Western business and American governmental priorities. This Lebanese elite placed their commercial interests above political and foreign policy differences with the US. Despite their personal disagreement with US policy in Palestine, the Lebanese elite subordinated such disagreement to continued trade. Further, representatives of the Lebanese business elite had direct, personal connections to officials in Washington,8 and it was their interpretation of Lebanese domestic politics that Washington heard. American officials and Lebanese business alike portrayed Lebanon as a democratic, pro-Western country, unique in its mix of peaceful religious groups. This view supported the maintenance of the confessional system.9 The image of a stable, happy Lebanon, with no interference from external powers, persisted against reports to the contrary from US officials on the ground. America was heavily involved in propping up this system, even funding local elections to result in its allies’ favor.

The cold war and Lebanon’s first civil war The cold war era in Lebanon demonstrates the complex overlay of international hostilities onto domestic battles. The US became militarily embroiled in Lebanon’s domestic affairs in 1958 when Lebanon’s President Chamoun invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine. He claimed to be threatened by international communism by way of Arab nationalism and Egypt’s charismatic president Gamal Abdel Nasser. At times, a struggle between the Soviet and American spheres of influence played out in coups, revolutions, and the spread of Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East. In reality, these events were more about Arab nationalism and discarding regimes left by the colonial powers (France and Britain) than intrinsically pro-Soviet or anti-American. But the US administration considered Arab nationalism, spearheaded by

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Abdel Nasser, to be under the sphere of influence and control of Moscow. Socialism—not communism—was indeed a central component of many opposition movements of this time, albeit a modified version often called Arab socialism. Many Arab nationalist movements and states did become allied with the Soviets. The terms of Soviet–Arab relations were often rocky, and the Soviet Union was not often the alliance of choice for Arab nationalists. Still, in the polarized environment of the 1950s, overthrowing a pro-Western regime denied the possibility of allying with the West. The civil war in which the US intervened in 1958 began with the Lebanese president’s attempt to unconstitutionally extend his tenure in office.10 While Washington supported the president and wanted to protect its oil and commercial interests, it did not want to intervene militarily until regional events changed.11 President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles were convinced Lebanon was threatened by communism, but did not want to confront Nasser. In part, this was because they believed that Nasser and Arab nationalism had significant popular support. Bound by the Eisenhower Doctrine, the US said it would abide by the findings of a United Nations observer group that determined whether Lebanon was truly threatened by international communism. The observer group did not find evidence of communist interference, and Washington was therefore not obliged to intervene.12 On the ground, US officials continued to argue that the conflict was one of personalities and unequal representation, not communism. The president was widely unpopular, he ruled with broad prerogative, and he marginalized other elites who in turn mobilized against his rule. Once the US sphere of influence had been severely reduced as a result of the Iraqi Revolution in July, Washington decided to enter the Lebanese presidential crisis. On top of the Iraqi Revolution that toppled a pro-Western monarchy, internal socialist opposition was threatening the Jordanian regime, a Western ally, and Egypt and Syria entered the Soviet orbit by forming the United Arab Republic in 1958. Not wanting to lose another ally and desiring to send a message to Nasser and the Soviet Union,13 the US sent the marines and army. The marines landed on the beach alongside sunbathing Lebanese. The actual intervention itself, entailing 15,000 troops and marines, was confused and lacked a commander or a defined mission.14 The conflict essentially ended the second day of the US intervention with the impromptu meeting of the leaders of the American forces, the US ambassador, and General Shehab, head of the Lebanese army, at a roadblock on the road to the airport. The Lebanese army subsequently accompanied the marines to Beirut and acted as a buffer between them and the domestic population. The US forces avoided opposition-controlled areas to prevent clashes, and essentially stayed off the radar.15 Eisenhower sent Robert Murphy to negotiate a solution, which resulted in the election of the head of the Lebanese army, Shehab, to become president.16 On the ground, US officials corrected Washington’s pervasive conclusion of Soviet meddling and were able to find a compromise without military involvement. The two militaries on the scene, the Lebanese and the American, never took part in fighting in this civil war. The US handling of this crisis reflected a nuanced view and acknowledgment of the domestic conflicts involved, which was not the case later in Lebanon’s history. This permitted the US to stand aside, oversee new elections ousting the president who had called for US support in the first place, and help restore stability. The ability of the US to abandon its erstwhile ally President Chamoun in deference to the large existing opposition to his tenure facilitated the end of the crisis.

The PLO and Shi’a in Lebanon Between the 1958 crisis and the civil war in 1975, Lebanon experienced large-scale demographic changes that drew continued American concern. From the late 1960s, the Palestinians, mobilized in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and later the Lebanese Shi’a in the

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Islamist political party and militia Hezbollah, drew the diplomatic ire of the US and military fire from Israel. Israeli invasions aimed to rid Lebanon first of the PLO then of Hezbollah. Both were declared terrorist organizations by the US, and Israeli actions against them had full American support. However, the two organizations are not equal in Lebanese politics. There are important differences between them that complicate current military moves against Hezbollah. While the PLO is a foreign organization, Hezbollah is not. The PLO has long been a problem for US policy. In 1967, the Israeli takeover of the West Bank and Gaza Strip pushed more Palestinians into the surrounding countries, first to Jordan and then after 1970 to Lebanon. There were now 300,000 Palestinians living in sixteen camps in Lebanon. Palestinian organizations became increasingly militant, striking at Israel from neighboring countries. Israel struck back, and Lebanon was caught in the middle. Southern Lebanon became known as “Fatahland” after the main component of the PLO, Arafat’s group, Fatah. As the PLO launched operations against Israel from Lebanese territory, the Lebanese army was powerless to intervene. One of the perennial characteristics of Lebanon has been the weakness of its army. In 1969, the Lebanese army and the PLO agreed to the Cairo Accord, which stipulated they would leave each other alone. The army would not enter the Palestinian camps but was acknowledged as the sovereign power in southern Lebanon, and the PLO could continue its attacks on Israel.17 Israel’s retaliations against the PLO, most famously bombing the Lebanese airport in 1969 and assassinating PLO officials in Beirut in 1973, highlighted the inept nature of Lebanese security. Again and again, Lebanon has been unable to prevent foreign actors from acting on Lebanese soil. Hezbollah, a group designated as terrorist by the US, arose through demographic changes linked to Israeli actions in Lebanon. Israel–PLO bombardments, along with the lack of economic development, caused a rural exodus of the southern population into Beirut. Most of these were Shi’a Muslims, who settled in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982 drove more Shi’a north into Beirut. Lacking even basic government services such as drinking water and sewage collection, the residents organized to provide for themselves. Numerous small organizations arose, each with a limited capacity. Displaced Shi’a in urban Beirut formed the base of Hezbollah or the Party of God. This Islamist militia, political party, and social service umbrella organization formed in the wake of the Israeli invasion of 1982 by uniting many of the existing social service and civil society organizations.

Reagan, Israel, and Lebanon’s long civil war Lebanon’s long civil war broke out in 1975 after much hostility and clashes among rival groups. Washington’s main concerns in Lebanon after the oil pipeline TAPLINE ceased operating in 1976 were combating the PLO and avoiding a confrontation with the Soviets. While the war in Lebanon threatened to bring the PLO into a central influential position, US officials wanted to exclude the PLO from any potential negotiations on the future of the occupied Palestinian territories—the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Instead, the preferred negotiating partner was Jordan. When the civil war ended, the PLO was marginalized and then became a legitimate player eliminating one US policy concern, but the war had also created Hezbollah, which remained armed. American promotion of the Christians in the war was part of the administration’s embrace of the status quo ruling elites and part of its help to Israel. Israel and the right-wing Phalange militia were allies for a time, and the Phalange was clearly against the PLO. Israel sent arms to the Phalange militia with US approval, and if necessary the US was willing to supplement this indirect aid with direct military actions.18 In 1976, Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war with the blessing of the US to defend the Phalange, mainly Christian, forces against the Lebanese National Movement and its allies the PLO. At this point, the PLO and Phalange were the main protagonists and the Phalange was not doing well. Against the wishes of its ally

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the Soviet Union, Syria intervened to defeat another Soviet ally using Soviet weapons.19 Washington approved these moves, viewing Syrian actions as positive for US interests as they thwarted the PLO and protected the Christian Phalange. But the administration was aware that too much Syrian involvement would draw the Israelis into the conflict. An Israeli move against Syria could incite Soviet intervention and a broader war with larger economic consequences directly tied to US interests, including use of the oil boycott weapon.20 Israeli needs and concerns about the Soviet actions were at the forefront of American policymakers’ minds. For the rest of the 1970s, Lebanon was marginalized in US policy as the Carter administration focused on attempting an overall settlement that could subsume the Lebanese problem.21 Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 and established a zone of influence in the south. Washington protested and voted for UN Security Council Resolution 425 calling for Israeli withdrawal. The US threatened a halt in aid to Israel, and Israel moved back to the strip it called its security zone on the border. It established a new, proxy militia in this occupied southern area, the South Lebanese Army (SLA). Israel and the SLA remained in southern Lebanon until 2000. The US did nothing further to push Israel to withdraw fully from Lebanese territory.22 The United Nations sent a new unit, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), to monitor Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and provide security. The organization remains in Lebanon. American policy toward Lebanon shifted with the Reagan administration. Reagan was more confrontational than his predecessor, and his chief concern was the Soviets. In the Middle East, Reagan believed Israel to be a strong ally. Syria, in the Soviet orbit, was to be excluded from peace efforts. Despite this global perspective of superpower competition, US involvement in Lebanon would become entangled in domestic affairs, taking the right-wing Christian side in the conflict. Reagan brought US forces back into Lebanon, although unlike 1958 the US forces engaged. The result was disastrous. In the end, the US was considered just another militia active in the war and was attacked as such. In 1981, Reagan sent Philip Habib to negotiate a crisis between Syria and Israel over Syrian missiles placed in Lebanon. He mediated again between Israel and the PLO over a particularly intense series of civilian casualties resulting from Israeli attacks in Beirut. A ceasefire between the PLO and Israel was put in place in 1981.23 In 1982, Israel invaded deep into Lebanon, surrounding West Beirut. Israel believed that Washington approved, as a result of conversations with Alexander Haig prior to the military action. Haig indicated that Washington did not oppose an Israeli invasion provided there was appropriate justification.24 The invasion sparked widespread condemnation in the international community, Israel, and the US. After the invasion, Washington vetoed UN resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal or even a ceasefire.25 The US shared Israel’s goals in the invasion, those of eliminating the PLO as a force, marginalizing the PLO in peace talks, and protecting Israel’s northern border. As Israel bombed West Beirut heavily, Washington sought PLO withdrawal from Lebanon, and US officials decided on an appropriate location for PLO forces to relocate.26 US troops briefly entered to see the PLO evacuate, and the US guaranteed the safety of the remaining Palestinian civilians, now without a militia for protection. The US troops left and the PLO went to Tunisia. Reagan presented a comprehensive peace initiative for the Palestinian issue without involving the PLO. The Reagan administration also informed Congress that Israel could have violated restrictions on the use of cluster bombs in the Lebanon war, and the administration then temporarily halted further cluster bomb transfers to Israel. In September 1982, a few days after the US troops left, Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel, a close ally of Israel, was assassinated. Israeli troops went into West Beirut, against the agreement negotiated by Habib, and oversaw the massacre of about 2,000 unarmed Palestinians in the refugee camps by the Christian Phalange militia. The massacre of Sabra and Shatila camps became known throughout the world. Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon

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was found by an Israeli commission to be partly responsible for the massacre. These massacres caused the marines to return to Beirut as part of the Multi-National Forces including French, British, and Italians. As American actions became more clearly aligned with Israel and the Christian forces, and the US lost the pretense of neutrality. Syria, the Soviets, the Shi’a, the PLO, and the Druze were all viewed as the opposing forces to the Americans.27 Put simply, the conflict was viewed as Soviet–Muslim against Western–Christian. Now perceived as propping up Christian dominance of Lebanon, opposition Lebanese groups fired upon US positions. US troops were instructed to return fire against the advice of commanders on the ground.28 American ships also bombed Druze and Syrian positions in the mountains. Washington staked its hopes on a new treaty signed with the Lebanese president. Amin Gemayel succeeded his brother as president and signed a peace treaty with Israel on May 17, 1983. Known as the May 17 Accord, it delivered Israeli security demands, particularly regarding its proxy army in the south, while excluding Syria and non-Christian parties from the negotiations entirely. The accord placed the Lebanese government within the Israeli orbit and the US backed it fully. The May 17 Accord was viewed as the one accomplishment of the US administration in the Lebanese war and a vehicle for peace.29 In reality, the accord narrowed support for the Lebanese president and drew the lines between the sides more sharply. The opposition came to rely more heavily on Syrian support. With the Christians isolated and unable to govern without Israeli or American firepower, Syria became the main power broker in Lebanon.30 The response to American partiality in the Lebanese civil war came in attacks against the US embassy in April and October 1983, the latter resulting in 241 US troops dead. The French barracks were attacked as well. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombing. This Islamist group’s relation to the Shi’a Islamist group Hezbollah, formed around this time with the help of the Iranian revolutionary guards, is murky, and Hezbollah is generally accused of the actions against American and French troops. The US responded by retreating from Lebanese soil to the coast and using the battleship USS New Jersey to strike at the mountains above Beirut, Druze and Shi’a territory presumed pro-Syrian and anti-American.31 In February 1984, US forces left Lebanon. The remainder of the war was characterized by kidnappings and the departure of virtually all foreigners from Lebanon. Numerous US hostages were kidnapped and three were killed. Flights to Lebanon by US planes were prohibited from 1985, and a ban on all travel to Lebanon by US citizens was enacted from 1987 to 1997.32 US policy degraded into defensive aggression and became entangled with Iran in the Iran–Contra scandal, partly to obtain influence over Iranian-allied actors in Lebanon.33 In 1985, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-linked activities resulted in the bombing of a Beirut neighborhood in order to assassinate Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. The bombing killed eighty people but not its target. A major kidnapping of an American occurred days later. American goals in Lebanon in the mid-1980s were to ensure the border with Israel, support the extension of the Multi-National Forces for peace and security in the border region, and to continue supporting the Lebanese government and army, training and arming the latter.34 It was and still is the American belief that the Lebanese army can combat and replace the militias and anti-American forces operating in Lebanon such as the PLO and Hezbollah.

Reconstruction and the Syrian occupation The end of the Lebanese civil war began with the Ta’if Accords signed in Saudi Arabia in 1989, as the sides accepted a (slightly) modified government formula. The agreement changed the system slightly, decreasing the balance of Christians to Muslims from six to five, to equal numbers of both in parliament. Syria was a strong player in this accord, and led the new peacekeeping body in Lebanon, the Arab Deterrent Force. The accord did not delineate a final date to Syria’s military role in Lebanon. The head of the Lebanese army, General Michel Aoun, vehemently disagreed with this treaty and waged a “war of liberation” against Syrian

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occupation. In 1990, when Syria agreed to take part in the First Gulf War against the Iraqi Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the US turned silent on Syria’s actions in Lebanon.35 Syria dispensed with Aoun’s war and extended its forces throughout Lebanon with the exception of the border area occupied by Israel and the South Lebanon Army. Syria remained in Lebanon until 2005. American policy sought a comprehensive peace treaty among all parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict after the Gulf War, initiating the Madrid peace process in 1992. Policy toward Lebanon was subsumed within this process or the country was ignored. The policy of supporting Lebanon’s business and ruling elite continued after the civil war, in the person of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. A business tycoon, he was pro-Western and advocated neoliberal economic reforms and privatization of Lebanese public companies. To accomplish these goals and reconstruction of the country after the civil war, Western countries lent large amounts of money to Hariri. The US began to pressure Syria after the US war in Iraq, a war Syria protested. In 2003, Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act imposing sanctions on Syria for its continued occupation of Lebanon, among other things. This prohibited trade from Syria to the US, airplane traffic of Syrian planes, financial dealings with the Bank of Syria, and allowed freezing of the assets of certain Syrians. In fall 2004, Lebanon was preparing to extend the term of President Emile Lahoud unconstitutionally, a move benefiting Syria. France and the US responded by promoting UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calling for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanese territory. After the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, an aggression often attributed to Syria, anti-Syrian demonstrations in Lebanon caused Syria to end its long occupation of the country. For Washington, these demonstrations—called the Beirut Spring in Lebanon and the Cedar revolution in the West—affirmed the power of civil society and the pro-Western character of Lebanon. This view of Lebanon as either Western or Eastern, but not both, could not explain Lebanese reaction to the Israeli invasion of 2006 when the country turned anti-American. The US supported a UN investigation into those responsible for the assassination, believing it would lead to Syria. Lebanon’s opposition, chiefly Hezbollah, opposed the investigation and tribunal into the assassination because of fears that international rulings in a pro-American court could be turned against them.

Countering Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah US policy toward Lebanon in the 2000s was a by-product of US hostility to Hezbollah and Syria and its tight alliance with Israel. American goals in Lebanon after the end of the civil war went from support for a Syrian solution to the civil war to overt animosity to Syria and its presence in Lebanon, even after Syrian troops left the country. The US views Syria and Iran as controlling the actions of Hezbollah, whose continual skirmishes with Israel and association with Iran are major concerns to Washington. Hezbollah is also accused of sponsoring terrorism, and arguments have been made that Hezbollah is more of a danger than al-Qaeda.36 US foreign policy again sought to promote the Lebanese army and now Lebanese civil society in order to thwart Hezbollah. Clinton’s advisors did not push Israel to withdraw from its occupied security zone in Lebanon, called for in UN Security Council resolutions. Such a selective application of UN resolutions led to charges that US policy suffered a pro-Israeli bias.37 President Clinton affirmed his belief that the continued occupation was for Israel’s security and the US should yield to Israel given that security consideration.38 The 1990s saw multiple Israeli attacks on Lebanon that the US also did not protest. Israel bombed Lebanon particularly in 1993 and 1996, hitting civilian targets and causing large refugee populations. The operations were geared toward causing Hezbollah to disarm by forcing the Lebanese government to act. The US, through Secretary of State Warren Christopher, negotiated ceasefires. After the 1996 bombing, Christopher

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negotiated agreement to a set of rules for keeping the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah and confined to military targets. An international force monitored the agreement, which includes US forces. Skirmishes continued between Israel and Hezbollah forces, and by 2000, the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon had become unpopular with the Israeli public. Israel withdrew in 2000, intending to leave its proxy militia, the SLA, in place. The SLA collapsed, and its leaders fled to Israel while others were tried in Lebanese courts. Hezbollah took over security in these areas of southern Lebanon. The Lebanese army did not exert control over southern Lebanon, a key demand of the US and Israel, until after the 2006 war. The Israeli withdrawal was not complete, but continued in an area known as the Sheb’a farms. Israel contends this area was Syrian, captured as part of the Golan Heights in 1967, while Lebanon and Syria maintain the area is Lebanese. The US continued to support Israeli action against Hezbollah, notably in the 2006 Israel– Hezbollah war, known in Lebanon as the July war. While Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, incursions, bombings, and clashes between Israel and Hezbollah persisted. In July 2006, Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers across the Lebanese border in Israel, intending them for a prisoner exchange (which had occurred before). The Israeli response was full-scale bombing and invasion of Lebanon, as Israel considered the taking of soldiers to be an act of war. In this war, the US approved of Israeli actions for the purposes of disarming Hezbollah. Some observers maintain the 2006 war was pushed by the US.39 The American stance was clear inside Lebanon when the Bush administration did not push for a ceasefire. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that she would not press for a halt to hostilities, as in her view the Israel–Lebanon war demonstrated “the birth pangs of a new Middle East.”40 The remark indicated at least implicit support for Israel’s actions and insensitivity to the devastation in Lebanon. The effect on Lebanese public opinion was clear: in this historically pro-American population, opinion swung decidedly anti-America.41

Once more into the fray US policy in Lebanon is in a quandary. Current US policy is focused on building Lebanese civil society and its armed forces, and pressuring the government to disarm Hezbollah. Washington supports the reigning government, called the March 14 coalition, against broad opposition spanning major Christian groups along with the Shi’a Hezbollah. While the US very publicly supports democracy, it objects to Hezbollah, an organization with significant electoral success in Lebanon. Further, other opposition groups who advocate an end to the confessional system are also not welcome in Washington. The result is American attempts to bolster civil society and win “hearts and minds,” through increased economic aid, promotion of civil society, and still more help for Lebanon’s military. The US gave economic aid through the civil war and after. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored projects in Lebanon throughout the civil war and after, in business, schools, and civil society. The US helped the Lebanese reconstruction effort even during the war. Washington funded projects to rebuild bridges, remove rubble, and donate foodstuffs.42 The US gave around $35 million annually between 2001 and 2005, increasing dramatically after the 2006 war with Israel.43 After the 2006 war, aid stepped up in order to compete with Hezbollah’s aggressive rebuilding of the areas destroyed by Israel.44 Aid topped $800 million in 2007, which included economic, foreign, and military assistance.45 For most previous years, the amount was significantly lower, between $35 and 40 million. In 2008, $60 million was requested. While Washington expanded its economic assistance in recent years, this assistance never dealt with the fundamental lack of social service institutions in Lebanon and the state’s confessional bias. American money worked through the state, meaning the money was still allocated on confessional and patron–client lines.

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Developing civil society is another focus of current US policy. The US encourages a wide range of civil and political society organizations in Lebanon and the broader Middle East through the Middle East Partnership Initiative, from literacy campaigns to election monitoring.46 Altering attitudes was the focus of public diplomacy campaigns in Lebanon. USAID supported an advertising campaign for the slogan “I love life,” presumably in contrast to Hezbollah’s emphasis on martyrdom and death. On the ground, the slogan was changed in order to protest against the public relations effort itself and turned into negative slogans such as “I love capitalism” and “I love sectarianism,” highlighting Washington’s support for the current government and confessionalism historically. Society also responded with positive slogans, such as “We love life,” affirming a difference between US individualism and support for the Lebanese community in its entirety.47 The US has begun to take an even clearer position on domestic Lebanese issues. In late 2007, the Bush administration issued an executive order freezing the assets of anyone participating in anti-democratic actions in Lebanon. The order was directed at what the administration considered interference by the Syrians, but was so worded that any members of the political opposition could be targeted.48 As the largest element of the opposition, Hezbollah, already had sanctions against it by the US, the order threatened the other elements of the opposition who are chiefly Christian. This brings the US squarely into the domestic political fight for power. As has been witnessed previously in Lebanon, US officials became targets. The wave of bombings in Lebanon encompassed the US in January 2008, when embassy officials were attacked.49 A consistent and continuing US policy has been the attempt to strengthen, train, and arm the Lebanese armed forces. This policy springs from the belief that a strong military would conquer militias hostile to the US such as the PLO previously, and Hezbollah, and al-Qaedaaffiliated groups in Lebanon currently. Iranian influence allied with Syria is another target of US policy. The belief that the Lebanese army would follow the (pro-Western) government’s direction and move against Hezbollah or the PLO has not been borne out. The army has either split or refused to enter conflicts that force it to take sides on issues that divide the population. US arms to the Lebanese army during the civil war were channeled directly to the differing militias, especially the Christian one. The Lebanese military only acts in reflection of popular opinion, and current Lebanese opinion supports the presence of Hezbollah and its militia. In 2007, the Lebanese army acted effectively against a small group of Islamist terrorists called Fatah al-Islam operating out of a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon. While appearing to bolster US faith in the Lebanese military’s ability to control the country, the incident in fact confirms the Lebanese army’s deference to public opinion. There was societal consensus for the military’s actions, and even Hezbollah publicly approved. Further, the target of military action was viewed as foreign, not Lebanese, and not even affiliated with the Palestinian cause or the residents of the refugee camps. The fallacy of the US view that the Lebanese military could and would move against Hezbollah was borne out in the Hezbollah–Sunni militia clashes in May 2008. The army stayed absent from the fight, refusing to support the government, as Sunni militias filled that role. Hezbollah easily trounced these militias, then pulled back and allowed the Lebanese army to take over. For its part, the army reversed the governmental decrees that sparked the conflict. The incident demonstrates both Hezbollah’s role in the Lebanese system and the futility of US attempts to remove the Islamist group.

Conclusion: prospects for change? Throughout the differing phases of US policy in Lebanon, the US has sided with the ruling elites and the confessional system. The efficacy of US policy goals has suffered. Washington’s depiction of any opposition to these ruling elites as puppets of disliked foreign countries has inhibited the ability to see the domestic popularity of these opposition groups and the

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unpopularity of Lebanese governments. Foreign actors have surely acted in Lebanon, but they are not the cause of Lebanon’s governing quandaries. Domestic discontent with the ruling elites persisted and periodically caused violent clashes. The precarious foundation upon which Lebanon is built has been propped up by US support even as it is further taxed by Israeli military actions. While the US views Hezbollah as the main danger in Lebanon, a large—by some accounts majority—of Lebanese instead perceive their danger is Israel. US support for Israel and for the ruling government serves short-term US policy goals of maintaining proAmerican elites in power. However, a longer perspective would question the wisdom of this policy. The popularity of the opposition, including Hezbollah, has only increased throughout US opposition to the group and the 2006 war with Israel. In 1958, the US recognized the domestic nature of grievances and the broad support for the opposition as due to the influence of officials on the ground. The isolation of US government officials since the 1980s has exacerbated the reliance upon others for information and advice on Lebanon. Without an independent view of the Lebanese situation, the US will continue to back one side in a domestic conflict without realizing the unpopularity of its ally. Such policies will not keep Lebanese friendly to the US or maintain US priorities in Lebanon when the ruling elite changes.

Notes 1 The views here are those of the author and not those of the US government or any other institutional affiliation. Thanks to Rob Weiner and Jessica Piombo for comments. 2 Irene L. Grendzier, Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997): 16. 3 Paul E. Salem, “Superpowers and Small States: an Overview of American–Lebanese Relations,” Beirut Review, 5, 1993. 4 Clyde R. Mark, “Lebanon,” in CRS Issue Brief for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2005). 5 Irene L. Grendzier, “Exporting Death as Democracy: US Foreign Policy in Lebanon,” in Nubar Hovsepian, ed., The War on Lebanon: A Reader (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008). 6 Salem (1993). 7 Grendzier (1997): ch. 5. 8 Ibid.: 10. 9 Ibid.: 16. 10 US reaction to this is in marked contrast to the same move in 2004. In that year, Syrian-allied president Emile Lahoud attempted—and succeeded—in extending his stay, also unconstitutionally. On this occasion, it resulted in uproar in the West and was fiercely condemned by the US. 11 Fawaz Gerges, “The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated Self-Importance,” Beirut Review, 5, 1993. 12 Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (New York: Routledge, 1996): 118. 13 Gerges (1993). 14 Winslow (1996): ch. 5. 15 Ibid.: 124–25. 16 Ibid.: 126–27. 17 See Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 18 Minutes, National Security Council Meeting (Top Secret), April 7, 1976 (declassified). Available from www.ford. utexas.edu/library/DOCUMENT/NSCMIN/minlist.htm. 19 Salem (1993). 20 National Security Council Meeting, April 7, 1976. 21 He did not succeed in a Geneva conference of all the parties, and switched instead to the eventual Camp David treaty. Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 5th edn (New York: Bedford/ St. Martin’s, 2004): 345–46. 22 Stephen Zunes, “The United States and Lebanon: A Meddlesome History,” in FPIF Policy Report (Foreign Policy in Focus, April 26, 2006). 23 Smith (2004): 363–65. 24 Avi Shlaim, “The Impact of US Policy in the Middle East,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 17(2), 1988: 21. 25 Zunes (2006). 26 Taped phone conversation between Morris Draper and Charlie Hill, July 3, 1982. Available from www.jewishvirtual library.org/jsource/History/lebtoc.html, “State department officials discuss PLO evacuation,” unclassified document. 27 Shlaim (1988): 22. 28 Smith (2004): 371.

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29 Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon, A Shattered Country: Myths & Realities of the Wars in Lebanon, trans. Franklin Philip (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1996): 126. 30 Shlaim (1988): 22. 31 Witness the circular nature of this violence: a man whose family was killed in the indiscriminate bombings in 1985 took part in hijacking a TWA plane in which an American navy officer was killed. Zunes (2006). 32 Mark (2005). 33 Zunes (2006). 34 National Security Decision Directive #103, September 10, 1983. 35 Salem (1993). 36 Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah Be Next?” Foreign Affairs, 82(6), November/December 2003. 37 Zunes (2006); Joel Beinin, ”The Israelization of American Middle East Policy Discourse,” Social Text, 21(2), 2003. 38 Zunes (2006). 39 Stephen Zunes, “US Role in Lebanon Debacle,” in FPIF Policy Report (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, May 18, 2007); Seymour M. Hersh, ”Watching Lebanon: Washington’s Interest in Israel’s war,” The New Yorker, 21, August 2006. 40 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Special Briefing on Travel to the Middle East and Europe, July 21, 2006. Available from www.merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/syria/State/69331.pdf. 41 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, “People say no,” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, 3–9 August 2006. 42 America.gov, August 26, 2006, David Shelby, “US Foreign Assistance Director Outlines Aid to Lebanon. Randall Tobias identifies Six Projects the United States will fund” Available from www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/ 2006/August/20060831123055ndyblehs5.626857e-03.html. 43 Congressional Research Service, “CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Lebanon,” (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 2005). 44 Jeremy M. Sharp, “US Foreign Aid to Lebanon: Issues for Congress,” in CRS Issue Brief for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2007). 45 Jeremy M. Sharp, “US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2008 Request,” in CRS Issue Brief for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2007): 19. 46 “MEPI in Lebanon,” Middle East Partnership Initiative, US Department of State. Available from www.medregion. mepi.state.gov/about_lebanon.html. 47 Lara Deeb, “Louder Than Bombs,” Middle East Report, 242, 2007. 48 “Blocking Property of Persons Undermining the Sovereignty of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions.” Available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/20070802–1.html; Iman Azzi, “US makes list of those engaged in ‘anti-democratic actions’: FPM slams charge of undermining sovereignty as ‘ridiculous’,” The Daily Star, August 9, 2007. Available from www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_ id=84433. 49 Hezbollah’s leader denounced the attack. “Beirut blast targets US embassy vehicle,” (AP) USA Today, January 15, 2008. Available from www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-01-15-lebanon-blast_N.htm.

References Beinin, Joel. “The Israelization of American Middle East Policy Discourse,” Social Text, 21(2), 2003: 125–39. Byman, Daniel. “Should Hezbollah Be Next?” Foreign Affairs, 82(6), November/December 2003: 54. Cobban, Helena. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Congressional Research Service. “CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Lebanon.” Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 2005. Deeb, Lara. “Louder Than Bombs,” Middle East Report, 242, 2007: 18–19. Gerges, Fawaz. “The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated Self-Importance,” Beirut Review, 5, 1993. Grendzier, Irene L. “Exporting Death as Democracy: US Foreign Policy in Lebanon,” in Nubar Hovsepian, ed., The War on Lebanon: A Reader. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2008: 119–32. ——. Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Hersh, Seymour M. “Watching Lebanon: Washington’s Interest in Israel’s war,” The New Yorker, 21, August 2006. Mark, Clyde R. “Lebanon,” in CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2005. Picard, Elizabeth. Lebanon, A Shattered Country: Myths & Realities of the Wars in Lebanon. Translated by Franklin Philip. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1996. Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. “People say no,” Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, August 3–9, 2006. Salem, Paul E. “Superpowers and Small States: an Overview of American–Lebanese Relations,” Beirut Review, 5, 1993. Sharp, Jeremy M. “US Foreign Aid to Lebanon: Issues for Congress,” in CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2007a. ——. “US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2008 Request,” in CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2007b.

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Shlaim, Avi. “The Impact of US Policy in the Middle East,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 17(2), 1988: 15–28. Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 5th edn. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2004. Winslow, Charles. Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society. New York: Routledge, 1996. Zunes, Stephen. “The United States and Lebanon: A Meddlesome History,” in FPIF Policy Report. Foreign Policy in Focus, April 26, 2006. ——. “US Role in Lebanon Debacle,” in FPIF Policy Report. Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, May 18, 2007.

25 Missed opportunities Co-operation and confrontation in the US–Syrian relationship David W. Lesch

Introduction Once upon a time, things were not all that bad between Syria and the US. Syrian troops were stationed alongside US forces in the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war—to help Kuwait regain its independence from Iraqi control, rather than to assist the Americans, but alongside nonetheless. Syria was a key participant in the convening of the Madrid peace process sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Gulf War, which led to Oslo, a Jordanian–Israeli treaty, and almost a decade of on-again, off-again US-brokered Israeli–Syrian peace negotiations. When Israeli–Syrian talks broke down in early 2000, both US President Bill Clinton and his lead negotiator, Dennis Ross, claimed in their memoirs that Damascus was serious about peace and that the unraveling of negotiations was at least as much the fault of the Israelis.1 Syria was also the only one of the original seven charter members of the USdesignated list of “states that sponsor terrorism” that has maintained diplomatic relations with the US, with embassies operating in each other’s capitals (today it is the only one of five). Even during the heyday of the superpowers’ cold war, when Syria was considered a clientstate of the Soviet Union, there were important moments of US–Syrian co-operation, such as the US-brokered 1974 disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria regarding the Golan Heights following the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, an accord that has been assiduously maintained to this day. Such was the importance of Syria in the Middle East from the point of view of Washington that the man who negotiated that disengagement agreement, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, commented that, while there could be no war in the Arab–Israeli arena without Egypt, there could also be no peace without Syria. These moments of co-operation between Damascus and Washington became a thing of the past. Since early 2003, the relationship has deteriorated dramatically. The deepening hostility is inimical to America’s interests in the region—the most vital of which are tamping down Islamist extremism and terrorism, building a stable peace within and among the countries of the region, and stabilizing the situation in Iraq. It did not have to be this way. Although there is plenty of blame to go around, in the author’s opinion, much of it lies with the intensifying rigidity and misplaced moralism of the administration of George W. Bush. The failure to consummate a Syrian–Israeli agreement in the 1990s represents a historic missed opportunity. Yet subsequent opportunities for the US and Syria to improve their relationship in a way that could have facilitated an Syrian–Israel peace have also been missed, or worse, ignored. By the end of 2006, US policy toward Syria could be described as illinformed if not outright stubborn, based in part on an almost emotional antipathy. Although the Bush administration made gestures toward Syria in 2007 that could have established a foundation on which to build a dialogue, the diplomatic environment was still fraught with deleterious opportunity costs, and in the end it was more show than substance.

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What is behind the inimical state of relations between Syria and the US since 2003? Has the US squandered opportunities to build a productive US–Syrian dialogue? Can current US policy under the administration of President Barack Obama be adjusted or reversed with regard to Syria? Is Syria truly interested in improving its image and its relationship with the US?

Opportunity lost and created: 1999–2001 As history has already shown—and probably will continue to show—the failure to consummate an Israeli–Syrian peace treaty initiated by the Madrid peace process still casts a shadow across the region. There were two periods of intense direct negotiations between Syrian and Israeli officials brokered by the US, one in 1995–96 and the other in 1999–2000. The site of both negotiations was within earshot of Washington: the Wye Plantation in Maryland for the former, and in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, for the latter. Most officials in Washington and in Israel actually preferred the Syrian track over the Palestinian. This is not to say that it would be easy—its failure indicates otherwise—but that overall it was less complicated than the Israeli–Palestinian track. The contested area, the Golan Heights, has less population overall and less mixed Jewish and Arab populations than the West Bank; in addition, the issues revolved around land demarcation, security measures, water accessibility, and rates of withdrawal—all issues with specifiable metrics that can be and to a great extent were negotiated. At the time of the Israeli–Syrian negotiations in the 1990s and into early 2000, the thinking suggested the following outcome: once Syria signed on the dotted line, Lebanon would soon follow step, opening the way for the Arab Gulf states and some North African nations to ease their hostility to Israel, while awaiting a resolution of the Palestinian issue. Furthermore, there seemed to be an inverse relationship between progress on the Arab–Israeli front and Saddam’s troublemaking activities; if an overall Arab–Israeli peace developed, the Iraqi regime might have been effectively contained if not circumscribed. Had Saddam Hussein’s Iraq been further isolated in the region, it is possible we would not have heard much from Baghdad in the late 1990s—specifically not the fodder that turned into the basis for going to war against Iraq in 2003. If the Madrid process had been successful, it is unlikely we would have had the Israeli– Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon in summer 2006; indeed, Hezbollah may have been militarily emasculated by now. This is not to suggest that snowballing progress toward peace would have strangled all Islamic extremism or groups such as al-Qaeda in their crib, but it would have lessened their appeal and drained the swamp of Arab ire that incubated tolerance or even sinister sympathy for the massacre of 9/11. And for those who contend that an emerging Arab–Israeli settlement along these lines would have weakened the Palestinian position in the Occupied Territories by removing energetic Arab backing (and leverage), thus making the hope of a viable, independent state more remote, it could equally be said that an Israel that finally felt safe and secure in the region might then have been more emboldened to make the necessary tradeoffs leading toward Palestinian statehood and a durable peace. But this did not happen for a variety of reasons, even though a great distance toward an Israeli–Syrian peace in terms of practical matters had been traveled. When long-time Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad died in June 2000, his second son, Bashar, succeeded him. The untested, youthful new president concentrated on consolidating his position for the time being. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had already made the fateful decision unilaterally to withdraw Israeli troops from Lebanon in May 2000, when the preferred structure in which he wanted the withdrawal to take place—a peace treaty with Syria—reached a dead end. So when Bashar took over, the peace process was moribund. In his inaugural address in July 2000, Bashar focused on internal affairs in Syria, especially the need for economic reform and accountability. Toward the end of his speech, he addressed

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relations with Israel, introduced through nationalistic statements regarding Lebanon, revealing the Lebanese link in the Israeli–Syrian dynamic. His language regarding Israel consisted of fairly harsh rhetoric, although he reaffirmed Syria’s “strategic choice” for peace to which his father had twice committed a decade earlier. It was expected that a young, relatively inexperienced leader would stake out a tough line vis-à-vis Israel. Bashar tried to reassure powerful elements within his regime that he was not going to make concessions willy-nilly or repeat the tactics that had failed to result in the return of the Golan. In this vein, many in the West, with their expectations that the ophthalmologist-turnedpresident would immediately engage in the peace process because he was a computer nerd and Western-educated modernizer, failed to appreciate the inner dynamics of Syrian politics. In fact, this writer told Bashar on one occasion that one of the worst things to happen to him when he became president was that the Western media widely reported that he liked Phil Collins’s music, from which many in the West extrapolated to make some generalized—and inaccurate—conclusions about his political tendencies. Bashar had spent less than two years of his entire lifetime of education in the West, and although he loved London, his brief stay there did not translate into instant “conversion.” He is Syrian. Most of his life was directly affected by the superpower cold war and the Arab–Israeli conflict, viewing the US on the opposite side of the cold war divide and Israel as an antagonist and an aggressive strategic threat, all the while championing the return of the Golan Heights and the rights of the Palestinians. To expect anything different was wishful thinking, which set up Bashar and many in the West for disappointment. This came fairly soon when Bashar adopted a more antagonistic attitude toward Israel following the outbreak of the so-called al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000. The Arab world was inflamed by the course of events in the al-Aqsa intifada, as the Palestinian cause still resonated on the Arab street if not with all of the Arab governments. Leading the way was the young president of Syria, one of the few countries in the Arab world that can play both sides of the fence. Its Arab nationalist credentials are intact because it served as the cradle of modern Arab nationalism and because it has not signed a peace treaty with Israel. It still confronts Israel indirectly through its support of Hezbollah and Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Despite the Islamic extremism that threatens the Syrian regime, support for these groups is painted as resistance against Israel and placed within a clear Arab– Israeli paradigm. Syria has historically been at the vanguard of the so-called steadfastness front in the Arab world arrayed against Israel in the 1970s and 1980s, especially following the 1979 Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty. So it can legitimately adopt, at least rhetorically, a radical position vis-à-vis Israel when it is advantageous in the Arab world to do so. On the other hand, because of its track record of serious involvement in the Madrid peace process and its participation in the Gulf War coalition in 1991, Syria has been able to hop over to the other side of the fence when necessary and re-enter peace negotiations with Israel and/or adopt a more co-operative stance with the US when the environment dictates it. In fall 2000, following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, Bashar became a leading voice castigating Israel and emerged as a strong advocate of implementing concrete steps (such as reapplying a full Arab economic boycott of Israel) to support the Palestinian cause.2 Little did Bashar know that this rhetoric only reinforced the negative opinion of Syria that certain elements in Congress and in the Bush administration had long held.3 Despite this, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 afforded the US and Syria an opportunity to improve their relationship. Following 9/11, there seemed to be a brief period for a dramatic reversal in the Bush administration’s position in the Middle East. It understood that it needed as many allies as possible, especially in the Muslim world, to go after the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and fight what was now a global war against terrorism. The Bush administration at first appeared to take a certain distance from Israel and draw closer to the Arab states, including Syria. Bashar sent a letter of condolence to President Bush after 9/11 expressing Syrian officials’ sympathy for the US by describing how their country had itself

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experienced death and destruction from Islamic extremism in the late 1970s and early 1980s.4 At a more practical level, Syria began to co-operate by sharing intelligence information with its counterparts in the US regarding al-Qaeda, to the point where State Department officials were commenting that Syria had helped save American lives.5

Toward confrontation: 2001–3 Following the flush of quick military victory in Afghanistan that resulted in the expulsion of the Taliban in fall 2001, a rumble could be heard in Washington regarding more ambitions to reshape the region. Regime change in Iraq began to emerge as the next objective. Despite Syria’s intelligence co-operation against Islamist terror networks, pro-administration voices in Washington assailed Syrian support for terrorism, citing groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, both of which Syria considers to be legitimate resistance groups against “foreign occupation.” Movement in Congress toward passage of the Syrian Accountability Act began in earnest. All of this would reach a crescendo with the 2003 war in Iraq. Even before the end of 2001, and certainly throughout 2002, Syria felt itself placed more and more on the defensive. Members of Congress, who had never seen political advantage in promoting an entente with Damascus, found there was now no push-back from the administration to protect the US–Syrian relationship. In hearings on the Syrian Accountability Act, very harsh language was used toward Syria and, in particular, Bashar al-Asad.6 In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations in September 2002 on whether or not to pass the bill (House Resolution 4483), majority leader Dick Armey (R-TX) proclaimed, Our inaction on holding Syria accountable for its dangerous activities could seriously diminish our efforts on the war on terrorism and brokering a viable peace in the Middle East … Syria should be held accountable for its record of harboring and supporting terrorist groups; stockpiling illegal weapons in an effort to develop weapons of mass destruction; and transferring weapons and oil back and forth through Iraq.7 Certain appointees in the Pentagon were becoming more vociferous in their complaints about Syria, and pressure groups, including Christian Lebanese, Syrian exiles, American evangelicals, and neoconservative think tanks in Washington, heightened their anti-Syrian rhetoric while trying to convince the administration that Syria belonged with Iran, Iraq, and North Korea in the axis of evil that was announced in President Bush’s State of the Union address in January 2002. The State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and even some Bush administration officials, however, still believed that engagement with Syria was strategically important for Damascus’s assistance in destroying al-Qaeda and for drumming up support in the Arab world for the planned war in Iraq (especially as Syria held a rotating seat in the UN Security Council at the time). As such, the Syrian regime believed that US–Syrian relations would retain the status quo and that the policy of engaging Syria that had been in place for several administrations (the so-called honey and vinegar approach) would stay in place. Notably, this continued engagement approach did not include encouraging Syrian participation in a larger peace process. Damascus may have grown a bit too complacent, imagining that the State Department mantra—Syria had saved American lives—would insulate the country from the Bush administration’s post-9/l1 interventionist thrust of assertive nationalism and democratization. The National Security Strategy of September 2002 represented a merger of these two streams— and a much more aggressive foreign policy posture resting on the premise that the US would utilize pre-emptive force as a preventative measure in a reformulated national security doctrine. Regime change became a central US foreign policy objective in order to prevent more regimes, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, from harboring and aiding US-designated terrorist groups, and Syria seemed to be edging closer to inclusion in this category.

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Essentially, Bashar al-Asad and his foreign policy advisors did not adequately adjust to the important underlying changes in US foreign policy as a result of 9/11, which heightened Syria’s exposure to US regime change rhetoric, especially as the Bush Doctrine took hold. Damascus thought the old rules of the game were still in place, and State Department and other administration officials led them to believe that such was the case; the Syrians may have been guilty of selectively hearing what they wanted to hear. But at the same time, the new rules of the game were being written in Washington in the corridors of Congress, the Pentagon, and influential conservative think tanks by those who saw Bashar and his regime as part of the problem rather than the solution. The focus of foreign policy power in the Bush administration had shifted to the Pentagon with the wars in Afghanistan and then Iraq, which led to a more bellicose posture toward Syria. State Department officials, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, made comments from time to time praising Syria’s co-operation against jihadists, which reassured Damascus that the old rules still applied, but in hindsight, these statements carried little weight in the US foreign policymaking apparatus. Thus Bashar’s continued verbal assaults on Israel and support for groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas well into 2003 played right into the hands of the ascendant group of American foreign policy ideologues, whose positions seemed to mirror the security concerns and methods of the hard-line Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon. Apparently, Bashar was relatively unaware that he and his regime were becoming more of a target. President Bush said in a speech on April 4, 2002, that “Syria has spoken out against al-Qaeda. We expect it to act against Hamas and Hezbollah as well,” and on June 24, Bush added, “Syria must choose the right side in the war on terror by closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organizations.”8 Syria perhaps assumed that the clear differences between al-Qaeda, on the one hand, and Hamas/Hezbollah, on the other, were self-evident, as they were understood by all in the region. But these distinctions were apparently lost on the Bush administration. No longer could the differences between Washington and Damascus be resolved as part of an Israeli–Syrian peace process; Syria now had to meet all of Washington’s concerns before negotiations could even begin with Israel. From the point of view of Damascus, this was a nonstarter, for it would entail relinquishing its few remaining assets, such as its ties with Hezbollah and Hamas, before the initiation of peace talks. Further, the Bush administration’s increasing focus on Iraq rather than the Arab–Israeli arena diminished Syria’s utility in the eyes of many in the administration who had been deeply suspicious anyway of Syrian motives during the peace negotiations in the 1990s. This emerging policy toward Syria has its roots back in the mid-1990s, when the Republicans regained control of both houses of Congress, laying the foundation for important shifts in foreign policy. A more propitious environment for the implementation of their foreign policy arose when a sympathetic administration came to power with President George W. Bush, especially when combined with the disaster of 9/11. Without an acute and transforming event such as an Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis to compel a change in policy direction, it usually takes some time and aligned circumstances for a policy distinct from that which exists to percolate upward. One of the first representations of the emerging view of Syria as an enemy to be confronted was a six-page report prepared by the Jerusalem-based Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in 1996, titled, “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.”9 The report was compiled from discussions among the Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000, consisting of, among others, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser, and Meyrav Wurmser (David Wurmser’s Israeli-born wife and fellow at the Hudson Institute). All these people had important positions either in the Bush administration itself or in groups that were closely aligned to various elements in the administration. The report was prepared for Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu after his election as Israeli prime minister in May 1996, offering recommendations regarding Middle East policy.

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In many ways, this report has become a blueprint for the Bush administration’s subsequent approach to the Middle East and especially Iraq and for some time thereafter. Most of it was never adopted by Netanyahu in Israel, although this report has gained public notice because it called for the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein—its primary target for “securing the realm” was actually Syria, and more specifically, the Asad regime. Asserting that Syria “challenges Israel on Lebanese soil,” the report calls on Israel to seize the strategic initiative and engage Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran as “the principal agents of aggression in Lebanon.” Far from seeking peace with Syria, Netanyahu’s US advisers counseled that Israel should militarily confront it:10 “Given the nature of the regime in Damascus, it is both natural and moral that Israel abandon the slogan ‘comprehensive peace’ and move to contain Syria, drawing attention to its weapons of mass destruction program, and rejecting land for peace deals on the Golan Heights.” The report further states that “Israel can shape its strategic environment, in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, by weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria. This effort can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq— an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right—(and) as a means of foiling Syria’s regional ambitions.” Quoting extensively from this report is important in view of the insight it gives into the mindset of people who become policy influentials under Bush and the centrality that Syria assumed in their transformationist vision of the Middle East. In May 2000, many of the same people convened under the auspices of a pro-Israeli (specifically pro-Likud) research group called the Middle East Forum (MEF), along with the United States Committee for a Free Lebanon (USCFL), to release a study titled, “Ending Syria’s Occupation of Lebanon: The U.S. Role?”11 The report explicitly calls for the use of military force to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Syria and end its occupation of Lebanon. The policy document called for a more aggressive US policy regarding Lebanon.12 Among the signatories of the document were Richard Perle, David Wurmser, Douglas Feith, Michael Ledeen, Frank Gaffney, and Elliot Abrams. Again, all were either in or intimately connected to the Bush administration. Abrams was the head of Middle East affairs on the National Security Council, and he is widely considered to have been the most influential voice in the administration on overall Middle East policy. Despite the fact that many of these people left the administration, discredited by the quagmire in Iraq, their hostility toward Syria became institutionalized in Washington and represented a marked reversal of US policy from prior (Republican) administrations. Syria’s participation in the 1991 Gulf War coalition and its direct and serious involvement in the Madrid peace process tend to be glossed over or trivialized. The fact that both the Madrid and Oslo peace processes sputtered out does not diminish and certainly does not negate the Syrian contribution and role. Both were vitally important to US interests as they helped reshape the regional balance of power, which for about a decade came very close to establishing a paradigm for a comprehensive Arab–Israeli peace. Many US officials and commentators over the years needed to do a much better job of analyzing Syria’s position in the Middle East from the perspective of Damascus, rather than conveniently casting a stiff ideological net over the country. At times, Syrian interests are inimical to American ones; at other times, they are convergent. In order to determine and identify these convergent interests, there must at least be an attempt to understand the strategic position of Syria.

Confrontation: 2003–4 The deterioration in US–Syrian relations accelerated with the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. A range of US accusations against Syria appeared soon after the invasion began, from harboring Saddam regime members and hiding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to supplying military equipment to Iraqi fighters. Then-White House spokesman Ari Fleischer

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bluntly stated on April 14, 2003, that “Syria is indeed a rogue nation.”13 President Bashar, in response to accusations such as this, stated that: some see me as bad, some see me as good—we don’t actually care what terms they use. It is not right to apply this term to Syria—I mean, look at the relationship that Syria has with the rest of the world; if you have good relations with the rest of the world, you are not a rogue state just because the United States says you are.14 The most pointed accusation of all, however, would only gain momentum as the Iraqi insurgency took shape: that the Syrian regime was actively assisting the insurgency with financial and logistical assistance. In short, US officials insisted Syria’s putative stance was costing American lives. Syria had crossed the line. With the Bush Doctrine, Syria could no longer play on both sides of the fence—it had to choose one side. And as the Bush administration shifted its emphasis toward promoting democracy in the region, Syria’s authoritarian regime became a natural target. By early 2005, while the Bush administration officially pushed for a change of behavior on the part of Damascus, particularly in demanding that it do more to stop the flow of insurgents crossing into Iraq, it was widely believed that its unofficial policy toward Syria was one of regime change through regional and international pressure combined with support of anti-Asad Syrian exile groups and potential disaffected members of the regime itself. Of course, as seen from Damascus, the invasion of Iraq implanted 150,000 US troops in a country on its eastern border, armed with the Bush Doctrine and fresh off a swift, and to the Syrians, the shockingly easy, military removal of the only other Ba’athist regime in the world. To the north was Turkey; and while Syria has markedly improved its relationship with Ankara in recent years (and Turkey’s parliament refused to allow US troops access through its country on the way to Iraq), Turkey was still a member of NATO. To the south was, of course, Israel as well as Jordan, with which it had a long-standing mercurial relationship and, in any event, it was a US ally. Bashar looked out from his perch in Damascus and saw that his country was virtually surrounded by actual and potential hostile forces. The only friendly neighbor was Lebanon, and even there various domestic factions were agitating more assertively for a Syrian troop withdrawal and less Syrian interference in their country’s affairs. In the fresh glow of the Bush administration’s “mission accomplished,” several implicit threats were hurled at Damascus that Syrian officials took very seriously. Remembering that many of the same people who had written “A Clean Break” were now in high-level positions in the US government, the Syrian regime had grounds for thinking it would be next on the Bush administration’s hit list. As such, it is no surprise then that the Syrian regime at the very least casts a blind eye at times toward Arab insurgents crossing over into Iraq. Damascus wanted the Bush Doctrine to fail, and it hoped that Iraq would be the first and last time it was applied. Anything it could do to ensure this outcome, short of incurring the direct military wrath of the US, was considered fair game. While certainly under pressure from the US to do more on the border, Bashar also had to face a domestic constituency that identified strongly with the Iraqi insurgency. The Syrian regime was caught a bit off guard by the popular reaction in the country, particularly among Sunni Muslim salafist groups. Because Bashar had yet to solidify his hold on power, he could not afford to be seen as doing Bush’s bidding—nor did he want to. In fact, the more the US pressured Syria, the more it compelled the Syrian regime to appeal to a combination of Arab, Syrian, and Islamic nationalism to strengthen its base of support. Trying to walk that fine line, Bashar took measures along the border after a series of meetings with US officials in 2004 and into early 2005; it was clear by this time, however, that the US was sinking in an Iraqi quagmire and not in a position to turn its guns against Syria. At this juncture, there was little harm in improving border control, even if it was meant just as much to control the stream of Iraqi refugees who were quickly overwhelming the Syrian ability to provide for them.15

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Confrontation intensifies: Lebanon 2004–5 The US–Syrian confrontation became more serious following Bashar’s perhaps imprudent decision to extraconstitutionally extend pro-Syrian Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s term in office in 2004. Syrian policymakers seem to have seriously misjudged the regional and international outcry over the heavy-handed intervention to prolong an unpopular presidency. With anti-Syrian pressure building in Lebanon, no doubt with the support of the West and proWest Arab moderates such as Saudi Arabia, Bashar wanted a clear Syrian ally in the office of the Lebanese presidency. It completely backfired. Even France, the European country with which Syria traditionally enjoyed the closest ties and one that had been at odds with Washington over the war with Iraq, joined the US in sponsoring UN Security Resolution 1559, adopted on September 2, 2004, which condemned Syrian actions and called on “all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon” and for the “extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory,” the latter aimed at Hezbollah, which had long established a kind of state-within-a-state in southern Lebanon and in south Beirut. Clearly Bashar did not expect the issue of Lebanon to be placed on the agenda of the UN Security Council, with a resolution passed, and with an associated mechanism to periodically check and report on Syrian compliance. With enhanced international pressure, it was at this time that Bashar consented, after meeting with US officials, to take additional measures along the border with Iraq mentioned previously. This move actually produced some positive statements from Bush administration officials. The deterioration in US–Syrian relations went from serious to grave, however, on February 14, 2005, when Rafiq Hariri, the billionaire businessman and former Lebanese prime minister, was assassinated in a massive car bombing in Beirut. Syria was immediately held at least indirectly responsible for the killing, with many in the region and in the international community—certainly in Washington—suspecting that it was ordered by Damascus. The US ambassador to Syria was recalled the day after the assassination, although Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that the killing was the “proximate cause” of the recall. Although the US maintains its embassy in Damascus, the US ambassador has not returned as of this writing. The US, Europe (particularly France, whose president at the time, Jacques Chirac, had close ties with Hariri), and most of the Arab world (especially Saudi Arabia, whose royal family also had close ties with Hariri) were united in calling on Syria to withdraw its 14,000–16,000 remaining troops from Lebanon. This development was Bashar al-Asad’s severest test, and it gave additional ammunition to those who wanted to contain Syria, if not to generate regime change. Although Bashar had reduced Syria’s troop presence in Lebanon by over 50 percent since he came to power, he had to succumb fully to regional and international pressure and implement a complete withdrawal. With several bombings and assassinations that targeted anti-Syrian Lebanese figures after the withdrawal, however, there remains suspicion that not all of the Syrian intelligence agents have been removed, and the West worries that Damascus is trying to run things in Lebanon by “remote control” through its remaining allies in the country. Even though an anti-Syrian coalition won the majority of seats in the Lebanese parliament in elections in May and June 2005, it was not enough to remove Lahoud from power; furthermore, Hezbollah won a large bloc of seats, so Syria’s influence on its neighbor to the west remained significant. This was not the only thing the Syrian regime had to worry about, however, for the US and France, continuing their co-operation forged in 2005, spearheaded the commissioning of a UN investigation into the murder of Hariri. In October, Detlev Mehlis, the UN representative in charge of investigating the Hariri assassination, produced his preliminary report to the UN Security Council. The detailed report in effect concluded that the assassination could not have occurred without Syrian connivance. The trail of evidence in an early leaked draft of the report led all the way to the heart of the regime in Damascus, including the head of Syrian intelligence, Asef Shawkat (who also happens to be Bashar al-Asad’s brother-in-law), and Bashar’s

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younger brother, Maher al-Asad. While it remains unclear whether Bashar was directly involved in ordering the assassination, his reputation was further damaged because, if he had not approved the security services actions, their audacity gives an ominous indication of the lack of power he really wields in the country. Upon hearing the Mehlis report, the UN Security Council unanimously passed another resolution (UNSC Resolution 1636) calling on Syria to co-operate fully with the UN investigation or possibly face further measures, probably entailing more widespread sanctions, this time including Europe, with whom lay most of Syria’s trade. Syria co-operated to a minimal extent with the UN investigation under the mandate that extended into 2006. In any event, UN Security Council members such as Russia, China, and Algeria were opposed to expanding the breadth of the investigation as well as the imposition of a tougher sanctions regime against Syria. By early 2006, the focus of the Bush administration seemed to shift more toward concerns regarding Iran’s alleged attempts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. From the perspective of Damascus, the threat environment had receded somewhat with the US sinking deeper in Iraq. A different threat remained, however; Serge Brammertz replaced Mehlis as UN investigator, and although he was much more acceptable to the Syrians in terms of his measured approach to the matter, he still would doggedly investigate the assassination. Additionally, on May 30, 2007, the UN Security Council authorized the formation of an international tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri assassination (Resolution 1757, by a vote of ten for, zero against, and five—China, Indonesia, Qatar, Russia, South Africa—abstaining). The Syrians and their allies in Lebanon were hoping that the investigation would, if not absolve Syria, at least raise enough doubt as to Syrian complicity to destroy any momentum toward convening the tribunal. This is no longer an option. The United Nations acted in response to Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora’s request because the Lebanese parliament had not been able to convene due to opposition from Hezbollah, Amal, and their allies. In August 2007, the Netherlands (The Hague) agreed to host the tribunal. It now has a momentum of its own and cannot be stopped. The process has slowed considerably, however, thus causing a bit less angst in Damascus, which naturally views the whole affair as a political instrument used by the Bush administration to pressure the Syrian regime. Regardless, this remains something of an albatross over the head of Bashar and his regime that may, pending the outcome, still become a politicized issue in the future. Lebanon continues to be important to Syria for a number of different reasons. Economically, Lebanon is an outlet for surplus Syrian labor, ranging from 300,000 to a million workers depending on the season, which results in about $1 billion of remittances flowing back into the Syrian economy. In addition, overland Syrian–Lebanese trade was estimated at about $600– $700 million in 2005, with 35 percent of Lebanese exports depending on the route through Syria. For Damascus, it is a strategic imperative that Lebanon should not fall into hostile hands through military or political flanking operations carried out by Israel, the US, and/or anti-Syrian subversive groups. Syria certainly considered Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon as one such attempt, and opposed it doggedly via local allies. Syria is not going to go away easily in Lebanon; it will do—and has done—what it must to maintain enough influence in the country to prevent strategic disadvantages from developing. And with Hezbollah having improved its political position in Lebanon (by garnering the ability, along with its allies, to veto cabinet decisions) following its May 2008 display of military power in response to government attempts to restrict its position in Beirut, Syria has emerged with even more influence vis-à-vis the pro-West March 14 coalition in power and its regional Arab allies; indeed, some would say that Syria prevailed in Lebanon over other external oppositional actors such as the US, France, and Saudi Arabia. The fact that Syria helped broker the Doha agreement in May 2008 that reapportioned power in the Lebanese cabinet toward Hezbollah was evidence of the fact that no other country has as high a stake in Lebanon as Syria. This “victory” started to convince many in the West, most notably in France, that dialogue with and not isolation of Syria was the most prudent way forward.

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2006 recovery Bashar adeptly survived 2005. He is no longer the inexperienced, untested ruler. No one survives as president of Syria for any length of time without political cunning, resolve, and staying power. As Syrian expert Joshua Landis pointed out, Bashar may have lost Beirut, but he gained Damascus. In other words, he used the internal fallout of “losing” Lebanon to push aside internal foes and albatrosses, most particularly the forced resignation of Vice President, Abd al-Halim Khaddam at a Ba’ath party congress meeting in June 2005. He also deflected the increased international pressure following the publication of the Mehlis report by drumming up a nationalistic response that strengthened domestic supply for the regime and facilitated the portrayal of internal critics as being accomplices of the West. In addition, the external threat environment allowed the regime to heighten political repression in the country, particularly against civil society and democracy activists.16 With chaos reigning in Iraq, it was not hard to remind the Syrian populace that US-inspired democracy promotion could likewise rip the fabric of its own society apart. As the Westerneducated Syrian deputy prime minister, Abdullah Dardari, stated: “I may not be keen on early morning arrests, but this regime was being threatened. The survival of this regime and the stability of this country were threatened out loud and openly. There were invitations for foreign armies to come and invade Syria. So you could expect sometimes an overreaction, or a reaction, to something that is really happening.”17 If any thing, the US and the Syrian opposition in exile overplayed their hands following the publication of the Mehlis report. As the general goal of the Syrian opposition in exile is the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime and its replacement by a pluralist, democratic political system, there was a great deal of excitement and anticipation in those circles that Bashar’s days were numbered. The Bush administration helped facilitate (and possibly partially fund) the merger of various Syrian exile groups in order to establish the appearance of a co-ordinated and united anti-Asad front. Khaddam gave some damning interviews in Europe regarding the Syrian regime and then, himself, joined the exiled Syrian opposition, forming the National Salvation Front, led organizationally by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in coalition with a number of secular elements. But they did not realize that Bashar had to a significant degree already consolidated his position domestically; the fact that Khaddam was outside Syria giving these interviews was evidence of this fact. With the intense anti-American feeling in the region, the more the Syrian exiled opposition appeared to attach itself to the US, the more it became discredited in Syria. Finally, the US did not receive support in the UN Security Council in December 2005 when it and France pushed for stronger measures against Syria in light of the Mehlis report. As expected, both Russia and China opposed and vetoed US attempts. For the time being, then, Syria had weathered the post-Hariri onslaught. As further evidence of this, Bashar reshuffled his cabinet in February 2006. This is the most loyal and probably the most capable and independent cabinet during Bashar’s tenure in power to date in terms of the ability to make decisions that used to be the preserve of the Ba’ath party Regional Command, which to a certain degree has been circumscribed in recent years by Bashar. The more technocratic composition of the cabinet is reflected in the regime slogan of “modernization and development” (al-tahdith wa al-tatwir) from what had been “reform and renewal” (al-islah wa al-tajdid) in the early years of Bashar’s tenure in power. This is a clear indication that the regime had moved away from tentatively stated political reform and toward primarily economic and administrative reform. While the UN investigation and associated pressures resulted in Bashar’s improved domestic position, the summer 2006 Israeli–Hezbollah war improved his regional position. Israel was unable to “defeat” Hezbollah. As Robert Malley stated, “A war waged to reassert Israel’s power of deterrence and to spoil Hezbollah’s image has significantly eroded the former while unintentionally improving the latter.”18 With both Israel and Hezbollah appearing to seek a

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way out as civilian casualties mounted and a military solution appeared fleeting, the US belatedly withdrew its objections to the UN Security Council arranging a ceasefire. But by the time UN Security Council Resolution 1701 passed on August 11 and was implemented on August 14 by the governments of Lebanon (which included Hezbollah representation) and Israel, it was clear that the Olmert government had been rattled and weakened.19 Any talk of further withdrawal (or realignment) from the West Bank was put on hold indefinitely. The policy of unilateralism conducted outside the framework of a negotiated settlement had come home to roost. A negotiated settlement would have held a legitimate entity such as the Palestinian Authority in Gaza (or Syria in Lebanon in 2000) responsible for extending and maintaining the terms of the agreement. Hezbollah at least won the war of narratives following the conflict. And as would happen again in 2008, a “victory” for Hezbollah was a victory for Syria. Bashar had very few strategic assets left as of early 2007, and Syrian foreign policy under the Asads is all about having leverage for quid pro quos, particularly regarding a return of the Golan Heights. The Bush administration had been basically saying to Bashar: there is nothing you can do to hurt us, and you have nothing to offer us. The actions by both Hamas (particularly its more radical wing, with which Damascus has more influence) and Hezbollah in summer 2006, however, showed that these quasi state and sub-state actors can make a significant difference in the Middle East political and strategic landscape, thus providing Syria with more regional diplomatic leverage than it has had since 2001, which has only continued into 2009. In a meeting of this writer with President Bashar in the midst of the Lebanon war, he was very confident and relaxed and spoke with a certain bravado regarding Israel’s performance (or lack thereof) against Hezbollah. Bashar was riding Nasrallah’s popularity to boost his own on the home front as well as his regime’s popular legitimacy in the region. Maybe now Syria could regain a seat at the diplomatic table and utilize its new-found leverage to restart Israeli–Syrian negotiations and engage the US in a dialogue. There were a number of calls in both Israel and the US for such talks, especially by former senior diplomatic and military officials and academics, and in Israel by sitting ministers too.20 But the Bush administration was adamant that there should be no contacts, by either Israel or Washington, with such a defiant regime.

Syria and Iran Syria’s connection with Iran plays an important role here. It is a relationship that was forged immediately after the 1979 Iranian Revolution and then cemented during the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s, when Syria supported non-Arab Iran against its Arab neighbor in Iraq. It is important to realize that the Syrian–Iranian connection is a strategic relationship at its roots. The socio-political systems in each country are vastly different, Syria being a secular, Ba’athist state while Iran is an Islamic republic. Even though the Syria leadership is Alawite (a derivative of Shi’ite Islam) and Iran is a Shi’ite-dominated country, there is very little, if any, shared religious ideology. It may be fair to acknowledge a Syrian–Iranian axis, but it is patently incorrect to include the Sunni-majority country of Syria as part of an emerging Shi’ite crescent from Iran to Lebanon. As such, there has always been a certain level of discomfort among important elements in each country regarding the relationship. The relationship has shifted over the years. Syria was an outlet and asset during times of trouble for Iran in the 1980s; now, Iran is an outlet and asset for Syria, particularly in terms of providing Damascus with some strategic depth at a time when it felt threatened. There is an economic dimension to the alliance, but not to the point yet that Syria has become dependent on Iran. Primarily, though, Iran has enhanced Syria’s ability to be a regional diplomatic player and to maintain its influence in Lebanon—particularly, of course, through the Hezbollah link. While Bush administration officials continuously attempted to damn Syria by grouping it with Iran in any official discussions or pronouncements regarding undesirables in the Middle East,

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Damascus actually did not mind at all, for it indicates, again, that the US is thinking about Syria and that it has regained some diplomatic leverage, even by proxy. During the last few years, Syria has had very few friends. Even in the Arab world, US allies and Sunni Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan distanced themselves from Damascus after the Hariri assassination, and following Bashar’s harsh criticism of them as “half-men” during the Lebanon summer war. As Bashar mentioned to me on one occasion, when one has few friends, one cannot be choosy about who they are, the implication being that Damascus has had no choice but to draw closer to Iran. Equally, however, this implies that, if Damascus is given a legitimate option in another direction, it might loosen its ties with Tehran. In this writer’s meeting with Bashar in Damascus on May 30, 2007, he said, “Whoever works more for our [Syria’s] interests, I will be their friend. It is about interests, not ideology, and if the United States works for my interests, I will be their friend.” Again, on October 19, 2008 in Damascus, Bashar mentioned to this writer that, “relations with Hamas and Hezbollah have nothing to do with Iran; they are only related to the peace process.” In the context in which this was said, by implication Bashar appears to be indicating that Syria will makes its decisions regarding the peace process independent of Iran, and in many ways, it has already engaged in peace dialogue and overtures over the objections of Tehran. Some close to Bashar advocate looking east toward China, Russia, India, and Iran rather than toward the West in terms of developing economic ties. This view, in my opinion, is one that Bashar seems not to have bought into, for he knows that ultimately the improvement in the economy his country so desperately needs will have to be accomplished through enhanced trade relations with Europe and a revocation of the Syrian Accountability Act. According to various estimates, Syria will be a net importer of oil within five years barring any new reserves being discovered, and at current rates of production (approximately 400,000 barrels per day), the country will run out of oil in the 2020s. On top of a stagnant public sector-dominated economy with high population growth rates (exacerbated by the stream of Lebanese and Iraqi refugees escaping conflict), Syria’s economic forecast is bleak unless systemic economic and judicial reform is undertaken in a way that is paired with increased foreign investment and foreign trade.

Another opportunity? Late 2006 and 2007 To Syria’s secular regime, Israel is not an existential enemy, as it is to many Islamist entities in the Middle East, such as Iran, elements of Hamas, and Islamic extremist organizations. Rather, Israel is seen as a strategic threat to Syria, and it has certainly presented a manifest and serious strategic challenge from time to time. But it is also a country with which Syrian officials have held direct negotiations, and it is the only country that can return the Golan Heights, the prime foreign policy objective ingrained into Bashar’s being—and just about every other Syrian as well. Bashar observed to this writer during the Lebanon war in 2006 that he would be a “hero” if he was able to effect a return of the land that Israel seized in 1967, implying that it might be worth cashing in some chips to acquire the Golan Heights, such as Syrian influence with Hamas and Hezbollah, both of which became much more of a concern to Israel in 2006. The return of the Golan would give Bashar the necessary legitimacy to make concessions to Israel and the US resulting from any peace accord. Importantly, it might allow him to finally begin to dismantle the mukhabarat or security state in Syria. Ironically, the be-all and end-all of the return of the Golan pummeled into the minds of every Syrian since 1967, which has often been a hindrance to Damascus in terms of meeting public expectations in peace negotiations, can in the end provide Bashar valuable political space. There was no shortage of signals emanating from Damascus after the fighting that Syria was prepared to resume negotiations with Israel.21 A debate ensued inside and outside the Israeli

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government on whether to explore Syrian intentions. But Prime Minister Ehud Olmert remained steadfast in rejecting Bashar’s peace overtures, in part because he did not want to negotiate from a position of perceived weakness following the debacle in Lebanon. It was also widely believed that the Bush administration was pressuring Israel not to re-engage with Syria in order to maintain the US-led isolation of Damascus. Then came the Democratic victory in both houses of Congress in the November 2006 midterm elections, widely seen as a repudiation of Bush’s Iraq policy, followed by the publication in early December of the Iraq Study Group report. The commission was chartered to produce recommendations regarding Iraq, but commissioners soon saw that Iraq’s problems were so tightly interwoven with its neighbors’ that they concluded that this would have to address the question of improving the US position in the Middle East overall. Accordingly, and as something of a precursor to the stated intent of the Obama administration, they elaborated a broader regional diplomatic offensive and a call for the US to re-engage in a dialogue with Syria. The Iraq Study Group called for US–Syria talks as part of an overall diplomatic initiative in the Middle East that would restart negotiations on a variety of fronts leading ultimately to that elusive comprehensive Arab–Israeli peace, all of which would have serendipitous repercussions (from the US point of view) for the US position in Iraq, and it would by default diminish Iran’s enhanced influence in the region. For former Secretary of State James Baker and his panel, Syria is a keystone. As in the 1990s, their thinking assumes the following: with Syria engaged in peace negotiations with Israel amid an improved diplomatic environment with the US, both Hezbollah and Hamas could be more effectively contained. This would, in turn, lessen Tehran’s ingress into the Arab–Israeli arena, improve the chances for a final Israeli peace agreement with the Palestinians, and loosen the ties between Syria and Iran. In addition, Syria would be held to a higher standard in terms of more energetic efforts by Damascus to stem the inflow of support for Iraqi insurgents crossing over the Iraqi–Syrian border, thus helping US efforts to continue to stabilize the situation there. Syria even re-established diplomatic relations with Iraq in November 2006 (broken since 1982), in anticipation perhaps of becoming part of a regional diplomatic solution to the Iraqi problem. Reports of rumored and actual meetings between Syrian and Israeli elements began to appear in the press and created a buzz about the possibility of a new peace plan emerging. There was a great deal of hope in Damascus that the Bush administration would finally be compelled to give up its objective of isolating, if not overthrowing, the regime of Bashar al-Asad as well as relinquishing its support for exiled Syrian opposition groups. Not so. The Bush administration made it clear in December following the publication of the Iraq Study Group report that it would not reopen a dialogue with Syria. Quite the contrary, there were numerous reports and rumors at the time that the Bush administration had embraced with renewed vigor the idea of regime change in Damascus. With the support of regional Sunni Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, all of whom to varying degrees were interested in preventing a “Shi’ite crescent” from developing, as well as continued admonishment of Syrian opposition groups, the Bush administration wanted to ensure that Syria did not “win” in Lebanon through the political empowerment of its Lebanese allies. Bush administration officials wanted to split Syria off from Iran, but rather than attempt to do so through diplomatic engagement with Bashar, it wanted to do so through continued pressure and isolation. Anything less appeared, from this administration’s point of view, to be rewarding Syria for bad behavior. Any effort to trigger regime change in Syria is pure folly. The US has few assets to utilize in any attempt to effect regime change in Damascus, including the divided and delegitimized Syrian exile groups. Moreover, given the Bush administration’s track record of inept performance in the region, what would likely be the result? Israeli officials certainly did not want US-led regime change because it would most likely lead to another Iraqi mess on their doorstep, and perhaps another, even more radical, Islamic regime.

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There is certainly some question as to who might come to power in Syria should Bashar somehow be overthrown. I doubt any remaining significant regime figures would be any more willing than Bashar to re-engage with the West and Israel. America’s interests would be even more disadvantaged if a Sunni Islamist group took power, whether indigenously grown or supported by the exiled Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. It is difficult to assess the influence of Sunni extremism in the country because of the repressive apparatus of the Ba’ath regime, but from the number of women wearing the veil to more muscular sermons by imams and a few incidents of Islamist-oriented protests and violence, it is clear that fundamentalism is on the rise in Syria as elsewhere in the Arab world. The Islamist challenge is, indeed, worrisome to the Syrian regime, but several factors mitigate against an Islamic extremist takeover of Syria: (1) The effective repressive apparatus of the regime in terms of historical memory (Hama22), including actual detention and arrests to back up Syrian law regarding membership in an Islamist party, and successful infiltration of Islamist groups. (2) State control of the media as a kind of Syrian televangelism preaching a more tolerant and quietist form of Islam. The late Grand Mufti of Syria, Ahmed Kuftaro, set this ecumenist tone, one that is currently being carried forward by the new Grand Mufti of Syria, Ahmad Hassoun, and Muhammad Habash, who is director of the Center of Islamic Studies in Damascus and also a parliamentarian. (3) The large, if fragmented, non-Islamist elements in the country, that is Kurds, Alawites, Christians, Druze, Sufis, and the secularized Sunni business class; add up their numbers and you have over 50 percent of the country’s population, presumably ready to act as a bulwark against Islamic extremism. (4) The decision by Hamas and Hezbollah to participate in democratic elections has really placed jihadists in Syria and elsewhere in an intellectual bind. This, combined with the lack of intellectual rigor and unity among the salafists, provides the regime with a distinct advantage as long as it does not follow the Egyptian model of going overboard to accommodate Islamist trends in the country. This pattern of accommodation facilitates the creation of an environment for Islamic extremism in the long run and concurrently shrinks and restricts secular political space given the repression of democratic activists.23 The bottom line is that, other than periodic shuffles of the cabinet and the military–security apparatus, Bashar is securely ensconced in power for the time being; no serious threats to his position exist internally or externally.24 In light of these realities, logic dictates that the Obama administration could not possibly be thinking in terms of regime change in Syria. On the contrary, at least some form of limited engagement seems to be the order of the day, perhaps beginning with the return of the US ambassador to Damascus. Ideology and institutional inertia, however, often trump logic, and moral absolutism buries compromise. Obama will not be able to wave a magic wand and immediately build a productive relationship with Syria. It will take small steps leading toward bigger ones. The legacy of the Bush administration is tremendous distrust on both sides of the equation, as well as a web of UN resolutions, a UN tribunal, an International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) investigation into alleged Syrian efforts to build a nuclear capability, and the Syrian Accountability Act. All of these things have found their way into the US–Syrian dynamic, and they cannot be easily disentangled, especially as the Obama administration is compelled to deal with other important domestic and foreign policy matters.

Conclusion What should have been a sagacious foreign policy of dialogue and co-operation with Syria on Islamic terrorism, peace with Israel, and political space in Lebanon fell victim to a neoconservative ideological strait-jacket. Because of this, the Bush administration repeatedly failed to distinguish the trees from the forest in the Middle East. Syrian officials were tremendously disappointed over the lack of a positive response to their overtures from the Bush administration in late 2006. They met with Iraq Study Group

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representatives, and several US senators visited Damascus and met with Bashar in December 2006. Syrian officials truly believed a corner had been turned with the US. At the time, Bashar concluded that he must wait until another administration came to power in Washington, which, regardless of political party, could only be better than Bush.25 The decision by the Bush administration to attend a conference of Iraq’s neighbors in Baghdad in March 2007, including Syria and Iran, and then its participation at the ministerial level at Sharm-al-Sheikh in May (at which Condoleezza Rice bilaterally met with her Syrian counterpart) offered faint hope for rebuilding a constructive relationship. The fact that this came on the heels of a US–North Korean accord, agreed to within regional multiparty talks, suggested that the foreign policy of the Bush administration under Secretary Rice shifted in a way that might have positive implications for resuming a US–Syrian dialogue. More importantly, Syria was, perhaps reluctantly, invited by the Bush administration to attend an international conference in November 2007 held in Annapolis, Maryland, that was primarily organized to jump start Israeli–Palestinian negotiations. The issue of the Golan Heights was kept to a minimum, but Syria did send its deputy foreign minister, Faysal al-Maqdad, who performed admirably by all accounts. In the end, however, the conference did not energize any peace process at all in 2008 amid Israeli–Palestinian differences and divisions and weaknesses in both the Israeli and the Palestinian leaderships. In lieu of a US role, regional players began to enter Middle East negotiations as arbiters and brokers, from Qatar to Turkey; indeed, many were surprised by the announcement in May 2008 that Turkey had been brokering indirect Israeli–Syrian peace negotiations. This not only revealed the diplomatic vacuum in the region that the US should have filled, but it also indicated, contrary to Bush administration lamentations that Damascus only wanted the benefits of involving itself in a peace process without ever making the commensurate sacrifices, that, indeed, Syria was—and continues to be—serious about peace with Israel and that the Israelis are listening and at least exploring the possibility. Syria can, indeed, play a positive role. Syria apparently gave the green light to Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal’s participation in the Saudi-brokered meetings in Mecca in February 2007 between Hamas officials and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, which resulted in a Palestinian Authority power-sharing agreement (that has since completely broken down). Nonetheless, this, along with Syrian contributions to the Doha agreement over Lebanon, has shown the positive contributions Syria can make to peace and stability in the region. This is exactly how Bashar has been trying to position Syria. He will not cut relations with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas; instead, he would prefer to utilize Syria’s unique capacity to play both sides of the fence in order to facilitate dialogue and Iranian, Hezbollah, and Hamas engagement with the West, particularly the US. Maybe the election of Barack Obama has finally allowed the times to catch up with Bashar’s preferred foreign policy orientation. Bashar also supported the effective reissuing of the Saudi-constructed Arab–Israeli peace plan unveiled at the Beirut Arab League summit meeting in 2002, at the Riyadh Arab league summit in March 2007. And the Arab League summit meeting was held in Damascus in 2008, although the limited attendance by Arab moderate leaders signaled continued animosity between Damascus, on the one hand, and Cairo and Riyadh, on the other, with the latter two viewing Syria as an unwitting conduit for enhanced Iranian influence in the region. Syrian officialdom believes the ruling establishment in Saudi Arabia has little enthusiasm for a rapprochement with Syria, is still aligned with Washington, and continues to foment discord and disruption in a way that is inimical to Syrian interests. In other words, Damascus is not counting on the Saudis and is currently not expecting much diplomatic assistance from Riyadh.26 On the other hand, Bashar is confident that he has placed the country on the right side of the strategic equation in the inter-Arab arena, especially after Israel’s heavy-handed military action in Gaza against Hamas in December 2008 and January 2009. As the Arab moderates are seen in the Arab street as lackeys of the Israel and the US by their lack of

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support for Hamas resistance against Israel, Bashar’s stature in the region continues to grow as he has been consistently unwilling to give in to what has been called the American project. The walls of isolation of Syria were fast crumbling down in 2008. US hard-liners’ own isolation was spotlighted in April, when the new speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, led a bipartisan delegation of congresspersons, including the chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Tom Lantos, and the chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Henry Waxman—both of whom are close to Israel—on a high-profile visit to Syria and met with Bashar al-Asad. Although Pelosi reiterated most of the Bush administration differences with Syria, her effort to implement the Baker Study Group’s recommendation for US–Syrian dialogue was a symbolic victory for Damascus, demonstrating the bankruptcy of Bush administration policies aimed at Syria’s isolation. This was certainly a far cry from the antagonistic attitude Congress had toward Syria in the period surrounding the passage of the Syrian Accountability Act. In addition, the new president of France, Nicholas Sarkozy, decided to break with US policy and engage Syria in a quid pro quo foreign policy that produced some dividends once Syria acted as a positive force in helping to engineer stability in Lebanon with the Doha agreement. In return, Bashar was invited by Sarkozy to attend a European–Mediterranean partnership conference in Paris in July, a meeting that was also attended by Israeli Prime Minister Olmert. High-level diplomats from other European countries, including Great Britain, have all found their way to Damascus. By early 2009, everyone seems to be on board except the US. Even the Israelis, as mentioned earlier, have deemed Bashar’s peace overtures worth exploring. Bashar has continued to maintain the strategic choice for peace with Israel.27 This despite a September 2007 Israeli attack on a suspected Syrian nuclear facility, launching an IAEA investigation into the matter, as well as a US cross-border raid into Syria from Iraq in October 2008 to kill an alleged key figure in the Iraqi insurgency. These incidents did not alter Bashar’s overall course. He responded in a relatively limited fashion, understanding that he could not do much more but also realizing that he did not want to sour the relationship with the US at a time when the Bush administration position seemed to be softening a bit in 2007 or, more importantly, when an anticipated Obama presidential victory might augur a whole new diplomatic environment between the two countries. All of this has created another opportunity to improve the US–Syrian relationship. According to Bashar, until the US returned its ambassador to Damascus nothing much could occur in terms of US–Syrian cooperation. The Obama administration announced in June 2009 that it was prepared to do so. There must be an overt political process—no secret back channels. From Bashar’s perspective, Syria’s inclusion in a regional dialogue is the only way to guarantee consideration of Syria’s concerns regarding issues such as Lebanon and Iraq, and this can be accomplished through a region-wide conference sponsored in the main by the US and not one that is narrowly focused on the Israeli–Palestinian situation alone. The announced return of the US ambassador to Damascus has signaled an end to outright US hostility and the beginning of political co-operation.28 If Syria can be drawn (rather than forced) back into the mainstream Arab fold, perhaps a tacit, de facto alliance between a constellation of Arab states and Israel could be constructed, not unlike that which was formed against Iraq in the 1990–91 Gulf crisis and war. But Bashar’s self-confidence in terms of his power position in Syria and in the region has been on the rise for several years, riding in some ways on the wings of a more assertive Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. He believes he can now afford a wait and see approach as the Obama administration works out its foreign policy priorities and as Israel works through its own political divisions in the post-Olmert political environment following the February 2009 election. The bureaucratic and cultural momentum arrayed against renewed normal relations with Syria may also be difficult to overcome in the short term. But there are steps that can be taken on which to build a more permanent foundation of dialogue and trust in the future. Cooperation in Iraq is a good place to begin as both countries are interested in stabilizing the situation there. The flow of Iraqi refugees into Syria is overwhelming an already brittle infrastructure.

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There are an estimated 1.2 million Iraqi refugees in the country,29 whose presence is leading to rising rents, inflation, and overcrowded schools.30 Syria has a definite interest in stemming this flow and receiving more aid from the international community to deal with the situation. The formation of committees to examine security, energy, and refugee issues coming out of the 2007 Baghdad conference may provide multiple venues for Syrian and US officials to meet and discuss areas of mutual interest. This could possibly lead once again to some intelligence co-operation regarding al-Qaeda, another issue where Syria and the US enjoy similar objectives. This could be important in Lebanon, where Islamic extremist groups such as Fatah al-Islam, an organization claiming allegiance to al-Qaeda, established a threatening presence.31 This is too important a time in the Middle East for progress to be stalled by a game of diplomatic “chicken.” It seems that, under current conditions, small steps that could lead to bigger ones are the order of the day, although a new set of regional circumstances could easily reverse (or accelerate) the process. Perhaps for different reasons today, Henry Kissinger’s axiom regarding Syria is still largely accurate. Historians like to ponder the counterfactual in history, that is, what would have happened had the subject under discussion not happened. This is difficult, to say the least, because it is totally hypothetical. In some important ways, though, today we are seeing the counterfactual to peace in the Arab–Israeli arena. An Israeli–Syrian peace treaty should have occurred in 2000; therefore, the al-Aqsa intifada, the war in Iraq, and the 2006 Israeli–Hezbollah conflict are all the counterfactual turned reality to that should-have-been peace treaty. The US must take advantage of these opportunities so that another regrettable counterfactual assessment cannot be made ten years hence.

Acknowledgment This paper is one of a series that The Century Foundation is commissioning as part of its Prospects for Peace Initiative, which focuses on the conflicts in the Middle East that not only destabilize the region but also increasingly threaten American security and empower extremists. The Prospects for Peace Initiative seeks through dialogue and policy research to inform and enrich the American policy debate on long-running conflicts in the Middle East—core among them the Israeli–Palestinian conflict—and to advance pragmatic policy solutions to resolve them. The initiative works to bring a wide range of perspectives to the debate to help lay the groundwork for a durable peace supported and guaranteed by the international community. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Century Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. Copyright © 2007 by The Century Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of The Century Foundation.

Notes 1 See Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace. The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004); Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Vintage, 2005). 2 In support of this, see excerpts from some of Bashar’s speeches in fall 2000 in David W. Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005): 159. 3 These opinions revolved around Syrian actions in Lebanon in the 1980s, as well as what they believed to be Syria’s fraudulent involvement in the Madrid peace process, that is Damascus participated in order to improve its relationship with the US and Arab Gulf countries who could aid the Syrian economy.

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4 Of course, the Syrian regime under Hafiz al-Asad dealt with the threat from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in a ruthless fashion in 1982 at Hama. 5 In particular, see an essay in the New York Times, October 30, 2001, on Syrian–US intelligence co-operation. I was informed by a high-level US source that this article was extremely accurate. 6 The US Senate passed the act in November 2003 by a vote of 89–4; in October, the House passed it by a vote of 398–4. The act was signed into law by President Bush on December 12, 2003. The act directs the president to block the export to Syria of items on the US Munitions List or Commerce Control List of dual-use items. In addition, it requires the president to impose at least two of the following sanctions on Syria: (1) prohibit export of US products (other than food or medicine); (2) prohibit US businesses from investing or operating in Syria; (3) restrict the movement of Syrian officials in Washington, DC, and New York; (4) prohibit aircraft of any Syrian carrier using US airspace or taking off from or landing in the US; (5) reduce US diplomatic presence in Syria; and (6) block property transactions in which the government of Syria has an interest or is subject to US jurisdiction. In May 2004, Bush activated numbers one and four, both of which are mostly symbolic considering the fact that there were no Syrian carriers in the US to begin with and that trade between the two countries was minimal, less than $300 million in exports and less than $200 million in imports in 2002. 7 In support of the resolution, co-sponsor Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY) asserted, “We will not tolerate Syrian support for terrorism. We will not tolerate Syrian occupation of Lebanon. We will not tolerate Syrian making weapons of mass destruction; and we will not tolerate Syria’s lack of compliance with the oil embargo against Iraq.” He went on to say that “I do not want to witness horrors worse than 9–11. I urge the Administration to get tough on Syria.” At the same hearing, Rep. Gary Ackerman (D-NY) said, “This is not too big a nut to crack. Syria is a small, decrepit, little terror state that has been yanking our diplomatic chain for years.” Alluding to President Bashar’s background in ophthalmology, Rep. Shelly Berkley (D-NY) stated the following: “I don’t care if he’s a doctor, a lawyer, a plumber, a carpenter—this is not a kinder and gentler leader. This is a kinder and gentler terrorist, and we don’t need another one of those. He is no different from his father; perhaps, even worse because he should know better. This is a disgrace that this country isn’t standing up to this terrorist and making sure that this type of behavior is not only condemned, but eliminated.” 8 Speeches by President George W. Bush, April 4, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2002/04/20020404– 3.html, and June 24, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2002/06/20020624–3.html. 9 Text of the report can be found at www.iasps.org/strat1.htm. 10 The report further stated: “Israel also can take this opportunity to remind the world of the nature of the Syrian regime. Syria repeatedly breaks its word. It violated numerous agreements with the Turks, and has betrayed the United States by continuing to occupy Lebanon in violation of the Taif agreement in 1989. Instead, Syria staged a sham election, installed a quisling regime, and forced Lebanon to sign a Brotherhood Agreement in 1991 that terminated Lebanese sovereignty.” 11 Lebanon Study Group Report, “Ending Syria’s Occupation of Lebanon: The U.S. Role,” www.meforum.org/ research/lsg.php. 12 Ibid. It is believed that Syria has a chemical weapons capability, and it certainly has the long-range missiles to transport chemical weapons. Syrian officials, including President Bashar, do not openly acknowledge this, but they also do not deny it, commenting that such things should be expected when a small and relatively weak state, such as Syria, is threatened by a much more powerful state, such as Israel, which continues to maintain its position of nuclear ambiguity but is widely believed to have 100–200 nuclear warheads. The report states, “the Vietnam legacy and the sour memories of the dead American marines in Beirut notwithstanding, the U.S. has entered a new era of undisputed military supremacy, coupled with an appreciable drop in human losses on the battlefield. But this opportunity will not wait, for as WMD capabilities spread, the risks of such action will rapidly grow. If there is to be decisive action, it will have to be sooner rather than later.” 13 New York Times, April 15, 2003. In June 2003, Under Secretary of State John Bolton placed Syria on a “second tier axis of evil” along with Cuba and Libya (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were on the first tier). Syria was termed by administration officials as a member of the “junior varsity of evil,” the “ladies auxiliary of the axis of evil,” and an “axis of evil aspirant.” Quoted in Ross Leonard Fisher, “There’s Something About Syria: US Foreign Policy Toward Syria During the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations, 1994–2004,” PhD dissertation, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 2004: 122–23. 14 Interview with the author, Damascus, Syria, May 27, 2004 Then-foreign minister of Syria Farouk al-Shar’a had a more biting response: “You happened to have different teachers in school. One you respect and one you do not respect just because the style or conduct of that person is not attractive to you. But the one that you respect, if he just winks at you angrily, you spend the whole day upset because you respect him; but if you do not respect him, even if he says ‘go to hell,’ you do not accept it. You say to a friend that this man I do not respect, so whatever he says to me I am not going to respect. It would have been very harsh if it [calling Syria a rogue state] was directed at us by a respectable nation. How dare they put us in accountability, especially now with what is going on in Iraq?” (Interview with the author, Damascus, Syria, June 3, 2004). 15 There is also evidence to suggest that one reason the Syrian regime was facilitating the sending of insurgents into Iraq, especially salafists, was the hope that it could get rid of them, many of them either getting killed by Americans or rounded up as they attempted to re-enter Syria. Bashar repeatedly pointed out that, if the US with all of its money and resources could not control its border with Mexico, how could a poor country such as Syria even hope to do so. 16 For a delineation of actions against civil society and democracy activists in Syria during this time, see David W. Lesch, “Syria,” in Countries at the Crossroads (New York: Freedom House, 2007).

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17 Michael Slackman, “Syria Imposing Stronger Curbs on Opposition,” New York Times, April 5, 2006. 18 Robert Malley, “A New Middle East,” New York Review of Books, LIII(14), September 21, 2006: 10–15. 19 The resolution actually called for a “cessation of hostilities” and not a formal ceasefire, with a combination of the Lebanese army and a beefed-up UNIFIL moving into the south to act as a buffer to take up positions that were vacated by Israeli forces. 20 Including one by this author; see David W. Lesch, “Try Talking to Syria,” Washington Post, July 27, 2006. Breaking out of the diplomatic isolation imposed by the US is important to Bashar; establishing an official dialogue with the Bush administration would have weakened the anti-Asad Syrian exile groups. Evidence of this was his comment to me at the July 25 meeting in response to my query regarding President Bush’s infamous expletive regarding Syria that was caught on tape during a G8 summit meeting luncheon in June 2006. Rather than expressing anger at Bush’s caustic remark, Bashar told me that it was actually a positive thing; in other words, at least the American president was thinking about Syria, by implication meaning that Syria was having an impact and making an impression—and therefore it had gained some leverage. 21 For instance, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faysal Maqdad stated on August 27 on a visit to Oman that “when Israel, supported by the US, is ready to resume the peace process on the basis of international resolutions, Syria will be constantly ready to achieve results that restore the Arabs’ legitimate rights, notably a just peace. … We will continue our efforts to bring about a just peace.” Quoted in Times of Oman, August 27, 2006. Another important indication late in 2006 was Bashar al-Asad agreeing to receive in Damascus Sir Nigel Sheinwald, a senior foreign policy adviser to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, which was the highest level UK–Syrian diplomatic encounter since the launching of the Iraq war in 2003. “Blair in Secret Overture to Damascus,” The Financial Times, October 31, 2006, www.ft.com/cms/s/bd8ad28a-690f-11db-b4c2–0000779e2340. 22 In response to Muslim Brethren (MB) attacks against the regime since the late 1970s, President Hafiz al-Asad, in February 1982, ordered a devastating military attack against the city of Hama, an MB stronghold, that killed some 10,000–20,000 people. It effectively, though ruthlessly, quelled the Islamic extremist resistance. 23 Stephen Ulph, “Jihadi After Action Report: Syria,” The Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, www.ctc.usma.edu. 24 In a nationwide referendum on May 27, 2007, Bashar al-Asad, “won” another seven-year term in office with approximately 97 percent of the voters saying “yes” in the “yes–no” ballot (there were no other candidates). While the extraordinary hoopla (concerts, parades, fireworks, etc.) all over the country during the referendum process was most certainly planned and orchestrated in advance, my personal observations of the festivities in Damascus for several days in a row indicated to me that the outpouring of support for Bashar was, for the most part, quite genuine. 25 Bashar’s attitude certainly became more defiant. When I first met President Bashar al-Asad in May–June 2004, he was perplexed by the downward spiral in US–Syrian relations, but he was also hopeful that it could be reversed, mentioning many of the common interests that the US and Syria share in the region. When I met him again in May 2005, one month after the Syrian troop withdrawal from Lebanon, Bashar seemed resigned to the fact that the Bush administration was out to get him no matter what he did. He believed he had made a number of gestures, including getting out of Lebanon, improving security along the Iraqi border, and continuing to indicate a willingness to re-engage in peace talks with Israel from the position at which they had broken off in 2000, but he felt he was not getting any credit for them. He appeared to get angrier as we talked more about it. Then, on meeting him again in February 2006, he was a different person in this regard, emboldened, if not cocky. When I asked him if there was anything the Bush administration could do to improve the US–Syrian relationship, he replied in a bold tone that “I do not need anything from the United States; I do not want anything from the United States. I am more popular then ever in the country and in the region. Why would I want anything from the United States?” Finally, in July 2006, May 2007, November 2007, and October 2008 when I met him, he seemed supremely confident in his position, as if he had been right all along, especially regarding Iraq, and now he was the one in a position to make demands of the US rather than the other way around—a 180-degree shift. He stated to me on May 27, 2007, that “the United States has lost credibility and lost respect, and no matter how strong you [the United States] are, you cannot work with lies. Terrorism is much stronger and the United States is more vulnerable. You have emboldened the Islamists, not just the Islamic extremists, but the Islamists in general, and you have weakened the secular elements. In a few years if things do not change drastically, all the countries in the region will be ruled by Islamists.” 26 Author interviews with Syrian officials, including President Bashar, in Damascus in June and July 2007, February and October 2008. This may help explain why Syria turned to Turkey as a third-party conduit to Israel. 27 See an especially positive toned interview Bashar gave to the British paper The Guardian on February 17, 2009. Ian Black, “Assad urges US to rebuild diplomatic road to Damascus.” 28 Author interview with Bashar al-Asad in Damascus, Syria, May 30, 2007. As Bashar told me, “When political cooperation starts, then we can begin other types of cooperation, such as security cooperation [regarding Iraq and Islamic extremism].” 29 “Statistics on Displaced Iraqis around the World,” UNHCR, April 2007. 30 USIPeace Briefing, “Syria’s Relationship with Iraq,” April 2007, www.usip.org. For an excellent article on the Iraqi refugee problem in Syria, see Nir Rosen, “The Flight from Iraq,” New York Times, May 13, 2007. 31 See report in New York Times, March 16, 2007.

26 US–Jordan bilateral relations Jomana Amara

Introduction Even though the US and the Kingdom of Jordan have never signed a formal treaty, the relationship between the two countries has been close. The continued stability of Jordan, the increasing role that Jordan is playing in stabilizing Iraq, the co-operation of Jordan in the peace process, and the military and intelligence co-operation between the two countries are of primary strategic interest for the US. As a reflection of this strategic interest, Jordan became a major recipient of US assistance, both military and economic, in the 1990s. Between 1998 and 2002, annual US aid to Jordan was approximately $150 million in economic assistance and $75 million in military assistance. In 2003, primarily as a result of Jordan’s support for the US war against terrorism and operations in Iraq, US assistance to Jordan increased. Total economic assistance since 1952 now exceeds $4.4 billion. The US views the economic and military stability of Jordan as being an essential component in the on-going stabilization efforts in the Middle East.

Overview of Jordan The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a middle-income country with a population of 6.5 million that is highly urbanized, at around 80 percent. Jordan’s economy is open but with few natural resources and little manufacturing. The country has a large skilled population that works abroad. Jordan has inadequate supplies of water and consists mainly of arid desert with around 4 percent arable land. Its main natural resources are potash and phosphate. A substantial percentage of the population, 32 percent, is under the age of fourteen, resulting in a rapid increase in the working age population. Jordan currently has a large disparity between its official and unofficial employment rates at 13.5 percent and 30 percent respectively.1 The government is a hereditary constitutional monarchy. The prime minister and the cabinet (Council of Ministers) are appointed by the king. Jordan has a legislature composed of an elected 110-member lower house and an appointed 55-member upper house. The Jordanian parliament has limited power. As parliament has a pro-government majority, it rarely attempts any actions contrary to the wishes of the king. The constitution allows the king to dissolve parliament, postpone elections, declare martial law, and suspend the constitution. The king can also issue decrees not subject to parliamentary oversight and can issue provisional legislation when parliament is not in session. In terms of human development, Jordan is higher than average in comparison to middleincome countries. This is the result of consistently high levels of spending—more than 25 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)—on human development factors such as education, health, pensions, and social security. In addition, Jordan emphasizes a high level of gender parity in access to basic public services. However, population pressures and increasing income levels are placing escalating demands on the existing education and health services.2 In

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addition, there is an increasing recognition of the need for acceleration of educational reforms to produce students functional in a knowledge-based economy. Services constitute a significant portion of Jordan’s GDP. In 1980, services accounted for approximately 64 percent of GDP, rising to 72 percent in 2003. This high percentage is a direct result of policies designed to develop the financial sector, to accommodate inflows of workers’ remittances, and tourism, as an important source of foreign exchange. Jordan depends on one of the world’s highest share of workers’ remittances, about 20 percent of GDP, to support its balance of payments. The country developed into a provider of skilled technical and professional manpower and services for neighboring Arab countries. Its private and public institutions effectively became training centers for manpower that eventually migrated to the petroleum-rich Arab countries. Remittances and foreign aid allowed Jordan to maintain income and consumption patterns exceeding those available from domestic production capacity. The gross national income (GNI) per capita in 2007 was $5,160 (PPP method), which afforded the population one of the highest regional per capita disposable incomes compared with other emerging countries.3 The relatively comfortable economic situation can be credited as contributing to the country’s ability to maintain social and political stability (Tables 26.1 and 26.2). In the early 1990s, the Jordanian economy was highly regulated and recovering from an exchange rate and banking crisis. Economic growth was due to housing investment, and external trade and exports were predominantly mining and agricultural products. The government controlled a significant share of industrial production and regulated commodity prices. In addition, Jordan’s neutral stance during the Gulf War disrupted its relations with the US and the Gulf states. This resulted in a severe decline in the economic and military aid that Jordan received. The country was also struggling to absorb approximately 300,000 Jordanian refugees as a result of the Gulf War. Tourism, a major component of Jordan’s GDP, suffered a major decline. Since the early 1990s, Jordan has undertaken some broad economic reforms aimed at stabilization by reducing the budget deficit and the foreign debt through waivers and rescheduling. In 1994, the US Congress, in recognition of Jordan’s support for the Middle East peace process, passed legislation to waive $702.3 million of debt to the US. This represented almost

Table 26.1 Estimate of Jordanians working abroad

Arab countries Other countries Total

1975

1980

1985

1995

2001

2003

2006

264,700 39,500 304,200

261,500 43,900 305,400

276,000 52,000 328,000

200,000 21,700 221,700

215,200 26,100 241,300

265,500 28,500 294,000

– – 450,000

Source: Razzaz and Iqbal (2008).

Table 26.2 Value of Jordanian workers’ remittances (current year millions of dollars) 1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Payments 93 107 100 200 207 204 197 193 194 227 272 Receipts 1,094 1,244 1,544 1,655 1,543 1,664 1,845 2,011 2,135 2,201 2,287 GDP 6,237 6,732 6,928 7,246 7,912 8,134 8,447 8,941 9,448 9,952 10,814 Percent of GDP 19 20 23 26 22 23 24 25 25 24 24 Source: Jordan Ministry of Industry and Trade and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2006).

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10 percent of Jordan’s debt. However, Jordan’s other creditors such as Japan, the World Bank, Germany, France, and the UK were largely unwilling to forgive the nation’s debts. In a series of meetings with Paris Club creditors in the late 1990s, Jordan did succeed in rescheduling its debt to the eleven members of the Club. This relieved Jordan of debt servicing payments until 2007. In 2007, reflecting the improved economic and financial performance of Jordan, the country undertook early repayment of its debt. In addition, the Jordanians reduced trade tariffs and regulations, freed most commodity prices, and pursued a market orientation primarily through privatization.4 By 2000, the government managed to liberalize the trade regime sufficiently to secure Jordan’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) with major diplomatic support from the US. To facilitate WTO membership, Jordan amended its customs laws and enacted legislation protecting intellectual property rights. The nation also lowered tariff levels and liberalized its trade regime. Jordan also began to privatize public sector companies as part of its on-going economic reforms and as a means of encouraging private investment. Following the successful privatization of the telecommunications and cement sector, the Jordanian government sold 51 percent of the Central Electricity Generating Company in 2007 and plans to sell shares in the Irbid District Electricity Company, the As-Samra electrical power plant, and the Electricity Distribution Company. In addition, an initial public offering for the national carrier Royal Jordanian began in 2007. The government has accepted a build/operate/transfer bid for the expansion and management of the international airport and drafted a new energy law to open up the hydrocarbon-refining sector for investors. The economic crisis of the 1990s spurred the Jordanian authorities to enact extensive reforms in the Jordanian dinar exchange rate. The exchange rate was managed by a currency board from 1950 to 1964. The UK pound was used as an anchor. From 1965 to 1988, the dinar was pegged to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) within a margin of 2.25 percent. The dinar was allowed to float for a brief period in 1988 but was pegged again, with frequent adjustments, to the SDR from 1989 to 1995. Since 1995, the dinar has been pegged to the dollar at a rate of 0.71 dinars to the dollar. Building on the related reforms enacted in 2000, Jordan and the US began implementation of the Free Trade Agreement in December 2001, positioning Jordan as the fourth country (after Canada, Mexico, and Israel) to enjoy such a relationship with the US; Jordan also has an Association Agreement with the European Union. These measures have helped to improve productivity and increased foreign investments in Jordan. Jordan imported most of its oil from Iraq at a concessionary price. However, as a result of the US-led war in Iraq in 2003, Jordan was forced to import oil from other Gulf nations. This forced the Jordanian government to raise both the retail petroleum product prices and the sales tax base. The increase in petroleum product prices resulted in a spike in consumer price inflation and a marked increase in the current account deficit. Jordan’s export market, which is heavily dependent on exports to Iraq, was also affected by the war. The market recovered quickly, however, due to the Iraq rebuilding effort. Historically, Jordan has had difficulty attracting investments. The development of the US– Jordan Free Trade Area Agreement (FTA), Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ), and the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZA) are government attempts to integrate Jordan more closely into the global economy by spurring trade and investment. Substantial differences exist between the FTA and QIZ. US officials established the legal framework for QIZ in 1996 by offering special duty- and quota-free access to goods produced with specified minimum Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israeli content. To qualify, a minimum of 35 percent of the product’s appraised value must be produced in the QIZ. The 35 percent may be arrived at using one of three methods. The first method requires content of 11.7 percent from a Jordan QIZ and 8 percent from Israel (7 percent for high-tech goods). The remaining content may come from Jordan, Israel, the West Bank/Gaza, and the US. The

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J. Amara

second method requires that Jordanian and Israeli manufacturers maintain at least 20 percent of the total production cost. The third involves a combination of the first two methods. Textiles and apparel have been the primary products of QIZ to circumvent the high US custom duty on these items. Jordan feared that the 2005 expiration of the WTO multi-fiber agreement, which would allow China unimpeded access to the US market, would render the QIZ unprofitable. The Bush administration, however, reimposed textile quotas in some categories imported from China allowing a limited increase in imports to the US. As a result, Jordan experienced a rise in the number of QIZ companies registering in 2005. The QIZ ownership is overwhelmingly non-Jordanian. The FTA is a phased arrangement, only eliminating duties on a number of products after ten years. Products exported from QIZ have immediate duty- and quota-free access. The rules of product origin are different between the QIZ and FTA with a larger Jordanian percentage value added under the FTA. Jordan officially launched ASEZA in May 2001. As of 2004, the zone has attracted $1 billion in private investment and registered 250 companies. The zone is the largest free zone in Jordan at an area of 375 square kilometers. It offers investors a business income tax set at 5 percent, no tariffs on imported goods, streamlined labor and immigration procedures, and no restrictions on foreign equity investment. To date, the two largest projects appear to be tourism related, Tala Bay, a residential and resort complex, at $350 million, and Ayla Oasis, a marine town, at about $700 million. Over the next twenty years, approximately 50 percent of investments in Aqaba are anticipated to be tourism related, 30 percent in industry, and the remaining in services. In addition, a maintenance center serving Russian-made planes operating on Middle East routes started operating in 2007 at the King Hussein International Airport in Aqaba. The project will benefit from incentives offered by ASEZA. Since 2000, there has been rapid growth in merchandise exports especially in textile and pharmaceutical products. A significant portion of export growth is due to duty- and quota-free access to US markets from the QIZ. In addition, job creation was regarded as an essential component of QIZ in Jordan. The number of QIZ jobs created from 2001 to 2004 rose by 46 percent for local workers. The jobs available for expatriate workers, however, rose even more dramatically during the same time period by 360 percent. Many explanations have been provided for the increase in foreign workers. They include the perception that foreign workers are more efficient, willing to work longer hours, and have higher skills than local workers.5 The main economic challenges facing Jordan are reducing dependence on foreign grants, reducing the budget deficit, improving the level of basic government services, and creating investment incentives to promote job creation. To meet these challenges, the government of Jordan has promoted three programs. The first is the Social and Economic Transformation Plan (SETP). This plan focuses on economic reform through private sector development, education, political reform, and health care reform. “Jordan First” represents a second major policy initiative by the Jordanian government. This program encourages the participation of all Jordanians in civil society and governance and develops consensus on the future reform agenda of the country. A third reform plan, Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy (ERfKE), addresses the future human capacity requirements of Jordan through improved early childhood, primary, and secondary education. US aid to Jordan provides support for these three initiatives by focusing on water resources management, economic growth, democracy and governance, education, health, cash transfer, and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).6 The US and Jordan maintain close military co-operation. A US Jordanian Joint Military Commission has functioned since 1974. In excess of 300 Jordanian military personnel train in the US each year. Joint US–Jordanian military exercises take place on an annual basis. President Clinton in 1996 declared Jordan as a major non-NATO ally of the US giving Jordan priority status in the use of military assistance funds for procurement through commercial leases, stockpiling of US military material, and priority consideration for transfer of excess

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defense articles. Jordan has made some contributions in support of US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These contributions include committing 600 health care professionals and two military hospitals in Afghanistan and Iraq, courses for Iraqi military and police personnel, and donation of military and police equipment.

US aid to Jordan The US has increased aid to Jordan since the mid-1990s to help Jordan strengthen its economy and maintain domestic stability. In 1994 and 1995, Congress waived the equivalent of $700 million of Jordanian debt to the US following the Washington Declaration, which formally ended the state of war between Jordan and Israel. Since 2003, the US has increased the level of aid in recognition of Jordan’s support for the war against terrorism and operations in Iraq. The US provides both economic and military assistance (Table 26.3). Economic assistance to Jordan is provided as cash transfers and for specific development programs. The cash transfers have constituted a major portion of the US assistance program since 1997. The cash transfer program serves multiple purposes including providing Jordan with foreign currency to pay down its external non-military debt, helping reduce the international debt burden, and strengthening Jordan’s foreign exchange position. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt by implementing a multiyear balance of payment program. The US links policy reform objectives in the water, health, economic, and social development sectors to the disbursement of the cash transfer program funds. In return, Jordan provides an equal amount of money in Jordanian dinars to support development programs in Jordan. The local currency program associated with the cash transfer is programmed jointly by the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and

Table 26.3 US assistance to Jordan (current year millions of dollars) 2003a Economic support funds (ESF) Foreign military financing (FMF) International military education and training (IMET) Child survival and health (CSH) Total

2004

2005

2006

2007b

2008c

948.000 604.000 2.400

348.525 204.785 3.225

348.000 304.352 3.000

297.000 207.900 3.020

255.300 251.000 3.000

263.000 200.000 3.067

1,554.400

556.535

655.352

510.911

534.300

21.350 513.219

Source: CRS (2007, July 3). Notes: a The numbers reflect $700 million in economic and $406 million in military funding to help offset the effects on Jordan of the war with Iraq. b Estimate. The total for 2007 includes additional supplemental assistance in 2007 for military, counterterrorism, and assistance to communities affected by the large influx of Iraqi refugees. c Requested for 2008. In a press release of January 5, 2008, USAID in Jordan reported that the US will increase the ESF to $363.55 million and the FMF to $300. President Bush signed legislation on June 30, 2008 to further increase the ESF by $200 million and FMF by $50 million.

Table 26.4 US Jordan cash transfer program (current year millions of dollars) 1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

50

100

50

50

50

125

114.5

238.5

188

167.5

116

Source: USAID (2008). Retrieved August 21, 2008 from www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/ane/jo.html.

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USAID. This program has made several development initiatives possible by freeing up money that would otherwise have been used to pay off Jordan’s external debt. The US has provided $1.163 billion for the cash transfer program between 1997 and 2007 (Table 26.4). US assistance administered by USAID programs in Jordan focus on water resource preservation, social sector development and democracy assistance, and improving economic opportunities for Jordanians. Lack of water poses a serious challenge to economic growth and political stability in Jordan. The country is considered to be one of the most water-deprived countries in the world with average per capita use of 200 cubic meters annually, in contrast to the US where per capita consumption averages 9,000 cubic meters annually. It is estimated that two-thirds of the water goes to supporting low-value agricultural crops while demand from urban customers, industry, and tourism goes unmet. In addition, half the urban area’s water supply is lost as a result of leakages. USAID’s program for water resource preservation supports the reuse of reclaimed water, improving efficiency in municipal and irrigation usage, reducing water losses in the delivery system, and encouraging the substitution of high water usage, low economic return activities by more water-efficient uses. In 2008, the US donated money to facilitate a World Bank feasibility study of a canal from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea. The aim of the canal is to restore the water level of the Dead Sea and to generate hydroelectric power that can be used for desalination. Social sector development funding helps to facilitate the development of democracy and the strengthening of governance institutions. In addition, the social sector programs fund improvements in primary and reproductive heath care and modernizing elements of the educational system. In the governance sector, the emphasis is on strengthening the rule of law and the legislative process by improving parliamentary infrastructure, supporting stronger ties between parliament and civil society, and improving the status of women. In the area of rule of law, aid efforts are focused on encouraging transparency and efficiency in a free and independent judicial sector. These objectives will be accomplished by providing technical training for judges and upgrading the judicial training institute to include new coursework and new teaching methodologies. In addition, aid will be provided for the computerization of the courts for case management and administration. Programs focusing on legislative strengthening will upgrade the research capacity and use of information technology for parliament. To promote greater understanding and participation in legislative issues, funding will be provided for activities that promote stronger linkages between the legislature and civil society, media, and women’s groups. The outcomes from strengthening the civil–legislative partnership include improved legislative staff capability, stronger legislative institutional capacity, enhanced key non-governmental organizations’ engagement in the policymaking process, and strengthened capacity of the press to report responsibly on issues of parliamentary process. The goal of Jordan’s education reform program is to modernize and redirect education policy by restructuring educational programs, improving physical learning environments, and promoting learning readiness through enhanced early childhood education. With USAID assistance, Jordan launched the Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy (ERfKE) initiative in 2003. Under ERfKE, USAID will assist by creating public kindergartens, developing an accreditation system, creating school-to-work programs, and developing an IT curriculum for high school students.7 As a component of the social development program, USAID supports programs that stress improvements in primary and reproductive heath care, expand and institutionalize highquality health care services, and provide health information at national and sub-national levels in Jordan. The health programs emphasize family planning, reproductive health, and maternal and child health services. In addition to the activities that strengthen the delivery of maternal and child health services, USAID is working to improve important health indicators such as

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life expectancy, infant mortality, and morbidity. To improve important health management systems, USAID is assisting in adopting a more competitive legal and regulatory framework for the health sector that includes heath insurance reforms, decentralization of hospitals, development of systems for continuous medical education, and adoption of relevant health provider incentives. Finally, US-funded programs attempt to combine primary health services strategies and programs that prevent and treat chronic diseases and assist in the development and implementation of a national health communication strategy encouraging Jordanians to practice healthy lifestyles. The economic opportunities program supports the development of a more transparent and efficient public sector, a more effective legal and regulatory system, and increased depth of private sector growth. Increased competitiveness in the global economic system is essential for Jordan’s economic growth. Jordan requires technical assistance for legal and regulatory reform, intellectual property protection, information and communication technologies, and the creation of a more efficient financial sector. These measures will ensure that Jordan can seize investment opportunities related to global economic integration and promote a competitive private sector. USAID programs focus on institutional capacity building for the agencies regulating and facilitating trade and focus on ensuring that Jordan’s public and private sectors have the ability to respond quickly to trade and investment opportunities. In addition, USAID has implemented aid programs to provide support for participation and implementation of trade negotiations such as WTO accession and US FTA. Jordan has been able to benefit from funding from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a US government corporation designed to work with developing countries to promote sustainable economic growth. MCC is based on the principle that aid should reinforce good governance, economic freedom, and investments in people. MCC is responsible for administering the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which receives funds appropriated by Congress every year. MCC provides two different kinds of monetary assistance—compact agreements, to fund specific programs targeted at reducing poverty and stimulating economic growth, and threshold agreements, to assist countries that have not yet qualified for MCA compact funding, but have demonstrated a significant commitment to improve their performance on the eligibility criteria for MCA Compact funding. In October 2006, the MCC signed a $25 million Millennium Challenge Threshold Program Agreement with the government of Jordan. The program will help Jordan to accelerate implementation of its reform initiatives focused on improvements in public administration, civil liberties, infrastructure, and the economy. In November 2006, Jordan was selected as one of the countries eligible for additional assistance from the MCC, and Jordan began the process of applying for MCC Compact assistance. USAID is the lead US government agency tasked with implementing the Jordan Threshold Program. In addition, funds have been made available to Jordan by the US Trade Development Agency (USDTA) for projects in the telecommunication, power, water, energy, and transportation sectors. Currently, USDTA is funding a National Freight Information and Transportation Hub pilot and feasibility study for a nationwide freight information transportation system that allows cargo to be cataloged and tracked across a supply chain via a web-based platform for instant information. In addition, USTDA is providing a grant to the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation for a feasibility study on an improved wastewater collection and treatment system to serve the communities of the Zarqa River Basin in Jordan.8 As part of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), Jordan has received funding for nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and universities. The aim of MEPI is to fund programs that advance democratic reform, support the participation of civil society in government, empower women, and support the creation of small and medium size enterprises (Table 26.5).9 Military assistance to Jordan has concentrated on helping Jordan modernize its security forces and meet current security threats. In 2005, foreign military financing (FMF) funds

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Table 26.5 USAID program budget for Jordan (current year millions of dollars)

Water resources management Social sector development Economic opportunities

2004

2005

2006

2007

39.600 32.850 37.550

50.000 62.609 47.391

58.000 45.000 42.000

45.000 63.000 42.000

Source: USAID (2008). Retrieved August 21, 2008 from www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2007/ane/jo.html.

recognized Jordan’s support for the war on terror and help in rebuilding the Iraq security forces by providing funding to assist Jordan in establishing the King Abdullah II Center for Special Operations Training, a regional training center to help regional security forces, military forces, and individuals to meet existing and emergent threats. In 2007, FMF included funding for logistical expenses incurred by Jordan in support of US operations. Recently, US FMF has been directed toward upgrading Jordan’s forces. The air force purchased upgrades to US-made F-16 fighters, medium-range air-to-air missiles, and radar systems. In addition, Jordan purchased Black Hawk helicopters to enhance border monitoring and counterterrorism capabilities. The US delivered three anti-missile batteries to Jordan in early 2003. In 2008, Jordan became eligible to receive US Excess Defense Articles (EDA).

US–Jordan trade The US designed the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 1976 to provide preferential duty-free entry for certain products from developing countries. GSP was intended to promote economic growth and development in participating countries. GSP was the first preferential export program offered to Jordan by the US. Jordan’s main exports under GSP were jewelry, organic chemicals, edible preparations, stone and marble, and beverages. Despite the GSP program, Jordan exports to the US were minimal, reaching $11 million in 2005. The GSP share of total exports to the US is declining over time, and it appears that exports are using the FTA program for exports. The volume of bilateral trade between the US and Jordan continued to be quite modest in the 1990s. However, the volume increased significantly in the late 1990s. In 2000, Jordan ranked as the US’s 98th trading partner with $73.3 million in imports from Jordan and $316 in exports. Trade had been mainly in one direction, from the US to Jordan. However, there was a perceptible shift in the level of Jordanian exports in 2001. By 2005, the US was Jordan’s top export market at 29 percent of volume of exports and fourth supply source, and Jordan ranked as the US’s 70th trading partner. Trade between the two countries reached the $2 billion mark. Over 99 percent of Jordan’s exports to the US were non-agricultural goods whereas the imports to Jordan are 84 percent non-agricultural. The high level of bilateral trade is a result of two major initiatives, the Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) agreement and the US–Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Despite the change in volume of trade between the two nations, there was no significant shift in the composition of the traded goods. Agricultural products, mainly cereals and tobacco, constituted four of the top ten exports to Jordan. The other leading exports include manufactured items such as airplane and helicopter parts, wood pulp, vessels, turbines, and radio transceivers. Jordanian exports to the US were primarily textiles, apparel, suitcases, and jewelry (Table 26.6). The QIZ agreement was authorized by Congress in 1996. The program was intended to strengthen trade between the economies of Jordan and Israel and serve as a peace dividend by providing Jordanian goods with duty- and quota-free access to the US market. It was also anticipated that the QIZ would attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to Jordan and would

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Table 26.6 US Jordan imports, exports, and balance (current year millions of dollars) 1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Imports 25.3 16.4 30.7 73.3 229.2 412.4 673.5 1,093.4 1,266.8 1,422.1 1,328.9 Exports 402.5 353.0 275.7 316.9 339.0 404.4 492.4 551.5 644.2 650.3 856.2 Balance 377.2 336.6 245.0 243.6 109.8 –8.0 –181.0 –541.9 –622.7 –771.7 –472.7 Source: US Census Bureau (2008). Retrieved September 23, 2008 from www.census.gov/foreign-trade/ balance/c5110.html.

result in local job creation. Approximately 75 percent of Jordanian goods entering the US do so under the QIZ program. The QIZ are industrial zones that house manufacturing processes and can be compared with free trade zones. The differences between the QIZ and free trade zones are that QIZ have operations in both Jordan and Israel; they produce goods intended only for the US market; they are subject to oversight from the US, Jordan, and Israel in the determination of tariff relief. QIZ industrial parks are designated as such from the outset. QIZ articles must be substantially transformed in the manufacturing process, and 35 percent of the appraised value of the article must be generated in a QIZ. The remaining 65 percent can come from anywhere in the world. Of the 35 percent, 20 percent of the content must originate in Jordan or Israel, 15 percent from the US, Israel, the West Bank/Gaza Strip, or Jordan. However, the articles must contain a minimum of 8 percent Israeli content and 11.7 percent Jordanian content. Eligibility of products is determined by a Jordanian–Israeli committee with a US observer and is reviewed on a twelve-month basis. Both the private and the public sector play a role in the QIZ. Jordan currently has thirteen QIZ: three are administered by the Jordan Industrial Estates Corporation, a semi-governmental corporation with financial and administrative autonomy created in 1985 to promote the establishment of industrial estates in Jordan. The apparel industry constitutes 99.9 percent of all QIZ exports to the US. While the QIZ have been successful in increasing the volume of exports to the US, they are viewed as a low investment process with minimal linkages to the Jordanian economy. QIZ contribution to new job generation has been uncertain. The majority of jobs created have been for low-skilled labor, and QIZ owners have brought in large numbers of foreign workers under temporary labor contracts (Table 26.7). The US–Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed in 2000 and came into effect in 2001. This agreement is the first US FTA with an Arab country and reflects the importance that the US attaches to it bilateral relations with Jordan. Under the terms of the agreement, the two nations agreed to a series of phased tariff reductions. It is anticipated that all tariffs would be eliminated in 2010 except for the tariffs on tobacco, tobacco products, and alcohol. The FTA followed a graduated system of tariff reductions over a ten-year period. Currently, 75 percent of all Jordanian goods entering the US take advantage of the QIZ agreement enabling duty-free access for the goods. This could change with the full implementation of the FTA in 2010, as the rules of origin are more advantageous under the FTA enabling Jordanians greater flexibility in sourcing material. The QIZ agreement imposes a minimum of 8 percent requirement for Israeli inputs. In addition, articles entering the US under the FTA have no restrictions as to the territorial area of manufacturing in Jordan. However, all QIZ exports need to be manufactured and exported from designated QIZ parks. The FTA does encourage production sharing using rules of origin. This allows Jordanian exports with 35 percent Jordanian value added to qualify for import to the US under the FTA. In addition, the FTA allows up to 15 percent of value to come from US inputs; thus Jordanian value added can be 20 percent and qualify for entry to the US under the FTA. The FTA also compels the US and Jordan to implement intellectual property rights (IPR) for software,

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Table 26.7 Employment in QIZs

Jordanian labor Foreign labor

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

13,300 5,700

13,900 9,600

15,200 11,300

18,700 12,600

18,500 36,200

Source: Jordan Ministry of Trade and Industry, QIZ unit and Ministry of Labor.

Table 26.8 Jordan exports to the US by export program (current year millions of dollars)

FTA QIZ GSP NTR Total

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

– – 5 26 31

– 30 10 32 73

– 181 9 39 229

13 369 6 24 412

28 564 35 46 673

21 927 90 55 1,093

246 945 12 64 1,267

309 1,022 15 75 1,421

313 923 12 85 1,333

Source: USTIC Interactive Tariff and Trade Data. Retrieved October 1, 2008 from http://dataweb. usitc.gov/. Notes: FTA free trade agreement QIZ qualifying industrial zone GSP generalized system of preferences NTR normal trade relations.

Table 26.9 Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Jordan (current year millions of dollars)

Total FDI USFDI

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

310 n/a

158 30

800 n/a

120 n/a

64 31

424 31

620 34

390 72

1,200 78

1,480 84

Source: Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (2004) and US Department of Trade (2008). Retrieved September 23, 2008 from www/state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2008/100887.htm and www.mop.gov.jo/. Note: n/a not available.

copyrights, pharmaceuticals, and trademarks under the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) multilateral agreements. In addition, under the FTA, both nations resolved not to relax environmental laws to encourage trade. The US–Jordan FTA includes worker rights provisions in the body of the trade agreement rather than as a side agreement. This is the first instance of a US trade agreement including labor provisions and dispute settlement provisions in the text of the agreement. Exports from Jordan under Normal Trade Relations (NTR) are subject to the WTO prevailing tariff rates. However, the majority of articles exported under NTR may enter the US duty free under GSP, FTA, or QIZ. The use of NTR may result from lack of awareness of export programs or lack of compliance with the rules of origin and value added. The hope was that US–Jordan trade liberalization would stimulate FDI inflows into Jordan as multinational and regional companies take advantage of the trade agreements between the two nations to facilitate the entry of goods into US markets. Multinational companies would relocate some operations to Jordan to take advantage of duty-free access to the US, and US operations would reroute their purchases to Jordan to reduce production and import costs to benefit from

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either the FTA or QIZ arrangements. However, regional instability continues to hinder Jordan’s economic development by adversely affecting the investment climate and the attraction of FDI into the country. While FDI inflows have increased in the past decade, the increase has been erratic. Growth in the amount of US FDI in Jordan has been very weak (Table 26.9).

Conclusion Jordan’s small size and geographical location have made the nation extremely vulnerable to regional politics. The same regional political factors continue to define and affect US–Jordanian bilateral military and intelligence co-operation. These factors include the stability of Iraq, the stability of the Jordanian regime, and the role of Jordan in the peace process. The bilateral relations have progressed from a low in the 1990s when Jordan refused to join the alliance against Iraq to a high degree of co-operation in the late 1990s as a direct result of Jordan’s role in the peace process and its contribution to stability in Iraq. As a result of US confidence in Jordan, the US has increased foreign economic and military assistance to the nation. Military and intelligence co-operation between the two nations developed in the form of military sales, joint exercises and training, and the designation of Jordan as a major non-NATO ally. To strengthen the Jordanian economy and maintain its domestic stability, the US negotiated a FTA and a QIZ agreement with Jordan. However, regional instability continues to adversely affect Jordan’s economic development.

Notes 1 CIA (2008). Retrieved August 25, 2008 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ jo.html. 2 International Monetary Fund (2008). Retrieved September 12, 2008 from www.imf.org/external/country/JOR/ index.htm?pn=0. 3 The World Bank Group (2008). Retrieved August 25, 2008 from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTAT ISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. 4 $900 million in state-owned enterprise assets have been transferred to private sector control as of 2004 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jordan). 5 Kardoosh and Khouri (2004) point out that the Jordanian-owned companies have a small proportion of foreign workers and in some cases none at all. 6 US AID in Jordan (2008). 7 US AID in Jordan (2008). Retrieved September 20, 2008 from http://jordan.usaid.gov/. 8 United States Trade and Development Agency (2008). Retrieved September 24, 2008 from www.ustda.gov/. 9 Middle East Partnership Initiative (2008). Retrieved September 24, 2008 from http://mepi.state.gov/.

References Amara, J. (2008). “Military Industrialization and Economic Development: Jordan’s Defense Industry,” Review of Financial Economics, 17(3): 130–45. American Chamber of Commerce in Jordan. (March 2006). Jordan–United States Trade Report for 2005. Retrieved September 11, 2008, from www.jaba.org.jo/update/09.Jordan-US_Trade_Report_for_2005.pdf. Bouhga-Hagbe, J. (May 2006). “Altruism and Worker’s Remittances: Evidence from Selected Countries in the Middle East and Central Asia.” IMF working paper, WP/06/130. Retrieved August 23, 2008, from www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06130.pdf. Congressional Research Service (CRS). (December 4, 2007). Jordan: US Relations and Bilateral Issues (RL33546). Retrieved August 25, 2008, from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf. ——(July 3, 2007). US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2008 Request (RL32260). Retrieved August 25, 2008, from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32260.pdf. ——(May 1, 2001). US–Jordan Free Trade Agreement (RL30652). Retrieved August 25, 2008, from www.sice.oas.org/ TPD/USA_JOR/Studies/CRS_E.pdf. International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2008). Jordan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix (08/291). Retrieved September 29, 2008, from www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08291.pdf. Jordan Ministry of Industry and Trade and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2006). Assessment of Trade in Services of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Retrieved September 29, 2008, from www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/ Part%20I%20-%20Services%20Sector%20in%20the%20Economy%20(3).pdf.

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Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. (2006). The Executive Programme 2007–2009 for the Kuluna al Urdun/National Agenda. Retrieved September 15, 2008, from www.mop.gov.jo/uploads/Ex.%20Program%202007– 9%20English%205%20June%2008.doc%20final.pdf. Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, United Nations Development Programme and Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development/Queen Zein Al Sharaf Institute for Development, Jordan. (2004). Jordan Human Development Report 2004: Building Sustainable Livelihoods. Retrieved September 14, 2008, from www.pogar.org/ publications/other/undp/hdr/2004/jordan-e.pdf. Kardoosh, M. and Al Khouri, R. (2004). Qualifying Industrial Zones and Sustainable Development in Jordan. Jordan Center for Public Policy Research and Dialogue. Retrieved September 25, 2008, from www.erf.org.eg/CMS/getFile.php? id=570. Manneh, J. (2003). Qualifying Industrial Zones. Export and Finance Bank, Sector Report. Retrieved September 30, 2008, from www.menafn.com/updates/research_center/Jordan/Equity_val/efbqiz100603.pdf. Ramachandran, S. (2004). “Jordan: Economic Development in the 1990s and World Bank Assistance.” World Bank Operations Evaluation Department. Retrieved September 30, 2008, from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/14/ 36488608.pdf. Razzaz, S. and Iqbal, F. (April 2008). “Job Growth without Employment Reduction: The Experience of Jordan.” Paper presented at the Third Institute for the Study of Labor/World Bank Conference on Employment and Development. Rabat, Morocco. US AID in Jordan. (2008). Retrieved September 20, 2008, from http://jordan.usaid.gov/. Zaqqa, N. (2006). “Economic Development and Export of Human Capital: A Contradiction? The Impact of Human Capital Migration on the Economy of Sending Counties: A Case Study of Jordan.” PhD thesis, Kassel, Germany: Kassel University. Retrieved August 18, 2008, from www.upress.uni-kassel.de/publi/abstract_en.php?978-3-89958205-5.

27 Who lost the Middle East? The collapse of the neoconservative-led US–Israeli hegemonic project Leon Hadar

After the Chinese communists led by Mao Zedong won the civil war in China in 1949 and forced Chiang Kai-shek and his pro-American Chinese Nationalists to flee to Taiwan, US Congress and the press started to debate the question: “Who Lost China?” Conservatives blamed the “China Hands” in the US State Department, who were accused of exhibiting procommunist sympathies, while liberal critics argued that Washington’s long-time support for the corrupt Nationalists ended up producing anti-American blowback in China.1 Considering the continuing decline in US influence in the Middle East—from the Persian Gulf through the Levant and to the Holy Land—is it possible that sometime during the first or second term of the next occupant of the White House, when Iran, perhaps armed with nuclear weapons and supported by its proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, emerges as a dominant regional power, lawmakers and pundits in Washington will engage in a similar debate: who lost the Middle East? In many ways, the last visit by US President George W. Bush to the Middle East in May 20082—his advisers once referred to the region with the sobriquet the “New Middle East”3— could be seen as a defining moment in the history of America’s relationship with that region. It exposed the failure of the Bush administration’s Middle East policy that has been driven for eight years by the neoconservative officials and pundits whose agenda was based on what they considered to be two intertwining axioms: that the strategic interests of the US and Israel were compatible, and that those interests would be advanced by maintaining US hegemony in the Middle East with Israel serving as its local deputy of the American sheriff there. But as was becoming clear during the last days of the Bush administration, pursuing US policies based on these dubious assumptions proved to be disastrous for both US and Israeli interests.

Bush visits his “new” Middle East As he was drowning politically and personally in scandals that would lead eventually to a humiliating resignation from office, in June 1974, President Richard Nixon took a triumphant seven-day trip to four Arab states and Israel, where, as Time put it, “the huzzas and the hosannas fell like sweet rain.” The magazine suggested that, “coming out of the parched Watergate wasteland of Washington, the praise and the cheers of multitudes were welcome indeed, particularly since each stop, each spectacle, was beamed in living color back to the living rooms of the US.”4 Following on the flight route of another unpopular and disgraced Republican White House occupant, President Bush decided that, as it was raining in the Midwest, in the form of his falling approval ratings, it was time to seek the sunshine of the Middle East, hoping that the television images of his five-day excursion to the region in May, 2008 would help salvage his personal and political legacy in the Midwest and the rest of the US. Bush’s legacy included his ambitious strategy of transforming the Middle East and making it safe for US interests and values. Indeed, Bush’s tour to the region took place a month after the

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fifth anniversary of the beginning of the Iraq war, which was supposed to mark the launching of the Freedom Agenda in the Middle East. Bush and his neoconservative advisors had promised that ousting Saddam Hussein would lead to the establishment of a stable and prosperous democracy in Mesopotamia that would serve as a model for the rest of the Middle East, creating the conditions for the emergence of pro-US liberal political systems in the Arab world and for the resolution of the Israel–Palestine conflict, or as neoconservative pundits would put it as the US was preparing to invade Iraq, “The road to Jerusalem leads through Baghdad.”5 Hence, on the eve of the ousting of Saddam Hussein, Bush and the other supporters of the planned “liberation” of Iraq in Washington argued that, notwithstanding the death and destruction that Jews and Arabs in Israel/Palestine experienced in the aftermath of the second Intifadah that had started in 2000, the resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict could be placed on the policy backburner until freedom and democracy were established in Iraq. Iraq would be joined by free and democratic Syria and Iran, and other players in the Americandominated Broader Middle East in pressing a free and democratic Palestine to make peace with Israel. After all, the creation of a Westernized and secular Mesopotamia was supposed to have a “domino effect” on the rest of the authoritarian governments in the region. Hence, the withdrawal of Syria’s troops from Lebanon in the aftermath of the so-called Cedar revolution, which was celebrated as an important chapter in the US-led “democratization” of the Middle East, was supposed to help eradicate the sectarian splits in that country and make it possible to disarm and co-opt the Shi’ite-led Hezbollah into the political system. The expectation in Washington was that this would be followed by the collapse of the Ba’ath regime in Damascus, leading eventually to the downfall of the ayatollahs in Tehran. As the Bush Administration envisioned it, the dramatic explosion of freedom in the Arab world would make it more likely that the Palestinians would move to establish their own independent state and conclude a peace accord with Israel. In the first stage of that process, the Palestinians would hold a free election that would bring to power a moderate and peace-oriented leadership. But if the Nixon-in-the-Mideast spectacle and the accolades in Jerusalem and Egypt couldn’t help warm the political weather in Washington and strengthen Nixon’s hand in his battle to stave off impeachment, it was very doubtful that Bush’s May 13–18 trip to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, a follow-up to his trip to the same three countries and others in the region in January, would produce more than photo ops. If anything, Bush’s visit helped to highlight the gap between his grand designs for the Middle East and the depressing reality on the ground: the continuing violence and political and economic disintegration of Iraq; the failure to bring about an end to the Arab–Jewish dispute in the Holy Land; and the most dramatic development that has taken place since the removal of Saddam Hussein and the invasion of Iraq—the increasing power of Iran and its allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. “What we’re seeing here is, in a sense, the growing—the birth pangs of a new Middle East, and whatever we do, we have to be certain that we’re pushing forward to the new Middle East, not going back to the old Middle East,” said Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her effort to end the Israel–Hezbollah war in July 2004.6 During his visit to the Middle East in May 2008, Bush had the opportunity to observe the contours of this “new” Middle East, which looked very different from the way he, Rice, and the rest of the neoimperialists and democratic crusaders in Washington had envisioned it. There was an element of chutzpah in Bush’s assertion before the Israeli Knesset that diplomatic engagement with Iran—an idea proposed by, among others, his own Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Bush family’s close aide, former Secretary of State James Baker—could threaten US interests in the Middle East and strengthen Iran. In reality, it is the policies that Bush has pursued, including the refusal to open a dialogue with Tehran, that have been responsible for the weakening of the US position in the region and the increasing influence of Iran, making it less likely that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians would be resolved any time soon.

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Hence, the ouster of Saddam Hussein helped open a Pandora’s box of sectarian discord between the Shi’ites and the Sunnis in Iraq, igniting the current violence between the ethnic and religious groups in the country and turning it into new safe heaven for terrorists from around the Middle East. Al-Qaeda was able to establish its presence in Iraq only in the aftermath of the collapse of Hussein’s secular Ba’athist regime, which had been one of the fiercest foes of Osama bin Laden’s radical Islamist terrorist group. At the same time, the fall of Hussein’s Sunni-led Iraq, which had served as a counterbalance to the power of the Shi’ite-controlled regime in Tehran, ended up helping to strengthen the power of Iran in the Persian Gulf. The government in US-liberated Baghdad, which was composed of Shi’ite political figures and groups with close ties to Iran and the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon, which represented the growing Shi’ite community in Lebanon, were becoming part of what the pro-US Arab Sunni regimes describe as a pro-Iran Shi’ite crescent in the Middle East.7 Indeed, future historians will probably conclude that the implementation of Bush’s neoconservative agenda in the Middle East—the toppling of Iraq’s secular Sunni regime; the resurgence of Iran and its Shi’ite allies; a series of US-driven elections that strengthened the hand of Islamist parties in Iran, Lebanon, and Palestine; the breakdown in the Israel–Palestine peace process—provoked a set of powerful revolutionary changes that are challenging the post-cold war status quo in the Middle East, and in a way that runs contrary to the interests of the US and its traditional allies there. That was certainly the message that Bush received from these allies during his stops in Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, where there was clearly a sense of panic over growing indications that Iran’s Shi’ite allies are growing stronger and that the US is losing its hegemonic position in the region. In Lebanon, the Western-backed government was fighting pro-Iran Hezbollah forces and seized control of much of Muslim west Beirut. Iran and its Shi’ite proxies were demonstrating that neither the Lebanese military nor the various militias representing the Sunni, Christian, and Druze communities have the power to disarm Hezbollah. The other side of the coin was that the Americans did not have the power to impose a settlement in Lebanon, and that the interests of Hezbollah, and by extension Iran and Syria, who support the Shi’ite militias, had to be taken into consideration in any agreement to bring stability to the Levant.8 The “new” Lebanon is one in which “the strongest group comprises Iranian- and Syrianbacked Islamist Shiites and their junior partners, Christian and Sunni Lebanese allies,” wrote Lebanese columnist Rami Khouri recently. “They will share power in a national unity government with fellow Lebanese who are friends, allies, dependents, and proxies of the US and Saudi Arabia.” Khouri told The Christian Science Monitor that “Bush and Rice singled out Lebanon as a poster child of their success” during the so-called Cedar revolution that brought an end to the Syrian occupation of that country. “That makes the loss even bigger,” he added.9 In Iraq, the US-led offensive against the Shi’ite militia of anti-US and pro-Iranian cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in Baghdad’s Sadr City was suspended only after the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which is controlled by Shi’ite parties, sent a mission to Tehran and requested Iran’s intervention to halt the fighting in the Shi’ite neighborhood. As with Lebanon, Iran demonstrated that it, not the US, is the power broker in Iraq, where Iranian influence has been growing in the political, economic, and religious spheres. Ironically, while Washington continues to accuse Tehran of assisting the Iraqi insurgents, the Maliki government maintained close ties to Iran’s leaders.10 The worst case scenario was that Iraq gradually becomes a satellite of Iran, which in turn could emerge as the hegemon in the Persian Gulf, able to exert enormous influence on the Saudis and the other pro-Western petroleum sheikhdoms. These concerns were raised during Bush’s meeting with Saudi leaders, who do not have the military capability to contain Iran’s

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rising power. And if Iran succeeds in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, it would pose a threat not only to the Saudis and the other Sunni Arab regimes, but also to Israel. While Bush discussed the issue of Iran during his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and other Israeli leaders, the main reason for his visit to Israel was to take part in celebrating its sixtieth birthday and to try to revive (once again) the Israeli–Palestinian “peace process.” In the speeches he made in Israel, Bush promoted (once again) his Freedom Agenda for the region. After praising “60 years of democracy in Israel,” he stressed that “what happened here is possible everywhere.”11 But notwithstanding Bush’s public commitment to reviving Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, which he reiterated during the 2007 summit in Annapolis, Maryland, there was no indication that Israelis and Palestinians are closer to reaching an agreement to the principles that would guide a final accord. Olmert’s political power was now threatened by investigations into allegations of bribery, while the Palestinian Authority’s Mahmoud Abbas controlled only the West Bank and remained in power thanks to the backing of Israel, the US, and the European Union, which rejected any negotiations with the Hamas movement that rules over Gaza. Dramatizing the lack of progress on the Israel–Palestine front and the potential for a major war between Israel and Hamas, Palestinians in Gaza launched a large-scale rocket attack on an Israeli shopping mall while Bush was at a gala event in Israel. While many Israelis have hailed Bush as one of the most pro-Israel US presidents, others point out that the stalemate in the peace process and the failure to implement a two-state solution—an Israel side-by-side with an independent Palestine—threatened Israel’s survival as a Jewish state, as more and more Palestinians would demand the creation of a single, binational state in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. Indeed, it was difficult to argue that Bush’s policies were advancing the long-term interests of Israel—or for that matter, those of the US and its allies in the Middle East. That was the depressing reality that the White House and its neoconservative allies would be facing during the last six months of the Bush administration. It was not surprising, therefore, that pundits were speculating that the Americans and the Israelis, with tacit support from the Saudis and other Arab Sunni governments, might decide to take military action against Iran, as well as against Hezbollah and Hamas, before Bush leaves office as a way of reversing the regional rise in power of Tehran and its proxies. According to an Israeli Army radio report quoted in the Jerusalem Post, a “senior member” of Bush’s traveling entourage told officials in Jerusalem that Bush intended to attack Iran before the end of his term, but that Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates’ were opposed to such action.12 At the same time, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst Philip Giraldi reported on the American Conservative website that speculation in Washington was growing that the National Security Council agreed with plans to attack an Iranian camp where Iraqi insurgents are believed to be trained. Gates, however, counseled delaying any offensive action.13 There were also growing indications that Israel was preparing for a massive military strike against the Hamas forces in Gaza, which could result in an invasion of that Palestinian territory by Israel. According to the Israeli press, Vice President Dick Cheney gave Israel the green light for such an operation during his last visit to the country. And interestingly enough, after expressing opposition to the opening of negotiations between Israel and Syria that could result in a peace agreement between the two countries, there were signs that the Bush administration is now approving such an Israeli–Syrian dialogue, mediated by Turkey, as part of an effort to provide Damascus with incentives to end its partnership with Iran. The Americans and the Israelis were apparently hoping that co-opting Syria into the pro-US coalition in the Middle East would weaken the power of Hezbollah, which receives military support from Iran via Syria. These and other reports suggested that a new Middle Eastern war, pitting the US, Israel, and other pro-US players against Iran and its proxies in Lebanon and Gaza, could take place before the November presidential election, a dramatic development that could affect the outcome of

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the race. But a US military conflict with Iran would only speed up what would probably turn out to be the most dramatic makeover of the Middle East since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Western takeover of the region after the First World War. The partnership between the US and Israel has helped produce these changes in the Middle East. But this relationship would be transformed as a result of the new balance of power evolving in the region.

The neoconservatives and US–Israeli relationship The terrorist attacks on the American homeland on September 11, 2001 highlighted the costs of the US strategy of maintaining US hegemony in the Middle East after the end of the cold war and, particularly, in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. That strategy had been embraced by both Republican President George H.W. Bush and the Democratic administration of President Bill Clinton, and it was based on the notion that an “over the horizon” presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states would be sufficient to contain the anti-status quo powers of Iraq and Iran (a policy known as “offshore balancing”), and that continuing US diplomacy aimed at fostering peace between Israel and the Palestinians would help win the support of the moderate Arab regimes in the region. In short, it was a low-cost strategy aimed at deterring potential challenges from regional players, such as Baghdad and Tehran, as well as global powers such as the European Union. In this context, Turkey, the pro-American Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf, the Levant, and Egypt were expected to play a supporting role in this scenario of cost-free Pax Americana. There was very little pressure on Israel to end its settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza, with the Clinton administration occasionally dispatching its diplomatic brigades to the region as part of an effort to create an impression that it was trying to make progress in the peace process involving the Jewish state, the Palestinians, and Syria.14 But the collapse of the Camp David talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians in 2000 and the start of the second Intifadah, followed by 9/11, illustrated the need for replacing the old deluxe Pax Americana approach in the Middle East and also provided Americans with a glimpse of hell-on-earth, of what could happen if the tensions between the West and the Islamic world degenerated into a bloody confrontation—with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict becoming a major source of this apparent global clash. US policy in the first months of the presidency of George W. Bush could have followed the realist approach to the region that was pursued by President George H. W. Bush and then Bill Clinton, of trying to help resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in a way that would have served common US and Israeli interests. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Secretary of State Colin Powell, the leading proponent of this realpolitik view in the new administration, was trying to promote a new effort to revive Israeli–Palestinian negotiations along the lines of a Saudi peace proposal, which was based on the notion that the road to a creating a new balance of power in the region that would favor US and Israeli interests led through Jerusalem and not Baghdad.15 An activist and creative US role in creating the conditions for the resolution of the main issues separating Israelis and Palestinians—the future of the Jewish settlements in the occupied Arab territories, the status of Jerusalem and the Jewish and Moslem religious sites there, the demand for the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees—could have weakened the hands of Muslim radical figures (such as Osama bin Laden) and secular Arab leaders (such as Saddam Hussein) while strengthening the hands of the pro-American governments in the region and lessening anti-US sentiments in the Middle East, and by extension, the ability of terrorist groups to attract more public support and new recruits.16 Instead, the neoconservative ideologues that emerged as the central players in the policy process and the elite discourse in Washington succeeded in exploiting the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in order to advance a US-led messianic crusade to remake

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the Middle East—in the most devastating way, as far as US national interests and the Western presence in the Middle East were concerned. And while the neoconservative agenda seemed to be advancing short-term Israeli interests by providing then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon with the green light to crush the second Intifadah, isolate Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and members of his Fatah movement, and implement a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the implementation of the ambitious American strategy, including the invasion of Iraq and the threats to do “regime change” in Tehran and Damascus as part of a hegemonic project, ended up harming the long-term security of the Jewish state. In a way, the neoconservative notion that the US and Israel were allied together in the cause of spreading democracy in the Middle East and worldwide would be scoffed at by Israeli officials and pundits who tend to subscribe to a realpolitik reading of their national interests. After all, their government has been strengthening its military ties with China despite US opposition. Israelis are not “pro-American” because of their commitment to Jeffersonian values—the Jewish state has yet to adopt a constitution—but because they concluded that their interests and those of the US are compatible now. But they have always seen this “special relationship” not as a marriage but as an affair. And like any affair, it could end. Indeed, there was a time when Israelis were pro-Soviet and pro-French.17 In 1948, Stalin’s Soviet Union was the most enthusiastic supporter of establishing Israel, which it hoped would be a leading anti-imperialist post in the Middle East, while Secretary of State George Marshall pressed Harry Truman not to recognize the new state, warning that it could harm America’s position in the region. Hence Moscow recognized Israel immediately after the state was proclaimed and provided it with arms, while it took the Americans more than a year to grant de jure recognition to Israel, on which they imposed an arms embargo. At the height of the “InRussia-With-Love” mood in Israel, the expectation was that the new state would remain neutral in the evolving cold war. Then Israel had its French kiss. It was France that served as Israel’s main source of arms in the 1950s and early 1960s and helped it develop its nuclear arsenal. Israel was then embracing a European orientation and forming close ties with an emerging Franco-German bloc to help resist US pressure to end its nuclear program. The Israeli alliance with France reached a peak in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez campaign during which the two conspired (with Britain and against US wishes) to oust Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Their interests were seen to be compatible as the French tried to suppress the Nasser-backed struggle for independence in Algeria. But after Charles de Gaulle’s decision to grant independence to Algeria, the relationship between Israel and France cooled; relations soured after Israel rejected the aging French leader’s advice not to attack Egypt in 1967. It was only after Israel’s 1967 victory over Egypt, a Soviet ally, that the intellectual predecessors of today’s neoconservatives started popularizing the idea of Israel as an American “strategic asset” in the Middle East. Members of the first generation of neoconservatives, such as the Rostow brothers and Ben Wattenberg, who served in the administration of President Lyndon Johnson, helped him drum up support for the Vietnam war among Jewish liberal democrats who had been opposed to that military adventure. This was done by convincing such liberals that only a militarily strong and perpetually interventionist America can guarantee the security of Israel. The corollary was that a strong Israel is a “strategic asset” as far as US interests in the Middle East were concerned, helping Washington to contain Soviet expansionism in the area. This was reduced to the neoconservative dogma that what is good for Israel is good for America, and vice versa. Neocons have treated the questioning of this dogma as the equivalent of a declaration of war and have immediately sought, by innuendo, to brand such questioners as “anti-Semitic.”18 Israel became one of the most important elements on the agenda of the neoconservative coalition that emerged as a counterforce after the 1972 victory of presidential candidate George McGovern in the Democratic Party. In 1968, the neocons backed the late Senator Hubert Humphrey from Minnesota for president. In 1972, they mobilized their support

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behind the late Senator Henry Jackson from Washington. Both Humphrey and Jackson represented staunch anti-Soviet and pro-Israeli positions in the party. Senator Jackson’s aides, Richard Perle and Elliott Abrams, who later became major figures in the Reagan foreign policy team, attempted to torpedo any effort by the Nixon and Carter administrations to improve relations with the Soviet Union or to launch peace efforts in the Middle East. And it was the Carter administration’s foreign policy agenda, including its efforts to improve the relationship with the Soviets and to accommodate the national interests of the Palestinians, that accelerated the political transition of the neocons from the Democratic to the Republican Party, with some of their leading figures holding key positions in the administration of President Ronald Reagan. Neoconservatives in the Reagan administration argued that Israel should become America’s leading ally in the region during the renewed cold war tensions, while depicting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a Soviet stooge. For members of the second generation of neoconservatives, including officials such as UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle, and Elliott Abrams, and for more traditional anti-Soviet officials, such as Marine Colonels Robert McFarlane and Oliver North, Israel was a country that could combat Soviet mischief by no-nonsense foreign policy realism, unbound by domestic legal constraints. The neoconservative propagandists proposed Israel as a model for recovering from “postVietnam syndrome” and for renewing American energy and drive. Unilateral US intervention in places such as Grenada and Libya began to resemble Israel’s own iron fist approach to Middle East issues. The two countries found themselves increasingly alone in international organizations such as the United Nations. A visitor from Mars to the UN headquarters in 1985 would have found it difficult to decide, after listening to US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and Israeli Ambassador Benjamin Netanyahu, which of the two represented the US and which Israel. To the Likud Party, the policies of the Reagan administration seemed to offer Israel time to consolidate its hold on the West Bank and Gaza. The neoconservatives occupying top positions on Reagan’s foreign policy team encouraged Washington to view the Arab–Israeli conflict through cold war lenses, and to identify Palestinian nationalism as an extension of Soviet-induced international terrorism. In that context, Washington could view Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands with benign neglect. All this was accomplished at serious cost for both Israel and the US. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Iran-Contra affair were among the harmful products, while the first Intifadah highlighted the destructive consequences of the neoconservative “strategic asset” formula and its operational implication of placing the Palestinian issue on the backburner. But the end of the cold war seemed to spell disaster to the neocons, now at risk of being deprived of their favorite enemy and the justification for the strategic alliance between Washington and Jerusalem. Enter the Middle Eastern bogeyman, as neoconservative intellectuals began focusing on the need for the US to confront the new transnational enemy from the Middle East, radical Arab nationalism and Islamic “fundamentalism,” or what columnist Charles Krauthammer termed the “global Intifadah.”19 The notion that America was threatened by a new set of enemies in the Arab and Muslim worlds in the aftermath of the cold war seemed to fit into the evolving neoconservative narrative. It suggested that the value of the strategic relationship between the US and Israel was now becoming even more significant as the military strength of the Jewish state could serve as a deterrent to radical Arab regimes and help shore up shaky ones.20 By this vision, Israel could become the contemporary crusader state, a bastion of the West in a region and a world beset by the threat of what President George W. Bush, reflecting the neoconservative narrative, described as Islamo-Fascism.21

Israel as America’s “strategic asset”: the geostrategic paradox But even as Israel and the US were strengthening their ties, there was recognition in both governments of the strategic constraints on their relationship. America could not maintain its

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position in the Middle East without establishing a presence in the Arab world, while Israel’s friendship with America could not substitute for the acceptance of Israel by its Arab neighbors. Washington’s efforts to bring about Middle East peace had to be an integral and central part of a strategy to advance US and Israeli interests. Indeed, Washington’s ability to play the role of an honest broker between Israel and Egypt (and Syria) after the 1973 Middle East war was only made possible when Richard Nixon reestablished diplomatic ties with Cairo, co-opting it into the pro-American camp. It was the even-handed US role that made it possible for Jimmy Carter to mediate the historic peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1979 and for George H.W. Bush to launch a round of Israeli–Arab negotiations after the Gulf War in 1991 that resulted in the peace accords between Israel and the PLO and Jordan. Hence, from an Israeli perspective that regarded peace with the Arabs as a top national interest, the pressure on Israel by Nixon, Carter, and Bush to withdraw from occupied Arab territories in exchange for peace reflected a genuinely pro-Israeli direction of US policy as the agreements with Egypt, the Palestinians, and Jordan advanced the Jewish state’s long-term strategic interests. But of course, if you were listening to the proponents of Greater Israel in Jerusalem and their neoconservative allies in Washington, Nixon, Carter, and Bush were the enemies of the Jewish people. At the same time, a realistic analysis of Israeli interests would have concluded that there was nothing pro-Israeli in the willingness of the Reagan administration to treat with benign neglect Israel’s creeping annexation of the West Bank, creating the conditions for the outbreak of the first Intifadah, or in giving Israel a yellow light to invade Lebanon in 1982. Those US policies reflected the agenda of Likud and its neoconservative partners, with their emphasis on propping up the “strategic asset” by placing the Palestinian issue on the backburner and punishing the “pro-Soviet” PLO. They resulted in the rise of Palestinian and Shi’ite terrorism aimed against both the Jewish state and the US and damaged core Israeli and American interests.22 The same kind of geostrategic paradox—an American administration that is tagged as “proIsraeli” but whose policies damage the long-standing interests of the Jewish state—will be recalled as one of the legacies of George W. Bush. After 9/11, and against the backdrop of the second Intifadah and the Iraq war, a new generation of neoconservatives succeeded in marketing to another White House the notion that the US and Israel were now being brought together in a strategic alliance against “Islamo-Fascism.” This alliance would operate with America as sheriff and Israel as its deputy while Israeli–Palestinian peace is placed on the backburner. Bush and his advisers saw America’s battle with Iraq and Israel’s battle with the Palestinians as part of the same war, according to Ha’aretz chief political analyst, Akiva Eldar. “They have actually suggested that Israel will help the United States to take over the Middle East,” Eldar said. “They were sitting in think tanks that believed that you don’t even try to appease or satisfy the Arabs, you reach peace by force which means you impose it [and] you don’t make concessions to people you don’t trust, and that puts them and Sharon in the same party.”23 Consider the results of US policies—the coming to power of radical Shi’ites in Baghdad and the strengthening influence of Iran and its allies; the radicalization of the Palestinians, the election of Hamas, and an environment less conducive for Arab–Israeli peace; the growing isolation of the US and Israel in the Middle East, in Europe, and around the world. Is it surprising that many Israelis were now asking: if we have a pro-Israeli administration in Washington, how would an anti-Israeli one look?

How the Iraq war disappointed Israel There is no doubt that, in the months leading to the US invasion of Iraq, Israeli officials and analysts were jumping on the American bandwagon. After all, it became clear that the ousting of Saddam Hussein was inevitable and, despite Israel’s tragic failure in achieving “regime change” in multiethnic Lebanon in 1982, most Israeli observers expected that the American

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experience in Iraq would be more successful and benefit short-term Israeli interest by ridding the region of the anti-Israeli leader in Baghdad, and were not even trying to hide their glee over American plans to conquer Mesopotamia. “Enthusiastic IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] Awaits War in Iraq,” screamed the headline in the respected Israeli daily Ha’aretz on February 17, 2003. “The military and political leadership yearns for war in Iraq, seeing it as an opportunity to win the war of attrition with the Palestinians,” reported diplomatic editor Aluf Benn. Senior IDF officers and those close to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, such as National Security Advisor Ephraim Halevy, painted a rosy picture of the wonderful future Israel can expect after the war. They envisioned a domino effect, with the fall of Saddam Hussein followed by that of Israel’s other enemies: Arafat, Hassan Nasrallah, Bashar Assad, the ayatollah in Iran, and maybe even Muhammar Gadaffi. Along with these leaders, the war would bring about the disappearance of the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Benn also noted that there was “excitement” in the IDF’s planning department over the standoff between the US and its NATO allies: “A paper distributed to the army’s upper echelons even spoke of an opportunity to ‘remove the pro-Palestinian Europeans from the Middle East.’” Israeli officials concluded, according to Benn, that the US would “punish the Europeans for their back-stabbing on the road to Baghdad, and will no longer ask them for input regarding Israeli concessions.” Benn quoted Maj. Gen. Amos Gilad, Co-ordinator of Government Activities in the West Bank and Gaza, voicing the Israeli army’s belief that a US-led war for regime change in Iraq would establish a precedent for, in Gilad’s words, “the removal of other dictators closer to us who use violence and terror.” Reflecting official and public Israeli attitudes at that time, polls indicated that a large majority of Israelis cheered the removal of Saddam Hussein by the Americans.24 Ironically, after American critics of the planned war against Iraq raised these same points, suggesting that neocons were pressing for Saddam’s ousting because they were hoping that it would help secure Israeli interests, mainstream US media columnists seemed to insist that Americans must not speak as frankly as the Israelis. When then New York Times columnist (and now editor) Bill Keller wrote about the possible effects of the invasion of Iraq on Israeli interests, he made it clear that he wasn’t trying to advance “one of the more enduring conspiracy theories of the moment, the notion that we are about to send a quarter of a million American soldiers to war for the sake of Israel,” and he even chose an ironic title for his piece, “Is It Good for the Jews?”25 But an alternative title, “Is It Good for Israel?” would certainly have captured the gist of his column—that the war was perceived in Jerusalem and Washington to be in Israel’s interest. But was it? That was certainly not the conclusion that you would be drawing after skimming through analyses issued by Israeli experts since the collapse of Saddam’s statue in downtown Baghdad, which suggest that America was fighting the right war (against terrorism) in the wrong place (Iraq). “The war in Iraq did not damage international terror groups but instead distracted the United States from confronting other hotbeds of Islamic militancy and actually ‘created momentum’ for many terrorists,” the Associated Press reported of a study conducted by “a top Israeli security think tank.” The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University said that, far from undermining Islamic militants, the Iraq war “has created momentum for many terrorist elements, but chiefly al-Qaeda and its affiliates.” The center’s director, Shai Feldman, suggested in the report that the vast amount of money and effort the US has poured into Iraq has deflected attention from other centers of terrorism, such as Afghanistan. The focus of US intelligence upon Iraq “has to be at the expense of being able to follow strategic dangers in other parts of the world,” he wrote. The bottom line of this and other similar Israeli studies is that Iran, and not the US, has emerged from the war in Iraq as the major winner.26 Even more intriguing was the way Israeli officials and pundits scoffed at the Wilsonian fantasies of the neocons—fantasies of using the invasion of Iraq as the first stage in

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“democratizing” the Middle East. Not only were most Israeli experts suggesting that such a scheme is impractical, they also argued that the collapse of authoritarian regimes in places such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan is bound to bring to power anti-Israeli and anti-American forces. As Israeli leaders saw it, the Jewish state would have a hard time adjusting to a democratic Arab world in which public opinion, rather than centralized rulers, determined policy. Yehezkel Dror, a political science professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, related the Israeli establishment’s view: “We’re all for democracy, but let us imagine democracy in Egypt or Jordan. Will it strengthen their peace with Israel?” Dror and his colleagues have concluded that the answer to this question is a clear “No!”27 That explained why Newsweek characterized the reputation of Natan Sharansky—George W. Bush’s favorite author and the prophet of Middle Eastern democracy—in Israel as that of a “scorned idealist.” “I’m very frustrated,” Sharansky told the international edition of Newsweek. “My ideas are not taken seriously at all [in Israel].” Why? Because they were perceived as “too disconnected from the harsh Middle East reality,” Sharansky explained, noting that most Israelis believe that democracy in the Arab world could easily translate into even greater hostility toward Israel.28 In short, there was a growing recognition in Israel that the Iraq war was not so good for the Jews. It has diverted attention and resources from the war on terror and threatened to unleash anti-Israeli and anti-American forces in the Middle East—such as a Shi’ite clerical government in Iraq that could become an ally of a radical Shi’ite, nuclear-armed Iran, which would pose more of a long-term threat to the strategic interests of the Jewish state than the militarily weak Saddam ever did.29 Israel’s enthusiastic support for US intervention in Iraq was easy to understand: an opportunistic response by a client state that had hoped to get a free ride on a successful military operation against an anti-Israeli Arab state. “Unlike during the Roman Empire, this time the current reigning empire is with us,” explained Likud politician Benjamin Netanyahu in the immediate aftermath of the successful US military operation in Iraq. But what many Israelis failed to take into consideration was that the American empire could fail. “What was interesting is that among the many scholars preoccupied with the war in Iraq, not a single one has discussed the possible outcome of an American withdrawal, in the wake of faulty handling of the war,” Ze’ev Schiff, Ha’aretz’s military analyst, wrote recently. If that happens, Israelis’ “relatively optimistic intelligence assessment regarding strategic threats to the country would be eroded,” he concluded.30 The neoconservative strategic vision assumed that what is good for America is good for Israel, that a global and democratic American empire in control of the Middle East will help preserve Israel’s interests while a strong and democratic Israel would help secure American concerns in the region. As noted, the neocons considered this an axiom and seemed to be amazed that most American Jews, most of whom did not vote for Bush in the last election, do not share their perspective. “The surprising thing is not that there are so many Jews who are neocons but that there are so many who are not,” complained leading neocon and former Pentagon official Douglas Feith in an interview with The New Yorker.31 Some Americans, such as professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, authors of the controversial The Israeli Lobby, concluded that Israeli and American strategic interests were not always compatible and that the strong ties with the Jewish state were hurting the US position in the Middle East. Some Israelis are now asking themselves whether they can count on the long-term support of an American empire that, not unlike the Roman one, was bound to decline and shed its commitments in the Middle East.32

Israel–Hezbollah war demolishes the “strategic asset” thesis These Israeli sentiments were becoming more prevalent in the aftermath of the Israel–Hezbollah war in Lebanon during which the high costs of the Israeli–American “strategic alliance” were

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becoming quite evident to both sides. Washington had given Israel a green light to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon as a way of punishing its patrons, Iran and Syria. But Israel proved to be more of a strategic burden than an asset, hurting the interests of a pro-American government in Beirut and eroding what remains of US credibility in the Middle East. “Hezbollah’s unprovoked attack on 12 July provided Israel the extraordinary opportunity to demonstrate its utility by making a major contribution to America’s war on terrorism,” wrote Charles Krauthammer, insisting that America “has been disappointed” by Israeli failure to defeat Hezbollah.33 From that perspective, one of the main casualties of that crisis in the Middle East was that favorite neoconservative paradigm, according to which the US should regard Israel as a major “strategic asset” in the Middle East, which in turn was rooted in a neoconservative axiom that what is good for Israel’s strategic interest is good for America, and vice versa. That paradigm was very central to the spin that the neocons concocted on the eve of Lebanon war II. Their plot-line was obvious: Iran and Syria encouraged its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, to deliver a blow to America’s proxy in the Middle East, Israel, as a way of shifting the balance of power in the Middle East in favor of Tehran and Damascus. According to the script, Israel, the American proxy, was supposed to deliver a counterblow to Hezbollah, the Iranian–Syrian proxy and reshift the balance of power in favor of Washington. This game was expected to conclude with an American–Israeli win over the “axis of evil” team. Instead, according to the conventional wisdom among experts, the final results of Lebanon war II— Israel failing to decimate Hezbollah by doing a rerun of the Six Day war or a remake of the Entebbe rescue operation—were looking more and more like, in the best case scenario, a draw or, in the worst-case scenario, a perception of a Hezbollah victory. “We have been driven into something we didn’t want to do,” said Anthony H. Cordesman, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington in an interview with the New York Times. “Far from Israel being the American proxy in a war against Iran, we’ve become Israel’s proxy in its war against Hezbollah,” he said. “Israel’s miscalculations have been so serious that its only hope for victory is to have the United States and the international community do for Israel what it can’t do militarily, which is defeat Hezbollah, assemble an international force in Lebanon and bring some sort of endgame to all this.”34 In short, something not very funny had happened to the neocon paradigm on the way to southern Lebanon. As noted earlier, the end of the cold war should have made the “Israel-as-a-strategic-asset” paradigm obsolete. But after 9/11 and against the backdrop of the Iraq war, neoconservatives succeeded in marketing the notion that the US and Israel were now being brought together in a strategic alliance against Islamo-Fascism and a global Intifadah. This alliance would operate in the form of an American sheriff and its Israeli deputy—American hegemony in the region with certain military tasks subcontracted to Israel. Israeli–Arab peacemaking was placed on the policy backburner. The neoconservative message was that the US needed to adopt more of the Israeli tough methods in dealing with Middle Eastern terrorists and “bad guys” (as Arabs only understand force, etc.), which the Americans were trying to do in Iraq with very little success. In the process, the Bush administration has strengthened Iran—which, of course, ran contrary to both American and Israeli interests. Then Washington, as part of the implementation of the Freedom Agenda, encouraged the holding of free elections in the Palestinian territories in January 2006, which brought to power the radical Hamas movement, and made it even less likely that the Israelis and the Palestinian could restart peace negotiations. The decision to give an American green light to the Israeli military operation, which helped the status of Iran (and Syria) and its proxy Hezbollah, seemed to fit very much into this disastrous American strategy, a bizarre mix of old-fashioned imperialism (which helps produce a backlash from dissatisfied players) and a democratic crusade (which helps strengthen the power of these same players). So it was not surprising that neocons such as Charles Krauthammer were angry and confused after the war in Lebanon, after concluding that the Israeli deputy had failed to deliver

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the goods to the American sheriff. In his unique form of Israel bashing, Krauthammer, in a column in The Washington Post, blamed Israel for not playing its part as a “strategic asset” of the US in the Middle East, based on his own “America-and-Israel-defeat-the-bad-guys” script. Suggesting that America had given Israel the green light to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon not as a favor to Israel, but as an act of clear (US) self-interest, Krauthammer explained: “America needs a decisive Hezbollah defeat.” Hence, it was “Israel’s rare opportunity to demonstrate what it can do for its great American patron.” The United States “has gone far out on a limb to allow Israel to win and for all this to happen,” counting on “Israel’s ability to do the job”. And “it has been disappointed”. It seemed that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s “search for victory on the cheap has jeopardized not just the Lebanon operation but America’s confidence in Israel as well,” concluded Krauthammer. But Israel, as Ha’aretz columnist Doron Rosenblum put it, “was not established in order to be a spearhead against global Islam, or in order to serve as an alert squad for the Western world.” Moreover, the neoconservative paradigm would make Israel a modern-day crusader state, an outlet of a global power whose political, economic, and military headquarters are on the other side of the world. America’s commitment to the security of the Israeli “province” would always remain uncertain and fragile, reflecting changes in the balance of power in Washington and the shifting dynamics of US politics and economics.35 At the same time, the Israel–Hezbollah war demonstrated to Americans once again that the interests of Israel—a small Middle Eastern power focused on maintaining its security—were not necessarily compatible with those of the US, a superpower with broad global interests that require co-operation with the leading Arab and Muslim states. In fact, taking into consideration the constraints on their relationship, Washington has never established a formal military alliance with Israel—whose status remains that of a client state that needs US military support in order to preserve its margin of security while occasionally providing assistance to its American patron. And as in the case of any other client state, Washington should ensure that the Israeli tail doesn’t wag the American dog by drawing it into unnecessary and costly ventures. In short, if Israel continued to be limited in its ability to provide security services to the US, American hegemony cannot make the Middle East safe for Israel. Indeed, Israelis were beginning to understand that taking a path toward a peaceful co-existence with the Palestinians and their other neighbors in the next generations could advance the long-term interests of both Israel and the US.

On the road to Damascus: US and Israel clash over Syria A prime example of the contrast between the Israeli perceptions and the Bush administration’s perspective on dealing with the changing balance of power in the Middle East has to do with Syria, and in particular, with the Turkish-backed efforts by the Syrians to restart peace negotiations with the Jewish state. Since 2002, the Bush administration pursued policies aimed at isolating Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Consistent with the advice of those who advocate regime change in Damascus, it has provided assistance to Syrian opposition groups and imposed sanctions on Syria designed to compel the Assad government to reverse course on Lebanon and its support for Palestinian terrorist groups. The Bush administration has portrayed Syria as part of an Iran-led regional coalition, and administration officials have depicted the Syrian Ba’ath regime, a secular and anti-Islamist political movement, as a leading regional opponent of its Freedom Agenda in the Middle East as well as one that is committed to an Islamo-Fascist ideological orientation. In that context, the Bush administration has continued to pursue a consistent policy, even under the leadership of the more pragmatic Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, of blocking Israeli moves to open a diplomatic dialogue with the Syrians. The Israelis have regarded Syria as a formidable regional Arab adversary, but contrary to the view advanced by the neocons,

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they considered the ruling Assad dynasty and the Ba’ath regime as pragmatic political players who have been dedicated opponents of the radical Islamic forces in the region and whose long-term interest lies in achieving stability in the Levant, including through an agreement with Israel, and in opening to the West. According to this view, Syria’s partnership with Iran and Hezbollah, its proxy in Lebanon, is tactical and not strategic and provides the Syrians with leverage in future negotiations with Israel as well as the US and the EU. Hence, confronted with the threat of isolation and perhaps even regime change by Washington, Syria sees its partnership with Iran as a way of counterbalancing US and Israeli power.36 The Israelis, recognizing after the war with Hezbollah that they were limited in their ability to impose their strategic preferences on Lebanon without Syrian co-operation, have come to the conclusion that negotiations with Syria could weaken Damascus’s ties with Iran and bring about its co-option into the more moderate camp in the Middle East, in a way that could advance the interests of Israel as well as the US on several fronts, including the future of Iraq, the long-term prospects for a viable state in neighboring Lebanon, and progress toward peace between Israelis and Palestinians. But the Bush administration has continued to apply a Manichean and dogmatic ideological framework through which it considers US interests in the Middle East, rejecting diplomatic overtures from Syria and pressing Israel to refrain from opening a dialogue with Damascus.37 Facing this strong American opposition, the Israeli government had nevertheless given the green light to several Israeli public figures to open informal “track two” diplomatic talks with Syrian officials under Turkish and Swiss auspices. The talks, which had been initiated by the Turkish government in early 2004, yielded only mixed results, including an invitation by one of the negotiators, a Syrian-American businessman, to address the Israeli Knesset (parliament) in April 2007. But growing military tensions along the Israel–Syria border and an Americanbacked Israeli attack on an alleged nuclear military site in Syria have created pressure on both Jerusalem and Damascus to decide to open official talks between the two governments in 2008. Israel and Syria announced on May 21 in simultaneous statements that they had begun indirect talks in Turkey, thus confirming that two long-time enemies are talking again for the first time in almost a decade. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said the following day that Israel wanted peace with its neighbors, but Syria needed to “distance itself completely” from its “problematic ties” with Iran. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moalem said Israel had indicated readiness for a full withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights, seized in June 1967, although Israeli officials have been unwilling to confirm or deny his claim.38 In a way, both the Israelis and the Syrians have become aware that the collapse of the hegemonic American project in the Middle East has created both risks and opportunities for them. The strategic vacuum created by the erosion in US power could create more instability in the region and could ignite new military conflicts involving Israel, Syria, and Iran. But the same vacuum has also created incentives for the Israelis and the Syrians to start promoting their interests that didn’t seem to be aligned with the strategic perspective that continued to dominate thinking in Washington, where the neoconservatives were insisting that their Freedom Agenda was alive and well and that the war in Iraq was creating the foundations for an Israeli–Palestinian peace accord, that the road to Jerusalem continued to lead through Baghdad.

Annapolis and the “strategic consensus” fantasy First, a flashback: On February 11, 1985, President Ronald Reagan welcomed Saudi Arabian King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz during a welcoming ceremony on the White House lawn. “The people of the United States share with the people of Saudi Arabia a deep moral outrage over the continuing aggression and butchery taking place in Afghanistan,” Reagan said, referring to the brutal Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. “The citizens of the Western democracies and the

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Muslim world, by all that they believe to be true and just, should stand together in opposition to those who would impose dictatorship on all of mankind.” He added: “Marxist tyranny already has its grip on the religious freedom of the world’s fifth largest Muslim population. This same grip strangles the prayers of Christians, Jews, and Muslims alike. We all worship the same God. Standing up to this onslaught, the people of Afghanistan, with their blood, courage, and faith, are an inspiration to the cause of freedom everywhere.”39 Fast forward to the December 2007 Middle East conference in Annapolis, and there is a sense of déjà vu. This time, President George W. Bush addressed a meeting attended by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and called on Jews and Arabs to make peace. Bush highlighted the ominous threat posed by the radical Shi’ite theocracy in Iran to Christians, Jews, and Muslims alike; this supposedly explains why the Western democracies, the Muslim world, and Israel should stand together in opposition to Iranian regional designs. Indeed, the notion that the US could utilize a perceived common strategic and ideological threat—the Soviet Union during the cold war and Shi’ite Iran today—to bring together Arabs and Jews under an American umbrella and help create the conditions for an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement has been a central concept shared by the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.40 It also reflected the influence of the pro-Likud neoconservative ideologues on these two conservative Republican presidents. As pointed out earlier, the neocons who played a leading role in influencing Reagan’s foreign policy—government officials such as Defense Department aide, Richard Perle, and the US Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, are not unlike the neocons who have dominated the thinking of Bush administration policies, applying a similar grand geostrategic and ideological framework to guide US policy in the Middle East. During the Reagan years, the Middle East, including the Arab–Israeli conflict, was seen as an extension of the struggle with the Soviet Union. Israel served as a strategic asset as far as US interests in the Middle East were concerned, helping Washington contain Soviet expansionism in the region. The PLO under Yasser Arafat was depicted as a pro-Soviet terrorist organization that served to advance Moscow’s regional interests. And in order to overcome the dilemma that was confronting US policymakers in the Middle East—how to juggle the alliance with Israel with the US strategic commitment to the pro-American Arab camp led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia—Reagan’s neoconservative advisers came up with a creative formula: promote a “narrative” in which Israel and the “moderate” Arabs are supposedly facing common threats—the Soviet Union and, to some extent, the revolutionary regime in Tehran—and unite them through a so-called anti-Soviet “strategic consensus.” In that context, the conflict in the Holy Land would become a side-show of a larger confrontation between the West and the “evil empire” and would become more amenable to resolution as the pro-American Israelis and pro-US Arabs come to the conclusion that the need to confront the common enemy outweighed the significance of the ethnic, religious, and territorial differences that separate them. During the George W. Bush administration, in particular after 9/11 and the second Intifadah, neoconservative advisers such as Pentagon Deputy Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, and State Department official, Elliott Abrams, as well as those populating the Weekly Standard and the American Enterprise Institute, recycled the old cold war paradigm as a framework for the new “war on terror.” Again, Israel was perceived as a central ally in the war against radical Islam, while the Palestinians and Arafat were depicted as an integral element of Islamo-Fascism, and their Intifadah against Israel was described as an extension of 9/11, part of the anti-Western global Intifadah. But just like during the 1980s, US officials face a similar dilemma: how to reconcile the partnership with Israel with the important strategic ties with pro-American conservative regimes in Riyadh and Cairo. This dilemma has become even more acute against the backdrop of the

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mess in Iraq and the rise of Shi’ite Iran as a regional power, not to mention the increasing economic power of the oil-rich Arab gulf states. At first, some of the neocons had hoped that the US “march of freedom” in the Middle East and free elections in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine would bring to power pro-American governments aspiring to make peace with Israel (“the road to Jerusalem leads through Baghdad”). But as we know, that did not happen. In fact, the elections strengthened the radical political parties, some of which have ties to Iran. Thus by extension, the elections helped increase the influence of Tehran and its more radical allies (Hezbollah) and anti-Israeli players (Hamas). But the spin-masters in the Bush administration replaced one defective narrative with another. Instead of the march of freedom that was supposed to bring together Israel and the pro-American Arabs, Bush and his advisers ended up exploiting the major disasters, such as a more powerful Iran and the election victory of Hamas that they had helped to unleash. They decided to promote a new fantasy: Israelis and pro-American Arabs would be brought together under the US umbrella as part of a new “strategic consensus” against Iran, just as Washington was accusing Iran of developing nuclear weapons and supporting anti-American insurgents in Iraq. Forget the march of freedom. Long live the Iran threat! The meeting in Annapolis was supposed to highlight the emergence of this Israeli–Arab “consensus” and help persuade both sides to move toward resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. After all, faced with such a menacing regional threat—Iran—Israelis and Palestinians would surely be able to overcome their differences on Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements, and the Palestinian refugees. This inspiring narrative helped the Bush administration write the script for the media event in Annapolis. The problem was that the “peace conference” had very little to do with the realities of the Middle East. In reality, none of the major attendees was buying into the notion that the issues separating the Israelis and the Palestinians could be resolved by unifying over the threat of Iran. The politically weak prime minister of Israel Ehud Olmert and the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (whose control of the West Bank came about thanks to Israeli and American support) couldn’t even take the first steps to overcome their differences during the talks leading to Annapolis. So it wasn’t surprising that the meeting, once envisioned as a three-day conference to kick off the negotiation of final-status issues, was transformed into a pathetic twenty-four-hour media event during which Bush played the role of MC and not that of an energetic, honest broker. The meeting failed. The Saudis attended the meeting but refused to shake the hands of the Israeli officials. But more importantly, the Saudis do not see the rise of Iran as a challenge to the West. They see it through the prism of the Sunni–Shi’ite divide. If anything, they would like to see reconciliation between the radical but Sunni Hamas and Fatah, a move that the Americans and the Israelis oppose. The notion that a perceived common threat could help produce a common Israeli–Arab front proved to be a fantasy during the cold war. Israel and Egypt decided to make peace only after recognizing that the costs of their conflict outweighed the benefits. And the Oslo peace process began in the aftermath of the cold war, focusing only on the real problems separating Israelis and Palestinians. Peace would come to the Holy Land if and when these issues are resolved. Promoting the idea of an Iranian “threat”—which US intelligence estimates suggested was less menacing than the Bush administration portrayed it—would not make that happen.

Conclusion: Israel: America’s weakest link? It is often argued that the grand strategic plan of reshaping the Middle East was conceived by the neoconservatives in the Bush administration as an attempt to lessen the risks for Israel in the region. The presumption was that this US strategy would create a regional environment in

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which US hegemony—as well as fractured and weakened Arab states—would place no constraints on Israel’s ability to pursue its most ambitious goals. In the same way that US unilateralism—according to the Bush Doctrine—would make it impossible for any power to oppose US global predominance, US hegemony in the Middle East would protect Israel from challenges from regional players. In short, the American empire was ultimately designed to make the Middle East safe for Israel and to create conditions under which any deal between Israel and the Palestinians would help preserve Israel’s dominant position while turning Palestine into a Bantustan-like entity. But the current strength of the US–Israeli connection is a product of unique conditions: America’s post-cold war unipolar moment, US economic gains of the 1990s, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—and the ensuing war on terrorism. These developments—coupled with the presence of powerful forces in the Bush administration, the GOP, the conservative movement, and Congress—have persuaded President Bush to align US policy with the Israeli government. The problem is that these same policies helped perpetuate the status quo in Israel–Palestine, which is symbolized by the security fence Israel has been building in the West Bank. These policies created the conditions under which Israel was able to continue with its creeping annexation of parts of Jerusalem and parts of the West Bank while building and expanding Jewish settlements there and pursuing a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. At the same time, Bush’s Freedom Agenda helped bring to power the Hamas in Palestine, weakening the power of the more moderate Palestinian Fatah that still maintains control over parts of the West Bank thanks to Israeli and Western support. At the end of the day, these US policies were making it less likely that Israel would achieve peace with the Palestinians while increasing its dependency on the US. Moreover, the ousting of Saddam Hussein as part of the plan to spread political and economic freedom in the Middle East has strengthened the power of Iran and its Shi’ite proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, which threatens the power of the pro-American Sunni Arab governments in Egypt, Jordan—which has signed peace accords with Israel—and in the Persian Gulf where Saudi Arabia’s promotion of an Arab League-backed peace agreement with Israel has received only tapered support from Washington, which has also continued to isolate Syria and to block efforts to open a diplomatic dialogue between Damascus and Jerusalem. Add to all of that the green light that Washington had given Israel to launch its unsuccessful campaign to destroy Hezbollah’s infrastructure in Lebanon, and it becomes clear that the neoconservative-led hegemonic project that was supposed to establish a quasi US–Israel condominium in the region has only led to the weakening of American influence in the Middle East while playing into the hands of the anti-status quo forces in the region. The ensuing attempts by the Bush administration to square the Middle East circle by trying to create an anti-Iran “strategic consensus” between Israel and the pro-American Arab regimes as a way of creating a diplomatic momentum aimed at reviving the Israel–Palestine peace process have proved to be another example of the neoconservative fantasies. From an Israeli perspective, the post-9/11 policies of the Bush administration have harmed the long-term strategic interests of Israel. They have failed to create an environment in which US military and ideological supremacy in the Middle East would create a balance of power that favors Israeli interests and put pressure on the Palestinians and other Arab states to make peace with it. If anything, the result has been the evolution of a new balance of power in the Middle East that favors those players in the region that oppose the US and its values, and in that context, reject any plans to recognize Israel and establish normal ties with it. In a way, these policies have not led to the creation of a Palestinian Bantustan but of Palestinian Hamastan. It is unlikely that a US and/or Israeli military strike against Iran would help readjust the balance of power in the Middle East and tilt it in favor of the US and Israel. Such a costly and difficult operation could wreak even more havoc in the region and around the world in the

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form of new waves of anti-Americanism, including more terrorism, and force energy prices to rise to the stratosphere. In the eyes of most members of the international community, Israel will be identified with this fragile American hegemonic project. For the Arab and Muslim nations—as well as for other powers, especially those challenging the international status—Israel is already perceived now as the “weakest link” in the American empire and is becoming an ideal target for antiAmerican and anti-globalization forces. We are already seeing the shape of things to come in the growing anti-Israeli sentiments in Europe and Asia, and the way anti-Israeli sentiments are starting to intertwine, in some cases, with dormant anti-Semitic attitudes. In some respects, Israel’s ties with the US are starting to resemble the relationship between the old political and economic elites and the Jewish community in Europe during the nineteenth century. As Hannah Arendt pointed out in her classic study of European anti-Semitism, it was the erosion in the power of those elites—and their growing inability to protect the Jews of Europe—that sealed their fate. The new and angry social classes and political players turned their frustration against the group they associated with the hated status quo—a group that was also very vulnerable.41 A similar scenario could take place on an international scale, when a weaker and less confident US would be under pressure at home and abroad to reduce its global commitments. This would leave Israel—its weakest link—vulnerable to attacks not only from Arab and Muslim nations, but from other new anti-status quo powers. That will take place at a time when inside Greater Israel—Israel and the Palestinian territories—Israeli-Jews would be losing their majority status. Ironically, the original mission of classical Zionism was to release Europe’s Jews from the trap that Hannah Arendt described, to turn them into a normal people, living in a normal state, able to protect themselves—and not dependent on others for their survival. In the real world of nation-states and power politics and in face of opposition from the surrounding Arab states, Israel has to search for support from foreign powers, including the US (and France in the 1950s and the Soviet Union in the late 1940s). But that support was seen by Israel’s founders as a temporary measure to sustain its national security. The long-term goal was to use that outside support and combine it with Israel’s military power as a way of pressing the Arabs to recognize that Israel was a permanent feature in the Middle East—and to make peace with it. Some of the Israeli policies that followed the 1967 Middle East war, especially from the Likud, violated those principles. US support was utilized to fulfill a Messianic agenda of settling Judea and Samaria—and pursuing the annexation of those territories. Ultimately, it was a policy that was never supported by the majority of Israelis, but one that was promoted by nationalist and religious fanatics. And it only played into the hands of the extremists on the other side and helped to set off the vicious circle of Palestinian–Israeli violence that we are now witnessing. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the rise of the neoconservatives in Washington with their hegemonic Middle Eastern agenda helped create an environment conducive to the interests of those Israelis who want to maintain the disastrous status quo that threatens the Jewish identity of the state. Perhaps it is not too late for the Israelis to figure out how to take a path toward normalcy in the Middle East that leads to peaceful co-existence with the Palestinians and their other neighbors in the next generations. And, most importantly, Israel has to do so as an independent nation-state—and not as a crusader state whose fate is determined by the decisions of a foreign and distant power. It could then become a technological and commercial center in the region, the Singapore of the Middle East. It is possible that President Barack Obama could encourage the Israelis to move in that direction by replacing the current neoconservative policies with a new American approach

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that leads to a constructive diplomatic dialogue with Iran and invites other regional and global players to support a process that could bring stability to the Persian Gulf and the Levant, and in that context creates incentives for the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the Palestinians to take steps toward peace. In that case, the US as a global power maintaining its influence in the Middle East could still be first among equals (or primus inter pares) when it comes to it, which is the next best thing to being Number One.

Notes 1 “Who Lost China Debate.” Available from www.bookrags.com/research/who-lost-china-debate-aaw-04/. 2 “‘F’ on Mideast Policy,” Toledoblade.com, May 27, 2008. Available from http://toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ article?AID=/20080527/OPINION02/805270309. 3 Nir Rosen, “The End of the New Middle East,” TheWashingtonnote.com, May 9, 2008. Available from www. thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2008/05/the_end_of_the/. 4 “A Triumphant Middle East Hegira,” Time, June 24, 1974. Available from www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 0,9171,944867,00.html. 5 Gary Kamiya, “Peace in the Middle East: Now it’s up to Bush,” Salon.com, February 9, 2005. Available from http://dir.salon.com/story/opinion/feature/2005/02/09/middle_east/. 6 “Rice sees Bombs as Birth Pangs,” aljazeera.net, July 22, 2006. Available from www.informationclearinghouse. info/article14146.htm. 7 “Sunni Arabs Concerned Over a ‘Shiite Crescent’ of Power,” The Associated Press, January 29, 2005. Available from www.truthout.org/article/sunni-arabs-concerned-over-a-shiite-crescent-power. 8 Robert F. Worth and Nada Bakri, “Deal for Lebanese Factions Leaves Hezbollah Stronger,” The New York Times, May 22, 2008. Available from www.nytimes.com/2008/05/22/world/middleeast/22lebanon.html. 9 Scott Peterson, “US–Iran Regional Power Plays Shift,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 30, 2008. Available from www.csmonitor.com/2008/0530/p11s01-wome.html. 10 Juan Cole, “Maliki–Sadr Agreement on Sadr City; Al-Maliki Heads to Mosul,” juancole.com, May 11, 2008. Available from www.juancole.com/2008/05/maliki-sadr-agreement-on-sadr-city-al.html. 11 “Full text of Bush’s Knesset Address,” The Jerusalem Post, May 18, 2008. Available from www.jpost.com/servlet/ Satellite?cid=1210668644840&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 12 “White House Denies Iran Attack Report,” The Jerusalem Post, May 20, 2008. Available from www.jpost.com/ servlet/Satellite?cid=1210668683139&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 13 Philip Giraldi, “War With Iran Might Be Closer Than You Think,” May 9, 2008. Available from www.amconmag. com/blog/2008/05/09/war-with-iran-might-be-closer-than-you-think/. 14 Leon T. Hadar, “America’s Moment in the Middle East,” Current History, January 1996: 1–5. 15 David E. Sanger with Serge Schmemann, “Bush Welcomes Saudi’s Proposal on Mideast Peace,” The New York Times, February 27, 2002. Available from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9406E2DC1431F934A 15751C0A9649C8B63. 16 Leon Hadar, “The War on Terror Ended, and the US was the Winner,” Chronicles, March 2007. Available from www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=14180. 17 Leon Hadar, Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East (Palgrave Macmillan, June 2005). Available from www. amazon.com/gp/product/1403967245/104-9207847-4290341?v=glance&n=283155&n=507846&s=books&v=glance. 18 Leon Hadar, “The ‘Neocons’: From the Cold War to the ‘Global Intifadah’”, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 1991. Available from www.washington-report.org/backissues/0491/9104027.htm. 19 Leon Hadar, “The ‘Green Peril’: Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat,” Policy Analysis no. 177, Cato Institute, August 27, 1992. Available from www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1037. 20 Leon Hadar, “The Rise of the Middle Eastern Bogeyman: Toward Post-Cold-War Interventionism,” Foreign Policy Briefing no. 2, Cato Institute, September 5, 1990. Available from www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1527. 21 Leon Hadar, “Responding to Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: Has the United States Been Effective Since 9/11?” Cato Institute, September 18, 2006. Available from www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6688. 22 Leon Hadar, “Playing Cowboy – and Falling off the Horse,” Right Web, August 16, 2006. Available from http:// rightweb.irc-online.org/rw/3438.html. 23 Barbara Plett, “US and Israel’s Common Cause,” BBC.com.uk, March 15, 2003. Available from http://news.bbc. co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2852299.stm. 24 Aluf Benn, “Enthusiastic IDF awaits War in Iraq,” Haaretz, February 17, 2003. Available from www.middleeast. org/launch/redirect.cgi?a=15&num=163. 25 Bill Keller, “Is it Good for the Jews?” The New York Times, March 8, 2003. Available from http://query.nytimes. com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05E7DF1E3FF93BA35750C0A9659C8B63. 26 Mark Lavie, “Israeli Think Tank: Iraq War Distracted US, ‘Created Momentum’ for Terrorists,” Associated Press, October 11, 2004. Available from www.commondreams.org/headlines04/1011–25.htm. 27 “What the World Is Saying”, thelastsuperpower.net, March 10, 2005. Available from www.lastsuperpower.net/ newsitems/worldpress/view.

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28 “A Scorned Idealist”, Newsweek International, 2005. Available from www.newsweek.com/id/49075/page/2. 29 See Leon Hadar, “Democracy and its Discontents,” The American Conservative, February 27, 2006. Available from www.amconmag.com/2006/2006_02_27/cover.html. 30 Ze’ev Schiff, “The Costs of a Hasty US Withdrawal,” Ha’aretz, September 27, 2005. Available from www.lebanonwire. com/0905/05092301HZ.asp. 31 Jeffrey Goldberg, “A Little Learning, What Douglas Feith knew, and when he knew it,” The New Yorker, May 9, 2005. Available from www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/05/09/050509fa_fact. 32 Wikipedia, “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy.” Available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Israel_ Lobby_and_US_Foreign_Policy. 33 Charles Krauthammer, “Israel’s Lost Moment,” The Washington Post, August 4, 2006. Available from www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/03/AR2006080301258.html. 34 John M. Broder and Mark Mazzetti, “US Treads Softly Over Iran’s Role in Crisis,” The New York Times, August 5, 2006. Available from www.nytimes.com/2006/08/05/world/middleeast/05proxy.html?fta=y. 35 Doron Rosenblum, “Not Sparta – and Just as Well,” Haaretz, August 23, 2006. Available from www.worldaffairsboard. com/israeli-palestinian-conflict/13814-not-sparta-just-well.html. 36 Leon Hadar, “A Diplomatic Road to Damascus: The Benefits of US Engagement with Syria,” Policy Report, The Independent Institute, October 1, 2007. Available from www.independent.org/publications/policy_reports/detail. asp?type=full&id=26. 37 Leon Hadar, “Reporter-at-Large: Time to Talk to Syria?” National Interest Online, September 21, 2007. Available from www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=15576. 38 “Israel Talks to Syria,” Chronicles, chroniclesmagazine.org, May 27, 2008. Available from www.chroniclesmagazine. org/?p=599. 39 “Saudi–US Relationship.” Available from www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2004/saudi-relations-interest-0611.html. 40 Scott Macleod, “Can Annapolis Forge a Mideast Peace?” Time, October 6, 2007. Available from www.time.com/ time/world/article/0,8599,1669093,00.html. 41 Hannah Arendt, Antisemitism: Part One of The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harvest Books, 1968). Available from www. amazon.com/Antisemitism-Part-One-Origins-Totalitarianism/dp/0156078104.

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The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries

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28 Close allies, ambivalent partners The role of the UAE in US Gulf policy Christian Koch

The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a federation of seven sheikhdoms in the lower Gulf region, has begun to play an increasingly important role within the framework of US policy in the Gulf, a position it is likely to maintain as the region overall struggles to balance regional and external interests and move toward more stable security arrangements. Despite some disagreements over various policy approaches, the UAE and the US enjoy a strong and mutually beneficial relationship. While the US sees the UAE as an important moderate Arab country that supports the general interests of the US with its balanced policies, the UAE views America as a critical strategic ally and a key component to guarantee a level of stability in the region. The UAE places great importance on promoting a positive and substantive relationship with the US and on trying to find ways whereby relations can continue to be deepened and strengthened further. As far as the US is concerned, while the UAE, as the country with the fifth largest petroleum reserves in the world (after Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait),1 is a critical player on world energy markets and a key element for stable energy supplies, in recent years it has attained, in addition, a level of more general political and strategic significance. Owing to the fact that the UAE and the US share common security objectives, there exists close policy co-ordination between the two sides, a process that has intensified over the years and has led to more concrete co-operation. As the new UAE ambassador to the US Yusuf Al-Otaiba stated upon his appointment in August 2008: “The current state of UAE–US relations is excellent. We share common interests to advance peace and security, promote economic stability and growth, and forge closer cultural and educational ties.”2 Such an assessment does not mean that differences do not exist. In fact, there are a host of issues on which the UAE and the US do not share the same perspective. On a broader regional level, there is a certain degree of frustration among UAE policymakers, similar to that among officials from the other member states of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)3 of which the UAE is a part, that the GCC position on regional issues is not always taken seriously in Washington or sufficiently acknowledged. This is particularly frustrating for local officials as they view the Arab Gulf states as oases of stability that can play an effective role in promoting greater security in an otherwise volatile region. On a specific policy issue level, there are differences as far as US policy toward the critical issues of the Middle East are concerned, i.e., the role of the US in Iraq, its policy towards Iran, the American efforts to promote political reform in the wider Middle East, its position on terrorism, and of course, the perceived US bias toward Israel and what is viewed as its unfair treatment of the Palestinian issue. The differences are, however, more related to tactical issues rather than being of a deeper strategic nature. Given the fact that neither Iraq and Iran have played a positive role in establishing a more stable Gulf security system and that both these countries have in fact often threatened the legitimacy and sovereignty of their neighboring Arab Gulf states, a close military relationship with the US has developed that is seen as both a necessary and a legitimate measure to safeguard national security and preserve the Arab Gulf and Emirati way of life.4 With Iran and Iraq continuing

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to be more of exporters of insecurity for the entire region, the GCC, including the UAE, is likely to remain a key pillar for the US as far as safeguarding its own interests is concerned. Relations at all levels—political, defense, economic, and cultural—between the UAE and the US have gradually broadened since the establishment of the UAE federation in late 1971. Initially, given that the UAE represented a fragile new state that from the outset needed to ensure its own domestic political consolidation while at the same time fending off various regional attempts to encroach on its sovereignty,5 the UAE made it a principle of its foreign policy to call for the main external actors, such as the US and the USSR, to maintain a presence beyond the horizon of the Gulf. The decades since the late 1970s, however, when events such as the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent Iran–Iraq war saw the security of the Arab Gulf states being threatened in more direct and explicit ways, have witnessed a gradual and persistent expansion of US presence in the region. The degree to which the US began to associate its own national interests with the developments and events of the Gulf was underlined in January 1980 when President Jimmy Carter declared in his State of the Union address: Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.6 His statement ultimately became known as the Carter Doctrine and it has guided US Gulf policy ever since. Although the actual implementation of an expanding American role would not occur immediately, regional dynamics would soon ensure that the US would be drawn ever closer into both the domestic and regional affairs of the Gulf littoral states. With the USled invasion of Iraq in March 2003, another chapter would be opened, and US involvement in effect would become more direct than ever. One of the consequences of this development is that, as of 2008, the US has to be seen as a regional power per se and its decisions have a direct impact on the policy formulation of the other regional actors. The problematic role played by Iran and Iraq has increased the Arab Gulf states’ dependence on the US. At the same time, given the numerous shortcomings of the George W. Bush administration in handling its overall Gulf policy, there is also an increased determination by the Arab Gulf states to keep that dependence as low as possible and instead underscore their own degree of independence. This development points to a more differentiated relationship in the future, although the pre-eminent role of the US in the region will remain for the time being.

The early days To understand the role that the US plays in the foreign policy framework of the UAE, it is first important to understand the basis around which UAE foreign and security policy has been formulated. From the very beginning of the establishment of the federation, it was clear that the country represented a small state in a rough and unstable neighborhood where decisions were largely made by bigger powers, i.e., Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. As Peter Hellyer has stated: “ … the country’s size and location require it to work, whenever possible, in collaboration with others.”7 Thus, from the very outset, there was an immediate need to balance national priorities with regional realities. Given that these two factors were not necessarily congruent with one another, the UAE adopted a basic position of trying to maintain balanced relations and neutrality. This provided for a degree of flexibility, in that it allowed the federation both to expand its relations with regional states and, at the same time, seek ties with external powers that were seen as important and, therefore, necessary to ensure a level of security for the state. During the early days of the federation, the US did not play a significant role as far as the UAE was concerned. For over two centuries, Great Britain had executed foreign and defense

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policy on behalf of the different sheikhdoms. Even after independence in 1971, which itself was a direct result of the British decision announced in 1968 to withdraw from their commitment east of Suez, the British retained a pre-eminent position. The British withdrawal, however, was not clear-cut and smooth, and some of the decisions made at the time contained repercussions that have lasted to the present day. For example, the continued occupation of the three UAE islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs by Iran, which were taken over with the tacit acquiescence of the British who did not want to risk a confrontation with the Shah during the final moments of their presence in the Gulf, is a key impediment in 2008 preventing a closer and workable UAE–Iran relationship.8 Nevertheless, Britain has continued to play an important role in the development of UAE foreign policy despite some of the unfinished business that was left over for the new country to deal with. A direct result of the role played by Great Britain in dominating the UAE’s external treaty relations right up until the early 1970s was that the relationship with the US took some time to develop. The US itself did not pay too much attention to the establishment of the UAE as it was more concerned about how to fill the strategic vacuum in an increasingly important region following the British withdrawal. Within the context of the Nixon Doctrine enunciated in 1969 by President Nixon on the island of Guam, the US soon instituted a so-called “twin pillar policy” in the Gulf by relying primarily on the Shah of Iran and the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to maintain stability in the region.9 At the same time, the US was one of the first countries to extend diplomatic recognition to the new country of the UAE, a step that is still highly regarded today by UAE decision makers. The first US resident ambassador to the UAE was sent in 1974. With the US largely watching developments from a distance and depending on Iran to carry out US interests, the UAE was able to formulate its foreign policy principles without too much external interference. Attention was naturally focused on the immediate neighborhood with emphasis placed on close relations with fellow Arab states. Within this context, differences with US Middle East policy began to emerge. This was, of course, most apparent when it came to the US position in the Arab–Israeli conflict given that Arab identity represented an important component in the UAE’s foreign policy formulation. Despite the fact that the main priority was the consolidation of the federation, the UAE became one of the initiators of the oil embargo of 1973 which brought home, for the first time, the dependence of the West on the region’s hydrocarbons. With the promotion of Arab solidarity as a guiding principle, the UAE saw its engagement within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its support for keeping supply restrictions tight as a way in which other Arab states such as Egypt and Iraq could be supported in their struggle against Israel and the policies of the US.10 As UAE President Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan Al-Nahyan would argue at the time to justify the oil embargo: “Arab oil is not dearer than Arab blood.”11 Over time, the UAE would strongly support the Palestinian cause and the Arab front-line states by extending hundreds of millions of dollars worth of humanitarian and social aid that included not only food and medicines but also help in massive infrastructure development and assistance for the building up of Palestinian educational institutions.12 Sheikh Zayid became one of the most outspoken critics of both Israel and the associated US policy, and on numerous occasions he underlined his conviction that US Middle East policies were unjust. He would also consistently urge the US to take the initiative to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict, arguing that with its great power status the US bears responsibility for such critical issues of international peace and security.13 Given the central role of the Arab–Israeli conflict in the minds of Arab policymakers, the UAE saw it as necessary to maintain a certain distance from Washington. It did this not only by publicly denouncing those US policies that it considered most objectionable but also by engaging with and voicing support for, at least on the surface, Arab nationalist causes. Furthermore, the UAE rejected a direct American military presence on the ground in the region and refused to consider requesting any weapons from the US.14 On the issue of military sales,

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the UAE’s position stood in contrast to that of the other Arab Gulf states. But overall, Sheikh Zayid rejected the notion that foreign involvement in the Gulf was needed, and he urged both the US and the Soviet Union to withdraw from the region by stating that: “The people of the Gulf have got capabilities, wealth and awareness. They are capable of filling any vacuum and of shouldering responsibility for their country and their land … The people of the Gulf are the defenders of the Gulf.”15

The Iranian Revolution and changes to Gulf security While the US was content to rely on the Shah of Iran to provide security in the Gulf throughout the 1970s, that equation changed dramatically with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. With the Shah suddenly removed from power and replaced by a government no longer willing to follow US directives, the twin pillar policy that characterized the US policy approach to the Gulf fell apart. The overthrow of the Shah was not only a severe loss for the US, but the establishment of a radical Islamic government in Tehran also sent shockwaves through the conservative monarchical regimes of the Arab Gulf. The explicit demand from Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini that his revolution be exported to the neighboring countries represented a clear threat to the very system of rule in the Arab states on the other side of the Gulf. As such, developments would be set in motion that would result in the US being drawn ever closer into Gulf regional security matters. With increasing concern about the policies being pursued by the new government in Tehran as well as a level of uncertainty about the reliability of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the Arab Gulf states would re-evaluate their foreign policy positions. That reassessment would ultimately culminate in a shift to a more pro-Western policy stance, a shift that would include the UAE. How dangerous and unstable the region had become would be underlined by the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war in September 1980. Suddenly, the Arab Gulf States were confronted with a large-scale conflict right on their own borders. The war highlighted their weakness in defending themselves or even minimally being able to prevent such a conflict from reaching across their borders. One immediate response was the decision by the Arab Gulf states to establish the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) as a means to provide a common front, co-ordinate policies, and better harness capabilities. Given that each of the participating countries relied on small military forces, however, it was quickly apparent that simply more regional co-operation would be insufficient to provide an instant deterrent able to keep Iraqi and Iranian ambitions at bay. It became increasingly apparent that the GCC states would have little choice but to consider expanding their security arrangements to include a wider Western and US-dominated component as a means to bolster their national interests. With the two protagonists in the initial phases of the Iran–Iraq war solely preoccupied with one another, the GCC states proclaimed their neutrality and the UAE, for example, maintained its position that the Gulf should be kept free of the presence of foreign forces. That position would change in the course of the war, particularly during the Tanker war when the US navy became instrumental in maintaining the freedom of passage in the Gulf and guaranteeing that the vital Strait of Hormuz chokepoint would remain open for the export of oil from the region to the rest of the world. It is thus during this period that the security relationship between the UAE and the US, as well with the rest of the GCC states, began to take on a new shape. Any doubts that remained about how close that relationship should ultimately be would soon be dispelled with the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in August 1990. While the Iran– Iraq war had provided a first indication of how fragile the security of the GCC states was, the actual invasion of one of its member states and the inability by themselves to reverse the invasion made it clear that security without foreign external involvement was no longer an option. Without the US liberating Kuwait in February 1991, Iraqi forces could still be in Kuwait. For the GCC states, the US had become an integral element whose presence was seen as pivotal.

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The shifting strategic circumstances did not mean that the GCC states would begin subjugating their policy decision process to that of the US. For the UAE, it remained a priority to try to avert further crises in the region and at least to make an effort to achieve a peaceful resolution of disputes, even if at the last minute. For example, the UAE attempted to broker a deal between Iraq and Kuwait just prior to the invasion by Saddam Hussein. It was only when these initiatives failed to materialize into something concrete that the UAE would take a strong position in favor of what it considered its own national interest. Saddam Hussein’s actions against Kuwait were clearly unacceptable for the UAE, not only because of the precedent the event set in occupying an Arab Gulf state and overthrowing its ruling family, but also because the Iraqi leaders had issued direct threats against the UAE just prior to the decision to invade. With no peaceful resolution of the crisis in sight, the UAE in fact became the first Arab state to join the US-led coalition.16 And while UAE President Sheikh Zayid understood the necessity of bringing in the US to help restore the status quo in Kuwait and have the Iraqi invasion reversed, he would still argue against any permanent stationing of US forces in the Gulf, which he continued to view as a temporary requirement. Throughout, Sheikh Zayid stuck by his general philosophy of the peaceful settlements of disputes, good neighborliness, and amicable relations.17 It would soon become apparent that the expansion of US military forces in the Gulf would be anything but temporary. The expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait did not lead to the downfall of the Saddam regime as many had hoped it would. Instead, Iraq would remain a permanent thorn in the side of regional security, a fact that would, as a result, necessitate a longer term involvement by the US than had originally been envisioned and hoped for by the Arab Gulf states. With neither Iraq nor Iran putting forward substantive initiatives that would allay GCC security threat perceptions, the defense relationship between various GCC states and the US became closer. In 1994, the UAE and the US concluded a defense pact which reflected the primary role that the US had begun to play in the region. This was to be the first formalized defense relationship between the two countries, although the agreement was certainly not as far-reaching as others that the US concluded, for example with Kuwait, which included the stationing of troops on Kuwaiti territory. Still, it represented a new elevation in the scope and quality of relations, and it moved the US even closer to providing for and ensuring UAE physical security. In addition to the political angle, the UAE saw the agreement with the US as an opportunity to tie the experience of the US military to that of its own armed forces in the areas of training, joint exercises and, ultimately, state-of-the-art modern equipment. Immediately after the defense agreement was signed, the UAE sent a contingent of military personnel to participate in the US operation in Somalia to end the factional fighting there. The UAE would also move some of its armed forces to Kuwait in 1994 in a precautionary move when Saddam Hussein once again moved his own army in a position to threaten the emirate. What the closer military-to-military ties with Washington signified was that the broad outlines of the security environment in the Gulf remained much the same as they had in the 1980s. With Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq and Iran unwilling to adopt a more cooperative attitude toward its southern Gulf neighbors, the US would remain the prime guarantor of Gulf security. The scope of the relations with the US would quickly broaden into deeper political ties and large-scale defense deals. In May 1998, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayid became the most senior UAE official to lead a delegation on an official visit to the US.18 A communiqué issued following some of the talks underlined the need to maintain and bolster the strategic relationship stating that such a partnership would stabilize the overall strategic balance in the region. In addition, an agreement on a major arms deal for eighty F-16 Block 60 fighter planes was announced in a deal worth close to $8 billion and one that would secure jobs for 30,000 Americans. As part of the overall defense relationship, the US would pre-position military equipment on UAE soil and US warplanes would use UAE airbases to monitor the no-fly zone over southern Iraq.19

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The 1990s were, however, not only a period that witnessed a steadily deepening relationship. Instead, there were also differences that were apparent as both sides sought to have their interests represented within the framework of developing bilateral ties. Indicative of the determination to keep some distance from the US while still benefiting from its technology and know-how was the fact that the UAE signed a defense pact with France in 1991. From a UAE perspective, France was seen as the one Western state that had the most distanced relationship with Washington.20 As a result, France soon emerged as the key military supplier with the purchase by the UAE of over 400 LeClerc Main Battle tanks in 1995 at a value of $3.65 billion and thirty Mirage fighter aircraft in 1997 for a total of $3.4 billion. The only military commercial contract with the US up to this point was for a Hawk missile defense system bought from the Raytheon Corporation in the 1980s.21 A similar situation would repeat itself in early 2008, when the UAE announced the establishment of a French military base on UAE territory, the first of its kind for any foreign power, at around the same time that US President George W. Bush was visiting the country for the first time and trying to persuade the UAE to take a harder line vis-à-vis Iran in regard to the latter’s nuclear program. As far as the UAE was concerned, the decision to allow a French military base on Emirati soil would in effect amount to the same level of protection under a Western security umbrella but with less of the political baggage that would accompany a similar deal with Washington. Given the general dissatisfaction with the policies of the second Bush administration (see below), it was also a clear signal to the US that it was not the only ally as far as the UAE was concerned. Nevertheless, UAE authorities continue to believe that through arms sales by major US corporations and by having relations with the Pentagon, the commitment of the US towards ensuring UAE security is maintained at the highest levels. There were also specific issues in the late 1990s on which the two sides had opposing views. One particular point of contention was the continued sanctions policy vis-à-vis Iraq. While there was certainly no sympathy for Saddam Hussein and his regime after what had happened with regard to Kuwait, and while the UAE reaffirmed its commitment to all UN resolutions related to Iraq and asked Baghdad to fulfill them, the growing concern over the impact of the sanctions policy on the Iraqi civilian population led the UAE to speak out more directly against the embargo. In 1996, in a speech commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the UAE, President Sheikh Zayid repeated his wish that “an end should be put to the suffering of the Iraqi people.”22 The UAE had by this time concluded that Saddam was using the sanctions to solidify his power by controlling his own population. As such, the sanctions were seen as being largely counterproductive. For the UAE, as an Arab nation, it simply became unacceptable to witness the suffering of many Arab compatriots. As the UAE’s Deputy Prime Minister, Sheikh Sultan Bin Zayid Al-Nahyan, would state at the time: “The suffering of the Iraqi people has gone beyond the limits of human tolerance. It is high time for the human conscience to move to alleviate the plight of the Iraqi people.”23 Outside of sanctions, the UAE also opposed further military strikes on Iraq to force them to co-operate with UN weapons inspectors. Thus, when the US went ahead with Operation Desert Fox at the end of 1998, resulting in a four-day bombing campaign of Iraq, the UAE refused to allow the US to use its territory as part of the operations.24 In addition to Iraq, the UAE remained highly critical of the US position on the Arab– Israeli conflict. Sheikh Zayid would define US Gulf policy as follows in 1998: The USA is a friend … but as close friends of the United States, we would not have wished for America to be like this. We would have wished to see American policies that are far more even-handed. They are not, which is an incorrect position for a country like the USA to adopt. What we would like to see is an American policy that upholds justice and stands up to anyone in order to support that which is right, whether the party likes it or not.

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Sheikh Zayid made it clear that the US presence in the region was not here just for Iraq or Saddam but for three targets, namely Saddam, Iran and the Palestinians. They represent pressure on Iran to soften its stand, and on the Palestinians to back off and to be softer in seeking to redress the injustice they have suffered. This is my personal opinion though not the American rationale as we have been informed of it.25 At the same time, the UAE threw its weight behind the US role in the peace process of the 1990s, including the principle of land for peace, to achieve a lasting settlement. In this context, the UAE supported the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and agreed following the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 to drop the secondary and tertiary boycott of Israel.26 However, it stated that it was too soon to also drop the primary boycott which, as a result, remained in place. For the UAE, further progress would need to become visible before such a step could be contemplated. What becomes visible by the end of the 1990s is a subtle shift in the foreign policy direction of the UAE from one of broad neutrality and stringent promotion of Arab solidarity and interests to more of a Western orientation increasingly centered on the US with the involvement of key European countries such as Great Britain and France. This was not necessarily an open choice but rather a reflection of the regional security environment in which key states such as Iran and Iraq, by repeatedly questioning the status quo in the region, had threatened the very legitimacy of the Arab Gulf monarchies. The GCC states were well aware that they were rich in natural resources but limited in national manpower, and backed by the fact that the majority of them had just gained their sovereignty a few decades earlier, there was a need to rely on external protection to ensure their survivability. With the restoration of the Al-Sabah family in Kuwait by the US-led coalition, the US had displayed a desire to see the status quo maintained despite some of the drawbacks in terms of political reform, human rights, and the spread of liberal democratic values. This was a price to be paid, however, and the US emerged as the key component in maintaining the overall stability and security of the volatile Gulf.

September 11 and its impact on the UAE–US relationship It is of course beyond argument that the events of September 11, 2001 had a direct impact on the direction and scope of US policy in the Gulf region.27 In addition to the most direct outcome, that of the US-led invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, there were other issues brought to the surface, such as the role played by authoritarian or closed political systems in the region in supporting a movement towards extremism and, more specifically, terrorist financing, which began to cast a cloud on the US–GCC relationship. In essence, the role of the GCC as allies of the US began to be questioned, and as such the Arab Gulf states soon found themselves under a high degree of scrutiny by its supposed close ally. The spotlight also focused on the UAE given that two of the nineteen hijackers of the planes used in the September 11 attack were UAE nationals. News of this came as a complete shock to UAE authorities. But, in addition, it was soon discovered that money for the operation had passed through UAE banks, a discovery that raised some very fundamental questions and led to negative publicity inside the US. Significantly, however, the role played by the UAE, though unwitting, within the overall September 11 equation did not lead to an immediate crisis in relations. While there emerged widespread negative public perceptions, the broadbased relationship was hardly impacted at all. In fact, in 2002, less than a year after the horrific events, the UAE and the US entered into a strategic partnership dialogue that aimed to broaden discussion between the two countries to cover all aspects of bilateral ties. What has instead become more apparent is that, for the US, in the wake of September 11, the UAE is a difficult country to characterize in terms of what sort of relations Washington

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seeks with Abu Dhabi and the other emirates. On the one hand, the UAE plays a vital role in support of US regional policy efforts and an integral role in the overall military strategy that the US pursues in the Gulf region. For example, over 600 US naval vessels docked at UAE ports in 2006, which is more than for any other port outside of the US. Without such logistical support, the US would find it difficult to adequately carry out its patrols and missions in Gulf waters. President George W. Bush would underline that role when he stated that “ … the UAE is a committed ally in the war on terror. They are a key partner for our military in a critical region. And outside of our own country, Dubai services more of our military—military ships—than any country in the world.”28 This, however, was not a new development and should not be interpreted as an attempt by the UAE to regain the confidence of the US in the wake of September 11. In fact, since the time of Operation Desert Storm, the UAE had become the most important foreign country allowing port calls by US naval vessels.29 Similarly, the UAE has continuously provided the use of an airbase for the US to conduct patrolling operations over Gulf waters. General Peter Pace, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has noted: The military-to-military relationship with the United Arab Emirates is superb … They’ve got airfields that they allow us to use, and their airspace, their logistics support. They’ve got a world-class air-to-air training facility that they let us use and cooperative with them in the training of our pilots. In everything that we have asked and work with them on, they have proven to be very, very solid partners.30 The bottom line is that the UAE has provided the US with basically whatever Washington required, although most of that support was provided discreetly and outside the limelight. As a factsheet released by the White House in 2006 would highlight: “The UAE is providing assistance to the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, combating terrorists by cutting off their financing, and enhancing America’s homeland security by actively participating in initiatives to screen shipments and containers.”31 On the other hand, as far as the US is concerned, the UAE is also a country that has been in the news for cases of illicit trade taking place through UAE ports, human trafficking, proliferation issues, and overall having a somewhat lax attitude towards issues that the US considers absolutely critical. The Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2007 released by the US State Department states that the government restricts “civil liberties, including freedoms of speech, press (including the Internet), assembly, association, and religion,” that trafficking in women and children occurs, and that there are severe restriction on worker rights with the abuse of foreign domestic servants in particular remaining a problem.32 Similarly, the 2008 Trafficking in Persons report also issued by the State Department underlines that “the Government of the United Arab Emirates does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking,” although the report acknowledges that the country “is making significant efforts to do so.”33 In fact, Bahrain and the UAE were the only GCC countries mentioned in the 2008 report where progress was noted, while the other four GCC states were kept on the blacklist as Tier 3 countries of concern. Of particular concern for US authorities is the use of the UAE for possible terrorist financing as well as for proliferation activities. The Country Report on Terrorism of the US State Department notes that the UAE “continued its efforts to combat terror financing, but challenges remain.” In particular, the 2007 report stated that “the [UAE] Central Bank remained resistant to implementing operations targeting passengers suspected of Bulk Cash Smuggling arriving from terrorist source countries.”34 In relation to the uncovering of the illicit transfer of materials by the A. Q. Khan network to countries such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea, the UAE emirate of Dubai was described as a key transfer point for shipments of nuclear components.35 The US even threatened to include the UAE in a new designation of “countries of

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concern for diversion” of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-capable exports, but did not follow through when the UAE government strengthened its exports laws.36 The US concern on proliferation has not stopped the two sides from signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to begin negotiations towards the more extensive Section 123 agreement, which would establish a legal basis for trade in significant nuclear commodities. This step, however, came after the UAE had announced its intention, along those of other GCC states, to look into the development of a civilian nuclear program and also after the UAE had signaled that it would endorse the US-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.37 On the issue of the promotion of democracy and political reform, which stormed to the top of the US agenda following September 11, the pressure on the UAE to institute various reforms was limited. Despite the absence of an open political system that could be classified as democratic by US standards, the US has understood that progress is being made and that the UAE leadership is committed to ensuring an evolutionary path toward the implementation of political reforms. During his speech in Abu Dhabi in January 2008, US President Bush lauded the UAE by stating: You have succeeded in building a prosperous society out of the desert. You have opened your doors to the world economy. You have encouraged women to contribute to the development of your nation … You have shown the world a model of a Muslim state that is tolerant towards people of other faiths. Overall, Bush characterized the UAE as an “example to be emulated.”38 US officials have basically stuck to the line that, while progress is being made, more needs to be done.39 And while there existed a level of local resistance and skepticism as far as the democracy promotion plans under the Bush administration were concerned, the UAE quietly went along with the US plans without raising too many public objections. This included allowing the US to go ahead and open the regional office of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in the UAE in September 2004 to co-ordinate all MEPI programs in the GCC states, Jordan, and Yemen.40 Economically as well, relations have expanded, and the UAE is the most important export market for US goods in the Arab world. Bilateral trade topped $13 billion in 2007. US exports to the country have tripled within four years (2003 to 2007) and can be related to the overall growth and development occurring in the UAE. This includes the participation of over 750 US firms that were located in the UAE in 2007. Major headlines were made during the same year when the US energy services conglomerate Halliburton announced the relocation of its world headquarters to Dubai (Table 28.1). In addition, US weapons sales continue to be an important component of the relationship from a political, strategic, and economic angle. In September 2008, the Pentagon announced that it would sell to the UAE a theater-wide missile defense system with a value of almost $7 Table 28.1 US–UAE trade (all figures in millions of US dollars) Year

US exports to UAE

US imports from UAE

Trade balance

2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997

11,609.4 8,482.4 3,508.3 2,638.0 2,707.8 2,607.0

1,339.4 1,468.3 1,128.0 1,194.2 714.5 919.9

10,269.9 7,014.1 2,380.2 1,443.8 1,993.3 1,687.1

Source: US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination Branch, Washington, DC (http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5200.html).

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billion, which would also include UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. In a statement, it said: “The proposed sale of the weapons will strengthen the effectiveness and interoperability of a potential coalition partner, reduce the dependence on US forces in the region, and enhance any coalition operations the US may undertake.”41 Finally, there is also an expanding relationship as far as cultural and social issues are concerned. This includes close association with institutions such as Harvard University, New York University, and the Guggenheim Museum, which will open in Abu Dhabi in late 2009, as well as a range of other cultural and educational institutions.42 Links have been established with leading health care providers in the US such as Johns Hopkins University, the Cleveland Clinic, and the Mayo Clinic. In this context, the UAE donated $100 million to the victims of Hurricane Katrina in the US. Outside of the overall dichotomy of the relationship, there have also been specific instances that have highlighted some of the inherent complexity. The strong reaction in the US against the attempt by the Dubai-based DP Ports World company to take over six important ports in the US may be cited as an example. This was a deal that the UAE authorities defined as purely business but which many in the US saw as a step that would bring key US security installations under the control of foreign operatives.43 While the deal had the approval of the US Committee on Foreign Investment, which stated that it had “thoroughly reviewed the potential transaction and concluded they had no objection,” opposition from within the US exploded with one of the main proponents from the US side in favor of blocking the deal, Charles Schumer, Democratic Senator from New York, bluntly stating: “How could we turn over one of the most vital areas of homeland security to a company run by the country that has a nexus of involvement with terrorism? Its banks have laundered terrorist money. Two of the hijackers were UAE citizens.”44 As became quickly apparent, Senator Schumer was not alone in his concern and vocal opposition. The fact that the House Appropriations Committee voted sixty-two to two to block the ports deal was indicative of the severity of the protests. Another US Senator, Tim Coburn, would also note that: “Handing the keys to US strategic ports to a regime that recognized the Taliban is not a sound next step in our war on terror.”45 Overall, the UAE was taken aback by the firestorm of protest against the deal and the overall politicization of the issue, as they considered the transaction to be a pure business encounter without strategic underpinnings. Abdul Khaleq Abdullah, a professor of political science at UAE university, voiced his surprise when he wrote: “Politicians in Washington are picking on the wrong deal and the wrong country for the wrong reasons at the wrong time.”46 Part of the surprise was because the UAE felt it had taken a series of steps to counter terror activities, including co-operating with US officials on combating money laundering activities. The ports deal highlighted a particular phenomenon that is not unique to the UAE but which frames the overall relationship between the US and its allies in the Middle East. Thus, while bilateral relations are good and solid, the same cannot be said of the public perceptions that exist on both sides. From an official point of view, there was little to be concerned about in terms of the ports deal especially because Dubai was the first Middle Eastern entity to join the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a multinational program intended to protect global trade from terrorism. Under CSI, a team of US Customs and Border Protection officers is actually permanently stationed inside Dubai’s ports, where they work closely with Dubai Customs to screen containers destined for the US. Besides, US officials have repeatedly stated that co-operation with Dubai officials was outstanding and a model for other operations. Dubai was also the first Middle Eastern country to join the Department of Energy’s Megaports Initiative, another program aimed at stopping illicit shipments of nuclear and other radioactive material. But from a general American perspective, knowledge about the UAE has remained either very low or completely absent. Similarly, for the UAE citizen, US policies are necessarily framed within the Middle East context as a whole, and specifically they are tied to the perception of US policies vis-à-vis Israel and the Arab–Israeli conflict.

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The Dubai ports fiasco is one specific example of the high level of misperceptions that came to the forefront in the wake of September 11, but the episode is also symptomatic of a fundamental gap that remains between the two countries. At least as far as UAE officials were concerned, what the Dubai ports issue laid bare was the fact that the UAE had to protect its own national interests and that those interests did not necessarily coincide with those of the US. As a result, the UAE became more adamant about its core positions within the framework of the negotiations for a UAE–US Free Trade Agreement which started in 2004. Such an agreement represented part of the overall Bush administration strategy toward the Middle East to encourage greater political reform, and as such, negotiations were begun not only with the UAE but also with Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, and Oman.47 While the move followed the signing of a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in March 2004, as negotiations proceeded to discuss details, the resistance within the UAE grew to the scope of the discussions which included demands from the US side to allow for the establishment of worker unions, a commitment to undertake measures to improve human rights, take more serious steps to protect intellectual property, as well as open the UAE oil sector on a production sharing basis.48 Furthermore, the scope and directions of the negotiations were influenced by the DP Ports World controversy, which raised serious doubts in UAE minds about what the ultimate US intentions were. In fact, the ports controversy came at a critical time when the negotiations were heading into the final round, causing UAE Central Bank Governor Nasser Al-Suwaidi to remark that: “It is something that does not reflect well.”49 Earlier, the UAE Minister of Communications Ahmad Humaid Al-Tayer had argued that the UAE should refrain from making any concessions in the talks: “The US demanded the UAE should amend its laws— this forms a threat to the UAE national economy and interests. The UAE shall do what is good for its national interests before going far in such negotiations.”50 In the wake of the ports controversy, however, Abdul Khaleq Abdullah would take the position one step further and state: Now that the ports deal has been scuttled, it is time to take stock of some of the possible negative effects. No one should pretend that it is business as usual, at least not here in the UAE. People, businesses, as well as the government in the UAE are deeply offended. … The collapse of the ports deal was a shattering episode that has damaged people-to-people relationships. This can result in a major long term setback for the US–UAE relationship.51 The ultimate outcome was that it became a paramount issue for the UAE not to pay any political price for a free trade deal. Talks effectively stalled in 2006 and no further progress has been reported.52

Conclusion During the visit of US President Bush to the UAE in January 2008, the first of a sitting US president to the country, UAE President Sheikh Khalifa underscored the close relationship when he noted: “The UAE is a partner in the war on terrorism and will exert every possible effort to achieve stability and development in the region and the world.”53 Overall, it can be argued that the level of exchange between the two countries has increased and that there exists a close and constant co-ordination of policies. Even on sensitive issues such as terrorism, the UAE has been identified by the US as a “model for other operations.”54 But while the UAE has taken the lead on many issues and even understands the importance of providing an immediate response to the threat posed by the al-Qaeda network and other extremist activity, it has equally argued for a more comprehensive approach which focuses on eliminating the root causes of terrorism. Particularly dismayed by some of the approaches pursued by the George W. Bush administration, the UAE has not shied away from arguing

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that terrorism cannot be eradicated by focusing on military solutions alone, but rather that broader economic and social initiatives aimed at promoting third world development and overcoming inequalities are required. As the UAE approaches the close of its fourth decade of sovereignty, the country does not face any serious external threats and, while there are border and territorial issues that could escalate, none is considered serious enough to pose a direct threat of invasion. What exist instead are internal threats that could be magnified or triggered by external factors. As of 2008, this includes the distinct possibility of a larger US–Iran confrontation in which the UAE could unwillingly be involved either through widespread opposition within the country to US policies or by Iran using the large Iranian expatriate community in the UAE, estimated at more than 400,000 people, i.e., almost two-thirds of the indigenous UAE population, as a fifth column to create internal problems and upheavals. As a consequence of the problematic issue of US foreign policy in the Gulf, the UAE has returned once again to its position of having a more balanced foreign policy position due to various domestic, regional, and international considerations, which also means maintaining a certain distance from the positions and policies of the US. In practice, this means regionally aligning with Saudi Arabia and the other members of the GCC as well as balancing Iran and Iraq against one another, and internationally expanding the relationship beyond the traditional strong and central role of the US and Europe to also include Russia, key Asian countries such as India, China, and Japan, and even other potential partners such as Australia and South Africa. There is also a renewed heightened uneasiness about the policies being pursued by the US in the region, which the UAE does not view as promoting overall security and stability. Certainly as far as Iraq is concerned, the UAE would like to see the US put more pressure on the present Nouri al-Maliki government for a political settlement and further progress on overall national reconciliation. For the UAE, it is essential that an end to sectarian fighting is achieved and that the unity, integrity, and independence of Iraq is preserved.55 In a significant step that received much praise from Washington, the UAE announced in the summer of 2008 that it would open its embassy in Baghdad and also that it would waive the $7 billion debt that Iraqi still owed the country.56 Overall, it was stated that the UAE would not hesitate to “provide all kinds of financial and moral aid” to Iraq. From a US perspective, this was an important shift that extended a level of legitimacy to the Maliki government, which up to this stage had largely been shunned by the Sunni-led GCC states, which perceived his government as following, for the most part, a sectarian agenda and failing to make any efforts to promote a true national reconciliation process within Iraq. The White House spokeswoman Dana Perino would note that: “It is the first Arab ambassador to return to Iraq since 2005, so a significant development, and both countries [Iraq and UAE] are to be praised for that action.”57 She also specifically thanked the UAE for the debt waiver which, she stated, is a “recognition that a secure and prosperous Iraq is in the best interest of the region.”58 In terms of the future outlook for UAE–US relations, it should be clear that, while close ties to Washington are seen as critical to the UAE, this does not mean that the emirates will allow their own sovereignty to be compromised. As the former US ambassador to the country has stated: “The UAE does not automatically buy US goods and services just because the United States provides nearly all the foreign forces in the Gulf,” adding that “the UAE bases most commercial decisions essentially on price and quality rather than on political considerations.”59 What can be said is that the UAE follows a very consistent set of principles as far as its policies are concerned. For the US, the UAE has become an important symbol of progress and vision that is more or less representative of the kind of Middle East that any administration in Washington would like to see. The result of this has been a regular level of interaction between the two sides even at the highest level of government.60 This is unlikely to change fundamentally as both countries begin to better understand how the world around them is constantly changing.

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Notes 1 See BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008. Available from www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929& contentId=7044622. 2 “New UAE Envoy to US Presents Credentials,” Gulf Today, August 1, 2008. 3 The Gulf Co-operation Council was formed in 1981 and includes the countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 4 See Christopher M. Davidson, The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005): 96. 5 For example, Saudi Arabia did not recognize the UAE from the outset, and even one of the constituent elements of the UAE federation, Ras Al-Khaimah, did not join until February 1972, i.e., three months later, because they hoped to get recognition and support for their independent status from Saudi Arabia. It was only after the UAE and Saudi Arabia signed a border agreement in 1974, which some from the UAE side claim was signed by the UAE under duress, that the Kingdom officially recognized the federation. The fact that many of the UAE’s regional neighbors did not give the federation much of a chance of survival was a key concern for Emirati officials during the early days of their state’s establishment. 6 See Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992 (New York: The Free Press, 1992): 106. 7 Peter Hellyer, “The Evolution of UAE Foreign Policy,” in Ibrahim Al-Abed and Peter Hellyer, eds, The United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective (London: Trident Press, 2001): 163. Hellyer refers to the UAE’s position as “the accident of geography.” 8 For a complete treatment of the island issue from a UAE perspective but based on extensive historical research, see Thomas Mattair, Occupied Islands: Abu Musa and the Tunbs (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006). 9 See George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990): 116–19. 10 See Christopher Davidson, Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008): 167–69. 11 Cited in Mohammad Al-Siksek and Shams Al-Din Al-Doaifi, Leadership: Collection of Speeches, Stances, Meetings and Instructions of HH Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, since 1971 to 1987 (Abu Dhabi: no publisher cited, 1987): 143. 12 The most recent example is the $62 million Sheikh Zayid Residential City in the Gaza Strip announced in 2004. See Khaleej Times, October 23, 2004. 13 See, for example, his interview with the New York Times on June 1, 1998 and reprinted in Gulf News on the same day. This stance of Sheikh Zayid was not confined only to the Arab–Israeli issue but also included other important regional events such as the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s. See The Chronicle of Progress: The UAE 1971–1996 (London: Trident Press, 1996): 276–77. 14 William Rugh, Diplomacy and Defense Policy of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Emirates Lecture Series 38, 2002): 30. 15 Al-Siksek and Al-Doaifi, Leadership: Collection of Speeches of HH Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, President of the UAE 1971–1987, op. cit.: 187. 16 This would be repeated just prior to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 when the UAE offered Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein sanctuary in the UAE if he was willing to relinquish power and thus avoid US military action. This episode caused significant tension between the UAE and the Arab League, whose Secretary General at the time, Amr Mousa, refused to discuss the UAE proposal within the Arab League deliberations, arguing that it represented interference in the internal affairs of a fellow member state. Current Abu Dhabi Crown Prince, Sheikh Mohammad Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, would later state that Saddam Hussein had in fact accepted the UAE’s proposal but that a final decision was never allowed to materialize. “Results would have been obtained if (the proposal) had been put forward and discussed,” Sheikh Mohammad was quoted as saying. See “Saddam Accepted Ill-fated Exile Proposal: UAE Prince,” Agence France Presse, October 29, 2005. 17 See William Rugh, “The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates,” Middle East Journal, 50(1), Winter 1996: 66. 18 While the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince is formally only the next in line to the leadership of the Abu Dhabi emirate and not the UAE as a whole, the de facto role of Abu Dhabi as the largest and most important emirate within the federation means that the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince is also the next in line for the UAE presidency. This, however, is subject to the formal approval of the UAE Supreme Council, composed of the leaders of each of the seven emirates that make up the foundation. In November 2004, when Sheikh Zayid passed away, Sheikh Khalifa succeeded him and was immediately pronounced by the Supreme Council as the next president of the UAE. 19 See Sean Foley, “The UAE: Political Issues and Security Dilemmas,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), 3(1), March 1998: 8. 20 See Henner Fürtig, “Kleine im Konzert der Großen: Die strategische Orientierung der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate nach dem Ende des Ost–West Konflikts,” Orient, 43(2), 2002: 195. 21 Rugh, “The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates,” op. cit.: 68. 22 Quoted in Ibid.: 63. 23 Emirates News Agency (WAM), August 13, 2000. 24 Rugh, “The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates,” op. cit.: 67. 25 Interview in the New York Times and reprinted in Gulf News, June 1, 1998. 26 See Rugh, “The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates,” op. cit.: 64–65.

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27 The literature on the shift of the Bush administration in terms of foreign and security policy is voluminous, but for a very comprehensive treatment on how the Bush presidency embraced the concepts of unilateralism, pre-emption, and regime change, see Robert S. Litwak, Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007). 28 “President Addresses National Newspaper Association Conference,” Washington DC, March 10, 2006. Available from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060310–12.html. 29 Rugh, “The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates,” op. cit.: 68. 30 See “Perspectives on the UAE–US Relationship.” Available from www.uae-us.org/page.cfm?id=9. 31 “The United States–UAE Bilateral Relationship,” Fact Sheet, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, February 23, 2006. Available from http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-10.html. 32 US State Department, “United Arab Emirates,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007. Available from www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100608.htm. 33 US State Department, “United Arab Emirates: Country Narratives,” 2008 Trafficking in Persons Report. Available from www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2008/105389.htm. 34 US State Department, “United Arab Emirates,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2007. Available from www.state.gov/s/ ct/rls/crt/2007/103708.htm. 35 See Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, “Nukes ‘R’ US,” New York Times, March 4, 2004. 36 Kenneth Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, RS 21852, May 1, 2007: 5. 37 “UAE, US Sign MoU on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” Emirates News Agency (WAM), April 22, 2008. 38 “President Bush Discussed Importance of Freedom in the Middle East,” January 13, 2008. Available from www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/print/20080113–1.html. 39 See, for example, the statements by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Erica Barks-Ruggles in “US to Continue Push for More Democracy in the UAE,” Khaleej Times, March 19, 2006. 40 “Partnership Initiative Opens UAE Office,” Gulf News, September 8, 2004. 41 “Pentagon Proposes Sale of Missile Defense System to UAE,” Agence France Presse, September 13, 2008. 42 For a listing of some of these institutions, consult the website established by the UAE embassy in Washington on the UAE. Available from www.uae-us.org/page.cfm?id=99. 43 The deal involved the takeover by DP Ports World of the London-based Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company and involved the US ports of New York, New Jersey, Baltimore, New Orleans, Miami, and Philadelphia. The total of value of the deal was reported to be $6.8 billion. 44 See “Aftermath Ports Deal,” Online Newshour, March 30, 2006. Available from www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ middle_east/jan-june06/ports_3–30.html; see also Ted Bridis, “UAE Co. Poised to Oversee Six US Ports,” Associated Press, November 2, 2006. 45 “US Welcomes UAE Port Deal Delay to Brief Congress,” Reuters, February 24, 2006. 46 Abdul Khaleq Abdullah, “The Ports Deal: A View from the UAE,” Gulf News, March 2, 2006. 47 “Bush Return to Clear Way for UAE–US Trade Accord,” Gulf News, November 7, 2004. 48 See “UAE Weighs Price of Trade Pact with US,” Gulf News, February 5, 2007. 49 “UAE–US Trade Talks at Risk,” Gulf News, March 7, 2006. 50 “Concessions to US Will Not Benefit UAE, Says Al-Tayer,” Gulf News, December 8, 2004. 51 Abdul Khaleq Abdullah, “Ports Deal: A UAE Perspective,” Gulf News, March 17, 2006. 52 UAE Central Bank Governor Nasser Al-Suwaidi would also comment on the larger picture by stating that the ports controversy was “against the principles of international trade … which the US was instrumental in making. They are contravening their own principles in this respect … Investors are going to take this into consideration. They will look at investment opportunities through new binoculars.” See Will Rasmussen, “Ports Row Will Affect Investment in US: UAE Cbank,” Reuters, March 12, 2006. 53 Gulf News, January 14, 2008, 8. 54 See US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006: chapter on UAE. 55 This is how it was stated in a commentary posted by the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR), a government think tank located in Abu Dhabi, in conjunction with the visit of US President Bush to the country. See “Bush’s Visit and Prospects for UAE–US Relations.” Available from www.ecssr.ac.ae/CDA/en/ FeaturedTopics/DisplayTopic/0,1670,756-97-37,00.html. 56 “UAE Waives $7b Iraq Debt,” Khaleej Times, July 7, 2008. 57 “Return of UAE Envoy to Iraq is Significant Development: White House,” Kuwait News Agency, September 11, 2008. 58 “Bush Thanks UAE for Canceling Iraq Debt,” Agence France Presse, July 12, 2008. 59 Rugh, “The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates,” op. cit.: 69. 60 Most recently, this was the visit of UAE Prime Minister and Ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohammad Bin Rashid AlMaktoum to Camp David where he met President Bush in August 2008. See “UAE–US talks focus on cooperation,” Emirates News Agency (WAM), August 4, 2008.

29 US relations with Qatar Jill Crystal

Introduction The United States and Qatar have a close although sometimes complicated relationship. Qatar is an important US military ally. Its al-Udaid base, south of the capital of Doha, serves as a logistical hub for US operations in Afghanistan as well as a key command and basing center for on-going operations in Iraq. Qatar’s Camp al-Sayliyah, near Doha, is the US military’s largest pre-positioning base abroad. The US and Qatar have a defense agreement and co-operate in joint military operations. For both countries, this co-operation is largely driven by security needs. Qatar has the world’s third largest natural gas reserves and, with a population of just under a million and a half, has one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. Qatar, although wealthy, is militarily weak. It has a history of tension with its neighbors, notably Saudi Arabia. For Qatar, the US presence is protection against regional threats. For the US, Qatar is one part of a larger strategy to ensure the free flow of petroleum and gas from the region and to secure US interests in the Gulf. Yet despite this affinity, there have been recurring tensions in the relationship. Particularly since the accession of Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifah al-Thani, in 1995, the country has pursued an independent, proactive, and at times provocative foreign policy, which has left it occasionally at odds with the US. The government of Qatar continues to host and support the often anti-American satellite station al-Jazeera, which it established in 1995 as the Arab world’s first all-news television network. Despite the government’s co-operation with the US in its “war on terror,” some members of Qatar’s ruling family are suspected of having ties to al-Qaeda.

History Qatar has long fallen within the Western orbit. From 1868, when Qatar signed its first treaty with Britain, until 1971, when Qatar received independence, Qatar’s foreign policy was largely shaped by British interests. The US deferred to Britain in its handling of Qatar as well as the other Gulf states. Within the constraints of British interests, Qatar’s rulers were able to a degree to manipulate the British presence to serve their own political purposes. One purpose was to compensate for Qatar’s weakness vis-à-vis other outside powers. Weak in territory, population, and military strength, Qatar’s rulers felt fairly confident that, were it not for the British presence, they would have been absorbed by the Ottoman empire or Saudi Arabia. Britain limited but did not eliminate the involvement of other outside powers and preserved Qatar’s sovereignty. The second problem the Qatari rulers confronted was their relative weakness vis-à-vis other members of the large and contentious al-Thani ruling family. Internal dissent led Qatar’s rulers to try to leverage their relationship with Britain to control local contenders for power. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, local factions that felt slighted by the ruler would often

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appeal to outside powers, among them Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the Ottoman empire, to weigh in on disputes. The Saudis especially have long been host to Qatari exiles, from deposed rulers to dissident sheikhs to political opponents. Qatar’s rulers balanced this interference by bringing Britain into family disputes. From the beginning, then, Qatar’s foreign policy was in part a reflection of its rulers’ weakness vis-à-vis other powers. Patterns emerged while Qatar was still a protectorate that would shape foreign policy after independence. The relationship with the US, as with Britain, has been shaped by the rulers’ need for an external patron who would help Qatari leaders stave off neighborly, particularly Saudi, influence. Qatar’s post-independence rulers also confronted continuing challenges from within the ruling family. One consequence has been domestic instability and succession through coups, most recently in 1972 and 1995. The rulers’ inability to exercise the same discipline over the ruling family characteristic of other Gulf states has often led to the emergence of separate fiefdoms within the family and sometimes to multiple foreign policies run by different sheikhs. In 1968, Britain announced its intention to withdraw its forces from the Gulf. For a time, Qatar’s leaders considered joining a larger Gulf federation, but chose ultimately to stand alone. Following independence, Qatar signed a treaty of friendship with Britain. It maintained a good relationship with Britain and continued to employ many British advisors in the government. Britain’s departure forced Qatar to develop new allies and an independent foreign policy. With no external patron, Qatar’s leaders had little choice initially but to follow the lead of their powerful neighbor, Saudi Arabia. This left the leadership open to Saudi meddling in domestic politics. There were rumors that Saudi Arabia backed Sheikh Khalifah al-Thani in 1972 when he overthrew his cousin Ahmad in a bloodless coup, at a time when Saudi borders were being renegotiated. Consequently, Qatar turned increasingly towards the emerging new force in the region: the United States. In 1973, the US opened its first embassy in Doha and the following year sent its first ambassador. The announcement of Britain’s departure from the Gulf came as an unwelcome shock to the US, which for years had relied on Britain to contain the Soviet Union in the Gulf. When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, his administration undertook a major review of US foreign policy in the Gulf. The US then viewed the region primarily through a cold war lens and worried about Soviet efforts to acquire influence in the region and to obtain a warm-water port. Efforts to contain the Soviet Union in southeast Asia had left the US with fewer resources in the Middle East. Militarily stretched by the increasingly unpopular Vietnam war, the US was unwilling to fully replace Britain’s military and political presence in the Gulf. Instead, it decided to rely heavily on local allies. The result was the Nixon Doctrine, emphasizing security co-operation to help protect US interests. In the Gulf, this became the twin pillar policy, the pillars being Iran and Saudi Arabia. This policy left Qatar vulnerable to the ambitions of both countries. Shortly after the British departure, the 1973 Arab–Israeli war broke out. The oil embargo imposed by Arab oil producers during the war made the US realize how dependent it was on Gulf oil, how vulnerable its energy supply was, and how support for Israel could conflict with this increasingly important goal of secure access to oil. After 1973, oil became a much more important part of US policy in the region. With this focus, preserving the domestic stability and independence of the pro-American oil-producing Gulf Arab states became an ancillary policy goal. The price hikes of 1973 and 1979 also gave the Gulf states more wealth and, with it, influence. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the emergence of a new Islamic republic there changed the way both the US and Qatar viewed their relationship. For the US, the transformation of Iran, a close ally, into a hostile enemy forced a complete re-examination of its position in the Gulf. Then in December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, increasing US

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concern. In January 1980, President Carter announced the Carter Doctrine: any attempt by an outside force to control the Gulf would be considered an attack on vital US interests and would be met with military force if necessary. The Gulf states were concerned about the revolution as well, but largely because they viewed the Islamic republic, intent on exporting its revolution, as a threat to domestic security. This was less so for Qatar which, unlike Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or Kuwait, had a very small Shia population. The vulnerability the Gulf states increasingly felt prompted them to come together in 1981 to form the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), comprising Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. While the Iranian threat was the impetus to the union, the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 and the subsequent Iran–Iraq war provided the opportunity for the GCC to exclude both Iran and Iraq. President Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan (1981–89), pursued a more robust version of his predecessor’s Gulf policy. Reagan’s first challenge was the Iran–Iraq war. For a time, the US asserted its neutrality but, as the war continued, it began to tilt toward Iraq. As the war dragged on, Iran began targeting Gulf, and particularly Kuwaiti, vessels and so in 1987 the US, at the request of the Kuwaiti government, began reflagging and escorting Kuwait oil tankers through the Gulf. To this end, the US moved a large number of naval ships into or near the Gulf. As the Gulf increased in importance to the US, relations between Qatar and the US deepened. Qatar, like the US, supported Iraq in its war with Iran. There were still moments of tension with the US. In the 1980s US displeasure over the Qatari government’s black-market purchase of American-manufactured Stinger anti-aircraft missiles (which appeared in a government parade in 1988), purchased after a US government decision to sell Stingers to Bahrain, with whom Qatar had a long-standing territorial dispute, resulted in a congressional ban on arms sales to Qatar and the cessation of economic and military co-operation. The ban was lifted only in the months leading up to the Gulf War after Qatar granted permission to US and coalition forces to operate from Qatar and also promised to destroy the missiles. The ban was formally lifted in 1991. When President Clinton came to office in 1993, the Gulf War had ended, but now terrorism began to emerge as a concern shaping US Gulf policy. In 1993, al-Qaeda launched the first attack on the World Trade Center. In 1995, five US servicemen were killed at a Saudi National Guard training site. In 1996, an attack on a US military installation in Saudi Arabia at Khobar resulted in nineteen American and one Saudi deaths. In response, the US consolidated its forces in Saudi Arabia at fewer, less accessible sites, particularly Prince Sultan airbase. This political opposition in Saudi Arabia and consequent base consolidation was the first step toward the subsequent transfer of its primary airbase in the Gulf from Saudi Arabia to Qatar. The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990 caused a more dramatic realignment of Qatari policy. While Qatar had supported Iraq in its 1980–88 war with Iran, Qatar now reversed itself, joining the US-led anti-Iraq coalition. The GCC, initially created in 1981 in part to balance the Iranian threat, became a forum for dealing with the Iraqi threat. Qatar, previously wary of a US military presence in the region, now embraced it. US–Qatari relations improved significantly during the US-led Gulf War to oust Saddam Hussain’s forces from Kuwait, and Qatari forces even assisted coalition troops in resisting an Iraqi attack on the Saudi town of Ras al-Khafji in January 1991. During the war, Qatar permitted the US to operate its military forces from its territory, prompting Iraq to fire a Scud missile at Qatar (which landed in the desert). Following the war, Qatar and the US signed a Defense Co-operation Agreement in June 1992 which permitted the US access to bases, pre-positioning of US material, and joint military exercises. After the war, Qatar worked closely with other GCC members on defense co-operation and moved closer to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In 1993, the Clinton administration

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introduced the policy of dual containment, aimed at isolating both Iran and Iraq and containing them through sanctions. This led to a growing US military presence in the Gulf, giving the relationship with Qatar greater importance. In 1995, Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Khalifah bin Hamad, was overthrown in a bloodless coup by his son, Sheikh Hamad. The US quickly recognized the new emir. Sheikh Hamad in turn renewed and expanded the defense co-operation agreement his father had signed. The al-Qaeda attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 changed the way the new Bush administration viewed the Gulf. The Bush Doctrine, which ultimately emerged in response to this attack, emphasized a forceful, unilateral, and pre-emptive approach to fighting what it saw as a global radical Islamist threat. The US sought support from Gulf leaders in its new “war on terror.” The Qatari view on the US “war on terror” was mixed. Qatar was relatively free from political violence. In 2004, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, a former vice president of Chechnya, was killed in a car bomb outside a Doha mosque. From 1999 to 2004, he lived in Qatar and, according to Russia, raised money for the Chechen cause. A crisis was averted when a compromise was worked out, whereby the Russians convicted in the incident were allowed to return to Russia to serve their sentences. In March 2005, another terrorist attack occurred when an Egyptian, perhaps linked to al-Qaeda, carried out a suicide car bomb attack on a theater popular with Westerners, killing one British national and injuring twelve others. (Shortly afterwards, the emir signed an agreement with Rudy Giuliani to provide Qatar with counterterrorism advice, an agreement that briefly came under scrutiny when Giuliani later launched a campaign for the Republican presidential candidacy.) There have been unsubstantiated rumors that Qatar has bought off al-Qaeda attacks. There were more serious allegations that the Minister for Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, Sheikh Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani (who became Interior Minister in January 2001), known to be sympathetic to the jihadi salafis, helped al-Qaeda members financially. He was also suspected of sheltering al-Qaeda members in his own compound, among them the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, who was given a position in the Ministry of Electricity and Water. In early 1996, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents nearly captured Khalid Shaikh Muhammad in Qatar (then wanted in connection with an investigation of his nephew, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing mastermind Ramzi Yousef), but he was able to escape before FBI agents arrived because, some suspect, he had been warned by Sheikh Abdallah. The US also expressed concern that the government of Qatar indirectly facilitated al-Qaeda by allowing the state-owned al-Jazeera station to freely cover statements by Osama bin Laden. While Qatar itself had few incidents of terrorism, terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia in 2003 and 2004 raised the fear that Qatar too could become a target or that al-Qaeda members fleeing the Saudi authorities might seek refuge in Qatar. Consequently, Qatar co-operated with the US. In 2004, it issued new counterterrorism legislation and began tracking the activity of Islamic charitable organizations more closely. The US, in turn, provided Qatar with some support in developing its domestic security forces. For Qataris, the US response to terrorism has also had an impact. Following 9/11, new US visa requirements made it increasingly difficult for Qatari students to study in the US. The Qatari government responded by bringing US educational institutions to Qatar. In 1994, the emir had established the Qatar Foundation to finance universities that opened branches in its new Education City. The government now invited a number of largely American universities to set up campuses in Qatar, beginning with Carnegie Mellon University in 2004, followed by Georgetown, Texas A&M, Virginia Commonwealth, and Cornell University’s Medical College. Today, Qatar spends some $2 billion a year to host US universities. The US war in Iraq that began in 2003 prompted another shift in the US–Qatari relationship. Worried about potential instability in Saudi Arabia and frustrated by Saudi Arabia’s

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refusal to permit jets based there to be used in airstrikes on Afghanistan, the US began in 2001 to expand al-Udaid airbase, built by Qatar in the 1990s at a cost of $1 billion. In December 2002, Qatar and the US signed an agreement to upgrade Qatari military bases in the likely event of war and to set up the forward headquarters of the US Central Command. In 2003, the US Combat Air Operations Center for the Middle East moved from Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia to al-Udaid. For the US, Qatar provided an attractive alternative to increasingly volatile Saudi Arabia. For Qatar, a country with the second smallest armed forces in the region, the government hoped the US base would protect the country, and its gasfields, from its neighbors. A final component of the Bush Doctrine when it was first unveiled was an effort to promote political and economic liberalization in the region. The “war on terror” began with the assumption that one cause of Islamist violence was the absence of non-violent political alternatives. After 9/11, the US government became a fervent, if inconsistent, advocate of political reform in the Gulf. The Bush administration set forth an ambitious plan to foster democratic transitions including elections, promotion of civil society, expanding women’s rights, reforming education, and opening markets. In December 2002, the Bush administration launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative, followed by the Greater Middle East Initiative, launched at the Sea Island, Georgia, Group of Eight Industrialized Nations Summit in June 2004, with the goal of fostering political, economic, and social reform through dialogue and a series of US-backed projects. Interestingly, Qatar was not invited to the summit, owing to tension with the US over al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Iraq war. After an unenthusiastic response, the project was recast in more modest form as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative at the Forum for the Future held in Morocco in 2004. But in 2005, at the second Forum for the Future, held in Bahrain, the Egyptian delegation torpedoed the now considerably scaled-down goals of fostering civil society and encouraging the formation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While much of the region was reluctant to embrace this new presidential initiative, Qatar responded positively, urging other Arab states to consider the US proposals. The Doha Declaration for Democracy and Reform, issued in June 2004 at a conference hosted by Qatar University, called for democratic change, accusing Arab governments of using the Israeli– Palestinian conflict and the war in Iraq as an excuse to postpone needed domestic political reform, affirming the need for free and fair elections and calling for a transition toward constitutional monarchy and limiting the role of the military in politics. Qatar now undertook a number of high-profile but substantively limited reforms including granting women’s suffrage, holding elections, and writing a new constitution. While these reforms were well received by the US government, they were largely cosmetic. Qatar had never been a repressive state in the past. It was ruled by a series of relatively benign autocrats. The reforms made the ruler a little more benign. Elections were held, but only for a municipal council with no legislative authority, although in May 2008, Qatar’s appointed consultative council adopted an electoral law potentially paving the way for two-thirds of its forty-five members to be directly elected. Public gatherings remained banned, as did political parties. Professional associations were required to register and were monitored. The administration’s push for political liberalization was, in any event, waning. Opening public space in the region typically meant opening up to voices that were anti-American and anti-regime. Moreover, as the “war on terror” continued, the US found itself increasingly reliant on its old, often autocratic allies, such as Saudi Arabia, allies that were unlikely to be replaced in any open election by a leadership more responsive to US concerns. In Qatar, instead of pressuring the government to increase press freedom, the US government pressured the government to restrict al-Jazeera, initially over its airing of Osama bin Laden’s statements and then increasingly over al-Jazeera’s coverage of the growing insurgency, then civil war, in Iraq. After 9/11, many observers saw the station’s tone became increasingly anti-American and somewhat pro-Sunni Islamist. After the US invasion of Iraq, al-Jazeera replaced its more

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secular bureau chief in Baghdad, Faisal Yasiri, with Wadah Khanfar, who had reported from Afghanistan after the US invasion in 2001 and who many regarded as an Islamist. Soon after that, Khanfar replaced the more secular head of al-Jazeera, Muhammad Jassim Ali. Since then, the US has expressed its concern to the government about al-Jazeera’s coverage of both Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Qatar and raised US concerns about al-Jazeera with Qatar’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, US forces bombed al-Jazeera’s offices in Kabul and Baghdad and, according to leaked information from the British government, President Bush may even have considered bombing al-Jazeera’s offices in Doha. The release of this news prompted considerable concern in Qatar and open discussion of the merits of supporting US policies in the Gulf.

Qatari policy concerns The inner circle of Qatar’s ruling family is the primary source of foreign policy decision making. As do the other Arab Gulf states, Qatar has two distinct but overlapping centers of power: the cabinet and the ruling family. The key, or sovereign, ministries, including those related to foreign policy, energy, and defense, are controlled by powerful members of the ruling family, with the emir at the apex. However, unlike the other GCC states, the cohesion and discipline of Qatar’s ruling family are weak. At times, sheikhs act almost independently. To a degree, Qatar has as many foreign policies as it has powerful princes. Part of the explanation for its often contradictory foreign policy lies in the emir’s incomplete control over his own family, from the Interior Minister to one of the most important actors in the system, Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs, head of the Qatar Investment Authority and, since 2007, Prime Minister. In foreign policy, the ruler must also be attuned to keeping his small and wealthy population generally happy, and must thus be alert to the possibility that the US presence could serve as a rallying cry for protest. Thus far, the rather large US presence has elicited little protest, but even in quiescent Qatar, the potential exists. A final threat to internal security with foreign policy implications is Qatar’s large expatriate population. Typically political docile, interested primarily in earning money and returning home, the poorly paid expatriates who perform menial labor have become increasingly dissatisfied in recent years owing to the bite that inflation and the falling dollar (to which the Qatari currency is pegged) have taken out of the remittances they send home. Qatar has thus far resisted pressure to drop the dollar peg and switch, as Kuwait has, to a basket of currencies, in part because it is still pressing for a shared GCC currency, but the situation is a matter of concern. Energy policy is central to understanding both Qatar’s relationship with the US and its overall foreign policy. Qatar has large gas reserves, the third largest in the world after Russia and Iran. Moreover, Qatar’s output of natural gas is expected to double in the next five years. Most of this gas is found in the North Field, the world’s largest unassociated gasfield which Qatar shares with Iran (which calls its field South Pars). In the 1980s, then emir Khalifah made the decision to shift investments away from Qatar’s more modest oil supply towards gas. The fall in oil prices in the early 1980s, coupled with the approaching depletion of Qatari oilfields (expected to run out by 2025 at current production rates), and the long Iran–Iraq war all prompted this new energy strategy. The development of the gas sector accelerated with the accession of Emir Hamad to the throne in 1995. In a major departure from past practice, Sheikh Hamad borrowed money in the late 1990s to finance the modernization and expansion of Qatar’s energy infrastructure, especially gas extraction and liquefied natural gas (LNG) production facilities. By 2006, Qatar had become the world’s largest LNG producer. The North Field presents logistical challenges. If the gas is to be transported to distant customers, pipelines (which cannot be rerouted when disputes arise) must be constructed, or

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the gas cooled, liquefied, and shipped, all at great expense. Qatar’s initial hopes for a GCC pipeline collapsed when Saudi Arabia withdrew a preliminary grant of transit rights after deciding to expand a gas project of its own. Bahrain also hesitated, in part because of its territorial dispute with Qatar. Qatar then scaled back its plan and what emerged was the Dolphin Project, which proposed underwater Qatari LNG pipelines to the UAE (Abu Dhabi and Dubai) and Oman, and perhaps later to Pakistan. Gas in Qatar is produced by Ras Laffan LNG and Qatar LNG Company, both with international partners, among them Total and Exxon Mobil. The rising price of oil has made gas more attractive, as have advances in LNG technology that have lowered the cost of chilling LNG to the point of liquefaction. Qatar is also engaged in several gas-to-liquids (GTL) projects that transform natural gas into a synthetic fuel on which vehicles can run, which can be shipped in ordinary tanks and unloaded at ordinary ports. Qatar aims to become the largest GTL producer in the world. Qatar’s growing dependence on gas has led it to strengthen ties with Russia, another major gas producer. The Gas Exporters Group, an outgrowth of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum established in 2001, includes fifteen states, among them Qatar, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria, which together control nearly three-quarters of the world’s gas reserves and nearly half of its production. If a gas cartel similar to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ever emerged, Qatar could potentially be, like Saudi Arabia, a swing producer. At present, a cartel is considered unlikely owing to the inflexibility of pipeline infrastructure and long-term contracts. Qatar’s future plans extend beyond gas export. Qatar is planning on building an Energy City, which will include a spot market for LNG sales (presently sold largely through long-term contracts) and a business hub for the region’s energy sector. In 2006, the GCC announced its support for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Qatar, like the other GCC states, has expressed an interest in developing nuclear energy. In 2007, Qatar established a National Center for Nuclear Information to encourage research and serve as a link with the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). Regional politics also shape Qatar’s relationship with the US. Qatar has been a member of the GCC since its establishment in 1981. It contributes forces to the GCC’s Peninsula Shield. Qatar supported the launch in early 2008 of a Gulf common market. The US has tried to work with the GCC to further its own interests. In 2006, the Bush administration launched an effort to revive US–GCC security co-operation under the auspices of a new Gulf Security Dialogue, which included promoting US arms sales to GCC states that would both increase the GCC’s defense capability and improve the interoperability of their militaries. Qatar’s relations today with its GCC neighbors are good; however, in the past, Qatar has experienced tension with both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The tension between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in particular has undermined the harmony of the GCC. Qatar has long had a complicated relationship Saudi Arabia. The two countries have a strong cultural affinity. Not only are they, like the other GCC members, part of the same cultural lake, but Qatar and Saudi Arabia both ascribe to the same Wahhabi school of Islamic thought, albeit Qatar to a much more moderate variant. Historically, before borders were fixed, nomadic tribes from present-day Saudi Arabia would camp seasonally in Qatar. These tribes still span the borders, and individuals sometimes carry both Saudi and Qatari passports. The vast difference in size and power has always meant that Saudi Arabia dominated the relationship. Saudi ambitions were a major reason why Qatar’s emirs welcomed British influence. Even with the British presence, Saudi Arabia continued to collect taxes from tribal sections in Qatar into the late 1940s. Saudi Arabia continued to meddle in Qatari politics both during the colonial period and after. In 1970, Saudi Arabia supported Sheikh Khalifah in his coup against his cousin Ahmad. In 1992, a clash occurred when Qatar alleged that Saudi forces attacked a border post, killing two, and a border agreement signed in 1965 in an effort

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to clarify oil concession negotiations was suspended. In December 1995, Emir Hamad boycotted the last session of the GCC summit in protest over the choice of a Saudi as the new secretary general. In 1996, Saudi Arabia supported Qatar’s former emir Khalifah in a failed countercoup against his son (who had overthrown his father the previous year). This support led to a decade of tension between the two states. But after the coup and countercoup, the Saudi government mediated a settlement between the emir and his father, following a lawsuit filed in several jurisdictions by the emir over the billions of dollars the former emir had taken with him when he left the country. The feud with Saudi Arabia was a factor leading to the creation of al-Jazeera, which was founded soon after the countercoup attempt. Al-Jazeera quickly became a forum for criticizing Saudi policies. In 2002, the Saudi government recalled its ambassador over al-Jazeera’s coverage of Saudi affairs. Al-Jazeera’s broadcasts of Osama bin Laden, whose prime objective has long been overthrowing the Saudi regime, also led to tension with the Saudis. In 2006, relations began to thaw, owing largely to a shared concern with Iran’s growing power in the region and a growing disenchantment with US policy in the Gulf. In 2007, the two countries effected a rapprochement. Al-Jazeera’s head, Sheikh Hamad bin Thamir alThani, reportedly traveled to Saudi Arabia with Qatar’s emir to participate in meetings with the Saudi leadership. Following this rapprochement, Saudi Arabia, which had previously banned al-Jazeera, now allowed it to return. Some observers felt that al-Jazeera’s coverage of Saudi Arabia now became substantially less critical. For example, when a Saudi court sentenced a Saudi woman to 200 lashes in November 2007 for being alone with unrelated men, seven of whom had raped her, the case produced widespread critical coverage, which alJazeera did not air. Following the reconciliation, Saudi Arabia attended the GCC summit in Doha in December 2007. In March 2008, Saudi Arabia re-established diplomatic relations with Qatar. In May 2008, Qatar reversed an earlier decision to strip some 5,700 Qataris, members of the Murra tribe, of their citizenship on the grounds that they also had Saudi nationality. In June 2008, Qatar and Saudi Arabia began allowing the use of smart ID cards instead of passports for travel between the two states. The underlying power imbalance means that tension could resurface, but for the moment, the two countries’ leaders are on the same page. This, in turn, facilitates the ability of the GCC to function more effectively. Qatar also has a long history of tension with Bahrain, although in recent years, a rapprochement has occurred there too. At the core of the tension lies a territorial dispute between the two states dating back to the eighteenth century when the al-Khalifah, present-day rulers of Bahrain, migrated to the area. For a time, the al-Khalifah ruled Bahrain from a base in Zubarah, on the Qatari peninsula. In 1867, the dispute between the al-Khalifah and the alThani escalated into an attack on Doha by a large Bahraini force. Britain, which had until this time viewed Qatar as a Bahraini dependency, intervened and the following year signed a treaty recognizing the al-Thani as Qatar’s ruling family, an agreement that essentially created Qatar as a sovereign entity. The dispute continued and intensified with the discovery of oil in the region. In 1936, Bahrain claimed the Hawar islands, on Qatar’s west coast, and the following year reasserted its claim to Zubarah. The tension continued after independence despite British and Saudi mediation efforts. In 1986, the dispute flared up again when Bahrain started building a coastguard station on the Fasht al-Dibal reef and Qatari military forces responded by raiding the island and taking the Bahraini workers. In 1991, Qatar sent the case to the International Court of Justice, which issued a ruling in 2001, accepted by both parties, giving Qatar sovereignty over Zubarah and Bahrain sovereignty over the Hawar islands. The emergence of new leaders in both countries in the interim also facilitated the rapprochement. In 2006, Qatar and Bahrain signed an agreement to build a causeway connecting the two states. Qatar’s positions on Iraq and Iran, of considerably greater importance to the US, have also sometimes been at odds. Following the American lead, Qatar supported Iraq during the Iran–

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Iraq war and opposed it during the Gulf War. However, Qatar was also quick to restore relations with Saddam Hussain after the Gulf War. While Qatar offered the US substantial logistical support through its bases during the war in Iraq, tensions began to grow as the insurgency developed into a sectarian civil war, with the US favoring the Shia-dominated government and the Qatari government at times seemingly sympathetic to the largely Sunni insurgency. In 2004, Iraq closed al-Jazeera’s office in Baghdad, accusing the station of airing footage that incited violence. Qatar also gave refuge to Saddam Hussain’s wife, whom the Iraq government accused of helping to finance the insurgency. Like its GCC neighbors, Qatar is concerned about instability in Iraq, although somewhat less concerned than its fellow GCC members about radical Islam bleeding into Qatar. However, if sectarian tension or radical Islamism emanating from Iraq were to destabilize Saudi Arabia, that, in turn, would concern Qatar. Unhappy with the tension in Iraq, Qatar would like the US to find a way to stabilize the country and leave while still retaining enough of a Gulf presence to guarantee the security of Gulf maritime traffic and of Qatar’s ruling family. Disagreements have also arisen with the US over its policy toward Iran. Qatar, with its small Shi’ite population, has never been as concerned about Iranian involvement in its domestic affairs as have Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait. At the same time, the discovery and development of the North Field gas reserve, which straddles the Qatari–Iranian maritime border, has added a new dimension to the Qatari–Iranian relationship and gives Qatar an interest different from and sometimes at odds with US policy in the region. In 1989, an Iranian claim to a third of Qatar’s North Field gas reserves was resolved through an agreement to exploit the field jointly. Since then, Qatar’s development of the field has increased dramatically. In the 1980s, the Iran–Iraq war made financing of the fields difficult but, with the war’s end, foreign direct investment returned and Qatar was able to proceed with development of the field. Iran’s efforts to develop its LNG projects in its South Pars gasfield have moved slowly owing largely to economic sanctions. On the issue of perhaps greatest concern to the US, Iran’s nuclear program, the Qatari government has mixed feelings. Qatar does not see Iran as a major or imminent threat to regional security. While it would like to see control over nuclear enrichment in Iran, it does not want to antagonize Iran and certainly does not want to see any US military action in Iran. In 2006, Qatar, then a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council, was the only member to oppose a resolution calling on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related development. In March 2008, the UAE and Qatar both publicly announced that they would not allow their territory to be used in an attack against Iran. Such an attack, Qatar fears, could provoke a retaliatory Iranian attack on US bases in Qatar. Qatar would much prefer the US to engage Iran diplomatically. President Bush’s efforts to build an anti-Iran alliance among Arab states and implicitly with Israel has little resonance in Qatar or in the other GCC states. Tacit US support for Israel’s nuclear weapons program has undermined its credibility in its efforts to restrain Iran. Qatar, like the other GCC states, is also concerned with the environmental problems that might accompany Iran’s plans to develop more nuclear power plants, given Iran’s location in an earthquake zone. But ultimately Qatar knows it has little impact on the US–Iran conflict. Qatar is not happy that Iran’s position in the Gulf has been strengthened by the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is a reality Qatar lives with. Thus, while remaining a close US ally, Qatar has moved to improve its relationship with Iran. In 2007, as the host of the annual GCC summit, Sheikh Hamad broke with tradition to invite Iran’s controversial president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, to attend. In 2008, Iran and Qatar signed a letter of understanding covering co-operation in agriculture, energy, health, information technology, tourism, and other areas. High energy prices have brought Qatar high profits. Qatar’s residents are among the richest in the world. The wealth of the Qatari nationals, who comprise perhaps 25 percent of Qatar’s residents is, of course, far higher. The question the government faces is what to do with all this money. Part of the answer has been to give Qatar a larger global profile. al-Jazeera, launched

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in 1996 with a $140 million grant from the emir, was intended, in part, to put Qatar on the map. At that time, its style of open debate and relatively neutral news was new and very popular. As the station offers very little coverage of domestic Qatari affairs, it has become a platform for foreign policy. In 2006, al-Jazeera opened an English-language station, hoping to capture still larger audiences. The station has always been controversial. It has alienated nearly every Arab government, most of which have banned it at one time or another. At a meeting in Cairo of Arab information ministers in February 2008, attendees adopted a charter permitting governments to withdraw permits from satellite channels deemed to have offended Arab leaders or national or religious symbols. Qatar was the only country refusing to endorse the charter. In 2004, the Qatar Foundation also began hosting the Doha Debates, often over controversial issues such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Sunni–Shia conflict. In a similar bid to raise Qatar’s global profile, Qatar hosted the Asian Games in 2006 and bid (but failed) to host the 2016 Summer Olympics. Qatar has also tried to carve out a place for itself as a neutral arbiter in regional disputes. In May 2008, Qatar played a central role in mediating an agreement on Lebanon after a year and a half of conflict between Lebanese factions, resulting in an agreement, signed in Doha, on the election of a new president, the composition of the new government, an electoral law, and future discussion about disarming Hezbollah. Two factors allowed Qatar to succeed where others had failed. The first was its neutrality. Many of the regional actors, notably Saudi Arabia and Iran, were already aligned with key groups in Lebanon. Qatar, while largely independent, enjoyed good relations with Iran, Syria, the US, Israel, and the United Nations (Qatar sent a small contingent of troops to the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon following the 2006 war). The second was its wealth: the settlement in Lebanon was reportedly facilitated by the distribution of a large amount of money to close the agreement. After Lebanon, Qatar also attempted in May 2008 to mediate an agreement between the Yemeni government and opposition groups in the north.

US policy concerns US foreign policy towards Qatar is shaped by its larger geostrategic concerns. With the cold war over, its primary concern in the Gulf lies with assuring guaranteed access to and the free flow of petroleum and natural gas to world markets. After 2001, support for the “war on terror” became another goal. After 2003, support for its mission in Iraq became still another goal. Qatar supports these goals by providing the US with a base at al-Udaid. The US, in turn, is willing to provide security for Qatar’s leadership, both in reciprocation and because the maintenance of stability in the Gulf is itself a national security priority for the US. To that end, the US has made security commitments to Qatar, sold it arms, offered military training, and supported it in its efforts to counter external threats. US economic interests are second to these strategic concerns, but they are also important. The emir, since taking power, has invited international oil companies to locate and develop new oilfields, invest in advanced oil recovery systems to extend existing fields, and expand the production of natural gas, signing major new deals with ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Shell to develop Qatar’s energy sector. The US and Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in 2004 and envisage ultimately signing a free trade agreement. The emir appears to share the US government’s belief in the efficacy of some market-oriented reform. Since taking office with an agenda of economic reform, he has streamlined the energy sector and introduced a significant degree of transparency, although corruption in the form of large commissions, typically to ruling family members, for large government contracts remains a problem. The emir has been hampered in his reform efforts by the limits of his own authority and his inability to rein in the strongest sheikhs (notably his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Jassim), who have long ruled over semi-autonomous ministerial fiefdoms.

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In recent years, the US has become increasingly interested in sovereign wealth funds, including the Qatar Investment Authority, a $60 billion sovereign wealth fund established in 2005 and headed by Crown Prince Tamim. While Qatar is interested in supporting the US in whatever ways will bring reciprocal US support, its understanding of international investment has grown substantially in the last decade, and it is less vulnerable to manipulation than it once was. The US is increasingly turning to the sovereign wealth funds of the GCC states to finance its growing deficit, although the US is concerned that these funds are less transparent than other funds, that they have the potential to be used as a foreign policy tool, and that their visible investment in the US might prompt public outcry. Support for Israel and concern with the Israeli–Palestinian issue, while a major driver of US policy in the Middle East, is less important in the Gulf. The issue of Palestine remains important to Qatar and rises in concern as the situation in the West Bank and Gaza deteriorates. While it is less central to foreign policy in the Gulf, the US still finds it easier to forge agreements with the Gulf states in other areas, if it is seen to be actively engaging the Israeli– Palestinian conflict. This linkage was laid bare in 1973 but continues today. Among the Gulf states, Qatar has given considerable support to the peace process. Qatar does not have diplomatic relations with Israel but has hosted an Israeli trade mission, Israel’s only diplomatic mission in the Gulf, since 1996. Qatar has had a policy of opening contacts with Israel. When Qatar hosted the fourth annual Middle East/North Africa Economic Conference in November 1997, it invited Israeli as well as Arab business and political leaders together to discuss regional economic co-operation. In 1999, the government allowed an Israeli team to play in the world handball championships it hosted that year, prompting some Arab states to boycott. In 2002, Sheikh Hamad met then Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, the first Gulf foreign minister to meet publicly with an Israeli official. In 2003, Qatari and Israeli foreign ministers met in France to discuss the peace process, shortly after the emir’s visit to Washington, suggesting that perhaps this was done at the encouragement of President Bush. In 2008, Israel’s Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni visited Doha and spoke at the Doha Forum on Democracy, Development and Free Trade, again prompting some other guests to boycott. These contacts notwithstanding, Qatar has become increasingly disenchanted with the prospects for the peace process. Qatar also maintains close ties with the Palestinian leadership. It attenuated its support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) after its support for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, but retains ties with and has given aid to the Palestinian Authority. Qatar has also maintained close ties with Hamas, some of whose top leaders have homes in Qatar. Qatar does openly criticize Israel about its treatment of Palestinians, most notably in Gaza, where it has sent aid. After Hamas’s victory in the 2006 legislative elections, Sheikh Hamad publicly criticized the US for obstructing the outcome of democratic elections. Qatar also expressed support for Hezbollah during the 2006 war and sent aid to rebuild Lebanon after the 2006 war.

Conclusion For the US, Qatar is a small but important piece of its larger security arrangements in the Gulf. For Qatar, the US offers protection against dangerous neighbors. The US and Qatar have been strong foreign policy allies on the issues most important to each state. Qatar’s more assertive foreign policy over the last decade has created moments of tension. This policy has been driven by several factors: tensions with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, an interest in projecting the country onto the global stage, and an awareness that the US, bogged down in Iraq, has lost some of its ability to coax or coerce, creating openings for regional actors. The Qatari government still believes that an American base on its soil offers it protection from outside challenges.

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Qatar remains concerned about the regional implications of the war in Iraq and about the possibility of a military attack on Iran. If Gulf security were to deteriorate still more, Qatar might seek more advanced weapons and missile defense systems from the US as well as clearer US guarantees for its security, including a clear commitment to defend Qatar from imminent attack. The Obama administration will inherent many problems in the region, notably an unpopular war in Iraq, an overstretched military, and a continuing dependence on the region’s oil. Consequently, the basic alliance between the US and Qatar is likely to remain strong.

References Aras, Bulent. “Turkey and the GCC: An Emerging Relationship,” Middle East Policy, 12(4), Winter 2005. Blanchard, Christopher M. “Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, January 24, 2008. Crystal, Jill. Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge University Press, 1995). Dargin, Justin. “Qatar’s Natural Gas: the Foreign Policy Driver,” Middle East Policy, 14(3), Fall 2007. Herb, Michael. All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies (SUNY Albany Press, 1999). Katz, Mark. “Russia and Qatar,” MERIA Journal, V11(4), December 2007.

30 US–Saudi Arabia diplomatic relations An evolutionary process1 David E. Long

Introduction Bilateral diplomatic relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia have been among the most misunderstood and misrepresented US bilateral relations since their inception in the early 1930s. There have been mutual periodic stresses and irritation over specific issues and skepticism of the other party’s motivations and intentions, resulting in a significant degree of mutual ambivalence. But overall, mutually perceived self-interests have sustained remarkably cordial and stable relations throughout the history of the relationship. These mutual interests have run the gamut of issues, but two interests have consistently received high priority: security and petroleum. And although the substance of those two interests has changed markedly over the years, their importance has remained constant, particularly when the two interests have overlapped. Because the ways in which the two countries have addressed those changes has been an evolutionary process, simply presenting a descriptive, historical narrative tracing security and oil relations would add little to readers’ understanding of the dynamics of the bilateral relationship. It would be useful at the outset, therefore, to present a brief overview of how these two highly disparate countries, one a world power that became a superpower and the other a relatively remote, traditional Islamic principality that became a major oil producer in a global economy, have maintained such a lasting bipartisan relationship. Saudi perceptions of security emanated from Najd, the geographical and political heartland of Saudi Arabia. Traditional Najdi society was basically tribal, conservative, and strongly Islamic. When Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al Saud restored Saudi rule to Najd at the beginning of the twentieth century, Najd was one of the most isolated places on earth. Extreme isolation and the constant threat of tribal warfare created an encirclement syndrome, and as ruler of Najd and later first King of Saudi Arabia, Abd al-Aziz was always aware of threats posed by rival families and tribes. In the best desert tradition, he constantly sought to ally himself with a stronger third party as political and military security against those threats. In the years that followed, Saudi security concerns have expanded to become worldwide. But the search for third parties to help provide external national security has been a major element in Saudi foreign policy. Oil was not a major mutual foreign policy interest for either country when the US formally recognized the regime of King Abd al-Aziz in May 1931. Formal diplomatic relations were not established until November 1933, six months after the King awarded an oil concession to Standard Oil of California (SoCal, now known as Chevron), but resident US diplomatic representation did not occur for another decade. In the years that followed, however, the global importance of Saudi oil production has increased tremendously and still remains a major mutual interest to both countries. Although these two mutual interests have prevailed over the years, various stresses and irritations have also been present, many of them caused at least in part by the broad cultural

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gap existing between the two countries. America’s modern, secular, Western cultural norms and values contrast sharply with Saudi Arabia’s traditional, Islamic cultural norms and values. But in addition, the rapid pace of modernization financed by oil wealth has caused Saudi society to experience more future shock within living memory than Western culture has experienced since the Middle Ages. Not only is there a clash of modernization and tradition between the two countries, but also within Saudi Arabia itself. One area in which culture clash impacts on bilateral relations is communications. Compared with the US, personal communications in Saudi Arabia tend to be elliptical and to avoid the social solecism of causing the other person to lose face. As a result, American political decision makers often misinterpret social etiquette for agreement in how to respond to mutual threats to both their interests. There are also major differences in foreign policy decision making. In the US democratic political process, decision making is ultimately legitimized by majority rule, in which executive and legislative braches are both chosen by and represent the people. Saudi decision making, on the other hand, is based on an ancient custom sanctioned in Islam in which the decision maker engages in consultation (shura) with trusted and recognized individuals to create a consensus (ijma’). Consensus rather than majority rule is the major vehicle for legitimizing group decisions, and ignoring a strong consensus can be done only with great risk. The King, therefore, is not only chief executive but also plays the role of chief consensus maker. If no consensus can be reached on an issue, decisions can be put off, sometimes for years, much to the frustration of US policymakers. Probably the greatest negative impact of culture clash, however, arises from ethnocentric xenophobia. When the US recognized the Saudi regime in 1931, neither society had much if any idea at all about the cultural norms and values of the other. Indeed, the few locals who had ever met Americans—principally the Dutch Reformed medical missionaries from Bahrain who periodically ran clinics on the mainland—were generally well disposed toward them. American public perceptions of Arabia at the time, to the extent that there were any, were likely to have been taken from the glamorized, fantasized 1921 movie, The Sheik, starring Rudolph Valentino. Xenophobia has generally occurred when major policy differences over such emotional issues as the Arab–Israeli problem, the global price of oil, and the other country’s responses to various national security threats have created strong mutual fears and perceived grievances. Although such occasions have created significant impediments to US–Saudi relations, they have not so far permanently altered the sense of mutual self-interest that has been at the cornerstone of US–Saudi relations.

The early years: 1931–45 During the First World War, oil became a major strategic interest to the US, but by 1931, when it recognized the regime of King Abd al-Aziz, the main US interest in foreign oil was to make sure that US oil companies could be competitive with European oil companies that were backed by their governments. Abd al-Aziz’s main foreign policy interests at the time were national security and financial assistance, which he established in a close relationship with Great Britain, the most powerful power in the region. He had also noted, however, that European colonialism often followed in the wake of foreign oil concessions and did not wish that to happen to Najd. In 1923, he had nevertheless granted a concession to an entrepreneur from New Zealand, Frank Holmes, not in expectation of finding oil but because he needed the money. In any event, the concession lapsed in 1928. Five years later, however, the King desperately needed money. By the early 1930s, the great depression and rising international tensions that ultimately led to the Second World War had seriously reduced the number attending the Hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and Hajj

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receipts had become Saudi Arabia’s major of source of income. Thus the King began actively seeking to grant an oil concession. In May 1993, he granted it to Standard Oil of California (SoCal). He chose an American firm not only because of better financial terms but because the Americans were interested only in business and had no political agenda in the region. The US government recognized the primacy of the British role in maintaining regional security and had no desire to challenge them in that role. SoCal created a subsidiary, California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc), jointly owned with Texaco. In 1944, Casoc’s name was changed to the Arabian American Oil Company and, in 1948, two more American oil companies, Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso and Mobile) and Standard Oil of New York, became partners in the company. For over a decade after recognizing the Saudi regime, the US had no resident diplomatic mission in Saudi Arabia. As war clouds gathered, however, the US government concluded that some diplomatic representation was required. In 1940, the US minister to Egypt presented his credentials to the King as non-resident minister to Saudi Arabia. On May 1, 1942, an American legation was opened in Jiddah, and James Moose, one of the few pre-war State Department Arabists, was appointed the resident chargé d’affaires. In 1943, he was appointed US minister to Saudi Arabia, laying the diplomatic foundations for bilateral relations that have survived until the present day. The Second World War also influenced the evolution of diplomatic relations in an unanticipated way. After five years of exploration, Casoc finally found oil in commercial quantities in March 1938 when the Dammam Number 7 well began producing. But because of the lead-up to the Second World War, oil could not be exported in any significant quantities. With steeply declining Hajj receipts, the Saudi government was increasingly strapped for funds. Casoc partners initially provided financial aid to the King by advancing royalties on future production, but by 1943, the owners petitioned the US government to help defray the costs. The US responded with a Lend Lease agreement, which not only provided for financial assistance, but also provided for a US military team to survey Saudi defense needs. The King had demobilized his traditional tribal forces in the 1930s and had no modern military force.

The post-war years: 1945–61 If the creation of a legation in 1942 laid the foundation for future relations, the meeting between President Roosevelt and King Abd al-Aziz on February 14, 1945 could be considered the cornerstone. King Abd al-Aziz was transported by the US Navy to the cruiser USS Quincy, which was carrying Roosevelt home from the Yalta conference. Thanks in part to the efforts of the US minister, Col. William A. Eddy, including acting as interpreter, the visit was a notable success. Eddy, the son and grandson of missionaries to Lebanon, spoke fluent Arabic and understood Arab culture and behavior. The personal chemistry created between the two leaders was extraordinary. Although the bilateral relationship has changed markedly since that historic meeting, the years immediately following saw the beginning of a framework in which it has been conducted ever since. It can best be described as a marriage of convenience from which there is no divorce despite mutual ambivalence and periodic antagonisms so long as the mutual interests that bind the two countries together remain strong. The most significant issue of mutual antagonism between the US and Saudi Arabia has been the partition of Palestine in 1948. It was first raised during the meeting on the USS Quincy. Roosevelt wished to consult the King as ruler of an independent Arab state about support for a solution to the Palestine problem. The President was sympathetic to the plight of the Jewish victims of the Nazi holocaust and had supported creating a homeland for the Jewish people, but he was also well aware of the threat to US interests in the region that

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would result from creating a homeland in Palestine over the solid and fervent opposition of the Arab people. The King was adamant in framing the issue as one of honor and justice and called on Roosevelt to support the Arab position. Roosevelt responded by pledging to the King that he would not act on the Palestine problem without full and prior consultation with both Arabs and Jews. On April 5, he reaffirmed his pledge in a letter to the King.2 Given the intense domestic political pressure to support partition stemming from shock at learning the full extent of the Nazi atrocities and intensified by feelings of guilt nurtured by American Zionists, it is doubtful whether Roosevelt could have found any solution acceptable to the King, or any Arab, despite his awareness of the damage to US interests certain to result from the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, and his empathy with the King. But a week after he sent the letter, he was dead. His successor, Harry S. Truman, was even less sensitive toward Arab objections. His rejoinder to senior diplomat at the State Department who warned of the damage to US interests that would result was, “I’m sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.”3 The result of partition was what Roosevelt and the State Department had foreseen. The son of the King and his Foreign Minister, Prince (later King) Faisal, was particularly bitter, having been assured by the State Department during a visit to Washington in 1946 that Roosevelt’s pledge of consultation was still in effect. From Faisal’s perspective, the partition of Palestine was a betrayal to live up to Roosevelt’s pledge to consult with his father and the Arabs in general. Breaking a pledge to consult is a breach of honor in Saudi culture as well as a breech of good faith. Despite the Saudi bitterness and feelings of betrayal over Palestine, however, US–Saudi relations continued to expand. In 1949, the US raised its consulate in Dhahran to a consulate general and then raised the American embassy in Jiddah to an embassy with J. Rives Childs as the first ambassador. With the end of the war, Saudi oil exports soared, and the economic importance of Saudi oil production became an important focus of bilateral relations. The main focus, however, was on mutual national security interests, including oil security. Although the 1943 Lend Lease agreement had resulted in US military surveys in Saudi Arabia and the US had built an airbase at Dhahran in 1945 to be leased for three years, US interest in mutual security arrangements with the Saudis had waned after the Second World War. But they quickly revived with the outbreak of the cold war. Co-operation against security threats by the Soviet Union and/or its client states throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and West and South Asia continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. During the war years, Washington had made a conscious effort to co-operate on security matters in the Gulf with the British, in recognition of their protective relationship with the Arab littoral states. With the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, however, the US took over from Britain the primary responsibility for security against communist threats in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and became the principal mutual security partner of the Kingdom. In 1949, soon after it had vacated the Dhahran airbase, the US pressed the King for an extension of its lease. It was extended pending a final agreement which was concluded in June 1951after hard bargaining, extending the lease for five more years and extendable for five additional years. A Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed at the same time providing for a US Military Training Mission (USMTM). Established in June 1953, it is still a fundamental component of the US–Saudi military relationship. In November 1953, King Abd al-Aziz died and was succeeded by his son, Saud bin Abd alAziz (reigned 1953–64). King Saud was a throwback to an earlier time. Although he was a

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well-meaning person, he could not cope with the complexities of rapid social, economic, and political modernization and change made possible by oil wealth. As a result, his reign was characterized by palace intrigue, corruption, waste, and being on the verge of bankruptcy. It was a challenging time for US–Saudi relations. But the ambivalence and antagonisms created ultimately failed to prevail over co-operation. At the same time, there was then and continues to be a striking lack of mutual understanding. A major source of ambivalence during King Saud’s reign was his attitudes toward the US and Britain, the primary guarantors of Gulf regional security. Although Saud shared his father’s encirclement syndrome and desire for powerful mutual security partners against the communist threat, he also had an ingrown distrust of the political intentions of the US and Great Britain in the region. For the US, the main focus of its security role was not limited to protection of Saudi Arabia alone but to the defense of the Free World against the global threat of the Soviet Union. The strident cold war policies of the Eisenhower years were also threatening to the King, who had to deal with growing radical Arab nationalist sentiment. Suspicions of US stridency in its Middle East policies were at least a contributing factor to Saudi Arabia staying out of the US- and UK-supported Baghdad Pact in 1955. At the same time, Saudi Arabia recognized the need for co-operating with the US against communism, and it continued to accept US military assistance. In 1955, the US agreed to sell weapons, including some M-41 light tanks, to Saudi Arabia. However, increased Arab–Israeli tension had obliged the Saudis to join an Arab “defense alliance” in October, causing the US supporters of Israel to lobby the US government to cancel the sale. The tanks were obsolescent and no threat to Israel, but members of Congress, the media, and the Israeli ambassador, Abba Eban, all criticized the sale, and few politicians wanted to take on the Israel lobby. In the end, the tank sale went through the following February, much to the elation of the Saudis. In retrospect, it was an early example of how the level of US–Saudi co-operation was inversely proportionate to the level to which US domestic politics could influence US foreign policy to a friendly Arab state. The King was also an early admirer of President Nasser who had become president of Egypt in 1954 following the overthrow of the British-supported Egyptian monarchy the previous year. In June 1954, Saud agreed to a “joint command” with Egypt. In January 1955, an Egyptian military training mission arrived in the Kingdom which temporarily overshadowed USMTM. The Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Eisenhower Doctrine proclaimed in 1957 both exhibited a mix of mutual interests, ambivalence, and antagonisms. Nasser, unable to meet the terms for purchasing Western arms, turned to the Soviet bloc, purchasing arms from Czechoslovakia. US Secretary of State Dulles was furious, and in July 1956 withdrew the US offer to fund the construction of the Aswan High Dam. A week later, Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal. That infuriated Britain and France who saw it as an infringement of their “rights.” In collusion with them and seeking “strategic depth” in Sinai, Israel invaded and occupied the canal the following October. To the surprise of all three, Eisenhower opposed the occupation and through the United Nations pressured them to accept a ceasefire, and afterward, forced Israel to withdraw. He thus became the first US president to use direct coercion in challenging Israeli policies against an Arab state deemed harmful to US interests. Saudi confidence was greatly restored. The response did not change Secretary of State Dulles’s cold warrior vision of Middle East security policy, however, and alarmed that the crisis would weaken the Baghdad Pact, he quickly responded with an initiative to deter Soviet expansion in the region that became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Dulles had hoped that King Saud would be a strong conservative ally against radical Nasserism and play a lead role in gaining regional support for Eisenhower. He was to be disappointed, however. The Saudi leadership still felt some

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admiration for President Nasser. And the King, as one might expect, was still ambivalent about the Eisenhower Doctrine. He welcomed US arms and economic assistance but remained skeptical of US intentions in offering military assistance to Baghdad Pact members. US–Saudi relations remained rocky. Changes in leadership in the late 1950s and early 1960s paved the way for a significant increase in co-operation and cordiality in the bilateral relationship. In 1958, King Saud was forced to turn over the reins of government to his half-brother, Crown Prince Faisal, who set about restoring government fiscal responsibility. Faisal retired from public service in 1960 when Saud regained power, but returned to power in 1962 and became King in his own right when Saud was forced to abdicate in 1964. If King Abd al-Aziz was the father of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Faisal was the father of Saudi foreign affairs and internal modernization that went hand in hand with Saudi Arabia’s growing oil state status. Faisal was first involved in foreign affairs from the tine he was as a young teenager when he represented his father in an official visit to London after the First World War. In 1931, he became country’s first foreign minister, a position he retained until his death save for the two years, 1960–62, when he retired to private life. Faisal’s mother was an Al al-Shaykh, a descendent of Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the puritanical Islamic reform movement called Wahhabism. Through his maternal grandfather, Faisal became a scholar of Islamic law, the basis of the Saudi legal system. In January 1961, John F. Kennedy was inaugurated President of the United States. Kennedy was one of the most charismatic US Presidents in modern times, and through his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, he changed course in US foreign policy away from the confrontational cold warrior focus of Secretary Dulles in the Eisenhower years to one of more accommodation and negotiation. In addition, two other events occurred that also helped create a new era of close mutual relations. The first was the non-renewal of US base rights at Dhahran. By 1961, the development of intercontinental missiles had made the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) base at Dhahran no longer cost effective. At the same time, the rise of radical Arab nationalism throughout the Arab world had greatly increased the political liability of hosting a US base in the Kingdom. The announcement in March 1961 that base rights would not be renewed thus removed a significant irritant in the bilateral relationship. The second was the deterioration in Saudi–Egyptian relations. Saudi admiration for President Nasser had begun to sour as his brand of pan-Arabism increasingly acquired a secular, socialist tone and he turned to the Soviet bloc for economic and military assistance.

Maturing of bilateral relations: 1962–73 By 1962, relations had stabilized, and despite continued mutual irritants and ambivalence in specific areas, remained relatively stable for the next three decades. A major source of irritation and ambivalence that has continued until the present day has been the cross-cultural clash between the secular, democratic, Western culture of the US and the traditional and highly conservative Islamic culture of Saudi Arabia, with neither society fully understanding or approving of the cultural values and norms of the other. An early example was the determination of political idealists in the Kennedy administration to bring Western social and political reform to Saudi Arabia. In response to President Kennedy’s urging, Crown Prince Faisal announced a Ten Point Reform Program in 1962. The idealists, however, complained that little or nothing was being done to implement the plan, and Washington kept instructing its US ambassadors to push Faisal harder. Ambassador Eilts related to the author the story of having to make the pitch to King Faisal who responded by showing him photos from an anti-war riot at the University of California, Berkeley, and asking, “What does he [the President] want me to do? Turn this country into a Berkeley campus?” Later, during

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the Johnson administration, Secretary Rusk cabled Eilts to stop pushing internal reform, saying that the King knew best what was good for his country and would act accordingly.4 Rusk’s instructions were actually an understatement. King Faisal had adopted his father’s philosophy that Saudi Arabia would seek modernization, but as an Islamic monarchy would not embrace secularization. Pushing either too fast or too slowly would have created social unrest, and his genius was in maintaining a delicate balance between the two. A more inflammatory issue arose in 1962 when civil war broke out in Yemen, in which Egypt aided and abetted republican military elements in overthrowing the Yemeni monarchy. From the Saudi point of view, Egypt under Nasser had by then become a client state of the Soviet Union. The Kennedy administration, while still hostile toward the Soviet Union, was less stridently Manichaean it its approach to radical Arab nationalists than its predecessor. Thus, while very co-operative against the threat of international communism, King Faisal was incensed when the US, after receiving pledges from President Nasser that its troops would be withdrawn from Yemen, recognized the republican regime. Nasser’s pledges were not kept and the civil war intensified. President Kennedy sent Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to seek an Egyptian–Saudi disengagement, but to no avail. Hostilities continued until the 1967 Arab–Israeli war forced Nasser to withdraw his forces. The 1967 war created some mutual irritation but did not disrupt cordial bilateral relations. Saudi Arabia was one of the few Arab countries that did not break diplomatic relations with the US. It did join other Arab oil producers in imposing an oil embargo. But because there was still a global oil glut and the US was still a net oil exporter, it had little effect on the global market. Moreover, King Faisal quietly allowed shipments of J-9 jet fuel for the US Air Force in Vietnam despite the embargo.

The emergence of Saudi Arabia as a key global oil producer: 1967–74 Oil market stability throughout the 1960s was maintained by the oil companies by regulating production. One result was the birth of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960 in an attempt by producing companies to play a greater role in regulating prices. OPEC wielded little influence, however, as the oil trade was in a buyers’ market throughout the decade. The closure of the Suez Canal and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline to the Mediterranean in the wake of the 1967 war placed a premium on Libyan oil, and Libya thereupon successively demanded a voice in market regulation. That started a trend which eventually resulted in OPEC countries acquiring full ownership of their oil operations, many through nationalization. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates rejected nationalization and in 1973 opted for a more gradual buyout process called “participation.” The policy was formulated by Saudi oil minister, Ahmad Zaki Yamani, who wanted to keep the Aramco owners involved during the transition to national ownership. The emergence of Saudi Arabia as a key global oil producer became dramatically apparent during the October 1973 Arab–Israeli war when King Faisal engineered an oil embargo through the Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (AOPEC). The embargo had immediate global effect in what had become a global sellers’ market, after the US changed from a net oil exporter to a net importer in 1969. Taking punitive action was not characteristic of Saudi foreign policy, which had habitually avoided aggressive confrontations, particularly aimed at valued Western allies. Thus, for the King to levy an oil embargo that, unlike the 1967 embargo, was virtually certain to be damaging to the global economy and was against long-term Saudi oil interests reflected very strong feelings indeed. He had been warning the Nixon administration for over a year that, unless there was progress on a Palestinian–Israeli settlement soon, renewed hostilities were inevitable, but it had turned a deaf ear.

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But there was another issue: breach of promise. When the 1973 Arab–Israeli war broke out, President Nixon sent King Faisal a highly classified message promising that the US would be “even-handed” in the hostilities. Just days later, the President announced a $2.2 billion military assistance program to Israel. Nixon, under huge domestic political pressure from the Israel lobby, felt the need to offer public reassurance of US military support for Israel which had suffered serious aircraft losses early in the war. From the King’s perspective, this was a second breach of promise tantamount to a breach of honor. Moreover, Faisal was Foreign Minister when President Truman failed to honor President Roosevelt’s promise to consult with his father before partitioning Palestine a quarter of a century earlier. Thus Nixon’s announcement was a second breach of honor at the highest level of the US government. He was furious with the Nixon administration and the embargo was the result. As oil prices soared as a result of the embargo, US public opinion became infuriated at Saudi Arabia. This hostility was further inflamed by a major anti-Saudi smear campaign by US supporters of Israel, apparently fearing that the US might sell out Israel for a barrel of Saudi oil. Secretary of State Kissinger tried to pressure the King to lift the embargo, but was not immediately successful, leading him in December 1973 to make his highly publicized remarks that the US might have to consider a military response in case of “strangulation” of the industrial world.5 His words only created a more bitter reaction throughout the Arab world, but no immediate results. Nevertheless, after hard but quiet diplomacy, the embargo was lifted in March 1974.

The special relationship: 1975–81 King Faisal was assassinated in 1975 and was succeeded by a half-brother, King Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz. A younger half-brother, Prince Fahd bin Abd-Aziz, became the heir apparent and presided over the day-to-day operations of government. On the death of King Khalid in 1982, Fahd became king. Each new monarch introduced his own personal style of governance and, over time, foreign policy priorities have changed. But Kings Khalid and Fahd and Fahd’s successor, the current monarch, King Abdallah, have all preserved the basic foreign policy directions established by King Faisal. Despite, or possibly because of, the mutual public hostility induced by the 1973 Arab–Israeli war and the Arab embargo, both countries concluded that the need for co-operation in fostering mutual interests outweighed mutual antagonisms. Lifting the embargo thus restored close co-operation that lasted over the next two decades. At the same time, underlying differences remained, maintaining a degree of ambivalence that characterized the relationship. On economic issues, the oil wealth accrued by Saudi Arabia during the embargo added a new dimension to US–Saudi economic relations, for both the public and the private sectors. In January 1974, the American embassy in Jiddah proposed to Washington the creation of a US– Saudi joint commission to bring the two countries closer together politically, assist the Saudis in economic and technological development, expand bilateral trade, and provide military assistance and arms sales to meet Saudi defense requirements. The idea took hold, and during a visit to Washington in June, heir apparent Prince Fahd and Secretary Kissinger issued a joint statement of US–Saudi co-operation. In February 1975, the US–Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation was created. The joint commission, administered by the US Department of Treasury, was basically a Saudi-funded US economic assistance program for Saudi Arabia. It was highly successful and continued in operation until the early 1990s. Its creation was the beginning of what became called a “special relationship” between the two counties. Oil prices remained high throughout the 1970s and were a continuing source of US public resentment. However, the Saudi government invested great amounts of their oil wealth, called “petrodollars,” in economic development projects, providing significant commercial opportunities for American businesses.

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Despite the benefit to the US economy from repatriated petrodollars, however, the US Congress, motivated more by political than by economic interests, produced a plethora of antiArab and anti-Saudi investigations, hearings, and legislation. One particularly pernicious act drastically raised the tax liabilities for Americans working overseas to dissuade Americans from taking jobs in the Gulf oil states. Finally recognizing the damage done to the US balance of payments from the loss of export revenue, the Congress passed a law lowering the liability in 1978. From the Saudi perspective, these pejorative political acts and media coverage stereotyping Saudis as greedy, corrupt “oil sheiks” were greatly resented. In the area of mutual security interests, new issues were appearing. In 1967, the former British colony, Aden, gained independence and had become a Marxist state, the People’s Republic of South Yemen (PDRY). In 1969, South Yemeni troops attacked a remote Saudi border post at Wadiy’ah, but were beaten off by Saudi aircraft. The South Yemeni regime also supported an Omani insurgent group, the People’s Front for the Liberation of Southern Arabia (PFLOAG), which initiated a full-scale insurgency in the Dhufar region of southern Oman that lasted until 1975. In the meantime, Britain ended its long-standing protective status in the lower Gulf states, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. All these developments led President Nixon to announce a new Gulf policy, the Nixon Doctrine, which sought to place more reliance on local states to help share Gulf security responsibilities in the wake of the withdrawal of the British, and to seek the co-operation of the Gulf oil-producing states in maintaining oil price and production stability in what had become a global commodity. It was often called the “twin pillar policy,” because it placed special dependence on two major Gulf states, Iran and Saudi Arabia. As part of the new policy, US military assistance established in the 1960s continued unabated. Under the direction of USMTM, modernization and training programs and arms sales were expanded for all branches of the Saudi military. A separate modernization program was developed for the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) at the request of its commander, Prince (now King) Abdallah. The National Guard, a descendent of King Abd al-Aziz’s traditional tribal army, had been reconstituted under British tutelage as the Kingdom’s domestic security force. In addition, the US Army Corps of Engineers continued to supervise numerous military and civilian engineering projects including the establishment of a Saudi television network. There was also a separate assistance program for upgrading Interior Ministry communications. Still, security co-operation continued to be challenged by mutual ambivalence, created in large part by the domestic political pressures from supporters of Israel to limit all US military assistance to the Kingdom as a threat to Israel substantially raised bilateral tensions. In 1976, when incoming President Carter reaffirmed the approval by his predecessor, President Ford, of a sale of F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia to replace their obsolete Lightnings, the Israel lobby waged an all-out campaign in the US Congress to block the sale. The campaign failed, in part because of the efforts of Carter’s new ambassador to Saudi Arabia, John West, who was governor of South Carolina when Carter was governor of Georgia, and of Saudi Princes Bandar bin Sultan, later ambassador to the US, and Turki Al Faisal, then head of the Saudi intelligence service. The Saudis considered the F-15 sale as a “litmus test” of US friendship and co-operation. Political relations were even more ambivalent, with unmet expectations of what each could expect from the other, particularly on the Arab–Israeli issue. The Saudis had high expectations that President Carter would work for a just settlement, and the US had high expectations of support toward that end from the Saudis. Neither side’s expectations were met. Carter was bitter that the Saudis did not support the Camp David Accords of September 1978 that he brokered between Egypt and Israel. The Saudis, who noted that they had not even been consulted during the negotiations leading up to the accords, believed that they did not adequately address the key issues of Palestinian selfdetermination, refugees, and the status of Jerusalem. Thus, when a separate Egyptian–Israeli treaty was signed on March 26, 1979, the Saudis felt betrayed by both Egypt and the US.

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The fall of the Shah of Iran in December 1979 introduced new problems for US–Saudi relations. For the US, it meant the collapse of the twin pillar policy. On balance, the twin pillar policy itself was ill-fashioned. Although recognizing that Saudi Arabia and Iran shared US antipathy toward Soviet communism, the US political leadership never really focused on the age-old Arab–Persian national, ethnic, and sectarian differences that divided them, or on the fact that, while they maintained mutual co-existence, there was little love lost on either side. At any rate, the Carter administration developed a Gulf strategy based on a rapid deployment force, the forebear of the US Central Command. The Saudis were appalled at the new Iranian republican regime. Their first reaction was that the US either did not or could not do anything to come to the aid of one of its major Middle East allies. Many senior Saudi officials wondered whether the US would do the same were the Saudi regime to experience similar circumstances. In an effort to bolster relations with the Kingdom, the Carter administration invited Crown Prince Fahd to visit Washington. Unfortunately, he arrived just as the Egyptian–Israeli treaty was being signed. The special relationship was in shambles.

Toward more realistic expectations: 1981–91 When President Reagan was inaugurated in 1981, US–Saudi relations again entered a period of closer co-operation. The high oil prices in the 1970s had resulted in more efficient fuel consumption, particularly in the US, causing a significant lowering of global oil demand, which in turn lowered prices. In addition, depolarization of the Arab–Israeli issue in domestic politics lowered the level of US public antipathy toward the Kingdom. The virulent anti-Saudi campaign continued, but as oil prices lowered, it achieved little or no traction among the general American public. Global oil prices remained low into the twenty-first century. In addition, the Reagan administration placed a greater focus on security issues and subsequently less on an Arab–Israeli settlement. Regional and global security issues remained a major mutual interest. The Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and the Iran–Iraq war had broken out in 1980. Shortly after President Reagan’s inauguration, his incoming administration announced that its first priority in the Middle East would be to restore the West’s strategic position against the Soviets. That included the sale of Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and an F-15 enhancement package to Saudi Arabia. When President Reagan endorsed the AWACS sale initially approved by his predecessor, President Carter, the Israel lobby again launched an all-out campaign to block the sale, and again lost by a very small margin. For the Saudis, gaining Congressional approval for the AWACS sale was considered a great victory and a second successful litmus text of US friendship. The renewed focus on security measures did not obscure the need for co-operation on oil and other interests, but neither did it incline the Saudis to be more receptive to US wishes where there were differences. This was particularly the case in addressing the Arab–Israeli issue. In August 1981, heir apparent Prince Fahd announced an eight-point Arab–Israeli plan without prior consultation with the US. The Saudis had no faith that the Camp David Accords were a credible first step toward peace, nor did they believe that the separate Egyptian–Israeli peace would bring concrete progress toward that end. Neither in their view adequately addressed the four basic issues: the Palestinian refugees, boundaries, the status of Jerusalem, and Palestinian statehood. The most controversial point of the plan was point seven, “Affirmation of the right of all states in the region to live in peace.” This was the first time an Arab state had addressed even implicitly Israel’s right to exist and its demand for a security guarantee. Israel and its US supporters, however, denigrated the language as insufficient, impugned Fahd’s motives, and condemned the Fahd Plan, as it was called, out of hand. Since then, both the US and Saudi Arabia have made efforts toward achieving a peace settlement, but there have been no significant bilateral efforts in that direction.

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In 1985, the Saudis were again disappointed when President Reagan told King Fahd that he could not get Congressional approval for additional F-15s or an advanced air defense system the Saudis had been seeking. In response, the Saudis began diversifying their arms purchases. Then in 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. It was an archetypical conventional military operation endangering both US and Saudi political, economic, and strategic interests that US–Saudi security co-operation had focused on for many years. US President George H. W. Bush was determined to respond with military force. And although the Saudis were initially hesitant to allow US military operations to be staged from their country because of a potential political backlash, they recognized the threat to the Kingdom should Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait be allowed to become permanent. In early 1991, US forces led a coalition of Saudi, other Arab allies, and European forces in Operation Desert Storm, which quickly defeated the Iraqis. From the US and Saudi point of view, the war was a great success. The Saudi military acquitted itself very well, and the participation of Arab states created a broad consensus that legitimized its own presence there. Moreover, the Saudi military acquitted itself well.

Business as usual and a creeping mutual security crisis: 1991–2001 Bilateral relations after the war for the most part returned to business as usual. However, the continuing oil glut that continued into the early twenty-first century brought some unfortunate unintended consequences for both countries. For the Saudis, the foreign currency reserves that they had built up during the embargo period were gradually reduced by deficit spending in the face of strong public resistance to increased taxes. Foreign reserves all but disappeared as a result of huge war costs incurred by the Saudis, including underwriting US and other coalition costs as well as its own. For the US, sustained low oil prices encouraged Americans to purchase increasingly high gasoline-consuming vehicles, greatly increasing demand for oil and hastening the time when high prices would return again in the next decade. In US–Saudi mutual security relations, only in retrospect can the Kuwait war be viewed as the end of an era. The last Soviet troops had left Afghanistan in 1988, ending the Afghan war, and in 1991, the Soviet Union itself collapsed, ending the cold war. Although the end of the cold war drastically changed the nature of US–Saudi mutual security interests, the extent of the change was not immediately recognized. For the US, the rapid defeat of President Saddam’s forces was seen as a major technological breakthrough in military warfare, and a harbinger of how future wars would be fought. Moreover, Saudi Arabia underwrote a significant portion of the US combat costs. In the wake of the war, President Clinton and the US Congress approved roughly $40 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia, including sophisticated F-14E fighter bombers. The sales were a boon not only to the Saudi armed services but also to the US defense industry. Differences still existed over how to deal with Iran. While the Saudis shared US concern about the security threat posed by Iran, they differed with the US bellicose attitude toward the Iranian republican regime. Much to the displeasure of the US and despite Iranian provocations, the Saudis preferred to pursue a policy of mutual co-existence instead What neither country fully foresaw was that conventional military conflict was gradually being overtaken by asymmetrical conflicts as their primary mutual security threat. It was a creeping crisis and to fully understand it one must look back in time. Terrorist attacks had been common in the Middle East for years, usually by small, extremist groups espousing either militant left-wing nationalist and/or Islamist ideologies. What draws people to join and/or support asymmetrical organizations, however, is not ideology, but rather social, cultural, economic, and political conditions that generate fear, anger, grievance, and hostility. They can be national, ethnic, sectarian, or some combination in origin. In traditional societies such as Saudi Arabia, they are often caused by the stresses of social change and future shock resulting from rapid modernization.

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With the end of the cold war and the discrediting of radical left-wing, nationalist political ideologies as the principal vehicle for expressing grievances and anger, many politically disaffected young people throughout the Muslim world began to turn to radical Islamist political ideologies to justify supporting and/or participating in asymmetrical activities. Throughout the 1980s, numbers of these people traveled to Afghanistan to perform their “jihad” by fighting atheistic Soviet communist occupiers with the assistance of the US. Returning to their homelands when the war ended, they were a major influence in persuading marginalized youth seeking a cause to assuage their anger and frustrations to join terrorist organizations. As the term “asymmetrical” implies, these activities were generally carried out and supported by individuals and states that were not capable of challenging the overwhelming conventional military power of their perceived adversaries. Thus, the strategic objective was not military but psychological, to intimidate the adversaries through the use of violence in order to gain political objectives. By the 1990s, information technology evolved into a principal accelerator in the rise of asymmetrical conflicts by instantly spreading news of perceived threats, grievances, and asymmetrical responses throughout the third world. At the same time, a new charismatic Jihadist figure, Osama bin Laden emerged. In 1994, Saudi Arabia revoked his citizenship and froze his assets because of his support for militant Jihadist activities. But that did not stop him organizing what was to become the premier Jihadist organization worldwide, al-Qaeda. Nor did it stop him and others like him from recruiting hundreds of disaffected young people and from receiving logistical support from individuals of all ages and sympathetic states. His primary targets were the Saudi regime and Americans living and working in the region. The first major terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia involving Americans were a car bomb attack on the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) headquarters in Riyadh in 1995 that killed five Americans and an Indian, and a truck bomb attack against American military personnel housed in the al-Khobar Towers residential complex in the Eastern Province in 1996 that killed nineteen US servicemen and a Saudi and wounded 372 others. By the late 1990s, it became apparent that al-Qaeda was the most active terrorist group in the region and was concentrating on targeting Americans and Saudis. In 1998, al-Qaeda bombed the US embassy in Nairobi. In response, President Clinton launched a bombing attack at Bin Laden’s headquarters, but he was absent at the time. In 2000, al-Qaeda carried out a small boat suicide attack on the US destroyer USS Cole, docked at Aden, Yemen, in which eighteen seamen were killed. The same year, a series of car bomb attacks occurred in various cities in Saudi Arabia. Lack of bilateral co-operation against terrorism was not the problem. Following the first two attacks, the US and Saudi Arabia worked closely together. The problem was failure to foresee that asymmetrical conflicts were becoming the major security threats of the future.

September 11 and its aftermath: 2001–8 The Saudis had high hopes for incoming President George W. Bush. His father had initiated Operation Desert Storm and the son was familiar with the oil business and had shown a liking for Arabs. They also had hopes that the new president would finally make what they considered real progress toward an Arab–Israeli peace settlement. In the early months of his first administration, George W. Bush shied away from Middle East politics, though in June 2001, he became the first US president to state explicitly that the Palestinians should have an independent state. But the president’s strong support of Israel was to cause the Kingdom to continue seeking a settlement on its own. In 2002, heir apparent Prince Abdallah announced his own peace proposal. On September 11, 2001, the creeping mutual security crisis exploded; nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon. Fifteen of the attackers

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were Saudis. The World Trade Center Towers attack was seen on live television around the world. The entire American public was traumatized. Not since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had such a crisis occurred on US soil. Saudis were also shocked, particularly members of the extended families of the Saudi participants, many of whom were in denial that their relatives could commit such acts. But for many, grief quickly turned to grievance and a sense of betrayal over the US response that followed. From the viewpoint of US–Saudi relations, the tragedy of 9/11 was not the initial trauma, but the events that followed. The president’s response to the 9/11 attack was to initiate a military “global war on terrorism.” In order to gain public support for this aggressive policy, he exploited the nation’s trauma by using scare tactics exaggerating the nature of the threat. The tactics had the desired effect of winning public support, but had the side-effect of adding credence to the vitriolic anti-Saudi and anti-Muslim materials that were spread by the media by ultraconservative supporters of the Bush administration. For some, Islamic terrorism had replaced communism as the new global threat to national security. The combination of American vitriol, heard all over the world thanks to information technology, and the US military occupation of Iraq posed a conundrum for the Saudis. Together, they incited fear and hostility in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Arab world, particularly among the politically disaffected, increasing rather than decreasing regional instability and asymmetrical threats to the Kingdom. For Saudis, the US, with which they shared mutual security interests, had become a major catalyst of domestic and regional threats to those interests. The terrorist threat to the US, particularly from al-Qaeda, was shared by, not supported by, Saudi Arabia itself. On May 12, 2003, following the US occupation of Iraq, multiple terrorist attacks attributed to al-Qaeda included American housing compounds in Riyadh. The Saudis responded to the threat with a broad-based counterterrorism campaign that included aggressive countermeasures such as shootouts, massive arrests of suspected terrorists, and closer oversight to interdict private financial support of terrorist organizations. But more sensitive to the psychological nature of asymmetrical warfare than the West, they also instituted a re-education and rehabilitation program for apprehended terrorists that has achieved significant success. The second strain on mutual interests was the rapid rise in oil prices beginning in 2003. As prices continued to rise, American public opinion began to view Saudi Arabia and OPEC as the culprits. By the presidential campaigns in 2008, high fuel prices had become a greater US domestic political issue than opposition to the Iraq war. In contrast to the response to the September 11 attacks, however, Saudi Arabia has been portrayed as a major contributor to the spike in prices. Again, the two countries share a mutual interest in bringing down prices to avoid a global recession and endangering global financial investments. Saudi Arabia did not altogether reject President Bush’s request to increase oil production in order to lower prices, and promised a total increase of add 500,000 barrels per day. But it emphasized that stabilizing the oil market was a global problem and not amenable to a quick fix solution. The oil price spike was far more complicated than market fundamentals of supply and demand or speculating on future prices.

Looking to the future The post-9/11 period has again shown that mutual oil and security interests can prevail over long-term ambivalence and short-term crises. But it also argues against the notion that the clock can be turned back to a pristine time of total cordiality and co-operation that never existed in the first place. The world has changed faster in the past seventy-five years than in any time in history, and one could reasonably argue that rapid social, cultural, environmental,

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and technological change is likely to increase even faster in the present century. For bilateral relations to continue to benefit both the US and Saudi Arabia, they will require accommodation of what each side requires and what each side can bring to the table as well as constant modifications and adjustments to meet inevitable social, economic, and political changes as they occur in the future.

Notes 1 The ideas and concepts found in this chapter are based on the author’s personal observations, interviews, and findings over a period of more than forty years, and many of them have appeared in a number of published books and articles, including The United States: Ambivalent Allies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), The Anatomy of Terrorism (New York: Free Press, 1990), The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997, second edition in train), and The Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia (Westport, CT, and London: Greenwood Press, 2005). 2 The text of the letter is quoted in Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians, ed. Walter Johnson (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1949): 289–90. 3 William A. Eddy, FDR Meets Ibn Saud (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1954): 37. 4 Personal notes of the author. 5 See David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud (Sidgwick and Jackson, 1981): 272.

31 The Sultanate of Oman and the US* Joseph A. Kéchichian

The United States “courted Oman spiritedly” after Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id acceded to the throne on August 9, 1970, and “received substantial cooperation from Muscat” even if US objectives were formulated without taking into account “the nature of Omani history, society and politics.”1 Nevertheless, Oman remained a critical country for the US, because of the Sultanate’s strategic position on the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, Washington faced the British hurdle for close to two centuries, and deferred to London for about that long before it successfully launched independent initiatives. In turn, Muscat looked to the Western superpower with awe, confident that its own modest policies benefited the West in general and the US in particular. Whether various Omani ideas were reciprocated was difficult to confirm. Suffice it to say that the Sandhurst-educated and widely respected ruler perceived the US as the key security guarantor of the Persian Gulf region. While the Omani ruler repeatedly advocated improving and enlarging joint Gulf state defense capabilities, his experience on both the bilateral as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) levels, was not encouraging. Qaboos was aware of regional limitations, which were best illustrated in the 1980s and 1990s and, consequently, seldom hesitated in his unflinching support of recent major US combat operations in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF). Even if the Sultanate remained publicly critical of the US decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003, Qaboos, along with all the senior members of his government, understood that Washington’s presence in the Persian Gulf served Omani and Arab Gulf states interests. Remarkably, there was limited popular opposition in Oman to the US military presence on the Arabian Peninsula, despite the popular perception that these operations were conducted against fellow Muslims. In the aftermath of the tragic events of 9/11 in the US, Oman reconfirmed its unique relationship with the US as it extended unparalleled co-operation in the legal, intelligence-sharing, and financial aspects of the euphemistically known global “war on terrorism.” After the 9/11 attacks, Muscat issued new laws to prevent terrorist organizations from raising or laundering money in the Sultanate and, according to the State Department, established carefully vetted surveillance systems to identify unusual financial transactions.2 A new comprehensive anti-terrorism law was promulgated in January 2007, which established the “National Committee for Combating Terrorism” and strengthened the country’s legal proscriptions against all forms of terrorist acts, including the furnishing of assistance to terrorists. This was another example of the Sultanate’s consistent foreign policy preferences, which seldom wavered after 1970 and were anchored in time-tested confidence measures between Omanis and Americans.

Initial contacts until 1850 Sporadic commercial contact between the US and Oman started in the late 1700s. Records suggest that the first American vessel to visit Muscat was the Boston brig, Ramber, captained by Robert Folger in September 1790. Two years later, in 1792, a group of Americans traveled

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via the grueling mountains and deserts of south and central Oman to Muscat, the survivors of the ill-fated Boston ship, Commerce, which was wrecked on the uncharted South Arabian cost near Cape Chancery (Ras Sharbithat) and never completed its journey to Bombay. For the next quarter century, American merchant vessels occasionally touched at Muscat, although their cargoes were not usually of American origin. American shipmasters engaged in “coastal trade,” transported cargoes to Muscat because of its importance as a transit port for Arabian Gulf commerce and, generally speaking, benefited handsomely from contacts in Oman. Political turbulence in the Gulf, however, and the constant threat of piracy at the hands of Qawasim tribesmen during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, disrupted Muscat’s trading position.3 These developments, coupled with the shipping embargo imposed by President Thomas Jefferson between 1807 and 1809, a war with great Britain from 1812 to 1814, and the closure of the Isle de France (Mauritius) to US ships after the British seizure of that island in 1819, reduced the number of visits to ports in the northern Indian Ocean area, including Muscat. Significantly, American shipmasters recognized that they were in maritime competition with the substantial Omani fleet of Sayyid Sa’id bin Sultan Al Bu Sa’id. Despite maritime competition, both the US and Oman pursued commercial interests with Sayyid Sa’id playing a major role in this relationship. Few Arab rulers were as well known and respected by Americans as was Sayyid Sa’id during his long reign (1804–56). In a period when Americans were ill-informed about Arabs, and when their sparse contacts with Arabic-speaking peoples were often contentious, Sayyid Sa’id enjoyed an unrivaled reputation for forceful leadership, decisiveness, friendship, and commercial savvy. For the better part of a quarter century, he maintained close personal and commercial ties not only with American consuls and shipmasters who resided in or visited his domains, but also with merchants who had never left the US and knew him only through correspondence. Many an American shipmaster benefited from his personal benevolence to replace lost anchors, advance funds, or provide other services. These private contacts resulted in closer ties between the US and Oman. In 1828, Edmund Roberts met Sayyid Sa’id in Zanzibar, the African seat of the latter’s influential empire. Believing that American commercial ties with the Sultan’s realm suffered disadvantages, Roberts urged that American traders receive the same treatment extended to the British who, he noted, already enjoyed treaty status with Oman and thus were accorded a favored position.4 Moreover, unlike the British or the French, Roberts argued, the US had no territorial ambitions abroad and was solely interested in mutually beneficial commerce. He therefore proposed that Sayyid Sa’id entrust him with dispatches to the government of the US, setting forth the terms under which American merchant vessels might trade in ports under “Sultani control.” He further suggested that a commercial treaty be concluded between the two governments to finalize his proposition. Sa’id weighed the Roberts offer positively, as he sought to bank on this opportunity to secure some military equipment, which might enable him to drive Portugal out of Mozambique and recapture Mombasa.5 Before Roberts’s departure, Said affirmed his desire to place official and commercial relations with the US on a firm treaty basis. Unfortunately, due to a transition in American leadership and other internal considerations, President Andrew Jackson did not address US–Omani bilateral questions until 1831. When Senator Levi Woodbury—a relative of Roberts through marriage—became Secretary of the Navy in 1831, he persuaded the president to mount a naval expedition against Javanese pirates who had attacked an American merchant ship in the Indian Ocean. This move placed Washington on the bilateral commercial agreements path with several states in East Africa and the Persian Gulf. Through Woodbury’s influence, the Secretary of State named Roberts Special Diplomatic Agent, and instructed him to proceed to various East Indian and Arabian ports to direct treaty negotiations. On September 18, 1833, Roberts arrived in Muscat, where he outlined American ideas for a commercial treaty, which Sa’id accepted with few modifications. A few days

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later, on September 21, 1833, the US and Oman agreed on the “Treaty of Amity and Commerce.” It was the first bilateral accord between the US and an Arab Gulf state.6 The US president ratified the treaty on June 30, 1834 with formal ratification in Muscat on September 30, 1835. Once word was received in Washington that the treaty ratification was exchanged, arrangements were made for the posting of American consuls. Richard Palmer Waters arrived in Zanzibar in 1837 and was accredited to Muscat as well. In 1838, the US consulate opened in Oman, and Sa’id bin Khalfan, the Omani translator at the 1833 Treaty, was named acting consul and confirmed in the post in 1834.7 As Muscat welcomed American vessels, Sa’id pondered the usefulness of sending Omani vessels to the US, because, he reasoned, such direct trade would enable Oman to obtain cheaper products. On his orders, the Omani vessel Sultanah entered New York harbor on April 30, 1839. Sayyid Sa’id’s special emissary, Ahmad bin Nu’man, delivered merchandise and gifts for President Martin Van Buren.8 Nu’man, who was the first Arab diplomat accredited to the US, received a warm welcome in Washington, and while the Sultanah unloaded its cargo, the ship was refitted in New York at US government expense.

Trade contacts until 1910 In the late 1870s, some twenty years after the death of Sayyid Sa’id, a new burst of US trade expansion resulted in the exploration of untapped Persian Gulf markets. As part of this effort, the US government dispatched Commodore R. W. Shufeldt, a naval officer and a former American consul to Havana, aboard the USS Ticonderoga, to explore what could be accomplished without full American representations. It must be recognized that the absence of a consular officer representing the US in Muscat since 1845 had a great impact on US policies towards the Sultanate. When Shufeldt arrived in Muscat on November 18, 1879, his instructions regarding Muscat and Oman reflected Washington’s uncertainty as to the precise nature of the changes introduced after Sa’id’s death in 1856.9 Washington seemed unclear what the implications of the separation between Muscat and Zanzibar, which had been formalized in an 1861 British arbitration award, were. In talks with the Omani ruler, Sayyid Turki bin Sa’id, a younger son of the late Sa’id, Shufeldt discussed Washington’s interest in reopening the Muscat consulate. Turki agreed, although noting that American trade had been conducted satisfactorily for many years without a resident American official, and confirmed his agreement in writing. In the absence of a readily suitable American candidate, Louis Maguire, an Irish resident in Muscat who represented a number of European and American firms, was selected as American consul. By July 22, 1880, the new American consulate was in place.10 Although trade was a key ingredient in Omani–American ties, sorely needed medical assistance, which was generously dispensed by incredibly courageous people, helped solidify growing bonds of friendship. In December 1893, the Reformed Church of America established a permanent station of its Arabian Mission in Muscat that, over a period of seven decades (with an interregnum between 1915 and 1928), dispatched dedicated American physicians and nurses to perform greatly needed medical work. For years, these courageous men and women served Omani patients along the coast, where they established an Arabian Mission and hospital in Mutrah in 1909, and ventured into Inner Oman where few foreigners dared to go. Still, as trade relations declined starting in the early 1900s, few American products were available in the Sultanate. The cause of this decline appeared to be competition from Indian and British shipping over Omani dates. Significantly, a direct steamship service from Europe and India to the Gulf signaled an upsurge in non-American flag carriers for the lucrative date trade. Moreover, internal problems in Oman, beginning in 1913, adversely affected the Omani date industry and presented opportunities for competition from Basra in Iraq, which turned American attention away from Oman.

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US–Omani relations before 1970 Limited commercial opportunities, coupled with the growth of British control throughout the Indian Ocean region, pushed US–Omani relations to their lowest levels in several decades. In 1915, the US consulate closed its doors in Muscat, because there was hardly any work left to do. Ironically, the absence of American and Western interests produced a vacuum that was filled by the British, which may be the time when London enhanced its presence in the Sultanate.11 In the 1930s, Washington sought to rekindle its trade relationship with the Sultan and, in 1934, sent its Minister to Iraq, Paul Knabenshue, to Muscat with a presidential letter marking the centennial celebration of the 1833 treaty. Welcomed by Sayyid Sa’id bin Taymour, Knabenshue presented an official invitation to the Sultan from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to visit the US. Sa’id accepted and embarked on a memorable tour of the US in 1938, which planted the seeds of long-term friendship. He was formally welcomed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and honored as a guest by Roosevelt at a White House state dinner. Sa’id bin Taymour was so pleased with this reception that he vowed to reciprocate at the first opportunity, which came with the Second World War, when he authorized US aircraft bound for the Far East to use British RAF air facilities at Salalah in the Dhuffar as well as on Masirah island. A small number of US Air Force maintenance personnel were stationed at these installations to service transiting aircraft but were quickly seconded to upgrade the Ras al-Hadd and Masirah airfields.12 Whether Washington decided to enhance its ties with the strategically located country after the Second World War is difficult to document but, in 1956, with prospects for the discovery of petroleum growing in Oman, the US proposed re-establishing an American consular office in Muscat. Consequently, Sultan Sa’id suggested that the 1833 treaty was in some respects outdated, and that a new consular treaty should be negotiated. Starting in June 1957, the Sultan led his team to secure preferred terms, perhaps aware of the value that the Sultanate could add to the growing US presence in the area. In the absence of a resident American representative, Walter Schwinn, the American consul general in Dhahran, regularly shuttled to Salalah to confer with the ruler. A new “Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights” was signed on December 20, 1958. It superseded the earlier 1833 treaty and, in accordance with Article XII, authorized to each party the right to exchange consular representatives. President Dwight D. Eisenhower ratified the treaty on May 9, 1959, opening a new chapter in the relationship, which builds on the critical strategic axle.13

Strategic links between 1970 and 1980 Presidents Nixon and Ford articulated a “twin pillars” policy to define US policy in the Persian Gulf between 1970 and 1980. By concentrating on Iran and Saudi Arabia, Washington adopted a highly controversial initiative, which promoted military developments in Tehran and Riyadh without, however, advancing regional stability. This overwhelming emphasis meant that little attention could be devoted to the smaller states even if the latter offered far greater strategic prizes. Washington opened an embassy in Muscat two years after Sultan Qaboos came to power. Ambassador William H. Stolzfus, Jr., who was also accredited to Kuwait, presented his credentials to the ruler as non-resident plenipotentiary in 1972 and, a year later, Sayyid Faysal bin ‘Ali Al Bu Sa’id inaugurated the Omani chancellery in Washington, DC. Stolzfus was replaced in July 1974 by William D. Wolle, who was fully aware of the Sultan’s deep preoccupation with the Dhuffar rebellion, which channeled early American work in the Sultanate. US military assistance to Oman, discreet or otherwise, was very limited even if greatly needed, and US interests in Omani “facilities,” chiefly the use of the RAF airfield at Masirah, were systematically polished as early as 1973.14 In September 1973, US Army Colonel George

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Maloney visited on a fact-finding mission, when he stressed the potential significance of the airstrip.15 Qaboos informed his British advisors that Washington was interested in Masirah and that it had expressed an interest to use it “occasionally.”16 A high-level State Department official, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sidney Sober, visited Muscat in September 1974 to further discuss the terms under which such arrangements were to be made.17 No agreements were reached until Qaboos visited Washington in January 1975 where he met President Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Colby.18 Simultaneously, Washington asked London for landing rights at RAF Masirah, which were granted. The move was interpreted as a sorely needed counteraction against the growing Soviet presence throughout the region. A fully fledged agreement was finally reached in 1975, when the US donated TOW missiles in exchange for access to Masirah. The “Sultan reached an informal agreement with President Ford about strengthening his country’s defenses” in January, and some of the TOW missiles were moved into the Dhuffar region to protect the border area against possible attacks from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). In the event, the TOWs proved extremely useful against rebel redoubts, although the latter were highly mobile and generally operated freely.19 Officials never disclosed how the TOW shipment arrived in Oman, how many missiles were involved, and whether further shipments would follow. The transaction, the first known direct arms transfer by Washington to Oman, was a further indication of the growing US interest in the strategic country. Even after all these years, it remains to be determined whether this informal agreement involving TOWs was made in exchange for the access to Masirah, and whether this was initiated by the administration or by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with State Department or National Security Council approval. Between 1977 and 1980, the US–Omani security and political relationship grew much stronger, with serious benefits for US regional interests. In 1977, Qaboos publicly encouraged Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat to proceed with his plans for a comprehensive peace accord with Israel, as the Sultanate publicly supported Sadat in the US-sponsored Camp David peace talks in 1978. Muscat was one of three Arab governments not to break diplomatic relations with Cairo when it recognized the Jewish state in 1979.20 Two key regional events challenged the US “twin pillars” policy. First, the fall of the Shah of Iran in February 1979, and his replacement by a radical, revolutionary Islamic government, threatened to destabilize the entire region. Second, the December 25, 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan crystallized the cold war at its best. In response, Washington immediately reviewed its strategy towards the entire area, proposed, and implemented the Carter Doctrine, which sharpened the US resolve to defend Western interests in the Persian Gulf. To lend his policies credibility, President Carter authorized the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (later renamed the US Central Command or USCENTCOM) and an increase in US security assistance programs with Saudi Arabia and other friendly Arab Gulf states. These initial plans were not without hitches, however. When a US reconnaissance and monitoring ship visited Mina Qaboos in March 1979, the Middle East rumor mills speculated that American forces had landed in Oman.21 For the better part of 1979, critics maintained that US C-141 cargo planes stopping at Masirah (with supplies destined for the carrier task forces based in the Indian Ocean) were, in fact, transporting troops and weapons to Oman. Although these flights were perceived as representing a permanent US presence, leading Foreign Minister Qays Al-Zawawi to categorically reject any foreign state from establishing military bases in January 1980, they only reflected routine military movements.22 Nevertheless, in February 1980, Al-Zawawi stated that Oman was interested in granting access to port and airport facilities to the US under certain conditions. He stressed that these conditions included a time limit on the actual access, assurances that granting such deployments would help make the entire Gulf region secure and reinforce Omani defense capabilities. Al-Zawawi stressed, however, that Muscat would never allow foreign bases on its soil.23

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The 1980 facilities access agreement In the shadows of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US and Omani officials negotiated for seven months before reaching an accord, which was signed on June 4, 1980. This epochal agreement authorized a US contingent access to, and use of, Omani facilities at Salalah, Thumrayt, Masirah island, Mutrah, Seeb, and Khassab.24 At the time, it was the first and only such agreement between the US and an Arab country.25 The agreement was not a “base” accord in the strict sense because Oman requested that Washington provide advance notice of landings as well as moorings of vessels entering the Sultanate. According to Sultan Qaboos, the US would be granted access to Omani facilities at the request of the Omani government or a majority of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and only in case of a direct threat that Oman could not repulse alone. From Qaboos’s perspective, it was clear that the arrangement provided more than support for his regime.26 The agreement stated that there were to be no US ground troops stationed in Oman, none “in rotation” through the Sultanate, and formally excluded that any parcel of territory would be used as a rest and recreation area for US troops in the region.27 Muscat was anxious to keep US military visibility in Oman at a minimum. It defined this low profile to mean little publicity about US military activities, military personnel wearing civilian apparel rather than uniforms, maximum use of civilian contractors rather than military personnel, and US military exercises conducted away from populated areas.28 Still, the agreement allowed the US to stockpile supplies at three large depots as well as the use of Masirah airbase for flights bringing in equipment, food, and supplies for the US fleet in and around the Persian Gulf.29 In terms of regional contingencies, the agreement provided the US with access to Omani military facilities, which assisted the Sultanate in gaining expertise. Logistically, the agreement greatly enhanced US military capabilities in the Indian Ocean where Washington undertook a thorough sea surveillance program over Soviet ships. B-52 bombers flown out of Guam landed at Masirah, especially as “the British Government ha[d] refused to permit the bombers from landing at Diego Garcia.”30 Washington even contemplated Omani facilities as staging grounds to respond to a Soviet attack on the region, but it was not certain whether it would be able to use them to intervene in an intra-Arab conflict where US interests were threatened.31 Nevertheless, the agreement was widely criticized by several Arab governments, who feared that it was a US encroachment in the Gulf. Relations with the US, declared Foreign Minister Yusuf bin ‘Alawi, were based on mutual respect and equality “without any pressures or other methods entailing any form of hegemony,” even if few Arab critics believed him.32 Naturally, these criticisms were uttered before the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which altered perceptions once and for all. From the Omani perspective, the access agreement included a commitment to economic as well as military assistance, estimated at $80–100 million in 1982.33 In fact, Washington requested $45 million from Congress in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) guarantees for Oman, as well as $100,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance for 1984. An additional $15 million was requested from the Economic Support Fund.34 By August 4, 1980, following an exchange of notes between representatives of the two governments, this co-operation was given concrete expression with the establishment of an Omani– American Joint Commission for Economic and Technical Co-operation. Consequently, agreements were signed to provide assistance for fisheries development, for the construction of an aquifer recharge dam, and for a training program for Omanis in the US. Long delays in implementing the agreement, however, added to pent-up frustrations. At the end of 1980, Muscat was still awaiting the arrival of an Army Corps of Engineers survey team—promised for September—to identify specific construction needs and projects. These continued delays reinforced the Omani perception that Washington did not live up to its security commitments, even if, according to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the Omani access was constrained by

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expenditures associated with improving key facilities.35 US military assistance and training moved slowly in 1980, when six M-60 tanks and an undetermined number of TOW and Sidewinder missiles for Oman’s Jaguar fighter aircraft were sold in that first year. US training advisory field teams trained Omanis on these weapons systems as Washington agreed to also sell Oman C-130 aircraft. These sales notwithstanding, the US could not expand its military transfers fast enough because Britain pushed hard to remain the Sultanate’s principal arms supplier.36 In the event, the accord helped build cantonments, hardened shelters, warehouses, and other facilities for use by US forces, in return for $320 million in US funds to build up these facilities.37

Enhanced ties throughout the 1980s With the Reagan administration in power, the two countries shared a closer strategic philosophy, especially in the politico-military sphere. Leading US officials visited Oman, including former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Senator John Tower, and former President Gerald Ford.38 All three met with the Sultan and Foreign Minister Al-Zawawi. In military-to-military contacts, joint exercises dominated bilateral contacts and, in February 1981, a small contingent of US Army and Air Force personnel set up a temporary communications center in the Sultanate to monitor airborne surveillance of the Straits of Hormuz.39 Consequently, the US upgraded its military facilities on Masirah as well as the dual use international airport at Seeb, and US General P. X. Kelly, Commander of the Rapid Deployment Force, visited Muscat to finalize logistical procedures. By the fall of 1981, Oman purchased additional M-60 tanks, in part on Kelly’s advice.40 In late December, US troops participated in “Bright Star 81” maneuvers, landing on the Dhuffari coast.41 To forestall its Gulf partners’ objections, Muscat pushed Washington to reduce the length and scope of the maneuvers—which involved more than 6,000 army, marine, air force, and navy personnel. The landing was designed to demonstrate US intentions to help safeguard the security of oil-producing states in the Gulf.42 Yusuf bin ‘Alawi declared that Bright Star maneuvers were being conducted with: a state that was a friend of all the area’s states. On this basis, the maneuvers could not be interpreted as being directed against any Gulf state. The United States was a country which had transcended the stage of friendship to the point where it could be said that it was an allied state, despite the fact that there was nothing written in this respect.43 Public pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding, Oman encouraged the building and improvement of airfields, as well as the pre-positioning of arms, equipment, and fuel for use by USCENTCOM forces during an emergency. Senior Omani officials asserted that Muscat could not agree to the establishment of outright bases in the Sultanate but, to meet the country’s strategic responsibilities, would co-operate with its Western allies. To illustrate its commitment, Oman participated, albeit on a modest scale, in the annual US military exercises in southwest Asia, code-named “Jade Tiger.” The maneuvers involved about 2,500 American soldiers, who tested their defenses in the event of a Soviet or other foreign attack on the Persian Gulf region. Omani officials, however, in conjunction with the Pentagon, made no announcements about Jade Tiger because the Sultanate wanted to play down its links with the US to avoid criticism from vocal Arab regimes.44 Clearly, Muscat’s close military ties with Washington were aimed at ensuring the security of the Sultanate and those of the conservative monarchies. For Qaboos, the choice was obvious: conservative Arab Gulf monarchies faced multi-pronged threats, which required the military assistance that only the US could, and was willing to, address. In was within this context that the relationship generated Omani support for US policies in the Middle East, as Muscat stood by Washington, even if it expected some understanding in return.45

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Between 1982 and 1983, US–Omani military relations became more sophisticated as the Reagan administration built on the Carter Doctrine. In January 1992, Senator Charles Percy, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spent four days in the Sultanate and met with Sultan Qaboos to discuss bilateral relations.46 Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger followed a month later, when detailed arrangements were made to allow US troops to use key facilities. According to Omani sources, Weinberger sought “to acquaint himself with the capability of the Omani Armed Forces, the efficiency of the Omani soldier, and his comprehension of the latest weapons and advanced equipment.”47 Minister ‘Alawi asserted that the December 1982 “maneuvers ha[d] goals that coincide[d] perfectly with what [Oman] want[ed].”48 In February 1983, the Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs concluded an updated accord to establish certain procedures for consultation in emergency situations. Although steady progress was achieved on the military front, political ties required careful nurturing as well, and were only addressed after Sultan Qaboos visited the US at the invitation of President Reagan in 1983. The Sultan expressed his confidence that Washington would indeed come to the assistance of the GCC states to repulse any foe. Nevertheless, he cautioned that Oman was not ready to become a “target of superpower confrontation,” which, in hindsight, was a clear signal of the evolving nature of Omani foreign policy.49 Although allied with the West and committed to the GCC, Qaboos was concerned with the nihilistic characterization of the Soviet Union during the first term of the Reagan administration, but in June 1983, the Sultan argued that Oman still required its military facility agreement with the US as a back-up, despite plans to create a separate GCC Rapid Deployment Force.50 Little of what transpired after these understandings changed the Omani perception. Following the October 1983 car bombing of US troops in Beirut, Muscat denounced the attack, and stated that such behavior could only lead to the destruction of peace efforts.51 In a rare proactive statement, the Sultan called for a renewal of the dormant Camp David accords to serve as a model for future peace talks in the Middle East. In December 1983, he asserted that the Camp David accords had been and still were the only means that achieved a constructive step in the direction of reaching a peaceful solution to the Middle East issue. We believe it is necessary to regard the Camp David accord as alive, and that every effort designed to attain further progress should be based on it.52 Progress on the political front was urgently needed, reasoned Qaboos, who conveyed his concerns to President Reagan’s personal envoy, Donald Rumsfeld, with whom he held a long and much noticed meeting.53 Lieutenant General Robert Kingston, then commander of USCENTCOM, followed up during his tour of the Gulf in March 1985.54 Kingston and Major General David Watts, director of Logistics and Security Assistance for USCENTCOM, confirmed that Washington had nearly completed building and modernizing various sites for use by a rapid deployment force in the event of a crisis. These new installations supported tactical air operations, Military Airlift Command maneuvers, and pre-positioning of air force war readiness material assets. Other US agencies called the Sultanate a huge asset to security in the Gulf and the Middle East, as one senior military official declared that “Oman had become what we had hoped Egypt might be,” while a State Department official claimed that “we could never secure the kinds of access in Saudi Arabia that we have negotiated in Oman.”55 US officials further claimed that the Sultanate was a priceless staging area whose usefulness was proven by providing an invaluable link in the logistical chain that supplied military equipment to Afghan rebels. In April 1985, the Sultan discussed the US–Omani military relationship, and stated that “it [wa]s not true that Oman gave the Americans bases in Masirah or elsewhere in the country. All we gave was naval and airport facilities that [could] be used upon request from the majority of the GCC countries, if they [decided] they [were] under a direct threat which they [could] not repel with their own forces.”56 The Sultan

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explained that the facilities did not mean a permanent foreign military presence on Omani soil, independent from national decision making, but access to facilities, as stipulated by the agreement with the US, which were confined to transit or temporary presence for a defined and temporary mission, and in response to a request from the majority of the GCC countries. He added: I would like to reveal one of the reasons behind this agreement. The strategic location of Oman and the possible threats, however remote, made it indispensable that Oman should enlarge its military establishments and airports. Consequently, we asked the GCC brothers to help us in this task, particularly as our oil resources are very limited in comparison to theirs. The required improvements involved about $2 billion, a sum which most brothers declined to spend, while the US showed readiness to finance these projects. That is how we came to agree on the facilities.57 Because Muscat perceived the 1980 access agreement as an extremely valuable initiative, and concluded that the US was the primary beneficiary, Qaboos requested and received a five-year review of the accord. The September 1985 reconsideration added several specific clarifications. First, that all US military deployments to Oman required prior approval; second, that Oman would enjoy priority use of certain Military Construction (MILCON) projects; third, that sharing operating costs would be spread more evenly; and fourth, that prepositioning US military supplies would be examined in more detail. In tandem with its review, the White House notified Congress of its decision to sell Oman 300 Sidewinder missiles, worth an estimated $20 million, ostensibly to support Washington’s “linchpin in [its] Southwest Asia strategy.”58 The sale, according to US diplomats, was accompanied by Omani political support for on-going Middle East talks, as Muscat called for direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis in October 1985. The year ended with a successful rescue mission when a US carrier-based aircraft landed in Oman to avoid imminent loss at sea. The safe landing saved a considerable number of lives and, over the ensuing years, the Omani Ministry of Defense recorded similar episodes. With an updated accord, a USCENTCOM briefing team visited Oman in October 1986 to review regional threats and military capabilities, although no one publicly mentioned secret US arms transfers to Iran even if the November 1986 Iran–Contra revelations shocked many in the lower Gulf. If Muscat was angered or disappointed, it was difficult to tell. The highly influential Minister of Information, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin Mohammed Al-Rowas, declared that Omanis should “not be surprised if a country makes contact with Iran. The fact [of the matter] is that the entire world makes contact with Iran in one way or another,” as he identified Syria and Libya for assisting Iran throughout the Iran–Iraq war, without penalty.59 This perspective revealed at least a degree of sophistication and, under the circumstances, Oman was once again correct in pursuing an independent foreign policy towards Tehran. Still, this was a delicate matter, and Omani officials knew that they needed US assistance after the Iran–Iraq ceasefire to accomplish specific foreign policy objectives without provoking Iran. For Muscat, the delicate balance between these two factors required immense skills and, for Qaboos, that balance would be preserved best if the Sultanate could meet its defensive requirements preferably with Western, including US, assistance. To further reinforce critical links between the two countries, a delegation from the State Consultative Council traveled to Washington in March 1986 for a two-week fact-finding mission on legislative matters. This was another milestone because Omanis were “introduced” to the workings of the US Congress as they experimented with political participation.60 Vice President George H. W. Bush returned to Oman in April 1986 to discuss regional developments and Gulf security at a time when yet another joint military exercise, this one labeled “Accurate Test,” was under way.61 The exercise went forward despite widespread Arab

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protests following the US raid on Libya. In June 1987, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, and Senators John Glenn (D-OH) and John Warner (R-VA) held talks on the US commitment to escort Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf. As a result of these conversations, and between 1987 and 1988, Oman granted US overflight rights for critical operations during the Kuwaiti tanker reflagging operation. In addition, Oman allowed the use of its facilities for the US task force’s resupply and logistical support and, in September 1987, Muscat served as an intermediary for the exchange of Iranian personnel captured aboard the minelayer ‘Ajr by US warships. Despite all of these positive developments, when border skirmishes between Oman and Saudi Arabia occurred in September 1987, the Sultanate requested Stinger missiles from the US to protect its Command Center. Washington did not respond favorably, even as US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and Southeast Asian Affairs Richard W. Murphy acknowledged in congressional testimony that US operations in the Gulf “would be difficult, if not impossible, without Oman’s assistance.”62 In April 1988, US naval aviators launched attacks on targets in the Straits of Hormuz and, in May 1988, Ambassador G. Cranwell Montgomery urged Congress to reconsider the sale of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Sultanate, just four months after it prohibited such sales to Gulf countries.63 Interestingly, the request, which came in a classified letter to Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), hovered around the necessity to make a “limited exception” for Oman. In a telephone interview, Montgomery asserted that the US government supported the sale and believed it was a legitimate, valid application.64 USCENTCOM Commander General George Crist and US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy visited Muscat again in June 1988, specifically to discuss bilateral military affairs, but Washington would not budge on the Stinger issue, even though the Sultanate granted US overflight rights for critical operations.65 When USCENTCOM Commander General Norman Schwarzkopf met with the Commander of Oman’s Land Forces, Major General Khamis bin Humayd al-Kalbani, in November 1989, the Stinger issue was left in abeyance.66 Yet, over the full decade of the 1980s, Washington provided close to $200 million in FMS credits and about $853,000 in IMET assistance to the Sultanate.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm: 1990–91 At the August 1990 Cairo League of Arab States emergency meeting, Oman condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and prepared for war with its Arab and Western allies. Although Omani diplomacy sought to support its military preparations with the strongest legal backing at the United Nations, few were persuaded that no political solutions could be found to reverse the course of action unleashed by Saddam Hussein. Towards that end, the Sultanate reiterated its GCC defense commitments, while it simultaneously renewed the ten-year-old “Facilities Access Agreement.” Miraculously, a secret side letter to the December 1990 draft concentrated on Washington’s readiness to transfer excess defense articles, subject to bilateral military arrangements. This was a watershed moment given that such appendices were seldom inked by the US, almost always wary of arming its allies, lest some of that equipment be diverted to third parties. The Sultanate of Oman granted full access to US and allied forces deployed in Operation Desert Shield and, starting in January 1991, participated in Operation Desert Storm by deploying a 1,000-troop brigade to the Arab Joint Forces Command in Saudi Arabia. Throughout the long preparations months before the war for Kuwait was launched, Muscat authorized a full drawdown of pre-positioned equipment from various Omani installations to support critical operations for US forces in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Simply stated, the West in general, and the US in particular, could not have achieved their successes in the liberation of Kuwait were it not for the pre-positioned equipment in Oman.67 In the event, and by assuming its share of the burden within the GCC, Muscat demonstrated that its long-term

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commitments to the security of the Persian Gulf region were intact. There were no qualms about defeating a belligerent Iraq even if a long-term political solution was the preferred option. General Norman Schwarzkopf visited Sultan Qaboos in March 1991 on his victory tour to personally acknowledge the modest but important Omani role in the war. Schwarzkopf stressed Muscat’s support during the early stages of the conflict before major US reinforcements arrived in the theater.68 Oman stood by its GCC allies in 1991 even if few of them supported Sultan Qaboos in 1970, which was yet another illustration of strategic stability, seldom appreciated within the GCC as well as in Washington. Nevertheless, the period after 1991 introduced a remarkably different style in US–Arab contacts, as apprehensive and doubting US officials finally recognized how essential, even critical, Arab Gulf states actually were. Oman, in particular, welcomed this sense of genuine commitment and wished to see the incoming Bill Clinton administration continue along the same path. US policy between 1993 and 1997 was driven by Clinton’s “dual containment” option, which pretended to keep both Iran and Iraq in check, while its conservative Arab Gulf allies were strengthened. This controversial and, in hindsight, counterproductive preference was not GCC states’ first option. Simply stated, all Arab Gulf governments, including Muscat, perceived Iran as a far greater danger than Iraq because most knew of the latter’s dire conditions. Under a strict United Nations sanctions regime, Baghdad was simply in no shape to threaten anyone, except itself. The GCC states participated in various efforts to contain Iraq and, in 1994, Muscat deployed a squadron of fighter aircraft to Kuwait, when Iraqi forces moved towards the Kuwaiti border in October of that year. Despite these routine maneuvers, GCC governments cautioned the US to pay serious attention to Iraq’s deteriorating economic conditions, lest those spillover and destabilize the entire region. As far as Iran was concerned, GCC governments were more pessimistic, but perceived in the May 1997 election of the moderate president Mohammad Khatami a golden opportunity to improve relations with Tehran. It was during the 1990s that Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs made significant strides, although no evidence emerged to suggest that GCC and Omani officials knew about it, as they devised their policies towards the Islamic republic. In the event, Muscat was kept informed of Tehran’s activities, and co-operated with Washington on a limited scale. Ironically, Washington opted to phase out its development assistance to Oman in 1996, but granted the Sultanate about $15 million per year in Economic Support Funds (ESF) in combined loans and grants to improve the conservation and management of Omani fisheries and water resources. Oman went through a difficult period in the mid-1990s after the price of oil collapsed. Muscat adopted an ambitious ten-year economic plan to develop the sector, along with major improvements in the Sultanate’s infrastructure, including the construction of several water desalinization plants. With limited resources, the Sultanate sought US financial assistance when the facilities accord was up for renewal in 2000. More experienced than in 1980, Omani negotiators appreciated the US dependence on critical Omani facilities, and reasoned it to be eminently logical for Washington to provide adequate compensation. Consequently, Oman received thirty US-made M-60A3 tanks in September 1996 on a “no rent” lease basis, and it was later given title to the tanks outright. This was a much needed boost as there had been virtually no Excess Defense Articles (EDA)—a program falling under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act geared to sell surplus US military hardware of allies—transactions since 1991. Still, Omani officers were interested in acquiring Bradley fighting vehicles and Humvees under EDA provisions, but in 2004, they turned down a US offer of EDA US-made M1A1 tanks because of very strict conditions that accompanied the proposal. Any additional armor acquired by the Sultanate was intended to supplement the thirty-eight British-made Challenger 2 tanks and eighty British-made Piranha armored personnel carriers it bought in the mid1990s. In an effort to modernize its air force, however, and after several years of consideration,

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Oman announced in October 2001 the purchase of twelve US-made F-16 A/B aircraft and associated weapons (Harpoon and AIM missiles) for about $800 million. The purchase was partially intended to keep pace with Oman’s Gulf neighbors who also bought F-16s, including the UAE and Bahrain, but it was also the result of sophisticated behind the scenes negotiations. The Sultanate successfully negotiated the purchase of three US-made coastal patrol boats suited for anti-narcotics and anti-smuggling missions as well. These military acquisitions were supplemented by increased amounts of US security assistance, partly in appreciation for Oman’s help in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, and partly to familiarize Omani officers with US equipment and military doctrine.69

Twenty-first century initiatives After the “Facilities Access Agreement” was renewed in 2000, the two countries turned their attention to several new programs, including a significant “Peace Corps” program, which assisted Omanis primarily in the fields of health and education. Bilateral initiatives increased in scope and frequency which delighted senior Omani officials. To be sure, the Peace Corps program first started in 1973—and was phased out in 1983—but its legacy was felt for decades. Likewise, a team from the Federal Aviation Administration worked with Oman’s Civil Aviation Department on a reimbursable basis throughout the 1970s and 1980s before the program was phased out in 1992 following native competency. Many other programs were developed through the Muscat-based Joint Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation, which channeled US economic assistance until the mid-1990s, although most were replaced with private sector efforts.70 The close relationship entered a new chapter following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, which redefined US foreign policy. Oman swiftly authorized the use of its facilities for “Operation Enduring Freedom” against the Taliban in Afghanistan, as US—as well as British—aircraft moved through Omani airbases, especially Masirah. In March 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney toured Masirah, even if the visit was kept low key. In fact, Omani facilities were used for both operational and logistical needs in Afghanistan as well as Iraq. It was in October 2001 that Washington announced that the Sultanate would buy twelve F-16 A/B aircraft even if actual deliveries only began in December 2005. Nevertheless, this was a critical time for the US, still reeling from a major terrorism assault on its homeland. Coincidentally, and just a few weeks after the March 2003 war for Iraq, Muscat added podded airborne reconnaissance systems for the F-16s in a sale valued at $46 million. As the conflict expanded, the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on July 28, 2006 of its plans to sell Oman 250 Javelin missiles and associated launchers and equipment for approximately $48 million.71 It must be emphasized that the significant US deployment in the Sultanate during the Afghanistan campaign awakened Omani officials to their many needs. During Operation Enduring Freedom, there were about 4,300 US personnel in Oman, mostly serving in the US Air Force. Omani air facilities hosted US B-1 bombers that were used extensively for strikes in Afghanistan, although the numbers were only about 3,750 during the attack on Iraq.72 When the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, Muscat understood that war was inevitable. Resolution 1441 called on Iraq to immediately disarm itself of WMD and WMD “weapons capabilities,” to allow the immediate return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UN weapons inspectors, and to comply with all previous UN resolutions since 1991. Washington and its Western allies began amassing troops in the region. By early February 2003, there were 3,750 US military personnel and approximately forty aircraft in Oman. At about the same time, Muscat authorized the construction of a new airbase, with a 14,000-foot runway capable of accommodating the most sophisticated hardware flying.73 Interestingly, while US troops were pouring into Oman,

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and in all GCC states, Muscat declared that it would not allow an attack on Iraq to be carried out from its soil without UN approval. Still, while GCC governments rejected aggression against Baghdad, and called for continuing UN weapons inspections, they understood that Baghdad was engaged in a no-win conundrum.

The Iran conundrum For murky reasons, and even before 9/11, the US left Iran’s WMD programs in abeyance as it devoted most of its energies to Iraq. After it overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime, and altered the Gulf threat profile once again, Oman sensed a new and different threat, namely the strategic emergence of Iran, especially after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president in 2005. An emboldened Iran sought to play a far more active role in Gulf security affairs and, perhaps, even design an updated Gulf security structure. Even if it was loath to admit it, Muscat was fearful of long-term Iranian intentions, as it renewed and expanded its joint defense initiative discussions.74 Any US military move against Iran was likely to draw swift retaliation on all GCC states, including Oman, which local authorities were aware of. Nevertheless, Oman understood that, despite likely retaliation, it had little choice but to back Western actions to halt or set back Iran’s nuclear program, while it remained confident that Iranian attempts to block the Straits of Hormuz would be quickly repulsed by adequate indigenous capabilities. These concerns were discussed in 2008, when Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military Affairs, Stephen D. Mull, and Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mary Beth Long, received the Omani Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sayyid Badr Al Bu Sa’id in Washington to co-chair the fourth round of the US–Oman Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD). In fact, these annual meetings permitted both delegations to engage in serious conversations and strengthen US–Omani ties. Mull and Long reiterated the American commitment to the longstanding US–Oman strategic relationship, forged new programs on counterproliferation and counterterrorism, and foresaw additional substantive opportunities.75

Conclusion As Oman prepares for the 300th anniversary of its original treaty of amity with the US in 2033, its long-term relations have matured beyond anything that Sayyid Sa’id bin Sultan or his advisors could imagine. Over the years, successive rulers have strengthened ties with Washington because these served Omani interests, aware of limitations in their intrinsic capabilities. True to the Omani character, all interactions were laid out carefully, realistically and, most importantly, on the basis of respect and equality. A long supporter of US presence in the region, and against some odds, the Sultanate was the first Gulf country to conclude an access agreement with the US. It has long provided valuable support to US maritime and air operations in the region, enhanced Washington’s abilities to respond to contingencies that arose in the Middle East and Africa, and never reneged on its commitments to the US–Omani ties. In recognition of this unique privilege, the US supported Oman in its long confrontation with the PDRY, especially during the Dhuffar civil war, as well as in dealing with the potential threat posed by Iran after the beginning of the Iran–Iraq war when Tehran sought to gain an upper hand in the navigation situation through the strategic Straits of Hormuz. Yet, by patrolling all navigation that necessarily transited through Omani territorial waters, Muscat ensured safe tanker traffic. Oman’s critical strategic location on the Straits of Hormuz, and active co-operation in regional security initiatives, remained the chief reasons why the Sultanate was such a valuable ally to the US in southwest Asia. Because of its geographical position as well as its leadership’s calculated policies, steady US–Omani contacts required internal stability, mostly to protect and maintain the free flow of oil and other trade through the Persian Gulf. Except for a few

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isolated cases, the Sultanate’s moderate political stances on key issues ensured this stability, even if Muscat went through a painful period of acculturation with its powerful ally. For Muscat, US economic assistance was helpful given its limited oil resources, and for Washington, but only gradually, the Sultanate’s economic needs were justified. To be sure, Oman was an oil producer but its intrinsic capabilities were limited. In turn, this reality strengthened the argument that any investments in the Sultanate helped enhance its stability, which further served larger regional needs. It was for this reason that Washington proposed and Oman welcomed a long-term Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was successfully negotiated in October 2005, and signed on January 19, 2006. The Congress formally ratified the US–Oman FTA in mid-2006, and the White House signed the bill into law on September 26, 2006. This agreement sought to open new markets in agriculture, manufactured products, and services to US firms and workers, and provided economic growth and employment opportunities for both the US and the Sultanate. Still, as Oman was the fifth Middle Eastern country to have negotiated an FTA with the US— after Israel, Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco—the effort was part of Washington’s larger Middle East Trade Initiative, which fits a strategy of a greater Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) to be implemented by 2013, ostensibly to contribute to regional economic growth and stability. As far as Oman was concerned, however, the FTA expanded more or less exclusive security accords that dominated ties after 1970. Muscat favored a strong relationship with the US in planning future contingencies while Sultan Qaboos insisted on being treated equally regardless of existing problems. This was important in the early 1970s and has remained so ever since. Over the years, Oman welcomed thousands of US soldiers, airmen, and sailors to help defend the Sultanate and GCC states, as well as to train indigenous personnel in new systems. Inevitably, however, Oman and its GCC allies confronted the consequences of US-led wars, which required that they devise appropriate policies to withstand their spillover effects. It maybe worth repeating, nevertheless, that Muscat actually signed a “Facilities Access Agreement” with Washington in 1980, when embarking on such a scheme was not a popular thing to do. Oman refused to budge from its perceived long-term interests, and stood by the US, even as it earned the ire of the Arab world. Then as now, the Sultanate strove to delineate intrinsic interests, adopt specific objectives, and persuade citizens of the value of its alliances.

Notes * This chapter is adapted from material originally published by the RAND Corporation. 1 J. E. Peterson, “Legitimacy and Political Change in Yemen and Oman,” Orbis 27(4), Winter 1984: 973. 2 Although Oman did not have a significant money-laundering problem, it nevertheless “adopted controls designed to prevent the use of its financial system to fund terrorist or other illicit activities.” According to the US Department of State, and following the launch of the “Oman Program for Anti-Money Laundering” (OPFAM) in 2006, “the government sponsored two workshops to enhance the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of money laundering. The Omani government continued to encourage information exchanges among relevant actors, standardize indicators to report suspicious transactions, and develop common guidelines to address the threat of money laundering.” See Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Washington, DC: US Department of State. Available from www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103708.htm. 3 The Qawasim tribal confederation ruled over much of the Persian Gulf from their Ras al-Khaymah base before British imperial forces destroyed them in 1805. 4 Roberts blamed the British for property he lost during travels to Oman. See Wendell Phillips, Oman: A History (London: Reynal & Company, 1967): 105. 5 Ibid.: 106. 6 The US–Omani treaty was the second treaty ever signed by the US and an Arab country. The oldest US treaty with an Arab state was signed in 1787 with Morocco. 7 The ninth article of the treaty introduced the historic principle of extra-territorial rights, granting to a foreign official jurisdiction over his fellow citizens at all posts in the Sultanate. See Phillips, op. cit.: 107–8. 8 Frederick Eilts, United States and Oman: A Sesquicentennial Commemoration (Washington, DC: United States Information Service, 1983).

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9 Sa’id bin Khalfan died in 1845. Consequently, his jurisdiction reverted to the American consul in Zanzibar, which meant that Muscat was largely unattended. 10 The system of using non-American consuls continued until 1906, when Washington decided that only career consular officers, not engaged in private trade, should be assigned to American posts. Between that year and the closure of the Muscat consulate nine years later, three American consuls served in the post. Throughout this period, Mohamed Fazel, an Indian expatriate first appointed by Maguire, whose relations with the ruler of Oman were excellent, remained as deputy consul and later as vice consul. He served as acting consul in 1914 when the First World War broke out and when Washington closed the post, chiefly because of political uncertainties. See Eilts, ibid.: 9. 11 As oil was discovered elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula, Oman remained rather isolated (and poor); partly because American oil companies were not allowed to prospect in the Sultanate. 12 Calvin H. Allen, Jr., Oman: The Modernization of the Sultanate (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987): 118; see also Joseph A. Kéchichian, “Oman and the World,” American–Arab Affairs, 35, Winter 1990–91: 145. 13 “US Supplying Missiles and Instructors to Oman,” New York Times, February 9, 1975: 4. 14 The RAF maintained an expanded base at Masirah island after 1958 under a secret agreement that contained provisions for landing rights to friendly powers. Vulcan bombers, the only British aircraft with nuclear capability at the time, sometimes stopped at Masirah on flights around the world. But Masirah was largely used as a refueling stop and staging point for transport planes flying to the Far East and jet fighters supporting the Britishled Omani forces in Dhuffar. Two medium-range Andover transports were stationed for regular supply runs to the RAF bases at Salalah and Muscat. Group Commander Captain Keith Hepburn stated that Masirah “ha[d] six aircraft movements a day, sometimes 12.” Hepburn commanded 580 British RAF personnel, 120 British civilian base employees, and 300 Pakistani and Omani laborers. There was no fresh water on the island. The RAF had a desalinization plant, which supplied 4,000 Omani fishermen with water. See “Strategic Oman Island ‘Discovered’ by USAF,” Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 1975. 15 With British acquiescence, P-3 Orion anti-submarine patrol planes, based on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, used Masirah regularly at this time as well. The landings occurred despite the fact that British officers at Masirah denied seeing “any American advance parties courting a possible base site within the past few months.” Ibid. 16 Joe Stork, “The Carter Doctrine and US Bases in the Middle East,” MERIP Reports, 90, September 1980: 11. 17 For details of these difficult negotiations, see Jeff Gerth and Judith Miller, “US Is Said to Develop Oman As Its Major Ally in the Gulf,” The New York Times, March 25, 1985: A1, A8; see also Jeff Gerth and Judith Miller, “Ex-Intelligence Agents Are Said to Have Major Roles in Oman,” The New York Times, March 26, 1985: A8; Gerald F. Seib, “US Quietly Expands Its Military Partnership With Oman, Strategic Plum in Persian Gulf Overlooking Oil Routes,” The Wall Street Journal, April 11, 1985: 34; and David B. Ottaway, “US, Oman Hold Delicate Negotiations Over Bases,” The Washington Post, July 19, 1985: A29. 18 At a dinner reception for the Sultan, Kissinger declared that “finally, we also take a strong interest in the independence and sovereignty and progress of our old friends, such as His Majesty, who faces in his own country some pressures from his neighbors and who nevertheless has striven successfully to bring development and progress and conciliation to his people and to his neighbors.” See Department of State Bulletin, February 10, 1975: 188; at the same time, US diplomats in Oman believed that the Sultan was under considerable pressure from several cabinet ministers to diversify his arms purchases and end his heavy reliance on a single source. See “Oman Looks to West for Military Support,” The Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 1975. 19 “US Supplying Missiles and Instructors to Oman,” New York Times, February 9, 1975: 4. Two American military experts trained armed forces instructors on how to use the missiles. However, it was unclear if they were all Omani soldiers. See “The Struggle for the Liberation of Oman,” MERIP Reports, April 1975. 20 “Sultan Qabus Views PDRY Threat, Gulf Security,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Middle East and North Africa, V [hereafter FBIS-MEA-V-], 5 February 1980: C1–C3. 21 “US Reconnaissance, Monitoring Ship Visits Qabus,” FBIS-MEA-V-79, March 29, 1979: C1. See also “Kuwaiti Press Alleges US Sending Force to Masirah Island,” FBIS-MEA-V-79, September 12, 1979: C2–C3; and “Ath-Thawrah Comments on Reports of US Forces on Masirah,” FBIS-MEA-V-79, September 13, 1979: H1–H2. 22 FBIS-MEA-V-80, January 29, 1980: C3. 23 “Port, Airport Facilities May be Granted to US,” FBIS-MEA-V-80, February 19, 1980: C1–C2. 24 Because of its remote location and to maintain total secrecy, the US used Oman to stage the unsuccessful mission to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980, even if Masirah presented certain drawbacks. It was 400 miles from the Straits of Hormuz; large ships could not dock at the jetty because shallow waters and shoals surrounded the island that precluded its use as a naval base; monsoons made it unreachable by ship for four months of the year so that petroleum, oil, lubricants, and water storage to handle US aircraft, crews, and ground support needed to be sufficient to cover that period; and strong cross-winds during monsoons made takeoffs and landings difficult although not impossible. In addition, Masirah was extremely vulnerable to air attacks. The cost of improving the airbase was deemed very high. See US Security Interests in the Persian Gulf, Report of a Staff Study Mission to the Persian Gulf, Middle East, and Horn of Africa, October 21–November 13, 1980, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, March 16, 1981: 16–17 [hereafter US Security]; see also Jeff Gerth and Judith Miller, “US is Said to Develop Oman as its Major Ally in the Gulf,” The New York Times, March 25, 1985: A1, A8. 25 The agreement had been sought since 1977 when the RAF abandoned its airbase at Masirah. See Allen, Oman, op. cit.: 119. In addition, US Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer was reported to have testified that the US would be willing to finance any reconstruction or make improvements to the airstrips at Seeb and Thumrayt

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and seaports at Mutrah and Salalah for US use in peacetime or during conflict. See US Congress, House of Representatives, Military Construction Appropriation for 1981, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 96th Congress, 1st Session, March 10, 1982: 1151. US Interests in and Policies toward the Persian Gulf, 1980, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, March 24– September 3, 1980, Washington, DC: 92. Liesl Graz, The Omanis: Sentinels of the Gulf (London: Longman, 1982): 60. US Security, op. cit.: 16. War in the Persian Gulf: The US Takes Sides, A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 100th Congress, 1st Session, November 1987, Washington, DC: 34. “US Announces Pact with Oman on Access to Air Bases and Port,” The New York Times, June 6, 1980: A4. US Security, op. cit.: 16. Radio Muscat, June 8, 1981 as cited in Colin Legum, ed., Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume 5, 1980–81 (New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982): 493. Ibid.: 494. Security and Development Assistance, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 98th Congress, 1st Session, February 17–March 14, 1983: 304. The FMS figure for 1984 was considerably higher than the $533,000 in 1983, but remained meager in comparison with Oman’s needs. The critical problem, as far as Muscat was concerned, was the limited funds available to the Sultanate considering its large requirements for economic development. US Security, op. cit.: 17; see also Persian Gulf Situation, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session, September 17, 1981: 15. US Security, op. cit.: 19. “Country Analysis Briefs, Oman,” Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration, March 2006. Available from www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Oman/Full.html. Tower’s visit took place at a desert camp in the northern part of the country where he presumably watched exercises by the Sultan’s armed forces. “Senator Tower, in Visit to Oman, Meets the Sultan at Desert Camp,” New York Times, February 19, 1981. See also, respectively, for other US dignitary’s visits to Oman, “Henry Kissinger Arrives in Muscat 8 January,” FBIS-MEA-V-81, January 9, 1981: C2; “Qabus Receives US Senate Committee Chairman,” FBIS-MEA-V-81, February 18, 1981: C5; “Muscat Reports Arrival of Gerald Ford 13 March,” FBISMEA-V-81, March 16, 1981: C1. “Oman Announces Joint Maneuvers with US Forces,” FBIS-MEA-V-81, February 9, 1981: C4; “Omani–US Maneuvers End; US Force Leaves,” FBIS-MEA-V-81, March 2, 1981: C2. Several GCC members criticized Oman for conducting these exercises. For a flavor of the debate, see Ar-Ra’y Al-’Amm, February 11, 1981: 1. According to the Congressional Research Service, there were no security commitments or obligations to sell weapons, nor were there any obligations on the US to expend funds or to maintain forces in Oman, Somalia, and Kenya. See The Persian Gulf: Are We Committed? At What Cost? A Dialogue with the Reagan Administration on US Policy, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, with the Assistance of the Congressional Research Service, December 21, 1981: 20. Prior to Bright Star 81, GCC states asked Oman to reduce its military co-operation with the US. The newspaper Al-Qabas quoted a “high official from the Gulf” as stating that Oman, in exchange for complying with the request, was offered a pledge that the council would intervene with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen to stop meddling in internal Omani affairs. In addition, the GCC and Saudi Arabia offered Oman $2 billion in development aid. Saudi Arabia later denied such an offer was made. See “Oman Reportedly Asked to Reduce US Ties,” FBIS-MEA-V-81, December 7, 1981: C1; and “Minister Denies $1.2 Billion Offer to Oman,” FBIS-MEA-V81, December 4, 1981: C9–C10. For a flavor of the discussion on early US military preparations in southwest Asia, see Congressional Budget Office, The Marine Corps in the 1980s: Prestocking Proposals, the Rapid Deployment Force, and Other Issues (Washington, DC, May 1980). “US Asked to Trim War Games,” New York Times, November 6, 1981; FBIS-MEA-C-81, December 7, 1981: C1. Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, November 9, 1981: 1, 2. “2,500 US Soldiers Reported Holding Maneuvers in Oman,” The New York Times, December 6, 1982. David B. Ottaway, “Oman Expects US Help for Use of Its Bases,” The Washington Post, April 7, 1982: A1, A28. “Senator Percy, Delegation Arrive Oman 12 January,” FBIS-MEA-C-82, January 15, 1982: C3; and “US Senator Percy Concludes 4-Day Visit,” FBIS-MEA-V-82, January 18, 1982: C7–C8. “US Defense Secretary’s Visit Praised,” FBIS-MEA-V-82, February 12, 1982: C4–C5. The article also discussed Omani defense needs: “The sultanate, as it endeavors to establish a strong army and defend the territory and sanctity of the homeland and region, exerts every conceivable effort to achieve this objective in view of the fact that the Omani Army is a shield protecting the Gulf and Arab states. Therefore, the sultanate is always ready to effect all possible modernization in the Omani Army so as to strengthen its potential and efficiency and consolidate Oman’s military capability.” “Minister on Soviet Threat, US Maneuvers,” FBIS-MEA-V-82, December 27, 1982: C2–C3. ‘Alawi further stated that “We feel these agreements fall within the framework of the fundamental interests of Gulf Cooperation Council countries and that cooperation between the United States and Arab nations should be increased.” Financial Times, March 13, 1984. Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Butros Butros Ghali also briefed the Sultan on Middle East developments and the result of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s tour of

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Asian states during his Washington visit. See “Sultan Qaboos Meets Egypt’s Ghali in Washington,” FBIS-MEA-V83, April 15, 1983: A2. Arab Times, June 28, 1983: 1, in “Qaboos Stresses Continuing Need for US Support,” FBIS-MEA-V-83, June 30, 1983: C1. “Government Denounces Beirut Explosion,” FBIS-MEA-V-83, October 25, 1983: C2. “US Magazine Interview of Sultan Qaboos Reported,” FBIS-MEA-V-83, December 20, 1983: C1–C2. “Sultan Qabus Receives Reagan Envoy,” FBIS-MEA-V-83, December 13, 1983: C7. “US Commander Ends Visit, Departs for Oman,” FBIS-MEA-V-85, March 21, 1985: C6. Jeff Gerth and Judith Miller, “US Is Said to Develop Oman As Its Major Ally in the Gulf,” The New York Times, March 25, 1985: A1–A8. “Sultan Qabus Interviewed On Gulf Issues,” FBIS-MEA-V-85, April 5, 1985: C2–C5. This point was echoed by Omani ambassador to Qatar ‘Isa bin Ahmad bin ‘Ali in Al-Yawm, June 11, 1985: 6 in “Ambassador Views PDRY, Hormuz, US Presence,” FBIS-MEA-V-85, June 13, 1985: C2. FBIS-MEA-V-85, April 5, 1985, op. cit.: C2. See also “Official Source Denies Report on Aid to Oman,” FBISMEA-V-85, June 27, 1985: C2. Robert S. Greenberger, “White House Notifies Congress of Plan to Sell Oman 300 Sidewinder Missiles,” The New York Times, September 27, 1985: 20. The Minister of Information was interviewed by the London-based Al-Hawadith, December 19, 1986. “Consultative Council Delegation Leaves for US,” FBIS-MEA-V-86, March 14, 1986: C3. “Sultan’s Representative Hosts Dinner for Bush,” FBIS-MEA-V-86, April 10, 1986: C2–C3, and “Further Reportage on Visit by George Bush,” FBIS-MEA-V-86, April 11, 1986: C3. Richard W. Murphy, “Transcript of FY 1989 Assistance Proposals for the Middle East and North Africa,” Department of State Bulletin (Washington, DC: US Department of State, June 1988): 4. The law banning Stinger sales in the Persian Gulf was passed in December 1987. It contained one exception allowing the sale of 70 Stinger missiles to Bahrain at a cost of $7 million, but requiring Bahrain to keep the missiles under tight security and sell them back to the US if they had not been used by June 1989. Earlier in 1988, the State Department had announced that Qatar had illegally obtained twelve Stingers, and Doha refused to return the missiles or co-operate with US efforts to determine how it got them in the first place, most probably from proUS Afghan Mujahidin ostensibly fighting the Soviet Union. See “US Envoy Seeks Missiles for Oman,” The New York Times, May 12, 1988: A8. Senators and Foreign Service officers said it was unusual for a US ambassador to make a direct appeal to Congress for an arms sale to a foreign country. Such proposals usually came from the White House, the Pentagon, or the State Department. Ibid.: A8. “US Military Commander, Delegation Leave 21 June,” FBIS-NES-88-120, June 22, 1988: 6; see also “Further Reportage on Visit by Richard Murphy: Received by Defense Official,” FBIS-NES-88-121, June 23, 1988: 14. “Officials Confer With Frank Carlucci 3 December,” FBIS-NES-88-235, November 7, 1989: 15. Although details are not available in open sources, the US Air Force in particular benefited from the equipment at Thumrayt airbase, near Salalah. Few Omani defense officials volunteered any information corroborating this assessment, thereby sticking to both the letter as well the spirit of the agreements with the US, but senior US military officials have verified the vital link that Oman provided during the initial stages of Operation Desert Shield. “Sultan Qaboos Receives Schwarzkopf in Muscat,” FBIS-NES-90-060, March 28, 1991: 6. Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Oman (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 June 2006). Kenneth Katzman, “Oman: Reform, Security, and US Policy,” CRS Report for Congress RS21534 (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 28 June 2005). Oman – JAVELIN Anti-tank Missile System (Washington, DC: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, July 28, 2006). Available from www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/36-b/2006/Oman_06–38.pdf. Katzman, op. cit.: 2. There was a great deal of controversy over the Masna’ah airbase, about eighty miles (120 kilometers) west of the capital city, which was not slated for completion for several years. See “US to Spend £90m on Air Base in Oman, and its Interrelation with the War on Iraq,” online blog page titled Sablat ‘Uman, whose Arabic page is located at www.omania2.net/avb/showthread.php?t=3444; and English page at www.englishsabla.com/forum/showthread. php?t=11260. Private conversation with one of the highest ranking military officers in Muscat, on condition of anonymity, conducted on February 27, 2008. US Department of State, “US–Oman Gulf Security Dialogue,” May 2008. Available from www.merln.ndu.edu/ archivepdf/NEA/State/105529.pdf.

32 US–Bahrain relations Jeffrey B. Nugent

Introduction The relations between the US and Bahrain are multifaceted, increasingly dense, and strong. Indeed, despite the geographic distance between the countries, enormous differences in geographic and population sizes, important differences in language and religion, and substantial differences in governance systems between the two countries, Bahrain and the US are in several important respects much more closely allied than most other countries in the world, including those that are much closer in terms of geography, religion, language, size, and political systems. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the various facets of these increasingly close relations, to explain how and why they have evolved over time, and the extent to which tensions in these relationships remain. In the pages that follow, we discuss each of several distinct facets of the relationship separately, in a largely historical order. After a very brief section on the early beginnings, the narrative turns to the relations between the two countries over petroleum, followed by the closely related topic of military and security relations. This is followed by the relatively recent emergence of relations concerning law and governance, and civil and human rights. Then, we turn to economic diversification, which has facilitated relationships in non-oil industries and finance. Because of their critical importance for diversification and the future of Bahrain’s economy after oil, this is followed by a discussion of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between the two countries signed in 2000 and the US–Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, which came into effect in 2006, and their implications for both countries’ relations with the countries around them. A short concluding section completes the chapter.

Early beginnings As noted by Palmer (1992), upon gaining independence from Britain, Americans were anxious to proselytize the world with their ideas of political and religious freedom and to open up markets for goods with their merchant ships. The Indian Ocean was an interesting, though distant, target in that respect as parts of it were less securely tied up in European Imperial relations than elsewhere. US exports (mainly in cotton textiles) to the Indian Ocean region (broadly defined to include the Persian Gulf and Bahrain in particular) expanded sufficiently that, by 1833, the US had established a commercial and diplomatic treaty with Oman. Merchant ships from then on were welcome in Muscat and from there could visit other ports in the region. By the early 1850s, that trade had expanded to the point that the US tried to negotiate a commercial treaty with Persia. Negotiations on the latter treaty, however, foundered as Americans found that Persia was trying to use the treaty to draw the US into a military alliance that would help that country fend off further incursions on its territory by the Russians in the north and east and by the British from the Gulf and Indian Ocean. In 1856, however, the treaty between the two countries was finally signed. While it was clearly only a commercial treaty (as the US wanted),

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the US did promise to send a naval ship to the region. Over the years, naval ships came from time to time, but until 1879 only as far as Muscat, not venturing further into the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, Great Britain was solidifying its position in the Persian Gulf. In 1853, it signed a treaty with several of the leading sheikhs on the Arab side of the Gulf. By 1873, the British formally became administrators of what became known as the Trucial States, although Bahrain did not officially enter the Trucial States until 1931. By 1892, Great Britain had officially become administrator of the Trucial States and Bahrain, making them protectorates (Kjeilen 1996), and fortifying its naval and political dominance in the Persian Gulf. These arrangements left foreign policy and control of the seas to Great Britain but allowed internal affairs to remain in the hands of the traditional rulers. In the 1880s, when Persia was being further intruded upon by Russia in the north, the US expanded its commercial treaty with Persia in such a way as to establish full diplomatic relations. Some diplomats saw the Persian Gulf as an area of strategic interest to the US. This opportunity became more apparent after a Scotsman named William Knox d’Arcy had obtained an oil concession from the Shah in Persia in 1901 and especially after oil was discovered on it in 1908. A few years later, the company he founded, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, decided to build a pipeline to transport oil to the Persian Gulf for shipment (Palmer 1992), drawing further attention to the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile missionaries, mainly Protestant, had been attempting to make converts throughout much of the region. Their conversions were much more numerous in the Orthodox Christian territories of the crumbling Ottoman Empire than in its Islamic territories. Yet, even in Bahrain, still a semi-autonomous protectorate of Britain, American missionaries were active. In 1911, American missionaries founded the first hospital in Bahrain (American Mission Hospital; www.Bahraingateway.org). Several US ships and commercial interests were attracted to Bahrain during the prosperity that Bahrain enjoyed during the latter days of the pearling industry. Pearling had been Bahrain’s main industry for centuries prior to the discovery of oil, but by this time, the industry centered in Bahrain was a global one. This industry requires substantial amounts of credit for all those involved in pearling operations in the Gulf. Its global scope included polishing and jewelry manufacturing operations in India and marketing in Western Europe and indeed all over the world. On Bahrain, the industry had its own specialized courts (“diving courts”) to settle disputes among the many parties involved in the industry (Datta and Nugent 1985).

Oil Despite the importance of the missionary presence in Bahrain, and the pearling-based prosperity that created a Bahraini market for US exports of textiles and other goods, it was the oil industry that led to a rather sharp increase in the extent of relations between the US and Bahrain in the early twentieth century. While Persia (which soon became Iran) was the site of the first oil discovery in the region in 1908, the fact that the concession that had been obtained by Knox d’Arcy and built into Anglo-Persian (which became Anglo-Iranian in the 1930s and subsequently British Petroleum in the 1950s) encompassed the potential oil fields of virtually the entire country meant that British interests had almost exclusive control over Iranian oil.1 Moreover, thanks to their strong military and political position in the Gulf, in 1912, Britain was able to get the sheikhs and emirs of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the Trucial States to agree not to grant oil concessions to non-British companies (Palmer 1992) there as well. The British monopoly over oil rights in the area got an additional boost after the First World War from two events: (1) the Russian Revolution, which temporarily weakened the Russian push into Iran; and (2) the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, which left Britain with a mandate over the Ottoman province of Iraq.2 As a result, Britain was also able to control the coming development of oil in Iraq beginning in the 1920s. Given the dominance of

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the British navy in the general region, not surprisingly Britain was by far the major player in Middle Eastern oil for a couple of decades. Yet, US oil companies were still the largest in the world and, with reserves inside the US at extremely low levels, these companies were looking for any opportunities they could find to break the British monopoly in the Persian Gulf area, even if without much help from their government. The countries of the Persian Gulf, of course, had every incentive to have the US firms break the monopoly. The fulfillment of such a possibility was facilitated by the extremely weak financial position that the British firms were in at the time, making it difficult for them to be able to bid for the concessions offered by the various local rulers of the Trucial States as rapidly as the latter desired. The major breakthrough came in 1926 when, unable to find a British firm willing and able to bid for exploration rights in Bahrain, the British holders of the concession sold the rights to the Bahrain concession to Eastern Gulf Oil, a subsidiary of America’s Gulf Oil, a minor partner in the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC). When the parent IPC refused to undertake the concession or even to allow Gulf to undertake it, in 1928, Gulf sold these rights to Standard Oil of California (SoCal) (Palmer 1992). SoCal, however, was also ineligible to actively participate because of the earlier agreement between Bahrain and the British to exclude nonBritish oil companies. To get around this constraint, SoCal formed the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) as a wholly owned Canadian subsidiary (Findlay 1994), classifying it as a Bahraini corporation. Subsequently, SoCal sold half its shares to the Texas Oil Company (Texaco) to form Caltex, a Bahamas-chartered company to market BAPCO oil internationally (Palmer 1992). In 1932, oil was discovered on this concession at Jebel Dukhan, the highest point on Bahrain’s main island. Based upon its success in Bahrain, SoCal went on to buy exploration and production rights in much of Saudi Arabia. Soon thereafter, oil was discovered there. Hence, Bahrain’s oil attracted US firms to Bahrain, and from there they went on to the rest of the Persian Gulf. The US companies that came were not only oil companies, but also included numerous contractors and sub-contractors, law firms, oil drilling operators, and various service providers. By 1934, BAPCO had exported its first shipments of crude oil, and did so in US tankers. In 1936, BAPCO constructed its first refinery in Bahrain with a capacity of 10,000 barrels per day. The BAPCO refinery has come to serve not only all of Bahrain’s domestic needs but has also exported some refined products. Its capacity grew gradually over time to its present capacity of 250,000 barrels per day. In recent years, much of the oil has come from a second oil field, this one the offshore field of Abu Saafa (shared with Saudi Arabia), as well as from Saudi Arabia itself. By 1937, oil revenues exceeded customs duties as the largest source of the Bahrain government’s revenues. Until at least 1940, Bahrain’s production of crude petroleum exceeded that of Saudi Arabia. While oil revenues declined somewhat during the Second World War, they continued to serve as the most important source of revenue. From the late 1940s to the mid-1950s, oil revenues rose about ten-fold, implying a further increase in the relations between US oil and other commercial interests and the still not fully independent Bahrain (Abdulla 1999). As in other oil-exporting countries, the rise of oil brought the virtually unavoidable “Dutch disease” effects, wherein other traditional exports such as pearling and fishing were largely or even entirely eliminated. Consistent with the model, however, the production of non-tradables including a wide variety of services grew. During the Second World War, the BAPCO refinery was bombed by Italian planes. While this held oil production and refining down for a time, it led to the development of another important dimension in the relations between Bahrain and the US, the military or security dimension (Palmer 1992). Before concluding this section, it must be pointed out that oil continues to play an important role in the Bahraini economy and in US–Bahrain relations. Much of the story to be told

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below stems from Bahrain’s rather pioneering efforts to diversify its economy away from oil, efforts induced by the realization that Bahrain’s reserves of crude petroleum were quite small and declining. However, the soaring prices for oil between 2002 and mid-2008, declining reserves of both oil and gas, and rising demand for gas by local industry have stimulated new exploration and recovery activities. According to Bahrain’s current Minister of Oil and Gas Affairs, Ali Mirza, this has been facilitated by the formation in 2005 of the National Oil and Gas Authority (NOGA), which consolidated a number of different agencies, streamlining and making more transparent the process of seeking tenders on new offshore exploration. Once again, US oil companies are engaged in this. In addition, NOGA has negotiated long-term contracts to import gas from neighboring countries (www.unitedworld-usa.com/pdf/Bahrain/ pdf; p. 12).

Military and security During the Second World War, British forces in the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region were overstretched. British oil interests and its military were threatened by the Germans from the north and by the Italians and Germans in North Africa. The US Navy entered the Persian Gulf in a major way for the first time for the express purpose of serving as a supply lifeline to the Soviet Union, which was cut off from the West and partly invaded by the Germans. The US was desperate to keep the Soviet Union in the war fighting Germany from the east. Having its naval and other forces in the Gulf was deemed vital to success in this respect. Maintenance of oil production in Bahrain and the entire Gulf region was also deemed vital to that success, and for the first time the US government became active in trying to help US oil companies in that respect. Bahrain, in fact, was one of the few nearby locations for the production of specialized fuels for aircraft and naval ships (Palmer 1992). The conclusion of the war left the region a very different one than it had been before the war. Immediately after the war, the Soviet Union under Stalin took over the Baltic States and much of central and southeastern Europe. It threatened Turkey and Greece and was once again a major threat to British interests in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean as well as to the nation-states and British protectorates of the Persian Gulf. Soviet troops had entered Azerbaijan and further south into Iran, giving rise to an Iran crisis (Palmer 1992). In the spring of 1946, the US came to replace Britain on the diplomatic front as the major defender of Iran from the Soviet threat. With the US heavily involved in helping Europe recover from the war, but oil demand growing rapidly in both Europe and the US, the US was exporting to Europe about as much oil as it imported from the Middle East. In 1947 and 1948, the US was hit by fuel shortages, prompting priority attention to be given to energy security. This led to a government decision to stop US oil exports to Europe but to compensate by helping to secure oil supplies to Europe from the Persian Gulf. This it did by naval protection of tankers going through the Gulf and the Suez Canal. But this was hard to accomplish without a base for its naval ships. With approval from Britain and Bahrain’s royal family, in 1948, the US Navy established its first base in the Middle East at the Bahraini port of Juffair, a few miles from downtown Manama (Bahrain’s capital city). Since that time and especially after Bahrain’s independence in 1971, this port has served on and off as US Navy headquarters in the Persian Gulf and, more recently (known as Naval Support Activity Bahrain), it has become home to both the US Naval Forces Central Command and the US Fifth Fleet. While, as with virtually any military base in a foreign land, there have been incidents triggering tensions from time to time, the size and strategic and security importance of the US military presence in Bahrain has grown significantly over time. Several events contributed to this. First was the growing importance of the oil sector, which as a result of the plane attacks of the Second World War on Bahrain’s oil facilities were revealed to be vulnerable to foreign attack or sabotage. Second was the aforementioned

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importance of providing military protection when needed for oil tankers from the Persian Gulf on their way to Europe. Third, when statehood was formally given to Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971, Bahrain was tiny in size and very weak in relation to its neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, the seven emirates which formed the UAE, and especially Iran. Iran was of particular concern as Bahrain had historically been part of Iranian territory for certain periods.3 Moreover, even when independence was granted, the relationships between Bahrain and its neighbors were soured by several unsettled border disputes, primarily with Qatar and the UAE (Palmer 1992; Halliday 1980). Fourth, and perhaps most important, was the Iranian revolution of 1979 in which the Shah was overthrown and forced into exile. This event greatly increased the threat posed by Iran for several different reasons. Not only did the overthrow of the Shah demonstrate the vulnerability of oil-producing monarchies in Bahrain and elsewhere in the region to social upheaval related to the enormous social and economic changes that the oil booms were bringing, but also Iran had become an important military power by the 1960s. Indeed, it had come to play a decisive military role in the region by helping Omani forces subdue the long-standing rebellion in Oman’s Dhofar Province. Even more serious was the fact that, with Iran no longer a monarchy and by then engaged in a series of bitter disputes (e.g., the hostage crisis) with the US (its former ally), Iran had become something of a potential adversary of Bahrain.4 Religious divisions within Bahrain further exacerbated that threat. In particular, a substantial majority of Bahrain’s population are Shi’ite, many of whom had migrated from Iran to Bahrain at various points in time when conditions in Iran were not favorable to business and trading activities. At the same time, Bahrain’s ruling family and much of the traditional elite are Sunni. As a result, with Iran after the revolution run by Shi’ite clergy and an elected president both backed by a powerful military, the ruling family and the largely Sunni-led government of Bahrain became worried about Iran’s potential to foment rebellion among Bahrain’s Shi’a community (Herzog 1999; Palmer 1992). Fifth, even after the Iranian revolution, there were four more important events that contributed to the growing strategic value of the US naval presence in Bahrain. One was the long Iran–Iraq war of the 1980s that brought hostile fire very close to Bahrain and threatened the security of Bahrain’s oil exports and imports through the Gulf. In the latter part of this war, the US got dragged into a somewhat more active role by reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers that had been threatened during the war. On top of this, viewing the US as a supporter of Iraq, Iran started to lay mines in the Gulf as a direct threat to the oil exports of Iraq and other Arab exporters of the Gulf, and the US Navy was called upon to provide minesweepers to clear the shipping lanes (Palmer 1992). The second such event occurred shortly after the end of the Iran–Iraq war when Iraq, with a military believed to be one of the largest in the world at that time, invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Soon thereafter, Iraq declared that it was annexing Kuwait. This was another case of a neighboring ruling family being overthrown. The United Nations set a deadline of January 15 for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. When this deadline was ignored by Iraq, on January 16, the US led a coalition of forces for the specific purpose of expelling Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. The coalition which included Bahrain was carefully put together by President George H. W. Bush and his administration. Rapid deployment proved critical to the success of Operation Desert Storm, and the base in Bahrain proved critical to that rapid deployment. The result was the remarkably sudden defeat of Iraq’s forces in Kuwait and their total withdrawal back into Iraq’s own national boundaries. The third and fourth important events contributing to the growing strategic value of Bahrain to the US (although in this case not so much vice versa) were the invasions of Afghanistan after the 9/11 events in New York and Washington and subsequently of Iraq in 2003. The latter was the more important of these invasions, one undertaken by a smaller “coalition of the willing” led by the US and UK and put together by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair.

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Launched against a prominent member of the Arab League, not surprisingly, this “coalition of the willing” in Iraq did not include Bahrain or any other Arab country. Indeed, it prompted violent protests in a number of Arab countries and harsh criticism from the press and civil society in many countries. Bahrain and the other monarchies of the Gulf, however, were much less critical of the pre-emptive strike by the US and its “coalition of the willing” than other countries in the region. Several, including Bahrain, provided the staging areas for naval, land, and air operations. Once again, the US naval presence in Bahrain proved to be of crucial importance to the quick termination of the formal hostilities in Iraq and Iraqi surrender. With Iraq descending for a while into virtual civil war and the Taliban making a comeback in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Bahrain’s help to the increasingly unpopular US was making tiny Bahrain a potential target for terrorist actions. The result of these various events and growing security concerns in Bahrain has been the continuous strengthening of the US military presence in Bahrain. A Defense Co-operation Agreement was signed between the two countries in 1992 that granted to the US the right to pre-position both navy and air force materials for use in future crises. The number of military personnel, mostly navy, increased from a hundred or so in the 1970s to 20,000 or more by 1995 (Herzog 1999), and still more since then. At the same time, the facilities at Juffair grew in size and sophistication. As a military facility, this expansion required many military contractors and specialized personnel. As the military were generous in their housing and per diem allowances, this gave rise to a local real estate boom in the neighborhood of the base and even some hotels catering largely to military personnel and their families (Commander, US Forces Command, US Fifth Fleet). It also involved rapid growth in the number, size, sophistication, and variety of the military ships based there. Given the on-going military operations of the US in Afghanistan and Iraq and the growing threats from Iran, Russia, and other countries, the ships in Bahrain including those of the Fifth Fleet took on various new roles. The new roles have come to include prepositioning of war material, the protection of maritime shipping, and the interception of both ships trying to break trade sanctions such as those on Iraq during the 1990s and pirate vessels trying to hijack merchant ships anywhere in the Persian Gulf, part of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Oman, bodies of water touching some twenty-seven different countries (www.GlobalSecurity.org). The growing US military presence, while providing security to both Bahrain and its neighbors and making US forces more effective in this oil-rich and turbulent region, also brings with it risks. It makes Bahrain a potential target for terrorist attacks aimed at either US interests or Bahrain’s royal family (the Al-Khalifas). For example, during the continuing stalemate in resolving Iran’s nuclear energy program when, in early 2007, it was rumored that the US would conduct an air strike at Iran’s facilities, there was considerable speculation that this would lead Iran to strike back by attacking the vulnerable Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. Clearly, the realization of such a threat could have a devastating effect on Bahrain and severely reduce the military capabilities of the US (Salla 2007). While this growing dependence of Bahrain and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries on the US military has its shortcomings, there would appear to be little choice. This is because, in the face of external threats from Iraq or Iran, no individual GCC country or even all of them together would be able to constitute a credible deterrent. While they might be able to buy the most advanced arms available, they do not have the size or skills needed to operate them effectively with their own nationals. Using foreign mercenaries would also be feasible but hardly likely to give their populations confidence that the mercenaries could be counted on in time of crisis, and would not pose a coup threat to the monarchies. It should be admitted that the steadily growing importance of military and security relations between Bahrain and the US has not been without occasional interruptions and significant tensions. In particular, during the 1973 Arab–Israeli war in which the US was perceived to be

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a strong defender of, and supplier of arms to, the Israeli side, Bahrain announced the termination of the base leasing agreement with the US. However, the US agreed to amend certain provisions of its 1971 agreement and, in their turn, the Bahrainis dropped their demand for immediate withdrawal of US forces. A new agreement was signed in 1977 in which, officially at least, the US no longer had a right to have the Middle East Force based there (Palmer 1992). The fact that other ports in the region were closed to US forces as a result of the war only served to strengthen the importance to the US of the Bahrain base.

Democracy, law, and civil and human rights Bahrain and Kuwait are the only Gulf states to have made any serious attempt over the years to have more representative governments. As noted above, before independence under the British Protectorate, rule had been left largely to the Al-Khalifa royal family. Shortly before independence, however, a twelve-member Council of State, headed by the ruler’s brother but including other Bahrainis, was instituted. At independence, in August 1971, the Council of State became the Council of Ministers headed by the ruler, Sheikh Isa Al-Khalifa himself. Elections were held two years later for a new Constituent Assembly. The newly elected Constituent Assembly, in turn, passed a new constitution paving the way for an elected National Assembly. By 1975, however, Sheikh Isa dissolved the newly instituted National Assembly on the grounds that it was slowing down decision making, the same rationale offered by the Kuwaiti ruler for suspending that country’s National Assembly (even without political parties) twice, 1976–81 and 1986–92. Both the Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq by the “coalition of the willing” have given rise to another important dimension of US–Bahrain relations, namely, that pertaining to democracy, civil and human rights, and legal and other institutions. Pressures for democratization and civil rights have come from two sources: the local populations of the Gulf countries and international pressures, especially from the US and its non-Arab coalition partners. After the Gulf War, Kuwait was probably under the most intense pressure to liberalize its political regime, given that so many other nations were making large sacrifices in terms of both money and people to defend its citizens from the Iraqi invaders who claimed to be reclaiming Iraqi control and liberating the people of Kuwait from their non-democratic monarch. Indeed, in October 1992, elections for a new National Assembly were held with right and left opposition parties included. But, if the people of Kuwait could exert pressure for a greater political stake in public affairs, so too could the people of Bahrain and other monarchies in the Gulf. Indeed, only one month after Kuwait had called for its National Assembly elections, Bahrain’s ruler Sheikh Isa announced the establishment of a new consultative council. As it was granted only very limited powers, as Abdelkarim (1999: 15) put it, “the council was not received enthusiastically.” Indeed, during the remainder of the 1990s, there arose considerable tension between the Shi’a and Sunni communities. The majority Shi’a were unhappy about not being allowed more political power or even civil rights. Increasingly, this conflict gave rise to cycles of violence and repression by the police and military (Burke 2008). In 1996, Bahrain accused Iran of a plot to destabilize the country by providing support from a Hezbollah-related organization to the Shi’a population in the island country. Subsequently, when he was President of Iran, Mohamed Khatemi curbed Iranian support for the Shi’a community in Bahrain, leading to the resumption of normal relations between the countries. In the face of the seemingly ineffective and glacially slow progress toward democratization in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Arab world, the democratization pressure was further boosted from outside the Gulf by important Arab intellectuals who authored the influential publication of the United Nations Development Program, called the Arab Human Development Report (United Nations Development Program 2002, 2004). These scholars traced the shortcomings of human and economic development in the region as a whole to three important “deficits”: the freedom

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deficit, the women’s empowerment deficit, and the human capabilities deficit. The first two related directly and almost exclusively to weak governance and civil and political rights, and the third was at least indirectly related to these deficits. Attention was therefore directed to the weak governance and civil liberties indicators of each Arab country. Meanwhile, the US and its non-Arab coalition partners also faced political pressures concerning the need for political and civil rights reforms in the Gulf states. Even with cost-sharing by Kuwait and other countries in the Gulf, the Gulf War was seen in the US and elsewhere as expensive and diverting attention away from domestic priorities. While criticism from the outof-power Democratic Party in the US might have been natural, it is notable that even William Gates, an architect of the George H. W. Bush administration’s pursuit of the Gulf War, admitted in retrospect that the US share of the cost burden had been too high (Terasawa and Gates 1992). US leaders were therefore anxious to see political liberalization proceed as much as possible so as to avoid the critique that they were merely backing totalitarian, repressive regimes from which the Iraqi regime was trying to liberate their populations. The Democratic administration of President Clinton, throughout the latter part of the 1990s, was perhaps somewhat more forceful in expressing these views (Ottaway and Dunne 2007). Indeed, it funded an institution called the National Democratic Institute to support civil and political liberties in Bahrain and elsewhere in the region. After years of continuing unrest and violence exerted both by and against the Shi’a majority during the late 1990s, at the death of Sheikh Isa, his son Hamad Al-Khalifa acceded to the throne. Almost immediately, he proceeded to free political prisoners, welcome back political exiles, and outline a new national charter aimed at restoring parliament. The US ambassador to Bahrain and authorities in Washington greeted these events with great enthusiasm. However, when the new constitution of 2002 was unveiled, it turned out to give more power to the appointed upper house but much less power to the elected lower house than had the earlier constitution. Only political societies (not political parties) were allowed, leading to widespread disappointment at the extent of political liberalization. The largest political societies (mostly Shi’a) boycotted the 2002 election. By 2004, there was considerable unhappiness and, in September 2004, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights was closed down when its vice president publicly criticized the prime minister. The international society Human Rights Watch called this a severe setback to civil rights in Bahrain (Human Rights Watch 2004). Meanwhile, the US-funded National Democratic Institute gradually convinced Al-Waqaf, the largest Shi’a political society, to participate in the 2005 municipal and 2006 legislative elections. In leading the “coalition of the willing” to overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq, President George Bush had advocated that a desired objective was “to bring democracy to the Middle East.” His administration, therefore, was equally if not more anxious to encourage democracy everywhere in the region, including of course Bahrain. To the Bush administration’s chagrin, however, the National Democracy Institute in Bahrain was asked to shut down and leave. Because the human rights record of the Bahrain government under King Hamad was much better than that of his predecessor, and Al-Waqaf continued to participate in the elections, the US reaction to this ouster was relatively mild. According to Ottaway and Dunne (2007) at least, the Bahrain government should have been very pleased in that it managed to split the Shi’a majority over whether or not to participate and yet could boast of having made significant political and civil rights reforms. As a result, even in a relatively open election, the Shi’a majority was kept at bay, and the government was successful in claiming the center ground between the participating segment of the Shi’a on the left and the Islamic Sunni party on the right. The above changes in the willingness of the Bahraini monarchy to allow political reform correlated rather well with the changes in economic conditions over time. In the mid- to late 1990s, when oil prices were at a low point, the government was in a much weaker position to keep its subjects happy than it was from 2002 to mid-2008 as oil prices rose sharply. The

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leverage of the US government over civil and political rights was weakened by its dependence on Bahrain as host for its naval base, which greatly strengthened its military posture throughout the vast region covered by the Fifth Fleet. That leverage, however, may have been at its height when the US government was trying to get Congress to approve the US–Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (FTA; discussed below) in 2004 and 2005. This is because the US Congress often objects to trade treaties with countries with poor civil and labor rights records. Notably, therefore, a new human rights organization, the Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society, was created in November 2004 within two months of the closing of the old one, and other reforms were announced by various officials in the testimony to Congress.

Diversification, investment, and trade As the first oil-producing country to realize that it would be running out of oil in the near future, Bahrain has long been a path-setter among oil-exporting countries in diversification. Beginning in the 1970s, this took two forms: (1) industrialization taking advantage of flared and other natural gas as a low-cost source of energy; and (2) the development of offshore banking. Among the examples of industrialization were alumina and aluminum products manufacture (ALBA), BANAGAS, which processes natural gas into propane, butane, and naphtha, Gulf Petrochemicals producing ammonia, methanol, and urea, an iron and steel industry, and its important shipbuilding and drydock facilities. ALBA has in fact become the world’s largest aluminum smelter and has also led to the development of local industries using aluminum. As these are all export industries, they need to be efficient. Not surprisingly, at various stages in their development, US consulting firms have played important roles. Aluminum products, moreover, have become an important export to the US. These industrial diversification activities have been boosted by Bahrain’s co-operation with other countries in the region. As a member of the Organization of Arab Oil Exporting Countries (OAPEC), some of its industries both in and outside Bahrain have been jointly financed with other members of OAPEC. More importantly, on November 11, 1981, Bahrain joined with five other Arab countries of the Gulf (Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Although formed largely for security reasons at a time when its larger and militarily stronger neighbors Iran and Iraq were at war with each other, the GCC soon multilateralized existing bilateral trade agreements, thereby making it easier for Bahrain to sell some of its industrial and other products to its fellow GCC members. Over time, the coverage of the treaty has become more complete and also deeper. It has gradually managed to harmonize standards, an important non-tariff barrier to trade. It has come to allow for the free flow of individuals and capital across member countries. In 1992, a GCC Patent Office was formed. On January 1, 2008, common external tariffs came into effect, thereby making the GCC a common market. It also has a plan to become a currency union, although the target date for accomplishing this has been postponed. As noted in Hoekman and Sekkat (2008), Bahrain is far above the Middle East average in the share of its exports that go to other countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The offshore banking industry developed in large part to take advantage of the financial assets being accumulated in the Gulf as a whole. Because of heavy-handed regulation in other Gulf countries, financial institutions and markets in those countries were repressed, implying that those with accumulating funds would be looking for better returns on their funds. Being offshore, Bahrain’s offshore banks were much less regulated than domestic banks, and foreign banks including US ones were encouraged. They were also largely free of taxation. The offshore banking facilities were allowed to lend and invest domestically but not to take in deposits from Bahraini citizens. They were also attracted to Bahrain by lack of restrictions on capital inflows and outflows. With offshore banking came the development of industries and professions

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serving that industry, such as accounting firms, legal firms, and insurance specialists (McKee, Garner, and Abu 1994). This also helped pave the way for the foundation of the Bahrain Stock Exchange in 1988, which subsequently became linked with other exchanges in the region. Another niche within the financial industry in which Bahrain has become something of a world leader is in Islamic banking and financial institutions. Under pressure from US and other external sources, Bahrain was one of the first countries in the region to adopt the various rules and regulations needed to deter money-laundering. Both the industrialization development and offshore banking industries have over the years faced growing competition as other countries in the region have followed Bahrain in promoting downstream industries from oil and gas and financial markets. As a result, Bahraini authorities have continued to search for ways of opening up new opportunities for economic diversification. During the last decade, the US has offered Bahrain two important opportunities which Bahrain has taken advantage of. On May 23, 2000, President Clinton signed into law a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with Bahrain which was based on the prototype BIT developed in 1994. The most important provision of the US–Bahrain BIT is Article 2 granting to each party that its investment in the partner country should receive the better of (1) national treatment or (2) Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment. Article 11 goes beyond this by stating that this is only a floor on the treatment of a covered investment, specifically allowing the treatment to be better than either of these alternatives. By Article 1, investment is very broadly defined to include the establishment of a subsidiary, the purchase of stocks, bonds, mortgages, leases, intellectual property rights, licenses, and permits. Articles 5 and 6 allow transfers of funds into and out of the country to be done freely without delays at the market exchange rate, and prohibits governments from insisting on permissions, licenses, or local content. Article 7 allows that, subject to the country’s laws on entry and sojourn of aliens, each party permits the nationals of the other party to enter and remain in its territory to conduct activities relevant to its investment. Articles 9 and 10 establish dispute settlement procedures and options, including the resolution of disputes by binding arbitration. The US–Bahrain BIT is the third BIT that the US has completed with a Middle Eastern country, earlier ones being with Egypt and Jordan, and subsequent ones in the region including Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. In addition to the general purposes of promoting US private investment activities in Bahrain and Bahraini investment opportunities in the US, the BIT with Bahrain was aimed at promoting security not only in their reciprocal investments but also to signal this to other investors. Like other Middle Eastern investors in the US, in the wake of incidents such as the freezing of Iranian assets in the US by US sanctions, without the BIT, Bahrainis and other Middle Eastern investors would have understandable concerns about the possibility of receiving similar treatment if certain unfavorable conditions between the two countries should emerge. The US–Bahrain BIT clearly provides security to Bahraini investors against any such unwanted action and demonstrates the usefulness of BITs to other countries with actual or contemplated investments in the US. At the same time, by the treaty, the US also signals its confidence that Bahrain can be a secure location for US and other businesses to set up regional business offices and other activities. Naturally, this contributes to Bahrain’s efforts to diversify its economy away from oil into a variety of other activities. The bilateral character of these agreements, of course, suggests that competitive economic pressures must have played an important role in their formation. Despite the kinds of security concerns that arose in the case of the proposed investments by Dubai Ports in different ports in the US, the US wants to encourage investments of various kinds to offset its continuing current accounts deficits and at the same time to provide jobs in the US and better or cheaper products for its consumers. Indeed, it is believed that competitive pressures in the pursuit of foreign direct investment (FDI) are the most important factor lying behind the proliferation of BITs around the world in the last several decades (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006).5 In

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light of the rather dim view that foreign investors have about the fairness and efficiency of the judicial systems in countries such as Bahrain, the dispute settlement provisions of the BIT could well be an important feature as far as US investors are concerned. US investments in Bahrain may also benefit from the fact that Bahrain has signed BITs with thirty-six other countries. Among these are BITs with Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, and Syria (World Bank 2008). The second significant opportunity the US has provided to Bahrain in its diversification efforts and the development of bilateral economic relations between the two countries was to engage in a FTA with the US. Negotiations on such a treaty began in 2004 and culminated in the signing of the US–Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (USBFTA), which came into force on August 1, 2006. This was another in a line of FTAs that the US has negotiated with countries that were only very small trading partners prior to the implementation of these treaties. Others have been with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman in the MENA region. What distinguishes the US FTAs from most others not involving the US is that they are “deeper” than most other FTAs (Hoekman and Sekkat 2008). By this is meant that they apply not only to trade in commodities and to tariff rates, but also to services and non-tariff barriers. They also have provisions regarding investment, labor, and various other kinds of regulations. Most importantly, the US FTAs contain provisions regarding implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of the provisions of the treaties and dispute resolution (Sakmar 2008; World Bank 2008). The importance of this lies in the fact that some of the FTAs that Bahrain has entered into with other countries are not well monitored and enforced. Anecdotal evidence on many of these FTAs indicates that the private parties to trade between countries in such FTAs often have little recourse to somewhat arbitrary treatment at borders and in ports by customs officials (Zarrouk 2008). In few if any of the US FTAs have competitive pressures from firms been the major driving force to the establishment of such agreements. The USBFTA is no exception in this regard. Instead, it seems to have been motivated primarily by mutual strategic interests. For Bahrain, it was seen as a useful means of furthering its diversification objectives. For the US, it was seen as both a part of a broader Middle East strategy and a complement to its security interests. The testimony given in the hearings on the USBFTA provide evidence on US motives. For example, in his opening statement at the US Senate’s hearing on the treaty, Shaun Donnelly, the Assistant Trade Representative for Europe and the Mediterranean, indicated that this agreement was an intimate part of the US effort to establish a US–Middle East FTA (USMEFTA) by 2013. Small Middle Eastern countries might not be able to satisfy minimum local content rules of origin of an FTA with the US and therefore might not find it advantageous to join. However, once in a USMEFTA, the local content could be made cumulative among Middle Eastern countries; as more individual countries form FTAs with the US, the incentives for others to join would grow. Donnelly also made it clear that the US also promised help to other MENA countries in making the reforms needed to get World Trade Organization (WTO) approval of their entry into the WTO, and in extending its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to these countries. So too, Donnelly indicated that this effort was to be seen as a positive response to the 9/11 Commission’s appeal for the US to expand its trade with the Middle East “to encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for the people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance the prospects for their children’s future.” That commission had identified FTAs with Bahrain and Morocco as important examples of such a strategy. The hearings on the USBFTA in September 2005 in the US House of Representatives revealed frequent references by both elected officials and witnesses to the contribution to US security interests that Bahrain had made. For example, one congressman cited Bahrain for (1) supplying oil to the US fleet during the Second World War; (2) serving as headquarters of the Fifth Fleet; (3) being the only GCC country to supply forces to “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan; (4) co-operating in the attempt to suppress money-laundering and

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terrorism finance;6 and (5) helping in the reconstruction of Iraq. One witness, a retired admiral in the US Navy, cited the useful role that Bahrain had played in containing Iran’s activities in the Persian Gulf during the Iran–Iraq war. Yet, the importance of security concerns in the formation of the USBFTA is by no means an exception. In fact, most FTAs including the EU and, as mentioned above, the GCC (to which Bahrain has been a signatory since its founding in 1981) have been formed in large part for security reasons. Over time, the new rules provided by these treaties have provided the incentive for growth in trade among member countries and in most cases with the rest of the world as well. In terms of economic integration theory, this implies that the “trade creation benefits” tend to dominate over the “trade diversion losses,” unless the schemes are extremely protective in nature (as some of the earlier FTAs among developing countries were). Trade diversion occurs in FTAs to the extent that trade is diverted from lower cost suppliers in the rest of the world to higher cost suppliers among the members of the FTA because of the discriminatory nature of tariffs in an FTA. As to economic benefits for the US, according to Ambassador Donnelly at least, this FTA would open Bahrain’s important service market more widely than any other existing FTA involving the US and would protect US firm-owned trademarks, movies, software, and other intellectual property more strongly than in existing treaties. Bahrain’s membership of the GCC should also strengthen the ability of Bahrain-based US firms to penetrate the markets of other GCC countries. This is especially important as Bahrain was the first GCC country with which the US concluded an FTA. Insufficient openness to union activity and failure to accept enough of the various International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions concerning worker rights in various other countries that have negotiated FTAs with the US have sometimes given rise to substantial opposition from organized labor in the US, delaying or defeating ratification. In the case of Bahrain, however, Bahrain’s 2002 Workers’ Trade Union Law seems to have been deemed satisfactory in those respects, explaining why this FTA came into existence with little debate.7 Enforcement of labor regulations has also been strengthened by doubling the staff of the inspectors of these regulations. The other issue that is frequently raised in the case of FTAs with Arab countries is the country’s position on the boycott of trade with Israel. On this point, Bahrain agreed to drop its primary boycott (i.e., on direct trade with Israel).8 As the US has continued to pursue additional FTAs with countries around the world after the conclusion of the USBFTA, each new treaty has the potential to set new precedents for subsequent ones. Yet, to maintain consistency, the US may want to modify its old treaties to maintain consistency with the new ones. By the same token, if any partner country should see that the US has changed its terms on any clause, it may want to push for revision of the terms in its own treaty with the US. Notably, when the Democrats regained control of Congress in 2006, they made it clear that they wanted some changes if they were to agree on future treaties. The first one to come along after that was the US–Peru FTA, which brought several innovations pushed by the Democrats. These included strengthening of the commitment to intellectual property rights, of labor’s freedom to organize, and of environmental protection. As a result, either Bahrain or the US could well ask that the USBFTA be revised to incorporate one or more of the innovations of the US–Peru FTA. For Bahrain, some of the concessions made in the existing treaty must have been politically difficult, but clearly offset by the diversification from oil advantages. On the economic side, the USBFTA was expected to complement the US–Bahrain BIT in strengthening Bahrain’s ability to attract FDI to the country, especially FDI of the type that would contribute to its economic diversification strategy and also provide high-wage employment opportunities for Bahraini nationals. The elected Lower House was reported to have voted 25–4 in favor of the treaty while the appointed Upper Chamber voted unanimously in favor. The USBFTA, however, complicates Bahrain’s relations with some of its partners in the GCC, especially over the rules of origin which differ between the two treaties. On top of this,

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it should be noted that some other members of the GCC have apparently turned down offers to engage in FTAs with the US.9 At the same time, the GCC as a whole is presently negotiating a treaty with the European Union, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Turkey and has already completed an FTA with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (UNCTAD 2008). Bahrain is also a signatory to the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA), which involves more overlapping and in some cases conflicting rules of origin. But, at the same time, as the GCC has recently become a customs union, the issue of overlapping agreements should become less relevant. Also, with experience in dealing with the overlapping agreements and as progress is made toward overall liberalization in the region, in the longer run, the US–Bahrain FTA could turn out to contribute to fuller liberalization not only in the Gulf but in the Middle East as a whole (Lawrence 2006). This was indeed an objective of the US administration of President George Bush in announcing the MEFTA initiative in 2003 with a target of achieving it by 2013. Although subsequently, with the refusal of many MENA countries to commence negotiations for FTAs with the US, the US has backed away from its 2013 target date for the formation of MEFTA. It is certainly possible that GAFTA will make progress and that, in the longer run, more countries will choose to form FTAs with the US because of the “deeper character” of US FTAs. In any case, irrespective of whether or not the MEFTA initiative continues, the USBFTA as an FTA that includes services and has various investment and other characteristics of a deep FTA, together with Bahrain’s commitments to the ever-deepening GCC (currently in the process of achieving more complete harmonization of standards and lowering the transaction costs of trade), should continue to encourage investment in Bahrain and to increase Bahrain’s exports and imports. The share of intra-MENA trade in Bahrain’s non-oil merchandise exports is already over 30%, one of the highest such shares in the MENA region (World Bank 2008). This contrasts with the MENA region as a whole where intra-regional trade has been estimated to be considerably below that which would be expected on the basis of its location, market size, and other characteristics used to predict bilateral trade patterns among individual countries and regions (Miniesy and Nugent 2008; Miniesy, Nugent, and Yousef 2003). Just how significant have the effects of the US–Bahrain BIT and the USBFTA been for trade and FDI between the US and Bahrain? Unfortunately, what with lags in the availability of statistics and the short time since the initiation of these agreements, it is clearly too early to allow anything like a comprehensive assessment. In Table 32.1, however, it can be seen that the growth of FDI flows in either direction has been very modest. So, too, has been that of US exports to Bahrain. Somewhat more noticeable has been the growth of Bahrain’s exports to the US, which have risen at least five-fold since the mid-1990s. The US exports to Bahrain are quite volatile depending on whether or not Bahrain buys any airplanes from the US in a particular year. The fastest rising component of US exports to Bahrain has been of US passenger cars, and aluminum products have been a rapidly growing component of Bahraini exports to the US. Except for Bahrain’s exports to the US, the growth of trade and FDI between the two countries since the commencement of the BIT and FTA has been modest indeed. The levels are, moreover, tiny in comparison to the totals for each country. Nevertheless, the trade figures do not include trade in services which have been known to grow very significantly. There are no accurate data on the breakdown of services trade of each country by country. Hence, bilateral flows for services are not available. Perhaps more important than the increase in trade and FDI to date have been new institutional arrangements that should lower the costs of future transactions by both US and Bahraini firms. The most important such mechanism is the establishment in September 2006 at the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington of the US–Bahrain Business Council. This Council serves as a forum for public–private stakeholders to discuss bilateral business relations.

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Table 32.1 Merchandise trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between Bahrain and the US (millions of dollars) Year

US exports to Bahrain

Bahraini exports to US

US FDI stocks in Bahrain

US FDI flows to Bahrain

Bahraini FDI stocks in US

Bahraini FDI flows to US

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

255.1 244.1 406.0 294.4 347.8. 448.9 432.8 419.5 508.4 301.8 350.8 474.5 591.3 653.7*

134.3 116.1 116.4 155.6 225.5 337.6 424.0 394.7 378.2 405.3 431.6 632.4 624.6 456.3*

n/a -138 -186 -200 -37 39 46 70 144 207 210 138 60 n/a

n/a D -88 -10 25 31 -17 13 60 27 -45 -107 -87 n/a

n/a D 57 D 58 D 37 184 D D 267 215 209 n/a

n/a -11 D D D D D 149 D -12 D -47 6 n/a

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, interactive tables. Notes: n/a not available; D figures cannot be divulged because there are too few firms involved that disclosure would be considered to jeopardize data confidentiality; * preliminary estimates.

Bahraini firms may take out memberships in the Council but may not serve on its Board. The respective ambassadors are honorary members of the Board. Through this vehicle, Bahrain hosted the first US–GCC investment forum. Through it, firms in each country may take advantage of the networks of firms and government agencies in the other country. This initiative at the US end followed the even more impressive creation by King Hamad in Bahrain of the Economic Development Board (EDB) chaired by the country’s Crown Prince. The EDB was designed to facilitate the strategic development of the Bahraini economy and to promote FDI. Its Board of Directors consists of seven government ministers as well as seven executives of private firms. The EDB also contributed to the creation in 2006 of the Bahrain Investors Center within the Ministry of Industry and Commerce with the participation of all the ministries involved in establishing businesses to facilitate the creation of new corporations and other businesses. Even earlier, the Commercial Company Law was revised in 2001 to allow 100 percent foreign ownership in many sectors. All of these institutions have received rave reviews by the World Trade Organization (2008), also helping to explain why Bahrain has come to be ranked nineteenth in the world in the Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation 2008) and also so high in the World Bank’s Doing Business Surveys.

Conclusion Despite the still modest levels of trade and FDI between Bahrain and the US, relations between two countries have grown tremendously since the arrival of the first missionaries and merchant ships in Bahrain over a century ago. Indeed, for two countries of such different size, histories, language, religion, and distance from each other, the growth of these relations has been remarkable. As the preceding discussion indicates, the strengthening of these relations emanated first from the vital role of US oil companies in the discovery and development of Bahrain’s oil and gas sector, and subsequently from the strategic location of Bahrain in the

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Persian Gulf between the giant and sometimes warring countries of that region (Iraq, Iran, and Russia) and in the traffic lanes for oil shipments out of the Gulf. From military security, the relationship has diversified into economic diversification and security and the development of the US–Bahrain BIT and FTA, on the one hand, and relations concerning civil liberties and governance, on the other hand. The relationship has been strongly affected by changing conditions in the general area. Among these have been the US replacement of the UK as the major naval power in the region, Bahrain’s independence from being a British protectorate, the succession of one king by another in Bahrain, the Iranian revolution, the Iran–Iraq war, which triggered the development of the GCC, the Gulf War, and the US-led invasion of Iraq. Bahrain attaches sufficient priority to this relationship as to provide a website with up-to-date information on the various facets of the relationship (www.Bahraingateway.org). With the US Fifth Fleet and the naval base on Bahrain charged with providing security for Bahrain’s islands and industries and the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the West, the interests of both countries are vulnerable to attack by any one of several third parties. But, together, they offer a credible threat to any such party wanting to launch such an attack. Should this remain the status quo, the remarkably close relations between the US and Bahrain could continue for some time to come.

Notes 1 An exception was the Caspian Sea where Russia had already discovered oil near to Iran in the Black and Caspian Sea areas. 2 Another chunk of the Ottoman Empire, Syria, was given to France and indeed French companies gained a 25 percent share in the Turkish Petroleum Company, which was later to become the Iraqi Petroleum Company as part of an agreement to permit the construction of a pipeline from the northern Iraqi fields through French-controlled Syria to the Mediterranean. 3 Only Qatar was comparable (indeed even smaller) in size to Bahrain. 4 It should be recalled that the US had been especially supportive of the Shah, among other reasons because the Shah was brought in to replace the previous Iranian government of Mossaddegh, who had attempted to nationalize the oil industry in Iran and thereby induced Britain and the US to impose a boycott on Iranian oil. 5 The evidence these authors provided for this was based on a panel data analysis of BITs across countries and over time showing that an earlier BIT involving a competing country was the single most significant determinant of a country’s decision to enter a BIT. 6 In 2001, Bahrain passed an anti-money-laundering law making money-laundering an extraditable offense. Further, via Ministerial Order 23 of 2002, financial institutions are required to establish the identities of their customers, representatives, and transaction beneficiaries and to require their employees to take an anti-money-laundering course each year (Testimony of Mr. Donnelly, the Assistant USTR for Europe and the Mediterranean, United States. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 109th Congress, First Session, 2005: 26–27). 7 Testimony by Mr. Robert Baugh of the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Council at the Senate hearings, and by Thea Lee of the AFL-CIO at the House hearings on the USBFTA indicated that both of these labor union officials in the US were not entirely happy with Bahrain’s 2002 Labor Law. They stated that it did not allow labor unions to organize in the public sector, that the law’s provisions on behalf of worker rights might not be enforceable, that three-quarters of union members would be needed to approve a strike instead of a simple majority, that abuse of foreign workers by employers is common and attributable to the fact that the right of a foreign worker to enter for purposes of work is retained and exclusive to that employer, that labor unions are not supposed to get involved in politics, and that only one labor union is allowed in any activity (United States. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 109th Congress, First Session, 2005; United States. US Senate, Committee on Finance, Subcommittee on International Trade, 109th Congress, First Session 2005). 8 Its secondary boycott of Israel involving the blacklisting of US companies doing business with Israel had been dropped by Bahrain in 1994. 9 However, Oman has also signed an FTA with the US.

References Abdelkarim, Abbas. 1999. “Change and Development in the Gulf: An Overview of Major Issues,” in A. Abdelkarim, ed., Change and Development in the Gulf. London: Macmillan: 3–24. Abdulla, Khalid M. 1999. “The State in Oil Rentier Economies: The Case of Bahrain,” in A. Abdelkarim, ed., Change and Development in the Gulf. London: Macmillan: 51–78.

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Burke, Edward. 2008. “Bahrain: Reaching a Threshold. Fundacion Para Las Relaciones y el Dialogo Exterior,” Working Paper No 61. Commander, US Forces Command, US Fifth Fleet. Available from www.cusnc.navy.mil/. Datta, Samar K. and Jeffrey B. Nugent. 1985. “Bahrain’s Pearling Industry: How it Was, Why it Was that Way and its Implications,” in J. B. Nugent and T. Thomas, eds, Bahrain and the Gulf: Past Perspectives and Alternative Futures. London: Croom Helm: 25–41. Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A Simmons. 2006. “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000”, International Organization, 60: 811–46. Findlay, Allan M. 1994. The Arab World. London: Routledge. Halliday, Fred. 1980. “The Gulf between Two Revolutions: 1958–79,” MERIP Reports, 85: 6–15. Heritage Foundation. 2008. Index of Economic Freedom. Available from www.heritage.org. Herzog, Serge. 1999. “Arms, Oil and Security in the Gulf: A Tenuous Balance,” in A. Abdelkarim, ed., Change and Development in the Gulf. London: Macmillan: 238–59. Hoekman, Bernard and Khalid Sekkat. 2008. “Deeper Integration of MENA Goods, Services and Labor Markets: What is the Policy Research Agenda?” Paper presented to the Workshop on Inequality and Regional Integration in the Arab World, Economic Research Forum, November 2008. Human Rights Watch. 2004. www.hrw.org, September 2004. Kjeilen, Tore. 1996. “Trucial States”, Looklex Encyclopedia (online). Lawrence, Robert Z. 2006. A U.S.–Middle East Trade Agreement: A Circle of Opportunity? Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. McKee, David L., Don E. Garner and Yosra Abu. 1994. Offshore Finance Centres, Accounting Services and the Global Economy. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. Miniesy, Rania and Jeffrey B. Nugent. 2008. “Are There Shortfalls in MENA Trade? If So, to What Can They Be Attributed?” in Anna Maria Ferragina, ed., Bridging the Gap: The Role of Trade and FDI in the Mediterranean. Naples: Sprint Campania: 197–238. Miniesy, Rania, Jeffrey B. Nugent and Tarik M. Yousef. 2003. “Intra-regional Trade Integration in the Middle East: Past Performance and Future Potential,” in Trade Policy and Economic Integration in the Middle East and North Africa: Economic Boundaries in Flux. London: Curzon-Routledge: 41–65. Nugent, Jeffrey B. and Theodore Thomas, eds. 1985. Bahrain and the Gulf: Past Perspectives and Alternative Futures. London: Croom Helm. Olson, Mancur and R. Zekhauser. 1966. “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 48: 266–79. Ottaway, Marina and Michele Dunne. 2007. “Incumbent Regimes and the King’s Dilemma in the Arab World: Promise and Threat of Managed Reform”, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: No 88. Palmer, Michael A. 1992. Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992. New York: The Free Press. Sakmar, Susan L. 2008. “Globalization and the Arab World: Will External Trade Initiatives Result in an Increase in Global and Intra-regional Trade in the MENA Region?” University of San Francisco Law Review, 42 (Spring). Salla, Michael E. 2007. “U.S. Neoconservative Agenda to Sacrifice the Fifth Fleet—the New Pearl Harbor,” The Canadian, November 8, 2007. Terasawa, Katsuaki and William R. Gates. 1992. “Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf: Lessons Learned and Implications for the Future.” Naval Post Graduate School, Department of Administrative Sciences, Defense Technical Information Center ADA255903, August 31, 1992. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2008. World Investment Report 2008. Geneva: United Nations. United Nations Development Program. 2002. Arab Human Development Report 2002. New York: United Nations ——2004. Arab Human Development Report 2004. New York: United Nations. US Senate, 106th Congress, Second Session. 2000. “Investment Treaty with Bahrain”, Message from the President, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, Treaty Document 106–25. US Senate, Committee on Finance, Subcommittee on International Trade, 109th Congress, First Session. 2005. United States–Bahrain Free Trade Agreement: Hearing. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, Senate Hearing 109–258. United States. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 109th Congress, First Session, 2005. Implementation of the United States–Bahrain Free Trade Agreement: Hearing. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, Senate Hearing 109–31. World Bank. 2008. Economic Developments and Prospects: Regional Integration for Global Competitiveness. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Trade Organization. 2008. “Impressive Growth which Continued Reform Would Sustain,” Trade Policy Review: Kingdom of Bahrain, 2007. Geneva: WTO. Zarrouk, Jamal. 2008. “Regional Integration among Arab Countries: Some Integration for Research Agenda,” Paper presented to the Workshop on Inequality and Regional Integration in the Arab World, Economic Research Forum, November 2008.

33 Kuwait–US relationship—a small state alliance with the major power From hesitant to strategic alliance Abdullah Alshayji

Introduction The ascendance of a new US administration to office in Washington in 2009 is an opportune time to take stock and assess the strategic relationship between Kuwait and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners, on one hand, and the US, on the other hand. No understanding of US relations with Kuwait is fully understood without juxtaposing it to the wider US strategy in the Gulf region and in the wider Middle East region. With the ubiquitous US presence in terms of its hard and soft power alike, and with the shifting balance of power and the increasing discussion of the US drawing down its troops in Iraq and oscillating between military action against or a grand bargain with Iran, the assessment of the strategic relationship between the two sides is urgent and timely in light of the heavy US presence—in its various hard and soft powers, “militarily, politically and economically”—in the Gulf region. As of July 2008, over 200,000 US troops remain stationed in the Gulf with close to 140,000 on active duty in Iraq. The forces serve as both a stabilizing and a destabilizing agent for the region, maintaining a certain balance of power and protecting US regional allies, but also drawing the ire and resentment of those opposed to their presence. Combined with the destructive political policies pursued under the Bush administration, US policy has in fact created more uncertainty in the region. As such, the US has become as much a part of the problem as a part of the solution. How to balance the need for a military presence with the political prerogative of regional stability is a key question that an incoming US administration will have to grapple with.1 The plight of Kuwait could be summarized in its hostile geopolitical location, as a “good piece of land in a tough neighbourhood.” To capture that phrase, David Pollock quoted a Saudi analyst summing up the Kuwait dilemma: Kuwait is a platform from which one can see the burning palm trees of Iraq, and the Iranian reactors which are about to burn, as well as the sands of the Arabian Peninsula, which is used to tranquility, swallowing up all dangers only to return to calm once more.2 Kuwait is described as a staunch US ally and strategic partner, in terms of both hard and soft security needs, products, and exchanges, which covers the gambit from armaments and military and civilian products to trade and investment, and the US is the most sought after educational destination for about 4000 Kuwaiti students studying in the US. The US is the major depository of Kuwait’s sovereign funds and public and private investments. Kuwait has been repeatedly praised by the US as a valued partner in the counterterrorism campaign, thus forging what the Kuwaitis and the Americans describe as “strategic partnership.”3 Kuwait played a pivotal role in US “Operation Iraq Freedom” in 2003 to reciprocate and return the favor to the US, which led an international coalition to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein’s occupation in 1991. Kuwait suffered the Arab world’s wrath for such a

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controversial stance against a fellow Arab country, but believed it was doing the right thing in helping to rid Iraq, its people, and the region of Saddam Hussein’s autocratic rule. Kuwait continues to be a valuable partner of the US, which elevated the relationship with Kuwait on April 1, 2004 to “Major non-NATO ally in recognition of Kuwait as a ‘steadfast friend and ally of the US’.” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the visiting Kuwaiti defense and foreign ministers that Americans are “grateful for your friendship, [and] we’re grateful for the steadfastness of the Kuwaiti people.” Rumsfeld said Kuwait has been a “strong friend” of the US, as well as “a valued and dependable ally and a courageous partner in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” “And so it is fitting that Kuwait be recognized today as a major non-NATO ally, a designation that is enjoyed by just a handful of other nations.” Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said the status “conveys not only the deepest respect but also durable responsibilities.” Kuwait’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Sheik Jabir Mubarak Al-Hamad Al Sabah said the designation “reflects the warm and close relationship between our two countries.” This alliance between us will continue and will become stronger as we proceed in our war against all forms of extremism and terrorism.4 In February 2004, the US and Kuwait signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) to facilitate economic development in the region. As former US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, who is now the president of the World Bank, stated, This agreement is part of our effort to facilitate economic development in the region. Increased trade will allow Kuwait to grow while laying the foundation for greater liberalization and diversification of its economy. Kuwait has been a strong supporter of the US in the fight against terrorism and I look forward to exploring ways to deepen our economic relationship.5 The Kuwait–US relationship is a glaring example of a conspicuous disparity in the relationship between a powerful and strong country (US) and a small and weak one (Kuwait) in international relations. What Kuwait lacks in hard power, it compensates for greatly with soft power in terms of its 10 percent oil reserves, being the seventh biggest oil exporter, and the generous foreign aid and loans provided by its financial foreign policy arm to over 100 countries over the last four decades totaling over $12 billion.6 This chapter highlights the relationship between Kuwait and the most powerful and influential nation, the US, in an asymmetric relationship, which is mutually beneficial for both sides. Moreover, this chapter traces the evolving strategic relationship and its various phases since the inception of the Kuwaiti–US relationship, which dates back to 1910, with the opening of the American Missionary Hospital in Kuwait. It was the earliest example of US– Kuwaiti co-operation. Although it failed to convert a single Kuwaiti to Christianity, nevertheless it provided needed medical care to Kuwaitis in the days before oil wealth.7 It showed US goodwill toward Kuwaitis. This chapter sheds light on the factors that underpin, influence, and determine this asymmetric relationship and highlights the developments, the transformation, and the future of this alliance. It reviews the literature of small states’ security dilemmas in international politics and discusses the options available for these states to improve their security environment, applying such analysis to Kuwait and its reliance on “imported or outsourcing security and protection” in its alliance as a small nation-state with the US and other international players. The chapter discusses Kuwait’s security dilemma as a small state in a regional system with many competing players and interests within an international system shifting gradually away from a unipolar to a bipolar or even, as some strategist put it, a “non-polar” international system. Owing to the limitations of the chapter, only major events and developments will be visited to show how the relationship evolved from the first encounter between the US and Kuwait through a missionary hospital at the turn of the twentieth century and was strengthened

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through US oil companies in the 1930s and 1940s, later developing into official consulate representation in the 1950s and ambassadorial representation in the 1960s. The chapter follows the evolving relationship from a testy, hesitant, and reluctant relationship in the early 1960s and 1970s into a strategic and valuable partnership following the reflagging operation in 1987 and for the next two decades into a solid and expanded strategic relationship. That partnership was solidified and strengthened following the US-led coalition to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation in 1991, for which Kuwaitis are indebted to the US for its major role in returning their country and restoring their leadership with much gratitude and deeply felt public and official gratitude. The liberation of Kuwait coincided with the ascendance of the US as the dominant international player and the most influential regional player. Following Kuwait’s liberation, the US became the undisputed leading world power in what Francis Fukuyama called “the end of history and the last man” and the prevailing of the West.8 Kuwait quickly reciprocated when it played a major pivotal role as the launching pad in the US “coalition of the willing” war and the US-led “Operation Iraq Freedom,” which led to the removal of Kuwait’s arch-nemesis Saddam Hussein’s regime which had threatened Kuwait for over six decades. Finally, Kuwait is a major US partner in its global war against terrorism following the terrorist attack by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001, and Kuwait has been repeatedly praised by the US as a valued partner in US’s “global war on terrorism”.9 The Kuwaiti Prime Minister, Sheikh Naser Al Sabah, when accepting the President’s Medal at George Washington University, declared: As proactive partners in the US-led campaign against global terrorism, we are providing military and diplomatic assistance as well as supporting efforts to block the financing of terrorist groups, we are active and strong allies with the US in the global war on terrorism.10 The chapter gains saliency for three reasons: There has not been any recent study in the body of the literature dealing with and discussing the strategic relationship between the two countries, especially from the Kuwaiti perspective. Second, with the departure of the Bush administration and the ascendance of a new US administration with shifting focus and changing calculus with new priorities and preoccupation on other flashpoints and regions, this chapter calls for maintaining such a strategic partnership for both countries and for the security and stability of the region. Kuwait stands to play an even more significant role considering future US plans in terms of scaling down the combat military troops in Iraq. Such a development would impact the US–Kuwaiti strategic relationship. Where does Kuwait stand in the strategic projection of US security? What are the future US plans for Iraq with the new administration and how would the new administration view Kuwait in relation to Iraq? Considering the serious talks by the US and Iraq over the proposed $9 billion deal, including helicopters, tanks, and armored vehicles, which is causing Kuwaiti concerns at the government and parliamentary levels, Kuwait defense minister, Sheikh Jaber Mubarak al-Sabah, warily declared: Kuwait has told the US it is concerned over proposed arms sales to former occupier Iraq, the Gulf state. We have informed the US of our fears over this issue and that … (Iraqi) forces should be defensive in nature … In the short term, there is no danger for Kuwait, but in the long term, there could be some fears from these arms sales.11 And lastly, the chapter raises questions related to the future of the bilateral relationship considering the shifting powers at the regional and international levels from wars, failed states, rising sectarian tensions, and emboldened regional state and non-state actors challenging the US, chipping away at its dominance, and scorning the US and its regional allies.

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At times, the relationship with the US in the region has been a liability considering the low public image the US has in the region, its uneven siding with Israel, and its failure to gain the battle for hearts and minds. What exacerbates the situation is the US insistence on grouping its allies including Kuwait into the axis of moderation facing the axis of radicalism, which groups state and non-state actors led by Iran. Kuwaitis, like others, follow with intrigue and a lot of interest the cataclysmic shift in the balance of power and the shifting world politics. Currently, contemporary world politics are experiencing a clear decline and ebbing of US dominance. What is more alarming is the US intelligence forecast, which envisions a steady decline in US dominance in the coming decades, as the world is reshaped by globalization, battered by climate change, and destabilized by the regional upheavals over shortages of food, water and energy.12 Even in the Gulf region itself, there are emerging powers attempting to jockey for influence ranging from the resurgent Russians after their invasion of Georgia to China with its energy needs and NATO through its Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The French under President Sarkozy are making a strong showing with nuclear reactors and a naval base in the United Arab Emirates.13 Fareed Zakaria argues in his most recent book The Post American World for a world in which the US will no longer dominate the global economy, orchestrate geopolitics, or overwhelm cultures. According to Zakaria, the great story of our times is not the decline of the US but rather the rise of everyone else.14 “The growth of countries like China, India, Brazil, Russia, and many others—as the great story of our time, and one that will reshape the world.” “This is manifested in booming China, assertive Russia, and the terrorism threat. He insists that if America is losing the ability to dictate to this new world, it has not lost the ability to lead.” Other analysts agree that US power is on the wane in a world turning more and more into a multipolar environment or, as others label it, a “non-polar”15 or flat16 world.

Small states’ alliances with major powers in international relations: the case of US–Kuwait relations as a model Kuwait’s fate and destiny have been determined and sealed a long time ago by four sobering facts—geography, oil, wealth, and strategic vulnerability—and its ceaseless quest for survival in the most precarious and volatile yet valuable and indispensable region in the world. Kuwait represents a classic prototype for the core principle that geography and resources shape the behavior of nation-states. Since its inception, Kuwait has lacked the means, the resources, and the capability to defend itself whether individually or collectively with other members in the GCC coalition without relying on external Western power to provide the needed protection, as was the case with Great Britain for over sixty years in the twentieth century, and the US, as the US played the major role in liberating the country and signed a ten-year security arrangement with the US, which was renewed in 2001 and runs until 2011. Kuwait’s security dilemma could be summarized by what Milton Viorst once said about Kuwait and Kuwaitis, It has been said a long time ago that Kuwait is too rich for its own good and is too vulnerable to defend itself, its people are too spoiled and too rich to care about democracy. Moreover, Kuwait is too clever and self possessed to tie its future to the policies of other nations.17 I take issue with this writer that the richness of Kuwaitis prevents them from caring about democracy. But the other points he raises are well taken and capture the security dilemma felt in Kuwait.

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The international relations literature on “small states” is: characterized by a deficit of power. Due to their limited capabilities they lack both the capacity to influence other actors and to prevent these actors from influencing them. To overcome this dilemma small states have to choose between both a defensive strategy focusing on the maintenance of autonomy and a cooperative strategy aimed at increasing influence. The former is embodied by the policy of neutrality while the latter is represented by the policy of alliance.18 In a realist approach to international politics, they provide a strategy for small states to pursue strategy based on aggregation, coalition formation, and integration. Realists characterize the contemporary international system as a field of competing units of various sizes and capabilities, struggling by means of strategies of self-advancement to achieve goals that are sometimes common, sometimes contradictory. The nation-state is the fundamental unit in the realist constellation of actors. Large and resourceful states can achieve their goals through partnership, influence, alliance, demand, and coercion. While small and less resourceful states find the strategies at their disposal more constrained. Hence small states are encouraged by realist doctrine to pursue strategies of aggregation, coalition-formation, and integration. Thus, realist prescriptions for the small state encourage strategies that run counter to the realist explanation of international dynamics.19 After the cold war era, the literature on small states in international relations focused on the fact that “traditionally, small states faced a security dilemma between favoring influence and guaranteeing sovereignty.” These security options were embodied by the strategy of alliance and the policy of neutrality. There is a school of thinking within that body of literature which argues, “in today’s unipolar world small states’ security policy must be cooperative either in the form of joining a security institution or an ad hoc coalition.”20 In the case of Kuwait, as a small state in a volatile region, it has employed both approaches. It has claimed neutrality by joining the non-aligned movement (NAM) and has refrained from interfering in other countries’ domestic politics or meddling in their internal affairs. A case in point, unlike other Iraq’s neighbors, Kuwait has a benign non-interference position when it comes to Iraq. This Kuwaiti strategy vis-à-vis Iraq of non-interference in its affairs by maintaining neutrality in dealing with various political and sectarian blocks and factions is typical of Kuwaiti foreign policy, even if such a passive stance could be detrimental to its national security because it deprives Kuwait of any leverage or influence over any group or faction in Iraq. On the other hand, Kuwait was the main architect of the GCC as a regional security organization, which comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, hoping such an alliance will stave off security threats against the member states in a collective manner. Such an assumption was disillusional and proved wanting when the GCC’s collective efforts failed to deter Saddam Hussein from occupying Kuwait and were incapable of liberating Kuwait without relying on outside power, mainly the US. Furthermore, eighteen years after Kuwait’s liberation, neither Kuwait nor its allies in the GCC have been successful in lessening their reliance on outside protection to fend for themselves in the hostile Gulf environment. With Kuwait lacking any hard power in its arsenal, it is left with what is known as soft power. Soft power is a term coined by Joseph Nye to “describe a nation’s ability to attract and persuade … It rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of its culture, political ideals, and policies.”21 Thus Kuwait can only rely on the few assets it possesses in terms of soft security, mainly an indigenous home-grown model of democracy and representative politics a long time before the US initiatives and push to

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democratize the region. In addition, it is notable for being a generous donor and provider of foreign aid and low-interest loans to help modernize and finance infrastructure projects in more 100 developing countries in the last four decades totaling over $12 billion.22 Kuwait has been a successful prototype for the last fifty years for what happens to a tiny entity that harnesses its oil wealth and survives in a hostile environment. Kuwait has implemented a reverse of the adage of “no representation without taxation” to representation without taxation, which set the trend and became a harbinger for much of the region to look upon and emulate as an indigenous model for what these countries, leaderships, and intellectuals would like to see implemented in their own societies. Kuwait was not interested to serve as a model, but found itself being a model by default for lack of any other viable model to serve as a yardstick and an acceptable model in a region where democracy and representative politics are not in vogue.23 No understanding and appreciation of Kuwait’s foreign and strategic policy and its alliance, rivalry, and maverick attitude to the US and regional players could be fully comprehended without taking into consideration the factors at play in shaping Kuwait’s threat perception and security-oriented strategy. These factors intertwine and consist of the following factors. First, Kuwait is influenced greatly by its geography. Oil-rich Kuwait is nestled in the northern Gulf, and is overshadowed, menaced, and co-opted by its larger and more powerful neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. Collectively and individually, these states exert an influence on a lot of Kuwait’s decisions, approaches, and politics. Second, there are geopolitical regional challenges in the Gulf region with all the competing players from the region and foreign imperial powers old and new. Third, its wealth as a major oil and energy supplier with the third largest known oil reserves in the world, estimated at 10 percent of the world’s known oil reserves, and huge sovereign funds assets. Lastly, Kuwait’s acute sense of vulnerability as an entity first, and then as a vulnerable state with little hard power to defend its very existence in a turbulent region. These multiple challenges highlight Kuwait’s acute sense of vulnerability and its ceaseless quest for survival in a hostile environment.24 These insurmountable challenges forced Kuwait to rely for over a century on major foreign non-regional powers not only for protection, but even for its very survival in a tough neighborhood inhabited by predatory and irredentist regimes with covetous designs and ambitions, on one hand, and major international powers driven by their interests and strategic goals, on the other hand. Thus, this explains the significance and the relevance of the strategic partnership between Kuwait and the US in assisting Kuwait; therefore, Kuwait does not resort to pre-emptive surrender.

The evolving US–Kuwaiti relationship The US–Kuwaiti relationship evolved from the establishment of the American Missionary Hospital at the beginning of the twentieth century into oil and limited commercial ties involving US oil companies in the 1930s, diplomatic consulate-level representation in the 1950s and full ambassadorial diplomatic relations in the early 1960s. After years of negotiations, the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Ahmad Al-jaber, was able to strike a deal with Anglo-Iranian and Gulf Oil to form the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC). He was the main architect who signed the first oil concession in 1934 with the vast benefits it brought to Kuwait.25 Shafeeq Ghabra alluded to an important component in Kuwait foreign policy thinking. He quoted Abdurrahman Al-atiqi, Kuwait’s former minister of oil and finance from 1967 to 1975: Although Kuwait was in need, it had intentionally postponed finalizing an oil agreement with the British companies. While the British reached agreements with Bahrain, Iraq, and Iran, Kuwait waited. Ahmad was able to use to his advantage the British desire to limit US involvement in the region.

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This example provides insight into the way Kuwait’s foreign policy thinking and behavioral philosophy developed. No appreciation of Kuwait’s strategic policy formulation and implementation can be made in isolation of the fundamental realities which underpin Kuwait’s foreign policy thinking. That philosophy rests on Kuwait’s eternal obsession with its national security through its deep feeling of a “siege mentality,” validated by Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait and its lack of balance of power and deterrent capabilities. These brute strategic realities forced Kuwait to ally itself with Great Britain in the nineteenth century to fend off the Great Powers of the time, the Ottomans and the Persians. This same reality is alive today in staving off chaotic Iraq, emboldened Iran, and menacing al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Kuwait therefore finds itself in an endless search for security and protection in a hostile and volatile environment in one of the most strategic regions of the world. The US led an international coalition unmatched since the Second World War to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein’s occupation in 1991. That move and its aftermath, along with the concomitant developments of maintaining tough sanctions against Iraq, Kuwait’s role in US military “Operation Iraq Freedom,” its existence as a continued major logistical gateway for the US military presence in Iraq, and Kuwait’s leading role in the counterterrorism fight in what the Bush administration called “the global war on terrorism” left an indelible mark in cementing and transferring the Kuwaiti–US alliance from a fragile and reluctant one26 into a strategic or even indispensable alliance, and propelled Kuwait even to the status of “Major non-NATO ally” and keystone player for US policy in the wider Gulf region.27 With these enormous challenges at stake, even six years after the eradication of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein’s regime, the major security challenge for Kuwait’s existence is still dominated by continued ceaseless quest for survival mentality. Such bitter geostrategic realities continue to influence and shape Kuwait’s strategic options and force Kuwait to adjust its policy to allay its fears and strengthen its alliance with its protector, in this case the US, which has influenced and continues to color much of its behavior at all levels, whether its security, pioneering foreign aid provision to Arab and other less fortunate countries, or its strategic alliance in forming the GCC with the other Gulf states and its neutral non-interference foreign policy approach. More importantly, Kuwait’s sense of vulnerability and lack of deterrence capability continue to preoccupy Kuwait, particularly after the trauma of Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Such bitter facts and incapability to defend itself propelled Kuwait to outsource its security by striking security agreements and security arrangements with the major powers of their era, whether the protection was provided by Great Britain for over sixty years during the twentieth century or by the US over the last two decades. In between, Kuwait relied on an unreliable Arab security umbrella, led by countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia following Abdulkarim Qassim of Iraq’s threats to annex Kuwait in 1961 just a few days after Kuwait’s full independence from Great Britain.28 That umbrella failed the real test in deterring Saddam Hussein or forcing him to reverse his aggression against Kuwait. Kuwait tried to mask that sense of vulnerability by challenging and charting independent foreign and security approaches in the 1970s and 1980s by its hawkish and maverick stances in refusing to provide bases in the Gulf region for the US and the Soviet Union, thus exploiting the cold war rivalry to Kuwait’s advantage: by giving the Russians the first diplomatic mission on Gulf soil; by leading the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) countries to boycott the US and the West for their support for Israel’s wars against fellow Arabs in 1967 and 1973. But the most glaring Kuwaiti challenge to the US was when Kuwait bluntly and unabashedly snubbed the Reagan administration in August 1983 by refusing the appointment of US Ambassador Brandon Grove as the prospective US ambassador to Kuwait. The reason the Kuwaitis gave was that Ambassador Grove served earlier as the Consul General in Jerusalem, which Israel had annexed, and the Reagan administration supported the Israeli move, which infuriated Kuwait who played the leading Arab role in opposing the Reagan administration’s support for

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the illegal Israel annexation of Jerusalem. The US was taken aback by the Kuwaiti defiance, which received supportive coverage in the Arab world. The US feared that the consequences of the Kuwaiti challenge would set a precedent for other Arab countries to follow Kuwait’s move in exercising “assertive influence over the US.”29 Kuwait’s threat perception and potential threat flashpoints became more threatening in post-Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The threat shifted from invasion, intimidation, and co-optation to sectarian and civil war, terrorism, and the spillover of sectarian Sunni–Shi’ite rivalry and tension.30 Kuwait is forced to deal with a host of international and regional challenges emanating from the chaotic situation in Iraq: emboldened Iran and its grandiose regional design and its nuclear program, which threatens to become the anchor and the dominant regional power and the menacing terrorism threat. Kuwait employs soft power tools to lessen its security dilemma, as explained in the previous section. It relies on shrewd diplomacy, exercising neutrality and non-interference in other countries internal affairs, so they do not meddle in Kuwait’s internal affairs. In addition, Kuwait smartly used its oil-generated wealth through generous donations and checkbook diplomacy and diversifying its options and alliances. Such policies sought to balance the forces in order to maintain freedom of movement. In this context, Kuwait’s insistence on giving the oil concession to the US rather than the UK oil company played a similar function,31 which was repeated later in Kuwait’s balancing act in the cold war era in diversifying its relationship and armaments purchases from both West and East alike. As stated earlier, the US–Kuwaiti relationship started as a public and missionary relationship at the beginning of the twentieth century. The official relationship was inaugurated in 1954, when the US opened its consulate under British tutelage; it was elevated to embassy status after Kuwait’s independence in 1961. The relationship between the two countries was cordial, but with little strategic significance for the US, as Kuwait, the size of the US state of New Jersey with a population of less than 200,000, where foreigners outnumbered Kuwaitis according to the 1965 census, and with oil as Kuwait’s main export, meant little to the US. It did not garner much attention. The Arabian Gulf countries started to factor in the US strategic role in the region after the 1973 Arab oil boycott of the US, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and the establishment of US Rapid Deployment Forces in 1980, as a substitute for the US twin pillar strategy in the Gulf, with the Nixon administration threatening to occupy the Gulf strips stretching from Abu Dhabi to Kuwait. According to top-secret documents declassified by the UK government in 2004: The US government drew up plans for military seizure of oilfields in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states in 1973. … The US government might consider that it could not tolerate a situation in which the US and its allies were in effect at the mercy of a small group of unreasonable countries. The report warned that Washington’s preparations for an intervention aimed at seizing Persian Gulf oil “has been reflected, we believe, in their contingency planning.” “We believe the American preference would be a rapid operation conducted by them to seize oilfields,” the document stated. It predicted that the US military would need just three brigades—up to 15,000 troops—to occupy oil-producing regions in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi.32 The US–Kuwaiti relationship took a major leap at the strategic level in 1987 following the escalation of the Iran–Iraq war. The Kuwaiti government requested the Reagan administration to reflag Kuwait’s oil tankers, which had been attacked since the mid-1980s by Iran in retaliation against Kuwait’s siding with Iraq. This Kuwaiti move ushered in not only a major strategic shift in the US–Kuwaiti relationship, but an irreversible US permanent presence in the Gulf region to safeguard its national interests, protect its allies and oil sources and transportation routes. The physical US military presence in the Gulf replaced the defunct twin pillar strategy and propelled the US to become the “guardian of the Gulf.”33

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US–Kuwaiti relations were cemented and evolved into a strategic partnership as a result of the strategic developments and US-led actions in the 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century. The US led a military coalition to liberate Kuwait in 1990–91—Operation Desert Storm—and signed a series of bilateral military and security arrangements with the GCC states, followed by major sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s and dual and differentiated containment by the Clinton administration. The US military reached its pinnacle and culminated in “Operation Iraq Freedom” and the war that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, initiated by the George W. Bush administration, which led to the occupation of Iraq and changed the balance of power in the Gulf region with around 200,000 US troops stationed from Muscat in Oman to Mosel in northern Iraq with over 10 percent of these troops stationed in Kuwait, the country that played host to more US troops than any other country in the Gulf region with the exception of Iraq. Kuwait has been the focal point and played a major role in implementing and executing these plans, wars, and strategies. The US ascendance in the Gulf region came on the heels of the British withdrawal. During the cold war era, Kuwait supported the Palestinian struggle for a just and final settlement and a homeland for the Palestinian people, and found itself at odds with the US. This has become one of the contentious issues with the US. Little vulnerable Kuwait was able through a shrewd and calculated approach to exploit the cold war environment to its advantage. Kuwait maintained cordial relations with the US, and at the same time friendly relations with the Soviet Union to stave off the Russians’ wrath, as they vetoed Kuwait’s admission to the UN for two years in 1961 and 1962. Not until the toppling of the Iraqi regime of Abdulkarim Qassim in 1963, who threatened to annex Kuwait in 1961 a few days after the granting of Kuwait’s full sovereignty and independence, and after Iraq recognized Kuwait, did the Russians relent and lift their veto, and Kuwait was admitted to the UN. Kuwait became the first Arab Gulf country to host a Soviet diplomatic mission in the Arab Gulf states.34 Thus, Kuwait’s national security concerns are the paramount determining factors in its relationship with regional and international powers alike. There is no doubt that national security is every country’s major concern. However, for Kuwait, national security concern is an obsession. Saddam Hussein’s occupation of Kuwait and the failure of Kuwait to defend or deter that aggression heightened that reality and influenced the Kuwaiti way of thinking in its relationship with the outside world, especially with the US, which led an international coalition to liberate Kuwait in 1991 and ushered in a new era of strategic relationships between the US and its junior partner, based on reciprocal and mutual benefit, as this chapter will highlight with some contentious issues at the bilateral level that do not dent the strategic relationship. Kuwait is a cash customer; therefore, it is not eligible to receive excess defense articles and receives no US assistance.35 Since the liberation of Kuwait, the US has provided military and defense technical assistance to Kuwait. In 2008, there were over 100 open foreign military sales (FMS) contracts between the US and Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense totaling $8.1 billion. Principal US military systems purchased by Kuwait are: 218 M1A2 tanks valued at $1.9 billion, five Patriot anti-missile fire units including twenty-five launchers and 210 Patriot missiles, valued at about $800 million, forty FA-18 Hornet combat aircraft, sixteen A-64 (Apaches) helicopters equipped with Longbow fire-control system, and major recapitalization of Kuwait’s Navy with US boats.36

The strategic importance of Kuwait for the US To underscore the significance of Kuwait, the State Department in 2004 and 2007, as quoted in David Pollock’s excellent exposé on Kuwait: Keystone of US Gulf Policy, stated Kuwait rushed to construct a new permanent military base … turning it over to us three years ahead of schedule. Kuwait turned over significant portions of its territory to

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Coalition forces. In 2007, Kuwait provides indispensable support in terms of access to its facilities, resources. And land to support military operations in Iraq. Its major ports and airfields are in constant use by US forces and contractors.37 President Bush repeated the US appreciation and gratitude to Kuwait’s prime minster at the White House, “for being such a good security partner in the region. I can remember fondly coming to Kuwait and going to our base there, and how appreciative our commanders and our folks based there were for the hospitality of your country.”38 Although Kuwait played a leading role in “Operation Iraq Freedom” (OIF), which overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003 closing off almost 60% of its territory in order to secure the US led invasion which consisted of about 250,000 personnel and several thousand pieces of armor and related equipments … Kuwait provided $266 million in burden-sharing support to OIF … In post Saddam Iraq, about 90,000 US military personnel are in Kuwait at any given time, mostly preparing to rotate into Iraq. However, only about 20,000 are based in Kuwait more permanently.39 In January 2008, the US and Kuwait signed a missile deal worth $328 million. The missiles the Kuwaiti government will purchase are directed by lasers and used by land forces.40 In the summer of 2007, the US announced a major multi-year US arms sale package valued at $20 billion to the GCC states, including Kuwait. Details of the proposed weapons sales did not have a break down of country by country totals. But it is a safe bet that Kuwait’s share will be several billion dollars. It is interesting to point out what Secretary of State Rice proclaimed in announcing the deal: “intended to help bolster the forces of moderation and support a broader strategy to counter the negative influences of Al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran.”41 Because of burgeoning oil prices, Persian Gulf sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have become the preferred investment vehicles of Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. As SWFs blur the line between public and private investment, however, Western nations worry about the security implications of foreign countries, including Persian Gulf states, acquiring important positions in key industries and companies. The Kuwait Investment Authority oversees two state funds—the General Reserves, established in 1960, and the Future Generations Fund, created in 1976—which are jointly worth $213 billion. All told, the combined funds of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar account for more than half the $2.5 trillion total assets of global SWFs.42 The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), the financial arm of the state of Kuwait, has a huge investment portfolio that is heavily invested in the US, including 6 percent ownership of Citigroup, and has contributed $6 billion as a cash infusion in its bailout. KIA also owns 4.8 percent of Merrill Lynch.43 Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed, in his visit to New York and Washington in the summer of 2008 and following the US financial meltdown, expressed his trust in the Kuwaiti investments in the US and the American economy’s ability to recover from the latest crisis to hit the financial markets there. Responding to a question during an interview with CNN regarding the fate of $5 billion which Kuwait recently invested in Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, after the latter was bought out last week by Bank of America, the Prime Minister said, “I cannot give a definite answer now, and we are awaiting experts’ reports in this regard.”44

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Table 33.1 Oil production

All countries (1,000,000 barrels per day) Kuwait (1,000 barrels per day)

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

11,530 228

12,264 220

13,145 250

13,714 243

13,707 185

13,468 181

Table 33.2 US trade with Kuwait: 2008 Month

Exports

Imports

Balance

January 2008 February 2008 March 2008 April 2008 May 2008 June 2008 July 2008 Total

233.9 169.5 214.4 191.9 204.1 220.3 252.2 1,486.3

707.2 619.5 540.1 675.3 786.1 535.0 622.9 4,486.1

–473.3 –450.0 –325.6 –483.4 –581.9 –314.8 –370.7 –2,999.8

Source: www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5130.html. Note: All figures are in millions of US dollars.

Given the bleak economic circumstances in the US in the last few months of the Bush administration, there are concerns in Kuwait and in other GCC states over energy security, the role of the US dollar in Gulf financial markets, the overall position of the oil-producing states as a rising force in global financial affairs, their crucial importance in financing the US current account deficit, and the consequences that continued growth in the region will have in the social and political development of Gulf societies.45 Furthermore, Kuwait is an oil powerhouse in terms of oil reserves and oil exports (Table 33.1). Table 33.2 shows the trade balance between Kuwait and the US, which is clearly in Kuwait’s favor due to US imports of Kuwaiti oil, which has shown a steady decline from 228,000 barrels per day in 2002 to 181,000 barrels per day in 2007.46 The US is currently Kuwait’s largest supplier of goods and services, and Kuwait is the fifth largest market in the Middle East. The total trade value between the two countries in the first seven months of 2008 is close to $6 billion. The trade balance is in favor of Kuwait.

The contentious issues between Kuwait and the US Although Kuwait plays a major role as a component of US strategy in the Gulf region, the relationship is not without some contentious issues and disagreements that surface now and then. But none of these contentious issues at the strategic level affects the long-standing commitments between the two countries. There are “more area of agreement than disagreement between the US and Kuwait on important matters in the foreseeable future.”47 There is a policy divergence over regional issues between the US and Kuwait. Kuwait and the other GCC states believe the US should be more sensitive to their concerns and consult and listen to their pleas whether over military withdrawal from Iraq or striking a blow against or a deal with Iran. There is a sinking feeling in Kuwait and the other GCC states that, whether the US strikes Iran or strikes a deal with it, it will be at their expense and a rebuff to their good behavior and staunch alliance with the US. W. Andrew Terrill put it best when he

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declared that, “The US Government must avoid making statements that appear to take Kuwaitis for granted or deal with Kuwait as an unequal ally. The US politicians that speak of redeploying from Iraq to Kuwait might do well to note that such a move would only be done after careful exchange of views with Kuwaiti permission.”48 The complete US backing of Israel has historically been a contentious issue not only in US– Kuwait relations but, according to many opinion polls, is the main reason why the US has such low popularity ratings in the Arab and Muslim worlds and is not winning in its public diplomacy over the battle for minds and hearts in the region. Kuwaitis have traditionally squared off with the US over the Palestinian issue, and even snubbed the US and refused the appointment in the 1980s of a US ambassadors who had served in Jerusalem. Kuwaitis have long considered themselves among the standard-bearers for the Palestinian cause. In the 1950s, Kuwait was the home in exile to Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, and to hundreds of thousands of other Palestinians, who helped build the country. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kuwait was a leading supporter of Arab nationalism and of Palestinian claims to a homeland.49 Kuwait still has no diplomatic relationship with Israel and officially is in a state of war with the Jewish state. Its former and current leadership are on record that there will not be any normalization with Israel until it withdraws from all Arab occupied territories and reaches a final settlement with the Palestinians with a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. But Kuwait, after the US-led liberation, followed a more pragmatic policy. In 1993, Kuwait publicly announced abandonment of the secondary and tertiary aspects of the Arab boycott of Israel (those aspects affecting US firms).50 The contentious issues, as stated earlier, range from the US policy towards holding Kuwaitis and other GCC nationals without trial for years in Guantanamo Bay prison, to US policy visà-vis Iraq, Iran, the “global war on terrorism,” and the Middle East peace process. The contentious issues between Kuwait and its allies in the GCC states and the US become personal over the annual reports issued by the US State Department over human rights and the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report. The dispute between the two sides reached boiling point in 2008. This author addressed the issue in a column in Gulf News, a leading English Gulf newspaper, titled “When US offends its allies.” I advanced the argument that we can sense growing suspicion in the asymmetric relationship between the US and the six GCC states owing to divergent US views and positions on GCC issues, which the member states—collectively and individually—deem as either unfriendly or interfering in their domestic affairs. The GCC states are frustrated at Washington’s lack of gratitude and appreciation for their invaluable contribution to stability and security in the region and for pursuing the path of moderation in the Middle East. As part of the axis of moderation, the GCC plays a major role in Iraq, ensures energy security, and generates sovereign wealth. But it was all ignored by the US Congress when the US House of Representatives approved legislation that would allow the US to sue OPEC under its anti-trust laws. With the unprecedented increase in oil prices, now hovering around over $100 per barrel, only the GCC states can calm the world’s fears of rising oil prices. Saudi Arabia took the initiative and increased its daily oil output by 200,000 barrels and also held a conference to address the significant relationship between the oil-producing and oil-consuming countries. Furthermore, the GCC is a regional powerhouse with a projected accumulative gross domestic product (GDP) for 2008 expected to exceed $1 trillion, up from $800 billion last year. The major clout the GCC has is its dominant status as a soft power in terms of oil and gas output. In addition, their collective sovereign wealth makes the GCC states a global world player, compensating for their lack of size and lack of hard power. As The Economist put it, The Gulf added $215 billion to its stock of foreign assets in 2007, the IIF calculates. This hoard is divided between the region’s central banks, its sovereign-wealth funds and its wealthy sovereigns. It added up to $1.8 trillion by the end of last year, by the IIF’s

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The US State Department’s eighth annual TIP report, or modern-day slavery, published in June 2008, was deemed offensive by the GCC states. The US insists that the report is dedicated to ending human trafficking, a deeply dehumanizing form of exploitation. In virtually every country around the world, including the United States, men, women and children are held in domestic servitude, exploited for commercial sex, coerced into work in factories and sweatshops. In some, children are forcibly recruited as soldiers. Mark Lagon, the US State Department’s senior adviser on human trafficking, elaborated: “For the last four years, the weak performance of several nations in the Gulf has been the matter of great concern and disappointment.” But he added that he was “happy to report that the UAE and Bahrain continued to make significant improvements, notably the UAE. It is a model in the region.” The report kept the other four GCC states on the blacklist with threat of sanctions against Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia because their governments have taken serious steps to deal with “trafficking in people.” The GCC countries dismissed the report as “unjustified,” and their foreign ministers chastised the US in an unprecedented public display of anger. The statement by the foreign ministers said that they “deeply regret the wrong information on the GCC states contained in a US State Department report for 2008 on human trafficking.” [This information] aims to practice unjustified pressure for political ends, and asked the US to “revise its unfriendly policy towards GCC countries.”51 The divide between the US and Kuwait and the other GCC states widened further when the US Treasury Department froze the assets of a Kuwait-based charity organization, Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS). It is one of the most respected charity organizations in Kuwait, and managed by the Salafi group. The Salafis, along with their allies, won ten seats or 20 percent of the seats in the Kuwaiti parliament in the 2008 parliamentary elections. In the new cabinet, there is also a senior member of the Salafis. Without providing any material evidence to support its claim, the US has accused the charity organization of supporting and funding al-Qaeda. In his report, the US Treasury Department’s Stuart Levy, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, has accused “RIHS of using charity and humanitarian assistance as covers to fund terrorist activity and harm innocent civilians, often in poor and impoverished regions.” Furthermore, the report accuses the senior leadership of RIHS of being “aware of both legitimate and illegitimate uses of RIHS funds.” RIHS offices have also been closed or raided by the governments of Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Russia over suspicion that the charity is allegedly linked with the funding of terrorism. The decision by the US Treasury Department has raised many eyebrows in Kuwait and has led to official and public outcry. In a show of solidarity and support, the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, met the leaders of RIHS and praised their charitable works in all parts of the Muslim world. The Kuwaiti cabinet called the US allegations baseless, and the parliament and its Speaker accused the US of interfering in Kuwait’s sovereignty. They also reminded the US that it was living in a glasshouse and should not throw stones at others. In reference to the dismal human rights record of the US, they stated that Washington has no moral authority to lecture other nations because it does not practice what it preaches.

Conclusion The strategic partnership between the US, the dominant power, and Kuwait along with its GCC partners should be based on mutual trust and respect, and nurtured by mutual

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appreciation and gratitude as both sides need each other. Even though such an unhealthy environment will not affect the strategic relationship between them, it will exacerbate unneeded tension and foster an unhealthy environment that will not benefit either side.52 The results of a Pew Opinion Poll, conducted in December 2007,53 were revealing. While many in the region believe the US poses a danger to their country. 54 percent of Kuwaitis consider the US their strongest ally, which is one of the highest marks for the US in Arab countries. But the same Pew Opinion Poll shows that 26 percent of Kuwaitis identify the US as the biggest threat to their country behind Iraq and Iran; and 63 percent worried that the US could become a military threat. In a stark convergence of Kuwaiti public views on US policy, 23 percent of Kuwaitis hold the US responsible for the lack of a Palestinian state, 86 percent believe that US policy favors Israel, while only 5 percent believe it favors the Palestinians. On the other hand, 49 percent of Kuwaitis hold favorable views of Hezbollah and 41 percent of Hamas, which the US labels as terrorist organizations, while 13 percent hold favorable views of Bin Laden, the arch-nemesis of the US. Such results speak volumes for how Kuwaitis, after all these years of indebtedness to the US for saving their country, continue to harbor mixed feelings toward the US, their strategic ally and principal protector, which has recently come under more scrutiny and criticism from some Kuwaiti members of parliament, academics, and columnists over its policy vis-à-vis various Arab and Islamic issues. On the one hand, the Pew Opinion Poll demonstrates Kuwaitis’ adherence to their pan-Arabist and Islamist aspirations and beliefs. Although Kuwaitis keep showing their gratitude, yet at the same time, as W. Andrew Terrill argues, because gratitude is a highly perishable asset in most cases: “The US can not expect endless gratitude for the 1991 liberation to the basis of policy towards Kuwait.”54 In the final analysis, as David Pollock postulated, the main issue should be, not what Kuwait can do for Iraq, or against Iran, but how to keep Kuwait from being somehow engulfed in the turmoil and violence of its much larger northern neighbor—or the regional ambitions of its even larger Iranian neighbor just across the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf. As long as it is protected, Kuwait is an irreplaceable land bridge to Iraq and a key contributor both to global energy supplies and to the international “recycling petrodollars.”55 Well put, only if heeded by all parties concerned and especially by the new US administration.

Notes 1 Gulf Research Center, The Gulf Forum 2009 Conference Outline “US–Gulf Relations Under a New Presidency,” Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, January 6–7, 2008. 2 David Pollock, quoting Misharia Daydi, “Kuwait: Key Stone of US Gulf Policy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus no 76, November 2007: 1. 3 President Bush and the Kuwaiti prime minister exchanged these terms at the White House, “President Bush Meets with Kuwaiti PM at White House,” Kuwait News Agency, September 19, 2008. 4 “Kuwait Designated Major non-NATO Ally by the US. Rumsfeld, Armitage Praise Kuwait’s Role in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” April 2, 2004. Available from www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/April/20040402123208ESnam fuaK0.2382929.html. 5 www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2004/February/United_States_Kuwait_Sign_Trade_Investment_ Framework_Agreement.html. 6 Sheikh Naser Alahmad Al Sabah, Kuwait Prime Minister, speech at the 63rd UN session, New York, September 25, 2008. 7 http://kuwait.usembassy.gov/pr_05222007.html. 8 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 9 Kenneth Katzman, “Kuwait Post-Saddam Issues and US Policy,” CRS Report to Congress, RS 21513, May 18, 2005. The State Department report on global terrorism for 2004 again praised Kuwait’s co-operation against alQaeda militants seeking to attack US forces in Kuwait. The report praised Kuwait’s co-operation with US efforts against terrorism financing. 10 Matthew Rist, Hatchet Reporter Issue, September 22, 2008.

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11 A.F.P., September 22, 2008. 12 July 2008. “ National Intelligence Council, ‘Review of the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 Report” and “Reduced Dominance Is Predicted for US,” Washington Post, September 10, 2008: A02. 13 “France Announces Base in the Persian Gulf: Deal with UAE seen as a Warning to Iran,” Washington Post, January 16, 2008: A11. Available from www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-cooperation.htm. See NATO, Istanbul Initiative. 14 Fareed Zakaria, The Post American World (London: Allen Lane Publishing, 2008). 15 Richard Hass, “What will follow US Dominance: The Age of Nonpolarity”, Foreign Affairs, May–June 2008. 16 Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century (Farrar, Strauss, and Grioux, 2005). 17 Milton Viorst, A Reporter at Large, “Out Of The Desert,” The New Yorker, May 16, 1988: 43 18 Jean-Marc Rickli, “Small States in International Relations,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of ISA’s 49th Annual Convention, “Bridging Multiple Divides,” San Francisco, CA, USA, March 26, 2008. 19 Gregory Gleason, Asel Kerimbekovab and Svetlana Kozhirova, “Realism and the Small States: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan,” International Politics, 2008: 40–51. 20 Jean-Marc Rickli, “European Small States Military Policies after the cold war: from Territorial to Niche Strategy,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21(3), September 2008. 21 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Public Affairs, New York, 2004. 22 Sheikh Naser Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, Kuwait Prime Minister, Speech at the UN General Assembly, New York, September 25, 2008. 23 Abdullah Alshayji, “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: A Small Nation-State Ceaseless Quest for Survival,” The Center of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, Special Publication, Vol. 1 “The International Conference on the Effects of the Iraqi Aggression on the State of Kuwait”, Vol. 1, 1994. 24 Ibid. 25 Shafeeq Ghabra, “Kuwait and the United States: The Reluctant Ally and the US Policy Toward The Gulf,” in David Lesch, ed., The Middle East and the United States: A Historical Reassessment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999). 26 Shafeeq Ghabra, ibid.: 280. 27 David Pollock, “Kuwait: Key Stone of US Gulf Policy”, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus#76, November 2007. 28 Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City State in World Politics. Westview Special Studies on the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990). 29 Chookiat Panaspornprasit, US–Kuwait Relations1961–92: An Uneasy Relationship (Routledge, 2005). 30 Abdullah Alshayji, “Nazrah Istashrafiya Lila’aqat Alkowitiya Aliraqiah,” (in Arabic) [“A Futuristic Look towards Kuwaiti–Iraqi Relationship”] Journal of Gulf and Peninsula Studies, 129, April 2008. 31 David Pollock, “Kuwait: Key Stone of US Gulf Policy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus no 76, November 2007: 280. 32 World Socialist website, “Washington Weighed Seizure of Arab Oil Fields in 1973,” January 6, 2004. Available from www.wsws.org/articles/2004/jan2004/1973-j06.shtml. 33 Michael Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf (Free Press, 1992). 34 Abdullah Alshayji, “Democratization in Kuwait: The National Assembly as a Strategy for Political Survival,” unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1988. 35 Katzman, op. cit.: CRS-3. 36 Ibid.: CRS-3; and Kuwait–United States Relations, Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, February, 2008. 37 Pollock, op. cit.: 2. 38 “President Bush meets with Kuwaiti PM at White House”, KUNA, September 19, 2008. 39 Kenneth Katzman, “Kuwait: Post-Saddam Issues and US Policy,” CRS Report For Congress, May 18, 2005. 40 “US–Kuwait Missile Deal,” Kuwait Times, January 6, 2008. 41 Pollock, op. cit.: 1. 42 Nimrod Raphaeli and Bianca Gersten, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Investment Vehicles for the Persian Gulf Countries,” Middle East Quarterly, XV(2), Spring 2008: 45–53. 43 http://swfinstitute.org/fund/kuwait.php. 44 “Kuwait Investments,” Kuwait Times, September 24, 2008. 45 Gulf Research Center, The Gulf Forum 2009 Conference Outline “US–Gulf Relations Under a New Presidency,” Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, January 6–7, 2008. 46 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_a.htm. 47 W. Andrew Terrill, op. cit.: 82. 48 Ibid.: 81. 49 “Kuwaitis Quietly Breach a Taboo—Easing hostility with Israel”, New York Times, October 5, 2008. 50 Kuwait–United States Relations, Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, February, 2008. 51 “GCC Condemns US Report on Trafficking,” Gulf News, June 10, 2008. 52 Abdullah Alshayji, “When US Offends its Allies,” Gulf News, June 23, 2008. 53 Pew Global Attitude Project, November 27, 2007; “Friday-Lunch-Club Kuwait: Bush Rude Awakening,” January 11, 2008. 54 W. Andrew Terrill, op. cit.: 82. 55 David Pollock, “Kuwait: Key Stone of US Gulf Policy,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus no. 76, November 2007: 280.

Iraq, Iran, Yemen

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34 Opting for the lesser evil US foreign policy toward Iraq, 1958–2008 Abbas Kadhim

Introduction For the past fifty years, US policy in Iraq has been crafted according to the same precepts that guided the larger policy toward the Middle East. There are three main concerns: combating the spread of communism, securing the flow of petroleum to the world market, and protecting the security of Israel. These concerns have produced a policy that focused on the support and protection of traditional allies in the region and the containment of unco-operative regimes and movements. While the last two concerns seem to endure the test of time, the fear of communism has been succeeded by a larger phobia: the rise of religious consciousness among the overwhelmingly Muslim population. Whether it is a middle-of-the-road Islamic consciousness or an extremist religiosity with terrorist manifestations, the result is hardly different as far as the US economic and political interests are concerned. Both modes of Muslim resurgence represent direct threats to the US-backed oppressive regimes in the region as well as to the current nature of Israel, as a Jewish state with a superior military capacity in the region. For a long time, the mutually exclusive goals of securing the flow of Arab oil and, concurrently, supporting Israel were made possible by assuring the stability of the undemocratic Arab regimes in the oil states and presenting coercive or non-coercive incentives to those who stood to disturb the regional peace and stability. The plan worked very well, because all Arab regimes, notwithstanding their colors and stripes, were concerned with nothing more than their survival. The rise of religious awareness presented a formidable challenge to US foreign policy, because its makers are yet to figure out the successful set of coercive and non-coercive incentives for hostile non-state actors. Thus far, the only option on the table is an amorphous “global war on terror,” with terror being broadly defined to encompass anything between outright al-Qaeda terrorist acts and a rally by wretched Shia protestors in Sadr City demanding better services from the US-backed second most corrupt government in the world. However, US foreign policy has allowed some terrorists to be more equal than others. The anti-Iranian group, Mujahedin-e Khalq, for instance, enjoys US protection in Iraq, in spite of being designated as a terrorist group by the US State Department and having worked with, and been sponsored by, the former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. Similarly, terrorisminciting Wahhabi religious leaders, who work for the Saudi government and form a major pillar of its structure, have never made the list of possible targets in the global war on terror. These and similar features of US foreign policy have brought into question the credibility of the very principles the US proclaims to stand for, in a region where the US has already been suffering a credibility crisis for decades. This chapter will present a historical analysis of US foreign policy toward Iraq in the second half of the twentieth century to the present time. Unlike all other Arab regimes in the Middle East, Iraq represented both a major oil-producing country and an unco-operative regime, from a US foreign policy perspective. Therefore, the policy toward Iraq has been more complex than toward any other Arab country in the Middle East.

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US–Iraqi relations before 1958 In 1955, Iraq and Turkey inaugurated a process to develop mutual military co-operation that was known later as the Baghdad Pact. This bilateral alliance was crafted with the flexibility to admit a number of other countries. Regionally, Pakistan and Iran were lined up to join the Pact, in addition to the UK, which was the overlord of the region up to that time. The US was initially invited to participate at the level of observer. The US was represented by its Ambassador to Iraq, Waldemar Gallman, Admiral John H. Cassady, and Brig. Gen. Forrest Caraway. At the inaugural meeting held in Baghdad on November 21, 1955, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said gave a lengthy speech emphasizing the need to strengthen the pact by involving the US at a level larger than a mere observer. To arouse the interest of the US delegation, the threat of communism was well articulated not just by Nuri al-Said, but also by the rest of the speakers who took turns to state their respective visions for the Pact’s future. In the words of a US delegate: At the second session, heads of the various delegations spoke in turn. Each mentioned points which especially interested his own country … All their speeches at some point emphasized the Communist threat and the resultant need to strengthen the Pact as quickly as possible. Mention of this turned all eyes to the little group of American observers.1 On the same day, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was briefing the National Security Council (NSC) at Camp David on a host of foreign policy issues, including the concurrent proceedings of the Baghdad Pact meetings. Secretary Dulles indicated to the NSC that it was his idea to form an alliance creating the “Northern Tier” of Middle Eastern countries, a concept the British were originally unconvinced about. However, realizing the opportunity to “regain the lost British position with the Arab States,” the British developed the tendency “to run away with it.”2 Dulles was very worried, however, about the ramifications of the British zeal to regain the lost position: “While this was understandable, it was simply impossible to ignore the position of the Israeli Government. If we did so the Israelis might move in such a way as to bring down the whole house,” he told the assembled NSC.3 He had already concluded a “serious talk” with the Israeli foreign minister, who was visiting Washington to present the US “with a large request for arms.”4 The Iraqis were having a delicate balance to make between their new privileges and obligations under the Pact and, on the other hand, their old commitment toward their Arab counterparts as a founding member of the Arab League. In his aforementioned speech, Nuri al-Said had suggested that one way to strengthen the Pact—beside the inclusion of the US— was to admit “at least one more Arab State,”5 in order to dispel the impression that Iraq had chosen a different destiny from its fellow Arab states. This was finally addressed in the meeting’s final communiqué, which declared that Iraq’s “responsibilities under [the Pact] did not conflict with her defense obligations as a member of the Arab League, nor with her obligation to co-operate economically with other members of the League.”6 But this gesture could hardly assure the objecting Arab countries, who had already begun their campaign to undercut the Pact. The Soviets, who were the main target of the Pact, began to establish lines of communication with the Middle Eastern states that were still unsure about the consequences of the Pact. In a frustrated letter from British Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan to his American counterpart, dated November 25, 1955, Macmillan cites “large subsidies which the Saudi Arabians [were] making to every form of subversive and antiWestern activity throughout the area.”7 Macmillan cites Lebanese President Camille Chamoun as saying that the Saudis were distributing these millions of dollars, in collaboration with “communist agents,” in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt.8 Aside from Iraq, this Saudi

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plot, which greatly antagonized the British, was not contrary to what the US had in mind anyway. On December 22, 1955, President Eisenhower told the NSC that “unlike the British, we had always gone on the theory of not getting any country having common frontiers with Israel into the Baghdad Pact.”9 The US ultimately realized that it could not join the Baghdad Pact, in spite of the advantages and the UK pressures to do so.10 At the heart of the US reluctance was the dilemma articulated by Secretary of State Dulles: “We had thought it would be politically impossible for the United States to join until we were able to offer a comparable security arrangement to Israel. Without this, the United States could not get public support for undertaking the Baghdad treaty.”11 By the beginning of 1957, the US had another regional “friend” to appease by not joining the Pact, Saudi Arabia. In February of that year, Iraq’s Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah visited the US and conducted many talks with the President and the Secretary of State regarding economic and military aid, as well as the US raising its level of commitment to the Pact. He was told by President Eisenhower and, in a separate meeting, Secretary Dulles told the accompanying delegation that the US had joined the Pact’s Economic and Counter Subversion Committees and that would be the farthest the US could go at that point. They were also told that, pending Congress favorably acting on a proposal sent to it by the President, the US officials “hope to be able to go much further in our participation in the Pact’s Military Committee, as well as in all activities of the Pact directed against communism.” The secretary then ended by saying, “We do not wish to become involved in anything that might hurt our friendly relations with Saudi Arabia.”12 The last meeting of the Pact members was held in Ankara (Turkey) in January 1958, and the US was represented by Secretary of State Dulles, but this high-profile representation and the continued pleas from the Pact members for the US to join the Pact, especially those made by the head of the Iraqi delegation, Nuri al-Said, were not heeded.13 But this conference was overshadowed by a momentous event that made the US, as well as the Pact members, make a serious review of their policies. The major regional development was the announcement of the United Arab Republic, a union between Egypt and Syria under the leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser, whose popularity among the Arab masses was unparalleled at the time. Although the union was not officially announced until February 1, 1958, news of it arrived in Ankara the afternoon of the last session on January 29.14 Secretary Dulles urged Nuri al-Said, who expressed the most concern about this development, to co-ordinate with other Arab countries to endure the pressure from their population, whose sentiments were on the side of the United Arab Republic and against the Baghdad Pact and any pro-Western alliances. He offered to contact the Saudis on his behalf, and indeed a letter was later sent by President Eisenhower to King Saud on February 1, 1958.15 Iraq immediately put the plan into action and announced the formation of a federation with Jordan, the other Hashemite monarchy, on February 12, calling the new entity the Arab Union. To cover the expenses for the period from July 1, 1958 to May 31 of the next year, Nuri al-Said requested $37 million from the US and the UK. He also requested that the Arab Union be allowed to include Kuwait, which was a British protectorate at the time. In a highlevel meeting on the issue, held in June 1958 and attended by President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan, the two countries seemed to be in agreement on the fate of Kuwait, but clearly at odds on the fate of Nuri al-Said. The British were still interested in continuing the support for Nuri, who was a solid British ally and the most pro-West among the Iraqi political elite, albeit stopping short of awarding him the oil-rich protectorate of Kuwait. Contrarily, the Americans were growing impatient with his tactics. Secretary Dulles told the British guests that “Nuri’s personality has become a liability in recent times and that he put the most extravagant demands on us when he was here with the threat of resigning, which may be a kind of blackmail.”16

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Thirty-three days later, Nuri’s body was tied to a truck that was dragging it through the streets of Baghdad. Brig. Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim led a successful coup against the monarchy and Nuri’s government. Iraq was declared a republic on July 14, 1958 and, later on that day, “the Baghdad Pact headquarters were sealed and occupied by Qasim’s troops.”17 US foreign policy toward the Iraqi monarchy in the final lustrum of its reign was characterized by a series of missed opportunities and indecisive positions. The US continued to operate under the assumption that Iraq was a sphere of British influence. Therefore, if it were not for the rise in communist activities, the US would probably not have paid any serious attention to that country for many years to come. In spite of continued appeals from the Iraqis, the US refrained from crafting a comprehensive Iraq policy. By 1957, US investment in Iraq was a humble sum of $48 million in the oil industry and about $12 million of assets owned by various American contractors.18 The Eisenhower administration persistently resisted Iraqi appeals to join the Baghdad Pact, mainly in deference to Israel and Saudi Arabia. The administration was also indecisive concerning the continued Iraqi requests to provide serious military aid. The US mission to administer the military aid was a small group of fifteen officers and non-commissioned personnel, who were hamstrung by bureaucratic constraints, inadequacy of funds, and lack of co-ordination. Nuri al-Said pleaded for some reinforcement for the Iraqi Air Force and was fed with promises until the assurance came to him, in May 1958, that six F86-F jets were on the way. But the jets were delivered virtually on the eve of the coup and were put to use by the Qasim government.19

US–Iraqi relations: 1958–63 The Briefing Notes taken by Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, on July 14, 1958 set the tone of the US attitude toward the change in Iraq: The pro-West government of Iraq under Prime Minister Nuri was overthrown at daybreak today, Baghdad time, by a military coup supported by pro-Nasir civilian elements. It is reported, but not confirmed, that Prime Minister Nuri and the Crown Prince have been murdered. One Baghdad radio report states that the Crown Prince was torn limb from limb and carried through the streets. The King’s Palace is reported by an American observer to be under fire. The fate of King Faisal is unknown, but there is a report that he has been permitted to flee the country.20 These notes, of course, reflect the initial hearsay dispatches from the US Embassy in Baghdad, which was surrounded by tanks. On the morning of July 14, Baghdad was overrun by Abd al-Salam Arif, Qasim’s deputy, who ordered the occupation of the broadcasting station, the Royal Palace, and the house of Prime Minister Nuri al-Said. At 8:00 a.m. both the King and the Crown Prince, along with the rest of the royal family, were rounded up and shot dead in the courtyard of the Palace.21 However, Nuri managed to escape and take refuge in a friend’s house, the Istrabadi family. He was identified the next day while trying to escape, perhaps on his way to the US Embassy, disguised as a woman. He was shot dead, along with the wife of his host, who tried to provide cover for his escape.22 What is quite interesting is that the US Embassy had no idea of what was happening until Baghdad Radio announced the coup. Here is how the US Ambassador remembered that morning: Shortly after five o’clock on the morning of 14 July, I heard gunfire. I went out into the garden where I could get a view of the streets. Traffic was normal and early risers who were passing by were untroubled. The scene in the neighborhood of the Embassy was so reassuring that I concluded that the firing was part of the ceremonial send-off for the

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King and his party.23 I had just returned indoors, when a member of my staff appeared to announce that troops were firing on the Palace and Nuri’s home and that mobs were gathering in the vicinity … I was fortunate to have been alerted in the early hours of the coup.24 However, in fairness to the US Embassy, its British counterpart was also caught in total surprise, although it was more active in providing updates to the Foreign Office and other concerned British missions, in spite of its peril, having been sacked and looted in the early morning of the coup. These initial dispatches, including an 8:00 p.m. report issued by the British Embassy in Ankara, were also full of erroneous and contradictory information.25 Contrary to the fate of the British Embassy, which was completely destroyed by an Iraqi crowd, and its personnel, who were rounded up and taken to a hotel in Baghdad, the US Embassy was guarded by tanks and the Ambassador informed Washington, before noon on July 14, that, “Although two Americans, according to present reports, were killed in fracas, there is no sign of any strong anti-American feeling as yet.”26 The two Americans in question were contractors, one of whom was the President of the Overseas Division of Bechtel, George Colley Jr., of San Francisco. Another American was also reported dead according to a later telegram.27 The US Ambassador met Qasim on the afternoon of the day following the coup and was given all the necessary assurances for the safety of American lives in Iraq and a guarantee of safe evacuation if needed. He reported that Qasim, who was “quite fluent in English,” spoke with him “without benefit of interpreter” and assured him that, “We Iraqis … want to be friends with the US.”28 Contrarily, the British ambassador, who met Qasim later on the same afternoon, was not as satisfied. Apparently, he was still acting as if no major changes had taken place in Iraq. In his reports to the Foreign Office, he continued to refer to Qasim and his foreign minister as the “rebel Prime Minister” and “rebel Minister of Foreign Affairs.” He “protested vigorously against action taken against staff of Embassy and destruction of Embassy building, and said Her Majesty’s Government held Iraqi authorities responsible for death and damage.”29 The Iraqis gave him half-hearted assurances and requested him not to use code or cipher when communicating with his government.30 In addition to the humiliation of the British diplomats and the sacking of their embassy building, which would have been enough to poison the meeting with Qasim anyway, it seems that the British ambassador was dealing with the military coup leaders as if there was a pending British intervention on the way, as had happened in 1941 when the British reoccupied Iraq and restored the monarchy following a similar military coup. At the same time, the Iraqis were trying to politely assure him that the world had changed in their favor. The only threats to intervene came from the region. The Turks were ready to send forces, having been partners in a mutual defense treaty with the Iraqi monarchy, but were denied a green light by the Americans. Of course, the Americans did not tell the Turks that the reason for their policy of taking no action in Iraq was driven by “fear of Russian intervention,” as indicated in a dispatch from the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office dated July 19, 1958.31 However, Turkey continued to prepare for a possible invasion of Iraq for quite a while. In a telegram from the British High Commission in Karachi dated August 5, 1958, the Turks were reported as having “put forward the suggestion that Turkey should invade Iraq with four divisions which could be made available at short notice.”32 The other call for war on the new Iraqi government came from King Hussein of Jordan. He too was disappointed by the response from his British patrons. Following the reports of the imminent death of the royal family in Iraq, King Hussein saw a great prospect of taking over Iraq under the guise of the constitutional arrangement of the federation of the Arab Union. By 5:00 p.m. on the day the coup took place, King Hussein declared himself the head of the Arab Union and, having received word that the Iraqi Army and Air Force were not involved in the

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coup, he began to exploit this “encouraging, or at any rate a hopeful, sign … In the exercise of his sovereignty he call[ed] upon them and upon the troops under their command to express their loyalty to him by taking orders from him and no one else. They should immediately establish contact with him through the R.A.F. [in] Habbaniya and the British Embassy in Amman.”33 Lacking the means to contact the Iraqi forces in Habbaniya, King Hussein asked the British Embassy in Amman to use their Air Force Group Commander in Habbaniya to deliver the message. Citing his reluctance to acting as a facilitator, the British Ambassador in Amman argued that this was the only way to deliver the message, which could keep the Iraqi Army and Air Force in Habbaniya “steady and available for intervention against the rebels.”34 King Hussein kept urging the British to provide “assistance in re-conquest of Iraq,” as indicated in telegrams from the British Embassy in Amman on July 19, 21, and 22. The Foreign Office finally instructed the British ambassador of the following: … it is important that we should be on the record as having rejected this request. You should therefore reply to Jordanian note. Your reply need not be in the form of an official Note but can be delivered orally in the same way as the American reply.35 He was also told that the British forces stationed in Jordan were for the purpose of deterring threats from the United Arab Republic against Jordan and not to initiate a war on his behalf. Further, he was assured that “Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to extend military, economic and political assistance for the purpose” of reconquest of Iraq.36 The US and the UK gradually began to reconcile their differences with Qasim as his new government began to consolidate its power and gain popular support. However, Qasim began to face the challenge of fragmentation within his own government over future relations between Iraq and the United Arab Republic. Gamal Abd al-Nasser was increasingly gaining popularity among the Arab masses and, for him, oil-rich Iraq was the best guarantee for securing a better union than he already presided over. Revenues from Iraq’s oil could be diverted to finance much needed social and economic programs in Syria and Egypt, whose resources could barely sustain the population. He began to court some opportunistic figures in Iraq who purported themselves to be Arab nationalists full of aspirations for the unity of the Arab land from the Gulf to the Ocean. Among such figures, Abd al-Salam Arif stood out in both his opportunism and his conspiratorial spirit. He gave Nasser every assurance that, once he took over in Iraq, he would begin the process of joining the United Arab Republic.37 He was sent to Bonn to be ambassador to West Germany, as a way of eliminating his threat without having to kill him. Soon after receiving his post, Arif defiantly returned to Iraq at the same time as rumors about a plot to overthrow Qasim were spread in Baghdad. Arif was arrested, tried, and sentenced to death, but Qasim commuted the sentence to life in prison— perhaps Qasim’s worst mistake, which sealed the latter’s fate.38 Qasim’s conflict with the Arab nationalists left him in desperate need of finding a solid ally who could keep them in check. He was left with one of two choices, the Shia and the communists. There were two main problems with the first choice: most importantly, the Shia were politically inefficient in spite of their numerical superiority in Iraq. They had been marginalized and excluded from any considerable political participation, which allowed them the one and only role of the opposition and no proven skills of governance. Taking a chance on them sounded too risky an act in the midst of turmoil. The second problem was inherent in the structure of the Shia community itself, which is tightly connected to its religious leadership— a small number of Ayatollahs who, given the chance, would form a state within the state and command more loyalty than the political leadership of the country. Furthermore, the leading Ayatollah of the time, Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim, was a reactionary figure whose vision for Iraq was diametrically opposed to the direction of the newly established republic. He was in full symbiosis with the tribal elements, large landlords, and other “fat cats” from the previous era,

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who were made targets for the new economic reforms. He was also vehemently against many social reforms, especially the Personal Status Law, which elevated the status of women to somewhat too high a level than the Ayatollah would permit. Furthermore, the Shia religious establishment in Najaf was not interested in real political participation and lacked the requisite aptitude to even press the appropriate demands on the Sunni government in Qasim’s time and after he was toppled. For instance, on March 19, 1964, Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim was visited by the Iraqi prime minister and a delegation consisting of the Ministers of Transportation, Health, Agriculture, Labor, Industry, Housing, and Public Works and many other officials to take note of his demands for the Shia constituency who lived in sub-human conditions. The Ayatollah counterintuitively asked for no roads, hospitals, employment, housing projects, or agrarian services. His demands were the reversal of the Personal Status Law, a ban on alcohol, as well as some general admonitions concerning sectarianism and the need for equality of the sects and ethnicities.39 Contrarily, the communists, who were more organized and highly educated in politics and social mobilization, quickly identified the opportunity and seized it immediately. Following a crackdown on the Arab nationalists, driving their ministers to resign in February 1959, their positions were “quickly filled by leftists supported by Qasim.”40 Also, the communists actively came to support Qasim in the media and on the streets. During the Mosul Revolt against Qasim, which began on March 8, 1959, the communists, who were flooding the town with approximately 250,000 members, were the decisive force to re-establish the pro-Qasim order against the Arab nationalists.41 The new alliance between Qasim and the communists alarmed the US and triggered a continuous debate over the best policy choices toward Iraq. The frustration of the Eisenhower administration can be seen in almost all of the communications among its members. In an assessment produced by Gordon Gray, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, on April 1, 1959, he wrote: Mr. Allen Dulles has briefed the Council almost every week with respect to the deteriorating situation in Iraq. Recent reports from the Ambassador and other sources paint a picture of rather complete gloom in that the trend seems to be towards a Communist government without any arresting factors in sight. … I feel constrained to point out that our primary objective in the Near East is the denial of the area to Soviet domination. Nevertheless, we sit and watch unfolding events which seem to point inevitably to Soviet domination of Iraq, acknowledging, I am afraid, an inability to do anything about it. It is almost like watching a movie whose end we will not like but which we are committed to see.42 On the next day, President Eisenhower told the rest of the NSC members that it was time to immediately begin “to undertake to save Iraq.”43 The choice was, of course, to explore better relations with the lesser of two evils, Nasser. However, the US was unsure of Nasser’s success and, at the same time, unwilling to take the risk of having Iraq drawing closer to the Soviets in case of his failure. The operating theory in 1959 was that the situation was not as dire as to require tough measures. According to a State Department policy recommendation issued in on April 15, the US “should maintain a correct but friendly attitude toward Qasim and the Iraqi government, refraining from publicly condemning Iraq and from adopting an attitude of public hostility,” because there was still hope for Qasim, or some other anti-communist force in Iraq, to curtail the rise of communist influence in the country.44 This prophecy began to show promise as soon as the beginning of June, when the US Embassy in Baghdad reported “that the drift towards Communism in Iraq has been slowed down at least temporarily,” and it was recommended that the policy from that point of time forward should focus on promoting the reconciliation between Qasim and the anti-communist camp in Iraq and between him and Nasser as well—the latter had already decided to cease his

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personal attacks on Qasim and focus his propaganda on anti-communism. Also, another dimension of US policy should be focused on assuring Qasim of US and UK intentions toward his regime and Iraq.45 By the end of June 1959, the intelligence community had concluded that the “recent [Special National Intelligence Estimates] have been too gloomy. There are signs of growing resolve on Qasim’s part to move with increasing determination against the Iraqi Communists,” and that “Communist control of Iraq is somewhat less likely that” than was predicted in the previous Estimates.46 By August 9, 1958, the embassy in Baghdad was reporting that the Iraqi Communist Party “has gone too far and has alarmed and angered Qasim,” who began taking some measures that included the dismissal of some “pro-Communist army officers” and the reinstating of some Arab Nationalist officers.47 However, these welcome developments were short-lived. On October 7, a group of Ba’athists intercepted Qasim’s car in al-Rashid Street and stormed it with bullets, injuring Qasim and killing his driver. Qasim rightfully blamed the attempt on the Arab Nationalist forces. The attempt was masterminded by Fuad al-Rikabi, the Iraqi Ba’ath Party’s Secretary General through whom went all Ba’athist contacts with Nasser, and was carried out using Egyptian weapons and financed by Egyptian money.48 US fears of a failed attempt to topple Qasim came true as the assassination attempt managed to throw Qasim “more heavily into the arms of the Communists for support.”49 However, the US policy of not showing any public hostility to Qasim’s regime had paid off, for he had not included the US as a co-conspirator in the failed attempt on his life. US–Iraqi relations continued their slow progress through the first half of 1961 in accordance with an unenthusiastic foreign policy of “wait-and-see” that was content with Qasim’s characterization of the US approval ratings in Iraq by stating that the US was “no longer hated” by the Iraqis.50 On June 25, 1961, Qasim renewed Iraq’s claim to sovereignty over Kuwait, six days after the termination of the Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty of 1899, which was to facilitate Kuwait’s independence. US–Iraqi relations for the balance of the year were mainly concerned with this unfolding crisis. US policy toward the dispute was neutral. Two days after Qasim advanced the Iraqi claim, the Department of State advised the US consulate in Kuwait that “Qasim’s claim to Kuwait is basically inter-Arab controversy and there is clearly some value keeping it [in] that context.”51 The US did not want to risk alienating Iraq, which would cause Qasim to move closer to the Soviets and end the trend of improving US–Iraqi relations. Furthermore, the British were already on the case. By the end of 1961, Iraq was deemed “to be returning to something like the post-revolution period in 1958 and 1959, during which there was great alarm that Iraq was going communist.”52 This deterioration in US–Iraqi relations came in the wake of US support for the independence of Kuwait and the British military presence in the area, which aimed at preventing Qasim from annexing Kuwait militarily. Ultimately, Iraq reduced US–Iraqi diplomatic representation to a chargé level. US Ambassador John Jernegan was told to pack up and leave as soon as it was convenient. His role as ambassador, however, was terminated as of June 2, 1962.53 This move came in retaliation for accepting Kuwaiti diplomatic representation, after Iraq had threatened to cut its relations with any country that established diplomatic relations with Kuwait. The long list included Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the UK, and the US, among others. No US ambassador was received until the end of Qasim’s era. From that point in time, US policy focused on keeping as good relations as possible with Qasim but being prepared to give early recognition to any “non-Communist successor regime,” that would overthrow him.54 On February 8, 1963, a coalition of Ba’athist and Arab nationalist officers and civilians overthrew Qasim and he was executed on the following day.55 The Kennedy administration carefully welcomed the event and prepared to recognize the new regime as soon as its success was assured. On the first day of the coup and before knowing the identity of those involved in it—other than their Ba’athist and Arab nationalist affiliation— Robert Komer, a senior staff member at the NSC, urged President Kennedy to recognize the new regime as soon as it becomes “sure these guys are firmly in the saddle.”56

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US–Iraqi relations: 1963–68 US–Iraqi relations under the Arif brothers’ regime—Abd al-Salam Arif (February 8, 1963 to April 13, 1966) and Abd al-Rahman Arif (April 16, 1966 to July 17, 1968)—were mainly concerned with two interconnected issues: the Kurdish problem in northern Iraq and the deteriorating Iraqi–Iranian relations. In principle, the US considered the Kurdish problem an internal Iraqi affair in which the US would not assume any direct or indirect role, as declared in CA-9411 of March 1963.57 Therefore, the US henceforth resisted the relentless appeals from Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani. One such desperate attempt was made on April 12, 1965, when Mulla Mustafa sent his own son, Masoud Barzani, to the US embassy in Iran accompanied by a certain Shamsuddin Mofti. The two emissaries were instructed to urge the US to regard their area as “another state of the union.” He expressed the preference to have the oil resources in the area “handled by an American firm in direct arrangement with the Iraqi Kurds.”58 In exchange, Barzani was requesting financial and military assistance, “especially heavy weapons,” from the US. “We of course gave him no encouragement whatsoever,” the embassy assured Washington. The US had three reasons for not granting Barzani the assistance he was desperately seeking. First, US–Iraqi relations were improving at an excellent rate. There was no intention to risk a reversal in this favorable trend, which would give an advantage to the Soviets and Nasser to acquire the upper hand in their relations with Iraq, especially considering the latter’s unique influence on President Arif. On August 6, 1963, the State Department suggested that President Kennedy should not respond to a letter addressed to him by Barzani. Instead, the US consul in Tabriz (Iran) would be instructed to “respond orally to Barzani’s intermediary,” reiterating the US position “that the United States sympathizes with legitimate Kurdish aspirations within the sovereign state of Iraq, but that our sympathy will not be permitted to prejudice the cordial relations now existing between the United States and Iraq.”59 Second, and equally important, the US was not convinced that a new regime in Iraq would be sympathetic toward the Kurdish demands. Last, but not least, the US thought that “a high degree of autonomy or independence for the Iraqi Kurds would be disruptive of area stability and inimical to our interests in the long run.”60 On 13 April 1966, President Abd al-Salam Arif was killed in a helicopter crash near Basra. He was succeeded by his brother, Abd al-Rahman Arif, three days later following a staged referendum. Abd al-Rahman Arif was considered by the US embassy and the Johnson administration to be “well disposed toward the US,” but only so in private. Because of the tense political atmosphere in Iraq and the Arab world at large, wrote US ambassador to Iraq, Robert Strong, “we cannot expect him to take cordial public posture and there inevitably will be events which will embarrass our relations somewhat.”61 This moment came on June 6, 1967, when the US embassy was informed by the Iraqi Foreign Ministry that “Iraq has broken diplomatic relations with [the] United States and Great Britain for … air and other aid to Israel.”62 The problem, as Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi put it to the US ambassador Robert Strong, was that “the Arabs had been misled as to what they could expect from the United States, or they had misled themselves.”63 US–Iraqi relations were not re-established for the balance of the Arif reign. Among the obstacles to the resuming of relations were the demands that Iraq compensates the US for the damages caused to the embassy in Baghdad and the consulate in Basra, the lifting of the ban on US overflights, and the ending of the Iraqi boycott of US goods and services.64 These issues were not resolved by the time Arif’s government was toppled by a Ba’ath Party coup on July 17, 1968.

US–Iraqi relations under the Ba’ath regime: 1968–2003 At daybreak on July 17 1968, Iraq was again under the shadow of a coup d’état. The Ba’athists, who lost power to the Arif brothers on November 18, 1963, scored a decisive victory over

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President Abd al-Rahman Arif, with the help of Arif’s close confidants. Four of these men played a major role: Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif, the chief of military intelligence; Abd al-Rahman alDauod, the commander of the Republican Guard; Sa’dun Ghaidan, commander of the tank regiment attached to the Republican Guard; and Hammad Shehab, the commander of Baghdad Garrison.65 Although non-Ba’athist, and therefore far from being trusted by the coup makers, these men were absolutely necessary for the success of the plot. The last three were contacted and persuaded to take part in the coup in exchange for prominent positions in the new regime, when the coup succeeded, while Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif was not approached; he was greatly feared, because of his belonging to the same tribe—the Jumailis—as the President as well as his in-law relation to Said Slaibi, who was another Jumaili and the right hand of President Arif. Having been informed by his close associate, Abd al-Rahman al-Dauod, alNayif initiated the contact with the Ba’athists and offered them his help. Learning that their plot was exposed to the chief of military intelligence, they had to either take his word and go forward with the plot or abort the coup and face the certainty of being rounded up and executed. They chose to take the risk and take him at his word and, to induce his loyalty, they promised him the position of prime minister once the coup succeeded.66 He kept his word and got the promised job, but only for two weeks. The July 17 coup was complemented by an immediate internal coup. The Ba’athists held a meeting three days after their rise to power and plotted to eliminate the aforementioned partners, whose services were no longer needed. The Ba’athists plotted to separate Abd al-Razzaq alNayif and Abd al-Rahman al-Dauod to make their elimination easy. The latter was sent to visit Iraqi troops in Jordan. He was arrested on the way and was exiled to Spain, while the former was arrested in the President’s office by Saddam Hussein and Salah Umar al-Ali.67 He was exiled to London shortly thereafter. On July 30, 1968, the Ba’athists were the only authority in Iraq. Having no representation in Iraq, the US was resigned to the “wait-and-see” approach. One thing was clear, however, “The intelligence community’s initial reading [was] that the new group – apparently Baathists – will be more difficult than their predecessors.”68 Meanwhile, the “most important question” for the Johnson administration was “whether they will continue Iraq’s support for King Hussein.” The 25,000 Iraqi troops, it was believed, “could easily make life difficult for the King.”69 On July 22, while the Ba’athists were plotting to consolidate their power and eliminate their non-Ba’athist partners in the government, a US National Security Council memorandum was describing the new government in Iraq as consisting of Ba’athists “from the right wing of the party – the opponents of those in control in Syria – and non-Baathists are playing a major role in the new government.”70 The memorandum highlighted the reason for the coup as being the failure of the Arif government to handle Iraq’s domestic problems. Especially noted in the memorandum were the new Iraqi leaders’ promises to enact economic reforms, eliminate corruption, and solve the Kurdish problem, as well as “the usual statements about Zionism, Imperialism and Arab unity.” It was estimated, however, that “there have been no indications that Iraq’s foreign policy will become more radical.”71 Six months later, these themes were reiterated by the new Iraqi government in a more dramatic fashion. On June 5, 1969, Iraqi Minister of Information, Salah Umar al-Ali, read the following statement in a public broadcast: Today’s Iraq will not forgive any traitor, spy or a collaborator with the Fifth Column. Hear me, illegitimate Israel, Imperialist Americans and Zionists! We shall expose your dirty tricks, we shall punish your collaborators and we shall execute your spies, even if there are thousands of them.72 Fourteen Iraqis, including nine Jews, were publicly put to death by hanging at the Liberation Square in Baghdad. In response to this act, the US embassy in Tel Aviv advised the State

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Department that the news of the public hanging “has hit Israel hard” and that the government of Israel was considering some form of retaliation. The embassy urged the State Department to “take the lead in public statement condemning the executions and calling on Iraq to desist from any further trials and executions.”73 The nationalizing of Iraq’s oil created another roadblock for the prospects of improved relations with the West. Iraq nationalized the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) on June 1, 1972—a move that caused the world oil cartel to boycott the nationalized Iraqi oil. As an alternative, Iraq solicited the help of the Soviet Union, which supported the nationalization as an anti-Western policy that it hoped would be emulated by other countries. The Iraqi government already anticipated the confrontation with the West. One day after the announcement of the nationalization, a delegation arrived in Moscow to co-ordinate alternative marketing plans for the nationalized Iraqi oil. The Soviets began transporting Iraqi oil from the Syrian port of Banias to be sold in new markets, the Eastern European countries.74 Iraqi oil sales were also helped greatly by the turn of events a few months later with the breaking out of the 1973 Arab–Israeli war and the one-time decision by the Arab oil-producing countries to refuse exporting oil to countries that supported Israel. Owing to the high demand, which was caused by the oil crisis, Iraq received offers from Hungary, Spain, Greece, Japan, Romania, Italy, Ceylon, Brazil, West Germany, and India.75 Iraq began to use its improved relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc to strengthen its economic and military capabilities and compensate for the disadvantages of strained relations with the West. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government managed to court some Western countries whose economic interests overshadowed their ideological considerations, especially France and West Germany—both countries provided Iraq with a great deal of scientific and technological assistance. Other non-Western countries, mainly Japan and China, also had their share in Iraqi economic co-operation.76 Regionally, Iraq found itself in a better position to solve some enduring problems. The 1975 agreement with Iran was concluded in Algeria between the Shah and Saddam Hussein, who were attending a summit meeting of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Although it was a humiliating concession by Iraq, this agreement successfully ended the Kurdish rebellion, supported by Iran, and deferred the Iraqi conflict with Iran, over border issues, for a few years. Having secured its economic and political positions, both regionally and internationally, the Iraqi regime became the spearhead of the anti-American campaign in the Middle East. This position was particularly manifest following the visit of the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, to Israel and the signing of the Camp David Accord between the two states with the sponsorship of the US. It was Iraq that convened the Arab leaders in the 1978 summit in Baghdad and facilitated a unified position against Egypt, which was subsequently expelled from the Arab summits and had the headquarters of the Arab League moved from Cairo to Tunisia. With Egypt in total isolation, Iraq assumed a leading role in Arab politics—all at the expense of any prospects of normal relations with the US. In 1979, Iraq entered a new era in its history, the ascendance of Saddam Hussein to the presidency. One of the by-products of the 1978 anti-Egyptian conference in Baghdad was the reconciliation between Iraq and Syria. The two countries were governed by two factions of the same party, the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party, whose main stated goal is Arab unity. The two countries formed joint committees to pave the road for some form of gradual unity, and the citizens of both countries began to cross the border without a passport. Having focused all his efforts on securing the presidency, Saddam saw his hopes evaporating before his own eyes. There was no chance for him to be the president of the new union and, to make things even worse, his ally, Iraqi President Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, was very ill. This would leave the Syrian President, Hafiz Asad, in charge. In the week of July 17, 1979, Iraq’s national day, Saddam pre-empted the conclusion of the project and staged a palace coup against al-Bakr, forcing

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him to announce his resignation for health reasons. A few days later, a “conspiracy” against Saddam was announced and, once again, Saddam hit two birds with one stone: he eliminated his main rivals in the Ba’ath Party and the government and halted the unification project after blaming the Syrian regime for fostering the foiled coup. Earlier in the same year, a dramatic political change took place in Iran, when Ayatollah Khomeini managed to overthrow the Shah, ending fifty-three years of rule by the pro-Western two-man dynasty. In the last two decades of his political life, the Shah was ruling Iran as a tyrant. His overthrow ushered in a new era of Iranian national politics, mainly characterized by the confrontation with the US. The new position assumed by Iran, as America’s sworn enemy, gave exceptional importance to the regime of Saddam Hussein, who also happened to be at the top of the list of Iran’s targets. While the US did not have an active role in the initiation of the ensuing Iraq–Iran war (1980–88), the US took a steadfast approach in ensuring Saddam’s survival in a prolonged war of attrition with an adversary several times larger in territorial, demographic, and financial resources.77 From 1982, US policy shifted towards supporting Iraq, mainly by regional proxies, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries, who were also interested in Iraq’s survival as their only chance to stop the slogans of “exporting the Islamic revolution.” Towards the end of the war, in 1988, and shortly thereafter, the Reagan administration’s commitment to shielding Saddam Hussein was above any other consideration, even after it was proven that the Iraqi regime had in fact committed acts of genocide against its own people throughout 1988. “The United States Senate swiftly and unanimously passed the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988 calling for tough sanctions against Iraq … The Reagan administration, however, strongly opposed the Senate bill.”78 Once again, the Kurds were abandoned for the higher goal of the need to have “solid businesslike relations” with the Iraqi regime.79 In the period between the Iraq–Iran war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the administration of President George H. W. Bush was moving in the same direction of achieving normal relations with Iraq, citing minimum conditions, such as the abstention from “any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons,” improvement in human rights issues, and abstention from meddling in the affairs of countries such as Lebanon.80 “Normal relations between the United States and Iraq,” argued the administration, “would serve our long-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East.” The goal was to increase US influence in Iraq and encourage the Iraqi regime to “moderate its behavior” through the offering of “economic and political incentives.”81 This opening towards Iraq was part of the overall US strategy in the Gulf, whose twin objectives were, as the opening paragraph of the National Security Directive 26 states, “Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area.”82 This policy was reversed in August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. In response, President George H. W. Bush signed National Security Directive 45 (NSD 45), whose opening paragraph is virtually identical to that of NSD 26. “Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area,” which formed the basis for a friendlier policy towards Iraq in 1989, are now the basis for expelling Iraq from Kuwait by any necessary means—diplomatic, economic, and military.83 However, the stated goals in NSD 45 placed more emphasis on deterring Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia and enforcing UN-imposed sanctions. There was no explicit mention of military action against Iraq to restore the toppled Kuwaiti regime. This latter goal was to be achieved, according to NSD 45, by keeping diplomatic and economic pressure on Iraq. When US troops were fully assembled in Iraq, President George H. W. Bush signed NSD 54 on January 15, 1991. Again, Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the region were cited as the paramount concerns for the action the US was about to take. NSD 54 was, in essence, a war declaration. President Bush authorized military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait, citing a number of UN resolutions and the authorization by US Congress granted to

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the President in the H. J. Resolution 77 of 1991. While the scope of the military operations did not extend beyond the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait’s territory, NSD 54 explicitly stated the following: Should Iraq resort to using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, be found supporting terrorist acts against US or coalition partners anywhere in the world, or destroy Kuwait’s oil fields, it shall become an explicit objective of the United States to replace the current leadership in Iraq.84 Iraq did indeed destroy Kuwait’s oil fields by setting them ablaze, but the President did not act on the relevant part of NSD 54. To explain this mystery, it is helpful to read the account of events according to a key figure in the George H. W. Bush administration, James A. Baker, who held the office of Secretary of State at the time. Writing in 1995, Secretary Baker made an arguably false claim and a true confession. He stated that, “while it would have been welcome, Saddam’s departure was never a stated objective of our policy.”85 As stated above, NSD 54, of which a copy was addressed to Secretary Baker, clearly stated that Saddam’s torching of Kuwait’s oil fields shall make his departure “an explicit objective of the United States.” Also, on February 15, 1991, while the air assault on Iraq was continuing for four weeks, President Bush addressed the American Association for the Advancement of Science and stated that, “there’s another way for the bloodshed to stop. And that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands – to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.”86 Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi military men and civilians took this statement as a stated policy to support the removal of Saddam Hussein and did exactly what President Bush urged them to do; they launched an uprising in fourteen major provinces in the north and south, counting on US support, which never materialized. The rationale for President Bush’s change of heart was revealed in the following statement in Secretary Baker’s book: … as much as Saddam’s neighbors wanted to see him gone, they feared that Iraq might fragment in unpredictable ways that would play into the hands of the mullahs in Iran, who could export their brand of Islamic fundamentalism with the help of Iraq’s Shiites and quickly transform themselves into the dominant regional power.87 For obvious reasons, it did not occur to the Iraqis that President Bush’s exhortation for “the Iraqi military and Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands” meant his desire for an Iraqi general, supported by the Iraqi people, to replace Saddam Hussein’s regime by another military regime, rather than a true popular uprising that would put the Shi’ites, by virtue of their numerical superiority, in charge of Iraqi politics. The Iraqi Shi’ites, who were falsely seen as an Iranian proxy, had to be prevented from acquiring power in Iraq, even if the price was allowing Saddam to massacre tens of thousands of their men, women, and children after General Schwarzkopf allowed the Iraqi military to use armed helicopters that ended up being used to commit the massacre. It is in that spirit that Secretary Baker writes, “I do not recall any debate among the President and his senior advisors on this issue, either before or after Schwarzkopf’s decision.”88 What ensued was an era of economic sanctions that lasted for twelve years to merely contain Saddam Hussein’s regime and sustain a prolonged UN search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This policy of containment through strict economic sanctions was continued throughout the administration of President Bill Clinton in spite of its proven failure due to the lack of co-operation by Iraq’s neighbors and the sanctions’ catastrophic toll on the Iraqis, who lost the ability and will to rise against the regime one more time. The callousness of this approach was perhaps best illustrated by President Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, whose response to a question about a report that half a million of Iraqi

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children had died because of the sanctions was that: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price – we think the price is worth it.”89 To be sure, the Clinton administration did not strictly confine its policy to economic sanctions. On a couple of occasions, missiles were sent to Baghdad, without any clear or coherent objective, much less an assurance to achieve any outcome. To make things worse, on one such occasion, the order to bomb Iraq was on the eve of the US House of Representatives session to vote on impeaching President Clinton in the Monica Lewinsky affair, leaving an open question about whether the missiles were sent to support US foreign policy or to divert attention from a sordid debate at home. President Clinton also signed H.R. 4655 (Iraq Liberation Act of 1998), which made it “the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government.” This policy was to be pursued by providing financial support for Iraqi opposition groups—$97 million in military aid and a few million dollars in direct aid the following year—and by calling on the UN to establish an international criminal tribunal to indict and try Saddam and his regime’s officials for crimes against humanity. This policy shift inaugurated an era of thriving activities by various Iraqi groups and Iraqi individuals, who stormed Washington, DC, to present themselves as the spokespersons of the oppressed Iraqi people. Among these groups, a coalition of political operatives was united under the umbrella of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which was led by Ahmed Chalabi— a highly controversial figure himself. Chalabi and his colleagues finally had their wish come true with the election of President George W. Bush and the rise of a group of US political appointees, especially in the Department of Defense, who had been advocating for years the toppling of the regime of Saddam Hussein. In the wake of the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing military action in Afghanistan, a consorted effort by high-ranking US officials, such as Paul Wolfowitz, in partnership with the Iraqis in the INC, finally succeeded in turning the policy from regime change by US-backed Iraqi opposition groups to regime change by US military intervention. On April 9, 2003, Baghdad fell to US troops not numerous enough to prevent the looting and burning of the city, much less maintain law and order. The Bush administration presented its case citing a number of reasons for invading Iraq— WMD, links to terrorism, the regime’s oppression of its own people, and the spread of democracy, which is the last standing rationale. However, six years later, the new regime in Iraq has given democracy a bad name. The Iraqi government is grossly inefficient and corrupt from top to bottom. Among 180 countries surveyed by Transparency International, Iraq was the third most corrupt country in the world in 2006, 2007, and 2008. Only Haiti and Myanmar were considered worse than Iraq in the first two years and Somalia and Myanmar in 2008. Considering the low stakes in Haiti, Myanmar, and Somalia, Iraq’s annual budget of $79 billion indicates catastrophic corruption. Does the US have a coherent policy to help steer Iraq toward the path of transparency and democratic governance? It is hard to say. The post-Saddam US policy has been more interested in keeping Iraq’s various factions glued together, while lack of efficiency, transparency, and good governance are highly tolerated. Given the firm conviction of US policymakers that the reversal of this policy will result in a vicious civil war, the policy pattern of the last fifty years continues to prevail: opting for the lesser evil.

Notes 1 Waldemar Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964): 67. 2 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, November 21, 1955,” in John P. Glennon et al., eds, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, vol. XII: 200–203. 3 Ibid.: 201. 4 Ibid. 5 Gallman, op. cit.: 68.

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6 Ibid.: 69. 7 “Letter from Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles,” in John P. Glennon et al. (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, vol. XII, pp. 205–7. 8 Ibid.: 206. 9 Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, in John P. Glennon et al., eds, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, XII: 214. 10 See letter from British Prime Minister Anthony Eden to President Eisenhower, dated March 4, 1956, in John P. Glennon et al., eds, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, XII: 249. He apparently sent this letter after British low-level diplomatic efforts had failed to convince the US to join the Pact. 11 “Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15–4 p.m.,” in John P. Glennon et al., eds, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, XII: 240. 12 “Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957,” in John P. Glennon et al., eds, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, XII: 1035. 13 Although Nuri al-Said was not Iraq’s prime minister when the Ankara meeting took place, he still headed the Iraqi delegation just as he did as a prime minister in the previous ones in Baghdad, Tehran, and Karachi. See Gallman, op. cit.: 83–85. 14 Ibid.: 84. 15 “Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State,” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 33–34. 16 “Memorandum of Conversation,” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 301–2. 17 Gallman, op. cit.: 85. 18 Ibid.: 182. 19 Ibid.: 190–91. 20 “Briefing Notes by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles,” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 308. 21 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004): 84–85. 22 Gallman, op. cit.: 203. 23 On the morning of July 14, 1958, King Faisal II, Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah, and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said were to leave Baghdad for Istanbul to conduct talks with Turkey’s prime minister concerning the upcoming meeting of the council of the Baghdad Pact, which was scheduled to take place in London before the end of July. 24 Ibid.: 201. 25 See the telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Office and several British missions in the region, in Walid Said al-Adhami, Thawrat 14 Tammuz wa Abd al-Karim Qasim fi al-Watha’iq al-Baritaniyya [The July 14 Revolution and Abd al-Karim Qasim in British Documents] (Baghdad, 1989): 213–22. 26 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State,” in Edward Keefer (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. XII, p. 315. 27 Ibid.: see editor’s footnote. 28 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State,” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 318–79. 29 “From Baghdad (Emergency HIQ) to Foreign Office,” in Walid Said al-Adhami, Thawrat 14 Tammuz wa Abd al-Karim Qasim fi al-Watha’iq al-Baritaniyya [The July 14 Revolution and Abd al-Karim Qasim in British Documents]: 222. 30 Ibid. 31 “From Washington to Foreign Office,” in Walid Said al-Adhami, Thawrat 14 Tammuz wa Abd al-Karim Qasim fi alWatha’iq al-Baritaniyya [The July 14 Revolution and Abd al-Karim Qasim in British Documents]: 226. 32 Telegram from the British High Commission in Karachi to the Commonwealth Relations Office in London, in Walid Said al-Adhami, Thawrat 14 Tammuz wa Abd al-Karim Qasim fi al-Watha’iq al-Baritaniyya [The July 14 Revolution and Abd al-Karim Qasim in British Documents]: 231. 33 “From Amman to Foreign Office,” in Walid Said al-Adhami, Thawrat 14 Tammuz wa Abd al-Karim Qasim fi al-Watha’iq al-Baritaniyya [The July 14 Revolution and Abd al-Karim Qasim in British Documents]: 216. 34 Ibid. 35 “From Foreign Office to Amman,” in Walid Said al-Adhami, Thawrat 14 Tammuz wa Abd al-Karim Qasim fi al-Watha’iq al-Baritaniyya [The July 14 Revolution and Abd al-Karim Qasim in British Documents]: 227. 36 Ibid. 37 When Arif became president in 1963, he began to manufacture a thousand-and-one reasons to postpone the unity with Egypt. See Ali Karim Said, Iraq 8 Shubat 1963: min Hiwar al-Mafahim ila Hiwas al-Dam [The Iraq of February 8, 1963: From the Dialogue of Ideas to the Dialogue of Blood]: 205ff. 38 On February 8, 1963, Arif insisted on executing Qasim following a kangaroo trial at the Baghdad Radio Station with a court formally established, to legitimate the process, after he was shot dead. See Ibid.: 102–10. 39 Al-Mawsim, issue 19, 1991 (also accessible online in Arabic, as of July 1, 2008, at www.almawsem.net/turath/ index4.htm#_ftn1). 40 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, op. cit.: 90. 41 Ibid.: 91. See also Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (London: Saqi Books, 2004 [1978]): 880ff. 42 “Paper by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray),” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 401–2.

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43 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 401st Meeting of the National Security Council,” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 403. 44 “Paper Prepared in the Department of State … The Situation in Iraq,” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 414–22. 45 “Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree) to Acting Secretary of State Dillon,” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 464–66. 46 “Special National Intelligence Estimate [June 30, 1959]”, in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 471. 47 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State,” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 474–75. 48 Ali Karim Said, Iraq 8 Shubat 1963: min Hiwar al-Mafahim ila Hiwas al-Dam [The Iraq of February 8, 1963: from the Dialogue of Ideas to the Dialogue of Blood]: 29. 49 “Memorandum of the Discussion at the 432nd Meeting of the National Security Council [January 14, 1960],” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 501. 50 “Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board,” in Edward Keefer, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, XII: 525 (emphasis is added). 51 “Telegram from the Department of State to Consulate in Kuwait,” in Nina Noring, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, XVII: 163. 52 “Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball),” in Nina Noring, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, XVII: 365. 53 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State,” in Nina Noring, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, XVII: 703–4. 54 “United States Policy on Iraq,” in Nina Noring, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, XVII: 743. 55 For a detailed account of the coup, see Ali Karim Said, Iraq 8 Shubat 1963: min Hiwar al-Mafahim ila Hiwar al-Dam [The Iraq of February 8, 1963: from the Dialogue of Ideas to the Dialogue of Blood]: 61–127. 56 Nina Noring, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, XVIII: 342, footnote no. 1. 57 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,” in Nina D. Howland, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, XXI: 348. 58 Ibid.: 347. 59 “Memorandum from the Department of State Acting Executive Secretary (McKesson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),” in Nina Noring, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, XVIII: 664. 60 “Airgram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State,” in Nina D. Howland, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, XXI: 355. 61 “Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State,” in Nina D. Howland, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, XXI: 360. 62 “Telegram from Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State,” in Nina D. Howland, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, XXI: 381. 63 “Memorandum from the Ambassador to Iraq (Strong),” in Nina D. Howland, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, XXI: 383. 64 “Telegram from the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State,” in Nina D. Howland, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, XXI: 386. Also see the editor’s footnote no. 3. 65 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (London: Saqi Books, 2004 [1978]): 1073ff. 66 Al-Ali, Salah Umar, a series of televised interviews with al-Jazeera TV, episode aired on June 8, 2003. 67 Ibid. 68 “Memorandum from John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow),” in Nina D. Howland, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, XXI: 387. 69 Ibid. 70 “Memorandum from John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow),” in Nina D. Howland, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, XXI: 388. 71 Ibid. 72 Al-Ali, Salah Umar, a series of televised interviews with al-Jazeera TV, episode aired on June 15, 2003. 73 “Telegram from the Embassy in Tel Aviv to the department of State,” in Monica Belmonte, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. E4. 74 Haim Shemesh, Soviet–Iraqi Relations, 1968–1988 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992): 78–79. For background on the nationalization of the IPC, see Michael Brown, “The Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10(1), February 1979: 107–24. 75 Michael Brown, “The Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10(1), February 1979: 123. 76 Haim Shemesh, Soviet–Iraqi Relations, 1968–1988, op. cit.: 111–13. 77 Bruce Jentleson, With Friends Like These, op. cit.: 15. 78 Ibid.: 68–69. Ironically, these acts of genocide were, conveniently, made part of the rallying cry to mobilize world opinion against Saddam Hussein by the officials in subsequent US administrations, many of whom were key figures in the Reagan administration.

US foreign policy toward Iraq, 1958–2008 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

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State Department Memorandum, “Administration Policy of Proposed Iraq Sanctions,” quoted ibid.: 69. National Security Directive 26, October 2, 1989: 2. Ibid. Ibid.: 1. National Security Directive 45, August 20, 1990. National Security Directive 54, January 15, 1991. James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1995): 442. Remarks to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, February 15, 1991. James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1889–1992: 437. Ibid.: 440. Secretary Albright’s interview with 60 Minutes on May 12, 1996.

35 Missed opportunities and political blunders The tale of US–Iran relations1 Manouchehr Dorraj and Hamid Zangeneh2

Introduction After almost three decades of interminable and tumultuous interaction with the countries of the region and, for that matter with the world, Iran is still at square one. At the other end of the spectrum, the US is not doing any better. Yet, both Iran and the US must know that they can succeed in achieving their goals in pursuit of their national interests in the region much more easily and with less costly consequences if they reconcile their differences. However, as we learned from the cold war, Iran, just like the USSR, cannot win this war, and the US, given its immense economic, military, and political superiority, can bleed and live without Iran for a long period of time. Why can they not recognize that reconciliation, when it eventually happens, will not be a zero-sum deal? In this chapter, we intend to discuss the roots of acrimony on both sides. Why did the US policymakers think that their policy of coercion would work? Why has Iran missed some of the opportunities for rapprochement? Why do neither the US nor the Islamic Republic pay attention to the aspirations of their people for normalization of the relationship? Finally, what are the driving forces that could get the two sides to sit at the same table and see eye-to-eye and promote their mutual national interests not the interests of those who have meddled in US– Iran affairs and poisoned the environment to prevent the meeting of minds and reconciliation?

Foundation of US–Iran relations The foundation of US–Iran relations today is based on the fundamentally divergent political posturing of the two countries. Americans behave like an eagle perched on the top of a redwood tree looking down at the world—an attitude that is anathema to the Iranian sense of history and pride—and Iranians, wounded and angry, are sitting at the base of the tree roaring and growling, unable to do much. The Iranians are torn between historical pride, revolutionary zeal, mistrust, and the reality of the power structure in the world today and their position on the totem pole. The US, on the other hand, is similarly torn between its different roles as the sole remaining superpower, its impulse to speak the language of power, and its interests as a nation that are guided by “the rule of law and not a government of men.” These are some of the tensions that are keeping the two sides apart and incommunicado and, currently, there is no country in the world that wants to bridge the gap and function as a peacemaker. As a matter of fact, it has become a most lucrative and opportune time for other parties to widen this schism.3 Consequently, both Iran and the US are doing what any objective outsider would consider to be antagonistic to their own national interests.

The twisted path of US–Iran relations: a brief history The first time Iran turned to the US was in 1883, and it did so to counter the Russo-Anglo political interferences in Iran. These initial approaches did not amount to much. There was no

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interest in the US for a relationship with Iran. But somehow Iran thought of young America as a better friend and ally than those already there vying for power and influence. During the Second World War, Iran declared itself a “non-belligerent” nation and, for the duration of the war, Iran stayed out of hostilities, although many suggested that Reza Shah and some of the tribal chieftains in the south were Nazi sympathizers (Keddie 2006: 105). However, as a pre-emptive move, in order to assure themselves that Iran would not become part of Germany’s sphere of influence and allow Germany to attack the Soviet Union from the south while securing transportation lines between the “warm waters” of the Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union, in 1941, Iran was invaded from the north by the Soviets and from the south by the British, and they divided the country into two spheres of influence.4 The northern part became a Soviet outpost and the southern part became a British outpost; neither were quite colonies. As a matter of fact, neither the Soviet Union nor Britain established colonial administrative offices in the same way they had in other corners of the world. They both used locals to do their work for them. The occupation of Iran actually led to a great opening for the US to become Iran’s “savior.”5 This potential political capital, however, was spent unwisely later by the US. In the summer of 1945, Truman started expressing concerns over the Soviet occupation of the Azerbaijan and Kurdistan regions of Iran and pressed for a withdrawal of Soviet forces. When Iran turned to the UN for assistance in this regard, Truman openly and forcefully supported the Iranian government’s appeal. Probably the high point of this political encounter came when the Soviets, in May 1946, relented to Iran’s steadfast demands for departure and US pressure and withdrew their forces. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, US policy was marked by inaction and ambivalence. Iran did not fit into the US post-war containment plans for the Soviet Union yet, which mainly concentrated on the East–West confrontations in Europe and east Asia; Iran was mostly an afterthought in US security decisions. It only took a prominent role in 1950, when the US recognized the Shah’s ineptitude in dealing with the confused and sometimes tumultuous internal political bickering and wheeler-dealing instigated by the British and the Russians. The Americans worried that this in-fighting could have contagious effects in the petroleum-rich region and destabilize neighboring Arab countries and the oil market. As a result, the Truman administration decided that oil-rich and strategically located Iran was important to the US national security, signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with her, and started a mini—and half-hearted—Marshall Plan for the country.6

The genesis of anti-Americanism The Russian desire to access the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and the British aspiration to dominate India, Persia, and the Red Sea trade routes led to fierce competition between these two powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Consequently, they recruited high-ranking individuals close to the royal courts, secular politicians, religious leaders, intellectuals, bazzaris, and tribal leaders, as their lobbyists and agents in pursuit of their respective political agendas. A combination of the Shah’s weakness and the ferocious activities of these superpowers and their agents and lobbyists culminated in agreements and concessions that wounded the sense of nationalism of a proud and once powerful (imperial) nation. The country is riled by these slights, and they are major reasons for Iranian political behavior today. The significant contribution of these events to the Iranian leadership’s self-perception has been missed by most US policymakers so far. These rather tumultuous and uncertain decades forced many unwelcome treaties and concessions to foreign powers, which became symbols of foreign domination over and exploitation of Iran; these political developments etched indelible fear and mistrust on the Iranian psyche toward foreign powers.7 Against this background, the British–Iranian dispute over one of these

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treaties granted to William D’Arcy for the exploration and sale of Iran’s oil and gas, which had been simmering for years, erupted in full force. This eventually brought the US to Iran in a significant and lastingly negative way.

Mosaddegh: the champion of Iranian nationalism Mohammad Mosaddegh was the one and only democratically elected politician during the Pahlavi regime. He was misunderstood by friends and foes alike. He was definitely misunderstood by the US, especially by the Eisenhower administration. By all accounts, he was a fervent nationalist and believed in the constitution and monarchy. However, in order to advance their interests, the British successfully portrayed him to Eisenhower and his administration at least as a communist sympathizer, which was far from reality. Mosaddegh and his family were members of the landed gentry, and he was always loyal to the institution of monarchy, probably to a fault. Mosaddegh, empowered and supported by the intellectuals, bazzaris, the National Front,8 and the middle class in general, sponsored two seminal bills in the Majles (Parliament) that have been the rallying cries and defining points for Iran ever since: the first was the 1944 bill that outlawed the granting of further oil concessions to foreign powers,9 and the second bill was the nationalization of Iranian oil, which has had worldwide implications for oil-exporting countries (Elm 1992: 81–123). Whether the 1953 Anglo-American coup against Mosaddegh was to secure Iranian oil, or to use Iran as a piece in the chess game of containing the Soviet Union and the communist ideology, or both, is irrelevant to Iranians of all walks of life. They were the ones who were imprisoned, tortured, and displaced by the Shah’s regime in the aftermath of the coup, and Iranians put the blame squarely at the doorsteps of the US and Great Britain. US policies since have helped to maintain the sense of vulnerability that the majority of Iranians feel when it comes to the Anglo-American relationship. The rampant rumors of other coup plots in the last twenty-seven years must be understood against this historical context. More recently, “the regime change” propaganda of the Bush administration has added much fuel to Iranian suspicions about Western powers’ penchant for interference in their internal affairs.

The Kennedy administration The Kennedy Doctrine was based on the premise that right-wing dictatorships breed left-wing dictatorships. Therefore, the best way to repel the communist threat was to encourage America’s authoritarian allies in the third world to reform their political systems. The hope was that reform from the top would avoid a socialist revolution from the bottom (Bill 1989). When the Shah visited Washington to ask Kennedy for more military hardware, Kennedy admonished him arguing that he did not need more weapons. What he needed, according to Kennedy, was to implement reforms so that he could expand his dwindling base of support. This policy reduced some of the social and political pressures on the opposition and civil society organizations. It also allowed the civil society organizations to educate, mobilize, and recruit new members. Meanwhile, the “White Revolution” proposed by the Shah and ratified in a referendum by the people implemented agrarian reform, curbed the power of the clergy, and expanded women’s rights. Yet, the Kennedy years were relatively the brightest years for Iranians of every ilk, especially for the intelligentsia, as they sowed the seeds of discontent among the landed gentry and the clergy (Arjomand 1988: 72–74; Milani 1988: 79–99). The clergy took issue with at least two principles of the White Revolution that was forced on the Shah by the Kennedy administration; the first was a pocket book issue and the second was a religious matter. In general, the landlords provided major financial support for the

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seminaries and lesser religious leaders. Land reform meant the redistribution of land from landlords to the peasants who worked the land. As a result of this reform, landlords cut back on their donations. Moreover, the land reform also encompassed the land owned by the clergy (the Oqaf ). Both of these negatively impacted the clergy’s finances and power. Consequently, the clergy denounced the land reform as a farce. But the clergy’s denunciation of the White Revolution was particularly vociferous when it came to women’s equality. The fact that women were given the right to vote and wear judge’s robes was completely unacceptable to the traditional clergy. To protest against this initiative, they sent tens of thousands of their supporters into the streets to demonstrate against the Shah and, by extension, against the US as a supporter of the Shah and the instigator of the reforms. Ayatollah Khomeini’s first major intervention in Iranian politics occurred when he gave a scathing sermon in the Madreseh Faizieh (Faizieh Seminary) in the city of Qom, ostensibly against the land reform. The Shah, incensed by this “audacious” sermon, ordered an attack on the seminary where a seminarian was killed and many others injured. Ayatollah Khomeini gave another sermon on June 3, 1963, a day after the first attack on Faizieh, in which he attacked the Shah personally, accusing him of being the servant of the US and betraying the country’s interests (Milani 1988). This led to Khomeini’s arrest, which resulted in continuous rioting and demonstrations for several days. These incessant riots and demonstrations were answered with an order of “shoot to kill,” which made this period infamous as one of the darkest and bloodiest10 of Pahlavi’s rule (Milani 2000: 156). This was another seed of discontent that instigated a chain reaction and led eventually to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

The Johnson administration Lyndon Johnson inherited a war in Vietnam that consumed most of his administration’s time and efforts. Even though he was Kennedy’s messenger to the Shah to push forward with reform, when he became President, he started feeding the Shah’s ever increasing appetite for more military hardware. Iran became a top priority of the Johnson administration; especially after the US had to withdraw its intelligence operations from Pakistan, it became apparent that Iran was the best strategic alternative. This gave the Shah another excuse to ask for more armaments (Ambrose 2000). However, the Johnson administration extracted something that would prove to be a mega blunder by the Shah in exchange for military hardware. The Shah acceded to a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which became the rallying cry for Iranians across the spectrum. The SOFA passed by the parliament has been referred to as the “capitulation law” by rank-and-file Iranians, and gave all US military personnel in Iran, regardless of their ranks and positions, similar immunity to that usually afforded to foreign diplomats. The agreement “was unprecedented and represented the most favorable SOFA between the United States and any of its allies” (Johns 2007: 70). It created a fury in the country that could not be quieted down without increasingly repressive and brutal measures by the infamous secret security forces (SAVAK), measures that intensified resentments and disaffection toward the monarchy and its patron, the US, which eventually contributed to the regime’s demise.

The Nixon administration The Shah’s regime fit into Nixon–Kissinger foreign policy like hand in glove—an ambitious king, flush with oil money, ready to be the US surrogate and client state in exchange for military hardware. In May 1972, during a visit, Nixon conceded, for the first time, that Iraq was a security danger to the Persian Gulf countries and promised to sell the Shah any US arms other than nuclear weapons that the Shah deemed desirable. This led to many purchases of top of the range weaponry, including F-4, F-5, F-14, and F-15 fighter jets, which had only been sold, besides to the US Air Force, to Great Britain.11 According to Gary Sick (1987: 210):

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M. Dorraj and H. Zangeneh [T]he meeting between Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah of Iran [in Tehran after the President’s Moscow trip, where he signed Salt I treaty] was extraordinary. In a couple of days in Tehran, Nixon and Kissinger struck a bargain with the Shah which, in effect, relinquished responsibility for US security interest in the region to the Shah and told the Shah that we would look to him for guidance. We would look to his judgments about what kind of arms he needed, and would not second-guess him.

Theoretically, the Nixon Doctrine allowed others to do US bidding without American blood spilled on the streets of Saigon or in the waters of the Persian Gulf. But in reality, it did not work as well as people in Washington had expected. Saigon soon fell and North Vietnam overran the South. The Shah was forced to flee the country by a popular revolution in 1979, and the arms and equipment did not do any good in propping up and protecting the monarchy.

The Ford administration The Ford–Kissinger years were mainly a continuation of the Nixon–Kissinger Doctrine in relation to the Shah. He received what he asked for and, in addition, he was convinced by the Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz team to agree to a multi-billion dollar nuclear deal that included material for a potential nuclear weapons system. Ford’s team endorsed Iranian plans to build a massive nuclear energy industry, but also worked hard to complete a multibillion-dollar deal that would have given Tehran control of large quantities of plutonium and enriched uranium—the two necessary elements for building a nuclear bomb. Either can be shaped into the core of a nuclear warhead, and obtaining one or the other is generally considered the most significant asset to would-be weapons builders. Linzer (2005) The irony of this policy and its implications for the current US imposition of economic sanctions and military threats against Iran is not lost on most Iranians, who see a double standard in the acrimonious US posture toward today’s Iran.

The Carter administration The two most significant events of the Carter presidency regarding the Middle East were the Camp David Accords and the Iranian Revolution. The latter took most of the administration’s time and energy. As Sick (1987: 211) has observed, The key date of the Revolution was the second week of September when Iranian troops mowed down a large number of demonstrators in Jaleh Square, and what had been sporadic riots and demonstrations turned from rebellion into Revolution. When that information was relayed to the White House, President Carter was in the second day of talks at Camp David. To say that he was preoccupied would, I think, be the understatement of the century. On New Year’s Eve, 1977, President Carter toasted the Shah at a state dinner in Tehran, calling him “an island of stability” in the troubled Middle East. This toast was an indication of the Carter years of confusion: torn between the ideals of America—respect for human rights and human dignity—and the reality of American economic and political interests—thus bowing to the military–industrial complex and approving increasingly more military hardware

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and assistance to the Shah’s regime during his presidency. Carter’s confusion was also evident in the Shah’s behavior during the revolutionary period. On the one hand, he continued with his ambition of creating the largest and most powerful military force in the Middle East in order to be the gendarme of the region, yet when it came to decisive use of force at home to suppress the revolutionary movement in the fateful years of 1978–79, he remained hesitant. This ambivalence in the use of force reflected the Carter administration’s straddling between National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s hawkish position, who wanted to encourage the Shah to brutally suppress the revolution in a tough and decisive manner, and Carter’s as well Cyrus Vance’s respect for human rights that the Shah did not appreciate.12 In the end, this indecisiveness of the Carter administration in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution made dealing with the new regime in Iran more difficult and unmanageable to the extent that hostage-taking became profitable for the Islamic Republic in the short run by giving them some time to rally nationalist sentiment and consolidate power in the hands of the clergy in order to establish a theocracy.

The Iran hostage crisis Probably the most egregious political action of the Islamic Republic against the US has been the hostage crisis of 1980, when American embassy staff members were held for 444 days in captivity, initially by a group of student activists/ revolutionaries, which then became an action condoned and co-ordinated by the government for its own political agenda. Although many rationales for the action were provided, in retrospect, it was inexcusable, and the sooner the Iranian government apologizes for it and removes it from the table, the sooner the healing can begin. The hostage taking and the ensuing political behavior of the Islamic Republic were based on many false premises about US and international sentiments, anticipated reactions, and Iran’s national interests.13 In the chaotic first few months after the revolution, the US embassy was seized twice: the first time by leftists and the second time by Muslim students, who became known as the “students following the Imam line.” The first time, the occupation was resolved and peace was restored quickly by the government of President Bani-Sadr. However, the second time, Ayatollah Khomeini saw a tactical advantage in the seizure, and supported the students who initiated the hostage taking, which changed the dynamics of the seizure, and the hostage taking turned into a crisis. Ayatollah Khomeini used the hostages as a means of establishing and defining the “Islamic Republic regime,” as we know it (Moin 1999: 227–28). As one observer put it: He noticed the value of the hostages and became an ardent supporter of the students. Khomeini’s prime concern was the establishment of an Islamic Republic and the speedy foundation of its institutions … Thus, Khomeini believed, as long as the hostages remained in Iran, there was no danger of serious opposition to the establishment of the institutions of the Islamic Republic. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic’s institutions and the takeover of the most powerful positions by the clerical faction and their loyal supporters, the hostages were of no further use. Alerassol (1993: 100–102) The Carter administration considered many military, political, and economic options and they were dismissed, because they were inconsequential, unfeasible, or dangerous to the wellbeing of the hostages. However, every action14 or inaction tightened the rope around Carter’s political neck in a tough election year that became a referendum on US prestige and security. Carter’s seeming impotence to free the hostages also discredited his foreign policy, paving the way for Reagan’s ascendance to the presidency.

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The Reagan–Bush administrations The hostage crisis ended on Reagan’s inauguration day15 and ended a point of immediate contention and a potential confrontation between the US and Iran that would have been imminent given President Reagan’s campaign rhetoric. But the lessons of Vietnam and Iran were not lost on Reagan. The Reagan Doctrine had two dimensions. First, dictatorships were best for US interests, but dictators themselves were not indispensable. Therefore, it became evident that dictators in Haiti (Duvalier), the Philippines (Marcos), and Sudan (Numairi) were not to be protected at any cost to the US, but the systems in place were viewed to be worth fighting for. All three dictators were deposed and new ones took their places, but their political systems remained intact. Second, Reagan saw everything through an anti-communist prism. Fighting communist insurgencies was given highest priority, especially in South America. If there were one anti-communist insurgency, such as the one in Nicaragua by the Contras, it was to be supported. This attitude and Reagan’s desire to free US hostages in Lebanon led to the “IranContra affair,” which turned out to be the most serious constitutional scandal after the “Watergate affair” that brought President Nixon’s term of office to a disgraceful end. In pursuit of the Reagan Doctrine, through a web of secret deals, which involved the US, Israeli, and Iranian governments, military hardware was sold to Iran and the proceeds were partially diverted to insurgents in Nicaragua (known as Contras) who were fighting the leftist Sandinistas. In exchange for the arms sales, the Iranians helped with the release of most of the US hostages in Lebanon. This was significant on two levels. First, Reagan diverted money to the Contra insurgents, which was explicitly prohibited by law. That put the President, who might have engaged in further illegal activity to cover up his original unlawful policy, in a dangerous legal position. Second, it became an “arms for hostages” deal, which necessarily required negotiation with the “terrorists,” despite the fact that President Reagan had promised not to do so (Bill 1989: 409–15; Parsi 2007). Iran, meanwhile, was entangled in a war with neighboring Iraq. Conspiracy theorists believe that the war was instigated by the US as payback for the hostage taking. The war was also intended to defang and destroy Iran’s military might, which had been built up during the Shah’s rule. The US policy was to punish Iran with economic sanctions and support Iraq with weapons and intelligence, as well as politically. However, the administration was not shy of trading spare parts in exchange for co-operation in Lebanon and sending money to “freedom fighters” in Nicaragua, which came to be known as the Iran-Contra affair. George H. W. Bush started his presidency with an inaugural speech that announced, “Good deed begets good deed.” It gave hope that a new era in US–Iran relations had started. In response to this pronouncement, Iran helped with the hostages in Lebanon as a good gesture. Also, it opted for neutrality during the US-led Persian Gulf War of 1991 to expel Saddam from Kuwait. However, neither of these initiatives received a positive response from the Bush administration. This coldness was later buttressed by the policy of containment, which left Iranians less forthcoming and accommodating as well.

The Clinton administration During the first term of his presidency, Clinton’s Doctrine entailed a “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran. The Iranian containment was instituted unilaterally with the imposition of economic sanctions, and on the Iraqi side, it was instituted through the UN and military enforcement. The 1996 imposition of Iran–Libya sanctions barring any country from investing more than $20 million in Iran’s energy sector was designed to prevent Iran’s oil industry from re-emerging from the destruction incurred during the war with Iraq (1980–88). However, during Clinton’s second term, the realities on the ground changed somewhat. As the vast oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region were discovered, some of the Clinton advisers argued that Iran was the gateway to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, and the Iranian revolution had

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run its course, a new policy emerged during the second term of the Clinton administration known as “differentiated containment.” This policy was intended to distinguish between Iran and Iraq. Whereas Iraq would still be contained, the US would work toward a normalization of relationships with Iran (Dorraj 1999: 31–40). The election of reformist cleric Muhammad Khatami to the presidency in 1997 and his promotion of a “dialogue of civilizations” and improved relations with the US changed the political atmosphere and provided a window of opportunity for rapprochement. By 1998, both Iran and the US took positive steps to break the ice and build confidence. On the Iranian side, President Khatami, in his CNN interview that year, denounced terrorism as an inhuman act and made it clear that, if Israelis and Palestinians could reach a just peaceful settlement of their conflict, Iran would not stand in their way. He also expressed his regret for the hostage crisis of 1979–81. On the issue of nuclear weapons, he made it clear that Iran was not a nuclear power and did not plan to become one (Sick 2002: 367). In response, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for a new policy initiative regarding Iran. She took some small confidence-building measures, hoping to change the political atmosphere and create a better environment for a dialogue. These included ceasing references to the Islamic Republic as a “rogue” state, designating the regime’s nemesis Mujahedin Khalgh as a terrorist group, waiving sanctions against foreign oil companies that did business in Iran, easing restrictions on the sale of agricultural and medical goods to Iran, and fostering academic exchanges between the two countries. Albright’s apology for the coup of 1953 and the wrestling and soccer diplomacy that ensued were designed to serve as trust-building measures, which might facilitate the rapprochement and pave the way for direct negotiations (Sick 2002: 367– 68). But unfortunately, for both sides, a combination of intense factional power struggle between the conservatives and the reformers in Iran, coupled with the Clinton administration’s inability to make an attractive offer, prevented a breakthrough. By the end of Clinton’s terms in office, the rapprochement had not culminated in the creation of a road map for the normalization of the relationship.

The George W. Bush administration During the presidential campaign of 2000, George W. Bush announced that the Middle East would not be a top priority for his administration (it would be on the backburner), and he criticized the Clinton administration’s policy of nation building in the former Yugoslavia. Early in his presidency, he was preoccupied with rejuvenating Reagan’s Star Wars Defense Initiative (SDI) program, which had been shelved for more than a decade in the post-cold war era. But 9/11 changed all that. More than any other event, 9/11 shaped and defined George W. Bush’s presidency. The 9/11 horrors, which permanently changed world politics for the worse, were a defining moment in America and, due to the magnitude and projection of US power, they had an immediate global impact. Even though terrorism has always dogged the world, it has not done so on as massive a scale as it did on 9/11. Why did George W. Bush reverse the unthawing of the US–Iran relationship, which had been in progress during the Clinton administration, with his “axis of evil” speech, even after reaching out to the Muslim world diplomatically in the immediate aftermath of 9/11? This change in direction was due to a confluence of several factors. Among them are:  Unsure of what sort of military challenge awaited US troops in Afghanistan and what kind of negative backlash a US invasion would induce, the Bush administration reached out to the Muslim world. For example, an invitation was extended to President Khatami to visit New York for an interfaith dialogue. During the US military campaign in Afghanistan and in its immediate aftermath, Tehran and Washington collaborated closely against their common enemy, the Taliban, and Iran played a constructive role in establishing the Karzai

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government, and emerged as the largest financial donor among developing nations in the reconstruction campaign, contributing $650 million at the Donner conference of 2002. A quick military victory in Afghanistan and the destruction of much of al-Qaeda’s military infrastructure, however, modified Washington’s thinking. Using the Karin A shipment of weapons to the Palestinian authority, allegedly made by the Iranian government, as an excuse, by 2002, Iran along with Iraq and North Korea were put on the “axis of evil” list. In so doing, George W. Bush deliberately destroyed the fragile bridges that were built toward Iran under the Clinton administration and derailed the rapprochement.  In the eyes of the Middle Eastern governments, the Shah’s ambitions of being the gendarme of the region and serving as a US surrogate were akin to the notion that a powerful and imperial Iran was in the making and must be stopped. This did not change after the revolution. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, in particular, view a large and powerful Iran as a threat, irrespective of the type of government in Tehran because of their own troublesome relationship with their Shi’ite minorities who could become restless in the case of a conflict with Iran.  The lingering fears among conservative Arab regimes, buttressed by Iranian post-revolutionary rhetoric and the denunciations of corrupt Arab leaders during the first decade of the revolution, shook the foundations of Arab governments throughout the Middle East and North Africa. These fears have only intensified with the possibility of a nuclear Iran in recent years.  The Israelis lost their only real ally in the Middle East (with the exception of Turkey) with the downfall of the Shah. Also, ideologically, logistically, and pragmatically, Israel is a safer enemy for Iran than some of the other antagonists. The opposition to Israel, at least by some factions in Tehran, is a powerful tool in enhancing the Islamic regime’s legitimacy as the leading “defender of Muslims’ honor”, thus advancing its popularity on “the Arab streets.” By the same token, a powerful Iran is more of a threat to Israel compared with its Arab neighbors, who have been emasculated and humiliated by Israel repeatedly since 1948. The Israelis could now point to a powerful Iran as the beacon of pan-Islamism in the same way that the Soviet Union served to inspire and spread communism. Given the resurgence of Islamic movements in the region, the Israeli government regards the Islamic Republic as a threat to the region and the world rather than those Arabs who have been defeated and defanged and are no longer perceived to be a credible threat. Israel’s strategic value after the fall of the USSR has also diminished somewhat. Israeli influence in the US, therefore, is not intrinsically related to the US national interests, even though proponents of Israel have tried very successfully to intertwine the two as one and the same. Today, Israel’s political value is a derivative of three factors: Iranian intransigence, Christian Zionist dogma, and the powerful Israel lobbies, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and others (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). That is why the Israeli government and AIPAC are so adamant in making Iran the most dangerous threat for the US, Arabs, and for that matter, for the entire world. They are simply trying to enhance their role as an indispensible ally by substituting Iran for the former USSR.  George H. W. Bush’s “oil sensitivities” and, by implication, Arabist proclivity was passed on to George W. Bush, which gave the conservative, oil-rich, pro-Western, Arab governments a more powerful voice compared with the Clinton administration era.  Hegemonic domination of the Middle East and control of the oil reserves for the foreseeable future would put Europe, China, India, and Japan under the thumb of the US. In 2003, President Khatami offered the Bush administration a grand bargain. Iran would cease uranium enrichment, halt its support of Hezbollah and Hamas, and support the Palestinian–

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Israeli peace process if the US would provide it with security guarantees that it would not attack Iran, end sanctions against Iran, and unfreeze Iranian assets. But the Bush administration rebuffed the Iranian government’s offer (Leverett 2006). Indeed, the anti-Iran obsession became so intense among some of the hawks in the Bush administration that some of the other high officials in the government expressed their concern that the administration had subordinated its campaign to unravel al-Qaeda to their current attempt to escalate the tensions with Iran (Cobban 2007). According to one report, confirmed by senior US intelligence and administration officials, since the winter of 2001, Tehran has turned over hundreds of people to US allies and provided US intelligence with the names and photographs and fingerprints of those it held in custody. In early 2003, it offered to hand over remaining high-value targets directly to the US in exchange for a group of exiled Iranian militants hiding in Iraq. Bush ultimately rejected the exchange on the advice of Vice President Cheney and the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who argued that such an exchange would legitimize the Iranian regime. Thus, Bush’s National Security Council agreed to accept the information from Iran on al-Qaeda but offered nothing in return (Linzer 2005). One of the consequences of rebuffing Iran’s gestures of goodwill was that the Islamic Republic halted its anti-al-Qaeda co-operation with Washington and its allies. These negative reactions by the Bush administration weakened the reformist camp who got nothing in return to show for their accommodationist and conciliatory policies toward Washington and, consequently, probably inadvertently, bolstered the conservative forces in the Iranian government. The second term of the Bush presidency and the continued ascendance of the neoconservatives in Washington coincided with the rise of Mahmood Ahmadinejad to the presidency in Iran and the ascendance of second-generation revolutionary populists to political power. This signified complete domination of power by the conservative camp. However, nuclear standoff notwithstanding, and despite his anti-US and anti-Israeli rhetoric, his two letters, the first written to George W. Bush in May 2006 and the second written to the American people in November 2006, indicate that Ahmadinejad seeks a better relationship with Washington. Another sign of this aspiration can be seen in Tehran’s willingness to negotiate with Washington over Iraqi security after twenty-seven years of diplomatic freeze. Since 2007, the US and Iranian ambassadors to Iraq have had four rounds of negotiations over Iraqi security. However, Washington has not been so forthcoming. Not only were the two letters from Ahmadinejad rebuffed, but also, by 2007, the US Congress voted positively on a request from the Bush administration to fund a major escalation of covert operations against Iran, designed to destabilize the Islamic Republic and paving the way for regime change (Hersh 2008: 1–2). Since the commencement of the covert US operations, the number of terrorist initiatives against Iranian security forces has increased. The US government funding supports Mojaheen Khalgh, an organization that has been on the State Department’s list of terrorist groups for more than a decade. It also provides for other violent Sunni fundamentalist anti-regime groups such as Jundallah, which is, according to Vali Nasr, a “vicious Salafi organization whose members attend the same madrassas as the Taliban and Pakistani extremists; they are suspected of having links to al-Qaeda and they are also thought to be tied to the drug culture” (cited by Hersh 2008: 5). Another pillar of US operations in Iran is the Baluchi Sunni fundamentalists who, according to Robert Baer, a former intelligence officer with Middle East field experience, “are Sunni fundamentalists who hate the regime in Tehran, but you can also describe them as al-Qaeda. These are guys who cut off the heads of nonbelievers—in this case, it’s Shiite Iranians. The irony is that we’re once again working with Sunni fundamentalists, just as we did in Afghanistan in the nineteen-eighties” (cited by Hersh 2008: 5). It is well known how al-Qaeda found fertile ground for recruitment in the ranks of Afghan Mojahedin. “Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is considered one of the leading planners of the September 11th attacks, are Baluchi Sunni fundamentalists” (cited by Hersh 2008: 5). These are the groups

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that are the instruments of US policy in Iran and the US government is hoping to bring “democracy” to Iran with their help.

The outstanding issues between the US and Iran The nuclear issue The roots of the Islamic Republic’s drive for any deterrent lies in its bloody eight-year war with Saddam Hussein (1980–88), in which some half a million Iranians perished. Saddam initiated the war by pre-emptively invading Iran, and he enjoyed financial or military support from the US, European allies, the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and a number of other countries. With the exception of the support it received from Syria, Iran remained for the most part isolated and had to buy weapons on the black market at exorbitant prices in order to repel the invading Iraqi forces. When Saddam used chemical and biological weapons against Iranian soldiers and bombarded major Iranian cities with Scud missiles, killing many innocent civilians, the US government and its allies looked the other way and remained silent. A second factor motivating Iran’s drive for a deterrent is the continuous campaign of military threats, regime destabilization, and acrimonious political posturing from the US and its close ally, Israel. From the Iranian government’s perspective, the more than 200,000 US troops stationed in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan are a major threat; the US invasion of Iraq and the regime change there took place under the false pretense that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction; and the US Congress, which is supposed to watch over the advisability of the president’s policies, sanctioned the Iraqi invasion. Moreover, the Bush administration’s pre-emptive military action against Iraq, which was a clear violation of international law, took place against serious opposition from some of the European allies and China and Russia who are members of the UN Security Council. What then is the guarantee that Iran is not next? So far, the fact is that there is no guarantee. Thus, the need for a deterrent. Iran has serious and legitimate security concerns that only Washington can put to rest. However, whether or not Iran remained in pursuit of a nuclear weapon was an open question until the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report. That report, which indicated that since 2003 Iran has not been pursuing a nuclear weapons program, reinforced by similar reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), put the question to rest except for those who have other agendas, i.e., a confrontation with Iran at any cost. Still, one needs to ask whether Iran’s security will be enhanced or endangered by owning such devices. A plausible argument is that a nuclear device is costly and does not enhance Iran’s security. Assuming Iranian leaders are sensible in their political decision making, and there is no reason to believe otherwise, they cannot spend their limited resources in producing nuclear weapons that they know they can only use at the expense of the “obliteration of the country,” as Senator Hillary Clinton, during her bid for the Democratic nomination for the presidency, so bluntly put it in May 2008. The Iranian government is interested in self-preservation, not the annihilation of the entire nation. Some believe that a nuclear arsenal would give Iran prestige and clout and would solidify its position as the regional hegemon. However, it can be argued that a nuclear Iran would have the opposite effect. The specter of a nuclear Iran may push its neighbors further away under a broader security umbrella of world powers, including the US, which is exactly what Iran so vehemently and repeatedly protests against.16 In light of recent Israeli saber-rattling and increasing military threats against Iran, should Israel attack Iran, as the Israeli air force has to go through US-controlled air space, such an attack would be regarded, not only by Iranians but also by the entire Muslim world, as a USsponsored attack. And as the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently observed, “We’ll create generations of Jihadists, and our grand children will be battling our enemies here in

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America” (Hersh 2008: 2). The legacy of the 1953 coup d’état that overthrew the nationalist government of Mossadegh loomed large for the religious and nationalist forces that overthrew the Shah’s government in 1979, and it was one of the factors that has prohibited the normalization of relationships for the last three decades. Should the US or its close ally, Israel, engage in a pre-emptive and unprovoked military attack against Iran, it would rally the majority of Iranians behind the current regime, and would turn the Iranian youth—one of the most pro-Western in the entire Middle East, if not the whole world—against the US and Israel, and would postpone the normalization of relations for decades longer. If this scenario materializes, Iran would no longer be obliged to abide by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) obligations and supervision of its nuclear activities and could undertake an aggressive campaign of building its nuclear arsenal to protect itself against such future attacks. In the absence of improved relations between Tehran and Tel Aviv, the only favorable potential that a nuclear device would have for Iran is to serve as a deterrent against a preemptive Israeli attack. If Iran is pushed to successfully redirect its nuclear strategy from a peaceful use to a military use, Israelis could no longer credibly deliver on their threat of destroying a nuclear Iran and its population, as Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, Israel’s Infrastructure Minister, and the Iranian-born Israeli Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz proclaimed lately. To do so would be tantamount to mutually assured destruction. Neither can Mr. Ahmadinejad deliver on his threat of “wiping Israel off the map” even though his proponents claim that he did not mean physically wiping Israel off the map.17 These statements would become political blusters and would be recognized for what they are. Therefore, a cost–benefit analysis would lead one to conclude that the potential costs for the Islamic Republic to develop a nuclear weapon arsenal outweigh its possible benefits. Indeed, a close scrutiny of Iran’s factional political alignments suggests that the faction of pragmatist conservatives who have won the favor of the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenie subscribe to the position that Iran should adhere to its obligations under the NPT and favor a negotiated settlement of the nuclear crisis with the US and its European allies (Takyeh 2007: 27). In addition, there are numerous studies that lend credence to the Iranian government’s claim that it needs nuclear power as an alternative source of energy (Stern 2007: 377–82). Iran’s population has doubled in the last thirty years, and the declining refining capacity has made the country a net importer of gasoline to satisfy domestic needs. The government pays between $20 and 30 billion in energy subsidies out of an annual energy income of about $50 billion. As more than 80 percent of Iran’s foreign exchange comes from exporting oil and gas, access to nuclear energy would provide the lion’s share of domestic needs, allowing the government to export larger amounts of its oil and gas to satisfy its foreign exchange needs (Stern 2007). However, despite all the evidence and logic against a military application of nuclear technology by Iran, as long as the specter of the US and Israeli military threat looms—as President Bush repeatedly reminds us that “all options are on the table”—the Iranian government has the incentive for a deterrent and will continue to seek the capability to weaponize their nuclear program (Powers 2008). What would eventually prevent Iran from such a redirection toward nuclear weapons is the removal of the threat. As long as Tehran perceives Washington to be committed to the idea of regime change or a “soft coup,” it will also see the current nuclear standoff as an excuse for Washington to exploit the crisis in order to rally its allies against the Islamic Republic. From the Iranian point of view, the nuclear issue is bogus. This sentiment was reiterated by President Ahmadinejad, who stated, “If this problem is resolved, then [the Americans] will bring up the issue of human rights. If the human rights issue is resolved, then they will probably bring up the issue of animal rights” (cited in Takyeh 2007: 25). In order to remove such suspicions and break through the wall of mistrust, what is required is not a mere policy change, but a “paradigm shift” (Takyeh ibid.). The US should change its policy of regime change to a policy of change in regime behavior and initiate a grand bargain that normalizes the relationship. As Takyeh (2007: 28) has aptly observed:

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M. Dorraj and H. Zangeneh The new policy of engagement, normalization would have to be the starting point of talks; it would then facilitate discussions on issues such as nuclear weapons and terrorism. A strategy that seeks to create a web of mutually reinforcing security and economic arrangements has the best chance of tying Iran to the status quo in the region. In essence, a new situation would be created in which Tehran’s relationship with Washington would be more valuable to the regime than either its ties to Hezbollah or its pursuit of nuclear arms.

Takyeh accurately sees the Nixon administration’s grand bargain with China in the 1970s, which ultimately led to the normalization of relations and modified China’s political behavior from one of revolutionary defiance to one of responsible stakeholders, as a useful model to emulate. The current tit-for-tat policy of brinkmanship on both sides is only conducive to an escalation of conflict, a classic case of how not to do diplomacy. In June 2008, the US and its European allies with the endorsement of China and Russia offered Iran a new package of incentives while the Israeli air force simultaneously engaged in a rehearsal military exercise for a long-range bombing mission. This was clearly intended to send a message to Tehran, warning it of the possible consequences if it did not accept the new package of incentives and did not halt its uranium enrichment. The Islamic Republic responded to the package positively and welcomed the resumption of negotiations, while also testing two sets of mediumand long-range missiles as a response to Israeli and US saber-rattling and military threats. Brandishing carrot and stick on one side elicits the same on the other side. This was Iran’s way of saying that they would not be coerced, and that they want to be treated on an equal basis.

The Iraqi quagmire While the Islamic Republic may not have been thrilled about the way both its nemeses, Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, were overthrown by the US army, nevertheless, it saw the departure of Saddam and the Ba’athists and the potential empowerment of its fellow Shi’ites in Iraq, as well as the demolition of the Taliban, as a positive political development. Nonetheless, a defeat for the US in Iraq and the relocation of its forces to the neighboring countries would result in having the US army next door for a longer period of time than they would be under calmer situations. Iranian leadership does not aspire to such a political outcome.18 In Iraq, the US has adopted a strategy similar to the failed Israeli policy in Palestine. That is, the US is trying an iron-fist military policy of coercion, on the one hand, and a wait-and-see attitude on the other. The Bush administration is waiting for the Iraqis to come to terms with each other, and they are not in any rush to do so. Because of the close relationship between the Iranian Shi’ite state and the leading Shi’ite political parties and militias in Iraq—Dawa and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution, as well as the Badr Brigade and Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army—Iran has close ties with the Iraqi Shi’ite community and leadership. Iran has contributed $300 million toward Iraqi reconstruction, and since 2003 its trade and cultural ties with Iraq have expanded considerably. By 2008, Iranian trade with Iraq is projected to have climbed to $1.8 billion (Kamrava 2008). As such, Iran can play an important role in bringing political stability to Iraq. Iran, like the US, would like to see an end to Iraqi civil war and turmoil. Like the US, Iran does not support the disintegration of Iraq. It supports Prime Minister Nouri Al-Malaki’s government and wants his government to succeed in defeating the insurgency so that Iraqis can facilitate the departure of US forces and create a stable government. These are clearly the goals and interests that the US and Iran have in common. This also means that the current Iraqi leadership is unlikely to confront Iran or risk an acrimonious relationship with the Islamic Republic in order to play their part in Washington’s containment scheme. For example, in response to US support for Mojaheedin Khalq, the opposition group stationed in Iraq, Mr. Malaki declared, “Iraq was not willing to be a staging ground for covert operations

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against other countries” (Hersh 2008: 6). Finally, the post-war chaos, suffering, and violence in Iraq should have made clear to Washington the dangers of regime change by force. The neoconservative pipe dreams of “creative destruction” and the creation of “democracy through the use of military force” have now been replaced by the stark reality of massive death, destruction, and devastation in Iraq, and the tremendous loss of blood and treasure and political capital in the US. This should give the more sober minds in Washington much food for thought whether the replication of the Iraqi fiasco in Iran would be beneficial to the US national interest.

Conclusion The rocky road of US–Iran relations in the twentieth century assayed in this chapter is a testimony to a clash between a once mighty empire and an ancient civilization, and a reigning superpower with ambitions of empire and a hegemonic demand for submission. The twisted path of conflict and concord, confrontation and co-operation that marks this relationship has been shaped as much by differing ideological outlooks as it has been dictated by convergence or divergence of their respective national interests. With the Islamic Revolution of 1979, US–Iran relations changed dramatically from a close alliance to an acrimonious one. We have attempted to analyze the roots of this protracted conflict and bellicose relationship and shed light on its persistence. However, with the ascendance of the Bush administration, hostilities intensified and this relationship reached its nadir. During the cold war with the former USSR, the US successfully assembled a global network to contain the communist ideology. In all those decades, when weapons in the air, in open oceans, and on the territories surrounding the former Soviet Union were cocked and ready to go, no one suggested that the US should cut contact with the enemy. However, the Bush administration has done exactly that in the Iranian case so far. Talking to Iranians is considered “appeasement” and, at the same time, the US government seems to demand that Iran should abandon its enrichment program completely and appease the US before coming to the table. But what is there to talk about if they are to abandon enrichment, the very issue that they are supposed to negotiate about before even coming to the table? Many Iranians ask a legitimate question: Why did Washington, which had lost some 56,000 soldiers in Vietnam, willingly normalize relations with the Vietnamese government, while it seems unwilling to normalize relations with Iran when not a single American was lost during the hostage crisis of 1979–80? Why does this hostile posture, which in turn elicits an acrimonious Iranian political stance, continue no matter who is in the White House? The policy of containment of Iran, a relic of the cold war mentality that has been adopted by both Republican and Democratic administrations since 1979, clearly has not worked. Despite the US government’s persistent attempts, Iran simply refuses to remain isolated. Thanks to the Bush administration’s policy of “war on terror” and its subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, which culminated in removing two enemies of the Islamic Republic, Iran currently is in a much stronger position politically than it was prior to 2001. The US military misadventure in Iraq, its invasion of Iraq under false pretenses, and its inability to defeat the insurgency and bring security to either Iraq or Afghanistan has escalated antiAmericanism in the region and eroded confidence in America’s intentions and capabilities. In contrast, in spite of numerous attempts by the Bush administration to build an anti-Iran coalition among moderate Arab allies (Murphy 2006), Iran’s political capital has been rising steadily in the region. Despite Bush’s repeated warning to the moderate Arab states that Iran remains the most serious threat to peace and stability in the Middle East, in December 2007, the Gulf Co-operation Council countries decided to invite Mr. Ahmadinejad to their annual summit in Doha, Qatar, the first for an Iranian president. This was a sign that, even in the face of Washington’s pressures to isolate and contain Iran, its Arab neighbors are choosing the

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path of engagement, integration, and accommodation. Hence, when in 2008, at the insistence of Washington and its West European allies, the UN Security Council passed a third set of sanctions against Iran, Ahmadinejad was given a red carpet welcome on his official visit to Baghdad by Nouri Al-Maleki’s government (Kupchan and Takeyh 2008). America’s Arab allies are showing the way. The long-term US interest and regional peace and stability would be better served if the Bush administration followed their lead. This is particularly significant as the new regional realities point to diminishing US political influence. It is Turkey that is mediating the peace negotiation currently under way between Israel and Syria. It is Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt that are the major mediators in negotiations under way between Israel, Hamas, and Hezbollah. If in the past there were doubts about America’s ability to act as an impartial broker, commanding the respect of conflicting parties in the Middle East, the further erosion of US legitimacy under the corrosive impact of the Bush administration’s policies has relegated the US to the status of a marginal player in the region. While the US still possesses the largest economy and the most powerful army in the world, the reality of the US sinking deeper in the Iraqi quagmire, and Iran’s increasing influence in Iraq and the Middle East, combined with a declining dollar and diminishing US political capital raises a legitimate question regarding US–Iran relations: who needs whom the most? If a rapprochement between the US and Iran occurs in the future, with global and regional changes under way, the terms of power relations between the two nations will have changed significantly since a decade ago. Washington’s policy toward Tehran, however, seems incoherent and contradictory. On the one hand, the Bush administration has allocated $75 million toward “soft regime change” in Iran and is currently engaged in covert operations to destabilize the regime and, according to some accounts, is “preparing the battlefield” for a full bombardment of Iran’s nuclear facilities and other military targets (Hersh 2008). Yet, there are other analysts who argue that “too much of the Bush Doctrine features Iran as its center piece, and too much of President Bush’s rhetoric about the ‘war on terror’ revolves around Iran, for the Administration to alter its current, confrontational stance toward the Islamic republic” (Kamrava 2008: 14). On the other hand Washington has also taken initiatives that signal the possibility of rapprochement. A scenario may emerge under which a compromise may materialize that may have the potential of inaugurating a breakthrough. It may well be that a combination of America’s need to enlist Iranian support in its exit strategy from the Iraqi quagmire, on the one hand, and the positive demonstrative effect of peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis through multilateral negotiations would compel Washington to re-examine its policy of non-negotiation, though this is more likely in the post-Bush era. The waning influence of the neoconservatives in the final months of the Bush administration, the popularity of the president at all-time low, his fractured base of support in Congress, and the US army stretched to its limits in Iraq and Afghanistan may prohibit the US government from engaging in yet another misadventure in the Middle East. On the Iranian side, concerned about Ahmadinejad’s reckless rhetoric and confrontational style, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenie, has appointed a bipartisan foreign policy advisory board (including the two former moderate foreign ministers, Mr. Valayati and Mr. Kharrazi) to advise him on major foreign policy issues. For example, when in June 2008, the European Union envoy, Javier Solana, delivered the new package of incentives endorsed by Germany, France, Great Britain, the US, China, and Russia in order to restart the negotiation process, in several interviews, Mr. Valayati criticized Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy and his penchant for provocative statements, and has spoken positively about accepting the EU package of incentives. As he puts it: “Because we know that America and certain other enemies are acting against Iran’s national interests and wish Iran not to accept the package, it is expedient to accept it” (Leyne 2008).

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As a goodwill measure toward the new EU package of incentives, the Islamic Republic declared it would halt the enrichment of uranium for six weeks if the EU halts its newly declared imposition of sanctions for six weeks as well. The Iranian government also delivered its response to the EU-initiated package to Mr. Solana, while the detailed content of the Iranian response at this writing remains undisclosed, according to US under Secretary of State for political affairs, William Burns, who was reacting to Iran’s response, “Tehran is interested in finding common ground” (Hosseinian and Lyon 2008). On July 10, 2008, the US government declared that UN-imposed sanctions had crippled the Iranian government’s ability to make further advances in its nuclear program. One way to interpret this statement is that the sanctions have worked and there is no reason for the military attack against Iran. In another development, the State Department is putting forward a proposal to station US diplomats in Tehran for the first time since the revolution of 1979. Reportedly, the Iranian Foreign Minister has cautiously welcomed such an initiative (Leyne 2008). The crisis also bears the seeds of rebirth and regeneration. It may well be that the current nuclear standoff that has brought Iran and the US (and Israel) to the brink of war and destruction may also be the harbinger of a new beginning, ushering in an era of gradual normalization of relations between these two proud nations.

Notes 1 The authors would like to thank Janine Utell of Widener University for her technical editing of this chapter. 2 Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian and Professor of Economics at Widener Universities respectively. 3 Note that other countries do not want this divide to close: Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, Europe, Japan, and China. 4 At this time, the US acquiesced with the Soviet occupation of Iran to give them access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf (Gasiorowski 1991: 50). 5 “The United States inherited a legacy of good will from the good works of a number of private American citizens. Morgan Shuster was one of the greatest assets of American diplomacy” (Cottam 1964: 206–7). 6 Interestingly, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) created a network called BEDAMN to undermine the influences of Iran’s communist party, the Tudeh, in 1948. This network, consciously or unwittingly, enhanced the British’s hand in confrontation with Iran despite Truman’s public support for Mosaddegh regarding the oil dispute. It caused splits among many factions of the National Front and therefore weakened his position vis-à-vis Britain (Gasiorowski 1991: 70). 7 Even today, one can hear the echoes of fear and distrust in the writings and sermons of Iranian leaders. Mohammad Khatami, former President of Iran, writes: “West, in its political appearance, does not want us or any nation or ethnic group to be independent and in charge of our destinies. [This is] Because one aspect of imperialism (which is the nature of Western policy) is violation, exploitation, and domination [of other countries], and another aspect [of imperialism] is the acceptance of dominance and passivity [by the dominated] vis-à-vis greed and domineering policies [of the West] and dependence to them” (my translation, brackets are added). Mohammad Khatami, collected articles in Persian, Fear of tide, seemay-e javan, 1372 (1993). 8 The National Front was formed as the opposition party with Mohammad Mosaddegh as its leader. It comprised mostly the Toilers party (a working middle class party), Mojahedin-e Islam (a religious party), and the Pan-Iranist party (a nationalist party). 9 The 1944 bill prohibited the Iranian government from signing a concession with any foreign power. At the time, the USSR was using all the tools available to obtain a concession for oil exploration and extraction in northern Iran. This bill ended their aspiration for the time being, and as it turned out until now. 10 There are different figures for the fatalities and casualties. They range from a few hundred to many thousands. 11 Basically, as the Secretary of State put it in two memoranda to President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laired on the eve of Shah’s visit to the US, even though these procurements were not absolutely necessary for Iran’s defense needs, their denial in pursuit of good arms policy is not worth alienating the Shah and losing a good sale (www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/Nixon/e4/72108.htm). 12 This position, of course, was due to the fact that Iranian arm forces decisively changed their allegiance from the Shah to the Revolution and therefore any attempt by a loyal faction to the Shah would have been really bloody. 13 According to Ali Abdi, one of the student leaders reportedly said “the students speculated that the role of American public opinion in ending the Vietnam war could have similarly helped their cause as well. They predicted that the whole seizure of the embassy would take no more than a week and the relations between the two countries would return to normal” (Alikhani 2000: 21). 14 On the economic front, Carter boycotted the importation of Iranian oil, froze Iranian assets estimated at the time to be around $12 billion, and finally imposed a complete sanction against trade with Iran other than humanitarian assistance. On the political front, he persuaded the UN Security Council to pass a resolution condemning the

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diplomatic violation and ordered their immediate release. On the military front, he ordered a rescue mission, which failed due to extreme weather in the Iranian desert. It left one downed helicopter, eight dead servicemen, and another black mark on US pride. Prior to the 1980 election, both the Carter and Reagan campaigns were accused in the media of the so-called “October surprise.” The Reagan camp was accused of secret meetings with Iranians to prevent hostage release before the election. The Carter camp was accused of planning a military action for the release of the hostages before the election. However, a Congressional inquiry found no credible evidence of any October surprise by Ronald Reagan. The recent pronouncements of a broader security umbrella beyond Israel in the Middle East that would cover the littoral sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf should not be expected to invite a friendlier posture from Tehran. According to President Ahmadinejad and his protagonists, he meant Israel will be wiped out in the same manner as the former USSR, i.e., non-violently. The relocation of forces to these authoritarian countries would put a burden on the US that would require the US to attend to these countries needs and satisfy their sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis Iran in the short run. On the other hand, the inhabitants of these countries might start to buy Osama bin Laden’s cry of foul play and become disenchanted with their own governments, and by implication, with the US. Soon, their governments’ corruption and mismanagement will be America’s to solve. The US might be able to tactfully finesse and maneuver its way around for a while. But in the medium to long run, these countries are going to be albatrosses around America’s neck exactly the way the late Shah of Iran was in the 1970s. When, not if, the time comes and people in these countries overthrow their corrupt absolute monarchies, the US government will have to pay dearly for its miscalculations, in the same way the US has paid for its unconditional support of the Shah’s regime in the last three decades.

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Klein, Aaron. “Israel: We’ll ‘destroy’ Iran: Harsh Warning as Region under General War Alert.” Available from www. worldnetdaily.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=60965, April 7, 2008. Kupchan, Charles and Ray Takyeh. “Iran Just Won’t Stay Isolated,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2008. Leverett, Flynt. “The Gulf Between Us,” New York Times, January 24, 2006. Lewis, Neil A. “House Inquiry Finds No Evidence of Deal On Hostages in 1980,” The New York Times, January 13, 1993. Leyne, Jon. “Stark Choice in Iran Policy Battles,” BBC News Tehran. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/7489430.stm, Monday, 7 July 2008. Linzer, Dafna. “Past Arguments Don’t Square with Current Iran Policy,” Washington Post. Available from www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3983–2005Mar26.html, March 27, 2005. Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt. The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007). Milani, Abbas. Persian Sphinx: Amir Abas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution (Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2000). Milani, Mohsen. The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988): 79–99. Mina, Parviz. History and Evolution of Iranian Oil Agreements (1901–78). Available from www.iranica.com/newsite/articles/ ot_grp6/ot_oil_agreements_20040818.html, August 18, 2004. Moin, Bagher. Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999). Murphy, Dan. “Can Rice Rally Middle East Against Iran?” Christian Science Monitor, Wednesday, October 4, 2006. Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). Powers, Thomas. “Iran: the Threat,” The New York Review of Books, 55(12), July 17, 2008. Available from www.nybooks. com/articles/21592. Ramazani, R. K. “Enlightened Iranians Clamor for Representative Democracy,” Charlottesville Daily Progress, April 6, 2008. Sick, Gary. “Iran: a View From the White House,” World Affairs, 149(4): Spring 1987: 209–13. ——“Iran’s Foreign policy: A Revolution in Transition,” in Nikki Keddie and Rudi Matthee, eds, Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics (University of Washington Press, 2002: 355–74). Stern, Roger. “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security,” Journal of National Academy of Science, 104(1): January 2, 2007: 377–82. ——“Iran’s Nuclear Drive Linked to Looming Oil Crisis: US Study,” Agence France Presse, December 25, 2006. Takyeh, Ray. “Time for Détente with Iran,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007: 17–32. Unger, Craig. House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties (Scribner, 2004). US State Department. “Foreign Relations, 1969–72, Vol. 4, Iran and Iraq.” Available from www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/ frus/Nixon/e4/72108.htm.

36 The United States and Yemen A history of unfulfilled expectations J. E. Peterson

Yemen has never figured in the front rank of US foreign policy interests, even within only the Middle East. Nevertheless, it has occupied a certain and often significant degree of Washington’s attention and concern at almost regular intervals across the last half-century. This has been even more true in the 2000s. Two constants over this entire period have been Washington’s twin focus on Yemen’s impact on Saudi Arabia and the stability of successive Yemeni regimes. All too often, Yemen has been a haven for ideological forces that have been antithetical to US interests. The nature of these anti-status quo forces has evolved over time. The US, for its part, fundamentally a supporter of the status quo in the region, has maintained a steady if wobbly policy of engaging Sanaa governments while simultaneously regarding them as fragile, undependable, and/or untrustworthy. This certainly holds true today, as a regime narrowly based on a foundation of support by the military and two smallish tribes appears unable or unwilling to contain Islamist extremism, wages ineffective yet brutal war on its own citizens, and is powerless to deal with such pressing socioeconomic crises as an exploding population, pervasive and persistent poverty, declining modest petroleum revenues, and a precipitous fall in vital water resources. There is a certain symmetry between the beginning of relations between the US and Yemen in the 1960s and relations in the 2000s. In both cases, the US sought to improve relations not to further direct US interests in Yemen but mainly because of US fears that the instability in Yemen and the presence there of antagonistic elements would create security problems for the region and farther afield. In the 1960s, the civil war in the north threatened to unleash panArab nationalism and Nasserism on the Arabian Peninsula, while the emergence of an independent state in the south was seen as even more threatening with its Marxist ideology and total dependence on communist-bloc backers. In the 2000s, the specter of Islamist extremism in the form of jihadist activism has emerged as a direct challenge not only to the Yemen government but to the US as well.

Background US relations with Yemen date to the 1940s. Diplomatic relations between the US and Yemen were established in 1946, and an American mission was established in Taʿizz, the de facto capital, in 1959 but moved to Sanaa in 1966. A Yemeni mission was opened in Washington before the 1962 revolution, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) started a small aid program, punctuated by the building of the road between Mocha, Taʿizz, and Sanaa.1 The next step in US–Yemeni relations occurred with the revolution in the north.2 Washington had seen its influence slipping in the Arab world as the wave of “progressive” Arab regimes began toppling monarchies and older constitutional regimes. Thus, the US was forced into a defensive posture that backed the remaining conservative regimes in the region.

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The coup d’état of September 26, 1962 in Sanaa removed an extremely conservative monarchy—with which Washington had gotten along even if relations were not close. Furthermore, the coup replaced the monarchy with a radical republic—at least in rhetoric—that was strongly supported by Nasser’s pan-Arab socialist Egypt. Indeed, the coup was quite likely engineered by Cairo. Nevertheless, President Kennedy chose to make a statement of his willingness to work with Nasser and the emerging order in the Arab world. Accordingly, the US was one of the first countries to recognize the Yemen Arab Republic. It was largely an empty gesture as Britain opposed it and Saudi Arabia felt directly threatened (and gave refuge to the Imam and his family).3 Alienation from the Sanaa regime continued to grow as the civil war grew more entrenched and Soviet advisers appeared on the republican side. US–Yemeni relations remained low key after the civil war. Washington welcomed the negotiated end to the civil war, and there was always a US embassy in Sanaa and the provision of a modest amount of aid. Nevertheless, US interests lay squarely with Saudi Arabia, and Yemen was mostly marginal to US foreign policy. Key US interests included the fear that the regime would collapse and the country would descend into anarchy that would threaten the conservative regimes of the Arabian Peninsula. The small amount of assistance that the US provided seemed to be a small, local side-show in the global cold war. The US and the Soviet Union both vied to provide military equipment to North Yemen, while the Sanaa regime was seen as a bulwark against the more radical South Yemen. Washington’s relations with South Yemen were far more troubled. Aden had been the site of the first US consulate in the Arabian Peninsula, established about 1940. It made a good listening post for Yemen and for Saudi Arabia as well until a consulate was established in Jiddah in 1942. Indeed, much of the information gathered seemed to be garnered from the British, who held Aden as a crown colony and the surrounding hinterland as a protectorate. For that reason, an American diplomatic presence in Aden was never a problem—until opposition groups began carrying out a campaign of hostile acts against the British presence in the 1960s. By November 1967, Britain was forced to hand over control of Aden and the protectorates to the radical National Liberation Front (NLF).4 The new People’s Republic of Southern Yemen, later renamed the People’s Republic of Democratic Yemen (PDRY), continued to have diplomatic relations with both Britain and the US even though it began building close ties with China, the Soviet Union, and East Germany. It was not long before the regime lurched even further to the left. At Independence Day celebrations in 1969, the PDRY abruptly announced it was cutting off relations with the US and ousting its embassy in Aden. This development was not unexpected, particularly as the US ally Saudi Arabia had been funding and providing arms to various small South Yemeni groups that attempted to overthrow the regime from exile. Another reason for US suspicion of South Yemen was the logistical and safe-basing support that Aden provided for the leftist opposition front waging an insurrection in Oman’s southern province of Dhufar. Furthermore, the NLF had grown out of the Arab Nationalists’ Movement (ANM), and consequently its ties were close to such radical Palestinian groups as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, organizations that had acted against US interests on multiple occasions. Clearly, the US would have liked to see changes in Aden but apparently it did not regard the PDRY stance as threatening enough to justify active intervention. Fundamentally, the PDRY was a small, weak, and poor country that could do little real harm. Containment was a better and less risky option.

Unification and the crisis of 1990–91 The year 1990 was a momentous one for US–Yemeni relations. The first development was the long hoped for achievement of Yemeni unity in May. Unity had been a cherished goal since

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before the 1962 revolution in the north, but had been stymied by the denouement of the British presence in the south. After Aden’s independence, the North Yemeni government turned more conservative, while the South Yemeni government became more radical. One consequence was the outbreak of two small border wars in 1972 and 1979, which ended with renewed commitments to achieving unity.5 The key to a change in the environment that would actually permit the process of unity was the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. The loss of its principal supporter pushed South Yemen into bankruptcy. (In addition, internecine struggles in 1969, 1971, 1982, and especially 1986 had removed many of the principal figures in South Yemeni politics and resulted in a less doctrinaire leadership.) The regime in Aden had no choice but to accept unity with the north essentially on the north’s terms. But only a few months after unification was achieved in May, the new Republic of Yemen (ROY) found itself in a serious crisis provoked by Iraq’s August invasion of Kuwait. Yemen’s relations with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq had been relatively warm, and Sanaa had joined with Iraq and Jordan to form the Arab Co-operation Council, an attempt to answer and emulate the far more viable Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). Furthermore, Yemeni public opinion seemed to be solidly in favor of Iraq’s action. But, most importantly, Yemen held a seat on the UN Security Council at the time. The combination of its existing relations with Iraq and public opinion at home caused Yemen to abstain on a series of resolutions meant to condemn Iraq and authorize action to liberate Kuwait. The consequence was the deportation of approximately one million Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia and a termination of all foreign aid from the US and most Western countries. It took years for Yemen to get back into Washington’s good graces, and diplomatic relations were not re-established with Kuwait until 1999. As a consequence, US–ROY relations remained low key during the early to mid-1990s. Certainly, some US interests remained, principally the holding of the former North Yemen’s principal oil concession by US company Hunt Oil, as well as the awarding of the concession held by Canadian Occidental (a Canadian subsidiary of a US company) in the former South Yemen. In addition, the US sought to broker better relations between Riyadh and Sanaa. Furthermore, President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih, who came to power in 1978, was clever in providing a growing semblance of democratization, as demonstrated in holding free elections for a parliament. This attracted Washington’s attention given the emphasis on democratization as a bulwark of declared US policy towards the Middle East at the time. The National Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute both opened offices in Sanaa to observe elections and to encourage additional steps.

The US and the 1994 civil war After unity in 1990, the south quickly found itself reduced from constituting an independent country to being simply several smaller and less populated provinces of a united Yemen. At first, the south’s Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) became a junior partner with President Salih’s General People’s Congress (GPC) in governing the Republic of Yemen (ROY), and national leadership was formally invested in a five-man Presidential Council. But it was clear that Salih retained the actual reins of power and the council was subsequently disbanded. The YSP was soon cast out into opposition as the GPC turned to the conservative al-Islah party as its coalition partner. Simply put, the much smaller population of the former south meant that the YSP had no more influence in the legislature than it did in united Yemen’s practical politics. Popular opinion in the south shifted from strong opposition to the YSP at the time of unity to grudging support for the party as a quasi national symbol of southern identity. As the years passed, it became increasingly clear that President Salih did not consider the south as an equal half of the state. By 1994, the situation had become so tense that the principal southern politicians had withdrawn to Aden. In May, the YSP leaders gathered all the southern political figures they could

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find, including even right-wing figures who had opposed the NLF/YSP before independence, and declared independence for a new Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY). Fighting broke out soon after between northern and southern army units, and gradually DRY forces were on the retreat to Aden and finally to the Hadramawt in the east. The war was over in a matter of weeks.6 The US assumed no definitive position on the war, confining itself largely to supporting GCC calls for a ceasefire, which if it took effect would have favored the south. Despite this, President Salih subsequently told the Kuwait Times that “The United States supported the unity of Yemen. We had the green light from them to maintain the unity. The US wanted the region (Yemen) united and not partitioned, we felt that.”7 A few months later, an improvement in bilateral relations was signaled by a letter from President Clinton to President Salih urging good relations between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. According to an Arab newspaper, Sanaa’s dismissal of Iraqi trainers for ROY’s MiG-29 fighters was a prime cause of the changing climate.8 The theme of US support for a Saudi–Yemeni border agreement gained additional support from comments by the US ambassador to Sanaa in 1997.9 A further sign of improvement came in 1997 with Washington’s dispatch of a team of experts to remove land mines placed during the 1994 war.10 By 1998, Yemen was co-operating regularly with the US in providing access to Aden for US naval port calls and bunkering. However, the positive climate changed after the USS Cole was attacked in Aden harbor in 2000 and the 9/11 attacks took place a year later.

US–ROY relations after the attacks on the USS Cole and of September 11, 2001 There were other signs of gradually and slightly improving relations through the late 1990s and beyond. Certainly Yemen was low on the list of Washington’s priorities, but it was deemed advisable to nudge Yemen and Saudi Arabia towards a better working relationship. On the other hand, Sanaa and Washington definitely held deeply divergent views on Arab– Israeli matters, and the US continued to be irritated by Yemen’s relations with Saddam’s Iraq. US aid slowed to a trickle and the USAID closed its Sanaa office. Economic ties proceeded on an even path but at a minor level, thus mirroring political relations. US goods exports to Yemen in 2002 totaled only $366 million, compared with $1 billion to Kuwait for example. Imports from Yemen totaled $246 million, mainly crude oil and coffee, again compared with $2 billion from Kuwait. Still, the US indicated its desire to negotiate a free trade agreement with Yemen as part of its broader regional trade framework.11 The biggest factor in economic relations was oil. The US firm Hunt Oil Company began prospecting in Yemen onshore in 1981 and offshore in 1984. The company struck oil in 1984 in the Ma’rib region east of Sanaa in a structure that appeared to stretch across the border into South Yemen.12 Work began subsequently on a pipeline to the Red Sea coast and a small domestic refinery at Ma’rib. Exports began in December 1987, initially at 130,000 barrels per day (b/d).13 Hunt’s offshore exploration was unsuccessful, as were the efforts of Exxon and Texaco in other concessions, but Exxon subsequently became a partner with Hunt in the Yemen Hunt Oil Company, which operated the producing Block 18. After unification, Canadian Occidental Petroleum, a subsidiary of American Occidental, began producing in the Masilah field in the Hadramawt region of what had been South Yemen.14 By the time of the civil war in 1994, Hunt was producing 170,000 b/d and CanOxy was producing 150,000 b/d.15 Production in both areas was shut down only temporarily during the hostilities. Another impact of unification was the availability of two additional pipelines, one to al-Shihr on the Arabian Sea and the other to al-Nashimah in the Gulf of Aden, thus allowing oil to be exported easily in various directions.16 Helped by exploration and discoveries in a number of new concessions, Yemeni oil production peaked at 450,000 b/d in 2000.17 But as fields matured, Yemen faced steadily

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declining production, despite the government’s sustained efforts. It shrank to 380,000 b/d in 2006 and to 317,000 in 2007.18 Production and export was also impeded from time to time by repetitious attacks on the pipelines by disgruntled tribes and workers’ strikes. US interests in hydrocarbons suffered a blow in 2005 when Yemen expropriated the Hunt Oil/Exxon Mobil concession and reassigned it to a state-owned company. The two US companies sought international arbitration alleging breach of contract. In August 2008, the International Chamber of Commerce ruled in favor of Yemen.19 Despite this disagreement, Hunt has continued to operate the smaller Jannah Hunt Oil Company concession, which has averaged 45,000 b/d of production in recent years.20 Hunt has also been instrumental in the development of Yemen’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) export industry since 1997 and holds a substantial interest in the Yemen LNG Company. The start-up of the first train was expected in December 2008.21 There is a long, if fitful, history of US development assistance to Yemen, beginning with road building during the last years of the Imamate in the North. Low-level assistance continued off and on after the end of the North Yemeni civil war (1962–70) until the debacle of 1990. US and other Western development aid almost completely dried up at that time. It took until 1993 for USAID funding for Yemen to reach about $4 million, still only one-fifth of the amount offered at the beginning of the 1980s.22 By 1995, assistance had increased to $9.4 million.23 But Yemen’s debt to the US also grew, totaling about $102 million in the same year. In 1998, bilateral agreements were signed to forgive some $17 million of the debt.24 USAID closed its Yemen programs in 1996. However, the atmosphere in Yemen had improved enough by 2003 for the mission to reopen.25 The restarted aid program focused on five poor governorates in the north and northeast of Yemen, including Saʿdah, al-Jawf, ‘Amran, Ma’rib, and Shabwah, and concentrated on maternal and child health, basic education, income, food security, and democracy promotion. Not coincidentally, these governorates suffer heavily from inadequate socioeconomic infrastructure and were specifically targeted because it was felt that, for this reason, they were susceptible to terrorist recruitment and provided havens for terrorists.26 Yemen became eligible for the Threshold Program of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC; an arm of the US government that provides aid for the poorest countries) in 2004 and then received $14.8 million in aid during 2005. The total amount disbursed dropped to $9 million the following year when the ROY’s MCC eligibility was withdrawn because of the repression of journalists and pervasive corruption. As a consequence, Yemen never saw the $30 million in MCC support requested for 2007 and lost in excess of $100 million in aid from the World Bank. However, in November 2007, the MCC declared that Yemen had made enough reforms to reinstate its eligibility. These were said to include anti-corruption efforts, judicial reforms, enactment of new procurement laws, free elections, re-evaluation of a draconian press law, and implementation of a National Agenda for Reform. As a consequence, the MCC awarded a $20.6 million grant to fight corruption and improve the rule of law on September 12, 2007.27 In addition to more traditional programs for support in health care, education, and agriculture, USAID assistance in Yemen has been targeted towards the National Decentralization Strategy, along with support for local councils at the governorate and district levels in planning, budgeting, and management. It has also provided support for the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum, as well as tribal conflict mitigation programs.28

Security concerns A major focus of US interests in Yemen since 2001 has been the belief that the country is or can be a haven for terrorists. Serious concerns about domestic security had been present in previous decades because of the weakness of the central government in the North and the

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ideological orientation in the South. Elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization were given refuge in North Yemen after the 1982 Israeli sweep into Lebanon, and the South has hosted radical secular Palestinian groups over the years. Later, after the Soviets were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan, as many as 60,000 “Afghan Arabs” made their way to Yemen and set up shop in remote provinces and steadily influenced local radicals and won converts.29 Many Yemenis became convinced that Saudi Arabia was actively proselytizing in Yemen for its ultraconservative Wahhabi view of Islam and that the ranks of the converted included Islamist extremists. Some evidence of extremism appeared before 2001. In 1993, bombs were set off in two Aden hotels where US marines were staying en route to Somalia. As a consequence, the US withdrew its troops from Aden, which had been serving as a refueling port for US forces.30 Furthermore, at least one Yemeni national was suspected of involvement in the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.31 Threats made against the US and British embassies in early 1999 forced the withdrawal of US mine-clearing teams for three months.32 More threats against the US embassy in June 2001 forced the removal of dependents from the country, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) teams investigating the USS Cole attack.33 The most consequential incident by far was the attack on the US warship USS Cole in Aden harbor in October 2000. An explosive-laden boat approached the warship, set off its explosives, and blew a hole in the side of the ship, killing seventeen sailors aboard the USS Cole as well as the suicide attackers. Two years later, a French supertanker, the Limburg, was attacked off the coast of al-Mukalla on the Gulf of Aden. While these two incidents garnered the most attention, they were not the only or the last ones. The US embassy in Sanaa was closed for a week in April 2002 because of a terrorist threat.34 A suspected terrorist attack to kill the US ambassador was thwarted in May 2004.35 The US and British embassies were closed again in April 2005 and non-essential personnel and dependents evacuated.36 In December 2006, a Yemeni man opened fire with an AK-47 on the US embassy and was wounded and captured by Yemeni security forces, but it is not clear whether this incident was terrorist related.37 The latest attack aimed at the US occurred on September 17, 2008 when two cars rammed the barriers in front of the US embassy in Sanaa. The first car sped up to the compound and several attackers began firing at the guards with rocket-propelled grenades and rifles. This was followed by a second car that drove into the gate and exploded in a suicide bombing. The death toll was sixteen, including the six attackers, six security guards, and four bystanders, one of them a US citizen. The embassy was not breached.38

US–ROY military and security co-operation From the low point of 1990–91, military relations improved as the decade progressed, so much so that rumors began to circulate that Sanaa would grant the US basing rights in Yemen, particularly on the island of Socotra. This provoked President Salih to announce that, “It is not our policy to grant facilities to the United States.”39 In April 1998, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs Martin Indyk stopped in Sanaa, and a month later, Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, the Commander in Chief of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), visited Yemen and held talks with President Salih. It was the first time that such a visit had been made, and it was prompted in part by US difficulties in getting Bahraini permission to use that country’s military facilities at the time of the 1998 air strikes on Iraq.40 It is not surprising that the US should be interested in utilizing Aden’s excellent natural harbor. Not only would it provide an alternative if necessary to bases in the Gulf, but it is ideally situated near the vital Red Sea shipping lanes and the volatile Horn of Africa. It is also

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likely that Washington sought greater influence in Yemen in order to stiffen the government’s resolve to act firmly against Islamist activism and to encourage the improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia. Evidence of US military interest was soon forthcoming: a warship became the second US naval vessel to anchor in Aden since 1967, more ship visits were scheduled, and a small joint exercise took place. The new Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Ronald Neumann declared in Sanaa in May 1998 that US interest was more than just security related: “The United States has not paid attention to Yemen for a long time, but we are increasingly recognizing its leading role as a democratic reformer and its importance for regional stability.”41 Security relations continued to forge ahead in 1999, with Zinni making his third visit to Yemen in less than two years amid rumors that the US intended to use Yemen as a military staging post and to open a naval base on Socotra—an assertion quickly denied by Zinni.42 However, a few days later, the Yemeni foreign minister said that his government had no objection to allowing US forces to use its bases “some day if it is in Yemen’s interest.”43 The US already was using Aden for bunkering by this time. In 2000, the US offered its good offices to mediate on Saudi–Yemeni issues, an offer that the Saudis rejected as unnecessary.44 President Salih’s visit to Washington in April 2000 dwelt on US appreciation for easing exit requirements on Yemeni Jews and on Salih’s voicing of appreciation for US development efforts in his country.45 By the time of the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, Zinni had made four visits to Yemen, and the US Navy had made twenty-three port visits to Aden, a relationship that Zinni insisted had developed because of Aden’s strategic location and not as an attempt to curry favor with the ROY government.46 One consequence of the USS Cole attack was the withdrawal, at least temporarily, of the mine-clearing teams.47 The attack refocused US attention on Yemen as a haven for terrorists. Paradoxically, another effect was to demonstrate Yemen’s near-complete inability to police its own territorial waters. If similar actions were not to reoccur, Yemen would need substantive help in boosting its territorial security. General Tommy Franks, Zinni’s successor at CENTCOM, visited Yemen in January 2001, a joint US–Yemeni team was formed to track down the USS Cole perpetrators, US assistance was provided for upgrading security at its airports a few months after the US ambassador’s plane was hijacked, and the State Department sent Edmund Hull, its Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, to Yemen as the new ambassador.48 Ten months after the bombing, US–Yemeni security relations were returning to normal. Franks, on another visit to Sanaa, presented proposals for relaunching a planned joint exercise and resuming the Aden port calls.49 Relations grew more complicated following the 9/11 attacks. Not only was al-Qaeda linked with activities in Yemen through the USS Cole incident, but Washington was convinced that the ROY government was not being vigorous in rooting out al-Qaeda supporters and other Islamist extremists. Former Yemeni Prime Minister and Foreign Minister ‘Abd al-Karim alIryani was dispatched to Washington to discuss matters two weeks after 9/11.50 Both President Salih and the speaker of the parliament, Shaykh ‘Abdullah Husayn al-Ahmar, distanced Yemen from the US-led attack on Afghanistan.51 President Salih himself visited Washington in November to assure the US of his positive intentions vis-à-vis terrorism and agreed to permit greater access to US investigators of the USS Cole attack. In return, the US said it would help improve Yemen’s special forces and provide some development assistance to the remote governorates in which terrorists were believed to operate.52 By trumpeting its willingness to co-operate, Yemen escaped the possibility that it would be a US target after Afghanistan. As a sign of good faith, the government announced that it was hunting several tribesmen suspected of being key agents in the al-Qaeda network.53 Early 2002 saw a number of top US officials dropping into Sanaa to emphasize the need for co-operation in security and anti-terrorism efforts. These included Robert Mueller, Director of the US FBI, in January, George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in

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the following month, and Vice President Richard Cheney in March.54 Furthermore, US officials were sent to Yemen to inspect security arrangements at Aden port as a prelude to resuming port calls there. A US cargo ship put into Aden in October, the first US ship to do so since the USS Cole bombing.55 Still, there were concerns about Salih’s intentions as he apparently continued to deal with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and bought North Korean Scud missiles. In addition, it was believed that ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Nashiri, the chief of al-Qaeda’s operations in the Gulf and a major planner of the USS Cole attack, was moving freely in Yemen. Still, the US felt it was necessary to deal with and support the Sanaa government in order to root out alleged terrorists from the remote provinces. In addition to training Yemeni troops, support included the dispatch of Special Forces to Yemen, and the CIA began flying Predator drones over Yemeni territory.56 One of these drones was used to kill the leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen ‘Ali Qa’id Sinan al-Harithi and associates in November 2002 by remote control.57 The Yemeni government admitted its co-operation in the attack only after more than a year had passed.58 Security co-operation went through ups and downs, partly due to disagreements over how investigations and suspects should be handled and partly over Yemeni public suspicion of ties between Sanaa and Washington. A Sanaa demonstration against the expected US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 resulted in the death of two demonstrators.59 Shortly afterwards, the US State Department issued a travel warning because of a terrorist threat and let dependent personnel leave Yemen in March and again in August.60 The persistence of these threats convinced President Salih to agree to the opening of an FBI office in Yemen.61 In November, Yemen announced its success in the arrest of local al-Qaeda leader Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal.62 Another bone of contention was US insistence on the extradition to the United States of prominent Islamist figure ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who had been designated in February 2004 as a US Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US Treasury Department.63 The Yemen government refused on grounds that it could not extradite any citizen.64 More to the point, Zindani was a founding figure in Yemen’s principal opposition party al-Islah, runs alIman private university, and has considerable support throughout the country and even in the government. In September 2005, the ROY government formally asked the US government to drop charges against Zindani as it felt that they were based on partisan newspapers. If there was any real proof, Sanaa said, it should be submitted to the Yemen government, which would then be obligated to take appropriate action.65 The US returned to the attack in February 2006, when Bush sent a letter to Salih asking him to arrest Zindani. Again, Yemen demurred and asked for evidence of his involvement with terrorism.66 Still, Yemen somewhat grudgingly permitted the US greater access to terrorism suspects and participation in the prosecution of the suspects accused of bombing the USS Cole during their 2004 trial. Many of the defendants were being tried in absentia, including mastermind ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Nashiri who was in secret US custody at an unnamed location.67 In return, the US agreed to hand over to Sanaa seven of the approximately 100 Yemeni detainees in Guantánamo Bay. The up-and-down nature of political and security relations continued into recent years. Remarks in 2005 by US ambassador Thomas Krajeski contending that Yemen had halted progress toward democracy drew rapid condemnation from the ROY government.68 On the other hand, President Salih was invited to visit Washington, DC, in November 2005, his third trip since 9/11. A major subject of his talks with President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice centered on co-ordinating anti-terrorism strategies, but the Bush administration was also said to have pressured Salih on the lack of progress of democracy in Yemen.69 A few months later, it was revealed that US naval ships were patrolling Yemeni waters in an effort to block maritime escape routes for the suspected al-Qaeda members who had been part of a mass escape from prison in 2004.70 In March 2006, three Yemenis who had been held in secret prison locations by US agents since 2003 were turned over to Yemen, which quietly released them after concluding that they had no terrorist ties.71

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Another cause of contention was Jamal al-Badawi, one of the suspected planners of the USS Cole attack who had escaped from prison in 2004 but was recaptured in September 2006. The US protested the ROY government’s apparent release of Badawi in October 2007 and threatened to cut off aid through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.72 When this caused Condoleezza Rice to withdraw from the US-sponsored Forum for the Future on reform in the Middle East, Yemen cancelled the event.73 Throughout this period, Badawi’s status was less than clear. Some Yemeni officials asserted that he had been released so that he could help track down other al-Qaeda members, an option that seemed to mesh with Yemen’s policy of re-educating Islamist extremists.74 This approach did not go down well in Washington. The administration sent FBI director Robert Mueller to Yemen in April 2008 to express Washington’s opposition—a visit that accomplished little.75 In addition, an Arab-American former FBI agent who had participated in the USS Cole investigation lambasted Yemen’s lukewarm attitude and what he saw as an inadequately aggressive US policy vis-à-vis Yemen.76 Washington renewed its military relations with Yemen gradually over the years after the USS Cole attack. Port calls to Aden port by US naval vessels resumed, joint exercises were held, and seven gunboats were delivered by 2004.77 The US was instrumental in the creation of the Yemeni coastguard and has provided assistance to the anti-terrorism unit of the ROY Central Security forces and the Ministry of the Interior.78

US views of Yemen’s stability The net result of this tortured history of co-operation and disagreement has been a heightened and continuing official US fear that Yemen will not be able to control extremists in its territory. In part, this is because of Yemen’s dire economic situation. It is one of the world’s poorest countries and its resources, ranging from oil to water, are being rapidly depleted. A rapidly expanding population, now approaching 23 million, threatens to make a dire situation worse. Ironically, Yemen’s problems are compounded by the necessity of providing refuge and assistance to citizens of a country even worse off, a wave of Somalis crossing the Red Sea. President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih has been in power for more than a third of a century, far more than anyone expected and has proven far cleverer than anticipated. The future after Salih is a matter for great concern. His regime is based on his personal control of the reins of power, exercised through his own small tribe and an equally small allied tribe. It is widely believed that Salih is grooming his son, Ahmad, for succession, in the manner of Hafiz alAs’ad in Syria and potentially Husni Mubarak in Egypt. It is questionable whether such a tactic will work and, if so, whether Ahmad can long retain power in an inherently fractious and fissiparous political environment. While the power of the central government has improved markedly since unification, it is still weak. The outlying provinces bordering the great Rubʿ al-Khali Desert are largely autonomous and harbor numerous extremists with relative impunity. Salih’s victory in the 1994 civil war has been regarded by most southerners as a humiliating defeat and a northern occupation. Tensions on this account remain strong, and demonstrations and acts of violence by southerners against domination by northerners occur with some regularity. In addition, Sanaa has fought a long-running war against the Huthis, a Zaydi Shi‘i group in the far north of the country, during which it has committed numerous brutalities. While active fighting seemed to have been brought to an end in mid-2008, many of the underlying causes of the fighting remain unresolved, among them Zaydi uneasiness at the increasing Sunni Salafi influence in Yemen and in the government in particular. Finally, the more the ROY government co-operates with the US in the matter of terrorism and security, the more opposition it generates among its own people. The US is exceedingly unpopular throughout the Middle East and beyond. Yemen is no exception. There are foundations and

The US and Yemen

511

good reasons for better relations. But the road to improvement is unpaved and potholed. For both sides, unfortunately, the incentives to enhance ties do not seem to be vital enough to alter continuing policies in any truly significant way.

Notes 1 US Department of State, Background Note: Yemen (December 2007). Available from www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 35836.htm. A good overview of US–Yemeni relations is Ahmed Noman Kassim Almadhagi, Yemen and the United States: A Study of a Small Power and Super-State Relationship, 1962-1994 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996). 2 On the politics of the Yemen Arab Republic, see Robert W. Stookey, Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978); J. E. Peterson, Yemen: The Search for a Modern State (London: Croom Helm; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Mohammed Ahmad Zabarah, Yemen: Traditionalism vs. Modernity (New York: Praeger, 1982); and Robert D. Burrowes, The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962–1986 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press; London: Croom Helm, 1987). On both Yemens, see Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens (London: Longman; Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983) and Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 3 On Saudi Arabia’s relations with Yemen, see Saeed M. Badeeb, The Saudi–Egyptian Conflict Over North Yemen, 1962– 1970 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Washington: American–Arab Affairs Council, 1986); F. Gregory Gause III, Saudi–Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); and Renaud Detalle, ed., Tensions in Arabia: The Saudi–Yemeni Faultline (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000). 4 On independent South Yemen, see Robert W. Stookey, South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press; London: Croom Helm, 1982); Joseph Kostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984); Helen Lackner, P.D.R. Yemen: Outpost of Socialist Development in Arabia (London: Ithaca Press, 1985); and Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen 1967–1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 5 On the relations between the two Yemens and the achievement of unity, see J. E. Peterson, Conflict in the Yemens and Superpower Involvement (Washington: Georgetown University, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1981); F. Gregory Gause, III, “Yemeni Unity: Past and Future,” Middle East Journal, 42(1), Winter 1988: 32–47; Joseph Kostiner, Yemen: The Torturous Quest for Unity, 1990–94 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996; Chatham House Paper); and Charles Dunbar, “The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects,” Middle East Journal, 46(3), Summer 1992: 456–76. On Yemeni politics after unity, see Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Dresch, Modern History, op. cit. 6 On the progress of the war, see David Warburton, “The Conventional War in Yemen,” Arab Studies Journal, 3(1), 1995: 20–44. On the factors leading up to the war, see the contributions in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi, ed., The Yemeni War of 1994: Causes and Consequences (London: Saqi Books, 1995). 7 Reuters, December 14, 1994. 8 Reuters, February 5, 1995, citing al-Hayat (London), February 4, 1995. 9 Reuters, December 6, 1997. 10 Reuters, July 3 and December 6, 1997. 11 Reuters, February 4, 2004. 12 Middle East International, 231, 10 August 1984; Financial Times, November 26, 1984. 13 Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), October 26, 1987; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), December 10, 1987, Sanaa Domestic Service, December 10, 1987; Washington Post, December 11, 1987. 14 In 2000, CanOxy bought out Occidental’s ownership in the country, but the two companies continued to be partners in the Masilah field. Reuters, March 1, 2000. 15 AP, June 7, 1994. 16 MEES, April 20, 1998. 17 Reuters, December 18, 2000. 18 Yemen Observer, February 3, 2007; SABA News Agency (SABAnet), February 27, 2008. 19 New York Times, November 24, 2005; SABAnet, August 12, 2008; Yemen Post, August 25, 2008. 20 Hunt Oil Company website, www.huntoil.com/. 21 Hunt Oil Company website, www.huntoil.com/. 22 American Institute for Yemeni Studies, Yemen Update, 33, Summer–Fall 93: 4. 23 Yemen Times, April 1995. 24 Reuters, May 19, 1998. 25 Alfred B. Prados and Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Current Conditions and U.S. Relations” (Washington: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RS21808, January 4, 2007: 6). 26 US Agency for International Development (AID), “Feature Story: Yemen,” February 12, 2007. Available from www.usaid.gov/our_work/features/yemen/index.html. 27 US Millennium Challenge Corporation, press release, February 14, 2007. Available from www.mcc.gov/press/ releases/documents/release-021407-boardreinstatesyemen.php; MCC press statement, October 26, 2007. Available from www.mcc.gov/press/releases/documents/pressstmt-102607-yemen.php.

512 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

J. E. Peterson

AID country summary. Available from www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/yemen/. New York Times, December 16, 2002. Washington Post, December 30, 1992 and January 3, 1993. Reuters, September 2, 1998. Agence-France Presse (AFP), March 23, 1999. Reuters, June 12 and July 9, 2001. Reuters, April 19, 23, and 26, 2002; AP April 23, 2002. UPI, June 9, 2004. Yemen arrested two men more than a year later for trying to throw a hand grenade at the ambassador. Reuters, October 13, 2005. AP, April 9, 2005. Reuters, December 5, 2006. New York Times, September 17, 2008. A government security official disclosed on November 1, 2008 that the attackers had been trained at al-Qaeda camps in the Hadramawt and Ma’rib and that three of them had returned from Iraq. The final death toll was said to be nineteen. AP, November 1, 2008. AFP, April 23, 1998. IPS, May 1998; al-Watan al-ʿArabi (Paris), June 12, 1998. The latter source also claims that US–ROY talks were held in November 1997 about the possibility of conducting joint maneuvers. Bahrain plays host to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. Washington Times, June 24, 1998. AFP, April 26, 1999. Reuters, May 16, 1999. Reuters, February 19 and March 23, 2000. AP, April 4, 2000. CNN, October 19, 2000. Reuters, November 9, 2000. Reuters, January 11, April 28, and September 25, 2001; al-Zaman (Sanaa), March 20, 2001; AP, May 3, 2001. Middle East Newsline, August 17 and 28, 2001. Reuters, September 27, 1971. Reuters, October 15 and 22, 2001. Yemen Times, November 12, 2001; Reuters, November 22, 2001; New York Times, November 25, 2001; AP, November 27, 2001. Yemen Times, December 3, 2001; Reuters, December 7, 2001. These were subsequently identified as Qa’id Salim Sunyan al-Harithi and Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal. The Yemeni foreign minister revealed that the government was negotiating for their surrender. AP, January 29, 2002. Yemen News Agency SABA website, January 21, 2002; Reuters, February 16, 2002; March 14, 2002. AP, March 14 and October 20, 2002. New York Times, December 16, 2002. AP, November 5, 2002; Reuters, November 6, 2002. Reuters, January 24, 2004. Reuters, March 21, 2003. Reuters, March 29, 2003; AP, August 20, 2003. Reuters, September 30, 2003. Aljazeera.net, November 30, 2003. Prados and Sharp, “Yemen,” op. cit.: 3. UPI, May 6, 2004. Yemen Observer, September 24, 2005. Washington Post, February 23, 2006; Reuters, February 24, 2006. AP, July 29, 2004. AFP, October 10, 2005. Yemen Times, November 14, 2005. Reuters, February 9, 2006. New York Times, April 5, 2006. AP, October 29, 2007. AFP, January 24, 2008. New York Times, January 28, 2008. Newsweek, April 26, 2008. Ali H. Soufan in the Washington Post, May 17, 2008. Aljazeera.net, February 21, 2004. Prados and Sharp, “Yemen,” op. cit.: 2.

Index

2006 National Security Strategy of the United States 255 2008 Trafficking in Persons Report 384 9/11: Bahrain-US relations 438–39; Egypt-US relations 291; Iran-US relations 491–94; and Israeli interests 370; Libya-US relations 269–70; Morocco-US relations 244–45; Qatar-US relations 394; response to 19; Saudi Arabia-US relations 414–15; Syria-US relations 326–27; United Arab Emirates (UAE)-US relations 383–87; Yemen-US relations 505–6, 507–10 “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” 328–29 Abbas, Mahmoud (Abu Mazen) 169 Abbott, K.W. 52 Abdellah, Mohammed 88 accountability 154 Achille Lauro 291 Aden 411, 503 Adler, Emanuel 10, 60 Afghanistan: power relations 15; role in US-Pakistan relations 212; Soviet occupation 367–68; US intervention 58–59 Africa Command (AFRICOM) 35, 231 Ahmadinejad, Mahmud 58, 493 aid: Jordan 347–50; Tunisia 251 al-Aqsa intifada 326 Al-Attiyya, Abderaham 97 Al-jaber, Sheikh Ahmad 455 Al Jabouri, Samir Ahmed Mahmoud 172–74 Al Jaburi, Ahlam 172, 173–74 al-Jazeera 395–96, 398, 399–400 Al-Qaeda 112, 414, 508–9; and Qatar 394; rise of 15; targeted by US 27 Al-Zawawi, Qays 421 Albright, Madeleine 141, 185, 479, 491 Algeria: arms purchases 231–32; foreign policy 220–23; in international politics 223–24; National Liberation Front 219–20; nuclear program 96; regional security 230; US response to increased power 222 Algeria-US relations: 9/11 229; bilateral trade 232–33; complexity 219; economic exchanges

222–23; energy and the war on terror 228–29; expansion 233; Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment 232; hostility and pragmatism 220–26; Islamism in Algeria 226–27; security, political and economic cooperation 229–33; terrorism 229–30; US military 230–31 Algiers Accord, 1975 75 Alliance Base 230 alliance curse 38, 46–48 Ambrose, Stephen 88 American Mission 282–83 Annapolis Conference 32, 62, 89, 186, 367–69 Aoun, E. 60 Aoun, General Michel 317–18 Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZA) 345–46 Arab Human Development Reports (AHDRs) 33, 87, 440–41 Arab-Israeli conflict 12–13; Jordan-US relations 201–3, 205; peace process 14, 183–84 see also separate heading; role of Morocco 241–42, 244; Tunisian position 249 Arab-Israeli War, 1948 70–71, 284 Arab-Israeli War, 1956 71 Arab-Israeli War, 1967 72 Arab-Israeli War, 1973 73–74, 289, 392, 409–10 Arab League 63; expulsion of Egypt 74–75; formation and purpose 70; impact on US Middle Eastern policies 62; lack of cooperation 98; support for reform 88; US relations with 56–57 Arab Maghreb Union 62 Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (AOPEC) 409 Arab organizations, US relations with 56–57 Arab Peace Initiative 62 Arab populations, demand for conflict 45–46 Arab states: attitudes to UN 58; categorization by US 192 Arab Street, as myth 174–75 Arab Union 469 Arafat, Yasser, peace process 142, 144, 145, 148 archaeology 283 Arendt, Hannah 371

514

Index

Arif, Abd al-Rahman 475 Arif, Abd al-Salam 472, 475 Armey, Dick 327 arms control and regional security (ACRS) 104 arms-for-hostages deal 15 Asad, Bashar el- 325–26, 330, 331, 333–34, 335, 338–39 Assad, Bashar al-137 asymmetrical organizations 413–14 Atatürk, Kemal 11 Atlantic Charter 9 authoritarianism 12, 48–49 autocracy 26; MENA 41; support for 46–48; and underdevelopment 33–34 awakening, political and social 109 Ayubi, Nazih 83 Aziz, King Abd al-404, 405 Aziz, King Saud bin Abd el- 406–7 Ba’aathists, coup 1968 475–76 Badawi, Jamal al- 510 Baghdad Pact 285, 286, 468–69 Bahrain: Economic Development Board 447; industrial diversification 442; National Assembly 440; oil 435–37; regional cooperation 442; relations with Iran 440; relations with Qatar 398 Bahrain-US relations: 9/11 438–39; assessment of relationship 447–48; Bilateral Investment Treaty 443; Bush (G.H.W.) administration 438; Bush (G.W.) administration 438; democratization 440–41; early days 434–35; Free Trade Agreement 444; military and security 437–40; overview 434; trade 444–47 Baker, James 19, 239, 241, 242, 336, 479 Baker Plan II 242 balance of power: MENA 45–46; and nuclear proliferation 104 Baluchi Sunni fundamentalists 493 Bandung Conference 285 banking and finance 86 Bar-Lev Line 289 Barak, Ehud 184; peace process 142–44 Barakat, H. 82 Barghouti, Fadwa 168 Barghouti, Marwan 167–68, 169 Barzani, Masoud 475 Barzani, Mustafa 475 Begin, Menachem 182 Bemer, Jennifer 158 Ben Ali, Zine Al Abidine 252–53, 254, 256 Ben Bella, Ahmed 222 Ben-Meir, Alon 138 Benn, Aluf 363 Bilateral Investment Treaties 443–44 Black Saturday 284 Black September 73, 288 Blair, Tony 273

Bolton, John 54 Boucher, Richard 147–48 Bourguiba, Habib 249, 251–52 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 503 Brammertz, Serge 332 Bretton Woods Agreements 9 Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: assessment of initiative 162; constraints on reform 160–62; reform, economic and governance 164; stages of reform 158–60 Brown, L.C. 80 Brzezinkski, Zbigniew 87–88 Burns, Nicholas 61 Burns, William 230 Bush Doctrine 330, 395 Bush, George H. W. 16 Bush, George W. 82, 171, 273; arguments for invasion of Iraq 356; invasion of Iraq 17; visit to Middle east 2008 355–56 Bush (G.H.W.) administration: Bahrain-US relations 438; Iran-US relations 490; Iraq-US relations 478–79; Morocco-US relations 240–41 Bush (G.W.) administration 185–86; Bahrain-US relations 438; Egypt-US relations 291–92; energy policy and occupation of Iraq 120–22; focus on terror 18–19; globalization 82–84; international organizations 51; Iran-US relations 491–94; Iraq-US relations 480; Israel-US relations 359; Israeli–Palestinian conflict 32; Israeli-Palestinian conflict 358; Lebanese-US relations 320; Libya-US relations 273–76; Morocco-US relations 242–45; peace process 145–47, 149; post 9/11 interventionism 327–28; Qatar-US relations 394–95; Saudi Arabia-US relations 414–15; strategic consensus fantasy 368–69; Syria-US relations 327–29, 330, 335–37, 366–67; Syrian peace process 138; Tunisia-US relations 255–56; United Arab Emirates (UAE)-US relations 383–87; US-EU relations 55–57; weakening influence 356–57 Camp David Accords 73, 74–75, 181, 184, 290, 411 Camp David talks, 2000 142–44 Campbell, Kurt 94 Carrier Strike Group 30 Carter administration: Morocco-US relations 240; Oman-US relations 421; Saudi Arabia-US relations 411–12 Carter Doctrine 25, 26, 30, 378, 393, 421 Carter, Jimmy 25 cash transfers 347–48 Chafetz, Glen 95 Chelgham, Muhammad Abdul Rahman 271 Cheney, Dick 85 China, demand for oil 31

Index Chomsky, Noam 10 CIA, ousting of Mossadegh 11 civic Islam 111 civil rights 441 Clinton administration: Iran-US relations 490; Iraq-US relations 479–80; Israel-US relations 359; Lebanese-US relations 318–19; Libya-US relations 264–66, 268, 272–73; Morocco-US relations 242; Oman-US relations 427; Oslo peace process 141–44; Qatar-US relations 393–94; refugees 182–83 Clinton, Bill: dual containment policy 16; US-EU relations 55 coalition of the willing 53, 438–39, 452 Cobler, Martin 87 Cohen, S. 80 Cohen, William 268 cold war: Arab-Israeli conflicts 13, 71; effect of collapse on Middle east 299; effect on UN 54; ending of 9–10; as model in Middle East 11 colonialism 109–10 Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa 30 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 55 Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement 276 confessional system 310, 312, 313 conflict 175; demand for 45–46 constructivism 10, 51–52, 95 Container Security Initiative 386 containment 176 convergence plan 148–49 Coptic Church 282 Cordesman, Anthony 151, 365 corruption, control of 154 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2007 384 Country Report on Terrorism 384 Cuban missile crisis 298 culture 52 Dahlan, Mohammad 168, 169 Dardari, Abdullah 333 de-globalization 89 Declaration of Principles 14, 61, 136, 139–40, 176, 184–85, 300 decolonization 11, 176 Defense Cooperation Agreement 439 DeLee, Debra 138 democracies, illiberal 34 democracy, promotion of 41 “democratic peace” thesis 9 democratic reform, based on Islam 111 democratization 9, 88, 364; Bahrain 440–41; Tunisia 255–56; United Arab Emirates (UAE)-US relations 385; as US aim 19 demographic threat 185 Department of Defense 35 deterrence 104

515

developmental administration, MENA 44 diplomacy, oil security 30–31 diplomatic country teams, delegation of authority to 35 disaggregation, global Islamist insurgency 28 disillusionment 48 Doha Declaration for Democracy and Reform 395 domestic politics model of nuclear proliferation 95 Dror, Yehezkal 364 dual containment policy 16, 427, 490 Dubai Ports 386–87 Dulles, John Foster 285–86, 407–8, 468–69 “Dutch disease” 20 economic freedom 153–54 Economic Support Fund (ESF) 40 economic underdevelopment 26 education 42 Egypt 73–75; British protectorate 283; nuclear program 96; relations with Saudi Arabia 407–8; tourism 283 Egypt-US relations: 1952–58 285–87; 1967–73 287–89; 9/11 291; areas of tension 293; Bush (G.W.) administration 291–92; Carter administration 289–90; common interests 292; Eisenhower administration 285–86; food aid 287; future 293; Johnson administration 287; Kennedy administration 286; Mubarak era 290–92; Nixon administration 288–89; peace process 289–90; regional conflicts 286–87, 288; role of consuls 282; Second World War and after 283–85; smuggling 292; before World War II 281–83 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty 290 Eilat peace process 144–45 Eisenhower administration: Egypt-US relations 285–86; Iraq-US relations 473; Lebanese-US relations 313–14; refugees 178–79; Tunisia-US relations 250–51 Eisenhower Doctrine 286, 313, 407–8 Eizenstat Initiative 242–43 Eldar, Hakiva 362 employment patterns 43 En-Nahda 253–54 “Ending Syria’s Occupation of Lebanon: The U.S. Role?” 329 energy security 128–29; definition 133–34; economic dimension 129; environmental dimension 130–31; foreign policy dimension 130; and low oil prices 133; market strategies 134; security dimension 132–33; social dimension 131; technical dimension 132 European organizations, US relations with 54–56 European Union: as global power 55; impact on US Middle Eastern policies 60–61 Excess Defense Articles 427 extremists, methods 112–13

516

Index

Facilities Access Agreement 422–23, 428 Fadl, Abou El 114 Fahd Plan 412 Faisal, King 408 fear, and policy making 120 Feldman, Shai 363 First Gulf War 16, 75–77 Flintlock maneuvers 230 Foot, R. 52 Ford administration, Iran-US relations 488 foreign direct investment 233 foreign policy, maintaining long term goals 35–36 France, relations with United Arab Emirates 382 Frankel, Benjamin 94–95 Free Trade Agreements 444–46 Freedom Agenda 365, 370 French-Algerian War 251 G8 summit, June 2004 87, 88 Gas Exporters Group 397 gas, Qatar 397 Gati, T.T. 54 Gause, Greg 98 Gaza Strip: Israeli aims 187; living conditions 31 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 350 Geneva Initiative 147–48 geographic location 191 George, S. 60 Ghannouchi Rached al-253–54 Gini coefficient 42 Gliddon, David 282 global Islamist insurgency 27–28 global terrorist network 27 global war on terror 27 globalization 4, 26; failure to change 89; MENA 81–82; MENA region crossroads 88–90; seen as threat 33; and US agenda 82–84 Godec, Robert F. 256 Golan Heights 137–38; Israeli-Syrian negotiations 325 governance 154–56 government effectiveness 154 Gramsci, Antonio 10 Gray, Gordon 245 Great Britain 378–79, 435; role in Iraq 470–71 Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) 84–88, 151 see also reform, economic and governance; background and focus 152 Greek-Turkish War 68 Green March 239 Grosser, Alfred 54 Guantanamo Bay 461 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 6, 62, 103; nuclear programs 97; Turkey-US relations 305; US relations with 57, 461 Gulf Security, and Iranian Revolution 380–83

Hafez, Mohammad 111 Haglund, D.G. 54 Hajj 404–5 Hakim, Sayyid Muhsin al-472–73 Hamas 89, 111; complexity 113; electoral victory 186; Iranian support for 29; potential for legitimacy 114 Hamza, Mahmoud 170 Hariri, Rafiq 318, 331–32 Hart, Gary 272 hegemony: in international relations 10; as Iranian aim 26, 29; United States 94, 359, 370, 371; US imposition 176 Helsinki Accords 152 Helsinki process 86 Heritage Foundation 85 Heritage Index 153 Hezbollah 15; complexity 113; Iranian support for 28–29; Lebanon 315, 317; potential for legitimacy 114; Syria-US relations 333–34; US view of 318–19 Hizb’u Tahir (HuT) 114 hostility towards US: underlying factors 3–4 human rights: Egypt 293; Morocco 244; Tunisia 255–56, 259; United Arab Emirates (UAE) 384 human security 9 human trafficking 462 Hussein, Saddam 16–17, 75–77, 477; deception regarding weapons 99 Huthis 510 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin 291–92 idealism, and nuclear proliferation 96 identity politics 21 Idris I 262 imperialism 10 income inequality 41 independence, of Middle Eastern states 12 India, relations with Pakistan 211–12 Indyk, Martin 267, 272–73 insurgency, Islamist 27–28 intellectual property rights 351–52 interconnectedness, issues in Middle east 34 interest groups 52 International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) 96 international normative context 53 international organizations: impact on US Middle Eastern policies 57–63; perceptions of performance 53; US behavior towards 52–57; US relations with 51 international relations: constructivism 10; hegemony 10; liberalism 9–10; literature 51–52; Marxian analysis 10; neorealism 9; radical critique 10; realism 8–9; theories 8–10 international relations theory 8–10 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 59–60

Index Iran 6–7, 11; coup 1953 486; establishment of Islamic Republic 14–16; EU incentives 498–99; hegemony 26, 29; land reform 486–87; nuclear program 28, 399; nuclear weapons capability 15–16, 92; oil, nuclear and US 121–24; Oman-US relations 429; relations with Iran 440; relations with Israel 494–95; relations with Qatar 399; relations with Syria 334–35; relations with Turkey 300–301; revolution, 1979 75; Soviet occupation 485; state building 15; Turkey-US relations 303–4; weapons acquisition 99–100; White Revolution 486–87 Iran hostage crisis 489 Iran-Iraq War 15, 75–77, 438, 478 Iran-US relations: 9/11 491–94; assessment of relationship 497–99; Bush (G.H.W.) administration 490; Bush (G.W.) administration 491–94; Carter administration 488–89; Clinton administration 490; Ford administration 488; foundation 484; genesis of anti-Americanism 485–86; history 484–85; hostage crisis 489; Iranian nationalism 486; Iraq 496–97; Johnson administration 487; Kennedy administration 486–87; Nixon administration 487–88; nuclear issue 494–96; overview 484; Reagan administration 490; soft-regime change 498 Iranian Revolution 438, 478; and Gulf Security 380–83; Qatar-US relations 392–93; Saudi Arabia-US relations 412 Iraq: coup 1958 470–71; coup 1968 475–76; effects of World War I 69; invasion of Iran 16; invasion of Kuwait 16, 380, 393, 413, 426, 438, 478–79; Iran-US relations 496–97; Iranian influence 357–58; oil nationalization 477; refugees 172; regional politics 477; relations with Qatar 398–99; relations with Soviet Union 477; relations with Syria 477–78; relations with United Arab Emirates (UAE) 388; role in regional politics 16–18; sanctions 16–17; sectarian violence 29; significance of oil to US 120–22; Turkey-US relations 302–3; US invasion 17, 27, 59, 301, 329–30, 362–64; US support 15; weapons acquisition 99–100 Iraq Liberation Act 1998 480 Iraq Study Group 336 Iraq-US relations 6; before 1958 468–70; 1958–63 470–74; 1963–68 475; 1968–2003 475–80; Bush (G.H.W.) administration 478–79; Bush (G.W.) administration 480; Clinton administration 479–80; Eisenhower administration 473; overview 467; Reagan administration 478; regional politics 468–69 Iraq War 77–78 Islam: as ally for change 115; as basis of desire for democracy 111 Islam, political 10

517

Islamic activism 109–12 Islamic fundamentalists, fear of 49 Islamic Jihad 317 Islamic organizations: allies of US 114–15; examples 112–15; means and goals 111; mixed bag 113–14; problematic 112–13; US policy options 115–16; western scholars 114–15 Islamic Revolution 14–16, 26; civic 111 Islamic Tendency Movement 253–54 Islamism, hostility from West 15 Islamist groups, propaganda 31 Islamist insurgency 27–28 Israel: 1967 war 13; 1978 invasion of Lebanon 316; 1982 invasion of Lebanon 316; attacks on Lebanon 318–19; attitude to Iraq War 362–64; attitude to UN 58; changing allegiances 360; clash with US over Syria 366–67; establishment of state 11, 12–14; foreign policy 14; identified with US 371; influence on US 119; Kuwait-US relations 461; nuclear program 92; peace as threat 185–88; relations with Iran 494–95; relations with Syria 335–37; relations with Turkey 300; settlements 187; as strategic asset 360, 361–62, 364–66; strategic value 492; technical and military superiority 176; Turkey-US relations 304–5; US support 12–13 Israel-Hezbollah war 364–66 Israel-US relations: conditions underlying 370; neoconservatism 359–61 Israeli-Palestinian conflict 26, 31–32, 358, 359; attitudes of US and UN 58; balance of sympathy 45; role of EU 61 Israeli-Syrian negotiations 325 Israeli-Syrian relations 366–67 Jade Tiger 423 Jamaat-e-Islami 212–13 Jaysh al-Mahdi 29 Jihadism 110–11, 414 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 212 Johnson administration: Egypt-US relations 287; Iran-US relations 487; refugees 180 Johnson, Joseph 179 Jordan: aid 190; Iraq coup 1958 471–72; nuclear program 97; overview 343–47; reform plans 346 Jordan-US relations 189–90; aid 347–50; Arab dimension 200–201; Arab-Israeli conflict 201–3, 205; assessment of relationship 353; democratic transformation and political reform 198; economic and military aid 195–97; economic aspects 193; economic reform 198; Free Trade Agreement 345–46; historical development 195–97; international environment 203–4; Jordanian goals 192–93; Jordanian-Israeli dimension 201; Jordanian perspective 190–91; Jordanian role and US

518

Index

policy 204–5; Jordan’s internal environment 197–99; Jordan’s regional role 193; military assistance 349–50; Palestine 199; political and security aspects 192–93; post 9/11 203; regional environment 200–203; results 206–7; trade 350–53; US goals 193–95; US internal environment 199–200; US perspective 191–93; US political reform project 203–4; water deprivation 348 Kalpakian, J. 56 Karns, M.P. 52 Kasarda, John D. 158 Keller, Bill 363 Kennedy administration: Egypt-US relations 287; Iran-US relations 486–87; refugees 179–80; Saudi Arabia-US relations 408–9; Yemen-US relations 503 Kennedy Doctrine 486 Kennedy, John F. 55 Khaddam, Abd al-Halim 333 Khaled, Amr 114 Khatami, Muhammad 491, 492–93 Khomeini, Ayatollah 487 Khouri, Rami 196 Khristenko, Viktor 96 kidnapping 173–74, 270 Kissinger, Henry 136, 180–81, 288, 289, 410 Korany, Bahgat 90 Kupchan, C.A. 63 Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) 299–300, 301, 303 Kurdistan 303 Kurds 299–300, 475 Kuwait: exploitation of cold war 458; foreign policy 455–56; Iraqi invasion 16, 77, 291, 380, 393, 413, 426, 438, 478–79; Iraqi occupation 456; neutrality 454; regional and international politics 456–57; security 456; security dilemma 453; security options 454; vulnerability 456 Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) 459 Kuwait-US relations: assessment of relationship 462–63; contentious issues 460–62; context and overview 450–53; development 451–52, 455–58; Israel 461; as liability 453; as model in international relations 453–55; strategic importance of Kuwait 458–60; trade 460; Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 451 Laden, Osama bin 414 Lake, Anthony 264 Lavoy, Peter 95 leadership deficit 167 League of Arab States (LAS) 62 League of Nations 67–68 Lebanese-US relations: assessment of relationship 320–21; Bush (G.W.) administration 320;

Clinton administration 318–19; cold war 313–14; countering Syria, Iran and Hezbollah 318–19; current US policy 319–20; Eisenhower administration 313–14; history of US policy 310–11; initial US interests 313; Reagan administration 315–17; Syrian occupation 318 Lebanists 312 Lebanon 74; civil wars 313, 315–17; as commercial center 313; differing perspectives on 310–11; domestic political structure 312; Hezbollah 315; Israeli attacks 318–19; Israeli invasions 316; PLO 314–17; reconstruction and Syrian occupation 317–18; significance to US 311–12; Syria-US relations 331–32; Syrian occupation 317–18; US aid 319; US intervention and perspective 310–11; US policy 357 liberal autocracies 34 liberal democracy 11–12 liberal institutionism 52 liberalism, in international relations 9–10 Libya 103; liberalization 265 Libya-US relations: assessment of relationship 276–77; change in 262; Clinton administration 264–66, 268, 272–73; history 262–66; internal situation 269; international arena 269; normalization 268–69; post 9/11 269–70; Reagan administration 264; secret diplomacy 272–73; shift in US policy 266–68; since 2003 273–76; US military presence 262; weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 271–74 literacy 86 Livni, Tzipi 185 lobby groups 52 local organizations, opportunities for positive change 109 Lockerbie bombing 265–66, 270, 273 Looney, R. 81 Luck, E. 52, 54 MacFarlane, S.N. 52 Macmillan, Harold 468 Madrid peace conference 138, 176–77, 300, 325 Maghraoui, Abdeslam 111 Maghreb 225–26; regional security 230; US relations with 242–43 major powers, changing roles in Middle East 20–21 Malik, M. 85 Malley, Robert 143, 144 March, J. 51–52 Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable (MEU-SOC) 30 Marshall, George C. 13 Marshall Plan 55 Marxian analysis 10

Index Mastanduno, M. 52 material capabilities 52–53 May 17 Accord 317 Mazen, Abu (Mahmoud Abbas) 169 McGuire, S. 55 Mearsheimer, John 51, 94 media 86 medical aid, Oman-US relations 419 Mehlis, Detlev 331–32 MENA: balance of power 45–46; developmental administration 44; education 42; employment patterns 43; foreign aid as insurance premium on oil price 44–45; Gini coefficient 42; globalization 81–82; income inequality 41; lessons and consequences of US aid policy 48–49; natural resources 42; population 85; position of women 41; post-cold war politics 80; as recipient of US aid 41–46; role of military 43–44; socio-economic and political status 85; US foreign aid 38–40; US military assistance 40 Middle East: cold war as model 11; independence 12; international relations theory 8–10; nationalism 10–12; post-war development 21; reasons for global attention 8 Middle East and North African (MENA) region see MENA Middle East Forum 329 Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 385, 395 Middle East Peace Initiative (MEPI) 243 Middle East Treaty Organization 285, 286 Middle Eastern organizations, impact on US Middle Eastern policies 61–62 migration 111–12 militancy 110 military, role in MENA countries 43–44 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 349, 506 Mingst, K.A. 52 missionaries 282–83, 435 Mitchell, George 32 mobilization theory 18 modernization 20 moral relativism 175 Morgenthau, Hans J. 8–9, 20 Moroccan-Algerian conflict 221 Morocco 6; description 238; economic development 243–44; as friend to US 224–25; human rights 244; nuclear program 96; relations with Israel 240 Morocco-US relations: conflict in Western Sahara 239–42, 245–46; global war on terror 242–45; history 237–38; Maghreb 242–45; post 9/11 244–45; significance 246–47; US foreign policy 238–39 Mossadegh, Mohammad 11, 486 Muasher, Marwan 32

519

Mubarak, Gamal 96, 103, 171 Mubarak, Hosni 47, 86, 290–92 multilateralism 63 Muslim Brotherhood 96, 109–10, 113–14, 292 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 406 Nahayan, Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan Al-379, 380, 382–83 Nasser, Gamal Abder 285–86, 288, 472 nation, defining 12 National Oil and Gas Authority (NOGA) 437 National Security Strategy 327 nationalism 10–12, 21 natural resources 42 neoconservatism 88; effects of 357; influence in US 360–61; Israel as strategic asset 365–66; Israel-US relations 359–61; strategic consensus fantasy 368–69 neoliberalism, nuclear proliferation 95, 100, 101–2 neorealism: in international relations 9; nuclear proliferation 93–95, 97–100, 100–103, 105 Neumann, Ronald 267 neutrality, Kuwait 454 Niblock, T. 85 Nixon administration: Egypt-US relations 288–89; Iran-US relations 487–88; Qatar-US relations 392; refugees 180–81; Saudi Arabia-US relations 409–10, 411 Nixon Doctrine 14, 379, 392, 411, 488 Nixon, Richard 250–51 Non-Aligned Movement 285 non-proliferation, strengthening regime 104 Non-Proliferation Treaty 104, 273 non-state terror, Palestine 18 normative context 53 norms, as central to liberalism 9 norms model, of nuclear proliferation 95, 103 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): impact on US Middle Eastern policies 59–60; Morocco 244–45; summit, 2004 87, 88; Turkish membership 297–98; US relations with 55–56 Nour, Ayman 47, 292 nuclear energy 92 nuclear issue, Iran-US relations 494–96 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 92 nuclear proliferation see also neoliberalism; neorealism; realism: changing regional posture 96–97; explanatory frameworks 93–96; motivation 98; policy implications 103–5; possible bad outcomes 92; and power distribution 101–2; recent history 97–100; restraint 99; United Arab Emirates (UAE)-US relations 385 nuclear weapons capability, Iran 15–16 Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) 100 Nye, Joseph 53, 453

520

Index

Obama administration: approach to Islam 214–15; Israel-US relations 371–72; Israeli–Palestinian conflict 32; role in development 35; tasks 3 offshore banking 442–43 oil: Bahrain 435–37; demand for 31; demonizing 120; foreign aid as insurance premium on price 44–45; influences on prices 118; Iran 121–24; Iraq nationalization 477; Lebanese-US relations 313; Libya 262; Libya-US relations 274–75; and politics of fear 119–20; price rises 30; prices and energy security 121, 133; production and reserves 119; Qatar 396–97; Qatar-US relations 392; role in international relations 19–20; Saudi Arabia-US relations 403, 405, 406, 409–10; significance of 120–22; US responses to price rises 118–19; Yemen-US relations 505–6 oil embargo. 1973 379 oil security 26, 29–31; diplomacy 30–31 oil wars 74–78 Olsen, J. 51–52 Oman-US relations: to 1850 417–19; 1980 facilities access agreement 422–23, 428; 1980s, enhanced ties 423–26; 1990–91 426–28; 21st century 428–29; assessment of relationship 429–30; Carter administration 421; Clinton administration 427; Free Trade Agreement 430; Iran 429; medical aid 419; military cooperation 423–26, 427–28; political cooperation 424; pre-1970 420; Reagan administration 423–26; recent overview 417; strategic links, 1970–80 420–21; trade contacts until 1910 419 Operation Bright Star 291, 423 Operation Desert Fox 291 Operation Desert Shield 426 Operation Desert Storm 16, 291, 426, 458 Operation Enduring Freedom 428 Operation Iraq Freedom 450–51, 452, 458 Operation Northern Watch 299 Operation Provide Comfort 299 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 20, 409; oil production 44–45; US relations with 57 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC): impact on US Middle Eastern policies 61–62; US relations with 57 Oslo Accords see Declaration of Principles Oslo peace process, US role in collapse 141–45 Otaiba, Yusuf al-377 Other 175 Ottoman Empire, collapse 66 Ottoman succession, wars of 67–69 Oz, Amos 138 Pace, General Peter 384 Paemen, H. 54 Pahlavi regime, decline 14–15

Pakistan: Islamist politics 212–13; and Middle East 212–13; relations with India 211–12; relations with US 210–12 Palestine: British Mandate 70; Jewish immigration 70; non-state terror 18; partition 70, 71; radicalization 73; refugees 177; Saudi Arabia-US relations 405–6; US policy 177 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 73, 181; in Lebanon 314–17; peace process 138–40, 141 Palestine Wars 69–74 Palestinian Authority 185 Palestinian state, US attitudes towards 135 pan-Arabism 11, 12, 13–14 Parker, Richard B. 224 Patten, Chris 55 peace, as threat to Israel 185–88 peace process see also Arab-Israeli conflict: Egypt-US relations 289–90; Geneva Initiative 147–48; international consensus 135; Palestinian track 138–40; requirements for 176; road map 145–47; Sharon’s disengagement plan 148–49; Syrian track 137–38; threat from UN 140–41; US opposition 136; US role in collapse of Oslo process 141–45 People’s Republic of Democratic Yemen (PDRY) 503 Perino, Dana 388 Periphery Pact 298 Persian Gulf, US military presence 30 petrodollars 410–11 petroleum, influences on prices 118 Pew Center 212 Phalange 315–17 Phase 0 operations 30 POLISARIO 224, 231, 239–40, 241 political culture 52 political instability, role of West 125 political reform, cooperation in 34 political rights 441 political stability 154 political underdevelopment 26 politicide 184 politics: extremism 112–13; of fear 119–20 Politics Among Nations 8–9 pollution 130–31 popular attitudes 3 popular support, for insurgency 27–28 population 85 post-colonialism 10 Powell, Colin 230, 269–70 power, regional distribution 101–2, 103–4 Prevention of Genocide Act 1988 478 preventive war 17 Prisoners’ Document 169 propaganda 31 Prospects for Peace Initiative 340 public sector reforms, US assistance programs 40

Index Qaboos bin Sa’id, Sultan 417, 421, 424 Qaddafi, Colonel Muammar 262 Qaddafi, Saif Aleslam 271 Qaradawy, Sheikh 114 Qasim, Brigadier General Abd al-Karim 470–74 Qatar: centers of power 396; energy policy 396–97; foreign policy 396; regional politics 397–400; relations with Bahrain 398; relations with Iran 399; relations with Iraq 398–99; relations with Saudi Arabia 397–98; relationship with Great Britain 391–92; wealth 399–400 Qatar-US relations: 9/11 394; Arab-Israeli War, 1973 392; assessment of relationship 401–2; Bush (G.W.) administration 394–95; Clinton administration 393–94; defense cooperation 393; democratization and reform 395; history 391–96; Iraq War 394–95; Israeli-Palestinian conflict 401; Nixon administration 392; oil 392; overview 391; Qatari policy concerns 396–400; Reagan administration 393; regional politics 397–400; US policy concerns 400–401 Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) 345–46, 350–53 radical critique, in international relations 10 Ramadan, Tariq 114 Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 421 Reagan administration: Arab-Israeli conflict 368; attitude to Algeria 224–25; Iran-US relations 490; Iraq-US relations 478; Lebanese-US relations 315–17; Libyan-US relations 264; Morocco-US relations 240; Oman-US relations 423–26; Qatar-US relations 393; refugees 181–82; Saudi Arabia-US relations 412–13 realism 51; in international relations 8–9; nuclear proliferation 93–95, 97, 100–103; on small states 454 Reed, Joseph 240 reform 34, 87–88, 109 reform, economic and governance 151; assessment 162; background 152–53; constraints 160–62; economic freedom 153–54; governance 154–56; New Second World Framework 158; Rostow framework 156–57; stages 158–60 reform initiatives 5 refugees: Bush (G.H.W.) administration 182; Carter administration 181; Clinton administration 182–83; Eisenhower administration 178–79; Iraq 172; Israeli policy 184–85; Johnson administration 180; Kennedy administration 179–80; Nixon administration 180–81; Reagan administration 181–82; Syria 339–40; Truman administration 177–78; US policy 177 regulatory quality 154 renewal 109

521

Republic of Yemen (ROY) see under Yemen resources, international relations’ view of 20 Revival of Islamic Heritage Society 462 Rice, Condoleezza 46–47, 186, 232, 258, 276, 356 right of return 185 rights, political and civil 441 road map 145–47 Road Map for Peace 32 Roberts, Edmund 418–19 Rogers Plan 136, 180, 288 rogue states 264, 272, 330 Roosevelt administration: Saudi Arabia-US relations 405–6 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 9 Ros-Lehtinen, Ilea 228 Rostow framework 156–57 Roy, Olivier 213 rule of law 154 Rumsfeld, Donald 451 Rusk, Dean 222, 408–9 Sabah, Sheikh Jaber Mubarak al-452 Sabra and Shatila massacres 316–17 Sadat, Anwar 73–74, 288–90 Sadr, Moqtada al-112 Sagan, Scott 94, 95, 105 Salafis 110–11 Sallam, Ehab 171 sanctions 16–17, 266–67, 271, 273, 274, 382, 479 Sanders, Jackie Wolcott 246 Saudi Arabia: creation of state 69; nuclear program 97; relations with Egypt 407–8; relations with Qatar 397–98; Turkey-US relations 305 Saudi Arabia-US relations: 1931–45 404–5; 1945–61 405–8; 1967–74 409–10; 1975–81 410–12; 1981–91 412–13; 1991–2001 413–14; 9/11 414–15; Arab-Israeli conflict 412; Arab-Israeli War, 1973 409–10; Bush (G.W.) administration 414–15; Carter administration 411–12; cultural differences 403–4, 408–9; decision making 404; future 415–16; Iranian Revolution 412; Kennedy administration 408–9; Nixon administration 409–10, 411; oil 403, 405, 406, 409–10; overview 403–4; Palestine 405–6; Reagan administration 412–13; Roosevelt administration 405–6; security 403, 407–8, 411; terrorism 414, 415; Truman administration 406 Second Gulf War 77 Second World War 438 sectarian violence, Iraq 29 security 86; lack of cooperation 98; perceived threats 101; Saudi Arabia-US relations 403, 407–8, 411 security guarantees, from US 98–99 self-determination 11–12, 239 September 11, 2001 9 shaping operations 30

522

Index

Sharabi, Hisham 82 Sharansky, Natan 364 Sharett, Moshe 184–85 Sharon, Ariel 185; disengagement plan 148–49; peace process 145 Shatt al-Arab 75 Shi’ite extremism 25–26, 28–29; Iranian support for 28–29 Shufeldt, Commodore R.W. 419 Sick, Gary 488–89 Six Days’ War 72, 110 small states, perspectives on 454 Smith, M. 55 smuggling 292 Snidal, D. 52 social movement theory 18 soft power 454, 457 Solingen, Etel 52, 95–96 Somalia 381 South Yemen 411 see also Yemen sovereign wealth funds 401 sovereignty, for religious groups 13 Soviet Union: Arab-Israeli conflict 13; occupation of Iran 485; relations with Iraq 477; threats to Turkey 297 stability, as illusory 66 state-sponsored terrorism 71 state terror 18 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 25, 258, 487 strategic consensus fantasy 367–69 strategy, steps 35 Suez Canal 71, 285, 286, 360, 407 Sultanate of Oman see Oman-US relations summit diplomacy 284 Sunni extremism 25 Sunni Islamist insurgency 27–28 sustainable security 33–34 Syria 69; Iraqi refugees 339–40; in Lebanon 315–18; peace process 137–38; relations with Iran 334–35; relations with Iraq 477–78; relations with Israel 335–37; relations with Turkey 300; Turkey-US relations 304; US-Israel clash 366–67; weapons acquisition 99–100 Syria Accountability Act 137, 327 Syria-US relations: 2001–3 327–29; 2003–4 329–30; 2006 333–34; 2006–7 335–37; assessment of relationship 337–40; Bush (G.W.) administration 327–29, 330, 335–37, 366–67; change in policy direction 328; changing nature of relationship 324–25; Lebanon 2004–5 331–32; opportunities created and lost 325–27; post 9/11 326–27 Syrian-Israeli negotiations 325 Taba, peace process 144–45 Ta’if Accords 317–18 Takyeh, Ray 495–96

Taliban 15, 27, 496 tanker war 76 terror, challenge of 18–19 terrorism: financing 384; Qatar-US relations 394; Saudi Arabia-US relations 414, 415 trade: Kuwait-US relations 460; Oman-US relations 419, 430; United Arab Emirates (UAE)-US relations 385–87 Trade and Investment Framework Agreements 387, 451 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) 257, 275 Treaty of Amity and Commerce 419 Treaty of Lausanne 68 Treaty of Marrakesh 237 Treaty of Peace and Friendship 250 Trucial States 435 Truman administration: refugees 177–78; Saudi Arabia-US relations 406 Truman Doctrine 297 Truman, Harry S. 13 Tunis Declaration 56 Tunisia: aid 251; human rights 255–56, 259; Islamism 253–55; military vulnerability 249; nationalism 250; regional and international role 249–50 Tunisia-US relations: assessment of relationship 258–60; continuity 252–53; democratization 255–56; Eisenhower administration 250–51; history 250–52; Islamism 253–55; security relations 257–58 Turkey 6, 67–69; Iraq coup 1958 471; nationalism 11; relations with Iran 300–301; relations with Israel 300; relations with Syria 300; response to US invasion of Iraq 17 Turkey-US relations: 1940s 297; 1950s 297–98; 1960s 298; 1970s 298–99; 1980s 299; 1990–2003 299–301; assessment of relationship 305–6; cold war years 297–99; Iran 303–4; Iraq 302–3; Israel 304–5; Saudi Arabia and GCC states 305; strengths of alliance 301–2; Syria 304; US invasion of Iraq 301 twin pillar policy 392, 411, 412, 420, 421, 457 two-state solution 187 UN Development Program (UNDP) 63; MENA 41; Middle East 33 UN Security Council, Resolution 1441 428 underdevelopment 5, 26, 32–34, 41 unilateralism 63 “unipolar moment” 18 United Arab Emirates (UAE): foreign policy development 378–80; human rights 384; internal threats 388; relations with France 382; relations with Iraq 388 United Arab Emirates (UAE)-US relations: 9/11 383–87; assessment of relationship 387–88; complexity of relationship 386; cultural and

Index social links 386; defense pact 381; democratization and reform 385; nuclear proliferation 385; policy coordination 377–78; trade 385–87 United Arab Republic 286, 469 United Nations: General Assembly Resolution 194 177; impact on US Middle Eastern policies 58–59; in Lebanon 316; peace process 140–41; resolutions 176; US relations with 53–54 United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine (UNCCP) 177 United Sates Committee for a Free Lebanon 329 United States: Afghanistan 58–59; Arab-Israeli conflict 12–13; attitudes to Arab Islamic world 192; categorization of Arab countries 192; clash with Israel over Syria 366–67; foreign policy as root of hostility 4; invasion of Iraq 17, 27, 330; lasting issues 25–27; military presence 450; national security 18–19; need for broad-based policy 26–27; need for diplomatic engagement 29; need for integrated strategy 34–35; oil security 78; policy in Middle East 20–21; relations with Pakistan 210–12; responses to oil price rises 118; support for Iraq 15; unpopularity 115 UNSC Resolution 1636 332 US government, as honest broker 362 US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 345–46, 350–53 US-Middle East relations: themes 5 US-North Africa Economic Partnership 242–43 US North Africa Economic Program 242–43 US-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation 410 US-Soviet rivalry 9 US Trade Development Agency (USTDA) 349 USAID: Jordan 348–49; Yemen 506 USCENTCOM 421, 423, 424, 425, 426 USS Cole 505–7 values, in global politics 9–10 Venice Declaration 60 Villepin, Dominic de 88

523

violence: absence of 154; extremism 112 voice 154 Wahabism 213 Waltz, Kenneth 9, 93–94 wars, threat of 358–59 Washington, George 237 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 16–17, 271–73, 479; Libya-US relations 273–74 Welch, David 245–46, 275 Wendt, Alexander 10 Western Sahara, conflict 223–24, 239–42, 245–46 White Revolution 486–87 Wictorowicz, Quintan 110–11 Wilson, Woodrow 9, 51 Wilsonianism 19 women: position in MENA countries 41 Woodbury, Levi 418 World Bank 49n World War I: long-term effects 66; Ottoman involvement 67 xenophobia 404 Yaalon, General Moshe 138 Yemen: central government 510; civil war 409; coup 1962 502–3; economic situation 510; Huthis 510; Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 506; USAID 506 Yemen-US relations: 9/11 505–6; Aden 411, 503; background 502–3; civil war 504–5; Kennedy administration 503; military and security cooperation 507–10; oil 505–6; overview 502; security concerns 506–7; unification and 1990–91 crisis 503–4; USS Cole 505–6, 507, 508; Yemen’s stability 510–11 Yemini, Ben-Dror 138 Zakaria, Fareed 33, 34, 453 Zindani, ‘Abd al-Majid al-509 Zinni, Anthony 507–8 Zionism 11, 69, 71–72, 183, 371 Zoellick, Robert 451

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