Handbook of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection [1 ed.] 9781609180041, 9781609180027

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Handbook of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection

Handbook of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Edited by Mark D. Alicke Constantine Sedikides

The Guilford Press New York

London

© 2011 The Guilford Press A Division of Guilford Publications, Inc. 72 Spring Street, New York, NY 10012 www.guilford.com All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the publisher. Printed in the United States of America This book is printed on acid-free paper. Last digit is print number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Handbook of self-enhancement and self-protection / edited by Mark D. Alicke, Constantine Sedikides. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-60918-002-7 (hbk. : alk. paper) 1.  Self-perception.  2.  Self-protective behavior.  3.  Self psychology.  I.  Alicke, Mark D.  II.  Sedikides, Constantine. BF697.5.S43H3634 2011 155.2—dc22 2010036492

About the Editors

Mark D. Alicke, PhD, is Professor of Psychology at Ohio University. His main research interests are the psychology of the self—including the role of the self in social judgment, social comparison, and self-enhancement biases—and the psychology of blame and moral judgment. Dr. Alicke has served on the editorial board of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, as an Associate Editor of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and is currently Editor of Self and Identity. His recent publications include articles in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Psychological Bulletin, Personality and Social Psychology Review, the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, and Psychological Science. Constantine Sedikides, PhD, is Professor and Director of the Centre for Research on Self and Identity at the University of Southampton, United Kingdom. His research focuses on self and identity and their interplay with emotion and motivation, close relationships, and group processes. His recent publications included articles in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Journal of Personality, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Psychological Review, Psychological Bulletin, and Social Cognition.



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Contributors

Lyn Y. Abramson, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin Mark D. Alicke, PhD, Department of Psychology, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio Lauren B. Alloy, PhD, Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Jamie Arndt, PhD, Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri Emily Balcetis, PhD, Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York C. Daniel Batson, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas Jennifer S. Beer, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas Shimrit K. Black, MA, Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Shirley Y. Y. Cheng, MA, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Champaign, Illinois Chi-yue Chiu, PhD, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Nanyang, Singapore Shana Cole, MS, Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York Elizabeth C. Collins, PhD, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana Clayton R. Critcher, PhD, Department of Marketing, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California Tracy DeHart, PhD, Department of Psychology, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois M. Brent Donnellan, PhD, Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan David Dunning, PhD, Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York Dina Eliezer, BA, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California



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viii   Contributors Elizabeth Focella, BA, Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona Amanda L. Forest, BA, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada Rachel K. Gerstein, PhD, Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Jamie L. Goldenberg, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida Richard H. Gramzow, PhD, School of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom Corey L. Guenther, PhD, Department of Psychology, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska Eddie Harmon-Jones, PhD, Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas Kimberly A. Hartson, MA, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California Erik G. Helzer, BA, Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York Vera Hoorens, PhD, Department of Psychology, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Stephan Horvath, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland Brent L. Hughes, BA, Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas Young-hoon Kim, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Champaign, Illinois Megan Peggy-Anne Kinal, BA, Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada Joachim I. Krueger, PhD, Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island Julie Longua, MA, Department of Psychology, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois Brenda Major, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California Mario Mikulincer, PhD, Interdisciplinary Center, New School of Psychology, Herzliya, Israel Carolyn C. Morf, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland Michael Ross, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada Constantine Sedikides, PhD, School of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom Phillip R. Shaver, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, Davis, California David K. Sherman, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California John J. Skowronski, PhD, Department of Psychology, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois Jennifer Smith, MA, Department of Psychology, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois Jeff Stone, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona



Contributors   ix

Loredana Torchetti, MS, Department of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland Kali H. Trzesniewski, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada Clara A. Wagner, MA, Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Ching Wan, PhD, Division of Psychology, Nanyang Technological University, Nanyang, Singapore Anne E. Wilson, PhD, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada Joanne V. Wood, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada Jack C. Wright, PhD, Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island Yung-jui Yang, MA, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, Champaign, Illinois

Contents

Introduction.  Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection: Historical Overview and Conceptual Framework

1

Mark D. Alicke and Constantine Sedikides

Part I.  Neurocognitive Bases of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection   1. Neural Bases of Approach and Avoidance

23

Eddie Harmon-Jones

  2. Self-Enhancement: A Social Neuroscience Perspective

49

Jennifer S. Beer and Brent L. Hughes

Part II.  Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Self-Construal   3. Self-Enhancement via Redefinition: Defining Social Concepts to Ensure Positive Views of the Self

69

Clayton R. Critcher, Erik G. Helzer, and David Dunning

  4. Moral Hypocrisy: A Self-Enhancement/Self-Protection Motive in the Moral Domain

92

C. Daniel Batson and Elizabeth C. Collins

  5. The Role of Time in Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection

112

Anne E. Wilson and Michael Ross

  6. Reconciling Self-Protection with Self-Improvement: Self-Affirmation Theory

128

David K. Sherman and Kimberly A. Hartson



xi

xii   Contents

Part III.  Perceptual, Judgmental, and MemoRY Processes in Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection   7. Of Visions and Desires: Biased Perceptions of the Environment Can Serve Self-Protective Functions

155

Shana Cole and Emily Balcetis

  8. Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Social Judgment

174

Mark D. Alicke and Corey L. Guenther

  9. Postdecisional Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection: The Role of the Self in Cognitive Dissonance Processes

192

Jeff Stone and Elizabeth Focella

10. The Positivity Bias and the Fading Affect Bias in Autobiographical Memory: A Self-Motives Perspective

211

John J. Skowronski

Part IV.  Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Interpersonal, Relational, and Group Contexts 11. The Social Consequences of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection

235

Vera Hoorens

12. Seeking Pleasure and Avoiding Pain in Interpersonal Relationships

258

Joanne V. Wood and Amanda L. Forest

13. An Attachment Perspective on Self-Protection and Self-Enhancement

279

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer

14. To Enhance or Protect the Self?: The Complex Role of Explicit and Implicit Self-Esteem

298

Tracy DeHart, Julie Longua, and Jennifer Smith

15. Attributions to Discrimination as a Self-Protective Strategy: Evaluating the Evidence

320

Brenda Major and Dina Eliezer

Part V.  Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Developmental, Clinical, Health, Personality, and Cultural Contexts 16. Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in a Developmental Context Kali H. Trzesniewski, Megan Peggy-Anne Kinal, and M. Brent Donnellan

341



Contents   xiii

17. The Breakdown of Self-Enhancing and Self-Protecting Cognitive Biases in Depression

358

Lauren B. Alloy, Clara A. Wagner, Shimrit K. Black, Rachel K. Gerstein, and Lyn Y. Abramson

18. When Self-Enhancement Drives Health Decisions: Insights from a Terror Management Health Model

380

Jamie Arndt and Jamie L. Goldenberg

19. Narcissistic Self-Enhancement: Tales of (Successful?) Self-Portrayal

399

Carolyn C. Morf, Stephan Horvath, and Loredana Torchetti

20. Cultural Perspectives on Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection

425

Chi-yue Chiu, Ching Wan, Shirley Y. Y. Cheng, Young-hoon Kim, and Yung-jui Yang

Part VI.  BoundarY Conditions and Methodological Issues in Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection 21. Academic Exaggeration: Pushing Self-Enhancement Boundaries

455

Richard H. Gramzow

22. Measurement of Self-Enhancement (and Self-Protection)

472

Joachim I. Krueger and Jack C. Wright

Author Index

495



513

Subject Index

Handbook of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection

Introduction Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Historical Overview and Conceptual Framework Mark D. Alicke Constantine Sedikides

Psychological science is a boon to the philosophy of science. The empirical study

of people—their thoughts, feelings, anxieties, values, aspirations, and behavior—has stimulated epic debates and countless academic articles about how to deal with these capacities or whether to deal with them at all. Recommendations have ranged from treating inner life as though it were the only thing that mattered to treating people like nonpeople and dispensing with subjective constructs altogether. As if the task of explaining the human condition were not difficult enough, disagreements about how it should be studied in the first place occupied a great deal of experimental psychology’s attention during its first century. Today, we do not worry much about these issues. Scientific psychology is more eclectic than at any time in its brief history. Hypothetical constructs, intervening variables, and processes that are indirectly observable are not only tolerated but are also the basis of some of psychology’s most active research areas, such as cognitive and social neuroscience. Provided that valid and reliable measurements are demonstrated, new constructs are evaluated on their promise for theoretical advancement and on investigators’ perceptions that the constructs are indispensable to the phenomenon under study rather than on preexisting dogma about what constructs are acceptable. All of which makes the time ripe for a volume dedicated to what has sometimes been a controversial topic in psychology, namely, the motivation to enhance or protect one’s

1

2   Introduction self-image—which, following convention, we label as self-enhancement and self-protection, respectively. Whereas self-enhancement refers to a tendency to claim greater standing on a characteristic, or more credit, than is objectively warranted, self-protection refers to tactics that are adopted to avoid falling below a desired standard (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). Despite being subject to periodic critiques, self-enhancement and self-protection motivations have been among the most actively researched topics by social and personality psychologists, perhaps more actively researched at present than at any previous time. So why have these constructs, which psychologists deem so vital and which are mainstays of literary and artistic conceptions of human life, been intermittently suspect in scientific psychology? One possibility is their historical association with Freudian theory. The defense mechanisms posited by Sigmund Freud (1915/1961a, 1923/1961b, 1926/1961c) and Anna Freud (1936/1946) provided the first important discussion of such issues in psychology. Whereas few would deny the operation of psychological tendencies such as repression, projection, displacement, and rationalization (Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 1998; Cramer, 2000; Schimel, Greenberg, & Martens, 2003), the Freudian conception contains dubious and difficult to validate assumptions about their unconscious and sexual nature that diminishes their scientific utility. Moreover, given that they belong to the family of motivational constructs, self-enhancement and self-protection were subject to the same onslaught as were all motivational constructs during the heyday of radical behaviorism. Skinner (1953) thought of self-enhancement and self-protection as Freudian-type constructs that occurred in a mythical unconscious mind—which is to say that he did not think much of them at all. Skinner lost his battle, as it became increasingly clear that reliable and valid measurement, along with theoretical efficacy, were the main touchstones for the scientific usefulness of a construct. All sciences make extensive use of unobservables (e.g., “force” in physics), and many formerly unobservable constructs in psychology have become observable with advances in technology. Perhaps the single most damning criticism of the radical behaviorist enterprise was the recognition that behavior itself is a construct to be explained. So, although a person who is “swinging an axe” appears to be enacting a behavior that can be taken at face value, whereas a person who is “acting defensively” is seen as doing something that requires further interpretation, the matter is not quite so simple. A person swinging an axe might be described as building a canoe, getting exercise, working out his frustrations, destroying his neighbor’s property, doing his neighbor a favor, or committing a crime. Simply stating that he is swinging an axe is uninformative at best and may be misleading or inaccurate. In short, whether the event to be explained is swinging an axe, feeling insulted, exaggerating one’s abilities, or taking undeserved credit for an assignment, the motives underlying these events are relevant to an accurate characterization. Although Skinner (1953) eschewed most “internal” events, he began his career doing physiological research and could never quite bring himself around to deny the importance of genetics on behavior. It was his perception that internal events were resistant to empirical study that troubled him more than their existence, and it was the motivation construct above all that aroused his ire. To be fair, there was good reason for his dyspepsia. During the 1950s, exquisitely complex motivational mechanisms dominated behavior theories so that even the simplest actions were explained by convoluted processes with scant empirical support. Radical behaviorism waned as the study of cognition and language waxed, but, during its ascendance, it was a useful corrective for motivational theories run amok.



Introduction   3

A final reason that self-enhancement and self-protection explanations have been met with resistance is that they seem to violate William of Ockham’s (c. 1287–1347) dictum to favor explanations with fewer theoretical mechanisms (Spade, 2006). Ockham’s “razor” was actually intended to eliminate theological assumptions from nascent scientific explanations, but its greatest legacy is the proposition that the simpler of otherwise identical theoretical explanations should be preferred (Thorburn, 1918). There are, however, no inherent complexities in self-enhancement and self-protection mechanisms to discourage their use in scientific explanations. Despite their central role in human behavior and social relations, no single volume has been dedicated to self-enhancement and self-protection as they are represented in psychological theory and research. Our goal in this handbook is to provide a comprehensive survey of research areas in which self-enhancement and self-protection explanations play an important role. To put the study of self-enhancement and self-protection in context, we begin by examining briefly the emergence of the motivation concept, then trace its introduction into psychological theories, and finally describe its deployment in self-enhancement and self-protection theories.

The Motivation Construct Emerges Although self-enhancement and self-protection are complex motives, they have at their roots the assumption that people want to feel good, or avoid feeling bad, about themselves. In this regard, the self-enhancement and self-protection motives are consistent with the earliest conjectures about what drives human action, namely, that hedonism was at the helm. The hedonism construct entered Western thought with the writings of the Cyrenaic and Epicurean philosophers. The founders of these schools of thought, Aristippus and Epicurus, respectively, emphasized the pursuit of pleasure over anything else (including traditional conceptions of virtue) and painted a picture of humans as pleasure seeking and pain avoidant (De Witt, 1973; Tatarkiewicz, 1976). The dominant role of hedonism as the master motive in human affairs receded for a time while rationalist philosophies were in ascendance. Rationalism depicted an objective reality that all people with correct understanding (literally, “orthodoxy”) could discern (Kenny, 1986; Loeb, 1981). According to the continental rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz), for example, irresponsible, malicious, selfish, or foolish actions stemmed from faulty knowledge—a view that echoed Plato’s ideas (The Republic, trans. 1991). If there were a master motive for the rationalists, therefore, it would be to obtain correct knowledge, and the failure to behave morally, or in a way that ultimately advanced personal and societal goals, was due to inadequate understanding. Hedonism reemerged as the dominant perspective with the rise of British empiricism in England in the late 16th century. For Hobbes, behavior was driven by the unbridled pursuit of pleasure rather than by a failure to grasp a priori truths. Experience, which could confer a range of salutary or destructive motives, became the key to understanding behavior. In short, empiricists (e.g., John Locke, David Hartley, James Mill) substituted learned associations for innate knowledge, and Hobbes (and later the utilitarians, particularly Bentham) supplanted rationality with desire. With desire reestablished at the forefront and the role of experience or learning recognized as the key to understanding behavior, the early foundation for motivation research was laid (Cofer & Appley, 1964; Macfarlane, 1978).

4   Introduction

Motivation in Psychology With the notable exception of the aforementioned radical behaviorists, most psychologists have readily embraced motivational constructs and theories. Motivation has been used in three essential ways in psychology. First, motivation accounts for fluctuations in how much energy is exerted toward a goal. Skinner (1953) proposed that learning, deprivation, and genetic endowment could account for these differences, but even most behaviorists invoked energization or drive constructs to account for variations in behavior strength (Atkinson, 1960; Dollard & Miller, 1950; Hull, 1943). In fact, these early learning theories contributed some of the most comprehensive motivational perspectives that have emerged in psychology. The second conceptualization of motivation is as directive or purposive. Whereas energization refers to variations in how hard the organism is working, the directive component explains what the organism is trying to accomplish. This aspect of motivation is represented in ordinary concepts, such as desires, preferences, goals, wishes, values, wants, and needs (Higgins & Sorrentino, 1996; Schwartz, 1992; Shah, Kruglanski, & Friedman, 2002). The directive or purposive component accounts for the fact that identical stimulus conditions can produce dramatically different responses. A pair of identical twins, for example, imbued with the same genetic constitution and deprived of food for the same period, might respond very differently to the sight of triple-chocolate ice cream. Although a staunch behaviorist would argue that preferences are written in people’s reinforcement histories, practical limitations make it virtually impossible to identify all the past and present contingencies that govern behavior. Thus alluding to the reasons for which people acted or to the desires that impelled them substitutes for complete knowledge of their reinforcement histories. The third prominent use of the motivation construct is to describe individual differences in behavior and desire. This meaning of motivation harkens back to the instinct concepts that were popular through the 1920s (and that are currently reemerging in evolutionary psychology; Taylor, 2002). For example, Murray’s (1938) list of needs (e.g., achievement, aggression, autonomy, nurturance) differs primarily in length from McDougall’s (1923) voluminous list of instincts. However, motives as personality characteristics share many of the same problems that bedevil instincts: They are difficult to disconfirm, they have trouble accounting for situational variations, and there are potentially as many of them as imaginative investigators can conjure. A more profitable avenue for investigating motives is to treat them as moderators of other important behavioral phenomena. Social and personality psychologists have used motives such as the needs for achievement (McClelland & Koestner, 1992), closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), competence (White, 1959), control (Burger, 1992), uncertainty reduction (Trope, 1979), or uniqueness (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980) for this purpose. Within this framework, self-enhancement and self-protection can be viewed as particular types of motives, namely, motives whose directive function is either to elevate self-regard toward a more desired level or to avoid reducing it. The energizing aspect of these motives refers to how much effort people are willing to expend and how much distortion they will tolerate to achieve these goals. Self-enhancement and self-protection efforts are applied most vigorously to central characteristics—those that are especially vital to one’s self-concept and global self-esteem. On the other hand, for less important or peripheral characteristics, selfenhancement and protection strategies may be engaged only weakly and readily abandoned



Introduction   5

if contradicted by objective data. Self-enhancement and self-protection motives apply not only to oneself but also extend to others in whom one is invested, such as children and relationship partners. Regarding the third function of the motivation construct, several individual-difference measures are relevant to the dispositional tendencies to engage in self-enhancement or selfprotection. For example, persons high on narcissism, self-concept certainty or clarity, and self-handicapping engage in more self-enhancement than their counterparts, whereas persons high on repression, shyness, and depression engage in more self-protection than their counterparts (for reviews see Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Morf, Horvath, & Torchetti, Chapter 19, this volume). The self-protection motive has been more prominent than self-enhancement in psychology’s history due to its origins in the Freudian defense mechanisms. In social and personality psychology, self-protection motives are presumably aroused in the numerous studies that threaten an individual’s self-concept or create anxiety by providing feedback about failure (Sedikides & Strube, 1997) or social rejection (MacDonald & Leary, 2005) or by inducing concerns about mortality (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). In addition, specific defensive strategies have been studied in their own right, such as selfhandicapping (Berglas & Jones, 1978), defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986), and repression (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992). Self-enhancement, however, is a more recent addition to the theoretical arsenal. The self-enhancement motive can be traced to humanistic psychologists’ concern with what Rogers (1959) called “organismic” needs, or, more generally, growth strivings. The humanistic movement was a reaction against the ego-defense orientation of Freud and the drivereduction emphasis of the behaviorists. Whereas psychodynamic and behavioral approaches stressed the need to reduce or eliminate undesirable states (anxiety for Freud, physiological tension for the behaviorists), humanistic psychologists argued that people had higher, selfactualizing needs (Maslow, 1970), such as love (Rank, 1932/1989), meaningfulness (Frankl, 1959/1976) and aesthetic beauty (Arnheim, 1971), that could not be conceptualized as drive reduction. The construct of “self” emerged in the late 1940s (Lecky, 1945) and became central to Rogers’s (1961) theorizing. The roots of self-enhancement can be traced to Rogers’s discussion of the need for positive self-regard. Self-regard in Rogers’s system entailed a form of self-appreciation that could overcome “conditions of worth,” that is, conditions that require people to adjust their preferences and values to satisfy others’ expectations. An important component of Rogerian therapy, therefore, involves establishing or recouping the individual’s true needs and goals divorced from the desire to satisfy others. Although this is a lofty goal, the fact remains that social approval is one of the most basic of all human motives (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and it would be neither feasible nor desirable completely to shun others’ expectations. In the same vein, although countless self-help books have echoed Rogers’s encouragement to grant oneself unconditional positive regard (Branden, 1995; McKay & Fanning, 2000; Webber, 2002), life, unfortunately, provides a smorgasbord of negative selfevaluation opportunities, and most people are aware of their weaknesses as well as their strengths. Thus people must navigate their way through self-enhancement opportunities without exaggerating their capacities beyond believability and in a way that satisfies their need to be accepted by others. Self-serving attributions, the better-than-average effect, overoptimism, the illusion of control, and the misconstrual and misremembrance of events all

6   Introduction have limits that are determined by what people believe is feasible to themselves and to others (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Higgins, 2005; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003, 2008).

Motivation in Social Psychology Cognitive Consistency Theories Motivational constructs were present at the earliest stages of social psychological research. Examples are Triplett’s (1897) studies demonstrating the motivational advantages of racing bicycles in direct competition with others versus in solitary time trials and Floyd Allport’s (1924) social facilitation research. However, the use of motivation-type explanatory variables gained prominence with the advent of cognitive consistency theories, especially balance and cognitive dissonance perspectives. Although it would be relatively straightforward to cast the need for consistency among cognitive elements in nonmotivational terms (Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958; Insko, 1984), both Heider (1958) and, to an even greater extent, Festinger (1957) cast their theories in motivational language. For Festinger, of course, inconsistency among cognitive elements created a central tension state that was analogous to peripheral deprivation states such as thirst and hunger. The precise relation between cognitive “dissonance” and peripheral drive states still requires clarification, but years of research supports Festinger’s contention that inconsistencies between avowed values and overt behaviors produce drive-like states that can be reduced through cognitive or behavioral mechanisms (Cooper, 2007; Stone & Focella, Chapter 9, this volume). Until the late 1960s, motivational theories were so ingrained in social psychology as to arouse little controversy. The first antimotivational rumblings arrived in the form of Bem’s (1967) behaviorist reinterpretation of cognitive dissonance theory, which eventually morphed into self-perception theory. Bem interpreted cognitive dissonance as a self-construal problem. He began with the assumption that people are generally aware of the reinforcement contingencies that guide their behavior. Behaviors that are enacted with the expectation of a substantial payoff are behaviors that most others would do in the same situation and are, therefore, relatively uninformative of one’s attitudes, values, or characteristics. On the other hand, behaviors that are enacted for little or no reward, or that accrue costs, are quite informative of one’s preferences and traits. A research participant in a cognitive dissonance experiment, therefore, who is paid a large sum of money to express an attitude that she does not really hold simply infers that the reward explains her behavior, whereas a participant who receives a much smaller reward infers instead that she holds the attitude she expressed. Whether attitude change occurs under these circumstances depends on judgments of whether external conditions can sufficiently explain one’s behavior and drive-reduction assumptions are eschewed. Although cognitive dissonance theory has received extensive empirical support (Aronson, 1992; Cooper, 2007; Elliot & Devine, 1994), self-perception assumptions also have wide applicability (Alicke, 1987). One of the main virtues of Bem’s alternative construction was that it not only challenged the tenets of cognitive dissonance theory but it could also be adapted to explain many phenomena that cognitive dissonance was not designed to address (Alicke, 1987). In other words, Bem’s challenge provided a heuristic theoretical alternative, one that disclosed new research vistas, even if it did not explain away the phenomenon it originally addressed.



Introduction   7

Attributional Egotism Bem’s self-perception theory dovetailed perfectly with the emerging attributional theories that spawned scores of studies in the 1960s and 1970s. Ironically, the enduring value of the “intuitive scientist” metaphor that guided attributional perspectives may be that it provides a normative baseline against which to assess the various ways in which people diverge from rational expectations. Attributional biases were studied most frequently in the context of Weiner’s (1972) attributional model of achievement motivation, which originally partitioned attributions into internal (i.e., ability and effort) and external (i.e., luck and task difficulty) factors. Many studies showed that people ascribed successful events and outcomes to their ability and effort and explained away unsuccessful ones as due to bad luck or insurmountable task obstacles. This research topic, which came to be known as the “self-serving bias,” became increasingly complex both conceptually and in terms of the consistency of the findings (Zuckerman, 1979), but, throughout the 1970s, self-serving bias research pushed the self-enhancement and self-protection issues to the forefront of social psychology. In fact, the voluminous studies conducted on this topic represent one of the single largest literatures devoted to self-enhancement and self-protection in social and personality psychology. Miller and Ross’s (1975) classic critique of the self-serving bias literature was a model for later critical analyses of theories that included self-enhancement or self-protection mechanisms. Miller and Ross proposed a number of alternatives for these purportedly self-serving attributional tendencies, the most important being that people expect success and may, therefore, simply be making attributions to expected outcomes. Subsequent research (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Weary, 1979) demonstrated self-serving attributions in conditions that could not be explained by the alternatives that Miller and Ross proposed (1975) and also showed that they were not simply self-presentational postures (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1982; Roese & Olson, 2007; Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 2002). Nevertheless, Miller and Ross raised a number of issues that could not be ignored by later researchers who wished to advance self-enhancement or self-protection positions. For example, when researchers manipulate positive or negative social or task feedback, they must consider how this will jibe with participants’ existing beliefs about their abilities and characteristics. For this reason, tasks are usually chosen that measure purportedly novel abilities or characteristics.

The State of the Art For a time, the difficulty of distinguishing between motivational and nonmotivational explanations led some to wonder whether the distinction was even viable (Tetlock & Levi, 1982). Around this same time, the burgeoning social cognition movement shifted research interests toward exploring how attentional capacities and knowledge structures influenced social perception and judgment. Given the historical importance social psychologists had always placed on motivational processes, motivation found its way back into the mainstream in the form of the distinction between so-called “cold” motivational processes, referring to goal formulation and pursuits, and “hot” ones, corresponding to self-enhancement and self-protection. Integrative work by Kruglanski (1989), Kunda (1990), and Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1983) showed how more complete explanations of social phenomena could be

8   Introduction given by integrating cognitive process mechanisms with self-enhancement and self-protection assumptions where relevant.

The Present Volume The 22 chapters in this handbook attest to the vibrancy of theories that incorporate selfenhancement and self-protection mechanisms in social and personality psychology. If one had tried to project 25 years ago what the psychology of the self would look like circa 2010, it would have seemed that it would be dominated by the study of autobiographical memory, self-schemas, and self-categorization processes, with little room for self-enhancement and self-protection mechanisms. Although excellent self-theories of each of these sort exist (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; McConnell & Strain, 2007; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), a more accurate assessment of the present state of the art is that selfenhancement and self-protection mechanisms are interwoven into most of the major theories of how the self is constructed, evaluated, and defined and how it influences social perception and judgment.

Part I The first section includes chapters by Harmon-Jones and by Beer and Hughes that explore the neurocognitive underpinnings of self-enhancement and self-protection. Although social neuroscience is at the initial stages of exploring the brain correlates of motivated selfprocesses, it holds the promise of helping to uncover what might be called the holy grail for self researchers: the ability to distinguish between memory and judgment phenomena that entail only information-processing mechanisms and those that are motivated by concerns with advancing positive self-images or avoiding negative ones. The problem, of course, is that all so-called motivated biases have nonmotivational components and can occur for reasons that have nothing to do with self-enhancement (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). Identifying different brain states and events that are activated when self-enhancement and self-protection are believed to occur would be one way of isolating motivated processes. Harmon-Jones, in Chapter 1, discusses the relation between neurological representations of approach and avoidance motives, the distinct brain regions that are associated with positive versus negative evaluative responses, brain control of self-regulatory behaviors, altering emotional responses with neurofeedback, and identifying temporary and chronic affective states such as anger. Beer and Hughes (Chapter 2) report the findings of neuroimaging studies that begin to distinguish processes that are uniquely self-related (e.g., self-insight, exaggerated positivity) from those that are common to any social judgment task. They also discuss studies showing the specific brain regions that are involved in well-known phenomena such as overconfidence, accepting personal responsibility for failure, unrealistically favorable self-evaluations, and the influence of self-enhancement motivations on social comparison choices.

Part II The second section comprises four chapters related to what we call motivated self-construal. Critcher, Helzer, and Dunning (Chapter 3) address a central issue in self-enhancement and self-protection research concerning the ways in which people enact motivated strategies while



Introduction   9

maintaining believability to themselves and others. Such strategies have sometimes been caricatured as deep, dark secrets that are accessible only through extraordinary efforts (such as 5 years on an analyst’s couch). Social psychologists recognized relatively early, however, that self-enhancement and self-protection did not necessarily require large doses of self-deception. In his article on the “totalitarian ego,” Greenwald (1980) used the analogy for self-deception of refusing to open unwanted mail: You have a pretty good idea of what’s in it, but you avoid opening it to dampen the impact. By recognizing these more ordinary self-protection strategies, social and personality psychologists have broadened the scope of phenomena to which self-enhancement and self-protection theories apply. Critcher et al.’s chapter is a current incarnation of this perspective. They begin by noting an important disjunction between the ways people behave and the construals they place on those actions. The needs to maintain favorable self-images and to avoid derogatory ones are aided splendidly by the subjectivity that characterizes social events. Whereas test scores, performance outcomes, and even some social actions may have unambiguous interpretations at one level, they are open to favorable construals at higher categorization levels. So, although I have no choice but to confess to poor grades, low SAT scores, and abysmal performance on standardized IQ tests, when asked to rate my “intelligence,” I still see myself as better than most, as I rely on idiosyncratic conceptions of intelligence (such as whatever I do well). In the older, attributional literature, these self-serving explanations involved ascribing unflattering outcomes to forces beyond one’s control. But Critcher et al. make the crucial point that subjective construal is more the norm than a special attribution to external forces. If my relationship partner tells me that forgetting to send her a Valentine’s Day card is a sure sign of my feeble devotion, there is always wiggle room for interpretation: I can argue that the depth of my love exceeds anything that the hacks at Hallmark could possibly express. So self-enhancement and protection do not require herculean reality distortions for the simple reason that social constructs are conveniently malleable, and Critcher and colleagues explore the various ways in which construal opportunities influence self-enhancement and self-protection efforts. Avowing higher standards than one’s behavior actually delivers is another way to advance a belief in one’s superiority—in this instance, in one’s moral superiority. In Chapter 4, Batson and Collins review research on moral hypocrisy. Identifying the contours of hypocrisy has kept philosophers busy (Szabados & Soifer, 2004), particularly in debating whether hypocrisy requires self-deception, which, of course, veers off into debates about the nature of selfdeception. Thankfully, these questions need not be answered definitively before psychologists can make progress in assessing when and how something like hypocritical behavior occurs. The first question Batson and Collins pose is whether the disjunction between moral standards and moral action is primarily a failure of understanding or of willpower. They quickly conclude that poor judgment—a favorite excuse of moral transgressors—is a far less compelling explanation than the sheer desire for material gain and sensual pleasures. The next question, then, concerns the causes of these moral failings. In addition to social learning and situational pressures, each of which clearly play a role, Batson and Collins point to the desire to promote one’s own interests. Given that others are likely to thwart one’s self-interested pursuits when they become patently obvious, moral hypocrisy is a means by which selfinterest can be advanced while bamboozling others with one’s alleged adherence to exacting moral standards. Batson and Collins review a series of studies that demonstrate hypocrisy in the way research participants allocate reward to themselves and others, namely, by avowing

10   Introduction egalitarian standards and then behaving selfishly. They also review findings showing that, despite having acted in ways that are egregiously hypocritical by virtually all logical conceptions of the term, participants rate their actions as relatively moral. This is another instance in which construals save the day. An additional type of construal that can serve self-enhancement and self-protection needs involves the perception of time. As Wilson and Ross note in Chapter 5, personal identity is composed of experiences that span a person’s life, and people possess considerable latitude in deciding which elements to include as part of their self-concepts and how heavily those elements should be weighted. In their research, Wilson and Ross have found that people exaggerate the recency of positive events and the distance of negative ones, thereby according experiences that reflect favorably upon oneself a privileged position in the self-concept. The same types of effects are obtained at the group level: People see historical injustices attributed to their group as “old news,” presumably to deflect their importance to the group’s identity. Sherman and Hartson (Chapter 6) raise the theme of reconciling self-enhancement and self-protection with the needs to function adaptively and to make accurate judgments and decisions. A large and growing literature on self-affirmation demonstrates that buffering oneself against threatening information, such as by affirming one’s core values, permits people the luxury to be less self-serving in defining themselves and their outcomes and to be more open to potentially threatening information. Given the opportunity to assert their global selfintegrity, people can be more realistic about their abilities and characteristics. Sherman and Hartson view self-affirmation as an integral part of the larger psychological immune system that protects the self and maintains psychological health and well-being. Self-affirmation is believed by the authors to confer these benefits by marshalling self-resources, such as reducing stress or increasing energy.

Part III The third section consists of four chapters devoted to the perceptual, judgmental, and memory aspects of self-enhancement and self-protection. Cole and Balcetis (Chapter 7) start things off with a “newer” new look in perception. Research in the 1940s and 1950s (Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954) suggested that personal needs, values, and expectancies could influence basic perceptual processes, but, despite a research program that produced many intriguing findings, the idea that unconscious motivations could influence perception spooked psychologists who wished to disavow any connection to the Freudian past. With improved methodologies and a half century of social cognition research showing the widespread operation of automatic mental processes (Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005), the waters are safe for revisiting this question, and Balcetis and her colleagues have produced an impressive body of findings in this promising area, which is reviewed in this chapter. They begin by noting that self-enhancement is, in essence, a form of wishful thinking and then ask whether wishful thinking can be extended to the perceptual realm. Specifically, can motivational processes direct the way we actually see things? Cole and Balcetis describe the findings of a number of studies that leave little doubt that they do. Motivational states influence which objects and events capture our limited attentional resources, they affect the “lens” or filter that colors what is seen, they raise or lower thresholds for recognizing objects, and they affect the amount of processing that occurs. These findings greatly expand the scope of phenomena to which self-enhancement and self-protection are potentially relevant. For



Introduction   11

example, Balcetis and Dunning (2007) showed in one study that people in whom dissonance is aroused by their choosing to put themselves in embarrassing situations estimate the physical distance required to remove themselves from the embarrassment to be shorter (thereby reducing dissonance) than do participants who were assigned to the embarrassing situation. Other findings, such as that desirable objects are perceived to be physically closer—sort of like seeing a mirage in the desert—have an interesting analogue in Wilson and Ross’s findings that positive events are perceived to be closer in time. Apparently, both physical and temporal distance are influenced by motivational concerns. Although most self-enhancement and self-protection theories assess the influence of these motives on how people interpret their actions and outcomes, define their characteristics, and explain their predicaments, self-enhancement and self-protection motives also have pivotal implications for social judgment. In Chapter 8, Alicke and Guenther discuss various ways in which self-related motives influence judgments of other people. Perhaps the most important consequence of self-involvement in social judgment is the use of one’s own values and preferences as a barometer for judging the quality and moral worth of others’ actions. Research has shown, for example, that people who endorse less ethical choices (e.g., those who say that they would lie rather than tell the truth if it were to their advantage) evaluate other moral slackers less harshly. Condoning others’ dubious ethical choices may be a subtle way of excusing one’s similar choices, thereby protecting the self from the derogatory implications of moral compromise. In performance domains, research has shown that, when the self is threatened, people tend to contrast the scores of lower performers to their own, thereby improving their self-standing by implication. Conversely, research on the “genius effect” shows that when people are unambiguously outperformed on an intellectual task, they respond by exaggerating the ability of the individual who outperformed then (Alicke, LoSchiavo, Zerbst, & Zhang, 1997). By assigning extraordinary ability to the person who is better than they, people maintain relatively favorable views of their own abilities. We mentioned earlier that cognitive dissonance theory represented the first major installment of a self-protection model in social psychology. As Stone and Focella (Chapter 9) note, rationalizing the difficult choices that one makes serves self-enhancement by helping people to maintain consistent and coherent self-concepts. However, the dissonance literature is replete with complex and difficult-to-reconcile findings, not all of which support self-enhancement or self-protection accounts of dissonance processes. Stone and Cooper’s (2001) self-standards model (SSM) was developed to integrate these diverse findings. The SSM assumes that people generally evaluate their behavioral decisions with reference to prevailing cultural norms and justify their actions when they are perceived to be discrepant with these norms. Alternately, however, people may evaluate their actions by invoking their personal, idiosyncratic standards. Thus people who have low expectations for their moral behavior or task prowess may experience no dissonance at all as a result of ostensibly poor moral or intellectual performance because these actions or outcomes are not terribly inconsistent with their self-concepts. The essential question in making dissonance-related predictions, therefore, is whether people are relying on cultural or personal norms to evaluate their actions. Stone and Focella report a series of studies that support this revised dissonance model and explore when cultural and personal standards are likely to be invoked. In Chapter 10, Skowronski takes up the topic of positivity biases in autobiographical memory. A straightforward self-enhancement prediction would be that people would

12   Introduction recall predominantly favorable life experiences at the expense of life’s pitfalls and downturns. Indeed, there is evidence that, for example, students recall having received better grades in courses than they actually did and that people recall more favorable health information than they actually received. As Skowronski notes, effects such as these could represent an augmentation of positive material in memory, a diminution of negative information, or a bias toward consistent information. Further research is needed to assess when each of these tendencies might prevail.

Part IV The fourth section is dedicated to self-enhancement and self-protection in interpersonal, relational, and group contexts. Hoorens provides the first general attempt to examine the interpersonal consequences of self-enhancement and self-protection in Chapter 11. People who are prone to self-enhancement may feel that their superior efforts will not be appreciated and therefore “loaf” on group tasks, advance their own goals at the expense of others, respond with aggression when they receive negative feedback, and feel as though they are entitled to greater rewards than others. Interestingly, some evidence suggests that self-enhancers are viewed more positively than self-deprecators, although the generality of this finding depends on the nature of the enhancement or deprecation and the context in which it occurs. As Hoorens notes, the research that is available on the consequences of motivated biases focuses predominantly on self-enhancement rather than self-protection, suggesting that future research needs to be directed at this neglected topic. In Chapter 12, Wood and Forest look more generally at the operation of self-enhancement and self-protection motives in interpersonal relationships. The rewards that people receive and the costs they incur in interpersonal relationships are arguably the prepotent determinants of self-esteem. This makes relationships both the best and worst incubators for self-enhancement: the best when relationships are rewarding and nurturing, and the worst when they are debilitating and cause people to question their fundamental worth. Wood and Forest discuss research that shows that individuals with high self-esteem (HSE) possess the confidence to take risks in initiating and maintaining relationships, whereas individuals with low self-esteem (LSE) are far more cautious and protective. Compared with their counterparts with HSE, individuals with LSE interpret ambiguous or even positive feedback from a potential group member more negatively. These different styles have relationship consequences: Individuals with LSE, who are less secure about their partners’ acceptance and commitment, may respond to personally threatening information by devaluing their partners and evaluating them negatively, whereas individuals with HSE pursue the opposite strategy of increasing their partners’ value under threat. Shaver and Mikulincer (Chapter 13) review their interesting studies on the attachment motive in adults. Feelings of secure attachment in adults help to deflect psychological threats and diminish the need to engage self-protective mechanisms. Simply priming thoughts of a supportive attachment figure has positive effects on mood and behavior. Attachment security is associated with self-insight, healthy self-enhancement, and positive self-views. Anxiously attached individuals, on the other hand, are less likely to achieve self-insight due to an unwillingness to consider potentially threatening information, and they tend to rely on self-defeating mechanisms such as thought suppression and unrealistic self-inflation to compensate for their insecurity.



Introduction   13

In Chapter 14, DeHart, Longua, and Smith (like Wood and Forest) tackle the most frequently studied topic in research on the self, namely, self-esteem. Self-esteem is also one of the thorniest and most complex topics in the psychology of the self. Historically, selfesteem has been assessed using explicit measures whose downside is that they are easily subject to socially desirable responding. DeHart and colleagues concentrate on findings derived from implicit measures such as the name-letter technique and the Implicit Association Test and examine the relation between implicit and explicit measures. The fact that implicit and explicit self-esteem are typically weakly related suggests that they are separate constructs, or that people respond differently to the different measures. As the authors show, research in this area includes some consistent patterns admixed with an array of conflicting findings. As a general rule, research indicates that individuals with low self-esteem respond more defensively to threats or stress, whereas individuals with high self-esteem may even display self-enhancement in the face of threat. One of the promising avenues of recent research in this area is assessing how variations in self-esteem might influence, and be influenced by, selfregulation. For example, implicit self-esteem is raised in response to self-threats to alleviate anxiety, and students with low implicit self-esteem drink more alcohol on days when they have negative interpersonal interactions. The self-enhancing and self-protecting functions of prejudice and discrimination have been recognized in social psychology at least since the findings of Hovland and Sears (1940), who documented an increase in lynchings in the South corresponding to reductions in the price of cotton. This is one form of scapegoating, or blaming others for one’s own problems. Major and Eliezer (Chapter 15) review research that shifts the perspective to the person who is the target of discrimination rather than the agent. In particular, they discuss the conditions under which attributing others’ actions to discrimination may serve a self-protective function for the person who claims discrimination. Beginning with the somewhat surprising finding that stigmatized groups do not typically have lower self-esteem than nonstigmatized ones, researchers came to recognize that beliefs about the nature of the discrimination were critical. Research has shown that attributions to discrimination prevent the self-esteem decrements that would otherwise occur. These effects occur primarily when the nature of discriminatory comments is unambiguous. On the other hand, when sufficient ambiguity is introduced— such as when a target is unsure whether a potentially sexist comment reflects sexism or a valid criticism—these advantages diminish.

Part V The fifth section places self-enhancement and self-protection in developmental, clinical, health, personality, and cultural contexts. As Trzesniewski, Kinal, and Donnellan note in Chapter 16, developmental psychologists have not used the terms self-enhancement and selfprotection as prominently as social and personality psychologists have. Nevertheless, these processes are implied in many developmental investigations. Children are unrealistically optimistic in predicting their performance outcomes but fairly accurate in estimating the outcomes of other children. Self-serving biases (making internal, stable, and global attributions for positive rather than negative events) are present in children as well as adults and are particularly strong in children in the 8–11 age range. Children have high self-esteem that decreases somewhat in adolescence. Ascribing these tendencies to motivations to promote a favorable self-image is difficult, however, because specific features of children’s cognitive

14   Introduction abilities probably contribute to their self-enhancement. Children are egocentric and focus predominantly on their own experiences and outcomes; they engage in wishful thinking and have difficulty distinguishing between desires and realistic expectations; and they tend to confuse ability and effort, often equating effort with high ability. The authors discuss the adaptive functions that self-serving tendencies in children might serve and consider why these tendencies decline in adolescence. Alloy, Wagner, Black, Gerstein, and Abramson (Chapter 17) discuss their findings that depressed people (in both college-student and clinical samples) are frequently more accurate in their self-assessments than are nondepressed people. Compared with nondepressed people, depressed people are better at calibrating their control over outcomes and less susceptible to the illusion of control. When depressives miscalibrate, it is typically in the direction of taking responsibility for negative outcomes that they did not control. These findings, and more recent ones that the authors review, highlight the potential disadvantages of relinquishing self-protective mechanisms—what Alloy et al. have called the “sadder but wiser” effect, which has been replicated many times. In Chapter 18, Arndt and Goldenberg review the ways in which terror management theory has been applied to health decisions. Their health-decision model is based on the extensive literature that has tested predictions derived from terror management theory. This research has demonstrated that, when thoughts about mortality are made cognitively accessible, people strive to maintain self-esteem and to promote cultural worldviews. Mortality thoughts in relation to health concerns are elicited not only by actual illnesses or risky health behaviors but also by hearing about diseases and seeing others cope with illness. The mortality thoughts that these concerns evoke can be dealt with effectively by adopting health-promoting behaviors such as exercise, but they are often dealt with defensively by, for example, denying the threat or even increasing risky behaviors, especially when mortality thoughts are primed below awareness. Self-enhancement is, for the most part, an adaptive strategy that improves mood, instills confidence, and helps people maintain their goal pursuits in the face of obstacles. At the extreme, however, lies the personality trait of narcissism, which, in addition to representing self-enhancement run amok, has other deleterious features, such as lack of empathy for others. Morf, Horvath, and Torchetti (Chapter 19) discuss narcissistic self-enhancement and the strategies that narcissists pursue to achieve their goals. They emphasize the selfregulatory aspect of narcissism, in particular the strategies that narcissists use to be noticed and admired. They depict narcissists as people with high trait self-esteem but with fragile state self-esteem that requires constant vigilance against threat. Narcissists show high activation of negative words after being primed with failure, increase the positivity of their self-presentations toward expert evaluators, blame others for poor group performance, exaggerate their virtues after rejection, and invest less in relationships—perhaps as a way of countering possible rejection. In Chapter 20, Chiu, Wan, Cheng, Kim, and Yang suggest that need for positive selfevaluation is universal. Members of both Eastern and Western cultures negotiate the dynamics between the self-concept and the social environment in terms that enhance and protect either the individual self or the cultural self. Chiu and colleagues then go ahead to discuss the intricate role of cultural constraints in this process. For example, Westerners enhance their personal qualities (i.e., individual selves) more than Easterners. However, Easterners enhance their individual selves by associating them with cultural authorities. Easterners, then, use



Introduction   15

cultural symbols, establishments, or authorities to augment the positivity of their individual selves.

Part VI The sixth and final section is devoted to boundary conditions and methodological issues in self-enhancement and self-protection. Gramzow (Chapter 21) stakes out the apparent boundaries of self-enhancement and self-protection strivings. Overly positive self-evaluations are less prevalent for attributes that are unambiguous and concrete. People are more accurate in their self-appraisals when they are aware of their true standing and when they are accountable. Ambiguity, abstractness, awareness, and accountability help to identify the constraints on self-enhancement. As self theorists contend, “people cannot self-enhance willy-nilly” (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008, p. 108). Nevertheless, the motive to self-enhance and self-protect is powerful, and people pull at the constraints and push the boundaries. This resistance is especially evident when examining the tendency to exaggerate academic performance. Students exaggerate unambiguous and concrete information about themselves: their grades in specific courses and their overall grade point averages (GPAs). Academic exaggeration occurs despite the fact that students are aware of their actual GPAs and know that their responses could be verified. As with other forms of self-enhancement and self-protection, however, the strength of the motive to exaggerate academic performance varies across individuals and situations. Students high in achievement motivation and dispositional self-enhancement are particularly prone to exaggerate their grades. And, although the self-enhancement motive is powerful, its influence can be curtailed, and it can be satiated. Students are less likely to exaggerate when their actual academic performance (rather than their performance goals) is made salient to them. Likewise, students who typically exaggerate their GPAs do so less if they have an alternative opportunity to affirm an important aspect of themselves. However, the self-enhancement motive can also be energized and its influence increased. Unconscious priming of achievement increases the degree to which students exaggerate their academic performance. The tendency to resist these constraints attests to the important role that selfenhancement and self-protection play in the regulation not only of self-evaluation but also of behavior. Academic exaggeration is related to high performance goals and predicts better actual performance in the future. Students who push the boundaries also move forward. Krueger and Wright (Chapter 22) close the volume with a consideration of methodological issues in assessing self-enhancement and self-protection. This, of course, is a critical topic in that most of the controversy surrounding explanations based on these motives involves the methods by which they are investigated and, in particular, whether alternative explanations are available. As Krueger and Wright note, most of the arguments in the literature for selfenhancement, such as research on the better-than-average effect, are based on aggregate data and preclude assessing the accuracy of individual participants. The strongest evidence for self-enhancement is obtained when individual judgments can be compared with an objective standard, which raises the question of the validity of different standards. A common technique is to compare actors’ responses to those of observers and, for the sake of reliability, to average across a number of observers, and Krueger and Wright discuss the advantages and potential shortcomings of this approach. They note that, in the end, the strength of a psychometric approach to self-enhancement is inextricably tied to the precise theoretical question that is being posed.

16   Introduction

Concluding Remarks Our intention in this handbook is to provide a broad overview of self-enhancement and self-protection theories and findings, and we trust that the reader will find that the landscape has been well represented, even if it is impossible to include all aspects of this voluminous literature. Clearly, self-enhancement and self-protection, which have varied in their prominence over the years in social and personality psychology, are playing a more important role than at any time in the field’s history. We hope that this volume will attest to the relevance self-enhancement and self-protection for psychological phenomena and to the ingenuity of researchers who have contributed their theories and findings.

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Introduction   17

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Introduction   19

sure, to thine own self be true, and to thine own self be better. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 209–269). New York: Academic Press. Shah, J. Y., Kruglanski, A. W., & Friedman, R. (2002). A goal systems approach to self-regulation. In M. P. Zanna, J. M. Olson, & C. Seligman (Eds.), Ontario symposium on personality and social psychology (Vol. 10, pp. 247–276). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan. Snyder, C. R., & Fromkin, H. L. (1980). Uniqueness. New York: Plenum Press. Spade, P. V. (2006). William of Okham. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved February 17, 2010, from plato.stanford.edu/entries/ockham Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2001). A self-standards model of cognitive dissonance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 228–243. Szabados, B., & Soifer, E. (2004). Hypocrisy: Ethical investigations. Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press. Tatarkiewicz, W. (1976). Analysis of happiness. Warsaw, Poland: Polish Scientific. Taylor, S. E. (2002). The tending instinct: Women, men and the biology of our relationships. New York: Holt. Tetlock, P. E., & Levi, A. (1982). Attribution bias: On the inconclusiveness of the cognition–motivation debate. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 18, 68–88. Thorburn, W. M. (1918). The myth of Ockham’s razor. Mind, 27, 345–353. Triplett, N. (1897). The dynamogenic factors in pacemaking and competition. American Journal of Psychology, 9, 507–533. Trope, Y. (1979). Uncertainty-reducing properties of achievement tasks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1505–1518. Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Weary, G. (1979). Self-serving attributional biases: Perceptual or response distortions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1418–1420. Webber, C. (2002). Get the self-esteem habit. London, UK: Hodder & Stoughtor. Weiner, B. (1972). Theories of motivation: From mechanism to cognition. Chicago: Rand McNally. White, R. W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence. Psychological Review, 66, 297–333. Zuckerman, M. (1979). Attribution of success and failure revisited, or: The motivational bias is alive and well in attribution theory. Journal of Personality, 47, 245–287.

PART I

Neurocognitive Bases of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection

Chapter 1 Neural Bases of Approach and Avoidance Eddie Harmon-Jones

Self-enhancement can be viewed as varying along several bipolar dimensions, as

noted by Sedikides and Gregg (2008). One dimension ranges from self-advancing to selfprotecting and typically involves augmenting the positivity or diminishing the negativity of the self-concept or self-regard (Arkin, 1981). This dimension of self-enhancement may be a subset of the more general distinction between approach and avoidance (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Elliot & Mapes, 2005), a fundamental motivational dimension present in most living organisms (Schneirla, 1959). Approach motivational processes underlie self-enhancement or self-advancement strivings that guide individuals toward selecting situations in which they are likely to excel and toward promoting their virtues when fear of contradiction is low (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). Avoidance motivational processes, on the other hand, underlie self-protection strivings that assist in processes such as retreating from threatening situations, staying away from situations that threaten failure, and misremembering negative information about the self (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). This chapter provides a review of research on the neural bases of approach and avoidance motivation—that is, brain regions involved in responses to rewards and punishments. Much of this research is predicated on models that assume that approach motivation and responses to rewards involve a positive affective system, whereas avoidance motivation and responses to punishments involve a negative affective system. The basic motivational dispositions toward approach and withdrawal are often associated with emotions. However, an emotion is not a “thing” but is a multicomponent process made up of basic processes such as feelings of pleasure or displeasure, facial and body expression components, particular appraisals, and particular action plans and activation states

23

24   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES (Frijda, 1986). Moreover, these components are not perfectly correlated with each other (Lang, 1995). Approach and withdrawal motivational processes likely involve brain systems and not just specific brain structures. However, this systems-level analysis has yet to be well investigated because of the empirical difficulties of mapping these microprocesses in time. Consequently, I focus this review on brain regions that have received the most research attention in motivation. These are the amygdala, the nucleus accumbens/ventral striatum, the orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the left and right frontal cortical regions. The following review is necessarily incomplete because of the vast amount of research currently being conducted. Finally, I should emphasize that it is difficult to make one-to-one associations between psychological processes and physiological processes. For example, if neurons in the amygdala become more active, it is almost impossible to claim that this activation reflects a certain psychological variable such as fear. As will be reviewed, amygdala neurons become active in response to a wide range of psychological variables, including uncertainty (Whalen, 1998), positive affect (Anderson et al., 2003), and motivational relevance (Cunningham, Van Bavel, & Johnsen, 2008).

Perception of Motivational Relevance Many of the stimuli that arouse motivation are perceived with the visual or the auditory system. The processes of orienting and attending have been posited to “stem from the activation of defensive and appetitive motivational systems that evolved to protect and sustain the life of the individual” (Bradley, 2009, p. 1). Attention and emotive processes are inextricably linked. Novel and significant events attract our attention. Novel and significant or relevant events evoke an orienting, or “what is it,” response. Of course, defining significance can be difficult, but several researchers have suggested that significance can be defined in terms of approach and avoidance behavior (Thorndike, 1911) or in terms of the pleasure and arousal or emotion evoked (Bradley, 2009; Maltzman, 1979). Emotion is often theorized to be fundamentally a disposition to act, to behave effectively toward events that threaten or promote life (Frijda, 1986; Lang, 1985). These motivational tendencies are realized in general systems of approach and avoidance, with approach processes often acting to promote survival and avoidance processes often acting to prevent threats to well-being. Some theorize that judgments of positivity reflect approach motivation, judgments of negativity reflect avoidance motivation, and judgments of arousal index the intensity of activation or motivation (Bradley, 2009). Although this may often be the case, the relationship between emotional valence and motivational direction (i.e., approach motivation is positive) is not always that direct. For instance, anger, a negatively valenced emotion, is often associated with approach motivation (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009), a point to which I return later. Emotional stimuli automatically capture attention (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). The neural specifics of this process have been examined most extensively using auditory conditioned stimuli (single tones) that evoke fear in rats. The conditioned stimulus is transmitted through the auditory system to the auditory thalamus, including regions of the medial geniculate body and regions of the posterior thalamus (LeDoux, Farb, & Ruggiero, 1990).



Approach and Avoidance   25

Then signals are sent from all regions of the auditory thalamus to the auditory cortex, while a subset of thalamic nuclei send signals to the amygdala. This thalamo–amygdala pathway begins in the medial division of the medial geniculate body and associated posterior intralaminar nucleus (LeDoux, Cicchetti, Xagoraris, & Romanski, 1990). Signals from the auditory cortex also project to the amygdala (Mascagni, McDonald, & Coleman, 1993). These two pathways to the amygdala, the thalamo–amygdala and thalamo–cortico–amygdala pathways, terminate in the sensory input region of the amygdala, the lateral nucleus (LeDoux et al., 1990; Mascagni et al., 1993). These two pathways are often referred to as the low road (thalamo–amygdala) and high road (thalamo–cortico–amygdala) to the amygdala. However, the high road is not necessary for the acquisition of conditioned fear (Romanski & LeDoux, 1992). But the high road is likely more involved in processing of more complex stimuli (LeDoux, 1996). Once sensory information enters the lateral nucleus of the amygdala, it is then transmitted via intra-amygdala connections to the basal and accessory basal nuclei (Pitkänen, Savander, & LeDoux, 1997). There it is integrated with other incoming information from other areas and then transmitted to the central nucleus of the amygdala. The central amygdala is the main output system of the amygdala, and it projects to structures that affect blood pressure, freezing behavior, and hormone release (LeDoux, 1996). Research with primates has demonstrated extensive neuroanatomical connectivity between the amygdala and the visual cortex (Amaral, Price, Pitkänen, & Carmichael, 1992; Freese & Amaral, 2005). In humans, amygdala responses predict neural activity in areas of the visual cortex in response to emotional images (Morris et al., 1998; Sabatinelli, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, & Lang, 2005). In addition, damage to the amygdala has been associated with decreased activity to emotional stimuli in the visual cortex. Research with humans measuring event-related brain potentials (ERPs) recorded over the parietal region has revealed that pictorial emotional stimuli show differences from neutral stimuli as early as 136 ms following stimulus onset (Foti, Hajcak, & Dien, 2009), and it has been suggested that this early ERP reflects selective attention.

Amygdala As illustrated earlier, one of the most investigated structures in emotive research is the amygdala. It is well known for its involvement in fear, although more recent research has revealed the story to be more complex than that, as will be reviewed subsequently. The amygdala, which is composed of approximately a dozen nuclei (Pikänen et al., 1997), is critically involved in learning, storage, and expression of emotive processes. The amygdala is an almond-shaped structure on the medial temporal lobe sitting slightly in front of the hippocampus. The importance of the amygdala in emotive processes was first recognized by Klüver and Bucy (1937), who demonstrated that lesioning the medial temporal lobe of monkeys caused the monkeys to approach normally feared objects and exhibit unusual sexual behaviors. Weiskrantz (1956) later demonstrated that it was lesioning the amygdala within the medial temporal lobe that caused these behaviors. Three amygdala nuclei have been identified as important in fear—the lateral nucleus, the central nucleus, and the basal nucleus. The lateral nucleus receives input from thalamic and cortical regions, and the lateral nucleus connects to the central nucleus both directly and indi-

26   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES rectly via projections to the basal nucleus. The lateral nucleus is involved in the acquisition and storage of fear conditioning, whereas the basal nucleus and central nucleus are involved in the expression of fear (Cain & LeDoux, 2008). Animal research has also revealed that the amygdala is involved in positive emotional reactions. For example, in rats, amygdala lesions cause a failure to work for a salty reward even when rats are in a physiological state of sodium depletion (Schulkin, 1991). Moreover, amygdala lesions cause rats to fail to consume salt that is freely given to them, even though they display positive reactions to a salty taste if it is placed in their mouths (Schulkin, 1991). Other research has suggested that amygdala damage causes a disruption of reward learning (Everitt & Robbins, 1992). Male rats fail to perform a learned task to gain access to sex after amygdala damage, even though the same rats will engage in sex if access to the female is freely granted (Everitt, 1990). The animal research has revealed that destruction of the amygdala is clearly not sufficient to eliminate all emotional learning, because many aspects of learned reward and learned fear exist after amygdala removal. For instance, monkeys still show fear to extremely strong stimuli after bilateral amygdala destruction (Kling & Brothers, 1992). Along these lines, some studies have revealed that humans with bilateral amygdala damage still show normal recognition of vocal expressions of fear (Anderson & Phelps, 1998) and that individuals with amygdala damage show normal patterns of daily mood (Anderson & Phelps, 2002). Taken together, this work reveals that although the amygdala may be involved in emotional processes, it is not necessary for the production of these states. Human research has largely confirmed the animal results, although with less spatial precision. Currently, the best technique for measuring amygdala activation in humans is functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The spatial resolution for a 3-Tesla magnet is on the order of a 3-mm cube or voxel, but such a voxel contains hundreds if not thousands of neurons. Moreover, fMRI relies on blood flow, blood volume, and blood oxygenation to detect neuronal activation, and regions that contain neurons too closely packed together, such as the hypothalamus or amygdala, do not permit detailed measurements of subpopulations of neurons within the regions. Human neuroimaging research has converged with the animal research to reveal that the amygdala is important in fear processing. For instance, the amygdala region is more activated by a neutral stimulus paired with an aversive event (conditioned stimulus) than by another neutral stimulus that does not predict an aversive event (LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, & Phelps, 1998). Moreover, amygdala activation correlates with the conditioned response of increased skin conductance (an indication of arousal) to the conditioned stimulus (LaBar et al., 1998). Going beyond these correlations between amygdala activations and responses to stimuli, research has revealed that patients with lesions including the right, left, or bilateral amygdala do not demonstrate a conditioned response as measured by skin conductance, even though they respond normally to the unconditioned (aversive) stimulus (Bechara et al., 1995). These results fit well with the animal research demonstrating that the amygdala plays an important role in fear conditioning. Interestingly, although the amygdala is important for the acquisition of fear as measured by skin conductance, a measure of implicit learning, it does not appear to be important for the acquisition of fear learning measured explicitly. Individuals who suffer bilateral amygdala damage acquire explicit knowledge about the relationship between the conditioned stimulus and the aversive unconditioned stimulus (Gazzaniga, Irvy, & Mangun, 2002). This type of



Approach and Avoidance   27

explicit knowledge is controlled by the hippocampus (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991). An individual who has a damaged hippocampus but an intact amygdala shows normal skin conductance responses to conditioned stimuli but no explicit knowledge of the relationship between the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus (Bechara et al., 1995). More recent human neuroimaging research has revealed that the amygdala becomes activated in response to a variety of emotive stimuli, in addition to fear-provoking ones. For instance, experiments have revealed that positive stimuli also evoke greater amygdala activity than neutral stimuli (Breiter et al., 1996). Other studies have independently manipulated valence and intensity and found that amygdala activity is more associated with processing affective intensity than with processing any specific valence (Anderson et al., 2003). Consistent with results obtained from these studies, several researchers have suggested that the amygdala is generally vigilant for motivationally relevant stimuli (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Whalen, 1998). In an excellent illustration of this point, Cunningham et al. (2008) had participants provide bivalent (positive to negative) ratings of famous people, positive ratings (from none to very good) of famous people, or negative ratings (from none to very bad) of famous people. When participants provided bivalent evaluations, both positive and negative names were associated with amygdala activation. When they provided positive evaluations, positive names were associated with amygdala activity, and when they provided negative evaluations, negative names were associated with amygdala activity. In addition, a negativity bias was found, such that amygdala activity was more modulated for negative than for positive information. These results suggest that the amygdala flexibly processes motivationally relevant evaluative information in accordance with current processing goals but processes negative information less flexibly than positive information. Other brain regions contributed to the affective flexibility observed in the amygdala. This occurred only in the negative-only and positive-only conditions in which participants had to selectively process a subset of information to determine affective connotations because to do so requires deliberate processing. Cunningham et al. (2008) found that right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was more active in the positive and negative conditions than in the bivalent condition and that several areas were more associated with amygdala activation in the positive and negative conditions than in the bivalent condition. These areas were medial areas of orbitofrontal cortex, right lateral orbitofrontal cortex, right rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, left orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate. Taken together, these results suggest that the amygdala is responsive to motivational relevance and that areas of the prefrontal cortex play a role in amygdala activation, particularly when individuals deliberately process motivational information.

Nucleus Accumbens/Ventral Striatum Other brain regions critically important for emotive processes are the nucleus accumbens and ventral striatum. The nucleus accumbens lies at the front of the subcortical forebrain. It is rich in dopamine and opioid neurotransmitters, and it is famous for being involved in positive affect or feeling good. However, as with the amygdala, research has revealed the story of the nucleus accumbens to be more complex than only one of positive affect. Dopamine cell bodies in the ventral tegmental area have projections to forebrain regions,

28   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES including the nucleus accumbens, amygdala, ventral pallidum, and prefrontal cortex. These regions also project back both directly and indirectly to the ventral tegmental area. A number of theories have developed to explain the psychobehavioral functions of this mesocorticolimbic dopamine system. Incentive salience theory posits that the mesolimbic dopamine system provides the motivation to direct behavior toward reward-related stimuli (Berridge, 2000, 2007). Increased dopamine function in these regions is critical to the “wanting” of stimuli and not critical for pleasure, hedonic impact, or the “liking” of rewarding stimuli. Consistent with this hypothesis, research has found that drug craving, but not drug pleasure, to a pleasurable drug (amphetamine or cocaine) was reduced when suppression of dopamine neurotransmission in humans was manipulated (Brauer & De Wit, 1997). Similarly, human functional neuroimaging research has revealed that the nucleus accumbens is activated during pregoal positive emotion but not during postgoal positive emotion. In contrast, the medial prefrontal cortex is activated during postgoal positive emotion but not during pregoal positive emotion (Knutson & Wimmer, 2007). In humans, fMRI research has revealed that the nucleus accumbens becomes active during the anticipation of rewards. For instance, Knutson, Wimmer, Kuhnen, and Winkielman (2008) found that anticipation of viewing rewarding stimuli (erotic pictures for heterosexual men) increased nucleus accumbens activity and financial risk taking. Nucleus accumbens activity also increased in anticipation of making a risky decision, that is, a high- ($1.00) as compared with a low- ($0.10) risk financial gamble. Moreover, the risk taking was partially mediated by increases in nucleus accumbens activation. However, dopamine and the nucleus accumbens have been revealed to be involved in more than only wanting. Specific subregions of the nucleus accumbens in combination with specific neurotransmitters may be involved in “liking” or postgoal positive affect. For instance, microinjection of morphine, which activates opioid receptors, into posterior and medial regions of the accumbens shell increases positive affective reactions to sweet tastes (Peciña & Berridge, 2000). Other research has revealed that the nucleus accumbens is critical in regulating effort-related functions (Salamone, 2007), such that lever-pressing schedules that require minimal work are unaffected by accumbens dopamine depletions, whereas leverpressing schedules that require high work are impaired by accumbens dopamine depletions (Salamone, 2007). Other research has revealed that dopamine accumbens systems are activated in aversive situations, such as expecting or receiving foot shock or other stressors (Gray et al., 1997; Salamone, 1994). More recent research has examined both appetitive and aversive behaviors and tested whether subregions of the nucleus accumbens are responsible for these different emotive reactions (Reynolds & Berridge, 2001, 2002). Injections of gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) agonists into the rostral (front) shell of the nucleus accumbens, which should increase GABAergic neural transmission, increased appetitive behaviors (e.g., eating, place preference, orofacial expressions of taste-elicited liking). In contrast, injections of the same substance into the caudal (back) shell of the nucleus accumbens increased fearful defensive behaviors (e.g., place avoidance, orofacial expressions of taste-elicited disliking). Human neuroimaging research has replicated this rostral–caudal distinction in the nucleus accumbens (Seymour, Daw, Dayan, Singer, & Dolan, 2007). Other work has suggested that dopamine and acetylcholine have opposing roles in the nucleus accumbens, with dopamine fostering approach and acetylcholine fostering inhibition or avoidance (Hoebel, Avena, & Rada, 2007).



Approach and Avoidance   29

In a fascinating extension of this research, Reynolds and Berridge (2008) found that exposing rats to stressful environments caused the caudal fear-generating zones to expand rostrally, filling approximately 90% of the nucleus accumbens shell. In contrast, a preferred home environment caused fear-generating zones to shrink and appetitive-generating zones to expand caudally, filling approximately 90% of the shell. This work illustrates that emotional environments can modify the generation of motivation in specific brain circuits. It also illustrates the plasticity of brain regions involved in motivation.

Orbitofrontal Cortex The bottom (ventral) one-third of the prefrontal cortex is called the orbitofrontal cortex. It is most developed in humans and primates, but it is present to some extent in all mammals. The orbitofrontal cortex receives inputs from sensory modalities, including gustatory, olfactory, somatosensory, auditory, and visual. It also receives visceral sensory information. This large amount of input makes the orbitofrontal cortex one of the most polymodal regions in the cortex (Kringelbach, 2005). The orbitofrontal cortex has direct reciprocal connections with a number of other brain structures, including the amygdala, cingulate cortex, insula/ operculum, hypothalamus, hippocampus, striatum, periaqueductal gray, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004). Neurons in this region fire when monkeys taste desired foods and even when the monkeys only see the food or an associated stimulus (Rolls, 1997, 2000; Rolls, Yaxley, & Sienkiewicz, 1990). These neurons respond to affective, rewarding qualities of the stimulus and not simply the sensory quality of the taste. For example, neurons stop firing once the monkey has eaten its fill of the desirable food (Rolls, Scott, Sienkiewicz, & Yaxley, 1988). In rats, orbitofrontal cortex neurons fire action potentials in response to cocaine or heroin (Chang, Janak, & Woodward, 1998), and rats will work to obtain a microinjection of cocaine or related drugs into the medial prefrontal region (Carlezon & Wise, 1996). Animal research has also revealed that orbitofrontal cortex is activated to negative affective stimuli (Berridge, 2003). Human neuroimaging studies have also found increased activity in the orbitofrontal cortex in response to pleasant and unpleasant stimuli. Using fMRI and many affective stimuli (e.g., faces, odors, tastes, games of chance), research has found that different subregions of the orbitofrontal cortex are involved in reward and punishment processing. Monetary reward and pleasant odors, smells, and faces activate the medial orbitofrontal cortex. In contrast, monetary punishment and unpleasant odors, smells, and faces activate the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (O’Doherty, Winston, et al., 2003; Gottfried, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2002; O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001; O’Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002). In addition to this mediolateral distinction, a posterior–anterior distinction exists within the orbitofrontal cortex: More complex or abstract reinforcers (such as monetary gain and loss) involve more anterior regions, whereas more simple reinforcers involve more posterior regions (see Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004, for review). However, the complete loss of affective reactions due to orbitofrontal cortex damage is extremely rare (Damasio, 1994, 1996). Individuals with lesions to this region still seek some simple pleasures (e.g., they choose palatable foods and eat them), and they react to pain and avoid unpleasant events. Similar effects have been observed in animals (Berridge, 2003). These results suggest that the orbitofrontal cortex is not the chief site for the representation

30   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES of primary reinforcers and that it may be involved in other aspects of emotional processing (Berridge, 2003), as noted next. Another body of research has emphasized the importance of the orbitofrontal cortex for reversal learning (Schoenbaum, Setlow, & Ramus, 2003) or self-monitoring (Prigatano, 1991; Stuss, 1991; Stuss & Benson, 1984). In reversal learning, an animal is taught that responding to one cue produces reward, whereas acting similarly to another cue produces nonreward or punishment. After the animal learns to respond correctly, the experimenter switches the cue–outcome associations, and the animal must learn to change its behavior. During cue– outcome learning across reversals, the orbitofrontal cortex is activated (O’Doherty, Critchley, Deichmann, & Dolan, 2003). However, orbitofrontal lesions do not affect reversal of some innate response tendencies (Chudasama, Kralik, & Murray, 2007). In the literature on the orbitofrontal cortex, self-monitoring is defined as the ability to evaluate one’s behavior in the moment in reference to higher order goals or the reactions of other people (Beer, John, Scabini, & Knight, 2006). This is the process “by which individuals evaluate their behavior in the moment to make sure that the behavior is consistent with how they want to behave and how other people expect them to behave” (Beer et al., 2006, p. 872). Individuals with orbitofrontal cortex damage have been found to have an impaired ability to prioritize solutions to interpersonal problems (Saver & Damasio, 1991) and a tendency to greet strangers in an overly familiar manner (Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994) and to behave in disruptive manners in hospital settings (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). They also tease strangers inappropriately and are more likely to include unnecessary personal information when answering questions (Beer, Heerey, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003; Kaczmarek, 1984). This self-monitoring perspective on the orbitofrontal cortex is consistent with the previously reviewed research on the emotional functions of the orbitofrontal cortex when functional accounts of emotion are considered. That is, self-monitoring may be critical for generating social emotions that help promote adaptive social behavior (Beer et al., 2006).

Anterior Cingulate Cortex Sometimes stimuli may directly cause behavior. In such cases, information may proceed from sensory processing areas of the brain to structures involved in approach and avoidance. In other cases, however, information may be more complex, or multiple response options may exist. In such cases, brain regions implicated in decision making become active to assist in deciding whether to approach or avoid. One area that has received research attention on these issues is the anterior cingulate cortex. In much of this research, response conflicts are examined on tasks such as the colornaming Stroop (1935) task. For example, when completing the color-naming Stroop task, one’s goal is to identify the ink color of a word stimulus, regardless of the word’s meaning. However, the processing of word meaning is typically automatic, and when a word’s meaning is incongruent with one’s goal to judge the word’s color, such as when the word red is presented in blue ink, there is conflict between the intended and the automatic response tendencies. In studies examining neural activity during the Stroop task, anterior cingulate cortex activity is greater during incongruent trials than congruent trials (Carter et al., 1998; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). Similar findings have been observed using other response-conflict tasks, such as Eriksen and Eriksen’s (1974) flanker’s task and the Go/



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No-Go task (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissel, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Kiehl, Liddle, & Hopfinger, 2001). Researchers have interpreted these findings as evidence that the anterior cingulate cortex plays an important role in monitoring the moment-to-moment representations of action tendencies for potential conflicts, presumably so that other mechanisms may be engaged to override the unwanted tendency and to promote an effective goal-directed response (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Thus conflict monitoring represents the first component of a dual-process model of cognitive control whereby the need for control is initially detected. Amodio et al. (2004) integrated the conflict-monitoring framework with social psychological theories of self-regulation by examining conflict between automatic stereotyping tendencies and participants’ goals of responding without prejudice. In this study, anterior cingulate cortex activity was monitored using an ERP measure referred to as the “errorrelated negativity” component (Gehring et al., 1993; van Veen & Carter, 2006). When participants—who reported low-prejudice attitudes—accidentally made responses that reflected the application of racial stereotypes, thus constituting a clear response conflict, the anterior cingulate cortex was strongly activated. By comparison, anterior cingulate cortex activity was lower on other trial types that did not elicit conflicting actions. In subsequent research, Amodio, Devine, and Harmon-Jones (2008) demonstrated that heightened anterior cingulate cortex activity associated with racially biased responses was observed only for participants with strong personal motivations to respond without prejudice. Furthermore, across studies, participants with stronger anterior cingulate cortex activity were more likely to engage in controlled behavior (slower, more careful responding). These results suggest that the anterior cingulate cortex may be involved in coping with conflicts between various responses, such as approach–avoidance conflicts.

Asymmetric Frontal Cortical Regions The asymmetric involvement of prefrontal cortical regions in positive affect (or approach motivation) and negative affect (or withdrawal motivation) was suggested over 70 years ago by observations of persons who had suffered damage to the right or left anterior cortex (Goldstein, 1939). Later research supported these observations using the Wada test, which involves injecting Amytal, a barbiturate derivative, into one of the internal carotid arteries and suppressing the activity of one hemisphere. Amytal injections in the left side produced depressed affect, whereas injections in the right side produced euphoria (Alema, Rosadini, & Rossi, 1961; Perria, Rosadini, & Rossi, 1961; Rossi & Rosadini, 1967; Terzian & Cecotto, 1959). These effects were interpreted as reflecting the release of one hemisphere from contralateral inhibitory influences. Thus activation in the right hemisphere, when not inhibited by the left hemisphere, caused depression; an uninhibited left hemisphere caused euphoria. Subsequent studies appeared to confirm these results, finding that persons who had suffered left-hemisphere damage or lesions tended to show depressive symptoms (Black, 1975; Gasparrini, Satz, Heilman, & Coolidge, 1978; Gainotti, 1972; Robinson & Price, 1982), whereas persons who had suffered right-hemisphere lesions tended to show manic symptoms (Gainotti, 1972; Robinson & Price, 1982; Sackheim et al., 1982). Other research has revealed asymmetries underlying appetitive and avoidant behaviors in nonhuman animals, in species ranging from great apes and reptiles (Deckel, Lillaney, Ronan, & Summers, 1998;

32   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES Hopkins, Bennett, Bales, Lee, &Ward, 1993) to chicks (Güntürkün et al., 2000), amphibians (Rogers, 2002), and spiders (Ades & Ramires, 2002). More recent research suggests that in humans these asymmetric activations are often specific to the frontal cortex. This research often uses asymmetric activation in right versus left frontal cortical areas as a dependent variable, usually assessed by electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings. Frontal cortical asymmetry is assessed by comparing activation levels between comparable areas on the left and right sides. Difference scores are widely used in this research, and their use is consistent with the Amytal and lesion research described previously that suggests that asymmetry may be the key variable, with one hemisphere inhibiting the opposite one. Consistent with that view is evidence from studies of transcranial magnetic stimulation, discussed later (Schutter, 2009; Schutter, van Honk, d’Alfonso, Postma, & de Haan, 2001). Much of this evidence has been obtained with EEG measures of brain activity or, more specifically, alpha frequency band activity derived from the EEG. Research has revealed that alpha power is inversely related to regional brain activity using hemodynamic measures (Cook, O’Hara, Uijtdehaage, Mandelkern, & Leuchter, 1998) and behavioral tasks (Davidson, Chapman, Chapman, & Henriques, 1990). Source localization of EEG signals (Pizzagalli, Sherwood, Henriques, & Davidson, 2005) and fMRI results obtained in emotion– frontal asymmetry studies converge in suggesting that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is responsible for these effects (Berkman & Lieberman, 2010).

Trait Affective Styles and Resting Asymmetric Frontal Activity Depression has been found to relate to resting frontal asymmetric activity, with depressed individuals showing relatively less left than right frontal brain activity (Jacobs & Snyder, 1996; Schaffer, Davidson, & Saron, 1983), even when in remission status (Henriques & Davidson, 1990). Other research has revealed that trait positive affect is associated with greater left than right frontal cortical activity, whereas trait negative affect is associated with greater right than left frontal activity (Tomarken, Davidson, Wheeler, & Doss, 1992). Subsequent studies observed that trait approach motivation was related to greater left than right frontal activity at resting baseline (Amodio, Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008; HarmonJones & Allen, 1997; Sutton & Davidson, 1997). These studies suggested that asymmetric frontal cortical activity could be associated with motivational direction instead of affective valence. However, avoidance and approach motivation are mostly associated with negative and positive affect, respectively (Carver & White, 1994), and consequently the interpretation is clouded. Similarly, the finding of promotion (vs. prevention) focus being associated with greater relative left (vs. right) frontal activation at baseline (Amodio, Shah, Sigelman, Brazy, & Harmon-Jones, 2004) could be interpreted from a motivational direction view or an affective valence view because promotion (vs. prevention) is more often associated with positive (vs. negative) affect. That is, past research had essentially confounded emotional valence with motivational direction, but researchers had made the interpretation that relatively greater left than right frontal cortical activity reflected greater approach motivation and positive affect, whereas relatively greater right than left frontal cortical activity reflected greater withdrawal motivation and negative affect. These claims fit well into dominant emotion theories that associated positive affect with approach motivation and negative affect with withdrawal motivation (Lang, 1995; Watson, 2000).



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However, other theories suggested that approach motivation and positive affect are not always associated with one another. Anger, for example, is a negatively valenced emotion that evokes behavioral tendencies of approach (Darwin, 1872/1965; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Plutchik, 1980; Young, 1943). Anger is associated with attack, particularly offensive aggression (Berkowitz, 1993; Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984; Lagerspetz, 1969). And offensive aggression can be distinguished from defensive aggression, which is associated with fear. Offensive aggression leads to attack without attempts to escape, whereas defensive or fear-based aggression leads to attack only if escape is not possible. Other research also suggested that anger was associated with approach motivation (Izard, 1991; Lewis, Alessandri, & Sullivan, 1990; Lewis, Sullivan, Ramsay, & Alessandri, 1992). More recent studies examined whether trait behavioral approach sensitivity (BAS) related to anger-related responses. Several studies have found that trait BAS, as assessed by Carver and White’s (1994) scale, is positively related to state and trait anger (Carver, 2004; Harmon-Jones, 2003; Smits & Kuppens, 2005). Because of the large body of evidence suggesting that anger is often associated with approach motivation (see Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009, for a review), research has been conducted to examine the relationship between anger and relative left frontal activation to test whether asymmetric frontal cortical activity is due to emotional valence, motivational direction, or a combination of emotional valence and motivational direction.

Trait Anger Because anger is associated with approach motivation, assessing the relationship of anger and asymmetric frontal cortical activity can assist in determining whether asymmetric frontal cortical activity relates to motivational direction or affective valence. If asymmetric frontal cortical activity relates to motivational direction, then anger should relate to greater left than right frontal activity, because anger is associated with approach motivational direction. However, if asymmetric frontal cortical activity relates to affective valence, then anger should relate to greater right than left frontal activity, because anger is associated with negative valence. In a study testing these competing predictions, Harmon-Jones and Allen (1998) assessed trait anger using the Buss and Perry (1992) questionnaire and assessed asymmetric frontal activity by examining baseline resting EEG activity. In this study of adolescents, trait anger related to increased left frontal activity and decreased right frontal activity. Asymmetric activity in other regions did not relate to anger. The specificity of anger to frontal asymmetries and not to other region asymmetries has been observed in all of the reviewed studies on anger. These results have been replicated in a study that revealed that these results were not due to anger being evaluated as a positive feeling (Harmon-Jones, 2004), as well as in other studies (Hewig, Hagemann, Seifert, Naumann, & Bartussek, 2004; Rybak, Crayton, Young, Herba, & Konopka, 2006).

Manipulations of Asymmetric Frontal Cortical Activity and Emotion Neurofeedback To test whether these individual differences in asymmetric frontal cortical activity were causally involved in the production of the affective response, research has used neurofeedback training to manipulate asymmetric frontal cortical activity (Allen, Harmon-Jones, & Cav-

34   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES ender, 2001). Neurofeedback presents the participant with real-time feedback on brainwave activity. If brainwave activity over a particular cortical region changes in the direction desired by the experimenter, then the participant is given “reward” feedback; if brainwave activity does not change in the desired direction, either negative feedback or no feedback is given. Rewards can be as simple as the presentation of a tone that informs the participant that brain activity has changed in the desired way. Neurofeedback-induced changes result from operant conditioning, and these changes in EEG can occur without awareness of how the brain activity changes occurred (Kamiya, 1979; Siniatchkin, Kropp, & Gerber, 2000). Participants typically are not aware of how they brought about changes in brain activity; in fact, extensive practice is required to gain awareness of how one may intentionally cause changes in brain activity (e.g., 8 weeks of practice; Kotchoubey, Kübler, Strehl, Flor, & Birbaumer, 2002). In the experiment by Allen et al. (2001), individuals were exposed to neurofeedback training designed to increase relative right versus relative left frontal activity over several days. Then, on the last day following training, participants were exposed to film clips designed to evoke emotions, and zygomatic (cheek) and corrugator (brow) muscle region activity was recorded to measure positive and negative emotional reactions, respectively. As expected, neurofeedback training altered asymmetric frontal activity, with individuals who received neurofeedback training to increase relative right frontal activity showing a significant change in relative right frontal activity from Day 1 to Days 3 and 4. Individuals who received training to increase relative left frontal activity did not show a significant change in asymmetric frontal activity but did differ from the relative right frontal training condition on the latter days. More important, this manipulated change in asymmetric frontal cortical activity caused changes in emotional responses, with the increase in right frontal cortical activity condition showing less zygomatic and more corrugator muscle region activity in response to all film clips than the increase left frontal cortical activity condition. This research suggests that asymmetric frontal cortical activity is causally involved in emotional responses.

Hand Contractions Other research has suggested that asymmetric frontal cortical activity is causally involved in emotional experience. Contractions of the left hand and of the left side of the lower third of the face induce sadness and bias perceptions and judgments negatively, whereas contractions of the right hand and of the right side of the face induce positive affect and assertiveness and bias perceptions and judgments positively (Schiff & Lamon, 1989, 1994). The effects of contractions of muscles on one side of the body on emotional and motivational outcomes have been explained as a result of activation of the contralateral hemisphere. Innervation of facial muscles in the lower third of the face (Rinn, 1984) and of muscles in the hand is contralateral (Hellige, 1993). Thus it has been assumed that the emotive outcomes produced by the contractions resulted from the spread of activation to or recruitment of contralateral frontal areas (Schiff & Lamon, 1989, 1994). To test these ideas, an experiment was conducted in which participants were randomly assigned to contract their left or right hands by squeezing a ball for roughly 4 minutes (HarmonJones, 2006). Then participants were exposed to a mildly positive, approach-oriented radio editorial about apartment living options in the city where the participants lived. EEG was recorded, followed by completion of an emotion scale that included items designed to measure positive activation. Results revealed that the unilateral contraction of the hand increased



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the activation of the contralateral hemisphere, as measured by EEG alpha suppression, over the central and frontal regions. The hand contraction manipulation also affected positive activation, with the right-hand contraction causing greater positive activation than the lefthand contraction. Finally, in the right-hand condition, positive activation related to greater relative left frontal activity at midfrontal sites, but not other sites.

Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Other research has manipulated asymmetrical frontal cortical activity and examined how it affected anger-related responses. For example, d’Alfonso, van Honk, Hermans, Postma, and de Haan (2000) used slow repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to inhibit the left or right prefrontal cortex. Slow rTMS produces inhibition of cortical excitability, so that rTMS applied to the right prefrontal cortex decreases its activation and causes the left prefrontal cortex to become more active, whereas rTMS applied to the left prefrontal cortex causes activation of the right prefrontal cortex. They found that rTMS applied to the right prefrontal cortex caused selective attention toward angry faces, whereas rTMS applied to the left prefrontal cortex caused selective attention away from angry faces. Thus an increase in left prefrontal activity led participants to attentionally approach angry faces, as in an aggressive confrontation. In contrast, an increase in right prefrontal activity led participants to attentionally avoid angry faces, as in a fear-based avoidance. Conceptually similar results have been found by van Honk and Schutter (2006). The interpretation of these results concurs with other research demonstrating that attention toward angry faces is associated with high levels of self-reported anger and that attention away from angry faces is associated with high levels of social anxiety (van Honk, Tuiten, de Haan, van den Hout, & Stam, 2001). We recently extended the work of van Honk, Schutter, and colleagues by examining whether a manipulation of asymmetric frontal cortical activity would affect behavioral aggression. Based on past research showing that contraction of the left hand increases right frontal cortical activity and that contraction of the right hand increases left frontal cortical activity (Harmon-Jones, 2006), we manipulated asymmetric frontal cortical activity by having participants contract their right or left hands. Participants then received insulting feedback, ostensibly from another participant. They then played a reaction-time game on the computer against the other ostensible participant. The game was designed so that participants would lose on half of the trials so that they could choose how much aversive noise to administer to their opponent; thus aggression could be unobtrusively measured. Results indicated that participants who squeezed with their right hands gave significantly louder and longer noise blasts to the other ostensible participant than those who squeezed with their left hands (Peterson, Shackman, & Harmon-Jones, 2008). Also, within the right-hand-contraction condition, greater relative left frontal activation was correlated with more aggression.

State Manipulations of Affect and Asymmetric Frontal Cortical Responses Research has also demonstrated that asymmetric frontal brain activity is associated with state emotional responses. For instance, Davidson and Fox (1982) found that 10-month-old infants exhibited increased left frontal activation in response to a film clip of an actress generating a happy facial expression as compared with a sad facial expression. Frontal brain activ-

36   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES ity has been found to relate to facial expressions of positive and negative emotions, as well. For example, Ekman and Davidson (1993) found increased left frontal activation during voluntary facial expressions of smiles of enjoyment. Coan, Allen, and Harmon-Jones (2001) found that voluntary facial expressions of fear produced relatively less left frontal activity. Other studies have examined emotional processes and frontal asymmetry using ERPs. In one study, Cunningham, Espinet, DeYoung, and Zelazo (2005) measured the late positive potential (LPP) while participants made evaluative (good vs. bad) and nonevaluative (abstract vs. concrete) judgments about socially relevant concepts. The concepts were then rated for goodness and badness. Concepts rated bad caused greater LPPs over the right frontal hemisphere, whereas concepts rated good caused greater LPPs over the left frontal hemisphere. Similarly, van de Laar, Licht, Franken, and Hendriks (2004) found that cocaine-addicted individuals, but not nonaddicted individuals, showed larger positive slow-wave responses over the left (but not right) frontal cortex to cocaine-related photographs as compared with neutral photographs. Ohgami et al. (2006) also found ERP evidence that suggested that reward cues caused greater left frontal cortical activity. The separation of emotional valence from motivational direction suggests that positive affects vary in motivational intensity. That is, some positive affects are lower in approach motivation, whereas others are higher in approach motivation. An important question remains regarding the valence-versus-motivational-direction models of asymmetric frontal cortical activity: Do positive affects of any approach motivational intensity cause increases in relative left frontal activation? An experiment addressed this question by assigning participants to write a short essay on one of three topics (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008). In the neutral-mindset condition, participants wrote about an ordinary and neutral day in their lives. In the high-approach-positive-mindset condition, participants wrote about a goal that they intend to accomplish within the next 3 months. In the low-approach-positive-mindset condition, participants wrote about a time when something exceptionally positive happened to them that did not result from something they did (e.g., when someone did something wonderful for them). After writing about the event, participants were instructed to think about the event while EEG was recorded. Consistent with predictions, participants in the two positive-mindset conditions reported feeling more positive affect than participants in the neutral-mindset condition. More important, the highapproach-positive-mindset condition caused greater relative left frontal cortical activity than the other conditions. These results support the hypothesis that it is the approach motivational aspect of some forms of positive affect, and not the positive valence per se, that causes greater relative left frontal cortical activation (as measured by EEG).

State Anger To further test the motivational direction model of asymmetrical frontal cortical activity, experiments have been conducted in which anger was manipulated. Harmon-Jones and Sigelman (2001) found that individuals who were insulted evidenced greater relative left frontal activity than individuals who were not insulted. Additional analyses revealed that within the insult condition, reported anger and aggression were positively correlated with relative left frontal activity. Neither of these correlations was significant in the no-insult condition. Harmon-Jones, Peterson, and Harris (2009) conceptually replicated the aforementioned research and extended it by showing that social rejection causes increased relative left



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frontal activity that is associated with anger and jealousy. Jensen-Campbell, Knack, Waldrip, and Campbell (2007) and Verona, Sadeh, and Curtin (2009) also replicated Harmon-Jones and Sigelman’s (2001) results, with the latter group extending them by showing that an impersonal stressor (high-pressure air blasts assigned by a computer) also evokes greater relative left frontal activity, which correlates with aggression in an “employee–supervisor” lab task. Other work replicated these results and revealed that state anger evokes both increased left and decreased right frontal activity. In the same experiment, when participants were first induced to feel sympathy for a person who insulted them, this reduced the effects of insult on left and right frontal activity (Harmon-Jones, Vaughn-Scott, Mohr, Sigelman, & HarmonJones, 2004), consistent with the idea that sympathy reduces aggression (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988).

Independent Manipulation of Approach Motivation within Anger In the experiments just described, the designs were tailored in such a way as to evoke anger that was approach oriented. Although most instances of anger involve approach inclinations, it is possible that not all forms of anger are associated with approach motivation. To manipulate approach motivation independently of anger, Harmon-Jones, Sigelman, Bohlig, and Harmon-Jones (2003) performed an experiment in which the ability to cope with the anger-producing event was manipulated. Based on past research that has revealed that coping potential affects motivational intensity (Brehm, 1999; Brehm & Self, 1989), it was predicted that the expectation of being able to take action to resolve the anger-producing event would increase approach motivational intensity relative to expecting to be unable to take action. In support of this prediction, angered participants who expected to engage in the approachrelated action evidenced greater left frontal activity than angered participants who expected to be unable to engage in approach-related action. Moreover, within only the action-possible condition, participants who evidenced greater left frontal activity in response to the angering event also evidenced greater self-reported anger and engaged in more approach-related behavior. The research of Harmon-Jones et al. (2003) suggests that the left frontal region is most accurately described as a region sensitive to approach motivational intensity. That is, it was only when anger was associated with an opportunity to behave in a manner that could resolve the anger-producing event that participants evidenced the increased relative left frontal activation. The effect of approach motivation and anger on left frontal activity has also been produced using pictorial stimuli that evoke anger (Harmon-Jones, Lueck, Fearn, & Harmon-Jones, 2006). The preceding findings may suggest that relatively greater left frontal activity will occur in response to an angering situation only when there is an explicit approach motivational opportunity. However, it is possible that an explicit approach motivational opportunity is not necessary for increased left frontal activity to anger to occur but that it only intensifies left frontal activity. In other words, other features of the situation or person may make it likely that an angering situation will increase approach motivational tendencies and activity in the left frontal cortical region. For example, individuals who are chronically high in anger may evidence increased left frontal activity (and approach motivational tendencies) in response to angering situations that would not necessarily cause such responses in individuals who are

38   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES not as angry. This prediction is based on the idea that individuals high in trait anger have more extensive associative networks for anger than individuals with lower trait anger and that anger-evoking stimuli should therefore activate parts of the network more readily in individuals high in trait anger (Berkowitz, 1993; Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004). In the study, participants were exposed to anger-inducing (and other) pictures and given no explicit manipulations of action expectancy (Harmon-Jones, 2007). Across all participants, a null effect of relative left frontal asymmetry occurred. However, individual differences in trait anger were related to relative left frontal activity to the anger-inducing pictures, such that individuals high in trait anger showed greater left frontal activity to anger-producing pictures (controlling for activity to neutral pictures). These results suggest that the explicit manipulation or opportunity for approach-motivated action may potentiate the effects of approach motivation on relative left frontal activity, but may not be necessary. Additional support for the role of approach motivational intensity being involved in the anger and frontal asymmetry relationship comes from a recent experiment in which body posture was manipulated to influence approach motivational intensity (Harmon-Jones & Peterson, 2009). Past research has suggested that manipulated body postures can affect behavior, with slumped postures leading to more “helpless behaviors” (Riskind & Gotay, 1982). Similarly, lying flat on one’s back may be antithetical to approach motivation, or the urge to move toward something. In the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to an upright or reclined body position, and then they received neutral or insulting interpersonal feedback, as in previous research (Harmon-Jones et al., 2004). For participants who received the feedback while upright, results replicated past research, with the insulting feedback causing greater relative left frontal activation than the neutral feedback. In contrast, participants who were insulted while in a reclined position did not show the typical increase in relative left frontal activation. This research further supports the role of approach motivation in the anger-related left frontal activity relationship.

Anger and Withdrawal Motivation The reviewed research suggests that greater relative left frontal activation is associated with anger because anger is often associated with approach motivation. This conclusion is most strongly supported in the studies by Harmon-Jones and colleagues (2003; Harmon-Jones, et al., 2006) that showed that reducing the approach motivational intensity of anger reduces relative left frontal activation. Is it possible for anger to be associated with an increase in right frontal activation? Based on the motivational direction model, we would expect that anger may be associated with right frontal activation if the anger evoked withdrawal motivational tendencies. However, anger may be evolutionarily prepared to evoke approach motivation, and it thus may be difficult for anger to activate withdrawal motivation. Indeed, research with infants (Lewis et al., 1992) and nonhuman animals (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1984) suggests that anger is predominantly associated with approach motivational tendencies. Despite these caveats, it is possible that anger may be associated with withdrawal motivation when the angering situation also evokes punishment concerns. If the expression of anger is perceived to be socially inappropriate, some individuals may withdraw from the context rather than evidence approach-oriented anger. To test these ideas, Zinner, Brodish, Devine, and Harmon-Jones (2008) created a social context in which the experience of anger was considered socially inappropriate. Because of



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the norms discouraging public expressions of racial prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), some individuals may become angered by the pressure to behave in a “politically correct” manner but also want to avoid expressing anger, leading them to withdraw. Indeed, our research revealed this to be the case in a situation in which individuals were pressured to behave in a “politically correct” manner. In this situation, anger was related to greater relative right frontal cortical activity. Moreover, anger was associated with anxiety, suggesting that this situation had evoked concerns of punishment among individuals who became angry. These results support the idea that anger was associated with relative right frontal activation because of withdrawal motivation.

Conclusion This chapter provided a selective review of some of the most researched neural substrates of approach and avoidance motivation. The research suggests that the amygdala is involved in determining motivational relevance. The anterior regions of the nucleus accumbens are generally involved in appetitive processes, and the posterior regions of the nucleus accumbens are generally involved in avoidance processes. The orbitofrontal cortex is involved in both approach and avoidance motivation, with the medial areas being more involved in approachrelated motivational processes and the lateral areas being more involved in avoidance-related motivational processes. The anterior cingulate cortex is critically involved in the detection of response conflict and, as such, may assist in resolving approach–approach, approach– avoidance, and avoidance–avoidance conflicts. Finally, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is asymmetrically involved in motivational direction, with the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex being involved in approach motivational processes and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex being involved in withdrawal motivational processes. Although the current research clearly supports this summary, it is important to note that plasticity exists throughout the brain and that life experiences can modify how given brain regions process positive and negative emotional information, as Reynolds and Berridge (2008) have shown within the nucleus accumbens. As noted previously, each structure is densely connected with other structures and infused with multiple neurochemicals. These connections and chemicals will likely prove important in unraveling the role of the brain in motivation. Ultimately, the story of the neural substrates of motivational direction will become more complex as scientists develop better techniques to track the fleeting communications among neurons and chemicals and better theories and behavioral methods to understand approach and avoidance motivation. Unraveling how self-enhancement and self-protection processes unfold within the neural circuits devoted to approach and avoidance motivation will undoubtedly assist us in better understanding this neural circuitry, as these self processes play significant roles in our everyday lives (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). Moreover, the investigation of neural circuits involved in these self processes may assist in testing competing psychological explanations of processes underlying self-enhancement and self-protection (see Beer & Hughes, Chapter 2, this volume).

Acknowledgments Work on this chapter was supported by National Science Foundation Grant Nos. BCS 0350435 and BCS 0643348.

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approach and withdrawal. In M. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 7, pp. 1–42). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Schoenbaum, G., Setlow, B., & Ramus, S. J. (2003). A systems approach to orbitofrontal cortex function: Recordings in rat orbitofrontal cortex reveal interactions with different learning systems. Behavioural Brain Research, 146, 19–29. Schulkin, J. (1991). Sodium hunger: The search for a salty taste. New York: Cambridge University Press. Schutter, D. J. L. G. (2009). Transcranial magnetic stimulation. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. S. Beer (Eds.), Methods in social neuroscience (pp. 233–258). New York: Guilford Press. Schutter, D. J. L. G., van Honk, J., d’Alfonso, A. A. L., Postma, A., & de Haan, E. H. F. (2001). Effects of slow rTMS at the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex on EEG asymmetry and mood. Neuroreport, 12, 445–447. Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2008). Self-enhancement: Food for thought. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 102–116. Seymour, B., Daw, N., Dayan, P., Singer, T., & Dolan, R. (2007). Differential encoding of losses and gains in the human striatum. Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 4826–4831. Siniatchkin, M., Kropp, P., & Gerber, W.-D. (2000). Neurofeedback: The significance of reinforcement and the search for an appropriate strategy for the success of self-regulation. Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback, 25, 167–175. Smits, D. J. M., & Kuppens, P. (2005). The relations between anger, coping with anger and aggression, and the BIS/BAS system. Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 783–793. Squire, L. R., & Zola-Morgan, S. (1991). The medial temporal lobe memory system. Science, 253, 1380–1386. Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18, 643–662. Stuss, D. T. (1991). Self, awareness, and the frontal lobes: A neuropsychological perspective. In J. Strauss & G. R. Goethals (Eds.), The self: Interdisciplinary approaches (pp. 255–278). New York: Springer. Stuss, D. T., & Benson, D. F. (1984). Neuropsychological studies of the frontal lobes. Psychological Bulletin, 95, 3–28. Sutton, S. K., & Davidson, R. J. (1997). Prefrontal brain asymmetry: A biological substrate of the behavioral approach and inhibition systems. Psychological Sciences, 8(3), 204–210. Terzian, H., & Cecotto, C. (1959). Determination and study of hemisphere dominance by means of intracarotid sodium amytal injection in man: II. Electroencephalographic effects. Bolletino della Societa Italiana Sperimentale, 35, 1626–1630. Thorndike, E. L. (1911). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. New York: Macmillan. Tomarken, A. J., Davidson, R. J., Wheeler, R. E., & Doss, R. C. (1992). Individual-differences in anterior brain asymmetry and fundamental dimensions of emotion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(4), 676–687. van de Laar, M. C., Licht, R., Franken, I. H. A., & Hendriks, V. M. (2004). Event-related potentials indicate motivational relevance of cocaine cues in abstinent cocaine addicts. Psychopharmacology, 177, 121–129. van Honk, J., & Schutter, D. J. L. G. (2006). From affective valence to motivational direction. Psychological Science, 17, 963–965. van Honk, J., Tuiten, A., de Haan, E., van den Hout, M., & Stam, H. (2001). Attentional biases for angry faces: Relationships to trait anger and anxiety. Cognition and Emotion, 15, 279–297. van Veen, V., & Carter, C. S. (2006). Conflict and cognitive control in the brain. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15, 237–240. Verona, E., Sadeh, N., & Curtin, J. J. (2009). Stress-induced asymmetric frontal brain activity and aggression risk. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 118, 131–145. Watson, D. (2000). Mood and temperament. New York: Guilford Press.

48   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES Weiskrantz, L. (1956). Behavioral changes associated with ablation of the amygdaloid complex in monkeys. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 49, 381–391. Whalen, P. J. (1998). Fear, vigilance, and ambiguity: Initial neuroimaging studies of the human amygdala. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 7, 177–188. Young, P. T. (1943). Emotion in man and animal: Its nature and relation to attitude and motive. New York: Wiley. Zinner, L. R., Brodish, A. B., Devine, P. G., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2008). Anger and asymmetric frontal cortical activity: Evidence for an anger–withdrawal relationship. Cognition and Emotion, 22, 1081–1093.

Chapter 2 Self-Enhancement A Social Neuroscience Perspective Jennifer S. Beer Brent L. Hughes

D

ecades of behavioral research have shown that people exaggerate the positivity of their task performance, knowledge, and personality (Alicke, 1985; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Paulhus & John, 1998; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Taylor & Brown, 1998). Researchers agree that people are motivated to view themselves in a positive light. However, the way in which people fulfill their motivation to view themselves positively is a matter of debate. Two mechanisms have been proposed to account for the exaggerated positivity that characterizes self-evaluations: (1) selective cognitive processing and (2) a failure to correct heuristic processing. Aside from its making intuitive sense, researchers have theorized that exaggerated positivity arises from active searches for flattering information as a means of self-esteem maintenance, because these evaluations are associated with situations in which self-esteem is invested or threatened (Dunning, 1995; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). For example, people will rate themselves highly on personality characteristics and will overclaim knowledge (e.g., claim knowledge about nonexistent items) if they believe that the personality characteristics or knowledge reflect on their potential for success (Klayman et al., 1999; Paulhus et al., 2003). Just as a threat to self-esteem can increase the extent of positivity in self-evaluation, self-affirmation may reduce it. When people presumably satisfy their motivation to feel good about themselves—by affirming themselves through positive feedback, focusing on their core values, or thinking about their close relationships—they exhibit relatively accurate self-perceptions or preferences for accurate feedback (Gramzow & Willard, 2006; Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005; Trope & Neter, 1994). Together these studies suggest that “shaking up” the self-esteem system modulates the degree to which evaluations

49

50   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES exhibit exaggerated positivity and, therefore, they likely reflect a defense to protect selfesteem. On the other hand, exaggerated positivity also characterizes self-evaluations when selfesteem has been neither threatened nor affirmed. For example, people give inflated reports of their abilities and knowledge even when self-esteem is not contingent on possessing those abilities or that knowledge (Klayman et al., 1999; Moore & Small, 2007). If exaggerated positivity in self-evaluations serves as a self-esteem defense, why does it occur when selfesteem is not at stake? Researchers suggest that self-evaluations, like many other judgment domains, fall prey to a heuristic processing approach. People often rely on the most salient or easily available information when making judgments rather than reasoning through all relevant information (Metcalfe, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, people may believe they know more about a domain of knowledge based on its familiarity (e.g., temperature information; Klayman et al., 1999) despite the fact that their actual knowledge is similar in a less familiar domain (e.g., state poverty levels). Although it at first might seem puzzling that a “default” mode of processing would be associated with imprecise perception, it is important to remember that other systems also operate imprecisely and make corrections only when accuracy is paramount (Beer, 2007). For example, the visual system makes a number of assumptions for the sake of efficiency but is capable of precision when necessary (Eagleman, 2001). So what research can be done to more fully understand the mechanisms through which self-enhancement motivations are accomplished? A major difference between the two perspectives is that cognitive control is most strongly engaged by either exaggerated positivity (i.e., selective searches for flattering information) or accuracy (i.e., integrating more than just salient information into self-evaluations). The heuristic-versus-executive-function nature of a cognitive process is often tested with mental load. Mental load (e.g., created by allocating some of the limited cognitive resources to an additional task or speeding responses) minimizes cognitive resources so that only the most automatic processes can be engaged for the target task. Therefore, mental load may reduce exaggerated positivity arising from self-esteem concerns (e.g., there are fewer cognitive resources to manipulate to “make the data come out in a favorable manner”), whereas it may increase or have no significant effect on exaggerated positivity arising from heuristic processing. Surprisingly, most studies have examined whether people pay primary attention to flattering information about the self (Paulhus, Graf, & Van Selst, 1989; Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989). The few studies that have directly addressed the extent of cognitive resources needed for exaggerated positivity have yielded mixed results (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Kruger, 1999). Regardless, manipulating mental load in such ways as requiring participants to quickly perform a task cannot tell us the whole story about whether a process relies on heuristic compared with controlled processing (DeMartino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Logan & Cowan, 1984). Some executive functions become so overlearned that they can be executed with few cognitive resources. For example, driving requires refined hand–eye coordination and online attention, but experienced drivers perform these operations with less cognitive effort. Therefore, it might be that executive functioning does underlie exaggerated positivity but that people become such experts at bending incoming data in a selfserving manner that they persist in their ability to do so even under mental load. Another possibility is to examine the neural systems that underlie accuracy and exaggerated positivity in self-evaluation.



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The Field of Social Neuroscience: A Brief Overview Social neuroscience is an approach that strives to understand the relation between the social and neural levels of analysis (Beer & Ochsner, 2006; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1992; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1998). As a field at the intersection of disciplines, social neuroscience has implications for both cognitive neuroscience and social psychology. Oftentimes, the benefit of social neuroscience is most intuitive for cognitive neuroscience. Research endeavors that illuminate the brain regions involved in a cognitive process brings scientists closer to developing a complete map of the brain and its functions. However, social neuroscience can also be helpful for understanding the mechanisms underlying psychological phenomena. As noted earlier, the underlying mechanisms that distinguish accurate from unrealistically positive self-evaluations are not fully understood (Gregg, Sedikides, & Gebauer, in press). Do neural regions associated with cognitive control support cognitive gymnastics that promote exaggerated positivity, or do they reduce exaggerated positivity by correcting heuristic processing? Although an initial literature search using such terms as self, emotion regulation, and social cognition, in combination with brain, may generate a bevy of articles, the results are ultimately unsatisfying for those looking for research that explicitly deals with motivational issues surrounding the self. Social neuroscience research on self-perception has mostly focused on understanding whether (1) self-perception is similar to or different from perceptions of others and (2) the interaction between self-perception and perceptions of other people. Studies comparing self-perception to other kinds of perception have typically adopted self-reference paradigms in which participants make judgments about personality trait words. Judgments of the self-descriptiveness of the trait words are contrasted with other kinds of judgments, such as how well the traits describe another person or whether the traits are socially desirable. Research along these lines shows strong convergence on the association between selfjudgments and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) activation. Although it was first thought that this association was specific to self-judgment, later research showed that MPFC is also associated with making judgments about well-known others (Beer & Ochsner, 2006; Gilihan & Farah, 2005; Heatherton, Macrae, & Kelley, 2004). Another major focus has been elucidating the neural systems that underlie simulation—that is, using the self to understand what someone else might be thinking or feeling. Research on this topic has examined this question using more varied paradigms than the self-reference research. Simulation has been examined by contrasting perceptions of other people who are similar or dissimilar to the self or by looking for neural commonalities between the self’s own experience and observation of that experience in another person (i.e., “mirror neurons”). These studies have identified MPFC, temporal–parietal junction (TPJ), and the mirror-neuron system as important neural components of social cognition (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Saxe, 2006; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007). Similarly, social neuroscience research on emotion regulation has been dominated by paradigms involving reappraisal and interference of emotional stimuli that do not typically have relevance for self-esteem. Participants regulate their emotional reaction to pictures or films through suppressing or reappraising their meaning or suppressing their attention to superfluous emotional information that is embedded in other tasks (Beer, 2009a; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). These studies have shown that a number of neural regions typically involved in cognitive control (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004) are also helpful for controlling emotional experience or attention to emotional information. For example, regions such as

52   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; ventral: vACC, dorsal: dACC) are involved in reappraising and ignoring emotional stimuli. Furthermore, this research has shown that VLPFC likely down-regulates amygdala activity during emotion regulation (see Beer, 2009a; Ochsner & Gross, 2005, for reviews). The research that forms the extant core of the field of social neuroscience does suggest a neural model of exaggerated positivity in self-evaluation. For example, regions associated with self-representation, such as MPFC, might distinguish whether self-evaluation is accurate or exaggerated in its positivity. Additionally, regions associated with emotion regulation, such as VLPFC, DLPFC, and ACC, should presumably be important for regulating feelings about the self if the selective processing view of exaggerated positivity is correct. However, if the advantage of social neuroscience is truly bridging the social and neural levels of analysis, then we can do better than extrapolating from studies that do not directly examine the motivated evaluations that pervade human social cognition. Although not currently a central focus, there are some studies that move beyond self-referent and emotion regulation paradigms to investigate the neural systems that support exaggerated positivity in self-evaluations and to inform the debate about their underlying mechanism.

Social Neuroscience Research on Self-Enhancement The current social neuroscience research supports the view that exaggerated positivity in self-evaluations arises from heuristic processing; it is accuracy that engages the most cognitive control. A classic observation of neurologists and neuropsychologists is that frontal lobe damage impairs self-insight (Blumer & Benson, 1975). Patients who have sustained frontal lobe injuries are often described as having little insight into the deficits arising from their brain damage (Blumer & Benson, 1975). More recently, empirical work has built on these clinical observations. Diverse research, including lesion studies and neuroimaging in healthy populations, has refined our understanding of the frontal lobe subregions involved in accurate self-insight. These studies suggest that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and dACC are helpful for correcting heuristic processing that can give rise to exaggerated positivity in self-evaluations, whereas MPFC may be needed to generate exaggerated positivity (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). Empirical studies of patients with OFC damage have shown that their self-perceptions are characterized by exaggerated positivity when compared with trained judges’ perceptions of their behavior. In these studies, patients with OFC damage participated in social interaction tasks such as making conversation, sharing autobiographical memories, and teasing (Beer, Heerey, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003; Beer, John, et al., 2006). Both verbal and nonverbal measures showed that patients with OFC damage interacted with strangers in a manner that would have been more appropriate for interactions with familiar others. In comparison with other participants, patients with OFC damage disclosed overly personal information and were more likely to stare at or invade the personal space of their conversation partners. Patients with OFC damage were proud and unembarrassed by their inappropriate social behavior (Beer et al., 2003; Beer, John, et al., 2006). These feelings were not accounted for by a lack of awareness or concern for social norms. These patients’ understanding of the social norms for interacting with strangers was similar to that demonstrated by patients with



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TABLE 2.1.  Neural Studies on Positivity Biases in Self-Evaluation Study

Method

Paradigm

Finding

Beer, John, et al. (2006)

Lesion

Self-perception vs. observer perception

Patients with orbitofrontal damage have unrealistically positive self-views; patients with dorsolateral prefrontal damage have insight similar to healthy controls

Moran et al. (2006)

fMRI

Self-evaluation of positive personality traits vs. negative personality traits

Ventral anterior cingulate cortex associated with evaluation of positive traits, especially those that are rated as self-descriptive

Sharot et al. (2007)

fMRI

Self-evaluation of the likelihood of positive future events vs. negative future events

Ventral anterior cingulate cortex associated with evaluation of positive future events, especially for optimistic individuals

Beer & Hughes (2010)

fMRI

Social comparison of self to average other for abstract vs. specific traits

Orbitofrontal cortex and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex reduce biased social comparisons

Beer, Lombardo, & Bhanji (2010)

fMRI

Self-evaluation of task confidence vs. actual task performance

Orbitofrontal cortex reduces overconfidence

Blackwood et al. (2003)

fMRI

Internal vs. external attributions

Orbitofrontal cortex associated with non-self-serving attributions

Krusemark, Campbell, & Clementz (2008)

ERP

Internal vs. external attributions

Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex associated with non-self-serving attributions

Kwan et al. (2007)

TMS

Self-evaluations vs. evaluations of best friend

TMS to MPFC decreased self-favoring ratings

Barrios et al. (2008)

TMS

Self-evaluations vs. evaluations of best friend

TMS to MPFC showed significantly different degree of self-favoring ratings than sham TMS

DLPFC damage and healthy control participants (Beer, John, et al., 2006). Instead, patients with OFC damage lacked insight into how their behavior was received by others. Specifically, their evaluations of their social behavior were much more positive than evaluations of their behavior conducted by trained judges (Beer, John, et al., 2006). In contrast, patients with DLPFC damage exhibit self-insight that is similar to that exhibited by neurologically intact control participants (Beer, John, et al., 2006). Intriguingly, patients with OFC damage may be able to gain appropriate self-insight in certain circumstances. After watching a videotape of their social interactions with a stranger, patients with OFC damage reported feeling embarrassed about their behavior (Beer, John, et al., 2006). Together these findings raise two possibilities for the role of the OFC in self-insight. The OFC may be important for spontaneous monitoring of behavior but is not solely responsible for the processes needed to gain accurate insight. Alternatively, the videotape may have helped counteract deficits incurred as

54   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES

Figure 2.1.  Medial view of regions implicated in self-enhancement (MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; vACC, ventral anterior cingulate cortex) and the reduction of self-enhancement (OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex).

a result of the reduction in OFC tissue. Although they have OFC damage, most patients have some remaining tissue. Therefore, the second chance to process information from the social interaction may have bolstered the computations of the remaining OFC tissue. Neuroimaging studies have had to grapple with the difficult problem of operationalizing exaggerated positivity in the scanner environment. As demonstrated by the lesion studies just reviewed, social interaction tasks make it possible to objectively measure behavior so that these objective measurements can be compared with self-evaluations. However, this is more difficult to do in the scanner environment. As a first step, the earliest attempts to study this topic built on the social neuroscience research on self-evaluation that used self-referent paradigms (Kelley et al., 2002; Ochsner et al., 2005). These studies moved toward understanding how emotional concerns might affect self-evaluation by comparing self-evaluation of positive characteristics to self-evaluation of negative characteristics (Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006; Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007). In these studies, people evaluated the self-descriptiveness of traits or the likelihood of future events that vary in their social desirability (Moran et al., 2006; Sharot et al., 2007). Judgments of stimuli with positive valence were equated with exaggerated positivity. These studies have shown that vACC differentiates judgments of positive stimuli from judgments of negative stimuli. Therefore, these studies suggested that exaggerated positivity was supported by vACC function. However, the confound between self-enhancement motivation and positive valence of stimuli left open the question of whether the vACC is associated with motivated perceptions or encoding positive valence. People do claim more positive information as self-descriptive than negative information (Taylor & Brown, 1988). However, it is also the case that people underreport negative information about themselves (Dunning et al., 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Therefore, the valence of characteristics is not a reliable proxy for the presence or absence of a self-enhancement motive. In order to address this issue, recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have adapted new paradigms from the social psychological literature to investigate the



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neural systems associated with accuracy and exaggerated positivity. For example, exaggerated positivity can be operationalized by having participants evaluate themselves in relation to an average peer across a large number of personality traits (Alicke et al., 1995; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Dunning et al., 1989). When asked to judge themselves in relation to their average peer, the majority of people judge themselves to be “above average.” Specifically, participants report that they have more socially desirable traits and fewer undesirable traits than their average peer. This pattern reflects exaggerated positivity because, although each individual is likely to have some unique characteristics, it is unlikely that so many people in a random sample would be significantly more desirable than an average peer across such a large number of traits. Accurate self-ratings across a large number of traits should be centrally distributed around the average peer (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). This type of paradigm also makes it possible to tease apart exaggerated positivity and valence through manipulations of the trait words. Behavioral research has shown that people make relatively accurate social comparisons when evaluating traits that have fewer rather than many associated behaviors. In other words, there are fewer ways to be “tidy,” whereas there are more ways to be “talented.” People evaluate themselves as more similar to an average peer for specific traits such as “tidy” than for broad traits such as “talented” (Dunning et al., 1989). The specificity of traits is independent of their valence. In this way, accuracy can be examined through comparisons of judgments of specific versus broad traits, whereas valence can be examined through comparisons of judgments of positive versus negative traits. Two neuroimaging studies have used this approach to disentangle the neural systems associated with exaggerated positivity and valence (Beer & Hughes, 2010; Hughes & Beer, 2010). These studies have found that vACC is most important for differentiating positive valence from negative valence rather than exaggerated positivity from accuracy. Additionally, judgments of specific traits more strongly engage OFC and dACC. Furthermore, individual differences in social comparisons modulate activation in these regions. The more participants evaluated themselves as similar to their average peer, the more they engaged medial and lateral OFC and dACC (Beer & Hughes, 2010). A second study used this paradigm to examine evaluations of social targets who varied in their intimacy with the self (i.e., relationship partner, assigned roommate; Hughes & Beer, 2010). Evaluations of relationship partners exhibited patterns of exaggerated positivity that were similar to those found in self-evaluations (i.e., better than average for broad traits; about average for specific traits), whereas evaluations of dorm roommates were relatively accurate across trait conditions. Consistent with the first study, OFC and dACC were recruited for specific trait judgments of relationship partners and for all roommate judgments (i.e., judgments of both specific and broad traits). Furthermore, OFC was modulated by individual differences in accuracy. The more participants viewed their relationship partners or roommates as similar to the average peer, the more they engaged OFC (Hughes & Beer, 2010). Although the second study is not directly relevant to how judgments of the self might serve to maintain self-esteem, it provides convergent evidence and rules out the possibility that the neural activation associated with accuracy is somehow accounted for by judgments of specific traits. Neuroimaging studies of exaggerated positivity in self-evaluations have also moved beyond paradigms that involve the evaluation of general personality traits or future events. For example, exaggerated positivity is also evident when people’s evaluation of their task performance exceeds their actual performance or when they consistently take credit for their task successes but not their task failures (Klayman et al., 1999; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Even

56   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES when exaggerated positivity is operationalized in relation to discrepancies between evaluations and task performance or attributions for task performance, the pattern of neural results remains similar to the studies of exaggerated positivity in personality evaluations. Accuracy most strongly engages dACC and OFC. For example, one study asked participants to answer forced-choice trivia questions and then to estimate how confident they were in their performances (Beer, Lombardo, & Bhanji, 2009). The trivia questions came from two domains that differed in their likelihood of eliciting exaggerated positivity, that is, overconfidence in one’s performance. One of the domains, average July temperatures in tourist cities, felt relatively familiar to participants. Although they had not studied this topic, the familiarity of the topic elicited overly confident estimates of task performance from participants. The other domain, the percentage of U.S. state populations below the poverty line, felt very unfamiliar to participants. Although actual performance was similar across the two domains, participants were more accurate in their evaluations of their task performance in the state-poverty domain. This study found that within the domain that elicited overconfidence (i.e., temperature), participants who were less likely to exhibit bias were the most likely to engage a region of medial OFC. Additionally, in both domains, a different region of OFC was negatively modulated by confidence estimates, but only for trials that participants had answered incorrectly. This finding is particularly remarkable because participants were not given feedback, so the sensitivity of OFC to incorrect trials was not driven by explicit external cues. Together these findings suggest that the OFC was important for reducing overconfidence, because one OFC subregion was recruited by the most accurate participants and because another OFC subregion was helpful for keeping confidence estimates low on incorrect trials. Studies examining self-serving attributions for task performance have also found that a willingness to take personal responsibility for failure is associated with dACC and lateral OFC activation. In one study, participants were asked to imagine positive and negative events and then make an attribution about why something like that might happen to them (Blackwood et al., 2003). The attribution choices measured an internal or external attribution style. For example, participants were asked to imagine that a neighbor had invited them over for a drink (positive event) or that a friend had picked a fight with them (negative event). Then they made judgments about whether something about themselves (internal) or the situation (external) would cause that kind of event. Participants were considered to be non-self-serving if they attributed positive events to something about the situation and negative events to something about themselves. The non-self-serving participants were most likely to engage the lateral OFC. In another study, participants performed a working-memory task, received trial-by-trial manipulated feedback on their performance, and then made an attribution for each trial’s success or failure (Krusemark, Campbell, & Clementz, 2008). Self-serving attributions were operationalized as internal attributions for successes (i.e., “I am smart”) and external attributions for failures (i.e., “It was bad luck”). Attributions were considered to be non-self-serving when the opposite pattern occurred: Successes were attributed to external factors (i.e., “It was luck”) and failures were attributed to internal factors (i.e., “I am dense”). The study used event-related potentials (ERP) and found differences at 320 ms after the attribution selections had been presented. Source localization procedures suggested that a swath of medial cortex including the dACC predicted the selection of non-self-serving attributions. Together the attribution studies suggest that lateral OFC and dACC are important for explaining hypothetical and actual events in a non-self-serving manner. Aside from the lesion and neuroimaging studies that implicate dACC and OFC in accu-



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rate self-evaluations, two transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies implicate MPFC in exaggerated positivity self-evaluations (Barrios et al., 2008; Kwan et al., 2007). In one study, participants rated themselves and their best friends on a series of personality traits. Self-evaluations were considered to be exaggerated in their positivity to the extent that more desirable traits and fewer undesirable traits were ascribed to the self when compared to ratings of a best friend. Consistent with behavioral studies (Alicke et al., 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988), participants in a sham TMS condition showed a tendency toward exaggerated positivity for self-evaluations. When TMS was delivered to the MPFC, ratings of the self and best friend tended to be similar. However, TMS delivered to the somatosensory cortex was not associated with convergence between self and other ratings. These findings suggest that a disruption of MPFC function affects exaggerated positivity rather than TMS in general. A second study used a similar self-rating and best-friend rating approach (Barrios et al., 2008). This study differed by separately examining words that reflected “egoistic” or “moralistic” aspects of self. Egoistic traits are those traits that elevate the self’s status (e.g., ambitions, popularity) and are distinct from moralistic traits that reflect exaggerated views of one’s exceptional ability to adhere to social norms (e.g., morality, consideration; Paulhus & John, 1998). On average, participants in this study did not show a significant discrepancy between self-ratings and best-friend ratings. However, a comparison of sham TMS stimulation and MPFC TMS stimulation found that discrepancies between self and best-friend ratings did differ across these conditions for egoistic but not moralistic traits. As in the first study, MPFC stimulation reduced the differences between self-ratings and ratings of a best friend. Together these studies suggest that TMS stimulation to the MPFC reduces the extent to which people claim more positive aspects in relation to themselves than to their best friends.

Implications and Future Directions for Research on Intrapersonal Self-Esteem Defense The findings from neural studies of inflated self-evaluations have several implications for understanding the psychological and neural mechanisms through which people are able to maintain their self-esteem by viewing themselves in the best possible light. First, the findings strongly converge on the association between accuracy and neural regions associated with cognitive control. Regardless of whether exaggerated positivity was operationalized by discrepancies between self and others or by evaluations of task performance, accuracy was consistently associated with OFC and dACC. Therefore, neural regions associated with cognitive control were responsible for overcoming exaggerated positivity rather than supporting it. Additionally, these findings are consistent with the view that self-enhancement motivations are accomplished using heuristic strategies. The neural findings more closely paralleled the findings from neural studies that have examined availability heuristics in nonsocial judgments (Beer, Knight & D’Esposito, 2006; DeMartino et al., 2006) rather than emotionally regulated information processing (Beer, 2009; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002). As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the reliance on heuristics is theorized to extend to nonsocial judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Therefore, the correction of heuristic processing in nonsocial judgments should be similar to the correction of the heuristic processing that helps accomplish self-enhancement. Indeed, neural studies examining gambling judgments that are susceptible to salience heuristics (such as emotion or win–loss frames;

58   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES Beer, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2006; DeMartino et al., 2006) have found that OFC and dACC are helpful for integrating less salient information into gambling judgments. Furthermore, the less participants relied on salient information, the more they engaged the medial (mOFC) and lateral (lOFC) (Beer, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2006; DeMartino et al., 2006). These studies suggest that the exaggerated positivity that characterized self-evaluations in the neural studies were likely the result of a heavy reliance on easily available information, such as whether a trait is socially desirable or whether a knowledge domain feels familiar. Conditions that made it difficult to rely on easily available information (e.g., specific traits that may have made it difficult to easily associate the self with desirable traits) elicited more OFC and dACC activation. Additionally, individuals who were more accurate were the most likely to engage OFC and dACC, which may reflect individual differences in the tendency to rely on heuristics. Whereas the lesion, fMRI, and ERP studies provided a consistent relation between neural activation associated with cognitive control and accurate self-evaluations, the TMS studies raised the possibility that disruption of the MPFC, a region associated with social cognition, reduces the influence of self-enhancement motivation on self-evaluation. The TMS findings invite several questions. Why might TMS stimulation of MPFC affect the influence of self-enhancement motivations on self-evaluations when (1) fMRI studies have not identified MPFC as a region that is associated with exaggerated positivity and (2) studies of frontal lobe damage typically find impaired self-evaluation (Blumer & Benson, 1975)? There are several possible explanations. First, these findings are not necessarily mutually exclusive with the other studies. The study examining social comparative judgments of significant others and roommates (Hughes & Beer, 2010) found that vACC differentiation between positive stimuli and negative stimuli was associated with greater feelings of intimacy. Intimacy also predicts the extent to which self-enhancement motivations influence social comparisons. The vACC activation from the social comparison study (Hughes & Beer, 2010) may overlap with the MPFC region from the TMS study (Kwan et al., 2007). In the TMS study, the selfenhancement motivation was theorized to be reflected in discrepancies between self and bestfriend ratings, but this discrepancy measure also reflected the degree to which positive and negative traits were rated differently. If the TMS did disrupt vACC regions that differentiate positive and negative traits, it might be that exaggerated positivity is reduced, because this region no longer distinguishes between positive and negative traits for either the self or best friend. Second, a similar line of reasoning could apply in relation to the previous research associating MPFC and mentalizing processes (Mitchell et al., 2006; Saxe, 2006; Uddin et al. 2007). It might be that disruption of MPFC impairs mentalizing functions that are needed to differentiate the self from other people. Third, TMS disrupts neural activity, so it is more similar to a lesion methodology than to methods that assess neural activation (Schutter, 2009). As such, these methods capture different aspects of brain function. Although the neuroimaging studies may not show differences in this region’s activation between conditions of accuracy and exaggerated positivity, it may be that if it cannot function, its impairment is more evident for exaggerated positivity than accuracy. Patients with focal MPFC damage are rare, even more so than patients with OFC damage (Beer, 2009b). If studies of MPFC patients were conducted, then it might be that these patients would show relatively accurate self-evaluations. These findings would be especially interesting given the impaired selfinsight that clinically characterizes frontal lobe patients (Blumer & Benson, 1975). Empirical research on patients with OFC and DLPFC damage has shown that patients with OFC



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damage have impaired insight, whereas patients with DLPFC damage do not (Beer, John, et al., 2006). If MPFC function actually interferes with exaggerated positivity and damage to this region results in greater accuracy, then that finding would suggest that not only do some frontal lobe areas not affect accuracy (i.e., DLPFC) but also that damage to certain regions of the frontal lobe actually promote accuracy (i.e., MPFC). The current research also highlights many fruitful avenues for future research. For example, manipulations that directly affect self-esteem will be helpful for more deeply understanding how the findings from the current studies fit into the debate about the underlying psychological mechanism of self-enhancement motivations. The current findings provide support for the view that self-enhancement motivations can be accomplished through heuristic processing but do not rule out the possibility that the controlled processing perspective is correct under certain circumstances. Most of the extant studies examined accuracy and exaggerated positivity in paradigms in which self-esteem was not explicitly threatened or affirmed. If the preceding studies do reflect the exaggerated positivity that supports selfesteem maintenance, then they suggest a different interpretation of the mechanism underlying the changes in exaggerated positivity as a function of threat or affirmation. As mentioned earlier, threats to self-esteem elicit even greater exaggerated positivity, whereas affirmation reduces bias (Gramzow & Willard, 2006; Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005; Paulhus et al., 2003). The association of greater exaggerated positivity with threat has been theorized to reflect an even stronger engagement of the cognitive control used to manipulate self-relevant information in a self-serving way. However, drawing on the findings from the current neural studies, it would be expected that increased exaggerated positivity reflects greater heuristic processing. An alternate possibility is that the current studies do not actually reflect the influence of self-enhancement motivations that support self-esteem maintenance but a baseline processing mode aimed at efficiency that extends to self-evaluation when threat is not present. Perturbing the self-esteem system in a negative manner might reveal a completely different pattern of neural regions associated with exaggerated positivity. In this case, it may be that the controlled processing perspective is correct for situations of self-esteem threat; people defend their self-esteem by engaging cognitive control once self-esteem is threatened. For example, if self-esteem threat were manipulated, neural regions supporting cognitive control might be more strongly associated with exaggerated positivity than with accuracy. It would be especially intriguing if self-affirmation led to increased accuracy that reflected a reduction of neural activation associated with cognitive control compared with a condition without self-affirmation. It is difficult to understand why accuracy would be more mentally arduous at baseline than after self-affirmation, but one possibility is suggested by the relation of self-affirmation to mood. At times, self-affirmation manipulations increase positive mood (McQueen & Klein, 2006), and positive mood is often associated with more automatic forms of information processing (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994). Second, more research is needed to understand the neural systems that support exaggerated positivity. In some of the current studies, exaggerated positivity was not associated with unique neural activation (Beer & Hughes, 2010, Hughes & Beer, 2010). Instead, the condition associated with exaggerated positivity engaged the neural regions associated with accuracy but to a lesser degree. From a psychological perspective, it is possible that exaggerated positivity just reflects a weaker version of the computations that lead to accuracy. This would challenge current dual-process theories of judgment bias, which suggest that exaggerated positivity reflects an intuitive judgment system that is unchecked by a controlled process-

60   NEUROCOGNITIVE BASES ing system (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, it is possible that the current findings are artifacts of the need to contrast within-subject conditions of exaggerated positivity with conditions of accuracy in order to conduct analysis of neural activation. The conditions are necessarily very similar (e.g., both social comparisons of trait words), which increases the likelihood that they engage similar kinds of processing, making it appear that exaggerated positivity and accuracy rely on different degrees of the same kinds of computations. Therefore, research that elicits differences in accuracy and exaggerated positivity using different experimental manipulations or through individual differences is needed to more strongly conclude whether exaggerated positivity engages unique regions or just less activation in neural regions associated with accuracy. For example, a host of research has shown that individual differences in narcissism and defensive coping styles predict greater positivity. Even people with nonclinical levels of narcissism are likely to report inflated perceptions of their popularity, social status, and intellectual ability, but not their agreeableness or morality (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002; Paulhus & John, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001). Theorists suggest that the fragility of narcissists’ self-esteem increases their threshold for defending the self, but only in domains they care about. In this way, narcissists are constantly under self-esteem threat when asked to evaluate particular aspects of themselves. Therefore, research on individual differences in narcissism is another way to examine the neural systems mediating exaggerated positivity in contexts of self-esteem threat. As with experimental manipulations of self-esteem threat, it would be beneficial to understand whether increased positivity in this context represents a corresponding increase in heuristic processing or the neural regions previously associated with accuracy when the self-esteem system is not challenged or affirmed. The involvement of the frontal lobes also suggests that lifespan differences in exaggerated positivity could reflect differences in frontal lobe maturation. Almost nothing is known about the degree of exaggerated positivity in the self-evaluations of the very young or the very old. However, research suggests that, if exaggerated positivity requires correction by frontal lobe engagement, then exaggerated positivity may be particularly pronounced at stages in the lifespan at which frontal lobes are still maturing or beginning to decline. For example, the literature on old age has presented a paradox for researchers. On the one hand, older people exhibit an increased focus on emotion regulation and are quite successful at maintaining positive moods (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999; Labouvie-Vief, 2003; Mroczek, 2001). On the other hand, older age is also associated with reduced frontal lobe volume and declining inhibitory ability (Hartel & Buckner, 2006; Raz, 2000). Although older people are still able to execute controlled processing, they are more judicious about when they do (Hess, 2006; Mata, Schooler, Rieskamp. 2007) and may have to engage additional neural structures to achieve the same results as younger people (Hartel & Buckner, 2006; Mather, 2006; Raz, 2000). How is it possible that older people are able to maintain such positive emotion when they are simultaneously developing deficits in the very neural structures thought to support emotion regulation? It might be that older people’s moods benefit from their increased reliance on heuristic processing; this is the kind of processing that supports exaggerated positivity in self-evaluations. Relatedly, developmental research has shown that the frontal lobes do not fully develop until early adulthood, and this accounts for the reduced executive functioning seen in children (Bunge & Wright, 2007). Young children may have especially exaggerated positivity because they do not have full executive function capacity. Studies of young children may be helpful for understanding



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how positivity heuristics develop. Are unrealistically positive self-evaluations automatic at all stages of the lifespan, or do they become automatized over time? Finally, the extant social neuroscience research on exaggerated positivity in self-evaluations suggests a slightly different perspective on the reasons for such a strong association between frontal lobe impairment and disorders that are characterized by poor insight. For example, mood disorders and substance abuse are associated with compromised frontal lobe function and reduced volume in frontal lobe regions such as OFC and ACC (Steele, Currie, Lawrie, & Reid, 2006; Volkow et al., 1991) and have often been associated with poor selfinsight but in different ways (Aleman, Agrawal, Morgan, & David, 2006; Sanz, Constable, Lopez-Ibor, Kemp, & David, 1998). The poor self-insight is sometimes overly positive, such as when substance abusers believe that they can use drugs without relapsing (Kim et al., 2007; McLennan et al., 1998). However, mood disorders such as depression can be associated with overly negative self-views, possibly because of a failure to correct automatic negative associations with self (Beevers, 2005). The extant research suggests that these disorders may represent different heuristics that are used to evaluate the self, which are difficult to correct because of frontal lobe impairment. Frontal lobe impairment may reduce monitoring of the appropriateness of evaluations or may make it difficult to switch heuristic thinking to a more controlled mode of thought. Therefore, understanding changes in frontal lobe function in relation to motivated self-evaluations may be helpful for designing therapeutic interventions for various disorders.

Conclusion Although not yet a central focus of social neuroscience research, neural studies suggest that self-enhancement motivations may be accomplished through heuristic processing. Exaggerated positivity in social evaluations is reduced by OFC and dACC activation, regions associated with the correction of heuristic processing. These findings held across a diverse set of methodologies, including lesion, fMRI, and ERP, as well as a diverse set of operationalizations, including social comparison, confidence in task performance, and attributions for task performance. Future research will be helpful in clarifying whether this neural pattern holds when self-esteem is directly threatened or affirmed. A more complete understanding of the neural architecture of motivational influences on social cognition will also be important for elucidating how self-evaluation is affected by lifespan development and frontal lobe disorders.

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PART II

Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Self-Construal

Chapter 3 Self-Enhancement via Redefinition Defining Social Concepts to Ensure Positive Views of the Self Clayton R. Critcher Erik G. Helzer David Dunning

Words may show a man’s wit, but actions his meaning.                  —Benjamin Ffranklin (American author,                   political theorist, and scientist, 1706–1790)

P

eople live in a world of concrete actions and events, but they think, interpret, communicate, and remember in terms of abstract concepts. People see someone smile and interpret the action as either happy or ironic. Someone pats someone else on the back, and they classify it as friendly, aggressive, or ingratiating. People endorse the idea that they want to achieve well-being, but does that state primarily involve healthy relationships with family, more success at work, or just a positive attitude to start the day? This chapter focuses on the space between the concrete actions that people take and the categories they use to label those actions. It asks how people map the linkages between the concrete experiences they encounter and the abstract concepts they use to categorize, talk about, and remember those experiences. In a sense, we ask how people in their everyday lives complete a task that a psychological researcher often faces. Researchers commonly wish to study interesting concepts such as intelligence, self-esteem, or altruism and have to conjure some way to instantiate those concepts in a concrete manner in the laboratory. For example, to instantiate intelligence, a researcher might have people complete a math quiz in the lab, tackle a vocabulary test or might examine how many nonsense syllables they remember. More broadly, as Benjamin Franklin indirectly noted in the quote that begins this chapter,

69

70   SELF-CONSTRUAL researchers must take seriously the mapping between ideas as they exist at a conceptual level and how they are to be reflected at an operational, or concrete, level. In this chapter, we make a commonsense observation that people going about their everyday lives also have to make these connections between conceptual and operational levels. But here is the twist. Such mappings are often neither straightforward nor unambiguous. A single behavior may suggest many different, and reasonable, conceptual mappings. Should a student, for example, who makes a point to talk to the professor after class be considered primarily talkative, an intellectual, or just someone infused with raw ambition? In addition, a concept might be best exemplified by very different behaviors. When a person is sophisticated, does that most directly mean that he or she knows several world languages, has a working knowledge of many different wines, has read a lot of good books, or simply knows how to navigate any social conversation with ease and panache? To be sure, concepts do contain some core meanings. Ask people how to distinguish the concepts of intelligence and dominance, for example, and they will show a lot of agreement. They will agree that a large vocabulary has more to do with the former but that asserting oneself in conversation is more relevant to the latter. Classic work in cognitive and social psychology shows that people also agree about many of the core characteristics of what it means to be in love, or a good lawyer, or even a chair (Fehr, 1988, 2004; Rosch, 1975, 1978). But that classic work also suggests that concepts are fuzzy, that people can disagree about the actions, attributes, and events that best fit the sense of most concepts (for a review, see Horowitz & Turan, 2008), and that the level of disagreement between them can be quite marked. For example, Cantor, Mischel, and Schwartz (1982) asked college students to list the features they associated with such everyday, familiar concepts as party, date, or being at an interview. Ten students provided 10 features for each individual concept. On average, 88 features were listed for each concept, but only 15, on average, were listed by more than one student. That is, for each concept, 80% of the features each student mentioned were listed by that student alone—indicating more than a fair amount of variability in the mapping each individual brings to mind between abstract concepts and the concrete attributes they link to that concept. Other work affirms just how variable people’s ideas of familiar and important social concepts are. Beck, McCauley, Segal, and Hershey (1988) asked participants to consider such social categories as quarrelsome and to rate how much various actions and attributes (e.g., complaining about having to do someone a favor) reflected that category. The ratings participants gave were rather stable through time; when participants were asked to give a second round of ratings 3 weeks after the first, their responses pretty much recapitulated what they had said earlier. Those ratings, however, did not recapitulate what their peers thought. A single person’s ratings correlated with another peer’s at the rate of only .08 to .50. Fehr (1988) found a similar pattern of disagreement when respondents were asked to consider the concept of love. When 96 students were asked to generate attributes of that concept, they generated 183 different attributes, of which only 68 were mentioned by more than one person—and no attribute was mentioned by more than half of respondents. The mean level of agreement between any two of the respondents in this study has been estimated to be only .16 (Horowitz & Turan, 2008). Thus people agree that love exists; they just do not agree on how it looks, behaves, and feels.



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The Aims of This Chapter This chapter focuses on the fuzzy links between action and idea and asks what leads people to disagree in their mapping between the concrete and the conceptual. More specifically, we suggest that people tend to shape that mapping in a self-serving way. They tend to endorse concrete–conceptual linkages that place themselves, their characteristics, and their place in the world in a more favorable light. That is, people tend to define such terms as outgoing, self-esteem, and tall in the way that is the most flattering to them. We review past research showing that people tend to adopt self-serving definitions—that is, mappings—of social concepts and that this tendency leads them to reach overly flattering and much too stable conclusions about themselves that fail to align with objective evidence. We then consider the recent view, from the psychological and economic literatures, that although people embrace self-serving definitions of social concepts, this does not necessarily lead to self-assessments that are counternormative. Instead, people can have it both ways, being quite flattering in the way they describe themselves yet still completely accurate in their self-impressions. We then discuss whether the use of self-serving definitions leads to or away from good psychological adjustment. Finally, we explore potential avenues for future research.

The Fuzziness of Social Concepts A sizable amount of psychology research reveals that the disagreements people display in the linkages they make between the concrete and the conceptual is not random. This work has shown that people appear to take fuzziness in those linkages and exploit them to their own psychic advantage. They emphasize linkages that put themselves in the best possible light, allowing them to claim for themselves positive characteristics while denying negative ones. People mold these linkages in two separate ways. One way we can refer to as the horizontal method. The other is the vertical method.

The Horizontal Method Social concepts are fuzzy in that is it often unclear which specific attributes or actions best exemplify them. Place an array of concrete attributes in front of people, and they will differ widely in which they pick as most central to any social concept they are quizzed about. For example, given math skill and having a large vocabulary, people will disagree about which best indicates intelligence. Put diplomatic skill and persistence in front of them, and they will often disagree about which attribute is more crucial to leadership. But what drives those disagreements? It appears that the motive to think of oneself as a lovable and capable individual fuels some of the difference. For example, when people are asked about the behaviors and characteristics they link to intelligence, they tend to emphasize attributes they possess and deemphasize the ones they do not. People who think they are good at math are more likely to claim that math skill is a central component of intelligence. Those who do not think they have this skill are more likely to claim that other attributes (e.g., having a large vocabulary) are better indicators of intelligence. When it comes to negative concepts, such as submissiveness, people reverse. A person who regularly lets his or her

72   SELF-CONSTRUAL companion choose which movie to go to will probably deny that this behavior is indicative of the negative trait of submissiveness, whereas a person who always chooses the movie of the night might very well link a reluctance to do so with the negative trait (Beauregard & Dunning, 2001; Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995; Dunning & McElwee, 1995; Dunning, Perie, & Story, 1991). These linkages are not merely acts of self-presentation. More automatic measures of the linkages people make show that people connect their personal attributes to good concepts, whereas they avoid linking their shortcomings. Wentura and Greve (2004) asked participants to take a general knowledge quiz with some rather difficult questions (such as “Who wrote Crime and Punishment?”). Later, participants were placed in a lexical-decision task in which they had to say whether word strings were well-formed words. Of key interest was the speed with which participants could identify the term erudite as a word, especially if the word was preceded by a fact that the participants themselves either did or did not know (e.g., Dostoevsky wrote Crime and Punishment). When erudite was preceded by a fact they knew, they were quicker to label erudite as a word than when preceded by a fact they had not known—suggesting that participants had linked knowledge in that particular area with the abstract concept of erudite. This linkage, of course, implies that they themselves are more erudite than not.

The Vertical Method Even if people agree on the behavioral indicators that best reflect a trait, they still have in hand fuzziness that they can exploit for self-enhancement purposes. For example, let us stipulate, as most people do, that performance on the quantitative Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) test is a central and valid indicator of math skill. There is still some fuzziness left in that people can differ about how far up the performance ladder on the SAT one must climb to qualify for the trait term mathematically skilled. Some people believe that a moderate performance, such as a score of 500, will do; others say that a much more stringent threshold must be met, such as 750 (Dunning & McElwee, 1995). What drives these disagreements, again, appears to be a desire to maintain positive selfviews. People want to claim positive traits for themselves. And once they do, they wish to claim that they exclusively have them relative to others. One sees this activity in how people resolve vertical ambiguity in behavioral indicators. People who score relatively low on the quantitative SAT test, for example, tend to state that a moderate score is sufficient to claim math skill. In doing so, they can claim math skill for themselves. People who score high on the SAT, however, cite a much more stringent threshold. In doing so, they can claim to have math skill and exclude most others in their rather special club, thus heightening the prestige of their own accomplishments (Beauregard & Dunning, 1998; Dunning & Cohen, 1992; Dunning & Hayes, 1996).

The Self as Source of Definitions Further evidence shows just how people’s definitions of traits and the impressions they have of themselves fall into alignment in a self-serving way. It appears that people often start with themselves and their own attributes and use that information as a guide toward creating a pleasing map between the concrete and the conceptual. That is, people revise their concepts



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to better match the selves they already believe they have. To be sure, at times people may reverse this process and massage their self-concepts to better match the versions of concepts they already have in their heads; Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989), but much evidence shows that much of the work people do to maintain self-worth is completed by the redefinition of social concepts. We know this because altering the self-concept leads to changes in how people define social concepts. One sees this in both horizontal and vertical ways. Concerning the horizontal method, MacDonald, Sulsky, and Brown (2008) asked participants to complete a task that highlighted how much they were people who were either independent of or interdependent with others. Later they were asked to describe their prototypes of a good leader. People who had been primed to think of their independent selves tended to describe leadership in a “transactional” way, emphasizing the need for requirements, conditions, rewards, and punishments. Those who, instead, had been reminded of their interdependent characteristics were more likely to emphasize common goals and transcending one’s own self-interests. In sum, each group emphasized aspects of leadership that aligned with the particular self that had been primed. In a similar way, people who succeed at a task respond by raising the vertical standard that must be met to earn a positive social label. People who succeeded at an exercise in which they had to distinguish real from fake suicide notes, relative to those who did poorly, set a higher standard of performance for achieving competence in social perceptiveness and recognizing falsehoods (Dunning & Cohen, 1992). In real-world settings, college professors who achieve tenure respond by setting higher standards of productivity and achievement for someone to be considered worthy of tenure than they had advocated before (Eidelman & Biernat, 2007).

The Consequences of Self-Serving Mappings This self-serving exploitation of fuzziness has consequences in that it allows people to hold rosy opinions of themselves that defy the logic of mathematics and reality. However, it carries other consequences as well, such as influencing whether people learn from life experience just how skilled or not they are in certain domains.

Unrealistic Self-Views It is well known in the psychological literature that people, on average, tend to think of themselves as anything but average. They tend to think they are more ethical and skilled than their peers and more likely to attain positive future life events (such as long life, for example), while avoiding negative outcomes (such as being fired from a job). In short, when it comes to positive attributes, people on average think they are above average; for negative attributes, they believe they are below average (Alicke, 1985; Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Weinstein, 1980; for reviews, see Dunning, 2005; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; but see Chambers & Windschitl, 2004, for a critique). Such a set of beliefs defies logic in that it is impossible, except under very severe and unusual statistical circumstances, for people on average to be “above average.” The self-serving exploitation of fuzziness is a significant source of people’s logic-defying

74   SELF-CONSTRUAL self-descriptions in that they report such descriptions mostly when dealing with characteristics for which ambiguity can be exploited but not when such ambiguity is unavailable. For example, traits such as sophisticated and talented are quite broad and allow for much cherrypicking in the concrete actions and attributes that most reflect them. As a consequence, people are more likely to claim they are above average for these traits. For other traits that are constrained in meaning—that is, that are less ambiguously definable (e.g., neat, thrifty)— people show little, if any, bias (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Suls, Lemos, & Stewart, 2002). Other researchers similarly show that the exploitation of fuzziness leads to self-serving beliefs. Hsee (1996) asked participants to take a 20-item quiz and at the end told them that all the correct answers were “A.” He then told some participants that he would pay them for each odd-numbered item they got right. Participants in this case provided rather unbiased reports of their performance on the quiz. In the other condition, the numbers next to the questions were replaced by figures that looked, more or less, like the Chinese characters for yin and yang. These participants were told that they would be paid for their performance on the 10 items attached to the yin-like figures, but what looked yin-like was not entirely clear. Thus it is not a surprise that participants overreported how many items they got right, defining yin and yang in such a way as to bolster their prospects. The same happens in the real world in regard to self-descriptions of physical attractiveness. Relative to how others rate them, men and women rate themselves higher on fuzzy concepts such as attractiveness and sexiness than on more well-defined attributes such as body size (Donaghue & Smith, 2008).

Stability of Self-Concepts Self-serving definitions may be at the heart of another finding in psychological research: that people maintain fairly stable views of themselves despite the fact that they receive feedback that is quite variable and inconsistent with those views (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). For example, medical students’ self-rated ability at the end of medical school is strongly correlated with their self-ratings during their first year, despite the fact that their self-ratings at the end fail to correlate with either supervisor ratings or objective examination scores (Arnold, Willoughby, & Calkins, 1985). Moreover, the fact that these self-ratings correlate so strongly (r = .54) seems to imply insensitivity to the vast amount of new information that is surely garnered after hundreds of hours of clinical training. On our account, these self-views are maintained through redefinition (see also Critcher & Dunning, 2009). Medical students in this study likely redefined their criteria for medical ability in order to accommodate their performance feedback. In general, when people engage in behavior that is relevant to their standing on a trait, they stand to receive three classes of feedback: They may learn that their believed standing on a trait is calibrated and accurate, they may learn that their believed standing on a trait is overblown and unrealistically optimistic, or they may learn that their believed standing on a trait is better than they originally thought. All types of feedback may lead to self-serving redefinition. For example, when people receive information from the world that indicates that they have exceeded even their own idiosyncratic standards of a desirable trait, there is evidence that they will revise their trait definitions to reflect this improvement in the self. On receiving an A, Tom may update his definition of a “smart” student from one who maintains a B+ to one who holds at least an A– average (see Eidelman & Biernat, 2007).



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Conversely, when people receive unflattering feedback from the world, they can barricade their positive self-views by tagging the new information as nondiagnostic of the threatened trait. Greve and Wentura (2003) have showed this most directly. In one of their studies, participants competed against a confederate in four trivia quizzes. The competition was rigged such that the participant outperformed the confederate in two domains (e.g., politics and fine arts) but performed relatively poorly in two domains (e.g., history and natural sciences). When asked in what domains a person with good general knowledge would excel, participants saw the domains at which they had been randomly assigned to excel as more diagnostic of a person’s general knowledge. This process, known as self-immunization, is not merely a product of conscious, effortful rationalization. Wentura and Greve (2004) used implicit measures to show that people possessed automatic connections between specific pieces of concrete information and flattering abstract traits that those concrete tidbits might reflect, but only to the extent that the potentially flattering concrete information was true of themselves. This process, it should be noted, functions on the basis of two principles. First, people must be aware of their strengths and shortcomings. As such, this self-enhancement technique stands in contrast to lower level distortions that might block people’s awareness of their failures. Second, people must adjust their criteria for a desirable trait so as to exclude the domain in which they have experienced failure. Self-enhanced trait definitions are also supported by reliable differences in the way people conceptualize successes and failures in everyday life. Kurman (2003, Study 1), for example, showed that people contain failures in part by dissociating them from their more global sense of self-worth. When participants judged a list of 30 hypothetical successes and 30 hypothetical failures in terms of how global versus specific each was, ratings for successes reflected more global construals than did ratings for failures. In addition, participants rated how much of a self-esteem boost or hit they would receive for each of the 60 events, should it happen. The global-versus-specific construal of the event was found to moderate the relationship between failure and self-esteem: The more specifically participants construed failures, the less they anticipated a hit to their self-esteem. In addition, work by Taris (1999) suggests that not only do people represent their successes more abstractly than their failures but also, when spontaneously describing their actions, they cite more instances of success than failure. In sum, people may only infrequently face the burden of reconsidering their standing on flattering traits when confronted with feedback. People describe failures less frequently and rope them off as specific instances that only loosely implicate more global self-worth, allowing them to hold them independent of their broader, positive traits. When feedback (either negative or positive) suggests a mismatch between people’s idiosyncratic trait definitions and trait-relevant behavior, they can make affordances for behavioral data by adjusting their criteria for desired traits. If feedback is positive, people can adopt more selective criteria for a desired trait; if feedback is negative, people may tailor their definitions so as to prune away domains in which failure has occurred.

Are Self-Serving Social Concepts Normative? At first blush, the use of self-serving definitions would appear to be counternormative, in that they lead to judgments that are mathematically impossible and cause people to ignore

76   SELF-CONSTRUAL informative feedback that the world is supplying to them. Traditionally, psychologists have viewed self-enhancing self-views as directly antagonistic to accuracy. Taylor and Brown (1988), for example, contrasted the self-enhancement of the mentally healthy with the realism of the depressed. Noting that many people who claimed to be above average may not have been exaggerating their self-views, other researchers did more to differentiate “true self-enhancers” from those who were merely accurate in their above-average assessments (John & Robins, 1994; Kurt & Paulhus, 2008; Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & Robins, 2004; Paulhus, 1998). From this perspective, self-serving social concepts are normatively unjustifiable to the extent that they offer flattering self-views that depart from reality. We feel compelled, however, to point out that this analysis may be inaccurate and premature. There is a way in which people may self-enhance, even severely, yet still have judgments that are accurate and normative. Because self-serving trait definitions essentially connect two levels of information—concrete details about one’s life and abstract inferences about one’s standing—it may be possible for people to hold overly rosy views of themselves at one level while maintaining perfect accuracy at the other. Specifically, according to Schneider (2001), there is a telling difference between knowledge, concrete facts about ourselves and our environments, and meaning, the abstract significance granted to such details. The nature of concrete knowledge is more exact and simpler to describe and offers a clearer normative standard against which to compare one’s selfknowledge. A person either received an A on his or her economics exam or did not, can dunk a basketball or not, has a clean driving record or not. In each case, concrete reality is precisely defined, and it is relatively simple to assess whether one’s understanding of the world is accurate or deluded. Schneider (2001) pointed out, as do we, that one has great latitude in attaching abstract meaning to one’s concrete knowledge. Although the B atop one’s economics exam or the silver medal around one’s neck leave little room for interpretation, rational people may differ in concluding whether or not the mark reflects an aptitude for economics or whether the quality of judging in the figure skating competition was poor. In this way, people may be perfectly accurate about their concrete knowledge (“I received a B on the exam”) but put a self-flattering spin on this knowledge in the realm of meaning (“Given I’m just a freshman, I’m practically an economics genius!”). Economists, for example, have recently asserted this analysis of the above-average effect and have proposed that the flattering judgments that people make of themselves are perfectly appropriate—and not at all remarkable—if based on self-serving definitions of social traits (Santos-Pinto & Sobel, 2005). Of course, there is some point at which self-serving definitions move from exploiting ambiguity to defying reason (e.g., a repeat-offending felon seeing himself as “law abiding”). Although we acknowledge that there are some constraints on how much one may reasonably twist a social concept’s meaning, our point is that for many social concepts there is great latitude in how reasonable people may (and do) differ in their concrete definitions of those concepts. Given this, there is plenty of room for people to exploit these honest disagreements to their advantage, without necessarily being biased. Greve and Wentura (2003), in their work on self-immunization, have offered a clear demonstration of how people can accurately accept their limitations at the concrete level by giving those limits a flattering spin at the conceptual level. Recall that participants took quizzes, on roughly half of which they excelled at and on the other half did not. Afterward, the participants offered accurate judgments of their own skill in the tested domains. Their



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sense of relative competence in each tested domain closely aligned with their performance relative to the confederate. But this accurate, concrete knowledge was complemented by a flattering assessment of what this knowledge meant: Participants emphasized the areas they had excelled at as being the more crucial components of “general knowledge.” Dunning and Beauregard (2000) have shown similar reactions when people are given feedback about themselves. In their study, they gave participants false personality feedback about their social competence. Those who started off with a low opinion of themselves incorporated this feedback into their self-views. In contrast, those who were already confident of their own social skills dismissed the relevance of the feedback, continuing to believe they were socially competent even when one concrete datum told them otherwise. To the extent that these initial self-views were accurate, this form of self-immunization is not only justifiable, it is probably warranted. There is a massive caveat to this observation, however. The accuracy of self-views is notoriously poor (see Dunning, 2005; Dunning et al., 2004), suggesting that people, on balance, may do better to pay attention to the feedback they receive from the world, no matter how unpleasant, than to dismiss it as uninformative.

But a Step Too Far: Confusing Knowledge and Meaning Thus there is a way in which people can have their evaluative cake and eat it, too. They can possess both accurate knowledge and a pleasing image of the self. However, achieving this state depends on a crucial assumption—that people can keep straight what is meaning and what is knowledge, so as not to confuse the abstract opinions they hold about themselves with the facts at the concrete level. More specifically, enhanced views of the self can be normative only if people remain aware that self-flattering definitions of social concepts are merely their subjective views and not facts in themselves. Other people need not agree with them, nor should their personal definitions in any way be construed as universal. For example, if Paul has a rather Paul-like definition of intelligence but understands that Art could just as reasonably construct his own different definition of intelligence—one based on Art’s own idiosyncratic skills and shortcomings—then Paul’s self-serving definitions need not lead to counternormative results. However, when people take the additional step of confusing meaning and knowledge, beginning to believe that their abstract self-beliefs are not just opinion but rather the way things really are (e.g., I am objectively more intelligent), people and their decisions may begin to depart from a purely normative position. Such a departure can occur in two interrelated ways. First, people may decide—as fact—that they really are better than other people when it comes to social traits. Second, they may decide that the definition they have created represents the only right and true one. In a sense, we argue that self-serving definitions become problematic when people commit the error of naïve realism. Naïve realism is the mistake of tacitly assuming that one’s opinions and beliefs represent the true state of the world and the way it should be. It is to mistake subjective opinion for objective truth (Ross & Ward, 1996). Evidence suggests that people pervasively take this step, considering their definitions to be the definitions that should be used in evaluating social life, thus leaving the realm of normative judgment. They apply their definitions universally, using roughly the same definitions in judging other people, as well as themselves (Paulhus & Landolt, 2000). For example, McElwee, Dunning, Tan, and Hollmann (2001) asked participants to rate the

78   SELF-CONSTRUAL leadership ability, creative talent, and intelligence of a number of target individuals. They found that participants judged others according to the same (flattering) criteria that they used to judge themselves (see also Dunning & Cohen, 1992; Dunning & McElwee, 1995; Dunning et al., 1991). When a target was a task-oriented individual, participants rated that target’s leadership ability more favorably if they themselves were task-oriented individuals. Furthermore, the influence of participants’ self-views on judgments of the targets was fully mediated through participants’ self-serving trait definitions as explicitly expressed. This suggests that participants went beyond putting a flattering spin on the truth (“That I know how to write music means I am a creative person”) to insisting that their spin actually was the truth (“People who can’t write music aren’t creative people”). Put another way, problems arise when people move beyond saying that concrete abilities they possess are sufficient for concluding that they possess valued abstract qualities to concluding that it is necessary that someone possess these concrete abilities if they wish to be accorded the positive abstraction. Further evidence that people confuse their subjective opinions with social reality comes from data on interpersonal disagreement. For example, therapists agree only modestly (r = .23) with their clients about their own therapeutic effectiveness (Bogwald, 2001), and managers and employees show very little agreement about the former group’s influential ability (Blickle, 2003). To be sure, these disagreements are due to a number of psychological and social factors; however, when people differ in their evaluations of one another, a good share of that disagreement can be traced to the parties’ differential and perhaps self-serving resolution of trait ambiguity (Hayes & Dunning, 1997). Story (2003) found that the greatest disagreement between self and other on trait ratings was among participants who differed in their idiosyncratic definitions of a given trait and that interrater agreement could be improved by providing peer raters with the target’s own definition of a given trait. Even so, ambiguity alone may not be sufficient for disagreement. After all, independent third-party raters can show remarkable agreement about a target’s standing on a number of ambiguous traits, even on the basis of limited information. Equally problematic is that the spin that people put on concrete knowledge can interfere with their memory for that knowledge. For example, participants who have just been led to believe that either extroversion or introversion was a trait that reflected an aptitude for future success became more likely to recall past behaviors that were consistent with the desired trait (Brunot & Sanitioso, 2004), reported that it was metacognitively easier to recall such behaviors (Sanitioso & Niedenthal, 2006), recalled just-received feedback to be more consistent with the desirable trait (Sanitioso & Wlodarski, 2004), and judged recent behavior to be more in line with the desired characteristic (Sanitioso, 2004). Those who were told that frequent toothbrushing was actually harmful to dental hygiene recalled brushing their teeth less often (Klein & Kunda, 1993). To the extent that the positive spin people place on self-relevant knowledge then distorts people’s recall of concrete details about themselves, self-serving conceptual definitions have set in motion a self-perpetuating process that pushes people’s self-views from merely sympathetic to indisputably incorrect. Finally, when flattering spin is confused with positive knowledge, people will be led astray if they use this flattering spin in trying to make predictions about their concrete future. For example, people seem to use self-serving criteria in evaluating their morality, giving weight to praiseworthy intentions even when those do not actually translate into praiseworthy behavior (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004). When people rely on that positive spin in judging



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the likelihood that they will engage in future moral behaviors, they offer predictions that are overly optimistic. Across many demonstrations, Epley and Dunning (2000, 2006) found that people were much too optimistic in predicting their own future prosocial behaviors, such as voting and giving to charity (see also Balcetis & Dunning, 2008), whereas they were much more accurate in predicting the behavior of their peers.

Summary Much of people’s representation of the world is inherently subjective, and people’s beliefs are not outside the bounds of rationality when they choose to weave a hopeful interpretation of the facts before them. This tendency can have the pragmatic benefit of allowing people to accept unflattering concrete details about themselves while putting an esteem-buffering spin on such shortcomings. Furthermore, the tendency can lead people to recognize aberrant negative feedback for what it is—aberrant. But people run into trouble when they fail to recognize the subjectivity of their own perspectives on the world. Gestalt psychologists demonstrated that people effortlessly move beyond the concrete, perceptual details of a stimulus and automatically extract out a reality that, in truth, exists only in the mind of the perceiver (Köhler, 1930). The visual system is not “wrong” in offering this perspective on reality, but it is ignorant in implicitly assuming that what it sees is reality. As social perceivers, people seem to operate under a similar type of naïve realism—believing that their perspective on social reality is reality (Icheiser, 1943; Ross & Ward, 1996). In this section, we have seen that people are naïve realists in their approach to social concepts. They do not see their own self-enhancing perspective on the world as one theory among many but instead see it as the theory of the social world.

Are Self-Serving Definitions Adaptive? However, even if people use self-serving definitions in a non-normative way that leads to inaccuracy, they might still be using them in a way that is adaptive—that is, in a way that leads them to beneficial rather than costly outcomes. The psychological literature has long harbored a controversy about whether self-flattering self-views are adaptive or maladaptive. Taking issue with the consensus among clinicians, Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) argued that positive illusions do not interfere with, but instead provide, the foundation for psychological health. However, subsequent research cast doubt on these conclusions. Instead of being unconditional models of psychological adjustment, self-enhancers have been observed to be heavily narcissistic (Gosling, John, Craik, & Robins, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001), defensive (Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995), and less well adjusted in the eyes of mental health professionals (Robins & John, 1997; but see Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003). We think that to address this controversy completely, one must consider not only the fact of self-enhancement but also the avenue by which people achieve it. The fact that selfserving definitions underlie so many positive illusions suggests that a complete treatment of the adaptiveness issue must specifically address the types of illusion prompted by self-serving definitions. We first introduce two relevant distinctions and discuss them in turn—the process responsible for bringing about self-enhancement and the nature of the adaptiveness

80   SELF-CONSTRUAL measure. We conclude by alluding to two additional distinctions that are important to the adaptiveness question.

The Cause of Self-Enhancement Self-enhancement may occur for a variety of reasons. People may harbor enhanced self-views because they are just not skilled or knowledgeable enough to know how incompetent they are (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999); because the ambiguity of certain concepts allows people to draw self-serving conclusions that seem reasonable (Dunning et al., 1989; Felson, 1981); because negative feedback is often couched in ambiguous or euphemistic terms (Goffman, 1955); because other people feel social pressure to provide feedback that validates a person’s positive self-conceptions (Swann, 1983; Taylor & Brown, 1988); or because one wishes to motivate oneself to persevere in implementing an action plan (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). One can ask whether the adaptiveness of self-enhancement differs depending on the specific psychological pathway that produced it. On the one hand, it might seem strange to think that the adaptiveness of self-enhancement would depend on the process and circumstance that produces the illusion. After all, the likelihood of contracting a disease from unprotected sex does not change based on whether one engages in it due to ignorance of condoms’ protective function or motivated reasoning that such behavior is safe. On the other hand, to the extent that different pathways to self-enhancement covary with other features of the situation and the person, the adaptiveness of self-enhancement might depend on how the self-enhancement arose. Some pathways to self-enhancement may arise via processes in which they confer functional advantages. For example, deliberately choosing to be optimistic while implementing an action plan may help one to persevere when “the going gets tough.” Here, a self-enhancing bias would be a conscious strategy, one knowingly chosen to produce adaptive results. But, on the flip side, fate may not be so kind if self-enhancement follows from a simple but honest failure to recognize the limits on one’s own ability due to inexperience. The seafloor is littered with fragments of airplanes flown by too many inexperienced, and thus inadvertently overconfident, pilots. In addition, the different reasons for the emergence of self-enhancement have different implications for whether distorted self-knowledge is correctible. For some causes of selfenhancement, people may be able to shift to more accurate self-understanding if the situation calls for it. By eliminating the definitional ambiguity of a quality on which one will judge oneself or by reverting from a mind-set focused on implementing an action plan to a mind-set that deliberates about a proper course of action, one may be able to impose “reality checks” that allow for accurate perceptions when they prove crucial. In contrast, poor metaknowledge about how to reasonably evaluate the self or the frequent receipt of distorted feedback may produce misperceptions that are uncorrectable (see Taylor et al., 2003, for a similar argument). With this in mind, we have to admit that it is likely that there is not a straightforward answer as to whether self-enhancement through conceptual definition is adaptive or not. At times, people may benefit from the positive illusions that these definitions support; at other times, these illusions may prevent people from spotting errors when they occur. And even though bias can be corrected to some extent by providing people



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with specific definitions on which to base judgments of themselves (Dunning et al., 1989), it is unclear whether such techniques actually lead people to more realistic selfassessments or merely reflect temporary accuracy that stems from the compliance of experimental participants.

The Nature of Adaptiveness In judging whether self-enhancement is adaptive, one must be careful to consider the different faces of adaptiveness. For example, it may be useful to distinguish internal adaptiveness from external adaptiveness. Internal adaptiveness refers to intrapsychic benefits such as emotional resilience, a positive sense of self-worth, and a hopeful outlook on the future. External adaptiveness refers to benefits in the person’s attempts to interact with the world, such as interpersonal harmony, positive or worthy behaviors, and goal achievement. In reviewing the literature, one finds clearer evidence that self-enhancement promotes internal adaptiveness than external adaptiveness.

Internal Adaptiveness Self-enhancement encourages a positive sense of self. Kwan and colleagues (2004) found that “self-specific” self-enhancers—those who had distorted positive views of themselves but not simply distorted positive views of everyone—had higher self-esteem. Kurt and Paulhus (2008) found that such individuals saw themselves as higher in personal adjustment: They worried less in life and did not feel that life had offered them a raw deal. But, curiously, their peers seemed to have the opposite opinion of them. Finally, self-enhancers maintain greater emotional equanimity in the face of tragedy (Bonanno, 2004) and are rated by mental health professionals as better adjusted (Bonanno, Field, Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002) and possessing fewer biological markers of stress (Bonanno, Rennicke, & Dekel, 2005). Self-enhancement through conceptual redefinition may confer internal adaptiveness in a qualitatively different way as well. Roese and Olson (2007) have argued that people stand ever vigilant against threats. When people detect a threat, a surge of negative affect alerts them that there is a problem that must be addressed. The aversiveness of the affective experience motivates a quick threat response. If people do not respond to the threat relatively quickly, then their affect-based threat detection system will not return to baseline, and they will not be ready to notice new threats as they appear. From this perspective, even if self-enhancement through definition is at times maladaptive from a local perspective, such a strategy may promote adaptive vigilance when considered from a broader perspective.

External Adaptiveness What about external adaptiveness? Although there is some evidence that self-enhancers have more positive interpersonal relationships, this benefit seems to be limited to those selfenhancers who have unjustifiably positive views not only of themselves but also of other people (Kwan et al., 2004). Outside of this subsample, though, self-enhancers often elicit negative reactions from others. Others may see self-enhancers as condescending (Colvin et

82   SELF-CONSTRUAL al., 1995), disdainful (cf. Gibson & Oberlander, 2008), and filled with too much braggadocio (Paulhus, 1998). Looking more narrowly at self-enhancement through definition, a great deal of disagreement can arise when people bring their own self-enhancing definitions to an interpersonal context (McCrae, Stone, Fagan, & Costa, 1998; Story, 2003). One area in which disagreements may be especially likely to produce rancor is the domain of morality, in which ambiguity about what is a correct course of action is at its highest. People differ not only in their moral convictions but also in their beliefs about whether an issue even falls within the moral domain (Bauman & Skitka, 2009). For example, although liberals believe that moral questions deal with harm or fairness, conservatives have a more expansive definition that includes ingroup loyalty, purity, and respect for authority (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Such divergences shed light on the reasons that conservatives and liberals often seem not only to differ in opinion but also to have fundamentally incompatible perspectives on contentious issues such as same-sex marriage. Although these definitional differences may stem only in part from self-enhancement (e.g., a loyal ethnic group member may want to believe his allegiance is a moral issue), this demonstrates nonetheless the way divergent conceptual definitions can produce discord. Finally, self-enhancement can lead one to engage in maladaptive behaviors. In a series of studies, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) showed how people’s inflated self-views lead them to make unwise economic decisions. For example, when participants were told that their economic outcome in a game would be determined by their own skill (as opposed to luck), participants were more likely to unwisely enter the game and lose money. Fortunately, there are often social checks on one’s own (idiosyncratically defined) delusions of grandeur. Even if one has defined one’s own skills in an overly flattering way, outside observers (e.g., a boss) can keep self-enhancers in check. Dunning et al. (2004) noted that, problematically, those who have the power to make the most consequential decisions are often those who are so powerful that they have few social constraints on their decision making. In a business, this person would be the chief executive officer (CEO). Reflecting CEO overconfidence, decisions to acquire other companies rarely meet with enthusiasm in the stock market (Malmendier & Tate, 2005). And, as those playing the market predicted, the most overconfident CEOs’ acquisitions ended up offering the most negative returns on their investments (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).

Summary In summary, the question of the adaptiveness of self-enhancement through conceptual definition is not a clear-cut issue. In this section, we have considered two distinctions that may be relevant in answering this question: the cause of self-enhancement and the nature of the adaptiveness measure. We suspect that still more distinctions may be important in acquiring a nuanced understanding of the adaptiveness of self-enhancement. For example, exploiting the ambiguity in conceptual definitions may offer short-term benefits at the expense of longterm costs (Bonanno et al., 2005; Paulhus, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001). In addition, even when exploiting conceptual ambiguity to bolster one’s self-image does not have maladaptive consequences for self-enhancers, it may adversely affect those around them (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009). Although a variety of research has studied in isolation the distinctions introduced in this section, future research should examine how these orthogonal distinctions interact in conferring adaptive benefits.



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New Questions Faced with this extensive body of literature, one may wonder whether there is anything new to say, empirically at least, with regard to self-enhancement through definition. We believe there is and focus on two potential lines of investigation that could expand an understanding of the role of conceptual redefinition in social life. The first issue is the scope of social concepts that people might paint in rosy, self-serving tones. A second might explore the way in which collectives, ranging from dyads to entire cultures, agree on definitions that flatter the group rather than the individual.

The Scope of Self-Serving Definitions The work described herein, although far-ranging, has tended to focus on only one category of social concepts that people might redefine in their favor. That category consists of social traits, such as intelligence or leadership. There are a variety of other social concepts, equally full of ambiguity, that people might link to concrete behaviors in an attempt to make sense of themselves in the social world. Let us enumerate just a few.

Goals “I want to get healthier,” cries the downtrodden northeasterner, emerging from a long winter of pizza, beer, and pork rinds. What does he mean by that? The goal itself is an ambiguous one, and we suggest that to resolve this ambiguity our winter sloth (and people in general) will call on self-serving construals of “getting healthy” so as to evaluate progress toward the goal in the most flattering way. Although this idea has intuitive appeal, we know of no direct research that examines this possibility. There are at least three ways to capitalize on the ambiguity of goals so as to reach a selfserving conclusion. First, a person can reevaluate the how of the goal—how (through what concrete behaviors) does one make goal progress? Second, a person can reconstrue the what of the goal—what is the target that indicates goal completion? Third, a person can exploit the when of the goal—when should progress be measured: at short-term behavioral accomplishments or long-term end-state completion? When self-enhancing through the how of their goals, people can take a horizontal approach by including and excluding types of behaviors from the definition of the goal or a vertical approach by redefining the amount of a behavior that is tied to a goal. Whether taking the stairs to a third-floor office constitutes “getting healthy” probably depends on whether or not the walker made good on his or her promise to go to the gym that day. If not, the individual may temporarily include this somewhat trivial exertion as an indicator of his or her goal progress, even though he or she might overlook the very same behavior if there were more convincing concrete evidence to link to the abstract goal of “getting healthy.” Similarly, if “getting healthy” is inextricably linked to the concrete behavior of going to the gym, one may still capitalize on vertical ambiguity by redefining the amount of gym attendance necessary: Is getting healthy a matter of going to the gym three times a week or three times a month? If a person goes only once but works up a “really good sweat,” that behavior, too, might a serve as a sufficient self-serving indicator of progress toward the goal of “getting healthy.”

84   SELF-CONSTRUAL Alternatively, people may render self-enhanced visions of goal progress by keeping the behavioral indicators constant while altering the what and when of goal completion. Achieving the goal of “getting healthy” could mean losing 15 pounds or 50, improving muscle strength or cardiovascular health, eating better, or being more active. Thus people may believe they have reached the goal of getting healthy by citing one of a number of different end states that are potential whats of goal fulfillment. In much the same manner, people may capitalize on the ambiguity of the whens of goal fulfillment: Is each trip to the gym its own success, or does one achieve the goal of getting healthy only after establishing a long-standing workout routine? The answer to this may depend on what concrete changes the goal setter was actually able to accomplish.

Attitude Objects In the quest for positive self-regard, people may find it desirable to claim attitudes that signify them as persons of worth (see Katz, 1960). It is well known that people feel better about themselves when they adhere to culturally accepted beliefs and practices (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991); so, for example, a college freshman might wish to hold attitudes that are left of political center in order to garner favor with his or her professors, and a guest at a party may wish to claim attitudes that are sophisticated in order to be accepted by the nouveaux riches in attendance. However, in order to render this attitude construction something more than complete self-deception, people must link abstract attitudes to actual attitude objects. According to attitude representation theory (Lord & Lepper, 1999), people generate attitudes online by calling to mind particular exemplars of the attitude category. When a person offers her attitude about politicians, for example, she uses her evaluation of an accessible relevant exemplar (e.g., Barack Obama) as a cue to her feelings about politicians as a general category (“politicians are agents of change”). Put another way, people define their attitudes on the basis of concrete examples that are stored away in memory. Of course, for most attitude domains, people have a wealth of material from which to draw, and this fact suggests that the product of such a search can be a self-enhancing attitude. This road toward self-enhancement can happen entirely automatically and without awareness. When the aforementioned undergraduate student is asked for his opinion on affirmative action, the political science classroom in which the question is posed or the student sitting next to him at the moment of questioning may prime certain exemplars in memory, and he may, as a result, produce exactly the attitude that bolsters his sense of self-worth as a broad-minded and enlightened college student (cf. Lord, Desforges, Fein, Pugh, & Lepper, 1994).

Intentionality When people form links between a concrete behavior and an abstract trait, their inferences are often driven by their analysis of the actor’s motivations. Whether “kicking a dog” is represented as “mean-spirited,” “clumsy,” or “unfortunate” depends on whether the actor performed the behavior with intent. But intentionality, like other social concepts, is an ambiguous feature of behavior. Because people have very little access to the underlying motives for others’ (or even their own) behavior, self-serving motivation can, and does, run rampant on people’s attributions of intentionality, promoting self-flattering links between behaviors and traits.



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Past work in moral psychology, for example, has shown that people can arrive at desired conclusions about an actor’s moral character by deeming that act intentional. As an illustration of this, consider a scenario used by Knobe and colleagues (Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006), in which participants read about a CEO who learns that a new corporate policy will increase profits but will carry the side effect of harming the environment. The CEO responds to the potential negative consequence by saying, “I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can.” Note that this concrete statement could be linked to the traits of either “shrewd businessman” or “heartless capitalist” and could be interpreted as either “looking out for the interests of the company employees” or “being greedy at any cost.” Nonetheless, when drawing a link between concrete behavior and abstract meaning, people are constrained by whether the behavior is an intentional one—after all, it does not make sense to say that the CEO’s acts are greedy if he did not intend to do them. As a result, when participants are asked to evaluate the CEO’s behavior, not only do they offer unwavering condemnation of his moral character but they also believe that he harmed the environment intentionally. One route by which people can see intentionality where it may or may not exist is by shifting their definition of intentional so as to include the actor’s motivation at hand. In a replication of the Leslie et al. (2006) study, Tannenbaum, Ditto, and Pizarro (2008) compared the reactions of environmental absolutists, who are unwilling to make pragmatic environmental trade-offs, and environmental relativists, who will consider pragmatic trade-offs for a greater good. As expected, rabid environmentalists offered harsher condemnation of the CEO than did the more moderate environmentalists. When asked to support their judgments, those who most condemned the CEO cited a “strict” definition of intentionality as their standard of blame, one that included any sort of foreknowledge that bad consequences might be incurred, whereas those who tempered their moral outrage cited a “loose” definition of intentionality, claiming that the CEO flatly stated that he held no preexisting goal to hurt or harm the environment (Tannebaum et al., 2008; cited in Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009). In sum, then, if preserving warm thoughts of the self requires that a person render moral condemnation on another actor, people can lower their standard for an intentional act to one that encompasses more mundane motivational states, such as negligence or recklessness. One might also call on this lowered standard when accepting praise for one’s own ambiguously intentional behavior. Conversely, if self-enhancement goals are served by removing blame from oneself, one can shift to a stricter standard of intentionality, one that rules out these very same motivational states.

Social Definition at the Collective Level In recent years, self-enhancement researchers have become increasingly interested in whether members of individualist and of collectivist cultures differ in their patterns of self-enhancement (Balcetis, Dunning, & Miller, 2008; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). To date, the focus of the debate has been on whether people from collectivist cultures enhance their own standing on positive traits to the same degree that individualists do. A different perspective on enhancement, though, begins with the more general observation that groups of people, from dyads to entire cultures, maintain

86   SELF-CONSTRUAL positive feelings about their collective and motivate behavior within the collective by defining abstract positive traits in ways that map onto group behavior. Looking at the ways in which groups maintain their status by engaging in enhanced trait definition is an avenue for a great deal of fruitful research. One way to maintain unwavering positive feelings toward shared social groups is through group-level definitions of valued concepts. Work by Aloni and Bernieri (2004), for example, suggests that romantic couples define “love” according to the behavioral patterns that are most prevalent in their own relationship. Just as self-serving definitions of one’s own traits can be a source of great interpersonal disagreement, these relationship-based trait definitions blind couples’ social judgments: Partnered people are less accurate than unpartnered people at detecting romance in couples whose behavioral patterns differ from their own (Aloni & Bernieri, 2004). In fact, one may look at the largest collectives (religious sects, political parties, or nationalities) as being fundamentally bound by collective agreement on definitions of ideological concepts. Abstract notions of desirable concepts such as freedom, faith, or fidelity are likely to be represented as patterns of behavior that are common to the group that holds them. As an example, the constellation of behaviors and mental states that constitute happiness appears to be highly dependent on the culture from which one emerges. In a series of studies, Tsai and colleagues (Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006) showed that children and adults from Asia link the abstract emotion of happiness with the concrete experience of low-arousal positive affect, whereas European children and adults link the same emotion with higharousal positive affect. An analysis of children’s books and sacred texts from both cultures further illustrated this culturally specific linking: European culture portrayed the trait of happiness as a high-arousal experience, whereas Asian culture portrayed the same trait as a low-arousal experience (Tsai, Louie, Chen, & Uchida, 2007; Tsai, Miao, & Seppala, 2007). In light of other research suggesting that from birth Asian babies show less arousal than do their European counterparts (Freedman, 1974; for a review, see Rushton, 1999), one could reasonably explore the possibility that shared collective definitions of happiness and other virtues are biased so as to favor the collective’s typical patterns of concrete behavior.

Concluding Remarks People desire to think positively of themselves, and, fortunately for them, the inherent ambiguity of the world often allows people to define social concepts in self-flattering ways. In this chapter, we have highlighted the creative strategies people employ in order to “get the most” out of the abstract meaning they assign to concrete behavior. However, people’s desire to paint themselves in a positive light is sometimes at odds with other important needs— the need for positive relationships with other people, the need to foresee events of personal consequence, and the need to act in ways that keep the self safe and secure. When people’s self-enhancing definitions of the world become too divorced from, or become confused with, concrete reality, they may have difficulty satisfying all of these needs. Thus it may be true that the world looks more beautiful through rose-tinted lenses and also that this tinted world seen through those glasses is not entirely imaginary. However, the challenge for people may be to recognize, at some level, that it is not entirely real but a product of their own definition.



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Acknowledgments The writing of this chapter was supported financially by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship to Clayton R. Critcher and a National Science Foundation Grant (No. 0745086) to David Dunning.

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Chapter 4 Moral Hypocrisy A Self-Enhancement/Self-Protection Motive in the Moral Domain C. Daniel Batson Elizabeth C. Collins

W

e want to talk about morality, and a good place to begin is with the first pages of Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility (1811/1995). The very well-off Mr. John Dashwood is discussing with his wife how he should fulfill the promise to his dying father to “do everything in his power” (p. 3) to care for his stepmother and three stepsisters, whose financial situation is now dire. Austen explains: “When he gave his promise to his father, he meditated within himself to increase the fortunes of his sisters by the present of a thousand pounds apiece” (p. 3) per year from the seven thousand per year he was to inherit. “ ‘Yes, he would give them three thousand pounds; it would be liberal and handsome!’ ” (p. 3). But soon he sees his moral responsibility more clearly. His wife reminds him of their son: “ ‘How could he answer it to himself to rob his child, and his only child too, of so large a sum?’ ” (p. 6). He cuts the imagined annuity in half, to five hundred pounds apiece per year, affirming, “ ‘I would not wish to do anything mean. . . . One had rather on such occasions do too much than too little’ ” (p. 7). Thinking further, he abandons the idea of an annuity altogether. “ ‘Whatever I may give them occasionally will be of far greater assistance than a yearly allowance, because they would only enlarge their style of living if they felt sure of a larger income and would not be sixpence the richer for it at the end of the year’ ” (p. 9). His wife goes further: “ ‘I am convinced within myself that your father had no idea of your giving them any money at all. . . . They will be much more able to give you something’ ” (p. 9). At last, Mr. Dashwood settles on a plan that will “ ‘strictly fulfill my engagement’ ” (p. 10): 92



Moral Hypocrisy   93 “When my mother removes into another house [he is evicting her from the one that has been her home] my services shall be readily given to accommodate her as far as I can. Some little present of furniture too may be acceptable then. . . . ” He finally resolved that it would be absolutely unnecessary, if not highly indecorous, to do more for the widow and children of his father. . . . (p. 10)

What Is Wrong with Morality? Why is doing what is morally right so difficult? Our friends in philosophy seem to assume that the problem lies in a failure of judgment: If people can be shown through logical analysis and discourse—or by intuition—what is morally right, they will act accordingly. Implicit in this view is the assumption that we want to be moral; we just need to know how. Many of our best writers of fiction are less optimistic. Astute observers of the human condition such as Austen (1811/1995), Dickens (1843–1844/1982), and Twain (1884/1959) suggest that the problem is not in knowing what is right but in really wanting to do what is right. After all, being moral can be costly. They suggest that we are apt to talk a better game than we play. Recent psychological research, some our own, leads us to side with the novelists rather than the philosophers on this issue. Research reveals that most people unhesitatingly affirm their allegiance to moral principles such as fairness or justice (Lerner, 1970). Research also reveals that most people perceive themselves to be above average in adherence to such principles (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Van Lange, 1991). These findings are very robust. Check your own perceptions. Would you say that you are below average in morality? Only average? Probably neither. But we cannot all be above average. Epley and Dunning (2000) attribute this exaggerated sense of one’s own morality to a cognitive problem—insufficient attention to base-rate information in predicting one’s own behavior. We think more is involved than an inferential error. As the novelists suggest, we think there are motivational problems as well (also see Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). One of the hard lessons taught by the atrocities of the modern age—from the Holocaust, My Lai, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur to corporate cover-ups of product dangers and hedge-fund fraud—is that immoral behavior is not limited to monsters. People who sincerely value morality, who firmly believe that they should not put their own rights and interests ahead of the parallel rights and interests of others, can act in ways that show a blatant disregard for the welfare of others and for moral principles held dear (Arendt, 1963; Bandura, 1991; Darley, 1992; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Lifton, 1986; Milgram, 1974; Staub, 1989a; Todorov, 1996). How is this possible?

Two Explanations of Moral Failure: Learning Deficit; Situational Pressure Social psychological explanations of immoral behavior by moral people tend to be of two types. Those who approach the problem from a social learning perspective are likely to blame a learning deficit. If a person’s behavior is not adequately controlled by his or her standards, then the standards must not have been learned well enough or not learned in the

94   SELF-CONSTRUAL right way. The motivation to be moral is not sufficiently strong (Bandura, 1977; Burton & Kunce, 1995; Hoffman, 1977; Wright, 1971). Those who approach the problem from a social influence perspective are likely to blame situational pressures—orders from a higher authority (Milgram, 1974), conformity pressure (Asch, 1956), foot-in-the-door processes (Freedman & Fraser, 1966), pluralistic ignorance (Latané & Darley, 1968), diffusion of responsibility (Darley & Latané, 1968), organizational norms and structure (Darley, 1992), and the like. Combine these situational pressures with (1) the generality and abstractness of most moral principles (be fair; do no harm; do unto others . . . ) and (2) the well-known human capacities for selective perception and rationalization, and the result is likely to be moral exclusion (Staub, 1990)—excluding certain people from those deserving moral treatment—or moral disengagement (Bandura, 1991)—deactivation of moral self-regulatory mechanisms in specific situations. The problem is not the strength of the motive to be moral but the strength of countervailing pressures. From a social learning perspective, the remedy for moral failure is for society to do a better job of teaching moral values and principles. People need standards strong enough to guide behavior even in the face of temptation (Bennett, 1992). A remedy is harder to prescribe from a social influence perspective because situational pressures are endemic to social interaction, especially in hierarchical organizations (Darley, 1992). The most that one can hope for is that increased awareness of the pressures might make people less vulnerable to them—and more understanding of those who succumb. As Bandura (1990) summarized: Mechanisms of moral disengagement operate not only in the perpetration of inhumanities under extraordinary circumstances, but in everyday situations where people routinely perform activities that bring personal benefits at injurious costs to others. Given the many psychological devices for disengagement of moral control, societies cannot rely solely on individuals, however honorable their standards, to provide safeguards against inhumanities. (p. 27)

A Third Explanation: Moral Hypocrisy We believe that there is truth in each of these explanations of moral failure. At the same time, we believe that neither, nor the two combined, is the whole truth. It is also necessary to look more closely at the nature of moral motivation. In contrast to the optimistic assumption that moral individuals are motivated to act in accord with moral principles as an ultimate goal, displaying moral integrity, we suspect that there is a motive to appear moral in one’s own and others’ eyes while, if possible, avoiding the cost of actually being moral. Setting aside the harsh connotations of the term, Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, and Wilson (1997) called this motive moral hypocrisy. (Webster’s Desk Dictionary of the English Language, 1990, defines moral as “1. of or concerned with principles of right or wrong conduct. 2. being in accordance with such principles” [p. 589]; it defines hypocrisy as “a pretense of having desirable or publicly approved attitudes, beliefs, principles, etc., that one does not actually possess” [p. 444].) For those who consider any pretense immoral, moral hypocrisy may seem to be an oxymoron. We use the adjective to denote the domain of pretense— morality rather than, for example, science or politics or religion. A remedy for moral failure is especially difficult to prescribe if the failure is due to moral hypocrisy. The problem is not only that moral motivation is weak, countervailing situational



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pressures strong, and means of disengagement many, but also that the goal is not actually to be moral—only to see oneself and be seen by others as moral. From this perspective, seemingly good, moral people will put their own interests ahead of the interests of others if they can appear not to do so. Provided with sufficient “wiggle room,” even people who strongly endorse moral principles and who are in relatively low-pressure situations can fail to act morally.

Why Be a Moral Hypocrite? There is good reason for wanting to appear moral without actually being moral. Morality is a virtue lauded by children’s literature and parents alike. Freud (1930/1961) suggested that society inculcates moral principles in us when young in order to bridle our selfish impulses by making it in our best interest to act morally even when unobserved. We are constrained by conscience. But the bridle chafes; there is an unrelenting impulse to break free, to do what we want, not what we ought. One way out of this bind is a moral masquerade: Make a show of morality, but only a show. Then we can garner the social and self-rewards of being moral, such as esteem and pride, as well as avoid the social and self-punishments for failing to be so, such as shame and guilt. Better yet, we can get these benefits of being moral without paying the price. We have defined moral hypocrisy as motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoiding the cost of being moral. We use this definition to cover two distinct versions of moral hypocrisy. In what might be called the high-bar version, the motive is to appear moral. This version is directed toward self-enhancement for virtue, much like Jones and Pittman’s (1982) self-presentation strategy of exemplification. In the low-bar version, the motive is to not appear immoral. This version is directed toward self-protection from censure rather than toward self-enhancement. The full benefits of moral hypocrisy accrue only to those who make it over the high bar and appear moral, but many of us seem satisfied to clear the low bar.

How? Post Hoc Rationalization From the perspective of moral philosophy, the generality and abstractness of universal moral principles such as fairness are major virtues (Rawls, 1971). They expand our moral universe beyond narrow partialities of self-interest, kinship, friendship, and group. From the perspective of the psychology of moral motivation, generality and abstractness can be an Achilles’ heel. The more general and abstract a principle is, the more vulnerable it is to rationalization (Tsang, 2002). Most of us are adept at moral rationalization, at justifying to ourselves, if not to others, why showing partiality to ourselves and those we care about does not violate our principles—why, in Jonathan Kozol’s (1991) apt phrase, the “savage inequalities” between public school systems of rich and poor communities in the United States are just; why storing our nuclear waste in someone else’s backyard or using a disproportionate amount of the earth’s natural resources is fair; why the killing of innocents by one’s own side is a regrettable necessity, whereas such killing by the other side is an atrocity. Indicative of moral rationalization, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007, 2008) found that people, when asked in retrospect about

96   SELF-CONSTRUAL their immoral behavior, expend cognitive effort to manage to see the behavior as moral, judging their behavior to have been more moral than others’ similar behavior.

Self-Deception But there is more to moral hypocrisy than post hoc rationalization. As defined, moral hypocrisy is a goal-directed motive that can affect behavior. Economist Robert Frank (1988), building on biologist Robert Trivers’s (1971) ideas about reciprocal altruism, argued that people are motivated to present themselves as passionately committed to moral principles in order to gain the self-benefits that the ensuing trust provides. Frank also argued that shamming this commitment is difficult due to our highly developed ability to detect deception. Therefore, the more evolutionarily stable strategy is genuine commitment. Our ancient ancestors may have taken up morality lightly as part of a masquerade, but over time, natural selection favored those whose appearance of morality was genuine. Only in them was hypocrisy likely to be undetected. For Frank, then, primordial hypocrisy breeds modern moral integrity. Trivers himself (1985, pp. 415–420; also see Alexander, 1987, pp. 114–125) argued for a less sanguine scenario, one in which primordial hypocrisy breeds a more subtle form of hypocrisy. If we are unaware that serving our own interests violates our moral principles, then we can honestly appear moral, and so avoid detection, without paying the price of actually upholding the principles. In the moral masquerade, self-deception may be an asset, providing us access to all the social and self-rewards that being moral offers, free of charge.

Moral Integrity Perhaps, however, the cynical claim that moral principles lack intrinsic motivating power is wrong. Perhaps Frank (1988) and others who have argued for the existence of moral integrity are right. Even if principles are inculcated in childhood through appeals to reward and punishment, once the principles are internalized, upholding them may become an ultimate rather than an instrumental goal (Kohlberg, 1984; Staub 1989b). One may be motivated not simply to appear moral but to actually be moral—or at least not immoral (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp. 2009).

Testing the Nature of Moral Motivation What is the nature of moral motivation—integrity, hypocrisy, both, or neither? To address this question empirically, we need a research strategy that enables us to determine the ultimate goal motivating a moral act. To follow the same logic used over the past several decades to empirically test for the existence of altruistic motivation (Batson, 1991), a two-step strategy is required. First, it is necessary to give people a chance to act morally or immorally. In so valueladen an area as morality, we cannot trust self-reports or judgments about what one would do in hypothetical situations; we need to infer motivation from behavior. Moral action by itself, however, tells us only that there is some motivation, not the nature of that motivation. Therefore, second, it is necessary to vary the circumstances under which the moral act can occur, and to do so in a way that reveals whether the ultimate goal is to uphold moral



Moral Hypocrisy   97

principle (integrity) or to uphold the appearance of morality while, if possible, serving selfinterest (hypocrisy).

A Moral Dilemma in the Lab To implement this two-step strategy, Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al. (1997) created a moral dilemma in the laboratory. Their dilemma was a simple, straightforward zero-sum conflict between self-interest and the interest of another person. It was a real dilemma, not hypothetical, making it possible to observe actual behavior. It was simple, not complex, so there would be no problem understanding what was at stake and so variations could easily be created to disentangle goals. The dilemma pitted self-interest against the interest of another individual, not against the interest of a hallowed institution such as church or state, so responses would not be affected by institutional affiliation or allegiance. It was mundane and bland, not stereotypically moral and dramatic (e.g., stealing or killing), to avoid scripted responses. It was a dilemma with broad consensus about the morally right course of action, not one for which opinions differed, so there would be agreement on what was right. Drawing on the widely endorsed principle of procedural justice (“be fair”), Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al. (1997) gave research participants the chance to assign themselves and another participant (actually fictitious) to tasks. There were two tasks: a positive-consequences task, on which each correct response earned a raffle ticket for a $30.00 gift certificate, and a neutral-consequences task, on which each correct response earned nothing and which was described as rather dull and boring. One person had to be assigned to each task. Participants were told that the other participant would not know that they were allowed to assign the tasks; the other would think the assignment was made by chance. Participants were left alone to make the assignment decision, simply indicating which task consequences each participant would receive by entering an S (for Self) and an O (for Other) in the two blanks on an assignment form. They knew they would never meet the other participant. Documenting a clear preference for the positive-consequences task, Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al. (1997, Study 1) found that most research participants faced with this simple dilemma assigned themselves the positive consequences (80%; 16 of 20), even though when later asked on an open-ended questionnaire item (“In your opinion, what was the most morally right way to assign the task consequences?”), very few said that assigning oneself the positive consequences was the most moral way to assign the consequences (5%; 1 of 20). Moreover, when asked in another part of the questionnaire to rate the morality of their own actions (“Do you think the way you made the task assignment was morally right?” 1 = not at all; 9 = yes, totally), the 80% who assigned themselves to the positive consequences rated the morality of their assignment relatively low (M = 4.38) compared with the 20% who assigned the other person to the positive consequences (M = 8.25). Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, and Strongman (1999, Study 3) replicated this pattern of effects. (Results of these two studies are summarized in Table 4.1.) In each of these studies, the action of the majority of participants failed to match their retrospective judgments about the most moral thing to do. But this behavior–standard discrepancy was not necessarily evidence of moral hypocrisy. It could simply reflect moral oversight (Bersoff, 1999). Participants may not have thought about the moral implications of their decision until it was too late. Two procedural additions were necessary to provide a test of the nature of moral moti-

98   SELF-CONSTRUAL TABLE 4.1.  Percentage Assigning Self to Positive Consequences, Percentage Perceiving Assigning Self to Positive as Most Moral, and Rated Morality of the Way One Assigned the Tasks When Moral Standard Not Salient Rated morality of the way one assigned the tasks Assign self to positive consequences

Perceive self-topositive assignment as most moral

By those who assigned self to positive

By those who assigned other to positive

Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al. (1997, Study 1)

   80%

    5%

   4.38

   8.25

Batson et al. (1999, Study 3)

   71%

    0%

   5.40

   8.00

Study

Note. Ratings were on a 1 (not at all morally right) to 9 (yes, totally morally right) scale.

vation. First, it was important to make the moral relevance of the decision salient. Second, there needed to be sufficient wiggle room, or ambiguity, so that it would be possible to appear moral without actually having to be moral (see Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979; for a parallel use of moral wiggle room in behavioral economics, see Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007). If participants are motivated to actually be moral (moral integrity), those for whom the relevance of fairness to the task assignment is made salient should not favor themselves even when provided with the wiggle room to appear fair without having to be fair. If participants are motivated to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of being moral (moral hypocrisy), those provided with wiggle room should favor themselves. Only when the appearance–reality link is unambiguous should moral hypocrisy produce a moral result. Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al. (1997) used two techniques to provide wiggle room: They allowed participants to flip a coin in private to assign the tasks, which gave them a chance not to abide by the flip outcome (Study 2). Or they allowed participants to accept a “random” assignment that they already knew had given them either the positive task or the neutral (Study 3). Results with each technique were much the same, so we discuss only the first.

Initial Tests of the Nature of Moral Motivation To make the moral standard of fairness salient, Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al. (1997, Study 2) included the following sentence in the task assignment instructions: “Most participants feel that giving both people an equal chance—by, for example, flipping a coin—is the fairest way to assign themselves and the other participant to the tasks.” To create wiggle room, participants, who were alone in a research cubicle, were provided a coin to flip if they wished (a quarter in a clear plastic pouch taped to the inside of the folder containing the task assignment instructions). Under these conditions, virtually all participants said in retrospect that using a fair method such as the coin flip was the most moral way to assign the consequences. Yet only about half chose to flip the coin. Of those who chose not to flip. 90% assigned themselves to the positive-consequences task, similar to what participants without the sentence about fairness and with no coin had done. Batson et al. (1999, Study 2) replicated this effect. More interesting and revealing, much the same was true among those who flipped the coin; Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al.



Moral Hypocrisy   99

(1997, Study 2) found that 90% assigned themselves the positive-consequences task, a significantly higher percentage than the 50% expected for a fair coin flip. Batson et al. (1999, Study 2) again replicated this effect. (Results of these studies are summarized in Table 4.2.) Clearly, either the coin was very charitable, or some who flipped it failed to abide by the outcome. In spite of the same pattern of assignment, Table 4.2 reveals one notable difference between participants who assigned themselves to the positive consequences after flipping the coin and those who made this assignment without flipping. Those who flipped the coin rated the morality of the way they assigned the tasks considerably higher (Ms = 7.11 and 7.82 for the two studies, respectively) than did those who did not flip the coin (Ms = 3.56 and 4.00). Even though many did not abide by the outcome of the flip, they managed to see themselves as having acted morally—or at least to say they had. The pattern of results reported in Table 4.2 has proved very robust. In study after study, the percentage of participants assigning themselves the positive consequences after flipping the coin (always in private) has been significantly greater than the 50% that would be expected from an unbiased coin flip, providing evidence of motivation to appear fair yet avoid the cost of being fair (i.e., moral hypocrisy). The pattern was found in a study in which the less desirable consequences were more negative—uncomfortable electric shocks (Batson, Tsang, & Thompson, 2001). This variation led a smaller percentage of participants to flip the coin (30%) but did not reduce the percentage of those who assigned themselves to the positive consequences after flipping (100%). The pattern was found in a study in which participants

TABLE 4.2.  Percentage Assigning Self to Positive Consequences, Percentage Perceiving Assigning Self to Positive as Most Moral, and Rated Morality of the Way One Assigned the Tasks When Moral Standard Salient Rated morality of the way one assigned the tasks

Study

Assign self to positive consequences

Perceive self-topositive assignment as most moral

By those who assigned self to positive

By those who assigned other to positive

Participants who did not flip the coin Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al. (1997, Study 2)

   90%

    10%

   3.56

   8.00

Batson et al. (1999, Study 2)

   85%

     8%

   4.00

   9.00

Participants who did flip the coin Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al. (1997, Study 2)

   90%

     0%

   7.11

   9.00

Batson et al. (1999, Study 2)

   85%

     0%

   7.82

   9.00

Note. Ratings were on a 1 (not at all morally right) to 9 (yes, totally morally right) scale.

100   SELF-CONSTRUAL were told that the other participant knew they were assigning the tasks (Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 2002, Study 1). This variation led a larger percentage of participants to flip the coin (90%) but did not noticeably reduce the percentage of those who assigned themselves to the positive consequences after flipping (89%). The pattern was found in a study in which, at the top of the form on which they made the task assignment, participants indicated both (1) the importance of their making the assignment in a fair way and (2) whether or not they flipped the coin (Batson, Sampat, & Collins, 2005). Again, this variation led more participants to flip the coin (83%) but did not noticeably reduce the number who, after flipping, assigned themselves to the positive consequences (93%). Nor has the evidence of moral hypocrisy been limited to those scoring relatively low on measures of personal morality; quite the contrary. Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al. (1997, Study 2) found that an index of personal moral responsibility correlated positively with choosing to flip the coin (r = .40). But among participants who flipped, those who scored higher on this index were no less likely to assign themselves to the positive-consequences task than were those who scored low. Thus those with greater self-reported moral responsibility did not show signs of greater moral integrity; they showed signs of greater hypocrisy. They were more likely to appear moral (flip the coin) but no more likely to be moral (allow the coin flip to determine the task assignment). Batson et al. (2002, Study 2) replicated this finding. Taken together, the results of these studies provide considerable evidence of moral hypocrisy and very little evidence of moral integrity. The results consistently conform to the pattern we would expect if the goal of many who flipped the coin was to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of being moral.

Exploring Possible Explanations for the Moral Hypocrisy Effect: The Role of Self-Deception How did participants in these studies manage to negotiate the task assignment dilemma so that they could appear moral yet still unfairly favor themselves? They do not seem to have distorted or disengaged their moral standards. When asked later about the most morally right way to assign the tasks, by far the most common response was (1) use a random method (e.g., flip a coin), followed by (2) give the other participant the positive consequences. They also rated their mode of assignment as moral. Thus the effect cannot be explained by post hoc rationalization (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, 2008) or by a switch from seeing oneself as moral to seeing oneself as savvy. Moral standards were still there and, for many, so was the appearance (flipping the coin) and the perception (self-ratings) of morality, but real morality was rare. Nor is self-presentation a sufficient explanation (Jones & Pittman, 1982). When faced with a moral decision, more is at stake than appearing moral to others. If one is to gain the self-rewards for being moral (self-enhancement) and, more important perhaps, to avoid the self-punishments for being a hypocrite (self-protection), then one must appear moral to oneself. How is this possible when violating one’s moral standards to serve self-interest? As noted earlier, this is possible if one can self-deceive in the manner suggested by Trivers (1985). Self-deception is a concept that has been used widely and with varying meanings in both philosophy and psychology, so it is important to consider (1) what form of selfdeception is implied by the motive of moral hypocrisy and (2) what strategies might serve this



Moral Hypocrisy   101

motive. Sometimes self-deception has been thought to require that a person simultaneously hold two contradictory beliefs, being unaware of one (Gur & Sackheim, 1979), or that a person believe what at some level he or she knows is not so (Demos, 1960). Such paradoxical forms of self-deception are not required for moral hypocrisy. It is sufficient that a person engage in what philosopher Alfred Mele (1987) called “ordinary self-deception” or “desireinfluenced manipulation of data” (p. 126). The goal of appearing moral to the self can be reached if the person can manipulate the data so as to avoid confronting the discrepancy between his or her self-serving behavior and moral standards. How can a person manipulate the data to avoid this discrepancy? Assuming that (1) the person has behaved in a way that violates his or her moral standards and (2) responsibility for the behavior cannot be denied or justified, ordinary self-deception strategies that would serve moral hypocrisy can be classed into two types. First, the person can perceive the selfserving behavior as moral—that is, as being in line with his or her moral standards—even though it actually is not. Second, the person can avoid comparing the behavior with his or her moral standards. The first of these two strategies, if available, seems preferable, because the second leaves one vulnerable to anything that might focus attention on the behavior– standard discrepancy. If I can convince myself that I have acted morally, then I can scrutinize my behavior from the perspective of my moral standards with impunity, even pride. Might participants in the studies providing evidence for moral hypocrisy have been able to perceive their self-serving behavior as in line with standards? Might they, for example, have been able to perceive a coin flip as fair even when it was biased in their favor? It seems possible. Participants were left alone to decide whether to flip the coin and, if so, how to interpret the outcome. Many may not have decided the meaning of heads and tails in advance. Rather, once they saw that the result of the flip was heads (or tails), they may have “remembered” that this result assigned them the positive consequences: “It’s heads [tails]. Let’s see, that means I get the positive task.” In this way, they could enjoy not only the positive consequences but also the knowledge that they had made the assignment fairly by using the coin.

Labeling the Coin to Eliminate the First Type of Self-Deception To the degree that participants rely on this first type of self-deception, it should be relatively easy to diminish, if not eliminate, the moral hypocrisy effect. All that is required is to clearly identify who gets which task if the coin comes up heads or tails. Accordingly, Batson et al. (1999, Study 1) placed participants in the task assignment dilemma, making the moral standard of fairness salient and providing a coin. This time, however, there was a blue sticker on each side of the coin; one said “SELF to POS” and the other said “OTHER to POS.” If, using this labeled coin, the hypocrisy effect disappeared (i.e., there was no longer a significant deviation from 50 percent in the direction of assigning the self to the positive consequences), we would have evidence that the hypocrisy effect is a product of the first self-deception strategy: perceiving self-serving behavior as moral. If the effect remained, we would need to look elsewhere for an explanation. As can be seen in the top half of Table 4.3, adding labels did nothing to reduce the moral hypocrisy effect. Once again, the percentage of those assigning themselves to the positiveconsequences task after flipping the coin (86%) was much like the percentage doing so without flipping the coin (83%) and was significantly greater than the 50% one would expect

102   SELF-CONSTRUAL TABLE 4.3.  Percentage Assigning Self to Positive Consequences, Percentage Perceiving Assigning Self to Positive as Most Moral, and Rated Morality of the Way One Assigned the Tasks When Coin Labeled Rated morality of the way one assigned the tasks Did participant flip coin?

Assign self to positive consequences

Perceive self-topositive assignment as most moral

By those who assigned self to positive

By those who assigned other to positive

Coin labeled “SELF to POS,” “OTHER to POS” (Batson et al., 1999, Study 1) No

   83%

    17%

   3.90

   8.50

Yes

   86%

     0%

   7.42

   9.00

Coin with colored labels “SELF to POS,” “OTHER to POS” (Batson et al., 2002, Study 2) No

   75%

     0%

   3.89

   8.00

Yes

   84%

     0%

   6.33

   8.80

Note. Ratings were on a 1 (not at all morally right) to 9 (yes, totally morally right) scale.

from a fair coin flip. And, once again, those who assigned themselves to the positive consequences after flipping the coin rated the morality of the way they assigned the task higher (M = 7.42) than did those who assigned themselves to the positive consequences without flipping the coin (M = 3.90). It was not that participants failed to notice the labels or failed to think them important. When asked afterward whether it would make a difference if the coin had no labels, most participants said that without labels it would be easier to cheat (e.g., “It would be easier to pick me if the coin was not labeled. You could fool yourself and say, ‘No, I meant that side’ ”; “Without the labels you’d be more likely to change your mind after the flip”; “People would probably cheat their way out and take the positive for themselves”; “You could fudge it”; “You could play mind games until you came to the conclusion that you get the positive”). Still, labeling the coin did not eliminate—or even noticeably reduce—the hypocrisy effect. After this study had been run, Batson et al. (2002) realized that labels on the coin could provide even more useful information if the two labels were of different colors. There was a small window in the door of the research cubicle in which their participants sat to make the task assignment decision; the window was covered with paper. By peeking through a tiny opening in the covering, one could see not only whether participants flipped the coin but also which color label came up. So, one could know which participants won the flip fair and square and which did not. Comparing the ratings of morality of the way one assigned the tasks for each of these groups with the ratings of those who assigned themselves the positive consequences without flipping the coin would shed light on a question raised by the results of previous studies: Was the higher rating among those who flipped the coin simply a product of those who flipped, won fairly, and assigned themselves the positive consequences, or was the charade of a dishonest flip sufficient to produce higher ratings of morality? Accordingly, Batson et al. (2002, Study 2) placed a yellow “SELF to POS” sticker on one side of the coin and a blue “OTHER to POS” sticker on the other side. As can be seen in the bottom half of Table 4.3, responses were much the same as in the previous labeled-coin



Moral Hypocrisy   103

study and in the studies in which the coin was not labeled. But now, surreptitious observation permitted classification of task assignment behavior into four categories: (1) assign other to positive task (8 participants did this—3 without flipping the coin, 5 with); (2) flip the coin, get SELF to POS, assign self to positive task (11 participants did this); (3) not flip the coin, assign self to positive task (9 participants did this); and (4) flip the coin and get OTHER to POS, or “fiddle” the coin flip, assign self to positive task (16 participants did this). Of the 16 participants in the final category, five participants flipped the coin once, got OTHER to POS, yet assigned themselves the positive consequences. Seven used the coin but rigged the flip so that they “won” (for example, several participants who lost the initial flip flipped the coin again until it came up SELF to POS). Four did not flip the coin at all but reported on a subsequent questionnaire and in a postdecision interview that they had. Table 4.4 presents—separately for each of the four task assignment behavior categories— participants’ mean ratings of the morality of the way they made the task assignment decision. As can be seen, those in Category 1, who assigned the other to the positive-consequences task, rated the morality of the way they made the decision quite high (M = 8.50). So did those in Category 2, who flipped the coin, won, and assigned themselves the positive consequences (M = 7.45). In contrast, participants in Category 3, who did not flip the coin and assigned themselves the positive consequences, rated the morality of the way they made the task assignment decision relatively low (M = 3.89). Most important, participants in Category 4, who fiddled the coin flip and assigned themselves the positive consequences, rated the morality of the way they made the decision moderately high (M = 5.56), significantly higher than participants in Category 3. The higher rating among Category 4 participants was not a function of only one type of fiddler (e.g., those who rigged the flip); a comparison of rated morality among the three types did not approach statistical significance. In sum, even though the coin had no more effect on their decisions than it had on the decisions of those who did not claim to use the coin at all, the fiddlers still said they thought the way they made the task assignment decision was more moral. Their sham use of the coin seems to have provided sufficient appearance of morality so that they could claim to have acted, if not totally morally, at least moderately so. And, by fiddling the flip, they made sure that they got the more desirable task. They were able to appear moral—or at least not immoral—without incurring the cost of being moral. This pattern of responses could not be explained by the first type of self-deception. However, it seemed quite consistent with the second type.

TABLE 4.4.  Mean Rated Morality of the Way They Assigned the Tasks by Participants in Four Task Assignment Behavior Categories Task assignment behavior category

N

M

SD

Assign other to positive task

 8

8.50

0.76

Flip the coin, win, and assign self to positive task

11

7.45

1.37

Not flip the coin, assign self to positive task

 9

3.89

1.45

Fiddle the coin flip, assign self to positive task

16

5.56

2.37

Note. From Batson, Thompson, and Chen (2002, Study 2). Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

104   SELF-CONSTRUAL

Using a Mirror to Eliminate the Second Type of Self-Deception How might the second type of self-deception—avoiding comparison of one’s immoral behavior (unfairly assigning oneself the positive-consequences task) with one’s moral standards (be fair)—operate in the task assignment situation? Consistent with Baumeister and Newman’s (1994) analysis of the role of strategically interrupted thought in self-deception, those who fiddled the flip may have reasoned to the point, “I flipped the coin, which is fair,” and stopped without adding, “But I ignored the result, which is not.” In this way, they may have managed to avoid assessing their behavior in light of the salient moral standard. Self-awareness manipulations, such as looking at one’s face in a mirror, have been found to heighten awareness of discrepancies between behavior and salient personal standards, creating pressure to act in accord with standards (Wicklund, 1975). In the moral domain, for example, Diener and Wallbom (1976) induced self-awareness in research participants who had the opportunity to cheat on a test. They found that those who were self-aware cheated significantly less often than those who were not self-aware. If people who are motivated to appear moral yet avoid the cost of actually being moral rely on not comparing their immoral behavior with their moral standards, then introducing self-awareness should reduce or eliminate the hypocrisy effect. It should draw attention to the behavior–standard discrepancy, creating pressure to act in accordance with the standard. Pursuing this logic, Batson et al. (1999, Study 2) placed participants in the task assignment dilemma, gave them the statement about fairness to make this moral standard salient, and provided a coin (unlabeled). A large mirror was also present, sitting on the participant’s desk and leaning against the wall. Participants in the high-self-awareness condition were seated facing themselves in the mirror while deciding how to assign the tasks; those in the low-selfawareness condition were also seated facing the mirror, but it was turned to the wall so they saw only its back. A sign in the corner of the mirror said: “ANDERSON STUDY—DON’T TOUCH PLEASE,” and participants were asked not to move the mirror. None did. As can be seen in the top half of Table 4.5, results in the low-self-awareness condition were much as in previous studies. Even among those who flipped the coin, well over half assigned themselves to the positive-consequences task (85%). However, results in the high-self-awareness condition were dramatically different. Those who flipped the coin while facing themselves in the mirror showed no bias; 50% assigned themselves the positive consequences (see the bottom half of Table 4.5). Reflecting the fairness of the assignment, participants in this condition who assigned themselves the positive consequences after flipping the coin rated the morality of the way they assigned the tasks very high (M = 8.80). The difference across the self-awareness conditions was precisely the pattern expected if drawing attention to the behavior–standard discrepancy rendered the second type of self-deception ineffective and forced participants to actually be moral in order to appear moral. It suggests that avoiding comparison of one’s immoral behavior and moral standards plays an important role in moral hypocrisy.

Perspective Taking: A Stimulus to Moral Integrity . . . or Hypocrisy? Having found evidence of the prevalence of moral hypocrisy—and having some idea of the underlying psychology—but finding little evidence of moral integrity, one begins to think



Moral Hypocrisy   105 TABLE 4.5.  Percentage Assigning Self to Positive Consequences, Percentage Perceiving Assigning Self to Positive as Most Moral, and Rated Morality of the Way One Assigned the Tasks Rated morality of the way one assigned the tasks Did participant flip coin?

Assign self to positive consequences

Perceive self-topositive assignment as most moral

By those who assigned self to positive

By those who assigned other to positive

Not facing mirror (Low Self-Awareness) No

   85%

    8%

   4.00

   8.00

Yes

   85%

    0%

   7.82

   9.00

Facing mirror (High Self-Awareness) No

   62%

    0%

   3.50

   8.00

Yes

   50%

    0%

   8.80

   8.00

Note. Ratings were on a 1 (not at all morally right) to 9 (yes, totally morally right) scale. From Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, and Strongman (1999, Study 2). Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

about possible ways to stimulate moral integrity. One way that has been suggested by many religious teachers and moral philosophers is perspective taking. Arguably, the most universal moral prescription is the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” (Matt. 7:12). This rule implies an act of perspective taking in which you mentally place yourself in the other’s situation. Doing this sensitizes you to how you would want to be treated and provides a standard for how you should treat the other, leading you to consider the other’s interests as well as your own. Philosopher Mark Johnson (1993) made the moral significance of perspective taking explicit in his analysis of moral imagination. He argued that moral sensitivity requires the ability to imagine ourselves in the other’s place: Unless we can put ourselves in the place of another, unless we can enlarge our own perspective through an imaginative encounter with the experience of others, unless we can let our own values and ideals be called into question from various points of view, we cannot be morally sensitive. . . . It is not sufficient merely to manipulate a cool, detached “objective” reason toward the situation of others. We must, instead, go out toward people to inhabit their worlds. (Johnson, 1993, pp. 199–200)

The idea seems to be that if individuals can be induced to take the perspective of another with whom their own interests conflict, then they will be more inclined to move beyond narrow self-interest to consider and give weight to the interests of the other. As a result, they will be more motivated to uphold moral principles that require consideration of the interests of others, such as principles of fairness. That is, they will display moral integrity.

Two Different Perspectives on Another’s Situation, Two Different Motives In his classic early studies on empathy, Ezra Stotland (1969) identified two different forms of perspective taking. Using both self-report and physiological measures, Stotland found that

106   SELF-CONSTRUAL (1) imagining what one’s own thoughts and feelings would be if one were in the situation of a person in need (an imagine-self perspective) and (2) imagining the thoughts and feelings of the person in need (an imagine-other perspective) both led to increased emotional arousal compared with adopting an objective perspective. However, the emotions aroused by the two imagine perspectives were not the same. An imagine-self perspective produced a mix of self-oriented personal distress (feeling tense, upset, etc.) and other-oriented empathic concern (feeling sympathetic, compassionate, etc.), whereas an imagine-other perspective produced relatively pure empathic concern (for further evidence of this difference in emotions produced by these two imagine perspectives, see Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997).

Imagine-Self The Golden Rule and philosopher Johnson seem to agree that an imagine-self perspective is the one that should stimulate moral integrity. To actually be moral, a person should first imagine him- or herself in the other’s place. This reasoning suggests that if research participants in the task assignment paradigm are induced to imagine themselves in the other participant’s situation prior to making the assignment decision, this will stimulate moral integrity. These participants should be more likely to flip the coin, and, among those who flip, the outcome should be more fair.

Imagine-Other Results from a number of experiments have indicated that adopting an imagine-other perspective toward a person in need evokes empathic concern for that person, which in turn leads to increased altruistic motivation (motivation with the ultimate goal of relieving the need evoking the empathic concern), not to increased moral motivation (Batson, 1991; Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995). This research suggests that in the task assignment paradigm, participants induced to imagine the other’s feelings prior to making the assignment will not be more fair. Instead, they will be more likely to assign the other participant to the positive-consequences task directly, without flipping the coin.

Effects of Perspective Taking on Task Assignment To test these predictions, Batson et al. (2003) had some participants who were about to make the task assignment decision first perform a brief imagination exercise, whereas others did not. Among the former group, half were asked to “imagine yourself in the place of the other participant” for 1 minute, then write down what they imagined (imagine-self condition); half were asked to “imagine how the other participant likely feels,” then write (imagine-other condition). How did these two perspectives affect task assignment? The imagine-self perspective had little effect on the fairness of the task assignment. It slightly but nonsignificantly reduced the percentage assigning themselves to the positive-consequences task after flipping the coin (67%) compared with the percentage doing this when not asked to do an imagination exercise (85%). It slightly increased the percentage assigning themselves to the positive consequences without flipping the coin (89% vs. 64%). Nor did the imagine-other perspective have much effect on the fairness of the task assignment after flipping the coin—67% of those who flipped



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the coin assigned themselves to the positive-consequences task. What is striking is the percentage of participants in the imagine-other condition who did not flip the coin and then assigned themselves the positive consequences (27%). It was by far the lowest in any study using the task-assignment procedure. After imagining the other’s feelings, almost three-fourths who did not flip the coin assigned the other to the positive consequences. Consistent with the idea that the imagine-other perspective produced empathy-induced altruistic motivation, assigning the other the positive consequences was significantly positively correlated with reported empathic concern felt for the other in this condition (r = .60), and choosing to flip the coin was significantly negatively correlated with reported empathic concern (r = –.53).

Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Moral Dilemmas Why did the imagine-self perspective, widely touted as a stimulus to moral integrity, have such a small effect? Are those extolling the virtues of this form of perspective taking simply wrong? Perhaps, but perhaps not, at least not entirely. Assigning the positive- and neutralconsequences tasks poses a particular type of moral dilemma: The preassignment plight of both participants is exactly the same; each faces the prospect of being assigned to either a more desirable or a less desirable task. In a symmetrical dilemma such as this, to imagine oneself in the place of the other participant may not lead one to attend to the other’s interests, stimulating moral integrity. Instead, it may lead one to attend all the more to one’s own. If the inability of the imagine-self perspective to stimulate moral integrity was due to the symmetrical nature of the dilemma, then an imagine-self perspective should be more effective when the other’s initial situation is worse than one’s own. When the other’s need is clearly greater, imagining oneself in the other’s place may provide insight into what it is like to be in the position of disadvantage and, as a result, lead to a more productive focus on the other’s interests, stimulating moral integrity. When, for example, considering whether to vote for an increase in one’s own taxes in order to fund a job-training program for the unemployed, imagining oneself in the place of someone in need of a job may stimulate moral action. Pursuing this logic, Batson et al. (2003) ran a second study in which participants were told that they had been initially assigned to an asymmetrical condition in which they would receive two raffle tickets for each correct response on their task whereas the other participant would receive nothing for each correct response. However, if they wished, participants could switch to a symmetrical condition, in which each participant would receive one raffle ticket for each correct response. Participants who made the decision about switching after imagining themselves in the place of the other participant were far more likely to make the switch (83%) than were participants who engaged in no imagination exercise (38%). So in this case, an imagine-self perspective may indeed have stimulated moral integrity. (Alternatively, it may have stimulated moral hypocrisy by eliminating wiggle room and rendering it necessary to opt for the switch to appear moral.) Results of these two studies suggest that an imagine-self perspective may have a limited but important role in stimulating moral integrity. Imagining oneself in the other’s place may provide a corrective lens for the specific moral myopia to which a position of advantage is prone. This myopia is legendary. Those who, like Candide, live in the best of all possible worlds (Voltaire, 1759/1930) are not likely to trouble themselves thinking about the worlds in which others live. Those innocently born with silver spoons in their mouths are not likely to ask whether it is morally right to keep them there. If introducing an imagine-self perspec-

108   SELF-CONSTRUAL tive can effectively stimulate the moral sensitivity of persons of privilege, it has done important work. This very effectiveness may, however, lead to a less salutary consequence. Persons of privilege, aware of the potential power of imagining themselves in the place of the less advantaged, may not simply neglect to adopt this perspective; they may actively resist it. If so, admonition or instruction to imagine oneself in the other’s place is likely to fall on deaf ears. This possibility, which raises the specter of motivation to avoid imagining oneself in the place of the less fortunate in order to avoid stimulating moral integrity, seems worth pursuing in future research. Distinct from moral hypocrisy, it may be another important reason for the lack of moral integrity.

Conclusion Moral motivation can be deceptive. What looks like motivation to be moral (moral integrity) often is not. It is, instead, motivation to appear moral, yet, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral (moral hypocrisy). When there is sufficient wiggle room, moral hypocrisy has the virtue of providing us with the social and self-enhancement or the social and self-protection benefits of moral integrity without having to pay the price. In pursuit of self-interest, we, like Mr. John Dashwood, can ride roughshod over our principles yet still see ourselves as paragons of virtue. But the goal of moral hypocrisy—appearing moral without having to be moral—is not attained without skill. To gain the full self-enhancing and self-protecting benefits, one must be adept not only at post hoc rationalization and deceit of others but also at self-deception. Many of us seem to be. To recognize the prevalence of moral hypocrisy and to recognize the role that moral rationalization and deception play certainly complicates our understanding of moral motivation. Yet this recognition seems essential if we are to unravel the mysteries of why people act morally—and why, all too often, they do not.

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Chapter 5 The Role of Time in Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Anne E. Wilson Michael Ross

P

eople often think about time. They estimate how long projects will take, schedule for the future, and try to remember when events occurred in the past. The language of time includes precise terms such as hours and years, as well as fuzzier expressions such as a short time, a long time, and some time. The difference between the more precise and more nebulous measures of time is, in part, the difference between objective and subjective time estimates. An hour lasts 60 minutes for everyone, but one person’s short time can be another person’s long time. In the current chapter, we focus on the distinction between objective time, such as calendar time and the subjective experience of time. The study of time has a long history in psychology; William James devoted an entire chapter to the perception of time in Principles of Psychology (1890/1950). In much psychological research, time is an independent variable. In longitudinal studies, psychologists assess the same people at different time periods. Researchers also conduct studies relying on participants’ ability to engage in mental time travel. In such studies, research participants recall what they and others were like (traits, emotions, behaviors, etc.) in the past or predict what they will be like in the future (Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Ross, 1989; Wilson & Ross, 2001). In other studies, researchers examine people’s judgments as they think about near or distant points in time (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007) or the end of their lives (Carstensen, 2006; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). 112



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In the research described in the current chapter, we examine time as a dependent rather than an independent variable. Most previous researchers examining time as a dependent variable have focused on estimates of actual time, from minutes to months (Block, 1989; Brown, Ripps, & Shevell, 1985; Skowronski, Walker & Betz, 2003; Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003). Our focus is on people’s subjective experience of time, typically over intervals as long as months and years. Controlling for how distant the events actually are, we ask participants whether events “feel” far away or near in time. The common phrase “It feels like yesterday” captures the distinction between subjective and actual time. When people utter this phrase, they are fully aware that the event in question did not occur “yesterday”—it just feels that way. We identify the identity regulation functions of these types of temporal perceptions.

The Timeline Where is it, this present? It has melted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of becoming.                         —William James (1890/1950, p. 609)

Intuitively, time has three objective and clearly distinguishable components: the past, the present, and the future. People’s understanding of time is not so straightforward, however. The minute slice of time that is actually “right now” is not what people typically mean when they refer to the present. People create an extended present by assimilating past and future instances into it (James, 1890/1950). But how far in the past and how far in the future does the present extend? People are flexible on this issue, as evidenced by the use of the word present in everyday English. The temporal duration of the word present expands or shrinks, depending on the noun it modifies. People speak of the present second, minute, week, year, decade, century, and so forth. This ambiguity about the present helps make subjective time a very useful tool in identity regulation. When people consider aspects of themselves, such as their traits and abilities, they rarely focus solely on the precise moment they currently inhabit, the “right now.” Instead, individuals define themselves in large part by where they’ve been and where they believe themselves to be going. Their personal autobiographies (including anticipated future chapters) help them to construct their current identities (Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; McAdams, 2003; Ross & Wilson, 2003; Wilson & Ross, 2001) and provide them with a sense of meaning (Landau, Greenberg, & Sullivan, 2009). But how do people organize and integrate all of this information to arrive at a coherent sense of self? For example, people’s personal past experiences inevitably contain high and low points, accomplishments and failures. Likewise, most people recognize that their futures will have some downs as well as ups. How do glories and shortcomings contribute to an individual’s sense of self? When people in Western cultures construct a personal identity, they do not assign equal weight to all available data. They are often motivated to regulate their current self-view by highlighting flattering and downplaying uncomplimentary information in their personal trajectories (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Baumeister, 1998; Dodgson & Wood, 1998; Sedikides, 1993; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). Researchers have identified a host of strategies that people can use to construct positive identities and deflect threats to the self. For example,

114   SELF-CONSTRUAL people may neutralize a threat to identity by denying personal responsibility for negative outcomes (Miller & Ross, 1975). Some negative outcomes are difficult to disavow completely, however, and have the potential to threaten individuals’ favorable self-views long after they occurred. These are the kinds of events that we are particularly interested in. How do people include these types of events in their personal histories and still manage to protect or enhance their current self-views? Our answer to this question emphasizes the importance of subjective time. Although people have a life story in which some events happened more recently than others, their subjective chronology of events differs systematically from calendar time. Where individuals locate an event on their personal timeline has significant implications for its relation to their present identity. All else being equal, unflattering events from long ago pose less of a threat to current identity than do comparable events in the recent past. Likewise, distant glories have less of an effect on self-evaluations than do recent experiences. Why do people put less weight on distant than on recent past outcomes? At least part of this phenomenon is likely based on our intuitions of how people change over time (Ross, 1989), leading people to conclude that remote past selves are too dissimilar from their current selves to be pertinent to current identity. In addition, memory vividness and emotional intensity tend to decline with the passage of time (Brown et al., 1985; Skowronski et al., 2003), which likely reduce the psychological impact of distant events on the self. In the realm of actual time, the impact of past outcomes on the present self is sometimes formalized. Legal codes often include statutes of limitation that specify how long after an offense a person can be prosecuted. In work settings, pay raises are often linked to achievements in the preceding year rather than to more long-term accomplishments. What often matters is what the person has done recently. In the realm of subjective time, however, there are no formal rules about which outcomes “count” with respect to self-appraisals, and “recent” is a personal judgment. Although people may feel a decreasing connection to chronologically more distant outcomes or events, actual calendar time is not the only determinant of feelings of connectedness. Sometimes people feel temporally close and connected to chronologically remote events. Sometimes people feel temporally distant from chronologically close events. In our research, we show that to some extent it does not matter whether an embarrassing episode occurred a year ago or yesterday. When subjective time diverges from chronological time, the psychological experience of time more powerfully predicts the relation between a past event and people’s current self-views. If an embarrassing episode feels like yesterday, it still has the power to taint a person’s self-appraisal. If the same event feels very remote, it has much less effect on a person’s current self-appraisal (Ross & Wilson, 2002). Note that we focus our analysis of the effects of subjective time on the individual’s own self-appraisal. Subjective time should also influence people’s judgments of others. We theorize, however, that the sense of subjective time often differs for self and other because the motivations differ. A husband who feels far removed from the time he totaled the family car may discover that his wife feels as if his accident occurred yesterday. In the remainder of the chapter, we describe our research on temporal self-appraisal theory. We present evidence of a subjective distance bias in three temporal domains: people’s perceptions of their personal pasts, projections for their futures, and perceptions of historical events. Next, we examine evidence that people’s subjective time biases are motivated by the desire to protect and enhance their identities. Finally, we examine some possible limits to, and consequences of, systematic biases in judgments of time.



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Evidence of the Subjective Time Bias Past Selves One factor that should influence the subjective experience of time is the valence of selfrelevant events. Potentially flattering self-relevant events should have more favorable implications for identity than uncomplimentary events, but this is mainly the case for events that feel recent. Hence, experiencing positive past events as relatively recent capitalizes on their potential to benefit identity, and keeping negative past events subjectively at arm’s length alleviates their potential threat. Supporting our predictions, we found that people felt further away from unflattering events than from equally distant (in calendar time) flattering episodes (Ross & Wilson, 2002). For example, students reported that their previous term of college felt closer when they were randomly assigned to recall their best grade rather than their worst grade from that same term. Importantly, the passage of calendar time was exactly the same for participants in both conditions. Only their subjective experience of that time differed across conditions. In another study, participants reported feeling much closer to a past event they were proud of than to a personally embarrassing past event (Ross & Wilson, 2002). In this case, we were unable to determine with certainty when in calendar time the events occurred, but we did ask participants for their best estimates. Biases in time were observed only in estimates of subjective time, not in judgments of calendar time. People did not report that positive events happened more recently in calendar time than the negative events did; they just indicated that positive events seemed more recent. In all of our research on subjective time estimates, we either keep calendar time constant (i.e., by asking everyone about the same point in calendar time) or control for date estimates statistically. When participants make judgments of self-relevant events, their estimates of calendar time and their reports of subjective time are only weakly correlated, if at all (Ross & Wilson, 2002). Subjective time biases are never fully explained by variations in actual dates. When people make more impersonal judgments (about events unrelated to the self, for example), their judgments of calendar and subjective time are typically more highly correlated (Wilson & McTeer, 2004). We argue that self-enhancement and self-protection goals lead people to shift their sense of time for personal events, causing their judgments of personally relevant events to diverge from calendar time.

Future Selves Not only do people judge favorable past events to be subjectively closer to the present than unfavorable past events (Ross & Wilson, 2002) but they also show the same tendency for future events. Just as close past events have more implications for current identity than remote occurrences, so too should subjectively close future events. In a test of this hypothesis, Peetz, Wilson, and Strahan (2009) asked participants to report the grade they realistically expected to get on an upcoming psychology midterm that was about 2 weeks away. Those who expected to do well on the midterm reported feeling that it was imminent, whereas those who expected to perform more poorly viewed the test as still a long way off. One explanation of this finding is that students who anticipate future failure keep the threat from tainting present identity by keeping the outcome distant as long as possible. Because participants were not randomly assigned to conditions, other interpretations are also possible. For example, perhaps students study harder and experience increasing confidence in their abilities when an

116   SELF-CONSTRUAL exam feels close (for whatever reason) rather than distant. Nonetheless, this study provides preliminary evidence that the same distancing biases that apply to past outcomes may also pertain to future outcomes.

Social Identity and Ingroup Historical Events According to social identity theorists (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006), people define themselves, in part, by their membership in social groups. Just as personal experiences help to shape personal identity, an ingroup’s history can play a role in shaping social identity. Hence people may be prone to the same motivated biases of personal memory when recollecting incidents from their group’s historical past (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997). Negative events in the ingroup’s history could threaten individuals’ social identity, and positive events could flatter their sense of self derived from group membership. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of studies examining events that were attributed to participants’ historic ingroup but in which they personally played no role. Indeed, most of the events we examined occurred before the participants were born. In a number of studies, we examined people’s responses to historical transgressions committed by their ingroup. In an age in which historical injustices are frequently discussed and the appropriateness of apologies and compensation for past atrocities is hotly debated, people might be likely to find the wrongdoings and injustices committed by their ingroup to be rather threatening to their social identity. In one study, male participants read about life circa the year 1900 (Gunn & Wilson, 2010). Some men read about the injustices that men perpetrated on women in that era: Women were denied the right to vote, spousal rape and battery were legal, women had few rights in the home and at work. Others read a neutral description of family life at the turn of the century (portraying a typical farm lifestyle, family size, daily chores and activities, etc.). Presumably because the injustice information was more threatening to social identity than the neutral information, men in the injustice condition regarded 1900 as ancient history relative to the men in the neutral condition judging the very same time period. Even though men in both conditions judged the same year in calendar time, those who considered aspects of that era with negative implications for their social identity viewed that time period as more distant.

Evidence of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Motivation Taken as a whole, evidence suggests that people shift their perceptions of temporal distance in response to the valence of personal pasts and futures, as well as historical events pertinent to their social identities. According to temporal self-appraisal theory, these shifts in subjective time perception reflect people’s motivation to dissociate their current selves from undesirable outcomes in their history and to link their current selves to complimentary outcomes. Although the observation of a systematic bias in the subjective distance of negative and positive events is consistent with a motivational account, it is not compelling evidence by itself. Positive and negative past events may differ in a host of other ways—for instance, positive and negative events might differ in frequency, unexpectedness, and degree of personal control. It is possible that some other factor associated with event valence is responsible for its



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link to subjective temporal distance. If, for example, people believe that positive events are more frequent than negative events, then any given positive event could be judged as more recent due simply to the greater probability that it occurred in the recent past. Hence we need to provide clearer evidence that this bias is due to a motivated desire to self-protect and selfenhance. Next, we describe a variety of procedures that we have used to establish the role of motivation in temporal distancing.

Self–Other Differences One way to assess motivation is to examine whether people evidence an ostensibly selfserving bias when considering their own flattering and unflattering outcomes, but not when thinking about the outcomes of mere acquaintances. Episodes in the life of an acquaintance should have little effect on people’s personal identity if they do not share a significant common bond with this person. In one study we asked some participants to recall an event that made them proud of themselves or that made them personally embarrassed. Although their academic awards, good deeds, and athletic successes did not occur any more recently in calendar time than their social missteps and drunken blunders, participants reported that the proud personal events felt much closer than did the humiliations. We asked other participants to recall similar events for an acquaintance—someone they had known for some time but with whom they were not close (Ross & Wilson, 2002). Supporting a motivational interpretation, participants did not show the same biases when recalling other individuals’ accomplishments and embarrassments that they did when recalling their own (Ross & Wilson, 2002). Presumably, the past highs and lows experienced by an acquaintance should not reflect directly on an individual’s self-view; hence they should not experience any motivation to systematically distance undesirable events and keep positive ones close. We have also observed ingroup–outgroup differences in perceptions of the temporal distance of historical events. Ingroup members sometimes consider historical atrocities committed by their group to have implications for their own social identities, even if the atrocities were committed before they were born. For instance, when current-day Germans reflect on the atrocities of the Holocaust, they are likely to experience a threat to their social identities. Although current-day Canadians and Germans judged the Holocaust to be equally heinous, the atrocities pose a threat to German but not Canadian social identity. Accordingly, we found that current-day Germans judged the Holocaust to be subjectively more temporally remote than did Canadians (Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson, 2010). These studies indicate that past events are particularly likely to be distanced if they have negative implications for personal or social identity.

Attributional Focus Self–other differences provide evidence of motivation, but, again, alternative explanations are plausible. For instance, perhaps people possess more detailed and vivid memories for their own than for their acquaintances’ experiences. Events feel subjectively closer when people remember them vividly (Ross & Wilson, 2002). Statistically controlling for participants’ ratings of memory vividness does not eliminate the bias in subjective time, but the motivational interpretation is more plausible if it is supported by other methodological approaches. Haddock (2004) conducted a series of studies that offer an interesting parallel to the self–other

118   SELF-CONSTRUAL approach. He examined how feelings of temporal closeness to a past success were affected by whether or not participants regarded themselves as personally responsible for the outcome. Just as events that happened to another person (especially someone to whom one is not especially close) should have little impact on personal identity, self-events for which people are not personally responsible should also have minimal impact on self-views. Haddock varied participants’ attributions for personal experiences of success by randomly assigning them to reflect on either how they caused the outcome or how someone else contributed to the success. Because all participants recalled a personal event before being assigned to focus on either its internal or external causes, any systematic bias in subjective distance cannot be caused by differences in the type of events remembered or the vividness of the memories. Participants reported feeling temporally closer to past successes when they were led to attribute the outcomes to themselves rather than to others. The tendency to keep successes temporally close is magnified when people view themselves as personally responsible for success, an attribution that is flattering to the current self.

Self-Affirmation In addition to perceiving flattering outcomes as especially close, people regard uncomplimentary outcomes as especially distant. If people distance unflattering outcomes to protect their current self-identities, then the temporal bias should decrease if they can alleviate the threat to identity by alternate means. The alternative means we studied was self-affirmation. When the self has been threatened in one domain, people can restore their positive identity by affirming their self-worth in another domain (Steele, 1988). Self-affirmation procedures establish a positive sense of self by encouraging people to focus on a positive, self-relevant life domain. In one study, we assigned participants to recall either a flattering or unflattering personal event (Wilson & Ross, 2002). Before assessing participants’ evaluations of the subjective temporal distance of these events, we randomly assigned participants to either an affirmation condition, in which they described a value that was personally important to them, or a control condition, in which they considered a value that might be important to others (Steele, 1988). We expected and found that the distancing bias was strong in the control condition: People felt temporally closer to flattering than to unflattering episodes, controlling for estimates of calendar time. However, after having completed a self-affirmation procedure, participants no longer systematically distanced the negative events relative to the positive ones. This self-affirmation approach has been used in other lines of work (Sherman & Cohen, 2002; see also Sherman & Hartson, Chapter 6, this volume) to assess the role of defensiveness or self-enhancement in people’s responses and provides converging evidence that biases in subjective time are motivated by identity concerns.

Mitigating Social Identity Threat Affirmation should not change the implications of the past events directly: It simply provides a buffer between memories and current identity. Another way to examine motivation is to alter the degree of threat posed by the target event itself. We have used this approach in our research examining social identity. In these studies, participants are first reminded of a threatening injustice committed by their ingroup—for instance, German participants were reminded of the Holocaust (Peetz et al., 2010), or Canadian men were reminded about past



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injustices that men inflicted on Canadian women (Gunn & Wilson, 2010). Some participants were then randomly assigned to also read about information that should mitigate the threat of the injustice. German participants read about their country’s postwar efforts at restitution (Peetz et al., 2010, Study 1) or about wartime German resistance fighters who worked against the Nazi regime (Study 2). In the study of historical injustices against women, men in the mitigated threat condition read about the advances since 1900 in women’s rights. Mitigating information alleviated the subjective time biases: Participants felt temporally closer to historic injustices accompanied by mitigating information. Importantly, threat-mitigating information did not affect the subjective time estimates of individuals who were not members of the threatened ingroup, whose social identities should not have been threatened in the first place.

Individual Differences in Self-Serving Biases Another way to examine self-enhancement or protection motivation is to study individual differences in the tendency to show self-serving biases. People with high self-esteem (HSEs) appear to be more inclined and able to deflect threats to their self-regard than do those with lower self-esteem (LSEs; Baumeister, 1998; Blaine & Crocker, 1993). HSEs focus more on their strengths than their weaknesses after failure (Dodgson & Wood, 1998; Steele et al., 1993) and are more prone to dissociate from people who might reflect poorly on them (Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Bodenhausen, 2000). We expected that HSEs would also be more inclined to regulate their positive self-regard by dissociating themselves from past shortcomings while keeping former strengths temporally near. By shifting subjective time in this manner, we expected that HSEs would reap the psychological benefits of earlier successes, sever ties with past failures, and thereby maintain their high self-esteem. We measured global self-esteem in a number of studies examining the subjective temporal distance bias for both past (Ross & Wilson, 2002) and future events (Wilson, 2003). HSEs consistently demonstrate the subjective time bias, feeling closer to both past and future glories than to failings, whereas LSEs show the bias weakly or not at all. Although we have focused on self-esteem, we expect that other related variables would show very similar patterns. Chronically happy people tend to behave in ways that perpetuate happiness (Fredrickson, 2001; Gebauer, Broemer, Haddock, & von Hecker, 2008), and depressed or dysphoric people often do the opposite. In several samples, we have obtained measures of depression, as well as self-esteem, for participants. Not surprisingly, dysphoric individuals show the same lack of subjective bias reflected as LSEs. Indeed, highly depressed individuals even demonstrated a reverse bias, judging unflattering events to be closer in subjective time than complimentary ones (McLellan, Wilson, & Antl, 2009). Importantly, these effects are not accounted for by differences in the actual dates of past successes and failures. For example, HSEs did not typically recall more recent successes than failures. Why do these individual differences in subjective time estimates occur? At least some of the difference may be explained by how HSEs and LSEs (or high and low dysphorics) process their successes and failures. Frequently rehearsed events—including those that people happily reminisce about and those that they despondently ruminate on—tend to be remembered better then rarely recalled events, and vividly remembered events tend to be perceived as subjectively more recent than less well-remembered events (Brown et al., 1985; McLellan et al., 2009). Just as HSEs focus on their strengths rather than their shortcomings after

120   SELF-CONSTRUAL failure (Dodgson & Wood, 1998), we expected that HSEs would not dwell on past failures as much as LSEs and would reminisce more frequently about past glories. In one lab study, participants were reminded of either an important past academic success or a failure, then were left alone for several minutes while the experimenter ostensibly left the room to look for a late participant. When the experimenter returned, she asked participants to report what they had thought about during her absence. LSEs in the failure condition reported spending much of their time thinking through the failure in question, how they felt about it, and what implications it continued to have. HSEs reminded of failure were more likely to report contemplating what they’d have for lunch, how many holes were in the ceiling, sex, and why the experimenter was taking so long to return. In other words, they thought of anything but the threatening event. The reverse pattern occurred for participants reminded of a past success—HSEs dwelled on that memory, whereas LSEs spent less time contemplating it and more time distracting themselves. Correspondingly, HSEs felt temporally closer to successes than failures, whereas LSEs evinced a nonsignificant reversal. In a subsequent study, we attempted to simulate these differential thinking patterns by assigning people to either ruminate over or distract themselves from thinking about a past negative experience. Participants who ruminated felt subjectively closer to negative events than those who distracted themselves (McLellan et al., 2009). We have also examined individual differences in defensiveness as a predictor of biases in subjective distance. Research has demonstrated that some people are particularly sensitive to self-threats and have a particularly strong propensity to defend their self-esteem (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003). We reasoned that people who were especially defensive about a particular past event might be especially likely to subjectively distance it. When examining our initial samples of German participants and their reactions to reminders of the Holocaust, we found that some individuals seemed quite open to hearing about the Holocaust, were willing to acknowledge a sense of collective guilt, and were willing to compensate victims and support programs that memorialize these events (Peetz et al., 2010). Other individuals (comparable in age and other demographic variables) appeared to be quite defensive about the topic, complaining that other nations still blame Germans to an unfair or unwarranted degree. In subsequent studies, we developed a measure of this particular type of defensiveness (specifically capturing perceptions of unwarranted blame from other nations) and examined it as a moderator of subjective distancing. As expected, only individuals high in defensiveness subjectively distanced the Holocaust; less defensive individuals did not appear to use the strategy at all. We expect that defensiveness in this study is capturing a set of ideologies more complex than simply the propensity to be self-serving; however, it is likely that social identity threat is one of the factors that differed between defensive and nondefensive groups. Those who were open to acknowledging the collective wrongdoing may not have been as threatened by the information in the first place.

Cultural Differences Some researchers have argued that there are cross-cultural differences in the tendency to self-enhance (Heine & Hamamura, 2007), with Westerners being especially prone to selfflattery. The jury is still out with regard to the interpretation and magnitude of cross-cultural differences in self-enhancement, with some researchers arguing that self-enhancement occurs in different ways or for different culturally valued dimensions (Sedikides, Gaertner,



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& Toguchi, 2003). In one cross-cultural investigation, we examined the temporal distancing bias among a sample of Canadian and Japanese participants (Ross, Heine, Wilson, & Sugimori, 2005). Beginning with the hypothesis that Westerners may display greater selfenhancement tendencies than Asians, participants were asked to recall an event that caused them to feel personal pride or embarrassment and to report subjective distance. Replicating Ross and Wilson (2002), Canadian participants reported feeling much closer to events that made them proud than to embarrassing events. Japanese participants reported no difference in the subjective temporal distance of both kinds of experiences. This null result suggests that Japanese participants did not vary subjective time estimates to protect or enhance their current selves. Recently, however, Kam, Wilson, Perunovic, and Bond (2008) obtained a temporal distancing bias for some kinds of events with participants in China. The researchers asked Chinese participants to recall either agentic (independent, achievement-related) or communal (relationship-related) successes or failures experienced either by themselves or by another person. The researchers expected that communal events would be more central to Chinese identity and more prone to biases in subjective time estimates than agentic events. They demonstrated that, although Chinese participants showed no evidence of the distancing bias for agentic memories, they judged their communal successes to be subjectively closer than their communal failures. In addition, participants showed no distancing bias when recalling the agentic or communal events of acquaintances. These data indicate that even individuals from interdependent cultures may use the relatively subtle strategy of biasing subjective time estimates to regulate their self-views in culturally important domains.

Evidence for Motivation The evidence using different methods and samples suggests that the bias in subjective time estimates for personal past, future, and historic events may well be motivated by a desire to promote a desired current identity. Although each individual method has strengths and weaknesses, the findings across self–other studies, self-affirmation studies, experimental variations of identity threat, and studies of individual and cultural differences converge on the conclusion that the distancing bias is motivated by self-enhancement and self-protection goals.

Is the Distancing Bias Effective? Do biases in subjective time estimates actually help people feel better about themselves? The finding that the distancing bias is stronger among people with high self-esteem offers indirect evidence that engaging in this process might contribute to higher self-regard. Potentially, HSEs are more prone to subjective time biases, which in turn serve to protect and promote continued high self-esteem. We have found a corresponding pattern for social identity: Germans who distanced the Holocaust to the greatest extent subsequently reported the highest levels of collective self-esteem (Peetz et al., 2010). However, the connections between the subjective distance bias and self-esteem (personal or collective) in these studies are correlational. Consequently, causal inferences about the impact of subjective distance are speculative. We obtained additional evidence that distancing plays a role in well-being when we

122   SELF-CONSTRUAL asked people to either ruminate about or distract themselves from a previously nominated negative event. Those who spent about 8 minutes ruminating about this incident judged it to be subjectively more recent than those who spent the same amount of time thinking about a selection of unrelated topics. People reported more negative affect in the rumination than in the distraction condition, an effect that was partially mediated by subjective distance. People who felt closer to past negative experiences tended to report feeling sadder in the present (McLellan, et al., 2009). To examine the causal role of the distancing bias in self-enhancement or protection, we studied how the same past experience affects present identity when it feels near or remote. We took advantage of the malleability of subjective distance (Broemer, Grabowski, Gebauer, Ermel, & Diehl, 2008; Pennington & Roese, 2003; Sanna, Chang, & Carter, 2004; Wilson & Ross, 2001) to experimentally manipulate feelings of closeness to the event (Wilson & Ross, 2003). In one study, university students were asked to think back to their high school experiences. To alter perceptions of distance, participants were asked to place a target period (senior year of high school) on a timeline. Some participants received a timeline spanning a long period (e.g., birth to present day), whereas other participants received a timeline spanning a relatively brief period (e.g., high school to present day). Senior year was placed spatially closer to the present day on a timeline beginning at birth than on a timeline beginning at high school. Spatially altering people’s perceptions of time causes people to feel psychologically closer to the target period in the former than the latter timeline condition. As expected, people evaluated their current selves to be more in line with past experiences that felt recent: For instance, those who reported being popular in high school felt more socially successful today when high school was induced to feel close, and those who recalled a socially awkward high school life felt less successful in the present. Those findings do not seem very surprising, given that extraverted, likable people might have wider social circles both in the past and the present. However, consider what happens when people were randomly assigned to a condition that induced them to feel distant from their high school experiences. Formerly popular people did not feel quite so popular, and high school outcasts felt quite a lot more popular in the present. Subjective distance appeared to prevent formerly popular individuals from resting on their laurels but allowed former social rejects to avoid feeling tainted by their past social inadequacies. Parallel findings have also emerged for people’s considerations of future selves. After being instructed to envision an upcoming expected success (e.g., obtaining a desired summer job, doing well on final exams), participants were led to view that success either as imminent or still far off (Wilson, Buehler, Lawford, Schmidt, & Yong, 2010). Although the future glory did not differ by condition in calendar time, those who were induced to see their success as temporally near reported more favorable current self-views than those led to see the same successes as off in the distance. In general, evidence suggests that the distancing bias is likely to be effective at regulating a positive identity. People feel better about themselves when they felt close to, rather than distant from, past or future triumphs and felt better about themselves when they felt distant from, rather than close to, former flaws (Wilson & Ross, 2003; Wilson et al., 2010). In addition, Gebauer et al. (2008) found evidence that recent past selves are assimilated into and distant past selves are contrasted with current identity: Participants reported higher self-esteem after recalling a positive past self to be recent rather than distant, but lower self-esteem after recalling a negative past self to be recent rather than distant.



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Subjective Time and Calendar Time We have focused on the role of subjective time in self-enhancement and self-protection. Is it the case that only psychological time, but not calendar time, can have these effects on the self? We suspect that in many cases calendar time can have similar effects. As suggested by the proverb “time heals all wounds,” getting dumped yesterday stings more than a breakup of a year earlier. A recent career award likely evokes more pride in adults that the memory of winning a grade school spelling bee. However, because subjective time is malleable and calendar time is not, people have more control over the former. The research that we have reviewed indicates that people alter their perceptions of subjective time in ways that trump the effects of calendar time. Of course, people are not always effective at—or even always interested in—protecting and enhancing the self. Subjective time appears to play a role in posttraumatic stress, in which even long-past traumas feel very “present” (Holman & Silver, 1998). Individual differences in personal characteristics (self-esteem, depression) and characteristics of the event (e.g., severe events, “flashbulb” memories) may also influence feelings of subjective temporal distance (Ross & Wilson, 2002). Future research could examine circumstances in which subjective distance biases yield protective versus self-debilitating effects. Debilitating patterns could occur at the individual level (as when a depressed individual feels close to an earlier failure). At the interpersonal level, unhappy couples might view past grievances as subjectively recent and especially hard to excuse (Wohl & McGrath, 2007). Similarly, intergroup harmony may be hindered when groups in conflict perceive the subjective distance of past injustices very differently. For instance, current members of a group that has perpetrated historical injustices against another group might regard their ingroup’s past wrongs as ancient history. In contrast, current members of the previously victimized group might view the same historical wrongs as subjectively recent and therefore worthy of apologies or reparations. This divergence in perceptions may be quite evident to members of these groups. For instance, commenting on Canada’s anti-Chinese policies (including a “head tax”) between 1885 and 1947, Chinese Canadian Yew Lee observed, “When you speak about the Head Tax, people often see it as in the distant past. But for me and many others, it is a family legacy that still needs to be resolved” (Inter Pares, n.d., para. 4).

Subjective Time Biases versus Other Self-Protection Strategies Psychologists have identified a vast array of strategies that people can use to accomplish self-protection goals (Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, & Beach, 2000). We have not, to date, empirically addressed the question of when people might be especially prone to use subjective distancing instead of some other strategy. We can suggest some contexts in which a bias in subjective distancing may be an especially effective way to regulate identity.

Unambiguously Unflattering Events Subjective time biases operate on memories after—sometimes long after—an event has occurred. Other self-protection strategies may occur earlier and preempt the need to psychologically distance past events. People often shift their interpretation of an event to enhance its

124   SELF-CONSTRUAL desirability or deflect its threat to self-appraisals. Such shifts can involve attributions for the causes of the event, changes to its perceived importance, or redefinitions of the criteria that represent success (Dunning & Cohen, 1992; Dunning & McElwee, 1995; Miller & Ross, 1975). If initial strategies are effective, the event will not be encoded in memory as uncomplimentary. When this is the case, people will have little motivation to subjectively distance that event. Some unflattering events are not readily reinterpreted as benign, however. For example, in our studies, participants had little difficulty remembering personal events that they still coded as embarrassing (Ross & Wilson, 2002). In these instances, people might acknowledge their failing but subjectively distance it.

Self-Presentation Strategies We have focused on strategies that people use privately to regulate their personal identities. People also strategize aloud to protect or enhance their public images. Some defensive strategies are effective in the privacy of people’s own minds but have a self-presentational downside when uttered aloud. For instance, it can be bad form to gleefully derogate others in order to enjoy the boost of a downward social comparison (Wills, 1981; Wilson & Ross, 2000). Similarly, there can be social sanctions against strategies such as denying a wrongdoing, making excuses, or blaming the victim. Moreover, such strategies might run afoul of the objective evidence. In contrast, temporal distancing may allow people to gain credibility by taking responsibility for a shortcoming while limiting its harm to their current self-image. For instance, a public figure accused of an earlier indiscretion might choose to deny allegations (e.g., Bill Clinton’s famed “I did not have sexual relations with that woman”) or attempt to trivialize a past misstep (e.g., Bill Clinton’s, “I experimented with marijuana a time or two . . . I didn’t inhale and never tried it again”), but these approaches risk being challenged by counterevidence. In contrast, distancing such an incident may reduce its harmful implications for the person’s current public image while allowing the individual to appear honest, experienced, and mature (e.g., Arnold Schwarzenegger, pointedly contrasting his response to Clinton’s, admitted, “I did smoke a joint and I did inhale. . . . That’s what it was in the ’70s, that’s what I did. . . . As you grow up and as you become more mature, those things change”). We have not yet established empirically, however, that temporal distancing can be a valuable self-presentational tool. Indeed, the same properties that make biases in subjective time hard to disprove might sometimes make them less compelling to others when they are publicly expressed. Cheating spouses may not easily convince their partners that last month’s infidelity was committed by “the old me.” Likewise, a promotion committee will be unmoved by the claim that a decades-old accomplishment still “feels like yesterday.” How proximal an event privately feels may be effective in regulating identity intrapersonally but may in some instances be disputed or disregarded interpersonally. Perhaps the subtlety of the subjective time bias underlies its effectiveness. Typically, subjective distance would be experienced as no more than a vague feeling of connection or dissociation with an episode. Publicly arguing for the validity of such subjective impressions is difficult, and holding subjective impressions up to scrutiny may be all it takes to disrupt their role in regulating both public and private identities. Just as many of the other mechanisms in people’s “psychological immune systems” seem to work best when they are largely outside of people’s conscious awareness (Gilbert, Blumberg, Pinel, Wilson, & Wheatley, 1998), subjective dis-



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tance may, too, operate best when it remains on the periphery of awareness and not too closely considered.

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Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., & Toguchi, Y. (2003). Pancultural self-enhancement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 60–79. Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2002). Accepting threatening information: Self-affirmation and the reduction of defensive biases. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 119–123. Skowronski, J. J., Walker, W. R., & Betz, A. L. (2003). Ordering our world: An examination of time in autobiographical memory. Memory, 11, 247–260. Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology: Vol. 21. Social psychological studies of the self (pp. 261–302). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Lynch, M. (1993). Self-image resilience and dissonance: The role of affirmational resources. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 885–896. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). Social identity theory of intergroup conflict. In S. Worschel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall. Tesser, A., Crepaz, N., Collins, J., Cornell, D., & Beach, S. (2000). Confluence of self-esteem regulation mechanisms: On integrating the self-zoo. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1476–1489. Vohs, K. D., & Schmeichel, B. J. (2003). Self-regulation and the extended now: Controlling the self alters the subjective experience of time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 217– 230. Wills, T. A. (1981). Downward comparison principles in social psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 90, 245–271. Wilson, A. E. (2003). [Self-esteem moderates the subjective temporal distance of positive and negative anticipated events.] Unpublished raw data. Wilson, A. E., Buehler, R., Lawford, H., Schmidt, C., & Yong, A. G. (2010). Basking in projected glory: People’s appraisals of subjectively close and distant future outcomes. Manuscript in preparation. Wilson, A. E., & McTeer, T. (2004, May). A matter of time: Divergent estimates of subjective and calendar time for autobiographical and news events. Paper presented at the annual convention of the American Psychological Society, Chicago. Wilson, A. E., & Ross, M. (2000). The frequency of temporal-self and social comparisons in people’s personal appraisals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 928–942. Wilson, A. E., & Ross, M. (2001). From chump to champ: People’s appraisals of their earlier and current selves. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 572–584. Wilson, A. E., & Ross, M. (2002, February). Distancing the past. Poster presented at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology convention, Savannah, GA. Wilson, A. E., & Ross, M. (2003). The identity function of autobiographical memory: Time is on our side. Memory, 11, 137–149. Wohl, M. J. A., Branscombe, N. R., & Klar, Y. (2006). Collective guilt: Emotional reactions when one’s group has done wrong or been wronged. European Review of Social Psychology, 17, 1–37. Wohl, M. J. A., & McGrath, A. L. (2007). The perception of time heals all wounds: Temporal distance affects willingness to forgive following an interpersonal transgression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 1023–1035.

Chapter 6 Reconciling Self-Protection with Self-Improvement Self-Affirmation Theory David K. Sherman Kimberly A. Hartson

A

persistent puzzle emerges from a review of the psychological research literature on how people defend the self from potentially threatening information and events: People can be adamantly protective of their sense of self-worth and defensively resistant to threatening information, on the one hand, and yet capable of accepting threatening, critical information and changing their behavior, on the other. The general tendency for self-enhancement that is the focus of so many of the chapters in this book (see also Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Taylor & Brown, 1988) is a testament to people’s ability to maintain a view of the self as capable, adaptive, and culturally appropriate despite the many threats that they may encounter. However, only a very maladaptive organism would be so engaged in self-protection that it was incapable of change. And so the question is raised as to how individuals can put aside their ego-protective needs when faced with criticism and threats and come to recognize that potentially painful and self-threatening pursuits could also help one improve. For example, at times people will resist information from their doctors that they need to change their health behavior, from their teachers that they need to improve their study skills, and from their family members that they need to adjust their interpersonal style. Yet, despite the self-threat that comes with acknowledging imperfections, flaws, and mistakes, individuals can come to change such important behaviors. In this chapter, we propose that one way that people can resolve the tension between self-protection and self-improvement is by affirming the self in an important domain of self-worth in response to threat, thereby reaffirming an overall image of self-integrity. Since the inception of self-affirmation theory 128



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(Steele, 1988), there have been many demonstrations, in both the laboratory and the field, that when people affirm the self, they are less defensive and more open to otherwise threatening information (see Sherman & Cohen, 2006, for a review). Studies that have used selfaffirmation theory with individuals confronting threats have also found that affirmations, such as having people write about their important values, can reduce physiological stress responses (Sherman, Bunyan, Creswell, & Jaremka, 2009) and can improve academic performance among those experiencing high levels of stress due to stereotype threat (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 2006; Cohen, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns, Apfel, & Brzustoski, 2009). How is it that simply reminding oneself of one’s important values can exert such effects? In this chapter, we propose a multistage model drawing on recent research that suggests that self-affirmations may reduce threat, stress, and defensiveness by boosting self-resources (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009) and changing one’s perspective on threats (Critcher & Dunning, 2009; Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008; Sherman, Cohen, et al., 2009; Wakslak & Trope, 2009).

Overview and Goals for This Chapter Self-affirmation theory begins with the premise that people are motivated to maintain the perceived worth and integrity of the self and examines how people respond to information and events that threaten a valued self-image (Steele, 1988; see also Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999; McQueen & Klein, 2006; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Everyday life offers numerous potential psychological threats, whether it be poor performance on an exam or health information implying that past behaviors put one at risk of disease. People often respond to such threats in a manner that leads them to construe situations as less threatening to personal worth and well-being. For example, people respond to failure at times by attributing it externally (Miller & Ross, 1975) or by simply disidentifying with the threatened domain, sustaining self-worth but forestalling self-improvement (Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998; Nussbaum & Steele, 2007). People view contradictory information through the prism of their ideology, placing greater scrutiny on information inconsistent with prior beliefs (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). When health information suggests personal risk, people may react by challenging the information rather than by changing their risky behavior (Kunda, 1987). These defensive judgments help maintain the perceived integrity of the self by reducing potential psychological threats. The most basic tenet of self-affirmation theory is that people are motivated to protect the perceived integrity and worth of the self (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). People seek to maintain a global sense of self-integrity, “a phenomenal experience of the self . . . as adaptively and morally adequate, that is, competent, good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of free choice, capable of controlling important outcomes” (Steele, 1988, p. 262) rather than just of their perceived worth in a specific domain or in particular situations. This global self-integrity is best thought of not as self-esteem or a positive feeling toward the self but as a quality possessed by the “self-system.” This self-system (see Figure 6.1) is composed of the different domains that are important to an individual, including individuals’ roles (e.g., being a teacher or a sibling); values (e.g., being charitable or moral); social identities (e.g., as a member of a particular group); and belief systems (e.g., political parties or religion;

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Global Self-Integrity

Roles (e.g., student, parent) Values (e.g., humor, religion)

Group identities (e.g., race, culture, nation)

Central beliefs (e.g., ideology, political beliefs)

Goals (e.g., health, academic success)

Relationships (e.g., family, friends)

Figure 6.1.  Schematic representation of self-system.

Sherman & Cohen, 2006). The goal of the self-system is to maintain this quality of global self-integrity. When this goal of global self-integrity maintenance is threatened, people seek means of reaffirming their self-integrity. To borrow a familiar metaphor, the self-system could be thought of as an individual’s self-concept (i.e., the iceberg), with the working self-concept (Markus & Nurius, 1986) being whatever roles, values, or identities are salient for the individual at the moment (i.e., the tip of the iceberg). Within this flexible self-system, all of these domains or self-conceptions are potential routes to global self-integrity that could be either threatened or affirmed. Thus defensive responses to threatening events and information (e.g., rationalizing one’s risk for health problems as minimal due to one’s limiting of smoking) are one means of affirming global self-integrity, because they reduce the psychological threat inherent in the information. Similarly, changing one’s behavior can also minimize the threat (e.g., quitting smoking). However, the insight of the model is that the self-system is flexible, so if people can affirm an important domain of self-worth in another domain, they will have less need to rationalize away threatening information because their overall self-integrity, their view of the self as being capable and adaptive, has been secured (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). Indeed, many studies have demonstrated that experimentally induced self-affirmations—for example, writing about important values—can reduce defensive processing of threatening information (Adams, Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006; Binning, Sherman, Cohen, & Heitland, in press; Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Jaremka, Bunyan, Collins, & Sherman, in press; Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008; Unzueta & Lowery, 2008). These affirmations of self-integrity can serve as reminders that self-worth is not solely contingent on the threatened domain, reducing the need to defend the self in the particular threatened domain. For the remainder of this chapter, we would like to accomplish three primary goals. First, to provide a background for the theory, we situate self-affirmation as a process that operates as part of a psychological immune system (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998) that is engaged when individuals experience self-threats. Second, we review recent research on the effects of self-affirmation on individuals confronting various threats to self-integrity stemming from health threats, stressful situations, and environments of stereotype threat. Third, we present a model that lays out how self-affirmation manipulations exert their effects.



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The Psychological Immune System: Insights on Affirmation and Self-Protection Self-affirmation may be considered as one process that operates as part of a psychological immune system that is engaged when individuals experience self-threats (Gilbert et al., 1998). Gilbert and colleagues introduced this concept of the psychological immune system, including self-affirmation among many self-enhancement strategies: Psychologists from Freud to Festinger have described the artful methods by which the human mind ignores, augments, transforms, and rearranges information in its unending battle against the affective consequences of negative events (Festinger, 1957; Freud, 1936; Greenwald, 1980; Kunda, 1990; Steele, 1988 . . . Taylor & Brown, 1988). Some of these methods are quite simple . . . and some are more complicated . . . taken in sum, however, they seem to constitute a psychological immune system that serves to protect the individual from an overdose of gloom. (Gilbert et al., 1998, p. 619)

Just as the body’s immune system responds to pathogens and protects against disease by identifying and killing foreign invaders and tumor cells, the psychological immune system initiates protective adaptations under impending threats to the self. And just as the actual immune system has different components to protect the body from illness, such as lymph nodes and the spleen, the psychological immune system has different strategies that it employs to protect the self from threat. Motivated inferences, self-serving judgments, rationalizations, self-enhancement, positive illusions, and self-affirmation are all processes that are helpful in protecting the self. Additional components of the psychological immune system that initiate protective responses to threat include active coping, seeking social support, and increasing one’s effort to nullify the threat. Each process is likely to have its own particular function, advantages, and disadvantages, and yet, overall, they work together as an integrated system. Thus the first insight we can take from the psychological immune system metaphor is to consider self-affirmation as one strategy among many that people employ with the goal of maintaining psychological health and to examine how it achieves this goal. The second insight derived from this metaphor is the notion that there are costs and benefits to engaging the threat-response system. That is, a response of the physical immune system (e.g., a fever that kills an invading agent) requires a great mobilization of energy that alters equilibrium, detracts from long-term projects (such as growth and reproduction), and leaves the body more prone to attacks from other pathogens. Similarly, engaging the psychological immune system is not without costs. Motivated inferences, defensive attributions, and self-enhancement are all psychological responses that could, at times, lead individuals to ignore potentially important information, especially if these responses are chronically engaged. However, there are other costs that we would like to emphasize, specific costs to the individual that are a direct consequence of the threat response. Consider a woman who is preparing to take a math test that could potentially confirm a negative stereotype about her gender—that is, the type of situation that prompts stereotype threat (Steele, 1997, 2010). People respond to stereotype threat with a physiological stress response, a tendency to actively monitor performance (i.e., to be overly focused on the threat), and an effort to suppress negative thoughts and feelings (Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008). These costs may

132   SELF-CONSTRUAL be the by-product of processes that yield psychological benefits, such as attempts to actively disconfirm the negative stereotype (Jamieson & Harkins, 2007). Yet these various responses consume cognitive resources needed to perform well on the test (Logel et al., 2009). Furthermore, the desire to disprove the stereotype may prevent the relaxed looseness needed to excel on high-stakes tests, as people spend more time toiling on individual problems rather than working efficiently on the test as a whole (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Thus it may be that certain psychological responses to threatening situations—such as an active attempt to disconfirm the stereotype or to actively monitor performance—may paradoxically lead to the eventual outcome—underperformance—that a person most wants to avoid (see also Wegner, 1997, who makes a related point about suppression). We would like to suggest, however, that other responses of the psychological immune system could potentially offset these costs and enable people to deal with threats without some of the negative consequences just noted. Indeed, recent studies demonstrating that self-affirmation can reduce stress (Creswell et al., 2005; Sherman, Bunyan, et al., 2009) and underperformance in situations of stereotype threat (Cohen et al., 2006; Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006) suggest that this particular aspect of the psychological immune system, when induced experimentally, could buffer individuals from some of the pernicious effects of threatening environments. The third insight stemming from the psychological immune system is the view that it may operate more effectively when people are unaware of its operation. Gilbert et al. (1998) argue that people are generally unaware of the influence of the psychological immune system, a phenomenon they term immune neglect. Research suggests that immune neglect characterizes self-affirmation as well (Sherman, Cohen, et al., 2009). People are generally unaware of the impact of self-affirmation, and when awareness of the influence of an affirmation is increased, effects are attenuated. This insight has implications for understanding self-affirmation effects, as well as for efforts to apply the theory in intervention settings, a point we shall return to later in this chapter.

Research Review: Recent Research Using Self-Affirmation Theory We next review recent research on the effects of self-affirmation on individuals confronting various threats to self-integrity. In particular, we focus on three different threat responses: (1) defensiveness in response to threatening health information; (2) physiological stress responses to threatening situations; and (3) underperformance in situations of social identity threat. We focus on these three areas because they combine both laboratory and field studies and are relevant to important real-world outcomes such as health, stress, and grades. We also focus on these three areas because, although the effects are conceptually similar and theoretically consistent, the domains of application are sufficiently diverse as to raise important questions as to how reflecting on values and personal characteristics—the common self-affirmation manipulation employed across the studies—can yield consistent effects.

Reducing Defensiveness to Threatening Health Information Health information from one’s doctor, the media, or health campaigns has the potential to threaten an individual’s self-perception of being healthful, smart, and adaptive by suggesting



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that a person has acted unwisely or participated in unhealthy, risky behaviors. Consequently, individuals may respond to these messages defensively, maintaining their positive perceptions of the self by disregarding or downplaying the risks described in the health message (Kunda, 1987). For example, a smoker confronted with the evidence that smoking leads to cancer may question the evidence or downplay the extent to which he or she is at risk, thinking “I only smoke a cigarette a day.” These defensive responses are exhibited most strongly among those for whom the message is most relevant (Liberman & Chaiken, 1992), paradoxically leading individuals who are at the highest risk away from adaptive behavioral change. To accept threatening health messages requires acknowledging the maladaptiveness of one’s own behavior. Self-affirmation provides a psychological buffer for individuals to accept these health messages without sacrificing their self-perceptions as globally competent and worthy individuals. When people write about important values, for example, they are reminded of what makes them competent and worthy in a global sense, and thus threatening health information can be evaluated in terms of its importance for personal health and not its implications for self-worth. Across a variety of domains, research has found that experimentally induced self-affirmations can reduce defensiveness and increase acceptance of health messages (see Harris & Epton, 2009, for review). For example, one study on smoking behavior exposed university student smokers to disturbing images that were going to be printed on actual packs of cigarettes in the European Union (Harris, Mayle, Mabbott, and Napper, 2007). These images graphically depicted the consequences of prolonged smoking (e.g., open heart surgery) and were the latest in a trend of fear-inducing antismoking campaigns. The study was designed to test the effectiveness of these images and similar threat-driven campaigns at deterring their target audience, smokers, from smoking. After completing a self-affirmation task (writing about one’s desirable features) or a control task (writing about what one recently ate), participants rated the graphic smoking images for how threatening, unpleasant, and personally relevant they found them and then completed a number of questionnaires about their current smoking behavior, intentions to quit smoking, and thoughts and feelings related to smoking. The researchers found that participants in the no-affirmation condition defensively reduced the potential threat in this information by rating the graphic images as less threatening and self-relevant. By contrast, participants who were affirmed were more able to acknowledge the potential threat inherent in the information and see it as relevant (Harris et al., 2007). Additionally, affirmed participants expressed stronger intentions to change their smoking behavior (which persisted for 1 week), more negative feelings toward smoking, and more feelings of control over their smoking behavior than nonaffirmed participants. However, self-affirmed participants did not differ from nonaffirmed participants in actual smoking behavior in the week following the affirmation. In another study conducted with heavy smokers at a factory in the United Kingdom, researchers presented smokers with a leaflet adapted from the U.K. government’s antismoking campaign (Armitage, Harris, Hepton, & Napper, 2008). Participants who completed a self-affirmation by indicating agreement with statements related to kindness had greater acceptance of the antismoking information, increased intentions to reduce their smoking behavior, and were more likely to take a brochure with further tips on how to quit smoking relative to participants in a noaffirmation control condition. The effects of self-affirmation on health message acceptance have been shown to persist

134   SELF-CONSTRUAL for time periods ranging up to 1 month. In one study (Harris & Napper, 2005), women who ranged in their alcohol consumption from light to heavy drinkers read a pamphlet linking alcohol to breast cancer. Participants wrote about important values in the self-affirmation condition or relatively unimportant values and why they might be important to others in the no-affirmation condition. Perceived risk of developing breast cancer was assessed immediately following their reading of the pamphlet, 1 week later, and 1 month later. Among the heavy drinkers, who were the most at risk and therefore most threatened by the pamphlet, the women who were affirmed saw themselves as more at risk for breast cancer, reported being more able to imagine themselves with breast cancer, and had stronger intentions to change their alcohol consumption than those who were not affirmed, and these perceptions persisted through the 1-month follow-up. However, despite intentions to change, high-risk self-affirmed participants did not demonstrate a reduction in alcohol consumption in the month following the study (Harris & Napper, 2005). One possible mechanism consistent with these findings is that the affirmations enable people to orient more toward the threatening information. Recent research using an implicit-attention paradigm demonstrates that moderately heavy drinkers who are affirmed are biased toward threatening words linking alcohol use and breast cancer (Klein & Harris, 2009; see also van Koningsbruggen, Das, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2009), whereas nonaffirmed participants who are moderately heavy drinkers showed a bias away from such threatening words. Thus self-affirmation has been shown to be effective at leading individuals to take the first behavioral steps toward changing their health behaviors, such as forming intentions (Harris & Napper, 2005) and taking relevant brochures (Armitage et al., 2008). Consistent findings were also obtained in a study with sexually active college students, who watched a video that was meant to imply that the students’ current behavior put them at risk for potentially contracting sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). Those in the affirmation condition increased their perceived risk of acquiring HIV following the video, whereas those in the no-affirmation control condition responded to the video by maintaining their pretest levels of perceived risk. Moreover, following the video, when participants were given the opportunity to purchase condoms, 50% of affirmed participants did so, whereas only 25% of nonaffirmed participants did. However, taking brochures (Armitage et al., 2008) and purchasing condoms (Sherman et al., 2000) are still only proxies for the critical behavioral outcome of long-term and enduring change; evidence for this kind of change in the health context has been weak (Harris & Epton, 2009; McQueen & Klein, 2006). Moreover, effects of self-affirmation have not been observed in all health studies, as some studies have found null effects of the affirmation manipulations on health-risk acceptance (Dillard, McCaul, & Magnan, 2005) and intentions to adopt detection behaviors (Fry & Prentice-Dunn, 2005). Thus it as an open question as to when, or whether, self-affirmation can lead to actual health behavior change. One study explored whether self-affirmation would lead to health behavioral change when the change was focused more on health promotion (e.g., eating healthier foods) than on terminating unhealthy behaviors (e.g., quitting smoking; Epton & Harris, 2008). Female participants completed either a self-affirmation task or a control task prior to reading a health message advocating the beneficial health effects of eating fruits and vegetables. Participants in the self-affirmation condition not only intended to consume more fruits and vegetables immediately following reading the article but also actually consumed 5.5 more portions of fruits and vegetables during the week immediately following the experimental session (Epton



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& Harris, 2008). Thus aspects of the behavior (e.g., promoting health vs. preventing illness) may moderate when the affirmations lead to successful behavior change. In the health domain, self-affirmation has thus been shown to decrease defensiveness to health messages, increase risk perceptions and intentions to change behavior, and in some cases even facilitate behavior change. Enabling people to affirm values and other important aspects of the self can lead them to accept the maladaptiveness of their current health behaviors and instigate adaptive behavioral change.

Reducing Physiological Responses to Stressful Situations Students often get “stressed out” about exams, just as employees get stressed out about performance evaluations and patients get stressed out about medical tests. One reason these events are stressful is that they have implications for how the student, the employee, and the patient see themselves in important domains. Naturalistic stressors of this sort are a common feature of day-to-day life and are known to trigger a cascade of neuroendocrine events that are adaptive in the short run but that can, over time, lead to increased susceptibility to negative mental and physical health outcomes (Cohen, Janicki-Deverts, & Miller, 2007). Identifying psychological means by which individuals can cope adaptively with stressful situations is a topic of historical and contemporary research interest (Carver, 2007; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Recently, researchers have sought to use self-affirmation theory to understand why people may experience stress and to incorporate self-affirmation interventions into stressreduction techniques. The self-affirmation analysis of stress posits that affirming valued sources of self-worth such as important personal qualities, values, or relationships can buffer threats to the self, reducing the impact that these threats have on both physiological and psychological responses (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Because people are motivated to maintain a global sense of self-integrity, rather than their perceived worth in a specific domain or in particular situations, affirmations of unrelated domains of self-worth may make self-evaluation less contingent on a particular focal stressor. As a consequence, stressors may be experienced as less taxing. Evidence for this approach has been obtained in studies in which participants completed self-affirmation (or control) tasks during or prior to experiencing a stressful event. One study investigated the effect of self-affirmation on stress reduction in response to acute laboratory stressors (Creswell et al., 2005). Following either an affirmation (indicating agreement with important personal values on a scale) or a control (indicating agreement with unimportant values) task, participants were put through the Trier Social Stress Task (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993), a performance situation in which they had to give a 5-minute speech describing why they were qualified for a job as an administrative assistant in the psychology department and then had to count backward aloud from 2,083 by 13’s. Cortisol, an indicator of hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenocorticol (HPA) activation, was assessed via saliva samples taken throughout the session. During baseline, there were no differences in cortisol levels between the affirmation group and the control group. Twenty minutes after the stress task, however, participants in the control group had elevated stress hormone cortisol levels, whereas those in the affirmation condition showed no change in cortisol levels from baseline. This pattern of stress reactivity persisted for 45 minutes follow-

136   SELF-CONSTRUAL ing the stress task, providing evidence that self-affirmation can buffer individuals from stress associated with threatening environments. To examine whether self-affirmation could buffer individuals when confronting more chronic, naturalistic stressors, a study was conducted with students at the time of their most stressful midterm examinations (Sherman, Bunyan, et al., 2009). By allowing students to affirm other valued aspects of the self, self-affirmation might provide a buffer from the threat to the self posed by the demanding school and test-taking environment. Participants indicated what midterm examination they were most stressed about and provided urine samples collected during two 15-hour intervals 14 days prior to the exam (baseline) and on the morning of the exam. Catecholamine levels were assessed from the urine samples. Catecholamines, specifically epinephrine and norepinephrine, are released by the sympathetic nervous system in order to mobilize energy for the fight-or-flight response to a stressor (Lundberg, 2000). In the 2 weeks prior to their exams, the students wrote two essays as part of an online writing exercise either on the values most important to them (self-affirmation condition) or on values unimportant to them (control condition). Whereas participants in the control condition experienced an increase in epinephrine levels from baseline to the morning of the exam, individuals in the self-affirmation condition had epinephrine levels that did not differ significantly from baseline (Sherman, Bunyan, et al., 2009). Further, the affirmation seemed to be the most beneficial for those who were the most threatened and therefore most stressed, as effects were strongest among those who, at baseline, expressed the most concern about negative academic performance evaluations. As stress increases one’s susceptibility to colds and serious illnesses (Cohen, Tyrrell, & Smith, 1993; Marmot, Bosma, Hemingway, Brunner, & Stansfeld, 1997) an important question is whether the stress-buffering effects of self-affirmation could yield health benefits. To test the hypothesis that self-affirmation could buffer individuals from the negative health outcomes associated with daily stressors, researchers in one study had undergraduates write essays over winter break about the events of the day and how they related to their most important value (affirmation condition) or on a number of control topics (Keough & Markus, 1999). Those in the affirmation condition reported being less stressed and visited the health center less often than those in control conditions (conditions in which people wrote about what happened that day, about positive things that happened that day, or did not write about anything; Keough & Markus, 1999). Thus repeated experimentally induced self-affirmations can reduce stress-induced health symptoms. Finally, initial evidence for the beneficial effects of self-affirmation among ill populations comes from a study with early-stage breast cancer survivors (Creswell et al., 2007) who had participated in a study on expressive writing in which they were assigned to write essays on different topics related to their cancer (their deepest thoughts and feelings regarding the disease, the benefits they found since being diagnosed, or the facts of the day). The original study by Stanton and colleagues (2002) found reduced symptoms and doctor visits in the 3 months following the study for women who wrote about their thoughts and feelings related to cancer and those in the emotional-processing and benefit-finding conditions. In the later study (Creswell et al., 2007), all essays were coded for evidence of self-affirmation, operationalized as positive reflections on valued domains. The amount of self-affirming writing predicted reductions in distress and physical symptoms among the breast cancer survivors and, in fact, explained much of the positive effects of expressive writing on health outcomes.



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In sum, self-affirmation appears to be able to reduce stress in chronically ill populations, highlighting the potential for greater application of self-affirmation interventions in health and medical contexts.

Attenuating the Effects of Stereotype Threat on Performance Academic environments can be particularly threatening, as intellectual evaluation is a persistent element in school and doing well is important to how many individuals see themselves. Stereotype threat is an additional burden that occurs for individuals when a negative stereotype is made salient about their group’s performance within a certain domain (Steele & Aronson, 1995). In academic settings, in which stereotypes about race and intellectual ability or gender and quantitative ability are pervasive, stereotype threat can lead to underperformance and disidentification (Steele, 1997). In both the laboratory and the field, several researchers have examined whether selfaffirmation can help individuals from negatively stereotyped groups overcome stereotype threat and improve their performance in situations in which they have previously been shown to underperform. One series of studies examined whether self-affirmation would lead to improved performance by women on a math test (Martens et al., 2006). It was theorized that, by allowing females to affirm another valued domain, self-affirmation would reduce the threat women face of confirming the stereotypes associated with math performance. Thus self-affirmation directly addresses the threat and stress response posed by the stereotype, unlike other interventions aimed at reducing stereotype threat that seek to undermine the stereotype itself by portraying a test as gender-fair (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999) or making an alternative identity salient (Rydell, McConnell, & Beilock, 2009). In one study, male and female undergraduates completed either an affirmation task or a control task prior to taking a difficult math test (Martens et al., 2006). The test was described as either diagnostic of their math abilities, making it stereotype-threat inducing, or as a test that was under development for research purposes, making it unrelated to math ability and therefore not stereotype-threat inducing. Women in the stereotype-threat condition performed worse than women in the no-stereotype-threat condition and worse than men in the stereotype-threat condition. However, women in the stereotype-threat condition who completed the self-affirmation performed significantly better than women in the stereotypethreat condition without affirmation. A second study found that affirmation reduced the sex difference in spatial rotation under conditions of stereotype threat (Martens et al., 2006). Thus affirmation buffered female students from the threat associated with confirming negative stereotypes. The findings in these laboratory studies led to important questions regarding self-affirmation as an intervention to be used in classroom settings to reduce the psychological distress associated with stereotype threat and to potentially improve minority students’ academic performance. A series of field studies (Cohen et al., 2006, 2009) investigated the effect that affirming important aspects of the self could have on easing the evaluative stress that minority group members feel when faced with the threat of confirming negative stereotypes about their racial group. Cohen and colleagues initially looked at self-affirmation’s effects on the academic performance of two different student cohorts over the course of one school term (Cohen et al., 2006). During the beginning of the seventh-grade school year, students were given the experi-

138   SELF-CONSTRUAL mental task once or twice during the term as part of their regular class curriculum. The task consisted of a 15-minute standardized writing exercise in which students in the affirmation condition were asked to write about values that they had indicated as highly important to them, whereas those in the control condition wrote about values that they had indicated as unimportant. The fall term grades for all students revealed that African American students in the affirmation condition earned higher grades in the course in which the affirmation was given than African American students in the control condition, and this effect was largest for those who had initially performed the worst (Cohen et al., 2006). That is, the affirmation was most effective for those African American students who had the most room for improvement. By contrast, the affirmation had no effect on European American students’ academic performance. Based on a comparison between African American and European American students’ performance across conditions, the self-affirmation intervention reduced 40% of the racial achievement gap that had existed between these students prior to the intervention (Cohen et al., 2006). Cohen and colleagues (2009) conducted a follow-up study to assess the longer term impact of the self-affirmation intervention—that is, whether affirming values could yield academic benefits for the 2-year period following the affirmation. During the course of the seventh-grade year, the experimental task was given to each of three cohorts three to five times at approximately equal intervals. The researchers monitored academic performance over the course of the 2-year period. They found that the grade point averages of African American students were higher for those in the affirmation condition than for those in the control condition, even over 2 years. Consistent with previous findings (Cohen et al., 2006), the self-affirmation intervention was most effective for those whose performance started out the worst; by contrast, African American students in the no-affirmation condition who had low initial performance did not improve over time. Analysis of the individual tests of students suggests that the affirmation did not so much improve grades as it prevented grades from dropping; analogously, in the stress study reported earlier (Sherman, Bunyan, et al., 2009), the affirmation did not reduce epinephrine levels but kept levels from increasing during the stressful examination time. In academic settings, individuals face consistent threats to the self, which can be magnified for those in stereotyped groups. Across a variety of studies in both the field (Cohen et al., 2006, 2009) and the laboratory (Martens et al., 2006), writing about values seems to buffer students from the evaluative stress associated with stereotype threat, leading to benefits in academic performance.

Summary Self-affirmation exerted consistent effects across the disparate domains of responses to personally relevant health information, physiological responses to stressful situations, and performance among individuals contending with a negative group stereotype. This particular aspect of the psychological immune system, the reaffirmation of self-integrity by reflecting on alternative domains of self-worth, seems to enable people to respond to threatening events and information with less defensiveness, keeping stress at bay, and preventing decrements in performance. Important questions to address are why, how, and when self-affirmations exert such effects.



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Understanding Self-Affirmation Effects: A Multistage Approach We believe that self-affirmation effects may be understood in terms of the following three stages: 1.  Affirmation boosts self-resources—the psychological resources that one has to cope with a threat. 2.  With self-resources salient, an individual can view the threat from a broader perspective. 3.  This broader perspective allows the threat and the self to become “uncoupled,” reducing the threat’s potency at affecting the self. We elaborate and present evidence supporting these three steps in the sections to follow.

Affirmation Boosts Self-Resources An influential model of how to conceptualize psychological resources in stressful or threatening situations was advanced by Hobfoll (1989). He defined resources as “those objects, personal characteristics, conditions, or energies that are valued by the individual or that serve as a means for attainment of these objects, personal characteristics, and energies” (p. 516). Psychological resources are likely to be taxed when individuals experience a focal threat or stressor, but they can also encompass aspects of the self that are unrelated to the threat. For example, one of the most commonly chosen affirmation topics is relations with friends and family (Creswell et al., 2007; Crocker et al., 2008). Writing about personal relationships or the other values within an affirmation activity could equip people with additional psychological resources when they experience threats, potentially leading to the observed effects previously reviewed. However, do self-affirmation manipulations boost self-resources? It certainly seems plausible, considering the basic values affirmation that is most commonly employed as a self-affirmation manipulation (McQueen & Klein, 2006). People write about, or indicate the importance of, their most important values via a values scale, values that generally are unrelated to the threatening event. These manipulations are typically ideographic in that people select and write about values or personal characteristics that are important to them; for more general affirmations (e.g., of one’s kindness; Armitage et al., 2008) to be effective, the domain would have to be important to many people. Note also that writing about failure in an important domain would not be self-affirming, and indeed such topics have been used as a control condition in some studies, yielding different effects from standard affirmations (e.g., greater, rather than reduced, closed-mindedness; Cohen et al., 2007). The intent of affirmation manipulations is to make individuals aware of important aspects of the self so that they can consider the potential threat within the context of their overall self-image. By writing about religion, or friends and family, or other values, the individual is reminded of core aspects of life and resources that can be relied on when confronting threats. Yet, to date, the evidence that the self-affirmation manipulation boosted self-resources in this manner was rather indirect, demonstrating predicted effects on measures theorized to be reflective of having greater resources (i.e., reduced stress and defensiveness). However, recent studies by Schmeichel and Vohs (2009) present more direct evidence that affirmations

140   SELF-CONSTRUAL can boost self-resources. Research on self-control has shown quite dramatically that acts of self-control deplete a resource required for subsequent self-control (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). When resources are depleted, for example, by being forced to delay gratification or to maintain a straight face during an emotional video, individuals perform worse at subsequent tasks that require self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). If self-affirmation boosts self-resources, then it should be able to counteract this type of ego depletion; and, if this were the case, it would suggest that the self-resources that researchers in self-affirmation have written about (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) possess similar qualities to the self-resources that ego-depletion researchers have studied (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). That hypothesis was supported across several studies (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). For example, in one study, some participants’ self-resources were depleted by being instructed to inhibit use of the letter n in writing a story, whereas other participants could write without such prohibitions. Then participants wrote about either an important value or a relatively unimportant value, the self-affirmation manipulation. It was theorized that writing about important values would make salient additional self-resources that a person could draw on during subsequent self-control tasks. Finally, researchers measured how long participants could keep their hands in cold water, the cold-pressor task that is used as a measure of self-control. In the no-affirmation condition, the standard effects of resource depletion were exhibited, as those who depleted resources by regulating their writing kept their hands in the water for less time than those who could write freely. This difference was eliminated among those in the self-affirmation condition, as those who were self-affirmed after resource depletion performed just as well as those not depleted. This interaction effect between self-affirmation and ego depletion was replicated in another study using a different manipulation of resource depletion (watching a video while not attending to words written on the screen) and a different measure of self-control (persistence on puzzles), supporting the generality of the findings (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009, Study 2). This set of studies presents the strongest evidence to date that self-affirmation boosts self-resources, enabling people to confront ego-depleting, threatening events without typical threat responses. Considering these findings in terms of the reviewed studies on self-affirmation, then, it may be that threatening health information, stressful situations, and stereotype threat all consume psychological resources and lead to ego depletion, but that affirmation counteracts negative outcomes by providing additional self-resources with which people can confront threats.

With Boosted Self-Resources, an Individual Can View the Threat from a Broader Perspective The next question to address is how a boost in self-resources might reduce typical threat responses, as exhibited in self-affirmation studies. We propose that the extra self-resources that the affirmation makes salient may change the way an individual perceives the threat.1 That is, an individual under threat may perceive that his or her entire self-evaluation is con-

1

One question that may have emerged from the previous section is whether, given the effects of glucose on ego depletion (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007), self-affirmation effects can be reduced to increased energy or even glucose levels. Although it seems that glucose can boost self-control, it seems doubtful that it changes one’s perspective on a threat, although, of course, this remains an open question for future research.



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tingent on the threatened domain, but a threatened individual whose self-resources were just boosted via an affirmation may take a broader view of the threat. Consider the study described earlier (Sherman, Bunyan, et al., 2009) in which participants who affirmed important values showed reduced sympathetic nervous system responses on the day of their most stressful exam relative to nonaffirmed participants. After taking the exam, participants responded to questions assessing their appraisals of the exam, such as: “During the exam I often thought about what would happen if I failed.” Self-affirmed participants reported reduced stress appraisals on such items, suggesting that the self-affirmation may have reduced their metaevaluative concerns, a finding consistent with research demonstrating that self-affirmation can lead to the cessation of rumination after failure (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999). These findings suggest that when people are given the opportunity to write about important values, people may be more secure in their self-worth and thus less concerned about what the potential failure would represent in terms of their overall self-image, enabling them to “transcend concerns about self-image or self-worth” (Crocker et al., 2008, p.  741) by, for example, focusing more on others than on themselves (Crocker et al., 2008). However, this evidence that affirmation changes the individual’s perspective is still somewhat indirect and inferential. More direct evidence that affirmation can change people’s perspective comes from Schmeichel and Vohs (2009) and Wakslak and Trope (1999), who both theorized that self-affirmations enable people to view events at higher levels of abstraction, or what has been termed higher levels of construal (Trope & Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Levels of construal have been associated with self-control, suggesting that, at the dispositional level, those who see things at lower levels are more driven by impulsive responses to situational threats and less able to forestall the negative long-term consequences of their behavior (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). By contrast, those who view things at a higher level are more able to integrate actions and information with their values (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Self-affirmation manipulations typically focus people on important (vs. unimportant) values. These values are abstract and lead people to think about their ideals at a relatively high level, to examine why a particular value is important to the self. Thus they may lead individuals to see things from a higher level of construal. This hypothesis was tested in two different studies (Schmichal & Vohs, 2009; Wakslak & Trope, 2009), in which participants completed a standard self-affirmation manipulation and then the Behavioral Identification Form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), a standardized measure that presents 25 behaviors and asks participants to describe whether a given behavior (e.g., “taking a test”) is best seen as a low level of construal (“answering questions”) or a higher level of construal (“showing one’s knowledge”). Self-affirmation led participants to view events at a higher level of construal (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). Moreover, self-affirmations led people to evaluate items in terms of their broader structure, rather than focusing on their secondary details (Wakslak & Trope, 2009). Finally, self-affirmations that were induced at a higher level of construal (e.g., writing about why one pursues a particular value) led to greater selfcontrol than self-affirmations that were induced at a lower level of construal (e.g., writing about how one pursues a particular value; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). Thus affirmations appear to lead people to take a broader view of events in general. However, the question remains: Do they enable people to see threatening events in particular with greater perspective? Critcher and Dunning (2009) propose that affirmations expand the

142   SELF-CONSTRUAL working self-concept by reminding people that the threatened domain does not encompass the entire self. Values affirmations remind people of other aspects of the self-concept and thus reduce the implications that the threatened domain has for self-evaluation, making defensive biases unnecessary. As a result, as Sherman and Cohen (2006) suggested: When global perceptions of self-integrity are affirmed, otherwise threatening events or information lose their self-threatening capacity because the individual can view them within a broader, larger view of the self. People can thus focus not on the implications for self-integrity of a given threat or stressor, but on its informational value. When self-affirmed, individuals feel as though the task of proving their worth, both to themselves and to others, is “settled.” As a consequence, they can focus on other salient demands in the situation beyond ego protection. (p. 189)

Several recent studies support this notion. First, after writing about an important identity unrelated to academics (e.g., being a cultured individual), college student participants were asked to think about their intended majors (Critcher & Dunning, 2009). Affirmed students were more likely to agree with statements such as, “In thinking of domains that contribute to how I feel about myself, nonacademic aspects easily come to mind” and “There is a lot more to my skills and abilities than just who I am in my academic major” than nonaffirmed students. Thus thinking about a valued identity seemed to enable students to consider academics—the source of much potential threat to their self-concept—as one part of many and as less central to how they see themselves. Importantly, the affirmation did not lead students to trivialize academics, consistent with research showing that self-affirmation does not lead people to think a threatened domain is less important (Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004; see also Brinol, Petty, Gallardo, & DeMarree, 2007). Rather, those who completed a self-affirmation were more certain of who they were, and thus their self-evaluations were less contingent on the threatened domain. And, indeed, self-affirmations have been shown to increase self-concept clarity, suggesting that people are more certain about who they are when given the chance to write about important values (Wakslak & Trope, 2009). When these findings are taken together, it appears that self-affirmations can reduce the ego-defensive needs prompted by threat by enabling people to view threats within a broader context of the self.

When Affirmed, the Threat and the Self Can Become “Uncoupled,” Reducing the Threat’s Potency at Affecting the Self As summarized previously, there is evidence that self-affirmations can boost self-resources, changing people’s construal of events, which enables them to view the threat within the broader perspective of the self. We propose one further consequence of this broader perspective that links the proposed mechanism to the outcomes of interest: Self-affirmation may reduce defensiveness by “uncoupling” the threatened domain from self-evaluation. Operationally, this process could yield weaker correlations between measures of self-evaluation and measures related to the threatened domain in self-affirmation conditions, relative to noaffirmation conditions, with strong correlations indicating that the individual is anchoring social judgments on the self (Dunning, 2003). Several studies have found this pattern of correlations, suggesting the uncoupling effect of self-affirmation (Cohen et al., 2007; Sherman, Cohen, et al., 2009; Sherman & Kim,



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2005). For example, in one field study, intramural athletes who participated in a competitive team sports event were assigned to the affirmation or no-affirmation condition and then indicated their attributions for their team’s winning or losing. In the absence of self-affirmation, self-attributions were highly, positively correlated with group attributions, suggesting that people were anchoring their judgments of the group on the self (Sherman & Kim, 2005). However, those who had completed a self-affirmation task no longer used the self as an anchor in judging their group. That is, their team assessments were no longer correlated with self-perceptions, suggesting that the athletes evaluated the group and the self independently of each other. Similar patterns have been observed in evaluations of identity-threatening information. In one study, participants’ patriotism was negatively correlated with openness of information critical of United States foreign policy, with patriots being less open to this information than antipatriots (people who described themselves as critics of the United States) (Cohen et al., 2007). However, when their national identity was made salient, self-affirmation attenuated this relationship, as participants evaluated the information critical of the United States independently of their personal feelings toward the country. Consequently, patriots were more open, and antipatriots less accepting, of the information. Similar findings were obtained in another study (Sherman, Cohen, et al., 2009), in which, in the absence of affirmation, identification with a particular sports team (the San Francisco Giants) negatively predicted how people responded to information critical of a member of that team (Barry Bonds), such that highly identified fans were the least open to the potentially, identity threatening information. By contrast, when participants completed a standard self-affirmation, there was no correlation between identification and evaluation of the information, as the highly identified Giants fans become more open to the information critical of Barry Bonds. In the domain of performance under social identity threat, further evidence for uncoupling comes from affirmation intervention studies with middle school children (Cohen et al., 2009). For affirmed minority students, performing poorly early in the school year did not have any bearing on their sense of adequacy in school at the end of the year. But for nonaffirmed minority students, it did, as early poor performance was related to lower feelings of self-adequacy at the end of the academic year. Affirmation severed the relationship between a given threat (poor academic performance) and long-term self-evaluations, here over the course of a year. Within the domain of evaluation of health information, evidence for uncoupling comes from studies where, in the absence of affirmation, there exists a negative relationship between a personal characteristic, such as the relevance of the health message, and evaluation of the potentially threatening information. For example, in one study (Sherman et al., 2000), in the absence of affirmation, coffee drinkers were more resistant than non-coffee-drinkers to health information describing the negative effects of caffeine. By contrast, when affirmed, this negative relationship was reversed, and the coffee drinkers were most open to the potentially threatening health information (see also Harris & Napper, 2005). As these findings suggest, self-affirmation may in some cases reverse correlational relationships (suggesting not just uncoupling, but reverse coupling) and as other researchers have suggested, may at times decrease positive relationships (Klein & Monin, 2009). For an extended and detailed discussion of the relationships among variables in regard to self-affirmation and health information, see also Harris and Epton (2010) and Klein and Monin (2009). As both the present discussion of uncoupling and these other publications point out, understanding how

144   SELF-CONSTRUAL self-affirmation affects the relationship among variables may yield important information in understanding how, when, and why affirmation manipulations exert their effects. To summarize, recent studies conducted across a number of different laboratories have provided evidence for a multistage process by which value affirmations buffer the self and reduce stress and defensiveness and improve performance. A story suggests itself. Affirmations boost individuals’ self-resources by reminding them of other aspects of the self not centrally relevant to the threat. In so doing, affirmations broaden an individual’s perspective on the threat, enabling them to view potential threats at a higher level of construal. With this broader perspective, people are able to evaluate threats to a greater extent, independently of ego-defensive concerns. Although we do not claim that this is “the underlying process” of all self-affirmation effects, given the multitude of studies that have been conducted across many domains, we believe that significant progress has now been made toward understanding why self-affirmation manipulations yield their effects. Future research should build on these initial findings by conducting studies that directly link these proposed mechanisms to outcomes such as defensiveness, stress, and underperformance. We address two final issues that we believe are important to understanding self-affirmation’s effects. The first issue addresses how brief self-affirmation manipulations, such as writing about values, could result in long-term behavior change (Cohen et al., 2009; Harris & Napper, 2005). The second issue addresses boundary conditions for self-affirmation effects, focusing on the role of awareness in the affirmation process (Sherman, Cohen, et al., 2009).

Recursive Processes in Self-Affirmation Self-affirmation manipulations have had effects over 1 month on health intentions (Harris & Napper, 2005), 1 week on eating behaviors (Epton & Harris, 2008), 10 days on evaluations of President Obama among Republicans (Binning et al., in press) several weeks on sympathetic nervous system activation (Sherman, Bunyan, et al., 2009), and up to two years on academic performance (Cohen et al., 2009). How might this occur? At a general level, the affirmed state—the thoughts and feelings one has after writing about values—is likely to be relatively brief. However, the change in how individuals view and respond to threatening events may be more likely to persist over longer periods of time. Cohen and colleagues (Cohen et al., 2009) have focused on the recursive nature of selfaffirmation processes. In a context of persistent threats, such as those that occur for minority students in academic settings, they propose that: A recursive cycle, where psychological threat lowers performance, increasing threat and lowering performance further, in a repeating process, can magnify early performance differences among students. Early outcomes set the starting point and initial trajectory of a recursive cycle and so can have disproportional influence. For instance, the low self-confidence of students who experience early failure, even by chance, is surprisingly difficult to undo. A well-timed intervention could provide appreciable long-term performance benefits through early interruption of a recursive cycle. (Cohen et al., 2009; p. 400)

Their 2-year follow-up of a series of self-affirmation interventions conducted in mixed-race middle schools provides striking evidence that affirmation interrupted the recursive pro-



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cess whereby difficulty begets failure. Consider three findings in particular. First, although overall the affirmation produced significantly improved grades for African-American students, the effects were strongest for initially low-achieving African Americans. That is, prior performance was less predictive of postintervention performance (suggesting uncoupling). Second, in this same study, the affirmation reduced the slope of the downward trend in performance for threatened students. Relative to nonaffirmed students, who experienced a steep decline term by term, affirmed African American students maintained their performance. Third, as noted before, in the absence of affirmation, early poorly performing African American students perceived themselves to be less adequate and reported that they fit in less well at school at the end of the academic year relative to higher performing students. That is, their self-evaluations were tightly linked to their performance in the threatened domain. By contrast, affirmed participants exhibited a decoupling between their perceptions of adequacy in school and their earlier performance. Thus lower performing African American students had greater perceptions of personal adequacy when affirmed than not. In sum, among minority students, early poor performance instigated a downward slide in performance and selfperceived adequacy. This downward slide was halted in the affirmation condition. Beyond interrupting a recursive cycle, the affirmation seemed to cause enduring changes in how people construed poor performance. They saw poor performance as having fewer implications for their self-perceived adequacy.

Boundary Conditions for Self-Affirmation Effects Given the self-affirmation findings described in this chapter that have shown beneficial effects on important outcomes, there may be a sense that implementing self-affirmation widely, broadly, and frequently could yield positive effects. There are two points that we would like to make in this regard. First, the “beneficial” effects of self-affirmations are typically a function of the construction of the study (and likely to reflect the underlying interests of the researcher in increasing acceptance of health information or attenuating stress and stereotype threat, etc.) and not necessarily a function of the theory or how the self-system functions. The more general point made by the self-affirmation studies reviewed in this paper is that self-affirmations can reduce the need to defend a particular threatened identity or aspect of the self. However, under the right conditions, it is likely that selfaffirmations could lead to “harmful” effects. Indeed, when an open-minded identity was made salient, self-affirmation reduced the need to defend that identity, and people were more closed-minded in response to threatening information (Cohen et al., 2007, Study 3). Thus, although studies conducted with self-affirmation typically yield beneficial effects, this need not be the case. To the extent that defensive responses result in “positive” outcomes, such as a person who argues against a racist attack because it threatens his or her egalitarian worldview, it would be predicted that self-affirmations would attenuate this (positive) defensive response as well. The second point refers to how the affirmations are implemented. Although affirmation interventions may produce large effects due to the recursive nature of the threat–affirmation process, we suggest that they should also adhere to small-scale subtlety (Sherman, Cohen, et al., 2009). The self-affirmation process is not a panacea for stress, threat, and defensiveness

146   SELF-CONSTRUAL but, rather, as we outlined earlier, plays a role in the operation of the “psychological immune system” that people use to protect the self when it is threatened (Gilbert et al., 1998). In keeping with that reasoning, recent work has focused on a relevant feature of the psychological immune system and its implication for self-affirmation; namely, that people are generally unaware of it when it is operating. Heightened awareness of self-affirmation processes may attenuate the effects described earlier. In particular, three facets of awareness of the affirmation process have been explored (Sherman, Cohen, et al., 2009). First, people can be affirmed without deliberative awareness. Affirmations that are manipulated via value-relevant sentence-unscrambling procedures and are hence outside of participants’ awareness can exhibit similar threat-reducing effects to those of standard affirmation manipulations. When participants are queried after affirmation studies about factors that may have influenced them, they do not spontaneously generate anything related to the affirmation manipulation as a potential cause of their judgments about the threatening information, and, when asked, people rate affirmation tasks (e.g., writing tasks) as relatively minor influences on their judgments or performance. Finally, when participants are aware of the effects of affirmation, as assessed by measure (those who spontaneously report that they were influenced by the affirmation task) or manipulation (via studies in which participants are informed of potential affirmation effects), affirmation effects are weaker (Sherman, Cohen, et al., 2009). Increased awareness may attenuate affirmation effectiveness through several of the processes described earlier. First, the boost in resources that occurs when a person writes about important values may be reduced to the extent to which people are focused on the outcome of the affirming event. When people explicitly pursue happiness, or explicitly strive to boost their self-esteem, such acts can be self-defeating and lead to less happiness and reduced self-esteem, because they may lead people to focus more on the extrinsic benefits of an act (Crocker & Park, 2004; Schooler, Ariely, & Loewenstein, 2003). Consistent with this notion, affirmations that focus on intrinsic aspects of the self are more successful at reducing defensiveness than affirmations that focus on extrinsic aspects of the self (Schimel, Arndt, Banko, & Cook, 2004). Second, heightened awareness of an affirmation in the face of threat may lead people to link the affirmation to the threatened domain rather than broadening their perspective on the threat (Critcher & Dunning, 2009). If people perceive that they are engaged in a stress-reduction exercise, for example, they may be more cognizant of their stressors rather than of the alternative self-resources that are made salient by the affirmation. This issue may also speak to the types of affirmations that can backfire, or lead to greater defensiveness. Research has found that same-domain affirmations exacerbate dissonance, whereas alternative domain affirmations reduce it (Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik, & Aronson, 1997; Sivanathan, Molden, Galinsky, & Ku, 2008). It may be that same-domain affirmations cause people to link the affirmation exercise with threat, which may lead it to backfire. These findings on awareness have implications for future field research, as they offer a perhaps counterintuitive suggestion for those interested in applying self-affirmations in field settings. The key to an effective affirmation intervention may lie in the subtlety of its delivery and the minimalism of its administration. It may be that more transparent affirmations may raise awareness and reduce effectiveness.



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Conclusion: Reconciling Self-Protection with Self-Improvement We began this chapter by raising the puzzle of how the tendency for self-enhancement and self-protection that is so prevalent and well documented seems to imply that people could never accept self-criticism and make positive behavioral changes. Based on the research reviewed here, self-affirmation appears to be one mechanism in the psychological immune system that helps explain this paradox. People are willing to be self-critical when they feel globally self-affirmed. Self-affirmation can thus lead to self-improvement in terms of less defensiveness and stress and more positive behavioral change and better performance. Moreover, the process underlying self-affirmation effects is beginning to come into focus. Values affirmations appear to boost self-resources, broadening the perspective with which people view threats, and enabling them to reconcile protection and self-critical motivations.

Acknowledgments We acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation Grant No. 0720429. We also thank Mark Alicke, Kevin Binning, Cameron Brick, Thai Chu, Geoffrey Cohen, P. J. Henry, Lisa Jaremka, and Nate Way for commenting on earlier versions of this chapter, and Peter Harris and William Klein for their discussion of the issues raised in this chapter.

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PART III

Perceptual, Judgmental, and Memory Processes in Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection

Chapter 7 Of Visions and Desires Biased Perceptions of the Environment Can Serve Self-Protective Functions Shana Cole Emily Balcetis

M

rs. D, a woman in her late 70s, sat in a wheelchair across from her doctor. Eight days prior, she had suffered a debilitating stroke. The stroke rendered the entire left side of her body completely paralyzed, and she was unable to move without a wheelchair. Mental examination revealed she had no signs of dementia or cognitive or language difficulties. The doctor asked her what happened, and she experienced no trouble describing the circumstances of how she arrived at the hospital. In fact, she had full awareness of her stroke. When the doctor inquired whether she could move both hands, she responded that she could indeed. He asked if she would point to his nose with her left hand. After a moment, he asked, “Mrs. D, are you pointing to my nose?” Though the hand clearly lay paralyzed in front of her, she confidently affirmed that she was. When he asked whether she could actually see her left hand pointing, she frankly responded, “Yes, it is about two inches from your nose!” Finally, the doctor wheeled Mrs. D in front of a full-length mirror and asked her to point to herself using her left hand. Her arm rested limply at her side. Even though the mirror provided concrete visual information that her hand was not moving, Mrs. D insisted that she could clearly see her hand pointing in the mirror (for a discussion of Mrs. D’s case, see Ramachadran, 1995). Mrs. D confidently believed she saw herself and the world around her exactly as it really was. She perceived a left arm that was actually carrying out the doctor’s instructions. However, the doctor and any observers who may have watched this examination could see the unfortunate reality that Mrs. D could not. Mrs. D has a curious condition known in the medi

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156   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES cal community as anosognosia. Anosognosia is a broad term used to describe people who, like Mrs. D, have a serious physical disability yet fail to recognize the extent, or even existence, of their impairment. For example, paralyzed patients with anosognosia see themselves as capable of movement, blind patients claim they can see, deaf patients do not realize they cannot hear, and patients with psychiatric disorders believe themselves to be quite healthy. Anosognosia can present in a variety of forms, but common among patients with anosognosia is that their perceptions of themselves and how they navigate their environments diverge markedly from reality (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989). Importantly, however, their dramatic misperceptions are not random distortions of the world around them. Rather, their biased perceptions reflect active motivations to manage the threat that accompanies their affliction and are often confined to those specific domains, situations, and experiences that are most threatening. Indeed, patients with anosognosia often do recognize other, less serious impediments and conditions. For example, one patient denied his complete blindness and yet was aware of, and complained often about, an ulcer on his left foot (Stengel & Steele, 1946). The perceptual distortions that patients with anosognosia experience are systematic and may reflect, at least in part, a psychological motivation to protect themselves from the extreme maladies that they are encountering (Hirstein, 2005). Because their motivated misperceptions enable patients with anosognosia to see the world they want to see, a world in which they are as healthy and capable as ever, rather than the world that actually exists, anosognosia serves self-protective functions. Although anosognosia is rare, generally afflicting only a small subsection of those people who experience serious neurological impairment (see Orfei et al., 2007), a mundane version affects the average, healthy individual as well. As surprising and arcane as anosognosia is, biased perceptions of the self and one’s environment are not restricted to this mysterious medical malady. Rather, everyday people often similarly, though perhaps less dramatically, see themselves and the world around them in biased ways. Vilayanur Ramachandran, a prominent neurologist who has extensively studied patients with anosognosia, mused that though watching the distortions that these patients exhibit can be “spooky” at first, one soon realizes that “you’re really looking at yourself, in amplified form” (Shreeve, 1995). Indeed, everyday people believe they see their world exactly as it is, that their perceptions of themselves and their environment match reality completely and accurately. However, with striking usualness, healthy and normal individuals frequently perceive themselves and their surroundings in a more favorable light than is objectively warranted. In this chapter, we summarize research from our lab that catalogs some ways in which average individuals come to perceive themselves and their surroundings in biased ways. In addition, we suggest that these perceptual biases are systematic. People see the world around them in ways that align with their desires, wishes, and motivations. We argue for a form of wishful seeing, as people perceive the surrounding environment. Furthermore, we argue that wishful seeing serves self-protective functions. People see their environment more favorably than is actually the case in order to protect themselves from psychological threat and harm.

Wishful Thinking as the Roots of Wishful Seeing Although we intend to provide an overview of our contributions to a new and burgeoning field that explores how the motivational state of the perceiver influences visual perception of the surrounding environment, the roots of this perspective run deep. To be sure, there is a long



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tradition in psychological research showing that people’s motivations shape their conscious thoughts. That is, people’s motivations influence the ways in which they process information of which they are knowingly aware. People’s fundamental self-enhancing motivations to see themselves in the most favorable light possible often lead to biased cognitive conclusions in which they think of themselves in overly flattering ways (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). We call such motivationally biased reasoning by its more everyday name, wishing thinking. Wishful thinking leads people to think of themselves in ways that are inconsistent with and sharply diverge from objective standards. People routinely tout their positive traits, readily espousing that they are highly intelligent, ethical, moral, altruistic, and generous (Balcetis & Dunning, 2008; Epley & Dunning, 2006). In response to the national tragedy in 2001, charitable gifts by individuals across the country to causes related to September 11 were estimated at $1.25 billion (American Association of Fundraising Counsel, 2002). Although this may seem impressive, consider that less than 3 months later, on the day after Thanksgiving, Americans spent that same amount, another $1.25 billion, on a single day of shopping at Wal-Mart (Max, 2001). Although people fancy themselves generous and benevolent, their self-assessments tend to be poorly calibrated to reality. When asked whether they would purchase an item at a bake sale, the proceeds from which would support the building of a roof over a Tanzanian hospital, 100% of survey respondents predicted that they would. However, when the bake sale was actually held a few weeks later, only 5% of passersby actually made a purchase (Balcetis & Dunning, 2008). In general, people’s perceptions of personal beneficence are rarely calibrated to their actual charitable appropriation. Likewise, people downplay their negative traits, seeing themselves rarely, if ever, as lazy, rude, mean, or irrational (Alicke, 1985). For example, although only 5% of American adult respondents in a national survey consider themselves obese, 31% of American adults actually are (Pew Research Center, 2006). Similarly, only 5% of survey respondents anticipated that they would rudely avoid contact with a person soliciting signatures for a petition to support breast cancer research. Yet, when we actually staged this event and attempted to find support for this petition, four times as many people—20% of those approached—responded by avoiding eye contact, turning away, or ignoring the petitioner (Balcetis, Dunning, & Miller, 2008). The tendency to claim more positive qualities and fewer negative qualities for oneself than is warranted is the result of wishful thinking—a motivation that shapes information processing and the resulting cognitive conclusions about which participants are consciously aware. Our mission in the research reported in this chapter has been to ask how “deep” wishful thinking might go. Certainly, wishful thinking influences conscious, deliberate, and effortful judgments, but we ask whether it can constrain what information reaches consciousness in the first place. Can wishful thinking influence processes that take place before conscious awareness? We propose that it does. Wishful thinking literally shapes what people see in the surrounding world and does so without people’s knowledge, understanding, or awareness. In this way, like the patient with anosognosia who wrongly believes him- or herself healthy, people often see the world they want to see rather than the world that objectively exists.

Motivated Environmental Perception Motivations interact with the visual system to contribute to a common form of anosognosia. During the basic steps and preliminary moments of processing, motivations lead people to see what they want to see in the world around them. Specifically, motivations can infiltrate four

158   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES stages of visual processing that precede information processing and judgment. First, motivations influence the strength of the visual signal sent from the eyes to the brain for processing. That is, at the very moment a person lays eyes on an object or image in the environment, motivations determine the strength with which that visual information will be communicated to the brain. If visual information supports, aligns with, and is congruent with motivations, the visual signal will be amplified. The result of increased signal strength is that perceivers will see what they want to see at the expense of less desirable visual experiences. Second, motivations can bias perception even before the cognitive processor is engaged. Specifically, motivations can influence information gathering by creating filters that allow some and exclude other forms of information from entering cognition. If motivated perception can be considered akin to prospecting during the Gold Rush, motivational filters can be likened to a gold pan, sifting through debris and catching only those most valuable nuggets. For instance, information that is inconsistent with a desire or motivation can be filtered out, whereas information consistent with a desire or motivation can be retained for further processing and refinement (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990). Third, motivations can bias where attention is deployed as information streams in. Perceivers cannot possibly focus on all of the information present in the environment at the same time. Once a person is immersed in a complex, saturated, and rich environment, motivations may direct attention to certain elements of the environment at the expense of others once those elements have been recognized. Fourth, motivations can bias the way in which visual information is processed once it is received but before conscious judgment and decision-making faculties are made aware of it. Motivations may shape the extent to which elements in the environment receive perceptual processing. Favored elements of the environment may receive greater perceptual processing than disfavored elements of the environment. In discussing the impact of motivation at each of these stages, we suggest that it is precisely because of this multicomponent system of checks and balances that motivated visual perception is successful. In the sections that follow, we summarize the empirical support we have gathered for the role of motivations in shaping each of these four tasks the visual system takes on. And we argue that these motivated misperceptions serve a self-protective function, protecting people from psychological threats that may be present in the world around them.

Motivations Influence Signal Strength Motivations exert an influence very early on. In fact, motivations exert an influence immediately as a perceiver sees an object in the environment. As a person’s eyes first fall on a multifaceted scene, several factors can determine what people will consciously recognize, perceive, and experience. For instance, exogenous factors such as background luminance, orientation, spatial frequency, and motion can influence visual experience (Blake, 1989, 2001; Mueller, 1990; Sugie, 1982). These factors bias perceptual experiences by changing the strength of the visual signal sent by the different component parts of the visual scene to the brain (Blake & Logothetis, 2002). For instance, a brighter color or larger image might send a stronger visual signal and increase the chances that this component part of the visual scene remains dominant in the visual representation that is formed. However, endogenous factors, those internal to the perceiver, may also influence how a scene is experienced. Specifically, we propose that



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the visual signal sent by component parts of the scene may be intensified when those parts are congruent with motivations. When multiple component parts of a visual scene compete for dominance in visual representations, motivations can predict what will win the affections of the visual system. To test the idea that motivations increase the signal strength of visual information that is consistent with a wish or desire, we called on the phenomenon of binocular rivalry. During binocular rivalry, perceptual experience alternates between two different images that compete for exclusive dominance. The competition occurs because discrepant pieces of visual information are presented to each eye separately (Blake & Logothetis, 2002). For instance, the right eye may be presented with the letter B, while the left eye may be presented with the number 8. During conditions of binocular rivalry, the visual system can process only one piece of information at a time. As a result, one image is seen and then is eventually replaced by the other image. During rivalry, people have the experience of seeing the B, which eventually fades and is replaced by the experience of seeing the 8, which eventually fades and is replaced by the B, and so on. The visual image that wins this perceptual battle is determined by the strength of the visual signal sent by each image. This competition for dominance is fought very early on, in some of the most primary areas of visual information processing in the brain, including area V1 and the lateral geniculate nucleus (Haynes, Deichmann, & Rees, 2005; Lee & Blake, 2002). Though the strength of the signal can be increased by properties of the stimulus such as luminance and contrast (Blake, 1989, 2001), we tested whether internal states of the perceiver, such as desires, can increase the strength of the visual signal as well. In other words, when competing images are presented to each eye, do people see the image they want to see? We presented separate images to each eye and manipulated the social value of each image (Balcetis & Dunning, 2009). That is, we experimentally manipulated the desirability of each image. Participants saw binocular rivalry figures that were composed of a red image and a cyan image that were single letters and single numbers. For instance, a red G might be superimposed on a cyan 5. During stimulus presentation, participants wore glasses with colored filters so that in one eye the red G, for example, would be filtered out, and in the other eye the cyan 5 would be filtered out. Thus for every participant the image presented to one eye was a letter, and the image presented to the other eye was a number. Participants played a game to earn raffle tickets for monetary prizes. Half of the participants knew that letters were worth positive points that would earn them tickets, and half of the participants knew that numbers were worth positive points that would earn them tickets. We found that increasing the social value of the letters or numbers influenced perception of binocular rivalry images. When seeing letters was the key to winning raffle tickets, participants perceived 10% more letters than numbers. But when numbers were the desirable images, participants perceived 30% more numbers than letters. The fact that motivations can exert their influences so early on in the perceptual process, immediately at stimulus onset, may account for one way in which people see the world they want to see. A motivation to think of one’s environment as offering pleasant, favorable, or enjoyable objects can increase the signal strength of stimuli that coincide with that motivation. Primary processing areas in the brain favor and increase the signal strength of only those objects in the environment that are congruent with what one desires. Indeed, in the binocular rivalry studies we conducted, participants reported that they were unaware that there were multiple competing stimuli. Thus desires can influence perceptual processing as

160   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES early as stimulus onset, exerting influence over the perceptual information that is ultimately transmitted to consciousness before perceivers have any idea that alternate perceptual experiences are possible.

Motivated Filtration Another way that motivations influence visual perception is by establishing filters through which visual information from the environment must pass. Filters allow information congruent with motivations to be retained for further processing while filtering out threatening or incongruent information. Filters are born from many types of information or experiences, including expectations, past experiences, underlying assumptions, beliefs, and attitudes. Although there are many experiences that can create them, filters generally assume one of two types. The first type is a perceptual filter, and the second is a conceptual filter (for a discussion, see Balcetis & Dale, 2007). A perceptual filter involves specific, directly relevant labeling information immediately descriptive of upcoming visual stimuli. For example, participants in experiments who just viewed pictures of animals were more likely to see the famous rat/man ambiguous figure as a rat, whereas those who viewed pictures of human faces saw it as the face of a man (Figure 7.1, part A; Bugelski & Alampay, 1961; Crandall & de Lissovoy, 1977). Seeing animals versus humans activates a number of physical, local features associated with animals (e.g., four legs, tails, fur), thus making a perceptual filter for these features more cognitively available and increasing their capability of capturing attention. These features pass through the filter as people scan their environments. The second type of filter is a conceptual filter. Unlike perceptual filters, conceptual filters do not contain information that is literally descriptive of an upcoming visual experience. Instead, conceptual filters suggest a visual experience without directly describing it. Nonetheless, conceptual filters, too, bias visual perception. For example, participants read a news report about the legal battles faced by either Napster, a music file sharing company, or the adult pornography industry (Balcetis & Dale, 2007, Study 1b). Neither story directly mentioned specific musicians, types of musicians, or people. However, activating the schemas and stored representations related to these two concepts led to downstream consequences for perceptual experience. When participants described what they saw when shown an ambiguous, reversible figure that could be interpreted as either a saxophone player or a face, participants’ interpretations reflected the contents of the conceptual filters that had been activated by the news reports (Figure 7.1, Part B). Whereas 23% of participants who read about Napster saw the figure as a saxophone player, not a single participant who read about pornography saw it as such. Similarly, participants’ interpretations of an object contained in a photograph that appeared as a lightened circle with a line through it in front of a mountain desert scene were influenced by previously activated conceptual filters (Figure 7.1, part C; Balcetis & Dale, 2007, Study 1a). If they had just read about the history of space flight, 8% of participants interpreted this circle as the back of a stop sign, whereas 50% of participants who had just read about Henry Ford did the same. Just as recently read stories and anecdotes can activate them, motivations can also serve to activate conceptual filters. Wanting to have a particular perceptual experience can activate conceptual filters that sift through incoming visual information. The results of biased filtration are perceptual experiences that match perceivers’ wishes. Sexual desires are one



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Figure 7.1.  Ambiguous figures.

particular type of motivation that can activate conceptual filters and bias perceptual experiences. Sexual desires are high during women’s periods of fertility (i.e., during ovulation). During these times, women were sensitive to visual markers of “maleness” and as a result identified male photographs more quickly than female ones (Macrae, Alnwick, Milne, & Schloerscheidt, 2002). This effect was stronger for ovulating women compared with women taking a contraceptive pill or those who were pregnant (Johnston, Arden, Macrae, & Grace, 2003). Likewise, lesbians showed enhanced sensitivity to markers of femaleness during ovulation when sexual desires were high. Together, these data suggest that sexual desire predicts perceptual sensitivity for visual stimuli in the environment that are relevant to psychological desires rather than purely biological motives. In our research, we demonstrated that cognitive motivations influence perceptual experience by activating conceptual filters. Participants read through a transcript about a couple on a first date, with the goal to detect the couple either deceiving or flirting with one another. Later, participants reported what they saw when shown a reversible figure that could be interpreted as the word Liar or the outline of a face (see Figure 7.1, part D). When they had just been actively engaged in detecting deception, 75% of participants interpreted this figure as the word liar, whereas only 13% of those who were detecting flirting identified it as such (Balcetis & Dale, 2003). We also provided direct support for the activation of conceptual filters. We created a paradigm in which participants played a game that assigned them to complete an undesirable task—singing Gloria Gaynor’s “I Will Survive” in front of other participants, who

162   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES would judge their karaoke abilities—or a desirable task, being the judge of another participant’s performance (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006, Study 4). In the game, participants identified whether objects presented on their computer screens were farm animals or sea animals. For half of the participants, farm animals were worth positive points that brought them closer to the desired role of judge; for the other half of the participants, sea animals were worth positive points. At the end of the penultimate round, participants’ scores were tied. Thus, going in to the final round, half of the participants were hoping to see a farm animal and half were hoping to see a sea animal. In order to measure whether the desire to see a particular animal activated a conceptual filter related to that animal, we had participants engage in a lexical decision task, in which they indicated whether a string of letters formed a word. Participants saw strings of letters that formed words related to the concept of “horse” (e.g., cowboy) and “seal” (e.g., ocean). We measured reaction times to respond to these words. Quick responses to the word cowboy would suggest that the conceptual filter descriptive of farm animals was activated. Quick responses to the word ocean would suggest that the conceptual filter descriptive of sea animals was activated. When we investigated the speed with which they responded to these words that were presented just before the final animal appeared, we found that participants hoping to see a farm animal in the final round were quicker to respond to words associated with the concept of “horse,” whereas participants hoping to see a sea animal responded more quickly to words associated with “seal.” This evidence suggests that participants’ wishes activated a conceptual filter related to the concept of “horse” or “seal.” To investigate whether the activated conceptual filters biased subsequent visual perception, we asked participants to report what they saw after the final animal was presented. The animal we presented was actually one that could be interpreted as both a horse and a seal, yet participants were unaware that two interpretations were possible (Figure 7.1, part E). Among participants who hoped to see farm animals, 97% reported seeing a horse. However, this overwhelming percentage dropped among participants hoping to see sea animals. In this case, only 76% of participants reported seeing a horse. This evidence suggests that wishes and desires activated conceptual filters that biased subsequent perceptual experience to assist participants in seeing what they wanted to see when their environment presented ambiguous information.

Motivated Direction of Attention Once a person is immersed in a complex, saturated, and rich environment, motivations may direct attention to certain elements of the environment while neglecting others. This process is called selective attention (Yantis, 1996) and is often likened to a spotlight that highlights by drawing attention to or directing attention away from a definite region (Posner & Petersen, 1990). We argue that motivations systematically manipulate the spotlight of attention to shadow or occlude undesirable elements of the environment and highlight desirable ones. Motivations influence locations to which attention is directed, nudging perceivers to attend to objects in the environment that are capable of satisfying desires. The motivated perceptual system will direct attention to information and objects that are related to and assist in the satisfaction of current motivations. For example, in one study participants’ eye



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movements were surreptitiously recorded as they filled out a survey while sitting next to either a tasty chocolate cake or a brown bundt pan used to bake a cake (Balcetis, 2006). Participants made 12% more eye movements toward the chocolate cake than toward the cake pan. Similarly, when participants had just eaten a serving of dry salty pretzels, they reported that they had a hard time looking away from a bottle of water across the room. An object that had the capability of quenching their thirst received attention whereas a neutral object, such as a can opener across the room, did not (Balcetis, 2006). Thirsty participants were also more likely to notice, remember, and report seeing items in a room that were related to their state of thirst than were participants who were not thirsty. For example, thirsty participants were about three times more likely to recall seeing a container of salt and about 1.5 times more likely to recall a tank filled with sand than were participants who were not thirsty. They similarly were more likely to recall items related to satisfying their thirst; they were 11 times more likely to recall a Nalgene water bottle than nonthirsty participants (Balcetis & Ferguson, 2009). Taken together, these studies provide evidence that the motivated perceptual system directs attention to information and objects in the environment in ways that serve current motivations. When attention can be disproportionately deployed to objects related to current motivations, perceivers’ eyes will focus on goal-relevant objects at the expense of the remaining contents of the environment. Again, this systematic attentional bias is not a deliberate mechanism the perceiver employs. Rather, it occurs outside of awareness, enabling perceivers to maintain views of their surroundings that are consistent with self-serving motivations.

Motivation Influences Information Processing Motivations can have an impact via a fourth perceptual mechanism. Motivations may shape the amount and type of processing that is allocated to favored and disfavored elements in the environment. This influence can be revealed in three different ways. First, favored aspects of the stimulus may receive more perceptual processing, whereas disfavored aspects of the stimulus may receive relatively little or no processing. For example, a hopeful romantic, trying to gauge the possible reciprocation of his love interest, may spend considerable time processing her polite smile but spend little effort taking in her crossed arms and wandering gaze. As a result, the lovesick suitor might believe that his target is more favorably disposed to his advances than is actually the case. Second, motivations may shape the thresholds or criteria that perceivers establish for recognition to occur. In other words, motivation may influence the point at which people believe they have done enough processing and can reach a perceptual conclusion. The suitor might need to see only a slight beginning of a half-smile to conclude that his advances are being welcomed but might require seeing that his honey’s lips are tightly pursed, that her eyebrows are pinched inward, that her nose is scrunched, and that her hand is raised to slap him before concluding that she is annoyed. Recent evidence supports these first two forms of motivated visual information processing. This work demonstrates that motivations influence perceptual processing by both affecting the amount of processing that pleasant and foul items receive and the criteria established for deciding that a perceptual conclusion has been reached. Voss, Rothermund, and Brandtstädter (2007) showed participants swatches of colors. The swatches contained a mixture of

164   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES pixels from two colors, such as blue or orange, arranged in a random pattern. Participants looked at the patch and decided which color constituted a majority of the pixels in the patch. Sometimes, participants knew they would be rewarded with money if the patches contained more of one color than the other. Other times, participants knew that they would lose money if more of one color was present in the swatch. Changing motivations through financial reward influenced participants’ perceptions about the predominance of the colors in the swatch. More often than not, participants perceived more of the financially rewarding color in the swatches than the costly color—even when that was not actually true. Interestingly, perceivers reached the conclusion that they would win money more quickly than that they must lose money. In other words, participants’ wishes for financial reward led them to a favorable conclusion, whether right or wrong, with greater speed than to an unfavorable one. Additionally, Voss and colleagues’ (2007) analysis allowed them to comment on the specific visual information-processing strategies that perceivers used to reach these motivationally biased perceptual conclusions. The motivation instilled by monetary rewards influenced perceptual processing in two ways. First, perceivers exerted more effort in gathering information when attempting to reach a rewarding perceptual conclusion. Specifically, perceivers more eagerly searched for pixels containing the rewarding color over pixels containing the costly color—thus indicating more perceptual processing of favored aspects of the environment. Second, perceivers implemented an earlier informational “cutoff” when reaching rewarding perceptual conclusions. That is, they ended their search sooner when the collection of pixels suggested a rewarding outcome rather than a costly one. They scrutinized the color swatches for shorter periods of time if they suspected that more rewarding colors were contained in the swatch. The third way motivations can influence information processing is by biasing the processing of natural, evolutionarily important elements in the environment in order to create a pleasant, positive, and favorable gestalt perceptual representation. That is, motivations bias the way people perceive the relative placement of local elements so that the overall construction or picture of the natural environment, and of themselves within it, is favorable. Generally, people want to be surrounded by smiling friends, happy colleagues, proud parents, and the like. Likewise, people want to lounge around in environments that smell nice, look pretty, and are pleasant to be in. Certainly, these types of environments are favored relative to environments in which the boss is yelling, colleagues are antagonistic, students react with disdain, and the office is dilapidated and smells bad. Such general wishes to reside in a pleasant environment can shape the way in which people perceive their surroundings. For example, motivations can lead people to believe that desirable places are closer to them than less desirable places. Cornell University students reflected on the Statue of Liberty from their student union in upstate New York. The more they reported favorable attitudes toward the iconic landmark, the fewer miles they estimated it was from them (Balcetis, 2009b). For every 10% increase in the positivity of participants’ attitudes about the statue, the Statue of Liberty was seen as 15 miles closer. Motivations not only bias beliefs about how far away desirable landmarks are but can also influence perceptions of objects sitting in immediate view. Evidence from our lab reveals that desirable objects are seen as physically closer than less desirable objects (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010). College students estimated the distance to a $100 bill that they had a chance to win, a highly desirable prize to a college student, or a $100 bill they thought belonged to



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the experimenter, a far less desirable object. As a result of the difference in desirability, the $100 bill that participants could win was seen as 14% closer to participants than the $100 bill that they could not win. Beyond objects whose value and desirability change as a function of whether it might soon be in their possession, the valence of self-relevant information can affect perceptions of distance. Favorable self-relevant feedback can be perceived as physically closer than less flattering feedback. Participants estimated the distance to a quiz that offered positive or negative self-relevant feedback regarding their sense of humor. Participants for whom the quiz provided positive feedback about their sense of humor described the stapled stack of papers as more desirable and estimated that this quiz was literally 16% closer than participants who received negative feedback. Participants’ motivations to see themselves in a positive light influenced the way they saw an object in their environment that represented a flattering or critical depiction of themselves. Thus general motivations to be surrounded by positive things in a pleasant environment can influence people’s literal perception of the world around them.

Consequences of Biased Perception of Distance A consequence of such motivationally biased perceptions of the construction of one’s physical environment is that people interact with objects in their environment differently. When participants need to engage in action within their environment, how they interact with the objects around them can be determined by whether the objects are favorable or unfavorable. For example, participants stood down the hallway from either a desirable Visa gift card with a $25 value or an undesirable Visa gift card described as having no value left on it (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010). They were given a beanbag to toss at the card and told they had a chance to win the card if they hit it. When the gift card was described as having a value of $25, participants underthrew the beanbag by 6%. However, participants were essentially accurate in their throws toward the undesirable gift card, landing nearly right on it on average. This suggests that perceivers saw the more valuable gift card as closer to them than the less valuable one, and such biased perceptions of distance produced different behavioral interactions with the object.

Summary Like the blind patient who is convinced she can see and the paralyzed patient who insists he is quite agile, people may perceive themselves and the world around them in a more favorable light than reality suggests. Motivations can exert their influence during conscious and deliberate evaluations of the self, as well as preconsciously before people become aware of the motivated misperceptions. One of the first places this process can kick in is during the visual process, as the senses take in information from the world. We have suggested four ways in which motivations infiltrate the visual perception process. Motivations, desires, and wishful thinking increase the signal strength of visual information competing for dominance. They activate filters to sift favorable from unfavorable self-relevant information. They direct attention to visual information supportive of the person’s current goals. Finally, they bias the type and amount of visual information processing. Together, these components of the motivated visual perceptual system allow people to see what they want to see.

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Motivated Perceptions Serve Self-Protection An important question still remains: What function does maintaining an inaccurate view of oneself in one’s environment serve? We argue that one functional purpose of motivated visual perception is self-protection. Self-protection motivations are pervasive; people neglect, discount, filter out, reinterpret, and remember information in strategic ways that minimize its threatening impact (Sedikides, Green, & Pinter, 2004; Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000). Indeed, people have a fundamental and immutable desire to protect themselves from that which is potentially harmful or threatening. The environment is wrought with threatening information, including threats to emotional well-being, to physical safety, and to the positive self-views people hold. Biased visual experiences can help protect the self in a variety of ways. For example, the motivated visual perception system can serve self-protective functions by helping to rid the perceiver of negative affect, by being sensitive to emotions incited by the surrounding environment in order to guide appropriate action, and by withholding attention from information in the environment that threatens to undermine favorable perceptions of the self. Perhaps one of the most important ways that biased perceptions serve self-protective functions is by helping a perceiver to feel good and expunge negative affect and feelings. We can look to the psychological forces that bias the perceptions of patients with anosognosia for a powerful demonstration of this functional purpose. For some patients, the misperceptions they hold of their own physical condition calm them and buffer against angst and frustration. For example, one patient, following a 2-week coma that resulted from a serious car accident, was in good spirits when the doctor visited his room a few weeks later. He denied that he had any trouble speaking and seeing, though he actually had serious detriments in both. A few weeks later, a follow-up examination revealed that he had a new awareness of his impairments, and there were striking emotional consequences. The patient was agitated and depressed about his condition, ultimately necessitating a transfer to a psychiatric unit (Weinstein, 1991). For patients with anosognosia, a more favorable perception of themselves and their environments buffers against the extreme negative emotional consequences that can result from perceiving the severity of their condition. In much the same way, motivated misperceptions that protect people without anosognosia from realizing their own deficiencies can have positive, protective consequences. One particular situation in which people may need protecting is in their forming and maintaining of contradictory beliefs. Much angst and mental unease arises in such a situation. When cognitive beliefs contradict one another, feelings of mental turmoil, psychological unrest, or cognitive dissonance that people find aversive are produced (Festinger, 1957; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). In this situation, an active coping strategy that assists in reducing such dissonance is beneficial and necessary. Our lab argues that motivated perception may serve as one means to reducing dissonance and the mental unrest that follows. Motivated perception can assist in creating a positive visual representation of the external world that may reduce dissonance and provide other important psychological benefits. In fact, evidence from our lab suggests that to rid the mind of cognitive dissonance, people can and do harness the power of motivated perception and literally perceive their environments differently. We had participants complete an aversive task (Balcetis & Dunning, 2007). Participants walked around while wearing a



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Carmen Miranda costume, complete with grass skirt, coconut bra, and fruit-adorned hat, in the middle of a busy campus quad. Half of the participants “chose” this task in lieu of other, unnamed tasks, whereas the other half of participants were assigned to the task. Feeling as if one chose to perform an aversive task produced dissonance and psychological discomfort (see Elliot & Devine, 1994, for a review). Participants who felt that they chose to dress as Carmen Miranda and who were thus experiencing dissonance perceived the distance they had walked as 39% shorter than participants in the low-choice condition. In a second study, participants either chose or were assigned to kneel on an all-terrain skateboard and push themselves up a hill using their hands among a crowd of people. Just prior to actually performing the task, participants estimated the slope of the hill. Participants motivated to reduce dissonance estimated that the hill was 23% less steep than participants who still expected to perform the skateboard task but who were not experiencing dissonance. The motivation to resolve cognitive dissonance led participants to perceive their environments in a less aversive way. This provides yet another example of the ways motivations can influence how people construct representations of their environments, allowing them to see the world in ways that help alleviate psychological distress. Another way in which the motivated visual system serves a self-protective function is by attuning to, being aware of, and responding to the emotions produced by the surrounding environment in order to guide appropriate action. Perceptions of the natural environment are systematically biased. People have strong motivations to see themselves and their environments in positive, congenial ways. As we mentioned earlier, when the situation is right, the motivated visual system leads people to see desirable objects in the environment as closer to the self than less desirable objects. People’s desires to surround themselves with desirable and goal-relevant objects that are instrumental to their success and happiness biases perceptions of actual distance to those desirable objects by underestimating it. Yet this motivated process is not so simplistic. The motivated visual process cannot simply result in the perception of good things as close and bad things as far away. Indeed, there would be detrimental costs if this were the case. For example, a motivated visual system that causes one to see an ill-tempered snake on the path up ahead as farther away than it actually is would have dangerous implications. Instead, a successful and functional motivated perception system is necessarily contextually sensitive. If an undesirable object is threatening and necessitates immediate action, the motivated perceptual system may see the object as closer to guide appropriate action. This is, in fact, the case. The motivated visual processing system is sensitive to the cues suggested by the emotions emitted in response to surrounding objects. That is, it is not only the valence of attitudes associated with the object but also the meaning of the emotion, the source of the attitude, and the implications of the presence of the object in one’s environment that predict how objects will be perceived. For example, two objects can be equally undesirable but result in different perceptual experiences because of differences in the emotions they arouse. Fear and disgust are both negative emotions but require discrepant behavioral responses. As a result, they produce quite different perceptual experiences. Although both fear and disgust are aversive affective states that produce arousal, fear increases blood pressure and cortisol (Lerner, Gonzalez, Dahl, Hariri, & Taylor, 2005), which may indicate that the body is ready to take action. However, disgust decreases blood pressure and cortisol, which may suggest that no action is necessary. Therefore, when an object arouses fear emotions, it might cue the visual system to attend more closely, and the perceiver may view the

168   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES object as closer. Thus the motivated visual system is sensitive to specific affective states that objects in the environment induce. We tested the consequences of fear and disgust reactions on perceptual experience. We started our investigation with the assumption that the motivated perceptual system aims to assist in successful navigation of the environment. As a result, objects that are perceived as threatening are seen as physically closer than objects that are equally as negative but that do not pose an immediate danger. Participants estimated the distance to a needle on a table in front of them (Balcetis & Cole, 2009). A needle described as threatening was perceived as 18% closer than a needle described as disgusting. In addition, the disgusting needle, which presents no imminent danger, was estimated as being the same distance away as a neutral pen. Likewise, distance estimations to a tarantula depended on the fear induced by the spider. Participants most afraid of spiders perceived the spider to be 41% closer than did participants who experienced the least amount of fear. Thus the motivated perceptual system not only categorizes objects in terms of the valence associated with them but is also sensitive to the specific emotions that objects in the environment arouse. Although perceivers might want to see themselves as situated in a benign and even pleasant environment, the motivated perceptual system that could produce this visual experience, however illusory, instead produces a more sophisticated and nuanced experience in order to serve one of what are surely many self-protective goals. Another way the motivated visual system might serve self-protective functions is by avoiding information that threatens to undermine favorable perceptions of the self. Threatening information about the self can be avoided by simply directing attention away from it or by not looking at it at all. We have evidence that people do not readily attend to objective information that might contribute to more accurate (albeit less favorable) self-perceptions, even when this information can be plainly seen. As a first step, we demonstrated that people do in fact hold highly favorable impressions of themselves that contribute to their overly flattering self-concepts. To do this, we asked participants to read descriptions of a series of positive and negative behaviors and to predict the likelihood that they would engage in the behavior (Balcetis, 2009a). For instance, participants predicted the likelihood that they would donate blood, perform community service, cheat on an exam, and be sent to student judiciaries for engaging in underage drinking. At the same time that they were considering the likelihood that they would engage in each behavior, participants saw accurate base rate statistics reporting percentages of the student body who actually engaged in the behaviors appear on the screen. For example, when considering the likelihood of donating blood, a statement appeared simultaneously indicating that 5% of the student body did so last year. We found that participants anticipated that the likelihood that they would engage in prosocial behaviors was quite high. These estimates for themselves were far from accurate, even though participants had at their disposal and in their immediate and plain sight the base rate information that reflected the actual likelihood of engaging in the actions. These errors, also, are not the result of simply faulty cognition, because participants are far more accurate when making predictions about the likelihood that others will engage in these behaviors. That is, some participants who predicted the likelihood that others would engage in these same behaviors made estimates that were well calibrated to the actual base rate information. Second, we intended to examine how the visual system was recruited in order to assist the creation of such faulty self-impressions. We posited that participants would construe



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base rates as uninformative when thinking about themselves. As a result, they would literally look less often to base-rate information when predicting their own moral actions than when predicting others’. In other words, in order to maintain such overly inflated self-construals, perceivers would simply avoid looking to places in the environment, including the place on the computer monitor that presented actual base rate information, that could possibly undermine the favorability of self-judgments. To test this hypothesis, we used an embedded video camera to covertly record participants’ eye movements while they were contemplating the various actions. Blind coders counted the number of times participants looked to the base rate information when making their likelihood judgments. Participants looked at the base rate information 1.6 times more often when making social predictions than when they made self-predictions. That is, when thinking about their own likelihood of engaging in the given behaviors, participants largely ignored the objective information that might help them make these predictions. In fact, eye movements to the base rate information partially mediated the relationship between the target of the prediction and the average correlations between base rates and likelihood estimates. This suggests that the discrepancy between self- and social perception, and the consequential inaccuracy of self-views, was at least partially a function of differences in how much participants looked to objective base rate information when making their estimations. The study suggests that one way participants may be able to maintain favorable views of themselves is by literally looking less frequently to information that might attenuate the positivity of those predictions. Thus the visual system can help people see what they want to see by directing attention away from possible sources of threat. More generally, the motivated visual system will withhold eye movements to visual information in the environment that threatens people’s flattering conceptions of themselves. Such withholding of attention occurs without perceivers’ awareness and acts as a protective blindness of sorts—the common person’s anosognosia. Indeed, in stroke patients with anosognosia, one explanation for patients’ ability to convince themselves that they are healthy is the fact that they neglect information in their environment that clues them in to their impairments. Evidence from some patients with left-side paralysis indicates an attentional bias to the right side of the body (Heilman, 1991). If a patient does not attend to his or her left arm, he or she never has to recognize that it is not moving.

When Motivated Misperceptions Are Costly Although motivated perception can assist in self-protection, there may also be costs to such misperceptions that ultimately undermine self-protective goals. At times it may be important that perceivers have an accurate view of themselves and their surroundings, yet a motivated perceptual system does not always represent the world completely and accurately, even when the perceiver might be best served by this strategy. This is certainly evident among patients with anosognosia whose misperceptions of their own abilities are associated with poor medical outcomes. The patient who believes him- or herself healthy when he or she is not may delay medical treatment and may hinder his or her ability to naturally compensate for the impairment. And he or she may put him- or herself into dangerous situations that he or she is not capable of navigating. For example, one patient with complete blindness in his left eye was unaware that his vision suffered. Though his doctors advised him not to return to his factory job, at which cranes carried large steel beams along the ceiling, he insisted he was

170   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES capable of handling the job. Although his biased perceptions of his capabilities successfully protected him from the emotional consequences of realizing the gravity of his impairment, it also left him vulnerable to the large steel beam that swooped from the ceiling one day and struck him on the left side of the head (Heilman, Barrett, & Adair, 1998). In a similar vein, everyday people are at risk when their motivated perceptions keep them from knowing the truth about the environment. A visual system that filters, attends to, and processes information in the environment in accordance with motivations may have negative consequences for the perceiver. The motivated visual system aids in the perception of an environment that is pleasant and benign; however, an inaccurate view of one’s surroundings is not always beneficial. For example, a veridical representation of the world around us may help to prepare us for unfavorable outcomes. Consider the starry-eyed suitor chatting up his love interest, desperately hoping she returns his affections. With such wishful thinking may come wishful seeing as well. The motivated visual system may filter out her negative expressions, attend only to those signs that she may be interested, and differentially process only the information that indicates a romantic reciprocation. And though this may have short-term implications of deceiving the suitor that his target is within reach, in the long run such a distorted view of reality may prove costly. In failing to see signals that she does not share his warm feelings, the hopeful romantic may be unprepared for the drink thrown in his face when the woman has to resort to clearer signs. Thus biased perceptions may result in costly blows to self-esteem and psychological well-being that might otherwise be avoided if people more accurately perceived the components of their environments and subsequently were more prepared for unfavorable outcomes. In addition, in our research, we have demonstrated that the motivation to construe the self as situated in a pleasant environment leads to biased perceptions, which may actually produce counterproductive outcomes. Perceivers’ desires to see pleasant objects as close to oneself and disgusting objects as farther away can and do bias estimates of the physical distance between oneself and the objects. For instance, participants estimated that delectable European chocolates were 13% closer than a freshly collected sample of dog feces, suggesting that their motivated visual system represented the environment in a way concordant with current motivations (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010). However, a consequence of this biased perceptual experience was that, when asked to move in this environment, participants actually positioned themselves less than 14 inches closer in physical space to the feces than to the chocolates. Thus a motivated perception system that protects perceivers from negative information about themselves and their environments may also make them vulnerable to the consequences of a more dangerous or disgusting world than they realize exists around them. In sum, the biases that permeate both self- and environmental perception may enable people to reap great psychological benefits. However, they can also be maladaptive. Motivated perceptual processes enable people to maintain gross misperceptions at the expense of making improvements to themselves or adequately preparing for threatening information (or large steel beams) in their environments. To predict whether and when the self-protective benefits will outweigh the costs of a motivated perceptual system, researchers may need to explore temporal dimensions of the query. Perhaps in the foreseeable and immediate future, perceptions that are biased toward more favorable views of the self in the environment may be beneficial through the temporary activation of positive affect. However, these biased perceptions may be harmful in the long run through repeated misperceptions, dangerous miscalibration in important domains and



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environments, and lack of expenditure of necessary effort (Robins & Beer, 2001). This temporal approach to resolving the issue of relative costs and benefits is certainly a new one and provides fruitful avenues for future research.

Conclusion Audre Lorde was a critically acclaimed novelist who battled society on issues of racism, sexism, and feminism following a mastectomy to treat cancer. Impassioned to promote change in society on these issues, she is credited with proclaiming that “our visions begin with our desires.” Lorde’s vision was a social one, born out of her desires to see social equality among people of all races, cultures, classes, nationalities, and sexualities, regardless of the physical form they assume. And yet her words also reflect a truth about more basic perceptual processes in which people’s desires shape their literal views of themselves and the world around them. Just as Audre Lorde wished to see herself and her world in ways more favorable than reality, we began this chapter by describing a clinical conundrum, a disorder in which people’s biased views of the world result, at least in part, from their desires to see themselves and their surrounding world in a different and superior manner. Patients with this disorder—anosognosia—have severe medical impairments, including blindness, paralysis, and dementia, yet have no awareness that these deficits exist. In order to protect themselves, people systematically misperceive themselves and their environments in order to maintain the belief that they are healthy, capable individuals, although any other individual could see that they are clearly not. This discrepancy is, in part, the product of biased perceptions that protect patients from the devastating realities of their disabilities. Patients are astonishingly able to maintain much more favorable perceptions of themselves and their capabilities than is objectively warranted. In this way, anosognosia may be an extreme example of the kind of motivated misperceptions that are present in all of us. Though anosognosia is rare, its psychological equivalent is quite prevalent. Normal, healthy people exhibit similar biased perceptions with striking regularity. They maintain distorted perceptions, in part as a result of motivations to see themselves and their world as capable, affable, and superior. These motivational forces infuse and linger through multiple stages of processing, from the earliest moments of information processing, as the visual system gathers information from the surrounding world, through later stages of judgment and evaluation. Thus people think what they want to think, as well as see what they want to see. As a result, biased perceptions can provide a protective shield from the consequences of accurately perceiving a potentially threatening environment.

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Chapter 8 Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Social Judgment Mark D. Alicke Corey L. Guenther

The tendency to see—indeed, the inevitability of seeing—the world from the van-

tage point of our own expectations, beliefs, and values is perhaps the predominant biasing source in social judgment. The most effective debiasing technique that humans have developed for extracting themselves from the judgment process is the scientific method of controlled observation. Except for those with special training, however, the ability to factor the self out of the judgment equation is limited, and even those who deploy controlled observation to great effect in their professional activities are unlikely to use it as successfully in their personal lives. The recognition that perception and judgment are colored by our own contributions is an old one, crystallized eloquently in Plato’s parable of the cave. In the seventh book of The Republic (Hamilton & Cairns, 1973), Plato creates a thought experiment involving people who have been chained in a cave from birth in a way that allows them to look in only one direction. What they see are shadows cast on the walls by the unseen, multifarious activities surrounding them, and this is all they know of the world and its operations. Plato augments this theme in the Theatetus, which concentrates on the ways in which true knowledge is distorted by the senses (Hamilton & Cairns, 1973). Even by 400 b.c., therefore, the idea that accurate understanding was skewed by the peculiar perspective of the knower was wellentrenched in Western thought. 174



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Fast forward about 2,400 years, and you have research scientists elaborating this theme in empirically demonstrated phenomena such as the false-consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), social (Krueger, 1998) and defensive (Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997) projection, and implicit social comparison (Dunning, 2000), as well as in the notions of selfschemas (Markus, 1977) and personal constructs (Kelly, 1955). Whereas Plato’s cave parable dealt broadly with epistemology and the problem of accurate knowledge, our concern in this chapter is with a special aspect of epistemology, namely, knowledge of oneself and others. In particular, the modern understanding of the self’s role in social judgment emphasizes the ways in which desires, beliefs, and extant cognitive constructs influence the judgments people make about their own and others’ characteristics, actions, abilities, and beliefs (Alicke, Dunning, & Krueger, 2005).

Prelude: The Ubiquitous Self Subjectivity is an inherent feature of human mental life: Everything that happens takes place within the confines of our own heads, and, as far as we know, we cannot leap into anyone else’s. In fact, to say that people see the world from their own perspectives is trite—absent religious ecstasy or major mental disorder, there simply is no more direct perch to view it from. The self’s hegemony is not only a fact of perception and cognition but also a common theme in Western cosmology and religion. For centuries, the Earth was presumed to be the center of the universe, a belief that solidified humans’ special place in God’s grand scheme. A more intimate instance of this privileged position is religious groups’ proclaiming to be the chosen people of a deity or as having a special covenant with one. To sweeten the package, the deities themselves possess human qualities, albeit not always commendable ones: The extraordinary powers of the Greek gods, for example, were vitiated by their possession of human foibles such as anger, greed, petulance, and jealousy. On a more felicitous note, the gospel accounts of Jesus depicted human qualities to which most ordinary mortals can only feebly aspire. People’s exalted sense of their importance occurs because their thoughts, feelings, and actions are especially salient and memorable and because the belief in their uniqueness or superiority is comforting and rewarding. These cognitive and motivational contributors to self-importance are represented in social judgment in four significant ways: (1) they influence construal processes such that people understand others’ actions and goals with reference to their own habitual and preferred knowledge structures or schemas; (2) they encourage evaluating others in terms of personal standards of acceptability or propriety; (3) they lead people to project their current preferences, emotions, and perceptual and knowledge states onto others; and (4) they contribute to the way self-concepts are defined, namely, by misconstruing or misusing relevant information about others’ actions and characteristics. In this chapter, we concentrate specifically on how self-enhancement and self-protection motives influence construal and evaluation of other people’s actions, characteristics, and outcomes. We also consider the reciprocal process by which self-evaluations are enhanced by judging others in a way that ultimately preserves or augments a favorable self-image.

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Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Social Construal Inferences about Intentions and Motives The early history of social perception research concentrated on how lay perceivers infer traits or attitudes from overt behavior and the context in which it occurs (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1972). The self enters these construal processes by providing a unique interpretive framework for understanding social action. Many studies have shown, for example, that people rely on their own constructs and expectancies to make sense of others’ intentions, motives, and personalities. Research on self-schemas (Markus, 1977) has shown that individuals “schematic” on certain trait dimensions (e.g., extraversion) process social information related to those dimensions more quickly and remember such information better than individuals who are “aschematic” on the same traits. Similarly, research on self-image bias (Lewicki, 1983) has shown that individuals use core aspects of their selfconcepts to guide evaluation of others’ personalities. Finally, research on group processes has identified “illusions of unanimity”—the belief that one’s motives and opinions are commonly shared—as one of the principal symptoms of groupthink (Janis, 1982). In addition to influencing social construal by dint of expectancies and schemas, the self is also invested in construing others’ actions in a way that promotes or protects its esteemmaintenance interests. One manifestation of these interests is the way people interpret the motives underlying others’ behavior as similar to the ones that would guide their own actions in similar situations (Alicke & Weigold, 1990; Alicke, Weigold, & Rogers, 1990). Such assumptions can serve to validate the appropriateness of one’s own motives, especially those whose desirability is questionable. For example, perceivers may discern ulterior motives where they do not exist to justify the assumption that everyone possesses the same devious intentions as themselves. These construal tendencies may be especially useful to those with chronically objectionable motives such as anger, spite, selfishness, or greed. Angry people who assume that others are also acting out of anger or selfish people who see selfish motives in others can believe that they have found support for their deleterious tendencies by consistently construing others’ actions in a way that exaggerates their similarity to the self and the compatibility of their orientation (Newman et al., 1997). Whereas the foregoing examples primarily represent self-protective motives, selfenhancement motives can be served by construing others’ behaviors to be less favorable than one’s own. People may interpret, for example, constructive criticism as being destructive or an attempt to be open and honest as cruel or inconsiderate. Detecting harmful or selfish intentions where they do not necessarily exist can, by implication, assert the superiority of the perceiver’s own intentions in similar situations (Erdelyi, 1985).

Personalism It is easy, and relatively common, to assume mistakenly that others’ actions are somehow directed toward oneself or staged to convey a personal message—an assumption that reaches its zenith among adolescents and paranoid schizophrenics. The well-known “spotlight effect” provides empirical examples of the egocentric tendency to overestimate how much attention others are paying to oneself, especially to one’s undesirable or embarrassing behaviors (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000). What we refer to here as personalism includes the assumption that others’ behaviors, rather than simply their attentions, are self-directed. This



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term refers to such beliefs as that others are talking about us, intimidating us, showing off for us, expressing opinions for our benefit, expressing opinions in order to persuade us, or flirting with us. One of the unfortunate consequences of the erroneous belief that others’ actions are self-directed is that the perceiver might implement retaliatory strategies. In other words, to protect oneself against the erroneous belief that others’ behaviors are self-directed, people may wind up treating others unfairly and ultimately engaging in self-defeating behaviors. This applies both at the individual and group levels (Hoorens, Chapter 11, this volume). The belief that other groups are behaving intentionally in ways that are directed against one’s own group is an important source of intergroup conflict. For example, Brewer and Brown (1998) suggest that such misconstrual plays a significant role in the perpetuation of certain minority prejudices. Conflict that arises from competition over scarce resources, they argue, derives not only from competition for tangible assets (i.e., realistic group-conflict theory; Sherif, 1966) but also from perceived conflicts of interest. Thus a majority group’s perception that specific minority members are “taking our jobs” may perpetuate negative stereotypes about that minority group, even if such contentions are erroneous.

Self as a Judgmental Standard The consequences of judging other people’s performances and actions by comparing them to one’s own is a well-researched topic in social psychology (Sedikides, 2003), most notably by Dunning and his colleagues (Dunning, 2002; Critcher, Helzer, & Dunning, Chapter 3, this volume). A preponderance of this work has focused on academic or cognitively based tasks, such as bogus intelligence or competence tests, or on comparisons of behavioral preferences and habits. The self used as a judgmental standard also serves as an evaluative criterion for judging the appropriateness or propriety of others’ actions. This facet of the self in social judgment has received far less attention. The propensity to judge others according to our own values, customs, and preferences is so powerful that teaching “tolerance” is one of the foremost goals of educational and religious institutions, obviously with rather mixed results. Harsh evaluations of people with different customs and practices range from relatively trivial feelings of disgust for those who eat unfamiliar foods to dislike of people with incompatible social and political views and, more extremely, to feelings of loathing and a desire to harm those with “deviant” sexual practices or religious beliefs.

Relative-Preference Effect We have referred to the tendency to evaluate others with dissimilar moral and ethical preferences less favorably than those with similar ones as the “relative-preference effect” (Alicke, 1993). The relative-preference effect is a variation of the false-consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977) but refers to evaluation of behavioral choices rather than to estimates about norms. We have demonstrated this effect by presenting research participants with moral dilemmas that contain incompatible resolutions and first asking them to indicate which resolution they favored. For example, college student participants in one scenario were asked to imagine that they had been drinking and that they had received a call from their boyfriend or girl-

178   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES friend telling them that he or she had flown in for a surprise visit and had just landed at the airport. Participants were asked to indicate whether they would drive to the airport or find some other way to greet their partner. Dilemmas were pretested so that the distribution of participants who selected each option was not severely skewed. Participants later learned of a target who had confronted exactly this dilemma and who had decided to drive to the airport. The main dependent measure was the degree to which participants thought that the target was blameworthy for his or her behavioral choice. The expected and obtained relativepreference effect showed that those who selected morally inferior options (e.g., driving while intoxicated) ascribed less blame to targets who did the same than did participants who chose the moral high road. Of course, such findings do not necessarily establish that the self per se is the standard that participants use to evaluate targets. Possibly, some factor that is correlated with the self could account for these findings. Other possible standards include perceptions of the norm or of the morally ideal course of action or assessments of the practically expedient course. In subsequent studies, we controlled for these possibilities statistically and still found a strong tendency for self-judgments to predict target evaluations. In fact, even when participants acknowledged that their choice was not ideal, normative, expedient, or the one they would want their children to select, they still evaluated similar targets more favorably. Furthermore, we demonstrated in subsequent studies that the relative-preference effect obtains even if the participant’s preferred choice leads to severely negative outcomes, such as physical harm, criminal charges, or financial ruin (Alicke, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1996). The most straightforward conclusion of these studies, therefore, is that the mere fact of preferring a behavioral option determines evaluations of others’ morally relevant choices. Clearly, people who endorse inferior moral options recognize that their choices are neither ideal nor commendable. However, if they were to excoriate someone else who made the identical choices, they would be damning themselves by implication. Self-protection is best served, therefore, by showing leniency in evaluating those who endorse the same, censurable moral options as themselves.

Being Better Than Myself The findings just described suggest a trend toward evaluative leniency among those who select less desirable moral options. However, the methodology we used in the relative-preference-effect studies, adapted from the false-consensus paradigm, yields relative effects; that is, those who chose morally undesirable options were lenient relative to those who chose morally superior ones. As a general rule, even when people are comparing their behaviors with the identical behaviors of others (as in the relative-preference effect), the tendency is to evaluate oneself more favorably. We have demonstrated this superior stance in a series of experiments on what we call the “better-than-myself effect” (Alicke, Vredenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun, 2001). In a representative study, participants in a pretesting session indicate the percentage of times they are cooperative or uncooperative when the opportunity to behave cooperatively arises. Based solely on this estimate, they rate themselves on a bipolar scale ranging from extremely uncooperative to extremely cooperative. This is completed for about 25 trait dimensions. Later in the semester, they read another student’s behavior frequency estimates and, based on this information, rate the student on the same traits. What they do not know is that they



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have actually been given the exact same estimates that they provided in the pretesting session, copied in a different handwriting. The results of such studies show a strong and consistent tendency for participants to evaluate themselves more favorably than this “randomly selected student,” who is actually themselves. One might argue that participants failed to follow instructions to base their trait ratings solely on their behavioral estimates and inadvertently accessed past behaviors. To address this possibility, participants in another study were asked to enumerate everything they could possibly think of that explained their standing on a particular trait dimension (e.g., kind– unkind). Using that information, they then rated themselves on the trait dimension. Each participant was yoked to a peer who had written a similar explanation and then rated the peer based on his or her explanation. Even when evaluations were made with the benefit of all the behavioral evidence that participants could adduce, participants still rated themselves more favorably than the peer to whom they were yoked. These “better-than-myself” studies call seriously into question whether the tendency to evaluate one’s characteristics more favorably than those of others is due primarily to the selective recruitment of behavioral examples that favor the self. Many aspects of self-judgment may be based on a tendency, perhaps automatic, to associate the self with ideal states, characteristics, and people (Alicke & Govorun, 2005).

Assimilation and Contrast Classic research by Hovland and Sherif (1952) suggested that people tend to evaluate the extremity of attitude statements with reference to their own positions: Attitude statements that fall into their “latitude of acceptance” are assimilated toward their own positions, and those that fall into the “latitude of rejection” are contrasted. This work harkened back to Thurstone and Chave’s (1929) early work on attitude scaling, which was ultimately bedeviled by judges’ inability to estimate the scale value of an attitude statement independently of their own views. Since the time of Hovland and Sherif’s seminal research, assimilation and contrast rank high on the list of theoretical constructs that have been applied to social judgments, although their promiscuous usage sometimes obscures their intended meaning (Wheeler & Suls, 2007). Whatever they mean, they are almost always treated as perceptual or cognitive judgmental phenomena and rarely as motivational ones. In a representative study, for example, Judd and Harackiewicz (1980) found that women with relatively liberal attitude positions toward women’s rights (members of the Boston National Organization for Women) judged paragraphs that were slightly anti–women’s rights (according to general norms) to be more unfavorable than did women with relatively conservative views on women’s rights (Massachusetts Federation of Republican Women). Hovland and Sherif’s interpretation of this contrast effect would be that relatively moderate statements “appear” different to people with extreme attitudes on either side of the issue. Judd and Harackiewicz (1980), however, provided compelling evidence for an accentuation-theory (Tajfel, 1957) explanation, which argues that when making a focal judgment about the extremity of an attitude position, judges are influenced by a peripheral assessment, namely, their agreement or disagreement with the issue. When the peripheral and focal judgments are correlated, judges’ own attitude positions will influence their estimations of attitude extremity. Accentuation theory is a powerful and heuristic explanation for many judgment phe-

180   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES nomena (Eiser, 1990). However, although parsimony favors explanations with fewer causal mechanisms, there is good reason to conjecture that peripheral judgments of favorability can also be impelled by self-serving motives. Although research on attitudinal judgments naturally focuses on agreement–disagreement as the peripheral dimension, more generally, any favorable or unfavorable reaction can accompany focal judgments. When people make a focal judgment, for example, about whether another’s behavior was malicious, inconsiderate, selfish, intentional, negligent, and so on, they spontaneously register disgust, dismay, pride, admiration, or other “reactive attitudes” (Strawson, 1974)—peripheral reactions that reflect their own values and beliefs (Alicke, 2000a, 2000b; Alicke, Davis, Buckingham, & Zell, 2008). From a motivational standpoint, peripheral reactions may create a conscious or unconscious desire to render a positive or negative focal judgment. In other words, the correlation between the peripheral and focal dimensions is not simply a statistical phenomenon; it represents judges’ tendencies to impose their value systems, vent their emotions, or exact revenge on others in evaluating their actions and characteristics. With regard to evaluating attitude statements, peripheral agreement or disagreement reactions make the attitude statement seem more similar to (i.e., assimilation) or more different from (i.e., contrast) the judge’s own. For other judgments, such as those involving trait attributions or evaluations of positive and negative social conduct, favorable and unfavorable peripheral reactions to the target’s conduct make that conduct seem more favorable to judges who favor it (i.e., assimilation) and less favorable to judges who disfavor it (i.e., contrast). The main point of this section, then, is to argue that assimilation and contrast can have self-enhancement or self-protective functions in addition to resulting from purely perceptual and cognitive processes. Assimilating favorable actions to one’s own behavioral preferences validates those behaviors, whereas contrast buttresses selfserving desires to make disparate positions seem unreasonable or one’s own position more reasonable by comparison. In concert with this idea, Beauregard and Dunning (1998) argued that egocentric contrast effects often emerge in attempts to bolster one’s sense of self-worth. In two studies, they showed that threatening participants’ self-esteem (via failure feedback on an initial task) led to significant downward contrast in their evaluation of another person’s intelligence. Bolstering participants’ self-esteem via success feedback, however, negated such effects. These findings support the idea that contrast effects in social judgment are sometimes impelled by self-serving motives.

The Reasonably Prudent Person Is Me One area in which self-serving self-standards potentially have an important influence is in judgments about offensive or criminal conduct. Defenses against criminal charges fall into two broad categories. In the first defendants claim that they are innocent of the charges. In the second they acknowledge having committed the offense but argue that there were mitigating or extenuating circumstances that excuse or justify it. Some excuses are easy to evaluate. If you were forced to rob a bank while someone was holding a gun at your back, you would almost certainly be acquitted of the crime. Of course, if the extenuating circumstances were this obvious, criminal charges would never be brought in the first place. Such cases require adjudication only when the validity of the excuse is questionable. When the legitimacy of an excuse is sufficiently ambiguous, it is typically referred to a “reasonably prudent person”



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standard. This standard involves estimating what a reasonable person in the community would do under similar circumstances. The reasonably-prudent-person standard is applied most frequently in tort law to assess whether a reasonable person could have exhibited the same negligence as the defendant. In criminal law, the reasonably-prudent-person standard is probably invoked most frequently in cases of alleged self-defense. One of the most notorious instances in modern legal history was that of Bernhard Goetz, the subway vigilante, who, on December 22, 1984, shot four young men who approached him for money on the New York subway. All four of the men survived the shooting, but one was left permanently paralyzed. Goetz was charged with attempted murder and first-degree assault. Goetz’s primary defense was based on the argument that he was justified in his belief that his life was threatened. This defense came at a time when the crime rate in New York City in general, and in the city’s subway system in particular, was extremely high. Among the decisions the jury in the criminal trial had to make was whether a reasonable person in the same situation as Goetz would have felt similarly threatened. Apparently, the jury determined that Goetz’s fear was reasonable, and they acquitted him of the most serious charges, convicting him only of possessing an unlicensed weapon in a public place, for which he served 8 months in jail. Ironically, the standard of the reasonably prudent person is referred to as an “objective” standard by legal theorists. The objective nature of the judgment is brought into question, however, by scores of studies on the false-consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977) and social projection (Krueger, 1998). When people try to guess what the average person in the community would do, they are likely to use themselves as proxies. This self-standard becomes even more subjective when the judge’s intuitions are at variance with actual community standards. We (Alicke, Gordon, & Rose, 2010) have recently conducted two studies to assess the role of the self in judgments of the reasonably prudent person and in guilt and blame judgments for legal offenses. Participants in the first study read one of four legal cases to which the reasonably-prudent-person standard would be relevant. One example was as follows: Mr. Jefferies boarded WSW bus at 1:15 p.m. At approximately 1:40, Mr. Jefferies exited the bus at the corner of 32nd street. Mr. Jefferies was approached by a man, Mr. Grey, who was holding in his hand a white Styrofoam cup and requesting some change. Mr. Grey proceeded to block Mr. Jefferies’ path as if to prevent him from passing. Mr. Jefferies pushed Mr. Grey out of his way. Mr. Grey fell over a curb and hit his head on a large rock on the ground. Mr. Grey suffered a concussion and back injuries. Mr. Grey still had blurred vision and back problems a year after the incident.

The primary measures asked participants to indicate the likelihood that they would behave in a manner similar to the defendant in the same circumstances, the likelihood that a reasonably prudent person would behave similarly, and the likelihood that they would find the defendant guilty. Interestingly, for each of the four cases, participants indicated that the reasonably prudent person would be more likely to act in the same manner as the defendant than they would themselves. Because the defendant’s behavior in each instance led to severely harmful consequences, we interpret this as a self-protective response used by participants to distance themselves from unfortunate behavioral outcomes. Regression analyses in each case showed that both self-estimates and reasonably-prudent-person estimates contributed significantly to guilt judgments, although self-estimates were substantially larger in each instance. In a second, more involved study, participants read a longer case (adapted from an

182   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES actual event depicted in a YouTube video) about two freshman roommates, Kevin and Rusty, who had been living together for about 6 months. One day, Kevin caught Rusty masturbating to a nude picture that Kevin’s girlfriend had taken of him. Kevin began yelling at Rusty, and Rusty pushed him out of the way. Kevin punched Rusty in the face and broke his jaw. During pretesting held at the beginning of the academic session, participants had completed an attitudes-toward-gay-men scale, which was used, along with the same measures employed in the first study (and an extra measure of blame attribution), to predict dichotomous guilt-orinnocence judgments (i.e., whether Kevin should be found guilty of criminal assault). Various structural equation models were tested; the best-fitting model was one in which attitudes toward gay men predicted estimates of the likelihood that participants would have behaved in the same manner as the defendant, which in turn predicted blame and guilt judgments. In all cases, the direction was such that greater antigay attitudes were associated with participants’ perceptions that they would have behaved in the same manner as the defendant, which then led to fewer guilt judgments. Although estimates about one’s own likely behavior in the situation were positively associated with estimates of what the reasonably-prudentperson would do, reasonably prudent person judgments by themselves did not predict blame or guilt. These findings provide a strong demonstration that, when people are asked to predicate their decisions about blame and guilt on estimations of what a reasonably prudent person would do in the situation, they project themselves into the situation as proxies and use their own beliefs and standards as the basis for rendering a verdict. Such use of the self as a proxy, especially the self-enhancing assumption that one would behave better than the judgment target, suggest an important motivational role for the self in evaluations of harmful conduct.

Social Projection: I Know I Am, but So Are You One consequence of living inside our own minds is that it is easy to imagine that others live there, also—that is, that they have the same thoughts, emotions, beliefs, intentions, or goals; in short, that they see things just as we do. The notion of projection was launched in psychology by the redoubtable father-and-daughter team of Sigmund and Anna Freud. The psychoanalytic conception of projection, however, contains dubious assumptions that limit its scope and make it difficult to assess empirically (Holmes, 1968, 1981)—such as that people are unaware of the threatening material that is projected and that projection typically subserves aggressive or sexual impulses. Social projection, on the other hand, simply refers to using one’s internal states or beliefs to estimate what others are thinking or feeling. One of the major hurdles in early social projection work was to establish unique self-involvement. In research on the false-consensus effect, for example, participants estimate the percentage of others who have the same preferences as themselves. If one’s own preference is the only datum available, it is perfectly logical to use it as a basis for inference (Krueger & Zeiger, 1993). The question is whether a selfrelated bias is evident in such judgments; that is, whether there is something unique about a datum pertaining to oneself that leads to projections that differ from the same datum about another person. We (Alicke & Largo, 1995) demonstrated unique self-involvement by telling research participants that either they or a peer had succeeded or failed on a social sensitivity test and



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then asking them to estimate what percentage of their peers would succeed or fail on the test. Compared with control participants who took the test but did not learn whether they or another person had succeeded or failed, participants who learned that they had succeeded estimated that more people would succeed than did controls, and those who failed estimated that more people would fail. The estimates of participants who simply learned that a peer had succeeded or failed did not differ from those of the controls. These findings showed that estimates were assimilated to the participant’s own score to a greater extent than to another’s, thereby establishing a stronger tendency to project from a self-standard (see also Krueger & Clement, 1996). Granting that the self is involved in projection, the question most relevant to this chapter is whether projection occurs in a way that reflects self-serving motives. Classic Freudian projection involves seeing characteristics in others that one wishes to disavow in oneself—what is referred to as “defensive projection.” One source of evidence for defensive projection has been obtained in a series of experiments by Newman and colleagues (1997). Participants were first asked to identify which of a series of traits they would least want to possess. Repressors were defined as people who went to special lengths to avoid thinking about themselves in terms of these unwanted traits (e.g., spending less time writing stories that required them to describe an instance in which they displayed the unwanted trait). The most relevant finding for present purposes was that repressors tended to resolve ambiguous behaviors by a target as being consistent with the threatening trait more frequently than did nonrepressors (Study 3). Newman and colleagues provided evidence that this defensive projection occurs because the unwanted or threatening material, rather than being repressed, becomes hyperaccessible and therefore more likely to be ascribed to others. Govorun, Fuegen, and Payne (2006) showed that, in addition to projecting threatening self-related information onto other individuals, people also project onto stereotyped social groups. In one study, participants were first asked to recall a time that they had failed at either an intellectual or a leadership task. They were then asked to think about stereotypes of sororities and list the characteristics that were most relevant to the sorority stereotype. Results showed that those who had previously thought about a failure in the intellectual domain tended to list intelligence-related traits more than leadership-related traits among their first few descriptions, whereas the opposite was true for those who thought of a failure experience involving leadership. Clearly, then, defensive projection has been established in judgments of both individuals and social groups. Nevertheless, the effects that have so far been obtained are of limited scope. In the Newman et al. (1997) studies, for example, projection occurred only for people who evinced a strong tendency to repress unwanted information. Stronger and more pervasive demonstrations of defensive projection might occur if the unwanted information posed a stronger threat to the self. For example, instead of an unwanted trait, participants might be primed with the most shameful behavior in which they ever engaged. Under these conditions, self-protection would be well served by discerning the same actions or motives in others.

The Self-Serving Consequences of Social Judgment Social evaluations have important implications for self-evaluations. The central aspect of social judgment for self-evaluation concerns the perceived status of the social judgment tar-

184   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES get; in particular, whether the target is deemed to be better off or worse off than oneself on the relevant judgment dimension. A basic tenet of Festinger’s classic social comparison theory (1954) is that social judgment targets are important for self-evaluation only if they are similar (in a way that Festinger never clearly specified) to the judge. As we note subsequently, there is good reason to question the accuracy of this assumption. Other people influence selfevaluations even without any particular similarity to the judge. We consider three facets of the social judgment–self-judgment relationship. The first concerns the oft-studied better-than-average effect; in particular, whether there is any evidence that the pervasive tendency to evaluate oneself more favorably than others is fueled by self-serving concerns. The second topic concerns the self-evaluative consequences of assessing that another person is better or worse than oneself on the comparison dimension. Third, we also discuss recent evidence of self-serving motives in social comparison situations in which people have both temporal and social comparison information; that is, information about whether they are getting better or worse on a task and where that trajectory ultimately places them in relation to others.

The Self, Social Judgment, and the Better-Than-Average Effect The better-than-average effect (BTAE), obtained across a diverse set of trait adjectives (Alicke, 1985) and self-related judgments (Svenson, 1981; Weinstein, 1980), holding for students (Alicke, 1985), professors (Cross, 1977), and in different cultures (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003), and persisting when the self is compared with real or hypothetical others (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995), is one of social psychology’s most durable effects. The fact that people consistently evaluate themselves more favorably than an average peer is often considered a prime example of how self-serving concerns permeate self- and social judgment (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Yet there remains considerable debate regarding the extent to which self-enhancement drives this phenomenon (for recent reviews, see Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). To date, relatively little direct evidence of motivated self-enhancement in the BTAE has been obtained. We believe that both motivational and nonmotivational factors (particularly egocentrism) contribute to the BTAE, and we have conducted a series of studies to examine their interplay (Guenther & Alicke, in press). In an initial study, we first had separate groups of participants make absolute self-ratings on 23 trait dimensions or absolute ratings of where they thought the average college student stood on the same dimensions. In a later, experimental session, participants either received their earlier self-ratings and were asked to evaluate the average college student on the same scales (relative average-college-student ratings) or received their earlier average-college-student ratings and were asked to evaluate themselves on the same scales (relative self-ratings). In addition to obtaining the usual BTAE, we found that ratings of the average peer were significantly more favorable when made with reference to self-ratings than they were when the same judgments were made absolutely. Judgments of the self, on the other hand, did not fluctuate depending on whether they were made absolutely or relative to the average peer—they remained consistent across conditions. These data suggest that self-ratings anchor judgments of the average peer. On the face of it, the finding that average-peer judgments are assimilated to rather than contrasted from the self (as suggested by others; Beauregard & Dunning, 1998; Kruger,



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1999) seems to contradict rather than support the argument for self-enhancement. From a self-enhancement perspective, one might expect individuals to distance themselves as far as possible from perceptions of “average” to maximize their superiority. Yet virtually every researcher who proposes self-enhancement or self-protection motives recognizes that they typically work in tandem with various cognitive processes (Guenther & Alicke, 2008; Kunda, 1990). Because self-ratings occupy high scale anchor points, they are likely to induce some degree of assimilation among referent targets with which they are compared. Thus assimilation of the average peer toward the self is a natural derivative of basic anchoring and adjustment processes. We therefore conducted a second study to assess whether self-enhancement motives could be detected within this context and, in particular, whether self-enhancement might curtail average-peer assimilation. The methodology of this study was similar to the previous one, with one crucial difference. Half the students who were given back their self-ratings and asked to evaluate the average peer on the same scales were actually misled to believe that these ratings had been provided by another student. That is, the participant’s own responses were copied with another student’s handwriting, and a different ID number was placed at the top of the page. This manipulation allowed us to compare how favorably participants would evaluate the average peer in relation to identical scale points, the only difference being that in one case they believed that the scale points were their own and in another that they were another student’s ratings. Results showed that the degree to which average-peer judgments were assimilated toward high scale anchor points was substantially greater when participants believed that those anchor points represented another student’s ratings as opposed to their own. We interpret this differential assimilation as solid evidence that the tendency to evaluate oneself more favorably than the average peer is driven at least in part by self-serving concerns. Furthermore, these findings are a prime example of the complex interplay between the cognitive and motivational processes that underlie most important social phenomena.

Comparisons with Superior and Inferior Others People are reasonably accurate at judging where their peers stand on various ability and personality dimensions (Nisbett & Kunda, 1985). When the judgment task is highly objective, they also recognize accurately whether they are better off or worse off than others (Alicke, LoSchiavo, Zerbst, & Zhang, 1997). Students who receive their grades on objective tests, runners who finish a race, and people who compare their annual incomes would have a difficult time misperceiving their relative standing. As a general rule, superior targets who are inspiring have positive effects on self-evaluation if the comparer believes that he or she has the potential to attain the superior target’s status but negative effects if the superior target suggests that the comparer is chronically inferior (Collins, 1996; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). However, we have shown that the effects of a target’s chronic superiority on the self need not be deflating if comparers can construe the target’s ability to be even better than it actually is. In short, when a target’s performance superiority is unambiguous, comparers can maintain their self-views at a relatively satisfactory level by contrasting the superior performer to themselves (relative to ratings made by outside observers), which we call the “genius effect” (Alicke et al., 1997). The genius effect reflects the intuition that, whereas being outperformed by a slouch is indeed threatening, being outperformed by a supremely gifted peer is no disgrace.

186   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES In this same research line, we have shown that people not only exaggerate the ability of superior performers but also elevate (again, relative to disinterested observers) the ability of the people whom they outperform. The reasoning is similar: Just as it is no shame to be outperformed by a genius, it is no great feat to outperform a nitwit. Exaggerating the ability of inferior performers, therefore, enhances the merit of one’s superior performance. Although researchers have attained some clarity regarding the consequences of upward comparisons, the same cannot be said of downward comparisons. Early lore suggested that people chose to compare themselves with worse-off others in order to elevate their self-conceptions (Wills, 1991), and although this idea seems intuitively compelling, there is actually very little evidence that people select downward-comparison targets for comparison. Most of this research, however, examined comparison selections rather than the outcome of comparisons that were foisted on people. Furthermore, this research deals with self-evaluations and rarely reports evaluations of the comparison target. As described previously, we have provided some evidence that when downward comparisons occur, people exaggerate the target’s prowess. Although research on evaluations of downward-comparison targets is sparse, one could easily adduce many supportive anecdotes. Athletes, to take one example, lionize their opponents prior to a competition, even if these opponents have far lower standing than themselves. Besides adding luster to a victory over such an opponent, elevating inferior targets can be an effective self-protective strategy in the eventuality of being outperformed.

Temporal and Social Comparisons Temporal comparisons refer to the progress or regress of an individual’s behavior or status over time, whereas social comparisons locate the individual’s position in the distribution of the relevant characteristic. Although these fundamental building blocks of personal identity have evolved as separate research traditions in social comparison theory, in real life they work in tandem, and it is important to consider their interplay. In particular, the way people construe temporal versus social comparison may have important self-enhancement and selfprotection implications. For example, one of the obvious features of cognitive and physical development in childhood through young adulthood is that people get better at almost everything: They become smarter, stronger, more experienced, and so on. What they may not fully realize is that everyone else is getting better, also. There are many circumstances, therefore, in which self-enhancement may be served by failing to recognize that, although one’s own status is improving, others are improving at an even greater rate. Among the questions relevant to the social comparison–temporal comparison relationship that are only beginning to be explored are: What is the relative importance of social and temporal comparison information in self-evaluation? If people improve over time but still have poor social comparison status, do their self-evaluations improve? Conversely, if people decline over time but still have favorable social comparison status, do their self-evaluations deteriorate? We began the task of answering such questions in an initial study (Zell & Alicke, 2009b) in which students took a lie detection test weekly over a 10-week period and learned that they were getting successively better or worse at the task. They also learned that their final performance level gave them high, average, or low social comparison status. Both factors influenced their self-evaluations: Ratings of their performance increased when they got better at the task, and higher social comparison status also led to more favorable self-evaluations. One could argue that temporal comparison information is logically irrelevant here because



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ability is ultimately determined by where the individual stands relative to others. In fact, this is the way that outside observers viewed it; they based their ratings of the actors purely on social comparison information. We interpreted these findings as evidence of egocentrism on the part of actors; that is, of their tendency to focus on their advancement or decline, which was probably more salient and immediate to them than to the observers. More fine-grained analyses showed that when temporal information indicated that their fortunes were declining, actors ignored this information and based their self-evaluations solely on their social comparison status. However, when their outcomes steadily improved, they capitalized on this ascendance to a greater extent than observers to elevate their perceptions of their performance. This asymmetry between improving and declining temporal outcomes illustrates a tendency to use temporal comparison information when it helps and to eschew it when it hurts, thus providing some evidence of selective self-enhancement in the temporal comparison–social comparison interplay. In a second study (Zell & Alicke, 2010), participants learned that their social comparison status on the lie detection task was improving, remaining constant, or declining over an 8-week period. When their performance was improving, participants evaluated themselves more favorably than when their performance remained constant over the period, as did outside observers. However, declining performance led to no decrease in self-evaluations for actors (relative to the constant performance control), whereas observers lowered their estimates of the actors’ ability when their social comparison status declined. Again, this type of asymmetry suggests that people attend to information about their changing status when it serves their purposes, but not when it suggests a lowered ability level.

The Local Dominance Effect In all the research conducted in social comparison theory’s long and illustrious history, the comparisons that are made almost always involve two people, or one person vis-à-vis a small group. As we have noted throughout this chapter, the way that others’ status is construed has important implications for self-perception (Alicke, 2007). However, ascertaining one’s general ability based on relative group status can be a complex and multilayered task. Being the best singer among one’s friends is great if they are exemplary vocalists, but not so great if they make the dog howl. Immediate reference groups are embedded in increasingly larger distributions: A student who receives a test score in a class can compare her score to that of her roommate or to the class distribution. If she is truly trying to assess her ability at the material the course covers (e.g., her mathematical ability), she could consider the skill of her class compared with others at her university (perhaps she has a particularly demanding or easy instructor) and the quality of her university compared with others. We have found, however, that local comparisons with a small group of peers, or even with one other student, dwarf the influence of larger sample data on self-evaluations. In an initial series of studies, we showed that self-evaluations were influenced far more by whether participants performed better or worse on a task than another student than by the knowledge that they performed better or worse than average (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002). In a subsequent series of studies (Zell & Alicke, 2009a), we have shown that self-evaluations are influenced more by whether participants learn that they are the best or worst performers in a small group of their peers than by knowledge of where they stand among about 1,500 of their peers. In another variation, we have told participants that they are the best or worst perform-

188   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES ers in a group of five and that their group is either at the 30th or 90th percentile of similar groups at their university. Again, self-evaluations are based on the local information, with no effect of the general quality of their group. It should be noted that these findings were not due to a general neglect of statistical data about average or percentile performance: When participants were given only information about average performance or about the general quality of their group in the population, this information strongly influenced their self-evaluations in the expected direction. Furthermore, when simply asked, in the absence of any feedback, which source of data would be more useful for self-evaluation, participants overwhelmingly endorse the large-sample data. For this reason, we refer to the tendency of local comparison information to supersede larger scale data as the “local dominance effect.” Our explanation of local dominance emphasizes the habitual tendency for people to compare themselves to close others and the greater emotional impact that such comparisons have. People evolved in small groups, and so it is natural that in defining their abilities and characteristics they should turn to others in their local environment. Furthermore, throughout early development, most comparisons occur among family members and peers. Such comparisons are likely to have more emotional impact than more distant, abstract assessments. Being better or worse than others with whom one is continually in contact, or even than those with whom one might potentially interact, seems to enhance emotional involvement. Although larger sample data are used appropriately when local information is unavailable, people’s evaluations of their ability and performance are influenced far more by the local comparison information.

Concluding Remarks Social judgments are reciprocal: Personal desires and expectations influence social judgment, and judgments of others are relevant to self-perception. In this chapter, we have argued, and adduced evidence for, the proposition that social judgments are often complicated by the personal agenda of the evaluator. The way people judge others says much about their own values, beliefs, and tendencies, such as whether they are harsh or lenient, liberal or conservative, and sympathetic or nonsympathetic toward the judgment target. In addition, as we have emphasized in this chapter, judgments about others are reflexive in a way that influences selfevaluations: Acknowledging that people are better off or worse off than oneself has direct implications for perceptions of one’s own characteristics and status. Motivated self-enhancement and self-protective social judgments, however, rarely work in isolation from powerful perceptual and cognitive processes (Alicke, 1999; Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). Many of the most pervasive biases in social judgment, including egocentrism, assimilation and contrast tendencies, and the tendency to overgeneralize from small samples, are capable of explaining social judgment phenomena in the absence of contributions from personal desires and needs. For the most part, such desires and needs are but one of many contributors to social judgment effects. Nevertheless, such effects are extremely pervasive, and in some cases—such as in defensive projection or the use of idiosyncratic self-standards to evaluate others, or when motivational needs are exceptionally high (Alicke, 1999)—they are the primary determinants of social judgment. Complete accounts of most social judgment phenomena, therefore, would be impossible without taking into account the agenda of the person making the judgment.



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Chapter 9 Postdecisional Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection The Role of the Self in Cognitive Dissonance Processes Jeff Stone Elizabeth Focella

W

hen people make a difficult decision, the tendency to justify or rationalize the choice reflects a tension between the motives for self-enhancement and self-protection. On the one hand, rationalizing a difficult choice may stem from a desire to increase self-worth. Rationalization may also provide the means to protect or maintain current conceptions of specific self-views. Ironically, even the failure to rationalize a difficult decision can reflect an attempt to enhance or protect the self. This chapter describes theory and research that distinguish between these competing processes as they influence how people make sense of a difficult choice. The self-enhancement perspective generally holds that people are motivated to think and feel favorably about the decisions that they make (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). By justifying or rationalizing a difficult choice, people are able to view a bad decision as wise and moral, which satisfies their desire to view themselves in a positive light. Alternatively, for the purposes of this chapter, we treat the motive for self-protection as synonymous with the desire to maintain or verify a consistent, predictable sense of self (Aronson, 1968; Stone, 2009; Swann, 1990). Traditional theories of self-consistency hold that people prefer information that confirms their current conception of themselves, which they can achieve by creating selfconfirmatory circumstances and defending against information that contradicts an important self-conception. This sometimes requires that positive, enhancing information about the self 192



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be overlooked or rejected in favor of negative information that is more consistent with the current body of self-knowledge. It is often difficult for researchers to untangle enhancement and protection among people with positive self-views given that both motives tend to lead to the same responses. The critical test often rests in the postdecision processes of people who hold negative self-views, as they can either engage in activities that protect or maintain their negative self-knowledge or engage in activities that embrace more positive views of themselves. The competition between these mutually exclusive motives allows for relatively clear interpretations as to which is guiding the individual: the motive for self-enhancement or the motive for self-protection. Many reviews suggest that the motive for self-enhancement following a difficult decision may be more primary, or more powerful, than the motive for self-protection (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). All else being equal, people prefer to see their decisions as smart and prudent, especially those who harbor negative views of themselves. Nevertheless, there are conditions under which people are motivated to eschew an opportunity to self-enhance so that they can protect or maintain an important self-view. Thus the focus of this chapter is on theory and research that document the situational antecedents that cause people to protect specific conceptions of themselves after they make a difficult decision. We start by reviewing the development of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and the self-consistency perspective (Aronson, 1968) that guides the work on self-protection and self-enhancement in postdecision justification. We then turn to describing the contemporary research that attempts to integrate the two competing self-motives under one conceptual framework.

Dissonance and the Drive to Rationalize Choice Festinger (1957) published the most influential perspective on how people justify difficult decisions in his book, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Festinger observed that whenever an opinion is formed or a decision made, it creates a state of tension that people are motivated to reduce. His classic example was the choice to smoke: How can a smoker know that smoking is bad for him or her but continue to smoke? Festinger proposed that this is possible because the smoker successfully convinces him- or herself that (1) smoking is enjoyable, (2) the chances of ill health are very low, (3) one cannot avoid all possible dangerous contingencies and still live, and (4) excessive weight gain would occur if he or she stopped smoking. As long as the smoker could recruit cognitions—defined as any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, oneself, or one’s behavior—that were consistent with the choice to smoke, smokers could continue to smoke despite the risk to their health. According to Festinger, a smoker’s rationalization of his or her decision to smoke reflects a simple premise: An inconsistency between cognitions causes people to experience psychological discomfort, which he conceptualized as a drive state similar to hunger or thirst. The presence of discomfort motivates activity aimed at reducing the discomfort, just as hunger induces activity aimed at satiation. Thus the discomfort generated by inconsistency or dissonance motivates people to reduce the inconsistency, and in addition to reducing the dissonance, people actively avoid situations and information that would likely increase their dissonance.

194   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES Festinger (1957) observed that decisions cause at least some level of dissonance when they involve selecting one option from among two or more alternatives. For instance, choosing a job at University A over a job at University B causes dissonance to the extent that University B has positive features that University A lacks and to the extent that University A has negative features that University B lacks. The magnitude of dissonance following a choice depends on the importance of the decision: A decision about which job offer to accept will cause more dissonance than a decision about which window cleaner to use. The level of discomfort is also predicated on the difficulty of choosing between alternatives. The relative attractiveness of the rejected alternative and the amount of “cognitive overlap,” or number of attributes shared by the two alternatives, creates more difficulty, and more dissonance, following the choice. Once a final decision has been made, people reduce dissonance by focusing on the consonant aspects of the decision: the positive features of the chosen alternative and the negative features of the rejected alternative. Focus on the consonant elements leads to a “spreading of alternatives,” whereby people change their evaluations so that they perceive the chosen alternative more favorably and the rejected alternative less favorably than before the decision. Thus, when a difficult decision creates a high level of discomfort, people are motivated to justify their choice by changing their attitudes toward the alternatives. Brehm (1956) published the first empirical test of the postdecision justification that follows a choice. In the free-choice paradigm, women were asked to evaluate a number of consumer items, including a toaster, an electric coffeepot, and a silk-screen print. Participants were then given a choice between two of the items as a gift for completing the study. For some participants, the decision was difficult, because they had rated the alternatives as very similar in attractiveness. For other participants, the decision was simple, because they had rated one alternative as much more attractive than the other. After making their decision, participants evaluated all of the items again. As predicted, participants who made a difficult choice increased their favorability toward the chosen alternative and decreased their favorability toward the rejected alternative; participants who made a simple decision showed little change in their ratings of the alternatives. Postdecisional dissonance processes follow many different kinds of difficult decisions, including the choice between job offers (Walster, 1964), horses at the race track (Knox & Inkster, 1968), or partners in close relationships (Johnson & Rusbult, 1989); in collective decisions made by small groups (Zanna & Sande, 1987); and in the choice of the type of psychology study to participate in (Stone, 1999). Dissonance has also been shown to follow from the decision to lie to another person about an upcoming boring task (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), the choice to suffer a humiliating initiation in order to join a boring group (Aronson & Mills, 1959), the decision to avoid a pleasing activity in the face of a mild punishment (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1963), and, in the vast majority of dissonance studies, the decision to express an opinion about an issue that is inconsistent with one’s own position (Cohen, 1962).

Protecting the Self via Consistency Processes Aronson (1968) was the first to observe that the self-concept may play a critical role in the discomfort that follows from a difficult choice. He suggested that most difficult decisions



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challenge people’s expectancies or beliefs about themselves. Understanding when dissonance occurs requires taking into account the firm expectations people hold for themselves and their behavior. For example, when smokers feel dissonance about smoking, it is aroused by the inconsistency between cognitions about the self (e.g., “I am a smart and moral person”) and cognitions about the behavior (e.g., “I am risking my health and well-being”). Aronson (1968) firmly proposed that “If dissonance exists it is because the individual’s behavior is inconsistent with his self-concept” (p. 23). The emphasis on the self-concept shifted the motivational nature of dissonance from one of general psychological consistency to a more specific motive for self-consistency. With respect to protecting the self, self-consistency assumes that if beliefs about the self are among the most important cognitions that people hold, then dissonance will be greatest when behavior or other cognitions are inconsistent with cognitions about the self. But the importance of the cognitions about the self also makes them resistant to change. Thus, in the self-consistency perspective, dissonance motivates people to protect their self-concepts by changing their attitudes, behavior, or beliefs after they make a challenging decision. Moreover, Aronson reasoned that dissonance and motivation to rationalize a difficult choice should depend on the content of an individual’s self-expectancies. Would smoking cause dissonance in people who held negative expectancies for their behavior? Aronson hypothesized that it would not; people with negative expectancies should not experience dissonance under the same conditions as people with positive expectancies for their behavior. Whereas lying, cheating, or taking a stand against one’s own beliefs—the “stock in trade” of most dissonance experiments—will be discrepant for people with positive expectancies, such undesirable acts are consistent for people who hold negative expectancies for their behavior. Thus the self-consistency perspective specified the cognitions most likely to underlie dissonance processes, and it also provided specific predictions regarding self-concept differences in dissonance phenomena. The critical test of the self-consistency prediction is to show that people with negative self-expectancies or low self-esteem do not show evidence of dissonance after they make a decision that challenges positive self-expectancies for the choice. In the first relevant experiment, Aronson and Carlsmith (1962) hypothesized that, when an important expectancy about the self was disconfirmed by performance on a task, the inconsistency between the self-expectancy and performance would cause dissonance. According to selfconsistency theory, if given the opportunity, the discomfort would be reduced by changing performance, effectively bringing behavior back in line with the firm self-expectancy. It follows, then, that a poor performance should cause high-expectancy subjects to try harder to succeed on future trials. However, for low-expectancy subjects, if consistency were at stake, a good performance would lead low-expectancy subjects to try harder to fail on subsequent trials. In the study, females were asked to complete a test ostensibly designed to measure “social sensitivity.” The test required them to view a set of three pictures and choose the person who developed schizophrenia later in life. During the first four sets of pictures, participants were either told that they were doing well on the test (e.g., approximately 90% correct), suggesting that they were socially sensitive, or that they were not doing well on the test (e.g., approximately 20% correct), and were, by implication, not very socially sensitive. On the final trial, half were provided the same (consistent) feedback, and the other half were provided the opposite (inconsistent) performance feedback. All were then allowed to take

196   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES the final trial over again, and the dependent measure was the number of scores they changed when asked to repeat the last trial of the test. The results clearly supported the self-consistency prediction: Participants who had developed a negative expectancy from the low-performance feedback during the first four trials but then suddenly received positive-performance feedback on the last trial changed significantly more of their answers when retaking the final trial, essentially sabotaging their positive performance. As predicted by the self-consistency position, participants with negative expectancies for their social sensitivity experienced dissonance when they received positive feedback, and, to reduce it, they changed most of their correct scores so that their final performance would match their negative expectancies. This study clearly showed that the motive for self-protection could be more powerful than the motive for self-enhancement following a discrepant act. The self-imposed poor performance of participants with negative expectancies immediately stimulated the laboratories of several investigators, but many failed to replicate the self-consistency pattern in the low-expectancy conditions. Several reviews of the performance-expectancy paradigm concluded that the vast majority of replication attempts were unsuccessful, and, as a result, researchers cite this as evidence that self-consistency strivings are less influential than self-enhancement motives (Dipboye, 1977; Jones, 1973; Shrauger, 1975). Some researchers characterized Aronson and Carlsmith’s (1962) original finding as a fluke or chance event (Dipboye, 1977; Swann, 1990) or as a function of some unknown artifact of the paradigm (Ward & Sandvold, 1963; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). A recent meta-analytic review of the performance-expectancy literature by Stone (described in Stone, 2009) revealed 25 attempts to replicate Aronson and Carlsmith’s (1962) self-consistency finding. The analysis showed that 9 hypothesis tests out of 25 (36%) supported Aronson and Carlsmith’s original findings—5 more than the highest number reported in any previous qualitative review (Swann, 1990; Dipboye, 1977). The analysis also showed that specific changes in the original procedure accounted for significant variance in the replication record and that successful replications shared several important procedural details. Specifically, low-expectancy participants were more likely to demonstrate consistency when (1) a female experimenter manipulated low-performance expectancies by (2) giving small doses of (3) highly credible performance feedback on a (4) novel “psychological test.” Thus the motivation for self-protection in the performance-expectancy context turned on the degree to which replication studies provided highly credible but limited feedback about a novel self-view. Under these conditions, participants may have shifted their goals from selfenhancement to self-protection because the original procedure created highly certain negative self-views that participants were motivated to protect. When studies altered the way the feedback was constructed and delivered, they created less certain negative self-views that participants were motivated to enhance. Where do people derive their expectancies for their behavior? Thibodeau and Aronson (1992) observed that expectancies for competent and moral behavior are extracted from “the conventional morals and prevailing values of society” (p. 592). In order for self-protection motives to operate, people must perceive a discrepancy between making a questionable decision and their “personal standards” for the self-attributes of competence and morality. Furthermore, when people rely on their own “personal standards” for competence and morality to evaluate their behavior, those with high self-esteem, who hold positive expectations for competent and moral conduct, are likely to perceive foolish or immoral behavior as falling



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short of their expectancies and feel the bite of dissonance arousal. People with low selfesteem, who hold less positive expectations for competent or moral conduct, are likely to perceive the same behavior as confirming their expectations and should therefore feel less dissonance. Thus people with high self-esteem will experience more dissonance compared with people with low self-esteem following decisions that deviate from the norms for “lying, advocating a position contrary to their own beliefs, or otherwise acting against one’s principles” (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992, p. 592). There are several studies that support the self-protection formulation of postdecision dissonance processes. For example, Glass (1964) provided participants with false personality feedback designed to raise or lower self-esteem. Participants who received positive selfesteem feedback were told they were “considerate and sympathetic,” whereas participants who received negative self-esteem feedback were told they were “inconsiderate” and “lacking the capability for leadership (i.e., conformist).” After the self-esteem manipulation, participants were induced to distribute painful electric shocks to a confederate under conditions of high or low choice. When they chose to deliver the painful shocks, participants with high self-esteem derogated the victim of their aggression more than did participants with low self-esteem. According to the self-protection interpretation, harming the confederate caused more dissonance for participants with high self-esteem, because their aggressive act was inconsistent with their induced positive self-expectancies for considerate and sympathetic behavior. To reduce dissonance, those with high self-esteem justified their aggression by derogating the victim. In contrast, participants with low self-esteem did not derogate the confederate, because harming the victim was consistent with their induced negative expectancies for inconsiderate and conformist behavior. Similar self-esteem or self-concept differences supporting the self-protection pattern are reported throughout the literature (Gibbons, Eggleston, & Benthin, 1997; Peterson, Haynes, & Olson, 2008; Prislin & Pool, 1996; Stone, 1999; Snyder & Tanke, 1976). Recent research on implicit self-processes in dissonance provides compelling support for self-protection mechanisms. For example, Gawronski, Bodenhausen, and Becker (2007) proposed that, when given a choice between two objects, people develop more favorable attitudes toward the chosen object, because they automatically associate the chosen object with the self. As a result of this “mere-ownership” process, simply choosing an object will cause implicit evaluations of the self to transfer to implicit evaluations of the object. To test this prediction, participants completed implicit measures of attitudes toward two large color postcards before they were allowed to choose one of the postcards as a gift. Participants also completed implicit measures of self-evaluation or implicit self-esteem. The results across three experiments showed that (1) participants formed more positive implicit attitudes toward the chosen item, (2) they formed stronger self-associations with the chosen than with the rejected item after the choice, and (3) the choice produced a significant positive correlation between implicit self-esteem and implicit attitudes toward the chosen item. It is important to note two ways in which these data support the self-protection prediction for postdecision dissonance processes. First, the positive correlation between implicit self-esteem and implicit attitudes toward the chosen object shows that, as predicted by Aronson (1968), participants with positive implicit self-esteem showed more postdecision justification than people with negative implicit self-esteem. Second, these data also provide striking support for Aronson’s (1968) view that discrepancies between behavior and belief, as in

198   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES making a difficult decision, can automatically link to self-expectancies, which then influence the motivation to rationalize the choice.

The Decision to Be a Hypocrite It should be clear that the motive to protect the self is not limited to people with negative expectancies or low self-esteem. People who develop positive expectancies for their behavior or hold strong positive self-views also require a stable and predictable sense of who they are in the social world. To protect the self when behavior is discrepant with a specific positive self-view, people will be motivated to maintain the threatened self-view, even if it means changing behavior in the future. Research suggests that this is how people with positive selfviews prefer to reduce their dissonance when they choose to be hypocritical about an important issue (Aronson, 1999; Aronson, Fried & Stone, 1991; cf. Batson & Collins, Chapter 4, this volume). In the hypocrisy paradigm, people are made aware of a preexisting inconsistency between their beliefs and behavior while completing two carefully constructed tasks. First, they are asked to make a public advocacy about the importance of a prosocial target behavior that they believe will benefit the health and welfare of specific individuals or society in general. Their advocacy is designed to be consistent with their current attitudes and beliefs about the target behavior, and, as a result, it does not cause dissonance. Dissonance is aroused by subsequently making the advocates think about past instances in which they themselves decided not to perform the target behavior. Once they are made mindful of the inconsistency between their beliefs about the behavior and past failures to perform the behavior, people feel the discomfort associated with cognitive dissonance, which they become motivated to reduce. According to the self-protection perspective, hypocrisy should motivate people to change their behavior rather than their attitudes to reduce the dissonance. Specifically, when made mindful of past failures to perform the target behavior, the discrepancy activates highly important cognitions linked to positive self-beliefs about honesty and sincerity (Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997). Following a hypocritical act, maintaining or restoring core beliefs about self-integrity requires that people act in a more honest and sincere manner than in the past. Thus, when they behave like hypocrites, people become motivated by dissonance to be honest and sincere about what they professed, which is most directly accomplished by bringing their behavior into line with the course for action they advocated to others. The initial tests of the dissonance-arousing properties of hypocrisy were designed to motivate sexually active college students to adopt the use of condoms to prevent AIDS (Aronson et al., 1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994). Participants first made a videotaped speech in which they proposed that college students should use condoms every time they have sexual intercourse. To induce hypocrisy, participants then were asked to generate a list of their previous failures to use condoms when having sexual intercourse. When they acted hypocritically, participants reported higher intentions to use condoms in the future (Aronson et al., 1991), and when offered the opportunity, more purchased condoms, compared with participants who just advocated the use of condoms, were just made mindful of past failures to use condoms, or merely read about the dangers of AIDS (Stone et al., 1994). One way to know whether the behavior change that follows hypocrisy represents a



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motivation for self-protection or for self-enhancement is to provide participants with more than one option for reducing their dissonance. If a hypocritical discrepancy activates a goal to enhance the globally positive self, and if people can achieve this goal by conducting any important but unrelated positive act, then a hypocritical discrepancy may not motivate people to reduce dissonance by changing their behavior. This suggests that, after an act of hypocrisy, people might use a strategy to restore the globally positive self, even if it does not restore their sense of honesty and sincerity. However, if an act of hypocrisy arouses dissonance because the behavior threatens positive expectancies about honesty and sincerity, then in order to restore their self-integrity, participants should be motivated to change the discrepant behavior. Thus, when provided a choice between performing the behavior that would reduce the hypocrisy directly and restore their self-integrity or performing a behavior that would leave the discrepancy intact but enhance global self-worth, most people would choose to perform the behavior that most directly reduces the hypocritical discrepancy. Stone and colleagues (1997) tested these predictions by having participants commit an act of hypocrisy about their practice of safer sex. At the end of the study, some participants were provided with the opportunity to donate to support a homeless shelter—a behavior that would reduce their dissonance via self-enhancement but would not directly restore their sense of honesty and sincerity about safer sex. In another condition, some participants were offered the opportunity to donate to the homeless, but at the same time, they were also offered the opportunity to directly resolve the hypocritical discrepancy about safer sex by purchasing condoms. The results supported the self-protection prediction: When offered only the enhancement option (donation), 83% of those in the hypocrisy condition used it. However, when the enhancement strategy was offered alongside the opportunity to restore their honesty and sincerity by purchasing condoms, 78% chose to purchase condoms and directly restore their self-integrity, whereas only 13% chose the unrelated but positive donation option. A second experiment replicated the choice to directly resolve the hypocritical discrepancy even when the enhancement strategy held more importance for self-worth than the protection option. Together, the results indicate that, when the only dissonance reduction opportunity available to a hypocrite is a behavior that enhances global self-worth, they will take advantage of it. However, when a behavior is available that directly resolves the hypocrisy and protects the attributes of honesty and sincerity, most people are motivated to perform the target behavior (see also Fointiat, 2004, for similar findings). In a recent review, Stone and Fernandez (2008) reported that the effect of hypocrisy on prosocial behavior change has been replicated in more than 20 studies. These include the motivation to conserve water (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson, & Miller, 1992), to quit smoking (Peterson et al., 2008), to participate in a recycling program (Fried & Aronson, 1995), to reduce discrimination against minority group members (Son Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002), to extend interpersonal forgiveness (Takaku, 2006), and to practice safer driving (Fointiat, 2004). These studies indicate that when people choose to publicly advocate the importance of the target course of action and are then privately reminded of their own recent personal failures to perform the target behavior, hypocrisy motivates a specific form of dissonance arousal and reduction that directs people toward changing their behavior. At least under these conditions, the desire to protect specific positive self-views appears to be more important than the need to enhance the global self.

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Self-Enhancement in Postdecision Dissonance Some revisions of dissonance theory can be seen as supporting a self-enhancement interpretation of postdecision justification processes. With respect to what causes the arousal of dissonance, the models either implicitly or explicitly assume that discrepancies between cognitions cause a threat to specific sources of positive self-worth that are not moderated by individual differences in the self-concept. For example, according to the aversive consequences model (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), dissonance is aroused when a behavior is perceived to deviate from societal or normative standards for behavioral conduct. The idea here is that, as children, people learn to monitor the fit between their actions and what significant others, such as parents and friends, believe is appropriate behavior—the perceived “norms” for behavior (Cooper, 1999). When behavior falls short of the perceived normative standards, dissonance is aroused, and people become motivated to reduce the consequences of what they have done, presumably to maintain a favorable self-image in the eyes of others. The aversive-consequences model assumes that because most people subscribe to similar societal norms for behavior, dissonance is not driven by the desire to protect specific self-expectancies or self-esteem. Most people, regardless of their idiosyncratic self-knowledge, should feel uncomfortable when their decisions violate internalized normative standards for acceptable behavior (Cooper & Worchel, 1970) As evidence supporting the emphasis on the consequences of a difficult choice, Cooper and Duncan (1971) replicated the manipulation of self-esteem used by Glass (1964) before inducing participants, under high or low choice, to videotape a counterattitudinal message. Despite evidence that the self-esteem manipulation was successful, the data showed that, when choice to make the advocacy was high, all participants justified the discrepant essay regardless of their levels of self-esteem. Thus even people with low self-esteem were motivated by the consequences of their decision to justify it, presumably as a way to reduce the consequences and restore their positive self-worth. We note that the assumptions of the aversive-consequences model (Cooper & Fazio, 1984) about what underlies the arousal of dissonance is similar to Carl Rogers’s emphasis on the impact of receiving conditional positive regard from important others. It is also consistent with contemporary theories about the reasons that people are motivated to have positive self-regard, such as the sociometer theory (Leary & Baumeister, 2000) and terror management theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997), which view maintaining connectedness with important referent others to be a fundamental human motivation. Harmon-Jones and colleagues recently proposed a new explanation for dissonance processes that also supports a self-enhancement interpretation (Harmon-Jones & HarmonJones, 2008). According to the action-based model, a difficult decision causes discomfort because the inconsistency inherent in the choice has the potential to interfere with effective and unconflicted action. Thus, after a difficult choice, people are motivated to justify their choice so that they can execute effective and unconflicted action consistent with the decision they just made. Tests of the action-based prediction typically involve priming action orientation by asking participants to form implementation intentions for a goal they wish to achieve (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008). Results show that participants who form implementation intentions rationalize their decisions more than participants who make a difficult choice but do not form implementation intentions. Impor-



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tantly, the effect of priming implementation intentions is significant even after controlling for participants’ levels of self-esteem. Thus, as predicted by a self-enhancement perspective, participants with low self-esteem were just as likely to justify their decisions as participants with high self-esteem when their achievement goals were made accessible in the decision context.

Self-Affirmation Processes The role of self-enhancement in dissonance processes is more explicit in self-affirmation theory. Steele (1988) proposed that dissonance experiments typically induce participants to make decisions that pose a threat to the integrity of their positive self-belief systems. One way to restore self-worth is to resolve the discrepancy by rationalizing the choice. However, the novel insight of affirmation theory is that rationalization represents just one means by which people restore a globally positive self. If the primary goal of dissonance reduction is to enhance the self, then any thought or action that restores the positive self-system is sufficient for dissonance reduction. Thus, if people can call on other positive aspects of their selfconcept when threatened, dissonance will be reduced without having to justify the decision. Anything that brings to mind other important positive aspects of the self, such as positive feedback from a significant other or a positive social comparison to another person or group, can eliminate the need to rationalize a tough choice. Many of the initial tests of affirmation theory were conducted using dissonance procedures. For example, Steele and Lui (1983) had participants write a counterattitudinal essay under a high-choice condition, and then had half the participants, who held strong sociopolitical values, complete a scale measuring their sociopolitical values. All then completed a measure of their attitudes toward the essay topic. Attitude change under high-choice conditions was eliminated when participants with strong sociopolitical values were allowed to “reaffirm” those values while completing the survey. Participants who were not value-oriented or who did not complete the sociopolitical value measure after writing the essay reduced dissonance by changing their attitudes. Similar studies provided strong evidence for selfenhancement by showing that valued aspects of the self or other “affirmational resources” could eliminate the need for justifying a difficult decision (Steele, 1988). Affirmation also suggests a qualitatively different role for self-esteem in dissonance. In order to affirm the self, people must think about more positive than negative self-attributes following a discrepant act. Steele, Spencer, and Lynch (1993) proposed that, because people with high self-esteem have more positive attributes to use as resources against threat, affirmation processes should be more available to people with high than with low self-esteem. To test this prediction, individuals with high or low self-esteem participated in a free-choice paradigm (Brehm, 1956). For some participants, self-attributes were primed when they completed the Rosenberg (1979) self-esteem scale before making their difficult decisions; the other participants made their decisions without having their self-attributes primed. In the no-prime control condition, both self-esteem groups significantly changed their attitudes to justify their choices. However, as predicted, when self-attributes were primed before the dissonance-arousing choice, participants with high self-esteem showed significantly less rationalization compared with participants with low self-esteem. Subsequent studies supporting the self-resource prediction (Holland, Meertens, & Van Vugt, 2002; Nail, Misak, & Davis, 2004) reported a similar pattern of self-esteem differences in rationalization that is precisely the opposite of what is predicted by the self-protection perspective (i.e., people

202   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES with high self-esteem should show more rationalization than people with low self-esteem; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). Self-affirmation theory introduced the possibility that a tough choice induces a more general motivation to enhance self-worth. By showing that people have some flexibility about how they reduce dissonance, this theory challenged the notion that dissonance induces a motive to protect the self after a difficult choice. However, other lines of work indicate that there are limitations to the affirmation process. For example, in order for positive selfattributes to serve as resources for dissonance reduction, they must be unrelated to the source of the threat (Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995; Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik, & Aronson, 1997; Stone & Cooper, 2003). Thinking about positive self-attributes that are relevant to the discrepancy can actually exacerbate the need to justify a difficult decision. And affirmation does not provide relief from dissonance if something challenges the validity of the affirmation (Galinsky, Stone, & Cooper, 2000). Thus it appears that in order to use an affirmational strategy to enhance the self once dissonance is aroused, people need to focus on unrelated positive attributes that they perceive to be valid representations of their positive self-worth. There is also continued debate over the mechanism by which affirmation reduces dissonance. A consistent finding is that affirmation of the self does not increase self-esteem (McQueen & Klein, 2006), which is clearly at odds with a self-enhancement interpretation of the process. What, then, mediates affirmation effects? Whereas the moderating role of the relevance of the positive attributes suggests that affirmations reduce dissonance by distracting people from the discrepancy (Blanton et al., 1997), distraction does not seem to be a plausible mediator when the affirmation is administered before the difficult choice (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Simon, Greenberg, and Brehm (1995) proposed that the salience of affirming self-attributes might cause people to trivialize the importance of a difficult decision. However, whereas some studies show that participants are more likely to reduce the importance of a tough choice when affirming the self (Simon et al., 1995), other research indicates that affirmation does not always induce trivialization (Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004). Other lines of work have focused on positive affect as a potential mediator. Tesser (2000) observed that dissonance, like other threats to the self, engenders negative affect, and when various self-esteem maintenance mechanisms, such as affirmation, infuse the self with positive affect, it reduces the discomfort associated with dissonance. Similarly, Crocker, Niiya, and Mischkowski (2008) recently proposed that affirmations reduce the threat associated with dissonance by making people feel other-directed positive affect. Thus, despite the fact that affirmation of the self appears to reduce defensive responses across a broad range of situations and self-threats (Sherman & Cohen, 2006), the mechanism(s) by which affirmations attenuate rationalization of a difficult decision have yet to be fully understood (see also Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005).

Integrating Self-Protection and Self-Enhancement in Postdecision Dissonance There is ample evidence to support both the self-protection and self-enhancement perspectives on postdecision dissonance processes. But because they make opposing predictions for the role of self-relevant thought in the dissonance process, it is difficult to integrate all of the available data using any one of the existing theories, including the original published by



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Festinger in 1957. Thus researchers have proposed new models designed to integrate selfconsistency and self-enhancement processes under one theoretical roof.

The Self-Standards Model Drawing from social cognitive principles that guide theory and research on action identification (Wegner & Vallacher, 1985), cognitive accessibility, and the structure of self-knowledge, Stone and Cooper (2001) proposed the self-standards model (SSM) as a way to integrate the various models. The SSM maintains that, once people have made a difficult choice, they evaluate their decisions against a standard of judgment, and that standard of judgment may or may not relate to a cognitive representation of the self. For example, if normative standards of judgment are made salient in the context, as assumed by the aversive-consequences revision (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), then people interpret and evaluate their decisions using the rules and prescriptions followed by most people in the culture. If they perceive that the choice represents a discrepancy from the salient normative standard, then dissonance will be aroused for most people, regardless of their levels of self-esteem. Thus, in line with a selfenhancement assumption, most people will be motivated to justify their choices in order to restore a sense of connectedness to the norms. Alternatively, people sometimes interpret and evaluate a decision using information related to their own personal, idiosyncratic self-concepts. The SSM predicts that, if personal standards are made salient in the context, then people compare the choice against their own idiosyncratic self-expectancies. As originally observed by Aronson (1968), people with high self-esteem, who hold more positive expectancies for their behavior, are more likely to perceive the decision as a discrepancy and experience the discomfort associated with dissonance. In contrast, people with low self-esteem who hold more negative expectancies for their behavior should perceive the same choice as presenting less of a discrepancy with what they expect. Consequently, they should experience less discomfort and show less rationalization. When personal standards are used to assess a tough choice, the SSM predicts that selfprotection processes will guide the arousal and reduction of dissonance. Empirical tests have shown that across different types of decisions, attitude change can be a function of the predicted interaction between self-esteem and the type of standard used to evaluate the choice (Stone, 1999). For example, Stone (2003) had participants with high or low self-esteem write a counterattitudinal essay under conditions of high or low choice. In some high-choice conditions, personal versus normative standards were primed after the choice. The results showed that, when normative standards were primed, participants with high and with low self-esteem showed similar evidence of rationalization. However, when their personal standards were primed, participants with high self-esteem showed significantly more rationalization than participants with low self-esteem. As predicted by the SSM, the motives for self-protection and self-enhancement were determined by what standard was made accessible in the context of the discrepant act. According to the SSM, when personal standards are salient, it is the differential use of positive and negative self-expectancies in the assessment of a difficult decision that mediates the perception of a discrepancy and the magnitude of dissonance that is aroused (Stone & Cooper, 2001). Direct support for this prediction was found in a study that directly measured the accessibility of positive and negative self-attributes using a self-judgment response task (Stone, 2004). Participants first wrote a counterattitudinal essay under conditions of high

204   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES choice and then completed a sentence-scramble task based on the one used in Stone (2003) to prime personal standards, normative standards, or neutral information. All then provided self-descriptiveness ratings of positive and negative traits (Markus & Kunda, 1986). When primed for their own personal standards, participants with low self-esteem endorsed fewer positive traits and more negative ones as self-descriptive than they did when they were primed for normative standards or neutral information. Participants with high self-esteem endorsed significantly more positive than negative traits, and this did not vary as a function of the standards primed. In line with the SSM assumption, personal standards for behavior cause participants with low self-esteem to bring to mind less positive and more negative self-knowledge compared with participants with high self-esteem, and this induces selfprotection processes. The use of normative or neutral standards, in contrast, focuses both those with high and those with low self-esteem on using predominately positive self-knowledge to determine the meaning of their choices, which then leads to self-enhancement. The SSM also maintains that, once a tough choice is made, priming specific selfattributes can influence the motivation to rationalize or use positive self-knowledge as an affirmation (Steele et al., 1993). After dissonance is aroused by a difficult decision, if no further self-relevant thought occurs, the discrepancy will remain salient, and people will seek a means to reduce their discomfort. However, if new positive cognitions about the self are made accessible in the context, rationalization turns on the relevancy of the self-attributes to the discrepancy. If relevant positive attributes activate self-expectancies, people with high selfesteem should experience more discomfort than people with low self-esteem. Alternatively, if cues in the situation make accessible positive attributes that are irrelevant to the discrepant act, then people with high self-esteem will use them as an affirmational resource for dissonance reduction. Those with low self-esteem, who have fewer positive self-attributes in their self-knowledge structure, should instead rely on rationalization to reduce their discomfort. In one study designed to test these predictions (Stone & Cooper, 2003), participants chose to argue in favor of decreased funding for handicapped services on campus (a compassionless act). They then completed a sentence-scramble task (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) designed to prime either neutral attributes (e.g., punctual, average), positive attributes that were relevant to the discrepant choice (e.g., compassionate, thoughtful), or positive attributes that were irrelevant to the discrepant choice (e.g., creative, imaginative). The results showed that after participants wrote the compassionless essay, priming relevant positive selfattributes (e.g., compassion) caused more rationalization for those with high self-esteem than for those with low self-esteem, which reflects self-protection processes. In contrast, priming irrelevant positive self-attributes (e.g., creativity) caused more rationalization for participants with low self-esteem than for those with high self-esteem, which reflects the self-enhancement processes assumed by self-affirmation theory (Steele et al., 1993). Thus, as predicted by the SSM, the relative power of self-enhancement and self-protection turned on the accessibility and relevancy of the self-attributes brought to mind after a difficult choice was made. In summary, by directly manipulating the processes by which people evaluate a difficult choice, it is possible to predict when and how the motivation to protect the self versus the motivation to enhance positive self-regard drives postdecision rationalization. As specified by the SSM (Stone & Cooper, 2001), when cues in the immediate context lead people with low self-esteem to rely on their negative self-expectancies to make sense of their decisions, they bring to mind more negative than positive self-knowledge, which, in turn, provides a sense of protection that leads to less discomfort and need to justify the decision. However, cues that



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focus people with low self-esteem on the prevailing norms for behavior or that fail to provide them with resources to attenuate their discomfort can instill a desire for self-enhancement that leads them, as well as those with high self-esteem, to seek justification of their difficult decisions.

Multidimensional Models of Self-Esteem A different integrative approach to understanding the relative power of self-protection and self-enhancement in postdecision dissonance involves treating self-esteem as a multidimensional construct. Aronson (1999) proposed that, rather than conceptualizing high self-esteem only in terms of whether it is high or low, it might be more accurate to view high self-esteem as representing a positive sense of self that is either “fragile” or “well grounded.” Whereas those who possess fragile high self-esteem should be especially prone to maintaining their high expectancies by rationalizing a tough choice, those with well-grounded self-esteem should be especially resilient to decisions that challenge their positive expectancies. Aronson (1999) speculated that people who possess well-grounded high self-esteem should treat questionable choices as a learning experience. As a result, they ostensibly do not experience the discomfort that usually follows making a difficult decision (cf. Kernis & Waschull, 1995). Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, and Correll (2003) proposed and tested a similar theoretical perspective regarding a multidimensional model of high self-esteem. In their view, self-esteem is characterized by explicit, deliberate evaluations of the self and by implicit, unconscious evaluations of the self. People with explicit positive attitudes toward themselves are especially likely to rationalize a difficult decision if they also hold preconscious or implicit “nagging” self-doubts. When their explicit positive self-expectancies are challenged by a difficult decision, their unconscious self-doubts enter awareness and cause the arousal of dissonance. In contrast, people with explicit positive attitudes toward themselves who also hold implicit positive attitudes toward themselves possess a more “secure” sense of high self-esteem. Like Aronson’s (1999) well-grounded version, people with secure self-esteem are less likely to respond to a difficult decision by rationalizing it. Empirical support for this prediction was reported in a study in which participants completed measures of explicit and implicit self-esteem before making a decision in a free-choice procedure. Whereas participants with positive explicit but negative implicit self-esteem rationalized their difficult decisions, those with positive explicit and positive implicit self-esteem did not rationalize their choices. However, there was also no evidence of rationalization among participants with explicit low self-esteem, regardless of their levels of implicit self-esteem. Thus this study generally shows evidence of self-protection processes except for those who hold positive explicit and implicit attitudes toward themselves. More recent work (Jordan, Logel, Spender, Zanna, & Whitfield, 2008) suggested that people with low explicit–high implicit self-esteem respond defensively like those with high explicit–low implicit self-esteem, whereas those with explicit and implicit low self-esteem tend to show the lack of defensive responding to a discrepancy that is predicted by the self-consistency perspective. Research and theory linking multidimensional models of self-esteem to dissonance is still emerging and has yet to directly identify the processes that permit people with wellgrounded, secure, or stable high self-esteem to avoid rationalizing their behavior following a difficult decision. One possibility is that the dual positive attitudes that characterize secure high self-esteem influence the detection and/or interpretation of the difficult choice, such that

206   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES it is perceived as a discrepancy, but it does not represent a challenge to the positive view of self. This could reflect the type of open-minded, growth-oriented information processing proposed by some researchers (Correll et al., 2004; Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001). However, the lack of dissonance reduction in people with high implicit–explicit selfesteem could also reflect different forms of defensive responding. For example, if holding dual positive attitudes toward themselves causes people to distort their perceptions of the negative implications of a difficult choice, then the mechanism represents a form of self-serving bias that mitigates dissonance arousal. Another possibility is that the people who have dual positive attitudes toward themselves perceive a difficult choice as an inconsistency, but they resolve the dissonance through mechanisms other than rationalization. For example, they may be prone to trivialize the importance of the decision (Simon et al., 1995) or to deny responsibility for it (Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006). The degree to which the responses of people with dual attitudes toward themselves serve a self-protection or self-enhancement motive has yet to be addressed.

Conclusion When people have to choose between two or more very attractive alternatives, it may be very difficult for them to avoid the implications that the choice has for their current conceptions of self. As a result, they are likely to experience the discomfort associated with cognitive dissonance and become motivated to rationalize the decisions that they make. But the literature suggests that whether decision justification stems from the desire to protect their current self-knowledge or to enhance what they currently know, it is often driven by what goals, standards, and other aspects of the self are brought to mind in the decision context. Whereas the motive for self-enhancement may represent a global default, it clearly does not dominate thought and action in the presence of cues or other antecedents related to self-protection. Nevertheless, there is room to further integrate the self-protection and selfenhancement motives that influence postdecision rationalization processes. Research on the interplay between implicit and explicit processes may provide new understanding of these competing self-motives.

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Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2008). Self-enhancement: Food for thought. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(2), 102–116. Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self-defense: Self-affirmation theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 38, pp. 183–242). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Shrauger, J. S. (1975). Response to evaluation as a function of initial self-perceptions. Psychological Bulletin, 82(4), 581–596. Simon, L., Greenberg, J., & Brehm, J. (1995). Trivialization: The forgotten mode of dissonance reduction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 247–260. Snyder, M., & Tanke, E. D. (1976). Behavior and attitude: Some people are more consistent than others. Journal of Personality, 44, 510–517. Son Hing, L. S., Li, W., & Zanna, M. P. (2002). Inducing hypocrisy to reduce prejudicial responses among aversive racists. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 71–78. Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 261–302). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Steele, C. M., & Lui, T. J. (1983). Dissonance processes as self-affirmation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 5–19. Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Lynch, M. (1993). Dissonance and affirmational resources: Resilience against self-image threats. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 885–896. Stone, J. (1999). What exactly have I done? The role of self-attribute accessibility in dissonance. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 175–200). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Stone, J. (2003). Self-consistency for low self-esteem in dissonance processes: The role of self-standards. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 846–858. Stone, J. (2004). Investigating the self-standards model of self-justification. Unpublished raw data, University of Arizona. Stone, J. (2009). The power of the self-consistency motive in social life. In M. H. Gonzales, C. Tavris, & J. Aronson (Eds.), The scientist and the humanist: A festschrift in honor of Elliot Aronson. New York: Psychology Press. Stone, J., Aronson, E., Crain, A. L., Winslow, M. P., & Fried, C. B. (1994). Inducing hypocrisy as a means of encouraging young adults to use condoms. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 116–128. Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2001). A self-standards model of cognitive dissonance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 228–243. Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2003). The effect of self-attribute relevance on how self-esteem moderates attitude change in dissonance processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 508–515. Stone, J., & Fernandez, N. C. (2008). To practice what we preach: The use of hypocrisy and cognitive dissonance to motivate behavior change. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2, 1024–1051. Stone, J., Wiegand, A. W., Cooper, J., & Aronson, E. (1997). When exemplification fails: Hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 54–65. Swann, W. B., Jr. (1990). To be adored or to be known ? The interplay of self-enhancement and self-verification. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Motivation and cognition (Vol. 2, pp. 408–448), New York: Guilford Press. Takaku, S. (2006). Reducing road rage: An application of the dissonance-attribution model of interpersonal forgiveness. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 36, 2362–2378. Tesser, A. (2000). On the confluence of self-esteem maintenance mechanisms. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 290–299. Thibodeau, R., & Aronson, E. (1992). Taking a closer look: Reasserting the role of the self-concept in dissonance theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 591–602.

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Chapter 10 The Positivity Bias and the Fading Affect Bias in Autobiographical Memory A Self-Motives Perspective John J. Skowronski

It is very human to forget unpleasantness, so that when we reminisce about the past we can truly make those the good old days in our memory. When we fight to save the old courthouse from the wrecker’s ball, when we work to get old implements for a museum, we are more often than not trying to preserve the “good times” as we either remember them or want to remember them.                               —Terry Shoptaugh (1991)

T

wo phenomena that emerge from studies of autobiographical memory are the focus of this chapter. One of these is the positivity bias in the content of autobiographical memory. This is the tendency to sometimes see the past as more positive than it actually was. The second is the fading affect bias (FAB). Remembering the past often produces emotions, and the FAB reflects the tendency for positive memories to retain their emotion-provoking power for longer periods of time than negative memories. In this chapter, I argue that both of these effects can be driven by the kinds of cognitive processing instigated by the motives of self-protection, self-enhancement, and self-consistency. In the process of making this argument, I review the literature that has emerged for both of these biases. One conclusion from this review is that neither of these positivity biases is inevitable. Instead, although self-motives may generally work to promote positivity both in the content of recall and in emotional responses when recalling memories, there are specific circumstances in which these same self-motives might work against such positive trends. Moreover, I note that the emergence of evidence supportive of these effects may be related to

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212   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES the methods that one uses to explore memory. That is, the impact of the self-motives on the emergence of these positivity biases may be more readily apparent on some measures than on others. These themes will be apparent in the review of the positivity bias in the content of recall, which is the literature that I first review and scrutinize. These themes are reiterated in the review of the FAB literature, which is examined in a subsequent section of this chapter.

Relations between an Event’s Hedonic Valence and Autobiographical Memory: The Positivity Bias, Exceptions to the Bias, and the Causes of Such Effects It is a truism that there is a tendency to remember the past through “rose-colored glasses.” This positivity bias in the content of memory suggests that when trying to remember the events of their lives, peoples’ memories tend to “accentuate the positive” and “eliminate the negative.” Indeed, examinations of the relation between an event’s hedonic tone and memory for the event are often observed in the scholarly literature exploring the psychology of memory; the results of many studies have evinced some form of a positivity bias (Barrett, 1938; Bohn & Berntsen, 2007; Carter, 1935; Matlin, Beard, & Rose, 1981; Monnier & Syssau, 2008; White, 1936; White & Powell, 1936; White & Ratliff, 1934; also see Mather, 2006). One manifestation of this positivity bias is that people tend to selectively remember the positive and selectively forget the negative. For example, people sometimes look back on the days of their youth with longing, recalling sun-splashed days of bucolic pleasure and bemoaning their current stress-filled urbanized existence. When recalling events in this manner, they seem to conveniently forget about the negatives of those early days: Among them might be the prevalence of devastating diseases (e.g., tuberculosis and polio), comparatively short life spans, having to work at backbreaking jobs for 12 to 16 hours a day, and relatively widespread poverty. Research verifies that these selective positivity effects in memory can emerge. For example, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008) asked participants to recall positive and negative events that involved self-evaluations (i.e., pride and shame) and positive and negative events that involved evaluations about others (i.e., admiration and contempt); various phenomenological characteristics of the events (e.g., sensory details, feelings of reexperiencing) were assessed using rating scales. The results showed that people reported subjectively remembering positive events with more details than negative events for events that involve self-evaluations; this outcome did not occur for events that involved evaluations of others. A second version of this positivity bias refers to distortions in memory. In one type of distortion, events are misrecalled to be more positive (or less negative) than warranted when compared with the objective historical record. For example, an individual might recall that he or she hit a “hot line drive” double to win a baseball game; a video replay of the event might suggest that the ball was more of a “blooper.” Similarly, an individual might recall that he or she made a critical error on a ball that was hit “like a bullet”; video replay might suggest that the ball was a normal “grounder.” However, a second kind of distortion reflects false memory: reporting memories of events that never happened. It is easy to see how such false memories might tend toward positivity, to the seeming benefit of the self. For example, one might experience a “memory” of studying intensely in preparation for one’s graduate record exams, when, in fact, no such studying ever occurred.



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Research shows that such distortions can, indeed, occur. One example comes from Bahrick, Hall, and Berger (1996), who reported that college students who were asked to report their high school grades remembered more A’s than were present on their transcripts (also see Bahrick, Hall, & Da Costa, 2008; Crary, 1966). A second example comes from Croyle and colleagues (2006), who examined accuracy of recall for self-relevant health information. The results that they obtained showed that people misrecalled their cholesterol scores and the cardiovascular risk categories into which they were placed. Moreover, recall errors showed a systematic bias: Individuals who received the most undesirable test results were most likely to remember their cholesterol scores and cardiovascular risk categories as lower (i.e., healthier) than those actually received (for results with similar implications, see Christensen, Wood, & Barrett, 2003). These memory tendencies seem to emerge fairly early in life. For example, Wilson, Smith, Ross, and Ross (2004) investigated children’s personal representations of significant sibling conflicts. Forty pairs of siblings were interviewed separately about the same disputes. Although they described the same episodes, both older (M age = 7.0) and younger (M age = 4.4) siblings ascribed more serious transgressions to their opponents than to themselves.

Theories That Can Predict a Positivity Bias in Autobiographical Memory Content Based on his review of the literature, Greenwald (1980) concluded that people often paint a picture of their past actions and characteristics that is overly favorable. This conclusion is widely accepted (perhaps more so than is warranted), and numerous theoretical perspectives have emerged to explain it. These theoretical perspectives almost always involve the self, either implicitly or explicitly, as a key element of the theorizing. For example, early scholarly interest in the positivity bias in memory was often framed by the speculations of Freud with respect to the phenomenon of repression (as reflected in various volumes of the Standard Edition translation of Freud, 1953–1974). Freud hypothesized that defense mechanisms, some conscious, some unconscious, worked to inhibit recall of negative events relative to recall of positive events, particularly when the negative events posed a threat (see Standard Edition, Vol. 14, pp. 143–158; Vol. 23, pp. 3–137). The repression idea was further used to suggest that memories that are especially threatening can become extremely inaccessible, so much so that people can appear to have “forgotten” that they experienced very traumatic events. Accordingly, one of the goals of some therapies was to facilitate access to these “forgotten” traumatic events; such access was thought to have diagnostic, as well as therapeutic, value. For some, mechanisms underlying this phenomenon were outside of the study of memory mechanisms that have long been the domain ruled by cognitive psychologists. That is, there seemed to be a line of thought among some scholars (Edelson, 1990) that the mechanisms that were proposed by Freud were somehow different from the mundane mechanisms, such as encoding, attention, storage, organization, and retrieval, that became the focus of experimental work on memory (for various perspectives on this issue, see J. L. Singer, 1990). More recent work (Erdelyi, 2006) has tried to broker a rapprochement between Freud and contemporary experimental approaches to memory by attempting to translate Freud into the modern language of cognitive psychology. Although this effort has been criticized, perhaps for good reasons (Hayne, Garry, & Loftus, 2006; Kihlstrom, 2006; McNally, 2006), at the very least the attempt demonstrates the understanding that one needs to make a clear

214   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES distinction between the descriptive phenomena that comprise the positivity bias (selective memory and memory distortion) and the motivationally driven mental structures, processes, and mechanisms that might be responsible for these effects. One problem with early bias studies was that this outcome–process distinction was not made: Selective memory and memory distortion were seen as prima facie evidence of repression (Sharp. 1938). Such interpretations ignored the fact that positivity biases could occur as a result of many mechanisms, only some of which fit with the mechanisms that Freud saw as promoting repression. Erdelyi’s analysis reflects this distinction. However, whether or not one views the mechanisms cited by Erdelyi as fitting with the Freudian concept of repression, it is clear that such mechanisms can sometimes work toward promotion of positivity and the elimination of negativity in autobiographical memory (also see Levy & Anderson, 2008). The hypothesis that a positivity bias can emerge in autobiographical memory can also be generated from contemporary thinking about the self (Sedikides & Green, 2009). The argument is that the powerful motivations of self-enhancement and self-protection, as well as both cognitive and motivational tendencies toward self-consistency, should generally work to promote recall of positive autobiographical memories and to diminish recall of negative autobiographical memories (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Libby & Eibach, 2007; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). One can link these motives and the mental mechanisms to which they are related to ideas described by Erdelyi (2006; Sedikides & Green, 2006). For example, Sedikides and Green (2000; also see Sedikides & Green, 2004) found that people had poor memory for self-threatening negative feedback (for a similar finding, see Rhodewalt & Eddings, 2002), but that this effect was eliminated when people were given limited time to process the feedback. The inferences that the authors drew from this finding were: (1) that when given ample time, people voluntarily avoid the self-threatening feedback and reflect on the self-promoting positive feedback and (2) when processing time is limited, there is no opportunity for differential avoidance and approach to operate in the memory domain. Is this avoidance of threat posed by negative memories intentional? Sedikides and Green (2009) suggest that avoidance might not be intentional; if it were, then there might be some probability of producing undesirable rebound effects (as in Wegner, 1994; but see Joormann, Hertel, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005) that would enhance recall of negative memories. However, theoretical perspectives grounded in emotion regulation (Charles & Carstensen, 2007; Wranik, Barrett, & Salovey, 2007) imply the possible operation of such intentional mechanisms. The line of reasoning derived from these ideas relies on the powerful mood-altering properties of autobiographical memories (Gebauer, Broemer, Haddock, & von Hecker, 2008; Kensinger & Leclerc, 2009; Kross, Davidson, Weber, & Ochsner, 2009; Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 1996; Philippe, Lecours, & Beaulieu-Pelletier, 2009; Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2006). One can argue that people should prefer to be in a positive mood and that they will take actions to promote this positive mood state. One of the actions that can be taken is to recall positive memories and to avoid recall of negative memories. This mental activity implies differential rehearsal rates for positive memories and negative memories, which could lead to long-term differences in memory strength for these two types of event valence (for a similar suggestion, see Matlin & Underhill, 1979). Some authors have suggested that individual differences in the propensity to engage in mood-altering activities might be related to the tendency for positivity biases in memory to emerge. For example, Mather and her associates have engaged in a program of research suggesting that the elderly are more likely to evince a positivity bias in memory than the youthful



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and that this difference is a consequence of the elderly’s tendency to use autobiographical memory for purposes of emotion regulation (for a review, see Mather & Carstensen, 2005). For example, in one study (Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004), 300 nuns, ages 47 to 102 years, recalled personal information originally reported 14 years earlier. They did so under experimental conditions that either repeatedly prompted the nuns to focus on their current emotional states or on their memory accuracy or that provided no instructional focus. Both older control participants and participants who were focused on current emotional states showed a tendency to remember the past more positively than they had originally reported in 1987. In contrast, both younger control participants and participants who were focused on accuracy tended to remember the past more negatively than originally reported. This age-related positivity may also extend to false-memory effects. This was the conclusion reached by Fernandes, Ross, Wiegand, & Schryer (2008). These authors examined memory for autobiographical, picture, and word information in a group of younger (17–29 years old) and older (60–84 years old) adults. For the autobiographical memory task, the authors asked participants to produce four positive, four negative, and four neutral recent autobiographical memories and to recall these a week later. For the picture and word tasks, participants studied photos or words of different valences (positive, negative, neutral) and later remembered them on a free-recall test. The authors found significant correlations in memory performance across task material for recall of both positive- and neutral-valence autobiographical events, pictures, and words. However, when the authors examined accurate memories across the different types of material, they failed to find consistent evidence of a positivity effect in either age group. Instead, an age-related positivity effect emerged in false-memory response: Older participants recalled more false-positive than false-negative memories and did so for all types of material. At least one additional set of theoretical mechanisms can be applied to the finding of a hedonic valence effect in memory. These mechanisms rely on the tendency for the self to desire self-consistency and for the cognitive system to be especially congenial to selfconsistent information, and they suggest that such tendencies are additional driving forces underlying a positivity bias in memory (a position advocated by Greenwald, 1980, and Ross, 1989). Hence, from this view, one can argue that the positivity bias in memory might emerge from the manner in which the cognitive system differentially processes (usually self-consistent) positive information and (usually self-inconsistent) negative information (for insight into how those with negative self-views might process affective information, see Joormann, Teachman, & Gotlib, 2009). Fundamental to this position is the idea that people generally have a positive view of themselves; given this assumption, then information that fits this positive self-view might be advantaged in memory in a number of ways. A host of cognitive mechanisms might be involved; this chapter does not provide the space to review them all (but see Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003; Skowronski & Walker, 2004; Strauss & Allen, 2006; and Thompson, Skowronski, Larsen, & Betz, 1996, pp. 69–75). As but one example, consider that a reliable finding that emerges from research in cognitive (Ridderinkhof & Bashore, 1995) and social (Roese & Sherman, 2007) psychology is that people process expectancy-consistent information in a manner that is different from the manner in which they process expectancy-inconsistent information. If positive information is expectancy-consistent, then it might be more easily encoded (Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, & Sherman, 2001) than negative information (but see Sedikides & Green, 2004). As a second

216   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES example, one might speculate that positive information might be processed in a manner that is especially likely to integrate that information with other positive self-knowledge, providing multiple pathways that can facilitate retrieval of information in free-recall or cued-recall tasks (as suggested by White, 1936). Negative information may not be stored in such an integrated manner, leading to poorer recall on such tasks. As a final mechanism example, is possible that, when reconstructing memories for events, people’s positively biased selfconceptions might cause event details to be reconstructed such that they reflect the positivity of the self-conception. Research by Gramzow and Willard (2006; also see Willard & Gramzow, 2008) illustrates the operation of self-consistency mechanisms that might work independently of the self-protection and self-enhancement motives. These authors speculated that current performance is of motivational and self-evaluative significance, so exaggerations of current performance might stem from motivated self-enhancement concerns. However, the authors also speculated that self-reports of past performance might sometimes be relatively uninfluenced by motivated self-enhancement, instead demonstrating an impact of self-consistency effects on reconstructions of past events. To pursue this idea, they asked students to report memories of one fact that was highly relevant to the current self-concept and to self-goals (grade point averages [GPA]) and a second fact (SAT scores) that had been important to the self in the past but was unrelated to the current self or its goals. Results of an initial study demonstrated that dispositional self-enhancement predicted greater GPA (but not SAT) exaggeration, whereas advanced class standing predicted greater SAT (but not GPA) exaggeration. Results of a second study demonstrated that a self-affirmation manipulation attenuated the association between dispositional self-enhancement and GPA exaggeration, but not the association between class standing and SAT exaggeration. Collectively, these data suggest that both self-enhancement and self-consistency mechanisms can work to promote a positivity bias in recall (but for a contrary view, see Sedikides & Green, 2004).

Just How Powerfully Do the Data Support the Hedonic Valence Hypothesis? That at least four reasonably well-known and powerful theories involving the self seemingly lead to the same prediction of a hedonic valence effect (or positivity bias) in autobiographical memory might lead some to have high confidence in the empirical emergence of the phenomenon, as does the seemingly regular emergence of hedonic valence effects in many studies. Indeed, Walker, Skowronski, and Thompson (2003) confidently declared that “Life is pleasant—and memory helps keep it that way.” However, skeptics might suggest that the autobiographical memory data are not always entirely congruent with the presence of a hedonic valence effect. This may be a surprise to some, but it is a state of affairs that has been known for some time. For example, Meltzer (1930) reviewed the results of 26 studies that examined the relation between hedonic valence and memory. His summary reflects the contradictoriness of the evidence, revealing: (1) results favoring pleasantness, (2) results favoring unpleasantness, (3) results favoring either hedonic tone over neutral tone, (4) results favoring neither hedonic tone, to (5) indifferent results. Similar inconsistency was reflected in a review by Matlin and Stang (1978). Their assessment was that a hedonic valence effect emerged in only two out of every three studies that they reviewed. Indeed, contemporary studies that look for evidence of valence effects sometimes



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continue to fail to find evidence of the effect (Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004; Thompson, 1985). Even more pessimism about consistency of the positivity effect in memory may come from some researchers who have studied the relation between trauma and memory. One of these researchers (Berntsen, 2001) suggests that, contradicting the repression hypothesis, the available evidence shows that traumatic events are essentially unforgettable (also see Berntsen, 2002; Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008; Thomsen & Berntsen, 2009). Corroborating this conclusion, McNally (2003) concludes that the evidence favoring the repression of threatening memories is very weak, at best. However, the extent to which such evidence applies to the hedonic valence hypothesis may be limited. The studies that McNally (2003) reviews focus on the tendency to forget traumatic events. Although McNally (correctly, in my view) concludes that people do not forget such events, the essence of the hedonic valence/positivity hypothesis is that such negative events should be recalled more poorly than positive events or should experience distortion that reduces the accuracy of negative memories relative to the accuracy of positive memories. The studies that McNally reviews generally do not offer comparisons of recall of negative events with recall of positive events. Particularly important to the hedonic valence hypothesis might be comparison with positive events that are equivalent in extremity to negative events. Indeed, such a comparison was crucial to a series of studies conducted by Thompson, Skowronski, and their colleagues (summarized in Thompson et al., 1996, Chapter 4). Those studies asked each participant to keep a diary of events from their own lives, and to provide at the time of recording a series of ratings. These ratings contained information about the event’s valence and extremity. Later, each participant was given the verbal descriptions that they provided and were asked to report on a response scale how well they remembered each event. The data were analyzed by means of simultaneous multiple regression in which hedonic valence and extremity were entered as predictors of the memory ratings provided. Results showed that extremity significantly predicted the memory ratings in 8 out of the 10 studies reviewed. Because extremity was such a strong and consistent predictor of the memory ratings, it is not surprising that McNally’s (2003) review suggested that people generally had good memory for traumatic events. Such events tend to be extreme, and event extremity tends to be positively related to event memory. More relevant to the hedonic valence hypothesis was whether event valence predicted the memory ratings such that a positivity bias emerged in recall, controlling for the extremity of the events. In such analyses, the hedonic valence effect significantly emerged in six of the reviewed studies; the valence variable approached significance as a predictor of the memory ratings in two of the reviewed studies and was not a significant predictor of the memory ratings in the final two studies. Because these studies examined the hedonic valence effect in a manner that controlled for extremity effects, the results reported by Thompson et al. (1996) suggest that earlier positivity biases in recall that were reported in similar diary-based autobiographical memory studies (ones that did not control for extremity effects; Linton, 1975; Wagenaar, 1986, 1994; White, 2002) may not have been compromised by their failure to control for extremity effects. However, it is important to note that, even when hedonic valence was a statistically reliable predictor of the memory ratings, the analyses presented by Thompson et al. (1996) show that magnitude of the hedonic valence effect was relatively small in comparison with

218   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES the magnitude of the extremity effect. Hence the fact that valence effects do not emerge in all studies, even those that used methods similar to those reported by Thompson et al. (1996; Talarico, et al., 2004) suggests that the overall hedonic valence effect in autobiographical memory is relatively weak. One of the other important implications of the results of some of the studies described by Thompson et al. (1996) is that the hedonic valence effect is not simply the consequence of negativity but instead emerges only when negativity is relevant to the self. This point was made most strongly by Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, and Shannon (1991). In two studies, participants kept diaries both for themselves and for another person (typically a friend, significant other, or family member). The same kinds of event ratings and memory ratings that were outlined for the diary studies described earlier were again collected. Their data showed evidence of positivity biases in memory when people reported how well they recalled their own events. However, examination of the hedonic valence effect in memory for the events of others (controlling for event extremity, which again strongly predicted the memory ratings) was enlightening: When remembering the events that pertain to another person, memory for the negative events that happened to the person was better than memory for the positive events. Hence, although the tendency might be to remember better the positive events than the negative events in one’s own life, the reverse seems to occur in memory for the life events of another person. This outcome suggests that it is not simply whether an event is positive or negative that contributes to an event’s recallability; it is also whether that event pertains to oneself. This lends additional credence to the operation of the theoretical mechanisms for hedonic valence effects in autobiographical memory that were described earlier in this chapter; such mechanisms would mostly be inapplicable when remembering events from the life of another person. The importance of the self to the hedonic valence effect is also highlighted by research into the phenomenon of mnemic neglect (Sedikides & Green, 2009). This research uses a laboratory paradigm in which people are given false performance feedback and are later asked to remember the feedback. The valence of the feedback is systematically manipulated: Sometimes it is positive, sometimes it is negative. However, in these studies (Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008) the self-relevance of the feedback is also manipulated: Sometimes the feedback is relevant to traits that are central to subjects’ self conceptions; at other times, the feedback is relevant to traits that are peripheral to subjects’ self-conceptions. Results using this paradigm reflect the presence of a hedonic valence effect, such that people recall the positive feedback better than they recall negative feedback. However, this effect does not emerge when the feedback pertains to peripheral traits; it emerges only when the feedback pertains to traits that are central to subjects’ self-conceptions. Here again, recall is not simply determined by the valence of the event (in this case, the feedback); instead, it is prompted only when the negative feedback has the potential to threaten the self.

Sources of Violations of the Positivity Bias in Autobiographical Memory: Self-Relevant Event Information Processing and Methodological Considerations One important lesson of research is that a focus on the mental structures, processes, and mechanisms that are involved in processing memories and how these might be affected by self-motivations can help scholars to understand some of the inconsistency that emerges



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in examinations of the valence–memory relation. A fine exemplar of this idea comes from the work of Wilson, Ross, and their colleagues (Cameron, Wilson, & Ross, 2004; Ross & Wilson, 2002, 2003; Wilson & Ross, 2000, 2001; for results with similar implications, see McFarland & Alvaro, 2000; Safer & Keuler, 2002), who suggest that the self-enhancement and self-protective motives that serve to maintain the positivity of the current self can sometimes produce a negativity bias in memory for past events. The Wilson and Ross team suggests that this can occur as a consequence of the meaning-making activities in which people engage as events are retrospectively considered and rehearsed. For example, one way in which I might glorify my current ability to write psychology manuscripts is to remember how bad I was at the activity when I entered graduate school. The meaning to be derived from the parable that I construct about myself is: “look at how far I’ve come—I could barely put crayon to page when I started, but now I can actually manage to string some sentences together.” The fact of the matter is that for this self-parable to have maximum impact, one must emphasize (via selective memory or memory distortion) just how bad one was at the start of one’s graduate education. This exact effect has been observed in the research conducted by the Wilson and Ross team. Indeed, one of the lessons from this body of research is that people in reconstruct their early performance levels and that such reconstructions reflect performance that is worse than suggested by the historical record (Ross & Wilson, 2003). Despite the negativity bias in these memories, the bias serves the self: Cameron et al. (2004) argue that this reconstructive distortion of memory has the effect of making the current self look good via the effects of mental comparison with the old self. Similar results were reported by Dewhurst and Marlborough (2003). These authors noted that previous research has shown that students asked to recall the anxiety levels they reported prior to an exam sometimes exaggerated how anxious they had been. The researchers hypothesized that this effect might be related to the self-enhancement and self-protection motives and explored this idea by asking participants to rate their anxiety levels 48 hours prior to an exam and to later recall these levels after receiving their exam results. The exaggerated recall of preexam anxiety was observed only in students who surpassed their target grade. Students who failed to achieve their target grade significantly underestimated their preexam anxiety levels. Echoing the conclusion of the Wilson and Ross team, Dewhurst and Marlborough (2003) attributed these findings to the action of the self-enhancement and selfprotection motives that bias the recall of preexam anxiety in the direction that maximizes current self-esteem. Hence, in this body of research, the self-enhancing or self-protective goal of accentuating the positive does not eliminate memory for the negative; via the mechanisms of rehearsal and meaning-making, the effect can actually be to maintain or enhance memory for the negative. However, given the way that memory becomes framed over time, remembering the negative actually has a positive effect—it makes the current self feel good, and it probably provides an entertaining story to relate to others. (For the record, I do wish to point out that I could actually wield a pen at the start of my graduate program—but my graduate advisor would undoubtedly agree with the assessment that my writing at that time was definitely not up to professional standard; he used to draw tanks on my manuscripts and employed them to blow up some of my less desirable phrasings). Meaning making is a routine activity (Barclay, 1996; McAdams, 2006; Pasupathi, 2001; Pasupathi, Mansour, & Brubaker, 2007), and, as such, it has the potential to affect memory

220   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES for many negative autobiographical events as they become incorporated into the life story. For example, a recent study by Ritchie, Skowronski, Hartnett, Wells, and Walker (2009) examined events that had changed their affective tenor over time, moving from negative to positive or vice versa. Examination of such events lends support to the notion that meaningmaking activity may affect event memory. For example, consider the plight of a person who had been “dumped” by a significant other. Such an event might have been crushing when it happened, and rightly so. However, as the person’s life progressed, that person might have become partners with another significant other, and that new person turned out to be “the one” or “the soul mate.” In such a case, that initial soul-crushing dumping might come to be perceived as a fortuitous event because it ultimately led to a very positive outcome. In such a case, one would likely not expect memory for the dumping event to be diminished. In fact, one might expect that because of the high relevance of the entire event sequence, which ended up as positive to the current self, memory for the “dumping” event might actually be quite good and might strongly persist over time. Indeed, the story becomes even more poignant if the crushing nature of the original breakup is emphasized. Accordingly, some have speculated that such effects might be maintained or enhanced by an individual’s propensity to relate life tales to others and that such effects should be enhanced by the norms that dictate that positive and personally revealing tales be related to others during interpersonal discourse (Skowronski & Walker, 2004). More generally, these considerations suggest that an understanding of relations between event valence and memory necessitates an understanding of how an event fits into a series of events and actions—either real or as formed into a personal narrative (an idea anticipated by J. A. Singer, 1990). This points to one limitation of laboratory research that examines valence effects or even of autobiographical memory research that considers memory for events in isolation from memory for other events: Such studies often fail to appropriately consider the effects of this kind of postevent processing on the long-term memory for autobiographical events. Another conclusion of the tale that I am trying to relate to you is that I believe that at least some of the apparent inconsistency in the hedonic valence–memory relation might be attributed to the kinds of mental activities specified by Cameron et al. (2004) and by the narrative researchers. That is, although the motives and mental mechanisms that are involved in processing affectively toned material may tend to favor memory for positive information over negative information, under the right circumstances those mechanisms can be coopted to eliminate that outcome or even to produce the reverse outcome. I am sure that, because readers of this chapter are likely to be unusually perceptive, they will have already noted the truth of this statement. For example, several of the studies that have been described revealed the presence of moderators of the positivity bias. For example, in the studies of memory for feedback, it was only feedback that was threatening to the self, not all negative feedback, that produced a positivity bias in memory for the feedback. In the studies of the relation between aging and the positivity bias in memory, it was only the older nuns who evinced a positivity bias in autobiographical memory; the younger nuns did not. Reversals of the positivity bias were also observed in the Wilson and Ross team’s studies in which people sometimes remembered their past abilities as worse than they actually were and in the studies assessing recall for preexam anxiety in which people sometimes had accentuated recall for preexam anxiety. The lesson here is that researchers cannot automatically assume that there will be a posi-



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tivity bias in recall. Instead, the exact relation between event valence and memory that will emerge in a given situation (or in a given study) will depend on the precise blend of circumstances that are in play when a researcher examines the hedonic valence–memory relation. To reiterate, although the cognitive and motivational systems may favor positive information, such favoritism may dissipate under certain circumstances and when those circumstances are accompanied by appropriate cognitive processing. These circumstances may reflect elements of method. For example, one can probe memory in many different ways, and the exact method used may moderate the emergence of a positivity bias: Such a bias outcome might not emerge using all measures. For example, Newby-Clark and Ross (2003) did not find evidence of a positivity bias in memory when they measured memory via speed of memory generation (but see White & Ratliff, 1934). The Green et al. (2008) studies described earlier in this chapter found that the positivity bias emerges when free recall is used as the method of assessing memory, but not when a recognition measure is used. Additional methodological considerations emerge from those studies that assess autobiographical memory by asking people to self-report the “goodness” of the memory. There can be different dimensions on which a memory can be “good”—it can be accessible, vivid, or held with high confidence as a known “fact” (e.g., Ritchie, Skowronski, Walker, & Wood, 2006). In addition, memory questions might probe memory for different components of the memory—for example, whether details are central or peripheral to an event. Hedonic valence effects in autobiographical memory might occur on some of these measures, but not on others (see Berntsen, 2002; Bohn & Berntsen, 2007; Levine & Bluck, 2004; Talarico, Berntsen, & Rubin, 2009). Moreover, one can probe memory for different elements of the past. One can probe for recall of memory for various details of an event—with whom one was, what happened, what one was doing when it happened, where it happened, and when it happened. One can also probe for personal reactions to the event, as well as for the status of the self when the event happened. For example, one can assess various elements of the self, such as perceptions and evaluations of how one was feeling before the event, how the event made one feel (Levine, Safer, & Lench, 2006), and one’s evaluation of the self just before or just after the event. Again, it is surely the case that some of these elements will be more subject to hedonic valence biases in recall than others. For example, in their review of their results from 10 diary studies, Thompson et al. (1996) examined participants’ performance at exactly placing the date on which events occurred. They found a positivity bias in event-dating accuracy, but the bias appeared to be substantially weaker than the positivity bias that they documented in selfreports of memory goodness. Hence, in probing for the presence of hedonic valence effects in memory, researchers must closely consider the cognitive processes thought to underlie such effects and effective ways to probe the memory system for the presence of such effects (for a similar point, see Levine & Pizarro, 2004). More important, one conclusion to be drawn from this review and critique of the literature is that differential memorability is not an intrinsic property of positive events versus negative events. Instead, I suggest that: (1) the positivity bias in event memory generally emerges as a consequence of the self’s motivational and cognitive tendencies toward self-protection, self-enhancement, and self-consistency, but (2) it is clear from the data that these tendencies, can, under certain circumstances, with certain measures, and with certain people, be negated or reversed. Nonetheless, as noted by Cameron et al. (2004),

222   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES at least some of these reversals continue to point to the importance of the tendencies toward self-enhancement, self-protection, and self-consistency that work to drive an individual’s memories of his or her personal past.

How Recalling Events Makes One Feel: The FAB A similar conclusion is likely to apply in a second domain of memory–affect relations: the study of how recalling memories makes one feel at the time of recall (J. A. Singer, 1990). Clearly, as noted earlier in this chapter, recalling events can have emotional consequences. Sometimes, as in recalling the death of a spouse, those emotions can be quite painful. At other times, as in recalling specific events that one engaged in with the spouse, the emotions can be quite uplifting. Recall of such events often produces emotional responses that resemble those experienced in response to the original events. However, it stands to reason that the emotional experiences prompted by the memories are not always exactly the same as the emotions prompted by the original events. Only recently has concentrated scientific attention been paid to how the emotions that accompany memories change across time (exceptions are Cason, 1932; Holmes, 1970). For example, in one influential series of studies (Walker, Vogl, & Thompson, 1997), participants were asked to keep a diary of unique events and to make ratings for each event at the time that the event occurred. The diaries were collected weekly. At the end of the recording period, participants were brought into the laboratory, where they were tested on the contents of their diaries. Thirty-eight participants in one study were tested after a 3.5-month retention interval; 6 participants in a second study were tested after a 1-year retention interval; and 1 participant in a third study was tested after a 4.5-year retention interval. One of the ratings made at both the time of the event and at the time of test was a pleasantness rating. Examination of these ratings showed that, unsurprisingly, the intensity of emotions prompted by event recall decreased with the increase of the passage of time between event occurrence and event recall. The surprise in the data came from an examination of the data in terms of the valence of the original event: The intensity of the affect prompted by recall of negative events faded faster than the intensity of the affect prompted by recall of positive events. This outcome has come to be known as the fading affect bias (FAB). To exemplify this effect, imagine the intense anger that might have accompanied a betrayal by a friend when the event occurred; a milder anger response might emerge when the sequence of events leading to the betrayal is recalled. In comparison, the intense joy that might have accompanied scoring a championship-winning football game might provoke a fairly strong sense of happiness when later examining photos of the event in old newspaper clippings. Research conducted so far suggests that the FAB is a real characteristic of autobiographical event recall and cannot be accounted for by variables such as differences in the initial extremity of unpleasant events and pleasant events, better recall of pleasant events than unpleasant events, distorted memory for the affect that accompanied the initial event, the arousal of the emotion prompted by the initial event, the mood of the judge at the time of rating, or personal theories of emotion change (Ritchie et al., 2009; Ritchie & Skowronski, 2008; Ritchie, Skowronski, Wood, et al., 2006; Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Walker,



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2004; Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl, & Thompson, 2003; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003).

The FAB Comes in Two Flavors Progressing research suggests that the original conception of the bias as lowered intensity across time for negative events than positive events was partially correct—this was, indeed, one of the effects observed in the data. However, there was a second kind of affect change that was noticed in the data: Sometimes events changed their valence from occurrence to recall, with negative events at occurrence becoming positive events at recall, and vice versa (Ritchie et al., 2009). Such events are easy to imagine. For example, bring to mind a scholar who was denied tenure in her first job. Her original reaction to the event may have been distress. However, when she now recalls the event, she experiences relief. This may occur when, from the perspective of her new job, she recognizes the stresses that she was subject to in her original department and how much more hospitable her new department is compared with the old one. In comparison, imagine that a woman who was being courted might have been thrilled at the time she received a marriage proposal. However, after recently meeting her “soul mate,” the woman may now feel considerable regret at experiencing the marriage proposal episode. The Ritchie et al. (2009) results suggest that these changes do not occur at equal rates: Events that are originally negative were more likely to evince reversal of the valence of emotions prompted by later recall than are events that were positive at their occurrence. Hence, there seem to be two kinds of affect biases: one that reflects a more rapid decrease in the emotion intensity prompted by negative events than by positive events from event occurrence to event recall and a second that reflects the fact that events that were negative at event occurrence are more likely to prompt positive emotions at later recall than events that were positive at event occurrence are to prompt negative emotions at recall. However, regardless of the specific “flavor” of the FAB under consideration, as with the positivity effect in memory, the fingerprints of the self are beginning to emerge as important to the effects. This is apparent in some of the variables that are known to moderate the effect. For example, Ritchie, Skowronski, Wood, et al. (2006) found that the magnitude of the FAB was especially small when autobiographical events were perceived to be self-important, psychologically open (seen as a part of the self’s past; Beike & WirthBeaumont, 2005), or self-caused.

Mechanisms Underlying the FAB: The Self, Echoes of the Positivity Bias in Memory Content, and Some New Ideas Recent theorizing about the FAB (Walker & Skowronski, 2009) highlights the similarity in mechanisms thought to underlie the positivity biases in both memory and emotion. Walker and Skowronski argue that at least some of the change in affect that emerges in the emotions prompted by event recall reflects reevaluation of events in light of current life circumstances, a point anticipated by Levine and Bluck (2004). As noted in the discussion of the positivity effect in memory, such effects suggest that one variable that must be accounted for when trying to understand the emotions prompted by event recall are the processes that people use

224   PERCEPTUAL, JUDGMENTAL, AND MEMORY PROCESSES to construe events. Such construals do not end with the occurrence of the event but instead might persist through life as an individual attempts to make sense of his or her “life story” (McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007). To the extent that individuals’ activities in this regard will emphasize the positive in the self and minimize the negative, the emergence of the FAB makes considerable sense. Walker and Skowronski (2009) also argue that the FAB can be viewed through a lens of functionality. A positive self is seen as essential to an individual’s optimal functioning in a social world (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Sedikides, Skowronski, & Gaertner, 2004). Thus Walker and Skowronski (2009) argue that some of the same cognitive processes and social processes that work toward maintaining the positivity of the self contribute to the emergence of the FAB in the emotions that accompany autobiographical event memories. Obviously, these can include the motives of self-protection and self-enhancement and, to some extent, the tendency toward self-consistency. Although these broad motivations might be the general guides that shape the outlines of the FAB, those guides require specific mechanisms that translate the motives into psychological effects. FAB research has only begun to explore these mechanisms. One kind of mechanism lies in the ways in which events are rehearsed. For example, consider how mental reactions might differ in response to the failure of a research study. Some might simply ruminate on the event (e.g., “It didn’t work! I can’t believe the thing did not work”). Some might try to understand the event, perhaps engaging in counterfactual thinking while doing so (e.g., “If only I had run my subjects earlier in the semester, I might have gotten better results”). Some might have a forward-looking focus that engages in problem-solving activity (e.g., “I’m going to do this again next semester, but this time I’ll use a stronger manipulation”). Some might trivialize the failure (e.g., “It was only a class project—who cares?”). Preliminary results suggest that mental processing of events, indeed, does matter to the emergence of the FAB. For example, results from Ritchie et al. (2006) suggested that the FAB was especially large when people engaged in mental problem-solving activity (largely in response to negative events) or when they rehearsed events for the purpose of “savoring” the event-related emotion (largely for positive events). However, this study reflected only a first pass at the issue; there obviously is much more to be done to pursue this research direction. One of the other important mechanisms pursued in recent research concerns the extent to which conveying events to others might be related to the FAB. In this regard, Skowronski and Walker (2004) argued that socially sharing event memories with others could have distinct effects on the subsequent recall of those memories and on the emotions accompanying those memories. That is, they argued that socially conveying autobiographical events often requires that the informant follow a carefully scripted set of conversational norms. They further argued that adherence to such norms may ultimately work to minimize the negative elements and to enhance the positive elements of events. Another force pushing research in this direction was the finding that social support from others often helps people to overcome the aftereffects of negative and traumatic events (Cohen & Willis, 1985). In general terms, social support refers to function and quality in social relationships. Social support can take many forms, including instrumental (e.g., assistance with a problem), tangible (e.g., donating goods), informational (e.g., giving advice), and emotional (e.g., giving reassurance). It is not hard to imagine how these mechanisms



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of social support might alter an individual’s emotional response to a recalled event. For example, imagine that a person describes a negative event to a friend. That friend might respond to the event description with messages of support, entreaties to avoid self-blame, and encouragement to blame the negative event on other people or on bad luck that will not be repeated. Thus an interaction with a sympathetic listener might help to remove the sting of negative events. Skowronski and Walker (2004) speculated that these social support mechanisms may also promote positive emotional responses to events. Imagine that a person describes a positive event to a friend. That friend might reply to that event with expressions of joy, attributing that good event to the describer’s personal qualities and implying that the event might be likely to occur again in the future. It is not hard to imagine how, over time, such reactions might influence the affect associated with recalled events. A series of studies by Skowronski et al. (2004) examined these ideas. Results from one study revealed a strong FAB for events that had been frequently disclosed to others and a relatively weak FAB for events that had been infrequently shared with others. Results of a second study revealed a strong FAB for events that were shared with multiple others and a weak FAB for events that were shared with few others. One difficulty with these studies is that they were solely observational in nature and hence only weakly spoke to the possibility that the FAB was caused by the disclosure activity that was explored. This ambiguity was resolved by a third study that, in the context of a speed-dating-like self-disclosure study, forced people to disclose events with differing frequencies. Increased social rehearsal led to a stronger FAB. Overall, then, this research lent support to the notion that sharing memories is related to retention of emotions prompted by recall of such events. Results of studies exploring individual differences and the FAB also suggest the importance of the self to the effect. Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, et al. (2003) investigated the relation of dysphoria to the FAB. In one study, nondysphorics exhibited a robust FAB. Dysphorics, however, did not: Unpleasant emotions and pleasant emotions faded at the same rate. A second study replicated and extended these findings, providing a fine-grained analysis of the relation between the FAB and dysphoria. Those whose scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) indicated that they were experiencing dysphoria (scores above 13) also exhibited a minimized FAB. The FAB robustly emerged in nondysphoric participants, regardless of their BDI scores. Brunson, Wheeler, and Walker (2010) also considered the FAB in light of ideas of the role that emotion may play in maintaining optimal functioning. They reasoned that retaining the affect associated with positive events would help to create and maintain the positive emotional state that helps prepare a person for new experiences. In comparison, maintaining the affect associated with negative events for prolonged periods of time would serve as a distraction and would leave a person unprepared for upcoming events. Participants completed the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory. This is a 56-item survey in which people read a series of statements related to how they think about time and rate how well each statement describes them. Participant responses were used to classify them as past-oriented (N = 19), present-oriented (N = 12), or future-oriented (N = 39). Participants were then asked to recall event memories and to provide a series of ratings for each event, including ratings of initial event pleasantness and current pleasantness prompted by event recall. Participants’ time perspective was related to the emergence of the FAB. That is, present-oriented and future-oriented participants showed a significantly stronger FAB than participants who were past-oriented.

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The Positivity Bias in Memory and the FAB: A Union in Functionality? In considering the results of such studies, Walker and Skowronski (2009) conclude that the context of emerging theory and the research driven by such theorizing support the notion that the FAB is a consequence of processes that help to maintain a positive self-conception and to regulate emotions. They also conclude that the convergence of evidence from multiple areas of research examining emotion and appraisal processes suggests that the FAB fits neatly into an emerging story in which people’s mental processes work over time to keep them open and engaged with the world around them and to avoid the excessive mental focus produced by negative emotion that can have adverse consequences if maintained for too long a time. Perhaps this conclusion can also serve to help explain the general tendency toward positivity in memory. That is, remembering does not occur in a vacuum; it occurs in a context in which individuals must function in the context of both physical reality and social reality. One can hypothesize that one of the functions of memory is to help people to effectively navigate these realities. Certainly, strong memory for the negative might have some degree of functionality, allowing avoidance of severe physical threats and dangers. However, even more benefit might accrue to an actor who can cast aside memories of nonlethal threats so that the actor can continue to be open to the world and to engage the world. Perhaps this attempt at linking the positivity bias in memory and the FAB in this manner is a stretch. On the other hand, it is difficult to ignore the fact that both of these phenomena are affected by mechanisms related to the self: the tendency to self-enhance, to self-protect, and to process information in a manner that is self-consistent. The research reviewed in this chapter shows that these powerful effects shape both human cognition and human emotion to (generally) produce positivity biases in memory and to cause memories of positive events to retain their affective punch better than memories of negative events. It seems certain that similar effects will be documented in many other ways as researchers who are interested in the self continue to explore the impact of self-motives and self-relevant information processing on memory and emotion.

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PART IV

Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Interpersonal, Relational, and Group Contexts

Chapter 11 The Social Consequences of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Vera Hoorens

W

hen individuals exaggerate or emphasize the positive aspects of their selfconcepts or downplay their negative aspects, their self-enhancement and/or self-protection may affect how they behave toward others and how others behave toward them. For instance, an author who expects that an editor will accept his or her manuscript because of the superiority of his or her research may respond to a rejection either with distrust and anger or with gratefulness for the reviewers’ useful suggestions. Similarly, students who believe that they contribute more to group projects than others may cut down their efforts, weaken the group performance, and disappoint the other students. Alternatively, they may view the group as dependent on them so that they take up even more responsibility to enhance the group’s performance—perhaps frustrating others and unwittingly taking away learning opportunities from them. Self-enhancement and self-protection may particularly entail social consequences if they are relative rather than absolute. Absolute self-enhancement and self-protection occur when people view themselves more positively than their actual qualities warrant. Relative selfenhancement and self-protection occur when people view themselves more positively than they view other individuals. Whereas both absolute and relative self-enhancement may have social consequences, there is reason to believe that relative self-enhancement most strongly affects how people interact with each other. Given the ubiquitous nature of social comparison, people may focus more on how they rank among their peers—and how others rank

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236   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS them—than on their absolute standing. Consequently, they may respond more intensely to other individuals’ relative self-enhancement than to absolute self-enhancement. Moreover, relative self-enhancement is more likely to affect how actors behave toward others with whom they are supposed to cooperate, compete, negotiate, and share. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the social consequences of relative self-enhancement. As implied by the preceding, self-enhancement may affect social interactions in two distinct manners. First, self-enhancement may affect how individuals behave toward others. I use the term actor effects to denote the effects of an actor’s self-enhancement on his or her social behavior. Second, individuals’ self-enhancement may affect how other people view them and hence behave toward them. I use the term observer effects to denote the effects of an actor’s self-enhancement on how observers (sometimes, but not necessarily, the targets of the actors’ behavior) view and treat the actor. Whereas actor effects solely depend on the actor’s self-enhancement, observer effects also depend on the detection of this self-enhancement by observers. Therefore, I also address how and when observers perceive or infer that another individual self-enhances.

Actor Effects When people (wish to) view the self as superior to others, they may behave toward others as if they were entitled to better outcomes and as if they were obliged to work less hard to contribute to group achievements. Their striving for a superior self-view may also lead them to apply negative stereotypes to others. It may furthermore affect to whom they are attracted and how they relate to both their colleagues and their loved ones—or, for that matter, how they respond to the conflicts that are sometimes inevitable in human interaction.

Social Dilemmas In many circumstances, actors are mutually dependent. Whether or not any given team member’s contribution to a group performance will lead to success or failure not only depends on his or her personal contribution but also on the other group members’ contributions. Similarly, each member of groups that together create, maintain, or consume public goods may contribute to these goods or consume from them to various extents. Whether or not the public good comes about, survives, or gets exhausted depends not only on his or her contribution or consumption but also on those of the other group members. Social dilemmas occur when, in situations as the ones just described, the short-term benefits of the individual are at odds with the long-term benefits of the group. For each individual in the short term, not contributing to the group performance or the common good and consuming as much as possible from the latter is the optimal choice. If all individuals make this choice, however, the outcome is, in the long term, detrimental for the group as a whole and hence for the individual as well. For any given individual, therefore, the optimal situation occurs when he or she acts egoistically, whereas the others act cooperatively or even selflessly. In such circumstances, perceiving the self as occupying a special position in the group—for example, because one’s needs are more important, because one’s claims are more warranted, or because one has already contributed more than others—may affect how willingly actors contribute to and wish to profit from collective goods and performances.



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Social Loafing Self-enhancement may lead people to expect that their contribution to a group performance will be superior to the contributions of other group members. People may expect that they will outperform the others because they feel that they possess superior talents, invest more time, effort, and other resources, or work more effectively. When working on collective tasks that do not allow the identification of individual contributions, they may therefore cut back on their efforts. Similarly, the behaviors of self-enhancing people may be particularly driven by the desire to have their personal superiority confirmed. They may be less motivated for collective tasks that do not allow the identification of their “superior” contribution than for individual tasks on which they expect to shine. Self-enhancement may thus enhance social loafing and harm group productivity (Charbonnier, Huguet, Brauer, & Monteil, 1998; Harkins & Petty, 1982; Huguet, Charbonnier, & Monteil, 1999). Supporting this view, social loafing occurs when groups work on easy collective tasks but not (or to a lesser extent) when groups work on difficult collective tasks. According to Harkins and Petty (1982), difficult collective tasks generally provoke weak or no social loafing because “people feel that their contribution is needed, because they are better able than the average person to perform the task.” On easy tasks, people do not feel that the group really needs their contribution, superior though it may be, and hence they do not exert much effort. However, recent studies have shown that people generally expect to outperform others on easy tasks but not on difficult tasks (e.g., Moore & Kim, 2003; Windschitl, Kruger, & Simms, 2003). Therefore, an alternative interpretation of the task-difficulty effect on social loafing may be that when doing easy group tasks, individual group members believe that their contributions will be superior to other members’ contributions and therefore cut back their effort. When doing difficult group tasks, they believe that their contributions will be equal or perhaps even inferior to other members’ contributions. Hence they do not cut back their effort and, in some cases, even do more than they would have done on an individual task. Also supporting the view that self-enhancement encourages social loafing is the finding that weaker social loafing occurs in strongly cohesive groups than in weakly cohesive groups (Karau & Williams, 1993, 1997). This finding has typically been interpreted in terms of greater group cohesiveness enhancing the individual group members’ concern for their collective performance. Interestingly, however, people self-enhance less when they compare themselves with individuals they like and know well than when they compare themselves with generalized or unknown others (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Hoorens & Buunk, 1993; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986). Because members of cohesive groups are more attached to each other than members of noncohesive groups are, the former probably do not self-enhance as much as the latter when they compare themselves with their groups. Therefore, the finding that strong group cohesiveness attenuates social loafing is consistent with the hypothesis that self-enhancement encourages social loafing. Direct evidence for the role of self-enhancement in social loafing comes from a series of studies in which participants high versus low on self-enhancement performed idea generation tasks either coactively or collectively. In one study (Huguet et al., 1999, Study 1), pairs of participants wrote down different uses for a knife. They wrote down each use on a slip of paper that they put in a box. In the coactive condition, the two members of each pair had separate boxes, so that their individual performance could be determined by examining the

238   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS boxes’ contents afterward. In the collective condition, the two members shared a box so that only their collective performance could be determined. All participants had previously filled out a questionnaire that asked about their best abilities and about the percentage of students that shared these abilities. Participants who had reported that few students shared their abilities exerted less effort in the collective condition than in the coactive condition. Participants who had reported that many students shared their abilities exerted as much effort in the collective condition as in the coactive condition. In a follow-up study (Huguet et al., 1999, Study 2), participants high versus low on self-enhancement in the domain of abilities performed an easy idea generation task (writing down uses for a knife) or a difficult idea generation task (writing down uses for a detached doorknob). When the task was easy, strongly self-enhancing participants exerted less effort in the collective condition than in the coactive condition (cf. Huguet et al., 1999, Study 1). When the task was difficult, strongly self-enhancing participants exerted more effort in the collective condition than in the coactive condition. In line with Harkins and Petty (1982), Huguet et al. (1999) concluded that strongly self-enhancing participants loafed when the task was easy but compensated for their coworkers when the task was difficult. However, their studies did not measure how good participants thought they were at the task or how well participants expected to do as compared with other people or the other team member. It is not clear, therefore, whether participants who generally self-enhanced also did so on the task at hand. If they self-enhanced in the easy task condition but self-denigrated in the difficult task condition, then the relationship between self-enhancement and social loafing may be more straightforward than Harkins and Petty (1982) and Huguet et al. (1999) suggested. Indeed, self-enhancement may always enhance social loafing rather than enhancing it on easy tasks and inhibiting it on difficult tasks.

The Tragedy of the Commons In many circumstances, people may choose between actions that advance their immediate individual well-being at the expense of their group’s long-term well-being and actions that advance their group’s long-term well-being at the expense of their immediate individual wellbeing. These situations are named dilemmas when individual and collective outcomes are intertwined in a non-zero-sum manner. This happens when a noncooperative choice benefits the actor and harms others more than a cooperative choice does, with the harm done to others exceeding the benefit to the actor. In dry summers, for instance, individuals may fill their swimming pools, shower twice a day, wash their cars, and copiously water their gardens. If they do so, they may pass hot days in comfortable circumstances and keep their properties in good shape. If most individuals choose this option, however, water supplies may run dry so that all community members will suffer, including those who have used water at leisure. Alternatively, individuals may cut down on their water use to help safeguard the water supply. This costs them a reduction in their personal comfort but helps to ensure that all community members— including themselves—will continue to have sufficient water to cook, to wash, and to flush their toilets. A vast literature exists on how people behave in social dilemmas. This literature has revealed an impressive number of individual, group, task, and context characteristics that



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affect people’s choices. However, one motive that induces people to place their own benefits above those of the community may be self-enhancement. Self-enhancement may encourage egoistic behavior in various ways. First, self-enhancing individuals may so egocentrically focus on the personal consequences of their behaviors that they do not realize how their behavior affects the common good. Second, they may believe that their individualistic choices harm the community less than other people’s individualistic choices do. Third, even if they appreciate that their behaviors affect the common good as much as any other individual’s behaviors do, they may believe that they are still more entitled to opt for their immediate individual benefit. They may feel, for instance, that their needs are unique or that their value to the community entitles them to special privileges. Although the consequences of self-enhancement in social dilemmas have received little attention, some evidence suggests that people sometimes do behave uncooperatively because they believe that it is fair for them to use more resources than others (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline & Bushman, 2004; Wade-Benzoni, Hernandez, Medvec, & Messick, 2008; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996). In one study using a harvesting dilemma, for instance, participants thought it was fair for them to harvest more than others if an equal division did not unequivocally impose itself (Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996). The study simulated a conference in which four organizations that depended on shark fishing dealt with an overfishing crisis. Each participant in each group of four represented one organization. The organizations’ task was to maximize their own profit while avoiding the risk that the sea would get overfished and that the harvest pool would thereby get depleted. Participants estimated what would be a fair harvest for each of the four organizations, including the one they represented, and made actual harvesting decisions. They did so both before and after discussing the task with each other. Half of the participants faced a symmetrical dilemma, with each organization fishing equal numbers of sharks and depending equally on the future health of the harvest pool. In such circumstances, people readily apply an equal-division rule so that it is obvious what would be a fair share for each user. Not surprisingly, these unambiguous situations did not lead participants to find that a higher harvest would be fairer for them than for others. The other half of the participants faced an asymmetrical dilemma, with commercial organizations fishing large numbers of sharks and having little interest in the future availability of sharks, and recreational organizations fishing small numbers of sharks but having great interest in the future availability of sharks. In such circumstances, the differential short-term and long-term aims of the organizations render fairness ambiguous. Participants who faced this situation generally thought that it would be fair if they harvested more than the others. They did so both before and after discussion. Interestingly, perceptions of fairness predicted actual harvesting decisions: the more participants thought that it was fair for them to harvest more than others, the more they actually harvested. Further support for an effect of self-enhancement on behavior in commons dilemmas comes from Campbell et al. (2004, Study 7). They developed a self-report entitlement scale that measured stable individual differences in the belief that one should get more than other people. Participants with high scores on this scale harvested more from a common good than participants with low scores. Social dilemmas are particularly relevant in intergenerational relations. Each generation needs to decide how much to harvest from existing nonrenewable resources (such as fossil energy) and how much to invest in the creation and maintenance of new resources (such as

240   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS a public health care system). Because present gains come at the expense of future costs and vice versa, generations find themselves in a social dilemma involving themselves and other generations. In addition to the emotional, motivational, and cognitive complexities of intergenerational solidarity, the latter may be further complicated by self-serving views of fair allocations. To the extent that people find that their generation deserves to get more than other generations, they may overharvest nonrenewable resources and refrain from investing in new resources. Supporting this reasoning, participants in an experimental simulation of intergenerational allocation thought that a preceding generation should harvest less of existing resources and leave more of them for the succeeding generation if they belonged to the succeeding generation rather than to the preceding generation (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2008).

Perceiving and Judging Others Does relative self-enhancement affect how we perceive others? At first sight, the answer to this question seems straightforward, because wanting to be and to view oneself as superior to others implies viewing others as inferior. People indeed tend to view others more negatively when their self-esteem is low or threatened than when their self-esteem is high or unthreatened (Beauregard & Dunning, 1998). The question takes a less intuitive twist when we ask if and how relative self-enhancement affects the extent to which we see others as individuals in the first place and not just as members of some social group. When people observe other individuals, these individuals’ group membership and the associated stereotypes may readily come to mind. People are aware of this tendency to think about individuals as group members and try to suppress stereotypes. They may do so because they believe that they should treat people as individuals and not as group members, let alone members of negatively stereotyped groups. Alternatively, observers may apply stereotypes because they do not realize how much the latter affect their thinking, because they feel that the relevant stereotypes are valid, or because applying stereotypes helps to fulfill a currently active motive. Some of the motives that may be involved in stereotype use are self-enhancement and self-protection. To the extent that applying stereotypes allows the observer to view him- or herself as superior, it may help him or her to achieve or to protect a positive self-view. If self-enhancement and self-protection lead to stereotyping, people should particularly use stereotypes when they feel that their self-esteem is threatened. Supporting this view, selfesteem threat indeed enhances the application of negative stereotypes (Fein & Spencer, 1997, Studies 2 & 3). Participants described a homosexual man (Study 2) and a Jewish woman (Study 3) more stereotypically after receiving negative feedback about their intelligence than they did when their self-esteem had not been threatened. Moreover, stereotypically describing a Jewish woman repaired the self-esteem of participants who had received negative feedback (Study 3). When people apply stereotypes to others out of a self-enhancement or a self-protection motive, they should be particularly likely to use negative stereotypes. Applying negative stereotypes indeed makes the self seem superior, whereas applying positive stereotypes threatens this personal superiority. At least one set of studies has tested this implication (Van den Bos & Stapel, 2009). The researchers activated a self-enhancement or a comprehension goal by making participants unscramble sentences that contained words related to comprehension (e.g., grasping) or self-enhancement (e.g., self-respect; Van den Bos & Stapel, 2009, Study



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1). In one study, participants then read a story about a man or a woman who behaved consistently with negative elements of the male stereotype (i.e., egoism), as well as with positive elements of it (i.e., self-confidence). Their task was to rate the actor on a series of “male” traits (Study 2). In another study, participants read a story about a Muslim or a non-Muslim who behaved consistently with positive elements of the stereotype about Muslims (i.e., devotion), as well as negative elements of it (i.e., intolerance). They rated the actor on positive and negative stereotypical traits and on nonstereotypical traits (Study 3). Activating either a comprehension or a self-enhancement goal did not affect ratings of the actor to whom the stereotype did not apply (the woman in Study 2 and the non-Muslim in Study 3). However, it did affect ratings of the actor to whom the stereotype applied. As compared with a control condition, participants in whom a comprehension goal was induced rated the man and the Muslim higher on stereotypically male or stereotypically Muslim traits, respectively. They did so regardless of whether the traits were positive or negative. Participants with a self-enhancement goal rated the man and the Muslim higher on negative but not on positive stereotypical traits. In a follow-up study, self-enhancement was activated by threatening participants’ selfesteem. Half of the participants then got an opportunity to self-protect by describing positive aspects of their personalities, whereas the other half did not get this opportunity. As compared with a control condition, participants with an unfulfilled self-enhancement motive reported that a male actor possessed negative stereotypically male traits to a larger extent. Participants whose self-enhancement motive was fulfilled did not describe a male actor more stereotypically than control participants did (Van den Bos & Stapel, 2009, Study 4). One implication of the view that people stereotype to self-enhance or to self-protect is that they are likely to apply negative stereotypes to individuals who threaten their selfesteem. For instance, people whose competence has been threatened may be more tempted to apply a negative stereotype to a job applicant from a minority group when the applicant seems competent than when the applicant does not seem competent (Collange, Fiske, & Sanitioso, 2009). In a study testing this implication, participants received false positive feedback (not threatening) or false negative feedback (threatening) about their intelligence. In a control condition, they received no feedback (not threatening). The participants then evaluated a candidate for a management position that required both warmth and competence. The applicant was described either as an Asian American or as a working mother. The stereotype about Asian Americans includes that they are competent but not warm, whereas the stereotype about working mothers includes that they are warm but not competent. As such, the Asian American candidate implied a threat to the participants’ competence, whereas the working mother did not. When participants’ competence was not threatened (positive feedback and control conditions), they rated the Asian American or the working mother as equally warm. When their competence was threatened, they rated the Asian American as less warm than the working mother. Moreover, when participants’ competence was threatened, their derogation of the Asian American was so strong as to rate the working mother as better suited for the job, whereas in the control condition they rated the candidates as equally suited. Interestingly, when participants’ competence was bolstered (positive feedback condition), they rated the Asian American as better suited than the working mother. A threat to their competence apparently made them apply a derogating stereotype to the individual who constituted an additional threat but not to the individual who did not constitute such a threat (Collange et al., 2009).

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Coping with Aversive Social Episodes: Forgiveness and Aggression Self-enhancement may affect how people deal with the conflicts, disappointments, frustrations, and misunderstandings that sometimes arise in human relations. Its effects have been studied particularly on forgiving and aggressive reactions.

Forgiveness Most people feel that they are entitled to respectful treatment by others, so unrespectful treatment feels like a transgression. However, relative self-enhancement may provoke the feeling that one is entitled to a particularly respectful treatment. Other people’s failure to meet this expectation then feels like a disproportionally large transgression. As a consequence, selfenhancement may hamper forgiveness for others’ failure to treat them respectfully. Supporting this reasoning, Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, and Finkel (2004) found that scores on the entitlement scale of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979) predicted how people experienced other people’s transgressions against them, as well as their views of the appropriateness of forgiving transgressions. In a recall study, for instance, Exline et al. (2004, Study 1) let participants recall an event in which another individual had offended, harmed, or hurt them. Participants with high scores on the entitlement scale reported that they had forgiven the transgressor to a lesser extent (both privately and as communicated to the transgressor), that the transgressor deserved less forgiveness, and that forgiveness was less morally appropriate. Scores on the entitlement scale were also positively correlated with concerns about the costs of forgiving and negatively correlated with expectations about the personal benefits of forgiveness. In a scenario study, participants read about and imagined standardized transgression incidents (Exline et al., 2004, Study 2). Participants with high entitlement scores reported that they would perceive greater offense, find forgiveness less appropriate, and insist more on repayment than participants with low entitlement scores. A naturalistic study of forgiveness in romantic relationships further brought to light that people with high entitlement scores are less forgiving toward their partners than people with low entitlement scores (Exline et al., 2004, Study 6).

Aggression As Krueger, Vohs, and Baumeister (2008) noted, “The motive of self-enhancement and the dependency of self-esteem on the approval of others who are also motivated to self-enhance virtually ensure that not everyone will get the esteem they desire” (p. 64). How do people respond when they are confronted with others’ explicit or implicit denial of their superiority? One published study is directly relevant to this effect. Campbell et al. (2004, Study 9) found that participants with high scores on an entitlement scale responded more aggressively to a provocation than participants with low scores did. Participants in their study received either negative or positive feedback to an essay they had written. Afterward, they participated in a reaction-time competition “against the individual who had criticized or praised them” (actually against a computer program). On each trial they pressed a button as fast as they could; whoever was faster was permitted to give the other participant a noise blast. When they had been criticized, participants with high entitlement scores responded more



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aggressively to “the other participant” (both in terms of the loudness and the duration of the blasts) than participants with low entitlement scores. When they had been praised, no difference occurred between participants with high versus low entitlement scores. Although no other published studies directly addressed the relationship between selfenhancement and aggression, suggestive evidence comes from research on the relationship between narcissism, self-esteem, self-threat, and aggression (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). Narcissism is indeed characterized by relative selfenhancement. For instance, Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, and Elliot (2000) showed that narcissists are particularly likely to take the credit for a collective success and to blame others for a collective failure, even if this implies derogating a teammate. Baumeister et al. (1996) suggested that the overly favorable self-views that contribute to narcissism may lead to aggression, because people who strongly hold them not only experience frequent and severe threats to their self-views but also are chronically intolerant of these threats. Supporting this view, high narcissism scores correlate with aggressiveness and hostility (Brown, 2004; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991; Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, 2002; Wink, 1991). Apart from showing more aggression-related characteristics, individuals who score high on a narcissism scale also respond more aggressively to self-threats than individuals who score low on a narcissism scale do (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Kernis & Sun, 1994; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998; Twenge & Campbell, 2003). Bushman and Baumeister (1998), for instance, had participants fill out both the NPI and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Study 1) or the Janis and Field Self-Esteem Scale (Study 2). Participants then wrote an essay and received bogus feedback in which “another participant” judged their essays either unfavorably (ego threat) or favorably (no ego threat). Next, participants completed what they believed was a reaction-time competition against “the other participant” (Studies 1 and 2) or a third participant (Study 2). Unknowingly, they played against a computer that was programmed to let them win on some trials and lose on others. After each trial, the “winner” administered a noise blast to the “loser.” Participants were allowed to set the duration and the loudness of the blasts that they wished to administer. At winning trials, participants who had undergone an ego threat generally responded more aggressively to “the other participant” (both in terms of the loudness and the duration of the blasts) than did participants who had not undergone an ego threat. However, participants with high narcissism scores responded more aggressively to the threat than participants with low narcissism scores. Self-esteem neither provoked aggression in itself nor interacted with ego threat. In the study of Rhodewalt and Morf (1998), the self-threat took the form of failure feedback that came after an initial success. Again, narcissists responded aggressively to the failure feedback. Kernis and Sun (1994) had a female researcher give participants positive or negative feedback on their social skills. Following positive feedback, narcissism was associated with describing the assessment technique as diagnostic and the evaluator as competent and likeable. Following negative feedback, narcissism was associated with describing the assessment technique as undiagnostic and derogating the evaluator’s competence and likeability. Finally, Twenge and Campbell (2003) showed that narcissists respond more angrily and aggressively to social rejection experiences than non-narcissists do. Taking these findings together, narcissists respond more aggressively to self-threat than do others. Because narcissism includes the belief that one is superior to others, they may react this way because unfavorable feedback implies a denial of their superiority. Interestingly, this

244   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS analysis of the relationship between narcissism and aggression may help us to understand why self-esteem predicts aggression to a weaker degree than narcissism does (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Bushman et al., 2009; Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989). Self-esteem scales often include absolutely worded items (e.g., “I take a positive attitude towards myself” in the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale), in addition to comparatively worded ones (e.g., “I am able to do things as well as most people” in the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale). If the comparative items tap into relative self-enhancement, the correlation between self-esteem scores and aggression may reflect a relationship between relative self-enhancement and aggression. However, self-esteem scales typically contain fewer comparative items than narcissism scales do, so the weaker relationship with aggression may be due to relative self-enhancement determining overall scores to a lesser extent.

Interpersonal Attraction and Close Relationships Intuitively, it seems reasonable to assume that relative self-enhancement affects how people choose and view their friends and romantic partners. If actors perceive themselves as superior to others, they may strive for more attractive partners (physically, socially, economically, and/or morally) than they otherwise would. Supporting this assumption, narcissists look for partners with highly desirable characteristics (Campbell, 1999). Given the existence of the matching phenomenon, implying that people try to match up with others who are approximately as attractive as they are (see Feingold, 1988, for a review), self-enhancement may form a true stumbling block on individuals’ romantic paths. One determinant of attraction is physical beauty. Suggesting that self-enhancement occurs in perceptions of physical attractiveness, Horton (2003) found that college students generally found themselves more beautiful than the average college student and equally as beautiful as targets that were preselected on the basis of their high attractiveness. Epley and Whitchurch (2008) found that people were more likely to recognize an embellished picture of their faces (i.e., a picture that was digitally made more attractive) as their own than a veridical portrait. Self-enhancement in the domain of physical beauty may explain why people tend to believe that “what is beautiful is good”; they attribute desirable personality traits and high abilities to beautiful people and are eager to affiliate with them. If people overestimate their own beauty, then beautiful people are simply more similar to the self, so that the “what is beautiful is good” aphorism may be an attraction-similarity phenomenon that basically rests on self-attachment. Supporting this possibility, Horton (2003) found that self-ratings of beauty moderated the effect of a target’s beauty on inferences about and liking for the target. Once they have entered a relationship, self-enhancing individuals may feel less need, obligation, or pressure to continue to invest effort, time, and money in their relationships. Thus far little research has been done that specifically deals with how self-enhancement affects intimate relationships. One notable example is a study by Campbell et al. (2004, Study 8), who found that scores on their entitlement scale were negatively associated with empathy, respect, perspective taking, and willingness to adjust to one’s partner and positively associated with a dismissing attachment style. Just as with aggression, however, the narcissism literature is highly informative in the present context. Perhaps surprisingly, narcissism entails various short-term benefits. In one study, narcissistic men responded to a rejection by a potential romantic partner by recalling more positive



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romantic histories and fewer negative romantic histories than non-narcissistic men did (Rhodewalt & Eddings, 2002). Whereas this tactic may be adaptive in terms of emotion regulation and self-esteem bolstering, it may also reduce the chances of narcissists learning about what potential partners may not like about their behavior. In another study, narcissistic individuals experienced or at least reported greater difficulty thinking about reasons why their partner might have become less committed to them than did non-narcissistic individuals. They also judged their relationships as less dysfunctional and were less interested in accepting a dating invitation from someone else after considering these reasons than non-narcissistic individuals were (Foster & Campbell, 2005). Narcissism probably also affects relationships in the long term. For instance, narcissists approach relationships more selfishly, taking a game-playing approach to love. They feel less committed to their present partners, strive more for power and autonomy, and believe that they have attractive alternatives (Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002).

Self-Enhancement at Work Relative self-enhancement may lead people to think that they deserve higher rewards than their colleagues do if they think that their work is more effective. Ironically, however, relative self-enhancement may damage their performance in specific professional situations, such as the ones that require negotiations.

Entitlement Self-enhancement may lead professionals to feel that they outperform their colleagues and competitors. More specifically, they may feel that they are more talented, work harder, or that their job contributes more to the organization’s main goals. To the extent that reward systems are performance based, self-enhancers may expect higher pay, more status, and various other privileges. Stated differently, self-enhancement may enhance entitlement. A study on pay expectations supports the idea that people feel entitled to higher rewards than others (Van Avermaet, 1974). Participants were asked to imagine two individuals who worked 7 and 10 hours, respectively. According to the instructions, the individual who had worked 7 hours had been paid $25. Participants were asked to estimate how much the individual who had worked 10 hours should be paid in order for his or her payments to be fair. Half of the participants imagined that they were the individual who had worked 7 hours and that someone else had worked 10 hours. On average they reported that this other individual should receive $30.29. The other half of the participants imagined that another individual had worked 7 hours and that they had worked 10 hours. On average they reported that they should receive $35.24. In another study, participants reported that they should get paid more than others for doing household and administrative chores. Moreover, they reported that they should receive more than they would be willing to pay to someone else (Hoorens, Remmers, & Van de Riet, 1999). People also consider it more unfair when they are underpaid than when they are overpaid (Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997). Similarly, they find it more unfair when they must pay more than others than they do when they must pay less (Peters, 2005, Study 4.3). When people are less rewarded than others for doing the same task, their satisfaction with their payment is lower than when they are equally rewarded. When they are more

246   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS rewarded, they are as satisfied as when they are equally rewarded. It seems, then, that people find overpayment as appropriate as equal payment if they profit (Peters, Van den Bos, & Bobocel, 2004, Study 1). All these demonstrations of a self-serving interpretation of fairness in a work context suggest that people feel entitled to higher rewards than others. Additional evidence for the relationship between self-enhancement and entitlement comes from a study in which participants estimated what would be a fair reward for a task that they and others had done. The more participants thought that they had done better than other participants, the more they wanted to be paid (Pelham & Hetts, 2001). Campbell et al. (2004) developed a self-report entitlement scale that measured stable individual differences in the belief that one should get more than other people. In a scenario study about fair wages for employees (Campbell et al., 2004, Study 6), participants who scored high on this entitlement scale thought that they should get a higher salary than other employees. When participants could help themselves to candy as a reward for their participation, knowing in advance that the remaining candy would be given to children, those with high scores on the entitlement scale also took more candy than those with lower scores (Campbell et al., 2004, Study 5). Interestingly, people think that others are more satisfied with overpayment than with equal payment (Peters et al., 2004, Study 1). When people merely imagine an overpayment situation (such as in a scenario study), they claim that others would be as satisfied with overpayment as with equal payment, whereas they would feel more dissatisfied with overpayment (Peters et al., 2004, Study 2). These findings suggest that people couple to their entitlement a form of moral superiority in that they believe that others enjoy overpayment even more than they do.

Negotiation To the extent that negotiators believe that they are better negotiators than others, they may invest less effort toward an agreement. One potential consequence is that it takes the negotiators longer to reach an agreement or that suboptimal agreements follow from the negotiation. Supporting the idea that people hold self-enhancing views of their negotiation abilities, most students in a business administration program who participated in a negotiation class thought that they ranked among the 25% most successful negotiators in their class. In addition, they thought that they were superior to others on traits that are generally considered characteristic of negotiators, such as trustworthiness, honesty, fairness, cooperativeness, flexibility, and competence (Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke, 1993). When the parties who are involved in a negotiation self-enhance, moreover, their views of what constitutes a fair outcome may also get distorted in a self-serving manner. If this is the case, it may be more difficult to come to agreement than it would be if the parties did not self-enhance. As such, self-enhancement may lead to impasse in negotiations (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997). Various studies support the detrimental role of self-serving views of fairness in work contexts (for a review, see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000). For instance, participants who engaged in a negotiation task judged the fairness of various outcomes in a work conflict in a self-serving manner. The more self-serving the negotiators’ fairness judgments were, the longer it took to come to agreement. Participants also recalled the dispute in a self-serving manner, focusing on information that favored their position (Thompson &



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Loewenstein, 1992). Because of their influence on negotiations, self-serving assessments of fairness may hamper pretrial bargaining situations (Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer, & Babcock, 1993). In one study, participants read the case materials in a real-life tort case arising from a collision of a car and a motorcycle. The motorcyclist, who was injured, sued the driver for $100,000. Participants assumed the role of either the plaintiff (the motorcyclist) or the defendant (the driver). Both read the same materials. After doing so, they first estimated what would be a fair settlement, as well as what the judge had awarded the motorcyclist. They then attempted to negotiate a settlement. Participants received a fee for their participation ($3 for the plaintiff and $10 for the defendant). If they settled, the defendant would have to pay the plaintiff one dollar per $10,000 the settlement was worth. If they failed to settle, the defendant would have to pay an amount of money that was determined by the decision of the judge in the real-life case. In addition, the defendant, the plaintiff, or both (depending on conditions) would have to pay an amount of money that represented the costs of going to trial. Afterward, they recalled the arguments used by the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff’s estimate of the judge’s decision was on average $14,527 higher than the defendant’s estimate. Similarly, the plaintiff’s estimate of a fair settlement was $17,709 higher than the defendant’s estimate. In addition, both parties recalled more arguments that favored their position than arguments that favored the opponent’s position. The more the plaintiff and the defendant differed in their estimates of a fair settlement, the less likely it was that they reached a settlement. In a follow-up study, participants were assigned the role of plaintiff or defendant either before reading the case materials, predicting the judge’s award, and estimating a fair settlement or after doing so. All participants then tried to negotiate a settlement in the role of the plaintiff or the defendant. When participants knew their roles in the case while they read the materials and estimated a fair and a likely award, they were both less likely and slower to reach a settlement than when they did not yet know their roles. Moreover, participants who knew their roles before reading the materials rated the arguments that supported their position as more important than the arguments that contradicted their position, whereas participants who did not know their roles rated the arguments in a balanced manner (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995).

Perceiving Other Individuals’ Self-Enhancement When do people decide that others self-enhance? To some extent, they always do. When asked how others think about themselves, people generally endorse the theory that most people want to see themselves favorably (Kruger & Gilovich, 1999, Study 1b). Similarly, people realize that others are more likely to self-attribute traits that these others idiosyncratically view as desirable (Krueger, 1998, Study 2). More important, people also think that others self-enhance more than they themselves do (Armor, 1999; Friedrich, 1996; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). In one study, for instance, participants read a description of the above-average effect, including the finding that 70% of all students thought that they were above average on leadership skills and that 60% thought that they were above average on the ability to get along with other people. They then rated how often they or the average other showed this type of self-enhancement. On average, participants thought that they themselves were less susceptible to this bias than the average other

248   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS was (Friedrich, 1996, Study 1). They even did so after having heard the researcher lecture about the above-average effect (Friedrich, 1996, Study 2). When asked to describe behaviors that may be indicative of self-enhancement, people also believe that others routinely show these behaviors. In one study, for instance, married participants apportioned credit for desirable marital behaviors (e.g., spending time on one’s appearance to please the other) and blame for undesirable marital behaviors (e.g., causing arguments) to themselves and their spouses. They also estimated how their partners would apportion the credit and blame for these behaviors. Participants overestimated their share in both the credit and the blame for desirable and undesirable behaviors, respectively. However, they expected that their spouses would claim even more credit for desirable behaviors and less blame for undesirable behaviors (Kruger & Gilovich, 1999, Study 1a). Similarly, participants who had played a shooter video game together with another participant estimated that their teammates claimed more than their share of credit for the team’s successes (e.g., scoring points) and less than their share of blame for the team’s losses (e.g., missing shots; Kruger & Gilovich, 1999, Study 2). These findings suggest that people generally expect others to distribute responsibility for collective behaviors in a self-enhancing manner. Although observers generally assume that others self-enhance, they do not assume that all self-enhance to the same degree in all circumstances. Consistent with the ingroup favoritism phenomenon, people believe that members of outgroups self-enhance more than members of ingroups do. This was illustrated by a study in which participants in a two-on-two debating contest apportioned responsibility to the individual team members and in which they estimated how the other participants judged these contributions. Participants estimated that both their teammates and the members of the rival team would claim more than their share of credit for desirable aspects of the debate (e.g., making important statements) and less than their share of blame for undesirable aspects of the debate (e.g., not delivering arguments as convincingly as intended). However, they estimated that the members of the rival team would do so to a much larger extent than their own teammates would (Kruger & Gilovich, 1999, Study 3). In a follow-up study on a darts contest, participants attributed self-enhancement only to the members of the rival team (Kruger & Gilovich, 1999, Study 4). One obvious way to differentiate between others’ levels of self-enhancement is on the basis of what these others say. Individuals may overtly say or write that they are superior to others or that they have contributed more to group performances than other team members. Stated differently, they may translate their self-superiority beliefs into self-superiority claims. At least one set of studies showed that people attribute a stronger self-superiority belief to an individual who describes him- or herself as superior to others than to an individual who describes him- or herself either as equal to others or in an noncomparative manner (Hoorens, Pandelaere, Oldersma & Sedikides, 2010). In Hoorens et al.’s (2010) studies, however, participants also attributed some self-enhancement to an individual who simply claimed being good and even to an individual who claimed being equal to others.

Observer Effects Most research on judgments of self-enhancing individuals has been done within the theoretical context of the debate on whether positive self-illusions are beneficial or harmful. Of all potential consequences of positive self-illusions, most attention has been paid to the actors’



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subjective well-being, self-esteem, mental health, and ability to cope with risks and adversities (e.g., Colvin & Block, 1994; Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; Norem, 2002; Paulhus, 1998; Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003a, 2003b). Because these may be affected by both absolute and relative self-enhancement, the distinction between the two has been treated as a methodological rather than as a theoretically relevant issue (e.g., Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & Robins, 2004; Kwan, John, Robins, & Kuang, 2008; Lönnqvist, Leikas, Verkasalo, & Paunonen, 2008; Paulhus, 1998). For various reasons, researchers have advocated either absolute measures of self-enhancement (e.g., Colvin & Block, 1994; Paulhus, 1998) or a combination of absolute and relative measures (Kwan et al., 2004; Kwan et al., 2008). Regardless of their suitability for studying individual differences in self-enhancement, one consequence is that research on responses to other people’s relative self-enhancement is particularly scarce.

Neutral Responses to Relative Self-Enhancement At least two sets of studies examined how people respond to individuals who self-enhance by claiming that their futures will be better than average (Helweg-Larsen, Sadeghian, & Webb, 2002; Le Barbenchon, Milhabet, Steiner, & Priolo, 2008). Both suggested that such comparative optimism is more socially accepted than its self-depreciative counterpart, comparative pessimism. In Helweg-Larsen et al.’s (2002) study, for instance, participants read an excerpt from an interview in which a student said that he was less at risk (comparative optimism), equally at risk, or more at risk (comparative pessimism) than others for sexually transmitted diseases, being injured in a car accident, and heart conditions. Participants then rated how much they wanted to meet the student, work with him on a project, have him as a friend, talk to him, have him on their sports team, and go to a party with him. If the student described himself in a comparatively optimistic manner, participants rated him nonsignificantly more favorably than in the equal-risk condition. If he had described himself in a comparatively pessimistic manner, they rated him nonsignificantly more unfavorably. The difference between the comparative optimism condition and the comparative pessimism condition was significant, however, with participants responding more favorably to comparative optimism than to comparative pessimism.

Favorable Responses to Relative Self-Enhancement Whereas the preceding studies suggest that people respond neutrally to others’ self-superiority claims, other studies reveal distinctively favorable responses. People may welcome other people’s self-superiority claims because they take these claims at face value. As evidenced by the correspondence bias, people often think that individuals’ self-descriptions reflect their “true” dispositions and performances (e.g., Gurevitch, 1984; Powers & Zuroff, 1988). If an individual claims to be better than others, readers or listeners may believe that this is a true description of reality. Supporting this view, observers attributed greater intelligence to an actor who claimed that his problem-solving abilities were “better than average” than to an actor who claimed to be “below average” (Vonk, 1999). Similarly, they judged an actor who openly expected to perform above average on an exam or in a tennis tournament as both more likable and more competent than an actor who openly expected to perform at an average or below-average level (Schlenker & Leary, 1982).

250   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS Observers may interpret a self-superiority claim as a cue that it is all right for them to claim to be better than others as well (e.g., Holtgraves & Srull, 1989). If they wish to make self-superiority claims but are hesitant to do so, this cue may elicit favorable responses. An argument supporting this view comes from findings that participants described themselves more favorably after observing other individuals evaluating themselves favorably than after observing other individuals who evaluated themselves as average or below average (Gergen & Wishnov, 1965; Powers & Zuroff, 1988). Similarly, people seem to match the positivity of their self-descriptions to the positivity of other people’s self-descriptions (Vorauer & Miller, 1997). One intriguing possibility is that individuals who claim to be better than others come across as particularly honest and therefore as likable. If people realize that most individuals hold self-superiority beliefs, then those who openly display them may indeed seem more candid than those who conceal their self-superiority beliefs. Two lines of evidence support this view. First, people do view self-superiority claims as reflecting honesty (Vonk, 1999; see, however, Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Also supporting the view that self-superiority claims suggest honesty is the finding of Hoorens et al. (2010) that people attribute self-superiority beliefs not only to individuals who claim that they are superior to others but also to individuals who claim that they are equal to others. Second, most people value honesty (e.g., Anderson, 1968; Paunonen, 2006).

Unfavorable Responses to Relative Self-Enhancement Relative self-enhancement may provoke unfavorable responses because individuals who make self-superiority claims seem to look on others—including these observers—as bad or incompetent. This negative view of others may provoke antagonism and hostility (e.g., Kowalski, 1997; Leary, Bednarski, Hammon, & Duncan, 1997). Ironically, self-superiority claims may particularly provoke unfavorable evaluations to the degree that they are taken at face value. When observers believe that the individual who makes a self-superiority claim is truly superior to others and perhaps also to them, they find themselves in an unsought upward comparison situation. This upward social comparison may threaten the comparer’s mood or self-esteem (Alicke, 2000; Collins, 1996; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Supporting the idea that relative self-enhancement may elicit unfavorable responses in observers, Norem (2002) found that people with higher scores on the Self-Deception scale of the Balanced Directory of Desirable Responding—a scale that measures truly held but inflated self-views—reported that they received less companionship and less social support from their friends than people with lower scores. Similarly, narcissism has been shown to enhance actors’ attractiveness during initial encounters, relationship formation, and shortterm coping with potential relationship problems but to negatively affect the long-term quality of relationships (for a review, see Buffardi & Campbell, 2008). Studies that directly addressed responses to self-superiority claims also suggest that people generally disapprove of them. For instance, participants disliked an individual who made a self-superiority claim if they knew that the individual’s competence would not be tested (Vonk, 1999). Being confronted with someone else’s self-superiority claims has also been shown to elicit hostile reactions (e.g., Colvin et al., 1995).



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At least one set of studies compared responses to overt expressions of relative selfenhancement with responses to other types of self-descriptions (Hoorens et al., 2010). Participants read a self-superiority claim (“I am better than others”), an egalitarian claim (“I am as good as others”), or a noncomparative positive self-description (“I am good”). They then rated the self-description and the individual who had given it on a series of evaluative dimensions. The self-superiority claim elicited unfavorable responses, both absolutely and relative to the egalitarian claim and the noncomparative positive claim. This pattern held regardless of whether the self-description had allegedly been given in public or in private and whether it was about a communion domain (friendship) or an agency domain (studentship). It seems, then, that people dislike overt expressions of relative self-enhancement. Interestingly, just minutes after expressing their disapproval for another individual’s self-superiority claim, participants in Hoorens et al.’s (2010) studies claimed that they were superior to their peers on the same dimensions as the one depicted in the individual’s self-description. The observed disapproval of self-superiority claims cannot be due to a societal norm promoting modesty. If it were, participants should also disapprove of noncomparative boasting. In contrast, the noncomparative positive self-description provoked favorable responses. Neither can the unfavorable responses to the self-superiority claim be due to a societal norm against social comparison. If it were, then participants should also disapprove of the egalitarian claim, which implies social comparison as well. It seems, therefore, that people specifically reject other individuals’ explicit demonstrations of relative self-enhancement.

Summary The scarcity of studies that examine observer effects of relative self-enhancement—or selfenhancement in general—renders any speculation about whether people generally approve or disapprove of others’ self-enhancement premature. Still, it is striking that people respond neutrally to self-enhancing future expectations but reject individuals who claim that they are presently better than others, the sole exception to the latter being when individuals claim that they outperform others in a very specific performance domain.

General Conclusion and Unanswered Questions The picture that emerges from the present chapter is that, when it comes to actor effects, self-enhancement predominantly brings unfavorable social consequences. As to observer effects, the evidence is scarce and mixed. However, the bulk of the available research is on self-enhancement. The question therefore arises as to whether its social consequences generalize to self-protection. Second, the question arises as to whether self-enhancement and self-protection work as a monolithic phenomenon or take various forms that bring their own social consequences.

Self-Enhancement or Self-Protection? One possibility is that the consequences of refusing to view the self in an unfavorable light are the same as the consequences of viewing the self in a favorable light. However, another

252   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS possibility is that the valence of the dimension on which actors put themselves above others crucially determines how they behave toward others and how others behave toward them. Support for the view that self-enhancement and self-protection may be distinct phenomena, so that each may have its own causes and consequences, comes from a review of the intraindividual correlates of relative self-enhancement (Hoorens, 1996). From this review, it seems that relative self-enhancement is positively associated with measures of self-esteem and subjective well-being when it takes the form of believing that one possesses desirable characteristics to a larger extent and that one is more likely to experience pleasant events than others do. In contrast, relative self-enhancement seems negatively associated with measures of depression and anxiety when it takes the form of believing that one possesses undesirable characteristics to a smaller extent and that one is less likely to experience unpleasant events than others. Conceptually, the distinction between self-enhancement on desirable versus undesirable dimensions does not necessarily map the distinction between self-enhancement and selfprotection. Still, it is worthwhile to explore the possibility that having to judge the self on desirable dimensions provides people with the opportunity to self-enhance (by saying that one possesses desirable attributes to a larger extent than others), whereas having to judge the self on undesirable dimensions confronts them with a self-threat and hence leads to self-protection (by saying that one possesses undesirable attributes to a smaller extent than others). If this parallelism can be established, then the differential personal correlates of selfenhancement on desirable versus undesirable dimensions suggests that self-enhancement and self-protection may have differential interpersonal correlates as well.

One Self-Enhancement or Multiple Self-Enhancements? Several authors have argued that person and group perception are fundamentally structured by just a few dimensions. One basic distinction is between competence and warmth or morality (e.g., Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Wojciszke, 2005) or between other-profitable and self-profitable characteristics (Peeters, 1992). Based on such categorizations, Paulhus and John (1998) distinguished between egoistic, or alpha-type, and moralistic, or gamma-type, self-enhancement. The former implies self-enhancement on status-related dimensions such as intelligence and social prestige, whereas the latter implies self-enhancement on dimensions that are related to the social norms governing social interaction. Because of the fundamental nature of dimensions of warmth or morality (generally other-profitable) and of competence (generally self-profitable) in social cognition, it is very well possible that self-enhancement or self-protection in each of these domains carries differential social (and particularly observer) consequences as well. Interestingly, above-average effects of the moralistic type seem to be stronger than above-average effects of the egoistic type (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; Van Lange, 1991; Van Lange & Sedikides, 1998). Although Hoorens et al. (2009) found no differential observer effects of relative self-enhancement in the communal versus the agency domain, it might be useful to systematically compare actor and observer effects of the two types of self-enhancement. Because previous research has typically either focused on one type of selfenhancement or treated self-enhancement as a monolithic phenomenon, studying domain effects in the social consequences of self-enhancement may prove a fruitful direction for future research.



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Chapter 12 Seeking Pleasure and Avoiding Pain in Interpersonal Relationships Joanne V. Wood Amanda L. Forest

The need to belong—to feel accepted and loved by other people—is a “fundamen-

tal human motivation” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In cultures all over the world, healthy personal relationships strongly predict happiness (Diener & Diener, 1995). People in strong and satisfying close relationships enjoy better mental health and well-being (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000) as well as better physical health (for references, see Stinson et al., 2008). For example, university students who report more interpersonal conflicts miss more classes and visit the campus health centers more often (Stinson et al., 2008). Dispositional self-esteem—one’s overall evaluation of and liking for oneself—also seems to be intimately tied to the health of one’s relationships. According to Leary’s sociometer theory (Leary, 2005; Leary & Baumeister, 2000), one’s feelings of self-worth act as a barometer of how much others value oneself. In general, people with high self-esteem (HSEs) feel loved and expect new people to like them, whereas people with low self-esteem (LSEs) are uncertain about their social worth and project their doubts onto new relationships. Evidence supports this theory: The higher one’s self-esteem, the more one feels included by other people in general, as well as accepted and loved by specific people in one’s life (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Considerable evidence also indicates that relationships are not only key to global selfesteem but to “state self-esteem”—one’s feelings about oneself at a particular moment— which can fluctuate around one’s average level of global self-esteem. University students who report interpersonal stressors also report a drop in state self-esteem (Stinson et al., 2008). Many experimental studies indicate that rejection experiences lead to sadness and declines 258



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in state self-esteem (Leary, Haupt, Strausser, & Chokel, 1998; Wood, Heimpel, Manwell, & Whittington, 2009) and can even make people feel less deserving of good things in life (Wood, Heimpel, et al., 2009).

Self-Protection and Self-Enhancement in Relationships Interpersonal relationships, then, are central to people’s feelings of self-worth—and are perhaps the paramount domain for engaging one’s thoughts and feelings about the self. As such, relationships often trigger the goals of self-protection and self-enhancement and are rich in opportunities to fulfill these goals. Consider self-enhancement first. Relationships can make people feel good about themselves in a myriad of ways. The mere existence of friends and lovers validates one’s worth: “If others value me, I must be valuable!” Additional bonuses include close others’ compliments, as well as validation through shared values and goals. One can bask in reflected glory when siblings succeed or when a romantic partner turns heads on entering a room (Cialdini et al., 1976). Aron and Aron’s (1986) research on “self-expansion” even indicates that people incorporate close relationship partners’ skills and abilities into their own self-concepts. And there is no ego boost like feeling special and irreplaceable to someone one admires (Murray, Leder, et al., 2009). Alas, interpersonal relationships also have a dark side. Certain emotions, such as embarrassment, seem to be impossible without the presence of other people. As the opposite of basking in reflected glory, one may be embarrassed by the gaffes of close others, for fear that they will reflect poorly on oneself (Lemay & Clark, 2009). Rejection is painful, even by strangers (Leary, Haupt, et al., 1998) and despised outgroups (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). Some so-called friends offer more insults than compliments, and family members— parents, siblings, spouses, children—can hurt one’s feelings like no one else can. Even if one is certain of another person’s overall love, his or her disapproval can sting. Estrangement from close others is especially painful. Divorce often lowers happiness and life satisfaction and heightens psychological disorders (see Berscheid & Reis, 1998, for references). Because other people offer so many possible threats to one’s self-image, then, they may lead one to self-protect: to avoid disapproval or rejection, or to lessen the pain of such devaluation if it does occur. In the remainder of this chapter, we review empirical evidence of self-protection and self-enhancement processes in interpersonal relationships. Most of this research identifies global self-esteem as being critical to these processes. When we refer to people with high and low self-esteem (HSEs and LSEs, respectively) we are speaking of dispositional self-esteem, which is quite stable over time (Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & Robins, 2003), rather than state self-esteem. We also focus on global self-esteem rather than on self-evaluations in specific domains (e.g., academic, social). In addition, we typically refer to self-esteem as traditionally measured—through self-report questionnaires, with items such as, “I am a worthy person”— rather than “implicit” self-esteem, which involves feelings about the self that may be beyond one’s awareness. Most research indicates that LSEs do not truly dislike themselves; they view themselves positively, just less positively than do HSEs (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989). We also assume in this chapter that HSEs’ positive self-views are genuine and secure, rather than falsely inflated or narcissistic, which undoubtedly would have different consequences for relationships.

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The Role of Dispositional Self-Esteem Self-esteem is important to self-protection and self-enhancement in relationships in two primary ways. First, dispositional self-esteem seems to calibrate the sensitivity of the sociometer (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). LSEs are especially attentive to social cues regarding their relational value and are overly vigilant for possible signs of rejection (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006). When rejection actually occurs, LSEs are sometimes more devastated than HSEs (Sommer & Baumeister, 2002), although not always (Leary, Haupt, et al., 1998). A second way in which dispositional self-esteem is critical for self-protection and selfenhancement processes in relationships concerns the general interpersonal orientations and strategies that LSEs and HSEs differentially adopt. Specifically, Baumeister et al. (1989) proposed that HSEs characteristically seek self-enhancement; they try to draw attention to their skills and talents and are willing to take risks to achieve gains for their self-esteem. In contrast, people with low self-esteem aim for self-protection; they “focus not on their good points but on trying to minimize their weaknesses” (Schlenker, Weigold, & Hallam, 1990, p. 856). Because LSEs’ main goal is to avoid exposing their unfavorable characteristics, they steer clear of challenges that may bring rewards but that also carry the risk of revealing their flaws. This view of LSEs as cautious and self-protective is supported by evidence in various domains (see Baumeister, 1993; Baumeister et al., 1989, for reviews). For example, in studies of social comparison, LSEs who failed against another person refrained from making further comparisons with him or her, a strategy that appears to be self-protective. In contrast, HSEs actively pursued further comparisons, apparently in an effort to outperform the other, despite the risk of competing against someone who had already outperformed them (Wood, Giordano-Beech, & DuCharme, 1999; Wood, Giordano-Beech, Taylor, Michela, & Gaus, 1994). As another example, studies of decision making have indicated that LSEs are much more risk averse and self-protective than HSEs when they make decisions (Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992). The self-protection–self-enhancement distinction parallels the distinction between approach and avoidance in the motivation literature (Elliot & Sheldon, 1997; cf. Higgins, 1997). Approach goals involve moving toward a positive end state; avoidance goals involve avoiding a negative end state. For example, a student may focus on trying to do well in classes (approach goal) or on avoiding doing poorly (avoidance goal; Elliot & Sheldon, 1997). Selfprotection, with its focus on concealing faults and preventing declines in self-esteem, appears to be an avoidance-based motivation, whereas self-enhancement, with its focus on presenting oneself in a positive light and enhancing self-esteem, appears to be an approach-based motivation (Elliot & Mapes, 2005; Heimpel, Elliot, & Wood, 2006). Indeed, HSEs and LSEs do differ in their general approach–avoidance orientations; LSEs adopt more avoidance goals in various domains of their lives than do HSEs (Heimpel et al., 2006). Risky situations may exaggerate these tendencies. Cavallo, Fitzsimons, and Holmes (2009a, 2009b) have recently shown that when a threat occurs in the relationship domain, LSEs become more conservative and risk averse in unrelated domains, but HSEs do the opposite: They become more risk taking. For example, after a relationship threat, when participants were asked to make a financial decision that allegedly had real consequences, LSEs chose a more dependable but not particularly profitable option, whereas HSEs chose more risky, but potentially more rewarding, options (Cavallo et al., 2009a).



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In their seminal introduction of the idea of self-esteem differences in self-protection– self-enhancement, Baumeister and his colleagues (1989) emphasized self-presentation—how LSEs and HSEs present themselves in their effort to manage others’ impressions of them. We depart from this emphasis on self-presentation in two ways. First, we suspect that LSEs and HSEs engage in these different strategies not only to manage others’ impressions but also to protect or enhance their self-image in their own eyes. Second, we find the self-protection–selfenhancement distinction useful not only to understand how LSEs and HSEs present themselves to others in a superficial sense but also to understand how they think and behave toward other people at all stages of relationships. In the remainder of this chapter, we review evidence that people are self-protective and self-enhancing in two phases of relationship development: initiating new relationships and regulating closeness in established relationships. In between these two sections, we cover emotional expression and self-disclosure, which are critical in all relationship phases.

Relationship Initiation A recent advice column in a Toronto newspaper encouraged women to ask men out, but warned: “Is it risky? Yup. Is there a possibility of crushing humiliation if your friendly tone is met by a frosty one? Absolutely” (Smith, 2009, p. L4). Risky, indeed. In a study that followed single undergraduates over a 6-month period, respondents labeled almost two-thirds of their initiation attempts as unsuccessful in launching a relationship (Cameron, Anthony, Wood, & Holmes, 2005, Study 4).

Why LSEs and HSEs May Differ When Initiating Relationships Because initiating relationships is risky, we and several colleagues proposed that LSEs behave more self-protectively than HSEs where relationship initiation is concerned. A number of factors are likely to make it difficult for LSEs to initiate relationships and to give HSEs confidence to do so. First, high self-esteem is associated with other personality traits that make social life run more smoothly. HSEs tend to be extraverted (Wood, Heimpel, & Michela, 2003), whereas LSEs tend to be shy and socially anxious (Leary & MacDonald, 2003). In addition, LSEs are less confident than HSEs about possessing qualities that make them immediately appealing to new acquaintances. That is, relative to HSEs, LSEs perceive themselves as weaker in such traits as physical attractiveness, social skills, and popularity— traits termed “social commodities.” It is not the case that LSEs view themselves more negatively on all traits. Anthony and her colleagues found that for certain traits involving “communal qualities” such as kindness and honesty, LSEs’ self-beliefs are nearly as positive as HSEs’ (Anthony, Holmes, & Wood, 2007). However, for people in Western cultures, social commodities are the key to social acceptance. Respondents believed that, compared with communal qualities, other people assess them on traits such as physical attractiveness and social skills more quickly, that others more often base their first impressions on these things, and that they themselves will continue to be evaluated on these things more frequently by both strangers and friends as they go about their daily lives (Anthony, Holmes, & Wood, 2007). (Results differed somewhat for East Asian participants, who saw communal qualities as more important.)

262   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS Because of the importance of social commodities to social life, at least in Western culture, Anthony, Holmes, and Wood (2007) proposed that Westerners’ self-esteem is especially attuned to such traits. As predicted, for Westerners, (1) self-esteem correlated more highly with social commodities than with communal qualities, (2) self-esteem was related to the cognitive accessibility of these traits (HSEs were faster than LSEs at making decisions about whether they were physically attractive and socially skilled but did not differ in their speed of deciding whether they possessed communal qualities), and (3) LSEs’ social behavior was influenced more by feedback about their social commodities than about their communal qualities (Anthony, Holmes, & Wood, 2007). When LSEs meet new people, then, they may be acutely aware of their self-perceived deficits in social commodities such as physical attractiveness and social skills—the very traits that would make them attractive to new people. Indeed, LSEs anticipate less acceptance from novel interaction partners than do HSEs (Anthony, Wood, & Holmes, 2007), and they tend to underestimate how much new acquaintances like them (Brockner & Lloyd, 1986; Campbell & Fehr, 1990). In a recent set of clever experiments, Cameron and her colleagues showed that LSEs and HSEs differ in their perceptions of acceptance even when presented with exactly the same acceptance cues (Cameron, Stinson, Gaetz, & Balchen, in press). In these studies, single participants were led to believe that a single, attractive, opposite-sex participant whom they had not met was in the next room. They were asked to “introduce” themselves to the other person over videotape, and then they watched what appeared to be the other participant’s response. In a high-acceptance condition, for example, the confederate self-disclosed personal information, exhibited nonverbal liking cues (e.g., smiling, eye contact), and ended by saying, “So, I hope to see you in the second part of the study!” Results showed that when presented with the very same acceptance cues, LSEs perceived less acceptance than did HSEs. Do these factors—tendencies toward introversion and social anxiety, beliefs that they fall short on social commodities, and low expectations for acceptance—inhibit LSEs from cultivating new relationships? Apparently, yes. HSEs rate themselves, and are rated by others, as being better than other people at initiating relationships (Buhrmester, Furman, Wittenberg, & Reis, 1988). HSEs also report dating more often than do LSEs (Girodo, Dotzenroth, & Stein, 1981). At the same time, these factors are not likely to preclude LSEs entirely from initiating relationships. People have strong needs to connect with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). We suspect that, given LSEs’ tendencies toward avoidance and self-protection, they use strategies to initiate relationships that minimize their risk of rejection as much as possible. Support for this idea has emerged across several studies and in several domains of relationship initiation.

Choosing to Affiliate In our laboratory, we examined whether LSEs and HSEs take advantage of an opportunity to initiate new relationships. We hypothesized that HSEs’ high expectations for acceptance would allow them to adopt a high threshold for acceptable social risk, which would permit them to enter novel social situations more readily. We expected that LSEs would adopt a low threshold for acceptable social risk, because LSEs expect interpersonal rejection and because rejection may be especially painful to LSEs (Sommer & Baumeister, 2002). To exam-



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ine these predictions, we created a context in which undergraduate research participants had an opportunity to join an appealing group. Ostensibly, this group was already in existence and would continue to meet monthly. When participants were given no information about the group’s likelihood of accepting them, LSEs had lower expectations than HSEs about how much the group would like them (Anthony, Wood, & Holmes, 2007) and were less willing than HSEs to join the group (Anthony, Holmes, & Wood, 2007). In another experiment, we attempted to overcome LSEs’ risk aversion. In one condition we presented participants with clear evidence that they would be accepted by the group. We suspected that, with little fear of rejection, LSEs would be eager to join. In a second condition, we conveyed that the group’s acceptance was more ambiguous and reserved. We expected that LSEs would be hesitant to enter this social situation but that HSEs would join the group in either instance. Results were as predicted: LSEs were much less interested in joining the group in the ambiguous-acceptance condition than in the obvious-acceptance condition, whereas HSEs were equally willing to join the group in the two conditions. It seems that HSEs’ high threshold for acceptable risk allows them to overlook small variations in anticipated acceptance. The results of these two studies confirm that LSEs’ decisions about entering into new social situations depend on their expectations for acceptance and that, in the absence of information to the contrary, their expectations are often low. At the same time, clear, obvious evidence of acceptance can overcome LSEs’ hesitation to enter new social situations. Further evidence suggested that LSEs focused on the costs of rejection, whereas HSEs focused on the social rewards of joining the appealing group. Rudich, Sedikides, and Gregg (2007) obtained similar results in studies involving a choice to affiliate with an individual (rather than a group). However, in their studies, participants who were not in the acceptance condition received feedback that was not ambiguous but downright rejecting. Participants wrote information about themselves, were led to believe that it was shared with two other same-sex participants, and then received what appeared to be the others’ written responses. The accepting other indicated a willingness to meet and befriend the participant, whereas the rejecting other indicated a reluctance to do so. Participants then had a choice of which other participant to interact with for a 30-minute getting-acquainted conversation. LSEs made the sensible, self-protective choice: They were nine times more likely to choose the accepting over the rejecting person. In contrast, HSEs chose the rejecting person almost as often as they chose the accepting person. Why might HSEs make this seemingly foolhardy choice? Rudich et al. (2007) suspected that HSEs, “having a flattering view of themselves, and the confidence to prove a point—might strive to win over rejecting partners” (p. 962). Indeed, results indicated that HSEs anticipated a positive interaction with the person who had earlier been rejecting. When making a decision about whether to join a group or to spend time with another person, then, LSEs seem to self-protectively avoid others who are not clearly accepting, whereas HSEs are more risk-taking—sometimes to the point of choosing to interact with someone who has been clearly rejecting.

Initiating Romantic Relationships: Riskier versus Safer Strategies Suppose Nora is romantically attracted to Nick but does not know how he feels about her. Most people would agree that Nora faces a risky situation—one with a definite potential

264   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS for rejection. Does self-esteem predict responses to it? In four studies, Cameron and her colleagues examined university students’ experiences of initiating romantic relationships (Cameron et al., 2005). They predicted that, when HSEs were attracted to someone, they would use more direct, risk-taking strategies than LSEs. For example, it is risky to approach an attractive stranger and ask him or her out for a date. A less risky, more self-protective tactic is to attempt to get to know the target better, look for signs of the target’s liking, and eventually, and rather indirectly, indicate one’s own interest. As Cameron et al. (2005) predicted, LSEs and HSEs differed in their approaches. First, 75% of HSE men but only 55% of LSE men reported making the first move. (Even in this day and age, over two-thirds of the romantic heterosexual relationships were initiated by the man.) Second, HSE men were more likely to use direct strategies, such as asking a friend to get the target’s phone number and telling the target of their liking. In contrast, LSE men were more likely to use indirect strategies, such as simply waiting for the woman to make a move and spending time with her while in the company of mutual friends.

Acting Warmly versus Not When meeting new people, one may show warmth and interest by making eye contact, smiling, and asking questions of the other. Such behaviors seem approach-oriented. Alternatively, one may self-protectively inhibit one’s warmth so as to lessen the sting if the other person does not reciprocate one’s interest. Indeed, people behave differently when they expect to be accepted than when they do not. Curtis and Miller (1986) induced acceptance or rejection expectancies in female participants and found that when participants anticipated acceptance, they self-disclosed more and had a more positive and agreeable demeanor than when they anticipated rejection. Similarly, studies in our lab indicate that when people expect to be liked and accepted by others, they act more warmly toward those others than when they do not. In two studies, participants were either videotaped as they “introduced” themselves to a fictitious group they believed they had the potential to join (Stinson, Cameron, Wood, Gaucher, & Holmes, 2009, Study 1) or as they interacted with a confederate of the opposite sex (Stinson et al., 2009, Study 2). Independent observers of the videotapes judged participants who anticipated more acceptance as more warm and friendly than participants who anticipated less acceptance. People who anticipated acceptance acted warmer and friendlier overall (Study 1) and exhibited specific behaviors that were warmer, such as making more eye contact (Study 2).

Detecting Other People’s Acceptance Earlier we noted self-esteem differences in detecting acceptance cues. LSEs’ failure to pick up on acceptance cues may not be just an unhappy by-product of their low self-worth. Recently, Cameron and her colleagues made the surprising proposal that self-esteem differences in detection of acceptance cues are motivated. In particular, LSEs’ motivation to avoid rejection leads them to self-protectively underestimate acceptance from potential romantic partners, whereas HSEs’ motivation to self-enhance leads them to overestimate acceptance. Cameron et al. (in press) showed evidence of this motivational account in several ways. First, recall the experiment described earlier in which participants watched a videotape of a trained confederate acting in a friendly way. In one study, these researchers manipulated whether par-



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ticipants believed the videotape was made for them or for another participant. When LSEs believed that the friendliness was directed at another person, they detected acceptance cues just as readily as HSEs did; it was only when the friendliness was directed at themselves that they underestimated acceptance. Clearly, then, LSEs’ failure to recognize acceptance does not reflect a skill deficit. Further indication that these processes are motivated emerged from studies in which Cameron et al. manipulated social risk. According to their model, self-esteem differences in social motivations emerge when social risk is present: Risk provokes LSEs to self-protect and HSEs to self-promote or relationship-promote. To study this idea, Cameron et al. (in press) created a high-risk condition, in which participants were told that they might meet their interaction partner for a face-to-face interaction, but only if the supposed other participant wanted to meet them. Participants in the no-risk condition were simply informed that they would not meet the other participant. As the authors predicted, when the risk of rejection was present, LSEs not only tended to detect fewer acceptance cues than HSEs, but they also detected fewer acceptance cues than they did when there was no risk of rejection. In contrast, HSEs detected more acceptance cues in the high-risk condition than in the no-risk condition. Social risk affected not only perceptions of acceptance but also indications of LSEs’ approach to—or, should we say, avoidance of—initiation situations. On a subtle measure of avoidance goals involving word recall, LSEs in the high-risk condition showed increased activation of avoidance goals. LSEs also reported that when they made their videotape to introduce themselves to other participant, they leaned toward the camera less in the highrisk condition than in the no-risk condition. Such self-esteem differences in avoidance goals, avoidance behaviors, and perceptions of acceptance were eliminated when social risk was removed. In summary, because relationship initiation contexts are risky—holding the potential for acceptance and rejection, which would lead to a boost or decline in one’s self-worth— they elicit motives to self-protect and self-enhance. Often, these different motivations align with self-esteem differences. For example, when facing a potential romantic partner, LSEs and HSEs adopt different initiation strategies: self-protective for LSEs and self-enhancing for HSEs. However, certain contexts bring out self-protective or self-enhancing responses in nearly everyone. Regardless of their self-esteem, when people believe that they will be accepted, they tend to act warmly; when they anticipate rejection, they do not.

Consequences of Self-Protection and Self-Enhancement in Relationship Initiation If LSEs are hesitant to seek new social relationships unless acceptance is virtually guaranteed yet are prone to doubt other people’s acceptance, it seems likely that LSEs would wind up with fewer friendships and romantic associations than HSEs. Indeed, HSEs do report being more popular and having higher quality relationships than LSEs (see Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003, for references). As Baumeister et al. (2003) point out, however, self-esteem biases people’s self-reports, such that HSEs give sunnier reports of most matters than do LSEs. Although we have observed repeatedly that our research participant pool has a dearth of men with LSE who are romantically attached, objective evidence of self-esteem differences in number of relationships is scant (Baumeister et al., 2003). Hence, we must

266   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS speculate about the consequences of self-esteem differences in relationship initiation as we await further research. It does seem highly likely that LSEs’ reliance on relatively passive and indirect strategies for initiating romantic relationships results in fewer dates. In the studies of initiation strategies described earlier, the researchers found that initiation attempts that participants called “successful” involved a greater number of overtures and more direct overtures than those labeled “unsuccessful” (Cameron et al., 2005). An additional possible consequence of LSEs’ indirect, relatively feckless attempts is that, when they fail to garner dates or the target’s interest, LSEs may not realize that their own behaviors are partly to blame. Instead, LSEs may assume that, once again, their undesirability has been confirmed (Anthony, Cameron, Wood, & Holmes, 2004). Finally, another possible consequence is that, if LSEs have fewer dating options and less experience in relationships with different partners than do HSEs, they may choose marital partners who are less well suited for them. In the case of acting warmly during relationship initiation, we can be less speculative about consequences. Considerable evidence indicates that interpersonal warmth is a strong determinant of liking (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993). Hence, if people do not act warmly on meeting someone new, the new acquaintance is unlikely to be attracted. In the studies we described earlier involving videotapes of people who expected that another person or group would or would not accept them and coders rated participants’ smiling and overall warmth, a separate group of coders rated participants’ likability. Participants who acted warmly were seen as more likable and more appealing as potential relationship partners than participants who acted less warmly (Stinson et al., 2009). Stinson et al. (2009) proposed and found evidence that warmth mediates the self-fulfilling prophecy of acceptance: If people expect acceptance, they behave warmly, which in turn leads other people to accept them; if they expect rejection, they behave coldly, which leads to less acceptance (cf. Curtis & Miller, 1986). Cameron et al. (in press) recently obtained similar results in their research on social risk, again using observers’ ratings of participants’ videotapes. Their results led them to conclude that “when risk is present, LSEs self-protectively inhibited their pro-social behaviors. Ironically, the observers’ actual liking results also suggest that LSEs’ self-protective cognitions and behaviors ultimately lead to the very rejection they were trying to avoid” (p. 35).

Revealing Oneself to Others: Emotional Expressivity and Self-Disclosure Expressing one’s emotions and disclosing one’s thoughts and feelings are important in all phases of relationship development, from being introduced to a stranger to interacting daily with one’s spouse in a long-term, committed marriage. Research indicates that expressivity is critical to relationship formation (Reis & Shaver, 1988). For example, among incoming university students, self-disclosure positively predicted the development of social support and friendships over the following few months (Cohen, Sherrod, & Clark, 1986). In established relationships, partners who frequently self-disclose and express emotions to each other experience more love and fulfillment and are more likely to stay together than partners who do not (Berscheid & Regan, 2005; Sprecher, 1987). However, revealing oneself is risky (Reis & Shaver, 1988). If Tim shares personal information with Patti, she may disapprove, become jealous, like Tim less, betray Tim’s con-



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fidences to others, or even sever her ties to him. Yet if Tim self-protectively withholds his feelings from Patti, they will not become closer. According to Reis’s intimacy model (Reis & Patrick, 1996; Reis & Shaver, 1988), intimacy develops as a dyadic process: One person reveals personal information and feelings, and the other is responsive—shows understanding, validation, and caring—which in turn encourages more self-disclosure. When deciding whether to express one’s true feelings or disclose personal information, then, people again face an approach–avoidance conflict: Do they reveal themselves, which could lead to closeness with another person, but which could also beget disapproval or rejection? Or do they self-protectively inhibit themselves? Gaucher and her colleagues examined these questions through a person × situation lens (Gaucher et al., 2010). They proposed that interpersonal risk is the key determinant of whether a person expresses emotion or self-discloses to another person and that personality variables and situational factors determine interpersonal risk. More specifically, people gauge the risk of revealing themselves to another person by their perceptions of that other’s regard for them. If they believe that they are highly esteemed by the other, they will risk revealing themselves; if they doubt the other’s esteem, they will inhibit their self-expression. Accordingly, any personality factor that is associated with perceptions of others’ regard and any situational influence on others’ regard are important in determining people’s assessment of risk, which in turn determines their expressivity.

Personality Determinants of Expressivity Gaucher et al. (2010) proposed that self-esteem is a chief personality determinant of expressivity. Given LSEs’ chronic concerns about others’ acceptance (Leary, 2005), their general self-protectiveness, and their specific worries about revealing their flaws (Baumeister et al., 1989), LSEs should be especially averse to the risks of revealing themselves. They should respond to risks not as HSEs would—in a fashion that is self-promoting or relationship promoting—but should self-protectively inhibit themselves. A few self-report studies have suggested that LSEs are less emotionally expressive than HSEs (Buhrmester et al., 1988; Graham, Huang, Clark, & Helgeson, 2008). Gaucher replicated these self-report findings in two studies with measures that tapped into not only emotional expressivity but also other ways of revealing oneself (e.g., “How openly do you reveal unfavorable aspects of yourself with [target]?” and “How openly do you express disagreement with [target]?”). Relative to LSEs, HSEs reported being more open and expressive with various people in their lives, including casual acquaintances, mothers, friends, and romantic partners. Gaucher et al. (2010) also obtained objective evidence of self-esteem differences. In one study, participants created a videotape that supposedly would be sent to a close friend in which they described positive and negative experiences. When they spoke about their negative experiences, HSEs, relative to LSEs, talked longer and were rated by observers as more expressive and self-revealing (Gaucher et al., 2010, Study 3). Studies of other personality traits associated with self-esteem have also used objective measures of expressivity in studies of different relationship phases. A few studies of interactions between strangers have shown that socially anxious people (DePaulo, Epstein, & LeMay, 1990; Meleshko & Alden, 1993) and introverts (Thorne, 1987) adopt a non-selfrevealing mode of interacting, in which they mostly listen and agree—a style that Leary (1995) calls “innocuous sociability.” At the other end of the relationship spectrum, a study

268   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS of long-term dating couples showed that securely attached people (who tend to be HSEs) were rated by observers as more emotionally expressive and self-disclosing than insecurely attached people (who tend to be LSEs; Collins & Feeney, 2000). Gaucher et al. (2010) also obtained evidence that what underlies HSEs’ and LSEs’ differences in expressivity is their differing perceptions of perceived regard. Participants’ perceptions of each target’s regard for them were assessed with items such as: “My [target] think[s] that I am a valuable person,” and “My [target] care[s] about me.” Analyses of mediation indicated that perceived regard accounted for the association between self-esteem and expressivity. Conceptually similar results, and nice evidence for the role of risk, emerged in a study in which dating couples were observed as they discussed personal topics (Brunell, Pilkington, & Webster, 2007). Participants who held strong beliefs that intimacy is risky (as measured by a scale with items such as, “It is dangerous to get really close to people”) self-disclosed less to their partners and had lower quality relationships than participants who were worried less about the risks of intimacy.

Situational Determinants of Expressivity Personality effects, and individual differences more generally, dominate the literatures on expressivity and self-disclosure. However, situational determinants of expressivity are certainly ripe for study, as Gaucher et al. (2010) learned. They manipulated the riskiness of the interpersonal context so as to obtain stronger causal evidence of the role of risk. They manipulated risk by varying the target of participants’ expressivity—specifically, making the target either higher or lower in perceived regard for the participant. In one study, participants were asked to identify someone who was either unconditionally accepting of them (low risk) or who cares for them but can sometimes be judgmental (high risk). LSEs reported that they would be more expressive of their negative emotions with an unconditionally accepting partner than with a judgmental partner, whereas HSEs did not differentiate between the two targets. The risk of revealing oneself can also be diminished when one believes that the other person will be responsive to one’s self-disclosures—that is, will show understanding, caring, and validation (Laurenceau, Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998; Reis & Shaver, 1988). Forest and Wood (2010) examined this prediction experimentally. Their participants were asked to self-disclose about a sad event to a fictitious partner. Participants either received an understanding and caring written response from their ostensible partner (responsive condition) or did not receive a response (control condition). Participants then selected topics to discuss with the other person from a list of potential topics that varied in intimacy. Choosing to discuss highly intimate topics (e.g., “something you have done and regretted”) is assumed to indicate a greater willingness to self-disclose than choosing low-intimacy topics (e.g., “the place in the world to which you would most like to travel”). Participants also rated how willing they would be to discuss each topic in depth. Results indicated that expecting a partner to be responsive led LSEs to become more willing to self-disclose but did not affect HSEs’ willingness to self-disclose. Certain features of the situation or the context may generally encourage or inhibit expressivity for everyone, regardless of personality. And, again, risk of rejection or disapproval may well be the critical feature of such situations. Gaucher et al. (2010) found that for both LSEs and HSEs, their openness varied with relationship targets. They were both



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most expressive with romantic partners, less expressive with friends, and least expressive with casual acquaintances. There may be various reasons for this differential expressivity, but Gaucher et al. (2010) argued, and found evidence for, the role of risk. People feel more secure in their romantic partner’s regard than in that of friends in general. Another contextual factor that may have universal influence is the valence of one’s emotions. People are generally more expressive of positive emotions than negative emotions (Gaucher et al., 2010; Howell & Conway, 1990). It is riskier to express negative than positive emotions. Expressing worry or sadness may reveal one’s vulnerability and personal flaws, and expressing anger can lead to conflict. In one study, Gaucher et al. (2010, Study 4) created a social context that was powerful— so powerful that it overwhelmed personality differences. Specifically, they placed participants in a face-to-face interaction with a stranger (actually a confederate). In one condition, the confederate was trained to be warm and accepting; she leaned toward the participant, maintained eye contact, smiled a lot, and agreed with the participant several times. In contrast, in the rejecting condition, that same confederate acted uninterested and eager to end the interaction. She leaned away from the participant, made little or no eye contact, avoided smiling, and looked at her fingernails or around the room while the participant was speaking. Results were striking: All participants, regardless of self-esteem, spoke more with the accepting than with the rejecting confederate, and all were more expressive, both verbally and nonverbally, with the accepting confederate, as judged by independent observers. To summarize, in keeping with a person × situation analysis of the role of risk in determining expressivity, Gaucher et al. (2010) found that whether or not people reveal themselves to another person depends on the risk they perceive in doing so, which in turn depends on their beliefs about the other person’s regard for them. People’s perceptions of others’ regard depends in part on their own personalities—self-esteem, in particular—and on characteristics of the targets, such as whether they are generally accepting or judgmental.

Consequences of Expressing versus Inhibiting Expressivity Recall that when people with chronic worries about others’ acceptance—socially anxious people, introverts, and probably people with low self-esteem—meet new people, they tend to interact in a pleasant but non-self-revealing way dubbed innocuous sociability (Leary, 1995). How do interaction partners react to this guarded style? They report discomfort, boredom, and less liking (DePaulo et al., 1990; Meleshko & Alden, 1993; Thorne, 1987). Thus a self-protective style may bring about the very result that the individual is trying to avoid: rejection. In friendships and romantic relationships, LSEs’ continuing inhibitions about revealing themselves (Gaucher et al., 2010) are likely to thwart the closeness that they crave. When people do not communicate their needs, their loved ones cannot provide social support; if they do not share their joys and triumphs, the others cannot help them celebrate (Gable, Reis, Impett, & Asher, 2004). They deprive their partners of the chance to be responsive (Reis & Shaver, 1988). Given the strong association between expressivity/self-disclosure and relationship closeness and happiness (Berscheid & Regan, 2005), it is likely that LSEs’ inhibitions lead to relationships that are less intimate. Indeed, Choi reported correlational evidence that LSEs experience lower relationship satisfaction than do HSEs and that expressivity mediates this association (Choi et al., 2006; cf. Brunell et al., 2007).

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Established Relationships In the context of established relationships, people continually face two competing goals: They can seek closeness with their partner, or they can attempt to protect themselves from the pain of rejection (Murray et al., 2006). Although seeking connection can be self-enhancing in the ways we described earlier, it can also be quite risky for two reasons: First, the very behaviors that contribute to the development of intimacy and interdependence—for example, self-disclosure (Reis & Shaver, 1988), support seeking (Collins & Feeney, 2000), and physical intimacy (Gillath & Schachner, 2006)—also create opportunities for rejection (Murray & Holmes, 2009). Second, becoming highly connected to another makes the pain of possible rejection more devastating (Murray et al., 2006). For these reasons, people may choose to self-protect instead of promoting closeness with their relationship partners. It may seem odd that people who are in established, committed relationships would worry about being rejected. After all, the partner’s presence in the relationship conveys liking and acceptance. Although outright rejection may be uncommon in established relationships, rejection can come in many other forms. In addition to being “dumped,” rejection can occur when a partner makes fun of one’s self-disclosures, criticizes one’s performance, disapproves of one’s choices, or rebuffs one’s attempts to initiate physical intimacy. In their work on risk regulation, Murray and Holmes (Murray et al., 2006) view rejection as encompassing such acts, which can be extremely hurtful even if the relationship does not dissolve. As with earlier relationship phases, LSEs and HSEs tend to manage the conflict between attaining connection and protecting the self very differently. These self-esteem differences may stem from disparities in LSEs’ and HSEs’ perceptions of risk, which continue well past the relationship initiation phase. Research suggests that LSEs perceive rejection by their relationship partners as more likely than do HSEs: LSEs underestimate how positively their partner sees them on specific traits (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2000) and how much their partner loves them (Murray, Holmes, Griffin, Bellavia, & Rose, 2001). Whereas LSEs respond to self-esteem threats (e.g., failure feedback on an ostensible intelligence test) by becoming concerned about their partner rejecting them, HSEs react to such threats by exaggerating their partner’s love and acceptance (Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998). Perceiving rejection as more likely and experiencing it as more painful than do HSEs (Leary & Baumeister, 2000) appear to lead LSEs to adopt a self-protective style in their relationships, turning down risky opportunities to connect with their partner in favor of personal safety from rejection. HSEs, in contrast, put self-protective concerns aside and seek to promote their relationships. In the remainder of this section, we describe the ways in which people self-enhance (by seeking connection) and self-protect in established relationships, focusing on the role of perceived risk.

Determinants of Partner Valuing One way in which people can self-protect or promote connection is by adjusting how highly they value and regard their partner. When people perceive little risk of rejection, they should hold positive views of the partner, but if they expect rejection, holding such views increases the potential for hurt: The more highly one values a partner, the more it hurts to lose him or her. In general, people who believe that their partner sees them more positively on valued



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traits (Murray et al., 2000) and who feel more confident in their partner’s love (Murray et al., 2001) are more likely to idealize their partner’s traits (Murray et al., 2000; Murray et al., 2001) and to express greater certainty about their commitments to their partner (Murray et al., 2000). These findings suggest that LSEs—who have doubts about their partner’s love and commitment (Murray et al., 2000; Murray et al., 2001)—should value their partners less than do HSEs. Indeed, risky situations seem to lead LSEs to self-protectively decrease the psychological value of their partner. For example, when LSEs are led to doubt themselves (e.g., through false feedback on an intelligence test or by contemplating a personal flaw), they devalue their partner, evaluating the partner’s traits more negatively (Murray et al., 1998; Murray, Rose, Bellavia, Holmes, & Kusche, 2002). Reminding LSEs of the ways in which a partner thwarts their goals also leads LSEs to evaluate their relationships less positively (Murray, Holmes, et al., 2009). In contrast to LSEs’ self-protective approach, HSEs respond to threatening situations by valuing their partners more. In one daily diary study of newlyweds, HSEs reported being even more in love with their partner on days after their partner interfered with their goals (Murray, Holmes, et al., 2009). HSEs also express stronger positive sentiments about their relationships and about their partner when the costs associated with being in the relationship are primed (Murray, Holmes, et al., 2009).

Determinants of Closeness and Distancing Behavior Another way in which people may resolve the conflict between connection strivings and self-protection concerns is to regulate closeness with their partner. Whereas being close and connected can be self-enhancing, distancing oneself psychologically from the partner ensures that rejection will hurt less if it occurs. LSEs tend to distance themselves from their partners in threatening situations. When LSEs were threatened—for example, by being led to doubt their intellectual abilities (Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998) or by being outperformed by their romantic partner on a test (Murray & Pinkus, 2008)—they drew away from their partners by reducing their dependence on the partner as sources of affirmation and self-definition (Murray et al., 1998), becoming less optimistic about their partner’s future behavior (Murray et al., 1998) and reporting less closeness with their partner (Murray & Pinkus, 2008). LSEs seem to be more likely than HSEs to fear that a friend’s or romantic partner’s flaws reflect poorly on them. Hence, when such flaws become salient, LSEs’ motivation to care for and support the other diminish (Lemay & Clark, 2009). In yet another study, learning that they were easily replaceable caused LSEs to distance themselves from their partner by reporting less involvement in their partner’s daily activities and taking less behavioral responsibility for their partners (e.g., cooking meals, helping with schoolwork; Murray, Leder, et al., 2009). Whereas LSEs pull away from their partners under conditions of threat, HSEs actually draw closer. As just one example, when HSEs were led to believe that their romantic partner had unspoken complaints about them, they reported feeling closer to that partner (Murray et al., 2002). HSEs’ tendency to approach their partner in threatening situations is not limited to feelings of closeness: It is also reflected in their behavior. For example, when HSEs were threatened through exposure to a disappointment prime, they increased interdependence with their partner by becoming more willing to give their partner decision-making power and to prioritize interdependent activities (Murray, Derrick, Leder, & Holmes, 2008).

272   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS Research that has examined the relation between distancing behavior and personality constructs associated with self-esteem has yielded findings convergent with the self-esteem findings. Like LSEs, people who are highly socially anxious (Alden & Phillips, 1990), anxiously attached (Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips, 1996), or who generally believe that their partners regard them relatively negatively (Murray, Bellavia, Rose, & Griffin, 2003) respond to conflict or signs of rejection with coldness, anger, and diminished feelings of commitment and closeness (Alden & Phillips, 1990; Murray, Bellavia, et al., 2003; Simpson et al., 1996). Studies that have not examined self-esteem differences but that have involved strong situations that increase the perceived risk of rejection have shown that the self-protective distancing behavior exhibited by LSEs can be a more general response to such risks. When a close other hurts their feelings, people often become less trusting of the transgressor (Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell, & Evans, 1998), and when a partner is perceived as less accepting of one’s disclosures, one reports feeling less close to that partner (Laurenceau et al., 1998). Decreases in closeness even occur when rejection risk is heightened without people’s awareness: When subliminally primed with the name of an attachment figure with whom they had previously reported having an avoidant attachment style, people exhibited increased accessibility of distancing goals (Gillath et al., 2006). As a final example, primes of the exchange script—the notion that people and goods should be evenly matched or traded—led people to report less closeness with their romantic partner (Murray, Aloni, et al., 2009).

Automatic versus Controlled Processes Does LSEs’ tendency to self-protect in relationships mean that they do not desire connection with their partners? In an intriguing theoretical development, Murray et al. (2008) recently proposed a dual-process model of risk regulation that suggests otherwise. At an automatic level, they argued, interpersonal risk activates both connection and self-protection goals for both LSEs and HSEs. The executive control system then kicks in to resolve this approach– avoidance conflict. HSEs maintain the automatically triggered connection goal and seek out ways to achieve connection. In contrast, LSEs override their automatic tendency to connect in favor of self-protection. In a series of studies testing this dual-process model, Murray et al. (2008) showed that being primed with approach words automatically activated approach goals for both LSEs and HSEs, but only HSEs explicitly expressed feeling closer to their partner. LSEs actually reported diminished feelings of closeness. When participants were threatened, such as when researchers highlighted interpersonal risk (Murray et al., 2008) or, in another investigation, when researchers reminded participants of how the relationship had led them to sacrifice their goals (Murray, Holmes, et al., 2009), both LSEs and HSEs responded the same way on implicit measures. They evaluated their partners more positively (Murray, Holmes, et al., 2009) and were quicker to identify connectedness words on a lexical decision task (Murray et al., 2008). However, on explicit measures, only HSEs reported positive illusions (Murray, Holmes, et al., 2009), and HSEs, not LSEs, were willing to engage in the risky interdependence-increasing behavior that would help them meet their connection goals (Murray et al., 2008). Just as LSEs overturn automatically activated connection goals and behave self-protectively, HSEs override automatically activated self-protection goals and increase connection. When Cavallo et al. (2009b) increased participants’ rejection expectancies, these participants



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performed better on a prevention-framed anagram task than did control participants, suggesting that the goal of self-protection was automatically activated. However, in another set of studies, these authors showed that after facing a relationship threat, HSEs reported stronger promotion goals on explicit measures (which afforded the opportunity for conscious processing; Cavallo et al., 2009a).

Consequences of Self-Protection and Self-Enhancement in Established Relationships Relative to HSEs, LSEs have less stable and satisfying relationships (Leary & MacDonald, 2003). Although initially LSEs are loved just as much as HSEs (Murray et al. 2001), over time, relationship partners regard them less highly and become less satisfied (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). LSEs’ tendency to pass up opportunities for increasing connection in favor of protecting themselves may contribute to these unfavorable relationship outcomes (Wood, Hogle, & McClellan, 2009). It is clear that inhibiting one’s expressiveness and devaluing others are likely to impede closeness. A second, less obvious way that self-protective distancing may harm a relationship is through projection. Lemay and Clark (2009) showed that when LSEs distanced themselves from a loved one by reducing their motivation to support and care for him or her, they assumed that the other’s responsiveness to them declined as well. Evidence that self-protectiveness is connected with poor relationship outcomes and that relationship promotion is tied to good outcomes comes from research by Murray. For example, when wives responded to their own self-doubts by assuming that their husbands devalued them, the husbands became less satisfied over the course of 1 year (Murray, Griffin, Rose, & Bellavia, 2003). In contrast, when women behaved in a self-enhancing fashion and exaggerated their partner’s acceptance in the face of self-doubts, their husbands reported relatively greater satisfaction over time. People who were willing to risk evaluating their partner’s traits more positively reported greater satisfaction and more optimism about the future of their relationship—and the partners of such people were also more satisfied and optimistic (Murray et al., 2001). Similarly, evidence has emerged from Murray, Holmes, et al.’s (2009) research on people’s responses to autonomy costs—reminders of how their personal goals have been sacrificed in their relationships. The more that participants responded to incurring autonomy costs in a relationship-promotive way—by valuing their partner more the following day—the more relationship satisfaction they experienced 1 year later (Murray et al., in press). This research provides further evidence, then, that seeking connection is better for relationships than self-protecting.

Conclusion In summary, self-protective strategies may inhibit LSEs from seeking new relationships, from expressing themselves to others, and from maximizing closeness with loved ones, whereas self-enhancing strategies may lead HSEs to cultivate new relationships, to reveal themselves to others, and to connect more strongly with the people in their lives. We have emphasized the costs and benefits that relationships incur when people engage in self-protection and selfenhancement, but these strategies are likely to have other important effects as well. Specifi-

274   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS cally, self-protection may perpetuate LSEs’ low self-worth, whereas self-enhancement may encourage HSEs’ high self-worth. Self-protective strategies—avoiding negative outcomes— are designed to merely avoid or control damage to self-esteem. In contrast, self-enhancement strategies may actually restore self-esteem after threats, making them more adaptive than self-protection in the long run (cf. Baumeister et al., 1989; Josephs et al., 1992). Moreover, when people take the risk of acting in relationship-promoting ways, they make it more possible for relationships to enhance their self-worth—to afford opportunities to receive praise, social support, and other ego boosts from relationship partners. Indeed, Murray et al. (1996) found that when paired with a partner who thought the best of them, LSEs’ self-esteem increased over the course of a year. Documentation of actual increases in self-esteem among LSEs is exceedingly rare in self-esteem research. We would not be surprised if loving, close relationships provide the most surefire way of boosting LSEs’ self-esteem.

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Chapter 13 An Attachment Perspective on Self-Protection and Self-Enhancement Phillip R. Shaver Mario Mikulincer

Ever since Darwin it has been evident, if it was not evident to earlier thinkers, that

people, like all animals, are motivated to attain states of safety and well-being while avoiding danger and pain, because these states, aside from feeling good, are important routes to survival and reproductive success. In the case of human beings, who are extremely dependent on conspecifics for safety and survival and—just as important—thoroughly enmeshed in cultural meaning systems that make coherent cooperation possible, self-protection and selfenhancement extend beyond the realm of the physical into deep recesses of the mind. People sometimes sacrifice themselves physically to attain symbolic prestige and significance or to avoid depression and demoralization. In such cases, one kind of self-protection and selfenhancement (social and symbolic) overrides another (physical), even though strong intuitions suggest that the latter should be more important. Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1982; Cassidy & Shaver, 2008; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a) is one theory that tries to make sense of human beings’ self-enhancement and selfprotection urges at both the physical and the psychological levels. In this chapter, we explore the relevance of this theory to understanding self-protection and self-enhancement. We begin with a brief summary of the theory and an account of the two major individual-difference dimensions it highlights, attachment anxiety and avoidance. We then explain how the theory and some of the research it has inspired illuminate self-protective and self-enhancing processes, including potentially destructive defensive processes. We show how avoidant individuals’ attempts at self-enhancement are motivated by a wish to view themselves as self

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280   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS reliant and as not needing to rely on others to help them cope with life’s demands. Finally, we consider attachment security and secure attachment relationships that foster secure attachment as alternative, more authentic, less defensive routes to self-protection and self-worth. Attachment security demonstrably reduces defensive self-enhancement and produces a sense of safety and protection without requiring desperate, defensive self-enhancement.

Attachment Theory: Basic Concepts In his classic trilogy on attachment, separation, and loss, Bowlby (1973, 1980, 1982) conceptualized what he called the “attachment behavioral system”—an innate psychobiological system that motivates human beings, from infancy through adulthood, to seek proximity to significant others (attachment figures) in times of need as a means of attaining safety and security. He thought that seeking proximity to “stronger and wiser” others, labeled “attachment figures” in the theory, and becoming emotionally bonded or attached to them psychologically, was an evolved strategy for increasing the chances of survival and reproduction. Attachment relationships work partly by keeping infants and children safe while they are socialized to live successfully in their physical environment and social group, and it is within these relationships that people form psychological selves that also require social support and protection. In other words, Bowlby’s theory was concerned with social aspects of both physical and psychological survival and “protection.” During infancy, this innate search for self-protection through attachment relationships can be observed directly when infants stop whatever they are doing (e.g., playing with interesting toys) and seek comfort and support from a caregiver if an unusual or unexpected noise is heard or a stranger enters the room (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). The same search for self-protection is notable in the minds of adults who are subjected to conscious or unconscious threats. For example, we (Mikulincer, Gillath, & Shaver, 2002) conducted experiments in which we subliminally presented threatening words (e.g., failure, separation) to adults on a computer screen and then assessed indirectly (using reaction times in a word-identification or Stroop color-naming task) which names of relationship partners became more mentally available for processing following the unconscious threat. It turned out that the names of a person’s attachment figures (determined by a self-report questionnaire) became more accessible following unconscious exposure to threatening words. These words had no effect on the mental availability of the names of other people, even familiar ones, who were not viewed as attachment figures. That is, mental representations of attachment figures tended to be automatically activated when a need for self-protection was unconsciously aroused. During infancy and childhood, a sense of being loved and protected is gradually consolidated based on actual interactions in which a child’s behavioral bids for proximity and protection are accepted quickly, reliably, sensitively, and supportively by one or more familiar caregivers. In the adult years, however, self-protection does not necessarily require actual proximity-seeking behavior, although such behavior is still often observed (seeking hugs, calling a spouse when one receives bad news, and so on). In addition, an adult can feel protected and valued by activating comforting mental representations of attachment figures (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004). These cognitive–affective processes create a sense of security and protection and help a person deal successfully with threats without other self-defensive



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maneuvers being required. In our experimental studies, for example, we have repeatedly found that priming thoughts of a supportive attachment figure has positive effects on mood, physiology, and prosocial feelings and behavior (Mikulincer, Hirschberger, Nachmias, & Gillath, 2001; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001; Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005; Mikulincer, Shaver, & Horesh, 2006). Similar positive effects of priming security-related mental representations have been found using self-esteem and openness to new information as dependent variables (Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; Green & Campbell, 2000). Another change in attachment-system functioning that occurs as a person ages and develops is in the kinds of people who are selected as sources of self-protection and support (in Bowlby’s [1982], terms, as safe havens and secure bases). During infancy, parents, grandparents, older siblings, and day-care workers are likely to serve as attachment figures. Infants tend to seek proximity to their primary caregivers when tired or ill (Ainsworth, 1973) and are most easily soothed by their primary caregivers (Heinicke & Westheimer, 1966). During adolescence and adulthood, other relationship partners may become sources of support and protection, including close friends and romantic partners or mates (Fraley & Davis, 1997; Hazan & Zeifman, 1999). Teachers and supervisors in academic settings, therapists in clinical settings, and even symbolic personages (such as God or the Virgin Mary) can also serve as real or symbolic sources of comfort and support. In recent studies, we have found, for example, that the actual presence of a supportive relationship partner in different kinds of relationships (romantic, leader–follower, group, or therapeutic) have short- and long-term positive effects on subjective well-being, psychological functioning, and mental health (Davidovitz, Mikulincer, Shaver, Izsak, & Popper, 2007; Lavi, 2007; Rom & Mikulincer, 2003). Bowlby (1973), a practicing psychoanalyst, noticed important individual differences in attachment-system functioning, and Ainsworth et al. (1978) devised ways to identify these differences reliably in a laboratory. Interactions with attachment figures who are available and responsive in times of need facilitate the optimal functioning of the attachment system and promote a sense of attachment security—a feeling or sense that the world is generally safe, that one is loved, protected, and accepted, and that key people are likely to be available and supportive in times of need (in the present and in subsequent years). Moreover, securityenhancing attachment figures help a person maintain positive mental representations of self and others (which Bowlby, 1973, called “internal working models”). Theoretically, securityenhancing interactions with attachment figures and the resulting positive working models are an authentic source of self-worth that renders most defensive psychological maneuvers unnecessary (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005). When attachment figures are not reliably available and supportive, however, a sense of security is not attained, negative working models of self and/or others are formed, worries about self-protection and self-worth are heightened, and strategies of affect regulation other than proximity seeking or recalling previous episodes of solid social support are adopted. In order to study these individual differences in adulthood, Hazan and Shaver (1987) created a simple categorical measure of what was later called “attachment style”—a systematic pattern of social-relational expectations, emotions, and behaviors in close relationships that results from experiences in close relationships (Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). The three relational styles assessed by that early measure—avoidant, anxious, and secure—were modeled after the three patterns of infant–mother attachment observed by Ainsworth et al. (1978). Infants and adults with a secure attachment style are ones who find it easy to trust others, open up emotionally to them, and feel confident about others’ help-

282   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS fulness and good will. Those with an anxious style are uncertain about being loved, doubt their social value, and worry about being protected or emotionally supported by a partner. This causes them to be unusually vigilant and worried about a partner’s feelings and behavior; overly dependent, demanding and intrusive; and emotionally excitable and unstable. In contrast, individuals with an avoidant attachment style have learned to rely heavily on themselves and try not to seek support or protection from a partner. It is these avoidant individuals that concern us most directly in this chapter, because they are the ones who tend to use self-enhancing defenses to keep themselves afloat under stress without having to rely on other people. For a number of years, attachment researchers used the three-category attachment style measure (see Shaver & Hazan, 1993, for a review). But subsequent studies (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998; Simpson, 1990) indicated that attachment styles are more appropriately conceptualized as regions in a continuous two-dimensional space—an idea that had been raised earlier in dimensional analyses of infant attachment reported by Ainsworth and her colleagues (e.g., 1978, p. 102). The first dimension, avoidant attachment, reflects the extent to which a person distrusts relationship partners’ good will and strives to maintain behavioral independence and emotional distance from partners. The second dimension, anxious attachment, reflects the degree to which a person worries that a partner will not be available in times of need, partly because of doubts the anxiously insecure person harbors about his or her own lovability and value. People who score low on both dimensions are said to be secure or to have a secure attachment style. The two dimensions can be measured reliably and validly with self-report measures, such as the Experience in Close Relationships inventory (ECR; Brennan et al., 1998), and scores on the two dimensions are associated in theoretically predictable ways with interpersonal functioning, affect regulation, and relationship satisfaction (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, for a review). Mikulincer and Shaver (2007a) proposed that individual differences in attachment anxiety and avoidance reflect both a person’s sense of attachment security and the ways in which he or she deals with threats and distress. People who score low on both dimensions hold internal representations of comforting attachment figures, which create a continuing sense of attachment security, feelings of self-protection and lovability, and reliance on constructive strategies of affect regulation (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004). Those who score high on either attachment anxiety or avoidance possess internal representations of frustrating or unavailable attachment figures and hence suffer from a continuing sense of attachment insecurity. These insecure individuals rely on what Cassidy and Kobak (1988) and Cassidy and Berlin (1994), following Main (1990), called secondary attachment strategies (contrasted with the primary strategy of seeking proximity to an attachment figure in times of need). These strategies involve either hyperactivation or deactivation of the attachment system in an attempt to regulate distress. High scores on the attachment anxiety dimension are associated with hyperactivating strategies: energetic attempts to attain greater proximity, support, and protection combined with a lack of confidence that it will be provided. High scores on avoidant attachment are associated with deactivating strategies: inhibition of proximity-seeking tendencies, denial of attachment needs, maintenance of emotional and cognitive distance from others, and compulsive reliance on oneself as the only reliable source of comfort and protection. Attachment styles are formed initially during infancy and childhood in early interactions with primary caregivers (a fact well documented in an anthology edited by Cassidy and Shaver, 2008), but Bowlby (1973) contended that important interactions with other close



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relationship partners throughout life have the effect of updating a person’s working models. Moreover, although attachment style is often conceptualized as a global orientation toward close relationships, it is part of a hierarchical cognitive network that includes a complex, heterogeneous array of episodic, relationship-specific, and generalized attachment representations (Overall, Fletcher, & Friesen, 2003). In fact, research indicates (1) that attachment style can change, subtly or dramatically, depending on the availability of a supportive relationship partner (see Shaver & Mikulincer, 2008, for a review); (2) that people possess multiple attachment models or schemas (Baldwin, Keelan, Fehr, Enns, & Koh Rangarajoo, 1996); and (3) that actual or imagined encounters with supportive or nonsupportive people can temporarily activate congruent attachment memories and behaviors (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b). This means that attachment parameters and dynamics can be manipulated, at least to an extent, in laboratory experiments.

Attachment Style and Self-Representations As mentioned earlier, Bowlby (1973) argued that children construct a model of themselves while interacting with attachment figures in times of need, when the children are tired, in pain, afraid, or disappointed. When interacting with available, empathic, and helpful attachment figures, children can easily perceive themselves as valuable, lovable, and special because that is how they are actually perceived and treated by their caregivers. Moreover, in such interactions they learn to view themselves as active, strong, and competent, because they can effectively mobilize a parent’s support, regain self-control, and restore emotional harmony and equanimity. In this way, interactions with responsive others and the sense of attachment security that develops from these interactions become primary sources of self-worth and selfefficacy. Borrowing from Kohut’s (1977, 1984) self-psychology, we (Banai, Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2005) have argued that security-enhancing interactions facilitate what Kohut called “healthy narcissism” and the development of a sense of self-cohesion—the feeling that one’s many qualities and experiences reside within a single, well-integrated self-structure. These interactions provide a subjective sense of stability and permanence and allow a person to feel coherent, consistent, and clear-minded even under threatening or unpredictable conditions. Moreover, they provide a sense of resilience, which allows people to calm themselves in times of stress and repair wounds to self-esteem inflicted by inevitable frustrations and disappointments. Individuals who feel safe, protected, valuable, and lovable can also develop a stable set of ambitions, ideals, and values and a motivating but realistic set of self-standards (which Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986, called the ideal-self and the ought-self), which help the person pursue and attain important goals. These positive experiences supply feelings of success, achievement, and growth and move a person steadily toward what Maslow (1954, 1971) called “self-actualization” and Rogers (1961) called a “fully functioning personality.” Lack of parental availability, sensitivity, and responsiveness contributes to disorders of the self, characterized by a lack of self-cohesion, doubts about one’s coherence and continuity over time, and vulnerable or unstable self-esteem (Kohut & Wolf, 1978). This is the condition of insecurely attached people, whose frustrating, frightening, and disappointing interactions with unavailable, inconsistent, or rejecting attachment figures raised doubts about

284   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS the degree to which they were esteemed, loved, and protected by these important people. Insecure people’s self-esteem is likely to be overly contingent on other people’s approval, the experience of temporary successes and failures, or defensive mental processes that distort reality. During their many demoralizing interactions with attachment figures, insecure people gradually incorporate (or introject, to use the psychoanalytic term) dismissing, degrading, and disapproving messages, making it likely that they will regard and treat themselves and others with disapproval and disdain. Thus insecure people are likely to suffer from selfcriticism and painful self-doubts or to erect distorting defenses to counter feelings of worthlessness and hopelessness. Adult attachment researchers have repeatedly shown that attachment security is associated with positive self-views. As compared with anxiously attached persons, secure individuals report higher self-esteem (Mickelson, Kessler, & Shaver, 1997), view themselves as more competent and efficacious (Cooper, Shaver, & Collins, 1998), and possess more optimistic expectations about their ability to cope with stressful events (Cozzarelli, Sumer, & Major, 1998). Attachment security is also associated with having a coherent model of self. In a series of studies, Mikulincer (1995) found that, as compared with less securely attached participants, whether anxious or avoidant or both, those with a secure attachment style had relatively small discrepancies between actual self-representations and self-standards (idealself and ought-self representations). That is, attachment security not only encourages positive self-appraisals but also seems to allow people to integrate them in a coherent and overall positive self-structure. Although both anxious and avoidant people have difficulty achieving an authentic, cohesive, and stable sense of self-worth, their reliance on different secondary attachment strategies results in different self-configurations and disorders of the self. Anxious, hyperactivating strategies intensify doubts about self-worth and self-efficacy, thereby exacerbating a person’s negative self-representations and leaving him or her flooded with feelings of vulnerability, helplessness, and lack of self-protection. Avoidant, deactivating strategies, in contrast, are attempts to suppress such doubts while working to enhance the value of the self and convince oneself and other people that one is self-sufficient and invincible. In the remainder of this chapter, we focus mainly on self-enhancing defenses of avoidant individuals and compare them with the more authentic feelings of self-worth associated with attachment security. Processes of self-devaluation and self-derogation, which are associated with attachment anxiety, are outside the bounds of this chapter.

Avoidant Attachment and Self-Enhancement Self-enhancement—the tendency to distort self-appraisals in order to maintain a favorable self-view—is considered by social psychologists to be one of the fundamental motives that guide the regulation of cognitive and affective processes (see other chapters in this volume). As reviewed in the other chapters, this motivational tendency causes people to exaggerate positive self-views, dismiss and easily forget negative information about themselves, seek positive feedback about their worth, attribute positive outcomes to themselves and negative outcomes to external forces, and positively bias expectations of control and success. Whereas some of the chapter authors view these positive distortions as adaptive means of maintaining emotional stability and mental health, others emphasize the negative side effects



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of self-enhancement maneuvers such as self-deception, narcissism, and even aggression and violence. According to attachment theory, security-enhancing social relationships and the sense of attachment security that arises within them allow a person to maintain a stable sense of selfworth, to feel safe and protected, and to function adaptively without self-enhancing defenses (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005, 2007a). Security-enhancing interactions provide people with feelings of being loved and accepted by others and possessing special and valuable qualities, which constitute part of what Rogers (1961) called the “real self”—positive self-perceptions derived from the positive regard others have bestowed on a person. In other words, because secure people are able to feel good about themselves even under threatening circumstances, there is less need for defensive self-glorification and rejection of negative self-relevant information. Incidentally, it was because Rogers (1961) viewed painful parental “conditions of worth” as the main difficulty facing troubled therapy clients and “unconditional positive regard” from a therapist as the remedy that he developed a theory of personality and a clientcentered approach to therapy, both of which have a great deal in common with Bowlby’s attachment theory. Viewed from the perspectives of Bowlby’s and Rogers’s theories, reliance on defensive self-enhancement is an indication that a person has been forced by attachment figures to cope with life’s demands without having an adequate sense of attachment security and has had to struggle for a positive self-concept while worrying about being unworthy, unloved, and unaccepted. This situation is particularly characteristic of avoidant attachment, because exclusive reliance on oneself and reluctance to rely on other people encourages avoidant people to emphasize their positive qualities and deny or suppress negative information about their weaknesses and failings. How can an avoidant individual rely exclusively on him- or herself if that self is unworthy, deficient, and unlovable? Only by denying negative traits and perceiving themselves as unusually strong, perfect, and worthy can avoidant people maintain a fairly comfortable self-reliant stance. Attachment research provides considerable evidence for avoidant individuals’ selfenhancing defenses. For example, Gjerde, Onishi, and Carlson (2004) found that, as compared with secure individuals, avoidant persons’ descriptions of their traits on the California Adult Q-Set (CAQ) were more favorable than descriptions provided by trained observers (an index of self-enhancement.) Moreover, avoidant individuals scored lower than their secure counterparts on the CAQ index of self-insight (the correlation between a participant’s selfdescription and raters’ descriptions of him or her). Avoidant people’s lack of self-insight was also noted in a study by Davila and Cobb (2003), who found avoidant attachment to be negatively associated with measures of self-clarity. Self-enhancement tendencies were also noted by one of us (Mikulincer, 1995, Study 2), who measured the accessibility of positive and negative self-traits in a Stroop task, as well as the level of integration of different self-aspects (participants’ ratings of mutual influence, trade-offs, and joint interactions between different self-aspects). The findings indicated that secure individuals had ready access to both positive and negative self-attributes during the Stroop task, as well as having highly integrated self-concepts. In contrast, avoidant participants exhibited many signs of defensiveness. They had ready access to positive but not to negative self-attributes, and their different self-aspects were poorly integrated. Lopez (2001) also noted this lack of self-integration in a study relating avoidant attachment to measures

286   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS of “splitting” defenses—that is, attempts to protect desirable aspects of the self by detaching them from undesirable aspects. Attachment studies have also revealed that avoidant people react to threats by defensively inflating their self-images (Hart, Shaver, & Goldenberg, 2005, Study 2; Mikulincer, 1998). Participants in several experiments were exposed to a variety of threatening or neutral information: Mikulincer (1998) provided his study participants with failure or neutral feedback in an ego-involving cognitive task; Hart et al. (2005) asked participants to think about an attachment threat (separation from a close relationship partner) or a neutral topic (watching TV). In these studies, avoidant individuals appraised themselves more positively following threatening as compared with neutral manipulations. Secure individuals’ self-appraisals did not substantially differ between neutral and threatening conditions. They made relatively stable and unbiased self-appraisals even when coping with threats. Mikulincer (1998) also noted that a contextual manipulation that made self-enhancing defenses less likely to be acceptable (a “bogus pipeline” that supposedly measured “true feelings about things” or the presence of observing friends who knew the participants well) had no effect on secure individuals’ self-views but significantly reduced avoidant individuals’ tendency to inflate their self-views under threatening conditions. Thus secure people’s positive self-images seem to be rooted in a solid sense of self-worth. But avoidant people’s positive self-views seem to be based on attempts to convince themselves or other people of their valuable and admirable qualities. More evidence on the defensive nature of avoidant people’s defensive self-enhancement was obtained in Mikulincer, Dolev, and Shaver’s (2004, Study 2) experiment on thought suppression. Participants were asked to recall either a painful breakup with a romantic partner or a more neutral experience (being at a drugstore) and to perform a 5-minute stream-ofconsciousness task in which they were instructed or not instructed to suppress thoughts of the just-recalled episode. All participants then performed a Stroop color-naming task while at the same time recalling a 1- or 7-digit number (viewed as either a light or a heavy cognitive load). The Stroop task assessed color-naming latencies for negative self-traits and positive self-traits taken from lists supplied by each participant during a previous research session. We found that the cognitive load moderated the link between avoidant attachment and self-enhancement following suppression of thoughts about separation and loss. Under a low cognitive load, avoidant individuals evinced readier access (slower color-naming latencies) to positive self-representations following suppression of thoughts about a breakup. Under a high cognitive load, avoidant individuals had readier access to negative self-traits following suppression of thoughts about a breakup. In other words, the effectiveness of avoidant strategies was significantly impaired when a high cognitive load interfered with the mental processes needed to maintain thought suppression. The avoidant defenses collapsed, and formerly suppressed negative self-representations were activated, along with memories of the painful relationship breakup. Avoidant people’s self-enhancement tendencies operate in line with the psychodynamic conception of defensive suppression. Their attempts to maintain a positive self-image fail to fully dispel worries and doubts caused by painful attachment relationships, and the suppressed material resurfaces when high cognitive and emotional demands are imposed. This mental collapse resembles the vulnerability that Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz, and Sweatt (2001) noted in individuals at risk for depression: “High levels of thought suppression may indicate that the individual has not resolved the negative patterns of thinking that contrib-



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uted to the previous depressive episode. These patterns of negative thinking are apt to become evident when stress undermines mental control efforts” (pp. 448–449). Using the Adult Attachment Interview (Hesse, 2008; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985), Kobak and Sceery (1988) found further evidence connecting avoidant attachment and selfinflation in a sample of college students. Compared with secure students, avoidant students showed a greater discrepancy between self-report and peer reports of personal competencies and distress: Peers viewed avoidant students as having lower ego resilience, higher anxiety, and higher hostility than the avoidant students themselves reported. The same self-inflating tendency was observed in an analysis of avoidant university students’ responses to the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Berant, Mikulincer, Shaver, & Segal, 2005). More avoidant adults were more likely to give inkblot responses indicating a tendency to hide behind a false facade and to try to maintain a grandiose, inflated self-image. Similar findings were obtained in studies examining attachment-style differences in selfserving attributions (Man & Hamid, 1998). As compared with securely attached individuals, avoidant ones attributed successes to more internal, stable, global, and controllable causes and failures to more external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable causes. Kogot (2004) also found that avoidant attachment was associated with tendencies to attribute failure on an actual academic test to less internal causes, to dismiss the diagnosticity of the failure, and to blame other people for it. Avoidant people’s self-enhancement can also be seen in their defensive reactions to selfrelevant feedback from a romantic partner (Brennan & Bosson, 1998). Avoidant people tend to be averse to partner feedback, preferring partners who do not know them well and reacting to feedback dismissively or indifferently. In contrast, secure people tend to seek partner feedback and react favorably and acceptingly to it. They are relatively open to their partner’s feedback and often use it to adjust their self-appraisals, resulting in a more accurate and diagnostic self-conception. Avoidant attachment has also been associated with another self-enhancement strategy— defensive projection of unwanted self-traits onto others, which then, by comparison, can enhance the avoidant individual’s sense of self-worth (Mikulincer & Horesh, 1999). This maneuver was examined in three 2-session studies. In the first session, participants were asked to generate actual-self traits and unwanted-self traits. In the second session of each study, the researchers assessed (1) participants’ initial impressions of hypothetical people, (2) their ability to retrieve memories of actual familiar people, or (3) the inferences they made about the features of hypothetical people. As expected, avoidant participants projected unwanted self-traits onto others. That is, they tended to perceive in others the very traits they had listed as ones they did not like in themselves, they easily retrieved examples of known individuals whose traits resembled those of their unwanted selves, and they made faulty judgments that traits taken from their unwanted selves were among the features of a target person they heard about whose description included traits that resembled their own unwanted-self traits. In the studies just reviewed, anxiously attached individuals did not engage in defensive self-enhancement. Rather, they tended to suffer from negative self-representations and to further deflate their already less positive self-views. For example, Mikulincer (1998) found that anxiously attached people tended to make more negative self-appraisals in threatening as compared with neutral conditions. Interestingly, although avoidant people’s self-enhancing defenses and anxious people’s self-derogating tendencies resulted in antithetical self-apprais-

288   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS als, both forms of insecurity are associated with pathological forms of narcissism (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003). In particular, avoidance is thought to predispose a person to, or to accompany, overt narcissism or grandiosity, which includes both self-praise and denial of weaknesses (Gabbard, 1998). Attachment anxiety, in contrast, predisposes a person to, or accompanies, covert narcissism, which is characterized by self-focused attention, hypersensitivity to other people’s attention to or evaluation of oneself, and a sense of needy entitlement (Hendin & Cheek, 1997).

Attachment Security, Self-Protection, and the Dissolution of Defensive Self-Enhancement As mentioned earlier, attachment theory not only portrays avoidant attachment as involving defensive self-enhancement but also portrays secure attachment as the antidote to this defensive tendency and an authentic source of self-protection and self-esteem. In this section, we review empirical evidence regarding (1) the extent to which the sense of attachment security can reduce self-enhancement tendencies and (2) the ways in which attachment security provides self-protection and self-worth without requiring self-enhancing defenses.

Attachment Security and the Reduction of Self-Enhancing Defenses There is experimental evidence for the reduction of self-enhancing tendencies by increasing a person’s sense of attachment security (Arndt, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001). In these studies, participants were primed with security-enhancing images (e.g., thinking about being accepted and loved by someone) or with neutral images, and their use of self-enhancement strategies was assessed. Schimel et al. (2001) assessed defensive social comparison—seeking more social comparison information in cases in which other people scored worse than oneself than in cases in which one had been outperformed by others (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985). Arndt et al. (2002) assessed defensive self-handicapping—emphasizing likely situational impairments of one’s performance so that negative outcomes would not need to be attributed to lack of ability (Berglas & Jones, 1978). In both studies, encouraging security-enhancing imagery weakened the tendencies to seek self-enhancing social comparison information and to grasp at self-handicapping excuses. Similar effects of the attachment security manipulations on rejection of negative selfrelevant feedback have been reported (Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005). In two studies, participants were asked to perform a difficult cognitive task and then visualize either a responsive close friend or a distant or negative interaction partner. Following the priming procedure, all participants received negative feedback about their performance, and their interest in obtaining further information about the task and the underlying cognitive ability it tapped was assessed. The results were consistent across the two studies: Participants expressed more interest in receiving information about their newly discovered liability after they were primed with thoughts of a responsive close relationship partner than after other kinds of primes. That is, having visualized a security-enhancing relationship partner, participants were willing to explore and learn about their potential personal weaknesses. Kumashiro and Sedikides (2005) concluded that “close positive relationships may bolster and shield the self to the



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point where, even following unfavorable feedback, accurate information about personal liabilities is sought out despite its self-threat potential” (p. 733). Although these studies indicate that making attachment security salient and stronger reduces the need for defensive self-enhancement, they did not include assessments of participants’ degree of avoidant attachment and hence do not provide evidence that security priming mitigates avoidant individuals’ tendency to self-enhance. To examine this issue for the purpose of the present chapter, we conducted an exploratory two-session laboratory study involving 100 Israeli university students (68 women and 32 men). The study was based on Study 1 of Mikulincer (1998), but it added security priming as an additional variable. We subliminally primed participants whose scores on avoidance varied, using the name of a security-enhancing attachment figure or the name of a close relationship partner who was not included on each person’s list of security-providing attachment figures. The participants had been randomly assigned to either a threat or a no-threat condition. Immediately after the manipulations, we measured participants’ self-views by asking them to rate the extent to which a list of positive and negative traits described how they felt during the experiment. The first session was designed to assess participants’ attachment orientations and to acquire specific names of security-enhancing figures and other close persons to be used later as primes in the second session. In that first session, participants completed the ECR inventory (Brennan et al., 1998), a measure of attachment anxiety and avoidance, plus two computerized measures of the names of attachment figures and other close persons who were not attachment figures. The first of these two computerized measures was a Hebrew version of the WHOTO scale (Fraley & Davis, 1997) in which participants were asked to type in a Microsoft Excel worksheet the names of their security-enhancing attachment figures. The scale included 6 items, 2 of which addressed the proximity-providing function of attachment (e.g., “Who is the person you most like to spend time with?”), 2 of which addressed the safe-haven function (e.g., “Who is the person you would count on for advice?”), and 2 of which addressed the secure-base function (e.g., “Who is the person you can always count on?”). For each item, participants wrote the name of the person who best served the targeted attachment-related function. In the second measure, participants were asked to write in a separate Excel worksheet the names of their father, mother, brothers, sisters, best friend, current romantic partner, grandfathers, and grandmothers without making any reference to the attachment functions they did or did not serve. We assumed that because these people’s names were not provided as primary attachment figures, they probably did not meet the strict requirements for that role. In the second session, conducted 2 weeks later by a different experimenter, participants performed a 30-trial computerized word-relation task. During each of the trials, they were subliminally exposed (for 20 ms) to the name of their most security-enhancing attachment figures (based on the first session of the study) or to the name of a familiar person who was not selected as an attachment figure. Following the priming procedure, participants in both priming conditions performed four cognitive tasks while an ego-relevant threat—failure feedback—was presented to half of them. In the threat condition, participants were exposed to four unsolvable problems and told that they had failed every one. In the no-threat condition, participants were exposed to four solvable problems and received no feedback concerning their performance. In sum, participants were randomly divided into four experimental conditions (with 25 participants in each), according to a 2 × 2 factorial design defined by kind of priming (security, neutral) and presence of threat (yes, no).

290   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS Afterward, participants received a list of 50 traits and were asked to rate “the extent to which the traits describe you as you are here and now.” Ratings were made on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The list included 25 positively valued traits and 25 negatively valued traits. For each participant, we later reversed the scale for the 25 negative traits and computed a total positive self-view score by averaging the 50 trait ratings. To examine the extent to which security priming mitigates avoidant people’s tendencies to defensively self-enhance, we conducted a three-step hierarchical regression analysis with participants’ scores on the ECR avoidant attachment scale, security priming, and threat induction as the predictor variables. In the first step of the analysis, we entered security priming (a dummy variable comparing the security priming condition to the neutral priming condition), threat induction (a dummy variable comparing the threat and nothreat conditions), and avoidant attachment (a continuous variable) as a block to examine the unique main effects of these predictors. In the second step, the two-way interactions between security priming and threat induction, security priming and avoidance, and avoidance and threat were entered as additional predictors. The three-way interaction term was added in a third step. There were two significant two-way interactions (security priming × threat, beta = –.32, p < .01, and avoidance × threat, beta = .37, p < .01) and a significant three-way interaction, beta = –.29, p < .01. Examination of the significant interactions (using Aiken & West’s [1991] procedure) revealed that a threat produced more positive self-views than a lack of threat only when avoidant attachment was relatively high (+1 SD), beta = .35, p < .01, but not when it was relatively low (–1 SD), beta = .08. These slopes replicate Mikulincer’s (1998) findings and provide additional evidence concerning avoidant individuals’ tendency to inflate their self-views following an ego-threat, failure. However, the observed effect of threat on avoidant participants was significant only after a neutral prime, beta = .56, p < .01, but not following a secure prime, beta = .14. In this case, there was no longer a significant difference in avoidant participants’ self-views between threat and no-threat conditions. Moreover, following security priming, avoidant participants’ self-views did not differ from those of less avoidant participants in either the threat or the no-threat conditions, betas < .11. These results provide encouraging preliminary evidence that even a temporary sense of attachment security reduces avoidant individuals’ habitual tendency to glorify themselves, especially when threatened with failure or humiliation. Further research is needed to determine whether security priming can also eliminate or mitigate other avoidant self-enhancement strategies (e.g., rejection of negative self-relevant feedback, self-serving attributions, projection of unwanted self-traits onto other people).

How Does Attachment Security Provide Self-Protection without Defensive Self-Enhancement? According to attachment theory, securely attached people’s sense of protection and wellbeing is derived primarily from the love, care, affirmation, and acceptance they receive, or received in the past, from their security-enhancing attachment figures. Therefore, they are likely to seek proximity to and support from attachment figures in times of need and to use this support as a form of protection and social value. We (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a) reviewed a sizable body of evidence that securely attached people tend to cope with stress



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and distress by seeking support from actual security providers or internal mental representations of interactions with such people. The importance to a person’s self-image of being loved, accepted, and appreciated by others is also emphasized in other theoretical frameworks. For example, Andersen and Chen (2002) contended that “Given the profound importance of significant others in people’s lives, the self and personality are shaped largely by experiences with significant others” (p. 621). Hinkley and Andersen (1996) found that implicit memories of feelings experienced in connection with a close relationship partner affected self-evaluations when a person interacted with someone new who resembled the previous partner (a case of what psychoanalysts, as well as Andersen and Chen [2002], call transference). Specifically, study participants freely listed more positive self-traits (controlling for baseline self-evaluation at a pretest session) after learning about a new person who resembled an accepting and supportive relationship partner than after learning about a person who did not resemble a previous partner. Similar ideas are part of the “sociometer” theory of self-esteem (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). According to this theory, interactions with an accepting, loving other create an increase in self-esteem, whereas experiences of rejection cause a painful drop in self-esteem. There is extensive evidence for this aspect of “sociometer” theory (see Leary, 1999, and Leary & Baumeister, 2000, for reviews). For example, laboratory manipulations that convey others’ acceptance or interest increase participants’ self-esteem (Leary, Cottrell, & Phillips, 2001; Snapp & Leary, 2001), and feeling accepted and valued by others predicts positive changes in self-esteem (Srivastava & Beer, 2005). In line with these theoretical frameworks, Baccus and colleagues (2004) have shown that feeling accepted and loved by others automatically increases one’s implicit sense of self-worth. Participants provided information about themselves (e.g., name, birthday, hometown) and then performed a reaction-time task in which they clicked on a word appearing on a computer screen as quickly as possible. After they clicked on each word, a picture of a person was presented on the screen for a few seconds. In the experimental condition, every time a self-relevant word (e.g., the participant’s name) appeared, it was followed by a picture of a smiling, accepting face. In the control condition, self-relevant words were randomly paired with pictures of smiling, frowning, and neutral faces. The researchers found that participants in the experimental condition provided more positive self-evaluations than those in the control condition. These findings strengthen the conclusion that representations of attachment security (i.e., receiving others’ acceptance and love) are important sources of positive self-evaluations. The emphasis placed by attachment theory on external or internalized attachment figures as sources of self-protection raises important questions about the extent to which secure attachments contribute to the development of autonomous self-regulation skills. On first encountering the theory, one might guess that secure attachments, which encourage people to rely on support from external sources, interfere with self-reliance (Kirkpatrick, 1998). That is, securely attached individuals might be extremely dependent and chronically driven to seek support when distressed. However, this view is at odds with both attachment theory (Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg, 2003) and empirical findings concerning a developmental sequence in which secure attachments provide a foundation for the development of self-regulatory skills (Sroufe, Fox, & Pancake, 1983). It is also at odds with findings showing that self-ratings of attachment security are positively associated with reliance on instrumental problem solving and other active methods of coping that do not require others’ assistance (Birnbaum, Orr, Mikulincer, & Florian, 1997; Mikulincer & Florian, 2000). Security is also related to positive

292   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS attitudes toward autonomous exploration (Mikulincer, 1997). In fact, Main and colleagues (1985) described securely attached individuals, based on the Adult Attachment Interview (see Hesse, 2008, for a review), as “secure and autonomous with respect to attachment”—that is, as valuing attachment relationships but not being overly reliant on them or needing to distort perceptions and actions in ways designed to defend against lack of confidence in oneself and one’s relationship partners. It seems, then, that securely attached adults can feel safe and protected by relying on either current attachment figures or their own resources and skills that were acquired in previous supportive relationships. In attempting to explain this fact, we (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004) proposed that some components or subroutines of the self that originate in interactions with available attachment figures (which we called security-based self-representations) underlie secure people’s sense of self-protection and value in times of stress. We focused on (1) mental representations of the self derived from how a person sees and evaluates himself or herself during interactions with an available attachment figure (self in relation with a security enhancing attachment figure) and (2) representations of the self derived from identification with features and traits of a caring, supportive attachment figure (self-caregiving representations). These mental representations become accessible during encounters with threats and have a soothing, comforting effect on a person. They are another avenue, besides direct, tangible emotional support, by which secure attachment makes reliance on defensive selfenhancement strategies unnecessary. We (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2004) conducted two 2-session studies to test these ideas. In the first session, participants freely generated traits that described a security-enhancing attachment figure or themselves in relation with this figure. In the second session, participants were exposed to either a threatening or a neutral condition and then rated the extent to which various categories of traits were descriptive of the way they currently felt about themselves. They then rated their current emotional and cognitive states. As predicted, securely attached participants reacted in the threat condition with heightened mental access to security-based self-representations—they rated traits that they had originally used to describe a securityenhancing attachment figure or the self in relation with this figure as more descriptive of their current feelings following the threatening but not the neutral condition. This heightened accessibility of security-based self-representations was not observed among insecurely attached persons. In addition, security-based self-representations had a soothing effect: The higher the accessibility of these self-representations, the more positive was a participant’s emotional state following a threat and the less frequent were task-related worries and other interfering thoughts. It seems that securely attached individuals can mobilize caring qualities within themselves—qualities modeled on those of their attachment figures—as well as representations of being loved and valued and that these representations can provide real comfort, allowing a person to feel protected and worthy. In sum, there are two related paths by which secure attachments provide a sense of selfprotection and worth without requiring distortive self-enhancement strategies. First, one can rely on the love, care, support, acceptance, and appreciation one receives from others and maintain a solid and stable positive self-image that is an accurate reflection of close others’ positive regard. Second, one can rely on security-based self-representations that foster a compassionate, caring, and loving attitude toward oneself and allow one to cope autonomously with many threats and stresses. These two paths allow a person to choose to deal with threats either autonomously or with the help of close others without feeling that support seeking



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implies personal weakness or worthlessness. The two paths sustain a sense of self-worth under most circumstances without the need for defensive self-enhancement.

Concluding Remarks There is persisting tension in psychology between, on the one hand, social psychologists’ efforts to portray humans in general as burdened with biases and distortions, many of which are viewed as maintaining undeserved self-esteem, and, on the other hand, clinically oriented psychologists’ efforts to distinguish between healthy, adaptive coping strategies and ones that are dangerously defensive and hence often unadaptive and vulnerable to collapse under stress. An example is the influential review article by Taylor and Brown (1988) that made defensive self-enhancement seem normative and adaptive, followed by the less frequently cited study by Shedler, Mayman, and Manis (1993) that distinguished between authentic and inauthentic self-esteem. Another example is the distinction between early studies of “terror management” (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997), which made it seem that people generally become more ethnocentric and belligerent when reminded of their mortality, and later studies (Mikulincer, Florian, & Hirschberger, 2003) showing that people who score higher on measures of attachment security focus on good relationships and symbolic immortality rather than becoming defensively hostile. Attachment theory offers a valuable perspective on these matters. People definitely do benefit from self-esteem, and they do many different things to achieve and maintain it. They are all afraid of death and social isolation to some degree, for good evolutionary reasons. But they do not necessarily have to distort their perceptions of the physical and social worlds or of themselves to feel up to the task of dealing with life’s inevitable stresses and problems. The ones who benefit from a history of close relationships in which they felt known, appreciated, and valued have good reasons for their sense of value and worth, and they have fewer reasons to grasp at self-enhancing delusions. Rather than taking pride in objectively unmasking the supposed tendency of humans to wrap themselves in self-protective illusions, it might be useful for psychologists to find ways of making comfortably accurate self-perception the norm. Attachment research suggests that this worthy goal can be accomplished partly by helping people establish and sustain loving relationships.

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Chapter 14 To Enhance or Protect the Self? The Complex Role of Explicit and Implicit Self-Esteem Tracy DeHart Julie Longua Jennifer Smith

I

n the history of research on the self-concept, no topic has been more heavily studied than self-esteem. The self-esteem literature demonstrates that people often compensate for threats to the self. Whereas people with high explicit self-esteem typically respond to threatening information by enhancing or maintaining their positive beliefs about the self, people with low explicit self-esteem respond to such information by experiencing a diminished sense of self (see Sedikides & Gregg, 2003, for a review). However, all of this research has focused on people’s explicit (consciously considered and relatively controlled) self-evaluations. Recently, researchers have begun to focus on people’s implicit (i.e., presumably unconscious, relatively uncontrolled, and overlearned) self-evaluations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Koole & DeHart, 2007). Research has demonstrated that implicit self-esteem predicts psychological and physical behaviors independent of explicit self-esteem (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Our goal in this chapter is to summarize how self-enhancement and self-protection motives influence the development of explicit and implicit self-esteem. In addition, we examine how, once formed, explicit and implicit self-esteem differences in the tendency to enhance or protect the self influence the regulation of behaviors and interactions with significant others. Finally, we suggest some directions for future research on the complex role of self-esteem in self-enhancement and self-protection. 298



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Measures of Implicit Self-Esteem One of the most widely used, reliable, and valid measures of implicit self-esteem is based on research on the name-letter effect (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997; Nuttin, 1987). Participants’ evaluation of their first and last initials is assessed by asking them to rate their preferences for all of the letters of the alphabet. A letter liking score is computed that is the difference between each participant’s rating of his or her first and last name initials and the mean liking for these two letters provided by people whose names did not include that letter (thus more positive numbers would indicate higher name-letter preferences). Participants’ name-letter preferences are computed by taking the average liking scores for their first and last name initials (for detailed information on scoring name-letter measures see DeHart, Pelham, & Tennen, 2006). The name-letter test has been used to assess implicit self-esteem as both a stable trait (DeHart et al., 2006) and a temporary state (DeHart & Pelham, 2007). Another widely used measure of implicit self-esteem is the Self-Esteem Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Participants are asked to categorize different combinations of self-related words and valenced words. Implicit self-esteem is determined by comparing how quickly participants are able to categorize self-related and negative words and how quickly they are able to categorize self-related and positive words together. The Self-esteem IAT has been used to assess implicit self-esteem at the trait level (Greenwald & Farnam, 2000; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003) and also as a temporary state (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Although both the name-letter effect and the IAT are believed to assess people’s implicit self-esteem, these measures are often weakly correlated with one another (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Rudolph, Schröder-Abé, Schütz, Gregg, & Sedikides, 2008). However, research has observed similar effects on different measures of implicit self-esteem that are typically uncorrelated with one another (Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Pelham, Koole, et al., 2005). For instance, research using the IAT (Jordan et al., 2003) and the name-letter measure (Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; Gregg & Sedikides, 2010) has linked high explicit and low implicit self-esteem with greater defensiveness and higher levels of narcissism. Measures of implicit self-esteem are also weakly correlated with measures of explicit self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2000; DeHart et al., 2006; Gregg & Sedikides, in press). Presumably, this has to do with differences in the nature of people’s implicit and explicit beliefs (DeHart et al., 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). People’s implicit beliefs about the self likely develop earlier than their explicit beliefs (Rudman, Phelan, & Heppen, 2007), implicit selfesteem appears to change much more slowly than explicit self-esteem (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Hetts, Sakuma & Pelham, 1999), and self-enhancement motivations may cause people to reinterpret negative social experiences on an explicit level (Crocker & Major, 1989), although leaving a clear mark on the implicit level. However, other investigators have argued that implicit and explicit attitudes toward the self are not independent of one another (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007). Therefore, another potential explanation for the dissociation between people’s implicit and explicit selfesteem is that self-enhancement motivations influence some people to inflate their self-esteem on explicit measures (Olson, Fazio, & Hermann, 2007). Therefore, discrepancies between people’s implicit and explicit self-esteem may be due to self-enhancement motivations that

300   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS influence explicit measures of self-esteem (not a reflection of distinct attitudes as dual-process models suggest). There is no easy answer to the question of whether implicit and explicit selfesteem measures tap distinct attitudes. However, the accumulating evidence for the validity of implicit self-esteem clearly suggests that implicit measures of self-esteem provide important information not provided by measures of explicit self-esteem (DeHart et al., 2006; Shimizu & Pelham, 2004).

Self-Enhancement, Self-Protection, and the Development of Explicit and Implicit Self-Esteem Significant Others People’s explicit and implicit self-evaluations are presumably formed through interactions with significant others. Theories in the tradition of symbolic interactionism suggest that people develop a sense of self on the basis of how others treat them (Cooley, 1902). Over time, people internalize their perceptions of others’ views of them. In addition, the sociometer theory of self-esteem suggests that self-esteem is a consequence of people’s perceived social standing through their interactions with others (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). Self-esteem is an indicator of one’s “relational value” to and acceptance by other people (Leary, 2005). The interpersonal monitoring system continuously monitors people’s relational value by functioning preconsciously (Leary et al., 1995) and motivates people who experience a decrease in relational value or acceptance to seek acceptance (Rudich, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2007). Therefore, both explicit and implicit self-esteem should be indicators of people’s perceived relational value. Research on early childhood experiences as an origin of self-esteem found that adult children who reported that their parents were more nurturing also reported high implicit and explicit self-esteem compared with those whose parents were less nurturing (DeHart et al., 2006). In addition, adult children who reported that their parents were more overprotective also reported lower implicit self-esteem. Finally, mothers’ independent reports of their parenting were also related to their children’s levels of implicit and explicit self-esteem. These findings may reflect changes in children’s ability to make self-protective attributions as they grow older (Wilson, Smith, Ross, & Ross, 2004). For example, children’s perceptions of parental overprotectiveness were reliably related to implicit self-esteem but were not reliably related to explicit self-esteem. Given that very young children are not as adept as older children at self-protection, having overprotective parents might have a stronger impact on implicit than on explicit self-esteem. When older children make self-protective corrections for parental overprotectiveness, they may protect their explicit self-esteem but fail to repair their implicit self-esteem (Hetts et al., 1999). Once formed, people’s self-esteem influences their beliefs about how others evaluate them. Securely attached people not only have positive mental representations of themselves but these positive self-evaluations are also reflected in secure people’s beliefs that important others also evaluate them as positive (Mikulincer, 1995). Also, whereas people with high explicit self-esteem perceive others’ acceptance as unconditional, or not contingent on success and failure, people with low explicit self-esteem perceive others’ acceptance as conditional in nature (Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996). In addition, people with high explicit self-esteem



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have very positive, well-articulated beliefs about the self that are relatively stable in response to negative events (Campbell, 1990; Pelham, 1991). Conversely, people with low explicit self-esteem are more neutral and uncertain about their beliefs about the self, and their beliefs about the self are influenced by recent negative experiences. Because people with high self-esteem feel that others value them, others’ regard is not contingent on whether they succeed or fail, and that their self-beliefs are well articulated and stable, they are able to enhance the self in response to potential threats. For example, people with high self-esteem are more likely than those with low self-esteem to engage in self-serving attributions (Schlenker, Weigold, & Hallam, 1990), favorable social comparisons (Wood, Giordano-Beech, Taylor, Michela, & Gaus, 1994), and to inflate their perceptions of themselves (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). These self-enhancement tendencies reinforce the positive beliefs of people with high self-esteem. In contrast, because people with low selfesteem feel that others may not value them, others’ regard is contingent on them performing well, and their beliefs about themselves are uncertain, they opt to protect the self in response to potential threats. These self-protective tendencies reinforce their already uncertain selfbeliefs. Therefore, self-esteem differences in self-enhancement and self-protection may reinforce initial differences in self-evaluations.

Culture The culture in which one lives also exerts an influence on the development of the self. Specifically, there are cultural differences in how the self is construed in relation to others (Markus & Katayama, 1991). Specifically, many Western cultures construe the self as independent, and the self is viewed as separate and distinct from others—the individual self is enhanced. In contrast, many Eastern cultures construe the self as interdependent, and the self is viewed as embedded and connected to others—the individual self is minimized instead of enhanced. In fact, researchers have argued that self-enhancement is only a trademark of independent cultures (Heine & Lehman, 1997). However, other researchers have argued that the need for self-enhancement is universal across cultures, although it may be manifested differently depending on one’s cultural context (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005). In a study of acculturation and self-esteem, Hetts et al. (1999) examined Asian immigrants in the United States and their explicit and implicit beliefs about the self (both individual and collective). Hetts and colleagues demonstrated that Asian Americans’ explicit self-esteem changed very quickly when they immigrated to the United States. Specifically, their explicit self-evaluations became more favorable (i.e., self-enhancing) and their group evaluations became less favorable. However, their implicit self-esteem scores changed much more slowly. In fact, their implicit self-esteem scores appear to have increased slowly over a 10-year period, whereas their implicit group-esteem decreased. These findings suggest that people’s explicit self-evaluations become much more self-enhancing to match their current cultural context. In addition, research has also demonstrated that individuals from Eastern cultures have implicit self-esteem that is as high as that of their Western neighbors (Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Together, these findings also suggest that the need to view the self favorably may be universal, but that it is manifested differently in Eastern and Western cultures (Sedikides et al., 2003, 2005).

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Insecure High Self-Esteem As mentioned previously, the correlation between implicit and explicit self-esteem is small at best (DeHart et al., 2006; Jordan et al., 2003). This finding suggests that there are discrepancies between people’s implicit and explicit self-esteem. Researchers have recently been examining some self-protective defensiveness related to insecure (high explicit and low implicit) versus secure (high explicit and high implicit) high self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 2003). Previous research has found that people with insecure high self-esteem reported more narcissism (Jordan et al., 2003). Inconsistent with these findings, other researchers have found that both explicit and implicit self-esteem have only main-effect relations with narcissism (Gregg & Sedikides, 2010). Specifically, explicit self-esteem is positively related to narcissism, and implicit self-esteem is negatively related to narcissism. Still, a recent meta-analysis found that implicit self-esteem was positively related to narcissism (Bosson et al., 2008). It appears that both explicit and implicit self-esteem are related to narcissism, although the exact nature of that relation is unclear. Nevertheless, it may be fruitful for researchers to examine how self-enhancement and self-protective motivations influence the development of people’s implicit and explicit self-esteem. To our knowledge, no research has specifically examined the origins of secure versus insecure high self-esteem. However, there is theory and some research on early experiences related to other types of defensiveness, such as narcissism and unstable high self-esteem. For example, Kernis (2003) has argued that people possess a certain trait level of explicit selfesteem around which their state self-esteem fluctuates. Presumably, negative events activate negative self-evaluations among people with unstable (or labile) self-esteem, which they are then motivated to protect the self by engaging in self-enhancement. Children with unstable self-esteem (i.e., a higher standard deviation) reported that their parents were more critical and that their fathers were more controlling compared with children with stable self-esteem (Kernis, Brown, & Brody, 2000). Presumably, children with unstable high self-esteem are able to make self-protective attributions for their parents’ critical and controlling behavior (Wilson et al., 2004). Engaging in self-protective attributions may result in having explicit self-esteem that is high, but negative daily events may activate negative self-evaluations, resulting in labile self-esteem. Clinical conceptions depict narcissistic individuals as having excessively positive selfviews that are believed to be defensive and that mask underlying insecurities (Kernberg, 1975). Most psychodynamic perspectives on narcissism point to the influential role of early relationships with parents who are rejecting, neglectful, and disapproving and do not meet the child’s needs as being internalized into negative feelings about others, as well as feelings of inferiority and insecurity (Nemiah, 1973). Therefore, a vulnerable self-structure develops, and narcissistic individuals try constantly to compensate for their insecurities by exaggerating their accomplishments, preoccupying themselves with thoughts of success, and seeking excessive admiration from others. Previous research has linked both authoritarian and permissive parenting (Ramsey, Watson, Biderman, & Reeves, 1996), as well as parental coldness and overvaluation (Otway & Vignoles, 2006), to narcissism. In addition, other research revealed that children who scored higher on healthy (with self-esteem left in) and unhealthy narcissism (with self-esteem partialed out) reported that their parents were higher in warmth and lower in monitoring compared with children who scored lower on narcissism, although only unhealthy narcissism



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was positively related to psychological control (Horton, Bleau, & Drwecki, 2006). However, other researchers did not find any associations between parental warmth, monitoring, and psychological control and narcissism (Miller & Campbell, 2008). Although these findings are consistent with the idea that early parent–child relations are related to the development of narcissism, the retrospective reports of parenting are open to alternative causal interpretations. Specifically, narcissism may bias the reporting of early parent–child interactions. Nevertheless, this is some of the first empirical evidence linking early childhood experiences to narcissism. Overall, these findings may help explain why narcissists have both a grandiose sense of self and underlying insecurities. Presumably, having cold, distant, or controlling parents left a mark on people’s implicit self-esteem, but over time defensive self-enhancement motivations led them to rationalize their parents’ behavior and form grandiose explicit beliefs about the self. However, the need to affirm their grandiose fragile self leads narcissistic individuals to constantly seek social approval, although their efforts are often counterproductive (Morf, Horvath, & Torchetti, Chapter 19, this volume; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001).

Self-Esteem Moderates the Regulation of Behavior In this next section, we examine how people with high and low self-esteem differ in how they respond to threatening information. Specifically, we review literature on how both explicit and implicit self-esteem moderate how people regulate the self, and as a consequence how they regulate affect and health behaviors.

Explicit Self-Esteem Moderates the Regulation of Behavior Self-Regulation Several conceptualizations of the self suggest that having a biased, self-enhancing view of the self is related to physical and psychological well-being (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Taylor & Brown, 1988), although other researchers have noted the negative consequences of these self biases (Colvin & Block, 1994; Robins & Beer, 2001). In fact, people with high explicit selfesteem present themselves in a self-enhancing fashion, whereas people with low explicit selfesteem present themselves in a self-protective fashion (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989). These differences between people with high and low explicit self-esteem in self-enhancement and self-protection are especially prevalent in response to self-threatening feedback (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Whereas people with high explicit self-esteem often respond to self-threatening information by protecting or maintaining their positive beliefs about the self, people with low explicit self-esteem often respond to selfthreatening information by experiencing a lowered or diminished sense of self. People with high self-esteem have more “self-affirmational resources” to draw on when their self-esteem is threatened (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). As a result, people with high self-esteem are more likely to enhance the self in response to threat. In short, there is a good deal of evidence that people high versus low in explicit self-esteem respond differently to threatening information.

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Affect Regulation The basic motivations to enhance or protect the self also have implications for other psychological processes, such as affect regulation. People sometimes recall information about the self that is incongruent with their mood (Sedikides & Green, 2001). For example, people with high and low explicit self-esteem differ in how they respond to negative moods. In particular, people with low explicit self-esteem recall negative thoughts and memories in response to negative moods, whereas people with high explicit self-esteem recall positive thoughts and memories in response to negative moods (Smith & Petty, 1995). In addition, people with high and low explicit self-esteem differ in their motivation to repair negative moods. In particular, people with low explicit self-esteem are less likely to report a goal to improve their mood (or to choose to watch a funny movie) after a failure compared with their high self-esteem counterparts (Heimpel, Wood, Marshall, & Brown, 2002; Wood & Forest, Chapter 12, this volume). There is also research suggesting that people with high and low explicit self-esteem differ in how they savor positive affect (Bryant, 2003; Wood, Heimpel, & Michela, 2003). For example, participants with high explicit self-esteem are more likely to savor their positive moods, whereas participants with low explicit self-esteem are more likely to dampen their positive moods (i.e., calm themselves down or distract themselves; Wood et al., 2003). Therefore, people with high explicit self-esteem are more likely to maintain their positive experiences. In short, the results of the literature on explicit self-esteem and affect regulation are consistent with the idea that people with high self-esteem are motivated to enhance the self (and their feelings) in response to negative events and to maintain their positive feelings in response to positive events.

Alcohol Consumption Alcohol consumption is a behavior that is related to both the self and emotion regulation. Negative interpersonal experiences are one type of stressor that play an influential role in alcohol consumption (Marlatt, 1996). Due to their chronically activated concerns about others’ acceptance, people with low explicit self-esteem want to approach their romantic partners for comfort, but at the same time they want to self-protectively distance themselves from partners they fear may reject them (Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 2006). Accordingly, people with low explicit self-esteem may drink more in response to negative interactions with their romantic partners as a way to regulate the tension arising from competing approach– avoidance motivations (Conger, 1956). Consistent with the risk regulation model, in a community sample of moderate drinkers, people with low explicit self-esteem drank more on days on which they experienced more negative relationship interactions with their romantic partners (DeHart, Tennen, Armeli, Todd, & Affleck, 2008). However, people with high trait self-esteem did not drink more on days when they experienced more negative romantic relationship interactions. Thus people with low explicit self-esteem may drink to reduce the tension associated with competing motives to approach their partners for acceptance and to self-protectively distance the self from their romantic partners to prevent further rejection. In addition, for participants with low trait explicit self-esteem, daily increases in state explicit self-esteem buffered them from the desire to drink in response to negative inter-



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actions with their partners (DeHart et al., 2008). That is, currently feeling accepted (i.e., high state self-esteem) buffered people who chronically feel less valued from self-protectively responding to potential rejection by trying to distance themselves from their romantic partners. Because there is a high within-day association between desire to drink and drinking behavior, daily increases in feelings of acceptance may indirectly reduce drinking behavior. Therefore, it seems as if both high trait and high state explicit self-esteem may serve a protective function against increased desire to drink and drinking after disagreements with romantic partners.

Implicit Self-Esteem Moderates the Regulation of Behavior Self-Regulation There is a good deal of research suggesting that implicit self-esteem plays a role in regulating the self (DeHart & Pelham, 2007; Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007). For example, after a failure manipulation, people with high versus low explicit self-esteem exhibited differences on a response latency measure of implicit self-evaluation (Dodgson & Wood, 1998). Specifically, after a failure manipulation, participants high in explicit self-esteem recruited thoughts about their personal strengths and suppressed thoughts about their weaknesses (compared with participants low in explicit self-esteem). In addition, in a study designed to assess whether name-letter preferences are based on self-evaluation rather than mere exposure, participants high in explicit self-esteem reported elevated liking for their name letters in response to a self-concept threat compared with participants with low explicit self-esteem (Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002). Apparently, experimentally induced self-concept threats have a more negative impact on implicit self-esteem for people low as opposed to high in trait explicit self-esteem. These self-enhancement tendencies among people with high explicit self-esteem have also been demonstrated in a repeated assessment study examining changes in state implicit self-esteem after negative events (DeHart & Pelham, 2007). Multilevel modeling analyses revealed that people with low trait explicit self-esteem experienced decreases in state implicit self-esteem on days on which they experienced more negative life events. In contrast, for people with high trait explicit self-esteem, their state implicit self-esteem remained stable after negative events, although their state explicit self-esteem decreased. These results suggest that self-regulation processes may begin to unfold on an unconscious level before they unfold on a conscious level (also see Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007). The results of the experimental and naturalistic studies reviewed suggest that one “self-affirmational resource” that people with high explicit self-esteem have is the ability to recruit positive implicit associations about the self in response to threat. Other research exploring whether self-enhancement processes exist at an implicit level has revealed the importance of studying implicit egotism, which suggests that people’s selfenhancing tendencies unconsciously bias their evaluations of people, places, and objects that are associated with the self (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & Mirenberg, 2004; Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones, 2005). For example, using archival research, Jones et al. (2004) reported that people were significantly more likely to marry someone with a first or last name that resembled their own. Using an experimental methodology, these same researchers revealed that participants arbitrarily preferred other people whose experimental code numbers mirrored their own date of birth (Jones et al., 2004). In addition, this research

306   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS revealed that implicit egotism is most likely to occur under conditions of self-threat, such as when people are asked to think about personal flaws. Thus, after a threat to the self, projecting positive implicit evaluations of the self onto people or places that resemble the self can serve as a self-enhancement tool.

Affect Regulation Implicit self-esteem (independent of explicit self-esteem) also plays a role in affect regulation (Conner & Feldman Barrett, 2005; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Spalding & Hardin, 1999). For example, people’s retrospective reports of negative affect are unrelated to implicit self-esteem, but are associated with explicit self-esteem. However, people’s spontaneous reports of negative affect using an experience sampling methodology are related to their implicit self-esteem (independent of their explicit self-esteem; Conner & Feldman Barrett, 2005). Diary methodologies that repeatedly capture people’s in situ behaviors as well as within-person contingencies between different situations and behavior may be well suited to assess the impact of implicit self-esteem on psychological functioning and health. High implicit self-esteem seems to buffer people from negative affect associated with doing poorly (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), self-concept threats (Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007; Spalding & Hardin, 1999), and negative daily experiences (DeHart & Pelham, 2007). Specifically, Spalding and Hardin (1999) had participants engage in either a self-relevant or self-irrelevant interview on emotional health. Participants then rated their own levels of anxiety, and interviewers rated participants’ nonverbal anxiety. In the self-relevant condition, participants’ self-reported anxiety was related to their explicit self-esteem, whereas observer-rated nonverbal anxiety was related to participants’ implicit self-esteem. In addition, people enhance their implicit self-esteem in response to threats to the self (e.g., gender identity, racism, and rejection) as a way to regulate anxiety (Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007). This effect was apparent even when participants demonstrated decreases in explicit self-esteem and has been referred to as implicit self-esteem compensation (ISEC). These results are consistent with the findings of DeHart and Pelham (2007), which suggest that self-regulation processes unfold on an implicit level before unfolding on an explicit level.

Alcohol Consumption According to the sociometer theory, to monitor one’s connection to other people, the interpersonal monitoring system must function preconsciously and must motivate behavior to restore acceptance when threatened (Leary et al., 1995). Consistent with this idea, a 30-day daily diary study on college students examined how implicit self-esteem moderated the relation between interpersonal events and alcohol consumption and how this was mediated by spending time with others who were drinking (DeHart, Tennen, Armeli, Todd, & Mohr, 2009). Multilevel analyses revealed that students with low implicit self-esteem drank more on days on which they experienced more (vs. fewer) negative interpersonal interactions. In contrast, students with high implicit self-esteem drank more on days on which they experienced more (vs. fewer) positive interpersonal interactions. Spending time with people who were drinking mediated both the low implicit self-esteem by negative interpersonal events interaction and the high implicit self-esteem by positive interpersonal events interaction. However,



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explicit self-esteem did not moderate the relation between positive or negative interpersonal interactions and alcohol consumption. These findings suggest that people with low implicit self-esteem may drink as a consequence of seeking out other people for acceptance. On the other hand, people with high implicit self-esteem may drink as a consequence of seeking out other people to enhance their positive interpersonal experiences.

Insecure High Self-Esteem and the Regulation of Behavior Defensive Self-Regulation As mentioned previously, people with high levels of narcissism have developed fragile selfstructures (Bosson et al., 2003; Gregg & Sedikides, 2010; Jordan et al., 2003). People with insecure high self-esteem scored higher on a measure of narcissism and engaged in more defensive behaviors than people with secure high self-esteem (Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, & Kernis, 2007; Jordan et al., 2003). In addition, participants with insecure high selfesteem reported higher levels of self-esteem instability than participants with secure high selfesteem (Zeigler-Hill, 2006). Presumably, negative events activate negative self-evaluations among people with labile self-esteem. Finally, self-esteem instability (and insecure high selfesteem) was found to be related to increased levels of verbal defensiveness (Kernis, Lakey, & Heppner, 2008).

Overconfidence and Self-Promotion People with secure high self-esteem engaged in less dissonance reduction after a decision compared with people with insecure high self-esteem, suggesting that people with insecure high self-esteem were more motivated to rationalize their decisions (Jordan et al., 2003, Study 3). A related defensive strategy is to increase the perception that others’ beliefs are similar to one’s own beliefs. When threatened, people with insecure high self-esteem exaggerated their estimates of perceived consensus for personal beliefs (McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 2005). Similarly, when faced with uncertainty, people with insecure high self-esteem responded defensively by reporting increased levels of certainty about other issues (McGregor & Marigold, 2003). In short, one way that people with insecure high self-esteem defend their fragile views of the self is by becoming overconfident in their views and beliefs. There is also a difference in the relation between insecure versus secure high selfesteem and self-promotion (Bosson et al., 2003; Kernis et al., 2005). Specifically, people with insecure high self-esteem reported that very flattering personality profiles were more descriptive of them compared with people with secure high self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2003, Study 1). Similarly, people with insecure high self-esteem reported that positive personality profiles were more self descriptive after a mortality salience manipulation (Schmeichel et al., 2009). Also, reported actual–ideal discrepancies in self-concept ratings were smaller for people with insecure high self-esteem compared with people with secure high selfesteem, suggesting that participants with insecure high self-esteem enhanced their reported actual self-concepts (Bosson et al., 2003). Finally, people with high explicit self-esteem whose state implicit self-esteem had been decreased (i.e., state insecure high self-esteem) were more likely than people with high explicit self-esteem whose state implicit self-esteem had been increased (i.e., state secure high self-esteem) to self-promote after an ego threat (Kernis et al., 2005).

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Behavioral Outcomes Researchers have examined secure versus insecure high self-esteem as predictors of selfprotective behaviors, such as ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005; Kernis et al., 2005). Using the minimal-group paradigm, people with insecure high self-esteem showed greater levels of ingroup favoritism compared with people with secure high self-esteem (Jordan et al., 2003, Study 2). Another study found that people with insecure high self-esteem (compared with secure high self-esteem) recommended more severe punishments for an outgroup member after experiencing an ego threat (Jordan et al., 2005, Study 1). Similarly, people with state insecure high self-esteem, compared with those with state secure high self-esteem, rated outgroup members more negatively after an ego threat (Kernis et al., 2005, Study 2). Implicit self-esteem can also moderate the relation between explicit self-esteem and selfregulating behaviors. For example, people with insecure high self-esteem displayed poorer self-regulation behaviors after receiving an ego threat, whereas self-regulation was better for participants with secure high self-esteem after an ego threat (Lambird & Mann, 2006). In addition, compared with people with secure high self-esteem, people with insecure high self-esteem reported higher levels of anger suppression behaviors and more days of impaired health (Schröder-Abé, Rudolph, & Schütz, 2007). Overall, insecure high self-esteem is associated with more detrimental behavioral outcomes compared with secure high self-esteem.

Self-Esteem Moderates Responses to Evaluative Audiences The need to belong and feel accepted is a fundamental human motivation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Therefore, it is no surprise that the evaluations of others can have a profound impact on perceived relational value (Leary, 2005), and as a result, on our motivations to enhance or protect our social worth. People with high self-esteem tend to enhance their social value in response to negative feedback (i.e., perceived rejection) from evaluative audiences, whereas people with low self-esteem protect their social value in response to negative feedback from evaluative audiences. However, the outcomes associated with these different motivations differ depending on whether the evaluative audience is someone people do or do not include in their sense of self.

Evaluative Audiences Not Included in the Self Previously, we reviewed many positive outcomes associated with people high in self-esteem enhancing the self in response to negative events. However, there are some negative consequences associated with enhancing the self. Specifically, there are some negative interpersonal consequences associated with enhancing the self in response to negative feedback from evaluative audiences who are not included in the self.

Explicit Self-Esteem Self-esteem moderates the relation between social rejection and self-evaluation as a form of self-enhancement (Sommer & Baumeister, 2002). Specifically, participants with high explicit self-esteem maintained perceptions of social acceptance and feelings of self-worth in response



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to social exclusion (Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary, Blevins, & Holgate, 1997). Conversely, participants with low explicit self-esteem lowered perceptions of social acceptance and decreased feelings of self-worth in response to social exclusion. People high in explicit self-esteem can draw on inner resources to successfully enhance the self in the face of rejection. However, people low in explicit self-esteem lack the inner resources to combat rejection with selfenhancement. Because people with high and low self-esteem differ in their self-evaluations in response to failure, they engage in different motivations to self-handicap in situations in which they are being evaluated (McCrea & Hirt, 2001; Tice, 1991). Self-handicapping is strategic behavior that people engage in by placing barriers in the way of performance; thus if they perform poorly, it provides a self-protective excuse for failure, and if they perform well, it provides a self-enhancing credit for success. People with high self-esteem practiced less, listened to performance inhibiting music before an evaluative task, and endorsed statements about the self-enhancing benefits of self-handicapping behavior (Tice, 1991). People with high selfesteem were engaging in self-handicapping behavior as a way to enhance the self and maintain self-esteem (McCrea & Hirt, 2001). In contrast, people with low self-esteem chose a self-handicapping strategy motivated by the desire to protect the self from the negative selfevaluations associated with performing poorly. However, there are some negative interpersonal consequences associated with enhancing the self (Heatherton & Vohs, 2000; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001; Robins & Beer, 2001). For example, after an ego-threat people with high self-esteem are perceived as less likable by their interaction partners compared with people with low self-esteem (Heatherton & Vohs, 2000). In fact, people with high self-esteem were rated as more arrogant, fake, uncooperative, rude, and unfriendly compared with their low self-esteem counterparts. However, there was no difference in how people with high and low self-esteem were viewed by their interaction partners under neutral conditions. In addition, people with high self-esteem were found to seek competency feedback and were more independent after an ego threat, which is why they were rated as less likable by their interaction partners (Vohs & Heatherton, 2001). In contrast, people with low self-esteem sought interpersonal feedback and were more interdependent after an ego threat, which is why they were rated as more likable by their interaction partners. People with high versus low explicit self-esteem also differ in whether they will choose to interact with an accepting versus a rejecting evaluator (Rudich et al., 2007). In particular, people with low self-esteem were more likely to choose an interaction partner who had given them acceptance feedback, regardless of that person’s social status. In contrast, people with high self-esteem were more likely to choose an interaction partner with high social status, regardless of whether that person had given them rejection or acceptance feedback. Rudich and colleagues (2007) suggest that people with high self-esteem are more likely to interact with the rejecting evaluator to either challenge the evaluator’s opinion or because they identify with the evaluator’s high status. In contrast, people with low self-esteem self-protectively choose the accepting evaluator.

Implicit Self-Esteem Much of the research exploring how the self influences enhancement or protection motives in response to rejection from evaluative audiences has focused on the moderating role of explicit

310   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS self-esteem. However, research has begun to suggest that unconscious beliefs about the self can also inform behavioral reactions to rejection from evaluative audiences. For example, daily diary research on implicit self-esteem has demonstrated that on days on which people with low implicit self-esteem experienced more (vs. fewer) negative interpersonal experiences, they drank more and were more likely to drink with others that evening (DeHart et al., 2009). These researchers suggest that, compared to people with high implicit self-esteem, people with low implicit self-esteem are more reactive to feelings of rejection stemming from the negative interpersonal events they experienced. Presumably as a way to seek acceptance, people low in implicit self-esteem sought interpersonal connection from other individuals (DeHart et al., 2009). Perhaps people low in implicit self-esteem can protect the self from painful decreases in already lagging feelings of self-worth by seeking acceptance from evaluative audiences that are not the perpetrators of that day’s rejection.

The Complex Role of Self-Esteem Discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem are also related to unrealistic optimism, a method of defensive self-enhancement (Bosson et al., 2003; Schröder-Abé, Rudolph, Wiesner, & Schütz, 2007). For example, people with insecure high self-esteem reported higher levels of unrealistic optimism compared with people with secure high self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2003). People can also mitigate the threat of social feedback through biased information processing. Specifically, the effects of implicit and explicit self-esteem can be seen on two defensive information processing responses—biased interpretation and decreased attention to feedback (Schröder-Abé, Rudolph, Wiesner, & Schütz, 2007). After a threat manipulation, people with discrepant high self-esteem attended to feedback for less time compared to people with secure high self-esteem. Overall, compared with secure high self-esteem, insecure (or discrepant) high self-esteem is associated with increased levels of defensive self-enhancement and self-protective personality characteristics. There are also some negative interpersonal consequences associated with people high in narcissism receiving negative feedback from evaluative audiences. Theory and research on narcissism support the idea that these individuals are more sensitive to rejection and are highly reactive to criticism (Kernis & Sun, 1994). For example, people who were higher in narcissism were more aggressive to a confederate who had criticized their essay compared to people lower in narcissism (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). In addition, research has revealed that narcissists are willing to derogate others in an effort to feel better about themselves (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, Elliot, & Gregg, 2002). In fact, although the interaction partners of people high in narcissism view them favorably at first (likely due to their selfenhancing strategies), over time their evaluations of these narcissistic individuals became less favorable (Paulhus, 1998).

Evaluative Audiences Included in the Self Several conceptualizations of people’s evaluations of significant others underscore the importance of the self (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996). Previous research on explicit self and close other representations suggest that the degree to which we treat others like the self is related to how close or how much we incorporate them



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into our sense of self (Mashek, Aron, & Boncimino, 2003). Previous research has also demonstrated that the same self-protective dynamics that are elicited when people think about the self are also evident in people’s implicit evaluation of close others after threat (DeHart, Pelham, & Murray, 2004).

Explicit Self-Esteem and Significant Others The Projection of Explicit Self-Evaluations People often project aspects of themselves onto their perceptions of their significant others (Lemay & Clark, 2008; Murray et al., 1996). Therefore, the same self-enhancement biases that influence how people evaluate the self extend to their perceptions about how close others evaluate them, which in turn influence how they view close others. That is, children’s beliefs about how parents and peers evaluate them are largely dependent on how they evaluate themselves. For example, children’s self-esteem predicted their perceptions of their popularity, with children high in self-esteem reporting being more popular compared with children low in self-esteem (Bohrnstedt & Felson, 1983). Similarly, children project their own self-evaluations onto parents and assume that their parents view them in the same way they view themselves (Felson, 1989). In addition, these reflected appraisal dynamics also appear in parent–child relationships during college (DeHart, Murray, Pelham, & Rose, 2003). Specifically, both mothers and children with low explicit self-esteem felt less loved by one another than did mothers and children with high self-esteem. However, children with low self-esteem actually underestimated how much their mothers loved them.

Enhancement and Protection after Interpersonal Rejection Research suggests that people high and low in explicit self-esteem differ in both their perceptions and reactions to rejection from romantic partners, friends and family members (DeHart et al., 2003; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2000). For example, research on the sociometer model of self-esteem has shown that feelings of general social acceptance correlate positively with explicit self-esteem, indicating that people high in explicit self-esteem typically feel more socially included than their counterparts with low self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995). As mentioned previously, the sociometer model suggests that people’s previous interpersonal experiences dictate the calibration of the sociometer to more (or less) readily perceive interpersonal rejection (Wood & Forest, Chapter 12, this volume). People with high and low explicit self-esteem respond differently to threats of interpersonal rejection from close others (DeHart et al., 2003; Murray et al., 2000). According to the risk-regulation model, the risk of interpersonal rejection activates two competing goals: the goal of seeking closeness with others who are likely to meet needs for connectedness and the goal of protecting the self from further rejection and pain (Murray et al., 2006). Although perceived risk automatically activates connectedness goals in everyone, people with low explicit self-esteem also activate an executive control system that prioritizes self-protection and inhibits connection (Murray, Derrick, Leder, & Holmes, 2008). Whereas people high in explicit self-esteem pursue connectedness goals after rejection by presenting themselves and their relationships in a positive light, people low in explicit self-esteem pursue self-protection goals by presenting their relationships less favorably.

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Implicit Self-Esteem and Significant Others The Projection of Implicit Self-Evaluations Much like people project their explicit self-evaluations onto their beliefs about close others, people’s implicit beliefs about the self are also projected on their implicit beliefs about close others. Specifically, across five samples people’s implicit self-esteem was related to their implicit evaluations of their close others (both implicit self-esteem and implicit evaluations of significant others were assessed using the name-letter measure; DeHart, Pelham, Fiedorowicz, Carvallo, & Gabriel, in press). This finding held for parent–child, romantic, and sibling relationships as well as for friendships. This finding also held when controlling for people’s explicit self-esteem and how much people liked letters in general. People include their significant others into their evaluations of the self, and their tendencies to enhance or protect the self spills over to their evaluations of close others. Presumably, people high in implicit self-esteem implicitly evaluate close others positively because they assume that their close relationship partners (i.e., friends, family, and romantic partners) accept them. On the other hand, people with low implicit self-esteem self-protectively regulate their closeness to relationship partners by devaluing implicit evaluations of them.

Enhancement and Protection after Interpersonal Rejection People’s implicit evaluations of their close others are contingent on their explicit self-esteem and the current quality of their relationships (DeHart et al., 2004). People with low explicit self-esteem have more negative implicit evaluations of their romantic partners when the current quality of their relationships is low. Similarly, people with low explicit self-esteem have more negative implicit evaluations of their best friends as feelings of closeness decrease. In contrast, the implicit evaluations of romantic partners and best friends of people high in explicit self-esteem did not differ depending on the current quality of their relationships. Notably, people’s implicit evaluations of their romantic partners and best friends were independent of their explicit evaluations. These findings suggest that implicit evaluations of relationship partners become overlearned, are elicited automatically, and may be more sensitive than explicit evaluations to cues of closeness in interpersonal relationships. Therefore, when things go wrong in the interpersonal relationships of people with low explicit self-esteem, they self-protectively distance themselves from partners as a way to protect themselves from potential rejection. However, this self-protection process apparently occurs beyond a level of people’s conscious awareness. People with high explicit self-esteem appear to enhance their perceptions of their close others, just like they enhance the self.

The Complex Role of Self-Esteem Do people with fragile or insecure self-structures also enhance close others as they do the self? Though differing explicit and implicit self-esteem should create tension between motives for self-enhancement and self-protection, research suggests that self-regulation processes may occur at an implicit level before occurring at an explicit level (DeHart & Pelham, 2007; DeHart et al., 2004). As a result, low implicit self-esteem may predispose people high in explicit self-esteem to experience a hidden vulnerability to signs of rejection within their interpersonal relationships. Theory and research on narcissism support



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the idea that these individuals are both more sensitive to rejection and highly reactive to criticism (Ruiz, Smith, & Rhodewalt, 2001). Narcissists are willing to derogate others in an effort to feel better about themselves (Morf et al., Chapter 19, this volume; Sedikides et al., 2002). Narcissists prefer romantic partners who are both perfect and admiring, in part because narcissists believe these partners will enhance their self-esteem (Campbell, 1999). Unfortunately, self-report data have revealed that narcissists report not only less commitment in their romantic relationships, but also less accommodation during romantic relationship conflict (Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002). Like people with low explicit self-esteem, narcissists appear to engage in self-protection strategies that distance themselves from people who provide the potential for rejection. Though narcissists may use their relationships to maintain an embellished sense of self-worth, when romantic partners become the source of threat, narcissists (i.e., people with insecure high self-esteem) appear to respond in a self-protective fashion by being both less accommodating and more defensive. Narcissists (i.e., people with insecure high self-esteem) are more resistant to doubts about a romantic partner’s commitment in response to perceived rejection (Campbell & Foster, 2008). Specifically, narcissists reported less relationship dysfunction when a romantic partner’s commitment is called into question (i.e., listing reasons why their current romantic partners might not be committed). However, this effect was partially mediated by the difficulty they had listing reasons why their partners might not be committed to them. This resistance is presumably part of narcissists’ defensive self-enhancement bias (Campbell & Foster, 2008), suggesting that people with insecure high self-esteem might behave in ways that protectively defend the self. One of the consequences of unstable high self-esteem (a correlate of insecure high selfesteem) is that people with this type of self-esteem are more reactive to a partner’s negative behavior (Kernis, 2005). For example, in a laboratory study, participants were asked to read scenarios about their partners’ engaging in ambiguously negative behaviors, such as not looking up from what they are doing when the participants walk into the room. Participants with unstable high self-esteem reported that they would react to such scenarios by either getting even or doubting their partner’s acceptance. In short, people who are included into the self-concept of people with fragile self-structures are not awarded the same self-enhancement biases as the self.

Summary and Future Directions The role of implicit self-esteem in self-enhancement and self-protection processes is still in an early stage, providing several interesting and fruitful avenues for future research. There is some initial research linking people’s perceptions of early childhood experiences with the development of implicit self-esteem (DeHart et al., 2006). Future research should examine which children do and do not engage in self-protective attributions to explain away negative experiences as they grow older. Are there early experiences related to the use of these self-protective strategies? In addition, future research should examine whether the stability of people’s implicit beliefs about the self are related to defensive self-enhancement and selfprotection processes. If so, are the same parent–child communication patterns (i.e., critical and controlling) that are related to unstable explicit self-esteem also related to unstable

314   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS implicit self-esteem? Finally, future research should explore whether temporary enhancement of implicit self-esteem, perhaps through classical conditioning (Dijksterhuis, 2004), can reduce motives for self-protection in the face of negative feedback from significant others.

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Chapter 15 Attributions to Discrimination as a Self-Protective Strategy Evaluating the Evidence Brenda Major Dina Eliezer

S

ocial rejection is a fact of life; everyone has had the experience of being disliked, excluded, or devalued at one time or another. Social rejection also hurts. Experiencing rejection often leads, at least temporarily, to negative feelings and a loss of self-esteem (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). For those who are lucky in life, rejection experiences are rare. But for some, especially those who are members of stigmatized groups, rejection experiences are common occurrences. People who are stigmatized possess (or are perceived to possess) a social identity that is broadly devalued in society or in particular social contexts (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). Examples of groups that are stigmatized across a wide variety of contexts in the United States include minority ethnic and religious groups, such as African Americans and Muslims; people who are overweight, mentally ill, disfigured, or disabled; and people who are perceived to have engaged in socially unacceptable behaviors (e.g., child abusers, drug addicts, homosexuals). Other groups, such as women and Asian Americans, experience devaluation in more specific contexts: in masculine domains for women and in some social domains for Asian Americans. As a result of personal experiences, observations of how others like themselves are treated, and exposure to media and other cultural messages, members of stigmatized groups typically are aware of their devalued status, the negative stereotypes that are applied to them, and their potential for being targets of discrimination (Crocker et al., 1998). In this chapter, we consider the implications of this predicament for the self-esteem of the stigmatized. In particular, we examine the hypothesis that one mechanism by which the 320



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stigmatized can protect their self-esteem is to blame social rejection, setbacks, and other negative experiences on prejudice and discrimination directed against their stigma (Crocker & Major, 1989). We also consider whether blaming negative experiences on discrimination protects the self-esteem of those who are relatively advantaged in society. In the following sections we first briefly review theory and research on the relationship between stigma and self-esteem. We then consider theory and research examining whether perceiving the self to be a victim of discrimination is damaging to or protective of self-esteem and factors that moderate these effects. We also consider whether attributions to discrimination are self-protective for members of high-status groups. Finally, we consider the implications of attributions to discrimination for implicit, as well as explicit, self-esteem.

Stigma and Self-Esteem There is substantial evidence that stigmatization is harmful to its targets (Crocker et al., 1998; Link & Phelan, 2001). Prejudice and discrimination against the stigmatized limit their access to important resources, including adequate housing, education, medical care, employment, and income, and are linked to poorer health outcomes among the stigmatized, including a higher incidence of anxiety, depression, heart disease, low-birthweight babies, and cancer (Contrada et al., 2001; Harrell, Hall, & Taliaferro, 2003; Klonoff, Landrine, & Campbell, 2000; Paradies, 2006; Williams & Mohammed, 2009). It is commonly assumed that experiencing stigmatization also harms self-esteem (see Crocker & Major, 1989). For example, symbolic interaction theories posit that people’s selfperceptions are based on their perceptions of how they are viewed by others (Cooley, 1956; Mead, 1934). These theories thus predict that people who are devalued in society are likely to internalize that devaluation, resulting in lowered self-esteem. Theory and research on the self-fulfilling prophecy posit that people’s cognitions, behaviors, and self-views are shaped by how they are viewed and treated by others (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Merton, 1948). One implication of these theories is that people who are viewed and treated negatively by others may come to see themselves accordingly. Theories such as sociometer theory (Leary & Baumeister, 2000) posit that experiencing social rejection threatens the core need to belong and leads to lower self-esteem. Empirical studies examining the relationship between stigma and self-esteem, however, often find that members of stigmatized groups do not have lower self-esteem than members of nonstigmatized groups (see Crocker & Major, 1989; Porter & Washington, 1979; Rosenberg & Simmons, 1972, for reviews). For example, African Americans, a group that has faced persistent and severe devaluation and discrimination for hundreds of years in the United States, report levels of self-esteem equal to or greater than those of European Americans (Rosenberg, 1965; Twenge & Crocker, 2002). Many other stigmatized groups also do not report diminished self-esteem, including Latinos (Jensen, White, & Galliher, 1982; Martinez & Dukes, 1991), people with disabilities (Johnson, Johnson, & Rynders, 1981), gay and lesbian individuals (Carlson & Baxter, 1984), and mentally retarded people (Corrigan & Watson, 2002). The data with regard to other stigmatized groups is mixed. For example, there is some evidence that women (especially white women) have lower self-esteem than (white) men (Gentile et al., 2009; Major, Barr, Zubek, & Babey, 1999) and that the overweight (particularly overweight women) have lower self-esteem than those who are of average weight

322   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS (Miller & Downey, 1999). Overall, however, despite often facing severe and pervasive discrimination, many members of stigmatized groups do not have lower self-esteem than those who belong to nonstigmatized groups. What can account for this paradox?

Do Attributions to Discrimination Protect Self-Esteem? Crocker and Major (1989) theorized that several cognitive mechanisms associated with membership in a stigmatized group may buffer the self-esteem of members of stigmatized or oppressed groups against social rejection and negative outcomes. One of these self-protective mechanisms, they proposed, is to attribute negative outcomes to the prejudiced attitudes of others rather than to themselves. In particular, because the stigmatized are aware of their devalued status and their potential for being targets of prejudice, Crocker and Major (1989) suggested that they may experience attributional ambiguity about their negative outcomes. For example, if a black person fails to get a job, is criticized, or is denied promotion, he or she may be uncertain whether the event occurred because of his or her personal inadequacies or whether it occurred because the evaluator was racist. Drawing on Kelley’s discounting principle (1973), Crocker and Major (1989) hypothesized that the availability of prejudice as a plausible external cause of social rejection allows the stigmatized to discount their own roles in producing those outcomes. That is, attributing a job rejection to discrimination reduces the extent to which it is blamed on oneself. Furthermore, they proposed that because the prejudice of others is external to the self, attributing negative outcomes to prejudice should protect self-esteem relative to making attributions to “internal, stable, and global causes such as a lack of ability” (p. 613). They derived this latter hypothesis from theory and research showing that attributing negative events to causes external to the self protects self-esteem, whereas attributing negative outcomes to causes internal to the self, such as a lack of ability, leads to low self-esteem (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Weiner, 1985). Crocker and Major (1989) observed that “this self-protective mechanism is particularly powerful because it may be used not only in response to negative evaluations or outcomes that do, in fact, stem from prejudice against the stigmatized group, but also in response to negative outcomes that do not stem from prejudice” (p. 612). Importantly, Crocker and Major (1989) focused on the impact of attributions to discrimination on personal self-esteem and self-esteem-related emotions (e.g., worthlessness, depression, sadness, shame). They were not concerned with emotions such as anger or hostility. This distinction is important, as the perception of injustice is often associated with the emotional response of anger (see Miller & Kaiser, 2001, for a review). Anger is also a frequent affective response to perceiving that one is a target of discrimination (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). Also, Crocker and Major (1989) focused on the impact of discrimination attributions on personal, rather than collective, self-esteem. That is, they were concerned with how stigma affects feelings about the individual self rather than feelings about the stigma more generally or feelings about one’s stigmatized group. Several early studies provided support for Crocker and Major’s (1989) hypothesis. For example, K. L. Dion (1975) reported that following receipt of negative feedback from a male evaluator, female participants who believed that they had been discriminated against reported higher self-esteem than those who did not believe they had been discriminated



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against. Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, and Major (1991) manipulated the perceived attitudes of a male evaluator and found that women reported fewer depressed emotions (but not less anger or hostility) following negative feedback when told the evaluator held sexist attitudes than when told he held nonsexist attitudes. A second study found that when African American participants received a negative evaluation from a white evaluator whom they thought was aware of their race, they attributed the feedback more to discrimination and reported marginally higher self-esteem than participants who thought the evaluator was unaware of their race (Crocker et al., 1991). Despite this early support, the proposition that perceiving oneself to be a target of discrimination is a self-esteem protective strategy proved to be highly controversial. For example, Schmitt and Branscombe (2002b) argued that because prejudice signals rejection and exclusion on the part of the dominant group, “attributions to prejudice . . . are detrimental to the psychological well-being of the disadvantaged.” (p. 193). In addition, whereas some subsequent research provided support for attributions as a self-esteem protective strategy, other research contradicts this perspective. These theoretical challenges and conflicting empirical findings led to subsequent theoretical refinements and clarifications of how and when attributions to discrimination protect self-esteem. We consider these next.

Attributions to Discrimination and Self-Esteem: Theoretical Refinements Measurement and Terminology Scholars often use the terms attributions to discrimination and perceived discrimination interchangeably. However, these constructs are typically studied in two distinct ways that yield conflicting findings about the nature of the relationship between discrimination attributions or perceptions and self-esteem. Researchers using survey methods typically ask participants to indicate the extent to which they personally and/or members of their group have experienced discrimination and then correlate their responses with an outcome variable, such as self-esteem. Studies using this approach frequently report that the more people perceive themselves to have been victims of discrimination, the lower self-esteem and more depressed affect they report (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Klonoff et al., 2000; Meyer, 1995; Swim et al., 2001). There are a number of problems with this approach that cloud interpretation of these findings (see Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Major & Sawyer, 2009, for a discussion). For example, when perceived discrimination is assessed retrospectively on questionnaires, self-reports of experiences with discrimination confound attributional processes with frequency and severity of exposure to discrimination. In other words, it is unclear whether making an attribution to discrimination is damaging in itself or whether constant mistreatment is the detrimental factor. This confounding makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of exposure from the effects of attributions to discrimination. Researchers using experimental methods, in contrast, typically manipulate or control for exposure to a negative event across participants, manipulate the plausibility that prejudice could have caused the event (or measure individual difference variables that might predict this attribution), measure the extent to which participants attribute the event to discrimination, and assess self-esteem (Crocker et al., 1991). This approach disentangles the psychological consequences of exposure to negative events from attributions for those events. Studies using

324   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS this approach more often find that attributing a specific negative outcome to discrimination can protect self-esteem (Hoyt, Aguilar, Kaiser, Blascovich, & Lee, 2007). Major, Quinton, and McCoy (2002) posited that measures of perceived exposure to discrimination and attributions of specific events to discrimination may tap different processes. The former can be conceptualized as a threat appraisal, in that individuals who report that they are frequently victims of discrimination are appraising their environment as hostile and dangerous. In contrast, the latter can be viewed as a cognitive reappraisal coping strategy, in that blaming an event on discrimination mitigates the threat to personal self-esteem that might arise from blaming the event on internal, stable aspects of the self. Thus, when considering the relationship between attributions to discrimination and self-esteem, it is important to take into account exactly what construct was measured and the context and manner in which it was assessed.

Is Discrimination an External or an Internal Attribution? Crocker and Major (1989) proposed that an attribution to prejudice is an external attribution. Schmitt and Branscombe (2002a) challenged this, observing that because one’s group membership is an aspect of the self, attributions to prejudice have a strong internal component. Furthermore, they argued that because attributions to discrimination threaten an important aspect of the self—one’s social identity—making such attributions will heighten rather than decrease self-esteem. To test their claims, they asked participants to imagine that a professor refused their request to add a closed class. Half learned the professor was a “jerk” and did not honor anyone’s request; the remaining half learned the professor was “sexist” and did not honor the request of any members of the participant’s gender. As they predicted, women who read the “sexist” rejection vignette rated the rejection as more due to internal causes than women who read the “everyone rejected” vignette, and the former also reported more negative affect (a composite of depression, hostility, and anger emotions) than the latter. This study made the important point that attributions to discrimination have an internal component. However, this study did not provide an adequate test of Crocker and Major’s (1989) discounting hypothesis for two reasons. First, it did not compare the emotional effects of attributing rejection to discrimination with the emotional effects of attributing rejection to internal, stable factors of the self (e.g., a lack of ability). Second, it did not examine the effects of discrimination attributions on self-related emotions separately from their effects on other-directed emotions (e.g., anger, cruelty). Major, Kaiser, and McCoy (2003) replicated Schmitt and Branscombe’s (2002a) studies, adding a third condition in which participants were asked to imagine a professor who refused to honor their course request because “he thought they were stupid.” They also examined depressed/self-esteem emotions separately from hostile/anger emotions. As predicted, participants in the personal rejection condition rated the rejection as due significantly more to internal causes and felt significantly more depressed compared with those in the sexist rejection condition. The former did not, however, feel more hostile or anxious than the latter. In sum, these studies make several important points, including that attributing negative outcomes to discrimination: (1) is more external than attributing them to internal, stable properties of the self, (2) protects self-esteem relative to attributing them to internal, stable properties of the self, but (3) is not self-protective compared with attributing negative outcomes to random external factors.



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Do Attributions to Discrimination Always Lead to Discounting of Internal Factors? Crocker and Major (1989) assumed that the presence of discrimination as a plausible cause of a person’s outcomes leads to discounting of internal factors as causal. They based their assumption on Kelley’s (1973) idea that explanations of actions commonly involve a tradeoff between causes internal and external to a person. In a review of research on the discounting principle, however, McClure (1998) observed that outcomes can have multiple causes and that both internal and external sources can be seen as influencing one’s situation. Furthermore, internal and external causes are not necessarily inversely related—increased ratings of external factors may have no effect on ratings of internal factors, and vice versa. Consequently, attributing an outcome to discrimination does not necessarily imply that a person will attribute no responsibility to the self. This implies that it is insufficient, and potentially misleading, to examine the relationship between attributions to discrimination and self-esteem without controlling for self-attributions, as the relationship may not be negative, as is typically assumed. Several studies provide evidence of this. In one study (Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003), women received negative feedback from a male evaluator under conditions that were clearly sexist, possibly sexist, or contained no overt cues to sexism. The relationship between discrimination attributions and self-attributions varied by condition: They were negatively related in the clear sexist condition, unrelated in the ambiguous condition, and positively related in the no-sexism cues condition. Hence, women discounted their own contributions to the negative feedback only when evidence of injustice was clear. Furthermore, when self-attributions were not controlled for, the relationship between attributions to discrimination and self-esteem varied by condition. Attributions of feedback to discrimination were positively related to self-esteem in the clear-sexist condition, unrelated in the ambiguous condition, and negatively related in the no-cues condition. Across conditions, however, discounting (blaming feedback more on discrimination than on a lack of ability) was positively related to self-esteem. This experiment illustrates the importance of examining the implications of discrimination attributions for self-esteem relative to self-attributions, especially when discrimination is ambiguous, as it usually is in real-life contexts. A set of recent studies illustrates the importance of doing this in survey contexts. Major and colleagues (Major, Henry, Kaiser, Simon, & Sawyer, 2009) asked women and members of ethnic minority groups to indicate on a questionnaire the extent to which they had experienced negative events because of their gender or ethnicity. In a separate set of questions, they asked them to indicate the extent to which they had experienced negative events because of something about them as individuals, such as their personalities. These two perceptions were positively correlated. That is, the more people said they had experienced negative events because of their gender or ethnicity, the more they also said they had experienced negative events because of their individual characteristics. Furthermore, although perceptions of discrimination were negatively related to self-esteem when self-attributions were not controlled, this relationship became nonsignificant when self-attributions were controlled.

Locus of Causality versus Responsibility Crocker and Major (1989) originally proposed that attributing a negative outcome to one’s social identity (an external factor) protects self-esteem because it leads to discounting of the

326   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS self (an internal factor) as causal. They later distinguished between attributing outcomes to one’s social identity versus to prejudice based on one’s social identity, noting that the latter, but not the former, carries with it an assumption of injustice (Crocker & Major, 1994). Major, Quinton, and McCoy (2002) further refined the theory, noting that the question that must be resolved by the stigmatized target to protect his or her self-esteem in the face of rejection is not “Did something internal or external to me cause this outcome?” but rather “Who is to blame for this outcome—you or me?” This follows from Weiner’s (1985) perspective that judgments of responsibility (or blame, in the case of negative outcomes) rather than judgments about the locus of causality (internal vs. external) are the critical determinants of emotion. According to Major, Quinton, and McCoy (2002), attributions to discrimination will protect self-esteem only to the extent that they shift responsibility (blame) for negative events away from the self. Major, Kaiser, and McCoy (2003) demonstrated this in the study described earlier. Discounting self-blame (blaming the professor’s rejection on discrimination more than on the self) mediated the relationship between condition (sexist rejection or personal rejection) and depressed affect, whereas discounting internal factors (relative to discrimination) did not.

When Do Attributions to Discrimination Protect Self-Esteem? As illustrated by the research reviewed here, the relationship between attributions to discrimination and self-esteem is not straightforward. Inconsistencies in findings led to efforts to identify factors that predict when and for whom an attribution to discrimination is (or is not) self-esteem protective. In seeking to understand this issue, it is useful to clarify the features of an attribution to discrimination. Major, Quinton, and McCoy (2002) define an attribution to discrimination as a causal judgment that has two essential components: (1) a judgment that treatment was unjust or undeserved and (2) a judgment that treatment was based on social identity or group membership. Both components are necessary. Thus people who regard a negative outcome (e.g., a job rejection) as undeserved but who do not blame it on a social identity or group membership (e.g., “I am not well connected”) are not making a discrimination attribution according to this definition. Nor does it qualify as an attribution to discrimination if a person attributes an outcome to his or her group membership but believes differential treatment on the basis of group membership is justifiable or deserved. For example, a woman who believes that men are better fighters than women is unlikely to feel she was discriminated against if she is denied combat duty because of her gender. Research has shown that the more ambiguous it is that negative outcomes are unjust (vs. deserved) and linked to a group (vs. a personal) characteristic, the less likely a person is to attribute a negative outcome to discrimination (see Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Major & Sawyer, 2009, for reviews). We propose that ambiguity about discrimination also undermines the self-protective effects of attributing negative outcomes to discrimination. That is, the more ambiguity people experience about whether their treatment is undeserved (vs. deserved) and/or was based on their social identity (vs. a personal attribute), the less likely it is that attributing negative treatment to discrimination will protect their self-esteem. This is consistent with Crocker and Major’s (1989) observation that “overt prejudice or discrimination should be less damaging to the self-esteem of its targets than is prejudice or discrimination that is hidden behind



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of cloak of fairness” (p. 621). When injustice is ambiguous (vs. clear), the role of the self in producing negative outcomes is more difficult to discount. We consider evidence for this claim next, focusing on factors that increase or decrease ambiguity surrounding attributions to discrimination.

Situational Factors Situational cues can make prejudice more or less ambiguous, with implications for the selfprotective properties of attributions to discrimination. The study by Major, Quinton, and Schmader (2003), reviewed earlier, which manipulated the clarity or ambiguity of situational cues to injustice, illustrated this clearly. Women rejected in a context of clear prejudice cues reported significantly higher self-esteem than women rejected in the presence of ambiguous prejudice cues or no cues; these latter two conditions did not differ from each other. Furthermore, attributing negative feedback to discrimination was positively and significantly related to self-esteem when discrimination cues were obvious, unrelated to self-esteem when discrimination cues were ambiguous, and negatively and significantly related to self-esteem when cues were absent. Women discounted self-blame (attributed rejection more to discrimination than to the self) when situational cues to injustice were obvious but not when they were ambiguous or absent.

Group Membership Ambiguity about the extent to which negative outcomes are due to prejudice also varies by type of stigma or social identity. In general, people whose stigma is (or is perceived to be) controllable are held more responsible for their condition (by both themselves and others). They also are treated more negatively than people whose stigma is believed to be uncontrollable (Rodin, Price, Sanchez, & McElligot, 1989; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). Furthermore, this negative treatment is often regarded as fair, even by those who have the stigma (Crandall, 1994). Consequently, when faced with social rejection or other negative outcomes, individuals who feel responsible for their stigma may blame themselves to some extent, even when discrimination cues are obvious. Ambiguity about the extent to which negative outcomes are truly undeserved is also likely to be experienced by those who have accepted (at least to some extent) negative attitudes toward or stereotypes about their stigmatized group. Consequently, people who feel responsible for their stigma or endorse negative attitudes toward their stigma may not fully discount self-blame, even when they also blame their outcomes on discrimination. People who feel control over or responsibility for their stigma may also regard their stigma as an aspect of their personal identity rather than as a part of group membership, creating ambiguity about whether rejection on the basis of stigma qualifies as group-based discrimination. Consider, for example, the plight of those who are overweight in the United States. Despite substantial evidence that it is extremely difficult to lose weight permanently, both those who are of average weight and those who are overweight perceive weight to be controllable. Furthermore, the overweight dislike overweight people just as much as do those of average weight. In addition, the overweight do not identify themselves with the group “overweight” (Crandall, 1994). Consequently, even when the overweight experience negative outcomes that are clearly due to their weight, they are unlikely to fully discount self-blame.

328   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS For example, Crocker, Cornwell, and Major (1993) found that although overweight women who were rejected by a male who was aware of their weight attributed the rejection to their weight, they did not blame the male for being prejudiced. Furthermore, attributing rejection to weight did not protect their self-esteem. Although we are unaware of any experiments testing this directly, we would expect attributions to discrimination to be more self-protective for those who are perceived (by self and others) as having no control over their stigma and for those whose stigma is associated with a recognized group identity, such as tribal stigmas of race, ethnicity, or gender.

Group Identification People vary in the extent to which they identify with their group. Group identification refers to the extent to which people include the ingroup as a central part of their self-concepts (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; McCoy & Major, 2003; Smith & Henry, 1996; Tropp & Wright, 2001). Although group identification influences how people respond to discrimination, it is unclear exactly how group identification influences the self-esteem of those who face discrimination. In general, group identification is positively related to perceived discrimination among members of minority groups. For example, ethnic minorities and women who regard their groups as more central to their self-concepts (i.e., are high in group identification) are more likely to attribute negative feedback to discrimination, especially under attributionally ambiguous circumstances (Eccleston & Major, 2006; Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003; Operario & Fiske, 2001). Furthermore, a number of correlational studies report a positive relationship between group identification and global self-esteem (Branscombe et al., 1999; Munford, 1994; Phinney, 1991; Phinney & Chavira, 1992). This implies that those who are highly group identified are more likely to reap the self-esteem protective benefits associated with attributing negative outcomes to discrimination than those who are less group identified. However, it is also possible that those high in group identification may not experience self-protective benefits from attributing negative feedback to group-based discrimination because doing so does not discount the self. That is, for those who regard their group as a central component of their self-concept, rejection based on group membership may be experienced as a rejection of the personal self. Several experiments provide support for this latter hypothesis. In one study, women received negative feedback from a male evaluator whom they were told held sexist or nonsexist attitudes toward women (McCoy & Major, 2003, Experiment 1). Women low in group identification reported higher self-esteem and less depressed emotion in the sexist compared with the nonsexist condition, replicating a pattern observed earlier by Crocker et al. (1991). In contrast, self-esteem and depressed emotion among women high in identification did not differ by condition. Thus, even though highly identified women recognized that their evaluator was sexist and attributed their rejection to discrimination, this did not buffer their self-esteem. In a second experiment, Latino American participants read a research article documenting pervasive discrimination against either their own ethnic group or a non-selfrelevant group (McCoy & Major, 2003, Experiment 2). Compared with those low in ethnic identification, Latinos who were highly identified reported decreased self-esteem, increased depressed emotions, and greater feelings of threat if they read that discrimination against their ingroup was pervasive. If they read about pervasive discrimination against a non-selfrelevant group, in contrast, there were no significant differences by group identification,



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although high identifiers tended to report somewhat higher well-being. In sum, these two experiments suggest that when directly faced with evidence of group or personal discrimination, those who regard their groups as a less central part of their self-concepts are more likely to benefit from making an attribution to discrimination than those who regard their groups as a more central aspect of their self-concepts. Although group identification may make an individual temporarily vulnerable when faced with discrimination, it is also possible that group identification may serve as a resource that can be drawn on over time to cope with setbacks and social rejection, thus explaining the positive correlation that is often observed between group identification and self-esteem.

General Beliefs about Justice/Injustice People also vary in the extent to which they believe that status differences between groups in their society are fair. These general beliefs or worldviews influence the extent to which people attribute their own negative outcomes (and those of their ingroups) to unjust discrimination (Major, Gramzow, et al., 2002) and may affect people’s certainty about whether their own negative outcomes are deserved or undeserved. Examples of status-justifying beliefs in American society include the Protestant ethic, which posits that success is a reflection of hard work; the belief in individual mobility, which posits that advancement is possible for all individuals in society, regardless of group membership; and the belief in a just world, which posits that people deserve what they get and get what they deserve. Although these beliefs are widely held in America, they are not universally endorsed. Some individuals explain existing status hierarchies in terms of discrimination, bias, and favoritism, for example, rather than in terms of individual deservingness. Individual differences in endorsement of status-justifying beliefs moderate the relationship between perceived discrimination and self-esteem (Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007). For example, the self-esteem of Latino Americans and African Americans who endorse the belief in individual mobility is negatively related to perceptions of self or ingroup as a victim of discrimination. In contrast, the self-esteem of Latino Americans and African Americans who reject the belief in individual mobility is positively related to perceptions of self or ingroup as a victim of discrimination (Foster & Tsarfati, 2005; Major et al., 2007). Major et al. (2007, Experiment 2) randomly assigned Latino American participants to read an article describing pervasive discrimination against either their own ethnic group or a nonself-relevant group. Latino Americans who endorsed the belief in individual mobility had lower self-esteem after reading that their own group (vs. a non-self-relevant group) was a victim of discrimination. In contrast, Latino Americans who rejected the belief in individual mobility showed the reverse pattern: They had higher self-esteem after reading that their own group (vs. a non-self-relevant group) was a victim of discrimination. In a third study, Major et al. (2007) assigned women to read an article describing discrimination against women in the United States as either prevalent or rare. Women who endorsed the belief in individual mobility had lower self-esteem if they read that discrimination against women was prevalent rather than rare. In contrast, women who rejected the belief in individual mobility had higher self-esteem if they read that discrimination against women was prevalent rather than rare (Major et al., 2007, Experiment 2). Thus this last study illustrated that members of lowstatus groups who believe that status is unfairly distributed in society experience a threat to their self-esteem when informed that status is, in fact, fairly accorded.

330   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS In sum, this line of research illustrates that general beliefs about the extent to which status in society is fair and individually deserved moderate the relationship between perceived discrimination and self-esteem among members of disadvantaged groups. One potential explanation for these provocative findings is that members of low-status groups who endorse status-justifying beliefs experience more ambiguity about the extent to which they (or their group) are to blame for their negative outcomes and disadvantaged position in society. Thus, when faced with evidence of group or personal devaluation, they may not fully discount self-blame, leading to lowered self-esteem. In contrast, members of low-status groups who reject status-justifying beliefs more confidently blame their own (and their group’s) negative outcomes on discrimination rather than on themselves (or their group). Evidence of group or personal devaluation only bolsters this belief and their self-esteem. Informing them that group status is, in fact, fairly accorded in society, however, challenges this belief and introduces ambiguity about the role of personal (or group) deservingness in producing negative outcomes. Hence this information threatens a key strategy by which they protect their selfesteem in the face of social disadvantage, resulting in lower self-esteem.

Do High-Status Groups Benefit from Attributing Negative Outcomes to Discrimination? Most research examining attributions to discrimination as a self-protective strategy has focused on people who are generally aware that they are vulnerable to being targets of discrimination because of their stigmatized status in society. This raises the question of whether attributions to discrimination can also be self-protective for members of chronically highstatus groups. Several studies suggest that they are. In one study that used immersive virtual environment technology, Hoyt and colleagues (2007) asked Latino and white participants to perform as leaders of three-person groups in an employee-hiring task conducted in a virtual world. Within this world, half of the participants saw themselves portrayed as white and half saw themselves portrayed as Latino. Following the task, all participants received negative feedback from the other two group members (both of whom were portrayed as white). Compared with participants portrayed in the virtual world as White, participants portrayed as Latino were more likely to attribute the negative feedback to the other group members’ prejudice and reported higher well-being (higher self-esteem and less depressed affect). In addition, discrimination attributions mediated the relationship between experimental condition and well-being. Importantly, these effects occurred regardless of the actual ethnicity of the participants. That is, white participants with an “induced” ethnic stigma attributed their rejection to discrimination and benefited from this attribution just as much as did Latino students portrayed as Latino. And Latino students whose stigma was “removed” (because they were portrayed as whites) were just as unlikely to attribute their rejection to discrimination as were whites portrayed as white. It is important to note, however, that in this study the white participants who attributed negative feedback to prejudice did so on behalf of a virtual identity as Latino, rather than of their real identity as white. Studies exploring reactions to affirmative action policies more clearly show that attributing rejection to “reverse discrimination” serves a self-protective function for members of high-status groups. In one study, men and women were rejected for a leadership role and were told that the decision was based solely on their sex (sex-based condition), solely on their



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lack of merit (merit-based condition), or on both sex and merit (Major, Feinstein, & Crocker, 1994). Men and women reacted quite similarly to rejection under these conditions. Regardless of gender, participants rejected in the sex-based condition were less likely to blame their rejection on themselves (lack of merit) and were more likely to blame their rejection on their sex than participants in the merit-based condition. Participants who were rejected under more attributionally ambiguous circumstances (i.e., who were told that both sex and merit contributed to their rejection) were more likely to attribute their rejection to sex but were just as likely to attribute their rejection to a lack of merit as those in the merit-alone condition. Thus, despite recognizing that their group membership contributed to their rejection, men and women in the ambiguous condition did not discount self-blame. Furthermore, regardless of gender, participants who were told that the decision was based solely on their sex were significantly less depressed than those told they were rejected solely on the basis of merit or those told they were rejected on the basis of sex and merit. Importantly, participants rejected in the attributionally ambiguous sex-and-merit condition were just as depressed as those rejected solely on the basis of a lack of merit. This provides further support for our claim that people do not derive self-esteem protection from attributing negative outcomes to discrimination if they suspect that they may also be responsible for those outcomes. Another set of studies demonstrated that white men’s belief that affirmative action is a form of reverse discrimination protects their self-esteem from threats to their self-image by boosting their general sense of competence (Unzueta, Lowery, & Knowles, 2008). The first of these studies showed that the more that white male college students believed that their university’s affirmative action policies utilized quotas (which they regarded as reverse discrimination), the higher their self-perceived competence and their personal self-esteem were. Selfperceived competence mediated the relationship between belief in quotas and self-esteem. In a second study, Unzueta et al. (2008) manipulated threat to self-esteem by giving some white men positive feedback and others negative feedback on an intelligence test. Men who did not believe that quotas were used (i.e., who did not believe affirmative action involves reverse discrimination) had lower self-esteem after receiving negative than positive feedback, whereas men who did believe that quotas were used (i.e., who make reverse-discrimination attributions) were unaffected by feedback. Again, self-perceived competence mediated this effect. A third study manipulated, rather than measured, beliefs about affirmative action and also manipulated test feedback. Some white men were told that most businesses set aside positions that can be filled only by underrepresented minority applicants (i.e., practice quotas or reverse discrimination), whereas others were told that most businesses do not use quotas. The authors reasoned that telling white men that affirmation action is not a quota policy is equivalent to taking away a self-esteem-protective belief. Thus men in the nonquota condition given negative feedback should show lower self-perceived competence and lower selfesteem. In contrast, telling white men that affirmative action does involve quotas gives them a self-esteem-protecting belief (i.e., they are victims of reverse discrimination) that should protect their sense of competence and self-esteem in the face of negative feedback. Results confirmed their hypotheses. White men who were given negative test feedback and who were told that affirmative action does not involve quotas reported significantly lower self-perceived competence and lower self-esteem than the other three groups, which did not differ from each other. Note that beliefs about affirmative action policies were manipulated separately from and were not linked to negative test feedback in this study. Thus this study illustrates that the self-protective power for white men of believing in reverse discrimi-

332   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS nation extends beyond situations in which threats to self-esteem can directly be attributed to discrimination. Unzueta et al. (2008) speculated that perceiving the self as a victim of reverse discrimination may protect white men’s self-esteem through two mechanisms. It may allow them to augment their past successes, that is, to reinterpret them as more impressive testaments of their competence because they were achieved despite adversity; or it may allow them to discount past failures, that is, to reinterpret them as nondiagnostic of their true competency. Consequently, the belief that affirmative action involves reverse discrimination against white men may persist among white men precisely because of its self-esteem-protective benefits.

Is High Self-Esteem in the Face of Stigmatization “Genuine”? All of the research reviewed herein measured personal self-esteem using explicit measures (i.e., self-reports). The counterintuitive nature of many of the findings raises the question of whether the high self-esteem observed among stigmatized groups reflects their “true” or “genuine” self-esteem. It is possible, for example, that members of devalued groups defensively amplify their explicit self-esteem in response to perceived prejudice to compensate for uncomfortable feelings of self-doubt (Baumeister, 1982; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). People with “defensive” or “discrepant” self-esteem, for example, are posited to harbor deep insecurities and self-doubts but to compensate for them by artificially inflating their self-esteem (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; Lambird & Mann, 2006; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). It is also possible that the stigmatized are motivated for self-presentational reasons to distort their explicit self-esteem responses (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Nosek, 2005). For example, they may inflate their explicit self-esteem to conform to cultural norms for self-enhancement in Western societies (Kobayashi & Greenwald, 2003). It may therefore be useful to measure self-esteem in response to discrimination using measures less subject to self-report biases and distortions, such as measures of implicit self-esteem (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Spalding & Hardin, 1999). Assessing implicit self-esteem in response to discrimination may also provide unique information unrepresented in measures of explicit self-esteem. Implicit attitudes are thought to reflect affective and unconscious beliefs that stem from an associative learning system, whereas explicit attitudes are thought to be controlled, conscious beliefs and to stem from rule-based learning (Epstein, 1994; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Thus implicit and explicit self-esteem seem to be distinct constructs that reflect different attitude systems. Data regarding how perceived discrimination influences the implicit self-esteem of members of stigmatized groups, however, are rare. In one of the few studies on this topic, Verkuyten (2005) examined the implicit and explicit personal and collective self-esteem of majoritygroup adolescents (Dutch in the Netherlands and Turkish in Turkey) versus minority-group adolescents (Turkish in the Netherlands). On explicit measures of self-esteem, minorities (Turkish–Dutch) reported higher personal and collective self-esteem than majority groups. In contrast, minorities did not differ from majority groups on measures of implicit personal self-esteem and had lower implicit collective self-esteem than majority groups. Another study observed similar results: Majority and minority groups had equivalent levels of implicit



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personal self-esteem, but minority groups had lower levels of implicit collective self-esteem than majority groups (Pelham & Hetts, 1999). Verkuyten (2005) also found that perceived discrimination among minorities was unrelated to their personal self-esteem (implicitly or explicitly measured) or their explicit collective self-esteem. However, perceived discrimination was negatively related to implicit collective self-esteem among minority adolescents. These studies suggest that minorities are able to protect their personal self-esteem, implicit or explicit, in the face of discrimination. They also suggest, however, that negative information about one’s group in society adversely affects implicit views about the group. Although individuals may be able to cope with discrimination in a manner that preserves their explicit collective self-esteem, they may be unable to protect their automatically formed, implicit views about the group. We believe an important direction for future research is to examine implicit personal self-esteem in response to a specific discriminatory stressor. It is possible that, although the implicit personal self-esteem of stigmatized groups may not differ overall from that of highstatus groups, they may nonetheless experience a decrease in implicit personal self-esteem immediately after encountering discrimination. Although explicit self-esteem may be protected by discounting negative events as due to discrimination rather than to the self, implicit self-esteem may respond only to the negative valence of the situation. Alternatively, threats to the self may automatically trigger implicit self-esteem compensation to defend against threat. For example, people exhibit higher implicit self-esteem after rejection than after acceptance by another person (Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007). It has yet to be explored whether people engage in similar implicit self-esteem compensation following threats to the group.

Summary and Conclusions Although it is widely assumed that perceiving oneself to be a target of discrimination damages self-esteem, decades of research on this topic question the validity of this assumption. Under some circumstances, perceived discrimination is associated with diminished self-esteem, whereas under other circumstances it is associated with higher self-esteem. In this chapter we considered the hypothesis that attributing negative outcomes to discrimination based on one’s group membership or stigma is a self-esteem-protective strategy because it enables members of stigmatized groups to discount their own roles in producing those outcomes. We reviewed theoretical refinements of this hypothesis and empirical evidence testing it. We concluded that, contrary to the discounting hypothesis, blaming negative outcomes on discrimination (i.e., judging that the outcomes are unjust and based on one’s group membership) does not necessarily lead to discounting of the self as causal. Furthermore, we concluded that attributing negative outcomes to discrimination protects self-esteem only to the extent that this judgment is associated with discounting of self-blame. Features of the situation, group, or person that introduce ambiguity about the extent to which outcomes are deserved versus undeserved or caused by personal versus group attributes lessen the self-esteem-protective benefits of attributing negative outcomes to discrimination. Factors that decrease ambiguity, in contrast, strengthen the extent to which attributions to discrimination protect self-esteem. This is true for members of high-status, as well as low-status, groups. The research reviewed here has important implications. In real-life contexts, discrimination is typically masked or ambiguous rather than blatant, especially toward those who are

334   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS tribally stigmatized (e.g., members of ethnic minority groups). Consequently, unless supported by a shared and strong belief system (e.g., a belief that “people like us” are targets of discrimination or reverse discrimination), attributing negative events to discrimination in real-life contexts may often be accompanied by nagging doubts that oneself might also be to blame. These doubts, in turn, lessen the self-protective benefits of discrimination attributions. Furthermore, because claiming one is a victim of discrimination often has negative interpersonal costs (Kaiser & Miller, 2001), in many real-life contexts attributing outcomes to discrimination may hurt more than it helps.

Acknowledgment Preparation of this chapter was supported by National Institute of Health Grant No. R01 HL079383 to Brenda Major and Wendy Mendes.

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336   INTERPERSONAL, RELATIONAL, AND GROUP CONTEXTS Major, B., Henry, P. J., Kaiser, C., Simon, S., & Sawyer, P. (2009). Discrimination attributions, selfattributions and self-esteem: On the failure to discount. Manuscript in preparation. Major, B., Kaiser, C., & McCoy, S. (2003). It’s not my fault: When and why attributions to prejudice protect self-esteem. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 772–781. Major, B., Kaiser, C., O’Brien, L., & McCoy, S. (2007). Perceived discrimination as worldview threat or worldview confirmation: Implications for self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 1068–1086. Major, B., Quinton, W. J., & McCoy, S. K. (2002). Antecedents and consequences of attributions to discrimination: Theoretical and empirical advances. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 251–330). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Major, B., Quinton, W. J., & Schmader, T. (2003). Attributions to discrimination and self-esteem: Impact of group identification and situational ambiguity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 220–231. Major, B., & Sawyer, P. J. (2009). Attributions to discrimination: Antecedents and consequences. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination. New York: Psychology Press. Martinez, R., & Dukes, R. (1991). Ethnic and gender differences in self-esteem. Youth and Society, 22, 318–338. McClure, J. (1998). Discounting causes of behavior: Are two reasons better than one? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 7–20. McCoy, S., & Major, B. (2003). Group identification moderates emotional responses to perceived prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1005–1017. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Merton, R. K. (1948). The self-fulfilling prophecy. Antioch Review, 8, 193–210. Meyer, I. H. (1995). Minority stress and mental health in gay men. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 36, 38–56. Miller, C. T., & Downey, K. T. (1999). A meta-analysis of heavyweight and self-esteem. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 68–84. Miller, C. T., & Kaiser, C. R. (2001). A theoretical perspective on coping with stigma. Journal of Social Issues, 57, 73–92. Munford, M. B. (1994). Relationship of gender, self-esteem, social class, and racial identity to depression in Blacks. Journal of Black Psychology, 20, 157–174. Nosek, B. A. (2005). Moderators of the relationship between implicit and explicit evaluation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 564–584. Operario, D., & Fiske, S. (2001). Ethnic identity moderates perceptions of prejudice: Judgments of personal versus group discrimination and subtle versus blatant bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 550–561. Paradies, Y. (2006). Defining, conceptualizing and characterizing racism in health research. Critical Public Health, 16, 143–157. Pelham, B. W., & Hetts, J. J. (1999). Implicit and explicit personal and social identity: Toward a more complete understanding of the social self. In T. R. Tyler, R. M. Kramer, & O. P. John (Eds.), The psychology of the social self: Applied social research (pp. 115–143). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Phinney, J. S. (1991). Ethnic identity and self-esteem: A review and integration. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 13, 193–208. Phinney, J. S., & Chavira, V. (1992). Ethnic identity and self-esteem: An exploratory longitudinal study. Journal of Adolescence, 15, 271–281. Porter, J. R., & Washington, R. E. (1979). Black identity and self-esteem: A review of studies of black self-concept, 1968–1978. Annual Review of Sociology, 5, 53–74. Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., & Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people need selfesteem? A theoretical and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 435–468. Rodin, M., Price, J., Sanchez, F., & McElligot, S. (1989). Derogation, exclusion, and unfair treatment



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PART V

Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Developmental, Clinical, Health, Personality, and Cultural Contexts

Chapter 16 Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in a Developmental Context Kali H. Trzesniewski Megan Peggy-Anne Kinal M. Brent Donnellan

It is fairly rare to see the terms self-enhancement and self-protection in the titles

of articles read by developmental psychologists. In contrast, numerous articles with selfenhancement and self-protection in their titles appear in journals that appeal to social and personality psychologists. This superficial difference does not mean that developmental psychologists have ignored phenomena related to self-enhancement and self-protection; rather, it indicates that the topics are generally investigated under different labels, such as the positivity bias (Schuster, Ruble, & Weinert, 1998) or protective optimism (Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 2002). For example, the idea that young children overestimate their abilities is well documented and frequently discussed in the developmental literature (Butler, 2005; Stipek & Mac Iver, 1989). Moreover, it has been suggested that phenomena related to self-enhancement in childhood are adaptive both functionally and evolutionarily (Bjorklund, 1997, 2007). Thus there has been considerable interest in issues of self-enhancement and self-protection in the developmental literature. In line with this interest, the goal of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the most salient developmental issues that are relevant when considering the self-enhancement and self-protection motives. Our strategy is to provide a broad overview of the issues rather than to offer an exhaustive survey. We therefore focus on a few illustrative studies and draw tentative conclusions based on large qualitative and quantitative reviews. Prior to discussing

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342   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS developmental research related to self-enhancement and self-protection phenomena, however, it is useful to first describe briefly what we mean by a developmental approach.

What Is a Developmental Perspective? Two considerations are especially salient when taking a developmental approach to selfprocesses (see Ruble & Goodnow, 1998, for additional and alternative considerations). The first and perhaps most obvious consideration is the observation that children and adolescents are not necessarily miniature adults. A considerable amount of biological, cognitive, and social development takes place over the first 20 or so years of life. Children differ from adults in terms of their cognitive abilities, as well as their social ecologies. Adults are capable of thinking about themselves in abstract and hypothetical terms, whereas such capabilities are not present in the average preschooler. These differences might be linked to differences in the underlying processes responsible for self-enhancement. Likewise, it is possible that self-enhancement and self-protection strivings have different implications and even different functions at different points in development (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Tangney & Leary, 2003). A second consideration has to do with methodological issues. Developmental perspectives usually involve a specific methodological approach to research questions. Baltes, Reese, and Nesselroade (1977) even suggested that “developmental psychology [is] less an independent body of knowledge than . . . an orientation to the way behavior is studied” (p. 4). The preferred methodological orientation is to use longitudinal designs to answer both descriptive and process-oriented questions. Descriptively, longitudinal studies are used to document both stability and change in the attributes in question and to study trajectories over time. In terms of processes, longitudinal designs are used to identify antecedents and consequences of particular individual differences. This methodological approach is somewhat different from the age-restricted cross-sectional and often experimental paradigms favored by social psychologists. Thus issues of experimental control are sometimes less emphasized. Nonetheless, we believe that an appreciation of age-related issues with respect to self-enhancement and self-protection can provide an important complement to existing work in social psychology even if such work does not strongly emphasize internal validity.

Self-Enhancement in Adulthood Self-enhancement and self-protection have been defined in various ways in the literature on adults (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & Robins, 2004; Paulhus, 1998; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; see footnote 3 in Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2003). A common theme is that self-enhancement involves tendencies to view oneself in a positive light and self-protection involves tendencies to avoid seeing oneself in a negative light. For example, Jill may rate herself above the scale midpoint on a questionnaire item asking if she agrees with the statement “I am intelligent.” Likewise, Jill might report an average score somewhere above the scale midpoint for a measure of self-esteem (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). These are both perhaps instances of self-enhancement and self-protection, as both ratings reflect the fact that Jill endorsed a positive self-view rather than a negative self-view. Sometimes, however, researchers make more restrictive definitions and consider self-enhancement



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as judgments about the self that are higher than warranted by reference to some objective standard or criterion (Paulhus, 1998). In this case, Jill would need to rate her intellectual abilities more favorably than her intellectual abilities are rated by friends, former teachers, or work supervisors. Alternatively, it is possible to define self-enhancement as the tendency to rate oneself more favorably than others are rated. Thus we would obtain an average rating of Jill’s perceptions of the intellect of others and compare that with her self-rating. All three cases are examples of holding a positive view of the self. However, the three varieties of self-enhancement may have different psychological consequences and even developmental antecedents (Kwan et al., 2004). For the purposes of this chapter, we review work on children and adolescents with respect to the general positivity of self-evaluations in line with the most general approach to defining self-enhancement and self-protection.

Do Children Self-Enhance? The most basic answer to this question is “yes,” as one of the most well-known findings about young children’s self-views is that they tend to be overly positive (Eccles, Midgley, & Adler, 1984; Harter, 1996, 2006; Lockhart et al., 2002). Self-enhancement tendencies are often demonstrated by having children predict and evaluate their performance in achievementrelated contexts, such as academics and physical activities. For example, when preschool children (i.e., 4-year-olds) were asked to predict how far they could jump or how many balls they could throw into a box, they consistently overpredicted their performance (Schneider, 1998). Older children (i.e., 6-year-olds) also overpredicted their performance but to a lesser extent than younger children. Both groups of children were more accurate in their predictions when evaluating the performance of another child, which suggests that the positivity bias is something that is more pronounced for self-judgments than for judgments of others (for an adult parallel, see Sedikides, 1993; Sedikides & Green, 2000). Moreover, investigators found that both age groups were able to provide reasonably accurate reports of their actual past performance, suggesting that distortions associated with memory were not part of the explanation for the self-enhancement tendencies. These findings regarding the tendency of young children to overpredict their performance on tasks are broadly representative of the existing literature. These tendencies occur even when the task is unfamiliar and the skills needed to succeed at the task are unknown. In addition, young children discount the role of even their own previous failures in making predictions for their own future performance. For example, when 4-year-olds are asked to predict their future performance, they predict they will do well, and these positive predictions do not change even after they try the task several times and fail each time (Schneider, 1998; Stipek, Roberts, & Sanborn, 1984). This positivity bias is most pronounced in children ages 3–4 and declines throughout the elementary school years (Stipek & Mac Iver, 1989). All in all, there is clear and consistent evidence for a positivity bias in young children. Besides a positivity bias in predicting their own performance, younger children are extremely optimistic and even unrealistic about the likelihood of future events. For example, children were presented with stories about hypothetical children age 5 and age 10 and then asked to predict what these children would be like at age 21 (Lockhart et al., 2002). These hypothetical stories involved biological (e.g., missing a finger), psychological (e.g., messy), and hybrid (e.g., aggression) traits. Analyses revealed consistent age differences: younger

344   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS children were more likely to report that negative traits could change, even when the change was impossible (e.g., growing a finger). A recent study investigating the optimistic assessments of 5-year-olds for self-versus-other ratings found a more pronounced optimism bias for self-ratings versus ratings for other children (Diesendruck & Lindenbaum, 2009). Thus these optimistic tendencies are accentuated for self-judgments. Moreover, both of the aforementioned studies found that children believed that positive traits are more stable than negative traits. In short, children are generally optimistic, but they are especially optimistic about themselves—a pattern that points to self-enhancement and self-protection. There is also evidence that children demonstrate the self-serving attribution bias defined as “the tendency of individuals to make attributions for positive events that are more internal, stable, and global than their attributions for negative events” (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004, p. 712). A recent meta-analysis based on 523 effect sizes found robust evidence that people take more personal credit for their successes than blame for their failures (d = 0.96; Mezulis et al., 2004).1 Importantly for our discussion, the effects were moderated by age such that the bias was largest for children (ages 8–11) and adults over 55 and lowest for adolescents and adults. This suggests that the positivity bias persists to some degree past the age of 4, given that children 8–11 were more self-serving in their attributions than adults. Nonetheless, the overall bias was present at all ages. These general trends for aspects of self-enhancement seem to correspond with the developmental trend for global self-esteem (Robins & Trzesniewski, 2005). On average, young children have relatively high self-esteem, which gradually declines over the course of childhood, producing a substantial cumulative drop from childhood to adolescence. One complicating factor is related to the existing controversies over measuring self-evaluations in young children (Davis-Kean & Sandler, 2001), especially in terms of the validity of assessments of global self-esteem (Harter, 1999; Marsh, Craven, & Debus, 1991). Although we want to acknowledge this controversy, we believe that there are compelling indications that global self-views can be assessed in fairly young children. Therefore, we believe that the drop in global self-esteem from childhood to adolescence is a real phenomenon and not simply an artifact of measurement issues. In summary, children clearly manifest several forms of self-enhancement. They overstate their abilities, they are overly optimistic about the future, they rate themselves as more capable than their peers, and they make self-serving attributions. Children also report high average levels of global self-esteem. Interestingly, these self-enhancement tendencies are strongest in childhood and attenuate with age, showing a downward trajectory into adolescence and early adulthood. The existence of these trends raises obvious questions about underlying mechanisms. We now turn to a summary of the proposed explanations for the positivity bias in childhood and the general decline of self-enhancement strivings from childhood to adolescence. We then discuss why self-enhancement in childhood might be adaptive, followed by a discussion of lifespan issues with respect to aging and self-enhancement. Finally, we attempt to integrate the extant literature by discussing the relation between childhood and adult self-enhancement. Specifically, we entertain questions related to similarities and differences between self-enhancement in childhood and in adulthood.

1

Effect sizes in this meta-analysis reflected the standardized difference between making internal, stable, and global attributions for positive as opposed to negative events.



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Explanations for Self-Enhancement in Childhood and for the Decline of the Positivity Bias from Childhood to Adulthood Cognitive Limitations Several explanations for the positivity bias hinge on issues of cognitive development. The general idea is that the patterns of thinking and reasoning in young children are limited, especially with respect to the ability to hold two or more things in mind at once. This creates situations whereby children’s thinking is “centered” (to borrow a Piagetian phrase) on one aspect of multidimensional phenomena at the expense of others. A classic example concerns errors regarding the conservation of liquid, whereby children are thought to attend more to the level of liquid in containers of two different shapes without taking other dimensions into account when making judgments about volume. These kinds of cognitive errors or biases might be even more likely to occur when there are marked differences in the salience or attractiveness of particular dimensions. For example, children might fixate on the good feelings that accompany anticipated success rather than using all available information in making judgments of future performance. The suggestion here is that it is harder to decenter thinking (i.e., pay attention to multiple dimensions or considerations) when there is a strong “pull” for one of the dimensions. In contrast, older individuals are less likely to fixate on the most emotionally salient dimensions at the expense of other, very relevant pieces of information, such as a previous history of failure. In line with these general arguments, the wishful thinking explanation suggests that children have a difficult time separating desires from reality (Stipek & Mac Iver, 1989). When children are asked to estimate how well they will do on a task, they base their response on the outcome they desire rather than on realistic expectations based on previous performance or intuitions about their actual abilities. This account is bolstered by the observation that children have higher expectations for their own performance than they have for the performance of peers. However, when a reward is made contingent on the performance of their peers, 4-year-olds will raise their prediction of the peers’ performance to the same level as their own (Stipek et al., 1984). This suggests that young children’s self-judgments might be influenced more by their desires for positive outcomes than by their evaluations of ability. This account was further tested by assessing whether young children have the cognitive ability to use past performance information to make predictions about future behavior. It was found that children as young as 3 can use past performance to evaluate performance when the past performance is made salient (Stipek et al., 1984). The issue is that they are more likely to use past performance information when evaluating a peer than when evaluating themselves (Stipek & Hoffman, 1980). In short, children have the cognitive abilities to accurately evaluate abilities and recognize that past performance bears some relation to future performance. It might be that they attend more consistently to their desires when making self-evaluations (Schneider, 1998). A related explanation suggests that children are not able to distinguish ability from effort in a clear and consistent manner. The idea here is that children will base their self-evaluations on the amount of effort put into the task, regardless of the outcome, when evaluating their own performance. Thus, if a child fails to complete a task by some objective measure but puts a lot of effort into completing the task, she may conclude that she is “good” at the task.

346   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS Trying hard seems to be an especially salient consideration for young children. For example, 5- and 6-year-olds were more likely than 7- and 8-year-olds to describe smartness in terms of work habits and less likely to describe it in terms of a trait or specific task performance (Stipek, 1981). These attributional tendencies could result in the child looking as though he is self-enhancing because his evaluation of his performance would be more positive than his actual performance would warrant given that he tried hard. In addition, this trend toward effort explanations for ability was less prominent for explanations of a classmate’s ability than for self-ratings. For example, children in kindergarten and first grade were asked to rate themselves and each classmate on smartness. They were then asked to explain their ratings. The most common explanation for personal smartness was work habits, and the most common explanation for classmates’ smartness was specific task performance (Stipek, 1981). In sum, these results show that children as young as 4 have the cognitive ability to make accurate assessments of ability, especially when making evaluations of others. However, for self-evaluations, young children appear to focus more on their desires and their expenditure of effort rather than their actual abilities.

Life Experiences A second set of explanations involves the kinds of experiences that are typical of young children. According to this perspective, one reason that young children overestimate their abilities and express undue optimism about their futures is that they have had little experience with absolute failure (Bjorklund, 2007). To be sure, young children are rarely asked to do difficult tasks in isolation and without assistance from older and more skilled caregivers, who often scaffold tasks for them. Adults will often shift the meaning of success during a task (Bjorklund, 2007), so that if a young child is struggling, the adult will set more attainable goals. Given these considerations, it may be the case that many young children have not had considerable experience with complete failures. Accordingly, when children are asked whether they can accomplish a task, they may respond affirmatively because they have been reasonably successful at accomplishing tasks in the past in light of the adult assistance and reframing. Likewise, early formal education experiences downplay normative evaluations in favor of fairly liberal grading policies in primary school. School marks are viewed less as a tool for differentiating students and more as a marker of whether or not particular competencies have been achieved. The upshot of these practices is that most young children have fairly limited exposure to comparative grading practices. Nonetheless, kindergartners in classrooms with higher levels of normative evaluation were found to have lower evaluations of their competence and future performance than kindergartners in classrooms with lower levels of evaluation (Stipek & Daniels, 1988). This pattern was not obtained for fourth graders, presumably because, by the fourth grade, most children have had ample evaluative experiences. Finally, it might be the case that past experience is less diagnostic of future performance for children compared with adults. In fact, it appears that stability coefficients for attributes such as personality (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000) and intelligence (Bloom, 1964) are less substantial in childhood than in adulthood. Children learn new skills at a rapid rate, especially over the first 5 years of life. Accordingly, their past experiences may suggest that their abilities can change relatively quickly over short periods of time. For example, the findings that young children are overly optimistic and do not use past performance as a basis for



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predicting future performance might be explained by the fact that they often are unable to do something at first and then fairly quickly get better at the task. It is possible that past performance is in fact less diagnostic of future performance at this age.

Why the Positivity Bias Declines In line with an interest in the underlying processes responsible for the elevated levels of selfenhancement in children, it is useful to consider the mechanisms responsible for the general decline in self-enhancement during the transition to adolescence. As children mature, several cognitive skills develop that allow them the opportunity to gain a more accurate view of their abilities (Harter, 2006). For example, as children gain the ability to hold contrasting views in mind, they are able to think simultaneously about an ideal version of themselves and their actual selves (Harter, 2006). These two aspects of the self may not perfectly overlap, and discrepancies can be detected. Likewise, changing cognitive abilities may help adolescents to realize that their overly optimistic self-views are not perfect reflections of reality. This might prompt a readjustment of self-views to bring them in closer accord with reality. In addition, they have increased perspective-taking skills, which means that they are better able to see that others may not view them in the overly positive way in which they view themselves. In addition, the school environment also changes in ways that emphasize comparisons with others and more critical evaluation of the self (Eccles et al., 1993). Indeed, the school environment places importance on such subjects as academics and athletic ability, and it is easier to compare oneself with age-mates due to posted grades in classrooms and differences in observable athletic talents in gym class and in formal athletic competitions in which scores are kept. These changes in the school environment are especially prominent as children transition to junior high school. Junior high school classrooms spend more time on whole-class tasks and participate in more ability grouping (i.e., creating work groups consisting of only the best readers or only the average readers), and teachers do more public evaluations and corrections of student performance. These practices lead to an environment that emphasizes competition over cooperation and thereby highlight the existence of salient individual differences. In turn, these changes could function to provide individuals with a clearer understanding of their actual abilities. Teacher–student relations are less personal and positive in junior high school. One might speculate that such a shift would be inconsequential, given prevailing ideas about the importance of peer relations in adolescence. However, research shows that feedback from teachers still plays an important role in the adolescent’s life. For example, one of the strongest predictors of increasing self-esteem across the junior high school transition is receiving positive feedback from teachers (Hoge, Smit, & Hanson, 1990). Similarly, students who report increased dissatisfaction with teachers also report lower self-esteem after the junior high school transition (Fenzel, 2000). A possible reason for the negative teacher-student relations is that junior high school teachers report feeling less competent in their teaching ability than elementary teachers, especially with low-ability students (Eccles et al., 1993). In addition, junior high school teachers use stricter and more social comparison-based standards when evaluating students’ competence and performance (Eccles & Midgley, 1989). These school-based changes during early adolescence also coincide with the increasing importance of peer cultures and a normative increase in the tendency to compare oneself with others, especially same-age peers (Harter, 1998; Rosenberg, 1986). Differences in

348   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS social skills and popularity might become another arena for social comparison. Likewise, pubertal changes might increase the importance of physical appearance and attractiveness. It is also the case that attributes such as attractiveness and popularity are easily visible domains in which there are clear individual differences. Thus the domains and standards used to evaluate relative standing may change during the transition from childhood to adolescence. Indeed, older children are in a better position to use social comparison processes to inform their self-judgments. For example, before formal schooling, most children do not have ready access to age-mates who can serve as referents for social comparisons, especially in domains that are linked with achievement. Increasing the availability of comparison targets will produce a tendency to change either one’s own opinion of oneself or the ability that is being compared, according to a general principle of social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954). One consequence of self-evaluation is that it may lead to cognitive conflict if one’s own perceived abilities fall short of one’s expectations of these abilities. Individuals are then left to reconcile where they will fit in, given that they know that they are not as good at an activity as they had previously thought. In short, exposure to a peer group might promote self-comparison processes that would offer a stronger “signal” regarding objective abilities. This information might help to constrain self-enhancement processes to keep self-judgments at least somewhat tied to reality. Finally, with age and experience also come refinements in children’s understanding of the stability of traits. That is, children understand that their abilities may not be so easy to change and that their abilities are linked with outcomes. As such, they may begin to make more internal, stable global attributions for their performances. This is the explanation given for the age decline in the self-serving attributional bias (Mezulis et al., 2004, p. 734). However, it is important to note that the interpretation of the developmental trend found in the self-serving attribution bias meta-analysis (Mezulis et al., 2004) can be complicated because the unit of analysis was a difference score. Thus the decline in the self-serving bias from childhood to adolescence could be driven by an average decrease in taking personal credit for successes, by an average increase in taking personal responsibility for failures, or by some combination of both trends.

Why Self-Enhancement in Childhood (and Beyond) Might Be Adaptive As we described in the previous section, the complete explanation for the existence of childhood self-enhancement and its decline into adulthood is likely to involve multiple processes. The fact that young children can evaluate peers more or less accurately and can provide accurate self-evaluations under some circumstances (i.e., when past performance is made especially salient) suggests that pure cognitive limitations are not the only factor promoting self-enhancement. Motivational considerations might also factor into the explanation. Indeed, positive feelings about the self generate positive or pleasant affect and may serve to energize individuals to pursue challenging tasks (Di Paula & Campbell, 2002). The difficulty with a purely motivational explanation for changes in self-enhancement across the lifespan is explaining why young children are more motivated to self-enhance than older children and adults. In light of this difficulty, we suspect that motivational aspects of self-enhancement



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are likely to be fairly constant across development. These motivational aspects might also involve evolutionary considerations. To be sure, the existence of apparently robust evidence of self-enhancement in children naturally leads to questions about the possibility that such tendencies are adaptive or otherwise functional. As it stands, the literature on adult self-enhancement includes vigorous debates over the potentially adaptive benefits of self-enhancement (Robins & Beer, 2001). The findings regarding the adaptive benefits of self-enhancement are mixed, but, overall, selfenhancement appears to be related to positive psychological health and better physical health (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). We do not know of studies that have directly examined links between the positivity bias and outcomes such as cardiovascular health or depression in children, probably because these outcomes are not usually studied in young children. Moreover, most developmental research on the positivity bias has examined group differences (e.g., age differences) rather than individual differences per se. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that childhood self-enhancement is adaptive and functional. Bjorklund (1997, 2007; Bjorklund & Green, 1992), however, has made a persuasive case for the claim that there are adaptive benefits to children’s cognitive immaturity. Humans have large brains, but there are trade-offs associated with the possession of this resource. One noticeable consequence is that human infants are very immature at birth in terms of their physical and cognitive skills, and a considerable amount of development occurs in the first several years of life. During childhood, individuals are required to acquire a wide range of skills to function as adult members of a particular society. One advantage is that the extended period of immaturity in humans permits a great deal of cognitive and behavioral flexibility. On the other hand, the individual is faced with a number of challenges and potential frustrations that occur as part of the process of acquiring the complex set of skills and capabilities necessary to survive and become a functioning member of human society. Bjorklund (2007) has argued that forms of self-enhancement and egotism evident in childhood might be locally adaptive in the sense that these biases help to facilitate development during the early years of life. Positivity and an ability to overlook one’s limitations and previous failures may facilitate motivation and engagement at a time when the young human is faced with a laundry list of daunting challenges such as learning to walk, talk, throw a ball, read, understand written language, and internalize the complex rules that govern human social interactions. Self-enhancement processes may prevent helpless responses in the face of the inevitable setbacks that accompany the mastery of basic cognitive skills and other difficult tasks inherent in the socialization process. As an example of the potential advantages of the positivity bias, Bjorklund (2007, p. 131) reported pilot data showing that children who overpredicted their performance on a memory task tried more strategies and improved more over the course of several trials than did children who began the study with more accurate views of their abilities. Children who enhanced more were at an advantage over the children who enhanced less. Bjorklund and Green (1992) proposed that this advantage was attributable to the fact that self-enhancing children were not discouraged by their limited abilities. Children have fairly limited motor and intellectual abilities, and if they focused on those limitations, they might not be so eager to attempt new tasks to develop their abilities. Children who have a fairly robust ability to ignore past performances and their present limitations are able to stay motivated and attempt a wide range of new tasks. They are perhaps more vigorous in the pursuit of goals and may

350   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS avoid helpless responses to failure. Such efforts might actually facilitate the development of skills. It is of at least passing interest to note that existing research has established a relation between how children and adults interpret past performances and their engagement and persistence in future tasks (Dweck, 1999). People who believe that their abilities are fixed and cannot be changed (i.e., entity theorists) are more likely to believe that failure is indicative of low ability and therefore are more likely to avoid challenging situations. In contrast, people who believe that abilities are malleable and can change (i.e., incremental theorists) are more likely to view failure as a learning opportunity and more likely to approach challenging situations with the goal to learn and acquire skills. Thus young children’s belief in the changeability of traits (Kurtz-Costes, McCall, Kinlaw, Wiesen, & Joyner, 2005; Lockhart et al., 2002) and their ability to discount past performance is similar to the psychological mind-set of incremental theorists. More broadly, these tendencies may facilitate persistence and achievement when tasks are difficult. In sum, Bjorklund (2007) makes the case that the self-enhancement tendencies evident in children have adaptive benefits in both the functional sense and the broad evolutionary sense. These biases may literally promote growth development and thus survival. Vestiges of these self-enhancement biases seem to be present in adulthood, and they may likewise confer similar benefits for adults in terms of motivation. Importantly, the theoretical work of Bjorklund and his colleagues offers an intriguing perspective on the origins of self-enhancement tendencies in the first place. Many times the current debate in social and personality psychology frames these “origins” questions in terms of the cultural practices, values, and beliefs that either promote or inhibit self-enhancement tendencies. An equally interesting question informed by an evolutionary perspective concerns why cultures would encourage or attenuate these tendencies in the first place. We believe that this perspective may add an interesting dimension to the ongoing debates over the costs and benefits associated with selfenhancement in adulthood.

Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Older Adults Up to this point, we have focused primarily on the beginning of the lifespan. However, development is a lifelong process, and issues related to aging should be considered, even if briefly. Particularly relevant to a lifespan perspective is the fact that older adults seem to maintain positive evaluations about themselves and their lives while experiencing a plethora of physical, occupational, and social changes. An example of self-enhancement in old age is the subjective age bias: the tendency for older people to report feeling younger than their chronological age. Given the negative biological changes associated with aging, reporting feeling younger than in actuality could be evidence of self-enhancement and self-protection. This process has limitations in that objective conditions associated with aging can sometimes be difficult to ignore. Indeed, when faced with objective standards (e.g., physical fitness), older people are less likely to engage in this bias, whereas when the standards for comparison are ambiguous and they are less likely to receive feedback from others (e.g., mental ability), older people are more likely to engage in this bias (Teuscher, 2009). In short, these tendencies are tethered to reality. There is also evidence of self-protection tendencies in older adults, such as downward



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comparisons. For example, all adults have been found to make downward social comparisons across multiple domains such that they believe other people’s problems are worse than their own. However, for older adults, this tendency was most pronounced for domains in which they were having problems (Heckhausen & Brim, 1997). In short, self-enhancement and self-protection are a lifespan phenomenon. Cramer (2008) argues that different defense mechanisms develop across the lifespan and are used when individuals are faced with stressful circumstances, resulting in the reduced conscious experience of negative emotions. With increasing loss of independence and physical control over the environment, the transition into older age might involve unpleasant aspects, and therefore defense mechanisms might be needed to reduce negative emotions to protect the self. Although this account is helpful in explaining why older adults may maintain positive self-views in old age in the face of objective losses (Collins & Smyer, 2005), it does not quite tell the whole story. For example, although older adults do not always show increases in depression or negative affect or decreases in life satisfaction and positive affect (Baltes & Mayer, 1999), they do show decreases in self-esteem (Orth, Trzesniewski, & Robins, 2010; Robins, Trzesniewski, Tracy, Gosling, & Potter, 2002). Thus it is possible that self-enhancement and self-protection mechanisms are sufficient for protecting and promoting some aspects of mental health but not others. At this point, additional research is needed to understand the roles of self-enhancement and self-protection in the psychological development of older adults.

Is There a Relation between Childhood and Adulthood Self-Enhancement? As it stands, there appears to be clear evidence of self-enhancement in children when selfenhancement is broadly defined as the tendency to view oneself in a positive light. Young children may, in fact, exhibit some of the highest levels of self-enhancement of all age groups, and meta-analytic results also support the claim that self-serving attributional tendencies are quite high in children. These trends raise important questions about the degree of comparability between manifestations of self-enhancement in children and in adults. To what extent is there developmental continuity with respect to self-enhancement? This issue is complicated by the fact that U-shaped development is a documented phenomenon in developmental research. For example, newborns will often exhibit something that approximates reaching behavior early in life. However, this behavior disappears, only to reappear again in a more mature form later in development. On the surface, it may seem that young infants have the ability to reach. However, researchers examining this behavior more closely have found that the early form of reaching is not intentional, whereas the later form of reaching includes a combination of actions that clearly demonstrates purposeful reaching with the intent to grasp an object. It is has been suggested that there are different underlying processes behind the “reaching” behaviors of newborns and those of older individuals. Thus behaviors that superficially resemble each other at different points in development might be linked to different psychological processes and might serve different underlying functions. The basic idea is that two things that “look the same” at different points in development may, in fact, be different. On the other hand, heterotypic continuity (or developmental coherence) can exist when

352   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS different manifestations of the same underlying process occur at different ages. For example, aggression might be explained by the same psychological mechanisms at all ages, but the manifestations of aggression in toddlers are different from those exhibited by adults. Toddlers throw tantrums and bite, whereas adults might use weapons such as guns and knives to harm others. Nonetheless, researchers believe that there is a detectable and appreciable degree of consistency in aggression across the lifespan (Olweus, 1979). The issue is that two things that “look different” at different points in development may, in fact, be manifestations of the same psychological process. These dual considerations of U-shaped growth and the possibility of heterotypic continuity make definitive judgments about the similarities (and differences) between childhood and adult self-enhancement difficult. Nonetheless, it might be possible to make a tentative case for coherence by considering several features of adult self-enhancement. Research on adults suggests that there is a universal need for positive self-regard, and this is discussed primarily as a motivated phenomenon, either implicitly (Yamaguchi et al., 2007) or explicitly (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). Adults also tend to view themselves in a positive light. Indeed, Schmitt and Allik (2005) provided cross-cultural evidence for positive self-esteem scores across 53 countries given that the average score was 30.85 (SD = 4.82) on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, assessed using a 4-point scale (theoretical minimum = 10; theoretical maximum = 40). (It is also true that the degree of positivity differed across nations.) Despite the normative tendencies toward positive self-views, most adults maintain some tethering to reality. In fact, there are documented boundary conditions to self-enhancement in adulthood, as Sedikides and Gregg (2008) noted “positive self-evaluations reflect not only what people want to believe, but also what they can believe” (p. 108). For example, adults are less likely to self-enhance on specific traits than on ambiguous traits, presumably because they can interpret ambiguous traits in a way that most closely resembles themselves in reality (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). As such, adult self-enhancement is thought to be motivated but nonetheless constrained in key ways by objective reality. The overall characterization of childhood self-enhancement drawn in this chapter is somewhat different from the account of the phenomenon in adulthood. Foremost, much of the research on childhood enhancement focuses on cognitive limitations as a factor that contributes to the positivity bias. As reviewed earlier, it has been suggested that children selfenhance because they confuse desires with reality, confuse ability and effort, and generally possess other cognitive limitations. As far as we know, cognitive limitations have not been invoked as a key explanatory factor for why adults self-enhance. Thus the literatures on adults and children are framed around somewhat different concerns. This difference does not necessarily mean that child and adult self-enhancement are qualitatively different. Instead, it might be the case that cognitive limitations in children coupled with limited experiences end up producing greater observed levels of self-enhancement in children than in adults. The idea is that the motivational benefits of self-enhancement are similar in childhood and in adulthood but that other factors constrain these tendencies with development. Recall Bjorklund’s view that cognitive immaturity evolved so that children can stay motivated to learn new things and not be held back by fear of failure (Bjorklund & Green, 1992, p.  47). Viewed in this light, it seems plausible that self-enhancement in childhood stems from much the same motivational processes as does self-enhancement in adulthood, with the caveat that the cognitive maturity, extended life experiences, and social



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ecologies of adults act to tether self-enhancement tendencies more strongly to reality in adulthood than in childhood. Indeed, the most salient difference between children and adults seems to be in the size of the biases toward self-enhancement. This raises the issue as to whether the difference in magnitude represents a difference in process or in function. Our proposed explanation hinges on the suggestion that adults have a greater pull toward maintaining a tethering to reality, whereas young children are less bounded by reality when making self-judgments. In other words, children and adults are similarly motivated to self-enhance, and the difference in magnitude can be explained by contextual and cognitive differences that serve to tether adult self-enhancement to reality, whereas children do not have that constraint. To be sure, research on children’s ratings of peers has demonstrated that children are capable of taking reality into consideration when evaluating others, but they do not appear to use knowledge about their own abilities when evaluating themselves. This difference might stem from cognitive shifts linked to the ability to bear multiple perspectives in mind at a single time. That is, it is possible that immature cognitive skills may limit young children’s ability to think simultaneously about past performance and future performance. Similarly, it could be that young children may choose to ignore past performance in favor of the more pleasant and thereby salient anticipation of successful future performance. In addition, the difference in magnitude might also be linked to contextual differences between the social settings of young children and adults. As described earlier, children in classrooms that emphasize evaluation showed less self-enhancement than children in less evaluative classrooms (Stipek & Daniels, 1988), and, when past performance was made salient, children self-enhanced less (Stipek et al., 1984). However, these factors probably do not characterize the everyday experiences of most children. In fact, caregivers may attempt to effectively shelter children from the reality of their limited abilities in order to encourage them to attempt challenging tasks. In contrast, adults have had many more life experiences, have greater cognitive skills, and have received much more evaluative feedback. Indeed, adults are less able to dismiss past performance when making judgments about their abilities. Fortunately, the sheltered and closely supervised lives of children ensure that their overprediction of their abilities does not lead to negative consequences, such as physical injury and embarrassment. There are likely to be fewer consequences for children who have unrealistically positive self-views as compared with adults. Young children seem to reap many of the benefits in terms of the resilience needed to attempt new challenges and acquire new skills. Likewise, for adults it is beneficial to have some positive view of the self, because self-enhancement in adulthood is also linked to engagement in challenging tasks (Di Paula & Campbell, 2002). The difference is that it is more important that adults maintain some tethering to reality so that they do not attempt dangerously difficult tasks way beyond their abilities or risk alienating close others because of their grandiosity. In short, we propose that the strength of motivational tendencies might be generally similar from childhood to adulthood, whereas a combination of contextual and cognitive differences could account for the larger self-enhancement bias in children as compared with adults. The foregoing speculation is perhaps compelling, but it will require more extensive empirical evaluation. One potentially opposing empirical observation has to do with the meta-analytic findings showing that individuals over age 55 show more of self-serving bias than younger adults (Mezulis et al., 2004). How might we reconcile that observation with our proposed explanation? Previous research has suggested that self-enhancement is related

354   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS to better health outcomes (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). Thus it is possible that any elevated levels of self-enhancement among older adults are due to selective attrition. That is, people who were less likely to self-enhance may have died at a younger age or may not be sampled in the extant literature (e.g., because they live in retirement residences). On the other hand, it may be that older people have elevated levels of self-serving biases because of adaptive changes in emotional regulation processes that provide other benefits. For example, an extensive body of research on older adult emotion regulation and emotion processing has led to the conclusion that “older people appear to attend to, hold in mind, and remember emotionally positive information more than they do negative and neutral information” (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005, p. 120). It is also important to note that not all types of positive evaluation increase in old age. Specifically, lifespan studies of self-esteem show that self-esteem is highest in childhood and midlife but declines considerably during old age (Orth et al., 2010; Robins et al., 2002). Our point is to be fair-minded about the existing evidence and highlight existing puzzles. To be sure, additional developmental work is needed to truly understand the continuity or discontinuity of different manifestations of self-enhancement across the lifespan. In addition to simply documenting the course of different manifestations of selfenhancement, it is important to evaluate potential developmental trends on which traits are likely to be the “targets” of self-enhancement. For example, cross-cultural studies have suggested that underlying motivations to self-enhance are universal but that the traits that individuals self-enhance on vary (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005). The same could be true across the lifespan given the changing salience of certain attributes. Achievementrelated traits might be particularly important in the earlier phases of adulthood, whereas traits promoting affiliation might be more important later in life. Thus future research could assess differences in domains and differences in adaptive benefits of self-enhancement across the lifespan.

Concluding Thoughts In sum, children around the ages of 4 and 5 show some forms of self-enhancement that bear at least a superficial resemblance to the kinds of self-enhancement phenomena described in the adult literature. The most salient difference might be in the magnitude of the enhancement tendencies, as children seem to consistently show levels of self-enhancement that are typically higher than those observed with adults. We developed a speculative explanation for this trend by suggesting that self-judgments become more tethered to reality with development because of cognitive maturation, life experiences, and changes in social contexts and not because of a changing strength in the underlying motives. This insight that observed self-enhancement tendencies become more attenuated with age corresponds well with psychoanalytic perspectives on psychosocial development: “A final central proposition of contemporary psychodynamic theory is that personality development entails not only learning to manage sexual and aggressive impulses but moving from an immature, dependent state to a mature, interdependent one” (Westen, 1998, p. 334). We believe that this quotation provides a succinct statement of social development from childhood to adulthood, although we might add an additional impulse to the list. Indeed, we modestly propose that normative personality development may also involve the channeling of a seemingly universal and often adaptive



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self-enhancement motive such that the potential benefits can be maximized and any negative interpersonal or intrapsychic costs can be minimized.

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Schuster, B., Ruble, D. N., & Weinert, F. E. (1998). Causal inferences and the positivity bias in children: The role of the covariation principle. Child Development, 69, 1577–1596. Sedikides, C. (1993). Assessment, enhancement, and verification determinants of the self-evaluation process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 317–338. Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., & Toguchi, Y. (2003). Pancultural self-enhancement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 60–70. Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., & Vevea, J. L. (2005). Pancultural self-enhancement reloaded: A metaanalytic reply to Heine (2005). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 539–551. Sedikides, C., & Green, J. D. (2000). On the self-protective nature of inconsistency/negativity management: Using the person memory paradigm to examine self-referent memory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 906–922. Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2008). Self-enhancement: Food for thought. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 102–116. Sedikides, C., & Strube, M. J. (1997). Self-evaluation: To thine own self be good, to thine own self be sure, to thine own self be true, and to thine own self be better. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 209–269. Stipek, D. J. (1981). Children’s perceptions of their own and their classmates’ ability. Journal of Educational Psychology, 73, 404–410. Stipek, D. J., & Daniels, D. H. (1988). Declining perceptions of competence: A consequence of changes in the child or in the educational environment. Journal of Educational Psychology, 80, 352–356. Stipek, D. J., & Hoffman, J. M. (1980). Development of children’s performance-related judgments. Child Development, 51, 912–914. Stipek, D. J., & Mac Iver, D. (1989). Developmental change in children’s assessment of intellectual competence. Child Development, 60, 521–538. Stipek, D. J., Roberts, T. A., & Sanborn, M. E. (1984). Preschool-age children’s performance expectations for themselves and another child as a function of the incentive value of success and the salience of past performance. Child Development, 55, 1983–1989. Swann, W. B., Jr., Rentfrow, P. J., & Guinn, J. (2003). Self-verification: The search for coherence. In M. Leary & J. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 367–383). New York: Guilford Press. Tangney, J. P., & Leary, M. R. (2003). The next generation of self research. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 667–674). New York: Guilford Press. Teuscher, U. (2009). Subjective age bias: A motivational and information processing approach. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 33, 22–31. Westen, D. (1998). The scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud: Toward a psychodynamically informed psychological science. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 333–371. Yamaguchi, S., Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Murakami, F., Chen, D., Shiomura, K., et al. (2007). Apparent universality of positive implicit self-esteem. Psychological Science, 18, 498–500.

Chapter 17 The Breakdown of Self-Enhancing and Self-Protecting Cognitive Biases in Depression Lauren B. Alloy Clara A. Wagner Shimrit K. Black Rachel K. Gerstein Lyn Y. Abramson

T

he tendency to enhance and protect one’s self-image is normative among people (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Alicke & Sedikides, Introduction, this volume) and influences individuals’ self-perceptions, social cognition, and daily behavior. One mechanism by which individuals may engage in self-enhancement and self-protection is through the operation of optimistic cognitive illusions or biases in which they see themselves as having more personal control, as the cause of positive events, as having brighter futures, and as better than objective circumstances warrant or than other people view them. Several theorists (Abramson & Alloy, 1981; Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Alloy & Abramson, 1988; Greenwald, 1980; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Taylor & Brown, 1988) have suggested that such optimistic cognitive illusions have adaptive consequences, including positive affect, high self-esteem, behavioral persistence, improved resilience and coping with stress, greater personal and social resources, and decreased vulnerability to physical and psychological dysfunction (but see Joiner, Kistner, Stellrecht, & Merrill, 2006, for a dissenting view). Indeed, some (Greenwald, 1980; Tiger, 1979) have suggested that optimism is pervasive in human cognition and has adaptive or evolutionary significance. However, individuals who are depressed are less likely to exhibit optimistic cognitive biases than nondepressed persons. That is, the cognitive mechanisms for self-enhancement 358



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and self-protection appear to have broken down in depression. Indeed, throughout history, depression has been characterized as a turning against the self in which the depressed individual becomes preoccupied with the negative aspects of his or her character and experiences. These negative self-evaluations have been recognized as critical features of depression across diverse theoretical perspectives. For example, according to Beck’s (1967) cognitive model of depression, negative self-perceptions are core symptoms and causes of depression. Beck suggested that depressed people have a “systematic bias against the self” that results from logical errors in interpreting reality. Similarly, psychoanalysts (Bibring, 1953; Fenichel, 1945; Freud, 1917/1957) emphasized low self-esteem as the feature that distinguishes depression from grief. Behaviorists (Bandura, 1977; Rehm, 1977) also implicate unrealistic personal standards and inadequate self-reinforcement in the depressed person’s negative self-concept. Thus in this chapter we review evidence that depression is characterized by a lessening or a breakdown of the normative, optimistic cognitive biases that promote self-enhancement and self-protection. We focus on five types of studies that compare depressed and nondepressed individuals’ judgments or evaluations. Some of these studies (judgment of control/ contingency studies, expectancy of success/prediction studies, and recall of feedback studies) contain an objective standard of reality against which the accuracy of participants’ judgments can be assessed, whereas others (attributional style studies and self-evaluation studies) have no objective measure of reality. However, a consistent theme across all of these types of studies is that regardless of whether depressed or nondepressed individuals’ judgments are more accurate or realistic, depressed individuals’ judgments are less optimistically biased than those of nondepressed persons. Following our review of the evidence, we consider whether smaller optimistic biases among depressed persons reflect a breakdown in self-enhancement and self-protective motives and whether the reduction in optimistic biases is a consequence of the depressed state or a factor that promotes vulnerability to depression.

Judgment of Control/Contingency Studies Evidence suggests that people often exhibit an illusion of control in which they overestimate their own ability to influence or exert control over an outcome. This illusion appears to serve a protective or even self-enhancing function among nondepressed individuals. However, in depressed individuals, research suggests that the motivation to maintain or enhance one’s positive sense of self has broken down. Specifically, depressed individuals often show evenhandedness and accuracy in judgments of their ability to control outcomes, a phenomenon referred to as “depressive realism” or the “sadder but wiser” effect (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). This tendency was first observed in a series of four experiments comparing the contingency judgments of depressed and nondepressed individuals (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). Overall, findings revealed a pattern of overly optimistic, systematic errors in judgment among nondepressed participants. In comparison, judgments of control among depressed participants were consistently more accurate. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with one of three contingency problems. Outcomes (onset of a green light) in all problems were somewhat controllable but varied in the degree of contingency between participants’ responses (pressing vs. not pressing a button) and outcomes (e.g., 25%, 50%, and 75% contingency). When asked to provide a judgment regarding the degree of contingency between button pressing and light onset, both depressed

360   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS and nondepressed participants showed relative accuracy in their judgments under circumstances in which outcomes are contingent on responses. In Experiment 2, a similar design was employed, with the addition of two contingency problems in which outcomes were completely uncontrollable. Results indicated that nondepressed participants showed an “illusion of control,” overestimating their degree of control when the desired outcome occurred frequently, whereas depressed participants accurately judged outcomes as not contingent on their responses regardless of outcome frequency. In Experiment 3, two contingency problems were used in which responses and outcomes were noncontingently related. Participants lost money when the outcome did not occur in the “lose condition” and won money when the outcome occurred in the “win condition.” Nondepressed individuals were found to display an “illusion of control,” overestimating their control over the desired outcome in the win condition, whereas depressed individuals judged more accurately that they had little control in both the win and lose conditions. Overall, the findings of Experiment 3 indicated that nondepressed individuals exhibit an illusion of control for positive, but not negative, outcomes. Finally, Experiment 4 explored whether depressed individuals might negatively distort judgments of contingency, underestimating their control over controllable outcomes in hedonically charged situations. Two contingency problems involving win and lose conditions were employed in which participants had 50% control and in which the active versus the passive response (e.g., pressing vs. not pressing the button) leading to higher percentage of green light onset was counterbalanced. Nondepressed participants were found to underestimate the degree of control their responses exerted over outcomes in the lose condition but not in the win condition, whereas depressed participants were accurate regardless of condition. Thus Experiment 4 suggested that nondepressed individuals underestimate their impact on controllable outcomes associated with undesirable consequences (losing money) or when a passive response is associated with success. Overall, results of Alloy and Abramson’s (1979) experiments suggested that nondepressed individuals make systematic errors in judgments of contingency as a function of characteristics of the outcome and response, including the desirability of the outcome, its frequency, and the passive-versus-active nature of the response. In comparison, depressed individuals were consistently accurate in their judgments of control. Aspects of this pattern of findings underscore the self-enhancing function played by illusions of control in normal individuals. These illusions are present when desirable outcomes occur and allow the individual to take credit for positive outcomes even when they are noncontingently related to behavior (as in Experiment 3). At the same time, the absence of this illusion in the lose condition serves a self-protective function, allowing the individual to escape a sense of responsibility for a negative outcome, even when that outcome was contingent on his or her behavior (as in Experiment 4). In contrast, depressed individuals do not engage in self-enhancement, failing to exhibit these illusions of control in situations in which the outcome is associated with success. Depressed individuals do not even engage in the self-protective strategy of underestimating their degree of control over undesirable outcomes. Alloy and Abramson’s (1979) findings have been replicated in a number of subsequent studies (Alloy & Abramson, 1982; Alloy, Abramson, & Kossman, 1985; Alloy, Abramson, & Viscusi, 1981; Benassi & Mahler, 1985; Martin, Abramson, & Alloy, 1984; Presson & Benassi, 2003), including a replication in a Spanish sample (Vazquez, 1987). Alloy and Abramson (1982) exposed depressed and nondepressed students to controllable, uncontrollable, or no noises in a learned-helplessness triadic design and subsequently presented them



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with a judgment of contingency task for an objectively uncontrollable outcome associated with success or failure. Nondepressed students exposed to either uncontrollable or no noises greatly overestimated their subsequent control over the outcome in the win condition, whereas when they were exposed to controllable noises, they judged the noncontingency accurately. However, depressed participants showed accurate judgments of noncontingency regardless of their prior exposure condition. These findings suggest the possibility that depressed individuals fail to succumb to biases and illusions that would allow them to view themselves and their interactions with the environment in a positive or optimistic light (Alloy & Abramson, 1982). Interestingly, support for depressive realism has been found for depressed individuals’ judgments regarding their own, but not others’, control over outcomes. For example, there is evidence that nondepressed and depressed individuals are equally accurate in judging the control others’ responses exert over both controllable and uncontrollable outcomes. However, nondepressed individuals show an illusion of control with regard to their own responses under these circumstances, whereas depressed individuals remain accurate in their judgments regarding their own responses (Alloy et al., 1985). Along similar lines, Martin and colleagues (1984) asked depressed and nondepressed undergraduates to judge the degree of control of either their own or another person’s responses over a positive uncontrollable outcome. Depressed individuals showed accurate judgments regarding their own control but overestimated another person’s control. In contrast, nondepressed individuals showed an illusion of control regarding their own responses but more accurately judged another person’s responses as noncontingently associated with outcomes. This finding suggests that nondepressed individuals display the illusion of control when it serves a self-enhancing function, whereas depressed individuals display this illusion in a manner that enhances others but not themselves. It is interesting that the illusion of control occurs selectively at times when nondepressed individuals’ own ability to exert control over their environments is in question and fails to occur in depressed individuals under these circumstances. Furthermore, research suggests that when depressed individuals do evidence distortions regarding their degree of control, the distortions are typically negative, not likely to protect or enhance a sense of control over positive outcomes. Vazquez (1987) utilized judgment of contingency tasks in which outcomes consisted of sentences that were either positive or negative in content. Nondepressed students overestimated their control over sentences with positive but not negative content, whereas depressed students gave equivalent and relatively accurate control judgments for both types of sentences. When outcomes and responses were noncontingently related, nondepressed individuals exhibited an illusion of control for sentences with positive content only, whereas depressed individuals exhibited an illusion of control for sentences with negative content only. This was the case only when the sentences were self-referent. This finding indicates that depressed individuals fail to engage in self-protective strategies and even go so far as to engage in self-denigrating strategies, accepting responsibility for negative input for which they are not responsible. Consistent with this result, severity of depression was associated with pessimistic judgments of contingency in a study employing a sample of depressed and nondepressed undergraduates (Kapci & Cramer, 1999), which found that when participants were categorized as optimistic, realistic, or pessimistic based on the accuracy of their judgments, the pessimistic group displayed the highest levels of depressive symptoms. In a slightly different approach, Braverman (2005) examined the influence of mood

362   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS on the ability to detect covariation. Hypothesizing that depressed mood may lead to datadriven information processing resulting in better detection of true covariation, Braverman (2005) induced a sad, happy, or neutral mood state in undergraduate participants and then presented participants with a series of facial images accompanied by math and verbal ability scores. Images were presented so that the physical characteristic of nose size covaried strongly with having math versus verbal ability. Only participants in whom sad mood had been induced performed significantly better than chance on this task and were found to perform significantly better than did those in whom happy mood had been induced. In contrast, the performance of those in a happy or neutral mood state did not differ from chance. A few exceptions to the pattern of findings described so far should be noted, but these exceptions are characterized by methodological limitations. One study failed to replicate depressed and nondepressed group differences in accuracy in judgment of contingency (Dobson & Pusch, 1995). However, this study introduced a didactic practice trial prior to the task that may have served to impart an illusion of control to the depressed participants and to obscure the depressive realism effect. Although a subsequent validation trial did not indicate that the practice trial influences judgments of contingency in a group of undergraduates, this validation study did not specifically examine the effect of the practice trial on judgments of contingency in depressed individuals. Likewise, a second exception (Bryson, Doan, & Pasquali, 1984) failed to replicate original findings. However, this study also failed to find evidence that people’s judgments of control are influenced by the frequency of noncontingent outcomes. More recently, two studies have challenged the depressive realism phenomenon (Msetfi, Murphy, & Simpson, 2007; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson, & Kombrot, 2005). These suggest that the differences in contingency judgments between depressed individuals and nondepressed individuals found in the original depressive realism studies (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) may reflect mood effects on learning. Their findings suggest that the pattern of contingency judgment differences between the groups may be seen only in experimental designs that include long intertrial intervals and that individuals who are depressed differ in their contingency judgments because they process these intertrial intervals differently than those who are not depressed. Specifically, Andrews and Thomson (2009) suggested that depressed individuals were better than nondepressed individuals at staying focused on the contingency problem rather than the intertrial intervals (when they were long) in the Msetfi et al. studies. Further research is necessary to elucidate whether these findings hold true across positively and negatively valenced outcomes and explain self–other discrepancies in judgments of contingency for both depressed and nondepressed individuals. Regardless, both the depressive realism literature and these findings illustrate that depressed individuals are less optimistically biased in their control judgments than individuals who are not depressed.

Expectancy of Success/Prediction Studies Depressed individuals also differ from normal individuals in their predictions regarding future success or positive events. Expectancy of success studies compare depressed and nondepressed individuals’ estimates of the likelihood of success on various tasks that are designed to appear determined by skill but that are, in fact, chance-determined. Langer (1975) originally reported that normal individuals succumb to an “illusion of control” and provide



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overly optimistic success expectancies compared with the objective probability of success on chance-determined tasks when factors characteristic of skill-determined tasks are present in the situation. Expectancy of success studies that compare depressed and nondepressed participants have found that nondepressed individuals provide higher expectancies of their success than do depressed individuals, whose expectancies fall closer to the objective probability of success (Golin, Terrell, & Johnson, 1977). This finding has been replicated in depressed and nondepressed psychiatric inpatients (Golin, Terrel, Weitz, & Drost, 1979). In addition, depressed and nondepressed individuals differ when changes in expectancies of success are examined over a series of trials following prior successes and failures in chance-determined and ostensible skill tasks (which actually are also chance-determined). On ostensibly skillbased tasks, depressed individuals show smaller changes in expectancies of success across trials than do nondepressed individuals (see Alloy & Abramson, 1980; Alloy & Seligman, 1979 for reviews), and their final expectancies of success more closely reflect the actual 50% probability of success than do those of nondepressed individuals. In contrast, on evidently chance-determined tasks, depressed and nondepressed individuals’ changes in expectancies of success across trials do not differ. Interestingly, there is some evidence that depressed individuals are more accurate in their expectancies of success for themselves than for others. For example, compared with nondepressed individuals, depressed students’ confidence ratings of success in a dice game fell closer to the actual probability of success when they themselves rolled the dice. However, when the experimenter rolled the dice, depressed individuals’ confidence exceeded the actual probability of success to a greater degree than did nondepressed control individuals (Golin et al., 1977). Likewise, depressed students have shown smaller changes in success expectancies across trials on an ostensibly skill-based task only when it is a task for which they are responsible, not when it is a task for which another person is responsible (Garber & Hollon, 1980). These findings suggest that nondepressed individuals exhibit an illusion of control during apparently skill-based tasks. Nondepressed control individuals thus show larger changes in their expectations of success based on their experiences of success and failure across task trials. In contrast, depressed individuals show less of this illusion, exhibiting smaller changes in their expectations of success across task trials and, ultimately, showing expectancies of success that more accurately mirror the true 50% probability of success. This realism occurs only regarding their own likelihood of success; it disappears when they make judgments regarding others’ likelihood of success. The tendency to overestimate the likelihood of success may well serve a self-enhancing function, acting as a self-fulfilling prophecy and encouraging individuals to persist in the face of discouraging odds, increasing the likelihood that they will ultimately experience success over time. The lack of this bias in depressed individuals could be interpreted as the absence of a self-enhancing strategy. Depressed and nondepressed individuals also differ in their expectations regarding the likelihood of successes and failures, and positive and negative events more generally, in their own lives. Nondepressed individuals have been found to rate their probability of academic success as greater than that of others identical to themselves on the predictors of success (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987) and to estimate that positive events were more likely and negative events less likely to occur in their lives than in others’ lives (Tabachnik, Crocker, & Alloy, 1983). In contrast, depressed individuals did not show these biases. In addition, nondepressed individuals have been found to estimate the likelihood of sad events happening in others’ lives

364   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS as greater than the likelihood of such events happening in their own lives, whereas depressed individuals estimated the likelihood of such sad events happening in their own lives as greater than the likelihood of such events happening in the lives of others (Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985). Likewise, nondepressed individuals have been found to rate positive events as more likely to happen to themselves than negative events, whereas depressed individuals rated positive events as less likely to occur to themselves and more likely to occur to others (Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987). Again, these findings highlight depressed individuals’ absence of self-protective and selfenhancing biases that might shield them from the awareness that negative events are as likely to happen to them and positive events are as likely to elude them as anyone else. Such selfprotective and self-enhancing biases may lead nondepressed persons to behave in a persistent manner that maximizes their likelihood of positive experiences. In a similar study in which increased accuracy would be associated with a more positive outlook, Keller, Lipkus, and Rimer (2002) examined the association between level of depression and updating of health-related risk estimates (likelihood of getting breast cancer) following medical risk feedback. Participants’ risk estimates were obtained at baseline and after risk feedback was received, and depressive symptoms were assessed at baseline. Interestingly, depressed and nondepressed individuals did not differ in their risk estimates at baseline. However, following feedback, depressed individuals had lower follow-up risk estimates than nondepressed individuals. There was an interaction between baseline risk and depression on follow-up risk such that depressed individuals with high baseline risk estimates lowered their follow-up risk estimates in accord with risk feedback, whereas nondepressed individuals with high baseline risk estimates did not. This suggests that in some cases depressed mood can lead to greater accuracy and lack thereof can lead to less accuracy, even when accuracy might serve a self-protective or self-enhancing function. At the same time, there is evidence that in some situations, depressed individuals may even negatively distort the likelihood of future events. When depressed and nondepressed individuals were compared in the accuracy of their predictions regarding the likelihood of events occurring over the upcoming month (compared with the events that actually did occur over that month), individuals high in depressive symptoms showed a pessimistic bias, those low in depressive symptoms showed a nonsignificant optimistic bias, whereas those with mild symptoms showed no bias (Strunk, Lopez, & DeRubeis, 2006). Similarly, Anderson (1990) found that higher levels of depressive symptoms were associated with more pessimistic predictions about the future and greater certainty about the pessimistic predictions. Thus depressed individuals appear to expect a lower likelihood of success and positive events occurring in their lives and a higher likelihood of negative events, as compared with nondepressed individuals. This may reflect a breakdown in motivation to engage in self-protective ways of viewing the world and the future. However, one exception was a study conducted by Dunning and Story (1991) that asked undergraduates to predict the likelihood of a checklist of events over the upcoming semester, obtained confidence ratings regarding predictions, and subsequently obtained retrospective self-reports regarding the actual occurrence of those events throughout the semester. Findings suggested that depressed individuals were actually less accurate in their predictions regarding events. However, a major limitation of this study was its reliance on retrospective self-report for the assessment of “objective” reality against which to measure individuals’ predictions, as retrospective self-report may well be biased by depressed mood.



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Attributional Style Studies Another way in which nondepressed individuals have been found to engage in self-enhancement and self-protection is via the attributions they make for the causes of positive and negative life events. Researchers have termed this cognitive phenomenon the positive, or “selfserving attribution,” bias (Miller & Ross, 1975). The self-serving attribution bias is defined as the tendency to attribute positive events in one’s life to internal, stable, and global causes while making external, transient, and specific attributions for negative events. For example, based on this bias, a college student who has received a high grade on an exam may make the attributions “I am intelligent, I study well for exams, and I can expect to do well on other exams, graduate from college, and do well in the future.” The existence of the self-serving/positive attribution bias has been demonstrated in a range of experimental and clinical studies, summarized in Campbell and Sedikides (1999) and, more recently, in Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, and Hankin’s (2004) meta-analytic review. In fact, research suggests that the self-serving attribution bias is pervasive in the general population. In their review of the literature, Mezulis and colleagues (2004) found that in the general population, the self-serving attribution bias has an effect size of 0.96, indicating a significant and large bias in the overall population. They noted significant variations in the size of the bias in terms of age, culture, and psychopathology. Of interest, studies showed a larger bias effect size when they comprised community samples of normal controls without any psychopathology (d = 1.28) as compared with general community samples (d = 1.08). Samples selected for psychopathology showed an average self-serving attribution bias effect size of d = 0.48, suggesting that the presence of the bias is attenuated in these groups. Of particular relevance here, Mezulis and colleagues (2004) reported that the smallest effect size for the self-serving attribution bias existed in studies of samples of individuals with depression (d = 0.21). Thus their review suggests that whereas the selfserving bias may be prevalent in the general population, its magnitude is much smaller in depressed individuals. Furthermore, several recent studies have focused on comparing the occurrence of the self-serving attribution bias in samples of depressed and nondepressed individuals. In their study, Watson and colleagues (Watson, Dritschel, Jentzsch, & Obonsawin, 2008) asked depressed individuals and nondepressed controls to rate the emotional valence and degree of self-reference of 240 words. In accordance with previous research, the authors found that the normal controls rated positive words as self-referent and negative words as non-self-referent, thus displaying the self-serving attribution bias. Additionally, the depressed individuals displayed a lack of this positive attribution bias. Watson and colleagues (2008) noted that the difference between the groups lay in the self-reference ratings, but not in the valence ratings, of the words. Depressed participants and controls had similar valence scores for the different words; however, they varied in how much they associated those words with themselves. In particular, the depressed group associated themselves more with the negative words as compared with the nondepressed group. This suggests that the nondepressed group showed a positivity bias that the depressed group lacked in comparison. Indeed, a number of attribution studies have found that depressed individuals make rather evenhanded (i.e., similar, unbiased) attributions for positive and negative events (see Alloy & Abramson, 1988, for a review). Thus it appears that depressed individuals exhibit a lessening of the normative selfenhancing and self-protecting attributional bias for events.

366   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS Not only do depressed individuals lack a positive attribution bias, but research also suggests that they may, in fact, exhibit an attributional style in the opposite direction. In their 1978 reformulated helplessness theory and the 1989 hopelessness theory, Abramson and colleagues suggested that depressed individuals tend to make internal, stable, and global attributions for negative events in their lives. The authors proposed a vulnerability–stress model, suggesting that individuals who exhibit this negative attributional style are more vulnerable to depression when they experience negative events (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). This theory has garnered support in both children and adults. For example, in his review of negative attributional style in children, Joiner (2000) found that a negative attributional style was clearly concurrently related to both selfreported and clinical depression. He reported that this relationship held across age, gender, and sample type. Similarly, Robins (1988) and Sweeney, Anderson, and Bailey (1986) concluded that for negative events, internal, stable, and global causal attributions showed reliable and significant associations with depression. In addition, studies assessing attributions for positive events found that external, unstable, and specific attributions were associated with depression as well (Sweeney et al., 1986). These findings not only support the view that depressed individuals lack the self-serving attribution bias but also suggest that the breakdown of the self-serving bias occurs via a self-deprecating tendency to make internal, stable, and global attributions for negative events, blaming stable and pervasive self-characteristics for negative outcomes. In addition, there is some evidence that depressed individuals may show a similarly self-deprecating pattern in their unstable, external, and specific attributions for positive events, failing to take credit for such positive outcomes. Of note, research indicates that the existence of the self-serving attribution bias is adaptive and associated with both physical and mental health, correlating with, for example, lower mortality and morbidity (Peterson & Seligman, 1987), more positive mood states (McFarland & Ross, 1982), and less depression (Abramson & Alloy, 1981). These findings underscore the self-protective and self-enhancing nature of the self-serving attribution bias. The bias allows individuals to enhance their self-images by attributing positive events to stable, global, and internal causes—associating themselves and their futures with similar events. Similarly, the self-serving attribution bias protects individuals’ self-images in that they make external, unstable, and specific attributions for negative events—dissociating themselves and their futures from similar events. It appears that depressed individuals are deprived of the self-enhancing and self-protecting mechanisms provided by this cognitive style.

Recall-of-Feedback Studies Depressed individuals also fail to engage in normative self-enhancement or self-protection when it comes to their recall of evaluative feedback. In studies examining this phenomenon, depressed and nondepressed individuals are given positive and/or negative feedback regarding their performance throughout a task and are later asked to recall the degree of positive and/or negative feedback they received. Results suggest that whereas nondepressed individuals recall such feedback accurately or engage in positively distorted recall, depressed individuals at times recall feedback accurately but at other times engage in negative distortion. A number of studies suggest that depressed individuals recall less positive feedback than do nondepressed individuals (Buchwald, 1977; DeMonbreun & Craighead, 1977; Dennard



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& Hokanson, 1986; Gotlib, 1981; Kennedy & Craighead, 1988; Kuiper, 1978; Nelson & Craighead, 1977) and that they underestimate the amount of positive feedback they previously received relative to the objective reality (Dennard & Hokanson, 1986; Gotlib, 1981; Kennedy & Craighead, 1988; Nelson & Craighead, 1977). This pattern of findings is consistent with the idea that depressed individuals lack self-enhancing strategies that would consist of accurately recalling or even exaggerating recall of positive feedback. In contrast, nondepressed individuals do appear to engage in such self-enhancing strategies, either accurately recalling (Gotlib, 1981; Kennedy & Craighead, 1988; Nelson & Craighead, 1977) or overestimating the amount of positive feedback they received (Dennard & Hokanson, 1986). Of note, studies vary as to the conditions under which depressed individuals underestimate positive feedback or differ from nondepressed individuals in their recall of positive feedback, with some studies suggesting that this occurs only when feedback is given at high rates (DeMonbreun & Craighead, 1977; Nelson & Craighead, 1977), one study obtaining findings only at low rates (Dennard & Hokanson, 1986), and one study obtaining findings only at intermediate rates (55% of trials; Kuiper, 1978). One study has even suggested an interaction between severity of depressive symptoms and rate of feedback (Dennard & Hokanson, 1986). In this study, participants completing a visual problem-solving task were presented with feedback following each trial as to whether their responses were correct (in the form of illumination of one of two colored lights marked “correct” or “incorrect”). Moderately depressed individuals were found to underestimate the percentage of times they received positive feedback when it was presented at low rates (e.g., on 25% of trials), whereas mildly depressed individuals accurately recalled feedback regardless of rate of presentation, and nondepressed individuals overestimated positive feedback when it was presented at high rates (e.g., on 75% of trials; Dennard & Hokanson, 1986). Likewise, depressed individuals do not engage in self-protective strategies in the face of negative feedback, but instead have been found to accurately recall negative feedback, or punishment, whereas nondepressed individuals have been found to underestimate the amount of negative feedback received (Kennedy & Craighead, 1988; Nelson & Craighead, 1977). Thus the pattern of recall of evaluative feedback of depressed individuals appears to lack the self-protective–self-enhancing mechanisms displayed by nondepressed individuals and even to be characterized by negative distortions that minimize positive feedback received and accurately reflect or inaccurately magnify negative feedback received in a way that is not likely to protect or enhance a positive sense of self. In addition, there is evidence that depressed individuals differ from nondepressed individuals in their recall of evaluative feedback regarding their personalities. Specifically, depressed individuals appear to either accurately recall negative personality feedback or to recall feedback in a negatively distorted manner. For example, in a study comparing depressed and nondepressed psychiatric inpatients and nondepressed hospital employees (Gotlib, 1983), participants were asked to engage in a dyadic interaction with a stranger and were then provided with neutral interpersonal feedback that they were told was based on objective observation. When they were later asked to reproduce this feedback, depressed patients recalled feedback as significantly more negative than it had been, whereas nondepressed participants were relatively accurate. Again this pattern of findings is consistent with the idea that the mechanism for self-protection has broken down in depressed individuals, so that they even exaggerate negative feedback rather than underestimating it in a manner that would be consistent with motivation to self-protect.

368   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS Dykman, Abramson, Alloy, and Hartlage (1989) gave depressed and nondepressed students ambiguous and unambiguous personality feedback on dimensions differentiating the two groups’ self-schemata and on dimensions on which the two groups had similar self-schemata. Depressed individuals perceived ambiguous feedback more negatively in the schema-discriminating condition only, and all groups showed positive biases, with the depressed individuals in the schema-discriminating condition showing the least positive bias. When later asked to recall the feedback, the groups did not differ in recall of unambiguous feedback, but depressed individuals showed negative bias in their recall of ambiguous feedback in the schema-discriminating condition. Thus, consistent with a failure to engage in selfprotection, depressed individuals’ negatively biased perceptions and recall of ambiguous feedback occurred only when the feedback was relevant to core aspects of their self-concepts. Depressed and nondepressed individuals also differ in their recall of self-referent information. In general, these studies find that depressed participants recall less positive and more negative self-referent information than do nondepressed participants (see Alloy, Abramson, Murray, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 1997; Greenberg, Vazquez, & Alloy, 1988; Kuiper, Olinger, & MacDonald, 1988, for reviews). However, although depressed individuals’ recall of selfrelevant material is more negative than is nondepressed persons’ recall of self-relevant information, depressed individuals’ recall of positive and negative information about themselves tends to be evenhanded, rather than truly negative. This pattern is consistent with the idea that depressed individuals fail to engage in self-protective strategies such as minimizing recall of negative self-relevant information. Interestingly, there is some indication that nondepressed controls may engage in the self-protective and self-enhancing strategy of positively distorting their recall of feedback for themselves and negatively distorting their recall of feedback for other people, whereas depressed individuals may do the opposite. In one study, nondepressed individuals recalled unfavorable feedback for themselves as more positive than it had been and unfavorable feedback for others as less positive than it had been (Wenzlaff & Berman, 1985). In contrast, depressed individuals accurately recalled both favorable and unfavorable feedback regarding themselves and others, even showing some positive bias in their recall of unfavorable feedback for others but not for themselves (Wenzlaff & Berman, 1985).

Self-Evaluation Studies Depressed individuals also evaluate their behavior, performance, and ability less favorably than do nondepressed controls. Several studies assessed how participants reward or punish themselves differently based on their self-evaluations of performance on a task. For example, Rozensky, Rehm, Pry, and Roth (1977) asked moderately or severely depressed veterans and nondepressed controls to evaluate and then compensate themselves (via reward or punishment) based on their subjective performance on a memory task. The authors found that the moderately or severely depressed veterans tended to reward themselves less and punish themselves more than controls, a pattern consistent with both lack of self-enhancement and lack of self-protection. In addition, when comparing the accuracy of self-evaluation with an objective measure of performance, the depressed veterans were significantly more accurate. In comparison, the controls exhibited a self-enhancing tendency to make overly positive evaluations of performance and thus to overreward themselves relative to their objective



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performance on the task. Similarly, Dunn, Dalgleish, Lawrence, and Ogilvie (2007) found that, relative to objective criteria, depressed individuals exhibited a more accurate judgment of their performance in contrast to the overestimating tendency of the controls. In some studies of self-evaluation and reinforcement, the comparative accuracy of self evaluation between groups is less clear. Some studies suggest that depressed individuals tend to be realistic and accurate in their self-evaluations, whereas nondepressed controls tend to be positively biased (e.g., Siegel & Alloy 1990; Stone, Dodrill, & Johnson, 2001); other studies suggest that depressed individuals tend to be more negative in their self-evaluations compared with the accurate or positively biased controls; or some combination thereof (e.g., Gotlib et al., 1981; Nelson & Craighead, 1977). For example, McNamara and Hackett (1986) found that depressed individuals differed from controls in their social competence according to self-perceptions and evaluations, but not according to objective raters’ evaluations. However, the authors point out that it is unclear which of the ratings was more accurate, as there was no objective measure of reality. In a more recent study, Bruce and Arnett (2004) found that moderately depressed individuals with multiple sclerosis (MS) exhibited more accurate estimations of their own daily memory difficulties as compared with their nondepressed counterparts, who displayed an overestimation bias. In particular, the depressed group’s daily self-reports of memory difficulties aligned more closely with results on laboratory neuropsychological assessments of memory function. However, mildly depressed individuals with MS displayed a negative evaluation bias, overestimating their memory difficulties on the self-reports as compared with the objective memory measures. In a similar study, Stone and colleagues (2001) compared self-evaluations of depressed and nondepressed controls on a task of general knowledge. They found that depressed individuals, in their judgments of their answers on an item-by-item assessment, demonstrated a more realistic, less overconfident pattern of evaluation than controls. However, in the evaluation of their overall performance on the task, depressed individuals exhibited an inaccurate underconfidence. Many studies have found a tendency for depressed individuals to exhibit a negative (rather than more realistic) bias in their evaluation of their own performance. For example, Gotlib (1981) found that depressed psychiatric inpatients tended to reward themselves less and punish themselves more than nondepressed controls. Relative to their objective performance on the task, depressed individuals tended to underreward themselves for their positive performance but to accurately punish themselves for their poor performance. In other words, the depressed group correctly evaluated their performance when doing poorly but either underevaluated or inaccurately rewarded their performance when doing well on the task. In their 1977 study, Nelson and Craighead (1977) found partial support for this underevaluation and reward processing in depressed individuals. In a low-reinforcement condition, depressed individuals rewarded (but did not punish) themselves less than did nondepressed controls. However, in the high-reinforcement condition, there was no difference in self-evaluation, reward, or punishment between groups. This suggests that only under certain circumstances will depressed individuals display a negative evaluation bias. In a more recent set of studies, Beyer (2002) found that on tests of mathematics and English skills, depressed individuals tended to underestimate their performance more than nondepressed controls, though not necessarily to make more accurate evaluations. Depressed individuals’ self-evaluations were more accurate only in that they overestimated comparatively less than did the controls. In a study using a sample of clinically depressed patients, formerly depressed patients, and demographically matched nondepressed controls (Fu, Koutstaal, Fu, Poon, & Cleare,

370   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS 2005), participants completed a series of tasks (e.g., object recognition, social judgment, general knowledge, and line-length judgment) and retrospectively estimated the proportion of items they answered correctly following each of the four tasks. Discrepancies between actual proportion of correct responses and participants’ estimates were examined. All participants underestimated their performance significantly, with depressed participants showing a nonsignificant tendency to underestimate their actual performance more than the nondepressed control group. In addition, when the depressed and comparison groups were matched on level of overall performance, depressed patients’ magnitude of underestimation was significantly greater than that of the nondepressed group, and nondepressed but not depressed participants’ estimates of their performance significantly exceeded the 50% level expected on the basis of chance. In the area of social perception in particular, researchers have also found differences in self-evaluation between depressed individuals and controls. Again, although the literature is mixed on whether the difference reflects a relative accuracy in the evaluations of depressed individuals as compared with the relatively positively distorted evaluations of controls or simply a negatively distorted evaluation mechanism in depressed individuals, the directionality of the differences remain constant; depressed individuals consistently evaluate themselves in a more negative direction as compared with the more positive evaluations of the normal group. For example, Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, and Barton (1980) found that depressed outpatients rated their own social skills more accurately relative to a blind observer’s rating of them, whereas nondepressed controls overestimated their social skills. Interestingly, the authors found that, following treatment, depressed outpatients began to overestimate their social skills similarly to the controls. Siegel and Alloy (1990) compared depressed and anxious individuals with controls in their estimation of the affective and behavioral impact of their interactions on themselves and on their roommates. They found that depressed males rated their own negative impact realistically, whereas depressed females overestimated their own negative impact—but only as compared with their nondepressed and nonanxious roommates’ overly positive ratings of them. Finally, they found that nondepressed and nonanxious roommates underestimated their own negative impact on others. Similar studies found that depressed individuals were more accurate at monitoring negative behavior (Roth & Rehm, 1980) and anticipating social rejection (Strack & Coyne, 1983) as compared with controls, who tended toward optimistic evaluations of themselves and underestimated the likelihood of social rejection. In an interesting extension of this principle, Lovejoy (1991) found that depressed mothers reported more negative, yet more accurate, perceptions of their children’s behavior as compared with nondepressed mothers. Many social evaluation studies comparing depressed individuals with nondepressed controls have found that depressed individuals tend to exhibit a negative bias in their interpretations and evaluations of their own performance. For example, Bynum and Scogin (1996) found that in comparison with controls, depressed individuals exhibited a more negative bias in their evaluations of their own social interaction skills. However, the depressed group showed comparatively more realistic ratings of others’ social interaction skills than did the controls. This pattern of behavior is in contrast to what one would expect from people engaging in self-enhancing strategies, who should be expected to positively bias their evaluations of their own social interaction skills and/or negatively distort those of others. Along similar lines, Whitton, Larson, and Hauser (2008) compared self-evaluations of social com-



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petence in depressed and nondepressed young adults with peer ratings of participants’ social competence. Findings indicated a linear relationship between depressive symptoms and discrepancies between self- and peer ratings, such that higher levels of depressive symptoms were associated with negative distortion whereas lower levels of depressive symptoms were associated with positive distortion of one’s own social competence relative to peer ratings of social competence. When the same study categorized participants as low, moderate, or high in depressive symptoms, those with moderate depressive symptoms showed relatively accurate ratings of social competence, whereas those low in depressive symptoms showed positively biased self-ratings, and those high in depressive symptoms showed negatively biased self-ratings. As the authors suggest, these findings are consistent with several other studies suggesting that there may be an association between level of depressive symptoms and accuracy versus distortion, with those low in depressive symptoms showing positive or self-enhancing distortions, those high in depressive symptoms showing negative distortions, and those with intermediate levels of depressive symptoms exhibiting relative accuracy or realism (Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991; Dennard & Hokanson, 1986; McKendree-Smith & Scogin, 2000). In a study examining social comparisons in individuals high and low in depressive symptoms, Albright and Henderson (1995) obtained participants’ self-ratings on a number of personality characteristics and subsequently randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions (e.g., objectively more positive, objectively more negative, or objectively similar), in which they were asked to read responses to the same items ostensibly completed by another person. Depressed and nondepressed individuals did not differ in their ability to accurately identify the comparison target as more positive, more negative, or similar to themselves, but they varied in the magnitude of difference they perceived between themselves and the target. Depressed individuals positively distorted their ratings of the target, while their ratings of themselves remained consistent during the social comparison task. In contrast, nondepressed individuals’ self-ratings changed, becoming more favorable during the social comparison task, whereas their ratings of the target were accurate. In addition, individuals high in depressive symptoms made more self-derogating and fewer self-enhancing responses than would be expected by chance (e.g., identified objectively more negative targets as similar to themselves). Likewise, nondepressed individuals provided more self-enhancing (e.g., identified objectively more positive targets as similar to themselves) and less self-derogating responses than would be expected by chance. These findings highlight the lack of selfenhancing strategies displayed by depressed participants in their social comparisons relative to nondepressed individuals and are consistent with other literature suggesting that depressed individuals show positive distortions in their ratings of others. Pursuing a slightly different hypothesis, Johnson and DiLorenzo (1998) found that both depressed and nondepressed individuals were equally accurate in their overall assessments of social interactions when evaluating the valence of an interaction between two strangers and their own interactions. Both groups showed schema-based biases in which depressed individuals were more accurate when rating negative interactions but less accurate when rating positive interactions, whereas the control group showed the opposite tendency. Thus the authors suggest that depressed individuals may be more accurate in evaluation of negative constructs as compared with controls, who appear to show a more positive bias in these evaluations.

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Boundary Conditions As has been discussed at points throughout this review, various boundary conditions exist that influence the degree to which depressed and nondepressed individuals exhibit accurate versus distorted judgments. One important factor is whether the judgments that individuals are asked to make are about themselves or someone else. The pattern of findings reviewed earlier could be interpreted to indicate that depressed individuals are more accurate or even negatively distorted in their self-referent judgments but display more positive biases in other-referent judgments. Likewise, the previously reviewed pattern of findings suggests that nondepressed individuals display positive biases or optimistic illusions in their selfreferent judgments but are more accurate or even negatively distorted in their other-referent judgments. In their judgments of contingency, depressed individuals accurately judge their own degree of control over outcomes but overestimate others’ degree of control (Martin et al., 1984), whereas nondepressed individuals accurately judge others’ degree of control but overestimate their own degree of control (Alloy et al., 1985). In rating their likelihood of success, depressed individuals are accurate in rating the likelihood of their own success but overestimate the likelihood of others’ success (Garber & Hollen, 1980; Golin et al., 1977). In recalling feedback, nondepressed individuals have been found to positively distort recall of self-referent feedback and negatively distort other-referent feedback, whereas depressed individuals showed relative accuracy regarding self- and other-referent feedback (Wenzlaff & Berman, 1985). In their self-evaluations, depressed individuals are often found to be negatively biased, but they have been found to be more realistic than normal individuals in their evaluations of others (Bynum & Scogin, 1996). Depressed individuals rate their own social competence consistently while positively distorting their ratings of others’ social competence, whereas among nondepressed individuals the opposite pattern has been observed (Albright & Henderson, 1995). This pattern of discrepancies between self-referent and other-referent judgments is intriguing because it highlights a pattern of judgments by nondepressed individuals that appear calculated to enhance a positive sense of self. In contrast, this pattern of discrepancies in depressed individuals highlights what appears to be a breakdown in motivation to protect and enhance the self, enhancing others at the expense of their own sense of self-efficacy and self-worth. A second potential factor that may influence the degree of accuracy or distortion displayed is severity of depression. Namely, some findings suggest that those with mild depressive symptoms may display relative accuracy in their judgments, whereas those with more severe or clinically significant depressive symptoms may display negative distortions in their judgments. This pattern of findings is consistent with previous hypotheses (Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991) and was supported in a study examining judgments regarding likelihood of future events occurring (Strunk et al., 2006), in a study examining recall of frequency of positive feedback (Dennard & Hokanson, 1986), in studies of accuracy of judging other people’s emotional states from pictures of their eyes (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005; Lee, Harkness, Sabbagh, & Jacobson, 2005), and in a study examining self-evaluations of social competence relative to peer ratings of social competence (Whitton et al., 2008). It may be that nondepressed mood is associated with strong, optimistic, self-enhancing, and self-protecting biases; that mild to moderate depression is characterized by a lessening of these self-enhancing and self-protecting mechanisms, resulting in greater



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self-accuracy and lack of biases; and that severe depression is associated with a further breakdown of the normative self-enhancing and self-protecting biases to the point of actual self-denigration.

Depression: A Breakdown of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Motivation? A consistent tendency to perceive oneself optimistically and to enhance oneself relative to others may be a consequence of motives to enhance or protect one’s self-concept or self-esteem (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Alicke & Sedikides, Introduction, this volume). The research findings on judgments of control, expectancies of success, attributional style, recall of performance and personality feedback, and self-evaluation reviewed herein are consistent with the idea that nondepressed persons exhibit “self-serving” optimistic biases and illusions that may function to either enhance their self-images or to protect them against assaults to their self-esteem that would be engendered by a more objective or unbiased view of their personal successes and failures, strengths and weaknesses. From a self-enhancement–self-protection perspective, the unbiased or negatively biased self-perceptions and judgments of depressed individuals reflect a breakdown in this motivation (Alloy & Abramson, 1988). This breakdown could occur for several reasons. Depressed persons may be unable to generate or utilize self-enhancing or protective strategies due to their generalized motivational deficits (Bibring, 1953; Freud, 1917/1957). Alternatively, preexisting low self-concept may leave the depressed person with little that he or she would be motivated to enhance or protect (Abramson & Alloy, 1981). The hypothesis of self-enhancement and self-protection motivation is consistent with findings from studies reviewed earlier comparing depressed and nondepressed individuals’ judgments for themselves and others. These studies demonstrate that nondepressive optimistic biases and depressive realism or depressive negative biases appear to be specific to the self. If nondepressed individuals’ optimistic biases reflect self-enhancement or protection motives, one would expect such biases to be less likely in their judgments about others, because misperceiving others would have a smaller effect on self-esteem than misperceiving oneself. Similarly, if the absence of optimistic biases about the self among depressed individuals is a result of a breakdown in the mechanisms of self-enhancement and self-protection, such dysfunction should not apply to judgments of others. This is the pattern of self–other differences observed in the judgments of nondepressed and depressed individuals. The selfenhancement–self-protection hypothesis can also explain why nondepressed individuals’ tendency to exhibit optimistic biases about themselves is accentuated under conditions of high ego involvement or direct threats to self-esteem, whereas depressed individuals’ judgments remain unbiased under conditions of both high and low ego involvement or threat (Alloy & Abramson, 1982; Alloy et al., 1985). Some studies suggest that self-enhancement and self-protection motives can be overridden by other competing motives, such as impression management (Koenig, Clements, & Alloy, 1992), or by competing cognitive processes, such as self-focused attention (Mikulincer, Gerber, & Weisenberg, 1990) or the presence of alternative causal factors (Shanks, 1985). However, self-enhancement and self-protection motives may at least partially explain optimistic biases in nondepressed individuals and the breakdown of these biases in depressed individuals.

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The Breakdown of Self-Enhancing Biases: Cause or Consequence of Depression? What is the causal direction of the relationship between depression and the lessening of self-enhancing or self-protective optimistic biases? Does the state of depression somehow lead individuals to be less likely to engage in self-enhancing cognitive illusions, whereas the absence of depression allows individuals to systematically overestimate their capacities in a manner conducive to maintaining a positive sense of self? Or, alternatively, are those individuals who fail to exhibit optimistic biases more vulnerable to developing depression than those who do succumb to overly positive illusions regarding themselves? Few studies have addressed this issue directly; however, the association between depression and the absence of an illusion of personal control may be reciprocal. Alloy et al. (1981) induced a depressive mood state in nondepressed individuals and an elated mood state in depressed individuals and then assessed the impact of these transient mood states on the participants’ susceptibility to the illusion of control in the noncontingent win condition. They found that, compared with depressed participants who simulated elation or who received a neutral or no mood induction, depressed individuals in the elation-induction condition now exhibited an illusion of control over the positive outcomes. Similarly, compared with nondepressed individuals who simulated depression or who received a neutral or no mood induction, nondepressed participants in the depression-induction condition became accurate and no longer exhibited an illusion of control over noncontingent positive outcomes. Thus participants’ current mood states influenced their susceptibility to the illusion of control, suggesting that optimistic biases and their absence are a consequence of nondepressed and depressed mood states, respectively. Similarly, other studies have also found that induced sad mood states are associated with greater accuracy in judgments of covariation (Braverman, 2005) and decision making in financial trades (Au, Chan, Wang, & Vertinsky, 2003). However, Alloy and Clements (1992) found that the absence of an illusion of personal control may also be a vulnerability factor for depression. Alloy and Clements (1992) examined whether individual differences in susceptibility to the illusion of control in the noncontingent win condition predicted differential vulnerability to depressive affect and symptoms following exposure to a laboratory failure and naturally occurring stressful life events. They found that participants who failed to succumb to the illusion of control exhibited greater increases in depressive mood after the laboratory failure and greater increases in hopelessness and depressive symptoms following stressful events in their lives over 1 month than did participants who initially exhibited an illusion of personal control over noncontingent positive outcomes. Thus persons who tend to exhibit an illusion of control may be at decreased risk for depression after life stress, in comparison with individuals who fail to show an illusion of personal control, and positive affect, in turn, may maintain or even enhance susceptibility to this illusion. Similarly, in the context of testing Abramson et al.’s (1989) cognitive vulnerability hypothesis of the hopelessness theory of depression, much prospective research has examined whether the absence of self-serving attributional biases (or the internal, stable, global attributional style for negative events characteristic of depressed persons) actually serves as a vulnerability factor for depression on its own or in combination with the occurrence of negative life events. These prospective studies have shown that the depressive attributional style does, in fact, predict increases in depressive symptoms and onsets of diagnosable depressive



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episodes in children, adolescents, and adults (see Abela & Hankin, 2008; Alloy et al., 2006; Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005, for reviews). Indeed, even among individuals never depressed before in their lifetimes, a negative attributional style predicts first onset of major depression (Alloy et al., 2006). Thus the breakdown of optimistic biases, negative affect or depression, and psychological impairment may operate as a mutually interdependent self-perpetuating maladaptive system.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have reviewed ample evidence that depressed individuals exhibit a lessening of normative, optimistic biases and illusions regarding their personal control, chances of success and positive outcomes, performance and personality, and self-evaluation. The absence of these optimistic biases may reflect a breakdown in depressed individuals’ mechanisms or motivation for enhancing or protecting their self-image. If taken to the extreme, optimistic, self-enhancing biases may be maladaptive if they interfere with the achievement of desired goals or decrease successful coping with stress, because a person is not sensitive to his or her true strengths and weaknesses or true environmental circumstances. However, regardless of whether depressed or nondepressed individuals’ self-relevant judgments and perceptions are realistic or unrealistic over the long run in their natural environment, the breakdown of more normative optimistic biases may have maladaptive psychological and physical consequences. Dysfunctional features of depression, such as low self-esteem, sad affect, decreased persistence, poor coping with stress, and suicidal thoughts and attempts may be consequences, in part, of the absence of healthy optimistic personal biases.

Acknowledgment The preparation of this chapter was supported by National Institute of Mental Health Grant No. MH079369 to Lauren B. Alloy and Lyn Y. Abramson.

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Chapter 18 When Self-Enhancement Drives Health Decisions Insights from a Terror Management Health Model Jamie Arndt Jamie L. Goldenberg

A

casual stroll in most any park or beach or other well-populated area is likely to reveal an assortment of behaviors relevant to physical health. At the beach, you are sure to see people glazing their bodies with suntan oil, catching some rays to bronze their skin. Joggers, bikers, and an occasional inline skater will inevitably dart across your path at the park, and, under a tree, you may notice a group of people hanging out, smoking. Such observations highlight the obvious point that people routinely engage in behaviors with implications for their physical health. Although some such behaviors, such as exercise, can enhance people’s health, others, smoking and tanning, for example, pose a direct threat. Moreover, people make decisions to engage in such behavior in spite of (and at times because of) an ever-increasing barrage of information about behavioral risks to health and how to promote physical well-being. This leads to a basic question: Why do people make the decisions they do when it comes to their physical health? To be sure, there are a variety of factors that influence people’s health-relevant decisions. Many are directly associated with the implications of the behavior for health, whereas others appear to emanate from psychological motives that on the surface have little logical connection to the health-relevant outcomes of people’s behavior. In this chapter, we focus primarily on the latter, seeking to understand how the motives for self-enhancement and self-protection 380



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can affect everyday health decisions. As this volume attests, such motives are widespread in their effects and implications. But stepping back, we might wonder why it is that people should have so trenchant a need to enhance and protect themselves that, in the service of this motive, they would forgo protecting their physical health. Our goal here is to provide one answer to this basic question and to show how this answer can inform an understanding of the pervasive influence that self-enhancement motives can have on health-relevant decisions and when that influence is most apt to occur. We focus specifically on a recently proposed terror management health model (TMHM; Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008) to explicate how deeply rooted awareness of mortality gives rise to a pressing need for self-esteem, which, in turn, becomes a motive often implicated in the decisions people make with respect to their health. We begin with a brief consideration of some common themes to emerge from health psychology research and then turn to the question of why it is that people may be so powerfully driven to enhance and protect the self. We then integrate these insights with a presentation of TMHM, with a particular focus on recent research revealing how concerns about mortality engage self-enhancement motives in the context of decisions about health.

The Emergence of a Duality: Two Broad Motivational Themes Underlying Health Behavior In seeking to understand why individuals make the decisions they do with regard to their health, we suggest that it can be useful to consider operative motivations as varying along a hierarchy of self-regulatory abstraction (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). From this perspective, influences on (in this case, health) behavior range from proximal factors that are directly relevant to the domain in question to underlying influences that operate at more distal, and broader, levels of abstraction. In this light, there are two general classes of psychological motives that have been implicated in the psychology of health decision making: those that are health-oriented and directly (or proximally) relevant to the health situation and those that are more distal, oriented not so much to health but to motives that implicate the selfconcept (i.e., self-oriented; see Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008). The assumption of the former is that people are motivated to protect their health, whereas the assumption of the latter is that people are motivated to enhance or protect their sense of self. That people are motivated to protect their health can be considered a basic truism in the field. Two of the most generative health models, the health belief model (Becker, 1974; Rosenstock, 1974) and protection motivation theory (PMT; Rogers, 1983), for example, have inspired considerable research showing that, when people are faced with healthrelevant fear appeals, increases in perceived risk of a health condition and increases in perceived efficacy of a response to combat that risk lead to more productive health decisions. But one of the frightening things about “fear” is that people do not always respond in the ways that would most effectively reduce the threat. This is evidenced in health psychology by findings that people sometimes respond by avoiding the threat, denying their vulnerability, and thus placing their physical well-being at increased risk (Jemmott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986; Kunda, 1987). Shedding light on these seemingly counterproductive reactions, parallel processing frameworks (Leventhal, 1970; Witte, 1998) suggest that people process health threats within a self-regulatory framework designed to reduce both the health threat and its

382   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS accompanying distress. Accordingly, more threatening health communications produce both greater health intentions and greater threat avoidance (Rothman & Kiviniemi, 1999), and variables that reflect more efficacious (Fry & Prentice-Dunn, 2005) or optimistic (Scheier & Carver, 1985) outlooks influence whether people are more motivated to address the health threat or to control the fear with which it is associated. The point we wish to emphasize is that both health-protection and threat-avoidance reactions can be motivated by concerns and moderated by factors (i.e., health-threat coping variables) that are proximal to the eliciting health threat. This can be contrasted to influences that operate at more distal, broader levels of abstraction. There has of late been a growing recognition of how self-oriented, rather than healthoriented, variables influence the decisions people make in the context of health. Self-affirmation work (see Sherman & Hartson, Chapter 6, this volume, for an overview) is increasingly suggesting, for example, that affirming the value of the self can have potent effects on people’s ability to tolerate, process, and attend to health risk information (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). Work from the dissonance tradition also shows that motives to restore the consistency of the self can engage safer health practices. For example, Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, and Aronson (1997) had people advocate safe sex and then asked them to think about occasions in their past when they themselves did not engage in safe sexual behavior. The salience of this hypocrisy motivated people to purchase condoms when later given an opportunity, presumably to bring their current behavior in line with their advocated position and thus restore consistency of the self. In both self-affirmation and dissonance examples, the important point for present purposes is that the operative motivation is relatively removed from a more direct concern with physical health and instead revolves around the self-concept. Leaping a bit closer to the focus of this volume, we see also that self-presentational motives influence health decisions in a variety of domains (Leary, Tchividjian, & Kraxberger, 1994). As decades of research show, people do not just want to present themselves positively; they also harbor a need to enhance and protect their own views of themselves. This self-enhancement is greatly facilitated by a positive reception from others. Thus motives to enhance and protect the self provide a complementary view explaining the effectiveness of interventions that target domains likely to increase people’s social appeal. Appearance demands are potent catalysts of health risk behavior such as tanning (Gibbons, Gerrard, Lane, Mahler, & Kulik, 2005) and smoking (Wakefield, Flay, Nichter, & Giovino, 2003). Indeed, current tanning intervention efforts are starting to capitalize on this and convey feedback about the negative effects of tanning on appearance and the normative appeal of pale skin (Jackson & Aiken, 2006). Given what we know about the influence of social reference groups and social comparison on self-enhancement striving, it is thus not surprising to note that they, too, have a powerful effect on health decisions. People are more likely to perform risky behaviors if they hold positive images about the prototypical person who engages in such behaviors. Even smoking, particularly in its beginning stages, is influenced by self-oriented motives (Baker, Brandon, & Chassin, 2004) and the enticement of the “cool smoker” (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1995). We see this, for example, in the considerable research supporting a causal effect of media advertisements linking smoking with appearance and image on smoking perceptions, intentions, and use, especially among adolescents and young adults (National Cancer Institute, 2008). Further, identifying with smoking (Gerrard, Gibbons, Lane, & Stock, 2005), as well as implicit association between the self and smokers (Dal Cin, Gibson, Zanna, Shumate, & Fong, 2007), has been shown to predict smoking out-



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comes, including the prospective onset of smoking and success in smoking cessation groups (Aloise-Young, Hennigan, & Graham, 1996). Thus research suggests that, at least under certain conditions, not only may “health” decisions be understood as reflecting concerns with health, but they can also be rooted in more distal and heuristically processed psychological implications for the self. This kind of approach may offer substantial insights, sharing conceptual commonalities with not only dual-process theories (see Smith & DeCoster, 2000, for a review) but also notions of primary and secondary control, wherein responses reflect both direct and indirect modes of dealing with challenges (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). In the present context of health decisions, although there are a variety of “self-oriented” motives that may be relevant (Wiebe & Korbel, 2003), one of the most strongly implicated motives pertains to self-enhancement. But why are people so ravenous to protect and enhance the self that in seeking to do so they actually make decisions that put their health at risk?

Why People Need Self-Esteem: Terror Management Theory That people have a pressing need for self-esteem—to feel that they are people of significance and that they matter—has of course long been recognized by social scientists. Until about 20 years ago, however, what was missing was any concerted theoretical effort to explain why it is that people have such a need. Terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) provides an answer to this question. The theory is grounded in both evolutionary and existential traditions and draws most notably from the work of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (1973) to posit that self-esteem functions in large part to assuage anxiety ultimately associated with humans’ awareness of inevitable mortality. Over the last 20-plus years the theory has inspired considerable research pertaining to diverse ways that people manage this awareness (Greenberg, Solomon, & Arndt, 2008). But at the core, the theory is fundamentally concerned with why it is that people seem to have a pervasive need to feel good about themselves. TMT views the roots of the motivational self-esteem system as emanating from early childhood. The theory proposes that the foundation for the connection between a sense of value and anxiety protection begins in the context of parental socialization given the child’s profound physical immaturity on birth. Indeed, the human infant is virtually helpless, unable to lift its head or even roll over, let alone defend itself from harm or procure the sustenance needed to survive. So dependent on its caregivers for survival, the child experiences security when the parent responds favorably to the child but anxiety when the absence of overt affection signals that his or her needs may not be met. In this way an early attachment mechanism sets the stage for the critical association between appropriate conduct and security. To earn the same sense of security from its caregivers as the child grows, the child must eventually learn to alter its behavior in accordance with the symbolic standards of value prescribed by mom and dad (e.g., “we bite food, not people”). When this occurs, the child feels loved, protected, and relatively free from anxiety. However, when the child eschews these parental standards of behavior (e.g., chomps on another child’s arm), the child opens the door to anxiety, as he or she is then denied the overt affection that renders secure functioning possible. But, of course, the setting changes as the child continues to mature, progressing toward adolescence. As detailed in developmental accounts of self-esteem and peer influence, the

384   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS child begins to depend less on caregiver approval and more on societal approval (Becker, 1971; Harter, 1999; Rosenberg, 1981). The child attends school, participates in social activities, forms friendships, and eventually establishes a social network beyond the family unit. These facets of socialization weave the child into the cultural fabric, and the thread is drawn tighter by a range of cultural teachings that associate adherence to values of goodness with security (cf. Lerner, 1980). With this expansion of the social network comes also an expansion of the child’s cognitive abilities. Capacities for increasing cognitive sophistication in the form of temporal, abstract, and critically, self-reflective thought emerge. While certainly facilitating unparalleled self-regulatory skills and behavioral plasticity, these capacities also unveil cause for trepidation. Anxiety is no longer experienced only in the face of immediate threat but also with the imagination of threats that have yet to occur. In particular, people develop an awareness of the inevitability of death. Given a biological proclivity for survival that humans share with other living organisms, TMT thus posits that the dawning awareness that death is always potentially imminent and ultimately inevitable engenders a uniquely human capacity for experiencing potentially debilitating terror. The maturing child must therefore develop means of managing that fear. With the emerging realization that the parents cannot provide omnipotent protection from death and vulnerability, the security blanket transfers from parental standards of value to those more broadly derived from the culture. Security begins to be obtained by pleasing society, and the attenuation of anxiety depends on living up to cultural standards of value, which becomes manifested as feeling good about oneself, or self-esteem. Thus, for TMT, self-esteem is a culturally based construction that consists of viewing oneself as living up to specific contingencies of value (cf. Crocker & Wolfe, 2001) that are derived from the culture at large but are integrated into an individualized (by virtue of unique socialization experiences) blueprint by each person. These standards of value are in turn embedded in a larger belief system, or cultural worldview, that imbues the world with a sense of meaning, order, predictability, and permanence. This implies that there is likely to be considerable variability across both cultures and individuals in the specific contingencies that an individual must meet in order to feel valuable. But in each case the specific daily goals that lead to feeling good about oneself can be conceptualized as part of the more abstract goal of becoming a significant contributor to a meaningful and enduring cultural drama (Becker, 1971) and thus buffering the potential for incapacitating existentially derived anxiety. Thus, while the pursuit of self-esteem can proceed along various culturally defined trajectories (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003), individuals within a particular culture also vary in the contingencies of value that they have internalized from the larger culture and thus in the specific standards through which they achieve self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). Because people’s sense of self-worth and the cultural worldview in which it is embedded are socially constructed (in the sense that no specific cultural conception of reality is likely to be absolutely true), they are effective only to the extent that people maintain faith in their validity (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Accordingly, people expend considerable effort to maintain the meaningfulness of their beliefs and their sense of personal significance. Of course, as so many theorists have argued, confidence in a particular belief is fortified when others believe similarly and thus corroborate our conceptions of reality (Festinger, 1954). Because other people can provide the consensual validation of one’s worth, and because an



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important contingency of self-worth is often how liked or accepted one is by others, people are generally motivated to manage the impressions they convey to others in the service of maintaining their sense of self-esteem. TMT posits that these two structures, faith in a cultural worldview and self-esteem, are essential to sustain psychological equanimity in the human animal that has partaken from the proverbial tree of knowledge and thus recognizes the inevitability of death. This, in a nutshell, is the TMT view of why people need self-esteem, and when we consider this perspective, we can start to make sense of how deeply embedded the need for self-esteem is and why people would go to such great lengths to maintain it. Indeed, the TMT literature features a number of lines of research that attest to the powerful role that human awareness of mortality plays in strivings for self-enhancement and self-protection. Reviewing this research would be far beyond the scope of this chapter, and here we only note a few different swaths of this empirical canvas (for an extended review, see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Initial work focused on demonstrating that, consistent with an anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem, temporarily raised or situationally boosted self-esteem lowers anxiety in response to threat (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992). Subsequently, a range of studies have proceeded from the mortality salience hypothesis, which states that to the extent that a psychological structure (i.e., self-esteem) provides protection from the awareness of mortality, then increasing the accessibility of death-related cognition should motivate increased efforts to defend or maintain that structure. Accordingly, reminders of death (mortality salience; e.g., writing about one’s own mortality, being primed with death-related imagery or words, standing in front of a funeral home) relative to other psychologically aversive conditions (e.g., uncertainty, personal failure, social exclusion, paralysis, dental pain) have been found to increase a wide variety of manifestations of self-esteem striving. From increasing identification with the body among those who derive esteem from the body (Goldenberg, McCoy, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000) to increasing environmental interest among those who derive esteem from protecting the environment (Vess & Arndt, 2008), when people are confronted with the existential threat of death, they respond in ways that enhance their sense of self-value. As we describe more fully, these efforts to enhance self-value occur in response to death-related thought that is outside of focal awareness (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). This is because such symbolic vestiges of value shield individuals from unconscious fears of mortality rather than conscious thoughts of vulnerability to death. Further evidence for a terror management function of self-esteem is provided by studies showing that conditions that attenuate concerns about death (e.g., bolstering a sense of literal immortality) reduce the effect of mortality salience on self-esteem striving (Dechesne et al., 2003), that judgments that enhance or protect the self reduce the accessibility of death-related thought after reminders of death (Mikulincer & Florian, 2002; Schmeichel & Martens, 2005), and, further, that threats to self-esteem increase death thought accessibility (Hayes, Schimel, & Williams, 2008). Taken together, then, the available literature appears to paint a convergent picture revealing that one of the core reasons people need self-esteem is to buffer existential and largely unconscious fears about mortality. Indeed, as we discuss, the need for enhancing and protecting the self can be so potent that under certain conditions people may engage in behavior that bolsters their symbolic selves at the expense of the health of the their physical selves.

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On the Intersection between Self, Health, and Death: The TMHM In this chapter we have thus far introduced the ideas that (1) although health decisions are often influenced by proximal, health-oriented factors, they may also often reflect efforts for self-enhancement rather than health enhancement and (2) self-enhancement serves a vital function of ameliorating nonconscious existential insecurity about mortality. Might these two general propositions have important implications for one another? We suggest they do, and we offer the TMHM (Goldenberg & Arndt, 2008) as a generative account of how cognitions concerning mortality, which can be frequently activated in the context of health, influence people’s decisions with regard to health behaviors and determine when health-oriented factors are most likely to be influential and when, in contrast, self-oriented motivations are likely to dominate health decisions. A heuristic model is presented in Figure 18.1. Whereas in the absence of TMT, and this model in particular, one might assume that concerns about death would generally increase efforts to promote health, the model (and the research designed to test it) reveals that cognitions about death can influence health decisions by decreasing the relevance of health-oriented concerns compared with other motivations that center around protecting and enhancing the self—sometimes leading to increased health risk.

FIGURE 18.1.  Heuristic overview of TMHM. Adapted from Goldenberg and Arndt (2008). Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted by permission.



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The Structure of the Model: Dual Defenses in Terror Management When people are consciously thinking about death, they do what any right-minded creature with a general inclination to live would do—put their hands over their ears and sing loudly. Well, not literally, but in a sense such childlike denial captures an element of how people respond. TMHM builds from the dual-process model of TMT (Pyszczynski et al., 1999), which depicts qualitatively separate defenses as a function of whether death thoughts are activated consciously or outside of consciousness, and thus it is helpful to briefly review this perspective. The gist is that when death thoughts occupy consciousness, threat-focused defenses are employed to confront the proximal concern—death-related thoughts must be removed from current focal attention. In contrast, it is when death thoughts are activated but outside of conscious attention that people engage in distal defenses that are oriented toward more symbolic concerns pertaining, not to death per se, but to more abstract levels of meaning and value. A considerable amount of research supports the operation of dual processes as a function of conscious and nonconscious mortality activation (see Arndt, Cook, & Routledge, 2004, for a review). In general, immediately after explicit contemplations of one’s mortality, people suppress death-related thoughts or bias inferential processes to reduce concern with the conscious thought of death (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997; Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000). In contrast, it is when a delay follows explicit death reminders (or immediately after subliminal “death” primes) and such cognition is active but outside of focal awareness that people respond by defending their cultural worldviews and striving to maintain self-esteem (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994). These divergent effects of conscious and nonconscious mortality activation have also been found to converge with a general sequence of death thought accessibility in which the first lines of defense against conscious thoughts of death result in initially low levels of death thought accessibility. Once death-related thought is outside of focal attention (e.g., after a delay or, alternatively, immediately after subliminal death primes), nonconscious death accessibility activates symbolic beliefs pertinent to the individual’s bases of meaning and value (Arndt, Greenberg, & Cook, 2002), and the defense of these structures in turn functions in part to reduce previously elevated implicit death thought accessibility (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997). This TMT process model provides a framework from which TMHM was developed to elucidate the specific motivations that are influential within the context of health decision making. This is an extension that—perhaps surprisingly, given that death appears to be rather relevant to health—was until recently unexplored. As we noted earlier, much of the health psychology literature suggests that health decisions are at times influenced by health-oriented motivations that are at proximal levels of abstraction relative to the health situation, whereas at other times such decisions are fueled by self-oriented factors that are at more distal levels of abstraction. In considering the relevance of TMT to health decision making, we noticed a parallel between dual (i.e., proximal and distal) responses in the health literature and in defense against mortality awareness. It was with this parallel in mind and the consciousness of death as the operative factor that we developed TMHM to offer insight into when it is that self-oriented variables, and in particular motives for self-enhancement, are most apt to be activated in the context of health decisions and when self-enhancement motivations are more likely to take a backseat to health concerns.

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When the Self-Enhancing Self Rides in Back: Conscious Mortality Thoughts and Health-Oriented Responses TMHM posits that as people are navigating though life they may encounter a variety of health-relevant situations that have the capacity to either consciously or nonconsciously activate thoughts of death. Exposure to information about cancer or conducting a breast self-exam (BSE) or getting a mammogram, for example, have been found to increase death thought accessibility (Arndt, Cook, Goldenberg, & Cox, 2007; Cooper, Goldenberg, & Arndt, 2010; Goldenberg, Arndt, Hart, & Routledge, 2008). When thoughts of death are conscious, the model suggests that health decisions are guided in part by the goal of removing such thoughts from focal awareness. In many cases, this can be accomplished by behavior (or intentions) that facilitate health, and thus, in such contexts, the health protection motivations articulated by many health models are likely to be especially predictive of health outcomes. Accordingly, when death is conscious, people have been found to increase their intentions to engage in behaviors that facilitate health (decreased smoking; Cox, Arndt, Goldenberg, & Piasecki, 2009; intentions to exercise; Arndt, Schimel, & Goldenberg, 2003; and to purchase high-SPF sunblock; Routledge, Arndt, & Goldenberg, 2004). Moreover, they typically make these decisions irrespective of the relevance of the behavior to their self-esteem. In addition, because the underlying goal triggered by conscious death thought activation is to facilitate the removal of death thoughts from consciousness, people can also engage in threat-avoidance responses that similarly function to this end. For example, people have been shown to deny their vulnerability to a fatal health risk when death was in conscious thought but not when thoughts of death were active but outside of conscious awareness (Greenberg et al., 2000), and people also respond to explicit thoughts of cancer by suppressing an associative link with death, especially when they were led to believe that they were at high personal risk (Arndt et al., 2007). Research confirms that an important influence on whether an individual tries to reduce conscious thoughts of death with health-facilitating or threat-avoidance tactics are those proximal factors explored by health-oriented models. In contexts in which thoughts of death are consciously activated, health-oriented coping variables (response efficacy, active coping strategies, health optimism), which indicate how successfully one can cope with a threat, moderate health decisions (Arndt, Routledge, & Goldenberg, 2006; Cooper, Goldenberg, & Arndt, in press). For example, Cooper et al. (in press) found that individuals who perceive sun-protection behavior as effective (for preventing cancer) responded to conscious thoughts of death with increased sun-protection intentions, whereas individuals who did not perceive the behavior as effective did not. This moderation of mortality salience by response efficacy was not found in a condition in which death thoughts had faded from conscious attention, suggesting that response efficacy was indeed influencing the effects of conscious thoughts of death but not nonconscious ones. Further, this same study demonstrated the critical role of death thought reduction in the outcome by demonstrating that the same relationship did not occur in the context of health threats that were not death related (e.g., cavity protection). Thus TMHM posits that when thoughts of death are conscious, health decisions will reflect either behavioral health or threat-avoidance tactics as a means to banish death thoughts from consciousness. As such, these decisions are moderated by factors that directly pertain to an individual’s (or a response’s) ability to effectively manage the health situation and its



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implications for fatality. As noted, motives for self-enhancement and self-protection, and the contingencies of value and belief on which they are based, take a backseat in such contexts.

The Self-Enhancing Self in the Driver’s Seat: Nonconscious Mortality Thoughts and Self-Oriented Health Responses Although self-enhancement strivings may take a backseat in the front line of psychological defenses against awareness of mortality, they do not stay there for long. The model’s less intuitive proposition is that when thoughts of death are activated but not conscious, then health decisions should reflect, in part, efforts to bolster the value and integrity of the self. Thus, after people are confronted with explicit thoughts of death and respond with efforts to remove such thoughts from consciousness, the model predicts that a different type of defense is engaged in response to the unconscious resonance of death-related cognition. Alternatively, health situations (e.g., conducting a BSE; Goldenberg et al., 2008) may activate death thoughts without ever bringing them into consciousness. In either case, it is when death thoughts are activated outside of consciousness that self-oriented motivations, many of which have been identified by social-health researchers, are posited to drive decision making about health. To date, research derived from TMHM has focused on contingencies for self-esteem as a predictor of health decisions when death thoughts are activated outside of consciousness, as well as considering specific belief systems and confrontations with the physicality (or creatureliness) of the body that threatens to undermine the symbolic value of the self.

The Role of Esteem Contingencies Recall the studies described earlier wherein, immediately after explicit reminders of death, participants increased their sun-protection and exercise intentions across the board (i.e., without moderation by esteem contingencies; Arndt et al., 2003; Routledge et al., 2004). As TMHM predicts, a different picture emerged when thoughts of death were allowed to fade from focal awareness (i.e., there was a delay following the mortality reminder). In these conditions, only people who reported basing their self-esteem on fitness responded with increased exercise intentions (Arndt et al., 2003), and people whose self-esteem was contingent on being tan actually reported increased tanning intentions (Routledge et al., 2004). These results are consistent with other findings indicating that people who value certain highrisk behaviors (e.g., risky sex; Taubman Ben-Ari, 2004; alcohol and drug use; Hirschberger, Florian, Mikulincer, Goldenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002; driving; Jessop, Albery, Rutter, & Garrod, 2008; Taubman Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999; drunk driving; Shehryar & Hunt, 2005; scuba diving; Miller & Taubman Ben-Ari, 2004) intend to, or actually do, take more risks when mortality is nonconsciously activated. As described earlier, standards of self-esteem are embedded within the context of cultural meanings and societal prescriptions for value. Thus, from the perspective of TMHM, when individuals are provided with information concerning the societal value of particular standards (e.g., for appearance) in the context of activated, nonconscious mortality awareness, people’s health decisions should then reflect efforts to attain these standards. This hypothesis has been supported in a number of health domains. For example, in the context of tanning decisions, exposing participants to a picture of an attractive tanned woman (Routledge et al., 2004) or a fashion article entitled “bronze is beautiful” (Cox et al., 2009), in combina-

390   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS tion with priming nonconscious death thought, increased intentions related to suntanning. Conversely, exposing participants to a fashion article touting an increasing societal consensus that “pale is pretty” led to decreased intentions to tan under the same conditions (Arndt, Cox, et al., 2009; Cox et al., 2009). Notably, such effects have been also obtained among beach patrons in South Florida who, in response to “pale is pretty” primes and nonconscious death thought activation, indicated that they would prefer sample lotions with higher SPFs (Cox et al., 2009). These findings not only speak to the malleability of self-esteem standards in the context of using self-enhancement to manage existential fear but they also offer clear predictions of how TMHM can inform health promotion efforts. When people make “health” decisions under conditions of nonconsciously activated thoughts of death, they are often relying on their contingencies of self-esteem as a road map for how to respond; therefore, global differences in how a person derives self-esteem should also moderate health responses to nonconscious death thought activation. One distinction that we have considered focuses on whether individuals base their self-esteem on extrinsic standards (i.e., more conditional acceptance from others as compared with an intrinsic, or internalized, sense of self-acceptance; Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2001). Arndt, Cox, et al. (2009) reasoned that such extrinsically oriented individuals would be more susceptible to blow in the socially articulated breeze after thoughts of death have been activated and receded from focal awareness and that this susceptibility would in turn color their health-relevant responses toward that which was advocated by the social context. Such effects have been observed in tanning, smoking, and exercise domains. For example, people who base their esteem on extrinsic standards responded to mortality salience with increased interest in tanning (presumably because tan skin is considered socially attractive) but were also more potently influenced by the situational primes touting the attractiveness of tanned skin. Thus people can be pushed toward either healthy or unhealthy trajectories based on the salient standards of value and their proclivity to be attentive to such externally defined standards. Indeed, Arndt, Cox et al. (2009) similarly found that when individuals who smoke for extrinsic reasons were reminded of mortality and exposed to an antismoking commercial that articulated negative peer group reactions to smoking, they reported greater intentions to quit smoking. The rationale behind these efforts to productively change behavioral intentions is that exposure to the esteem-relevant prime increases the associated self-esteem contingency (e.g., of being tan), which in turn guides responses to nonconscious death thought activation. Arndt, Cox, et al. (2009) tested this hypothesis in the context of fitness. In this study, the situational prime involved exposing participants to a positive exemplar of people who exercise (a “prototype”; Ouellette, Hessling, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, & Gerrard, 2005) or a negative exemplar of people who do not exercise subsequent to a mortality salience/delay manipulation. Uniquely among those participants who had been exposed to thoughts about death and the positive exercise prototype, as extrinsic self-esteem increased, so too did the relevance of exercising to self-esteem. Thus one of the mechanisms by which death-related cognition exerts its influence is by elevating the importance of self-esteem contingencies that may implicate health-relevant behavior. An exception to the assumption that health motivations will be relatively less pressing when thoughts of death are nonconsciously activated occurs when “being healthy” itself becomes a source of self-esteem. In such cases, health and esteem motivations should converge, and thus, if specific health behaviors are framed as esteem-relevant, individuals may



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respond to activated, but nonconscious, death awareness by embracing the behavior. The results of Cooper et al. (2010) provide encouraging support for this analysis. Among women attending a mammogram clinic, higher levels of death thought accessibility led to increased BSE intentions when women were exposed to an instructional brochure framing BSEs as empowering (i.e., providing an opportunity for women to empower themselves by taking control of their health) compared with one emphasizing the practical reasons to conduct BSEs. There were no comparable effects for worry about cancer, supporting the TMHM assumption that motives concerning self-esteem were driving the effect rather than concerns about health. Such findings highlight the potential for health behavior to be embraced to the extent that it is portrayed as a pathway to self-esteem in a context in which death thoughts are accessible.

The Role of Belief Systems Although most research on TMHM has focused on operative self-esteem motives in response to accessible death-related cognition, the theoretical tradition suggests that more general worldview beliefs should also become more influential to the extent that mortality awareness is activated. Initial research has considered this issue from the perspective of how religious fundamentalism, under conditions of activated nonconscious death thought, may promote increased reliance on faith instead of medical treatment for health problems (see Asser & Swan, 1998). In a series of studies by Vess, Arndt, Cox, Routledge, and Goldenberg (2009), after being reminded of mortality, followed by a delay, individuals scoring high on religious fundamentalism were more likely to endorse prayer as a substitute for medical treatment (both for themselves and others) and saw it as a more effective approach to combating illness. From the perspective of TMHM, such responses are engaged because affirming the religious belief allows the individual to address the more pressing psychological need for existential meaning. Consistent with this analysis, when participants were allowed to affirm the efficacy of prayer after thoughts of death faded from focal awareness, religious fundamentalism was associated with decreased search for meaning. This particular study thus provides insight into the functional significance of what may often seem like objectively (or, at least, medically) health-compromising decisions. Although the decision may undermine physical health, it provides vital existential resources to buffer deeply rooted fears about death. This fits with other research showing that individuals may indeed make decisions (show interest in martyrdom or self-sacrifice) that advance the symbolic self over the physical self (Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Routledge & Arndt, 2008). Unfortunately, the need to affirm the integrity of one’s worldview in the face of nonconscious mortality awareness can affect not only one’s own health but also the health of others, if one is in a position to influence others’ health outcomes. Consider, for example, the propensity for psychological factors to influence triage, diagnosis, and treatment decisions by medical providers. Based on the present analysis, when health care providers are reminded of mortality, they may be motivated to seek ways to enhance their own self-esteem and worldview beliefs. As a manifestation of this, they may offer more protective (i.e., higher) risk estimates for those who support their worldview and more cavalier (i.e., lower) risk estimates for those who threaten their worldview with alternative belief systems. Arndt, Vess, Cox, Goldenberg, and Lagle (2009) tested this hypothesis among a sample of medical students who were asked to make cardiac risk estimates for a hypothetical patient after

392   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS being primed with either mortality salience or a control topic. In this study, the emergency room admittance forms that the medical students inspected, in addition to describing symptoms, also subtly indicated that the patient was either Christian or Muslim. Although the symptoms presented were the same in all cases, when thoughts about mortality were primed, medical students rendered higher cardiac risk estimates for the Christian patient and lower risk estimates for the Muslim patient. These findings demonstrate how self-oriented concerns rendered more pressing in the context of implicit mortality awareness can affect heath decisions that put not only oneself at risk, but others as well. We know that the motivation to protect the self through favoritism toward the groups with which it is affiliated can become a problematic aspect contributing to medical prejudice and errors (Einbinder & Schulman, 2000), and the present analysis suggests one situation in which such processes may be most likely to emerge.

The Threat of Human Creatureliness TMHM offers an additional implication of how nonconsciously activated mortality concerns can affect health decisions. Consider that many health behaviors involve treating the body as a physical specimen. With breast exams, for example, women knead through flesh in search of abnormalities indicating disease. Men are advised to similarly inspect the body when conducting testicular exams, and this is to say nothing of more invasive procedures such as colonoscopies or even routine practices that take place during an annual physical exam. Because the basis of terror management resides in the ability to enhance and protect symbolic conceptions of the self (e.g., the body’s appearance or fitness as a basis of selfesteem), TMHM posits that in the context of nonconscious death thought activation, the extent to which people focus on the physical, or “creaturely,” aspects of the body rather than its symbolic value, and the degree to which individuals are sensitive to such concerns, should moderate discomfort with, and avoidance of, body-oriented health behavior. This proposition follows from research revealing that when mortality concerns are nonconsciously activated people appear threatened by those aspects of the body that are shared with other creatures. For example, when faced with managing implicit thoughts of death, people are more disgusted by bodily products and functions (Cox, Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, & Weise, 2007); report that the physical, but not the romantic, aspects of sex are less appealing to them (Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, McCoy, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999); and will even arrange their chairs so as to be farther away from a woman they expect to be breast-feeding compared with bottle-feeding her baby (Cox, Goldenberg, Arndt, & Pyszczynski, 2007). In addition, confrontation with each of these physical stimuli and/or behaviors has been shown to increase the accessibility of cognitions about death and human creatureliness. In much of the research exploring the impact of threats associated with creatureliness on health behavior, people are induced to focus on the body’s more creaturely, and thus less symbolic, aspects. Following prior research not directly focused on the health domain (Goldenberg, Cox, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2002), creatureliness is traditionally manipulated by having participants read an essay that highlights the biological similarities between humans and other animals (i.e., “our bodies work in pretty much the same way as the bodies of all other animals. Whether you’re talking about lizards, cows, horses, insects, or humans, we’re all made up of the same basic biological products”) in contrast to an essay that focuses on human culture or a neutral topic. This approach serves to render salient (or



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not) the human similarity to other animals. Using such manipulations, TMHM research has targeted cancer detection exams due to their physical nature and their potential, in more involved contexts, to naturalistically prime thoughts of death. Experimental evidence supports the hypothesis that when such concerns are activated, individuals may be apt to put their health at risk by avoiding health behavior that involves confrontation with the body’s physicality. For example, Goldenberg et al. (2008, Study 1) demonstrated that when creatureliness was primed in the context of nonconsciously activated mortality concerns, college students reported decreased intentions to conduct BSEs in the future. Mortality salience in the absence of the creaturely reminder did not decrease intentions to conduct BSE, suggesting that it is not merely fears associated with mortality that contribute to this effect but specific difficulties associated with the threat posed by the physicality of the body. Additional analyses revealing that decreased intentions were not accounted for by worry about breast cancer further suggest that concerns about health were not driving the effects. Thus health enhancement motives are again pushed into the background as nonconscious thoughts of death engage motives to protect the symbolic value of the self from the threat of creatureliness. Such tendencies affect not just people’s self-reported intentions but their behavior as well. Goldenberg et al. (2008, Study 2) documented such reactions using more realistic confrontations with BSEs and found that, in these more involving contexts, thoughts of death become accessible in the absence of a mortality salience manipulation; and, accordingly, priming creatureliness decreased BSE-related behavior (time conducting an exam on a breast model). Presumably, people avoided the behavior in this context because the creatureliness prime rendered the exam more uncomfortable. Goldenberg et al. (2008) directly examined this hypothesized mediating mechanism in a third study. Women at greater risk for breast cancer (age 35 and up) conducted a BSE on their own breasts while also being exposed to a misattribution of arousal manipulation. According to the current analysis, a creatureliness manipulation should lead to increased discomfort with the exam and thus decreased exam duration—that is, unless a feasible alternative explanation was provided for participants’ discomfort. As predicted, after being exposed to the creatureliness essay, exam times were reduced when participants had no alternative explanation for their discomfort compared with when they were given a misattribution cue to which to attribute their discomfort. Thus, presumably, the threat associated with creatureliness created discomfort with the physical exam, and this (non-health-oriented) concern disrupted the health behavior. Are certain individuals more likely to avoid health behaviors that bring them closer to the body as a result of the existential implications of creatureliness? Prior theorizing and empirical research outside of the health domain implicates the trait of neuroticism, as such individuals are prone to difficulties with the body and appear to possess tenuous terror management resources (Goldenberg et al., 2006). In a recent pair of experiments exploring how neuroticism operates in the bodily oriented health context we have been describing, Goldenberg, Routledge, and Arndt (2009) examined whether individuals high in neuroticism are especially likely to manifest discomfort with, and reduced compliance with recommendations for, mammography. In an initial test, the authors found that for participants with little risk of breast cancer (i.e., college students with no family history of breast cancer), when concerns about mortality were primed, a creatureliness manipulation led women who were high, but not low, in neuroticism to report reduced willingness to undergo a mammogram. To examine the merits of this position with regard to the relevant population, Goldenberg et al. (2009,

394   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS Study 2) had women, prior to receiving a mammogram at a clinic, complete a neuroticism inventory and the creaturely manipulation. The results revealed that the creatureliness prime increased perceptions of discomfort with the mammogram among women high in neuroticism. For certain individuals, then, it appears that the need to protect the self from the undermining blow of physicality exerts an especially potent influence on their health behavior.

Concluding Remarks In this chapter we have presented a framework for understanding the role of self-enhancement in health decisions that has at its crux the human need to manage one’s awareness of mortality. The recently developed TMHM relies on the theoretical insights of TMT and its comprehensive explanation of why people have such a deeply rooted need for self-esteem and why the motivation to self-enhance is so pressing that it can override what would otherwise seem to be a fundamental need for health protection. TMHM goes beyond the growing recognition that self-oriented motivations often underlie decisions to engage in behaviors that are relevant to physical health by offering specific guidelines as to when self-enhancement needs will take a backseat to health and when they will drive decision making pertinent to health. Specifically, the model suggests that the relative importance of self-enhancement needs in health decisions can be predicted as a function of the consciousness of death. It is the unconscious resonance of death-related thought that can often underlie the need for selfenhancement and its influence in “health” decisions. So next time you are out and about and see people on the beach oiling up their bodies, the smokers hanging out under the tree, and the convoy of joggers run across your path, it might be more pertinent to ponder not why they would risk or seek health enhancement but how such behaviors are meeting their need for self-enhancement.

Acknowledgment Preparation of this chapter and much of the work reported herein was supported by National Cancer Institute Grant No. R01CA96581.

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Jackson, K. M., & Aiken, L. S. (2006). Evaluation of a multicomponent appearance-based sun-protective intervention for young women: Uncovering the mechanisms for program efficacy. Health Psychology, 25, 34–46. Jemmott, J. B., III, Ditto, P. H., & Croyle, R. T. (1986). Judging health status: The effects of perceived prevalence and personal relevance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 899–905. Jessop, D. C., Albery, I. P., Rutter, J., & Garrod, H. (2008). Understanding the impact of mortalityrelated health-risk information: A terror management perspective. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 951–964. Kunda, Z. (1987). Motivated inference: Self-serving generation and evaluation of causal theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 636–647. Leary, M. R., Tchividjian, L. R., & Kraxberger, B. E. (1994). Self-presentation can be hazardous to your health: Impression management and health risk. Health Psychology, 13, 461–470. Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum. Leventhal, H. (1970). Findings and theory in the study of fear communications. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 5, pp. 119–186). New York: Academic Press. Mikulincer, M., & Florian, V. (2002). The effect of mortality salience on self-serving attributions: Evidence for the function of self-esteem as a terror management mechanism. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 24, 261–271. Miller, G., & Taubman Ben-Ari, O. (2004). Scuba diving risk taking: A terror management theory perspective. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 26, 269–282. National Cancer Institute. (2008). The role of the media in promoting and reducing tobacco use: Tobacco Control Monograph No. 19 (NIH Publication No. 07-6242). Bethesda, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Cancer Institute. Ouellette, J. A., Hessling, R., Gibbons, F. X., Reis-Bergan, M., & Gerrard, M. (2005). Using images to increase exercise behavior: Prototypes versus possible selves. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 610–620. Pyszczynski, T., Abdollahi, A., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., & Weise, D. (2006). Mortality salience, martyrdom, and military might: The Great Satan versus the Axis of Evil. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 525–537. Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1999). A dual-process model of defense against conscious and unconscious death-related thoughts: An extension of terror management theory. Psychological Review, 106, 835–845. Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., & Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people need selfesteem? A theoretical and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 435–468. Rogers, R. W. (1983). Cognitive and physiological processes in fear-based attitude change: A revised theory of protection motivation. In J. Cacioppo & R. Petty (Eds.), Social psychophysiology: A sourcebook (pp. 153–176). New York: Guilford Press. Rosenberg, M. (1981). The self-concept: Social product and social force. In M. Rosenberg & R. H. Turner (Eds.), Social psychology: Sociological perspectives (pp.  591–624). New York: Basic Books. Rosenstock, I. M. (1974). The health belief model and preventive health behavior. Health Education Monographs, 2, 354–386. Rothbaum, F., Weisz, J. R., & Snyder, S. S. (1982). Changing the world and changing the self: A twoprocess model of perceived control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 5–37. Rothman, A. J., & Kiviniemi, M. (1999). “Treating people with health information”: An analysis and review of approaches to communicating health risk information. Journal of the National Cancer Institute Monographs, 25, 44–51. Routledge, C., & Arndt, J. (2008). Self-sacrifice as self-defense: Mortality salience increases efforts to affirm a symbolic immortal self at the expense of the physical self. European Journal of Social Psychology, 38, 531–541. Routledge, C., Arndt, J., & Goldenberg, J. L. (2004). A time to tan: Proximal and distal effects of

398   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS mortality salience on sun exposure intentions. Personality of Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1347–1358. Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1985). Optimism, coping, and health: Assessment and implications of generalized outcome expectancies. Health Psychology, 4, 219–247. Schimel, J., Arndt, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (2001). Being accepted for who we are: Evidence that social validation of the intrinsic self reduces general defensiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 35–52. Schmeichel, B. J., & Martens, A. (2005). Self-affirmation and mortality salience: Affirming values reduces worldview defense and death-thought accessibility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 658–667. Sedikides, C., Gaertner, L., & Toguchi, Y. (2003). Pancultural self-enhancement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 60–79. Shehryar, O., & Hunt, D. M. (2005). A terror management perspective on the persuasiveness of fear appeals. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 15, 275–287. Sherman, D. A. K., Nelson, L. D., & Steele, C. M. (2000). Do messages about health risks threaten the self? Increasing the acceptance of threatening health messages via self-affirmation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1046–1058. Smith, E. R., & DeCoster, J. (2000). Dual-process models in social and cognitive psychology: Conceptual intergration and links to underlying memory systems. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 108–131. Stone, J., Wiegand, A. W., Cooper, J., & Aronson, E. (1997). When exemplification fails: Hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 54–65. Taubman Ben-Ari, O. (2004). Intimacy and risky sexual behavior. What does it have to do with death? Death Studies, 28, 865–888. Taubman Ben-Ari, O., Florian, V., & Mikulincer, M. (1999). The impact of mortality salience on reckless driving: A test of terror management mechanisms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 35–45. Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1987). What do people think they’re doing? Action identification and human behavior. Psychological Review, 94, 3–15. Vess, M., & Arndt, J. (2008). The nature of death and the death of nature: The impact of mortality salience on environmental concern. Journal of Research in Personality, 42, 1376–1380. Vess, M., Arndt, J., Cox, C. R., Routledge, C., & Goldenberg, J. L. (2009). The terror management of medical decisions: The effect of mortality salience and religious fundamentalism on support for faith based intervention. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 334–350. Wakefield, M., Flay, B., Nichter, M., & Giovino, G. (2003). Effects of anti-smoking advertising on youth smoking: A review. Journal of Health Communication, 8, 229–247. Wiebe, D. J., & Korbel, C. (2003). Defensive denial, affect, and the self-regulation of health threats. In L. D. Cameron & H. Leventhal (Eds.), The self-regulation of health and illness behaviour (pp. 184–203). London: Routledge. Witte, K. (1998). Fear as motivator, fear as inhibitor: Using the EPPM to explain fear appeal successes and failures. In P. A. Andersen & L. K. Guerrero (Eds.), The handbook of communication and emotion (pp. 423–450). New York: Academic Press.

Chapter 19 Narcissistic Self-Enhancement Tales of (Successful?) Self-Portrayal Carolyn C. Morf Stephan Horvath Loredana Torchetti

S

elf-enhancement is the trademark of narcissism. Indeed, narcissism can be said to be “the self-enhancer personality.” Narcissists are characterized by grandiose self-views and a relentless addiction-like striving to continually assert their self-worth and superiority. Thus, although people seem fundamentally motivated to enhance the positivity of their selfviews (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003, 2008), for narcissists this motive appears to be their modus operandi (Campbell & Foster, 2007; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Sedikides & Gregg, 2001). They crave attention and admiration and will do anything to be in the limelight. Narcissists brag, show off, and dominate conversations (Buss & Chiodo, 1991; Vangelisti, Knapp, & Daly, 1990). They also affiliate with high-status others, compete so they can emerge as winners, and strive to assume leadership positions (Brunell et al., 2008; Campbell, 1999; Horton & Sedikides, 2009; Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). Moreover, narcissists habitually engage in a level of self-enhancement that is beyond normal boundaries and that seems to be less sensitive to social-appropriateness norms and constraints. For example, they unduly steal credit from others for joint interpersonal task performances but blame them for failure (Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000; John & Robins, 1994). When in conflict with a self-goal, they often only marginally adjust their excessively positive self-presentations, even in situations requiring modesty (Collins & Stukas, 2008; Morf, Davidov, & Ansara, 2010). In short, self-enhancement is an omnipresent feature of narcissists’ lives, and they enact it with seemingly little regard for consequences. This chapter examines the evidence regarding narcissistic self-enhancement strategies and analyzes how narcissists employ them in the service of their most central self-goals. We

399

400   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS begin with a brief background and definition of narcissism, and we then describe the dynamic self-regulatory processing model to demonstrate the important role of self-goals—how individuals want to see themselves and be seen by others. Next, we review research on narcissistic self-enhancement in terms of how narcissists capitalize on opportunities and deal with threat. Subsequently, we contemplate the likely outcomes of narcissistic self-enhancement, both for oneself and others, and discuss its inherent trade-offs. We follow this with a consideration of how successful narcissists are in accomplishing their self-construction efforts and whether the narcissistic self-system is robust or fragile. Finally, we discuss the potential malleability or changeability of narcissistic self-enhancement.

Narcissism Defined Background and Historical Perspective Introduced into psychology by Havelock Ellis (1898), the construct of narcissism was later elaborated by Freud (1914/1957, 1931/1950) to describe a person overinvested in the self and trying to keep anything away that would threaten his or her ego, even at the expense of others. The mechanisms he describes as being employed in this process fit contemporary notions of self-enhancement. Expanding on Freud’s ideas, Kernberg (1975) and Kohut (1977) became the two most influential theorists on the clinical perspective on narcissism. Although they differ in many respects, both describe narcissism as a defense against a vulnerable, inadequate self, resulting from unfulfilled childhood needs. Kernberg proposed the differentiation between relatively well-functioning narcissists, who successfully showcase their virtues and obtain confirmation for their grandiosity, and a more malignant type, in whom paranoia, aggression, and antisocial behavior become the dominant features. Kohut, too, described how individuals maintain grandiosity by repressing their unacceptable needs from consciousness (splitting) through a fixation on an archaic primitive self. Thus, although in these clinical theories the focus is on the defensive self-regulation of pathological narcissism, self-enhancement mechanisms are also relevant. It was Kernberg’s and Kohut’s extensive descriptions of narcissistic attributes that finally led to the classification of narcissistic personality disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980), in which its most important characteristics were systematized and consensually defined. Essential features are a grandiose sense of self-importance, an excessive need for admiration, and a lack of empathy toward others. Interestingly, more than half of the criteria concern grandiosity and its maintenance, emphasizing the centrality of self-enhancement. The DSM definition facilitated the development of scales, of which the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Hall, 1979) has become the most widely used in personality and social psychological research. Although based on the DSM criteria, the NPI is not a measure of pathology or typology. It measures along a continuum narcissistic personality attributes that are widespread and normally distributed in the general population. Accordingly, the NPI puts more emphasis on the grandiose aspects of narcissism than on its vulnerability. Most of the research findings described in this chapter are based on the NPI and on nonclinical samples. Thus they refer to “normal,” subclinical, and grandiose manifestations of narcissism. Nonetheless, we assume that its clinical expression is not qualitatively different but



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solely that the self-regulatory mechanisms are implemented with less success; thus there is more impairment.

The Dynamic Self-Regulatory Processing Model of Narcissism In order to understand the processes that give rise to narcissism, we have relied on a framework that we have termed the dynamic self-regulatory processing model (Morf, 2006; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Morf, Torchetti, & Schürch, in press). Our point of departure is the assumption that many of people’s behaviors are guided by goals concerning how they would like to see themselves and to be seen by others, and this results in distinctive self-regulatory processing dynamics. That is, people continuously perceive and interpret situations as they relate to the pursuit of their selfgoals—as opportunities or obstacles. This process, in turn, activates characteristic intra- and interpersonal processes aimed at aligning conditions to be supportive of their self-goals. As stated earlier, narcissists’ self-regulatory tactics revolve around being noticed and admired, showing that they are better than others, and by any means curbing any potential inferences about inadequacy. Their primary self-motive thus appears to be the desire to affirm their grandiose self and their superiority over others. They appear to be pursuing a maximal-gain strategy bent on capitalizing on success, and they are willing to incur risk. Getting ahead seems more important to narcissists than either minimizing damage to the self or getting along with others (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Narcissists invest a great deal of effort and implement a large variety of strategies in pursuit of superiority and to promote perceptions of extraordinariness. They do so through interpersonal maneuvers (e.g., positive self-presentations, excuses for failures)—that is, processes that engineer positive and deflect negative feedback or that more generally control the impressions of others. But narcissists also are adept at using intrapersonal mechanisms that shape the meaning of self-relevant information in support of the desired self-view. These mechanisms involve cognitive and affective transformations—for example, biased recall or reconstrual of events, as well as distorted interpretations of outcomes. These intra- and interpersonal self-regulatory mechanisms function in parallel and in continual exchange, such that through their actions and interpretations narcissists create and shape their social environments to support their grandiose self-image. Furthermore, although these self-enhancement efforts are “strategic” in the sense of being in the service of self-goals, they can be executed at either deliberate or automatic levels. Indeed, we assume that much of narcissistic selfenhancement is transacted automatically and with little or no explicit awareness.

The Role of Motivation, Emotions, and Self-Esteem The goal-driven development and regulation of the narcissistic self-system occurs through a process of motivated self-construction, characterized by continuous reciprocal interactions between the system’s dynamics and the demands and affordances of the particular social context. Narcissists’ superordinate goal to affirm their grandiose self organizes and gives general direction to their other, more context-specific goals, such as being applauded and recognized as special and superior, surpassing others in competition, attaining the trophy partner, and obtaining power or a leadership position. Thus we assume that the self-system consists of a coherent organized connectionist network-like meaning system of cognitive–affective representations and processing dynamics (Mischel & Morf, 2003; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Morf

402   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS & Horvath, 2007). The organization is derived from the individual’s most important goals, which become activated by particular types of internal and external trigger conditions and which may play out in stable and distinctive patterns. The class of goals for which narcissists strive reflect agency, comprising themes of dominance, power, and achievement rather than affiliation or intimacy (Campbell & Foster, 2007; Emmons, 1989). These motivational strivings are characterized by an approach strategy and maximizing opportunities for selfenhancement, as opposed to avoiding failure (Foster & Trimm, 2008). The affective mechanism for this type of striving appears to be a forceful defense against or attack on excessive shame (Tracy, Cheng, Robins, & Trzesniewski, 2009). In order to keep shame at bay, narcissists actively and continually inflate their self-representations, thus maximizing hubristic pride—a form of pride associated with arrogance and conceit rather than actual accomplishment and genuine confidence. Whereas shame regulation may be an underlying mechanism, state self-esteem operates like an internal subjective gauge for assessing a narcissist’s relative progress in meeting his or her self-goals (Morf & Horvath, 2010). Thus, although the narcissist’s trait self-esteem is generally high, his or her state self-esteem provides a readout of how well his or her goals of admiration, superiority, and dominance are being served or endangered at the moment. To sum up, according to the dynamic self-regulatory processing model, self-goals organize the self-system and guide people’s self-regulatory behavior, hence determining which situations will be perceived as opportunities or threats. These specific self-goals are translated in characteristic behavioral signatures that play out in stable and distinctive IF . . . THEN . . . situation–behavior patterns (Mischel & Morf, 2003; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). For narcissists, the typical self-signatures are: “IF opportunity for promotion or demonstration of the grandiose and superior self, THEN self-affirm, self-promote, and self-enhance!” as well as: “IF threat to own grandiosity and superiority, THEN strike back!”

Affirming and Protecting the Narcissistic Self through Self-Enhancement: The Evidence Just what do these behavioral signatures of narcissists look like concretely? As will be seen, narcissists are highly creative in the methods they use and seem to have an unlimited arsenal to draw from (Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010). We propose that these behaviors take two forms: proactive, in which narcissists take the initiative and try to create or shape situations to defuse a potential threat or to set up maximal opportunity to enhance the self; or reactive, in which they try to counteract adverse implications of a negative event or take advantage of a positive event by embellishing it.

Creating Opportunities for Self-Enhancement Narcissists by default overestimate and aggrandize their own characteristics and skills in selfpresentation, fantasy, expectations, and performances. For example, when compared with objective criteria, narcissists overestimate their intelligence, as well as their physical attractiveness (Bleske-Rechek, Remiker, & Baker, 2008; Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994). Narcissists also perceive themselves as better than others (John & Robins, 1994), including even their romantic partners (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002). Furthermore, narcissists’ day-



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dreams are marked by fantasies about achievement, heroism, power, and self-admiration— fantasies that they report using to cope with stress (Raskin & Novacek, 1991). Narcissists also show exaggerated optimistic expectations about their performance. Narcissistic college students overestimated not only their actual grades but also their future achievements (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998). In a similar vein, narcissists self-enhance in terms of their contributions to group tasks. In a managerial group discussion, narcissists overestimated their performance when compared with peers’ and experts’ ratings, whereas nonnarcissists underestimated their contributions to the group effectiveness (John & Robins, 1994). Narcissists, then, are keenly aware and will take advantage of contexts that allow them to work toward their goals of self-affirmation. Along with their “default” overestimations, narcissists also seem to more actively “work on” their social environment to demonstrate their grandiosity and superiority through their self-presentations. For example, in newly formed groups, narcissists apparently manage to make a good impression on others, so that they are temporarily perceived as agreeable, competent, well adjusted, entertaining, and exciting—although this initial impression does not hold up over time (Paulhus, 1998). Similarly, in leaderless groups, narcissists conveyed a positive impression so that they were likely to emerge as leaders during group discussions (Brunell et al., 2008). In addition, narcissists actively create opportunities for self-promotion by engaging and investing more in competitive tasks that have the potential for showcasing their superiority. For instance, male narcissists experienced the most enjoyment and persisted longer in a task when it was framed as competitive as opposed to an occasion for learning (Morf, Weir, & Davidov, 2000). Moreover, when narcissists were presented with difficult tasks, their performances increased compared with less challenging situations (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). Thus narcissists are able to step up to the plate and elevate their performances, when their performances are diagnostic of exceptional ability and provide a suitable opportunity to garner admiration. To extrapolate, narcissists may not just exploit but also actively seek out competitive situations that provide opportunities for glory. Narcissists also create self-enhancement opportunities in the realm of romantic relationships. They feel attracted to highly positive (i.e., attractive and popular), as well as admiring, partners rather than nurturing ones (Campbell, 1999). This preference occurs because positive partners contribute to the popularity and importance of the narcissist; they serve as a means of status acquisition and self-esteem aggrandizement. Further characteristic of narcissists is their game-playing love style: Narcissists pay attention to and flirt with alternative partners, engage in deceptive behavior, and are more susceptible to infidelity (Buss & Shackelford, 1997; Campbell & Foster, 2002; Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002). They use this love style to enhance their power and autonomy. Narcissists can thus feel good about themselves as romantic partners. There are many partners for the picking, given how great they are, and they pursue multiple partners at once to confirm their superiority.

Preempting Threat So as Not to Endanger Self-Enhancement In addition to actively creating opportunities for self-enhancement, narcissists also engage in behaviors targeted to prevent potential threats from occurring. In a reaction time experiment, we (Horvath & Morf, 2009) showed that narcissists are hypervigilant and actively scan for such possibilities. In particular, they showed activation of worthlessness-related words after

404   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS being subliminally primed with “failure” relative to neutral primes, at least when processing time was too short for correction processes to kick in. When processing time was longer, the association between the self-threatening prime and worthlessness reversed, indicating that narcissists engaged in quick and automatic inhibition. Narcissists also circumvent threat at the behavioral level. In a situation in which insufficient competence would likely be detected by an expert assessor, narcissistic men (in contrast to nonnarcissistic men and also women regardless of narcissism level) increased the positivity of their self-presentations (Morf, Davidov, & Ansara, 2010). This pattern was mediated by self-promotion: Narcissistic men reported that they intended to impress the expert in the interaction; they also had higher performance expectations and believed that they would attain them—in short, they were going to meet the threat head-on and prevent it. Alternatively, one can deal with a potential negative outcome by altering its meaning or implications. In a study by Rhodewalt, Tragakis, and Finnerty (2006), narcissistic men self-handicapped by choosing to listen to distracting music while completing an intelligence test. By so doing, they created a situation in which subsequent failure could be discounted as not being due to low ability. Narcissists are also known for their low commitment toward their romantic partners (Campbell & Foster, 2002; Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002) and their lack of interest in emotional intimacy (Campbell, 1999). This lack of emotional closeness may be a way of dealing with potential threat. By not getting too emotionally engaged in a romantic relationship, narcissists avoid the risk of being rejected and hurt. All considered, it seems that, although there are instances of narcissistic behavior aimed at preventing threat, such behavior is far outweighed by narcissists’ efforts to proactively shape their environments so as to create opportunities to showcase their grandiosity and superiority. This is consistent with narcissists’ stronger inclination toward an approach rather than an avoidance orientation (Foster, Misra, & Reidy, 2009; Foster & Trimm, 2008). They seem to care more about reaching desirable outcomes than sidestepping feared ones. We turn next to narcissists’ self-enhancement tactics applied to exploit positive and avert negative implications after an event has taken place.

Capitalizing on Opportunities for Self-Enhancement Positive events offer an ideal opportunity for narcissists to self-aggrandize. A particularly favored strategy narcissists use to exploit positive outcomes is their attributional style. When asked to make attributions for hypothetical positive outcomes (Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995) or for task success (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998), narcissists ascribe positive outcomes to themselves; that is, they make internal, stable, and global attributions. They have been shown to do so even when outcomes are noncontingent and they should feel uncertain about their contributions. They also seem oblivious to the fact that this attributional style will backfire in subsequent failure (Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998). Furthermore, in a group task, they ascribe responsibility for success to themselves, even if it means that thereby they devalue their partners’ accomplishments (Campbell et al., 2000). In addition, after receiving positive performance feedback, narcissists (compared with nonnarcissists) view the appraisal process as more diagnostic and the evaluator as more competent (Kernis & Sun, 1994). This increases feedback credibility, implying that their excellent



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performances were well founded. Narcissists also brag about their physical features and generally blow up their achievements, academic and otherwise (Buss & Chiodo, 1991; Paulhus, 1998). They also amass material goods and buy flashy clothes and other ostentatious products that they can put on show and use to make an impression (Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2010; Cisek, Hart, & Sedikides, 2008; Vazire, Naumann, Rentfrow, & Gosling, 2008).

Dealing with Threats to Self-Enhancement When a threat has actually occurred, narcissists use wide-ranging tactics to lessen its significance, change its implications, or attack the threatening agent. First, although Rhodewalt and Morf (1995, 1998) did not find evidence for more external attributions among narcissists than nonnarcissists for negative events, there is other evidence that narcissists discount negative outcomes. For example, they blame their partners for failure on a group task (Campbell et al., 2000) and deny the credibility of negative performance feedback by judging it as stemming from an incompetent evaluator (Kernis & Sun, 1994). Evidence for self-enhancement in the case of failure also was shown by Campbell, Goodie, and Foster (2004) in a betting task. Narcissists evaluated their performance to be higher, even after having been faced with an objectively poorer outcome, and they continued to do so despite visibly losing points. They were so overconfident that they even expected better performance in the future despite this initial failure. Narcissists also seem to employ self-enhancing strategies when confronted with potential threats in romantic relationships. When asked to generate a list of possible reasons for why their romantic partners might not be committed, they had great difficulties in producing such reasons (Foster & Campbell, 2005). The authors interpreted this as a strategy for resisting self-threat. An alternative interpretation is that, due to their self-perceived greatness, noncommitment from their partners is unthinkable. Reactive self-enhancement after a selfthreat has also been observed in narcissistic distortions of autobiographical memory. After having had a telephone interview with an ostensible potential dating partner, male narcissists who learned that they had been rejected by an attractive woman aggrandized the positivity of their past romantic experiences compared with an earlier report (Rhodewalt & Eddings, 2002). Here, too, narcissists reacted to threats by boosting selective recall of, or perhaps fabricating, their romantic encounters. When given the opportunity to appraise an outperforming (and thus threatening) other, narcissists judge the other’s personality more negatively than do nonnarcissists (Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993; South, Oltmanns, & Turkheimer, 2003). Through this devaluation, they make the other a less threatening comparison target. Interestingly, narcissists were shown to do this even if they expected to deliver the feedback face-to-face. Moreover, the otherderogation seems to be specifically aimed at dealing with the threat, as it did not extend to another, nonthreatening target also present in the situation. Thus it likely is not a general tendency employed indiscriminately against others. A final and particularly troublesome narcissistic characteristic is aggression in response to self-threat. Narcissists react aggressively toward negative evaluators (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Bushman et al., 2009) and following social rejection (Twenge & Campbell, 2003). In a subliminal priming experiment, Morf, Horvath, and Zimmermann (2010) showed that narcissistic aggression is activated by worthlessness. Narcissistic men reacted faster toward

406   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS aggressive target stimuli after having been subliminally exposed to a worthlessness-related prime, whereas less narcissistic participants inhibited aggression after worthlessness primes. In sum, narcissists are very talented in the defusion of threatening events and use a variety of strategies to do so, from denial to aggression. They also capitalize on opportunities by augmenting the favorability of any positive features (e.g., showing off possessions, bragging about famous acquaintances), although this aspect has been less studied—perhaps because it is rather obvious and trivial.

Weighing the Evidence for Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection The reviewed evidence leaves no doubt about the self-enhancing nature of narcissists’ selfconstruction. They actively and reactively exploit opportunities as well as threats to promote their grandiose self and to affirm their superiority. But, clearly, narcissists also seem to have to protect their cherished self-views from worthlessness (Hepper et al., 2010). So what role does self-protection play, and what is its relation to self-enhancement in narcissistic selfregulation? The two forms of self-regulation are virtually impossible to disentangle, because both entail striving to preserve one’s level of functioning. Self-enhancement implies more than just maintenance, however; it also involves moving toward one’s ideal self, whereas selfprotection is a form of damage control (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009) in the case of a possible or real threat to the self-system. Thus self-enhancement can be said to be motivated primarily by approaching one’s ideals and can be pursued by promoting self-presentations and exaggeration of one’s strengths. Self-protection, on the other hand, is motivated more by avoiding feared implications about the self, and it can be pursued either through actively minimizing one’s shortcomings or by avoidance and withdrawal. To complicate matters further, selfprotection can also be achieved through self-enhancement efforts. In the end, therefore, it is often hard to infer the underlying motive from the observed behavioral strategy, as the same behavior may serve diverse motives. Nevertheless, we surmise that for narcissists the bulk of the evidence emphasizes selfenhancement and suggests that their self-enhancement motive is more or less chronically active. Even in the presence of a self-threat, when they can be assumed to be motivated to selfprotect, they often tend to do so through self-enhancement strategies. Consider, for example, the study described earlier in which, even though the likelihood of discovery of an ability deficit was high, narcissistic men magnified the positivity of their self-presentations instead of prudently and self-protectively minimizing them (Morf, Davidov, & Ansara, 2010). Similarly, despite their obviously failing at a task due to poor decisions, narcissists maintained their high expectation levels and continued to bet more points or kept on picking the riskier deck rather than becoming more cautious (Campbell et al., 2004; Lakey, Rose, Campbell, & Goodie, 2008). Narcissists thus routinely push the proverbial envelope trying to get more and will do so even when in risky situations. They are much more interested in amassing evidence for their superiority than they are concerned about avoiding feared outcomes. This is consistent with the finding that narcissists are sensitive and strongly motivated by rewards but low on avoidance motivation (Foster & Trimm, 2008). Thus, even when self-protection may be part of the goal, if self-enhancement is simultaneously possible, this will be in the foreground (for one notable exception, see Rhodewalt et al., 2006). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, narcissists respond aggressively to criticism and neg-



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ative evaluation (Bushman et al., 2009; Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993). Thus, when dealing with threat—a situation in which presumably the self-protection motive is at least in part activated—their strategic behavior is assertive, consisting of offense and direct attack, not passivity, avoidance, or withdrawal. There is an exception to this rule: Namely the finding that initial activation of worthlessness in response to implicit failure cues is followed by rapid inhibition in narcissists’ information-processing system (Horvath & Morf, 2009). However, in this study that was the only available response option. It could very well be that narcissists would simultaneously have activated a positive self-presentation if they could have, which would subsequently have reduced the need for inhibition. We suspect that, for narcissists, inhibition, withdrawal, or other forms of avoidance rarely occur in isolation but rather in combination with self-enhancement, allowing narcissists to latch on to something positive and thus buttress their grandiosity. This possibility remains to be empirically verified, however. In sum, although there may be instances of self-protection, these are often trumped or accompanied by self-enhancement. Thus the general tenet that “bad is stronger than good”— connoting that negative feedback has more impact than good or that self-protection is more pressing than self-advancement (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001)—does not seem to hold true for narcissists. Narcissists’ central priority is the relentless pursuit of ever more superior self-definitions, and they are much less concerned about avoiding negative ones.

Benefits and Costs of Narcissistic Self-Enhancement In this section we examine the concrete consequences of narcissists’ chronic self-inflation in different domains (performance, health, relationships) and assess the ensuing trade-offs for themselves and others. We also discuss narcissistic aggression as a particularly problematic self-enhancement strategy.

Achievement, Performance, and Decision Making Despite narcissists’ high estimations of themselves, their optimistic beliefs about their ability and prospects for success are often unrealistic. For example, they do not differ from nonnarcissists in IQ levels (Gabriel et al., 1994), knowledge (Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003), or academic performance (Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998). Further, despite their claims to the contrary, there were no objective differences in their contributions to a group task (John & Robins, 1994), nor in performance outcomes at the individual or group levels (Brunell et al., 2008). However, depending on the psychological situation, narcissists may either outperform or underperform their nonnarcissistic counterparts. When tasks are framed to be about performance in important domains, narcissists are highly motivated, persistent, and convinced that they will outperform others even in the face of setbacks (Wallace, Ready, & Weitenhagen, 2009). Indeed, in studies by Wallace and Baumeister (2002), they were more successful than nonnarcissists in skill- and effort-based tasks, but only when these tasks were highly challenging and therefore offered them the possibility to show off superior ability. Narcissists also performed better at the individual level at commons-dilemma tasks (Campbell,

408   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS Bush, Brunell, & Shelton, 2005), because they neglected the community’s interests. However, this came at the cost of group-level performance, as the groups with more narcissistic members performed worse (Campbell et al., 2005). Even narcissists’ persistence in the face of self-enhancement opportunities, which on the surface appears adaptive, can be a doubleedged sword. For example, narcissists persisted inordinately long on impossible tasks that are framed as intelligence tests, if they had no alternate means of demonstrating their genius (Wallace et al., 2009). Narcissists’ overconfidence can also cause poor decision making. In a study by Campbell and colleagues (2004, Study 2), narcissists miscalibrated the odds and placed bad bets. They accepted too many bets on their own answers to knowledge questions, because they overestimated the likelihood of having answered them correctly. As a result, they lost significantly more points than nonnarcissists. In other words, narcissists took too much risk relative to their actual ability. In addition, narcissists seem not to learn from their failures; if anything, they maintain their unrealistically positive expectations (Campbell et al., 2004, Study 3). These deficits in judgment and decision making have also been linked to gambling-related pathology (Lakey et al., 2008) and compulsive buying (Rose, 2007). In addition to individual-level outcomes, narcissists’ performances can have an impact on those around them. Herein it is important to differentiate between close others (e.g., family members, friends) and competitors. The latter could potentially benefit from poor narcissistic performances that result from myopic decisions and an inability to learn from failures; after all, the narcissist’s losses are someone else’s gains. On the other hand, close others are more likely to have to pay for poor narcissistic performance, especially when narcissists risk common resources (Campbell, Brunell, & Finkel, 2006). This predicament pertains not only to close relationships with narcissists but also to companies managed by narcissistic leaders (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). By and large, then, performance outcomes seem to be unrelated to narcissism. In some situational constellations, narcissists outperform nonnarcissists (i.e., when they are more motivated and confident and intensify their efforts in competitive situations). But their performances can also be poorer and costly for them, as when they fail to learn from their own mistakes.

Psychological Health The effect of self-enhancement on psychological health has been a hotly debated issue (Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007). Although initially biased self-perceptions had been interpreted as indicators of poor mental health (Johada, 1958), Taylor and Brown (1988) later showed that psychologically healthy persons have positive illusions about themselves. They proposed that biased self-perceptions help to maintain and promote self-efficacy, self-esteem, and optimism and also found that they buffer stress (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003a). Thus a little self-enhancement seems to have positive effects on psychological health. But does the same hold true for the rather exaggerated self-enhancement patterns narcissists exhibit? Recent research has found a linear connection between general self-enhancement and mental health (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003b)—suggesting that the protective effect should also apply to narcissists. Indeed, nonpathological narcissism appears to be beneficially related to psychological health. Narcissism consistently correlates posi-



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tively with explicit self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2008), and narcissists’ self-enhancement efforts preserve their self-esteem (Rhodewalt & Eddings, 2002). Narcissistic self-enhancement also fosters optimism (Hickman, Watson, & Morris, 1996) and, in particular, confidence and positive performance expectancies (e.g., Campbell et al., 2004), which can have healthprotecting implications. Moreover, narcissism also was found to be related to various indicators of happiness and life satisfaction (Rose, 2002) and to frequent positive affect (Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998). In addition, narcissism is commonly inversely associated with daily sadness, anxiety, depression, and loneliness and positively related to subjective well-being (Raskin & Novacek, 1989; Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). The studies by Sedikides and colleagues suggest, however, that these findings might need to be qualified, as the relation between narcissism and various psychological health indicators was fully mediated by self-esteem. Narcissists thus benefit from their higher self-esteem. On the other hand, it may be precisely because of their self-enhancement tendencies that narcissists have high self-esteem in the first place, as their interest in self-esteem shapes their behaviors and colors their interpretations thereof (Rose & Campbell, 2004). Time course also may qualify these all-out positive effects. Self-enhancement was shown to be positively related to well-being and self-esteem in the short run, but this reversed in the long run to gradually predict a decline (Robins & Beer, 2001)—although there is some preliminary indication that this problem may not hold for narcissists (Zuckerman & O’Loughlin, 2009). A final qualifier pertains to the pathological form of narcissism, which has been shown to be related to psychological distress, both concurrently and prospectively (Miller, Campbell, & Pilkonis, 2007). These links were mediated by current impairment (e.g., inability to function in romantic relationships or at work) and thus may be indicative of a breakdown of the narcissistic self-enhancement system. Perhaps the long-term costs of self-inflation include undermining the building of long-term close relationships (as discussed in the following section) and hence the loss of the support for mental and physical health that such relationships can provide. In sum, in contrast to the overall null association between narcissistic self-enhancement and performance, there seem to be clearer benefits at the level of psychological health. Narcissists’ self-enhancement shields their confidence and self-esteem and thus helps neutralize self-threats. These efforts further contribute to optimism and overall happiness and wellbeing—in short, it “feels good” to be a narcissist (Rose & Campbell, 2004). The verdict is still out on whether the health benefits hold up over time (Robins & Beer, 2001; Zuckerman & O’Loughlin, 2009). When self-enhancement efforts collapse (e.g., due to loss of important relationships), even pathological depression might result (Miller & Campbell, 2008).

Interpersonal Relationships Personal Relationships How is narcissistic self-enhancement perceived by others? And how successful is this selfenhancement from their own and their partners’ perspectives? On first acquaintance, narcissists are liked by others. For example, when rated by another person on the basis of a short video clip, narcissists were seen as more likable than nonnarcissists (Oltmanns, Friedman, Fiedler, & Turkheimer, 2004). Likewise, narcissists made good first impressions on others in a new group—they were regarded as intelligent, entertaining, and confident. However, over

410   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS time the positive attraction faded away, and, in the end, narcissists were evaluated as arrogant, bragging, and hostile (Paulhus, 1998). Narcissists use even their romantic relationships as an arena for inflating and maintaining a positive self-concept. As described earlier, they prefer admiring and trophy partners (Campbell, 1999) and display a game-playing love style (Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002). This style is problematic, because it keeps narcissists from developing emotional closeness and intimacy, prevents them from increasing their commitments in their current relationships (Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002), and may contribute to more infidelity (Buss & Shackelford, 1997). Narcissists also self-report less accommodation (i.e., constructive responding) when they perceive their partners to have behaved badly (Campbell & Foster, 2002). After transgressions, they are less forgiving (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004) and more vengeful (Brown, 2004). Hence narcissists seem to risk their relationships in direct trade-offs for enhancing themselves. There is some tentative evidence from the partner perspective that an intimate relationship with a narcissist may offer the experience of excitement and satisfaction in early stages (Foster, Shrira, & Campbell, 2003, as cited in Campbell et al., 2006). Unfortunately though, even these benefits were not long-lasting, as satisfaction ratings dropped dramatically over time, a drop accounted for by lack of emotional intimacy, game playing, and overcontrolling behavior from the narcissist. Thus the positive experiences at the beginning of a relationship with a narcissist might fade when his or her partner penetrates the deceptive self-presentations and recognizes the true narcissistic personality (Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002). As a result, one would expect decreasing relationship satisfaction and well-being of the partner over the course of a relationship, culminating in a decision to break it up. However, to our knowledge, the only study on relationship satisfaction in a longer term married sample surprisingly found that neither satisfaction nor subjective well-being was necessarily negatively influenced by a narcissistic partner (Sedikides et al., 2004). Thus, in stable relationships, at least some narcissists might have learned to adapt and moderate their self-enhancement. For example, Foster (2008) reported that, when things are going well, narcissists’ relationship dysfunctions disappear: When they are satisfied with their relationships, they stop looking for alternatives, invest more in the relationships, and are as committed as nonnarcissists. On the other hand, our guess is that the duration of these relationships may mainly depend on the compensatory and accommodating responses of nonnarcissistic partners. To recapitulate, narcissists view their relationships in terms of what benefits they will receive from them, with apparently comparatively little concern for the needs and well-being of their partners. Such attitudes and behaviors are unlikely to be conducive to longevity or positivity of intimate relationships. Nevertheless, there is some indication that relationships with narcissists have some positive effects, especially in the short run. Further, narcissists do enter and maintain long-term relationships, but, due to a scarcity of research, it is not clear what the quality of these relationships is. Further research is needed on when and why people remain in an intimate relationship with a narcissist, despite all their negative behaviors.

Leadership Another important interpersonal arena is leadership behavior (Campbell & Campbell, 2009). Leadership represents power, and power is of central interest to narcissists, because it offers



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the possibility to display their superiority (Rose & Campbell, 2004). Thus self-enhancement can be expected during the selection of a leader and in the evaluation of leader performance. In a study by Brunell et al. (2008), narcissists were rated as good leaders by the other members of small, new (and thus leaderless) groups, as well as by expert observers. Narcissists seem to be capable of exploiting the initial diffusion of responsibility in new leaderless groups to dazzle the others with their positive self-presentations and to take charge. However, although self-enhancement may be beneficial to taking over leadership, it is probably not related to performance as a leader. Consider the studies discussed earlier indicating poor decision making due to miscalibration of the likelihood of success (Campbell et al., 2004) or the mismanagement of common goods as a result of an egoistic focus on personal gain (Campbell et al., 2005). Furthermore, the congruence between self-ratings and other ratings of leadership performance vanished when their immediate supervisors rated the leadership quality of narcissists (Judge, LePine, & Rich, 2006). Narcissism in CEOs has also been shown to be related to volatility in performance, indicating that they were taking big risks that sometimes paid off and other times crashed (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Such economic instability is problematic, as it decreases corporate value. The upshot is that narcissism may be beneficial in leadership tasks in which success is contingent on the extent to which the leader or agent exudes charisma, confidence, and belief in the product (e.g., contract negotiations, sales of luxury products). Also, to the extent that narcissists are good visionaries, they should do well in transformational leadership roles that require “big” actions and visible changes (Maccoby, 2000). On the other hand, difficult contract negotiations that are dependent on empathy and perspective taking are likely to be harmed by narcissistic leaders. Accordingly, having a narcissist in one’s group or as a leader can be beneficial, as well as costly. So long as the interests of the company or country are congruent with narcissists’ selfpromotion goals, they will uncompromisingly be pursued, and collaborators or followers might be able to go along for the ride while basking in reflected glory (Post, 1986). However, when narcissists exploit their positions to assert power and dominance but ignore broader and common goals, their leadership will turn costly in the long run (Campbell et al., 2006). It is again their risky and myopic decisions based on their exaggerated self-conceptions of ability and control that can have the most negative consequences for their coworkers or community, especially in times when conservative leadership would be more appropriate (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006).

Aggression and Other Antisocial Behaviors A most pernicious outcome of narcissists’ concerns with self-enhancement is their aggressive and otherwise deviant behavior, which may be enacted when they perceive a self-threat. Narcissists are likely to overperceive discrepancies between self- and others’ appraisals, given their sky-high opinions of themselves. Moreover, their sense of entitlement chronically makes them feel that they are owed and deserve more than they are getting. Correspondingly, narcissists readily perceive themselves to be the victims of interpersonal transgressions (McCullough, Emmons, Kilpatrick, & Mooney, 2003). Such dynamics may underlie the deviant and counterproductive behaviors by narcissists that sometimes have been observed in the workplace. For example, Penney and Spector (2002) found narcissism to be related to frequently stealing from employers, or purposely

412   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS doing one’s work incorrectly, especially when work impediments were high (e.g., poor equipment, interruptions, deficient supervisors). This connection was mediated by anger, suggesting that these destructive behaviors had likely been triggered by perceived self-threats. Narcissism also predicts aggression in situations involving various forms of provocation, ranging from critical or failure feedback to social rejection or restrictions of autonomy (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Bushman et al., 2009; Jones & Paulhus, 2010; Reidy, Zeichner, Foster, & Martinez, 2008). Here narcissistic aggression typically is target oriented (directed against the source of threat), although there also is some tentative evidence that narcissists may at times engage in displaced aggression toward an innocent bystander (Twenge & Campbell, 2003). In sum, aggression might have value for narcissists because it allows an immediate compensation for self-threat and the maintenance of their grandiose self-image. On the other hand, the strategy is costly—not only to its targets, who risk being victims of aggression (Bushman, Bonacci, van Dijk, & Baumeister, 2003), but even to narcissists themselves, as they risk prosecution and incarceration. Indeed, inmate violent offenders have been found to have higher levels of narcissism than nonoffenders (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998).

Inherent Trade-Offs To conclude: The outcomes of narcissistic self-enhancement in part depend on the domain. Although self-enhancement seems to have some advantages for psychological health (although it is mediated by high self-esteem), the pros and cons for performance and relationships are more balanced. Aggression, on the other hand, is squarely on the costly side of the equation. Moreover, although self-enhancement is beneficial in the short term, in the long term the costs may dominate. In the short term, narcissists are successful, healthy, and liked by others, but that may not be so in the long term (Campbell & Campbell, 2009). Finally, it is obviously important to differentiate between the perspectives of the narcissist him- or herself and of those around him or her. The possible benefits of being relationally involved with a narcissist seem to be limited and dominated by the costs. One may enjoy the excitement of a relationship in the fast lane, but in the end one may go down when the driver overstrains the engine. Furthermore, the driver will use the passengers to maintain his or her grandiosity. In short, we conclude that the empirical findings give no reason either to curse or to glorify narcissistic self-enhancement. We next turn to a broader assessment of the degree to which these self-enhancement strategies pay off for narcissists’ self-construction.

Are Narcissists Successful in Their Self-Construction Efforts? High-Functioning Narcissists How successful are narcissists at implementing self-enhancement in the pursuit of their selfgoals? The preceding review showed that at the intrapersonal level, it may be beneficial. Self-enhancement helps sustain positive affect, expectations, self-esteem, and higher levels of well-being, at least in the short run—thus shielding narcissists from temporary vulnerability. Indeed, we suspect that a majority of “normal” narcissists may regulate their vulnerability so well that for all practical purposes it becomes virtually nonexistent. It may be dealt with and neutralized so automatically that the vulnerability never becomes directly visible or actually



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experienced by the narcissist on the explicit level, although it might be present on the implicit level (Bosson et al., 2008; Gregg & Sedikides, 2010). Moreover, this vulnerability can be activated as our priming studies have shown, through failure or worthlessness cues. Narcissists quickly deflect this vulnerability, though, either through an inhibition process (Horvath & Morf, 2009) or through “transformation” into aggression (Morf, Horvath, & Zimmerman, 2010). Together with their more overt strategies (e.g., external attributions, selective focus on positive outcomes), this makes them highly resilient to any negative implications for the self. In that sense, the narcissistic system developed to regulate this potential vulnerability, and in well-functioning individuals it does so with much success. The implications at the interpersonal level are more complicated. The answer to the question as to what degree narcissists are able to create the desired impressions of superiority and specialness seems to be “somewhat.” As discussed previously, apparently narcissists’ self-assured behavior earns them respect in initial encounters but meets with disapproval later (Brunell et al., 2008; Oltmanns et al., 2004; Paulhus, 1998). Apparently, on accumulation, their self-enhancement attempts surpass the believable and become wearing, such that they begin to undermine narcissists’ efforts at affirming their self. Moreover, narcissistic self-enhancement could pay off or backfire depending on whether the behavior and its outcomes are supported by features of the situation—impressing some audiences in some situations yet antagonizing them in other circumstances (i.e., when their self-enhancement oversteps what is acceptable within the particular context; cf. Sedikides & Strube, 1997). When their self-enhancement is blatant and too obvious, it might become problematic. Primarily, narcissists will not generate the desired responses from others, but we suspect in addition that they themselves at some level may be aware of their “manipulations” such that any responses they generate are no longer believable even to themselves. On the other hand, narcissists in general may be able to get away with “more.” That is, they may be able to brag or self-enhance more than others, because they are “expert” and well practiced at implementing these strategies. Even in the interpersonal realm, we suspect that their self-construction efforts do not suffer greatly, even though they may hurt those with whom they closely interact. Narcissists are too adept at placing blame on others, and if all else fails, they move on to another relationship (Campbell, 2005), a transition that seems to come easily to them and can be taken as further reconfirmation of their superiority. In the same way, other negative consequences of self-enhancement, such as suffering from risk taking and failing to learn from their own mistakes, similarly may leave narcissists cold given that all that matters to them is the power and glory of the moment, which they are able to re-create time and again. Thus, although the effectiveness of their self-enhancement also depends on features of the situation, so long as their strategies work a good deal of the time and do not misfire too often, narcissists are reinforced to keep using them. And in the end, as others have suggested (Rose & Campbell, 2004), this may leave narcissists not all that vulnerable if it turns out that they are adept at employing these strategies. We think that, at least for the successful self-enhancer, even the hotly debated question of whether narcissists have chronic low implicit self-esteem (Gregg & Sedikides, 2010) or not (Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, & Kernis, 2007) may become irrelevant, because it seems not to affect their functioning. Sedikides and Gregg (2001) quite aptly make reference to “high-functioning autistics,” as narcissists unswervingly carry on with self-enhancement

414   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS seemingly unaware of how it is being received by others. Nevertheless, the narcissist’s Teflonlike self that deflects anything negative likely comes with a drawback: In order to be safe, they always wear their armor to protect themselves from the bad entering; but the good cannot entirely enter or “stick,” either. This would explain why narcissists remain continually online dependent on self-affirming feedback despite their adroitness at generating it. Moreover, as we have seen, their strategies do misfire at times, not yielding the desired outcome or perhaps even bringing about the feared outcome they are keen on preventing or deflecting. This situation further contributes to making the need to generate self-affirming feedback a never-ending process. In conclusion, whether self-regulatory strategies are adaptive or maladaptive will depend on the degree of match or mismatch between the individual’s strategies for pursuing his or her core self-goals and situational demands and affordances (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Therefore, it makes little sense to ask the adaptivity question at a global level, as it is contextdependent. Ultimately, how adaptive the defenses turn out to be will depend on how adept narcissists are at “constructing their niches” (Tesser, 2001), that is, at selecting and shaping environments to be supportive of their self-goals.

Low-Functioning Narcissists Vulnerable Narcissists Not all narcissists are successful self-enhancers. In addition to grandiose narcissists, many of whom may be relatively high functioning, there is growing evidence for a second subtype, termed vulnerable or covert narcissism, which is associated with more impairment. Like grandiose narcissists, vulnerable narcissists also have grandiose fantasies about themselves (Cooper & Ronningstam, 1992), feel entitled, and are exploitative toward others (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003). We therefore assume that both subtypes are pursuing the same goal of affirming their superiority. But there are also important differences relevant to the use and success of self-enhancement. Grandiose narcissists’ high approach motivation promotes high explicit self-esteem (Foster & Trimm, 2008), which, in turn, increases their subjective wellbeing (Rose, 2002). They report being securely attached (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003), and their self-esteem is based on achievement and competition but is not contingent on others’ views of them (Zeigler-Hill, Clark, & Pickard, 2008). This allows them, in essence, to selfenhance at will. In contrast, vulnerable narcissists are avoidance motivated, which partially explains their low explicit self-esteem (Foster & Trimm, 2008) and which, in turn, mediates their low subjective well-being (Rose, 2002). Furthermore, their attachment style is avoidant and anxious (Smolewska & Dion, 2005), and their self-esteem is highly contingent—including depending on feedback from others (Zeigler-Hill et al., 2008)—and unstable (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003). Being dependent on others might further strengthen their avoidance motivation and thus hinder the use of self-enhancement, at least in public. Instead, they are socially withdrawn, distant, and cold (Cooper, 1998). Consequently, they have trouble converting their fantasies about being grandiose into reality. Vulnerable narcissists experience internal conflict over their grandiose expectations and try to disavow them. They do not perceive themselves as dispositionally grandiose at the explicit level (Rose, 2002). They experience shame and disappointment from their unmet entitled expectations (Bosson & Prewitt-Freilino, 2007) and, after negative feedback, engage



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in rumination (Atlas & Them, 2008). As a consequence of their insecurity, they might be unable to actively defend their self-goals (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003). However, they also experience pride after success (Bosson & Prewitt-Freilino, 2007), which might result in extreme fluctuation between these positive and negative self-conscious emotions. That fluctuation is amplified through a maladaptive attribution style, namely, the internal and stable attribution of both success and failure. As a result, vulnerable narcissists experience hubristic (as opposed to authentic) pride after success and shame (as opposed to guilt) after failure. Hence vulnerable narcissists do engage in reactive self-enhancement after success by attributing it to innate ability (although they will not brag in public), but they do not defend their superiority against self-threatening events. A second form of self-enhancement that vulnerable narcissists have been shown to use is “self-sacrificing self-enhancement” (Pincus et al., 2009). They self-present as being concerned with others, even with the semblance of empathy (Cooper, 1998). Caring for and helping others who depend on them, while sacrificing their own needs, can make them feel good and important and thus serves as a means of self-esteem enhancement. In contrast to other forms of public self-enhancement, self-sacrificing may be less likely to backfire because of its social acceptability. It, too, however, is likely to fail when it becomes identified for its egoistic motive. Finally, whereas grandiose narcissists aggress against others to protect or promote their superiority, vulnerable narcissists aggress against others as well as themselves (Pincus et al., 2009). We assume, therefore, that for vulnerable narcissists aggression is less instrumental and represents more an “acting out” in frustration due to the recurring experience of inferiority and shame. In short, although both narcissistic subtypes have the goal to affirm their grandiosity, only grandiose narcissists ultimately succeed in this endeavor. In contrast, vulnerable narcissists are too insecure to explicitly command the attention and approval they yearn for and solely fantasize about it instead; they remain constantly confronted with shame experiences.

Pathological Narcissism A group with even more severely failed self-enhancement consists of those narcissists considered “pathological,” that is, those with a diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). In contrast to high-functioning narcissists, pathological narcissists are psychologically distressed (having depression and anxiety) and more severely so than are vulnerable narcissists. This experienced distress seems to be the outgrowth of perceived functional impairments in social and occupational domains. They report being unable to work, having no friends, and having no or a chaotic history of romantic relationships (Miller et al., 2007). The fact that pathological narcissists recognize and suffer from these impairments indicates a complete breakdown of the narcissistic self-system, likely as a result of their failed self-enhancement efforts. Thus, whereas vulnerable narcissists still can command at least some forms of selfenhancement, even if restricted and with more limited success than grandiose narcissists, those with NPD appear to lack, or to have lost, the ability entirely. This failure may be the result of more serious distortions, of severely deficient social skills, or of the experience of repeated failures and setbacks in life. Although clinical theories describe variations of expression in pathological narcissism (Cain, Pincus, & Ansell, 2008; Miller, Gaughan, Pryor, Kamen, & Campbell, 2009), we suspect that the grandiose form may be more resistant to

416   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS becoming pathological, because these narcissists are generally more highly functioning and seem to experience little psychological distress. Our take is that this is due to their more successful implementation of self-enhancement strategies. Vulnerable narcissists, on the other hand, due to their avoidance and fear of social rejection, are severely curtailed in their ability to engage in self-enhancement and thus in making their grandiose self real. Accordingly, this form of narcissism may be more likely to show up in clinical practice, although they might be often misclassified as having avoidant personality disorder, because their narcissistic entitlement is not as obvious as their avoidant behavior (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003). Nevertheless, either subtype may experience breakdown, though they will manifest different forms of impairment. In sum, in trying to regulate a potential vulnerability, self-enhancement thus helps build a fairly robust self-system; or, in other words, low self-enhancement abilities contribute to a rather fragile narcissistic self-system. We now return our focus to the grandiose subtype of narcissism.

Malleability of Self-Enhancement: Can They Change? To what degree is narcissistic self-enhancement discriminative versus rigid, and to what degree can it be influenced or altered? There is no doubt that self-enhancement is a robust and pervasive feature of narcissism (e.g., Campbell & Foster, 2007; John & Robins, 1994; Paulhus et al., 2003). Moreover, narcissists’ quest for self-advancement seems to be insatiable; Baumeister and Vohs (2001) draw parallels to drug addiction, and Campbell and Green (2007) invoke the metaphor of a hurricane that grows and grows until it runs into land and falls apart. Such images seem to imply that narcissistic self-enhancement is inflexible, applied habitually and blindly, and makes no consideration of situational factors. However, the evidence suggests that narcissists are not entirely indiscriminate in their self-enhancing responses but, rather, that these are often moderated by contextual constraints and affordances. This is particularly true in nonthreatening situations that afford opportunities to selfaffirm superiority. Rhodewalt and Eddings (2002), for example, found that men high in narcissism made a clear distinction between threat and opportunity and strategically selfpresented in response to each accordingly. When being rejected by a potential dating partner, they embellished their past dating histories to repair self-esteem, but they also became more humble in response to being chosen. They reported having had fewer serious relationships and more difficulties in meeting women than in their original accounts. Thus they ceased to self-enhance when it was no longer needed and did not promise any further gain—showing considerable flexibility and discriminative behavior. Furthermore, although narcissists do exploit performance situations and interpersonal competition to demonstrate their superiority (Morf et al., 2000; Wallace & Baumeister, 2002), they also temper their task persistence depending on self-enhancement alternatives (Wallace et al., 2009). They persisted longer at an unsolvable test when no other routes for proving intelligence were provided but cut their losses faster and switched to an alternate test of the same ability when available. Hence narcissists are highly attuned to opportunities, or lack thereof, for pursuing their self-goals and gravitate toward and exploit those situations that offer them best prospects to exhibit their specialness. They will not, however, similarly



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“put themselves out” in situations they perceive to entail reduced potential for demonstrating their worth. Their forte lies in seizing opportunities to shine and reaping maximal gain out of self-advancement. Are narcissists unmovable, then, in their efforts to prove their positive self-views in the face of threat? Evidence indicates that even these efforts are often moderated by context. For example, in a study by Horton and Sedikides (2009), narcissists reported higher self-esteem when they received negative feedback from a high-status evaluator compared with a lowstatus evaluator. This indicates that they self-enhanced more when the negative evaluation came from a high-status source and therefore represented a stronger self-threat. Furthermore, as Paulhus et al. (2003) showed, narcissists are sensitive to constraints. Although narcissists throughout overclaimed their knowledge, they also curtailed selfenhancement to the same degree as nonnarcissists when warned about the presence of foils (a form of accountability) in the test. Thus, although narcissists do tone down their selfenhancements in response to constraints, they do so beginning from a higher starting point and thus also in the end remain higher self-enhancers than nonnarcissists, giving the impression of inflexible self-enhancement. Nevertheless, there is reason to assume that narcissists are more rigid in their selfaggrandizement in response to threat, especially if the domain is important to them. Collins and Stukas (2008) found that narcissists dampened down their self-presentations when made accountable—but only if these did not concern agentic attributes on which narcissists’ selfesteem was highly contingent. Similarly, narcissists are also not particularly likely to reduce their efforts to impress others in situations in which external constraints impose modesty and propriety goals if these conflict with their desire to reaffirm their grandiose self, as, in contrast to nonnarcissists, social appropriateness is not a major goal of concern for them (e.g., Morf, Davidov, & Ansara, 2010). Further, as we saw in examples of decision making and betting behavior, narcissists seem to have the most difficulty making appropriate adjustments in situations in which they overestimate their potential gains (Foster, Shenesey, & Goff, 2009; Lakey et al., 2008). Taken together, the evidence shows that narcissists can be malleable. Nonetheless, even when narcissists adjust their self-enhancement, it is hard to evaluate whether they adjust it “enough” because of a frequent lack of objective outcomes (e.g., performance indicators, impact on others). Still, the fact that their self-enhancement is somewhat flexible leaves open the possibility of intervention in circumstances in which self-enhancement is to the narcissist’s detriment (e.g., in public settings; Oltmanns et al., 2004; Paulhus, 1998) or stands in the way of self-improvement (e.g., resistance to critical feedback; Kernis & Sun, 1994; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995). Surely such change will not come easily, because narcissists are not particularly motivated to change; they are convinced of their greatness (Rose & Campbell, 2004), and they are high on impulsivity (Vazire & Funder, 2006). Nevertheless, an initial success in this direction was obtained by Finkel and colleagues, who showed that the activation of communal concerns can ameliorate narcissists’ destructive lack of commitment in close relationships (Finkel, Campbell, Buffardi, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2009). Further identifying the conditions that might enable such changes remains an important challenge for the future. In general, it is likely more useful to attempt change via strengthening weak components (e.g., lack of focus on long-term goals) rather than taking on narcissists’ cherished self-enhancement strategies per se.

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Concluding Thoughts Self-enhancement is the core dynamic of narcissistic self-construction. Although narcissism is widely assumed to be a defensive trait developed to protect a fragile, vulnerable core, narcissists aggressively maximize opportunities to shine and self-affirm rather than timidly or avoidantly self-protect. Whereas they may be simultaneously motivated both to protect the self-system from threat and to expand their self-views, they tend to do so through assertive self-enhancement strategies, even when dealing with threats to the self. Consistent with their relentless pursuit of superiority, only winning matters; just maintaining the status quo is useless. Accordingly, they would prefer to take a risk, rather than leaving an opportunity unexploited or being more cautious and playing it safe. Viewed from their perspective, their core self-enhancement dynamics are highly functional, allowing them to accomplish their self-goals, at least in the moment. In this sense, they can be considered successful self-enhancers, as these efforts preserve their grandiose self-views and keep vulnerability at bay. The costs to others with whom they interact, however, may be high—in the leadership roles they eagerly seek, in the workplace, and in their close interpersonal relations. Although narcissistic dynamics and the gains and losses they incur are now reasonably understood for well-functioning narcissists, the unsuccessful versions—those for whom the self-enhancement dynamics are impaired or have collapsed—leave many questions unanswered. Particularly challenging is the question of how readily, by what means, and under what conditions the core dynamics of this personality type might be open to change.

Acknowledgments Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by Grant No. PP0011-116892 from the Swiss National Science Foundation. We wish to thank Walter Mischel, Constantine Sedikides, and Eva Schürch for thoughtful and constructive commentary on earlier drafts of this chapter.

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Chapter 20 Cultural Perspectives on Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Chi-yue Chiu Ching Wan Shirley Y. Y. Cheng Young-hoon Kim Yung-jui Yang

Consider the following three phenomena: •  Phenomenon 1: In a survey of over 21,000 people across 38 countries, Americans ranked themselves first in their understanding of nutritional information, yet only 38% of respondents in the United States had heard of the glycemic index (compared with 80% in Korea), and only 58% of them knew the distinction between saturated and nonsaturated fat (compared with 65% in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; A. C. Nielsen Company, 2005a). •  Phenomenon 2: In another telephone survey carried out by the same agency in the same year, more than 3,000 Chinese respondents in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou were asked about their attitudes and usage in relation to over-the-counter drugs. Eighty-six percent of the respondents claimed that doctors’ opinions were their major consideration when making decisions about over-the-counter drug purchases. However, only two-thirds of the respondents had bought such products in the past year (A. C. Nielsen Company, 2005b). •  Phenomenon 3: In 2000, a Starbucks coffee shop opened in the Forbidden City Museum in Beijing. In 2007, a complaint led by Rui Chenggang, a popular TV news anchor, claimed that the shop was trampling over Chinese culture. More than a million Chinese

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426   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS people signed a petition to remove the franchise from the museum. In his provocative essay, Rui (2007) made the following remarks: The Forbidden City is a symbol of China’s cultural heritage. Starbucks is a symbol of lower middle class culture in the west. We need to embrace the world, but we also need to preserve our cultural identity. There is a fine line between globalization and contamination. . . . But please don’t interpret this as an act of nationalism. It is just about we Chinese people respecting ourselves.

•  Incidents such as this occur in Europe as well. In 1993, the Parisian authorities refused permission to put a McDonald’s under the Eiffel Tower. In October 2008, France was in uproar over news that McDonald’s would open its 1,142nd French outlet in the underground entrance to the Louvre. These phenomena illustrate the major ideas that we discuss in this chapter. First, all three phenomena are related to enhancement or protection of one’s positive self-views. Although there could be alternative explanations, in the first two phenomena, the respondents negotiated positive self-evaluations by overestimating their knowledge or by exaggerating their willingness to display socially appropriate behaviors (following medical doctors’ guidance). In the third phenomenon, the Chinese and the French attempted to negotiate positive evaluations of their cultural selves by protecting the purity and integrity of their heritage culture. Enhancing or protecting the cultural self can lead to positive self-evaluations when the individuals connect the self to their culture: Through enhancing and protecting positive views of their culture, they indirectly enhance and protect positive views of the individual self. Thus there are at least two approaches that individuals can take to negotiate positive self-evaluations: (1) by enhancing or protecting the individual self and (2) by enhancing or protecting the cultural self. Second, irrespective of their cultural background, individuals from the East and the West take both approaches to positive self-evaluation negotiation. This suggests that both Easterners and Westerners find positive self-evaluations to be desirable and that the need for positive self-evaluation is universal. Third, culture plays a role in both approaches to positive self-evaluation negotiation. Nonetheless, the roles culture plays in these two modes of positive self-evaluation negotiation are different. When negotiating positive evaluations of the individual self, culture regulates or constrains the choice of self-enhancement and self-protection strategies. For instance, in the first phenomenon, North Americans enhanced their personal qualities more than did Asians and South Americans. In the second phenomenon, the Chinese respondents also wanted to present a positive self-view to the interviewers but expected that following the opinions of medical authorities would make a better impression on the interviewers. When people negotiate positive evaluations of the cultural self through self–culture connection, culture provides a conduit for negotiating positive views of the individual self by enhancing and protecting the purity and integrity of one’s culture. The primary objective of this chapter is to explicate these cultural dynamics.



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Social Negotiation of Positive Self-Evaluations Self-evaluation refers to the way a person views him- or herself. An individual’s self-view is socially negotiated (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). As Cooley (1902) put it: “The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s mind” (p. 184). In 1988, Taylor and Brown presented extensive evidence that self-aggrandizing selfperceptions “are highly prevalent in normal thought and predictive of criteria traditionally associated with mental health” (Taylor & Brown, 1994, p. 21). This evidence implies that having positive self-regard is a basic human motive essential for mental health. Subsequently, drawing on William James’s original formulation, Sedikides (2009; see also Alicke & Sedikides, 2009) proposed that the need for positive self-regard has two types of motivational manifestations: (1) self-enhancement, which is expressed as “strivings to maintain or raise one’s positive self-views,” and (2) self-protection, which is expressed as “strivings to shelter or defend one’s positive self-views” (p. 72). The focus of this chapter is on the negotiation of positive self-evaluations in cultural contexts. As illustrated in Table 20.1, individuals can negotiate positive self-evaluations by elevating or defending their positive self-views. Alternatively, individuals can negotiate positive self-evaluations by connecting themselves to their culture and raising or defending positive views of their culture. In the following sections, we discuss (1) individuals’ strategic choice of self-enhancement and self-protection behaviors in response to anticipated demands from the culture and (2) strategic pursuit of self-enhancement and self-protection goals vis-à-vis the self–culture connection and comparative evaluations of one’s culture (vs. other cultures).

Enhancement and Protection of the Individual Self One most widely contested issue in cultural psychology concerns the cultural relativity of the need for positive self-regard. Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama (1999) spurred the controversy when they made the following provocative claim: “The empirical literature provides scant evidence for a need for positive self-regard among Japanese. . . . The need for positive self-regard, as it is currently conceptualized, is not a universal, but rather is rooted in significant aspects of North American culture” (p.  766). Major support for this claim comes from research that has found less prevalent and more restrained expressions of self-

TABLE 20.1.  Strategies of Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection in Cultural Contexts Motivational manifestation Goal

Self-enhancement

Self-protection

Negotiate positive views of the individual self

Maintain or raise one’s positive self-views

Shelter or defend one’s positive self-views

Negotiate positive views of the cultural self

Maintain or raise positive views of one’s culture

Shelter or defend positive views of one’s culture

428   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS aggrandized self-views in Eastern than in Western cultural contexts (Heine et al., 1999; Heine & Hamamura, 2007). In the following subsections, we advocate a different perspective on the cross-cultural differences in self-enhancement and self-protection behaviors. Recall that an individual’s selfview is socially negotiated. People gain positive self-evaluations through projecting a culturally approved image of the self in the mind of their significant others. From this perspective, there are cross-cultural variations in self-enhancement and self-protection behaviors, but not necessarily because some cultural groups need positive self-evaluations and some do not. Rather, despite the universality of the need for positive self-evaluations, cultures differ in the ways that expressions of this need are socially regulated. Consistent with this view, Sedikides and Gregg (2008) have distinguished between four different aspects of self-enhancement: (1) the motive behind self-enhancing behaviors, (2) self-enhancing behaviors in a concrete situation, (3) habitual display of self-enhancing behaviors, and (4) the psychological processes implicated in self-enhancing behaviors. Thus it is possible that all individuals have the need or motive to self-enhance; nonetheless, not all individuals would display self-enhancing behavior in all situations, and some individuals have a greater habitual tendency than others to self-enhance. An analogy to these distinctions is that all individuals have the desire for nutrition; nonetheless, most Muslims refrain from eating in Ramadan for religious reasons, and dieters habitually hold back on the amount of food they eat. Thus group differences in how frequently self-enhancing behaviors are displayed do not entail group differences in the strength of the self-enhancement motive. An important goal in self-enhancement research is to uncover the social psychological processes that mediate negotiation of positive self-evaluation in social contexts.

The Social Coordination Function of Culture A digression into the definition of culture is helpful for understanding this perspective. Although there exist many definitions of culture, it is generally accepted in cross-cultural and cultural psychology that culture is an evolved constellation of loosely organized ideas and practices that are shared (albeit imperfectly) among a collection of interdependent individuals and transmitted across generations for the purpose of coordinating individual goal pursuits in collective living (Chiu & Hong, 2006; Chiu, Leung, & Hong, in press). This definition emphasizes the social coordination function of culture. In classical economic theory, pursuit of individual gains increases the overall benefits of the group. Accordingly, the group will enjoy maximum benefits when its members maximize their personal gains. In such interactions, self-organization will eventually lead to a stable pattern of interactions (Heylighen & Campbell, 1995). For example, in a free market without any central regulation, the operation of the invisible hand or market forces will ensure that the market will reach an equilibrium point at which market efficiency is optimized and all participating economic actors can maximize their personal utility. Although this assumption may hold in most cooperative interactions, in competitive interactions the scramble for maximum individual benefits may lower the fitness of the group as a whole. An extreme example of this is negative sum interactions, in which competition for maximum individual benefits decreases the overall fitness of the group. An instance of negative-sum interaction is the arms race. When individual nations compete for military dominance over other nations, each nation will channel resources away from meeting its citizens’ fundamental needs, reducing the fit of



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the individuals in the nation and the nation as a whole. Furthermore, the military buildup will also escalate tension between nations and increase the danger of worldwide destruction when the escalated tension eventually leads to an outbreak of international warfare (Heylighen & Campbell, 1995). Most human interactions involve mixed motives: Individuals are motivated to compete for short-term individual gains despite the incentive to cooperate to increase long-term collective gains (Axelrod, 1984). For example, in the “tragedy of the commons,” it is in the interest of each herdsman to outsmart his competitors by allowing his herds to consume more grass on the common pasture, in spite of the long-term benefits to the group if all herdsmen cooperate to allow the grass to grow back and avoid accelerated depletion of the common resource (Hardin, 1968). In these interactions, the motivation to maximize individual benefits through competition often overpowers the motivation to maximize group fitness through cooperation. Furthermore, although everybody profits from cooperation, the noncooperative “free riders” can take advantage of the cooperative synergy produced by the cooperative individuals. Thus, in these interactions, coordination of individual actions for the purpose of maximizing the overall fitness of the group is difficult. The challenge of social coordination is illustrated in a social-dilemma study by Sheldon and McGregor (2000). Participants were first identified as intrinsically or extrinsically oriented in a pretest (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996). Intrinsically oriented participants were those who valued intimacy and community and were willing to make sacrifices for the common good. In contrast, extrinsically oriented participants were those who valued money and popularity and were inclined to pursue self-interest. The participants played the game either with four other participants with the same orientation or with four other participants with mixed orientations. Each participant in the group acted for a timber company. They made bids anonymously to decide how much timber to harvest from a self-replenishing forest and continued to bid until the forest became completely depleted. Within the mixed groups, the extrinsically oriented participants made selfish choices and harvested more than the selfrestrained intrinsic participants. Interestingly, groups with extrinsic participants only harvested less than groups with intrinsic participants only because the extrinsic groups depleted the forest more quickly. Thus, at the group level of selection, intrinsic groups had a selective advantage over the extrinsic groups. However, at the individual level of selection, intrinsic participants were disadvantaged within a mixed group. Thus a key issue every society needs to resolve is how to move its members away from suboptimal selfish maximization of personal fitness toward the optimal overall fitness of the group as a whole. Culture is an evolved mechanism for resolving this social dilemma. According to Heylighen and Campbell (1995), culture is a memotype, or a body of shared knowledge that constrains or controls the actions of all individuals having that body of knowledge. This body of knowledge may consist of lay theories or beliefs that define what the truth is, values that define what is important, and norms that prescribe socially approved behaviors and proscribe socially unacceptable ones (Chiu, Leung, & Hong, in press). This body of knowledge has been referred to as intersubjective consensus or cultural consensus (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010; Wan & Chiu, 2009; Wan, Chiu, Peng, & Tam, 2007). It comprises an individual’s “theory of what his fellows know, believe, and mean, his theory of the code being followed, the game being played, in the society into which he was born” (Keesing, 1974, p. 89). Individuals who have internalized this body of knowledge willingly submit themselves to the influence of culture. Furthermore, the

430   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS society offers an incentive for individuals pursuing their own goals to adjust their behavioral strategies to consensual expectations in their culture, because strategic compliance would elicit favorable reactions and minimize hostile reactions from others, particularly from those who have control over access to valuable resources. Thus even individuals who privately disagree with the consensual beliefs, values, and norms in their culture may still comply with the shared expectations in the culture for utilitarian reasons (Yamagishi, in press).

Cultural Consensus The preceding analysis implies that perceived cultural consensus may be different from the aggregate of personal attitudes and beliefs of all members in the culture. Evidence for such dissociation abounds (Fischer, 2006; Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, 2009; Terracciano et al., 2005; Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 2007; Yamagishi, in press; Zou et al., 2009). For instance, Hashimoto and Yamagishi (2009, cited in Yamagishi, in press) reported that, when asked to describe their cultural fellows’ values, most Japanese expect other Japanese to hold stronger interdependent than independent values. However, when asked to describe their preferences (their ideal self), most Japanese express a stronger desire to be independent (vs. interdependent). Zou et al. (2009) reported similar results. For example, Poles and Americans endorse individualist and collectivist values to the same extent. Nonetheless, Poles expect other Poles to endorse collectivist (vs. individualist) values more, whereas Americans expect other Americans to endorse individualist (vs. collectivist) values more. Similarly, Shteynberg et al. (2009) found that South Koreans view themselves as less collectivistic than others in their country, whereas Americans see themselves as less individualistic than others in their country. Zou et al. (2009) found that Asians and Americans do not differ from each other in their causal beliefs. Nevertheless, both Asians and Americans expect Americans (vs. Asians) to hold stronger dispositionist beliefs about behavioral causality. These results show that, although country differences in personal values and beliefs are largely inconsistent and small (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002), cultural differences in intersubjective measures of values and beliefs are coherent and sizable. People from cultures with strong individualist institutions perceive their cultural fellows to be individualistic, and people in cultures with strong collectivist institutions perceive their cultural fellows to be collectivistic. More important, as illustrated in the classic social psychological phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, people may submit themselves to the influence of cultural consensus even when they privately disagree with its contents. Pluralistic ignorance refers to the situation in which a majority of group members privately reject a norm but assume (incorrectly) that most others accept it (Katz & Allport, 1931). There are many empirical demonstrations of the behavioral effects of pluralistic ignorance. One well-known finding comes from Prentice and Miller’s (1993) study of excessive drinking on campus. Among college men at Princeton University, on average, private levels of comfort with excessive drinking on campus were much lower than the perceived average. Nonetheless, college men at Princeton acted on the perceived norms and gradually shifted their private attitudes toward the perceived norm. Recent research also shows that many well-documented cross-cultural differences in cognition and behavior arise from people using perceived cultural consensus as behavior guides. For example, actor intentionality has a smaller impact in collectivist (vs. individualist) culture. People in collectivist (vs. individualist) cultures also perceive duty violations to be more hurtful and rights violations less hurtful. Furthermore, people in collectivist (vs.



Cultural Perspectives   431

individualist) cultures find a consensus appeal more persuasive and a consistency appeal less persuasive. Participants’ perceived prevalence of collectivism in their own culture mediates these cultural differences, whereas personal collectivism does not (Shteynberg et al., 2009; Zou et al., 2009). Subscription to a dispositionist theory of causality is related to the inclination to make internal attributions. Again, perceived prevalence of dispositionism mediates cultural variations in internal attributions, but personal endorsements of dispositionism do not (Zou et al., 2009). A focus on preventing losses is related to a greater likelihood of having regrets over actions that have brought negative outcomes. Again, only perceived popularity of prevention focus mediates cultural variations in regret (Zou et al., 2009). Furthermore, perceived prevalence of conscientiousness predicts cultural differences in conscientiousnessrelated behaviors (e.g., postal workers’ speed and clock accuracy), whereas self-report and observer ratings of conscientiousness do not (Heine, Buchtel, & Norenzayan, 2008). As mentioned, cultural consensus serves important social regulatory functions. Accordingly, people are more likely to display cultural consensus-consistent behaviors when this function is salient, as when individuals are held responsible to an ingroup audience for their behavioral choices (Briley, Morris, & Simonson, 2000; Gelfand & Realo, 1999). In Gelfand and Realo’s (1999) study, holding individuals accountable to their constituents for their behavioral decisions in negotiation settings increased cooperation in negotiations among Estonians, whereas the same accountability manipulation increased Americans’ competitiveness. Furthermore, when the cultural identity of the interaction partner changes, people adapt their behavioral choices to the perceived norms in the new interaction partner’s culture. Thus American–Chinese biculturals use the perceived norms in American culture as behavior guides when interacting with an American and switch to the perceived norms in Chinese culture when interacting with a Chinese (Chao, Zhang, & Chiu, 2010; Zou et al., 2009). Yamagishi and his colleagues (Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008) have also reported consistent results across studies that well-documented differences in the need for uniqueness would disappear when people knew that their choices would have no impact on other people’s choices. When asked to choose a souvenir pen from four pens of one color and one pen of a different color, compared with Americans, Japanese had a lesser tendency to choose the unique pen (Kim & Markus, 1999). However, when the participants were told that they were the last person in a group of five to choose a pen, the cultural difference disappeared. In this situation, most Japanese (71%) and American participants (72%) chose the unique pen (Yamagishi et al., 2008). Thus both Americans and Japanese have a personal need for uniqueness. However, the two groups differ in their default strategies in choice situations. Whereas the Japanese spontaneously think of the interpersonal implications of their choice, Americans do not. The greater sensitivity of the Japanese to the interpersonal implications of the choice may result from the higher importance of maintaining good reputations as conscientious community members. As Yamagishi (in press) puts it: To the degree that one’s social life is circumscribed by the boundaries of the group that one belongs to, a large cost is imposed on people who are excluded from that group. In a collectivist society in which groups are typically closed to outsiders, those who are excluded from the group they currently belong to have a hard time finding alternative groups that accept them. The cost of being excluded, therefore, is much higher in collectivistic societies than in individualistic societies, in which individuals can more easily replace lost opportunities.

432   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS Yamagishi’s observation is consistent with the recent finding that lack of mobility increases adherence to perceived cultural norms and lowers the tendency to express one’s distinctive personal qualities (Chen, Chiu, & Chan, 2009). However, these data should not be taken to mean that Americans are insensitive to the interpersonal implications of their choices. In the Yamagishi et al. (2008) pen choice study, when participants learned that they were the first person in a group of five to choose a pen, Americans behaved just like the Japanese and did not show a preference for the unique pen. When there are situational cues that clearly signal the interpersonal implications of one’s choice, both Americans and Japanese consider such implications in their choice. Similarly, when American undergraduates are placed in a simulated job market with limited (vs. plenty of) job mobility, they gradually learn to follow normative expectations and suppress expressions of personal uniqueness (Chen et al., 2009). In summary, some basic needs—such as the need for uniqueness—are present in both Eastern and Western societies. Individuals living in a shared social environment learn the cultural consensus regarding how one’s basic needs are supposed to be expressed in concrete social contexts. Because consensual knowledge serves to coordinate social actions, it constrains or regulates behavioral expressions of basic human needs, particularly in situations in which the interpersonal implications of one’s behaviors are clear. Thus cultural differences in the expression of a certain basic need may arise not because the need is stronger in some cultures but because there are cultural variations in specific contents of cultural consensus. Furthermore, expressions of the same need within a culture may vary across situations depending on how clear the interpersonal implications of one’s actions are.

Implications on Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection The principles of cultural dynamics described in the preceding can be applied to understanding cultural variations in self-enhancement and self-protection behaviors. As illustrated in Figure 20.1, strategic expressions of self-enhancement and self-protection result from the interplay of the universal need for positive self-evaluation and culture-dependent consensual beliefs, values, and norms (Chiu & Kim, in press; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005). The model depicted in Figure 20.1 is similar to the selfenhancing tactician model (SCENT; Sedikides & Strube, 1997), which assumes that people in all societies have a need for positive self-evaluation; nonetheless, the cultural consensus in different societies has different contents. For instance, the cultural consensus in some societies emphasizes expressing the idiocentric self. In these societies, the need for positive self Culture-dependent cultural consensus     Universal need     for positive     self-evaluation

   Strategic expressions    of self-enhancement    and self-protection

FIGURE 20.1.  Strategic expressions of self-enhancement and self-protection.



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evaluation is often expressed in the forms of enhancing and protecting positive views of one’s personal qualities. However, the cultural consensus in other societies emphasizes expressing the allocentric self. In these societies, the need for positive self-evaluation is often expressed in the forms of (1) enhancing and protecting positive views of one’s communal qualities and (2) subtle and indirect ways of enhancing and protecting positive views of one’s personal qualities.

Universal Benefits of Positive Self-Evaluation The SCENT model assumes that viewing the self in a positive light confers psychological benefits to individuals in all societies. Consistent with this assumption, a comparative study shows that, in both individualist and collectivist societies, people who overrate their positive self-attributes tend to report higher self-esteem and subjective well-being (Kobayashi & Brown, 2003; Kurman, 2003). A more recent study also shows that, among Taiwan Chinese, the tendency to self-enhance on personally important attributes is associated with fewer psychological problems (having less stress and fewer depressive symptoms) and higher levels of life satisfaction and subjective well-being (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 2008). In addition, among both European Americans and Chinese in mainland China, positive self-evaluation is associated with setting more challenging goals for the self and having higher levels of persistence in goal pursuits (Kim, Peng, & Chiu, 2008).

Cultural Consensus Regarding What Constitutes a Good Person The SCENT model also postulates that cultures differ in the contents of the cultural consensus regarding what constitutes a good person. As mentioned earlier, although people in collectivist and individualist societies are similar in the degree to which they endorse individualist and collectivist values (Oyserman et al., 2002), people in individualist cultures perceive individualist (vs. collectivist) values to be more popular in their cultures, and people in collectivist cultures perceive collectivist (vs. individualist) values to be more widespread in their cultures (Shteynberg, et al., 2009; Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 2007; Zou et al., 2009). If people strategically choose to display behaviors that would enhance social evaluation of the self, people in individualist societies will self-enhance on agentic attributes—attributes that are consensually believed be socially desirable in individualist societies. Likewise, people in collectivist societies will self-enhance on communal qualities—qualities that are consensually perceived to be welcome in collectivist societies. Although there is consistent support for the greater prevalence of self-enhancing behaviors in individualist (vs. collectivist) cultures, these studies considered primarily enhancement of the agentic self. For example, there is evidence that the Japanese and Chinese do not exhibit the self-serving bias. That is, they do not attribute positive events to personal dispositions and negative events to situational causes (Gelfand et al., 2002; Kitayama, Takagi, & Matsumoto, 1995). Second, East Asians display a self-critical bias, behaving humbly when rating or describing themselves or their achievements (Akimoto & Sanbonmatsu, 1999; Bond & Cheung, 1983; Heine & Renshaw, 2002; Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001). Third, compared with North Americans, East Asians have lower scores on standard self-esteem measures (Heine et al., 1999). A very different conclusion emerges when investigators also measured enhancement of

434   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS the communal self. For example, compared with people in Israel, where both individualist and collectivist values are perceived to be important, people in Singapore, where collectivist values are perceived to be more important than individualist values, self-enhance less on agentic traits but not on communal traits (Kurman, 2001). Compared with European Americans, the Japanese self-enhance more on communal attributes and less on agentic attributes (Sedikides et al., 2003). Furthermore, compared with people from collectivist cultures, people from individualist cultures have a greater tendency to distort their responses to appear more skillful, competent, or attractive, endorsing items such as “Many people think that I am exceptional.” In contrast, people from collectivist cultures have a greater tendency to distort their responses to appear more normatively appropriate, agreeing with items such as “I have never dropped litter on the street” (Lalwani, Shavitt, & Johnson, 2006; Lalwani, Shrum, & Chiu, 2009). These results indicate that, in both individualist and collectivist cultures, individuals present themselves in ways that would enhance their looking-glass selves—they enhance on attributes that are perceived to be socially desirable in their culture.

Enhancing and Protecting the Agentic Self in Collectivist Cultures The lesser tendency among individuals from collectivist (vs. individualist) cultures to selfenhance on agentic traits should not be taken to mean that these individuals do not desire positive views of their agentic qualities. In fact, when self-enhancement is measured with implicit measures, it is at least equally strong among individuals from individualist and collectivist cultures (Kobayashi & Greenwald, 2003; Yamaguchi et al., 2007). For instance, Kobayashi and Greenwald (2003, Study 1) used the Implicit Association Test to assess implicit self-enhancement among the Japanese and European Americans. Both the Japanese and European Americans displayed implicit self-enhancement: They viewed themselves more favorably than they did another student on campus. Indeed, the magnitude of implicit selfenhancement was slightly higher among the Japanese than among European Americans. Kobayashi and Greenwald (2003, Study 2) obtained from European American undergraduates overt or explicit evaluations of themselves and another student on campus, in addition to their responses to the implicit measure of self-enhancement. European Americans self-enhanced more on the explicit than the implicit measure. Because self-presentational concerns affect explicit measures more than implicit ones, these findings suggest that selfenhancement is part of self-presentation norms in North America. Thus individuals in collectivist cultures might have chosen not to express agentic qualities because of the greater emphasis on modesty in these cultures. The modesty norm in East Asian cultures prescribes downplaying one’s accomplishments and showing moderation in self-presentation and proscribes direct communication of favorable self-evaluations (Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1978; Yoshida, Kojo, & Kaku, 1982). The self-presentation norm of modesty is perceived to be more important in collectivist cultures than in individualist cultures (Kurman, 2003). In addition, European Americans like people who self-enhance more than people who self-efface, whereas Asians have the reverse preference. In one study (Bond et al., 1978), Hong Kong Chinese participants observed two persons (who were actually the experimenter’s confederates) working on an intellectual task. In one condition, the confederates were incompetent. When asked to predict their performance on a similar task in the future, the self-enhancing confederate said, “I don’t know what has happened to me today. I am not so useless. If I can do it again, I will get more answers correct.” The self-effacing con-



Cultural Perspectives   435

federate said, “I have already tried my best. If I have to do it again, it is hard to say what the result would be.” Participants liked the self-effacing confederate more than they did the selfenhancing one. Similar findings have also been reported in Korea (Kim, Kim, Kam, & Shin, 2003). These findings illustrate that, in Asia, being modest is considered a socially desirable way of presenting the self in social situations. Although modesty is also valued in Western culture (Godfrey, Jones, & Lord, 1986), it has relatively less authority over self-expression. If people in collectivist cultures adjust their strategic choice of self-enhancement behaviors to the modesty norm, the relative prevalence of the modesty norm should mediate differences between individualist and collectivist cultures on self-enhancement of agentic qualities. Kurman (2003) tested this idea in several studies. The participants in these studies were students in Singapore, Japan, and Israel. She asked participants to report their school grades. Next, she compared their reported grades to their actual grades. In all national samples, reported grades were reliably higher than actual grades, reflecting a self-enhancing bias, although the extent of self-enhancement bias was reliably stronger in Israel than in Singapore and Japan. More important, Kurman (2003) also measured individual differences in self-construal (the importance of the independent and the interdependent self) and perceived desirability of and the motivation to adhere to the modesty norm, using items such as “Bragging on oneself in a group is always socially inappropriate,” and “Telling people about my strengths and successes has always been an embarrassing thing for me.” Considerable cultural differences emerged in the perceived desirability of and motivation to adhere to the modesty norm. Compared with the Israelis, Singaporeans viewed the modesty norm to be more desirable and were more inclined to adhere to it. Furthermore, mediation analysis revealed that cultural variations in self-enhancement were related to cultural differences in modesty, but not to cultural differences in self-construal (Kurman, 2003). A later study also showed that the modesty norm mediated differences between North Americans and mainland Chinese in self-enhancement (Cai, Brown, Deng, & Oakes, 2007). If individuals in collectivist cultures refrain from overrating their agentic qualities because of normative considerations, they should self-enhance on agentic qualities when the interpersonal implications of their behaviors are not clear. Recall that one source of evidence for the absence of self-enhancement motivation in Japanese culture is the fact that the Japanese do not display the self-serving bias in attribution as North Americans do. In one study (Kudo & Numazaki, 2003), Japanese participants were promised complete anonymity and confidentiality of their responses when they made attributions for their personal successes and failures. Once the anonymity manipulation has removed the participants’ normative concerns, the participants displayed the self-serving bias: They attributed more personal responsibility for their success than for their failure. In another study (Kim, Chiu, Peng, Cai, & Tov, 2010), college students from the United States and mainland China took a performance test and received moderately negative feedback on their performance. Next, they were asked either to estimate their future performance on a similar task in complete anonymity or to report their estimation orally to the experimenter. The anonymity manipulation did not affect American students’ ability estimation. However, it significantly increased the Chinese participants’ estimated performance. Indeed, in the private reporting condition, the Chinese made higher estimation of their future performance than did their American peers. Yamagishi (in press) contends that the modesty norm in collectivist societies is a conscious application of the do-not-offend-others strategy. Individuals in these societies strategically avoid displaying self-enhancing behaviors that could offend others in the ingroup, par-

436   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS ticularly those ingroup members who have control over valuable resources. Consistent with this idea, Takata (2003) showed that, when placed in a noncompetitive situation, Japanese undergraduates are humble and self-critical. For example, they express lower confidence in their performance and spend less time reviewing the performance feedback when their performance is good than when it is bad. However, when they are placed in a competitive situation, the goal of winning becomes more important than the goal of maintaining harmony. In this situation, Japanese undergraduates do not follow the modesty norm. Instead, they selfenhance: They feel confident in their performance and spend more time reviewing the performance feedback when they outperform (vs. being outperformed by) their competitors. Suzuki and Yamagishi (2004) also showed that the self-critical tendency among the Japanese disappears when situational expectations overpower the effect of cultural consensus. In one experiment, they asked Japanese students to take a bogus intelligence test and then judge whether their performances would be above or below the average performance level in their school (Hokkaido University). When given no additional information, 77% of the participants estimated their performances to be below the school average. However, this self-effacement tendency disappeared when participants were told before making the judgment that they would be paid 100 yen if their judgments were accurate. In this condition, 69% of the participants judged their performances to be above, not below, the school average. According to Yamagishi (in press), the incentive for making accurate judgments signals to the participants that the modesty norm is not applicable in the situation. The desire for positive self-evaluation of agentic qualities among individuals in collectivist societies is also evident from the indirect ways that these individuals have innovated to express their positive self-evaluations. For instance, Kim et al. (2010) observed that although unrealistic denial of negative traits (e.g., “I am flawless”) is a manifestation of favorable self-evaluations as much as unrealistic affirmation of positive traits (e.g., “I am perfect”), expressing favorable self-evaluations indirectly through denying possession of negative traits does not oppose the modesty norm, which proscribes playing up one’s positive personal qualities and achievements but does not prescribe denial of negative personal qualities. Thus these investigators hypothesize that individuals from collectivist cultures would be more comfortable making favorable self-evaluations by repudiating negative self-aspects than by affirming positive ones, whereas individuals from individualist cultures would be comfortable with making favorable self-evaluations by both means. Results from two cross-cultural studies (Kim et al., 2010; one comparing European Americans with mainland Chinese and one comparing European Americans with Asian Americans) supported this hypothesis. Whereas Asians make more favorable self-evaluations by repudiating negative traits than by affirming positive traits, European Americans were equally comfortable with making favorable self-evaluations by both means. This finding also indicates that, in collectivist societies, the self-protection motive (the motive to defend positive self-views by denying possession of negative qualities) may be stronger than the self-enhancement motive (the motive to raise positive self-views by attributing positive qualities to the self). Indeed, recent evidence shows that promotion concerns mediate the greater tendency in individualist cultures to distort their responses to appear more skillful, competent, or attractive, whereas prevention concerns mediate the greater tendency in collectivist cultures to distort their responses to appear more normatively appropriate (Lalwani et al., 2009). Muramoto (2003) has discovered another indirect self-enhancement strategy in Japan. When Japanese undergraduates were asked to make attributions for their successes and fail-



Cultural Perspectives   437

ures, they displayed a response pattern typically found among the Japanese: They attributed personal successes to situational factors and failures to internal factors. Despite their self-critical responses, participants expected their important others to make supportive and appreciative attributions and believed that these supportive attributions reflected how participants really thought about their achievements. These participants anticipated that their close friends and families would attribute the participants’ successes to internal factors and failures to situational factors, although they did not expect their classmates to do the same. Participants also believed that their close friends and families understood them more than their classmates did, and participants were more willing to share personal successes and failures with friends and families than with classmates.

Summary Recent studies in cultural and cross-cultural psychology have revealed a lesser tendency to display self-enhancing behaviors in collectivist (vs. individualist) cultures. This has led some investigators to believe that collectivists do not need positive self-evaluation. However, a closer look at the extant research evidence reveals that (1) positive self-evaluation confers psychological benefits to individuals in both individualist and collectivist cultures; (2) the need for positive self-evaluation is present in both individualist and collectivist cultures; (3) because of the content differences in cultural consensus, individuals in individualist cultures strategically choose to enhance their agentic qualities, whereas individuals in collectivist cultures strategically choose to enhance their communal qualities; and (4) individuals in collectivist cultures also desire favorable self-evaluations of their agentic qualities but will self-enhance these qualities either indirectly or in situations in which the cultural consensus regarding modest self-presentation is inapplicable or inappropriate. As Brown (2003) puts it, “The self-enhancement motive is alive and well in collectivistic cultures, but cultural norms limit its expression” (p. 604).

Enhancement and Protection of the Cultural Self Another way individuals can enhance and protect their positive self-views is through connecting the self to their culture and enhancing and protecting positive views of their culture. Building psychological connection between the self and one’s culture is a precondition for the efficacy of this approach to negotiating positive self-evaluations.

Self–Culture Connection As mentioned, through cultural immersion, individuals learn what most people in their culture believe in, what they value, and what behaviors they consider to be appropriate or inappropriate. However, as noted earlier, not all individuals privately agree with the contents of the cultural consensus. As Wan, Dach-Gruschow, No, and Hong (in press) put it: Most experienced members of a culture have some knowledge about the culture’s beliefs, values, life practices, norms, and other characteristics. However, possessing extensive knowledge about a culture does not entail strong identification with the culture. The American anthropologist conducting field research in Samoa and the Chinese ambassador to the United

438   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS States are likely to have gained much knowledge of the cultures that they work in through extensive exposure to the cultures. However, despite their expertise in the cultures, they may not strongly identify with the respective cultures and construct an important part of their self-definitions based on the cultures. Even for individuals who are normally categorized as members of certain cultures, such as European Americans born and raised in the United States and Chinese born and raised in China, there are individual differences in how much an individual sees the culture as part of the self.

The cultural self is not synonymous with the collective self, although these are related concepts. The cultural self is defined with respect to the individuals’ personal identification with a subset of ideas in their knowledge tradition. Individuals who identify with a culture perceive its knowledge tradition as a defining characteristic of the self (Hong, Wan, No, & Chiu, 2007). In contrast, the collective self is defined through memberships in certain collectives or social categories (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; Triandis, 1989). Individuals with strong collective identities would experience strong emotional attachment to the group as a category and also to other individuals who are members of the group. In addition, cultural identity exists only when people have at least some knowledge about the knowledge tradition of a culture (Hong et al., 2007), whereas a collective identity can exist without a knowledge tradition, which makes research using the minimal-group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) feasible. Because the cultural self and the collective self are conceptually distinct, individuals within a collective may not identify with the knowledge tradition in that collective, particularly when the collective membership is an ascribed one. For example, members of a racial minority may identify less strongly with the cultural tradition in their ethnic group than with the cultural tradition in the majority group. Likewise, people who do not belong to a certain collective may personally identify with the cultural tradition of the collective. For example, a Japanese adolescent may admire American culture more than a typical American adolescent does. Likewise, a European American youth may develop an affinity, admiration, and indeed identification with Japanese culture through video games, manga, and food without being Japanese or having a Japanese friend (Wan et al., in press).

Psychological Functions of Culture Why do people connect their selves to their culture? One answer to this question is that culture confers psychological benefits to the self. Recall that culture refers to a constellation of ideas and practices that are shared among a collection of interdependent individuals and transmitted across generations. Two defining characteristics of a cultural knowledge tradition are its sharedness and continuity (Chiu & Liu, in press). A unique family tradition is one that has a history but is not widely shared in the community. A fad is a fashion, notion, or manner of conduct followed enthusiastically by a large group, but its popularity is temporary. An individual’s eccentric belief is not shared by others and would unlikely be passed down through history. As illustrated in Figure 20.2, unlike a unique family tradition, a fad, or an eccentric belief, a cultural tradition both is shared among many people and has a history. By virtue of its sharedness and consensual validity, culture provides to its followers a sense of epistemic security (Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000; Fu et al., 2007). Widely shared cultural knowledge provides individuals with a consensually validated framework through which to interpret otherwise ambiguous experiences. It informs individuals in the society what



Cultural Perspectives   439 Low continuity

High continuity

Low sharedness

Eccentric idea

Family tradition

High sharedness

Fad

Culture

FIGURE 20.2.  Defining characteristics of culture.

ideas or practices are generally considered to be true, important, and appropriate. Thus it protects individuals from the epistemic terror of uncertainty and unpredictability. Consistent with this idea, research shows that individuals are more likely to follow consensual norms and expectations when the need for epistemic security is salient. Accordingly, many documented cultural differences in cognition and behavior are enlarged when the need for epistemic security is high. For instance, compared with each other, when explaining an ambiguous event, collectivists are more likely to reference dispositions of a group and individualists are more likely to reference dispositions of the individual (Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999). However, these differences are found only among those who have a high need for firm answers (i.e., high need for cognitive closure) or in high time-pressure situations, in which the need for firm answers is particularly pronounced (Chiu et al., 2000). Similar moderation effects of the need for firm answers were reported in subsequent studies on cultural differences in reward allocation and conflict resolution (Chao et al., 2010; Fu et al., 2007). By virtue of its continuity, culture provides its followers with a sense of existential security, protecting the individual from the terror of recognizing one’s mortality (Kesebir, in press). Despite the finitude of an individual’s life, the cultural tradition one belongs to will be passed down through history. Thus connecting the self to a seemingly immortal cultural tradition can help assuage existential terror. Whereas adherence to cultural norms confers epistemic security, connecting the self to an endurable cultural tradition confers existential security. Thus, when the need for existential security is salient, individuals will be particularly motivated to enhance and protect their culture—by enhancing and protecting their culture, these individuals also enhance and protect their cultural selves.

Implications of Enhancing and Protecting the Cultural Self The preceding analysis leads to three hypotheses, which are illustrated in Figure 20.3. First, individuals would enhance and protect positive views of their culture when the self–culture connection is threatened. Second, individuals with strong self–culture connection—those with high chronic levels of cultural identification—are particularly likely to enhance or protect positive views of their culture. Because culture confers existential benefits by virtue of its continuity, individuals with strong (vs. weak) self–culture connection would be more motivated to protect the integrity and continuity of their culture. Thus threats to the culture’s integrity and continuity are particularly likely to engage defensive reactions from individuals with high (vs. low) levels of cultural identification. Such threats may take the form of explicit attacks on the integrity and continuity of one’s culture. However, as illustrated in the examples at the beginning of this chapter, subtle cues such as presence of a Starbucks Coffee (which may be

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FIGURE 20.3.  Enhancement and protection of positive views of culture. seen as a symbol of global, capitalist culture) in China’s heritage site may evoke among the Chinese the fear of cultural erosion. Likewise, the presence of McDonald’s at the Louvre may evoke among the French anxiety over cultural contamination. In response to these threats, the Chinese and the French sought to protect their cultural selves by removing the cultural contaminants from their country’s heritage sites (Chiu & Cheng, 2007). Third, rendering mortality threats salient would increase the tendency to enhance or protect the perceived integrity and continuity of one’s culture. We now turn to the evidence for each of these hypotheses.

Repairing Culture–Self Connections The first hypothesis states that individuals would enhance and protect positive views of their culture when the self–culture connection is threatened. Wan and her colleagues tested this hypothesis. The participants were American college students. Pretest results showed that these students perceived enjoying life and true friendship as core values and moderation and detachment as peripheral values in American culture. In the main study, participants were requested to speak for or against the core values (enjoying life, true friendship) or the peripheral values (moderation, detachment). The results showed that participants’ level of national identification increased after they had spoken on the core (vs. peripheral) values, regardless of whether they spoke for or against these values (Wan, Chiu, Tam et al., 2007). Speaking on American core values reminded the participants of their American identity and increased their level of American identification. Although speaking both for and against American core values increases the salience of national identity, only speaking against these values would present a threat to the self–culture connection, which would in turn evoke a tendency to reestablish one’s connection with the culture through positively evaluating American culture. To elaborate, whereas speaking for American core values signals connection of the self with American culture, speaking against the American core values signals abandonment and betrayal of American culture. As such, only individuals who are induced to speak against the American core values would become more motivated to reaffirm their connection with American culture by displaying more positive evaluations of American culture.



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To test this idea, in one study (Wan, Torelli, & Chiu, 2010), after the manipulation just described, participants were asked to estimate American achievements in various domains. Specifically, they were asked to estimate the percentage of winners of various famous international prizes who were Americans, the percentage of the world population who are native speakers of English, and the literacy rate of the United States. For each question, participants also provided estimates for five other countries. Finally, they ranked American students and students from nine other countries on math performance and creativity. As predicted, after having been induced to speak against the core values of American culture, participants exhibited more favoritism for American culture. They made relatively favorable estimates of the United States’ international accomplishments and unfavorable estimates of other countries’ achievements. Interestingly, those who promoted the peripheral values also had more favorable estimates of American achievements. Thus promoting the importance of the peripheral values signals disconnection of the self from the culture, resulting in defensive responses similar to those in the core value denouncement condition. Identical results were obtained in another study (Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 2007) that used the same manipulation but a different dependent measure. Following the manipulation, participants read about an aspiring author, Pat, who submitted his writings to various websites for amateur writers around the world for proofreading help and had recently submitted his writings to two websites. Participants then read the proofreading feedback from the editors of the two websites. The first part of the message contained a short letter from the editor that told Pat that the quality of the writing was acceptable but that he needed to improve his spelling. The second part of the message contained the editor’s corrections of Pat’s submission. The original writing contained mostly spelling errors, which mainly involved words that are spelled differently in British and American English (e.g., flavour vs. flavor, centre vs. center). One editor corrected the errors using British spelling, whereas the other editor corrected the errors using American spelling. The submissions to the two websites were travelogues that described two different places. Also, the wording of the editors’ letters and the layout of the messages were slightly different. The pairings of the submissions with the website layout and the language of the website were counterbalanced. After reading each message, the participants rated their impression of the editor. Denouncing American core values led participants to reestablish self–culture connection by positively evaluating the social personality of the “American” (vs. British) editor.

Cultural Identification and Defense against Cultural Contamination The second hypothesis states that threats to the culture’s integrity and continuity are particularly likely to engage defensive reactions from individuals with high (vs. low) levels of cultural identification. To test this hypothesis, Yang, Chiu, and Chen (2010) presented an ad to the participants, who were college students in Beijing. The ad was titled “McDonald’s is scheduled to open a new shop at the Great Wall.” The participants were asked to indicate how likely they would be to patronize this café when they visited the Great Wall. In the ad, as illustrated in Figure 20.4, the McDonald’s logo (the golden arch) was either superimposed onto the image of the Great Wall (the overlapped presentation) or next to it (the separate presentation). This manipulation was crossed with another manipulation. Half of the participants in the overlapped presentation condition and half of the participants in the separate presentation condition saw the following slogan below the picture: “Freedom,

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FIGURE 20.4.  Stimulus materials used to elicit fear of cultural contamination.

Independence, American Culture: All in McDonald’s.” This slogan was added to evoke the perception of McDonald’s as a symbol of American culture. The remaining participants read a slogan that was intended to evoke the perception of McDonald’s as a business undertaking: “Fast, Convenient, Delicious: All in McDonald’s.” The investigators reasoned that, when the logo of a foreign shop is superimposed onto a symbol of the heritage culture (as in the overlapped presentation condition), evaluation of McDonald’s will be more negative in the situation in which the shop is seen as a symbol of the foreign culture (vs. merely a business undertaking), because the ad in this context will evoke fear of contamination of Chinese culture by elements of a foreign culture (in the same way the Starbucks Coffee in China’s Imperial Palace Museum evoked fear of cultural contamination among the Chinese). Contrarily, when the logo of a foreign shop is placed next to a symbol of the heritage culture (as in the separate presentation condition), the shop will not be perceived as invading the Chinese cultural space. Thus evaluation of the shop will not depend on whether the shop is seen as a symbol of the foreign culture or merely a business undertaking. The results supported these predictions. In the overlapped-presentation condition, the intention to patronize the new McDonald’s was lower when McDonald’s was framed as a symbol of American culture than when it was framed as a restaurant. The framing manipulation did not affect the participants’ intention to eat at the new McDonald’s in the separatepresentation condition. Apparently, when the participants saw the McDonald’s as a symbol of American culture contaminating the Chinese cultural space, they would try to protect their cultural selves by negatively evaluating the contaminant.



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Another study (Yang et al., 2010) shows that this pattern of reactions is more pronounced among individuals who identify more strongly with their culture. Here, the investigators used the same stimulus materials but measured rather than manipulated the meanings of McDonald’s. The participants were undergraduates in Shanghai, China, and their identification with Chinese culture was measured. The dependent measure was the participants’ negative emotions toward McDonald’s. Replicating the results of the first study, in the overlapped-presentation condition, the more the participants viewed McDonald’s as a symbol of American culture, the more intense their negative emotions toward the new McDonald’s were. However, in the separate-presentation condition, perception of McDonald’s as a symbol of American culture (vs. a business) was unrelated to the participants’ emotional responses to the new McDonald’s. More important, these effects were more pronounced among those who identified with Chinese culture more strongly.

Cultural Identification and Protection of Cultural Continuity Yang et al. (2010) examined the role of cultural identification in protecting the integrity of one’s culture. Another set of studies has examined the role of cultural identification in protecting the continuity of one’s culture. As mentioned, by virtue of its continuity, culture addresses individuals’ existential anxiety. Because the cultural tradition to which one belongs outlasts an individual’s physical existence, connecting the self to a seemingly immortal cultural tradition can help assuage existential terror. Accordingly, anxiety over discontinuity of one’s cultural heritage may lead individuals to adopt defensive strategies to protect the integrity of their culture, often by blocking cultural diffusion. In a recently completed experiment (Cheng, Chen, & Chiu, 2009), participants in Shanghai, China, read a magazine article about some Chinese folk arts. To manipulate continuity threat, half of the participants learned from the article that these folk arts are facing extinction because the younger generations were not interested in learning about folk arts. The remaining participants read that these folk arts continued to be a part of everyday life in modern China. Next, in an ostensibly separate study, participants evaluated a New York-based children’s book publisher who planned to promote Western folklore and train new Chinese writers to write in English. As predicted, the continuity-threat manipulation increased negative reactions toward the publisher. Compared with participants in the nothreat condition, participants in the continuity-threat condition were more inclined to deny trade privileges to the publisher. Again, the effect of continuity threat on reactions to the publisher was stronger among individuals with high (vs. low) identification with the Chinese culture. Thus individuals with salient self–culture connections are particularly motivated to protect the continuity of their culture. People in fast-growing economies (e.g., China, India) often experience the threat of cultural discontinuity. With the importation of capitalist practices, individuals in these countries may feel that erosion of the heritage culture is a price their countries pay for modernization and globalization. The discontinuity threat resulting from modernization and globalization may lead individuals to enhance positive views of their heritage culture. For example, Fu and Chiu (2007) reported that, in Hong Kong, although people generally associate Western cultures with high levels of competence, they protect their cultural identity by affirming the importance of the moral and existential values in the Chinese tradition. Similarly, Cheng et

444   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS al. (2010) reported that, in China, although people generally believe that their country has lost many of its moral virtues in the process of acquiring its economic strengths, the Chinese rate traditional China as warmer than modern China and expect the return of the warm Chinese tradition in the future. Again, these effects are stronger among individuals with higher levels of cultural identification. In this connection, it is interesting to note that urbanization often requires demolition of heritage architecture to give space to new buildings. Urbanization scholars have noted that demolition of historical landmarks often triggers an outburst of negative reactions in the public, ranging from feelings of ambivalence to radical resistance. Some urbanization scholars have suggested that cities build monuments and important landmarks to symbolize continuity of the cultural heritage amid rapid social changes (Huyssen, 2003).

Mortality Salience Increases Protection of the Cultural Self The third hypothesis states that mortality salience would increase the tendency to enhance and protect the perceived integrity and continuity of one’s culture. A common way to induce existential threat in social psychological experiments is to remind participants of their mortality. To manipulate mortality salience, participants in the mortality-salient condition are asked to describe the emotions that the thought of their own deaths arouses in them, whereas participants in the control condition are asked to describe the emotions aroused by the thought of having dental work done. Consistent with the third hypothesis, reminding people of their mortality increases the level of self–culture connection. In both Western and Eastern cultural contexts, following a mortality-salience prime, there is an increase in the level of cultural identification, which, in turn, leads to more fervent endorsement of the central values in the culture (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Tam, Chiu, & Lau, 2007). Consistent with the assumption that culture provides a symbolic sense of self-continuity in the face of existential threats, research conducted by Kesebir and Chiu (2008, cited in Kesebir, in press) shows that reminders of death motivate participants to regard famous people, who embody significant cultural values, as “less mortal” than ordinary humans. The researchers demonstrated, for example, that American undergraduates, when reminded of their own mortality, expect famous Americans (e.g., Abraham Lincoln, John F. Kennedy, Oprah Winfrey) who exemplify core American values to live longer. Similarly, participants expect that famous Americans (already dead or still alive), and especially those who represent the values of American culture, will be remembered for a longer time in the future when they are primed with mortality. Furthermore, mortality reminders increase the tendency to enhance positive views of one’s culture and to protect the perceived integrity of one’s culture. A study by Greenberg et al. (1990) demonstrated that participants with a Christian religious background evaluated a Christian target more positively and a Jewish target more negatively after a mortalitysalience treatment. This finding also indicates that, aside from enhancing the positive views of one’s culture, reminding people of their mortality also reduces tolerance of foreign cultural worldviews. Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, and Breus (1994) showed that mortality-salience inductions reduced American students’ liking for an author with antiAmerican views. Strachman and Schimel (2006) also reported that mortality-salience prim-



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ing reduced the commitment of undergraduates in a romantic relationship to partners with different cultural worldviews. Finally, mortality-salient priming also lowers tolerance for contamination of one’s cultural tradition. After a mortality-salience prime, individuals would display strong negative reactions toward inappropriate use of cherished symbols in one’s culture. In a study by Greenberg, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1995), when participants were reminded of death before an alleged creativity task requiring them to use cherished symbols in their culture in a creative way (e.g., using their national flag as a sieve and a crucifix as a hammer), they had poorer performance on the task. These participants also expressed more reluctance to use the symbols in culturally inappropriate ways and experienced greater tension. Similar results are reported in two studies carried out by Torelli, Chiu, and Keh (cited in Chiu, 2007). In the first study, following the mortality-salient manipulations, American business students studied a business case that described Nike’s (an iconic American brand) out-of-the-box marketing plan to strengthen its presence in the Middle East. The key strategies in the marketing plan included adopting a new brand name using the Arabic word for “sportsmanship,” eliminating the “swoosh” mark from the product, selecting well-known local soccer players (a popular sport in the Middle East) as endorsers, having the endorsers wear traditional Islamic attire and a pair of “Sportsmanship” running shoes, and using a new slogan, “Dress modestly, the Islamic spirit,” in the new brand’s advertisements. All these strategies could be seen as ones that could undermine the purity of Nike, an iconic American brand. As expected, compared with the participants in the control condition, participants in the mortality-salient condition reacted more negatively to the marketing plan: They believed most strongly that the plan would fail, that consumers in the Middle East would dislike the new brand name, that the news of the plan would bring down Nike’s stock price in the New York Stock Exchange, and that Nike’s market share in the United States would decrease. In the second study (cited in Chiu, 2007), following the same mortality-salient manipulation, American business students were asked to read Nike’s marketing plan in the Middle East and then write a message supporting it. Compared with those in the remaining conditions, participants in the mortality-salient condition expressed a lower level of enthusiasm in their messages than those in the control condition. In short, under the influence of mortality salience, European Americans feel a need to affirm their cherished cultural worldviews. As a consequence, they become less tolerant of actions that would contaminate an iconic American brand.

Summary By virtue of its continuity, culture promises rescue to those who are frightened by the thought of the inevitable finitude of their physical existence. To manage mortality threats, individuals connect the self to their culture. Through self–culture connection, individuals have discovered an indirect way to enhance and protect their positive self-views and even to indulge in the symbolic invincibility of the self. To fulfill this function, the individual needs to be vigilant in maintaining the self–culture connection. Signs that signal potential severance of the connection will trigger attempts to reaffirm such connection by advocating positive views of the culture. Likewise, when the integrity and continuity of one’s culture are threatened, individuals—particularly those who have strong self–culture connections—would feel obliged to prevent erosion and contamination of their culture. This motivation to preserve the purity,

446   DEVELOPMENTAL, CLINICAL, HEALTH, PERSONALITY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS continuity and respectability of one’s culture is particularly strong when the individual needs to face a mortality threat squarely.

Conclusion We discussed two routes individuals take to negotiate positive self-evaluations in cultural contexts. Our analysis began with the assumption that the need for positive self-evaluation is universal. Nonetheless, because an individual’s self-view is socially negotiated, culture can constrain or regulate how individuals express their need for positive self-regard. Thus cultural differences in self-enhancing and self-protection behaviors need to be understood as culturally constrained expressions of the universal need for positive self-regard. Culture also provides symbolic resources through which individuals can attain their need for existential security. The individual can achieve symbolic immortality by connecting the self to a seemingly immortal tradition. This process also moves individuals to maintain allegiance to their cultural tradition and submit themselves to the influence of the consensual ideas in their cultural tradition, even when they do not agree with all the ideas in the tradition. A major premise in cultural psychology is that culture and psyche make each other up. We submit that this mutual constitution process does not occur in a social vacuum. Cultural psychology emphasizes culture’s authority over human psychology and has focused its research attention on finding culture’s imprints on human behaviors. However, individuals do not always conform to cultural expectations, and cultural practices are often developed to constrain expressions of the individual’s personal needs (Chiu & Chao, 2009). Chiu, Kim, and Chaturvedi (2009) have characterized the relationship of the person, the society, and culture as a love–hate triangle: They need each other and are useful to each other. Most of the time, they work together seamlessly. Sometimes, culture constrains expression of personal needs; sometimes, the self tries to outsmart culture. It is through such dynamic transactions between culture and the self that they make each other up.

Acknowledgments This material is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0743119. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

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PART VI

Boundary Conditions and Methodological Issues in Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection

Chapter 21 Academic Exaggeration Pushing Self-Enhancement Boundaries Richard H. Gramzow

Reading through the present volume might suggest that self-enhancement and self-

protection processes are so utterly rampant that people should become more and more selfdelusional as they bolster and defend themselves in countless ways and at every opportunity. After all, if the way we construe the world—cognitively, moralistically, and even visually—is directed and distorted methodically toward self-favoring perceptions, then there should be no limit to the positivity of our self-views. If we consistently perceive our present selves as superior to our past selves, we should be on an ever-ascending balloon ride of self-adoration. Indeed, if the brain is hardwired to “accentuate the positive” and “eliminate the negative” systematically, we should be on a polarized journey to personal stardom. Alas, such is not the case. Consider the lifecycle trajectory for self-esteem discussed in the chapter by Trzesniewski, Kinal, and Donnellan (Chapter 16, this volume). Self-esteem actually decreases from childhood to adolescence, before increasing in young adulthood, staying relatively stable for several decades, and then finally decreasing again in older adulthood (see also Robins & Trzesniewski, 2005). So, although the chapters in this volume cover a broad landscape of psychological processes and contexts across which self-enhancement and self-protection mechanisms are influential, they also stake out some apparent boundaries. As reviewers of the broader literature have noted, “people cannot self-enhance willynilly” (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008, p. 108). Some of the restrictions on self-enhancement have to do with properties of the attributes on which people are asked to evaluate themselves. For example, overly positive self-evaluations are less prevalent for attributes that are unambiguous, concrete, and verifiable. Knowledge about one’s true standing is another important constraint on self-enhancement. People are more accurate in their self-appraisals when they are aware of their true standing and when they are accountable to a knowledgeable audi

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456   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES ence. The strength of the motive to self-enhance and self-protect also varies—both within and across individuals. In short, there are limits to the ability, tendency, and desire to craft an overly positive view of the self. Furthermore, there are societal norms governing when and in what manner it is appropriate to self-enhance. The purpose of this chapter is to review some of the key variables that place limits and constraints on self-enhancement and self-protection while emphasizing that these boundaries are often hard fought against. The desire to maintain a positive self-view and to further enhance that self-view serves such a critical function within our psychological and social worlds that every resistance is put up against these constraints—every boundary pushed (or skirted). In reviewing these boundary conditions, I will focus primarily on research examining the tendency to exaggerate academic performance (when relevant research is available). The reason is that academic exaggeration is a form of self-enhancement that my colleagues and I have examined rather extensively over the past several years. More important, the academic context is particularly (perhaps uniquely) suited to a discussion of self-enhancement and its constraints. Academic performance is important in life, with many practical, emotional, social, and self-evaluative implications. In addition, unlike most other important domains of life, the educational setting provides clear and agreed-upon indicators of personal performance and relative standing. Furthermore, for current students, ultimate performance is undetermined. Some are striving for improvement; others may be resigned to mediocrity. Thus the academic context provides a real-life setting within which to examine links between self-evaluative processes and self-regulatory behavior. For all these reasons, in academics, the boundaries to self-enhancement are pushed hard.

Properties of the Attribute Ambiguity Psychologists have documented various ways in which people enhance and protect their sense of self-worth (Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010). One of the most frequently examined strategies or indicators of self-enhancement is the better-than-average effect (Alicke, 1985; Weinstein, 1980). This effect represents the tendency for a majority of people to perceive themselves as above average on positive traits and below average on negative traits. The chapter by Critcher, Helzer, and Dunning (Chapter 3, this volume) emphasizes that the better-thanaverage effect is more prominent for traits that are relatively ambiguous. People are more prone to evaluating themselves as above average on positive traits that are comparatively ambiguous (e.g., sophisticated or disciplined) rather than traits that are comparatively unambiguous (e.g., athletic or punctual; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). Dunning et al. (1989) argue that the more ambiguous traits can be defined idiosyncratically, allowing people to select examples from their own more concrete traits and behaviors that match the broader positive trait category. One person might claim to be sophisticated because he dresses smartly and frequents posh nightclubs, whereas another person might claim sophistication due to her extensive knowledge of English literature and classical music. This basic pattern holds for negative traits, with people claiming to be below average on comparatively ambiguous traits (e.g., naive or impractical) rather than on comparatively unambiguous traits (e.g., clumsy or sloppy; Dunning et al., 1989). Importantly, the tendency to take advantage of the ambiguity



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of negative traits when comparing the self to others is greater for people with high self-esteem (Suls, Lemos, & Stewart, 2002). Although self-enhancement might be “easier” for relatively ambiguous traits and attributes, the tendency to view the self as better than others (i.e., above average) extends beyond abstract personality traits to particular performance domains. For example, Felson (1981) found evidence for overly positive self-evaluations among American football players rating themselves on physical and mental attributes specifically relevant to football. Likewise, Van Yperen (1992) found evidence for the better-than-average effect among Dutch soccer players evaluating their soccer skills. In both studies, however, attribute ambiguity was an important moderating variable. Felson (1981) reported that self-ratings were more positive than coaches’ ratings for relatively ambiguous attributes (e.g., mental toughness or coordination) but not for relatively unambiguous attributes (e.g., speed or size). Likewise, Van Yperen (1992) reported that the soccer players rated themselves as superior to their peers on a relatively general and ambiguous item (soccer ability) but not on a more specific item (heading the ball). A similar pattern has been observed in self-ratings of academic ability and performance. For example, Kurman and Eshel (1998) found that students’ ratings of their general academic self-competence and general academic success were more discrepant from their actual grades than were their self-reports of those grades. In summary, it is well documented that people self-enhance to a greater extent on ambiguous attributes than on unambiguous attributes. A lack of ambiguity, therefore, appears to limit the ability or tendency to self-enhance. However, other evidence indicates that attribute ambiguity is not sufficient to curtail the tendency to self-enhance and self-protect. Lying, for example, is a relatively unambiguous act (compared to a broader trait such as trustworthiness). Yet, at the conclusion of a diary study on lying in daily life, participants from both a college sample and a community sample estimated that they lied less frequently than did other people in the study (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). Driving ability also is a fairly specific attribute (relative to a broader trait such as coordination). Yet people tend to rate themselves as being more skilled than others at driving, having better reflexes and superior judgment, and obeying traffic rules more closely (Harré, Foster, & O’Neill, 2005). Therefore, people occasionally do show the better-than-average effect for fairly unambiguous positive and negative attributes. The two example attributes in the preceding paragraph are relatively low in ambiguity, but they are not so concrete as to eliminate all flexibility in defining them. There remains room for people to define lying and driving ability in an idiosyncratic manner that supports a positive self-view. In addition, nonmotivational processes may account for the better-thanaverage effect to some degree (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Krueger & Mueller, 2002). What about aspects of a person that are even more specific and concrete? Do people provide overly positive self-reports for attributes that can have only one socially shared definition? And do they do so in the service of self-enhancement and self-protection concerns and motives? Indeed, the literature contains many examples of people distorting unambiguous selfattributes in a self-favoring manner. For example, a recent study found that 87% of men and 76% of women provided incorrect information about their height, weight, and/or age when they completed online dating profiles. They systematically claimed to be taller, lighter, and younger than they were in reality (Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008; see also, Lawson & Leck, 2006). People also tend to provide misleading reports of their routine concrete behav-

458   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES iors. Observational estimates of the percentage of Americans who actually attend religious services each week converge on approximately 20–25%; however, 40–50% of poll respondents indicate that they attend religious services weekly (Hadaway, Marler, & Chaves, 1993, 1998). There is systematic discrepancy between self-reported and actual behavior for a wide variety of specific acts, even condom use (Agnew & Loving, 1998). The tendency to misreport very specific aspects about the self and behavior is particularly evident within academic and other intellectual performance contexts (Hansford & Hattie, 1982). For example, students on average report higher SAT scores than they actually achieved (Bahrick, Hall, & Dunlosky, 1993; Gramzow & Willard, 2006; Shepperd, 1993; Willard & Gramzow, 2008). Students also report higher grade point averages (GPAs) and higher grades for specific courses than official records indicate (Bahrick, Hall, & Berger, 1996; Bahrick, Hall, & Da Costa, 2008; Dobbins, Farh, & Werbel, 1993; Gramzow, Elliot, Asher, & McGregor, 2003; Gramzow & Willard, 2006; Gramzow, Willard, & Mendes, 2008; Kirk & Sereda, 1969; Willard & Gramzow, 2009). SAT scores and grades are very concrete and unambiguously defined attributes about the self. Although the magnitude of self-enhancement bias may be lower for these concrete performance attributes than for more global and ambiguously defined ones (Kurman & Eshel, 1998), there is still a significant and systematic tendency to exaggerate one’s performance.

Awareness For many of the dimensions and attributes on which people evaluate themselves, there is limited concrete information about where they stand in absolute terms or relative to others. This information deficit when it comes to actual or social reality offers a greater opportunity for self-enhancement and protection (for a particularly insightful and comprehensive review of this issue, see Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). For example, Kruger and Dunning (1999, Studies 2–4) assessed individuals’ performances on validated tests of logical reasoning and English grammar. Overall, participants overestimated their own performances on the tests— both in terms of the percentage of questions they answered correctly and of their relative percentiles in the distribution of all participants’ scores. Even those participants who fell into the bottom 25% of the performance distribution (with an average score at the 12th percentile) evaluated their performances as significantly above the 50th percentile. In this context, participants were unaware of their actual performances. They, therefore, used their more general self-views to guide their estimates of how well they performed (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003). Given that most people have positive views of their overall competence (the participants in these studies were students at Cornell University), their estimates of their performances on the specific test were biased upward by their global self-views (Critcher & Dunning, 2009). In addition, people tend to focus on the solutions they get correct rather than on the problems they fail to solve when evaluating their performances (Caputo & Dunning, 2005). The lack of valid information about performance and ability introduces another type of ambiguity that people tend to resolve in their favor (Carter & Dunning, 2008). However, as with ambiguously defined traits, ambiguity due to a lack of information is not a necessary condition for self-enhancement. People provide overly positive self-reports even when they have clear knowledge of their true standing and are well aware of reality. Again, the academic context provides some examples of this tendency. Students exaggerate their GPAs even though they receive regular reports of their academic performances and check their GPAs



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online with considerable frequency. Moreover, when students are first told that their actual GPAs will be verified by the registrar, their self-reported GPAs are much more accurate (Willard & Gramzow, 2009). Shepperd (1993) reported a similar finding when he examined the tendency for students to exaggerate their SAT scores. Self-reported scores were significantly closer to the actual SAT scores on file when students were offered an incentive to be accurate (extra credit on an exam). He concluded that the students largely were aware that their self-reports were exaggerated, but they were internally motivated to present a positive selfimpression. Only when an explicit motive to be accurate was introduced did the influence of self-enhancement and/or self-protection concerns diminish. The tendency for people to exaggerate despite being aware of their true performances also is evident when they are learning new information about themselves. In one study, participants took a computer-administered test of logical reasoning (Willard & Gramzow, 2008). At the end of the test a (randomly assigned) 3-digit numeric score was displayed in large font in the center of the screen. After looking at the score for approximately 10 seconds, they were asked to enter the score they received into the computer (i.e., “What score did you receive on the test?”). Even though participants in this condition had seen their scores just seconds before, nearly 15% reported higher scores than they actually had received (while less than 3% reported lower scores). It is not just academic and intellectual performances that people misreport despite being aware of their true standing. For example, the vast majority of people know their own ages, but, as described earlier, many report being younger when profiling themselves on online dating sites (Toma et al., 2008). Being unaware of reality makes it easier for people to selfenhance. However, clear and precise knowledge about one’s standing does not always render accurate self-reports of that standing.

Verifiability One reason that self-enhancement is more prevalent for attributes that are ambiguously defined or about which people are uncertain of their true standing is that self-reports on these types of attributes are difficult to verify. Allison, Messick, and Goethals (1989) found that people tend to evaluate themselves as substantially more moral (fair) than others but as only slightly more intelligent than others. Van Lange and Sedikides (1998) replicated this basic effect and also found that participants felt that it was easier to infer and judge someone’s intellectual ability (intelligence or unintelligence) and more difficult to infer and judge someone’s morality (honesty or dishonesty). In other words, people believe that intelligence is easier for others to verify. It is riskier, therefore, to attempt to self-enhance on that attribute. Verifiability also appears to have an important influence on the self-enhancement strategies that people use when applying for jobs. Donovan, Dwight, and Hurtz (2003) surveyed people who had recently submitted employment applications. They found that the applicants admitted to various exaggerations, omissions, and fabrications on their resumes and during the interview process. However, they also found that the prevalence of a given self-enhancing behavior or tactic was highly correlated with perceptions of the extent to which an organization could verify or confirm the information. As Schlenker (1980) has noted, people will strive to self-aggrandize unless there is a “reality check.” Verifiability provides this check. Likewise, Sedikides and Strube (1997) contend that people self-enhance tactically and strategically. They argue that people are moti-

460   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES vated to have and to express a positive self-view, but that they do not do so through “brute self-aggrandizement.” Instead, people are sensitive to the plausibility of their self-images and the presentation of those images to others, as well as to the balance between short-term and long-term benefits of a given self-enhancement or self-protection behavior or judgment. Unfortunately for them, not everyone is as tactical as they probably should be. Not everyone suppresses their striving to present a positive self in the face of verifiability. Again, the academic context provides many examples of cases in which individuals have misrepresented themselves despite others being in a position to debunk their claims. Sometimes this involves the inclusion of college or university degrees that were never received. A quick search of news articles online reveals numerous examples of presidents of major national committees, chief executives of global companies, political candidates, university officials, athletic coaches, judges, and high-ranking military officers being fired or forced to resign for distorting their academic past (among other things, such as military service). The power of achievement and enhancement strivings over the pressure of reality is particularly evident in the case of a student recently expelled from Harvard College. The student was accused of deceiving Harvard officials in order to gain acceptance. Among the accusations were that he falsely reported perfect SAT scores, forged letters of recommendations from a professor and employer, and submitted false transcripts. He also claimed to have attended several prestigious schools. After being expelled, he submitted resumes for employment and internships that apparently were rife with fabrications (including a perfect GPA at Harvard, book authorships and contracts, and familiarity with rather obscure ancient languages). This student was recently accepted at and later dismissed from Stanford University as well. Obviously, these are rather extreme and relatively uncommon examples. Verifiability places definite constraints on the tendency to self-enhance. However, the fact that individuals sometimes present information about themselves that conceivably (or even certainly) will be disconfirmed and that this disconfirmation can have severe consequences attests to the sheer strength of the self-enhancement and self-protection motives.

Influences on the Motive Domain Desirability People evaluate themselves more favorably relative to others on traits and attributes that reflect domains that they personally consider to be desirable (Krueger, 1998). Therefore, when assessing self-enhancement, it is useful to collect desirability ratings at the individual level (Sinha & Krueger, 1998). This certainly is the case in the academic context. For example, Kurman (2004) found that male students self-enhanced when reporting their ability in mathematics (indexed against their actual math grades), whereas female students tended to self-enhance when reporting their ability in English (indexed against their actual English grades). Presumably, given gender stereotypes about these two subjects, the male students had a stronger desire to perceive themselves as better in math. Chatard, Guimond, and Selimbegovic (2007, Study 1) provided direct support for this interpretation when they examined the role of gender stereotypes on students’ reports of their grades in arts (stereotypically feminine) and mathematics (stereotypically masculine). They found that the more students endorsed the relevant gender stereotypes, the more they displayed stereotype-consistent recall of their previous grades.



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In the several studies on academic exaggeration with which I have been involved, we have never found a gender difference in the tendency to exaggerate overall GPA. Perhaps this is because GPA aggregates over the many courses that a student has taken, some of which are in important domains for that student, and others not. Alternatively, men and women may not differ systematically in the degree to which they perceive a high GPA to be important and desirable. Rather than gender differences, we consistently find that individual differences in achievement orientation and academic performance goals predict the magnitude of GPA exaggeration (Gramzow et al., 2003; Willard & Gramzow, 2009). Again, these findings emphasize that self-enhancement (even for a specific and concrete attribute) is more pronounced when the attribute is personally desirable. Nevertheless, the predictors of academic exaggeration can be altered by shifting the situation. When individuals report their academic performances and grades in relative isolation and with presumed anonymity, their own personal performance goals predict the magnitude by which they exaggerate their GPAs. However, when they report their performances while a video camera is trained on them, GPA exaggeration is predicted by public social desirability concerns (Willard & Gramzow, 2009, Study 4). The presence of a video camera has been shown to create a cognitive state that has been termed public self-focus (Carver, 2002; Davies, 2005; Hass, 1984). We reasoned that participants’ private feelings about the desirability of a high GPA would have less of an influence in the public self-focus situation. Instead, beliefs about the public desirability of a high GPA would influence self-enhancement. Furthermore, perhaps apprehension about having a relatively low GPA prompted greater self-protective exaggeration in the public self-focus condition. In other words, people enhance on attributes that they consider desirable, and they self-protect against attributes that they consider to be undesirable. But what it is that they consider to be desirable and undesirable may be situationally variable. Therefore, the motive to self-enhance and self-protect on a given attribute likely varies in strength, as what is considered desirable varies.

Accessibility The construct accessibility of a particular domain can also influence the tendency for people to self-enhance on attributes related to that domain. For example, in Chatard et al.’s (2007, Study 2) research on gender stereotypes and self-reported academic performance, they manipulated the salience of the gender stereotypes by having some participants evaluate stereotype-consistent statements (e.g., “Men are gifted in mathematics”) before reporting their grades in previous arts and math courses. Male students reported positively biased math grades when gender stereotypes were high in salience, whereas female students reported positively biased arts grades when gender stereotypes were salient. Primes that increase construct accessibility implicitly also have been shown to affect selfperception (Wheeler, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007). Therefore, implicit priming could influence the tendency to self-enhance on a relevant attribute. Gramzow, Johnson, and Willard (2010, Study 3) manipulated the accessibility of the concept of achievement by having participants complete a word search task that included either achievement-related words (e.g., strive, master, and succeed) or neutral words (e.g., shampoo, window, and table; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001). Participants then completed a demographic questionnaire in which they were asked to enter their current GPAs. GPA exaggeration was significantly higher in the achievement-prime condition than in the neutral-prime condition.

462   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES This priming effect was replicated using an even more indirect mind-set manipulation (Johnson & Stapel, 2010). These findings provide additional evidence that the tendency to selfenhance on a particular attribute is variable; in this case, being influenced by the cognitive accessibility of related constructs.

Accountability Accountability refers to an expectation that one’s self-evaluations will have to be explained, justified, and defended to an audience (Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002). Being accountable to others tends to decrease a variety of cognitive biases, such as overconfidence in the accuracy of social judgments (Tetlock & Kim, 1997) and the use of heuristic cues (e.g., communicator likability) rather than substantive arguments when evaluating persuasive messages (Chaiken, 1980). The tendency to self-enhance also is tempered by a sense of being accountable to others for one’s self-ratings. Several of the boundary variables discussed earlier may have their dampening effect on self-enhancement because they influence the degree to which respondents feel accountable. For example, if an attribute is unambiguously defined and can be verified by others, that should increase a feeling of accountability. McKenna and Myers (1997) investigated the role of accountability on self-enhancement within the context of driving ability. Participants rated themselves relative to the average driver in terms of overall skill, safety, and accident likelihood, as well as 17 specific driving skills (e.g., three-point turns and merging onto a highway). Participants in the accountable condition were told that they would take a driving test and be evaluated immediately after their ratings. Self-ratings of relative driving ability were significantly lower in the accountable condition than in a control condition. In a series of four experiments, Sedikides et al. (2002) examined the potential mechanisms underlying the effect of accountability on self-enhancement. The first study demonstrated that participants assigned themselves lower grades on an essay they had written when they believed they were going to have to justify their evaluation of the essay to a specific other person waiting in an adjacent room compared with a nonaccountable condition. The subsequent studies demonstrated that the status of the audience did not influence the effect of accountability on self-enhancement, that being personally identifiable to the audience was an important component of accountability, and that a sense of being critically evaluated also was important. Thus accountability appears to reduce self-enhancement when it involves being identifiable to a judgmental audience. Some of the research on academic exaggeration that was discussed earlier is consistent with this conclusion. Specifically, students exaggerated their GPAs significantly less when they were aware that their self-reports would be verified by the registrar’s office (Willard & Gramzow, 2009). The broader literature, however, has demonstrated that accountability also can increase certain cognitive biases (for a review, see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). There is some evidence that this can be the case with self-enhancement biases as well, at least for certain individuals. People high in narcissism are self-enhancers—by definition and by behavior (e.g., Farwell & Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998; John & Robins, 1994; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). They also tend to be less flexible in their utilization of self-enhancement (Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot, 2000) and use more defensive self-enhancement strategies, such as selfhandicapping and moral hypocrisy (Hepper et al., 2010). Narcissism also appears to influence how people respond to accountability. In an investigation of the effect of accountability



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on self-enhancement as a function of narcissism, Collins and Stukas (2008) first separated self-ratings into external and internal domains based on research by Crocker and Wolfe (2001). The external domains included physical appearance, outdoing others in competition, academic competence, and winning the approval of others. The internal domains included moral virtue, family love and support, and God’s love. (Note that the external domains appear to be more verifiable than the internal domains.) Participants rated themselves along each of the external and internal domains. In the accountable condition they were told that they would have to “explain, justify, and defend” their ratings to a staff member whom they would be meeting later. In the unaccountable condition they were told that their responses were anonymous. First, narcissism did not influence the effect of accountability on selfratings on internal domains (which was minimal, as these domains are relatively low in verifiability). However, narcissism did influence the effect of accountability on self-ratings on external domains. The findings for low narcissists were consistent with previous research on accountability (i.e., Sedikides et al., 2002). That is, low narcissists self-enhanced less in the accountable than unaccountable conditions (e.g., rated themselves as less physically attractive when accountable). High narcissists showed a different pattern, self-enhancing more in the accountable condition (especially if they reported that their sense of self-worth was based on how they were perceived on those external domains). These findings also are consistent with Sedikides et al.’s (2000) conclusion that narcissists show less contextual sensitivity in their expression of an overly positive self-view. Whereas others become more modest when accountable for their self-views, narcissists become more self-enhancing (if the domain is relevant to their self-worth). In other words, a strong motive to self-enhance can overpower the constraints of accountability—even leading to its overexpression.

Satiation Although the self-enhancement motive can be quite powerful and influential, it can be satisfied at least temporarily, reducing its influence on judgments about the self. Self-enhancement serves a function, allowing people “to elevate the positivity of their self-conceptions and to protect their self-concepts from negative information” (Sedikides & Strube, 1997, p. 212). If a person is feeling positive about himself or herself and is not under threat, self-enhancement concerns may not be at the forefront and may not have a major influence on judgments and behavior. Indeed, one opportunity to engage in a self-enhancing behavior or judgment can reduce the tendency to engage in subsequent enhancement if given the opportunity (Tesser & Cornell, 1991). The review by Sherman and Hartson (Chapter 6, this volume) on self-affirmation theory and research emphasizes a related point: that an affirmation of an important aspect of the self can buffer against the negative effects and reactions to other self-threatening information and experiences. For example, enhancing judgments of the self relative to another person are increased following a threat to the self but are reduced by selfaffirmation (Beauregard & Dunning, 1993). Likewise, self-affirmation has been shown to reduce the influence of self-enhancement concerns on ratings of a stigmatized outgroup (Fein & Spencer, 1997), as well as the tendency to perceive a novel ingroup as superior (Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005). Finally, affirmation has been shown to reduce the influence of dispositional differences in the strength of the self-enhancement motive on academic exaggeration. Gramzow and Willard (2006) found that a self-affirmation manipulation decreased the tendency for people

464   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES high in dispositional self-enhancement to exaggerate their GPAs. Importantly, however, affirmation did not influence overall levels of GPA exaggeration. This suggests that affirmation shifted the motive or reason for exaggeration from enhancement to something else. Regardless, it is possible to reduce the influence of the self-enhancement motive on judgments of the self and others, essentially by satisfying the motive in some other way.

Introspection and Self-Criticism In the research on accountability discussed earlier, Sedikides et al. (2002) further found that being accountable and identifiable to an evaluative audience increased focus on one’s shortcomings as a writer, rather than one’s strengths. In follow-up research, Sedikides and Herbst (2002) found that a manipulation that required participants explicitly to focus on their weaknesses directly influenced the grades that participants assigned to themselves, leading them to evaluate their own essays less positively. Thus it appears that self-focus can reduce or counteract the influence of the self-enhancement motive on self-appraisal. Further research by Sedikides and his colleagues has demonstrated the tendency for introspection to reduce self-enhancing judgments. Participants were instructed to think carefully about the reasons they possess a particular trait (e.g., honesty or unkindness) and to write the reasons down before they rated themselves on those traits (Sedikides, Horton, & Gregg, 2007). If participants were asked to introspect about a positive trait, they rated the trait as less descriptive of themselves than did a control group. If participants were asked to introspect about a negative trait, they rated the trait as more descriptive of themselves than did a control group. It also was determined that the introspective exercises reduced the level of self-enhancement by increasing uncertainty about the self. More subtle methods for increasing self-focused attention also have demonstrated that an internal focus reduces self-enhancing judgments and increases negative affect. For example, having participants complete a self-report measure of sociability while in front of a mirror increased the association between self-reported sociability and objectively assessed sociability (Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio, & Hood, 1977). The presence of a mirror also increases anxiety (George & Stopa, 2008; Hass & Eisenstadt, 1991) and self-criticism and decreases self-esteem (Heine, Takemoto, Moskalenko, Lasaleta, & Henrich, 2008, in their U.S. sample). Most pertinent to the present discussion, self-focused attention as a result of mirror presence has been shown to reduce self-enhancing reports of academic and intellectual performance. Participants who reported their SAT scores while facing a mirror were more accurate in their self-reports than were control participants (Pryor et al., 1977). In summary, increasing self-focus and introspection draws people’s attention toward their inner standards and toward discrepancies between their ideal and actual selves (Silvia & Duval, 2001), which can increase self-criticism and negative affect and override the desire and/or ability to selfenhance.

Ceilings and Set Points An additional factor that could limit the tendency for self-evaluation to increase continuously is that there may be an optimal level of positive illusion about the self (Baumeister, 1989). Baumeister proposes that a modest amount of distortion may be adaptive—an optimal



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“bandwidth” of illusion. Below that bandwidth resembles depression. This may be accompanied by a sense of meaninglessness that deenergizes the motivational system and diminishes any desire and the confidence to strive and achieve. Above the bandwidth resembles mania or hubris. Goals and expectations may be too high, leading to risky behavior and to the almost certain prospect of eventual failure and painful disillusionment. If this notion of an optimal level of illusion is at all legitimate, it suggests that most people settle within an optimal bandwidth. There must then be checks and balances that keep self-evaluation from crossing the adaptive thresholds. Routine self-enhancement and self-protective strategies keep the person at the optimal, moderately biased level of selfbelief. When self-esteem begins to take a hit, self-enhancing and protection strategies become hyperactivated to bolster the self, or atypical reserve strategies are employed. This might be thought of as the defensive zone. When a person begins to feel too fondly about him- or herself, then internal corrective cognitions (“you’re not all that great”) or external protests (“I’m no hero”) may be triggered. Perhaps this could be thought of as the modesty zone. In other words, the strength of the self-enhancement motive might vary adaptively at the margins of the optimal bandwidth. Beyond the bandwidth lies psychopathology. The sociometer model of self-esteem also is clearly relevant here, as it proposes thresholds on how high and low self-esteem can be moved as a function of interpersonal feedback and appraisal (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). A similar but slightly more elaborated version of an “optimal level” theory has been proposed by Cummins (1998, 2010). He contends that levels of subjective well-being (SWB) are actively managed to remain at or be drawn back to an adaptive (and adapted to) set point. Cummins’s model uses the physiological concept of homeostasis as an analogy for how the psychological system manages levels of SWB. According to this model, SWB is actively managed by “dispositional, genetically pre-wired, neurological systems” (Cummins, 2010, p. 4). He argues that each person has a set point of SWB that is genetically determined. Even if positive circumstances are experienced (such as winning the lottery or gaining a promotion), the homeostasis system will adapt to the new circumstances and eventually SWB will return to the set point. If challenging or threatening circumstances are experienced (such as stress due to health, relationship, or financial concerns), the system actively will defend SWB from falling below the bottom of the set point range. Only if the challenge is so great as to exceed the capacity of the homeostatic system’s defenses will sharp decreases in SWB occur. At this point, SWB is no longer under the control of the defense system and is at the mercy of the severity of the challenging circumstances. If and when the level or immediacy of the threat diminishes, then the homeostasis system will reassert itself and return SWB within the set point range. Cummins proposes both external and internal buffers as the mechanisms for SWB homeostasis. External buffers include material resources (e.g., money and property) and supportive relationships. Internal buffers include the cognitive capacity for adaptation and habituation and other cognitive and emotional mechanisms that are referred to in this volume as self-enhancement and self-protection strategies (for a review of the proposed internal buffers, see Cummins & Nistico, 2002). Cummins speculates that the primary function of this system is to manage core affect (Russell, 2003) and ultimately the positivity of selfperception. Both Baumeister’s and Cummins’s models imply that, at a global level, maintaining a bolstered sense of self-worth and positive affect is adaptive for daily functioning and effective self-regulation. A modestly inflated academic self-view also appears to be associated

466   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES with adaptive self-regulation specifically within the academic domain. First of all, although students tend to exaggerate their grades, the amount by which they do so is relatively small. Across the many studies my colleagues and I have conducted on academic exaggeration, the average mean difference between self-reported and actual GPA is approximately 0.09 points (on a scale of actual GPAs that generally range from 1.80 to 4.00). Very few students exaggerate by 0.75 points or more. In addition, students who exaggerate their GPAs report that when they think about academics and their academic performances they feel positive affect and challenge-oriented emotions (such as excitement and eagerness) rather than negative affect and threat-oriented emotions (such as worry and anxiety). They also report promotion-focused goals rather than prevention goals. Finally, controlling for initial actual GPA, students who exaggerate their GPAs tend to earn higher GPAs down the line than do students who do not exaggerate (Willard & Gramzow, 2009). Like self-enhancement at a global level, moderate self-enhancement of a specific aspect of the self appears to yield emotional and performance benefits.

Alternative Motives Finally, although self-enhancement is an important and, arguably, primary motive (Sedikides, 1993), theorists have identified several influential self-evaluative motives other than the immediate desire to establish and maintain a positive self-concept. For example, Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) proposed that there are situations in which people are less biased in their self-perceptions. Specifically, when people are in a deliberative mind-set in which they are planning a course of action, it may be more functional to place a priority on accurate and diagnostic information. If the deliberative context requires appraisal of one’s own attributes and abilities (such as whether to quit one’s job and run for political office), a self-assessment motive that triggers careful consideration and evaluation of one’s capabilities and resources may be more functional than a self-enhancement orientation that prematurely launches the decision forward due to raw ambition blurred by positive illusions. A self-assessment orientation also would be useful in an academic context on occasion. For example, self-enhancement probably is useful to some degree when preparing application materials for graduate school (e.g., in one’s personal statement). However, it also would be useful to suppress one’s typical tendency to exaggerate specific (and verifiable) attributes of the self, such as one’s GPA, and to report this information accurately. An honest assessment of your true ability also could prevent you from wasting money on application fees to universities that do not have a record of accepting students with your true qualifications. There could be implications for performance, as well. When deciding which major is best and which courses to take, an assessment of your true strengths and weaknesses, and a frank reflection on your past successes and failures could set you on the right path and help you avoid failure. Once the decision has been made, however, a shift to a more enhancing orientation could provide the confidence and drive toward success.

Conclusion Although there are many limits to the ability to establish and maintain a positive self-view, the motive to self-enhance and self-protect is very powerful, and people pull at the constraints



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and push the boundaries. This resistance is especially evident when examining the tendency to exaggerate academic performance. Students exaggerate unambiguous and concrete information about themselves: their grades in specific courses and their overall GPAs. Academic exaggeration occurs despite the fact that students are aware of their actual GPAs and that their responses presumably could be verified. As with other forms of self-enhancement and self-protection, however, the strength of the motive to exaggerate academic performance varies across individuals and situations. Students high in achievement motivation and dispositional self-enhancement are particularly prone toward exaggerating their grades. And, although the self-enhancement motive is powerful, its influence can be curtailed, and it can be satiated. Students are less likely to exaggerate when their actual academic performances are made salient to them (rather than their performance goals). Likewise, students who typically exaggerate their GPAs do so less if they have an alternative opportunity to affirm an important aspect of themselves. However, the self-enhancement motive can also be energized and its influence increased. Unconscious priming of achievement increases the degree to which students exaggerate their academic performances. The presence of these boundaries helps to explain why self-esteem is not ever increasing. The tendency to resist these constraints attests to the important role that self-enhancement and self-protection play in the regulation not only of self-evaluation but also of behavior. Academic exaggeration is related to high performance goals and predicts better actual performance in the future. Students who push the boundaries also move forward.

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470   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 255–275. McKenna, F. P., & Myers, L. B. (1997). Illusory self-assessments—can they be reduced? British Journal of Psychology, 88, 39–51. Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 556–563. Pryor, J. B., Gibbons, F. X., Wicklund, R. A., Fazio, R. H., & Hood, R. (1977). Self-focused attention and self-report validity. Journal of Personality, 45, 513–527. Robins, R. W., & Trzesniewski, K. H. (2005). Self-esteem development. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 158–162. Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. Psychological Review, 110, 145–172. Schlenker, B. R. (1980). Impression management: The self-concept, social identity, and interpersonal relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Sedikides, C. (1993). Assessment, enhancement, and verification determinants of the self-evaluation process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 317–338. Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2008). Self-enhancement: Food for thought. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 102–116. Sedikides, C., & Herbst, K. (2002). How does accountability reduce self-enhancement?: The role of self-focus. Revue Internationale De Psychologie Sociale, 15, 113–128. Sedikides, C., Herbst, K. C., Hardin, D. P., & Dardis, G. J. (2002). Accountability as a deterrent to self-enhancement: The search for mechanisms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 592–605. Sedikides, C., Horton, R. S., & Gregg, A. P. (2007). The why’s the limit: Curtailing self-enhancement with explanatory introspection. Journal of Personality, 75, 783–824. Sedikides, C., & Strube, M. J. (1997). Self-evaluation: To thine own self be good, to thine own self be sure, to thine own self be true, and thine own self be better. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 209–269). New York: Academic Press. Shepperd, J. A. (1993). Student derogation of the Scholastic Aptitude Test: Biases in perceptions and presentations of College Board scores. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 14, 455–473. Silvia, P. J., & Duval, T. S. (2001). Objective self-awareness theory: Recent progress and enduring problems. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 230–241. Sinha, R. R., & Krueger, J. (1998). Idiographic self-evaluation and bias. Journal of Research in Personality, 32, 131–155. Suls, J., Lemos, K., & Stewart, H. L. (2002). Self-esteem, construal, and comparisons with the self, friends, and peers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 252–261. Taylor, S. E., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1995). Effects of mindset on positive illusions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 213–226. Tesser, A., & Cornell, D. P. (1991). On the confluence of self processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 501–526. Tetlock, P. E., & Kim, J. L. (1997). Accountability and judgment processes in a personality prediction task. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 700–709. Toma, C. L., Hancock, J. T., & Ellison, N. B. (2008). Separating fact from fiction: An examination of deceptive self-presentation in online dating profiles. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1023–1036. Van Lange, P. A. M., & Sedikides, C. (1998). Being more honest but not necessarily more intelligent than others: Generality and explanations for the Muhammad Ali effect. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 675–680. Van Yperen, N. W. (1992). Self-enhancement among major league soccer players: The role of importance and ambiguity on social comparison behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22, 1186–1196.



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Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 806–820. Wheeler, S. C., DeMarree, K. G., & Petty, R. E. (2007). Understanding the role of the self in primeto-behavior effects: The active-self account. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 234– 261. Willard, G., & Gramzow, R. H. (2008). Exaggeration in memory: Systematic distortion of self-evaluative information under reduced accessibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 246–259. Willard, G., & Gramzow, R. H. (2009). Beyond oversights, lies, and pies in the sky: Exaggeration as goal projection. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 477–492.

Chapter 22 Measurement of Self-Enhancement (and Self-Protection) Joachim I. Krueger Jack C. Wright

Half of the people you know are below average.            —Steven Wright (American comedian, writer, and actor, 1955–   )

S

edikides and Gregg (2008, p. 102) define self-enhancers as “human beings who hold an excessively flattering view of themselves and of things associated with the self.” This definition implies that self-enhancement and—to an extent—self-protection are marked by a difference between judgment and reality. Logically, this definition does not imply that everyone who has a highly positive self-image is also a self-enhancer. If Albert Einstein had regarded himself a genius, hardly anyone would have objected. Self-enhancement means that there is a discrepancy between self-judgment and the self’s true nature or value. As Alicke and Sedikides (2009, p. 28) frame the measurement issue, “to demonstrate a self-enhancement or self-protection bias is to refer a person’s actions or attributions to an objective standard.” Typically, self-enhancement is measured on personality traits or other characteristics, such as happiness or intelligence, on which a high score is desirable (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). Conversely, self-protection is measured on traits or characteristics on which a low score is desirable, such as depression or vulnerability to adverse life events (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001; Weinstein, 1980). Although different motivational systems appear to underlie self-enhancement and self-protection (cf. Alicke & Sedikides, 2009), they are quantitative analogs of each other. Self-protection can be recast as a form of self-enhancement by reverse-coding the measure. The measurement issues reviewed in this chapter apply to both self-enhancement and self-protection, but they are presented with reference to the former. The researcher’s task is to capture the discrepancy between self-judgment and reality. Self-judgments are easy to obtain by self-report. The challenge lies in the identification of 472



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suitable criterion (reality) variables and their reliable and valid measurement. When selfenhancement is considered a psychological attribute of the person, its measurement faces many of the same problems arising in the measurement of any personality characteristic, only more so. How do we know that Eva is extraverted? Eva can report how extraverted she thinks she is, and a score can be calculated from her responses to a psychometric scale designed to measure extraversion. Likewise, observers can rate Eva with respect to extraversion, or they can fill out a scale with her as the target person. Neither Eva’s self-report nor the observer ratings have an automatic claim to be the superior measure. On the one hand, self-reports can benefit from the person’s rich knowledge of her or his own behavior in a variety of social contexts (Fiedler, 1996; Krueger, Ham, & Linford, 1996; Malle & Pearce, 2001). This privileged knowledge can lead to self-enhancement. In his analysis of egotism, William James credits philosopher Adolf Horwicz with the idea that “Our own things are fuller for us than those of others because of the memories they awaken and the practical hopes and expectations they arouse” (James, 1890, p. 327, emphasis in the original). Yet on the other hand, the person may unwittingly deceive him- or herself or deliberately distort his or her judgment to manage the way others see him or her (Paulhus & Reid, 1991). Research in the self-enhancement tradition emphasizes the possibility of distortion while downplaying the person’s advantage in accessing private information. One common technique for overcoming the small information base available to individual observers is to recruit several observers. The theory is that, by aggregating multiple observer judgments, scores can be constructed that closely represent what the person is really like. On this assumption, the discrepancy between a self-judgment and average observer judgment indicates in which direction and how strongly the person’s self-view is distorted. The aggregation of observer ratings holds two promises. First, as the sample of observers becomes larger, the random errors affecting each individual rating are gradually eliminated. Second, as the sample of observers becomes more diverse, any systematic bias arising from the observer’s unique perspective is also eliminated. Ideally, a sample includes observers whose different experiences with the target person map his or her social world. One would want to include, for example, observers who have witnessed Eva interacting with her family and friends and other observers who know her in her working environment (Kraemer et al., 2003). Inasmuch as Eva’s behavior varies over such contexts, the agreement among her observers will be only modest. A representative sampling of social contexts will likely reduce interobserver agreement. Contrary to conventional wisdom, high agreement is not a good proxy for accuracy. Instead, high agreement can indicate nonrepresentative sampling or shared observer biases.

Outline of This Chapter The observer-based approach is but one of several measurement paradigms currently in use. We begin our review by considering self-enhancement measures that do not require observer judgments. The conceptual platform for these intrapersonal measures is social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954; Suls & Wheeler, 2000). From the perspective of this theory, selfenhancement is a person’s perception or belief of being superior to others. We review measures devised to capture the discrepancy between judgments of self and judgments of others and examine their statistical properties. We then return to the observer-based paradigm, the conceptual platform of which is the social realist approach to personality assessment (Funder,

474   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 1995; Kenny, 2004). From this perspective, self-enhancement is indicated by self-perception that is more favorable than the perception of the same person in the eyes of others. A comparison of the two paradigms reveals significant similarities. Both approaches cast self-enhancement as a discrepancy, which entails the use of statistical difference or residual scores. At the same time, there is a metatheoretical difference. According to the social comparison approach, self-enhancement is beneficial to the person, whereas according to the social realist approach, it is a detriment to the person’s well-being and adjustment. We show that careful attention to the question of “Who is judging whom with respect to which person characteristic?” can explain these divergent results. In the final section of the chapter, we review attempts to go beyond traditional methods of measurement and analysis. Some of these alternative methods are found to be deficient, whereas others hold promise (see also Paulhus & Holden, 2008). With a gold standard for the assessment of self-enhancement still being elusive, researchers and readers are advised to be mindful of the assumptions and constraints pervading the work. Measuring self-enhancement is a far cry from sticking a meat thermometer into a turkey to see if dinner can be served.

The Social Comparison Approach Direct Measurement In social psychology, a popular way of measuring self-enhancement is to ask participants to judge themselves relative to other people or to the average person (Suls, Lemons, & Stewart, 2002; Zuckerman & O’Loughlin, 2006). This method seeks to bypass psychometric complexities by placing the burden of measurement on the respondents themselves. In its crudest form, this “direct” approach (Alicke & Govorun, 2005) suggests the inference that a person claiming to be better than average is guilty of a self-enhancement bias. Recalling Einstein, however, must give us pause. A person claiming to be better than average may indeed be better than average. Following classical test theory (Lord & Novick, 1968), each individual selfjudgment can be regarded as a composite of a true score and bias (and random error). If true scores were known, the correlation between these scores and the comparative self-judgments would be an index of accuracy. If this correlation were positive and perfect (and if the means were the same), no one would be biased; if it were zero, a claim of being better than average would be equally likely to be true and false. In social psychology, there is limited interest in the self-enhancement scores of individual research participants. Instead, it is noted that the average comparative self-judgment typically lies above the midpoint of the scale, thereby giving prima facie evidence of self-enhancement at the group level (Svenson, 1981). Indeed, if true scores are distributed symmetrically, it is not possible for most people to be better than average. This is not true, however, for skewed distributions. Measures of self-esteem and other self-report measures of desirable psychological attributes are highly skewed, with most people obtaining high scores (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). The self-esteem of most individuals is therefore above average (Moore & Small, 2008). Yet only 50% of people can be above the median. To capitalize on the median’s insensitivity to distributional skew, some researchers ask respondents to estimate the percentile of their score. They may ask respondents to estimate the percentage of people whose self-esteem scores are lower than their own. This modified language, it is hoped, will protect respondents from confusing mean and median.



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The basic finding is that estimated percentiles lie between 60 and 70% on average (Williams & Gilovich, 2008). There is some variation over participant populations, attributes judged, and other contextual variables. For example, self-enhancement tends to be stronger for attributes relating to morality than for attributes relating to competence (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; Krueger & Acevedo, 2007), for attributes thought to be controllable rather than uncontrollable (Alicke, 1985; Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993), and for attributes whose meaning is somewhat ambiguous rather than well defined (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). These moderator effects can be exploited in research on the cognitive and motivational sources of self-enhancement. It is tempting to equate the bias of self-enhancement with a lack of accuracy. There is some truth to this idea. If 65% of respondents believe themselves to be above average, the maximum correlation (phi) between belief and reality is .73. In contrast, if 95% believe themselves to be better than average (see Cross, 1977, for proof that this can happen), the maximum correlation is .23. However, one must bear in mind that the minimum correlations are constrained in analogous fashion (being –.73 and –.23, respectively, for the 65% and the 95% self-enhancement effect). In short, a larger group-level self-enhancement effect narrows the window for possible accuracy correlations; it does not guarantee that judgments are overall less accurate. Likewise, extreme better-than average effects limit the variance of self-judgments, which makes it more difficult to discover systematic associations between individual differences in self-judgment and other variables of interest, such as true scores on the focal variable or other personality variables. The classification of individual respondents as self-enhancers or self-effacers requires independent criteria. As noted before, respondents’ percentile estimates of how well they did on a test of ability can be compared (and correlated) with the percentiles associated with their test scores. Unless a test addresses an arcane subject, such as the metaphysics of Heraclitus, a positive, though imperfect, accuracy correlation can be expected. If, for example, 65% of respondents claim to be above average and if the accuracy correlation is .50, then about a third of those claiming to be above average are not. A positive correlation between estimated and actual percentiles permits the following predictions. The lowest scoring respondents are most likely to overestimate their scores, and the highest scoring respondents are most likely to underestimate theirs (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). With a criterion measure in play, a self-enhancer is not necessarily someone who believes him- or herself to be better than average but someone who overestimates his or her true percentile. Coupled with the overall finding that most estimates are greater than 50%, it follows that the errors among the low scorers will be larger than the errors among the high scorers (Krueger & Mueller, 2002). Figure 22.1 (top) displays this pattern. It is often forgotten that a bivariate distribution can be plotted in two different ways (Dawes & Mulford, 1996; Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994). When true percentiles are plotted against estimated percentiles, the respondents with the highest self-estimates are most likely to overestimate their true scores, and the respondents with the lowest estimates are most likely to underestimate theirs. The absolute size of the errors is now the same (what differs is their frequency), and no one is tempted to speculate about the psychological sources of two “asymmetric errors.” In Figure 22.1 (bottom), overestimation is indicated by a negative difference between the identity line and the regression line, whereas underestimation is indicated by a positive difference. Nonetheless, and regardless of which plotting scheme is used, a difference measure of

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FIGURE 22.1.  Predicting errors from criterion percentiles (top); predicting errors from estimated percentiles (bottom).

self-enhancement is large inasmuch as a self-rating (S) is high or a reality measure (R) is low. This result is implied by the definition of self-enhancement as S – R. When self-judgments and criteria are assessed as an individual’s percentile relative to a group, both S and R are themselves difference scores. Assuming knowledge of the underlying distributions, selfjudged percentiles follow from the differences between absolute judgments about the self (S) and absolute judgments about the average person (P). Likewise, criterion percentiles follow from the differences between true individual scores and the average score in the group (M). In other words, the difference S – R can be expanded into (S – P) – (R – M), with S, P, and R varying over respondents and M being a constant (Moore & Healy, 2008).

Indirect Measurement The direct measurement approach assumes that respondents can faithfully perform an implicit social comparison. They are thought to generate estimates of how good they are or how well they do in some absolute sense. They are also assumed to generate estimates of how good



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the average person is or how well that person does. Finally, they are assumed to evaluate the difference between these two estimates and translate it into a single composite judgment of how good they are or how well they do relative to others. These implicit judgments and operations are rarely unpacked, but they can be and they should be. Why, after all, should people who are assumed to be prone to self-related biases be expected to compute their own biases rationally and reliably? Among others, Klar and Giladi (1999) decomposed the single comparative judgment by also asking participants to render absolute self-judgments and absolute judgments of the average person. Using this “indirect” approach (Alicke & Govorun, 2005), they confirmed that the difference between self-judgments, S, and judgments of the average person, P, predicted the comparative judgment, C (self judged to be better or worse relative to the average person). The question is, however, how the individual components of the difference score contribute to this result. The correlation between the difference score S – P and the criterion C can be recovered from the variance of self-judgments, the variance of judgments of the average person, and correlations among the three variables (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Specifically, sself .rself,criterion – sperson .rperson,criterion

√ s2self + s2person – 2.sself .sperson .rself,person Inspection of the formula shows that the difference-score correlation rS–P,C becomes more positive inasmuch as sS > sP or as rS,C > rP,C. These effects are simple and lawful. Figure 22.2 (top) displays a plot of difference-score correlations against the natural logarithm of the ratio of standard deviations. Figure 22.2 (bottom) displays a plot of difference-score correlations against the natural logarithm of the ratio of correlations. Two differences are noteworthy. First, differences between rS,C and rP,C have a larger effect on rS–P,C than differences between sS and sP. The ratio of standard deviations would have to approximate infinity in order to match the maximum effect of the ratio of correlations. Second, the effect of differences between the primary correlations is harder to predict than the effect of differences between the standard deviations. Whereas the effect of the ratio of standard deviations is captured by a single ogival function, the effect of the ratio of correlations yields a family of exponential functions. A final insight drawn from inspection of the formula for the difference-score correlation is that its value becomes more extreme as rS,P increases (Krueger, 2008). This latter correlation can be read as an index of accuracy on the assumption that people ought to expect similarities between themselves and others. Note, however, that a strict interpretation of accuracy would call on everyone to provide the same estimate for P (as the average person has only one true score), in which case rS,P is not defined. Taken together, these lawful determinants of the size of the difference-score correlation demand that individual empirical results be interpreted with caution, as any particular value of rS–P,C may have arisen from a variety of different underlying patterns (see Asendorpf & Ostendorf, 1998; Krueger, 2008; Ullrich, 2009, for careful mathematical and empirical analyses). In their empirical work on comparative judgment, Klar and Giladi (1999) confirmed (trivially) that the difference score S – P does not predict C when S and P are controlled. More important, they found that S was by far the best predictor of C. The correlation between P and C appeared to be spurious; its size could be estimated by multiplying rS,C with rS,P. Figure 22.3 displays the result with sanitized, though empirically representative, numbers.

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FIGURE 22.2.  Predicting the difference-score correlation from the ratio of standard deviations (selfjudgments over judgments of the average person) (top); predicting difference-score correlations from the ratio of correlations (self with criterion over other person with criterion) (bottom).

Several explanations of this finding have been offered (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). Consider the following three. First, people may simply put more weight on their absolute self-judgments than on their judgments of the average person. This hypothesis assumes no differences between how much people know about themselves and others, only an egocentric tendency to anchor self–other comparisons on the self (Kruger, 1999). Second, it is possible that people retrieve more relevant information about the self in part because they focus their attention on the target of the comparison (the self) rather than on the referent. According to this focalism hypothesis, comparative judgments are more closely linked to judgments about others when those others are compared with the self (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). Third, there may be a genuine informational advantage for the self that cannot be overcome by a change of focus. If so, judgments of others are more regressive, that is, less extreme than self-judgments (Krueger, 2000; Moore & Small, 2007). Such a restriction in variance can attenuate correlations with third variables. Recall that according to one interpretation of rationality, there should be little variance in judgments



Measurement of Self-Enhancement (and Self-Protection)   479     Absolute     Self-Judgment

.70 [.65]  

  Comparative   Self–Other   Judgment

   .50    [.38]

  Absolute Judgment   of Other Person

.35 [0]

FIGURE 22.3.  Comparative self–other judgments in relation to absolute self-judgments and absolute other judgments. Hypothetical (but empirically plausible) results.

of the average person; the average person has only one particular value, whereas individual selves differ. All three interpretations lead to the conclusion that a comparative judgment is problematic. As the difference score is not a suitable predictor, one might conclude that the residuals in the S judgments, after controlling for P judgments, are credible measures of self-enhancement. After all, these residuals predict the comparative judgments well. Note, however, that this line of research began with the question of whether the comparative measure is a good measure of self-enhancement. The results suggest that it is not. If the comparative measure is now taken to validate the residual S judgments, it begs the question of what self-enhancement is. It would not be logical to validate one measure (residual S) with a recently discredited one (the comparative judgment). Likewise, it is no use seeking refuge in the residualized P judgments after controlling for S judgments. These residuals are independent of S. A presumed self-enhancer would be a person whose P judgment is lower than predicted on the basis of rS,P. However, this measure cannot be validated either with reference to comparative judgments. Despite the failure of the comparative judgment to explain unique individual differences that are not accounted for by its component variables, the measure remains of interest from a social psychological point of view. Otten and van der Pligt (1996) found that respondents are more likely to self-enhance when using a direct measure than when using an indirect, componential measure. This finding suggests that the comparative measure incorporates positive self–other contrasts regardless of the basic positivity of a respondent’s self-image. Such contrasts tend to be stronger when people judge the average other person than when judging specific individuals (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Codol, 1975). So far, we have seen two meanings of self-enhancement. According to one, a selfenhancer overestimates his or her true score (S – R > 0); according to another, a self-enhancer believes him- or herself to be better than average (S – P > 0). How different are these measures? As both difference scores share the variable S, they must be “fundamentally related”

480   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES (Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007, p. 78). For example, if the three variables are independent of one another and their variances are the same, the correlation between S – R and S – P can be expected to be .5.1 Hence, compared with people with negative self-images, people with positive self-images are more likely to overestimate their true scores (e.g., on a test) and to believe they are better than others. This simple picture changes when people’s own estimated percentages of correct responses and their estimated percentages of correct responses obtained by the average person are plotted against actual percent correct. Now, there is a seemingly paradoxical result of a negative correlation. For easy tests (i.e., high actual percent correct), most people underestimate their own scores but believe that they did better than others (i.e., R > S > P); for difficult tests (i.e., low actual percent correct), most people overestimate their scores but believe they did worse than others (P > S > R). Moore and Healy (2008) present an elegant model to resolve this conundrum. Their argument can be summarized as follows. First, a criterion variable is regressive with respect to a predictor variable unless r = 1 or –1. In the present context, the average self-judgments associated with the highest and the lowest actual scores are less extreme than those actual values. This is so because self-judgments include random error in addition to genuine self-knowledge and because these judgments are biased by prior self-knowledge extending beyond the judgment task at hand. Second, the average judgments of others associated with the highest and lowest self-judgments are less extreme than those self-judgments. This is so because people have less knowledge of others than of themselves; to make judgments of others, they fill this epistemic gap by projecting (imperfectly) from themselves. In short, self-judgments are regressive with respect to actual scores, and judgments of others are more regressive still. The negative correlation between S – R and S – P over values of R is a necessary result. As actual scores rise, the better-than-average effect becomes stronger, and the overestimation of the self becomes weaker.

Interlude: The Taylor–Brown Hypothesis Self-enhancement, like self-protection and self-effacement, is a psychological construct. As in the case of any such construct, its antecedents and consequences are of interest. As for the antecedents, psychologists have examined the contributions of many cognitive or motivational processes. Although a desire for a positive self-image seems all too human and legitimate, a bias of self-enhancement calls the person’s morality and rationality into question and thereby impugns the mechanisms underlying the bias. Self-enhancement calls up associations with collectively censured character traits such as pride, arrogance, and selfishness. Selfprotection seems less objectionable, for a self-protector can claim psychological self-defense as a legitimate motive. Self-effacement, although it is as much a bias as self-enhancement, raises associations with modesty and humility and hence less opposition. A moral subtext is difficult to avoid in social psychology (Asch, 1952; Brannigan, 2004). Yet overt challenges to people’s morality are rare. Often, the challenges address aspects of human performance, with the message being that people are not as logical or rational as 1 A simulation with all means set to 0 and standard deviations set to 1 shows that rS–P,S–R = .5+.5rP,R if rS,P = rS,R = 0. Conversely, the correlation between the two difference scores decreases nonlinearly when rS,P or rS,R increase. Specifically, rS–P,S–R = –0.2394r2 – 0.1534r + 0.4917, where r represents rS,P or rS,R.



Measurement of Self-Enhancement (and Self-Protection)   481

they should be. Errors, biases, and fallacies, which are among the favorite phenomena of the field, raise the specter of incoherent thinking (Dawes, 2001; Krueger & Funder, 2004). Self-enhancers, it seems, need to be educated. As Heraclitus put it during the axial age, “To extinguish hybris is more needed than to extinguish a fire.” As for the consequences, biases are a potential threat to the person’s successful adaptation to life. A reasonable assumption is that biased thinking will, most of the time, degrade the accuracy of judgments. Inasmuch as accurate judgment is essential for survival, biased judgment courts negative consequences. If one believes that people learn from the consequences of their behavior, the question is, Why is there still so much self-enhancement? Taylor and Brown (1988) gave a surprising answer. Referring to research performed with the social comparison approach, they claimed that self-enhancement and other “illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative work” (p. 193). This argument is pragmatist in the Jamesian tradition. Social beliefs can be regarded as true if they are true in their consequences, that is, if the consequences are desirable. The Taylor–Brown hypothesis soon met with opposition from researchers favoring a realist approach to self and social perception. The key to their opposition was the suspicion that by using a within-person measurement approach, the social comparison paradigm stacks the deck in favor of the hypothesis. To overcome this problem, self-perception ought to be compared with an external—realistic—criterion.

The Social Realist Approach Observer-Based Measurement The backlash against the Taylor–Brown hypothesis was led by personality psychologists with a tradition of studying people both from the inside (self-reports) and from the outside (observer reports). These researchers favored study designs of the type introduced in the first section of this chapter. To effectively attack Taylor and Brown, however, they had to abandon a central premise of their field, namely the idea that self-perception contains valuable and valid information about the person that only that person can access. In other words, they had to agree with Taylor and Brown that discrepancies between self-judgments and criterion judgments only reveal the self’s biases and distortions. Without this concession, their alternative measures of self-enhancement could not enter the contest with the intrapersonal social psychological indices. Hence, for the purposes of the debate, the personality psychologists retreated to a reductive, behaviorist definition of personality. Armed with Hofstee’s (1994, p. 155) assertion that “in a scientific context, personality is by definition a public phenomenon,” they accepted interobserver agreement as the best—if not a perfect—index of accuracy and average observer judgments as measures of reality.2 Despite this difference in approach, the arsenal of statistical tools remained the same during the initial phase of research. The first result was that, on average, there was little evidence for self-enhancement. The mean differences between self-judgments and aggregated observer judgments were small and inconsistent, but the vanishing of this mean-level effect

2

Recall that this indexing is of dubious validity from a sampling-theoretic perspective.

482   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES received little attention. In the same way that someone wishing to ford a river has no interest in knowing that it is 3 feet deep on average, personality researchers kept the focus on individual differences and what they might predict. Their question was “Who self-enhances more than others and how is this related to adjustment?” Colvin, Block, and Funder (1995) found that, compared with self-effacers, self-enhancers were described less favorably by their peers. This result contradicted the Taylor–Brown hypothesis. Again, unpacking the difference-score correlation is instructive. Consider again the formula sself .rself,criterion – sobserver .robserver,criterion

√ s2self + s2observer – 2.sself .sobserver .rself,observer The difference-score correlation is negative inasmuch as sS < sO or rS,C < rO,C. A difference in the variance of self-judgments and observer judgments may arise when observers judge multiple target persons, whereas each target judges only him- or herself. Being able to compare target persons, observers may accentuate individual differences, whereas single target persons do not. Recall the point of the preceding section that self-judgments tend to be somewhat immune to social comparisons unless a target of comparison is explicitly provided. Even when observers consider only a single target person, they may make less regressive (i.e., more extreme) judgments than target persons themselves. The latter may be more prone to gravitate to the middle of the scale inasmuch as they try to integrate more diverse sources of information relevant for the trait at hand. Admittedly, these tendencies are counteracted by the effect of aggregation, which is that average observer judgments are regressive (i.e., have a small standard deviation) inasmuch as individual observers lack agreement with one another. A difference between the two correlations may arise because of shared method variance. As the paradigm is staked on the idea of social reality, the criterion measures must also be provided by observers—indeed, often by the same observers who are also judging the traits involved in the measure of self-enhancement. Any shared bias among these observers inflates rO,C. Defining such shared biases away with an appeal to aggregation cannot replace an empirical demonstration that such biases do not exist. Some personality psychologists have come to distrust difference scores because of their vulnerability to regression artifacts, which has been known since the early years of the 20th century (Thorndike, 1924). They turned to multiple regression to overcome these problems (see Edwards, 1993, for a technical description, and Zuckerman & Knee, 1996, for an application to self-enhancement research). John and Robins (1994) suggested that self-judgments be regressed on aggregated observer judgments and that the residuals be retained as measures of self-enhancement. In other words, the idea was to isolate the variance in the selfjudgments that could not be accounted for by social reality. John and Robins (1994) found that these residuals predicted individual differences in narcissism, that is, a positive residual correlation with an undesirable trait was consistent with the claim of Colvin et al. (1995) that self-enhancement is counterproductive. Despite using different methods, these personality psychologists were united in their rejection of the Taylor–Brown hypothesis. Much as the difference-score correlation can be unpacked, so can the residual-score correlation. This correlation is the familiar semipartial correlation between self-judgments and



Measurement of Self-Enhancement (and Self-Protection)   483

criterion judgments when the correlation between self-judgments and observer judgments is statistically controlled. The formula is rself,criterion – robserver,criterion .rself,observer

√ 1 – r2self,observer It is important to note that this correlation is strongly biased to be positive. In other words, a correlation of zero is not a credible null hypothesis. Why is this so? Note that in contrast to the case of the difference-score correlation, the inequality rS,C < rO,C is not sufficient to yield a negative residual-score correlation. The correlation rS,C must be smaller than the product of rO,C and rS,O. How might this happen? Although it may be expected that rO,C > rS,C for reasons outlined earlier (i.e., method variance), the correlation rS,O would still have to be quite large. If the expected value of the residual-score correlation is positive even before study, support for (or opposition to) the Taylor–Brown hypothesis depends primarily on whether the criterion variable is desirable (or undesirable). An unexpected result, that is, a negative residual correlation, is more likely inasmuch as the agreement between self-judgments and observer judgments is large. Taken together, these built-in constraints mean that to the extent that self-judgments appear to be accurate (high rS,O), self-enhancement has an elevated chance of appearing dysfunctional if the criterion variable is desirable and of appearing functional if the criterion variable is undesirable. This asymmetry is built into the statistical logic of the measure. It is not a feature of the world being studied. Unbiased tests of the Taylor–Brown hypothesis ought not to tolerate embedded conclusions. This leaves the option of computing the inverse residual correlation. Could one not regress observer judgments on self-judgments and correlate the residuals with a criterion? Here, a self-enhancer is a person who is judged less favorably by observers than predicted. To make this score more easily interpretable, its sign can be inverted. Again, however, the utility of this residual-score correlation is limited by the fact that it is biased to be positive and the fact that it induces asymmetric interpretations depending on the desirability of the criterion variable (see Bereiter, 1963, for a critical analysis of regression methods).

A Hybrid Measure It is perhaps surprising that few researchers have tried to apply different discrepancy measures (differences and residuals) to the same data (see De Los Reyes & Kazdin, 2004, for an exception). Instead, many individual investigators raise concerns about one type of measure and then employ another. Over time, cottage industries have emerged that take one measure off the shelf, accepting its validity without further inquiry. Yet a certain discontent can be discerned. In particular, the field’s inability to reach closure on the Taylor–Brown hypothesis has been a source of dissatisfaction. Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, and Robins (2004) noted the differences between the social comparison approach and the social realist approach. In an effort to break the stalemate between the two, they proposed to combine them. This was a remarkable step, as it required acceptance of the idea that the combination of two fallible measures will cancel rather than compound the shortcomings of each. Kwan et al. (2004) proposed that, although the social-comparison difference of S – P and the social-reality difference of S – O both capture valid aspects of self-enhancement,

484   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES each is confounded with the other. The two difference scores are correlated over respondents because they share one variable. If P and O are independent, one may expect a correlation rS–P,S–O of about .5, which is roughly what Kwan et al. (2004), and Sinha & Krueger (1998) found. To create an unconfounded index of self-enhancement, Kwan et al. (2004) adapted the social relations model (SRM; Kenny, 1994). The SRM decomposes judgments into main effects and interactions. The empirical realization of this model calls for a round-robin design, in which each person is both a target and an observer to everyone else. Judgments are then scaled relative to the mean (M) of all judgments. The target effect is given by the difference O – M, showing whether an individual person is judged more or less favorably by others. The perceiver effect is given by the difference P – M, showing whether a particular individual person judges others more or less favorably than others do. Setting aside some corrections that Kwan et al. (2004) recommended for small-group research, a self-judgment is predicted by the two main effects and the grand mean, namely by (O – M) + (P – M) + M, or O + P – M. The difference between the actual self-judgment and its predicted value, they say, represents an idiographic interaction effect. If S – O – P + M > ( 0) while self-effacing interindividually (S – O < 0)? How does she compare with Sven, who self-enhances interindividually while self-effacing intraindividually? A pragmatic solution might be to distinguish three types of people: Those who self-enhance according to both measures, those who self-efface according to both measures, and everyone else. As S – P and S – O tend to be positively correlated, less than half of the respondents fall within the third type. How much is gained with the use of summed difference scores? The answer is “Not much.” The critical problem is that P has little variance. Indeed, a round-robin design using



Measurement of Self-Enhancement (and Self-Protection)   485

TABLE 22.1.  Round-Robin Design Take 1: Perfect Consensus Person 1

1

2

3

4

5

P

S–O

S–P

S–O–P+M

5

4

3

2

1

3

0

 2

0

2

5

4

3

2

1

3

0

 1

0

3

5

4

3

2

1

3

0

 0

0

4

5

4

3

2

1

3

0

–1

0

5

5

4

3

2

1

3

0

–2

0

O

5

4

3

2

1

M=3

rankings makes it so because every person uses all available numbers. As the variance of P approaches zero, the hybrid term S – O – P reduces to the simple interindividual score S – O. This is an analytical truth, and Kwan, John, Robins, and Kuang (2008) “discovered” it in an empirical study. To illustrate some of the dependencies among the data in a round-robin matrix, consider three hypothetical patterns. Table 22.1 represents an idealized situation in which the rankings of five raters are in perfect agreement. This agreement will be taken to indicate perfect accuracy. Hence, all target effects, S – O, are zero. The perceiver effects, S – P, vary because S varies while P does not. All hybrid scores are also zero. The numbers displayed in Table 22.2 are constructed from the same data, but small perturbations have been introduced. For each person, the numbers referring to two others have been switched. The consequences are revealing. From the perspective of the social-reality paradigm, these perturbations constitute error. As 10 out of 25 rankings have been changed, 22 of the individual judgments now differ, if only slightly, from the aggregated O judgments. As the perturbations are small, the average O judgments retain their rank order, but their variance has become smaller. The difference S – O now has variance. As the variance in S – P has not changed, the results for S – O – P are identical to S – O. Two respondents are now classified as self-enhancers and two as self-effacers. This may be unfortunate, because the biases attributed to these respondents stem from erroneous judgments made by other observers about other targets. A hybrid score that capitalizes on random error cannot signal a systematic interaction effect.

TABLE 22.2.  Round-Robin Design Take 2: Some Error Person

1

2

3

4

5

P

S–O

S–P

S–O–P+M

1

5

4

2

3

1

3

  .2

 2

.2

2

5

4

3

1

2

3

  .4

 1

.4

3

5

2

3

4

1

3

 0

 0

0

4

4

5

3

2

1

3

–.4

–1

.4

5

5

3

4

2

1

3

–.2

–2

.2

O

4.8

3.6

3

2.4

1.2

M=3

486   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES TABLE 22.3.  Round-Robin Design Take 3: Consensus plus Projection Person 1

1

2

3

4

5

P

S–O

S–P

S–O–P+M

5

4

3

2

1

3

 0

 2

0

2

6

5

4

3

2

4

 1

 1

0

3

5

4

3

2

1

3

 0

 0

0

4

4

3

2

1

0

2

–1

–1

0

5

5

4

3

2

1

3

 0

–2

0

O

5

4

3

2

1

M=3

To introduce variance in the person variable P, it is necessary to abandon the constraints of the round-robin design. One possible source of variation in P is variation in S. Psychologically, this variation is the result of social projection. The hypothetical data displayed in Table 22.3 are constructed from the data in Table 22.1 with the modification that all judgments made by Person 2 are raised by 1 point, and all judgments made by Person 4 are lowered by 1 point. The result is a change in S – O, but all hybrid scores remain zero. If the hybrid score were taken outside of the confines of the round-robin design, the findings would only obscure these methodological problems. In a nomination design, for example, each target person recruits his or her own panel of observers, that is, people deemed highly familiar with the target’s personality (Funder, 1995). The target could rate the average person in the population or the average of his or her own observers. This approach could allow for considerable variation in P, and the hybrid score could be different from the simple differences S – O and S – P. Nonetheless, the logic of regression dictates that there is nothing left for a difference score to predict once a criterion variable has been regressed on the individual predictors (i.e., the regression weight for S – O – P = 0 once the weights for S, O, and P are estimated).

Other Methods More Discrepancies As we have seen, each individual-difference-score measure has found its critics who recommend use of regression residuals instead. A parallel suggestion has not been made with regard to the hybrid difference score. As it has become clear that the hybrid difference score does not reveal a statistical interaction effect, there is reason to hope that multiple regression may succeed where the ANOVA analogy failed. In multiple regression, an interaction term is expressed as the cross-product of the main effects (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). A multiple-regression model involving an interaction term offers analytic opportunities hitherto not exploited. For example, it would be possible to test Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) original hypothesis that people with low true scores make poorer social judgments than people with high true scores. When S is regressed on O, P, and O × P, this hypothesis suggests that the residuals—both positive and negative—of S relative to P are larger for individuals with low O scores than for individuals with high O scores. This result would also



Measurement of Self-Enhancement (and Self-Protection)   487

support Kruger and Dunning’s idea that high scorers are more prone to social projection. Whereas Kruger and Dunning (1999) took social projection to be another bias, Krueger (1998b) showed that projection increases judgmental accuracy (see also Dawes, 1989; Hoch, 1987). Still, caution must be used in the interpretation of regression results. First, a residual of S relative to the cross-product of O and P is not an index of self-enhancement. The residual can be positive when the value of O is high and the value of P is low, or vice versa. Second, the asymmetries noted before still apply. Even in a full multiple-regression model, outcomes of tests of the Taylor–Brown hypothesis depend on whether the criterion variable is desirable (e.g., self-esteem) or undesirable (e.g., narcissism) and who judges it (e.g., self or observer). All discrepancy measures discussed so far exploit variation in judgments by the target person or variation in judgments of the target person while using normative scores for the desirability of the trait. It is assumed, for example, that everyone agrees that “sincerity” is a desirable trait and that “selfishness” is an undesirable trait. Of interest is only how strongly a person attributes the trait to the self or to others. Demonstrably, there are also individual differences in perceived trait desirability. Individuals who see themselves as sincere or selfish rate these traits as significantly more desirable than individuals who do not claim these traits for themselves. The finding of systematic self-serving variation in trait evaluation is consistent with Dunning’s theory of trait construal (Dunning et al., 1989). An idiographic self-enhancement index, which amounts to a multiple regression performed for each respondent, exploits this variation (Krueger, 1998a). Over a set of traits, self-judgments are regressed on the person’s own judgments of trait desirability, as well as on the group averages of self-judgments and the group averages of the desirability judgments. A self-enhancer is a person whose pattern of overestimation and underestimation of self relative to the social norm of self-judgments is positively correlated with his or her pattern of overestimation and underestimation of trait desirability relative to the social norm of desirability judgments. Note that this “social normative” index of self-enhancement is not an individual residual but an idiographic regression weight (or partial correlation). In contrast to all other discrepancy measures, this index can be tested for statistical significance for each individual respondent. Perhaps more important, the social-normative index avoids the criterion problem that plagues the social-comparison and the social-reality paradigms. This method does not presume to ascertain what a person is really like in order to ascertain whether the person’s self-image is too positive or too negative. The respondent neither judges other people nor is judged by others. The social-normative measure can be understood as an intraindividual association between judgmental tendencies (to rate the self high [low] and to rate traits high [low]). Other respondents come into play only by undergoing the same exercise for themselves. Their aggregated judgments furnish the normative base rates that serve as statistical controls in each individual’s assessment. Freed from the criterion problem, researchers can focus on the task of sampling traits and respondents. To help with the former, Sinha and Krueger (1998) constructed a 23-item scale based on the Big Five Inventory (John & Donahue, 1994). Initial tests showed that, as intended, the social-normative measure is independent of the normative positivity of the self-image (i.e., rS, average desirability judgments). A priori, a person with a positive normative self-image is as likely to self-enhance (or self-efface) as a person with a negative normative self-image.

488   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES This feature should be useful in tests of the Taylor–Brown hypothesis, especially when the criterion trait (e.g., narcissism) is judged by observers. Alicke, Vredenburg, Hiatt, and Govorun (2001) also proposed a within-person measure of self-enhancement. Their “better-than-myself” measure does not even require other respondents to be engaged in the same task. Each person is both a target and his or her referent. The hypothesis that people will self-enhance under this condition is so daring that even Sir Karl Popper would have liked it. Alicke et al. (2001) found that respondents rated themselves as better than average even when the estimates of relevant behaviors were their own, obtained several weeks before the comparative judgments were made. In other words, many people hold on to the idea that they are better than average even if the average person is modeled after themselves. Such results suggest that self-enhancement contains at least a modicum of self-deception (Trivers, 2010). In a series of elegant experiments, Epley and Whitchurch (2008) found that most individuals falsely identify a face in a photograph as their own if it has been morphed with a photo of a very attractive face. The effect is not entirely egocentric as it also occurs for photos of close friends but not for photos of strangers. The effect appears to be automatic, however, because individuals show no awareness of it and because its strength is correlated with implicit (but not explicit) self-esteem. Recently, Preuss and Alicke (2009) proposed that metaperceptions can be used to tap into self-enhancement. According to this approach, a self-enhancer is someone who overestimates how favorably others see him or her. Conceptually, this difference-score measure is interesting because it combines a feature of the social-comparison paradigm (a judgment about another) with a feature of the social-realist paradigm (a judgment made by another), while avoiding the redundancies of the hybrid measure proposed by Kwan et al. (2004). Metaperception is logically independent of the person’s private self-image, although it is empirically dependent because most people expect others to see them as favorably as they see themselves.

Beyond Discrepancies A final family of self-enhancement measures does not involve discrepancies at all. Paulhus developed (Paulhus, 1984) and refined (Paulhus, 2002) a Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding that independently assesses a person’s tendency to strategically present the self favorably (“I never read sexy books or magazines”) and the tendency to unwittingly distort the self positively (“I never regret my decisions”). These scales are suitable for the study of individual differences, but they do not reveal where self-effacement ends and self-enhancement begins. Arguably, though, the scale assessing unconscious distortions only reveals enhancement; a low score indicates the absence of enhancement but not the presence of effacement. Paulhus also suggested that self-enhancement can be measured within a signal-detection framework (Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003). This approach returns to the challenge of distinguishing individuals who falsely claim positive outcomes for themselves from people who do so correctly. A self-enhancer is someone with a low threshold of claiming a positive outcome. Within a person, the bias increases both false and true positives. The ratio of the two depends on how well the person’s judgments are calibrated over tasks. The method thereby allows a separate assessment of bias and accuracy. When only impossible tasks are used, however, bias and inaccuracy are the same. Using an adaptation of this idea, comedian



Measurement of Self-Enhancement (and Self-Protection)   489

Steven Wright enjoys perplexing his audience with the challenge “Those of you who believe in psychokinesis, please raise my hand.” Why would people accept many false positives in their self-assessments? Errormanagement theory suggests that under certain conditions, people feel there is less harm in misplaced optimism than in false modesty (Haselton et al., 2009; Krueger & Mueller, 2002). Weber (1994) argued that such conditions often prevail. Her asymmetric loss function model assumes that “the more positive the outcome, the greater the cost of forgoing the beneficial effect of overestimating its likelihood and thus turning it into a self-fulfilling prophecy” (p. 230). Notice that this formulation is akin to Taylor and Brown’s (1988) pragmatist interpretation of self-enhancement. Unlike Taylor and Brown, however, Weber regards the updating of probability estimates in light of outcome valence and extremity as “a reasonable response that takes into consideration constraints that are ignored by the [standard expected utility] model” (p. 236).

Conclusion Alicke and Govorun (2005, p.  102) wrote that “The better-than-average effect is difficult to locate in this ‘zoo’ . . . of self-enhancement mechanisms.” The same is true for the methods used to measure self-enhancement. Psychological characteristics are difficult to quantify. Sometimes it makes sense to aggregate different measures in hopes that each one of them contributes a piece of the picture (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). This is not so in the case of selfenhancement. Different measures imply different assumptions about who is judging whom with regard to which attributes and under what conditions (Kurt & Paulhus, 2008). There are also fundamental differences in the underlying assumptions about the statistical construction of suitable quantitative indices. It would be shortsighted to claim that “everyone’s a winner,” especially when different measures lead to substantively opposite conclusions (as in the debate over the Taylor–Brown hypothesis). Not all measures of self-enhancement can be above average. Why is it so difficult to settle the question of proper measurement? The issue of measurement is sandwiched between the issues of hypothesis creation and hypothesis testing (Reichenbach, 1938), and sometimes it takes on features of either or both. A researcher wishing to study the trait of extraversion must have a theory of the kinds of behavior that represent extraversion and how to sample them. Scale development is theoretically driven, and it is, to some extent, open to empirical pruning and refinement. If a new scale of extraversion correlates poorly with established scales while correlating highly with scales of neuroticism, a hypothesis has been refuted. The dialectic of theory and data does not work as well in the case of self-enhancement. For one thing, there are no clear behavioral referents. Even if it is defined as a trait-like individual attribute, the bias of self-enhancement is measured as a judgment or as a relationship among judgments.3 Moreover, there is no clear way of achieving construct validity. As different measures compete for the distinction of being the true index of self-enhancement, correlations among them can neither support claims of convergent validity nor demonstrate 3

See, however, Holden’s (1995) use of differences in response latencies to detect self-enhancing faking in selfreports.

490   BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES the superiority of one measure over another. Most troubling, the performance of the measures cannot be evaluated with reference to differences in predictive validity. The fate of the hybrid measure is a case in point. Acceptance or rejection of the measure cannot depend on its being more or less correlated than other discrepancy scores (most notably S – O) or with criterion variables of social success or failure. Such a decision would have to presuppose the truth or falsity of the Taylor–Brown hypothesis. Studies such as the one reported by Kwan et al. (2004) that seek to validate a new measure and test this hypothesis necessarily yield uninterpretable results. The evaluation of the measure can only be analytical, as we attempted to show in this chapter. Ending on a realistically hopeful note, we submit that the analytical exercise presented herein has been useful. We have tried to show that there are measures of self-enhancement that show promise. Further psychometric work and independent testing of theory-driven hypotheses may yet lead to a science that will enhance insight into ourselves and the people we study.

Author Note We believe that this chapter is among the finest ever written about self-enhancement and its measurement. We fully realizes that the other contributors to this handbook will feel the same way about their chapters, but they are just sorely mistaken. Anyone who wishes to contest this assertion may reach the first author at [email protected].

Acknowledgments Financial support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (which recognizes the first author’s brilliance!) is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Mika MacInnis and Andra Geana, who worked magic creating the figures. David Freestone ran a simulation in MatLab, and Tony Evans, though being well above average himself, urged us to be mindful of the average reader.

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Author Index

Abela, J. R. Z., 375 Abelson, R. P., 6 Abrams, D., 116 Abramson, L. Y., 7, 322, 344, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 365, 366, 368, 373, 374, 375 Acevedo, M., 475 Ackermann, R., 371, 372 Adair, J. C., 170 Adams, G., 130 Ades, C., 32 Adler, T., 343 Affleck, G., 304 Agnew, C. R., 458 Agrawal, N., 61 Aguilar, L., 324 Ahrens, A. H., 363 Aiken, L. S., 290, 382 Ainsworth, M. D. S., 280, 281, 282 Akimoto, S. A., 433 Alampay, D. A., 160 Albery, I. P., 389 Albright, J. S., 371, 372 Alden, L. E., 267, 269, 272 Alea, N., 113 Alema, G., 31 Aleman, A., 61 Alessandri, S. M., 33 Alexander, R. D., 96 Alicke, M. D., 2, 6, 8, 11, 23, 39, 49, 50, 55, 57, 73, 93, 113, 157, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182,

184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 192, 193, 214, 237, 250, 303, 342, 349, 354, 358, 373, 399, 406, 427, 456, 472, 474, 475, 477, 478, 479, 488, 489 Allen, D. N., 215 Allen, J. J. B., 32, 33–34, 36 Allik, J., 342, 352 Allison, S. T., 93, 252, 459, 475 Alloy, L. B., 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 365, 366, 368, 369, 370, 372, 373, 374 Allport, F. H., 6, 430 Alnwick, K. A., 161 Aloise-Young, P. A., 383 Aloni, M., 86, 272 Alvaro, C., 219 Amaral, D. G., 25 Ambady, N., 266 Amir, O., 74 Amodio, D. M., 31, 32 Andersen, S. M., 291 Anderson, A. K., 24, 26, 27 Anderson, C., 484 Anderson, K., 366 Anderson, M. C., 214 Anderson, N. H., 250 Anderson, S. M., 364 Andrews, C., 29 Andrews, P. W., 362 Ansara, D., 399, 406, 417 Ansell, E. B., 272, 415 Anthony, D. B., 261, 262, 263, 266



Antl, S., 119 Apfel, N., 129 Appley, M. H., 3 Arden, K., 161 Arendt, H., 93 Ariely, D., 74, 146 Arkin, R. M., 23 Armeli, S., 304, 306 Armitage, C. J., 133, 134, 139 Armor, D. A, 247 Arndt, J., 5, 146, 206, 288, 332, 381, 383, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393 Arnett, P. A, 369 Arnheim, R., 5 Arnold, L., 74 Aron, A., 259, 310, 311 Aron, E. N., 259, 310 Aronson, E., 6, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 202, 203, 205, 382 Aronson, J., 129, 130, 132, 137, 146, 202 Asch, S. E., 94, 480 Asendorpf, J. B., 477 Asher, E. R., 269, 458 Asser, S. M., 391 Atkinson, J. W., 4 Atlas, G. D., 415 Au, K., 374 Austen, J., 93 Avena, N. M., 28 Axelrod, R., 429

495

496   Author Index B Babcock, L., 246, 247 Babey, S. H., 321 Baccus, J. R., 281, 291, 299 Back, M. D., 405 Bahrick, H. P., 213, 458 Bailey, S., 366 Baker, J. P., 402 Baker, T. B., 382 Balcetis, E., 11, 79, 85, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 170 Balchen, S., 262 Baldwin, M. W., 281, 283, 299, 300 Bales, S. L., 31–32 Baltes, M. M., 60 Baltes, P. B., 60, 342, 351 Banai, E., 283 Banaji, M. R., 51, 298, 299, 305, 332 Bandura, A., 93, 94, 99, 359 Banko, K. M., 146 Banner, M., 80 Barch, D. M., 31 Barclay, C. R., 219 Barclay, L. C., 244 Bargh, J. A., 10, 204, 321, 461 Barlas, S., 49 Barndollar, K., 461 Barr, L., 321 Barrett, A. M., 170 Barrett, D. M., 212 Barrett, F. L., 214 Barrett, L. F., 213, 268 Barrios, V., 53, 57 Bartholomew, K., 282 Barton, R., 370 Bartussek, D., 33 Bashore, T. R., 215 Batson, C. D., 96, 97, 98–99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 Bauman, C. W., 82 Baumeister, R. F., 2, 5, 104, 113, 116, 140, 175, 200, 242, 243, 244, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 265, 270, 274, 291, 303, 308, 310, 320, 321, 332, 399, 403, 405, 407, 410, 412, 416, 464, 465, 474 Baxter, L. A., 321

Bazerman, M. H., 239, 245, 246 Beach, S., 123 Beard, C. K., 212 Beaulieu-Pelletier, G., 214 Beauregard, K. S., 72, 77, 180, 184, 240, 463 Bechara, A., 26, 27 Beck, A. T., 359 Beck, L., 70 Becker, A., 197 Becker, E., 383, 384 Becker, M. H., 381 Bednarski, R., 250 Beer, J. S., 30, 39, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 79, 82, 171, 291, 303, 309, 349, 409, 484 Beevers, C., 61 Beike, D. R., 223 Beilock, S. L., 137 Bellavia, G., 270, 271, 272, 273 Bem, D. J., 6 Benassi, V. A., 360 Bennett, A. J., 31–32 Bennett, W. J., 94 Benson, D. F., 30, 52, 58 Benthin, A., 197 Berant, E., 287 Bereiter, C., 483 Berger, P. L., 384 Berger, S. A., 213, 458 Berglas, S., 5, 288 Berkman, E. T., 32 Berkowitz, L., 33, 38 Berlin, L. J., 282 Berman, J. S., 368, 372 Bernieri, F., 86 Berntsen, D., 212, 215, 217, 221 Berntson, G. G., 51 Berridge, K. C., 28, 29, 30, 39 Berscheid, E., 259, 266, 269 Bersoff, D. M., 97 Betz, A. L., 113, 215, 218 Beyer, S., 369 Bhanji, J., 53, 56 Bibring, E., 359, 373 Biderman, M. D., 302 Biernat, M., 73, 74 Billig, M. G., 438 Binning, K. R., 130, 144 Birbaumer, N., 34

Birnbaum, G. E., 291 Bjorklund, D. F., 341, 346, 349, 350, 352 Black, W., 31 Blackwood, N. J., 53, 56 Blaine, B., 119 Blair, R. J. R., 30 Blake, R., 158, 159 Blanchard, D. C., 33, 38 Blanchard, R. J., 33, 38 Blanton, H., 146, 202 Blascovich, J., 324 Bleau, G., 303 Blehar, M. C., 280 Bleske-Rechek, A., 402 Blevins, T., 309 Blickle, G., 78 Block, J., 79, 249, 303, 482 Block, R. A., 113 Bloom, B. S., 346 Bluck, S., 113, 221, 223 Blumberg, S. J., 124, 130 Blumer, D., 52, 58 Boals, A., 217 Bobocel, R., 246 Boden, J. M., 243 Bodenhausen, G. V., 59, 119, 197, 299 Bogwald, K. P., 78 Bohlig, A., 37 Bohn, A., 212, 221 Bohrnstedt, G. W., 311 Bonacci, A. M., 239, 412 Bonanno, G. A., 81, 82 Boncimino, M., 311 Bond, M. H., 76, 121, 249, 341, 433, 434, 483 Bond, R. N., 283 Bosma, H., 136 Bosson, J. K., 287, 299, 302, 307, 310, 409, 413, 414, 415 Botvinick, M. M., 31, 51 Bowlby, J., 279, 280, 281, 282, 283 Bradley, M. M., 24, 25 Branden, N., 5 Brandon, T. H., 382 Brandtstädter, J., 163 Brannigan, A., 480 Branscombe, N. R., 116, 323, 324, 328 Bratslavsky, E., 140, 407 Brauer, L. H., 28

Brauer, M., 237 Braver, T. S., 31 Braverman, J., 361, 362, 374 Brazy, P. C., 32 Brehm, J. W., 37, 194, 196, 201, 202 Breitenbecher, D. L., 50, 184, 237, 479 Breiter, H. C., 27 Brennan, K. A., 282, 287, 289 Breus, M., 387, 444 Brewer, M. B., 177, 438 Briley, D. A., 431 Brim, O. G., 351 Brinol, P., 142 Brockner, J., 262 Brodish, A. B., 38 Brody, G. H., 302 Broemer, P., 119, 122, 214 Brothers, L., 26 Brown, A. C., 302 Brown, D. J., 73 Brown, J. D., 49, 54, 55, 57, 76, 79, 80, 128, 131, 249, 293, 303, 304, 358, 408, 427, 433, 435, 437, 481, 489 Brown, N. R., 113, 114, 119 Brown, R. J., 177 Brown, R. P., 243, 299, 410 Brozovich, F., 214 Brubaker, J. R., 219 Bruce, J. M., 369 Bruce, M. N., 49, 407, 488 Brunell, A. B., 268, 269, 399, 403, 407–408, 411, 413 Bruner, J. S., 10 Brunner, E., 136 Brunot, S., 78 Brunson, C. A., 225 Bryant, F. B., 304 Bryson, S. E., 362 Brzustoski, P., 129 Buchtel, E., 431 Buchwald, A. M., 366 Buckingham, J. T., 180, 187 Buckner, R. L., 60 Bucy, P. C., 25 Budescu, D. V., 475 Buehler, R., 122 Buffardi, L. E., 250, 417 Bugelski, B. R., 160 Buhrmester, D., 262, 267 Bundy, R. P., 438

Author Index   497 Bunge, S. A., 57, 60 Bunyan, D. P., 129, 130, 132, 136, 138, 141, 144 Burger, J. M., 4 Burrows, L., 204, 321 Burson, K. A., 480 Burton, R. V., 94 Bush, C. P., 407–408 Bushman, B. J., 239, 242, 243, 244, 310, 405, 407, 410, 412 Buss, A. H., 33 Buss, D. M., 399, 403, 405, 410 Butler, R., 341 Buunk, A. P., 237 Bynum, J., 370, 372

C Cacioppo, J. T., 4, 51 Cai, H., 435 Cain, C. K., 26 Cain, N. M., 415 Cairns, H., 174 Cairns, K. J., 5 Calkins, E. V., 74 Camerer, C., 82, 247 Cameron, J. J., 219, 220, 221, 261, 262, 264, 266 Cameron, J. S., 82 Campbell, D. T., 428, 429, 489 Campbell, J. D., 262, 265, 301, 348, 353, 474 Campbell, K. W., 7 Campbell, R., 321 Campbell, S. D., 37 Campbell, S. M., 410, 412 Campbell, W. K., 7, 53, 56, 60, 239, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 250, 281, 303, 307, 310, 313, 365, 399, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407–408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 415, 416, 417, 461 Cantor, N., 5, 70 Caputo, D., 458 Carlezon, W. A., Jr., 29 Carlsmith, J. M., 166, 194, 195, 196 Carlson, H. M., 321 Carlson, K. S., 285 Carmichael, T. S., 25

Carstensen, L. L., 60, 112, 214, 215, 354 Carter, C. S., 30, 31, 51 Carter, H. D., 212 Carter, S. E., 122 Carter, T. J., 458 Carvallo, M. C., 305, 312 Carver, C. S., 24, 32, 33, 135, 358, 382, 461 Cason, H., 222 Cassidy, J., 279, 282, 287 Castano, E., 444 Cavallo, J. V., 260, 272, 273 Cavender, J., 33–34 Cecotto, C., 31 Chaiken, S., 133, 462 Chambers, J. R., 55, 73, 184, 457, 478 Chan, F. S. F., 374, 432 Chang, B., 341 Chang, E. C., 122 Chang, J. Y., 29 Chang, K., 433 Chao, M. M., 431, 439, 446 Chaplin, W., 370 Chapman, J. P., 32 Chapman, L. J., 32 Charbonnier, E., 237 Charles, S. T., 60, 214 Chassin, L., 382 Chatard, A., 460 Chatman, J. A., 484 Chatterjee, A., 411 Chaturvedi, A., 446 Chave, E. J., 179 Chaves, M., 458 Chavira, V., 328 Cheek, J. M., 288 Chen, E. E., 86 Chen, H., 100, 103 Chen, J., 432 Chen, M., 204, 321 Chen, S., 291 Chen, T., 372 Chen, X., 441, 443 Cheney, S., 409 Cheng, J. T., 402 Cheng, Y.-y., 440, 443 Cheung, T.-S., 433 Chiodo, L. M., 399, 405 Chiu, C.-y., 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 438, 439, 440, 441, 443, 444, 445, 446

498   Author Index Choi, K., 269 Chokel, J. T., 259 Chowdrey, N. K., 372 Christensen, T. C., 213 Chudasama, Y., 30 Cialdini, R. B., 259 Cicchetti, P., 25 Cipolotti, L., 30 Cisek, S. Z., 405 Clark, C. L., 282, 414 Clark, M. S., 259, 266, 267, 271, 273, 311 Cleare, A. J., 369 Clement, R. W., 183 Clements, C. M., 373, 374 Clementz, B. A., 53, 56 Coan, J. A., 36 Cobb, R. J., 285 Codol, J. P., 479 Cofer, C. N., 3 Cohen, A., 85 Cohen, A. R., 194 Cohen, G. L., 72, 73, 78, 118, 124, 129, 130, 132, 135, 137, 138, 139, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 202, 250 Cohen, J. D., 31, 51, 477, 486 Cohen, L. L., 322 Cohen, P., 477, 486 Cohen, S., 135, 136, 224, 266 Cole, S., 168 Coleman, J. R., 25 Collange, J., 241 Collins, A. L., 351 Collins, D. R., 399, 417, 463 Collins, E., 100 Collins, J., 123 Collins, N. L., 130, 260, 268, 270, 284, 304 Collins, R. L., 185, 250 Colvin, C. R., 79, 249, 250, 303, 482 Conger, J. J., 304 Conner, T., 306 Constable, G., 61 Contrada, R., 321 Conway, M. A., 8, 269 Cook, A., 146, 387, 388 Cook, I. A., 32 Cooley, C. H., 300, 321, 427 Coolidge, F. L., 31 Coon, H. M., 430 Cooper, A. M., 414, 415 Cooper, D. P., 388, 391

Cooper, J., 6, 11, 146, 198, 200, 202, 203, 204, 382 Cooper, M. L., 284 Cornell, D. P., 123, 463 Cornwell, B., 328 Correll, J., 120, 142, 202, 205, 206, 299, 332 Corrigan, P. W., 321 Costa, P. T., 82 Cottrell, C. A., 291 Cowan, W. B., 50 Cox, C. R., 388, 389, 390, 391, 392 Coyne, J. C., 370 Cozzarelli, C., 284 Craighead, W. E., 366, 367, 369 Craik, K. H., 79 Crain, A. L., 198 Cramer, D., 361 Cramer, P., 2, 351 Crandall, C. S., 327 Crandall, S. J., 160 Crary, W. G., 213 Craven, R. G., 344 Crayton, J. W., 33 Crepaz, N., 123 Creswell, J. D., 129, 132, 135, 136, 139 Critcher, C. R., 74, 129, 141, 142, 146, 458 Critchley, H. D., 29, 30 Critelli, J. W., 402 Crocker, J., 119, 129, 139, 141, 146, 202, 299, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 328, 331, 363, 384, 463 Cross, P., 184, 475 Cross, S. E., 433 Croyle, R. T., 213, 381 Cummins, R. A., 465 Cunningham, W. A., 24, 27, 36 Curhan, J. R., 246 Currie, J., 61 Curtin, J. J., 37 Curtis, R. C., 264, 266

D Dach-Gruschow, K., 437 Da Costa, L. A., 213, 458 Dahl, R. E., 167 Dal Cin, S., 382 Dale, K., 2 Dale, R., 160, 161

d’Alfonso, A. A. L., 32, 35 Dalgleish, T., 369 Daly, J. A., 399 Damasio, A. R., 29, 30 Dana, J., 98 Daniels, D. H., 346, 353 Dardis, G. J., 249, 462 D’Argembeau, A., 212 Darley, J. M., 93, 94 Darwin, C., 33 Das, E., 134 David, A. S., 61 Davidov, M., 399, 403, 406, 417 Davidovitz, R., 281 Davidson, M., 214 Davidson, R. J., 32, 35, 36 Davies, M. F., 461 Davila, J., 285 Davis, K. E., 176, 281, 289 Davis, R. M., 201 Davis, T. L., 180 Davis-Kean, P. E., 344 Daw, N., 28 Dawes, R. M., 475, 481, 487 Dayan, P., 28 Debus, R., 344 Dechesne, M., 385 Deckel, A. W., 31 DeCoster, J., 332, 383 de Haan, E. H. F., 32, 35 DeHart, T., 298, 299, 300, 302, 304, 305, 306, 310, 311, 312, 313 Deichmann, R., 29, 30, 159 Dekel, S., 81 De Los Reyes, A., 483 DelVecchio, W. F., 346 DeMarree, K. G., 142, 461 DeMartino, B., 50, 57, 58 DeMonbreun, B. G., 366, 367 Demos, R., 101 Deng, C., 435 Denizeau, M., 206 Dennard, D. O., 366–367, 371, 372 DePaulo, B. M., 267, 269, 457 Derrick, J. L., 271, 311 DeRubeis, R. J., 364, 371, 372 Desforges, D. M., 84 D’Esposito, M., 57, 58 DeSteno, D., 95, 100 Deutsch, R., 299

Devine, P. G., 6, 31, 38, 39, 167 Dewhurst, S. A., 219 De Wit, H., 28 De Witt, N. W., 3 DeYoung, C. G., 36 Di Paula, A., 348, 353 Dickens, C., 93 Dickerson, C. A., 199 Dickinson, K. A., 288, 414, 415, 416 Diehl, M., 122 Diekmann, K. A., 245 Dien, J., 25 Diener, E., 104, 258 Diener, M., 258 Diesendruck, G., 344 Dijksterhuis, A., 141, 299, 306, 314 Dillard, A. J., 134 DiLorenzo, T. M., 371 Dion, K. L., 322, 414 Dipboye, R. L., 196 Ditto, P. H., 85, 381 Doan, B. D., 362 Dobbins, G. H., 458 Dobson, K. S., 362 Dodgson, P. G., 113, 119, 120, 305 Dodrill, C. L., 369 Dohn, M. C., 305, 306, 333 Dolan, R. J., 28, 29, 30, 50 Dolev, T., 286 Dollard, J., 4 Donaghue, N., 74 Donahue, E. M., 487 Donnellan, M. B., 259 Donovan, J. J., 459 Doosje, B., 116 Doss, R. C., 32 Dotzenroth, S. E., 262 Downey, G., 260 Downey, K. T., 322 Downs, D. L., 291, 300 Dritschel, B., 365 Drost, P. L., 363 Drwecki, B., 303 DuCharme, M. J., 260 Duff, K. J., 175 Dukes, R., 321 Duncan, B. L., 200 Duncan, T., 250 Dunlosky, J., 458 Dunn, B. D., 369

Author Index   499 Dunning, D., 11, 49, 54, 55, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 93, 124, 129, 141, 142, 146, 157, 159, 162, 164, 165, 166, 170, 175, 177, 180, 184, 240, 352, 364, 456, 458, 463, 475, 486, 487 Duval, T. S., 464 Dweck, C. S., 215, 350 Dwight, S. A., 459 Dykman, B. M., 368

E Eagleman, D. M., 50 Early, S., 106 Eccles, J., 343, 347 Eccleston, C., 328 Eddings, S. K., 214, 245, 405, 409, 416 Edelson, M., 213 Edwards, J. R., 482 Ee, J. S., 402 Eelen, P., 214 Effron, D. A., 82 Eggleston, T. J., 197 Egloff, B., 405 Ehrlinger, J., 80, 458 Eibach, R. P., 214 Eidelman, S., 73, 74 Einbinder, L. C., 392 Eisenberg, N., 37 Eisenstadt, D., 464 Eiser, J. R., 180 Ekman, P., 33, 36 Ellemers, N., 116 Elliot, A. J., 6, 7, 23, 167, 243, 260, 310, 399, 458, 461 Ellis, H., 400 Ellison, N. B., 457 Ellsworth, P., 270, 271 Emmons, R. A., 400, 402, 411 Enns, V., 283 Epley, N., 79, 93, 157, 244, 488 Epstein, J. A., 267, 457 Epstein, S., 332 Epton, T., 133, 134, 143, 144 Erdelyi, M. H., 176, 214 Erev, I., 475 Eriksen, B. A., 30 Eriksen, C. W., 30 Ermel, O., 122 Eshel, Y., 457, 458

Espinet, S. D., 36 Esteves, F., 24 Evans, K., 272 Everitt, B. J., 26 Exline, J. J., 239, 242, 410

F Fagan, P. J., 82 Fairchild, K., 305, 306, 333 Fanning, P., 5 Farah, M. J., 51 Farb, C. F., 24 Farh, H. L., 458 Farnham, S. D., 299, 306, 332 Farwell, L., 403, 404, 407, 462 Fazio, R. H., 200, 203, 299, 332, 464 Fearn, M., 36, 37, 200 Feeney, B. C., 268, 270 Fehr, B., 70, 262, 283 Fein, S., 84, 130, 240, 463 Feingold, A., 244 Feinstein, J., 331 Feldman, S. I., 260 Feldman Barrett, L., 306 Felson, R. B., 80, 311, 457 Fenichel, O., 359 Fenzel, L. M., 347 Ferguson, M. J., 163, 322 Fernandes, M., 215 Fernandez, N. C., 199 Festinger, L., 6, 131, 166, 184, 193, 194, 348, 384, 473 Fetzer, B. K., 237 Fiedler, E. R., 409 Fiedler, K., 473 Fiedorowicz, L., 312 Field, N. P., 81 Finkel, E. J., 242, 245, 313, 403, 404, 408, 410, 417 Finkenauer, C., 407 Finnerty, J., 404 Fischer, R., 430 Fiske, D. W., 489 Fiske, S. T., 241, 328 Fissel, K., 31 Fitzsimmons, J. R., 25 Fitzsimons, G. M., 260 Flament, C., 438 Flay, B., 382 Fletcher, G. J. O., 283 Flor, H., 34 Florian, V., 291, 293, 385, 389

500   Author Index Flykt, A., 24 Fointiat, V., 199 Fong, G. T., 158, 382 Forbes, C., 131 Forest, A., 268 Foster, C. A., 245, 313, 403, 404, 410 Foster, J. D., 245, 399, 402, 404, 405, 406, 410, 412, 414, 416, 417 Foster, M. D., 329 Foster, S., 457 Foti, D., 25 Fox, N. A., 35, 291 Fraley, R. C., 281, 289 Frank, R. H., 96 Franken, I. H. A., 36 Frankl, V. E., 5 Fraser, S. C., 94 Fredrickson, B. L., 119 Freedman, D. G., 86 Freedman, J. L., 94 Freese, J. L., 25 Freud, A., 2, 131 Freud, S., 2, 95, 213, 359, 373, 400 Fried, C. B., 198, 199 Friedman, J. N., 409 Friedman, R., 4 Friedrich, J., 247, 248 Friesen, M. D., 283 Friesen, W. V., 33 Frijda, N. H., 24 Fromkin, H. L., 4 Fry, R. B., 134, 382 Fu, C., 369 Fu, H.-y., 438, 439, 443 Fu, T., 369 Fuegen, K., 183 Funder, D. C., 79, 249, 417, 473–474, 481, 482, 486 Fung, H. H., 86 Furman, W., 262

G Gabbard, G. O., 288 Gable, S. L., 258, 269 Gabriel, M. T., 402, 407 Gabriel, S., 119, 312 Gabrieli, J. D. E., 57 Gaertner, L., 85, 120–121, 184, 224, 301, 352, 354, 384, 432, 433, 463 Gaetz, R., 262

Gailliot, M. T., 140 Gainotti, G., 31 Galinsky, A. D., 146, 202 Gallardo, I., 142 Galliher, J. M., 321 Garber, J., 363, 372 Garcia, J., 129 Garrod, H., 389 Garry, M., 213 Gasparrini, W. G., 31 Gatenby, J. C., 26 Gaucher, D., 264, 267, 268, 269 Gaughan, E., 415 Gaus, V., 260, 301 Gawronski, B., 197, 299 Gazzaniga, M. S., 26 Gebauer, J. E., 51, 119, 122, 214 Gelfand, M. J., 429, 430, 431, 433 Gentile, B., 321 George, L., 464 Gerber, H., 373 Gerber, W.-D., 34 Gergen, K. J., 250 Gerrard, M., 250, 382, 390 Gibbons, F. X., 197, 250, 382, 390, 464 Gibbons, J. A., 222, 223 Gibson, B., 82, 382 Giladi, E., 477 Gilbert, D. T., 124, 130, 131, 132, 146 Gilihan, S. J., 51 Gillath, O., 270, 272, 280, 281 Gilovich, T., 78, 176, 247, 248, 475 Giordano-Beech, M., 260, 301 Giovino, G., 382 Girodo, M., 262 Gjerde, P. F., 285 Glass, D., 197, 200 Godfrey, D., 435 Goethals, G. R., 93, 252, 459, 475 Goff, J. S., 417 Goffman, E., 80 Goheen, T. W., 307, 413 Goldenberg, J. L., 286, 381, 385, 386, 388, 389, 391, 392, 393 Goldstein, K., 31 Golin, S., 363, 372

Gollwitzer, P. M., 80, 461, 466 Gonsalkorale, K., 259 Gonzalez, R. M., 167 González-Vallejo, C., 49 Goodie, A. S., 405, 406 Goodman, C. C., 10 Goodnow, J. J., 342 Gordon, E., 181 Gore, J. C., 26 Gosling, P., 206 Gosling, S. D., 79, 351, 405 Gotay, C. C., 38 Gotlib, I. H., 214, 215, 367, 369 Gottfried, J. A., 29 Govorun, O., 6, 73, 93, 178, 179, 183, 184, 472, 474, 477, 478, 488, 489 Grabowski, A., 122 Grace, R. C., 161 Graf, P., 50 Graham, J. W., 82, 383 Graham, S. M., 267 Gramzow, R. H., 49, 59, 216, 329, 402, 456, 458, 461, 462, 463, 466 Grannemann, B. D., 244 Gray, J. A., 28 Green, B. L., 349, 352 Green, J. D., 166, 214, 215, 216, 218, 221, 281, 304, 343, 416 Greenberg, J., 2, 5, 7, 84, 112, 113, 132, 158, 200, 202, 206, 288, 293, 301, 332, 364, 383, 385, 387, 388, 390, 392, 444, 445 Greenberg, M. S., 368 Greene, D., 175 Greenwald, A. G., 9, 131, 213, 215, 298, 299, 305, 306, 332, 358, 434 Gregg, A. P., 5, 6, 15, 23, 49, 51, 128, 184, 193, 218, 224, 243, 263, 298, 299, 300, 302, 303, 307, 310, 342, 352, 399, 408, 409, 413, 427, 428, 455, 464, 472 Greve, W., 72, 75, 76 Griffin, D. W., 270, 272, 273, 310, 311 Gross, J. J., 51, 52, 57 Guenther, C. L., 184, 185

Guimond, S., 460 Guinn, J., 342 Gunn, G. R., 116, 117, 119 Güntürkün, O., 32 Gur, R. C., 101 Gurevitch, Z. D., 249

H Habermas, T., 113 Hackett, G., 369 Hadaway, C. K., 458 Haddock, G., 117, 119, 214 Hagemann, D., 33 Haidt, J., 82 Hajcak, G., 25 Hall, C. S., 242, 400 Hall, L. K., 213, 458 Hall, S., 321 Hallam, J. R., 260, 301 Ham, J. J., 473 Hamamura, T., 120, 428 Hambrick, D. C., 82, 411 Hamid, P., 287 Hamilton, E., 174 Hamilton, V. L., 93 Hammon, D., 250 Hancock, J. T., 457 Hankin, B. L., 7, 344, 365, 375 Hansford, B. C., 458 Hanson, S. L., 347 Harackiewicz, J. M., 179 Hardin, C. D., 306, 332 Hardin, D. P., 249, 462 Hardin, G., 429 Hariri, A. R., 167 Harkins, S. G., 132, 237, 238 Harkness, K. L., 372 Harmon-Jones, C., 36, 37, 200 Harmon-Jones, E., 24, 31, 32, 33–34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 200 Harms, P. D., 49, 407, 488 Harré, N., 457 Harrell, J., 321 Harris, C. R., 36 Harris, P. R., 133, 134, 143, 144 Hart, C. M., 405, 408 Hart, J. J., 286, 388 Hartel, C. R., 60 Harter, S., 343, 344, 347, 384 Hartlage, S., 368 Hartnett, J., 220 Harvey, R. D., 323 Haselton, M. G., 489

Author Index   501 Hashimoto, H., 431 Hass, R. G., 461, 464 Hassin, R., 10 Hastings, S., 116 Hattie, J. A., 458 Haupt, A. L., 259, 260 Hauser, S. T., 370 Hayes, A. F., 72, 78 Hayes, J., 385 Hayne, H., 213 Haynes, G. A., 197 Haynes, J. D., 159 Hayward, M. L. A., 82 Hazan, C., 281, 282 Healy, P. J., 476, 480 Heath, C., 73, 458, 475 Heatherton, T. F., 51, 54, 309 Heckhausen, J., 351, 475 Heerey, E. H., 30, 52 Heider, F., 6, 176 Heilman, K. M., 31, 169, 170 Heimpel, S. A., 259, 260, 261, 304 Heine, S. J., 85, 120, 121, 301, 427, 428, 431, 433, 464 Heinicke, C., 281 Heitland, K., 130 Helgeson, V. S., 267 Hellhammer, D. H., 135 Hellige, J. B., 34 Helweg-Larsen, M., 249, 472 Hemingway, H., 136 Henderson, M. C., 371, 372 Hendin, H. M., 288 Hendriks, V. M., 36 Hennigan, K. M., 383 Henrich, J., 464 Henriques, J. B., 32 Henry, P. J., 325 Henry, S., 328 Hepp, S., 96 Heppen, J. B., 200 Hepper, E. G., 402, 406, 456, 462 Heppner, W. L., 307 Hepton, G., 133 Herba, E., 33 Herbst, K. C., 249, 462, 464 Hermann, A. D., 299 Hermans, D., 214 Hermans, E. J., 35 Hernandez, M., 239 Hershey, L., 70 Hertel, P. T., 214

Hess, T. M., 60 Hesse, E., 287, 292 Hessling, R., 390 Hetts, J. J., 246, 299, 300, 301, 305, 333 Hewig, J., 33 Heylighen, F., 428, 429 Hiatt, M., 178, 488 Hickman, S. E., 409 Higgins, E. T., 4, 260, 283 Higgins, R. L., 6 Highberger, L., 106 Hinkley, K., 291 Hirschberger, G., 281, 293, 389 Hirstein, W., 156 Hirt, E. R., 309 Hobfoll, S. E., 139 Hoch, S. J., 487 Hoebel, B. G., 28 Hoffman, J. M., 354 Hoffman, M. L., 94 Hofstee, W. K. B., 481 Hogan, M. E., 368 Hogan, R., 243 Hoge, D. R., 347 Hogg, M. A., 8, 116 Hogle, A., 273 Hokanson, J. E., 366–367, 371, 372 Holden, R. B., 489 Holden, R. D., 474 Holgate, S., 309 Holland, R. W., 201 Hollmann, S., 77 Hollon, S. D., 363, 372 Holman, E. A., 123 Holmes, D. S., 182, 222 Holmes, J. G., 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 270, 271, 272, 273, 304, 310, 311 Holt, K., 364 Holtgraves, T., 250 Holzberg, A. D., 49, 74, 352, 456, 475 Hong, Y.-y., 428, 429, 437, 438, 439 Hood, R., 464 Hoorens, V., 237, 245, 248, 250, 251, 252 Hopfinger, J. B., 31 Hopkins, W. D., 32 Horesh, N., 281, 287 Hornak, J., 29, 30 Horowitz, L. M., 70, 282

502   Author Index Horton, R. S., 244, 303, 399, 417, 464 Horvath, S., 402, 403, 405, 407, 413 Hoshino-Browne, E., 120, 205, 299, 332 House, P., 175 Hovland, C. I., 13, 179 Howell, A., 269 Hoyt, C. L., 324, 330 Hsee, C. K., 74 Huang, J. Y., 267 Hughes, B. L., 39, 53, 55, 58, 59 Huguet, P., 237, 238 Hull, C. L., 4 Hunt, D. M., 389 Hurtz, G. M., 459 Hutton, D. G., 259, 303 Huyssen, A., 444 Hyde, J. S., 7, 344, 365 Hyers, L. L., 322

I Iacoboni, M., 51 Icheiser, G., 79 Impett, E. A., 269 Ingram, R., 375 Inkster, J. A., 194 Insko, C. A., 6 Irvy, R. B., 26 Isaacowitz, D. M., 60 Issacharoff, S., 247 Izard, C. E., 33 Izsak, R., 281

J Jackson, K. M., 382 Jacobs, G. D., 32 Jacobson, J. A., 372 James, W., 113, 473 James-Hawkins, L., 252 Jamieson, J. P., 132 Janak, P. H., 29 Janicki-Deverts, D., 135 Janis, I. L., 176 Janoff-Bulman, R., 96 Jaremka, L. M., 129, 130 Jemmott, J. B., III, 381 Jensen, G. F., 321 Jensen-Campbell, L. A., 37 Jentzsch, I., 365 Jessop, D. C., 389 Johada, M., 408

John, O. P., 30, 49, 52, 53, 57, 59, 60, 76, 79, 249, 252, 341, 399, 402, 403, 407, 416, 462, 482, 483, 485, 487 Johns, M., 131, 132 Johnsen, I. R., 24 Johnson, B., 363 Johnson, C. S., 461, 462 Johnson, D. J., 194 Johnson, D. W., 321 Johnson, K., 80 Johnson, M., 105 Johnson, N., 369 Johnson, P., 36, 200 Johnson, R. T., 321 Johnson, T. J., 371, 434 Johnston, L., 161 Joiner, T. E., Jr., 358, 366 Jones, D. N., 412 Jones, E. E., 5, 100, 176, 288, 435 Jones, J. T., 305 Jones, S. C., 196 Joormann, J., 214, 215 Jordan, C. H., 120, 205, 299, 302, 307, 308, 332 Josephs, R. A., 260, 274 Josephson, B. R., 214 Joyner, M. H, 350 Judd, C. M., 179, 252 Judge, T. A., 411

K Kaczmarek, B. L. J., 30 Kahneman, D., 50, 57, 478 Kaiser, C. R., 322, 324, 325, 326, 329 Kaku, H., 434 Kaltman, S., 81 Kam, C., 121 Kam, K. Y., 435 Kamen, C., 415 Kamiya, J., 34 Kanagawa, C., 433 Kang, S. J., 307 Kapci, E. G., 361 Kaplan, N., 287 Karasawa, M., 299 Karau, S. J., 237 Kashima, Y., 252 Kashy, D. A., 457 Kasser, T., 429 Katz, D., 84, 430

Kazdin, A. E., 483 Keelan, J. P. R., 283 Keenan, J. P., 51 Keesing, R. M., 429 Keller, P. A., 364 Kelley, H. H., 176, 322, 325 Kelley, W. M., 51, 54 Kelly, G. A., 175 Kelman, H. C., 93 Keltner, D., 30, 52 Kemmelmeier, M., 430 Kemp, R., 61 Kennedy, Q., 215 Kennedy, R. E., 367 Kenny, A., 3 Kenny, D. A., 76, 249, 341, 474, 483 Kensinger, E. A., 214 Keough, K. A., 136 Kernberg, O. F., 302, 400 Kernis, M. H., 205, 243, 244, 302, 307, 308, 310, 313, 404, 405, 413, 417 Kesebir, P., 439, 444 Kessler, R. C., 284 Keuler, D. J., 219 Kiehl, K. A., 31 Kihlstrom, J. F., 51, 213 Kilpatrick, S. D., 411 Kim, H. S., 142–143, 431 Kim, J. L., 435, 462 Kim, K. M., 61, 430 Kim, M.-S., 435 Kim, T. G., 237 Kim, Y.-H., 432, 433, 435, 436, 446 Kinlaw, C. R., 350 Kirk, B. A., 458 Kirkendol, S. E., 457 Kirkpatrick, L. A., 291 Kirschbaum, C., 135 Kistner, J. A., 358 Kitayama, S., 85, 299, 301, 427, 433 Kiviniemi, M., 382 Klar, Y., 116, 477 Klayman, J., 49, 50, 55 Kleck, R. E., 98 Klein, R., 283 Klein, S. B., 51 Klein, T. R., 106 Klein, W. M. P., 59, 129, 134, 139, 143, 202 Kling, A., 26

Klonoff, E. A., 321, 323 Klotz, M. L., 50, 184, 237, 479 Klüver, H., 25 Knack, J. M., 37 Knapp, M. L., 399 Knee, C. R., 482 Knight, R. T., 30, 52, 57, 58 Knobe, J., 85 Knowles, E. D., 331 Knox, R. E., 194 Knutson, B., 28, 86 Kobak, R. R., 282, 287 Kobayashi, C., 332, 433, 434 Kobrynowicz, D., 97, 98–99, 100 Koenig, L. J., 373 Koestner, R., 4 Kogot, E., 287 Koh Rangarajoo, E, 283 Kohlberg, L., 96 Kohut, H., 283, 400 Kojo, K., 434 Kombrot, D. E., 362 Konopka, L. M., 33 Koole, S. L., 141, 298, 299 Korbel, C., 383 Kossman, D., 360 Kotchoubey, B., 34 Koutstaal, W., 369 Kovacevic, A., 81 Kowalski, R. M., 250, 309 Kozol, J., 95 Kraemer, H. C., 473 Kralik, J. D., 30 Kramer, G. P., 59 Kramer, R. M., 246 Kraxberger, B. E., 382 Kringelbach, M. L., 29 Kropp, P., 34 Kross, E., 214 Krueger, J. I., 175, 182, 183, 184– 185, 242, 247, 265, 457, 460, 473, 474, 475, 477, 478, 481, 484, 487, 489 Kruger, 50, 78, 80, 237, 247, 248, 458, 475, 478, 486, 487 Kruglanski, A. W., 4, 7 Krull, D. S., 50 Krusemark, E. A., 53, 56 Ku, G., 146 Kuang, J. X., 98 Kuang, L. L., 249, 485 Kübler, A., 34 Kudo, E., 435

Author Index   503 Kuhnen, C. M., 28 Kuiper, N. A., 367, 368 Kulik, J. A., 382 Kumaran, D., 50 Kumashiro, M., 49, 59, 202, 288, 409, 417 Kunce, L., 94 Kunda, Z., 7, 73, 78, 129, 131, 133, 158, 185, 204, 381 Kuppens, P., 33 Kurman, J., 75, 433, 434, 435, 457, 458, 460 Kurt, A., 76, 81, 489 Kurtz-Costes, B., 350 Kusche, A., 271 Kwan, V. S. Y., 53, 57, 58, 76, 81, 249, 341, 343, 483, 484, 485, 488, 490

L LaBar, K. S., 26, 217 Labouvie-Vief, G., 60 Lagerspetz, K. M. J., 33 Lagle, S., 391 Lakey, C. E., 307, 406, 408, 413, 417 Lalwani, A. K., 434, 436 Lambird, K. H., 308, 332 Lamon, M., 34 Landau, M. J., 113 Landolt, M. A., 77 Landrine, H., 321 Lane, D. J., 382 Lang, P. J., 24, 25, 32 Lange, C., 51 Langer, E. J., 362 LaPrelle, J., 288 Largo, E., 182 Larrick, R. P., 260, 480 Larsen, S. F., 215 Larson, J. L., 370 Lasaleta, J., 464 Latané, B., 93, 94 Lau, I. Y.-m., 444 Laurenceau, J. P., 268, 272 Lavi, N., 281 Lawford, H., 122 Lawrence, A. D., 369 Lawrie, S. M., 61 Lawson, H. M., 457 Le Barbenchon, E., 249 Leary, M., 200 Leary, M. E., 308 Leary, M. R., 5, 249, 250, 258,

259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 267, 269, 270, 272, 291, 300, 306, 308, 309, 311, 320, 321, 342, 382, 465 Leck, K., 457 Lecky, P., 5 Leclerc, C. M., 214 Lecours, S., 214 Leder, S., 259, 271, 311 LeDoux, J. E., 24, 25, 26 LeDoux, J. L., 25 Lee, J., 31–32 Lee, K., 324 Lee, L., 372 Lee, S. H., 159 Lee-Chai, A., 461 Lehman, D. R., 85, 301, 427 Leikas, S., 249 LeMay, C. S., 267 Lemay, E. P., 259, 271, 273, 311 Lemons, K., 474 Lemos, K., 74, 457 Lench, H. C., 221 LePine, J. A., 411 Lepper, M. R., 84, 129 Lerner, J. S., 79, 167, 249, 408, 462 Lerner, M. J., 93, 384 Leslie, A. M., 85 Leuchter, A. F., 32 Leuenberger, A., 72 Leung, A. K.-y., 428, 429 Leung, K., 434 Leventhal, H., 381 Levi, A., 7 Levine, L. J., 221, 223 Levy, B. J., 214 Lewicki, P. W., 176 Lewinsohn, P. M., 370 Lewis, M., 33, 38 Li, W., 199 Libby, L. K., 214 Liberman, A., 133 Liberman, N., 112, 141 Licht, R., 36 Liddle, P. F., 31 Lieberman, M. D., 32 Lifton, R. J., 93 Lillaney, R., 31 Lin, D. Y., 247 Lindenbaum, T., 344 Lindsey, S., 332 Linford, K. M., 473

504   Author Index Link, B. G., 321 Linton, M., 217 Lipkus, I. M., 364 Lissovoy, V. de., 160 Liu, Z., 438 Lloyd, K., 262 Lockhart, K. L., 341, 343, 350 Lockwood, P., 185 Loeb, L., 3 Loewenstein, G., 146, 246–247 Loftus, E. F., 213 Logan, G. D., 50 Logel, C., 132, 205 Logothetis, N. K., 158, 159 Lombardo, M., 53, 56 Lönnqvist, J. E., 249 Lopez, F. G., 285 Lopez, H., 364 Lopez-Ibor, I., 61 Lord, C. G., 84, 129, 435 Lord, F. M., 474 LoSchiavo, F. M., 11, 185 Louie, J. Y., 86 Lovallo, D., 82 Lovejoy, M. C., 370 Loving, T. J., 458 Lowery, B. S., 130, 331 Luckmann, T., 384 Lueck, L., 37 Luhtanen, R., 328 Lui, T. J., 201 Lundberg, U., 136 Lynch, M., 113, 140, 201, 303 Lysy, D. C., 49, 407, 488

M Mabbott, L., 133 Mac Iver, D., 341, 343, 345 Maccoby, M., 411 MacDonald, G., 5, 261, 270, 271, 273 MacDonald, H. A., 73 MacDonald, M. R., 368 Macfarlane, A., 3 Macrae, C. N., 51, 54, 161 Madrian, J. C., 409 Magnan, R. E., 134 Magnusson, J., 327 Mahler, H. I. M., 360, 382 Main, M., 282, 287, 292 Major, B., 129, 284, 299, 320, 321, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 331 Malle, B. F., 473

Malmendier, U., 82 Maltzman, I., 24 Man, K. O., 287 Mandelkern, M., 32 Mangun, G. R., 26 Manis, M., 293 Mann, T., 308, 332 Mansour, E., 219 Manwell, L. A., 259 Mapes, R. R., 23, 260 Marigold, D. C., 307 Markus, H. R., 85, 130, 136, 175, 176, 204, 301, 364, 427, 431, 433 Marlatt, G. A., 304 Marlborough, M. A., 219 Marler, P. L., 458 Marmot, M., 136 Marquez, M. J., 130 Marsh, H. W., 344 Marshall, M. A., 304 Martens, A., 2, 132, 137, 138, 385 Martin, D. J., 360, 361 Martinez, M. A., 412 Martinez, R., 321 Mascagni, F., 25 Mashek, D. J., 311 Maslow, A. H., 5, 283 Master, A., 129 Master, S. L., 32 Mata, R., 60 Mather, M., 60, 212, 215 Matlin, M. W., 212, 214, 216 Matsumoto, H., 433 Max, S., 157 Mayer, K. U., 351 Mayle, K., 133 Mayman, M., 293 Mazar, N., 74 McAdams, D. P., 113, 219 McCall, R. J., 350 McCaul, K. D., 134 McCauley, C., 70 McClellan, J. C. D., 273 McClelland, D. C., 4 McClure, J., 325 McConnell, A. R., 8, 137 McCoy, S. K., 323, 324, 326, 328, 329, 385, 392 McCrae, R. R., 82 McCrea, S. M., 309 McCullough, M. E., 411 McDonald, A. J., 25

McDougall, W., 4 McDowell, N. K., 79, 249, 408 McElligot, S., 327 McElwee, R. O., 72, 77, 78, 124 McFarland, C., 219, 366 McGlynn, S. M., 156 McGrath, A. L., 123 McGrath, J., 30 McGregor, H., 429, 458 McGregor, I., 307 McKay, M., 5 McKendree-Smith, N., 371 McKenna, F. P., 462 McLean, K. C., 224 McLellan, L., 119, 120, 122 McLennan, J. D., 61 McNally, R. J., 213, 217 McNamara, K., 369 McQueen, A., 59, 129, 134, 139, 202 McTeer, T., 115 Mead, G. H., 321 Medvec, V. H., 176, 239 Meertens, R. M., 201 Mele, A. R., 101 Meleshko, K. G., 267, 269 Meltzer, H., 216 Mendes, W. B., 458 Menon, T., 438, 439 Mentzer, S. J., 98 Merrill, K. A., 358 Merton, R. K., 321 Messick, D. M., 93, 239, 252, 459, 475 Metalsky, G. I., 366 Metcalfe, J., 50 Meyer, I. H., 323 Meyerowitz, J. A., 49, 74, 352, 456, 475 Mezulis, A. H., 7, 344, 348, 353, 365 Miao, F. F., 86 Michela, J. L., 260, 261, 301, 304 Mickelson, K. D., 284 Midgley, C., 343, 347 Mikels, J. A., 354 Mikulincer, M., 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 300, 373, 385, 389 Milgram, S., 93, 94 Milhabet, I., 249

Miller, C. T., 322, 334 Miller, D. T., 7, 114, 124, 129, 199, 250, 365, 430 Miller, G. E., 135, 389 Miller, J. D., 303, 409, 415 Miller, K., 264, 266 Miller, N., 4 Miller, P. A., 37 Miller, R., 85, 157 Mills, J., 194 Milne, A. B., 161 Mirenberg, M. C., 305 Misak, J. E., 201 Mischel, W., 70, 370, 401, 402 Mischkowski, D., 129, 202 Misra, T. A., 404 Mitchell, J. P., 51, 58 Mohammed, S. A., 321 Mohr, C., 306 Mohr, S., 37 Molden, D. C., 146 Monin, B., 82, 130 Monin, M. M., 143 Monnier, C., 212 Monteil, J. M., 237 Mooney, C. N., 411 Moore, D. A., 50, 237, 246, 474, 476, 478, 480 Moran, J. M., 53, 54 Morf, C. C., 243, 303, 399, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 413, 416, 417 Morgan, K. D., 61 Morris, J. S., 25 Morris, M. W., 431, 438, 439 Morris, R. J., 409 Moskalenko, S., 464 Mroczek, D. K., 60 Msetfi, R. M., 362 Mueller, R. A., 457, 475, 489 Mueller, T. J., 158 Mulford, M., 475 Munford, M. B., 328 Muramoto, Y., 436 Muraven, M., 140 Murphy, R. A., 362 Murray, E. A., 30 Murray, H. A., 4 Murray, L. A., 368 Murray, S. L., 259, 260, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 304, 310, 311 Mussweiler, T., 119 Myers, L. B., 462

Author Index   505 N Nachmias, O., 281 Nail, P. R., 129, 201, 307 Napper, L., 133, 134, 143, 144 Naumann, E., 33 Naumann, L. P., 405 Negel, L., 272 Nelson, G., 310 Nelson, L. D., 134, 382 Nelson, R. E., 367, 369 Nemiah, J. C., 302 Nesselroade, J. R., 342 Neter, E., 49 Newby-Clark, I. R., 112, 221 Newman, L. S., 104, 175, 176, 183 Newton, E., 246 Nezlek, J. B., 309 Nichter, M., 382 Niedenthal, P. M., 78 Niiya, Y., 129, 202 Nisbett, R. E., 185, 260 Nistico, H., 465 Nitzberg, R. A., 281 No, S., 437, 438 Norem, J. K., 5, 249, 250 Norenzayan, A., 431 Nosek, B. A., 82, 332 Novacek, J., 243, 403, 409 Novick, M. R., 474 Numazaki, M., 435 Nurius, P., 130 Nussbaum, A. D., 129 Nuttin, J. M., 299 Nystrom, L. E., 31

O Oakes, M. A., 435 Oakes, P. J., 8 Oberl,, D., 206 Oberlander, E. M., 82 Obonsawin, M., 365 O’Brien, L. T., 130, 329 Ochsner, K. N., 51, 52, 54, 57, 214 O’Doherty, J., 29, 30 Ogilvie, A. D., 369 O’Hara, R., 32 Ohgami, Y., 36 Öhman, A., 24 Oldersma, F., 248 Olinger, L. J., 368 O’Loughlin, R. E., 409, 474

Olson, J. M., 7, 81, 197 Olson, M. A., 299, 332 Oltmanns, T. F., 405, 409, 413, 417 Olweus, D., 352 O’Neill, M., 457 Onishi, M., 285 Operario, D., 328 Orfei, M. D., 156 Orr, I., 291 Orth, U., 351, 354 Ostendorf, F., 477 Otten, W., 479 Otway, L. J., 302 Ouellette, J. A., 390 Overall, N. C., 283 Oyserman, D., 430, 433

P Packer, D. J., 281, 299 Paladino, M., 444 Pals, J. L., 224 Pancake, V., 291 Pandelaere, M., 248 Paradies, Y., 321 Park, L. E., 146 Pasquali, P., 362 Pasupathi, M., 219, 224 Patrick, B. C., 267 Paulhus, D. L., 49, 50, 57, 59, 60, 76, 77, 81, 82, 249, 252, 310, 342, 343, 403, 407, 410, 412, 413, 416, 462, 473, 474, 488, 489 Paunonen, S. V., 249, 250 Payne, B. K., 183 Pearce, G. E., 473 Peciña, S., 28 Peeters, G., 252 Peetz, J., 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121 Pelham, B. W., 50, 246, 299, 300, 301, 305, 306, 311, 312, 333 Peng, S., 429, 433, 435 Pennebaker, J. W., 299 Penney, L. M., 411 Pennington, G. L., 122 Pereg, D., 291 Perie, M., 72 Perloff, L. S., 237 Perria, P., 31 Perry, M., 33 Perry, R. P., 327

506   Author Index Perunovic, W. Q. E., 121 Peters, S. L., 245, 246 Petersen, S. E., 162 Peterson, A. A., 197, 199 Peterson, C. K., 35, 36, 38, 366 Petty, R. E., 4, 142, 237, 238, 304, 461 Phelan, J. C., 321 Phelan, J. E., 200 Phelps, E. A., 26, 27, 54 Philippe, F. L., 214 Phillips, D., 272 Phillips, M., 291 Phillips, N., 272 Phinney, J. S., 328 Piasecki, T., 388 Pickard, J. D., 414 Pietromonaco, P. R., 268, 364 Pilkington, C. J., 268 Pilkonis, P. A., 409 Pincus, A. L., 288, 414, 415, 416 Pinel, E. C., 124, 130 Pinkus, R. T., 271 Pinter, B., 166 Pirke, K., 135 Pitkänen, A., 25 Pittinsky, T. L., 408, 411 Pittman, T. S., 100 Pizarro, D. A., 85, 221 Pizzagalli, D. A., 32 Plaks, J. E., 215 Plant, E. A., 39 Pleydell-Pearce, C. W., 8 Plutchik, R., 33 Poehlman, T. A., 298 Pommerenke, P. L., 246 Pool, G. J., 197 Poon, L., 369 Popper, M., 281 Porter, J. R., 321 Porteus, J., 445 Posner, M. I., 162 Post, J. M., 411 Postma, A., 32, 35 Potter, J., 351 Powell, M., 212 Powers, T. A., 249, 250 Prentice, D. A., 430 Prentice-Dunn, S., 134, 382 Presson, P. K., 360 Preuss, G. S., 488 Prewitt-Freilino, J. L., 414, 415 Price, J. L., 25, 327

Price, T. R., 31 Prigatano, G., 30 Priolo, D., 249 Prislin, R., 197 Pronin, E., 112, 247 Pry, G., 368 Pryor, J. B., 464 Pryor, L., 415 Pugh, M. A., 84 Purdie-Vaughns, V., 129 Pusch, D, 362 Pyszczynski, T., 5, 7, 84, 112, 158, 200, 206, 288, 293, 301, 332, 364, 383, 385, 387, 389, 390, 391, 392, 444, 445

Q Quinn, D. M., 137 Quinton, W. J., 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328

R Rada, P., 28 Raes, F., 214 Raio, C. M., 54 Ramachadran, V. S., 155 Ramires, E. N., 32 Ramsay, D. S., 33 Ramsey, A., 302 Ramus, S. J., 30 Rank, O., 5 Raskin, R. N., 242, 243, 400, 403, 409 Ratliff, M. M., 212, 221 Rawls, J., 95 Raz, N., 60 Ready, C. B., 407 Realo, A., 431 Reeder, G. D., 7, 243, 310, 399, 461 Rees, G., 159 Reese, H. W., 342 Reeves, A. L., 302 Regan, P., 266, 269 Rehm, L. P., 359, 368, 370 Reichenbach, H., 489 Reicher, S. D., 8 Reid, D. B., 473 Reid, I., 61 Reidy, D. E., 404, 412 Reis, H. T., 258, 259, 262, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270 Reis-Bergan, M., 390

Remiker, M. W., 402 Remmers, N., 245 Rennicke, C., 81 Renshaw, K., 433 Rentfrow, P. J., 342, 405 Reynolds, S. M., 28, 29, 39 Rhodewalt, F., 214, 243, 245, 303, 313, 399, 401, 404, 405, 406, 407, 409, 416, 417 Rholes, W. S., 272 Riccardi, A. M., 54 Rich, B. L., 411 Ridderinkhof, K. R., 215 Rieskamp, J., 60 Rimer, B. K., 364 Rinn, W. E., 34 Ripps, L. J., 113 Riskind, J. H., 38 Ritchie, T. D., 220, 221, 222, 223, 224 Robbins, T. W., 26 Roberts, B. W., 346 Roberts, T. A., 343 Robins, C., 366 Robins, R. W., 60, 76, 79, 82, 171, 249, 259, 303, 309, 341, 344, 349, 351, 354, 399, 402, 403, 407, 409, 416, 455, 462, 482, 483, 485 Robinson, R. G., 31 Rodin, M., 327 Roese, N. J., 7, 81, 122, 215 Rogers, C. R., 5, 283, 285 Rogers, L. J., 32 Rogers, R. W., 381 Rogers, S. L., 176 Rolls, E. T., 29, 30 Rom, E., 281 Romanski, L.-M., 25 Ronan, P. J., 31 Ronningstam, E., 414 Rosadini, G. R., 31, 32 Rosch, E., 70 Roscoe, J., 258 Rose, D., 181 Rose, P., 212, 270, 271, 272, 273, 311, 406, 408, 409, 411, 413, 414, 417 Rosenberg, M. J., 6, 201, 321, 347, 384 Rosenstock, I. M., 381 Rosenthal, R., 266

Rosenthal, S. A., 408, 411 Roskos-Ewoldsen, D. R., 134 Ross, H. S., 213, 300 Ross, L., 77, 79, 112, 129, 175, 177, 181, 245, 247 Ross, M., 7, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 129, 213, 215, 219, 221, 300, 365, 366 Rossi, G. F., 31, 32 Roth, D., 368, 370 Rothbaum, F., 383 Rothermund, K., 163 Rothman, A. J., 382 Routledge, C., 387, 388, 389, 391, 393 Rozensky, R. H., 368 Rubin, D. C., 113, 215, 217, 218, 221 Ruble, D. N., 341, 342 Rude, S. S., 286 Rudich, E. A., 60, 263, 300, 309, 402, 409 Rudman, L. A., 200, 305, 306, 333 Rudolph, A., 299, 308, 310 Ruggiero, D. A., 24 Rui, C., 426 Ruiz, J. M., 313 Rusbult, C. E., 194, 409, 417 Rushton, J. P., 86 Russell, J. A., 465 Rutter, J., 389 Ryan, R. M., 258, 429 Rybak, M., 33 Rydell, R. J., 137 Rynders, J., 321

S Sabatinelli, D., 25 Sabbagh, M. A., 372 Sacchi, S., 444 Sackheim, H. A., 31, 101 Sadeghian, P., 249 Sadeh, N., 37 Safer, M. A., 219, 221 Sage, R. M., 79, 249, 408 Sakuma, M., 299 Salamone, J. D., 28 Salovey, P., 214 Salvarani, G., 106 Sampat, B., 100 Samuels, S. M., 245

Author Index   507 Sanbonmatsu, D. M., 433 Sanborn, M. E., 343 Sanchez, F., 327 Sande, G. N., 194 Sandler, H. M., 344 Sandvold, K. D., 196 Sanitioso, R. B., 73, 78, 158, 241 Sanna, L. J., 122 Santos-Pinto, L., 76 Sanz, M., 61 Saron, C., 32 Satz, P., 31 Savander, V., 25 Saver, J. L., 30 Savitsky, K., 176 Sawyer, P. J., 130, 323, 325, 326 Saxe, R., 51 Scabini, D., 30, 52 Sceery, A., 287 Schachner, D. A., 270 Schacter, D. L., 156 Schaffer, C. E., 32 Scheier, M. F., 358, 382 Scher, C., 375 Schiff, B. B., 34 Schimel, J., 2, 5, 132, 146, 206, 288, 332, 385, 388, 390, 444 Schkade, D. A., 478 Schlenker, B. R., 249, 250, 260, 301, 459 Schloerscheidt, A. M., 161 Schmader, T., 129, 131, 325, 327, 328 Schmeichel, B. J., 113, 129, 139, 140, 141, 307, 385 Schmidt, C., 122 Schmitt, D. P., 342, 352 Schmitt, M. T., 323, 324 Schmukle, S. C., 405 Schneider, S. L., 76 Schneider, W., 343, 345 Schneirla, T., 23 Schoenbaum, G., 30 Schooler, J. W., 146 Schooler, R. J., 60 Schooler, T. Y., 332 Schröder-Abé, M., 299, 308, 310 Schryer, E., 215 Schug, J., 431 Schulkin, J., 26

Schulman, K. A., 392 Schürch, E., 401 Schuster, B., 341 Schutter, D. J. L. G., 32, 35, 58 Schütz, A., 299, 308, 310 Schwartz, J. C., 70 Schwartz, S. H., 4 Scogin, F., 370, 371, 372 Scott, T. R., 29 Sears, R., 13 Sedikides, C., 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 23, 39, 49, 51, 59, 60, 85, 93, 113, 120–121, 128, 157, 166, 177, 184, 188, 192, 193, 202, 214, 215, 216, 218, 224, 243, 248, 249, 252, 263, 288, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 307, 310, 313, 342, 343, 349, 352, 354, 358, 365, 373, 384, 399, 402, 405, 406, 408, 409, 410, 413, 414, 417, 427, 428, 432, 433, 434, 438, 455, 456, 459, 461, 462, 463, 464, 466, 472 Segal, M., 70 Segal, Y., 287 Segal, Z., 375 Seibt, B., 299 Seifert, J., 33 Self, E. A., 37 Seligman, M. E. P., 322, 363, 366 Selimbegovic, L., 460 Seppala, E., 86 Sereda, L., 458 Setlow, B., 30 Seuferling, G., 97, 105 Seymour, B., 28, 50 Shackelford, T. K., 403, 410 Shackman, A., 35 Shah, J. Y., 4, 32 Shanks, D., 373 Shannon, L., 218 Sharot, T., 53, 54 Sharp, A. A., 214 Shaver, P. R., 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 290, 291, 292 Shavitt, S., 434 Shaw, L. L., 106 Shedler, J., 293 Shehryar, O., 389

508   Author Index Sheikh, S., 96 Sheldon, K. M., 258, 260, 429 Shelton, J., 239, 407–408 Shenesey, J. W., 417 Shepperd, J. A., 458, 459, 472 Sherif, M., 177, 179 Sherman, D. A., 72 Sherman, D. A. K., 134, 382 Sherman, D. K., 79, 118, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136, 138, 141, 142–143, 144, 145, 146, 202, 249, 250, 408 Sherman, J. W., 215 Sherrod, D. R., 266 Sherwood, R. J., 32 Shevell, S. K., 113 Shimizu, M., 300 Shin, H.-c., 435 Shoda, Y., 401, 402 Shoptaugh, T., 211 Shrauger, J. S., 196 Shreeve, J., 156 Shrum, L. J., 434 Shteynberg, G., 429, 430, 431, 433 Shumate, R., 382 Siegel, S. J., 369, 370 Sienkiewicz, Z. J., 29 Sigelman, J., 32, 37 Sigelman, J. D., 36, 37, 200 Silver, R. C., 123 Silvia, P. J., 464 Simmons, R., 321 Simms, E. N., 237 Simon, L., 202, 206, 387, 444, 445 Simon, S., 325 Simonson, I., 431 Simpson, J. A., 272, 282, 362 Sinclair, L., 300 Singer, J. A., 214, 222 Singer, J. L., 213 Singer, T., 28 Sinha, R. R., 460, 484, 487 Siniatchkin, M., 34 Sivanathan, N., 146 Skinner, B. F., 2, 4 Skitka, L. J., 82 Skowronski, J. J., 113, 114, 166, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226 Skurnik, I., 146, 202 Small, D. A., 50, 474, 478

Smart, L., 243 Smeets, K., 141 Smit, E. K., 347 Smith, A. P., 136 Smith, E. R., 328, 332, 383 Smith, M. D., 213, 300 Smith, N., 74 Smith, R., 261 Smith, S. M., 304 Smith, T. W., 313 Smits, D. J. M., 33 Smolewska, K., 414 Smyer, M. A., 351 Snapp, C. M., 291 Snyder, C. R., 4 Snyder, D., 32 Snyder, M. L., 98, 197 Snyder, S. S., 383 Sobel, J., 76 Soifer, E., 9 Soll, J. B., 49, 480 Solomon, S., 5, 7, 84, 112, 200, 293, 332, 383, 385, 387, 392, 444, 445 Sommer, K. L., 2, 260, 262, 308 Son Hing, L. S., 199 Sorrentino, R. M., 4 South, S. C., 405 Spade, P. V., 3 Spalding, L. R., 306, 332 Spataro, S. E., 484 Spears, R., 116 Spector, P. E., 411 Spencer, S. J., 113, 120, 129, 130, 137, 140, 142, 201, 202, 205, 240, 299, 303, 308, 332, 463 Spender, S. J., 205 Sprecher, S., 266 Springer, C., 272 Squire, L. R., 27 Srivastava, S., 291, 484 Sroufe, L. A., 291 Srull, T. K., 250 Stam, H., 35 Stang, D. J. ., 216 Stansfeld, S., 136 Stanton, A. L., 136 Stapel, D. A., 240, 241, 462 Staub, E., 93, 94, 96 Steele, C., 320 Steele, C. M., 113, 118, 119, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134,

137, 140, 201, 204, 260, 303, 320, 382 Steele, G. D. F., 156 Steele, J. D., 61 Stein, S. J., 262 Steiner, D. D., 249 Stellrecht, N. E., 358 Stengel, E., 156 Stephan, E., 112 Stewart, H. L., 74, 457, 474 Stinson, D. A., 258, 262, 264, 266 Stipek, D. J., 341, 343, 345, 346, 353, 354 Stock, M. L., 382 Stone, E. R., 369 Stone, J., 11, 192, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 202, 203, 204, 382 Stone, S. V., 82 Stopa, L., 464 Story, A. L., 72, 78, 82, 364 Story, T., 341 Stotland, E., 105 Strachman, A., 444 Strack, F., 299 Strack, S., 370 Strahan, E. J., 115 Strain, L. M., 8 Strauman, T. J., 283 Strauss, G. P., 215 Strausser, K. S., 259 Strawson, P. F., 180 Strehl, U., 34 Strenta, A., 98 Stroessner, S. J., 215 Strongman, J., 97, 105 Stroop, J. R., 30 Strube, M. J., 5, 49, 93, 214, 342, 413, 414, 427, 432, 459, 463 Strunk, D. R., 364, 372 Stukas, A. A., 399, 417, 463 Stultz, C. H., 286 Stuss, D. T., 30 Sugie, N., 158 Sugimori, S., 121 Sullivan, D., 113 Sullivan, M. W., 33 Suls, J. M., 73, 74, 179, 457, 458, 473, 474, 475 Sulsky, L. M., 73 Sumer, N., 284 Summers, C. H., 31

Sun, C.-R., 243, 310, 404, 405, 417 Süsser, K., 59 Sutton, S. K., 32 Suzuki, N., 436 Svenson, O., 184, 474 Swan, R., 391 Swann, W. B., 50, 80, 192, 196, 299, 342 Sweatt, R. A., 286 Sweeney, P. D., 366 Swim, J. K., 322, 323 Syssau, A., 212 Szabados, B., 9

T Tabachnik, N., 363 Tagiuri, R., 10 Tajfel, H., 116, 179, 438 Takagi, H., 433 Takaku, S., 199 Takata, T., 436 Takemoto, T., 464 Talarico, J. M., 217, 218, 221 Taliaferro, J., 321 Tam, K.-P., 429, 430, 433, 440, 441, 444 Tambor, E. S., 291, 300 Tan, P. L., 77 Tangney, J. P., 342 Tanke, E. D., 197 Tannenbaum, D., 85 Taris, T. W., 75 Tatarkiewicz, W., 3 Tate, G., 82 Taubman Ben-Ari, O., 389 Taylor, C. J., 286 Taylor, K. L., 260, 301 Taylor, S. E., 4, 32, 49, 54, 55, 57, 76, 79, 80, 128, 131, 167, 249, 293, 303, 358, 408, 427, 466, 481, 489 Tchividjian, L. R., 382 Teachman, B. A., 215 Teasdale, J. D., 322, 366 Tenbrunsel, A. E., 239 Tennen, H., 299, 304, 306 Terdal, S. K., 291, 300 Terracciano, A., 430 Terrell, F., 363 Terzian, H., 31 Tesser, A., 123, 202, 414, 463 Testa, M., 323 Tetlock, P. E., 7, 462

Author Index   509 Teuscher, U., 350 Them, M. A., 415 Thibodeau, R., 196, 197, 199, 202 Thompson, C. P., 215, 216, 217, 218, 221, 222, 223 Thompson, E. R., 97, 99, 100, 103, 105 Thompson, L., 246–247 Thomsen, D. K., 217 Thomson, J. A., 362 Thorburn, W. M., 3 Thorndike, E. L., 24, 32, 482 Thorne, A., 267, 269 Thurstone, L. L., 179 Tice, D. M., 140, 259, 303, 309 Tiger, L., 358 Todd, M., 304, 306 Todorov, T., 93 Toguchi, Y., 85, 120–121, 184, 301, 352, 384, 432 Toma, C. L., 457, 459 Tomarken, A. J., 32 Torchetti, L., 401 Torelli, C., 441 Tormala, T. T., 130 Tov, W., 435 Tracy, J. L., 351, 402 Tragakis, M. W., 404 Triandis, H. C., 438 Trimm, R. F., 402, 404, 406, 414 Triplett, N., 6 Trivers, R. L., 96, 100, 488 Trope, Y., 4, 49, 112, 129, 141, 142 Tropp, L., 328 Trötschel, R., 461 Trzesniewski, K. H., 259, 344, 351, 402, 455 Tsai, J. L., 86 Tsang, J., 95, 99 Tsarfati, E. M., 329 Tudor, M., 310 Tuiten, A., 35 Turan, B., 70 Turkheimer, E., 405, 409 Turner, J. C., 8, 116 Tversky, A., 50, 57 Twain, M., 93 Twenge, J. M., 243, 321, 405, 412 Tyrrell, D. A. J., 136

U Uchida, Y., 86 Uddin, L. Q., 51 Uhlmann, E. L., 298 Uijtdehaage, S. H. J., 32 Uleman, J., 10 Ullrich, J., 477 Underhill, W. A., 214 Unzueta, M. M., 130, 331, 332

V Valdesolo, P., 95, 100 Vallacher, R. R., 141, 203, 381 Valley, K. L., 246 Van Avermaet, E., 245 Van Bavel, J. J., 24 van de Laar, M. C., 36 van de Riet, K., 245 Van den Bos, A., 240, 241 Van den Bos, K., 246 van den Hout, M., 35 Van der Linden, M., 212 van der Pligt, J., 479 van Dijk, M., 412 van Honk, J., 32, 35 van Knippenberg, A., 141 van Koningsbruggen, G., 134 Van Lange, P. A. M., 93, 252, 459 Van Selst, M., 50 van Veen, V., 31 Van Vugt, M., 201 Van Yperen, N. W., 457 Vangelisti, A. L., 399 Vaughn-Scott, K., 37 Vazire, S., 405, 417 Vazquez, C. V., 360, 361, 368 Verkasalo, M., 249 Verkuyten, M., 332, 333 Verona, E., 37 Vertinsky, I., 374 Vess, M., 385, 391 Vevea, J. L., 301, 354, 432 Vignoles, V. L., 302 Viscusi, D., 360 Voelkl, K., 323 Vogl, R. J., 222, 223 Vohs, K. D., 113, 129, 139, 140, 141, 242, 265, 309, 407, 416, 474 Volkow, N. D., 61 Voltaire, 107 von Hecker, U., 119, 214

510   Author Index Vonk, R., 249, 250 Vorauer, J. D., 250 Voss, A., 163, 164 Vredenburg, D. S., 50, 178, 184, 237, 479, 488

W Wade, D., 30 Wade-Benzoni, K. A., 239, 240 Wagenaar, W. A., 217 Wakefield, M., 382 Wakslak, C., 129, 141, 142 Waldrip, A. M., 37 Walker, W. R., 113, 215, 216, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226 Wall, S., 280 Wallace, H. M., 399, 403, 407, 408, 416 Wallbom, M., 104 Wallsten, T. S., 475 Walster, E., 194 Wan, C., 429, 430, 433, 437, 438, 440, 441 Wan, K. C., 434 Wang, D., 374 Ward, A., 77, 79 Ward, J. P., 31–32 Ward, W. D., 196 Waschull, S. B., 205 Washington, R. E., 321 Waters, E., 280 Watson, A. C., 321 Watson, D., 32 Watson, L., 365 Watson, P. J., 302, 409 Weary, G., 7 Webb, M. S., 249 Webber, C., 5 Weber, E. U., 489 Weber, J., 214 Weber, R. A., 98 Webster, D. M., 4 Webster, G. D., 268 Wegner, D. M., 132, 141, 203, 214, 381 Weigold, M. F., 176, 260, 301 Weiner, B., 7, 322, 326, 327 Weinert, F. E., 341 Weinstein, E., 166 Weinstein, N. D., 73, 184, 458, 472 Weir, C., 403 Weise, D., 392

Weisenberg, M., 373 Weiskrantz, L., 25 Weisz, J. R., 383 Weitenhagen, E., 407 Weitz, J., 363 Wells, B., 220 Wentura, D., 72, 75, 76 Wenzlaff, R. M., 286, 368, 372 Werbel, J. D., 458 West, S. G., 290 Westen, D., 354 Westheimer, I., 281 Wetherell, M., 8 Whalen, P. J., 24, 27 Wheatley, T. P., 124, 130 Wheeler, D., 225 Wheeler, L., 179, 473 Wheeler, R. E., 32 Wheeler, S. C., 461 Whitchurch, E., 244, 488 White, C. S., 321 White, M. M., 212, 216, 221 White, R. W., 4, 217 White, T. L., 32, 33 Whitehouse, W. G., 368 Whitfield, M. L., 205 Whitney, H., 97, 105 Whittington, E. J., 259 Whitton, S. W., 370, 372 Wicklund, R. A., 104, 196, 464 Wiebe, D. J., 383 Wiegand, A. W., 198, 382 Wiegand, M., 215 Wiesen, C. A., 350 Wiesner, A., 310 Willard, G., 49, 59, 216, 458, 459, 461, 462, 463, 466 Williams, D. R., 321 Williams, E. F., 475 Williams, J. M. G., 214 Williams, K. D., 237, 259 Williams, K. M., 462 Williams, T. J., 385 Willis, T. A., 224 Willoughby, T. L., 74 Wills, T. A., 124, 186 Wilson, A. E., 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 213, 219, 300, 302 Wilson, T. D., 124, 130, 332 Wimmer, G. E., 28 Windschitl, P. P. D., 55, 73, 184, 237, 457, 478

Wink, P., 243 Winkielman, P., 28 Winslow, M. P., 198 Winston, J., 29 Wirth-Beaumont, E. T., 223 Wise, R. A., 29 Wishnov, B., 250 Witte, K., 381 Wittenberg, M. T., 262 Wlodarski, R., 78 Wohl, M. J. A., 116, 123 Wohlwend-Lloyd, R., 403, 404, 407, 462 Wojciszke, B., 252 Wolf, E., 283 Wolfe, C. T., 129, 384, 463 Wood, J. V., 113, 119, 120, 213, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 266, 268, 273, 301, 304, 305 Wood, S. E., 221, 222, 223 Woodward, D. J., 29 Worchel, S., 200 Wranik, T., 214 Wright, D., 94 Wright, S. B., 60, 328 Wyer, M. M., 457 Wyland, C. L., 54

X Xagoraris, A., 25

Y Yamagishi, T., 429, 430, 431, 432, 434, 435, 436 Yamaguchi, S., 301, 352 Yang, Y.-j., 441, 443 Yantis, S., 1162 Yaxley, S., 29 Yee, C. M., 32 Yong, A. G., 122 Yoshida, T., 434 Young, I. J., 33 Young, P. T., 33 Yurak, T. J., 50, 178, 184, 237, 479 Yzerbyt, V., 252, 444

Z Zanna, M. P., 120, 142, 194, 199, 202, 205, 299, 308, 332, 382 Zeichner, A., 412

Zeifman, D., 281 Zeiger, J. S., 182 Zeigler-Hill, V., 299, 307, 332, 414 Zelazo, P. D., 36 Zell, E., 180, 186, 187

Author Index   511 Zerbst, J. I., 11, 185 Zhang, S., 11, 185 Zhang, Z-X., 431 Zimmermann, T., 405, 413 Zinner, L. R., 38

Zola-Morgan, S., 27 Zou, X., 430, 431, 433 Zubek, J., 321 Zuckerman, M., 7, 409, 474, 482 Zuroff, D. C., 249, 250

Subject Index

“f” following a page number indicates a figure; “t” following a page number indicates a table.

Abstractness, 15 Academic exaggeration. see also Self-aggrandizing influences on the motive, 460–466 overview, 15, 455–456, 466–467 properties of, 456–460 Academic performance, 137– 138. see also Academic exaggeration Accentuation theory, 179–180 Acceptance relationships and, 263–265 secure attachment and, 290–291 self-esteem and, 308–312 Accessibility, academic exaggeration and, 461– 462 Accountability, 15, 462–463 Acculturation, self-esteem and, 301 Acetylcholine, 28–29 Achievement, 407–408. see also Academic exaggeration Action-based model, postdecision dissonance and, 200–201 Actions. see also Behaviors ideas and, 69–71

self-affirmation theory and, 134–135 social concepts and, 71– 73 Actor effects, 236–247, 251–252 Adaptation attributional style and, 366 childhood self-enhancement and, 348–350 nature of, 81–82 overview, 14 self-serving definitions and, 79–82 Adolescence, self-esteem and, 13–14 Adult Attachment Interview, 287 Adulthood decline of positivity bias from childhood to adulthood, 345–348 self-enhancement and selfprotection in, 342–343, 350–354, 354–355 Affect bias, fading. see Fading affect bias Affect regulation, 304, 306. see also Emotion regulation Affiliation, 262–263. see also Relationships



Affirmation processes, postdecision dissonance and, 201–202 Age autobiographical memory and, 214–215 social neuroscience perspective and, 60–61 Agentic self, collectivist cultures and, 434–437 Aggrandizing behavior, 404–405 Aggression asymmetric frontal cortical regions and, 33 narcissism and, 405–406, 411–412 social consequences and, 242–244 Alcohol consumption, 304– 305, 306–307 Ambiguity, 15, 456–458 Amygdala, 25–27 Analysis of variance (ANOVA), 484–486, 485t, 486t Anger, asymmetric frontal cortical regions and, 33, 36–39 Anosognosia motivation and, 157–165, 161f overview, 156, 171

513

514   Subject Index Anterior cingulate cortex overview, 30–31 social neuroscience perspective and, 52, 54f, 55–57, 58–59 Antisocial behaviors, 411– 412 Anxiety, 384, 385 Anxious attachment styles, 282, 414–415. see also Attachment Approach asymmetric frontal cortical regions and, 31–39 overview, 23–24 relationships and, 260 Assessment, 460. see also Measurement Assimilation, 179–180 Asymmetric frontal cortical regions, 31–39 Asymmetrical moral dilemmas, 107–108 Attachment. see also Attachment theory attachment style and, 283–284 avoidant attachment styles, 284–288 narcissism and, 414–415 overview, 12, 279–280, 293 security and, 288–293 self-representations, 283–284 Attachment behavioral system, 280. see also Attachment Attachment theory, 279–283, 293. see also Attachment Attention filters and, 160–162, 161f motivated direction of, 162–163 Attitude change, 201 Attitude objects, 84 Attitude representation theory, 84 Attitude statements, social judgment and, 179–180 Attraction, interpersonal, 244–245 Attractiveness, social consequences and, 244 Attributional egotism, motivation construct and, 7

Attributional focus, temporal self-appraisal theory and, 117–118 Attributional styles depression and, 365–366 narcissism and, 404–405 Attributions to discrimination, 323– 334 overview, 201 Audiences, evaluative responses to, 308–312 in the self, 310–311 self-esteem and, 308–312 Auditory system, 24–25 Autobiographical memory. see also Memory fading affect bias and, 222–226 hedonic valence hypothesis and, 212–222 narcissism and, 405 overview, 11–12, 211–212, 226 positivity bias and, 212–222, 226 Automatic processes, 272– 273 Avoidance. see also Withdrawal asymmetric frontal cortical regions and, 31–39 narcissism and, 407, 414–415 overview, 23–24 relationships and, 260 Avoidant attachment styles. see also Attachment narcissism and, 414–415 overview, 282 self-enhancement and, 284–288 Awareness academic exaggeration and, 458–459 overview, 15

B Balanced Directory of Desirable Responding, 250 Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding, 488–489 Basal nucleus, 25–27

Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), 225 Behavior regulation, 303–308. see also Behaviors Behavioral approach sensitivity (BAS), 33 Behaviorism motivation construct and, 4, 5 overview, 2–3 Behaviors. see also Behavior regulation consistency processes and, 197–198 cultural factors and, 427– 439, 427t, 432f ideas and, 69–71 narcissism and, 402–407 relationships and, 271– 272 self-affirmation theory and, 134–135 self-esteem and, 308 social concepts and, 71–73 Beliefs consistency processes and, 197–198 regarding justice/injustice, 329–330 terror management health model (TMHM) and, 391–392 Better-than-average effect (BTAE) academic exaggeration and, 456–457 measurement and, 489 overview, 184–185 social comparison approach to measurement and, 475 Better-than-myself effect, 178–179 Bias, positivity adaptiveness of, 348–350 autobiographical memory and, 212–222, 226 childhood self-enhancement and, 343–350 confusing knowledge and meaning and, 77–79 decline of from childhood to adulthood, 345–348 hedonic valence hypothesis and, 212–222

overview, 11–12, 49–50, 211–212 perceptions of environment and, 165 social neuroscience perspective and, 53t, 55–56 Boundary conditions academic exaggeration and, 455–456 depression and, 372–373 overview, 15 properties of, 456–460 self-affirmation theory and, 145–146

C California Adult Q-Set (CAQ), 285 Caregiving, 281–284 Causality, locus of, 325–326 Ceilings, academic exaggeration and, 464–466 Central nucleus, 25–27 Change, narcissism and, 416–417 Childhood adaptiveness and, 348–350 adult self-enhancement and, 351–354 attachment and, 280–281, 282–283 decline of positivity bias from childhood to adulthood, 345–348 self-enhancement and selfprotection in, 343–350, 354–355 Childhood experiences, 300–301 Choice consistency processes and, 194–199 dissonance and, 193–194 social dilemmas and, 236–240 Clinical factors, 13–15 Closeness behavior, 271–272 Cognitive biases depression and, 368–371 overview, 358–359 Cognitive consistency theories, 6

Subject Index   515 Cognitive dissonance processes. see also Dissonance cognitive dissonance theory, 6, 11 consistency processes and, 194–199 overview, 192–193, 206 postdecision dissonance, 200–206 rationalization and, 193–194 Cognitive factors, decline of positivity bias from childhood to adulthood, 345–346 Cognitive models, 359 Cognitive processes, autobiographical memory and, 215–216 Cognitive psychology, 213–214 Collective social definition, 85–86 Collectivism, 429–432, 434–437 Comparisons local dominance effect and, 187–188 in older adults, 350–351 self-deception and, 104 social judgment and, 185–186, 186–187 Conceptual filter, 160–162, 161f Confidence, relational functioning and, 12 Consequences. see also Social consequences childhood self-enhancement and, 353 judgment of control and, 359–362 moral dilemmas and, 97–104, 98t, 99t, 102t, 103t relationships and, 265–266, 273 self-deception and, 100–104, 102t, 103t Consistency processes, 194–199 Contingency, judgment of depression and, 359–362 terror management health model (TMHM) and, 389–391 Contrast, 179–180

Control, illusion of depression and, 359–362 success expectations and, 362–364 Control, judgment of, 359–362 Controlled processes, 272–273 Cortisol, 135–136 Covert narcissism, 414–416. see also Narcissism Criticism, 406–407. see also Self-criticism Cross-cultural factors, 120. see also Cultural context Cultural consensus about what constitutes a good person, 433–434 overview, 429–432 Cultural contamination, 441–443, 442f Cultural context. see also Cross-cultural factors cultural self and, 438–446, 439f, 440f, 442f overview, 13–15, 425–426, 446 positive self-regard and, 427–437, 427t, 432f self-enhancement and selfprotection and, 427–439, 427t, 432f self-esteem and, 301 temporal self-appraisal theory and, 120–121 terror management theory and, 384–385 Cultural continuity, 443–444 Cultural self, 437–446, 439f, 440f, 442f

D Decision making cognitive dissonance process and, 192–193 hypocrisy and, 198–199 narcissism and, 407–408 Defense mechanisms accountability and, 462– 463 to health information, 132–135 individual differences in, 120 in older adults, 351 overview, 2

516   Subject Index Defense mechanisms (continued) secure attachment and, 288–293 self-esteem and, 307 subjective time bias and, 120 Defensive coping styles, 60 Defensive suppression, 286–287 Definitions of traits adaptiveness of, 79–82 confusing knowledge and meaning and, 77–79 consequences of self-serving mappings and, 73–75 future directions for research in, 83–86 fuzziness of social concepts and, 71–73 overview, 86 self as a source of, 72–73 self-serving social concepts and, 75–79 Depression asymmetric frontal cortical regions and, 32–34 attributional style and, 365–366 avoidant attachment styles and, 287 boundary conditions and, 372–373 judgment of control and, 359–362 motivation construct and, 5 overview, 14, 358–359, 375 recall-of-feedback and, 366–368 self-enhancement and selfprotection in, 373–375 self-evaluation and, 368– 371 success expectations and, 362–364 Developmental factors adult self-enhancement and, 342–343 attachment and, 280–281, 282–283 childhood self-enhancement and, 343–350 overview, 13–15, 341–342

self-esteem and, 351, 352, 455–456 social neuroscience perspective and, 60–61 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), 400–401 Discrimination, 321, 330–332. see also Attributions Dispositional self-enhancement, 15 Dispositional self-esteem, 258, 260–261. see also Selfesteem Dispositional theory of causality, 430–431 Dissonance, 11, 193–194, 206. see also Cognitive dissonance processes Distancing behavior narcissism and, 414–415 relationships and, 271–272 Distancing bias, 121–123 Distortions in memory, 212. see also Memory Domain desirability, 460–461 Dopamine system, 27–29 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), 52, 53–54, 58–59 Downward comparisons, in older adults, 350–351 Dynamic self-regulatory processing model of narcissism, 401–402. see also Narcissism Dysphoria, 225

E Education experiences, 346– 347. see also Academic exaggeration Egocentric tendencies, 176– 177 Emotion regulation. see also Affect regulation autobiographical memory and, 214–215 self-esteem and, 304, 306 social neuroscience perspective and, 51–52, 60–61 Emotional expressivity, 266–269

Emotions amygdala and, 26 asymmetric frontal cortical regions and, 33–36 attributions to discrimination and, 322–323 fading affect bias and, 225 narcissism and, 401–402, 415 Employment social consequences and, 245–247 verifiability and, 459 Entitlement, 414–416 Entitlement scale, 238–244 Environment, biased perceptions of motivation and, 157–165, 161f overview, 155–156, 171 self-protection and, 166–171 wishful thinking and, 156–157 Environmental factors, 268–269 Error-management theory, 489 Esteem contingencies, 389– 391 Evaluative audiences responses to, 308–312 in the self, 310–311 self-esteem and, 308–312 Evaluative feedback, 366– 368 Event valence, 212–222 Event-related potentials (ERPs) asymmetric frontal cortical regions and, 36 social neuroscience perspective and, 56–57 Exaggeration, academic. see Academic exaggeration Expectations consistency processes and, 194–199 hypocrisy and, 198–199 of success, 362–364 Experience in Close Relationships inventory (ECR), 282 Explicit self-esteem. see also Self-esteem behavior regulation and, 303–305

complex role of, 312–313 overview, 298, 313–314 responses to evaluative audiences and, 308–310 self-enhancement and selfprotection in, 300–303 significant others and, 311 stigma and, 332–333 External adaptiveness, 81– 82. see also Adaptation External attributions, 129 External domains, 463

F Fading affect bias, 211–212, 222–226 Failure, narcissism and, 415 Fairness, 246–247 False memories. see also Memory age and, 215 autobiographical memory and, 212, 215 Falsehoods, recognizing, 73 Fear, amygdala and, 25–27 Feedback, external depression and, 366–368 narcissism and, 404–405, 406–407 recall-of-feedback and, 366–368 self-serving social concepts and, 75, 76–77 Filters, perceptions of environment and, 160– 162, 161f Flanker’s test, 30–31 Forgiveness, 242–244 Free-choice paradigm overview, 194 self-esteem and, 205–206 Freudian theory autobiographical memory and, 213–214 narcissism and, 400 overview, 2 Frontal brain activity asymmetric frontal cortical regions and, 35–36 social neuroscience perspective and, 60–61

Subject Index   517 Frontal cortical regions, asymmetric, 31–39 Future selves, subjective time bias and, 115–116

G Gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) agonists, 28–29 Gender, domain desirability and, 460–461 Genius effect, social judgment and, 185–186 Gestalt psychology, 79 Global self-esteem, 344. see State self-esteem Goals narcissism and, 401–402 redefinition and, 83–84 Go/No-Go task, 30–31 GPA exaggeration. see Academic exaggeration Grade exaggeration. see Academic exaggeration Grandiose expectations, narcissism and, 414–415 Group contexts attributions to discrimination and, 327–329, 330–332 high-status groups and, 330–332 overview, 12–13 Group identification, attributions to discrimination and, 328–329 Guilt, narcissism and, 415

H Hand contractions, 34–35 Health belief model, 381– 382 Health decisions motivational themes underlying, 381–383 overview, 380–381 self-esteem and, 383–385 terror management health model (TMHM) and, 386–394, 386f terror management theory and, 383–385 Health factors, 13–15

Health information defensiveness to, 132–135 uncoupling effect and, 143–144 Health-decision model, 14 Hedonic valence hypothesis, 212–222 Hedonism, 3 Heuristic processing, 50, 57–58, 60–61 Hopelessness theory of depression, 374–375 Horizontal method, 71– 72 Humanistic movement, 5 Hybrid measure, 484–486, 485t, 486t Hypocrisy. see also Moral hypocrisy cognitive dissonance process and, 198–199 overview, 9 Hypothalamic–pituitary– adrenocortical (HPA) activation, 135–136

I Ideas actions and, 69–71 social concepts and, 71–73 Illusion of control depression and, 359–362 success expectations and, 362–364 Immune neglect, 132 Immune system, 10 Implicit Association Test (IAT) collectivist cultures and, 434 overview, 299 Implicit self-esteem. see also Self-esteem behavior regulation and, 305–307 complex role of, 312–313 measures of, 299–300 overview, 298, 313–314 responses to evaluative audiences and, 309–310 self-enhancement and selfprotection in, 300–303 significant others and, 312 stigma and, 332–333

518   Subject Index Implicit self-esteem compensation (ISEC), 306 Impression management, depression and, 373 Indirect measurement, 476– 480, 478f, 479f. see also Measurement Individual differences attachment system and, 281, 282 autobiographical memory and, 214–215 measurement and, 486 motivation construct and, 5 self-serving biases and, 119–120 Individualist cultures, 430–432. see also Cultural context Infancy, attachment and, 280, 282–283 Information deficit, 458 Information processing motivations and, 163–165 narcissism and, 406–407 Ingroup historical events, 116 Ingroup–outgroup differences attributions to discrimination and, 327–328 perception of others’ selfenhancement and, 248 temporal self-appraisal theory and, 117 Inhibition emotional expressivity and, 269 narcissism and, 407 Inhibitory control, 60–61 Injustice, beliefs regarding, 329–330 Insecure attachment. see also Attachment narcissism and, 414–415 overview, 283–284 Insecurity overview, 12 self-esteem and, 302–303, 307–308 Integrity. see also Moral integrity; Self-affirmation theory overview, 96 self-system and, 129–130, 130f Intelligence, 69–70

Intentionality overview, 84–85 social judgment and, 176 Intergroup conflict, 177 Internal adaptiveness, 81. see also Adaptation Internal domains, 463 Interpersonal attraction, 244–245 Interpersonal contexts, 12– 13 Interpersonal relationships, 409–412. see also Relationships Intersubjective consensus, 429–432 Interventions, 138 Introspection, 464

J Japanese culture, agentic self in, 434–437 Judgment. see also Social judgment of contingency, 359–362 of control, 359–362 depression and, 359–362, 372–373 of others, 240–241 overview, 10–12 psychological immune system and, 131 Judgment of control, 359– 362 Justice, 329–330

K Knowledge, confusing with meaning, 77–79

L Lateral nucleus, 25–27 “Latitude of acceptance”, 179 “Latitude of rejection”, 179 Leadership, 410–411 Learning, 26 Learning deficit, 93–94 Life experiences, decline of positivity bias from childhood to adulthood, 346–347

Lifespan differences. see also Developmental factors adult self-enhancement and, 354 social neuroscience perspective and, 60–61 Local dominance effect, 187–188 Locus of causality, 325– 326

M Meaning, confusing with knowledge, 77–79 Meaning-making, autobiographical memory and, 219–220 Measurement other methods, 486–489 overview, 472–474, 489– 490 social comparison approach, 474–480, 476f, 478f, 479f social realist approach to, 481–486, 485t, 486t Taylor–Brown hypothesis, 480–481, 483 Medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), 51, 52, 54f, 58–59 Memory. see also Autobiographical memory overview, 10–12 positivity bias and, 215 subjective time bias and, 123–124 Mental health, 408–409 Mirror-neuron system, 51 Modesty, 434–436 Moral dilemmas consequences and, 97–104, 98t, 99t, 102t, 103t perspective taking and, 106–107 Moral hypocrisy. see also Hypocrisy; Morality overview, 94–96, 108 perspective taking and, 104–108, 105t self-deception and, 100–104, 102t, 103t testing the nature of, 96–100, 98t, 99t

Moral integrity. see also Integrity; Moral hypocrisy; Morality overview, 96, 108 perspective taking and, 104–108, 105t testing the nature of, 96–100, 98t, 99t Moral psychology, 85 Morality. see also Moral hypocrisy explanations for moral failure, 93–96 integrity and, 96 motivation and, 96–100, 98t, 99t overview, 11, 92–93, 108 perspective taking and, 104–108, 105t problem with, 93 reasons for, 95 Mortality, 387, 389–394 Mortality salience, 44–45 Motivated inferences, 131 Motivated misperceptions, 166–171. see also Environment, biased perceptions of Motivated self-construal, 8– 9 Motivation, social judgment and, 176 Motivational systems approach and avoidance processes and, 23–24 health decisions and, 381–383 moral hypocrisy and, 95, 108 narcissism and, 401–402 overview, 2–3, 10–11 perception of motivational relevance, 24–25 perceptions of environment and, 157–165, 161f psychology and, 4–6 social psychology, 6–8 Multidimensional models, 205–206 Multiple-regression model, 486–487 Multistage approach, 139– 144

Subject Index   519

N

O

Naïve realism, 77–79 Narcissism accountability and, 462–463 behaviors of, 402–407 change and, 416–417 costs and benefits of, 407–412 high-functioning narcissists, 412–414 low-functioning narcissists, 414–416 motivation construct and, 5 overview, 14, 399–402, 418 self-enhancement and selfprotection in, 412–416 self-esteem and, 302, 313 social consequences and, 242–244 social neuroscience perspective and, 60 Narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), 415–416. see also Narcissism Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), 242 Negative attributional style, 365–366. see also Attributional styles Negotiation, 246–247. see also Social negotiation Neurocognitive factors amygdala and, 25–27 anterior cingulate cortex, 30–31 asymmetric frontal cortical regions, 31–39 nucleus accumbens and ventra striatum, 27–29 orbitofrontal cortex, 29–30 overview, 8, 39 perception of motivational relevance and, 24–25 Neurofeedback, 33–34 Neuroimaging technologies amygdala and, 26–27 orbitofrontal cortex and, 29 social neuroscience perspective and, 54–55, 54f, 58 Norms collectivist cultures and, 434–437 narcissism and, 399–400 Nucleus accumbens, 27–29

Observer effects, social consequences and, 248–251 Observer-based measurement approach, 473–474, 481–483 Older people autobiographical memory and, 214–215 self-enhancement and selfprotection in, 350–354 social neuroscience perspective and, 60–61 Optimism, 408–409 Orbitofrontal cortex overview, 29–30 social neuroscience perspective and, 52–54, 54f, 55–57, 58–59 Others’ self-enhancement observer effects and, 248–251 perceptions of, 247–248 Overconfidence, 307 Overestimations, 402–407

P Parent–child communication patterns, 313–314 Partner valuing, 270–271. see also Relationships Past selves, 115 Pathological narcissism, 415– 416. see also Narcissism Peer relationships, 383–385. see also Relationships Perceived discrimination, 322. see also Attributions Perception. see also Environment, biased perceptions of depression and, 370 judgment of control and, 359–362 of others, 240–241, 247–248 overview, 10–12 of time, 10, 116–121 Perceptual filter, 160 Performance expectancy and, 194–199 monitoring, 132, 137–138, 370–371, 434–435 overview, 407–408

520   Subject Index Personalism, 176–177 Personality emotional expressivity and, 267–268 narcissism and, 405–406 Personality context, 13–15 Personality disorders, 400 Perspective taking, moral hypocrisy and, 104–108, 105t Physical attractiveness, 244 Physiological responses, 135–137 Pluralistic ignorance, 430 Positive illusions, 131 Positive self-regard adult self-enhancement and, 352 cultural factors and, 427 social negotiation and, 427 Positivity bias adaptiveness of, 348–350 autobiographical memory and, 212–222, 226 childhood self-enhancement and, 343–350 confusing knowledge and meaning and, 77–79 decline of from childhood to adulthood, 345–348 hedonic valence hypothesis and, 212–222 overview, 11–12, 49–50, 211–212 perceptions of environment and, 165 social neuroscience perspective and, 53t, 55–56 Post hoc rationalization, 95–96. see also Rationalization Postdecisional dissonance processes. see also Dissonance consistency processes and, 194–199 overview, 194 self-enhancement in, 200–202 self-protection and selfenhancement in, 202–206 Power, narcissism and, 410–411

Predictions, depression and, 362–364 Prejudice, stigmatization and, 321 Pride, narcissism and, 415 Priming, self-standards model (SSM) and, 204 Projection self-esteem and, 312 social, 182–183 Protection motivation theory (PMT), 381–382 Proximity seeking, 290–291 Psychodynamic approach autobiographical memory and, 213–214 avoidant attachment styles and, 286–287 motivation construct and, 5 Psychological factors, 408–409, 438–439, 439f Psychological immune system, 131–132 Psychology, motivation construct and, 4–6

R Rationalism, 3 Rationalization dissonance and, 193–194 moral hypocrisy and, 95–96 psychological immune system and, 131 self-serving mappings and, 74–75 self-standards model (SSM) and, 204 Reactive self-enhancement, 405 Recall-of-feedback, depression and, 366–368 Recognizing falsehoods, 73 Redefinition adaptiveness and, 79–82 confusing knowledge and meaning and, 77–79 consequences of self-serving mappings and, 73–75 future directions for research in, 83–86 overview, 69–70, 86 self-serving social concepts and, 75–79 social concepts and, 71–73

Regression analyses overview, 486–487 social judgment and, 181–182 Rejection attachment and, 283–284 depression and, 370 narcissism and, 405–406 overview, 320–321 relationships and, 263–264 self-esteem and, 311, 312 stigma and, 321–322 Relational contexts, 12–13 Relationships attachment and, 283–284 emotional expressivity and, 266–269 established relationships, 270–273 initiation of, 261–266 narcissism and, 404, 405, 409–412 overview, 258–259, 273– 274 self-disclosure and, 266– 269 self-esteem and, 260–261, 311–312 self-protection and selfenhancement in, 259 social consequences and, 244–245 terror management theory and, 383–385 Relative self-enhancement overview, 251–252 social consequences and, 248–251 Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), 35 Repression autobiographical memory and, 213 motivation construct and, 5 Responses, threat autobiographical memory and, 214 narcissism and, 403–404, 405–406 self-affirmation theory and, 140–144, 143 Responses to evaluative audiences, 308–312

Responsibility attributions to discrimination and, 325–326 collectivist cultures and, 435 Reverse discrimination, 330–331 Reward learning amygdala and, 26 employment environments and, 245–246 nucleus accumbens and ventra striatum and, 28 Risk regulation model, 304–305 Romantic relationships. see also Relationships initiation of, 263–264 narcissism and, 404, 405, 409–412 self-esteem and, 313 social consequences and, 244–245 “Rose-colored glasses”. see Positivity bias Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, 352 Rumination, narcissism and, 415

S Satiation, academic exaggeration and, 463– 464 Schemas, depression and, 371 Secondary attachment strategies, 282. see also Attachment Secure attachment. see also Attachment narcissism and, 414–415 overview, 281–282, 288– 293 Security-based selfrepresentations, 292 Selective attention, 162–163 Selective memory, autobiographical memory and, 212–213 Self-actualization, 283 Self-affirmation. see also Selfaffirmation theory boundary conditions for, 145–146

Subject Index   521 health information and, 132–135 overview, 10, 201–202 recursive processes in, 144–145 temporal self-appraisal theory and, 118 Self-affirmation theory. see also Integrity; Self-affirmation boundary conditions and, 145–146 multistage approach, 139–144 overview, 128–130, 130f, 147 psychological immune system, 131–132 recursive processes and, 144–145 research using, 132–138 Self-aggrandizing. see also Academic exaggeration narcissism and, 404–405 verifiability and, 459–460 Self-assessments, 157 Self-concept consistency processes and, 194–199 motivation construct and, 5 stability of, 74–75 Self-criticism academic exaggeration and, 464 self-affirmation and, 128–129, 147 Self-culture connection, 437–438. see also Cultural context Self-deception measurement and, 488 moral hypocrisy and, 96, 102t, 103t Self-disclosure, 266–269 Self-efficacy, narcissism and, 408–409 Self-enhancers, 81–82 Self-enhancing tactician model (SCENT), 432–434, 432f Self-esteem. see also Explicit self-esteem; Implicit selfesteem adaptiveness and, 81 adult self-enhancement and, 352

attachment and, 284, 291 attributions to discrimination and, 322–332 behavior regulation and, 303–308 complex role of, 312–313 consistency processes and, 197–198 emotional expressivity and, 267–269 hypocrisy and, 198–199 lifecycle trajectory of, 351, 352, 455–456 multidimensional models of, 205–206 narcissism and, 401–402, 408–409 in older adults, 351 overview, 13, 13–14, 313–314 postdecision dissonance and, 200 relationships and, 12, 258– 259, 260–261, 261–266, 271–274 responses to evaluative audiences and, 308–312 self-serving biases and, 119–120 self-standards model (SSM) and, 204 social consequences and, 240–241 social neuroscience perspective and, 49–50, 60 social rejection and, 320–321 stigma and, 321–322, 322–332, 332–333 temporal self-appraisal theory and, 122 terror management health model (TMHM) and, 389–391 terror management theory and, 383–385 Self-Esteem Implicit Association Test (IAT), 299 Self-evaluation depression and, 368–371 local dominance effect and, 187–188 self-esteem and, 309 social neuroscience perspective and, 53t

522   Subject Index Self-handicapping, 309 Self-immunization, 75, 76–77 Self-inflation, 12 Self-insight, 12 Self-judgments, 472–473, 477–479, 479f Self-monitoring orbitofrontal cortex and, 30 social neuroscience perspective and, 53–54 Self-motives perspective, 211–212 Self–other differences, 117 Self–other judgments, 478–479, 479f Self-perceptions, 49–50. see also Positivity bias Self-presentation collectivist cultures and, 434–435 narcissism and, 403 relationships and, 261 subjective time bias and, 124–125 Self-promotion, 307 Self-psychology, 283 Self-regard, positive adult self-enhancement and, 352 cultural factors and, 427 social negotiation and, 427 Self-regulation academic exaggeration and, 465–466 health decisions and, 381–382 narcissism and, 401–402, 406–407, 414 self-esteem and, 303–308 Self-related bias, 182–183 Self-representations, 283– 284, 292–293 Self-resources, 139–144 Self-sacrificing selfenhancement, 415 Self-schemas, 176 Self-serving bias adult self-enhancement and, 353–354 depression and, 365–366, 374–375 individual differences in, 119–120

overview, 7, 13–14 temporal self-appraisal theory and, 117 Self-serving definitions, 79–82 Self-serving judgments, 131. see also Judgment Self-serving mappings, 73–75 Self-standards, 180–182 Self-standards model (SSM), 203–205 Self-system, 129–130, 130f Self-worth, terror management theory and, 384–385 Set points, academic exaggeration and, 464– 466 Sexual desires cognitive dissonance process and, 198–199 conceptual filters and, 160–161 Shame, narcissism and, 415 Shyness, 5 Signal-detection framework, 488–489 Significance, 24 Situational factors attributions to discrimination and, 327 emotional expressivity and, 268–269 situational pressure, 93–94 Social comparisons. see also Comparisons decline of positivity bias from childhood to adulthood and, 347 education experiences and, 347 local dominance effect and, 187–188 measurement and, 474–480, 476f, 478f, 479f social judgment and, 186–187 Social concepts consequences of self-serving mappings and, 73–75 future directions for research in, 83–86 fuzziness of, 71–73 overview, 69–70, 86 self-serving, 75–79

Social consequences. see also Consequences actor effects and, 236–247 observer effects and, 248–251 overview, 235–236, 251–252 perception of others’ self-enhancement and, 247–248 Social construal, 176–177 Social coordination, 428–430 Social definition, 85–86 Social dilemmas social consequences and, 236–240 tragedy of the commons and, 238–240 Social identity mitigating social identity threat, 118–119, 143 subjective time bias and, 116, 118–119 Social judgment. see also Judgment overview, 174–175, 188 self as a standard for, 177–182 self-enhancement and selfprotection in, 176–177 self-serving consequences of, 183–188 social projection and, 182–183 Social learning perspective, 93–94 Social loafing, 237–238 Social negotiation, 427. see also Negotiation Social neuroscience perspective future directions for research in, 57–61 overview, 49–57, 53t, 54f, 61 Social perceptiveness depression and, 370 overview, 73 Social projection, 182–183 Social psychology measurement and, 480– 481 motivation construct and, 6–8 Social realist approach to measurement, 481–486, 485t, 486t

Social reality academic exaggeration and, 458 measurement and, 481–486, 485t, 486t Social rejection. see also Rejection depression and, 370 narcissism and, 405–406 overview, 320–321 stigma and, 321–322 Social relations model (SRM), 484 Social skills, 415–416 Social support, fading affect bias and, 224–225 Socialization, terror management theory and, 383–385 Sociometer theory alcohol consumption and, 306–307 stigmatization and, 321 Spotlight effect, 176–177 State anger, 36–37 State emotional responses, 35–36 State self-esteem, 258–259. see also Self-esteem Stereotypes domain desirability and, 460–461 self-affirmation theory and, 131–132, 137–138 social consequences and, 240–241 Stigma attributions to discrimination and, 322–332 high-status groups and, 330–332 self-esteem and, 321–322, 332–333 Stress depression and, 366 narcissism and, 408–409 physiological responses to, 135–137 secure attachment and, 290–291 self-affirmation theory and, 135–137 terror management theory and, 385

Subject Index   523 Stroop task anterior cingulate cortex and, 30–31 avoidant attachment styles and, 285–286 Subjective time bias. see also Time calendar time and, 123 effectiveness of distancing bias, 121–123 versus other self-protection strategies, 123–125 overview, 115–116 temporal self-appraisal theory and, 116– 121 Subjective well-being, 465 Subjectivity, 175 Success expectations, 362– 364 Symmetrical moral dilemmas, 107–108

T Task assignment, 106– 107 Taylor–Brown hypothesis, 480–481, 483 Teacher–student relations, 346–347 Temporal comparisons, 186–187. see also Comparisons Temporal self-appraisal theory effectiveness of distancing bias, 121–123 overview, 114, 116–121 subjective time bias and, 115–116 Temporal–parietal junction (TPJ), 51 Terror management health model (TMHM), 381, 386–394, 386f Terror management theory, 14, 383–385 Thalamic regions fear and, 25–27 perception of motivational relevance and, 24– 25

Thought suppression avoidant attachment styles and, 286–287 overview, 12 Threat responses autobiographical memory and, 214 narcissism and, 403–404, 405–406 self-affirmation theory and, 140–144, 143 Threatening situations, 131–132 Time. see also Temporal selfappraisal theory calendar time and, 123 overview, 112–113 perceptions of, 10, 116–121 subjective time bias and, 115–125 temporal self-appraisal theory and, 116–121 timeline, 113–114 Timelines, 113–114 Tragedy of the commons, 238–240 Trait affective styles, 32–34 Trait definition. see Definitions of traits

U Ubiquitous self, social judgment and, 175 Uncoupling effect, selfaffirmation theory and, 142–144 Underperformance, 132

V Ventral striatum, 27–29 Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), 52 Verifiability, 459–460 Vertical method, 72 Visual system motivations and, 163–165 perception of motivational relevance and, 24–25 perceptions of environment and, 158–160, 163–165

524   Subject Index Vulnerability, narcissism and, 412–413 Vulnerability hypothesis, 374–375 Vulnerability–stress model, 366 Vulnerable narcissism, 414–416. see also Narcissism

W Warmth, relationships and, 264, 266 Weighing the evidence, narcissism and, 406–407 Wishful thinking decline of positivity bias from childhood to adulthood, 345

perceptions of environment and, 156–157 Withdrawal. see also Avoidance anger and, 38–39 narcissism and, 407, 414–415 overview, 23–24 Worldview, terror management theory and, 384–385