Handbook of Argumentation Theory: A Critical Survey of Classical Backgrounds and Modern Studies 9783110846096, 9783110131369

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Handbook of Argumentation Theory

Studies of Argumentation in Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis (PDA) This series contains reports on original research in both pragmatics and discourse analysis. Contributions f r o m linguists, philosophers, logicians, cognitive psychologists, and researchers in speech c o m m u n i c a t i o n are brought together to promote interdisciplinary research into a variety of topics in the study of language use. In this series several kinds of studies are presented under headings such as 'Argumentation', 'Conversation' and 'Interpretation'. Editors Frans H. van E e m e r e n Rob G r o o t e n d o r s t University of A m s t e r d a m D e p a r t m e n t of Speech C o m m u n i c a t i o n

Handbook of Argumentation Theory A Critical Survey of Classical Backgrounds and Modern Studies

Frans H. van Eemeren Rob Grootendorst Tjark Kruiger

1987 FORIS PUBLICATIONS Dordrecht-Holland/Providence-U.S.A.

Published

by:

Foris Publications Holland P.O. Box 509 3300 A M Dordrecht, The Netherlands Sole distributor

for the U.S.A. and

Canada:

Foris Publications USA, Inc. P.O. Box 5904 Providence Rl 02903 U.S.A.

ISBN 90 6765 330 6 © 1987 by the authors No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright owner. Printed in The Netherlands by ICG Printing, Dordrecht.

Contents Preface

i

1.

1 1 8

2.

3.

4.

5.

Introduction 1.1. What is argumentation? 1.2. A b a s i c argumentation model 1.3. The premisses and aims of argumentation theory Backgrounds to argumentation theory 2.1. The c l a s s i c a l background: l o g i c , tic and rhetoric 2.2. The study of f a l l a c i e s 2.3. Modern logic

dialec-

Major studies on argumentation 3.1. Contributions to the development of the study of argumentation 3.2. Arne Naess's a n a l y s i s of discussions 3-3. Crawshay-Williams's a n a l y s i s of controversy 3.4. Formal d i a l e c t i c Toulmin's a n a l y s i s model 4.1. Introduction 4.2. F i e l d - i n v a r i a n t and field-dependent f e a tures of argumentation 4.3» The form and v a l i d i t y of arguments 4.4. The application of Toulmin's model 4.5. Argumentation a n a l y s i s using Toulmin's model 4.6. Conclusion The new rhetoric of Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca 5.1. Introduction

36 55 55 78 94 108 108 113 122 131 162 162 169 174 186 191 199 208 208

6.

5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5.

The rhetorical framework of argumentation The point of departure of argumentation A typology of sorts of argumentation Argumentation a n a l y s i s according to the insights of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca

21L, 221 227

5.6.

Conclusion

251

The present state of argumentation theory

246

260

Notes

273

Classified bibliography

288

Alphabetical bibliography Index

295 330

Preface This book is about the study of argumentation. It is not a practical course designed to teach the reader how to put his case together or how to convince others in a discussion, nor is it an introduction to any one theoretical approach to arguing and discussing: rather, it is a survey of a number of interesting and thought-provoking attempts at forming theories of argumentation. The intention is to give a picture of the way in which the field of argumentation theory has developed over the past few decades. We begin with an exposition of the subject, aims and premisses of argumentation theory as a study, and go on to outline the most important theoretical backgrounds to the field. It is hoped that this will establish the frame of reference within which those engaged in the study of argumentation do their work. We then move on to examine some major studies on argumentation, parting particular attention to those contributions to argumentation theory that have been most influential in recent years. Finally we survey the chief lines of thought to be discerned in argumentation studies today. This Handbook of Argumentation Theory is a translation of a book originally published in Dutch as Argumentatietheorie (2nd edn. 1981). It is our considered opinion that anyone concerned to resolve disputes as peaceably and as satisfactorily as possible should reflect on the ways in which arguing takes place in practice and on how argumentation ought to be conducted. We therefore believe that the present theoretical work will in principle be of interest to everyone. We hope that those who have read the book will agree with us.

Chapter 1

Introduction 1 . 1 . What is

argumentation?

This book is in the nature of an introduction to the study of argumentation. We shall therefore begin our opening chapter by defining what we mean by argumentation. Argumentation is a part of the personal experience of every human individual. Everybody regularly advances arguments in defence of assertions or actions, and everybody is regularly confronted with the arguments put forward by other people. Let us start with four examples: (a) and (b) are invented, (c) and (d) are quotations. (a) Tom: Elly: Tom: Elly: Tom:

'Of course I'm in favour of harsher sentences for drug addicts.' 'Why?' 'Well, otherwise the problem will carry on getting worse.' 'How do you mean?' 'You know the way it goes: word gets round that it's such a fantastic experience, and since everyone knows there's hardly any risk of getting caught, they all try it. '

(b) Mother to daughter: 'There's no question of your going away on holiday by yourself. We didn't let your sister either when she was fourteen.' (c) Letter to The Times, 11 February 1959: 'Sir, When consideration is being given to a third television channel could not a way be found out of the "advertising break" problem by devoting the new channel entirely to advertising?

2

Introduction In that way the present commercial channel could be l e f t free from programme breaks (natural or otherwise), thus satisfying those of us who object to these interruptions while those millions who are alleged to prefer "the adverts" w i l l also be made more happy in their viewing. Yours f a i t h f u l l y , E.H. Dare.1

(d) 'Dutch- shops are bulging Member of Soviet trade delegation: with goods, but the people never have time to buy them — there's never anybody queuing up1 (Het Parool, 15 January 1977). Nobody will have much trouble in identifying these passages as examples of argumentative usage-, they clearly have certain features peculiar to argumentation. We believe that what we are dealing with here is a number of general features of argumentation which are present in every discussion and which, by their presence together, mark a particular form of language usage as argumentation. Combining these features, which we shall discuss below, thus produces a definition of the concept of what we call 'argumentation 1 . However, even though our definition is of an element of language usage familiar to all language users from their own experience, and accords with that experience, it must be regarded first and foremost as a stipulative definition. By means of this definition we indicate the meaning which we attach to the word argumentation in what follows. 1. Argumentation is a social activity Arguing is a human activity directed at people. As a rule these will be other people, but not necessarily. The person who is arguing may also be conferring with himself. For example, he may be weighing up the pros and cons of the arguments he has thought up for himself. Even then, however, the argumentation is socially motivated, since possible reactions are anticipated. But the social nature of argumentation is most clearly expressed in discourse between two or more interlocutors who can react to each other's arguments. 2. Argumentation is an intellectual activity Argumentation is founded on thought. A person engaged in argumentation shows that he has given some degree of consideration to the subject of his argument. He performs a conscious and purposeful act which would not be possible if his behaviour at that particular moment were

What is

argumentation?

3

wholly regulated by unconscious impulses and automatic reflexes. Argumentation is founded on intellectual considerations, and must therefore be regarded as an activity of reason (or ratio). This does not mean that emotions play no part in it, merely that their role is subordinate to that of reason (see also feature 7). S. Argumentation

is a verbal

4. Argumentation

is a matter

activity

Argumentation requires the use of language. A person engaged in argumentation makes an assertion or statement, assumes or doubts something, denies something, and so on. For the performance of all these activities he must utter words and sentences (whether spoken or written). Besides these verbal means he can, of course — just as in any other verbal activity — employ non-verbal means ( e . g . facial expression and gestures). To the extent that these f u l f i l an argumentative function, they can always be explicitized v e r b a l l y . However, non-verbal means of communication can never completely replace verbal ones: argumentation without the use of language is impossible. This means that a person engaged in argumentation has deliberately opted for the use of verbal means. He clearly prefers to use words rather than non-verbal means of communication; he speaks, rather than resorting to blows or other forms of violence. Here we have another excellent reason for calling argumentation a pre-eminently verbal activity. The arguer uses words to lend force to his words. As a rule, argumentation is conducted in ordinary colloquial speech. However, it is also possible to make use, either wholly or partially, of a formal language (which may be constructed especially for the purpose). This is what we see in logic and mathematics, for example. There, symbols with explicitly defined and unequivocal meanings replace the words of colloquial speech, which are often ambiguous and vague and whose meanings are rarely sharply defined. (In fact the distinction between colloquial speech and formalized language is not absolute: even in colloquial language it is not uncommon for the meaning of vague or ambiguous words to be indicated more specifically or precisely, or even defined exactly, in the interest of c l a r i t y . ) of

opinions

Argumentation always refers to a particular subject concerning which opinions can or do d i f f e r . Holding an opinion is not in itself, however, sufficient to initiate argumentation: it is necessary not only that this first opinion should be expressed, but also that another

Introduction

4

interlocutor should indicate that he has a different point of view, i . e . that he does not simply accept the first opinion, that he doubts it, or that he has another opinion of his own to set against it. It is thus an expressed and controverted or disputed opinion that is the subject of argumentation. 1 Our use of the word opinion here does not imply any limitation whatsoever as regards the subject of argumentation. In expressing an opinion, a person also implies that he regards himself as positively committed to that opinion, and whoever attacks an opinion thereby implies that he regards himself as negatively committed against that opinion. That is the only restriction. The argumentation may thus relate to a view, an idea or a conception of something, but also to a course of action, policy or attitude; it may be a matter of an affirmative or negative and accurate or inaccurate assertion, but also of a wish or ethical or aesthetic judgement-, all scientific, scholarly, non-scientific and non-scholarly areas of human knowledge and behaviour, without any exception whatever, may be the subject of argumentation: politics, entertainment, economics, psychology, the weather , and so on and so forth. To illustrate the immense diversity of possible subjects for argumentation, a few examples of opinions will suffice: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Litmus reacts to acid by changing colour. I f you ask me, not a l l top sportsmen take stimulants. Amsterdam is the capital of the Netherlands. I think one should help one's fellow men in times of need. In my opinion Satie's 'Prélude de la porte héroïque du c i e l ' is superb. (6) Even in academic circles people discriminate to their hearts' content. As these examples show, a language user can formulate his opinion explicitly as an opinion by adding words like if you ask me (2), I think (4) and in my opinion (5). But at the same time it is possible, and in ordinary speech perfectly usual, to omit such additions and present the opinion in the form of an observation or statement (1, 3, 6).

See p p . book.

274 ff. for the n o t e s , w h i c h are n u m b e r e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y

through

the

What is argumentation?

5

5.

The purpose of argumentation is the justification or refutation of opinions The purpose of argumentation i s f i r s t and foremost to j u s t i f y or refute an o p i n i o n . Other possible o b j e c t i v e s (such a s being l i k e d or thought i n t e l l i g e n t ) a r e s e c o n d a r y . As a r u l e it is p o s s i b l e to pursue them v e r y well in other w a y s , whereas j u s t i f i c a t i o n and r e f u t a t i o n c a n only be a c h i e v e d b y means of a r g u m e n t a t i o n . A r g u i n g , t h e n , is an a c t i v i t y which may be d i r e c t e d e i t h e r towards defending an opinion or to attacking an o p i n i o n . In the f i r s t c a s e the argument is an attempted justification, and in the second it i s an attempted refutation. In p r a c t i c e , these two a c t i v i t i e s a r e not u s u a l l y independent of e a c h o t h e r : they will both be present in a d i s c u s s i o n , and t h e r e will g e n e r a l l y be a degree of mutual i n t e r a c t i o n . Both a c t i v i t i e s c o n t r i b u t e , in t h e i r own w a y s , to the fulfilment of the critical function of a r g u m e n t a t i o n . A s p e a k e r attempting to j u s t i f y an opinion defends it a g a i n s t s t a t e d , expected or p o s s i b l e c r i t i c i s m , and the s p e a k e r attempting to refute an opinion e x p r e s s e s c r i t i c i s m of i t s t e n a b i l i t y in the l i g h t of arguments in i t s f a v o u r , whether or not these have a l r e a d y been e x p l i c i t l y e x p r e s s e d . Argumentation i s o f f e r i n g , defending a g a i n s t , t a k i n g account o f , and a n t i c i p a t i n g criticism. 6. Argumentation consists of a constellation of statements. Argumentation c o n s i s t s of a c o n s t e l l a t i o n of one or more statements by means of which a l a n g u a g e u s e r t r i e s to j u s t i f y or refute an o p i n i o n . These statements a r e the arguments adduced for or a g a i n s t the opinion; following Naess (1978: 100-19) we may c a l l them pro-arguments and contra-arguments. A s p e a k e r a d v a n c i n g a c o n s t e l l a t i o n of statements a s p r o - a r g u m e n t s b e l i e v e s t h a t on the grounds of t h i s c o n s t e l l a t i o n he c a n claim t h a t the opinion he i s defending merits a p p r o b a t i o n . By c o n t r a s t , a s p e a k e r advancing a constellation of statements as contraarguments b e l i e v e s p r e c i s e l y the opposite, i . e . t h a t the o r i g i n a l opinion does not merit approbation and ought p e r h a p s to be r e t r a c t e d . The f e a t u r e common to both pro-arguments and c o n t r a - a r g u m e n t s is t h a t both forms of argumentation a r e directed towards testing the opinion t h a t is the s u b j e c t of d i s c u s s i o n . To sum up, we might a l s o s a y t h a t argumentation c o n s i s t s of a constellation of statements with a test function. A s p e a k e r (we use the term speaker here as a c o n v e n ience i n s t e a d of language user; what is s a i d a p p l i e s e q u a l l y to written argumentation) c a n e x p r e s s this test function e x p l i c i t l y by means of words l i k e so, therefore,

Introduction

6

since or because, but he need not do s o . The test function may be absolute ( e . g . ' P r i n c e s s B e a t r i x is certain to be i n a u g u r a t e d as queen in Amsterdam, b e c a u s e the c o n s t i tution r e q u i r e s i t ' ) , but need not be so; a s p e a k e r c a n a l s o i n d i c a t e t h a t he t h i n k s he h a s j u s t i f i e d or refuted a given opinion only up to a point ( ' J o a n is not v e r y l i k e l y to come now — she so often f a i l s to turn u p . L e t ' s go'). 7. Argumentation is directed towards obtaining the approbation of an audience Whether the arguments which a s p e a k e r a d v a n c e s for or a g a i n s t a given opinion succeed in j u s t i f y i n g or r e f u t i n g t h a t opinion depends ( p a r t l y ) on the r e a c t i o n s of his audience. It i s thus a l s o p o s s i b l e to d e s c r i b e a r g u m e n t a tion as an attempt — whether or not it is s u c c e s s f u l — to e l i c i t the approbation of the l a n g u a g e users who c o n stitute his a u d i e n c e ; in other words, it is an attempt at convincing . From the very f a c t t h a t a s p e a k e r attempts to win his audience over by means of argument it is c l e a r t h a t he r e g a r d s his audience as competent to e x e r c i s e judgement. The audience i s thus e n t i t l e d to e x p r e s s an opinion of the arguments put forward by the s p e a k e r . However, the s p e a k e r does not simply l a y his arguments before the audience for t h e i r a p p r a i s a l : he a l s o e x p e c t s them to judge his arguments rationally. A r a t i o n a l assessment of argumentation means, among other t h i n g s , t h a t the assessment does not t a k e p l a c e p u r e l y on the b a s i s of prejudice, tradition or uncontrolled emotions, but t h a t in p r i n c i p l e it c a n in turn be j u s t i f i e d or refuted by means of argument. This does not mean t h a t emotions a r e d e b a r r e d from p l a y i n g a p a r t in the a s s e s s ment by the a u d i e n c e . The question of whether such an assessment may be r e g a r d e d a s r a t i o n a l (or r e a s o n a b l e ) has in i t s e l f nothing to do with the question of whether the argument and i t s assessment a r e b a s e d on emotions, a n d , i f so, what emotions these a r e . Arguments and assessments c a n and may v e r y well be r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s of. emotions ( a n d in p r a c t i c e they p r o b a b l y often will b e ) , but a r a t i o n a l assessment aims to determine the extent to which statements a r e t e n a b l e a s arguments and not the degree to which they a r e e x p r e s s i o n s of noble or i g n o b l e emotions.2 The assessment is a matter of the ratio; emotions a r e p a r t of the causa and f a l l outside the scope of a rational assessment. A

person

engaging

in

argumentation

appeals

to

the

What is

argumentation?

7

rationality of the assessing audience at whom the a r g u mentation is directed. However, this appeal is pointless if the arguing speaker and his audience do not apply more or less the same criteria to the arguments. A speaker addressing an audience with a view to j u s t i f y i n g or refuting an opinion t a c i t l y assumes that such common c r i t e r i a are a v a i l a b l e and that the audience w i l l apply those c r i t e r i a in the assessment of the argument. A r g u mentation is thus an appeal to an audience for a rational assessment on the basis of assumed common criteria. Some of these seven general features are c l e a r l y related to the process of argumentation ( e . g . feature 1), while others relate to the product that is the result of that process ( e . g . feature 6 ) . In colloquial speech the term argumentation , too, displays this 'process-product ambig u i t y ' . If we say 'the argumentation in that article is not v a l i d ' we are r e f e r r i n g to the product, whereas in ' I have not yet finished my argumentation' we are concerned with the process. In our v i e w , each of the seven features is a necessary feature of argumentation, and their presence together constitutes a sufficient condition for being able, in a given case, to speak of 'argumentation'. (This does not mean that there are no other common features of a r g u mentation: merely that we believe it is enough for us to indicate these s e v e n . ) Argumentation is a social, intellectual, verbal activity serving to justify or refute an opinion, consisting of a constellation of statements and directed towards obtaining the approbation of an audience. The definition above also serves to delineate, in general terms, the subject of the branch of study known as argumentation theory. In this introduction to argumentation theory we shall t r y to present a coherent picture of the theoretical work that has been done on argumentation up to the present. To do this in an orderly and responsible fashion we shall f i r s t have to discuss the central e l e ments in scholarly approaches to argumentation. In doing so, we shall introduce a number of terms which w i l l f a c i litate a clear and consistent discussion of argumentation. By concluding our examination of these central elements by formulating a. general objective of argumentation theory, we shall attempt in this introductory chapter to provide a general frame of reference within which the remaining chapters may be placed.

8

Introduction

1 . 2 . A b a s i c argumentation model A s p e a k e r attempting to j u s t i f y or refute an opinion b y means of argumentation is at the same time attempting to perform a s p e c i f i c k i n d of verbal conveyance of information — where the term information i s t o be viewed in a very wide s e n s e . The s p e a k e r uses l a n g u a g e to inform other people of something, and a l l forms of l a n g u a g e u s a g e s e r v i n g t h i s aim may be r e g a r d e d a s attempts at information c o n v e y a n c e . When c o n s i d e r i n g the word information one is n a t u r a l l y i n c l i n e d to t h i n k f i r s t of statements of fact, but t h a t is not the only form of information. Suppositions, questions, requests, orders e t c . a r e a l l forms of v e r b a l information. In g e n e r a l it may be s a i d t h a t e v e r y message t h a t i s e x p r e s s e d in l a n g u a g e and i s thus t r a n s m i t t e d by means of l a n g u a g e , is v e r b a l i n f o r m a t i o n . 3 The message c o n t a i n e d in an u t t e r a n c e always c o n s i s t s of two components: it has a p a r t i c u l a r content and a p a r t i c u l a r force. In the sentence ' I a s s e r t t h a t Marius f e l l a long w a y 1 , for i n s t a n c e , the content of the mess a g e is t h a t Marius f e l l a long way and the force i s t h a t the sentence i s to be r e g a r d e d as an a s s e r t i o n . The sentences ' I a d v i s e Peter not to r e a c t ' and ' I a s k Peter not to r e a c t 1 both have the same content as r e g a r d ' s P e t e r ' s n o n - r e a c t i n g : the force of the two, however, is d i f f e r e n t . The f i r s t h a s the force of a recommendation, the second t h a t of a r e q u e s t . 4 The v e r b a l c o n v e y a n c e of information implies t h a t a s p e a k e r attempts by means of u t t e r a n c e s to convey to a n other l a n g u a g e u s e r a p a r t i c u l a r message with a p a r t i c u l a r content and a p a r t i c u l a r f o r c e . The c o n v e y a n c e 5 of information b e g i n s with the formulation (whether w r i t ten or spoken) of the message by one l a n g u a g e u s e r (the w r i t e r or s p e a k e r ) and ends with its interpretation and assessment by the other l a n g u a g e user (the r e a d e r or l i s t e n e r ) . Thus the complete process of information c o n v e y ance c o n s i s t s of providing ( f o r m u l a t i n g ) , acquiring ( i n t e r p r e t i n g ) and processing ( a s s e s s i n g ) information. In argumentation the message i s always a complex one which h a s a s p e c i f i c function and the components of which d i s p l a y a s p e c i f i c i n t e r r e l a t i o n . The message a l ways c o n s i s t s of a statement f u l f i l l i n g the function of an opinion and a c o n s t e l l a t i o n of one or more statements c a l c u l a t e d to serve a s argumentation for or a g a i n s t t h a t opinion. This c o n s t e l l a t i o n thus c o n s i s t s of statements which justify or refute the sentence functioning a s the opinion, which i s defended or attacked by the c o n s t e l l a t i o n c o n c e r n e d . The whole comprising the statements composed

A basic

argumentation

model

9

of the opinion a n d the a r g u m e n t s i s c a l l e d a discursive text, 5 a n d the whole of the s e n t e n c e s c o n s t i t u t i n g the a r g u m e n t s i s the argumentation for or a g a i n s t the o p i n i o n . The p r o c e s s of information c o n v e y a n c e by a r g u m e n t a t i o n i s complete when one l a n g u a g e u s e r ( r e a d e r or l i s t e n e r ) understands t h a t the v e r b a l m e s s a g e i s a d i s c u r s i v e text in which a r g u m e n t s a r e a d d u c e d for or a g a i n s t an o p i n ion a n d when he h a s assessed the j u s t i f y i n g or r e f u t i n g function of the a r g u m e n t s r e l a t i n g to t h a t o p i n i o n . Dep e n d i n g on the r e s u l t of t h i s a s s e s s m e n t , t h i s l a n g u a g e u s e r will then e i t h e r accept or reject the a r g u m e n t a t i o n his a n d the o p i n i o n , or he may for the moment reserve judgement. This does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean, a n y more t h a n a p o s i t i v e or n e g a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t by the r e a d e r or l i s t ener d o e s , t h a t v e r b a l c o n t a c t between w r i t e r a n d r e a d e r or s p e a k e r a n d l i s t e n e r i s then broken o f f . It i s p e r f e c t l y p o s s i b l e for a new c o n v e y a n c e of information to t a k e p l a c e , in which c l a r i f i c a t i o n i s r e q u e s t e d , new a r g u m e n t s a d d u c e d , or the opinion r e t r a c t e d a n d r e p l a c e d by a n o t h e r . In other words a dialogue i s i n i t i a t e d which t a k e s the form of a discussion or polemic a n d in which the communicative roles of s p e a k e r a n d l i s t e n e r or w r i t e r and reader are alternately exchanged. The b a s i c model which i s the s t a r t i n g point f o r t h i s book c o n t a i n s a schematic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the elements which a l w a y s p l a y a p a r t in a r g u m e n t a t i o n . The model r e l a t e s to the s p e c i f i c p r o c e s s of information c o n v e y a n c e t h a t t a k e s p l a c e in a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d t h u s c o v e r s the formu l a t i o n , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d a s s e s s m e n t of a r g u m e n t s for or a g a i n s t a p a r t i c u l a r o p i n i o n . Let us f i r s t e x a m i n e the elements c o n t a i n e d in the model a n d then look a t the model i t s e l f , g o i n g t h r o u g h it point by p o i n t . The argumentation (A) comes from a speaker (S) who t r i e s to j u s t i f y or r e f u t e an opinion ( 0 ) to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of a listener (L) by a c q u a i n t i n g him with a constellation (C) of statements (Sti , . . . ,St n ) which h a v e a j u s t i f y i n g or r e f u t i n g f u n c t i o n with r e g a r d to the o p i n i o n . S e x p r e s s e s 0 a n d C ( S t i , . . . , S t n ) v e r b a l l y in u t t e r a n c e s uo and u j , . . . , u n r e s p e c t i v e l y , which together c o n s t i t u t e a discursive text (T).7 On the b a s i s of T, L a r r i v e s at an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (T *) of the d i s c u r s i v e t e x t . T' c o n s i s t s of an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 0 ' of 0 a n d an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n C ' f S t ' j , — , St' n ) of C( St J , . . . , St n ) . On the b a s i s of T ' , L a r r i v e s at an assessment (As) of the d e g r e e to which C ' ( S t ' j . . ,St' ) is a j u s t i f i c a t i o n or r e f u t a t i o n of 0 ' .

social reality situation

0 •/-

Ml

t A

'

C(St!

>

>-u...... u 1 n J

S justifying/ refuting

Fig. S L 0 0' A A' C C'

= =

«

«

-

t'o t'l

Stn) formulating

'

1 1 ! 1 1 | | | |

t •/-A'

C'fSt'!

St' n )

interpreting L assessing

1.1. Basic argumentation

model.

speaker listener opinion interpreted opinion argumentation interpreted argumentation constellation interpreted constellation

St St 1 u u' T T' +/-

t'„

= = « «

=

statement perceived statement utterance perceived utterance text interpreted text j ustifying or refuting r elation

The basic argumentation model can be represented as follows in terms of the intentions of S and L: S intends to express 0 and C(St \ , . . . ,St n ) in the utterances u 0 and ui , . . . , u n in such a way that L, by interpreting these utterances, is enabled to understand, what 0 and C(St i , . . . ,St n ) imply and that CiStj St n ) is intended as a justification or refutation of 0. In other words, S intends to make it possible for L to interpret T in such a way that 0 ' corresponds to 0 and C C S t ^ St'n) corresponds to C(Stj S t n ) . Moreover, S also intends with C(Sti , . . . , S t n ) to make L regard 0 as justified or refuted on the basis of i t , i . e . he intends that L shall accept or r e j e c t the opinion 0 on grounds of C (Stt , . . . , S t n ) . In other words, S intends to convince L of the Tightness of the justifying or refuting assertion represented by C(Stj St„) with regard to 0 . 8 L intends to interpret utterances u0 and u [ , . . . , u n in such a way that M' and C' (St' S t ' n ) agree with the content and force of 0 and CtStj , . . . ,St n ) as S intended 10

A basic argumentation

model

11

them to be understood. L has the further intention of assessing on the basis of C ( S t j , . . . ,St n ) whether 0 should be accepted or rejected. In other words, L intends to form a judgement regarding the Tightness or wrongness of the j u s t i f y i n g or refuting function which S attributes to C(Stj , . . . , S t n ) with regard to 0, and he then intends to draw from the result of his assessment the consequence that he shall, or shall not, allow himself to be convinced by C(St x Stn). Explanatory remarks Social

reality

and

situation

Argumentation always takes place in a particular social context which we c a l l the social reality. The social context should not be seen as a static entity; the whole of p r o cesses and structures which we mean when we refer to the social r e a l i t y is subject to continuous change. 9 The specific circumstances in which the argumentation takes place at any g i v e n moment constitute the situation in which those involved in the argumentation f i n d themselves. It would be v e r y d i f f i c u l t to g i v e an objective description of such a situation, but that is not what we are concerned with here. What we are interested in is the question — also f a r from easy to answer — of how those taking part in argumentation perceive the circumstances in which they find themselves: that i s , in the interpretation that they g i v e of the situation. This i n t e r pretation of the situation is of v i t a l significance for the course taken by the argumentation. Of course, the speaker may place a different interpretation on the situation than the listener, and if their interpretations are different in every respect a meaningful exchange of ideas becomes impossible. In practice, of course, it is the interlocutors themselves who have to determine whether or not a meaningful exchange of ideas appears possible, though an outsider — such as an argumentation theorist — may sometimes be able to render some theoretical assistance here. In any event, the situation is always significant to the course of the argumentation. Neither speaker nor l i s tener can completely divorce himself from the influence of the situation. Sometimes the interlocutors are at l i b e r t y , taking certain ' p e r i p h e r a l conditions' into account, to create a certain situation for themselves and thus impose their own definition on the situation. In many cases,

12

Introduction

however, the situation is l a r g e l y predetermined. Certain aspects may have been defined c l e a r l y in a d v a n c e , p e r haps in statutes or other r e g u l a t i o n s . The interlocutors are then committed to abiding by e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e s . Even in cases where this is not e x p r e s s l y so, they will have to take account of the way in which others ( e . g . other interlocutors, or electors, supporters or constituents) will interpret the s i t u a t i o n . In our model we have referred to the interlocutors as the speaker and the listener. In p r a c t i c e , of course, it may be a matter of a writer and a reader, but this makes no e s s e n t i a l difference to the model. 10 A speaker may address himself to one l i s t e n e r , but may a l s o — e . g . on radio or television—address many l i s t e n e r s or potential l i s t e n e r s . He may speak s t r i c t l y for himself, but may also speak wholly or p a r t l y as the representative of others. The interpretation of the situation and of the status of o n e ' s partner in the discourse—does he represent only himself or others too?—plays a role in argumentation in the form of a complex of general presuppositions. For example, the speaker may a s s i g n c e r t a i n r i g h t s and duties to the l i s t e n e r , and vice v e r s a . At the same time, a role is also played by particular presuppositions. These relate to such things as the knowledge, ideas, attitudes and values which interlocutors a s c r i b e to one another. For i n s t a n c e , the speaker may suppose the l i s t e n e r to be in possession of c e r t a i n f a c t s , and may therefore assume that there is no need for him to apprise him of them. He assumes not only that the l i s t e n e r has this knowledge, but also that the l i s t e n e r knows that the speaker assumes him to have i t . The general and p a r t i c u l a r presuppositions j o i n t l y constitute the point of departure of the argumentation. Arguments Arguments are statements advanced in j u s t i f i c a t i o n or refutation of an opinion. As we observed when discussing the general features of argumentation (feature 6 ) , we c a l l arguments which are intended to j u s t i f y an opinion pro-arguments and those intended to refute an opinion ccntra-arguments. A l a n g u a g e user defending a given opinion can a d vance both pro-arguments and c o n t r a - a r g u m e n t s . In p r a c t i c e the defending party will almost always produce the pro-arguments and the attacking party the c o n t r a arguments, but this need not n e c e s s a r i l y be so. For

A basic argumentation model

13

example, the interlocutor defending the opinion may wish to heighten the effect of his argument by r a i s i n g objections to his own point of view and then refuting them or producing a convincing argument to show that they are unimportant. Advancing contra-arguments, then, does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply rejection of the opinion. Even if the contra-arguments are advanced by the attacking p a r t y this does not automatically mean that he rejects the opinion out of hand. It may be that he merely wishes to test its t e n a b i l i t y . But in practice it is f a i r to s a y that advancing contra-arguments often goes hand in hand with rejection of the opinion concerned and adherence to another opinion ( e . g . one diametrically opposed). The whole of the pro- and contra-arguments and the opinion to which they relate is a discursive text. A d i s c u r s i v e text contains a finite number of arguments for and/or a g a i n s t an opinion. Every text that f u l f i l s this condition i s , at least in p a r t , d i s c u r s i v e in c h a r a c t e r . In p r a c t i c e , texts will often be of a somewhat mixed c h a r a c t e r , but for convenience 1 sake we shall- confine ourselves here to purely d i s c u r s i v e t e x t s . Nevertheless, what we have to s a y is of course also a p p l i c a b l e to the relevant components of d i f f e r e n t sorts of text with d i s c u r s i v e elements. Arguments and opinions are statements each of which is expressed in one or more utterances. A statement is never an argument or opinion per se, but only in the framework of a (wholly or p a r t i a l l y ) d i s c u r s i v e text. A statement which functions as an argument in one d i s c u r s i v e text may in another be the opinion being defended or attacked, whereas in a different sort of text it may be neither of these, being no more, for example, than an assertion. Arguments and opinions are functional units. The statement (untrue) that 'The Hague is the c a p i t a l of Holland' has the function of an argument in 'because The Hague is the c a p i t a l of Holland, the Dutch monarch is inaugurated in The H a g u e ' . (In Holland the monarch is not a c t u a l l y crowned.) But the same statement has the function of an opinion in 'the Dutch monarch is inaugurated in The Hague, therefore The Hague is the c a p i t a l of Holland. Unexpressed statements The examples just given are a good illustration of the role played in d i s c u r s i v e texts by unexpressed arguments— often r e f e r r e d to as suppressed or tacit premisses (cf. Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, forthcoming). Both examples can

14

Introduction

be regarded as ( v e r y short) discursive be represented schematically as follows: (1) a b

texts which can

The Hague is the capital of Holland. Therefore: The Dutch monarch is inaugurated in The Hague.

(2) b

The Dutch monarch is inaugurated in The Hague. Therefore: a The Hague is the capital of Holland. In both (1) and (2) the following statement has omitted: a

been

The Dutch monarch is inaugurated in the capital of Holland.

Statement c can be regarded as the unexpressedargument in (1) and ( 2 ) . The reason for not formulating this premiss explicitly may be that the speaker supposes its content to be known to the listener. In general we may say that factual or other information belonging to the particular presuppositions of the argumentative situation may be omitted and may thus act as unexpressed premisses. In another situation it might be perfectly possible for c to appear explicitly as an argument, a or b being left out: (3) c b (4) c a

The Dutch monarch is inaugurated in the capital of Holland. Therefore: The Dutch monarch is inaugurated in The Hague. The Dutch monarch is inaugurated in the capital of Holland. Therefore: The Hague is the capital of Holland.

Naturally, it is also possible to think of situations in which statement c , which functioned as an unexpressed argument in (1) and (2) and as an explicit argument in (3) and ( 4 ) , appears in a discursive text as the opinion under discussion. In such a case, statements a and b might then appear as justifying arguments, one or both

A basic

argumentation

being

unexpressed:

(5) a b c (6) a

o (7) b o

IS

model

The Hague i s the c a p i t a l of Holland. The Dutch monarch i s inaugurated in The Hague.

Therefore:

The Dutch monarch i s Holland.

inaugurated in the c a p i t a l of

The Hague i s the c a p i t a l of Holland.

Therefore:

The Dutch monarch i s Holland.

inaugurated in the c a p i t a l of

The Dutch monarch i s inaugurated in The Hague.

Therefore:

The Dutch monarch i s Holland.

inaugurated in the c a p i t a l

of

These, of course, are only theoretical p o s s i b i l i t i e s . For example, it is e a s i e r to think of an apt situation for (1) than for ( 4 ) . The c a u s e of this difference l i e s , inter alia , in the fact that a discussion about where the Dutch monarch is crowned is more likely than one about the location of the Dutch c a p i t a l . That is something which the reader of this book may be expected to know, though it is quite possible that not everybody will know where the inauguration in question is supposed to take p l a c e . We have given a l l the p o s s i b i l i t i e s in full in order to emphasize that whether a statement functions a s an a r gument or an opinion, and whether arguments in a d i s c u r s i v e text are e x p r e s s e d or not, depends entirely on the p a r t i c u l a r presuppositions obtaining in any given situation. Statements with which the interlocutors or potential interlocutors do not a g r e e , or with which they believe they do not a g r e e , g e n e r a l l y assume the function of an opinion; statements acting a s arguments the content of which the speaker supposes to be known to the listener are in a sense s u p e r f l u o u s ; they may therefore be omitted, thus acquiring the s t a t u s of unexpressed arguments. However, it is also p o s s i b l e for a speaker to make a s t a t e ment act a s an unexpressed argument even though he knows or supposes that the listener does not s h a r e his own opinion of i t . Opimorts, too, can sometimes be omitted from d i s c u r s i v e texts for a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s .

Introduction

16

A speaker who omits an argument usually assumes not only that the listener is acquainted with the information contained in it but also that he agrees with that information. This means that an observation implicitly presented by the speaker as a fact is also regarded as being one in the eyes of the listener, that the listener is assumed to share an unexpressed opinion and so on. If a speaker wishes to convince a listener of a particular opinion and suspects or knows that the listener w i l l not subscribe to a statement such as he wishes to use as a p r o argument, he may, however, find in this a reason to omit that statement. His reasoning is then that the l i s t ener's attention must not be drawn to a doubtful statement. He hopes that the listener w i l l not perceive his intention and that he w i l l accept the opinion. Efficiency, then, is not the only reason for omitting arguments: the speaker may also l e a v e arguments out because he thinks that by doing so he w i l l more easily achieve his aim, which is to convince the listener. He is then g u i l t y of manipulating or misleading the listener. Example (3) may serve as an illustration of this: in order to convince the listener of the Tightness of the (erroneous) opinion b, the speaker omits statement a ( ' T h e Hague is the capital of H o l l a n d ' ) , which the listener would undoubtedly regard as incorrect. The following example may serve to illustrate that it is also possible for opinions to be omitted from discursive texts:

(8)

a b

He is in love with Jim. Affairs between teachers trouble.

and

pupils

always

end

in

Here the conclusion has been omitted: a

He would be wise not to start an affair with Jim.

A speaker who says a and b, but omits c, certainly offers the listener a suggestion of the conclusion, even though subsequently he can always maintain that it was not he that said i t . In other words, strictly speaking the speaker is not himself a r g u i n g : he is initiating a p a r t icular process of argumentation in the listener. In such cases the question is often whether there is actually an 'opinion' being ' j u s t i f i e d ' by means of 'arguments'. Often, too, there is something to be said for regarding (8) in such a way that the speaker is considered to have

A basic argumentation model

17

done no more than make a couple of ' a n n o u n c e m e n t s ' . The following is an example of a b o r d e r l i n e c a s e : (9). a b o

Democratization of the u n i v e r s i t i e s f i n a l l y came about a t the end of the s i x t i e s . During the s e v e n t i e s , u n i v e r s i t y courses were s i m p l i fied, and: A tendency arose to d i r e c t research towards solving problems immediately r e l a t e d to the sphere of i n t e r e s t of the students who caused a l l the f u s s .

This text may h a v e been intended by the s p e a k e r and i n t e r p r e t e d by the l i s t e n e r a s a s e r i e s of simple statements : however, a, b and c can a l s o be i n t e r p r e t e d a s argumentation for the—unexpressed—opinion t h a t the demo c r a t i z a t i o n of the u n i v e r s i t i e s h a d c e r t a i n consequences ( p r o b a b l y to be r e g a r d e d a s detrimental) for the way the u n i v e r s i t i e s were r u n . At the v e r y l e a s t , (9) can c r e a t e the impression that c e r t a i n events ( s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of c o u r s e s e t c . ) were caused by what preceded them (democ r a t i z a t i o n of the u n i v e r s i t i e s ) . The s t r u c t u r e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d the schema of mentation

argu-

The simplest form of argumentation occurs when in a s i n g l e d i s c u r s i v e text a s i n g l e opinion i s defended or a t t a c k e d (but not both at once) by means of one or more p r o - a r g u m e n t s or c o n t r a - a r g u m e n t s r e s p e c t i v e l y (but not combined). If the t o t a l i t y of a r g u m e n t s , furthermore, i s intended to be an independent and complete attempt to r e f u t e or j u s t i f y the opinion (but not b o t h ) , this is simple argumentation. The d i s c u r s i v e text then d i s p l a y s the basic structure of argumentation which formed the point of d e p a r t u r e for our b a s i c model. The prototype of simple argumentation is a d i s c u r s i v e text which c a n be r e p r e sented a s an argument with two p r e m i s s e s a n d a conc l u s i o n , a s in the following e x a m p l e : (10)

a b c

All men are c h a u v i n i s t s . You are a man. Therefore: You are a c h a u v i n i s t .

Introduction

18

Even if one of the two p r e m i s s e s i s omitted, the a r g u m e n t ation s t i l l r e t a i n s the b a s i c s t r u c t u r e . There a r e then the following two p o s s i b i l i t i e s : (11) a c (12) b

a

A l l men a r e c h a u v i n i s t s . Therefore: You are a c h a u v i n i s t . You are a man. Therefore: You are a c h a u v i n i s t .

In ( 1 1 ) , statement b, t a k e n from ( 1 0 ) , f u n c t i o n s a s an u n e x p r e s s e d p r e m i s s , a n d in (12) statement a of (10) a c t s a s an u n e x p r e s s e d p r e m i s s . T r u e , they h a v e been omitt e d , but t h a t does not mean t h a t they do not h a v e a p a r t to p l a y . After a l l , normally s p e a k i n g the r e a s o n for omitting them i s t h a t there i s no need to i n c l u d e them b e c a u s e the s p e a k e r may t a c i t l y a s s u m e t h a t the l i s t e n e r c a n s u p p l y them for h i m s e l f . U n e x p r e s s e d p r e m i s s e s a r e t h e r e f o r e p a r t of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d do not, t h e r e f o r e , a f f e c t the s t r u c t u r e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a s s u c h . In the c a s e of a sound simple a r g u m e n t a t i o n for or a g a i n s t an o p i n i o n , the a r g u m e n t s a d d u c e d a r e i n d i v i d u a l l y n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s a n d j o i n t l y a s u f f i c i e n t condition for the j u s t i f i c a t i o n or r e f u t a t i o n of the o p i n i o n , whichever i s d e s i r e d . O b v i o u s l y , in theory it i s p o s s i b l e a n d in p r a c t i c e it i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t more t h a n one simple a r g u m e n t a t i o n c o u l d be a d d u c e d for or a g a i n s t a p a r t i c u l a r o p i n i o n . The opinion in example ( 1 0 ) , for i n s t a n c e , c a n a l s o be defended by the following simple argumentation: (13) a b c

A l l Frenchmen are c h a u v i n i s t s . You are a Frenchman. Therefore: You are a c h a u v i n i s t .

It i s e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e for t h e s e d i f f e r e n t simple a r g u mentations for or a g a i n s t the same opinion to occur in one a n d the same d i s c u r s i v e t e x t . This c r e a t e s a chain of simple a r g u m e n t s r e l a t i n g to a s i n g l e opinion which thus r e i n f o r c e one a n o t h e r . This i s then c a l l e d compound argumentation. An e x a m p l e of t h i s c a n be p r o d u c e d by combining (10) a n d ( 1 3 ) :

A basic argumentation model (14) a b a d e

All Frenchmen are c h a u v i n i s t s . You are a Frenchman. Moreover: All men are c h a u v i n i s t s . You are a man. Therefore: You are a c h a u v i n i s t .

In p r a c t i c e , a and a will u s u a l l y be u n e x p r e s s e d m i s s e s , so that the argumentation looks l i k e t h i s :

d e

19

pre-

Moreover: You are a man. Therefore: You are a c h a u v i n i s t .

The l i s t e n e r confronted with (15) f i n d s himself f a c i n g the problem of how to determine whether two p r e m i s s e s h a v e been left u n e x p r e s s e d ( v i z . a and o), or only one, v i z . 'All Frenchmen a r e c h a u v i n i s t s ' . However, this is a matter of interpretation which we shall not go into f u r t h e r . The c h a i n of two or more simple arguments may r e l a t e to a s i n g l e opinion, but it i s a l s o p o s s i b l e for them to r e l a t e to different o p i n i o n s , so that a statement which f u l f i l s the function of a premiss in one argument may act a s an opinion in another argument in the c h a i n . In the f i r s t i n s t a n c e the simple arguments a r e p a r a l l e l to one a n other, in which c a s e we s p e a k of coordinate compound argumentation ; in the second i n s t a n c e one simple argument r e i n f o r c e s the other, so that we h a v e subordinate compound argumentation. To make t h i s d i f f e r e n c e p e r f e c t l y c l e a r one might s a y that the arguments in coordinate compound argumentation a r e switched 'in p a r a l l e l ' and in s u b o r d i n a t e compound argumentation 'in s e r i e s ' . An example of s u b o r d i n a t e compound a r g u m e n t a t i o n , written out in full, is: (16) a b c d

Yesterday Carla ran o f f with my g i r l . People who go o f f with your g i r l cannot be t r u s t e d . Therefore: Carla cannot be t r u s t e d . You don't have to i n v i t e to a party people who cannot be t r u s t e d .

Introduction

20

Therefore : I don't have to i n v i t e Carla to my party.

e

In (16), a and b are adduced to support c; in other words, a and b are arguments for c, which in the simple argumentation in the passage ' a , b , therefore c 1 has the function of an opinion. In the simple argumentation ' c , d, therefore e ' , a—like d—is an argument for the opinion e. The difference between coordinate compound argumentation and subordinate compound argumentation can be r e p r e sented schematically as follows:

Aj

A2

A3

J_ » . 1, ' A3

A^

I

II

Aj

I, I I

1.2.

Coordinate

- simple argumentation

A2

Subordination

Co-ordination

Fig.

A4

and subordinate A 0

compound

argumentation.

= argument ( p r e m i s s ) « opinion (conclusion)

The two compound argumentations in f i g u r e 1.2 can both be dissected into two simple argumentations: but the manner in which these simple argumentations are linked with one another d i f f e r s . These are two different forms of links between simple argumentations. Both simple and compound arguments can occur in a discursive text, and the compound arguments which occur within it may be constructed either coordinately or subordinately. The manner in which the arguments and opinions (premisses and conclusions) in a discursive text are ordered in simple, coordinate compound and subordinate compound argumentations constitutes the argumentational structure of that text. Reproducing the structure of a r g u mentation of a discursive text therefore amounts to a specification of the manner in which the constellation which the statements adduced to j u s t i f y or refute an opinion jointly constitute is constructed. Quite a different way of characterizing the argumentation

A basic argumentation model

21

in a d i s c u r s i v e text i s to d e s c r i b e the argumentation schemata o c c u r r i n g in the t e x t . An argumentation schema r e l a t e s to the n a t u r e of the r e l a t i o n between the arguments c h o sen and the opinion t h a t these a r e supposed d i r e c t l y to j u s t i f y or r e f u t e . The argumentation schema of a simple argument shows what kind of j u s t i f i c a t i o n or r e f u t a t i o n i s g i v e n in the a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Let us i l l u s t r a t e t h i s with an e x a m p l e : (17) a b c d e

If I carry on writing now, I'll just finish the article in time for Christmas. The article has to be finished by Christmas. Moreover: It is nearly finished. And: Otherwise (if it's not finished by Christmas) it'll never get done. Therefore: I'd better get on with it.

Like (14-), t h i s is an example of compound argumentation c o n s i s t i n g of two coordinate simple argumentations each c o n s i s t i n g of two p r e m i s s e s . The argumentational structure of (17) is thus the same a s t h a t of ( 1 4 ) . However, the argumentation schemata of (17) are not the same a s those in ( 1 4 ) . The argumentation in (14) i s b a s e d , in both the component simple a r g u m e n t a t i o n s , on the schema of the classification principle, which p r e s c r i b e s t h a t what a p p l i e s to e n t i r e c l a s s e s ( e . g . the c l a s s of men, and the c l a s s of Frenchmen) must a l s o a p p l y to the i n d i v i d u a l members of those c l a s s e s . The argumentation of (17) i s not b a s e d on the same schema; and furthermore, the f i r s t simple argument of (17) uses a d i f f e r e n t sort of p r i n c i p l e than the second. In ' a , b , t h e r e f o r e e ' , the f i r s t simple argumentation in ( 1 7 ) , it is assumed t h a t a t a r g e t which c a n e a s i l y be a c h i e v e d ought to be a c h i e v e d ; in ' c , d, therefore e 1 , the second simple a r g u m e n t a t i o n , the assumption is t h a t it would be a p i t y to abandon something t h a t is almost f i n i s h e d . The s p e a k e r defending the conclusion t h a t he had ' b e t t e r get on with i t 1 a p p e a l s in (17) both to a pragmatic argumentation schema ( ' t h e desired r e s u l t is within r e a c h ' ) and to an argumentation schema amounting to an anti-waste principle ( ' i t is a p i t y n e e d l e s s l y to let work done be in v a i n ' ) . As t h i s example shows, an a n a l y s i s of the a r g u m e n t ation schemata used in a d i s c u r s i v e text provides us with information about the c r i t e r i a , standards, principles,

Introduction

22

assumptions etc. on the basis of which the opinions or conclusions occurring in the text are j u s t i f i e d or refuted. An analysis of the argumentational structure provides an insight into the manner in which the argumentation in the text is built up from smaller elements. One might characterize the difference by saying that the argumentation schema relates to the internal organization of simple argumentation, indicating the principles according to which the argumentation is arranged, while the argumentational structure relates to the external organization of i n d i v i d u a l argumentation schemata, indicating the manner in which the various simple argumentations are grouped in the l a r g e r whole of a discursive text.

Formulating and interpreting

arguments

There are two ways in which a speaker can g i v e a v e r b a l presentation of the relationship between an opinion and one or more arguments: 1. he f i r s t g i v e s a number of arguments and then draws a conclusion ( o p i n i o n ) ; 2. he advances a thesis (opinion) and then supports it by one or more arguments. In the f i r s t instance, then, the arguments precede the opinion and we speak of a progressive presentation; in the seGond, the arguments follow the opinion and we speak of a retrogressive presentation. A progressive presentation can be indicated e x p l i c i t l y by words like so, hence and therefore, a retrogressive presentation by because, since, considering, and so on. However, words like this that are indicative of argumentation need not necessarily occur in a discursive text, nor is their presence a sufficient condition for i d e n t i f y i n g a constellation of statements as an argumentation. In practice the j u s t i f y i n g or refuting function of statements often remains implicit, and the argumentation-indicating words just referred to, which may indicate what function particular statements have in a discursive text, are not infrequently used without there being any question of argumentation. Implicit argumentation is exemplified by (18), while (19) is an example of the 'incorrect' use of an argumentation indicator: (18) You have a cold; you'd better stay indoors.

A basic argumentation model

23

(19)

I'll be off, then.

In g e n e r a l , however, the presence of words l i k e so and because are a strong i n d i c a t i o n of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , and in g e n e r a l the a r g u m e n t a t i v e function of statements c a n be made e x p l i c i t by u s i n g such words. In our b a s i c model it is assumed t h a t the s p e a k e r intends to make c l e a r to the l i s t e n e r which statements he means to be r e g a r d e d as opinions and which a r e a r g u ments, and a l s o what r e l a t i o n s h i p these statements have one to a n o t h e r . This assumption implies t h a t the s p e a k e r formulates his d i s c u r s i v e t e x t in such a way t h a t the l i s t e n e r is e n a b l e d to i d e n t i f y , and make the r i g h t c o n nections between, the c o n s t e l l a t i o n s of j u s t i f y i n g or r e f u ting statements and the statements which act as o p i n i o n s . Whether the s p e a k e r i n d i c a t e s the v a r i o u s functions of his statements and t h e i r v a r i o u s i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s explicitly or implicitly, and whether he p r e s e n t s his argumentation progressively or retrogressively, makes no d i f f e r e n c e in principle. According to our model, the l i s t e n e r intends to i n t e r pret the s p e a k e r ' s t e x t in such a way t h a t the statements upon which he b a s e s h i s judgement correspond to the information which the s p e a k e r wishes to c o n v e y . The presence of these i n t e n t i o n s , however, does not c o n s t i t u t e a guarantee t h a t the information a s i n t e r p r e t e d by the l i s t e n e r i s a c t u a l l y e x a c t l y the same a s t h a t intended by the s p e a k e r . This will only be the c a s e i f the opinion and arguments which the s p e a k e r wishes to e x p r e s s through the medium of h i s u t t e r a n c e s a r e the same a s those i n t e r p r e t e d by the l i s t e n e r . In p r a c t i c e t h i s need not always be s o . The reason for t h i s may b e , for example, t h a t the opinion and arguments e x p r e s s e d by the u t t e r a n c e s do not accord with those which the s p e a k e r intends to put f o r w a r d , or t h a t the opinion and arguments i n t e r p r e t e d by the l i s t e n e r a r e not the same as those e x p r e s s e d by the u t t e r a n c e s . In e i t h e r c a s e one might s a y t h a t the s p e a k e r or l i s t e n e r , as the c a s e may b e , r e v e a l s d e f e c t ive l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l s . An important complication in e s t a b l i s h i n g the correspondence between what i s e x p r e s s e d and what is intended or i n t e r p r e t e d , however, is t h a t there need not n e c e s s a r i l y be an e x a c t one-to-one c o r r e s pondence between i n d i v i d u a l u t t e r a n c e s or statements and propositions, as the 'thought c o n t e n t s ' e x p r e s s e d in u t t e r a n c e s a r e sometimes known. A s i n g l e u t t e r a n c e may

24

Introduction

in p r i n c i p l e e x p r e s s s e v e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s — s i m u l t a n e o u s l y or c o n s e c u t i v e l y — a n d s e v e r a l propositions can be e x pressed in a s i n g l e u t t e r a n c e . What we a r e concerned with here is the practical consequences of a d i s c r e p a n c y between what the s p e a k e r himself b e l i e v e s he has s a i d and what the l i s t e n e r b e l i e v e s the s p e a k e r to h a v e s a i d . Such a d i s c r e p a n c y b r i n g s with it the r i s k t h a t s p e a k e r and l i s t e n e r will find themselves t a l k i n g at c r o s s p u r p o s e s , which may r e s u l t in t h e i r erroneously b e l i e v i n g t h a t they disagree o r — e q u a l l y e r r o n e o u s l y — t h a t they agree. Both these consequences a r e , of c o u r s e , u n d e s i r a b l e : in the f i r s t i n s t a n c e the sequel is a wholly superfluous d i s c u s s i o n , and in the second t h e r e i s no discussion at all and the misunderstanding i s p e r petuated. For proper argumentation it i s a sine qua non t h a t such m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s be i d e n t i f i e d and s u b s e q u e n t l y e l i m i n a t e d , o r , b e t t e r s t i l l , t h a t they be prevented from o c c u r r i n g in the f i r s t p l a c e . To a c h i e v e t h i s , a s p e a k e r may t r y to make the statements which he h a s formulated (opinion and arguments) more p r e c i s e , so t h a t they b e t t e r e x p r e s s what he wishes to s a y , or a l i s t e n e r may ask him i f n e c e s s a r y to be more p r e c i s e , before consenting to e n t e r into a d i s c u s s i o n . A judgement of a s p e a k e r ' s argumentation t h a t is b a s e d on h i s i n c o r r e c t formulation of his intention or on the i n c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of his words may, in i t s e l f , be not u n r e a s o n a b l e or i r r a t i o n a l , but it i s an irrelevant judgement b e c a u s e it does not r e l a t e to the s p e a k e r ' s a c t u a l point of view. Such a judgement c a n t h e r e f o r e never l e a d to a c o n s t r u c t i v e i n i t i a t i o n or c o n t i n u a t i o n of a d i s c u s s i o n . It is up to the s p e a k e r to ensure t h a t his words a r e so p r e c i s e t h a t the r i s k of t h e i r being misunderstood by a l i s t e n e r i s as small as p o s s i b l e ; it i s the t a s k of the l i s t e n e r a s f a r a s possible to i n t e r p r e t the s p e a k e r ' s words in a c c o r d ance with his i n t e n t i o n s ; in c a s e of doubt he should ask the s p e a k e r for e l u c i d a t i o n . These t a s k s of s p e a k e r and l i s t e n e r precede the t a s k s which have to be c a r r i e d out for the proper conduct of the argumentation as such and for t h i s reason they a r e often d i s r e g a r d e d in s t u d i e s of argumentation ( c f . premiss 4, p . 40 J . 1 1

A basic argumentation model The assessment schemata

of points

25 of d e p a r t u r e and

argumentation

As the b a s i c model i n d i c a t e s , the a c t i v i t i e s of the l i s t e n e r are not confined to interpreting the d i s c u r s i v e text formu l a t e d by the s p e a k e r . The l i s t e n e r i s not merely t r y i n g to understand the arguments advanced by the s p e a k e r for or a g a i n s t the opinion e x p r e s s e d : he a l s o wishes to assess whether the argumentation for or a g a i n s t the o p i n ion is acceptable. The b e s t and most obvious order here is t h a t the l i s t e n e r f i r s t i n t e r p r e t s the argumentation a s best he can and then a s s e s s e s i t . In p r a c t i c e , however, t h i s order is f r e q u e n t l y departed from: l i s t e n e r s often f a i l to l i s t e n p r o p e r l y , form t h e i r judgements too h a s t i l y , and jump to c o n c l u s i o n s . Here too, even though the s p e a k e r ' s words a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r , the l i s t e n e r ' s judgement i s not r e l e v a n t to the s p e a k e r ' s point of view but to a point of view erroneously a s c r i b e d to him by the l i s t e n e r ( c f . premiss U, p . ¿ 0 ) . The l i s t e n e r ' s assessment of the s p e a k e r ' s a r g u m e n t ation r e l a t e s in p r i n c i p l e to two a s p e c t s of i t : i t s point of departure and the argumentation schemata employed in i t . The point of d e p a r t u r e comprises e v e r y t h i n g e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y assumed by the s p e a k e r in his a r g u m e n t a t i o n ; the argumentation s c h e m a t a — a s e x p l a i n e d on p . 2 1 — a r e the sorts of j u s t i f i c a t i o n s and r e f u t a t i o n s with which the s p e a k e r hopes to convince the l i s t e n e r of the Tightness or wrongness of a given opinion. In his assessment the l i s t e n e r t r i e s f i r s t of a l l to determine whether he a g r e e s with what the s p e a k e r proffers or accepts as obvious (assessment of the point of departure), and secondly he a s s e s s e s whether the connection made by the s p e a k e r between c e r t a i n statements with a j u s t i f y i n g or refuting function and the opinion being defended or a t t a c k e d is a r e l e v a n t and v a l i d connection (assessment of the argumentation schema). The point of departure of the argumentation is almost always p a r t l y e x p l i c i t and p a r t l y i m p l i c i t . The statements put forward as arguments make up the e x p l i c i t and the general and particular presuppositions the implicit p a r t of the a r g u m e n t a t i o n . We h a v e a l r e a d y e x p l a i n e d ( p . 12) what we mean by g e n e r a l and p a r t i c u l a r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , so t h a t it will be s u f f i c i e n t here to i n d i c a t e t h e i r f u n c tion as p a r t of the point of d e p a r t u r e . Examples of general presuppositions which may p l a y a p a r t in the point of d e p a r t u r e of the argumentation are t h a t the s p e a k e r recognizes t h a t the 'burden of proof' for the Tightness

26

Introduction

or wrongness of a particular opinion is on him, that he therefore has a duty to advance arguments for his opinion, that he will be assumed to subscribe to the arguments he advances, and that he accepts the listener as an equal and serious interlocutor- Normally the speaker will not declare all this in explicit terms, but will tacitly assume that the context and situation make it obvious. Particular presuppositions, as we have said, relate inter alia to the knowledge, ideas, standards and values which the interlocutors ascribe to each other. In the argumentation they often f u l f i l the function of unexpressed argument or premiss (see p. 13). Like general presuppositions, particular presuppositions can in principle always be made explicit. If this happens in a particular case, it does not mean that the presupposition concerned necessarily loses its status as a point of departure. As long as presuppositions (whether explicit or not) are not called into doubt, disputed, denied or contradicted by any other party, they continue to be part of the point of departure. As a matter of principle, however, they can be made the subject of discussion at any time; then they acquire the status of opinions and may initiate a new argumentation in which they are attacked and defended. What exactly is the subject of the listener's assessment of the point of departure? This is a difficult question to answer in general terms. If it is a matter of general presuppositions—whether or not they have been explicitized—the listener may, for example, wonder whether the speaker is sincere. In other words, the listener may be trying to establish whether the speaker actually subscribes to the point of view which he claims to hold and to which his arguments relate. Should this turn out not to be the case, in the listener's judgement, he may decide not to accept the chosen point of departure. If it is a matter of implicit particular presuppositions functioning as unexpressed premisses, or of explicitized particular presuppositions which are being used as arguments, then the objects of the listener's assessment will be to detrmine (1) their informative content, [2) their status and (3) their formulation. In his assessment of the informative content of the statements belonging to the point of departure of the argumentation, the listener will consider whether the speaker is offering him accurate information which is also relevant to the matter under discussion. This will not be the case i f , for example, the listener considers that the speaker is erroneously asserting or assuming that a democratic system offers good guarantees of social justice or that, apart from Dr. Zhivago, Pasternak

A basic argumentation

model

27

never wrote anything worth r e a d i n g . Even if in principle the listener does agree with these assertions, he w i l l nevertheless reject their informative content if he regards them as irrelevant to the defence or refutation of the opinion at issue. As these examples show, an assessment of the informative content of statements does not have to be confined to assessing factual declarations or assertions, but may also relate to utterances expressing v a l u e judgements . The status of the statements advanced is at issue i f , for example, the listener comes to the conclusion that the matters presented by the speaker as facts can in fact at most be regarded as plausible suppositions. Finally the formulation of a statement may be rejected if the listener thinks that the words chosen by the speaker are coloured or tendentious and, perhaps, presuppose the conclusion. In a l l these cases there is a difference of opinion between speaker and listener as regards the point of departure of the argumentation, and this disagreement w i l l have to be resolved before the actual discussion can be initiated or resumed. As we have already observed, the l i s t e n e r ' s assessment of the argumentation is concerned not only with the point of departure, but also with the argumentation schemata employed in i t . Although his assessment of the point of departure may be decisive in his f i n a l judgement, his assessment of the argumentation schemata is at least as important. The question to be asked here is whether the sort of justification or r e f u t a tion used by the speaker in his argumentation is conclusive in the view of the listener, i . e . whether it is acceptable to the listener. If the answer to this question is in the n e g a t i v e , the argumentation, however much the listener may agree with the point of departure chosen, f a i l s , at least as argumentation, to f u l f i l its aim, and the difference of opinion continues to e x i s t — i r r e s p e c t i v e of which of the interlocutors is right in his assessment of the argumentation schema.

The model put into practice The basic argumentation model enables us to refer to argumentation in a more comprehensible manner and to analyse the argumentation in a discursive text and examine its elements. We shall demonstrate this with the help of a test example. In this chapter we shall confine our analysis to the argument at ional structure ( c f . sections 4 . 5 and 5 . 5 ) . The text we have chosen seems to us to be

28

Introduction

fairly representative of discursive texts in general. It is an article from the Consumentengids (a Dutch consumer guide) for January 1974. The text is given in full below. Paragraphs are numbered with roman numerals, lines in each paragraph in arabic numerals. We shall assume that the social reality within which the text functions is readily appreciated by the reader and that the situation will be defined in broadly similar terms by anyone acquainted with the aims of consumer organizations and the function of consumer magazines. The article is an attempt to convince readers that centralized metering of electricity consumption is undesirable. 12 We shall give no exhaustive account of our interpretation of the text but will confine ourselves to a brief résumé of the main points. We shall then offer our analysis of the argumentational. structure, ending with a short account of our reasoning.

Centralized electricity metering: how NOT to do it I

II

III

1

The Delfland Power Company, which supplies not only Delft but also Zoetermeer and a number of the surrounding areas with electricity, gas and water, has introduced the system of centralized metering for 5 consumers in some apartment buildings. This means that meters are no longer installed in the apartments themselves, but that the overall consumption of the entire building is metered on centralized meters and the cost of this overall consumption 10 divided equally among the apartments. According to Delfland, consumers benefit from this system because the savings resulting from fewer meters, less meterreading and reduced administrative costs are passed on to the consumer in the form of lower prices. 1 This sounds fine, but it only works if overall consumption with central metering is no higher than with individual metering. But it is higher. The point is that the system is anything but an encou5 ragement to economize. One the contrary, because lavish consumption doesn't have to be paid for by the individual, and because 'next door they don't stint either1, it breeds a 'consume away' mentality. Result: high overall consumption and per apartment 10 not lower but generally higher electricity bills. 1 The system is based on the assumption that the electricity consumed by the average family is always more or less the same. But this in no way accords

A basic argumentation model 5

10

15 IV

1

5

10 V

1

29

with what the annual report of the federated electricity suppliers has to say on the subject. According to the report, the consumption of the average family varies from 3900 kWh to 7650 kWh annually. Because these differences might be smaller in uniform apartments in a single building, an action group opposing the centralized meter system monitored consumption in a large apartment building with individual meters. But even though consumption was lower, the variation was certainly not slighter, being from 2500 kWh to 5700 kWh annually. So as regards the thrifty, centralized metering is grossly unfair. In connection with the present need to save energy, too, the system has not much to be said for it. If a person wants to help cut down the nation's consumption as a whole, they should get some encouragement from lower electricity bills. In an American report* on the need for economy this is an aspect which is singled out for special attention. The writers make an urgent plea for the consumer to be shown how much he uses with extra meters on the spot. A separate meter by the electric stove, they say, will soon make him realize how much power the oven uses, for example. All things considered, we think the experiment of centralized metering is not worth continuing. On the contrary, where it is now being used it should go.

Summary The article comments on the introduction of centralized meters for electricity consumption in Delft and environs. The central theme is the question of whether centralized metering is preferable to a system in which consumption is metered individually for each apartment. First the article gives the standpoint of the Delfland Power Company, which has introduced a system of centralized metering (paragraph I). It then examines the system's financial consequences for the consumers (II), consequences from the fairness point of view (III), and the consequences for overall energy consumption (IV). Finally there is a concluding verdict on the desirability of *The Potential for Energy Conservation. Office of Emergency Preparedness

Executive Office of the President,

Introduction

30

c e n t r a l i z e d metering ( V ) . According to the Consvanentengids, D e l f l a n d claim that the system of c e n t r a l i z e d metering is in the consumer's interest because it leads to a reduction in costs which is passed on in lower p r i c e s . The Consvanentengids disa g r e e s , s a y i n g that on the c o n t r a r y , c e n t r a l i z e d metering in u n f a v o u r a b l e to the consumer because it l e a d s to an o v e r a l l increase in consumption. Moreover, no account is taken of the wide v a r i a t i o n s in consumption l e v e l s . The Consvanentengids therefore thinks that for economical consumers the system is extremely u n f a i r . Centralized metering does not encourage consumer r e s t r a i n t and thus makes no contribution to e n e r g y c o n s e r v a t i o n . The Consvanentengids rejects the system and concludes that it must be a b o l ished.

A n a l y s i s of the argumentational

structure

The above summary r e f l e c t s our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the main points and themes of the t e x t . We s h a l l now a n a l y s e the argumentational structure of the text on the basis of this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . We s h a l l dissect the compound argumentation into simple argumentations and i n d i c a t e which statements serve to j u s t i f y which opinions. The opinions defended are preceded in the a n a l y s i s by an 0 and the j u s t i f y i n g statements by an S. We have t r i e d to reproduce the argumentational structure with as g r e a t a d e g r e e of c l a r i t y as p o s s i b l e . The numbering of the S's is designed to assist in t h i s : they are numbered according to t h e i r position in the t e x t , and in cases where simple argumentations make up a compound argumentation which is i n tended in toto to supply an argument for the c e n t r a l opinion, these simple argumentations are numbered consecutively .

The Delfland point of view Si The c e n t r a l i z e d metering system 1.12-13 (CM) needs fewer meters, the meters need reading l e s s f r e q u e n t l y , and there are l e s s administrative expenses so that

S2O

CM leads to reduced costs

so that

S3O CM leads to lower prices f o r consumers

1.12 1.13-14

A basic argumentation model

therefore

S^O

the consumer benefits from CM

31

1.11

Schematically: 1—

2— 3

—*• 4

The Consumentengids point of view (A)

Si With centralized metering, lavish consumption does not have to be paid for by the individual consumer only

II.6-7

and

S 2 'next door they don't stint either1

II.7

therefore

S3O CM breeds a 'consume away' attitude

II.8

therefore

S^O CM leads to higher overall consumption

II.9

therefore

S5O CM usually leads to increased fuel bills for each apartment SgO the consumer does not usually benefit from CM

II.9-10

therefore

II.1-2, 9-10

Schematically: (A) —

3—

4 — 5

(B)

51 According to the annual report of the federated electricity suppliers the consumption of the average family varies from 3900 kWh to 7650 kWh annually

III.6-7

and

52 according to a group opposing the system consumption in a large apartment building varies from 2500 to 5700 kWh annually for the average family

III.10-14

therefore

S3O average family consumption varies widely

32

Introduction

and

S4 with CM every consumer pays the same amount

therefore

S5O with CM thrifty customers pay for much more than they actually use

therefore

S 6 0 CM is grossly unfair to thrifty consumers

III.14-16

Schematically: (B)

(C)

Sj If customers are encouraged by lower (individual) bills, overall consumption is reduced

and

S2 the CM system does not encourage consumers with lower (individual) bills

therefore

S3O CM does not lead to a reduction in overall consumption

therefore

S^O CM makes no contribution to energy conservation

therefore

S5O from the point of view of the present need for energy conservation CM has little to be said for it

IV.3-5

IV.1-2

Schematically: (C) 2 — 3 — 4 ^ 5

(D)

Si The consumer generally does not benefit from CM

II.1-2, 9-10

and

S2 CM is grossly unfair to thrifty consumers

III.I4-I6

32

A basic argumentation model

and

S3 from the point of view of the present need for energy conservation CM has little to be said for it

IV.1-2

therefore

S^O

V.l-3

CM should be banned

Schematically: (D) 1 2 3

- —

4

Explanation of the analysis Delfland - The analysis of Delfland1s argumentation is based exclusively on its presentation in the Consumentengids. The question that can be answered with the help of the data provided by the text is: assuming that Delfland's standpoint is correctly reported, what arguments are advanced for that standpoint and what is their interrelationship? This startingpoint for the analysis does not, of course, make any judgement of the accuracy of the reporting. - In the text, the argumentation for (4) is presented in a single sentence. In the analysis the argumentation has been split into three statements. The relationship between these and their function for the argumentation is indicated by the words 'so that' and 'therefore'. There is a causal relationship between (1) and (2), as there is between (2) and (3); (3) is a direct argument for (4). - The function of (4) is to justify (to the consumer) the introduction of the system of centralized metering. By using (4), Delfland tries to make it plausible that the introduction of the new system was a correct decision. Consumentengids (A) - The argumentation put forward by the Consumentengids in paragraph II is directed against Delfland's claim, reported in paragraph I, that the consumer benefits from the system of centralized metering. In the first and second sentences of paragraph II this relationship is indicated explicitly. The conclusion in the last sentence of the paragraph must

34

Introduction

therefore be interpreted as a denial of Delfland's claim, as formulated in (6). - The analysis is based on an interpretation of paragraph II in which an introduction to the central argumentation is provided by a statement of what the system of centralized metering does not do (viz. encourage economy), followed by an interpretation of the main argumentation. Only the latter has been included in the analysis. - Argument (2) should probably be interpreted as follows: consumers suspect each other of using more electricity than necessary. Argument (!) refers to the individual attitude which centralized metering breeds, (2) to the attitude individuals attribute to others. - In (4) the word used is 'higher', though the text refers alternately to 'high' and 'higher' consumption: in II.3 'higher', in II.8 'high'. However, (4) is derived from II.8, and since II.2, 3 and 9 all use the comparative form, that is presumably the intention of II.8 too.

(B)

- In the text the conclusion (6) is drawn directly from statements (l) and (2); steps (3), (4) and (5) are passed over. In the analysis, these intermediate steps are also considered. - (3) can be inferred from III.1-7: the words 'in no way' in III.3 justify the use of 'widely' in (3>. - (4) expresses the principle of the centralized metering system as formulated in 1.5-10 and referred to in III.1-3: centralized metering means that every consumer pays the same amount, and this is justified because there is little variation in the consumption of different consumers. - (5) is implied by (3) and (4) and functions in the argumentation as an (unexpressed) intermediate conclusion. (C) - (l) is based on IV.2-5, where a stated condition for a reduction in overall consumption is that consumers must be encouraged by lower fuel bills. Although the text does not explicitly say so, and although it does not necessarily follow from what the text does say, we interpret this as an indication that the Consumentengids assumes that encouragement by lower bills results in reduced consumption. This interpretation explains why the Conswnentengids lays down the condition as stated, though admittedly this passage is also open to other interpretations. - In the text, the conclusion (5) is drawn directly from premiss (l), which is implied by IV.2-5- In the analysis, the intermediate steps (2), (3) and (4) are also elucidated explicitly.

A basic argumentation model

25

- (2) follows from the principle of the system as formulated in I.5-10. The system is characterized by the substitution of common meters for individual ones. An individual consumer cannot detect a change in his own consumption from his own meter, and reduced consumption does not result directly in a lower bill. - (4) is not so much a conclusion drawn from (3) as a paraphrase of it: the word 'therefore' here really means 'in other words', since 'energy conservation' can be defined as 'reduction of overall consumption (of energy)', and 'makes no contribution to' here means roughly the same as 'does not lead to'. (D) - Conclusion (4) is a summarizing formulation of paragraph V, which contains the Consumentengids's final verdict on the centralized metering system. - Arguments (l), (2) and (3) for (4) are the conclusions from paragraphs II, III and IV. That these three conclusions are all adduced as arguments for the final conclusion is indicated explicitly in the opening words of paragraph V: 'All things considered'. Conclusion A6 (the consumer does not usually benefit from centralized metering) is directed against the Delfland claim (that the consumer does benefit) reported in the first paragraph. Conclusions B6 and C5 and the final conclusion DA are not aimed specifically at Delfland, but against the system of centralized metering in general. Paragraph V does not say that Delfland must do away with the system, but that it should be abolished 'where it is now being used'. Therefore the central question in the Consumentengids article, not formulated in the text itself, is not whether or not Delfland was right to introduce the system, but whether or not the system in general is something to be welcomed. According to the analysis we have given, the compound argumentation in the text in favour of the Consumentengids position can be dissected into eleven simple argumentations. The argumentational structure can be illustrated in a diagram (with eleven arrows), as demonstrated in figure 1.3. On the left, the compound argumentation is represented by three chains, each consisting of a combination of coordinately and subordinately ordered simple argumentations. O n the right, we see how the compound argumentation can also be represented in the form of a tree diagram. Both diagrams also include the argumentation for the Delfland point of view.

Delfland arguaentational structure

Al consumer guide arguaentational structure

A2~ Bl_ 62 "

CI. C2~

•A3-

-A4-

-B3 B4

85-

-C3—*-Zk

-A5 •

-86

= 02

-C5

= D3

Fig. 1.3. Two ways of representing structure in 'Centralized Electricity 1.3«

-A6 = D1 04

the argumentational Metering'.

The premisses and aims of argumentation theory

We wish in this book to provide a picture of the field in which argumentation is studied, and which we c a l l argumentation theory or theory of argumentation. The term argumentation theory, which we have chosen, following other authors, to refer to the study of a r g u mentation ( c f . Johnstone 1968), is used not only to describe a field of study, but also to refer to the (more or less orderly) recording of the results produced by research in that f i e l d . So f a r , the study of argumentation has not come up with any one g e n e r a l l y accepted theory, so that there is no question of our describing the subject of argumentation theory by giving an account of a single leading theory which meets a l l the requirements now made of any s c i e n t i f i c theory. The present state of a f f a i r s is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the presence of a v a r i e t y of theories, differing widely in conception, scope and degree of refinement and for the most part hardly deserving the name theory at a l l . To give a f a i r picture of the s u b j e c t , then, the best plan would seem to be to provide a survey of the d i v e r s i t y of insights and more or less elaborated ideas which have thus f a r been thrown up by the study of argumentation, with a l l t h e i r v a r i e t y as to content and q u a l i t y . 36

The premisses and aims of argumentation theory

37

What the various ' t h e o r i e s ' a l l have in common is the subject with which they are concerned. That is not a l l , however. With the help of the b a s i c model of argumentation given in section 1.2 it is possible to indicate somewhat more precisely what the various theorists of a r g u mentation have been occupying themselves with, and we s h a l l then a r r i v e at a somewhat more finely drawn picture of the problems being studied in argumentation theory. In g e n e r a l it is true to say that the c e n t r a l problem to be solved by argumentation theory is p r e s e n t ed by the difficulties which a r i s e when one t r i e s to draw a distinction between sound and unsound argumentation. The wish to make such a distinction is present in a l l existing theories of argumentation, without exception. The differences between the theories a r i s e f i r s t and f o r e most because different meanings are assigned to the terms sound and unsound themselves. The theories which we t r e a t in this book may thus be seen as p a r t i c u l a r elaborations of what we are to understand by 'sound a r g u m e n t a t i o n ' . As we observed in our e x p l a n a t o r y notes to the b a s i c model, a l i s t e n e r assessing an argumentation a r r i v e s at a verdict regarding the point of departure of the a r g u mentation and the argumentation schemata employed. If his verdict i s favourable in both c a s e s , he will find the argumentation as a whole sound and must in principle be prepared to agree with the s p e a k e r ' s point of view. During his assessment the l i s t e n e r applies c e r t a i n criteria for the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the point of departure and argumentation schemata. These enable him to determine whether the argumentation is sound. Following on from t h i s , one might describe argumentation theory as trying to e s t a b l i s h , and v e r i f y , criteria of soundness for points of departure and argumentation schemata. Starting from this view of argumentation theory, we may now give the following statement of the general aims of argumentation theory. The aim of argumentation theory is to distinguish between sound and unsound points of departure and between sound and unsound argumentation schemata; to this end, criteria are systematically formulated which are then applied, or ought to be applied, in the assessment of the soundness of points of departure and argumentation schemata. In p r a c t i c e , achieving the general aim of argumentation theory is made considerably more difficult by a l l sorts of complicating factors which play a part in a c t u a l argumentation. That is why, in the majority of theories,

38

Introduction

a number of general premisses are chosen (often tacitly) in order (perhaps only temporarily) to defuse these complications. These premisses, in other words, are intended to facilitate the study of argumentation. In what follows we shall give a résumé of premisses commonly accepted in existing theories. The list is not exhaustive and also includes some points which could themselves be the object of further research (this applies particularly to premisses 5, 6, 7 and 8). On the other hand, some of these premisses are certainly not exclusive to argumentation, but apply to verbal information conveyance in general (this applies particularly to premisses 1, 2, 3 and 4). The composition of this list is not based on any particular principles, but purely on practical considerations, unlike the choice of the last four, in which considerations of principle also played a part. One of the reasons for including any given premiss is always the expectation, and the hope, that it will further and facilitate research into the actual problems of argumentation itself. None of the premisses necessarily accords with the practice of argumentation in every case, and no one is obliged when studying argumentation to take them as his starting point. 1.

The interlocutors are ordinary language users in ordinary circumstances The language users taking part in the argumentation as speaker or listener are not, in the production and perception of utterances, i . e . in formulating and interpreting, so seriously affected by physical or mental disorders and impediments—such as deafness or aphasia—that normal speech and listening are actually impossible. Furthermore they both have a f a i r command of the language in which they are conducting their discourse. For example, they are not Americans trying to speak German for the first time, or Glaswegians taking part in a discussion in Texas. They are, moreover, more or less aware of what they are doing: they are neither dead tired nor dead drunk. Finally, the circumstances are such that the interlocutors can hear each other properly and are able to concentrate sufficiently on the matter in hand: they are not disturbed by the noise of overflying jet fighters or whining children. 2.

The language users taking part in the argumentation do so voluntarily and seriously A language user defending or attacking an opinion in an argumentation may be doing so in consultation with

The premisses

and aims of argumentation

theory

39

others, but he has embarked upon his defence of or opposition to the opinion of his own free w i l l , and the listener assessing an argumentation may be doing so with a view to the interests of others, but he is not obliged to accept an argumentation which his reason rejects. Of course, circumstances in practice may not always accord with this premiss. All sorts of psychol o g i c a l and social b a r r i e r s may stand in the way of a free argumentation. Several psychological and sociological theories pay attention to such b a r r i e r s , and a number of them are opposed from various quarters. However, a r g u mentation theory is under no obligation, as argumentation theory, to provide a solution to this: a l l it can do is indicate what possibilities might be open if those b a r riers were removed. A language user functioning as a speaker intends to convince the listener by means of his arguments, and a language user functioning as a listener has the intention of assessing the speaker's argumentation in order, on the basis of that assessment, to decide whether he w i l l allow himself to be convinced. The speaker and the l i s t ener are therefore serious in the sense that they use argumentative utterances for the specific purpose to which they are by their v e r y nature adapted. These assumed serious intentions in argumentation may be contrasted, for example, with the intentions of a speaker arguing solely in order to g i v e others the pleasure of listening to his voice, or of a listener attending to the argumentation solely in order to keep t a l l y of the number of times the speaker uses the phrase '1 mean 1 . This premiss also means that activities such as the arguing of an actor in a play or reading aloud from a sermon in the parish magazine just for the fun of it may be disregarded, even though in another sense p l a y i n g a part can be a perfectly serious business. 3.

A language user functioning as the speaker in an argumentation says what he means and is committed to what he has said That the speaker says what he means implies nothing more here than that he uses his words and sentences with the meaning assigned to them according to the rules and conventions of the language being spoken. This premiss does not, therefore, imply that the speaker must necess a r i l y be honest and sincere, but that he does not, for example, accidentally say ' d r a i n ' when he means ' t r a i n ' , of 'dissector' when he means ' d e t e c t o r ' . In practice, of course, misunderstandings are constantly being caused

40

Introduction

by such mistakes, and in some cases they may have a detrimental effect on the argumentation. The reason why we have nevertheless included this premiss is that preventing and resolving such misunderstandings is not specially a task for argumentation theory, but rather for a f i e l d like speech communication. Language users who act of their own free w i l l and voluntarily say what they mean may be held to what they have said. In other words they are committed to the statements they have made, unless these are e x p l i c i t l y After a l l , the speaker does not simply emit a retracted. sequence of noises: he makes statements which are c a l culated to j u s t i f y or refute some opinion. He cannot afterwards dissociate himself from his statements by s a y i n g , for example, that although he may have said something of the kind, no attention should be paid to i t . Incidentally this does not mean that he must always sincerely mean what he says, only that he cannot subsequently escape responsibility for statements which he has previously made of his own free w i l l . This commitment, of course, cannot always be held to exist in the case of involuntary statements or statements made against the speaker's own wishes. I*.

A language user functioning in an argumentation as the listener understands what the speaker has said and it is on this that he bases his assessment Premiss 3 says that a person engaged in an argumentation as a speaker also means what he says according to the rules and conventions of the language; in other words, a language user who takes the role of speaker is also capable of putting the information he wishes to convey in its optimum formulation,13 In the premiss under discussion here, we assume that a language user who takes the role of listener is capable of attaching to the information thus formulated its optimum interpretation : that is to s a y , that he w i l l assign to the utterances proffered to him the meaning which they have according to the rules of the l a n g u a g e . If this is indeed what happens, we may say that the listener understands the information to the extent permitted by the text formulated by the speaker. 1 ' 1 In argumentation theory, therefore, it is taken for granted that the participants in argumentation are p e r f e c t l y skilled in formulating (premiss 3) and interpreting (premiss U), and that they consequently have optimal comprehension. As observed in the explanatory notes to the basic model ( p . 23), this ideal situation is hardly

The premisses and aims of argumentation theory

41

ever encountered in r e a l l i f e , so t h a t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s c a n a r i s e . The s p e a k e r c a n t r y to eliminate t h i s r i s k by clarifying his words; the l i s t e n e r may a l s o a s k him to do so. The r i s k of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s and the concomitant need for c l a r i f i c a t i o n a r e not of course e x c l u s i v e to a r g u m e n t a t i o n , but p l a y a p a r t in e v e r y sort of v e r b a l information t r a n s f e r . Premiss 4 c a n therefore be important ( l i k e premisses 1, 2 and 3) for the study of v e r b a l communication in g e n e r a l . In the c a s e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , however, the a v o i d a n c e of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s i s c e r t a i n l y of p a r t i c u l a r importance. Misunderstandings waste time by c a u s i n g u n n e c e s s a r y d i s c u s s i o n , or in some c i r c u m s t a n c e s they may wrongly prevent a discussion from t a k ing p l a c e at a l l . That i s why in some theories of a r g u mentation the problems of formulation, c l a r i f i c a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e not d i s r e g a r d e d b u t , on the c o n t r a r y , accorded a c r u c i a l p l a c e in the t h e o r y . The c l e a r e s t example of t h i s i s the semantic theory of argumentation propounded by Arne Naess and d i s c u s s e d in section 3 . 2 . Optimum comprehension of the information by the l i s tener continues even in the event of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , however; to function a s a p r e m i s s , b e c a u s e the e v e n t u a l assessment of the argumentation by the l i s t e n e r c a n u l t i mately only be b a s e d on the information as the l i s t e n e r thinks he has understood it. True, where there is no p r o per u n d e r s t a n d i n g there c a n be no proper judgement, but in the c a s e of a rational assessment d i f f e r e n t criteria have to be a p p l i e d t h a n in the c a s e of rational interpretation, so t h a t the theory of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and the theory of assessment c a n be seen a s d i s t i n c t from one another. The l i s t e n e r t r y i n g to make a proper e v a l u a t i o n of a s p e a k e r ' s argumentation cannot do a n y t h i n g else but s t a r t from the information as expressed verbally by the s p e a k e r , and he is bound to b a s e his v e r d i c t on what he has understood of t h i s . Since he has no d i r e c t a c c e s s to the s p e a k e r ' s i d e a s and o p i n i o n s , he can only assume that the s p e a k e r has s a i d what he means, and since he must a s s e s s the s p e a k e r ' s argumentation and not his own version of i t , a l l t h a t i s e l i g i b l e for e v a l u a t i o n i s what he has understood of the information provided by the s p e a k e r . In order t h a t attention c a n be c o n c e n t r a t e d e x c l u s i v e l y on the assessment of the a r g u m e n t a t i o n , it i s often c o n v e n i e n t l y assumed in argumentation theory t h a t the l i s t e n e r ' s comprehension i s t o t a l , though in p r a c t i c e t h i s may be v e r y f a r from being the t r u t h . The study of the problems of c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y is therefore often left

42

Introduction

to fields like speech communication. At this point it should perhaps be stressed that the fact that when e v a l uating the argumentation the l i s t e n e r must s t a r t from what he has understood of the information provided (and perhaps, at the l i s t e n e r ' s request, c l a r i f i e d ) by the speaker, does not of course mean that the l i s t e n e r simply has to accept whatever the speaker s a y s . He always r e t a i n s the right to challenge both the point of departure of the argumentation (see p . 25) and the argumentation schemata employed by the speaker (see p . 21) and thus i n i t i a t e or invite a new argumentation. 5.

The interlocutors may adduce any desired point of view and any information which they consider relevant to the defending or attacking of an opinion In principle it is possible to have a point of view about any subject and to s t a r t an argumentation on any s u b j e c t . There are no subjects which, as it were, are per se unsuitable for adopting a point of view or conducting argumentation. And in p r a c t i c e it does in fact emerge that the most diverse of opinions are attacked and defended. It is possible to hear people defending the view that reduced expenditure automatically leads to the curbing of inflation and that male b a l l e t dancers need not n e c e s s a r i l y be homosexual, but at the same time there are other people attacking the view that Holland is at the forefront in the fight to eliminate discrimination and that fish must always be accompanied by white wine. A person who has no opinion on a p a r t i c u l a r subject can always, if he feels the need and is not worried about the q u a l i t y of his opinion, simply assume one. A point of view can only be assessed by others as to its value if it is f i r s t made known. A person wishing to convince others of the truth of his point of view should f i r s t make it perfectly c l e a r what his point of view i s ; and the best way to do that is to formulate it as comprehensibly as possible. The same applies to the information which someone regards as important for attacking or defending an opinion: it can only be judged by others if it has f i r s t been made known, so that i t , too, is best put into words as c l e a r l y as possible. This means that the interlocutors must as f a r as possible externalize their points of view and their arguments. In p r a c t i c e , however, there may be many reasons why language users should a b s t a i n from e x t e r n a l i z i n g p a r t i c u l a r standpoints and p a r t i c u l a r pieces of information. In some c a s e s they take a voluntary decision not to express their thoughts: they may, for example, wish to take their

The premisses and aims of argumentation theory

43

time to think about the issue concerned. In other i n stances they may feel constrained to hold their t o n g u e s — perhaps because they are a f r a i d of possible r e p r i s a l s which may be taken if they express a p a r t i c u l a r point of view or reveal c e r t a i n information. Premiss 5 is designed to make it quite c l e a r that in argumentation theory it is assumed that the interlocutors can speak freely and are not subject to a l l kinds of c o n s t r a i n t s against their will. If the p r a c t i c e of arguing f a i l s to conform to this premiss a b a s i c condition for optimum argumentation is v i o l a t e d . Naturally, the interlocutors may v o l u n t a r i l y impose c e r t a i n constraints upon themselves, and they may also v o l u n t a r i l y come to an agreement that c e r t a i n points of view or certain sorts of information are 'out of o r d e r 1 . They may, for example, decide not to go through a l l the points a l r e a d y made in an e a r l i e r discussion, or they may agree to d i s r e g a r d information which is 'too t e c h n i c a l ' . Sometimes they will t a c i t l y assume that in a given situation c e r t a i n points of view, such as 'purely p e r s o n a l ' ones, and c e r t a i n sorts of information, such as details of a p e r s o n ' s p r i v a t e l i f e , are to be regarded as i r r e l e v a n t , or they may endorse an existing tradition which says what is and what is not admissible. An important condition for optimum argumentation, however, is that those who v o l u n t a r i l y enter into argumentation with one another must be in agreement as to the cons t r a i n t s that are to operate on the freedom of speech and information e x c h a n g e . Premiss 5 implies that the interlocutors are in p r i n ciple permitted freely to introduce any point of view and any sort of information which they themselves consider r e l e v a n t . It constitutes an extension of the assumed freedom of action referred to in premiss 2, which is of p a r t i c u l a r importance for meaningful argumentation. Unlike premisses 1, 2, 3 and 4, it is not purely a premiss often chosen in argumentation theory on practical grounds only: it also reflects a choice of principle by the a r g u mentational t h e o r i s t . According to this premiss, argumentation may only be v a l i d l y assessed on its merits if the interlocutors are permitted to say whatever they wish to say. 6.

It must not be clear in advance to an interlocutor defending or attacking an opinion that the other interlocutors already share his own point of view A person advancing arguments for cr a g a i n s t a p a r t i c u l a r opinion always assumes, in p r i n c i p l e , that between him and the person or persons to whom he addresses his

44

Introduction

argumentation a difference of opinion exists or threatens to arise. The argumentation is then an attempt by the speaker to resolve the difference of opinion in his own favour by convincing the other interlocutor or interloctutors of the Tightness of his own point of view. The justification or refutation of an opinion, which is what the speaker aims at achieving through his argumentation, however, is only meaningful as an attempt at convincing, if the speaker's point of view is not wholly shared by the other interlocutor or interlocutors. If all the interlocutors adopt the same standpoint before the argumentation begins, then there is no question of any real d i f ference of opinion and the argumentation, strictly speaking, is superfluous. A wise speaker will always try, before he embarks on his argumentation, to establish whether there actually i s , or threatens to be, a real difference of opinion between himself and the other interlocutor or interlocutors. However, he may not always have an opportunity to do this, and even if he has, the answer may not be forthcoming. That is why it is understandable that in some cases the speaker simply starts from the assumption or expectation that there is or will be a difference of opinion; he may also believe that he has all kinds of evidence for one. He thus presupposes that there is a difference of opinion without prior certainty that this presupposition is actually correct. If he is mistaken, and erroneously assumes that his point of view is not completely shared by the other interlocutor or interlocutors, then there is neither actually nor potentially a real difference of opinion, in which case the speaker's argumentation is again, strictly speaking, superfluous. This situation can only be avoided if every participant or potential participant in the argumentation (or potential argumentation) externalizes his own point of view as clearly as possible before any argumentation begins. Despite this, the speaker who erroneously assumes that his own point of view is not yet fully shared by the other interlocutor or interlocutors still makes a serious attempt at convincing. That is why there is no good reason for not taking his argumentation seriously and considering such an attempt at convincing in a study of argumentation theory. There would be a good reason if it were already clear to the speaker in advance that the other interlocutors were going to subscribe to his own point of view, i . e . if before he even embarked on his argumentation he knew that the others were in complete agreement with him and that his argumentation would therefore be

The premisses and aims of argumentation

theory

45

s u p e r f l u o u s . It would be p o s s i b l e , for example, for him to p e r s e v e r e with h i s a r g u m e n t a t i o n solely in order to demonstrate to h i s a u d i e n c e t h a t he is on t h e i r side—but then the a r g u m e n t a t i o n would no l o n g e r be a serious attempt at convincing o t h e r s of the Tightness of the point of view defended in i t , b u t would be s e r v i n g a p u r p o s e other t h a n its a p p a r e n t one. Premiss 6 implies t h a t the i n t e r l o c u t o r s must make a serious attempt to convince one a n o t h e r a n d t h a t they may not conduct a n y a r g u m e n t a t i o n which they themselves know does not serve to convince e i t h e r side of the Tightness of a p a r t i c u l a r point of view. It c o n s t i t u t e s an extension of the s e r i o u s n e s s of action r e f e r r e d to in premiss 2, which is of p a r t i c u l a r importance for m e a n i n g f u l a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Like premiss 5, premiss 6 is not a p u r e l y p r a c t i c a l premiss s e r v i n g to d i r e c t the s t u d y of a r g u m e n t a t i o n by a r g u m e n t a t i o n theory f i r s t a n d foremost at clear-cut cases, b u t is also b a s e d p a r t l y on p r i n c i p l e , s e r v i n g to direct t h a t s t u d y at relevant cases. According to t h i s p r e m i s s , a r g u m e n t a t i o n may only be p r o p e r l y a s s e s s e d on i t s merits as long as the i n t e r l o c u t o r s do not

argue if they know it is unnecessary for them to do so. 7.

Any interlocutor may dispute any statement made by any other interlocutor to justify or refute an opinion

The i n t e r l o c u t o r s , if t h e r e seems to be a need for a r g u mentation (premiss 6 ) , a r e e n t i t l e d to a d v a n c e any argument which they c o n s i d e r relevant" to t h e i r defending or a t t a c k i n g of an opinion (premiss 5 ) . If one of the i n t e r l o c u t o r s makes a given j u s t i f y i n g or r e f u t i n g s t a t e ment, he i s — u n l e s s he s u b s e q u e n t l y r e t r a c t s it—committed to the content a n d force of t h a t statement (premiss 3 ) . In e v a l u a t i n g each o t h e r ' s a r g u m e n t a t i o n the i n t e r l o c u tors r e l y on the statements p r e v i o u s l y formulated in the a r g u m e n t a t i o n (premiss 4 ) . Premiss 7 follows on from t h i s : it i n d i c a t e s t h a t the i n t e r l o c u t o r s a r e e n t i t l e d to test any statement made (and not r e t r a c t e d ) to j u s t i f y or r e f u t e an opinion a n d t h a t they may do so by attacking it. Every i n t e r l o c u t o r a s s e s s i n g the a r g u m e n t a t i o n of a n other i n t e r l o c u t o r h a s the r i g h t , a c c o r d i n g to premiss 7, to c r i t i c i z e a n y d e s i r e d a r g u m e n t a t i v e statement which is p a r t of t h a t a r g u m e n t a t i o n . The other i n t e r l o c u t o r s have no r i g h t to p r o h i b i t him doing so, nor may they in any other way d e t r a c t from h i s r i g h t to do so. For example, an i n t e r l o c u t o r whose statement is d i s p u t e d may not s a y t h a t the c r i t i c i s m offered may be j u s t i f i e d but t h a t he is not i n t e r e s t e d in i t , or t h a t the d i s p u t e d statement j u s t h a p p e n s to be t o t a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . He h a s made the s t a t e -

46

Introduction

ment in order to lend force to a p a r t i c u l a r point of view and can be held to i t . The person a t t a c k i n g the s t a t e ment is entitled to assume that sound criticism of the statement will lead to a weakening of the argumentation of which it is a p a r t , and that the person who made the statement will not, following the c r i t i c i s m , simply be able to maintain that the opinion which he attempted to j u s t i f y or refute with its help must be regarded as j u s t ified or refuted on the grounds of the argumentation as given. This does not mean, of course, that the point of view which is at issue must at once be abandoned: a weakened argumentation need not n e c e s s a r i l y be wholly undermined, and there may be new arguments which can ensure that the point of view can be maintained. In p r a c t i c e , as we observed in our e x p l a n a t o r y r e marks on the b a s i c model (p. 2 2 ) , there is by no means always a c l e a r indication of which statements in a d i s cursive text a c t u a l l y have an argumentative function. Very often it seems to be a question of interpretation whether or not a p a r t i c u l a r statement is to be regarded as having a j u s t i f y i n g or refuting function. In many cases t h i s question i t s e l f gives rise to differences of opinion which may in turn give r i s e to new argumentation concerning c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the function of c e r t a i n s t a t e ments. In conformity with premisses L, and 3, we s h a l l assume here that the l i s t e n e r interprets the function of statements in the way intended by the speaker, and we s h a l l leave closer study of specific problems of i n t e r pretation to those working in the field of speech communication whose p a r t i c u l a r interest is 'comprehensibility research1. Premiss 7 implies that the interlocutors do not have to accept b l i n d l y any j u s t i f y i n g or refuting statement whatever, and that they may c r i t i c i z e wha.tever statements they may wish to c r i t i c i z e . It constitutes an extension, important for meaningful argumentation, of premisses 3, 4 and 5. Like premisses 5 and 6, it is not purely a p r a c t i c a l premiss but is also founded on matters of p r i n c i p l e . It serves to indicate that every statement made in an argumentation is regarded in argumentation theory as a statement which is i t s e l f in principle debatable and which may be treated as such. According to premiss 7 no statement is ever automatically exempt from criticism and the interlocutors in an argumentation may dispute any statement which they consider worth criticizing. 8.

The interlocutors must be prepared to defend all their justifying and refuting statements against criticism from other interlocutors

The premisses and aims of argumentation theory

47

If those t a k i n g p a r t in an a r g u m e n t a t i o n set themselves the t a r g e t of u s i n g the a r g u m e n t a t i o n in o r d e r to settle a d i f f e r e n c e of opinion in a manner a c c e p t a b l e to a l l p a r t i e s , they must not s t a n d in e a c h o t h e r ' s way in the s e a r c h for such a settlement. However, t h a t is what h a p p e n s if one i n t e r l o c u t o r declines to defend h i s j u s t i f y i n g or r e f u t i n g statements a g a i n s t c r i t i c i s m from other i n t e r l o c u t o r s . The statements he h a s made a r e , of c o u r s e , components of the a r g u m e n t a t i o n a d v a n c e d to settle the d i s a g r e e m e n t , a n d if components of the settlement a r e not, or not y e t , r e g a r d e d as a c c e p t a b l e , it may be t h a t the e n t i r e settlement t h e r e b y becomes u n a c c e p t a b l e . An i n t e r locutor who r e f u s e s to defend h i s statements a g a i n s t a t t a c k p r e v e n t s the other i n t e r l o c u t o r s from determining the extent to which the t e s t i n g f u n c t i o n which he a s c r i b e s to h i s statements is j u s t i f i e d , a n d t h u s makes it imposs i b l e to o b t a i n c e r t a i n t y as to the t e n a b i l i t y of h i s point of view. If t h e r e a r e i n t e r l o c u t o r s who decline to defend t h e i r statements a g a i n s t a t t a c k from other i n t e r l o c u t o r s , t h i s means t h a t the i n t e r l o c u t o r s ' r i g h t to c r i t i c i z e , l a i d down in premiss 7, is in f a c t an empty r i g h t . The u n w i l l i n g i n t e r l o c u t o r c a n of course t r y to a d d a nice twist to h i s o b s t r u c t i o n ( e . g . ' i t ' s no use t a l k i n g about it— i t ' s j u s t a g a i n s t my p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t ' s a l l ' ) , b u t by so doing he is more or l e s s removing a n y point in a n y f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n on the p a r t of the other i n t e r l o c u t o r s . The a t t i t u d e he a d o p t s amounts, in extreme c a s e s , to ' t h a t is so b e c a u s e I s a y it is s o ' , a n d it is an a t t i tude which c o n f l i c t s with the e s s e n t i a l conception of a r g u m e n t a t i o n . If he embarked upon the a r g u m e n t a t i o n with the other i n t e r l o c u t o r s of his own f r e e w i l l , a n d if none of the o t h e r s h a s v i o l a t e d a n y of the a g r e e d r u l e s , t h e r e is much to be s a i d for r e g a r d i n g h i s a t t i t u d e a s u n r e a s o n a b l e or irrational. Premiss 8 r e l a t e s to a w i l l i n g n e s s in p r i n c i p l e not to back out of d e f e n d i n g o n e ' s own s t a t e m e n t s . Of c o u r s e , in p r a c t i c e it is possible for i n t e r l o c u t o r s to f a i l to defend t h e i r own statements without t h i s being u n r e a s o n a b l e . They may, a f t e r a l l , have r e a s o n s which a r e , or ought to be, a c c e p t a b l e to the other i n t e r l o c u t o r s . For example, the i n t e r l o c u t o r s may h a v e a g r e e d not to exceed a c e r t a i n time limit, or they may know (or may be e x pected to know) t h a t the d i s p u t e d statement h a s a l r e a d y been a d e q u a t e l y d e f e n d e d , so t h a t a n y newly r e q u e s t e d defence would be merely r e p e t i t i o u s . P e r h a p s , too, the i n t e r l o c u t o r s h a v e v o l u n t a r i l y accepted a frame of r e f e r ence for the d i s c u s s i o n in which the defence concerned

48

Introduction

must be regarded as superfluous. Or the person c r i t i c i z ing the statement may himself f a i l to meet the conditions he imposes on others: he may, for example, refuse to defend statements which he himself has made e a r l i e r in the discussion. Premiss 8 implies that the interlocutors must in p r i n ciple defend their justifying or refuting statements if the other interlocutors so request. It is an extension, important for meaningful argumentation, of premiss 7 in p a r t i c u l a r . Like premisses 5, 6 and 7, it is not solely p r a c t i c a l but is based partly on p r i n c i p l e . It serves to indicate that in argumentation theory it is regarded as necessary for the settlement of differences of opinion that no attack on a statement may simply be left unanswered. According to premiss 8 the interlocutors in an argumentation are not entitled to regard the acceptability of any of their statements as taken for granted, and they must defend any statement which other interlocutors consider worth criticizing. The eight premisses we have just outlined are often t a c i t ly observed by argumentation theorists. All eight are intended to facilitate the study of argumentation, and this aim is pursued by assuming a situation which makes it possible to concentrate on aspects which are specifically relevant to argumentation. In that sense, they are practical premisses. The f i r s t four are in fact important in any conveyance of information, though here they have been specially adapted to argumentation. They indicate what sort of situation must be assumed in research into argumentation theory if one wishes to avoid the research being confused by factors not peculiar to argumentation. Such f a c t o r s , which may in practice be extremely important and therefore c e r t a i n l y deserve further a n a l y s i s , are so to speak placed 'outside b r a c k e t s ' in argumentation theory. Our l a s t four premisses also have a p r a c t i c a l side, but at the same time they are determined by matters of principle. They are a l l premisses relating to important b a s i c conditions for meaningful argumentation. Violation of- these conditions implies degradation of the significance which the argumentation can have for the interlocutors. If one or more of the basic conditions for meaningful argumentation are not fulfilled, the points of departure and the argumentation schemata chosen in the argumentation may s t i l l be sound, but the quality of the a r g u mentation is then at stake at a preliminary l e v e l . Premisses 5, 6, 7 and 8 can therefore be regarded as

The premisses and aims of argumentation theory

49

preliminary rules for meaningful argumentation. These rules indicate a choice of a particular way of looking at meaningful argumentation. At the moment this conception appears to be generally accepted by argumentation theorists, though it is of course possible to have other ideas. Taken together the eight premisses form a common assumption which is the starting point for argumentation theory, though in principle it is naturally open to theorists of argumentation not to subscribe to one or more of these premisses. Not every theorist, for example, need necessarily assume the preliminary rules for meaningful argumentation that we have formulated here; it would also be possible to choose other premisses, and one can also regard the preliminary rules not as premisses but as propositions made to potential interlocutors which ought to be the subject of study in argumentation theory and must be accounted for in a normative theory of argumentation. Although the present state of argumentation theory is one in which there is no question of a single generally accepted theory of argumentation, but of several theories of argumentation (or conceptions and fragments of theories), the .differences between them do not lie principally in different conceptions of these premisses. The most significant differences between the various theories relate to (1) the conception of rationality upon which they are based, and (2) the nature of the particular aims striven after by the different theorists. We shall examine both these sorts of difference more closely. According to our definition of argumentation (p. 7), argumentation is an appeal to an audience for a rational assessment. To obtain the approbation of a rationally assessing audience, the audience must be convinced that a particular opinion has been justified or refuted by the argumentation. However, we have not yet paid much attention to the question of what counts as a rational assessment in the context of argumentation. Yet this is a fundamental question for the whole study of argumentation. Indeed, in a sense every theory of argumentation may be seen as an answer to it. Regarded in this light, every theory of argumentation provides us with an extensive 'definition', or clarification, of the norms of rationality which are or ought to be applied in the assessment of argumentation. Argumentation theory indicates what criteria of rationality are adhered to, or ought to be adhered to, if we are to be entitled to call an argumentation sound. Specifically, this is indicated by reference to a particular conception of rationality, which

50

Introduction

is not the same for every argumentation t h e o r i s t . We s h a l l not go into the v a r i o u s conceptions of r a t i o n a l i t y u n d e r l y i n g the v a r i o u s theories of argumentation in any depth, but will confine o u r s e l v e s to a b r o a d o u t l i n e , s u f f i c i e n t to point out some major f e a t u r e s c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s between the v a r i o u s t h e o r i e s . 1 5 Our outline i s b a s e d on the d i s t i n c t i o n s a d v a n c e d by S . E . Toulmin in his book Knowing and Acting, where he g i v e s v a r i o u s sorts of p h i l o s o p h i c a l answers to the q u e s tion 'what is it to have reasons for our b e l i e f s or a c t ions? 1 (1976: v i - v i i ) . Here Toulmin d i s t i n g u i s h e s between three philosophical traditions: 1. a formal or logical t r a d i t i o n with i t s o r i g i n s in P l a t o ; 2 . an empirical t r a d i t i o n derived from common sense and most f a m i l i a r to us from the eighteenth c e n t u r y ; and 3 . a critical or transcendental t r a d i t i o n set in motion by Kant. According to Toulmin these t r a d i t i o n s f i n d e x p r e s s i o n in t h r e e d i f f e r e n t approaches to rationality, v i z . : 1. a geometrical a p p r o a c h ; 2 . an anthropological a p p r o a c h ; and 3 . a critical a p p r o a c h . Each of these a p p r o a c h e s to r a t i o n a l i t y implies a p a r t i c u l a r approach to a r g u m e n t a t i o n . A person e l e c t i n g for a geometrical a p p r o a c h , a c c o r d i n g to Toulmin, s t a r t s from a conception of r a t i o n a l i t y which r e l i e s h e a v i l y on formal l o g i c . In t h i s view, arguments are only r e g a r d e d a s a c c e p t a b l e a s the b a s i s of a r a t i o n a l judgement i f true or 'certain' premisses necessarily lead to true or 'certain' conclusions. F r e e l y i n t e r p r e t e d , This amounts to s a y i n g t h a t the points of d e p a r t u r e of sound a r g u i n g must be i n d i s p u t a b l e and the a r g u m e n t ation schemata formally v a l i d ( c f . 2 . 3 ) . Choosing an anthropological approach means t h a t one t a k e s the p r a c t i c e of the human community as the point of d e p a r t u r e for o n e ' s conception of r a t i o n a l i t y and thus in p r i n c i p l e b a s e s o n e ' s judgement on e m p i r i c a l d a t a . A r a t i o n a l j u d g e , in t h i s view, will only r e g a r d a s a c c e p t a b l e those manners of a r g u i n g which in a given society are regarded by consensus as sound. F r e e l y interpreted, this means t h a t the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of argumentation depends on the a c c e p t a b i l i t y a t t r i b u t e d to the chosen points of d e p a r t u r e and argumentation schemata at a given moment by p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s . A person e l e c t i n g for a critical approach couples r a t i o n a l i t y not e x c l u s i v e l y with formal l o g i c a l or e m p i r i c a l assumptions, but with the functionality of the argumentative procedure for achieving a particular aim. In t h i s view a r a t i o n a l judge will find a c c e p t a b l e

The premisses and aims of argumentation

theory

51

only t h a t a r g u m e n t a t i o n which c o n s t i t u t e s a s u i t a b l e means for a c h i e v i n g the aim s t a t e d by those conducting the a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Freely i n t e r p r e t e d , t h i s means t h a t the soundness of points of d e p a r t u r e a n d a r g u m e n t a t i o n schemata depends in p r i n c i p l e on the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r to which the a r g u m e n t a t i o n r e l a t e s . These three a p p r o a c h e s p r o v i d e an i l l u s t r a t i o n of some d i f f e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l a t t i t u d e s which may be adopted in respect of r a t i o n a l i t y . These v a r i o u s a t t i t u d e s h a v e consequences for the c r i t e r i a of soundness which people a p p l y when a s s e s s i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n . In p r a c t i c e , of c o u r s e , it is p o s s i b l e for v a r i o u s elements from the i n d i v i d u a l a p p r o a c h e s to be combined in a s i n g l e c o n ception of r a t i o n a l i t y . This may be so in the c a s e of an o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e u s e r b u t also in the c a s e of an a r g u mentation t h e o r i s t : b o t h , when a s s e s s i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n , will h a v e to s t a r t from a p a r t i c u l a r conception of r a t i o n a l i t y . The chief d i f f e r e n c e here is t h a t an o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e u s e r will commonly be more or l e s s u n a w a r e t h a t he is a p p l y i n g a p a r t i c u l a r conception of r a t i o n a l i t y , a n d will as a r u l e not f i n d it v e r y e a s y to e x p l i c i t i z e t h a t conception, w h e r e a s the a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h e o r i s t is more or less obliged to consider h i s conception of r a t i o n a l i t y in a d v a n c e . However, t h i s makes no d i f f e r e n c e in p r i n c i p l e to the role of the conception of r a t i o n a l i t y : in e i t h e r case it will determine what is to count as a rational judgement of a r g u m e n t a t i o n . A rational assessing audience r e p r e s e n t s some k i n d of normative ideal. It is the a u t h o r i t y to which the e v a l u a tion of the a r g u m e n t a t i o n is i d e a l l y e n t r u s t e d . It is d e b a t a b l e whether it is p r e f e r a b l e to h a v e a p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p of existent persons to f u l f i l the f u n c t i o n of a norma t i v e i d e a l , or whether the r a t i o n a l a s s e s s i n g a u d i e n c e should be r e g a r d e d solely a s an abstract ideal. In the f i r s t case one assumes t h a t the a s s e s s o r s a r e p e r s o n s who when a s s e s s i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n a r e c a p a b l e of s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e i r emotions, p r e j u d i c e s e t c . a n d making the best possible judgement according to p a r t i c u l a r norms of r a t i o n a l i t y , while in the second c a s e one assumes a t h e o r e t i c a l normative c o n s t r u c t t h a t is f u l l y a d a p t e d to making optimum judgements. 1 6 The answer to the question of which is the b e t t e r depends p a r t l y on the conception of r a t i o n a l i t y being u s e d , so t h a t d i f f e r e n t theories of a r g u m e n t a t i o n give d i f f e r e n t a n s w e r s . We s h a l l not go into t h i s a n y f u r t h e r . For our p u r p o s e s , the most i m p o r t a n t t h i n g at the moment is t h a t it is r e a l i z e d t h a t a r a t i o n a l audience r e p r e s e n t s a normative i d e a l which can t a k e v a r i o u s s h a p e s , a n d t h a t the v a r i o u s s h a p e s must

52

Introduction

be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a s c l e a r l y a s p o s s i b l e . The ' r e a l i s t i c ' conception of a r a t i o n a l audience h a s methodological consequences which a r e d i f f e r e n t from those of the ' t h e o r e t i c a l n o r m a t i v e ' conception, and a person who c o n f u s e s the two concepts, or v a r i a n t s of them, r u n s the r i s k t h a t his a n a l y s i s of argumentation will h a v e s e r i o u s defects.17 The e x i s t i n g theories of argumentation d i f f e r from one another not only in being founded on d i f f e r e n t conceptions of r a t i o n a l i t y , but a l s o b e c a u s e they a r e d e s i g n e d to achieve s p e c i f i c aims which v a r y in c h a r a c t e r . In some theories of argumentation the prime objective is to obtain a d e s c r i p t i o n of points of d e p a r t u r e a n d a r g u m e n t ation schemata which in practice prove to be regarded as sound, while in others the main aim i s to i n d i c a t e which points of d e p a r t u r e a n d argumentation schemata should be regarded as sound in the opinion of the theorist. Both these a p p r o a c h e s to a r g u m e n t a t i o n , of c o u r s e , a r e b a s e d on p a r t i c u l a r conceptions of r a t i o n a l i t y . The most important d i f f e r e n c e is that in the f i r s t a p p r o a c h it is a p u r e l y descriptive conception of the i d e a l of r a t i o n a l i t y that h a s been chosen, and in the second it i s a normative conception. The f i r s t a p p r o a c h i s empirical a n d the second analytical. The e m p i r i c a l - d e s c r i p t i v e a p p r o a c h to argumentation is d e s i g n e d to p r o v i d e a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the c r i t e r i a of soundness employed in the p r a c t i c e of e v a l u a t i n g a r g u mentation. Research b a s e d on t h i s a p p r o a c h i s c h i e f l y in the n a t u r e of 'effect' research, which i s d e s i g n e d p a r t i c u l a r l y to e s t a b l i s h what forms of argumentation b r i n g about the r e s u l t d e s i r e d by the s p e a k e r . The a n a l y t i c a l normative a p p r o a c h to argumentation aims to p r o v i d e a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the c r i t e r i a of soundness that must be a p p l i e d a c c o r d i n g to the t h e o r i s t ' s s t a n d a r d s of r a t i o n ality. Research then c h i e f l y t a k e s the form of a closer definition of criteria of rationality, i . e . it attempts to draw up r u l e s for argumentation which will be s u i t a b l e instruments for conforming, in a r g u m e n t a t i o n , to the norms which, a c c o r d i n g to a p a r t i c u l a r conception of r a t i o n a l i t y , must be a p p l i e d to a sound a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Both the e m p i r i c a l - d e s c r i p t i v e a n d the analyticalnormative a p p r o a c h to argumentation can be r e g a r d e d a s w a y s — d i f f e r e n t ways—of p u r s u i n g the g e n e r a l aim of argumentation theory which we formulated at the s t a r t of t h i s section ( p . 3 7 ) . In each of these a p p r o a c h e s the general aim acquires a particular character. Most of the theories of argumentation so f a r formulated—

The premisses

and aims of argumentation

theory

S3

u s u a l l y in a more or less provisional form—are predomi n a n t l y normative in c h a r a c t e r . This is probably c h i e f l y because they rely h e a v i l y on a c l a s s i c a l tradition that is pronouncedly normative in c h a r a c t e r (see chapter 2 ) . The difference between a descriptive and a normative approach to argumentation, i n c i d e n t a l l y , need not n e c e s s a r i l y be absolute: a somewhat normative s t a r t i n g point will often be chosen for description, and norm definition will often take account of the c r i t e r i a that are found to play a part in p r a c t i c e . Moreover, descriptive and normative approaches can complement one another very well: a person wishing to describe the p r a c t i c e of a r g u mentation can benefit from the evaluation models drawn up in the normative theory of argumentation, and a p e r son wishing to draw up c r i t e r i a of soundness can a v a i l himself of the knowledge of the way in which argumentation is assessed in p r a c t i c e which is provided for him by the descriptive theory of argumentation. If it is o n e ' s purpose to improve the p r a c t i c e of a r g u mentation, one must make use of both descriptive and normative argumentation theories, since one can only properly embark on such an enterprise if one has the best possible insights into the situation to be improved and the situation which one desires to bring about. Many argumentation theorists choose such a diagnostic and therapeutic o b j e c t i v e . They do not r e g a r d their task as ending with the description or drafting of soundness c r i t e r i a for argumentation, but wish also to e s t a b l i s h to what extent the e x i s t i n g situation accords with the desired situation in any given c a s e ( d i a g n o s i s ) , and to develop methods for, where n e c e s s a r y , making the e x i s t ing situation accord with that desired ( t h e r a p y ) . The p r a c t i c a l propositions which this kind of approach to argumentation can supply jointly constitute a p r a c t i c a l guideline for systematic t r a i n i n g in the art of a r g u i n g . In many c a s e s the propositions recommended in studies on argumentation extend over quite a broad a r e a . Ethics, in p a r t i c u l a r , is often involved in books on argumentation, as may be seen from such t i t l e s and subtitles as An Introduction to Responsible Persuasion and chapter headings like 'The ethics of r e a s o n i n g ' . 1 8 The r a t i o n a l e behind this is usually that anything that can in any way promote optimum argumentation must be incorporated. In the field c a l l e d speech communication, for example, similar considerations dictate that stylistic elements affecting the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of language usage are also included in the investigation of argumentation and in teaching l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l s (see e . g . McBath, e d . , 1975).

54

Introduction

In this book we shall discuss a number of different contributions to the development of the study of argumentation. In doing so, we shall try as c l e a r l y as possible to indicate what conceptions of r a t i o n a l i t y underlie these theoretical studies of argumentation and as f a r as possible we shall also try to allow the specific aims and approaches chosen in them to speak for themselves. In chapter 2 we shall examine some general backgrounds to argumentation theory which are important for a proper understanding of the various theories of argumentation. First we shall look at the classical approach to a r g u mentation, paying particular attention to the logic (or ' a n a l y t i c ' ) , dialectic and rhetoric of Aristotle; we then treat that particular f i e l d of argumentation theory t r a d i t i o n a l l y known as the study of fallacies; f i n a l l y we g i v e a brief account of modern logic, with particular reference to the ' v a l i d i t y c r i t e r i o n ' and the differences between the evaluation of formal demonstration and argumentation in colloquial speech. In chapter 3 we examine some important studies of argumentation, beginning with a survey of contributions to the development of argumentation theory. We go on to g i v e a brief outline of Naess's analysis of discussions, CrawshayWilliams's analysis of controversies andthe formal dialectic of Barth & Krabbe. Chapter A is devoted entirely to the influential theory of Toulmin. We discuss Toulmin's model for the analysis of argumentation and g i v e an evaluation of i t . Chapter 5 is wholly given over to the new rhetoric of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, beginning with an extensive outline of this similarly influential theory of argumentation and going on to assess its value to the study of argumentation. In chapter 6 we wind our story up with a survey of the present state of affairs in argumentation theory. Here we point to some important differences and similarities between the theories we have discussed and to connections with the general backgrounds outlined in chapter 2. We also g i v e some information about the latest developments in the f i e l d . Since this book does not pretend to be anything more than an introduction to argumentation theory, we have compiled an extensive alphabetical b i b l i o g r a p h y to assist the reader wishing to acquaint himself more thoroughly with the subject or any part of i t . We have tried to enhance its usefulness by the addition of a c l a s s i f i e d b i b l i o g r a p h y reflecting the order followed in the text.

Chapter 2

Backgrounds to Argumentation Theory

2.1.

The c l a s s i c a l b a c k g r o u n d : l o g i c , d i a l e c t i c rhetoric

and

The sources for modern theoretical thinking on argumentation l i e in c l a s s i c a l l o g i c , d i a l e c t i c and r h e t o r i c . In this section we s h a l l g i v e an o v e r a l l p i c t u r e of these three d i s c i p l i n e s . Before we do so, however, we s h a l l g i v e a brief outline of the c i r c u m s t a n c e s in which they evolved in Greek a n t i q u i t y . In Greek society there was o r i g i n a l l y no p l a c e for d i s c u s s i o n and a r g u m e n t a t i o n . The c u l t u r a l climate was r i g i d and dogmatic: nature' ( kosmos)and the s o c i a l order (polis or c i t y - s t a t e ) were seen a s an immutable system o r d a i n e d by the gods a s a reflection of the d i v i n e o r d e r . This was not open to d i s c u s s i o n : 'The g o d s h a v e wished it so. ' Anyone p o s t u l a t i n g any other e x p l a n a t i o n for the world and i t s c r e a t i o n set himself a g a i n s t the g o d s and would be c a l l e d to account for himself. In the f i f t h a n d s i x t h centuries B . C . a c h a n g e in this mythological p i c t u r e of the world b e g a n to set i n . Attempts were made to account for n a t u r a l phenomena and the creation of the world in a r a t i o n a l manner, without a p p e a l i n g to the g a l l e r y of the g o d s . ' E v e r y t h i n g that e x i s t s ' , for e x a m p l e , was e x p l a i n e d by some sort of ' p r i m o r d i a l p r i n c i p l e ' ( ' t h e l i m i t l e s s ' or 'the a i r ' ) , by a ' p r i m o r d i a l l a w ' ( ' e v e r l a s t i n g numerical r e l a t i o n s b e t ween the components of the w o r l d ' ) , or by a 'collection of d i f f e r e n t elements' ( ' t h e a t o m s ' ) . These e x p l a n a t i o n s now sound r a t h e r n a i v e , but that is no concern of ours h e r e . More important i s that the 55

56

Backgrounds to argumentation

theory

e x p l a n a t i o n s differed from e a c h o t h e r . Some of the e x p l a n a t i o n s and m e t a p h y s i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s on the n a t u r e or s t r u c t u r e of ' t h e w o r l d ' or ' e v e r y t h i n g t h a t e x i s t s ' c o n f l i c t e d w i t h one a n o t h e r . Thus H e r a c l i t u s b e l i e v e d t h a t e v e r y t h i n g w a s a l w a y s in c o n s t a n t motion, w h i l e P a r m e n i d e s opined t h a t motion a n d c h a n g e were i m p o s s i b l e . At a somewhat l a t e r p e r i o d ( c h i e f l y in the f i f t h c e n t u r y B . C . ) q u e s t i o n s of d i r e c t s o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e a l s o came to be d i s c u s s e d . Some people b e l i e v e d the s o c i a l o r d e r to be i n h e r e n t in human n a t u r e , w h i l e o t h e r s t h o u g h t it w a s the r e s u l t of a g r e e m e n t s , l a w s and c o n v e n t i o n s . Another problem w a s the q u e s t i o n of whether a l l members of the community s h o u l d be t r e a t e d a s p o l i t i c a l e q u a l s or w h e ther the c l e v e r e s t a n d s t r o n g e s t must simply e n s u r e t h a t power remained in t h e i r h a n d s . F o l l o w i n g on from these and other d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n , people b e g a n to a s k q u e s t i o n s l i k e ' w h a t a c t u a l l y is a "good" o p i n i o n ? ' a n d 'when c a n we s a y t h a t something is t r u e ? ' A l l opinions r e g a r d i n g the o r i g i n of the w o r l d and the p o l i t i c a l o r d e r l a i d c l a i m to t r u t h a n d a c k n o w ledgement b y o t h e r s . E v e r y o n e who d e f e n d e d an o p i n i o n h a d to g i v e a r g u m e n t s for i t . But w h a t a r g u m e n t a t i o n w a s the best? Was there such a t h i n g a s ' g o o d a r g u m e n t ation ' ? The Greek Sophists were the f i r s t to a s k q u e s t i o n s of t h i s s o r t . They were i t i n e r a n t t e a c h e r s who g a v e l e s s o n s in a r g u m e n t a t i o n and social, and p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s . Though i n t e r e s t e d in n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y , they were c h i e f l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h e t h i c s , p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y , m o r a l i t y and t h e o r e t ical r e f l e c t i o n on the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c q u i r i n g real k n o w l e d g e of these s u b j e c t s . Some Sophists h a d r a t h e r r a d i c a l v i e w s on t h i s l a s t m a t t e r . G o r g i a s , for e x a m p l e , w a s of the opinion t h a t (a) nothing r e a l l y e x i s t e d , (b) if a n y t h i n g r e a l l y d i d e x i s t it would be u n k n o w a b l e , and (c) if a n y t h i n g w a s k n o w a b l e it would be uncomm u n i c a b l e to o t h e r s . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s v i e w , e v e r y t h i n g we see about us is o n l y an i l l u s i o n . Another point of view f r e q u e n t l y h e l d w a s t h a t moral v a l u e s are r e l a t i v e a n d s u b j e c t i v e . In the e v e n t of a d i s p u t e c o n c e r n i n g moral q u e s t i o n s one may not, a c c o r d i n g to t h i s v i e w , a p p e a l to o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a . The most one c a n do is e n s u r e t h a t o n e ' s own opinion i s a c c e p t e d . D i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to t h i s view i s the Sophist s t a n d p o i n t t h a t o b j e c t i v e l y s p e a k i n g there c a n be no such t h i n g as good a r g u m e n t a t i o n . If one person c o n v i n c e s another w i t h h i s a r g u m e n t s , t h i s is b e c a u s e the other person a c c e p t s w h a t he s a y s . In other words the f i r s t person is agreed to be right, but t h a t does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean

The classical

background

57

that in objective terms he actually is right. As a group the Sophists were excellent orators, and their orations were followed with interest and pleasure. They would also debate for a fee and organized public debating contests. They had a reputation for being able to argue for any a r b i t r a r i l y chosen standpoint. One of the earliest examples of their skill at devising arguments is the following advice to someone accused of murder. If he is small in stature he must argue in his defence that it is unlikely that so weak a person committed the crime. If on the other hand he is of sturdy build, he can argue that it is improbable that so substantial a person did the deed, since he would be suspected straight away (Guthrie 1971: 178). There was widespread interest in the teaching of the Sophists, for good and convincing oratory was seen as a means towards achieving success in public l i f e . The democratic system as it existed in Athens for the major part of the f i f t h century meant that an advocate of a particular political measure had to defend it at public meetings. 19 And on such occasions it was naturally helpful to be able to put an argument well. The same applied in the administration of justice: when involved in a legal dispute it was advantageous to be able to defend oneself before a judge. Thus there were two main motives for taking an i n terest in argumentation. In the first place, comparison of the arguments for opposing views on all sorts of subjects led to the general query of what good argumentation i s . Second, the practice of politics and the law led to the question of what was good, and above a l l effective, argumentation. This general reflection on argumentation crystallized out in classical logic, d i a lectic and rhetoric. These theories were at their most influential in the finely worked out form given them by Aristotle; and it is for that reason that we shall take his work as a starting point. Each of Aristotle ' s theories is elaborated in one or more books. 20 His logical theory is found first and foremost in the Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics {he himself did not use the term ' l o g i c ' but referred to ' a n a l y t i c ' ) . What we now call logic (see 2.3) was often called dialectic in antiquity. In the way in which Aristotle uses the word, however, dialectic is the theory or art of debate. His dialectic is to be . found in the Topics and in De Sophisticis Elenchis (On Sophistical Refutations). The theory of good and convincing oratory, f i n a l l y , he

58 d i s c u s s e s in his

Backgrounds

to argumentation

theory

Rhetoric.

Aristotle s t a r t s from the assumption t h a t a l l knowledge, i n s i g h t s and o p i n i o n s , in so f a r a s they a r i s e from rational thought, a r e b a s e d on e x i s t i n g knowledge, i n s i g h t s a n d opinions ( P o s t e r i o r Analytics, 71a, 1-10). E x i s t i n g opinions make up the m a t e r i a l on the b a s i s of which, with the help of arguments or reasoning, we can a r r i v e at new opinions ( P r i o r Analytics, 68b, 14). The arguments which may be u s e d for t h i s he d i v i d e s into two s o r t s : deductive syllogisms a n d inductive syllogisms . 21 In the c a s e of deductive s y l l o g i s m s , something i s a s s e r t e d or assumed in a number of statements, and from these s t a t e m e n t s , the p r e m i s s e s , there n e c e s s a r i l y follows a conclusion. ' N e c e s s a r i l y ' means that the conclusion must follow from the p r e m i s s e s : in t h i s sort of argument the r e l a t i o n between the premisses and the conclusion is such t h a t it i s impossible for the p r e m i s s e s to be true a n d the conclusion u n t r u e . Nowadays arguments which h a v e t h i s q u a l i t y a r e c a l l e d ' d e d u c t i v e l y v a l i d ' . Let us g i v e an example of our own. Suppose there a r e two p r e misses: ' a l l cities have a city council' and 'Paris is a city'. There then n e c e s s a r i l y follows from these two p r e m i s s e s the conclusion ' P a r i s h a s a city c o u n c i l ' . Of c o u r s e , at a p a r t i c u l a r moment a c i t y may not h a v e a c i t y council (the council may j u s t h a v e r e s i g n e d , for e x a m p l e ) , but even then the conclusion n e c e s s a r i l y f o l lows from the p r e m i s s e s , becaus e if the premisses were true, then the conclusion would be true too. In the second sort of argument, inductive syllogisms, specific cases a r e named in the p r e m i s s e s and from the p r e m i s s e s a g e n e r a l conclusion is drawn. 2 2 One of A r i s t o t l e ' s examples is: the t r a i n e d helmsman is the b e s t ; the t r a i n e d c h a r i o t e e r i s the b e s t ; therefore a t r a i n e d man i s g e n e r a l l y the best in his f i e l d . Aristotle a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h e s arguments according to the purpose they a r e intended to s e r v e . Arguments d e s i g n e d to a c h i e v e a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n a n d r e l i a b l e knowledge he c a l l s apodictic or demonstrative a r g u m e n t s , arguments c a l c u l a t e d to l e a d to g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e opinions or points of view a r e dialectical arguments a n d arguments that a r e p r i m a r i l y intended to convince an audience of the Tightness of an opinion or s t a n d p o i n t a r e c a l l e d rhetorical arguments. For a demonstrative argument it i s p o s s i b l e to use or an inductive s y l l o g i s m . The p r e either a deductive misses of an a p o d i c t i c argument a r e incontrovertibly t r u e , a n d so is the c o n c l u s i o n . The c e r t a i n t y of the

The classical

background

59

premisses is passed on to the conclusion by the argument. Such arguments therefore serve as an apodictic (or demonstrative) ideal of knowledge. Here we must think primarily of mathematical knowledge. 2 3 For dialectical arguments, too, it is possible to use either deductive or inductive syllogisms. The premisses of a d i a l e c t i c a l argument are g e n e r a l l y accepted or are acceptable to 'the wise—that i s , to a l l of the wise or to the majority or to the most famous and distinguished of them 1 (Topics, 100b, 2 3 ) . But because the premisses are only ' g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d ' , the conclusions too are only ' g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d ' . The degree of c e r t a i n t y , in this case a c c e p t a b i l i t y or p r o b a b i l i t y , is here a g a i n t r a n s mitted from the premisses to the conclusion. The premisses of a rhetorical argument must be chosen so that they have cogency for the audience. By the use of a deductive or inductive syllogism the conclusion is then also cogent in the eyes of the audience. The a u d i ence must also accept the step from premisses to conclusion: the deduction. Whether this is valid by demonstrative or d i a l e c t i c a l c r i t e r i a is unimportant. As an example of an a p o d i c t i c a l l y i n v a l i d argument which can function well r h e t o r i c a l l y , Aristotle gives the argument: someone who is committing adultery wears gaudy clothes and loiters in the street at n i g h t ; this man is wearing gaudy clothes and loiters in the street at n i g h t ; therefore this man is committing a d u l t e r y . This argument can function well on the r h e t o r i c a l plane if the ( i n v a l i d ) connection between the premisses is accepted by the audience. To convince the audience, then, two conditions must be met: both the premisses and the inference must have cogency. Aristotle t r e a t s apodictic arguments in his l o g i c a l theory, the Analytics, d i a l e c t i c a l arguments in his Dialectic, and r h e t o r i c a l arguments in his Rhetoric. We s h a l l discuss a l l three theories b r i e f l y in a moment, but f i r s t we give a survey, in figure 2 . 1 , of the three sorts of argument and their c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s . arguments

demonstrative

dialectical

rhetorical

abjective

certainty

acceptability

cogency

s t a t u s of preaisses

Fig.

evidently

true

acceptable

deduction

valid

valid

theory

logic

dialectic

2.1.

Aristotle's

three

sorts

of

argument.

cogent for

audience cogent

for

audience

rhetoric

Backgrounds

60

to argumentation

theory

The l o g i c of A r i s t o t l e In h i s l o g i c a l theory Aristotle concerns himself c h i e f l y with d e d u c t i v e s y l l o g i s m s .2it His d e f i n i t i o n of a s y l l o g i s m i s so b r o a d t h a t it c o v e r s a n y argument in which a conc l u s i o n n e c e s s a r i l y follows from two or more p r e m i s s e s (Topics, 100a, 18-25 a n d Prior Analytics, 24b, 2 0 ) . Howe v e r , he only d e a l s with the t y p e now known a s a syllogism, which must meet more s t r i n g e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a n the g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n s u g g e s t s . Here i s an e x a m p l e of a s y l l o g i s m of the t y p e t r e a t e d by A r i s t o t l e : (1) (2) (3)

A l l humans are mortal A l l A u s t r a l i a n s a r e humans A l l A u s t r a l i a n s are mortal

A s y l l o g i s m c o n s i s t s of two p r e m i s s e s (1 a n d 2) a n d a c o n c l u s i o n ( 3 ) . The p r e m i s s e s a n d the c o n c l u s i o n a r e a l l categorical s t a t e m e n t s , i . e . they r e l a t e to classes of e n t i t i e s . N a t u r a l l y i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e to h a v e an a r g u m e n t with only one p r e m i s s or with more t h a n two, or with premisses a n d c o n c l u s i o n s which a r e not c a t e g o r i c a l s t a t e m e n t s . But a l t h o u g h such a r g u m e n t s s t i l l f a l l under the b r o a d d e f i n i t i o n g i v e n by Aristotle he does not d i s c u s s them. S u b s e q u e n t l y only a r g u m e n t s of the t y p e t r e a t e d by him were d e s c r i b e d a s syllogisms. In a c a t e g o r i c a l statement a subject is attributed a predicate by means of the word ' i s ' or ' a r e ' . In 1, for e x a m p l e , it i s s a i d of humans (the s u b j e c t ) t h a t they a r e mortal (the p r e d i c a t e ) . The term in a statement which f u n c t i o n s a s the s u b j e c t i s known a s the subject term (in the term f u n c t i o n i n g 1 humans, in 2 and 3 Australians), a s the p r e d i c a t e b e i n g c a l l e d the predicate term (in 1 mortal, in 2 humans a n d in 3 mortal). In 1, the p r e d i c a t e mortal i s a t t r i b u t e d to the s u b j e c t humans, i . e . all h u m a n s . However, the p r e d i c a t e might a l s o h a v e been withheld from the s u b j e c t or might not be a l l o c a t e d to all h u m a n s , only to some. In t h i s way a t o t a l of four v a r i a n t s c a n be formed, a l l of which A r i s totle r e g a r d s a s c a t e g o r i c a l s t a t e m e n t s . The four v a r i a n t s are: (la) (lb) (lc) (Id) In

A l l humans are mortal Some humans a r e mortal No humans a r e mortal Some humans are not mortal la

and

lb

the p r e d i c a t e

mortal

is

attributed

to the

The classical

background

61

subject humans, while in lc and Id, by contrast, it is withheld from the subject. Statements la and lb are therefore called affirmative, lc and Id negative, In la and lc the predicate refers to all humans and in lb and Id to some humans. The difference between affirming and denying is a qualitative difference, the difference between all and some a quantitative difference. 4IZ.-statements are called universal statements, some-statements are called particular statements. Examples la to Id may thus be identified as follows : (la) (lb) (lc) (Id)

universal affirmative particular affirmative universal negative particular negative

In the example, both the premisses and the conclusion of the syllogism are universal affirmative. However, it is possible for a syllogism to contain categorical statements of some other type, and it can also contain a variety of types. It might, for example, consist of three particular négative statements or two particular affirmative statements ( e . g . the premisses) and one universal negative statement (the conclusion): (4) (5) (6)

Some humans are not mortal Some Australians are not humans Some Australians are not mortal

(0) (0) (0)

(7) (8) (9)

Some humans are mortal Some Australians are human No Australians are mortal

(I) (I) (E)

Using the various possible ways of combining different types of categorical statement it is possible to indicate the mood of a syllogism. Usually this is done with the medieval abbreviations A, I , E and 0 as indications of universal affirmative, particular affirmative, universal negative and particular negative statements. A and I are the first two vowels in the Latin word affirmo ( I a f firm), and E and 0 are the vowels of the Latin word nego ( I deny). The moods of examples 1-3, 4-6 and 7-9 are thus AAA, 000 and I IE. Syllogisms, then, may be characterized by reference to their figures. The figure of a syllogism is determined by the manner in which the subject and predicate terms occurring in the syllogism are divided over the premisses

62

Backgrounds to argumentation

theory

and conclusion. To refer to this division we use the f o l lowing terminology. The predicate term of the conclusion is called the major term of the syllogism and the premiss in which the major term occurs is called the major premiss. The subject term of the conclusion is the minor term and the premiss in which it occurs is the minor premiss. The term which appears in both of the premisses but not in the conclusion is the middle term. The figure of a syllogism is determined by the position of the middle term in the major and minor premisses. 25 The figure of 1-3, for e x ample, can now be reproduced as follows: major premiss (1)

All humans are mortal

middle term

major term

minor premiss (2)

All Australians are humans

minor term

middle term

conclusion (3) A l l Australians are mortal minor term major term In this example the middle term in the major premiss is thus in the position of the subject and in the minor premiss in the position of the predicate. In all there are four possible combinations for the position of the middle term in the major and minor premisses. These four combinations correspond to four different figures for the syllogism. Syllogism 1-3 is an example of the first figure together with the other three figures, this is represented schematically in figure 2.2.26

second figure

first figure major term middle term

middle term minor term third figure middle term middle term

Fig.

2.2.

major term minor term

middle term middle term

fourth figure major term minor term

The four figures

major term middle term

cf the

middle term minor term

syllogism.

The combination of mood and figure produces the form of the syllogism. There are many possible combinations, so

The classical background

63

that there are many forms of syllogism. However, by no means a l l forms are v a l i d . Example 1-3 (mood AA, f i r s t figure) is v a l i d , but example 7-9 (mood I I E , f i r s t figure) is not. Aristotle distinguishes a total of fourteen v a l i d combinations of mood and f i g u r e . As stated e a r l i e r , Aristotle t r e a t s only arguments in which the premisses and conclusion a l l consist of c a t e g o r i c a l statements. This restriction has consequences for the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of his l o g i c a l theory, since in many arguments we find what are known as singular statements, so that those arguments f a l l outside the scope of Arist o t l e ' s theory. Singular statements are statements in which the p r e d i cate is attributed to a subject term which refers to a single individual, not a class or category of i n d i v i d u a l s . Examples of s i n g u l a r statements are premiss 11 and conclusion 12 in the following argument: (10) (11) (12)

All humans are mortal Socrates i s a human Socrates i s mortal

Argument 10-12 is the most commonly used example of a syllogism in modern textbooks on l o g i c . That 11 and 12 are not c a t e g o r i c a l statements is either disregarded or permitted by some a r t i f i c e . This u s u a l l y amounts to the s i n g u l a r term Socrates being regarded as a term which refers to a c l a s s consisting of only one member, Socrates. Using this a r t i f i c e , the s i n g u l a r statement 11 i s reduced to a c a t e g o r i c a l statement as follows (Kahane 1973: 2 2 1 ) : (11a) All members of the c l a s s whose sole member i s Socrates are men ( l i b ) All things i d e n t i c a l with Socrates are men This a r t i f i c e , then, enables us to t r e a t arguments as syllogisms even if they contain n o n - c a t e g o r i c a l s t a t e ments. To distinguish these arguments from ' g e n u i n e ' syllogisms they are sometimes termed ' q u a s i - s y l l o g i s m s ' . The a r t of d e b a t e : A r i s t o t l e ' s

dialectic

Dialectic was o r i g i n a l l y the term used to denote a p a r t i c u l a r argumentative technique in a discussion or debate. One of the interlocutors assumes a thesis (for the sake of the d e b a t e ) , deduces from this assumed thesis a conclusion which conflicts with i t , and on these grounds

64

Backgrounds to argumentation theory

r e j e c t s t h e t h e s i s . One of t h e o l d e s t e x a m p l e s of t h i s t e c h n i q u e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n i s t h e proof t h a t the s q u a r e root of 2 is not a f r a c t i o n ( i . e . r a t i o n a l n u m b e r ) . In t h e proof it i s f i r s t a s s u m e d t h a t t h i s is t h e c a s e . From t h i s a c o n c l u s i o n is d e d u c e d which c o n f l i c t s w i t h the a s s u m e d s t a r t i n g p o i n t , a n d on t h e b a s i s of t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h e a s s u m e d t h e s i s i s r e f u t e d a n d it i s a c c e p t e d t h a t the s q u a r e root of 2 i s not a f r a c t i o n (Kneale & Kneale 1962: 8 ) . This d i a l e c t i c a r g u m e n t a t i o n a l t e c h n i q u e i s c a l l e d reductio ad impossibile ( r e d u c t i o n to t h e i m p o s s i b l e ) or indirect proof.27 In A r i s t o t l e ' s Topics t h e term d i a l e c t i c h a s a b r o a d e r m e a n i n g . Here, d i a l e c t i c i s the a r t of r e a s o n i n g u s i n g p r e m i s s e s which a r e not e v i d e n t l y t r u e . In the Topics A r i s t o t l e e x a m i n e s how t h e s e p r e m i s s e s c a n be u s e d i n a d e b a t e a s concessions. Often t h e p r e m i s s e s c o n s i s t of g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d a s s u m p t i o n s , b u t in a n y e v e n t t h e y must be a c c e p t e d b y a t l e a s t one of t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r s . Aristotle g i v e s general instructions f o r t h e c o n d u c t of d e b a t e s , a n d a l s o specific instructions f o r t h e m a n n e r in which a p a r t i c u l a r t h e s i s may be a t t a c k e d or d e f e n d e d . These s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n s i s t of a system of p o s s i b l e moves w h i c h w i l l be e x e c u t e d p r i m a r i l y b y t h e o p p o n e n t , w a r n i n g s to t h e d e f e n d e r to be w a r y of c e r t a i n moves, a n d a l i s t of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r i c k s which a t t a c k e r a n d d e f e n d e r may u s e to m i s l e a d one a n o t h e r . The Topics may be r e g a r d e d a s a m a n u a l f o r t h e c o n d u c t of a p u b l i c d e b a t i n g c o n t e s t , a c o n t e s t h e l d in the p r e s e n c e of a n a u d i e n c e . However, A r i s t o t l e a l s o f i n d s dialectic useful as mental t r a i n i n g . In philosophical q u e s t i o n s t h e t r u t h w i l l be r e v e a l e d more e x p e d i t i o u s l y if we c a n f i n d a r g u m e n t s both f o r a n d a g a i n s t a c e r t a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t of v i e w . Dialectic i s t h u s the a r t of a r g u i n g for and a g a i n s t . A r g u i n g f o r a n d a g a i n s t a p o i n t of view in a d e b a t e worked l i k e t h i s . The opponent o f f e r e d t h e d e f e n d e r a t h e s i s in t h e form of a q u e s t i o n . This q u e s t i o n ( a n d the s u b s e q u e n t q u e s t i o n s a n d a n s w e r s ) r a i s e d a general q u e s tion.- In o t h e r w o r d s t h e d i s c u s s i o n w a s not a b o u t s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s l i k e 'must t h i s man be p u n i s h e d ? ' b u t a b o u t m a t t e r s l i k e ' c a n v i r t u e be t a u g h t ? ' The d e f e n d e r could now r e p l y in the a f f i r m a t i v e or in t h e n e g a t i v e . Depending on h i s a n s w e r , t h e opponent t h e n h a d to a t t a c k e i t h e r t h e t h e s i s ' v i r t u e c a n be t a u g h t ' or t h e t h e s i s ' v i r t u e c a n n o t be t a u g h t ' . P r o - a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d contra-argumentation recurred continually throughout the c o u r s e of t h e d e b a t e . Once the d e f e n d e r h a d committed himself to a t h e s i s b y h i s a n s w e r , t h e a t t a c k e r would

The classical

background

65

pose a further question, and so on. The opening question (the protasis ) , would be in the form ' i s S P?' ( ' S ' standing for subject, ' P ' for p r e d i c a t e ) . Thereafter the questions would take the form ' i s S P or not?' These latter questions (and the answers to them) were the problemata. By his r e p l y , the defender again committed himself (now to a problema), and because the attacker would not know in advance what the defender's answer would be, his attack would have to take account both of the problema 'S is P ' and of the problema 'S is not P ' . In other words, his attack would assume that the defender had accepted certain theses and was making use of them. It now becomes clearer what kind of role g e n e r a l l y accepted assumptions play in d i a l e c t i c . The attacker offers the defender these assumptions if he wishes to elicit a p a r t icular conclusion which he w i l l be able to c a l l on l a t e r . The defender is more l i k e l y to commit himself to g e n e r a l l y accepted assumptions than to a r b i t r a r y ones. The attacker has won when it becomes clear that the defender has accepted theses which contradict each other. How must the attacker disguise his questions to make the defender contradict himself? He can a v a i l himself of a system of topoi, i . e . a series of argumentative techniques. The major part of the Topics consists of a treatment of a number of these techniques. A topos is the place from which the attacker can get his arguments. Some translations of the word stress the 'topographic' nature of the word: ' p l a c e ' , 'argumentplace', 'location', 'search f o r m u l a ' . However, a topos is also a rule, law or procedure, and this is what is stressed in other translations of the word: 'argumentation schema', 'argumentational technique', ' p r o c e d u r e ' . Following Kneale & Kneale (1962: 34) we translate the term topos as ' m o v e ' , in order to do justice to both aspects. This translation also calls to mind the association with p l a y i n g a game and holding a contest, thus underlining the fact that, like a game or contest, a debate can be won or lost. A move is a tactical aid in setting up an argument for or against a thesis. The argument consists of a conclusion and premisses. The move specifies which premisses may be used. This is its selective function, corresponding to its 'topographic' character. Moreover the move itself is a premiss, albeit one of a more fundamental nature than the others. It guarantees the transition from the other premisses to the conclusion. This is its guarantee function, corresponding to i t s 'rule-like' or

move

p

R

Fig. 2.3. The selective and guarantee functions of a move P R

= possible premisses * premisses selected by selective function

—

C = conclusion - selective function guarantee function

'procedural' c h a r a c t e r . The two functions of the move are shown in figure 2 . 3 , which we have borrowed, with slight modifications, from De Pater 1965. Not every move is suitable for every attack (compare the moves in a game of c h e s s ) . What sort of move may be made depends on the thesis to be opposed. Aristotle divides theses into types by looking at the way in which the predicate says something about the subject. A predicate may contain a definition, a property, a genus, or" a coincidental property (accidens) of the s u b j e c t . In the case of a definition the predicate indicates t h e ' e s s e n c e ' of the subject (e.g.'man is a r a tional b e i n g 1 ) ; in the case of a property, something that is not an essential part of the subject but is nevertheless an inalienable property of it ( e . g . 'man is capable of learning a l a n g u a g e ' ) ; in the case of a genus, the predicate is a wide c l a s s to which the subject belongs as a species ( e . g . 'man is a living b e i n g ' ) ; and in the case of an accidens, f i n a l l y , the predicate refers to a.fortuitous property of the subject ( e . g . 'man is w h i t e ' ) . Following on from this c l a s s i f i c a t i o n Aristotle discusses definition moves, property moves, genus moves and accidens moves. An accidens move is one employed as an attack on a thesis in which the predicate expresses an accidens of the subj e c t . The same applies mutatis mutandis to a genus move, which is employed in an attack on a thesis whose predicate expresses a genus of the subject, and so on. To c l a r i f y the way a move works, let us look at two examples from the Topics. In the f i r s t , the attacker wishes to arrive at a conclusion in which two c o n t r a dictory predicates are attributed to the subject ('There is correctness and error in p e r c e p t i o n ' ) . The move amounts to the attacker having to find a genus to which 'perception' belongs and to which both of these c o n t r a 66

The classical

background

67

dictory predicates a p p l y . Aristotle c a l l s ' d i s t i n g u i s h i n g ' a genus of perception. Becausè distinguishing can be right and wrong, perception, as a species of d i s t i n g u i s h ing, can also be right and wrong ( T o p i c s , 111a, 15). The selective and guarantee functions of this move are shown in figure 2 . 4 . move: what applies genus also a species

There

R

p

1

R2

: Perceptions of

are a

are

right

to a

applies

to

within

it

and

wrong

species

distinction

: There

are

right and

wrong

distinctions

Fig.

2.4.

Example of a move.

Of the possible premisses P the move selects premisses Rl and R2 . The selection takes place as follows: There must be one premiss (Ri ) in which the term 'perception' (from the conclusion) occurs as a species of a genus (in this c a s e , d i s t i n c t i o n ) . The move does not specify what genus—that is left to the ingenuity of the attacker—only that it must be a genus. When the genus has been found, the contrary terms from the conclusion are attributed to i t . This is how we a r r i v e at premiss R2 . In the second example the a t t a c k e r must bring about the conclusion that what a p a r t i c u l a r subject term refers to is more worthy of choice than what a p a r t i c u l a r p r e dicate term refers to ('Health is more worthy of choice than e x e r c i s e ' ) . The move amounts to the a t t a c k e r e x ploiting the fact that the subject is worthy of choice for its own s a k e , while the predicate is only a means to an end ( T o p i c s , 116a, 2 9 - 3 1 ) . In that c a s e , the subject is more d e s i r a b l e than the p r e d i c a t e . The two functions of this move are shown in figure 2 . 5 . The f i r s t move (figure 2 . 4 ) is of a more g e n e r a l nature than the second (figure 2 . 5 ) , as the l a t t e r contains the term ' d e s i r a b l e ' (or 'worthy of c h o i c e ' ) and can only be used if it is a matter of comparing degrees of d e s i r a b i l i t y .

move: S is more desirable than P if S is desirable for its own sake and P isonly desirable to achieve something else C : Health is more than gymnastics

R j : Health and gymnastics are both desirable

P

desirable

R 2 ! Health is desirable per se

R 3 : Gymnastics is desirable to achieve something else

Fig. 2.5.

Example of a move.

Moves of the first type are called general moves, moves of the second type special moves. Special moves serve to make value-judgements possible. The following two special moves illustrate this: That which has more favourable consequences is preferable to that which has less favourable consequences. An end is more desirable than a means and the means that best achieves the end is more desirable than the means which achieves the end less well. How are such moves employed in a debate of the form we have just outlined? To clarify this, let us reconstruct a debate in which the attacker uses the move 'what is desirable for its own sake is more desirable than what is desirable only to achieve something else'. We shall use A to signify the attacker and D for the defender. (1) (2) (3) (4)

A: 'Is health more desirable than gymnastics?' D: 'Health is not more desirable than gymnastics.' A: 'Is what is desirable for its own sake more desirable than what is desirable only to achieve something else, or not?' 'What is desirable for its own sake is more desir68

The classical

(5) (6) (7)

A: D: A:

(8) (9)

D: A:

(10)

D:

background

69

able than what i s desirable only to achieve something e l s e . 1 ' I s health desirable for i t s own sake, or not?' 'Health i s desirable for i t s own sake.' ' I s gymnastics desirable for i t s own sake or desirable to achieve something else? 1 'Gymnastics i s desirable to achieve something e l s e . ' ' I s health more desirable than gymnastics, or not?' '...'

It is already clear from the defender's answer to question (3) that he is going to contradict himself. A condition, of course, is that the attacker phrases his questions in such a way that the defender does not at once realize what he is getting at. Moreover, the defender must answer in such a way that he causes the attacker the greatest possible difficulty. General problems of this kind, which have more to do with the form of the debate than with the moves themselves, are treated by Aristotle in the final book of the Topics, where, among other things, he goes into the order of the questions ('for the time being, conceal the purpose of the desired concession 1 ), the sort of concession which the attacker must contrive to elicit, and the sort of question which the defender cannot avoid answering affirmatively (' someone who refuses to concede, a generally accepted universal statement without being able to advance a counterargument behaves improperly 1 ). Just like the players in a game, the participants in a debate can cheat, i . e . break the rules by executing wrong or false moves. Aristotle deals with wrong moves i n a s e p a r a t e w o r k , De Sophisticis

Elenchis

(On

Sophistic-

al Refutations), which takes its title from the Sophists. Aristotle regards false moves as characteristic of the Sophists. However, De Sophisticis Elenchis is not concerned solely with refutations but also discusses other strategies which may lead to one's adversary losing. Refutation of one's a d v e r s a r y ' s argument means that he accepts both the thesis and a statement which conflicts with it. If the attacker can make the defender do this, he has won the debate and the defender has lost. According to Aristotle the attacker can also win by (1) seducing the defender into stating an untruth or p a r a dox, (2) tricking him into making grammatical blunders, and (3) seeing to it that the defender continually repeats himself. In

De Sophisticis

Elenchis

Aristotle d i s c u s s e s

the

false

70

Backgrounds

to argumentation

theory

moves whereby the a t t a c k e r c a n achieve these e n d s . However, he a l s o d e a l s with the ways in which the d e f ender may r e a c t in order not to be driven into a corner by these f a l s e moves. F i r s t he d e s c r i b e s how the a t t a c k e r must couch h i s q u e s t i o n s to achieve his o b j e c t i v e , s u b sequently going on to e x p l a i n how f a l s e moves may be p a r r i e d by the d e f e n d e r . The f a l s e moves d i s c u s s e d by Aristotle in De Sophisticis Elenchis h a v e since p l a y e d an important role in the h i s t o r y of l o g i c under the name fallacies. We s h a l l d e a l with them s e p a r a t e l y in section 2.2. The a r t of good and cogent o r a t o r y :

rhetoric

Aristotle defines rhetoric a s the f a c u l t y of d i s c o v e r i n g the p o s s i b l e means of p e r s u a s i o n in reference to any subject w h a t e v e r . These means of p e r s u a s i o n a r e u n i versal, i.e. they may be u s e d with every s u b j e c t : m e d i c a l , a r i t h m e t i c a l , g e o m e t r i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and so on. He does, however, d i v i d e the p o s s i b l e s u b j e c t s of a d i s course into genres. The g e n r e s of o r a t o r y a r e c l a s s i f i e d a c c o r d i n g to the circumstances in which a d i s c o u r s e is conducted. On t h i s b a s i s Aristotle d i s t i n g u i s h e s : (1) the genus iudiciale (2) the genus deliberativum, a n d (3) the genus demonstrativum. The genus iudiciale r e l a t e s to a juridical situation, in which speeches a r e made in f a v o u r of a p a r t i c u l a r judgment. In most c a s e s the point at i s s u e i s whether a p a s t act i s to be r e g a r d e d a s l a w f u l or u n l a w f u l or j u s t or u n j u s t . In this g e n r e the most important question is what i s the best way of making a s p e e c h . The genus deliberativum r e l a t e s to a political situation in which—as in a council of c i t i z e n s — s p e e c h e s a r e made for or a g a i n s t the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l m e a s u r e . Here too the main question is how the speech c a n best be made. The genus demonstrativum f i n a l l y , r e l a t e s to a festive or ceremonial o c c a s i o n , at which a person or thing i s p r a i s e d or condemned. This genre is a l s o known a s the epideictic genre. The most important f a c t o r to be taken into account in the three g e n r e s is the audience for whom the d i s c o u r s e i s intended. Because it i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r h e t o r i c a l p r a c t i c e that the means of p e r s u a s i o n a r e chosen to suit the a u d i e n c e , Aristotle a l s o examines them in their r e l a tion to i t . A p u b l i c g a t h e r i n g wanting to h e a r something p r a i s e d or condemned must be a p p r o a c h e d d i f f e r e n t l y

The classical background.

71

from a j u r y in a court of l a w . A g a i n , a c o n s u l t a t i v e meeting r e q u i r e s d i f f e r e n t treatment from, s a y , a j u d g e . As an example of a t t u n i n g the means of p e r s u s a s i o n to the a u d i e n c e , Aristotle s a y s t h a t deductive r e a s o n i n g c a n b e s t be used in the presence of e x p e r t s but t h a t i n ductive r e a s o n i n g i s b e t t e r for a discourse a d d r e s s e d to an u n l e t t e r e d multitude, b e c a u s e in inductive reasoning examples are g i v e n . He d i s t i n g u i s h e s between two sorts of means of p e r s u a s i o n : (1) extrinsic and (2) intrinsic. Extrinsic means do not depend on the s p e a k e r ' s s k i l l but are b a s e d on existing material. The s p e a k e r himself does not have to make a n y t h i n g up, but can c a l l on l a w s , documents, statements by witnesses or confessions by s u s p e c t s . Intrinsic means do make a demand on the s k i l l of the s p e a k e r : they a r e a means devised by the s p e a k e r h i m s e l f , who uses them to convince the audience of the Tightness of h i s own point of view. Within the group of intrinsic means Aristotle d i s tinguishes three subcategories: means of persuasion which make use of ethos, pathos or logos. If the s p e a k e r i n d i c a t e s , whether d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , t h a t he is of good and trustworthy c h a r a c t e r , he uses ethos ( c h a r a c t e r ) . In A r i s t o t l e ' s view t h i s is the most e f f e c t i v e means of p e r s u a s i o n , s i n c e once an audience t r u s t s the s p e a k e r it will a l s o be i n c l i n e d to accept what he s a y s . If during his discourse the s p e a k e r p l a y s on the emotions of the audience he employs- pathos ( s e n t i m e n t ) . In connection with pathos Aristotle s a y s that our judgement is clouded by j o y , sorrow, love or h a t r e d (Rhetoric, 1, i i , 5 ) . I f the s p e a k e r uses arguments, he employs logos. The f i r s t two means of p e r s u a s i o n are emotional, while logos is a r a t i o n a l means of c o n v i n c i n g . The rational means of convincing which the s p e a k e r may c a l l to his a i d ( a n d to whhich we confine o u r s e l v e s here) a r e deductive and inductive syllogisms. Aristotle c a l l s r h e t o r i c a l deductive syllogisms enthymemes and r h e t o r i c a l inductive syllogisms examples. With the help of these enthymemes a n a examples it i s p o s s i b l e to defend points of view concerning which other opinions are p o s s i b l e . The premisses of an enthymeme are a c c e p t a b l e to the a u d i e n c e ; and with the aid of examples a g e n e r a l i z a tion c a n be made p l a u s i b l e . Rhetorical s y l l o g i s m s , l i k e t h e i r d i a l e c t i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t s , are bound to a p a r t i c u l a r form of communication, in this c a s e the monologue. This means that the s p e a k e r c a n do without premisses i f he c a n assume t h a t his audience a u t o m a t i c a l l y accepts c e r t a i n premisses as obvious or taken for g r a n t e d . Indeed, it might have a deleterious effect if he were c o n t i n u a l l y

72

Backgrounds to argumentation

theory

to set out all his points of departure explicitly. When setting up enthymemes it is important to choose the right point of departure. For example a person wishing to defend his decision not to take a seat on a committee would be better advised to say that it is in the best interests of the club that he should devote himself to other tasks than to say that he can't be bothered. Aristotle groups these starting points or premisses according to their degree of acceptability for the audience. He distinguishes three gradations: (1) certainty ( ' a pregnant woman has had sexual contact with a man'), (2) plausibility ( ' a father loves his children') and (,3) fortuities, whether or not accepted ( ' a n adulterer wears gaudy clothes'). Starting points which are certain are more likely to be material for demonstrative arguments, but if they are available they can of course also be used for rhetorical arguments. In terms of rhetoric, it is the plausibilities which are the most important. Often they contain expressions of value-judgements ( e . g . 'we must strive after peace 1 ), and they may therefore be used to justify actions and decisions (plausibility: 'cars destroy the l i v a b i l i t y of the c i t y ' ; decision: 'cars will be kept out of the c i t y ' ) . If one wishes to defend a point of view, that point of view must be- the conclusion of an enthymeme. But how is one to come by the premisses? What plausibilities can one rely on? Here the speaker is assisted by the topoi or loci, which as rhetorical moves aid in the choosing of a starting point by means of their selective function. Through their guarantee function, the transition from starting points to conclusion is then made plausible. To illustrate this, in figure 2.6 we show a move which assists in defending the standpoint that it is better not to smoke. In his dialectic Aristotle discusses general and special moves. Some general moves are also discussed in his logic, though there he treats them as logical rules, so that- they are not formulated in terms of the role they can play in a debate. In the dialectic the special moves are in a minority. In the rhetoric, by contrast, they are the chief subject of discussion. A parallel with the dialectic, however, is that false moves are also discussed there: the fallacies (see 2.2). Greek rhetoric provided the foundation for the Roman rhetorical system. Like the Greek, the Roman theory d i v ides the rational means of convincing into two groups,

rhetorical

«ove:

what applies ^

applies

to

to

consequences

causes

\ preaxsses:

conclusion:

smoking

results

it is b e t t e r

in p o o r

health

poor

health

not to

smoke

is

undesirable

Fig.

2.6.

Example of a rhetorical

move.

enthymemes and examples. However, there is an important difference in that here the enthymeme is extended by more elements. According to Roman writers this extension accorded better with the practice of convincing o r a t o r y . Furthermore in the Roman theory the argumentation component f i t s better into the whole area covered by rhetoric. We shall begin by examining the place accorded to the argumentative component in the Roman theory and w i l l then discuss the extension of the enthymeme. Our sources- are the works of three highly influential writers on rhetoric: the unidentified author of the Rhetorioa ad Herennium (sometimes attributed to Cicero), Cicero, and Quintilian. They a l l l i v e d between about 100 B.C. and about A.D. 100. We shall treat the Rhetorioa ad Herennium, Cicero's De Inventione and Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria broadly and together; that i s , we shall not go into a l l the v a r i ants and a l l the differences between them. The place which the study of argumentation occupies in Roman rhetoric may best be characterized by connecting together two systems of classification which are fundamental to the Roman rhetorical system as a whole. The f i r s t relates to the tasks (official which the speaker must perform before he can make his speech, the second relates to the components of his speech. Before an orator can deliver his speech, he must p e r form f i v e tasks. He must (1) decide what he is going to say (inventio), (2) arrange this subject-matter (dispositio), (3) choose the right wording or formulations 72

74

Backgrounds to argumentation

theory

(elocutio), (4) learn the speech by heart {memoria), and (5) provide the speech with the right intonation, f a c i a l expressions and gestures during delivery ( a c t i o ) . When a r r a n g i n g his material ( dispositio ) the orator divides his discourse into elements. He begins with an introduction (exordium ) in order to make a favourable impression on the audience and arouse their interest in his s u b j e c t . He then gives an account of his subject or of the facts of the c a s e ( narratio ) . This b r i n g s him to the most important part of his speech, his argumentation ( argumentatio), which is i t s e l f often subdivided into two p a r t s : evidence for his own opinion (oonfirmatio) and refutation of the arguments of the opponent f r e f u t a t i o ) . There may then be a digression ( digressio ) , and the speech is concluded with a summary and a peroration (peroratio)-.

t a s k s o f the o r a t o r

components

of the

speech

exordium narratio inventio

argune.ntatio

dispositio •

confirmatio refutatio

elocutio

digressio

nemoria

peroratio

actio

Fig.

2. 7.

Argumentation

theory in Roman

rhetoric.

In Roman rhetoric the t a s k s of the orator and the various elements of his - oration are examined in considerable d e t a i l . Complex c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and s u b c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are discussed. Individual elements from the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n are provided with examples and p r a c t i c a l h i n t s . Moreover, in many c a s e s the dicussion is linked to the rhetorical g e n r e s , so t h a t , for example, the inventio in the genus iudiciale is treated s e p a r a t e l y . In figure 2.7 the two systems of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n are set side by side in order to c l a r i f y the place of the treatment of rhetorical argumentation within the system. In the inventio of the argumentatio the orator examines which means of persuasion are best suited to his p a r t i c u l a r purpose. Once they have been found, he can consult the dispositio to determine how best they should be

The classical

background

75

a r r a n g e d . For example, would it be better to s t a r t with weak arguments and go on to more powerful ones, or the other way round? Should he first give examples to support his view, or must it be supported by enthymemes s t r a i g h t away? And how should his various arguments be woven into one another? Such questions are a l l dealt with in the dispositio. The Greek division into e x t r i n s i c and i n t r i n s i c means of persuasion survives in the Roman system, as does the division into ethos, pathos and logos. The enthymemes and examples a r e — a g a i n as in the Greek system—regarded as r a t i o n a l means of persuasion. However, here the enthymeme is extended with some new elements, and the extended enthymeme is then known as the epicheirema. An epicheirema is i l l u s t r a t e d diagrammatically in figure 2 . 8 . The arrows show how the elements support each other. •complexio

assumptio•

approbatio a s s u m p t i o n s

propositio

approbatio

Fig.

2.8.

The epicheirema

and its

propositionis

elements.

assumptio - accepted starting point or minor premiss conplexio « conclusion approbatio assumptionis = support for the accepted starting

point

propositio = justifying principle or major premiss approbatio propositionis - support for the justifying

principle

In De Inventione Cicero gives an example which we i l l u s t r a t e in figure 2 . 9 ( I , x x x i v , 5 8 - 9 ) . The epicheirema, then, is an enthymeme extended with two new elements. Support is given to two premisses. The orator must allow the choice of elements he wishes to use depend on the audience he is going to address. For example, if the propositio is very obvious he can leave it out. What premisses must he use to complete the epicheirema? The theory of the inventio helps him in this problem by providing him with a system of lo-ci or

assuaptio:

coaplexio:

i

nothing is better organized

the universe is governed

than ,the universe

according to a predetermined plan

approbatio

assumptionis:

propositio:

the notions of the stars

things that are well

proceed in a fixed order,

organized are governed

the succession of the

according to a pre-

seasons proceeds according

determined plan

to fixed laws, the change fro« day into night takes place without variation

approbatio propositionis: a household governed according to a predetermined plan is better organized than a household governed without a predetermined plan; the same applies to an army; the same applies to a ship.

Fig.

2.9.

Example of an

epiaheirema.

rhetorical moves. These are a l l special moves and are presented more or less systematically. Thus the inventio theory distinguishes between moves relating to persons and moves relating to things (circumstances, causes, time and place of an e v e n t ) . For example, the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium advises the orator to go through the following points if he wishes to accuse a suspect of a crime in a speech to a court: (1) the degree of proba b i l i t y that the accused is g u i l t y ( e . g . the motive and the accused's way of l i f e ) , (2) comparison of the accused with other persons, (3) signs pointing towards g u i l t (the place and time of the crime, opportunity, chance of success, chance of evading detection), (4) presumed evidence for the guilt of the accused ( e . g . his behaviour before and after the crime). The orator can go through this l i s t , pick out from it whatever he thinks useful, apply it to the point of view which he wishes to defend, and use it as premisses in his argumentation. In this way he completes the general schema of the epicheirema. This example reveals the principal difference between Roman rhetoric and the rhetoric of Aristotle. A r i s t o t l e ' s general dialectical moves may be applied to any subject. 76

The classical

background

77

His special moves ( e . g . what applies to an effect also applies to its cause) do, it is true, contain some elements of content ( e . g . the moves relating to cause and effect and end and means), but not as much as those in Roman rhetoric. There the moves are so specific that to list them would be to give a (more or less systematic) catalogue of all possible premisses. They are in fact subject-committed rules: if a particular case arises, the speaker must adduce the arguments belonging to that type of case. To the extent that in the theory of the invent io an attempt is made to bring some sort of order to the rational means of persuasion, this always happens alongside and in apposition to two other sorts of means of persuading: those based on pathos and ethos. The Roman writers leave us in no doubt as to their preference for these latter types: in particular, their predilection for playing on the audience's emotions subsequently brought rhetoric into disrepute. But it is also possible to identif y other reasons too for the decline of rhetoric in general and the decline of the theory of argumentation within rhetoric in particular. Responsible for this last is a shift of attention to one of the orator's other tasks, the elocutio. In the theory of elocutio, or stylistic theory, we find rules for correct usage, a clear style, and stylistic embellishments. To achieve the last of these the speaker can call on figures of speech, a term which is here taken to include repetition, building up to a climax, metaphor, simile, personification and rhetorical questions (Cicero deals with about ninety different f i g ures of speech in De Oratore). Roman rhetoric still pays plenty of attention to the theory of the inventio, but in the Renaissance this part of oratory shifts to dialectic. This change of object need not necessarily be to the detriment of rhetoric: rules for correct usage, a clear style and stylistic embellishments can still be useful. But in the theory of elocutio the emphasis came to lie increasingly on stylistic embellishments to the exclusion of all else. When these rules of elocutio were applied, this led all too often to an artificial and bombastic style. As a result, rhetoric is often associated with insincerity and bombast. Such associations with rhetoric itself are misplaced, for one of the basic rules of rhetoric is that oratory must make a natural and unaffected impression and that it should be impossible to tell that rules have been applied at a l l . Criticism of an affected style relates to the externalized form of rhetorical activity: the oration itself. Yet rhetoric has

78

Backgrounds to argumentation

theory

had to endure much more fundamental criticism than. this. The f i r s t critic is Plato, who disapproves of the fact that with the help of rhetorical means people are p e r suaded of the Tightness of plausible—and hence in p r i n ciple disputable—points of v i e w . To his way of thinking, rhetoric is only defensible as a vehicle for conveying indisputable knowledge, and he utterly condemns the rhetorical practices of his times. He thereby also condemns the essential point about rhetoric: that it lends cogency to views about which more than one opinion is possible. 2.2.

The study of fallacies

The study of f a l l a c i e s constitutes a catalogue of stereotype forms of unsound argumentation. It is concerned with the deceptive or doubtful use of points of departure and argumentation schemata which may in practice be convincing but which, according to certain c r i t e r i a of soundness, ought not to be. The purpose of the study of f a l l a c i e s is to describe and c l a s s i f y forms of argumentation that are regarded as unsound: they are called fallacies. Probably the f i r s t to make a more or less systematic study of f a l l a c i e s was Aristotle. The list of f a l l a c i e s •which he drew up has, it is true, been extended considerably over the y e a r s , and the f a l l a c i e s distinguished by him have often been given new interpretations and new definitions, but the general conception of his t r e a t ment is s t i l l recognizable in modern treatments of the subject. For example, most introductions to modern logic contain chapters or sections devoted to f a l l a c i e s , and in almost e v e r y case this part of the book d i f f e r s from the rest by being much more deeply coloured by the classical tradition (see e . g . Copi 1972, Kahane 1973, Purtill 1979 and Rescher 1975). In his book Fallacies Hamblin gives a survey of the history of the study of f a l l a c i e s (Hamblin 1970). Although at the same time he offers his own contribution to theoretical thinking on f a l l a c i e s , the book is now a standard work on the subject due l a r g e l y to the way it uses material from historical sources. Our outline of the study of f a l l a c i e s , which follows below, relies to a considerable degree on Hamblin's survey. Aristotle, who—as we have already seen—is the spiritual father of the study of f a l l a c i e s , discusses them in De

The study of

fallacies

79

Sophisticis Elenchis, the Prior Analytics and the Rhetoric. It is in De Sophisticis Elenchis that he goes into the subject most thoroughly: the Prior Analytics contains not much more than some additional remarks, and in his Rhetoric Aristotle discusses only a selection from the list compiled in De Sophisticis Elenchis. The title De Sophisticis Elenchis means 'On Sophistical Refutations' or 'On refutations as used by the Sophists', and is the reason why f a l l a c i e s used sometimes to be called sophisms. Refuting one's opponent's thesis is one of the ways of winning a debate which Aristotle discusses in his d i a lectic (see 2 . 1 ) . However, the refutations discussed in De Sophisticis Elenchis are in his view not proper r e f u t ations but only apparent refutations, which he says are typical of the Sophists' way of arguing? 8 The correct moves open to an attacker for refuting the defender's thesis are discussed by Aristotle in the Topics. Aristotle divides incorrect or false refutations which can be used in dialectical contexts into two groups, d i s tinguishing between Sophistical refutations which are dependent on language (in dictione) and Sophistical r e f utations which are independent of language (extra dictionem). He then divides these fallacies into thirteen different types, in each case indicating how the defender can p a r r y the f a l s e move. The f a l l a c i e s which are dependent on language are divided into six types, a l l connected with ambiguities and shifts of meaning which may occur in ordinary c o l loquial l a n g u a g e . According to Aristotle they point to the imperfection of colloquial language. The f a l l a c i e s which are independent of language he divides into seven types, a l l of which could occur even if colloquial l a n g uage were perfect. Let us take an example of a language-dependent f a l lacy from part of P l a t o ' s Euthydemus dialogue, in which two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, take turns to demonstrate their debating skills (Euthydemus 275d276c, see e . g . Hamilton & Cairns 1973). Socrates relates how Euthydemus debates with the young Cleinias: Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began as follows: 'Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant?1 The youth, overpowered by the question, blushed, and in his perplexity looked at me for help. 'Whichever he answers,' said Dionysodorus, leaning forward so as to catch my ear, 'I prophesy that he will be refuted, Socrates.' While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: that those who learned were the wise. Euthydemus proceeded: 'There are some

80

Backgrounds

to argument at ion

theory

whom you would call teachers, are there not?' The boy assented. 'And are they the teachers of those who learn—the grammar master and the lyre master who used to teach you and the other boys? And were you the pupils?' 'Yes.' 'And when you were pupils you did not yet know the things that you were learning?' 'No', he said. 'And were you wise then?' 'No, certainly not', he said. 'But if you were not wise you must have been ignorant, must you not?' ' Certainly.1 'In that case, learning what you did not know, you were ignorant when you were learning, were you not?' The youth nodded assent. 'Then it is the ignorant who learn, Cleinias, and not the wise, as you imagine.' At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I have spoken, laughed and cheered like a chorus at a sign from their conductor. Euthydemus's rebuttal of Cleinias's thesis is followed in the later stages of the debate by a rebuttal b y Dionysodorus of the thesis that those w h o learn are the ignorant. In both cases u s e — o r perhaps misuse—is of the w o r d amath.es which, like m a d e of the ambiguity 'ignorant', can m e a n either 'untaught, uneducated' or 'witless, dull, stupid'. From the same dialogue by Plato Aristotle also takes a n example of a language-independent fallacy. This is a debate between Dionysodorus a n d a spectator, Ctesippus: 'If you will answer my questions', said Dionysodorus, 'I shall soon extract the same admissions from you, Ctesippus. Now you say you have a dog?' 'Yes, a villain of a one', said Ctesippus. 'And he had puppies?' 'Yes, and they are very like himself.' 'And the dog is their father, is he?' 'Yes,' he said, 'I certainly saw him and the puppies' mother come together.' 'And he is yours, is he not?' 'To be sure he is.' 'Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the puppies are your brothers. And let me ask you one more little question', continued Dionysodorus quickly, so that Ctesippus might not get in his word: 'Do you

The study of fallacies beat t h i s dog?' 'Indeed I d o , ' r e p l i e d Ctesippus, laughing; wish I could beat you i n s t e a d of him.' 'Then you beat your f a t h e r ' , he s a i d .

81

'and I only-

It is c l e a r from t h i s example t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two groups i s p r o b l e m a t i c a l . The f a l l a c y in the f i r s t example is founded on a m b i g u i t y , and i s thus dependent on l a n g u a g e , but in the second the s i t u a t i o n is more complex. The f a l l a c y in the argument ' t h i s dog is a f a t h e r and he i s y o u r s ' appears, it must be admitted, to be dependent on, r a t h e r than independent of, l a n g u a g e . According to A r i s t o t l e , however, the c a u s e of t h i s f a l l a c y l i e s in the confusion of an a c c i d e n t a l subordinate property (accidens) and an e s s e n t i a l p r o p erty—though it is not c l e a r e x a c t l y what he means by t h i s . Hamblin (1970: 85) t h i n k s t h a t Aristotle c a l l s a property essential if the s u b j e c t and p r e d i c a t e terms of the statement in which the property is a t t r i b u t e d to someone or something a r e convertible: if the conversion is impossible, t h e n , the property would be ' f o r t u i t o u s ' or ' s u b o r d i n a t e ' . I f a f o r t u i t o u s , or a c c i d e n t a l , property i s t r e a t e d in an argument a s if it were an e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t y , a f a l l a c y i s c r e a t e d which is independent of language. This c a n be i l l u s t r a t e d by the following" f a l s e r e a s o n ing: (1) (2) (3)

Corsicus i s not .Socrates Socrates i s a human Therefore: Corsicus i s not a human

In the second premiss of t h i s example we find a s t a t e ment of an a c c i d e n t a l property of S o c r a t e s , for ' S o c r a t e s is a human' cannot be converted to make ' a human i s S o c r a t e s ' , since not e v e r y human i s the same as S o c r a t e s . The f i r s t p r e m i s s , by c o n t r a s t , c a n be converted with no c h a n g e in m e a n i n g . With a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y it is p o s s i b l e to a n a l y s e the f a l l a c y of the dog in the second example in the same w a y . The statement ' t h i s dog is [ a ] f a t h e r ' is not c o n v e r t i b l e , b e c a u s e not a l l f a t h e r s a r e e q u i v a l e n t to t h i s dog. Therefore the fatherhood here must be r e g a r d e d as an ' a c c i d e n t a l ' p r o p e r t y , so t h a t the c o n clusion presented here may not be drawn. Modern w r i t e r s have l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y with languagedependent f a l l a c i e s , a s may be judged from introductions to logic and more p o p u l a r i z i n g studies on f a l l a c i e s such

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a s F e a r n s i d e & Holther 1959. C l e a r , a l b e i t at times h a r d l y r e a l i s t i c , examples of f a l l a c i e s of ambiguity a r e g i v e n , g e n e r a l l y t a k i n g the form of p u n s . A f r e q u e n t l y r e c u r r i n g one i s 'some dogs have fuzzy e a r s , my dog h a s fuzzy e a r s , t h e r e f o r e my dog is some dog' (see e . g . Copi 1972: 9 3 ) . A more ' o r d i n a r y ' example i s ' a f t e r her f i n a l s L a u r a went c r a z y [with j o y ] , c r a z y people [ l u n a t i c s ] have to be locked up, so L a u r a must be locked u p ' . L a n g u a g e - i n d e p e n d e n t f a l l a c i e s present more problems, at l e a s t i f one s t a y s with A r i s t o t l e ' s g r o u p i n g . In some textbooks on logic the d i f f i c u l t y i s solved by moving the acaidens f a l l a c y into the l a n g u a g e - d e p e n d e n t group ( e . g . Cohen & Nagel 1964). U s u a l l y , however, it is given a modern i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and d e s c r i b e d as the ' f a l l a c y of a c c i d e n t ' . The f a l l a c y concerned then c o n s i s t s of the f a c t t h a t a g e n e r a l rule i s a p p l i e d without modification to a s p e c i a l c a s e in which a c c i d e n t a l circumstances render it i n a p p l i c a b l e (see e . g . Copi 1972: 8 1 ) . An example of t h i s f a l l a c y i s : Member of Parliament Giebels is entitled to publish the content of his conversation with the queen, since in Holland we have freedom of speech.

In t h i s argument an a p p e a l is made to the g e n e r a l rule t h a t freedom of speech a p p l i e s to everybody in Holland: the f a l l a c y a r i s e s b e c a u s e the argument ignores the accidental circumstance t h a t t h i s was a c o n f i d e n t i a l meeting of a member of p a r l i a m e n t with the s o v e r e i g n , to which the g e n e r a l rule does not a p p l y . The r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t t h i s sort of f a l l a c y has undergone exemplifies the c h a n g e s t h a t have been made to A r i s t o t l e ' s l i s t of f a l l a c i e s — p a r t i c u l a r l y those in the second g r o u p . Many f a l l a c i e s which h a v e been borrowed from A r i s t o t l e ' s l i s t , as t h e i r names may i n d i c a t e , have thus become p r a c t i c a l l y u n r e c o g n i z a b l e . One reason for the c h a n g e s is undoubtedly the o b s c u r i t y of some of a s it Aristotle's definitions, an o b s c u r i t y which i s , were, an i n v i t a t i o n to multifarious other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Another f a c t o r which may p l a y a part here i s t h a t many modern authors h a v e not taken t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n s and examples of f a l l a c i e s s t r a i g h t from Aristotle but from other authors who in turn may themselves not have gone s t r a i g h t to Aristotle a s t h e i r s o u r c e . In t h i s way a mist a k e made a long time ago may s t i l l be p e r p e t u a t e d t o d a y . The treatment of the following f a l l a c y i s an example of t h i s :

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You eat today what you bought yesterday Yesterday you bought raw meat Therefore: Today you eat raw meat

According to De Rijk (1962), one of whose subjects is the manner in which f a l l a c i e s were treated in t w e l f t h century l o g i c , this example f i r s t appears in the Munich Dialectica. Usually this argument is regarded as a type of f a l l a c y known as secundum quid, the second of those regarded by Aristotle as independent of l a n g u a g e . ( I n modern jargon secundum quid is referred to as 'hasty g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ' . ) In the nineteenth century De Morgan was still counting this example as a member of the secundum quid type, but the passage in which he discusses accidens and secundum quid f a l l a c i e s is capable of being misconstrued, if one is not c a r e f u l , as a statement of De Morgan's view that the example is an accidens fallacy. It is conspicuous that not a single author writing before De Morgan regards it as an accidens type, whereas s e v eral writers of later years do ( e . g . Cohen & Nagel 1964. and Copi 1972). Not only were the f a l l a c i e s of Aristotle's o r i g i n a l list interpreted differently in subsequent centuries, they were also added to. The most important extension is the addition of what are known as the a d - f a l l a c i e s . The best known of these is the argumentum ad hominem, an example of which follows below. The argument that the state may not impose limitations on f r e e speech and thus may not contemplate any curtailment of the cable [ t e l e v i s i o n ] explosion only has the appearance of being sound. This reasoning i s used by groups with a vested interest in the cable explosion going ahead. I t i s therefore a f a l s e argument. (Peter van Bueren writing on cable t e l e vision in De Volkskrant, 12 November 1974-) This is an argumentum ad hominem because the argument is not concerned with the facts of the matter but refers to the motives and background of those who advance an opinion on the matter. To put it in v e r y general terms (and in the form found in most interpretations), an argumentum ad. hominem is a direct or indirect attack on one's a d v e r s a r y ' s person rather than his arguments. 29 The term argumentum ad hominem was f i r s t used as a 'technical t e r m ' — a l b e i t with a different meaning—by the

84 philosopher Understanding a s a way out to him concessions example:

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John Locke. In An Essay Concerning Human (1690) he d e f i n e d the argumentum ad hominem of p i n n i n g down o n e ' s opponent by p o i n t i n g c e r t a i n c o n s e q u e n c e s of h i s own p r i n c i p l e s or in d e b a t e (Locke 1971). 3 0 The following i s an

How can you say the c a s i n o s i n Las Vegas should be c l o s e d down? You've always s a i d everyone should be f r e e to decide f o r himself what he does and d o e s n ' t do. Locke d i s t i n g u i s h e s s e v e r a l s o r t s of a r g u m e n t s t h a t 'men, in t h e i r r e a s o n i n g s with o t h e r s , do o r d i n a r i l y make u s e of to p r e v a i l on t h e i r a s s e r t , or at l e a s t so to awe them a s to s i l e n c e t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n ' . Two of t h e s e h a v e been r e g a r d e d a s f a l l a c i e s in s u b sequent l i t e r a t u r e , though it i s not c l e a r whether Locke himself r e g a r d e d them in t h i s l i g h t . The two concerned here a r e the argumentum ad verecundiam a n d the argumentum ad ignorantiam, which a r e u s e d s u c c e s s i v e l y in the following example: Of course Beethoven d i c t a t e d t h a t symphony to Rosemary Brown: i n Playboy the famous authoress E l i s a b e t h Kiibler-Ross r e c e n t l y explained t h a t communication with the dead i s p e r f e c t l y p o s s i b l e . Anyway, nobody has ever proved t h a t dead composers don't manifest themselves in t h i s way. The argumentum ad verecundiam i s a f a l l a c y of a u t h o r i t y , g e n e r a l l y d e s c r i b e d a s a m i s p l a c e d a p p e a l to a u t h o r i t y . This does not q u i t e a c c o r d with the l i t e r a l meaning of verecundia ( ' s h a m e , e m b a r r a s s m e n t , m o d e s t y ' ) , though it a p p e a r s to be in l i n e with what Locke i n t e n d e d . He r e f e r r e d to an argumentum ad verecundiam in c a s e s in which it i s s u g g e s t e d or s t a t e d t h a t it would be a r r o g a n t of the l i s t e n e r to set himself up in o p p o s i t i o n to the a u t h o r i t y to which the s p e a k e r a p p e a l s in h i s a r g u m e n t . An argumentum ad ignorantiam, in Locke, r e l a t e s to the b u r d e n of proof in a d e b a t e : it i s an i n a d m i s s i b l e way of e v a d ing o n e ' s duty to g i v e a r g u m e n t s for o n e ' s point of view when e x p r e s s i n g an opinion c o n t r a r y to t h a t of a n o t h e r . Nowadays the argumentum ad ignorantiam is generally reg a r d e d a s a f a l l a c y of i g n o r a n c e or s t u p i d i t y : what it amounts to i s t h a t , a s in the a b o v e e x a m p l e , it i s c o n c l u d e d on the g r o u n d s of the o b s e r v e d f a c t t h a t something h a s not been proven not to be the c a s e , t h a t it i s the case.

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Since Locke introduced the concept of a d - f a l l a c i e s , during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a l a r g e number of new ones have been added to those identified by him. Hamblin (1970: 41) lists twenty-four, but only a few of these are discussed in the majority of modern treatments of f a l l a c i e s . The justification normally given for this is that the ones treated are 'the most important ' or ' most common'. Before we look at a number of f a l l a c i e s distinguished in modern studies of the subject, in introductions to logic and in other recent publications, let us f i r s t continue with our examination of the changes which have been made to A r i s t o t l e ' s list of f a l l a c i e s over the centuries. Even more important than the additions and the d i f f e r ences in interpretation, in our opinion, are the shifts in the perspective from which f a l l a c i e s are approached. In De Sovhisticis Elenohis Aristotle places f a l l a c i e s in the context of a debate in which an attacker tries to refute the theses put forward by the person defending them: f a l l a c i e s are then the f a l s e moves which the attacker employs for this purpose. Nowadays f a l l a c i e s are seen as perunsound arguments, which means that the.dia logic spective has been replaced by a monologic perspective. It is thus no longer a matter of deceptive manoeuvres by one party in respect of another, but of errors which a person runs the risk of making in his reasoning. One of the consequences of abandoning the context of debate is that it is no longer always clear why p a r t i c ular f a l l a c i e s from A r i s t o t l e ' s list should be included in a list of f a l l a c i e s at a l l , for some of the Aristotelian f a l l a c i e s are linked with the dialogue situation.' This is very clear, for example, in the case of the many questions and begging the question fallacies, both of which belong to the group which Aristotle regards as independent of l a n g u a g e . We shall illustrate this by reference to the many questions fallacy. The many questions f a l l a c y can be produced by asking a question which can only be answered if at the same time the answer is given to at least one other question 'concealed' within the question as asked. The answer to the question presupposes, in other words, a particular answer to one or more other questions. And it is with extorting the answer (whether explicit or implicit) to the presupposed question or questions that the many questions f a l l a c y is concerned. The following examples are commonly given to illustrate this:

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Are you s t i l l beating your wife? When did you stop beating your wife?

A person who answers the f i r s t question in the wayintended, with a simple ' y e s ' or ' n o 1 , thereby admits that he is, or was, in the habit of beating his w i f e . This is because example (1) contains within it the p r e supposition ( l a ) : 3 1 (la)

You used to beat your w i f e .

The same presupposition is contained in the second question, but here there is also a second presupposition, namely ( 2 a ) : (2a)

You no longer beat your w i f e .

It w i l l be clear that these f a l l a c i e s can only be d i s cussed adequately in a dialogic approach, since many questions is adapted to the dialogue situation. Asking questions of the many questions type can serve to pin down an opponent who has f a i l e d to spot the treacherous nature of such a question when it is put to him. According to Aristotle, such questions are incorrect moves in the debate which are designed to make one's opponent contradict himself. For example, if someone is defending the thesis that he has never beaten his w i f e , that thesis is refuted if at some point in the debate his attacker puts question (1) and he answers it with 'no' (he is in even deeper water, of course, if he answers 'yes'). However, in the Aristotelian conception of debate the defender is not l e f t with much option but to answer a f f i r m a t i v e l y or n e g a t i v e l y : the role of the attacker consists c h i e f l y of asking questions, while the defender has l i t t l e else to do but answer them. It is not too d i f f i c u l t to understand why Aristotle should r e g a r d questions of the many questions type as unsound in the context of debate, but again one wonders exactly why he should assign them to the group of language-independent f a l l a c i e s . After a l l , it is precisely the way in which the question is framed that offers the possibility of checkmating one's a d v e r s a r y . The wording of question (1) v i r t u a l l y forces the defender of the thesis to answer ' y e s ' or ' n o ' and thus admit that, as his opponent is trying to demonstrate, he is or was in the habit of beating his w i f e . The many questions fallacy may be defined d i a l o g i c a l l y as follows: A person is guilty

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of the many questions fallacy if he asks a question containing one or more presuppositions which are open to discussion. One way of defending oneself against this f a l l a c y is to avoid g i v i n g a direct answer to the question and to turn to the dubious presupposition or presuppositions. In the case of question (2) above, this might lead to any of the following r e p l i e s : (2 ' ) Last week. ( 2 1 ' ) I am s t i l l beating her. ( 2 , M ) I have never beaten her. Answer ( 2 ' " ' ) is the best way of p a r r y i n g question (2) if the discussion hinges on the question of whether the person being called upon to answer the question is or was in the habit of beating his w i f e ; the ' d i r e c t ' answer ( 2 ' ) would lead to his immediate and irrevocable defeat in the debate. The f a l l a c i e s we have referred to so f a r a l l appear in studies of f a l l a c i e s as they appear in introductions to logic and other modern publications. This is also true, though in a more sporadic w a y , of other f a l l a c i e s in A r i s t o t l e ' s standard l i s t . However, modern classifications of f a l l a c i e s g e n e r a l l y deviate somewhat from A r i s t o t l e ' s . Instead of f a l l a c i e s in dictione and extra dietionem, a distinction is sometimes made between fallacies of ambiguity and fallacies of relevance ( e . g . Copi 1972). We too w i l l employ a division into two categories. The f i r s t category we distinguish is composed of fallacies of ambiguity or fallacies of clearness, as these f a l l a c i e s are sometimes known. These more or less corand are respond to A r i s t o t l e ' s f a l l a c i e s in dictione, caused, except for cases of lexical ambiguity (an i n stance of which we have already seen in our example of the wise and the i g n o r a n t ) , by syntactic (or 'gramm a t i c a l ' ) ambiguity (amphiboly), accent, composition and division. Amphiboly is committed when the interpretation of an ambiguous sentence is surreptitiously changed—to the advantage of the speaker's own purpose—during the d i s course. The sentence 'in Holland, ministers who do not react quickly to written questions from members of p a r l iament, violate the rules of parliamentary democracy' can be interpreted in at least two different ways as long as one is not told whether there should be a comma after 'ministers' or whether the comma after 'parliament' should be removed, and anyone who abuses this in his argumentation by one minute behaving as if the former

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reading is correct and the next minute treating it as if the second were intended, or vice v e r s a , is g u i l t y of amphiboly. Another example, commonly quoted, is 'Save Soap and Waste P a p e r ' . The f a l l a c y of accent is also founded on a shift of meaning, but here the cause is the shifting of the stress within the sentence: 'we must not direct our action against our members ' may thus become 'we must not direct our action against our members', and the change of emphasis, if unobserved, can then be c l e v e r l y e x ploited in the further discourse. Fallacies of composition arise when characteristics of the part are attributed to the whole in order to make an opinion regarding the whole acceptable. The example often quoted is that on the basis of the argument that certain components of a machine are light in weight it is concluded that the machine to which reference is made is itself light in weight. Fischer (1971: 221) points out inter alia that due to this f a l l a c y it is sometimes assumed on the basis of the features of the work of some important thinkers of a particular period that those f e a tures are t y p i c a l of the period as a whole. Our second category of f a l l a c i e s is composed of fallacies of relevance. These include Aristotle's fallacies extra dictionem and the a d - f a l l a c i e s already referred to. They are a l l forms of argumentation which o f f e r no l o g i c a l justification for the opinion expressed, but which prove, psychologically speaking, to be capable of convincing an audience. Alongside secundum quid, accidens, many questions, ad hominem, ad verecundiam and ad ignorantiam this category contains the following f a l l a c i e s : begging the question, ignoratio elenchi, non sequitur, post hoc ergo propter hoc, ad baculam, ad misericordiam, ad populum and ad consequentiam. Begging the question, also known as petitio principii or circular reasoning, means that in the argument it is assumed that what has to be proved has already been proved. A simple example is 'that is my b i c y c l e , for I am its r i g h t f u l o w n e r ' , but usually a f a l l a c y of this kind w i l l be concealed in a more complex discourse. Ignoratio elenchi amounts to ignoring counter-arguments by discussing not the thesis that is the subject of debate but a totally different opinion which is attributed (whether justly or not) to the other p a r t y . Thus a person who doubts the usefulness of building state-controlled housing as a means of a l l e v i a t i n g the housing shortage may be opposed b y . for example, adducing arguments for the thesis that there is a serious shortage of houses.

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In this case, however, that is not the point at issue: indeed, the other party may well agree with that v i e w , but he may simply think that the shortage cannot be solved by building extra public housing. A non sequitur is a form of argumentation in which the arguments that are used and the conclusion that is drawn may in themselves be correct, but in which the one does not follow from the other. Fearnside and Holther (1959: 153) g i v e the following example: A l l the s k i l l and d i s c i p l i n e of H i t l e r ' s mechanized forces went down before the forces of communism and democracy which Der Fuhrer had disparaged and despised. 'Degenerate' democracy grasped control of sea and a i r ; ' i n e f f i c i e n t ' communism inspired i t s soldiers with the stubborn resolve that fought on to v i c t o r y in the rubble of Stalingrad. Thus i t was fascism that proved i n f e r i o r . Fearnside and Holther argue that military defeat does not make the defeated ideology i n f e r i o r . Post hoc ergo propter hoc implies, as the name suggests ( ' a f t e r this, therefore on account of t h i s ' : the term is usually shortened to post hoc), that events happening e a r l i e r in time are the cause of events occurring l a t e r . It is this f a l l a c y that is employed when it is claimed that the rise in unemployment which has manifested itself since the new government took o f f i c e is the result of the new government's policies, when in fact it is perfectly clear that there are other causes. Argumentum ad baculum, which is the argument of the big stick, •amounts to resorting to the use of threats against an adversary who refuses to accept one's point of v i e w . Physical force may be threatened, but other measures too. 'Anyone who is not with us can forget about getting elected next time' is one example of this. The argumentum ad misericordiam is a f a l l a c y in which an unjustified appeal is made to the audience's sympathy in order to further one's own interests: 'I've spent days and nights working on that essay—surely you can g i v e it a better mark than t h a t . ' The argumentvan ad povulum, sometimes referred to as e i ther 'mob appeal 1 or 'snob a p p e a l ' (Rescher 1975), appeals to the prejudices of a particular group, as by contrasting 'we' (the speaker and his audience) and ' t h e y ' (those against whom the discourse is aimed). The following might be an example of this: 'we a l l know that the arms race is being c a r e f u l l y maintained by the arms manufacturers and that in the f i n a l analysis i t ' s

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j u s t a matter of l i n i n g the pockets of a crowd of u n scrupulous s h a r e h o l d e r s . 1 The argumentum ad consequential!, f i n a l l y , is a f a l l a c y in which u n f a v o u r a b l e l i g h t i s c a s t on a t h e s i s by pointing out i t s p o s s i b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s , without the T i g h t ness of the t h e s i s i t s e l f being d i s p u t e d . For example: 'you may t h i n k it would be nice if the shops were open in the e v e n i n g s , but a b o l i t i o n of the hours of t r a d i n g r e g u l a t i o n s would l e a v e shop s t a f f open to e x p l o i t a t i o n . 1 It is i n t e r e s t i n g to have a c a t a l o g u e of f a l l a c i e s , but the most important q u e s t i o n , of c o u r s e , is what i s a c t u a l l y unsound about these forms of a r g u m e n t a t i o n . F a l l a c i e s are forms of argumentation which look sound but a r e u n sound. But what do we mean by sound and unsound here? C l e a r l y , at the v e r y l e a s t t h i s definition of a f a l l a c y needs to be more p r e c i s e . In the m a j o r i t y of t r e a t i s e s on f a l l a c i e s t h i s c l o s e r definition is not given in an unambiguous and s a t i s f a c t ory manner. Hamblin (1970: 12) opines t h a t ever s i n c e Aristotle f a l l a c i e s h a v e v i r t u a l l y a l w a y s been r e g a r d e d a s invalid arguments which h a v e an a p p e a r a n c e of v a l i d i t y , but in most modern introductions to logic the concept of v a l i d i t y or i n v a l i d i t y is b r o a d e r : f a l l a c i e s a r e then c a l l e d ' i n c o r r e c t ' or ' u n s o u n d ' sorts of argument. 3 2 Howe v e r , it i s conspicuous t h a t in those sections of such introductions which a r e devoted to f a l l a c i e s the terms invalid, incorrect and unsound a r e sometimes used i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y , while at the same time they a r e not u s u a l l y defined any more c l o s e l y . I f f a l l a c i e s (in the r e s t r i c t e d sense) a r e to be defined as i n v a l i d a r g u m e n t s , or a s sorts of i n v a l i d argument, then a number of the commonly d i s c u s s e d f a l l a c i e s must a c t u a l l y be s c r a t c h e d from our l i s t . This is t r u e , for example, of begging the question, as an e a r l i e r example may i l l u s t r a t e . (l)

That is my bicycle, for I am its rightful owner.

In a debate about whose the b i c y c l e i s , t h i s argument i s u n l i k e l y to c a u s e much of an impression, since the argument ' I am i t s r i g h t f u l owner' i s nothing more nor l e s s t h a n a d i f f e r e n t l y worded repetition of the t h e s i s being d i s c u s s e d . But the r e a s o n i n g as such is not i n v a l i d . This may become c l e a r e r i f we rewrite argument (1) as argument ( 2 ) , which amounts to the same t h i n g , and then show in (3) the ( v a l i d ) argument form.

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That i s my b i c y c l e , f o r that i s my b i c y c l e A, because A

Nor c a n the s o - c a l l e d a d - f a l l a c i e s simply be considered i n v a l i d a r g u m e n t s . We c a n demonstrate t h i s by r e f e r e n c e to an e a r l i e r example of an argumentum ad verecundiam: Of course Beethoven d i c t a t e d t h a t symphony to Rosemary Brown: in Playboy the famous authoress E l i s a b e t h Kiibler-Ross r e c e n t l y explained t h a t communication with the dead i s p e r f ectly possible. The ' f a u l t ' here a p p e a r s to l i e not so much in the form of the argument as in the i n c o r r e c t n e s s of an u n e x p r e s s e d p r e m i s s . I f t h i s u n e x p r e s s e d premiss is formu l a t e d e x p l i c i t l y , the argument i s not per se i n v a l i d : (1) (2) (3)

Elisabeth Kiibler-Ross has said that communication with the dead i s p o s s i b l e Kiibler-Ross i s an authority i n the f i e l d of occultism: everything she says about i t i s true Therefore: I t i s p e r f e c t l y p o s s i b l e that Beethoven d i c t a t e d t h a t symphony to Rosemary Brown

This argument h a s the following (l') (2') (3')

form:

X says t h a t S i s p o s s i b l e ; t h i s i s a statement of type T Everything X says about statements of type T i s true Therefore: S i s possible

If anybody o b j e c t s to the o r i g i n a l argument, he is not so much l i k e l y to o b j e c t to i t s form a s to find it n e c e s s a r y to make d i f f i c u l t i e s l i k e ' i t ' s e a s y enough for Kiibler-Ross to s a y t h i n g s l i k e t h a t ' , or ' j u s t how does t h a t Kiibler-Ross person know so much, t h e n ? ' 3 3 An important problem a r i s i n g in the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of f a l l a c i e s i s t h a t argumentation of the type concerned cannot in every c a s e be r e g a r d e d a s unsound. This may be made c l e a r e r by r e f e r e n c e to the argvmentum ad verecundiam: an a p p e a l to a h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y may, a s in the example a b o v e , be misplaced—but need not be so in every c a s e . Van Benthem (1975: 26) demonstrates t h i s with the following e x a m p l e :

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You know from the mathematics textbook that a quadratic equation ax 2 + bx + c = 0 with D = V b 1 - 4ac < 0 has no solution, but you do not know the proof of this argument. At the same time you have a similar equation (say x 2 + 2x + 3 = 0) for which you have found a root. There is then every reason to suppose that you have made a mistake in your calculation.

Kahane defines a f a l l a c y not a s an i n v a l i d argument but a s one which should not persuade a rational person to accept its conclusion (1973: 231). Rational p e r s o n s , a c cording to Kahane, must t r y to e s t a b l i s h whether ( a ) the argument i s v a l i d , (b) the p r e m i s s e s a r e d u b i o u s , and (c) any r e l e v a n t information h a s been withheld. However, he does not s a y when p r e m i s s e s have to be c a l l e d into doubt, nor does he p r o v i d e c r i t e r i a whereby one may determine whether ' r e l e v a n t ' information h a s been withh e l d . On the b a s i s of K a h a n e ' s c r i t e r i a , then, it i s not c l e a r whether, for e x a m p l e , the procedure recommended by Van Benthem in the example above should be r e g a r d e d a s r a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t a b l e or not. The same u n c e r t a i n t y r e i g n s when it comes to other f a l l a c i e s . In the c a s e of an argumentum ad hominem, for e x a m p l e , it is not a l w a y s e a s y to determine in which c a s e s the use of such argumentation i s a c c e p t a b l e to a r a t i o n a l p e r s o n , a n d in the c a s e of the post hoc f a l l a c y one may s a y that at the v e r y l e a s t it looks s u s p i c i o u s l y l i k e forms of argumentation which a r e u n i v e r s a l l y accepted in p h y s i c s a n d h i s t o r y , so that it is d i f f i c u l t to s a y in which c a s e s one i s d e a l i n g with a post hoc f a l l a c y and in which not. The argumentum ad ignorantiam, finally, would even a p p e a r to be the b a s i s of our j u r i s p r u d e n c e : the a c c u s e d is innocent a s long a s his g u i l t is not p r o v e d . In s h o r t , the problems of recognizing unsound forms of argumentation a r e not solved s a t i s f a c t o r i l y by defining and c a t a l o g u i n g f a l l a c i e s in the w a y s d i s c u s s e d h e r e , on the b a s i s of a r a t h e r u n c l e a r conception of what is sound and what i s not. The d i f f i c u l t y of i d e n t i f y i n g f a l l a c i e s is not merely a matter of the v a g u e n e s s of the conception of soundness that is taken a s the s t a r t i n g p o i n t . Hamblin (1970: 12) points out another p r o b l e m a t i c a l a s p e c t when he g i v e s his own definition of fallacy. He o b s e r v e s that a c c o r d i n g to p r e v a i l i n g views not a l l i n v a l i d (or, let us a d d , more b r o a d l y unsound) forms of argumentation can be d e s c r i b e d a s f a l l a c i e s , but only those i n v a l i d (or u n sound) argumentations which appear to be valid (or

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sound). This r i d e r i n t r o d u c e s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l element which makes" it i m p o s s i b l e to t r e a t f a l l a c i e s a d e q u a t e l y s o l e l y in l o g i c a l terms: there a r e no logical grounds upon which one may determine why a n d when a p a r t i c u l a r form of a r g u m e n t a t i o n appears to be s o u n d . To do t h a t , one needs p s y c h o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e , a n d t h a t c a n only be a c q u i r e d by e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h into the p r a c t i c e of a r g u i n g on the b a s i s of t h e o r e t i c a l i n s i g h t s from r e l e v a n t a r e a s of p s y c h o l o g y . The s t u d y of f a l l a c i e s h a s persuasion. thus become p a r t of the s t u d y of It may well be t h a t it i s p r e c i s e l y the p s y c h o l o g i c a l element in the m a j o r i t y of d e f i n i t i o n s of fallacy that is r e s p o n s i b l e for the f a c t t h a t new f a l l a c i e s a r e c o n s t a n t l y b e i n g d i s c o v e r e d a n d t h a t their c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s d i f f e r ent in the work of v i r t u a l l y e v e r y new author (for a s u r v e y of t h i s , see Hamblin 1970: 89-176). What w r i t e r s on the s u b j e c t l a c k i s a c l e a r t h e o r e t i c a l point of v i e w . The u n c e r t a i n t y i s so g r e a t , i n d e e d , t h a t some a u t h o r s , such a s Copi (1972: 72) a n d Hamblin (1970: 13) f i n d it n e c e s s a r y to remark on the s c e p t i c i s m e x p r e s s e d by De Morgan with r e g a r d to the p o s s i b i l i t y of making a s a t i s f a c t o r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of f a l l a c i e s : There i s no such thing a s a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the ways in which men a r r i v e a t an e r r o r : i t i s much to be doubted whether there ever can be. (De Morgan 1926: 276) The l a c k of c l e a r c r i t e r i a of s o u n d n e s s for e v a l u a t i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n and the p s y c h o l o g i z i n g a p p r o a c h to f a l l a c i e s a p p e a r to u s to be the main r e a s o n s for the i s o l a t e d position which the treatment of f a l l a c i e s occupies in modern i n t r o d u c t i o n s to l o g i c . Both t h e s e f a c t o r s o f f e r an e x p l a n a t i o n for the l a c k of l i a i s o n between the r e l e v a n t sections in i n t r o d u c t i o n s to l o g i c a n d the r e s t of the m a t e r i a l d i s c u s s e d , a n d for the s t r i k i n g l a c k of p r e c i s i o n a n d the informal c h a r a c t e r of f a l l a c y sections compared with those d e a l i n g with s u b j e c t s concerned with ' r e a l ' logic. Recently—for the f i r s t time for many y e a r s — n e w e f f o r t s h a v e been made to b r i n g about a connection between the theory of f a l l a c i e s a n d l o g i c . Here Hamblin h a s a c t e d a s the i n i t i a t o r . In h i s own t h e o r e t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to his h i s t o r i c a l s u r v e y of the s t u d y of f a l l a c i e s he t r i e s to b r e a t h e some l i f e into t h e o r e t i c a l t h i n k i n g on f a l l a c i e s by choosing a d i a l o g i c a p p r o a c h i n s t e a d of the monologic a p p r o a c h which c a l l s the tune in modern l o g i c . Hamblin wants to s t u d y f a l l a c i e s within the framework of a system of r u l e s for d i a l o g u e i n s p i r e d by the medieval ' o b l i g a t i o n

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g a m e ' , a system which he calls formal dialectic. He does not himself get any further than developing the v e r y f i r s t stages of this, but the idea of a dialectical concept of f a l l a c y studies found favour with other w r i t e r s . Thus Barth & Martens (1977) and Martens (1977) both attempt to g i v e a more precise indication of how f a l l a cies can be treated in formal l o g i c a l and d i a l e c t i c a l systems (see section 3.A). At the moment there is no way of telling how successful a formal-dialectical treatment of f a l l a c i e s is l i k e l y to be. What is c l e a r , however, is that efforts to form a theory of f a l l a c i e s deserve close attention from argumentation theorists: it is not only true to say that f a l l a c i e s are forms of argumentation in colloquial language, they are also, more importantly, unsound forms of argumentation, and that means that the study of f a l l a c i e s can lead to insights which may be relevant to the i d e n t i f i cation and c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the c r i t e r i a of r a t i o n a l i t y to be applied in the evaluation of argumentation. To what formal-dialectical approach will provide extent the interesting insights both for theoretical work on a r g u mentation and for the therapeutic application of the theory of fallacies—most important for the practice of discussion—is s t i l l questionable, but there can be no doubt that this reopening of the dialogic Aristotelian tradition once more places the theory of f a l l a c i e s as a background to argumentation in the perspective of a theory of critical discussion.

2.3.

Modern logic

There can be few objections to regarding argumentation theory as a branch of l o g i c . In any event, there is a degree of coincidence between logical research and r e search into argumentation theory. In recent y e a r s , howe v e r , research into logic has been so intensive and it is now so advanced that it has taken logic as a subject to heights f a r removed from argumentation in colloquial speech, and has itself become a matter for specialists with a mathematical background. At the v e r y least, research into argumentation ought to comprise more than current l o g i c a l studies have to o f f e r . It is therefore probably more realistic to regard argumentation theory as a discipline in which both logicians and psychologists, l a w y e r s , speech communication specialists and so on all make their contribution.

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With the exception of such contributions as the important work which we shall be discussing in section 3-4, modern logical research is still dominated by a monologic orientation. That is to say, arguments are studied not in the context of a dialogue or discussion, but as links between statements which as it were emanate from a single person. A logician concentrates on the schemata underlying arguments, disregarding the functions which the various steps in the argument f u l f i l in a discussion in colloquial language. Let us illustrate this form of logic by showing how it abstracts from factors that play an important role in discourse in colloquial speech. Let us take as our starting point the following dialogue between Hans and Laura: Hans: Mary said she was going to get beef or cod. Do you know what we're eating tonight? Laura: No, but i f she's already done the shopping i t ' l l probably be in the f r i d g e . Hans: Well, she rang me about her essay, and she told me then that she's already done the shopping because she wanted to go on working this afternoon. Laura: I ' l l have a quick look in the f r i d g e . . . . I t ' s stacked f u l l . But I can't smell f i s h , anyway. Hans: O.K., shall we get some mushrooms to go with the beef? Now this conversation about food takes place in a particular situation. The role played by the situation becomes apparent from, for example, the fact that from Laura's behaviour (looking in the refrigerator) and from what she says, Hans can deduce that there is some beef in the refrigerator. To Laura it is clear from the situation that Hans has drawn this conclusion. He does not even have to say so, but can make a statement in which that conclusion is presupposed ( ' s h a l l we get some mushrooms to go with the b e e f ? ' ) . Here Hans and Laura are reasoning. Laura thinks that the shopping is in the refrigerator. Her reasons are that (a) Mary has done the shopping, and that (b) Mary, if she has done the shopping, will have put it in the refrigerator. Hans thinks that Mary has bought beef. His reasons are that ( a ) Mary was going to get beef or cod, and that (b) Mary has not bought cod. When assessing the argumentation in the example a logician executes a number of abstractions which, as we shall demonstrate, result in his confining his evaluation of the soundness of the argumentation to a verdict on the logical validity of a form of argument to which the actual argumentation can be reduced.'"

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The first s t e p in the a b s t r a c t i o n p r o c e s s amounts to the a r g u m e n t a t i o n b e i n g made i n d e p e n d e n t of the s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h i t h a p p e n s to t a k e p l a c e . T h i s i s done b y d e p a r t i n g from t h e l i t e r a l form of the c o n v e r s a t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t i n g the c o n v e r s a t i o n in s u c h a w a y t h a t i m p l i c i t e l e m e n t s c a n b e made e x p l i c i t . I n the c a s e of the e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n Hans a n d L a u r a the r e s u l t of t h i s a b s t r a c t i o n from the d i s c o u r s e s i t u a t i o n might look l i k e this: Hans: Laura:

Mary said that Mary would buy beef or cod. Mary did not buy cod. Therefore Mary bought beef. If Mary did the shopping, then the shopping is in the refrigerator. Mary did the shopping. Therefore the shopping is in the refrigerator.

I n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s w a y , the two a r g u m e n t s a r e s t i l l a r g u m e n t s a d v a n c e d b y p e o p l e , v i z . Hans a n d L a u r a . The second s t e p i n t h e a b s t r a c t i o n e n t a i l s the a r g u m e n t a t i o n s ' b e i n g made i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e p e o p l e who h a p p e n to c o n d u c t t h e m , a n d e v e n i n d e p e n d e n t of p e o p l e i n g e n e r a l . T h i s i s done b y c o n s i d e r i n g o n l y the c o n n e c tions between statements with a j u s t i f y i n g function and opinions, and by r e g a r d i n g e v e r y argumentation as an i m p e r s o n a l l i n k i n g of p r e m i s s e s a n d a c o n c l u s i o n . 3 5 In our e x a m p l e , t h i s c a n be done b y l e a v i n g out t h e names Hans a n d Laura i n t h e two a r g u m e n t a t i o n s , a n d i n b o t h c a s e s p r e c e d i n g the f i r s t two s t a t e m e n t s b y the i n d i c a t o r premiss a n d t h e l a s t s t a t e m e n t b y the i n d i c a t o r conclusion. The third a b s t r a c t i o n r e s u l t s i n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n s i n the standard form of arguments. This i s a c h i e v e d b y s t a n d a r d i z i n g the w o r d i n g of the v a r i o u s s t a t e m e n t s to the e x t e n t t h a t a l l the p o s s i b l e v a r i a n t s of expression that are possible in English are eliminated so t h a t the s t a t e m e n t s a r e s t a n d a r d i z e d b y t a k i n g a s i n g l e u n i f o r m m a n n e r of e x p r e s s i o n . In o u r e x a m p l e s t h i s p r o d u c e s the f o l l o w i n g a r g u m e n t s i n s t a n d a r d form: argument 1 premiss: premiss: conclusion: argument 2 premiss: premiss: conclusion:

Mary bought beef or Mary bought cod. Mary did not buy cod. Mary bought beef.

If Mary did the shopping, then the shopping is in the refrigerator. Mary did the shopping. The shopping is in the refrigerator.

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In the e x a m p l e , s t a t e m e n t s a r e l i n k e d to one a n o t h e r b y means of w o r d s l i k e ' o r ' a n d ' i f . . . t h e n ' . T h e s e , l i k e the word ' n o t ' , w h i c h a l s o a p p e a r s in the e x a m p l e , h a v e a s p e c i a l m e a n i n g to the l o g i c i a n . T h a t i s w h y a fourth a b s t r a c t i o n i s c a r r i e d out i n o r d e r to r e n d e r the a r g u m e n t s in s u c h a form t h a t the i m p o r t a n c e of t h e s e w o r d s i s made more o b v i o u s . T h i s i s done b y a b r i d g i n g the i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e m e n t s a n d c o n t i n u i n g to w r i t e the l o g i c a l l y important words ' o r ' , 'if . . . then' and 'not' in f u l l , so t h a t t h e y a r e c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from the ' c o n t e n t ' p a r t of the s t a t e m e n t s c o m p o s i n g the a r g u m e n t . The s t a t e m e n t s may i n d e e d be r e p l a c e d b y a n a r b i t r a r y s e l e c t i o n of l e t t e r s , a s l o n g a s the same s t a t e m e n t i s a l w a y s r e p r e s e n t e d b y the same l e t t e r : g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , c a p i t a l l e t t e r s a r e u s e d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . In o u r e x a m p l e t h i s might r e s u l t i n the f o l l o w i n g : abbreviations A: Mary bought beef B: Mary bought cod C: Mary did the shopping D: The shopping i s i n the

refrigerator

argument 1 A or B not B A argument 2 i f C then D C D The w a y i n w h i c h the a r g u m e n t s w e r e w o r d e d i n E n g l i s h i s now i m m a t e r i a l . A, B, C a n d D m i g h t e q u a l l y well have stood for sentences in another language. Logicians call the 'abbreviations' A, B, C and D for short. sentence constants, or constants The w o r d s ' o r ' , ' i f . . . t h e n ' a n d ' n o t ' a r e the o n l y r e m i n d e r s of E n g l i s h to r e m a i n a f t e r the f o u r t h s t e p i n the a b s t r a c t i o n p r o c e s s . E v e n t h e s e , h o w e v e r , d i s a p p e a r in the f i f t h s t e p , i n w h i c h the l o g i c a l l y r e l e v a n t w o r d s a r e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e b y r e p l a c i n g them w i t h logical constants. As we s h a l l see in a moment, these logical constants have standardized meanings. T h u s the m e a n i n g s of the l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e the t r a n s l a t i o n s of ' o r ' , ' i f . . . t h e n ' a n d ' n o t ' a r e l a i d down i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l l o g i c , w h e r e t h e y a r e

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symbolized as 1 v ' ( ' o r ' ) , ' ( ' i f . . . t h e n ' ) and ' - ' ( ' n o t ' ) . 3 6 If we employ these symbols, the t r a n s l a t i o n s of the arguments we used as our example look l i k e t h i s : argument A v B B /•'• A argument 2 C => D

The symbol ' /• • ' serves to indicate that the conclusion is about to f o l l o w . It is important to distinguish p r o p e r l y between sentence constants and l o g i c a l constants. Presenting statements in the form of sentence constants is a form of a b b r e v i a t i o n ; the t r a n s l a t i o n of words l i k e ' o r ' , ' i f . . . then' and ' n o t ' into l o g i c a l constants, however, implies v e r y much more than t h a t . L o g i c a l constants h a v e a s h a r p l y d e f i n e d meaning which- is much more s p e c i f i c than that of the words whose t r a n s l a t i o n s they a r e . The meaning of the l o g i c a l constants of p r o p o s i t i o n value. al l o g i c is r e l a t e d to the concept of truth Statements l i k e ' M a r y bought b e e f ' can be attributed with two d i f f e r e n t truth v a l u e s : the statement is either true or f a l s e . Thus we can represent the possible truth v a l u e s of a sentence constant ' A ' as f o l l o w s : sentence constant: truth values:

A t(rue) f(alse)

Two or more statements or sentence constants can be connected to each other with the help of the l o g i c a l constants ' v ' ( ' o r ' ) , 1 3 ' ( ' i f . . . t h e n ' ) , or others not named here; a statement or sentence constant can also be preceded by the l o g i c a l constant ' ~ ' ( ' n o t ' ) . In a l l these cases the result is new, compound statements whose truth v a l u e is determined by the truth values of their component statements and the meanings of the l o g i c a l constants used. In propositional l o g i c the meanings of l o g i c a l constants are g e n e r a l l y l a i d down in what are known as truth tables. These are tables showing the truth v a l u e s of a compound statement on the basis of the possible truth values of its component statements. The truth v a l u e of

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the compound statement 'Mary did not buy beef' is false if the statement 'Mary bought beef' is true and true if the statement 'Mary bought beef' is false. In this case the truth table looks like this: A t f

~A f t

This table thus lays down the meaning of the logical constant ' ~ ' . The addition of this constant makes a true statement false and a false statement true. The logical constants v and o act as connectors between two statements. For this reason, four cases must be specified for their meaning: ( a ) both statements may be true, (b) the first may be true and the second false, (c) the first may be false and the second true, and (d) both statements may be false. Thus there are here four possible combinations of truth values: A t t f f

B t f t f

Two separate statements or sentence constants can be connected by logical constants. The result of the connection is a new, compound statement. What truth values the new statement may have depends on the meaning of the logical constants functioning as the links. The meanings of ' v ' and 1 3 ' are defined in the tables below.37 1 2 3 4

A B t t t f f t f f

A

v

t t t f

B

A 3 B t f t t

These tables must be read so that the statement 'if A then B', for example, is true if A is true and B is true. This is the case in line 1. That is why a ' t ' appears below A 3 B in that line. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other lines. When translating 'or' and 'if . . . then' into logical constants one abstracts from various aspects of the meaning which these words have in colloquial language.

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theory

For example, when determining the meaning of the l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t ' o ' one ignores a l l sorts of content l i n k s which may be e x p r e s s e d by the wording ' i f . . . t h e n ' in o r d i n a r y s p e e c h . The consequence of t h i s is t h a t the t r a n s l a t i o n of ' i f . . . t h e n ' by ' ' in statements l i k e ' i f a man jumps from a tower, then he f a l l s to his d e a t h ' or ' i f a l l the e l e c t r i c a l a p p l i a n c e s a r e switched on s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , then the fuse will blow' i n e v i t a b l y l e a d s to a c e r t a i n reduction in the m e a n i n g . I t i s then confined to those a s p e c t s of ' i f . . . t h e n ' which a r e r e l e v a n t to the p o s s i b l e truth v a l u e s of statements composed with the help of ' i f . . . t h e n ' . P a r t l y in order to ensure t h a t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e in meaning between l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s and t h e i r ' e q u i v a l e n t s ' in c o l l o q u i a l l a n g u a g e does not l e a d to confusion, the l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s h a v e t h e i r own names. Thus ' ~ ' i s c a l l e d negation, ' v ' disjunction and ' o ' material implication. The l a n g u a g e of propositional logic a l s o c o n t a i n s another important l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t which happens not to a p p e a r in our e x a m p l e . This is the t r a n s l a t i o n of the word ' a n d ' : it i s symbolized as '• ' and i s c a l l e d conjunction. The meanings of the l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s r e f e r r e d to so f a r are shown in the truth t a b l e s below, in which we h a v e chosen to use a n o t h e r form of n o t a t i o n — a l s o f r e quently used—by p l a c i n g the t r u t h v a l u e s of the compound statements below the logical constants which function a s c o n n e c t i v e s . negation

f t

~A t f

disjunction

B t f

t f

implication

A t t f f

o t f t t

B t f t f

conjunction

A t t f f

B t f t f

After the fifth abstraction, logical constants have t a k e n the p l a c e s of words in c o l l o q u i a l s p e e c h . Yet these a r e s t i l l arguments about b e e f , cod e t c . , even though t h i s is not immediately a p p a r e n t b e c a u s e the statements o c c u r r i n g in the arguments have been ' a b b r e v i a t e d ' by sentence c o n s t a n t s . The arguments c o n t i n u e , however, to be fortuitous arguments about fortuitous s u b j e c t s . Howe v e r , it is not the l o g i c i a n ' s intention to examine each i n d i v i d u a l argument s e p a r a t e l y . Quite a p a r t from a n y thing e l s e , t h a t would be somewhat d i f f i c u l t , since of course the number of p o s s i b l e arguments i s i n f i n i t e . In l o g i c , concrete arguments are reduced to c e r t a i n argument forms. I n d i v i d u a l arguments are treated as

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fillings, or substitution instances, for abstract argument schemata. The sixth abstraction to take place in logical examination is the elimination of the fortuitous substitution of an argument and the establishment of the argument form or forms of which the argument concerned constitutes a substitution instance. It is only then that the logician has penetrated to the actual subject of his investigation. The two arguments from our example are substitution instances of the following argument forms: argument 1

argument form of argument 1

argument 2

argument form of argument 2

A v B ~ B /:. A

C o D C /.'. D

p vq ~q /.'. p

p rs q p /.'. q

In these argument forms ' p ' and ' q ' do not stand for statements, a s . A , B , C and D do in the arguments. They are variables for which any statement of one's choice may be substituted. And because they are not statements they have no truth value, only becoming true or false if statements are substituted for them. The general aim of logic is to differentiate between valid and invalid argument forms and hence, indirectly, between valid arguments and invalid arguments. An argument form is valid if it has no argument as a substitution instance with true premisses and a false conclusion. All substitution instances of a valid argument form are valid arguments. In the logical theory in which the above two argument forms are treated it is demonstrated that they are v a l i d . The argument form of argument 1 is called disjunctive syllogism and the argument form of argument 2 is called modus ponens. If we wish to test the validity of an argument we must determine whether the argument is a substitution instance of a valid argument form. If it is, then the argument is v a l i d . I f , however, no valid argument form can be found for which the argument is a substitution instance, then the argument is invalid. To illustrate this, let us examine the validity of the modus ponens argument form. To demonstrate that it is valid we must show that there is not so much as a single substitution instance to be found in which the premisses are true and the conclusion false.

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Now there a r e , of course, any number of substitution instances of this argument form. They f a l l , however, into four groups: substitution instances in which the substitutions for p and q are t r u e , c a s e s in which the substitutions for p are t r u e , but not those for q , c a s e s in which the substitutions for p are f a l s e and those for q t r u e , and cases in which the substitutions for both p and q are f a l s e . By combining these four p o s s i b i l i t i e s with the meaning of the implication occurring in the f i r s t premiss, we can specify the possible truth values of the premisses and conclusions of a l l these substitution i n s t a n c e s . The four c a s e s are shown in the t a b l e below. 1

P t

=1 q t t

p t

q t

2 3 4

t f f

f t t

t f f

f t f

f t f

It is only in the f i r s t line that we are dealing with true substitution instances of p o q and-p. Only in this c a s e are the premisses t r u e . From the truth values of the substitutions for q (the conclusions) it emerges that in that case the conclusions are also t r u e . Thus it is impossible to find an argument of this form which has a f a l s e conclusion when its premisses are t r u e . In other words, this argument form is v a l i d . The method used here amounts to a systematic search for a counter-example which will disprove its v a l i d i t y . If a substitution instance can be found with true p r e misses and a f a l s e conclusion, the argument form is i n v a l i d . Line 1 shows a l l the substitution instances with true premisses, and we find that in this c a s e the conclusions are t r u e . In other words, the modus ponens a r g u ment form is v a l i d . Therefore our o r i g i n a l argument is also v a l i d . To say that an argument is v a l i d , then, means that it is impossible for the conclusion to be f a l s e if the premisses are t r u e . If the premisses are true and the argument is v a l i d , then the conclusion is also t r u e . Nevertheless it is important to realize that there is no requirement for the premisses to be true. A valid argument may very well have f a l s e premisses. One might for example s a y : 'All animals can speak. All machines are animals. Therefore a l l machines can s p e a k . ' This is a v a l i d argument, even though the premisses are f a l s e ; but if the premisses were t r u e , then the conclusion would

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a l s o be t r u e . V a l i d a r g u m e n t s with true premisses are c a l l e d sound b y l o g i c i a n s , but l o g i c i a n s are not b o t h e r e d with the soundness of a r g u m e n t s : they c o n c e n t r a t e on of argument forms a n d l e a v e it d e t e r m i n i n g the validity to o t h e r s to e s t a b l i s h w h e t h e r statements a c c o r d with an a c t u a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s a n d may t h e r e f o r e be d e s c r i b e d as true. V a l i d arguments may be used for two d i f f e r e n t p u r p o s e s . If the premisses are t r u e , t h e y produce new true s t a t e m e n t s — c o n c l u s i o n s . However, t h e y may a l s o be used to test statements a g a i n s t others w h i c h follow from them. This is w h a t h a p p e n s when s c i e n t i f i c h y p o t h e s e s a r e t e s t e d , but it i s a l s o an e v e r y d a y o c c u r r e n c e . If a c o n c l u s i o n d r a w n from a h y p o t h e s i s is f a l s e , at l e a s t one of the premisses o c c u r r i n g in the h y p o t h e s i s must a l s o be f a l s e , s i n c e v a l i d i t y g u a r a n t e e s t h a t the t r u t h of the premisses is p a s s e d on to the c o n c l u s i o n . If the c o n c l u sion i s f a l s e , t h i s means t h a t t h e r e 'must be something wrong w i t h ' at l e a s t one of the p r e m i s s e s . Suppose a h y p o t h e s i s in a murder c a s e i s t h a t A committed the murder. From t h i s h y p o t h e s i s it f o l l o w s t h a t at the time of the crime A must h a v e been i n the town where it w a s committed. If it c a n now be shown t h a t a t the time of the murder A w a s out of town, the h y p o t h e s i s h a s been falsified. V a l i d argument forms a n d v a l i d a r g u m e n t s c a n a l s o be a p p r o a c h e d in a n o t h e r w a y . To e v e r y v a l i d argument there c o r r e s p o n d s a t r u e statement in the ' i f . . . t h e n ' form, where the premisses—connected by 'and'—are placed after 'if' a n d the c o n c l u s i o n is p l a c e d a f t e r ' t h e n ' . This statement i s t h e r e f o r e sometimes known as the corresponding implication of the argument in q u e s t i o n . The c o r r e s p o n d i n g i m p l i c a t i o n of the argument 'Mary b o u g h t beef or c o d . Mary d i d not b u y c o d . Therefore Mary bought b e e f ' i s : ' i f Mary b o u g h t beef or cod and she did not b u y c o d , then she b o u g h t b e e f ' . The c o r r e s ponding i m p l i c a t i o n is not in i t s e l f an argument but a statement, and may t h e r e f o r e be true or f a l s e . In the c a s e of a v a l i d argument the c o r r e s p o n d i n g i m p l i c a t i o n is t r u e , and a v a l i d argument form must h a v e a c o r r e s ponding i m p l i c a t i o n form a l l of whose s u b s t i t u t i o n i n s t a n c e s are t r u e , r e g a r d l e s s of the s u b j e c t s to w h i c h they r e l a t e . T h e i r t r u t h depends on the s t r u c t u r e of the i m p l i c a t i v e forms a n d not on t h e i r c o n t e n t . This s t r u c t u r e i s determined b y the l o g i c a l constants, 3 8 the meaning of w h i c h g u a r a n t e e s t h a t statements of a p a r t i c u l a r s t r u c t ure are t r u e . Statements w h i c h do not t a k e the form of an i m p l i c a t i o n

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may a l s o be a l w a y s t r u e or a l w a y s f a l s e b e c a u s e of their form or m e a n i n g . An e x a m p l e of such a statement i s ' i t i s r a i n i n g or it i s not r a i n i n g ' . This i s a l w a y s t r u e , i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether or not it a c t u a l l y h a p p e n s to be r a i n i n g . Statements l i k e t h i s which b e c a u s e of their form or meaning a r e a l w a y s t r u e or a l w a y s f a l s e a r e c a l l e d analytic s t a t e m e n t s . B e c a u s e there i s an a n a l y t i c t r u e statement in i m p l i c a t i v e form to c o r r e s p o n d to e v e r y v a l i d a r g u m e n t , the l i t e r a t u r e of l o g i c sometimes r e f e r s to a n a l y t i c arguments. Sometimes the term ' a n a l y t i c ' i s a l s o employed to r e f e r to a r g u m e n t s whose v a l i d i t y or i n v a l i d i t y c a n be determined simply by looking at the logical constants appearing in i t . C o n t r a s t i n g with a n a l y t i c statements there a r e synthetic s t a t e m e n t s , such a s ' i t i s r a i n i n g ' . To f i n d out whether a statement of t h i s k i n d i s t r u e one must a p p e a l to an a c t u a l s t a t e of affairs. It i s c u s t o m a r y to draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between formal a n a l y t i c a n d material a n a l y t i c s t a t e m e n t s . In the c a s e of formal a n a l y t i c statements the truth or f a l s e h o o d of the statements d e p e n d s on t h e i r form, i . e . on the o c c u r r ence of ' f o r m a l w o r d s ' such a s ' o r ' , 'if — then', ' n o t ' a n d ' a n d 1 . In the c a s e of m a t e r i a l a n a l y t i c s t a t e ments t h e i r truth or f a l s e h o o d d e p e n d s on the meaning, i . e . on c e r t a i n a g r e e m e n t s r e l a t i n g to the u s e of d e s c r i p t i v e or r e f e r e n t i a l w o r d s . Thus the statement ' b a c h e l o r s a r e u n m a r r i e d ' i s a l w a y s t r u e b e c a u s e of what might be termed ' a g r e e m e n t s ' between l a n g u a g e u s e r s , while on the same g r o u n d s the statement 'the b a l l i s s q u a r e ' is a l w a y s f a l s e . In c o n t r a s t to s y n t h e t i c s t a t e m e n t s , in the c a s e of none of these a n a l y t i c statements i s it n e c e s s a r y for the determination of the truth v a l u e to r e f e r to e x t r a linguistic reality. A n a l y t i c a l l y true statements a r e known a s tautologies a n d a n a l y t i c a l l y f a l s e statements a s contradictions. 'The b a l l i s s q u a r e ' i s an e x a m p l e of a ( m a t e r i a l ) c o n t r a d i c t i o n . In p r i n c i p l e , l o g i c a l theories look only at formal a n a l y t i c i t y . The meaning of the r e f e r e n t i a l and d e s c r i p t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s u s e d in a r g u m e n t s i s d i s r e g a r d e d . L o g i c a l t h e o r i e s h a v e to do with, a r g u m e n t forms. The two a r g u m e n t s we h a v e u s e d a s our e x a m p l e s a r e s u b s t i t u t i o n i n s t a n c e s of argument forms from propos it iona I logic, which e x a m i n e s what argument forms a r e v a l i d on the b a s i s of the o c c u r r e n c e of the l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s 'if t h e n ' , ' a n d ' , ' n o t ' a n d ' o r ' . Now of c o u r s e there a r e a l s o a r g u m e n t s in which these words do not a p p e a r at a l l . T a k e the following v a l i d a r g u m e n t :

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A l l people over seventy are pensioners. Some people over seventy have wheel-chairs. Some pensioners have wheel-chairs. This argument is a substitution instance of the argument form: P q

It is thus a substitution instance of an i n v a l i d a r g u ment form, since it is easy to think of another s u b s t i tution instance in which statements are substituted for p, q and r in such a way that an argument is created in which the premisses are true and the conclusion is f a l s e . Even so, this argument is not considered to be invalid: both o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e users and l o g i c i a n s i n t u i t i v e l y feel that it is v a l i d . To j u s t i f y r e g a r d i n g it as v a l i d we need a theory that goes beyond propositional l o g i c , and the theory that tells us the grounds on which such arguments may be c a l l e d v a l i d is predicate logic. Predicate logic examines argument forms in which, besides ' v ' , ' ~ 1 , ' • ' and ' -=> ' , ' a l l ' and ' some' also p l a y a p a r t . Thus it is sometimes necessary to specify the logic according to which a given argument is or is not v a l i d . For example, the argument of the pensioners is ' i n v a l i d in propositional l o g i c ' but ' v a l i d in predicate l o g i c ' . This is one of the reasons why it is loose u s a g e , and sometimes misleading, simply to speak of ' i l l o g i c a l statements' or to refer merely to ' l o g i c ' , without q u a l i fication. 3 ? ' L o g i c ' is the name of a discipline of science or scholarship which comprises s e v e r a l l o g i c a l theories. If one wishes to refer to a p a r t i c u l a r l o g i c a l theory one should specify i t . As we have a l r e a d y seen, logic (the discipline) is concerned with argument forms. The aim of l o g i c a l i n v e s t igation is to draw a distinction between v a l i d and i n v a l i d argument forms, between argument forms which do and argument forms which do not allow of counterexamples. To the extent that this aim has been r e a l i z e d , there are c r i t e r i a for distinguishing v a l i d arguments from i n v a l i d ones. These c r i t e r i a depend on the definitions of the l o g i c a l constants. That such c r i t e r i a exist does not, i n c i d e n t a l l y , mean that it is a l w a y s p o s s i b l e — a s it was in the case of our examples from propositional logic — t o make 'mechanical' decisions as to the v a l i d i t y or

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theory

arguments.

We c o n c l u d e our t r e a t m e n t of the a i m s a n d o b j e c t i v e s of l o g i c with a b r i e f s u r v e y of some l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s . To do t h i s , we must f i r s t s a y something a b o u t the c o n c e p t of meaning. In the l i t e r a t u r e of l o g i c i t i s c u s t o m a r y to d i s t i n g u i s h between the intension a n d the extension of w o r d s . A w o r d ' s extension c o n s i s t s of t h i n g s to which one may r e f e r b y u s i n g the w o r d . The e x t e n s i o n of the word ' d o g ' c o n s i s t s of a l l d o g s a n d the e x t e n s i o n of the word ' d e m o c r a c y ' c o n s i s t s of a l l d e m o c r a c i e s . The intension of a word c o n s i s t s of a s e t of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t i s a p p l i c a b l e to a l l the t h i n g s c o v e r e d b y the w o r d . ' A m s t e r d a m ' , ' t h e c a p i t a l of H o l l a n d ' , a n d ' t h e l a r g e s t c i t y in H o l l a n d ' a l l h a v e the s a m e e x t e n s i o n ( i . e . Amsterdam) but different i n t e n s i o n s . L o g i c a l t h e o r i e s i n which no a c c o u n t i s t a k e n of d i f f e r e n c e s in i n t e n s i o n a r e extensional logics. Propositional l o g i c i s one of t h e s e . I f , s a y , the Mary in our e x a m p l e h a d been H a n s ' s g i r l , then we might t h r o u g h o u t the a r gument h a v e r e p l a c e d 'Mary' by ' H a n s ' s g i r l ' . This s u b s t i t u t i o n would h a v e no e f f e c t on the t r u t h (if a n y ) of the s t a t e m e n t s , a n d hence no e f f e c t on the v a l i d i t y of the a r g u m e n t s . The s i t u a t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t in the c a s e of the f o l l o w i n g a r g u m e n t :

premiss: conclusion:

Laura knows t h a t Mary bought b e e f . Laura knows t h a t Hans's g i r l bought b e e f .

It i s p e r f e c t l y p o s s i b l e h e r e t h a t the p r e m i s s i s t r u e a n d the c o n c l u s i o n f a l s e , s i n c e t h e r e i s no n e e d for L a u r a to b e a c q u a i n t e d with the n a t u r e of a n y r e l a t i o n s h i p between Hans a n d M a r y , a n d if s h e i s i n d e e d i g n o r a n t of it s h e i s not in a p o s i t i o n to d r a w t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . To e s t a b l i s h the v a l i d i t y of t h i s k i n d of a r g u ment we must known more a b o u t the l o g i c a l b e h a v i o u r of words l i k e ' k n o w ' , a n d a b o u t the l o g i c a l m e a n i n g of i n t e n s i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s s u c h a s t h a t between ' M a r y ' a n d ' H a n s ' s g i r l ' . The e f f e c t of i n t e n s i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s in s u b s t i t u t i o n i n s t a n c e s on the v a l i d i t y of a r g u m e n t forms i s s t u d i e d in intensional logics, of which modal, deontic a n d evistemic logic a n d the s o - c a l l e d time logic, in which the l o g i c a l e f f e c t of t e m p o r a l r e f e r e n c e s i s i n v e s t i g a t e d , a r e the most i m p o r t a n t . Modal l o g i c s e x a m i n e the l o g i c a l b e h a v i o u r of words l i k e ' n e c e s s a r y ' a n d ' p o s s i b l e ' . In modal p r o p o s i t i o n a l l o g i c s u c h words a r e t r e a t e d a s l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s a n d a d d e d to the l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s of p r o p o s i t i o n a l l o g i c . It

Modem

107

logia

thus becomes possible to examine arguments containing statements like ' i t is necessary that A' and ' i t is possible that A ' . Deontic logic looks at the logical behaviour of words like ' o b l i g e d ' and ' p e r m i t t e d ' , and these, too, function in deontic logics as logical constants. Our e x ample is a substitution instance of argument forms of the type examined in epistemic l o g i c s , in which the subject of study is the l o g i c a l behaviour of words like 'know' and ' b e l i e v e ' . We have now given a brief account of the aims and objectives of l o g i c a l research as it is conducted by the majority of l o g i c i a n s . F i n a l l y let us look at a schematic survey of the most important differences between this kind of l o g i c a l research and research into argumentation theory in the broader sense.

subject

argumentation theory

logic in the narrower

in the broader sense

sense

argumentation in

argument forms in

colloquial

symbolic language

language sound

distinguishing

aias and

distinguishing

objectives

and unsound points of

valid and invalid

departure of argumentation

argument forms

and sound and unsound argumentation approach

Fig.

2.10.

schemata

descriptive and normative

Differences

normative

between logic and argumentation

theory.

Chapter 3

Major Studies on Argumentation

3.1.

Contributions to the development of the study of argumentation

In chapter 2 we looked at some of the backgrounds to the study of argumentation: classical logic, dialectic and rhetoric, the study of f a l l a c i e s , and modern l o g i c . To the argumentation theorist the work which has been and is being done in these fields is of particular interest because its purpose is to find a solution to problems which also face the argumentation theorist himself. In many cases research into logic is an important substratum for activity in argumentation theory, and in some cases there may indeed be no clearly discernible boundary between the two. This becomes clear when we discuss the most important contributions to the development of argumentation theory as a field of study. During the nineteen-fifties the study of reasoning in colloquial language underwent certain developments which shaped the face of the f i e l d of argumentation theory as we describe it here. Until then the study of argumentation had been regarded as belonging to the classical tradition, principally rhetoric. The attention paid to reasoning in colloquial language was chiefly oriented along practical lines and found expression mainly in attempts to make rhetorical and logical i n sights applicable to teaching. There was no question of interesting theoretical innovations or an expansion of knowledge of the subject. The r e v i v a l of the practical interest in argumentation dates, speaking very generally, from the beginning of the last century. In the United States it was coupled with 108

Contributions to the development of the field

109

a r e - e v a l u a t i o n of c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c . Since the second h a l f of the nineteenth c e n t u r y courses in public speaking and writing have been given at American schools and u n i v e r s i t i e s , sometimes combined with courses in l i s t e n i n g and r e a d i n g . These courses a r e often run by speech or composition departments or by departments s p e c i a l i z i n g in communication and r h e t o r i c . In c o n t r a s t to c o u n t r i e s such as Holland, where s p e a k i n g , w r i t i n g , l i s t e n i n g and r e a d i n g a r e a l l t a u g h t as p a r t of what i s there c a l l e d speech communication ( ' t a a l b e h e e r s i n g ' ) , or E n g l a n d , where a l l these s u b j e c t s simply f a l l under the g e n e r a l heading of ' E n g l i s h ' , in the United States the v a r i o u s l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l s a r e g e n e r a l l y the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of s e p a r a t e d e p a r t ments (Kinneavy 1971). From within t h i s l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l s t e a c h i n g , help was sought to an i n c r e a s i n g degree from the c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n — a process i n i t i a t e d by t e a c h e r s of speech s k i l l s , followed a l i t t l e l a t e r by t h e i r writing c o l l e a g u e s . There a r e now many books a v a i l a b l e of the ' c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c for modern s t u d e n t s ' v a r i e t y ( a well-known example being Corbett 1966). I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e to buy textbooks b a s e d on r h e t o r i c a l i n s i g h t s for i n s t r u c t i o n in d e b a t i n g , d i s c u s s i o n s and meetings (see the b i b l i o g r a p h i e s of C l e a r y & Haberman 196/+ and Kruger 1975). In a l l t h i s t e a c h i n g m a t e r i a l a r g u m e n t ation occupies a p l a c e of g r e a t e r or l e s s e r importance. The p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t in argumentation finds e x p r e s s ion not only in the renewed attention being p a i d to c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c but a l s o in introductory textbooks on logic and in p o p u l a r i z i n g works on ' l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g ' . In such c a s e s the main i n f l u e n c e s to be d i s c e r n e d a r e those of d i a l e c t i c and l o g i c . Almost a l l l o g i c textbooks include a section on ' i n f o r m a l l o g i c ' or ' t r a d i t i o n a l l o g i c ' in which attention is p a i d to the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of l o g i c . Often t h i s c o n s i s t s of a treatment of f a l l a c i e s which stems from d i a l e c t i c , and t h e r e is u s u a l l y some treatment of the theory of the s y l l o g i s m , which o r i g i n a t e s in A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c . Many authors a l s o make room for a discussion of d e f i n i t i o n s (Copi 1972, Kahane 1973, Rescher 1975). As a r u l e these sections are wholly d i v orced from the r e s t of the matter d i s c u s s e d , which i s c h i e f l y modern l o g i c . The ' u s e ' of l o g i c a l i n s i g h t s is u s u a l l y confined to the ' t r a n s l a t i o n ' of argumentation from c o l l o q u i a l l a n g u a g e into l o g i c a l s t a n d a r d forms, such a s the syllogism ( e . g . Copi 1972), though sometimes the importance i s emphasized of the ' l o g i c a l ' s t r u c t u r i n g of a discourse ( e . g . Rescher 1975). Only in a few c a s e s is t h e r e any c o n s i s t e n t attention to the connection b e t ween logic and e v e r y d a y r e a s o n i n g in c o l l o q u i a l l a n g u a g e

no

Major

studies

on

argumentation

(Alexander 1969, Keene 1961, Purtill 1979). In the popul a r i z i n g publications on ' l o g i c a l thinking' this everyday reasoning does occupy an important p l a c e , but there the main focus of attention is the recognition and avoidance of f a l l a c i e s (Fearnside & Holther 1959, Michalos 1970), the emphasis being on improving o n e ' s own s k i l l in a r g u i n g and detecting f a u l t s in the arguments of others (Beardsley 1975, Emmet I960). Often such works are of a rather didactic nature and humorous examples are relied upon to provide the necessary light relief (this a p p l i e s , for example, to Fearnside & Holther's Fallacy: the counterfeit of argument of 1959). Humour is a l s o sometimes used to i l l u s t r a t e how l o g i c a l principles may be put to the service of rhetorical ends (see e . g . G i l b e r t ' s How to Win an Argument (1979)). During the f i f t i e s a number of philosophers saw to it that the study of argumentation received new impulses. They advanced i d e a s which led to a s h a r p i n c r e a s e in the interest which practitioners in other f i e l d s took in theoretical thinking on argumentation, and at the same time a p p e a r e d to open up new a r e a s for the p r a c t i c a l application of r e s u l t s . In none of these c a s e s was there any absolute break with the c l a s s i c a l t r a d i t i o n , but attempts were made to create new p e r s p e c t i v e s . Here the g r e a t e s t influence so f a r h a s come from the i d e a s of Toulmin and Perelman, published during the same period. The philosopher Johnstone, who in 1968 became the f i r s t to publish a brief survey of the state of the art in argumentation theory, a s s e r t s that among philosophers a re-evaluation of the study of argumentation h a s taken p l a c e , and that this is p r i n c i p a l l y due to the work of Toulmin and Perelman (Johnstone 1968). We agree with Johnstone to the extent that there can be no doubt that Toulmin and Perelman have been the most i n f l u e n t i a l writers in the field of argumentation over the p a s t two d e c a d e s . Many other authors have drawn inspiration from them, and references to their work a p p e a r in countless books and a r t i c l e s on the s u b ject. This success may be attributed p a r t l y to two books which Toulmin and Perelman published, independently of each other, in 1958. In that year Toulmin saw the p u b lication of his book The Uses of Argument and Perelman and

O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a ' s La nouvelle

rhetorique:

traité

de

l'argumentation a p p e a r e d . In view of the important role which the i d e a s put forward in these books by Toulmin and Perelman (and Olbrechts-Tyteca) p l a y e d in the development of argumentation theory as a field of s t u d y , we

Contributions

to the development of the

field

111

shall pay special attention to them in separate chapters (chapters L, and 5 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . When Toulmin was preparing The Uses of Argument he was l i v i n g in England, where his chief occupation at the time was a n a l y t i c a l philosophy. Perelman and 01b'rechts-Tyteca evolved their ideas for La nouvelle rhétorique in collaboration in Belgium. The influence which the two works have had (and still h a v e ) is international, but it is nevertheless not uniform. Toulmin's work has been influential c h i e f l y in literature with a diagnostic and therapeutic function and in writing on particular sorts of argumentation, such as l e g a l argumentation and argumentation on moral questions. The influence of the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is seen at its strongest in philosophical treatises on the norms of r a t i o n a l i t y which are applied in philosophical, l e g a l and ethical argumentation, though since the appearance of the English translation of the main work in 1969 there have been clear signs of increasing interest on the part of authors of a practical-therapeutic bent. Naturally enough, we believe that an introductory overview of the state of the art in argumentation theory must pay close attention to quite comprehensive and p a r t i c u l a r l y influential ideas on argumentation such as those put forward by Toulmin and Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, but at the same time we believe it to be equally advisable to go into important insights from other contributions to the subject which may not yet be so well known. That is why in this chapter we shall turn our attention to a number of salient points in the work of Naess (section 3.2) and Crawshay-Williams (section 3 - 3 ) , both of whom had interesting things to say about a r g u mentation even before Toulmin and Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, while we shall also spend some time on the 'formal d i a l e c t i c ' of Barth and Krabbe (section 3 - 4 ) , which must in our opinion be regarded as a promising new contribution to the theory of argumentation. The argumentation theory work done by the philosophers Naess and Crawshay-Williams was published before that of Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, but had no noticeable influence on i t . Both Naess and CrawshayWilliams are mentioned in the survey by Johnstone referred to e a r l i e r (Johnstone 1968). Referring to Crawshay-Williams, Johnstone notes that his work has not received the attention its deserves. Perhaps this is s t i l l true, but at least there has since been some improvement in the situation, witness, for example, the references to Crawshay-Williams 1S57 in later publications ( e . g . Barth 1972). Recognition

112

Major studies on argumentation

of the importance of N a e s s ' s work, too, h a s been f a i r l y slow in coming and is s t i l l not g e n e r a l . In t h i s c a s e the e x p l a n a t i o n for the delay in the b r e a k t h r o u g h may l i e in the f a c t t h a t N a e s s ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n to a r g u m e n t a tion theory was for some time a v a i l a b l e only in Norw e g i a n — a n d o r i g i n a l l y only in d u p l i c a t e d form at t h a t . An E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n did not a p p e a r u n t i l 1966, followed in 1975 by a German e d i t i o n . The i d e a s of Naess and C r a w s h a y - W i l l i a m s , which on c l o s e r inspection r e v e a l some degree of k i n s h i p , in f a c t evolved quite s e p a r a t e l y . In N a e s s ' s work the emphasis is c h i e f l y on the importance of l u c i d d i s c u s s i o n . He points to the u s e f u l n e s s of c l a r i f y i n g C p r e c i z i n g ' ) statements under d i s c u s s i o n , and makes recommendations for c a r r y i n g out v a r i o u s sorts of s u r v e y s of arguments for or a g a i n s t a p a r t i c u l a r o p i n i o n . Crawshay-Williams is a l s o concerned with d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n . He a n a l y s e s the c r i t e r i a n e c e s s a r y for the resolution of disagreements by d i s c u s s i o n , and in so doing makes an a n a l y s i s of the c r i t e r i o n of ' l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y ' which i s p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e ful to argumentation t h e o r y . Though n e i t h e r Naess nor Crawshay-Williams has a f u l l y e l a b o r a t e d theory of argumentation to o f f e r , both of them, a s we s h a l l t r y to make c l e a r in the following s e c t i o n s , h a v e made f u n d a mental c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the development of the study of argumentation. Barth and K r a b b e ' s 'formal d i a l e c t i c ' l i k e w i s e r e l a t e s to the conduct of d i s c u s s i o n s . A theory of argumentation in i t s e l f , it c o n s i s t s of systems of r u l e s for conducting c r i t i c a l d i a l o g u e s designed to l e a d to the r a t i o n a l r e s o l ution of d i s p u t e s . B a r t h , who i s professor of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherl a n d s , b e l i e v e s t h a t such a theory of argumentation is not merely of s i g n i f i c a n c e to philosophers but t h a t it a l s o has g r e a t importance in the s o c i a l c o n t e x t . One of her a m b i t i o n s , as she h a s s t a t e d in an i n t e r v i e w , is therefore to see argumentation a n a l y s i s (or theory of argumentation) introduced and accepted as a s u b j e c t in secondary schools, a s it i s in Norway and Sweden. I t was B a r t h , in f a c t , who introduced the s u b j e c t of argumentation theory into the Netherlands. Her l e c t u r e s and p u b l i c a t i o n s h a v e been one of the main r e a s o n s for the r a p i d i n c r e a s e in i n t e r e s t in the study of a r g u m e n t ation during the p a s t few y e a r s . Even before she and Krabbe embarked on t h e i r f i r s t attempts at developing a 'formal d i a l e c t i c ' she was drawing s t u d e n t s ' attention to the work of Naess, C r a w s h a y - W i l l i a m s , Toulmin, Perelman and O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a which we d i s c u s s h e r e . In B a r t h ' s

Naess's analysis

of

discussions

113

view Naess's insights into argumentation theory can be of great importance for developing a normative theory of argumentation. In p r i n c i p l e , Naess places conducting argumentation in the context of holding a c r i t i c a l d i a logue between an attacking and a defending p a r t y . Barth and Krabbe endorse this view and try to establish rules by which the parties can agree to be governed in such a dialogue. Following Hamblin (1970) they c a l l a system of rules for c r i t i c a l dialogues a formal dialectic. In the working out of the rules they draw on the insights p r e viously formulated on the subject by the German philosopher and logician Lorenzen and by other members of the 'Erlanger Schule'. We have now indicated b r i e f l y what are the most important contributions to the evolution of the f i e l d of study called argumentation theory, the subject of this book. Let us now examine these contributions in turn. We shall then be able to attempt a more detailed characterization of the similarities and differences between them. In this way we hope to g i v e an ordered and representative picture of the present state of argumentation theory. 3.2.

Arne Naess's analysis of discussions

The Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess has paid recurrent attention to argumentation theory throughout his work. His philosophical position—perhaps in his case it would be more accurate to speak of an attitude^—has brought him to a semantic approach to argumentation. Naess adopts the position of a sceptic who, without regarding any particular starting points as a priori evident and necessary, wishes to bring philosophical c l a r i f i c a t i o n to existing disagreements and to this end carries out emp i r i c a l research designed to lead to a better ' p r e c i z ation' of the statements about which the parties are in disagreement. As a philosopher Naess has e v o l v e d , according to Barth (1971b), from someone who took a stand against f i x e d starting points (an ' a n t i - a p r i o r i s t ' ) to someone who does not himself use f i x e d starting points (an 'ana p r i o r i s t ' ) . I n i t i a l l y his scepticism was the equivalent of antidogmatism; now it may be equated with a refusal to commit himself to particular standpoints in abstract philosophical matters, and it amounts to an attitude of constant interrogation and searching. In our view it is an attitude superbly illustrated by the following passage

114

Major studies on argumentation

from a t e l e v i s e d d i s c u s s i o n between Naess and the B r i t i s h philosopher A . J . Ayer (NOS Dutch t e l e v i s i o n , 1971). Naess: 'Up to now a cigarette has always burned when you lit it. The floor never caved in. Food stilled your hunger. But can you deduce from that that things will still be the same in the future? It remains a circular argument, based on something that cannot be proved. A lot of philosophy is looking for answers to questions like that.1 In Interpretation and Preciseness, p u b l i s h e d in 1953, Naess developed an empirical semantics in which he f i g h t s back against 'armchair semantics' as p r a c t i s e d then (and now) at Oxford and elsewhere. In the book he r e v e a l s a preference for methods from the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , such as p e r s o n a l interviews and q u e s t i o n n a i r e s , for i n v e s t i g a t i n g what i s understood by p a r t i c u l a r e x p r e s s i o n s in p a r t i c u l a r c i r c l e s . His semantic work i s t h a t of a r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of his p h i l o s o p h i c a l a t t i t u d e and e m p i r i c a l semantic i n s i g h t s for the study of argumentation i s well e x p r e s s e d in his Wie fordert man heute die empirische Bewegung? ( p . 35; the work was p u b l i s h e d in 1965). The following p a s s a g e is t a k e n from Barth (1978b: 159). Suppose there is a difference of opinion between psychologists, and they wish to deal with the question by discussing it. An advocate and practitioner of philosophical elucidation suggests to the interlocutors that by way of experiment they might observe certain rules for their discussional and descriptive techniques. One of these rules might then be formulated as follows: if one interlocutor posits the assertion 'A', while another asserts 'non-A1, and if it is unclear wherein the difference lies, then they must both indicate in what circumstances, which must be capable of being realized in the experiment, they would regard 'A' as verified (or confirmed) or falsified (or refuted) respectively. If they both believe that such circumstances do not exist, this must be regarded as a signal that neither further discussion nor new investigations would be able to bring about the elimination of the verbal disagreement between the interlocutors. At the same time it might be taken as a signal that the disagreement is not linked with any real difference of opinion. Naess then goes on to s a y t h a t the person d e s i r i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l e l u c i d a t i o n must a c t not a s ' j u d g e ' but as ' a g e n t ' : he would h a v e to recommend g u i d e l i n e s for an

Naess 's analysis

of

discussions

115

e f f e c t i v e discussion, and these would have to turn out d i f f e r e n t l y depending on the circumstances. Hi-s views on the question of what sorts of statement can justly claim to be knowledge, i . e . his views on cognitive meaningfulness, or his views regarding the relation between c o g nitive meaningfulness and testability would not have to be involved in this elucidatory work as c r i t e r i a for evaluation. 'The important thing is to r e l i e v e the work (of the agent) from the philosophical point of view and to moderate the claims connected with philosophy. If this is not done, one is then also unaware that rules for debating and formulating which are of greater or lesser effectiveness are quite a different matter from general c r i t e r i a for cognitive meaningfulness.' In Wie fordert man heute die empirische Bewegung? Naess describes the view which he then (in 1956) acclaimed ( p . 33) with the following words (here in a free translation) : Perhaps the best word to describe what I mean i s ' d i a l e c t i c ' . . . . In my terminology, debate, or d i a l e c t i c , i s a part of the investigation; that i s to say, i t i s a form of systema t i c intersubjective verbal communication whereby misunderstandings can be cleared up and individual points of view can be submitted f o r approval or r e j e c t i o n . This i s not meant as a normative d e f i n i t i o n , but as an approximation to a des c r i p t i v e d e f i n i t i o n [of 'philosophical d i a l e c t i c ' ] . I should to formulate a normative d e f i n i t i o n [of ' p h i l be inclined osophical d i a l e c t i c ' ] in such a way that rules for rational discussion were among the definiens. Looked at this way, philosophical dialectic ( d i a l e k t i k e ) appears to me to be a currently [ i n 1956] relevant reissue of the c l a s s i c a l d i a logue (dialogon), in so f a r as the c l a s s i c a l dialogue was not merely a l i t e r a r y form but a method of c o l l e c t i v e work by various philosophers. It is conspicuous that Naess takes a disagreement in a dialogue as his starting point. The argumentation theorist must not blow up his own y a r d s t i c k s — e . g . p a r t icular c r i t e r i a of meaningfulness—into a single allembracing criterion, but must confine himself to g i v i n g 'more or less e f f e c t i v e rules for debating and formulati n g ' . These rules may v a r y , depending on the circumstances. Naess regards dialogue as a dialectic amounting to 'a form of systematic intersubjective v e r b a l communic a t i o n ' , whereby in the f i r s t place misunderstandings can be cleared up and in the second place i n d i v i d u a l points of view are assessed. This dialectic must also

Major studies

116

on

argumentation

c o n t a i n r u l e s for m a t e r i a l d i s c u s s i o n . The l i n k between N a e s s ' s t h i n k i n g and c l a s s i c a l d i a l e c t i c becomes even c l e a r e r when we r e a l i z e t h a t he designed a p r a c t i c a l method of e v a l u a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l points of view which amounts to weighing up the a r g u ments both for and a g a i n s t a standpoint ( c f . 2 . 1 ) . Howe v e r , before an e v a l u a t i o n of t h i s kind c a n t a k e p l a c e any misunderstandings have to be e l i m i n a t e d . Naess therefore precedes his method of e v a l u a t i n g points of view with r u l e s for c l e a r i n g up m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . This he does in his textbook Communication and Argument, some points from which we s h a l l d i s c u s s below. Communication and Argument i s the E n g l i s h translation, p u b l i s h e d in 1966, of a work which f i r s t a p p e a r e d in 1941 in d u p l i c a t e d form, Om meningsytring: En del elementaere logiske errmer (On the e x p r e s s i o n of o p i n i o n s : some elementary s u b j e c t s in l o g i c ) , the s u b j e c t of which is i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , c l a r i f i c a t i o n and a r g u m e n t a t i o n . A German t r a n s l a t i o n (Kommunikation und Argumentation ) a p p e a r e d in 1975. One of the c e n t r a l t h e s e s in Communication and Argument i s t h a t the p a r t i c i p a n t s in a discussion can e l i m i n a t e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s by clarifying-, o r , a s Naess c a l l s i t , precizating, t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s . Because ' p r e c i z a t i o n ' makes use of the p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of an e x p r e s s i o n , we must f i r s t e x p l a i n what Naess u n d e r s t a n d s by interpreting. He himself e l u c i d a t e s it by r e f e r e n c e to the d i s t i n c t i o n between e x p r e s s i o n s , statements and s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , a d i s t i n c t i o n developed by the Stoa. 4 1 It i s often i l l u s t r a t e d with the help of the ' s i g n t r i a n g l e ' .

"A"

-B

Fig.

3.1.

The sign

triangle.

"A"-entities

= expressions

'C'-entities

» that which itions)

B-entities

and

(formulations),

words,

terms;

is e x p r e s s e d by " A " - e n t i t i e s :

statements

(propos-

concepts;

=• s t a t e s of a f f a i r s "A"-entities,

and things

followed

by

i d e n t i f i e d by " A " - e n t i t i e s

According to Naess,

to w h i c h states

reference of

or c o v e r e d by

interpreting

affairs

is m a d e and

with

things

'C'-entities.

is a t t r i b u t i n g a s t a t e -

Naess ' s analysis

of

discussions

117

ment to an expression. Suppose the expression 'he came home at two o ' c l o c k ' is uttered. We can then attribute to this expression the statement 'he came home at two o'clock in the morning' or the statement 'he came home at two o'clock in the a f t e r n o o n ' . In either case we i n terpret the expression. The statements we attribute to the expression are in turn themselves cast in expressions. That is why Naess says that 'the expression U is an interpretation of the expression T ' . (Here U and T function as v a r i a b l e s . ) Moreover, this interpretation is not a casual, random a f f a i r , but takes place in a p a r ticular relation or context of speaker, listener and circumstances. Naess suggests the following definition of interpretation: Expression U is an interpretation of expression T means the same as in at least one context U can express the same statement as T. However, it is often the case that a particular part of the expression determines differences in interpretations of the expression as a whole. In our example the differences in interpretation depend on the words 'two o ' c l o c k ' . Naess therefore adds a second d e f inition of interpretation. Saying that term b is an i n t e r pretation of term a means that an interpretation of the expression comes about if b is substituted for a in an expression. In order to avoid misunderstandings in a discussion or debate, the interlocutors must ensure that they a l l o c ate the right statements to the expressions they use, since real disagreements relate not to expressions but to the statements they express. If the interlocutors have reason to believe that they are not allocating the right statements to the expression, then they must request and provide precizations. A precization is a limitation on the number of statements which may be allocated to an e x pression. This limitation is seen more c l e a r l y in f i g u r e 3.2.

U.

V

w

"2 Fig.

Z. 2.

U as a 'precization'

TQ

-

expression

U, V, W

=

interpretations

serving of

U l , U2

=

interpretations

of U a n d TQ.

of TQ.

as p o i n t of To;

departure;

118

Major studies on argumentation

Naess s u g g e s t s t h a t p r e c i z a t i o n be defined as follows: The expression U is a precization of the expression T means the same as there is at least one correct interpretation of T which is not a correct interpretation of U, but there is no correct interpretation of U which is not also a correct interpretation of T. In f i g u r e 3 . 2 , V and W a r e c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of TQ , but not of U. U i t s e l f is a c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of TQ- U I and U2 ( a n d a l l other c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of U) a r e c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of U, but also of TQ • Therefore U is a p r e c i z a t i o n of TQNaess points out t h a t 'U is more p r e c i s e than T ' means the same as 'U is a p r e c i z a t i o n of T" . From t h i s it will be a p p a r e n t t h a t p r e c i z a t i o n is not an absolute but a comparative c o n c e p t . Naess a l s o o b s e r v e s t h a t a p r e c i z ation must always be p l a c e d in the context of the person for whom it is intended and the g e n e r a l context of the d i s c u s s i o n : U is more precise than T for a person X in context y. It is not N a e s s ' s intention t h a t the p a r t i c i p a n t s in a discussion should c o n t i n u a l l y p r e c i z a t e t h e i r e x p r e s s i o n s or be a s p r e c i s e a s would t h e o r e t i c a l l y be p o s s i b l e ( d i s cussion would then become a p r a c t i c a l impossibility). P r e c i z a t i o n must only t a k e p l a c e where there is a need for i t , i.e. where the disagreement r e l a t e s (or may r e l a t e ) to different statements c a p a b l e of being a t t r i b u t e d to the same e x p r e s s i o n . Because in t h a t c a s e the i n t e r l o c u t o r s h a v e d i f f e r e n t statements in mind when they c o n s i d e r the same e x p r e s s i o n , there i s no r e a l d i s a g r e e m e n t , merely a verbal d i s a g r e e m e n t . Verbal disagreement makes it imp o s s i b l e to weigh opinions a g a i n s t each o t h e r . I f a disagreement i s (or has become) a real d i s a g r e e ment, then the points of view must be weighed a g a i n s t each o t h e r . In developing a method of doing t h i s , Naess s t a r t s from the d i a l e c t i c idea t h a t what i s important is to e s t a b l i s h which point of view is more a c c e p t a b l e than the other (or o t h e r s ) . Just l i k e p r e c i z a t i o n , a c c e p t a b i l i t y i s a comparative c o n c e p t . It is a matter not of the a b solute a c c e p t a b i l i t y of an opinion, but of a comparative a c c e p t a b i l i t y : opinion 0 } is more a c c e p t a b l e than opinion O2 to a person X or a group of persons X. To determine which of two c o n f l i c t i n g opinions is more a c c e p t a b l e , it is therefore n e c e s s a r y to examine both the arguments for and the arguments a g a i n s t those opinions } 2 In order to a c q u i r e p r o f i c i e n c y in t h i s kind of e x a m i n a t i o n , Naess recommends e x e r c i s e s in the making of s u r v e y s of a r g u ments. He d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between two sorts of s u r v e y : p r o - e t - c o n t r a s u r v e y s and p r o - a u t - c o n t r a s u r v e y s . The

Naess 's analysis of discussions

119

pro-et-contra survey c o n t a i n s the most important arguments which have been (or may be) a d v a n c e d both for (pro) and against ( c o n t r a ) an opinion. The survey does not i n clude a c o n c l u s i o n . The dispute is s t i l l undecided. All the survey c o n t a i n s is what the i n t e r l o c u t o r s r e g a r d as a r g u i n g for or a g a i n s t a point of view. It i s preceded by a s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e c i s e e x p r e s s i o n of the point of view t h a t is at i s s u e . There is a l s o an i n d i c a t i o n of a h i e r a r c h y in the a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Compound argumentation i s broken down for a n a l y s i s into simple argumentation. Figure 3 - 3 is t a k e n from Naess to i l l u s t r a t e his method.

Ci:

PlCl : P3--

P2Cl:

PlP2Ci:

P1P3:

P2P2Ci: C,P 1^3

Fig. 3. 3. Eg

=

C1P2C1:

=

Scheme of a pro-et-contva

survey.

the expressed opinion;

Pi etc. =

arguments for the opinion;

Cj etc. 3

arguments against the

P1P3

=

an argument for an argument (P3) for the opinion;

PiCx

-

an argument for an argument (Cj) against the opinion.

opinion;

The p r o - e t - c o n t r a survey i s the b a s i s on which the arguments a r e weighed a g a i n s t each o t h e r . The r e s u l t of t h i s weighing is e x p r e s s e d in the second survey of a r g u ments, the pro-aut-contra survey (the f o r - o r - a g a i n s t s u r vey) . This c o n t a i n s the arguments which i t s compiler r e g a r d s as a r g u i n g for an opinion. It a l s o c o n t a i n s those arguments which the compiler b e l i e v e s a r g u e against the opinion. The opinion is the conclusion t h a t is drawn from the a r g u m e n t s . Naess compares the p r o - a u t - c o n t r a survey to a t u g - o f - w a r , which he r e p r e s e n t s as in f i g u r e 3 . 4 , where the a c u t e n e s s of the a n g l e s is an i n d i c a t o r of the cogency of the arguments.

Fig. 3.4.

The pro-aut-oontra survey as a tug-of-war.

EQ wins a g a i n s t not-Eg, i . e . i s more a c c e p t a b l e t h a n not-Eo, i f the pro-Eo arguments a r e more t e n a b l e than the p r o - n o t - E o a r g u m e n t s , a n d / o r a r e g r e a t e r in number than them, and i f the j u s t i f y i n g force of the pro-Eo argumentation i s g r e a t e r than t h a t of the p r o - n o t - E o a r g u mentation. The v a l u e of an argument for a p a r t i c u l a r point of view thus depends on two q u a l i t i e s , v i z . i t s t e n a b i l i t y ( t r u t h , c o r r e c t n e s s , p l a u s i b i l i t y ) and its j u s t i f y i n g force—Naess speaks of proof potential or relevance. I f p o s s i b l e , Naess a d v i s e s , i t s t e n a b i l i t y should be t e s t e d . As r e g a r d s proof p o t e n t i a l he d i s t i n g u i s h e s between d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t e m e n t s , in which it is a s s e r t e d t h a t something is so, and normative s t a t e m e n t s , in which it is a s s e r t e d t h a t something ought to be so. In the c a s e of d e s c r i p t i v e theses the concept of proof p o t e n t i a l somewhat resembles the concept of v a l i d i t y , but in f a c t it i s much l e s s s t r i n g e n t . In section 2 . 3 we saw t h a t an argument is v a l i d if it is impossible for the premisses (the a r g u ments) to be true and at the same time the conclusion (thesis) false. In t h i s formulation, moreover, we a r e d e a l i n g with an a b s o l u t e concept: an argument i s e i t h e r v a l i d or it i s not. Naess, by c o n t r a s t , formulates proof p o t e n t i a l a s a comparative concept. The proof p o t e n t i a l of a pro-argument P for a d e s c r i p t i v e t h e s i s Eo i n c r e a s e s according as it becomes more c e r t a i n t h a t Eo is true if P i s t r u e . Naess g i v e s the following example of the proof p o t e n t i a l of a d e s c r i p t i v e t h e s i s . 120

Naess 's analysis of discussions EQ: P^: P2: C^:

121

I t will rain tonight. The sky i s covered with grey clouds. The swallows are f l y i n g low.. The barometer i s r i s i n g .

The proof p o t e n t i a l of P^ and P2 i s e q u a l to the c e r t t a i n t y of the hypothesis ' i f the sky i s covered with g r e y clouds and the swallows a r e f l y i n g low, then it will r a i n t o n i g h t ' . I f Eo is a normative t h e s i s , the p r o argument has a g r e a t e r proof p o t e n t i a l according as the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of P is r e g a r d e d as d e s i r a b l e . The following example of proof p o t e n t i a l in a normative t h e s i s i s taken from Naess h i m s e l f . EQ:

P^: P2: Ci: C2:

AS long as I study I have to devote a l l my time to my subject. A n t i t h e s i s : I must s e t aside some of my working hours f o r reading poetry. I w i l l be earning a steady income a year e a r l i e r . I s h a l l be a u s e f u l member of s o c i e t y a year e a r l i e r . I s h a n ' t be a s o c i a l s u c c e s s . I s h a l l become one-sided.

The compiler of t h i s p r o - a u t - c o n t r a survey finds P^, P2> Ci and C2 a l l e q u a l l y t e n a b l e . Therefore a choice between P^ and P2 on the one hand and Cj- and C2 on the other will h a v e to be made p o s s i b l e b y the proof p o t e n t i a l or r e l e v a n c e a t t r i b u t e d to the v a r i o u s arguments from within a p a r t i c u l a r system of v a l u e s and norms. If the compiler r e g a r d s making money and becoming a r e spected member of society a s more important t h a n a ' r i c h i n n e r l i f e ' , then to him P i and P2 have g r e a t e r cogency than C^ and C2. In p r a c t i c e , of c o u r s e , more complex argumentations will a l s o be i n v o l v e d . For e x a m p l e , one might d e s i g n a t e P P j the argument t h a t it would then be p o s s i b l e to buy a nice cottage in the country a y e a r e a r l i e r , while CC2 might denote the argument t h a t the way in which the course of study was designed was i t s e l f a g u a r a n t e e of b r o a d - m i n d e d n e s s ; and so on. Besides i n s t r u c t i o n s for p r e c i z a t i o n , the making of s u r veys of a r g u m e n t s , and the weighing up of the v a l u e of arguments for a point of view, Naess a l s o g i v e s s i x rules designed to promote a b u s i n e s s l i k e e x c h a n g e of i d e a s , such a s 'keep to the p o i n t ' , ' a formulation intended to r e f l e c t a point of view in a serious discussion must maintain its n e u t r a l i t y in respect of any point of d i s unity w h a t s o e v e r ' , and 'do not a t t r i b u t e to your oppon-

122

Major studies on argumentation

ent views to which he does not subscribe'. Because Naess precizates these rules according to his own method, and particularly because he specifies what are violations of the rules, they are useful guidelines in discussion. As Communication and Argument was conceived as a textbook it is abundantly provided with examples and practical hints and instructions. Thus Naess gives instructions for proper precization and the application of the rules for discussion, highlights common mistakes and adds a few exercises. The, book is designed chiefly to function as an aid in discussions, or in their analysis, as they occur in practice. On the use of this textbook Barth says: 'Generations of freshmen at the University of Oslo have had to study this book as prescribed preliminary reading, the only exceptions being dentists and pharmaceutists. For those two professions, and for them alone, verbalized communication was regarded as of secondary significance. It is more than probable that Naess's philosophical work has also had a formative influence in the introduction during recent years of argumentation as a compulsory subject in the teaching of Swedish in the secondary schools of Sweden' (1978b: 162). 3.3-

Crawshay-Williams' s analysis of controversy

The British philosopher Rupert Crawshay-Williams, who died in 1977, was a friend of Bertrand Russell and moved in his philosophical milieu. 43 He wrote a book about the great thinker and in his other publications makes f r e quent reference to the affinity between his ideas and Russell's. This is also true of his most important theoretical publication, Methods and Criteria of Reasoning. An inquiry into the structure of controversy (1957). Some of the most significant ideas in this work are also to be found in Crawshay-Williams' s earlier publications ( e . g . 1946, 1947, 1951), but our assessment of his views on argumentation is based on his main work. Like Naess, Crawshay-Williams puts strong emphasis on the role of language usage in discussions directed towards the resolution of differences of opinion between the interlocutors. In the introduction to Methods and Criteria of Reasoning he defines his subject as follows: This book enquires how we use language as an instrument of reason, and whether our present use of i t is e f f i c i e n t . (1957: 3)

Crawshay-Williams 's analysis of

controversy

123

In the final chapter Crawshay-Williams characterizes what he had in mind with his work as follows: Indeed I could almost have called i t an Introduction to the Theory of Logic and Rhetoric i f I could have ensured that the word 'logic' would be interpreted not in i t s speciali s t (formal deduction) sense but in the lay sense, and the word 'rhetoric' vice versa, not in the lay sense but in the specialist sense, used by I . A . Richards, of 'a persistent, systematic, detailed inquiry into how words work . . . a study of misunderstanding and i t s remedies'. (1957: 26l) This explicit attention to verbal misunderstandings as a source of controversy in some respects places the work of Crawshay-Williams on a par with that of Naess. Crawshay-Williams starts from the question of how it can come about that there is a difference of opinion between the participants in a discussion and, particul a r l y , how such disagreements can continue to exist, regarding the truth of a statement. Why cannot such disagreements always be resolved? If the defender and the attacker of a given opinion are agreed as to the criteria according to which the statement concerned is to be tested, then, says Crawshay-Williams, it ought not to take long to find out whether: 1. the statement is true or false, 2. the statement is probably true or probably false, and 3. it is impossible to resolve the matter because there is not, or not yet, enough evidence available. However, says Crawshay-Williams, very often the interlocutors find it impossible to reach agreement on conclusion 1, 2 or 3» His explanation for this is that they do not agree on the criteria by which the statement must be tested and that they do not realize that they disagree on this point. One is then dealing with a fundamental misunderstanding. According to Crawshay-Williams, such a fundamental misunderstanding can easily arise if the discourse relates to a particular type of statement which he calls indeterminate. Methods and Criteria of Reasoning is an analysis of discussions concerning indeterminate statements and an attempt at clearing up the misunderstandings which can result from them. As a rule, more members calls such a company who

discussions are conducted between two or of a group of people. Crawshay-Williams group of people a company. Members of a disagree about a particular statement have

124

Major studies on argumentation

three sorts of criterion available to them for the resolution of their disagreement: 1• conventional criteria, 2. logical criteria, and 3- empirical criteria. Using a conventional criterion entails the interlocutors appealing to (other) statements about which the company is agreed. This agreement may have been created by negotiation, by accepting definitions, or by establishing procedures. Crawshay-Williams also counts as conventional criteria statements and rules which are implicitly accepted by the company as being taken for granted. However, he does add the following rider to this: Conventions which are not explicit can of course act e f f e c t ively as c r i t e r i a only while they remain unanimously accepted in a given company. (1957: 11) Both the tacitly accepted rule that in a discussion words must not be used with deviant meanings such that communication becomes impossible, and the logical principle that a statement cannot be simultaneously true and false, are regarded by Crawshay-Williams as examples of conventional criteria. These implicit conventions only come to light when they are violated, and they can only function as criteria if they are unanimously accepted by the company. For example, if during a meeting someone asserts that the vote which has just been taken is invalid because there is no quorum, his words will only be effective if he can back his argument by reference to the current statutes or standing orders, or if the company assembled assumes tacitly but unanimously that a vote is only valid if there is a quorum. Logical criteria have to do with the rules for valid reasoning and good argumentation accepted (implicitly or explicitly) by the company. Empirical criteria comprise an objective criterion and a contextual criterion and relate to statements with an empirical force. The objective criterion entails an empirical statement which must be in accordance with the facts; the contextual criterion is that the manner in which the objective facts are related to one another in the empirical statement must be in accordance, with the purpose of the statement. In Crawshay-Williams's view, the subject and predicate of a statement with an empirical force must always be related to each other with a view to a particular purpose.

Crawshay-Williams 's analysis of

controversy

125

According to him, every empiricial statement is thus in this sense always a methodological statement. The statement 'S is P' is equivalent to the statement 'S is P with a view to purpose M', and according to CrawshayWilliams this statement in turn amounts to the statement 'in connection with purpose M it is a good method to regard S as something which is commonly known as P . ' ^ The purpose of an empirical statement he calls the context of that statement.45 He uses the terms purpose and context in a f a i r l y arbitrary manner, incidentally. This he justifies as follows: I am afraid I must continue to use the words 'purpose' and 'context' somewhat indiscriminately. As can be seen, what I really need i s a word which would cover the range of both notions. (1957: 32) Only if the context of a statement is known, according to Crawshay-Williams, is it possible to determine whether the statement is true or false. In other words, a d i f f e r ence of opinion as to the truth of a statement can never be resolved merely by looking at 'the f a c t s ' , that is by applying the objective criterion on its own; it is always also necessary to provide an answer to the question of what is the purpose of relating these facts to each other. In other words, the contextual criterion must also be applied. Together, the objective and contextual criteria constitute the empirical criterion, which may now be formulated as follows: 'Are the facts such that in connection with, context M we may say that the statement "S is P" is correct?' 46 In practice the context of a statement is often left unexpressed, and according to Crawshay-Williams this is one of the main reasons for the failure of discussions. Statements whose context has neither been expressed nor is clear to those concerned Crawshay-Williams calls indeterminate statements.'*'1 Examples of these are: (1) (2) (3)

Mozart's music comprises fourteen periods. A language i s a set of sentences. Neuroses arise through a disturbance of the normal control apparatus.

The deceptive thing about indeterminate statements, says Crawshay-Williams, is the suggestion which they make that you only have to look at 'the facts' to see if they are true or not. The participants in a discussion about an indeterminate statement who believe that the

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discussion c a n be decided by the a p p l i c a t i o n of the o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n a r e often the victims of t h i s s u g g e s t i o n . They adduce a l l sorts of f a c t s with which they c l a i m the disputed statement a g r e e s , but the d i f f e r e n c e of opinion continues to e x i s t . They c a n only find t h e i r way out of the impasse if they r e a l i z e t h a t they may be assuming different contexts f o r the statement. According to C r a w s h a y Williams, disagreement about an indeterminate statement c a n only be r e s o l v e d i f the statement i s made determinate, i . e . i f the p a r t i e s e x p l i c i t i z e the contexts they have in mind. He demonstrates t h i s with the following e x a m p l e : Mr Brown i s a schoolmaster standing i n a f i e l d near to a white l i n e marked on the ground. Jones and Smith are two schoolboys rapidly approaching him from the same d i r e c t i o n . Jones c r o s s e s the white l i n e at 3*45 p.m. and Smith c r o s s e s i t h a l f a second l a t e r . This, then, i s the s i t u a t i o n and these are o f t e n c a l l e d 'the o b j e c t i v e f a c t s ' . Now how are we going to describe these f a c t s ? Are we going to say t h a t Jones and Smith arrived a t the same time or are we going to say that they a r r i v e d a t d i f f e r e n t times? (1957: 22) According to Crawshay-Williams the answer to t h i s question depends on the purpose which the schoolmaster had in mind when he g a v e the two boys i n s t r u c t i o n s to come to him. I f he only c a l l e d them to him in order to a s k them to get him a deck c h a i r , then the obvious thing would be to s a y t h a t they a r r i v e d at the same time. I f , on the other h a n d , he g a v e them i n s t r u c t i o n s to run a r a c e , then they did not a r r i v e at the same time: since t h e r e was a d i f f e r e n c e of h a l f a second. Thus both the statement ' t h e boys r e a c h e d the master at the same time' and the statement ' t h e boys did not r e a c h the master at the same time may be t r u e . According to C r a w s h a y Williams these two statements only appear c o n t r a d i c t o r y : in r e a l i t y they a r e complementary. That t h i s i s not immediately evident i s b e c a u s e in t h i s form they are indeterminate: the purpose for which the two statements are made h a s not been i n d i c a t e d . When the purpose is formulated e x p l i c i t l y , it t u r n s out t h a t the statements a r e not at a l l c o n t r a d i c t o r y , but i n s t e a d complement one another: (4) Statement 1 in indeterminate form: The boys reached the master at the same time.

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Statement 1 in determinate form: I f the purpose of comparing the times of a r r i v a l i s to e s t a b l i s h whether the boys came as soon as they were c a l l e d by the master, then the boys reached the master a t the same time. (5)

Statement 2 in indeterminate form: The boys did not reach the master a t the same time. Statement 2 in determinate form: I f the purpose of comparing the times of a r r i v a l i s to e s t a b l i s h who has won the r a c e , then the boys did not reach the master a t the same time. An obvious objection to this a n a l y s i s of the example i s that the boys did not in reality (i.e. in fact, strictly speaking) reach the master at the same time, since a s t o p watch would i n d i c a t e a d i f f e r e n c e of half a second. But anybody who r a i s e s t h i s objection, says CrawshayWilliams, commits a g r a v e e r r o r , for he thereby makes a l l p o s s i b l e contexts s u b o r d i n a t e to a s i n g l e context, v i z . one in which a d i f f e r e n c e of half a second i s s i g n i f i c a n t . The o b j e c t o r ' s own context is thus d e c l a r e d to be a universal context. T h i s , s a y s Crawshay-Williams, is a major source of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g : without r e a l i z i n g i t , the interlocutors h a v e d i f f e r e n t contexts in mind for their statements, while each thinks that his own context i s the u n i v e r s a l context. An example of such a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is the following. A company of people a r e d i s c u s s i n g the question of what l a n g u a g e i s . One of the interlocutors s a y s : (6)

Language i s a s e t of sentences. Another interlocutor (7)

says:

Not so: language i s the r e v e l a t i o n and unfolding of our humanity. Each interlocutor b e h a v e s a s though his statement is true in a u n i v e r s a l context; they therefore f i n d themselves d i s a g r e e i n g , a n d the d i s c u s s i o n comes to a h a l t . To s a v e the d i s c u s s i o n the d i s p u t a n t s must make their statements determinate by i n d i c a t i n g in what context they a l l o c a t e their p r e f e r r e d p r e d i c a t e s to the subject language. The

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determinate form of (6) might then look like t h i s : (6a) In order to make a study of the form of a language it is a good method to consider language as a set of sentences.

In t h i s form the methodological c h a r a c t e r of the s t a t e ment is c l e a r l y e v i d e n t , the context of (6) h a s now been formulated e x p l i c i t l y , and the statement h a s t h u s become determinated With a l i t t l e t r o u b l e the context of (7), too, could be e s t a b l i s h e d a n d formulated—though to s a y ' a l i t t l e t r o u b l e ' is p e r h a p s to be somewhat optimistic—in which c a s e the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d p e r h a p s a l s o the d i f f e r e n c e of opinion would be eliminated.'* 9 A more i n t r a c t a b l e problem a r i s e s if the d i s c u s s i o n is about a non-empirical s t a t e m e n t . In t h a t c a s e the d i s c u s s ion cannot be d e c i d e d , a f t e r the p a r t i e s h a v e i n d i c a t e d the context of t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s , by looking at ' t h e f a c t s ' . In such a c a s e , to p u t i t a n o t h e r w a y , the empirical criterion is u s e l e s s . To what extent c a n logical a n d conventional criteria p r o v i d e the answer? We c o n s i d e r C r a w s h a y - W i l l i a m s ' s r e p l y to t h i s question by r e f e r e n c e to the following e x a m p l e . A company of people a r e d i s c u s s i n g the following q u e s tion: (8) Can ethical statements be true or false?

One of the p a r t i e s a n s w e r s t h i s question in the n e g a t i v e , a d v a n c i n g the following a r g u m e n t : (9)

a

b c

Statements in which no facts are expressed cannot be true or false, and In ethical statements no facts are expressed. Therefore: Ethical statements cannot be true or false.

The other p a r t y a n s w e r s the question in the a f f i r m a t i v e , j u s t i f y i n g t h i s by the following a r g u m e n t : (10)

a

Ethical statements can be confirmed and denied with the words 'true' and 'false' respectively; for example: 'it is true that peace is good',

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b

a

and Statements which can be confirmed and denied with the words ' t r u e ' and ' f a l s e 1 r e s p e c t i v e l y can be true or false. Therefore: E t h i c a l statements can be true or f a l s e .

Both argument (9) and argument (10) a r e valid, so t h a t logical criteria are of no help in r e s o l v i n g the d i f ference of opinion r e g a r d i n g ( 8 ) . The p a r t i e s could now s t a r t t a l k i n g about the premisses of the a r g u m e n t s , but t h a t would p r o b a b l y not t a k e them much f u r t h e r , since n e i t h e r (9) a and b nor (10) a and b c a n be tested with the help of e m p i r i c a l c r i t e r i a . If a new argument were put up for (9)a, (9)b, ( 1 0 ) a or (10)b, the d i s c u s s i o n would merely t r a n s f e r i t s e l f to the premisses of the new argument, and so o n . In other words the p a r t i e s a r e l e f t with no a l t e r n a t i v e but to t r y to r e a c h agreement on (8) with the aid of conventional c r i t e r i a . That i s , they will have to negotiate agreements on the meanings in which they a r e going to use the terms ethical statement, true and false. They might decide to define these terms in such a way t h a t e i t h e r conclusion (9 )c or conclusion ( 1 0 ) c becomes an analytic statement. The decision the p a r t i e s a r r i v e at with r e g a r d to the meanings of the terms should not, s a y s C r a w s h a y - W i l l i a m s , be p e r f e c t l y a r b i t r a r y , but must be b a s e d — a s is the c a s e with the e m p i r i c a l c r i t e r i o n — o n contextual c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . I n s t e a d of ( 8 ) , the s u b j e c t of discussion is now ( 1 1 ) : (11)

I s i t s e n s i b l e to t r e a t e t h i c a l which can be true or f a l s e ?

statements

as

statements

In t h i s form the question i s indeterminate, for the context h a s not been i n d i c a t e d . I f the p a r t i e s now go on to formulate the context e x p l i c i t l y , they may then decide whether, on the grounds of the purpose of ( 1 1 ) , they wish to r e g a r d (9)c or (10)c as an a n a l y t i c statement. I f a discussion cannot be decided by the a p p l i c a t i o n of empirical or logical c r i t e r i a , then according to C r a w s h a y Williams the p a r t i e s c a n t r y , a s we h a v e s e e n , to resolve t h e i r d i f f i c u l t y with the a i d of the conventional c r i t e r i o n . Here he r e g a r d s it as being of fundamental importance t h a t a s h a r p d i s t i n c t i o n be made between the creation of a convention ( a g r e e m e n t , law) by the t a k i n g of a d e c i s ion, the n e g o t i a t i n g of a consensus by the members of a

Major studies on argumentation company, and the contextual or methodological considerations which underlie the decision or consensus and which justify i t . What applies to statements like (6) and (9 )c also applies, according to Crawshay-Williams, to logical laws and rules?0 Logical laws and rules, he believes, are valid because they are accepted as such by the members of a company, whether tacitly or on the basis of an explicit agreement: The only rules of logical deduction which are formally valid are those which are accepted as formally valid. (1957: 175) The fact that they are accepted by the company invests them with conventional v a l i d i t y ; but that is not enough. According to Crawshay-Williams they must also have methodological necessity. The company's decision to allocate a rule the conventional status of a logical law must be based—just like the definition of the terms ethical statement, true and false in (8)—on methodological or contextual considerations. Let us take as an example the fundamental logical principle known as the law of noncontradiction: (12)

No statement can ever be simultaneously true and f a l s e . This law is valid because in the majority of companies it is tacitly or explicitly accepted. The reasons for accepting this statement as a logical law invest it with its methodological necessity. The methodological form of (12) might look like this: (12a) In order to be able to speak about the world without getting tied up in knots, i t is a good method not to treat any statement whatever as simultaneously true and f a l s e . That without methodological considerations there would be no reason for the company to accept a given rule as a logical law is something which Crawshay-Williams makes clear by reference to the law of identity: The law of identity, f o r example, seems to assert something which no one but a madman could conceivably doubt: i f A is not A, then we w i l l a l l eat our hats in despair. But, of course, the reason why A simply must be A is that thinking

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and communicating by means of symbols would be impractical otherwise. I f we had no wish to think or communicate at a l l , the reason would disappear. (1957: 224) But even if methodological considerations constitute the reason for accepting a l o g i c a l l a w , it is the acceptance by the company which invests it with the status of ' l o g i c al necessity 1 . According to Crawshay-Williams, the sceptic listening to the methodological considerations which have led the company to accept the law can always s a y , when told that he must accept a particular rule as 'necessarily t r u e ' : That i s perhaps a good reason f o r your saying that I would be well-advised to treat i t so. But i t s t i l l does not explain why you use the word 'must'. Who says I must? The only possible Williams, is:

reply

to this,

according to Crawshay-

Clearly, i t i s we—the company concerned—who say i t . 225)

(1957:

Within the version of a f f a i r s presented by CrawshayWilliams, then, logical validity depends on both the negotiated agreements in a company and the methodological considerations underlying those agreements? 1 In other words, l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y has both a conventional and a contextual b a s i s . If we apply Crawshay-Williams' s view in a general sense to the status of criteria of rationality, we may conclude that in his view these, too, rest on two foundations: a conventional or intersubjective foundation and a contextual or objective foundation. It is this combination that makes Methods and Criteria of Reasoning a contribution to the basis of argumentation theory.

3-4.

Formal dialectic

In this section we shall be discussing a theory of a r g u mentation of recent date: formal dialectic. One of the driving forces behind the development of this theory is E.M. Barth, professor of philosophy at the University of Groningen. Barth is a pupil of Arne Naess and the Dutch philosopher and mathematician E.W. Beth. Barth regards herself as ( i n t e r alia) a c r i t i c a l rationalist building on

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the ideas chiefly of these two masters.52 She wishes to make a contribution to the following three tasks of analytic philosophy: (1) the study of intensional logic, (2) the study of the logical foundations of philosophical systems—revealing the principles which are a philosopher's postulates and which determine the manner in which he thinks and makes deductions—and (3) the development of a theory of argumentation. In what follows we shall confine ourselves to her involvement with argumentation theory. Barth's first major contribution to the development of argumentation theory relates to the conception of rationality, which is the basis upon which every theory of argumentation is founded. As we observed at the end of chapter 1 (p. 49). a theory of argumentation may be regarded as an extended definition or specification of the norms of rationality which are or ought to be applied in the evaluation of argumentation. As we stressed then, these norms of rationality always have a particular underlying conception of rationality, and the differences between existing theories of argumentation can largely be reduced to differences in these underlying conceptions of rationality. In Evaluaties (Evaluations), an inaugural lecture dating from 1972, Barth gives a dual precization of 'logical v a l i d i t y ' . In so doing she builds on the ideas of Crawshay-Williams. The insights which she puts forward are of major significance for the assessment of conceptions of rationality. Evaluaties is concerned with the authority and status of logical laws and rules. In research into the fundamentals of logic, various attempts have been made from a variety of philosophical perspectives to found or justify ' l o g i c ' . According to Barth all these attempts have been doomed to failure from the outset because the problem they are concerned with has been wrongly defined. In the first place it is always erroneously assumed that there is such a thing as a single 'thing' called ' l o g i c ' , and in the second place all these attempts at founding logic are themselves founded on logic: the principles to be justified are the same as those to which an appeal is made during the justification. 53 The word ' l o g i c ' does not refer to any properly defined doctrine or theory, but to a field of study which now accommodates quite a large number of theories. The problem, then, is not how to justify each of these theories singly or collectively, but how to determine whether there

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a r e p a r t i c u l a r r e a s o n s for p r e f e r r i n g one or other of their l o g i c a l systems to a n y or some or a l l of the o t h e r s . Thus it is not a ' Begriindungsproblem' (justification problem) but a 'choice problem' (1972: 9 - 1 8 ) . J u s t l i k e other t h e o r i e s , a l o g i c a l theory i s not absolutely correct between d i f or i n c o r r e c t : there is a comparative relation ferent s y s t e m s : the one system is or i s not better than the n e x t , and thus is or i s not to be p r e f e r r e d . This view is d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the i d e a s of Naess and Crawshay-Williams. The question immediately c a l l e d to mind by the c o m p a r a t i v e r e l a t i o n between d i f f e r e n t l o g i c al systems i s what s o r t s of r e a s o n one would h a v e to a d v a n c e in order to make the comparison turn to the a d v a n t a g e of one of the systems being compared. According to N a e s s , when such a comparison i s being made, the s t a r t i n g point should be the context in which it i s made. This means that the choice of l o g i c a l system must be in some r e l a t i o n to the p u r p o s e which that system and the other systems with which it i s being compared a r e s u p posed to s e r v e . As Crawshay-Williams puts i t , this choice must be made on 'methodological' g r o u n d s . The q u e s t i o n , then, i s to what p u r p o s e or p u r p o s e s a l o g i c a l system must be s u i t e d . Barth a d o p t s R u s s e l l ' s s u g g e s t i o n that l o g i c a l systems should be r e g a r d e d a s p r o p o s a l s for the s o l v i n g of puzzles or problems. What a r e the problems of l o g i c ? Barth b e l i e v e s that a l o g i c a l s y s tem must make it p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h between correct and incorrect deductions a n d must solve s o - c a l l e d ' l o g i c o i n t e l l e c t u a l l a n g u a g e problems' (1972: 1 3 - U ) . She c a l l s the s o l v i n g of problems of v a l i d i t y the ' p r i n c i p a l aim' of theoretical l o g i c ; it i s something sought a f t e r in a l l l o g i c a l s y s t e m s . A l o g i c o - i n t e l l e c t u a l l a n g u a g e problem is defined by Barth a s ' a problem c o n s i s t i n g in the construction of a l i n g u i s t i c f r a g m e n t , such that a c e r t a i n i n t e l l e c t u a l need i s met, while at the same time it should try to achieve the p r i n c i p a l aim of theoretical l o g i c ' (1972: 14). What Barth c a l l s the p r i n c i p a l aim of theoretical logic c o r r e s p o n d s to thè g e n e r a l aims and o b j e c t i v e s which we a s c r i b e d to the study of logic in section 2 . 3 ( p . 101), v i z . to draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between v a l i d and i n v a l i d a r gument forms a n d hence, i n d i r e c t l y , between v a l i d and i n v a l i d a r g u m e n t s . Barth does not e x p l a i n what one i s to u n d e r s t a n d by the s o l v i n g of l o g i c o - i n t e l l e c t u a l l a n g u a g e problems. How we should p i c t u r e it may best be i l l u s t r a t e d by reference to an e x a m p l e . As we saw in section 2 . 3 , the v a l i d i t y of an argument depends on the meanings and positions of the logical

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constants in the argument. The meaning a l l o c a t e d to a l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t in a l o g i c a l system—in other words, i t s d e f i n i t i o n — i s p a r t of t h a t system. But for what l o g i c o i n t e l l e c t u a l l a n g u a g e problem c a n , for e x a m p l e , the d e f inition of a p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t a n t be r e g a r d e d a s a solution? Let us t a k e the definition of negation a s our e x a m p l e . The problem t h a t h a n g s together with t h i s i s the followi n g : 'How must the l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t not ( ~ ) be defined in order to make it p o s s i b l e to draw a d i s t i n c t i o n b e tween c o r r e c t and i n c o r r e c t deductions in so f a r a s the c o r r e c t n e s s depends on the use of not ?' One solution to t h i s problem i s to define the word not as follows: 'The addition of t h i s l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t to a true statement produces a f a l s e statement, and the a d d ition of t h i s l o g i c a l statement to a f a l s e statement p r o d uces a true s t a t e m e n t . ' This i s only one of the p o s s i b l e solutions to t h i s l o g i c o - i n t e l l e c t u a l l a n g u a g e problem: others a r e a l s o c o n c e i v a b l e ( a n d have been p r o p o s e d ) . It is a l s o true of other l o g i c o - i n t e l l e c t u a l l a n g u a g e p r o b lems t h a t t h e r e i s more than one p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n . I f a proposed solution indeed solves the problem a s s e t , then it is ' a d e q u a t e in r e l a t i o n to t h i s p r o b l e m ' . Since a problem c a n have more than one a d e q u a t e s o l u t i o n , the question a r i s e s on what grounds one should p r e f e r one solution to another or o t h e r s . B a r t h i s of the opinion t h a t two sorts of c o n s i d e r a t i o n underly t h i s c h o i c e : (1) c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e l a t i n g to objective validity and (2) c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e l a t i n g to intersubjeative validity. Considerations of objective validity e n t a i l the followi n g . A l o g i c a l system or a l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e i s ' o b j e c t i v e l y b e t t e r ' than another system or p r i n c i p l e , a c c o r d i n g to B a r t h , when, and only when, t h e r e i s at l e a s t one l o g i c o - i n t e l l e c t u a l l a n g u a g e problem for which t h a t system or p r i n c i p l e is a d e q u a t e and the other i s not, and i f there i s no l o g i c o - i n t e l l e c t u a l l a n g u a g e problem for which the converse i s t r u e . A system or p r i n c i p l e t h a t i s b e t t e r than all other competing systems or p r i n c i p l e s i s objectively valid. In view of the comparative n a t u r e of o b j e c t ive v a l i d i t y , it i s c l e a r l y s u s c e p t i b l e of g r a d a t i o n . Barth r e g a r d s o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y , which may a l s o be termed problem validity, a s 'one p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t p r e c i z a t i o n ' of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y (1972: 1 4 ) . This f i r s t p r e c i z ation of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y i s in accord with C r a w s h a y W i l l i a m s ' s c r i t e r i o n of methodological n e c e s s i t y , which we d i s c u s s e d in section 3 . 3 ( p p . 130 f f . ) . Considerations of inter subjective validity e n t a i l the following. Not every l a n g u a g e u s e r h a s to be convinced once and for a l l of the a d e q u a c y of a p a r t i c u l a r solution

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for a p a r t i c u l a r l o g i c o - i n t e l l e c t u a l l a n g u a g e problem. According to B a r t h t h i s means t h a t the p r e c i z a t i o n of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y as o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y (or problem v a l i d i t y ) i s i n s u f f i c i e n t and t h a t a second p r e c i z a t i o n is r e q u i r e d . Barth c a l l s her second proposed p r e c i z a t i o n t h a t of inter subjective or conventional validity; it corresponds to Crawshay-Williams 1 s ' c o n v e n t i o n a l ' c r i t e r i o n . According to t h i s p r e c i z a t i o n , a l o g i c a l system or l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e is a ' l o g i c a l c o n v e n t i o n ' i f , and only i f , the members of a predetermined company have committed themselves e x p l i c i t l y to t h a t system or p r i n c i p l e by a written d e c l a r ation to t h a t e f f e c t . I n t e r s u b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y is timedependent. B a r t h r e g a r d s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y a s a 'second p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t p r e c i z a t i o n ' of l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y (1972: 1 6 ) . It will be a p p a r e n t t h a t in p r a c t i c e it will s c a r c e l y be possible to find a l o g i c a l system or p r i n c i p l e which meets the above condition and deserves to be termed intersubjective validity. In the m a j o r i t y of c a s e s there is no 'predetermined company' and t h e r e is no d e c l a r a tion set out in a signed document. At the b e s t of times it may be p o s s i b l e to deduce from t e x t s without the s t a t u s of a document t h a t for a p a r t i c u l a r but i m p r e c i s e l y defined group of people c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s a p p e a r to have the s t a t u s of c o n v e n t i o n s . In such c a s e s B a r t h r e f e r s to ' l o g i c a l s e m i - c o n v e n t i o n s ' and ' s e m i - c o n v e n t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s ' h a v i n g ' s e m i - c o n v e n t i o n a l v a l i d i t y ' (1972: 1 6 ) . We thus f i n d t h a t the normative s t r e n g t h of the l o g i c a l systems and p r i n c i p l e s commonly accepted h i t h e r t o h a s , according to the dual p r e c i z a t i o n proposed by B a r t h , two d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s : (1) problem v a l i d i t y and (2) semiconventional v a l i d i t y . Both problem (or o b j e c t i v e ) v a l i d i t y and i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e (or c o n v e n t i o n a l ) v a l i d i t y are n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s , and it is thus only in c o n j u n c t i o n t h a t they c o n s t i t u t e a s u f f i c i e n t condition for being a b l e to a r r i v e at ' a n optimum progression of monologic and d i a logic speech a c t s ' (1972: 1 7 ) . The p r e c i z a t i o n of ' l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y ' into a 'problem v a l i d i t y ' susceptible of gradation and a time-dependent ' c o n v e n t i o n a l v a l i d i t y ' means t h a t an absolute value cannot be a l l o c a t e d to any l o g i c a l system or p r i n c i p l e in a d v a n c e , but it a l s o means t h a t a t o t a l l y relativistic standpoint, which implies t h a t the v a l u e of a l o g i c a l system or p r i n c i p l e depends e x c l u s i v e l y on the audience or company e v a l u a t i n g i t , should be rejected. S t a r t i n g from the t h r e e approaches to r a t i o n a l i t y d i s t i n g u i s h e d by Toulmin in Knowing and Acting and outlined by us at the end of our f i r s t c h a p t e r (pp. 50 f f . ) , it is

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undoubtedly best to characterize the approach chosen by Barth (following in the footsteps of Naess and CrawshayWilliams) as a critical approach. What is its s i g n i f i cance for argumentation theory? Although the point of view set out by Barth in Evaluaties relates to logical validity, it also provides us with a useful starting point for the development of norms of rationality for the assessment of the soundness of argumentation, for the dual precization of ' l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y ' is wholly applicable to 'argumentative soundness'. To continue with our terminol o g i c a l analogy with l o g i c a l c r i t e r i a , we may say that criteria for the soundness of argumentation must be both problem sound and conventionally or semi-conventionally sound. By reference to Barth's c r i t i c a l understanding of r a t i o n a l i t y it is thus possible to indicate what the authority of rules in a normative theory of argumentation should be founded on. In other words, this understanding of r a t i o n a l i t y provides a basis for a normative theory of argumentation The consequence of applying this c r i t i c a l understanding of r a t i o n a l i t y to the c r i t e r i a for assessing the soundness of an argumentation is that any idea of universal rules for argumentation has to be abandoned. Rules for a r g u mentation are neither absolute nor timeless; they are more or less adequate to the task of solving certain problems and they are confined to a particular company which at a particular time is prepared to adhere to them. In the study of argumentation theory it w i l l be necessary to formulate several different proposals for rule systems for argumentation. And for each of these systems it w i l l be necessary to indicate which problems can be solved with its help, so that a company of potential interlocutors can make a reasoned choice. The problem-sound system chosen thereby also acquires conventional soundness and can then—and not b e f o r e — r i g h t l y be termed an adequate theory of argumentation. The second contribution made by Barth to the development of argumentation theory to which we wish to draw attention here is concerned with formal dialectic, which in its present form may be regarded as the beginning of an adequate theory of argumentation. The expression 'formal d i a l e c t i c ' was coined by Hamblin, who uses it to denote a system of rules for adducing arguments in a rational discussion; he was himself the f i r s t to t r y to design such a formal dialectic (1970: 253-82). However, Barth's contribution is based not on Hamblin's proposals but on the work of the German logician and philosopher

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Paul Lorenzen. In articles, lectures and talks Barth has put forward interesting ideas on the development of a formal dialectic theory of argumentation, and she has thus aroused considerable interest in the subject. Together with the logician E.C.W. Krabbe she has formulated various systems of a formal dialectic theory of argumentation The insights of Lorenzen on which Barth and Krabbe base their formal dialectic relate to the dialogical definition of logical constants. This is a development of historical significance because it signals the initiation of a pragmatic approach to logic. Building on the method of semantic tableaux introduced by Beth, Lorenzen developed a method of using what he calls dialogic tableaux to determine in what cases a person in a critical discussion about a particular thesis can win or lose the discussion.56 In a lecture of 1971, only recently published, Barth described the significance of this as follows: In about I960 Paul Lorenzen wrote ... Beth a letter, which I once read. In my view this letter deserves to be regarded as a historic document; unfortunately it cannot now be found. In this letter Lorenzen wrote to Beth: I set myself the task of taking the connectives and other logically important nonreferring words and defining them by describing the ways in which they are used in a dispute: that is to say, in a discussion between people who are disagreed about something. ... So Lorenzen took the interaction between a speaker and a critical listener—not just a passive or amenable listener prepared to allow himself to be swept along by a rhetor, but one who not only adopts a critical attitude but also puts it into words. On the rules for use which emerged in this way, Lorenzen wrote to Beth (in the letter referred t o — I am quoting from memory): 'und dann entstehen eben Ihre Tableaus' [and that is just when your tableaux are created]. (1980: 45-6) The great significance of the dialogic definition of logical constants, according to Barth, is that Lorenzen thereby demonstrates that modern logic is 'essentially' pragmatic: First, he has very explicitly introduced man—the language user—into logical theory, so that logic—modern logic— appears in a new, pragmatic garb. Second, he has also shown that man was already there in that logic, albeit not clearly visible to one and all. (198O: 46)

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To introduce our discussion of the formal dialectic of Barth and Krabbe we shall now give a general outline of those insights of Lorenzen which are of the greatest significance for the development of this theory of argumentation. Lorenzen worked them out in collaboration with colleagues and students at the university of Erlangen, West Germany, and the group round him, including Kuno Lorenz, Wilhelm Kamiah and Oswald Schwemmer, is sometimes known as the ' Erlangen School 1 . The school 1 s activities are not confined to logic alone but also extend to the philosophy of science, ethics, mathematics and the social sciences. The insights of the Erlangen School regarding argumentation are most clearly expressed in the following works: Logisahe Propädeutik by Kamlah and Lorenzen (1967; second edition 1973), Konstruktive Logik, Ethik und Wissenschaftstheorie by Lorenzen and Schwemmer (1973; second edition 1975), and Dialogische Logik by Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978). The last-named is a collection of the authors' earlier publications and is chiefly notable as a document of the development of the thinking of the Erlangen School. Ever since the appearance of Aristotle's Prior Analytics logicians have been chiefly concerned with formal aspects of the v a l i d i t y of deductions; the actual activity of a r guing in discussions between language users has gradua l l y been pushed into the background. According to Lorenzen and his associates this has meant that logic has evolved into a discipline increasingly divorced from the practice of argumentation and now appearing to have very little or no direct relevance to discussions in colloquial language. The activities of the Erlangen School are calculated to counteract this trend. One of the first contributions in this direction was Logische Propädeutik, which contains proposals for regimenting language usage in general and argumentative usage in particular. Konstruktive Logik, Ethik und Wissenschaftstheorie is a sequel to the 'Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens' ( ' P r e p a r a t o r y course in Rational O r a t o r y ' ) which is intended to provide these ' l o g i c a l propadeutics' and is described by the authors as 'a basic course in technical and practical r a t i o n a l i t y ' . The logical propadeutics provide 'the building blocks and rules for all rational o r a t o r y ' , which are supposed to enable the meaningful conduct of discussions on scientific and practical problems. The premiss for the logical propadeutics is that the usage of the interlocutors in a discussion or conversation

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must comply with c e r t a i n norms and r u l e s in order to prevent the i n t e r l o c u t o r s s p e a k i n g at c r o s s purposes in i n t e r m i n a b l e monologues. It is only when they have j o i n t l y accepted a number of e s t a b l i s h e d p o s t u l a t e s in respect of l a n g u a g e usage t h a t the i n t e r l o c u t o r s c a n have a s e n s i b l e d i s c u s s i o n . In the l o g i c a l propadeutics a l a n g u a g e i s c o n s t r u c t e d which e n a b l e s i n t e r l o c u t o r s to conduct meani n g f u l argumentation with each o t h e r . This l a n g u a g e i s c a l l e d the ' o r t h o l a n g u a g e ' and is c o n s t r u c t e d from f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s (ab ovo)- However, the starting point i s d e l i b e r a t e l y t a k e n to be the u s a g e t h a t l a n g u a g e u s e r s a r e a l r e a d y accustomed to u s i n g , and in t h a t sense the c o n s t r u c t e d o r t h o l a n g u a g e i s to some extent a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of o r d i n a r y c o l l o q u i a l l a n g u a g e . 5 7 Kamlah and Lorenzen s t a r t the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the o r t h o l a n g u a g e at what they r e g a r d as the smallest and simplest u n i t s of v e r b a l communication: elementary sentences. From here they a r r i v e at the regimentation of complex or compound sentences, in which logical constants p l a y an important r o l e . Since in t h e i r formal d i a l e c t i c B a r t h and Krabbe s t a r t from the regimentation proposed by Kamlah and Lorenzen for the use of l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s , t h a t will be the c h i e f o b j e c t of our attention h e r e . As r e g a r d s the rest of the l o g i c a l propadeutics we s h a l l g i v e only a g e n e r a l and s e l e c t i v e o u t l i n e , c o n c e n t r a t i n g c h i e f l y on elements n e c e s s a r y for a proper u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the regimentation of l o g i c a l constants. As we have s a i d , the s t a r t i n g point of the l o g i c a l propadeutics i s t h a t elementary sentences a r e the b a s i c units of l a n g u a g e u s a g e . Elementary sentences a r e used by the s p e a k e r s of a l l n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s , and they are i n d i s p e n s a b l e for s p e a k i n g to other l a n g u a g e u s e r s . To e x p l a i n what an elementary sentence i s , it is e a s i e s t to t a k e an e x a m p l e . 'William is a dog' is an example of an elementary s e n t e n c e . In i t , a thing i d e n t i f i e d by the word 'William' i s a l l o c a t e d the a t t r i b u t e ' d o g 1 . In the sentence 'William i s not a d o g ' , by c o n t r a s t , the p r e d i c a t o r ' d o g ' is withheld from the proper name ' W i l l i a m ' . This too is an elementary s e n t e n c e , j u s t as a r e the s e n tences 'William s n i f f s at B e t s y ' a n a 'William does not s n i f f at B e t s y ' , in which the p r e d i c a t o r ' s n i f f a t ' is ' a d d r e s s e d t o ' or ' d e n i e d ' two proper names. An elementa r y s e n t e n c e , t h e n , is one in which a p r e d i c a t o r i s a l l o c a t e d to or withheld from one or more proper names. Kamlah and Lorenzen propose the following r e g i m e n t ation of the forms of elementary s e n t e n c e s :

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x1(,x2,..-Jxn) x t ( , x 2 , • • •, x n )

e

on

argumentation

F

e' P

In this regimented form, x is a v a r i a b l e for proper names, P is a predicator v a r i a b l e , e is an abbreviation of the Greek ¿CTTIV ( ' i s ' ) and e1 an abbreviation of its negation ( ' i s n o t ' ) . Substituting proper names and p r e dicators for the relevant v a r i a b l e s in this sentence form, which is not confined to any particular colloquial l a n g uage, produces an elementary sentence. An elementary sentence in which it is asserted (case a) or denied ( b ) that a particular predicator belongs to a particular proper name or to particular proper names is also called an elementary statement in which an elementary p r e d i c a tion is c a r r i e d out. By the use of proper names elementary sentences are independent of the particular discourse situation in which they are uttered, so that they are eminently suitable for scientific usage. The reason for this is that proper names substitute for deiotic (demonstrative) acts which are by contrast wholly dependent on the situation. If one wishes to allocate a particular predicator, e . g . ' d o g ' , to a thing, one may do so by pointing at the thing and s a y i n g : 'That is a d o g . ' However, it is also possible to g i v e the thing a name, e . g . ' W i l l i a m ' , and then to say: 'William is a d o g . ' The proper name 'William' then replaces the demonstrative pronoun ' t h a t ' and renders the deictic act superfluous. Although it is in principle possible to allocate a proper name to anything to which a predicator can be attributed, in practice this is not f e a s i b l e ; neither is it necessary. For this reason alongside proper names use is made of definite descriptions which g e n e r a l l y consist of a small group of words and which, like proper names, refer to one thing o n l y . In place of the proper name ' W i l l i a m ' , for example, one might use the definite description 'the animal by the lamp-post'. It is immediately apparent from this example that replacing a proper name b y a definite description makes the language user more dependent on the discourse situation, though it is possible to keep this dependence to a minimum. Sentences containing definite descriptions in the place of proper names are called semi-elementary sentences. One of the f i r s t requirements for a meaningful discussion, of course, is that the predicators occurring in elementary or semi-elementary sentences should be use in the same way by a l l the interlocutors. A common method

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of teaching l a n g u a g e u s e r s to use p r e d i c a t o r s c o r r e c t l y is to g i v e examples and c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s : 'That is a dog, that is not a dog but a c a t , that is not a dog but a c o w ' , and so on. T h i s , an extremely common method in the period of p r i m a r y l a n g u a g e a c q u i s i t i o n , is c a l l e d 'introduction by means of e x a m p l e s ' . Now not a l l p r e d i c a t o r s can be introduced by means of examples and c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s . In p a r t i c u l a r , it is not possible in the case of a b s t r a c t p r e d i c a t o r s (abstractors) l i k e ' f a c t ' , 'concept' and ' m e a n i n g ' . We s h a l l not go into this in a n y g r e a t e r depth h e r e , but merely observe that such p r e d i c a t o r s a r e often used d i f f e r e n t l y by d i f ferent i n t e r l o c u t o r s . But even in the c a s e of n o n - a b s t r a c t p r e d i c a t o r s this is not impossible, and that means that it is n e c e s s a r y to h a v e a more p r e c i s e regimentation of the use of p r e d i c a t o r s in g e n e r a l , in order to eliminate the p o s s i b i l i t y of interlocutors t a l k i n g at cross p u r p o s e s . To this end, e x p l i c i t agreements must be negotiated to g u a r a n t e e the c o r r e c t , consistent and unambiguous use of predicators. Predicators whose introduction is effected by means of e x p l i c i t agreements a r e the terms (termini) of the orthol a n g u a g e . Making use of terms a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e , it is then possible with the help of definitions to introduce new terms. Here one has to a p p e a l to two or more predicator rules, which l i n k terms together and thus b r i n g about the creation of a terminology. A p r e d i c a t o r rule indicates that it i s legitimate to move from one g i v e n elementary statement to another. The regimentation a p p l i e d by p r e d i c a t o r r u l e s can be i l l u s t r a t e d as follows: (a) x z P =*• x e Q (b) x e P *» X e« Q E x p r e s s e d d i a l o g i c a l l y this means that it is e s t a b l i s h e d that whoever a s s e r t s a substitution instance of x e P > e . g . 'William is a d o g ' , may not dispute a p a r t i c u l a r substitution instance of x z Q> e - g - 'William is a mammal' (case a ) , nor may he dispute a g i v e n substitution instance of x e 1 Q» e - g - 'William is not a mollusc' ( b ) . In the case of a definition two or more p r e d i c a t o r rules a r e combined, so that defining can be r e g a r d e d as a form of a b b r e v i a t i n g . Moreover, it w i l l be a g r e e d that the compound p r e d i c a t o r r u l e may be r e a d either from l e f t to r i g h t or from r i g h t to l e f t . To c l a r i f y t h i s , let us take another e x a m p l e . Just now we described terms as p r e d i c a t o r s introduced by means of e x p l i c i t agreements. The use of the term 'term' can now be regimented as

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follows (the conjunction mark A indicates that two p r e dicator rules have been amalgamated and the sign shows that the rule c a n also be read in reverse o r d e r ) : 5 8 x e t e r m » x E predicator A X E

e x p l i c i t l y agreed

On this b a s i s the definition of 'term' reads as (the sign indicates that this is a definition):

follows

term —— e x p l i c i t l y agreed predicator By the e x p l i c i t l y agreed terms, the formulating of predicator rules and the introduction of new terms by means of definitions, the use of p r e d i c a t o r s has now been regimented. This means that those l a n g u a g e users who know the regimentation and adhere to it will use the predicators occurring in a discussion c o r r e c t l y , c o n s i s t ently and unambiguously. The f i r s t and most fundamental condition for the success of the discussion has thus been fulfilled. However, another condition is that the i n t e r locutors c a n agree as to the manner in which the truth of elementary sentences can be e s t a b l i s h e d . To put this another w a y , the interlocutors must ensure that they reach agreement as to whether a predicator which is in itself c l e a r is or is not rightly being allocated to or withheld from a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g . In order to e s t a b l i s h the truth value of an elementary statement, Kamlah and Lorenzen s a y it is n e c e s s a r y to check whether that s t a t e ment corresponds to a p a r t i c u l a r state of a f f a i r s in r e a l i t y . However, this check cannot be entrusted to just any l a n g u a g e u s e r : it must be c a r r i e d out by expert and rational s p e a k e r s . ' E x p e r t ' here means that the l a n g u a g e users concerned a r e in a position to c a r r y out the r e l e v ant check in a c o r r e c t manner, and ' r a t i o n a l ' means that they will not in any event allow themselves to be guided purely by emotions, habit and t r a d i t i o n . Kamlah and. Lorenzen themselves summarize their concept of truth as follows: And i f every other person who speaks the same language as I , and who i s expert and r a t i o n a l , would, a f t e r suitable checks, address the predicator 'P' (or a synonymous predica t o r ) to a thing, then I too am e n t i t l e d to say ' t h i s i s P' ( i n which case the predicator 1 P' belongs to that t h i n g ) . And i f t h i s condition i s f u l f i l l e d , then I may say f u r t h e r : 'the statement " t h i s i s P" i s t r u e ' (in which case the predicator ' t r u e ' belongs to that statement), or a l t e r n a t i v e l y :

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'the assertion "this is P" is justified.' (1973: 119-20) When the proper check has been carried out in the appropriate manner by competent language users and has led to a unanimously positive judgement, the elementary statement can then justly be described as ' t r u e ' . This does not mean, however, that an elementary statement with which no one happens to agree at a particular moment is not true. The absence of agreement may, after a l l , be the result of. a lack of the necessary f a c i l i t i e s for c a r r y i n g out the required checks. Thus an elementary statement may be perfectly true even though there is nobody, or not yet anybody, prepared to confirm i t , but of course it is only true if someone in a position to c a r r y out the proper checks in the correct manner would, if he actually did c a r r y them out, be obliged to endorse it. Establishing the truth value of elementary statements, then, according to Kamlah and Lorenzen, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of agreement among competent language users who have carried out suitable checks c o r r e c t l y . Kamlah and Lorenzen c a l l this the 'interpersonal v e r i f i c a t i o n ' of statements, and they r e g a r d it as the general framework within which establishing the truth value of elementary statements ought to take place. The particular methods and techniques used by the expert and rational language users during their checks may v a r y considerably from case to case and may change r a d i c a l l y during the course of time. Interpersonal v e r i f i c a t i o n is thus not itself a 'method' of determining the truth value of elementary statements, but a universal and constant principle serving as a general g u i d e l i n e . Interpersonal v e r i f i c a t i o n is concerned exclusively with elementary statements, the simplest units of v e r b a l communication in which something can be asserted or d i s puted. However, complex statements can also be put forward, attacked and defended in a discussion—indeed, generally speaking they are more common than elementary statements. The truth value of such statements can only be established after analysis has taken place to determine the manner in which they are composed of e l e mentary statements. In other words, complex statements f i r s t have to be decomposed, and this requires an understanding of the principles p l a y i n g a part in their composition. Complex sentences are built up from elementary

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sentences using logical constants, which Kamlah and Lorenzen c a l l logical particles (connectives or junctors and quantors). Establishing the truth value of complex sentences thus demands the regimentation of the use of logical p a r t i c l e s . Kamlah and Lorenzen do this in the following w a y . They introduce the l o g i c a l particles dialogicallyy which is quite a different approach from d e f inition using truth values, which is common in propositional logic (see section 2 . 3 ) . The dialogic introduction of l o g i c a l particles means that Kamlah and Lorenzen formulate rules for the use of these particles in a d i a logue. These rules l a y down how the interlocutors have to behave in respect of such particles when taking part in dialogue. The dialogic method makes f u l l use of the fact that human language usage is c h i e f l y directed towards a listener or listeners. If the listener reacts, then a d i a logue has been i n i t i a t e d . Statements are not posited as true or false 'just like t h a t ' : they are asserted or disputed before an interlocutor who may act as an opponent or as a proponent of the same statements. A dialogic definition of l o g i c a l particles (junctors and quantors) therefore implies that an indication is given of what course the dialogue must take to j u s t i f y or refute the statements constructed with the help of these p a r t i c l e s . In what follows we shall discuss b r i e f l y how l o g i c a l particles are defined in the l o g i c a l propadeutics. We shall confine ourselves to the junctors:

(1)

'and'

(2)

'or'

(3)

'if

(4)

'not'

- conjunction

- disjunction ( i n Kamlah and Lorenzen's terminology:

adjunction)

Conjunction

••• then'

- implication ( i n Kamlah and Lorenzen 1 s terminology:

subjunction) - negation

(A )

Suppose a speaker acts as the proponent of the thesis A A B, i . e . he asserts the conjunction 'A A B ' . Another speaker, who acts as the opponent of this thesis, is then entitled to choose either of the two component statements and cast doubt on its v e r a c i t y . If the proponent is unable to defend this statement, then the opponent has won, and he has won d e f i n i t i v e l y . I f , however, the proponent

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p a r r i e s the a t t a c k b y a s u c c e s s f u l d e f e n c e of the a t t a c k e d component statement, then he h a s won, but not d e f i n i t i v e l y , s i n c e the opponent i s s t i l l e n t i t l e d to u n d e r t a k e a second a t t a c k . If i n the f i r s t round he u n s u c c e s s f u l l y a t t a c k e d ' A ' , he may now a t t a c k ' B ' . If the second a t t a c k s u c c e e d s , then the opponent h a s won ( d e f i n i t i v e l y ) and if the proponent s u c c e e d s in p a r r y i n g t h i s second a t t a c k too, b y s u c c e s s f u l l y d e f e n d i n g the a t t a c k e d s t a t e ment ' B ' , then he h a s won, t h i s time d e f i n i t i v e l y . Adjunction

( v )

Suppose a s p e a k e r a c t s as the proponent of the t h e s i s A v B, i . e . he a s s e r t s the a d j u n c t i o n 'A v B ' . The o p ponent of t h i s t h e s i s i s then e n t i t l e d to a t t a c k the comp l e x statement b y c a s t i n g doubt on a l l of it at o n c e . The proponent may now choose one of the two component statements and attempt to d e f e n d i t . If he s u c c e e d s , he h a s won, and in t h i s c a s e he h a s at once won d e f i n i t i v e l y . If h i s d e f e n c e f a i l s he h a s l o s t , but at t h i s s t a g e he h a s not lost d e f i n i t i v e l y s i n c e he c a n s t i l l 'make t r u e 1 h i s statement in a second round of d e f e n c e , s i n c e he may be a b l e to p r o d u c e a s u c c e s s f u l defence of the other component s t a t e m e n t . If t h i s second d e f e n c e i s u n d e r t a k e n a n d s u c c e e d s , the proponent h a s won a f t e r a l l , and he has' then won d e f i n i t i v e l y ; if it f a i l s , on the other h a n d , he h a s then lost d e f i n i t i v e l y . The symbolic n o t a t i o n s A and v r e f l e c t the f a c t t h a t in s e v e r a l r e s p e c t s c o n j u n c t i o n and a d j u n c t i o n a r e d i a l o g i c mirror i m a g e s of e a c h o t h e r . In the c a s e of a c o n j u n c t i o n the c h o i c e of the component statement to be d e f e n d e d i s up to the opponent, in the c a s e of an a d j u n c t i o n it i s up to the p r o p o n e n t . In the c a s e of a c o n j u n c t i o n the proponent needs two rounds to r e a c h a d e f i n i t i v e v i c t o r y , w h i l e he h a s to lose o n l y one round in o r d e r to lose definitively; in the c a s e of an a d j u n c t i o n the c o n v e r s e is t r u e : now the opponent needs two rounds for a d e f i n i t i v e w i n , and the l o s s of o n l y one round is enough to b r i n g about h i s d e f i n i t i v e d e f e a t . Sub junction

( -> )

Suppose a s p e a k e r a c t s as the proponent of the t h e s i s A -» B, i . e . he a s s e r t s the s u b j u n c t i o n 'A -» B ' . The opponent of t h i s t h e s i s is then e n t i t l e d to a t t a c k t h i s statement b y c a s t i n g doubt on a l l of it at o n c e . If he

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does so, he is then himself o b l i g e d to p o s t u l a t e ' A ' . The proponent of the t h e s i s 'A B ' is now in turn e n t i t l e d to a t t a c k ' A ' a n d the opponent is o b l i g e d to d e f e n d ' A ' . If the proponent h a s indeed c a s t doubt on ' A ' and the opponent f a i l s s u c c e s s f u l l y to defend ' A ' , then the p r o ponent h a s won the e n t i r e d i a l o g u e , a n d he h a s at once won it d e f i n i t i v e l y . I f , on the other h a n d , the opponent succeeds in h i s defence of ' A ' , then the proponent must go on to a s s e r t a n d defend ' B ' . If t h i s defence s u c c e e d s , the proponent h a s then won, a n d h a s won d e f i n i t i v e l y , but if it f a i l s he h a s l o s t , a n d lost d e f i n i t i v e l y . Thus in the c a s e of a s u b j u n c t i o n , too, the d i a l o g u e may c o n s i s t of two r o u n d s . However, in the c a s e of c o n j u n c t i o n s and a d j u n c t i o n s one of the two p a r t i e s a l w a y s h a s to do two r o u n d s : in the c a s e of a conjunction the proponent h a s twice to defend a statement in o r d e r to a c h i e v e d e f i n i t i v e v i c t o r y , a n d in the c a s e of an a d junction the opponent h a s twice to a t t a c k a statement in order to a c h i e v e d e f i n i t i v e v i c t o r y . If in the c a s e of a s u b j u n c t i o n the d i a l o g u e r u n s to two r o u n d s , then the p a r t i e s only h a v e to do one round e a c h : in the f i r s t round the opponent d e f e n d s a statement ( ' A ' ) and in the second the proponent d e f e n d s a statement ( ' B ' ) . In both moves the proponent h a s a c h a n c e of d e f i n i t i v e v i c t o r y , w h i l e the opponent c a n a c h i e v e d e f i n i t i v e v i c t o r y o n l y b y the second move. T h i s i s another w a y in which s u b j u n c t ions a r e d i f f e r e n t from conjunctions a n d a d j u n c t i o n s . Negation

( T)

Suppose a s p e a k e r a c t s a s the proponent of the t h e s i s i A, i . e . he a s s e r t s the n e g a t i o n 1 l A ' . The opponent of t h i s t h e s i s c a n a t t a c k the a s s e r t i o n ' 1 A ' b y himself s a y i n g ' A ' . If he' i s s u b s e q u e n t l y in a position to d e f e n d ' A ' s u c c e s s f u l l y then h i s a t t a c k h a s succeeded a n d he h a s o b t a i n e d a d e f i n i t i v e v i c t o r y . I f , on the other h a n d , he is u n a b l e to d e f e n d ' A ' s u c c e s s f u l l y , then the p r o ponent" of the t h e s i s T A h a s won d e f i n i t i v e l y . On the s t r e n g t h of these d e f i n i t i o n s Kamlah and L o r e n zen formulate the f o l l o w i n g r u l e s f o r the use of j u n c t o r s . These r u l e s l a y down the r i g h t to a s s e r t or d i s p u t e a p a r t i c u l a r statement in a d i a l o g u e in a p a r t i c u l a r m a n n e r , a n d they may t h e r e f o r e be r e g a r d e d a s a dialogic definition of these l o g i c a l p a r t i c l e s .

assertion conjunction adjunction subjunction negation

A A

A A

B B

A V B A v B

attack

defence

L(eft)? R(ight)?

A B

7

A B

?

A -» B

A?

B

1A

A?

-

Fig. 3.S. Rules for the use of junctors. If the proponent in a dialogue uses a conjunction the opponent can choose from two possible lines of attack: ' L ? ' and ' R ? ' . If the proponent uses an adjunction which is attacked by the opponent, he has the choice of two possible lines of defence: ' A ' and ' B ' . Where a subjunction has been used, following an attack by the opponent the proponent may, instead of defending himself with ' B ' , make a counter-attack on ' A ' . And f i n a l l y , where a negation has been employed the proponent has no direct line of defence against attack from the opponent. He thus has no alternative but to carry out a counter-attack. The rules for using junctors have a decomposing e f f e c t . This means that a dialogue containing statements composed using junctors will always, after a finite number of moves, lead to elementary statements being asserted, since in the attacking and defending moves permitted by the rules there are only component statements (or p a r t statements) from the original assertions. This means that the interlocuotrs must know how a decision can be taken regarding the right to assert an elementary sentence before they can determine who has f i n a l l y won the d i a logue. In order to be able to indicate in what cases the proponent of a compound statement can conclude the dialogue with v i c t o r y , however, it is also necessary to have more precisely established rules for the conduct of dialogues. Rules are needed to indicate which statements may be 147

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attacked at any particular moment, and which defended, and which of the two p a r t i e s ' 'turn' it i s . These rules are the conventions of the dialogue game. Kamlah and Lorenzen distinguish three different sets of rules for the dialogue game. Here we shall discuss only the rules of the game they c a l l the constructive dialogue garnet Starting rule: The proponent starts by asserting a thesis; the partners in the dialogue take turns to move. Winning rule: The proponent wins if he successfully defends an attacked elementary statement or if the opponent f a i l s to defend an attacked elementary statement. General dialogue rule: The proponent attacks one of the statements put forward by the opponent or defends himself against the opponent's most recent attack; the opponent attacks the statement made by the proponent in the preceding move or defends himself against the proponent's attack in the preceding move. These rules for the constructive dialogue game are concerned with a material game. That is to s a y , ultimate v i c t o r y depends on successfully defending an elementary statement. But the truth or f a l s i t y of some compound statements can be established without account having to be taken of the truth values of the component elementary statements. This is the case with l o g i c a l truths ( t a u t o logies) and l o g i c a l f a l s i t i e s {contradictions), since the truth or f a l s i t y of the particular compound statement concerned is then not primarily dependent on that statement itself but on the statement form of which it is a substitution instance. Logical truth and l o g i c a l f a l s i t y can therefore be established in dialogues in which statement forms (formulae) take the place of statements. This g i v e s rise to a formal dialogue. For formal dialogue games to be possible the general dialogue rule must be changed so that the proponent is prohibited, when defending a formula, from attacking elementary statements; the opponent, however, may attack elementary .statements, but then the proponent has no defence. The winning rule must also be modified. According to Kamlah and Lorenzen the formal dialogue game with formulae constitutes an abstraction of the material game with statements; in other words, the

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m a t e r i a l game i s ' f o r m a l i z e d ' in the formal g a m e . The r u l e s of the formal d i a l o g u e game a r e a s follows:

General dialogue rule of formal dialogue games: 1. The proponent may a t t a c k only one of the compound formulae put f o r w a r d by the opponent, or he may defend himself a g a i n s t the o p p o n e n t ' s l a s t a t t a c k . 2. The opponent may a t t a c k only the statement made by the proponent in the p r e c e d i n g move, or he may defend himself a g a i n s t an a t t a c k in the p r o p o n e n t ' s l a s t move. Winning rule of formal dialogue games: The proponent wins if he h a s to defend a formula a l r e a d y put forward by the opponent. Together with other r u l e s , i n c l u d i n g those for the use of l o g i c a l p a r t i c l e s , these r u l e s constitute an attempt at an a d e q u a t e regimentation of a r g u m e n t a t i v e l a n g u a g e u s a g e . The r u l e s j o i n t l y determine how a d i a l o g u e b e tween the proponent a n d the opponent of a t h e s i s ought to p r o g r e s s . In h i s a t t a c k on the t h e s i s the opponent c a n a d v a n c e c e r t a i n ' h y p o t h e s e s ' , but the proponent then h a s the r i g h t to hold the opponent to t h e s e , and may make u s e of t h i s r i g h t by a t t a c k i n g the hypotheses in his defence of his t h e s i s . In t h a t c a s e the o p p o n e n t ' s hypotheses e f f e c t i v e l y function a s the premisses of an argument whose conclusion a p p e a r s in the d i a l o g u e a s the t h e s i s . As the r u l e s show, each i n t e r l o c u t o r ' s contributions a r e a l w a y s r e a c t i o n s to e a r l i e r moves by his a d v e r s a r y . The proponent formulates the t h e s i s , a f t e r which the opponent a t t a c k s i t , p o s s i b l y but not n e c e s s a r i l y s t a r t i n g from c e r t a i n h y p o t h e s e s . The proponent defends himself a g a i n s t the a t t a c k s of the opponent and in so doing may make u s e of the o p p o n e n t ' s h y p o t h e s e s . The opponent c o n s i s t e n t l y a t t a c k s a l l statements a d v a n c e d by the p r o ponent in defence of his t h e s i s . The r u l e s of the game determine not only whose turn it i s , but a l s o what moves a r e l e g i t i m a t e and when one of the two p a r t i e s h a s won the d i a l o g u e game—and who the winner i s . This brief d e s c r i p t i o n of the r u l e s for m a t e r i a l and formal d i a l o g u e s ends our account of the l o g i c a l p r o p a deutics of Kamlah and Lorenzen. The l o g i c a l p r o p a d e u t i c s make a s t a r t on the job of d e s i g n i n g an a d e q u a t e a p p a r a t u s whose p u r p o s e is to e n a b l e joint d e l i b e r a t i o n on the truth of s t a t e m e n t s . The r u l e s proposed can be u s e d by interlocutors who h a v e

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j o i n t l y set themselves the t a r g e t of u s i n g v e r b a l means in a dialogue to resolve a dispute about an o p i n i o n . It h a s been t a c i t l y assumed here t h a t the i n t e r l o c u t o r s are a g r e e d as to the purpose of the d i s c u s s i o n . In p r a c t i c e , however, t h i s i s f a r from always the c a s e , which i s why, according to Kamlah and Lorenzen, a theory of a r g u mentation must h a v e not only a ' t e c h n i c a l ' component r e l a t i n g to the a v a i l a b l e t h e o r e t i c a l means but a l s o a ' p r a c t i c a l ' component r e l a t i n g to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the i n t e r l o c u t o r s ' purposes and norms. Kamlah and Lorenzen r e g a r d t h e i r l o g i c a l propadeutics as a ' p r e p a r a t o r y c o u r s e ' (Vorschule) for the 'main course' (Hauptschule) in p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g . In a r g u mentation about m o r a l , l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s , in which o b j e c t i v e s and norms a r e the c e n t r a l i s s u e s , they s a y t h a t it i s impossible s y s t e m a t i c a l l y to turn b a c k to the p a r a d i g m a t i c example of the ' p r e p a r a t o r y c o u r s e ' in t h e o r e t i c a l r e a s o n i n g . The 'main c o u r s e ' is then intended to make it p o s s i b l e to eliminate p o s s i b l e sources of c o n f l i c t and c o n s t r u c t i v e l y resolve e x i s t i n g c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s r e l a t i n g to purposes and norms. The p r a c t i c a l complement of the l o g i c a l p r o p a d e u t i c s is provided with a foundation in Lorenzen and Schwemmer's Konstruktive Logik, Ethik und Wissensahaftstheorie. Here the authors r e g a r d it as the t a s k of ethics to l a y down p r i n c i p l e s for a r g u i n g for or a g a i n s t p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i v e s . E t h i c s , they b e l i e v e , should study the way in which purposes and norms c a n be properly j u s t i f i e d by l i n g u i s t i c means. We s h a l l not here go into the problems a s s o c i a t e d with t h i s i d e a . The c o n t r i b u t i o n to the development of argumentation theory which Barth and Krabbe have made with t h e i r formal dialectic c o n s i s t s i n , inter alia, t h e i r foundation and s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n of the r u l e s for formal d i a l o g u e s drawn up by Kamlah and Lorenzen. Barth and Krabbe dub these r u l e s the formal3 rules of formal d i a l e c t i c , and they c a l l the r u l e s for using l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s ( p a r t i c l e s ) formalz rules.60 Formal d i a l e c t i c c o n s i s t s of a l a r g e numb e r of formal3 r u l e s to which the r u l e s for using l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s ( f o r m a l r u l e s ) h a v e been added. In f a c t , t h e n , it would be more c o r r e c t to r e f e r to formal d i a l e c t i c as 'formal3 d i a l e c t i c ' . Just l i k e the l o g i c a l p r o p a d e u t i c s , formal d i a l e c t i c t r e a t s argumentation as a d i a l o g i c p r o c e s s . Two roles a r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d : the role of proponent and the role of opponent. Argumentation is the t o t a l i t y of moves made by the i n t e r l o c u t o r s t a k i n g p a r t in the d i s c u s s i o n in t h e i r a r g u m e n t a t i v e roles a s proponent and opponent. The r u l e s

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presented in formal dialectic l a y down what moves are permissible in a discussion when a proponent has successf u l l y defended a thesis and when an opponent has successfully attacked one. The rules of formal dialectic thus regiment discussions, and in that sense formal dialectic may be said to be a formal theory of argumentation; and it is to emphasize the special meaning which the term ' f o r m a l ' has vhere that Barth and Krabbe g i v e it a distinguishing index ( f o r m a ^ ) . The term ' d i a l e c t i c ' , which as we have already observed was borrowed from Hamblin, denotes that formal dialectic is designed to provide a critical-dialogic system of rules. 6 1 However, formal dialectic gives not just one system of rules but s e v e r a l . Barth and Krabbe distinguish different sorts of dialectic rules and like Kamlah and Lorenzen they distinguish three different rule systems and hence three alternative variants of formal d i a l e c t i c . As in our discussion of the l o g i c a l propadeutics, we shall confine ourselves here to the constructive variant® 2 The rules of formal dialectic relate to discussions the purpose of which is to resolve conflicts (or disputes) concerning opinions which have been put forward by one or more of the interlocutors (avowed opinions). As already observed, formal dialectic differentiates between two roles: that of proponent and that of opponent The point at issue in a dispute in which the proponent P and the opponent 0 are the parties is a statement S which has been made by P and attacked by 0 . S is the initial thesis T of the discussion. 0 may also himself have made one or more statements by which he challenges P to defend T. These statements are O's concessions, a b b r e v i ated Con; they correspond to the opponent's 'hypotheses' in Kamlah and Lorenzen's l o g i c a l propadeutics. What is at stake in the discussion is whether or not, in the light of Con, T can be maintained. The language user who has taken upon himself the role of 0 tries systematically to demonstrate that on the basis of Con it is not possible to maintain T, and the language user who has assumed the role of P tries systematically to prove that it i s . Thus the role of 0 entails the consistent attacking of T and the role of P the consistent defence of T_ 0 himself, therefore—in contrast to the situation v e r y commonly experienced in a discussion in practice—has no thesis of his own to defend, and P has nothing to attack (unless he defends a statement of his own by means of a counterattack against an attack by 0 ) . This distribution of roles implies that the rules of formal dialectic formulated by Barth and Krabbe s t i l l relate exclusively to what they

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call simple or pure conflicts. Disputes in which the l a n g uage user acting as 0 himself defends a thesis are termed by Barth and Krabbe complex or mixed conflicts. However, no rules have yet been established for these. (But see Barth & Krabbe 1981, section IV, 5 . 2 . ) The rules of formal dialectic l a y down the manner in which 0 may attack T, the manner in which P may defend T, when one of the two parties has won, and who the winner i s . We shall not here list a l l the rules formulated by Barth and Krabbe—there are more than thirty of them—but w i l l confine ourselves to a concise survey. Formal dialectic consists of f i v e different sorts of rule, each of which serves a different purpose. For each sort we shall indicate the norm-giving purpose, after which we shall present a number of rules which indicate how it is possible to comply with this norm. These f i v e sorts of rule are preceded by a number of elementary rules and are rounded off by rules establishing victory and defeat. Elementary rules The first elementary rule says that there are language users who assume the roles of P and 0. In the simplest case one language user assumes the role of P and another the role of 0. However, it is also possible for one l a n g uage user to take on the roles of both P and 0, or for two or more language users to take on the same role. If on the other hand no language users can be found who are prepared to f u l f i l the roles of P and 0 , then there is no discussion f a l l i n g within the scope of formal d i a lectic. Of course, some other sort of discussion may ensue instead, such as one serving as an opportunity for the interlocutors to provide one another with information, but it is only if there are language users who v o l u n t a r i l y take upon themselves the roles of P and 0 that the rules of formal dialectic a p p l y . The second elementary rule defines the roles of P and 0 more c l o s e l y . According to this rule, in the discussion 0 should adopt the 'dialogue attitude' of contra-position with regard to the statements of P and the attitude of pro-position with r e g a r d to his own statements. P is in pro-position with regard to his own statements and in neutral position in respect of the statements of 0. Contraposition as regards a statement S implies an unconditional entitlement to attack S, pro-position implies a conditional obligation to defend s, and neutral position implies neither of these. This means that 0 must attack all

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statements by P and that P must defend his own statements as soon as they are attacked by 0. P may not attack O's statements (except by way of defence through counter-attack), and 0 need therefore defend nothing. By this definition the asymmetry of the roles of P and 0, a characteristic of simple or pure conflicts, is thus established. The third elementary rule states that there are two ways of defending a statement once it has been attacked: defence (pD) and counter-attack (ca} A counterprotective attack must therefore be seen as a defending move, which means that it may be carried out by P, who by the terms of the second elementary rule would otherwise not be allowed to attack O's statements. The fourth elementary rule adds a rider to this, v i z . that all attacking and defending moves must consist only of speech utterances, must relate only to other speech utterances, and then only to the words and expressions used in those speech utterances and to the manner in which they are connected to each other by means of logical constants. Barth and Krabbe call this the principle of verbal externalizing. The fifth and final elementary rule lays down the consequences of violating one or more of the rules of formal dialectic. If either of the parties does anything or says anything which according to the rules of formal dialectic is not one of the permitted moves, the other party may withdraw from the discussion without thereby losing it. The party guilty of the violation then forfeits all his rights in the discussion and can even, if desired, be censured as 'irrational in the present dialectic situation ' . The importance of this rule, say Barth and Krabbe, is that it makes it risky to make irrelevant remarks in a discussion by, for example, changing the subject or advancing an argwnentum ad hominem, or to insult the other party, threaten him, deprive him of his liberty or cause him actual bodily harm. The non-elementary rules of formal dialectic are grouped to correspond to the various requirements which the system is intended to meet. These are that the system be systematic, realistic, thoroughgoing, orderly and dynamic. We shall go through these requirements one by one, indicating what they entail and what sort of rule Barth and Krabbe formulate in order to f u l f i l them.

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Systematic dialectic The norm for a systematic dialectic is that P shall always have a chance to defend a statement by another statement once it has been attacked. Compliance with this norm is achieved by making the defence progress step by step. Every intermediate thesis is therefore treated as a conditional defence of the previous intermediate thesis. This implies that if an intermediate thesis can in some way be defended unconditionally, the preceding ones and ultimately the i n i t i a l thesis are retroactively unconditiona l l y defended too. In order that discussions should progress step by step they are divided into chains of arguments, which are then subdivided into local discussions with local theses, or local intermediate theses, and local concessions. The local discussions are themselves subdivided into stages (turns to speak). Realistic dialectic The norm for a realistic dialectic amounts to ? in certain cases having an opportunity successfully to defend unconditionally a statement which has been attacked. The rule placing P in this position states that a local thesis can be defended unconditionally by means of an appropriate Ipse dixisti! remark. An appropriate Ipse dixisti! remark consists of the speaking of the words ' Ipse d i x i s t i ! ' ('You said it y o u r s e l f ! ' ) by P as soon as 0 makes a statement which at an earlier stage in the same chain 0 himself attacked, or, conversely, as soon as 0 attacks a statement made by P which 0 himself put forward at an earlier stage of the same chain. The consequence of an unconditional defence of a local thesis by P is that 0 forfeits the right to continue the discussion in the same chain of arguments, and this means that 0 has lost that -chain. Thoroughgoing dialectic The norm for a thoroughgoing dialectic is that P must be given an opportunity to defend his thesis in all possible ways and that 0 must have a chance to attack P ' s thesis in all possible ways. This norm is effected by means of rules enabling either party to abandon a lost or hopeless chain of arguments in order to start a new

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chain. Losing a c h a i n , therefore, does not automatically mean loss of the entire d i s c u s s i o n , since according to the rules of thoroughgoing dialectic 0 can try v a r i o u s lines of attack and P v a r i o u s lines of defence. However, opening a new chain must always be preceded by the abandonment (forced or voluntary) of an old c h a i n , which means that that chain is irrevocably l o s t . Orderly dialectic The norm for an orderly dialectic is that at every s t a g e in the discussion both p a r t i e s ' rights and duties must be c l e a r l y and a c c e s s i b l y defined. This aim is achieved by regarding

a

discussion

as

a

series

of successive

local

discussions and by restricting the rights and duties a r i s i n g out of P and O's dialogue attitudes (see the second elementary rule) to these local d i s c u s s i o n s , not r e g a r d i n g them a s a p p l y i n g to the discussion a s a whole. As soon a s a new local discussion b e g i n s , the rights and duties of its predecessor become void. A new local d i s cussion a r i s e s whenever 0 a t t a c k s one of P ' s statements; the newly attacked statement is then the new local thesis of the new local d i s c u s s i o n . However, O's ' o l d ' concessions continue to a p p l y . Dynamic d i a l e c t i c The norm for a dynamic dialectic is that the rules of formal dialectic must further the revision and flux of opinions. A condition of this is that an inevitable result should be reached a s quickly a s p o s s i b l e . To achieve this it is n e c e s s a r y that the rights of the p a r t i e s and t h e length

of

t h e stages,

local discussions

a n d chains

in

the discussion be limited. In other words, it is n e c e s s a r y to avoid the p a r t i e s having a chance to repeat themselves u n n e c e s s a r i l y and thus u n n e c e s s a r i l y prolonging the d i s c u s s i o n . To achieve this the following rules are proposed: (1) (2)

(3)

Stages may not contain more than one utterance of one sentence. If at a p a r t i c u l a r point the discussion can continue on more than one path ( i . e . if v a r i o u s chains of arguments are p o s s i b l e ) , each path may only be taken once. A counter-attack of one p a r t i c u l a r sort may not be c a r r i e d out on a statement more than once in

Major studies

156

(4) (5) (6)

(7)

on argumentation

the same local discussion. A local thesis may not be repeated by P in the same chainA statement by P may not be made a local thesis by an attack by 0 more than once. The only structural operators which may be used are those whose 'meaning in use1 is clearly established, i . e . those of which it is clear how sentences containing them can be attacked or defended. The operators must be decomposingly defined.

To meet the requirements stated in (6) and ( 7 ) , Barth and Krabbe include one (and only one) f o r m a l rule in their formal dialectic. This consists of Kamlah and Lorenzen's rules for the use of junctors, which they call the 'strip rules for logical constants' (see figure 3 . 5 ) . The possible lines of attack l a i d down there may be used both for O's attacks and for P ' s counter-attacks. The possible lines of defence indicate how a statement which has been attacked may be defended protectively. Winning and losing rules As we saw in realistic dialectic, 0 loses a chain if P makes an appropriate Ipse dixisti! remark. Another way of losing a chain is to use up the rights which the party in question has in that particular chain. When all the possibilities for making attacking or defending moves have been exhausted the chain is lost. If P succeeds in winning a chain according to the rules of formal d i a lectic, this does not automatically mean that he has won the discussion as a whole, nor, therefore, that he has successfully defended the i n i t i a l thesis. Only if the chain won by P is the last complete chain in the discussion has P won the entire discussion and successfully defended T against O's attack. If on the other hand P loses the last complete chain, then 0 has successfully refuted T and P has lost the discussion as a whole. Sometimes P or 0 may have a winning strategy. This means that there is a way in which the party concerned, when it is his turn, can make moves such that whatever moves his adversary makes every chain can be concluded with victory for the party concerned. If P has a winning strategy with regard to T in the face of 0, who attacks T from Con, then we may say that T follows logically from Con. Naturally this does not necessarily mean that T is true, for if that is to be the case the statements in

Formal dialectic

157

Con must also be true. If P has a winning strategy with regard to 0, regardless of whether 0 makes concessions or not and regardless of what concessions he makes if he does make concessions, then T is logically true. P then has a winning strategy with regard to all possible lines of attack or criticism (Barth & Martens 1977: 83-4). To g i v e an idea of how a discussion develops according to the rules of formal dialectic, let us look at the f o l lowing simple example.

P

0

1.

A

B

2.

B

C

3.

k.

A -»

(?)A/3

5. 6.

C\4 C?/5

7. 8.

(?)A/1 8\7

9. 10. 11.

C

(?)B/2 C\9 !(6,10)

Fig. 3.6. Example of a discussion according to the rules of formal dialectic. Remarks

1-3 The initial situation is shown above the broken line. P defends the thesis 'A C ' , the initial thesis, and 0 attacks it from 'A B' and 'B C ' , the initial concessions. This is the initial conflict. The language user who has assumed the role of P asserts that the initial thesis follows l o g i c a l l y from the initial concessions and the language user who has adopted the role of 0 disputes this. 4 In A the discussion opens with a move by 0. 0 is the only one who can make a move, since P is neutral towards

1S8

Major studies on argumentation

the statements made by 0 as c o n c e s s i o n s ; nor, since his own t h e s i s h a s yet to be a t t a c k e d , does he have a n y t h i n g to defend. 0 is in c o n t r a - p o s i t i o n with r e g a r d to P ' s t h e s i s and is thus e n t i t l e d to a t t a c k i t . He c a n do t h i s in only one way, according to the ' s t r i p r u l e s for l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s ' , and t h a t i s by himself s a y i n g ' A ' . ' (?)A/3' means t h a t 'A' i s put forward as an a t t a c k on the statement made by P in 3 . 5 We now have a s i t u a t i o n in which a statement by P has been a t t a c k e d , and s i n c e P is in p r o - p o s i t i o n with r e g a r d to t h a t statement he i s obliged to defend i t . In 5 he opts for a p r o t e c t i v e defence, which according to the ' s t r i p r u l e s ' must e n t a i l h i s a s s e r t i n g ' C ' . 'C\4' means t h a t ' C ' is put forward as a p r o t e c t i v e defence a g a i n s t an a t t a c k l a u n c h e d by 0 in 4 . However, P might a l s o , in 5, h a v e l a u n c h e d a c o u n t e r - a t t a c k a g a i n s t one of O's c o n c e s s i o n s . For the s a k e of c l a r i t y and s i m p l i c i t y we have shown only one of the t h r e e p o s s i b l e l i n e s of d e f e n c e . (P could a l s o have won by t a k i n g e i t h e r of the other t w o . ) 6

In 5» P made a new statement, and s i n c e 0 himself has nothing to defend a l l he can do is a t t a c k t h i s s t a t e m e n t . 'C?/5' means t h a t an a t t a c k i s being l a u n c h e d a g a i n s t the e l e m e n t a r y , or ' a t o m i c ' , statement made by P in 5 . According to the r u l e s of formal d i a l e c t i c t h e r e i s no protective defence a g a i n s t an a t t a c k on an atomic s t a t e ment, so t h a t in 7 P has to switch to a c o u n t e r - a t t a c k . As the t a r g e t of t h i s he chooses O's f i r s t c o n c e s s i o n , but he could a l s o have chosen his second. That way too he would have been a b l e to ensure v i c t o r y for h i m s e l f . 8

Now, for the f i r s t time, a statement by 0 h a s been a t t a c k e d , and t h a t means t h a t he may defend it p r o t e c t i v e l y . But P has a g a i n made a new statement, in 7, and t h a t means t h a t 0 may a t t a c k i t . I f he were to do so, however, it would immediately l e a d to his loss of the c h a i n , b e c a u s e he would be a t t a c k i n g a statement, ' A ' , which he himself put forward in 4 . He therefore opts for the f i r s t p o s s i b i l i t y .

Formal dialectic

159

9

In 9 P carries out a counter-attack cession.

on O's second con-

10

0 has been pinned down by P ' s move in 9. He might defend his concession protectively by asserting ' C ' , or he might attack ' B ' , the statement made by P in 9. In either case he loses: in the f i r s t case, which we have opted for in our example, because he is then positing a statement which he attacked in 6, and in the second because he is attacking a statement made by himself in 8. 11

P concludes the chain with a win by making an appropriate Ipse dixisti! remark on the basis of O's moves in 6 and 10. This ends our discussion of formal dialectic. As we stated at the outset, we have dealt with only one v a r i a n t , constructive dialectic, and left the other two proposed by Barth and Krabbe alone. Barth and Krabbe do not claim that with this formal dialectic they have produced a 'complete theory of argumentation, ready for use' (1978: 340). What they do believe is that in principle their formal dialectic has the same scope as other modern logical systems (1978: 322). They characterize the relationship between argumentation theory and logic as follows: The subject called 'formal l o g i c ' corresponds to that part of argumentation theory which studies systems of languageinvariant formal3 d i a l e c t i c rules and language-dependent formal d i a l e c t i c rules based on ( f o r m a ^ ) syntactic rules. (1978: 323) One of the first extensions which Barth and Krabbe regard as necessary relates to the f o r m a l rules. They confine themselves to the rules for using conjunction, disjunction, material implication and negation, which they borrowed from Kamlah and Lorenzen. They believe that the formal 2 apparatus should be extended with rules for other logical constants such as quantors ('all', 'some') and articles. An adequate theory of argumentation ought also to pay attention, they say, to questions of interpretation, definition and precization relating to

160

Major studies on argumentation

'content' words (like 'democracy', 'smoking' and ' r e l i a b l e ' ) , and to fallacies, mixed discussions and discussions between more than two parties (1978: 340). In connection with the study of fallacies Barth and Krabbe point to the distinction between what they call first order rules and higher order rules. The formal;) rules which we discussed earlier they regard as first order rules; the higher order rules, they say, must be discussion-furthering rules, but what exactly we are to understand by this they do not elucidate. Instead they are content to give a (not particularly clear) example: 'Don't call the other party names!' (1978: 323)- A cautious start has since been made with defining the term 'higher order rules' more closely, but it is clear that much still has to be done before a system of higher order rules can emerge that is as refined, precise and ordered as the systems of first order rules formulated by Barth and Krabbe. In our opinion higher order rules will have to refer to the attitude of potential interlocutors before and during a discussion. Higher order rules would have to specify what optimum discussion preparedness means in practice. Figuratively speaking one might say that the first order rules are the 'actual rules of the game' for a discussion and may be regarded as the laws of the game, while higher order rules provide a specification of the attitude required in order to act within the spirit of the law. Higher order rules would therefore be both preliminary and complementary to first order rules: preliminary because they create the conditions necessary for the optimum conduct of a discussion according to the first order rules, and complementary because they indicate how reasonable guarantees can be created for the continuance of succession of discussions. To end with let us look at some examples of possible higher order rules. The first one might be that the interlocutors must in principle regard their adversaries as equals. This would mean, for example, that they would not be permitted to abuse their social position or academic- title (or whatever else they might presume to grant them authority or status) in order to avoid a serious and rational discussion with particular adversaries by disqualifying them in advance on the grounds that they would be less than equal partners in the discussion. A second might be that the interlocutors must be prepared in principle to regard the arguments advanced by their adversaries as realistic and worthy of consideration, and that they must not, for example, simply dismiss

Formal

dialectic

161

them as 'rancorous p r a t i n g ' , 'left-wing nonsense' or 'the cold war mentality'. Optimum discussion preparedness entails, among other things, the adversary's arguments being taken seriously. And f i n a l l y one might consider a requirement that the interlocutors should be prepared, if asked to do so, to put up for discussion whatever they put forward in defence of a particular point of view, and that they should in no way whatsoever essay to withdraw certain subjects from discussion or in any other way immunize them against possible criticism. Whether theorizing on higher order rules will rise above the level of such simple examples in the near future is still an open question. In any event it is clear that some of the premisses formulated in section 1.3 may easily be regarded as higher order rules and that other presuppositions underlying many publications about argumentation may contain useful insights for the formulation of higher order rules.

Chapter 4

Toulmin's Analysis Model

4.1.

I ntroduction

The British philosopher Stephen Edelston Toulmin gained his impressive reputation in the f i e l d of argumentation theory with his book The Uses of Argument, in which he presents a model designed to reproduce the structure of arguments. This model, g e n e r a l l y in a form modified to a greater or lesser degree, has been adopted in many handbooks on argumentation and discussion technique as an aid in construing, analysing and evaluating a r g u ments. Toulmin's views on argumentation have also been influential at a more theoretical l e v e l . Toulmin was born in England in 1922. He studied mathematics and physics at Cambridge and took a doctorate in philosophy. During his philosophy studies he came under the influence of the ' o r d i n a r y language philosophy' being developed at Oxford and Cambridge. At Cambridge he studied under Wittgenstein and John Wisdom; in Oxford under Gilbert White and Austin. He has been professor of philosophy at the University of Leeds and since 1965 has held chairs at Michigan State University and Brandeis University, Massachusetts. At the time of writing he is on the staff of the University of Chicago. Toulmin has written on a v a r i e t y of subjects. His f i r s t article appeared in 1948, since when he has published books and articles on l o g i c , philosophy, epistemology, philosophy of science, history of science and ethics and meta-ethics. Together with his pupil Allan Janik he has also written a book about Wittgenstein. One of his more recent publications is Knowing and Acting (1976), an 162

Introduction

163

introduction to philosophy. An important theme in Toulmin's work is the question of how a s s e r t i o n s , opinions and attitudes concerning a l l sorts of s u b j e c t s which may be brought up in everyday life or in a p a r t i c u l a r branch of science or scholarship can be j u s t i f i e d . In p a r t i c u l a r , Toulmin is interested in the question of whether arguments adduced in support can l a y claim to r a t i o n a l i t y only in specific c a s e s or in every sort of c a s e . What norms must be applied in the r a t i o n a l assessment of argumentation? Is there only one system of norms, by which a l l sorts of argumentation must be judged, or must each sort of argumentation be judged according to its own norms? In The Uses of Argument Toulmin for the f i r s t time set out his views on this in a systematic way. The s t a n d point he adopts in that book has not since been modified in i t s e s s e n t i a l s . The Uses of Argument appeared in 1958. Unchanged paperback editions were published in 1964, 1969, 1974 and 1976. A German t r a n s l a t i o n appeared in 1975. In the preface to the f i r s t paperback edition of 1964 Toulmin writes that the reactions to the f i r s t edition have only confirmed him in his views, and it is c l e a r from other publications too that his opinion has not varied s i n c e . In the preface to Human Understanding, published in 1972, he repeats the c e n t r a l points of the view formulated in 1958 almost word for word. The model of arguments which was part of his discourse then does not appear in Toulmin's l a t e r theoretical work, though it is to be found in An Introduction to Reasoning, a practical textbook which he wrote in collaboration with Rieke and J a n i k and which appeared in 1979. What follows is based on The Uses of Argument. Toulmin's c e n t r a l thesis is that every sort of a r g u mentation can in principle claim r a t i o n a l i t y and that the c r i t e r i a to be applied when determining the soundness of the argumentation depend on the nature of the problems to which the argumentation r e l a t e s . The view that there are u n i v e r s a l norms for the evaluation of argumentation ana that these norms might be supplied by formal logic is an a b e r r a t i o n . Toulmin sees an e s s e n t i a l difference between the norms that are relevant to the p r a c t i c e of argumentation in everyday l i f e , and in the various sciences, and the c r i t e r i a of formal v a l i d i t y or a n a l y t i c i t y which are employed in formal l o g i c . His conclusion is that formal c r i t e r i a are i r r e l e v a n t to the assessment of argumentation as it occurs in p r a c t i c e and that logic cannot remain a formal science and at the same time be

164

Toulmin's

analysis model

applicable to actual practice. 5 3 What is needed is a r a d ical reorientation of l o g i c . Before Toulmin arrives at this conclusion in The Uses of Argument he turns first to the characteristics of discursive texts and then to the structure of argumentation on the finer level of individual arguments. We shall be paying attention to these aspects in sections 4.2 and 4.3* In those sections we shall record Toulmin's view as accurately as possible and without comment. In 4.4 we examine how Toulmin's model of arguments has been used by others, in 4.5 we use the model to analyse the argumentation in a discursive text, and in 4.6 we draw some conclusions regarding. Toulmin' s view of argumentation in general and the usefulness of his model in particular. Toulmin attaches to his discourse some far-reaching conclusions with regard to logical research. In reviews and other articles both logicians and philosophers have been unanimous in their condemnation of Toulmin's ideas on logic (see the classified b i b l i o g r a p h y ) . The titles of their reactions, which include references to a 'defence of l o g i c ' , are in themselves sufficient indication that they do not allow Toulmin' s conclusions to stand unchallenged. We cannot go into those conclusions in detail here, but w i l l confine ourselves to a general account of the manner in which Toulmin distances himself from orthodox logical thinking. The fact that logicians think argumentation can be evaluated with the aid of universal norms is the result, according to Toulmin, of their understanding of ' v a l i d i t y 1 . According to that understanding, the v a l i d i t y of an argument depends solely on the form of the argument. As we explained in section 2.3, the 'content' of the premisses is irrelevant here. It does not matter what the argumentation is about or what sort of problems it is supposed to solve; the form of the arguments determines the soundness or unsoundness of every argumentation. Toulmin calls this a geometrical understanding of v a l i d i t y , and we have already drawn attention to it in chapter 1. Toulmin illustrates the quintessence of the geometrical view of v a l i d i t y by reference to the following example. The argument ' a l l sprinters are runners, all runners are athletes, therefore all sprinters are athletes' has the form: All A are B All B are C Therefore: All A are C

Introduction

165

The argument form c a n a l s o be r e p r o d u c e d v i s u a l l y with a c i r c l e d i a g r a m , as follows. Classes A, B a n d C a r e each r e p r e s e n t e d by a c i r c l e . The premisses s t a t e t h a t the A c i r c l e is p a r t of the B c i r c l e a n d t h a t the B c i r c l e is p a r t of the C c i r c l e . This i s what we see in the l e f t - h a n d half of f i g u r e 4.1.

Fig. 4.1.

Geometrical

form of an

argument.

If the d r a w i n g is r i g h t , it also i l l u s t r a t e s the conclusion ' a l l A is C ' . It is impossible to execute the d r a w i n g in such a way t h a t the premisses a r e p r o p e r l y r e p r o d u c e d without the A c i r c l e e n d i n g up i n s i d e the C c i r c l e . In the r i g h t - h a n d half of f i g u r e ¿ . 1 we see the conclusion i l l u s t r a t e d by i t s e l f . In logic, s a y s Toulmin, ' v a l i d i t y ' is e q u a t e d with ' f o r m a l v a l i d i t y ' in t h i s g e o m e t r i c a l , or in f a c t no more t h a n q u a s i - g e o m e t r i c a l , s e n s e . Of a r g u m e n t s which a r e v a l i d according to l o g i c i a n s it may also be s a i d t h a t they a r e ' d e d u c t i v e l y ' v a l i d , or t h a t they a r e ' a n a l y t i c ' or t h a t the conclusion ' n e c e s s a r i l y ' follows from the p r e m i s s e s . Arguments which comply with t h i s norm of v a l i d i t y , s a y s Toulmin, a r e r e g a r d e d by l o g i c i a n s as ' i d e a l ' . One consequence of t h i s , he b e l i e v e s , is t h a t l o g i c i a n s set themselves the t a s k of developing r u l e s a n d r u l e systems which a p p l y e x c l u s i v e l y to argument forms t h a t a r e in the geometrical or q u a s i - g e o m e t r i c a l sense 'ideal'. Toulmin a g r e e s n e i t h e r with t h i s concept of v a l i d i t y nor with t h i s s e l f - a p p o i n t e d t a s k of logic. He a l l o c a t e s to the term ' v a l i d i t y ' a much wider meaning a n d is of the opinion t h a t logic must not be an ' i d e a l i z e d ' d i s c i pline wedded to mathematics, but must evolve into a science b a s e d on the p r a c t i c e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d s e e k -

166

Toulmin's analysis model

ing closer ties with epistemology. According to Toulmin, arguments which comply with the logicians' criterion of validity cannot be regarded as representative examples of argumentation as it occurs in practice. On the contrary, they are difficult to find outside the logic and mathematics textbooks. Indeed, the converse is more often the case: the manner in which argumentation takes place in everyday l i f e and in the sciences is left untouched in the textbooks, whose examples of logically valid arguments are special cases. Moreover by no means every argument can be reduced to the ideal form, so that the majority of the arguments regarded as perfectly acceptable in everyday l i f e and the majority of those which have proved to be reliable in various branches of science and scholarship must, according to the logical norm, be stamped invalid. The reason for this is that such arguments are not analytic but what Toulmin calls 'substantial'. By this he means that in such arguments the conclusion is not contained in the premisses: it is not implied by them. This is because the premisses are of a different 'logical type 1 from the conclusion; between the premisses and the conclusion there is a gaping logical abyss. The argument, seen logically, is a jump which has failed. In other words, the argument is not valid but invalid and not deductive but inductive, and not analytic but substanti a l ; the conclusion does not necessarily, but in the most favourable circumstances only probably, follow from the premisses. An example may c l a r i f y what Toulmin means. The phase of the moon on, say, 2L, March 1991 can be predicted by an astronomer ten years earlier by making use of observations of the moon up to 24. March 1981. The reasoning he will use contains a conclusion in which an assertion is made about the future, and premisses which relate to the past. The premisses are of a different logical type from the conclusion, and however probable or plausible the astronomer's prediction may be, the conclusion will never follow inevitably from the premisses. Anyone desiring certainty as to the accuracy of the prediction is wasting his time if he studies the argument: he must simply wait until the night of 24- March 1991. Logical chasms like this also occur in arguments whose conclusions are assertions about the past and whose premisses contain data taken from the present, or in which conclusions about the laws of nature are based on particular observations and experiments, or in which an aesthetic judgement is founded on references to such attributes as

Introduction

167

form, colour and so on. One consequence of r e g a r d i n g arguments in which the l o g i c a l type of the statements makes a jump between premisses and conclusion as i n v a l i d is that thé a r g u mentation in b r a n c h e s of science in which such arguments occur is seen as n o n - r a t i o n a l or at any r a t e as l e s s r a t i o n a l than the argumentation of l o g i c or mathematics, for it is only in l o g i c and mathematics that v a l i d a r g u ments o c c u r , and v a l i d i t y is the supreme c r i t e r i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y . Toulmin r e g a r d s this consequence as a b s u r d , dangerous and c o n t r a r y to e x p e r i e n c e . In a d d i t i o n to t h i s , however, he a l s o r e g a r d s the l o g i c a l concept of v a l i d i t y as s c a r c e l y r e l e v a n t to the p r a c t i c e of e v a l u a t ing the soundness of argumentation whether i n s i d e or outside the s c i e n c e s . Formal v a l i d i t y in the l o g i c a l s e n s e , s a y s Toulmin, is neither a n e c e s s a r y nor a s u f f i c i e n t condition for soundness of a r g u m e n t a t i o n . In Toulmin's v i e w , as we s h a l l e x p l a i n l a t e r , formal v a l i d i t y is in quite another sense a requirement which must be f u l f i l l e d in order to make a r a t i o n a l judgement p o s s i b l e . And what a r a t i o n a l judgement is cannot be g e n e r a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d for a l l c a s e s b y means of a u n i v e r s a l l o g i c a l norm. The c r i t e r i a of e v a l u a t i o n u l t i m a t e l y depend on the n a t u r e of the problem or set of problems with which the argumentation is concerned. A d i s c u s s i o n about whether the summer is going to be hot and d r y must be e v a l u a t e d a c c o r d i n g to meteorological, not l o g i c a l , c r i t e r i a if one wishes to a s s e s s it r a t i o n a l l y . A sound a r g u m e n t a t i o n , i . e . one c o n s i s t i n g of arguments which in the wider sense may be c a l l e d v a l i d , i s to Toulmin an argumentation conducted a c c o r d i n g to a f o r m a l l y v a l i d procedure and conforming to soundness conditions p e c u l i a r to the field or subject concerned. The widening of the concept of v a l i d i t y for which Toulmin a r g u e s h a s f a r - r e a c h i n g implications for l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h . It is no longer the t a s k of l o g i c i a n s to develop systems of f o r m a l l y v a l i d argument forms without r e f e r ence to the f i e l d s in which the s e a r c h for knowledge is conducted. The arguments which occur in the v a r i o u s f i e l d s of science and knowledge are ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' and not a n a l y t i c , and there is therefore a d i f f e r e n c e between the sort of statement making up t h e i r premisses and the sort of statement o c c u r r i n g in their c o n c l u s i o n s . But there is no question of an u n b r i d g e a b l e l o g i c a l chasm a l w a y s making t h i s k i n d of argument more d e f e c t i v e than a n a l y t i c a r g u m e n t s . Holding up the a n a l y t i c i d e a l to the s u b s t a n t i a l sciences has d r a s t i c consequences (such as

168

Toulmin's analysis model

using philosophical artifices or sinking into excessive scepticism). 6 ^ It is not so much that substantial arguments are so imperfect compared with the analytic i d e a l , but rather that the ideal is not relevant to such arguments . For this reason Toulmin says that logicians ought to abandon the criterion of formal v a l i d i t y in the strict sense and concentrate more on the practical side of assessing argumentation outside the one f i e l d where analytic arguments belong ( i . e . mathematics). Logic should amalgamate with epistemology, and the epistemological logic thus produced should then study the structure of argumentation in several different sciences in order to discover the qualities and defects of the various sorts of argumentation that are characteristic of different fields of science. Instead of using an absolute analytic ideal, logicians ought also to develop a comparative method, and they should start from the premiss that all sorts of argumentation are equal in principle, and that the different structures should be compared and contrasted without any one sort being automatically regarded as superior or inferior to another. The soundness of argumentation ( ' v a l i d i t y ' in the wider sense) is an ' i n t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l ' , not an ' i n t e r - t e r r i t o r i a l ' notion; that is to say, argumentation must be assessed" acording to the particular norms which happen to apply and happen to be adequate in the f i e l d to which the argumentation refers. In other words, the criteria for evaluation must not simply be shifted from one territory to another. Logicians using a comparative method would have the task of identifying similarities and differences in the different sorts of argumentation at the levels of both simple and compound argumentation. If differences are found, they must in principle be respected. Naturally it is open to anybody so desiring to try to improve the methods of argumentation current in the f i e l d in which he is interested, but it is wrong to assume in advance that there are fields in which all methods of argumentation must automatically be regarded as unsound. One f i n a l implication which Toulmin attaches to the widening of the concept of v a l i d i t y is that logic should become less of an aprioristic science and more of an emp i r i c a l and a historically oriented one. Empirical means that logicians would start to look at the argumentation forms which actually occur in the different fields of science, and historically oriented means that logic would also incorporate the history of ideas. According to

Field—invariant

and field-dependent

features

169

Toulmin, great scientific discoveries of the past have not only changed their own f i e l d s and the state of our knowledge, but also the ways in which we argue and our norms of good argumentation. If logic were to evolve in this epistemological, comp a r a t i v e , empirical and historical direction, the drafting of abstract formal systems of possible arguments divorced from the practice of argumentation in the various empirical sciences and in d a i l y l i f e could be l e f t to mathematicians. To Toulmin himself, the implication of such a practical logic as contrasted with an idealized logic is not necessa r i l y that only a specialist acquainted with the latest developments in his f i e l d would be competent to judge the soundness of the argumentation in that f i e l d . Toulmin's intention in presenting his view has been c h i e f l y to shift the accent from exclusive attention to universal criteria of evaluation towards more specialized and subject-related considerations. The view of logic put forward by Toulmin in The Uses of Argument is a recurrent theme in this book. We have seen that his objections to logic ultimately amount to objections to the concept of v a l i d i t y (in his view an i n correct one) used by l o g i c i a n s . His own view is. not only broader, it is also essentially d i f f e r e n t . The difference has to do with the notion of ' f o r m ' . In logic this is a quasi-geometrical concept, while Toulmin regards form as a procedural term which he assigns the same content as it g e n e r a l l y has in the administration of justice. A geometrical interpretation of 'form' produces a simple model of argumentation which f a i l s to do justice to the complexity of argumentation in e v e r y d a y l i f e and in the practice of science. A procedural interpretation can produce a more adequate model in which, moreover, accoufit is taken of the differences between the sorts of a r g u mentation characteristic of the wide range of f i e l d s to which argumentation may r e l a t e . 4.2.

Field-invariant argumentation

and

field-dependent

features

of

Toulmin regards argumentation as an attempt to j u s t i f y statements. To him, this j u s t i f y i n g function of argumentation implies the f o l l o w i n g . Stating an opinion regarding a subject means putting forward a claim. A person who claims something l a y s claim to agreement or approbation.

170

Toulmin's analysis model

Sometimes we shall simply be of the same opinion, sometimes we may simply decide to believe what they say, but sometimes we may require some argumentation. And the better the attempt to meet our demand, the higher will be our estimation of the original opinion. In other words, the degree to which a person can justifiably assert a claim depends on the quality of the arguments he can advance to support i t . The right to attack an opinion by asking for arguments to support it and to accept the opinion only when or if the argumentation is sound exists at all times, regardless of the nature of the subject to which the opinion relates. Whether it is a weather forecast by a meteorologist, an accusation of negligence by an employee against his employer, a doctor's diagnosis, a remark by a businessman about the dishonesty of a customer, or a critic's verdict on a painting—in every case justification may be demanded. Toulmin wonders how far argumentation which can relate to such diverse subjects can all be cast in the same mould and judged by the same standards. Toulmin provides the answer to his own question by reference to a comparison with jurisprudence. The practice of law too is concerned with justifying statements, and in the law courts matters of widely disparate natures may be at issue. The study of jurisprudence concerns itself, inter alia, with the legal process; the study of argumentation in general demands a characterization of the 'rational processToulmin regards an action at law as a special form of rational discussion, v i z . one in which the procedures and rules of argumentation have been institutionalized in a particular way. The evidence presented in judicial proceedings varies from case to case, but also from sort of case to sort of case. For example, a c i v i l action for libel will require different sorts of evidence from a murder charge in a criminal case. But however different the cases may be, there will overall be clear similarities in the procedure followed. Thus there will first be a formulation of the charge or claim, then there will be a stage during which evidence is produced and witnesses heard, and finally judgment will be given and sentence passed. According to Toulmin it is possible to discern this kind of constant element in argumentation in general, while in every case there will also be some variable elements. In order to obtain a better insight into this, it is important to bear in mind the variety of subjects it is possible to argue about and to try to determine what

Field-invariant

and field-depend.ent

features

1 71

is common to a l l types of argumentation and what is different in each individual type. To this end Toulmin introduces some new t e c h n i c a l terms: the ' l o g i c a l type' of a statement, ' f i e l d of a r g u m e n t ' , 'field-dependent' or ' p a r t i c u l a r ' , and ' f i e l d - i n v a r i a n t ' or ' g e n e r a l ' elements, the 'modal force' of statements and the ' c r i t e r i a ' for the use of modal terms and for evaluating argumentation. Toulmin gives no e x p l i c i t definition of logical type, but from the examples he gives one has a f a i r idea of what he means. He finds that statements like the following are of different types: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

The ministers handed in t h e i r resignations The government i s on the way out Early e l e c t i o n s w i l l probably be held The g u i l t y party has behaved improperly I t i s d i f f i c u l t to make out who i s responsible f o r the c r i s i s Measures w i l l have to be taken to avoid a r e p e t i t i o n

Statements of fact r e l a t i n g to the past (1) and the present ( 2 ) , predictions ( 3 ) , moral judgements (A), other judgements ( 5 ) , and opinions regarding a course of action to be followed ( 6 ) , are in Toulmin's eyes examples of different l o g i c a l t y p e s . The l i s t is not e x h a u s t i v e . For example, aesthetic preferences and geometrical axioms might also be added. If the statements to be j u s t i f i e d are of the same l o g i c al type, and i f the supporting statements are also a l l of one l o g i c a l type, Toulmin considers the argumentations concerned to belong to the same field of argument. The supporting statements need not n e c e s s a r i l y belong to the same l o g i c a l type as those to be j u s t i f i e d . For example, a moral judgement ( e . g . 'he is a bad man') may have statements of fact adduced in its support ( e . g . 'he beats his mother, he has poisoned his c a t s , he is a t a x dodger ' , and so o n ) . Now there are elements which remain the same in a l l fields of argument and elements which differ from field of argument to field of argument. The general features of argumentation which act in the same way in a l l fields of argument Toulmin c a l l s field-invariant and p a r t i c u l a r features which are different in- each field of argument he c a l l s field-dependent. A wide v a r i e t y of statements can occur in argumentation. With this fact in mind, Toulmin wonders how f a r

172

Toulmin's analysis model

the form and soundness of a r g u m e n t a t i o n in d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s of argument a r e f i e l d - i n v a r i a n t or f i e l d - d e p e n d e n t . He i s of the opinion that in a r g u m e n t a t i o n , j u s t a s in j u r i s p r u d e n c e , i t i s p o s s i b l e to d i s c e r n a f i x e d p r o c e d u r e , a n d t h a t in that sense a r g u m e n t a t i o n h a s a f i x e d form. This p r o c e d u r e or form c o n s i s t s of a number of d i f f e r e n t s t e p s which h a v e to be f o l l o w e d in a f i x e d o r d e r in the a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h i s order need not n e c e s s a r i l y c o r r e s p o n d to the v a r i o u s p h a s e s in which a person e n g a g e d in the p r o c e s s of a r g u i n g a r r i v e s at a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c l u s i o n ; i n s t e a d , they run p a r a l l e l to the v a r i o u s s t a g e s to be d i s c e r n e d in the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the c o n c l u s i o n . As we h a v e s a i d , Toulmin i s not concerned with the p r o c e s s of d i s c o v e r y of c o n c l u s i o n s , opinions and solutions or r e s o l u t i o n s , but with the manner in which they a r e j u s t i f i e d to o t h e r s . According to Toulmin the argumentative procedure b e g i n s with the formulation of a statement of the p r o b l e m . This t a k e s the form of a q u e s t i o n . In the next p h a s e p o s s i b l e solutions a r e l i s t e d ; t h a t i s , solutions which s t r a i g h t a w a y a p p e a r i n a d e q u a t e a r e set a s i d e . The p o s s i b l e solutions a r e then w e i g h e d up a g a i n s t each o t h e r . Sometimes t h i s p r o c e s s w i l l l e a d to one solution emerging a s the o n l y r i g h t one, and in t h a t c a s e t h i s is c a l l e d a n e c e s s a r y s o l u t i o n . In other c a s e s it i s n e c e s s a r y to pick out the best of a bunch of p o s s i b l e s — t h e b e s t one b e i n g t h a t which is or a p p e a r s to be b e t t e r or more l i k e l y to succeed t h a n the other p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s . In one f i e l d of argument it w i l l be more d i f f i c u l t to a r r i v e at a solution which may be termed ' n e c e s s a r y ' or ' t h e b e s t ' t h a n in a n o t h e r . If moral a t t i t u d e s or q u e s t ions of p e r s o n a l t a s t e a r e i n v o l v e d , f o r e x a m p l e , f i n d i n g such a solution c a n p r e s e n t enormous d i f f i c u l t i e s . But in a l l f i e l d s of argument i t i s p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h the p h a s e s d e s c r i b e d . T h u s , s a y s Toulmin, the p r o c e d u r a l form of a r g u m e n t a t i o n i s g e n e r a l , or f i e l d - i n v a r i a n t . At the v a r i o u s s t a g e s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n modal terms such a s ' i m p o s s i b l e ' , ' p o s s i b l e ' , ' n e c e s s a r y ' and ' p r o b a b l e ' o c c u r . The f u n c t i o n of these terms i s to i n d i c a t e the d e g r e e of c e r t a i n t y of the statements made at the v a r i o u s s t a g e s of the a r g u m e n t a t i o n on the b a s i s of other s t a t e m e n t s . A c o n c l u s i o n which emerges a s the only p o s s i b l e or o n l y r i g h t one out of a l l the p o s s i b l e solutions may be c a l l e d ' n e c e s s a r y ' or ' c e r t a i n ' . If the solution i s l e s s c e r t a i n , or if it i s s u b j e c t to c o n d i t i o n s , modal terms l i k e ' p r e s u m a b l y ' or ' p r o b a b l e ' w i l l be a p p r o priate. To what e x t e n t , t h e n , a r e modal terms f i e l d - d e p e n d e n t

Field-invariant and field-dependent features

173

or f i e l d - i n v a r i a n t ? Toulmin answers t h i s question by r e f erence to the modal term ' c a n n o t ' (or ' c a n ' t ' ) , which c a n a p p e a r in a v e r y wide v a r i e t y of u s a g e c o n t e x t s , as the following examples show. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

You You You You You You

can't can't can't can't can't can't

l i f t a ton get 100 000 people in the Albert Hall t a l k about a h o r s e ' s ' f e e t ' have an aunt of the male sex give him that small a t i p — i t ' s not done put the c a t out i n t h i s r a i n

Here ' c a n ' sometimes means ' b e c a p a b l e ' or ' i t is p o s s i b l e ' ( 1 - 4 ) and sometimes ' o u g h t ' ( 5 , 6 ) . In a l l s i x examples the function of ' c a n ' t ' is the same, v i z . it e l i m i n a t e s something. However, the reason for t h i s elimination is different in e a c h c a s e : the limits of human s t r e n g t h ( 1 ) , the limited c a p a c i t y of a b u i l d i n g ( 2 ) , a l i n g u i s t i c convention (horses h a v e hoofs) ( 3 ) , the meaning of a word ( 4 ) , a s o c i a l convention (5) or a moral r u l e ( 6 ) . In a l l these c a s e s the modal v e r b ' c a n ' and the l o g i c a l o p e r a t o r ' n o t ' a r e used to add a f u r t h e r q u a l i f i c a t i o n to the c e r t a i n t y of a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e m e n t , though the grounds for t h i s a r e d i f f e r e n t in e a c h c a s e . Toulmin r e f e r s to the function of modal words with the term modal force: they i n d i c a t e a p a r t i c u l a r degree of c e r t a i n t y . The grounds which j u s t i f y the use of these Toulmin c a l l s the criteria for the use of modal t e r m s . The force of modal terms, a c c o r d i n g to Toulmin, i s field-invariant, but the c r i t e r i a a p p l i e d in order to determine whether a g i v e n modal term h a s been used r i g h t l y or wrongly i n a g i v e n context a r e f i e l d - d e p e n d e n t . For example, we may only c a l l s something ' i m p o s s i b l e ' i f we a r e in a position to j u s t i f y t h i s claim by a d v a n c ing grounds or r e a s o n s . And the n a t u r e of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n , of the c r i t e r i a for the use of the. term ' i m p o s s i b l e ' , is d i f f e r e n t in e v e r y f i e l d of argument. Toulmin a r g u e s t h a t something l i k e t h i s i s true of a l l modal terms, even for words whose modal c h a r a c t e r i s not immediately a p p a r e n t , such as ' g o o d ' , ' b a d ' and ' p r o b a b l e ' . 6 5 T o t h i s view he a t t a c h e s i m p l i c a t i o n s r e l a t i n g to semantic and p h i l o s o p h i c a l questions which are not d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t here and which we s h a l l therefore d i s r e g a r d . ( I n f a c t t h i s r e f e r s c h i e f l y to the matter of developing an adequate semantic theory for modal words and the p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y about p r o b a b i l i t y which was c a r r i e d on with such vigour during the 1960s.) 6 6 We have seen t h a t Toulmin b e l i e v e s t h a t modal terms

174

Toulmin's

analysis model

f u l f i l an important function in argumentation, v i z . in weighing up possible solutions and in q u a l i f y i n g the solution that is ultimately selected as ' c e r t a i n ' , 'proba b l e ' , 'presumable', and so on. Toulmin sees the d i f f e r ence between modal force and criteria as a difference between field-invariance and field-dependence and is of the opinion that this kind of difference occurs in every sort of argumentation. The terms used in the assessment of argumentation in order to express the judgement are, like argumentative procedure, field-invariant; modal terms invest solutions with a f i e l d - i n v a r i a n t force. However, the criteria used in the assessment are f i e l d dependent. 4.3.

The form and validity of arguments

How does the v a l i d i t y of arguments depend on the mould in which they are cast and how must we view the ' v a l i d i t y ' and 'form' of arguments if we are interested in the practice of evaluating them? These are the questions asked by Toulmin when he turns to the level of i n d i v i d ual arguments (known as the ' m i c r o - l e v e l ' ) . Here he concentrates f i r s t and foremost on simple argumentation and, as in his treatment of discourse in general (the ' m a c r o - l e v e l ' ) chooses legal argumentation as his example. The model he designs on this basis is a procedural one, i . e . one in which the various functions of the steps that are successively taken are given due consideration. Here too, Toulmin wonders how f a r general, or f i e l d - i n v a r i a n t , and how f a r particular, or field-dependent, elements play a part. The f i r s t step in an argument is the expressing of an opinion (an assertion, preference, view, judgement, and so on). A person who expresses his opinion on something thereby takes upon himself the duty to defend it in the event that it should be attacked. In general terms: he must be in a position to j u s t i f y his opinion if challenged to do so. The opinion put forward and to be upheld is called, in Toulmin's term, the claim (abbreviated C ) . How can a claim that has been attacked be defended? One way is to point to certain facts on which the claim is based, the data ( D ) . The second step in an argument is thus the adducing of data which support the claim. Naturally, a challenger will not always immediately concede the accuracy of these data. In that case a preparatory argument must be employed to try to remove this

Form and validity

of

175

arguments

objection. But even if the d a t a a d d u c e d are accepted as a c c u r a t e , a request for f u r t h e r support for the claim may f o l l o w . In that c a s e there is no point in a d d u c i n g any more d a t a . I n s t e a d , the r e l a t i o n between d a t a and claim must be i n d i c a t e d . And t h a t might a l s o h a v e to be done for any new d a t a . The t h i r d step in the a r g u m e n t , then, is the j u s t i f i c a t i o n or warrant (W) of t h i s r e l a t i o n . The w a r r a n t can be produced b y a g e n e r a l statement in the n a t u r e of a r u l e , p r i n c i p l e , and so on. In p r i n c i p l e this g e n e r a l statement w i l l h a v e a h y p o t h e t i c a l form ( ' i f . . . then . . . ' ) . Toulmin a l s o r e f e r s to the function of the w a r r a n t as f o l l o w s : it functions as a bridge between d a t a and c l a i m . In Toulmin's view the w a r r a n t c a n t a k e three forms: (1) (2) (3)

I f D then C Data such as D e n t i t l e one to make claims such as C Given data D, one may take i t that C

Here Toulmin a d d s the immediate r i d e r t h a t it w i l l b y no means a l w a y s be e a s y in p r a c t i c e to recognize s t a t e ments as d a t a or as a w a r r a n t from t h e i r external form. Sometimes, i n d e e d , t h i s w i l l be quite i m p o s s i b l e . However, in most c a s e s we s h a l l be a b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h the d i f f e r ent functions f u l f i l l e d b y the statements in the argument. It is now p o s s i b l e to d r a f t a f i r s t , simple model of a r g u m e n t s . We s h a l l do t h i s by r e f e r e n c e to the following e x a m p l e , in which questions are a s k e d to i n d i c a t e the functions of the statements which a r e their a n s w e r s : Claim

Dation

Warrant

Harry is a B r i t i s h subject Harry was born in Bermuda A man born in Bermuda w i l l be a British s u b j e c t

What h a v e you got to go on? How do there?

you

get

Harry is a British

subject

(C) since A man born in Bermuda will be a British

subject

(W) Fig.

4.2.

Example of Toulmin's simple model.

Toulmin represents the different functions of the statements in the example as in figure 4.2. In the above example it has been assumed that the warrant is an absolute rule to which there are no exceptions, and that the accuracy of the warrant itself is not at issue. The force of the warrant would be weakened if there were exceptions to the rule, in which case a reservation or rebuttal (R) would have to be inserted and the claim weakened by means of a qualifier (Q). 67 A backing (B) is required if the authority of the warrant is not accepted straight away. Thus three auxiliary steps may be necessary in an argument, each of them with its own function. Apart from claim, data and warrant, these steps do not, however, have to come in any particular order. 68 An extended model of arguments therefore contains six elements. Let us illustrate these with the same example as the simple model: Claim (C)

Harry is a British subject

Datum (D)

Harry was born in Bermuda

Warrant

A man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject Is that always the case?

(W)

176

What have you got to go on? How do there?

you

get

Form and validity

of arguments

Rebuttal (R)

No, but it generally is. If his parents are foreigners or if he has become a natural ized American, then the rule doesn't apply Then you can't be so definite in your claim, can you? True: it is.only presumably so Come to think of it, what makes you think people are generally British just because they were born in Bermuda? I t ' s embodied in the following legislation

Qualifier (Q)

Backing (B)

Harry was born•

presumably

Harry is a British

in Bermuda

subject

(0)

(C) (0)

unless a nan born in Bermuda

his parents are

will generally be

foreigners, or he is

a British

subject

CM)

a naturalized

American

(R)

on account of the following

legislation (B)

Fig.

4.3.

Example of Toulmin 's extended model.

Of the six elements in the extended model the claim, the data (or datum) and the warrant are present in every argument; the rebuttal, the qualifier and the

178

Toulmin 's analysis model

b a c k i n g of the w a r r a n t need not a l w a y s o c c u r . That i s not to s a y t h a t the w a r r a n t i s a l w a y s e x p r e s s e d e x p l i c i t l y in p r a c t i c e ; it i s a l s o p o s s i b l e to make an implicit a p p e a l to i t . D

I 1

• so:

I Q

since

unless

W

R

C

I on account of B

Fig. 4.4.

Toulmin's extended model.

Toulmin a l s o e x p r e s s e s the r e l a t i o n between d a t a and w a r r a n t as follows: the w a r r a n t is i m p l i c i t l y p r e s e n t in the step from d a t a to claim a n d , c o n v e r s e l y , the n a t u r e of the d a t a depends on the n a t u r e of the w a r r a n t . Claim and d a t a do h a v e to be s t a t e d e x p l i c i t l y , b e c a u s e o t h e r w i s e , s a y s Toulmin, there would be no argument. Whether a b a c k i n g a p p e a r s in an argument depends on whether or not the w a r r a n t is accepted s t r a i g h t a w a y . If it i s , t h e r e i s no b a c k i n g , if not, then there i s . Here Toulmin o b s e r v e s t h a t it i s not p o s s i b l e to demand b a c k i n g for e v e r y w a r r a n t in a d i s c u s s i o n , b e c a u s e t h a t would make p r a c t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n i m p o s s i b l e . Toulmin sees the r e l a t i o n between the o c c u r r e n c e of a r e b u t t a l and the o c c u r r e n c e of a q u a l i f i e r as follows. Whenever there i s a r e b u t t a l a t t a c h e d to the w a r r a n t , the c l a i m must be weakened by a q u a l i f i e r . C o n v e r s e l y , however, it is not n e c e s s a r y for t h e r e to be a r e b u t t a l to the w a r r a n t j u s t b e c a u s e t h e r e is a q u a l i f i e r to the c l a i m , since it is a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t the w a r r a n t c o n t a i n s not an a b s o l u t e r u l e but one with an addition such a s ' i n g e n e r a l ' , without s p e c i f i c exceptions being named; as in the example in f i g u r e 4 . 5 . The f a c t s i n i t i a l l y adduced a s the b a s i s for the claim a r e the d a t a . In an argument, however, f a c t s may a l s o h a v e another f u n c t i o n . They c a n a l s o be adduced in the b a c k i n g for the w a r r a n t ( a s in our e x a m p l e ) , or to c o n firm or deny t h a t a w a r r a n t dependent on a p a r t i c u l a r r e b u t t a l o b t a i n s in a given c a s e . In the example of Harry (see f i g u r e L,..3) the w a r r a n t may be applied w i t h out r e s e r v a t i o n i f a d d i t i o n a l information about Harry

Petersen is a Suede

1

(D)

since

•so:

almost certainly (0)

Petersen is not a Roman Catholic (C)

I

a Swede can be taken to be almost certainly not a Roman Catholic (W)

I

because

I

the proportion of Roman Catholic Swedes is less than 2% (B)

Fig. 4.5. Example of an argument with a qualifier rebuttal.

without

a

includes the following statements: (1) (2)

Both his parents were no aliens He has not become a naturalized American

In that case the qualifier 'presumably' would also be omitted, since the claim would then 'necessarily' follow from the data and the warrant. I f , on the other hand, the additional information were to indicate that Harry came into one or more of the exceptional categories mentioned in the rebuttal, this would mean that the applicability of the warrant to Harry would have been refuted, so that the claim could not be defended. What, now, is the similarity between Toulmin's model and legal argumentation? In the general sense it is already apparent from the fact that both in Toulmin's model and in legal argumentation there are steps in the justification of a statement which f u l f i l various functions in the process of justification and which have to be executed according to the rules of a particular procedure. According to Toulmin himself, however, there is also a similarity in a more specific sense. For example, the claim corresponds to the indictment by the prosecution in a criminal case, the data to the evidence, and the warrant to the content of the legal rules or stipulations obtaining in the case concerned, while the backing may 179

180

Toulmin's analysis model

be compared with the r e l e v a n t p a s s a g e s in the r e l e v a n t l e g a l codes or t e x t b o o k s . And in l e g a l matters it may be n e c e s s a r y , j u s t as it may be in argumentation in g e n e r a l , to d i s c u s s the e x t e n t to which a p a r t i c u l a r law or r e g u l a t i o n or r u l e a p p l i e s in a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e — w h e t h e r it need n e c e s s a r i l y be a p p l i e d , or whether p a r t i c u l a r c i r c umstances make the c a s e an e x c e p t i o n , or whether the r u l e or whatever c a n only be a p p l i e d in a weakened form. In T o u l m i n ' s model it is assumed t h a t the d a t a as such a r e a c c u r a t e (or in l e g a l terms, whether a c a s e has been made o u t ) . What does the v a l i d i t y of an argument depend on, a c c o r d i n g to Toulmin? He c a l l s an argument ' v a l i d ' i f , f i r s t , the r e q u i r e d procedure h a s been c o r r e c t l y followed, i . e . i f the argument h a s been c a s t in the mould r e p r e s e n t e d in Toulmin's model, a n d , second, i f the w a r r a n t for the step from d a t a to c l a i m i s a d e q u a t e and may be r e g a r d e d a s a u t h o r i t a t i v e . The w a r r a n t i s a d e q u a t e if on the b a s i s of the d a t a it e x a c t l y g u a r a n t e e s the c o r r e c t n e s s of the c l a i m , whether or not modified by a q u a l i f i e r . It i s a u t h o r i t a t i v e i f it i s immediately a c c e p t e d a s such or i f it draws i t s a u t h o r i t y from the b a c k i n g . It i s the w a r r a n t , a c c o r d i n g to Toulmin, which i s the c r u c i a l element in determining the v a l i d i t y of the argument, for the w a r r a n t indicates e x p l i c i t l y that the step from d a t a to claim i s j u s t i f i e d and a l s o why t h i s i s so. To what e x t e n t a r e form and v a l i d i t y f i e l d - i n v a r i a n t or f i e l d - d e p e n d e n t in the Toulmin model? And to what degree does form determine v a l i d i t y ? According to T o u l min the form of an argument i s f i e l d - i n v a r i a n t . Not only l e g a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n , but arguments from every c l a s s of f i e l d of argument c a n in p r i n c i p l e be r e p r e s e n t e d in the same form. However, the v a l i d i t y of an argument is not, s a y s Toulmin, t o t a l l y f i e l d - i n v a r i a n t but h a s a f i e l d i n v a r i a n t and a f i e l d - d e p e n d e n t a s p e c t . V a l i d i t y i s p a r t l y a function of the form (the procedure must h a v e been c o r r e c t l y performed) and i n t h i s sense v a l i d i t y i s f i e l d i n v a r i a n t . But v a l i d i t y i s a l s o p a r t l y , and e s s e n t i a l l y , determined b y the w a r r a n t c h o s e n , so t h a t u l t i m a t e l y it is field-dependent. In the f i n a l a n a l y s i s the a u t h o r i t y of the w a r r a n t must d e r i v e from the b a c k i n g , and t h i s c a n v a r y a c c o r d ing to the f i e l d of argument. For e x a m p l e , the b a c k i n g may r e f e r to p a r t i c u l a r l e g a l s t i p u l a t i o n s , as in the Harry e x a m p l e , or to the r e s u l t s of a c e n s u s , as in the Petersen example; but it may a l s o r e f e r to a e s t h e t i c

Form and validity

of arguments

181

norms, moral judgements, psychological laws, or mathematical axioms. And in every field of argument it has to be determined which warrants may be regarded as authoritative and in what manner they must be backed. Toulmin's views with regard to the field-dependence of validity also imply that he makes no distinction in the degree of rationality with which it is possible to argue in different fields of argument. The only condition Toulmin lays down for being able to talk of rational arguments in any particular field of argument is that in the field in question there must be accepted and authoritative warrants. Toulmin designed his model in order to demonstrate that the criteria for evaluating arguments are related to their (field-invariant) form only to a subordinate degree, and in order to show "that these criteria are ultimately field-dependent and therefore cannot be universal. Let us summarize what Toulmin regards as the 'logical view' of arguments: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

an argument consists of two sorts of statement: premisses and a conclusion; validity depends on formal qualities of arguments; the form of arguments is a quasi-geometrical f a c t ; only analytic arguments can claim v a l i d i t y ; ' only valid arguments can claim rationality; the c r i t e r i a for validity are universal.

These six points are in no way separate from one another: (2) and ( 3 ) , for example, are closely related, and a person who finds (2) and (3) acceptable postulates will also have to endorse (4), (5) and (6). The chief point here, however, is that Toulmin does not agree with a single one of the six points of what he sees as the logical interpretation. Let us consider them one by one: Toulmin distinguishes not two but six sorts of statement in an argument (1); in his view validity is not primarily a formal quality ( 2 ) ; he interprets form procedurally (3); he regards all arguments as having in principle an equal claim to validity (4) and rationality ( 5 ) ; and he does not consider the criteria for judging validity to be universal (6). In other words, Toulmin's conception of the notions of 'form' and ' v a l i d i t y ' and of the relation between them is radically different from that which he says is customary in logic. This is the source of his criticism of the ' l o g i c a l ' postulates (1) to ( 6 ) . In what follows we shall give an overall impression of his arguments.

182

Toulmin's analysis model

In logic, a distinction is made between conclusions and premisses in arguments. Toulmin, whose starting point in his discussion of logic is a syllogism, or quasisyllogism, believes that it is characteristic of the ' l o g i c al view' that premisses are subdivided into major and minor premisses. 69 Toulmin finds this dichotomy misleadingly simple. Moreover, in his opinion the functions of the two sorts of premiss are so different that it is wrong to place them under the same denominator of 'premiss'. He gives the following example. (1) (2) (3)

Petersen i s a Swede No Swedes are Roman Catholics So, certainly Petersen is not Roman Catholic

In this syllogism, as we explained in section 2.1, (1) is the minor premiss and (2) the major premiss, while (3) is the conclusion. The treacherous nature of the simplicity of this argument lies concealed, in Toulmin's view, in the major premiss, which because of its terminology can be interpreted either as a warrant (W) or as backing ( B ) . These two interpretations are apparent from the following wordings. (2a) (2b)

A Swede is certainly not a Roman Catholic The proportion of Roman Catholic Swedes is zero

(2a) represents the W-interpretation, (2b) the B-interpretation. As Toulmin argues when explaining his model, the function of W is different from that of B. The syllogism takes no account of these different functions and therefore contains in its major premiss a hidden complexity. Now whether the major premiss is interpreted as W or as B, in either case its function is quite different from that of the minor premiss, which acts as the datum (D). In the syllogism this difference is ignored by the fact that in both cases the term used is 'premiss'. According to Toulmin, the argument in the Petersen example—minor premiss (1), major premiss ( 2 ) , therefore conclusion (3)—is regarded as valid in the logical view on the grounds of its form. Toulmin points out that the argument in the W-interpretation of the major premiss (2a) has a valid form in the logical sense, but that the B-interpretation (2b) presents problems. The argument

Form and validity

183

of arguments

can then clearly no longer be called formally v a l i d , even though it is perfectly acceptable. In other words: the validity of the argument with (2b) as a premiss is not derived from the form of the argument. But in that case, Toulmin argues, the validity of the argument is not a formal matter if the premiss is (2) or (2a) either. According to him, logicians f a i l to see this because the ambiguity of the major premiss conceals the crucial distinction between warrant and backing: the fact that the validity of arguments ultimately depends on the backing is thus hidden from view. The cause of all the trouble, says Toulmin, is the 'quasi-geometrical' conception of the notion of ' v a l i d i t y ' prevalent in logic. In this view, an argument is v a l i d if it is a substitution instance of a valid argument form, and an argument form is v a l i d when the conclusion is 'contained in the premisses', when it is 'nothing else but a slightly different representation of the same information as that contained in the premisses'. This, in his view incorrect, conception flows from the logicians' onesided interest in analytical (deductive) arguments, in his view, and he thinks these should not be regarded as exemplary cases of arguments. They seldom occur in practice and even when they do, their validity is not due to their form. Formal validity in the logical sense relates only to the ways in which arguments are formulated and has nothing to do with a reasoned f i l l i n g - i n of the concept of v a l i d i t y : no attempt whatever is made to identify reasons other than formal ones for calling arguments v a l i d . By reference to the above example Toulmin shows that (in his procedural approach) non-analytic arguments too can be v a l i d : (1) (2) (3)

Anne is one of Jack's sisters A l l Jack's sisters have red hair So: Anne has red hair

Unlike the logicians he criticizes, Toulmin calls this argument analytic because the backing, if we rewrite the major premiss (2) as a warrant accompanied by a backing, contains the same information as the statement presented as the conclusion in (3): (2a)

Any sister of have red hair

Jack's w i l l

(i.e.

may be taken to)

184 (2b)

Toulmin's

ana lysis-mode I

Each one of Jack's s i s t e r s has (been checked i n d i v i d ually to have) red hair

According to Toulmin the warrant (2a) is only authori t a t i v e i f , as we are informed in the backing ( 2 b ) , a l l Jack's sisters have i n d i v i d u a l l y undergone a check as to the colour of their h a i r . But in that case, of course, Anne's hair has also been checked: in other words, the conclusion that Anne has red hair (3) goes no further than what has a l r e a d y been said in the premisses. In non-analytic arguments—those which Toulmin calls ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' — t h e conclusion does contain new information. This becomes apparent, says Toulmin, if we change the Anne example as follows: (1') (2a 1 ) (2b') (31)

Anne i s one Any s i s t e r A l l Jack's hair So, presumably,

of Jack's s i s t e r s of Jack's may be taken to have red hair s i s t e r s have been observed to have red Anne now has red hair

The conclusion ( 3 ' ) has now been weakened by the qualifier 'presumably' because in the meantime Anne may, whether by accident, design, or the processes of nature, have red, green or g r e y hair (or any c o l o u r ) , or no hair at a l l ; it is therefore necessary to make a reservation regarding the warrant ( 2 a ' ) . In this example the backing ( 2 b ' ) no longer contains exactly the same information as the conclusion, but in Toulmin's view it is s t i l l v a l i d because the warrant guarantees the Tightness of the step from the data ( 1 ' ) to the claim ( 3 1 ) , acquiring authority from the backing ( 2 b ' ) (see f i g u r e A.6). With this example Toulmin considers he has proved that substantial arguments, which he says are by f a r the most prevalent in practice, can also be v a l i d . He also provides an explanation of why substantial a r g u ments are more common in practice than analytic ones. The use of argument, according to Toulmin, is to back conclusions about which we are uncertain with information about which we are c e r t a i n . Substantial arguments make a contribution in this sense. But in analytic arguments the conclusion contains the same information as the p r e misses; so that there is no particular uncertainty about the information contained in the conclusion. In that case, says Toulmin, there is no need for an argument at a l l .

Anne is one of Jack's

presumably

so :

sisters (0)

(0)

since unless any sister of Jack's nay be taken to have

Anne has dyed her hair,

red hair

gone white, lost her hair,

(W)

or ...

w" on account of the fact that all his sisters have previously been observed to have red hair (B)

Fig. 4.6. Example of an argument analytic but nevertheless valid.

in Toulmin's

view non-

Reference to the same examples can also i l l u s t r a t e the field-dependence of the v a l i d i t y of arguments. In the example of Anne, backing up the warrant requires that the n a t u r a l (or o r i g i n a l ) colour of Anne's h a i r be e s t a b l i s h e d , in the Petersen example a national census would have to have been held (see figure 4 . 5 ) , and in the c a s e of Harry it would be necessary to look up the r e l e v ant laws (see figure 4-3) • For a l l these things to be done properly, we should need f i r s t a chemist who is not colour-blind (or a h a i r d r e s s e r with a knowledge of c h e m i s t r y ) , then a demographer, and f i n a l l y a l a w y e r . Their arguments can in principle be e q u a l l y v a l i d and according to Toulmin there is no reason whatsoever to r e g a r d them as being automatically less r a t i o n a l than a n a l y t i c arguments, or even to go so f a r as to c a l l them i r r a t i o n a l . According to Toulmin, the idea that there are u n i v e r s a l c r i t e r i a of v a l i d i t y can only be upheld if v a l i d i t y is conceived of as a formal attribute of a n a l y t i c arguments. And that is p r e c i s e l y what happens in the currently prevailing l o g i c a l view. From this Toulmin concludes that it is the reluctance of logic to drop this conception of v a l i d i t y that is responsible for logic having become i n s i g n i f i c a n t for the evaluation of arguments as 185

Toulmin's

186

analysis

model

they a c t u a l l y occur in p r a c t i c e . 4-4.

The application of Toulmin's model

The influence that Toulmin's ideas have had finds e x pression chiefly in various p r a c t i c a l applications of his model. In the reviews of The Uses of Argument in the philosophical journals l i t t l e or no attention is paid to the model, and opinions as to the rest of the book are predominantly d i s p a r a g i n g . For a positive appreciation of it we must look chiefly beyond the ranks of philosophers. Theoretical speculations have been devoted to s i m i l a r ities between Toulmin's model and the syllogism and to the relation in which the model stands with regard to c l a s s i c a l rhetoric and d i a l e c t i c , e . g . the topos concept of the rhetorical and dialectic tradition (Bird 1961). Elsewhere the model has been linked with mental processes playing a part in convincing (Cronkhite 1969). Other writers have examined its a p p l i c a b i l i t y to the interpretation of texts in general (Huth 1975) and l i t e r a r y texts in p a r t i c u l a r (Grewendorf 1975); it has also been related to theories of truth (Habermas 1973). Yet other authors have written about its uses for p a r t i c u l a r forms of argumentation, notably for linguistic (Botha 1970, Wunderlich 1974) and l e g a l argumentation (Pratt 1970). But the largest and most favourable response to the model has been in l i t e r a t u r e on the s k i l l s of arguing, debating, discussing and speaking. It is to these l a s t applications of the model in practice-oriented a r t i c l e s and books that we s h a l l pay closer attention here. Toulmin's model may be found in at least fifteen different textbooks on one or more of the s k i l l s named. Most of these appeared in the United States and are i n spired, so f a r as the application of the model is concerned, by Ehninger and Brockriede's Decision by Debate (1963). Apart from An Introduction to Reasoning by Toulmin himself in collaboration with Rieke and Janik (1979), one of the most recent books to use the Toulmin model is C r a b l e ' s Argumentation as Communication (1976). Brockriede and Ehninger l a i d the foundations for their influential textbook on debating in an a r t i c l e published in I960. They give an interpretation of the Toulmin model and apply it to the construction of a system for c l a s s i f y i n g

Application of Toulmin's model

187

sorts of argument. Generally speaking they endorse Toulmin's criticism of logic and conclude that the Toulmin model is better suited to the description, a n a l y s i s and evaluation of arguments than the l o g i c - b a s e d methods u s u a l l y employed in textbooks on argumentation. They see the model as an a l t e r n a t i v e more in tune with actual practice. Brockriede and Ehninger use the model in a d i f f e r e n t function from that which it f u l f i l s in The Uses of Argument. They r e g a r d it as a rhetorical model, a f a c t reflected inter alia in the way they use it for c l a s s i f y i n g sorts of argument. Here they start from the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the means of persuasion that has been current in rhetoric ever since Aristotle: means based on logos, means based on pathos and means based on ethos. The f i r s t sort ( g e n e r a l l y r e f e r r e d to in the l i t e r a t u r e of rhetoric as logical) they c a l l substantive, the second motivational (pathetic), and the third authoritative arguments (ethical arguments). The differences between these three forms of rhetorical argument, s a y Brockriede and Ehninger, must be looked for in the nature of what Toulmin c a l l s the warrant. In a substantive argument, s a y Brockriede and Ehni n g e r , the w a r r a n t tells us something about the way in which 'the things in the world about u s ' relate to one another, in a motivational argument it tells us something about the emotions, v a l u e s , desires or motives which can make the claim acceptable to the person to whom the argument is a d d r e s s e d , and in an authoritative argument it s a y s something about the r e l i a b i l i t y of the source from which the data are drawn. 7 0 Let us now look at an example of each t y p e , borrowed from Decision by Debate. Brockriede and Ehninger distinguish v a r i o u s sorts of substantive arguments. An example of the f i r s t of these, arguments in which a causal relationship is defined, is seen in f i g u r e U . l . Examples of motivational arguments and authoritative arguments a r e : Motivational argument Continued testing of nuclear weapons i s needed f o r U.S. mili t a r y s e c u r i t y , therefore continued testing of nuclear weapons i s desirable f o r the U . S . , since the U.S. is motivated by a desire to maintain the value of military security. Authoritative argument (authors' own example) Milton Friedman says that the nation's economy would b e n e f i t

Toulmin's

188

analysis

model

from a drastic cutting back of government interference. That w i l l probably be true, since Milton Friedman's views on economics are authoritative. The price of steel-

• therefore:

probably-

»the price of products

has gone up

made from

(0)

steel

(0)

will rise

I

(C)

unless higher prices of raw materials usually

cause

higher prices in finished

other economic

factors

intervene to weaken the force of the warrant/ other costs in steel-products

products («)

industries go down to counteract increased steel

I

prices/etc.

because expert X asserts that the price of finished products almost always reflects the price of raw materials/ a study of a large sample of industries indicates that changed prices of raw materials generally cause changes of prices of finished products/etc.

Fig. 4. 7. warrant.

Example of

a substantive

argument with

a aausal

Brockriede and Ehninger's rhetorical adaptation of Toulmin' s model led to its widespread adoption in practical textbooks on argumentation. Where this has happened it has generally been with the interpretation attached to it by Brockriede and Ehninger in their article and subsequently in their handbook. As a rule the model is used only as an aid in the analysis of arguments in colloquial speech, and the assessment of validity (in the logical sense) takes place along the lines developed by ordinary logic. One attempt to make Toulmin's model applicable in practice which is closely allied to its interpretation by Brockriede and Ehninger is found in an article by Trent

Application

of Toulmin's

model

189

dating from 1968. Trent treats the Toulmin model as a syllogistic one. He observes that some authors (among them Manicas 1966) r e g a r d its syllogistic nature as a drawback because it renders it unfit for the analysis of non-syllogistic argument forms. 71 Trent does not find this limitation so serious, since in his view the vast majority of syllogisms occurring in practice are either syllogistic or can easily be reduced to the s y l l o g i s t i c form. The great advantage of Toulmin's model, to T r e n t ' s way of thinking, is the emphasis it puts on material rather than formal v a l i d i t y , since this too is more in accord with e v e r y d a y practice. Nevertheless Trent regards the model as incomplete and hence inadequate for i n v e s t i g a t ing the material v a l i d i t y of arguments. By modifying the model in certain respects he tries to remedy this drawback. Trent extends Toulmin's model by including the e l e ments of backing, q u a l i f i e r and rebuttal in the data too. In this w a y , he says, the model becomes more complete. Moreover it is easier to indicate where the source of the certainty or uncertainty of the claim must be sought. Trent distinguishes three groups of argument types or epicheir ernes', selection epicheiremes, inference epicheiremes and rhetorical epicheiremes. In a selection epicheireme the claim is selected from the backing by the warrant, while in an inference epicheireme it is inferred from data or warrant, and in a rhetorical e p i cheireme it is guaranteed by the authority of the speaker. 7 2 Trent illustrates the differences between these three groups of epicheiremes by reference to Toulmin's Anne example. For our example we shall take an inference epicheireme. In the case we have selected the (inference) claim ( I C ) cannot be posited with absolute certainty because there is a q u a l i f i e r to the (inference) datum ( I D ) . The uncertainty regarding the datum has its cause in the backing (BD). The backing to the warrant (BW), however, does allow an absolutely formulated w a r r a n t . Trent sees his own extension of the model, but also Brockriede and Ehninger's interpretation of i t , as an attempt to use it to bring logic closer to the practice of argumentation in e v e r y d a y l i f e . That the model should be used in this way was not, however, one of Toulmin's own intentions. In The Uses of Argument the solution is sought in a r a d i c a l reorientation of l o g i c : the model has a function in Toulmin's own argument, but is not itself presented as the solution. Instead, to Toulmin the model

therefore:

Since Anne is probably

..

one of Jack's sisters

Jack's sisters will

Anne's natural

all have red as their

colour is probably

natural hair colour

red

(ID)

(W)

because

because

(IC)

Anne lives with Jack's

both of Jack's parents

parents; Anne is about

have red hair; the gene

Jack's age; Anne's

for red hair is recessive

last

hair

nane is the sane as Jacks (8D)

Fig.

4.8.

C BW)

Example of an inference

epioheireme.

is part of the evidence for the thesis that the c r i t e r i a for assessing arguments are ultimately field-dependent. This was the purpose for which he designed it and he finds it adequate for this purpose. Nowhere does he p r e pretend to have designed a model adequate for the anal y s i s of argumentation. 73 Naturally, if it is one's desire to design such a model, one is f r e e to take Toulmin's as one's starting point, but in that case it must be c l e a r l y stated that the model is now being made to f u l f i l a different function. As regards designing a model for analysing argumentation both the work of Trent and that of Brockriede and Ehninger may be regarded f a i r l y enough as an extension of Toulmin's work. Brockriede and Ehninger's c l a s s i f i c ation can not only provide an illustration of the f i e l d dependence of the w a r r a n t , but also constitutes an attempt at making the model applicable to more sorts of argument. Here it is the addition of the distinction between authoritative warrants and motivational warrants that plays a p a r t i c u l a r l y important r o l e . There is however a major objection to be raised against the way in which both Trent and Brockriede and Ehninger go about achieving their aims, and its consequence is that the model's philosophical and l o g i c a l purport is lost. 190

Argumentation analysis

using Toulmin's model

191

In the efforts of Brockriede and Ehninger and Trent to 'put logic into p r a c t i c e ' , they have completely isolated the model from its context. Their articles both immediately embark upon a description of the model, and its function in The Uses of Argument remains undiscussed. The same thing happens in almost all the textbooks to have appeared since. In recent years, however, there have been some exceptions. In their Argumentation and Decision-Making Process, for example, Rieke and the Sellars, in their survey of some important theories of argumentation, g i v e a brief summary of the wider framework within which Toulmin's view of argumentation is to be placed (1975: 1-24). And in Argumentation as Communication. Reasoning with receivers, too, there is something of this broader context to be found at various places in the book. But this is hardly surprising in view of the fact that Crable refers to the work of Toulmin as his greatest source of inspiration, not to mention the circumstance that Toulmin himself acted as an adviser during the writing of the book. Yet even in these two quite recent works the application of the model is totally divorced from Toulmin's views on l o g i c . We therefore conclude that the influence of The Uses of Argument on the practical textbooks has been slight: only the model has been adopted and for the rest authors are concerned solely with its application.

4.5-

Argumentation analysis using Toulmin's model

We shall now c a r r y out an analysis of the argumentation in the article 'Centralized Electricity Metering: How Not To Do I t ' , which we have already looked at in chapter 1. There we analysed the text using elements from the basic model of argumentation; now we shall take the interpretation of the argumentation that we gave there and analyse it further on the basis of Toulmin's model as outlined in section 4.3. Analysis view

of the argumentation

In chapter 1 we argumentation: (1)

gave

the

for the Delfland point of following

analysis

of

the

The centralized metering system needs fewer meters, the meters need reading less frequently, and there

Toulmin 's analysis

192

(2) (3) (4)

model

are less administrative expenses, so that the centralized metering system leads to reduced costs, so that the centralized metering system leads to lower prices for consumers. Therefore the consumer benefits from centralized metering.

This argumentation c a n be represented using model as in figure 4.9: •therefore :

The centralized metering system needs

Toulmin's

the

centralized

fewer meters, the meters need reading

metering

less frequently, and there are less

leads to reduced

administrative

costs

expenses

(D") 1

because I (placing fewer meters, reading

system

(C")2 them

less often, and having less administrative expenses leads to reduced costs) (W")

The centralized metering

system

»therefore :

the

centralized

metering

leads to reduced costs

leads prices

systèm

to

lower

for

con-

sumers (D')2 . (C")

because I (reduced costs mean lower

(C')3

prices for consumers) («') •therefore :

The centralized metering system .

the consumer

leads to lower prices

benefits

for consumers

centralized

from

metering (0)3 -

(C)

(CH

because \

(lower prices are in the consumer's (*)

Fig. 4.9. Analysis of Delfland's min 's model.

interest)

argumentation

using Toul-

Argumentation

analysis using Toulmin's

193

model

In this a n a l y s i s D e l f l a n d ' s argumentation is s p l i t into three simple argumentations. The claim in the f i r s t link in the chain of argumentation (C") acts a s the datum (D') in the second l i n k ; the claim of the second link ( C ' ) is a datum (D) in the t h i r d . In a l l three c a s e s the warrant is implicit (indicated by the brackets in f i g u r e 4 . 9 ) , while the claim and d a t a are stated explicitly in the interpretation. There is no backing to the w a r r a n t , no rebuttal and no q u a l i f i e r . The function of the compound argumentation is to provide retrospective justification for the introduction of the centralized metering system. This function can be i l l u s t r a t e d a s in f i g u r e 4. 10. Consumers

benefit

centralized

from

-therefore:

(01)4 =

(the c o m p a n y to

metering

ized

(C)

(Benefits

(CI)

I

to the c o n s u m e r for

centralized

right

central-

metering)

because

a good reason

was

introduce

are

introducing

metering)

(HI)

Fig. 4.10. ation.

Analysis of the function of Delfland's

Analysis of the argumentation point of view

argument-

for the consumer's

guide

The Consumentengids point of view is that Delfland ought not to have introduced the centralized metering system and that the system in general should be rejected. In our a n a l y s i s of the argumentation for this point of view we d i s t i n g u i s h three argumentations. The f i r s t is directed a g a i n s t the Delfland standpoint that the consumer benefits from the system. It is postulated that cheaper r a t e s are only in the consumer's interest if overall consumption does not r i s e . In term's of Toulmin's model this means that Delfland ought to have made a reservation (rebuttal) with r e g a r d to the w a r r a n t . D e l f l a n d ' s argumentation would then have a p p e a r e d a s in f i g u r e 4.11.

The centralized metering system leads to lower prices for consumers

-therefore:

(D)

perhaps

(0)

because I (lower prices are in the consumer's interest)

consumers benefit from centralized metering (C)

I unless I overall consumption rises when the system of centralized metering is introduced

(W)

(R)

Fig. 4.11. Analysis of the assumption in the Consumentengids point of view. The Consumentengids argumentation against the Delfland argument of benefit to the consumer is designed to show that overall consumption rises w h e n the system is introduced. If this attempt were to succeed, this would also demonstrate that the claim m a d e by Delfland is inaccurate. In our analysis we distinguish the following steps. A (1)

(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

With centralized metering, lavish consumption does not have to be paid for by the individual consumer only, and 'next door they don't stint either'. Therefore: centralized metering breeds a 'consume away' attitude . Therefore: centralized metering leads to higher overall consumption. Therefore: centralized metering usually leads to increased fuel bills for each apartment. Therefore: the consumer does not usually benefit from centralized metering.

The argumentation is thus composed of four separate argumentations. For the sake of brevity w e shall illus194

Argumentation

analysis

using Toulmin's

trate only the f i r s t of model ( f i g u r e 4.12a).

With

centralized

metering,

lavish consumption

does

have to be p a i d for by individual

consumer

'next d o o r

they d o n ' t

these

-

by

model

195

reference to

-therefore:

centralized

not

a

'consume

Toulmin's

metering away'

breeds

attitude

the

only

(0)1

(C)3 stint

either' (0)2

because

I

(the k n o w l e d g e

that others

pay for o n e ' s o w n and the people's a

extra

fear of h a v i n g

to pay for

extra consumption 'consume

away1

Cw)

help

consumption brings

other about

attitude)

Fig. 4.12a. Analysis of the first engids benefit argument.

argument in the Consument-

This argument plays a central role in the consumer's g u i d e ' s argumentation against Delfland's benefit claim, because the rest of the steps are more or less s t r a i g h t forward. Once a person has accepted that a 'consume a w a y ' attitude is brought about he is not l i k e l y to have much d i f f i c u l t y in accepting the assertion that o v e r a l l consumption rises, that therefore fuel b i l l s are usually l a r g e r , and ultimately that there is no question of a benefit to the consumer. After a n a l y s i s , this last conclusion concerning the f i n a n c i a l consequences of introducing centralized metering proves ultimately to be founded on a psychological supposition (there is no backing to the w a r r a n t ) about 'human n a t u r e ' . The other two arguments put forward by the Consumentengids are l e v e l l e d not at D e l f l a n d ' s claim of benefits to consumers but against centralized electricity and gas metering in g e n e r a l . The second argumentation goes into the fairness aspect of the scheme, the third into the implications for energy conservation. I n the second a r g u mentation we distinguish the following steps.

196 B (1)

(2)

(3) (4) (5) (6)

Toulmin's analysis model

According to the annual report of the federated electricity suppliers the consumption of the average familyvaries from 3900 kWh to 7650 kWh annually, and according to a group opposing the system consumption in a large apartment building varies from 2500 to 5700 kWh annually for the average family. Therefore: average family consumption varies widely, and with centralized metering every consumer pays the same amount. Therefore: with centralized metering thrifty consumers pay for much more than they actually use. Therefore: centralized metering is grossly unfair to thrifty consumers .

In c o n t r a s t to the benefit argument, in the second argumentation the main emphasis l i e s on the f i n a l s t e p , from (5) to ( 6 ) . (3) i s a summarizing r e p h r a s i n g of (1) and ( 2 ) , (4) i s a definition of c e n t r a l i z e d metering, and (5) i s an a c c e p t a b l e conclusion from (3) and (A). But in the step from (5) to (6) someone who a c c e p t s the factual information c o n t a i n e d in the previous steps as a c c u r a t e must s t i l l endorse the implicit value-judgement in order to be a b l e a l s o to accept (6) a s the c o n c l u s i o n . The s t r u c t u r e of t h i s argument i s i l l u s t r a t e d in f i g u r e 4 . 1 2 b . With centralized metering thrifty consumers pay for much more than they actually use

(0)5

«-therefore:

centralized metering is grossly, unfair to thrifty consumers

because

(C)6

I

(it is unfair that consumers should have to pay for more than they actually use themselves) («)

Fig. 4.12b. Analysis of the final argument in the fairness argumentation in the Consumentengids.

Argumentation analysis using Toulmin's modelThe C (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

197

steps in the third argumentation are the following.

If consumers are encouraged by lower (individual) bills, overall consumption is reduced, and the central metering system does not encourage consumers with lower (individual) bills. Therefore: centralized metering does not lead to a reduction in overall consumption. Therefore: centralized metering makes no contribution to energy conservation. Therefore: from the point of view of the present need for energy conservation centralized metering has little to be said for it.

In this energy argumentation by the Consumentengids it is the first step—from (1) and (2) to (3)—which is the most important, as it was in the benefit argumentation. For (4) may be regarded as a paraphrase of (3) and (5) as a paraphrase of (4), though admittedly there is a new element in (5) as compared with (4), viz. the presupposition that there is a need for energy conservation. A person acknowledging this need will also, if the previous steps are acceptable to him, endorse the low opinion of centralized metering. The structure of the first argument is illustrated in figure 4.12c. The central metering system — does not encourage consumers with lower (individual) bills

-therefore:

(0)2

centralized metering does not lead to a reduction in overall consumption (C)3

because

I

if consumers are encouraged by lower (individual) bills, overall consumption is reduced

(W) 1 Fig. 4.12a. Analysis of the first argument in the energy argumentation of the Consumentengids.

198

Toulmin's analysis model

A conspicuous f e a t u r e of t h i s argument i s t h a t it c o n t a i n s our f i r s t explicit w a r r a n t . One might even r e g a r d the following p a s s a g e in the t e x t as a b a c k i n g for i t . (B?) In an American report on the need f o r economy t h i s i s an aspect which i s singled out f o r s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n . In our a n a l y s i s we have s t a y e d as close a s p o s s i b l e to the p h r a s i n g of the a c t u a l t e x t . And in the t e x t it does not s a y t h a t the report to which r e f e r e n c e i s made (the t i t l e of which i s given in a footnote) demonstrates the a c c u r a c y of the w a r r a n t , or simply endorses i t , but t h a t it i s s i n g l e d out for s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n . Thus the assumption in the American report i s the same a s t h a t in our consumer g u i d e , a f a c t which i s a l s o evident from the measure recommended in the report (the p l a c i n g of e x t r a meters for energy-consuming a p p l i a n c e s ) . From the point of view of a c r i t i c a l r e a d e r the r e f e r e n c e to the American report may p e r h a p s f a i l to be r e g a r d e d as a good, b a c k i n g to the w a r r a n t ; from the point of view of i t s function in the a r g u m e n t a t i o n , on the other h a n d , it may well be seen a s a b a c k i n g .

The

consumer

does n o t u s u a l l y

from c e n t r a l i z e d

benefit

—

•therefore:

metering

centralized s h o u l d be

metering

banned

(A) Centralized to t h r i f t y

metering

is g r o s s l y

unfair

consumers (8)

From

the p o i n t of view

of the

n e e d for e n e r g y c o n s e r v a t i o n metering

has

present centralized

l i t t l e to be s a i d for

it

(C) because (A s y s t e m

I

for m e t e r i n g

energy

consumption

m u s t o n l y be u s e d if it is c h e a p , and

fair

energy-conserving)

Fig. 4.12d. Analysis of the argumentation conclusion drawn by the Consumentengids.

for the final

The f i n a l conclusion drawn by the Consumentengids with r e g a r d to c e n t r a l i z e d e l e c t r i c i t y metering i s b a s e d on the conclusions of the b e n e f i t , f a i r n e s s and energy a r g umentations t a k e n t o g e t h e r . These are thus the d a t a for

Conclusion

199

the final claim. Thus according to the Conswnentengids any measure to be taken concerning the metering of energy consumption must be evaluated on three points: economies, fairness, and energy conservation. In respect of all three the consumer guide's verdict is negative and thus the whole system is rejected. The structure of the argument for the f i n a l conclusion is illustrated in figure 4.12d. 4.6.

Conclusion

Toulmin' s chief aim with The Uses of Argument was to demonstrate that for the analysis of argumentation in ordinary everyday and scientific discussions logic will only be a useful tool if it strikes out on a radically new course. Toulmin's suggestions were not received well by his fellow philosophers. In the most favourable r e views ( e . g . Abelson 1960-1) there is, admittedly, some concurrence with Toulmin's efforts to bring about an improvement in the degree to which logic is practically applicable, but in all the reactions to his book the course Toulmin advocates is rejected. These criticisms are chiefly concerned with his ideas on probability (see, for example, Cooley 1959 and King-Farlow 1963) and on the form and v a l i d i t y of arguments ( e . g . Castañeda I960 and Cowan 1964). Our assessment of Toulmin's contribution to argumentation theory will concentrate chiefly on his treatment of the model of arguments. We shall leave undiscussed the more general theoretical implications of his ideas on logic. Our own criticism is in fact directed more often than not at the many books and articles in which Toulmin's model has simply been uncritically adopted and unthinkingly applied, rather than at The Uses of Argument. Toulmin himself stresses the provisional nature of his ideas about l o g i c . He does not pretend to have developed a complete and universally applicable model, only a model with the aid of which he can show that v a l i d i t y criteria for arguments are field-dependent. The model appears in none of Toulmin's theoretical publications after 1958, and from his more recent theoretic work it is apparent that his view of logic has become subtler and more refined (Toulmin 1976). The Uses of Argument reveals clear signs of its construction from f i v e ' e s s a y s ' , some of which had appeared previously. (Toulmin deliberately calls them essays in

200

Toulmin's

analysis model

order to indicate the provisional, incomplete and polemical nature of the collection.) The composition of The Uses of Argument is not particularly well balanced and the book is not a little repetitious. A more important objection to the book, however, is that Toulmin's terminology is sometimes rather vague and obscure, and on some points even inconsistent. This is a grave drawback, since the choice of words plays an important part in his discourse J1* We shall demonstrate Toulmin's confusing use of words by reference to his use of the central term valid(ity). Sometimes Toulmin uses the word valid in its logical sense, sometimes he uses it for the logical concept of 'sound'. Most often, however, he appears to be using it for some vague, general notion of 'good' or ' a c c e p t a b l e ' . This is exemplified by the phrasing of the central question in the chapter in which he presents his model for the first time: 'How, then, should we l a y an argument out, if we want to show the sources of its v a l i d i t y ? ' (1969: 95). He then precises this question as follows: 'To what extent is the acceptability or unacceptability of arguments dependent on their "formal" qualities?' In this more precise version of the question, ' v a l i d i t y ' is interpreted as a rhetorical concept, an argument being regarded as ' v a l i d ' if it is ' a c c e p t a b l e ' ; in the original phrasing 'validity' might still be understood in its formal logical sense. The idiosyncratic use of a term which has a clearly defined and generally accepted meaning in a particular f i e l d may be annoying or inconvenient, and may even result in a degree of confusion, but it need not necessarily have any further serious consequences for the correctness of an argumentation. What is confusing here, however, is that Toulmin does not clearly differentiate his use of validity from the logical meaning of the term, but merely implies that he is using it in its 'correct' sense, and that this embraces the logical meaning. We see this, for example, in his argumentation for the thesis that the ' v a l i d i t y ' of an argument is not a f i e l d invariant 'formal' question but a field-dependent attribute of the backing for the warrant. In this argumentation Toulmin uses the Petersen example which we have already looked at in section A.3. (1) Petersen is a Swede (minor premiss) (2) No Swedes are Roman Catholics (major premiss) (2a) A Swede is certainly not a Roman Catholic (w) (2b) The proportion of Roman Catholic Swedes is zero (B)

Conclusion

(3)

201

So, Petersen i s not a Roman Catholic

In the logical sense the argument: minor premiss ( 1 ) , major premiss ( 2 ) , therefore conclusion (3) is v a l i d . Toulmin finds the argument also v a l i d if the major p r e miss (2) is interpreted as a warrant ( 2 a ) , thus implying that here too it is a matter of v a l i d i t y in the l o g i c a l sense. The argument with an interpretation in which the major premiss (2) is replaced by a backing (2b) is in Toulmin's view not formally v a l i d , true, but in practice it is ' a l l r i g h t ' , i . e . f u l l y acceptable. And the implication attributed to this by Toulmin is then that therefore the ' v a l i d i t y ' of l - 2 a - 3 , too, cannot be the consequence of formal q u a l i t i e s . And he concludes: 'Once we bring into the open the backing on which (in the last resort) the soundness of our arguments depends, the suggestion that validity is to be explained in terms of "formal propert i e s " , in any geometrical sense, loses its p l a u s i b i l i t y ' (1969c: 120; our i t a l i c s ) . In this argumentation the terms acceptabley sound and valid are turned into synonyms, so that a rhetorical notion is put on a par with two l o g i c al concepts which in l o g i c , moreover, have d i f f e r e n t meanings. This terminological confusion is also responsible for the fact that two obvious faults in Toulmin's reasoning escaped his notice. From the observation that of its form the argument l-2b-3 cannot be called a logically v a l i d argument even though in the practical sense it is s t i l l acceptable it must not be concluded that therefore the validity in the l o g i c a l sense of the a r g u ment l-2a-3 cannot be due to its formal q u a l i t i e s . The second flaw is that the argument l-2a-3 is anyway in this form not v a l i d in the logical sense, even if it can be turned into the required form without much d i f f i c u l t y (the result then being 1-2-3). 7 5 Toulminian v a l i d i t y is slightly different from logical v a l i d i t y , coming closest to the l o g i c a l concept of ' soundness', though it is more a 'semi-soundness', since when talking about 'validity' Toulmin is interested only in the backing: in this connection he completely disregards the data. Following on from this we must ask to what extent the warrant g u a r antees v a l i d i t y in the l o g i c a l sense and in the Toulminian sense. As regards l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y we can be b r i e f : the warrant does not guarantee i t . The reason is simple: Toulmin stipulates that the warrant cannot assume the form necessary for v a l i d i t y because then the distinction between the function of warranting (or justifying) the

202

Toulmin's

analysis

model

step from data to claim and the function of the backing (or support) for t h i s warrant would remain hidden. T h i s , after a l l , was also his reason for c a l l i n g the major p r e miss in a syllogism ' a m b i g u o u s ' . What form the warrant must take according to Toulmin in order for the argument to be v a l i d in his sense remains quite obscure. It might be thought that he does not a c t u a l l y r e g a r d this as very important, since his only intention with his model is to show that it i s the (field-dependent) b a c k i n g for the warrant (whatever form it may t a k e ) which ultimately determines the v a l i d i t y or i n v a l i d i t y of an argument. Or one might observe that one of the implications of Toulmin's views is p r e c i s e l y that the question cannot be answered in general terms at a l l because exact c r i t e r i a have to be developed for each field of argument. But Toulmin himself says that a condition for formal v a l i d i t y of an argument is that the warrant s h a l l be formulated explicitly as a warrant and that it s h a l l j u s t i f y precisely the inference concerned. What requirements may be made of an ' e x p l i c i t formulation' or a ' p r e c i s e w a r r a n t ' he f a i l s to e l u c i d a t e . Various authors, such as Johnstone 1968 and Manicas 1966, have pointed out that Toulmin is ultimately concerned to show that for the evaluation of argumentation in everyday life other norms are necessary than for the assessment of arguments in l o g i c . The requirement of formal v a l i d i t y in the l o g i c a l sense is s c a r c e l y relevant to the assessment of argumentation in p r a c t i c e . And the other norms cannot be u n i v e r s a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d for a l l argumentation, but are s u b j e c t - l i n k e d and f i e l d - s p e c i f i c : in Toulmin's terminology, ' f i e l d - d e p e n d e n t ' . The ultimate implication of this view is that only experts in a p a r t i c u l a r field are competent to assess argumentation in that field (Abelson 1960-1 and others also point this o u t ) . . B u t even though opinions regarding the relation between field-dependent and f i e l d - i n v a r i a n t c r i t e r i a for the e v a l uation of argumentation and regarding the role of formal logic may v a r y , even the severest c r i t i c s of Toulmin's book agree with him on this general point. Their o b j e c t ion is tied up more with the implication which Toulmin takes it upon himself to attach to it in The Uses of Argument. In their view the solution should in any case not be sought in taking l o g i c a l terms and distinctions which have a l r e a d y proved their worth and reinterpreting them in such a way that they become useless for l o g i c a l purposes and when applied to p r a c t i c a l argumentation tend to confuse the issue r a t h e r than bring about c l a r i fication.

Conclusion

203

As an aid in the evaluation of the validity of arguments (in whatever sense) the 1958 model, then, may be useless; but this does not necessarily mean that it has proved of no value for the analysis of arguments. And indeed, as an evaluation model it has found very little serious application, but all the more as an analysis model. It is then used to analyse the argumentation in a discursive text (whether spoken or written) in order to make the argumentational structure more transparent (as we did with the article from the consumer guide), and in order to be better able to evaluate the argumentation. In all its applications the model is used to analyse argumentation in colloquial language. Although Toulmin himself presents his model as one that is concerned with arguments, it is clear that what he really means by this is argumentation in discussions in colloquial language, and not deductions in a logical symbolic language. This emerges, for example, from the manner in which he introduces the elements of the model: in each case he describes the function of statements and other verbal elements in the defence of an opinion against a language user who is attacking i t . This functional element is particularly in evidence in the definition (and in the choice of term) of the warrant. The warrant must indicate explicitly why it is right for a language user defending an opinion to adduce particular data in defence of his claim. Statements which in this way f u l f i l a justifying role in a discussion between language users belong in an argumentational context and not a logical one.76 In several articles about the model ( e . g . Manicas 1966 and Trent 1968) it has been pointed out that it is inconsistent of Toulmin to include in it a backing, rebuttal and qualifier for the warrant but not for the data. The observation of this inconsistency is in itself correct, but the proposal advanced in such articles, namely that the same elements should be introduced for the data, is less felicitous. It is precisely because of these elements accompanying the warrant that Toulmin's model can no longer be termed a model of simple argumentation. Toulmin would have to apply the same consideration to the warrant as to the data. In fact, however, he assumes in his model that the data are accepted at face value; if this is not the case, then, he says, it will have to be made the case by way of a preliminary argument. Then the datum from the one argument will be the claim in the other. There is absolutely no reason why the same should not apply to the warrant. If a warrant is not

204

Toulmin 's analysis model

immediately accepted as authoritative, then an attempt must be made to remove the objections to it by means of another argument, in which the warrant from the first argument appears as the claim. And if an argument contains a backing for the warrant, then in fact there are two arguments. Something rather similar applies in the case of the qualifier and the rebuttal. Like the backing, as separate elements these do not. belong in a model of simple argumentation. A claim can be a definite or a cautious statement. If it is the latter, this must appear from the wording of the claim itself. A qualifier is thus not a separate element in the model. The claim can be attacked by casting doubt on either data or warrant, or both. In all these cases new arguments must be put up to defend the statements attacked (and thus ultimately the original claim). The warrant can be attacked by demonstrating that it is without any foundation ( i . e . has no backing) or by showing that there are exceptions to the rule presented as absolute (and hence that a reservation must be made). For analysing compound argumentation it is certainly useful to distinguish elements such as the qualifier, backing and rebuttal, but in a model of simple argumentation these elements are superfluous. Toulmin, therefore, would have been better advised in his introduction of the simple and the extended model to make clear that the simple model related to separate or individual arguments (which we call simple argumentations), while the extended model refers to combinations of individual arguments (what we call compound argumentations). Using our distinction between subordinately and co-ordinately compound argumentation it would also have been possible, moreover, to make refinements to the model for compound argumentation which would make it possible to include the defence of the data in the (extended) model. Without qualifier, backing and rebuttal the model consists of claim, data and warrant. Toulmin himself admits that because of the way they are formulated the data are sometimes difficult to tell apart from the warrant. It will be necessary to distinguish between them in some other way. One of the distinguishing marks of the data is that they always have to be expressed explicitly, while they must also contain specific factual information and must form the basis for the claim. The warrant, by contrast, may remain implicit, has a general, rule-like, justifying character, and f u l f i l s a bridging function.

Conclusion

205

Toulmin emphasizes t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e in function between the d a t a and the w a r r a n t is the main d i s t i n c t i o n . But even in combination with other c r i t e r i a it i s often d i f f i c u l t in p r a c t i c e to e s t a b l i s h , using t h i s f u n c t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n , e x a c t l y which statements a r e the d a t a and which statement s e r v e s a s the w a r r a n t . We can i l l u s t r a t e t h i s with the following e x a m p l e . Claim (C)

(1) Harry is a British subject

Datum (D)

(2) A man born in Bermuda is a British subject

Warrant (W)

(3) Harry was born in Bermuda

What have you got to go on? How do you get there?

In Toulmin's o r i g i n a l example (3) was the datum and (2) the w a r r a n t . The i n v e r s i o n in the above example i s p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e the defender of the claim e v i d e n t l y assumes t h a t the a t t a c k e r i s a c q u a i n t e d with H a r r y ' s b i r t h p l a c e and not with the l a w ; (3) i s therefore i n i t i a l l y i m p l i c i t , while (2) is s t a t e d e x p l i c i t l y . Statement (3) i s n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e the a t t a c k e r ' s question shows t h a t the d e f e n d e r ' s supposition i s i n c o r r e c t ; the statement now functions as a b r i d g e between (1) and ( 2 ) . Thus the datum i s now a g e n e r a l , r u l e - l i k e statement and the w a r r a n t c o n t a i n s s p e c i f i c f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n . And i f (2) i s understood to be the w a r r a n t and (3) the datum, then—in c o n t r a s t to what the c r i t e r i a for making the distinction s t i p u l a t e — t h e w a r r a n t h a s been e x p r e s s e d e x p l i c i t l y and the datum c a n remain i m p l i c i t . The d i s t i n c t i o n between d a t a and w a r r a n t i s p e r f e c t l y c l e a r only in Toulmin's e x a m p l e s . In p r a c t i c e , at l e a s t if one t r i e s to a p p l y h i s d e f i n i t i o n s , they a r e t o t a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , and t h i s e f f e c t i v e l y reduces the model to a v a r i a n t of the syllogism (or enthymeme i f the w a r r a n t i s i m p l i c i t ) . It i s u n c l e a r how the a n a l y s i s of argumentation i s supposed to b e n e f i t from the choice of t h i s Toulminian v a r i a n t of the syllogism, in which the elements are only v a g u e l y defined, as compared with a n a l y s i s in o r d i n a r i l y s y l l o g i s t i c terms. This i s c e r t a i n l y true of the simple model, but even the extended model has so f a r t a k e n us s c a r c e l y any f u r t h e r — c h i e f l y b e c a u s e where it i s a p p l i e d its c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s h a v e d i s a p p e a r e d (the r e b u t t a l , b a c k i n g and q u a l i f i e r are h a r d l y

206

Toulmin's

analysis

model

e v e r u s e d ) a n d b e c a u s e i t h a s been d i v o r c e d from the c o n t e x t of The Uses of Argument in which it f u l f i l s a c e n t r a l f u n c t i o n in the a r g u m e n t . The a t t r a c t i o n of T o u l m i n ' s model p r o b a b l y l i e s m a i n l y in the f a c t t h a t a p p l y i n g f o r m a l l o g i c to a r g u m e n t a t i o n in c o l l o q u i a l l a n g u a g e i s f u l l of p i t f a l l s . S t u d y i n g f o r m a l l o g i c s y s t e m s r e q u i r e s q u i t e a lot of e f f o r t , i t s r e l e v a n c e for p r a c t i c a l p u r p o s e s i s not i m m e d i a t e l y a p p a r e n t a n d the r e t u r n on the e f f o r t s p e n t i s s l i g h t . Toulmin c r i t i c i z e s l o g i c , d e n i e s the r e l e v a n c e of f o r m a l l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y a n d a p p e a r s to o f f e r a n a l t e r n a t i v e . T h a t h i s c r i t i c i s m t a k e s v i r t u a l l y no a c c o u n t w h a t e v e r of the d e v e l o p m e n t of l o g i c s i n c e A r i s t o t l e (he d i s c u s s e s the s y l l o g i s m to the e x c l u s i o n of a l l e l s e ) a n d i s b a s e d on a c o n f u s i n g j u g g l i n g with terms a n d c o n c e p t s a n d t h a t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e ( t h e model) f a i l s to s o l v e a s i n g l e p r o b l e m h a s e s c a p e d the notice of t h o s e who a p p l y i t . And even when t h e y r e v e a l some awareness of the c r i t i c i s m s that h a v e been levelled a g a i n s t The Uses of Argument in g e n e r a l a n d the model in p a r t i c u l a r , t h e y a c c o u n t f o r t h e i r h a v i n g a d o p t e d the model b y c l a i m i n g ' p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t ' ( l i k e B r o c k r i e d e & E h n i n g e r I 9 6 0 ) , i f , i n d e e d , they g i v e a n y r e a s o n whatever. The i d e a s a d v a n c e d b y Toulmin in The Uses of Argument a r e more c l o s e l y a l l i e d to a rhetorical view of a r g u mentation t h a n to a logical a p p r o a c h . T h i s too may be p a r t of the e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the e n t h u s i a s m with which h i s model h a s b e e n r e c e i v e d b y a u t h o r s c o n c e r n e d with a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d d i s c u s s i o n . Such a u t h o r s a r e g e n e r a l l y more o r i e n t e d on the r h e t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n t h a n on d e v e l o p ments in l o g i c ( c f . e . g . Lewis 1972). We c a n now e n d our d i s c u s s i o n of T o u l m i n ' s c o n t r i b u t ion to t h e o r e t i c a l t h i n k i n g a b o u t a r g u m e n t a t i o n b y summa r i z i n g our o p i n i o n of i t a s f o l l o w s . T o u l m i n ' s w a y of a p p r o a c h i n g argumentation c a n c e r t a i n l y be d e s c r i b e d a s i n t e r e s t i n g . In the f i r s t p l a c e he a d d r e s s e s h i m s e l f to a r g u m e n t a t i o n in e v e r y d a y s i t u a t i o n s , s t a r t i n g from a r g u mentation f o r m u l a t e d i n e v e r y d a y s p e e c h . Second, he a s s u m e s t h a t the p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n of a r g u m e n t a t i o n c o n s i s t s in the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of o p i n i o n s . And t h i r d , in the e v a l u a t i o n of a r g u m e n t a t i o n he p l a c e s the e m p h a s i s on the m a t e r i a l v a l i d i t y of a r g u m e n t s . It i s t h e s e t h r e e p o i n t s a b o v e a l l which make h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n to a r g u mentation t h e o r y a n i n t e r e s t i n g one in p r i n c i p l e . More t h a n j u s t i n t e r e s t i n g , h o w e v e r , i s T o u l m i n ' s view of the n a t u r e of the c r i t e r i a f o r a s s e s s i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n . His s t a r t i n g p o i n t h e r e i s t h a t the s u p r e m a c y of one

Conclusion

207

p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , or f i e l d of argument as he c a l l s i t , in e s t a b l i s h i n g the norms for assessment must be r e j e c t e d . According to Toulmin, in p r i n c i p l e the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r r i v i n g at a r a t i o n a l assessment of a r g u mentation in a manner s u i t e d to the f i e l d of argument concerned e x i s t s in e v e r y f i e l d of a r g u m e n t . He t h u s r e j e c t s the i d e a of u n i v e r s a l or a b s o l u t e norms for a s s e s s i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Furthermore he p l a c e s the d e v e l opment of r a t i o n a l norms for a s s e s s i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n in the context of a d i s c u s s i o n between l a n g u a g e u s e r s w i s h ing to solve s p e c i f i c problems. To Toulmin, r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n is a d i s c u s s i o n in which an opinion is defended a g a i n s t a c r i t i c a l a t t a c k e r or c h a l l e n g e r a n d in which the a r g u m e n t s a d d u c e d a r e made a c c e p t a b l e to the a t t a c k e r or c h a l l e n g e r . The foregoing will h a v e made it c l e a r t h a t Toulmin uses c e r t a i n premisses which a r e important for the d e velopment of a c r i t i c a l theory of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , b u t b e c a u s e he h a s i n a d e q u a t e l y p u r s u e d h i s b a s i c i d e a s the ultimate s i g n i f i c a n c e of h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n must n e v e r t h e l e s s be sought c h i e f l y in the i n s p i r a t i o n a l v a l u e which h i s model h a s h a d , a n d s t i l l h a s , for many w r i t e r s . Toulmin h a s not succeeded in e s t a b l i s h i n g the Tightness of h i s i d e a s with h i s model, a n d both t h e o r e t i c a l l y a n d from the p r a c t i c a l point of view it is poorly a d a p t e d to a n a l y s i n g a n d a s s e s s i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n . But h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l i d e a s a n d the model t h a t he h a s a d v a n c e d as p a r t of his defence of those -ideas h a v e been a c o n s i d e r a b l e stimulus to o t h e r s to embark upon the s t u d y of a r g u mentation. It is v e r y l a r g e l y t h a n k s to Toulmin t h a t interest in a r g u m e n t a t i o n theory h a s i n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l y since I960, both w i t h i n a n d outside p h i l o s o p h i c a l circles.

Chapter 5

The New Rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca

5.1.

I ntroduction

As r e g a r d s both n a t u r e a n d volume the c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e o r e t i c a l t h i n k i n g about a r g u m e n t a t i o n made by the Belgian p h i l o s o p h e r Chaim Perelman in c o l l a b o r a t i o n with Lucie O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a may be termed r e m a r k a b l e . As a l r e a d y observed in c h a p t e r 3, it is one t h a t is h i g h l y r e g a r d e d by a l a r g e number of a u t h o r s , so t h a t t h e r e is e v e r y r e a s o n to p a y closer a t t e n t i o n to it h e r e . To b e g i n with we s h a l l give a s good a s u r v e y of Perelman a n d O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a ' s p r i n c i p a l i n s i g h t s a s we c a n ; we s h a l l then c a r r y out some a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n a l y s i s a c c o r d i n g to those i n s i g h t s , a n d f i n a l l y , in our c o n c l u s i o n s , we s h a l l mention a number of p o i n t s of c r i t i c i s m . Perelman is p r o f e s s o r of l o g i c , ethics a n d m e t a p h y s i c s a t the University of B r u s s e l s , h a v i n g s t u d i e d f i r s t law a n d then p h i l o s o p h y . The l a t t e r s t u d y he completed with a t h e s i s on the German l o g i c i a n F r e g e . His a s s o c i a t e Olbrechts-Tyteca r e a d social science a n d economics. They h a v e been doing r e s e a r c h t o g e t h e r into r h e t o r i c a n d a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h e o r y since 1947. 77 Perelman a n d O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a h a v e developed a theory of a r g u m e n t a t i o n which they term the new rhetoric. The idea of developing such a t h e o r y came from Perelman a n d was announced by him in a l e c t u r e at the I n s t i t u t des Hautes Études de Belgique in 1949. He spent some ten y e a r s working the p l a n out with O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a . After a number of programmatic a r t i c l e s a n d p a r t i a l s t u d i e s , in 1958 Perelman a n d Olbrechts-Tyteca p u b l i s h e d a b u l k y s u r v e y of the r e s u l t s of t h e i r r e s e a r c h : La nouvelle rhétorique:

traité

de

l'argumentation. 208

Here

we

shall

be

Introduction

209

referring to an English translation which appeared in 1969 under the title The New Rhetor-La. A treatise on argumentation. The new rhetoric is concerned with argumentation in colloquial language. It is not an attempt to develop a normative theory of argumentation by establishing norms to which the investigators feel argumentation ought to adhere, but a description of sorts of argumentation which may be successful in practice and sorts of starting point which may be of relevance to the success of argumentation. It is in the nature of a phenomenological theory, and according to Perelman constitutes a reaction to the ' f a i l u r e ' of 'positivistic empiricism' and 'rationalistic idealism', 7 8 in which he believes important areas of rational thinking, such as l e g a l reasoning, are simply passed b y . During the nineteen-forties Perelman investigated v a r i ous questions concerned with philosophy and the philosophy of law. His study of formal law, i . e . the manner in which material law ( l a i d down in statutory regulations) is to be upheld in practice, 7 9 led him to conclude that formal law is only possible if one can refer to particular value-judgements. Criteria are necessary to determine whether particular people are in comparable circumstances, can be counted as belonging to the same class, and so on, and these criteria are ultimately based on v a l u e judgements. Thus in order to treat people equally (when they become unfit for work, for example), it is necessary f i r s t to establish what class of people is concerned and what people belong to that class. And for a court, for example, it is important to know in what cases a person must be regarded as only p a r t i a l l y or not at all responsible for his actions, and to what extent there are grounds for doubting the degree to which a given defendant may be held responsible for his actions. Here it is necessary to have criteria related to value-judgements, even though such criteria must as f a r as possible be ' o b j e c t i v i z e d ' by incorporation into formal rules. The value-judgements underlying these might be, for example, that in certain circumstances one cannot hold people entirely or at all responsible for their actions, that some people find themselves in a state in which they must be regarded as not responsible for their own actions, and that when determining the sentence account must be taken of the interests of the defendant as well as those of the community at large. The philosophy of logical empiricism to which Perelman

210

The New Rhetoric

of Perelman and

Olbrechts-Tyteca

at this time—according to his own testimony (1970b: 280)—adhered did not, however, enable him to account s c i e n t i f i c a l l y for the use of value-judgements. According to him this meant that, technically speaking, they ought to be regarded as unfounded and unjustified—that the step from ' i s ' to 'ought' cannot be accounted f o r , or at least not in a scientific way. 8 0 The implication of this would then be that argumentation r e l y i n g on v a l u e judgements was not r a t i o n a l . Perelman regarded this as an unacceptable implication which would render the concept of the 'reasonable d e c i s i o n ' , which is extremely important in law—and outside it—meaningless. If the adjective reasonable or rational is to be reserved for statements capable of being v e r i f i e d by empirical o b s e r vation or of being reached deductively by formal l o g i c , then formal law—as the systematic application of rules founded on value-judgements—has no rational basis, since in practice lawyers ( l i k e philosophers and other language users) only r a r e l y produce formally perfect proof of the theses they advance. Rather, they t r y to justify those theses. According to Perelman such an attempt at j u s t i fication may v e r y well be regarded as rational. 8 1 Perelman terms attempts at justification by l a w y e r s , philosophers and a v e r a g e language users argumentation.. According to him, argumentation is a rational a c t i v i t y which stands alongside formal argument and is complementary to i t , and the manner in which arguing takes place must be described in a theory of argumentation which is in turn the complement of formal l o g i c . In Perelman's view there is an urgent need of such a theory of argumentation. It would have to refer to disputes in which values play a part and which can be resolved neither by empirical v e r i f i c a t i o n (a ' s e n s o r y ' proof) nor by formal argument (a ' f o r m a l ' p r o o f ) , nor by a combination of the two. The theory would have to provide a model which would make it possible to show how choices and decisions, once made, can be j u s t i f i e d on rational grounds. The new rhetoric of Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca is an attempt to develop such a theory. The method used by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in developing their theory of argumentation is v e r y similar, according to Perelman (1970b: 281) to the manner in which F r e g e ' s contribution to logic came about. Frege analysed mathematical thinking in order to a r r i v e at a theory of l o g i c a l reasoning. Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca investigate philosophical, l e g a l and other a r g u mentation in order to a r r i v e at a theory of reasoning using value-judgements. Thus they do not establish a

Introduction

211

priori what p o s s i b l e argumentation schemata a r e , but tryto detect them by s u b j e c t i n g c a s e s of proven s u c c e s s f u l argument to a n a l y s i s . When Perelman decided to develop a theory of a r g u mentation he was e n t i r e l y unaware of the r i c h m a t e r i a l which l a y r e a d y for tapping in c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c (1970b: 2 8 0 ) . This only came to l i g h t through the e x t e n s i v e e x p l o r a t o r y r e s e a r c h which he c a r r i e d out in c o n j u n c t i o n with O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a . Modern science proved to offer few direct points of c o n t a c t , but the c l a s s i c a l approach to argumentation r e v e a l e d i t s e l f as h a v i n g s e v e r a l important s i m i l a r i t i e s to what Perelman and O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a e n v i s aged. In choosing a name for t h e i r t h e o r y , the new rhetoric, they e x p r e s s e d t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . Perelman and O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a r e g a r d c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c and d i a l e c t i c a s a s i n g l e whole ( c f . section 2 . 1 ) . In t h e i r view d i a l e c t i c is a theory r e l a t i n g to the t e c h n i q u e s of argument and r h e t o r i c a p r a c t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e i n d i c a t i n g how d i a l e c t i c a l t e c h n i q u e s c a n be used to convince or persuade people. For t h e i r view of c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c and d i a l e c t i c they r e f e r to A r i s t o t l e . Just a s in c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c , in the new r h e t o r i c it i s postulated t h a t argumentation i s always designed to a c h i e v e a p a r t i c u l a r effect on those for whom it i s i n t e n d e d . Thus in both old and new r h e t o r i c s an important p a r t is p l a y e d by the audience. The o r a t o r unfolds his a r g u m e n t ation in order to sway his a u d i e n c e , or to convince them of something. I f the argumentation i s to have the d e s i r e d e f f e c t , it i s v e r y important t h a t the audience be approached in a g o o d — i . e . effective—manner. As f a r as p o s s i b l e the s p e a k e r must i d e n t i f y himself with h i s audience and p l a y on e x i s t i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s , o p i n i o n s , e x p e r i e n c e s , knowledge and norms. R h e t o r i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , argumentation i s sounder a c c o r d ing a s it is more s u c c e s s f u l with the audience to whom it is a d d r e s s e d . For argumentation to be s u c c e s s f u l in p r a c t i c e , the t e c h n i q u e s used must therefore be attuned to the a u d i e n c e ' s frame of r e f e r e n c e . Perelman and O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a endorse t h i s point of view and it is t h i s t h a t stamps t h e i r theory of argumentation a s a r h e t o r i c a l t h e o r y : it i s a theory c a l c u l a t e d to provide a systematic survey of the knowledge n e c e s s a r y in order to use v e r b a l means to b r i n g about purposive p e r s u a s i v e e f f e c t s on the persons to whom one a d d r e s s e s oneself in an a r g u m e n t a t i o n . There i s thus a strong s i m i l a r i t y between the new r h e t o r i c and c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c . But t h e r e a r e a l s o d i f f e r e n c e s . In the f i r s t p l a c e the new r h e t o r i c c o n t a i n s not only elements from A r i s t o t e l i a n r h e t o r i c , but a l s o elements

212

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from d i a l e c t i c . I n d e e d , the d i a l e c t i c component is so l a r g e t h a t it would h a v e been possible to defend a d e c i s ion to c a l l the t h e o r y the new dialectic. However, the serious m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t h a t might h a v e a r i s e n from t h i s in view of Hegel's adoption of the term dialectic a n d the emphasis which c l a s s i c a l dialectic p l a c e s on the p a r a l l e l with a n a l y t i c r e a s o n i n g p e r s u a d e d Perelman a n d Olbrechts-Tyteca not to u s e t h a t t e r m . In the second p l a c e , Perelman a n d Olbrechts-Tyteca h a v e a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t conception of the object of t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a n , s a y , A r i s t o t l e . His u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the object of r h e t o r i c was determined by the p r a c t i c e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a s he knew i t : h i s r h e t o r i c r e l a t e s to o r a t i o n s a n d d e b a t e s c h i e f l y about p o l i t i c a l a n d l e g a l problems i n v o l v ing l a r g e g r o u p s of people, or held for a s p e c i f i c , e . g . l e g a l , p u r p o s e . The new r h e t o r i c r e f e r s not only to o r a l b u t also to w r i t t e n a r g u m e n t a t i o n , a n d in p r i n c i p l e t h a t a r g u m e n t a t i o n c a n be about a n y s u b j e c t w h a t e v e r a n d may be a d d r e s s e d to an a u d i e n c e of a n y sort a n d s i z e . According to Perelman (1970), the new r h e t o r i c is not merely a theory in which a d e s c r i p t i o n i s given of the p r a c t i c e of n o n - f o r m a l a r g u m e n t , it is also an attempt at c r e a t i n g a framework w i t h i n which a l l forms of t h i n k ing t h a t a r e not a n a l y t i c can be u n i t e d . A t h e o r y of a r g u m e n t a t i o n must p r o v i d e the p o s s i b i l i t y of p l a c i n g v a r i o u s claims to r a t i o n a l i t y a n d a m u l t i p l i c i t y of p h i l osophical systems in a s i n g l e t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k . Perelman sees the d i f f e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i e s a s systems of j u s t i f i c a t i o n for p a r t i c u l a r i d e a s . According to him, p h i l o s o p h e r s a s a r u l e do not - offer formal proof of the Tightness of t h e i r i d e a s , b u t t r y to j u s t i f y the r a t i o n a l i t y of those i d e a s with the help of a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Claiming r a t i o n a l i t y is not the same a s claiming to proclaim the o n l y , the u l t i m a t e t r u t h , a n d it should t h e r e f o r e not be e q u a t e d with i t . Claiming r a t i o n a l i t y means a l w a y s c l a i m ing the a p p r o b a t i o n of people—of the ' i d e a l ' a u d i e n c e . But t h i s i d e a l a u d i e n c e is not a n e x i s t i n g r e a l i t y : it is a t h o u g h t - c o n s t r u c t of the person a r g u i n g . The i d e a l a u d i e n c e will look d i f f e r e n t to d i f f e r e n t people a n d the p i c t u r e one h a s of it will h a n g t o g e t h e r with the h i s t o r i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s in which one f i n d s o n e s e l f . Sometimes the i d e a l a u d i e n c e may be imagined a s a c e r t a i n e l i t e corps ( e . g . ' t h e forum of s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h e r s ' ) , at other times the i d e a l p i c t u r e might be a more g e n e r a l one of ' t h e r e a s o n a b l e human b e i n g ' . An a d e q u a t e a n d u n i v e r s a l l y a c c e p t a b l e c r i t e r i o n , w h a t e v e r the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , does not e x i s t : t h e r e is no e x i s t i n g a u d i e n c e

Introduction t h a t we c a n point to as a g e n e r a l l y recognized body for e v a l u a t i n g n o n - a n a l y t i c argument. A person c l a i m i n g r a t i o n a l i t y will have to use a r g u mentation to convince others t h a t t h i s claim i s j u s t i f i e d . This a l s o a p p l i e s to p h i l o s o p h e r s . In p r i n c i p l e the p h i l osopher c a n choose which audience he wishes to convince with h i s a r g u m e n t a t i o n . The choice may be d i f f e r e n t depending on the p h i l o s o p h e r : one will wish to convince a few recognized s p e c i a l i s t s or a d h e r e n t s of a p a r t i c u l a r school of p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought, another will want to convince the whole of mankind. The same a p p l i e s , mutatis mutandis, for l e g a l and other t h i n k e r s . In a l l c a s e s , however, the argumentation will be d i r e c t e d towards convincing people. The new r h e t o r i c i s designed to make it p o s s i b l e to do j u s t i c e to t h i s e s s e n t i a l element of nona n a l y t i c t h i n k i n g . By submitting n o n - a n a l y t i c t h i n k i n g in a l l i t s v a r i e t y to an a n a l y s i s , t h i s theory of a r g u mentation is intended to c r e a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of b r i n g i n g about a s y n t h e s i s between the f r e q u e n t l y seemingly c o n f l i c t i n g claims to r a t i o n a l i t y made in different p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems. In the new r h e t o r i c , t h e n , argumentation i s p l a c e d in a r h e t o r i c a l framework; the soundness of an a r g u m e n t ation i s equated with i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s on the audience for whom it i s i n t e n d e d . The degree of soundness i s measured by the a s s e n t or a p p l a u s e of the a u d i e n c e . Thus soundness is here an e m p i r i c a l c r i t e r i o n c o r r e s p o n d ing to t h a t a p p l i e d to the assessment of argumentation in c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c . That i s why Perelman and O l b r e c h t s T y t e c a ' s c r i t e r i o n of soundness i s in p r i n c i p l e open to the same c r i t i c i s m a s t h a t l e v e l l e d a g a i n s t the c r i t e r i o n of soundness in c l a s s i c a l r h e t o r i c . However, Perelman and O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a b e l i e v e they c a n avoid t h i s ( P l a t o n ist) criticism (cf. section 2 . 1 ) by pointing out t h a t anyone who a r g u e s is in p r i n c i p l e free to determine for himself what audience he wishes to c o n v i n c e , and thus t h a t everyone c a n decide for himself what audience he wishes to function a s his c r i t e r i o n ( c f . section 5 . 6 ) . I f one r e g a r d s a given audience as being of i n s u f f i c i e n t q u a l i t y one c a n always r e p l a c e it by another considered more a u t h o r i t a t i v e . The c r i t i c i s m of the c r i t e r i o n of soundness in r h e t o r i c i s t h u s , a c c o r d i n g to Perelman and O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a , c r i t i c i s m of a particular choice of a particular audience r a t h e r t h a n c r i t i c i s m of the soundness norm as a matter of p r i n c i p l e . The q u a l i t y t h a t a r g u mentation must h a v e in order to be a c c e p t a b l e i s always a function of the q u a l i t y of the e v a l u a t i n g a u d i e n c e , and c r i t i c i s m of r h e t o r i c t a k e s no account of t h i s r e l a t i o n of

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dependence. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rationality cannot be defined in isolation from an audience. In the following section we shall set out the way in which they involve the audience in their rhetorical approach to argumentation. 5.2.

The rhetorical framework of argumentation

In their The New Rhetoric Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca define the new rhetoric as 'the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent' (1969: 4 ) . The purpose of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca' s research is to g i v e a systematic description of those techniques. Approval is always connected with people. Theses which are approved by one man may not be approved by the next. Moreover, approval can v a r y in intensity. A person can agree with something 'a hundred per c e n t ' , but he may also agree with it 'up to a p o i n t ' . Argumentation may make a thesis wholly acceptable, but it may also only make it more acceptable. It is a matter of degree. The measure of approval depends, inter alia, on the value-judgements of the evaluating audience. The description of argumentation in the new rhetoric starts from the evaluating audience. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not try to impose norms from outside to indicate what ought to happen in an argumentation: rather, their aim is to provide a survey of argumentative techniques which may be successful in practice. In fact, however, their description is not of argumentative techniques but of argumentation schemata regarded as having a certain cogency. The various sorts of argumentation schemata can only be employed successfully as argumentative techniques if they are in practice attuned to the premisses of the evaluating audience. Therefore Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca pay attention not only to the v a r i ous sorts of argumentation schemata, but begin with an account of the premisses playing a part in argumentation addressed to an audience. In particular, they go into the premisses which may serve as the starting point or point of departure for the argumentation. Broadly speaking we shall follow their design, but f i r s t it is necessary to introduce a number of terms needed for the clarification of the rhetorical framework within which, in the view of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, argumentation takes place. Although the new rhetoric is a descriptive theory it

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does not describe the manner in which discussions take place in practice. For example, the specific roles of the interlocutors and the stages by which a discussion develops are not discussed. Neither is there any description of the psychological mechanisms which play a part in argumentation. The speaker's motives, the psychological factors on which the effect of certain argumentation schemata depends and similar elements are disregarded. The new rhetoric is a theory of argumentation in which non-formal argumentation schemata are described. The description itself amounts to an explicitization of connections discerned by the theory's proponents between certain constellations of statements and the increased acceptability of a thesis. The verifiableness of what is asserted lies chiefly in the possibility for the reader to recognize what is advanced on the basis of his own experience. The objective of the new rhetoric, the description of non-formal argumentation schemata in everyday language, is quite different from the objective commonly striven after by modern logicians. Modern logics relate to formal argument in systems of unambiguous symbols (cf. section 2.3). In the deductions called v a l i d in formal logic there is an analytic connection between the premisses advanced and the conclusion of the argument. The argument has cogency. This means that in general it is considered compelling to anyone who understands and accepts the formal system concerned. However, say Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, argumentation in colloquial language is never immediately compelling. The symbols used ( i . e . words and sentences) are in principle polysemous and the totality of premisses (arguments) may make the conclusion (the opinion defended) plausible to a greater or lesser degree. There is no question of v a l i d i t y , but of plausibility. And this, according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, is the crucial difference between formal logic and the new rhetoric: in the latter the decision as to the soundness of an argumentation rests with the audience for which it is intended, while in the former the criteria for assessing the soundness of a formal argument are defined independently of the evaluator. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call the audience that a speaker (or writer) wishes to reach with his argument his audience. They define this concept, crucial to the new rhetoric, as follows: .'An audience is the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation' (1969: 19). It is important here to bear in mind that the picture that the speaker has formed of his audience

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is a l w a y s a c o n s t r u c t of h i s own m a k i n g . It i s a t o t a l i t y of o p i n i o n s , s y s t e m a t i z e d to a g r e a t e r or l e s s e r d e g r e e , formed b y the s p e a k e r about the p e r s o n s he w i s h e s to i n f l u e n c e with h i s a r g u m e n t a t i o n . For h i s a r g u m e n t a t i o n to be s u c c e s s f u l the p i c t u r e t h a t the s p e a k e r forms of h i s a u d i e n c e must a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e a c c o r d with r e a l i t y . It i s t h e r e f o r e a condition of s o u n d — i . e . , in t h i s c o n t e x t , e f f e c t i v e — a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t the s p e a k e r i s in p o s s e s s i o n of the n e c e s s a r y knowl e d g e concerning those whom he w i s h e s h i s a r g u m e n t a t i o n to i n f l u e n c e . In p a r t i c u l a r , he must know what i n t e r e s t the a u d i e n c e b e l i e v e s i t s e l f to h a v e in the opinion b e i n g d e f e n d e d , so t h a t he c a n p l a y on t h i s in h i s a r g u m e n t a t i o n . The t r o u b l e h e r e , h o w e v e r , i s t h a t such t h i n g s a r e sometimes d i f f i c u l t to f i n d o u t , a n d t h a t in a l l sorts of w a y s the a u d i e n c e may be of heterogeneous composition. In the c a s e of o r a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n the c o n s t r u c t of h i s a u d i e n c e made b y the s p e a k e r w i l l o f t e n , t h e r e f o r e , be s u b j e c t to c h a n g e even a s he s p e a k s ( e . g . u n d e r the i n f l u e n c e of r e a c t i o n s to what he s a y s ) . A sound a r g u m e n t a t i o n i s only p o s s i b l e if there i s a c e r t a i n d e g r e e of r a p p o r t between the s p e a k e r (or w r i t e r ) a n d h i s a u d i e n c e . The s p e a k e r ' s t r a i n of thought must in some w a y a c c o r d with the t h i n k i n g of h i s a u d i e n c e . In p r a c t i c e t h i s condition i s not a l w a y s met at once. Often the s p e a k e r must f i r s t g a i n the a u d i e n c e ' s attention f o r the v i e w he w i s h e s to a d v a n c e b e f o r e it i s p r e p a r e d to attend s e r i o u s l y to his a r g u m e n t a t i o n . As a r u l e it i s an i l l u s i o n to s u p p o s e t h a t what is to be a d v a n c e d w i l l s p e a k f o r i t s e l f , a n d w i l l a s it were c o n v i n c e the a u d i ence a l l b y i t s e l f . The s p e a k e r must be an o r a t o r and get h i s a u d i e n c e i n t e r e s t e d in what he h a s to s a y , and he must then t r y to m a i n t a i n t h i s i n t e r e s t throughout h i s a r g u m e n t a t i o n . He must f a s c i n a t e and continue to f a s c i n ate h i s a u d i e n c e with a n e c d o t e s , e x a m p l e s and s t y l i s t i c d e v i c e s . This c a n be a d i f f i c u l t t a s k , p a r t i c u l a r l y when the s p e a k e r (or w r i t e r ) h a s no c l e a r p i c t u r e of how h i s a u d i e n c e is composed. Knowledge of the a u d i e n c e w i l l a l s o h a v e to i n c l u d e knowledge of the t e c h n i q u e s which may be employed in order to i n f l u e n c e i t . A f t e r a l l , the s p e a k e r cannot s i m p l y allow himself to be c a r r i e d a w a y b y his thoughts a n d emotions: he must use the t e c h n i q u e s t h a t w i l l most a f f e c t h i s a u d i e n c e . He must decide f o r himself how f a r he c a n and w i l l go in a d a p t i n g to the a u d i e n c e . A r g u mentation t h e o r y , s a y Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, c a n p r o v i d e no solution to the problem of the ethic to be

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regard.

Philosophers have a l w a y s been interested c h i e f l y in techniques of argumentation which a r e , or should be, convincing for every audience—or at least for e v e r y audience that they r e g a r d as r a t i o n a l and s u f f i c i e n t l y e x p e r t . Argumentation that is e f f e c t i v e only with a c e r t ain group of persons has a l w a y s been less h i g h l y thought of in philosophical c i r c l e s . Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca c a l l argumentation which may be assumed to be acceptable to any reasonable being convincing and a r g u mentation which would meet with a p p r o v a l from one p a r t i c u l a r person or group, but not n e c e s s a r i l y everyone, persuasive. In o r d i n a r y e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e ' c o n v i n c i n g ' is often used more s p e c i f i c a l l y for the creation of understanding and ' p e r s u a d i n g ' for moving others to "some course of action. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca a l s o make this connection, albeit i n d i r e c t l y . The distinction between convincing and p e r s u a s i v e argumentation, they s a y , is c h i e f l y determined by a distinction in the sorts of audience for which the argumentation is intended, and it depends on the sort of audience whether the issue is one of understanding or a c t i n g . P e r s u a s i v e argumentation l a y s claim to a p p r o v a l from a particular audience: one p a r t i c u l a r person or group. Convincing argumentation l a y s claim to a p p r o v a l from the universal audience: in p r i n c i p l e , the entirety of reasonable mankind. The a p p r o v a l of a p a r t i c u l a r a u d i ence may manifest itself in p r a c t i c a l terms: the audience have w a y s , for example, of letting the speaker know that they agree with him, or not, as the case may be. The connection with action is obvious: only a concrete group of persons can be prompted into action. The a p p r o v a l of the u n i v e r s a l audience, on the other hand, is more a right to which the speaker l a y s claim than a fact: the u n i v e r s a l audience consists not of a group of actual persons, but of the idea which the speaker has formed in his own mind of ' r a t i o n a l i t y 1 . The connection with action, then, is here much less obvious: i n s t e a d , argumentation addressed to the u n i v e r s a l audience is more of a claim that i r r e f u t a b l e insights are being p r e sented. E v e r y speaker forms his own notion of the u n i v e r s a l audience. This picture can v a r y to a g r e a t e r or lesser degree from speaker to s p e a k e r , or from group of s p e a k ers to group of s p e a k e r s , and depends p a r t l y on the h i s t o r i c a l context. A person l i v i n g in the Middle Ages would probably have had a d i f f e r e n t picture of the

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u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e from t h a t p e r c e i v e d b y someone from the twentieth c e n t u r y . Sometimes a p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e c a n s t a n d in f o r ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' , i . e . i t c a n f u l f i l the f u n c t i o n of the u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e . Thus f o r a man l i v i n g in the Middle Ages a p a r t i c u l a r e c c l e s i a s t i c a l e l i t e may h a v e been the embodiment of r e a s o n a b l e t h i n k e r s , w h i l e to the modern p h i l o s o p h e r a p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p of c o l l e a g u e s may be the u n i v e r s a l ( ' i d e a l ' ) a u d i e n c e , a n d the man w r i t i n g to h i s n e w s p a p e r may p e r h a p s count on i t s r e a d e r s b e i n g the u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e which w i l l a g r e e t h a t he is r i g h t . In the extreme c a s e , h o w e v e r , the u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e r e p r e sents a norm t r a n s c e n d i n g a l l s p e c i f i c p a r t i e s , a n d a p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e c a n n e v e r be more than a f o r t u i t o u s ( ' m o m e n t a r y ' ) embodiment of the u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e . Yet in p r a c t i c e it w i l l often be d i f f i c u l t to t e l l where c o n v i n c i n g ends a n d p e r s u a d i n g b e g i n s and v i c e v e r s a . The c o u p l i n g of these two concepts to u n i v e r s a l a n d p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e s r e s p e c t i v e l y — w h i c h c a n o n l y be a d e q u a t e l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from e a c h other through an i n s i g h t into the world of the s p e a k e r ' s i m a g i n a t i o n — m e a n s t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between c o n v i n c i n g a n d p e r s u a s i v e a r g u m e n t ation i s v e r y i m p r e c i s e and in p r a c t i c e must remain so. Perelman a n d O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a r e g a r d t h i s a s an a d v a n t a g e , b e c a u s e it means that t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k a c c o r d s b e t t e r with r e a l i t y . As a l r e a d y o b s e r v e d , the new r h e t o r i c does not p r o v i d e an a n s w e r to the question of how f a r a s p e a k e r c a n go in a d a p t i n g himself to h i s a u d i e n c e . To put t h i s s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l y : the s p e a k e r must decided f o r himself whether he w a n t s to r e g a r d h i s a u d i e n c e a s a n embodiment of the u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e or p u r e l y a s a p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e — i n other w o r d s , whether he w a n t s to c o n v i n c e or p e r s u a d e . The question of h i s s i n c e r i t y i s p u s h e d into the b a c k g r o u n d : the new r h e t o r i c i s concerned only with the e f f e c t t h a t words c a n h a v e . The s p e a k e r who knows t h a t f o r a g i v e n a u d i e n c e he only h a s to mention the word ' s p e c u l a t o r ' , with a l l i t s n e g a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s , in o r d e r to be s u c c e s s f u l with h i s a r g u m e n t a t i o n , and who then ( a g a i n s t h i s b e t t e r judgement) e x p l o i t s t h i s knowl e d g e , i s no l e s s i n t e r e s t i n g f o r the s t u d y of a r g u m e n t ation schemata t h a n the s p e a k e r who does not. E v e r y p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e c a n in p r i n c i p l e be t r e a t e d a s the u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e , or an embodiment of i t , but it c a n a l s o be seen p u r e l y a s a p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e . In t h i s connection there a r e two d i f f e r e n t a u d i e n c e s to which Perelman and O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a p a y p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n :

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the audience that consists of a single interlocutor and the audience that a person constitutes for himself in s e l f - d e l i b e r a t i o n . Both these p a r t i c u l a r audiences can also be treated as an embodiment of the u n i v e r s a l a u d i ence, in which case they w i l l p l a y a normative role; the criticism advanced by the interlocutor and the criticism advanced by the speaker himself are then r e g a r d e d as representative of u n i v e r s a l r a t i o n a l i t y , and the same applies to positive appreciation from those two q u a r t e r s . Self-deliberation and the self-criticism which follows from it can lead to a person rejecting his own t r a i n of thought as u n r e a s o n a b l e . The exceedingly closed nature of this deliberation may be regarded by someone as a guarantee that this is a matter of convincing and not of p e r s u a d i n g , and that s e l f - d e l i b e r a t i o n may therefore be seen as a form of argumentation addressed to the u n i v e r s a l audience, though one might add that not every psychologist would go along with that s t r a i g h t a w a y . Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca recognize the p o s s i b i l i t y of someone acting as his own u n i v e r s a l audience. To c l a r i f y the complex situation of s e l f - d e l i b e r a t i o n they observe that the deliberation which someone conducts with himself can best be regarded ( r h e t o r i c a l l y ) as a form of deliberation with someone e l s e , who either does or does not represent the u n i v e r s a l audience. In their view argumentation is primarily aimed at obtaining the approbation of other people, and the argumentation of a person t r y i n g to come to terms with himself constitutes a special case of t h i s . Argumentation addressed to a single interlocutor must be r e g a r d e d within the rhetorical view as a dialogue. Even if the other interlocutor s a y s nothing in reply and adopts the attitude of a l i s t e n e r , the speaker w i l l s t i l l take account, or have to take account, of his reactions (frowning, nodding e t c . ) . Even if the other interlocutor is t o t a l l y impassive the speaker out for success w i l l anticipate his possible counter-arguments and t r y to meet his supposed objections. Thus in Introductory lectures on Psycho-Analysis Freud a s c r i b e s a l l sorts of objections to a fictitious opponent and then proceeds to refute them. If on the other hand the other interlocutor does react e x p l i c i t l y , perhaps by adducing counter-arguments, there is then the beginning of a d i a l o g u e . This is consistently the c a s e , for example, in the famous Socratic d i a l o g u e s , in which the discourse is a string of repartee. Here the other interlocutor may be seen as the representative of the u n i v e r s a l audience: Plato, for example, seems to hold the view that the dialogue is a method which leads to

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t h e t r u t h , which c a n o n l y be t h e c a s e if t h e a p p r o v a l a n d o b j e c t i o n s of t h e o t h e r p a r t y a r e not f o r t u i t o u s r e a c t i o n s from a n a r b i t r a r y p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e b u t s i g n s of a g r e e m e n t or d i s a p p r o v a l which a r e to be r e g a r d e d a s r e a s o n a b l e i n d i c a t i o n s of t h e r o u t e to t h e t r u t h . I n t h e new r h e t o r i c no such c o n n e c t i o n i s made between a p p r o b ation and t r u t h . Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish between h e u r i s t i c d i a l o g u e s or discussions a n d p o l e m i c a l ( ' e r i s t i c ' ) d i a l o g u e s or debates. In a d i s c u s s i o n t h e o t h e r i n t e r l o c u t o r i s t r e a t e d a s a n embodiment of the u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e : t h e s p e a k e r i s out to c o n v i n c e h i s p a r t n e r in t h e d i s c u s s i o n . I n a d e b a t e t h e o t h e r i n t e r l o c u t o r is p u r e l y a p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e : t h e s p e a k e r i s out to p e r s u a d e h i s p a r t n e r i n t h e d e b a t e . Even so, in a d e b a t e t h e s p e a k e r c a n s t i l l v e r y w e l l — r i g h t l y or w r o n g l y — r e g a r d h i s a u d i e n c e a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a l a r g e r g r o u p : f o r e x a m p l e , he may see i n t h e l i s t e n e r a d e l e g a t e from t h e p l a y e r s of t h e f i r s t t e a m , from t h e l o c a l E p i s c o p a l i a n c h u r c h , or from some o t h e r g r o u p with which f o r w h a t e v e r r e a s o n he f i n d s himself i n v o l v e d in a d i s p u t e . In p r a c t i c e the d i s t i n c t i o n between a d i s c u s s i o n a n d a d e b a t e , a s d r a w n h e r e , i s o f t e n not e a s i l y so s h a r p l y d r a w n . And i n d e e d , g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g it w i l l not be in t h e interlocutors' interests to make a s t r i c t distinction between t h e c o n v i n c i n g of d i s c u s s i o n s a n d t h e p e r s u a d i n g of d e b a t e s , if o n l y b e c a u s e d i s c u s s i o n s a n d d e b a t e s s e l dom s t a n d a l o n e a n d a s p e a k e r w i l l g e n e r a l l y be a w a r e t h a t a t r i u m p h f o u n d e d s o l e l y on p e r s u a s i o n may l a t e r p r o v e to be a hollow o n e , a n d t h a t on t h e o t h e r h a n d it i s a l l v e r y well f o r him to h a v e c o n v i n c e d h i s a u d i e n c e b u t w h a t m a t t e r s i s w h e t h e r when t h e y g e t home t h e y a r e a c t u a l l y g o i n g to a c t a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r newly g a i n e d convictions. In t h e new r h e t o r i c i t i s s t r e s s e d t h a t a r g u m e n t a t i o n s e r v e s a r h e t o r i c a l p u r p o s e : a n a r g u m e n t a t i o n must make a p a r t i c u l a r o p i n i o n a c c e p t a b l e , or more a c c e p t a b l e , to an -audience. Therefore the reasons put forward by a s p e a k e r must be chosen in such a way t h a t the r h e t o r i c a l e f f e c t i s m a x i m i z e d . I n t h i s s e n s e the r e a s o n s p u t f o r w a r d may be r e g a r d e d a s rationalizations82 by the s p e a k e r s e r v i n g to j u s t i f y h i s o p i n i o n to t h e a u d i e n c e . These r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s need not h a v e v e r y much to do w i t h the a c t u a l motives (causa) b e h i n d t h e s p e a k e r ' s h a v i n g a r r i v e d a t h i s o p i n i o n ; t h e y a r e a t t u n e d to t h e a u d i e n c e t h a t is to be c o n v i n c e d or p e r s u a d e d b y t h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e t h e y must be a d a p t e d to the s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t in which t h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n is t a k i n g p l a c e . Thus

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it is quite possible for a judge to come to the conclusion that in a given case criminal intent l a y behind the d e f endant's actions, and for this conclusion to be based on a vague mixture of motives and impressions, but when finding the defendant g u i l t y he w i l l cloak his judgment in l e g a l argumentation and not attempt to supply a survey of the reasons, some of which are to some extent bound to be personal, which underlie his decision. In this respect an even more obvious example is that of the defendant's counsel: he may be aware that his client is g u i l t y , or he may i n t u i t i v e l y b e l i e v e that he is innocent, but in either case he w i l l t r y to present the court with acceptable arguments designed to secure an acquittal. In short, the designers of the new rhetoric are less interested, in their study of argumentation, in 'being r i g h t ' than in 'being put in the r i g h t ' . In other words, they equate sound argumentation with e f f e c t i v e a r g u mentation. Argumentation is e f f e c t i v e if it obtains the approbation of the audience for whom it is intended or (in the case of a universal audience) if it may be r e garded as deserving of such approbation. Argumentation can be e f f e c t i v e to a greater or lesser degree. In the evaluation of the q u a l i t y of the argumentation .it is not the formal l o g i c a l , aesthetic or other norms applied by the argumentation theorist that are the y a r d s t i c k , but the c r i t e r i a which prove to be applied by the people for whom the argumentation is intended, or (in the case of a universal audience) the c r i t e r i a they may be deemed to a p p l y .

5.3.

The point of departure of argumentation

Sound argumentation leads to the audience's approval (or greater a p p r o v a l ) of the theses or opinions put f o r ward by the speaker. However, this kind of effect can only be achieved if speaker and audience are agreed on a number of points. The audience must agree with the point of departure which the speaker chooses for his argument and it must accept the argumentation schemata employed by him. We shall return to the latter point in section 5.4; we turn f i r s t to the point of departure of argumentation. By unanimity concerning the point of departure Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca mean agreement about the premisses used in the argumentation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca d i v i d e premisses into two classes: premisses relating to the real and those that relate to what is preferable. Premisses relating to r e a l i t y are

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statements in which a c l a i m i s l a i d to r e c o g n i t i o n b y the u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e . This c l a s s comprises f a c t s , t r u t h s and p r e s u m p t i o n s . Premisses r e l a t i n g to what i s p r e f e r a b l e h a v e to. do with the p r e f e r e n c e s of a p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e . This c l a s s comprises v a l u e s , v a l u e h i e r a r c h i e s and what a r e c a l l e d ' l o c i 1 .

- facts the real

- truths -

presumptions

- values the preferable

- value -

hierarchies

loci

Fig. 5.1. Premisses which may serve as points of departure for argumentation. Facts and truths a r e p r e m i s s e s which a r e t r e a t e d a s not b e i n g s u b j e c t to d i s c u s s i o n . F a c t s a r e statements about r e a l i t y which r e q u i r e no f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n but a r e a c k n o w l e d g e d b y e v e r y r a t i o n a l b e i n g . ' M a d r i d is the c a p i t a l of S p a i n ' a n d 'the e a r t h i s r o u n d ' are e x a m p l e s of f a c t s . What h a s j u s t been s a i d about f a c t s a l s o a p p l i e s to t r u t h s , but t h i s term i s p r e f e r a b l y u s e d f o r more complex systems of connections between f a c t s , such a s s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s . As soon a s f a c t s or t r u t h s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r d i s c u s s i o n t h e i r u n i v e r s a l s t a t u s is at s t a k e a n d they c e a s e to be f a c t s or t r u t h s . The s t a t e ment 'the e a r t h i s f l a t ' , f o r e x a m p l e , w a s f o r c e n t u r i e s endowed with the s t a t u s of a f a c t , but h a s lost it due to a l l sorts of s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o v e r i e s . Today the statement ' t h e e a r t h is r o u n d ' i s t r e a t e d a s a f a c t . Presumptions a r e statements e x p r e s s i n g something s u p posed to be r e a l or a c t u a l . They too a r e p r e m i s s e s r e g a r d e d a s e n j o y i n g the agreement of the u n i v e r s a l a u d i e n c e , but in c o n t r a s t to f a c t s it is e x p e c t e d , p e r h a p s even a s s u m e d , t h a t they w i l l at some s t a g e be c o n f i r m e d . 'A p e r s o n ' s a c t i o n s p r o b a b l y s a y something about h i s c h a r a c t e r ' is an e x a m p l e of a p r e s u m p t i o n . A person a d v a n c i n g t h i s statement a s a presumption t a k e s it t h a t e v e r y o n e w i l l be in agreement with him a n d t h a t c a s e s w i l l occur which w i l l confirm h i s p r e s u m p t i o n . 8 3 Values a r e p r e m i s s e s which a r e r e l a t e d to the p r e f e r e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e f o r one thing a s opposed to a n o t h e r . Agreement o v e r v a l u e s makes a common c o u r s e of

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action possible. Values serve as guidelines in the making of choices ('personal liberty is very important; therefore 1 shall vote for a party which says it will provide more p o l i c e ' ) . They also form the basis of opinions ( ' I like grape juice more than cola because 1 like natural products ' ) and therefore play an important role in a rhetorical approach to argumentation. The speaker relies on certain values not only in order to be able to make a particular choice of one thing as against another, but also, and more commonly, in order to justify choices once made in such a way that they are accepted by others. The values upheld by a given audience may be used as criteria for determining what will and what will not be acceptable to that audience. The values adhered to can vary from person to person or from group to group. Sometimes, indeed, it is characteristic of a given audience that it finds certain values very important. The values adhered to also indicate what attitude the people concerned adopt towards certain aspects (concrete or abstract) of reality. Thus a group of art-lovers may be distinguished from a group of investors by the fact that for the former, beauty is the only criterion to be applied to a building project, while for the latter the only possible criterion is profitability. Values which at first sight appear to be universal, say Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, will on closer definition lose their universality: everyone strives after good, but on closer inspection different people as a rule have different ideas of what good is. In the case of value-judgements which are part of a system of beliefs for which universal validity is claimed, the statements in which they are contained must by definition be regarded as representing facts or truths. It may be in the interests of clarity here tc observe that the manner in which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish facts and truths from each other is fundamentally different from the way in which this is commonly done in philosophy. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca link the distinction to the status which statements have for an audience, while in philosophy a fact is generally understood to be a state of affairs in actual reality ( ' i n France there are many v i n e y a r d s ' ) , while a value is understood as an attitude towards a state of affairs ( ' i t is a good thing that there are many vineyards in France'). Value hierarchies are as a rule even more important premisses in argumentation than values themselves. The reason for this is that the hierarchy composed of the various values adhered to by the members of an audience

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v a r i e s more w i d e l y from a u d i e n c e to a u d i e n c e t h a n t h e v a l u e s t h e m s e l v e s . Thus t h e m a j o r i t y of a u d i e n c e s w i l l p r o b a b l y r e g a r d both b e a u t y and p r o f i t a b i l i t y as v a l u e s , b u t if t h e y h a v e to be w e i g h e d a g a i n s t e a c h o t h e r t h e p r e f e r e n c e of e a c h a u d i e n c e w i l l p r o b a b l y be d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of e v e r y o t h e r a u d i e n c e . T h i s i s w h a t makes our e a r l i e r e x a m p l e of t h e a r t - l o v e r s , t h e i n v e s t o r s a n d t h e b u i l d i n g p r o j e c t so much of a c a r i c a t u r e : people h a v e a l l s o r t s of d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s a t t h e same time a n d d i f f e r not so much in the v a l u e s t h e y h a v e a s in t h e way t h e y a r r a n g e them in a h i e r a r c h y . Value h i e r a r c h i e s a r e t h e r e f o r e more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of d i f f e r e n t a u d i e n c e s t h a n a r e v a l u e s in t h e m s e l v e s . One a u d i e n c e w i l l f i n d t h a t r i g h t i s s u p e r i o r tc mercy a n d t h e n e x t w i l l n o t . And r e a l i t y i s f r e q u e n t l y even more c o m p l i c a t e d : 'You c a n p r o v e t h e p r a c t i c a l i t y of p l a n n e d p a r e n t h o o d t i l l you get t i r e d of l i s t e n i n g to y o u r s e l f a n d i t ' s g o i n g to go nowhere b e c a u s e y o u r a n t a g o n i s t i s n ' t b u y i n g t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a n y t h i n g s o c i a l l y p r a c t i c a l is good p e r s e . Goodness f o r him h a s o t h e r s o u r c e s which he v a l u e s a s much a s or more t h a n s o c i a l p r a c t i c a l i t y ' (Pirsig 1974:

11).

Like v a l u e s , v a l u e h i e r a r c h i e s g e n e r a l l y r e m a i n i m p l i c i t i n the a r g u m e n t a t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e s p e a k e r w i l l w a n t , or h a v e , to t a k e them i n t o a c c o u n t . He c a n n o t simply i g n o r e t h e v a l u e s of h i s a u d i e n c e , b u t he can t r y to p r e s e n t one v a l u e a s s u b o r d i n a t e to a n o t h e r , t h u s h o l d i n g u p to h i s a u d i e n c e a v a l u e h i e r a r c h y w h i c h a c c o r d s w i t h t h e p u r p o s e of h i s a r g u m e n t a t i o n . In d o i n g so he c a n e x p l o i t t h e f a c t t h a t not a l l v a l u e s a r e a d h e r e d to w i t h t h e same i n t e n s i t y a t a l l t i m e s : sometimes one v a l u e w i l l p r e d o m i n a t e o v e r a n o t h e r a n d sometimes it w i l l be t h e o t h e r w a y r o u n d . The s p e a k e r c a n t r y to make t h e v a l u e h i e r a r c h y t h a t s u i t s him b e s t p r e d o m i n a t e . The v a l u e h i e r a r c h i e s c r e a t e d i n t h i s w a y c a n sometimes be e x t r e m e l y complex. A r e l a t i v e l y simple e x a m p l e i s t h a t u s e d by some American p o l i t i c i a n s a t t h e time of t h e Vietnam w a r when t h e y a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e y w a n t e d to b r i n g a b o u t a j u s t p e a c e , b u t not a t a n y p r i c e a n d w i t h American d i g nity intact. Loci a r e p r e f e r e n c e s of a p a r t i c u l a r a u d i e n c e w h i c h a r e of an e x t r e m e l y g e n e r a l n a t u r e a n d c a n w i t h o u t a n y d i f f i c u l t y s e r v e a s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r s t a t e m e n t s made i n an a r g u m e n t a t i o n a d d r e s s e d to t h a t a u d i e n c e . P e r e l m a n a n d O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a p r e f e r t h i s L a t i n term to t h e Greek topci (see a l s o s e c t i o n 2 . 1 ) . Loci a r e p o s t u l a t e s s e r v i n g a s t h e b a s i s f o r v a l u e s a n d v a l u e h i e r a r c h i e s . They c o n s t i t u t e an e x t e n s i v e s t o r e

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to be drawn on during the a r g u m e n t a t i o n . In the sense in which this term i s used in the new r h e t o r i c , l o c i e x p r e s s a p r e f e r e n c e for one a b s t r a c t i o n r a t h e r than a n o t h e r . Thus for a p a r t i c u l a r audience it may be a locus t h a t the enduring i s p r e f e r a b l e to the t r a n s i t o r y . This locus is then the b a s i s for the v a l u e h i e r a r c h y in which f r i e n d s h i p i s p l a c e d above love b e c a u s e f r i e n d s h i p i s more e n d u r i n g . This a l s o demonstrates t h a t l o c i — e x p l i c i t in t h i s c a s e — c a n a l s o be used a s argumentation s c h e m a t a . Perelman and O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a follow Aristotle and d i s c u s s , for e x a m p l e , l o c i of q u a n t i t y and loci of q u a l i t y . It i s the f i r s t of these t h a t we r e l y on if we s t a t e t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r course of action i s to be p r e f e r r e d b e c a u s e then the most people would b e n e f i t , while an a p p e a l to the second i s made i f it i s a s s e r t e d t h a t a c e r t a i n course of action must be t a k e n b e c a u s e it i s the best. The f i r s t is the c a s e in ' t h e B r i t i s h government ought to n a t i o n a l i z e a l l those p r i v a t e e s t a t e s and p a r k s , then they would be some good to e v e r y o n e ' . The second i s a p p e a l e d to in ' I know t h a t a v e r y g r e a t many students c a n ' t stand multiple choice t e s t s , but I s t i l l t h i n k t h e y ' r e a good idea b e c a u s e t h e r e i s no other way of t e l l i n g whether r e q u i r e d knowledge i s t h e r e or not a s f a s t and as r e l i a b l y . F a c t s , t r u t h s , presumptions, v a l u e s , v a l u e h i e r a r c h i e s and l o c i a r e a l l premisses which c a n serve a s points of d e p a r t u r e for a r g u m e n t a t i o n . The point of d e p a r t u r e of an argumentation always c o n s i s t s of s e v e r a l premisses and combinations of p r e m i s s e s . These may be s t a t e d e x p l i c i t l y before the argumentation b e g i n s , but t h i s i s not n e c e s s a r y . In many c a s e s the premisses remain imp l i c i t and it only emerges during the course of the a r g u m e n t a t i o n , or even not u n t i l c l o s e r examination a f t e r it is o v e r , t h a t the s p e a k e r i s assuming c e r t a i n premisses . Now whether the premisses of an argumentation a r e s t a t e d in a d v a n c e , be it in whole or in p a r t , the a u d i ence for which the argumentation i s intended w i l l — i f the argumentation i s to be a s u c c e s s — h a v e to a g r e e e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y with the point of d e p a r t u r e ; or (in the c a s e of a u n i v e r s a l audience) it must be r e g a r d e d as being in agreement with i t . The s p e a k e r and his audience may d i s a g r e e about the premisses at t h r e e l e v e l s . They may d i f f e r in t h e i r opinion of (1) the status of c e r t a i n p r e m i s s e s , (2) the choice of c e r t a i n p r e m i s s e s , and (3) the verbal presentation of c e r t a i n p r e m i s s e s . For example, there i s a l a c k of agreement about the status of premisses i f the s p e a k e r a d v a n c e s a s a f a c t something

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which the audience s t i l l wants to see proven ( ' y o u keep assuming t h a t L a u r a i s i l l , but is she r e a l l y ? 1 ) or i f the s p e a k e r assumes a v a l u e h i e r a r c h y r e g a r d e d by the audience as n o n - e x i s t e n t ( ' B i l l can s a y Bourbon i s n i c e r t h a n Scotch i f he l i k e s , but I t h i n k a l l whiskies a r e much the s a m e ' ) . There is a l a c k of agreement about the choice of premisses i f , for example, in h i s a r g u m e n t ation the s p e a k e r uses f a c t s — h e r e Perelman and O l b r e c h t s Tyteca speak of g i v i n g f a c t s ' p r e s e n c e ' — w h i c h the a u d i ence recognizes as f a c t s but does not c o n s i d e r r e l e v a n t to the argumentation or would h a v e p r e f e r r e d not to see mentioned ( ' o f course Harry h a s been to I n d o n e s i a , but what h a s t h a t to do with what we a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t ? ' ) . The audience does not dispute the s t a t u s of the premiss but r e j e c t s i t s presence in the a r g u m e n t a t i o n . F i n a l l y t h e r e i s a l a c k of agreement about the verbal presentation of premisses i f , for example, the audience i s of the opinion t h a t the s p e a k e r i s p r e s e n t i n g c e r t a i n a c k n o w l edged f a c t s , a g r e e d to be r e l e v a n t , with a s l a n t or in words which h a v e connotations u n a c c e p t a b l e to the a u d i ence ( ' w e a r e a g r e e d t h a t we a r e t a l k i n g about five hundred men, but you keep r e f e r r i n g to t e r r o r i s t s while I should p r e f e r to c a l l them freedom f i g h t e r s ' ) . In p r a c t i c e the t h r e e points on which agreement may be l a c k i n g are closely interrelated. The point of d e p a r t u r e of an argumentation i s of g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e for i t s s u c c e s s and hence for i t s r h e t o r i c a l s o u n d n e s s . In the i n t e r e s t s of e f f e c t i v e a r g u m e n t a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , the s p e a k e r i s wise to c o n s i d e r c a r e f u l l y what s t a t u s his audience i s l i k e l y to accord c e r t a i n p r e m i s s e s , to select the premisses with g r e a t c a r e in order to e n s u r e t h e i r a c c e p t a b i l i t y to h i s a u d i e n c e , and f i n a l l y to choose h i s words for the maximum e f f e c t . All t h i s c a n be done in a somewhat covert manner. For e x a m p l e , the s p e a k e r might i n d i r e c t l y p l a c e s l i g h t l y g r e a t e r emphasis on a p a r t i c u l a r positive or n e g a t i v e v a l u e which the audience a l r e a d y a t t r i b u t e s to something. This c a n be done, for example, by putting a disputed s u b j e c t on a p a r with something e l s e , or with some c l a s s of other s u b j e c t s , which the s p e a k e r knows the audience to judge n e g a t i v e l y ('Jesus, Buddha, Ghandi, Marx and other p r o p h e t s ' ) . Whatever h a p p e n s , the s p e a k e r must not simply assume v a l u e s which the audience does not s u b s c r i b e t o , or name f a c t s which the audience d i s p u t e s , or use p h r a s i n g which the audience will r e g a r d as t e n d e n t i o u s . That would be to p l a c e an o b s t a c l e in the way of r h e t o r i c a l success even before the argumentation b e g a n , s i n c e the point of d e p a r t u r e is i t s e l f one of the r h e t o r i c a l tools by which

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an argumentation can be made to succeed. A speaker perfectly entitled to start from a point of departure which his audience does not subscribe, but then to be good orator he must be conscious that this point departure itself requires supportive argumentation. 5.A.

is to a of

A typology of sorts of argumentation

Following on from their discussion of the point of departure of argumentation Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca move on to look at a number of argumentation schemata which they present as techniques of argumentation. They do this by way of a typology of the sorts of argumentation that prove effective in practice. This typology comprises a survey of argumentation schemata which can be used in practice to make theses acceptable or more acceptable. In effect Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca regard these as a special species of loci. The schemata concerned are general schemata which can be used in argumentation, and only agreement among the members of the audience as regard their soundness can justify their use in p a r t i cular cases. In order to be able to serve as techniques of argumentation the argumentation schemata must accord with the preferences of a particular audience which the speaker wishes to move to approbation (or greater approbation) by his argumentation, or (in the case of argumentation addressed to the universal audience) the p r e f e r ences that the speaker attributes to the rational beings who to his way of thinking constitute the universal audience. In this sense Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's typology provides a survey of possible techniques of argumentation. The techniques of argumentation discerned by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rest on two principles: association and dissociation. Association consists in the bringing together and unifying in a single unit of elements which were previously separate, while dissociation consists in letting existing unions disintegrate and in separating elements previously regarded as a unit. We shall first discuss argumentation on the basis of processes of association, returning later to examine dissociation. Argumentation by association Every association in which there is a justifying function puts elements into a particular argumentative relation.

Argumentation

by

association

- Quasi-logical

argumentation

- Argumentation

b a s e d on

structure -

Argumentation structure

Argumentation

by

of

of

the

reality establishing

the

reality

dissociation

Fig. 5.2. Argumentation schemata which may serve as niques of argumentation.

tech-

Such an associative relation between a statement and a particular opinion is made, for example, if a person expresses the view that it is better not to read books because you won't learn anything from them anyway. The elements previously separate and brought together here are: reading books and learning. In the statement 'a language is a set of sentences', too, elements (a language, a set of sentences) are associated with each other, but here, in the absence of any further context, there is no function of justification. This function of justification is, however, present in the following association (taken from a book on psycholinguistics), though in our view erroneously: 'This book is the result of collaboration between f i v e authors. This in itself gives an idea of the complexity of the subject discussed here.' Here the suggestion is made that psycholinguistics is a complex subject by an association between the complexity of the subject and the number of authors that it proved necessary to have in order to write a book about it. Argumentative associations like this can be brought about in all manner of ways. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's typology is an attempt to map out the various possibilities as well as possible by making an inventory of the different sorts of relations capable of being drawn between particular elements by way of association. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish three sorts of associative relation capable of being made in argumentation: (1) quasi-logical relations, (2) relations based on the structure of reality, and (3) relations establishing the structure of reality. We shall discuss some examples of each of these. 228

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Before looking at each of these sorts of relation, however, we must first point out that in our discussion of it the argumentation is l i f t e d from the context and situation in which it normally takes place. Therefore a context and a situation must be made up. The advantage of this is that the interpretations can as f a r as possible be adapted to the purpose of the discussion of a p a r t i c ular argumentation. In this way it is possible to eliminate factors that would be irrelevant and disruptive in the typology, and the discussion can more easily concentrate on the features regarded as ess-ential to the sort of argumentation under discussion. However, there is also a disadvantage, and that is that in the discussion of the typology not enough attention can be paid to the interaction between different arguments and between arguments and the context and situation. Thus there is no indication of how the order in which arguments occur may influence the effect that is achieved with them, how one argument reinforces another and how the situation can influence the effect of the argumentation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca stress that in practice individual argumentations are part of a larger entirety of mutually influential elements. However, they regard the isolation of individual argumentations from this greater whole as necessary for the analysis. An adequate analysis of the individual argumentations will then, in theory, make it possible to pay proper attention to the synthetic aspects of argumentation as it occurs in practice.

Quasi-logical argumentation Argumentation in which elements are placed in a relation one to the other in such a way as to give the impression that the connections are logical is termed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca quasi-logical. In such argumentation the illusion is created that between the posited opinion and the statements connected with it there is a relation which is just as compelling as that between the conclusion and premisses of a logical argument form which the argumentation resembles. However, this suggestion is a misleading one: the similarity between the argumentation and formal argument is actually insufficient to justify the claim to v a l i d i t y of argumentation. Hence the p r e f i x quasi-. With their strictly formal argument forms, mathematics and logic have now, according to Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, acquired considerable prestige. In quasi-logical

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argumentation an attempt i s made to make this p r e s t i g e r e f l e c t on argumentation in c o l l o q u i a l l a n g u a g e and thus b r i n g about the a c c e p t a n c e by the audience of the opinions defended in the a r g u m e n t a t i o n . In r e a l i t y , however, t h e r e a r e e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s between q u a s i - l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t ation and formal demonstration. Formal demonstration i s only p o s s i b l e in an i s o l a t e d and p r e c i s e l y d e l i n e a t e d system in which the terms a r e e s t a b l i s h e d u n e q u i v o c a l l y . There i s no question of t h i s being the c a s e in c o l l o q u i a l l a n g u a g e . The s i g n s ( l a n g u a g e forms) used in c o l l o q u i a l l a n g u a g e often h a v e s e v e r a l m e a n i n g s ; these a r e not p r e c i s e l y defined and need not be the same for a l l l a n g uage u s e r s . The context and s i t u a t i o n a r e always f a c t o r s in the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a speech u t t e r a n c e . For example, it depends on these f a c t o r s how we i n t e r p r e t 'Henrietta i s going to the b a n k 1 : Henrietta may be on her way to a f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n , but she may a l s o be w a l k i n g to the edge of a r i v e r . Perhaps a more r e a l i s t i c example might be ' t h e s o c i a l i s t s want l e v e l l i n g ' , which, among other t h i n g s , could mean t h a t they want a reduction in the d i f f e r e n c e between the h i g h e s t and lowest incomes, but might a l s o be open to much wider i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , such as t h a t the s o c i a l i s t s a r e in favour of removing d i f f e r e n c e s between people in g e n e r a l . The meaning a t t r i b u t e d to speech u t t e r a n c e s p l a y s a d e c i s i v e role in the e v a l u a t i o n of the soundness of a r g u mentation. Equal l i n g u i s t i c forms c a n only be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y if they a l s o mean the same t h i n g , and a c c o r d i n g to Perelman and O l b r e c h t s - T y t e c a t h i s i s seldom or never the c a s e in c o l l o q u i a l l a n g u a g e . In t h e i r view speech utterances are always equivocal. In order a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e to g i v e argumentation in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e the a p p e a r a n c e of v a l i d formal a r g u ments it will a l w a y s be n e c e s s a r y to c a r r y out c e r t a i n ( a r g u a b l e ) m a n i p u l a t i o n s . As f a r as p o s s i b l e the form of the argumentation must be made to accord with the chosen argument form. The arguments must as c l o s e l y as p o s s i b l e resemble homogeneous, congruent and unambiguous p r e misses. For t h i s a c e r t a i n reduction or s p e c i f i c a t i o n of meaning i s r e q u i r e d which must be a d a p t e d to the purpose to be a c h i e v e d by the a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Q u a s i - l o g i c a l a r g u mentation means e x p l o i t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t i e s offered by c o l l o q u i a l l a n g u a g e in t h i s r e g a r d . The a d a p t a t i o n — w h i c h i n c i d e n t a l l y need not be d e l i b e r a t e or conscious—must be a s subtle as n e c e s s a r y for the audience to be r e a c h e d . Thus the following q u a s i - l o g i c a l argumentation i s u n l i k e l y to be s u b t l e enough for many l i s t e n e r s : ' C r a z y people have to be locked u p . After her f i n a l s Lottie went quite

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c r a z y . Therefore Lottie must be l o c k e d u p . 1 For q u a s i - l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n to h a v e the d e s i r e d e f f e c t it is not enough to use s u i t a b l e terms and p r e m i s s e s , it must a l s o be e n s u r e d t h a t the a u d i e n c e ' r e c o g n i z e s ' or p e r c e i v e s the s t r u c t u r e of the a r g u m e n t a t i o n a s logical. To e x p r e s s the s i m i l a r i t y with argument forms from mathematics or l o g i c a s c l e a r l y a s p o s s i b l e the s p e a k e r or w r i t e r w i l l h a v e to do h i s b e s t to i n d i c a t e the s t r u c t ure of h i s a r g u m e n t a t i o n . He may do t h i s , for e x a m p l e , b y m a k i n g the form of the a r g u m e n t a t i o n as c l e a r as p o s s i b l e , or he may s t a t e e x p l i c i t l y t h a t w h a t he i s p r e s e n t i n g is a l o g i c a l argument form: (a) 'We agreed t h a t those who have doubts must withdraw. Well, Gerard has doubts. So from t h a t i t f o l l o w s t h a t Gerard must withdraw. Doesn't i t ? ' (b) 'You said you would approve the plan i f Jim joined i n . Jim i s j o i n i n g i n . So i t i s p e r f e c t l y l o g i c a l to conclude that you approve the p l a n . ' It is q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r e v e r y a u d i e n c e would w i s h to r e g a r d these two a r g u m e n t a t i o n s — i n w h i c h the u n e x p r e s s e d e t h i c a l premiss t h a t one must keep o n e ' s promises p l a y s a prominent r o l e — a s