Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides: Perspectives from the Caribbean, Global South and Beyond (Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society) 3030845176, 9783030845179

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN RISK, CRIME AND SOCIETY

Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides Perspectives from the Caribbean, Global South and Beyond Edited by Wendell C. Wallace

Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society

Series Editors Kieran McCartan, Department of Criminology, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK Beth Weaver, School of Social Work and Social Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Lanarkshire, UK

Risk is a major contemporary issue which has widespread implications for theory, policy, governance, public protection, professional practice and societal understandings of crime and criminal justice. The potential harm associated with risk can lead to uncertainty, fear and conflict as well as disproportionate, ineffective and ill-judged state responses to perceived risk and risky groups. Risk, Crime and Society is a series featuring monographs and edited collections which examine the notion of risk, the risky behaviour of individuals and groups, as well as state responses to risk and its consequences in contemporary society. The series will include critical examinations of the notion of risk and the problematic nature of state responses to perceived risk. While Risk, Crime and Society will consider the problems associated with ‘mainstream’ risky groups including sex offenders, terrorists and white collar criminals, it welcomes scholarly analysis which broadens our understanding of how risk is defined, interpreted and managed. Risk, Crime and Society examines risk in contemporary society through the multi-disciplinary perspectives of law, criminology and socio-legal studies and will feature work that is theoretical as well as empirical in nature.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14593

Wendell C. Wallace Editor

Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides Perspectives from the Caribbean, Global South and Beyond

Editor Wendell C. Wallace Department of Behavioural Sciences The University of the West Indies St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society ISBN 978-3-030-84517-9 ISBN 978-3-030-84518-6 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022, corrected publication 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: CSA-Printstock/Getty This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

This book, titled Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides: Perspectives from the Caribbean, Global South and Beyond is edited by Dr. Wendell C. Wallace, a Lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice at The University of the West Indies (UWI) St. Augustine. Dr. Wallace is also a certified mediator and a barrister who is called to bar in both England and Wales and Trinidad and Tobago. As a sociologist, I have worked collaboratively with Dr. Wallace at The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine. We share similar interests on migration and crime. Our perspectives cut across disciplines such as sociology, criminology and academic or scientific research. Often times, our exchanges have been informal, but profound and have left an indelible mark on my intellect. Sometimes, they have stirred up my thirst for knowledge and renewed my desire to engage in academic research activity in the fields of sociology and, criminology and criminal justice. Instructively, it was important that I grasped the opportunity to author this foreword as it provided me with the opportunity to emphasize that interdisciplinary collaboration between criminologist (Dr. Wallace) and me (sociologist) is taking place at The UWI.

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As a Lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice, Dr. Wallace has been teaching undergraduate and postgraduate courses at The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine for more than ten years. Some of the courses taught include Crime, Police and Society, Criminal Justice Systems and Criminal Law and Procedure. This great scholar has been a mentor to many students who have benefitted from his years of experience in criminal justice and academia. Some of them have attained Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees and sustainable employment at home and abroad in a variety of fields. Dr. Wallace’s passion for academic and scholarly growth activities through research is exemplary. He has published original, empirical and theory-driven research in many subfields of criminology and criminal justice. The list includes individual and collaborative studies on policing, prison conditions, gangs, intimate partner violence and restorative justice. Dr. Wallace has been involved in the cross disciplinary activity (Social Work and Psychology) as he studies current societal problems such as Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) and, gangs and guns in urban communities particularly ‘Hot Spots’ or high crime areas along Trinidad’s East-West corridor. In addition, his research agenda has resulted in the conduct of field research in other Caribbean territories, namely: Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana. This book consists of sixteen chapters including an introduction and a conclusion. Each chapter is written by scholars and academics from social science disciplines: criminology, demography and sociology. Each chapter delves into specific aspects of guns, gun violence and gun homicides and others in Australia, the Caribbean, other parts of the global South including Africa, Asia and Brazil. The book makes a significant contribution to criminology and criminal justice by proffering scientific assessments of myriad issues in guns, gun violence, homicide and gun legislation. When readers delve into the chapters of this book, they will encounter scholarly, thought provoking and insightful perspectives on a number of related themes namely mass shootings, peace and security, increasing trends and patterns in gun homicides, gang violence and police use of lethal, deadly or excessive force, declining youth life expectancy, school drop-out and youth unemployment. An interdisciplinary epistemology and ontology are one of the major strengths of this

Foreword

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book. This is evident in the use of theories from criminology and criminal justice and sociology. This book makes for interesting reading. In addition, the history of gun violence in the colonialization of specific parts of the South has been ventilated in a number of chapters. The social positioning adopted by contributors to this book may be viewed from two major interrelated perspectives: dependency and neo-colonialization. I argue that both perspectives must be couched in constructionist philosophy. First, in regard to gun supply, it is evident that the global South is dependent on largely the Global North. On the whole, it can be argued that the South is a net importer of guns. Some contributors have pointed to a discernible increase in the use of guns to commit chiefly capital and property crimes. This raises serious doubt about the efficacy of governments in the South to provide adequate surveillance of their borders and implement effective border security in order to keep out major suppliers and gun traffickers. Also, this book raises arouses readers’ interest in the dependency of governments in the South, on international policing agencies such as Interpol, to reduce the risk of being overrun by gun traffickers from the North and other parts of the South whose main interest is profit-making. Second, in this book, it is apparent that an emergent neocolonialist philosophy in some parts of the South has emerged over the past fifty years or so. It is characterized by weak government structures, powerful, elite and autonomous police departments and the near absence of justice for families and victims of extrajudicial killings. The overarching ontological standpoint gleaned from book chapters is that the combination of dependency and neo-colonialization has produced increasing crime rates and trends in the South. This may be the case because dependency on guns results from the unequal exchange relationship between gun traffickers who reside outside the South and criminal networks within it. A salient point is that often gun traffickers sell guns without reciprocating purchases. They sell guns, but buy nothing from their clients in return. In essence, the economics of mercantilism of conventional colonialization, from the fifteenth Century onwards, dominates the gun trade as illegitimate guns get into the hands of local. The end result is growth and strengthening of alternative governments (illegitimate structures and institutions) that threaten the hegemony of democratically

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elected governments in the South in particular. The globalizing effects of gun and the gun trade parallel those arising from the financialization and commodification of legitimate goods and services traded on the World Market. This book delves into a number of chapters that illuminate a strengthening of the nexus between dependency and neo-colonization in the Global South. This nexus has evolved and strengthen because of the South’s apparent inability to stem the trade in illegal guns and increase in gun crimes within its borders. It is evident that some elites in the alternate government are bred within the South because some governments turn ‘a blind eye’ to gun traffickers, extrajudicial killings and the social malaise stemming from increasing gun violence and gun-related homicides. This book is worth reading as it provides opportunity for a reassessment of the impact of globalization in the context of guns in the Caribbean, the Global South and Beyond. Port-of-Spain, Tobago July 2021

Trinidad

and

Dr. Bennie Berkeley

The original version of this book was revised: Author names in Notes on Contributors have been changed. The correction to the book is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03084518-6_17

Preface

I was motivated and inspired to author this edited book due to three separate, yet interconnected factors. The first was the paucity of literature on guns and gun violence emanating from the Global South. The second factor was a personal desire to understand the phenomenon and posit solutions to this pervasive issue. Finally, the third and most nebulous concern was the increased usage of guns in the Caribbean to commit heinous crimes though the Caribbean does not manufacture guns. With the aforementioned in mind, the editor of this book is extremely grateful for the contributions made to this book by the book chapter authors. Indeed, I am heartened by the efforts made by the authors of these chapters as they accessed data, captured thoughts, collated them, and contributed their discourse to this book under extremely trying circumstances. Due to the historic time and condition under which this book was completed (the global pandemic caused by the Covid-19 disease), several book chapter authors were forced to withdraw their participation. Instructively, their efforts have not gone unnoticed or unappreciated as I extend a hearty thank you to these individuals for their noble efforts. This book includes the work of scholars of diverse career stages,

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including early, mid- and established career scholars. Further, the scholarship contained in this collective emanated from a diverse range of countries as the career stages of the book chapter authors. For instance, the research sites for the scholarship contained in this edited book range from Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean, to Bangladesh in South Asia, Brazil in South Africa to Nigeria and Zimbabwe on the African continent as well as to Australia. Based on the hard work conducted by the book chapter authors, the end result is this riveting and captivating edited book that is a treasure trove of information about guns, gun violence and gun homicides with perspectives from the Caribbean, Global South and Beyond. While the chapters are individualized, the contents are generally linked by to the central theme of the book. Further, primary and secondary data are skilfully interwoven into every book chapter of this collective. A key feature of this book is the preventative tips that are contained in each book chapter as the literature is solutions oriented. Due to the diverse range of book chapter authors, research sites and contents, emanating from jurisdictions in some instances that are traditionally un-and under-researched, Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides: Perspectives from the Caribbean, Global South and Beyond , provides much needed scholarship that is not based on Western dicta and adds to the development of criminological literature in the Global South. Additionally, this edited book facilitates the creation of scholarship and the transference of knowledge from the Global South, and thus reorient the traditional colonization of knowledge away from established status quo. St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago

Wendell C. Wallace

Acknowledgements

The task of being the editor of a manuscript is never an easy task. On one hand, the job of being the editor may appear to be an exasperating experience for some individuals, however, on the other hand, the experience is a gratifying and satisfying one, despite its arduous nature. Instructively, there are many people and many factors that contribute to the success of a collective effort such as the one undertaken by the editor of this book. Much of the work that goes into producing a successful edited book takes place behind the scene and involves the process of first convincing the potential publisher of the efficacy and virtue of the book. However, the process does not end with the acceptance of the proposal as the process continues to authoring an academically attractive Call For Paper, accepting and rejecting proposals from book chapter authors, sourcing reviewers and ensuring that the reviews are conducted in a timely and fair manner, ensuring that there is a central theme to the collective, working with book chapter authors and reviewers across different time zones and who possess different work ethos to those of the book editor, and ensuring that the full manuscript gets to the publisher on time.

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Acknowledgements

This book was written in a historic time, under tremendous emotional stress and environmental turmoil of a global pandemic caused by the Covid-19 virus. This facilitated a shift away from conventional methods of data collection to what has been globally referred to as the ‘new normal’. Indeed, it was no easy feat to complete this collective and it is imperative that every individual who contributed to the success of this book production be acknowledged and thanked. The editor of this book would like to thank Dr. Bennie Berkeley for agreeing to author the foreword for this book at short notice. The editor is also indebted to the book chapter authors who worked assiduously to collect data in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic when others would have simply given up. To this illustrious team of emerging, mid-career and established academicians, the editor of this book offers a heartfelt thank you. I also extend a significant and well-deserved thank you to those individuals who facilitated requests for data, provided contextual information via the conduct of interviews, and those individuals who took time off from their busy schedules to willingly share knowledge and information on their personal lives with the interviewers, and by extension, the global audience. To the three specially invited book chapter authors, Professor Tim Prenzler and team, Dr. Godfrey St. Bernard and Luiz Phelipe Dal Santo, thank you for your commitment and contribution to this book. Indeed, I owe the aforementioned individuals a debt of gratitude as their commitment to this book never wavered. The editor notes that the book chapter authors acknowledge one another for their contributions to this collective. Finally, the editor also extends his heartfelt gratitude to the team at Palgrave Macmillan who oversaw the production of this book and who offered constant and invaluable advice and who facilitated my every request. Congratulations, our long deliberations and arduous work is now rewarded. We did it, and we did it together!!

Contents

1

Introduction to Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides: Perspectives from the Caribbean, Global South and Beyond Wendell C. Wallace

Part I 2

3

Australia

Mass Shootings and Gun Control by Police: Comparing Australia and the United States Frederic Lemieux, Tim Prenzler, and Samantha Bricknell

Part II

1

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The Caribbean

Trends and Patterns for Gun Homicide in Trinidad and Tobago During the Early Years of the Twenty-First Century: A Data-Driven Analysis Godfrey St. Bernard

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4

5

6

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9

10

Contents

Gun-Related Violence and Homicides in Dominica: Why Isn’t There Even More? Peter K. B. St. Jean, Kyra Paul-L’Homme, and L. Daisy Henderson The Prevalence of Guns and Gun-Related Homicides in the Caribbean Lorna E. Grant The Use of Lethal Police Force and Its Consequences for the Mentally Ill and Vulnerable Groups in St. Lucia Perry Stanislas Understanding Haiti’s Current Phenomenon of Gang Violence and Illicit Arms Trafficking: A View from the Lens of Vertical-Horizontal Violence Guyma Noel and Evenson Pierre-Louis

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The Battle Against the Illicit Gun Trade in Trinidad and Tobago from a Military Perspective Michelle S. A. Nicholson and Colin L. R. Mitchell

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Past and Present Trends in Gun Violence and Gangs and Their Implications in Belize: 2011–2020 Wayne J. Pitts and Christopher S. Inkpen

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An Evaluation of Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides in Trinidad and Tobago—2010 to 2016 Wendell C. Wallace, Ayinka Nikesha Nurse-Carrington, and Akinee Harry

Part III

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Africa and Beyond

11 Trends, Precipitating Factors and Control of Gun-Related Violence and Suicide in Zimbabwe Ishmael Mugari

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Contents

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Gun Violence and Homicide in Nigeria and Implications for Ethno-Religious Conflicts Declan Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe and Abiodun Raufu

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Intimate Partner Gun-Violence (IPGV) in Zambia Phanwell Himulambo Namangala

14

Use of Force and Gun Violence in Bangladesh: The Culture of Extrajudicial Killings by the Law Enforcement Agencies of Bangladesh Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder

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Killing and Letting Die: Depicting the Brazilian Conundrum Between Police Killings and Private Lethal Practices Luiz Phelipe Dal Santo Conclusion Wendell C. Wallace

Correction to: Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides Wendell C. Wallace Index

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271 291

307

329 349 C1

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Notes on Contributors

Godfrey St. Bernard, Ph.D. is a senior academic at The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago. He has studied population dynamics across Latin America and the Caribbean for almost forty years. Dr. St. Bernard pioneered the establishment of the M.Sc. in Development Statistics in 2008 and has successfully co-ordinated that programme in the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (SALISES) between 2008 and 2020. He has advised major international institutions on technical matters pertaining to predicting, projecting and forecasting population sizes and other related social and demographic phenomena across Latin America and the Caribbean. Dr. St. Bernard is a Past President of the Caribbean Studies Association and a former Chief Editor of the Journal of the Caribbean Association of Professional Statisticians. Samantha Bricknell is the Head of the Indigenous Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Unit at the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. She was previously Research Manager of the Crime and Justice Statistics Program at the Australian Institute of Criminology, including the Drug Use Monitoring in Australia Program, National Deaths in Custody Program, National Homicide Monitoring Program and Human Trafficking and Slavery Research Program. xvii

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Lorna E. Grant is an Associate Professor and Director of the M.Sc. Programme in the Department of Criminal Justice Department, North Carolina Central University. She earned her Doctorate in Juvenile Justice from Prairie View A & M University, Texas, B.Sc. in Social Work and MSW in Social Work Administration from The University of the West Indies, Jamaica. Prior to joining the faculty at North Carolina Central University, she taught at The University of the West Indies, Jamaica and Clark Atlanta University, Atlanta. Dr. Grant is a member of The American Society of Criminology (ASC) and The Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS). Her research interest includes, but is not limited to youth gangs, juvenile justice issues, school violence, juvenile sex offenders, policing in Jamaica, community building and project development and implementation. Dr. has recently edited a book with two of her colleagues entitled Crime and Violence in the Caribbean. She has published numerous research articles in international peer reviewed journals. Akinee Harry holds a B.Sc. in Criminology and Public Safety from the University of Trinidad and Tobago. He is a postgraduate student at The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, where he is pursuing an MSc in Criminology and Criminal Justice. His research interests include, but are not limited to, juvenile delinquency, prisons and restorative justice. Akinee has recently published the book Redirecting Fate: Rising Above My Troubled Past. L. Daisy Henderson is a native of Dominica and an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Grand Rapids Community College in Michigan. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. in Sociology at the University at Buffalo State University of New York in 2006 and 2014, respectively. Her research interests include race, ethnicity, family (specifically families in foster care), inequality and stratification. In addition to the teaching and mentoring of students at the college level, her work involves a commitment to student success and building an inclusive campus. Christopher S. Inkpen, Ph.D. is a Research Sociologist and Demographer in the Division for Applied Justice Research at RTI International. In 2018, he co-directed the project, ‘Improving the Data Ecosystem for Governance Decision Making in Belize’. Funded by the UStates

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Embassy, this 2-year project is focussed on building capacity among civil society organizations and civil service actors to promote enhanced governance accountability. Dr. Inkpen studies quantitative criminology, specifically the application of machine learning techniques to social science and survey data. His substantive research focuses on public opinion of criminal justice issues, immigration and the intersection of migration and crime, particularly in Central America and the Northern Triangle. His research has been funded by the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the National Institute of Justice. Peter K. B. St. Jean, Ph.D. a native of Dominica, is a sociologist, criminologist and founder of Peaceology which he defines as the science and practice of making peace profitable. He is Professor, and chair of the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice, and Chair, Criminal Justice major in the School of Professional Studies at North Park University, Chicago, IL. The US Army veteran is also the founder and executive director of the Urban Peace Lab at North Park. His publications include two books, journal articles and book chapters. In Spring 2021, Dr. St. Jean purchased and begin developing 18 acres of land in his hometown of Trafalgar, Dominica where he is establishing a Peaceology museum, institute and retreat as part of the world headquarters of Peaceology. Frederic Lemieux is a Professor of the Practice and Faculty Director of the Master’s in Applied Intelligence at Georgetown University. His research focussed on policing, intelligence, homeland security and cybersecurity. Professor Lemieux has published articles on mass shootings and political violence. He also published several books including Intelligence and State Surveillance in Modern Societies: An International Perspective (2018), Current and Emerging Trends in Cyber Operations: Policy, Strategy and Practice (2015), Economic Development, Crime and Policing (2014), and International Police Cooperation (2010). Colin L. R. Mitchell (Colonel [Ret’d]) enlisted into the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (Regiment) on 27 August 1979 as an Officer Cadet. He attended the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst England and graduated as a Second Lieutenant in March 1981. On his return

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to his home country he served in various military capacities including platoon commander, Battalion adjutant, company commander, Battalion commander, along with several staff positions at the Defence Force Headquarters up to his appointment as the Chief Staff Officer to the Chief of Defence Staff. His final appointment during his regular career was that of Defence and Military Attache to the United States. He retired from the TTDF in 2015 but was recalled in 2017 to command the Defence Force Reserves which he did until his second retirement in 2020. During his service that spanned almost forty years, he was able to achieve a B.Sc. in Management Studies and a Master’s Degree in Military Arts and Science from the US Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS. Colonel Mitchell is married and is the father of three children. Ishmael Mugari holds a Doctorate in Police Science and is the current Head of Department in the Department of Intelligence and Security Studies at the Bindura University of Science Education, Zimbabwe. His research focuses on criminology, police accountability, police strategy and national security issues. He has published several articles in international peer reviewed journals. Phanwell Himulambo Namangala is a lecturer and researcher in Forensic, Criminological and Investigative Psychology at the University of Zambia, Great East Road Campus. Mr. Namangala also an Attorneyat-Law and an advocate of the High and Supreme Courts of Zambia who is involved in psycho-legal assessment of court referrals from various parts of Zambia. He is also a consultant in crime investigation in Zambia and currently facilitates short courses in forensic and crime investigations psychology, mostly targeting law enforcement officers in sub-regions of Zambia. Mr. Namangala obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology in 1998 and a Master of Arts degree in psychology in 2003 from the University of Zambia. In 2005, he obtained a Bachelor of Laws degree (LLB) from the same university, and in 2007 he obtained an advanced certificate in intellectual property law from a Swedish institution. Mr Namangala has served as the Senior Assistant Dean of students at the University of Zambia and has recently completed his term as the

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Assistant Dean (Undergraduate) in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences. Michelle S. A. Nicholson is a Sergeant in the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Reserves (TTDFR) and has 26 years’ military service. She is currently attached to the Welfare Department of the TTDFR and holds an MSc in Criminology and Criminal Justice and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Sociology with a double minor in International Relations and Criminology from The University of the West Indies. Michelle also holds a certificate from the William J. Perry Hemispheric School of Defense, Washington DC in Caribbean Security and Defence. She has presented papers on her postgraduate work at the 1st Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) Law Enforcement Conference and the International Criminology Conference 2017, Policy Studies Organization, New Hampshire, Washington DC. Guyma Noel holds a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in philosophy and Social Work from Saint John’s University in Jamaica-Queens (New York), a Master of Arts in Systematic Liberation Theology and a Master of Divinity (M.Div.) in Religious Studies from Saint Vincent College in Latrobe (Pennsylvania), a Master of Arts in Political Science with focus on International Relations, a Graduate Certificate in the United Nations Studies of International Diplomacy from Seton Hall’s School of International Relations and Diplomacy, and a Certificate in Clinical Pastoral Health Education (CPE) at Care and Counseling at Center of Georgia (CCCG) in Atlanta (Georgia). He is currently Ph.D. student in Interdisciplinary Studies with a concentration on Global Public Policy and Social Change at Union Institute & University. His research interests include Global Governance, Global Public Policy and Human Security. Ayinka Nikesha Nurse-Carrington is a Ph.D. candidate in Criminology and Criminal Justice at The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine where she also serves as a Research Assistant. Ayinka holds a Bachelor of Science (Hons.) degree in Sociology with Psychology and a Master of Science degree in Criminology and Criminal Justice. Her Ph.D. thesis is titled ‘Maternal Incarceration and Parenting’. As an ardent researcher and an advocate for social justice, she has worked

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with youthful populations as a Guidance Officer in the past. Her training has taken her into the fields of Defence and Security, Restorative Justice, Educational Consultancy, Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis and she has presented her research at several international conferences. Ayinka enjoys culture, especially carnival and is involved in the management of a Children’s Carnival Band which gives many young persons from disadvantaged homes an opportunity to participate in this annual festival in Trinidad and Tobago. Declan Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe is a Professor of Administration of Justice at Texas Southern University (TSU). Dr. Onwudiwe received his Ph.D. from the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida State University. His research has focussed primarily on community policing, terrorism and homeland security. Kyra Paul-L’Homme is a community animator and cultural enthusiast who firmly believes that community development initiatives and performing arts opportunities influence the socio-economic situation of communities. Through both her professional and personal development pursuits, Dr. Paul continues to inspire many young women to aspire to higher learning and to advocate for equality and justice on all fronts. Her love for social policy led her on a career path that took her from primary education, adult education and skills facilitation, research and programme coordination and gender and development to social and economic planning. At the time of writing, Dr. Paul is the acting Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Blue and Green Economy, Agriculture and National Food Security in Dominica. Evenson Pierre-Louis graduated in journalism from the Francophone Institute of Journalism (IFJ). He also holds a certificate in Legal Sciences from the School of Law of Economic Sciences of Hinche (EDSEH) province entity of the UEH. He is currently working on his thesis to obtain the degree of licentiate in Legal Sciences. Evenson is an active member of several organizations namely: Center of Leadership and Excellence (CLE) and the Collective of Young Executives for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (COJECAPH). Evenson is a wellrenown Human Rights activist.

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Wayne J. Pitts, Ph.D. is a Research Criminologist in the Center for Policing Research and Investigative Science, a component of the RTI International Applied Justice Research Division. Prior to his current position, he was a tenured associate professor in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Memphis. Since earning his doctorate in sociology in 2003 at the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque, he has led multiple research projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, including current work in Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Recently, he served as co-director of the project, ‘Improving the Data Ecosystem for Governance Decision Making in Belize’, funded by the U.S. Embassy in Belmopan. Dr. Pitts’ current research interests include international criminology, especially in Latin America; transnational migration; programme evaluation; human trafficking; and community trust and police legitimacy. Tim Prenzler is a Professor of Criminology in the School of Law and Society at the University of the Sunshine Coast, Australia. He teaches courses in policing, crime prevention and criminal justice ethics and accountability in the Bachelor of Criminology and Justice. His research interests include crime and corruption prevention, police and security officer safety, security industry regulation and gender equity in policing. Tim’s books include Regulating the Security Industry: Global Perspectives (2018, with Mahesh Nalla), Understanding Crime Prevention: The Case Study Approach (2017), Contemporary Police Practice (2015, with Jacki Drew) and Understanding and Preventing Corruption (2013, with Adam Graycar). Abiodun Raufu is an Assistant Professor at the Southern University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He obtained his Ph.D. at Texas Southern University, Houston, Texas. His publications have appeared in the Journal of Black Studies, Criminal Justice and Behaviour, Theory in Action, International Journal of Law and Crime and Justice. Luiz Phelipe Dal Santo is a D.Phil. candidate in Criminology at the University of Oxford. During his D.Phil., he has been the recipient of awards from the Oxford Law Faculty, Oxford Centre for Criminology

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and Wolfson College. Luiz is currently a Visiting Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Roehampton, and has also been invited to teach in Master’s programmes and graduate courses in Criminology in Brazil. Luiz is also a Graduate Teaching Facilitator and a Research Assistant to Professor Carolyn Hoyle and Professor Julian Roberts at the Oxford Centre for Criminology, and was a Research Assistant to Dr. Simone Santorso at the University of Hull. He is also co-founder and coconvenor of the Southernising Criminology Discussion Group, Oxford Law Faculty. He has published papers on punishment, penal populism, prison, policing, racism and criminal justice, Southern Criminology and Criminal Law. His work has been published in English, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish. Perry Stanislas is a policing and security specialist with over thirty-five years of experience in the field and has worked all around the world for governments and various agencies. He is currently Programme Director for Postgraduate Policing Programmes at Canterbury Christ Church University. Prior to that he worked for Rabdan Security Academy in Abu Dhabi, as an Associate Professor in Policing and Security. Dr. Stanislas is a member of several professional associations, including the International Association of Police Chiefs, the International Police Executive Symposium, the Caribbean Institute of Forensic Accountancy, which specializes in financial crime, and an executive member of the Association of Caribbean Criminal Justice Practitioners. Among his many books and publications include Public Corruption, Regional and National Perspectives on Procurement Fraud (2017) which he co-edited with Professor Petter Gottschalk. He is currently writing a book on contemporary policing pedagogy and the impact of new technologies. Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder is a Ph.D. Fellow at the Department of Security Strategies and Management, Institute of Security Sciences, Turkish National Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey where he is pursuing doctoral research on the impact of migration on national security, which studies the effects of Rohingya influx to Bangladesh. He is a fulltime faculty member at the Department of Criminology and Police Science, MBSTU, Bangladesh, since 2012. He is also a Director of Associates for Innovative Research and Development, a developmental

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research institute. Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder has published several articles, including, but not limited to, articles on criminological issues, for example, crime, domestic violence and sexual assault. His areas of interest are crime investigation, migration and crime, victimization and fear of crime. Wendell C. Wallace is a lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice at The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine and Chair of The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine-Police Research Group (UWISA-PRG). Dr. Wallace is also a Barrister who has been called to the Bar in both England and Wales and Trinidad and Tobago as well as a certified mediator with the Mediation Board of Trinidad and Tobago. Much of his work focuses on policing, gangs, violence (domestic and school), criminal justice reform and the tourism/crime nexus.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 2.2

Fig. 2.3

Fig. 3.1

Recorded mass shooting incidents, Australia and the United States, 1981–2019 (Sources Lemieux et al., 2015, p. 136; Mercer, 2019; Mother Jones, 2020b; New South Wales Coroners Court, 2015; Zillman, 2019) Recorded mass shooting victims, Australia and the United States, 1981–2019 (Sources Lemieux et al., 2015, p. 136; Mercer, 2019; Mother Jones, 2020b; New South Wales Coroners Court, 2015; Zillman, 2019) Recorded gun homicides per 100,00 population, Australia (1988–2019) and the United States (1998–2017) (Source Alpers & Picard, 2021) Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Trinidad and Tobago (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

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Fig. 3.2

Fig. 3.3

Fig. 3.4

Fig. 3.5

Fig. 3.6

Fig. 3.7

Fig. 3.8

Fig. 3.9

Fig. 3.10

Fig. 4.1

List of Figures

Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 port of Spain Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA) Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Northern Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA) Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Western Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA) Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 North-Eastern Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA) Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Southern Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA) Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Eastern Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA) Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Central Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA) Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 South Western Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA) Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Tobago Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA) Map of Dominica by Parishes (Source GIS Unit, Physical Planning Division)

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List of Figures

Fig. 4.2

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 9.1

Fig. 9.2 Fig. 9.3 Fig. 10.1 Fig. 10.2 Fig. 14.1 Fig. 14.2

Fig. 15.1

Fig. 15.2

None spot analysis of settlements in Dominica: 2016–2019 (Source GIS Unit, Physical Planning Division) Homicide Rate in St. Lucia (Source Organization of American States Data Repository [2000–2012]) Shooting incidents and firearms seized in Belize, 2011–2019 (Source Belize Police Department, Joint Intelligence Coordinating Center: Reported Crimes Comparative Statistics [2020]) Belize homicide rates by gender per 100,000, 2009–2020 (Source Belize Crime Observatory, 2021) Firearms Seized by Arrests in Belize, 2011–2020 (Source Belize Crime Observatory, 2021) Homicides by weapon type—1998–2008 (Source Katz & Fox, 2010) Persons shot and killed by the Police by gender (Source CAPA Branch, 2020) Homicide by any means in Bangladesh (Source https:// www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/bangladesh) Extrajudicial Killing in Bangladesh (allegedly by few members of different agencies) from 2004–2020 (Source Odhikar [2020] and Odhikar Annual Human Rights Report [2020]) ICVD rate—for every 100,00 inhabitants (1981–2015) (Source Waisefilsz [2016], Brazil [2017] and FBSP [2020]) Police killings in Brazil (2009–2019) (Source FBSP [2017, 2019, 2020])

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217 217 221 233 242 316

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 3.7 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 9.1

Annual homicide counts in Trinidad and Tobago—1960–2019 Properties of key attributes in the data file Summary of annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Distribution of homicide cases—key attribute of interest Selected homicide statistics—ethnicity, gender and age group Gun homicide victims as a per cent of all victims: key attributes 2000–2019 Binary logistic regression model—the odds of gun homicide Trinidad and Tobago 2000–2019 Gun related criminogenic profiles of settlements in Dominica: 2016–2019 Gun-related crimes by Dominica Parishes: 2016–2019 Ranges for gun-related crimes by Dominica Parishes: 2016–2019 Types and annual cost of gun licences in Belizean dollars (BZE)

57 65 67 68 71 73 81 99 102 103 219

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Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table 10.3 Table 10.4 Table 11.1 Table 11.2 Table 13.1 Table 13.2 Table 14.1

List of Tables

Murders committed using firearms by Police divisions and ethnicity—2010 to 2016 Murders by gender 2010–2016 Suicides committed with firearms by Police divisions 2010–2016 Persons shot and killed by Police—2010–2016 Statistics for robbery and firearms offences for 2016 to 2018 Suicide cases which made news headlines from 2017 to 2020 IPGV triger dactors Results of selected trigger factors by gender Fatalities left-wing extremism, South Asia terrorism portal, 2000–2020

239 240 241 241 257 260 294 295 319

1 Introduction to Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides: Perspectives from the Caribbean, Global South and Beyond Wendell C. Wallace

Introduction In a global context, there is hardly a more contentious issue than that of guns. In fact, the issue of guns and gun control is probably the most divisive topic on the national landscape of most nation states. This is premised on the notion that guns and their usage perpetuate a wide array of violence, including, but not limited to, homicides, suicides and serious injuries. It is in this context that guns constitute a serious challenge for the developed, developing and underdeveloped areas of the world and pose serious societal impacts as well as having severe consequences. Internationally, ‘guns are a fundamental enabler of violence’ (Sanjurjo, 2020, p. 2) and are frequently the weapon of choice in cases of homicide, suicide and unintentional injuries (Naghavi, 2018), while exacting W. C. Wallace (B) Department of Behavioural Sciences, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_1

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an enormous toll on humanity globally as thousands of lives are lost to this scourge each year. Unfortunately, the toll on humanity emanating from the wanton loss of productive lives to guns is not the only burden that is imposed on society as there are social and economic costs that taxpaying citizens must bear in terms of the provision of health services, counselling to traumatized victims, loss of income, severe and long-term psychological effects on individuals and communities, pain and suffering as well as increased security costs. Further, there are social and economic costs that extend beyond the immediate loss of life (Naghavi, 2018) as there are other burdens placed on societies as a result of guns, gun violence and gun homicides and this includes the fear of crime which can be more debilitating than crime itself. Instructively, Cook and Pollack (2017) in their reporting on guns, point to a vicious cycle of violence perpetuated by individuals with guns as they submit ‘[gun] violence contributes to a vicious cycle that exacerbates out-migration, loss of community cohesion, struggling schools, and withdrawal of employment and investment—setting the stage for more violence’ (p. 2). According to the APA (2013), gun violence is an urgent, complex and multifaceted problem that requires evidence-based, multifaceted solutions and demands special attention. Not only is the issue of gun violence a complex phenomenon, it is one that is also deeply rooted in different cultures. Therefore, it is imperative to adopt a global perspective in seeking to understand guns, gun violence and gun homicides. It is argued that there must be a renewed emphasis on improving gun violence research, especially in jurisdictions that are under researched, under-resourced and lacking capacity to effectively alleviate the concerns of affected populations. There is also a pressing need to gather and discuss research, policy and practice relating to gun violence and how it may be combated in developing and underdeveloped regions of the world. This desire is premised on the notion that many countries in the Global South as well as in developing and underdeveloped countries are limited by the lack of necessary means and/or policies to effectively deter gun violence. In light of this, evidence-based research from experts and scholars is essential for any meaningful policy solutions to take place. It is in this spirit, and in collaboration with the book chapter authors of

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this book that a great amount of research has been conducted that seeks to address the complex challenge of gun violence in the Global South. According to Sanjurjo (2020, p. 2) guns refer to ‘portable weapons that shoot projectiles from a metal tube, propelled at high speed by expanding gas that is generated by the explosion of gunpowder in a confined space’. Guns are also referred to as firearms and small arms and the terms may be used interchangeably by the book chapter authors in their narratives. In layman terms, gun violence refers to violence of a criminal nature (all incidents of death, injury or threat) committed with the use of a gun (firearm or small arm) and include a plethora of acts such as robbery, carjacking, home invasions, kidnapping, common assault, shooting at the police, assault with a deadly weapon, suicide, attempted suicide and unlawful homicide (when and where the homicide is ruled justifiable). The offences mentioned supra, are by no mean an exhaustive list as there are a multiplicity of other offences that are committed by way of guns, however, the limited space of this chapter does not permit the elucidation of all of those offences in every national jurisdiction. However, without a doubt, the impacts of gun violence are felt on a global scale. In fact, the global impact of gun violence is succinctly contextualized by Kofi Annan, the former United Nations Secretary-General when he expounded the following: ‘The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems — and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as weapons of mass destruction’ (Annan, 2000, p. 52). The pronouncement by Annan (2000) regarding the impact of gun violence is not a singular occurrence as other commentators and scholars have weighed in on the issue. For example, Mc Evoy and Hideg (2017), point out that more than 500 people die every day from gun violence, 44% of all homicides globally involve gun violence and that there were 1.4 million firearm-related deaths globally between 2012 and 2016, while the National Research Council (2005) submit that in a global context, many persons are killed by way of guns, thousands suffer nonfatal injuries and yet thousands of other individuals, though not shot, are also confronted by individuals carrying guns. In a similar vein, a key finding of the Global Burden of Armed Violence report that is contained

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within the Geneva Declaration (2008) point out that ‘every year in recent years, more than 740,000 people have died directly or indirectly from armed violence, both conflict and criminal violence’ (p. 2). As it relates to the global impact of guns, IANSA (2006, p. 1) cogitates that on average, there are 1,000 deaths every day globally and that an average of five hundred and sixty (560) are criminal homicides, 140 are suicides, while 50 are accidents or cases of undetermined intent, all caused by guns. On the other hand, the Geneva Declaration (2008) point out that guns are used to kill as many as 1,000 people each day (see also IANSA, 2006 for support). Further, gun violence also affects the productive capacities of nation states due to the fact that young people are especially affected by gun violence as firearm fatalities consistently rank among the leading causes of death per capita for youth globally (Meltz, 2018). Globally, gun violence is a pervasive public health, criminal justice, national security and policing issue that is not restricted to any one jurisdiction. For many nation states, gun violence facilitates a vicious ‘cycle of violence’ (Cook & Pollack, 2017) that involves shootings, killings, mourning, political rhetoric, inaction and recrimination after heinous acts of violence are committed using guns. However, while there is much research on guns, gun violence and gun homicides in the Global North, with a distinct focus on the USA (see Butters et al., 2011; Densley & Peterson, 2017; Furlong et al., 2001; Gotsch et al., 2001; Grinshteyn & Hemenway, 2019; Hepburn et al., 2007; Institute of Medicine & National Research Council, 2013; Kennedy et al., 2001; Vaughn et al., 2012), there is limited research emanating from the Global South as well as from developing and under developed countries on the issue. This has positioned scholarship on guns, gun violence and gun homicides in the South on the periphery and on the margins of knowledge production. Quite notably, much of what is known about guns, gun violence and gun homicides in countries in the Global South is based on conjecture and elliptical colloquialism, with a few exceptions. For example, there exist academic literature on guns and gun violence by Aderinto (2018) (Guns and Society in Colonial Nigeria: Firearms, Culture and Public Order), Farr et al. (2009) (Sexed pistols: The gendered impacts

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of small arms and light weapons), Holmes et al. (2008) (Guns, Drugs and Development in Colombia), Macola (2016) (The Gun in Central Africa: A History of Technology and Politics), Mkutu (2008) (Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley) and Sanjurjo (2020) (Gun Control Policies in Latin America). In the context of the Caribbean, there is also limited research on guns and gun violence by Agozino et al. (2009), Maguire et al. (2008) and Wells, Katz and Kim (2008), while internationally, such research includes, but is not limited to, Carlson, Goss and Shapira (2019), Sanjurjo (2020) and Squires (2014) as well as by researchers from the Small Arms Survey organization. However, these existing studies, though well-researched and well-written, possess a few notable limitations. For example, though the research literature produced by the scholars mentioned above covering the extent of gun crime is well researched and covers the dynamics of the international small arms trade, political debates on guns, gun control, guns and gender, and legislative attempts to regulate gun proliferation and use, they may appear to take a global perspective on firearm proliferation and violence, however, those perspectives are restrictive, limited to the Global North or a singular country in the Caribbean, and based on specific themes (which is research appropriate), however, they are admittedly non strictly Global Southern. With this academic deficit in mind, reducing gun violence and its impacts should be placed high on the political agenda of every nation state (Cook & Pollack, 2017), especially states in the South. The need for reducing gun violence and its impacts to be placed on the political agenda of every nation state is quite instructive and based on the need for social justice. This need for social justice has found support from Cook and Ludwig (2000) who submit that the placement of the reduction of gun violence high on the political agenda is partially premised as a matter of social justice. In a similar vein, Cook and Pollack (2017) cogitate that the high gun violence rates that afflict low-income neighbourhoods is not merely symptomatic of underlying poverty and joblessness, but that it negatively impinges upon the quality of life in these neighbourhoods and that this is cause for social and political concern. As indicated in earlier paragraphs, empirical literature on guns, gun violence and gun homicides is generally lacking in the Global South

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and where it is available, the literature is usually piecemeal, written by Western scholars, and/or framed in a range of disparate academic disciplines. This Western bias is problematic as it represents the continuing proliferation of the views of scholars in the North to the exclusion of scholars in the South. In other words, much of the research is ‘structurally skewed towards the global North’ (Carrington et al., 2018, p. 3). Based on the skewedness of the existing literature on guns, there is available space for more localized studies on the relationship between criminal activities and guns, gun violence and gun homicides by way of localized research accounting for guns and their impact on the global South in the twenty-first century. Importantly, ‘these localized’ perspectives on guns, gun violence, and gun homicides has the potential to yield greater insights into the matter as they are researched by individuals with localized and intimate knowledge of the issues at hand. The chapters in this book are written by scholars with a focus on the Social Sciences. From a disciplinary perspective, Meltz (2018) points out that the Social Sciences can best address approaches to stem gunrelated mortality in the context of firearm-related attitudes, biases and belief systems. According to Meltz (2018), using Social Sciences methods will allow researchers to consider what guns mean, what they do and to address nuanced questions that are both counterintuitive and selfevident. Meltz (2018), also points out that the Social Sciences appears best suited to assist in uncovering broader tensions about guns and this belief was adopted and used in the pursuit of authoring this book. On observing the deleterious effects of guns on humankind, especially in the Global South, where in some instances developed and developing nation states lack the necessary resources to fight gun violence as well as conduct much needed research that is aimed at policy formulation and implementation, the editor of this book sought out a body of international researchers in the Global South to act as authors of book chapters in this collective based manuscript, with three goals. First, the book is intended to focus on guns, gun violence and gun homicides, recognizing that knowledge about gun violence must be related to a broader understanding of local and international violence. Second, the book identifies the limited nature of research on this topical issue in the Global South, identifies gaps in the literature and proffers suggestions aimed at policy

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formulation and interventions aimed at reducing gun violence. Third, research on guns, gun violence and gun control has been mired in polarizing politics (Meltz, 2018), stymied by lack of funding as well as biased counter-research by powerful lobby groups in the USA, however, the authors of the chapters contained in this edited book are of the considered view that the cost of gun violence to global community is too great to remain silent and thus aim to have their collective voices heard on this pervasive issue. In sum, this edited book analyses the crucial role that guns play in the dynamics of increasing violence that is engulfing the global South, the cultural history behinds guns, the existing state of policies implemented to confront gun violence and proffers some solutions for practitioners in an effort to reduce gun violence.

Why a Focus on the Caribbean/Global South/Beyond? ‘Issues of vital criminological research and policy significance abound in the global South’ (Carrington et al., 2016, p. 1), however, Connell (2007) submits that Social Sciences research and knowledge production has succeeded in being representative of, and is widely accepted as universal, timeless and placeless, based on the experience of a small number of societies in the Global North. While the narrative of this chapter is not aimed at highlighting the different definitions of the Global North and Global South, for ease of reference, as well as for clarity, it is important to understand the North/South divide as many explanations abound as to conceptualizations of the North/South divide as well as the relationship between both (Fonseca, 2018). According to Carrington et al., (2016, p. 2) ‘The North/South distinction refers to the divide between the metropolitan states of Western Europe and North America, on the one hand, and the countries of Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania, on the other’. For Rigg (2007), the term global South refers to the lesser resourced economies primarily located in the southern hemisphere. Continuing, Rigg (2007), notes that this label (Global South) has political and economic implications and includes countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and developing Asia.

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Importantly, in this chapter, the North/South divide is conceptualized using the definition of Carrington et al. (2016). As the focus of the book is on the Global South, it is imperative to answer a question that appeared foremost on the minds of most publishing houses that were approached with the book proposal. That question was: ‘Why a focus on the Global South?’ Carrington et al., (2018, p. 3), point out that ‘empire building has shifted from colonizing territories to colonizing knowledge. Hence the question of whose voices, experiences and theories are reflected in discourse is more important now than ever before’. Continuing, Carrington et al., (2018, p. 3), also point out that ‘……the global production of knowledge in the social sciences is, like the distribution of wealth, income and power, structurally skewed towards the global North’. The position of Carrington et al. (2018) is supported by Connell (2007) who argues that there is a structural imbalance in the economy of knowledge that is skewed to the North (see also Hogg et al., 2017 for support). Connell (2007) also posits that this structural imbalance has produced a hegemony of social scientific thought that is based on the experiences of societies in the Global North. It is in light of the aforementioned pronouncements by Connell (2007), Carrington et al. (2018) and Hogg et al. (2017) that this book is written with a deliberate focus on developed, developing, underdeveloped and under-researcher nation states in the Global South. Much of the knowledge about criminological and criminal justice policies and procedures in the South emanates from the North, particularly England, due to past colonial attachments. Here, Smith (2012) identifies this practice as the coloniality of knowledge, imperialism expressed in the asymmetry of power and the exercise of influence. Therefore, by focussing on the South, this book addresses the problem of knowledge production in academe that is structurally skewed to the North (Carrington et al., 2018), reduce the coloniality of knowledge (Smith, 2012), enhance epistemological diversity and redresses the global imbalance of knowledge production by focussing specifically on the Global South. The scholarship contained in this book that is markedly Global South will also bring to the fore nuanced issues through non-Western lens, afford the readership different perspectives or epistemological diversity, as well as newer and enhanced knowledge emanating

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from researchers who are most familiar with the content, and most importantly, the context of guns, gun violence and gun homicides in this part of the world. The focus on the South will also afford the readership of this book insights into socio-legal and criminological issues plaguing the South, as well as suggestions and recommendations aimed at alleviating these concerns as viewed through Southern theorizing. As this edited book contains several chapters originating from the Caribbean, it is important to address, with a high level of specificity, the insights that will be gained from reading the diverse topics addressed in the book chapters dealing with guns and gun violence in the Caribbean as well as their relevance. The Caribbean consists of a cluster of islands with: (1) sustained democracies, and (2) strong British colonial heritage that is embedded in all infrastructures. Post-coloniality, weak and generally unprotected borders, small national budgets (when compared to some international criminal organizations) and small sizes are common features of most Caribbean countries and this has negative impacts on knowledge production, generation and transfer in the context of criminology and criminal justice as well as in other academic disciplines (Wallace, 2017). Importantly, the use of guns as an enabler of violence (Sanjurjo, 2020) is not restricted to any one criminal events as guns are widely used in the Caribbean to perpetuate extortion, robberies, suicides, homicides, intimidation and a host of other crimes. With this in mind, it is also important to understand the cultural history of gun usage in the region. Given the strong interest of agencies such as Department for International Development (DFID), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), World Bank, the United Nations and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in understanding as well as reducing all forms of violence in the Caribbean, this book makes an original and timely contribution to discerning of the centrality of gun violence and the ‘pistolization of civil society’ (Agozino et al., 2009, p. 287) in this understudied area of the Global South - the Caribbean. Finally, it is important that the voices and experiences of the Caribbean are heard on the issue of guns, gun violence and gun homicides as this is an understudied area within the Global South and

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appropriate and distinct spaces must be allocated for knowledge production and knowledge transfer as this will further the epistemological diversity of knowledge on guns. Importantly, due to the Caribbean’s past colonial attachment to England, it is imperative that research on guns be approached from a historical perspective (see Agozino et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2013 for support). Further, the ‘culture of violence’ according to Brereton (2010, p. 2) must be examined in the context of colonialism in order to seek out the impact of colonialism on gun violence in the Caribbean and an evaluation conducted on the consequences of empire, inequality and racism for the proliferation of violence and firearms in region today. The focus on the Caribbean region within the Global South is important and is also premised on the postulation by Louisy (2004) who spoke of the need for more local knowledge in the Caribbean. In sum, the research on guns and gun violence in the Caribbean must go ‘beyond’ historical perspectives and capture theoretical and social viewpoints, hence the diverse nature of the book chapters referencing the region. The book chapters on guns, gun violence or gun homicides in the Caribbean also sheds light on this pervasive issue in the Caribbean as readers are given insights on the nature and scope (as well as recommendations to alleviate gun crimes) of the problem, keeping in mind that “there is no domestic manufacturing of firearms in the Englishspeaking Caribbean” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank, 2007, p. 136). The focus on the Caribbean region within the Global South is an attempt to enhance our understanding of guns, gun violence and gun homicides in the region as the proliferation of illegal guns has the potential to threaten the ability of Caribbean states to meet their Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Additionally, the readership of the book chapters on guns in the Caribbean will be able to have a better understanding of the significant challenges to prohibit the entry of guns into the region as many Caribbean countries are ‘blessed’ with unguarded coastlines and nearby countries in South America with available stocks of guns to be illegally exported and purchased by the criminal element in the Caribbean.

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It must be noted that there are a few available books in the field of criminology and criminal justice that go beyond the Global North (especially in the context of guns and gun violence), but their weakness is that they do not have empirical research in such a wide range of countries as contained in this book, neither do they specifically engage with the goal of Southern theorizing (see Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012 as an example). On the other hand, the current effort is based on Southern criminology and Southern theorizing on specific aspects of crime (guns and gun violence) and aims to rectify omissions mentioned in the earlier paragraphs by adding new and diverse perspectives to the current criminological research agendas on guns that are primarily focused on the North, thus enhancing this area of inquiry and making it more inclusive and befitting of contemporary global societies. Instructively, the authors of the chapters in this book question whose voices, experiences and theories are reflected in the existing discourses on guns and gun violence, and argue that diversity of discourse is more important now than before. In sum, the contents of this edited book facilitates the whittling away of ‘epistemological coloniality’ or the dominance and transfer of knowledge from the Global North to the Global South.

Structure and Contents of the Book This book is divided into two parts and contains an introductory chapter, fourteen book chapters and a conclusion. The book begins with a thematic and methodological introduction to the issues that need to be considered in order to understand the context of the book and the rationale behind the scholarship. The book is divided into three sections based on geographical location within the Global South, notably: (1) Australia, (2) Latin America and the Caribbean and (3) Africa and beyond due to the wide range of topics that are articulated upon by authors from different regions in the Global South. Part 1 contains an article from Australia. Part 2 contains articles that inform us about the state of guns, gun violence and gun homicides in the Caribbean (Belize, Haiti, St. Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago), while Part 3 contains chapters that

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are written by authors from Africa and beyond and include works from Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe as well as Bangladesh and Brazil. The introduction and conclusion are written by the editor of the book, Dr. Wendell C. Wallace and they provide introductory and concluding thoughts on the book. The introduction to the book sets out the scope of the book and provides a brief explanation of the book chapters so that the readers of the book have a comprehensive idea about the book chapters before actual reading begins. On the other hand, the conclusion summarizes the book chapters, addresses a few lingering issues, closes some open gaps and sets forth a call to action. In sum, the conclusion to the book integrates the various issues covered in the book chapters and proffers comments upon the meaning of the contents of the preceding chapters, with a focus on prevention tips as espoused by the book chapter authors. The authors of this book emanate from a wide range of academic, professional, practitioner and geographic backgrounds. As such, there is a diverse range of methodologies, contexts and views expressed (suicide, homicides, guns and intimate partner violence and guns and gender) and this is symptomatic of the complexity of the issue under inquiry, while at the same time attempting to bring coherence to the chapters around twin themes of understanding gun usage and gun crime prevention. The chapters in this edited book are premised on a combination of fieldwork, academic research and practitioner experience in an interdisciplinary manner. Therefore, the chapters cover a range of analyses of who, what, why, when, where and how guns are used in different societies in the Global South as many countries in the region continue to experience high levels of gun based violence. Instructively, this book is meant to stimulate thoughts, debates and analyses and expose a diverse global readership to the multifaceted, pervasive and pressing concern of guns and gun violence as there is a recognition by the editor that there has been a traditional and important oversight on the topic as well as a pressing need to take the scholarship on the topic forward from the lens of the Global South.

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Part 1 This chapter of this book, the introduction is written by its editor, Wendell C. Wallace, and provides information on what the book will be about. The introduction gives background information, highlights the importance of the book and gives an overview of the contents. Chapter 2 is authored by renowned doyens of criminology and criminal justice (CJS) Drs. Tim Prenzler, Frederic Lemieux and Samantha Bricknell. This chapter, ‘Mass shootings, gun control of the police: Comparing Australia and the United States’ adopts a comparative approach to mass shootings in Australia and the United States and represents an update of a previous study conducted by Lemieux et al. (2015). The following chapter, ‘Trends and Patterns for Gun-Homicide in Trinidad and Tobago during the Early Years of the 21st Century: A Data-Driven Analysis’, is written by Dr. Godfrey St. Bernard, a Senior Fellow at the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (SALISES) at The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine. In his paper, St. Bernard uses a statistical data file of homicide cases for the period 2000–2019, a host of statistical techniques including univariate statistical analysis, bivariate statistical techniques and binomial logistic regression to examine temporal trends in gun homicide and related factors that are associated with such trends in the context of Trinidad and Tobago. Chapter 4 in this book is authored by Peter K. B. St. Jean and colleagues. In this chapter, the authors place focus on what can be learned from analyses of variations in gun related problems across and within nation states in the Caribbean. In this riveting chapter, the authors submit that despite wide and relevant variations across Caribbean nations, little is known about how coldspots containing low incidence of gun-related violence and homicide emerge and persist, even in close proximities to hotspots. The authors rely on the Peaceology approach that was developed by the lead author primarily based on his research in Caribbean settings over the last twenty-five years and makes use of data from archival review, spatial analyses, field research and key informant interviews. In Chapter 5, Dr. Lorna E. Grant from the North Carolina Central University, USA, delves into the history of the Caribbean as it relates to

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its colonial past, contemporary geopolitics and its contribution to the rise of crime, the accessibility of guns in the region, legislations addressing the use of guns, and the relationship between gun legislation and gun violence. Chapter 6 is succinctly written by the venerable and much travelled Caribbean born-scholar, Dr. Perry Stanislas. In this chapter, Dr. Stanislaus extols the challenges associated with policing Persons with Mental Illness (PMI). In this chapter, Dr. Stanislas of the Canterbury Christ Church University, a doyen of policing research in the Caribbean, examines the use of lethal police force and its consequences for the mentally ill and other vulnerable groups in St. Lucia. Chapter 7 is authored by Guyma Noel and Evenson Pierre-Louis. Titled ‘Understanding Haiti’s Current Mercenary Gang-Related Violence and Illicit Arms Trafficking: A View from the Lens of Horizontal Violence’ the author identifies the escalation of gun violence in Haiti. Given the prevalence of gun-related gang violence in Haiti which triggered the deployment of a UN mission due to the prevailing gun problem which led to a new Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme being devised in the jurisdiction, this chapter is certainly of much importance. Chapter 8 provides contextual information on the battle against the illicit gun trade in Trinidad and Tobago by examining the issue from a military perspective. Expertly written by two members of the Defence Force in Trinidad and Tobago, Michelle S. A. Nicholson and C. L. R. Mitchell, this chapter sheds light on the gun trade in Trinidad and Tobago and the approaches utilized by the military to assist the police in curbing this illicit trade in guns into the jurisdiction. Chapter 9 is expertly written by Wayne J. Pitts and his colleague Christopher Inkpen from the RTI International, USA. These distinguished and knowledgeable individuals conduct much needed research on guns and gun violence in Belize. Their book chapter titled ‘Past and Present Trends in Gun Violence and Gangs and Their Implications in Belize, 2011– 2020’ utilised a quantitative approach to elicit data on past and present trends in gun violence and gangs in postcolonial Belize. Chapter 10 concludes Part 2 of this edited book. The chapter is authored by Wendell C. Wallace, lecturer at The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, his supervisee, graduate student Akinee Harry (MSC candidate

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in Criminology and Criminal Justice) and Ayinka Nurse-Carrington, a Doctoral candidate in Criminology and Criminal Justice. In this chapter, the authors evaluate the pervasive issues of guns, gun violence and gun homicides in Trinidad and Tobago using 2010 to 2016 as the period under review. The authors also examine suicides by guns, homicides by gender, police killings and homicides by Police Divisions. Part 3 of the book begins with a chapter titled ‘Trends, Precipitating Factors and the Gender Narrative of Gun-Related Suicide and Deaths in Zimbabwe’. Ishmael Mugari is the author of Chapter 10 and he explores the problem of gun-related suicide in Zimbabwe. This chapter will specifically focus on issues such as nature of victims, precipitating factors for gun-related suicide, and the firearm regulatory framework in Zimbabwe. Moreover, the study also touches on gender aspects of gun-related deaths in Zimbabwe. A documentary survey of newspaper articles on suicide will be performed, followed by in-depth interviews with purposefully sampled representatives from society. Where possible, the study will also make reference to suicide cases in neighbouring South Africa. Chapter 12 is authored by Ihekwoaba Declan Onwudiwe and Abiodun Raufu. Instructively, the authors examine gun violence and homicide in Nigeria and the implications for Ethnic/Religious conflicts in Nigeria’s jurisdiction with its population of diverse ethnicities and religions. The authors make use of content analysis and a theoretical frame, to explain the risk factors of gun violence and homicide in Nigeria from a historical perspective. Instructively, the authors point out the insecurity cloud that has led to the killings in Nigeria by various ethnic, religious and insurgent groups. Chapter 13 is authored by Phanwell Namangala and examines the factors that affect the use of guns in instances of intimate partner violence (IPV) in Zambia. Using police and court records of twelve (12) cases involving both female and male perpetrated gunviolence in Zambia, the authors aim to tease out factors that might have influenced gun-violence. A comparison will be made between factors associated with female perpetrated gun-violence on the one hand and male perpetrated violence on the other. Theoretical explanations will also be sought in respect of this special form of interpersonal violence, on the

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basis of which recommendations for ameliorating the problem will be proposed. Chapter 14 is written by Md Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder who is associated with both the Turkish National Police Academy and the Mawlana Bhashani Science and Technology University, Bangladesh. In this chapter, the author makes use of a multiplicity of sources to expertly analyse how law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh makes use of gun violence and abuse of force to conduct extrajudicial killing in that jurisdiction. The final chapter is authored by Luiz Phelipe Dal Santo, a Doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford, UK and is titled ‘Killing and Letting Die—Between Police Killings and Private Lethal Practices: The Brazilian Dilemma’. Dal Santo adds a unique perspective from Brazil and this expands and enhances the diversity of knowledge production that is associated with this book. Instructively, Dal Santo explores two aspects of Brazilian cases which contributes to the contemporary debate on punishment and society. In so doing, he highlights common punitive practices in the Global South that are overlooked in the Northern literature. Drawing on secondary and official data, he analyses the high levels of homicides in Brazil and the lack of state intervention, whether punishment or mere investigation. Dal Santo then turns his attention to the police lethal action, another systemic practice in peripheral countries. The book ends with a brief conclusion by the book’s editor, Dr. Wendell C. Wallace. The author of this chapter sums up the book, answers lingering questions and seeks to engage the readership in a number of ways, while at the same time explaining that the contents of the book are centered around one major theme. In his brief narrative, Wallace explains the rationale for the brevity associated with the concluding chapter in a rather impressive manner. According to Wallace (2020), the term gun violence can be misrepresentative and misused as people often reference gun violence to instances where one person intentionally shoots another without considering the other forms that gun violence may take. Wallace (2020) also points out that suicides are often omitted from conversation about gun violence and gun violence prevention, while circumstances where no one is injured or killed due to gun violence are similarly overlooked in discussions on gun violence. Without a doubt, these misconceptions serve to hinder

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to development of scholarship and effective gun violence prevention efforts. Instructively, Gramlich (2019) points out that about 60% of gun deaths are suicides, 37% are homicides and 3% are attributed to accidents or other circumstances. It is against this background of omissions mentioned by Gramlich (2019) and Wallace (2020) that the editor of this collective ensured that the book chapters covered a wide range of issues, such as guns and gender, guns and domestic violence and guns and suicide as dimensions of this book. Guns, gun violence and gun homicides: perspectives from the Global South is a selection of recent scholarship from scholars, experts, academics, researchers and practitioners on gun violence, its effect, and possible solutions. The hope of the editor of this book and the book chapter authors is that by bringing the many pieces of the pervasive gun violence jigsaw together, we will inform and assist policymakers who are tasked with the responsibility for solving this crisis, as well as educate researchers and other concerned citizens who seek evidence-based work on this topic. Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides: Perspectives from the Global South examines the globally challenging and complex issue of guns and their usage for nefarious activities in the Global South by utilizing experts in their fields to comprehensively cover this pervasive issue. The purpose of the book is to provide a descriptive mosaic of guns and the wanton destruction of life and limb that is caused by its indiscriminate usage that has led to a notable global security challenge. By doing so, not only does this book highlight the past, present and future orientations of guns, but also proffers useful data, recommendations and interventions to deal with the issue. While written as separate and distinct chapters, the book chapters collectively present a robust and comprehensive outlook on the current geography of the usage of guns and the subsequent reign of terror that they unleash on a sometimes unsuspecting populace in the world today. Instructively, the chapters share a strong relationship as they are dynamically connected with other chapters due to the desire of the book editor who sought to produce a highly interconnected text based on understanding gun usage and the prevention of gun-related crimes in the South. This comprehensive book brings together the collective expertise and knowledge of academics, practitioners and scholars, all of whom

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are considered experts in their respective areas. Importantly, the book is premised on desk-based and fieldwork conducted by the book chapter authors and incorporates analyses of both primary and secondary data. Importantly, a key theme of this edited book is the reduction, prevention and minimization of crimes using guns and contains chapters that are authored by authors from a disparate range of countries, perspectives and foci. This approach was deliberately adopted by the book’s editor in an attempt to create, as far as possible, an all-inclusive book. This is premised on the notion that it is important to include as much academic and practitioner perspectives as possible in the search for justice as there is no monopoly on seekers of justice (whether academician, practitioner or layperson). Quite notably, Crank (2003) as cited in Kohm (2010, pp. 5–6) cogitates a similar view in his research on interdisciplinary justice as he espoused the following ‘one must gather together liberals and conservatives, professionals and academicians, federal and local justice organizations, judges, defence counsel, prosecutors, sworn officers, managers… they all bring something to the table… they all bring a commitment to justice’. It is in this context that the words of Crank (2003) as cited in Kohm (2010) can be juxtaposed onto this book. Instructively, every book chapter author brings a commitment to justice and this is encapsulated in each of the book chapters. Though the chapters have been authored from disparate perspectives, attempts have been made to link the chapters in a cohesive manner. This is achieved in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, having each author include key points for the prevention of gun-related crimes at the end of their chapters for the benefit of practitioners. In sum, this edited book brings together a divergent set of approaches to understanding guns, gun violence and gun homicides by authors articulating the importance of understanding the phenomenon under inquiry from a variety of lens such as gender, culture, history and non-Western perspectives. The variety of approaches and perspectives used by the book chapter authors in this collection is testament to the pervasive and prevarications nature of the topic under inquiry that has not limited its occurrence to developed countries or countries in the Global North, but which is global in reach, though under-researched in some jurisdictions. It is this global feature of guns and gun violence that lends itself

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to research incorporating multiple lens, critical insights and a variety of theoretical frameworks by authors from diverse disciplines and wideranging jurisdictions in an effort to expose the scourge of guns and gun violence. The chapters in this book therefore provide the basis of engendering a more complex understanding of guns as the choice of weapon for the criminal element in the scattered geographies of countries in the Global South and beyond. Focusing on a wide array of research by authors from diverse locations including Asia, the Caribbean, Africa and Australia, the chapters articulate on issues such as guns and gender, guns and suicide, domestic violence, gang-related violence and illicit arms trafficking and mass shootings. A key component of this book is inclusivity and diversity of scholars and this is a deliberate attempt by the Editor to ‘decolonize knowledge production’. For as Ajil and Blount-Hill (2020, p. 83) point out ‘An important programmatic component of decolonizing knowledge production consists of arguing for increased inclusivity and diversity among scholars’. With the aforementioned in mind, this collection utilizes a plethora of authors from diverse milieus to explore the ways in which guns can be used by criminals to fashion the criminal landscape of nation states, cause untold harm, pain and suffering on sometimes innocent populations, and further the criminal enterprise of individual as well as criminal enterprises in the modern and postcolonial worlds. The collection also proffers suggestions and recommendation on prevention methodologies to alleviate gun violence in affected states.

Importance of Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides The importance of this book based on scholarship emanating from the Global South, including the Caribbean and areas beyond that are traditionally under-researched, should not be discounted in any way as the book chapter authors succinctly demonstrate that intellectual knowledge can be produced by scholars from the Global South if given the opportunity and space to reverse the ‘colonialization of knowledge’ according to Carrington et al. (2018) and the structural imbalance of knowledge

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production that favours the Global North (Connell, 2007; Hogg et al., 2017). The importance of the collective body of work contained in this book is also of much importance to academia. This is premised on the notion that scholars in the Global South can and do produce high-quality research that is specific to non-northern contexts, northern ideologues and northern ideological positions. Further, Foucault (1980) theorizes that knowledge construction is closely tied to power relations (generally held in the Global North). Therefore, if knowledge production in criminology and criminal justice is to be decolonized away from this centrality of power that is largely due to colonialism, then an important aspect of this decolonization must ‘focuses on the inclusion of voices from the periphery and the Global South, and the decentralization and indigenization of knowledge production’ (Garcia, 2018; Moosavi, 2018; Takagi, 1981). It is these contextual frameworks by Garcia (2018), Moosavi (2018) and Takagi (1981), that informs this collection. Quite importantly, this book serves to strengthen the worldview by scholars in the Global South that academicians in the region can respond to criminological (and other academic and social challenges) that afflict the region and that are borne out of social, historical, ideological, ontological and contextual realities by reason of being located in the Global South. In a similar vein to Connell (2007, p. 1), the contents of this book creates a case for ‘the development of a more transnational criminology that is inclusive of the experiences and perspectives of the Global South, that adopts methods and concepts that bridge global divides and that embraces the democratization of knowledge production………’.

Conclusion Gun violence is a contemporary global human rights issue that threatens the most fundamental human right, the right to life. With this in mind, this book aims to provide clear analyses of one of the major issues facing countries in the Global South—guns, gun violence and gun homicides— as countries in that locale struggle to create societies free from violence perpetrated by individuals with guns who wreak havoc on a sometimes

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unsuspecting populace. While the emphasis of this book is academic in orientation, it is premised on being inspirational and motivational. In sum, the book chapter authors do not simply aim to catalogue what is wrong; but aim to demonstrate the possibility of taking control over the lives of citizens and changing the way things are being done by suggesting proactive measures, best practices, interventions and recommendations on achieving safer residential spaces for community residents, one that is free from the scourge of guns, gun violence and gun homicides. Without a doubt, the last three decades have witnessed an increase in research directed at guns and its deleterious effects, however, some researchers have argued that research on guns, gun violence and gun homicides is not sufficiently ‘global’ in its representation of scholars and perspectives (Wallace, 2017). The inclusion and representation of works from scholars based in the Global South, the Caribbean and regions beyond in knowledge production and dissemination of such knowledge is important as this serves to whittle away the ‘epistemological coloniality’ or the dominance and transfer of knowledge from the Global North to the Global South. Importantly, this edited book reduces the ‘coloniality of knowledge’ (Smith, 2012) and enhances equality, knowledge advancement and symbolic representation (Medie & Kang, 2018). Though the contents of the book chapters and their authors are clear, they are under no illusion that their book chapters will serve as a silver bullet or panacea for the demonstrable violence facing nation states in the Global South as a result of the proliferation of guns on the national landscape. As the academic narrative on guns, gun violence and gun homicides is somewhat limited and suggest a lacuna on this pervasive issue in the Global South, this amalgam of scholarly articles seeks to close that gap by ‘opening discursive spaces that bridge current global divides and inequities in the production of knowledge’ (Carrington et al., 2018). This book therefore contributes to the emerging scholarly dialogue on this often neglected area of criminology and criminal justice in the Global South—guns, gun violence and gun homicides. As the editor of this book, I am fully convinced that the book chapters in this edited book are timely, topical, unique, relevant and fully in line with the dicta of Carrington et al. (2018) regarding the production of knowledge in the Global South. The contents of the chapters contained

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in this book are wide-ranging in scope and authoritative in knowledge and will appeal to academicians, activists, policy-makers, legislators, practitioners, security specialists and students from the Social Sciences, in both the Global North and South, including Corrections, Criminology and Criminal Justice, Human Rights, Social Work, Policing and Security, Law and other academic disciplines. This book is of particular relevance to nation states in the Global South that are struggling to cope with the incidence of guns, gun violence and gun homicides that negatively impinges on the economic sustainability of these nations as well as on the quality of life of their citizenry. When the chapters of this collective are read conjunctively, the suggestions and recommendations on crime prevention and gun control contained in the book chapters should be of particular importance for policy makers in these jurisdictions. Apart from the policy relevance of the contents of the book chapters, readers of ‘Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides: Perspectives from the Global South’ will find new and interesting scholarship in this book that serves to invigorate thinking, modify existing thought processes, motivate further research on issues facing the Global South and facilitate a greater understanding of criminological issues facing the Global South as viewed through the lens of researchers from the Global South. Approaching the subject from a range of historical, theoretical and social perspectives, this collection promotes the Global South (including the Caribbean) not only as a space for the production of knowledge on the Social Sciences, but importantly, as a source of new and novel research on social issues, including, but not limited to, guns.

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Ajil, A., & Blount-Hill, K.-L. (2020). Writing the other as other: Exploring the othered lens in academia using collaborative autoethnography. Decolonization of Criminology and Justice, 2(1), 83–108. American Psychological Association. (2013). Gun violence: Prediction, prevention, and policy. https://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/gun-violence-report. pdf. Annan, K. (2000). Freedom from fear: Small arms. Report of the SecretaryGeneral to the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations; A/54/2000. United Nations General Assembly. Bowling, B., & Sheptycki, J. (2012). Global policing. Sage. Brereton, B. (2010). The historical background to the culture of violence in Trinidad and Tobago. Caribbean Review of Gender Studies: A Journal of Caribbean Perspectives on Gender and Feminism, 4, 1–15. Butters, J. E., Sheptycki, J., Brochu, S., & Erikson, P. G. (2011). Guns and sub-lethal violence: A comparative study of at-risk youth in two Canadian cities. International Criminal Justice Review, 4, 402–426. Carlson, J., Goss, K. A., & Shapira, H. (2019). Gun studies: Interdisciplinary approaches to politics, policy, and practice. Routledge, Taylor & Francis. Carrington, K., Hogg, R., & Sozzo, M. E. (2016). Southern criminology. British Journal of Criminology, 56 (1), 1–20. Carrington, K., Hogg, R., Scott, J., & Sozzo, M. (2018). Criminology, Southern theory and cognitive justice. In K. Carrington, R. Hogg, J. Scott, & M. Sozzo (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of criminology and the Global South (pp. 3–17). Palgrave Macmillan. Connell, R. (2007). Southern theory: The global dynamics of knowledge in the social sciences. Allen & Unwin. Cook, P. J., & Ludwig, J. (2000). Gun violence: The real costs. Oxford University Press. Cook, P. J., & Pollack, H. A. (2017). Reducing access to guns by violent offenders. RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, 3(5), 2–36. Densley, J., & Peterson, J. (2017). Gun violence in America. The Violence Project LLC. Farr, V., Myrttinen, H., & Schnabel, A. (2009). Sexed pistols: The gendered impacts of small arms and light weapons. United Nations University Press. Fonseca, D. S. (2018). Punishment at the margins: Groundwork for a revisited sociology of punishment. In K. Carrington, R. Hogg, J. Scott, & M. Sozzo (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of criminology and the Global South (pp. 709– 728). Palgrave Macmillan.

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Foucault, M. (1980). Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977 (C. Gordon, Ed.). Pantheon. Furlong, M. J., Bates, M. P., & Smith, D. C. (2001). Predicting school weapon possession: A secondary analysis of the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance Survey. Psychology in the Schools, 38, 127–139. Garcia, G. A. (2018). Decolonizing Hispanic-serving institutions: A framework for organizing. Journal of Hispanic Higher Education, 17 (2), 132–147. Geneva Declaration. (2008). Dimensions of armed violence: Global burden of armed violence. Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development Secretariat. Gotsch, K. E., Annest, J. L., Mercy, J. A., & Ryan, G. W. (2001). Surveillance for fatal and Non-fatal firearm-related Injuries-United States, 1993–1998. MMWR, 50 (SS02), 1–32. Gramlich, J. (2019). What the data says about gun deaths in the U.S. Pew Research Centre. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/16/whatthe-data-says-about-gun-deaths-in-the-u-s/. Grinshteyn, E., & Hemenway, D. (2019). Violent death rates in the US compared to those of the other high-income countries, 2015. Preventive Medicine, 123, 20–26. Hepburn, L., Miller, M., Azrael, D., & Hemenway, D. (2007). The U.S. gun stock: Results from the 2004 National Firearms Survey. Injury Prevention, 13(1), 15–19. Holmes, J. S., Gutiérrez de Piñeres, S. A., & Curtin, K. (2008). Guns, drugs and development. University of Texas Press. Hogg, R., Scott, J., & Sozzo, M. (2017). Southern criminology: Guest editors’ introduction. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 6 (1), 1–7. IANSA. (2006). ‘A thousand people die every day.’ 2006: Bringing the global gun crisis under control . International Action Network on Small Arms. Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. (2013). Priorities for research to reduce the threat of firearm-related violence. National Academies Press. Jones, K., Macola, G., & Welch, D. (2013). A cultural history of firearms in the age of Empire. Ashgate Publishing Company. Kennedy, D. M., Braga, A. A., & Piehl, A. M. (2001). Reducing gun violence: The Boston Gun Project’s Operation Ceasefire (NIJ 188741). U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. Kohm, S. A. (2010). Introduction. The Annual Review of Interdisciplinary Justice Research, 1, 5–8.

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Lemieux, F., Bricknell, S., & Prenzler, T. (2015). Mass shootings in Australia and the United States, 1981–2013. Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice, 1(3), 131–142. https://doi.org/10.1108/JCRPP-052015-0013. Louisy, D. P. (2004). Whose context for what quality? Informing education strategies for the Caribbean. Compare, 34 (3), 285–292. Macola, G. (2016). The gun in Central Africa: A history of technology and politics. Ohio University Press. Maguire, E. R., King, W., Johnson, D., & Katz, C. (2008). Why homicide clearance rates decrease: Evidence from the Caribbean. Unpublished study. George Mason University. Mc Evoy, C., & Hideg, G. (2017). Global violent deaths: Time to decide. Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. Medie, P. A., & Kang, A. J. (2018). Power, knowledge and the politics of gender in the Global South. European Journal of Politics and Gender, 1(1–2), 37–54. Meltz, J. (2018). Social science and the future of gun research. https://items. ssrc.org/understanding-gun-violence/social-science-and-the-future-of-gunresearch/. Mkutu, K. A. (2008). Guns and governance in the rift valley: Pastoralist conflict and small arms. James Currey. Moosavi, L. (2018). Decolonising criminology: Syed Hussein Alatas on crimes of the powerful. Critical Criminology, 27 (2), 229–242. Naghavi, M. (2018). Global mortality from firearms, 1990–2016. JAMA, 320 (8), 792–814. National Research Council. (2005). Firearms and violence: A critical review. The National Academies Press. Rigg, J. (2007). An everyday geography of the global south. Routledge. Sanjurjo, D. (2020). Gun control policies in Latin America. Palgrave Macmillan. Smith, L. (2012). Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples (2nd ed.). Zed Books. Squires, P. (2014). Gun crime in global contexts (1st ed.). Routledge. Takagi, P. (1981). Race, crime, and social policy: A minority perspective. Crime and Delinquency, 27 (1), 48–63. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank. (2007). Guns and crime: A case study of Trinidad and Tobago. In United Nations office on drugs/World Bank, crime, violence, and development: Trends, costs, and policy options in the Caribbean (Chap. 9, pp. 128–140) (Report No. 37820).

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Vaughn, M. G., Perron, B. E., Abdon, A., Olate, R., Groom, R., & Wu, L. T. (2012). Correlates of handgun carrying among adolescents in the United States. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 27 , 2003–2021. Wallace, W. C. (2017, October 19). Caribbean police leaders perspectives on the death penalty. Paper presented at the International Criminology Conference 2017, Whittemore House, Washington DC. Wallace, L. C. (2020). Gun violence: An introduction. Violence and Gender, 7 (1), 1–2. Wells, W., Katz, C. M., & Kim, J. (2008). Illegal gun markets in Trinidad and Tobago: Report to the Minister of National Security. Report to the Minister of National Security.

Part I Australia

2 Mass Shootings and Gun Control by Police: Comparing Australia and the United States Frederic Lemieux, Tim Prenzler, and Samantha Bricknell

Introduction Australia’s tight gun control laws have repeatedly been compared to lax laws in the United States, and these comparisons are at times made within the United States following major mass shooting events (for example, Glover, 2017). Research comparing mass shootings 16 years

F. Lemieux Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] T. Prenzler (B) University of the Sunshine Coast, Sunshine Coast, QLD, Australia e-mail: [email protected] S. Bricknell Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Canberra, ACT, Australia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_2

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before and 17 years after the 1996 Australian National Firearms Agreement found that shooting events and victims dropped to zero following the introduction of comprehensive licensing laws (Lemieux et al., 2015). In the same period post-1996 in the United States, there was a large long-term upward trend in events and victims. This chapter updates the Lemieux et al. (2015) study and adds new data on gun homicides, gun suicides and fatal shootings of police officers. The study also includes greater attention to the different antecedents of gun regulation in the two countries and the role of police. Police enforcement and support have been part of the success of the Australian system, although the present research suggests that a more nuanced and proactive approach to enforcement is needed following some relapses. In the United States, on the other hand, the fragmented institutional and social environment has included a splintered role for police that contributes to the tragic under-regulation of gun crime and mass shootings in that country. The findings add to the knowledge base developing within southern criminology, demonstrating the value of comparative case study research and the inclusion of often-marginalized locations in crime prevention research.

Background Gun crime represents an enormous problem globally and a major challenge for police—in terms of preventing gun-related crimes against citizens and also in protecting officers from attacks involving guns. The Small Arms Survey (2020) estimated there were 1,013 million firearms on the planet, with approximately 85% held by civilians. The United Nations has estimated that ‘a thousand people die each day from gunshot wounds, and three times as many are left with severe injuries’ (Peters, 2020, p. 1). While many of these incidents occur in warfare, many also appear in conventional crime cases including homicide, threats, domestic violence, robberies and conflicts between crime gangs. Guns frequently represent ‘“the tools of choice” for serious crimes of violence’ (van Dijk, 2008, p. 112). Gun crime disproportionately affects citizens in the ‘global south’ and often undermines development programmes

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(UNODC, 2019). At the same time, within more developed countries, gun crime disproportionately impacts lower income and vulnerable communities and younger people; and the greater availability of guns has been associated with higher rates of female homicide committed by male partners (van Dijk, 2008, p. 115). Firearms also represent a major facilitator of police officer deaths on duty (Allard & Prenzler, 2009). For example, in the United States, the Officer Down Memorial Page (2020) recorded 494 fatal shootings of police officers in the ten years from 2011 to 2020. The regulation of guns—focused on limiting their availability, possession and firepower—is a major public policy issue. In a review of data from the International Crime Victim Survey, involving 50 countries, van Kesteren (2014) identified a ‘significant correlation at the country level between ownership levels of handguns and rates of victimization by gunrelated contact crimes, gun-related threats and assaults and homicides, gun-related or otherwise’ (p. 68). In addition, the study found that guns did not provide protection: ‘At the individual level, owners of handguns are significantly more often victims of contact crimes’ (p. 68). This finding supported the conclusion that ‘the strict gun-reduction policies of many governments seem to be a sensible means to advance the common good’ (p. 68). Despite the commonality of this view, the counterview has been dominant in public policy in the United States for many decades, where an assertive gun lobby holds law makers to ransom through a combination of financial inducements and political threats. The lobby promotes a highly contestable Supreme Court interpretation of the Second Amendment to the Constitution—‘the right of the people to keep and bear arms’—that grants widespread freedoms to citizens to possess and carry high-calibre weapons (Epps, 2018). This liberal policy is associated with high numbers of gun homicides—14,542 fatalities in 2017—and the worst numbers of mass shootings in the world (Alpers & Picard, 2021; World Population Review, 2020). As noted in the introduction, Australia and the United States are at times compared in the debate over gun control in terms of the contrasting effects of restrictive and liberal regulations. The present study reviews this debate, focusing on key data and the role of police, including an updated analysis of mass shootings, and

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the addition of data on gun homicides and gun suicides, in the two countries. A comparative case study of the United States and Australia fits within the field of ‘southern criminology’ (Carrington et al., 2019). While geographically southern, Australia exemplifies many of the features of the ‘global north’ in its colonial heritage and racial divides, relative prosperity, large-scale private wealth and limited democratic government dominated by elites. At the same time, its traditional position within criminology shares many of the features of the ‘global south’ in being marginalised against the presumed superior knowledge and practices of the north—particularly that of the United States (Carrington et al., 2019). From that perspective, the study contributes to the internationalisation of criminology (Howes, 2019), inverting the dominant paradigm in crime research by promoting a southern source of fair and effective crime reduction, with globally applicable practical lessons, in clear contrast to theory and practice in the United States—the prime exemplar of the global north.

Australia Australia’s gun regulations have been described in international comparative terms as ‘restrictive’ (GunPolicy.org) and ‘some of the strongest firearm controls in the world’ (Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, 2020). However, for much of its history as a British-based frontier and agrarian society, Australia adopted a laissez-faire approach to firearms ownership and use on private property. Regulation was largely confined to registration requirements for handguns (Alpers, 2017). A series of mass shootings and increasing deaths from firearms between 1984 and 1991 led to partial changes. Lobby groups had some success in overcoming opposition and garnering political support for enhanced controls, most notably in Australia’s largest states New South Wales and Victoria. The lobby groups included police unions (Alpers, 2017). The 1980s were a peak period for police officer deaths on duty, with six fatal shootings in the 1970s and 12 in the 1980s (Allard & Prenzler, 2009, p. 70).

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The expansion of a federated patchwork of largely tokenistic restrictions from the mid-1980s was associated with a modest downward trend in gun homicides and suicides, which accelerated following the introduction of the National Firearms Agreement in 1996 (Alpers, 2017). The Agreement was made by the Australasian Police Ministers’ Council in the aftermath of the Port Arthur Massacre in Tasmania in which 35 people were killed and 18 wounded by a lone shooter firing legally obtained semi-automatic rifles. The conservative Prime Minister at the time, John Howard, and his rural-based deputy Tim Fisher, were able to persuade the eight state and territory governments (New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia, Queensland, the Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory) to adopt consistent legislation severely restricting gun ownership. The main features of the resulting legislation include the following (Council of Australian Governments, 2018): • a ban on automatic weapons and extremely limited access to semiautomatics (mainly for feral animal control), • registration and tracking of all firearms, • comprehensive licensing of individuals based on work or sport criteria and the disallowance of self-defense, • licensing restricted to low caliber weapons, • a 28 days waiting period, • training in gun safety, • secure storage, • an inspection regime, • all sales through licensed gun dealers and • ‘fit and proper person’ criteria, including a range of disqualifying offences (including drug and violence offences) and domestic violence protection orders. The licensing programme under the National Firearms Agreement is administered by police departments in each jurisdiction. Import and export issues are managed by the Australian Department of Home Affairs. The arrangement is overseen by the Firearms and Weapons Policy Working Group (2020), located within the federal Home Affairs

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Department, which includes the managers of state and territory firearms registries and a wide range of federal law enforcement agencies. Implementation of the Agreement was facilitated by an amnesty period and large-scale buy-back programme operated by police. Approximately 642,000 guns were surrendered during the initial 12 months’ amnesty and compensation period (Bricknell, 2012, p. 37). Police have also operated periodic amnesty and buy-back programmes. A national threemonths amnesty programme in 2017 yielded approximately 51,000 unregistered weapons (Ironside, 2017). Australian gun laws have received fairly consistent support from police, including police unions, extending to opposition to efforts to loosen the regulatory system (e.g., The Senate, 2015). Concern for officer safety appears as part of the mix of motives for police support, along with the value of the registration system in solving gun-involved crimes (Chapman, 1998) and the ongoing role of illegal firearms in violent crime. In a 2015 Senate Review of gun-related violence, the New South Wales Police representative reported that ‘16.2 per cent of assaults, 44.2 per cent of robberies and 33.3 per cent of sexual offences involving the use of a weapon in 2014 (up to 29 November) involved the use of a firearm’ (The Senate, 2015, p. 36). Queensland Police reported that ‘the period 2009–10 to 2013–14 showed a high rate of handgun use in homicides (33 per cent), assaults (34–44 per cent), robbery (50–67 per cent) and other offences against the person (23–42 per cent)’ (p. 36). New South Wales Police advocated before the Senate Review for registration of all ammunition sales and higher standards for gun storage; and police representatives argued for an improved national database to allow for more effective tracing of weapons (The Senate, 2015). Australia’s gun laws have enjoyed very high levels of public support— in the range of 90–98%—as well as media support (Alpers, 2017). Although originally an example of ‘top-down’ governance, the initiative clearly meshed with existing public sentiment and represents a strong and enduring case of consensus policy. There is also a fairly strong consensus regarding the NFA’s efficacy among researchers (Alpers, 2017). Available data indicate large-scale sustained positive impacts. For example, in the nine years up to and including the introduction of the NFA in 1996, the

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rate of ‘gun homicides’ in Australia averaged 0.49 per 100,000 population per annum. This fell by −61% to 0.19 in the 23 years following to 2019, with no evidence of displacement (Alpers, 2017; Alpers & Picard, 2021). The average number of individual deaths per annum for the equivalent periods was 85.8 pre-NFA and 39.6 post-NFA (−54%). There has also been a long-term decline in the murder rate in Australia from the 1990s, most likely accelerated by the National Firearms Agreement. The murder rate fell by 47.0% from 1.7 victims per 100,000 population in 1996 (n = 311) to 0.9 in 2019 (n = 225) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2020). In addition, the rate of gun suicides has been trending down from a peak of 2.92 per 100,000 population in 1991 to lows of 0.64 in 2011 and 0.67 in 2017 (Alpers & Picard, 2021). In terms of mass shootings, using the FBI standard of four or more fatalities among non-offenders, Lemieux et al. (2015) found that there had been 13 incidents and 104 fatalities in Australia in the sixteen years before the 1996 NFA, with no cases in the following 17 years to 2013. The Lemieux et al. (2015) study included seven domestic violencerelated cases out of the 13 Australian cases. Since 2013, there have been two domestic violence mass shootings. In 2014, in New South Wales, a man shot dead his wife and three children in a murder-suicide; and in 2018, in Western Australia, in a similar murder-suicide, a man shot dead six people including his wife, daughter and four grandchildren. Both cases occurred on rural properties and it appears that the perpetrators had licenses for the weapons (Mercer, 2019; New South Wales Coroners Court, 2015). One spree-style mass shooting by a parolee in a public place occurred in 2019 in the Northern Territory resulting in four deaths. The weapon was reportedly an illegal pump-action shotgun (Zillman, 2019). Australian police might also have been the beneficiaries of tighter gun laws. In the 20 years up to and including 1996, 19 officers were fatally shot in attacks involving weapons that were not their own. This fell by −47% to 10 in the equivalent 20 years following the implementation of the National Firearms Agreement (Prenzler, 2020).

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The United States For several decades, the United States has been plagued by gun violence and became the world’s epicentre for mass shootings. For instance, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report on causes of deaths in the United States for the year 2017. The data showed a rate of 12.2 deaths caused by firearms for 100,000 inhabitants—the highest on record (Kochanek et al., 2019, p. 33). More specifically, the rate of homicide by firearms was 4.5—totalling 14,542 deaths—and the rate of suicide by firearms was 7.3 per 100,000 inhabitants—totalling 23,854 (pp. 35, 36, 39). There were also 39,773 injuries from firearms. The Washington Post reported there was a total of 176 mass shooting incidents, involving four or more direct victims, between 1966 and March 2020 (Berkowitz & Alcantara, 2020). The 176 mass shootings involved 1,246 fatalities, including 199 teenagers and children. Shooters used a total of 355 guns. Where information could be obtained, 183 were legally obtained and 61 were illegally obtained. The United States has also experienced a major problem for many decades with firearms-related deaths of police officers—albeit involving a moderate long-term decline. According to the Officer Down Memorial Page (2020), there were 1,622 officer deaths from ‘gunfire’ in the 20 years to 1996, and 1,079 in the 20 years that followed—representing a reduction of −33%. However, in the latter 20 years period the number of fatal attacks has remained fairly stable, averaging 54 per annum. These high rates of gun violence in the United States can be explained by four key factors: (1) permissibility of gun laws, (2) accessibility of the firearm market, (3) availability of military-grade weaponry and (4) low eligibility criteria for gun purchasers. Gun regulations in the United States have been described as ‘permissive’ (GunPolicy.org), and the possession of a firearm is widely considered a right protected by the Second Amendment of the Constitution. Firearms possession and use also appear to be much more normative in American cultural narratives and historical myths than in many countries (Lemieux, 2014). US citizens and residents are protected against perceived ‘unnecessary burdens’ regarding the lawful acquisition, possession or use of a firearm, including for ‘personal protection’ (18 USC §921(a)(3)). At the same

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time, there is an array of regulations around guns. At the federal level, there are two major statutes: the National Firearms Act of 1934 and the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993. At state and local levels, governments can enact regulations that impact licensing, registration, permits, self-defense rules, transportation and possession of firearms in specific locations (Lemieux, 2014). However, firearm regulations vary tremendously from one state to another, with many permitting the open carrying of a handgun in public places without a specific license or permit. In terms of accessibility, because of the permissibility of the legal framework, firearms are easy to acquire in the United States. A report published in 2012 by the Congressional Research Service estimated that there were as many as 310 million guns ‘available’ to citizens in 2009, including ‘114 million handguns, 110 million rifles, and 86 million shotguns’ (Krouse, 2012, p. 8). In 2018, the country had 55,900 licensed gun dealers, which represented an increase of 18% compared to 2008 (Parsons, Vargas & Bhatia, 2020). Regarding the availability of firearms and accessories, federal laws provide some restrictions regarding the sales of machine-guns, sawn-off shotguns and rifles, and armor-piercing ammunition without appropriate licensing and registration (Krouse, 2012). However, there is fairly open access to semi-automatic firearms, and private citizens can legally purchase and possess silencers in 42 states without a permit. In fact, the United States has seen a growing militarization of its civilian firearms market with the increasing availability of high capacity handguns, assault rifles, assault pistols and anti-armour sniper rifles (Violence Policy Center, 2011). Finally, regarding eligibility, federal law (Title 18, United States Code 922(g)(1)–(9), (n)) identifies categories of persons barred from owning firearms, including those convicted of criminal offences with a prison term of more than one year, users of illicit drugs, persons under mental health orders and those subject to domestic violence protection orders. However, it is well established that the background checking system— the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS)—is severely limited by resource constraints and lack of information sharing between agencies (Eaton, 2019). This verification gap, with a failure from

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a local prosecutor to share information with the FBI, led to the killing of nine churchgoers in Charlestown South Carolina by Dylann Roof, who escaped the verification process and was able to illegally acquire a handgun (Schmidt, 2015).

Review The above accounts of the different approaches to gun control in Australia and the United States identified major differences in outcomes across a range of measures. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate these contrasts in the numbers of recorded mass shooting incidents and victims over approximately four decades from 1981 to 2019—updating the Lemieux et al. (2015) study. The charts show the likely effect of the National Firearms Agreement in Australia in stopping the recurring incidents of mass shootings, with no cases for 17 years from 1997 to 2013. The re-appearance of incidents in the last few years is extremely regrettable, but they stand in stark contrast to the size and escalating nature of the problem in the United States. In Australia, in the 16 years up to and including the introduction of the NFA in 1996, there were 13 mass shootings and 104 victims. In the following 24 years, up to and including 2020, there were three incidents and 14 victims. In the United States, in the 16 years from 1981 to 1996, there were 24 mass shootings and 190 victims. In the following 24 years there were 80 incidents and 734 victims. A number of important caveats apply to the data in Figs. 2.1 and 2.2. In the first instance, out of necessity, the criteria are extremely conservative—following the 2008 FBI definition of four or more victims not counting the shooter (Lemieux et al., 2015). Consequently, the charts represent a significant underestimation of the problem by not including (1) injuries, (2) cases with less than four direct victims, (3) the number of perpetrators killed and (4) attempted mass shootings. However, injuries and perpetrator deaths are available from the Mother Jones database, as are cases involving three or more victims since 2013—after the US government changed the definition (Mother Jones, 2020a; also https:// www.gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls). Injury and perpetrator data for

Fig. 2.1 Recorded mass shooting incidents, Australia and the United States, 1981–2019 (Sources Lemieux et al., 2015, p. 136; Mercer, 2019; Mother Jones, 2020b; New South Wales Coroners Court, 2015; Zillman, 2019)

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Fig. 2.2 Recorded mass shooting victims, Australia and the United States, 1981–2019 (Sources Lemieux et al., 2015, p. 136; Mercer, 2019; Mother Jones, 2020b; New South Wales Coroners Court, 2015; Zillman, 2019)

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Australian cases (with four or more victims) are available at Alpers (2019). In the second instance, the Australian data include cases in the category of domestic violence, whereas these are largely excluded from the American data. Inclusion of all domestic violence cases in the American data would most likely further greatly inflate the number of cases. Despite these limitations, the comparisons in Figs. 2.1 and 2.2 are worth making because they illustrate the likely benefits of comprehensive regulation, shown in the Australia example, and the likely harmful effects of under-regulation, shown in the American example. The legislative differences between Australia and the United States are also manifest in the rates of gun homicide and gun suicides. In Australia, there has been a long-term decline in gun homicides since the introduction of the National Firearms Agreement in 1996, when there were 104 cases. There were 30 cases in 2018. The lowest number was 22 in 2017. The rates are shown in Fig. 2.3, indicating the likely influence of the NFA in accelerating the downward trend associated with earlier enlargements of regulations. The rate spiked to a high of 0.57 per 100,000 population in 1996, declined to 0.09 in 2004 and 2005, and has remained low ever since. For the United States, Fig. 2.3 shows a moderate increase to 4.29 in 2006, followed by a moderate decrease to 3.45 in 2014, with an upward surge to 4.46 in 2017. As noted, the latter represents 14,542 fatalities. Also as noted, in Australia, the rate of gun suicide has been trending down from a peak of 2.92 in 1991 to lows of 0.64 in 2011 and 0.67 in 2017 (Alpers & Picard, 2021). The rate of 0.70 in 2019 equalled 180 suicides. In the United States, the rate of gun suicides has been increasing steadily from 5.66 per 100,000 in 2006 to 7.32 in 2017 (Alpers & Picard, 2021). The latter represents 23,854 persons. As outlined above, police officer deaths from firearms in Australia have reduced since the NFA. Nineteen officers were fatally shot by offenders in the 20 years up to and including 1996, while ten fatalities occurred over 20 years post-NFA (−47%) (Prenzler, 2020). There were no fatal attacks in the final four years to 2016. Reduced access by potential offenders to high-caliber weaponry is probably a factor, although available research indicates that the large long-term reductions in police

Fig. 2.3 Recorded gun homicides per 100,00 population, Australia (1988–2019) and the United States (1998–2017) (Source Alpers & Picard, 2021)

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officer deaths in Australia since the 1980s is most likely due to a combination of factors, including a much more cautious approach to raids and sieges, improved motor vehicle safety and better management of risky offenders—including the adoption of less lethal weapons such as Tasers and capsicum spray (Allard & Prenzler, 2009; Hine & Carey, 2020). In the United States, gun facilitated murders of police officers is an ongoing problem, although, as noted, there has been a moderate decline since 1996, with 1,622 recorded cases in the 20 years up to and including 1996, and 1,079 in the 20 years that followed (−33%) (Officer Down Memorial Page, 2020). It might be the case that the increased availability of guns in that time has been partly offset by similar more cautious approaches to risky situations as occurred in Australia, including the use of body armor (White et al., 2019). At the same time, the second 20 years in the United States were characterized by a stable pattern of fatal shootings, with an average of 54 instances per year. In contrast to Australia, with no cases, the last four years to 2016 involved 188 cases. The results for Australia have made the National Firearms Agreement a model for effective gun control—although it represents an amalgam of rules previously adopted in other locations including Britain, Japan, Canada and Switzerland (Chapman, 1998; Squires, 2015). Following the 2019 mass shooting in Christchurch, in which 51 people were killed, the New Zealand government adopted the main elements of the Australian model (Weller, De Luce & Aydin, 2019). The Australian example has also been cited repeatedly in the debate in the United States, although so far proponents have had no real success. In most countries, enlarged gun regulation has been ‘event driven’—following high-profile mass shootings (Squires, 2015, p. 278). The United States represents a major exception to this process. An aggressive gun lobby promotes a highly questionable Supreme Court interpretation of the Second Amendment to the Constitution—‘the right of the people to keep and bear arms’. The permitted weapons are well above the capabilities of firearms in circulation at the time of the Amendment in 1791, although the law also excludes weapons more powerful than automatics—demonstrating a qualified right in practice (Epps, 2018). The Supreme Court ruling also downplays the context of the Second Amendment statement—referencing ‘A well-regulated Militia, being

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necessary to the security of a free State’—which implies scope for government control (Krouse, 2012). However, the ongoing domination of the court by conservative appointees means that alternative interpretations are unlikely in the foreseeable future and the problems of mass shootings, gun homicides and gun suicides will continue to escalate. In addition, the failure of governments in the United States to create an adequate feeling of safety among citizens means that the idea that a gun is necessary for self-protection contributes to the vicious circle of guns and crime (Squires, 2015; van Dijk, 2008). Furthermore, law and practice are at odds with public opinion. There is support—and increasing support—in the order 60–80%, for enforcement of key elements of the Australian model, including licensing, training, safe storage and bans on military-style assault weapons (Barry et al., 2019). In the United States, a federal government ban on a range of assault weapons, occurring between 1994 and 2004, was associated with a modest reduction in victimisations from mass shootings (Lemieux et al., 2015). Since then, the Congress failed several times to enact new gun control legislation. However, eight jurisdictions have adopted new laws or strengthened existing laws to limit the availability of certain types of firearms, limit ammunition capacity for semi-automatic weapons and enhance the categories of persons who are not allowed to purchase or possess a firearm (Giffords Law Center, 2020). Nevertheless, without comprehensive legislation, authorities remain mostly powerless in preventing mass shootings. Efforts to pre-empt or reduce the harm from mass shootings through the use of analytical tools and interagency cooperation protocols, focused on early detection of imminent threats, have largely failed (Kayastha, 2016; Laqueur & Wintemute, 2020). Attempts to curtail gun crime through police stop and search procedures have generated an enormous backlash over ‘racial profiling’ effects (La Vigne et al., 2014). Overall then, the situation in the United States typifies aspects of the global north in its anti-democratic orientation and focus on private rights over public goods (Carrington, et al., 2019). This authoritarian aspect was manifested most starkly in 2020–2021 when Right-wing extremists, known for their advocacy of gun ownership, stormed several state

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capitols and the federal capitol building (Thomas, 2021). The intransigence of law makers on the issue has also generated a tone of despair in US criminological research on the topic that also tends to underplay the potential of alternatives from outside the United States, including examples of successful political change processes (e.g., Koper, 2020; Lewis, 2018; cf. Squires, 2015). At the same time, despite its superiority over the American model, the Australian model is not without problems. The Agreement involves a number of areas of ongoing controversy, and there would appear to be room for refinements in legislation and improvements in enforcement—issues that should be taken into consideration in any jurisdiction seeking to reduce gun-related harms. A 2017 study commissioned by the NGO Gun Control Australia reported that the states and territories had failed to fully comply with the provisions of the Agreement, including in areas of children’s use of guns, access to silencers, waiving of the cooling off period for existing gun owners, training without a license, stockpiling of weapons and purchases of ammunition without a license (Alpers & Rossetti, 2017). In light of the Western Australia domestic violence mass shooting, the state government flagged a review of licensing laws and consideration of more stringent mental health tests (Mercer, 2019). Mental illness was also a major factor in the New South Wales domestic violence case and might have been a factor in the Northern Territory public spree shooting (Gibson, 2020). While the anti-gun lobby has argued for the complete removal of domestic storage, in part to reduce access during domestic violence incidents, this does not appear to be on any government’s agenda (Squires, 2015, p. 292). Nonetheless, there might be scope to enlarge sources of what the NFA terms ‘reliable evidence of a mental or physical condition which would render the applicant unsuitable for acquiring, possessing or using a firearm’ (Council of Australian Governments, 2018, p. 19). Certainly, the legislation has not been set in stone and amendments might be forthcoming in the future. For example, further restrictions on high-powered and easily concealable handguns were introduced in 2002 following a partially successful mass shooting attempt (Alpers & Rossetti, 2017). In the Northern Territory mass shooting case, it was also alleged that police were not doing enough to trace unlicensed weapons and that

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there were too many illegal guns kept in hiding that were easily stolen (Zillman, 2019). Squires (2015) previously reported that in Australia ‘there was … evidence that the laws specifying the requirements for safe and secure domestic gun storage were only being variably and rather cursorily enforced by police’ (p. 292). This might have been primarily a resource issue. The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (2016, p. 7) has reported that there were approximately 260,000 illegal firearms in Australia, including many circulating on the black market, with reactivation of previously deactivated guns constituting a major source. Illegal imports constitute another major source. Right to Information requests by Gun Control Australia revealed that approximately 27,000 firearms had been reported as stolen between 2007 and 2017 (Knowles, 2018). It also appears that there are no national data on the ‘inspection and audit programme for storage requirements’ that is meant to occur under the Agreement (Council of Australian Governments, 2018, p. 12; cf. The Senate, 2015). Despite these complications, police support for the NFA appears as an important ingredient in its success to-date. This contrasts with the situation in America, where police have failed to present a united front against the proliferation of guns. This is despite the renowned political power of police, especially police associations, to influence policy making (McCormick, 2015). In fact, police in America appear deeply divided on the issue. The Washington-based International Association of Chiefs of Police (2019) has published a policy supporting restrictions on gun ownership, including ‘a revised ban on the production and sale of semi-automatic assault weapons’ (p. 9). Nonetheless, a 2016 study by The Guardian found that while ‘police chiefs and major city forces tend to favor more stringent gun laws … elected sheriffs and smaller departments are likely to lean the other way’ (Glenza & Beckett, 2016, p. 1). One study of officer attitudes in a sheriff ’s department in a rural area of the United States found that support for private gun ownership was deeply engrained in officers’ psyches (Sycafoose, 2014).

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Prevention Tips 1. Create a comprehensive national licensing and registration system that reduces gun ownership rights to a tolerable minimum. 2. Include a focus on removing access to guns by individuals at risk of harming others or self-harming. 3. Provide adequate resources to police and regulatory agencies to engage in proactive enforcement. 4. Match gun regulation with a highly effective violent crime reduction programme to assist in countering the view that guns are needed for self-protection. 5. Create a national research unit to monitor all gun-related crime and regulation issues with capacity to make recommendations for ongoing improvements to the regulatory system.

Conclusion This chapter provided an analysis of gun-related crime control efforts that serves the wider mission to internationalize criminology through the incorporation of lessons from southern criminology. Australia—representing southern criminology in this instance—and the United States— representing northern criminology and the global north—provide useful contrasts in gun policies and outcomes for gun-related crimes. In the wake of a major mass shooting event in 1996, Australians were able to overcome political, ideological and regional differences to adopt a common approach to government control of firearms with significant benefits for community safety. The situation in the United States is characterized by powerful sectional opposition to public opinion supportive of enhanced restrictions—a situation exacerbated by disunity on the issue within the influential policing sector. Despite the disavowal of the Australian model in the United States and elsewhere, it remains available for adoption through staged implementation where communities mature and move away from the simplistic notion of individualized self-protection through the ownership of guns.

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Officer Down Memorial Page. (2020). Honor roll of heroes. https://www.odmp. org/search/year/2020. Parsons, C., Vargas, E., & Bhatia, R. (2020, August 6). The gun industry in America. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/ issues/guns-crime/reports/2020/08/06/488686/gun-industry-america/. Peters, R. (2020). Small arms: No single solution. https://www.un.org/en/chroni cle/article/small-arms-no-single-solution. Prenzler, T. (2020). Unpublished analysis of police deaths on duty in Australia, 1977 to 2016 . Data obtained from the Australian National Police Memorial. https://npm.org.au/honour-roll/. Schmidt, M. (2015, July 11). Background check flaw let Dylann Roof buy gun, F.B.I. says. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/11/us/ background-check-flaw-let-dylann-roof-buy-gun-fbi-says.html. Small Arms Survey. (2020). Stockpiles. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/wea pons-and-markets/stockpiles.html. Squires, P. (2015). Gun crime in global contexts. Routledge. Sycafoose, A. (2014). Police officers talking about gun control: A case study of a rural sheriff’s department. West Virginia University. https://researchreposit ory.wvu.edu/etd/366. The Senate (Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee). (2015). Ability of Australian law enforcement authorities to eliminate gunrelated violence in the community. Commonwealth of Australia. Thomas, R. (2021, January 28). Armed protestors inspire fear, chill free speech. https://giffords.org/lawcenter/report/armed-protesters-inspirefear-chill-free-speech/. UNODC. (2019). Global study on homicide. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. van Dijk, J. (2008). The world of crime. Sage. van Kesteren, J. (2014). Revisiting the gun ownership and violence link: A multilevel analysis of victimization survey data. The British Journal of Criminology, 54 (1), 53–72. Violence Policy Center. (2011). The militarization of the U.S. civilian firearms market. https://www.vpc.org/studies/militarization.pdf. Weller, C., De Luce, I., & Aydin, R. (2019, November 16). Two students were killed in a school shooting in Los Angeles on Thursday—Here are 5 countries that have taken radical steps to eliminate firearm deaths. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/gun-deaths-nearly-eliminatedin-countries-what-us-can-learn-2017-11?r=AU&IR=T.

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White, M., Dario, L., & Shjarback, J. (2019). Assessing dangerousness in policing: An analysis of officer deaths in the United States, 1970–2016. Criminology and Public Policy, 18(1), 11–35. World Population Review. (2020). Mass shootings by country 2020. https://wor ldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/mass-shootings-by-country. Zillman, S. (2019, June 14). ‘Entrenched secrecy’ among police when it comes to tracking illicit guns, says expert. Australian Broadcasting Commission. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-14/nt-police-sec recy-over-tracing-guns-darwin-accused-shooter/11206096.

Part II The Caribbean

3 Trends and Patterns for Gun Homicide in Trinidad and Tobago During the Early Years of the Twenty-First Century: A Data-Driven Analysis Godfrey St. Bernard

Introduction In Trinidad and Tobago, gun violence and homicide due to gun violence have emerged as alarming criminal events with the onset of the new millennium. During the twentieth century and in periods before, there were very isolated incidents that were characterized by gun violence. In fact, a perusal of statistics on homicide between 1960 and 1984 indicate that there were at least 50 reported homicide cases annually though the number never exceeded 100. The first time when the annual number of homicide cases exceeded 100 was during 1985. Except for The original version of this chapter was revised: Chapter author name has been changed. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_17

G. St. Bernard (B) The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022, corrected publication 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_3

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1986 and 1990, there have always been more than 100 cases of homicide in Trinidad and Tobago during the late 1980s, the 1990s and the first twenty years of the twenty-first century. For almost all of the modern history of Trinidad and Tobago, guns have been a relatively rare phenomenon among dangerous weapons deemed responsible for injury and fatality in Trinidad and Tobago. Sutton and Alvarez (2017) acknowledge that for many years, homicides were mainly committed using blunt or sharp weapons. To the extent that guns prevailed among dangerous weapons, one could only associate such a revelation with the state apparatus that supports public services geared towards protecting the nation’s citizens from internal security threats and the nation as a whole from external aggression. Thus, heavy ammunition and guns were primarily the reserve of protective forces such as the police, the regiment and the coast guard. In Trinidad and Tobago, guns were such rare phenomena that in the early post-independence era, police officers simply bore batons and handcuffs as means to restore order or apprehend detainees during arrest proceedings. Guns were almost never made visible to the public. With the exception of a miniscule, almost invisible set of licensed holders of guns, members of the general public had absolutely no reason or recourse to accessing guns and faced criminal sanctions if found to have been in possession of a gun/guns illegally. Facing criminal sanction for the illegal possession of guns still prevails as a criminal offence in Trinidad and Tobago well into the twenty-first century but the main difference when compared to spirit of the times in the previous century rests principally on the visibility of guns in the possession of the nation’s citizenry and primarily in the hands of criminal elements in the society (Table 3.1). With the onset of the twenty-first century, it is not uncommon to observe police officers toting guns in order to engage in assigned duties to protect and serve an otherwise defenseless public and more important, preserve and restore law and order. This too constitutes a clear departure with regard to the tools of the trade in the execution of police duties in the twentyfirst century when compared to that which prevailed for almost all of the twentieth century. Whether in the context of state police services or the general public, the increasing visibility and awareness of guns as means of defense,

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Table 3.1 Annual homicide counts in Trinidad and Tobago—1960–2019 Calendar year

Homicide count

Calendar year

Homicide count

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

50 … 51 … 48 65 52 68 51 65 71 (15) 68 (19) 78 (21) 85 (25) 75 (17) 77 (17) 82 (14) 82 (18) 74 (17) 85 (19) 63 (16) 86 (12) 91 (10) 90 (13) 83 (9) 111 (12) 85 (6) 136 (34) 100 (15) 112 (13)

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

94 (10) 104 (7) 121 (12) 136 (25) 150 (17) 137 (16) 118 (11) 127 (26) 101 (4) 114 (22) 118 151 171 229 260 386 368 395 550 509 485 354 383 408 403 410 463 494 516 538

N.B. For the period 2000–2019, the counts relate to the total number of homicide cases. For the period 1970–1999, the counts in parentheses relate to manslaughter cases only while the other counts relate to the total number of homicide cases. The difference between the two magnitudes constitutes the number of murders. For the period 1960–1969, the counts relate to estimates of the number of murders only and have been derived from estimates of murder rates and population density for the period as contained in the Social Indicators Report published by the Central Statistical Office, Trinidad and Tobago in 1975 (see Table 6.6 and Table 1.6, respectively in the Social Indicators Report). In this period, it is quite possible that the reporting of the concepts ‘murder’ and ‘homicide’ were used interchangeably Source Social Indicators Report published by the Central Statistical Office, The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago in 1975. The Annual Statistical Digest published annually be the Central Statistical Office, The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago during the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Data shared by the Crime and Problem Analysis (CAPA) Branch in Trinidad and Tobago Police Service

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offense, regulation and demonstration of might have become worrisome as the twenty-first century gains momentum. This has not only been the case in Trinidad and Tobago but also in several other national jurisdictions that have predated Trinidad and Tobago with such concerns. More recently, in Trinidad and Tobago, as is the case elsewhere, private enterprise has driven the growth of establishments that thrive on the delivery of protection services as an economic sectors and further reinforce the visibility of guns as a means of defense, offense and regulation. This prevails in both formal and informal settings, the latter being manifest in the form of gangs which have their own dynamic character, have become increasingly prevalent and have been acknowledged as a phenomenon worthy of state attention and regulation in Trinidad and Tobago as is the case elsewhere. In Caribbean jurisdictions such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Belize, the proliferation of gangs is already linked to concerns about guns and their manifestation at societal levels especially where the consequences are deemed negative (Katz, 2015; Seepersad, 2015). There has been much theorizing about the increasing prevalence of guns in the hands of legal and especially illegal entities that use such weapons as means to facilitate defense, offense, regulation and invincibility (Stroebe et al., 2017). The demand for guns is a derived demand, which reinforces the need to understand the stimuli that frame the demand for guns by the myriad of entities. This chapter is not directed to addressing such questions. In the context of Trinidad and Tobago, the chapter examines homicide patterns that have evolved since the beginning of the twenty-first century and in particular, over its first 20 years. This is accomplished through an examination of temporal trends in gun homicide cases and an exploration of statistical associations between key attributes of gun homicide cases in Trinidad and Tobago between 2000 and 2019. This kind of trend analysis is instructive insofar as it relies upon the rigorous use of descriptive statistics to describe an explanatory framework. Drawing upon the key attributes of gun homicide cases, such an analysis provides results that contribute towards clever insights deemed useful in informing prescriptions for reducing the number of homicide cases. This is predicated upon the notion that in Trinidad and

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Tobago, the vast majority of homicide cases have been due to the use of guns. Accordingly, any empirical insights that yield ground for sensibly presenting arguments pointing to strategies with prospects for reducing motivations to access guns ought to be worthy in devaluing the significance attached to gun-possession and gun-use in sub-cultural settings and more important, reducing the prospect of fatal consequences.

Aim, Objectives and Desired Evidence The aim of this chapter is to document trends that reflect adversely upon annual homicide cases and especially those that are precipitated by the use of guns in Trinidad and Tobago during the first 20 years of the twenty-first century. It strives to provide ameliorative insights that are instructive in reducing the number of homicide cases in Trinidad and Tobago during the 2020s and beyond. Accordingly, the chapter is predicated upon the notion that by reducing and eventually eliminating homicide cases due to gun-use, actual reductions can be achieved with respect to the number of homicide cases in Trinidad and Tobago during the 2020s and beyond. No doubt, this is a first step in reducing the number of homicide cases annually with the onset of the 2020s and is likely to be supplemented by targeting other triggers, for instance, aggression and intimate partner violence in order to achieve further reductions. For the period 2000–2019, the chapter relies on evidence that is indicative of annual trends reflecting adversely on the number of homicide cases nationwide as well as upon the subset that is precipitated by the use of guns. These trends are examined not only in the context of Trinidad and Tobago but also in the context of the nine major police divisions that constitute spatial domains for the conduct of jurisdictional services by the nation’s police. With specific reference to homicide cases precipitated by the use of guns, another aim of the chapter is to yield clever insights from observed relationships that exist between key attributes of interest. Such attributes include victim characteristics such as age and gender, and circumstantial attributes such as plausible cause and detection status. Indeed, consistency with regard to patterned associations between selected attributes at the national level and within each of

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the spatial domains provide heuristic means for informing constructive decisions to achieve ameliorative outcomes regarding the annual number of homicide cases due to gun use and the overall number of homicide cases nationwide. The desired evidence hinges upon two sets of investigative techniques. The first permits an inspection and description of trends reflecting longterm trajectories gleaned from observing annual numbers of homicide cases as well as the subset due to gun-use. These trends are examined for Trinidad and Tobago as a whole and each of the nine police divisions in Trinidad and Tobago in particular. The inspection of trends spans the period between 2000 and 2019 as the early periods of the new millennium were characterized by phenomenal increases in the number of homicide cases annually as well as in the subset due to gun-use. The second is based on the use of statistical techniques that determine whether or not, strong statistical associations exist between principal attributes and the extent to which such associations may be instructive, especially when found to be consistent across police divisions and for Trinidad and Tobago as a whole. The combined knowledge gained from the two sets of results has utility in guiding decisions to achieve the prospects of reductions in the annual number of homicide cases during the 2020s and beyond.

Global and Regional Features of Gun Homicide The American Psychological Association (2013) notes that the incidence of gun violence is often associated with homicide, suicide or mass shootings. Gun-related deaths are principally due to homicide, suicide and accidental injuries involving the use of guns. This chapter focuses principally on those deaths that are classified as homicide. In the United States, firearm homicide rates remain highest for young non-white males in urban areas. Globally, the evidence suggests that firearm homicide is principally a phenomenon characterized by male victimization and in many cases, manifests itself among persons who belong to marginalized groups within their societies. Moreover, these events have a deleterious

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effect in affected societies and sub-cultures and affect families, friends and entire communities. The somber reality of homicide episodes ultimately places burdens on families and by extension, communities at large due to the requisite needs for treatment to overcome grief, counteract fear, manage PTSD and restore hope (Hemenway & Nelson, 2020). Violent gun deaths are measured according to violent gun-deaths per 100,000. Using data from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, Aizenman and Silver (2019) provide evidence of death rates for 10 countries at the two extremes of the violent gun-death rate spectrum. In 2017, the countries with the lowest rates of violent gun deaths were Singapore (0.02), Japan (0.04), Indonesia (0.04), Oman (0.04), China (0.04), South Korea (0.05), United Kingdom (0.6), Iceland (0.07), Bangladesh (0.07), Romania (0.08) and Norway (0.07). In countries classified low in the spectrum of violent gun deaths, legislative arrangements have been instituted to quell the private possession of guns. In Singapore, for example, gun control laws are the most rigid in the world. Death is an ultimate punishment for offenses such as using or attempting to use firearms to commit pre-meditated offenses. This also applies to accomplices on the scene of an offense. Trafficking in firearms also attract similar consequences unless evidence to the contrary comes to the fore. Some countries such as Japan have very strict gun laws that place onerous, almost impossible pre-requisites that will render somebody worthy of being extended such a privilege. In Norway, specific types of firearms are banned; in Japan, however, the processes for obtaining guns are onerous and time-consuming. In contrast, Aizenman and Silver (2019) also provided data on the countries with the highest rates on the violent gun-death spectrum. These include El Salvador (43.11, Venezuela (42.15), Guatemala (26.61), Honduras (24.66), Jamaica (23.57), Colombia (22.40), Brazil (21.68), Bahamas (20.60), Belize (15.69) and Trinidad and Tobago (15.19). In the United States, the violent gun-death rate is 4.43 and in many low-income countries violent gun-death rates are less than 1 per 100,000 population. In the latter half of the second decade of the twenty-first century, Muggah and Aguirre Tobon (2018) draw upon data revealing that Central America (65–70%), South America (50–55%), The Caribbean (50–55%) and North America (45–50%) were ahead of

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each of the remaining geographic regions globally with respect to the proportion of homicide that were due to firearms. With regard to the top 10 countries in the Americas, a strong correlation is evident between homicide rates and gun homicide rates. With reference to 2017, Muggah and Aguirre Tobon (2018) indicate that homicide rates in excess of 30 per 100,000 population were evident in El Salvador (60), Jamaica (56), Honduras (42.8), St. Kitts and Nevis (42), Belize (37.2), Trinidad and Tobago (36), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (35.5), St. Lucia (34) and the Bahamas (31). During the first 20 years of the new millennium, it is indeed an alarming prospect that homicide rates and by extension, violent gun-death rates in several Latin American and Caribbean countries have been the highest on a global scale. In Latin America and the Caribbean, gun violence is often associated with economic deprivation, gang cultures and lifestyles, family disputes, drugs-trafficking, school dropout rates and the abuse of alcohol. Agozino et al. (2009) recognize the association between drug trafficking, political patronage and armed violence as phenomena that are associated with the proliferation of guns in Caribbean societies. According to Ausman and Faria (2019), violent behaviours that involve the use of guns and other lethal weapons have their genesis in factors such as family dysfunction, alcohol and drug use, media and entertainment characterized by gun violence that is displayed in the media and the different means of entertainment, and an educational system that does not equip the youth with the proper civic and ethical principles to deal with life’s challenges. Similar observations were documented with respect to Jamaica (Lemard & Hemenway, 2006). The rise of crime and violence has been associated with an increase in the use of guns in some Caribbean countries. According to Sutton and Alvarez (2017), firearms are involved in the majority of homicide cases—the Bahamas (82.4%), Jamaica (73.4%) and Trinidad and Tobago (72.6%). In the Caribbean, handgun ownership is relatively high being equivalent to that which prevails in Latin America and though lower than the average for Africa, is higher than in each of the remaining global regions. In fact, UNODC and World Bank (2007) as cited in Sutton and Alvarez (2017) allude to a link between the rise in crime and violence and the

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increase use of guns noting that this trend had begun in the 1970s in Jamaica and in the early 2000s in Trinidad and Tobago. Within 23 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Gilgen et al., (2012) observed a positive correlation between overall homicide rates and the percentage of homicides committed with firearms during a 15-year period from 1995 to 2010. Moreover, a number of international studies have noted a positive correlation between gun ownership and homicide rates (Cerqueira, 2014; Hepburn & Hemenway, 2004; Kilias, 1993; Miller et al., 2002; Van Kesteren, 2013). Sutton and Alvarez (2017) note that in countries of the Caribbean, there are very rigid legislation and controls surrounding legal firearms ownership with very severe penalties being administered in cases where illegal ownership is uncovered. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, Townsend (2009) notes that registering a legal firearm is a lengthy and often unsuccessful process. Nonetheless, Harriott (2002) and Agozino et al. (2009) make reference to increasing firearms use in homicide events during the 1990s in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, respectively. The use of guns has prevailed as a prominent feature in gang-related homicide (Agozino et al., 2009; Leslie, 2010; National Institute of Justice, 2009; Townsend, 2009). In countries such as Trinidad and Tobago where ordinary criminal violence is facilitated primarily by access to illegal firearms, tighter control of access to legal firearms may not have a significant impact on homicides. In such countries, it is likely that it is more important to understand the reasons for criminal behaviour precipitated by gun-use rather than prescribing gun controls. The proliferation of gangs constitutes a valid reason for understanding the reasons for criminal behaviour within gangs. Katz and Maguire (2006) as cited in Seepersad (2015) noted that there were as many as 102 gangs in Trinidad and Tobago in 2012, most of them located in police divisions serving the East West Corridor (Port of Spain—44, Western—16, Northern—13 and North Eastern—12). These gangs have often been neighbourhood gangs which thrive in spatial and cultural settings characterized by lower levels of social cohesion (trust among neighbours) and higher levels of physical disorder.

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Given the aforementioned features of gun homicide and antecedents connected to gun violence, a number of strategies have been recommended and pursued to arrest gun violence and by extension, gun homicide. The first approach concerns the illegal trafficking of firearms across international borders and attempts to understand and arrest such movement in the Caribbean Region. The second approach has rested upon identifying gaps in legislation and in particular, gaps in the implementation process that shape such legislation whether in the context of gang engagement, gun-ownership and gun-use. A third approach has emphasized the importance of relying upon police patrols to reduce gun violence in specific geographic areas especially ‘hot’ spots. The fourth approach has sought to positively regulate security concerns surrounding state stockpiles of weapons associated with state protective services. Finally, there have been thrusts towards gun buybacks as means of encouraging gun-carriers to embrace positive behaviours.

Data Source, Methodological Issues and Statistical Evidence Data and Methods The data constitute a set of records reflecting observations associated with key attributes of all homicide cases captured in the database of the Crime and Problem Analysis (CAPA) Branch in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. The CAPA database permits the generation of recorded homicide cases for any given calendar year in Trinidad and Tobago. This chapter relies on such data that have been disseminated by the CAPA Branch in an EXCEL format. Each year’s homicide cases were imported into SPSS and each of the annual SPSS data files was merged to create a composite data file for the period 2000–2019. In essence, the author has been requesting the EXCEL annual data files from the CAPA Unit since the early 2000s and has continued receiving such data files as recently as 2020. For each homicide case in the composite SPSS data file, the attributes can be classified as spatial, temporal, victim-specific, accused-specific and

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crime-specific. Table 3.2 summarizes the properties of the key attributes contained in the SPSS data file. Some attributes have not been considered in subsequent analyses due to the fact that a large number of cases had observations declared as missing, especially with respect to accusedspecific attributes. Such cases are usually those for which somebody is yet to be charged to the extent that there are no observations available for all accused-specific fields. Limitations also arise with respect to classifying occupations as the declaration of generic as opposed to unique job positions places threats on the valid classification of occupations. These are serious limitations and as such, preclude the conduct of any analyses involving accused-specific attributes and victim’s occupation. Homicide cases are invariably criminal events that attract maximal penalties in instances where the accused is adjudged guilty. The threat to the validity of data pertaining to such cases is maximally minimized to Table 3.2 Properties of key attributes in the data file Class

Attribute

Characteristics

Temporal

Year

Spatial

Day of the week Month of the year Police division

Victim-specific

Age

Accused-specific

Gender Ethnicity Age

Crime-specific

Gender Ethnicity Plausible cause

Each calendar year between 2000 and 2019 Each day of the week (i.e. Sun–Sat) Each month of any given year (i.e. Jan–Dec) Port of Spain, Western, Northern, North Eastern, Eastern, Central, Southern, South Western, Tobago Single years of age (in completed years) Male, Female African, East Indian, Mixed, Other Single years of age (in completed years) Male, Female African, East Indian, Mixed, Other Revenge, Kidnapping, Narcotics-Trafficking, Robbery, Domestic Violence, Domestic Dispute, Altercation, Gang Violence Gunshot, Other means Somebody charged, Nobody charged

Means employed Detection status Source Personal Data Preparation (2021)

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the extent that high face validity is characteristic of observations relating to spatial, temporal, victim-specific and crime-specific attributes. The use of such observations is warranted and they are central to subsequent analyses. Much care and attention was placed upon eliminating errors that are likely to have resulted from data preparation procedures such as editing, coding and data capture. For each case, attributes such as victim’s age, victim’s sex, victim’s ethnicity, detection status, means employed to commit homicide, plausible cause, location of crime (i.e. police division) and temporal characteristics (i.e. calendar year) have been appropriately recoded to simplify analyses in accordance with the aims and objective of the chapter. The chapter is based principally upon simple statistical techniques. Additionally, multivariate statistical analyses, controlling for temporal and spatial attributes though exploratory, yield instructive insights consistent with efforts to reduce annual numbers of homicide cases in the 2020s and beyond.

Characteristics of Homicide Cases 2000–2019—Trinidad and Tobago The SPSS data file summarizes the total number of homicide cases recorded by the CAPA Branch for the 20-year period between 2000 and 2019 as well as the subset that was due to gun-use. According to Table 3.3, there were approximately 7,580 homicide cases during the first 20 years of the twenty-first century in Trinidad and Tobago, of which 5,637 or 74.6% were due to the use of guns. Over the period, Table 3.3 indicates that the annual number of homicide cases increased, this also being the case for homicide cases precipitated by gun-use. Additionally, Table 3.3 shows that just over a half (51.3%) of all homicide cases were due to gun-use in 2000 with the proportion increasing rapidly to more than three-quarters during the latter half of the first decade of the new millennium and being sustained at that level and increasing during the second decade. Table 3.4 provides an account of the distribution of homicide cases according to selected spatial, crime-specific and victim-specific attributes. During the first 20 years of the twenty-first century, approximately

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Table 3.3 Summary of annual homicide cases 2000–2019

Calendar year

Total homicide cases

Total gun-use homicide cases

Gun-use cases as a per cent of all homicide cases

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2000–2019

119 149 172 232 259 389 371 388 545 506 473 352 380 408 404 420 463 495 517 538 7580

61 83 104 150 181 272 269 304 431 364 359 250 289 320 304 339 351 377 416 433 5657

51.3 55.7 60.5 64.7 69.9 69.9 72.5 78.4 79.1 71.9 75.9 71.0 76.1 78.4 75.2 80.7 75.8 76.2 80.5 80.5 74.6

Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA

two-thirds of all homicide cases nationwide occurred in the East–West Corridor (i.e. Port of Spain, North-Eastern, Northern and Western Police Divisions). More interesting, almost three-quarters of all gun homicide cases nationwide occurred in the East–West Corridor. This observation reinforces the primacy of gun homicide as a phenomenon in the East–West Corridor particularly in the foothills and valleys of the Northern Range, the mountain chain that spans the northern fringes of Trinidad. According to the data contained in Table 3.4, revenge and drug-related activities featured more prominently as likely causes of gun homicide when compared to all homicide cases. With respect to crime-specific attributes, Table 3.4 also reveals that nobody was charged for almost 80% of homicide cases, this being substantially higher amounting to almost

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Table 3.4 Distribution of homicide cases—key attribute of interest

Key attributes Police division Port of Spain North Eastern Northern Western Central Southern South-Western Eastern Tobago Detection status Detected Not detected Not known Means employed Gunshot Stabbing Beaten Chopped Strangled Throat slit Other Unknown means Probable cause Gang related Revenge Drug related Altercation Robbery Domestic violence Other Unknown cause Ethnicity African East Indian

All homicide cases (N = 7,580)

Gun-use homicide cases (N = 5,657)

Count

Per cent

Count

1698 950 1546 875 828 741 377 429 136

22.4 12.5 20.4 11.5 10.9 9.8 5.0 5.7 1.8

1507 796 1164 743 512 463 178 251 43

26.6 14.1 20.6 13.1 9.1 8.2 3.1 4.4 0.8

1524 6055 1

20.1 79.9 –

669 4988 –

11.8 88.2 –

5657 649 397 339 133 56 204 145

74.6 8.6 5.2 4.5 1.8 0.7 2.6 1.9

5657 – – – – – – –

100.0 – – – – – – –

1974 848 809 815 894 439 165 1636

26.0 11.2 10.7 10.8 11.8 5.8 2.1 21.6

1920 696 743 336 551 98 78 235

33.9 12.3 13.1 5.9 9.7 1.7 1.3 21.8

5497 1394

72.5 18.4

4494 705

79.4 12.5

Per cent

(continued)

69

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Table 3.4 (continued)

Key attributes Mixed Other Unknown ethnicity Gender Male Female Unknown gender Age group Under 18 years 18–29 years 30–44 years 45–59 years 60+ years Unknown age group

All homicide cases (N = 7,580)

Gun-use homicide cases (N = 5,657)

Count

Count

Per cent

525 92 72

Per cent 6.9 1.2 0.9

372 44 42

6.6 0.9 0.7

6773 790 17

89.4 10.4 0.2

5372 281 4

95.0 5.0 –

356 3001 2541 1028 404 250

4.7 39.6 33.5 13.6 5.3 3.3

202 2551 2000 614 134 156

3.6 45.1 35.4 10.9 2.4 2.8

Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA

90% for gun homicide cases. In examining probable cause, the majority of homicide cases, just over one quarter were classified a gang-related (26%) while just over one third of all gun homicide cases were due to gang-related activities. Whether in the context of all homicide cases or those due to gun-use, just over one-fifth were such that the cause was unknown. Table 3.4 reveals that 72.5% of all victims in homicide cases were of African origin, as opposed to almost 80% of all victims in the case of gun-homicide cases. The nation’s population of African origin is disproportionately represented among victims of homicide and gun homicide in particular. This is indicative of the need to further explore phenomena that could account for such high levels of victimization the nation’s population of African descent. With reference to gender, there has been a masculinization of victimization of homicide and gun homicide cases across the twenty-year period under review with male victims accounting, respectively for 89.4 and 95% of all cases. Young and middle-aged persons aged 18–44 years account for 72.1% of the victims of homicide and 80.5% with respect to gun homicide. The

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respective proportions for young persons aged 18–29 years were 39.6 and 45.1% being indicative of greater proportions of victims aged 18– 29 years when compared to their older counterparts.

Ethnicity, Age Group, Gender and Homicide Victimization 2000–2019 On examining victims classified according to their ethnicity, age and gender, Table 3.5 reflects the concentration of homicide and in particular, gun homicide among young and middle aged male victims aged 18–44 years and of African origin. In the case of all homicide victims across the period 2000–2019, this subset accounts for 52.6% of all homicide victims. With respect to all victims of gun homicide, the corresponding percentage is 63.3%. On examining the prevalence of gun homicide among different sub-populations of victims classified according ethnicity, age group and gender, Table 3.5 shows that substantially higher prevalence rates among African males aged 18–29 years (91%) and African males aged 30–44 years (88%). Collectively, such evidence reinforces the alarming prevalence of proclivity of homicide victimization in these two sub-populations. Compared to African males aged 18–29 years and 30–44 years, other sub-populations classified according to ethnicity, age group and gender were observed to have had much smaller numbers of homicide victims during the first 20 years of the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, more than half of such cases were due to gun homicide, this being evident among sub-populations of males and females. For male sub-populations, more than half of all homicide victims were victims of gun homicide in the cases of African males aged under 18 years and 45–59 years, East Indian males aged 18–29 years and 30–44 years. For male subpopulations of Other ethnicities, similar observations prevail for those aged under 18 years, 18–29 years, 30–44 years and 45–59 years. For female sub-populations, noteworthy proportions of all homicide victims

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Table 3.5 Selected homicide statistics—ethnicity, gender and age group Key attribute

Gun homicide victims as a per cent of all victims

African male < 18 years 73 18–29 years 91.1 30–44 years 88 45–59 years 70.5 60+ years 41.6 East Indian male < 18 years 18.8 18–29 years 71.1 30–44 years 62.1 45–59 years 48.5 60+ years 32.7 Other male < 18 years 57.1 18–29 years 86.6 30–44 years 78.6 45–59 years 54 60+ years 43.3 African female < 18 years 34.2 18–29 years 55.1 30–44 years 45.6 45–59 years 49.1 60+ years 14.3 East Indian female < 18 years 4.8 18–29 years 24.6 30–44 years 32.1 45–59 years 26.2 60+ years 11.4 Other female < 18 years 33.3 18–29 years 41.7 30–44 years 31 45–59 years 50 60+ years 20 Unknown 63.1 Age

All homicide cases

Gun-use homicide cases

(N = 7,580)

(N = 5,657)

Count

Per cent distribution

Count

Per cent distribution

215 2265 1722 559 178

2.8 29.9 22.7 7.4 2.3

157 2064 1515 394 74

2.8 36.5 26.8 7 1.3

32 315 385 268 98

0.4 4.2 5.1 3.5 1.3

6 224 239 130 32

0.1 4 4.2 2.3 0.6

35 172 182 63 30

0.5 2.3 2.4 0.8 0.4

20 149 143 34 13

0.4 2.6 2.5 0.6 0.2

38 127 125 55 49

0.5 1.7 1.6 0.7 0.6

13 70 57 27 7

0.2 1.2 1 0.5 0.1

21 69 84 61 35

0.3 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.5

1 17 27 16 4

0 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.1

12 36 29 12 10 298

0.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 3.9

4 15 9 6 2 188

0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 3.3

Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA

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were victims of gun homicide in the cases of African females aged 18– 29 years, 30–44 years and 45–59 years. For female sub-populations of Other ethnicities, similar observations prevail for those aged 45–59 years.

The Prevalence of Gun Homicide Among Homicide Cases 2000–2019 With respect to a variety of characteristics associated with key attributes that are the focus of this chapter, Table 3.6 highlights prevalence rates with respect to gun homicide in relation to all homicide victims during the period 2000–2019. Gun homicide accounted for at least 80% of homicide victims in the Port of Spain, Western and North-Eastern Divisions (88.8, 84.9 and 83.8%, respectively). Similar percentages were also observed with respect to homicide cases that are yet to be detected (82.4%) and those that had been characterized by revenge killings (82.1%). Gun homicide accounted for more than 80% of cases involving victims of African descent (81.8%) and those who were aged 18–29 years (85%). For cases characterized by associations with gangs and drugs, Table 3.6 reveals that more than 90% of killings were as a result of gun homicide (97.3 and 91.8%, respectively). Noteworthy prevalence rates in excess of 7 gun homicide in every 10 homicide cases were observed for victims in revenge killings, those aged 30–44 years, those who were male, those of mixed origin and those who were killed in the Northern Division.

Presentation of Findings Homicide Trends and Temporal Patterns 2000–2019 For the period 2000–2019, Fig. 3.1 shows annual counts of all homicide and the subset that consists of gun homicide in Trinidad and Tobago.

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Table 3.6 Gun homicide victims as a per cent of all victims: key attributes 2000– 2019 Key attribute Police division Port of Spain North Eastern Northern Western Central Southern South Western Eastern Tobago Detection status Detected Not Detected Probable cause Gang-Related Revenge Drug-Related Altercation Robbery Domestic Violence Other Unknown Cause Ethnicity African East Indian Mixed Other Unknown Ethnicity Gender Male Female Unknown Gender Age group < 18 years 18–29 years 30–44 years 45–59 years 60+ years

Gun homicide victims as a per cent of all victims 88.8 83.8 75.3 84.9 61.8 62.5 47.2 58.5 31.6 43.9 82.4 97.3 82.1 91.8 41.2 61.6 22.3 47.2 75.5 81.8 50.6 70.9 47.8 58.3 79.3 35.6 23.5 56.7 85 78.7 59.7 33.2 (continued)

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Table 3.6 (continued) Key attribute

Gun homicide victims as a per cent of all victims

Unknown Age Group

62.4

Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA

Fig. 3.1 Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Trinidad and Tobago (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

Between 2000 and 2008, the annual number of cases due to gun homicide increased at a faster rate than the annual number of homicide cases. Between 2008 and 2019, the rate of change in the age annual number of cases, whether in the context of all homicide or gun homicide, appears to be similar and the prevalence of gun homicide relative to all homicide ranged between 70 and 80%, up from 50% in 2000. Despite marked increases between 2000 and 2008, the annual number of homicide cases and the subset consisting of gun homicide appear to have stabilized between 2008 and 2019. During the latter period, annual homicide counts stabilized mainly in excess of 400 but not exceeding 550, often characterized by random variation annually and increasing steadily since 2011. Similarly, annual gun homicide counts stabilized mainly in excess of 300 but not exceeding 440, again often characterized by random variation annually, also increasing steadily since 2011. These counts have to be compared to those that prevailed in 2000 when the annual number of homicide cases amounted to 119 of which 61 were due to gun homicide.

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In each of the nine police divisions, Figs. 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 reveal variable annual trends with regard to homicide cases and the subset classified as gun homicide across the 20-year period under review. With respect to homicide and gun homicide, a closer examination of Figs. 3.2–3.10 reveals that three police divisions impact variation in observed annual counts for Trinidad and Tobago across the period under review. The three police divisions are Port of Spain, Northern and Western, which are among the police divisions with the largest number of cases recorded annually and exhibiting a 20-year time-series pattern similar to that of Trinidad and Tobago whether in the context of homicide cases or the subset due to gun homicide. For the Port of Spain, Northern and Western Divisions, Figs. 3.2–3.4 reveal that prevalence rates of gun homicide had increased between 2000 and 2008. From 2009 to 2019, growth trends are indicative of a rate of increase that is slower than the preceding nine years and fairly constant. Temporally, the annual number of homicide and gun homicide cases fluctuated between 2009 and 2019, both exhibiting similar periodicities. Such an outcome is also indicative of some measure of stability with regard to annual numbers of homicide cases between 2009 and 2019. For the North-Eastern Division, Fig. 3.5 reflects trends that are similar to those observed for Port of Spain, Northern and Western Divisions but with a few unique departures. The first is that in the North-Eastern Division, the prevalence of gun homicide has been consistently high across the 20-year period. Despite having larger numbers of homicide cases than almost every other division except Port of Spain, there was a delay in the increase in the annual number of homicide cases that occurred and peaked in 2008 as was observed to be the case in most of the police divisions. However, as has been observed for the Port of Spain, Northern and Western Divisions, the annual number of homicide and gun homicide cases for the North-Eastern division fluctuated between 2009 and 2019, both exhibiting similar periodicities and reflecting some measure of stability with regard to annual numbers of homicide cases during the period. For the Southern, Eastern, Central and South Western Divisions, Figs. 3.6–3.9 reveal that the rate of prevalence of gun homicide increased

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Fig. 3.2 Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 port of Spain Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

steadily during the first 19 years of the twenty-first century. Despite fluctuations with similar periodicities, growth trends for the first 19 years of the twenty-first century suggest that there was a constant rate of growth in both the annual number of homicide and the annual number of gun homicide with the latter having increased at a somewhat faster rate. For the Tobago Division, Fig. 3.10 shows that the number of annual homicide cases fluctuated over the 20-year period remaining relatively stable and not trending upward. However, there is evidence suggesting that the number of gun homicide cases has been trending upward between 2012 and 2019.

The Odds of Homicide Due to Gun Use Earlier evidence contained in this chapter link gun homicide to several spatial, victim and criminogenic characteristics. These include police divisions in the East–West Corridor (Port of Spain, North Eastern, Northern and Western), males of African origin aged 18–29 years and 30–44 years and criminogenic characteristics such as gang activities, drug-related activities, revenge killings and unknown triggers. Along with temporal factors, these are among the most critical characteristics

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Fig. 3.3 Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Northern Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

Fig. 3.4 Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Western Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

that determine the likelihood of homicide victims being classified as a gun homicide. Regardless of calendar year and controlling for each of the other two explanatory factors, the binary logistic model permits an evaluation of the impact that each of police division, probable cause and combined age, sex and ethicity characteristics upon the odds of homicides being classified as gun homicide. For the 20-year period, binary logistic regression analysis reveal that regardless calendar year, police division and probable cause of homicide, male victims of African origin aged 18–29 years and 30–44 years exhibited notably higher odds of being victims of gun homicide as opposed

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Fig. 3.5 Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 NorthEastern Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

Fig. 3.6 Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Southern Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

to being killed by some alternative means. With reference to all other victims regardless of ethnicity, gender and age group, Table 3.7 shows that the respective odds ratios (OR = 4.244, CI 95%: 3.467–5.196) and (OR = 3.409, CI 95%: 2.789–4.168) for male victims of African origin aged 18–29 years and 30–44 years, respectively. Gang-related activities and drugs-culture also feature prominently in gun homicide cases. Compared to all other causes, the respective odds ratios associated with the two causal factors are observed to be extremely high being (OR = 21.393, CI 95%: 14.453–31.666) and (OR = 11.578, CI 95%: 8.245–16.259).

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Fig. 3.7 Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Eastern Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

Fig. 3.8 Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Central Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

The annual number of homicide cases was relatively low in the SouthWestern Police Division when compared to other police divisions in Trinidad and Tobago during the 20-year period. Figure 3.7 displays the odds of gun-homicide in eight police divisions with the South-Western Division being the reference category. Accordingly, the highest odds ratios were observed in police divisions in the East–West Corridor, the respective magnitudes being (OR = 4.502, CI 95%: 3.095–6.550) in the Port of Spain Division, (OR = 3.669, CI 95%: 2.451–5.494) in the Western Division, (OR = 3.582, CI 95%: 2.438–5.264) in the North-Eastern Division and (OR = 2.646, CI 95%: 1.893–3.698) in the

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Fig. 3.9 Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 South Western Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

Fig. 3.10 Semi-logarithmic trend—annual homicide cases 2000–2019 Tobago Division (Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA)

Northern Division. Statistically significant but somewhat lower magnitudes were evident in the Southern Division (OR = 2.115, CI 95%: 1.488–3.005), Central Division (OR = 1.693, CI 95%: 1.198–2.392) and the Eastern Division (OR = 1.673, CI 95%: 1.109–2.523). In contrast, the data informing this study did not yield sufficient to assert statistically significant differences between the odds of gun homicide in the Tobago and South-Western Divisions.

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Table 3.7 Binary logistic regression model—the odds of gun homicide Trinidad and Tobago 2000–2019 Attribute Probable cause

Police division

Age group + Ethnicity + Gender

Calendar year

Characteristic All other causes (ref) Revenge Drug-related Unknown cause Gang-related South-Western Division (ref) Port of Spain Division Eastern Division North-Eastern Division Northern Division Western Division Central Division Southern Division Tobago Division All other persons (ref) 18–29 + Male + African 30–44 + Male + African Calendar year Constant

Exp(B)

95% CI for Exp (B) Lower

Upper

4.788* 11.578* 3.445* 21.393*

3.679 8.245 2.813 14.453

6.230 16.259 4.220 31.666

4.502*

3.095

6.550

1.673* 3.582*

1.109 2.438

2.523 5.264

2.646*

1.893

3.698

3.669* 1.693* 2.115*

2.451 1.198 1.488

5.494 2.392 3.005

0.544

0.285

1.038

4.244*

3.467

5.196

3.409*

2.789

4.168

1.066* 0.244*

1.048

1.083

* Denotes

a statistically significant estimate at the 5% level Cox & Snell R2 = 0.273; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.430; Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Significance Level = 0.071; Overall Percentage Correct = 83.8% Source Personal Data Preparation (2021) using microdata obtained from CAPA

Redressing New Millennial Homicide Trends In Trinidad and Tobago, the first twenty years of the new millennium were characterized by a rapid increase in the annual number of homicide cases during the first decade between 2000 and 2009. Despite declining

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annual numbers in 2009, 2010 and 2011, there was evidence of a second upward trend between 2011 and 2019 during the second decade. However, the annual rate of change in the second decade appeared to be more modest than that which prevailed during the first decade. Concomitant with the observed increases in the number of homicide cases annually were annual increases in the subset classified as gun homicide to the extent that trends in the latter mirrored trends in the former. Moreover, the substantially high percentage of homicide cases classified as gun homicide was sustained across the 20-years period and even increased across the period. Given the evidence presented in this chapter, the alarming number of homicide cases and annual increases across the period seem consistent with the proliferation of guns observed in Trinidad and Tobago especially since the onset of the new millennium. Thus, the proliferation of guns and by extension, gun homicide have become one of the principal determinants of the annual increase in homicide cases during the first twenty years of the new millennium. In Latin American and Caribbean countries, the proliferation of guns contributing to increases in the prevalence of gun homicide is often due to criminal elements having access to illegal guns through practices such as smuggling, theft, diversionary tactics and stockpiling. The literature has documented systemic linkages that exist between drugs-trafficking, the formation of gangs, the proliferation of guns through the aforementioned practices and gun ownership (Wells et al., 2010). These are inherently sinister operations, often if not always operating in informal settings and attracting individuals to participate in nefarious activities that lead to criminal careers offering the promise of lucrative returns and/or especial care and comfort within a primary group. With the onset of the 2020s, the magnitude of homicide cases on an annual basis continues to be deemed alarming by civic-minded citizens in Trinidad and Tobago. These annual statistics have placed the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago among the top tier of nations with unacceptably high homicide rates since the onset of the twenty-first century. Beyond 2020, a major national goal ought to be a reversal in annual homicide rates and the first port of call in achieving such reductions is a reduction and eventual eradication of gun homicide. Gun homicide is preventable as gleaned from the statistical evidence in several countries. Access to

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and ownership of guns are predicated upon the supply of guns and often thrive in socio-cultural environments where there is some innate propensity to use guns for legal and illegal activities. In socio-cultural settings where there is a proliferation of illegal guns, the propensity to access and/or own illegal guns need to be understood and more important, the factors that permit assessments of the cost–benefit analysis of prospective outcomes dependent on the rationale for accessing, owning or using of such weapons (Plata & Guillermo, 2016). Thus, there is a need to understand the motivation and meanings associated with accessing, owning and using firearms among persons who follow or are predisposed to following careers characterized by violent crime. Spotting and identifying such motives and meanings are principal requirements in recognizing the fact that access, ownership and the use of guns is a derived demand and this is especially so when access and/or ownership and use are pursued to facilitate violent crime. In essence, the behaviour that facilitates violent crime and gun homicide is predicated upon motivations and meanings associated with access and/or ownership and use of firearms and how such access/ownership and use impact orientations that trigger behaviours tantamount to committing violent crime and in the context of this chapter, gun homicide. While efforts to reduce the existing stock of firearms and in particular, new flows should be encouraged, pursued vigorously, and even intensified, another critical intervention rests with efforts that seek to treat with reducing the derived demand for guns used to commit violent crime. The latter rests upon understanding population dynamics and the fact that victims and perpetrators of violent crime and gun homicide constitute highly specialized, even rare human population groups. The dynamic nature of such groups permits them to harbour variable characteristics, attitudes, orientations, motivations and behaviours that predispose them to variable risks of engagement in violent crime and in particular, gun violence. Specifically, the real aim is to spot characteristics, attitudes, orientations, motivations and behaviours that are associated with higher odds of engagement in violent crime and the committal of gun homicide. Having explored temporal trends pertaining to homicide and in particular, gun homicide during the first 20 years of the new millennium, the evidence contained in this chapter confirm that observed

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patterned relationships do not prevail at the national level only. They also persist annually, and in each of the police divisions. This is the case with respect to the overwhelming risk of gun homicide victimization observed among males of African origin whether aged 18–29 years or 30–44 years compared to all other victims classified as a group regardless of ethnicity, age and gender (Rand, 1994). This points to a need to understand the vicissitudes of life histories of young African males particularly in the context of family, community and schooling engagements at different stages of their lives. Gaining this kind of knowledge will likely be predicated upon a mixed method research design that ought to be embraced in order to address the pragmatism underlying the quest for this kind of knowledge. In particular, a quasi-experimental research methodology targeting young African males with lifelong experiences in hotspot communities, those with partial lifetime experience in such communities and those with no lifetime experience in such communities could be pursued along with phenomenology or grounded theory. The chapter has also reinforced notions of gang involvement and drugrelated activities as exposing victims to higher risks of gun homicide when compared to other probable causes. The evidence in the chapter is consistent with such an outcome regardless of calendar year, police division and demographic group (i.e. African male aged 18–29 years, African male aged 30–44 years, all other persons regardless of age, ethnicity and gender). Regardless of calendar year, demographic group and probable cause, risks of gun homicide are highest in police divisions in the East West Corridor (Port of Spain, North-Eastern, Western and Northern Divisions). Though not as high in the Central, Southern and Eastern Divisions, the aforementioned risks are notably higher than those in the South-Western and Tobago Divisions. Despite variable risks of gun homicide across each of the nine police divisions, gun homicide still constitutes a major concern in every police division and for the nation as a geographic space. To this end, further analyses are undoubtedly required at the level of police stations within each of the police divisions as a means of more efficiently targeting jurisdictional spaces for intervention strategies. In terms of human populations, the overwhelmingly high risks of victimization among African

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males aged 18–29 years and 30–44 years have implications for future data collection and systematic inquiries. With regard to these two populations, monitoring and evaluation frameworks should be established focusing upon interventions that target reductions in gun homicide as means of learning lessons and gauging the extent to which prescribed interventions are attaining desired results. This means that appropriate benchmark data and indicators, in accordance with life history methodologies, have to be collected, processed, stored, managed and manipulated in accordance with sophisticated methodological and statistical inputs akin to the logic of experimentation as a methodological requirement for the conduct of evaluation research. Insofar as human population groups are moving targets, it is essential to identify those who will likely be classified as males of African origin aged 18–29 years and 30–44 years in the next five, ten or even twenty years. Thus, there will be a requirement to embark upon interventions that alter mindsets consistent with discouraging attitudes, orientations, motivations and behaviours that expose boys and young men to the highest risks of becoming gun homicide victims. Specifically, boys attending primary and secondary schools and especially those from at risk communities, should be exposed to military-led programmes of training or national service interventions, both of which are likely to steer boys and young men in the right direction. Apart from national service interventions that ought to be established within the line ministry responsible for youth affairs, existing programmes such as Military-Led Academic Training (MiLAT)1 and Service Volunteered for All (SERVOL)2 ought to be expanded to have wider coverage. With respect to gang-related activities and drug-related activities, ethnographic research should seek to understand the power of gun/firearms as weapons of choice in the daily activities and functioning of such entities. A primary mission of such research will be to facilitate capacity building among social workers and psychologists charged with the responsibility of steering young persons away from criminal careers (Society for Adolescent Health & Medicine, 2020). In essence, all of the suggested interventions ought to add value with respect to gaining the requisite knowledge deemed instrumental in discouraging membership and engagement in gang-related and drug-related activities.

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Integral to such membership and engagement is the increased prospect of access/ownership and use of guns/firearms which other sets of interventions ought to address through programme activities that strive to reduce the derived demand for guns/firearms.

Prevention Tips Generally speaking, these homicide and gun homicide statistics paint a grim picture of the violent crime culture that pervaded Trinidad and Tobago during the first twenty years of the twenty-first century. The chapter is predicated upon real prospects for redressing this grim picture that continues to prevail as at the end of 2019 and constituting a basis for alarm among civic-minded residents in Trinidad and Tobago. To this end, some key messages have to be heeded and acted upon by the relevant authorities. They include the following: 1. The need to recognize that reducing homicide in Trinidad and Tobago is a function of reducing and better yet, eradicating gun homicide in the years beyond 2020, 2. The need to embrace efforts to reduce the derived demand for guns through altering attitudes, orientations, motivations and behaviours so as to prevent emergent cohorts from exercising options to access/own and use guns/firearms for the purpose of committing gun homicide, 3. Notwithstanding the achievements of the CAPA Branch of the Police Service of Trinidad and Tobago with regard to intelligence gathering and information sharing to treat with crime and violence in Trinidad and Tobago, there is additional room for further intelligence gathering and systematic data collection in collaboration with critical partners, for example, university-based researchers with demonstrably clear interests in such processes, 4. Moreover, the CAPA Branch ought to partner with universitybased researchers with demonstrably clear interests in building and managing databases, expertly designing research projects and engaging in systematic evaluations, all of which are relevant in

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understanding process and determining outcome with regard to interventions targeting reductions in homicide, 5. It is also important for targeted research agendas to be established focusing upon the homicide victimization of African males 18– 29 years and 30–44 years. Similar targeted research agendas should also seek to understand meanings and the significance attached to access, ownership and use of firearms in the context of protection, invincibility, regulation and offense in the routine conduct of the full range of gang-related and drugs-related activities.

Concluding Remarks This chapter draws on statistical data reflecting the characteristic features of homicide and in particular, gun homicide cases spanning a period of 20 years beginning in 2000 and ending in 2019. The annualized data are sufficiently valid in terms of content and coverage, this being evident in each of the nine police divisions and for the nation as a whole. Based on statistical procedures, analyses address the aims of the chapter and facilitate insights reflecting consistent trends and patterned relationships that have been proferred in earlier research undertakings. This chapter is valuable in terms of its coverage and presentation of time-series data on homicide and gun homicide in Trinidad and Tobago and its use of data driven analyses incorporating statistical reasoning as an interpretive means for producing clever insights. Responding to the five key prevention tips becomes a national imperative for the relevant authorities to embrace wholeheartedly. Action ought to be predicated on systems that yield formal knowledge that is rooted in rigorous evidence-based reasoning and interpretive outcomes. It should be noted that social change is a slow process that may even be generational. Just as this grim situation emerged over a 20-year period, a similar period may be required to remove the ills that created such a situation. This requires consistent effort that transcend political regimes that govern the country to the extent that any missteps in executing such a mission could even prolong or negate any prospect of recovery.

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Notes 1. MiLAT stands for Military-Led Academic Training. It is a local programme that strives to positively influence the direction of young men’s lives by addressing the symptoms that are a reflection of their earlier life challenges in their families, communities and engagement with the national education system. The MiLAT mainly targets highrisk youth, principally boys and young men between the ages of 16–20 years. 2. SERVOL (Service Volunteered for All) was established in 1970 in Trinidad and Tobago. It was born out of the vision and philosophy of Father Gerard Pantin and deemed to be an organization of weak, frail, ordinary, imperfect yet hope-filled and committed people seeking to help weak, frail, ordinary, hope-drained people become agents of attitudinal and social change in a journey which leads to total human development. It emerged in response to the challenges of the country’s Black Power Revolution of 1970 in which a number of persons and groups sought to challenge racial inequality and force social, economic and political change.

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Cerqueira, D. (2014). Causas e consequencias do crime no Brasil . Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social. https://web.bndes.gov. br/bib/jspui/handle/1408/1922. Gilgen, E., Aguirre, K., & Nowak, M. (2012). A fatal relationship: Guns and deaths in Latin America and the Caribbean. In Small arms survey 2012. Oxford University Press. Harriott, A. (2002). Crime trends in the Caribbean and responses. Unpublished Report submitted to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Hemenway, D., & Nelson, E. (2020). The scope of the problem: Gun violence in the USA. Current Trauma Reports, 6 , 29–35. Hepburn, L. M., & Hemenway, D. (2004). Firearm availability and homicide: A review of the Literature. Aggression and Violent Behaviour, 9 (4), 417–440. Katz, C. M. (2015). An introduction to the gang problem in the Caribbean. In A. Harriott & C. M. Katz (Eds.), Gangs in the Caribbean—Responses of state and society (pp. 1–27). The University of the West Indies Press. Katz, C. M., & Maguire, E. R. (2006). Reducing gang homicide in the Besson Street police station district (Report). Arizona State University, Phoenix. Kilias, M. (1993). International correlations between gun ownership and rates of homicide and suicide. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 148(5), 1721–1725. Lemard, G., & Hemenway, D. (2006). Violence in Jamaica: An analysis of homicides 1998–2002. Injury Prevention, 12(1), 15–18. https://doi.org/10. 1136/ip2005.010488. Leslie, G. (2010). Confronting the don: The political economy of gang violence in Jamaica. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Occasional Paper. Miller, M., Azrael, D., & Hemenway, D. (2002). Rates of household firearm ownership levels and homicide rates across US Regions and states, 1988– 1997. American Journal of Public Health, 92(12), 1988–1993. Muggah, R., & Aguirre Tobon, K. (2018). Citizen security in Latin America: Facts and figures (Strategic Paper 33). Igarape Institute. National Institute of Justice. (2009). Gun violence in America. Nij.opj.gov. https://nij.opj.gov/topics/articles/gun-violence-america. Plata, J., & Guillermo, R. (2016). Towards an armed citizenry? The effect of crime victimization on firearm possession in Latin America and the Caribbean. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3544071. Rand, M. R. (1994). Guns and crime—Handgun victimization, firearm selfdefense, and firearm theft. Crime Data Brief . US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

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Seepersad, R. (2015). Gangs in Trinidad and Tobago. In A. Harriott & C. M. Katz (Eds.), Gangs in the Caribbean—Responses of state and society (pp. 95– 116). The University of the West Indies. Society for Adolescent Health and Medicine. (2020). Preventing firearm violence in youth through evidence-informed strategies. Journal of Adolescent Health, 66 (2), 260–264. Stroebe, W., Pontus Leander, N., & Kruglanski, N. W. (2017). Is it dangerous world out there? The motivational bases of American gun ownership. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(8), 1071–1085. Sutton, H., & Alvarez, L. (2017). Guns—The tools of violence. In H. Sutton & I. Ruprah (Eds.), Restoring paradise in the Caribbean—Combatting violence with numbers (pp. 58–64). Inter-American Development Bank. Townsend, D. (2009). No other life: Gangs, guns and governance in Trinidad and Tobago (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper 8). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank. (2007). Crime violence and development: Trends, cost and policy options in the Caribbean (Report No. 37820). UNODC and World Bank, Washington, DC. Van Kesteren, J. V. (2013). Revisiting the gun ownership and violence link: A multi-level analysis of victimization survey data. The British Journal of Criminology, 54, 53–72. Wells, W., Katz, C. M., & Kim, J. (2010). Firearm possession among arrestees in Trinidad and Tobago. Injury Prevention. https://doi.org/10.1136/ip2009. 025122.

4 Gun-Related Violence and Homicides in Dominica: Why Isn’t There Even More? Peter K. B. St. Jean, Kyra Paul-L’Homme, and L. Daisy Henderson

Introduction According to the 2019 Global Study on Homicides, ‘Criminal activity is responsible for many more deaths worldwide than armed conflict and terrorism combined’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019, p. 1). Among all acts of criminality, intentional homicides are considered the ‘ultimate crime’ mainly because of its ‘ripple effects’ that create secondary victims beyond the original physical victim (United Nations P. K. B. St. Jean · K. Paul-L’Homme North Park University, Chicago, IL, USA e-mail: [email protected] K. Paul-L’Homme e-mail: [email protected] L. D. Henderson (B) Grand Rapids Community College, Grand Rapids, MI, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_4

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Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019, p. 1). In 2017, globally there were 26,000 intentional homicides associated with terrorism, 89,000 with armed conflicts and 464,000 from criminal activities (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019, p. 12). Intentional homicides are not unfamiliar to residents in any part of the world, but their occurrences vary considerably across regions, nations and even sections within nations themselves (Miron, 2001; Mc Evoy & Hideg, 2017; Khoshnood, 2017; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007, 2019). Nations in North America and South America (the Americas) continue to lead other regions with high rates of intentional homicides and gun-related violence where, ‘Young men are especially at risk, with a homicide rate for men aged 18 to 19 estimated at 46 per 100,000 – far higher than the risk faced by their peers in other regions. Firearms are also involved far more often in homicides in the Americas than in other parts of the world’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019, p. 1). It is important to note that overall, intentional homicide rates have declined over the last 25 years, with a rate of 7.4 per 100,000 in 1993 to 6.1 per 100,000 in 2017 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019, p. 10). However, the 2017 rate for the Americas was 17.2 while Asia recorded the lowest rate of 2.3. Comparisons between rates and raw numbers are important as they provide us with different viewpoints associated with various social phenomena. In this regard, among the 463,000 intentional homicides that occurred globally in 2017, the Americas accounted for the highest single proportion of 37.4% or 173,000, with the lowest number of 1,000 being reported from Oceania (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019, p. 10). With reference to methods of death, ‘Shooting has long been the most common cause of death in homicide cases worldwide. In 2017, slightly more than half of all homicides were carried out with firearms, whereas only one fifth involved sharp objects’ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019, p. 19). Moreover, countries around the world contribute disproportionately to the use of firearms in intentional homicides: ‘Most countries that experienced the highest rates of firearminflicted deaths in 2016 were in Latin America and the Caribbean, whose sub-regions are among those with the highest rates of firearm-inflicted

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lethal violence globally’ (Mc Evoy & Hideg, 2017 p. 53). Robert Muggah and John de Boer (2019, p. 9) also indicate that in the Latin America and the Caribbean region, ‘The regional homicide rate of 22 per 100,000 is three times the global average’. Several studies have further explored gun-related violence and homicides in Latin America and the Caribbean, with primary interests on explaining causes (see, for e.g., Harriott, 2003, 2008; Harriott & Jones, 2016; Katz & Maguire, 2015; Muggah & de Boer, 2019); consequences (see, for e.g., Agozino et al., 2009; Harriott, 2003, 2008; Katz & Maguire, 2015); potential solutions (see, for e.g., Harriott, 2003, 2008, 2009; Heinemann & Verner, 2006; Muggah & Aguirre Tobón, 2019); spatial distributions (see, for e.g., Berkman, 2007; Cummings et al., 2019; Katz & Maguire, 2015; St. Bernard, 2009) and comparisons across nations (for example, see de Albuquerque, 1984; Harriott & Jones, 2016; Miron, 2001; Rushton & Whitney, 2002). Within Latin America and the Caribbean region itself, rates and counts of intentional homicides vary considerably across nations especially as this relates to use of guns. A recent study by the Inter-American Development Bank by Sutton and Alvarez (2017, p. 125) put current conditions in context: ‘Firearms are a defining feature of violence across the Caribbean. For many years in the region, assaults and homicides were committed mainly with blunt or sharp weapons. However, the rise of crime and violence has been characterized, among other things, by an increased use of guns’. Moreover, the rise in violence involving guns in the Caribbean did not occur at the same level across all Caribbean nations. Jamaica is widely recognized in research as the Caribbean nation with the earliest onset of gun-related violence (Harriott, 2003; Harriott & Katz, 2015; Headley, 1996). Yet, in the late 1990s and 2000, Trinidad and Tobago emerged in research as experiencing increasing problems with gun-related violence (Agozino et al., 2009; Deosaran, 2007; Seepersad & Bissessar, 2013; Sutton & Alvarez, 2017). Sutton and Alvarez (2017, p. 125) indicate that while Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are among the Caribbean nations with highest involvements of gun-related violence, the realities are different among some other nations:

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Firearms are now responsible for most murders and many injuries resulting from assaults or armed robberies in the region, especially in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and The Bahamas. On the other hand, the overall lower levels of homicide with a firearm in crime in the capital cities of Barbados and Suriname are likely related to less frequent use of firearms in violent crimes in these two countries.

Other studies have also contributed to the trend of comparing high and low gun-related violence, murders and/or other forms of violence in Caribbean (Cole & Gramajo, 2009; Miron, 2001; United Nations Development Programme, 2012). Key findings within this body of literature are consistent with that of Sutton and Alvarez (2017, p. 125): ‘Regression analysis used to explore the factors associated with gun ownership finds that the most significant predictors are the belief that guns make you safer and the perception of high levels of gun ownership in one’s neighbourhood’. Recognizing that in the Caribbean region, ‘firearms are the “tools” of choice for serious crimes’. Sutton and Alvarez (2017, pp. 125–126) further demonstrate a general trend in criminological and social science research that primarily focus on comparing jurisdictional extremes to engage analytical discourse regarding problems of gun-related violence: Globally, firearms were used in 46.3 percent of all homicides from 2007 to 2011. The Caribbean falls just below Central America as the subregion with the second-highest average rate (65 percent) of homicides committed with a firearm (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). This is in stark contrast to Asia and Europe, where only 22 percent and 24 percent of homicides were carried out with firearms, respectively. Within the Latin America and Caribbean region, statistical analysis for 23 countries over 1995–2010 reveals a positive correlation between overall homicide rates and the percentage of homicides committed with firearms. (Gilgen et al., 2012)

A major trend in such literature is an overbalance of focus on high crime with some emphasis on low crime local. However, a conspicuous gap is that no significant attention has been placed on analyzing relevant dynamics associated with jurisdictions that are midrange problem areas.

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We contend that focusing on jurisdictions that depict midrange levels of gun-related violence will add unique and much needed insights to current analyses and discourses about causes, consequences and potential solutions to gun-related violence in society, and in this particular case, in the Caribbean region. However, since our approach to investigating midrange level problem areas is new to criminological and sociological research, it is important to indicate the scope of this inaugural publication. We do not seek to provide an exhaustive analysis of the causes, consequences and implications for Dominica’s position as a relevant midrange problem nation. Such is the focus of an ongoing larger book project that we have entitled, Peaceful Nature Isle. In this current chapter, we limit our contribution to associated conceptual justifications, methodological protocols and findings. Having already outlined above some of the conceptual justifications in terms of a conspicuous gap in literature (lack of focus on midrange problem areas) in what follows, we outline our methodological protocols, and key findings.

Method Dominica was selected because of its identification as a Caribbean nation with midrange level crime problems (Muggah & Aguirre Tobón, 2019). Gun-related problems in Dominica are not as serious as those in some Caribbean countries such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and St. Lucia. However, Dominica nationals commonly consider each gun-related incident that occurs on the island to be alarming. Those sentiments are often displayed on daily radio shows, social media and online news outlets. Dominica is also the native land of all three coauthors, and a main site of our ongoing social science research. As described by St. Jean (2006, p. 11), Dominica (Door-mi-ni-ka) is often misunderstood to mean the Dominican Republic, a Spanish speaking island that borders with Haiti, between the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Dominica, to the contrary, is the English-speaking island located 30 miles south from Guadeloupe

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and 30 miles north of Martinique in the northern end of the Windward island chain of the Lesser Antilles, in the Caribbean.

The island is extraordinarily mountainous, with limited flat and open land, and most of its settlements (communities) are coastal, facilitating accessibility to traditional sources for livelihoods. Mainly due to its lush greenery, 365 rivers, abundant eco-tourist attractions, and many valleys, hills and mountains, Dominica is branded as the Nature Isle. According to tabulations of parish level population estimates from Dominica’s Central Statistics Office (CSO), in December 2017, 71,293 residents were dispersed over the island’s 164 settlements (communities). The raw CSO data were cleaned and aggregated to reflect four main classes: city (capital), rural, suburban and urban, and distributed as follows: one (0.6%) city, 119 (72.6%) rural, 42 (25.6%) suburban and two (1.2%) urban. At time of research, reliable and accurate population counts for all settlements in Dominica were not readily available. These 164 settlements are further aggregated into ten administrative regions called parishes, named after religious saints, and varying in land size, shape, population and primary usage. Parish areas range from 8 sq. km to 185 square kilometers, with the three largest being St. Andrew (185), St. David (129.9) and St. Joseph (121.03); while the smallest are St. Luke (7.78), St. Mark (10.8) and St. Peter (32.28). Figure 4.1 depicts the spatial distribution of those 10 parishes. St. John, St. Andrew and St. Peter are in the distant north, with St. Andrew extending to the northeast, and St. Peter facing the northwest. On the west are St. Joseph and St. Paul, while St. David is due east. To the southwestern are St. George and St. Luke, while St. Patrick is southeastern. The most southern parish is St. Mark.

The Crime Statistics Gun-related crime statistics were obtained from the Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force (CDPF), and were available in the requested details only for the years 2016 to 2019. Currently, there is no dedicated platform that provides detailed and up-to-date data on firearm

St. Mark

St. Luke

St. George

St. Paul

St. Joseph

St. Andrew

St. Patrick

St. David

0

4.5

Coldspot

Warmspot

Hotspot

9

¯

Super Hotspot

Commonwealth of Dominica November 2020

Authors: Peter K.B St.Jean, Ph.D Kyra Paul L'Homme, Ph.D Lyn Baron

Dominica: Gun Crime Analysis

Profile

18 Kilometers

Gun Related Crimes (GRC)

Fig. 4.1 Map of Dominica by Parishes (Source GIS Unit, Physical Planning Division)

St. Peter

St. John

Gun Related Crimes (GRC)

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related incidents in Dominica. However, upon special request, the Criminal Investigative Department of the CDPF compiled requested data aggregated by police districts and communities. Staff at the Geographic Information Unit of the Physical Planning Division provided shapefiles of settlements processed in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria that devastated Dominica in 2017. Such shapefiles allowed the crime statistics provided by the CDPF to be geocoded by settlement, and parish levels.

Developing the Maps The gun-related crime mapping is grounded in hot spot analysis (Berestycki et al., 2014; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2010; Rossmo, 1999; St. Jean, 2007). Crime statistics provided by the CDPF were analyzed in Excel and SPSS to determine varied levels of concentration by settlements. Descriptive statistics processed in SPSS and Excel were used to identify cut-off points for determining five main levels of gun-related incidents and homicides: very high (super hotspots), high (hotspots), midrange (warmspots), low (coldspots) and none reported (nonespots). The algorithms for determining the four levels of reported gun-related crimes and homicides are as follows using population mean measurements: super hotspot (mean + standard deviation * 2), hotspot (mean + standard deviation * 0.5), coldspots (mean-standard deviation * 0.5), warmspots (>coldspots< hotspots). Computer technology (ArcGIS 10.8 Software) was used to develop cartographic analyses of settlements to visually reveal their spatial juxtapositions to other spaces with similar and different levels of gun-related violence and homicides. As a final step in developing the maps, shapefiles were exported from ArcGIS and were overlaid on the crime data with various Geographic Information Systems (GIS) datasets.

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Findings Total Indictable, and Gun-Related Offenses in Dominica, 2016–2019 During 2016–2019, a total of 352 gun-related offenses were reported to the CDPF, (65, 80, 91, and 116, respectively). Among that total, seven (2%) were gun-related criminal homicides (2, 1, 1, 3, respectively). These figures are part of the larger reality of crime in Dominica where a total of 4382 indictable offenses were reported for the years 2016–2019 (1280, 1290, 942 and 870, respectively), with 43 (1%) being criminal homicides or murder (10, 12, 11 and 10, respectively). Among the 4382 indictable offenses reported for that period, 352 (8%) were gun-related.

Total Gun-Related Offenses by Dominica Settlements Those 352 gun-related offenses were spread disproportionately across the 164 settlements in Dominica: one super hotspot, six hotspots, 19 warmspots, 10 coldspots and 128 nonespots (Table 4.1). The super hotspot accounted for 0.6% of the settlements, but its 89 offenses accounted for 23.3% of the total. Hotspots represented 3.7% of the settlements, but with a total of 118 reported gun-related offenses, they accounted for 33.5% of the total. Warmspots represented 11.6% of the settlements, but with 130 reported gun-related offenses, accounted Table 4.1 Gun related criminogenic profiles of settlements in Dominica: 2016– 2019 # of Criminogenic settleprofile ments

% of settlements

#GRC %GRC Mean Stdev Range

Superhot Hot Warm Cold None TOTAL

0.6 3.7 11.6 6.1 78.0 100.0

89 118 130 15 0 352

1 6 19 10 128 164

Source Authors’ own calculations

25.3 33.5 36.9 4.3 0.0 100.0

89 19.7 6.8 1.5 N/A 9.8

N/A 3.8 3 0.5 N/A 15.1

41–Max 17–40 3–16 1–2 0 1–89

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for the largest proportion of the offenses (36.9%). Lastly, coldspots which represented 6.1% of the settlements, with 15 offenses reported, accounted for 4.3% of those offenses. Figure 4.2 situates the 352 gun-related crimes into a more granular view. The map conveys that several settlements across the islands, including rural areas, experienced one or more incidents over the period studied. A significant cluster is observed in the City of Roseau and surrounding suburban areas, but for the most part the spread is sporadic. Table 4.1 reminds us that the single highest number of incidents (89) occurred in the city. The map depicts that gun violence and homicides are experienced unevenly across Dominica, but some locations seem relatively untouched within that period.

Total Dominica Gun-Related Offenses (2016–2019) by Parish Table 4.2 provides a depiction of those 352 gun-related crimes in Dominica when the 164 settlements are aggregated into the island’s 10 parishes. That table also provides per capita data since at the time of study, population estimates were only available on the parish level, but not for settlements. Note that the number of offenses per parish range from the two lowest categories being zero in St. Mark and two each in St. Peter and St. David, to a high of 31 in St. Joseph and the highest being 238 in St. George. Parishes also vary considerably in population size with St. George and St. Paul being the most populated with 21, 241 and 9,786 residents, respectively. With populations of 1,430 and 1,668 respectively, the parishes of St. Peter and St. Luke are least populated. When per capita crimes are considered, St. George and St. Joseph emerge with the highest gun-related crime rates of 11.2 and 5.5 per 1,000 residents, respectively. St. Mark and St. David recorded the lowest rates of 0.0 and 0.3 per 1,000 residents. These figures were used in conjunction with the algorithms outlined in the methods section of this paper to determine the criminogenic profiles (St. Jean, 2007) of parishes in categories of super hotspots, hotspots, warmspots and coldspots. As Table 4.3 also shows, with means and

St. Joseph

St. George

St. Mark

St. Luke

St. Paul

St. Andrew

St. Patrick

St. David

0

7.5

¯ Commonwealth of Dominica October 2020

Authors: Peter K.B St.Jean, Ph.D Kyra Paul L'Homme, Ph.D Lyn Baron

Dominica: Gun Crime Analysis

3.75

Parish Boundary

NONESPOT

COLDSPOT

WARMSPOT

HOTSPOT

SUPER HOTSPOT

None Spot Analysis

15 Kilometers

Fig. 4.2 None spot analysis of settlements in Dominica: 2016–2019 (Source GIS Unit, Physical Planning Division)

St. Peter

St. John

None Spot Analysis

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2 352

6.194

5.664

N/A

0.000

2.819

4.026

1.155

8.091

19

12

1

3

21

18

3

164

15.110 238

37

23

20

0

4

31

27

2

0.323

18

5

0.515

32

Source Fieldwork, 2021

St. 0.16 Andrew St. 0.11 Davis St. 6.43 George 1.42 St. John St. 2.58 Joseph 4.00 St. Luke St. 0.00 Mark St. 0.95 Patrick St. 1.28 Paul St. 0.67 Peter Total 2.15 89

2

16

12

0

4

18

27

89

1

2

100

0.6

6.5

5.7

0.0

1.1

8.8

7.7

67.6

0.6

1.4

100.0

1.8

11.0

12.8

1.8

0.6

7.3

11.6

22.6

11.0

19.5

Table 4.2 Gun-related crimes by Dominica Parishes: 2016–2019 % of % of # SettleTotal SettleParish Mean ments Stdev. Sum Max Sum ments

0.1

0.2

1430

9786

7622

1834

1668

5637

6561

0.7

1.3

1.0

0.0

4.0

2.6

1.4

21241 6.4

6043

9471

Pop

2

23

20

0

4

31

27

238

2

5

1.40

2.35

2.62

0.00

2.40

5.50

4.12

11.20

0.33

0.53

1

2

2

1

2

3

2

6

1

1

Cold Spot

Warm Spot

Warm Spot

Cold Spot

Warm Spot

Hot Spot

Super Hot Spot Warm Spot

Cold Spot

Cold Spot

Mean GRC GVCRate Criminogenic Rate Sum (1000) Rank Profile

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Table 4.3 Ranges for gun-related crimes by Dominica Parishes: 2016–2019 Mean Stdev Hi Mid Low Super Hot

3 3.3 4.7 1.5–4.6 1.4 9.7

Source Authors’ own calculations

standard deviations of 3.0 and 3.3 respectively, coldspots range from 0.0 to 1.4, warmspots from 1.5 to 4.6, hotspots from 4.7 to 9.6 and super hotspots from 9.7 and above. Based on those statistics, St. George emerged as the only super hotspot, and St. Joseph as the only hotspot. St. John, St. Patrick, St. Luke and St. Paul were warmspots, while St. Peter, St. Andrew, St. David and St. Mark were coldspots. One of the unique contributions of this paper is introducing the concept of nonespots— locations with no reported cases, and St. Mark exists as an example. Figure 4.1 provides a cartographic representation of the criminogenic profiles of the parishes; the darker the color the lower the crime rate.

Discussion Our justification for writing this chapter was to fill identified gaps in sociological and criminological literature where emphases are currently placed on highest and lowest profiles of crime. No identifiable attention has been placed on midrange problem areas. Focusing on Dominica as a Caribbean nation ranked midrange with crime and violence problems, including gun-related offenses, we offer the following theoretical, methodological, policy and programmatic implications.

Theoretical Implications First, our analytical framework introduces the concept of nonespot as a way of shifting the dominant paradigm which focuses primarily on hotspots and coldspots. Our emphasis on midrange problem areas,

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including warm spots, further advance analyses of crime and place. These analyses help to better understand gun-related violence and homicides in micro and macro community locales. By introducing the concept of nonespots to the literature, we place attention on the conceptual value of locations where no crimes are reported to have occurred. We consider this contribution to be a valuable extension of theories such as routine activities, opportunity and situational crime prevention which seek to explain realities of crime in time and place.

Methodological Implications Focusing on midrange problem areas encourages researchers to simultaneously consider high and low dynamics associated with crime and place. Our multi-methods approach which primarily combines quantitative and cartographic techniques create opportunities for further critical analyses. For instance, our use of police statistics to tabulate concentration of gun-related crimes by settlements and our use of spatial visualization provide a powerful approach to macro (parish) and micro (settlement) analyses. The use of the mix methods also creates opportunities for new research questions to emerge from the process of reviewing the spatial juxtapositions of micro spaces with varied intensities of criminalities. For example, the spatial embeddedness of the capital as the only super hotspot is juxtaposed by several coldspots and warmspots in the same vicinity. Such visual data can be insightful for raising questions about social, economic, cultural and other processes that significantly influence the spatial complexity. Also, our research has introduced processes and protocols for scientifically measuring problematic locales. Our algorithms for tabulating the outlined criminological profile of micro spaces are intended to guide new research intended to further develop this tradition.

Policy Implications The current overbalance of focus on hotspots to reduce their negative influences on society has created a vacuum of attention to other

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criminogenic profiles such as nonespots, warmspots and coldspots. The dominant trend in creating policies, rules and regulations in response to hotspots needs to be urgently balanced with focused attention on those other criminological locales. In this regard, we advocate an acceleration of efforts to draft the necessary policies, rules and regulations that will incentivize the preservation of nonespots, the stability of coldspots, and concerted efforts to prevent warmspots from developing into hotspots, or even worse.

Programmatic Implications Focusing on how gun-related crimes are differentially concentrated and distributed across sub-national spaces, provides the police and other practitioners with a very useful tool. This includes the ability to use such insights to improve decision-making around the more efficacious allocation and distribution of scarce resources, such as finance, tools and labour, and otherwise. In this regard, focusing on nonespots introduces a revolutionary opportunity for community stakeholders to engage in activities that seem to highlight, exemplify and increase the presence of desirable spaces such as nonespots and coldspots. Such efforts will be consistent with the agenda of peaceology, defined as the science and practice of making peace profitable. A major focus of peaceology is to engage in coordinated efforts aimed at amplifying conditions that explain why social problems are not even worse. Therefore, concentrated and deliberate efforts to recognize, amplify and reproduce nonespots and coldspots in society have potentials for unimaginable positive returns.

Prevention Tips 1. It is absolutely critical for police officers and practitioners to embrace a scientific approach to investigating, understanding, explaining and responding to conditions relevant to gun-related violence and homicides.

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2. It is critical for this scientific approach to be multidisciplinary with careful and deliberate use of multiple methods for gathering, processing and analyzing data. 3. Such multi-method approaches must include a careful and wellorchestrated use of quantitative, cartographic, global positioning, qualitative and other sources of data. 4. Such data must be relied upon as up-to-date indications of a true picture reflecting realities associated with the problems of concern. 5. By disaggregating official statistics to provide accurate portrayals of settlements, there are great potentials to preserve the good reputations of such spaces and minimize erroneous negative stereotypes about them. 6. The problems of concern must be approached in ways that accurately, ethically and efficaciously make the best use of the best resources. 7. In this moment of history, it appears that approaches such as community policing, problem-oriented policing, situational crime analysis and a host of other seemingly promising strategies seem to have become obsolete. Events such as police brutality reflected in the killing of George Floyd have provided clear evidence that whatever has been able to be accomplished with current police strategies, is not sufficient to meet the existing demands for safer community outcomes that involve the police. Such ongoing episodes of police brutality serve as urgent calls to revolutionize criminal justice responses to problems associated with gun crime and homicides. We therefore propose what we refer to as community peaceology, as a paradigm upgrade to move our society away from the abyss of chasing after problems of crime and focus on building the profits of peace.

Conclusion This chapter has identified a critical gap in current sociological and criminological literature where focus has almost exclusively been placed on explaining crime-related dynamics by analyzing processes within and across micro and macro spaces with high, and low, rates. In current literature, no significant evidence exists with intentional focus being placed on

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locations identified as midrange level problem areas. Thus, in this Global South study, we have chosen Dominica as the research site because it ranks midrange with problems of crime and violence that include gunrelated incidents and homicides. We have begun herein a new tradition in research that purposefully focuses on locales observed as midrange problem areas. Although our chapter focuses on gun-related violence and homicides in a Caribbean and Global South nation, this social promise and peaceology approach to research has implications for future research on other subjects of inquiry, and in other settings. Relying on principles of peaceology developed in previous works by our lead author (St. Jean, 2020a, 2020b), we adopt the theoretical and methodological protocols of social promise and peaceology. In doing so, we asked the question of why gun-related violence and homicides are not even worse in Dominica. Driven by this question, we employed a multimethods approach to data gathering and analyses. While this question had driven our inquiry, completely answering it is outside of the scope of this chapter, and is instead the subject of a larger study that we initiated as a result of the call for chapters for this edited volume. Thus, the scope of this chapter is limited to outlining conceptual and methodological justifications for beginning a research tradition intentionally focused on midrange problem areas, and reporting on initial findings from the inaugural research site of this new tradition (Dominica). Our findings indicated that for the years of 2016–2019, a total of 352 gun-related offenses were reported in Dominica, with homicides accounting for 2% of that amount. Among the 164 settlements in Dominica, 128 (78%) were identified as nonespots with no incidents reported. Among the 36 settlements with the reported crimes of concern, the city of Roseau alone recorded 89 (25%) of the incidents. Using established protocols of spatial crime analyses, official crime statistics were analyzed and resulting criminogenic profiles of super hotspots, hotspots, warmspots, coldspots were illustrated, with nonespots being introduced for the first time in literature. Maps generated to depict spatial representations of those criminogenic profiles show intriguing patterns of juxtaposition where low crime locales are sometimes nested in close proximity to spaces with other criminogenic profiles, and sometimes clustered among themselves. The data were also analyzed on the more macro

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community level of 10 parishes in Dominica. Results showed that four parishes were coldspots, four were warmspots, and one each as a hotspot, and super hotspot. We outlined theoretical, methodological, policy and programmatic implications for the finds, and proposed seven prevention tips.

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St. Bernard, G. (2009). Firearms and reported criminal homicide in Trinidad and Tobago: A socio-demographic perspective. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Public Safety, 14 (1–2), 81–109. St. Jean, P. K. B. (2006). Lessons from Grand Bay: Prospects for maintaining low crime in Dominica, nature island of the Caribbean. Pond Casse Press. St. Jean, P. K. B. (2007). Pockets of crime: Broken windows, collective efficacy, and the criminal point of view. University of Chicago Press. St. Jean, P. K. B. (2020a). Making peace profitable: Introducing peaceology as the cultural and identity building blocks of a new peaceful world industry, beginning in Chicago. In Sean Byrne, Thomas Matok, Imani Michelle Scott, & Jessica Senehi (Eds.), Routledge companion to peace and conflict studies (pp. 280–290). Taylor & Francis. St. Jean, P. K. B. (2020b). Whose victory: Introducing the conceptual framework of ideal victory as a paradigm shift moving away from politics and violence, and toward politics and peace, in the Caribbean Region and beyond. In W. C. Wallace (Ed.), Caribbean perspectives on criminology and criminal justice (Vol. II, pp. 103-129). Westphalia Press. Sutton, H., & Alvarez, L. (2017). Guns—The tools of violence. In Restoring paradise in the Caribbean combatting violence with numbers (pp. 125–140). Inter-American Development Bank. https://publications.iadb.org/en/restor ing-paradise-caribbean-combatting-violence-numbers. United Nations Development Programme. (2012). Caribbean human development report 2012: Human development and shift to better citizen security. United Nations Development Programme. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank. (2007, March). Crime, violence, and development: Trends, costs, and policy options in the Caribbean (37820). https://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Cr_and_Vio_Car_E.pdf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2019). GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE: Understanding homicide: Typologies, demographic factors, mechanisms and contributors. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/gsh/Booklet_3.pdf.

5 The Prevalence of Guns and Gun-Related Homicides in the Caribbean Lorna E. Grant

Introduction Amnesty International (2016) has long acknowledged gun-related violence worldwide as a human rights concern affecting individual lives. To this organization, the easy accessibility of firearms (legal and illegal) is one of the motivating forces of gun violence (Amnesty International, 2016). According to The Small Arms Survey, globally there were 1.4 million firearm-related deaths between 2012 and 2015 (Small Arms Survey, 2017). The Global Study on Homicide, United Nation Office on Drug and Crime (2019), further recognized Latin America and the Caribbean as accounting for a third of the world’s homicides, although it is under 10% of the world’s population. For the Global Study on Homicide, United Nation Office on Drug and Crime (2019), in geographic L. E. Grant (B) North Carolina Central University, Durham, NC, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_5

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areas where homicide rates surpass ten per 100,000 in the population, these areas are considered areas of ‘violence epidemics’. The problem of gun violence and gun-related violence in the Caribbean Region is a complex problem that hinders the development of the region socially, politically and economically. Although guns and gun-related homicide are not distinctive to the Caribbean, gun-related homicide has negatively impacted the region and has posed severe challenges for these developing countries. Diamond (1999) and Hillman and D’Agostino (2003), noted that the Caribbean has a complicated history, which was often plagued with violence during its colonialization. Renowned researcher Agozino (2004) argued that the residue of the colonial past still exists in the region and this is evident in the number of massacres, oppression, cruelty and brutality that the region still experiences. The pre-colonial period era in the Caribbean was characterized as a time of relative calm and violence-free. Gun violence and homicide were not characteristics of the region. Inhabitants such as the Paleo-Indians (5000–2000 BCE), the Meso-Indians (also known as the Ciboney) (1000–500 BCE) and the Neo-Indians—the Taino (300 BCE) focused on farming, hunting, pottery and tool-making which was embedded in their culture. For these early inhabitants, stone technology was evident, their primary tools were made out of stones; guns and dangerous weapons were non-existent. It was colonization, that introduced significant volumes of violence to the largely tranquil New World.

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A Brief History of the Caribbean The Caribbean comprises three main island chains, namely the Lesser and Greater Antilles, and the Bahamas. The Lesser Antilles starts with Trinidad in the south and ending at the three U.S. Virgin Islands in the north. Cuba, Hispaniola (the Dominican Republic and Haiti) Jamaica and Puerto Rico are included in The Greater Antilles. While the lowlying Bahamian islands are found to the north of Cuba and Hispaniola. Furthermore, the eastern coasts of some South American countries— Venezuela, Guyana, Belize, and Surinam are recognized as a part of the Caribbean region. Similar to other tropical islands, the Caribbean Islands were occupied by the Europeans for more than 500 years. Before the arrival of the Europeans, the Amerindians (the Ciboney (Guanahuatebey), Taino (Arawak) and the Caribs, occupied the territory. After the arrival of Europeans, then came the African, and Asiatic descent. The Caribbean has approximately 7,000 islands, consisting of 1.063 million square miles. There are 100 permanently inhabited islands and 50 major vegetated cays. The distances between Caribbean islands vary, but none is more than 200 km from its neighbour except for Bermuda. Trinidad and Cuba are known to be the oldest islands in the modern Caribbean (World History, 2017).

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Of importance, the Caribbean is known for its diversity, richer history, culture and tradition. Given the history of the Caribbean region with its diversity, it is obvious there is an eclectic mixture of the old and the new.

Gun Violence and Gun-Related Violence Post Colonization The colonization of the islands by the Spaniards (1492), English (1623), Dutch (1634) and French (1635), brought along varying degrees of violence the effects of which continues. Violence was initially used by these colonizers to enforce power, and sustain it, over countries in the Caribbean region. Starting with Christopher Columbus, an Italian representing Spain, he and his men unleashed violence on the Caribbean resulting in the partial extinction of natives in the early 1500s. Noted by Dr. Louis Balizet a retired Pueblo oncologist (1492) ‘ Columbus brought slavery, torture, and rape to every part of the “New World”’ (The Pueblo Chieftain, 2020, p. 1). After the Spaniards, other European nations established their presence in the Caribbean region. The Dutch, French and the British established a long-term presence using slaves imported from Africa as their main enterprise. Europeans establishing their presence in the Caribbean was not violence-free. Ammunitions were used to commandeer islanders, kidnap residents and instill fear to attain submission. By underlining this aspect of the colonial enterprise, the relationship of violence as a cultural norm, and the extent to which it impedes the development of the region is a testimony to the presence of guns, gun-related violence and homicide. The advent of United States intervention in 1898 after the Spanish of American War was another significant era in the life of the Caribbean. This was evident in the decolonization and departure of the European powers. The Caribbean experienced a trajectory of guns and gun-related violence over time, however, at critical points, it was more evident. For example, during the Post-Cold War period, from 1945 to 1989 (Deosaran, 2004). Another important juncture was the period when the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was active in the

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region in the late 1970s to early 1980s. Researchers argue that geopolitics played a role in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s introducing high-powered rifles to the region which already had pockets of violence, and this led to an increase in guns and covert activities in the region (Halliday, 1983). In 2016, statistics from the Gun Deaths by Country 2020, analysis, it was emphasized that 250,000 individuals worldwide died resulting from firearms. 64% were gun homicides, 27% gun suicide and 9% by unintentional injuries with a firearm. Moreover, approximately nine out of ten persons murdered are from gun violence, were essentially men, ages 20 to 24 years of age (World Population Review, 2020). In the twentieth and early twenty-first century, guns played and are still playing a brutal and deadly role in some Caribbean islands, although, deaths linked to guns were not exceptional. For example, Jamaica with a population of approximately 2,961,167, at mid-year 2020 (United Nation data), was among the 10 highest countries which had a 30.72 percentage firearm death rate, and 47.1- 26,49 homicide rate per 100,00 population. Trinidad and Tobago with a population of 1,403,375, experienced a 30.88 homicide rate, however, 80% of homicide involved firearms. While Saint Kitts and Nevis experienced a homicide rate of 34.23% and death by firearms accounted for 29% in a population of 53,544 residents (GunPolicy.org, 2020). The influx of guns and ammunition in the region gave rise to their use at specific points in time, for example, during national elections, where opposing parties campaign against each other to be the government of the country. Gun violence was used to control voting behaviour. In exchange, those managing the elections could obtain favours for their region, if their candidate was elected. This behaviour was more popular and prominent on some islands, but over time, politicians became less reliant on guns and ‘strong-arm’ men to help in winning elections, because ‘strong-arm men’ turned their focus on illegal drugs and drug trade. Nonetheless, the trafficking of illegal drugs, fueled the introduction of more guns, although some islands already had challenges with illegal guns. Guns took prominence as tools for safeguarding the evolving illicit drug industry. For example, as reported by The Gleaner (February 12,

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2020), Jamaica’s law enforcement authorities were experiencing challenges, in apprehending, and prosecuting, individuals involved in the guns-for-drugs trade. While Jamaica experienced a thriving business of illegal drugs in exchange for guns from neighbouring islands such as Haiti (Robbins, 2020). One news headline was: ‘Criminal gangs in Jamaica and Haiti are engaged in a deadly trade: the exchange of marijuana for guns’. The New York Times (August 2019), reported that annually more than 100,000 residents are killed across Latin America and the Caribbean with a majority by firearms. Another new outlet had as their headline: Haiti and Jamaica’s deadly trade (BBC News, Kingston, Saturday, 25 October 2008). The SKIN Vibes on Sunday 9 May 2010, asserted that a significant quantity of guns recovered in the Caribbean islands, such as Jamaica, and St. Kitts and Nevis have their origin in the United States of America. Once in these two locations, they find their way to different islands. The International Development Bank 2017 Report identified the Caribbean as having the highest average homicide rate at 15.1 per 100,000 population when compared to, Central America and South America, at 25.9 and 24.2 per 100,000 population, respectively. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were labeled as having the highest homicide rates between 2000 to 2010 among numerous Caribbean countries. For Jamaica, there was an average of 1,349 homicides annually (50.3 per 100,000 inhabitants) and Trinidad and Tobago 328 (25.1 per 100,000 inhabitants). In 2012, in Saint Kitts and Nevis, the homicide rate was 33.6 per 100,000 citizens, the seventh-highest during the period from 2005 to 2014, and the eighth-highest in the world (Global Study on Homicide, United Nation Office on Drug and Crime (2019).

Perpetrators of Homicide Perpetrators of homicide are more likely to be men than women. Women are more likely to be victims and this is especially true in the countries with the highest homicide rates, For example, in Latin America and the Caribbean. (Global Study on Homicide, United Nation Office on Drug and Crime (2019). The following section will offer a detailed explanation

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for gun and gun-related homicide in three specific Caribbean Islands— Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Saint Kitts and Nevis.

Homicide in Context Homicide is a multidimensional trend that origins from a combination of socio-economic, demographic and institutional factors. Using the conflict theory perspective, which focuses on the inequitable distribution of wealth, capitalism, and the separation of the ‘haves’ from the ‘have-nots’, it can be argued that these indicators will lead to interruption among citizenry both at the global and the regional level. (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017, 2019). Where there are patterns of financial disparity, joblessness and unequal development, there will be a widened gap between ‘haves’ from the ‘have-nots’. The ‘have-nots’ when confronted with rising levels of employment, poverty, in addition to other factors, such as the lack of social services and limited prospects to earn a living wage. Situations like these will lead to increase levels of crime, including homicide rates.

Jamaica Guns, gun-related violence and homicides in Jamaica have their geneses in the formation of small gangs, hostile criminals and exploitation by political parties which used fortified clusters devoted to one of the two major parties—the Jamaica Labour Party and the People’s National Party to attack each other for governance. There were also generational community disputes which allow neighbours to be enemies with each other due to different political ideologies. This trend continues into the twenty-first century. Currently, guns are still used to defend individuals, and commit illegal activities, so adding to the high rate of homicides. Despite Jamaica, being one of the first countries in the Caribbean Region to create a Gun Court in 1974, immense firepower still exists in the hands of criminals. The Gun Court was conceived to have swift trials and

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dispense harsh punishment on criminals, however, amidst that ideology, citizens are still being victimized at the hands of criminals. With 1,301 homicides in the year 2000, Jamaica was identified as having a homicide rate of 46.5 per 100,00 people in Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by Venezuela with 45.6. per 100,00 population. Sixteen years later, The GunPolicy Organization cited statistics from Jamaica’s Ministry of National Security that highlighted Jamaica as having experienced a loss of 1,352, lives in 2016, from a population of 2,950,210, (Jamaica Historical Population Data, 2016) through the use of firearms. Of this figure (1,352), eleven hundred were due to gun homicides, and sixty-two due to gun suicides. There were 1,647 gunrelated homicides in 2017 when shootings across the island increased. In the year 2018, the homicide rate was 47/100,000 residents, and 2019 saw an increase of 3.4% (Jamaica Gleaner, January 31, 2021). Due to the crucial role firearms play in Jamaica’s murder rate, authorities had to keep track of the nation’s 30 deadliest guns as per category, based on their ballistic matches (The New York Times, August 2019). These guns were categorized by names, such as Ghost or Ambrogio, etc. Annually, male homicides exceed females in Jamaica. In 2016, male homicide victims accounted for 1,215, (87.25%) while females were 137 (9.64%) (Global Study on Homicide, United Nation Office on Drug and Crime, 2019). Researchers from The Igarape Institute (2017) maintained that nearly 50% of the total all homicides globally are committed with firearms, with, Latin America and the Caribbean accounting for 66%. Furthermore, approximately 33% of the world’s homicides occur in Latin America and the Caribbean. Worldwide 80% of these victims are male, and of the 80%, 85% resided in Latin America and the Caribbean (The Igarape Institute, 2017). These researchers further contended that some of the guns used in most of these homicides originate in the United States and are illegally imported to the island due to Americas’ gun laws which are considered inconsistent, and make it difficult to pursue firearms, and disrupt the smuggling networks. Although there is continued discussion on gun policy in the United States, the lack of United States gun control contributes to the number of Jamaicans who have lost their lives annually in Jamaica, at a rate

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higher than the global average (The New York Times, August 2019). This easy access to guns has contributed to serial killers and serial killing for different reasons. Chief among the reasons for killing, as reported in the most recent newspapers are attributed to the multimillion-dollar scamming industry, gang warfare, and acts of retaliation (to settle disputes), and reprisal killings (The New York Times, August 2019). Although the 2010 Peace Management Initiative, which was aimed at stopping violence in Jamaica’s most treacherous communities, gun violence continues (The New York Times, August 2019). Another consideration for gun violence and gun-related homicide is an individual’s psychological state of mind. Behavioral scientists argued that homicide is a disease and as with all other social experiences, there are some clear links to homicidal behaviour. As noted by Currie and Tekin (2006), child abuse magnifies the prospect that individuals participate in several forms of crime (NBER Working Paper No. 12171 No. 1, January 2007). Furthermore, it is argued that persons who are physically abused or brutalized by parents are more apt to become serial killers. This was attributed to socialization in gun culture. The proximity to guns, increase the possibility of individuals becoming engaged in gun violence (NBER Working Paper No. 12171 No. 1, January 2007).

Gun Violence and Homicides by Police Officers Gun violence is not only committed by criminals, law enforcement is also engaged in this practice as reported by Amnesty International (2016). Research coming from this human rights organization mentioned the possibility of state-sponsored killings in Jamaica. Further, according to The Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) as cited in the Jamaica Observer (Thursday, August 15, 2019) and Amnesty International (2016), two police watchdog bodies, it has been alleged, that 3,000 citizens have been killed by representatives of the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF). According to INDECOM, in April 2019, 21 Law Enforcement officers were convicted, three for murder and three for manslaughter, while 49 police officers were awaiting trial for murder or

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manslaughter as of October 2019 (Jamaica Observer, Thursday, August 15, 2019). With the creation of INDECOM, in 2010, a decrease in police killings was evident. In 2014, 101 individuals were killed by police officers compared to 210 in 2011, and 258 in 2013. The Guardian News Paper (November 24, 2016). The annual increase in guns and gun-related violence added new challenges to law enforcement officials, politicians and citizens. Many citizens perceived the policies and programmes, formulated to eliminate violence were ineffective and called for new legislation due to the influx of illegal guns entering the country. For example, in 2017, at a Miami, Florida airport, the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBT) and the Outbound Enforcement Team (OET) intercepted more than 100 guns, plus more than 200 assorted rounds of ammunition destined for Jamaica (The Gleaner, Friday, May 4, 2018).

State of Emergency It is estimated that Jamaica’s population of nearly 3 million, civilians had 246,000 legal and illegal firearms in 2017 (GunPolicy.Org). Amid a rise in violent crime, gang activities and 335 homicides in 2017, the government in 2018, had to declare a State of Emergency in specific sections of the island, to stop the bloodshed in hot spots, and to help in curving the number of gun homicides. During the State of Emergency, there are curfews and police checkpoints in the most volatile areas. In the parishes of St. James Parish and St Catherine, the military was deployed into the streets to ensure the public safety of residents given the surge of homicide related to online scamming by unidentified Jamaicans (Jamaica Gleaner, January 20, 2018).

Gun Legislation in Jamaica Before Jamaica’s independence in 1962, its homicide rate was one of the lowest worldwide with 3.9 per 100,000 populations (Weingarten,

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2015). However, after independence, through the years, the rate fluctuated. After gaining independence from Britain, two pollical parties were formed in Jamaica: The Peoples National Party and the Jamaica Labour Party, and the first election was held on February 21, 1967, to select the first Prime Minister. During the political campaign, guns replaced bottles and stones in political conflicts between both parties, and zones of political exclusion were introduced, as noted by Martin Henry (The Gleaner, November 20, 2011). Fifty years late gun-related homicide is 46.5 per 100.000 residents, with 1,3001 killings according to official data published by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (InSight Crime, 2020), when compared to the pre-independence rate of 3.9 per 100,000 populations (InSight Crime, January 2021). With the increase in the number of gun violence, the government had to enact legislation in response to the noticeably rising crime rate. New legislation was enacted to provide security for citizens. First among the legislation was the 1967 Firearm Act, followed by the Suppression of Crime Act and the Gun Court Act aimed at expediting, improving and enforcing the Firearm Act, which allowed collaboration for joint operation of the police and the military to protect residents (Rowe, August 25, 1998). In the early 1970s, the government imposed complete gun prohibition. By 1980 notwithstanding the presence of legislation, the rate of gun homicide was among the highest in the world and continued during the 90s and peaked in 2009. Different crime-fighting strategies were also employed. For example, in 2015, a ‘Get the guns’ project was launched to retrieve illegal firearms. In 2018, there was a declaration of a state of emergency (SOEs) and Zones of Special Operations (ZOSOs) for several parishes including the Kingston Metropolitan Area and St. James (Montego Bay). Under the SOE, security forces were deployed to address organized crime, including gang violence related to drug and gun trafficking and lottery scams. The Emergency Powers Act allows the security forces to detain and deport suspicious persons, to enter premises and seize property without a warrant, and declare curfews. SOE and ZOSO remained in effect until January 2020, with a minimal long-term effect on the murder rate (OSAC’s report, June 16, 2020). In March 2018,

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there was a modification of the Firearms Act (Patterson, 2018) with the view of strengthening the act.

Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago, the oil and gas-rich republic, like other Caribbean countries experienced high levels of homicide, with more deaths each year per capita. Elizabeth Solomon in 2017, reported that Trinidad and Tobago similar to some other countries had extraordinarily high levels of homicides according to the annual statistics (NEWSDAY: Tuesday, December 5, 2017). In 2019, the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) crime statistics reported a 4.2% decrease in serious criminal activities compared to 2018. Gun violence in the twin-Islands of Trinidad and Tobago had been at epidemic proportions for several years, and vicious crime continued to be a widespread concern for the police and the public. Trinidad and Tobago, a relatively small population, had seen a steady increase in homicide with the involvement of guns. According to the statistics, there was a consistent increase from 1995 to 2008. Reflecting from the year 2003, there were 147 homicides committed with a gun. In 2004 there were 184, and 277 in 2005. There was a decline from 2008 to 2010, however, there was an increase after 2010. For example, in 2015 there were 420 homicides, 462 in 2016, 495 in 2017, 517 in 2018 and 539 in 2019, according to the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS). Noted by the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS), approximately half of all homicides committed resulted from gunshots. Example of incidents of homicides in Trinidad and Tobago in 2019 and 2020 include: • The killing of an alleged drug dealer, his wife and two of his bodyguards in July (Trinidad and Tobago News, July 25, 2019). • The murder of 30-year-old Curtly ‘Conehead’ Calder in St James (Stabroek News, September 29, 2019). • The shooting of police officer Allen Moseley in Morvant (Global Voice, June 30, 2020).

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• The killing of a prison officer after only one month on the job. (Trinidad and Tobago News October 5, 2020). Notwithstanding the confiscation of 888 firearms in 2019, murder by firearm accounts for 80% of lives lost. In the year 2019, the islands had the second-highest number of homicides in the country’s history. In 2020, Trinidad and Tobago had the fourth-highest homicide rate in Latin America and the Caribbean with 28.2 per 100,00 residents. According to InSight Crime’s, 2020 Homicide Round-Up, Jamaica was first with a homicide rate at 46.5 per 100,000 people, Venezuela second with 45.6 and then Honduras with 37.6. Although Trinidad and Tobago with 1.4 million people, it’s industrialized, and economic stability, plus its oil and natural gas sectors, the prevalence of poverty is high. When poverty is high in any country crime will likely be at an alarming rate. Faced with the inflow of illegal drugs and related transactional crimes, under-employment added to the violence in the islands. Similar to several other Caribbean countries, the demand for firearms in Trinidad and Tobago was fuel by drug trafficking and gang-related activities. Economist Elizabeth Solomon argued that when a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is high, there should be a relatively stable economic growth and development, and a lower crime rate. The opposite is true in the case of Trinidad and Tobago. The homicide rates were far above average given the GDP per capita. This leads to the question, what explains the high rates of violence in the Twin-Islands? Rational choice theory in offering a response states, when prospective criminals evaluate the benefits and costs of committing crimes they will choose accordingly. Individuals who continue their criminal lifestyles, after evaluating their choices, can argue that crime pays. These individuals carry on their criminal businesses to procure profits, to support their activities, fellow criminals and families. Therefore, despite the acquisition of illegal funds, hardship still exists in criminals’ environments and is intensified by societal exclusion. When this is evident more violence is experienced, more so gun-related violence. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in June 2016, identified gang-related violence as the widespread motive for the 1,445 homicide or 27.5% of all homicides, and drug-related murders (9.6%) in

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Trinidad and Tobago between 1995 to 2013. In explaining the reasons, the government attributed the increase in gangs and drug-related activities to areas such as the Northern Division of Trinidad (Arima and Tunapuna), for registering the highest number of murders. Followed by The Port of Spain Division (Laventille and Beetham Gardens), and the Western and North-Eastern divisions. Other authorities blamed the violence on the smuggling of drugs and weapons from the South American mainland. The local media in commenting on the state of gunrelated homicides remarked that gang-related killings had occurred even in public during the day. Maguire et al. (2008) revealed that a larger percentage of homicides in high-crime areas happened on the streets of Trinidad and Tobago. Cook et al. (2005) and Maguire et al. (2008), argued that the acquisition of illegal guns in Trinidad and Tobago were not supplied by legal dealers. They were obtained by stealing, purchasing, borrowing and renting from underground sources, through peer and social networks. Neither were the procurement of these illegal firearms limited to adults, youths also had access to them. Data from Trinidad and Tobago Youth Survey (TTYS) pointed to the risk factors that contributed to the involvement of youth in gangs. These included involvement in delinquent behaviours, involvement in drug sales and youths linked to illegal gun markets, through peer and social networks. However, there was no indication that large numbers of firearms were available to them (Maguire et al., 2008). The Strategic Services Agency (SSA) of Trinidad and Tobago statistics in 2016 disclosed that they were aware of 8,154 illegal firearms in Trinidad and Tobago which was just a fraction of illegal guns on the islands, with a majority of them coming from North and South America, and Europe. Research underscored the United States as one of the major sources of illegal firearm, resulting from the number of stolen guns, gun laws and lack of control. Annually millions of guns are stolen in the United States of America, which eventually reach the Caribbean through illegal sales and gun shows. Approximately 1,000 of these illegal weapons, came in through the legal ports of entry. However, other points of entry for illegal weapons are along the shoreline by pirogues and fast boats. Undoubtedly, the number of illegal firearms and 2,000 criminal gangs

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operating in Trinidad and Tobago gave rise to the call for new legislation to help in fighting crime and violence on the islands.

Gun Legislation in Trinidad and Tobago Guns in Trinidad and Tobago are regulated by the Commissioner of Police and the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS). Trinidad and Tobago’s Firearm Regulation Act 55, Regulation 56 and Regulation 57 were amended in 2008 and 2019. But, although the amendment of these regulations, Clarence Toussaint maintained that the island had strong gun laws, however, there was the need for a responsive police force, and a supportive community to reduce crime. Clarence Toussaint at that time thought it was important to have a pragmatic approach for the implementation of existing laws, to make communities safer (News, August 11, 2008). According to Trinidad and Tobago Strategic Services Agency( SSA) in 2016, 16,308 rounds of ammunition were retrieved, and 988 illegal guns were taken off the streets, while in 2017, 1,064 illegal firearms and 18,000 rounds of ammunition were confiscated by the TTPS. In the year 2018, 124 guns were recovered according to SSA (SSA, 2016). It was reported to the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament Joint Select Committee on National Security in 2019, that 1,000 illegal firearms were seized annually, criminals were changing their Modus of Operandi, and ammunition contributed to the high rate of violence on the islands. Additional reports stated that highly sophisticated military-type rifles were used as handguns, as supported by the number of high-powered guns confiscated on a raid in Cunupia in November 2018 (The Guardian, February, Wednesday 2019). Likewise, The Crime and Problem Analysis Branch of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS) in 2019, mentioned the seriousness of the inflow of firearms, and the recommendation was made to block the flow of these firearms through tougher legislation. Additionally, the Strategic Services Agency alerted the public to the financial power of the illegal firearm trade, and its wealth (The Guardian, February, Wednesday 2019). In 2019, the Minister of National Security, Stuart Young proposed new legislation to help in

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fighting violence. The proposed legislation included: a restriction on the time in which offenders could be offered bail, a reorganizing of the sentencing system for individuals convicted for the possession of illegal firearms, and the cancellation of bail to individuals involved in criminal activity while on bail (News.Gov.tt). The Firearms proposed Amendment Bill (Amendment Bill 2019) was passed in 2021. Apart from the Firearms Act, Trinidad and Tobago had an institutional framework for addressing violence and crime. This institutional framework includes numerous state agencies—the Ministry of National Security, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Legal Affairs, Ministry of the Attorney General, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Gender, Youth and Child Development, and Children. These authorities are charged directly or indirectly with the control of crime, violence and delinquency. For example, The Ministry of National Security’s responsibility is to establish an environment to guarantee public safety and security through the preservation of law and order, and the protection of life and property.

Saint Kitts and Nevis Great Britain granted Saint Kitts and Nevis its independence in 1983, at which time, the Twin-Island federation was created. Citizens and their representatives then had the responsibility for governance for both internal and external affairs (National Archives, St Kitts and Nevis, September 19, 1983). The population of Saint Kitts and Nevis is 52,892 per 100,000 per inhabitants, which is 0.00068% of the total world population, according to the latest United Nations estimates. The Twin-Islands are relatively small when compared with other Caribbean territories, but they also have their challenges with crime and gun-related violence. Post-independence the country’s homicide rate was at a low level, however, over time there has been a precipitous rise in homicides as well as other crimes. The United Nations’ Office of Drugs and Crime (2013) identified Saint Kitts and Nevis as having a homicide rate of 33.6 per 100, 000 citizens, which was the eighth (8th) highest in the world (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013, 2019).

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The Twin-Islands were also labelled as having the 7th highest homicide rate between 2005 to 2014 (World Economic Forum, 2016). Furthermore, Basseterre, the capital city with 17 homicides in the city in 2011, had the highest homicide rate of any capital city in the world at 131.6 per 100,000 residents (Mead & Blason, 2014). Gangs and gang-related activities accounted for most of the violence and gun-related homicide. In 2017 and 2018, there were 43 homicides (ISSAT, February 11, 2015). The police, working in collaboration with the Defense Force and the Regional Security System (RSS) confiscated 37 illegal firearms in 2018 (Times Caribbean January 3, 2019). Among all the capital cities, in the Caribbean, St. Kitts and Nevis crime rate as per 100.000 population outpaced the other islands in 2011. With 34 homicides, and 67.6 per 100,000 citizens, St. Kitts and Nevis had one of the top homicides rates in the world (ISSAT, February 11, 2015). In 2012, the islands acknowledged a 27% decline with homicides being 48% of the overall rate. The statistics indicated that homicides, predominantly connected to gang violence, were at their lowest rate in 14 years. This achievement resulted from the increased budgetary allocation in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 to the Ministry of National Security from the islands’ national budget. Prime Minister and Minister of National Security, Timothy Harris, in his December 2020 budget speech acknowledged the overall, reduction of the homicide rate. According to him, this was in part due to 2020, budget allotment of $99.2 million, which was 5% over the 2019 budget (St. Kitts and Nevis Information Service (SKNIS), December 12, 2019). Regardless of the decline in gang violence and gun-related homicides, there were still ongoing concerns about the high-crime rate. These concerns contributed to intensified government efforts in 2021, to implement measures and safeguards to continue the reduction of crime, in particular, homicides. With the continued reduction of crime, the legal system, courts and police in Saint Kitts and Nevis were consequently, considered effective by the citizenry. However, there were further needs for strengthening citizen’s surveillance, and greater collaboration with the police department, and the establishment of a modern penitentiary system (International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), February 11, 2015).

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Gun Legislation Guiding gun control legislation in St. Kitts and Nevis includes the Firearms Act 26, in 2002, the Firearms Regulations 27, and 28, and the Domestic Violence Act 29 of 2011. The Firearm Regulation Authority in St. Kitts and Nevis are regulated by the Minister of National Security, the Chief of Police and the Comptroller of Customs 17 and 28 Act. In 2017, St. Kitts and Nevis passed the Firearms Amendment Bill 2017 (St Kitts and Nevis News, June 15, 2017). The old Firearm Act which was enacted in 2002, was the guide on firearms issues until it was amended in 2017. This enactment of this new legislation contributed to the reduction in crime, due to the new crime strategies that were included in the act. With the new strategies, it became evident that budget allocations were not the solution to homicides in St. Kitts and Nevis. More targeted efforts seemed more promising. For example, the Alternative Lifestyle Pathway Project, funded by the Government through the Development Bank of St. Kitts and Nevis offered financial and technical assistance to problematic youths and youths considered to be At-Risk. In addition, there were additional social intervention programmes (St Kitts and Nevis News, June 15, 2017).

Strategies for Gun Violence and Gun-Related Homicide Violence by firearm is a criminal act, and a serious public health problem in the Caribbean, that impacts, citizens, the health sector and the safety of the region. With the increasing crime rate in some Caribbean islands, it is obvious there are important gaps in the knowledge of the problem and ways to prevent it. In addressing these gaps it is important to find preventative strategies to keep individuals, families and society safe from gun violence, and gun-related homicide. To accomplish this the following strategies are proposed.

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1. To increase resilience and systemically reduce risks of individuals, families and communities who are at risk of violence. To accomplish this, numerous agencies such as law enforcement, public health, non-governmental and social services should be involved. A comprehensive approach will be necessary to focus on the seriousness of the problem. For example, the public health sector must recognize gun violence as a critical and preventable public health problem. This sector should expand access to high-quality care, social, emotional and mental health support. In addition, every effort should be made to address the impact of trauma on victims and families. 2. Law enforcement agencies should assist in establishing a culture of gun safety. This can be done through the establishment and implementation of community policing, for islands without a community policing programme. With the formation of a community policing programme, law enforcement officers can help in educating residents in the local communities on the importance of gun safety, the importance of resolving personal issues with the use of a firearm, whether they are legally or not. 3. Law enforcement should establish accountability for sworn officers and private security. Law enforcement organizations/agencies should ensure that the police and security agencies examine who is most often to be victims or harmed as a result of their actions. Having this information, these agencies should develop effective approaches to reduce the harm of those who are most vulnerable. This strategy must also include residence with mental illnesses, and those who are disadvantaged. There should also be problem-oriented policing, in which police diagnose and solve problems that are increasing crime risks, in areas that have high levels of crime. Likewise, non-governmental agencies should off services as per their agency mandate in assisting victims and their families, for example, counseling service. 4. The support for research on gun violence, and gun-related homicide in the Caribbean. The government of each Caribbean should ensure more grants opportunities and funding are made available to researchers in the region. This would add new knowledge to the literature on the prevention of gun violence. Furthermore, universities in the region should encourage faculty and students to participate in

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research aimed at finding solutions to the gun problems confronting the different islands. Revisiting of gun legislation. If there is a need to enact more practical gun legislation, the government of each island should introduce amendments to existing legislation. The reduction of easy access to guns by, stricter licensing procedures, and banning of specific guns. The gun licensing authorities should insist on mandatory training before permission is granted to individuals who have applied for a license. The collaboration of Caribbean region governments in curtailing the easy flow of guns and ammunition coming from other countries to the Caribbean, as well as guns coming from other islands. This could be done through an agreement between all Head of States in the Caribbean. The reduction of gun access to youth and individuals who are at risk of harming themselves or others. Specific policies should be enacted to prevent the access of guns to youths and individuals who are at risk of harming themselves or others. For example, individuals who are mentally retarded and youths under a specific age. The investment in technology. Throughout the Caribbean, Government should invest in new and modern technology which would help in detecting guns and ammunition. This would further assist in the discovery of illegal guns coming into the different islands or transported between islands.

Conclusion and Recommendations The Caribbean Region has been plagued with guns, gun-related violence and homicides since their colonization, although successive governments have used different initiatives and strategies to tackle the issue. Despite all the efforts, some islands’ homicide rate has shown no sign of decline, while for other islands there is fluctuation. Although the different islands have enacted firearms legislation, increased the allocation of financial resources, have implemented new strategies for their programs and projects, the crime rate continues on an upward path annually. There is

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very little fluctuation in the crime rate in the Caribbean islands, therefore some policy recommendations will be made in an attempt to resolve the problem of violent crime and gun-related homicides. First, to adequately tackle the underlining cause of violence, Caribbean Governments must analyze the root causes of violence and review its response. Second, programmes targeting social and economic development and changing the culture of violence in vulnerable communities must be evaluated or reevaluated, to ensure they are effectively benefiting the atrisk population so yielding positive results over time. Third, the effective curtailing of the flow of illegal guns from other countries, and between islands. Fourth, the enforcement of existing legislation, and the enactment of new legislation. This strategy should further reduce the annual gun-related violence throughout the region. Firth, more resources must be provided to disrupt the inflow of illegal guns and the thriving gun markets and to keep guns out of the hands of criminals. This would be a solution-oriented public safety approach. Sixth, the building of good community relationships with citizens. This is essential in reporting illegal activities in the communities by residents, which in turn reducing gun-related violence. Seventh, the strengthening of law enforcement units and intelligence gathering. Effective and efficient gathering and recording of criminal activities can all assist in solving crime. Eight, training and retraining should be an ongoing activity at all levels in the police department, to assist in capacity building, in addition to policy implementation. Furthermore, the Caribbean coastlines need to be more secured and rigidly supervised, and ports of entry must enhance surveillance. If this is done, the number of illegal firearms and ammunition would be drastically reduced. Likewise stronger firearm legislation in some islands would avoid the detour of legal guns to the illegal market. Legal firearm owners must be held more accountable for their firearm/s and more scrutiny of individuals applying for ammunition licenses. There should be harsher fines for individuals who have lost their firearms under suspicious circumstances while not discouraging good faith reporting of loss. Overall, social issues related to poverty and macro-political processes, that keep these issues and challenges ongoing, must be addressed as a

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long-term solution to Caribbean gun violence. Furthermore, confronting remnants of the colonial violent pass is also necessary to re-shape the islands’ sub-cultures, and to eliminate violence as a response to distress and conflict. More immediately training, resources and international cooperation are necessary to stop guns from reaching the islands and to confiscate as many illicit guns as possible that are in circulation. Only with these changes and the ongoing political determination of the different Caribbean Governments, will Caribbean gun violence and crimes diminish satisfactorily.

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Jamaica Observer. (2019, August 15 Thursday). Jamaica: Six police officers charged over the killing of Matthew Lee Six cops charged with murder of three men in 2013. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/article/20190815/ ARTICLE/190819891 Maguire, E.R., King, W., Johnson, D., & Katz, C. (2008). Why homicide clearance rates decrease: Evidence from the Caribbean. Unpublished Study. George Mason University. Mead, V. N., & Blason, J. (2014). The 10 World Cities with the Highest Murder Rate-Picture. Retrieved 25 October 2019 from https://www.theguardian. com/cities/gallery/2014/... National Archives, St Kitts and Nevis. (1983, September 19). Independence 19 September 1983. https://www.historicstkitts.kn/events/independence National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). (2007, January 1). Does Child Abuse Cause Crime? (NBER Working Paper No. (12171)). News.Gov.tt: Minister of National Society proposes illegal firearm legislation. http://news.gov.tt/content/minister-national-security-proposes-illegalfirearm-legislation#.YBM7K3OSk2w News.Gov.tt. (2008, August 11). Crime in T&T, General T&T, No New Firearms Laws Needed . http://www.trinidadandtobagonews.com/blog/? p=574 OSAC’s report. (2020, June 16). Jamaica 2020 Crime & Safety Report. OSAC. https://www.osac.gov/Content/Report/d4b8403a-3feb-427b-bd3618f1af0b746a Patterson, C. (2018, 21 March). Firearms Act to be Amended to Address Illegal Dealing and Possession. Jis.gov.jm. Retrieved 25 August 2019 from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20180121/mob ays-grim-reality-lotto-scam-s Robbins, S. (2020, June 23). Jamaica and Haiti Swap Drugs and Guns. InSight Crime.https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/jamaica-haiti-drugs-guns/ Rowe, D. P. (1998, August 25). Trial by Jury – Right of Privilege. https:// web.archive.org/web/20081119065906/http://www.constitution-and-rights. com/support-files/trial-by-jury-1.pdf#search= Small Arms Survey. (2017). Global violent deaths 2017: Time to decide. SASReport-GVD2017.pdf. smallarmssurvey.org. St Kitts and Nevis News. (2017, June 15). St Kitts and Nevis government pass amended firearms law. https://wicnews.com/caribbean/st-kitts-and-nevis-gov ernment-pass-amended-firearms-law-10333017/ St Kitts and Nevis Vives. (2010, May 9). Us Combat Illegal Firearms in St Kitts and Nevis. https://www.sknvibes.com/news/newsdetails.cfm/19062

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St Kitts and Nevis Information Service (SKNIS). (2019, December 12). Homicide in St Kitts and Nevis drop by 48 percent in 2019 amid overall reduction in crime. https://www.stabroeknews.com/2019/09/29/news/regional/tri nidad/trinidad-tobago-records-400-murders-so-far-for-2019/ Stabroek News. (2019, September 29). Triple Homicide in South Trinidad. Trinidad & Tobago record 400 murders so far for 2019. Stabroek News. The Gleaner. (2011, November 20). Facts on 1980 murders. https://jamaicagleaner.com/gleaner/20111123/letters/letters7.html The Gleaner. (2018, January 20). MoBay’s Grim Reality—From ‘Lotto Scam’ to state of emergency. http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/201 80121/mobays-grim-reality-lotto-scam-state-emergency The Gleaner. (2018, May 4 Friday). Jamaica’s gun violence crisis. http://jam aica-gleaner.com/article/commentary/20180505/editorial-jamaicas-gun-vio lence-crisis The Gleaner. (2020, February 12). Impunity in Guns-For-Drug trade. http:// jamaica-gleaner.com/article/commentary/20200212/editorial-impunityguns-drug-trade The Gleaner. (2021, January 31). Jamaica Tops Homicides in Latin and Caribbean. http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20210131/ jamaica-tops-homicides-latin-america-and-caribbean The Guardian News Paper. (2016, November 24). Jamaica police commit ‘hundreds of unlawful killings’ yearly, Amnesty says. www.kolumnmagazine.com/2016/11/24/jamaica-police-commit-hundredsunlawful… The New York Times. (2019, August). How America Gun Laws are Fueling Jamaica Homicide Crisis. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/25/world/ americas/one-handgun-9-murders-how-american-firearms-cause-carnage-abr oad.html The Pueblo Chieftain. (2020). Was Columbus really that bad? No, he was worse. https://www.chieftain.com/story/opinion/editorials/2020/07/07/wascolumbus-really-that-bad-no-he-was-worse/42256475/ Times Caribbean. (2019, January 3). Gun homicides down by 27% in St Kitts and Nevis. Times Caribbean Online. http://www.timescaribbeanonline.com/ gun-homicides-down-by-27-in-st-kitts-nevis/ Trinidad and Tobago Guardian. (2019, February, Wednesday). Criminals switching to military weapons—Senior cop. https://www.guardian.co.tt/news/ criminals-switching-to-military-weapons-senior-cop-6.2.785090.77072e e53d

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Trinidad and Tobago Newsday. (2017, December 5). War, Conflict and Gun Violence. https://newsday.co.tt/2017/12/05/war-conflict-and-gun-violence Trinidad and Tobago Newsday. (2020, October 5). Trinidad: Only months on the job, prison officer’ gunned down. https://www.stabroeknews.com/2020/ 10/05/news/regional/trinidad/trinidad-only-months-on-the-job-prison-off icer-gunned-down/#:~:text=Stephon%20Richardson%20(Trinidad%20E xpress)%20A%20prison%20officer%20with,house.%20Richardson%20coll apsed%20and%20died%20at%20the% UNODC. (2019). Global study on homicide 2019. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Vienna: Austria. https://www.unodc.org/documents/ data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf. Weingarten. (2015). Jamaica: Draconian gun laws and murder rates. https:// www.ammoland.com/2015/12/jamaica-draconian-gun-laws-and-murderrates/#axzz6mTStlAtB World Economic Forum. (2016). Terrorism is on the rise—But there’s a bigger threat we’re not talking about. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/ter rorism-is-on-the-rise-but-there-s-a-bigger-threat-we-re-not-talking-about/ World History. (2017). A brief history of the Caribbean Region. https://worldh istory.us/latin-american-history/caribbean-history/a-brief-history-of-the-car ibbean-region.php World Population Review. (2020). Gun deaths by country 2020. worldpopulationreview.com. ZIZ Broadcasting Corporation. https://zizonline.com/homicides-in-st-kittsand-nevis-drop-by-48-percent-in-2019-amid-overall-reduction-in-crime/

6 The Use of Lethal Police Force and Its Consequences for the Mentally Ill and Vulnerable Groups in St. Lucia Perry Stanislas

Introduction This chapter examines how lethal force is used by members of the Royal St. Lucia Police Force (RSLPF) against vulnerable groups and raises questions about the nature of policing in St. Lucia. The chapter explores how lethal force is used by the RSLPF and the historical and contextual factors shaping this. Firstly, it examines the approach to policing in St. Lucia and how it is experienced by vulnerable groups within society. Secondly, the chapter looks at forms of accountability and how they shape the police’s use of force. Thirdly, the chapter examines evidence of how force is used and the social groups, such as suspected Mentally Ill People (MIP), who are vulnerable to police violence. Finally, it outlines the actions taken by the RSLPF to reduce the use of force against the mentally ill. P. Stanislas (B) Canterbury Christ Church University, Canterbury, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_6

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Policing the Caribbean What became the RSLPF was established during the 1800s to regulate former African slaves and enforce colonial law. The central feature of what has been termed the colonial model of policing is an emphasis on order maintenance (Mars, 2002; Mawby, 2008). A distinguishing feature of the colonial police was the arming of the police. The RSLPF like many of its counterparts was expected to operate if required in a military-type capacity in suppressing conflict. For Fanon (1967) many of those from colonized groups who were recruited to the police from other colonized societies were often pathological in their violent orientation (see Thomas, 1989) and bares similarities with many of the early black American police (Dulaney, 1996). While the characteristics of the RSLPF were similar to other police across the region, experience of police violence was not and shaped to a significant degree by specific contextual factors. This can be seen in the higher levels of police violence in the larger islands (Brereton, 2010; Stanislas, 2020; Stanislas, 2017). The increase in crime has seen governments respond by establishing specialist paramilitary-type policing units. In St. Lucia, the Special Service Unit (SSU), was created in 1976, in the context of political instability (Harmsen et al., 2012; Wayne, 2010). The SSU were more paramilitary in their orientation and resourcing, than their colleagues. Harriot (2000) writing about the paramilitarism of the Jamaican police has identified its key characteristics as: i. A heavy reliance on blunt indiscriminate ‘net fishing’ tactics, such as roadblocks and raids; ii. An excessive reliance on violence and a high value placed on action/pursuits and exhilaration. iii. The reliance on guns as the main tactical weapon. iv. Use of a significant amount of resources on operations. v. An emphasis on militaristic approaches to problem-solving, involving eliminating targets, not addressing underlying social problems.

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This policing model has drawn critical comment by Bowling (2010, p. 162) who criticizes the high level of violence associated with it, often leading to fatalities. What is revealing is the failure of paramilitary policing to make any discernible impact on the type of crime problems it is often applied to (Bowling, 2010, pp. 1612–164; Harriot, 2000; Stanislas, 2020). The conspicuous lack of results is contextualized by the damage paramilitary policing does to community relations. One issue which has contributed to growing disquiet is the reckless use of firearms which has led to the Jamaican police being criticized by human rights organization, for regularly killing innocent passers-by (Manning, 2007; Stanislas, 2013, p. 294). Features of paramilitary policing which adversely impact on local communities are highlighted by Harriot (2000, p. 133) include: i. ii. iii. iv.

Degrading treatment of entire communities and social groups Unjustified use of violence. Selective and arbitrary use of legal powers. Harassment of individuals and social groups.

The use of police violence has been theorized by numerous scholars (Belur, 2010; Choogngh, 1997; Muir, 1977; Uildriks & Mastright van Hans, 1991). Routine violence is rooted in informal work practices. Every day violence is used to impose authority over particular social groups, such as poorer and marginal sections of society, who purportedly do not share the same values as dominant groups. The police routinely cover-up inappropriate behaviour by charging the victims of their violence with resisting arrest, disorderly conduct or assaulting police. Police officers have higher status than the subjects of their violence and their account of events are more likely to be accepted (Chevingny cited by Uldriks & Mastright, 1991, p. 14). Chan (1996) applies Bourdieu’s social field theory based on the interaction between the habitus (i.e. the cultural disposition of the individual) and the field which refers to the structural position and social contexts of policing and suggests the use of violence by the police is part of the tools that they deploy against selective groups.

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Sources of Accountability The police’s use of force in advanced liberal democratic societies is regulated by law, the courts and professional standards that are enforced by police leaders and finally via independent oversight bodies. Constitutional law forms the basis for how the police utilize force in Caribbean societies, which is not uncommonly underpinned by colonial legislation. The impact of the latter on the use of force is examined by Mars (2002). Mars’ illustrate how the law enables the police to use force in clearly prescribed circumstances, such as in preserving life, the protection of property, inter alia. Mars (2002) found even with permissible legislation Guyanese police regularly operated outside the law, in the use of force, and were rarely held to account. Harriot (2000) and Bowling (2010) have detailed the lack of accountability of Caribbean police.

Methodology The methods used to obtain the data used in this chapter are briefly outlined for the benefit of the readership. The first involved semi structured interviews with police officers of various ranks from the RSLPF about the nature of contemporary policing (Stanislas, 2020). Of particular importance were the views of the members of the Complaints and Disciplinary Department (CDD) in shedding light on the nature of contemporary policing, which elucidates much of the negative public opinion about how many police officers carry out their work and some of the deficiencies and challenges involved. A survey of approximately 300 members of the public on their views about St. Lucian policing was carried out, along with 37 semi structured interviews with key criminal justice stakeholders (Stanislas, forthcoming). This included lawyers, Crime Prosecution Service officials (CPS), magistrates inter alia and journalists and doctors. For members of the RSLPF, a minimum criteria of five years policing experience working in areas which involved face to face interaction with the public was used for selecting police participants in the study. The stakeholder sample was

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not meant to be a representative and was more opportunistic in character and designed to obtain some insight from those who work with the police. The research was carried out between 2007 and 2010 in St. Lucia and was supported by documentary analysis and observation. St. Lucia has a single police organization with approximately 1,000 officers (Stanislas, 2013) with responsibility for policing 616 square kilometres and a population of around 170,000 (CIA, 2013).

Policing and the Use of Violence in St Lucia St. Lucia was a low crime society with little experience of police violence and remained so throughout the colonial period, with a short period of insecurity leading up to political independence (Stanislas, forthcoming). During the late 70s the country was thrown into a moral panic that saw the demonization of Rastafarians by the police who viewed them as an anathema to societal norms. This period witnessed the cold-blooded killing of members of this community by the SSU (Stanislas & Sadique, 2019). The decline in the banana-based economy had a significant impact on social cohesion and crime, and the relationship between the police and the public which was crystallized in the SSU attack on protesting banana workers that led to the death of a farmer in 2005 (Joseph, 2011). The timing of this incident coincided with the rise in violent crime. In 1975 the homicide rate consisted of two people. By 2001 the figure was 27, per 100,000 rising to 32, per 100,000 in 2011 (Stanislas, 2020). See Fig. 6.1. It is important to note that the number of individuals killed by the police is not recorded. The image of St Lucian police has transformed from one which was largely benevolent, to a more violent representation where they are now more prone to killing citizens (see Stanislas, forthcoming). The research findings show a pattern of excessive use of force which is often fatal in character and disproportionately experienced by marginal groups (Choogngh, 1997; Muir, 1977; Uildriks & Mastright van Hans, 1991). The term marginal group denotes several relatively weak social groups which include the poor, those with various addictions, or

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Fig. 6.1 Homicide Rate in St. Lucia (Source Organization of American States Data Repository [2000–2012])

promoting alternative lifestyles, and MIP among others. A journalist research participant elaborates: I don’t know any case in this country where a drug boss or serious criminal has been shot by the police. It’s the children of the poor and innocent people who are murdered in cold blood. No inquest, no proper investigation or means to hold these murdering cops to account.

It is noteworthy to underscore the point made by the journalist that well-known major criminals appear to be spared the inconvenience of having their homes raided by police, or being stopped on the streets, thus reducing the types of confrontations which result in suspects being shot. These sentiments are reinforced by a CDD investigator: The victims are the poor, those from the inner cities or the unfortunate ones in society, because they are prone to commit certain crimes, many officers develop prejudices and negative attitudes towards them.

A general problem in carrying out research on police killings in St. Lucia is the difficulty in obtaining accurate information, given the

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RSLPF’s CDD is poorly resourced and does not collect this information, nor does there appear any political desire for this to happen. Only a fraction of incidents are reported through the police complaints procedure. Newspaper journalists who cover these stories are hard-pressed and lack resources (Stanislas & Lancaster-Ellis, 2017). The Interview with the head of the independent police oversight agency highlighted many of the challenges experienced by the media and the CDD investigators. What is clear is police killings are not uncommon. The starkest example of this was the killing of Rastafarians by the SSU in their mountainous settlements. To this day, there is little public information about that police operation, or any explanation given for the police’s violent tactics towards an unarmed and peaceful community (Stanislas & Sadique, 2020). An example of arbitrary police killings which go unrecorded is provided by a member of the public: One day I was standing near my balcony when a plain clothed police officer asked me did I know a particular guy in the local neighbourhood. While I was trying to work out who the person was, the officer told me the guy he was looking for robbed his cousin.

He continues: The police officer interrupted me and said oh I see him, indicating he had just seen the guy. I saw the cop go up to a guy, and tap him on the back, and then shoot him twice. The police are like outlaws because it’s police investigating police and everybody knows that is just a waste of time, so this cop can act without fear knowing nothing will happen to him.

The above example throws light on the fact that the actual number of people killed at the hands of police will never be known, given the culture of lawlessness which exists within the RSLPF.

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Regulating the Behaviour of RSLPF’s Officers While there is little research on the use of force and legislation in St Lucia, the evidence suggests that the law has little constraining effect in how many police use force. This is supported in the comments of a CDD Sergeant: I think these incidents usually involve people who are accustomed to acting in a particular manner. You can move them about the force or transfer them, and some of them have been transferred all over the place, but unless something forces them to change they invariably will resort to their normal behaviour.

The respondent’s remarks that complaints tend to involve the same individuals indicates that some officers are more inclined to use excessive force than others and this position has found support in the literature from Geller and Toch (1991, p.26) as well as Terrill and Mastrofski (2002). The inaction of police leaders in holding officers to account is elaborated by another CDD officer, and highlights the general concern articulated by Stanislas (forthcoming) about the RSLPF’s leadership: Colleagues look at us as the big bad wolf or as traitors in carrying out our role, so of course they are not lining up to help. We tend not to get support from Senior Officers. You ask them to contact you, or make an appointment for us to speak to them, and we get the run around. I don’t know if you heard the Acting Commissioner on the radio the other day, when people phoned in and said that when they make complaints it appears nothing happens, and they are not informed of the outcomes. Why is this? In my view it’s because there is some informal policy that things should be handled in that way.1

The suggestion that RSLPF’s leadership are instrumental in the failure of the investigation and disciplinary process is reiterated in the following remarks: I think enforcement is the key issue. After we make our recommendations and write our report and hand it over to the SOs. Too often nothing

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happens and there is little we can do about it as our role and power is defined.

Unlike the Constitution of Guyana which explicitly addresses the issues of police use of force in considerable detail, this is not the case with the St Lucian Constitution. Section 1 of the 1978 Constitution details the rights of citizens to life and security. The circumstances where force can be lawfully used against a citizen are: i. In defence of any person from violence or for the defence of property. ii. In order to affect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained. iii. For the purposes of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny. iv. In order to prevent the commission by that person of a criminal offence or if he dies as a result of an unlawful act of war. In 2011, a rare occurrence transpired, when the Court ruled against the police in a civil action for its use of violence in the Case of Severin V Attorney General.2 Mr Severin had his car searched by the police. During the exchange he claimed he was verbally abused and returned the insults. Shortly after, another police squad came to the establishment where Mr Severin and some friends were and confronted him, about the verbal altercation which resulted in him being violently assaulted. The judge in summing up proceedings stated: The intention of the police squad in my view, at the time, was not to effect an arrest but to discipline Mr. Severin and deter him from any possible intended threatening behaviour towards a fellow police officer. The facts do not support the argument that the police officers went directly to find and arrest Mr. Severin. The kind of violence reported by the Claimant’s witness betrays the true intention of the officers at the time.

The evidence highlighted by the court supports a theme articulated by research respondents that citizens who do not comply with the police, including their abusive behaviour, are vulnerable to violence (Uildriks & Mastright van Hans, 1991).

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Public Perception of Police Violence The RSLPF seems to experience difficulties in dealing with incidents with minimum force, which is characteristic of contemporary Caribbean policing (Bowling, 2010, pp. 161–162; Harriot, 2007, pp. 290–291). A common belief from older members of the public and other stakeholders is that the contemporary RLSPF is significantly more violent than its colonial predecessor. The SSU are particularly prone to using extreme violence. A young man shares his experience: The SSU don’t really speak to people, they just use force first. They quicker to beat you than the others. If they come to search people, they just grab and beat. They love to put their big guns on you, and if you get angry and give them back chat they are fast to tell you that they will shoot you.

A male retiree from England recounts an incident: I was in town and saw a crowd of people and somebody lying on the floor face down with SSU around him. One had his army boot standing on the young man’s head, and another one was kicking and stamping on him. People were upset when they saw this. I was talking to an elderly lady, and I heard bam and turned around to hear the young man screaming ‘why you shoot me, why you shoot me?’ They shot him in the back of his knee in front of the whole world in broad day light.

A member of the public shares a similar experience: Me and my buddy was coming down the road and heard a commotion. A youth was screaming and shouting and we saw him laying in the road with handcuffs on and his leg was bleeding. He was shouting at the SSU guy asking him why you shoot me you? Everybody was watching, and a crowd started to build up, and we asked people what happened? They said the police shot the brother on the floor after they arrested him. They just fire shot in his leg for kicks. What happens if the guy suffered with anaemia or sickle cell or god knows what else and bleeds to death?

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As indicated while the number of people killed by the police is unknown, so is the number of those who have been seriously injured. A doctor highlights a worrying pattern of violence by the SSU which suggests their use of firearms-related violence is a public health concern (Obasogie & Newman, 2017): To say there is a gratuitous use of violence by the police is an understatement. We have detected a clear pattern of people being shot in the legs when they are already in police custody and pose no threat. Speaking to those who come for treatment it’s the same story. If they verbally challenge the police, who clearly lack confidence or skills and just go for their guns. They think nothing of crippling people and destroying their ability to work and life for what? Because of ego to show I am the boss man obey me?

The indiscriminate and callous use of violence described can result in permanently crippling individuals whose only wrong doing is to be randomly stopped by the police reflects the types of pathology described by Fanon (1967) and suggests something about the types of individuals recruited to the RSLPF. The issue of the personal gratification gained by the police in the use of violence is not something which figures highly in the research literature, even though there have been discussions about the types of police officers more inclined to use violence (Geller & Toch, 1991). Efforts to link this to individual psychological or emotional disposition has not been empirically supported. In the St Lucian instance, the research found evidence not only of the gratuitous use of force but police officers gaining what can be viewed as a disturbing sense of satisfaction from its use. A lawyer shares his experience of the type of gratification some police officers gain by their use of excessive force (see Fanon, 1967; Gray, 2003, pp. 18–21): I have a case before the court where the police came to a man’s home and told him to come out with his hands up. There were five police officers and they told him to get on the ground, and while he was on the ground they shot him in the leg with their machine gun. Then they told him to get up and walk to the van, while making jokes at him while he tried to walk.

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The lawyer continues: The guy who shot him, a new SSU recruit, played basketball and after work he went to practice and was boasting to those present how he shot this guy. According to witnesses, he [the SSU officer] was buzzing like his adrenalin was going crazy. He was so excited and not remembering this is little St Lucia, and two of the victim’s friends were amongst those present and heard what he said; and went to the hospital to find out whether this was true.

Specialist paramilitary units have been identified as being particularly prone to using disproportionate violence, and the SSU’s conduct underscored this finding. What is disturbing was evidence of the use of violence that appeared ritualistic in character, as in the casual shooting of males in their custody in the legs which has serious implications for their health and ability to work and potentially life changing in a poor country. The research findings indicate a significant amount of police violence is not carried out by officers trying to protect themselves, or citizens. In too many instances, the violence appears to be an effort to impose disciplinary measures on citizens who it is believed are not showing the police sufficient deference.

Police Violence and the Mentally Ill Despite much discussion about the interaction between the mentally ill and the police, there is little research on the matter and even less has been carried out in developing countries (Davis, 1991; Engel & Silver, 2001; Compton et al., 2006). A small body of Caribbean literature is beginning to emerge which is reviewed by Wallace (2019) in his study of policing PMI in Guyana. The belief that police are overzealous in their interactions with PMI found tentative support in the work of Davis (1991), however a decade later researchers were beginning to draw a different picture, even though on admittedly limited evidence. Engel and Silver’s (2001) findings suggest that mental illness can serve as a protective factor in how the police interact with individuals and are more likely to operate in a supportive role and downplay their law enforcement function.

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One of the problems highlighted by Compton et al. (2006) and others is the polices’ lack of knowledge about the mental health status of people they are called to attend to, which can be mistaken with other conditions, such as drug and alcohol abuse. An important development in the United States, and later Britain, has been the introduction of several initiatives to improve the interaction between PMI and the police (Chappell, 2013; McGeough & Foster, 2017). One initiative is the Critical Intervention Teams (CIT) which provide specialist support to front-line officers, who can be called to attend scenes involving PMI. One of the benefits of CITs is improved levels of police officers understanding of mental health matters. Despite these important developments, there is little evidence to suggest that they reduced the likelihood of individuals with suspected mental illness from being arrested (Compton et al., 2006). The issue of police violence in interacting with PMI has been one of the most enduring worries about this relationship, which has spurned discussions about police training and accountability. Cordner (2006) maintains that the general situational factors that contribute to violent interactions between the police and the public equally apply to PMI. Mental illness may contribute to individuals appearing aggressive and non-cooperative which can result in the police responding accordingly. Equally, the type of offence PMI are suspected of is critical in shaping the police interaction. In conclusion, an important finding of Cordner’s work is despite media representation focusing usually on a small number of high-profile cases, the number of injuries sustained by those suffering with mental health problems or the police as an outcome of their interaction is small. Fuller, Lamb et al. (2015) found PMI were 16 times more likely to be killed by the police. Their study also found a significant number of these individuals suffered with untreated mental illness. One possible factor in explaining the rise in these fatal encounters is deinstitutionalization and the lack of health service provision which results in more undiagnosed PMI inevitably encountering the police (Arsenault & Hinton, 2013, p. 147, see Wallace, 2019).

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Policing the Mentally Ill in St Lucia The research found that the issue of the interaction between those believed to be mentally ill and the police was a major concern for the public and the media (Wallace, 2019, p. 1229) which was crystallized in an incident that took place just before the start of the field work. The incident involved the shooting of an elderly homeless man who slept in a store doorway (The St. Lucia Voice, 2009 as cited in Stanislas, 2013). What was particularly disturbing about the incident, is that police officer shot the unarmed man seven times, after he protested at being asked to leave the premises. The extreme police response to an old man, believed to be suffering with mental health issues, served to underscore the perceived attitude of the police to the mentally ill (The St. Lucia Voice, 2009 as cited in Stanislas, 2013; Wallace, 2019). The feelings on the above incident were articulated by a member of the public: They shot that old man who was mentally ill who could not harm anyone. That is just pure shit. Shot him like a dog- not even one shot, they filled him with bullets. Then they will come and say it’s under investigation and nothing will happen. All they will do is wait until there is another crime that upset people and will drop the investigation on the sly. That’s how they do it.

An important point made above was the lack of confidence in the system of police accountability, and the methods used to de-prioritize investigations. The Chief executive of the Police Complaints Authority shares his view on the above incident: From what we can see is the police officer panicked and just kept on shooting that old man which was disgraceful.

There is no evidence that the elderly man was suffering with mental illness. The police, according to the Star newspaper, reported his non responsiveness to police questioning, followed by erratic behaviour, and his general condition, as indicating mental illness (see Cordner, 2006).

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The association between mental illness and the police use of fatal violence is institutionally justified by the police given incidents of officers being killed by PMI. Despite such instances being extremely rare, according to Chief Officers interviewed, it has contributed to an institutionalized view of PMI as being dangerous (Choogngh, 1997; Muir, 1977; Uildriks & Mastright van Hans, 1991). As members of a marginal group, PMI are more vulnerable to police violence, given the criminalization of entire communities that shapes the police institutional outlook, which increases with specific behaviours or actions the police view as problematic. One of the points the chief executive, and former RSLPF chief officer, stressed was the irrational fear many police officers have when dealing with PMI, and the misunderstanding associated with these conditions (Compton et al., 2006), which in this instance he believed contributed to the extreme response. A member of the public reinforces this view: There are different types of illness. Some people may just be depressed, or it could be much worse. You can have people who are totally sane but something happen to their children, or money problems, or grieving. You can’t come and just approach people the same way. But in St. Lucia, the police see all mentally ill people the same and they are coming with deadly force.

This view is supported by a CDD officer: I think we, or shall I say that the government, has no positive policy or attitude towards the mentally ill. I think people can understand physical illness but lack understanding about anything to do with mental health issues and are prejudiced towards them.

The issue of the interaction between the police, and those suspected of mental health problems ranked as a pressing for all research respondents. While an important factor in the awareness of this issue can be explained by the incident cited above, which grabbed national news headlines, it was driven by more than this given there was no shortage of examples provided by respondents of the police’s ill-treatment of the mentally ill. The belief that lack of education and training contributed to police ignorance about mental health matters was shared by respondents, which

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reflects a broader policy deficiency detailed in Wallace’s (2019) concerns in respect to Guyana. Unsurprisingly, according to CDD officers very few complaints of police abuse either by the mentally ill or those acting on their behalf are made. The reasons for this can be explained as the lack of support which members of this vulnerable group experience, and the stress that mental health matters places on families in poor countries, and or their lack of confidence in the police. The research revealed numerous cases of perceived abuse of the mentally ill. One example is provided by a young female professional: My mum is mentally ill and there was an incident when she was acting up and a police officer came. He was so aggressive and wrestled her to the ground and busted up her face and put handcuffs on her really tight. She never forgot about that experience, neither did I. She did not commit any crime; she was just having an episode. I was thirteen years old at the time and never forgot it.

The above example demonstrates the aggressive disposition many police officers adopt when interacting with the mentally ill. Despite the early research which did not find much evidence to support the view that the police were generally overzealous in their interaction with the mentally ill (Compton et al., 2006; Davis, 1991; Engel & Silver, 2001), this did not appear to be the case in St Lucia. A member of the public reinforces this view: About the mentally ill, we don’t have police trained to handle those things. Whenever the police come for a mentally ill person, the family better prepare the coffin because it is only one outcome. The police will always put it, as if the mentally ill threaten their life. I don’t think it is true, because all of us know a lot of mentally ill people who are not threatening people, but as soon as police come on the scene they claim they are violent or attacked them.

An important point made by the respondent is there appears to be a lot of PMI illness in St Lucia. While there is no research to support this view, evidence drawn from elsewhere shows the clear link between poverty and mental health problems. The comments made by the respondent

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may have validity about the levels of mental illness in St Lucia, given the levels of poverty on the island (Elliot, 2016; Patel & Kleinman, 2003). Another significant issue raised by the respondent is the belief that the RSLPF’s tendency to characterize individuals with mental health problems as violent, does not reflect the experience of other members of the public, nor was this reported by research respondents. This disjuncture may play a critical role in the wider community’s response to adverse incidents between the police and PMI. The RSLPF’s disposition when dealing with the mentally ill is highlighted in several cases recounted by the public, of the police shooting the ‘wrong people’ when responding to calls for assistance involving PMI: This case was all over the news involving a woman who had two sons. One had mental issues and was getting very agitated, throwing things around the home. The other son was not there at the time, and the old lady made the terrible mistake and called the police. By the time they came, the other son had returned. The son who had just returned home opened the door, and within seconds the police shot him in front of his mother and killed him.

Another respondent provides further example of the RSLPF’s overzealousness which led to fatal outcomes: I know a case in Gross Islet involving a guy with mental issues. His brother called the police because he was acting up. The brother with the issue left the house and could not be found. While his brother was looking for him in the bushes, the SSU came on the scene and shot him. Then to make matters worse, they claimed he tried to attack them with a machete. Do they take people for fools? Why would he do that? Everybody knows how violent the police are here. Once the police received the news the incident involved someone with mental issues, they are ready to kill?

A final illustration about the violence police meted out to the mentally ill is provided by a doctor, who recalls an incident where an individual was brought to the hospital in handcuffs with clear signs of physical injury. He describes the incident:

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The police handcuffed the individual and when one of the officers turned around to speak to the nurse he struck him. Both of the officers started to savagely beat the individual and my nurses tried to unsuccessfully intervene, when one of them pulled out his firearm. At this point another nurse ran and found me.

The doctor continues his account: I told them [the police] this is my ward and if they do not cease I will be speaking to the Police Commissioner, which seemed to work. When I examined the patient the signs that he had been severely beaten was clearly evident. He told me the police stopped him and wanted to know where he was going and what he was doing, but before he could explain they grabbed him aggressively and everything escalated from there. He was very upset with how he was treated, which is why he struck the police officer.

The research found concern from respondents about the police interaction with PMI, which not uncommonly was violent in character. The high-profile nature of some of these incidents contributed to a high level of public awareness about the issue.

Police Education and Training and the Mentally Ill The inability of the RSLPF leadership to avoid public disquiet about their interaction with PMI has raised the status of the issue. While the government has failed to provide leadership at the policy level, the RSLPF however took the opportunity of a review and changes in police recruit training in 2007, to include the issue of mental health (Stanislas, 2013, p. 215). The Acting Police Commissioner addresses this matter: I am glad to say we have been concerned about the interaction of our officers with the mentally ill for a while now, because they receive no training in these matters. This is now being addressed in our new model of recruit training. To do this, we had to get rid of many things which we now think are irrelevant to modern policing.

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The training new recruits receive consists of several inputs from mental health professionals from the Ministry of Health, about the basic issues in mental health such as the range of conditions, the symptoms, and how to interact with individuals believed to be suffering with mental health problems (McGeough & Foster, 2017). Stanislas (2013, pp. 228–229) found the majority of recruits viewed the education received on mental health as important and one of the most useful topics covered in their training. This indicates awareness of the significant numbers of PMI in St Lucia, and recruit’s anticipation of the strong likelihood that they will be engaging with them soon in their careers. The lack of resources and facilities for the mentally ill made this almost inevitable (Cordner, 2006; Wallace, 2019).

Conclusion The colonial policing model created an approach to policing where the use of force was central to its design, the recruitment of personnel and training. In the relatively peaceful environment of colonial St Lucia, the police’s use of force was not a common experience. The introduction of paramilitary specialists improved the capabilities of the police in the use of force, which with the increase in crime witnessed worrying patterns of police violence against vulnerable communities. Of particular concern was the police’s use of firearms with lethal results, and what can be seen as punitive disciplinary actions by the SSU, involving the shooting of suspects for arbitrary matters. In common with other Caribbean police, the RSLPF’s use of violence appears unconstrained and is facilitated by the absence of professional and legal accountability. The research revealed the work of the RSLPF’s Complaints and Disciplinary investigators is often frustrated by senior officers who appear to have a vested interest in ensuring that investigations into serious allegations of violence do not reach fruition. The RSLPF’s interaction with PMI takes place within a normative framework where the latter are criminalized and viewed as deviant, and dangerous which justifies the aggressive posture towards them. The plethora of cases leading to the death of PMI contributed to a change in police training to

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better prepare officers to effectively interact with members of this group. The evidence suggests this training was highly valued and welcomed as a progressive development in addressing one aspect of a pressing problem. However, training by itself is insufficient to address the institutional culture of police violence, of which the treatment of PMI is only one group. The police should be forced to collect data on police homicides and use of firearms and Commissioner’s and other police leaders should be held to account and if required dismissed and removed from post due to the unsatisfactory levels of use of force. The notion of police leaders being able to drag their feet to frustrate investigations and potential disciplinary proceedings should be undercut by holding them to account for the conduct of their officers, as well as their own. To prevent the abuse of firearms, the numbers of police officers able to carry weapons should be reduced, particularly in the instances where there is already concern about how individual officers use their weapons. The onus should be on police officers having to demonstrate their need for weapons, and the ability to use them adequately rather than simply issuing guns and trying to provide a rationale, albeit weak, for the wholesale arming of St Lucian police officers. Reducing the ready access of police officers to weapons is an essential element in reducing the fatal and unnecessary use of weapons. Finally, tighter regimes of control over all aspects of the issuing of weapons, their use, the monitoring of ammunition usage inter alia should be introduced to counter the laisse faire culture which currently exists within the RSLPF.

Notes 1. The head of the Crime Prosecution Service indicated that RSLPF senior officers. 2. https://www.policinglaw.info/assets/downloads/Severin_v._Attorney_ General.pdf.

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7 Understanding Haiti’s Current Phenomenon of Gang Violence and Illicit Arms Trafficking: A View from the Lens of Vertical-Horizontal Violence Guyma Noel and Evenson Pierre-Louis

Introduction This book chapter seeks to understand the current proliferation of gang violence associated with illicit arms trafficking and predominantly urban street gangs hired by economic and political entrepreneurs, using Warnecke-Berger’s (2019) concept of vertical-horizontal violence. Accordingly, vertical violence refers to a form of violence developed in situations in which disparities of power exist, and in its extreme form, between the elite and the subaltern class, while horizontal violence is defined in terms of the most organized form of violence between equally powerful rival elites in parallel to a lower level of violence between G. Noel (B) Union Institute and University, Cincinnati, OH, USA E. Pierre-Louis Haiti’s State University, Hinche, Haiti

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_7

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segments of the subaltern groups (Warnecke-Berger, 2019). The rationale is that very few studies (Kolbe, 2013; Schuberth, 2017) have sought to provide the Haitian political research on gang studies with a better relational approach in order to explain the current proliferation of illegal guns and various sources of violence that tends to worsen Haiti’s current chronic insecurity and political deadlock. With existing empirical data and Warnecke-Berger’s verticalizationhorizontalization concept, this chapter aims to rather discuss the link between the strategic use of vertical-horizontal violence by the Haitian political and economic elites, who rely on hired urban gangs with illegal guns and the logic of their political and economic survival. As it can be observed, the Weberian state alone does have exclusive control of violence under the rent-seeking and anarchic conditions in Haiti. We have rather seen the emergence of an increasing proliferation of urban gangs whose vulnerabilities have more and more been used by the powerful Haitian economic elites and political technocrats in order to better capture the scarce resources and maintain their self-serving interests in the system. Thus, the central argument is that Haiti’s proliferation of gang-related vertical-horizontal violence is a function of the rent-seeking and anarchic conditions influencing fragmented elites and ruling classes’ long-ranged political and economic objectives.

Historical Issues of Gun-Related Homicides, Formation of Gangs or Paramilitary Forces and Illicit Arms Trafficking in a Broadly Related Context Around the world, addressing the problem of gun-related homicides and illegal criminal activities can be a complex issue because firearms are manufactured and traded both licitly and illicitly thus making the identification and tracking of illegally manufactured and trafficked firearms difficult (UNODC, 2020). Haiti, which is the empirical unit of analysis of this chapter, has known an unprecedented phenomenon of gun homicides resulted from illicit arms trafficking and gansterization of

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the state. In other words, Haiti currently experiences a phenomenon of widely varying levels of violence produced by informal armed groups and paramilitary organizations that regularly hold relationships with powerful political and economic elites and ruling class across the Metropolitan region. According to a January 2015 report of Godson Orélus, the Director General of the PNH at the time, Haiti was having more than 250,000 illegal weapons in circulation (Haiti-Libre, 2016). By 2019, the number of illegal weapons were double (e.g. about 500,000 illegal firearms in the country) because of the increasing number of smugglers who have fell out of government’s oversight and control (Haiti-Libre, 2019). These illegal weapons were recorded to be responsible for an exponentially high percentage of homicide cases including kidnappings, abductions and extrajudicial killings recorded over the past 3 years (Haiti Libre, 2020). Sprague-Silgado (2018) underlines four historical periods during which the fragmented elites have used gang or paramilitary violence to maintain the status-quo or mobilize revolutionary movements. First, from 1986 to 1991, although they were not identified as ‘gangs’, some paramilitary under the name of ‘Attachés’ worked closely with the police and military especially because it became increasingly risky for the rightist paramilitaries to operate alone as the population began to mobilize and defend themselves and, in some instances, retaliate as a result of the various crimes perpetrated by the Duvalier remnants. The Attachés were used to oppress the country’s burgeoning popular movements, conduct massacres and targeted killings: the 1986 massacre of 15 people at Fort-Dimanche, the 1987 Jean-Rabel massacre of 139 peasants, the 1987 election day massacre at Ruelle Vaillant in which 34 were killed (with another 60 massacred in the Artibonite alone) and the 1988 massacre of 13 at Saint-Jean Bosco. Second, from 1992 to 1994, a group of paramilitary forces (FRAPH) was created by the military regime, which carried out a coup d’état against Aristide’s democratically elected government, and that was supported by some wealthy families that make up uppermost tier of Haitian society. As result, a lot of atrocities including extrajudicial killings, imprisonment and execution of large numbers of youth and pro-democracy activists were documented by human rights teams and

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journalists. Third, from 2000 to 2005, other group of gangs were mobilized by Aristide on his return to power to neutralize the rightist elites, who in turn, secretly reconstructed paramilitary force as the only viable coercive strategy to deploy against Aristide Lavalas movement. As a result, a record number of gun homicides were registered. Last, from 2011to now, the emergence of gangs under the PHTK government has become more pronounced than the previous era. According to a 2020 report of the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantling and Reintegration (CNDDR), major armed groups are operational in Port-au-Prince, the capital city of Haiti as well as in other peripheral towns where they frequently seek to impose their will on the population. There are about 76 armed gangs listed across the Haitian territory with the supply of illicit arm trafficking. Intentional homicides and kidnapping cases increased exponentially in Haiti during the first five months of 2020. For instance, Helen Meagher La Lime, the Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) reported to the U.N. Security Council that between January 1 and May 31, the number of intentional homicides reported by the Haitian National Police increased by 33%, killing 616, namely 591 men, including 11 police officers, 19 minors and 25 women, including 4 minors (UN Security Council, 2020). What is worth noting is that some of the most notorious gang leaders have received their supply of illicit firearms from powerful elites and government officials who in turn have access to gun import. To note, these gangs have no means to buy guns. Most guns are being distributed to them via their political entrepreneurs. The coercive power of the gangs under the PHTK regime has increasingly become ungovernable by imposing their will on even the legal police apparatus. On the evening of Friday August 28, 2020, the National President of the Bar Association, Me Monferier Dorval was assassinated. Certainly, his assassination was put under suspicion by other elite groups who said to have been antagonistic to Dorval’s political viewpoints (Le Nouvelliste, 2021, September 9). The gangs who have been identified in the killing of Dorval remain free without impunity. On March 12, 2021, a repressive action occurred in a gang sport called Village de Dieu (Village of God) where five police officers were killed and beheaded by the gangs. What is important here is that

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while various national and international laws have consequently been enacted to combat and control illicit arms trafficking as well as gangs and their violence more effectively, most illicit arms trafficking appear to be conducted by certain fragmented political and economic elites, and perhaps principally groups of opposition, who are either directly or indirectly involved in arming proxy groups or neighbourhood gangs in insurgencies against rival governments, terrorists with similar ideological agendas, or other non-state armed actors. Apart from the narrative above, the chapter continues by: (1) providing theoretical explanations to understand how various groupings of political and economic elites are engaged in providing proxy groups or mercenary gangs with illicit firearms for their survival in power and the retaining of their economic privileges, (2) describing the method to gather the empirical data, (3) providing some gang-related prevention tips will aim at not only reducing the incident of gun violence and homicides, but also assisting practitioners and legislators and (3) offering an interpretive empirical analysis and conclusion.

Framework of Explanations Previous empirical analyses using the logic of paramilitarism and politics of survival focused primarily on how political regimes attain and keep power through the utilization of formal and informal forces including urban gangs. For instance, Carey (2005) have used Janowitz’ (1977) concept of paramilitarism and Migdal’s (1988) concept of the politics of survival to explain how political regimes enhance their chance of survival in situations where intense civil-military and other types of conflicts are unable to resolve. In Janowitz’s view, if constitutional methods and regular forces fail to maintain stability the military must adjust its use of forces to maintain itself in power. Migdal (1988), on the other side, argues that regimes that feel insecure adopt paramilitary forces or armed gangs as a defense mechanism. In Migdal’s (1988) view, the best way to reduce such disequilibrium is to create a parallel force to counter the threat against the incumbent regime. The continuing relevance of Janowitz’ (1977) paramilitarism and Midgal’s (1988) politics of survival

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is crucial to understand why and how weak regimes, and perhaps other political factions attempt to stay or attain power. Another important scholarship is the work of Moritz Schuberth (2016) on the use of gangs by political entrepreneurs to achieve political objectives. Schuberth claims: ‘When gangs are pulled into the political sphere, they act on behalf of political entrepreneurs who might also happen to be leaders of such groups’ (2016, p. 2). In other words, gangs can play an important role of mercenary activities in support of powerful elites who seek to maintain the status-quo, and politically in defense of the underground economy (e.g. the sale of illegal weapons and other illicit products in the black market). Thus, two hypotheses are illustrated from Schuberth’s worldview (2016): One is that gangs serve primarily political purposes for their sponsors, fulfil socio-economic functions for their members and protect their own communities as much as they prey upon them—which is the reason why community members might— at least initially—support their emergence; and next is that, while the motivations to support gangs overlap, their violence fulfils one primary function for each stakeholder—political in the case of patrons, economic for gang members, and security as far as the community is concerned. What is common between Carey’s (2005) use of Jonowitz’ (1977) concept of paramilitarism and Midgal’s (1988) concept of politics of survival and Schuberth’s mercenary gangs’ concept is that they view gangs or paramilitary forces as an opportunity or useful instrument for powerful elites and regimes whose political and economic survival depends on the spread of violence. However, as important as their explanations are, they do not fully illuminate how to understand the social organization of violence and the conditions that influence the strategic action of powerful political and economic elites. Rather, their theoretical insights are most likely to be beneficial to the purpose of this chapter if they are integrated into Warnecke-Berger’s (2019), concept of Verticalhorizontal violence, which is the principle interpretive framework of analysis for the current chapter. Warnecke-Berger (2019) distinguishes between two forms of violence: vertical violence and horizontal violence. Vertical violence refers to a form of violence developed in disparities of power between the ruling class and the subaltern class while horizontal violence is defined in terms

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of the most organized form of violence between factions and/or segments of the elites in parallel to the reciprocal use of violence between segments of the subaltern groups (Warnecke-Berger, 2019). From the perspective of Warnecke-Berger’s literature and other theoretical insights, an explanatory approach to these forms of violence requires focusing on the political economy of rent, particularly on the social embeddedness of rents, and examining practices of violence in terms of anarchic conditions. Such an approach thus suggests how the appropriation of economic rents and balance of power in situation of anarchy verticalize and horizontalize the practices of violence using ‘pro-government militias’, gangs and other proxy groups acting on behalf of powerful elites or political parties. Thus, these distinguished forms of violence (e.g. Vertical-horizontal forms of violence) in which gangs with illicit arms trafficking play a great role are linked to the survival of political and economic elites under at least two conditions: rent-seeking and anarchy.

Rent-Seeking Rent-seeking refers to economic activities undertaken by elite individuals or groups that seek to increase their own wealth without creating any benefits or wealth to the society. Simply put, they aim to obtain financial gains and benefits through the manipulation of the distribution of economic resources. Precisely, it is an economic surplus that is still available when market mechanisms that generate capitalist profit fail (Warnecke-Berger, 2020). In weak states where resources are scarce, rents are most likely to be prevalent because their state leaders lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social pressures from non-state actors (Acemoglu, 2005). Also, weak states have an economy in which self-interested rulers and particular social groups/elites (or social group/elite) control the state apparatus and create undesirable economic inequities for the rest of the population living in the lower social strata. Economic and political rents create vested interests in the status-quo, and they reinforce each other to the extent that conflict can arise if political rulers fail to protect the interests of the powerful economic groups or elites (Fergusson, 2019). To

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note, in the presence of economic rents, politics cannot be distinguished from economics (Warnecke-Berger, 2020). More importantly, political rents are particularly problematic, partly because reformers face a curse of dimensionality: many things must work well for state capacity and stable peace to consolidate (Fergusson, 2019). According to Warnecke-Berger’s literature (2020), access to rents is structured by certain class alliances and institutional settings (e.g. the state) that tend to favour the political and economic dominance of elites, which in turn reinforces the exclusive access to economic resources. Basically, the author suggests that, if economic surplus is available, the elite maintain control of this surplus through political (non-economic) mechanisms and therefore need to exclude most of the population. On that account, weak states, where conflicts over such an economic surplus is inevitable, constitute fertile ground for the proliferation of gang-related violence and homicides. In fact, since the subordinated social groups (e.g., being exploited via low wages or cheap labor) are considered as one of the various sources of such an economic surplus, vertical violence to keep them from obtaining certain level of wealth and social mobility is not unconceivable. This falls within the argument of Warnecke-Berger (2020) which suggests that, in verticalized social settings, violence is a strategy to gain access to rents or to prevent others from gaining it, both by the elite as well as by subordinated social groups. Historically, while violence in the Latin American and Caribbean region has predominantly been associated with state repression and military dictatorships where vertical violence was mostly observable, the ‘new violence’ that emerged since the mid-1990s is predominantly criminal, horizontal, as most likely operational under illicit arms trafficking (Müller, 2018). In fact, the powerful economic elites did not have to preoccupy themselves with bottom-up vertical violence from the subordinate social groups because their alliances with the political ruling classes would rather exercise an up-to-bottom vertical violence under the monopole of state repression. Rather, by the mid-1990s, because new circumstances have led to the emergence of new types of social and economic relationships among ruling classes, powerful economic elites and subordinate social groups necessitate a new form of violence [Horizontal] in order to continue maintaining their economic rents.

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Theoretically, it is in the sphere of horizontal violence that gangs will be most likely used as mercenary tools by either political ruling classes or economic elites to wage war against one another ‘because peaceful strategies and negotiations become exceedingly risky’ (Warnecke-Berger, 2019). They seek to not only protect their alienating marginalized communities from the state and to allow gangs to position themselves as legitimate defenders of the community against abusive state security forces and foreign intruders, but also to offer themselves as mercenaries to the ruling classes and powerful economic elites (Schuberth, 2016). This also explains the raison d’être of the proliferation of illicit arms trafficking because either ruling classes or economic elites will need to provide the hired gangs with a great financial and material resources (e.g., firearms and money) to attack their rival counterparts. Thus, two different levels of horizontal violence emerge via the mercenary gang activities: (1) Indirect distributive sets of horizontal violence between powerful economic elites and their rival counterpart, between powerful economic elites and ruling classes, between ruling classes and their rival counterparts, and (2) Direct distributive sets of horizontal violence between one neighbourhood gangs and their rival counterparts.

Anarchy Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) ideas of anarchic situations in international politics provides us with important insights that may be integrated into Warnecke-Berger’s (2019) vertical and horizontal violence in domestic politics. If the reason for vertical-horizontal violence lies in the social embeddedness of rents in a socio-economic climate that is primarily shaped by the conflict over economic surplus, it also lies in the cultural script of balance of power in anarchic situations (Warnecke-Berger, 2019). In situation of anarchy, peaceful strategies and negotiations can be risky and expensive if means of vertical and horizontal violence is not applied. It implies that balance of power appears to be achievable between the ruling classes and economic elites when both make alliances with the gangs that obtain enough material resources and money from their respective political and economic entrepreneurs.

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In the logic of Warnecke-Berger’s (2019) approach, there is no guarantee that the balance of power will remain stable if gangs’ loyalty to their respective entrepreneurs is not sustained. It all depends on which individual or group of political entrepreneurs can mobilize and control violence through emotions such as fear and rage. What can be induced is that top-down vertical violence is most likely to be predominant when being under the control of the legitimate authorities that form alliances with the self-serving economic elites. Otherwise, the plurality of violence sources at the horizontal level is the likelihood if the Weberian state is unable to have the exclusive control of violence. The issue is that in the sphere of horizontal violence, balance of power is unpredictable in terms of life span. In short, in order to interpret the theoretical insights presented in the above discussion, we will proceed to examine the case of Haiti’s gangsterization and proliferation of hired gangs by multiple political and economic entrepreneurs. Put in a nutshell, the interpretive framework of Warnecke-Berger’s vertical-horizontal violence concept is applied in this chapter to explain how and under what conditions violence is most likely to be produced in terms of the gangsterization of the Haitian state. Thus, the central hypothesis that can be derived from the discussion of Warnecke-Berger’s interpretive framework is clear: Haiti’s proliferation of gang-related vertical-horizontal violence is a function of the rent-seeking and anarchic conditions influencing fragmented elites and ruling classes’ long-ranged political and economic objectives. Shortly, these conditions are relevant and important to explain Haiti’s case on the issue of gang-related violence and illicit arms trafficking.

Method To answer the question as to how to make theoretical sense of the prevailing gang-related violence along with illicit arms trafficking, desk research was the primary method of data collection. Desk research is secondary research method that involves using already existing data in documents that include books, scientific journals, grey literatures and other online documents. Most of these documents are available

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on Google Scholar and Online Library Resources. The researchers also used an interpretive approach built on insights drawn from the above theoretical explanations.

Empirical Analysis Haiti’s political entrepreneurs have long made use of armed groups in parallel to regular armed forces to impose their will on the rest of the Haitian population. For 29 years (from 1957 to 1986), the Duvalier regime used a unified paramilitary force to maintain and consolidate its power, and in alliance with the powerful economic elites, to keep the rest of the population under control. However, contrary to the era of Duvalier regime, the post-Duvalier regime will see the emergence of irregular armed gangs that have been used by the fragmented Haitian elites for their own self-serving interests. From the outset, it is evident that Haiti has known what Warnecke-Berger (2019) has aptly considered as ‘vertical-horizontal violence’. The post-Duvalier regime inaugurated and faced episodes of violence perpetrated not only by the paramilitary structures implicated in systematic human rights violations, but also new emerging armed groups actively participated in forging new forms of violence in urban and rural Haiti (Oliver, 2021). Basically, in the logic of Warnecke-Berger’s (2019) literature, Haiti has known a verticalization of violence based on state-sponsored resources against the subaltern social groups and a horizontalization of violence based on the availability of emerging urban gangs who are becoming new tools of power for the Haitian political and economic entrepreneurs. To date, Haiti has seen the emergence of a complex system of gangsterization involving at least 24 active groups of gangs. Since these gangs are pulled into the Haitian political sphere, they certainly begin to act on behalf of those fragmented political entrepreneurs who might also happen to be leaders of such groups (Schuberth, 2016). By all accounts, Haiti provides fertile ground for illicit arms trafficking and gun related violence. The development of these post-Duvalier forms of violence is examined in this chapter to understand the phenomenon

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of gangsterization of the Haitian state. The researchers will use insights from the explanatory framework presented above to assess the instrumentalization of gangs who have sought to produce much criminal gangs-related violence, already linked to kidnappings for ransoms, rapes and multiple massacres in the country (e.g. massacres of La Saline). To reiterate, Haiti’s proliferation of gang-related vertical-horizontal violence is a function of the rent-seeking and anarchic conditions influencing fragmented elites and ruling classes’ long-ranged political and economic objectives.

Rent-Seeking In the interpretive framework of rent-based economics, various forms of violence (verticalization and horizontalization) are produced as a result of the logic of capital accumulation and power elite. In the context of the Haitian political and economic elite domination, vertical and horizontal forms of violence coexist and reinforce each other to the extent that the Haitian political and economic entrepreneurs expect to be the subservient of one another for maintaining the status-quo and that they have interacted through causal mechanisms such as mercenary armed gangs to create the desired outcome (e.g. keeping power and economic surplus. As Lundahl and Vedovato (1989) claimed once, in Haiti, politics has to a very large extent been synonymous with the aspirations towards personal wealth by those who have entered the political arena. Also, the ruling elites in association with the Haitian economic elites have been able to accumulate huge fortunes as a result of their control of the state apparatus. To maintain such control, different forms of violence have increasingly become necessary. For instance, both regular and irregular forces have been used primarily to protect the political power and economic surplus of the fragmented Haitian elites. During the Duvalier regime (Between 1957 and 1986) the principal agent of vertical violence was the Haitian state under a regular paramilitary force, namely the National Voluntary Security (VSN) or the Tontons Makouts. Both the economic and ruling elites agreed to utilize the vertical form of violence in order

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to suppress the subordinate class. Basically, the coercive vertical violence was ‘centrally directed, in the sense that Macoute leaders were selected, according to the Sole Duvalier criterion of merit: loyalty to Papa Doc’ (Carey, 2005, p. 100), in order to suppress any revolt from the subordinate class, mainly the poor illiterate Haitian population. As Carey’s (2005) literature suggests, those who were loyal to the frozen regime of Duvalier were ‘rewarded with various opportunities to procure monopoly profits, public monies, or private transactions’ (2005, p. 100). The Tonton Macoutes made use of extortion and extrajudicial killings to support the political power of Duvalier regime, which in turn, help extract the economic surplus out of the subordinate class. More importantly, the high ranking black Tonton Macoutes, the Duvalier loyalists, sought greater wealth through intimidation, extortion and terror because they were in an excellent position to abuse public office financially. Thus, their lack of accountability was overshadowed by many instances of corruption and clientelism. In the post-Duvalier regime, the fall of paramilitaries or the Tonton Macoutes left a void, which will later be replaced by hired gangs of Cite Soleil under Aristide’s Lavalas regime. In this era, the dissociation between the political ruling elites and the economic Oligarchs become more pronounced because the Lavalas regime, which is considered as a leftist, anti-imperialist and Anti-Oligarch, has somehow relied on arming the gangs to consolidate its power and control the state apparatus. In fact, Jean Bertrand Aristide, the first ever democratically elected President in the post-Duvalier regime, was ousted out of power twice: first in September 1991 by the then regular armed forces and second in 2004 by other irregular paramilitary armed gangs. Interestingly, both coup d’états against Aristide and his followers suggest that the economic oligarchs supported by the regular and irregular military armed forces possess the monopoly over the use of force to preserve the status-quo and to strongly resist the implementation reforms promoted by Aristide in favour of the poor population (Dupuy, 1994). Aristide, a former Salesian liberation theologian priest, was one of the most vociferous voices challenging the repression and corruption of the dictatorships, even to the brink of death, who came to represent the aspirations of Haiti’s poorest, most marginalized, and most disenfranchised

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(Herard, 2016). The truth is that the Aristide’s Lavalas regime had an ambitious progressive agenda that was not tolerated not only by the local economic elites of oligarchs, but also by some western capitalist countries (e.g. the United States, France and Canada) promoting a carrot and stick democracy along with the free market neoliberalism. Under the Lavalas regime of Aristide (1994–2004), like previous political regimes, Haiti will see the phenomenon of gang activities being used for political purposes. If the Duvalier regime (1957–1986) exercised vertical repressive dictatorial control through the formal structure of the military, and the informal structure of the Tonton Macoute (Beer, 2017), the Lavalas would turn to armed gangs as instruments of illicit power. For instance, it is reported that Aristide facilitated organization of armed support among the poor, particularly in the slum areas of Port-au-Prince, which took the form of armed street gangs, led by young men who had grown up in the slums and under the influence of the priest Aristide (Beer, 2017). Although Beer’s literature does not say it directly, it would admit that gang violence begins to be transformed into an entrepreneurial business that is set to be profited by various fragmented political and economic elites in the context of political confrontation between the Lavalas regimes and various fragmented segments of the national elites. During the era of Lavalas regime, gang activity could be linked to public protests, general labour strikes, elections or political events because they were hired and derived their real power from vertical and horizontal violence displayed not only by the Lavalas regimes, but also by a number of political and economic elite groups with political objectives and criminal entrepreneurialism (e.g. drug cartels) in confrontation with one another. Beer’s literature describes a broad picture of gang structure and development, emphasizing the complexity of the gang as illicit power in Haiti by taking notes of Kolbe and Muggah’s (2013, p. 74) empirical investigation on gang’s sources of motivations: What is most worrying, however, is that some of Haiti’s gangs — particularly those affiliated with organized crime, paramilitary, and private security companies—are tied to the country’s political elite. It is those with money and power who are most inclined to use gangs as a means of intimidating

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enemies and extending business interests . . . As everyone in Haiti knows, there are specific politicians, business leaders, and wealthy landowners who serve as the gangs’ chief patrons. Essential to diminishing insecurity associated with gangs, then, is a better understanding of these relationships and exposing them for all to see.

What is clear here is that gang violence has no longer been monopolized by the state alone. Rather, it has been fragmented among different groups with political and economic objectives in Haiti. The most notorious high-profile gang leaders of 2004–2005 for instance, were Amaral, Tu-Pac (2Pac), Bily, Labanye, Ti Will, and Dread (Dred) Wilme, who not only were known to be competitive and threatened one another but also were known to fight together against the police, international forces or rival gangs (Beer, 2017). The worse scenario of gang violence has come to take place under the regime of Haitian Party of Bold Hair (PHTK) where the source of violence has increasingly become more and more fragmented among various segment of the Haitian society. As suggested, it is all about the control of economic surplus and the state apparatus. In this instance, the spread of vertical and horizontal violence has become even more acute. To take defense of the Lavalas regime, although the gangs are perceived as the armed element of Aristide’s populist Lavalas Party to neutralize the ‘repugnant elites’ of Haiti by historical association, they were exploited by the oligarchs as well. It is not a fake news to suggest that members from the executive and legislative branches made of different political parties in complicity with various groups of the dominant oligarchs have hired gangs to attain their political and economic objectives. The gangs themselves have their own testimony of being hired by certain members of the Haitian political and economic entrepreneurs. For instance, one official member of Haitian Party of Bold Hair reveals the implication of Mr. Moise government in the creation of G-9, which is the federation of gangs under the leadership of Barbecue, a notorious gang (Rezo Nodwes, 2020). The same official declares that the government-supported federation of gangs is ‘good thing’ because it makes the negotiation between various gang cells more attractable (Rezo Nodwes, 2020). Pierre Esperance, an executive Director of Haitian

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National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH) reports before the American Congress that armed gangs, with the protection of government authorities, have carried out five massacres over the course of President Jovenel Moise’s presidency. Further, Esperance (2020, p. 2) reports: The deadliest of these massacres is that of La Saline, where at least 71 people, including women and children, were killed, and over 400 homes were destroyed in November 2018. On November 6, 2018, a meeting was held to prepare the massacre where weapons and ammunition were distributed to gang members. This meeting was attended by the then Director General of the Ministry of the Interior and Collective Territories and the then Departmental Delegate. During the La Saline Massacre, people were ripped out of their beds to be chopped up with machetes. Others were shot while trying to flee. The victims’ bodies were burnt and thrown into pig sty’s to be eaten by pigs. Women were gang-raped in front of their children. Throughout these massacres, rape is used as a weapon of war. In total, 127 people were killed during these five massacres, with the overall goal of sowing terror in the communities and silencing the population and their demands for improving their living conditions.

Basically, it implies that while most arms trafficking appears to be conducted by various private entities, government authorities also contribute to the illicit trade by deliberately arming mercenary gangs involved in fights against rival members of opposition and other powerful elite groups with similar ideological agendas, or other non-state armed groups. To date, the Human Right Watch report of 2021 indicates: Alleged complicity between politicians and gangs have contributed to a climate of insecurity. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has reported charges against 98 people, including 2 senior government officials, for a 2018 gang-related massacre of 71 people and related abuses in the La Saline neighborhood of Port-au-Prince. Perpetrators

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operated with complicity of authorities, including policeman Jimmy Cherizier, who has since been fired and now leads a coalition of gangs. The UN has called for authorities to bring those responsible to justice.

In 2019, Cherizier and other National Police also aided in killing at least 3, wounding 6, and burning the houses of 30 families in the Bel-Air neighbourhood, where residents were protesting a rise in fuel prices, BINUH reported. Cherizier is suspected of attacks in the Grande Ravine neighbourhood in 2017 as well. To date, no criminal proceedings have been initiated against those implicated. Police did not intervene on August 31, 2019, when gangs killed at least 20 people and set houses afire in the Bel-Air and Delmas neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, forcing at least 1,221 residents to shelter in public squares and a soccer field. Interestingly, we may realize that Jimmy Cherisher’s name has been highlighted in the report because he has been one of the most notorious chief gangs in Haiti. The point is that the incumbent government has no interest of arresting Cherizier because, according to the documentation of Human rights organizations such as the National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH) and Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL), he has conducted numerous attacks with the protection of government authorities. Shortly, in line with the perspective of Warnecke-Berger’s (2019) verticalization-horizontalization of violence has been shown to be a function of rent-seeking among the fragmented powerful elites. At certain point in time, we can observe that the verticalization of violence as a major effect of economic rents stabilizes since the Haitian ruling classes and the dominant economic elites conjointly (Class solidarity) maintain power as the social conflicts are carried out within the subaltern class (and not among classes). The truth is that the ruling class and economic elites were not antagonistic towards each other per se since one was the subservient of the other. Keeping suppressing and oppressing the subaltern class to extract the economic surplus was the common goal. However, later one, the horizontalization of violence begins to involve equally powerful rivals once the new neoliberal global begins to challenge the rent-based economic mode of production, which give

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birth to a triangulation of social conflict. This presents a paradigm shift between the solidified regular paramilitary regime of Duvalier and the post-1990s’ gangsterization of the state. None of these actors have been able to overpower the opponent and to establish domination (WarneckeBerger, 2020). Thus, the criminal gangs-related violence, already linked to kidnappings for ransoms, rapes and multiple massacres, has become a second phase of lawless activities that is costly for the rest of the Haitian population and beneficial to the self-serving interests of fragmented political and economic elites.

Anarchy Waltz (1979) assumes that the international system is anarchical, and/or that states seek survival and balance of power. For Waltz (1979), due to the constraints inherent in international structure, states may not always get what they want (Waltz, 1979). Again, for Waltz, there is no hierarchical legitimate authority to trust and refer to. Like the international system, there is a lack of trusted authority in Haiti’s political system, ‘stimulating the balancing and/or the spiling of power, depending on the resources of the relevant actors’ (Carey, 2005, p. 98). There are empirical signs that Waltz’s anarchy thesis reverberates throughout Haiti’s political system because Haiti’s political system currently functions as if no hierarchical institutions of reference or central authority exists. Clearly, Haiti has become a state whose structure is anarchical and whose key players remain antagonistic against one another’s interest over resources. The Haitian actors, historically, never want to take a chance to trust their counterparts because everything is up for a grab. They would rather rely on self-help. The threat of verticalization and horizontalization of violence is ever present, and the anarchic situations make the Haitian ruling class and powerful economic elites rely on gangs or irregular paramilitary forces for self-help. Cooperation among the Haitian actors to put the country on the right track has not been possible. As Waltz (1979) could have argued, the condition of the uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions works against their cooperation. It has been clear that, to survive the anarchic system, all actors are arming

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their respective hired groups of gangs to spread violence against their counterparts’ territories. In fact, evidence shows that various fragmented groups have used gangs and allies to support their goals and objectives in the current anarchic system of Haiti. For instance, Becker (2010) recounts the origin of Haiti’s armed gangs beginning with President Aristide who consolidate his power in the face of subsequent political protests. Accordingly: “[President] Aristide resorted to distributing weapons to youth groups (Known as Bazes or Bases) in exchange for their support. Weapons provided to defend Aristide also gave the groups the wherewithal to commit crimes and dominate neighborhoods. With his departure, these gangs (which at that point were fully involved in criminal activity) quickly established control” (Becker, 2010, p. 137).

Basically, although Aristide was antagonistic to the Duvalier regime, he sought to use the same tactic of vertical-horizontal violence that Duvalier himself used to suppress and make balance of power for his regime. Another instance is the gangsterization of the Haitian state under the Moise’s government. To date, a federation of gangs is structured by 9 territorial factions under the title of G-9. This alliance of big ghetto gangs in the Metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince is respectively represented by their leaders: Barbecue (Bas Delma), Sonsonn (Bel-Air), Lasalin (Ti Junior), Waff Jeremie (Mikanon), Cite Soleil (Iska), Boston (Matias), Simon Pele (Zazou), Ti Bwa (Christ la), Baz Pilate (Ezekyel) and allies. Some members of G-9 have testified that the incumbent political party in power, Haitian Political Bald Hair Party (PHTK), has provided them with illegal weapons in order to control the territories in which they all agree to not only keep peace among themselves, but also to prevent mass uprising against the incumbent government (Fondasyon Je Klere, 2021). The G-9 alliance has been reported to benefit from its strong ties with the incumbent government of President Jovenel Moïse. Accordingly, the gang leaders are seemingly free from persecution so long as they help keep the peace in the neighbourhoods they control. In exchange, Moïse’s government has found in them loyal foot soldiers quelling insecurity, stamping out opposition voices and shoring up political support across the capital. In a press conference, the Prime Minister,

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Joseph Jouthe, confirms some executive branch members’ connection with certain groups of gangs, using the metaphor ‘Rat kay kap manje pay kay’ [Haitian acronym: It is the same rat of the house that is eating the owner’s house] (Jouthe, 2021). This metaphor of Jouthe speaks volume in terms of revealing the complicity of some members of the government with the gangs. When looking for the culprit of the violence, some government members are to be investigated. In the same Press Conference, Mr. Jouthe, declares that he has tried to stop the illegal weapons coming from the United States. Shortly, Mr. Jouthe’s metaphoric claim implies the gangserization of the state. Accordingly, the hired gangs appear to be crucial for President Moise’s consolidation and balance of power, given the constant political protests demanding his resignation by most of the Haitian population who blames him for the country’s dire economic crisis and rampant corruption. In fact, the literature on Haitian Politics indicates that omnipresent groups of gangs used by other powerful elites are credited with overthrowing governments, silencing the political opposition, preventing foreign and local investment, creating a nascent kidnapping industry and terrorizing the cities (Kolbe, 2013). Besides the incumbent government’s use of gangs, various sources and influential individuals indicate that other fragmented political and economic elite groups that form the opposition are arming its own group of gangs in other territories to fight against the incumbent government. Accordingly, the funding of armed groups comes from everywhere and elsewhere through different sources, namely, members of the opposition, private sector, parliamentarians and the power in place, which controls around three gang groups. Furthermore, the former senator and leader of the Pitit Dessalines Party Jean Charles Moise, accuse these three sectors for the distribution of illegal weapons. As Carey (2005) indicates, states that seek security always seek to attack and expand. It is then not surprising that the respective gang leaders including G-9, 400 Mawozo, and other alliances have sought to expand their spheres of influence for the sake of power, to drive out other mercenary gang leaders that are hostile to the incumbent power. According to FJKL, the slums and shanty neighbourhoods weigh heavily in the electoral balance. Territories controlled by armed groups

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represent a significant geographical distribution of voter-determined electoral districts. During the electoral season, fragmented groups, whether on the side of the incumbent power or opposition, always want to have the preponderance in these districts. The proximity of the candidates to their respective leaders of the armed groups can reassure their political entrepreneurs a victory in the centres in his zone of influence.

Prevention Tips To combat the current surge of vertical and horizontal gang-related violence in Haiti requires a pluralistic approach, which suggests the incorporation of a set of intervention tips to protect the Haitian population’s wellbeing. Thus, combating gang-related activities and firearm homicides must contextually incorporate at least five intervention tips, which are circumscribed around the context of anarchic and rent-seeking conditions under which vertical and horizontal gang-related violence is produced in Haiti. 1. Strengthening the elite accountability in the Haitian judicial system: A transparent, independent, trustworthy, credible and effective judicial system is crucial to reduce gang violence and firearm homicides in Haiti. Empirical research suggests that gang violence in general is most likely to be reduced when justice systems operate with transparency, openness, consistency and trustworthiness (World Bank, 2011). Empirical data indicate that the Haitian judicial system lacks transparency, autonomy, credibility and effectiveness to commit gang violence reduction strategies because it is politicized, unfair and inequitable. The truth is that those urban youth gangs are too poor to buy firearms. Therefore, to resolve the issue of gang violence in all forms (Vertical and horizontal), strengthening the Haitian judicial system in terms of making the powerful elites accountable. 2. Controlling the source of illicit arm trafficking: Haiti does not produce or fabricate firearms produced. Also, those young people are too poor to have access to financial resources that could access the most expensive weapons. The complicity of custom officials and police

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authorities after the seizure of shipments of weapons and ammunition has contributed to the level of gang violence and homicides. This complicity goes back to the lack of credibility and corruption in the Haitian judicial system that has failed to make the powerful elites accountable. 3. Elite settlement agreement: In Haiti, gang-related activities are indicated to be politically oriented because of its powerful elites’ persistent power conflict. Data have made it clear that the powerful Haitian elites have used gangs as powerful tools to manage their self-serving interests. Currently, Haiti’s elites are trapped into a political and economic dictatorial deadlock. 4. Reducing urban youth’s vulnerability and risk: Most of the Haitian street children or young people who are involved in gang activities are being used and abused because of their vulnerability, which is caused by multiple sources including paternal abandonment, lack of economic resources in the family, the absence of the state and other related risks. Among many other risks, many of Haitian children suffer a lack of paternal presence and co-responsibility in their childhood development. This is an issue that the state has failed to address despite its implication for the Haitian society. This abandonment of Haitian fathers has left many of these mothers without any support to help take care of their children. Thus, a fatherhood project intervention could have been very useful to reduce the vulnerability of these children by not only empowering fathers to be knowledgeable, active and emotionally engaged with their children, but also making the irresponsible ones accountable. 5. Addressing social exclusion and imbalance in favour of the urban youth: The issue of social exclusion and imbalance is one of the major causes, which has led many of these young people to be accessible and available to mercenary criminal activities produced by the political and economic entrepreneurs of Haiti. In other words, they have been up for grab by any Haitian politicians who are most likely to use them for the execution of politically related duty jobs in the current political atmosphere of the country. The fact is that the Haitian political and economic decision-makers must recognize that the reason street gangs

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exist is because of the continued marginalization of disenfranchised groups in society (Chioda, 2016). These five intervention tips represent a pluralistic approach that needs to synergistically and simultaneously work towards reducing gang-related violence and firearm homicides in Haiti and perhaps elsewhere because the contextual vertical and horizontal violence that keep Haiti from its political democratic development has become a serious transnational security threat. Thus, these intervention tips will need to be researched and evaluated further to assess their efficacy upon their application in the context of Haiti’s surge of violence.

Conclusion With this broad discussion of our empirical analysis, the present chapter have argued a detailed and nuanced approach to study the persistence of violence in Haiti. For instance, in using Warnecke-Berger’s verticalization and horizontalization of violence, it has contributed a new interpretive lens through which to understand Haiti’s gangsterization and proliferation of illegal guns. And perhaps even more importantly, it has sought to show the way in which violence is organized in urban areas of Haiti, that is, its transformation since mid-1990s. It has also analyzed the gangs’ modus operandi in which vertical and horizontal violence becomes a possible means of waging social conflicts in the current political system of Haiti. Finally, the chapter underscores, if not directly, but at least the dynamic effect of rent-based economic production and anarchic conditions in shaping social relations and explaining the current gang-related violence in Haiti’s current political system. The gangsterization developed amid the subaltern groups will now have different functions for different stakeholders including the security of their own communities. The gangs themselves testify that various fragmented powerful members of the national elites solicit their help and provide them with illegal guns. What we can thus understand is that as soon as rent economy and anarchy dominate the scene of Haiti, the different levels

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or forms of violence become an opportune mode of keeping their selfserving interests and balance of power hiring available gangs. Currently, we can assume that violence is less of a vertical phenomenon and less directed against the elites. Rather, violence is more horizontal in nature because urban gangs have been mostly used by various fragmented economic elite and ruling class groups within the subaltern class. Based on the gang-related violence intervention tips, future research should focus on the extent to which these gangs can be reoriented towards something other than producing violence. Acknowledgements Support for this research was provided in part by Venette Hector Nelson, Le Forum Transnational des Premiers de Saint-Martin de Porres (FTPSMP-Hinche-Haiti) and, of course, my co-author, Evenson Pierre-Louis.

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8 The Battle Against the Illicit Gun Trade in Trinidad and Tobago from a Military Perspective Michelle S. A. Nicholson and Colin L. R. Mitchell

Introduction The threat to the countries of the region is not the military force of the adjacent neighbor, or some invading foreign power. Today’s foe is the terrorist , the narco-trafficker. This threat is the weed that is planted, grown and nurtured in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces. (Hill, 2003, p. v)

The battle against the illegal arms trade by the military has been ongoing in various territories throughout the world inclusive of the The original version of this chapter was revised: Abstract has been changed. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_17

M. S. A. Nicholson (B) · C. L. R. Mitchell Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022, corrected publication 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_8

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United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) regions Latin American and the Caribbean. According to excerpts from Hernandez (2018), of the Dominican Republic Army, “The phenomenon of insurgency in Latin America had its origins in the armed movements that sprang up in the numerous countries as a way to fight back against the abuses of dictatorial governments” (2018, p. 55). Hernandez (2018), further argues that the emergence of dictatorships being opposed during the main insurgency period was especially due to the Cold War, which began to develop just after the end of World War II. Striving for liberty, but under the shadow of secrecy, groups of insurgents formed throughout all of Latin America. As a result, Hernandez (2018), is of the view that these groups of insurgents flourished primarily during the 1950s to the 1980s, with some continuing to operate well into the twenty-first century. He sees all of this, however, leading to a process of transformation that took place where some insurgent groups gravitated towards the process of democracy with the electoral process. Others meanwhile sought to remedy their lack of funds by forming alliances with drug traffickers, organized crime groups and narcoterrorists. This type of criminality is a problem being grappled with by militaries not only in Latin American Countries but the Caribbean and more specifically Trinidad and Tobago. Therefore, comprehending the present Caribbean security realities against the environment of the timeless occurrence of criminality, such as the illicit arms trade, is consequently, not just prudent but crucial (Griffith, 2004). The gravest dangers to security in the Caribbean are those that are globally described as transnational. Such threats are seen as organized criminal undertakings that cut across national borders and involve, but not limited to, illicit traffic in drugs and arms and ammunition. Griffith (1997), declares that it has been vividly validated that the feature of Caribbean criminality is somewhat multi-pronged and incorporates not only socio-economic dimensions but also military and political discourse which seeks to take into consideration the already developed hurdles such as threats from both external and internal elements. To stimulate a discourse on the illicit arms trade, it is fundamentally essential to describe the term to fully discern its distinctiveness, specifically within the Caribbean context. When translated comprehensively, the term illicit arms trade is defined by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to mean the import, export, acquisition, sale,

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delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State party to that of another State party if any one of the States parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance with the terms of this Protocol or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol. It is this definition that is applied throughout the chapter. While, this chapter cannot fully tackle the comprehensive extent of the illicit gun trade and the concerns facing Trinidad and Tobago, it strives to investigate some of the major concerns and challenges faced by the military as it grapples with the illicit arms trade by exploring policy, data, academic literature and theoretical approach, prior research and interviews with key military personnel.

Research Context Trinidad and Tobago as indicated by CIA Fact Book (2020), is the most southerly island of the Caribbean, situated just north of Venezuela and Guyana, south of Grenada and Barbados and just below the hurricane belt. Trinidad and Tobago is poised 7 miles off the north-eastern coast of Venezuela between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean (Katz & Fox, 2010). At its closest point Trinidad is located just 7 miles (11 k) off the South American coast, and is poised on the South American continental ledge. Trinidad and Tobago consist of two main islands, the larger being Trinidad, measuring 1,864 square miles, and Tobago 116 square miles and a number of smaller islands and other features with a population of approximately 1.26 million people. Its geographical location and its porous marine borders enable relatively free movement that could be exploited to encourage illicit acts.

Review of the Literature The greatest and most decisive act of judgement which a statesman and commander perform is that of recognizing correctly the kind of war in which they are engaged; of not taking it for, or wishing to make of it,

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something which under the circumstances it cannot be. This is, therefore, the first and the most comprehensive of all strategic questions. (Clausewitz, 1962, p. 86)

Bowling (2010) contribution to the literature describes transnational law enforcement as one of the most significant changes in the organization of security in the Caribbean and other parts of the world. This significant change places the current surge in cross-border law enforcement cooperation in the ambit of a new security agenda which focuses on contemporary entanglements across borders as well as between agencies traditionally seen as operating in separate spheres, such as the police, defence force, customs, coast guard and immigration. This discourse is supported by Pritchard (2018), who is convinced even more than ever that it takes a network to defeat a network. He is also of the view that it is impossible for a small state like Trinidad and Tobago to deal with the capability of transnational networks and their capacity on its own. As such Pritchard (2018) thinks that there is now a greater need for the agencies in Trinidad and Tobago to network and be as committed as our adversaries. Agencies external to this country also need to have a more coherent approach to networking and sharing resources. This is a key weapon in Trinidad and Tobago’s arsenal to combat illegal activities especially within the waters that separate it from Venezuela. It is therefore important to understand that a network is as good as its participants, or the elements that make up the networks which are fashioned to the likes of the structure of a government institution. So, if a government formulates policy and then has to roll out the very policy, the administration must have the competency to follow through. Failing this, the application of the purpose of the law or the policy will be ineffective (Pritchard, 2018). Research conducted by CARICOM Crime Security Strategy (CCSS), 2013 substantiates that CARICOM Member States do not manufacture guns or ammunition, nor import significant amounts. However, the Region has still been severely affected by an influx of guns and ammunition. According to former Minister of National Security Trinidad and Tobago Stuart Young, annually thousands of firearms and tens of thousands of illegal rounds of ammunition have been taken off the streets

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by members of the TTPS and TTDF. This has been quite evident with the recent find of importation of illegal firearms at the port by the Customs and Excise Division which is the entity charged with the legislative authority to search upon entry into Trinidad and Tobago and in particular legal ports of entry. The CCSS (2013), report also shows that despite numerous initiatives and mechanisms aimed at addressing the 25 problems of armed violence cited, high levels of gun crimes still persist in the Region. Moreover, illegal guns were found to be responsible for over seventy per cent (70%) of murders in the Region with the underlying negative impact and consequences of the illicit gun trade stretching way above the high degree of homicide. Illegal guns equally play a vital part in all areas of trafficking, not just as a trafficked commodity but as a way of enabling the illicit trade of other goods, and as a mechanism to facilitate criminal and aberrant actions. Hence, illegal guns are vastly becoming both the currency and commodity of the drug trade, having evolved into a major independent criminal activity (CCSS, 2013). Trafficking of firearms illegally continues to affect all parts of the world and has impacted society in multiple ways. In light of this it is a major concern in the context of human security and remains predominant in law enforcement efforts and activities. Firearms have also been proven to be instrumental in much violence, particularly homicide where it is used repeatedly by organized criminals and to support operations related to armed conflicts and terrorism (CCSS, 2013). This is not surprising, since the literature supports that firearm murders account for the majority of all murders in Trinidad and Tobago. In 2018 United Nations SecretaryGeneral António Guterres pointed out that the ownership and use of arms are closely linked to specific expressions of masculinity related to control, power, determination and strength. He further points out that the experience of violence normalizes the presence and use of firearms thereby promoting an expectation about masculinity that encourages acts of violence by men against women and children.

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Border Custodians Fight Against Illegal Trafficking The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF), was established in 1962 under the Defence Force Act 14:01 and operates under the umbrella of the Ministry of National Security. It is one of the largest military forces in the English-speaking Caribbean. The formations within the force consist of the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment (TTR), Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard (TTCG), Trinidad and Tobago Air Guard (TTAG) and the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Reserves (TTDFR). The main responsibilities of the TTDF are to: (a) Defend the sovereign good of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, (b) giving aid to the civil power in maintaining law and order, (c) render humanitarian aid and disaster relief and (d) assisting in the prevention of illegal trafficking (Ministry of National Security, 2020). TTDF, by way of TTCG is responsible for monitoring the waters of the coastal borders under Trinidad and Tobago’s Jurisdiction, logistical support to the land forces, Port Security (ISPS Code), assistance in scientific research, anti-smuggling / counter-narcotic operations, surveillance of the nation’s offshore installations, cooperating with other naval forces and the interdiction of drugs and weapons that enter Trinidad and Tobago through sea routes. TTAG conducts regional search and rescue, counter drug intraregional trade route patrolling, national security and defence operations, local and regional security defence operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime resources protection and developing and maintaining a leadership role for the TTDF in regional security (UTT, 2007). Additionally, in 2012 and 2013, TTR joined Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS), to patrol high-crime areas with the hope of reducing crime and gun/gang violence. Accounts by Pritchard (2018), speaks about the government of Trinidad and Tobago, investing greatly in its border security by implementing an integrated border security concept with the inclusion of customs, immigration and TTDF with the Coast Guard carrying out the primary role. The TTCG is the largest naval unit of the English-speaking Caribbean, with over 1400 personnel (Ministry of National Security, 2020). Thrust with the responsibility of security for the maritime domain

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of the Southernmost Island of the Caribbean archipelago, the TTDF must contend with the trade in illegal narcotics and weapons that emanates from South America. Owing to this, the capability and operational efficacy of the TTCG, therefore, has a direct bearing on the ability to interdict or deter the shipment of such contraband from the South American mainland. This duty is also extended to the country’s police as well as the security agencies of the ports. In terms of maritime, air and radar surveillance to secure the borders TTDF has the larger role and collaborates with its regional and international partners in information and intelligence sharing geared towards more secure borders (Ministry of National Security, 2020). It is important to note that the US partners in different ways with custodians of the Region’s borders, with Trinidad and Tobago being an avid supporter of this regional security collaboration. The government of Trinidad and Tobago has been working with its regional partners to build and maintain networks to counter the effects of trans-regional, and transnational threat networks. As a result, TTDF is now focussed on maintaining the rule of law as a Caribbean regional partner to build networks against criminal activity through a number of initiatives. Thus, its involvement in the annual regional training exercise, Exercise Trade Winds and the annual Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC) both of which are significantly supported by United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), provide additional opportunities for regional militaries to build corporation and understanding at the tactical, operational and strategic levels (Griffith, 2004). CANSEC is particularly important, as it provides a forum for the heads of military forces to exchange and explore ideas, of mutual concerns and initiate mechanisms for cooperation on security-related matters (Griffith, 2004). Consequently, at CANSEC 2017 Conference, issues such as the region porous borders, the penetration of illegal arms, the importance of building capacity to reverse the effects of illegal networks, activities in the Latin American and Caribbean Regions, and understanding at the tactical, operational and strategic levels were raised by Pritchard (2018). Apart from this there are a number of initiatives that Trinidad and Tobago through the military are working on in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), inclusive of the scourge of illegal

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trafficking. As stated by Pritchard (2018), Trinidad and Tobago has the largest partners across the globe within areas of operational training, intelligence training, infrastructure development and capacity building for both the military and the police. Another measure to counter threats to Trinidad and Tobago’s sovereignty is the installation of a radar system that enables the security forces to monitor and track all classes and sizes of vessels that traverse its territorial waters on a twenty-four-hour basis. The radar provides the course, speed and position of any vessels operating within its operational range. Additionally, the government of Trinidad and Tobago advocated to extend this coverage to as far as the island of St. Lucia and to cover Grenada and St Vincent and the Grenadines as well. This coverage could also be linked with Barbados since that country has proposed to upgrade its radar system and link it with its Regional Security System (RSS) partners. TTDF, despite the numerous challenges has continued its efforts of the acquisition of military equipment like naval vessels and helicopters. These are to be used in conjunction with the radar to provide security and military protection within its territorial waters and the wider Caribbean region. Such acquisitions are seen as crucial to the TTDF’s effectiveness of maritime patrols and boosting of security for shipping within the southern Caribbean region while acting as a deterrence against illegal traffickers. The TTDF is also involved in a number of youth programmes locally, namely the Military Led Academic Training (MILAT), which focuses on delinquent youth and youth with conflict, and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) which seeks to empower youth. Pritchard (2018), sees these programmes as providing an opportunity for them to deviate from crime, gun and gang violence thereby impacting positively on the survival of our human resource capability.

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Dialogue on the Illegal Firearm Trend in Trinidad and Tobago Were it not for the illegitimate character of their actions transnational criminals could be lauded as pioneers and visionaries in the age of globalization. They have adopted facilitative and exacting measures to remain competitive, fashioned an enviable organizational culture of efficiency and accountability, and maximized the opportunities provided by globalization. They have been able to innovate, expand, and flourish in a furiously changing international scenario and have done so while been relatively cloaked so that there is an aura of mystery and ambiguity about their operations. (Bryan, 2002, p. 65)

Intelligence gathering by CCSS (2013), unearthed that, individuals from known terrorist regions are heavily involved in the illicit drugs and guns trade and are increasingly mobile in the region. This argument has been supported by the Venezuela Investigative Unit Report (2019), which presented the recent interception of three military-grade weapons and 19 rifles in Venezuela provides evidence that such arms are present and in demand due to Venezuela’s violent political crisis. This is further supported by Trinidad Express Newspaper Article dated 13 July 2014, where several high-powered rifles were among the cache of 359 guns that may have been smuggled into Trinidad and Tobago along its coastal borders. These guns, along with thousands of rounds of ammunition, were seized during raids and police exercises and in some instances, the illegal firearms were found after shoot-outs between police and civilians. Making up some 39 per cent of the total number of firearms seized worldwide, pistols are the most seized type of firearm globally. This has been supported by the accounts of TTDF participant #1, a retired officer with 31 years active service, “Of the 31 years I spent in the TTCG, I was involved in the interception of approximately 500,000 illegal firearms, mostly pistols, automatic 9 mm and revolvers”. Seepersad (2020) adds merit to the argument by adding that Trinidad and Tobago’s close border with Venezuela, increases the possibility of more guns coming in and being used on a wider scale. Moreover, the use of illegal firearms can be

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experienced frequently in other types of offences, there is an awareness of the existence of devious individuals who are willing to trade guns for food and money. Excerpts emanating from the 2017 joint Select Committee (JSC), on National Security reveal that there is an estimated $100 million illegal firearm trade locally. According to the Organized Crime and Intelligence Unit (OCIU) discourse in 2017, the notion that guns and drugs always complement each other is a bit blurred. From the OCIU’s point of view it is evident that there are traffickers who specifically deal with firearms only, given its profitable business. TTDF participant #3, a retired officer with thirty years of active service, reinforces this notion, “there is a drastic change now as you will observe from the news that they are finding more automatic and semi-automatic weapons as they fetch a more lucrative price.” The OCIU (2017) further pointed out that given the range of persons of varying social and economic classes, being arrested for firearms possession, one can only be envisioned who the real recipients of these illegal firearms are. Gillead (2017), asserts that traditionally, the majority of illegal firearms were brought in by way of our porous coastline, predominantly along the South Western Peninsular. Due to the close proximity to Venezuela firearms were easily acquired and made accessible to organized crime groups based on their demands. Further to this, small arms, specifically pistols and revolvers, were regarded as devices for personal protection, murders or robberies, given their concealment advantage. In contrast though, larger firearms such as AK47s, and AR15s were used for drug protection and radical undertakings (Gillead, 2017). This illegal firearm consumer market has expanded to incorporate businessmen, prior crime victims and firearm fanatics, who obtained illegal firearms for subjected motives. As a result, the demand to possess a ‘clean firearm’ is of grave significance as it protects the holder from possible prosecution if the Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS), at the Forensic Science Centre (FSC), ascertains that such firearm was used previously in a crime locally (Gillead, 2017). Firearms sourced through South America as reported by Gillead (2017), were mainly pre-used firearms and only a few were sourced new. The developing consumer-based encouraged traffickers to acquire new

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firearms from North America. These firearms entered our numerous ports by employing varied techniques; via the airports, seaports and smaller tourists’ vessels to name a few. Of these, the most challenging now seems to be the effective manning of the seaports. This is where containers brought in for business and are seemingly unchecked or at best ‘skimmed on the surface’ (Gillead, 2017). This theory has been supported by the Trinidad and Tobago Comptroller of Customs and Excise who was cited in the Trinidad Guardian Newspaper 2017 as saying that forty per cent of the containers entering this country were not scanned. This phenomenon was also endorsed by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), interception in July 2020 of 6 semiautomatic pistols and 9 pistol magazines lodge in a toolbox. It was sent via air courier from Tennessee to Port of Spain. Resultantly, Gillead (2017) surmises that this position offers a degree of difficulty in calculating the total of illegal firearms entering our shores and moreover the amount that is used by the criminal industry. Likewise, he feels that it is nearly impracticable to administer a passing grade, to the interdiction efforts of the agencies, entrusted with protecting our ports and coastlines (TTCG and the Customs and Excise Division), as the supply of illegal firearms continues uninterrupted. This argument is also buttressed by the Joint Select Committee (JSC) on National Security in Trinidad and Tobago, as they investigated the Customs and Excise Division and the Port Authority on their lack of resources to monitor ports against the entry of illegal guns. Notwithstanding the previous argument, the efforts made by the TTPS with regards to illegal firearms recovery can still be gauged. Over the past twenty months January 2019 to August 2020, the TTPS Crime and Problem Analysis Branch (CAPA) responsible for data reported that the TTPS recovered 841,534 firearms and a total of approximately 41,009 rounds of assorted ammunition for that period (CAPA, 2020). It is of major importance to note that for 2019 the total of ammunition seized was 7,948, however for the period January to August 2020 the total for ammunition seized skyrocketed at 33,061. For that same period the 534 firearms seized were 281 pistols, 116 revolvers, 82 shotguns with 35 being homemade, 45 rifles and 10 submachine guns (CAPA, 2020). These figures have been supported by Trinidad and

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Tobago Minister of National Security’s reference to two cases earlier this year where nine AR15s were seized in Belmont and eight AR15s in Four Roads, Diego Martin some weeks later. For the past five years according to data from CAPA, over 2,778 persons were killed with approximately 2,178 (80%) of the murders being gun related. Gillead (2017) infers that the current recovery attempts by the TTPS is promising and speaks firsthand to the commitment of its officers in addressing this situation. Nonetheless, this perspective is at variance with the disheartening slant put forward by the Strategic Services Agency (SSA), that such seizures are merely a drop in the bucket. This notion has been supported by UNODC (2020) Global Study on Firearms Trafficking which cited that in 80 countries, a total of over 500,000 firearms have been seized both in 2016 and 2017. With existing gaps in data coverage in several of these countries and reported difficulties in detecting illicit trafficking flows lead to the conclusion that these amounts are likely to represent just the tip of the iceberg, as higher amounts of illicitly circulating firearms remain undiscovered and unreported (UNODC, 2020).

Theoretical Perspective Routine activities theory at the beginning explained the changes experienced in crime trends however it is now widely used to comprehend and deter the incidence of crime and forms a key component of environmental criminology (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1991). Routine activities theory identifies three elements as being present for a crime to occur: a motivated offender with criminal intentions and the ability to act on these inclinations, a suitable victim or target, and the absence of a capable guardian who can prevent the crime from happening (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Discourse by TTDF participant #2, a retired officer with thirty years active service supports routine activities argument where it was stated that, “criminals are highly motivated and they take advantage of the unmanned spaces of Trinidad and Tobago’s porous borders by carrying out the illegal arms trade.” It is also argued that criminals are also further aided

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by suitable targets due to the presence of over ninety something gangs in Trinidad and Tobago with approximately 95% being citizens and are most frequently involved in drug sales and firearms activity (Katz & Choate, 2010). The other element is the limitations of TTCG & TTAG with coastal patrols, cooperative law enforcement and treaty agreements which can negatively impact the capability, willingness and competency of the guardians. This presence of opportunity coupled with a lack of guardianship therefore increases criminal motivations and the likelihood of an offence taking place. This study therefore will apply the routine activities theory approach to better understand and explore situations, experiences and views of participants. Additionally, this theory also distinctly, provides very practical indications for prevention thus, professionals have applied routine activities theory to guide law enforcement practices and prevention capabilities in making informed crime control decisions.

Participants A total of four (4) retired military each personnel with approximately thirty (30) years of active service participated in semi structured interviews held from 1st March to 12th March 2020. The interviews consisted of thirty (30) questions which were administered via telephone. Participants were selected from TTCG and TTAG as these two units are directly involved in border protection by way of sea patrol and air surveillance respectively.

Discussion Perhaps the clearest lesson of the past decade is that transnational security threats can be only met with multinational security corporation. In today’s strategic environment, security challenges have become too intertwined to be met by a single institution. In today’s world, no country can ensure its security entirely on its own. (Lord George Robertson, 2002)

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Griffith (2004) postulates that effectiveness from a security standpoint has conceptual, moral and physical components. Thus, in the milieu of border security strategy the conceptual composition needed has to incorporate both international and national dimensions. To quote Pritchard (2018), “the networks that we fight against are made of many elements, including terror and criminal connections. As such before we start thinking defeat, we should first consider our response to these networks. It is not a conventional war it is a fluid war. Network wars tend to be a bit more strategic and indeterminate as such we need to do more work in building our own networks to counter networks that are well entrenched, very agile and many times elude us in pursuit of their objectives” (p. 53). Hemispheric security revolves in great part around the notion of sovereignty thus Governments’ control over internal developments and trans border movements is always difficult. Another factor compounding the issue in most Caribbean societies is purposefully weak and decentralized governmental structure which is a product of historical political arrangements often stemming from a colonial legacy Griffith (2004). In some instance legal regulations, law enforcement and defence capabilities are often insufficient to regulate the range of the nation’s boundaries. There are times even with the presence of government authorities the security system is corrupted to the point of being ineffective Griffith (2004). Based on the data put forward by CAPA it is clear that the contemporary explosion of transnational activities, legal and illegal, increases the difficulty for public authorities to exercise control. So, governments face a continuous, expensive struggle to maintain effective sovereignty Griffith (2004). This argument is supported by excerpts from the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Dr Keith Rowley who said, “We took a decision at the level of Cabinet that we are not in a position to pay $200 million to maintain our four Augusta helicopters for one year. We just can’t afford that and if we can’t afford it the helicopters will stay on the ground ,” This lack of government presence and control is seen by Figuera (2004), as producing ungoverned spaces which often occur in urban and rural spaces and offshore territory. An example of this is the issue of funding that has affected the TTCG with a shortage of boats since 1980. Regular supply of fuel for its vessels has also been curtailed thereby negatively

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impacting the ability to deploy its eight large patrol vessels to effectively sustain operations even in Trinidad’s coastal waters. Sadly, ungoverned spaces provide safe havens, logistical bases and revenue generating opportunities for criminals. This coupled with insufficient port security is a major vulnerability in the Caribbean, where sparse resources, connivance of port personnel with transnational criminal organization, corruption and advanced concealment methods present major law enforcement hurdles (Griffith, 2004). Consequently, “the threat to countries in the region is not the military force of the adjacent neighbour, or some invading power. Today’s foe is the narco-trafficker and the arms dealer. This threat is the weed that is planted grown and nurtured in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such as coastlines and unprotected borders. This threat is watered and fertilized with money from illegal drugs and arms sale and respects neither geographical nor moral boundaries.” (Hill, 2003). In light of this, the invaluable tips and recommendations put forward in this chapter echo the thoughts of key TTDF retirees who were interviewed. • Capacity of the external agencies supervising must be revised. • Maintaining social bonds with communities so that intelligence can be gathered on criminal activities especially fisherfolk. • Up to date specialized training for border custodians • Acquiring at least two large vessels to use as platforms on the south and north coasts equipped with long range grid radar coverage to sweep the borders supported by the interceptors to disrupt illegal entry. • Utilization of Drone and Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV), technology to the fullest. The drones can do the surveillance of the borders thereby feeding pertinent data to the command vessel which can initiate interception. The UUV used by naval forces worldwide is another method used to improve operational output by improving presence and persistence, situational awareness and reducing the risk of personnel and corruption. • Another consideration is the Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) for small boats that enables the vessel to independently react to threats and works together as a team to ascertain behaviour. Its ability to recognize, track, trail and classify threats is done by using images provided to the

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USV as well as other indicators. Once another vessel is sensed by the USV it can act to block it from entering your borders based on the instructions given by the command centre.

Conclusion Traditional issues, such as border disputes between Guyana and Venezuela, fishing issues between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, the geopolitics of the region and globalization continue to persist alongside non-traditional ones such as illegal sales of arms and ammunition are some of the issues that characterize the contemporary security landscape in the Caribbean. Thus, in order to deal with these issues, a cooperative and collaborative approach must be adopted (Dillion, 2004, p. 462).

Based on argument by CCSS (2013), the Region can only attain purposeful outcomes in this domain by working with key strategic partners; in particular the states where guns are sourced such as the United States who is seen as a primary originator. While the Region respects the rights of other states to establish liberal policies regarding access to guns, the negative impacts of these gun policies are not confined to their borders. They have very serious consequences for other countries, in the Caribbean like Trinidad and Tobago. So, stemming the tide of the illicit trafficking in guns is therefore a responsibility to be shared not only by CARICOM states but also the countries that are the sources of these weapons (CCSS, 2013). UNODC’s most extensive body of data on firearms trafficking are survey responses and data from 81 countries for 2016–17. These data mirror a clear picture into the patterns of trafficking arms globally, regionally and nationally, providing in depth resources for law enforcement, policymakers and public bodies striving to decrease the damage generated by the illicit movement of firearms. Today’s delivery of security requires that the military becomes more intimately familiar with its potential space which is not only physical arrangements but also the systems and processes organized to ensure that interagency challenges are identified and explored to foster mutual trust

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and confidence (Bishop & Khan, 2004). Additionally, the key to countering the illicit firearms trade is vigilance. Unfortunately, criminals have the upper hand in terms of action since they are able to select the time and place of their next act. This does not mean that nations and security forces are totally at their mercy. Rather, the best counter strategy is eternal vigilance and strategic thinking. Since criminals think out of the box, security personnel must be prepared to adopt the same action and try to think like a criminal in this way, it may be possible to view the world from their position and preempt possible actions before they occur (Mitchell, 2007). Focus must now be placed, on empowering the institutions that are available such as the Implementing Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS). There also needs to be more tolerance to sharing information, experiences and preparing together outside of annual exercise thereby developing a one for all and all for one culture in fighting the illicit gun trade (Pritchard, 2018). Regrettably, illicit trafficking impacts the structure of policy and governance which influences the global economy, yet policymakers frequently disregard the adaptability, ingenuity and powerful nature of transnational criminal network today. Many governments have failed by internalizing that equitability of policy, regulation and law enforcement will somehow stem the influx of illicit arms (Pritchard, 2018). The illicit trade is now a complicated occurrence desiring in depth brainpower and diverse, results-oriented techniques, as such there is greater need now more than ever for parity among all stakeholders. It is important to note that the TTDF is always committed and has managed the situation reasonably well, but there is the concern that if the present situation is not efficiently and effectively managed it can escalate into something much worse (Pritchard, 2018). TTDF participant #4, a retired officer with thirty years active service also adds merit to this argument by saying, “I would say the TTDF is failing in its fight because with the resources the TTDF have presently they are doing the best they can with very little in some cases obsolete technology to stop the illegal entry of drugs, migrants and firearms from entering the borders of Trinidad and Tobago. I think we can improve on the collaboration and communication with the police in a cohesive attempt to stem the influx of arms and ammunication.”

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It is quite clear from the arguments put forward that since the turn of the century, the demand on the armed forces to assist in the fight against crime in Latin America and the Caribbean has increased. Such demand for intervention has intensified with the rise of larger, more lethal and more sophisticated national and transnational criminal organization. This evidence suggests that when governments enlist the help of the military it is often to satisfy political demands for more stringent measures which include the deployment of soldiers (Pion-Berlin & Carreras, 2017). Combining capacities of the military forces and other key institutions from different spheres of power must be structured to generate effective policy development and progress. Military capability is now seen as a crucial underpinning of safety and security which directly strengthens political credibility. Thus restructuring military proficiency is a main stake for the future of security which must be understood by the population. This type of strategy speaks not only to Trinidad and Tobago’s reality, it reflects countries within Latin America and the Caribbean. In light of this, CARICOM IMPACS and the Small Arms Survey (SAS) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 13 January 2021, formalizing existing cooperation. This Agreement reinforces efforts to improve the capacity of CARICOM States to prevent the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons and augment States’ application of responsibility under international and regional arms control mechanisms, with a special emphasis on advancing more evidence-based policy to reduce armed violence in the Region (CARICOM IMPACS, 2021). The timely establishment of such intervention has occurred at a crucial point with the embarkation of a progressive roadmap in the region to tackle the illicit arms trade and its impacts (de Torres, 2021). He further added that there is an anticipation to working with CARICOM IMPACS so as to execute the roadmap’s primary targets. It will also facilitate the provision of reliable data, supported by indicators best suited for the region to aid monitoring and evaluation, as well as exploring avenues for developing sustainable and effective interventions (de Torres, 2021). Consequently, it is requisite, that every effort be made to fortify the battle against, the illicit gun trade that drives violence by criminal organisations, thereby reducing illicit firearms violence not just

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in Trinidad and Tobago but throughout CARICOM States. On that account, Young (2019), suggests that the fight must be taken to the criminals legislatively by way of our surveillance channels, through the collaboration of Trinidad and Tobago Police Service and Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. These combined with expansive research, grounded on well, constructed evidence, will be the driving force of the implementation of pertinent policy to put a dent in firearms trafficking and at the same time stepping up attempts to counter criminality.

References Bishop, C., & Khan, O. (2004). The anti-terrorism capacity of Caribbean security forces in Caribbean security in the age of terror: Challenge and change edited by Ivelaw L. Griffith. Ian Randle Publishers Kingston. Brantingham, P. J., & Brantingham, P. L. (1991). Environmental Criminology. Waveland Press. Bryan, A. T. (2002). Transnational organised crime in the Caribbean: The international relations context. In R. Ramsaran (cd.), Caribbean survival and the global challenge (p. 65). Ian Randle Publishing. CAPA. (2020). Crime and problem analysis branch. Trinidad and Tobago: TTPS CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy. (2013). Securing the region territoty (2013). Retrieved from https://caricomimpacs.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2020/11/CARICOM-CRIME-AND-SECURITY-STRATEGY.pdf CARICOM IMPACS. (2021). Reduction of gun violence in the Caribbean. Retrieved from https://today.caricom.org/2021/01/14/caricom-impacs-andthe-small-arms-survey-establish-a-memorandum-of-understanding-to-red uce-gun-violence-in-the- caribbean. CIA World Fact Book. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/the-world-fac tbook/countries/world/. Clausewitz, C. V. (1962). War politics, and power: Selections from on war and I believe and profess (trans. and edited by Edward M. Collins, p. 86). Regnery Gateway, Washington, DC: Princeton University Press. Clausewitz, C. V. (1984). On war (M. Howard and P. Paret, Eds., pp. 88–89). Princeton University Press. Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. American Sociological Review, 44 (4), 588–608.

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de Torres, D. (2021). Reduction of gun violence in the Caribbean. CARICOM IMPACS. Retrieved from https://today.caricom.org/2021/01/14/caricomimpacs-andthe-small-arms-survey-establish-a-memorandum-of-understan ding-to-reduce-gun-violence-in-the-caribbean. Dillion, E. (2004). Regional security cooperation: Traditional and non traditional areas in Caribbean security. In I. L. Griffith (Ed.), The age of terror: Challenge and change. Ian Randle Publishers Kingston. Figueira, D. (2004). Cocaine and Heroin trafficking in the Caribbean: The case of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Guyana. iUniverse, Inc. General Hill, James T. (2003). Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/ful ltext/u2/a418260.pdf Gillard, C. (2017, July–September). A discussion on firearm trends within Trinidad and Tobago. TTPS Quarterly, Issue No. 5. Griffith, I. L. (1997). Illicit arms trafficking corruption and governance in the Caribbean. Penn State International Law Review, 15 (3), 487–507. Griffith I, L. (2004). Caribbean security in the age of terror: Challenge and change. Ian Randle Publishers Kingston. Hernandez, C. (2018). The decline of insurgencies and Gurerrilla warfare in Latin America. Retrieved from https://dialogo-americas.com/magazines/ Interview with Retired Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Respondent #1 (Telephone 1st to 12th March 2020). Interview with Retired Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Respondent #2 (Telephone 1st to 12th March 2020). Interview with Retired Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Respondent #3 (Telephone 1st to 12th March 2020). Interview with Retired Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force Respondent #4 (Telephone 1st to 12th March 2020). Joint Select Committee 2017 Illegal Firearms. Retrieved from https://newsday. co.tt/2019/02/21/8154-illegal-guns-in-tt/ Katz. C., & Fox, A. (2010). Risk and protective factors associated with gang— Involved youth in Trinidad and Tobago. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, 27 (3). Katz, C., & Choate, D. (2010). Diagnosing Trinidad and Tobago’s Gang problem. Arizona State University Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety. Manwaring, M. G., Fontela, W., Grizzard, M., & Rempe, D. (2003). Foreword. In T. Hills (Ed.), Building regional security cooperation in the western hemisphere: Issues and recommendations. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11250

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Ministry of National Security. (2020). Trinidad and Tobago defence force. Retrieved from http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.tt/Divisions/Trinidad-andTobago-Defence-Force-TTDF. Mitchell. C, L. (2007). Countering maritime terrorism in the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean: Implications of possible Maritime terrorism in the Caribbean. Retrieved from http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:kBH WXXnjtYJ:scholar.google.com/&hl=en&as_sdt=2000 Pion-Berlin. D, & Carreras, M. (2017). Armed forces, police and crimefighting in Latin America. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 9 (3), 3–26. Pritchard, H. (2018). Caribbean commitment against Iilicit networks. Retrieved from https://dialogo-americas.com/magazines/ Remarks from Prime Minister Dr. Keith Rowley. (2020). Post cabinet media briefing. Retrieved from https://tt.loopnews.com/content/helicoptersgrounded-200m-maintenance-too-costly Remarks by Gen. James Hill, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command (Miami: North-South Center, March 3, 2003). Retrieved from http://www. ciponline.org/colombia/03030301.htm Seepersad, R. (2020). Jilted men with illegal firearms. Retrieved from https:// www.guardian.co.tt/news/jilted-men-with-illegal-firearms-6.2.1044262.842 fe566f0 Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson: “Prague 2002: Challenge and Change for NATO” at the NATO/GMFUS Conference. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_19716.htm University of Trinidad and Tobago. (2007). BORDER PROTECTION: MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE . Retrieved from https://utt.edu.tt/upl oads/07_TTCG_Enhancing_Ocean_Governance_FINAL.pdf. Trinidad Express Newspaper. (2014). Illegal guns. Retrieved from https://trinid adexpress.com/news/dana-gun-still-on-the-streets-266896421.html Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of National Security. (2020). Roles of Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force. (2020). Retrieved from http://www.nationalsecu rity.gov.tt/ UNODC. (2004). Transnational organised crime. Retrieved from https://www. unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-crime/UNI TED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_ ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_THERETO.pdf UNODC. (2020). Global study on firearms trafficking. Retrieved from https:// www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/firearms-study.html

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VIU. (2019). Recent arms seizures underscore risks of Venezuela’s political tension. Retrieved from https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/recent-arms-seizuresamid-venezuelas-political-tension/ Young. S. (2019). Illegal firearm legislation. Retrieved from Minister of National Security proposes illegal firearm legislation | Trinidad and Tobago Government News.

9 Past and Present Trends in Gun Violence and Gangs and Their Implications in Belize: 2011–2020 Wayne J. Pitts and Christopher S. Inkpen

Introduction Trending upwards since 2015, Belize has had one of the highest national homicide rates in the world, averaging just under 40 per 100,000 persons (OSAC During the same period, the UNODC (2019, 2020, 2021a) has identified Belize’s annual homicide rate among the top ten countries in the world. Immediate neighbours El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala also have high comparative homicide rates, making the northern part of Central America one of the world’s most homicidal subregions. Overall, homicide is the fifth leading cause of death for all persons in Belize W. J. Pitts (B) · C. S. Inkpen RTI International, Research Triangle Park, NC, USA e-mail: [email protected] C. S. Inkpen e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_9

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behind cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes and respiratory infections—however, among people ages 15–49 years old, homicide is the leading cause of death (Roser & Ritchie, 2019). This pattern is similar in neighbouring Latin American countries. By comparison, homicide in Western Europe is not among the top ten causes of death for younger persons and it is the sixth leading cause among young people in the U.S. (Roser & Ritchie, 2019). Firearms are at the heart of much of Belize’s violence and crime. Though firearm offences come with strict penalties and can result in lengthy jail sentences, approximately two-thirds of all homicides are committed using a gun (OSAC, 2020). Other violent crimes, including domestic violence, robberies, assaults, kidnappings, are also regularly committed using firearms. In 2019, 261 shooting incidents occurred nationwide, representing one-fifth of total major crimes. Unintentional shootings and firearm accidents are too common and self-inflicted gunshot wounds are the leading cause of suicide fatalities in Belize. The widespread circulation of guns—both licit and illicit—is a growing concern, particularly because the types of firearms circulating are increasingly sophisticated and include military-style weapons (Alpers & Picard, 2020). While the Government of Belize (2018) gun laws require a thorough background check, a waiting period of at least six months, controls for the maximum calibre allowed, and ammunitions access, such measures do little to address illicit gun ownership. In 2017, 10,755 civilians owned a registered firearm whereas the number of unregistered firearms was estimated to be more than double that number at 26, 245 (Alpers & Picard, 2020). Since 2015, the Belize Police Department has progressively increased its seizure of firearms and ammunition (Belize Crime Observatory, 2021). The available data on firearms and ammunition in Belize is deficient because of the large number of unregistered weapons. Documentation of legal imports of guns and ammo are more complete. Firearms seized by the police offer an additional piece of information, but it is also incomplete and may reflect the efficiency of certain police operations rather than the actual number of legal and illegal weapons in the country. Disaggregating information to districts is also especially difficult and even if the data did allow for summaries of sales and seizures by the municipality, the movement of guns and

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gun owners across townships, districts and international borders would further complicate any analysis. None of the previously discussed estimates address what other factors might affect increases or decreases in the number of illegal firearms in Belize at any given time. This is important because the arms market is not static; therefore, the number of weapons varies depending on certain factors. These could include successful community-based violence prevention programmes, the efficiency in arrests by the Belize Police Department, the number of convictions brought by prosecutors and the Ministry of the Attorney General and the subsequent punishments applied, the successful internal control of weapons and ammunition according to the Firearms Act, shifts in behaviour among the organized crime elements active in the country (i.e., “wars” between gangs, drug market instability), the number of weapons that become obsolete or dysfunctional, and, potentially, other factors.

Method This research began as part of a project funded by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) through the U.S Embassy in Belmopan, Belize as part of the project, ‘Improving the Data Ecosystem for Governance Decision Making in Belize’, (INL project number SLMAQM18GR219). This two-year activity, which was completed in 2020, focussed on building capacity among Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and civil service actors to promote enhanced governance accountability across a spectrum of topics. The specific project activities emphasized strategies to improve knowledge and skills to develop policies and procedures aimed at using high-quality open data sources to inform government decisionmaking. Some government agencies, such as the Statistical Institute of Belize, the Ministry of Natural Resources and others, collect and maintain excellent databases on a variety of topics important to Belizeans. However, like many government agencies worldwide, public access to these data resources is often challenging because of a variety of reasons including privacy restrictions, inadequate networks and computing

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capacity, limited access to the internet, complex bureaucracy, incongruent data formats, lack of software, political interests and limited human resources. Among the products developed for this work were several research briefs developed using open data sources, that is data that can be freely accessed and shared without copyright restrictions or any other controls. The project resulted in CSOs and community leaders having access and more information about improved data sources as well as specific knowledge on strategies for using open data and applying rigorous research methods to promote government accountability for improved services and intervention strategies in these areas. The information presented here was provided by the Belize Police Department through the open data repositories maintained by Belize Crime Observatory (BCO), which mission is ‘established for the collection, processing, analysis and storage of crime data, with a view of providing timely, reliable, and relevant information to its users’, (BCO, 2021). The BCO website (https://bco.gov.bz/) serves as a national crime dashboard which includes detailed analyzes of timely crime data using modern data-science-driven visualization approaches. Importantly, the BCO website also allows for crime data, purged of any personally identifying information, to be downloaded and independently analyzed. The secondary data analyses presented here were informed by informal conversations and interactions with Belizean police officers and international police advisors. This effort also included a thorough review of the Belizean Criminal Code and the Substantive Laws of Belize related to gun control and gun-related crimes.

Globalization of Firearms Firearm manufacture and distribution is a global enterprise driven by international business interests that promote the integration of markets to reduce barriers to access. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the 25 largest firearm companies in the world generated some US$361 billion in 2019, an 8.5% increase over the previous year and world gun manufacturers and dealers are looking to expand market shares by expanding growth into the global

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South (SIPRI, 2020). Belize does not manufacture firearms however, based on conversations about gun seizures with Belizean police officers and law enforcement advisors as well as a review of gun dealer websites in Belize, the worldwide diversity of firearm manufacturers in Belize is striking. These include Argentina (Bersa), Austria (Glock), Brazil (Taurus), Bulgaria (Arcus), Hungary (FEG), Israel (Bul Cherokee and Jericho), Italy (Beretta), Turkey (Akdal and Canik), South Korea (Daewoo) and the United States (Colt and Smith & Wesson) though, it is notable that relatively few weapons originate from Mexico (Industrias Cabañas, Mendoza, and Trejo), the closest international manufacturer of firearms. While the countries of origin of firearms in Belize are of general interest, the deeper context of firearm distribution, including trafficking, and how these firearms are related to various types of crimes is far more thought-provoking. A brief consideration of the Global South (and Global North) literature on guns and gun violence is worthwhile. There are more than 1,000 small arms manufacturers worldwide operating in approximately 65 countries, though the top five exporters between 2016 and 2020 accounted for 76% of global firearm exports: United States (37%), Russia (20%), France (8.2%), Germany (5.5%) and China (5.2%) (Wezeman et al., 2021). Based on the Small Arms Survey (2021), 21 countries, all in the Global North, exported US$100 million or more in total sales for weapons, ammunition, parts, or accessories in at least one year between 2001 and 2017 (Small Arms Survey, 2021). Perhaps not surprisingly, countries in the Global North produce and import the most light weapons in the world, while nearly all small arms in the Global South originate in the Global North which raises important questions about global supply and demand. This of course has serious implications for developing a theory for the political economy of guns. If the supply of weapons is the driving force, then the theoretical focus becomes the production and distribution of guns and how they ultimately end up being used for violent and illegal activities (Schroeder et al., 2006). If demand is the theoretical focus, then it is necessary to consider some of the key drivers including the culture of violence, civil unrest, gangs and gang culture, high levels of crime and violence, impunity and weak rule of law, human rights violations, terrorist radicalization, etc. (UNODC, 2021b). Furthermore,

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social theory largely developed and tested in the Global North is often inadequate for explaining the conditions of the Global South. These caveats and important considerations are especially important in Belize, a former Commonwealth country with a complex colonial past located geographically in Central America, but more culturally similar to other former Commonwealth Caribbean nations. Determining the root causes of violence in Belize is complex. The prevalence of firearms underscores the fact that exposure to guns, especially in urban regions, is part of negotiating and resolving conflicts in the community and inside the home. Moreover, gangs, drugs and other black-market activities are also important factors to consider. Since 2002, gang violence has been on the rise (Baird, 2019, 2020). The ‘Code of the Street’, in which reputation and saving face are paramount, combined with easy firearm access, leads to increased gang-related murders. In this code, guns are symbols of protection and status and promote a masculine identity (Anderson, 2000). Of the annual deaths resulting from firearms between 2007 and 2014, 95% of the victims were male. In 2009, 83% of the victims were youths with an average age range between 15 and 29 years old (Gayle & Mortis, 2010). Baird (2019) argues that Belizean gang behaviours are rooted in transnational masculinity that has established ‘patriarchy of the streets’ that accentuates the situation in Belize. According to data published by the Belize Crime Observatory (2021), firearms violence is on the rise since 2011. The departments of Ladyville, Hattieville, San Ignacio, Belmopan, Dangriga, Independence and Precinct 4 all had increases in shooting incidents compared to 2018 (Fig. 9.1). At the district level, over the last decade, Belize City has consistently been the district with the highest reported crime incidents involving firearms, with nearly two-thirds of all gun crimes occurring in this one district. Though female homicide rates have been steady between five and eight during the past decade, a close look at the data reveals that the use of firearms against women in homicide crimes have been slowly trending upwards. From 2009 to 2020, 155 female homicides occurred and 40.7% were committed with a firearm. Other methods include knife (22.6%) machete (7.7%), hands (6.5%), unknown (11.6%) and other methods (11.0%). In 2020, 7 out of the 11 female homicides were

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124 1429

1352

50 0

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5,694 4,852 218

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Number of Shooting Incidents or Firearms Seized

Shooting incidents and firearm and ammunition seizures: 2011-2019

Year Ammunition Seized

Shooting incidents

Firearms Seized

Fig. 9.1 Shooting incidents and firearms seized in Belize, 2011–2019 (Source Belize Police Department, Joint Intelligence Coordinating Center: Reported Crimes Comparative Statistics [2020])

carried out with a firearm (63.6%) (Belize Crime Observatory, 2021). See Fig. 9.2 for a presentation of homicide rates by gender since 2009. Homicide Rates by Gender 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2009

2010

2011

2012

Male

2013

2014

Female

2015 Total

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Linear (Total)

Fig. 9.2 Belize homicide rates by gender per 100,000, 2009–2020 (Source Belize Crime Observatory, 2021)

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Gun Ownership in Belize Belize, known as a British Honduras until 1973, was the last British colony on the American mainland. Belize achieved independence in 1981 but, it continues its relationship as a British Commonwealth nation. The government is modelled after the British parliamentary system and the Belizean legal system has developed from its foundations in English common law. The Firearm Act, Chapter 143 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, has evolved through various iterations following the first legislation related to firearms in 1913. Though gun licenses have been legally required since 1987, the most important update of the law occurred in 2003, 2011 and 2018. Under current legislation, all assault rifles, machine guns, ‘sawed off ’ or otherwise modified weapons, and any rifled long gun using ammunition larger than 7.62 millimetres are illegal. Additionally, shotguns may not have barrels of less than 18 inches and handguns larger than 9 millimetres are not allowed. Homemade and weapons altered to become semi or fully automatic, as well as sound suppressors, extended magazines, equipment used to reload spent cartridges, unregistered bullet-proof vests and armour-piercing ammunition of any calibre are prohibited. The amendments made to the Firearms Act in 2018 allows special gun licencing considerations for citizens of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries which include fifteen member states of Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat (a British overseas territory in the Leeward Islands), Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The CARICOM associate nations of Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands,and observer nations of Aruba, Colombia, Curaçao, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Sint Maarten and Venezuela have no special privileges under in the Act. Gun licensure in Belize is separated into two categories: (1) permits for Belizean and CARICOM Nationals, or CARICOM Companies, and, (2) licenses for non-citizens, non-CARICOM Nationals and foreign companies. The least expensive type of gun licence in Belize is the Farmer Gun Licence which costs BZE$5 annually, whereas a Company Gun

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Licence for up to sixty firearms costs BZE$32,000 per year. Updates to the Firearms Act in 2018 require licensure renewal every three years (see Table 9.1). The Belize Ministry of Home Affairs has operational and disciplinary control over the Belize Police Department. All applications for firearm licensure are subject to review and approval of the Belize Commissioner of Police, who has wide discretion to reject any application, and every applicant must present reasonable grounds as to why a licence should be issued. The Commissioner has the authority to specify the maximum number of rounds of ammunition that a gun owner can possess. Although rejections can occur, applicants do have an appeals process. Table 9.1 Types and annual cost of gun licences in Belizean dollars (BZE)

Type of gun licence Special protection licence Gun repair licence Sport hunter licence Farmer gun licence Shooting range Shooting club Firearm safety instructor Heirloom firearm licence Company gun licence (Category A: < 11 firearms) Company gun licence (Category B: 11–20 firearms) Company gun licence (Category C: 21–40 firearms) Company gun licence (Category D: 41–60 firearms)

Cost for Citizen of Belize, CARICOM national, or CARICOM company

Cost for non-Belizean, non-CARICOM National, or foreign company

$225

$1,500

$200 $450 $5 $1,000 $500 $500 $300

$500 $750 $250 $3,000 $1,500 $1,500 $600

$4,000

$10,000

$8,000

$20,000

$16,000

$40,000

$32,000

$80,000

Source Government of Belize. (2018). Belize Firearms Act, Chapter 143, revised edition

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The Belize Firearm Act is strict in many regards, though applicants as young as 16 years old are eligible to apply for a licence. Applicants must not have any criminal convictions during the past three years at the time of application. Another notable caveat of the Firearms Act is that any licenced firearm carrier who loses or has their firearm stolen due to negligence is unqualified to receive a new firearm permit. Firearm owners that forget to renew their licence may be detained by police and incarcerated without bail for one month. Any person who is suspected to be or is found to be in possession of an illegal firearm or ammunition as defined by the Firearms Act is subject to firearm seizure and immediate arrest without a warrant. Most violations of the Belize Firearms Act are punishable by a minimum of two years in prison for a first offence and a subsequent offence carries an imprisonment penalty of no less than three years. Since 2011, firearm (and ammunition) seizures have increased, enforcement as evidenced by firearm arrests have remained flat at just over 100 individuals arrested per year. According to the 2020 Belize Central Prison Annual Report, 724 individuals were convicted and sentenced to serve time in the Belize Central Prison, the nation’s only penitentiary with only 3% convicted of a firearm offence as their most serious charge. Another 1,099 persons were remanded, including 72 individuals being held for a firearm offence. Based on the census of the total population incarcerated on December 31, 2020, there were 56 individuals in custody including those convicted and remanded encompassing 5% of the total head count (Murillo, 2021) (Fig. 9.3).

Addressing Gun Violence in Belize—Prevention Tips Concerns about gun violence in Belize are not unique, though there are commonalities across nations regarding the possible solutions to address these pervasive concerns. However, based on this research, we have several specific recommendations to address gun violence in Belize. There are multiple institutional and logistical challenges to addressing gun violence in Belize. Though small in population, the total land area of Belize is especially challenging for government agencies to provide

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Trends in Firearms Seizures and Arrests 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Firearms Seized

Firearm Arrests

Linear (Firearms Seized)

Linear ( Firearm Arrests)

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Fig. 9.3 Firearms Seized by Arrests in Belize, 2011–2020 (Source Belize Crime Observatory, 2021)

services. Lack of government reach and limited infrastructure in remote areas pose distinct barriers, while densely populated and deep-rooted poverty in urban areas have conspicuously different set of complex risk factors. Increasing migration from Central and South America as well as transitory migrants en route to the United States from other areas also have a marked impact on domestic priorities and require additional resources. Steps to address gun violence in Belize must necessarily include international, national and local coordination. Civil society organizations (CSO) in Belize should target these challenges and lead the public discourse to address these issues. CSOs play a major role and have significant responsibility in leading grassroots activities to address gun violence. CSOs that aim to address reductions in violence should support community outreach activities and to implement municipal safety and gun violence prevention plans with key stakeholders (i.e., youth, women, community organizers, faith leaders, public officials, law enforcement, researchers, international donors) involved in every aspect of the process. Research has shown that gangs in Belize tend to protect their own communities and operate outside their territories (Martinez, 2014). This apparent allegiance to community represents an opportunity for CSOs

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to strengthen community ties, collective conscience and to reinforce community-based problem-solving. School truancy is problematic in Belize. Recognizing juvenile delinquency occurring during school hours is critical to launching enforcement programming to promote truancy abatement. Compulsory educational participation must be encouraged and vocational programming, grounded in measured labour market needs, should be promoted. To reduce firearm violence in Belize, it is imperative to strengthen social intervention programmes in Belize City focussing on creating opportunities for youth. Unemployed, disenfranchised youth in Belize City are perhaps the most significant challenge facing the entire country. Meaningful vocational training opportunities are rare. Extra-curricular activities, affordable leisure pursuits and opportunities for positive community engagement must be cultivated in order to promote alternatives to youth gang participation. Belize City Violence prevention programme targeting youth should become a greater priority and implementers should introduce strategies to reduce stigma affecting participation. Violence prevention programmes need to achieve a higher scale and intensity to effectively impact the community. Importantly, government authorities need to consider the gendered differences in gun crimes in Belize and pursue interventions to target these unique needs and risk factors. Deeper understandings of violent and criminal victimology in Belize could offer improved early intervention strategies. Activities are needed to monitor the illicit trafficking of weapons and to enforce existing laws. While the Belize Police Department, the Joint Intelligence Coordinating Center/Interpol (JICC/INTERPOL) and the Belize Crime Observatory produce analyzes of gun crimes, these entities should review the variables collected and pursue opportunities to include additional data points for consideration. Belize has notably resisted signing on to the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), sometimes referred to as the 1969 Pact of San José, and this should be reconsidered. Fundamental human rights of Belizeans are compromised by gun violence. These rights include: the right to life, the right to security of person, the right to health and mental health, the right to education, rights to equal protection under law and freedom from discrimination, the rights of children and

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the rights of women. The Organization of American States (OAS), of which Belize is a member, is responsible for overseeing compliance of the ACHR through the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The OAS includes 35 member countries and serves to promote cooperation between the countries. The ACHR is the principal human rights treaty of the OAS though only 23 member states have signed and ratified the agreement (Loveland, 2020). The ACHR is an important international human rights body that has the competence to receive complaints concerning human rights violations in Belize. The resistance of the remaining OAS member states, including Belize, seriously undermines the legitimacy of the OAS and weakens international responses to human rights protections (Cerna, 2019). Belize and those countries who have thus far refused to accept and ratify the ACHR should face international pressure, even sanctions, to fulfil their commitments to the OAS and to the promotion of universal human rights. Addressing violence and gun crime necessarily must involve the Belize Police Department who must be both well-trained and equipped to respond to suspected gun crimes. This manuscript points to an increasing prevalence of gun crime and a consistently high homicide rate and highlights the estimated prevalence of unregistered guns in Belize. Proactive approaches to preventing gun violence in Belize begin with enforcing regulatory and criminal enforcement of ownership and sales. The Government of Belize already has especially inclusive and detailed laws and regulations in place as part of the Firearms Act. However, enforcement of these laws is the primary challenge. Based on the author’s conversations with Belizean police personnel, the primary weapon of choice and the one most often used in crimes using firearms, are 9 millimetres millimetres handguns. Military grade assaults rifles, shotguns and long guns, in general, are not the main issue. Instead, the government should seek to fund and encourage research into the drivers of gun availability and recognize gun violence as a preventable public health matter. With regards to legal possession of firearms, the Government of Belize should bolster background checks, licencing and regulation of ammunition and gun quantities. At the same time, the Government of Belize

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should focus repressive efforts on firearms trafficking into Belize to stem the growth of unregistered firearms. The Belize Police Department should furthermore adopt an approach to gun violence prevention using a community informed, place-based and person-driven focussed deterrence strategy. Focussed deterrence strategies are problem-oriented policing strategies that follow the core principle of deterrence theory: the costs of committing crime must outweigh the benefits. Focussed deterrence strategies are most effective when authorities target specific criminal behaviour committed by a small number of chronic offenders who are vulnerable to sanctions and punishment. Following this strategy, Belizean police would engage in patrol activities to confront and inform suspected gang members and other potential gun crime perpetrators to inform them that continued criminal behaviour will not be tolerated. Targeted potential offenders will be told how the criminal justice system will respond to illegal gun possession. The deterrence-based messages will be reinforced through random observations of Belize Police Department patrol teams, surveillance equipment and enhanced community reporting programmes to identify offenders. Community outreach activities will be used to make suspects aware of alternatives to gun crimes (i.e., social and athletic events, employment, and educational opportunities). Similarly, efforts to reduce gun trafficking with focussed deterrence could correlate with a reduced pool of lethal weapons and could consequently have an impact on overall violence in Belize. It is especially important to acknowledge and identify both the victims and perpetrators of gun violence in Belize—younger men. Harmful norms among Belizean boys and men are embedded in latent and manifest behaviours connected to reclaiming, establishing and retaining social power and privilege (Baird, 2019, 2020). Civil society organizations and government actors should emphasize public messaging, community outreach and activities with schools that support healthy norms relating to masculinity. Gun violence interventions should also promote hospitalbased violence prevention programming, especially focussing on youth. Additionally, trained mediators with community ties, familiar with local gang dynamics, have proven effective at helping to reduce conflict, in contrast, to direct policing approaches (Peirce, 2017). More communitybased mediation training is needed. Restorative justice practices such as

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healing circles, victim-offender mediation, peer mediation and community group conferencing, are most often used at the early stages of involvement in the criminal justice system (Wilson et al., 2017). These practices appear promising for reducing recidivism and improving victim satisfaction, though the impact on the larger community is still unclear (Latimer et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2017). Youth attitudes towards gun violence and weapons carrying are predictive of future behaviours involving guns (Nickerson et al., 2020). Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) has proven effective in helping individuals to identify and change destructive thought patterns that can lead to negative behaviours (Barnes et al., 2016; Hoffman et al., 2012; Lipsey, 2009). These cost-effective programmes offer significant promise to community-based public health and mental health providers in Belize.

Conclusion Ten years after independence, one author referred to Belize as ‘an omitted land’, a new nation which rarely receives mention in Latin American and Caribbean scholarly works or media sources outside its borders (Ergood, 1991). Now, decades later, Belize remains understudied, misunderstood and rarely included in the international discourse. At the time of publication, a Google Scholar search of academic article titles including the words ‘Belize’ and ‘crime’ returns only eight citations. This neglect of Belize could be due to its small population or, the fact that there is only Galen University that offers a criminal justice degree programme in the country. This chapter has provided an overview of violence, gun laws and gun crimes in Belize and includes some recommended solutions for intervention strategies for communities, civil society organizations and importantly, the government of Belize. Despite restrictive gun laws, shooting incidents and ammunition and weapons seizures have been persistently trending upwards since 2012 and the homicide rate in Belize rivals, and often exceeds, its more notorious neighbours in Central America. The complex causes of gun crimes in Belize are likely driven by an amalgam of cultural norms and values of masculinity that interact with pervasive gang presence, widespread

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firearm accessibility, poverty and underdevelopment. These drivers are aided in part by a criminal justice system response that lacks capacity and infrastructure. The proposed solutions are similarly intricate, requiring political resolve, increased involvement from citizens, and strengthened by a well-trained and equipped police department committed to a using a community informed, place-based and person-driven focussed deterrence strategy. Key stakeholders from civil society including community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations and local foundations must be part of an effective response. Investments from international development organizations should seek to reinforce and strengthen the rule of law and to promote a strategy to improve economic opportunities and resilience.

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10 An Evaluation of Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides in Trinidad and Tobago—2010 to 2016 Wendell C. Wallace, Ayinka Nikesha Nurse-Carrington, and Akinee Harry

Introduction Guns are frequently the weapon of choice used to inflict lethal violence, for example, homicide, suicide, wounding and unintentional injuries. Globally, guns, commonly known as small arms or firearms (United Nations General Assembly, 1997), are used to kill approximately 1,000 W. C. Wallace (B) Department of Behavioural Sciences, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago e-mail: [email protected] A. N. Nurse-Carrington · A. Harry The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago e-mail: [email protected] A. Harry e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_10

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people each day (Geneva Declaration, 2008; IANSA, 2006). Additionally, thousands of individuals are wounded, maimed, intimidated and/or their lives are thrown into turmoil as a result of people with guns. Instructively, the turmoil described above has not bypassed Trinidad and Tobago as gun violence and gun homicides appear to be a daily regimen in the life of residents on the island. The nature of gun violence, combined with the frequency of media reports of gun violence and gun homicides on a daily basis in Trinidad and Tobago has substantially impacted residents (as well as visitors) perceptions of safety and security on the island. Instructively, gun violence is not confined to deaths as many residents of Trinidad and Tobago are also non-fatally injured in acts involving the use of a firearm each year. These deaths and non-fatal injuries include acts of interpersonal violence, police involved deaths (e.g., death/injury inflicted by police officers during the course of duty), self-directed violence (suicide), accidental deaths involving the use of a firearm, and acts where the intent remain undetermined. These will be examined later in this book chapter. The turmoil and subsequent carnage caused by guns are not lost on scholars and world leaders as Cornell and Guerra (2013), for example, point out that in the USA, more than 31,000 deaths and 78,000 nonfatal injuries occur every year as a result of gun violence, while Annan (2000), submits “The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems — and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as ‘weapons of mass destruction.” In sum, gun violence and gun homicides affect individuals, groups and society in general on a profound level. As a result of the butchery of humankind caused by guns, Grillot et al. (2006), cogitate that civic society groups and governments began elucidating concerns about the heightened access to illegally obtained small arms. This concern is not the sole domain of members of academia or developed countries, but also extends to Small Island Developing States (SIDS) such as Trinidad and Tobago (see studies by Holder & Mutota, 2006; Wells et al., 2010), as the proliferation of small arms is an issue in its own right (Laurence, 2001).

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For some scholars, gun violence is appropriated as a national problem that leads to a large number of deaths and non-fatal injuries each year (Cornell & Guerra, 2013) as well as an urgent, complex and multifaceted problem requiring evidence-based, multifaceted solutions (Cornell & Guerra, 2013). Conversely, Cornell and Guerra (2013), also point out that guns are not necessarily the cause of homicides as they can be used for a variety of activities and this is applicable to Trinidad and Tobago’s jurisdiction. Guns, however, provide unscrupulous individuals with the enhanced capacity to conduct nefarious activities such as extortion, robbery and fatal shootings, all which inflict severe pain, trauma, grief and insecurity on societies worldwide. Instructively, though gun violence and gun homicides are more prevalent and substantially higher in some jurisdictions, such as the USA, when compared with other jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and many others (Alpers & Wilson, 2013), gun violence is not the sole province of any one country. In fact, gun violence and the resultant homicides do not discriminate by country, gender, nationality, age, socio-economic status or religion. In the words, social problems [such as gun violence and homicides] are no longer confined to small geographical areas (Blakely, 2018), hence the non-discriminatory and prevalent nature of gun violence in almost every region of the world. In a similar vein, gun violence is a complex and multifaceted problem (APA, 2013) that demands a multifaceted approach and increasing attention as guns and the associated killings have a demoralizing and possibly decimating effect. From Trinidad and Tobago’s perspective, successive governments have attempted to control access to guns, gun violence by way of a plethora of plans, including, but not limited to gun amnesties (Holder & Mutota, 2006), legislation, seizures and increased border patrols. These plans are in congruence with attempts to control gun violence in the USA, for example, whereby in 2013 former President Barack Obama announced the ‘Now Is the Time’ plan (White House, 2013) that was aimed at addressing gun violence in an attempt to protect children and communities by the issuance of 23 executive orders to federal agencies.

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In Trinidad and Tobago’s context, accounts of drive-by shootings, homicides and other forms of gun violence are frequent subjects in the media today and it is argued in some quarters that the island suffers from a gun violence crisis. The aforementioned position on Trinidad and Tobago as suffering from a gun violence crisis is exacerbated by misinformation and a lack of understanding of the dimension and scale of gun violence and gun deaths. Therefore, empirical knowledge and knowing the facts may serve as a first step towards advancing solutions towards firearm violence and deaths and preventing a wide range of crimes committed with firearms on the island each year. In light of these events, the current research effort is focussed on the topic of guns, gun violence and gun homicides in Trinidad and Tobago. In the context of this study, guns or small arms refer to revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles and submachine and light machine-guns (UN Secretary General, 1997), while, gun homicides refer to ‘death resulting from a gunshot wound caused by a weapon that uses a powder charge to fire a projectile’ and includes death as a result of being wounded by a handgun, rifle and/or shotgun. This definition excludes gunshot wounds from air-powered, gas-powered and pellet guns, as well as death caused by non-penetrating injuries associated with firearms such as being pistol whipped. Research on gun violence and gun homicides in Trinidad and Tobago has not been extensive (see Adams & Sanchez, 2018; Holder & Mutota, 2006; Wells et al., 2010 as exceptions). With this in mind, the author of this article submits that the cost of gun violence to Trinidad and Tobago’s society is too great to allow this important gap in the literature to continue. Towards this end, this study has two goals. First, this study focuses on violence involving the use of firearms, recognizing that knowledge about gun violence must be framed, contextualized and understood in the broader context of understanding violence. Second, the study reviews the phenomenon of gun violence at the individual, communal and national levels and seeks its impact on different groups within Trinidad and Tobago. This chapter adds to the literature on homicides in Trinidad and Tobago by highlighting that geographic (Police Divisions) and demographic factors for homicide victimization on the island.

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The Present Study The present study examines gun violence and gun homicides in Trinidad and Tobago from 2010 to 2016. The study focuses on the extent of guns, gun violence and gun homicides on the criminal landscape in Trinidad and Tobago’s societies. Other gun-related issues, for example, suicides involving the use of a firearm, firearm seizures by the police, persons shot and killed by the police and firearm-related homicides by gender are also examined. The study builds on previous research by Katz and Fox (2010) which examined homicides by weapons type in Trinidad and Tobago’s jurisdiction and which showed a general usage and increase in homicides using guns from 1998 to 2008 (see Fig. 10.1).

Research Context The research was conducted in Trinidad and Tobago, a twin-island Republic situated in the Caribbean. The island is considered as one of

Fig. 10.1

Homicides by weapon type—1998–2008 (Source Katz & Fox, 2010)

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the global Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Trinidad and Tobago consist of two islands: (1) Trinidad, and (2) Tobago. Trinidad, the larger island is multi-ethnic and well known for its cultural diversity and natural resources (Cambridge et al., 2007). Tobago, the smaller island is culturally more homogeneous in nature and annually attracts tourists to its picturesque beaches. The capital city of Trinidad and Tobago is Port of Spain and total land area is 5128 sq. km, with a population of almost 1.3 million people (Cambridge et al., 2007). The island attained its independence from Britain in 1962 after almost after five centuries of colonial domination and became a Republic with a President as Head of State in 1976. Trinidad and Tobago is governed by a bicameral parliamentary system consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Tobago has internal self-government via the unicameral Tobago House of Assembly. The island’s infrastructure is generally British in orientation and this is reflected in its criminal justice system (CJS). Trinidad and Tobago rank high on several human development indices when it comes to access to health and educational services and life expectancy (Levitt, 2005). The economy of the island is characterized by an oil-based economy and natural gas. According to the CIA World Fact Book (2013), Trinidad and Tobago is the world’s largest exporter of methanol and ammonia, has a GDP of US $27.1 billion and is considered an economic powerhouse in the Caribbean (CIA World Fact Book, 2013). However, despite the island’s designation as a relatively high-income, non-OECD country (World Bank, 2012), there is an upsurge in crime and discontent across the country (Williams, 2012) and this upsurge in local crime has engendered an increase in violence.

Literature Review Before delving into the review of literature on guns and gun violence, it is important to point out that though this study is premised on non-Western locales, the study utilizes literature from a broad range of countries, including literature from the West, as literature on the topic under inquiry is scant in the Caribbean, especially, Trinidad and Tobago (see Agozino et al., 2009; Holder & Mutota, 2006; Katz & Fox,

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2010 as exceptions). Gun violence is a serious public health problem (Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence and Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, 2021). For example, in 2019, in the United States of America there were 39,707 firearm-related deaths alone (EFSGV, 2021) and apart from adults, children and adolescents have been exposed to gun violence in their homes and communities. When gun violence is examined by gender, it has been revealed that women have suffered a variety of genderrelated killings. For instance, Grinshteyn and Hemenway (2019) point out that 92% of all women killed with guns in high-income countries were from the U.S.A and that in the USA, women are 21 more times likely to die by firearms homicide than women in peer nations. In Trinidad and Tobago’s context, research by Katz and Maguire (2015) revealed that the homicides on the island primarily involve male offenders and victims, mostly young men of African descent, who are either members or affiliates of criminal street gangs and that their weapon of choice was guns (see Wells et al., 2010; Agozino et al., 2009 for support). Further, Kukis (2009) points out that in the last decade gunrelated homicides in Trinidad and Tobago have risen about 1000 per cent and Townsend (2009) attributed one reason for this increase to criminal cases taking several years before being brought to trial. Without a doubt, there are a plethora of impacts that are related to gun violence. These impacts range from economic and political to communal and social impacts. According to Irvin-Erickson (2017) gun violence has a pervasive emotional effect on communities and on the lives and livelihoods of community members. Apart from the emotional impacts of gun violence, fear of gun violence weighs negatively on residents who are exposed to gun violence as well as on employees, visitors and consumers (Cook & Ludwig, 2000). For instance, in areas that are prone to gun violence, people, including residents of the locale avoided shopping at night (Irvin-Erickson et al., 2017). The impact of gun violence also has connotations for victims’ families and the communities in which these victims and offenders reside. Importantly, Galea and Abdalla (2019) suggested that for those who were shot and survived, their families and their communities are likely to have a high prevalence of mental disorders that are disabling in the long term.

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Gun violence also impacts children as children who are exposed to gun violence may experience negative short and long-term psychological effects, including anger, withdrawal, posttraumatic stress and desensitization to violence (Garbarino et al., 2002). In a similar vein, gun violence can have negative effects on children’s development even if they are not directly involved in the gun violence activity (Garbarino et al., 2002) as they may have problems sleeping, fear of going outside of their homes, depression, grief and may act out or display anti-social behaviours (Miller et al., 1999). Gun violence also impacts policy making in jurisdictions with excessive gun violence. For instance, Luca et al. (2020) cogitate that a single mass shooting leads to a 15% increase in the number of firearm bills introduced within states in the year after a mass shooting and this effect increases with the extent of media coverage. It is also important to highlight the relationship between gender and homicides caused by guns, however, the relationship between both is a complex one. This complexity is evidenced in the work of Snodgrass (2006) who emphasizes that the relationship between women and guns is a complex one. Snodgrass (2006) points out that at one end women may be the perpetrators of the crimes using guns and at the other end they may be the victims. Instructively, the rates of severe physical violence and violence inflicted with firearm are predominantly experienced by women with male partners as perpetrators (Fridel & Fox, 2019). In a similar vein, Hemenway et al. (2002) in their study on firearm availability and female homicide victimization submit that of the females killed by men with a firearm, more than two-thirds were killed by their intimate partners. Hemenway et al. (2002) in their study on firearm availability and female homicide victimization pointed out that of the females killed by men with a firearm, more than two-thirds were killed by their intimate partners, while Kellermann and Mercy (1992) point out that many women are killed with guns used by their husbands or intimate acquaintances. The review of literature has demonstrated that guns, gun violence and gun homicides have economic, social, political, communal and health impacts. Without a doubt, the impacts of gun violence are global as well as a public health concern (The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 2006) and the Caribbean has not been spared from its wrath. Indeed, gun violence, suicides using guns and gun homicides

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have left numerous families and communities in Trinidad and Tobago in pain.

Materials and Method Data on firearms-related deaths, firearm-related deaths by gender, firearm seizures and other firearm-related issues were obtained from the Crime and Problem Analysis (CAPA) Branch, the statistical department of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS). The analysis included intentional injury deaths: suicides, homicides and deaths caused by unintentional firearm injury were also included in this analysis. Excluded from this analysis were: (1) homicides from unspecified means, (2) deaths from late effects after being shot with a firearm as these deaths could not directly be attributed to gun violence and (3) deaths due to police action (though this category of gun homicides will be briefly mentioned and discussed).

Data Sources and Analysis This study utilizes data collected by the Crime and Problem Analysis (CAPA) Branch of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS), (the statistical department of the TTPS) regarding gun violence, gun homicides, guns retrieved by the TTPS and gun homicides by gender, etc. The article explores the data for the purpose of understanding the nature of guns and its impact on violence and homicides in Trinidad and Tobago. The evaluation of the data in this study was conducted using trend analysis. Trend analysis is a statistical tool that quantifies and explains trends and patterns in ‘noisy’ data over time to attain meaningful information and ‘trends’ are viewed as upwards or downwards shift in a dataset over a defined period of time. The academic literature on trend analysis surmise that various tools exist to analyze trends in data, for example, linear regression, the Mann– Kendall test, the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test, MANCOVA (Multivariate Analysis of Covariance), and the Seasonal

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Kendall test (SK test), however, most trend analysis tools utilize one form of regression or another (Chandler & Scott, 2011). In this study, the relatively simple linear regression tool was utilized to seek out trends in the data. Using this method, the researchers utilized data for 2010 to 2016 and evaluated the data on a horizontal line.

Results The data for this book chapter are based solely from statistics provided by the CAPA Branch of the TTPS. The data revealed that for the period 2010 to 2016, 2,212 persons lost their lives to homicides committed using firearms in Trinidad and Tobago (see Table 10.1) and of that figure, approximately 5% of the victims were female and 95% were male (see Table 10.2). The data also revealed that for the period under inquiry, firearm-related murders by ethnicity accounted for 1,751 persons of Afro-Trinidad and Tobago descent or 83% of homicides on the island during the period under inquiry (see Table 10.1), despite the population in Trinidad and Tobago reflecting approximately 40% Indo- and 40% Afro-Trinidadian and Tobago citizens. When disaggregated by Police Division, the number of murders committed were as follows: Port of Spain Police Division—593, Northern Police Division—436, Western Police Division—260, North-Eastern Police Division—258, Central Police Division—231, Southern Police Division—212, Eastern Police Division—120, South-Western Police Division—89 and Tobago Police Division—13 (see Table 10.1). As it relates to suicides committed by way of firearms, the data revealed that this was not very prevalent for the period that is being examined. Indeed, the data revealed that fourteen suicides were committed using firearms between 2010 and 2016 and that all of the suicide victims were males. Further, the Northern Police Division recorded the highest number of suicides (4), while the Port of Spain Police did not record any suicides committed by guns between 2010 and 2016 (see Table 10.3). The data from the CAPA Branch of the TTPS were also distilled for persons who were killed by the Police by gender and Police Division. The data analysis revealed that for 2010–2016, a total of two hundred and

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Table 10.1 Murders committed using firearms by Police divisions and ethnicity—2010 to 2016 East Divisions Year Indian African Mixed Spanish Chinese Unknown Total Port of Spain

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Southern 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Western 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Northern 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Central 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

2 5 2 6 1 1 0 4 6 5 3 14 12 10 3 2 4 1 3 3 1 10 6 5 9 9 10 8 13 5 5 10 16 13 15

76 75 94 103 73 76 53 17 18 16 16 15 23 31 46 21 31 34 44 28 20 61 43 40 48 37 29 74 17 13 17 11 18 30 34

4 4 2 6 2 3 1 4 3 2 0 1 3 1 3 3 1 3 2 3 1 6 3 2 5 3 3 14 1 1 3 0 0 0 5

3 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

85 85 98 115 76 80 54 30 27 24 21 30 38 42 55 26 36 38 49 34 22 85 52 47 62 49 43 98 31 19 27 23 34 43 54 (continued)

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Table 10.1

(continued) East Year Indian African Mixed Spanish Chinese Unknown Total

Divisions

South 2010 4 Western 2011 0 2012 0 2013 1 2014 0 2015 5 2016 3 Eastern 2010 6 2011 2 2012 2 2013 2 2014 5 2015 7 2016 4 North 2010 1 Eastern 2011 1 2012 4 2013 5 2014 3 2015 9 2016 2 Tobago 2010 0 2011 0 2012 0 2013 0 2014 0 2015 0 2016 0 Total 288

8 4 4 5 4 24 14 8 8 10 8 12 15 19 28 23 33 33 32 35 30 3 0 1 2 2 2 2 1751

2 2 2 0 2 3 0 3 0 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 0 4 2 1 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 136

2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5

16 6 6 6 6 32 17 17 10 14 11 20 23 25 34 25 38 42 37 45 37 3 0 1 2 3 2 2 2212

Source CAPA Branch (2020) Table 10.2

Murders by gender 2010–2016

Gender

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

Male Female Total

334 22 356

241 11 250

280 11 291

306 12 318

285 19 304

326 14 340

336 15 351

2108 104 2212

Source CAPA Branch (2020)

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Table 10.3

Suicides committed with firearms by Police divisions 2010–2016

Division

2010 Male

2011 Male

2012 Male

2013 Male

2014 Male

2015 Male

2016 Male

Total

Port of Spain Southern Western Northern Central South Western Eastern North Eastern Tobago Total

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2

0 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 5

0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3

0 2 2 4 1 2 1 1 1 14

Total

Source CAPA Branch (2020)

Table 10.4 Police division Port of Spain Southern Western Northern Central South Western Eastern North Eastern Tobago Total

Persons shot and killed by Police—2010–2016 2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

M

4 0

3

31

0 1 1 6 1

0 0 0 0 0

4 1 2 7 4

23 15 28 58 18

1 1

11 37

0

M

3 0 0 0 0 0 0

M

7 0 2 4 8 10 3

0 0 0 0 0

M

2 0 1 1 4 5 1

0 0 0 0 0

M

6 0 2 1 0 10 2

0 0 0 0 0

M

6 0 2 3 2 16 3

0 0 0 0 0

M

0 0 2 0 0

12 4 9 4 4

0 0

3 0 10 0

3 0 3 0

2 0 3 0

0 0 4 0

0 0 12 0

2 0 4 0

0 2

1 0 50 0

0 0 40 0

0 0 19 0

0 0 25 0

1 0 45 0

0 0 19 0

0 2 23 223

Source CAPA Branch (2020)

twenty-three persons were shot and killed by the Police in Trinidad and Tobago. The highest incidence of persons shot and killed by the Police occurred in the Central Police Division (58), followed by the Northeastern Police Division (37) and the Port of Spain Police Division (31). The data on police killings by Police Divisions in Trinidad and Tobago is highlighted in Table 10.4.

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50 40 30 20 10 0 MALE FEMALE 2010

Fig. 10.2 2020)

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Persons shot and killed by the Police by gender (Source CAPA Branch,

Persons shot and killed by the Police were not restricted to any one gender. Instructively, the data indicates that of the two hundred and twenty-three persons shot and killed by the Police in Trinidad and Tobago between 2010 and 2016, two hundred and twenty-one or 99% were male individuals (see Fig. 10.2 and Table 10.4).

Discussion In Trinidad and Tobago, there is an age old adage ‘if you live by the gun, you will die by the gun’. This adage is an adaptation from another timeless parable ‘if you live by the sword, you will die by the sword’. When interpreted in a literal sense, it simply means that soldiers, even elite soldiers, are often killed in combat by other soldiers. This study seeks to examine the antecedents of individuals killed by gun violence in Trinidad and Tobago, for example, in an attempt to create a profile of those individuals who were killed. Unfortunately, data on the age of the victims of homicides were missing in some instances and the authors decided to omit the age component of the profile of homicide victims on

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the island. The authors also looked for trends in the data on guns and gun homicides and this paints an interesting picture. As it relates to suicides, a notable trend emanating from the data was that for 2010 to 2016, there were fourteen suicides committed using firearms in Trinidad and Tobago (see Table 10.3). Notable, all of the victims were male individuals and none of the suicides occurred in the Port of Spain Police Division. This finding, though surprising, is in line with similar findings by Vijayakumar (2015) and Fleischmann (2016) who both point out that the rates of suicide in most countries are higher in males than females. Further, one of the most consistent findings in suicide research is that women make more suicide attempts than men, but men are more likely to die in their attempts than women (Vijayakumar, 2015). In fact, based on this finding from the data, it is appropriate to suggest that men are most likely to die from gun suicide in Trinidad than women. International research indicates that women are roughly three times more likely to attempt suicide, though men are two to four times more likely to die by suicide (Vijayakumar, 2015) and that compared to men, women show higher rates of suicidal thinking, nonfatal suicidal behaviour and suicide attempt (Crosby et al., 2011), hence this finding in Trinidad and Tobago. Another notable trend emanating from the datasets on gun violence in Trinidad and Tobago is related to persons shot and killed by the police between 2010 and 2016 (see Table 10.4). The data points to a consistent trend that men were most likely to be shot and killed by the police as 99% of the victims of police shootings for the period under review were males and this was consistent across Police Divisions on the island. Instructively, this finding complements that of a previous study conducted in the USA by Edwards et al. (2019) which found that men are more likely than women to be killed by the police. This study has similar findings on the nexus between individuals killed by guns and their ethnicity as a previous study conducted by Adams and Sanchez (2018). In that study, the findings by Adams and Sanchez (2018) suggested that homicide victimization and perpetration is concentrated among young men of African descent, who reside in underprivileged communities with a high population density. In this study, the findings suggest that there is an over-representation of African descended male

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who are killed by gun violence in Trinidad and Tobago (see Table 10.1). When the data were examined by individual years between 2010 and 2016, the number of murders fluctuated consistently, however, a noticeable trend that emerged in the data was that irrespective of the year and the level of fluctuation, the Port of Spain, Northern and Western Police Divisions, generally had the highest number of homicides per year.

Conclusion This study set out to examine the pervasive issue of guns, gun violence and gun homicides in Trinidad and Tobago. While not a main objective of this book chapter, the researchers also attempted to create a profile of individuals who are most likely to succumb to death by guns. In the context of suicides by guns in Trinidad and Tobago’s jurisdiction, the data revealed that for 2010–2016, males were almost certainly more likely than women to die as a result of gun suicides. Further, African descended males who resided in the Port of Spain, Northern and Western Police Divisions were at higher risk of falling victim to gun homicides. In a similar vein, men were more likely than women to be shot and killed by the Police in Trinidad and Tobago. Unfortunately, due to data issues, the researchers were unable to create a fuller profile of the victims of guns and gun violence in Trinidad and Tobago by age. The result of this is that there is room for further research on this pervasive issue of gun and gun violence on the island, however, using age as a proxy for future research.

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Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence and Coalition to Stop Gun Violence. (2021). A public health crisis decades in the making: A review of 2019 CDC gun mortality data. http://efsgv.org/2019CDCdata. Edwards, F., Lee, H., & Esposito, M. (2019). Risk of being killed by police use of force in the United States by age, race–ethnicity, and sex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116 (34), 16793–16798. Fleischmann, A. (2016). Suicide prevention from a global perspective. World Health Organization. Fowler, K. A., Dahlberg, L. L., Haileyesus, T., & Annest, J. L. (2015). Firearm injuries in the United States. Preventive Medicine, 79, 5–14. Fridel, E. E., & Fox, J. A. (2019). Gender differences in patterns and trends in US homicide, 1976–2017. Violence and Gender, 6 (1), 27–36. Galea, S., & Abdalla, S. M. (2019). The public’s health and the social meaning of guns. Palgrave Communications, 5 (1), 1–4. Garbarino, J., Bradshaw, C. P., & Vorrasi, J. A. (2002). Mitigating the effects of gun violence on children and youth. The Future of Children, 12(2), 73–85. Geneva Declaration. (2008). Dimensions of armed violence. Global burden of armed violence. Geneva: Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development Secretariat. Grillot, S., Stapley, C. S., & Hanna, M. E. (2006). Assessing the small arms movement: The trials and tribulations of a transnational network. Contemporary Security Policy, 27 (1), 60–84. Grinshteyn, E., & Hemenway, D. (2019). Violent death rates in the US compared to those of the other high-income countries, 2015. Preventive Medicine, 123, 20–26. Hemenway, D., Shinoda-Tagawa, T., & Miller, M. (2002). Firearm availability and female homicide victimization rates among 25 populous high-income countries. Journal of the American Medical Women’s Association, 57 (2), 100– 104. Holder, Y., & Mutota, F. (2006). Guns and crime: A case study of Trinidad and Tobago. Background paper prepared for the World Bank study on Crime and Violence in the Caribbean, World Bank, Washington, DC. IANSA. (2006). A thousand people die every day. In 2006: Bringing the global gun crisis under control . International Action Network on Small Arms. Irvin-Erickson, Y., & Center, J. P. (2017). A neighborhood-level analysis of the economic impact of gun violence. Urban Institute. https://www.urban.org/ sites/default/files/publication/90671/eigv_final_report_3.pdf. Katz, C. M., & Fox, A. (2010). Structural disadvantage, gang presence and homicide in a Caribbean nation. Presentation at ASC Conference.

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Katz, C. M., & Maguire, E. R. (2015). Diagnosing gang Violence in the Caribbean. In A. Harriott & C. M. Katz (Eds.), Gangs in the Caribbean: Responses of state and society (pp. 118–175). The University of the West Indies Press. Kellermann, A. L., & Mercy, J. A. (1992). Men, women, and murder: Genderspecific differences in rates of fatal violence and victimization. The Journal of Trauma, 33(1), 1–5. Kukis, M. (2009, May 1). Is Baghdad now safer than New Orleans? Time. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1894566,00.html. Laurence, E. J. (2001). The emergence of the small arms issue. In: Chapter 7. Tackling the small arms problem: Multilateral measures and initiatives. In The Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem. Small Arms Survey. Levitt, K. (2005). Reclaiming development: Independent thought and Caribbean community. Ian Randle Publishers. Luca, M., Malhotra, D., & Poliquin, C. (2020). The impact of mass shootings on gun policy. Journal of Public Economics, 181(C), 1–20. Miller, L. S., Wasserman, G. A., Neugebauer, R., Gorman-Smith, D., & Kamboukos, D. (1999). Witnessed community violence and antisocial behavior in high-risk, urban boys. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 28(1), 2–11. Snodgrass, M. E. (2006). The impact of guns on women’s lives. Counterpoise, 10 (1/2), 59. The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. (2006). http:// www.genevadeclaration.org/home.html. Townsend, D. (2009). No other life: Gangs, guns, and governance in Trinidad and Tobago. Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. United Nations General Assembly. (1997). General and complete disarmament: Small arms (Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms). New York, NY: United Nations General Assembly. Vijayakumar, L. (2015). Suicide in women. Indian Journal Psychiatry, 57 (Suppl. 2), S233–S238. https://doi.org/10.4103/0019-5545.161484. Wells, W., Katz, C. M., & Kim, J. (2010). Firearm possession among arrestees in Trinidad and Tobago. Injury Prevention, 16 (5), 337–342. White House. (2013). Now is the time. Retrieved February 25, 2019 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/preventing-gun-violence. Williams, H. M. A. (2012). “Everybody violent”: Conceptualizations of violence within a secondary school in Trinidad and Tobago (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). Teachers College, Columbia University, New York. World Bank. (2012). World Bank country data. http://data.worldbank.org/cou ntry/trinidad-and-tobago.

Part III Africa and Beyond

11 Trends, Precipitating Factors and Control of Gun-Related Violence and Suicide in Zimbabwe Ishmael Mugari

Introduction There has been longstanding debate on whether possession of firearms by private persons leads to a safe environment or leads to violent crime. Arguments in support of the possession of firearms revolve around concerns over the need for citizens to arm themselves for their own protection and for the protection of property. To that end, there is an argument that gun controls are an infringement on the right of self defence and the right to protection of property (Bangalore & Messerli, 2013, p. 873). There is no doubt that privately owned firearms have been used to ward off the armed robbery, to defend private property and to prevent other violent occurrences. The argument in support of private ownership of firearms is strengthened by a study by Reed (2019), which concluded that guns prevent thousands of crimes every day. According I. Mugari (B) Bindura University of Science Education, Bindura, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_11

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to the study’s findings, 60% of convicted felonies admitted that they avoided committing crimes when they knew the victim was armed, while 40% admitted that they avoided committing crimes when they thought the victim might be armed. Moreover, felonies reported that they avoid entering houses where people are at home because they fear being shot (Reed, 2019). Consequently, when used properly used, guns can enhance human security, creating a conducive environment for other socio-economic activities to flourish. The argument against private ownership of firearms emanates from the concerns over the susceptibility of firearms to abuse, as they can be used to commit violent acts such as robbery, murder and suicide. The proliferation and misuse of guns is a worldwide phenomenon, which has resulted in the death of thousands of people. For example, in 2016 alone, more than 250,000 people died as a result of firearms worldwide. About 64% were the result of homicide, about 27% suicide, and 9% were accidental injuries caused by firearms (World Population Review, 2020). By virtue of their easy availability, low cost and manageability, small arms and light weapons (SALW) have become the weapons of choice in most conflicts in the world today and have resulted in raised levels of armed violence, even in areas at peace (Religions for Peace, 2007). These weapons are the leading contributors to the escalation of a culture of violence and to the militarization of society. A study on gun ownership and firearm-related death in 27 countries revealed a significant positive correlation between guns per capita per country and the rate of firearm-related deaths (Bangalore & Messerli, 2013). The study revealed that South Africa, which had a gun per capita of 12.7 per 100, had extremely high-firearm-related deaths (9.41 per 100 000). Similarly, the United states, with a gun per capita of 88.8 per 100, had a firearm-related death of 10.42 per 100 000. Conversely, countries with low gun per capita rates had the lowest firearm-related deaths. For example, the United Kingdom, with guns per capita of 6.2, had a firearm-related death rate of 0.25 per 100 000 (Bangalore & Messerli, 2013). In the end, although the correlation is not synonymous with causation, it seems conceivable that abundant gun availability facilitates firearm-related deaths.

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This chapter explores gun-related violence and death in Zimbabwe, a southern African nation and a neighbour to South Africa—one of the countries with leading gun-related death rates in the world. The chapter first gives a historical background of Zimbabwe, linking the colonial era legacy of violence to the post-independent Zimbabwe violent incidents. The chapter then takes a three-pronged approach to discussing gun violence and deaths in Zimbabwe and these three aspects are: gun violence by the state against citizens; armed robbery; and suicide that is committed using firearms. Contributory factors for the rise in gun violence in Zimbabwe are also discussed. The chapter also looks at the regional and national regulatory framework for firearms, as well as suggesting prescriptive measures for reducing gun-related deaths. Though not as high as in other nations, gun violence needs to be checked in Zimbabwe, as any escalation will affect the socio-economic environment for the nation. Moreover, the 2019 Global Peace Index placed Zimbabwe on number 132 out of 163 countries in the world, situating Zimbabwe as the least peaceful nation in the Southern Africa in 2019 (Institute for Economics and Peace [IEPC], 2019). Among other factors, IEPC considers safety and security, the degree of militarization, homicide rate, violent crime and terrorism’s impact to rank the countries. Such a ranking, coupled by incidents of gun violence, portrays a bad image for the nation and also dents the investment climate.

The Colonial Legacy of Gun Violence From the year 1964 to 1979, liberation movements in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) namely the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) waged a protracted war against white minority rule. Rhodesia shared the same predicament with South Africa and both countries were administered by settler regimes that employed oppressive elitist-white minority rule over the back populace, and sought to impinge on their civil liberties at nearly every turn (Solomon, 2019). The settler regimes put in place prohibitive policies that were blatantly racist and attempted to regulate the lives of black inhabitants in accordance with a flawed vision of the

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natural order of the world. This archaic apartheid system prompted the liberation movements in the two countries to wage war against the settler regimes. In as much as the liberation fighters were regarded as liberation heroes by the black population, the settler regimes regarded them as terrorists. The uprising by the blacks was characterized by violent protests, sabotage through the use of small and light weapons, murders and a host of other radical acts. A non-governmental organization notes the significance of the AK 47—a Russian made semi-automatic assault rifle—to the formerly colonized people of Southern Africa (Religions for Peace, 2007). As shall be seen, the AK 47 has become the gun that is associated with firearm-related deaths and suicide in Zimbabwe. But what is the significance of the colonial legacy to the contemporary challenge of gun violence? There is a strand of research which stems from the notion that the experience of war may lead to an increase in violence more generally (Van Baalan & Hoglund, 2019). It builds on the idea that war entails transformations of socio-cultural, institutional and economic structures of society that both enable and legitimize violence in the post-war era, sometimes to the extent that scholars speak of ‘a culture of violence’ (Steenkanp, 2005). In a study on the lives of ex-combatants in South Africa, Maringira (2014) shows how some excombatants in South Africa have remained militarized and continue to engage in firearm-related violence well after the end of apartheid. Highlighting the role of the gun in the commission of violent acts by some of the ex-combatants, Maringira notes: ‘They are either unemployed or earning little money to support their families. In such situations, there is a combination of hunger and anger, the gun remains an alternative avenue for rebuilding a life in a highly unequal society’ (p. 4). This could be a contributory factor to high incidents of gun violence in South Africa. Following the conclusion of the armed struggle in South Africa, it was generally expected that ex-combatants’ lives would be transformed for the better and that there would be a reduction in violence (Maringira, 2014). However, this did not happen as the end of the struggle was not accompanied by effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) (Cock, 2001 as cited in Maringira, 2014). On the contrary,

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Zimbabwe’s end to the liberation struggle was characterized by massive DDR of the ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants and they were conscripted into security arms of the state such as the Zimbabwe National Army, the Zimbabwe Republic Police and the Central Intelligence Organisation. Notwithstanding the massive DDR, Zimbabwe had to witness a rise in banditry activities in the early years of independence in 1980. The AK 47 became the major weapon that was used to commit armed robberies, most of which resulted in the death of innocent civilians. While several reasons have been proffered for the causes of the banditry activities, there is a bit of consensus that the activities were committed by disgruntled former liberation combatants who could have been marginalized during the reintegration process. In his memoir of the late Solomon Mujuru—the first black commander of the Zimbabwe National Army in the post-independent Zimbabwe, Tendi (2020) chronicles the marginalization of the ZIPRA combatants by the ZANLA counterparts during the reintegration process, a fact which the author believes could have compounded the acts of banditry in Zimbabwe’s Matebeleland and Midlands regions. Those who committed armed robberies were to be later labelled as ‘dissidents’. The state’s response to the ‘dissidents’ will be looked at in the proceeding section.

State-Sanctioned Gun Violence In some instances, the states have sanctioned gun-related violence against citizens, which is mainly perpetrated by the security arms of the states. For Zimbabwe, perhaps the first port of call in discussing state-sanctioned violence is to look at the State’s response to the dissident’s challenge in Matebeleland and the Midlands regions. The period 1983–1984 witnessed the deployment of an army brigade to deal with the dissidents in an operation that came to be known as Gukurahundi. However, the army operation was to later target innocent civilians who were viewed to be supporters of the opposition party—the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Party (ZAPU). There is no consensus on how many civilian lives were lost during the Gukurahundi operation, though Tendi (2020) notes that the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace

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estimated the dead or missing to be not less than 3 000, while other sources estimated the number to be around 20 000. Notwithstanding the different statistics regarding the impact of Gukurahundi operation, the point is that the state-sanctioned violence against innocent civilians through the use of guns. State-sanctioned violence against citizens through the use of guns was also witnessed during election-related protests on the first of August 2018. Soldiers fired semi-automatic weapons (AK-47) onto the protestors in Zimbabwe’s capital city—Harare, resulting in the death of six civilians and injury to several other civilians. It was culpable on the part of state security agents to fire live ammunition in an urban area. The Commission of Inquiry (2018) on the violent protests found out that the death of innocent civilians was largely due to the indiscriminate discharge of firearms by members of the state security services. In January 2019, soldiers also discharged semi-automatic weapons to deal with violent protestors who were protesting against fuel price hikes in Harare. Though there has been debate on the actual number of citizens who lost their lives, both state and independent media houses reported that several people died, while more than a hundred citizens were injured as a result of gun-fire by soldiers. A similar scenario regarding the indiscriminate discharge of firearms was witnessed in South Africa when police indiscriminately discharged their firearms to protesting miners at Marikana mine, an incident which has come to be known as the Marikana Massacre. In this incident, 34 mine workers were killed by members of the South African Police Service, while 79 others were injured as a result of the police shootings (Power & Gwanyanya, 2017).

Guns and Armed Robbery While most gun violence and homicide incidents are more pronounced in countries with armed conflicts, most stable countries have armed robbery as the most serious manifestation of gun violence. Though Zimbabwe has not witnessed armed conflicts for over three decades, there has, however, been a worrying trend of an upsurge in armed robbery

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Table 11.1

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Statistics for robbery and firearms offences for 2016 to 2018

Year Armed robbery 2016 2017 2018 Firearms offences 2016 2017 2018

Number of cases

Percentage increase

214 429 476

101% 11%

326 371 400

14% 9%

Source Extracted from the ZimStat Quarterly Digest of Statistics (2019)

cases. The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat) 2018 fourth quarter report notes a significant rise in armed robbery cases from 2016 to 2018 (ZimStat, 2019). Table 11.1 shows the statistics for armed robbery and firearms offences for three years. As reflected in Table 11.1 there was a phenomenal rise of armed robbery cases from 2016 to 2017 (101%) and a marginal rise from 2017 to 2018 (11%). Compounding the problem was the fact that firearmrelated offences also had a marginal increase during the same period. Majority of firearm-related offences in Zimbabwe relating to unlawful possession of firearms, unlawfully discharging a firearm and failure to secure a firearm. A look at the statistics in Table 11.1 shows a positive correlation between armed robbery and other firearm-related offences. The rise in armed robbery cases could be attributed to the deteriorating economic environment in the country, with unruly citizens resorting to armed robbery for survival. Similarly, the rise in armed robbery incidents in 2020 could also be attributed to limited opportunities for earning lawful income due to COVID-19 restrictive measures. The main targets of these rogue elements are legal and illegal foreign currency dealers, commuters, motorists, retail outlets, households and even churches (Kafe, 2020). A worrying trend is a violent manner in which the armed robbery cases are being perpetrated, as well as the violent manner in which the armed robbers resist arrest. In an unprecedented incident in February 2020, a group of armed robbers carried out an audacious daylight robbery at Makoni Shopping Centre—a satellite town near the capital

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city Harare. The daring gun-toting robbers pounced on illegal foreign currency dealers, making off with large sums of foreign currency and local currency. Describing the nature of operations of the armed robbers in Zimbabwe’s weekly newspaper—Sunday Mail, Kafe (2020, p. 1) notes; The criminals are well-knit, ruthless, well resourced and use different ways to strip the unsuspecting public of their valuables... daylight robberies happening in Harare are just a microcosm of what has become of the city - the metropolis has been besieged by gun-toting thugs!

In March 2020, police arrested three armed robbers after a shootout and a high speed chase and the robbers had been linked to nine armed robbery cases between August 2019 and March 2020 (Chingarande, 2020). Police recovered an assortment of firearms and ammunition from the accused persons, some of which had been stolen from victims. In November 2020, armed robbers pounced on a cash-in-transit vehicle that was carrying cash to a bank in Bulawayo-Zimbabwe’s second largest city, and made off with an undisclosed amount of cash (Zimlive, 2020). Such a modus operandi is peculiar to Zimbabwe’s neighbour in South Africa, where cash-in-transit heists are a common phenomenon. Another emerging armed robbery trend is the targeting of long distance buses. In October 2020, a police officer aboard a long distance bus was shot and injured, while 59 passengers were stripped of their valuables. A similar incident, which resulted in the death of one person and the injury of three others, occurred in 2018 (Muleya, 2020). In another bizarre incident in October 2020, eight armed robbers launched a daring raid on Bulawayo High Court after disarming two police officers, in what seemed to be an attempt to seize important legal documents from the crime registry safe (Zimlive, 2020). The divergent modi operadi and the unpredictable nature of the heinous activities make it difficult for the police to prevent the armed robbery activities. Compounding the scourge of armed robbery is the fact that soldiers and police officers are implicated in some of the incidents. In October 2020, five armed robbers, including a deserter from the army and a

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police officer were arrested, with the police noting that some unscrupulous members of the police have been loaning their uniforms and service weapons to criminals for a fee (Makuvaza, 2020). Similarly, an ex-soldier was arrested in May 2020 after leading a gang in an armed robbery incident in Harare (Mashaya, 2020). The involvement of military and police personnel in armed robbery could be one of the major contributory factors to the upsurge in armed robbery incidents in Zimbabwe. The rise in the incidents of armed robbery brings to the fore another paradox—citizens will need firearms to protect themselves from the armed robbers. Once this happens, the state will have to contend with the challenges that stem from the abuse of these firearms. This gives rise to the question, ‘who is fit to hold a firearm and what are the requirements to hold it?’ If the firearms fall into the wrong hands, they will be used to commit criminal activities—thereby creating a vicious cycle of gun violence. One of the manifestations of abuse of firearms is suicide, which is discussed in the proceeding section.

Guns and Suicide Empirical research on the causal effect of firearm availability on the risk of suicide has shown that the availability of firearms increases the risk of suicide (Betz et al, 2011, 2016; National Research Council, 2004). In Zimbabwe, cases of suicide are on the rise, with a majority of the cases largely attributed to marital conflicts and economic challenges (Mvere, 2017). There has been a growing trend of couples who are committing murder and suicide with the barrel of the gun following cases of infidelity, extramarital affairs and deception (Zimoyo & Gumbo, 2013). A look at the trends of gun-related suicides shows that access to guns is a major contributory factor to the fatalities, notwithstanding the underlying causes such as marital problems. Given the strict firearm regulatory controls in Zimbabwe, those who have access to firearms have the greatest propensity to terminate their lives using firearms. Table 11.2 shows suicide cases which made news headlines from 2017 to 2020. Statistics in Table 11.2 seem to confirm the view from previous researchers (Betz et al., 2011, 2016; National Research Council, 2004)

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Table 11.2

Suicide cases which made news headlines from 2017 to 2020 Reporting newspaper/ Incident Month news Perpetrator’s Type of no and year channel occupation firearm Circumstances #1

March 2017

#2

#3

Nehanda Radio

University student

Pistol

September Zimbabwe 2017 News

Not specified

Pistol

February 2018

Soldier

AK47

Newsday

A university student allegedly shot himself at his lodgings after being involved in a road accident. He had taken his relative’s vehicle and was driving his friends home when the accident happened The deceased committed suicide in a hotel room after illegally acquiring a firearm the previous day. Reasons for committing suicide were not given A soldier fatally shot his wife, her two sisters and injured his 18-month old son before turning the gun on himself in a suicide attempt over marital conflicts (continued)

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(continued) Reporting newspaper/ Incident Month news no and year channel

Perpetrator’s occupation

Type of firearm

#4

September Zimonline 2018 news

Policewoman

FN rifle

#5

July 2019

Security guard

#6

November Herald 2019

Soldier

#7

May 2020

Soldier

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Table 11.2

Nehanda radio

iHarare

Circumstances

The deceased booked an FN rifle for use during her guard duties and used the rifle to commit suicide. Reasons for committing suicide were not given Revolver The deceased used a service gun to terminated his life at a place where he was performing guard duties. The cause for committing suicide was depression as a result of failure to get his salary for four months AK47 The deceased soldier killed his wife and injured his mother-in-law before killing himself with his service rifle. The deceased had been having marital problems with his wife AK47 The deceased shot himself in the mouth using his service rife after he had lost 10 rounds of ammunition from his magazine (continued)

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Table 11.2

(continued) Reporting newspaper/ Incident Month news no and year channel #8

July 2020

Perpetrator’s occupation

New Soldier Zimbabwe

Type of firearm AK47

Circumstances The deceased soldier shot and killed his married lover before turning the gun to himself over allegations of infidelity

Source Online newspapers and news channels (2017–2020)

that firearm availability increases the chances of suicide. Among the eight suicide cases that made headlines, five were from the security arms of the state (four from the Zimbabwe National Army and one from the Zimbabwe Republic Police), while another victim was a private security guard. The nature of their jobs, which requires them to possess and use firearms could have been the major contributory factor to the suicide incidents. Similarly, incident #2 was as a result of access to a gun, albeit in an illegal manner, a day before the suicide incident. Given the stringent gun control laws in Zimbabwe, it is not surprising that those whose duties require them to use guns have the highest propensity to commit suicide using the guns. In the end, it is also worth noting that the major risk factor associated with suicide incidents by members of the security services is the availability of firearms within the state security establishments as compared to civilian society. Notwithstanding the link between access to firearms and suicides, the underlying causes for suicides are also critical, especially in addressing the problem of suicides. The cases in Table 11.2 point to two major causes of suicides—marital conflicts and failure to cope with socio-economic challenges. Another key aspect as regards gun-related suicide is the gender narrative. Except for incident #4 which involved a policewoman, all the other incidents involved males. Police reports have also confirmed that male suicide cases have been on the rise between 2015 and 2019 compared

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to females (Pembere, 2020). For example, in 2019 there were 565 male suicide cases compared to 69 female suicide cases (Pembere, 2020). The increase in male suicide cases could be attributed to the fact that they use more extreme or violent methods which are more lethal—for example, the use of weapons. Contrary, women use less lethal means of committing suicide such as overdoses of medicines and taking poisonous substances, thus resulting in more attempted suicide than successful suicides. Police reports also indicate that most suicide cases among men are tied to stress associated with failure to meet society’s expectations to fend for their families (Mvere, 2017)—a fact which seems to be confirmed in incident #5 in Table 11.2.

Regional and National Regulatory Framework On the regional front, the Sothern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and related Materials was signed in 2004. The main goal of this Protocol is to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related material and regulate the import and export of legal small arms. Among the Protocol’s provisions is the standardization of legislation on private ownership, and harmonized record-keeping of state-owned guns, along with the destruction of surplus state weapons. It also includes the regulation of brokers and provisions for marking and record-keeping. While the Protocol may be having key provisions to curb abuse of firearms, the provisions are only effective to the extent that they are incorporated in national legislation within the respective SADC countries. At the national level, the Firearms Act [Chapter 10:09] regulates the possession, sale and manufacturing of firearms in Zimbabwe. Among the key provisions to curb abuse of firearms are: the need to hold a firearm certificate; penalties for dealing with firearms without being registered; the requirement for a register of firearm transactions by firearm dealers; penalties for improper use of firearms; restrictions on possession of firearms by a person under the age of sixteen years; and the legal requirement for the safeguarding of firearms.

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Notwithstanding the stringent provisions that seek to curb abuse of firearms in Zimbabwe, a rise in incidents of armed robbery and gun-related suicide seems to suggest that the legal provisions are not water-tight. For armed robbery, there are three possible explanations for the abuse of firearms. First, illegal arms could be finding their way into Zimbabwe through porous borders, especially given the large quantities of firearms in South Africa. Second, despite the stringent requirements for possession and distribution of firearms, there could be an underground market for the illegal sale of arms and ammunition in Zimbabwe. Lastly, given that state security personnel are exempt from the firearm certificate requirement, some unscrupulous state security personnel may be supplying or even taking part in some of the armed robbery incidents. For suicide incidents, the exemption from the firearm certificate requirement for state security personnel and private security personnel possibly explains why they are prone to high suicide incidents.

Prevention Tips Given that the chapter had a three-pronged approach to discussing gun violence in Zimbabwe, the prescriptive measures also need to address the three forms of gun violence namely state-sponsored violence, armed robbery and suicide. The following specific measures can be implemented to curb incidents of gun violence:

Professionalism in Handling Public Disorder Situations Ordinarily the military should not be engaged to deal with public disorder situations as they are not trained to deal with public disorder. Under no circumstances should use of live ammunition be allowed when dealing with public disorder situations, as this will result in unnecessary loss of lives. The police should be trained to handle all public disorder situations without resorting to the use of lethal weapons.

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Addressing Socio-Economic Challenges Given that the upswing in armed robbery cases has largely been attributed to the deteriorating economy as citizens struggle to survive, addressing socio-economic challenges will reduce the temptations to engage in violent crime for survival.

Strict Gun Laws Enforcement While the national legislative framework may have key provisions to curb abuse of firearms, the legislation should be supported by strict enforcement of the relevant legal provisions by the police. There is need for constant monitoring of firearms dealers as well as gathering necessary intelligence on illegal firearms.

Border Controls There is need for strong border controls to prevent the possibility of smuggling of illegal firearms into the country. The government should invest in modern scanning technology which will help to identify illegal arms at border posts.

Stringent Conditions for Possessing Firearms To curb incidents of suicide, there is need for stringent conditions for private ownership of firearms. Private citizens should be allowed to possess firearms only in exceptional circumstances and after a thorough vetting process. There should also be stringent rules for carrying firearms by military, especially during peace times and they should not be allowed to carry their service firearms outside cantonment areas without justifiable reasons.

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Stiffer Penalties for Firearm-Related Offences To have a deterrent effect, there is need for stiffer penalties for all firearmrelated offences. Custodial sentences, without the option of a fine will go a long way in curbing firearm-related violence.

Conclusion Despite their significant role in the protection of people and their properties, firearms have been abused in Zimbabwe. State-sanctioned violence has been witnessed when state security personnel shoot and kill innocent citizens under the guise of enhancing security and maintaining and order. Armed robbery is another significant threat that has been perpetuated by the abuse of firearms. The rise in armed robbery is largely attributed to the deteriorating socio-economic environment, with desperate citizens engaging in criminal activities to survive. The challenge of armed robbery is also compounded by the involvement of state security personnel in some of the incidents. Lastly, firearms have also been used to commit suicide, with majority of the incidents involving people who have access to guns, such as soldiers, police officers and private security guards. Statistics reveal that more males are committing suicide than females, with marital problems and socio-economic challenges as the major underlying causes of suicide. While Zimbabwe seems to have a stringent regulatory framework to curb abuse of firearms, more measures need to be taken to curb abuse of firearms and gun violence. Access to guns by military and security personnel should also be properly regulated so as to reduce suicide incidents.

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12 Gun Violence and Homicide in Nigeria and Implications for Ethno-Religious Conflicts Declan Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe and Abiodun Raufu

Introduction Nigeria operates a strict gun control policy. The law allows an individual to own a single or double-barreled gun upon issuance of a government licence at the President’s discretion. Nevertheless, Nigeria is regarded as one of the world’s most dangerous countries with high homicide rates. While officially acquired guns are just a few thousand, the number of illegal firearms in private hands in Nigeria is estimated at more than two million of which one million are handguns (The Guardian, 2018). Most of these arms were smuggled into the country from countries such as D. I. Onwudiwe (B) Texas Southern University, Houston, TX, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. Raufu Southern University and A&M College, Baton Rouge, LA, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_12

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Iran, China, Libya and Turkey, mostly through porous land borders and the seaports aided by corrupt border officials. It is estimated that there are more than one billion firearms in 230 countries, out of which 84.6% are in the hands of civilians, with 13.1% held by state militaries. In contrast, 2.2% belong to law enforcement agencies (Dungel, 2020). In 2017, there were six million firearms in Nigerian civilians’ hands, up from two million arms in 2007 (Alpers et al., 2019). Homicides, which were 1,629 in 1994, jumped to 17,843 in 2015 (Centre for Law Enforcement Education, 2004; UNODC, 2020). A major cause of gun violence is Nigeria’s plurality, which has been a source of many challenges rather than a blessing. Highly diverse and heterogeneous with more than 250 ethnic groups with a plurality of religions, the inter-ethnic struggle has been a significant cause of tension and violence. Leadership failure has stoked structural inequality, social injustice, poverty, sectarian strife and ethnoreligious crisis. With the state’s increasing inability to guarantee the security of lives and property, people have resorted to self-help to defend themselves against terrorists, bandits and other criminal elements. In contrast, criminality has been embraced as a means of survival (Uchendu et al., 2019). Besides plurality, other factors, for example, socio-economic challenges, political factors, ethnoreligious violence and growing economic disparity have contributed to increasing gun violence in Nigeria (John et al., 2007). The situation is aggravated by communal clashes, militancy, cultism, and political vendettas. Besides, the recurring intra-state wars across Africa, particularly in the countries sharing borders with Nigeria, have led to the smuggling of arms into the land (Uchendu, Nwachoko & Ijomone, 2019). In this chapter, we used content analysis of secondary data collected primarily from literature reviews published articles. We examined records from the Amnesty International publications, Nigerian government and historical periodicals and academic searches using various search engines such as Google Scholar, JSTOR and Sage through the Texas Southern University’s Library Database. Additionally, relevant information on terrorism and the use of guns in the perpetration of violent attacks in Nigeria came via examining the Global Terrorism Index published by the

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University of Maryland. Through our academic search, information was also generated from educational institutes such as the Centre for Law Enforcement Education, United Nations Operation Center (UNOC), and Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre. As Neuman (2000) indicated, the merit of using content analysis stems from the notion that it helps to scrutinize documents and records and interpret texts without immersing oneself in the study’s subject.

Theoretical Perspective The incidence of gun violence and gun homicides in Nigeria can be explained within the context of the internal dynamics that provide a conducive environment for state failure. A state is assumed to have failed when it is exhibits social, economic, and political failure such that it can no longer fulfil some essential responsibilities expected of a sovereign to its citizenry (Patrick, 1999). Characteristics of a failed state include the collapse of state institutions, non-provision of basic amenities, inability to control all or parts of its territory, unchecked corruption, and failure to ensure law and order and uncontrollable internal violence (Clarke, 2015). Using the failed state theory, Nigeria can be described as a state characterized by a low autonomy level. The Weberian typology is applicable here since a country can either have low or high autonomy. A nation state demonstrates high independence when it can convince all social classes of its role as a relatively neutral umpire in the mediation of inter-class struggle through effective harmonization and reconciliation of class interests. Examples of such societies are the western capitalist nations in Europe and North America that have successfully negotiated middle ground for social classes to coexist in a sort of amity, despite the continued exploitation of the poor by the rich (Ake, 1985; Alavi, 1972). On the other hand, a state exhibits low autonomy when there is low commodification of capital and low penetration of private capital into the economy to facilitate the working class’s exploitation. As a result, the acquisition of political power and eventual access to the public treasury is the only way to accumulate wealth. In this case, states rather

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than perform regulatory roles are compromised because of their involvement in the first acquisition of wealth through the public treasury’s direct embezzlement. Indeed, rather than perform a regulatory function in moderating the wealthy and poor’s competing class interests, the state is compromised because of its involvement in mismanaging public wealth (Ake, 1976). The current state of anomie in Nigeria has made it impossible for the Nigerian government to monopolize coercion, enabling non-state actors to inflict violence on the citizenry.

Literature Review Ethno-Religious Violence and Gun Violence Before colonization by the British in the eighteenth century, the country now known as Nigeria was non-existent. The geographical landscape comprised more than 250 disparate and largely autonomous ethnic groups, with many isolated. The northern region had become a political unit after the Usman Dan Fodio’s jihad, which ended in 1812 through which much of the north came under Fulani rule. The other two major ethnic groups, Igbo and Yoruba, were mostly on their own. There were also several smaller ethnic groups. There were some trading relations. However, there were occasional internecine wars between the HausaFulani in the north and the Yoruba in the west, which only ended with the British colonialists’ intervention. The struggle to forge a national identity had been a significant challenge for Nigeria more than six decades after it became a politically independent country. This conflict is partly rooted in its history. Nigeria was not a single nation when its colonization by the British began in the eighteenth century (Lamb, 1981; Fayeye, 2013). It was not until 1914 that the country was cobbled together for administrative convenience. Over more than 150 years of colonization, the British colonialists did little or nothing to ensure any form of national cohesion. Instead, they used a divide and rule system, encouraging division among the disparate 250 ethnic groups that made up the country. This policy was to ensure that the people would not speak with one voice to seek independence.

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The ploy worked as the colonialists played the ethnic groups against each other. By the time the British left in 1960 to herald Nigeria’s birth as an independent nation, the country was like a hastily put together disparate groups of strange bedfellows with different religions, ethnicities, cultures and ways of life. The uneasy marriage of autonomous ethnic nationalities has bred distrust and constant bickering amid the perceived domination of one ethnic group over the others. The unhealthy rivalry among the ethnic groups and the fierce competition for access to political power and resources has pitted the ethnic nationalities against one another, resulting in frequent armed conflict and agitation for self-determination, encouraging arms proliferation. According to Okeke et al. (2014, p. 416) there were more than 30 communal clashes, sectarian violence and ethnoreligious crisis between 1999 and 2003 alone in which hundreds of lives were lost and leading to the internal displacement of people. It is estimated that ethnoreligious clashes and armed robbery claimed 1,000 people annually since 1999, and most of the deaths were by firearms.

Wars and Continental Destabilization Nigeria has not been immune to the destabilizing intra-state conflict around the African continent and those with which it shares borders. African borders’ porosity has provided a conducive environment for arms trafficking by non-state actors (BolakFunteh & Oladejo, 2019). Liberia, Sierra Leone and others were engulfed in civil strife in the 1980s, and the echoes of that sad past remain in the West African subregion. In recent years, Libya’s destabilization following the death of the former Libyan leader, Muammar Ghaddafi, has had significant consequences on arms proliferation. Besides, the diversion of arms to emerging rebel groups across the continent, as well as the spillover effects of armed conflict in the Sahelian region, has led to a thriving illicit small arms and light weapons market, posing significant security challenges to all countries in the subregion (Bashir, 2014). The absence of an effective disarmament and arms destruction programme in the troubled countries has made cheap small arms available in the black market. The vicious cycle

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of conflict around the Lake Chad region has also increased gun running around Nigeria’s northern border. These arms are being smuggled to ISIS backed Boko Haram terrorists engaged in a vicious conflict with the Nigerian military.

Boko Ham, Terrorism and Arms Proliferation Boko Haram is the most notorious terrorist group operating in Nigeria. It has carved out under its control a large swathe of territory in the country’s northeastern part. The origin of Boko Haram is rooted in the Nigerian state’s failure to address the basic needs of the people (in a remote area of north-east Nigeria). Boko Haram began as a small band of an angry mob led by an Islamic scholar, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2002 with the aim of Islamizing Nigeria. While its views were considered extreme, it was relatively non-violent in its methodology at inception. The Nigerian government’s inability to manage the sect and an attack on its members, including the 2009 killing of its leader in police custody, radicalized the sect. It went underground only to emerge later as a violent group, committed to the Nigerian state’s violent overthrow. Over time, the group secured foreign terrorist organizations’ backing to destabilize Nigeria and forcibly turn it into an Islamic state (Oketokun, Babalola & Salako, 2014). In recent years, the frequency, geographic scope, target selection and severity of Boko Haram’s activities have increased within the Nigerian landscape. The group’s evolution has been mainly influenced by its growing radicalization and fragmentation of the group and its knowledge and exploitation of Nigeria’s porous northern borders. More importantly, its strategic ties with Al Qaeda affiliates and an intricate web of relationship with global terrorism networks have provided a steady source of funding, arms and recruitment (Sanni, 2011; Weeraratne, 2017). These affiliations have helped transform Boko Haram from a ragtag group of disgruntled elements to a deadly enemy of the Nigerian state, enabling the group to expand its activities to include attacks on the Nigerian military installations. These include bombing raids across northern Nigeria aimed at Christian and Muslim targets.

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It is estimated that Boko Haram terrorists have killed more than 100,000 people, destroyed properties worth nine billion dollars, and displaced more than 2.4 million people around the Lake Chad Basin since the group embarked on violence in 2009 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018). The internal governance problem associated with Nigeria as a weak state, resulting in its inability to protect its citizens or provide them basic amenities, has created a state of insecurity, enabling internal rebellion such as the Boko Haram insurgency to thrive (Mickler et al., 2019).

Militancy, Resource Control and Gun Violence The Niger Delta armed agitation in the 1990s is a major contributory factor to arms proliferation in Nigeria. Most of Nigeria’s oil wealth is in the Niger Delta basin. However, the region is rife with poverty, infrastructural deficit and environmental degradation. For an extended period, the government ignored the grievances of the local communities. Eventually, exasperated community youth took up arms against the region’s oil infrastructure to press their demands (Ebiede, 2017). The directions led to armed conflict against Nigerian security agencies. The militants embarked on pipeline vandalism, kidnapping and other criminal activities to press their claims for resource control, leading to years of protracted violent clashes. More than two thousand deaths were recorded, and over 100,000 people were displaced in agitation. After years of sustained combat, the Nigerian administration eventually reached a truce with the Niger Delta communities (Ebiede, 2017). The Nigerian government granted unconditional amnesty to the Niger Delta militants in 2009. It established a peacebuilding programme anchored on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to quell the insurgency and return peace to the region (Davidheiser, 2011). The disarmament phase involved the surrender of arms by the militants. This phase was only partially successful as many of the militants refused to hand over some of their weapons despite the massive cash handout that was disbursed as compensation. More than a decade after, the expensive peacebuilding programme has not brought sustainable peace to the

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region. Some of the weapons in circulation are still being used by criminal gangs to foment trouble and in the service of politicians out for vendetta (Nwokolo & Aghedo, 2018).

Fulani Herdsmen/Farmers Clashes In recent years, a new dimension has been added to Nigeria’s gun violence phenomenon in perennial violent clashes between Fulani herdsmen from the northern part of Nigeria and the crop farmers in southern Nigeria. The Fulani herdsmen who are averse to ranching are nomadic, and they graze the cattle from one place to another. Nevertheless, the Sahelian region’s advancing desert encroachment has forced increased incursion of the Fulani herdsmen from the arid region of the north to the fertile land in the south in search of pasture for their cattle. However, the problem is that in the process of grazing their cattle, they have increasingly trespassed on privately owned farms, laying them to waste. The grazing crisis has precipitated violent confrontation between the herdsmen, who are often armed with automatic firearms such as AK47s and Kalashnikovs to protect their cattle against rustlers and defenceless farmers desperate to preserve their livelihood (Awotokun et al., 2020). Indeed, about more than 10,000 people have died in the decade of the herdsmen-farmers clash, with casualties reaching 2,500 in 2016 alone while fatalities from herders-farmers conflicts in 2017 and 2018 were 1,041 and 2,037 deaths, respectively (Ilo, et al., 2019; Kwaja & Ademola-Adelehin, 2018). Arguably, the herdsmen-farmers’ clashes have recorded more casualties in recent years than the Boko Haram terrorism. Scholars have asserted that the average annual deaths from herdsmen-farmers clash since 2016 exceed the death figures from the Boko Haram terrorist activities (Campbell, 2018; Campbell &Harwood, 2018). Also, the Nigeria Security Tracker showed fatalities from the herdsmen-farmers’ conflicts in 2017 and 2018 were 1,041 and 2,037 deaths, respectively, which compared to the record of the death toll of 2,016 from Boko Haram conflicts in 2018, indicate that herdsmen-farmers disputes are just as deadly as the Boko Haram terrorist carnage (Campbell, 2018; Ilo

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et al., 2019). The herdsmen-farmers conflicts have continued unabated due to government inaction and the security agencies’ inability to halt the herdsmen’s belligerence.

Failure of Governance, Poverty and Violence The management of internal security in Nigeria has been complicated by the outbreak of multiple security challenges such as Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East, and the intractable herdsmen-farmers’ clashes. Extant literature has demonstrated a nexus between poverty and urban violence. Urban violence in Nigeria manifests in armed robbery, kidnapping, urban gang violence, human trafficking, arms smuggling, cybercrime and illegal migration, which have remained unresolved (Oshita et al., 2019). Nevertheless, at the heart of Nigeria’s insecurity is poverty, unemployment, inequality, corruption fueled by poor governance and weak institutions. The imperative of survival is the first law of nature. When legitimate means of survival are no longer available, people are forced to seek illegitimate means of survival. While the management of internal security in Nigeria has become rather complicated by the outbreak of multiple security challenges arising from Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East and the intractable herdsmen-farmer clashes, urban violence in the forms of armed robbery, kidnapping, urban gang violence, human trafficking, arms smuggling, cybercrime and illegal migration have remained unresolved (Oshita et al., 2019). However, at the heart of Nigeria’s social and security problems are poverty, unemployment, inequality, corruption fueled by poor governance and institutional failure. Consequently, Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram terrorism, Fulani herdsmen-farmers conflict can be traced to the socio-economic conditions which drive people to survive the harsh economic situation imposed by state failure (Evans & Kelikume, 2019). Forced to endure by any means in the face of poor governance, structural inequality, corrupt leadership amid worsening economic situation, people have resorted to nonconformity to the law as a means of survival (Agudiegwu et al., 2019).

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More importantly, small arms proliferation and the consequent violence in Nigeria have been aided by the failure of governance, corruption, weak institutions, porous border and militarization of society as citizens feel compelled to engage in self-help to protect their lives and property. Bad leadership and resource mismanagement have increased poverty and unemployment, increasing the incidence of violent crime. The advent of globalization has transformed the world, predicated on a free market with minimum transnational barriers and unhindered international trade. Globalization has precipitated a complex integration of global production and exchanges and breaking down barriers and stateimposed restrictions, and closing the gaps among nations in an era of open borders. The integration of globalism in Nigeria’s economic policy also comes with challenges (Mallam, 2014). While globalization has eased the movement of people, goods and services across borders, it has also brought forth unintended negative consequences, including illicit trade in small arms across the world (Malhotra, 2016; Salihu, 2019). The proliferation of small arms and light weapons across the world is one of the consequences of globalization as armed conflict in one part of the world directly or indirectly affects others. Therefore, the increasing armed conflict in Nigeria can be partly explained as an offshoot of the various armed conflicts elsewhere across the world. Nigeria has not been immune to the ongoing violent conflict in the Sahelian region around its northern borders, which has made weapons readily available. The Sahelian angle has also aided the infiltration of ISIS backed Boko Haram into northeastern Nigeria and increasing the demand and supply of illegal arms. On the other hand, Nigeria is a weak nation state with fragile institutions. Fractionalization of Nigeria along ethnic and religious cleavages has increased the propensity for violent clashes among its mufti-ethnic groups.

Implications for Ethno-Religious Conflicts Nigeria is a multi-ethnic state, and its most intractable challenge has been managing its ethnic diversity and religious pluralism (Salawu, 2010). Ethnic diversity has been at the heart of its struggle with nationhood

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since it attained political independence in 1960. Ethnic rivalry was a creation of the British colonialists to rule Nigeria (Elochukwu, 2020). It was the tool of divide and rule system of the colonialists successfully used for many years, pitting ethnic groups against one another and distracting the people as they embark on the unrelenting exploitation of the human and material resources of their West African colony and elsewhere. As Falola (2016, p. 246) observed, this ‘pattern ensued in all colonies, European policies created the divisions, and African leadership manipulated them’. Ever since, mutual suspicion and animosity between the ethnic groups and the two main religions-Islam and Christianity, have remained the bane of nation-building in Nigeria (Elochukwu, 2020). Ordinarily, most Nigerians do not have protracted problems with each other irrespective of their religious or ethnic affiliation. The mutual ethnic distrust is driven by an unhealthy competition between selfish and competing elites of the ethnic groups for access to political power and economic resources, using the poor majority to fight their battles (Salihu, 2019). The failure of the Nigerian state can therefore be situated within the context of the perfidious exploitation of ethnic politics to advance the selfish quest for political power rather than any subsisting severe hatred among the various ethnic groups that make up Nigeria (Odunlami & Oyeranmi, 2020). Indeed, the poor majority have become frustrated by extreme poverty caused by unending lousy governance. Nepotism and infrastructural deficits and corruption have become pliant foot soldiers and cannon fodders in the elite’s zero-sum game competition for scarce resources (Igbini, 2020). However, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has made the challenge of nation-building even more unmanageable. Ethnic and religious diversity has been more of a curse than a blessing to Nigeria. The Nigerian nation’s successive administrations often unsuccessfully strive to resolve the constant ethnoreligious crises that have had crippling effects on national development. The emergence of militias along ethnic and religious lines poses an enormous risk to the country’s survivability. The constant state of insecurity creates a climate of tension that has made Nigeria one of the world’s most dangerous places (Nwankwo, 2015). Ethnic militias are essentially youth-based groups that have been established to protect ethnic interests and whose activities often involve

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the use of violence to achieve their parochial goals. They are like standing armies of their ethnic groups. The availability of small arms has helped their proliferation, and their rise to prominence has coincided with secession outcry across the country (Nwosu, 2020). The primary issue with ethnicity is that it can serve as a rallying point for identification with primordial loyalties and a platform for an informal political organization. The political elite can exploit primordial appeal to gain the people’s support for selfish ends (Cohen, 1988). It could incite ethnic violence as a basis for making a demand against other ethnic groups (Kaufmann, 2005). In other words, ethnic conflict is often manipulating group identity for social, political, or economic advantage (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Ruane & Todd, 2004). Ede and Chiaghanam (2019) have indicated that as the drumbeat of self-determination echoes across the country, the middle of the ground approach anchored on restructuring the economic and political framework is needed. The restructuring will include decentralizing political power to balance authority and fairness in managing Nigeria’s ethnic and religious diversities. The status quo does not augur well for Nigeria as the nation descends into uncontrollable chaos looms. Among those who contend that Nigeria’s situation is an irreconcilable union of strange cultural bedfellows, the call for consensus secession has been mooted. Consensual secession is a negotiated agreement between the sum parts of a parent state. Still, it is difficult to find precedents of peaceful unilateral dismemberment of any liberal democracy without some forms of initial violence (Busquets, 2020). Though there is no real danger of an immediate breakup of Nigeria, armed ethnoreligious conflict continues to mount, and cacophony over secession persists as the situation goes from bad to worse. Besides, the failure of governance, weak institutions, economic crisis, infrastructural deficits and youth unemployment have created a fertile ground for an anomic environment and the consequential effects of a failing state. Social disorder reigns as gun violence and escalating homicides threaten lives and property, and the general security, resulting in an exponential increase in violent crimes, including armed robbery, a state of anarchy, banditry, kidnapping and political assassination (Adewoyin &

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David, 2019). The result is an endless cycle of agitation for selfdetermination by the different ethnic groups and the ensuing pockets of ethnic insurgency (Omilusi, 2020).

Prevention Tips The need to tackle the challenges of insecurity in Nigeria requires finding a solution to the structural problem that brought about the continuous and rampant use of guns. With this in mind, the authors of this book chapter have included several prevention tips that are aimed at assisting policy-makers. These prevention tips are as follows: 1. We recommend that for Nigeria to solve the dilemma it encounters today in the proliferation of illegal weapons, it must first endeavour to improve the economy. Sound economic policies enhance the chances of gainful employment of Nigerian youths and reduce homicides and gun violence. 2. We contend that creating employment opportunities for the young graduates and the youths will encourage them to stay away from radicalization by the militant forces. An increase in work opportunities will generate jobs for youths who have massively become members of the vulnerable population due to idleness. The creation of employment for the youths in Nigeria would lessen the criminal incentives of joining criminal syndicate groups such as militants and kidnappers. 3. Again, it is difficult for a nation to survive or exist without having control of its borders. The Nigerian walls are readily penetrable by armed illegal dealers and suppliers of weapons to the terrorists and other violent groups. The government of Nigeria can increase its security personnel’s population in immigration, customs, border control agencies and additional security and law enforcement arms of the government (Onwudiwe, 2017). 4. We believe that the control of corruption at all the government levels in Nigeria will go a long way with the country’s management. Official state corruption is significantly a problem for Nigeria’s growth and economic development. When those entrusted with the country’s

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resources are looting it with impunity, their ruse and actions permeate the countryside. In other words, if the top members of the political elites are illicitly expropriating the country’s wealth abroad, jobless youths in Nigeria are forced to learn their techniques of official malefactions. As endangered species due to their disposable statuses in society, the youths innovate, generate and germinate smart propensities for criminality, increasing the risks of insecurity such as armed robbery, terrorism, kidnapping, advanced fee fraud and other criminal vices (Onwudiwe, 2003, 2017). Money that is stolen and pilfered by official corruption in Nigeria could be used and managed to have promising infrastructural developments—roads, rails, seaports, electricity—which would make life livable for the citizens. 5. Besides, the enforcement of the laws currently on the books through community policing (Wisler & Onwudiwe, 2008) would curtail the influx of guns into the country so that citizens will live in peace. According to the social contract between the governed and the state, the government must ascertain that citizens have peace and security.

Conclusion Nigeria is figuratively sitting on a keg of gunpowder. There is tension in the land due to irreconcilable internal contradictions revolving around simmering ethnoreligious conflict, failure of governance and an advancing ISIS backed Boko Haram terrorism from the northern flank determined to Islamize the country. It is estimated that there are six million illicit light weapons in Nigeria, 80% of which are in the hands of militants, herdsmen, and terrorists. Nigeria accounts for 70% or 350 million of the 500 million illegal arms in West Africa (Adetula, 2015). The arms proliferation is getting worse and quickly finds its way into Nigeria from every direction, including official ports of entry aided by corrupt border officials and by arms merchants ferrying arms on donkeys and camels through Nigeria’s thousands of miles of porous borders. Different criminal groups use these arms to terrorize the country as the government’s capacity to ensure law and order diminishes by the day.

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The 2016 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) ranks Nigeria third among countries with the highest impact of terrorism behind Iraq and Afghanistan. The GTI report estimated that Boko Haram terrorists killed 4,095 people in Nigeria out of the total 4,940 who died in the hands of terrorists in 2016. Amnesty International (AI), in its 2016/2017, also accused the Nigerian military of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances of people in North-Eastern Nigeria. In southeastern Nigeria, AI said the military killed at least 100 members and supporters of the group Indigenous People of Biafra (Duke et al., 2020). Undoubtedly, Nigeria’s cultural diversity has been more of a curse than a blessing, a variety of cultures and knowledge that could have been prosperous for its enrichment and development. Solving Nigeria’s gun violence challenge and preventing the implosion that appears imminent requires re-engineering the Nigerian state to deal with the underlying structural issues. The cosmetic approach will only postpone the day of reckoning and harden the contradictions in the polity. Without a dynamic and nationalistic leadership, the long and arduous process of resolving the national question cannot begin.

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13 Intimate Partner Gun-Violence (IPGV) in Zambia Phanwell Himulambo Namangala

Introduction Violence in intimate relationships has been increasingly identified and acknowledged as a public health concern that spans the globe (Drijber et al., 2013). This category of interpersonal conflict has been described alternatively as domestic violence, Gender-based violence (GBV), Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), and victims of IPV are described as battered men and women. Research suggests that battering often begins early in a relationship, and once it begins, it continues and the violence often escalates in frequency, intensity and severity in the absence of an intervention (Straus & Gelles, 1980). IPV has far-reaching consequences, stretching across generations. Instructively, the cost to the economy and burden on health services are considerable (Golding, 1999). In this chapter, the term IPV is preferable and used over other alternatives P. H. Namangala (B) University of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_13

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because it clearly identifies the violence as being experienced between partners in intimate relationships (Fruzzetti & Levensky, 2001). In recent years, cases of partner violence in jurisdictions across the globe have increased substantially. This increase results in large part from the fact that in most jurisdictions, police are now required to make mandatory arrests in cases of IPV and further require that these cases be prosecuted regardless of victim’s consent (Fruzzetti & Levensky, 2001). One particular form of IPV that invariably results in fatalities is what has been referred to as Intimate Partner Gun-Violence(IPGV). The current chapter focusses on this special form of IPV.IPGV refers to intentional use of firearms against one’s intimate partner either offensively or defensively. In terms of the extent, IPGV has been estimated to be a factor in nearly every intimate partner homicide (Roberts, 2002). These IPGV cases involve current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends of victims. IPGV is however far from being a problem peculiar to the West or to European countries. On the contrary, available evidence indicates that IPGV is a global ‘pandemic’. For instance, a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have reported high rates of IPV. Botswana, Namibia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia as well as South Africa are all grappling with the incidence of IPGV. In Zambia, for instance, The Police Service, during the 2020 annual ‘sixteen days of activism against gender based violence’, highlighted the gravity of intimate partner gun violence in the country. In a speech read on her behalf, the police spokesperson expressed concern about the ‘ever increasing use of fatal weaponry in marital disputes’. She singled out firearms, kitchen knives, axes, machetes and spears as the common fatal weapons intimate partners, in Zambia, have used against each other during marital disputes. The police spokesperson added that couples were also assaulting each other with substances such as boiling water, cooking oil and acid. The use of these and other fatal substances and weapons suggest the intention to seriously maim or kill. Arguably, in Zambia, the fatal weapon of choice during marital disputes are firearms, predominantly guns and pistols. Only rarely are other fatal substances and weapons used. A possible explanation for wide–spread use of firearms in disputes involving intimate partners is that they come in handy when

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families are attacked by criminals, especially in the night. As a result, most homes acquire firearms for this primary reason. Their use against intimate partners is therefore unintended and amounts to abuse. Of particular interest, despite the current ubiquity of firearm violence in pre-marital, marital and post-marital disputes, hardly any systematic study exists in Zambia on this specific category of intimate partner violence. As a result, its occurrence, to date remains a matter of unscientific conjecture and speculation. This chapter, therefore, seeks to address this grey area by shading some light on selected aspects of gun violence as it occurs between members of an intimate relationship. The chapter is premised on an exploratory study of firearm violence in intimate relationships. The exploratory study mainly relied on desk research involving police and court documents of intimate partner gun violence in Zambia. The site, methodology and results of the study are outlined below.

Study Site The site for the study which is the basis of this chapter was Zambia, a former British colony, located in Southern–Central Africa. Its economy is mainly anchored on copper and agriculture. The country has a population of about 18,920,651 inhabitants. Zambia gained its independence from Britain on the 24th of October, 1964. The country has 10 provinces and is the home to 72 tribes, and among other things, the country’s various ethnic groupings are united by the fact that they all use English as their official language. As expected inter-marriage between these ethnic groups is a double edged sword: in some instances, it is the basis for national unit, and in other instances, it is the sole basis for intractable and violent interpersonal conflict, mostly involving intimate partners.

Scope and Methodology To address the objectives of the study, an analysis of various data sources available such as police reports, eyewitness statements, intimate partner violence case files and court judgments relating to IPGV cases was

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undertaken. Wherever possible, collateral information relating to IPGV perpetrators and victims were also collected. The study upon which this chapter is premised was mainly exploratory and involved desk research of the various resources stated above. A total number of seventeen cases of intimate partner violence involving fatal and non-fatal gun violence were evaluated. For each case, the following information was teased out: gender of perpetrator and victim, the relationship between perpetrator and victim, socio-economic status of couple, circumstances that precipitated gun violence, consequences of the violence, etc.

Results Table 13.1 displays some of the results obtained: Of the seventeen (17) cases that were evaluated, gun violence was triggered by financial disputes in 48.5% of the cases. On the other hand, suspected infidelity accounted for 25.5% of the gun violence, while actual or anticipated rejection by a valued partner and unclear circumstances each accounted for 12.5%. Finally, instrumental factors and child custody, each, accounted for 6.25% of the incidents of gun violence in the 17 cases evaluated . Table 13.2 displays comparisons between male and female IPGV perpetrators with respect to three selected trigger factors. Thus money-related disputes triggered 22% of male perpetrated gun -violence while it triggered 38% of female perpetrated gun violence. Suspected infidelity on the other Table 13.1

IPGV triger dactors

Factor

Frequency Percentage

Money disputes Suspected infidelity Partner rejection Unclear circumstances Instrumental factors Child custody

48.5 25.5 12.5 12.5 6.25 6.25

Source Fieldwork (2021) Note IPGV – trigger factors = identifiable factors associated with occurrence of IPGV, Frequency percentage = computed by multiplying each relative frequency by 100

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Table 13.2

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Results of selected trigger factors by gender

Triger factors

Male perpetrator (N = 9)

Female perpetrator (N = 8)

Money Infidelity Unexplainable

22% 57% 20%

38% 46% 33%

Source Fieldwork (2021) Note N= total sample size, trigger-factors by gender = analysis of selected trigger factors by gender

hand triggered 57% of male perpetrated violence while it triggered 46% of female perpetrated gun violence. According to table 13.2, about 20% of male perpetrated violence occurred under unclear circumstances. Unclear circumstances also accounted for 33% of female perpetrated IPGV .

Discussion and Implications The findings of the study reported in this chapter reveal characteristics of perpetrators and victims of IPGV that have important implications for policy, practice and research relating to IPGV. One of the interesting findings of the study was that both men and women can be perpetrators and/or victims of intimate partner gun violence. As revealed in Table 13.2 above, the same factors that triggered gun violence in male perpetrators were responsible for gun violence in female perpetrators as well. This obviously undermines the feminist perspective as a complete explanation for IPV and seems to be supportive of the more inclusive theoretical perspectives such as the Learning Theory and Attachment Theory which have contributed greatly to the current understanding of intimate partner violence. Bandura (1977) for instance has argued that aggression in intimate relationships is acquired, like any other behaviour through observation and imitating aggression being acted out by other intimate couples in the past. Similarly, the Attachment Theory focuses on the formation of early relationships and the implications of how these relationships are formed for later childhood and adult functioning. It has been theorized by Dutton (1998) that adult IPV reflects an insecure attachment

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style, developed during childhood, and is associated with abandonment anxiety and anger. Indeed, there is evidence that IPV men are more likely to be characterized by insecure than secure attachment styles (Dutton et al., 1994). For example, Dutton et al. (1994) found that fearful attachment styles were related to anger, jealousy and trauma symptoms. Thus the study is skewed towards the current view that intimate partner violence, rather than being violence against women is actually mutual violence between men and women. In other words, either gender has equal chances of being a perpetrator or victim. This is contrary to the hitherto dominant feminist perspective which holds that ‘patriachy’ is the basis for men’s violence towards female partners (Bell & Naugle, 2008). Feminist theorist, therefore, view IPV as predominantly acted out by male towards female partners, caused by societal rules that support male dominance and female subordination (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). The current study, however, does not support the feminist position in that Tables 13.1 and 13.2 suggests mutual acts of gun violence between male and female intimate partners. In other words, Table 13.2, in particular, suggests that men and women engage in gun violence acts at approximately the same rate. This is consistent with other recent studies which have even suggested that ‘women are more likely than men to resort to physical aggression against their intimate partners’ (Dutton, 2006). In his twenty years of practising law in criminal courts, the author has noted with sadness that the police and courts unfairly hold men to be perpetrators of intimate partner violence even when they are the victims simply because of the fact that female partner sustained more pronounced physical injuries than the male partner. It is hardly surprising that the top three factors that triggered intimate partner gun violence in the current study were money, suspected infidelity and actual or anticipated rejection by the valued partner. Financial conflict accounted for 50% IPGV cases in the current study. This is self-explanatory given the unprecedented economic down-turn Zambia is currently experiencing. The value of the Zambian Kwacha has plummeted to its lowest ebb against the dollar, the cost of living is at its highest in ten years. Ironically the social pressure to acquire and own certain material possessions is equally at its zenith. This has exacerbated financial pressures in most households, resulting in frequent conflicts.

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With regard to infidelity as one of the top trigger factors of intimate partner gun violence, the Zambian government and church leaders are blaming the moral decadence which has resulted from westernization with its attendant problems of scant dressing, carefree life styles and so on. Interestingly, actual or anticipated rejection by valued partner is also, slowly, but surely taking centre stage as a basis for intimate partner gun violence. Two cases will illustrate the gravity of this issue in the Zambian context. In a recent IPGV case, a female medical doctor who was engaged to a military officer politely informed her fiancé that she had decided to end the relationship. The officer’s boyfriend objected, but all efforts to change the mind of the female proved futile. Upon realizing that he was fighting a losing battle, the officer changed tactics and pretended to have accepted and respected the lady’s decision. In the meantime, he managed to woe her to a quiet place for a farewell meal with her. On the way to the place he not only shot her dead, but also decapitated her. In another recent case, a Zambian police officer was in a romantic relationship with a young lady in a town where he was serving. He had made up his mind to marry the young lady, but unknown to him, the lady had no plans of marrying him. In the meantime, he lavished her and her parents with lots of expensive gifts, clearly beyond his means. As time went by the lady got involved with another man without ending the relationship with the officer. Word went around that the new boyfriend had impregnated her. In unbridled anger, the police officers went to the girlfriend’s home and shot her as well as her father. Believing that he had committed a homicide, he turned the gun on himself and ended his own life, however, his girlfriend and her father survived the attack. Another interesting finding of the current study relates to the instances of unexplainable intimate partner gun violence. A case in point involved a retired Zambia Airforce colonel. According to his family members, neighbours and church members, the colonel and his wife were enjoying a good marriage relationship. To every one’s shock, the night after the wife celebrated her birthday, and a few days before their 36th marriage anniversary, the Colonel gunned down his wife under circumstances which to date have remained unexplainable.

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Another relatively unusual basis for marital gun violence is what psychologists refer to as instrumental motive. This involves instances where a partner kills or seeks to kill his or her partner with the view of gaining a reward of one sort or another. Two Zambian cases would illustrate this category of gun violence. In the first case a business entrepreneur was shot, at close range by his long-time mistress. At first the case was classified as ‘unclear circumstance’ case. Further investigations, however, revealed that the mistress had been hired by the deceased man’s political enemies who were motivated to eliminate him. In a similar incidence, a middle aged man shot his wife of 25 years in order to marry a much younger woman he had already impregnated. This is also classified as an instrumental motive in the sense that he was motivated by the motive to ‘gain’ a younger woman upon getting rid of his elderly wife. It can be argued that the findings of the study reveal the multidetermined nature of intimate partner gun violence in the Zambian context. No single factor can explain a given case of intimate partner gun violence, however, to gain insights into any given gun violence case, a combination of factors has to be taken into consideration. The age range of IPGV perpetrators as well as victims was 18 to 32. These are relatively young couples. This is in line with what previous studies have found about IPV in general. For example, Schumacher et al. (2001) found that age was inversely associated with partner violence. In other words, he argued that young men were more likely to be physically violent with their partners than older men. Further Kantor, Jasinki and Aldarondo (1994) found that age decreased the odds of partner violence by a factor of 0.93.

Illustrative Examples of Intimate Partner Gun-Violence The researcher’s detailed notes show gender and age of perpetrator and victim of gun violence in each of the seventeen cases. In addition, the notes show whether perpetrator was married, divorced or affianced to the victim. The background to the dispute is also provided. Furthermore, precipitating factors and outcome of the gun violence are provided. The

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following case histories show typical gun violence behaviour between intimate partners in Zambia for a subset of reviewed cases. They are shortened from original versions as they are mainly for illustrative purposes. Case 1: The brief background was that tension had mounted in the marriage which was clearly on rocks. The trigger event was a disagreement over staying on at a drinking place where wife was drinking in the company of some male associates. In protest the late victim stormed out of the pub and went home leaving the Accused at the company of men drinking. When Accused finally returned home later that evening, the argument resumed and reached a fever pitch, culminating in the accused reaching for a gun and shooting the victim several times, killing him instantly. The gun was readily available in the matrimonial home and easily accessible. The use of the gun resulted in the instant death of victim. This was a case of female to male violence. The age of the perpetrator was 28 and the age of victim was 26. Case 2: The background was such that there was no manifest tension in the relationship. However, husband had suspicions that wife had gotten into an extramarital affair, and that most of her business trips were actually an excuse to be with her man-friend. While supporting the wife, he was on the lookout for hard evidence supporting his suspicion. The Trigger event was the wife’s business trip to Zimbabwe/South Africa. She did not return on the day she was expected, and did not call her husband to explain why. Several other factors raised the husband’s suspicion that she was in the company of another man. The husband must have sat strategically by the bedroom window, all night to observe the arrival of wife. Suddenly his patience paid off, a posh, black Mercedes pulled up a few metres from his gate. The man and woman in the car got into a passionate embrace and kissed, confident that they wouldn’t be seen as people were still fast asleep. Meanwhile the husband didn’t even wait to be sure that the woman at the gate, in a car was his wife returning from business, from the comfort of the bedroom window, he opened fire on the adulterous couple, killing the wife instantly and serious wounding her lover. The gun was readily accessible. The results of the use of the firearm were instant death of wife and serious injuries to wife’s lover. This was a male

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to female act of violence. The age of the perpetrator was mid-30s and the age of the victim late 20s. Case 3: The background was that on the surface and from on-lookers this was a good and happy marriage. There was no manifestation of marital disharmony. The husband was however suspicious that wife had an affair or two, connected to her regular work-related trips away from home. He also believed that men were taking advantage of his wife’s work which involved counselling men and women on sexual reproductive health. The trigger event was that wife was on one of her legitimate work-related trips to Kenya. The husband learnt that a certain government official had travelled with her and was actually sharing a room with her throughout that period. Upon her return, he confronted her about the issue. She worsted no time in admitting wrong doing, whereupon husband pulled a gun and shot her at close range. The gun was readily available at crime scene (bedroom). The result of use of the gun was fatal, victim died instantly. This is a case of male to female violence. The age of perpetrator was 32 and the age of the victim was 28. Case 4: The deceased met the accused at a drinking place. The two agreed to spend the night together in a lodge. In the morning the lady asked for an amount of money which the deceased said he did not have. She insisted that he looks for that money and give her, but the man kept responding that he was unable to find the amount of money she was asking for. In anger she forcibly grabbed a pistol from his brief case and shot him in the chest three times, whereupon he died. This is a female to male gun violence. The age of the perpetrator was 23 and deceased was 25. Case 5: The brief background was that tension had mounted in the marriage, clearly on rocks. The couple went on separation. The wife hurriedly left the matrimonial home and started renting a flat in another location but within same town. The event that triggered gun violence was that after sometime the woman who was a serving police officer returned to the matrimonial home to collect a few personal belongings that included a wardrobe whereupon a dispute ensued, and husband pulled a gun and shot the wife dead together with the landlord when he tried to intervene. The gun was kept in the matrimonial home and therefore easily accessible. The wife died instantly, but the Landlord

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survived. This is categorized as male to female gun violence. The age of the perpetrator was 25 and the age of the victim 23. Case 6: The background is that husband was working in another town far from the town where their matrimonial home was, Lusaka, Zambia’s capital city and wife was living in the matrimonial home with two of their children, and teaching at a nearby secondary school. Apparently, the wife got into a relationship with one of her fellow teachers, and she would meet him after work before going home. The husband soon got wind of the development, he started looking for ways of catching them ready handed. The trigger for gun violence was that on one fateful day, while believing husband was out of town, she arranged to meet her lover after work. The husband, who had quietly arrived in Lusaka without alerting the wife, on cue from one of his informers, followed her at a safe distance. Just when they were about to make love, the husband appeared on the scene, and forced them to accompany him to the matrimonial home he gunned his wife together with her lover. The gun was in the matrimonial home and readily available. The result of use of gun was fatal, wife and her lover died instantly. This incident is categorized as male to female violence. The age of the perpetrator was 28 and the age of the victim was 25. Case 7. The background is that the perpetrator of gun violence lived with her boyfriend in a two roomed flat. On the material day, they went drinking together as was their habit. While at the drinking place, the differed and had a bitter quarrel. The argument later ended and the couple continued drinking. When they returned home to sleep, the quarrel erupted again. The boy left the flat, but the Accused pulled out a pistol from where the deceased was securely keeping in case of criminal attacks at night. She followed him as she hauled insults at him. According to police report, when she got close to him, she tripped over and fell, whereupon the pistol discharged, killing the boyfriend instantly. Thus the result of using the firearm was fatal. The case is categorized as female to male gun violence. The age of the perpetrator was 21 and the age of the victim was 27.

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Interventions in Intimate Partner Gun-Violence According to the analysis of Zambian Intimate Partner Gun-Violence cases, the problem is invariably a culmination of unresolved tension between intimate partners and is a product of impulsivity, poor anger management and complete lack of requisite social skills on the part of one partner or both. And, of course, no gun violence would take place in matrimonial homes if firearms were not easily accessible. Hence, an obvious way to intervene against the use of firearms, in intimate partner disputes, is first and foremost to find ways and means of addressing prolonged discord between intimate partners, whether married, pre or post-marital. This can basically be achieved by the use of various practical strategies which might include the following: i. Enacting laws which prohibit partners with aggressive tendencies from owning, possessing any firearms or ammunition ii. Legislating for special protective orders against domestic violence as a legal intervention for IPGV. Evidence exists to the effect that domestic violence protective orders are an effective intervention against IPV in its various forms and manifestations. iii. Government should come up with deliberate policies to expand the provision of psychological services to couples country-wide. Since most of the causal factors of intimate partner gun violence are of a psychosocial nature, investing in country-wide psychosocial services would increase the probability that these potential fatal problems would be nipped in their buds. iv. The review of selected intimate partner gun-violence cases in Zambia revealed that in most cases, perpetrators threaten and show tell-tale signs of homicidal tendencies months, and sometimes even years before committing the felony. In this regard, law enforcement officers and other relevant government departments should take such warning signs seriously and take proactive steps to fore-store possible occurrence of a criminal event. In all the cases reviewed, there is clearly something the police, family members or even government could have done to prevent the crime. Unfortunately, in the Zambian

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context, there is the tendency to dismiss relationship conflicts as private matters, and therefore not taken seriously, ironically, until something serious happens. v. According to Fruzzetti and Levensky (2001) there are three primary goals in partner violence intervention: i Stopping the violence, ii Enhancing victim safety and iii Holding the abuser accountable. This provides effective guidance and summarizes the nature and scope of effective intervention in cases of interpersonal violence.

Conclusion Intimate partner gun violence is one of the various forms intimate partner violence can take. IPGV can be defined as the intentional use of a firearm against one’s current or former intimate partner whether offensively or defensively. The current study has revealed that IPGV is both widespread and a serious threat to people in intimate relationships. IPGV mainly affects young couples in the age range of 18 to 32 years. Although not to the same extent as younger couples, older couples are, however, also affected. In Zambia, IPGV is a multi-determined social problem, implying that a wide spectrum of factors account for its occurrence. In fact, no single factor can adequately account for the occurrence of a given incidence of IPGV. In Zambia, however, financial related conflicts and suspected infidelity account for most incidences of IPGV which result in fatalities. Arising from its multi-determined nature, IPGV equally requires a wide spectrum of preventive measures. Some of these measures include enacting laws that restrict availability of firearms to individuals with aggressive tendencies as well as legislating for specific protective orders against intimate partner violence.

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References Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Oxford, England: Prentice-Hall. Bell, K. M., & Naugle, A. E. (2008). IPV theoretical considerations: Moving towards a contextual framework. Clinical Psychology Review, 28, 1096–1107. Dobash, R. P., & Dobash, R. E. (1979). Violence against wives: A case against the patriarchy. Free Press. Drijber, B. C., Reijnders, U. J., & Ceelen, M. (2013). Male victims of domestic violence. Journal of Family Violence, 28(1), 173–178. https://doi.org/10. 1007/s10896-012-9482-9 Dutton, D. G. (1998). The abusive personality. New York: The Guilford Press. Dutton, D. G., Saunders, K., Starzomski, A., & Bartholomew, K. (1994). Intimacy-anger and insecure attachment as precursors of abuse in intimate relationships. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24, 1367–1387. Fruzzetti, A. E., & Levensky, E. R. (2001). Dialectical behavior therapy for domestic violence: Rationale and procedures. Cognitive and Behavioural Practice, 7, 435–447. Golding, J. M. (1999). Intimate violence as a risk factor for mental disorders: A meta-analysis. Journal of Family Violence, 14 (2), 99–132. Kantor, G. K., Josinki, J. L., & Aldarondo, E. (1994). Sociocultural status and incidence of marital violence in Hispanic families, violence and victims. Violence and Victims, 9 (3), 207–222. https://doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.9. 3.207 Novaco, R. W. (1977). Stress inoculation: A cognitive therapy for anger and its application to a case of depression. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 45 (4), 600–608. Roberts, A. R. (2002). Handbook of domestic violence intervention strategies: Policies, programmes, and legal remedies. New York: Oxford University Press. Robertson, K., & Murachver, T. (2007). Correlates of partner violence for incarcerated women and men. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 22(5), 639–655. Rosenbaum, B. D. (1988). Methodological issues in marital violence research. Journal of Family Violence, 3, 91–104. Rosenbaum, A., & O’Leary, K. D. (1981). Marital violence: characteristics of abusive couples. Journal of consulting & clinical psychology, 49 (1), 63–71. Saunders, D. G. (1986). When battered women use violence: Husband-abuse or self defence? Violence and Victims, 1, 47–60.

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Schumacher, J. A., Feldbau-kohn, S., Slep, A. M., & Heyman, R. E. (2001). Risk factors for male-to-female partner physical abuse. Aggression & Violent Behavior, 6 (2–3), 281–352. Straus, M. A., & Gelles, R. J. (1980). Behind closed doors: violence in the American family. Anchor Books. Wallace, R. (2014). Identifying potential challenges to providing emergence advocacy services to male victims of intimate partner violence. Partner Abuse, 5 (1), 58–68. Williams, J. R., Ghandour, A. M., & Kub, J. E. (2008). Female perpetration of violence in heterosexual intimate relationships: Adolescence through adulthood. Trauma, Violence, and Abuse, 9 (4), 227–249. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 15248324418

14 Use of Force and Gun Violence in Bangladesh: The Culture of Extrajudicial Killings by the Law Enforcement Agencies of Bangladesh Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder

Introduction Political issues in the current world have prompted the use of force by law enforcement (LE) agencies which frequently ended up starting clashes between them. The murder of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor by the police in the USA, as well as the actions of Indian forces against the Kashmiri people (Shaukat, 2015) are the latest examples of this. Terminologically, the use of force includes deadly physical force, which can The original version of this chapter was revised: Chapter author name has been changed. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_17

Md. I. A. Talukder (B) Department of Criminology and Police Science, Mawlana Bhashani Science and Technology University, Tangail, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected] Department of Security Strategy and Management, Institute of Security Sciences, Turkish National Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022, corrected publication 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_14

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cause death or serious health issue (cga.ct.gov, 2008). After the ‘second intifada’ Israel has been seen to use deadly force against the Palestinian (Cohen, 2008), who have been continuously becoming the victim of ‘targeted killings’ (Abrahms & Mierau, 2017; Falk, 2015), and lost thousands of lives (Kessler & Werner, 2008; Luft, 2003). In the Philippines, more than 300 people died from 2001 to 2010 as part of extrajudicial killings (Lanfer, 2010). According to Amnesty International (2017), people were executed in drug-related issues in different cities of the Philippines, which were mostly executed through extrajudicial killings. More than 1800 extrajudicial killings were recorded only in 2016 in the name of the war against drugs (Teehankee & Thompson, 2016). In many of these cases, LE authorities claimed to have a gunfight with the victim who died in a ‘crossfire’, whereas the survivors claimed the fire was one-sided (Center for Environmental Concerns Philippines, 2010). A pattern has been observed in the Philippines, where extrajudicial killings have become widespread since 2001 (Holden, 2012). In this chapter, extrajudicial killing is operationalized as ‘the killing of a person irrespective of innocent or not by the government apparatus without holding a fair trial or maintaining the due process of law’ (Hossain, 2017, p. 1117). The use of force practised in India is also similar where extrajudicial killings are termed ‘encounters’ (Belur, 2007) or ‘retaliatory killings’ (Singh, 2014). It has almost become a brutal culture in India (Mangoli & Tarase, 2010). As a ‘sub-cultural factor’ among the Police force (Belur, 2010), the police encounter also poses a significant threat to India’s democracy (Jha, 2016). In Nigeria, the situation is worse as the ‘loss of lives through extrajudicial killings’ (Enweremadu, 2017, p. 100) have been noticed for the past two decades (Jauhari, 2011). The LE agencies in Bangladesh can similarly be blamed for extrajudicial killing (Aziz, 2015) for the last two decades. Bangladesh has stumbled into its democratic system since the murder of its great leaders with two military regimes that hacked its constitution and changed the ultimate target of the independence (Afrina Osman, 2010). However, the country has allowed laws permeating the use of force against its citizens several times through the special operations led by different forces. The continuous use of crossfire (Human Rights Watch, 2011) has become popular among the general populace and is now considered a

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warning sign. Jews, historically, had been subjected to torture and death by terrorist attempts (Guiora, 2004), for which the Israeli LE agencies have been justifying the use of force (David, 2003). Crossfire is a media made popular terminology widely used in Bangladesh after the violent culture of extrajudicial killings started by Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) since their inception as an elite force to the Bangladesh Police (Quamaruzzaman, 2015). RAB, like the Israelis, have adopted similar narratives and added excuses of self-defence for the shootout, which undermines their respect for the law in a democratic country (Sakib & Rashid, 2018). This paper aims to explore the nature and practices of the use of force and gun violence in Bangladesh from the culture of extrajudicial killings in the last two decades that emerged with the modernization of the LE agencies. Bangladesh has ratified most of the international covenants; unfortunately, the current role of the LE agencies, specially RAB, for the last few decades gave birth to many questions (Habib, 2015; Odhikar, 2016). The culture of extrajudicial killing being surfaced since the creation of this elite force as a process of inquiry or zerotolerance policy of the government towards drugs (Momtaz, 2013). In almost all cases, the killings were justified either in the name of self-defence or the victims were gotten into ‘crossfire’ (Habib, 2015), a term that commonly denotes the extrajudicial killing in Bangladesh (Zafarullah & Rahman, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Methodology This book chapter examines the culture of gun violence and the use of force among the LE agencies in Bangladesh after 2004. Therefore, the study depends on the secondary data, which were collected from published books, articles and national reports as well as daily newspapers. Due to the nature of the study, information could be found only in the aggregate form published by the human rights organizations. In this study, commonly used sources are Odhikar (a human rights organization that also provides legal support to needy people in Bangladesh), Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK, legal aid, and human rights organization). These two organizations are renowned and nationally registered as NGOs, and

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other published sources like Amnesty International, journal articles and electronic documents available on the internet have also been used.

Use of Force The use of physical or deadly forces in a legal framework only relates to the government’s LE agencies. However, according to statutory laws, the use of force is only allowed first to compel the citizen to obey the law of the land and then to save one’s life from violent attack (Travis et al., 1999). Historically the concept of deadly force can be found in the practices of English common law (Blaricom, 1979). In the earlier period of England, it had almost all crimes defined as felonies and thus primarily punishable by death. Thus, if a fugitive escape from the police, it was considered a capital offence for which again the punishment was death. Nevertheless, after getting independence from the British empire and the Pakistani martial laws, where the people fought for emancipation and life with dignity, the use of force at this stage barely make any sense. The use of force can be categorized with actions, ‘consisting of a range of control tactics commencing from body language and oral communication, through weapon-less physical control, to non-lethal weapons, and finally to lethal measures’ (McKenzie, 2000, p. 182). Force can be defined as threats or physical actions which causes harm to citizens and can be categorized based on its ‘severity of harm’ that is applied to a citizen (Terrill, 2001, p. 2). The use of force by the police is always not incorrect or unsolicited. Policing in a certain situation may pose it inevitable to use coercion or aggression. For instance, the police may be left with no choice but to return to the use of force to suppress an aggressive mob and keep the disordered crowd under control when faced with circumstances they are powerless to control by other alternatives in any crisis. However, the volume and mode of violence used in any case by the police are open to controversy.

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The Emergence of Firearms and Individual Armament The study of the emergence and development of firearms will help understand the purpose of developing explosives as well as its use against humans. Historically, gunpowder as an essential element of firearms found to be invented and developed in the ninth century by the Chinese empire (Buchanan, 2006, p. 2; Chase, 2003, pp. 31–32) which later used in the firearms invented in the fourteenth century also invented by China (Needham, 1986). As history goes, the spread of gunpowder along with the firearms made its way from east to west through the Silk Road, adding the Mongol’s invasion, which announced its existence in the thirteenth century (Chase, 2003, p. 58; Norris, 2003, p. 11).Firearms extensively had been used in wars where certain nations or groups used it to control others. The development of Chinese ‘Fire-spurting lances’ to the development of modern automatic assault rifle thus has served governments’ interest through their LE agencies in the respective countries. The use of gunpowder was also believed to be introduced by the Mongols to the Delhi Sultanate in the Indian subcontinent, which was definitely used for the military purpose (Khan, 1981). Thereafter, the use of upgraded firearms for warfare in India was also found in the Mughals period in the seventeenth century, which were later controlled and again manufactured by the ‘East Indian Company - a commercial arm of the British state’, who started their venture by selling firearms to that region (Satia, 2018). The use of deadly force, therefore, indicates the use of firearms, and in the case of LE agencies while managing the public order, it becomes pretty standard (Mason & Waddington, 2007). The individual use of firearms can be found in the Second Amendment of the US Constitution, although early American historians have challenged the rights (Churchill, 2001). On the other hand, as a historic part of the Indian Sub-continent, Bangladesh does not have any record where individual level possession of weapons was found legal. If one was to examine the current statute, which was formed before the birth of Bangladesh, legality of individual arms use stated in Sect. 5 of The Arms Act 1878 of Bangladesh, ‘No persons shall manufacture, convert or sell, or keep, offer or expose for sale, any arms, ammunition

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or military stores, except under a license’. Therefore, only the LE agencies of Bangladesh can possess and use firearms to serve the government and maintain law and order.

International Obligations Towards Use of Force or Using Firearms Against Civilian There have been conflicting theoretical arguments that view firearms as a cause of violent crime, a violent crime prevention tool, or utterly irrelevant to violent crime. Before embarking on the discussion of violent actions by LE agencies, looking into the existing local and international laws towards the use of force and firearms, as well as its legality, is required. As a part of the international society, Bangladesh is required to ratify the international conventions as well as ensure its inclusion into the domestic law through parliamentary procedure. According to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, every ratifying country of the convention is obliged to recognize the treaty’s conditions as described in it. On the other hand, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 provides an opportunity to the signatory states and allows them to reserve the legal effect of any specific part of the convention, which is also its rights (McCall-Smith, 2014). However, Article 31 states, the country can reserve it with ‘good faith’ while using the convention (Linderfalk, 2003). The essence of Article 31 must be used impartially if faced with numerous challenges, which has to be ensured through ‘intuition and common sense’ in order to reach a conclusion while serving the interest of the parties and maintain the meaning of the law (Corten & Klein, 2011). In 1974, Bangladesh ratified the Charter of the UN, and later several articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) were included in Bangladesh Constitution. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Bangladesh has ratified in 2000, offers a broader perspective of the UDHR (OHCHR, 1966). The UN nevertheless adopted the UDHR and ICCRP as global human rights documents that have created a significant effect in the ratifying countries and also in their leadership and the subject matters (Stephen, 2007).

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Nevertheless, the practices of LE agencies, which has already become a terrorizing chapter in Bangladesh, clearly show that both the government and its agencies have violated the international convention and related laws (Hossain, 2017). The current terrorizing culture, which includes ‘crossfire’, ‘encounter’, ‘gunfights’ etc., can be classified as extrajudicial killings, is also a direct violation of human rights, international conventions and provision such as stated in Article 3 of UDHR, ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’ (UDHR, 1948). In addition to that, Article 9 of UDHR ensures people from getting arbitrarily arrest or detained or even exiled, which also happened to be violated on a regular basis in Bangladesh. Arbitrary arrest and extrajudicial killings infringe the provision of ‘the inherent right to life’, which even in an emergency period cannot be violated (Kretzmer, 2005). Since the birth of this particular elite forces, RAB, it has been observed that people, especially from the opposition to government party and people in business, have been targeted by a particular group of people, with power and close ties with the government, faced crossfire (Riaz, 2005). For some instances, crossfire events did not require any use of lethal force, which also alleged to be fake (Mariategui, 2010). Therefore, any act like extrajudicial killing will be a direct violation of those fundamental laws and will amount to be a gross violation of statutory acts and human rights, which, if committed, will require proper investigation of the fact and judgement by law (Mollah, 2014).

Crossfire or Extrajudicial Killing? Crossfire has been recognized as targeted killing (Human Rights Watch, 2011), often defined as the last resort to avoid any difficult situation like a terrorist attack or to save a significant number of people from an imminent threat (Kretzmer, 2005). In the case of Bangladesh, crossfire is popularly used in the print and electronic media and also in the local academia to denote any form of extrajudicial killing by LE (Kamruzzaman et al., 2016; Zafarullah & Rahman, 2002). In general terms, crossfire denotes the exchange of bullets at a particular place within a

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similar pace of time from both assailant and LE agency’s sides which begins with a special operation intended to apprehend the offender and associates, but the offender attacks, on the contrary, to defend their member or snatch away their accomplisher (Sakib & Rashid, 2018). In a similar sense, crossfire describes a situation like an encounter of killing a person (Ullah, 2009). Human Rights Watch, in its report published in 2011 stated, that crossfire is a process of killing members of the opposite political parties and oppress them (Human Rights Watch, 2011). There are several different approaches in the ongoing process of extrajudicial killing, especially those killed at the close range, which have been reported as either ‘crossfire’ or ‘encounter’ with few other synonyms like ‘gun battle’ and so on. In the name of gunfights between some supposed violent or hardened criminals and RAB or police, the Government uses this term frequently. In other nations, the word ‘death in an encounter’ is used to mean similar action, but the term ‘crossfire’ is preferred in Bangladesh by its LE officials. The dangerous context reveals the sheer powerlessness of the people who face extrajudicial killings indiscriminately by its LE agencies.

The Birth of Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) While there are some special forces formed with the cooperation of representatives from various organizations (i.e., RAB, Cobra, and Cheetah), the core agency to ensure citizens’ security is the Bangladesh Police (Momtaz, 2013). Apart from Bangladesh Police, other LE agencies were formed at different points in time to tackle special situations that used to resort to lethal force and thus used Crossfire (Odhikar, 2016). RAB has the highest criticism of these organizations and also are blamed for killing individuals in Crossfire (Habib, 2015). Around 44 per cent of all the people who were killed in the Crossfire from 2004 until 2016 have primarily been executed by RAB (Odhikar, 2016). The elite force is formed by the authority’s authority with the act called ‘The Armed Police Battalions (Amendment) Act, 2003. RAB comprises personnel from Police, Army, Navy, Air Force and Border Guards (Human Rights Watch, 2006). It started its operations on 14

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April 2004 following a rise in the national crime rate and a failure of a previous military-based operation named ‘Operation Clean Heart’ (Chowdhury, 2003); where their primary task was to maintain the internal security as well as comply with orders time to time given to them from the government. The formation of RAB was not an unwise decision, nor it was a plan to create a gross human rights violator. Nevertheless, Bangladesh inherited political instability and also geopolitical pressure after its independence from Pakistan in 1971 (Yılmaz & Talukder, 2019), which led to internal political instability created ways for criminals to spread their activities, and thus RAB got the opportunity to use the force and became violent.

The Culture of Extrajudicial Killing in Bangladesh After 2004 The availability of small arms in the hand of miscreants has always believed to be dangerous (Rana & Nesa, 2018). In addition to that, the rising number of militants, insurgents and a terrorist group with around 6.4 million small arms in their hand alone in the South Asian region (Kanwal & Chansoria, 2010) made the task difficult for the local LE agencies in Bangladesh. Along with the terrorist organizations organized criminal activities, the local crime rate also sore high. Crimes like drug dealings, political violence, small arms proliferation etc., increased at an alarming rate in the following years. The annual homicide count and rate have both increased in Bangladesh after 2000 (see Fig. 14.1). After the inclusion of new crime control policy and the creation of elite forces like RAB, the homicide rate spiked high (about 2.8 in 2000) due to its get-tough policy towards crime and indiscriminate use of force in general, which later remained at the top. The homicide rate indeed was affected by the small arms proliferation in Bangladesh, where the rate of illegal arms compared to legal small arms recorded to 400,000 (GunPolicy.org, 2018). The use of illegal weapons was found pretty much powerful, as observed in the local election campaign in that period where political violence, murder of the opposition leaders, killing rival candidates even in the election

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5000

3 2.91

4500 4000

2.8

3500 3000 2500 2000 1500

2.84 2.72

2.7

2.95 2.9

2.86 2.72

2.68 2.75

2.49 2.6 4514 2.5 4219 3988 3966 4114 4393 4166 2.5 3863 4099 3678 3503 3471 3902 3343 3592

2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4

1000

2.3

500 0

2.2 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Annual Homicides Total

Annual Homicides Rate per 100,000

Fig. 14.1 Homicide by any means in Bangladesh (Source https://www.gunpolicy. org/firearms/region/bangladesh)

day became rampant (Husain, 2002). Maintaining armed cadre became a political culture for self-protection, which opened the door for extortion and abduction and ended with a violent armed conflict with the LE agencies (Dhaka Tribune, 2014; The New Nation, 2016). The practices seem to be more violent among Police than the RAB, and the total death incidents went high (see Fig. 14.2). Remarkably, the trend of gunfights started back in 2004 increased in the following years fell down at the end of the 8th elected government lead by Bangladesh Nationalist Party around 2006; remain low during the interim period (2007–2008) led by the advisory government and continued to remain low until 2013, the end of ninth political government Awami League; started to rise with following 10th national parliament election in 2014 (Mollah & Jahan, 2018) and increased almost to double of the previous record before the successive years of 11th national parliament election held in December 2018 (BEC, n.d.). The trend of gunfights shows a significant correlation with the national parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The use and practice of violence in the politics of Bangladesh have remained violent over the periods (Hassan & Nazneen, 2017; Mohsin, 2014).

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EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS, 2004-2020 RAB

Police

53

Other Forces

27 87

FREQUENCY

19

258 26

133

64 111

22

94

68

38 75 41

16 43 68

175 10 31 43

203

7

9

126

118

24 59

192 77

276

116

144 30

119 12 18 40

38

29

5 119 117 136

53

51

43

33

101

62

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Fig. 14.2 Extrajudicial Killing in Bangladesh (allegedly by few members of different agencies) from 2004–2020 (Source Odhikar [2020] and Odhikar Annual Human Rights Report [2020])

Contribution of Drugs and Arms Related Issues in the Extrajudicial Killings The drug eradication campaign began in May 2016 and killed 348 people in one year until April 2017. Therefore, strict drug control policies and practices ended up killing hundreds of individuals through the means of crossfire or gunfight. Due to the geographical position of Bangladesh, it is close to both the ‘Golden Triangle’ and ‘Golden Crescent’, which made it vulnerable to drug-related issues (Rahman, 2009). Along with the existing drugs like heroin, cocaine, cannabis, the introduction of a cheap new drug smuggled from Myanmar called methamphetamine (locally known as ‘Yaba’) had poisoned the whole country (Department of Narcotics Control, 2017). The year 2018 has another significant event which includes the declaration of a zero-tolerance policy against drugs announced by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and further directives to launch anti-narcotic actions on 3 May 2018, which later contributed to increased extrajudicial killings amounted to 466 deaths alone in 2018 about three times more than recorded in 2017 (Odhikar, 2018).

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The drug smuggling issue was multiplied with the high incoming of Yaba into the local market; as a result, about 40 million Yaba tablets were seized alone in 2017, which was also a 36% increase from the previous year, as well as about 133,000 individuals were arrested (Department of Narcotics Control, 2017). According to an international report published in June 2019, at least 466 persons were executed only by the police in anti-drug operations (Harm Reduction International, 2019). Ain o Shalis Kendra (ASK, 2020) shared that 112 persons were executed by the LE agencies in drug-related cases in 2020 only. Figure 14.2 indicates the higher number of extrajudicial killings both in 2018 and 2019. The high rate of killings does not only consist of drug-related cases, but it also has other issues like political violence, and armed incidents with the terrorist organizations, etc. The political instability born with the ‘left-wing extremism and ethnic militancy’ just right after the independence from Pakistan in 1971, which got more structured and robust after the cold war as many of the fundamentalists joined the Soviet-Afghan war (BIPSS, 2017, pp. 3–4, 22). The left-wing extremism coupled with religious fundamentalism has contributed to establishing militia groups who have conducted a significant number of armed incidents in the country. The government of Bangladesh, however, always have acted tough on those extremists. Besides the extremist’s propaganda, only in 2020, about 73 people died of political violence (Odhikar, 2021, p. 43). The following table (Table 14.1) shows a brief picture of the armed incidents between the left-wing extremist and LE agencies from 2000 to 2020. According to the data, in 20 years, almost 867 incidents occurred in Bangladesh, where 917 extremists died. In all of the incidents, both of the parties involved in serious gunfights where the insurgent groups used varieties of arms and ammunition which includes Russia made AK-47 rifles, 9 mm pistols and revolvers, Pakistan-made rifle, cartridges, etc. also used locally made arms and ammunitions (SATP, 2021). According to a statistical report published on Odhikar’s website (2020), the LE agencies (Police and RAB only) have shot dead about 294 people over the last 16 years period (2004–2020). It also states that the number of shot to death was pretty much high in 2013 and 2014.

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Table 14.1 2020

319

Fatalities left-wing extremism, South Asia terrorism portal, 2000–

Year

Incidents of Killing

Civilians

Security forces

Terrorists /Extremists

Not specified

Total

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Total

3 2 24 101 139 153 140 51 48 74 31 18 7 19 12 10 13 10 7 3 2 867

0 0 8 55 42 15 28 7 2 10 1 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 176

1 0 4 7 0 3 6 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25

2 3 25 58 165 174 150 65 50 76 35 17 8 20 12 14 17 13 8 3 2 917

0 0 6 13 5 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28

3 3 43 133 212 193 186 72 54 86 39 19 10 24 12 14 17 13 8 3 2 1146

Source SATP (2021)

According to Amnesty International (2019, p. 21), the pattern of extrajudicial killing reveals that the people who were executed mainly were from lower to a lower-middle-class family, ‘the victims were “taken” by police or RAB officials before they were killed in what appear to be cases of enforced disappearance followed by extrajudicial execution’. According to the Statistics of Odhikar, 2020, the number of extrajudicial killing increased from 2004 to 2020; about 3859 individuals were killed. The execution rate increased to 10.26 in 2005 just after forming the elite force, then went down until 2012 and again started to increase in 2013, which went all-time high in 2018 and then fell down at the end of 2020 (see Fig. 14.2). In 2020, a retired Major was hacked to death by a group of Police officials in Teknaf, Cox’s Bazar, which is in the coastal region

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of Bangladesh (Odhikar, 2020, p. 4). After this particular event, the government took strict action against extrajudicial killings, which can be understood by the decreasing number of killing in the year 2020.

Measures to Reduce Extrajudicial Killings and Gun Violence Based on the findings of the study and reports published both by national and international organizations following steps are recommended to address the extrajudicial killing in Bangladesh: • Every LE agency must deny the culture of extrajudicial killing for the sake of humanity. Before that, the narration of the crossfire needs to be rewritten through controlled and minimal use of lethal force by the LE agencies and also stricter rules for illegal arms possession. • Possession of legal arms should be strictly maintained through proper registration and yearly usage inspection of the purchased ammunition. The eligibility of arms possession needs to be revised and should only be made available upon stringent background check and need assessment. • Political parties should be refrained from possessing and using illegal arms and ammunition. It is fundamental to stop gun violence both between parties and with the LE agencies. • The government must uphold the rights of its citizens as per the constitution and thus enforce strong legal standards to stop its agencies using lethal force and extrajudicial killing. A powerful and effective national human rights commission should be introduced to review every action taken by LE agencies and make them accountable for that which will surely decrease the abuse of power. The human rights commission therefore should independently investigate the case impartially and produced the report within the shortest period of time with sufficient proof and make the criminal pay for its action. • The legal remedy must be made available to the victims’ family who in need can resort to the court and can file a writ to remedy the wrongful actions as per constitutional rights. The victims must be supported

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by the government with necessary financial and legal aid in order to ensure proper justice. • Government should neither take any hard-core policies which might infringe human rights protected by the constitution nor direct its LE agencies to resort to deadly force to solve any issue. The government should ratify all international conventions against human rights violation and adopt them within their own legal framework which will hold both government and its agencies responsible for their actions.

Conclusion The government’s fundamental duty is to protect the life and liberty of its citizen, where the constitution of the country guarantees the fundamental and human rights of every citizen. Also, all legal instruments and statutes state that every individual is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Extrajudicial killing cannot be justified and accepted after having such kind of state traditions. Though, the Bangladesh government has been continuously being criticized over the last two decades for its position on the side of LE agencies as well as safeguarding their actions on several severe occasions. Additionally, the concept of crossfire and gunfight have become synonymous with killing people, which cannot be found in any developed countries. With the pace of time, the citizens of Bangladesh have developed a significant amount of fear from approaching LE agencies. However, another group of people have accepted and support the crossfire as an effective tool to eliminate social problems like drug abuse and trafficking and political violence. This type of behaviour can be categorized as per Jeremy Bentham’s idea of Utilitarianism, where the idea that pleasures outweigh pain gives the people resorting to happiness by ignoring others’ human rights. Even though the agencies are killing listed offenders, it should not justify their actions. The moral responsibility should not be discounted for any social issue which is the foundation of society.

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15 Killing and Letting Die: Depicting the Brazilian Conundrum Between Police Killings and Private Lethal Practices Luiz Phelipe Dal Santo

Introduction Though not being known for manufacturing guns, Latin America and the Caribbean are regions marked by high rates of homicide and interpersonal violence, as well as general human rights violations. Violence, in particular through the use of guns, is considered a key element in the production of order in these regions. As a consequence, several wellknown international institutions for the defence of human rights (e.g. Amnesty International, 2005, 2015; HRW, 2009, 2013), as well as local (e.g. Barcellos, 1997; Caldeira, 2002; Cano, 1997; Dal Santo, 2020; Misse, 2011; Pinheiro, 1991; Zaccone, 2015) and foreign (e.g. Ahnen, 2007; Chevigny, 1990; Clark, 2008; Hinton, 2005; Leeds, 2007; Willis, 2015) researchers have turned their attention to these regions. L. P. Dal Santo (B) University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_15

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This chapter focuses on gun violence in the Brazilian context. The country is not only characterized by its elevated homicide rates, but also—or mainly—by high levels of police deadly action. At first glance, this could be seen as an expected juncture: high levels of homicide and violence would then generate more conflictive situations tending to end up in crossfire, contexts in which police would be facing life or death. A careful look at the Brazilian reality tells us something different, as this chapter shows by drawing mainly on official data organized and shared by non-governmental organizations, but also on data collected by other researchers. This chapter depicts two complementary, rather than contrasting, practices of the Brazilian state penal apparatus: killing and letting die. In the first section, the researcher explores the conditions in which (i) homicides happen and are made possible, and (ii) how some specific lives are not protected in Brazil. While the first factor explores how the Brazilian state lets its people die, the second factor explores how it actively and systematically kills the very same group of people. In the third section, the researcher explores the contradictions and complexities which emerge from the Brazilian duality of killing and letting die, and the challenges this poses for both theory production and policy making.

Letting Die: Homicide and (the Lack of) Punishment Since 2012, nearly 60,000 violent deaths are intentionally caused every year in Brazil (FBSP, 2014, 2017, 2019). The figures in this ‘category’ of death (‘intentionally caused violent death’,1 ICVD henceforth) 1

This category is used by the Brazilian Forum of Public Security, and encompasses intentional homicides, deaths following a robbery (this situation is codified as a specific action in Brazil, called latrocínio), bodily injuries followed by death (which is also a different category of crime in Brazil), and deaths resulting from police intervention. In other reports, such as the Mapa da Violência, organized by Waiselfisz, ‘homicide’ is used as a synonym of this group of ‘intentionally caused violent deaths’. Another important aspect to be highlighted here is that so-called ‘violent deaths with undetermined cause’ are not considered as ICVD, though they are mostly actual homicides wrongly categorized—which is believed to happen in over 70% of the cases (Brazil, 2017: 48–49). Therefore, the absolute numbers and rates of ICVD are certainly underestimated.

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reached a peak in 2017, when 64,078 people were killed, and then started to decrease at a relatively fast pace—totalling 47,773 in 2019. I will not, however, turn my attention to this sharp decrease from 2018. Although the figures of this category of deaths have recently decreased, other typologies, such as suicides (12,700 in 2019), violent deaths ‘to be clarified’ or with undetermined cause (4,188 in 2019), and even disappearances (79,275 in 2019), have grown (FBSP, 2020). This scenario casts doubt on the accuracy of the annual ICVD figures recent decrease. That said, even if the official data is taken as fairly accurate and not overly underestimated, Brazilian ICVD numbers are alarming, and a broader timeframe gives us a better dimension of its seriousness: more than a million people were intentionally and violently killed in Brazil between 1980 and 2011. As Alagia (2016) puts it, these numbers can be compared to genocide rates. Despite being considerably high in absolute terms, the ICVD rates are also given in relation to every 100,000 inhabitants, which allows us to understand the magnitude of violent deaths intentionally caused in Brazil in comparison to other nations. The graph below shows that the ICVD rates have fluctuated within a margin of 27.8 and 30.9 between 2012 and 2017 in Brazil. The world average homicide rate was 5.78 in 2018. This means the Brazilian homicide rate was five times higher than the world average one. In that year, this rate was at 4.957 in the United States, and was around 1 in European countries such as the UK, Germany, France and Spain.2 One could correctly argue these are not the best countries to be compared with Brazil. Yet even when only Latin American and Caribbean countries are considered, the Brazilian ICVD rates remain significantly elevated. In 2015, the ICVD rate was 7 in Argentina, 11 in Costa Rica, 5 in Cuba, 18 in Dominican Republic, 6 in Ecuador, 17 in Mexico and 9 in Uruguay.3 It is therefore clear that, on a global

2 Data retrieved from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s International Homicide Statistics database, and organized by The World Bank. Available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?view=map. Accessed on 23 November 2020. 3 Only nine among 39 Latin American and Caribbean countries with available data had a higher ICVD rate than Brazil, those all being Caribbean, apart from Venezuela. Available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?locations=ZJ&view=map. Accessed on 23 November 2020.

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35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Fig. 15.1 ICVD rate—for every 100,00 inhabitants (1981–2015) (Source Waisefilsz [2016], Brazil [2017] and FBSP [2020])

and regional scale, Brazil suffers from disproportionately high numbers of homicides (Fig. 15.1). This picture alone says very little about the Brazilian reality though. ICVD is not proportionally distributed throughout the country. Its victims have a very specific profile: they are young, poor, under-educated and marginalized black men. As per the latest Brazilian Public Security Forum report (FBSP, 2020), 91.2% of the victims are men. When it comes to ethnicity, 74.4% are Black and 25.3% are white. This contrasts with Brazilian population figures where 53% of the population identifies Blacks and 46% as white (MJSP, 2017, p. 32). In terms of age, the most represented age group was between 20 and 24 years old (20.2% of the victims), followed by the group from 25 to 29 years old (16.2%), and 15 to 19 years old (13.6%).4 Finally, formal education levels can be considered, at least in the country, a useful indicator of the victims’ poverty and socioeconomic marginalization: over 80% of the victims had not completed upper secondary education. These intersections start to draw a better image of homicides and ICVD more generally in Brazil, but there are still some other features to be highlighted.

4 Homicide is the most common ‘category’ of death for people aged between 15 and 24 (Brazil, 2017: 7).

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‘Territorialisation’ is another key feature of ICVD in Brazil. There are two main trends related to territory—or the place where ICVD occurs. The first is its higher proportionality in poorer regions of the country: North, Northeast and Midwest. In these three regions, known for their high levels of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment when compared to the Brazilian Southeast and South, ICVD rates are higher than 35 (per 100,000 inhabitants), while the two Brazilian richest regions have rates lower than 25 (Brazil, 2017, p. 9). To illustrate this regional discrepancy, there are, in the same country, cities such as Altamira/PA, Lauro de Freitas/BA and São José de Ribamar/MA, in which homicide rates are of 105.2, 92.5 and 91.2, respectively; and cities such as Jaraguá do Sul/SC, Brusque/SC and Americana/SP, where homicide rates are of 3.1, 4.1 and 3.9, respectively (Brasil, 2017, pp. 17–18). The first three cities are located in the North and Northeast, while the last three are in the South and Southeast. This brief comparison corroborates the thesis of homicide territorialization and reinforces how public security in Brazil is remarked by heterogeneity and regional variation. The other aspect of homicide territorialization in Brazil regards its concentration within metropolitan areas (mainly state capitals). When analyzing the city of Rio de Janeiro, Gonçalves (2017) identified that ICVD’s take place mainly in favelas or in its ‘borders’. The same pattern is also observed in big cities such as São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Recife and Salvador, for instance. Therefore, in addition to broader, more regional concentration in poorer regions, ICVD is also concentrated in favelas or peripheral zones marred by poverty within metropolitan areas. Finally, the last feature of ICVD in Brazil to be reported here is that the vast majority of these deaths were caused by firearms. More specifically, guns were the instruments used to cause over two out of every three ICVD in 2019. These 2019 figures were not the exception but the indicative of the larger pattern observed in previous years (e.g. Waisefilsz, 2016). In this context, some authors identify the Disarmament Statute in 2003 (Law 10.826/03) as being responsible for backing an annual homicide growth trend (Waisefilsz, 2016), which was even more intense than the current one. This means that while the number of homicides has continued to rise, their intensity of growth has been considerably reduced since then. The Disarmament Statute was a federal initiative

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responsible for restricting both access and use of firearms by civil society and established a parallel campaign for people to hand over their guns to the police. As a result, over 280,000 firearms were collected between January 2004 and August 2008 (Cerqueira, 2014, p. 65), though this is just a minor representation when compared to the firearms in circulation in the country. The consequence of restricting access and the use of firearms was a reduction in the intensity of the annual growth of ICVD in Brazil. This indicates the importance of access to firearms to the reproduction of high-level homicide rates in the country. In spite of this whole scenario, homicides are hardly ever punished under law in Brazil. Though the growth of homicide in the country has been remarkable since the 1980s, the representation of this crime among the prison population has significantly decreased. Between 1983 and 2014, this figure was reduced by half, from approximately 20% to 10% of the prison population. This is a first indication that, in a certain way, the supposed ‘fight against crime’ and the Brazilian mass incarceration have not integrated a ‘fight against homicide’ or the protection of lives. That said, the mere percentage of people convicted of homicide in relation to the total prison population could mislead the reality. The so-called street crimes, not least robbery and drug trafficking, have also increased in an accelerated pace. For this reason, the thesis that homicide has remained excluded from the Brazilian public security priorities demands stronger evidence. When one considers the ‘homicide elucidation rate’,5 there is no doubt homicide is a crime which does not have a central status within the Brazilian public security programme. Actually, it is more adequate to argue that life protection policies and strategies are restricted to a very selective group of people in Brazil—those whose life has any value. According to the Prosecution Office National Council, the Brazilian homicide elucidation rate varies between 5 and 8% (CNMP, 2012). This means that for every 100 homicides, investigations are successful in claiming an eventual homicide perpetrator on approximately only five to eight occasions. This percentage is far lower than those of other 5

The homicide elucidation rate corresponds to the level of homicide investigation in which a formal charge is filed by the Prosecution—which is to say, this indicates the level of cases in which the Prosecution is able to accuse an specific person as the crime perpetrator.

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countries: about 95% in Germany and Japan, nearly 80% in the UK and Canada, around 65% in the United States (FBSP, 2014, p. 18) and just under 50% in Argentina (MJ, 2014, p. 26). This shows us how inefficient the Brazilian state is at investigating, identifying and holding perpetrators of homicide accountable. It actually could not be any different in a place where public expenditure on proactive policing is over 18 times higher than on information and intelligence (FBSP, 2019, p. 62). To sum up, homicides are not followed by successful investigations nor prosecutions in Brazil, and consequently crimes of this nature are not punished. As often said, it is very likely for one ‘to get away with murder’. This is also because, as many Brazilian scholars have argued (e.g. Fernandes, 1975; Holanda, 1936; Moura, 1994; Ribeiro, 1970, 2015; Schwarcz & Starling, 2018), young, poor, under-educated, marginalized, Black Brazilian lives have never had enough value in a country where indigenous lives were wiped out and Black lives were enslaved for four centuries. Their deaths, in present times, are not worth an investigation for the Brazilian state. Inaction—in not protecting vulnerable people and not holding perpetrators of homicide accountable—is one of the Brazilian state’s faces in relation to poor, Black and marginalized lives. ‘Letting die’ can well be the main face of the Brazilian state, but it is definitely not the only one.

Killing: Police Lethality as a Legal and Legitimated Mechanism The context explored so far exposes a passive approach in which the Brazilian state lets largely poor, Black and marginalized people die. We now turn to its opposite approach: when the State, through its penal apparatus, actively kills them. In 2019, at least 6,357 people were killed by the police in Brazil (FBSP, 2020). Surprisingly, this number has continued to rise even during the pandemic.6 As shown in the following 6 In the first semester of 2020, police killed 3,181 people in Brazil, which is more than in the first semester of the previous year (3,002) (FBSP, 2020: 84).

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graph, this number has acutely increased since 2013, when 2,212 people died as a result of the police intervention. This is not, however, a new feature of the Brazilian police. The beginning of a gradual increase in police lethality rates dates back to the 1970s. Since then, the country has experienced some periods of more intensive escalation in those rates, such as in the 1990s and now (Adorno, 2002; Dal Santo, 2020; Misse, 2011; Pinheiro, 1997). Brazil is actually the only Latin American country where police lethality has increased after military dictatorship (Sikking & Walling, 2007) (Fig. 15.2). In a similar manner to ICVD, numbers in absolute police killings can (and should) also be analyzed from proportional perspectives. Paul Chevigny (2003) presented three different models to measure the excessive use of deadly force by the police. These measurements are: the relation between the number of civilians killed and civilians wounded by the police; the relation between the number of police killed by civilians and civilians killed by the police; and the representation of police lethality in the totality of ICVD’s in a given region. Insofar as I have already done this elsewhere (Dal Santo, 2020) and limited space prevents me from developing a deeper analysis here, I will solely provide a brief overview of these measurements in Brazil. When all these three measurements are considered, it remains clear that police lethality is not unusual in Brazil, and its rates are far beyond 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 2009

Fig. 15.2

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Police killings in Brazil (2009–2019) (Source FBSP [2017, 2019, 2020])

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what could be expected or acceptable. Unfortunately, (and inappropriately) there is no broader national data available to assess the firstmentioned measurement. However, on a state level, when one compares the data from São Paulo state, it is possible to see that ‘shooting to kill’ has long been the rule (Bechara, 2015; Chevigny, 2003), since the number of people killed by the police annually is quite often higher than those wounded by them. This disproportionality is corroborated by the second indicator: about 70 civilians are killed by the police for every policeman killed on duty7 in Brazil (FBSP, 2017). Finally, according to Cano (1997), we are very likely to be before a context of abusive deployment of lethal force when police killings represent more than 5% of the total ICVD figures. The average percentage for Brazil in 2019 was 13.3% (FBSP, 2020), which is troubling in its own right, but the situation is even worse if attention is paid to those regional disparities already mentioned in this chapter. Representation of killings produced by policemen in the totality of killings reached 30.3% in Rio de Janeiro in 2019, and over 15% in several other states (FBSP, 2020, p. 84). If issues on police violence assume the image of police brutality in the Global North, they are better represented by the idea of police lethality in the Global South, and Brazil evidences this. Not surprisingly, the profile of those killed by the police is the same as of the general victims of ICVD’s. Recent reports have shown that victims of police lethality are mainly men (99.2%—FBSP, 2020), Black (79.1%—FBSP, 2020), and young (65% aged between 18 and 29 years—FBSP 2018). In addition, these killings also take place predominantly in favelas and peripheral metropolitan areas (Cano, 1997; Misse, 2011; Verani, 1996; Willis, 2015; Zaccone, 2015), which also testifies to the socioeconomic condition of those victims, and reproduces the territorial pattern of general homicides in the country. People who suffer from the lack of policing, protection, and security are the very same people who are victims of police (lethal) intervention. Parallel to the disproportionality shown above by the comparative measurements, the ways through which these killings happen are crucial 7

This rate is significantly reduced when the deaths of plainclothes policemen are considered (Dal Santo, 2020, p. 173).

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for comprehending that high rates of police killings are not a mere consequence of, or a reply to, high rates of homicide. To illustrate, more than half of the victims are shot in their back (Caldeira, 2002; Cano & Fragoso, 2000). Also casting doubt on whether this corresponds to a ‘mere’ reaction from the police, a significant percentage of these victims were found with injuries unrelated to firearms projectiles (Cano & Fragoso, 2000). Were police killings a reply to a context of high general lethal violence or a representation of police activity in settings of exchanging shots between ‘police’ and ‘criminals’, civilians would not be shot in their back, their dead bodies would not have marks of violence unrelated to the bullets, and nor would the rates of policemen and civilian deaths be so disproportional. Another similarity between police killings and the general ICVD’s is the lack of punishment. However, whereas general ICVD are not punished because perpetrators are hardly ever identified, deaths produced by policemen nearly always have their perpetrators identified. These very perpetrators—to be clear, the police—claim these killings but argue that they (re)acted in self-defence (Misse, 2011; Zaccone, 2015). It follows that policemen who kill end up not being punished—actually, they are barely investigated. State violence does not end with police killings in Brazil. After a policeman kills someone, there is a whole legal procedure that justifies and legitimates those killings, making them appear to be lawful. In Brazil, police killings are safeguarded by a judicial procedure, known as autos de resistência (resistance reports). The legal face of police killings was firstly uncovered by Sergio Verani (1996). Following him, several other scholars and human rights organizations dedicated special attention to the role of legal actors, such as judges and prosecutors, in the reproduction of these killings (Amnesty International, 2015; Cano, 1997; Cano & Fragoso, 2000; HRW, 2009, 2013; Zaccone, 2015). Autos de resistência is the name given to police inquiries of cases in which a policeman claims to have killed someone who has resisted or opposed police action. Their origins date back to the late 1960s, during the Brazilian military dictatorship. This legal mechanism is considered to be responsible for a new practice of police killings: since their introduction, it has no longer been necessary for the police to hide either the dead

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bodies (enforced disappearances) or those who committed the homicide. Instantaneous arrest of those policemen is now dispensed. These police inquiries categorized as autos de resistência nearly always end up the same way: as required by the prosecution, they are basically all dropped before any charge is filed. Because there is a large body of literature on this, the researcher will not provide a deep and detailed account on this procedure. However, it is worth highlighting some standardized practices which often happen in the period between the homicide and the closure of the autos de resistência. As the author of this book chapter has stated elsewhere (Dal Santo, 2020, pp. 181–182), right after these extrajudicial executions, the crime scene is often violated, rather than preserved8 ; the policemen narratives and testimonies are often identical9 ; in addition to the supposedly self-defence homicide, it is argued and registered that the dead person was caught flagrantly committing a crime, which is generally drug trafficking; drugs and/or guns are not always apprehended, and sometimes they are placed at the crime scene by the very policemen. In contrast, the policemen’s weapons are not apprehended—or, at best, they pledge to bring their own weapons to forensics later; examinations on the apprehended guns, when carried out, tend to indicate whether or not that gun is capable of shooting only, but not if they were actually used; criminal records (from the victim—the dead – but not the policemen) are attached to the inquiry at its very beginning. Further, the crime scene is hardly ever further examined by the investigative police10 ; 8

This has included, for instance, the removal of corpses and the collection of bullet casings from the ground (Willis, 2015). 9 As per the vast majority of cases analyzed by Misse and his colleagues (2011: 33), policemen declared ‘the police were on routine patrols or on operation, near or in a region controlled by armed groups of drug dealers, when they were shot and then retaliated against ‘unjust aggression’. After the shooting ceased, they found one or more ‘elements’ [the supposedly criminals] shot and laid on the ground, usually with weapons and drugs nearby; and [the policemen then] provided immediate assistance, taking them [wounded civilians] to the hospital. In almost all autos de resistência, it is reported that the victims died on the way to the hospital, and the Medical Service Bulletins subsequently attested the victim was admitted to the hospital already dead. There are also cases where [it is argued] the shooting started after an assault, or attempted assault, when the criminals responded to police intervention, but these [cases] are the minority’. 10 Cano and Fragoso (2000) identified only 12 cases, among 301 analysed by them, of forensics at the crime scene.

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the dead body’s hands are almost never examined, though the eventual presence or lack of gunpowder residues on there could eventually confirm or deny the hypothesis of a shootout between the policemen and the civilian who ends up killed; there are no witnesses other than the very policemen involved in the case; and prosecutors tend to transform the victims (those dead) into criminals, then validating the lethal police action. Police investigations are carried out to investigate the dead , not the death. Rather than investigating these homicides, these inquiries just conceive of them a feature of legality. Criminal justice frames all these killings as lawful. Elsewhere (Dal Santo, 2020), I have demonstrated how these police killings followed by these legal procedures of making them lawful represent the enforcement of an officialized death penalty in Brazil. This goes beyond the purposes of this chapter, however. Here we only need to consider that police killings are a systemic practice in Brazil, and the victim profile is basically the same as of the general ICVD victims. There is no better way to define Brazilian penal policy than as Nilo Batista (1997) puts it: ‘blood-shedding penal policy’, in which extermination is an institutional practice.

Contradictions, Complexities and Challenges from the Brazilian Dilemma Significant contradictions and complexities emerge from this situation in Brazil. The Brazilian dilemma touches upon neuralgic criminological issues of theoretical relevance and practical implications. But, first, what can all this data on general homicide and specific police killings tell us? Mbembe’s ‘necropolitics’ concept (Mbembe, 2019) is helpful for making sense of this. The Cameroonian scholar contrasts normative theories of democracy discussing notions of sovereignty, biopower and the state of exception. The idea of sovereignty as also or mainly the power to determine who may live and who must die has long been discussed (e.g., Agamben, 2005; Foucault, 1976 [2020]), and this is where Mbembe (2019) starts his analysis from. He analyzes contemporary forms of life subjugation to the power of death, highlighting their

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new features in comparison to old forms of ‘necropower’. He states that ‘weapons are deployed in the interest of maximally destroying persons and creating death-worlds, that is, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to living conditions that confer upon them the status of the living dead’ (Mbembe, 2019: 92). Considering Brazilian state’s actions and inertia in relation to life and death, one can see the centrality of necropolitics in the governance of the Brazilian society (Dal Santo & Ferraz Jr, forthcoming). Some scholars have claimed that, in the past, empires and their representants could kill as they please, without being subjected to any rule or law in the colonies. The Brazilian case shows how, at present, a State, through its police apparatus and some legal arrangements, can kill its very people, and this being within the realm of legality. This is also to say that, whereas in the past—or in colonial times—empires systematically used the power to kill in disputed or recently occupied territories (which has an external dimension), systematic killings by the State now also take place within its own margins, in undisputed, internal territories. Today, the marginalized ‘killable’ people may live within the murderous State’s boundaries, and the marginal territories may be marginal in a local- and internal-, not necessarily global- and external-level. Another issue touched upon by Mbembe regards the supposed monopoly on violence. Considered one of the main Modern states’ features (Weber, 1956), this is not observed in peripheral countries (see, e.g., Adorno & Dias, 2014; Dias & Darke, 2016; Willis, 2015). Not only are homicides a frequent, common practice in Brazil; they are also non-investigated and unpunished. Marginalized people are simply left to die in Brazil. This seemingly contradictory duality offers significant challenges of theoretical and practical dimensions to Criminology. In contemporary studies and debates on punishment, incarceration rates have been used as the main indicator of a country’s punitiveness. It is true that, at the same time, many authors have questioned its use and its eventual misleading character (Dal Santo, 2019; Matthews, 2005; Nelken, 2010). This duality in Brazil only reinforces how inaccurate an analysis limited to imprisonment rates can be. On the one hand, the Brazilian penal

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system kills thousands of people every year, and this extremely high punitiveness is not revealed by the mere observation of how much the country incarcerates. This, however, includes both the police lethal action and the legal activity of prosecutors and judges which gives those killings a legal appearance. Moreover, this is also a common practice in peripheral countries other than Brazil or Latin American and Caribbean countries more generally (e.g. Uddin, 2018). On the other hand, the case of thousands of homicides going unpunished does not represents a tolerant—as the opposition of punitive—penal system. As paradoxical as it may seem, the ‘non-punitive’, or the lack of a state punitive response, in particular situations may denote a rather high level of state punitiveness or violence, even if indirectly, through a malignant negligence (see also Morrison, 2005). Altogether, these issues raise several questions: why does punishment and society scholarship not address issues on police killings? Is it because this is a more ‘Southern’ problem? Can police killings be indeed understood as a form of punishment, particularly in settings in which judicial activity systematically considers them to be lawful? If yes, does this mean contemporary punishment has actually escaped a trend of more subtle and hidden punishment? How can we make sense of state inertia before high homicide rates? In this context, can a state be considered more punitive by…not punishing? How misleading can the analysis of punitiveness limited to incarceration rates be? Does this pose any methodological implication or unfeasibility for the development of comparative studies? In addition to theoretical and methodological concerns, the Brazilian dilemma between high rates of both police killings and private lethal practices also poses a crucial question for political praxis. As long highlighted by left-realist criminologists, marginalized communities are the ones who most suffer from crime and violence. They are the most victimized people in relation to the crime widely known as the most serious one (homicide). It follows from this that they are the very ones who most need protection from the state. At the same time, abolitionists are right when they argue police and the state penal apparatus produce more harm than ensure security for vulnerable and marginalized people. Poor, Black, young men are those who most suffer from the police intervention. They are the victims of police lethal action, which, as mentioned earlier, does

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not necessarily take place in contexts where policemen have their lives threatened. Therefore, they suffer both from the lack and the presence of the police. What is to be done then?

Prevention Tips – Improve living conditions of vulnerable and peripheral areas, where ICVD’s are concentrated, treating social policies (e.g. housing, education, job creation etc.) as the main penal policy or primary prevention; – Demilitarize the police. I reckon I have not discussed this above. However, this is a crucial element when it comes to police killings. Since 1970, Brazil has two different sorts of police in the state level.11 One is called polícia militar [military police], other is polícia civil [civil police]. Whereas the former is mainly responsible for proactive policing and the guarantee of public order, the latter is the investigative one. Currently, the military police is subjected to the trinomial ‘military instruction, military regulation, and military justice’, as established by the military dictatorial regime (Zaverucha, 2010, pp. 53–57). Brazilian military police therefore are trained in a context in which the enemy is its very people. Songs sang in their trainings also highlights a logic of war tactics in which favelados are clearly the enemies (see Menegat, 2012, p. 112); – Reorganize police funding, investing more in intelligence and information, in order to improve levels of homicide investigation resolution; – Set up mixed judging committees in the police internal affairs, being composed not only of senior officers, but also of public defenders, barristers, judges, prosecutors and representatives of the civil community. This could back corporatism and potentially provide an impartial judgement on the abusive acts perpetrated by policemen on or off duty, especially those that culminate in death12 ; 11

I am not here considering Federal police. I am particularly thankful to Jairton Ferraz Júnior for having stated this prevention tip in a paper co-authored by us (Dal Santo & Ferraz Jr, forthcoming).

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– Increase public expenditure in local and regional research aimed at understanding the dynamics and causes of the use of lethal violence as a private, alternative way of conflict resolution; – Invert the logic of Brazilian public security, which now prioritizes the war on drugs and patrimonial crimes, and start to centralize life protection in its programme.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have depicted the Brazilian conundrum between police killings and private lethal practices. I have shown that a state can be extremely punitive even if through inaction. The Brazilian state lets its poor, Black and marginalized citizens to die. There are no strategies, nor actions in practice to avoid tens of thousands of these annual homicides. Neither are there investigations, prosecutions and punishments after these homicides are committed. In tandem with that, the Brazilian state also actively kills its poor, Black and marginalized citizens. State actions in this context do not end with the endemic police deadly action, but also entails judicial practices that make police killings legal. Despite being relatively common in global periphery regions, these topics are not entirely integrated into a relatively global discussion on punishment and society. I have then highlighted some challenges the complexities and contradictions emerging from this Brazilian duality poses not only to national police-making, but also to a more globalized or international knowledge and theoretical production. Acknowledgements I am thankful to Dr. Wendell C. Wallace for kindly inviting me to contribute to this important and relevant collection. I am also thankful to Laurence Hutchence, Caitlyn McGeer and Ian Loader for their extremely helpful and thorough feedback.

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16 Conclusion Wendell C. Wallace

… a broad array of evidence indicates that gun availability is a risk factor for homicide, both in the United States and across high-income countries. (Hepburn & Hemenway, 2004)

For many people, a general rule is that endings are inevitable and often filled with sadness. This book is no exception to the general rule on endings, and as it comes to an end, readers may have a plethora of emotions, including, but not limited to, happiness, enlightenment, surprise and possibly sorrow. However, the editor of this captivating book ascribes to a self-effacing tenet that ‘endings and conclusions should not be sorrowful, rather they should be joyful as conclusions are akin to the light at the end of the tunnel, yet they remind us of dawn of a new beginning’. To the readership, as this book meanders to a conclusion, W. C. Wallace (B) Department of Behavioural Sciences, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_16

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do not be consumed with sorrow, but be enthused by the experience of reading this powerfully written manuscript and look gleefully forward to the beginning of another book on the horizon of the Global South as ‘Issues of vital criminological research and policy significance abound in the global South’ (Carrington et al., 2016, p. 1). In sum, there are much more academic works by scholars from the Global South that are on the horizon and that are imminent. Without a doubt, there are many limitations of the postcolonial views on criminology and criminal justice (as well as other academic disciplines) emanating from the Global South, where colonial control, colonial violence, knowledge production and transference and education imperialism from the West are still omnipresent. Therefore, it is of great importance to reorient this traditional ontology by creating and disseminating scholarship that originates in and is immanent from the South. For some ‘scholars’ in the contemporary era, the idea of knowledge production and transference from the South is a radical concept that challenges the established status quo and persistent, if not flawed, international assumptions about hierarchies and linear flows (North to South) of scholarship (see Obarrio, 2018 for support), however, knowledge production and transference is not the sole domain of scholars in any region or jurisdiction. Instructively, the contribution of every book chapter author to ‘Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides: Perspectives from the Caribbean, Global South and Beyond ’ serves to reorient debates on universality, particularity, centrality and peripherally and contributes to knowledge creation and ‘reverse transference of knowledge’, that is, from the South to the North. The editor of this edited book submits that any academic treatment of the pervasive criminological issue of guns, gun violence and gun homicides in the Global South should ideally include as many voices from the South as possible, hence the purport of this book. Carrington et al., (2018, p. 4) points out that “The South could be mined for data, as for other raw materials, and empirical studies might be conducted in Southern settings applying imported (Northern) theory, but little in the way of novel ideas or theoretical insights of anything more than local interest would be yielded by the social scientific enterprise in the South.” This book serves to appropriate and highlight that Northern theorizing is useful and that ‘we

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should not throw out the baby with the bath water’, but that Northern literature should not be viewed as the ‘panacea’ or the ‘silver bullet’ to social issue plaguing the Global South, but that it can be used alongside or as a referent point to novel research and provide theoretical insights into issues in the South. While Connell (2007) was not making a specific reference to the field of criminology when he used the term ‘metropolitan thinking’, criminology can learn from and avoid the enduring pitfalls of this ‘metropolitan thinking’ (Connell, 2007, p. 215). Instructively, Altbach (1978) submitted that Third World nations are, in a sense, at the periphery of the world system of knowledge, with the industrialized nations at the centre of that system, however, if the production and transference of knowledge remains largely Northern-centric, then the words of Altbach (1978) will remain a reality and will hold true for non-Western nation states. In an examination of guns, gun violence, and gun homicides, Miller et al. (2013) emphasized that the scientific criminological literature has identified a relationship between gun prevalence and suicide, homicide and unintentional firearm death. Importantly, the authors conclude that where there are higher levels of gun ownership, there are more gun suicides, more gun homicides, more total homicides and more accidental gun deaths. Thus, based on the lethality of guns, it is imperative that research be conducted in all parts of the globe to determine possible solutions and prevention strategies aimed at alleviating this pernicious issue. There is a disparate range of opinions regarding the role that social scientists should play in the understanding of law and society (van Heugten & Gibbs, 2015). Despite the plethora of debates surrounding the role of Social Scientists, it is argued that their role is primarily to synthesize material and to describe and explain sociolegal phenomena objectively (Sherwin, 2006). Indeed, a crucial aspect of the Social Sciences is to uncover and highlight social issues plaguing societies. However, the work of a Social Scientist is not so obtuse that it ends with simply pointing out challenges and social issues. In fact, it is cogitated by this author that Social Scientists go beyond ‘simplistic cognitive processes’, are critical in their ontology and do not seek merely to

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describe and explain social events. Instructively, contemporary Social Scientists conduct critiques of a wide range of social situations, while seeking to reorient and demystifying the world by highlighting constrains and routes to freedom. Importantly, contemporary Social Scientists are concerned with the resolution of social conflicts in their broadest sense and attempt this goal by actively seeking out solutions to identifiable social issues (see Kading, 1952 for support). It is against this background of seeking solutions to the problems associated with guns and gun violence that the authors of this book have centred their work and have provided prevention tips to legislators and policymakers. It is the desire of every book chapter author that the prevention tips contained in the chapters will be used as a guide to assist policy makers in the Global South to create and implement policies to fight the scourge of guns, gun violence and gun homicides in their jurisdictions and thus assist in the improvement of the quality of life for their constituents. The book chapter authors in this collective have highlighted a multiplicity of challenges associated with guns in the Caribbean, Global South and areas beyond. While these challenges are substantial, they are not insurmountable and with research and effective policies there may be a glimmer of hope for countries that are struggling to contain the pervasive issue of gun violence. Indeed, containing, managing and reducing the proliferation of gun violence can be achieved through closer collaboration with researchers and a thorough engagement with state departments and institutions. Further, a more robust relationship between law enforcement agencies in these regions is also necessary. This would not only serve the interest of the nation states, law enforcement, community residents and policy makers, but would ultimately lead to a truly international scholarship that includes work from non-Western as well as areas that are traditionally under-researched. In deciding on the efficacy of this book, the editor requests from the reader to conduct some introspection and ask what can be done to reduce the staggering toll of gun violence which claims over 31,000 lives each year in the USA for example. Further, Wallace (2020) in a presentation on policing in Trinidad and Tobago proposed that gun violence is an urgent public health issue that demands effective prevention through

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evidence-based policy response as well as through empirical research. In light of Wallace’s (2020) postulation, a more nebulous concern is ‘what can be done to stem the rising tide of gun violence against women in society as well as the well-known activities of mass shootings’? As a rule of thumb, academic conclusions, whether contained in books, journals or theses, should not be abrupt or appear to end suddenly as this can lead to the view that the author simply ran out of thoughts and ideas. While the editor of this collective subscribes to the aforementioned school of thought, the conclusion of this book is deliberately kept short as the editor prescribes brevity on one hand. On the other hand, it is the belief of the editor that the readership of this book should not be overly burdened with the thoughts and ruminations of the editor, but that they should be left to savour the writings of the book chapter authors and on the riveting, captivating and well-researched contents of their respective chapters. In sum, that the book’s conclusion does not conform to the status quo, in no way detracts from the efficacious nature of this edited collective.

References Altbach, P. G. (1978). Scholarly publishing in the third world. Library Trends: Publishing in the Third World, 26 (4), 489–504. Carrington, K., Hogg, R., & Sozzo, M. E. (2016). Southern criminology. British Journal of Criminology, 56 (1), 1–20. Carrington, K., Hogg, R., Scott, J., & Sozzo, M. (2018). Criminology, southern theory and cognitive justice. In K. Carrington, R. Hogg, J. Scott, & M. Sozzo (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of criminology and the global south (pp. 3–17). Palgrave Macmillan. Connell, R. (2007). Southern theory: The global dynamics of knowledge in the social sciences. Allen and Unwin. Hepburn, L., & Hemenway, D. (2004). Firearm availability and homicide: A review of the literature. Aggression and Violent Behavior: A Review Journal, 9, 417–440. Kading, D. (1952). The role of the social scientist. The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 32(4), 271–276.

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Miller, M., Azrael, D., & Hemenway, D. (2013). Firearms and violent death in the United States—Conclusion. In D. W. Webster & J. S. Vernick (Eds.), Reducing gun violence in America: Informing policy with evidence and analysis (pp. 13–15). Johns Hopkins University Press. Obarrio, J. (2018, January 25). Inter-lingual exchange in the global south: Translating and publishing critical theory. Presentation at Franklin Humanities Institute, Duke University—Translation and Publishing in the Global South. Sherwin, R. K. (Ed.). (2006). Popular culture and law. Ashgate. van Heugten, K., & Gibbs, A. (2015). Social work for sociologists: Theory and practice. Palgrave Macmillan. Wallace, W. C. (2020, December 10–13). Land-based policing: Implications for safety and security in Trinidad and Tobago. Paper presented at the 21st Annual SALISES Conference, Mt. Irvine Bay Hotel & Resort, Mt. Irvine, Tobago.

Correction to: Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides Wendell C. Wallace

Correction to: W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6 The original version of the book was inadvertently published with an incorrect abstract in Chapter 8 and incorrect author names ‘St. Godfrey Bernard’ instead of ‘Godfrey St. Bernard’ and ‘M. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder’ instead of ‘Md. Ishtiaq Ahmed Talukder’ in Chapters 3 and 14, respectively, which have now been corrected. The corrected book has been updated with these changes. The updated version of the chapters can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_3 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_8 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_14 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6_17

C1

Index

A

C

Ammunition 34, 37, 44, 45, 56, 114, 115, 120, 125, 130, 131, 156, 182, 190–192, 197, 199, 212, 213, 215, 218–220, 223, 225, 256, 258, 261, 263, 264, 302, 311, 318, 320 Armed conflicts 91, 92, 193, 256, 275, 277, 280, 316 Armed robbery 94, 251, 253, 255–259, 264–266, 275, 279, 282, 284 Arms proliferation 275, 277, 280, 284, 315

Capitalism 117 Caribbean 5, 9–11, 13, 14, 19, 21, 22, 58, 61–64, 82, 92–95, 103, 107, 111–118, 122–124, 126–132, 140, 146, 148, 155, 168, 190–192, 194–196, 202–204, 206, 216, 225, 233, 234, 236, 329, 331, 342, 352 Coercive powers 164 Coldspots 13, 98–100, 103–105, 107, 108 Colonial legacy 202, 254 Community engagement 222 Community outreach 221, 224 Conflict theory 117 Crime analysis 106 Crime control 47, 201, 315 Crime prevention 12, 22, 30, 104, 312

B

Boko Haram 276–280, 284, 285 British parliamentary system 218

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 W. C. Wallace (ed.), Guns, Gun Violence and Gun Homicides, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84518-6

355

356

Index

Criminal activity 6, 91, 92, 122, 126, 131, 162, 182, 193, 195, 203, 266, 277, 315 Criminal justice system (CJS) 13, 224–226, 234 Criminal lifestyles 123 Criminal sanction 56 Critical Intervention Teams (CIT) 149 Crossfire 308, 309, 313, 314, 317, 320, 321, 330 Cultism 272

D

Deaths 3, 4, 15, 17, 31, 32, 35, 36, 38, 41, 43, 60, 61, 91, 92, 111, 115, 122, 141, 155, 173, 211, 212, 216, 230–232, 235, 237, 244, 252–256, 258, 275, 277, 278, 299, 308–310, 316–319, 330–333, 335, 337, 338, 340, 341, 343, 351 Domestic violence 17, 19, 30, 33, 35, 37, 41, 45, 65, 68, 128, 212, 291, 302 Drive-by shootings 232 Drug trafficking 62, 123, 334, 339

Elites 32, 161–178, 180–184, 242, 281, 282, 284, 309, 313–315, 319 Ethnic groups 272, 274, 275, 280–283, 293 Ethno-Religious Conflicts 280 Extra-judicial killings 16, 163, 173, 308, 313, 315, 317, 320

F

Failed state 273 Failed state theory 273 Fatal violence 151 Felonies 252, 302, 310 Female homicide rates 216 Feminist theorists 296 Firearms 3–5, 10, 15, 30–38, 41, 43–47, 60–63, 83, 85–87, 92–94, 96, 111, 115, 116, 118, 120–131, 139, 147, 154–156, 162–165, 169, 181, 183, 191–193, 197–201, 204–207, 212–224, 226, 229, 230, 232, 233, 235–239, 241, 243, 251–253, 256–260, 262–266, 271, 272, 275, 278, 292, 293, 299, 301–303, 311, 312, 333, 334, 338, 351 Firearm seizures 220, 233, 237 Focused deterrence 224, 226

E

Economic deprivation 62 Economics 2, 7, 22, 58, 88, 104, 123, 127, 131, 161–163, 165–175, 177, 178, 180, 182–184, 190, 198, 226, 234–236, 254, 257, 259, 272, 273, 279–283, 296

G

Gang cultures and lifestyles 62 Gang involvement 84, 124 Gangs 14, 30, 58, 63, 64, 68, 72, 76, 82, 116, 117, 119, 120, 124, 127, 161–167, 169–184,

Index

201, 213, 215, 216, 221, 222, 224, 225, 235, 259, 278 Gangsterization 170–172, 178, 179, 183, 252 Gang violence 14, 65, 121, 127, 161, 174, 175, 181, 182, 194, 196, 216, 279 Gender 5, 12, 15, 17–19, 59, 65, 69–71, 78, 84, 126, 217, 231, 233, 235–238, 240, 242, 262, 292, 294–296, 298 Globalization of firearms 214 Global North 4–8, 11, 18, 20–22, 32, 44, 47, 215, 216, 337 Global South 2–12, 16, 17, 19–22, 30, 32, 107, 215, 216, 337, 350–352 Gun control 1, 5, 7, 13, 22, 29, 31, 37, 38, 43, 44, 46, 61, 63, 118, 128, 214, 271 Gun homicides 2, 4–6, 9–11, 15, 17, 18, 20–22, 30–33, 35, 41, 42, 44, 77, 115, 118, 120, 121, 162, 164, 230–233, 236, 237, 243, 244, 273, 350–352 Gun legislation 14, 120, 125, 128, 130 Gun ownership 33, 44, 46, 47, 63, 82, 94, 212, 218, 252, 351 Gun per capita 252 Guns 1–7, 9–15, 17–22, 30–37, 41, 43–47, 56, 58–64, 66, 82, 83, 85, 86, 93, 94, 112, 114–122, 124, 125, 129–132, 138, 146, 147, 156, 162, 164, 171, 183, 192–194, 196–199, 204, 212–216, 218, 219, 222–225, 229–238, 242–244, 251, 252, 254, 256, 259–263, 266, 271,

357

272, 276, 284, 292, 297, 299–301, 314, 315, 329, 333, 334, 339, 349–352 Gun violence 2–7, 9–12, 14–22, 36, 55, 60, 62, 64, 83, 100, 111, 112, 115, 119, 121, 122, 128, 129, 132, 165, 215, 220–225, 230–237, 242–244, 253, 254, 256, 259, 264, 266, 272–274, 277, 278, 282, 283, 285, 294–296, 298–302, 309, 320, 330, 350–353

H

Homicide elucidation rate 334 Homicide patterns 58 Homicide rate 60, 62, 63, 82, 92–94, 112, 115–118, 120, 123, 126, 127, 130, 141, 142, 211, 217, 223, 225, 253, 271, 315, 330, 331, 333, 334, 342 Hot spots 98, 120 Human rights 20, 22, 111, 119, 139, 163, 171, 176, 177, 215, 222, 223, 308, 309, 312–315, 317, 320, 321, 329, 338 Human security 193, 252

I

Illicit arms trafficking 14, 19, 161, 162, 165, 167–171 Illicit gun trade 14, 191, 193, 205, 206 Interpersonal conflict 291, 293 Intimate partner gun violence (IPGV) 292–298, 302, 303

358

Index

Intimate partners 236, 292, 293, 296, 299, 302, 303 Intimate partner violence (IPV) 12, 15, 59, 291–296, 298, 302, 303 Intra-state conflict 275

N

Net fishing 138 New security agenda 192 New violence 168 Nonespots 98, 99, 103–105, 107

P L

Latin America 5, 7, 10, 11, 62, 63, 92–94, 111, 116, 118, 123, 190, 206, 329 Law enforcement (LE) 16, 34, 119, 120, 129, 131, 148, 192, 193, 201–205, 215, 221, 272, 273, 283, 302, 307–316, 318, 320, 321, 352 Legislation 14, 33, 44, 45, 63, 64, 120, 121, 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 140, 144, 218, 231, 263, 265 Lethal police force 14

M

Mass shootings 13, 19, 29–32, 35, 36, 38–40, 43–45, 47, 60, 236, 353 Mental illness 45, 129, 148–151, 153 Mentally ill 14, 137, 148, 150–155 Militancy 272, 277, 279, 318 Military-style weapons 212 Moral panic 141 Murder 43, 57, 94, 99, 122–124, 193, 198, 200, 216, 238–240, 244, 252, 254, 259, 307, 308, 315, 335 Murder rates 35, 57, 118, 121

Paramilitarism 138, 165, 166 Peaceology 13, 106, 107 Police 3, 14–16, 30–35, 44–47, 56, 59, 60, 63–68, 75–77, 79, 81, 84, 86, 87, 98, 104–106, 120–122, 125, 127–129, 131, 138–156, 163, 164, 175, 177, 181, 192, 195–197, 205, 212–214, 217, 219, 220, 222–224, 226, 230, 232, 233, 237–239, 241–244, 255, 256, 258, 259, 262–265, 276, 292, 293, 296, 297, 301, 302, 307–310, 314, 316, 318, 319, 330, 334–344 Police killings 15, 16, 120, 142, 143, 241, 336–338, 340, 342–344 Police lethality 336, 337 Police officers 30–32, 36, 41, 43, 56, 105, 120, 122, 139, 140, 143, 145, 147, 149–152, 154, 156, 164, 214, 215, 230, 258, 259, 266, 297, 300 Police violence 137–139, 141, 146, 148, 149, 151, 155, 156, 337 Policing 4, 14, 22, 47, 106, 129, 137–141, 146, 148, 154, 155, 224, 284, 310, 335, 337, 343, 352 Political economy of guns 215 Political regimes 87, 165, 174

Index

Political system 178, 183 Politics 5, 7, 165, 166, 168, 169, 172, 180, 281, 316 Post-Cold War 114 Post-marital disputes 293 Poverty 5, 117, 123, 131, 152, 153, 221, 226, 272, 277, 279–281, 332, 333 Prevention 16–19, 36, 129, 194, 201, 221, 224, 343, 351, 352 Prevention tips 12, 47, 86, 87, 105, 108, 165, 181, 220, 264, 283, 343, 352 Private lethal practices 16, 342, 344 Private ownership of firearms 251, 252, 265 Protection of property 140, 251 Public health 4, 128, 129, 223, 225, 235, 352 Public health concern 147, 236, 291

359

Security collaboration 195 Shootings 3, 4, 30–32, 43, 45, 92, 118, 122, 148, 150, 153, 155, 212, 216, 217, 219, 225, 231, 243, 256, 299, 337, 339 Small arms and light weapons (SALW) 5, 206, 252, 275, 280, 281 Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 230, 234 Social intervention programs 128, 222 Southern criminology 11, 30, 32, 47 State of Emergency (SOEs) 120, 121 State repression 168 State-sanctioned gun violence 255 Subaltern class 161, 166, 177, 184 Suicide 1, 3, 4, 9, 12, 15–17, 19, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 41, 44, 60, 115, 118, 212, 229, 230, 233, 236–238, 241, 243, 244, 252–254, 259–266, 331, 351

R

Rational choice theory 123 Regulatory framework 15, 253, 263, 266 Right to life 20, 222, 313

S

School truancy 222 Security 2, 4, 17, 22, 44, 56, 64, 118, 121, 125–129, 145, 164, 166, 169, 180, 183, 190, 192, 194–196, 199–206, 222, 230, 253, 255, 256, 261, 262, 264, 266, 272, 275, 277–279, 282–284, 313–315, 319, 330, 333, 334, 337, 342, 344

T

Territorialisation 333 Terrorism 91, 92, 193, 253, 272, 276, 278, 279, 284, 285, 319 Terrorists 165, 189, 197, 215, 254, 272, 276–278, 283–285, 309, 313, 315, 318, 319 Trafficking of firearms 64, 193 Transnational networks 192 Trigger factors 294, 295, 297

U

Underground economy 166

360

Index

Use of force 137, 140, 141, 144, 145, 147, 155, 156, 165, 173, 307–310, 312, 315

V

Vertical-horizontal violence 161, 162, 166, 169–172, 179 Victims 2, 15, 30, 31, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 59, 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76–78, 83–85, 91, 116, 118, 129, 139, 142, 148, 198, 200, 216, 224, 225, 235, 236,

238, 242–244, 252, 258, 262, 291, 292, 294–296, 298–301, 303, 308, 309, 319, 320, 332, 337–340, 342 Violence prevention 37, 213, 222, 224 Voting behavior 115 Vulnerable groups 14, 137, 152

W

Warmspots 98–100, 103–105, 107, 108