Guns and Values: Individualism in the American Gun Debate 3031371739, 9783031371738

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Guns and Values Individualism in the American Gun Debate

Dylan S. McLean · Anthony K. Fleming

Guns and Values

Dylan S. McLean · Anthony K. Fleming

Guns and Values Individualism in the American Gun Debate

Dylan S. McLean Political Science University of West Georgia Carrollton, GA, USA

Anthony K. Fleming Political Science University of West Georgia Carrollton, GA, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-37173-8 ISBN 978-3-031-37174-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37174-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

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Introducing the Gun Fight and Values Values Motivate the Gun Fight Plan of the Book Our Aim, and the Limits of Our Scope References

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Gun Battles and Cultural Warfare Gun Control in the U.S. Gun Policy Overview Public Opinion on Gun Control Political Parties & Gun Control Race & Gun Control Gun Control Interest Groups Explaining the Politics of Gun Control in the U.S. Second Amendment Political Institutions The Challenges of Social Regulation? Culture Guns and Values American Gun Culture & American Values Gun Controllers: Searching for Cultural Resonance Framing Their Debate American Political Culture Lockean Consensus?

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Individualism(s) Communitarian Challenge Individualism: How It Influences Our Debates Cultural Conclusion: Private Rights, Public Goods Theory: Gun Battles, Cultural Warfare References

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Activists at the Grass Roots of Gun Politics The Activists Gun Rights Activists and Guns Gun Control Activists and Guns Policy Advocacy Fearing Lenient Gun Control and Defending New York’s Restrictive Laws Attacking New York’s Restrictive Gun Control and Longing for the Policies of “Free States” The Car Analogy: Driving with Freedom, Punishment, and the Common Good Tools or Values? Gun Use Versus Meaning Guns as Cherished Symbols of Core American Political Values Guns: Objects to Regulate Contrasting Worldviews Rugged Individualists—Powerful Citizens and Weak Government Members of Society Cultural Warfare The Consequences of Cultural Contrasts References

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Gun Politics in Our Federal Political Institutions The Kennedy and Johnson Era: Rise of Restrictive Policy and the Gun Control Act of 1968 The Nixon Years: Restrictive Roll-Back and Punitive Individual Accountability Stalemate: Punitive-Lenient Ford and Restrictive Congress The Carter Years: Gun Control Cease Fire? Reagan and the Era of Individual Responsibility President George H.W. Bush: Consistently Inconsistent Clinton: Bans and Background Checks, for Our Children

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Individualism in the Courts and Congress Under Bush II Obama: Calling for Commonsense References

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Conclusion: Controversial Values, Controversial Policies

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CHAPTER 1

Introducing the Gun Fight and Values

According to President Biden, the politics of gun control in the U.S. is “a national embarrassment” (The Associated Press 2021). His comment was prompted by the latest iteration of a familiar pattern of events: a mass shooting leads to an ultimately unsuccessful, but renewed, push for federal gun reform. By the Spring of 2021, when Biden gave those remarks, nearly three decades had passed since the federal government was able to enact significant gun control legislation. This is despite the occurrence of many high-profile mass shootings, a daily epidemic of firearm related violence, and multiple rounds of public debate over bills that will ultimately fail in Congress. Biden, like his predecessors had done before him, called on Congress to act. And, like those predecessors, Biden will ultimately be disappointed. Although he was able to sign into law a package of modest reforms more than a year later—in June of 2022, after additional horrific shootings—the most significant policies that he advocated for, like a new assault weapons ban, wouldn’t reach his desk because they couldn’t win enough support in Congress. Guns, and gun control, have been deeply embedded in the fabric of American society since the first Europeans set foot on our shores with these tools firmly in their grasps. For instance, just as there are currently more than enough guns in the U.S. to arm every American (Karp 2018), there were likewise enough guns at the Jamestown settlement to arm all of its inhabitants (Kennett and Anderson 1975, 249). It seems clear that © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. S. McLean and A. K. Fleming, Guns and Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37174-5_1

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guns were far more widespread in colonial America than they were in England (Malcolm 1994). In colonial America, and in the early U.S., gun ownership was normal. Guns were useful tools, but by the time of the American revolution they had developed symbolic value as well: representing citizenship and the means to defend political rights (Cramer 2006). It is difficult to overstate just how much the U.S. differs from the rest of the world when it comes to the prevalence and regulation of guns. In terms of raw numbers, and on a per capita basis, there are far more firearms in private hands in the U.S. than there are in any other country. The latest report from the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey—which provides the best available overview of global gun prevalence—estimates that for every 100 Americans there are 120.5 privately owned guns. The next country down the list of gun prevalence is Yemen. It is currently embroiled in a civil war and, with 52.8 guns per 100 residents, guns are far less common in Yemen than they are in the U.S. Among advanced industrialized countries, Canada comes closest to the U.S. with 34.7 guns per 100 Canadians. And, as a final point of comparison, since we just mentioned England, there are only 6.2 privately owned guns per 100 people living in England and Wales (Karp 2018). Guns are significantly more common in the U.S. than they are anywhere else on the planet. Notwithstanding the existence of some important federal gun control laws, and several relatively restrictive state regimes, every other developed democracy regulates gun ownership more stringently than the U.S. does. Gun regulations around the world cover, among other things, the types of firearms available, the criteria that must be met to own them, and what can be done with them. Guns are often categorized based on their perceived lethality and then regulated accordingly. Governments also often take the approach of registering the guns themselves and/or licensing gun owners. It is not uncommon for the process to acquire a gun to involve police interviews of a prospective gun owner’s relatives and/or neighbors. Few, if any, of these provisions are commonplace in the U.S. (McLean 2015; Kopel 1992). Contrasting the cases of New York State and Canada can be particularly enlightening. By global standards, Canada has a lot of guns and forgiving gun laws. By American standards, New York has strict gun control. Prospective owners of any type of firearm in Canada must first obtain a license. New Yorkers are only subject to licensing if they wish to own handguns or semi-automatic rifles. A person living in Buffalo can

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go to a sporting goods store and, in a matter of minutes, buy a home defense shotgun on a whim. A person living just on the other side of the Peace Bridge, in Fort Erie, Ontario, whose moved by a similar whim can only act on it by beginning the legal process with the police to acquire a license. Furthermore, that Canadian’s application would be denied if they indicated to the police that they desired to use the gun for home defense, since using a gun for self-defense of any sort is generally not recognized as a right in Canada. This leads us to the most glaring contrast between the two societies: defensive gun carry. Although the application process can be extensive, it is possible and not particularly uncommon for New Yorkers to legally carry a concealed handgun for self-protection. In fact, while the laws around gun carry differ greatly, every U.S. state allows some form of lawful concealed handgun carry for self-defense. This is true nowhere in Canada, and guns small enough to be most useful for concealed carry are actually banned outright (Fleming et al. 2018; McLean 2015; Fleming 2012; Brown 2012). So, it should be clear that guns hold special significance in the U.S. and that they are, comparatively speaking, lightly regulated. The question is, why? Why is the U.S. the global exception on guns? Why do we have so many? Why has the U.S. been so resistant to the style of comprehensive gun control that has been implemented in every other comparable society? Since this work is not comparative—it is entirely focused on the U.S.—we won’t claim the methodological heft necessary to confidently answer all of these important questions. However, enhancing our understanding of the contemporary American gun control debate, through good descriptive inference, will certainly point to answers for these big questions. Additionally, since we focus on the way that something else recognized as uniquely American, our political culture, drives that debate, we can have some degree of confidence in the direction our answers are pointing.

Values Motivate the Gun Fight This is precisely what we endeavor to do. The purpose of this book is to go below the surface of the gun control debate in a theoretically informed manner so that we can see what is actually driving that debate. We want to illuminate what we are really arguing about when we argue about how to regulate guns. Carefully describing the literal gun debate in order to uncover what is driving that debate is classic descriptive inference, which

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“is the process of understanding an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations” (King et al. 1994, 55). As we’ll see, carefully observing how people argue about gun regulation will lead us to understand, to infer, that they are really arguing about what values should be driving policymaking. Fundamentally, we argue that the gun control debate is best understood as a battle in the larger war over the role of individualism in American life. The debate that we are familiar with hearing is argued in seemingly pragmatic, technical, or legalistic terms. For instance, we’ll hear justifications for gun ownership that are linked to their practical utility. Similarly, arguments for, or against, particular gun control policies will often center on their expected effect on gun violence. And, of course, no American argument about guns would be complete without a reference to the Second Amendment. However, the most important divide between people on either side of this debate isn’t about how guns are legitimately used, how to interpret crime statistics, or whether or not a particular policy can pass constitutional muster. While they will disagree about these things, their most important contrast is rooted in cultural values. The American gun debate is fundamentally a debate about the strength of individualism in American life. It is a debate about values. Specifically, it is a debate about what we value most: private rights, or the public good. Conceiving of the gun debate as rooted in contrasting values illuminates its intractability. The gun control arguments that we hear don’t tend to change people’s minds. Statistics demonstrating that permissive gun laws are associated with increased gun crime are unlikely to make someone who believes they have a personal right to carry a gun for protection change their mind. Conversely, someone who firmly believes that guns in a community pose risks to people in that community is unlikely to be swayed by a study showing that concealed gun carry may deter criminals. Each of these views is motivated by values that are deeply held and resistant to change. The first position is likely motivated by an individualistic sense of self-reliance; that person believes they have a right to protect themselves and they ought to have access to the tools that best allow them to do so. The latter person is concerned with the collective consequences of many individuals making such a decision. Their focus is on the common welfare of the whole, the group. When the fundamental, often unspoken, difference is about what we value, or values generally, people’s

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minds won’t be changed with arguments that don’t actually target the underlying values, which are incredibly resistant to change. People on opposing poles of the American gun control debate see the world in fundamentally different ways. This is precisely why observers of the gun debate will note that its participants often seem to be talking past one another. It isn’t simply that one side’s arguments fail to persuade the other side. It is rather the case that each side simply cannot comprehend the sensibility, or the premise, of the other’s argument. They don’t resonate. Someone who fundamentally prioritizes me, my, and mine will not be persuaded by arguments that emphasize we, us, and ours. Supporters of gun control generally frame their arguments in communally oriented terms that emphasize the well-being of the collective, the we. Arguments against gun control tend to focus on the well-being of individual members of that collective and use the language of individualism, the me. We argue, and demonstrate with a detailed discussion of American political culture, that American politics and culture is biased toward individualism. More Americans are, and historically have been, biased toward thinking of the world in terms of me, rather than we. And, significantly, it is easier to use the language of individualism to argue against gun control than it is to argue in support of it. This means that gun control’s opponents can frame their arguments in ways that are likely to resonate with broad swaths of the American public, beyond their gun rights base. Gun control advocacy, on the other hand, attempts to appeal to a sense of the common, public, good. Although communitarian, or collectivist, sentiment like this has played a role in shaping American politics and culture, that role has historically been weaker than the role played by individualism. Essentially, American political culture gives natural advantages to opponents of gun control and natural disadvantages to its supporters. We should be clear from the outset about our views on several important points. First, the strength of America’s individualistic bias is dynamic. Although it seems clear that individualism has long been, and remains, a dominant influence on American political culture, it has challengers and therefore its influence waxes and wanes. In fact, we think our most contentious issues will be those where the communitarian challenge to individualism is strongest, like gun control. Second, we are speaking of general tendencies and biases, not absolutes. No perspective, person, or culture we discuss is entirely an individualist or collectivist. Even

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ardent individualists care for the well-being of their communities. Likewise, we wouldn’t expect a committed communitarian to entirely ignore their own self-interest. Third, we certainly understand that most people don’t think or argue in these terms explicitly. Neither individualist, nor communitarian, are commonly applied political labels. People don’t selfidentify with these things. They’re largely analytical terms. This is why our endeavor is descriptive inference. We will show evidence that these values operate under the surface and are driving the gun control debate (and of course are also likely to be driving several of our other important political disagreements); however, this evidence is not immediately obvious. Fourth, and finally, we expect that the influence of cultural values on the gun debate, as with other debates, interacts with other important explanatory factors, like the structure of our political institutions. Our goal is not to use these pages to advance a theory that replicates the complex reality of the American gun debate, including all possible influences on that debate. That isn’t the purpose of good theory. Our goal is to advance a theoretical approach that can help simplify that complex reality.

Plan of the Book Following this introduction, we will begin by providing a general overview of gun control policy in the U.S. This will provide important context and background for the remainder of the book. In addition to covering the general state and history of gun regulation, our focus in this section will be on reviewing some important elements of the politics, and the debate, that surround the issue of gun control. So, we will discuss public opinion on gun control, the relevant positions of the major political parties, how the issue has interacted with race, and finally we’ll introduce the most relevant interest groups. The primary purpose of this book is to advance, and illustrate, a theoretical approach that can help us make sense of the state of gun politics in the U.S. With that purpose in mind, neither this section, nor the book in general, is meant to provide a comprehensive overview of the subject. So, we expect that the reader will have no trouble thinking of a variety of elements of, or influences on, the American gun debate that we do not discuss in these pages. We will then move on to review and evaluate how existing work has attempted to explain the politics of gun control in the U.S. During this discussion, we’ll highlight some common answers to the questions raised

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above, such as, why has the U.S. been generally resistant to comprehensive gun control? This review includes work that tries to directly explain the state of gun control in the U.S. and work that focuses on identifying factors that are important in the politics of gun control generally. We will review explanations for American resistance to gun control that focus on America’s Second Amendment, political institutions, the challenges of social regulation, and culture. Since our core argument is grounded in political culture, we give explanations rooted in culture particular attention. We ultimately will conclude that any explanation for American resistance to gun control, and America’s affinity for guns, that does not include culture as a significant component of that explanation is, at best, incomplete. A core component of our argument is that the gun debate is heavily laden with political values. So, we are going to take a deep dive into these values. We will give an overview of American gun culture and we will show how values widely viewed as definitional to the American character, like individual freedom and self-reliance, are deeply enmeshed within this culture. We will then discuss how there is no comparable anti-gun culture, but there are anti-gun constituencies. They are generally bound by what they oppose, guns, and the individualistic values they stand for. Finally, but significantly, this section concludes with a discussion that describes the relationship between how the gun control debate is framed and political values. Political and cultural values structure how people perceive problems, and therefore, they lead people to support, or oppose, particular policies meant to solve those problems. Similarly, political actors will try to build support for their favored policies by framing them in ways meant to resonate with particular segments of the culture. We are making some fairly bold claims about American political culture and how it influences our policy debates. So, we will seek to justify these claims with an examination of American political culture, the most important influences on it, and the most influential strains of it. The long-standing, and deeply entrenched, view of American political culture characterizes it as classically liberal, built around the Lockean values of liberty, equality, and individualism. We review this literature and, although there have been challenges to its strength, we don’t see any reason to question this characterization of the prevailing strain of American political culture. Since it is particularly relevant to the gun control debate, we then discuss exactly what individualism means as a concept, and we review important challenges to its dominance over American culture. This

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section concludes with the observation that many of our most important political debates, not just the gun control debate, can be characterized as a clash between individualism and its challengers, particularly communitarianism. Essentially, many of our major political arguments distill down to a clash between private rights and public goods. Before proceeding to illustrate our approach by presenting our original empirical contributions, we outline the theory that will ultimately guide that discussion. Essentially, we’re arguing that American gun control politics is best understood as a battle in the long-running war between individualism and the various forces that have sought to limit individualism’s dominance over American political culture. If we look for it, which we do, we can see the influence of rugged individualism, and opposition to it, at all levels of the gun control debate. Cultural warfare in the great American gun debate is revealed by how the problem of gun violence is understood in the first place, the types of policies that are proposed to solve that problem, and how those solutions are framed. The two primary sides in this debate understand the world quite differently. Their fundamental point of disagreement centers on the relationship between individuals and society. The gun control debate is fundamentally a debate about private rights versus public goods. We start our substantive discussion by presenting the results of interviews we conducted with grass roots activists on each side of the gun control issue. The people that we spoke with in these two groups—gun rights and gun control activists—are quite different from one-another and they view the world in fundamentally different ways. They don’t simply disagree about how guns should be regulated. Their core cultural and ideological orientations are fundamentally opposed to one another. It is as if they are seeing the world through different lenses, one tinted with individualism and the other with communitarianism. We will discuss many different aspects of their views, but we’ll focus on identifying the underlying values that are motivating them. One group is motivated by rugged individualism, self-reliance, and freedom, while the other emphasizes society and the collective responsibilities that come with citizenship. After this presentation of the gun debate from the perspective of each side’s base, we move from that bottom-up view to describing how the gun debate has evolved from the top in Washington, DC, from the Kennedy through the Obama Administrations. With the exception of a concluding chapter, this will comprise the remainder of the book. In these sections, we catalog how gun control has been advocated for, and resisted,

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by presidents and members of Congress. For most of this time period, the influence of American individualism was strong and gun control was effectively resisted, and in some cases, rolled back. However, there were notable times—particularly 1968 and 1994—when concern for the public good was strong enough to overcome the American bias for protecting private rights, and major federal gun control legislation was signed into law. Throughout the nearly six decades of top-level debate about gun control that we reviewed, we consistently see evidence that resistance to gun control is rooted in a classically American conception of individual liberty and self-reliance while support for gun control is driven by a communitarian challenge to that individualism.

Our Aim, and the Limits of Our Scope The purpose of this book is to help us better understand the American debate about guns. We are specifically trying to do that by making a case that the gun debate is most usefully understood as an instance of a more general debate about—or clash over—values, especially the role of individualism in American life; it is a debate about values masquerading as a policy debate. Developing, presenting, and then illustrating this case is the principle focus of this book. Our review of gun policy and politics, the scholarly literature addressing these issues, American political culture, and the relationship between guns and culture is the raw material that we use to make this case. It is essential to carefully review, and critically discuss, this scholarship because it fundamentally informs the theoretical approach that we are advancing in these pages. However, we should be clear, it is beyond the scope of our work, and unnecessary to achieve our primary aim, to comprehensively address any of these topics. Our aim in the empirical Chapters (3 and 4) is to illustrate and begin to validate the theoretical approach we’ve introduced here and further developed in Chapter 2. Conducting a rigorous test of whether or not the American gun debate really is a proxy debate about cultural values is beyond the scope of this work. We are merely claiming that viewing the debate this way is useful. In this book, we show that it helps us make sense of the worldviews of grassroots activists and of nearly six decades worth of the debate over gun control policy that has taken place in our federal political institutions. Additional applications of our approach are welcome. We leave to future research the challenge of further judging the utility of the simplification of a very complex reality that we propose

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in these pages. For instance, people from other relevant activist groups, from different eras, or the general public, could be interviewed, and our approach could be applied to the gun debate in Washington either before Kennedy’s presidency or after Obama’s. Our focus has been on doing the simplifying, on developing the theory.

References Brown, R. Blake. 2012. Arming and Disarming: A History of Gun Control in Canada. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Cramer, Clayton E. 2006. Armed America: The Story of How and Why Guns Became as American as Apple Pie. Nashville, TN: Nelson Current. Fleming, Anthony K. 2012. Gun Policy in the United States and Canada: The Impact of Mass Murders and Assassinations on Gun Control. New York, NY: Bloomsbury. Fleming, Anthony, Dylan S. McLean, and Raymond Tatalovich. 2018. “Debating Gun Control in Canada and the United States: Divergent Policy Frames and Political Cultures.” World Affairs 181 (4): 348–371. https://doi.org/10. 1177/0043820018812609. Karp, Aaron. 2018. “Civilian Firearms Holdings, 2017.” Small Arms Survey, the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. Accessed 21 April. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/Weapons_and_Mar kets/Tools/Firearms_holdings/SAS-BP-Civilian-held-firearms-annexe.pdf. Kennett, Lee, and James La Verne Anderson. 1975. The Gun in America: The Origins of a National Dilemma. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kopel, David B. 1992. The Samurai, The Mountie, and The Cowboy: Should America Adopt the Gun Controls of Other Democracies? Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Malcolm, Joyce Lee. 1994. To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an AngloAmerican Right. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McLean, Dylan S. 2015. “Guns in the Anglo-American Democracies: Explaining an American Exception.” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 53 (3): 233– 252. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2015.1051287. The Associated Press. 2021. “‘It’s a National Embarrassment,’ Biden Says on Gun Violence.” New York Times. Accessed 20 April. https://www.nytimes. com/video/us/politics/100000007715104/biden-shooting-gun-control. html.

CHAPTER 2

Gun Battles and Cultural Warfare

Gun Control in the U.S. In this section, we will broadly review gun control policy in the U.S. We will also introduce some important factors, and actors, that are connected to the politics of gun control. This brief overview will help provide some context that will be helpful for the remainder of the book. Gun Policy Overview Just as gun ownership is a long-standing American tradition, gun regulation also has a long history. There is evidence that firearms and ammunition were regulated in colonial America and the early U.S.; however, we should be careful applying a twenty-first-century conceptual understanding of “gun control” to these laws. Many of them were actually meant to encourage the ownership, and maintenance, of private arms in order to ensure the existence of a militia that was sufficiently prepared to provide for the common defense. The major exception would have been prohibitions that related to concealed weapons. Gun control expanded with the country, but it was confined to state and local governments until the twentieth century (Winkler 2011; Cramer 2006; Waldman 2014; Cook and Goss 2014). There have essentially been three distinct rounds of federal action on gun control. All three followed in the wake of particularly violent © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. S. McLean and A. K. Fleming, Guns and Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37174-5_2

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periods in American history: gangland violence in 1920s and 1930s, political violence in the 1960s, and spiking violent crime rates in the early 1990s (Cook and Goss 2014). It is critical that these periods weren’t just violent—America has long been a violent place (Wood 1991)—they were violent in a way that captured the attention of the public. Also, the first two—but arguably all three—clearly coincided with upticks in American concern for the collective good and a willingness to embrace public solutions to society’s problems. The most significant legislation produced by the first round of federal gun control was the 1934 National Firearms Act (NFA), part of Roosevelt’s “New Deal.” Prohibition era violence was plaguing the cities and repeatedly making headlines. The criminal use of machine guns, a byproduct of the First World War, was identified as a particular problem. Therefore, machine guns, and other firearms that were favorites of the underworld, were specific targets of the NFA (Winkler 2011; Cook and Goss 2014; Campbell 2019). The NFA came in the context of a U.S. in crisis, economic and otherwise. As with the other more well-known components of the New Deal, the American public was clearly eager to embrace public solutions to the era’s many challenges. As Waldman writes, “The public that embraced the assertive national government embodied by Roosevelt’s New Deal social programs was untroubled by federal laws cracking down on unusually dangerous guns” (2014, 82). The 1960s gave us Johnson’s “Great Society,” the start of the gun control debate as we now know it, and the 1968 Gun Control Act (GCA). The GCA is really the foundation upon which the current federal gun control regime is built. Gun control had become a salient issue, and the political battle really began to escalate (Kleck 2001; Burbick 2006). Several factors stoked passions on each side of the issue. Gun control advocates were being motivated by focusing (also called triggering) events (Fleming 2012; Fleming et al. 2016; Wilson 2007), such as political assassinations, the availability of mail order and cheap imported/surplus guns, and a general sense that the lethality of guns was increasing (Burbick 2006). Gun rights advocates were animated specifically by vigorous opposition to the 2nd major round of federal gun control, the GCA, but this opposition served a broader purpose: it provided the basis to form a rights-laden narrative that could galvanize conservatives and counter the gains that democrats were making as a byproduct of the civil rights movement (Burbick 2006, 88).

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It is worth noting the potential relationship between the political upheavals of the 1960s and the gun control that followed them. Brian Patrick argues that the race riots and political assassinations of the 60s resulted in an “elite push” for gun control (2010, 44). While it is hard to know how much of a factor this was, other scholars have observed a link between socio-political unrest and gun control generally. BruceBriggs sees “a remarkable coincidence between gun control agitation and periods of social upheaval” (2001, 73). Likewise, criminologist Gary Kleck analyzed the historical record and concluded that there is precedent for gun legislation being passed during, or in fear of, periods of political violence; however, there is no link between the passage of gun laws and periods of high non-political violence (1996, 401). So, there seems to be something to the idea that socio-political circumstances that result in mass activation coincide with an atmosphere conducive to gun control. A third, and final, major wave of federal gun control occurred early in the Clinton administration and was part of a broader federal legislative effort to address violent crime, which was at a historical peak. Additionally, rampage shootings were starting to garner headlines. There were two major parts to this effort. The 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which led to the current background check system, as well as a separate 1994 ban on assault weapons and large capacity magazines (Cook and Goss 2014). The latter included a sunset provision and expired in 2004 when congress was unable to renew it. The bulk of gun regulation in the U.S. occurs at the state level. There is great variation in state laws and they cover everything from point of sale requirements, to the types of arms which are legal, to where and under what circumstances those arms may be carried. Although a relatively recent development, the states have essentially ideologically sorted themselves on the issue of gun control. A relatively small number of relatively populous states have strict gun laws while the remainder of the states have few restrictions. While there have been interesting exceptions, for the most part the strict states fall on the left of the American political spectrum while the lax states land on the right (McLean and Sorens 2019). Public Opinion on Gun Control Influential scholarship on gun control has discussed the existence of a paradox: “Most people want strict gun control, but they don’t get it.

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Why?” (Goss 2006, 6). There are two important components of this “gun control paradox.” The first is the basic observation that American gun control is fairly lax, especially when considered in a global context. This is interesting in its own right and the observation helps motivate our work. The other component is the idea that most people want strict gun control. Although consistent with the findings of the most well-known public opinion polls, this idea deserves more scrutiny, since the paradox hinges on its validity. The gun control paradox would be considerably less paradoxical if most Americans did not actually want strict gun control, or if they did not really know what sort of gun control they do or don’t want. Conventional wisdom has been in line with this paradox: most Americans favor stricter gun control (Spitzer 2008). The problem is that most of our knowledge about gun control comes from public opinion polling that may be deeply flawed and can be easily manipulated. For instance, Gallup’s long-running question that asks whether or not gun control should be more strict, left alone, or less strict, is probably the most frequently cited measure of public sentiment on gun control. The problem with this question is that it assumes that the respondent has a basic understanding of what the gun laws currently are (Harding Jr. 1998, 198). In reality, ignorance about the gun policy status quo is widespread (Wilson 2007, 121). So, responses to questions like this that indicate support for more gun control are probably most accurately interpreted as indications that people want a nebulous something done about gun violence (Kleck 1991). Any casual observer of the gun debate can note evidence of this: in the wake of specific episodes of gun violence calls for political leaders to “do something” are often the exact words we hear. Public subject matter and policy ignorance confounds opinion polling on gun control in other ways as well. Harding found that survey results about an assault weapon ban changed dramatically based on how the question was worded (1998, 198). Survey results can be confounded because people simply do not understand the questions since they are not familiar with the subject (Wilson 2007, 121). For instance, Brian Patrick writes, I have tested people’s ability to understand gun terminologies commonly used in mass media news and surveys – for example, the meaning of the term ‘semiautomatic’ – and found that even when provided with the correct answer in a multiple choice question format, only 44 percent of

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college students and 23 percent of senior citizens were able to select the correct definition…A group of shooters…selected the correct answer 97 percent of the time. (2010, 145)

Survey results are also plagued by what they don’t measure: expectations about a particular policy’s costs and broader implications (Wilson 2007, 121). Does support for universal background checks persist through the realization that this means a father can’t give their son a rifle as a gift, or that such a regime may require a registration system to be effectively enforced? Finally, social desirability bias may seriously confound public opinion research on gun control (Tonso 2001, 49). We should also, and arguably most importantly, be skeptical about the assertion that support for gun control is the American default opinion precisely because of the “paradox” identified by some researchers: lax gun control is the default outcome. We may not know how to measure it in public opinion polling but maybe the difficulty of getting gun control legislation passed is an indication that a majority of the public actually opposes gun control. There has been a clear movement against gun control. On the other hand, we haven’t seen a “mass American antigun movement, only an audience” (Patrick 2010, 52). It may be that it seems there is more support for gun control than there really is because—in cultural terminology common in gun control scholarship and reviewed elsewhere in this book—“cosmopolitan America” controls the mainstream media universe; this can help drive the narrative and contribute to the problem of social desirability bias in polls (Tonso 2001, 43). Political Parties & Gun Control Republicans and Democrats have had contrasting positions on gun control in their official national platforms since at least 1968, but these platforms were mostly driven by presidential politics (Spitzer 2008, 113– 115). During much of the twentieth century, gun control had been an issue area where party influence was a relatively weak predictor of votes by members of Congress (Ansolabehere et al. 2001). Today, opposition to gun control is strongly associated with the Republicans and gun control supporters make up a core component of the Democratic Party’s base (Miller 2019; Pearson-Merkowitz and Dyck 2017; Wozniak 2017). The current level of partisan polarization that we see on gun control is a relatively recent development that is, at least in part, a function of the

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NRA’s success linking it to the overall conservative movement and the Republican Party (Miller 2019; Joslyn 2020). This wasn’t particularly challenging because “conservatives’ rejection of ‘big government’ intrusion into private lives of citizens, staunch support of self-sufficiency, and personal responsibility, fits well with the gun ethos” (Joslyn et al. 2017, 384). The strength of the association between gun ownership and the likelihood of voting for a Republican has increased over time since the 1970s (Joslyn et al. 2017). In the 2016 election, 61% of gun owners voted for the Republican candidate, and the more guns someone owns the more likely they are to support a Republican (Joslyn 2020). We think that the relationship between partisanship and gun control is mostly being driven by the ideological inclinations of the people the parties are attracting. Essentially, this relationship has grown stronger because the relationship between ideology and partisanship has grown stronger. The parties have become nearly perfectly ideologically sorted (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Webster and Abramowitz 2017). Historically, however, liberals and conservatives have held views on some gun issues that may be unexpected given their more general ideologies. Furthermore, while we do agree that the battle over gun control is usefully viewed as a component of a wider cultural war, it is misguided to view it as simply another instance of liberal versus conservative American politics (Kleck 2001; Nisbet 2001b). As we will discuss more later, divisions over the strength of individualism lie at the heart of the American liberal-conservative ideological spectrum and, since partisanship and ideology are now tightly correlated, our partisan divide. Americans are rather individualistic in general. That is why this value is included in any depiction of American political culture. However, American conservatism has come to embrace the policy implications of this value more than liberalism, which more willingly embraces public solutions to social problems. We see this contrasting emphasis on the individual versus society reflected in gun politics. For instance, in their explanations for mass shootings, Republicans tend to focus on individual characteristics of the shooter while Democrats cite forces operating at the societal level (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2017). In sum, the long-running conflict in American political thought between a focus on the individual or the collective is embedded within the contemporary ideological clash between liberalism and conservatism, which is now completely partisan.

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Race & Gun Control A core component of our argument is that the American gun debate can only be properly understood if it is placed within the context of an American political culture that is predominately individualistic but has been moderated by a collectivist strain of variable influence. However, this must be further contextualized into the unique racial history of the U.S. Essentially, we must ask, who’s individual gun rights have been protected, or restricted, and who’s collective security interests have motivated restrictions? Unfortunately, gun control in the U.S. has a profoundly racist past. The story of the gun in America “is inseparable from keeping arms in the hands of whites and disarming black men to prevent their access to political and economic power” (Burbick 2006, 27). Prior to the Civil War overtly racist gun laws were commonplace. Racist gun control laws were revised in the wake of the Fourteenth Amendment to be race-neutral; however, it is clear from the legislative histories of these laws that their racist motivation remained intact (Cramer 1999, 13–15; Cook and Goss 2014, 165–166). Gun control was selectively enforced in a manner that focused on keeping arms out of the hands of blacks. There is clear evidence that many nineteenth and twentieth-century gun control laws were not meant to apply to the white population and they were not enforced against whites (Cottrol and Diamond 1991, 1995; Cobb Jr. 2016). This helps explain why, at least in terms of what was in the statute books, states with larger black populations had stricter gun laws. This is no longer the case and these conservative southern states have relaxed their gun control regimes considerably over the past three decades (McLean and Sorens 2019). Racially, rooted gun control was not only a southern phenomenon and the generally discriminatory roots of gun control persisted and expanded into the twentieth century. New York’s Sullivan Law, which granted local officials’ discretion to approve or deny gun licenses, is particularly emblematic of this era and discretionary licensing systems. There is evidence that this product of the infamous Tammany Hall was used to keep guns from certain undesirable groups, particularly immigrant communities (Squires 2000, 80; Cook and Goss 2014, 167; Patrick 2010, 23; DeConde 2001, 107–108). A similar discretionary “may issue” permitting system famously let a Montgomery, Alabama, police chief deny Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. the concealed weapons permit

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he applied for after his house was bombed (Cook and Goss 2014, 167– 168; Winkler 2011, 235). Similar white fears of armed blacks seem to have helped motivate California’s 1967 Mulford Act, which became one of the strictest gun laws in the country when it was signed by, then Governor, Ronald Reagan, a mere three months after armed Black Panthers conducted a demonstration at the Sacramento capitol (Winkler 2011, 245). Essentially, and tragically, for much of American history, gun control has served to protect the collective security and individual gun rights of white Americans. Gun Control Interest Groups The foundations for the most well-known gun control advocacy organizations were laid in the 1970s. A plethora of potentially catalyzing events set the stage for the formation of five national gun control organizations between 1974 and 1976 (Goss 2006, 40). In fact, in her book examining why gun control advocacy has not coalesced into a successful movement the way other social movements have; Goss argues that if there ever was a time when a successful gun control movement really could have taken flight it was the mid-1970s (2006, 44). Other scholars examining similar questions likewise highlight the significance of the 1960s and 70s. For instance, Carter also sees modern gun control advocacy emerging in the 70s. Critically, he connects the emergence of gun control organizing as a follow-up of a “1960s zeitgeist [that] encouraged individuals to view personal troubles as rooted in public issues” (1997, 73). As Carter and Goss both observe, gun control advocates were framing their arguments around the idea that freedom from gun violence is a public good. However, the policies that these organizations argued were necessary to secure this public good necessarily limited certain individual freedoms. So, even in an era that was particularly sensitive to the public good, gun control advocates still found themselves fighting the headwinds of America’s individualistic bias. While not a new organization, the National Rifle Association (NRA), the major player in gun rights advocacy, left this same era with new energy and defined itself as a leader in the defense of American individualism. In fact, the NRA’s lobbying arm, the Institute for Legislative Action (NRAILA) was founded in the mid-1970s and its fate was central to an internal revolution which made clear that political advocacy would be at the heart

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of the organization. Legacy NRA leadership had begun to signal that they wanted to step away from political advocacy—which had been gradually blossoming—and return to the group’s roots: promoting conservation and marksmanship. The conservatism of the NRA’s rank-and-file had been re-animated by the liberalism of the 60s and they were incensed by the passage of the Gun Control Act. Additionally, it seems that there was a clearer sense of the connection between individual rights generally and the right to firearms for self-defense particularly. This disconnect between the old guard leadership and the activist grass roots led to a membership revolt at the NRA’s 1977 annual meeting in Cincinnati, when new leadership under gun rights hardliner Harlon Carter was installed (Winkler 2011; Melzer 2009). In a sense, the newly invigorated NRA of the late 1970s—part of a broader reawakening of an individualistic conservatism in the U.S.—can be interpreted as a symptom of a pendulum swinging down from a collectively oriented liberalism that had just peaked and achieved some policy success by framing gun control as a public good.

Explaining the Politics of Gun Control in the U.S. We now turn to a review of existing scholarship, as well as popular arguments, about the politics of gun control in the U.S. During this discussion, we’ll highlight some common answers to the questions raised in the introduction, such as, why has the U.S. been generally resistant to comprehensive gun control? This review includes work that purports to directly explain the state of gun control in the U.S. and work that more simply identifies factors that are important in the politics of gun control generally. America’s Second Amendment, political institutions, culture, and the challenges of social regulation have been used to build explanations for American resistance to gun control. Second Amendment We should start by addressing a common, fairly obvious, but ultimately unsatisfying explanation for the exceptional role of guns in America: only the United States has the Second Amendment. First, other countries have had, and two still do have, constitutional provisions similar to the American Second Amendment. Mexico and Guatemala’s constitutions contain such provisions but each country also has very strict gun control. Each of these countries also has very high levels of gun crime (Weiss and Pasley

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2019; Elkins et al. 2013). Laws, and even constitutional provisions, only carry as much weight as they are granted by the broader society. Given the right context, constitutional rights can be ignored in the halls of government as readily as gun laws can be ignored on the streets. Also, for most of American history, the Second Amendment was not interpreted in a manner that would make it a roadblock for gun control. Until the landmark 2008 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in District of Columbia et al. v. Heller, the conventional legal wisdom about the Second Amendment was that it protected a collective right to organized state militias, such as the national guard (Winkler 2011; Carter 1997). It is significant that the court interpreted the Second Amendment as protecting an individual’s right to own a gun and this may in fact lead to a tightening of the constitutional guard rails around gun control in the long run. However, even in the context of this precedent, the courts have affirmed the constitutionality of a wide variety of gun control laws. So, at least as of this writing, the Second Amendment has not proven to be a significant legal impediment to gun control. There is some indication that this may be changing in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in the New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen case. However, we expect that gun control’s major roadblocks will continue to stem from the interaction of politics and culture, not constitutional law. Finally, and fundamentally, the most compelling reason why we must question the validity of the Second Amendment explanation for American resistance to gun control has to do with why such a provision exists and persists. A great deal has been written about the origins of the Second Amendment and reviewing that work is beyond the scope of this book. We can simply observe that at the very least, including it in the Bill of Rights indicates that the framers both recognized that arms played a role in society and they intended them to continue to do so. Furthermore, the fact that this provision remains in our constitution likewise says something about twenty-first-century American society. Put simply: we could have just eliminated it. Other countries have repealed, or evolved away from, constitutional protections for arms. For instance, one of the most influential accounts of the origins of the Second Amendment, which was cited by Justice Scalia in the landmark Heller opinion, traces its lineage to a similar provision in the 1689 English Bill of Rights (Malcolm 1994). In a later work, Malcolm argues that for three centuries Englishman and Americans essentially shared a legal right to firearms for self-defense. However,

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in the twentieth century the English version of this right was “effectively demolished” (2002, 5). Why hasn’t the American right been demolished? The Second Amendment isn’t as much a cause as it is an effect. Its existence is a reflection of eighteenth-century America just as its persistence is a reflection of twentyfirst-century America. Our intellectual focus must be on understanding the aspects of American society that sustain the Second Amendment, not the other way around. Political Institutions Many accounts of American resistance to gun control have focused on our political institutions. Scholars, as well as popular commentators, have specifically focused on the peculiarities of our bi-cameral, federal, presidential system and the way interest groups have interacted with it. Legislative change, of any sort, is particularly challenging in such a system. Divided government—whether across the chambers or the branches—at the federal level can easily lead to gridlock. Power sharing between the states and national government significantly inhibits the implementation of policy nationwide. And, a powerful interest group like the National Rifle Association (NRA) has the ability to exert significant influence over elected officials and bureaucrats. We’ve unfortunately become accustomed to a familiar pattern of events: a horrific mass shooting renews calls for gun control legislation. Tragedies such as these have been termed “focusing events” because they serve to get an item, in this case gun control, on the public agenda for debate. In other comparable countries, mass shootings have not only led to debate about gun control, but they have also led to actual gun control. When comparing the aftermath of focusing events in Canada and the U.S., Fleming determined that American political and governmental institutions—including their interaction with interest groups—were responsible for blocking gun control at the federal level (2012; see also Fleming et al. 2016). Interest groups are an important element of political systems and there are important differences in their ability to impact the policy process. In addition to focusing on the effects of the several ways the American system contrasts with the more efficient Canadian parliamentary system, Fleming (2012) really highlights how the NRA has skillfully navigated the American institutional environment. He argues that the NRA has

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taken full advantage of the multiple access points that the American political system affords interest groups. Unlike in parliamentary systems, the historically weaker party discipline, for instance, of the American system increases the relevant number of legislators that can be targeted for lobbying. Likewise, the American bureaucracy provides another point of access into the political system. Robert Spitzer’s (2008) influential work on gun politics in the U.S. also argues that the NRA has been a very effective interest group. He and Fleming both describe the NRA as representing individuals with an intensely held minority opinion. The conventional wisdom has long been that most Americans support stricter gun control laws (an idea we critically explore elsewhere). The concept of intensity is drawn from Robert Dahl’s seminal work on democracy. A person’s opinions vary in terms of substance, i.e. more/less gun control, but they also vary in how intensely those opinions are held. One person may sort of want stricter gun control while another may really strongly oppose new gun laws. Dahl argued that in certain narrow circumstances intense minorities may imperil democratic function. If a particular policy is only somewhat favored by the bulk of a majority of the populace, but it is intensely opposed by most of those with the minority view, a tyranny of the minority may take hold (Dahl 1956). This is especially the case when the minority favors the status quo because it is easier to block policies than it is to create new ones, which has generally been the position of the NRA (Spitzer 2008, 153). Spitzer, Fleming, and most recently Lacombe (2021) describe the membership of the NRA as a classic example of an intense minority. NRA members hold opinions that are not shared by most Americans and those opinions are extremely intensely held. While gun control advocates favor policies that may be widely supported by the public, that support generally isn’t as strong as the other side’s opposition. It is very likely that an NRA member’s vote will be driven primarily by their opposition to gun control. Other issues may be more important for a gun control supporter. This is extremely significant, and we must fully account for the source of this intensity: the natural synergy between the policy preferences of NRA members and long-running powerful strains of American political culture. There is no comparable force driving support for gun control. Noah Schwartz’s valuable work helps connect these dots by detailing how the NRA expertly capitalizes on this cultural advantage by linking gun ownership and gun culture to American identity. The synergy

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between the NRA’s story-telling and prevailing strains of American political culture is key to understanding its effectiveness. Schwartz writes that “Opinions about guns are heavily influenced by culture, and cultures are built on the stories that members tell” (2022, 15). The NRA reinforces connections between guns and American political culture—which is essentially the American identity as described by Schwartz—by sharing “narratives, especially narratives about America’s and Americans’ pasts, so that it can build and mobilize this community of supporters” (2022, 16). Several observers have noted that the NRA’s greatest political strength has been their ability to translate the intensity of their membership’s policy views into grassroots political activism. Goss, for example, even while questioning the existence of an intensity gap between pro and anti-gun forces, notes that gun rights advocates have done a superior job acting on their intensity in politically consequential ways (2006, 22–23). Spitzer likewise observes that “The key to the NRA’s effectiveness that distinguishes it from other interest groups lies in its highly motivated mass membership and the organization’s ability to bring pressure from that membership to bear at key moments and places” (2008, 90). This gives them a tremendous advantage and it really has distinguished them from interest groups on the other side of the gun issue. Unlike other interest groups that primarily rely on professional lobbyists and donations, “the NRA’s chief tactic for influencing Congress [is to use] members to put direct pressure on legislators” (Carter 1997, 80). In addition to the intensity that motivates their membership, they are able to do this because the NRA isn’t just in Washington; it is in the community. The NRA has an extensive educational and gun safety mission and this is how most gun owners actually interact with the organization (Carlson 2015; see also Schwartz 2022). The NRA’s lifeblood flows up from the bottom, the grassroots, while gun control interest groups tend to be more top-down in orientation; the NRA’s greatest strength is their naturally impassioned base (Patrick 2010). Carter (1997) argues that the NRA—in contrast to its pro-gun control foes, like Handgun Control Incorporated (HCI)—has simply been the superior political player. For instance, “the size of the NRA’s budget and membership has always been many magnitudes greater than HCI’s; for example, HCI’s total operating budget in 1992 was less than $6 million, but that same year, just one of the NRA’s divisions, the Political Victory Fund, spent $6.8 million” (1997, 108). However, the money battle lines have been redrawn in recent years, and newer gun control

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groups, with wealthy financial backers like Mike Bloomberg, have been able to outspend the NRA. The 2018 midterm election cycle was the first time that gun control groups outspent the NRA, in that case by the fairly wide margin of $37 million to $20 million (Epstein 2018). Although money matters, the NRA’s secret sauce hasn’t been derived from its ability to raise or spend money; it stems from its ability to motivate its members and nonmember sympathizers (Schwartz 2022; Lacombe 2021). The NRA has played the political game well in other ways too. While it has struggled to get its messages picked up by the mainstream media (Steidley and Colen 2017), it has developed its own highly effective mass communication operation. Additionally, the NRA has skillfully adapted to changes in the political environment: It benefitted from a late twentiethcentury rise in skepticism about government and it has been able to shift its efforts to the state level during periods when federal headwinds were strong (Carter 1997, 108–111). Conversely, its opponents, gun control advocates, have often struggled to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the American federal system to expand their movement (Goss 2006, 189). Much of the scholarly work that has been done on gun politics in the U.S. has focused on the anti-gun control side and sought to explain their success. Goss observes this and reframes the question. She asks, “Why do Americans who want strict gun control not mobilize, in large numbers in a sustained way, to get it?” (2006, 7). Essentially, she is asking why calls for gun control have not coalesced into a social movement akin to other movements in American history. She argues that in order for a movement for a policy like gun control to arise three key factors should be pursued and attained: “institutional patrons, culturally resonant frames that speak to the moral identities of civically resourceful people, and a strategy of incremental gains (2006, 191).” Proponents of gun control in the U.S. have struggled with these, especially the second point. As she notes—and this is a critical idea that we will absolutely return to—in contrast to gun control advocates, it is much easier for gun rights groups to frame their arguments in ways that resonate within the American political culture. If the question is why the U.S. doesn’t have a uniform national system of gun control, like all other developed democracies do, then we must consider the impact of federalism. Such a system of divided sovereign power is more the exception than the rule globally. It, therefore, shouldn’t be surprising that those lamenting the exceptional position of the U.S. on the gun issue don’t hesitate to assign some of the blame

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to federalism (DeConde 2001; Hofstadter 1970). Since, as Spitzer points out “nearly all [gun] regulations exist at the state and local levels” (2008, 157), our federal system certainly has the potential to stymie reform efforts. However, it also creates opportunities for states to follow their own ideological proclivities and enact gun regulations that are consistent with those proclivities (McLean and Sorens 2019). Furthermore, other countries have been able to overcome the challenges of federalism to enact uniform gun regulations. The most notable example is probably Australia, which was able to dramatically tighten gun regulations in all its states and territories in the aftermath of a shocking mass shooting in Port Arthur (Chapman 2013). As a whole, we really have to appreciate the fact that the design of America’s political institutions biases our system toward the status quo. In American politics, change is challenging. The system is essentially conservative by nature and this creates significant headwinds that potential gun reformers must contend with (Goss 2006, 195). “Our political structure favors policy deadlock by providing numerous mechanisms for obstruction, including allocation of senators by state, bicameral legislatures, separation of powers, presidential vetoes, and weak party structures” (Vizzard 2000, 172). If we are trying to understand why gun control in the U.S. has lagged the rest of the world, we can’t dismiss these factors. However, we also cannot ignore the fact that they don’t only apply to gun control, and we do in fact achieve change—sometimes even dramatic change on conflictual issues—via the legislative process. Institutional factors must be incorporated into any complete explanation for the state of gun politics in the U.S.; however, they cannot form the basis of such an explanation on their own. The difficulty of legislative policy change in the U.S. is by design, but gun control is far from the only policy area impacted by this fact. Lawmaking is typically more efficient in political systems in which there is little to no separation between executive and legislative authority, such as in parliamentary systems, and we’ve seen them move with great speed to tighten gun controls in the wake of mass shootings. However, the U.S. is not the only developed democracy with a presidential system, but it is the only one without comprehensive gun control. This same logic applies to arguments that focus on federalism. Likewise, accounts that emphasize the power of the National Rifle Association do not address why comparable gun rights advocacy organizations in other countries have been so weak: other countries have gun rights

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lobbies but, despite their efforts to emulate the NRA, they’ve been political losers. The NRA’s success seems to depend on its American context. In sum, even after considering these institutional factors, we still have to ask what makes the U.S. unique globally and what makes the gun issue unique in the U.S.? The Challenges of Social Regulation? Several scholars, beginning with Spitzer, have attributed some of the blame for the challenges of gun control to the nature of social regulation. As one type of government policy, regulatory policy is particularly conflictual because it seeks to control individual behavior. Social regulation, as opposed to economic regulation, can be even more conflictual because values and morals are involved. So, gun control—like abortion, marriage, and drug laws—will engender particularly passionate debate (Spitzer 2008, 3–5; see also Wolpert and Gimpel 1998; Wilson 2007). Social regulation certainly does pose challenges that are absent in other policy areas; however, there are two reasons why the challenges of social regulation can’t completely explain the politics of gun control in the U.S. First, social regulatory policy may be challenging to enact but it is not impossible; there are numerous areas where these challenges have been overcome (Vizzard 2000, 172–173). Second, and most important, gun control would face the challenges of social regulation in all countries, but the U.S. is still a significant outlier. Why do the challenges of social regulation seem to stymie efforts at gun control in the U.S. more than they do in other countries? We would point to the outsize strength of individualism in American political culture. Culture Our final group of direct attempts to explain American resistance to gun control centers on American political culture. Is there just something about Americans, as a people, that makes so many of us recoil from gun control? We generally think the answer is yes and share sociologist David Yamane’s view that the U.S. “appears unique in the world in having a strong cultural association of guns with personal identity and national values” (2017, 2). So, we are going to be returning to the concept of culture, specifically political culture, at length. We argue and demonstrate that cultural values are deeply embedded in the American gun debate

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and they are in fact its central driving force. Right now, our immediate purpose is to highlight existing explanations for the politics of gun control in the U.S. that are rooted in American political culture. This literature can be broken into three groups: work that considers culture an important part of the story of American gun politics but not necessarily its most consequential element; comparatively oriented literature that sees American political culture as the most relevant contrast; analysis that is primarily focused on the U.S. which characterizes the American gun control debate as a cultural proxy war. Political Culture as One Factor The relationship between gun control and American political culture has been incorporated into several of the more institutionally oriented explanations for gun politics that we discussed above. Most notably, Robert Spitzer threads a discussion of gun culture throughout his frequently cited work on the politics of gun control in the U.S.; however, he seems stubbornly reluctant to clearly embrace culture as any sort of explanation for those politics. Regarding that gun culture, he observes that: This veneration of guns, with all its attendant symbolism and mythology, drives a powerful and deeply felt belief that guns are not only an integral part of, but a force responsible for, America as it exists today. Although the percentage of Americans who aggressively embrace this tradition and consider it applicable to modern life is relatively small, the myths composing the gun culture survive and thrive in major elements of mass culture. (2008, 12)

Rather than clearly attribute any real theoretical causal power to this observation, Spitzer leans on the nature of our political institutions, parties, and especially how the NRA has worked them so effectively. So, while he recognizes the importance of an American gun culture that is supported by deeply held values and beliefs, he doesn’t fully develop this idea in a way that clearly shows its impact on the politics of gun control. Spitzer does, however, hint at this connection when he discusses the intensity of the NRA’s membership, writing that “the gun culture unites and motivates gun enthusiasts. No parallel force provides similar unity and motivation to gun control proponents” (2008, 92). In this respect, we are being explicit in a way that Spitzer doesn’t seem comfortable with by arguing that the source of gun culture’s strength, the real

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key to its political efficacy, is its synergy with widely held components of the American creed, our shared national political culture. It is clear from his later work that Spitzer is probably reluctant to embrace the causal power of culture because he thinks that the foundation of American gun culture is built on “quicksand” (2015, 3). That book stipulates that the modern gun debate is driven by a gun rights side which draws its strength from a strong gun culture. His concern is that its intense political animation is rooted in a particular understanding of American culture and history that is deeply flawed. Spitzer is not the only scholar to discuss the role of cultural mythology in the gun debate. Other scholars have pointed out the mythology surrounding common understandings of, for example, the American Revolution, or the frontier experience (see Atlas 2019; DeConde 2001; Harding Jr. 1998; Melzer 2009; Welch IV 2014). The problem is that even if we stipulate—which we don’t—that the cultural traditions the gun rights movement relies on are entirely based on myth, given their success, we must account for the power of that myth. Wouldn’t this success actually be more interesting if it was rooted in a fictitious understanding of the past? Don’t myths take hold because on some level people want to believe in them? The reality is, as we’ll show, that the “myths” that undergird the gun rights movement are powerful because they are deeply resonant with something much larger: a persistent American political culture that values individualism and self-reliance. Political culture plays important, but not central, roles in Goss (2006) and Fleming’s (2012) theoretical explanations for the limited success that has been experienced by gun control advocates in the U.S. Goss argues that policies that can be portrayed as challenging political-cultural values face particularly strong headwinds. She recognizes that gun control can be readily portrayed as challenging common American political values. Conversely, as we’ve noted above, she also recognizes that opponents of gun control are able to frame their arguments in ways that resonate broadly in American society. Although much of Fleming’s explanation for why Canada and the U.S. have, or have not, altered their gun control laws in response to mass shootings centers on contrasting political institutions, political culture is important in two respects. First, political culture has an important role in determining and sustaining those political institutions. Second, although this is implied more than it is clearly stated, political culture is the central force animating the intensity of American opposition

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to gun control which, among other things, gives the NRA its significant advantage in the debate. Distinct American Political Culture Is Comparatively Central Several studies comparing the U.S. with similar countries have emphasized how the uniqueness of American political culture is key to understanding the uniqueness of American gun control policy. If a comparative, i.e. global, lens is taken, institutionally rooted explanations only make sense if the role of political culture is added to the picture. For instance, our 2018 article with Ray Tatalovich concludes that the collective action problem alone can’t account for differences in the ability of gun control groups in Canada and the United States to effectively organize for their cause. The individual level decision-making that either contributes to, or helps alleviate, free-rider problems associated with organizing to support public issues is influenced by political culture. National culture impacts how much the issue frames used by organizers resonate in society. Essentially, the more a group’s cause aligns with national political culture the easier it is for them to drive political debate on their issue (Fleming et al. 2018). The politics of gun control actually provides an excellent lens through which we can see glaring contrasts in national political cultures. A comparison of the U.S. with several other English-speaking democracies paints a clear picture of American political culture that places more emphasis on individual liberty: we see an individualistic society hardly willing to defer to authoritative attempts to gain order by restricting access to items seen as expressions of that individualism and personal freedom. The picture painted of Canadian political culture, on the other hand, displays greater concern for establishing a more ordered society for the collective and this is a closer match to Australia, Britain, and New Zealand. (McLean 2015, 246–247)

McLean (2015) continues and uses the work of Lipset (1990), Hartz (1955, 1964), and Huntington (2006 [1968]) to identify, the reason why gun control policies in America have fallen within a comparatively narrow range and gun culture is persistently powerful. European settlers migrating to the new world in the seventeenth century brought with them liberal bourgeois ideological seeds extracted in the decline of the Tudor polity. By taking up their common arms in revolutionary revolt they

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allowed these seeds to flower into a unique and splendid bloom: American ideology. This Americanism – defined by individual liberty, anti-statism, meritocratic egalitarianism, and populism (Lipset, 1990a, p. 26) – is readily observed today in American gun culture and in debates over gun policy. Meanwhile, it is conspicuously absent in the gun politics of broadly similar societies. Understanding America’s relationship with the gun begins by understanding how the American Revolution transformed an idea and an ethic into a nation. (2015, 247)

Essentially, the founding circumstances of the U.S. led to a political culture that stacks the deck against advocates for gun control. The theoretical assertion that this American ideology is deeply embedded in the American gun debate is supported by findings of a study comparing the online political discussion of American and Canadian gun enthusiasts. Its elements were clearly revealed in the comments of Americans but not the Canadians. The findings of that article point toward the conclusion that this [American] ideology is more consistent with a perspective that is generally opposed to all but the most basic forms of gun control. This implies that the value-laden arguments made by gun rights activists and organizations are able to resonate with a broader swath of the [non-gun-enthusiast] American public because they find fertile soil there. Furthermore, it also indicates that the strength of American gun culture—and its lobby—has its roots in the nonintrinsic allure of firearm ownership. The value-laden nature of discussion by the Americans indicates that, to many American gun owners, guns are not simply physical objects; they are likely viewed as physical representations of political values that are central to American identity in general. Therefore, regulatory threats to those objects are interpreted as threats to the political values they embody. (McLean 2018, 978)

In sum, this all supports the idea that central and persistent elements of American political culture are key to explaining why the politics of gun control in the U.S. is such a global outlier. Probably the most influential culturally oriented comparative account of gun politics is David Kopel’s The Samurai, the Mountie, and the Cowboy (1992). The core of his argument is that America’s culture makes it illsuited to the gun laws of other countries. Law and culture must match one another: “one cannot simply look at statue books to understand a country’s firearms policy without considering its social context” (1992,

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391). He identifies several specific elements of American culture—such as individualism, social equality (defined as anti-classism), and distrust of government—that make it resistant to gun control. For instance, American culture idealizes the cowboy of common-man roots who carries a mass-produced affordable Colt, rather than an aristocratic knight with a fancy sword. Relative to other countries, Americans don’t trust the government, but they do trust other citizens. “In the rest of the world the armed masses symbolize lawlessness; in America, the armed masses are the law” (1992, 387). Kopel observes the significance of a “coincidence of causes for armament: open hunting, citizen militias, an armed frontier, violent cities, distrust of authority. Nowhere else in the world did environmental and sociocultural conditions foster use of shotguns and rifles and handguns” (1992, 383). The size of gun culture is theoretically significant, and it is inseparable from the broader American culture that gave rise to it and helps sustain it. Kopel provides a useful point of introduction into the third major way that culture has been used to explain the politics of gun control in the U.S.: viewing those politics as a cultural proxy war. Kopel’s interpretation of this battle sees it as a contest between traditionalists and those who are largely uncomfortable with the elements of American culture that guns represent. “In rejecting guns and admiring the ‘civilized’ foreign nations, gun control proposes a less American, more European model for the relation of the individual and the state” (1992, 387). He continues, Some gun prohibitionists are uncomfortable, though, with certain aspects of American culture, including the individualism and violence, and the difficult-to-control minorities, immigrants, and ‘rednecks’…Some gun controllers base their position on the sincere belief that control could reduce crime. Other advocates of gun prohibition seem motivated by a desire to express their disdain for the kind of people who own guns. (1992, 388)

Underlying the gun debate could be the idea, Kopel suggests, that guns are essentially a scapegoat object. We’re reluctant to blame groups, or individuals, for our society’s ills so we blame guns. We have problems loving and hating America at the same time. The cognitive dissonance between the fact that America can be both good and evil (i.e. quite free and quite violent) is too much to bear. So, we can imagine that the country’s problems stem from an object, and not our character.

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The idea that debate about gun control reflects deeper societal divisions is present through the contrasts that Peter Squires draws between the experiences of the U.S. and the U.K. Gun control in the U.K. has been about social control and has deep roots in a society with significant social stratification. “The interest of a more collective conception of order have sustained civilian disarmament in the U.K., albeit this has been a rather hierarchical form of collectivism which has typically privileged certain established class interests” (2000, 37). Squires recognizes that debate about gun control reflects an underlying tension in society between individualism and collectivism. He writes that gun control advocates, are fighting for a principle, the principle that society should take responsibility for the effective regulation of an item as dangerous as a firearm. It is, they claim, not an issue that can simply be left to the good sense of individual citizens. Indeed, at the very heart of the gun control debate there lie some fundamentally opposed conceptions of citizenship. Neo-liberals argue that the ‘right to bear arms’ is an essential precondition of free citizenship, whilst more left-leaning and ‘social democratic’ commentators insist upon gun regulations as a means of protecting the wider ‘social’ interest. (2000, 5)

Squires forcefully argues that placing the gun debate within—as an instance of—this larger philosophical context is essential. We won’t understand it unless we do this. We must appreciate that what undergirds the debate are “markedly different world views [that] inform the discourses of individual rights or collective ‘social’ responsibilities which form the ideological mainstays of the two traditions” (2000, 9). His comparison essentially leads to the conclusion that the individualistic worldview has been more dominant in the U.S., while the collectivistic orientation has clearly carried the day in the U.K. Gun Control Debate as a Cultural Proxy War We can see from this discussion there is evidence that, from a global perspective, the U.S. has a rather unique American political culture, and this may help explain why the U.S. is so unique when it comes to gun ownership and regulation. But, what if we don’t look globally? American culture isn’t monolithic. There may be a set of values that we share widely and generally enough to create a national political culture that can

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be used to distinguish us from the rest of the world; however, there is variability internally in the strength of our commitment to these values. Some Americans, for instance, care more about individual freedom as a political value than others and the societal influence of this political value—as well as others—can vary over time. Essentially, saying that the U.S. is a particularly individualistic society doesn’t mean we don’t recognize that some Americans are more individualistic than others and that the strength of individualism in American politics ebbs and flows. It also doesn’t mean that we don’t argue about how our core political values are going to manifest themselves in public policies. In fact, debate about policies that impact our core values is likely to be particularly visceral. So, is the great American gun debate really just a particularly nasty clash over much deeper political values, or world views? On the surface, the gun control debate appears to be driven by instrumentality. This is generally how it is discussed. People want guns, and oppose gun regulation, because of what guns do. Conversely, different people want to eliminate guns and support regulating them because of what guns do. Guns are useful tools for self-defense and recreation. Or, on the other hand, guns facilitate violence and criminality. The problem, from either perspective, is that arguments framed this way never really persuade those who hold the opposing perspective. Why is this? These instrumental arguments are what we hear when we listen to the gun debate, but they are really just proxies for opposing cultural worldviews, which is why they aren’t persuasive (Braman and Kahan 2006, 570). So, there are really two gun debates. The first is the obvious instrumental one: Do guns make society more, or less, safe? This is the debate we actually hear. The second is more important but it lies below the surface and is easily overlooked: What do guns represent culturally and do we like that? This is what motivates the debate we actually hear (Blanco 2016). The American gun debate isn’t about what guns do; it is about what guns mean (Joslyn et al. 2017; Schwartz 2022). A recent volume by Donald Campbell makes a very compelling argument that the American gun debate must be viewed as a cultural clash first, and a policy dispute second. The state of gun control in the U.S. can only be understood if its cultural context is given primacy, “the gun controversy is actually just an ongoing skirmish in a larger cultural battle” between “Bedrock” and “Cosmopolitan” America (2019, 9; see also Tonso 2001, 42–43; Kennett and Anderson 1975, 254–255). Campbell writes that,

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At heart, the conflict between the two Americas is not about gun control. The struggle over guns and gun regulations is merely the external manifestation of a much deeper struggle around sharply different national visions for the country and two distinct value systems. (2019, 153)

“Bedrock” America is characterized by “a belief in independence; personal accomplishment; self-reliance; justice; and the rightness of democracy, equality, and freedom – values captured in the idea of ‘rugged individualism’” (2019, 8). Campbell argues that this has been the dominant cultural strain and that guns fit in naturally with these values. His “Cosmopolitan” cultural strain has had its moments, but it has been less influential overall. It takes its inspiration from Europe: The values of Cosmopolitan America are communitarian in orientation, and they emphasize civil cooperation, reciprocal obligation, interdependency, inclusiveness, and trust in government for solving social ills. While not wholly rejecting Bedrock America’s more individualistic values, members of Cosmopolitan America view this individualistic orientation as ill-fitting and no longer applicable…”. (2019, 9)

The terminology that has been used to describe the two cultural poles that clash over guns has varied but they fundamentally diverge over their vision of a good society. According to Bruce-Briggs, “underlying the gun control struggle is a fundamental division in our nation…On the one side are those who take bourgeois Europe as a model of a civilized society…the other side is a group of people…whose…model is that of the independent frontiersman who takes care of himself and his family with no interference from the state” (2001, 73). This makes sense if we accept that the strength of the “American ideology” in society—which we identified above while discussing the U.S. in comparative context—exists on a continuum. Support for gun control is weak where it is strong. Kleck (1996) finds that support for gun control is explained more by cultural conflict—deep animosity between cultural groups who hold contrasting conceptions of American identity and culture—than concerns about crime. Legislation can be about either instrumentality or conflict between cultural groups. We want laws because we think they will do something good, or we want them because we think they will do something to some group. The arguments are instrumental, but the motives are cultural. The latter best fits the gun debate and explains findings in

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later work which show that people who support gun control laws are skeptical that they will effectively reduce crime, and they are likely to endorse negative stereotypes about gun owners. They support laws they don’t think will work. Why? They are really seeking symbolic (cultural), rather than pragmatic, value (Kleck 1996; Kleck et al. 2009). Supporting gun control is a way of expressing disapproval of particular lifestyles and segments of American society: “support for gun control may reflect hostility to culturally defined groups associated with gun ownership” (Kleck 2001, 92). Journalist Dan Baum observes the effects of this in the language that is often used in the debate. Gun enthusiasts are often openly disparaged as “gun nuts” or “loons,” even while similar epithets which have been used in other contexts became socially unacceptable long ago. That hasn’t been the case in this area where, as Baum writes, gun enthusiasts are readily described as “the unwashed. The yokels” (2013, 203). Kleck succinctly summarizes the personalizing of policy preference that we see in the gun debate: “Gun control, then, may be viewed by some supporters not merely as a form of violence control, but as redneck and reactionary control as well” (2001, 91). So, it could be that some people actually support gun control because they dislike people who like guns; likewise, opposition to gun control may be so intense because people who like guns perceive this attack on their lifestyle and the traditional American values they cherish. Since we argue that the American gun debate is a particularly visceral and protracted clash between individualism and collectivism in American political culture and politics; our work contributes most directly to this cultural proxy war literature. The American Ideology that we have discussed—which includes individualism as a central component—is a concept that is most apparent through a global comparative lens. In that view, the strength of American individualism dominates any interpretation of American political culture. However, when we focus on American political culture by itself, we will see that individualism’s strength varies over time and it is moderated by more collectively oriented impulses. American politics generally has been significantly impacted by an ideological clash between worldviews that give primacy to individual freedom on the one hand and the public good on the other. As Vizzard insightfully observes, “Gun control highlights a critical fault line in American political thought between a collective and individual focus” (2000, 5 emphasis in original text). These are the cultural worldviews that motivate the battle over guns.

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Guns and Values We want to try and understand the two groups really driving the American gun debate—each side’s base. We want to try and understand how they try and drive that debate, how they frame it. We are going to pay particular attention to the cultural orientations that undergird the specific views of the relevant actors. Neither of these groups comprises anything close to majority status in the broader American populace. Thinking about these groups in terms of their size will only reveal an incomplete picture. Understanding how many Americans own guns, for example, won’t necessarily lead us to a complete understanding of the state of gun control politics. Instead of asking how widespread gun owning is we should be asking how widespread the cultural pre-requisites to gun owning are. If there are more Americans predisposed to the cultural values that undergird gun culture—whether or not they themselves own guns—than there are to the values that motivate advocates for gun control, we would expect the former group to have a political advantage over the latter. Political actors representing each group must make their arguments to a wider American audience. That wider audience will be more receptive to those arguments if the cultural material that is motivating them resonates broadly. American Gun Culture & American Values Americans who own and use firearms for a variety of legitimate purposes are a key constituency in the gun control debate. So, we should spend some time reviewing what we know about this segment of American society. There is actually a lot that we don’t know about Americans who regularly use guns for recreation, or for self-defense, because scholars have paid comparatively little attention to this group (Boine et al. 2020). Gun ownership is not deviant behavior, but academic studies of gun culture have been most common in the fields of criminology and public health, almost as if it is (Yamane 2017; Schwartz 2022). In his book exploring American gun culture, the journalist Dan Baum (2013) commented that it is important to understand gun culture because so many Americans participate in it. This begs the question, how big is it? Since we don’t have universal registration or licensing, we don’t know exactly. We must rely on estimates of gun ownership and most of these are the results of surveys that are rife with problems. We know, for example, that people conceal gun ownership and—whether for social undesirability

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or other reasons—may be reluctant to admit to being a gun owner when surveyed. That said, and recognizing that there is debate among scholars on this point, a broad look at the best evidence suggests that probably about half of U.S. households have at least one gun in them (Bruce-Briggs 2001, 57; Legault and Lizotte 2009, 479; Joslyn 2020). Gun owners are more likely to be male, Republican, and from more rural areas (Filindra and Kaplan 2016; Joslyn et al. 2017). There have always been many gun owners who do not fit into one more of these categories. For instance, 57% of gun owners identify as either liberal (20%) or moderate (Schwartz 2022, 179). In the wake of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, the overall number of gun owners, particularly those who don’t fit the typical mold, has been on the rise (Tavernise 2021). “At least five million Americans purchased a gun for the first time in 2020,” and 64.8% of them were women (Schwartz 2022, 177–178). Recent research on American gun culture has identified three distinct, but not mutually exclusive, subcultures that surround recreation, selfdefense, or gun rights activism (Boine et al. 2020). The first category includes hunting, target shooting, and collecting. This recreationally centered gun culture—especially its hunting component—has been declining in influence and has been giving way to a gun culture that is focused on self-defense, especially concealed handgun carry. David Yamane described this shift toward a “culture of armed citizenship” as “Gun Culture 2.0” (2017, 5). The third cultural element has been strongest in states where gun ownership has been most threatened. It coalesces around Second Amendment activism and is defined by “a symbolic attachment to firearms as fundamental to individual freedom” (Boine et al. 2020, 10). The strength of American gun culture, and the prominence of guns in American culture generally, may stem from our revolutionary origins. The idea that the American Revolution was fought, or at least started, by regular citizens using their privately owned arms, as well as other narratives surrounding the American revolution, have been a powerful force within the gun culture that have served to “reinforce the idea that firearms are a key part of America’s story and soul” (Schwartz 2022, 172). Gun rights advocates will, for example, point out that Paul Revere’s famous cry—which was most likely actually a tactically wise whisper—of oncoming redcoats was a warning that the government was coming to confiscate guns and the “shot heard around the world” was fired to keep

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them from doing so (Winkler 2011, 103–105). It is certainly an oversimplification to claim that the American Revolution was caused by attempted gun control; however, we can’t dismiss the idea that our unique revolutionary origins have had significant consequences on American political culture generally and American gun culture specifically (see for instance Lipset 1990, 1996; McLean 2015). The legacy of America’s frontier past has also been incredibly influential. The frontier is popularly personified by the intrepidly self-reliant American frontiersman who is making his way in the world by the strength of his grit and the aide of his Colt. Numerous scholars have highlighted the power that this vision of the frontier wields in the American gun culture; however, they often do this while disputing just how realistic this particular vision of the frontier actually is (Spitzer 2008, 2015; Winkler 2011; Hofstadter 1970; Carter 1997). So, while guns may have been less necessary in a west that was more mild than is commonly thought, the popular image of the frontier has been wildly consequential for American culture (Atlas 2019). In his analysis of gun control politics, Robert Spitzer combines these two cultural forces into a “militia/frontier ethos” and he recognizes that its influence spreads beyond the gun culture. He describes the effects of this ethos: This veneration of guns, with all its attendant symbolism and mythology, drives a powerful and deeply felt belief that guns are not only an integral part of, but a force responsible for, America as it exists today. Although the percentage of Americans who aggressively embrace this tradition and consider it applicable to modern life is relatively small, the myths composing the gun culture survive and thrive in major elements of mass culture. (2008, 12)

So, not only are the traditions and values associated with this ethos influential in the gun culture, but they have also attained broader influence in American culture. Given that he recognizes the wide-ranging influence of these cultural orientations, it is rather interesting that Spitzer thinks the history they draw upon has been incredibly mischaracterized; according to him its foundation lies in myth, not reality (2015). What about this idea that the conception of American traditions that are so central to the identity of American gun culture are really grounded

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more in myth than reality? We’ve already noted that popular understandings of the “Wild West” frontier may not be firmly grounded in reality, and similar historically questionable mythologies surround visions of the typical Revolutionary War soldier (Harding Jr. 1998, 202; Hofstadter 2001, 34–35). Spitzer’s view is that contemporary American gun culture is clearly driven by “an imaginary past” and that the extent to which they mischaracterize history, and rely on myth, seriously undermines their arguments (2015, 3). The problem with this is that these myths must be incredibly powerful because those arguments have been incredibly effective. The strength of American gun culture, and the success of the gun rights agenda, might actually be more puzzling if the militia fighting at Lexington and Concord in 1775 were professionally trained and a Winchester was of no real value on the frontier. Regardless of how closely they resemble reality, the mythologies motivating American gun culture are clearly influential. And, wouldn’t explaining why and how they are so influential become more important the less they resemble reality? As social scientists (i.e. not historians) trying to make sense of the American gun debate, we are primarily interested in how myths take hold and influence society, especially the values they reveal and help support. For these purposes, common understandings of historical reality may in fact be more relevant than actual historical reality. We argue that myths are influential, and they can take hold, when they are consistent with cultural material in society that they can bind to. People believe in myths because they want to, because they are consistent with their values and worldviews. Myths can help buttress those worldviews. Popular conceptions of the American founding and frontier are so influential because they are so consistent with broadly popular American political values, like individual freedom and self-reliance. These values are deeply embedded in the American gun culture, just as they are in much of American political—and popular—culture more generally. Furthermore, the synergy between these mythologies and values that are central to American political culture make the mythologies extremely useful tools in the political debate over gun control. American gun culture is incredibly value-laden. It is often the case that “if you own guns…you are also assumed to hold a set of shared beliefs on any number of subjects completely unrelated to guns” (Somerset 2015, xiii). These specific beliefs flow from political values and there is growing evidence that, for many gun owners, guns are symbolic expressions of deeply held political values (McLean 2018; Kohn 2004a, b; Schwartz

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2022). This is incredibly significant because it means that to an individual, gun control is not just about the consequences of a particular policy, it is also about the meaning they interpret that policy as expressing. The gun control debate is at least as much about values and culture as it is policy effectiveness (Kahan and Braman 2003). Most significantly, and most consequentially for this debate, for many “guns and gun ownership are a synecdoche for American-ness itself” (Blanchfield 2019, 197). Guns, the culture around them, and what these represent are part of the American bedrock (Tonso 2001; Kennett and Anderson 1975; Campbell 2019). Since guns represent core American values, threats to gun ownership can be perceived as directly threatening what it means to be American. Political freedom and rugged individualism are core tenants of American political culture and these values are deeply embedded in the gun culture. Studies of American gun enthusiasts have shown them to be incredibly animated by these values (Kohn 2004a; Carlson 2015; Burbick 2006). Likewise, a detailed study of the NRA found that their members’ passion for the cause of “gun rights is about freedom, independence, self-reliance, and their American way of life” (Melzer 2009, 11; see also Schwartz 2022). Also, several comparative studies have demonstrated that the relationship between guns and these political values is uniquely American. Americans see guns as expressions of freedom and self-reliance but gun enthusiasts in other countries do not (Kohn 2004b; McLean 2018; Cookie and Puddifoot 2000). In addition to being symbolic of freedom, some corners of American gun culture see them as tools necessary for the preservation of freedom, where “unfettered access to firearms is the key ingredient in protecting individual rights from overreaching by government” (Horwitz and Anderson 2009, 1–2). For the classically self-reliant American, who may be reluctant to rely on, or feels failed by, the government for protection, the “final, back-to-the-wall recourse, is his gun” (Kennett and Anderson 1975, 253). In some corners of gun culture, the pull of rugged individualism is so strong that it isn’t necessarily that they feel they “cannot rely on police to protect them; it would be worse if they could” (Waldman 2014, 168). The term “gun culture” was coined in a 1970 lamentation on the subject by the well-known historian Richard Hofstadter. In his estimation, guns are so widespread, and the U.S. differs so dramatically from other countries in gun prevalence and regulation, the U.S. is a gun culture. He doesn’t cite hunting or target shooting as driving American gun culture;

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he points to the long-standing connections between guns and political values. Hofstadter writes that even though there are many other countries whose citizens’ don’t venerate guns but whose political and civil rights are nonetheless well protected, “Americans cling with pathetic stubbornness to the notion that the people’s right to bear arms is the greatest protection of their individual rights and a firm safeguard of democracy” (2001, 29). So, it is clear even to those who are deeply disturbed by it: American gun culture and American political values are deeply entwined with one another. Gun Controllers: Searching for Cultural Resonance It is clear that a distinctive American gun culture supports the anti-control side of the gun debate, but is there a comparable anti-gun culture that animates the pro-control side? If so, given that the values underlying the gun culture are extremely consistent with individualistic currents that run strong in traditional American culture, what values support anti-gun culture? In terms of size, level of cohesiveness, connection with broader themes of American culture, history, or tradition, we simply cannot identify an anti-gun culture that is at all comparable to American gun culture. We can, at best, identify anti-gun constituencies, groups that have been more associated with, or more receptive to, gun control efforts. In many respects, they only make sense as a distinctive group within American society when considered in contrast to what they oppose: guns, what they represent, and in many instances, the members of the gun culture who appreciate these things. In general terms, gun ownership is less common among women, urban residents, and Democrats (Cook and Goss 2014). These are also some of the most important constituencies for gun control advocacy. Women’s organizations—often joined by religious groups, especially mainline Protestants—have been important allies of gun control groups. The leaders of gun control groups tend to fall into these categories, and they have also often suffered personally from gun violence. For example, the National Council to Control Handguns—a forerunner to the influential Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence—was founded in 1974 by someone who was mugged at gunpoint while in graduate school. The Brady organization was named after Ronald Reagan’s press secretary, who was shot in the 1981 attempted assassination of Reagan. His wife, Sarah

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Brady, was an important public leader in the cause for gun control during the 80s and 90s (Goss 2006). Gun control activists believe large-scale public gun ownership is “a social anachronism and a major public safety menace” (Nisbet 2001a, 18). They are not only concerned with what guns do in society; they are concerned with what the presence of guns in society says about that society. They focus on the costs of gun violence and view restrictions on gun ownership “as the only effective means of keeping lethal weapons out of the hands of criminals, lunatics, political assassins, and especially gun owners who, in times of emotional distress, kill spouses, relatives, acquaintances, and/or themselves and whose negligence often allows guns to kill their children” (Nisbet 2001a, 18). In their view, society has a responsibility for the well-being of individuals, and guns harm individuals. Therefore, society has a responsibility to control guns (Joslyn et al. 2017, 384–385). Living in a society with many people that do not share this view troubles them. From the perspective of gun control advocates, guns represent challenges to society: individuals with guns represent possible threats to the community. We saw how the gun culture views guns as symbols of individual freedom and self-reliance. To a gun control supporter, that view is backward, anachronistic, and rooted in nostalgia for an idyllic past that may have been neither idyllic nor realistic. An individual with a gun didn’t “win” the West; a community was necessary to overcome the many challenges posed by the frontier. Only communities had a chance; individuals perished. Interdependence, not individualism, is the relevant value, and urbanization has only made it more relevant. Individuals with guns don’t solve social ills; they contribute to them. We are collectively, via government, responsible for solving social ills. Appeals to collectively oriented values are central features of gun control advocacy. Gun control is sought to increase public safety and regulating individual access to guns is essential for any society to be truly civilized. An op-ed entitled, “Get Rid of the Damned Things,” that was published in the wake of the Columbine shooting, clearly states that getting rid of guns would “advance the civilization” (Rosenblatt 2001, 111). Also, as exemplified by a Newsweek editorial, it is common to explicitly contrast these collectivist values with individual freedoms: “all rights have to be balanced with the need for public order” (Newsweek 2001, 115). Widespread private gun ownership simply does not fit into the gun controllers’ vision of the good society, in which social solidarity is valued

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above individualism; gun ownership represents “collective indifference to the well-being of strangers” (Braman and Kahan 2006, 570). Finally, several analysts have associated gun controllers’ with a “cosmopolitan,” more European, American sub-culture, whose values “are communitarian in orientation, and they emphasize civil cooperation, reciprocal obligation, interdependency, inclusiveness, and trust in government for solving social ills” (Campbell 2019, 9; see also Tonso 2001; Kennett and Anderson 1975). This association with cosmopolitan political values, which are traditionally more European and collectivist, relates to a key challenge that gun control advocates have consistently had: gaining the mass appeal necessary to stimulate and sustain a real social movement. Gun rights activists, on the other hand, have traditionally stood for “Bedrock America” and have had an easier time obtaining mass appeal. They have, for example, been able to build and sustain a real grassroots movement by framing their arguments around individual rights and freedom. The gun control side used an expert-led strategy that was intellectually grounded in detailed policy proposals but was ultimately ineffective because it was unable to win mass appeal (Goss 2006, 193–194). These elite orientated gun control advocates have not been able to frame their arguments in ways that resonate in traditional American political culture. They have had to rely on communally oriented themes, such as public safety. So, despite these appeals to community and their technical policy arguments, the uniquely individualistic dominant American political culture has limited the ability of gun control advocates to rally the degree of political participation necessary to support a real movement for gun control (Goss 2006, 195). Framing Their Debate The political and policy consequences of framing—especially the degree of consistency between issue frames and prevailing political culture— can be dramatic. For instance, consider the dramatic transformation in concealed carry laws that occurred over the past few decades. In the 1980s, most states either completely banned concealed gun carry or had restrictive discretionary “May Issue” licensing systems. Now, the laws of every state allow citizens to carry concealed guns and most either do not require a license or they have adopted non-discretionary “Shall Issue” licensing systems (McLean and Sorens 2019). A central ingredient to

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the success of the concealed carry movement was its ability to frame their arguments in ways that resonated broadly within American political culture. Discretionary systems gave local elites the ability to choose who deserved a concealed carry license and who didn’t. Under these systems “there was no fundamental right, just the right kind of people;” therefore, “discretionary systems affronted [American] egalitarian pride” (Patrick 2010, 71). Being able to credibly argue that existing licensing regulations contradicted widely cherished American political values gave the concealed carry reform movement a significant political advantage. The pro-control side of the American gun debate frames their arguments around crime control, public safety, and freedom from fear. The focus in all of these is on the common good that effective gun control would deliver to everyone in society. The public safety and crime control messages emphasize the negative outcomes that are associated with gun violence, arguing that these are preventable tragedies, and linking this violence with the number and type of guns in society (Steidley and Colen 2017, 617–618). These arguments, and the counter-arguments they engendered, led to what Goss calls a “bad hands versus bad guns” debate that worked against gun control advocates. It leads to elite level discourse that bogs down in the nuances of criminal minds, the technicalities of guns, and doesn’t resonate with the masses (Goss 2006, 192). In order to seek resonance in the mass political culture and to counter the freedom framing of the gun rights community, pro-control forces like the Brady organization began framing their arguments in terms of freedom from a fear of gun violence (Steidley and Colen 2017, 617). It isn’t clear that invoking freedom in this more group-orientated way has been particularly resonant. Anti-control, gun rights, forces have consistently framed their arguments in terms that stem from traditional conceptions of American political culture. These arguments typically focus on individual freedoms, self-reliance, the right of self-defense, and egalitarian anti-elitism. Also, popular understandings of American heritage and culture frequently find their way into gun rights issue frames (Steidley and Colen 2017; Goss 2006; Burbick 2006). In-depth studies of the NRA, for example, have found that rather than leading public opinion, it is exceptionally attuned to it and to its cultural underpinnings. They will lean heavily on rights and freedom framing, and they will invoke American history in ways that resonate with key constituencies, such as white-male conservatives,

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whether or not they are gun enthusiasts. The NRA skillfully tailors its messaging so that it resonates with large swaths of the American public (Melzer 2009, 2019). Frames have the most impact on an individual’s opinions when they are consistent with their preexisting cognitive predispositions (Converse 1962; Cacciatore et al. 2016), which are heavily influenced by culture. Actors in the gun debate strategically attempt to shape their arguments in ways that will resonate with these predispositions. For example, it has been common for the opponents of gun control to raise “the specter of big government usurping individual rights while proponents underscored public safety” (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001, 537). Similarly, in their explanations for mass shootings, Republicans tend to focus on individual characteristics of the shooter while Democrats cite forces at the societal level (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2017). When trying to explain gun violence, or conversely the utility of private gun ownership, “interest groups highlight narrative elements that match intended audiences’ experiences, interests, political orientations, and biases” (Merry 2020, 21). Since the ability of issue frames to influence opinion is contingent on the audiences’ predispositions, which are heavily influenced by culture, the political advantage will tilt toward the side that has a deeper cultural well to draw upon. In the case of gun control, that advantage has been held by the anti-control forces because they have been able to draw from a well teeming with traditional American political culture. In addition to what they reveal about the cultural environment, the frames that are used in the gun control debate are related to the types of policy solutions that are ultimately proposed by politicians. How issues are framed can help people develop simple causal stories for complex events; the way issues, or events, are presented can shape how people understand their causes. For instance, framing gun violence as a consequence of individual failure may lead one to lay the blame for a school shooting at the feet of the shooter’s parents, the influence of violent video games, or a mental illness. The way we understand the causes of problems directly relates to where we look for solutions. Do we need more restrictive gun laws, or should we relax laws governing where guns can be carried so that there are “good” individuals with guns ready to stop the “bad” ones? As Haider-Markel and Joslyn explain further, Characterizations of political events and tragedies are not simply rhetorical representations but rather important determinants of citizens’ causal

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reasoning. Indeed, while congressional Democrats framed the Columbine shootings as a result of weak gun laws, Republicans turned their attention to violence in the media. Each frame endorsed a specific causal chain that advanced a distinct policy objective. (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001, 537)

The resulting policy proposals can be usefully categorized into three types: punitive, lenient, and restrictive (Fleming 2012; Fleming et al. 2016). As we will see, each of these can be associated with a particular issue frame, causal story, or general understanding of gun violence; and, by extension, they are also tightly related to particular cultural orientations. We will define these terms in more detail now because we will be using this categorization fairly extensively later. Punitive policies are focused on punishing individuals who commit nefarious acts involving guns. Often these policies target people who commit gun violence directly. Laws that require harsher sentences for crimes that are committed with a gun—as opposed to while unarmed, or with a different type of weapon—are classic examples of punitive policies. Another common type of punitive policy are laws that target people who improperly acquire guns, such as people who lie on background check paperwork. These laws target the behavior, specifically the individual committing the behavior, and not the object the person is using. They are consistent with the idea that “guns don’t kill, people kill” and other common individually oriented issue frames. Punitive policies flow from the idea that individuals are responsible for their own actions, and they should be held accountable for those actions. They are likewise reflective of, and will be well received by, cultural orientations that emphasize individual responsibility and self-reliance. Lenient policies relax existing gun regulations or otherwise expand access to guns. Essentially, they are how opposition to gun control is translated into policy. They may, for example, make certain types of guns legal that are currently illegal, as would happen if an existing assault weapons ban is repealed. They could also decrease the legal hurdles that a person must navigate in order to legally carry a firearm. Or, as another example, they may expand the number of places that firearms can legally be carried. Policies categorized as lenient are generally focused on eliminating legal barriers to gun ownership and use. As with punitive polices, they are motivated by an understanding that guns are neither intrinsically good, nor bad; they are objects. To their supporters, punitive laws punish those who do ill with these objects, and lenient policies work to ensure

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those who will do good with them are able to access them. Cultural orientations that heavily emphasize individual rights, freedom, and self-reliance lead to lenient policies. The idea that law-abiding gun owners shouldn’t have their rights limited because some people use guns for crime is a common issue frame that can lead to supporting lenient policies. Restrictive policy is basically what we generally think of when we think of traditional gun control. These laws regulate, for instance, who can own guns, what must be done to acquire guns, what types of guns are available to own, or what a gun owner may do with their gun. Examples of restrictive policies are numerous. They range from assault weapons bans to the laws governing how concealed carry licenses are issued. Supporters of restrictive policies do generally see a causal link between the presence of (ease of access to, type of, etc.) guns in society and the problem of gun violence. They emphasize the object’s negative effects on society. Guns are framed as a threat to public safety. Restrictive supporters may ask, for example, why your (i.e. individual) right to a gun trumps our (i.e. collective) right to be free of fear? Frames like this that support restrictive policies flow from cultural orientations that value the common public good. Rather than individual rights, they will emphasize communal obligations.

American Political Culture The long-standing conventional view of American political culture characterizes it as classically liberal, built around the Lockean values of liberty, equality, and individualism. This view of political culture in the U.S. is so deeply entrenched that introductory American government textbooks commonly use these values, with the frequent addition of democracy, to define American political culture (see, e.g. Bianco and Canon 2021). These values are so widely cherished—in our nation of immigrants, which lacks the blood and soil tradition that commonly provides a basis for national identity elsewhere—they quite literally define Americanness. American political debate therefore has a certain uniqueness: we don’t argue about what our values are; we argue about what they mean and how we can live up to them (Lipset 1996). Since the American gun debate is so clearly value-laden, and there are clear appeals to these common political values; we need to explore American political culture in more detail.

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Lockean Consensus? Although its roots can be traced to Tocqueville’s well-read treatise on Democracy in America (2003), much of the scholarship that places classical liberalism at the core of America’s national character builds on Louis Hartz’s seminal The Liberal Tradition in America (1955). Hartz argued that American political development has been most influenced by a commitment to the limited government liberalism famously derived from the enlightenment writings of John Locke, which today many would label “classical liberalism” (in order to distinguish it from contemporary liberal political ideology, which is quite different). These Lockean ideas, with their emphasis on individual rights and freedoms, were influential in the founding period and they remain influential in the modern era. According to Hartz, one can only understand American history, and the arc of American political discourse, if one appreciates the existence, and impact, of this national liberal consensus whose values have defined the terms of our most important debates. Huntington and Lipset are influential scholars who also essentially argued that the U.S. is basically a highly individualistic, classically liberal society (Lipset 1963, 1996; Huntington 1981). They are therefore frequently cited by political scientists and historians as important contributors to the “Lockean – also sometimes referred to as liberal, or Hartzian – consensus” literature (see for instance Ellis 1993). Huntington and Lipset, separately but in similar terms, identify a unique “American Creed.” Huntington succinctly describes the American creed as the existence of broad consensus on the values of liberty, equality, individualism, and democracy (1981, 14). These are, not coincidentally, the same values we identified above which are commonly viewed as definitional to American political culture. The precise meaning, application, and implication of this creed changes over time, but adherence to these ideals is at the heart of American national identity. The idea that values define our national identity, our Americanness, is an essential point. Lipset discusses Americanism—by which he means reverence for the values in the American Creed—as an ideology. Whereas most “other countries define themselves by a common history as birthright communities,” the U.S. defines itself in ideological terms (Lipset 1996, 18). Being American means believing in a shared set of values. This is why, for instance, accusing someone of being un-American is widely perceived as an insult; it implies that they reject American values.

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We would use the language of political culture, not ideology, for what Lipset is referring to here. If this American Creed, or Americanism, is something all Americans share, and that differentiates us from other countries, then it is more usefully considered part of our common political culture. We think ideology is better understood as driving how these values get applied to actual policy debates and how much influence the values have over an individual’s political opinions. Since these values are so important, it is essential that we explore what exactly is meant by them? When we say that Americans care deeply about individualism and liberty, for example, what exactly are we saying? Given their clear relevance in the modern gun debate, it is particularly important to explore these specific values in greater detail. In the context of American political culture, what is individualism and liberty? Individualism(s) In the influential Lockean liberal consensus tradition, “individualism” and “liberty” go hand in hand: the most relevant freedoms are held by individuals, not groups. These values are inherently political and imply a particular relationship between an individual and the state: governments should protect, not grant, personal rights. This view has been labeled “negative liberty,” or “negative individualism.” It is “the idea that one’s individual rights are best preserved through one’s being left alone” (Walls 2015, 67). There is also a strong aura of self-reliance embedded within this conception of freedom. It isn’t just that the government should leave individuals alone, it is commitment to the idea that individuals—and by extension the societies in which the individual is at the center—thrive when they are left alone and are therefore free to rely on themselves. Success is understood as the result of individual effort. American culture, therefore, is commonly characterized as extremely “individualistic, meritocratic-orientated, and anti-statist” (Lipset 1996, 22). As a value cherished in American culture, individualism—which at its most basic level refers, at least, to the primacy of the individual in social and political life—has provided a through line for American history. It is the connective tissue that binds colonial America to the modern era. As Stephanie Walls, in her book on the concept, writes: The characterization of individualism has changed over time, but its use as an American ideal has been quite consistent… It is an ideological

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concept with deep roots in classical liberalism and the American psyche, and the effects of individualism on individual activities have proved to be significant. (2015, 162)

A political culture rooted in the primacy of the individual has been a constant force. In the U.S., political discourse has been consistently concerned with the betterment, and freedom, of the individual person. However, there have been important debates about how that goal should be accomplished, and what the relationship between the individual and society should look like. The understanding of individualism that is predominant today is rooted in negative liberty. This sort of individualism, which is typical of the liberal consensus view of American history, supports a minimal state that leaves individuals alone so that they may be allowed to flourish, which they are assumed to inevitably do when left alone. However, there is a more assertive view of individualism that stems from the idea of positive liberty: individual freedom is best achieved when individuals are robustly supported by the state, society, or community. This conception of individualism emphasizes an individual’s role, and importantly also their duties, as a member of a community (Walls 2015). Positive liberty is associated with the political philosophy of republicanism (which shouldn’t be confused with the modern political party). The individual is still at the center of republican society, but he is more duty bound to the collective. The influence of republicanism—especially its influence relative to classical liberalism in the founding era, and the liberal consensus view of American political development more generally—has been the subject of significant scholarly debate (Bailyn 1992; Wood 1991; Ellis 1993). Pulitzer and Bancroft Prize-winning historian Gordon Wood nicely describes the republican view of the relationship between the individual, positive freedom, and society: According to the classical republican tradition, man was by nature a political being, a citizen who achieved his greatest moral fulfillment by participating in a self-governing republic. Public or political liberty—or what we now call positive liberty—meant participation in government. And this political liberty in turn provided the means by which the personal liberty and private rights of the individual—what we today call negative liberty—were protected…Liberty was realized when the citizens were

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virtuous—that is, willing to sacrifice their private interests for the sake of the community…. (1991, 104)

So, in the republican tradition, individualism and liberty are still central components of American political culture, but they are viewed as best secured through engagement with, not rejection of, the broader community. Being neither historians nor political philosophers, we do not intend to wade into—or extensively review—the debate between liberalism, republicanism, their relative influence on American political development, or exactly which formulation of individualism best characterizes American culture. However, it is important that we draw a few key conclusions from the preceding discussion. First, it seems clear that some type of individualism has consistently characterized key aspects of American political culture and political discourse. Second, it seems as though there has long been a communitarian (i.e. positive individualism/liberty, or common good orientation) challenge to the understanding of individualism that focuses on personal rights and freedoms, which is predominant today. So, it may be possible that scholarly debate between classical liberalism and republicanism may reflect the reality that American politics has long featured a clash between individualistic liberal and communitarian republican influences. Stephanie Walls nicely summarizes how these seemingly contradictory orientations—toward the individual on the one hand, and the community on the other—are nonetheless ever present in American history and culture: First, we have a society of people who value the role and rights of the individual. Second, we have [founding era] documents that support the protection of individual rights. Third, we have a colonial and Early American culture that is rich in political, economic, and religious overtones, which stress the individual, the common good, industry, frugality, virtue, selfdenial, and freedom, both positive and negative. Fourth, we have a culture that supports and requires adventurous, rugged, wandering, grounded, individually motivated, community-based townspeople. (2015, 72)

American political culture does seem to be biased toward an individualism that is rooted in personal rights and freedoms; however, this is, and has long been, mitigated by a significant communitarian challenge. In other words, American political culture is consistently individualistic,

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but we have ideological clashes over how we understand individualism and how we allow it to influence policy. Communitarian Challenge Richard Ellis makes a similar observation: a complete “theory of American political cultures must acknowledge both the pervasive individualism of American life and the centrality of the communitarian or egalitarian challenge” (1993, 154). He reconciles the varied impact of individualism and community on American political conflict by expanding our conception of the ways that individual autonomy can be limited onto two dimensions of individuation. Individuals may be more, or less, connected to a wider group, and the degree of limits placed on individual behavior by an external entity, like a government, can also vary. The first is basically an integration dimension; the latter is a regulation dimension. This is an application of grid-group theory and Ellis uses it to argue that cultures can be distinguished from each other based on how they map onto these two dimensions. Two of the most relevant in the American case, and for our purposes, are “competitive individualism” and “egalitarianism or communitarianism.” Both are relatively low on the regulation dimension but the communitarian political culture has a higher sense of community belonging than is the case with competitive individualism (1993, 4). To an important degree, much of American history can be characterized as a battle between communitarianism and competitive individualism; however, there has been variability by “historical era” in “the scope of the communitarian challenge to competitive individualism” (Ellis 1993, 5). Although its most significant challenge has stemmed from the communitarian elements of American political culture, according to Ellis, the values of competitive individualism have also been challenged by hierarchical collectivism. Collectivist cultures are high on both the integration and regulation dimensions. Group bonds are strong and there are significant limits placed on individual behavior. Hierarchical values lead to an acceptance of authority whereas egalitarian communitarianism and competitive individualism are more suspicious of authority, whether that authority stems from social hierarchy (communitarianism’s chief concern) or government (the primary object of individualism’s ire). A great deal of American political conflict can be understood with an emphasis on individualistic, which are generally predominant, and egalitarian values— as Lipset (1963, 1996) and other members of the Hartzian consensus

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school of thought argue—but a complete picture requires the addition of hierarchy. For instance, acknowledging the influence of hierarchical values will help us understand important differences within modern American conservatism, such as between its socially liberal (i.e. libertarian) and socially conservative (i.e. evangelical) elements (Ellis 1993, 160). Lockhart (2001) also applies grid-group theory to American political development in a way that frames the dominant forces acting on American political culture as causing it to oscillate between three poles—individual, egalitarian, and hierarchy—which basically correspond to Ellis’s typology. He describes how the influence of these sub-cultures has varied throughout American history and how they have occasionally formed coalitions with each other. Most of American political development has been defined by coalitions that were dominated by individualists but also included either egalitarians or hierarchists (alternatively: communitarians or collectivists). However, there have been significant periods where individualists have lost their dominance and had to serve as junior partners in coalition with hierarchists; the New Deal and Great Society eras are two prominent examples. So, Lockhart’s work reinforces the idea that there is dynamism in American political culture, but there is also a persistent bias toward individualism. The idea that American political development has contained both individualistic and communitarian values—as well as the occasional collectivist mood—and that the relative dominance of individualism over these other forces varies over time, is central to our work. Although there can be important differences in exactly how they describe American political culture, Ellis and Lockhart are not the only scholars to note its dynamic character; the critical point for us is that the precise way that American political culture influences political conflict changes over time. Huntington, for instance, describes the American character as basically classically liberal, defined by the American Creed’s values of “liberty, equality, individualism, democracy, and the rule of law under a constitution” (1981, 14); however, we occasionally experience periods of “creedal passion” during which their influence is particularly intense. He argues that these periods occur when American society seeks to address the gaps that will inevitably develop between these values and the actual practice of our politics.

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Individualism: How It Influences Our Debates Culture is reflected in our political debate, and this is often its most important pathway to influence. Ericson focuses less on how the influence of the cultural values themselves changes over time and more on the dynamism of how they are used in American political discourse. He argues that debate in American politics has basically been defined by, and structured around, individualistic classically liberal principles. However, precisely how these principles have been rhetorically deployed by political actors has changed over time in response to particular political circumstances. In this sense, it isn’t necessarily that the influence of the values on American culture is particularly dynamic, but rather the way that various actors and interests use the values to debate issues is. Ericson’s work is significant because it calls our attention to the ways that the common values we share in our political culture can be used to frame persuasive political arguments in support of, or opposition to, particular policies. We agree with Ericson that “how American political actors have deployed those principles in political arguments” should really be our focus (2016, 105). Mary Glendon’s (1991) influential work argues that our politics is so significantly influenced by individualism that the language of rampant individual rights is the dominant American dialect. It is one of the most important ties that binds us. This “rights talk” is the political language that we are most comfortable with, and it is the one we use most effectively. This can mean that American political actors have a hard time getting traction for arguments made on behalf of groups. It also means that issues that can be framed as a matter of individual rights will have a natural advantage in the political debate. For instance, even though many Americans disdain flag burning, supporters of banning the practice were disadvantaged because they couldn’t use natural language. They had to make arguments that were rooted in emotion, whereas opponents to bans can invoke the rights talk of individual free expression (Glendon 1991, 110). The broader issue that Glendon’s critique suggests is that our individualistic “rights-laden public discourse easily accommodates the economic, the immediate, and the personal dimensions of a problem, while it regularly neglects the moral, the long-term, and the social implications” (1991, 171). Similarly, Bellah et al. describe individualism as the first language of American life; it “lies at the very core of American culture” (1996, 142).

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We have important second languages but using them as the basis for a political argument is challenging, and rare. For instance, “Progressives and New Dealers” tried to appeal “to civic or religious ‘second languages’”—which are akin to the communitarian or egalitarian traditions we’ve discussed above—but they could not completely transcend the predominant culture of individualism (Bellah et al. 1996, 209–210). Bellah and his colleagues do argue that egalitarianism is a strong force in American culture but, rather than mitigating individualism, our egalitarian ideals often amplify the influence of our individualism and are somewhat inseparable from it. For instance, since our American egalitarianism tells us that there is not supposed to be any class structure, we are led to make sense of the reality of class structures through our individualistic lenses: a person’s station in life can only be explained with reference to characteristics that are particular to that individual (i.e. work ethic). Americans struggle with the idea that society has any responsibility for problem solving because our first language of individualism frames problems as flowing from individual, not societal, failure (Bellah et al. 1996, 206). In the context of gun control: gun violence isn’t our fault—and therefore not our problem to solve, especially if trying to solve it would require sacrificing personal rights—it is the shooter’s fault. Cultural Conclusion: Private Rights, Public Goods Comparative accounts of political culture are likely to note a classically liberal and individualistic American character that can seem to contrast sharply with otherwise similar societies, such as our northern neighbor (Lipset 1990; Grabb and Curtis 2005; Kaufman 2009). However, it should be clear from our preceding discussion; American political culture appears much less monolithic when we consider it in isolation, only comparing it to itself. It absolutely does embrace an expansive view of individual rights, freedoms, and self-reliance, but there are less individualistic challenges to the dominance of these classically liberal values. We conclude that the dominant American character is rights loving and individualistic. We also conclude that this individualism has long been challenged, and frequently mitigated, by more community (or collectively), orientated values. These cultural biases and orientations have permeated our politics. They are clearly evident in our political debates. They influence the language of persuasion that is used in those debates. As Bellah et al.

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(1996) and Glendon (1991) make clear, that language is most frequently individualistic, and political rhetoric wrapped with rights and freedoms is likely to be particularly persuasive. If the issue under contention is at all amenable, there is a strong incentive to frame political arguments in such an individualistic manner. Likewise, we do also have communitarian, or collectivist, traditions. Even though they have been less dominant than our individualistic traditions, political actors have looked to them for values that they can call upon for political purposes that are more naturally aligned with the common good (like gun control). Given all of this, it is quite likely that our most contentious issues will be those in which arguments on one side naturally wrap well with the language of individual freedom and those on the other are easily framed in terms of a common good. Such issues reflect a long-running tension in American political life between private rights and public goods. Gun control is a key example of such an issue.

Theory: Gun Battles, Cultural Warfare Fundamentally, we argue that American gun control politics is best understood as a battle in the long-running war between individualism and the various forces that have sought to limit individualism’s dominance over American political culture. The dominant political culture in the U.S. is classically liberal, revolving around a highly individualistic view of rights, freedoms, and self-reliance. While this rugged individualism has generally been the most predominant strain of American political culture, it has never monopolized American political thought. The specific challengers to individualism’s influence have varied, but they have all attempted to do different versions of the same thing: shift our cultural focus from the part to the whole, from the member to their community, from the person to the society, from the citizen to the state, and from the individual to the collective. The tension between individualism and its more collectively oriented challengers is an endemic feature of American politics. It has consistently animated our most important political debates. Many of those debates have revolved around guns. Therefore, this central feature of American political culture has also been a central feature underlying the debate about guns in America. The two are inseparable; the latter is a specific application of the former. Since we’ve discussed the value-laden nature of the American debate about how to regulate guns, and we’ve discussed American political

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culture in general, we can now explicitly state how American political culture colors the American gun debate. The values that are central to the dominant classically liberal strain of American political culture—such as individual freedom and self-reliance—animate resistance to gun control in the U.S. Likewise, the values that undergird the less dominant, but still important, communitarian, or collectivist, strains of American political culture are clearly driving arguments made in support of gun control. If one looks for it, it should be readily apparent that the great American gun debate is a battle in the great American war between private rights and public goods. This book looks for it. It sees an individualism—by which we principally mean a classically liberal expansive view of personal freedom and an embrace of self-reliance—driving opposition to gun control. Conversely, it sees gun control advocacy as being rooted in a communitarian critique of an overly individualistic society. We see values that are associated with these perspectives reflected in, for example, the way the issues are discussed, the types of policies that each side supports, and the rhetoric that is used to argue for, or against, policies. Our core argument is that we simply cannot fully understand the long-standing debate about the role of guns in American society if we don’t understand that debate as a specific instance of a more general debate about the role of individualism in American life. We will show that the politics of gun control in the U.S. is such a reflection of this broader cultural clash that we can see evidence of it at all levels. Local grassroots activists, interest groups, congressmen, and presidents all use the language of rugged individualism, or challenges to it. Cultural values influence how these actors understand the causes of the problems that they seek to address, and they inform the development of the solutions they will ultimately propose for those problems. When they attempt to sell those solutions to the public in the form of specific policies, they will frame their arguments in ways that explicitly appeal to different strains of American political culture. The likelihood of a particular policy solution gaining traction and successfully navigating the policy process is going to be related to which side of the cultural war it can be successfully framed to fit on and how strong that particular strain of American political culture is at a given time. Notwithstanding the many nuances discussed in our review of American political culture, for these purposes we think it is useful to focus specifically on the role of individualism and to conceive of the challenges to it as forces that strengthen, or weaken, individualism’s impact on

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American political culture, rather than as themselves constituting distinct varieties of American political culture. By individualism, we are specifically referring to the classically liberal variant of this concept. It is a shorthand for a set of related values that emphasize the primacy of individuals in society (rather than the primacy of society for individuals), such as personal freedom, self-reliance, egalitarianism, anti-statism, and antielitism. Given this, it is further useful for us to understand individualism’s penetration in society as existing on a continuum. On one end of this continuum, the influence of these values is at their maximum while on the other end their influence has been diminished considerably by values that emphasize the individual person less and the society that person is part of more. We’ll call this latter end of the continuum communitarian or collectivist. We recognize that these terms are not synonymous. However, for our purposes, differences between communitarianism and collectivism are less important than the understanding that they both emphasize the public, rather than the private, good and they therefore weaken individualism’s dominant hold on American culture. There are at least three areas where we will be able to see this cultural proxy war reveal itself in the gun debate. All three are related to each other. In the language of social science, these are three important observable implications of our theory that the gun debate is basically cultural warfare (King et al. 1994). First, cultural orientations shape how we understand the relevant problems that policy is meant to address. For example, where people attribute blame for episodes of gun violence depends on how individualistic they are. More individualistic explanations for gun violence will focus on characteristics unique to the perpetrators, such as mental illness or parental failure. More communitarian explanations for the problem of gun violence will attribute more blame to enabling conditions in society, like poverty or access to guns. These examples illustrate that our cultural values condition how we make sense of the world around us. Since our cultural values influence how we understand the causes of problems, we will of course be attracted to solutions that flow from those same values. So, gun control policy itself is the second area that we can clearly see the impact that cultural warfare has had on the gun debate. As reviewed above, there are three categories that gun control policies can fall into. Lenient policies increase access to guns. Punitive policies increase the penalties for misusing guns. Restrictive policies decrease access to guns. Lenient and punitive policies flow from the individualistic side

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of our continuum. Restrictive policies stem from the more collectivist side. The position of these policy categories relates directly back to our first point: how is the problem the policy is meant to solve understood in the first place? For instance, someone who thinks that gun crime is primarily caused by bad people choosing to do bad things with guns would probably think harsh penalties for gun crime may serve as a deterrent (punitive). That same person would be likely to support policies that enable them to have a gun to protect themselves from those bad people (lenient). This person’s views are being driven by individualistic values like personal responsibility and self-reliance. Another person may view gun crime as stemming from social breakdown that is exacerbated by an over-abundance of guns in society; they would therefore be interested in reducing the prevalence of guns in society and likely to support policies that make guns less accessible (restrictive). The third way that we can clearly see that the gun debate is a battle in the cultural war between individualism and collectivism is in how these policies get sold, or opposed. Individualistic message frames are used to sell lenient and punitive policies. Communitarian, or collectivist, frames are used to argue in favor of restrictive gun control. The converse of each of these is true as well. For instance, values like individual freedom and self-reliance will often underlie arguments against restrictive gun control policies, while appeals to the public good will be made in support of such policies. Likewise, opponents of lenient policies will invoke the public harm that can be done by private guns. Debate about specific gun control policies is very clearly wrapped in, it is framed with, values that are readily placed on our continuum of individualism. So, cultural warfare in the great American gun debate is revealed by how the problem of gun violence is understood in the first place, the types of policies that are proposed to solve that problem, and how those solutions are framed. Thinking of the debate in this way allows us to see the clash between individualism and collectivism that underlies it and may not always be obvious. At the surface, the gun control debate can seem very instrumental, even practically focused. Do more guns cause more crime? Does handgun carry cause less crime? Do harsh sentences deter crime? However, if we look under that surface in the three-part way that we propose, it becomes clear that the various actors in the debate are being motivated by fundamentally different values. They simply understand the world differently.

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In the subsequent major substantive sections of this book, we are going to analyze the discourse of the gun control debate in a way that clearly demonstrates that the two primary sides in this debate understand the world quite differently. Their fundamental point of disagreement centers on the relationship between individuals and society. The gun control debate is fundamentally a debate about private rights versus public goods.

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CHAPTER 3

Activists at the Grass Roots of Gun Politics

In order to illuminate just how differently the two sides of the American gun debate understand the world, we are going to focus on two groups of individuals whose views on these issues are particularly well developed: grass roots gun control, and gun rights, activists. These are people whose support for, or opposition to, certain policies is so strong that they invest their limited resources to help achieve, or block, those policy goals. They donate to political candidates and advocacy organizations. They serve as local representatives of the major national interest groups. They lead state or local interest groups. They attend demonstrations. They write editorials in their local paper. And, of course, they make their arguments known to friends, family, and neighbors in a never-ending quest to advance their position. In short, these grass roots activists are the ground troops in the American battle over gun control. We are focusing on activists because doing so will help us understand the impact political values have on the gun debate. All of us care about some issues more than others, and it is easier for us to clearly explain our views on the issues we care most about. Asking someone why they support an assault weapons ban, for instance, wouldn’t be very useful if they’ve never given the issue much thought. Also, if underlying political values drive policy preferences—which we argue they do—it should be easier to see just how these values are influencing those policy preferences in people with strong preferences. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. S. McLean and A. K. Fleming, Guns and Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37174-5_3

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Examining gun control politics at the grassroots level provides important context for the review of how this debate has evolved in Washington that we will provide later. The lobbyists and politicians walking the halls of Capitol Hill are responding to pressures that are flowing up from these activists. They have to translate these pressures into legislation. They then—if they have any real hope of getting it passed—have to sell this legislation in a way that can resonate with a broad segment of society. Before we review that top-level of the debate, we are going to set the stage for it by discussing the most relevant actors at the bottom-level, these activists.

The Activists We conducted in-depth interviews with gun control and gun rights activists in the Buffalo, NY area. We spoke with six activists from each side of this issue. The interviews were conducted in-person during late 2014. This means that our interviews pair particularly well with the last section of our review of gun control politics in Washington: President Obama was in the White House, the aftermath of the Sandy Hook shooting was still driving the policy debate, we were closer to major federal gun legislation than we had been in the decades before or the years since, and New York had recently implemented sweeping gun policy reforms. So, gun control was very much at the front of the minds of our interviewees. It was an ideal time. In order to protect their privacy, all interview subjects were granted anonymity, so we will be referring to them by pseudonyms. The interviewees were all white and middle-aged, or older. The group of interview subjects was predominantly male; one female gun rights activist, and one female gun control activist, were interviewed. We should be clear that we don’t claim that this group is representative of anyone other than the population from which they were drawn: grass roots gun rights and gun control activists who were actively working on these issues in the Buffalo area in the mid-2010s. As we’ve discussed, this is a critical group to understand. However, there are certainly many other groups worth examining, and we encourage researchers to do so in the future. The people we met for these interviews weren’t merely supporters of gun control, or gun rights: they were activists. All of the interview subjects involved themselves in advocacy, often publicly, and in general

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this is what led to their inclusion in this sample. For instance, one of the interviewees published op-eds in The Buffalo News, the area’s major daily newspaper. Others were board members, or officers, in state-level advocacy organizations. So, publicly available contact information could be used to request an interview. As is often the case with people who are able to spend significant portions of their time volunteering, several of these activists were retired. Their professional and educational backgrounds varied considerably, including a stay-at-home mom, lawyer, retail sales associate, educators, IT systems manager, and golf course superintendent. Each group of activists included individuals with military and/or law enforcement experience, but this type of experience was more widespread among the gun rights activists. As one would expect, there were significant partisan differences between these two groups of activists. The gun rights activists uniformly identified as Republicans, or Conservatives (New York has a relatively active Conservative Party). However, we got the clear sense that their partisanship was incidental to their gun rights advocacy. Generally, their support for gun rights drove them to the Republican Party, not the reverse. For instance, they often reluctantly identified as Republicans, while noting disagreement with the party on several other issues. Ideologically, they frequently described themselves as limited government conservatives, or libertarians. When asked what he and others like him may think the role of government should be, Mark said, “I’ll take care of myself, leave me alone.” John succinctly stated that the government’s role in society should be limited to serving as “caretakers.” These statements contrast significantly with the views of the gun control activists who were uniformly Democrats, often identified as liberal, or progressive, and like Chase, thought “that the role of government is to try to make people’s lives better.” It seemed clear that partisanship, or ideology, was a much more significant motivator for the gun control activists than was the case with the gun rights activists. For the most part, we had the sense that gun control advocacy was simply one of several progressive goals that these folks cared deeply about and were willing to spend their time working for. When asked what led him to gun control advocacy, Chase said his interest in it stemmed from a general interest in public issues and that there are a broad range of social issues that concern him. These activists tended to discuss society, and social ills, in broad terms. They were not just focused on individuals and

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guns. For instance, Bill said that gun violence, “can’t be addressed in isolation from other economic, political, and social questions in the larger society.” He continued to argue that “they’re all aspects of the same general social question as to how we get to have a healthy society and expand democracy.” Gun Rights Activists and Guns When we spoke with Naomi, she wasn’t currently a gun owner. Although she said she had owned guns, and soon would again, not having one at the time of our interview made her the exception among the gun rights activists we spoke with. All of the others owned at least one gun, but like Naomi, they weren’t necessarily gun enthusiasts. Guns were part of their lives, but they weren’t necessarily something that structured their lives. Gun enthusiasts, like other sorts of enthusiasts, regularly structure important parts of their lives around their interest in firearms: using them, collecting them, discussing them, etc. (Kohn 2004). As would be the case with most gun owners, this label didn’t necessarily apply to these folks. They commonly had other hobbies. However, while they weren’t necessarily gun enthusiasts, they absolutely were gun rights enthusiasts. In fact, when asked what made him first get a gun, Alvis told us that he was motivated by the perception of a threat to gun rights: I remember back when they first started passing all of these regulations barring certain types of guns and that sort of thing. I was talking to some friends and saying, “You know, we should probably get a gun now if you ever want one, because all of the bans and things.” That was somewhere in the 1990s.

The gun rights activists most commonly said they owned guns for selfdefense. Some were even self-defense-orientated firearms instructors. A few of them also had recreational interests, such as various types of target shooting. Although some had hunting experience, none of these gun rights activists were particularly committed hunters. As activists, they actually consistently bristled at the tendency of their political opponents to continually discuss hunting, usually in the context of arguing that the ability to engage in hunting wouldn’t be impeded by the enactment of whatever gun control policy they are proposing. To these grass roots gun rights activists, protecting gun rights has very little to do with hunting. It

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strikes them as incredibly ignorant, and insulting, to suggest that banning a certain type of gun, for instance, is ok if other types of guns remain available for hunting use. They are moved by what they see as the larger message that is sent by gun control. For example, John perceives a certain level of elitism in gun control and tells us, …these laws are being made up by people who have no common sense and who have no knowledge of guns, like our spectacular governor, Mr. Cuomo, who sits there and panders to the public by saying, “I own a shotgun. I’ve gone hunting.” And that means absolutely nothing when you’re protected by one hundred men who are highly trained with all kinds of firearms that I can’t even think about owning in this state.

They also understand that a relatively small portion, only about 5%, of the American population actually hunts (Rott 2018; Statista 2022), but it is likely that about half of all US households contain a gun (Legault and Lizotte 2009; Bruce-Briggs 2001). These gun rights activists will tell you, very simply, that gun rights, or Second Amendment, advocacy has absolutely nothing to do with hunting. In sum, the gun rights activists we spoke to owned guns for self-defense and a variety of recreational pursuits. However, their political advocacy was nearly exclusively motivated by the first of these uses. They weren’t concerned with preserving access to sport. They were concerned with how gun control would affect the ability of individuals to protect themselves in violent encounters. As we will see more clearly in the discussion below, on a more fundamental level, they were also implicitly motivated by a sense of how gun control impacts the relationship between an individual and the state. Essentially, guns were useful to them as tools and as physical manifestations of political values that they cared deeply about protecting. Gun Control Activists and Guns As one would expect in a country with more guns than people, like most Americans, all of the gun control activists had some exposure to guns; however, the character and depth of this exposure varied considerably. Margaret was a victim of domestic violence and had been threatened with a gun. She was the only activist in our sample that had personal experience with gun violence. She was clearly disgusted by, and afraid of,

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guns. Unless they were attached to a police officer’s belt, she disliked even the sight of them. As an illustration of the level of disdain she had for anything resembling a gun, she mentioned how upset she was that her young nephew had recently been given a BB gun. While their disdain didn’t quite rise to Margaret’s level, Lawrence and Chase also disliked guns. Chase shot guns while he was a boy scout, and again while a camp counselor. He said they simply didn’t do anything for him. Lawrence was able to experience shooting guns while visiting his brother, who was serving in the Marines at the time. He described being able to shoot a variety of military weapons on the base’s firing range, but he said he got “no pleasure out of it.” Lawrence also described going hunting with a friend once, “just because it was the manly thing to do,” but he found himself unable to pull the trigger on an animal. In many ways, Bill, Aaron, and especially Jim were actually gun enthusiasts. They were, however, selectively gun enthusiastic. They were decidedly hostile toward many types of firearms, particularly the more modern designs that they supported banning, such as the AR15. All three were gun collectors and target shooters. Bill and Aaron had some moderate hunting interests. Aaron was retired from a career in law enforcement. These were all older gentlemen and their age was clearly reflected in their gun interests. Jim admitted that his tastes exhibited a generational divide. Before he went on to ridicule the bland synthetic aesthetic of many modern firearms, he said, “as an older guy, I’m used to walnut and blued steel, you know.” These, gun owning, gun control activists didn’t perceive gun control as a threat to the sort of guns they were interested in owning. And, they simply couldn’t understand why any sensible gun owner wouldn’t share their preferences. We discussed the idea that many of the firearms designs they were enthusiastic about owning today, such as a bolt action rifle, were once considered state of the art military technology. Jim even gave us a history lesson about a World War One era legal dispute between Germany and the U.S. to illustrate how impressive the bolt action design was as a military rifle. They clearly didn’t pick up on the cognitive dissonance between this idea and their justification for banning modern firearms, like the AR15, because they represent state of the art military technology. Jim, who had praised the bolt action, said, “I contest the notion that civilians should be reasonably on par with the military with small arms.”

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Policy Advocacy Gun control policy can be broken down into three categories, which we introduced previously: punitive, restrictive, and lenient. Our discussions with these activists most significantly revolved around the latter two. Other than as a general principle, there was little discussion about punitive gun policy, such as increased criminal penalties for misusing guns. The gun rights activists supported lenient gun laws, and the gun control activists supported restrictive gun control policy. That said, it was interesting that our discussions with both groups of activists were most heavily dominated by what they were against, not what they were for. This was particularly true of the gun rights activists. They used our conversations to largely argue against restrictive gun control. Likewise, but to a slightly lesser degree, the gun control activists spent a considerable amount of time arguing against lenient gun control. We realize that arguing against something—particularly in this context, where these two categories are each other’s converse—can imply what they would argue for. However, we do think the relative emphasis in how they articulated their views is noteworthy. The particular time and place of these conversations is directly related to the policies that were front of mind for these activists. New York, which already had one of the country’s most restrictive gun control regimes, had recently passed the SAFE Act into law. It strengthened the state’s existing assault weapons ban and placed a variety of other restrictions on gun ownership. Every one of the gun rights activists we interviewed spent some of our time criticizing this law. And, every one of the gun control activists defended it. Fearing Lenient Gun Control and Defending New York’s Restrictive Laws The policy wish lists of the gun control advocates we spoke with were most focused on assault weapon and high capacity magazine bans, universal background checks for prospective gun purchasers, and tightly regulating public gun carry. New York’s SAFE Act implemented and/or strengthened all of these things, which are restrictive gun control policies that are reflective of collectively oriented values. So, their advocacy focused first on defending New York’s law, advancing these causes federally, and/or criticizing other states that lacked such laws. These policy

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goals generally aligned with the goals of national gun control groups and the platform of the Democratic Party. The policy preferences of the gun control activists were heavily influenced by a preoccupation with two things: high-profile mass shootings and public gun carry. Margaret, for example, said, “The one thing in the world that scares me, and I am not afraid to walk the streets or live my life, but the only thing that scares me is sending my child to [a local school] and having someone go out and shoot them.” The types of firearms that are affected by assault weapons bans have been used in some of the highest profile mass shootings. So, it isn’t surprising that they supported these policies so strongly. They were also incredibly pre-occupied by what they perceived as a dramatic rise in the number of guns being carried in public as a result of the liberalization of concealed, and open, carry laws in many states. Jim told us that he was particularly concerned about “the dangers of widespread concealed carry pistols” because “most people in that group are neither adequately trained nor suitable by disposition.” Several of these individuals were particularly bothered by the sight of guns being carried in public, commonly called “open carry.” Aaron addressed this explicitly, as we sat together in a diner: I would almost prefer concealed carry to open carry. You come into a diner like this out west and you’ll see two guys come in and they have guns out. That makes me more uncomfortable than thinking maybe a guy has a gun under his coat maybe he doesn’t. I think that causes public upset more than anything else.

Margaret had serious issues with open and concealed carry. I’m very upset about the open carry. That’s very disturbing to me. And even more so, the concealed carry. Why? Why do people have to have all these guns?

She went on to say that she wants to go to Disney World but doesn’t want to drive through the south to get there, because “it terrifies me to think about [how many people have guns], while driving through Georgia.” Our discussions about gun carry policy frequently gave us the impression that the issue wasn’t simply the knowledge, or sight, of guns in public; it was the particular part of the public that had those guns and

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how culturally divergent those gun carriers were perceived to be from these gun control activists. Lawrence was fairly explicit about this. Citing Alabama and Texas as examples, he uneasily discussed how uncomfortable he would be in places where guns are seen in public more frequently because he views the people in those places as being so culturally distinct from him. Like Lawrence did, several of the other New York gun control activists were quick to point to southern states as examples of places with lax gun laws and widespread gun ownership. However, they never mentioned their neighbor Vermont, which at the time had less gun control than any southern state (McLean and Sorens 2019). In fact, after noting that her fear of southerners with guns would keep her from going to Disney, Margaret told us that she had just booked a New England vacation. She assumed they didn’t have open carry in New England. She quickly became dismayed when she learned that Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine all have fairly liberal gun carry laws, including open carry. These portions of our conversations had us thinking of, and concluding that there is support for, some of the arguments—which we reviewed above—that gun control politics can be understood as a cultural proxy war wherein gun control is supported (or opposed) in part because of its effect on a disliked cultural group. This motivation is unlikely to be explicitly stated, or even acknowledged, but one doesn’t have to read between the lines too deeply to observe it. Attacking New York’s Restrictive Gun Control and Longing for the Policies of “Free States” Although their individualistic value orientations inclined them to strongly favor lenient gun control policies, the gun rights activists were similarly focused on the new SAFE Act: attacking it, along with the rest of New York’s restrictive gun control laws. Essentially, since the focus of their advocacy was their home state of New York, in their view they didn’t have the luxury of pushing for new lenient policies, like those being advanced in other states at the time, such as the elimination of concealed carry licenses, often called “constitutional carry.” They were all very critical of laws, like the SAFE Act, that place limits on the types of guns that are legally available to individual citizens. For instance, John said all assault weapons bans do is go after guns that are perceived as scary:

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People don’t realize that number one, they are banning features. They are not banning guns. So, basically, by taking a feature, that is a ridiculous feature like a bayonet lug – because you know there are so many people doing bayonet charges nowadays – and saying this makes a gun illegal. It makes it a scary gun. So, if I put a bayonet lug on this gun, or my 22 or something else, all of a sudden it becomes a scary, evil gun. And these laws are being made up by people who have no common sense and who have no knowledge of guns.

The idea that the people advancing these policies are not knowledgeable of the subject of their policies was a criticism that was commonly advanced by these gun rights activists. And, it is a phenomenon that our conversations with several of the gun control activists indicated has merit. The gun rights activists we met with absolutely supported lenient gun control. So, it is worthwhile to highlight what, if any, restrictive policies they would support. Essentially, they tended to find the status quo as it existed in most other U.S. states acceptable. They were generally ok with the point of sale background check system and other existing federal rules that are used as a national baseline. Most of them were ok with states requiring a license to carry a concealed firearm, as long as issuing that license wasn’t discretionary. As John’s quote indicates, they generally had a dim view of restrictions that are tied to the characteristics of particular guns, especially bans of any sort. Most of them, however, did find it acceptable that prospective owners of fully automatic machine guns must undergo extra scrutiny, as is currently required under the federal National Firearms Act. Finally, while they thought that it was acceptable for the military to have access to weapons systems that regular citizens couldn’t, they generally didn’t extend this exception to domestic law enforcement. Only one thought that police should be exempted from the gun control laws—such as magazine capacity limits, or assault weapons bans—that the citizens they police must obey. One of the interviewees, who did believe in requiring this parity between citizens and police, was actually a senior police officer. It was common for these gun rights activists to contrast New York’s gun laws with those in “free states.” They used this term often. For instance, Ryan became quite animated discussing all of the new guns he was excited about buying when he retired and moved to a “free state.” It seemed abundantly clear that the restrictive gun control laws that they lived with in New York directly impacted their personal sense of freedom.

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It wasn’t just that Ryan would be able to pursue his hobby interests in new ways when he moved to a state with more lenient gun laws. It was clear that by doing so—by legally acquiring guns that he couldn’t legally acquire in New York—he would in fact feel like a freer citizen. So, in the course of their advocacy, in their minds their efforts weren’t simply about altering laws that controlled access to objects, they were working to increase access to freedom for individuals. The Car Analogy: Driving with Freedom, Punishment, and the Common Good Several of the activists we interviewed attempted to illustrate their views by drawing analogies to cars and driving. In each of these discussions, we could clearly see how their cultural orientations informed their policy preferences. The gun rights activists justified their preference for maximizing individual freedom, but punishing those who misuse that freedom, through lenient and punitive laws. The gun control activists, conversely, cited the common good as a justification for restrictive policy. We’ll provide some examples that demonstrate how they are able to seamlessly extend these value-driven arguments from firearms to automobiles. Alvis and Ryan explained how their lenient and punitive policy preferences apply to vehicles and driving. Alvis pointed out that some types of cars can be more dangerous than others. Some, for instance, are easier to accelerate to excessive speeds, and others are larger and can therefore wreak more havoc in a collision. He also argued that some types of vehicles, like sports cars or motorcycles, tend to be used more recklessly than others, and may even be more associated with dangerous driving. His point was that we don’t limit the availability of vehicles based on these factors. What we do is punish individuals who use these vehicles in a dangerous manner. Ryan applied this logic to driving while intoxicated. He argued that we ban neither alcohol nor vehicles, but we do punish people who drink alcohol while driving vehicles. His point was that the focus of our policy should be on the behavior, not the object. He extends this logic to guns: If you are a law-abiding citizen, but you utilize weapons criminally, then it should amplify your punishment. Going back to the analogy of driving while intoxicated, they don’t tell you you can’t drink, but if you do drink and drive, you are going to have a problem. Don’t tell people they can’t

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have things, but if they do have it and they misuse it, there’s going to be severe consequences.

We explored the other side of this coin with Aaron. He mentioned that he drives a particular car just because he thinks “it is cool;” he just likes it. We recalled some of the gun rights people making similar statements about some of the firearms they owned. So, we asked him, how would he react if the car he owns, and has a particular attachment to, was banned. He responded by saying, It depends why. We banned the sale of assault rifles because there has been such a social cost to them. If you told me that you can no longer buy a new car that pollutes and gets 3 MPG because it is a detriment to the greater good, I’d be alright with that. You know what, even in our constitution, you have the police power of the state to act on behalf of the greater good.

Even in a context like this, that touches him personally, he is sensitive to the relationship between his ability to act on his preferences and the public good. His response clearly contrasts with the perspectives of Alvis and Ryan. Their focus was on the individual. Aaron is focused on society, the collective. Aaron understands that there is a relationship between private rights and public goods, and he is most concerned with maximizing public goods even if doing so comes at the expense of private rights. As far as he, and the other gun control activists are concerned, this logic—which is clearly driven by deep cultural and ideological values—applies just as well to cars as it does guns. Compared to Alvis and Ryan, Aaron has a fundamentally different view of the world, and we can see that these contrasting worldviews influence their policy preferences.

Tools or Values? Gun Use Versus Meaning We’ve discussed what these activists use guns for, and/or what they perceive that others use them for (i.e. self-defense for the former, or criminality for the latter). As physical objects, or tools, guns clearly serve instrumental purposes. They are used by people to do things. We’ve also discussed the types of gun control policies that these activists work for, or against. Clearly, there is a relationship between their view of gun use, their instrumentality, and the policies they are trying to advance. If they believe that assault weapons are too frequently used in mass shootings then it isn’t

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surprising to see a gun control activist argue for a ban on these weapons. Similarly, if a gun rights activist thinks that guns are useful for self-defense then they may work toward policies that enable citizens to carry guns for this purpose. The instrumentality of guns—their perceived utility, or harm, as tools—is connected to opinions about how guns should be regulated. What we think guns do is related to what we think should be done about them. The arguments that we hear for, or against, gun control are generally made in these terms. We hear assertions about what guns do that are followed by how a proposed policy will impact that. For instance, the gun control advocates commonly pointed to a recent mass shooting where a high capacity magazine was used as justification for banning those types of magazines. On the other hand, gun rights activists commonly assert that mass shootings tend to occur in places where gun possession is prohibited, like most schools, as justification for expanding gun rights in those places, such as allowing teachers to carry a concealed weapon. The debates about gun control that we are most familiar with center on issues surrounding what guns do: Does concealed gun carry cause, or deter, crime? Does a gun in the home threaten, or benefit, the home’s occupants? And, so on. It should be clear to any observer of gun politics in America that instrumental arguments like these simply are not persuasive. They don’t tend to cause people to change their mind. For example, knowledge of studies (such as Kellermann et al. 1998, 2001) showing that guns kept in the home are more likely to harm, not protect, the home’s occupants are unlikely to keep a woman concerned about crime in her neighborhood from getting a gun if she sees value in having a gun. If her sense of personal security is going to be enhanced by having a gun in her house, she is going to get a gun. And, she is going to get one because it makes her feel safer. So, even though the arguments that we see and hear about gun control are instrumental in nature, they’re about what guns do, maybe if we look deeper we can see that we’re really arguing about what guns mean, and whether or not we like that. We hear arguments about what guns do. What we should be listening for are arguments about what guns mean (i.e. what values they represent). This is what is actually driving much of the gun debate. Guns have intrinsic and non-intrinsic value. To the woman in the hypothetical example above, her gun means she can feel safe in her home, which is a sort of self-reliance in the context of home security. In this case, the non-intrinsic emotional value and meaning that she gets from

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having her gun is related to the gun’s intrinsic value. However, as we will see, this doesn’t have to be the case. Guns can be valued for entirely nonintrinsic reasons, such as expressions of political values. So, now we are going to ask, what do guns mean, perhaps symbolically, to these activists? We don’t generally discuss the non-intrinsic, or symbolic, meaning of guns in explicit terms. Their significance as expressions of personal, or political, values lies under the surface of our typical discourse on the subject. However, when we look for this sort of meaning, we can clearly see it. So, in order to intentionally dive below the surface and develop an understanding about what guns mean to these activists, we just asked them. In addition to the other aspects of our discussions, we asked every interviewee these questions: • What does owning firearms, or the ability to own firearms, mean to you? OR In your view, thinking about those who do own firearms, what do you think those firearms and the ability to own them means to them? • What does the phrase “gun control” make you think about? • What does the phrase “gun rights” make you think about? • What do guns symbolize for you? The answers to these questions, which inform the following sections, help illuminate the gun control debate’s deeper dimensions. Guns as Cherished Symbols of Core American Political Values All of the gun rights activists referred to political values when we asked them what the ability to own firearms means to them. Some of them also mentioned various forms of practical value that they derived from their arms, such as sport, investment, or protection. However, they all drew an explicit connection between gun owning and intangible political values. In fact, it often seemed that they viewed gun owning as a way to tangibly express these intangible values. Freedom, especially in the context of freedom from government control, was the value that they most closely connected to gun owning. This was often expressed in a way that referenced the founding of the U.S. and the American Revolution. For example, Bryan responded by saying that,

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It means I have the freedom to do what I want to do. That was the establishment of our country. We weren’t meant to be under the thumb of somebody telling you what to do and not to do.

Naomi similarly responded by referencing freedom and the American founding, but she also incorporated a traditional view of individualism into her response: It means that there were some wise people who established this nation…And, they gave us the provision within our founding document, the Constitution, to protect future generations so that they would be able to carry on individual responsibility and freedom.

The answers that the gun rights activists gave us indicated that self-defense was viewed as a practical value that can be derived from gun ownership; however, owning guns for self-defense was often interpreted by them as a way to express the political values of individual responsibility and selfreliance. Essentially, it wasn’t only that they thought they needed to own guns to protect themselves, they wanted to be able to rely on themselves and guns enabled them to do that. Bryan simply said, “My personal security is up to me.” It was likewise common to discuss self-defense with rights-laden language, such as Ryan does in his response to the question about what the ability to own guns means: It is inherent. It is not...A lot of people say it is granted by the Constitution, no. It is affirmed by the Constitution. It is there. You have the absolute right to self-defense.

Our simple open-ended questions about the phrases “gun control” and “gun rights” elicited very illuminating responses. When responding to the first phrase, the gun rights activists tended to fixate on the word “control” in a way that clearly indicated they viewed it as the anti-thesis of the political freedom they so evidently cherished and viewed gun owning as emblematic of. Gun rights allowed for individual freedom and gun control threatened it. John responded by saying that gun control is “citizen control, people control.” Naomi said, The key word in that sentence is control…we just celebrated our break from the tyrannical over-lording of the British, back in 1776. And, that was a battle about control.

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She continued to say that gun control works to reduce individual freedom, which she viewed as one of our country’s “core values.” The responses to this particular question were visceral, emotional, and clearly reflective of deeply held values. Their responses to the question about the phrase “gun rights” continued this theme, and they indicate that they viewed gun rights as having equal, or greater, importance as other cherished rights. For instance, Mark said gun rights lie at the center of our constitutional rights and they help protect the other rights. Alvis similarly said that “the right to keep and bear arms…is the one that protects all the rest,” and he continued by attempting to draw connections between historical cases of civilian disarmament and mass atrocities. An expansive view of this concept was also expressed by John: Basically, it is our ability to defend ourselves and stand up for ourselves. Once again, it is not about guns. It is about personal rights.

It should be clear that these activists are not merely fighting to maintain legal access to physical objects that simply have practical value to individuals with particular interests. They see themselves as in a fight to preserve access to fundamental political rights. When they were asked what guns were symbolic of, five of the sixgun rights activists we spoke with immediately said freedom. They also cited independence and self-reliance. The one activist who didn’t reference freedom in this response referred to it elsewhere in our discussion. His response is useful because it is indicative of the notion that this is all below the surface. We normally don’t debate gun control at the level of values. But that doesn’t mean they aren’t there and that they aren’t really important drivers of that debate. When asked what guns symbolize, Bryan said, I never looked at from that point of view before. Self-reliance.

It was clear from the context of our overall conversation with Bryan that self-reliance is something that he personally places a great deal of value on. The remainder of the activists most directly saw guns as representative of freedom. Specifically, they saw them as representing a rather expansive conception of political and individual freedom. John said guns symbolize,

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“Freedom. The ability to defend. The ability to stand up.” They weren’t just arguing that guns gave them the freedom to shoot a deer. Also, as John’s response indicates, they connected this sort of freedom to other cherished values, such as individual self-reliance, especially in the context of protecting one’s self and way of life. Naomi’s response links several of the concepts we’ve discussed together: Protection from local threat. Protection from a tyrannical government. To protect the people and their freedoms from having a government that decides when they can turn their heat on. And, protection of other rights to – freedom of speech and religion – they all go hand in hand.

The connection between gun ownership and freedom is so tangible for Mark, he said taking guns away is tantamount to taking freedom away. So, revolution would be justified if that ever happened. Guns are of course tools. None of these gun rights activists would dispute that. However, it is clear that they are not just tools. Their meaning extends beyond their use. To these gun rights activists, who represent the grass roots of one side of the American debate about gun control, guns are physical manifestations of deeply cherished political values. Specifically, we found that guns represent political freedom and individual self-reliance. They are therefore emblematic of a strain of individualism that lies at the heart of most leading conceptions of American political culture. Guns: Objects to Regulate For the gun control activists, on the other hand, guns are mostly viewed as tools. They understand guns as objects that serve a variety of practical purposes. Whether or not they approve of these purposes depends on the specific purpose and can vary between the activists. They are unlikely to see guns as symbolically representative of anything that they value; however, some of them do associate guns, and gun ownership, with things that they hate. Some of them also understand that there are many people who do associate guns with some culturally potent political values, like freedom and independence. They also seem to appreciate the practical political challenges this creates for them. The responses that these questions elicited from the gun control activists were generally grounded in practicalities, not abstract values.

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They focused on what guns—or policies about guns—do, or are perceived to do. They were also more socially, rather than individually, focused. Since these gun control activists weren’t necessarily gun owners, they were asked to think about what the ability to own guns means to those who do own them. The most common response to this question immediately referenced what those guns are used for. In other words, they thought gun owners valued guns because they valued what they used those guns for. They suspected that guns were valued, for example, because they enabled their owners to engage in hunting, or to pursue a hobby, such as gun collecting. Lawrence, for instance, responded by saying, If you’re a hunter you’re a hunter…There are some people who have a gun lifestyle. It is there hobby. Some people collect stamps, some collect guns.

A couple of these activists, such as Bill, suspected that gun ownership was primarily valued for its association with self-defense. He said, “I think for a lot of people, it means your ability to protect yourself.” In addition to the practical justifications they associated with gun owning, several of these activists understood that the ability to own guns also had intangible value for many gun owners. This either repulsed or mystified them. Two of them thought that gun owning was a way to fulfil masculine, or militaristic, fantasies. They referenced how guns are being marketed by pointing to gun advertisements that had military themes or that featured attractive young women. It was also suggested that heavy news coverage of the War on Terror prompted people to want guns like they saw on the evening news. Bill and Aaron answered this question by citing fear. They thought gun owners were overcome with fear of the world around them and gun owning is a response to this fear. Bill said, “I think they are frightened. I have a hard time getting my mind around what it is they are frightened of.” Aaron responded by saying that, Most of it [gun ownership] is because these people live in a world of fear. They live in this delusional world of fear. I mean, read these [gun] magazines. It is all prey and predator. It has nothing to do with freedom. If you think that your sense of freedom is the ability to go to Gander Mountain and spend money, then you have a very shallow sense of freedom.

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As we saw in the previous section, in many cases it does seem clear that gun ownership is strongly associated with a broad sense of freedom. Aaron ridicules this but, since he felt compelled to essentially counter the argument that guns represent freedom, he clearly picks up on the power that this association has for many people. He was not the only gun control activist to pick up on this. When we asked him what the ability to own guns means to people, Chase said, I think for a lot of people, it is a pragmatic thing, that the gun is a tool…[he cites self-protection and hunting]…But there is kind of a mystical thing for some people about guns that I don’t relate to, and I don’t really understand it…People feel like if the government ever gets out of hand, we can rise up and [they’ll] have [their] gun. It’s like Red Dawn or whatever, when the Russians come over, we’ll all have our weapons. And that’s a little out there, I think. I don’t understand the mystical side of that. It is some kind of symbol of freedom, or independence, that kind of thing. That doesn’t resonate with me.

While it may not resonate with him, he clearly understands that it does resonate with a lot of people. And, he understands that this “mystical thing,” as he calls it, really can help gun rights advocates craft some powerful arguments that do resonate with many Americans because, as he says in response to a later question, “independence and freedom…are big words in American history.” The responses to our question about what the phrase “gun control” makes them think about were grounded in practicality. They focused on the policies that they sought and the good that they thought those policies would do for society. Margaret said that gun control “means keeping our children safe in school and keeping our citizens safe.” Chase first referred to the specific policies that he advocates, but then said that gun control in general “is the notion of trying to prevent violence.” This of course contrasts markedly with the visceral, emotional, and value-laden responses to this phrase that the question elicited from the gun rights activists. Two of these activists gave responses that clearly indicated an appreciation for the negative connotations that many people have associated with the term gun control. These negative connotations were certainly expressed by the gun rights activists. Jim answered this question with a bit of snark, “Well, I suppose the NRA trained me that to see gun control

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as being the elimination of all personally owned firearms.” Lawrence’s response was uniquely revealing, When I write anything, I don’t write gun control on it. I write safe, sane, sensible gun legislation. I don’t think we should be in the business of controlling guns. But I do think there should be a limit on what is available. I refrain from using the term gun control because I think it conjures up a negative right away…You’re taking a fundamental freedom from people, so I try and stay away from that term.

He clearly understands the potentially toxic nature of the term gun control. However, what is most significant about this statement is that he—a locally well-known gun control advocate—recognizes that it is toxic because it is readily framed as being inconsistent with a core American political and cultural value, freedom. Several of the gun control activists did have a more visceral, even defensive, reaction to hearing the phrase “gun rights.” Often their gut reaction was to acknowledge that they recognize there is a right to gun ownership. Chase, for instance, said that “I have no trouble at all with the notion that people have the right to own a gun.” Such acknowledgements tended to be immediately followed by a plea for broader recognition that those gun rights should be limited, and balanced with other rights. After making the aforementioned statement, Chase said that his issue was with “the practicalities of that.” Lawrence tried to walk a similar line, “I say you have a right to a weapon and sensible gun legislation.” They are arguing that gun control and gun rights can coexist. They also seemed to be saying, if they can accept the existence of gun rights why can’t the other side accept some of their gun control? They also expressed frustration with what they perceived as a failure of people who advocate for gun rights to appreciate the importance of other rights, or how gun rights interacted with other rights. Lawrence’s response exemplified the first frustration: You know what, everybody is worried about gun rights, you’re not worried about voting rights? How about these immigrant children? They’ve got rights too.

Margaret asked why other people’s gun rights should supersede her right to live free of fear. She rhetorically asked, “Why is your right to have a

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gun more important than my right to send my children to school and not have them shot?”. For the most part, in the minds of these gun control activists, guns didn’t seem to have much symbolic importance. Whereas the gun rights activists gave nearly instant responses, many of the gun control activists needed some time to answer our question about what guns symbolize. Lawrence indicated that they could represent threat. Bill similarly thought they represented violence, “To me, all they mean at this point is violence.” In their minds, guns were associated with negative things. Two others also associated guns with something negative, but their responses placed more emphasis on the broader society. Aaron said that guns stood for the “militarization of our society.” He had spent much of our interview discussing how militaristic marketing is used to drive gun sales, and how this exploits some of the more basic impulses of young males. He was clearly troubled that there was such a large segment of the population that is susceptible to this sort of marketing. Margaret also used this question to express a frustration with what the extensive presence of guns in our modern society says about that society. She said that to her guns symbolize “Cowboys and Indians, Dodge City. Wild West.” However, unlike some gun enthusiasts who actively express and foster a nostalgia for this time, she clearly said it with disdain. It was as if she was saying, why can’t we, as a society, move on from this? The gun control activists indicated that they just don’t think about guns this way, in symbolic terms. That is why some struggled to identify anything that guns symbolized for them. However, many of them were not shy about saying what they thought other people symbolically associated with guns. Two characteristically focused on the tangible qualities of guns, suggesting that they were merely tools or that, since they enabled participation in sport, they represented fun. Aaron also had a tangible purpose in mind when he suggested that for some gun owners their gun probably “represents security in an insecure world;” however, he also thought that they represented power to many. Two of them clearly understood that many Americans associate guns with freedom and independence. Referring to gun owners, Chase said “It is like symbolic and mythological. It’s a symbol of independence and freedom…” This question—what do guns symbolize—elicited a very strong reaction from Bill. They symbolized violence to him but he immediately indicated that there is a strong association in American culture between guns and independence. He used his response to question this association and to

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express frustration about the power that individualism has over American culture more generally. His response is worth quoting at length because it indicates a clear understanding of the power that individualism has in American culture, that individualism is widely associated with guns, and that he—a gun control activist—is incredibly frustrated by all of this: So, because of individualism in our society and the general culture of individualism, there’s always the fear of the state culturally. And that’s also part of the legacy of the revolution. By the way, it’s not just the firearms…And there is still this sense of freedom from what I believe in the gun culture, freedom from the repressive state...With respect to individualism, the fear of this large organization coming down on the individual. And there is an incredible culture in this society on all counts of individualism…if you look at American culture, you’re always looking at the hero who’s an individual. Only the individual makes history in America, never the masses. The real historical reality is who the fuck knows what their names were in a revolution, or who fought in a civil war? The reality is the masses make history…the whole culture rejects the historical fact that the masses make history in favor of elevating this romanticized vision, a false one, in my opinion, of the individual. This doesn’t deny that individuals don’t play significant roles in history, of course they do. Lincoln was an individual. In other words, individuals can at certain times represent the distillation or concatenation of the general mass movement.

Bill’s statement is emblematic of all of the discussions that we had with both the gun control and gun rights activists in two important ways. First, it references, draws upon, or is motivated by fundamental political and cultural values. Second, it reveals a characteristic preoccupation with the proverbial “other side.” While their influence was consistently clear to us, they themselves could all, with varying enthusiasm, generally articulate the values that were motivating their own advocacy. They would all generally enthusiastically speculate about, and pass judgment on, the values motivating their opposition.

Contrasting Worldviews It should be clear by now that the fundamental disagreement between these two groups isn’t simply about how guns should be regulated. They fundamentally disagree about what the ideal society is. Their views on gun control are expressions of much more basic cultural and ideological

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dispositions and orientations about, for example, the ideal relationship between the citizen and the state. They have a very clear idea about what their version of the good society looks like, and they can articulate what role, if any, guns play in that ideal society. Their gun control policy preferences flow from these visions. We asked two questions that most directly helped reveal these views. • Do you associate a certain lifestyle, culture, or way of living, with owning a firearm? How about with choosing not to own a firearm? • Do you associate a certain set of values, political, personal or otherwise, with firearm ownership? Again, how about with choosing not to own a firearm? In addition to these questions, which are rather explicit about how they seek information about the interviewee’s value orientations, in all of our conversations we spent some time trying to uncover how these activists understood the problem of gun violence. This aspect of our discussion was meant to reveal how those cultural values effected their understanding of the world. We wanted to know what they thought about the problems that gun control policy was meant to solve. What caused most gun violence, for instance? Their views on these issues became clear throughout our interviews, but we did ask them specific questions on this topic. These included: • When you hear about violence involving firearms in the news, particularly exceptional violence such as the Newtown school shootings or the attack in Moncton, what thoughts or reactions do you have? • Do you sense any level of personal vulnerability to violence, firearms related or otherwise? For instance, do you think that you or someone you care about is likely to be the victim of a violent attack? • Do you have any thoughts on what could or should be done to reduce violence involving firearms? Finally, we asked a series of questions about a hypothetical scenario in which the U.S. adopted Australian style gun control. This consistently proved to be one of the most illuminating parts of our conversations. It prompted fairly deep reflection on American political culture, how

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it contrasted with other political cultures, the consequences of American culture on the gun debate, and their opinions about all of this. We specifically asked these questions: • Through the late 90s and early 2000s Australia significantly altered its gun control laws. Part of this involved a ban of commonly owned classes of firearms, such as all semi-automatic self-loading and pump action long-arms. Owners were required to surrender their firearms or face stiff penalties. Do you think something like this could happen here? • Why or why not? If it did would it be accepted as legitimate? Do you think most gun owners would comply with it? The sections that follow are drawn from the discussions that were sparked by the aforementioned questions. They paint a picture that has each group of activists situated on opposing sides of an individualism-collectivism continuum. Furthermore, it will be clear that their position in the gun debate flows from their position on this continuum. Rugged Individualists—Powerful Citizens and Weak Government Our conversations with the gun rights activists often led them to describe their views on the proper role of government in general. Through these discussions it was clear that their outlooks were heavily influenced by, or a reflection of, a traditionally individualistic American political culture, which we reviewed extensively in a previous chapter. They favored a system of government that maximized individual freedom and, more generally, they idealized a society comprised of rugged individuals who were responsible for, and exercised agency over, their own destinies. These folks believed that the best society is one where citizens must—maybe even, want to—pick themselves up by their own bootstraps. The gun rights activists we talked with held fairly conservative views on the role of government. John said that government existed to be “caretakers,” and Bryan believed government should just “fix the damn roads, support interstate commerce, and provide an effective military.” Essentially, they believed in fostering a society where the citizens were powerful and the government was weak. They were, in fact, explicit and literal about this. They told us that the citizenry should be better armed

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than the government. Mark said, “I think the people should be more powerful than the government.” Naomi more explicitly added that, Freedom is citizens being able to have the same level of firepower as government. If a local police department wants a tank and machine guns they should be able to have that, but if I want a tank and machine guns I should be able to have that too. That is freedom.

As was often the case in these discussions, it was clear that they saw a positive relationship between guns in the hands of individuals and freedom. More of one means more of the other. New York’s gun control laws, like most, made exceptions for the police. For instance, at the time of this research, New York restricted the capacity of gun magazines to 10 rounds of ammunition. Such restrictions are commonly known as high capacity magazine bans. Police were exempted from this restriction. So, for further illustration, the Glock 22 is a pistol that is commonly carried by police officers and it is also commonly chosen by citizens for personal protection. A police officer’s Glock 22 holds 15 rounds of ammunition, which is the gun’s standard capacity, but a regular citizen’s is restricted by New York law to only 10. This clearly frustrated the gun rights activists. Most significantly, as Naomi’s statement above indicates, it seemed to frustrate them because it was an affront to their sense of what the proper balance of power between the citizens and the state should look like. These types of restrictions also seemed to offend their sense of freedom and equality, which they cherished as values definitional to the American character. When asked if the police should have to follow the gun laws that the citizens they police do John said, God, yes. If we need to be restricted, they need to be restricted. If they need to be unrestricted because they are seeing something and they may run into the bad guys, then I may run into those same bad guys so I should be able to take care of it as well.

Bryan, a retired police and military officer, despised the restrictions in general, but he said that if they must exist then the police should be exempted. He was the only one of the gun rights activists that we talked to who felt this way. The rest, like John and Naomi, thought there should be parity between the citizens and police. In fact, Ryan, who currently served as a police officer, even shared this view, “if the people that I am serving

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have to live under that, then I should have to live under that.” This is a fairly powerful and revealing statement about how these folks understand the proper relationship between citizens and their government. As we will see below, it sharply contrasts to the views that the gun control activists expressed. These activists didn’t just want limited government; they wanted limited government and empowered individuals. In addition to telling us the many limits that should be placed on the government’s ability to regulate individual behavior, as best exemplified by their general opposition to gun control, they frequently praised self-reliance and personal responsibility. We can see both points of emphasis—limited government and self-reliant individuals—in one of Alvis’s responses, “the person who cares more about his right to keep and bear arms is going to be more a person who believes in smaller, constitutionally-led government, self-reliance.” Naomi was comfortable extending this logic to instances of private individuals forming voluntary organizations with one another, “responsible private organization can and should care for the people who cannot care for themselves, churches for example.” They all took a dim view of people that they suspected didn’t share these values. When thinking about gun owners as a group, Mark thought that they think, “I’ll take care of myself, leave me alone.” On the other hand, he thought that non-gun owners tend to be liberals that “think, well, the government should take care of people that can’t take care of themselves.” Alvis used the language of individualism versus collectivism, which we reviewed above, to discuss a similar contrast: There are two basic competing theories about [the role of government]. There is the theory of the collectivists who believe that individual rights should be subservient to the good of the whole. And when I say collectivists, that includes communism, socialism, all of that, where your rights are not as important as the whole group. America was founded on the opposite principal where the greatest good comes to the most people by protecting individual liberties, whether it be the right to free speech, association, to keep arms, to be protected from overreaching government. That is where I am ideologically.

When we asked them to think about the causes of gun violence, the gun activists’ responses focused on individual perpetrators or the ability of individuals to defend themselves. For instance, when our discussions

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turned to mass shootings, particularly school shootings, the concept of “gun free zones” was raised repeatedly. They argued that would-be mass shooters are attracted to locations where guns are prohibited because they know there will be no one there who can stop their attack. They want their victims to be unarmed, and they select the location for their attack with this in mind. So, the gun rights activists say, eliminating gun free zones would deter potential attackers, since they wouldn’t be assured that their victims couldn’t shoot back. There were fundamental reasons why the gun rights activists had issues with the idea of gun free zones. Their concerns with prohibiting people from carrying guns in certain areas reflected the importance they placed on the values of individual freedom and self-reliance. They believed in things like concealed gun carry, for instance, because they understood it as empowering individuals to possess the ability to defend themselves. Identifying certain locations where this was not allowed disempowered individuals. It was interpreted as akin to denying people the ability to protect themselves, which directly offended their sense of individualism, freedom, and self-reliance, values that were a core part of their character. Ryan, for example, expressed both frustrations with gun free zones when he said that, “if you tell people they can’t defend themselves, they can’t possess the means to defend themselves, then the wolf is going to come in the door.” In sum, the gun rights activists thought violence in society could be reduced if individuals are able to possess the capability—specifically a gun—to defend themselves, and they should be able to legally possess this capability everywhere. Personal responsibility was major point of focus for the gun rights activists, especially in the context of how we can explain, and try to mitigate, violence. One major area in which a focus on personal responsibility manifested itself in our conversations was a concern for accountability. The gun rights activists firmly believed that people who misuse guns should be punished accordingly, and it was largely their impression that this did not happen as often as it should. They firmly believed in a broad right to bear arms, especially for the purposes of self-defense. However, they just as firmly believed that people, through their criminal actions, can and should have this right, as well as their freedom, taken away from them. They wanted people to have maximum personal responsibility, but they wanted this balanced with maximum accountability over how that personal responsibility is exercised.

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This worldview directly translated into very broad support for punitive gun control policies, such as harsh penalties for committing crimes with guns. They often expressed the opinion that laws like this were not enforced as much as they should be. If punitive laws were consistently enforced, they argued, then criminals would be deterred from committing crime. Bryan expressed this frustration by saying that, If you have a law that puts people in jail for abusing a firearm, enforce it, in commission of a crime enforce it. Don’t wheel and deal it out, plea bargain it out…my point is, people who do the shooting are doing it on a regular basis and nothing happens to them.

Furthermore, they were frustrated that this perceived lack of enforcement of punitive gun control was often, especially in New York, accompanied by increasingly restrictive gun control. In their view, people who actually use guns criminally were getting leniency while the state was cracking down on law-abiding gun owners like themselves. Alvis articulated all of these points, Prosecute people who commit crimes with guns. The vast majority of crimes that are committed with guns are committed by people who already have a criminal record. Most of the time they are committed against someone else who has a criminal record. And like 99% of the time it is committed with a firearm that was illegally possessed in the first place and by people for whom it was already illegal for them to have a gun. Enforce those laws in a uniform way and it will go a lot farther toward reducing crime than passing laws that restrict more and more peaceful and law-abiding citizens.

The gun rights activists also sought to explain society’s problem with gun violence by highlighting various maladies that individual perpetrators were thought to have. For instance, a couple of them voiced the suspicion that mass shooters in particular were likely to suffer from mental illness and be, as Bryan put it, “under medication.” Mental illness, however, was not generally their primary focus, especially outside the context of mass shootings. They were most concerned with the consequences of what they perceived as a decline in traditional family structure and in moral values more generally. Mark, for example, simply said that, “one of the things that I see causing the violence is a destruction of morality, broken families, and one parent families.”

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In their view, the family, especially child-rearing, was deeply entwined with their sense of self-reliance and personal responsibility. It was the job of moral self-reliant individuals to raise children who would grow into moral self-reliant individuals. John plainly said, I don’t believe in that crap where the community raises the kid. No, I raise my kid. It is my responsibility to raise a good citizen and make them understand responsibility.

Parents, therefore, are largely responsible for making sure their children don’t contribute to the problem of gun violence. John’s response is clearly a reaction to his sense that there has been a movement to shift some of this burden from parents to a broader community. Ryan expressed a version of this frustration with a focus on the problems caused by the modern “welfare state.” He argued that social welfare policies relieve individuals and families of too much responsibility, and this has unintended negative consequences for society. In his estimation, the problems occur when people, …don’t have any bit of self-reliance…You can give them everything, and it is like giving a kid a car, he is going to go out and wreck it. But if you make him work for four years throwing hay bales for every summer, he is going to take care of that damn car.

He continued to argue that policies like this perpetuate, rather than solve, poverty and that “poverty generally begets violence because people don’t think that they have anywhere else to turn.” In sum, these gun rights activists expressed a view of the world that is highly individualistic. They cherish personal responsibility, self-reliance, and individual freedom. They want policies that reflect and foster these values. The rugged individualism that they expressed is characteristic of most traditional conceptions of American political culture. Members of Society The gun control activists viewed themselves as members of a society. Their worldview was less individualistic, and they were much more comfortable thinking about the world in terms of groups, or communities. This shift in emphasis—from the individualistic focus of the gun rights activists, to the

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societal focus of the gun control activists—has important consequences for how they understand the problem of gun violence and how they think it should be addressed. The gun control activists didn’t generally feel personally vulnerable to violence. Relative to the gun rights activists, they placed more trust in other members of society and they had more confidence in the ability of the police to protect them. They didn’t feel a need to keep guns around for their own self-defense. Most of them would say that they can understand that some people, in some circumstances, may feel this need, but they personally didn’t. They would often make statements indicating that they believed people who carry guns for self-defense must live in a world of fear, and they refused to live that way. They would also often express the idea that carrying, or even owning, guns for self-defense can create, rather than solve, problems. For instance, Lawrence said “if I have a gun on my hip I’m probably more likely to be killed because of that.” Jim likewise said that “concealed carry creates more problems than it solves.” Like these gun control activists, the gun rights activists also told us that they didn’t feel particularly vulnerable to violence in their daily lives. However, they did express a generalized concern about routine violence and a desire for the capability to effectively protect themselves from that potential threat. So, while both groups generally felt safe, one felt compelled to be prepared, essentially, just in case. It is significant that the gun controllers were confident in the ability of the police to protect them should the need arise. The gun rights activists uniformly expressed the idea that the police are more likely to arrive to investigate, rather than prevent, a violent attack. It was as if one group had faith in the social order, and the other chose to rely on themselves. As we discussed above, for the gun rights activists, individuals cause violence and individuals are responsible for protecting themselves from violence. The gun control activists, on the other hand, understand violence as a social problem that social, collective, action can address. This is why they focus so much on restrictive gun laws. They want to limit everyone’s access to certain weapons that they view as responsible for the most harm. They will concede that individuals pull the trigger, but they will argue that society allowed that gun to be in the hands of that individual. When asked to think about how we can reduce violence in general, Margaret simply said, “I think it starts with laws for sure.” She, and many others, also repeatedly lamented the availability of certain types of weapons, such as AR15s, in this context.

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Although, as mentioned previously, they didn’t seem particularly concerned about most types of common violent crime, they were hyperfocused on mass shootings. To say that that mass shootings loomed large in the minds of these gun control activists would be an understatement. Margaret even said, I don’t believe there’s any more real violence in society than there ever has been, except for these mass shootings. That started in Texas in the 1960’s. And since then, that’s the only thing in our society where there really has been an escalation in violence is the mass shootings.

As this statement indicates, mass shootings were clearly seen as the most significant gun violence problem, and it is this problem that their proposed solutions were most designed to address. In order to address gun violence, which they seemed to most associate with mass shootings, they wanted to restrict the availability of certain guns and gun parts, which they thought were particularly problematic and which they uniquely associated with mass shootings. This translated into advocacy for assault weapon and magazine capacity restrictions. Margaret’s response about how to reduce violence in society, in which she mentioned that response starts with laws, continued, “limiting the size of the gun is a big one, and especially the ammunition.” Although they frequently had trouble defining exactly what they meant by these terms, they all wanted assault weapons and high capacity magazines restricted at the federal level. They were restricted in New York already. They also wanted universal background checks implemented federally. That is also something that New York already had. In addition to thinking of violence as a failure of society in terms of the guns that society allows access to, they also identified other social problems that lead to gun violence. Mental illness was raised as an explanation for mass shootings by the gun rights activists. Some of the gun control activists also discussed mental illness, but they did so with a different point of emphasis. Rather than thinking of it solely as the pathology of an individual —one that can explain their turn to violence—they raised mental illness as an example of a problem that society has failed to solve. Chase spoke about both of these issues—weapon availability and mental health— and, since his response is representative of the worldview expressed by the gun control activists generally, it is worth quoting at length:

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The thing with the school shootings, I am concerned with the weapon side of that. But I am also concerned about the people who do that kind of stuff…For instance, many of the people in these things are people who are mentally ill, and I think that one of the things is that we do a terrible job in this country of dealing with mental illness. And I think we could cut way down on that kind of violence if we did that stuff much better…I think part of the problem is that lots of people don’t have access to health insurance…So, I think in situations where a mentally ill person is involved in a mass shooting--a school shooting or another place--we could have prevented that by dealing with that problem. So, I think that is part of what comes to mind. I think what also comes to mind in those situations is…trying to get the crazy person with the gun to not be there to begin with. If we deal with the mental illness issues, if we deal with background checks and we make sure that people who shouldn’t have guns don’t have them...because if somebody shows up with high powered weapons at a school...like I said schools are inherently vulnerable…The problem is the broader social dialogue of controlling access to guns and controlling the people who have those tendencies.

We can see that Chase is concerned about individual perpetrators, but he thinks their actions are downstream of society. He, and other gun control activists, argue that we failed as a society—from our gun laws to our health system—if a teenager uses an AR15 to shoot up a school. This is indicative of the tendency for the gun control activists to refer to “society.” Referring to society, or community, was just as instinctive and natural for them as it was for the gun rights activists to talk about individuals, and their freedom. For example, Bill, thinking about mass shootings, said “that’s not a hallmark of a healthy society.” He continued to say that, …the gun question…can’t be addressed in isolation from other economic, political, and social questions in the larger society. They’re all aspects of the same general social question as to how we get to have a healthy society and expand democracy.

This certainly translated into how they thought about the role of government, and a citizen’s relationship to that government, in general. Whereas, the gun rights advocates believed in a society comprised of powerful individuals who lived under a weak government; the gun control advocates thought that good government could empower individuals. Chase said, “I think that the role of government is to try to make people’s

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lives better.” Margaret similarly said that “I think that government has a very strong role in society…government has a role in protecting and helping citizens.” Aaron discussed this worldview with reference to the U.S. Constitution’s preamble. It is the government’s responsibility promote the general welfare. If there is a healthcare crisis, we need to promote that. Ensure domestic tranquility. When we live in a society where people become afraid to go to a movie theatre, then we have a problem and the government has a duty and responsibility to ensure domestic tranquility.

These views diverge dramatically from those expressed by the gun rights activists. What was implicit, and sometimes explicit, in the ideas about society that the gun control activists were expressing was the view that social goods must frequently be achieved at the cost of some individual freedom. Conversely, they expressed the view that social costs can, and do, result from unfettered individual freedom. While discussing the concept of having to give up something that he enjoyed for the greater good, Aaron said, “at some point in time you have to sit back and say, ‘yeah, I enjoy this, but I understand that I live in a community and it is not about me.’” Margaret applied this logic by directly referencing people who view guns as expressions of freedom by saying they have to be willing to accept limits on those freedoms when exercising their freedom causes social problems: We are a society. I am not as into the personal liberty of carrying a gun just because I can, as I am a member of a society. You should be protecting your fellow citizens, especially children, in this society from gun violence. I think that is your first responsibility.

Jim also articulated the idea that social costs are created by individuals exercising their freedom to arm themselves for self-protection. He said, “those who seek to be free of risk by unfettered access to high capacity rifles and pistols only add to the risk to our populace.” In sum, rather than expressing an individualistic worldview, like the gun rights activists did, the gun control activists focus much more on community and society. They embrace the idea that individual rights must be balanced with the needs of the community, the collective. Their emphasis is on the public good, not private rights.

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Cultural Warfare These two groups—gun rights and gun control activists—clearly have very different views about what sort of society they want to be a part of. The gun controllers want to be part of a robust society with a government that supports individuals. The gun rights advocates want to live in a world comprised of self-reliant individuals who are governed in a manner that maximizes personal freedom. These ideological and cultural orientations are deeply embedded in their characters, and we’ve been able to see how the values associated with them motivate their advocacy. It is often the case that the best way to understand oneself is in contrast to another. Some of the most illuminating aspects of our discussions happened when the interviewees were thinking about their political opposition or people in other countries. We included several questions that helped prompt them to think in these terms. This was useful because it led to deep reflection on their own values, national values, and the assumptions they made about their opposition’s cultural and ideological values. We were also able to see more evidence of how their cultural values directly lead to their policy advocacy. We asked Margaret what political values she would associate with gun rights activists and she said, “I think its libertarianism, which I think is very misguided.” She went on to say that people like her are, less anti-government, at least not frightened of our government. More trusting in government and less, I think, paranoid. I don’t think the government is coming after me.

Many of the gun rights activists would agree with her assessment of them, as well as her description of other gun control activists. For example, Alvis characteristically said that gun control advocates “tend to think that maybe the government ought to have more control over people–not just on gun issues, but on many things.” We already mentioned that we got the sense from our discussions with Lawrence and Margaret that their reluctance to go to states they thought had stronger gun cultures had more to do with culture than with guns. It became clear throughout the course of our interviews that— although they would be unlikely to explicitly say this—each group simply didn’t like people in the other group. They viewed themselves as fundamentally—culturally, maybe morally—different than “those people.” This

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clearly applied to Bill, a gun control activist, and it had real consequences in his life. He was a target shooter. He compared being turned off over time from the gun community to how some young evangelicals get turned off to the church. The beliefs don’t change, “it’s all the other stuff.” Basically, it sounded like he felt out of place at gun clubs because, even though he liked traditional target shooting, he wasn’t traditionally politically, or culturally, conservative. Even though hunters comprise a small part of the broader gun community, this segment consistently looms large in the minds of gun control advocates like Bill. He clearly had a low opinion of people who enjoy hunting for sport: My personal point of view is that in a fully healthy society, which we are not a fully healthy society, there would be no need to have firearms. There would be no hunting. I look forward to a day in the maturity of humanity as a species in which it doesn’t see the need to kill other species for sport. I think that’s part of the period of humanity’s immaturity, hanging antlers on the wall.

Bill wasn’t the only gun control activist to imply that modern American gun culture is either somehow uncivilized, or it reflects aspects of American culture that are not very modern, and that we therefore should have somehow moved beyond. Several of them lamented the influence that popular images of the American founding period or the “Wild West” have on many Americans, particularly gun rights advocates. For example, while discussing the causes of violence in general, Chase said that violence “is deeply rooted in the culture. I mean not only going back to colonial times, but it is the Wild West and all kinds of things.” Margaret derisively said that guns make her think of the old “Wild West,” as if to say they shouldn’t have a place in the modern U.S. She also essentially declared that some aspects of American gun culture are uncivilized and embarrassing to her. I consider Canadians and Europeans to be fairly civilized...It embarrasses me that they are seeing things like these open gun rallies, these immigration things, these militia things. Like, “Oh my God! What are these people doing there?” I think it is an embarrassment to the country.

When asked if they wanted the U.S. to adopt Australian style gun control, the responses we received from the gun control activists ranged from Lawrence, who said, “No. No. And even I wouldn’t support it. Buybacks

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are ok, voluntary. Confiscation? No.” to Margaret who responded, “I wish it would happen here. I understand that it has got to be in stages.” However, whether they wanted it or not, they all doubted that the U.S. would ever adopt this sort of comprehensive and strict gun control. Furthermore, if it ever was adopted, they thought compliance with such a law would be very low. When we asked why, they didn’t talk about the NRA, federalism, the filibuster, or any other institution. They referenced aspects of American history and culture that made the U.S. resistant to the sort of gun control that works in other countries, like Australia. Chase said, “I don’t think so. It is too much a part of history and culture here.” After saying that they didn’t think most American gun owners would comply with such a law if it did pass, even though most Australian gun owners did, Lawrence explained, “that we’re more independent. Maybe they are more compliant, or respectful. You have to remember that this country was founded by renegades.” Jim similarly explained this difference by referencing a traditional conception of American political culture. He said, “The United States was the only country that was founded – from the start – on the idea of individual liberty and the government has to answer to the people…there is more of an element of self-reliance and individual liberties [for Americans].” These gun control activists know exactly what stands in the way of gun control: American political culture. The gun rights activists also of course answered these questions with reference to an individualistic and liberty loving American political culture. That is their first language. The gun control activists had to think about a comparison with a different country—or, about how to counter the arguments of gun rights advocates—before they thought about the consequences of American culture. That wasn’t the case with the gun rights activists. It is where their minds and arguments naturally go. Naomi said it wouldn’t happen because, “there is still an intensely strong individualism and freedom in this country that is handed down and is still being handed down.” Ryan, like others, could envision the attempt but thought, it would be an overwhelming failure…[there would be massive noncompliance] This country was started by a bunch of people who flipped off a king and said screw you we are not going to abide by your laws. It really is sort of in our DNA…[Americans] don’t like the government telling them what to do.

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To support this view, Ryan, who was a police officer, indicated that there is substantial evidence of widespread non-compliance with New York’s gun control laws. Most of the gun rights activists thought that implementing any federal gun law that included confiscation, or even mandatory buy backs, would result in widespread violence. Bryan said, There would be some people who would comply and turn their guns in, but there would be a lot of people who won’t. I don’t intend to…Americans are different than other nations. We’re a nation of rebels. We have people who like freedom to do what they want to do...they would be willing to fight for that freedom.

The distinct worldviews of the gun rights and gun control activists contrasted considerably with one another. Although referencing these contrasts wasn’t necessarily their first instinct, they were aware of them, and they were remarkably aware of the cultural orientations of their political adversaries. They were also remarkably aware of how their worldviews fit into American political culture more generally, and how America’s predominantly individualistic and freedom loving political culture affects gun control’s prospects. The gun control activists knew the cultural deck was stacked against them.

The Consequences of Cultural Contrasts The people in these two groups—gun rights and gun control activists— are quite different from one-another and they view the world in fundamentally different ways. They don’t simply disagree about how guns should be regulated. Their core cultural and ideological orientations are fundamentally opposed to one another. It is as if they are seeing the world through different lenses. The gun rights activists wear lenses that give the world an individualistic shade; for instance, they focus on how individuals cause, and can overcome, problems. The gun control activists wear lenses that reveal our collective social bonds; they’re concerned with, for example, the social consequences of individual choices. Since they view the world so differently, they understand the causes of problems differently; therefore, they of course propose very different solutions to those problems. They are consequently unlikely to find much common ground that they can use to build any sort of compromise on. They differ fundamentally in how they understand the problem of gun violence. For the gun rights activists, gun violence results from the

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actions of individuals and is best explained as a failure of, first and foremost, that individual. It may also be explained as a failure of individuals responsible for the perpetrator of that violence, like parents. Gun control activists understand gun violence primarily as a social problem. Its causes are rooted in various failures of society, such as the failure to adequately control access to guns. Individuals may commit the violence, but conditions that exists in the society are viewed as enabling, allowing, facilitating, or exacerbating that violence. Since they understand the problem of gun violence differently, they naturally propose very different solutions to that problem. Significantly, these solutions only make sense to those people who also share their world-view. This is a key reason why actual debates in the great American gun debate go nowhere. Neither group is going to convince the other to support their solution if they don’t even understand the problem in the same way. Individuals are at the heart of how gun rights activists understand the gun violence problem. So, individuals are also at the heart of the solutions they propose, and would accept. For instance, individuals should be severely punished for misusing guns (i.e. punitive policy), and individuals should be enabled to defend themselves with guns (i.e. lenient policy). On the other hand, in the minds of the gun control activists, social conditions facilitate gun violence. So, society has a responsibility to solve the problem by, for example, controlling the guns that are circulating in society (i.e. restrictive policy). Their culturally informed world-views also lead to contrasts in how they argue for—try to sell or frame—the policies that they do support. The gun control activists frame their policies as ones that will benefit all of society. They justify restrictions on guns as necessary to enhance public safety. They may argue that we will all be safer if a few of us can accept restrictions on our behavior, such as on our ability to own or carry weapons. While these gun control activists emphasize public goods, they are opposed by gun rights activists’ tendency to invoke private rights. They argue, for example, that individual freedom should not be restricted because some individuals abuse that freedom. Individuals must be able to access the most effective tools available to them so that they can protect themselves from other predatory individuals. One group argues for their policies in terms that will resonate with people who prize the values of self-reliance and individual freedom. The other’s arguments will resonate with people who cherish a healthy collective society and social order. The debate distills to we versus me.

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The problem, from the perspective of the gun control activists and their sympathizers, is that their arguments don’t resonate as strongly in American culture as the individualistic arguments of the gun rights activists do. American political culture has long been biased toward individualism. While the strength of individualism’s hold on American society and politics has ebbed and flowed, self-reliance and individual freedom are widely understood as being core American political values. They are important components of American political culture. The gun rights advocates ability to naturally frame their arguments in the language of individualism has given them a significant advantage in the great American gun debate.

References Bruce-Briggs, B. 2001. “The Great American Gun War.” In The Gun Control Debate: You Decide, edited by Lee Nisbet. Amherst: Prometheus Books. Kellermann, A. L., G. Somes, F. P. Rivara, R. K. Lee, and J. G. Banton. 1998. “Injuries and Deaths Due to Firearms in the Home.” The Journal of Trauma 45 (2): 263–267. https://doi.org/10.1097/00005373-199808000-00010. Kellermann, Arthur L., Frederick P. Rivara, Norman B. Rushforth, Joyce G. Banton, Donald T. Reay, Jerry T. Francisco, Ana B. Locci, Janice Prodzinski, Bela B. Hackman, and Grant Somes. 2001. “Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide in the Home.” In The Gun Control Debate: You Decide, edited by Lee Nisbet. Amherst: Prometheus Books. Kohn, Abigail A. 2004. Shooters: Myths and Realities of America’s Gun Cultures. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Legault, Richard L., and Alan J. Lizotte. 2009. “Caught in a Crossfire: Legal and Illegal Gun Ownership in America.” In Handbook on Crime and Deviance, edited by Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, and Gina Penly Hall. New York, NY: Springer. McLean, Dylan S., and Jason Sorens. 2019. “The Changing Ideological Politics of U.S. State Firearms Regulation.” Politics & Policy 47 (4): 638–672. https:/ /doi.org/10.1111/polp.12321. Rott, Nathan. 2018. “Decline in Hunters Threatens How U.S. Pays for Conservation.” NPR, Last Modified 20 March 2018. Accessed 19 August. https://www.npr.org/2018/03/20/593001800/decline-in-hun ters-threatens-how-u-s-pays-for-conservation. Statista. 2022. “Number of Participants in Hunting in the United States from 2006 to 2020.” Statista Research Department, Last Modified 28 Jun 2022. Accessed 23 August. https://www.statista.com/statistics/191244/participa nts-in-hunting-in-the-us-since-2006/.

CHAPTER 4

Gun Politics in Our Federal Political Institutions

So far, we have discussed the uniquely individualistic nature of American political culture and how the American bias toward individualism impacts the debate about how we should regulate guns. We’ve also presented our conversations with activists in a way that demonstrated the interaction between American political culture and gun policy at the micro-level. Now, we are turning to the macro-level. We are going to provide an overview of the gun control policy debate that has unfolded in Washington for a span of time ranging from the Kennedy to the Obama Administrations. It is important to clarify at the outset that our effort here isn’t meant to constitute a comprehensive legislative, or policy, history of gun control. While such an effort would have value, we are not historians and cataloging history is not the purpose of this work. As political scientists, and for the purposes of this work, we are interested in explaining the essence of the politics of gun control at the American federal level. We argue that essence is, to a large degree, explained by the predominant influence of individualism in American political culture. The strength of individualism’s grasp on our culture isn’t constant over time. Communitarian, or collectivist, challenges to individualism can, and do, moderate it. Our argument is that forces for gun control will be strongest when individualism is at its weakest.

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You’ll recall from our discussion of the activists that the influence of culture isn’t always obvious. We often had to unpack what was said to us in order to uncover the cultural, and ideological, forces led the activists to hold the opinion that led to a particular statement in the first place. Unfortunately, the cultural underpinnings of the gun debate can be even harder to detect when we move up to the macro-level. Culture helps us understand the causes of problems; it draws us to particular solutions for those problems, and it informs how we try and garner support for those solutions. In the context of gun control, this means that our cultural predispositions lead us to certain explanations for gun violence, make us attracted to particular policy solutions that are aligned with addressing whatever we think causes gun violence, and then we frame how we sell those policy solutions in a way that will resonate with people who are similarly culturally predisposed. In our conversations with people who think a lot about this issue, we could connect these three cultural touch-points. This is more difficult to do at the macro-level of policy debate, but we’ll endeavor to do so nonetheless. Much of what we are going to present below will be focused on the second and third cultural touch-points, the particular policy and how politicians frame, or sell, that policy in order to build support for it. We can frequently infer the first touch-point—what gun violence is attributed to—from these. We are mostly focusing our attention on how the U.S. Congress has pursued, and debated, the gun issue, and how presidents have tried to use their platform to shape congressional action on the issue. Through this discussion, it will become clear that individualism’s hold on our politics has varied over the past several decades. Astute observers of American political history will note that the time periods when we see gun control on the march coincide with the passage of other legislation, such as President Johnson’s Great Society programs, that challenged America’s prevailing individualistic tendencies. Conversely, the rights of gun owners expanded during the particularly individualistic Reagan era. Finally, we must emphasize again, the following discussion focuses on gun control politics and debate. Given this focus, we will discuss a variety of legislative provisions, stand-alone bills or amendments to other bills, that were simply introduced, or called for. This is important because considering these introductions in a general way can give the reader a good sense of how this debate has evolved over time. This leads to our first important caveat: we won’t necessarily catalog the final disposition of every measure we discuss; that is beyond the scope of our work. Our

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second important caveat is that, since we are focused on politics and debate, we are only interested in measures that actually get enough traction to impact these things. This is why we draw extensively on media reports and presidential statements: if neither the president nor the media is talking about it, it probably isn’t impacting the politics all that much. Most of the information that we used to construct the narrative that follows was drawn from three sources: The Congressional Bills Project, The New York Times Historical Archive, and The American Presidency Project. We used the Congressional Bills Project to identify every piece of legislation that would have increased regulations on guns in some way (restrictive policy), expanded access to guns (lenient policy), or punished people for misusing guns (punitive policy). The American Presidency Project was searched to identify every public statement made by a President, during their presidency that related to any of these policy categories. Finally, we reviewed the New York Times to understand what aspects of this debate were actually getting traction. Due to its reputation for independent and authoritative reporting, the New York Times is widely understood as an American newspaper of record (Martin and Hansen 1998). Focusing on one source like this will give us a consistent indication of how the politics of gun control was presented to the American public over time. We hope to contribute to an explanation for the state of gun politics in America. However, before we can explain something, we must describe it. That is the task to which we now turn: describing the political debate about gun regulation at the American federal level from the Kennedy to the Obama Administrations.

The Kennedy and Johnson Era: Rise of Restrictive Policy and the Gun Control Act of 1968 This chapter follows the firearms policies pursued by Congress and the President during the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. The gun control bills that were discussed in the 1960s were overwhelmingly restrictive in nature, with very few punitive and lenient proposals. We see Johnson and his allies try and build support for their proposals by appealing to the common good and otherwise framing their arguments in ways that invoke community-oriented values. The senators and representatives that led the opposition to this era’s restrictive gun legislation frequently invoked individual rights.

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The era’s restrictive proposals primarily focused on two areas: restricting mail-order weapons and preventing weapon dumping (sales of large quantities of weapons at a very inexpensive price) in the U.S. Mail-order weapons were a concern because they were very difficult to regulate. Weapon dumping was a concern because after World War II, many countries had a large surplus of cheap military-style weapons that they wanted to eliminate. Nations such as Italy and Japan began dumping their firearms in the U.S., which allowed everyday Americans to buy firearms at a very inexpensive price. These were also frequently the firearms of choice for mail-order purchases. Prior to 1965, neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson made public statements on firearms; however, that changed in 1965 when President Johnson suggested that the age of gun buyers should be increased from 18 to 21. This would be picked up by members of Congress and included in many bills after 1965. In 1960, there were only a few gun control bills introduced in Congress. These bills primarily focused on the two restrictive measures previously mentioned: increased regulation of mail order and the banning of cheap imported firearms. These measures did not gain momentum in 1960, but they would continue to re-occur throughout the 1960s. 1960 was also marked by the absence of punitive or lenient bills. President Kennedy did not speak publicly on the subject of firearms control and he had no proposals regarding them. For the most part, 1961 followed the lead of 1960. There were a few more restrictive bills introduced in Congress: the creation of a firearms registry and limits on the interstate sale of firearms. Desire for a firearms registry gained no momentum in Congress and it did not gain much attention from the media, or the public, in 1961. In fact, a firearms registry would not be mentioned again until 1968. However, President Kennedy did sign a bill into law regulating the interstate shipment of firearms. This bill was signed into law on October 3rd, 1961. It made sending weapons or ammunition across state lines to anyone who was convicted of a state or federal felony, under indictment, or a fugitive from felony charges illegal and punishable with up to five years in prison and a $2000 fine (The New York Times 1961). This bill was designed as more of a means to deter and limit organized crime from crossing state lines than it was a serious limitation on the interstate sale of firearms. As with 1961, no punitive or lenient measures were proposed by members of Congress or by the President.

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No new gun control legislation was introduced in Congress, or proposed by the President, in 1962. This changed in 1963 after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22nd, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. Kennedy’s assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had used an inexpensive mail-order Carcano Model 91/38 infantry rifle, which was imported from Italy. The assassination led to the re-emergence of many of the restrictive measures that had been introduced in the past, including banning many types of imported firearms, increased restrictions on the interstate shipment of firearms, and the banning of mail-order firearms. These bills were proposed by Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican from Massachusetts, Senator Edward Kennedy, Democrat from Massachusetts, and Senators Thomas Dodd and Abraham Ribicoff, both Democrats from Connecticut (Godbout 1963). The momentum that started with the flurry of restrictive bill proposals in December of 1963 was not carried into 1964. There was some discussion about limiting mail-order firearms, but this was the only restrictive measure that was discussed in Congress in 1964. However, the ramifications of the Kennedy Assassination were felt outside of Congress by the National Rifle Association. In November of 1964, the NRA warned its members to anticipate that new restrictive legislation would be proposed in January of 1965. The NRA stated in the American Rifleman that they wanted their members to encourage their representatives in Congress to not outlaw firearms, but to focus on punishing criminals (The New York Times 1964). Franklin Orth, Executive Vice President of the NRA, testifying before a Senate committee stated in December of 1964, that the NRA would be supportive of some federal regulations on firearms distribution, especially in terms of cheap, foreign-war surplus military rifles that could be purchased through mail orders. NRA leadership argued that by capitulating on these more modest gun reforms; they would be staving off even more broad and sweeping controls, such as outright bans on gun ownership. They argued that they felt that these more sensible gun control laws would help keep firearms out of the hands of the “unbalanced and uncontrolled shooter.” This stance by the NRA, who had traditionally stood against most gun control laws, was met with strong criticism from the rank and file members of the organization. One of the critics of more gun control argued: “The opposition is an amorphous, ill-informed bunch of do-gooders, but they have a lot of editors and reformers on their side because being against guns nowadays is like being against prostitution, liquor, and unemployment, it has a certain inherent

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virtue.” The rank and file’s stance was considered “extreme” by many in the leadership and the NRA stated that it had started disassociating itself with the more extremist groups and gun clubs that held this “extreme opinion,” and they were purging their ranks of the extremist element. However, this internal rift would persist within the NRA (Franklin 1964). The restrictive measures that were introduced in Congress after the assassination of President Kennedy resonated with some of the leadership of the National Rifle Association. While many of the rank and file members of the NRA disagreed with these restrictive proposals and continued to use the language of individualistic values, the top-level executives of the NRA were considering the merits of some restrictive legislation and the more communitarian values that they embodied. The willingness of the leadership in the NRA to at least consider capitulating on gun control policy indicates how powerful the push for restrictive gun control was after the Kennedy assassination and how influential communitarian values were in the 1960s. As the NRA promised its members would happen, Senator Dodd, in January of 1965 introduced Senate Bill 14. An identical bill was introduced in the House by Edward A. Garmatz, Democrat from Maryland. The bill would require mail-order dealers to withhold any shipment unless the order was accompanied by a signed statement from the buyer that the buyer was at least 21 and in compliance with local, state, and federal firearms regulations. The firearm dealer would be required to forward law enforcement in the purchaser’s home jurisdiction a copy of the signed statement. This bill aimed to limit the mail-order shipments, but also tried to curtail the amount of cheap, foreign weapons that were often the gun of choice in mail-order purchases. Franklin Orth, executive Vice President of the NRA, stated that the executive committee of the NRA had given him full authority to support the bill. Orth stated: “It is a tough position for us to take in a highly emotionalized atmosphere.” Orth went on to state that he thought that the measures were “sensible” and that they would “protect the sport of shooting from sweeping proposals to ban guns altogether” (Franklin 1965). Senator Dodd also introduced, in another bill, measures that would prohibit the importation of foreign surplus weapons, but this provision was not supported by the NRA. In terms of restrictive bills, strengthening laws on mail-order weapons and curtailing the shipment of cheap, foreign surplus rifles were the most publicized and discussed measures in early 1965; however, more restrictive proposals began to be introduced later in the year. On March 8th,

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President Johnson addressed the American people and encouraged them, and Congress, to support the measure banning all mail-order firearms. President Johnson also asked for an increase in the minimum age to purchase a firearm, from 18 to 21 (The New York Times 1965). Hearings were held by the Senate Judiciary Committee to discuss the Dodd bill in May of 1965. By the time of these hearings, the bill had evolved into a complete ban on interstate shipment of pistols and revolvers except between licensed dealers or manufacturers, as well as more regulations on the interstate shipment of rifles and shotguns, and the bill would increase the minimum age for firearm purchasers from 18 to 21. By making the bill more expansive, the Dodd bill was met with intense opposition by the NRA, who had supported the earlier, less restrictive version of the bill (Godbout 1965). At the start of 1966, the Dodd bill was still languishing in the Senate Judiciary Committee, where it was met with majority opposition. There was little conversation about the Dodd bill outside of Congress until August 1st, when Charles Whitman climbed to the observation deck of the main building at the University of Texas where he shot and killed 13 people and wounded many others. This shooting prompted President Johnson to call for Congress to once again consider the Dodd bill. President Johnson said that, The shocking tragedy of yesterday’s events in Austin is heightened because they were senseless. While senseless, however, what happened is not without a lesson: That we must press urgently for legislation now pending in Congress to help prevent the wrong persons from obtaining firearms. (Semple 1966)

As of August 1st 1966, the Dodd bill encapsulated all of the major restrictive measures that had been discussed in Congress, and by the President, in the 1960s. When asked how his bill could have helped prevent the Whitman shooting, Senator Dodd stated: I’ve never claimed that if the bill was passed it would put an end to all murders by firearms. But it would be a deterrent. If it had been passed, the retailer who sold Charles Whitman the gun yesterday would have had to get positive identification. (Semple 1966)

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Dodd also went on to say that he would like to strengthen some of the provisions in his bill by banning the interstate sale of rifles and shotguns. One of the major issues that Senator Dodd faced was as Congress added more restrictive provisions; the NRA mounted more resistance to the bill. The NRA had supported earlier versions of the bill but was vigorously opposed to the 1966 version of the Dodd bill (Semple 1966). On January 11th, 1967, Senator Dodd reintroduced his bill on firearms regulation. Senator Dodd stated: “We can no longer permit ourselves the luxury of doing nothing.” “We, Congress, hold the responsibility of ending this carnage.” He also cited President Johnson, who in his 1967 State of the Union Address, had called for “the strict control on the sale of firearms.” The January 1967 version of the Dodd bill contained the same restrictive measures that it had contained in the past: the prohibition of the interstate sale of handguns, the regulation of the interstate sale of rifles and shotguns, and the limitation of the importation of foreign-made firearms (The New York Times 1967a). President Johnson presented a special message on February 6th, 1967, that included a discussion of major firearms controls that President Johnson wanted to see passed by Congress. Johnson called attention to us all, as a collective, with references to “society” and, specifically, a “civilized society.” He said: This legislation is no panacea for the danger of human irrationality and violence in our society. But it will help keep lethal weapons out the wrong hands. This legislation will not curtail ownership of firearms used either for sport or self-protection. But it will place a valuable restraint on random trade in handguns... It will gain added strength as states pass firearms legislation and licensing laws similar to the Sullivan Law in New York. To pass strict firearms control laws at every level of government is an act of simple prudence and a measure of civilized society. Further delay is unconscionable. (The New York Times 1967b)

Johnson’s specific legislative proposals mirrored the Dodd bill. So, as of February 1967, the major restrictive measures that had been percolating in Congress for the previous five years were consolidated into the DoddAdministration bill, and President Johnson put the weight of his office fully behind it. It is clear that guns were heavily restricted in Johnson’s vision of the good society.

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The Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the DoddAdministration bill. While these hearings were taking place on April 7th, 1967, the National Rifle Association’s newly elected President, Harold W. Glassen, stated that the NRA did not want to be viewed as an organization that did not support any form of gun control, and they would be offering up their own proposal in Congress. This proposal would include restrictions on the mail-order sale of pistols and a Federal commission to screen, and thus reduce, the importation of cheap foreign military weapons that Mr. Glassen called “junk” and “unsuitable for sporting or target use.” While the NRA had been supportive of restricting all mail-order guns in 1964, this new proposal would only be supportive of mail-order restrictions on pistols and revolvers (Franklin 1967a). Senator Roman Hruska, Republican from Nebraska, introduced the new NRA counter proposal to the Dodd-Administration Bill. The Hruska Bill would require a seven-day waiting period for mail orders for nonresident pistol sales as well as the filling out of a form stating that the buyer is 21 and not a felon. This form would be mailed by the firearm dealer to the chief local police official in the buyer’s jurisdiction. Rifles and shotguns would not be covered. Many congressional observers felt that the Hruska bill would significantly handicap the chances of new gun control legislation being created in 1967. This is likely why the NRA and its supporters in Congress supported this bill: they saw it as a means to nullify the Dodd-Administration bill and, in essence, could prevent any new gun control legislation from being formed (Franklin 1967b). Officials from the National Rifle Association, including Harold Glassen, and other pro-gun groups testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee’s subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency on July 19th, 1967. Glassen, who was strongly opposed to the Dodd-Administration bill, stated that …the philosophy behind the Dodd bill is that guns shall not be available except to certain specified persons. Sportsmen disapprove of that type of legislation. They feel that the philosophy behind any measure to regulate firearms should be that firearms be available except to certain types of persons, such as felons and juveniles. (Franklin 1967c)

Opposition to the Dodd-Administration bill was also voiced by Senator Frank Church, Democrat from Idaho and Senator Hruska. Church explicitly appealed to individualism and self-reliance, saying,

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Guns come close to the feeling of sovereignty itself among our people. This is an issue that cuts right to the bone. It is entirely impractical to rely solely on law enforcement agencies in remote rural areas. Help may be more than an hour away. (Franklin 1967c)

Senator Hruska stated: “To deter criminals in the countryside is a little bit different than in New York City… The intruder breaking into an apartment in New York has it made because he knows that there is no one to shoot back.” While there were no punitive or lenient bills proposed in Congress in 1967, the comments made by Senators Church and Hruska clearly indicate that individualistic values were still influential and were driving opposition to the restrictive measures that we’ve been discussing. Opposition of this nature is one of the primary reasons that restrictive legislation had yet to be passed after the Kennedy assassination and the Whitman massacre and why more sweeping restrictive legislation would not be passed in the 1960s even with significant pressure from President Johnson (Franklin 1967c). Riots in cities such as Newark, New Jersey, in July and September of 1967, led President Johnson to push Congress to pass the DoddAdministration Bill. President Johnson continued his civilized society framing, saying, A civilized nation cannot allow this armed terror to continue... Last year two million guns were sold in the United States, many of them were sold to hardened criminals, snipers, mental defectives, rapists, habitual drunkards and juveniles. There is no excuse for this…We are long past the point where we can allow lethal weapons to be hawked by the same mail order techniques used to market frozen steaks or baskets of fruit. (Frankel 1967)

Phrases like “civilized nation” attempt to evoke collective sensibilities, feelings of we, not me. President Johnson’s pleas to the public good were heard. On September 20th, the Senate Juvenile Delinquency subcommittee approved by one vote the Dodd-Administration bill to control firearms. Frank Daniel, Secretary of the National Rifle Association, stated that while the bill was passed by the committee, he did not believe it would gain enough support if it were to make it to the Senate floor. The bill still had to make its way through the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Commerce Committee (which had historically reviewed firearms policy). Both of these committees were viewed as hostile to the Dodd-Administration bill. Senator Edward Kennedy,

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Democrat from Massachusetts, who was a strong proponent of the bill, stated that if either committee blocked the bill, he would see that it was added as an amendment to another bill that was already on the Senate floor (Franklin 1967d). Though the Dodd-Administration bill gained some momentum by being able to escape the Senate Judiciary subcommittee, the bill still met heavy resistance. In order to gain support from the western and rural states, Senator Dodd proposed weakening some elements of the bill. The proposed amendment to the bill would allow state legislatures to exempt themselves from the ban on mail-order sales of rifles and shotguns. The original bill would have banned all mail-order sales and would not have provided states with an opt out clause. Dodd stated: Witnesses from these states have indicated that a mail order ban or stringent controls on mail order rifles and shotguns would effect a hardship on sportsmen, ranchers, and farmers whose primary access to sporting rifles and shotguns is through the mail order routes. Eight of our Western states have memorialized [sic] Congress to oppose this gun bill mainly because of the inclusion of long arms. I believe this amendment will dissipate such opposition. (Herbers 1967)

The biggest battle for new gun control in the 1960s was fought in 1968. Between January 1st and April 4th there was very little discussion of gun control in Congress. Congress was heavily focused on new Civil Rights legislation and concerns about the Vietnam War. The April 5th, 1968, assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. intensified the focus of Congress on the need for new Civil Rights laws and there was less focus on new gun control. However, three days after the MLK assassination, Senator Dodd and Senator Kennedy were able to move the Dodd-Administration bill through a 9-7 Senate Judiciary Committee vote and tack it on to President Johnson’s Safe Street and Crime Control proposal as an amendment. In order to garner enough support to release the bill from committee, Senator Dodd had to agree to exclude rifles and shotguns from mailorder sale prohibitions. However, there was still serious concern that any firearms legislation would be passed because the same version of the bill was stalled in the House Judiciary Committee, with no signs that it was going to be released (Franklin 1968). On June 6th, 1968, Robert Kennedy was shot and killed while campaigning. The assassination of his brother John F. Kennedy is what

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inspired many of the restrictive measures that were proposed in Congress between 1963 and 1968. On June 7th, President Johnson spoke to the American people and called for a prohibition on the sale of any firearms through mail-order, to increase the age of all firearms buyers from 18 to 21, to prevent the sale of firearms by gun dealers to residents of another state, and he called on governors to seek restrictive legislation in all 50 states. Johnson reflected, and attempted to capitalize on, the era’s prevailing communitarian spirit, when he said: “The voices of the few must no longer prevail over the interest of the many.” The House Judiciary Committee immediately passed the amended Senate version of the gun control bill which banned the mail-order sale of pistols and revolvers. This provided a minor victory to gun control proponents who had finally seen the passage of restrictive gun control laws in both houses. However, President Johnson immediately called for more restrictions and stated, “So today I call upon Congress in the name of sanity. I call upon the Congress in the name of safety and in the name of an aroused citizenship to give America the gun control law that American citizens need” (The New York Times 1968a). Four days after the assassination, Senator Dodd introduced two new restrictive bills to the Senate. The first would prohibit the mail-order sales of rifles and shotguns. The other would provide for compulsory Federal registration of all firearms. The bill would also prohibit the sale of ammunition to any person who could not prove that his firearm had been registered. These bills were supported by Attorney General Ramsey Clark who said: “Rifles and shotguns have become the chosen instruments of slaughter for snipers and assassins. Any truly effective firearms legislation simply must cover long guns as well as handguns.” However, these assertions were met with opposition by Senators from both parties. Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican from Illinois, called a push for more gun control “emotional outbursts.” He continued by saying, “Let’s start applying what we’ve got. The people who are pressuring for more controls don’t know what’s in the bill [referring to the recently passed measure].” Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat from Montana and the Senate Majority leader, added, “The answer lies in a sense of responsibility, parental control, more and better trained police, improvement of environmental conditions, obedience of the law, and less protection for criminals and more protection for the innocent” (Finney 1968a). This criticism’s focus on personal responsibility and accountability is a classically individualistic critique of restrictive gun control.

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On June 12th, opinion within the Senate started shifting toward the passage of more restrictive gun control. Senator Mansfield, who we just quoted saying that he thought no new gun control legislation would be needed, stated that he felt it would not be too hard to pick up the required votes to ban mail-order rifles and shotguns. Senator Mansfield believed that the changing attitude of Senators was due to the large amount of mail Senators were receiving from outraged citizens who were demanding stricter gun control. In response to public outrage, Senator Tydings, Democrat from Maryland, proposed his own new bill that was even more restrictive than the Dodd’s bill. Senator Tydings’s bill would have required the mandatory registration of all firearms and the requirement of a license to purchase a firearm or ammunition (Finney 1968b). In a significant shift, Senator Mansfield eventually came out in full support of the Tydings bill. He said, The Tydings legislation will not disarm anyone of the right to own a gun. It will strengthen the hands of police officials in tracing of murder weapons. It will prevent the petty criminal and others of like nature who cannot buy a gun over the counter from a licensed dealer from buying one through the mails [sic]. (Finney 1968c)

Mansfield’s comments were accompanied by statements from three weapons manufacturers, Remington Arms Company, Savage Arms, and Winchester, which indicated that they would all support the mail-order ban on rifles and shotguns. These manufacturers also stated that Mossberg and the Ithaca Gun Company would support their position (Finney 1968c). Widespread support for gun control legislation continued to gain momentum. As of June 18th, 1968, the Senate Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee, which had only a month before blocked a weaker version of the gun control bill, now supported a stronger version of the bill that would ban the interstate sale of firearms and ammunition. Longtime gun control critic, Senator Roman Hruska, who served on the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated: “If the majority of the Senate feels it is necessary to pass gun control legislation such as the President suggested, I will not object. Indeed, I will support it” (Finney 1968d). On June 19th, President Johnson signed into law his omnibus crime bill that had been passed by Congress in early June. The signing of this

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bill officially banned the interstate sale of pistols and revolvers. President Johnson stated that he thought the crime bill did “more good than bad” but he would continue seeking more expansive gun controls (Finney 1968d). On June 24th, citing the Tydings bill, President Johnson called for the registration and licensing of all firearms. President Johnson’s argument explicitly called for restricting the rights of the few to secure benefits for the many, a classically communitarian statement: Registration and licensing have long been an accepted part of daily life in America. Automobiles, boats, even dogs and bicycles in many communities are commonly registered. Our citizens must get licenses to fish, to hunt, and to drive. Certainly, no less should be required for the possession of lethal weapons that have caused so much horror and heartbreak in this country. Surely this slight inconvenience for the few is minimal, when measured, against the protection for all. (Frankel 1968)

The Tydings bill would allow for 180 days for the registration of every gun. Thereafter, failure to register a firearm would be punishable with two years in jail and fines up to $2000 (Frankel 1968). On June 27th, the Senate Judiciary Committee dealt the Johnson administration’s goal of the registration and licensing of all firearms a blow by voting to delay all actions on the Tydings’s bill until July 9th. Senator Tydings saw the delay as a “real defeat” that “substantially weakens chances for passing responsible gun legislation in this Congressional session.” Gun control proponents were rightfully concerned that the delay could significantly hinder new gun control (Finney 1968e). On July 2nd, 1968 Carl Albert, Democrat from Oklahoma, and the House Democratic leader, stated that he would oppose both major gun control bills in Congress. Albert, very individualistically, stated: “I think we should take aim at the criminal and not at the rights of the lawabiding citizen. I cannot and will not support the two major gun bills now before Congress in the form in which they have been introduced.” Albert was fully against the ban on the interstate sale of firearms and ammunition, and he was against the registration of all firearms and the licensing of all owners (The New York Times 1968b). On July 8th, the day before the scheduled Senate Judiciary Committee meeting, Representative Emmanuel Celler, Democrat from New York and Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, said: “I state here that I will oppose any amendment offered on the floor for registration and licensing [of

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firearms] and I will oppose any Senate amendment for registration and licensing in conference.” Representative Celler stated that while he personally supported registration and licensing, his position was strategic. He did not think it would pass in this legislative session and he thought that by shelving registration and licensing it would significantly increase the chances of a positive vote on the banning of interstate firearms sales (Graham 1968). On July 24th, the House of Representatives in a 304-118 vote passed a bill that would prevent the mail-order sales of rifles, shotguns, and some ammunition. Due to the Celler’s defection, all discussion of registration and licensing had been dropped from the vote. On the same day, the Senate Judiciary Committee in a 9-3 vote approved a similar bill. The Senate bill had also removed discussion of registration and licensing (Hunter 1968a). This version of the Senate bill would be approved on the Senate floor. Momentum for restrictive gun control legislation reached its crescendo after the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. in April of 1968 and Robert Kennedy in June of 1968. Support for restrictive gun control legislation grew in both the House and the Senate. The American people began letter writing campaigns that encouraged their members of Congress to support gun control legislation. Even some weapons manufacturers got on board with the creation of new restrictive laws. In June of 1968, it appeared that expansive restrictive gun control had a very good chance of being passed. There was momentum for the registration of all firearms and licensing gun owners. However, the delay that took place between mid-June 1968, to mid-July 1968 significantly impacted the chances of gun control legislation being passed, and it caused gun control supporters to dial back their goals (by dropping registration and licensing). Why did this one-month delay kill momentum? The answer appears to come in the form of the National Rifle Association. The NRA took the one-month delay to pursue a massive letter writing campaign. The NRA’s goal was to have its members flood the offices of congressional members with letters demanding no new gun control be created. This massive letter writing campaign was effective in getting many Representatives and Senators who were in favor of registration and licensing to back off of it. For example, Senator Mansfield, who was initially against any form of gun control, received a large volume of letters from citizens who sought more gun control immediately after the Robert Kennedy assassination. Mansfield’s office stated that letters supporting gun control

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outweighed those supporting no gun control by 2 to 1. However, by the first of July, letters supporting no gun control outweighed those supporting gun control by 2 to 1. This caused Mansfield to once again change his position on registration and licensing. Many members of Congress felt this exact same pressure. On October 10th, 1968, Congress as a whole passed legislation that would restrict the interstate sale of rifles, shotguns, and ammunition. The final version of the bill also restricted over the counter sales of firearms to out of state residents and banned the sale of rifles and shotguns to persons under 18 and handguns to persons under 21. The bill would also ban the importation of cheap weapons that did not have a clear “sporting purpose” as determined by the Department of the Treasury (Finney 1968f). On October 22nd, President Johnson signed this legislation into law as the Gun Control Act of 1968. While President Johnson was pleased at the passage of some restrictive measures, he lamented that firearm registration and licensing had not passed as well. President Johnson said, “The voices that blocked these safeguards [registration and licensing] were not the voices of an aroused nation. They were the voices of a powerful gun lobby that has prevailed for the moment in an election year” (Hunter 1968b). On January 15th, 1969, just five days before the end of his term, President Johnson provided his final State of the Union Address, which also served as his farewell address. During this speech, President Johnson lamented his failure to see firearms registration and licensing become a reality by calling it “one of the greatest disappointments that I carry with me” (The New York Times 1969a). We wouldn’t see the White House make a major push for restrictive gun control again until the Clinton administration in the 1990s. While restrictive bill proposals would continue in Congress, their momentum would be significantly impacted by a lack of presidential support. The 1960s in the U.S. were a very tumultuous time. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas by a sniper using a mail-order Italian rifle. In 1966, Charles Whitman massacred 13 people at the University of Texas. In 1968, both Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy were assassinated with a firearm. The 1960s were also a highwater mark for communitarian, or collectivist, values being translated into restrictive policy in the U.S. The measures proposed by Congress and by President Johnson were almost universally in support of protecting society over protecting individual liberty. President Johnson was quoted

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many times using statements that clearly demonstrated his support for these communitarian viewpoints. The restrictive bills pursued in Congress demonstrated the community-oriented value of protecting society at the cost of individual liberty. However, communitarian values were not able to run completely rough shod over individualistic values. Senators such as Roman Hruska and Mike Mansfield and Representatives such as Carl Albert often were quoted espousing viewpoints that aligned with individualism. They were able to delay, and ultimately prevent, the most restrictive policies sought by Congress and President Johnson. The 1960s were a high point for communitarian values in the White House and in Congress; however, while these values may have been unusually influential, they were insufficient to support achieving the level of gun control that Johnson and others ultimately wanted. If it wasn’t for the persistent influence of American individualism, the 1968 Gun Control Act would have been far more restrictive.

The Nixon Years: Restrictive Roll-Back and Punitive Individual Accountability While President Johnson was a strong advocate for restrictive gun control, President Nixon seemed to have weak preferences on the issue. In fact, President Nixon did not speak directly on the topic in 1969. With the presidency no longer actively pursuing restrictive firearms policy, those voices in Congress who had supported more controls lost their advantage. Some lenient policy change, specifically repealing certain aspects of the Gun Control Act, occurred during the Nixon Administration. Most of the other conversation in Washington about firearms revolved around punitive policies, such as mandatory minimum sentencing. The only restrictive policy that gained any traction was a Saturday Night Special ban. In sum, gun control policymaking in the Nixon era was mostly driven by a concern for individual rights and individual accountability. The opening shots for punitive policy were fired on July 23rd, 1969, when Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat from Montana, argued for stiff sentences for gun crimes as an alternative to restrictive gun laws, like the much-debated licensing and registration proposals of the Johnson era. He said, “Gun crime is a national disgrace, but licensing and registration inconvenience the law-abiding gun owner.” Senator Tydings, who in 1968 had proposed registration and licensing, countered that, “higher penalties do not help solve gun crimes” (The New York Times 1969b).

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While less publicized, lenient proposals were being introduced in Congress during this time period. There was already an effort to repeal the Gun Control Act of 1968, seemingly one piece at a time if necessary. One aspect of it that sporting goods stores, gun manufacturers, and hunters found particularly onerous was the requirement that sellers of all ammunition types be required to record the names, addresses, and ages of a buyer. In November, 1969, measures that would remove shotgun and rifle ammunition from these record keeping requirements cleared their final Congressional hurdle, a House and Senate conference committee, and headed to the President, who signed this GCA roll-back. Gun control advocates called the action the start of “piecemeal destruction of the gun control laws designed to prevent sales of guns and ammunition to criminals, minors, and insane people” (The New York Times 1969c). While the GCA was being scaled back, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved mandatory sentencing for federal crimes committed with a firearm. The punitive legislation would provide sentences of one to 10 years for first offenses and from two to 25 years for second offenses. These sentences would be in addition to those for the crime itself (The New York Times 1969c). Franklin Orth, of the NRA, proposed an interesting view on why this shift from a restrictive to punitive policymaking was taking place, “The present administration [Nixon] wants to largely disarm the criminal class while the previous one [the Johnson Administration] aimed at licensing and registering every person who might own a firearm.” Orth continued by stating, “There is a lot of legislation on firearms restriction which has been proposed, but not much interest in pushing it. There seems to be no great interest these days in the gun-control issue” (Barmash 1969). Several restrictive measures were proposed in Congress the beginning of 1970. These included a national registry on all firearms, and even bans on all firearms. These measures did not gain any real momentum. While these short-lived bills were being introduced, numerous op-eds and letters to the editor were published in the New York Times that raised a new firearms problem: the Saturday Night Special. Saturday Night Specials were very cheap and often poorly made handguns that were considered “junk guns.” In some instances, these pistols and handguns could be purchased for a little as $15.00 (approximately $115 in 2022). The major influx of dumped weapons after World War II had been curtailed by the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968, but the manufacturing and selling of Saturday Night Specials was viewed as a replacement for these

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cheap imports. While it is important to note that these cheap pistols and handguns were not yet being heavily discussed in Congress, or by the President, concerned citizens were becoming aware of them as a major problem (The New York Times 1970a). While the end of President Johnson’s term at the beginning of 1969 was a major impediment to the momentum for restrictive firearms controls, the defeat of gun control proponents in both the House and the Senate, including Senators Dodd and Tydings was another major blow. The biggest defeat for gun control proponents was Senator Tydings’s 1970 re-election campaign loss. Senator Tydings received intense pressure from the gun lobby, who actively sought his defeat. While his stance on firearms policy made him an enemy to the gun lobby, he had also supported Nixon Administration crime policy in urban and suburban areas, which led to him losing support from his base (Franklin 1970). Senator Tydings’ Press Secretary, Ernest A. Lotito, stated that he believed that the Senator had lost close to 30,000 votes due to his stance on gun control, which was a larger number of votes than he lost the election by. Mr. Lotito went on to say, “Nobody in his right mind is going to take on that issue again.” In his concession speech, Senator Tydings said, “One of the worst things about this is that it will be interpreted as a victory for the gun lobby.” Michael J. Parker, who led the organization Citizens Against Tydings stated plainly, “The gun issue beat him” (Franklin 1970). With gun control proponents reeling, on December 1, 1970, the House Ways and Means Committee unanimously approved a measure to exempt the sales of 0.22 caliber rimfire ammunition from the Gun Control Act. This was like the 1969 exemption that carved rifle and shotgun ammunition from the GCA’s requirement for buyers to provide their name, address, and age (The New York Times 1970b). While this proposal did not become law in 1970, it demonstrates the continued push by individual gun rights advocates to continue dismantling the 1968 Gun Control Act. In May of 1971, Representative John Murphy, Democrat from New York, urged Representative Emmanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, to hold hearings on the dangers of not closing a Saturday Night Specials loophole. The 1968 Gun Control Act had banned the importation of cheap weapons that the Department of the Treasury deemed had no sporting purpose. However, the legislation had not banned the import of cheap firearm parts that could then be

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assembled into a firearm. Representative Murphy stated that this was an egregious loophole that needed to be closed because of the high volume of cheap weapons that were now being imported as parts and then assembled and sold at a discount (Wicker 1971). Representative Murphy was supported by Representative Abner Mivka, an Illinois Democrat, who sought a ban on manufacturing and selling all handguns. However, Mivka thought that the House was unlikely to hold hearings on that issue. Referencing gun control backer Tydings loss, he said, The real problem in getting attention here is that Celler and others sympathetic to tightening gun controls think any effort will be futile. I think I could talk from now to doomsday that Tydings wasn’t knocked off by the [gun] lobby, but a lot of Congressmen would continue to think he was. My colleagues say they can’t afford to sponsor my bill…There’s nobody even second to the NRA as a lobby. They are working down there at the precinct level. You can’t beat something with nothing-and those of us who want tough controls have virtually nothing. There is no organization on our side. You can’t take on the gun lobby with good will. (Sherrill, 1971)

While the Saturday Night Special issue was not pursued by the House Judiciary Committee, hearings were held in the Senate Judiciary Committee. On September 13th, the Senate Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee convened with Senator Birch Bayh, Indiana Democrat and chairman of the committee, seeking to amend the Gun Control Act of 1968 to close the Saturday Night Special loophole. Interestingly, another member of the subcommittee, Senator Edward Kennedy, Democrat from Massachusetts, had also proposed a much stricter version of the bill. Senators Bayh and Kennedy, while both Democrats and both supporters of more control, did not support one another’s bill. Congressional observers at the time argued that this rift was due to each wanting to seek the Democratic nomination for President. They were trying to use gun control as a feather in their caps and thus they wanted their version of the bill to be passed (Sherrill 1971). The first five and a half months of 1972 saw few firearms-related policy proposals in Congress. The New York Times published no articles on firearms during this time period and President Nixon, as was his norm, made no public statements. However, on May 15th, 1972, Alabama Governor George Wallace, while campaigning for the presidency in Maryland, was shot and wounded by would-be assassin Arthur Herman

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Bremer. The weapon that Bremer used was a snub nosed 0.38 and would have been considered a Saturday Night Special. This shooting would garner the attention of both the President and Congress. On June 26th, President Nixon expressed his interest in controlling Saturday Night Specials. Nixon said, I have always thought that there should be a federal law for the control of handguns. The problem there is to write the law, the legislation, in such a way that it is precise and deals with that kind of handgun which ought to be controlled. And I am referring to Saturday Night Specials. These are the ones where you would have Federal jurisdiction because many of them come in from abroad, being imported from abroad, and it would be particularly a matter for Federal control. I believe, however, that the legislation, if it is therefore precisely written-and we have been cooperating with the Senate committee, particularly with Senator Hruska, in attempting to work out the proper language-that Congress should pass such as a law, and I will sign it, ruling out Saturday Night Specials, which I think is the major source of this kind of crime. (Nixon 1972)

The fact that President Nixon cited Senator Hruska, a longtime ally of the NRA and enemy to most gun control, as the person his administration would need to work with the most for the creation of this ban on Saturday Night Specials indicates how lukewarm President Nixon was to significant restrictions on handguns. Later that summer the Senate voted 71-21 on a measure repealing the Gun Control Act controls on over-the-counter sale of 0.22 caliber ammunition. This bill also increased penalties for those who used, or carried, firearms during the commission of a federal felony. The Nixon Administration supported these measures. Senator Adlai Stevenson, Democrat from Illinois, attempted to add an amendment to the bill that would require the registration of all handguns and the licensing of all handgun owners, but it was voted down by a 75-16 margin (Hunter 1972). What is interesting about this vote is that it saw the passage of a punitive and lenient proposal, while a bill with restrictive measures was still being mulled in the Senate. This is an excellent illustration of how no one policy type was able to come to dominance in the 1970s, but restrictive measures were in the weakest position. The proposed ban on the manufacturing of snub-nosed pistols and handguns was still languishing in the House Judiciary Committee at the start of 1973. Senator Bayh, the sponsor of the bill in the Senate, said that

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he saw no reason to pick up the bill again due to the lack of attention it was receiving in the House. The lack of interest in pursuing gun control in the House did not stop Senators from proposing restrictive bills. Restrictive bills that received attention from the New York Times were Senator Kennedy’s bill that sought registration for all firearms, and licensing of all firearms owners, as well as a bill proposed by Senator Phillip Hart, Democrat from Michigan, that would ban the private ownership of all handguns. Both bills had been voted on in the Senate in 1972 and had been rejected by gigantic margins (Associated Press 1973). While restrictive bills were still being proposed, albeit with little support, punitive bills were gaining support in the Senate. In early April of 1973, the Senate voted on and approved a law that would set mandatory prison sentences for anyone convicted of using firearms to commit a federal felony. The passage of this legislation in the Senate came on the heels of President Nixon requesting that Congress pass tough minimum sentencing laws. The bill moved forward to the House Judiciary Committee, which was led by newly appointed chair Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Democrat from New Jersey, who replaced the recently defeated Representative Emmanuel Celler. Representative Celler had been viewed as being very hostile toward minimum sentencing, but Representative Rodino was seen as less rigid (Rosenbaum 1973). However, Rodino’s House Judiciary Committee still would not vote on the Senate bill. While completely outside the realm of gun control policy, by July of 1973, Congress, especially Rodino’s Judiciary Committee, was focused on the Watergate scandal. Gun control policy would not be discussed in Congress, or by the President, again with any sense of seriousness until 1975, well after the resignation of President Nixon on August 9th, 1974. During the Nixon Administration, many supporters of restrictive gun control were removed from office. A small minority of Representatives and Senators were still calling for new restrictions, but their proposals gained little momentum. This lack of momentum was often driven by the fear of how supporting gun control could threaten re-election. While President Johnson had been an advocate for restrictive policy, President Nixon was viewed as a supporter of punitive measures. President Nixon was also much more apathetic toward gun control policy in general. The early 1970s saw the rise of the Saturday Night Special as the most discussed firearm problem in the U.S. At various times, it appeared that momentum for banning Saturday Night Specials would break through,

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but due to a lack of interest from the House of Representatives this did not happen during Nixon’s presidency. During this same time period, proponents of lenient bills chipped away at the Gun Control Act of 1968. Several record keeping requirements for ammunition were removed. While these victories were relatively small in nature, it demonstrates how lenient proposals were able to gain momentum during the Nixon years. Punitive bills gained significant momentum in the Senate and were supported by the Nixon Administration; however, they were not able to make progress in the House, particularly in the Judiciary Committee.

Stalemate: Punitive-Lenient Ford and Restrictive Congress In the wake of Nixon’s resignation, President Gerald Ford was sworn into office on August 9th, 1974. Over fifty gun control bills were proposed in Congress during 1975. They ranged from restrictive measures like a complete ban on firearms to a lenient proposal to fully repeal the Gun Control Act of 1968. While many bills were introduced in 1975, only a few of these measures gained any real momentum in Congress, with President Ford, or in the coverage of the New York Times. In February of 1975, the House Judiciary Committee met to discuss the potential for more gun control laws. Representative John Conyers, Democrat from Michigan, and chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime said, “I don’t see how we can hold hearings in 1975 and not do something. The public is literally screaming for something to be done.” A key piece of legislation that was being discussed in the House Judiciary Committee had been proposed by Representative Jonathan B. Bingham, Democrat from New York. Bingham said, “I think we are literally out of our minds to allow 2.5 million new weapons to be manufactured every year for the sole purpose of killing people.” While Representatives Conyers and Bingham argued for their restrictive proposals, another member of the committee, Representative Robert Sikes, Democrat from Florida, resisted these calls by highlighting the role guns play in self-defense: “Firearms are used by American citizens to protect their lives, families, and property. The need to possess them for self-defense today is as great, if not greater, than in earlier periods of our nation’s history” (Hicks 1975a). By early April Senator Phillip Hart and Representative Bingham had each introduced the same bill in the House and the Senate. Their bill

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was essentially a handgun ban that called for the prohibition of the importation, manufacture, sale, purchase, transfer, receipt, possession, or transportation of handguns, except for or by members of the armed forces, law enforcement officials, and as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, licensed importers, manufacturers, dealers, antique collectors, and pistol clubs. It was supported by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Council for a Responsible Firearms Policy, and a large number of police chiefs from major cities. The bill was resisted by many members of Congress, the NRA, and other pro-gun rights groups (Hicks 1975b). The Bingham-Hart bills’ goal was to help get Saturday Night Specials off the street, but it would also have eliminated higher quality handguns as well. This would counter the NRA proposal of implementing quality control measures into how the Department of the Treasury determined what firearms could not be imported, which in essence, was a way to work around the Gun Control Act of 1968. President Ford made his first public statement as President on firearms and crime in June of 1975. He called on Congress to enact new laws to impose mandatory minimum sentences for certain violent or dangerous Federal crimes. While Ford focused on advocating for punitive policy, he did voice some support for additional gun restrictions. He said that he was “unalterably opposed to federal registration of firearms…Congress should move to ban the domestic manufacture, assembly or sale—but not the possession—of cheap handguns known as Saturday Night Specials” (Crewsdon 1975). With this statement, President Ford demonstrated that while he was not going to be as tough on firearms as President Johnson, he would be more supportive of restrictive policy than his predecessor was. The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime continued meeting to discuss potential restrictive measures into the summer of 1975. One major aspect of these hearings was that the committee finally, after close to five years of discussion, had come up with a formal definition for what would be considered a Saturday Night Special. Saturday Night Specials would be defined as guns that would not qualify for importation into the U.S. and were made of poor-quality materials that sold for less than $50, fired bullets of 0.32 caliber or less and had a barrel length less than three inches. The goal of the subcommittee was to provide a clear and concrete definition of Saturday Night Specials so that they could eventually pass legislation that would ban them (King 1975a).

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In July of 1975, the Ford Administration began crafting a piece of legislation that would change how federal licenses were issued to gun dealers and it would result in drastically limiting the number issued each year. The Ford Administration hoped to dramatically reduce the number of gun dealers from 156,000 to 40,000. The goal of this legislation was to eliminate gun dealers who were not carefully checking the credentials of gun purchasers. Under the existing law, these licenses were issued automatically upon application and fee payment. The Ford Administration also stated that they would continue seeking bans on Saturday Night Specials (Hicks 1975c). Squeaky Fromme nearly assassinated President Ford with her handgun on September 5th, 1975. The President made a brief statement after the assassination attempt where he applauded California’s gun laws. He thanked the “California Legislature for moving somewhat faster than Congress has on some of my recommendations, such as mandatory prison sentences for crimes involving firearms” (Ford 1975a). Ford survived another assassination attempt just over two weeks later. As he had in the wake of the first attack, President Ford gave public remarks about firearms immediately after this assassination attempt: I did recommend to the Congress early this year a rather comprehensive approach to crime control, a new proposal that would make it much more difficult for individuals to get what we call Saturday night specials, which are the cheap handguns that are used extensively for illegal purposes. In addition, I proposed to the Congress that we have much more severe penalties for a person using a gun in the commission of some other crime and for mandatory sentences in order to get people who use guns in the process of committing a crime or alleged crime. It seems to me that that approach is far, far better than the approach of some people who recommend that gun owners should be registered and that handguns and long guns ought to be registered. I prefer to go after the person who uses the gun for an illegal or criminal purpose. That, to me, is a far better approach than the one where you require registration of the individual or the gun. (Ford 1975b)

President Ford’s public comments immediately after the assassination— which emphasized holding individuals accountable for their actions, rather than restricting them—helped to thwart a push for major restrictive gun control legislation. However, these two attempts did bring gun control back into the national conversation.

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Representative Conyers proposed a bill that would outlaw the private ownership of pistols. Representative Robert McClorey, Republican from Illinois, proposed legislation that would require the registration of firearms and the licensing of firearm owners. However, support for these two bills immediately hit a roadblock when Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, said that he saw “constitutional problems with the Conyers bill and that he had no reason to believe that registration and licensing would deter anyone with a gun crazy enough to kill the President.” Reluctance to pursue more gun control was a sentiment felt throughout Congress. One aide to an anonymous Representative stated: “In private, my boss would probably agree that private citizens have no business owning concealable pistols, but he would never dare say so in public. There something special about guns to the people who own them” (Rosenbaum 1975). This aide clearly understood the symbolic power that is often associated with gun ownership and that animates resistance to gun control. After the two attempts on President Ford’s life, gun control proponents believed that the prospects were good for a successful a gun control bill in 1975. One of these proponents was Michael J. Harrington, Democrat from Massachusetts and strong supporter of a ban on the manufacturing and distribution of any pistols, except for police. Representative Harrington’s aide stated: I think what we’ll get is a Saturday Night Special bill. Representative Harrington is disgusted and disappointed because the Saturday Night Special approach doesn’t go far enough at all. It doesn’t even begin to address the problem. All you have to do is look at those two handguns used in the Ford attempts. They were not Saturday Night Specials. (King 1975b)

However, Congressional gun control proponents such as Senators Hart and Bayh said that they found it almost impossible to pass a strong, broad bill to control pistols in the face of opposition from the gun manufacturers and the National Rifle Association (King 1975b). In October of 1975, President Ford gave remarks that reiterated his support for punitive policies and his opposition to most of the restrictive measures that were being debated in Congress. He said:

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I do not think that the registration of guns nor the registration of gun owners is the way to handle the problem. In my judgment, we have some good laws on the books that, if enforced—which means prosecution, conviction with a jail sentence—we would have a big impact on the people who illegally use guns. Now, I have also recommended to the Congress some legislation that would provide mandatory prison sentences for people who use guns in the carrying out of violent crime. I wish the Congress would pass that legislation. We have to prosecute, convict, and put in jail those people who illegally use guns. And if we do, I think we can have a substantial impact on the bad use of firearms. (Ford 1975c)

Ford was clearly focused on punishing deviant individual behavior and he was unwilling to accept any restrictions on the ability of individual Americans to use their guns for traditionally lawful purposes. He went on to say that, It is the person who uses the gun that causes the trouble. What we have to do is to make certain that the people who use the gun are punished. And if you will recall from the crime message that I submitted to the Congress several months ago, we provided for stricter legislation so that a person using a gun in an attempt or in the actual committing of a crime, that person had a mandatory sentence and went to jail. This is the way, in my opinion, to prevent the illegal use of guns and not penalize the people who are collectors or individuals who properly use guns. I have not yet been convinced that the gun is the culprit. It is the person who uses the gun that ought to be punished for illegal purposes. (Ford 1975d)

However, after stating he did not believe firearms themselves were the issue, President Ford did say that we should be placing restrictions on guns known as Saturday Night Specials (Ford 1975d). President Ford spoke about gun policy frequently while campaigning in 1976. He mostly continued to advocate for punitive policy, while reiterating his opposition to several restrictive measures, in an attempt to try and galvanize support from gun owners. For example, on February 8th, 1976, President Ford stated: My basic philosophy is that we should make it as difficult as possible for the person with a criminal intent to have possession so he can use a handgun. You can do this in a number of ways. Number one, I think we should stiffen the penalties for those individuals who commit a crime while in the

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possession of a handgun. This includes, for those type of crimes, mandatory criminal prison sentences. In addition, I think we should extend the restrictions on the availability of so-called Saturday night specials. The Congress passed about 4 years ago [Gun Control Act of 1968] a law prohibiting the importation of Saturday night specials. That has not been effective, because the importers send the parts over and Americans put them together and then sell them. I have recommended to the Congress— and I hope it passes it—a strict limitation on the sale of so-called cheap Saturday night specials...I am categorically opposed to the registration of guns and/or the individuals who own handguns. (Ford 1976a)

So, while he mostly wanted to focus on punishing those misusing guns, while not restricting the freedom of those who do not misuse them, he continued to make an exception for cheap, low quality, and not particularly popular handguns. While President Ford was on the campaign trail, Congress also mulled potential firearms legislation. The House Judiciary Committee voted to send a bill that would have banned the manufacture and sale of approximately 70% of handguns in the U.S. back to subcommittee. This disappointed gun control advocates, like that committee’s Chair, Peter Rodino, who suggested that it would be very difficult to get any additional revisions and a vote on the bill because it was an election year (Hicks 1976a). However, the bill was eventually pared down and therefore revived somewhat. The revised version of would only ban the manufacture of Saturday Night Specials, but not the possession or sale of the existing supply of them, or any other guns. The weaker bill was met with outright hostility from proponents of strong gun control, such as Representative Harrington, who said, “It’s useless and does damage to the cause.” Harrington’s concern was that the passage of what was deemed a very weak handgun control bill would lead to the death of all momentum for more restrictive controls. Thus, he said that he, and many of his allies who sought strong handgun controls, would vote against the bill (Hicks 1976b). The ban on Saturday Night Specials would not materialize in 1976. While Congress went silent on firearms proposals after the failure of the Saturday Night Specials bill, President Ford continued pursuing punitive measures and resisting most restrictive measures. On April 2nd, 1976, President Ford stated:

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I have long been an adamant opponent of the registration of guns or the registration of gun owners, period…I believe that we should pass legislation to make mandatory certain penalties for those individuals who commit a crime in the possession of a gun, period. (Ford 1976b)

On April 22nd, President Ford said: I suggested to the Congress that we tighten up the control of these cheap handguns called Saturday Night Specials…those cheap handguns are not guns that any gun fancier keeps. Those guns are cheap, inaccurate guns that ought not to be on the street…I don’t want anybody in this audience to get the wrong impression. I am not for the kind of gun control that some people advocate. I do not believe we should penalize the legitimate owner of a firearm, period. I, therefore, am opposed to the registration of a gun owner, and I am opposed to the registration of handguns. (Ford 1976c)

Again, on April 28th, Ford spoke further about being adamantly against ever registering any gun owner, and never wanting to register any firearm, and that he fully supported mandatory penalties for those who use a firearm in the commission of a felony (Ford 1976d). For the remainder of the spring and most of the summer, President Ford made no public statements on firearms. On September 26th, 1976, as the election neared, he said: Gosh, I think we ought to make it very clear right now. All right-believing people who are law-abiding ought to have the traditional right under the Constitution to retain firearms for their own national [sic] protection, period. I don’t think you should have to go down and register your gun or your firearm if you want to go hunting, and you won’t under a Ford administration. (Ford 1976e)

These statements were clearly made to gain the votes of gun rights supporters for the upcoming presidential election. This is the clearest rights-laden expression of individualistic values that we have seen from Ford thus far. He is clearly trying to frame his argument in a way that will appeal to classically American conceptions of individual freedom. President Ford’s last public statement on firearms came on October 22nd, 1976, a couple of weeks before his eventual defeat to Jimmy Carter. He doubled-down on his punitive message and to generally preserve an

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individual’s ability to own and use guns for traditionally lawful purposes. Ford stated: The record of gun control, whether it’s in one city or another or in some States does not show that the registration of a gun, handgun, or the registration of the gun owner has in any way whatsoever decreased the crime rate or the use of that gun in the committing of a crime…And, therefore, I think the better way is to go after the criminal, the individual who commits a crime in the possession of a gun and uses that gun for a part of his criminal activity. Those are the people who ought to be in jail. And the only way to do it is to pass strong legislation so that once apprehended, indicted, convicted, they will be in jail and off the streets and not using guns in the commission of a crime…You should not, in the process, penalize the legitimate handgun owner. And when you go through the process of registration, you, in effect, are penalizing that individual who uses his gun for a very legitimate purpose. (Ford 1976f)

Very few proposals of any type were discussed in Congress in 1976. This was likely due to it being an election year. However, President Ford discussed all three types of gun policies during the year. As it got closer and closer to Election Day, President Ford began discussing restrictive policy—primarily a Saturday Night Special ban—less and began advocating for lenient and punitive policies more forcefully. The progression of Ford’s statements from mildly restrictive to punitive-lenient likely was related to his desire to gain support from gun rights supporters in the Republican Party. However, by referencing concepts like rights and freedom, the language he framed his arguments with was clearly designed to appeal to a wider section of the American electorate. Ultimately, Ford was defeated by Carter for the presidency.

The Carter Years: Gun Control Cease Fire? Jimmy Carter made no public comments about firearms policy during his first year as president. Likewise, the New York Times did not run any articles in 1977 that discussed the potential for creating new firearms policy. Bills of each policy type were proposed in Congress, but these proposals did not gain any momentum. They consisted of the restrictive measure of licensing firearms owners as well as the punitive measure of adding penalties and mandatory sentencing for those who use firearms during the commission of a felony. The lenient measures of repealing the Gun

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Control Act of 1968 and providing tax exemptions to firearms manufacturers were also proposed as bills. None of these went anywhere in 1977. Overall, it was a very quiet year for firearms policy. President Carter did not make any public statements on firearms in 1978 either. However, the Carter administration appeared to make a move on regulating firearms via executive action. On April 23, 1978, Rex D. Davis, Director of the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, discussed pending rules that the agency was considering. He said that the rules were, “designed to prevent the criminal misuse of firearms and are not in any way intended to interfere with the lawful possession or use of guns.” The new rules would require all new firearms to carry a special serial number, and gun manufacturers, importers, and dealers would be required to report the theft, or loss, of firearms to the bureau within 24 hours. In addition, quarterly reports on all sales would be necessary, but the names and addresses of individual purchasers would not be reported. Pro-firearm Republican John M. Ashbrook, Republican from Ohio, saw the rules as a means for the Carter Administration to circumvent Congress on the issue of whether guns should be centrally registered (The New York Times 1978a). On May 26th, 1978, the Treasury Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms pledged that they would not put any of the new proposed regulations into effect without approval from Congress. The reason for this change of heart was that both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had voted nearly unanimously to cut off all funding to the ATF for the proposed programs. The primary reason that Congress appeared to have voted to prevent funding for these regulations was due to the influence of the National Rifle Association. Both Congress and the Treasury Department were lobbied heavily by members of the NRA to prevent the regulations from being put into place. The Treasury Department alone received over 200,000 letters on the topic. NRA members argued that the regulations were the first steps to a national gun registry (The New York Times 1978b). On February 27th, 1979, the Treasury Department officially withdrew all proposed firearms regulations. A release by the Treasury Department stated that “the proposals did not amount to gun registration and would not have required reports on the names or addresses of private citizens. However, these proposals, which generated the most comments from the public, will not be considered again in the foreseeable future” (The New York Times 1979).

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Much like the years before it, 1980 was rather quiet on the issue of gun control. President Carter did not speak publicly on firearms, the New York Times published only three articles that pertained to federal gun control, and there were very few measures in Congress: there were no new restrictive proposals, punitive measures sought mandatory minimum sentencing, and lenient measures again sought the repeal of the Gun Control Act of 1968 as well as tax exemptions for gun manufacturers. Basically, 1980 was quiet like the preceding few years were. Two interesting harbingers of what was to come were presented in 1980. The first of these came in the form of an editorial on August 4, 1980, discussing how Senator James McClure, Republican from Idaho, and Representative Harold Volkmer, Democrat from Missouri, had proposed a bill that would seriously undercut the 1968 Gun Control Act. The McClure-Volkmer Bill, would be one of the most popular firearms related topics of the first half of the 1980s, and it would eventually be passed into law in 1986 (The New York Times 1980). The second harbinger was seen in campaign promises made during the 1980 presidential election. President Carter, who had campaigned on gun registration in 1976, had fully backed away from any firearms policy while he was in office because of the negative reaction he thought it would encounter in Congress. Thus, President Carter continued to remain quiet on the topic of firearms. Ronald Reagan, on the other hand had clearly stated that, “I don’t happen to be one who believes that by making it more difficult for law-abiding citizens to get firearms you’re going to stop crime” (Rosenbaum, October 25th, 1980). The early 1980s would amount to a high-water mark for lenient measures and proposals. Strong support for new lenient gun control legislation was present in both the House and the Senate throughout the early 1980s, and President Reagan shared this anti-gun control sentiment.

Reagan and the Era of Individual Responsibility On December 8th, 1980, world-famous Beatles front-man John Lennon was shot and killed outside of his home in New York. Lennon’s murder, along with the attempted assassination of President Reagan on March 30th, 1981, revived the seemingly forgotten discussion of the Saturday Night Special and generally reignited the gun control conversation in Congress. Members from both chambers argued for restrictive and punitive policies the day after the assassination attempt. Those who supported

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restrictive measures did not believe that there was much hope of seeing any new gun control legislation passed into law. However, momentum for more punitive measures would continue to grow throughout the early 1980s. On March 31st, 1981, the day after the attempt on Reagan’s life, an import ban on unassembled cheap gun parts was back on the table. Senator Strom Thurmond, Republican from South Carolina, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and longtime enemy of gun control stated that he would support such a ban. He would also introduce legislation that would require local law enforcement agencies to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation whenever they arrested someone carrying a weapon near a president, or a presidential candidate. However, many members of Congress were pessimistic that any new laws would pass. House Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill Jr., Democrat from Massachusetts, said, “I doubt that a general gun control bill would meet with very much success around here. Personally, I’m for gun control, but these are the facts of life.” Other Representatives argued that instead of focusing on gun control; Congress should focus on increased penalties for people who use firearms in violent crimes. Representative Thomas S. Foley, Democrat from Washington and House Majority Whip, stated: “There is a much greater likelihood that the opinion will coalesce around the idea that when guns are used in a crime tougher penalties should be provided.” However, Representative Hughes, Democrat from New Jersey, still thought restrictive measures needed to be enacted. He said, “I hope this event wakes people up to the insanity of a system that allows people to buy handguns as if they were lollipops” (Roberts 1981). On April 22nd, President Reagan dampened the momentum for restrictive gun control policy. When asked if he thought concealed weapon laws should be reviewed, President Reagan responded by saying: Your District of Columbia here has such a law. But a man was carrying a concealed weapon [referring to John Hinckley, Reagan’s would be assassin]. So, I don’t see where we believe that adding another law that probably will be just as unenforceable as this one is going to make a difference. In fact, if anything, I’m a little disturbed that focusing on gun control as an answer to the crime problem today could very well be diverting us from really paying attention to what needs to be done if we’re to solve the crime problem. (Reagan 1981)

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Reagan’s comments showed disdain toward gun control but encouraged a discussion of crime control and increased penalties for those who use firearms in a violent manner. Basically, he supported punitive measures, but he would not support restrictive policies. On June 16th, 1981, President Reagan continued pressing his case for punitive measures. In a news conference, he suggested that instead of creating national gun control, Congress should consider enacting laws like those that were in effect in California at the time. The California law added 5 to 15 years to a prison sentence for defendants who carried a firearm while committing a crime. During the press conference, President Reagan also stated that he thought gun control laws were “virtually unenforceable.” So, without the President’s support, conversation about new restrictive gun control largely came to a halt in Congress (King 1981). By September 1981, it was clear that Reagan was not content with just preventing new gun control policy, he also sought to eliminate the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the main federal regulatory body for firearms. The Administration argued that it wanted to do this for budgetary reasons. However, gun control advocates, such as Michael K. Beard, executive director of the National Coalition to Ban Handguns, saw the NRA’s hand at work. He said, “I fear it may be a major step backward and another victory for the NRA.” The NRA had run an effective nationwide television smear campaign against the ATF calling them “jackbooted fascists” whose sole goal was to harass law-abiding gun owners. High level officials in the ATF were quoted as saying, “They’re wiping us out. The NRA has finally won.” ATF Bureau Chief G. R. Dickerson was also quoted as saying, “The ATF is being destroyed by cuts that are in a large measure due to the NRA campaign against us” (Gailey 1981a). In December of 1981, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on a bill that was sponsored by Senator James McClure, Republican from Idaho and Representative Harold L. Volkmer, Democrat from Missouri. Their legislation, which would evolve into the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, was designed to significantly undermine the Gun Control Act of 1968. At this hearing, Senator Quentin Burdick, Democrat from North Dakota, said that in the haste to enact broad gun control legislation after the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Senator Robert F. Kennedy; Congress had ignored basic aspects of criminal and constitutional law. Senator Burdick went on to say, “The result [of the 1968 Gun Control Act] has been a regulatory nightmare, with honest,

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law-abiding gun owners and gun dealers the subject of oppressive bureaucratic harassment and unjustified prosecution” (The New York Times 1981). These members of Congress sought the dissolution of the 1968 Gun Control Act, as well as the ATF, as a means to expand gun rights. By the end of 1981, the McClure-Volkmer bill had gained significant support in Congress, with 57 cosponsors in the Senate and 166 cosponsors in the House. Among other things, it would limit federal control of gun dealers, eliminate the restrictions on the interstate sale of firearms, force the government to pay attorney fees in firearms cases it loses, require that authorities prove that violators intended to break the law and make it easier for convicted felons to purchase firearms. While momentum for the bill appeared to be growing, Donald E. Fraher, legislative director of Handgun Control Inc. thought that the support would fade. He said: I think support for the McClure-Volkmer bill is a mile wide and a half inch deep… I think a lot of Senators and Congressmen signed on for political reasons, not knowing what the bill would really do. How can any member of Congress be in favor of making it easier for convicted felons to buy a gun when they get out of prison? (Gailey 1981b)

The battle over the McClure-Volkmer Bill would continue for the next five years. In two separate speeches, made on April 15th and May 10th of 1982, President Reagan continued his push to impose increased penalties on violent criminals. The theme of both speeches is captured in this excerpt, from the April 15th speech: I don’t believe there’s any way you can keep the criminal from getting a gun, just as you can’t keep them from trying to steal anything they want. Now, the law that we passed in California, I heartily recommend to any society. We passed a law that said if a criminal is convicted of a crime and had in his possession a gun at the time he committed the crime, whether he used it or not, add 5 to 15 years to the prison sentence. And on top of that, then passed another law that said no judge can find a prisoner guilty who had a gun in the commission of a crime, and then give him probation. He must go to prison. And I think making it so costly to carry a gun is far more enforceable than trying to keep them from getting it. Washington, D.C., has probably the strictest gun laws in the United States, and there are some 20,000 gun laws now in the United States. And yet March 30th a year ago, a young man that disabled me—he was in Washington, D.C.,

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in broad daylight, out on the public street, standing, made his way among the press corps as I came out of the building, and all those laws did not keep him from having a gun and not only shooting me but shooting three other people. (Reagan 1982)

President Reagan’s statements proved to be very difficult for gun control proponents to counter. Reagan was himself a victim of a violent gun crime, yet he still vigorously defended firearms. He argued that if someone used a firearm inappropriately, they should be the one punished, not the law-abiding citizens. His support for increased penalties to criminals who use a firearm to commit a crime was a message that resonated clearly with those who supported individualistic values. This was the era of personal responsibility. With President Reagan being a staunch supporter of individualistic values and opposed to gun control, those in Congress who supported restrictive policies were virtually silent during 1981 and 1982. In 1983, very few restrictive measures were introduced in the House or the Senate. The measures that were introduced primarily focused on the interstate movement of firearms. On the punitive front, there was a continued push by both chambers to increase penalties for using a firearm to commit crimes. Lenient policy was actually passed into law during 1983. On January 27, 1983, President Reagan signed amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968 into law. These changes were first proposed in 1970, but they didn’t pass both houses until 1982. The amendments removed record keeping requirements for 0.22 caliber rimfire ammunition. President Reagan stated: Prior to this, dealers were required to verify and record the identity, birthdate, and ammunition type for most retail ammunition sales. Since several billion rounds of ammunition are sold to sportsmen and sportswomen each year, a tremendous amount of time and paperwork was involved in recording these sales. Yet there was little evidence that these record-keeping requirements were of significant use in solving crimes. These amendments will remove needless record-keeping requirements for the most popular sporting ammunition, the .22 rimfire, and thus eliminate the paperwork on over a billion rounds annually. (Reagan 1983a)

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Signing these amendments into law was a significant victory in the longrunning campaign of gun rights advocates to tear apart the Gun Control Act of 1968. On May 6th, 1983, President Reagan demonstrated how seriously he supported gun rights by being the first sitting president to speak at the annual meeting of the National Rifle Association. He used the opportunity to continue to advance punitive and lenient policy, saying, The NRA believes that America’s laws were made to be obeyed and that our constitutional liberties are just as important today as 200 years ago. And by the way, the Constitution does not say that government shall decree the right to keep and bear arms. The Constitution says “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” No group does more to promote gun safety and respect for the laws of this land than the NRA, and I thank you. Still, we’ve both heard the charge that supporting gun owners rights encourages a violent, shoot-em-up society. Don’t they understand that most violent crimes are not committed by decent, law-abiding citizens. They’re committed by career criminals. Guns don’t make criminals. Hard-core criminals use guns. And locking them up, the hard-core criminals up, and throwing away the key is the best gun-control law we could ever have…And as we crack down on criminals, we’re trying to move forward on another front: to reform the firearms laws which needlessly interfere with the rights of legitimate gun owners like yourselves…I look forward to signing a bill that truly protects the rights of law-abiding citizens, without diminishing the effectiveness of criminal law enforcement against the misuse of firearms. There’s only one way to get real gun control: Disarm the thugs and the criminals, lock them up, and if you don’t actually throw away the key, at least lose it for a long time. (Reagan 1983b)

Reagan’s speech to the NRA was laden with statements that reflected, and appealed to, individualistic values. He advocated for maximum individual freedom and maximum accountability for individuals who misuse their freedom. As was often the case with election years, gun control advocacy on Capitol Hill and at the White House tended to die down, and 1984 was not an exception to this. There were no restrictive bills introduced in the Senate. There was a bill proposed in the House, by William J. Hughes, Democrat from New Jersey that sought to ban armor piercing bullets. However, Hughes pulled the bill after pressure from House Speaker

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O’Neill. The Speaker and many Democrats in the House did not want to draw the ire of the National Rifle Association during an election year (New York Times, May 19, 1985). There were a few bills proposed in both the House and the Senate that sought increased penalties for those who use firearms inappropriately; however, these gained no momentum in Congress or in the media. For instances, the New York Times did not have any articles that substantially discussed gun control proposals in 1984. Only President Reagan spoke on firearms in 1984, and he only spoke about them once to reiterate the value of imposing more penalties on those who commit violent crimes. With the election in the rear-view, there was a lot of activity in Congress on restrictive and lenient measures during 1985. Representative Hughes once again proposed a ban on armor piercing ammunition, and the McClure-Volkmer bill would pass the Senate. Interestingly, President Reagan made no public statements on firearms in 1985. By May of 1985, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, which was chaired by Representative Hughes, had begun to hold hearings discussing the ban on armor piercing ammunition. Hughes’s bill was co-sponsored by Representative Biaggi, Democrat from New York. The bill would have eliminated the production, importation, and sale of armor piercing bullets. Representative Jack Brooks, Democrat from Texas, proposed an alternative bill that would seek to ban the importation and manufacturing of armor piercing bullets, but would not prevent them from being sold. The Brooks bill was supported by the NRA. However, police organizations, which historically were an ally of the NRA, supported the Hughes-Biaggi Bill. Thomas Murphy, vice president of the New Jersey State Police Benevolent Association said, “We are not out to stop sportsmen from hunting, but what are they going to hunt with armor piercing bullets, tanks?” (The New York Times 1985). While banning armor piercing bullets was being debated in the House, the Senate continued to move the McClure-Volkmer bill forward. On July 9th, 1985, the Senate approved measures that would make it easier to purchase and transport a firearm by an overwhelming 79-15 vote. The bill would make it legal to buy a firearm from a gun dealer in a different state as long as the sale was in person and did not violate state laws, federal officials would only be allowed one inspection a year of gun dealer records, prosecutors would have to prove that gun laws were being violated with the intent to commit a crime when someone was arrested, gun owners could now transport firearms across state lines as long as the firearm

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was unloaded and inaccessible, and gun dealers would be given more freedom to sell firearms at gun shows. After the vote, Senator McClure stated: “People will find it a little easier to exercise their rights to own and use guns” (Roberts 1985). However, while the bill was passed in the Senate there were serious concerns that it would not have the same level of success in the House. The McClure-Volkmer bill was met with immediate opposition in the House of Representatives and pro-gun control groups also lined up against it. House Judiciary Chair Peter Rodino was quoted as saying the bill was “dead on arrival” to his committee. Rodino and other House members who were against the bill had some important new allies: police groups. After the National Rifle Association helped kill legislation that would have banned armor piercing bullets, police groups such as the Fraternal Order of Police, the National Sheriffs Association, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, and the National Troopers Association, actively began opposing NRA efforts at the state and federal level. A spokesperson for police groups said, “We in the law-enforcement community are very disturbed with the provisions of the bill that would permit face-to face interstate sale of handguns. This we firmly believe would undermine state and local laws and make our job of protecting the public more difficult.” Jerald Vaughn, director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police stated: “We are imploring members of Congress, asking them not to turn the clock back. This bill will not help law enforcement. It will only create more problems.” Richard A. Boyd, national president of the Fraternal Order of Police, said that his organization felt “embittered toward the NRA” after their opposition to the armor piercing bullet ban. He went on to say, “They [the NRA] are in this for the gun dealers. I don’t know why. We still support them [the NRA] on the right to bear arms and we are with them on opposing the registration of firearms” (Herbers 1985). The NRA’s support for armor piercing ammunition, plus their support for easing many federal gun laws, had alienated police groups. Debate on the McClure-Volkmer bill would continue to dominate the conversation about gun control into 1986. However, a new restrictive measure would be born that year: the push to ban plastic/undetectable firearms. This discussion would gain momentum in the second half of 1986.

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After its passage in the Senate, the McClure-Volkmer bill’s fate appeared to be resting in the hands of the House Judiciary Committee, particularly Chairman Rodino. He was a staunch supporter of gun control and had boldly claimed that the McClure-Volkmer bill would be “dead on arrival” when it arrived at his committee. However, a House rule, called a discharge petition, allows for a majority of members of the House to vote to force a bill out of a committee. The McClure-Volkmer bill received one of these petitions and was thus released from the Judiciary Committee. After the bill was discharged, Representative Rodino wrote a letter to the New York Times imploring the American people to stand with police groups and fight the NRA (Rodino 1986). On April 12th, 1986, the House voted to pass the McClure-Volkmer bill. The bill eased record keeping requirements for gun dealers and lifted the ban on the sale of rifles and shotguns across state lines. Gun control supporters were able to preserve the ban on the interstate sale of handguns but they considered this a paltry victory. Police groups continued to rally against the McClure-Volkmer bill right up until its passage. These groups argued that some 700 police officers had been killed with a firearm in the line of duty during the previous 10 years and that the passage of this legislation would make their jobs even less safe. Representative Larry Craig, Republican from Idaho, was not moved by these arguments. He heralded the bill’s passage as a victory for civil liberties and said, “The law doesn’t belong to the nation’s police, but to the nation’s people” (Greenhouse 1986). 1986 saw the resolution of years-long debate over the McClureVolkmer bill and its final passage in both the House and the Senate. The passage of this bill was the high-water mark for lenient laws in the 1980s. While lenient and punitive bill proposals would continue, it would be many years before they gained comparable levels of support. During the early 1980s, President Reagan had been very vocal about resisting gun control and punishing criminal use of guns; however, in both 1985 and 1986 he was virtually silent on the topic of gun policy. He did ultimately support the passage of the McClure-Volkmer bill by signing it into law as the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986. The 1986 midterm elections resulted in bi-cameral Democratic control of Congress. Though gun rights advocates were concerned about the potential consequences of this, Congress would only actively pursue one restrictive measure in 1987: banning undetectable firearms. In March of 1987, Representative Robert J. Mrazek, Democrat from New York,

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and co-sponsor of such a bill argued: “I see this [banning undetectable firearms] as an anti-terrorism issue, not a gun control issue. The plastic weapon is going to be the terrorist’s weapon of choice, and certainly we ought to be able to stall it long enough to let technology catch up. (The New York Times 1987).” Gun rights groups did not buy this argument. Larry Pratt, executive director of Gun Owners of America, stated that these bills are “nothing more than an attack on the gun owner’s rights to keep and bear arms” (The New York Times 1987). There is a notable shift in how restrictive proposals are being framed in the debate about undetectable firearms. Firearms had long been criticized for their ability to kill and maim American citizens, but this message had led to very little substantive policy change. However, with undetectable firearms, gun control proponents began using terrorism as a framing instrument in order to gain support for passing restrictive policy. Gun rights groups did not significantly change their messaging strategy in response to the new terrorism frame adopted by the gun control proponents. On October 20th, 1988, Congress approved a ban on undetectable firearms. The bill prohibited the manufacture, importation, sale, shipment, delivery, possession, or transfer of any firearm that is not detectable by machines designed to discover a weapon with 3.7 ounces of stainless steel. Violators would be subject to fines ranging up to $1 million dollars and a prison sentence up to five years. The bill was proposed by House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime Chair William Hughes, Democrat from New Jersey. He said: Plastic gun technology presents enormous problems for our law enforcement community. This legislation will enable us to get ahead of those problems as they occur. You can just imagine the consequences if terrorists or other criminals could board airplanes or walk into courtrooms or prisons carrying firearms that can escape detection (Molotsky 1988).

The Undetectable Firearms Act was signed into law by President Reagan on November 10, 1988 (Molotsky 1988). Getting Reagan’s signature on the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 was a political victory for gun control supporters. However, the act itself wasn’t really a practical victory because it banned firearms that didn’t really exist yet. It was a hedge against a potential future problem. So, given that it wasn’t actually restricting anything that anyone actually had,

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it isn’t surprising that using traditional appeals to individual rights and freedoms to argue against it proved unpersuasive. Overall, the Reagan era was one that was friendly to individual gun rights. Significant lenient gun legislation was signed into law. Severely punishing people who use guns criminally remained a prominent feature of the gun debate. And, the only restrictive measure to become law didn’t actually restrict anyone. The most successful proposals were motivated by a desire to enhance individual freedom and hold individuals who abuse their freedom accountable. The Reagan years were famously known as the era of personal responsibly, and the period’s gun debate generally aligned with this prevailing mood. Individualism’s influence on politics and culture was particularly strong. The year, 1989, would start with the inauguration of a new President George H.W. Bush. While Reagan’s statements about gun control mostly appealed to, and reflected, a deep sense of individual freedom and personal responsibility, President Bush’s messaging on gun control would be less consistent.

President George H.W. Bush: Consistently Inconsistent President George H. W. Bush took his oath of office on January 20th, 1989. Three days earlier on January 17th, Patrick Purdy used multiple firearms to shoot-up a schoolyard in Stockton, California. This shooting left five children dead and over thirty others wounded. Thus, Bush was forced to confront the issue of firearms at the very start of his presidency. On January 24th, Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, Democrat from Ohio, introduced a bill to ban AK-47s from private ownership. An AK47 was one of the weapons used by Patrick Purdy in Stockton (Reinhold 1989). When Metzenbaum was told that gun rights groups argued that the AK-47 was a legitimate firearm for sportsmen he responded: “We know of only one instance in which this was used for hunting. When a psychopath in California went hunting schoolchildren” (The New York Times 1989). While Metzenbaum would not gain immediate support for this stance at the national level, the city of Los Angeles, where Stockton is located, banned all semi-automatic weapons within two weeks of the shooting.

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President Bush, who was a life member of the National Rifle Association, made the first public statements of his presidency about gun regulation on February 16th, saying: Look, if you’re suggesting that every pistol that can do that or every rifle should be banned, I would strongly oppose that. I would strongly go after the criminals who use these guns. But I’m not about to suggest that a semi-automated [sic] hunting rifle be banned. Am I opposed to AK47s, fully automated [sic]? Am I in favor of supporting the law that says they shouldn’t come in here? Yes, I do….I’d like to find some way to do something about these automated [sic] weapons. I’d like to see some way to enforce the laws that are already on the books about automated AK-47s coming into this country. And maybe there is some answer to it, but I also want to be the President that protects the rights of people to have arms…I am in the mode of being deeply concerned and would like to be a part of finding a national answer to this problem. (Bush 1989a)

Bush’s statement is supportive of individual gun rights and individual accountability via punitive policy. However, he does indicate some support for restrictions on the ownership of certain types of guns. In March 1989, President Bush implemented an import ban that covered 24 models of military-style semi-automatic rifles. White House press spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater said: “In recently approving a temporary suspension of imports of certain semiautomatic weapons, the President sought to foster a climate in which reasonable, well-intentioned people on all sides of the firearms issue could work out a solution without infringing on the rights of law-abiding hunters and sportsmen” (Mohr 1989). While President Bush tried to frame his actions as consistent with individual gun rights, Republicans in Congress weren’t buying it. Representative Larry Craig, a Idaho Republican, said: “President Bush is on the edge of breaking his campaign commitment to the American people not to restrict gun ownership further” (Mohr 1989). President Bush planned to announce in May a $1.5 billion-dollar anticrime proposal that would focus on deterrence, via punitive policy, rather than gun control. The plan included mandatory minimum sentences for criminals who use guns and a five-year ban on the sale of a weapon to anyone convicted of a crime, including a misdemeanor (Weinraub 1989). While some theorized, the anti-crime plan was President Bush softening his stance on firearms, this turned out not to be the case. When he spoke publicly about the firearm provisions of his plan on May 15th it was clear

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that—although he did support very tough punitive policies, and he did make general statements supporting gun rights—he wanted to restrict the availability of assault weapons and limit magazine capacity. He said: The first front of this campaign, new laws, starts with the semiautomatic and so-called assault weapons that criminals have taken as their gun of choice. The fact of the matter is, nearly half the households in this country have guns, and guns are already out there…the hard lesson we’ve learned is that criminals will get guns…first I am calling on Congress today to do for dangerous firearms what it has wisely done for dangerous drugs: to double the mandatory minimum penalties for the use of semiautomatic weapons in crimes involving violence or drugs. Anyone who uses a semiautomatic for crime, or so much as has one on them during a crime, will do an automatic 10 extra years in Federal prison—no probation, no parole, no matter which judge they get. And I’m directing the Attorney General to advise America’s prosecutors to end plea bargaining for violent Federal firearms offenses. Those who use guns will do time—hard time. And third, when a criminal carries a gun and someone dies, they must pay with their own lives. We are calling on Congress today to enact the steps necessary to implement the death penalty and to newly designate the use of a firearm as an aggravating factor for determining whether the death sentence should be imposed. And fourth, two months ago, at my direction, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms suspended the importation of certain so-called assault weapons. ATF is continuing its examination to determine which, if any, of those weapons are not acceptable under standards in existing law. And at the conclusion of this study, and after careful consideration, we will permanently ban any imports that don’t measure up to these standards. But one thing that we do know about these assault weapons is that they are invariably equipped with unjustifiably large magazines. The notorious AKS-47[sic], for example, comes with a magazine that pumps off 30 explosive bullets without reloading. And that is why -- fifth -- we stand on the steps here in front of the Capitol and ask its support for legislation prohibiting the importation, manufacture, sale, or transfer of these insidious gun magazines of more than fifteen rounds. (Bush 1989b)

This statement indicates that Bush is advancing a gun policy agenda that combines severely punitive measures with restrictions targeting certain classes of arms. As of July 1st, 1989, the assault rifle import ban had increased to 50 different firearms. On July 7th, 1989, the Bush administration declared

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a permanent ban on all but seven of these weapons. The ban was criticized by both gun control advocates and gun rights proponents. Senator Metzenbaum, Democrat from Ohio, was critical that the ban had not done nearly enough to curtail the sale of firearms; whereas, Larry Pratt, the director of Gun Owners of American called the ban, “a slap in the face of millions of Americans who voted for George Bush because of his well-publicized opposition to new gun control.” The National Rifle Association also stated that they would fight the ban in the courts, on Capitol Hill, and at the ballot box (Rasky 1989). Nine people killed at a mass shooting in Louisville on September 14th. This massacre prompted a response by the President. Bush said, “I don’t think banning weapons is going to be the ultimate answer or could ever safeguard against this kind of tragedy.” The President’s Chief of Staff, John H. Sununu, clarified the President’s position. He said that it was too early for the President to pursue additional gun control. They wanted to wait until the measures that he had proposed earlier in the year finished working their way through Congress. However, he hinted that if Congress passed measures beyond what the administration had requested, President Bush would certainly consider signing them (Wines 1989). President Bush reiterated his desire for certain firearm restrictions in a statement delivered on September 18th. He said, “I do feel one thing we can do is cut down on the automatic clips that are used, the amount of fire coming out of one of those guns.” However, he also stated that he wanted to pursue legislation that would target criminals, rather than target the law-abiding gun owner (Bush 1989c). One of the biggest issues that continually plagued President Bush was his inconsistent messaging. In a single speech, he provided statements that were both pro-gun and anti-gun. He would give a nod to individual rights while calling for some restrictions. Focusing proposed restrictions on particular types of guns, or gun parts, that are thought to be relatively unpopular, continued to be a tactic of politicians, like Bush, who otherwise wanted to be known as protectors of individual rights. What once applied to Saturday Night Specials, or plastic guns, now applied to assault weapons. This focus allowed politicians to essentially have it all: be seen as doing something about gun violence by restricting guns that had garnered a particularly sinister reputation, but that conveniently also were not particularly popular; therefore, no key constituencies were actually having their rights restricted. They likely figured that the kid with a Saturday Night Special didn’t vote,

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and not enough gun enthusiasts were interested in AR-15s or AK-47s to matter (at least not in the late 80s, this would seem to change by the early 90s). However, this strategy didn’t work for President Bush, probably because there actually was growing interest in guns that were being classified as assault weapons. His statements only appeared to make enemies in both the anti-gun and pro-gun camps because they didn’t provide clear messages that firmly allied him with either side. Had he more vigorously sought firearm controls and regulations, he may have found allies in antigun groups who thought his measure to ban imports was far too limited. Conversely, had he more devoutly defended firearms and scaled back his calls for limits on them, he may have gained allies with pro-gun groups. What the President did instead was alienate both groups. The President’s inconsistent stance on firearms would continue throughout his time in office. President Bush spoke publicly on his gun policy proposals five times in January and three times in February of 1990. In these public statements, he reiterated that he did not want more federal gun control, that he wanted stiffer mandatory sentencing, including the death penalty for murders committed with a firearm, and no plea bargains for firearms offenses. However, on May 24th, 1990, Bush also reiterated his support for banning large capacity ammunition magazines. He said: I have not changed my position on ammunition clips. I read in the paper somewhere that we had changed it, backed off of that position. That isn’t true. I am not supporting that. And I wish the Congress wouldn’t keep adding matters of this nature. Let’s get a good strong anticrime bill, and then we can have an open debate again on whatever they want to talk about. And if they want to add something on these clips, that’s fine; it would have my strong support. (Bush 1990a)

This, rather confusing, statement is emblematic of those issued by Bush. He doesn’t seem to consider it gun control to impose limits on a gun’s ammunition capacity. So, he can therefore at once call for no new gun control while simultaneously calling for—what many would consider—a restriction on guns. That May, in a move that surprised both gun rights and gun control activists, the Senate passed a bill in a 50-49 vote that would provide a

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three-year ban on the manufacture and sale of nine types of semiautomatic assault weapons. The bill’s sponsor, Arizona Democratic Senator Dennis DeConcini, who had secured the strong support of law enforcement groups, said, “There are too many bullet holes in blue suits. There are too many women weeping over coffins. There are too many children without fathers.” Senator Paul Simon, Democrat from Illinois, added, “We face the choice of siding with the gun lobby or the law enforcement people. Show a little courage and support the ban.” One of the bill’s many opponents, Senator James A. McClure, Republican from Idaho, thought that supporters were voting on appearances, rather than logic. Senator Orrin Hatch, a Utah Republican, similarly said, “The action of these [assault] weapons is functionally no different from semi-automatic hunting rifles. They only look more sinister” (Rasky 1990). On July 11th, 1990, the Senate overwhelmingly passed a crime bill that would include this three-year ban on nine semi-automatic assault weapons. There was some concern that President Bush would veto the entire bill if it included this ban, but that proved to be unwarranted. The Bush Administration stated: “Our position on the semiautomatic weapons ban is well known, but overall, we feel the package is a good one.” Sarah Brady, the chairman of Handgun Control Inc. was very happy with the Senate’s decision. She said, “I think it provides big momentum for us. I think it just shows tremendously how the tide has turned in this country and that the word has gotten to the U.S. Congress. They want to put an end to the violence.” The House Judiciary Committee—which was working on the House version of the bill and had already included provisions to ban certain firearms—was also planning to consider a seven-day waiting period for the purchase of any firearm. The Bush Administration said that while they supported the Senate bill, they had concerns about the more restrictive version being discussed in the House (Holmes 1990a). On July 23rd, 1990, the import ban that had been imposed by President Bush the previous year was weakened by a provision that would allow redesigned versions of the banned weapons to be imported. These weapons could now be imported if they eliminated military features, such as large capacity magazines, pistol grips, grenade launchers, and bayonet fittings. President Bush discussed this change while stating his support for the crime bill passed in the Senate. He said the change was acceptable because the manufacturers had redesigned the weapons in ways that allowed them to meet the criteria for import eligibility under the Gun Control Act (Bush 1990b).

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There were a number of gun control advocates who were critical of the President’s new interpretation of the import ban. Senator Metzenbaum, Democrat from Ohio, stated: “We are either going to keep these weapons off of our streets or we are not. The Bush Administration would do well to rethink its policy altogether and ban all assault weapons foreign or domestic” (Johnston 1990). On July 24th, 1990, the House Judiciary Committee approved by a 27-9 vote a seven-day waiting period to buy a handgun, called the Brady Bill. The proposed seven-day waiting period would be added to the house version of the crime bill that had been passed in the Senate (Holmes 1990b). Unfortunately for gun control proponents, the House version of the crime bill, and its gun control measures, would not make any further progress in 1990. However, the Brady Bill would gain momentum in future Congresses. Congress eventually passed, and the President later signed, the Crime Control Act of 1990. While there had been much debate about including a number of restrictive firearms measures within this major crime bill, the final bill had very little substantive impact on gun control policy, and it didn’t include the assault weapons ban that was part of an earlier senate version. The bill contained just one component, the Gun-Free School Zones Act, that provided any real restrictions on firearms. It made it a federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone (Congress.gov 1990). Support for the waiting periods that the Bush Administration resisted increased after former President Ronald Reagan, who’s stance on gun control had apparently toughened since leaving the White House, spoke out in favor of the Brady Bill on March 29th, 1991. In addition to waiting periods, the legislation would impose several other requirements on prospective gun buyers, such as providing photo ID and attesting to a clear criminal record. Proponents of the bill argued that it would create a national minimum standard which would help prevent a criminal from a state with strong gun laws from going to a nearby state with lax gun laws and buying firearms there (Bishop 1991). While the Brady Bill was gaining support, the National Rifle Association’s allies in Congress proposed an alternative bill. Harley O. Staggers Jr., a West Virginia Democrat, proposed a bill that resembled a Virginia law that would establish a toll-free telephone number to the Justice Department that would provide for immediate criminal background

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checks on prospective gun purchasers with no waiting periods. “The Staggers bill accomplishes what most of the handgun control people at least say in public they want to do, which is prevent criminals from being able to obtain guns from legal sources,” stated Richard Feldman, the grassroots coordinator for the National Rifle Association (The New York Times 1991). In May, the two bills went head to head in the House and the Brady Bill ended up passing by 53 votes. The Brady Bill moved on to the Senate. However, President Bush insisted that he would veto it if Congress did not pass his Anticrime Bill (Ifill 1991a). On April 18th, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh said that the Administration might accept a permanent ban on some domestic semiautomatic weapons if Congress adopted the President’s overarching Anticrime Bill. Thornburgh also indicated that the Administration might support the Brady Bill. The Bush Administration continued to pursue bans on ammunition feeding devices (i.e. magazines) with the capacity to hold more than 15 rounds of ammunition. He said, “Hunters do not need to shoot of dozens of rounds in a matter of seconds and neither is such a spray of bullets a necessary feature of firearms ownership for purposes of home protection” (Johnston, 1991). The Anticrime Bill reached the Senate in July of 1991. In terms of gun policy, it was restrictive and punitive. The bill contained provisions that would establish a five-day waiting period and a mandatory criminal background check for handgun buyers. It would also impose a mandatory sentence of 30 years in prison for using a firearm during a crime that federal authorities became involved in. The bill would also allow federal prosecutors to seek the death penalty in gun murders. While the Brady Bill had passed the House in May, the Anticrime Bill had not been under serious consideration there (Ifill 1991b). On October 16th, 1991, George Hennard shot and killed 23 people in Killeen, Texas. After the massacre, President Bush said that: “Obviously, when you see somebody go berserk and get a weapon and go in and murder people, of course, it troubles me. But what I don’t happen to have the answer to is if you can legislate that behavior away.” However, a Bush spokesperson later clarified that the President would support some firearm restrictions and new punitive policy, such as those passed in the Senate Anticrime Bill (Krauss 1991). This continues a pattern of Bush making, seemingly instinctual, lenient statements but moderating them later.

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The day after the massacre in Killeen, the House overwhelmingly rejected a ban on the sale and ownership of semiautomatic weapons and high-capacity magazines. Representative Chet Edwards, Democrat from Texas who represented Killeen, said: “Don’t let the tragedy in my district yesterday be the tragedy in your neighborhoods tomorrow. We cannot bring back the lives of 22 citizens lost yesterday but with your vote we can save lives.” However, Representative Harold Volkmer, Democrat from Missouri, countered by stating: “It was not the pistol that caused those deaths” (Krauss 1991). The response to the Luby’s Massacre in Killeen Texas demonstrated how, even in the immediate emotionally charged aftermath of a tragedy like this, gun rights proponents such as Volkmer were unmoved and would continue to battle against perceived infringements on individual rights. It also exemplifies a classically individualistic anti-gun control frame that focuses culpability on individuals, not objects. 1992 was a presidential election year and, as was the case in earlier election years, statements and proposals of all types went into decline. There was virtually no movement on gun control in Congress. The Brady Bill and President Bush’s Anticrime Bill languished. President Bush made a few public statements about firearms policy in hopes of gaining support against his presidential opponent Bill Clinton. For instance, in a June 29th speech he said: I don’t favor gun control. We did move, as you know, on clip size for automatic weapons. We’ve tried to do something about stopping the import of weapons coming in here. There was a compromise that we had almost worked out last year relating to—I want to call it “instant identification,” which I strongly favor. I just am reluctant to endorse something that would ban private ownership at a time when you see States that have very strong laws suffering from some of the highest levels of criminal activity with guns. (Bush 1992a)

Unfortunately for President Bush, his messaging did not provide a clear picture of where he stood on firearms. He suggests he did not favor gun control, but then he discusses gun controls that he proposed. He also states that he wanted to focus on criminal controls. President Bush, in a few short statements, indicates support for punitive, lenient, and restrictive gun policy.

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In September and October of 1992, President Bush delivered the clearest messages of his Presidency on gun policy. He dropped all support for any restrictive controls. On September 28th, Bush stated: I want much tougher penalties for criminal use of firearms, period. Tighten up the law and take the risk away from these law enforcement officers. (Bush 1992b)

On October 15th, he stated: “I am not for national registration of firearms. Some of the States that have the toughest anti-gun laws have the highest levels of crime. This one’s short and sweet. I want much tougher penalties for the criminal use of firearms” (Bush 1992c). On October 25th, President Bush made the final public statement on gun control of his presidency: I oppose gun control. It’s a good time to point it out in the first day of the big game hunting season out here. I am a hunter, and I’m a fisherman, and I believe I’ve got a sound record on the environment. But when it comes to guns, the answer is to have tougher anticrime legislation. Go after the criminal and not after the gun owner.” (Bush 1992d)

President Bush’s statements in September and October of 1992 were punitive and lenient in nature. It is clear President Bush was trying to gain the support of gun rights supporters during these final two months before the Presidential election. His opponent, Bill Clinton, was a strong supporter for gun control and was actively trying to gain support of progun control supporters. However, President Bush was ultimately unable to win re-election. While there were many issues that ultimately cost President Bush his re-election, his inability to effectively communicate a clear stance on gun control led to him having very few supporters in either the gun control or the gun rights camp. The Bush Presidency would not result in any new significant gun control laws at the national level; however, the major restrictive measures that were initially debated during this period (bans on assault weapons and the Brady Bill) would gain significantly more traction in the next few years. While President Bush was ambiguous on what he thought should happen with firearms laws, his successor, President Clinton was an unabashed gun control supporter. During his first term as President, he would help win passage of the Brady Bill and the Assault Weapons Ban.

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Clinton: Bans and Background Checks, for Our Children There would be a strong push for restrictive laws during the Clinton Presidency. His administration pursued a number of restrictive gun control measures, some of which would become law such as the Brady Bill and the Assault Weapons Ban. With support from the White House, supporters of restrictive gun measures in Congress were emboldened and their longterm nemesis, the NRA, appeared to be losing influence. And, at least in terms of gun control, Clinton was able to get some traction with his emphasis on public goods over private rights. President Clinton made the first public statement of his presidency on gun control on February 10th, 1993. He said: We ought to begin by passing the crime bill that nearly passed last year, which does two things: It gives the urban areas of this country more police officers for the streets… The second thing that bill has is the Brady bill that would require a waiting period before people could buy handguns. And the third thing we probably ought to do is do what Governor Wilder in Virginia is trying to do. It takes a lot of guts to do that, but he’s trying to pass a law which says that you can’t buy a handgun more than once a month. Try to stop all these people that go to legal gun stores and buy guns and then turn around and just give them to kids like they’re going out of style. I believe in the right to keep and bear arms. I believe in the right to hunt. I do not believe that we’re well served by having a bunch of 14- or 15-year-old kids out there with handguns shooting each other because of blood battles between gangs or because they’re mad or because they’re high on drugs. (Clinton 1993a)

So, while he tipped his hat to the general idea of gun rights, he comes out in favor of new gun restrictions. He continued to press his case for additional gun controls later in 1993. The President’s attention eventually centered around several specific restrictive measures, which he highlighted in an October 18th speech, “We ought to focus on the Brady bill, the assault weapons ban, and banning possession by minors right now.” In that speech, he highlighted the toll that gun violence was imposing on our communities, and he expressed skepticism about whether or not he had the votes to get an assault weapons ban and the Brady Bill through Congress (Clinton 1993b).

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On October 26th, 1993, Representative Jack Brooks, Texas Democrat and Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, agreed to release the Brady Bill from his committee. Brooks had been against the bill but he relented to pressure from his party. Representative Schumer, a New York Democrat, saw the bill’s release as a major victory. Schumer said, “This will mean Brady will be on the President’s desk this year at last. This is how the political process works: public sentiment and the inexorable pressure are outweighing whatever the National Rifle Association can throw in Brady’s path” (Krauss 1993a). The bill was eventually passed by the whole House on November 11th, with a vote of 238-189; the stage was set for a Senate battle over the bill (Krauss 1993a). There was hope that, especially with the President’s continued support, the Brady Bill would have support in the Senate as well. Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr, a Democrat from Delaware, believed that he would be able to gain support for the bill and could prevent a filibuster. Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Republican from Utah, was an outspoken critic of the bill and said, “It is a Band-Aid that won’t do any good.” Senator Hatch saw the bill as something that would not curb crime but would impose an unfair burden on law-abiding citizens (Krauss 1993a). President Clinton reiterated his support for the bill a few days later by again drawing attention to the widespread effects of gun violence: “The Brady bill is the first step. And we are going to pass it this year…it’s going to be very difficult for the Congress to justify continued inaction on what millions of Americans believe is the number one problem in their lives” (Clinton 1993c). The Senate, it turns out, was focused on different restrictive gun control measures. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat from New York, pushed for a bill that would impose a large tax on handgun ammunition. Senator Moynihan argued, “Guns don’t kill people, bullets do. It is time the federal government began taxing handgun ammunition used in crime out of existence.” The proposed bill would increase the wholesale tax on handgun ammunition from 11 to 50 percent. It would also raise the $10 a year license to manufacture ammunition to $10,000. The Executive Vice President of the NRA, Wayne LaPierre, ridiculed this bill by saying: “I seriously doubt anyone in America believes that crime is going to go down because taxes are going to go up. It shows how egg headed this whole debate has become” (Clymer 1993). As we noted in our earlier discussion of the views of the grassroots activists, the two sides simply can’t comprehend the other’s arguments. They talk past each other.

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In November, the Senate voted 56-43 to ban 19 types of military assault rifles. In addition to banning these specific guns, it also prohibited the manufacture of close copies of them by preventing manufacturers from making slight modifications in order to avoid the ban. The bill also banned large capacity ammunition feeding devices (i.e. magazines, sometime call clips) that hold more than ten rounds of ammunition (i.e. bullets). However, a grandfather clause was included so that currently owned firearms would not be impacted. The bill also specifically exempted 650 hunting guns (Krauss 1993b). As of November 18th, 1993, the Brady Bill had passed the House but was awaiting final passage in the Senate. An assault weapons ban, as well as some other restrictions, had passed the Senate but were awaiting approval in the House. On November 20th, 1993, in order to put pressure on the Senate, President Clinton gave a public address on the Brady Bill. He said: I think that the Republicans must be very uncomfortable with having once again thwarted the will of the majority of the Senate and now over 80 percent of the American people. I’m not for watering down the Brady bill. The Brady bill is important. Perhaps they have some change that is procedural that from their point of view makes it less onerous, that doesn’t change the substance of it. I think that the American people would think a lot more of the Congress if the Brady bill passed both Houses before they left. I thought after the bill passed the House, especially by such a healthy margin, that the majority rule would prevail in the Senate. And we’ll just have to see. We’ve still got a few hours, and let’s just see whether something can be broken. We’re working on it. (Clinton 1993d)

The administration certainly was working on it and Clinton’s prediction that the Brady Bill could still pass proved accurate. It passed later that same day by a vote of 63-36. The Brady Bill, that President Clinton signed into law on November 30th, required a background check and five-day waiting period for all firearm purchases. Before signing the bill, the President delivered remarks that continued to frame gun control as an essential element of public safety: The Brady bill has finally become law in a fundamental sense not because of any of us but because grassroots America changed its mind and demanded that this Congress not leave here without doing something about this.

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Americans are finally fed up with violence that cuts down another citizen with gunfire every 20 minutes…It also has a ban on several assault weapons, long overdue; a ban on handgun ownership and restrictions on possession of handguns by minors; the beginning of reform of our Federal firearms licensing systems; and an effort to make our schools safer. This is a good beginning. And there will be more to be done after that. (Clinton 1993e)

Although their focus would eventually settle on securing passage of an assault weapons ban, the Clinton Administration, and its allies in Congress, flirted with a variety of other restrictive proposals. For instance, on December 9th, 1993 Attorney General Janet Reno proposed requiring licenses for all gun owners. She said, “I think it should be at least as hard to get a license to possess a gun as it is to drive an automobile. I don’t think somebody should have a gun unless they can demonstrate that they know how to use it safely and lawfully, that they are willing to safely and lawfully use it.” Other examples of restrictive measures that were proposed immediately after the passage of the Brady Bill included a bill sponsored by Representative Schumer that would require the registration of handguns, licensing for handgun buyers, and it would limit the purchase of handguns to one per month. Finally, Senator Bradley, Democrat from New Jersey, proposed a 30 percent tax that would be imposed on sales of handguns, assault weapons, and their ammunition. That bill would have also increased gun dealers’ licenses to $3000 for a three-year license (Labaton 1993). President Clinton focused his push for new gun control specifically on the assault weapons ban with a February 15th, 1994, statement in which he said, “We ought to pass the assault weapons ban…These weapons have become the weapons of choice for drug traffickers, street gangs, and paramilitary extremists’ groups” (Clinton 1994a). However, it would take a couple more months for the House Judiciary Committee to approve the measure, which it did on April 28th. The bill, that specifically banned nineteen different assault weapons, won some unlikely supporters, including Representative Henry J. Hyde, Republican from Illinois. Hyde, who had been against a similar ban in 1991, said he had changed his mind on the assault weapons ban after reading documents detailing their criminal use. Representative Schumer, a major supporter, thought that there would be a vote of approval on the ban in the House in the near future, but he wanted to delay the vote long enough to give the President time

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to encourage 15–20 more House members to support it (The New York Times 1994). Schumer was wise to wait and Clinton obliged. On the 29th of April, Clinton gave a public address on the topic, saying: The 19 specific types of assault weapons that would be banned by the proposal currently being considered in Congress have no place on a deer hunt, in a duck blind, or on a target range—and they certainly don’t belong on our streets, in our neighborhoods, or on our schoolyards…We’ve got to keep Uzis and Street Sweepers out of the hands of criminals. Every major police organization wants us to—and nearly 80 percent of the American people feel that way too. High-paid lobbyists argue that the assault weapons ban will infringe on our right, as hunters and sportsmen, to own guns. But what they don’t tell you is that the proposal I support specifically safeguards hunters’ rights. It explicitly protects more than 650 hunting and recreational rifles from the ban… Call your representatives and tell them that you know the difference between a hunting rifle and a weapon that was designed for the battlefield. Tell them you support the proposed ban on assault weapons—because it protects your rights, and it doesn’t protect criminals. (Clinton 1994b)

He followed this with a similarly strong statement of support on the 2nd of May. In that statement, as in this one, he continues to argue that the ban is acceptable because it doesn’t interfere with the rights of hunters, saying, “I would never do anything to infringe on the rights of sportsmen” (Clinton 1994c). As we noted in our discussion of the conversations we had with gun rights supporters, although arguments like this are incredibly common, they can be incredibly alienating. Since hunting is only one of the many legitimate activities that guns are used for, centering an argument around hunting is most useful as an illustration of just how out of touch gun control proponents, and the diversity of gun owning America, are from one another. As it turns out, being this culturally disconnected from their political opponents would cost them politically. Clinton also said, “No good member of the House or the Senate, no Republican or Democrat, no rural legislator should ever fear losing their seat for voting for this bill” (Ifill 1994). He would famously be proven very wrong by the 1994 midterms. However, even with the strong push by President Clinton, the assault weapons ban looked doomed to fail. Its proponents remained optimistic, even though it remained about 15 votes short in the House. The bitter

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debate over the bill resembled debate over a lot of gun control legislation: the sides were dug in and they talked past one another. For instance, a critic of the bill, Representative Randy Cunningham, a military veteran and Republican from California, said, “If President Clinton had just spent a couple of weeks at boot camp, he’d at least know the difference between a battlefield firearm and the semiautomatic firearms he is trying to ban.” Wayne LaPierre, of the NRA, said that the ban was focused on “cosmetic nonsense” and he added: I think their vote count is accurate. They are 15 to 20 votes short. I don’t think you’ll see a big swing on this issue. People have staked out positions during their campaigns; they have staked them out for years. It’s hard for us to win converts from their side and it’s tough for them to win converts from our side. (Seelye 1994)

In the end, in what was a surprise outcome to many, the House passed the bill on May 5th with a 216-214 vote. Clinton would ultimately sign an assault weapons ban in to law, as part of a broader anti-crime bill, on September 13th, 1994 (Johnston and Holmes 1994). In a statement reflecting on this victory for his administration, President Clinton highlighted the necessity of changing some of these dug in minds. He said: When we were trying to get the assault weapons bill passed in the House— same song, second verse—Charles Schumer, a wonderful Congressman from Brooklyn, had carried this bill and had been defeated by 70 votes in 1991. And we even did something that had never been done before, we listed several hundred purely hunting and sporting weapons that were protected under this law. And so, Chuck called me, and he said, “Well, Mr. President, we really need your help. We’re probably 40 votes behind and we can’t get there, but we ought to try.” And I said, “I’d be happy to lose in this cause, but don’t be too sure that we can’t make it.” One of the clearer reasons was that a conservative Republican from Illinois who is very much respected among his party members, Henry Hyde, was undecided when Dianne Feinstein sent him a big, fat briefing book which included a list of the assault weapons shootings in Illinois since 1991. Henry Hyde stunned the entire Congress by announcing that he had changed his position, he was going to vote for the ban. A Congressman from Michigan in a hunting area, who had never in 20 years in Congress, never cast one vote against the NRA, changed his position. Two Democrats from difficult constituencies, one of whom was an ex-police officer, changed their

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vote walking down the aisle to cast their ballot, people knowing they were putting their careers at risk because they grew weary of the shouting and pushing and the division and the rhetoric and they wished something to happen. (Clinton 1994d)

In the first two years of his presidency, President Clinton, working with gun control supporters in Congress, managed to get two significant pieces of legislation signed into law: the Brady Bill and the Assault Weapons Ban. Gun control proponents interpreted these victories as a reason to hope that the National Rifle Association, and gun rights activists in general, were losing their stranglehold on policymaking. However, the 1994 midterm elections would once again change the gun policy landscape. In what would become known as the Republican Revolution, the Republican Party gained 54 seats in the House of Representatives and 8 seats in the Senate. This came as a surprise to many. Clinton—who had previously promised supporting gun control wouldn’t imperil re-election—had a simple explanation for this dramatic turn of events. He said, “the NRA is the reason the Republicans control the House” (Dreyfuss 1995). The power dynamics in Washington obviously changed significantly after the 1994 midterms. The new Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, a Republican from Georgia, was a staunch opponent of President Clinton and sought to undermine many of the Clinton Administration’s policies. He, and other congressional Republicans, wanted to repeal the Assault Weapons Ban. House Republicans created a task force to review all laws in the U.S. that might infringe on the Second Amendment, including the Assault Weapons Ban. Representative Bob Barr, another Republican from Georgia and a member of this task force, said: “our government is failing to meet its fundamental, most important, basic responsibility and that is to protect citizens and their property. The Speaker has asked us to look into the fundamentals of the Second Amendment, what it was intended to provide, what sort of protections and rights it guarantees our citizens, how it is being enforced.” Another member of the task force, Representative Roscoe G. Bartlett, Republican from Maryland, stated: “Much of this firearm legislation, no matter how well-intentioned, has simply been distracting and diversionary and gives the illusion that you are doing something about crime, and you are doing nothing about crime. Many of the laws that we have on our books are an infringement of the Second Amendment rights” (Seelye 1995). In the wake of this

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election, the rights and freedoms discourse of individualism had regained dominance in Congress. On February 28th, 1995, President Clinton issued a strong statement of support for both the Brady Bill and the ban on assault weapons. He said, “you can mark my words, the Brady law and the assault weapons bill are here to stay. They will not be repealed.” In specific support of the Brady law’s waiting periods, Clinton said, “I think 97 percent of us should be willing to wait a while, so that the 3 percent of us who are trying to buy guns for the wrong reasons can be stopped” (Clinton 1995). This is a classic appeal to a communal sense of the public good. He is essentially arguing that restricting individual rights is acceptable if those restrictions are understood as the price of public safety. Justifying policies along these lines can trigger fairly visceral negative responses from people with a more developed sense of American individualism. Timothy McVeigh used an ammonium nitrate bomb to blow up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on April 19th, 1995. McVeigh was motivated to attack the federal government after the events that took place in Waco and Ruby Ridge, where the ATF had wrongly, in McVeigh’s eyes, killed armed American citizens. The bombing put the National Rifle Association on the defensive because of comments made by NRA Board Member Harry Thomas. In reference to the events in Waco, he had said, “If you send your jack booted, baby burning bushwhackers to confiscate my guns, pack them a lunch—it will be a damned long day. The Branch Davidians were amateurs. I’m a professional.” Comments such as these made the NRA appear sympathetic to McVeigh. The NRA took another hit when instructions on how to make a homemade bomb were found on its electronic bulletin board (Holmes 1995). This combination of circumstances took much of the wind out of the sails of efforts to repeal the assault weapons ban. With the exception of scrutiny for the ATF, debate about gun control generally fell off through the remainder of 1995. In March of 1996, efforts to repeal the Assault Weapons Ban picked back up. House Republicans, after a blitzkrieg-like two-day campaign, with no hearings, brought the repeal up for a vote. It passed 239 to 173. One particular exchange from this episode illustrates the “we” versus “me” nature of the American gun debate. Representative Patrick J. Kennedy, Democrat from Rhode Island, and nephew to assassinated John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy, argued:

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Families like mine all across this country know all too well what the damage of weapons can do. And you want to arm our people even more. You want to add more magazines to assault weapons so they can spray and kill even more people. Shame on you. There are families out there. You’ll never know, Mr. Chairman, what it’s like because you don’t have someone in your family who was killed. It’s not the person killed, it’s the whole family that’s affected. (Clymer 1996)

Representative Gerald B. H. Solomon, Republican from New York, replied: The way to stop crime is to put criminals in prison, not take away from lawabiding citizens the right to protect themselves…When he [Representative Kennedy] stands up and questions the integrity of those of us who have this bill on the floor, the gentleman ought to be a little more careful. And let me tell you why: because my wife lives alone five days a week in a rural area in upstate New York. She has the right to defend herself when I’m not there, son. And don’t you ever forget it. (Clymer 1996)

As is often the case, the arguments boiled down to public good versus private right. Other critics of the repeal were upset by how fast the House Republicans had moved to repeal the Assault Weapon Ban. Representative Schumer, said, “The bill was brought to the floor so quickly that the nation won’t see it coming. Apparently, Speaker Gingrich must kiss the ring of the NRA.” Representative John Lewis, Democrat from Georgia added, “Our families will give their lives to pay the debt Republicans owe their special interests friends. The NRA and their money cannot bring back the lives that will be lost.” Representative Barr countered that, “Hearings were unnecessary because this is an issue the American people know. It is high time this body stood up, unafraid, undefensive.” While the House was embroiled in this conflict, it was futile. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole stated that he had no plans to take any floor action on repealing the Assault Weapons Ban in the Senate (Clymer 1996). President Clinton advocated for an expansion to the Brady Bill, along with a handful of other restrictive gun control measures, throughout 1996. He issued numerous statements in support of his proposals. For instance, on August 26th, he said:

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I believe that if someone has committed a crime of domestic violence against a member of his or her family, they ought to be covered by the Brady bill, too. They shouldn’t have a weapon they can kill somebody with. And I think we ought to ban those cop-killer bullets. They don’t do any good on the hunting trail, but they do a lot of harm in America. (Clinton 1996)

As he had done previously, he continued to sound as if he assumed that hunting was the only thing people used guns for. While President Clinton continued to seek more gun control measures, Congress was mostly silent on them after the House’s vote to repeal the Assault Weapons Ban. 1996 was a presidential election year and, as had happened previously, debate on gun control dwindled some. In this case, the 1996 elections would result in the defeat of many of the National Rifle Association’s key Congressional allies. Of the 23 House incumbents who were defeated in 1996, 19 of them had voted to repeal the assault weapons ban. At the same time, the NRA had specifically targeted ten Senators and Representatives who they found to be their biggest opponents in Congress and were unable to defeat any of them. The NRA would also see their preferred candidate for President, Senator Bob Dole, abandon his campaign pledge to repeal the Assault Weapons Ban. In sum, by negating many of the gains that they had made in 1994, the 1996 elections dealt a significant blow to gun rights supporters in Congress (Wines 1996). On March 5th, 1997, President Clinton delivered a strong statement on gun control and, after highlighting several of the Brady bill’s successes, he called for a few new policies. He wanted Congress to require child safety locks for every handgun, to further restrict the ability of non-citizens to acquire guns, and to ban “cop killer” armor piercing bullets. As is often the case with gun control proponents, Clinton framed his proposals in ways that emphasize the collective over the individual. He used language that is designed to evoke a sense of “us.” For instance, consider this introductory sentence from his statement: “Today I announce a series of new steps we must take immediately to protect our children, our neighbors, and our police officers from tragedies caused by firearms in the wrong hands” (Clinton 1997a). After using the term “we,” he goes on to repeat the word “our” three times. In August of 1997, Smith and Wesson, one of the largest firearms manufacturers in the U.S., announced that they were going to start

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including child safety locks with all of their handguns. President Clinton praised this move: This week, Smith and Wesson, the world’s largest manufacturer of handguns, announced that it is forging a partnership with the Master Lock Co. to provide a child safety lock with every handgun sold for commercial use. I particularly want to commend Smith and Wesson for taking an important and responsible step for children’s safety. Child safety locks are the right thing to do. In 1994, 185 children were killed by accidental gunshot wounds. That is why my anti-gang and youth violence legislation would require that all federally licensed gun dealers provide such safety devices with every handgun sold. And that is why on March Third I ordered all Federal agencies to provide child safety locks with the thousands of handguns they issue to Federal law enforcement officers. Child safety locks have garnered the wide support of law enforcement, the medical community, many local governments, and now a part of the firearms manufacturing industry. (Clinton 1997b)

Clinton’s attempt to mandate what Smith and Wesson did voluntarily was included in a youth crime bill that had been working its way through Congress. Gun rights activists and their congressional allies resisted and stalled this effort (Gray 1997). However, several other major gun manufacturers quickly followed Smith and Wesson’s lead and included the locks voluntarily (Clinton 1997c). This scenario illustrates that just as American political culture can make implementing mandates challenging; Americans (and American businesses) may voluntarily change their behavior if they become convinced that there is a good reason to do so. It is often the case that Americans need to be sold, rather than told, to do something. The Brady Act of 1993 mandated the creation of a computerized national instant background check system that all federally licensed gun dealers would eventually be required to use to conduct checks on all prospective gun purchasers. However, recognizing that this system would take time to create and implement, the law initially instituted a waiting period so that local law enforcement would have time to complete a background check on the gun buyer, which the law required them to conduct. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Printz v. the United States (1997) ruled that requiring local police officials to enforce federal law in this way violated the Tenth Amendment. Many conservative states chose to opt out of the background check program after this ruling (The New York Times 1997).

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However, the issue soon became moot because the federally run computerized instant background check system was up and running by the end of 1998. No gun could be sold by a federally licensed dealer, in any state, unless the buyer passed one of these checks. President Clinton praised the implementation of this new system: This week America launched a new effort to keep guns out of the hands of criminals and make our streets safer. For the first time ever, the Justice Department, working with the States, conducted computerized background checks on all firearm purchases. In its first 4 days, the new national instant check system reviewed more than 100,000 prospective gun sales to make sure only law-abiding citizens took home new guns. And in just 4 days, we stopped more than 400 felons, fugitives, stalkers, and other prohibited purchasers from walking away with new guns. That’s more than 100 illegal gun sales blocked each day. (Clinton 1997d)

In those remarks he also called on Congress to strengthen the law so that it applied to more gun sales: …we must make sure that firearms sold at gun shows are not exempt from background checks, that gun shows do not circumvent our gun laws. Last month I asked Treasury Secretary Rubin and Attorney General Reno to find ways to close this loophole.” (Clinton 1997d)

Closing this “gun show loophole” is something that gun control advocates, including the Clinton Administration, would eventually make a priority. For instance, on February 6th, 1999, President Clinton explained the need to expand the background check requirement of the Brady Act to sales at gun shows. He argued that the gun show loophole made it too easy for criminals to access firearms. Unfortunately, his remarks would serve as an eerie foreshadowing of the events that would take place at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, on April 20th, 1999, when two students would use firearms that were obtained at a gun show to kill their classmates. President Clinton made the following argument: Retail gun stores, sporting goods stores, licensed gun dealers: They’re all working to keep guns out of the hands of felons and fugitives. But there’s a loophole in the law, and criminals know how to exploit it…Last year there were more than 4,400 gun shows all across America…We should extend Brady checks and gun-tracing records to any and all open markets where

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large numbers of firearms are sold. And we should vigorously and fairly enforce the rules. The gun lobby may not want to hear this, but clearly, it’s the right thing to do: No background check, no gun. No exceptions. (Clinton 1999a)

While President Clinton was focused on expanding the Brady Bill to end the perceived gun show loophole, members of Congress were proposing additional gun restrictions. In March of 1999, Senator Robert G. Torricelli, Democrat from New Jersey, and Representative Patrick J. Kennedy, Democrat from Rhode Island, introduced legislation that would end the gun industry’s exemption from Federal health and safety regulations under the Consumer Product Safety Commission. The bill would also give the Treasury Department some ability to regulate the distribution of firearms. Senator Torricelli stated: “In almost every other aspect of American life, the Government sets minimum levels of safety, even for teddy bears, but not for guns. It’s a great irony…There is nothing in this legislation for law-abiding citizens to fear” (Butterfield 1999). A new tactic in America’s gun wars emerged in the late 90 s: suing gun manufacturers for the harm caused by their products. Several federal district court decisions made in the late 1990s allowed firearms manufacturers to be held liable for this harm. This led to a number of lawsuits against gun makers. In 1999, five major cities sued gun manufacturers to recover damages for the costs gun violence imposed on their communities. In response to one of these lawsuits, filed by Atlanta, Georgia passed legislation that forbid cities from suing firearms manufacturers. Bob Barr, Republican from Georgia, introduced a federal bill that would shield gun makers from such lawsuits (Rosenbaum 1999). Although this bill wasn’t expected to gain much traction at the time, the issue would resurface in a different political environment. The Columbine shootings shocked the country and President Clinton used the occasion to advocate for a raft of gun control proposals. He discussed them in a lengthy statement on April 29th: First of all, we ought to strengthen the Brady law. The mandatory waiting period has expired; that’s bad because we need it in addition to the instacheck system to give a cooling-off period to people who are in a fit of rage. The law that we would present, the act, will also prevent juveniles who commit violent crimes from ever buying a gun. It would apply the Brady law’s prohibition to juvenile violence. It would require Brady background checks on anyone who wants to buy explosives—very important. And it

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would abolish, at long last, as Senator Feinstein said, a dangerous loophole that was likely exploited in Littleton, which allows people to buy weapons at gun shows without any background checks at all. The second thing we’ve got to do is to strengthen the assault weapons ban, to close the loophole that allows dealers to sell older, high-capacity ammunition magazines manufactured abroad. The third thing the legislation would do is to raise the legal age of handgun possession from 18 to 21 years. It would also strengthen our zero tolerance for guns in schools, which, as one of the previous Members said, had led us to 6,000 suspensions or expulsions last year, by requiring schools to report to the police any student who brings a gun to school and requiring that the student get counseling. The provision holding adults criminally responsible would only apply, but—this is quite important—but it would apply if they recklessly failed to keep firearms out of the reach of young people. This would mandate a steep increase in penalties for adults who transfer guns illegally to juveniles. It would require child safety locks to be sold with all new guns. Finally, it would crack down on illegal gun trafficking, doubling the number of cities now working with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to trace every gun seized by the police. It would require that dealers submit information not only on the guns they sell but on used guns, which are often very hard for law enforcement agencies to trace. It would significantly increase penalties for gun runners caught trafficking large numbers of firearms.” (Clinton 1999b)

Senate Democrats followed Clinton’s lead and incorporated many of the administration’s gun control proposals into a juvenile justice bill. These amendments would include: a three-day waiting period before handgun purchases, the closing of loopholes that exempt gun shows and internet sales from regulations governing the sale of firearms in stores, a ban on juvenile possession of assault weapons, and the imposition of criminal penalties on adult gun owners whose children gain access to weapons and injure themselves or others. Chuck Schumer, now a Senator, said, “The amendments closely mirrored the gun control proposals from President Clinton and were intended to maximize its impact on criminals and children while minimizing its impact on law-abiding gun owners” (Bruni 1999a). After some debate and amendment, the Senate would eventually overwhelmingly vote to approve these measures (Bruni 1999b). Gun control supporters wrapped many of their arguments in a child safety frame during the post-Columbine debate about gun control. They

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also continued to try to foster, and appeal to, a commonsense of “weness.” They wanted us to act to protect our children. For instance, Clinton said, “we must act together to protect our children” (Clinton 1999c). In a later statement, Clinton argued that child safety was a collective good and we are all responsible for protecting it, “it’s time for everybody to stop trying to place blame and instead just basically say, ‘I would like to assume whatever my share of responsibility is for giving a safe childhood back to our children’” (Clinton 1999d). Seizing on the momentum created by the Columbine shootings and the Senate’s actions, gun control supporters pressed their case in the House. Their first target was Representative Bill McCollum, Florida Republican and chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, who sponsored the House’s version of the juvenile crime bill. He expressed a general openness to the idea of new restrictions and said that his bill would include some language that will make “it more difficult for teenage kids to get ahold of guns.” Speaker Dennis Hastert and Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, met on May 20th to discuss, and ultimately agree on, attaching the Senate gun control measures to the McCollum Bill. The House version of the bill planned to include one additional restriction, which would raise the minimum age to buy a handgun from 18 to 21 (Bruni 1999c). Speaker Hastert, after expressing support for the measures, said he planned to bring them up for a vote in three to four weeks. This was widely viewed as a delaying tactic that would give the National Rifle Association time to lobby and potentially kill the restrictions (Bruni 1999d). Clinton continued to put public pressure on Congress to pass the new restrictions. He issued a number of public statements in support of the changes, especially closing the gun show loophole. He touted the successes of the Brady Act and the Assault Weapons Ban, while emphasizing the minimal “inconvenience” they’ve imposed on “legitimate gun owners.” He also framed his argument in a way that implicitly asked people to reflect on what type of society they wanted to the U.S. to be, “This is crazy for the United States to be the only advanced country in the world that doesn’t take comprehensive, sensible, thorough steps to keep handguns out of the hands of criminals” (Clinton 1999e). In essence, he is asking, why can’t we have strict gun control and be civilized like the rest of the developed world? The House dealt gun supporters a major blow in two separate votes on June 18th. They effectively blocked efforts to close the gun show

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loophole. Representative Saxby Chambliss, Republican from Georgia, expressed his opposition to new gun control with a traditional reference to individual rights: “The majority of the amendments we’re debating aren’t about saving lives. They’re about taking rights away from law-abiding citizens. What we’re talking about is gun control and that is the wrong issue” (Mitchell and Bruni 1999). In another key vote, the same day the House rejected a bill that included the other gun restrictions that had passed the Senate in May (Bruni and Dao 1999). President Clinton issued a statement harshly condemning the House’s actions to kill the gun control he had called for and that had passed the Senate. He said: When the NRA got the House leadership to put the vote off a month, past the Memorial Day recess, so that the memories of Littleton would fade and they could wear the Members out—from these districts where they were vulnerable—they were given a terrific advantage. After, so it wouldn’t be on the evening news, in the hope that no one would find out that they are still running the Congress, this Congress, for their own convenience, instead of for the interest of the people. So one more time the Congress of the United States, with the majority in the lead, says, "We don’t care what’s necessary to protect our children. We can’t possibly bear to make anyone in the NRA mad.... So now they say, "Okay, if you go to a gun show and you’d rather not have your background checked, just walk outside and swap guns and money, and everything is fine.” (Clinton 1999f)

So, while highlighting strategic moves, he continues the “our children” frame. He’s frustrated that the members will not set aside individual interest and act for the benefit of all, i.e. “for the interest of the people.” Although they do clearly resonate with many, including obviously with him, we see Clinton learning the hard way that group-oriented communitarian arguments have limited persuasive value in the individualistic U.S. Although Clinton would keep up the pressure for the remainder of his time in the White House, this Congress was effectively done with gun control. We can’t over emphasize just how much pressure he applied. He spoke about gun control far more forcefully, and far more frequently, than any of the other presidents included in our work did. Gun control was clearly a priority for him. So, while his words would ultimately fall

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on deaf ears—at least among the most relevant ears, House Republicans—he spoke a lot of words on the topic! However, his message and sentiment remained consistent. He continued to mostly advance the same slate of policies, defending his accomplishments while advocating for the measures the House just defeated. He framed his arguments around public, especially child, safety. He also tried to invoke a sense of collective responsibility that, he hoped, would offset any perceived inconvenience resulting from new restrictions. On May 12, 2000, President Clinton discussed the importance of the upcoming Million Mom March. He tried to frame it as an event that could illustrate the mainstream appeal of gun control. President Clinton stated: Every day, nearly a dozen of our children are killed by guns… But I think it [the march] will have a seminal impact in the nature of this debate because, for a very long time now, large majorities of the American people have been for commonsense prevention legislation that has nothing to do with infringing on the right to keep arms, to bear arms, to hunt, to sport shoot, to keep weapons in self-defense, but has everything to do with keeping guns out of the hands of criminals and children. (Clinton 2000a) What we really have is hoping that these mothers will create a sense of awareness in America that this is not a debate framed the way the NRA has debated, gun control or not, implying that this is the beginning of a slippery slope to take people’s guns away no matter how law abiding they are, and that it’s about very specific, very concrete measures of prevention to reduce the likelihood of guns falling into the hands of children and criminals. That includes the Brady bill, the assault weapons ban, and a ban on cop-killer bullets. (Clinton 2000b)

About 300,000 people participated in the march, which took place in Washington, D.C. on May 14th. Many of the demonstrators had been personally affected by gun violence. They used the opportunity to share their story in hopes that it would motivate collective action to overcome legislative gridlock on the issue. Veronica McQueen, a mother whose daughter had been killed with a firearm, spoke at the event, saying, “I come to you today, two days after what would have been her seventh birthday. I am a mom with a terrible tragedy, and I hope it never, ever, happens again.” Another speaker, Tom Mauser, whose son was killed at Columbine, said, “You may have heard that Colorado is ground zero in the gun debate. You bet it is. And we’re going to show the rest of the

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nation how you respond to it.” Gun control advocates hoped that the rally would make Republicans, who supported gun rights, nervous about their electoral future. One attendee said: “Bush [George W. Bush] ought to be terrified. Look out there- that is the face of the soccer mom” (Toner 2000). Although The Million Mom March was a noteworthy event in the American battle over gun control, it would have little lasting impact on that debate and it didn’t reignite serious debate in Congress. The country was in the midst of a competitive presidential campaign. On October 4th, 2000, someone who had sought the Republican nomination for that election, Senator John McCain of Arizona, spoke in a television commercial where he supported initiatives in Colorado and Oregon that would require people who purchase firearms at gun shows to undergo background checks. Essentially, he supported closing the gun show loophole. McCain said: Convicted felons have been able to buy and sell thousands of guns at gun shows because of a loophole in the law. Many were later used in crimes. That’s wrong… I believe that law-abiding citizens have the right to own guns. But with rights come responsibilities. (Dao 2000)

Gun control advocates felt that McCain speaking out against the gun show loophole was a sign that the NRA was losing its grip on the Republican Party. Joe Sudbay, political director for Handgun Control Inc, said, “He’s been a true advocate for the gun lobby. So, I think it’s a big deal” (Dao 2000). The bigger deal is the innovative way that McCain tried to bridge the gap between individual rights and social responsibility framing. He gave a nod to each perspective. On November 30th, 2000, President Clinton made his presidency’s final statement about gun control. As he had been doing, he lauded his achievements and begged for more action: The Brady law and the crime bill, in addition to 100,000 police, the ban on assault weapons and support for the most innovative local crime-fighting strategies to keep kids out of trouble in the first place… According to the latest figures, the Brady bill has now stopped more than 611,000 felons, fugitives, and domestic abusers from buying guns. First, send me a budget that actually funds our proposal for the largest national gun enforcement initiative in history, resources for 500 ATF agents and inspectors, and hundreds more Federal, State, and local gun prosecutor... Close the gun show loophole in the Brady law, require child safety locks on handguns,

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and stop the importation of large capacity ammunition clips, which enable guns already in the United States legally to be altered so that they get around the assault weapons ban. (Clinton 2000c)

Unlike the majority of Presidents that had come before him, gun control was high on President Clinton’s agenda. President Clinton oversaw the passage of the Assault Weapons Ban and the Brady Bill. By American standards, at least at the federal level, these were significant victories for gun control advocates. He also diligently pursued a number of other measures that—while they would ultimately fail—would drive the narrative in the media and would pass one chamber of Congress. The election of President George W. Bush in November of 2000—and especially the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks—lead to a long period of gun regulation being relegated to the back burner of American politics. President Clinton tried to sell his restrictive policies by appealing to collectively orientated values. He emphasized us, our, and we. He had some luck using these appeals to chip away at America’s individualistic armor, but he still wasn’t able to accomplish everything he wanted.

Individualism in the Courts and Congress Under Bush II George W. Bush became President in January of 2001 after winning a close and disputed election. While gun control had been high on President Clinton’s agenda, the Bush Administration wasn’t particularly interested in the topic. The consequences of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, would define the G. W. Bush era. President Bush’s first public remarks about gun violence were sparked by a series of high-profile shootings that occurred early in 2001. He said, “In America today, a teenager is more likely to die from a gunshot than from all natural causes of death combined. This grim fact has caused too many families to bury the next generation. And for all our children’s sake, this nation must reclaim our neighborhoods and our streets.” However, President Bush did not use this occasion to call for new restrictions, as his predecessor had. He proposed to increase the amount the federal government spent on gun crimes prosecutions (Bruni 2001). So, it was clear from the outset that Bush’s instincts would bias him toward punitive gun policy.

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Remarks made by Bush’s Attorney General, John Ashcroft, in May 2001 further clarified the contrasts between the new administration and the previous one. Foreshadowing a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that would be handed down near the end of the Bush Administration, Ashcroft gave his interpretation of the Second Amendment. The Attorney General said: Let me state unequivocally my view that the text and the original intent of the Second Amendment clearly protect the right of individuals to keep and bear firearms. While some have argued that the Second Amendment guarantees only a collective right of the states to maintain militias, I believe the amendment’s plain meaning and original intent prove otherwise. (Butterfield 2001a)

By placing individuals at the heart of the Second Amendment, the AG was clearly staking out the administration’s position on a significant legal debate. However, he was also clearly signaling that, at least when it came to regulating guns and addressing gun crime, individuals were going to be the focus of the administration’s policies: protecting their gun rights via lenient policy and holding them accountable via punitive policy. The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, would fundamentally change the U.S., and the Bush Presidency. The 9/11 attacks were seen by some gun control advocates as an opportunity to advance restrictive policy. They focused on closing the gun show loophole in particular. Matthew Bennett, the Director of Public Affairs for the Americans for Gun Safety, began making the case that, “terrorists are getting guns at gun shows, it is time for Congress to act on this issue” (Butterfield 2001b). John Cowan, the President of Americans for Gun Safety said: “Now that we know for certain that terrorists have bought guns at gun shows. Basic political sense will tell you Congress needs to act in a bipartisan way to close that dangerous loophole. This could signal a historic shift in the gun debate” (Butterfield 2001b). Similarly, Michael Barnes, President of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, stated, “You would think the Congress would have rushed to address this issue in the aftermath of September 11th, with terrorists having such easy access to guns in the United States” (Butterfield 2001b). Senator John McCain, Republican from Arizona, even shared this sentiment: “I believe terrorists are exploiting a loophole in our laws so they don’t have a background check. It is hard to understand why we

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don’t change this, but the NRA remains extremely powerful” (Butterfield 2001b). James Baker, Chief Lobbyist for the NRA, responded by calling the efforts of gun control groups, “a fairly crass attempt to bootstrap their agenda on the tragedy of September 11th ” (Butterfield 2001b). Early in the following May, 2002, a group of senators proposed that the Transportation Department and the airlines allow pilots to carry firearms on board. Senator Zell Miller, Democrat from Georgia, argued, “We trust the pilots with our lives. It’s time to trust them with firearms.” Senator Conrad Burns, Republican from Montana added, “If a person, or a party, want to die in the commitment of an act, as they did on September 11th, it makes sense to this old cowboy that it would help if they died before they got it done.” Miller and Burns got support for this innovative lenient policy from fellow Republican Senators, particularly Frank Murkowski and Robert C. Smith (Wald 2002a). There was also significant support among House Republicans. Representatives John L. Mica and Don Young, the latter of whom was chairman of the Transportation Committee, introduced legislation that would ensure pilots who wanted to carry firearms could do so. Representative John Hostetler, Republican from Indiana, supported the measure and said, “Does it seem reasonable to insert one more preventive step before an F-16 launches a missile against a passenger plane?” (Wald 2002a). John W. Magaw, Undersecretary of Transportation and Security, opposed the idea and said that he would not allow airline pilots to carry firearms. However, members in both chambers of Congress would continue to pursue legislation that would compel the department to adopt this change. Representative Mica, a chief backer of the move, reacted to Mr. Magaw’s decision by saying, “I have reports that would curl your hair about what gets past passenger screening. I can’t believe they haven’t instantaneously allowed pilots to defend themselves given the gaps in the current system” (Wald 2002b). In July, 2002, the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly in favor of letting airline pilots carry guns in their cockpits. The legislation included a requirement that pilots who wanted to carry guns must be trained by the Transportation Security Administration and would be deputized as federal flight deck officers. This training and certification would allow them to carry firearms on domestic and international trips. Firearms could only be carried legally in the cockpit of the plane and not in the passenger cabin. Firearms would be supplied by the government (Wald 2002c).

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Later that summer the Senate voted 87-6 in favor of this bill. Senator Barbara Boxer, Democrat from California and a frequent gun control advocate, voted to support this bill, which, while unique, expanded gun access and we therefore consider lenient policy. Senator Boxer said, “We don’t have enough air marshals, the flight attendants haven’t had one bit of new training. The pilots want to have something at their disposal to save their aircraft. If I believed the skies were safe, I wouldn’t be here supporting this bill.” Georgia Democrat Zell Miller, explained his support for the bill, “Will someone please explain the logic that we can trust someone with a Boeing 747 in bad weather, but not with a Glock 9 millimeter?” While pilots overwhelmingly supported the measure, the airlines were strongly against it. A group of 21 airlines released the following statement: “While we are spending literally billions of dollars to keep dangerous weapons off of aircraft, the idea of intentionally introducing thousands of deadly weapons into the system appears to be dangerously counter-productive” (Wald 2002d). Starting on October 2nd, 2002, two snipers began randomly killing civilians in the Washington, DC and Baltimore Maryland area. This series of murders would put the spotlight back on guns. Gun control advocates started discussing creating a new ballistic fingerprinting system that could help better connect fired ammunition back to a gun and, presumably, its owner. On October 18th, a week before the two snipers would eventually be captured by law enforcement, Wayne LaPierre, executive director of the NRA, made a public statement: With every tragedy that involves firearms, whether it’s a post office shooting or a school shooting, you have an opportunistic attempt by gun control groups and some politicians to never miss a chance to trade on a tragedy and politicize the debate. But they’re trying to ride the same old tired horse. There’s nothing new in the what they are proposing and it is not resonating. (Seelye 2002)

Longtime gun control supporter Senator Schumer did not think there would be much opportunity to get new gun control policy through Congress. He said, “With a pro-gun president in the White House and one house of Congress in Republican hands and the other so narrowly divided, it’s an uphill fight.” Acknowledging the reality of a shift from a restrictive to a more punitive era, Schumer continued, “Before, we would

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have said ‘Ban the gun.’ Now we say ‘Let’s have a system where law enforcement can find the criminal’” (Seelye, 2002). Shielding gun manufacturers from civil liability, which first appeared on the agenda in the late 90s, resurfaced when, on April 3, 2003, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill that would provide firearm manufacturers, and firearm dealers, immunity from lawsuits seeking damages for the misuse of their products. Starting in the late 90s, lawsuits like these had become more common. Representative Cliff Stearns, a Florida Republican who introduced the bill, said, “We’re trying to stop making public policy through the courts with these nuisance suits.” The bill’s lead sponsor in the senate, Idaho Republican Larry E. Craig, said, “I think we’ll be successful this session. The Democrats have found that being aggressive advocates of gun control hasn’t worked for them.” Senator Craig went on to note that there were nine Democrats within the Senate who were co-sponsoring the bill. While the bill seemed to have strong support in both houses, Senator Jack Reed, Democrat from Rhode Island, was not one of them. Senator Reed said, “A filibuster is absolutely an option. I can’t imagine giving an exemption like this to one industry, especially this one. Toys are more heavily regulated than guns, and there’s no immunity for the toy industry against litigation” (Tierney 2003). In addition to seeking a liability shield for gun manufacturers, Congress was debating assault weapons again. In order to help win support for it, the 1994 ban on them included a “sunset” provision. The law would expire 10 years after its enactment—which would be in 2004—unless congress renewed it. In May, 2003, members of the Bush Administration indicated that President Bush would be in favor of renewing the assault weapons ban. President Bush had been viewed as a strong supporter of the Second Amendment, so his position came as a bit of a shock to conservatives and the NRA. Senator Schumer, along with Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, planned to introduce a bill in the Senate on May 8th that would renew the ban for an additional ten years. Schumer was hopeful that a push for renewal would be successful with the President’s support. He said, “We hope the President will not just say he supports the ban but will work to get it passed. This will be a good measure of the compassion in his compassionate conservatism.” Some Democrats wanted to strengthen the ban but feared trying to do so would doom the entire effort to renew in. Senator Feinstein said, “I would like to strengthen the bill, but I don’t want to lose the bill and important to that is the President’s support” (Lichtblau 2003).

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On February 24th, 2004, the New York Times published an op-ed written by four big city mayors—Michael R. Bloomberg of New York City, Richard M. Daley of Chicago, James K. Hahn of Los Angeles, and Scott L. King of Gary, Indiana—that argued against the bill shielding gun manufactures from civil liability. This bill, which had passed the House, became known as the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act. Mayor Bloomberg, in particular, would become an outspoken advocate for, and financial backer of, gun control. In the op-ed, the mayors urged the Senate to reject the bill. They argued that passing the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act would shield irresponsible firearm manufacturers from accountability and that it would make their job of protecting their citizens even more difficult (Bloomberg et al. 2004). The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act would languish in the Senate for a while. In the meantime, the clock was ticking for supporters of renewing the assault weapons ban, who were essentially up against a September, 2004, deadline. In order to help marshal support for renewal, the Million Mom March held a Mother’s Day rally in Washington, DC. Supporters were heartened by the fact that President George W. Bush had indicated that he would sign legislation renewing the ban. White House spokesman, Brian Besanceney said, “The president’s position on this issue remains unchanged.” While President Bush appeared to support the renewal bill, his support seemed tepid and he did not directly address it. There were members in Congress who thought that he should voice support for renewing a ban on assault weapons explicitly and forcefully. For example, Representative Carolyn McCarthy, Democrat from New York, said, “You can’t just say you will sign a bill. If he has the political will, it will be done” (Justice 2004). President Bush issued a statement on July 31st, 2004. Instead of giving supporters of renewing the assault weapons ban the backing they sought, it was mostly a generic—as well as classically lenient and punitive—statement about individual gun rights and personal accountability. He said: We stand for the Second Amendment, which gives every American the individual right to bear arms. As a sportsman, I understand that gun ownership carries serious responsibilities. I also know that when a person commits a crime with a gun, they need to be held to account. Over the past 3 years, Federal prosecutions of crimes committed with firearms have increased 68 percent. Our message is, law-abiding citizens should be allowed to bear

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and own a gun, and criminals who commit crime with guns ought to go to jail. (Bush 2004)

Without the President’s clear support, much less leadership, Congress would not renew the ban on assault weapons. Two weeks after the assault weapons ban’s expiration, the House’s Republican majority further demonstrated its lenient policy-mood with a vote to repeal Washington, DC’s handgun ban. The original law banned all handguns unless they were registered before 1977. The House’s vote to repeal the law would allow district residents to keep loaded firearms in their homes and businesses, would allow the ownership of semiautomatic assault weapons not prohibited by federal law, and would end the ban on private handgun ownership. Representative Tom DeLay, Republican from Texas said, “For years, American citizens in Washington, D.C. have had their right to self-protection denied them and it’s time to set things right. Washington residents are American citizens and therefore deserve the right to bear arms to defend themselves as much as anyone else.” Democratic Representative Charles B. Rangel of New York argued, “It’s an election vote. People want to show they’re for guns. It has nothing to do with D.C.” While the measure passed the House, the Senate appeared unlikely to take it up in 2004 (Stolberg 2004). President George W. Bush won his re-election campaign against Democratic nominee John Kerry. The 2004 presidential election was dominated by foreign policy and national security issues. Neither candidate made gun control a significant issue in their campaigns. Gun rights activists would ultimately benefit from four more years under a president who seemed largely ambivalent toward gun control. Renewing the assault weapons ban was off the table. Giving legal protections to the gun industry was back on the table. At the end of July, 2005, the Senate overwhelmingly approved the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act. It would prohibit lawsuits against firearm manufacturers and distributors for the criminal misuse of their products. Republican Senator Larry Craig of Idaho, who was one of the chief sponsors for the bill, said, “The bill is intended to do one thing and that is to end the abuse that is now going on in the court system of American against law-abiding American businesses when they violate no law.” Democratic Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, one of the bill’s chief opponents, argued, “This is about politics, the power of the NRA to dictate legislation” (Hulse, 2005).

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Providing immunity from lawsuits to firearms manufacturers would move on for consideration in the House of Representatives. The House had passed it during a previous Congress, in 2003, and it would do so again on October 20th, 2005. The bill was approved by a vote of 283144. Wayne LaPierre, the NRA’s chief executive said, “It’s a historic piece of legislation. As of October 20th, the Second Amendment is probably in the best shape in this country that it’s been in decades.” The law would not provide blanket immunity to firearms manufacturers. They could still be held liable for defective weapons or for criminal behavior, such as knowingly selling a weapon to someone who had failed a background check. President Bush indicated that he planned to sign the bill because it would “contribute to efforts to stem frivolous lawsuits.” Supporters of the bill, such as Representative Tom DeLay, said: “the bill will protect America’s legal system for genuine plaintiffs.” A critic of the bill, Senator Edward Kennedy, argued that the bill had been “bought and paid for by the NRA.” Another critic, Representative Chris Van Hollen, said, “The bill was a cruel hoax on victims of gun violence. I went to a lot of memorial services during that period of time [when the DC Snipers were active]. I’ve met with family members. To tell them that their cases were frivolous is, I think, to add insult to injury” (Stolberg 2005). The following Spring, of 2006, Mayor Bloomberg, and Thomas M. Menino, Boston’s mayor, tried to breathe life into the gun control agenda by organizing a meeting of fifteen mayors from major cities across the U.S. The meeting’s two biggest agenda items were expanding gun tracing technology in cities and cracking down on irresponsible gun dealers. It seemed clear that the more overarching agenda was to reinvigorate the gun debate and to position mayors as leaders in that debate. Bloomberg said, “It is time for national leadership in the war on gun violence and if the leadership won’t come from Congress or come from the White House, then it has to come from us. When Congress does not take the lead on a major problem that affects the whole nation-whether its global warming, welfare, immigration-its up to the cities and states to do it.” Mayor Menino added, “The federal government has vigorously taken on bird flu, another epidemic we hear about daily, but has not done one thing about illegal guns and gun violence in the streets.” Mayor Tom Barrett, of Milwaukee, stated, “We want the Congress to respond. We want the Congress to listen to us. We want the Congress to answer these phone calls.” The fifteen mayors signed off on a six-point statement of principles. They included: punishing illegal gun possession to the

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maximum extent of the law, prosecuting dealers who knowingly sell guns to criminals, opposing legislation being discussed in the House of Representatives that would limit firearm tracing technology, creating better technology to detect illegal firearms, and a coordinated legislative and litigation strategies that cities could use to advance this agenda (Chan 2006a). In an effort that would ultimately go nowhere, Senator Schumer quickly heeded the mayors’ calls. He proposed a bill that would give state and local law enforcement agencies access to federal data that would allow them to track sales histories on firearms used in crimes. Schumer said that Mayor Bloomberg’s efforts to draw attention to firearms policy would help provide the momentum needed to force Congress to act on his legislation (Hernandez 2006). It didn’t. Mayor Bloomberg continued to use his platform to press for gun control, as well as federal aid in prosecuting illicit gun dealers in the City of New York (Baker 2006). He also took his push for gun control on the road. For example, he made a trip to Pennsylvania in September of 2006 to lobby for more gun control in that state, which he viewed as a source of the guns being used criminally in his city (Chan 2006b). While Congress and the President were largely silent on gun policy in 2006, Mayor Bloomberg and his group’s push for more gun control drew a great deal of press. That said, and despite Schumer’s bill that we mentioned above, their efforts would result in little actual policy change. Our work’s scope has primarily led us to focus on the federal level. However, Bloomberg’s efforts help demonstrate how actors at other levels can, with varying degrees of success, influence federal policymaking. The Democrats regained control of Congress as a result of the 2006 midterm elections. One goal of the newly elected Democratic Congress was to remove mandatory sentencing for certain offenses. This marked a major shift away from the punitive legislative goals of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, where mandatory prison sentences were implemented for many offenses, including many firearms offenses. Many federal judges supported these changes because they found that mandatory sentences inappropriately tied their hands and led to unusually long sentences for relatively low-level offenders (Clemetson 2007). In March, 2007, a federal appeals court in Washington, D.C. struck down a law that forbid DC residents from keeping handguns in their homes. The decision of the court found that the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects an individual right to own a firearm, as

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opposed to the collective right of state militias. A collective right interpretation had been the conventional wisdom of the legal community. So, this was a significant ruling that, if upheld, could raise constitutional questions about a variety of gun control laws. The case was brought by Dick Heller, who served as a guard at the Federal Judicial Center. Although he carried a gun professionally, he was denied the right to keep a firearm at his home (Liptak 2007). The case would eventually be heard by the Supreme Court of the U.S. Thirty-Three students and faculty were killed in a mass shooting on the campus of Virginia Tech on April 16th, 2007. Gun control advocates in Congress, such as Democratic Representative Carolyn McCarthy of New York—whose husband was slain and child wounded in a mass shooting ten years prior—immediately called for more restrictive gun control. However, in general, key Congressional figures from both parties did not seem to have much of an appetite for vigorously pursuing additional restrictive measures. Senator John McCain said, “This brutal attack was not caused by nor [sic] should it lead to restrictions on the Second Amendment, which guarantees an individual right to keep and bear arms.” Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said, “I hope there’s not a rush to do anything. We need to take a deep breath.” Senator Schumer, who was generally known as a staunch supporter of gun control, also suggested it was too early to discuss additional measures. One reason that there seemed to be lukewarm support centered on the perceived political consequences politicians tended to face after supporting gun control legislation. Senator Larry E. Craig, Republican from Idaho, and staunch supporter of expansive gun rights stated, “There are several gun control advocates who have behind their name today, r-e-t, retired. Some of it was voluntary and some of it was involuntary [suggesting Democrats were losing their seats for supporting gun control]” (Eaton and Luo 2007). At the end of April, 2007, the Justice Department proposed legislation that would give the Attorney General the ability to bar terrorism suspects from buying firearms. The proposal was introduced in the Senate by Frank R. Lautenberg, Democrat from New Jersey. Senator Lautenberg said, “It took years but the administration finally realized that letting terrorists buy guns is dangerous.” Senator Lautenberg also noted that the bill was gaining support from the Justice Department in the wake of the Virginia Tech slayings (Luo 2007a).

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The mental health frame—the idea that individual mental illness is a significant driver of gun violence, particularly mass shootings—really became prominent in the wake of the Virginia Tech shootings. The first legislative consequences of mental health framing came in early May, with the introduction of a bill that would garner support from both sides of the traditional gun debate. The legislation would encourage states to report their mental health records to federal databases used to conduct background checks on firearms buyers. The bill was supported by traditional gun control advocates like Representative McCarthy and Senator Schumer; however, it was also co-sponsored by John D. Dingell, who was a longtime board member of the NRA. Major gun rights advocate Senator Craig said that he too supported the bill. Wayne LaPierre, the NRA’s chief executive, issued a statement saying, “We are not an obstacle. We’re strongly in support of putting those records in the system” (Luo 2007b). The following month, in June, 2007, the House of Representatives approved a bill that would give money to states so that they could update the national database that firearms dealers use for national background checks. The update would include criminal records and, significantly, mental health information. Representative McCarthy said that the bill was “good policy that will save lives.” Representatives John D. Dingell and Lamar Smith, longtime gun rights supporters, co-sponsored the bill. Representative Smith of Texas said, “This act will ensure that the background check system really is instant and accurate.” Senator Schumer was enthusiastic about the bill and its chance of ultimate passage. He said, “When the NRA and I agree on legislation, you know that it’s going to get through, become law, and do some good.” The NRA supported the bill; however, Gun Owners of America, which sells itself as the only no compromise gun rights group, did not. Erich Pratt, the communications director for the Gun Owners of America said the bill “forces honest, law-abiding people to have to prove their innocence to a bureaucrat before they exercise their constitutional rights.” The major impetus for this mildly restrictive legislation was the Virginia Tech Massacre, which happened two months prior (Palank and Urbina 2007). The mental health frame would stick around. It has a unique ability to appeal to both communitarian and individualistic values. Restricting overall access to guns is the natural inclination of people whose focus is on the societal consequences of gun availability. So, restricting them from a group that is seen as particularly problematic for public safety

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is likewise a natural reaction. On the other hand, people with a strong sense of individualism prefer to keep cause and consequence at the individual level: if an individual’s mental illness makes it more likely they’ll commit violence, that individual can be barred from accessing guns (but, implicitly, there is therefore no need to restrict the gun rights of people without mental illness). Furthermore, understanding gun violence as a mental health issue means, in this view, that it isn’t society’s problem to solve: it is a problem caused by individuals with mental illness and therefore requires individual-level solutions. The U.S. Supreme Court handed down their landmark opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller late in June, 2008. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, ruled that the Constitution’s Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to gun ownership. This was such a significant case because it was the first time the Court had weighed in on the core protections provided by the Second Amendment. It also settled the individual versus collective rights debate. President George W. Bush, who rarely discussed gun policy publicly, applauded the Court’s decision: As a longstanding advocate of the rights of gun owners in America, I applaud the Supreme Court’s historic decision today confirming what has always been clear in the Constitution: The Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear firearms. I also agree with the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the DC firearm laws violate this fundamental constitutional right. The District of Columbia should now swiftly move to ensure that its residents’ rights under the Second Amendment are fully protected. (Bush 2008)

While the Supreme Court’s decision in D.C. v. Heller suggested that a variety of gun control laws may now have a more difficult time passing constitutional muster, large cities such as D.C. (the subject of the original lawsuit) seemed determined to hold on to as much of their restrictive policy as possible. On December 16th, 2008, the D.C. City Council passed a new ordinance to regulate firearms ownership. The ordinance required all gun owners to receive five hours of safety training and to register their firearms every three years. Firearm owners would also be required to have a criminal background check every six years. Wayne LaPierre of the NRA, in a critical response to the ordinance, said, “The D.C. Council continues to make it harder and harder for law abiding citizens to access this freedom.” D.C. Councilman Phil Mendelson, in

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response to LaPierre’s criticism, said, “A lot of critics of gun registration say that all it does is restrict law abiding citizens. But the reality is it makes it easier for law enforcement to go after criminals” (Falcone 2008). LaPierre and Mendelson’s dueling statements reflect the chasm that lies at the heart of the American gun debate: Where are we going to focus, on private rights or public goods? On individual freedom, or the collective interest? As was typically the case during presidential election years, there would be little action on gun control in Congress during 2008. So, the story of the battle over gun control during the George W. Bush era would effectively end with the Heller decision. Bush’s attention was elsewhere and he addressed gun policy infrequently. So, the gun control agenda during his administration was largely driven by advocates within Congress, as well as outside actors like Mayor Bloomberg. Generally speaking, the naturally individualistic tendencies of American political culture were able to rule the Bush era. These were reflected most significantly in the defeat of restrictive legislation renewing Clinton’s assault weapons ban and, most literally, by Justice Scalia’s extremely individualistic interpretation of the rights protected by the Second Amendment. In fact, the legal issues debated by the Court in the Heller case—whether the Second Amendment protected the rights of individual Americans, or the collective rights of states to maintain militias—can largely be understood as a microcosm of the American gun debate more generally.

Obama: Calling for Commonsense When President Obama began his term in January 2009, his positions on gun control were fairly well understood. His election inspired hope among gun control advocates and spread trepidation in the gun rights community. However, he had other priorities for his first term. Like all first term presidents, one of those priorities was a second term. Given the fraught nature of the American gun debate, and the realities he faced in Congress, Obama understandably worked hard to steer clear of the issue during his first term. After winning re-election he, sparked by a particularly horrific mass shooting, became much more vocal about the topic. The push for new legislation that he led in early 2013 was the most significant drive for reform that there had been in decades. Even though his legislative agenda ultimately failed, in the twilight of his presidency

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he transformed into one of the country’s most powerful voices for gun control. On April 16th, 2009, while visiting Mexico, President Obama delivered the first public remarks of his presidency that directly addressed gun control policy. In this speech, President Obama discussed the difficulty of trying to reinstate the expired ban on assault weapons. He said: I have not backed off at all from my belief that the gun--the assault weapons ban made sense. And I continue to believe that we can respect and honor the Second Amendment rights in our Constitution, the rights of sportsmen and hunters and homeowners who want to keep their families safe to lawfully bear arms, while dealing with assault weapons that, as we now know, here in Mexico, are helping to fuel extraordinary violence--violence in our own country as well. Now, having said that, I think none of us are under any illusion that reinstating that ban would be easy... I’ll give you one example, and that is the issue of gun tracing. The tracing of bullets and ballistics and gun information that have been used in major crimes, that’s information that we are still not giving to law enforcement as a consequence of provisions that have been blocked in the United States Congress, and those are the areas where I think that we can make some significant progress early… That doesn’t mean that we’re steering away from the issue of the assault guns ban, but it does mean that we want to act with urgency, promptly, now. (Obama 2009)

The President’s statements suggested that he supported more restrictive firearms policies, but due to the difficulty of getting them passed, he seemed lukewarm about actually pursuing them. During this time period, the President was heavily focused on building support for the Affordable Care Act. So, he didn’t want to burn political capital on an issue that he did not think would get enough support to ultimately pass Congress. If he was going to spend any political capital at all on gun control, he was signaling that he intended to focus his efforts on more realistic, and modest, reforms. In May of 2009, Republicans in the Senate led by Tom Coburn, of Oklahoma, were able to add an amendment to a popular bill restricting credit card companies. Their amendment would allow visitors to national parks and wildlife refuges to carry loaded and concealed firearms. While many Democrats did not like this provision, they also did not want to derail the bill because of the amendment. Senator Coburn was quoted as

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saying, “Timing is everything in politics.” He went on to say, “I don’t like guns necessarily. What I want is those constitutional rights to be protected.” Senator Barbara Boxer, Democrat from California, was critical of the provision, but also explained her acquiescence to it, saying, It is a shame. But you have to come to a realization around here that at this point in time, the NRA gets the votes. Either you are going to bring down the whole Senate and never do anything or you are going to swallow hard and say, “I will just vote my conscience on those amendments and speak out until people get a hold of their senses.’” (Hulse 2009)

President Obama ultimately signed the measure expanding concealed carry rights to national parks and wildlife refuges (Johnson 2009). While this isn’t a dramatic expansion of gun rights, it is an expansion of gun rights nonetheless. So, we must highlight the fact that a president who instilled widespread fear among the gun rights community—and did in fact have a fairly extensive wish list of restrictive policies that he wanted Congress to pass—ultimately implemented lenient policy that expanded the rights of gun owners. In addition to this, he also signed a transportation bill that allowed guns to be packed in checked Amtrak bags (Urbina 2010). As we’ll see, the entirety of Obama’s restrictive gun control agenda would fail to make it through Congress. So, these two lenient measures were Obama’s only gun related legislative achievements. In July, 2009, another gun measure, generally known as national concealed carry reciprocity, was narrowly defeated in the Senate. It was introduced by South Dakota Republican Senator John Thune and would have given people with a valid license to carry a concealed weapon in their home state the legal ability to carry concealed weapons in other states. Essentially, this lenient policy would have required states to honor concealed carry licenses just like they honor driver’s licenses from other states. The provision was bitterly opposed by large city mayors such as Mike Bloomberg, who said, “The vast majority of states have set minimum requirements for obtaining a permit to carry a concealed gun and Congress should respect those laws instead of trying to usurp them.” After the provision’s defeat, New York’s Senator Schumer said, “Lives have been saved with the defeat of this amendment.” Supporters of the measure, such as Wyoming Republican Senator John Barrasso, said the provision would have created “a license for self-defense across state lines” (Becker and Herszenhorn 2009).

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The U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in McDonald v. Chicago in June of 2010. This decision incorporated, via the Fourteenth Amendment, the core finding of the 2008 Heller case. As they did in the Heller case, which most directly applied to the District of Columbia, a federal enclave, the Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment protects the rights of individuals to bear arms. This interpretation of the Second Amendment meant that complete bans on handguns, like the one Chicago had, violated the Second Amendment. As an incorporating case, McDonald applied the logic of Heller to state and local gun control laws. Justice Samuel Alito, who authored the Court’s majority opinion, said that “the right to self-defense protected by the Second Amendment was fundamental to the American conception of ordered liberty. And like other provisions of the Bill of Rights it must be applied to limit not only federal power, but also that of state and local governments.” Justice John Paul Stevens, who sided with the Court’s minority was quoted as saying, “Although the court’s decisions in this case might be seen as a mere adjunct to Heller the consequences could prove far more destructive-quite literally-to our nation’s communities and to our constitutional structure” (Liptak 2010). The contrasting perspectives of Alito and Stevens are emblematic of the great American gun debate more generally. Where shall we focus, on liberty or on community? The crux of each justice’s argument centers on these values explicitly. On January 8th, 2011, Representative Gabrielle Giffords, a Democrat from Arizona, was shot while she was meeting with constituents outside of a grocery store in Tuscon. Despite severe wounds, the congresswoman survived this assassination attempt. However, six people in the crowd, including a federal judge, were killed. This attack on a member of Congress would bring gun control back into the spotlight at the beginning of 2011 (Kristof 2011). Several restrictive gun control bills were proposed in the wake of the Giffords shooting. They included measures expanding background check requirements, creating no gun zones around members of Congress, and banning large capacity magazines. While Paul Hemke, Executive Director of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, would say that he thought this tragedy could lead to some real changes, many gun rights advocates, as well as policy makers on both sides of the issue, thought there was little chance for change. Representative Peter T. King, Republican from New York, who proposed the bill restricting guns from areas where members of Congress were present, got a quick lesson in the

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passion that this issue evokes. Representative King said, “I received 100 calls an hour from people who think I am trying to take away their Second Amendment rights. This kind of legislation is very difficult.” Representative King went on to discuss the potential renewal of the assault weapons ban. He said, “There is no enthusiasm even among Democrats for the renewal of the assault weapon ban. The fact is Congress has not done any gun legislation in years. Once you get out of the Northeast, guns are part of daily life.” Representative Carolyn McCarthy, the New York Democrat and avid supporter of gun control, proposed the bill banning large capacity magazines. She said, “This is not a gun control bill. I like to use the word gun safety bills. And this one just addresses the narrow issue of these clips. Listen, any kind of bill the NRA is against is always a problem.” Gun rights advocates in Congress, such as Representatives Jason Chaffetz, Mike Pence, and Tom Graves made a number of statements expressing their opposition to new gun control. Chaffetz said, “I carry a gun because it is a personal preference and for my own personal safety. It’s not for everybody. Not everyone should rush out because of what happened last week and start carrying, but I like it, and I do it.” Pence, spinning the typical pro-gun control invocation of community values, said, “I maintain that firearms in the hands of law-abiding citizens make communities safer, not less safe.” Finally, Graves aide, John Donnelly in discussing Represenative Graves’s stance on firearms said, “[He is] a firm believer in Second Amendment rights, owns a firearm, and has a concealed weapon permit in Georgia and has no plan to change his normal routines other than to focus his prayers on the victims of the tragic attack in Tuscon” (Nagourney and Steinhaur 2011). Gun control advocates placed increasing pressure on President Obama, urging him to exert more leadership on the gun issue. Representative McCarthy said, “[I am] hopeful that President Obama would respond after the pressure that’s been coming out from all the different groups and almost every paper I know of.” Dennis Henigan, vice president of the Brady Campaign, discussed how President Obama had received an F from them for his first year in office because he had signed a provision allowing people to carry concealed weapons in national parks, allowed guns in checked luggage on Amtrak trains, and had not named a director for the ATF. Henigan said, “Not only did he not champion the cause, but he also actually signed bad legislation into law.” White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said, “I wouldn’t rule out that at some point the president talks about the issues surrounding gun violence. I don’t have a timetable

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or obviously what he would say” (Calmes 2011). So, even after the attempted assassination of Representative Giffords, President Obama— who was likely concerned about his re-election prospects—would not make any public statements about firearm regulations in 2011. The issue of Stand Your Ground Laws and the consequences of a longterm movement to liberalize the laws governing concealed carry would lead the gun control conversation at the beginning of 2012. On February 26th, 2012, Trayvon Martin was shot and killed by George Zimmerman. Zimmerman—a neighborhood watch volunteer who was legally carrying a concealed weapon—argued that he was attacked by Martin. He therefore used Florida’s relatively new Stand Your Ground Law as a defense for using lethal force. This event would result in a national conversation about whether more citizens carrying firearms made the U.S. safer. It would also lead to criticism of bills that would further expand gun carry, such as the national concealed carry reciprocity bill, which was still a live issue in Congress and in the gun rights community (Collins 2012). A July 2012, mass shooting at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, prompted President Obama to deliver one of his first really substantial public statements about gun control. The president tried to walk a fine line between acknowledging the legal and cultural reality of individual gun rights while calling attention to the need for several new restrictions. Significantly, he also invoked the “common sense” gun control frame, which would be widely adopted by gun control advocates. He said: And when there is an extraordinarily heartbreaking tragedy like the one we saw [in Aurora, Colorado] there’s always an outcry immediately after for action. And there’s talk of new reforms, and there’s talk of new legislation. And too often, those efforts are defeated by politics and by lobbying and eventually by the pull of our collective attention elsewhere. And I, like most Americans, believe that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual the right to bear arms. And we recognize the traditions of gun ownership that passed on from generation to generation, that hunting and shooting are part of a cherished national heritage. But I also believe that a lot of gun owners would agree that AK-47s belong in the hands of soldiers, not in the hands of criminals, that they belong on the battlefield of war, not on the streets of our cities. I believe the majority of gun owners would agree that we should do everything possible to prevent criminals and fugitives from purchasing weapons, that we should check someone’s criminal record before they can check out a gun seller, that a mentally unbalanced individual should not be able to get his hands on

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a gun so easily. These steps shouldn’t be controversial. They should be common sense. (Obama 2012a)

Less than a month before winning re-election, President Obama made a similar statement and reiterated his previous calls for reform. Recognizing the political realities he confronted, he mentioned a ban on assault weapons—which was a priority for his political base—but since such a ban was unlikely to win enough support to clear Congress, he tried to redirect attention to the more routine, and significant, problem of urban gun violence in general. He said: We’re a nation that believes in the Second Amendment, and I believe in the Second Amendment. We’ve got a long tradition of hunting and sportsmen and people who want to make sure they can protect themselves. But there have been too many instances during the course of my Presidency where I’ve had to comfort families who have lost somebody, most recently, out in Aurora. So, my belief is that A, we have to enforce the laws we’ve already got, make sure that we’re keeping guns out of the hands of criminals, those who are mentally ill. We’ve done a much better job in terms of background checks, but we’ve got more to do when it comes to enforcement. But I also share your belief that weapons that were designed for soldiers in war theaters don’t belong on our streets. And so what I’m trying to do is to get a broader conversation about how do we reduce the violence generally. Part of it is seeing if we can get an assault weapons ban reintroduced, but part of it is also looking at other sources of the violence. Because, frankly, in my hometown of Chicago, there’s an awful lot of violence, and they’re not using AK-47s, they’re using cheap handguns. And so what I want is a comprehensive strategy. Part of it is seeing if we can get automatic weapons that kill folks in amazing numbers out of the hands of criminals and the mentally ill. (Obama 2012b)

A nation that had unfortunately grown accustomed to such tragedies was nonetheless shocked by a particularly horrific massacre that occurred on December 14th, 2012, when 26 people were murdered at Sandy Hook Elementary school in Newtown, CT. Twenty of the victims were children between the ages of six and seven. This tragedy thrust gun control back into the national conversation. Gun control advocates were emboldened to press for change at multiple levels of government, including in the U.S. Congress. President Obama, who for most of his first term clearly

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seemed reluctant to discuss gun control, would now make pursuing new restrictive measures a priority for his administration. The day after the shooting, President Obama signaled his willingness to engage on the issue, saying, “We’re going to have to come together and take meaningful action to prevent more tragedies like this, regardless of the politics.” However, many gun control advocates remained skeptical of President Obama’s willingness to embrace the fight for more gun control and called for him to pursue the issue more forcefully. For example, leading gun control advocate Mayor Bloomberg said, “Calling for meaningful action is not enough. We need immediate action. We have heard all the rhetoric before. What we have not seen is leadership- not from the White House and not from Congress. That must end today.” A leading congressional gun control advocate, Representative Carolyn McCarthy, likewise said, “The time to talk about it should have been after the last shooting or the shooting before that. I am not going to be shy about it anymore.” McCarthy said she planned to resume her pursuit of legislation that would reinstate the assault weapons ban, ban high-capacity magazines, require criminal background checks on gun buyers at gun shows, and improve instant background checks to more thoroughly catch people with histories of mental illness. However, gun rights supporters sought to steer the conversation back to the mental illness frame. For instance, Michigan Republican Representative Mike Rogers, when asked about restrictive gun control, said, “That’s the one thing I hope doesn’t happen. That’s certainly the lowest common denominator. What is [sic] the more realistic discussion is, how do we target people with mental illness who use firearms?” (Landler and Goode 2012). On December 18th, 2012, many members of Congress who had traditionally not supported gun control spoke openly about considering restrictive policies. Senator Harry Reid, senate majority leader and Democrat from Nevada, who had long opposed pursuing restrictive firearms legislation, said, “In the coming days and weeks, we will engage in a meaningful conversation and thoughtful debate about how to change laws and culture that allow violence to grow.” Senator Joe Manchin, Democrat from West Virginia and another unlikely supporter of gun control, said, “Everything should be on the table.” Kentucky Democratic Representative John A. Yarmuth similarly said, “I have largely been silent on the issue of gun violence over the past six years. I am now as sorry for that as I am for what happened to the families who lost so much in this most recent, but sadly not isolated tragedy.” Senators Dianne Feinstein and

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Frank Lautenberg, who had long been gun control advocates, planned to seize the moment and introduce legislation that would reinstate the ban on high-capacity magazines. Also, on December 18th, President Obama convened a meeting with Vice President Joe Biden, Attorney General Eric Holder, Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius, and Education Secretary Arne Duncan to plan the administration’s strategy for a response to the massacre at Sandy Hook (Steinhauer and Savage 2012). On December 19th, 2012, President Obama announced that he was placing Vice President Biden in charge of the administration’s gun control push and that details of an overall anti-gun-violence strategy would be forthcoming. President Obama stated: Over these past 5 days, a discussion has reemerged as to what we might do not only to deter mass shootings in the future, but to reduce the epidemic of gun violence that plagues this country every single day. And it’s encouraging that people of all different backgrounds and beliefs and political persuasions have been willing to challenge some old assumptions and change longstanding positions. That conversation has to continue, but this time, the words need to lead to action. And as I said on Sunday night, there’s no law or set of laws that can prevent every senseless act of violence in our society. We’re going to need to look more closely at a culture that all too often glorifies guns and violence. The fact that we can’t prevent every act of violence doesn’t mean we can’t steadily reduce the violence and prevent the very worst violence. That’s why I’ve asked the Vice President to lead an effort that includes members of my Cabinet and outside organizations to come up with a set of concrete proposals, no later than January, proposals that I then intend to push without delay. His is a team that has a very specific task, to pull together real reforms right now. I asked Joe to lead this effort in part because he wrote the 1994 crime bill that helped law enforcement bring down the rate of violent crime in this country. That plan—that bill also included the assault weapons ban that was publicly supported at the time by former Presidents, including Ronald Reagan. A majority of Americans support banning the sale of military-style assault weapons. A majority of Americans support banning the sale of high-capacity ammunition clips. A majority of Americans support laws requiring background checks before all gun purchases so that criminals can’t take advantage of legal loopholes to buy a gun from somebody who won’t take the responsibility of doing a background check at a gun show. And considering Congress hasn’t confirmed a Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in 6

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years—the agency that works most closely with State and local law enforcement to keep illegal guns out of the hands of criminals—I’d suggest that they make this a priority early in the year. (Obama 2012c)

Despite the efforts of President Obama and gun control advocates, there was still significant resistance to gun control in Congress, particularly among Republicans. On December 20th, 2012, a number of Congressional Republicans spoke about potential new restrictions. Representative Jim Jordan, Ohio Republican, was emblematic of this resistance. His criticism focused on the effects new restrictions would have on individual rights, saying, “It is clear that criminals will always find ways to acquire weapons and use them to commit acts of violence. Passing more restrictions on law-abiding citizens will not deter this type of crime.” Representative Howard Coble, Republican from North Carolina, invoked the individualistic mental health frame, “I think it’s more of a mental health problem than a gun problem right now. Traditionally states that enact rigid, inflexible gun laws do not show a corresponding diminishment in crime” (Shear 2012). The NRA’s leadership appeared on Meet the Press to address the new push for gun control. They were characteristically defiant and resisted pressure to support new restrictions. Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre said, “The NRA is not going to let people lose the Second Amendment in this country, which is supported by the overwhelming majority of the American people.” David Keene, President of the NRA, added, “We will continue to oppose a ban on semiautomatic weapons that are used for perfectly legitimate purposes. Despite what many people think, such weapons aren’t military weapons. We’re talking about sporting arms.” New York’s Senator Charles Schumer was very critical of their responses, particularly LaPierre’s. Schumer said, “He blames everything but guns—movies, the media, President Obama, gun free school zones, you name it. Now trying to prevent shootings in schools without talking about guns is like trying to prevent lung cancer without talking about cigarettes.” Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican from South Carolina, defended LaPierre and the NRA’s position. Senator Graham stated, “People where I live have come up to me: ‘Please don’t let the government take my guns away.’ And I’m going to stand against another assault weapons ban because it didn’t work before, and it won’t work in the future” (Lichtblau 2012).

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The Sandy Hook Massacre at the end of 2012, along with his recent re-election, would lead to President Obama finally taking an assertive position on gun control. He created a high-level panel, led by Vice President Biden that could lead the administration’s push for a number of gun related reforms. While President Obama and Democrats in the House and Senate would try to capitalize on gathering momentum for restrictive policy, the Republicans in Congress were generally not moved. They of course dusted off the tried-and-true argument that restrictive gun control serves primarily to limit the rights and freedoms law-abiding citizens, but they also heavily employed the newer mental health frame—in which they argue that massacres are not caused by firearms but by mentally unstable individuals—as a way to argue against new restrictions. The gun control debate would be a major focal point for President Obama and Congress in 2013. The Biden task force appeared to have a wide-ranging mandate. It was charged with seeking broad solutions to the challenge of gun violence. It would consider issues such as violence in video games and movies, gaps in mental health treatment, background checks, and—what many considered their primary agenda item—restoring an assault weapons ban. David Keene, President of the National Rifle Association, said, “I would say that the likelihood is that they are not going to be able to get an assault weapon ban through this Congress” (Schmidt 2013). Because of staunch resistance in Congress to many initiatives, such as the assault weapons ban, Biden’s task force planned to explore actions that could be taken without Congressional approval. Most of the actions seriously considered by the Biden group were restrictive in nature. However, a punitive measure garnered some support from both sides of the typical debate. The initiative was focused on felons whose criminal history suggested violence and who lied about their background while attempting to buy a gun. The gun control group Mayors Against Illegal Guns proposed applying a mandatory prison sentence of 7 to 15 years for felons who fit this profile. This initiative was also supported by the NRA. Andrew Arulanandam, NRA spokesman, said: “If the Justice Department started prosecuting these people it will send a message that if you are disqualified, we are sending you to jail. It’s a pretty good message to send to criminals” (Schmidt 2013).

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On January 16th, 2013, President Obama discussed the Biden task force’s findings. He announced two legislative priorities—universal background checks and a new assault weapons ban—that he justified with the child safety and commonsense frames. President Obama stated: Last month, I asked Joe to lead an effort, along with members of my Cabinet, to come up with some concrete steps we can take right now to keep our children safe, to help prevent mass shootings, to reduce the broader epidemic of gun violence in this country. So I’m putting forward a specific set of proposals based on the work of Joe’s task force. And in the days ahead, I intend to use whatever weight this office holds to make them a reality. Because while there is no law or set of laws that can prevent every senseless act of violence completely, no piece of legislation that will prevent every tragedy, every act of evil, if there is even one thing, we can do to reduce this violence, if there is even one life that can be saved, then we’ve got an obligation to try. First, it’s time for Congress to require a universal background check for anyone trying to buy a gun. The law already requires licensed gun dealers to run background checks, and over the last 14 years, that’s kept 1.5 million of the wrong people from getting their hands on a gun. But it’s hard to enforce that law when as many as 40 percent of all gun purchases are conducted without a background check. If you want to buy a gun—whether it’s from a licensed dealer or a private seller—you should at least have to show you are not a felon or somebody legally prohibited from buying one. This is common sense. And an overwhelming majority of Americans agree with us on the need for universal background checks, including more than 70 percent of the National Rifle Association’s members, according to one survey. Second, Congress should restore a ban on military-style assault weapons and a 10-round limit for magazines. The type of assault rifle used in Aurora, for example, when paired with high-capacity magazines, has one purpose: to pump out as many bullets as possible, as quickly as possible; to do as much damage, using bullets often designed to inflict maximum damage. And that’s what allowed the gunman in Aurora to shoot 70 people—70 people—killing 12 in a matter of minutes. Weapons designed for the theater of war have no place in a movie theater. And by the way, so did Ronald Reagan, one of the staunchest defenders of the Second Amendment, who wrote to Congress in 1994, urging them—this is Ronald Reagan speaking—urging them to listen to the American public and to the law enforcement community and support a ban on the further manufacture of military-style assault weapons. (Obama 2013a)

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The NRA led opposition to the President’s proposals. Most vitriol was directed against the call for a ban on assault weapons and high-capacity magazines. Mr. LaPierre, the NRA chief, introduced a potentially potent anti-elitism frame. He argued that elites like President Obama and his wealthy allies, like Bloomberg, want to take away the most effective defensive tools that ordinary people, who don’t have the luxury of professional security, are able to access. LaPierre said, “We are told that wanting the same technology that the criminals and our elites are protected by for themselves is a form of absolutism. Barack Obama is saying that the only principled way of making children safe is making other people less safe” (Shear 2013). While we’ve mostly discussed individualism, anti-elitism, and anti-classism are also traditional components of American political culture. So, LaPierre’s framing was likely to resonate broadly among the American people. However, this anti-elitist argument wasn’t strong enough to keep Senate Majority Leader, Democrat Harry Reid, who had previously been reluctant to support gun control, from allowing gun legislation to move forward. President Obama used a February 4th statement to try and keep the pressure on Congress. He led with his more realistic goals: Democrats and Republicans in the Senate are working on a bill that would ban anyone from selling a gun to somebody legally prohibited from owning one... We want to keep those guns out of hands of folks who shouldn’t have them... Senators from both parties have also come together and proposed a bill that would crack down on people who buy guns only to turn them around and sell them to criminals. It’s a bill that would keep more guns off the street and out of the hands of people with the intent of doing harm… We should restore the ban on military-style assault weapons and a 10-round limit for magazines. And that deserves a vote in Congress because weapons of war have no place on our streets or in our schools or threatening our law enforcement officers (Obama 2013b).

Bipartisan bills that would stiffen the penalties on the illegal purchase and transportation of firearms were quickly introduced in the House and Senate. Representative Scott Ringell, a Republican from Virginia, justified his support for the legislation by saying, “For those who have deep concerns about the overreach of the federal government I’m in that group. To the extent that people slow down and take a look at it, read it- unless you’re a gun trafficker or straw purchaser, there’s really no problem with this this.” Both Democrats and Republicans increasingly

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focused on strengthening background checks. There seemed to be broad support for this and there was optimism among gun control advocates that they would see their first real federal legislative victory since the early 90s (Peters 2013a). In late February 2013, Senator Schumer, Democrat from New York, and Senator Tom Coburn, Republican from Oklahoma led negotiations on a bill that would expand background checks on firearms purchases and increase penalties for those who bought firearms for criminals. However, their negotiations were getting hung up on a provision Senator Schumer wanted added to the bill that would require keeping a record of private firearms sales. He argued that such a record was necessary to enforce mandatory universal background checks, which is something both sides wanted in principle. Coburn’s side argued that these records would constitute a de facto gun registry. Schumer described the complex dynamic, saying, “These negotiations are challenging, as you’d expect on an issue as complicated as guns” (Steinhauer 2013a). The Senate Judiciary Committee moved the gun control ball forward in March, passing two measures targeting gun violence. The first would expand background checks to private gun sales, essentially the universal background checks the administration wanted. The second measure pertained to expanding funding for school security. The Committee had already advanced punitive measures enhancing penalties for straw purchases (knowingly buying a gun for someone who is prohibited from doing so on their own). Senator Grassley, a Republican from Iowa and the ranking Republican on the committee, supported the straw purchase measure but did not support the expanded background check measure. He believed that increasing background check requirements would lead to more straw purchases of firearms and more firearms being stolen. Senator Schumer responded to this criticism by saying, “We never see the argument, ‘We shouldn’t have laws because the bad people will get around them anyway” (Steinhauer 2013b). President Obama used his bully pulpit to try and build support for the measures working their way through Congress on March 28th, 2013. As was typically his practice, he framed the measures as commonsense reforms that respected individual rights. Obama said: Earlier this month, the Senate advanced some of the most important reforms designed to reduce gun violence. All of them are consistent with the Second Amendment. None of them will infringe on the rights of

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responsible gun owners. What they will do is keep guns out of the hands of dangerous people who put others at risk. And this is our best chance in more than a decade to take commonsense steps that will save lives. Now, in the coming weeks, Members of Congress will vote on whether we should require universal background checks for anyone who wants to buy a gun so that criminals or people with severe mental illnesses can’t get their hands on one. They’ll vote on tough new penalties for anyone who buys guns only to turn around and sell them to criminals. They’ll vote on a measure that would keep weapons of war and high-capacity ammunition magazines that facilitate these mass killings off our streets. Why wouldn’t we want to make it more difficult for a dangerous person to get his or her hand on a gun? Why wouldn’t we want to close the loophole that allows as many as 40 percent of all gun purchases to take place without a background check? (Obama 2013c)

The Senate ultimately agreed to hold votes on a significant number of gun related provisions. The votes would essentially end what had been the most significant effort to overhaul federal gun laws in 20 years. Given that each measure would ultimately require—and fail to achieve—the support of 60 senators to clear the filibuster threshold, these votes would do little more than give each side the opportunity to record votes on their legislative priorities. A reinstatement of the assault weapons ban and a ban on high-capacity magazines were Democratic priorities that were doomed to failure. Senate Republicans countered these restrictive measures with similarly doomed lenient proposals that would have expanded gun rights. It is worth highlighting that one of these, known as national concealed carry reciprocity, which would have required all states to honor the concealed carry permits of all other states, actually received more favorable votes than the background check expansion. Expanding background check requirements to cover gun sales between private individuals, particularly sales arranged at gun shows or online, was the one area where there was at least some bipartisanship and therefore some hope for movement. Senators Manchin, West Virginia Democrat, and Toomey, Pennsylvania Republican, worked hard to craft compromise background check legislation that may be able to get enough support from both parties to clear the 60 vote threshold (Weisman and Steinhauer 2012). However, despite widespread hope among advocates for gun control, and a major push by the Obama Administration, the compromise Manchin-Toomey background check legislation wouldn’t get enough support to clear a crucial April, 2013, Senate vote. Four Democrats joined

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41 Republicans to vote against the universal background checks. Two of the Democratic Senators, Mark Begich of Alaska and Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, were facing re-election in red states in 2014. Senator Bob Corker, a Tennessee Republican who voted against the bill, said his vote was motivated by concerns about how the bill would have impacted individual rights, “Like most Americans, I want to keep firearms out of the hands of criminals and dangerously mental ill people. But the bipartisan plan overly burdens law abiding citizens ability to exercise his or her Second Amendment rights and creates uncertainty about what is and is not a criminal offense” (Steinhauer 2013c). Even after this defeat, Manchin and Toomey weren’t ready to quit. Manchin said, “We’re going to work it hard.” There was some discussion about watering down the measure to help garner a few more votes. Specifically, they floated not extending the background check expansion to cover all person-to-person gun sales. There was concern that such a requirement might disproportionately impact people who live in rural areas. This is why both Senators from Alaska, one of whom was a Democrat, said they had voted against the previous background check measure (Peters 2013b). This effort would ultimately be unsuccessful and the April 2013 defeat would remain the closest we’ve come to passing federal legislation requiring universal background checks for gun purchasers. Having failed to get any of their gun control agenda through Congress, the Obama Administration announced that it would be moving forward with 23 executive orders meant to curb gun violence. Given the limited reach of executive authority on this issue, there was some debate about the ultimate significance of these actions. Some of the steps the administration was taking included bolstering the national database for background checks, making it easier to get people with serious mental illness entered into that database, and giving states more money to update their own databases. Denis McDonough, President Obama’s Chief of Staff, framed the administration’s moves as just the beginning: We’ve only just finished round one in our fight to get Congress to pass common-sense measures to save lives and we will continue to join 90 percent of Americans in calling on them to close loops in the background check system. But, in the meantime, we are doing everything in our power with them—including strengthening the existing background check system. (Steinhauer 2013d)

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Senator Marco Rubio, Republican from Florida and staunch gun rights defender, responded to the executive actions by focusing on executive overreach and individual rights, saying: President Obama abused his power by imposing his administration’s policies through executive action instead of working with Congress and allowing the issue to be debated. As a strong defender of the Second Amendment, I will continue to oppose the Presidents attempts to undermine American’s constitutional right to bear arms. (Steinhauer 2013d)

A mass shooting at the Washington Naval Yard reinvigorated the individualistic mental illness frame. Senator Kelly Ayotte, Republican from New Hampshire, responded to the shooting by saying, “Given the clear connection between mass shootings and mental illness, the Senate should not delay bipartisan legislation that would help address this issue.” Having seen their agenda consistently fall to defeat, traditional proponents of restrictive gun control also adopted mental health framing. For example, Senator Richard Blumenthal said, “Mental health is really the key in unlocking this issue. I’ve become more and more convinced that we should establish the mental health issue as our common ground” (Peter and Luo 2013). A reconsideration of the Undetectable Firearms Act, which was about to expire, would close out an eventful 2013. If you’ll recall, the original legislation solved a problem that didn’t really exist. However, given the advent of 3-D printing technology, undetectable firearms becoming a real problem was more conceivable. Gun control proponents wanted language specific to this technology included in the legislation. The House of Representatives was expected to provide a ten-year extension of the bill without adding any new provisions for 3-D printed firearms. Senator Schumer, addressing opponents of updating the Undetectable Firearms Act, said, “It’s hard to believe that anyone would oppose legislation like this, so tied into, so connected to our safety. In a world of terrorism, to say that we would make legal guns that can pass through metal detectors so people can slip through airports, stadiums, schools?” (Peters and Schmidt 2013). The House ultimately voted to renew the Undetectable Firearms Act without adding the 3-D printed firearms provision. Schumer responded by referencing the new technological landscape, saying, “The House bill is a step in the right direction, but it doesn’t get us across the finish line. A

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few years ago, these undetectable plastic guns were science fiction. Now, they’re frighteningly real.” Even though Senators like Schumer wanted to expand the Act, the Senate would also vote to renew it without adding a 3-D printing provision (Peters 2013c). After a busy 2013, there was little action in Congress, or from the Obama Administration, on gun control during the 2014 midterm election year. We didn’t record any presidential public statements about gun control in 2014. While the President was not active on the issue, there were a few bills introduced in Congress during 2014, none of which gained much traction or media coverage. Supporters of gun control continued to focus on expanding background checks and mental health issues. Those who generally supported lenient legislation mainly focused clarifying the definition of an “antique firearm,” which were subject to fewer restrictions. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives released a statement in February 2015 that proposed a unique, and controversial, policy. They planned to use their rule-making authority to restrict a particular bullet, the M855, that was commonly used in 5.56 mm rifle ammunition. They argued that this bullet had armor piercing properties, it was being used in new handguns, and it was therefore a threat to police. Gun rights groups immediately went on the offensive and accused the Obama Administration of trying to utilize backdoor measures to implement the gun control that they failed to get through Congress. Opponents of the move argued that it wasn’t a coincidence that most AR-15s, a principle target of the failed assault weapons ban, were chambered in 5.56 mm and commonly used M855 ammunition. Lawrence Keane, the general counsel for the National Shooting Sports Foundation said, “They couldn’t ban modern sporting rifles so it’s an attempt to ban the most common ammunition used in those rifles.” Conversely, the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence lauded the measure, stating, “We understand why law enforcement has always been concerned about the threat of armor piercing bullets. We hope any new regulations will appropriately reflect the priority of keeping our nation’s law enforcement officers safe.” Representative Robert W. Goodlatte, Republican from Virginia and Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, disagreed with the measure, “Millions upon millions of M855 rounds have been sold and used in the U.S., yet the ATF has not even alleged, much less offered evidence, that even one such round has ever been fired from a handgun at a police officer” (Shear and Davis 2015).

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The next month, in March, 239 members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to ATF Director Todd Jones arguing that trying to target the M855 bullet was untenable and urging him to abandon the policy. The Senate was sending a similar letter to Director Jones. Congressional opponents of the policy argued that the ammunition in question is widely available and has never been a problem for the police. They also concurred with gun rights interest groups that the optics strongly suggested that the administration was trying to impose its failed legislative agenda via executive action. Finally, the slippery slope argument surfaced: if they can ban this common bullet why would they stop with it? (Nocera 2015). On June 19th, 2015, two days after nine people were killed while attending bible study at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, President Obama addressed the nation. He continued to advance his arguments for commonsense gun control measures that he said didn’t interfere with traditional rights. However, he concludes by noting that Congress was unlikely to heed his calls. Obama said, There are actions that could be taken that would make events like this less likely. And one of those actions we could take would be to enhance some basic common sense gun safety laws, that by the way a majority of gun owners support… There’s no other advanced nation on earth that tolerates multiple shootings on a regular basis and considers it normal. I think it was in Tasmania about 25 years ago, it was just so shocking to the system the entire country said, “Well we are going to completely change our gun laws,” and they did. And ammunition shot up. And each time these events occur ironically gun manufacturers make out like bandits. And part of my argument is, you know it is important for folks to understand how hunting and sportsmen ship around firearms is really important to a lot of people. And it’s a part of how they grew up, a part of you know, the bonding they had with their dads. The question is just is there a way of accommodating that legitimate set of traditions with some common sense stuff that prevents a 21 year old who is angry about something or confused about something or is racist or is you know deranged, from going into a gun store and suddenly is packing—And it’s not because there aren’t violent people or racist people or crazy people in other countries; it’s that a 21-year-old kid can’t just walk in and buy a firearm and, oftentimes, through gun shows, avoid background checks, and then act on this hatred. And we’ve got to change that. And it’s not enough for us to

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express sympathy. We have to take action. And it is not going to happen in this Congress, but we have to stay on it so that it does. (Obama 2015a)

Later that Fall, in an address to a gathering of police chiefs that was being held in Chicago, President Obama similarly pressed his case for commonsense gun safety legislation, especially universal background checks and an assault weapons ban. As he typically did, he argued that his proposals don’t unduly restrict individual rights but were necessary “to make our communities safer.” However, this time he more explicitly addressed his critics who allege that he wants to take away guns and freedom. These remarks were particularly illustrative of the tension between individual rights and community safety that is an ever-present factor in the gun debate. Obama said: To make our communities safer and to make our officers safer, we’ve got to make it harder for criminals to cause chaos by getting their hands on deadly firearms… …And that’s why the IACP (International Association of Chiefs of Police) and the overwhelming majority of the American people—Democrat and Republican—believe we should require national criminal background checks for anybody who wants to purchase a gun. That’s why the IACP believes we shouldn’t sell military-style assault weapons to civilians. They don’t need them. They don’t need them to hunt a deer. But it’s time to be honest: Fewer gun safety laws don’t mean more freedom; they mean more danger. So, I’m going to keep calling on the folks in Congress to change the way that they think about gun safety. And if they don’t, Im going to keep on calling on Americans to change the folks in Congress until they get it right... And please do not—if some of you watching certain television stations or listening to certain radio programs, please do not believe this notion that somehow, I’m out to take everybody’s guns away. Every time a mass shooting happens, one of the saddest ironies is that suddenly, the purchase of firearms and ammunition jumps up because folks are scared into thinking that Obama is going to use this as an excuse to take away our Second Amendment rights. We’re talking about commonsense measures to make sure criminals don’t get them; to make sure background checks work; to make sure that—to make sure that we’re protecting ourselves. (Obama 2015b)

The year 2016 was a Presidential election year which, as usual, meant that Congress wasn’t particularly active on gun control. A few lenient measures were introduced, including one meant to limit the ability of

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executives to use their authority to implement gun control without congressional consent, likely prompted by the prior year’s M855 episode. A few restrictive measures were also proposed, primarily seeking to repeal the Protecting Lawful Commerce in Arms Act so citizens could sue firearms manufacturers. None of these would go anywhere. While Congress would be relatively quiet on the topic, President Obama in his final full year as President would make a number of public statements supporting more restrictive controls. We are including representative samples of a couple of these. They are particularly revealing of Obama’s frustration and the tension between community safety and individual rights that is inherent in this topic and in how he discusses it. In the twilight of his presidency, Obama was freed to advocate for exactly what he wanted and he had become intimately familiar with the lines of attack that his opponents would use against him. He argues for “common sense gun safety” measures that will enhance community safety. His opponents allege that these measures unduly restrict individual rights. Rather than ignore this criticism, he takes it on directly. Neither side in this debate wholly focuses on either community safety or individual rights. However, they do differ in emphasis. Obama clearly prioritizes community safety. As he is acutely aware, those who prioritize individual rights were adept at persuading large portions of the public that the threats posed by Obama’s proposals to those rights outweighed the promised gains in community safety. President Obama began the year with a January 5th statement, saying: The problem is, some gun sellers have been operating under a different set of rules. A violent felon can buy the exact same weapon over the Internet with no background check, no questions asked. A recent study found that about 1 in 30 people looking to buy guns on one website had criminal records. We’re talking about individuals convicted of serious crimes: aggravated assault, domestic violence, robbery, illegal gun possession. People with lengthy criminal histories buying deadly weapons all too easily. So, we’ve created a system in which dangerous people are allowed to play by a different set of rules than a responsible gun owner who buys his or her gun the right way and subjects themselves to a background check. Everybody should have to abide by the same rules. Most Americans and gun owners agree. And that’s what we tried to change 3 years ago, after 26 Americans—including 20 children—were murdered at Sandy Hook Elementary.

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Two United States Senators, Joe Manchin, a Democrat from West Virginia, and Pat Toomey, a Republican from Pennsylvania, both gun owners, both strong defenders of our Second Amendment rights, both with “A” grades from the NRA—that’s hard to get—worked together in good faith, consulting with folks like our Vice President, who has been a champion on this for a long time, to write a commonsense, compromise bill that would have required virtually everyone who buys a gun to get a background check. Second Amendment rights are important, but there are other rights that we care about as well… So, all of us need to demand a Congress brave enough to stand up to the gun lobby’s lies. All of us need to demand Governors and legislatures and businesses do their part to make our communities safer. We need the wide majority of responsible gun owners who grieve with us every time this happens and feel like your views are not being properly represented to join with us to demand something better. And we need voters who want safer gun laws, and who are disappointed in leaders who stand in their way, to remember come election time… Yes, the gun lobby is loud and it is organized in defense of making it effortless for guns to be available for anybody, any time. (Obama 2016a)

President Obama answered several questions posed by audience members attending a PBS NewsHour interview and townhall event that took place in Elkhart, IN on June 1st, 2016. His response to a question about gun control clearly reveals the frustration he’s experienced. Obama said: First of all, the notion that I or Hillary or Democrats or whoever you want to choose are hell-bent on taking away folks’ guns is just not true, and I don’t care how many times the NRA says it. I’m about to leave office. There have been more guns sold since I’ve been President than just about any time in U.S. history. There are enough guns for every man, woman, and child in this country. And at no point have I ever—ever—proposed confiscating guns from responsible gun owners. So it’s just not true… When we talked about background checks—if you buy a car, if you want to get a license—first of all, you’ve got to get a license. You have to take a test. People have to know that you know how to drive. You don’t have to do any of that with respect to buying a gun. And when we talked about doing effective background checks, it was resisted because the notion was, we were going to take your guns away… So, sir, I just have to say respectfully that there is a way for us to have commonsense gun laws. There is a way for us to make sure that lawful, responsible gun owners like yourself are able to use it for sporting, hunting, protecting yourself. But the only way we’re going to do that is

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if we don’t have a situation in which anything that is proposed is viewed as some tyrannical destruction of the Second Amendment. And that’s how the issue too often gets framed. (Obama 2016b)

During the Obama years, a nation that had unfortunately grown accustomed to enduring awful mass shootings would in fact be truly shocked by episodes of mass violence that were uniquely horrific. These episodes, particularly the tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary, would reinvigorate a push for comprehensive federal gun control legislation. In fact, there was more action in Congress, and the White House, on gun control in the months after Sandy Hook than there had been at any point in the preceding twenty years. However, despite all of this effort, Congress wouldn’t pass any new gun laws and the Obama Administration would have to settle for implementing a raft of comparatively inconsequential executive orders. History will associate President Obama with gun control. However, his connection to the subject stems from advocacy, not achievement. He settled on an advocacy strategy that framed gun control as a commonsense solution to the common problem of gun violence. In every instance, he stressed that the measures he called for, like a ban on assault weapons, respected the Second Amendment and didn’t restrict the rights of ordinary people. The problem for him was that a significant portion of the American public didn’t buy it. As evidenced by the reticence of their representatives in Congress, Americans thought that his proposals did, in fact, impose unacceptable burdens on individual rights. Americans are culturally predisposed to be particularly sensitive to impositions like this, and in this case, Obama simply wasn’t able to convince them that any potential public safety gains were worth the loss of private rights.

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Obama, Barack. 2016b. Remarks at the PBS NewsHour’s “Questions for President Obama” Town Hall Meeting in Elkhart, Indiana Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/node/318443 Palank, Jacqueline, and Ian Urbina. 2007. “House Votes to Bolster Database on Gun Buyers.” The New York Times, June 14. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Peters, Jeremy W. 2013a. “Bipartisan House Plan Focuses on Gun Trafficking.” The New York Times, February 6. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Peters, Jeremy W. 2013b. “Senators Quietly Seeking New Path on Gun Control.” The New York Times, April 26. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Peters, Jeremy W. 2013c. “House Votes to Extend Gun Law Without New Provisions for 3-D Printed Firearms.” The New York Times, December 4. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Peters, Jeremy W. and Michael Luo. 2013. “Mental Health Again an Issue in Gun Debate.” The New York Times, September 19. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Peters, Jeremy W. and Michael S. Schmidt. 2013. “Law Limiting Plastic Guns Set to Expire.” The New York Times, November 29. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Rasky, Susan F. 1989. “Import Ban on Assault Rifles Become Permanent.” The New York Times, July 8. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Rasky, Susan F. 1990. “Senate Backs Curb on Assault Rifles by a Vote of 5049.” The New York Times, May 24. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Reagan, Ronald. 1981. “Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters Helen Thomas and Jim Gerstenzang on the President’s Recovery Period.” Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/246941 Reagan, Ronald. 1982. “Question-and-Answer Session With Students at St. Peter’s Catholic Elementary School in Geneva, Illinois.” Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. The American Presidency Project https://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/node/245049 Reagan, Ronald. 1983a. “Statement on Amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968.” Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/244590 Reagan, Ronald. 1983b. “Remarks at the Annual Members Banquet of the National Rifle Association in Phoenix, Arizona.” Online by Gerhard Peters

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and John T. Woolley. The American Presidency Project https://www.presid ency.ucsb.edu/node/263089 Reinhold, Robert. 1989. “Effort to Ban Assault Rifles Gains Momentum.” The New York Times, January 28. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Roberts, Steven V. 1981. “A Ban on Gun Parts Is Urged in Congress.” The New York Times, April 1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Roberts, Steven V. 1985. “Senate Votes Sweeping Bill to Loosen Control of Guns.” The New York Times, July 10. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Rodino, Peter W. 1986. “Will Handgun Foes Be Over a Barrel.” The New York Times, March 28. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Rosenbaum, David E. 1973. “Senate Approves Stiff Drug Terms.” The New York Times, April 4. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Rosenbaum, David E. 1975. “Gun Control Problem.” The New York Times, September 27. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Rosenbaum, David E. 1980. “Narrow Issues May Sway Voting.” The New York Times, October 27. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Rosenbaum, David E. 1999. “Echoes of Tobacco Battle in Gun Suits.” The New York Times, March 21. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Schmidt, Michael S. 2013. “Both Sides in Gun Debate Agree: Punish Background-Check Liars.” The New York Times, January 14. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Seelye, Katharine Q. 1994. “Bill to Ban Some Assault Guns Seems Headed for House Defeat.” The New York Times, May 4. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Seelye, Katharine Q. 1995. “House Debating Measure That Would Cut New Police.” The New York Times, February 14. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Seelye, Katharine Q. 2002. “Killings May Not Affect Gun Control Measures.” The New York Times, October 20. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Semple, Robert B. 1966. “President Asserts Texas Shooting Points Up Need for a Law.” The New York Times, August 2. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Shear, Michael D. 2012. “Obama Vows Fact Action Pressing For Gun Control.” The New York Times, December 20. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Shear, Michael D. 2013. “N.R.A. Leader Denounces Obama’s Call for Gun Control.” The New York Times, January 23. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times.

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CHAPTER 5

Conclusion: Controversial Values, Controversial Policies

It is actually useful to conclude a book about one of America’s most controversial issues by comparing it with another, arguably more, controversial issue: abortion. It is difficult to think of anything that consistently, over generations, stirs more passionate debate than abortion policy. People tend to have clear opinions on the subject and no amount of persuasion is likely to change a person’s opinion about abortion. Many people are passionate advocates for their view of how abortion should be regulated. Since it is such a divisive and sensitive subject, many more people are careful to avoid discussing abortion policy at all. They keep their opinions—which they unquestionably have—private. The public debate that we hear about abortion policy is often technical in nature. It can turn on issues such as the point in a pregnancy at which abortions are no longer allowed, or the circumstances that may justify an exception for such a restriction. Similarly, practical evidence is often presented to support an individual’s position on the issue: examples may include discussion of the psychological consequences of abortion, or the economic consequences of unplanned pregnancies. The abortion debate also involves much more nuanced issues that tend to blend scientific technicality with other, more intangible, influences, such as philosophy or religion. For instance, abortion policy must wrestle with challenging questions like, when does a fetus develop the ability to feel pain? Or, when does conscious life begin? © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. S. McLean and A. K. Fleming, Guns and Values, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37174-5_5

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The challenge that advocates on either side of the abortion debate have is that they have to persuade people to change their minds on an opinion that is fundamentally shaped by deeply held personal values. This is a difficult, if not impossible, task. If someone holds the sincere belief that life begins at conception and abortion should therefore be banned or tightly restricted, it is hard to think of anything that will change their mind. Likewise, someone who firmly believes that a woman must maintain complete agency over her body will not be moved from the belief that laws limiting a woman’s ability to decide what she does, or doesn’t, want to allow her body to do are justifiable on any grounds. These are matters of principle that are rooted in people’s deepest personal values; therefore, people’s minds simply won’t be changed by logical, technical, or practical arguments. Fundamentally, when people argue about abortion, they are arguing about what—or, whose—values get to drive policy. People are generally uncomfortable discussing, much less debating, personal values. Since the abortion debate is so clearly connected to values, this is probably why many people are reluctant to discuss the topic. However, it isn’t particularly challenging to see the role of values in the abortion debate. Our argument is that the gun control debate is also fundamentally about what—or, whose—values get to drive policy; however, it can be more difficult to see how values shape the gun debate. This is precisely what we’ve tried to clarify in this book. The gun control debate is essentially a battle in the larger war over the role of individualism in American life. It is a clash between individual rights and social responsibility. As is the case in the abortion debate, the common arguments for or against gun control tend to be pragmatic, technical, or legalistic. However, as with the abortion debate, these sorts of arguments don’t change minds because they don’t address the heart of the matter: what values are our policies going to reflect? In the case of gun control, will our policy focus on protecting private rights, or providing public goods? The U.S. is, and has been from the start, a highly individualistic country. However, the strength of individualism, and its ability to influence our politics, has also always been tempered by forces driving concern for society, community, and the common good in general. Our prevailing gun control policy—or, particularly when compared to the rest of the world, lack of policy—reflects strong individualism that has occasionally been tempered by communitarian spirit. America is the land of

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triumphant rugged individuals and resilient communities. A complete story of the American West, for instance, must include pioneers, and towns. However, even today, the image most strongly associated with how the west was won in the American imagination is a lone cowboy riding into the sunset with a six-gun on his hip and a rifle in his scabbard. The individualistic bias in American political culture is strong. That individualistic bias, combined with America’s long-standing tradition of arms and the values that guns themselves represent to many people, stacks the deck against gun control. Gun control advocates appeal to a sense of the common good, but they must confront the fact that their goals restrict individual rights and attack personal values. Regardless of the particular issue, American culture is particularly sensitive to restrictions on private rights in the name of the common good. We do it, but it is always hard. It will be exceptionally hard when the particular right being restricted relates to something that is so deeply embedded in American history and culture—that is emblematic of a range of deeply cherished values, such as personal freedom and self-reliance (i.e. individualism)—like guns. In the U.S., it isn’t just that our prevailing bias toward individualism makes regulating guns hard, it is also the reality that for many people guns actually represent that very individualism (i.e. freedom and self-reliance). So, when we talk about gun control, we aren’t just talking about regulating objects; we’re talking about regulating values.