Guardians of Shi’ism: Sacred Authority and Transnational Family Networks 9780748691456

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GUARDIANS OF SHI‘ISM

SACRED AUTHORITY AND TRANSNATIONAL FAMILY NETWORKS

2 Elvire Corboz

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© Elvire Corboz, 2015 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road 12 (2f) Jackson’s Entry Edinburgh EH8 8PJ www.euppublishing.com Typeset in 11/13 JaghbUni Regular by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire and printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 0 7486 9144 9 (hardback) ISBN 978 0 7486 9145 6 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 0 7486 9146 3 (epub)             work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).

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Contents

List of Tables and Figures Acknowledgements A Note on Transliteration Glossary Introduction The Social Facets of Clerical Authority Transnational Authority between Communities and States Two Families of Religious Scholars Part I

Family, Students and Friends: From Dyadic to Transnational Networks

v vi viii ix 1 4 10 13

19

1 An Iraqi Family of Religious Scholars: Local and Transnational Networking Strategies The Hawza’s Social Capital and the Making of Interpersonal Networks Old Networks for a New Life in Exile Institutionalising Najaf’s Scholarly and Familial Networks in an Exiled Political Organisation Conclusion 2 An Iranian Marja‘ in Najaf and a Foundation in London: Reproducing Interpersonal Ties across Place and over Time The Marja‘iyya’s Local and Transnational Networks Traditional Networks in an Unconventional Structure Conclusion

48 48 57 70

             

 and the State

73

         A Marja‘ Reconnecting with Iraqi Shi‘a An Imported Leader at the Service of the Shi‘a

!" 76 78

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21 22 31 36 44

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Guardians of Shi‘ism Charity for Political Loyalty and Recognition in Exile Conclusion 4 The Priority of Charity: a Global Brand of Philanthropy in its Local Making Patronage and Clerical Politics in the Seminaries Transnational Charity: Many Encounters with the State Institutionalising Shi‘ism in the West Conclusion Part III

The Affairs of the State: Clerical Participation in Politics

82 92 94 95 100 110 116

119

5 From Najaf to Najaf: a Family at the Forefront of Iraqi Politics The Political Choices of an Iraqi Marja‘ Opposing Baghdad in Exile The Politics of Self-representation in the New Iraqi Polity Conclusion 6 Quietist Activism: Calculated Responses to Political Turmoil A Marja‘ in the Midst of Iranian and Iraqi Politics Representing the Voice of the Shi‘a Conclusion

123 124 132

Conclusion Reaching Out to the Community       Four Features of Transnational Clerical Authority

189 189 #$ 196

Notes Bibliography Index

204 237 268

154 161 165 166 177 186

iv

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Tables and Figures

Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3

Muhsin al-Hakim’s bayt members and representatives Composition of SCIRI’s central committee (1982–6) Composition of SCIRI’s central committee (1986–2003) Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s bayt Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s representatives outside Iraq The Al-Khoei Foundation’s trustees

27 38 40 52 54 60

Figures 1.1 2.1

Marriages arranged between the offspring of Mahdi, Muhammad Baqir and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim Marriage arranged between the grandchildren of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i and ‘Ali al-Sistani

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Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the help of many persons. Members of the al-Hakim and al-Khu’i families have trusted me with some pages of their family history. I am indebted to all of them and to my other informants. I am especially grateful to ‘Abd al-Sahib al-Khu’i, Yusif al-Khu’i and Muhsin al-Khalkhali at the Al-Khoei Foundation in London, Mr Ghanim Jawad and Sahib al-Hakim in London, Dr Ja‘far al-Hakim at the Al-Hakim Foundation in New York, Mujtaba Faqih-Imani and Muhammad Faqih-Imani in Qum, as well as to Sahib al-Hakim in Beirut. They not only shared their knowledge with me, but also introduced me to many contacts. I collected more information than I had hoped for and I apologise for not including all of it in this book, as well as for the different perspectives I may have taken on some particular points. My deepest gratitude goes to James Piscatori for his unique supervision of the doctoral dissertation on which this book is based. James, your intellectual guidance and personal qualities continue to inspire me, and I am simply thankful to be your student. I am also most indebted to Benoît Challand, Robert Gleave, Roy Mottahedeh and Qasim Zaman, who provided insightful comments on parts of the draft manuscript. Over the years, I had fruitful discussions on my research with Juan Cole, Laurence Louër, Sabrina Mervin, Robert Riggs and many other colleagues whom I all wish to thank, along with Anoush Ehteshami and Homa Katouzian who examined the dissertation. Any errors, shortcomings and mistakes of judgement remain entirely my own. Reza Sheikholeslami deserves my deep appreciation for the many 

   %  %& '*'%   ful to Hujjat al-Islam Ruhollah Husaynian and Kazem Bojnourdi who facilitated my work in their institutions in Tehran, while Kanan Makiyya welcomed me in his house to consult the archival material held by the Iraqi Memory Foundation. John Walbridge kindly shared with me a most valuable unpublished manuscript written by his wife, Linda Walbridge. Reidar Vissar also provided a useful piece of primary material. Nicola Ramsey, Eddie Clark with his remarkable patience and the rest of the team at Edinburgh University Press did not spare themselves any vi

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Acknowledgements effort during the production of this book. The index was prepared by Sally Phillips. Amy Heneveld, William Blair and my other shadow proof-readers improved early and later drafts of this work with their stylistic touch. Florence Keriakos and Sandrine Keriakos offered great help with some Arabic translations. I am grateful to all. '     %              to conduct this research. I thank the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Abdullah Al-Mubarrak Al-Sabah Foundation at BRISMES, Wadham College, the Vice-Chancellors’ Fund, the Andrew Smith Memorial Foundation and the Soudavar Fund at Oxford for their scholarships and, for their travel grants, the Institut français de recherche en Iran, the Institut français du Proche-Orient, the British Institute of Persian Studies, the Council for British Research in the Levant, the Iran Heritage Foundation, as well as the Faculty of Oriental Studies and the Cyril Foster Fund at +; * '              ?@  &   

X[  least in part, with Iraq or another Arab country.

viii

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Glossary

ahl al-bayt a‘lamiyya ‘alim (pl. ‘ulama’) arba‘in ‘atabat muqaddasa Ayatullah bahth al-kharij bayt faqih fatwa  hajj hasab hawza ‘ilmiyya

Hujjat al-Islam husayniyya ijaza ijazat al-ijtihad ijazat al-wikala ijtihad ‘ilm Imam

‘people of the house’, a term used to refer to the family of Prophet Muhammad superiority in learning a religious scholar the commemoration of the fortieth day after Imam Husayn’s martyrdom ‘the holy thresholds’, the name given to the Shi‘i shrine cities of Iraq ‘sign of God’, a title granted to a mujtahid; Grand Ayatullah is generally used to refer to a marja‘ the most advanced level of study in the Shi‘i religious training household, a term used to refer to the family and close entourage of a marja‘ a jurist a religious edict Islamic jurisprudence the pilgrimage to Mecca honour acquired through deeds ‘territory of knowledge’, a term referring either to a   

[     institution or to the totality of religious teaching      \**];  @[     _    @[     ;  &  >   marja‘ they follow madrasa a religious teaching institution marja‘ (pl. maraji‘) ‘source of emulation’, a mujtahid who is seen to al-taqlid  _    

    religious practice and law marja‘iyya leadership of a marja‘ mu’assasa a foundation Muharram    %     ` %  { %   during which the Shi‘a commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Husayn mujtahid a scholar capable of exercising ijtihad muqaddamat ‘preliminaries’, the introductory level of study in the Shi‘i religious curriculum muqallid an emulator, follower of a marja‘ al-taqlid nasab descent, honour acquired through descent Ramadan the ninth month of the Muslim calendar; month of fasting risala ‘amaliyya a practical treatise containing the legal opinions of a marja‘ on various issues sayyid a descendant of Prophet Muhammad shahid (pl. shuhada’) ‘witness’, commonly a martyr shar‘i deriving from religious law sutuh ‘externals’, the intermediate level of study in the Shi‘i religious curriculum tabligh religious propagation talib (pl. tullab) a student in the religious sciences taqlid emulation, imitation    principles of jurisprudence wakil (pl. wukala’) a representative wali amr al-muslimin Guardian of the Muslims waqf (pl. awqaf) a pious endowment wilayat al-faqih guardianship of the jurist zakat alms tax in Islam x

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Introduction

A visitor entering the foyer of the Imam Al-Khoei Islamic Centre in New York, with its crystal chandelier and frieze of gilded verses from the Qur’an, will also certainly notice the framed portrait of an ageing, white-bearded, black-turbaned Shi‘i cleric. During the research conducted for this book, I have encountered the same picture many times in many places: the library of a theological college in the Iranian seminaries of Mashhad, an orphanage in Beirut, a small religious school in Bangkok, the prayer room of a community centre in Paris, the website of a charitable association operating in India and the cover page of an Arabic magazine published in London. The face of Grand Ayatullah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i adorns the walls of places he never went to. From his classroom in the holy  & ]> 1

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Guardians of Shi‘ism International’2 – the community of foreign students and scholars populating the seminaries – had among its ranks the leaders-to-be of the myriad Shi‘i Islamist groups which emerged in the Arab world and South Asia from the early 1960s onwards. This book explores the political sociology of transnational clerical leadership in Twelver Shi‘ism. It seeks to decipher the analytical meaning of transnational linkages rather than simply describe how they manifest themselves. Accordingly, the central question is: How do Shi‘i ‘ulama’ establish and maintain their authority across borders? Clerical authority has several layers: religious, economic, social and political. Far from immutable, it is constituted, projected, negotiated and reformulated through the interactions of clerics with the communities and states located within their geographical reach. Based on an interpretative history of two prominent families of religious scholars, al-Hakim and al-Khu’i, this book   %&%      '_['[  Middle Eastern countries, South Asia, South-East Asia and the West. This multi-sited approach aims to stress the mutually reinforcing importance of the local and the transnational for the construction and maintenance of Shi‘i clerical authority. Two matters of concern for the study of Muslim societies and politics }

*ƒ [ 

X|    trality of the ‘ulama’ to contemporary affairs. The literature on modern Sunni Islam brought the religious scholars ‘back in’ only recently, demonstrating that their role in colonial and post-colonial societies has not been, as previously assumed, on the decline.3 Shi‘i ‘ulama’ did not suffer from scholarly neglect for as long as their Sunni counterparts. Following the coming to power of Ruhullah Khomeini (d. 1989) in Iran, studies on state–clergy relations from Safavid times to the twentieth century were a posteriori attempts to make sense of the watershed events of 1979, though different conclusions were reached with regard to the confrontational nature of the religious leadership.4 Initially a scholarship on Iranian Shi‘ism, its geographical scope was eventually broadened to consider the participation of the ‘ulama’ in Iraqi political affairs during the late Ottoman and the mandate periods,5 their contribution to a Shi‘i reformism in pre-independence Lebanon6 and their leadership of Arab and South Asian political movements. Accounts explaining how religious scholars establish, maintain and reformulate their status at the top of the Shi‘i community remain scarce, however, especially if compared to the many questions one could ask about their centrality. We owe our best understanding of the internal organisation of the community of learning to Meir Litvak’s study of 2

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Introduction the Iraqi seminaries in the long nineteenth century.7 It was also at that time that the marja‘iyya was developing to become a sort of centralised system of transnational religious authority. In a work that could not be brought to completion, Linda Walbridge delved into the working of the contemporary marja‘iyya, shedding precious light on the more or

    }&  }X&''_   latter half of the twentieth century have exercised it.8 In the so-called periphery, the clerics of Lebanon have found the preference of scholars who have explained the making of these religious, cultural and political leaders in relation to the Lebanese context.9 The complementing works proposed by Juan Cole and Justin Jones have focused on clerical Shi‘ism away to the east. The ‘ulama’ were able to grow as a hierocracy within the Shi‘i State of Awadh (1722–1856) in today’s northern India,10 while they later showed a remarkable capacity to rework their religious and communal leadership in response to great change under colonial rule.11 A noticeable feature of the Shi‘i community of scholars, which has often been observed but rarely studied, is the prevalence of clerical families in its ranks, both at the lower and upper levels.12 A meso-level unit of analysis, such families are a useful object of study to back with empirical evidence any assessment of the internal and external dynamics that underpin clerical authority in Shi‘ism. Moreover, the diverse life trajectories of their many members and their networks provide material to analyse, in a single work, different clerical leadership patterns. In exploring the multifaceted roles played by the al-Hakim and al-Khu’i families, this book seeks to explain the sociological working of the traditional marja‘iyya, political groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Second, addressing the question of clerical leadership from a clear transnational perspective can contribute to the debate swirling around the meanings of cross-border Shi‘i linkages for the future of the Middle East. In December 2004, King ‘Abdullah of Jordan famously expressed anxiety, soon to be echoed by Sunni ruling elites in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, at the existence of a ‘Shi‘i crescent’ (al-hilal al-shi‘i) stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.13 The coming to power of the Shi‘a after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the political and military victories of Hizbullah, the meddling of Damascus in Lebanese affairs, and Iran’s ambitions for regional hegemony, let alone nuclear power, could only threaten the stability of the region. Starting in 2011, the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings in Shi‘i-majority but Sunni-ruled Bahrain led to a revival of the crescent paradigm. 3

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Guardians of Shi‘ism |  ' %„  '  %  this alarm at transnational Shi‘ism. Yet, the literature usefully demonstrates that it should not be overstated. Iran’s failure to export its revolution was already evident at the end of the revolutionary decade.14 From the 1990s, moreover, transnational Islamist movements underwent a process of domestication, at least in the Gulf region.15 In Lebanon, where Iran’s %       > X&[16 cross-border linkages with the Islamic Republic also contributed to the production of Shi‘i Lebanese nationalisms.17 Hizbullah itself became Lebanonised in parallel with its continued Iranian patronage.18 In general %[   & > %%   }  ties,19 but the diverse nature of their transnational connections indicates that a uniform Iranian model does not exist.20 This book takes a similar line to this literature as it, too, aims to comprehend interactions across the Shi‘i world in their depth and complexity. Instead of taking one or several national Shi‘i communities as its unit of analysis, however, it follows the trajectories of transnational clerical actors across different communities and states. In so doing, it pays particular attention to the dialectical relationship of the local and transnational nature of the networks under study. This approach allows for an original consideration of the dynamics through which, to paraphrase Madawi alRasheed, the transnational is localised and, simultaneously, the local is transnationalised.21 A critique of overly universalistic views of transnational religious phenomena, this book demonstrates the potential tension, yet compatibility and mutually reinforcing effect, between both facets of Shi‘ism.

The Social Facets of Clerical Authority Any attempt to prove authority is methodologically complex. Broadly      %    &[   & be addressed with more or less abstraction. This study privileges the latter approach by asking analytical questions about the practical ‘how’ rather than undertaking an inquiry into the normative ‘why’.22 The focus is not on authority per se but on the holders of clerical authority, the ‘ulama’ who exercise religious and communal leadership (riyasa).23 The ‘ulama’ derive their name from ‘ilm (religious knowledge). They can speak authoritatively because they have the expertise to interpret Allah’s message. In Shi‘i Islam, the legitimate guardians and interpreters of Divine Law were the Imams, Prophet Muhammad’s descendants and rightful heirs according to the creed. Given their inability to exercise 4

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Introduction their claim to political rule, the Imams’ main function was to guide and educate the community.24 ‘Ilm was the portion of their authority most easily transferrable to the religious scholars after the Twelfth Imam went into hiding in 874, and more so from 941 during the greater occultation (ghayba). Initially, the role of the ‘ulama’ was to transmit what was considered a complete and comprehensive law laid down by the infallible Imams. The need to derive new norms led to the acceptance of ijtihad (independent reasoning) in the fourteenth century as a process through which scholars attain legal decisions. Based on the rational principles of Islamic jurisprudence (  ), this methodology provided the ground for the extension of clerical juristic authority.25 The Akhbari approach, which holds            '%% ?  to derive judicial decisions, survived, but by the late eighteenth century the Usuli understanding had become the most widely accepted method of jurisprudence. Gradually, and not without much doctrinal debate, the ‘ulama’ came to assume the executive functions originally invested in the Imams. The concept by which they could act as the general deputy (na’ib al-‘amm) of the Hidden Imam reached maturity,   

&[        the sixteenth century. Among other prerogatives were leading the Friday prayer and holy war (jihad), the imposition of punishment and the collection of religious taxes.26 In practice, the ‘ulama’ undertook their deputyship of the Imams not during but after Safavid rule in Iran, once Usulism   

X †X%*ƒ  [       defensive jihad by Shaykh Ja‘far Kashif al-Ghita’ and other ‘ulama’ dated X   „ ?'‡\#~ˆ€#^[; }  Qajar monarchy tacitly consented to the right of the ‘ulama’ to collect the sahm al-imam (the share of the Imam) as part of the khums (religious tax).27 Doctrinal developments also enhanced the social status of the ‘ulama’ vis-à-vis Shi‘i society. While Akhbarism viewed all believers as equal in their effort to imitate the Imams, the Usuli emphasis on ijtihad † [} }       >†\#"!€ 1629) in Isfahan until he went on a visit to Najaf and decided to stay. He became known as al-Hakim, the Arabic word for doctor.1 Over the centuries, the al-Hakim family built its fame as one of Najaf’s most renowned families of religious scholars. In recent decades, several family members gained particular prominence. Muhsin al-Hakim was the source of emulation for the majority of the Shi‘a worldwide in the 1960s. If he embodied the traditional system of transnational religious authority, the leadership of his most famous sons was of a different nature. Forced to leave Iraq, Mahdi and Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the latter being accompanied by his brother ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, exercised religious, philanthropic and political roles in exile. They institutionalised their leadership in separate organisations and in different places. Based in Iran, Muhammad Baqir and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim eventually returned home in 2003 at the head of the powerful SCIRI, a political organisation led since 2009 by the latter’s son ‘Ammar al-Hakim. This chapter explores the structure of transnational clerical authority. It maps the informal and institutionalised networks around which the above al-Hakim family members established and maintained their leadership, both in the family’s stronghold in Najaf and outside Iraq. Interpersonal ties informed the creation of these networks. The development of familial and scholarly relations in the Iraqi seminaries allowed Muhsin al-Hakim to build and later organise his marja‘iyya locally and, thanks to the movement of people, transnationally. The sons of Muhsin al-Hakim also relied on interpersonal networks to establish their leadership in exile and institutionalise it in their organisations. The transnationalisation of Najaf’s community of learning, a natural process exacerbated by the massive departure of scholars because of state repression under the Ba‘th regime, gave them access, in their respective places of residence, to home-made 21

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Guardians of Shi‘ism networks composed of their relatives and friends, former members of their father’s entourage, as well as the student circle of another renowned [ `%% _  ? \* #$~^*       appearance of political exiles is believed to invoke loyalty if it is transplanted from home,2 the practice of reproducing pre-existing networks in their institutions was crucial for the constitution of their leadership.

The Hawza’s Social Capital and the Making of Interpersonal Networks The recognition of Muhsin al-Hakim as a source of emulation for the %<  &  >} *' }   %   ? Iranian scholar – in this case an Arab – attracted such a broad following. Regardless of this uniqueness, his religious leadership allows for a broader sociological understanding of the marja‘iyya in the twentieth century. His early life as a seminary student up to his rise to prominence, and thereafter the years he exercised the function of a source of emulation, both  %   hawza is a source of social capital for religious authority. This section assesses the importance of teacher–student relations, family lineage and marital strategies in the formation and maintenance of the marja‘iyya’s local and transnational authority network. HOW TO BECOME A MARJA‘ The practice in Western scholarship of listing the names of maraji‘ by date of death conveys the misleading impression of a neat chain of succession throughout which each holder of the title would emerge at once when his predecessor passed away.3 Accordingly, Muhsin al-Hakim’s marja‘iyya is said to have started after the death of Qum-based Muhammad Husayn Burujirdi, who would have previously held the sole religious leadership. }   _ [ }*'_& 

% a name for himself in the hawza of Najaf earlier on, and he was already attracting a small popular following in the shrine city and in Baghdad after the demise of Abu al-Hasan al-Isfahani in 1946.4Œ| gradually in Iraq throughout the 1950s, as well as in Lebanon, the Gulf countries and Afghanistan. He then became primus inter pares after Burujirdi passed away.5 The rise to the marja‘iyya is an uncertain and gradual process. There is no set of precise criteria that one needs to satisfy to become a source of emulation. In addition to personal qualities such as piety, maturity, intelligence, faith and equity, a number of inherent attributes are required, 22

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Local and Transnational Networking Strategies most importantly being a male of legitimate birth. Descent from a sayyid and/or clerical family, as well as ethnicity, plays a role, but the acquisition of merit rather than these ascriptive factors determines status in the Shi‘i clerical hierarchy.6 Of prime importance is the scholarly and social capital that a religious scholar manages to accumulate in the seminaries from an early age until the recognition of his religious authority. The story of Muhsin al-Hakim provides an illustration. Shi‘i hagiographic biographies like to emphasise sacred signs sur    

  %    & manifestations of a predestined promising future.7 The birth of Muhsin  ?ŒX%  #$     &      , the festival of fastbreaking at the end of the month of Ramadan, allows for the exploitation of this topos. Regarding his birthplace, there are two stories. One states that al-Hakim was born in Bint Jbeil in today’s southern Lebanon where his father Mahdi bin Salih (d. 1894) had recently migrated. The other holds that his mother gave birth in Najaf where she had stayed without her husband.8 Shi‘i accounts prefer the second version because of the sanctity that Najaf confers upon a new-born, especially if his birth coincided with a holy date of the Muslim calendar. Be that as it may, Muhsin al-Hakim also lost his father at the age of six, becoming an orphan like Prophet Muhammad and several of the Shi‘i Imams. Given the importance of religious knowledge for the hierarchical organisation of the Shi‘i community, the acquisition of scholarly creden  _     *` ?ŒX%[ cated in the preliminaries (muqaddamat) by his older brother, entered the seminaries of Najaf when he was thirteen. He completed the sutuh classes (the intermediate level) in seven years. He attained ijtihad in Islamic sciences and deduction in 1919 after attending the bahth al-kharij lectures (the advanced level) of Muhammad Kazim al-Khurasani (d. 1911), Diya’ al-Din al-‘Iraqi (d. 1942) and ‘Ali Baqir al-Jawahiri (d. 1922). Muhsin alHakim continued to take advanced classes with the renowned Muhammad Husayn al-Na‘ini (d. 1936), as it is not uncommon for a mujtahid to pursue further his religious training.9 Even though a‘lamiyya is more of an ideal than a practical criterion for the selection of a marja‘, scholarly excellence is nevertheless a central _     &          *ahl alkhibra (experts) will assess the extent of his knowledge before vouching for him.10 In addition to specialised books, an aspiring marja‘ needs to write a risala ‘amaliyya (practical treatise) with his opinions on various aspects regulating Shi‘i life and practices. Doing so is the main act by which he announces his claim. Among his many other works, al-Hakim 23

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Guardians of Shi‘ism published one such treatise, Muntakhab al-Rasa’il (Selection of the Epistles), immediately after Abu al-Hasan al-Isfahani’s death. This was followed by his Minhaj al-Salihin (The Path of the Righteous) in 1952/3. The Iraqi ayatullah nevertheless waited for Muhammad Husayn Burujirdi to pass away before he issued his Arabic and Persian Tawzih al-Masa’il \     ‘  ^* Another aspect related to scholarly excellence is teaching. It is also the %    &       hawza. Even though students take classes with different teachers at the same time, each high-ranking mujtahid generally acquires a student base who will act as a lobbying force for the promotion of his marja‘iyya inside and outside the seminaries. Muhsin al-Hakim started his career as a teacher in 1920, initially at the intermediate level and later at the advanced level.11 Al-Hakim also developed a public presence in Najaf. He was asked to replace the ailing Ayatullah ‘Ali al-Qumi as imam al-jum‘a (Friday prayer leader) at the Al-Hindi Mosque in the mid-1920s. He started to perform the evening prayer in the yard of the Imam ‘Ali Shrine following Muhammad al-Na‘ini’s demise in 1936.12 The importance of these roles for the constitution of religious leadership should not be underestimated. The congregational prayer is one moment when clerics are in direct contact with followers, whether drawn from the local Shi‘i community or from pilgrims visiting the ‘atabat muqaddasa (the shrine cities of Iraq; lit. the holy thresholds). Networks in the community of learning are often formalised through marriage. Therefore Muhsin al-Hakim’s early marital strategies, if any, provide an additional perspective by which to analyse the social con          *  '_  

X    } when he was still a student in his twenties. Marrying the daughter or granddaughter of one of his renowned teachers, a practice not unusual in the hawza, would have given him social capital. But al-Hakim did not. Instead he married into his extended family. Endogamic marriages within Shi‘i clerical families are actually commonplace because they help consolidate kinship, in addition to more mundane purposes such as keeping property within the family.13 To be precise, Muhsin al-Hakim married the daughter of his maternal aunt and she bore him two sons, Muhammad Yusif (1922–91) and Muhammad Rida (1923–91), as well as three daughters. The choice of Muhsin al-Hakim’s second wife had more immediate       

          * This time, the cleric married a Lebanese woman. The opportunity for this transnational marriage arose during his stay in southern Lebanon in 1932. In need of a better 24

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Local and Transnational Networking Strategies climate than Najaf because of health problems, he went to Bint Jbeil at the invitation of Hajj Hasan al-Bazzi, a member of the powerful landowner family that had already encouraged his father Mahdi al-Hakim to migrate to this small town in 1889. Muhsin al-Hakim cemented ties with his host by receiving the latter’s daughter in marriage.14 Eight sons, Muhammad Mahdi (1935–88), Muhammad Kazim (1937–75), Muhammad Baqir (1939–2003), ‘Abd al-Hadi (1940–85), ‘Abd al-Sahib (1941–83), ‘Ala’ al-Din (1945–83), Muhammad Husayn (1947–83) and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1950–2009), as well as one daughter, were born out of this union. %}  ?       }  *      `  ?ŒX% }  *    > % was precarious15 and any kind of material assistance from his wealthy in-laws could help him live decently; more importantly, the contributions one can assume al-Hakim received from the al-Bazzi clan allowed him to     & marja‘iyya in its early days. Second, the association of his name with a well-respected family of the Jabal ‘Amil was an asset for the Iraqi mujtahid in gaining recognition from Lebanese Shi‘a. His ties with the al-Bazzi family were also reinforced in following decades with several marriages arranged between his offspring and those of Hajj Hasan. THE MARJA‘IYYA’S SOCIAL ORGANISATION The rise to prominence of a mujtahid } %   _  

? mix of scholarly and social credentials acquired in the Shi‘i seminaries. Once the status of marja‘ is attained, religious leadership is no more formalised. Best described as an amorphous system of authority rather than an institution, the marja‘iyya is internally organised in networks. These are composed of a number of individuals who assume key functions in the system. The bayt (entourage) of a source of emulation handle the   \barani  ]† } ?‰& Faraj al-‘Umran and ‘Ali al-Jayshi Muhammad ‘Ali al-‘Amri

wakil wukala’

Tabriz, Iran Kirmanshah, Iran Tyre, Lebanon (from 1959) Bahrain Qatif, Saudi Arabia Medina, Saudi Arabia

wakil

wakil

students –

student student; nephew (by marriage) student; family marital relationship

student student student

Note 1.

This table was compiled with information from Mu’assasa li-l-Dirasat al-Islamiyya, Al-‘Iraq bayna al-Madi wa-l-Hadir wa-l-Mustaqbal, pp. 540–1, 545; Ibn al-Najaf, Tarikh al-Haraka              , pp. 18–19; al-Sarraj, Al-Imam Muhsin al-Hakim, pp. 60, 112–13; Ahmad al-Husayni al-Ishkiwari, interview, Qum, 21 November 2006; Muhammad Rida al-Hakim, interview, Qum, 4 December 2006; Muhammad Husayn al-Hakim, interview, Qum, 12 December 2006; Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulum, interview, London, 20 July 2007; Salih al-Hakim, interview, Beirut, 23 and 26 March 2008; ‘Abd al-Amir al-Hakim, interview, Dubai, 28 December 2008.

28

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Local and Transnational Networking Strategies the social constitution of religious leadership is also evident with regard to a marja‘’s own family, and above all, his sons. Muhsin al-Hakim had ten sons who all received an education in the Iraqi seminaries. Yet it was not only religious knowledge that made them essential to the marja‘iyya. More importantly, the prestige they derived from their blood ties allowed them to incarnate the leadership of their father and spread his reputation inside and outside the hawza. The various roles they assumed on Muhsin al-Hakim’s behalf made them a critical link to the community of learning in Najaf, the Shi‘i laity and governments. Yusif and ‘Abd al-Sahib al-Hakim were particularly well-versed in the religious sciences and they became the main face of the marja‘iyya among Najaf’s community of learning. In addition to other administrative tasks, they oversaw the distribution of stipends to tullab (sing. talib; student in the religious sciences) and assisted non-Iraqi scholars with their visa and residency applications.19 Their brothers, Muhammad Rida, ‘Ala’ al-Din and ‘Abd al-Hadi, assumed managerial functions in the religious schools established with Muhsin al-Hakim’s patronage in Najaf.20 Equally crucial was the public presence the al-Hakim sons developed among lay believers. Yusif led the congregational prayer in the Al-Hindi Mosque in Najaf whenever his father needed someone to replace him.21 ` ?ŒX%}  wakil of the marja‘iyya in Baghdad after he moved there in 1964. Muhammad Baqir regularly toured the country to preach, attend ceremonies on religious occasions and open new places of worship. He also represented his father during the hajj in Mecca between 1960 and 1968.22 Muhsin al-Hakim’s sons were also a link to governments. Muhammad Rida al-Hakim was in charge of relations with the local authorities in Najaf, for instance when solutions to the administrative problems facing foreign scholars in the hawza needed to be negotiated.23 Mahdi al-Hakim was the marja‘iyya’s political intermediary to the regime in Baghdad; this role eventually made him the target of state persecution after the Ba‘th Party came to power and forced him into exile in 1969. Mahdi and Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim also represented their father at public events abroad, examples being the world Islamic conferences held in Mecca in 1965 and in Amman in 1967 after the Arab defeat at the hands of Israel.24 The Iraqi marja‘ also relied on family members other than his sons for %%      *ƒ  [  cousin Sa‘id al-Hakim represented him before one of the major societal forces of the Iraqi Shi‘i community, the tribes. Sa‘id al-Hakim, and his son Muhammad Husayn after him, worked on developing relations with important tribal leaders and could therefore mediate solutions to their 29

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Guardians of Shi‘ism  |       marja‘.25 Hadi al-Hakim and Muhammad Sadiq al-Hakim were two of the ayatullah’s more distant relatives who acted as his wukala’ in the cities of Baghdad and Kut, respectively. The latter also gave his daughter to Muhsin al-Hakim’s son, ‘Ala’ al-Din al-Hakim. In addition to familial ties, teacher–disciple relations informed the social organisation of Muhsin al-Hakim’s marja‘iyya, in particular its network of representatives. As an illustration of a wider trend, the bio      `  ? \  #$!^[ `%% Husayn Fadlallah (d. 2010) and Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din \*“~~#^[}  %  %      from the 1960s onwards, tell us that they were all Muhsin al-Hakim’s students in Najaf, that Fadlallah and Shams al-Din also represented their teacher in the Iraqi towns of ‘Aziziyya and Diwaniyya during the hawza holidays, and that the three clerics became agents of the Iraqi marja‘ in Lebanon once they moved there. Fadlallah, one should note, was also the nephew of Muhsin al-Hakim’s Lebanese wife. In general terms, the practice of formalising teacher–student relations with marital ties, which is sometimes used by maraji‘ to reinforce their transnational network of representatives, was almost non-existent in Muhsin al-Hakim’s case. While a marriage was arranged between one of his grandsons and the daughter of Mahdi Shams al-Din, this union did not serve any particular purpose for the marja‘ since it took place after his death and in any case ended in divorce.26 This selective social map of Muhsin al-Hakim’s authority network  %  traditional religious leadership is organised, albeit not exclusively, along familial and scholarly ties. Given the highly interpersonal organisation of the clerical establishment, one then wonders whether the authority network associated with a marja‘ produces, from within, the mujtahid who will achieve prominence after him. In particular, does familial lineage matter in leadership successions at the top of the Shi‘i clerical hierarchy? In the history of the marja‘iyya from the nineteenth century, leadership has not been passed down hereditarily. Looking at the period immediately after Muhsin al-Hakim, the short answer to the above question is also no. Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i became the main source of emulation following the death of his Iraqi colleague. Shi‘i followers can nevertheless be acutely conscious of the prestige that the sons of a marja‘ derive from their genealogy. When Muhsin al-Hakim died, thousands of people in Najaf organised a march to propose that the mantle of religious leadership be  

  [’ ?ŒX%* &[   had led 30

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Local and Transnational Networking Strategies the funeral prayers for his deceased father – a function often assumed by 

}       marja‘. However, he enjoined believers to follow al-Khu’i who, in turn, appointed him as imam al-jum‘a at the Al-Hindi Mosque.27 The marja‘iyya was eventually associated again with the al-Hakim name at the turn of the new millennium when Sa‘id al-Hakim, Muhsin al-Hakim’s matrilineal grandson, rose to become one of the current four maraji‘ of Najaf. His family lineage was certainly a source of repute, yet it would be anachronistic to regard his position as the direct by-product of the authority network formerly associated with the marja‘iyya of his renowned grandfather. The non-hereditary nature of the marja‘iyya does not mean that the offspring of a source of emulation will fall into oblivion. There are leadership roles other than the marja‘iyya which they can assume in contemporary Muslim societies, allowing families of religious scholars to maintain their status for generations. Clerics build upon their renowned hasab to derive prestige from the position of prominence attained, for instance, by their father or grandfather, while they sometimes also rely on his authority network to establish their own. As discussed next, Mahdi al-Hakim on the one hand, and Muhammad Baqir and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim on the other, did not constitute their leadership in exile from scratch but had preexisting networks to exploit.

Old Networks for a New Life in Exile ` ?ŒX%[      

X[}  third son of the Iraqi marja‘. He was trained up to the higher level of the religious curriculum in the hawza of Najaf but it was outside this scholarly milieu that he made a name for himself. He engaged in activities, initially in Iraq in the framework of his father’s marja‘iyya and afterwards in exile, for the religious, educational and social advancement of the Shi‘i communities among whom he resided. Better known was his role as a leader of the Iraqi opposition, which he assumed from 1980 in London until he was assassinated by Ba‘thist agents in 1988 during an Islamic conference he attended in the Sudan. Although our knowledge of Mahdi al-Hakim’s transnational trajectory is incomplete because of the secrecy warranted by a life in exile, it sheds some useful light on the informal and institutionalised networks of an Iraqi   &    } 

   %     ‘atabat. For this  [;   }  *† ?ŒX%| % country in 1969 to escape a death warrant issued by the Ba‘th regime against him, a departure which predated by a decade the massive exile of 31

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Guardians of Shi‘ism Shi‘i clerics from Iraq. During these years, he was disconnected from his entourage in Najaf. As a son of a marja‘, he could nevertheless rely on the fame of his family name. He also used his father’s transnational authority network and his familial connections in order to adapt to unfamiliar environments. Starting with his move to London in 1980, the second period was the time for a more systematic institutionalisation of his leadership. On the one hand, al-Hakim worked with several close friends and family members from Iraq, who had by then taken the road of exile, in order to establish the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre and the Organisation for Human Rights in Iraq. On the other hand, he collaborated with a broader transnational network of ‘ulama’ to launch a Shi‘i international organisation, the World Ahl al-Bayt Islamic League. PRE-EXISTING NETWORKS IN AN UNFAMILIAR ENVIRONMENT After his departure from Iraq, Mahdi al-Hakim made his way to Jordan, possibly because of the help he could receive there from ‘Ali al-Bazzi, his maternal uncle and then Lebanon’s ambassador to the Hashimite kingdom.28Œ }%  ; }   & &[ }* The following excerpt of a letter he wrote encapsulates well his confu   }         longer term: It has become dangerous for me to stay in Jordan since the Jordanian government has changed. The new government is getting closer to Cairo and Iraq. In   [”       & &  &ing their friends . . . I wanted to travel secretly to Iran but when I said the prayer of consultation [istikhara; lit. seeking the good]29 about going to Iran, this was not permitted. Then I wanted to go to Lebanon, but the prayer of consultation did not allow it. Then the Moroccan ambassador offered me to go to Morocco and this was very kind of him . . . The prayer of consultation did not allow it . . . Finally, the prayer of consultation let me go to London where I can take the opportunity to receive eye treatment.30

In another letter, Mahdi al-Hakim related his peregrination after he left Jordan, saying that after two weeks in London the prayer of consultation advised him to go to Tehran.31 Later in the year, the Iraqi exile moved to Pakistan to organise the religious affairs of local Shi‘a. To prepare his arrival in the country, he was told to coordinate with Muhammad al-Rashti from his father’s bayt in Najaf.32 From his base in Pakistan, he travelled regularly to places where he could connect with his family and friends. Iran was the country he 32

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Local and Transnational Networking Strategies visited the most, and whenever he did, he generally stayed in the house of Murtada al-‘Askari.33 The two clerics’ relationship was long established. Prior to their exile, they represented Muhsin al-Hakim in the Iraqi capital and were active in the Jama‘at al-‘Ulama’ (Society of Religious Scholars) of Baghdad and Kazimayn, which engaged in religious propagation among the Shi‘i laity. They were also founding members of the Islamic political group known as the Hizb al-Da‘wa (Islamic Call Party). Another

` ?ŒX%@} |'_#$$}`%% al-‘Ulum, Muhsin al-Hakim’s social and political advisor in Najaf. He settled in Kuwait, a country Mahdi reportedly visited at least twice in 1970.34 Although the main purpose of these visits was to meet secretly with his wife and children left behind in Iraq, he also possibly made    }  ?>— %*   %&[ ?ŒX%  % the hospitality of his maternal relatives since he stayed in the house of the half-sister of Ambassador ‘Ali al-Bazzi.35 The assistance he received from the al-Bazzi family during the early days of his exile can explain why he later reinforced ties with his Lebanese relatives by marrying his second son to the daughter of his hostess in Kuwait.  % % %  % 

&%  % of 1971 when Mahdi al-Hakim moved to Dubai. His integration into his new place of residence was facilitated by the transnational network associated with his father’s marja‘iyya. Prior to his death, Muhsin al-Hakim had already asked two important merchants of Dubai to assist his son if he ever decided to settle in the emirate. This enabled Mahdi al-Hakim to make good contacts with the Emirati business community and collaborate with them in the implementation of his religious and social activities, as discussed in Chapter 3. These local dignitaries also introduced him to Shaykh Rashid bin Sa‘id al-Maktum, the Emir of Dubai, with whom the Iraqi cleric developed a relationship of mutual respect.36 With the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War in 1980, however, Shaykh Rashid became uneasy about hosting a Shi‘i exile wanted by Baghdad. He asked al-Hakim to leave the country, explaining that ‘he could not protect him from Iraq’.37 IRAQI ASSOCIATES IN LONDON In search of a new home, Mahdi al-Hakim chose London. The historiography of the Iraqi Islamic movement holds that he settled in the British capital to honour the request of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr that he lead the opposition against Baghdad from there.38 Al-Sadr was a senior scholar and a prominent Islamic thinker descended from one of Najaf’s renowned clerical families. Al-Hakim’s ties to him dated back to the days when he 33

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Guardians of Shi‘ism was part of his student circle in Najaf. In the late 1950s, the two clerics also participated in the creation of the Hizb al-Da‘wa and, although they renounced formal association with the party, al-Sadr was considered its *   & > %”#$!$[ and awaiting his likely execution, he is said to have informally desig       [ %  % `  ?ŒX%[  %  qiyada na’iba (vice leadership) of the Shi‘i Islamic movement after him.39 London was becoming a hub for the Iraqi opposition in exile and al-Hakim };  } X }   * To organise his activities on the British scene, Mahdi al-Hakim had at his disposal a more familiar network than earlier in his exile. His collaboration with Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulum, who also made his way to London in 1981, was remarkable. Together, they established the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre, with Bahr al-‘Ulum acting as secretary-general of its board of trustees and al-Hakim as deputy secretary-general. Registered as a charity in 1983, this institution was a community centre for Iraqi migrants and refugees, and also served as a base for activities against the Ba‘th regime. After the murder of his associate in 1988, Bahr al-‘Ulum continued to oversee the centre in addition to his political work. In 1992, he obtained the Shi‘i seat, as an independent, on the three-member presidential council of the newly formed Iraqi National Congress (INC), an initiative aimed at unifying the Iraqi opposition. After the fall of the regime, he served as president of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) between June and August 2003 and again in March and April 2004. Khalil al-Tabataba’i was another trustee of the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre who also came from Mahdi al-Hakim’s entourage in Iraq, but this time familial. This layman was al-Hakim’s nephew and son-in-law, and he had left Iraq as a newlywed in 1974 to join his wife in Dubai. He did not move with his father-in-law to London but regularly travelled there throughout the 1980s to help him run his activities. Al-Tabataba’i now lives in Canada.40 †   ` ?ŒX%@ } X  }      ?ŒX%[%   } |'_ & 1983. He was put in charge of the Organisation for Human Rights in Iraq which was set up in 1983 to raise international awareness of the human rights violations perpetrated by the Ba‘th regime. In addition to Sahib al-Hakim, the executive committee of this organisation was composed of activists representing a variety of Iraqi opposition groups, not only Shi‘i Islamists.41 Also part of the network was Wahhab al-Hakim, Sahib al-Hakim’s nephew, who was Mahdi al-Hakim’s personal secretary and reportedly like a son to him.42 34

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Local and Transnational Networking Strategies A TRANSNATIONAL NETWORK FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SHI‘I ORGANISATION

Mahdi al-Hakim launched a third institutional initiative in London. Established in 1983, the World Ahl al-Bayt Islamic League was an international umbrella organisation aiming to facilitate cooperation between the ‘ulama’ and their institutions worldwide in order to better serve the interests of the Shi‘a.43 It was designed as a Shi‘i counterpart to the Muslim World League in Mecca, which it was thought did not give voice to non-Sunnis. Al-Hakim’s innovative idea found emulators. It is indeed noteworthy that, after Khomeini initially tried but failed to have WABIL move its headquarters to Iran, his successor ‘Ali Khamana’i took inspiration from the London-based organisation and established, in 1990, the World Ahl al-Bayt Assembly (Al-Majma‘ al-‘Alami li-Ahl al-Bayt) to carry out a similar agenda.44 With regard to WABIL, al-Hakim’s endeavour to create an all-inclusive,     [ >    } |           *} &? %% %    %% * These clerics were important community leaders from all around the world and the list included Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulum in London, Muhammad al-Musawi in India, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din and Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah in Lebanon, Muhammad ‘Ali Taskhiri in Iran, Safdar Ja‘far in Pakistan, Muhammad Jawwad al-Shirri in the US, Fahad Mahdi al-‘Amili in Australia, Sa‘id Akhtar Ridwi in Tanzania, ‘Abd al-Mun‘im  ?˜&     >†  ?†%   ?Ž    †%[ among others. New members have been appointed over the past thirty years to replace those having passed away or left the organisation, such as the Iranian cleric ‘Ali Taskhiri who resigned to assume the leadership of the World Ahl al-Bayt Assembly in Tehran. Nine of the above clerics, among them al-Hakim and Bahr al-‘Ulum who respectively acted as secretary-general and deputy secretary-general, also composed WABIL’s executive committee. They were elected by the delegates of member organisations during a general conference held every three years. Executive committee member Muhammad al-Musawi also became head of WABIL after al-Hakim was killed in 1988, a position he still held as of 2013. It is instructive that ‘Ali al-Hakim, the son of the deceased, was asked to become deputy secretary-general; the young cleric refused the appointment, however, explaining that he did not have enough freedom in Dubai, the place where he resided, to promote WABIL’s mission. Khalil al-Tabataba’i was for his part elected general director. That he was and still is Mahdi al-Hakim’s only relative to be involved 35

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Guardians of Shi‘ism in the organisation is evidence that WABIL was not turned into a family empire but kept a diverse and far-reaching internal structure. To summarise the above, the networks on which Mahdi al-Hakim relied to establish the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre and the Organisation for Œ%„ '_   [‡†'   [|  the two distinct missions of his institutional work in London. The growing presence of Iraqi exiles in London in the early 1980s allowed him to establish two Iraq-oriented organisations. To do so, al-Hakim made use of his personal entourage, while he also collaborated with Iraqi activists promoting a variety of interests. Since WABIL aimed to represent all Shi‘i communities, its leadership was formed around a broader network of cleri }      %   marja‘iyya’s network of representatives.

Institutionalising Najaf’s Scholarly and Familial Networks in an Exiled Political Organisation This introduction to the al-Hakim family would not be complete without proper consideration of the political organisation most famously associated with its name. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, though established to unify the Iraqi Islamic opposition in Iran, developed over time into an al-Hakim entity. The interpersonal networks   }    }  |   

  * '  formative years, SCIRI’s main personalities came from the former student circle gathered around Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Najaf. As a result, the

  % &%

     % & of the Iraqi Islamic movement. Al-Sadr’s network was gradually marginalised, however. With the centralisation of power in Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim’s hands, SCIRI became a structure for the institutionalisation of the al-Hakim family. This process was most evident in the 2000s when leadership successions were conducted within the family. In other words, if this political organisation always relied on primordial ties originating from the hawza milieu of Najaf, it allowed the sacredness of family to prevail over scholarly lineage. INSTITUTIONALISING MUHAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR’S STUDENT CIRCLE In a discussion Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim had with Khomeini upon his arrival in Iran in October 1980, the Iraqi exile explained that he could    }%  

   }  other activists also present in the country. He added that he favoured the 36

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Local and Transnational Networking Strategies second option and the supreme leader acquiesced.45 The Jama‘at al>— %@ ?`'_\  & `   

'_^} established later in the year as a loose formation of about eighty clerics representing various trends of the Shi‘i Islamic opposition to the Ba‘th %*† ?ŒX%}   &@    &? [  according to his critics, his leadership style was too individualistic. He was replaced by Muhammad Baqir al-Nasiri from the Hizb al-Da‘wa who had called for the election of an eleven-member administrative committee and won the largest number of votes.46 The society became increasingly assimilated with the Al-Da‘wa Party after Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim broke off with it in late 1982.47 Tension over the leadership of the Society of Militant Scholars in Iraq probably motivated Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim to establish the Maktab

? ?} ?' %&& ?>'_\  ' %„

   Iraq) in late 1981. His sympathisers propose another explanation: because the Society of Militant Scholars merely limited its activities against the Ba‘th regime to propaganda, al-Hakim wanted to have a new organisation that would engage in more direct political action.48 He entrusted Akram Hadi al-Hakim, a layman not related to him, with the executive management of this short-lived initiative.49 SCIRI was Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim’s third and most durable initiative to organise the Iraqi Islamic opposition in Iran. In announcing its creation during a press conference on 17 November 1982, the cleric described it as ‘a gathering of Iraqi religious personalities which lead the struggle for the overthrow of the ruling Iraqi regime’. These ‘Muslim personalities’ ‘could be from a political group but they were only considered as an individual in the council and not as a representative of that group’.50 Sixteen clerics and laymen initially composed SCIRI’s majlis al-shura (consultative council; called the central committee); membership increased to thirty-two by the end of 1985. Table 1.2 lists the original members, including an additional two individuals who joined the organisation’s leadership in this period. Information about their occupational background and politi       * SCIRI’s structure underwent important changes in early 1986. A general assembly (jam‘iyya ‘umumiyya), alternatively called the general committee (hay’a ‘amma), was created to accommodate about eighty delegates representing member organisations or acting as independents. The objective of this new body was to extend SCIRI’s reach by including a broader palette of political forces, in particular Kurdish, Sunni and smaller Islamic ones. Headed by a presidential council (one president, one vice-president and two rapporteurs), the general assembly convened 37

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Guardians of Shi‘ism Table 1.2 Composition of SCIRI’s central committee (1982–6).1 Name

Occupation



     

Mahmud al-Hashimi (chairman) Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (spokesman) Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi

cleric

independent

cleric

al-Hakim current

cleric

`%%` ?† Muhammad Baqir al-Nasiri ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim

cleric cleric cleric

Kazim al-Ha’iri Muhammad al-Haydari Husayn al-Sadr Abu Ahmad al-Ja‘fari (Ibrahim al-Ushayqir) ‘Ali al-Adib (Abu Bilal) Muhammad Baqir al-Muhri Jawwad al-Khalisi Akram Hadi al-Hakim

cleric cleric cleric medical doctor

Munazzamat al-‘Amal al-Islami (Islamic Action Organisation)a Al-Da‘wa Party Al-Da‘wa Party Harakat al-Mujahidin al-‘Iraqiyyin (Movement of Iraqi Fighters)b / al-Hakim current Al-Da‘wa Party al-Hakim current independent Al-Da‘wa Party

‘Ali al-Musawi Hasan Faraj Allah Sami al-Badri ‘Abd al-Zahra Uthman (‘Izz al-Din Salim) a

b

c d

teacher cleric cleric university lecturer engineer cleric cleric teacher

Al-Da‘wa Party independent independent al-Hakim current independent independent Jund al-Imam (Soldiers of the Imam)c Al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Call)d

Associated with the al-Shirazi family of Karbala’ and initially called the Message Movement (Al-Haraka al-Risaliyya), the Islamic Action Organisation was organised in exile by Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi. The Harakat al-Mujahidin al-‘Iraqiyyin was created in early 1981 and can be regarded as the embryonic form of SCIRI’s armed force, the Badr Corps. It embraced Muhammad Baqir alHakim’s leadership with his brother ‘Abd al-‘Aziz at its head.2 The Jund al-Imam was established in Kuwait in early 1979 by Sami al-Badri, a former Hizb alDa‘wa activist who left the party in 1969.3 Al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya had its origin in the Basra branch of the Al-Da‘wa Party until it split from it under the leadership of ‘Abd al-Zahra Uthman. It was ideologically close to the Islamic Republic of Iran.4

Notes 1.

2. 3. 4.

This table was compiled with information from A. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, pp. 239–40; Ra’uf, Al-‘Amal al-Islami, p. 312; Sande, ‘The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq’, pp. 52–3; Abu al-Hasan Shirazi and Tarami, Naqsh-i Guruhha-yi Mu‘ariz, pp. 304–5; Hamid al-Bayati, interview, New York, 20 April 2007. Al-Mu’min, Sanawat, p. 282. Ibid. pp. 287–8. On this group, see Louër, Transnational Shia Politics, pp. 174–5; A. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, pp. 257–8.

38

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Local and Transnational Networking Strategies &   %  *' }  %  $”& 1986 that it elected a new central committee of eleven members, who then designated the chairman, spokesman and executive secretary.51 Table 1.3 starts with the members elected initially, followed by some of the activists who were included at one point or another. It also lists the names of the two clerics who successively acted as president of the general assembly. Faleh A. Jabar has analysed the composition of SCIRI’s two consecutive central committees and its general assembly in terms of the 

          %%[  

  € &%   [  the regional and ethnic representation. Although Tables 1.2 and 1.3 are slightly at variance with his own lists, his conclusions provide a useful insight into SCIRI’s leadership apparatus.52 Of interest, in respect of the present analysis, are the personalities in the clerical group. SCIRI’s founding statement recognised the leading role of religious scholars in the organisation: ‘The line of the ‘ulama’ is the main line that controls the action of the assembly [i.e. SCIRI] and the presence of the ‘ulama’ in the assembly manifests their real existence in terms of %|*@53 In contrast to the Iraqi Hizb al-Da‘wa, in which shifts in the power balance between clerical and lay members took place to the detriment of the former,54 the scholars maintained their prominent position in SCIRI over time. An average ratio of two-thirds clerical and

?  &%%        %%  %  }   }  * †               '„'@   majlis al-shura was that the majority belonged to Muhammad Baqir alSadr’s close entourage when they resided in Najaf. Their biographical        & %     &     

 &  political legacy of the late Iraqi ayatullah, since they not only had studied with him but also had a record of political activism. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim himself was trained by al-Sadr in the hawza. During his studies, he assisted his teacher in his academic activities and assumed the editing of his seminal work, Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy), published in 1959.55 Mahmud al-Hashimi was considered Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s favourite disciple and he co-authored with him a multi-volume study entitled     al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa (Studies on the Interpretation of al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa), published in Najaf in 1971.56 '       “! ` #$!$[     him as a mujtahid and made him his fully authorised agent, a role alHashimi went on to assume in Iran.57 Kazim al-Ha’iri and Muhammad Baqir al-Muhri were two of the ayatullah’s other students who left Iraq to represent their mentor in Iran, the former in the early 1970s and the 39

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Guardians of Shi‘ism Table 1.3 Composition of SCIRI’s central committee (1986–2003).1 Name

Occupation



     

Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (chairman) Mahmud al-Hashimi (spokesman)a Abu Ahmad al-Ja‘fari (executive secretary) Muhsin al-Husaynib `%%` ?† ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim Muhammad al-Haydari Humam al-Hamudi ‘Ali al-Adib (head of the Unit of Internal Ties) Akram Hadi al-Hakim Muhammad Najib al-Barzanji

cleric

al-Hakim current

cleric

independent

medical doctor

Al-Da‘wa Party

cleric cleric cleric cleric cleric teacher

Munazzamat al-‘Amal al-Islami Al-Da‘wa Party al-Hakim current al-Hakim current al-Hakim current Al-Da‘wa Party

university lecturer cleric (Sunni Kurd) cleric teacher

al-Hakim current Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Kurdistaniyya (Kurdistan Islamic Group) Jund al-Imam Al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya

cleric

al-Hakim current

Sami al-Badri ‘Abd al-Zahra Uthman (head of the Information Unit) Sadr al-Din al-Qabanji (head

 +  Affairs) Haytham Mahfuz (Abu Ibrahim) (head of the Military Committee) Muhammad Taqi al-Mawla (Abu ‘Ali) Muhammad Baqir al-Nasiri (1986, president of the general assembly) ‘Ali al-Ha’iric (from 1986, president of the general assembly) a b

c

independent

cleric (Turcoman)

Haraka (Movement)

cleric

Al-Da‘wa Party

cleric

Mahmud al-Hashimi left SCIRI in the late 1980s and was not replaced. Muhsin al-Husayni was the deputy head of the Islamic Action Organisation; he replaced Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi in SCIRI’s central committee after the latter left in protest at the marginalisation of their movement in the organisation. For a brief period around 1984, ‘Ali al-Ha’iri had acted as SCIRI’s chairman instead of Mahmud al-Hashimi.2

Notes 1. 2.

This table was compiled with information from al-Mu’min, Sanawat, pp. 370–1; A. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, p. 242. Al-Mu’min, Sanawat, p. 342; Ghanim Jawad, interview, London, 25 March 2009.

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Local and Transnational Networking Strategies latter just after the Iranian revolution. Husayn al-Sadr, Muhammad Mahdi  ?†[ `%% _  ?][ `%%  ?Œ&   younger ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim also had Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr as their teacher in Najaf.58 Moreover, these clerics had in common an early engagement in political activism. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr had recognised the potential of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, Mahmud al-Hashimi and Kazim al-Ha’iri by appointing them to the qiyada na’iba he envisioned, as previously mentioned, to head the Iraqi Islamic movement in the likely event of his death.59 Al-Hakim had participated in the formation of the Hizb al-Da‘wa in the late 1950s, before he had to renounce a formal association with it after a couple of years at the request of his father. Kazim al-Ha’iri, `%%_ ?]`%%` ?†}

?   %%  Œ ?Ž>}*>† ?>† ?ŒX%     %  `%%_ ?@    with the Islamic movement during the months his teacher spent under house arrest before his execution in April 1980.60 The nature of SCIRI’s clerical leadership underwent transformation after 1986 with the gradual departure of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s former students from the organisation. Kazim al-Ha’iri and Husayn al-Sadr were not elected to the second central committee – the latter had already moved to London in 1984 to organise his own religious and political activities.61 Muhammad al-Nasiri, who had previously criticised Muhammad Baqir alHakim for his individualistic leadership of the Society of Militant Scholars in Iraq, split from SCIRI in December 1986 for the very same reason.62 A Kuwaiti national, Muhammad Baqir al-Muhri distanced himself from the Iraqi opposition to concentrate on the politics of his home country after he settled there in the early 1990s.63 Mahmud al-Hashimi stayed in SCIRI until the late 1980s, but as  X%[ %*  ;    }& 

& left the organisation holds that al-Hashimi became disillusioned with the world of oppositional politics and felt that he should instead keep the scholarly heritage of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr alive through teaching and writing. In other words, he could be more useful in the hawza than in SCIRI.64 In contrast, SCIRI’s detractors claim that al-Hashimi was pushed aside because he had stronger learning credentials than Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. Be that as it may, the cleric, who was of Iranian origin65 and from then on went by the Persianised version of his name – Mahmud Hashimi Shahrudi – did well outside the Iraqi organisation. His dual citizenship allowed him to access the Iranian governmental apparatus as head of the judiciary from 1999 to 2009 and then as member of the Expediency 41

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Guardians of Shi‘ism Council and the Assembly of Experts. With a career built on a mix of scholarly and political activism, Mahmud Hashimi Shahrudi is a potential contender in the succession for the position of supreme leader at the head of the Islamic Republic after ‘Ali Khamana’i,66 while he also made the headlines in 2012 as the pro-Iranian candidate to replace ‘Ali al-Sistani as marja‘ in Najaf.67        %'„'} X   advantage of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim because they were more senior than him in terms of age and scholarly status. This was not the case of the younger, less experienced and more compliant clerics who replaced them in the central committee. In the process, moreover, the representation of the Hizb al-Da‘wa in SCIRI’s leadership apparatus decreased while the al-Hakim faction was strengthened. INSTITUTIONALISING THE AL-HAKIM FAMILY’S LEADERSHIP SCIRI maintained ties with the hawza milieu of Iraq by institutionalising `%%_ ?@   &  ; * Afterwards, it became a structure for the routinisation of the al-Hakim % &@ *   |&[ %   

X   scholarly networks. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim assumed a central role in SCIRI through     ;   %'_“~~*Œ   as its spokesman, not its chairman. To explain why this was so, one narrative claims that al-Hakim had to be the public face of the organisation as long as the identity of other members remained undisclosed.68 As the son of a former marja‘, he had the respect of Iraqi Shi‘a and could therefore gain their support for the opposition’s activities. Another version argues that Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim initially renounced presiding over SCIRI to prevent internal dissent within its leadership. With his stronger learning credentials, Mahmud al-Hashimi was better positioned than him to assume this role. By 1986, the concern of having the most accomplished scholar head the organisation had vanished, allowing al-Hakim to claim the chairmanship.69 Vast powers were vested in al-Hakim’s hands. In addition to other prerogatives, the cleric personally appointed and dismissed the heads and staff of the organisation’s executive units. He designated the representatives of SCIRI’s branches and he chose several lay activists who, according to one observer, were all ‘cadres obedient to Sayyid al-Hakim’.70 He also supervised the dispatch of delegations abroad. This privilege allowed him to co-opt potential opponents through attractive appointments. A critic 42

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Local and Transnational Networking Strategies wrote: ‘It is not surprising to see a member of the central committee who had blamed the president, praise him a few weeks or months later because he was designated for a political or propagation trip abroad.’71 Finally, alHakim’s grip on power remained intact because he opposed a rotation in the chairmanship or the establishment of a collective presidential council. Only three rounds of elections for his position were held after 1986.72 Against all expectations, only a few other members of the al-Hakim family became involved in SCIRI during the period of exile. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim was one of them. For his part, Humam al-Hamudi, the brother of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim’s son-in-law, was the chairman’s political advisor and a member of SCIRI’s central committee.73 According to one informant, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was also keen on having his distant cousin, Muhammad Husayn (son of Sa‘id) al-Hakim, act as a spiritual leader for his organisation; but the elderly cleric did not want to be dragged into politics and refused the offer.74 Layman Muhsin al-Hakim, the son of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, became a spokesman for SCIRI probably around the time of regime change in Iraq. All in all, it was more qualitatively – because of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim’s monopolisation of power – than quantitatively that the organisation gradually evolved into an al-Hakim family entity. The question of succession also lies at the heart of the institutionalisation of the al-Hakim family into SCIRI. When the organisation lost its leader in a bombing attack in August 2003 shortly after his return from exile to Iraq, the central committee elected ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim as the new chairman. The cleric had been involved in SCIRI from the start as a central committee member, leader of the Badr Corps, head of delegations and, at some point in the organisation’s history, as deputy chairman. If Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim’s assassination had been unexpected, the death of his successor, who succumbed to cancer in 2009, could be anticipated. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was long gone by then, but it is worth noting that, towards the end of his life, he had been grooming ‘Ammar al-Hakim, the third family member who came to head ISCI (SCIRI had changed its name in 2007). It is reported in this regard that ‘when . . . Sayyid alHakim was to address his followers in Diwaniya on May 11, 2003, he grew too tired to speak, and asked . . . Sayyid Ammar to take his place’.75 Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim’s preference seemed sensible. ‘Ammar was his nephew, his son-in-law and a spiritual son to him – his own children had apparently neither the interest nor the stature to assume the mantle of political leadership. More generally, as explained by an ISCI member, ‘the &%

%   % & %       % & %@ worked in ‘Ammar’s favour.76 Incidentally, the thirty-seven-year-old 43

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Guardians of Shi‘ism cleric was already a member of ISCI’s central committee, its deputy chairman and the secretary-general of its charitable wing, the Mu’assasat Shahid al-Mihrab (Martyr of the Pulpit Foundation, known in English as the Al-Hakim Foundation). Both successions took place during sensitive times, requiring SCIRI/ ISCI to keep a face of unity. The year 2003 presented a unique opportunity for the organisation upon its return from exile to assert its position in the new Iraqi political order. This was no time for internal dispute. As for the 2009 succession, one could suspect that some members of ISCI’s old guard were not particularly keen on ‘Ammar al-Hakim’s accession to the chairmanship. Power was nevertheless transferred rapidly in order not to discredit the organisation before the forthcoming 2010 parliamentary elections. ISCI did not do well in the elections and internal dissention over ‘Ammar al-Hakim’s leadership and his political choices started to become more palpable not long afterwards. This contributed, in 2012, to the split from ISCI of the Badr Organisation – the political body of SCIRI’s former military force, the Badr Corps – under the leadership of a layman named Hadi al-‘Amiri.

Conclusion Clerical authority is in part a by-product of the networks at the disposal of religious scholars. Interpersonal ties constitute a resource that forms and strengthens, from within, both the informal and more institutionalised structures through which they exercise their role at the head of their communities. This organisational principle is an enduring feature of the marja‘iyya because it cements together the network that allows a source

%       @€ &       hawza, inaugurated new mosques, organised religious processions and headed pilgrimage delegations. On the other hand, and as a continuation of this, the activities undertaken by the sons of a marja‘ earn them an enhanced status. Mahdi and Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim gained much visibility and experience in the 1960s on which to promote their own institutional work, whether in Iraq or elsewhere in exile, in the longer term. As such, what can be called occupational association with the marja‘iyya reinforces the legitimising potential of family lineage. The centrality of blood ties for clerical authority raises the question of hereditary succession. If the fame of a source of emulation is transferred upon his sons and more generally his whole family, for all that, the traditional system of religious authority does not favour the establishment of dynasties of maraji‘. The sons of a deceased marja‘ might, one could contend, stand less of a chance than others to be preferred precisely because of the functions they play in running the mundane affairs of their  @      

   

 &      hawza. In contrast, clerical leadership exercised outside the framework of the marja‘iyya seems more conducive to successions from within the % &* †     

&  ‡†'      %  hypothesis, the case of SCIRI certainly does. Networks are also cemented through marriage. As bluntly put by Linda Walbridge, ‘while a marja’ must be content with the sons given to him, he can be more selective of his sons-in-law’.77 An aspiring marja‘ may already enact marital strategies when he chooses his wife(-ves) and later on by giving away in marriage his sons, daughters, granddaughters and grandsons. Preferred suitors are the offspring of a former marja‘, members of a powerful landowning family, the clerics working in his own bayt or their children, his students and his representatives. Although it would seem logical that networks of in-laws also become institutionalised within cleric-run organisations, neither Mahdi nor Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim extensively used marital ties to reinforce the leadership structure of their institutions. As illustrated in Figure 1.1 (overleaf), more remarkable was their inclination to inter-marry their own offspring in spite of, and probably in order to compensate for, the limited institutional exchanges between their respective movements of opposition against the Iraqi regime. ‘Ammar al-Hakim, ISCI’s chairman since 2009, revived the practice. He capitalised on the enduring charisma of his late uncle by having his son Ahmad marry Mahdi al-Hakim’s granddaughter. Finally, teacher–student relations are valuable in organising clerical 45

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woman

woman

Ahmad al-Hakim

‘Ali al-Hakim

‘Ammar al-Hakim

woman woman

‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim

Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim

Figure 1.1 Marriages arranged between the offspring of Mahdi, Muhammad Baqir and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim.

woman

‘Ali al-Hakim

Mahdi al-Hakim

Local and Transnational Networking Strategies authority networks. The hawza is a source of social capital and many of Muhsin al-Hakim’s former students joined his bayt or became his representatives in Iraq and abroad. Similarly, the al-Hakim brothers relied on pre-existing scholarly networks, though not their own, to organise the leadership of their institutions in exile. To launch WABIL, Mahdi alHakim cooperated with the most important clerical community leaders of the Shi‘i world, several of whom had studied with his father in Najaf. Also, SCIRI had a central committee that initially mirrored the former student circle of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. As such, the organisation was able to borrow the legitimacy of the martyred ayatullah and, more broadly, to claim a sacred attachment to the hawza of Najaf.

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2

An Iranian Marja‘ in Najaf and a Foundation in London: Reproducing Interpersonal Ties across Place and over Time

Mapping the internal organisation of the al-Khu’i family’s leadership     

        %&    | }  %       } X[ } & %  * † Iranian immigrant to the shrine city of Najaf, Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i built his career in the Iraqi seminaries, in the early 1970s becoming the most widely followed religious authority. He sustained his status by relying on a network spreading from Najaf into local communities worldwide. Towards the end of his life, he also sponsored and lent his name to the Al-Khoei Foundation, an NGO-type charitable institution representing the marja‘iyya in an innovative way from its headquarters in London. '    } %     %  of the transnational authority networks of the marja‘iyya and the Al-Khoei Foundation. The role of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s sons, the strategic selection of his sons-in-law and the centrality of his students are evidence of the endogenic nature of both leadership structures – one being traditional, informal and the other modern, institutionalised. In the context of an increasingly institutionalised form of religious leadership in the contemporary Shi‘i world, attested by the fact that maraji‘ tend to associate themselves with a plethora of institutions that are likely to survive them, the al-Khu’i case also helps explain the endurance of the marja‘iyya’s  } X  %*„     }    relevance for future successions at the top of the Shi‘i community.

The Marja‘iyya’s Local and Transnational Networks THE MAKING OF A NAME   &  †  ?‘%  ?™@@  ;%        marja‘iyya is open to newcomers. He had an inherent sacred lineage by being born into a sayyid family descended from Imam Husayn. Originally 48

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Reproducing Interpersonal Ties  %`[ %   ™ &@'_  tling in the twelfth century in the city of Khuy in Iranian Azerbaijan. The al-Khu’i family had a scholarly tradition, yet not to the same extent as the renowned families of Najaf who are proud of having produced a myriad of prominent religious scholars for generations. Abu al-Qasim’s father was a cleric named ‘Ali Akbar who studied in the Iraqi seminaries of Najaf and Samarra’ for eight years before returning to Iran to work as the ‘alim of his hometown. He married twice, with his second wife, the daughter of an Iranian trader, giving birth to Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i on 19 November 1899. Parents and children migrated to Najaf in the early 1910s. They eventually returned to Iran to settle in Mashhad in 1927/8, only leaving behind Abu al-Qasim, who already showed signs of the promising future awaiting him in the Iraqi hawza.1 Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i built his fame traditionally on his scholarly credentials. After a preliminary religious education in Azerbaijan, he started his formal studies in the seminaries after coming to Najaf. Seven years later, he was ready to attend the bahth al-kharij classes of the prominent mujtahids of the time from whom he received several ijazat of ijtihad at the age of thirty-two.2 While he owed a great intellectual debt to all his teachers, he became particularly close to Muhammad Husayn al-Na‘ini, the famous theoretician of Shi‘i constitutionalism. ‘Al-Naeeni, may Allah have mercy on his soul, was the last mentor I used to accompany more frequently than anyone else,’ he reportedly said.3† ?™@}  

 writer. In the course of his life, he authored about ninety works mainly in (Islamic jurisprudence),  (principles of jurisprudence) and ‘ilm al-rijal (the science concerned with the biographies of those who %    ^[     *4 Al-Khu’i also made his name through teaching, a sphere of activity in } ;

*Œ     %  level of the curriculum when he was still studying for the advanced degree and started to give bahth al-kharij classes a couple of years after reaching ijtihad.5 During his career, the ‘Teacher of the hawza’, as he was called, supervised hundreds of students while thousands of clerics are considered his indirect students. Such a network of knowledge ensured the wide dissemination of his school of thought during his lifetime, as well as afterwards with his many former students keeping his legacy alive through their own teaching. Several of them also attained the status of marja‘ in the aftermath of their mentor’s death in 1992: ‘Ali al-Sistani (b. 1930), Ishaq al-Fayyad (b. 1930), Sa‘id al-Hakim (b. 1934) and Bashir  ?]† †  ?]@&   } &Œ ?>— %[  % head of the Al-Khoei Foundation’s Montreal branch.

Note 1.

This table is based on the correspondence exchanged between Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i and Muhammad Taqi al-Khu’i (dated 20 and 21 May 1988); Al-Khoei Foundation, Taqrir Mujaz hawla Khidmat wa-Nashatat, p. 176; Ghanim Jawad, interview, London, 22 November 2007; Muhsin al-Khalkhali, telephone interview, 26 April 2012.

to dedicate his time to his scholarly activities.25 He eventually joined the foundation again in November 2007, not as a trustee but as the imam of the adjacent Imam Al-Khoei Islamic Centre in London. The Al-Khoei Foundation also invited laymen to join its board of trustees for at least two reasons. First, their managerial skills could help it administer its funds and establish services. With his professional expertise in engineering and architecture, Muhammad ‘Ali al-Shahristani took care of designing the building of its private schools in London.26 Second, and more importantly, businessmen such as Kazim ‘Abd al-Husayn and Mustafa Gokal were already acting as Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s representatives prior to their appointment to the Al-Khoei Foundation. They operated in regions where segments of the Shi‘i population were wealthy 61

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Guardians of Shi‘ism and greatly contributed, through their religious taxes and donations, to the   }  marja‘iyya. The former was based in the oil-rich region of the Gulf, while Gokal belonged to the Khoja Ithna ‘Ashari community who made their fortune in East Africa and the West. It therefore seemed sensible to give these prosperous communities a representation in the foundation’s decision-making apparatus with the appointment of two trustees having strong ties with them. Composed of several of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s representatives, the board of trustees replicated the international nature of the marja‘iyya, thereby making the Al-Khoei Foundation structurally transnational. As indicated in Table 2.3, a balance was kept at all times between Iraqi, Iranian, Pakistani and Kuwaiti board members – yet most of them had strong connections with Iraq because they were born or had studied there. These clerics and laymen were instrumental in promoting the legitimacy of the foundation across borders. They made its name known to communities in their places of residence, while attesting to its concern for all Shi‘a, regardless of their national and ethnic background. The trustees also contributed to the foundation’s charitable performance in that they used their X }        } &   from which they came to help it establish its projects.   |               @ [ several of which were projects previously set up in al-Khu’i’s name by his representatives who joined the board of trustees in 1989. In addition to the London headquarters, branches are found today in Manchester and Swansea in the UK, New York in the US, Montreal in Canada, Paris in France, Mumbai in India, Islamabad and Karachi in Pakistan, Bangkok in Thailand and, recently, Najaf in Iraq. The branches previously established in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia and in the American city Dearborn were closed down. Although one cannot dispute the fact that the Al-Khoei Foundation is transnational, any observer might be surprised by the limited inclusion of trustees who acted as Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s agents in the most highly Shi‘i-populated parts of the Middle East such as Iran, Lebanon and the Gulf, let alone by the absence of branches there. The political geography of Shi‘ism, with the actual or perceived danger that ruling regimes would resist the development of the foundation’s presence in the Iraqi and Iranian seminaries or elsewhere in the Middle East, can explain this. While it would have seemed logical for Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i to establish his foundation in Najaf, the Iraqi shrine city was not a viable

  * ' #$~[  >  %        —›“ %

   %           }   %  &*27 State 62

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Reproducing Interpersonal Ties pressure on the hawza was likely to put at risk the operational capacity of an international Shi‘i institution if it were to be based there.28 It took the removal from power of Saddam Hussein for the Al-Khoei Foundation to

 ]   %   ]† ?†>  ?} (d. 1993), until ‘Ali al-Sistani’s leadership became more solid in Iraq and abroad. Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr also gained in popularity among his fellow countrymen until the Ba‘th regime executed him in 1999 for his growing opposition. Given its own claim to religious authority, the Islamic Republic of Iran also engaged in the selection of the marja‘iyya. Khomeini’s interpretation of wilayat al-faqih granted religio-political authority to the position he himself initially assumed as supreme leader. His death in 1989 dealt a serious blow to the very essence of the doctrine, however. The functions of wilaya and marja‘iyya had to be separated because the new leader, ‘Ali Khamana’i, lacked the necessary scholarly credentials to be recognised as a religious authority.38 Khamana’i became the wali-yi faqih while Muhammad Riza Gulpaygani and Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Araki were put forward by the regime as suitable sources of emulation. The supreme leader did not give up the idea of reaching the status of marja‘, however. He was not even considered a mujtahid   }    seek such recognition, for instance by pressing high-ranking scholars to %   ijtihad.39 The death of Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Araki in late 1994 allowed for the more forceful promotion of Khamana’i’s marja‘iyya. The statebacked Association of Qum Seminary Teachers (Jami‘ah-yi Mudarrisin-i Hawzah-yi ‘Ilmi-yi Qum) declared the supreme leader a source of emulation along with six Iranian mujtahids. The list included several of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s former students: Muhammad Fazil Lankarani, Husayn Vahid Khurasani and Mirza Jawwad al-Tabrizi.40 However, the name of ‘Ali al-Sistani of Najaf was left aside, in complete disregard of a statement issued after Muhammad Riza Gulpaygani’s death one year  } &?   

   marja‘iyya (or alternatively to Muhammad Ruhani’s in Qum, another of al-Khu’i’s former students).41 65

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Guardians of Shi‘ism The Qum–Najaf rivalry was clearly at play. The Islamic Republic was intent on keeping the marja‘iyya in Iran while Khamana’i succeeded, with a state machine behind him, in exerting control over the Iranian seminaries.42 On the other hand, the clerical circles who threw their support behind ‘Ali al-Sistani hoped to ensure the survival of the Iraqi shrine city as the seat of religious authority. The Al-Khoei Foundation was obviously in the camp of those in favour of Najaf. It readily raised its voice and warned in an article published in its newsletter Dialogue that ‘the inherent dynamism of the Shi‘a tradition’ might not survive if the hawza of Najaf became ‘marginalised in the debate relating to the fateful succession of the mantle of Grand Ayatullahs Golpayegani and al-Khoei’. It went on saying that it was ‘in the interest of all Shia’ Muslims, irrespective of their political leanings, that the independence and sacred rights of all the Hawzas – and especially Najaf – be respected and cherished’.43 It was from this background that the Al-Khoei Foundation had to identify the highest religious authority to offer him the position of president at its head. Assuming this task proved a challenge. Some circles within the foundation started to promote ‘Ali al-Sistani before the trustees even had the chance to meet and discuss the matter in accordance with Article 6 of the Declaration of Trust. The newsletter al-Nur published a four-page         ]  '           *†œ†™\'@]   ' 

  &+  ^  & ?ŒX%@       ;; &          '_  would not necessarily serve the monarchy’s interests. They could not   %X

 } ` ? }  '% &         *28 Al-Hakim }   &          % @* Π           }       %    reinforced suspicions that he could not be trusted. Asked to formulate an

 [ †œ†™      80

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Leadership in Patronage control if Iran were to participate in the construction of the mosques and the centre.29 ' %   ` ?ŒX%@ ; %[ yet his activities in Pakistan and the UAE shed some light on the littleknown topic of a cleric working on the ground to organise the affairs of religious communities located away from the heartlands of Shi‘ism. He was an imported leader in these countries, and he found it important to play his role in collaboration with local Shi‘i elites, as attested by his envisioned conference of Pakistani ‘ulama’ and his project to centralise the administration of Emirati awqaf with the support of the indigenous merchant class. Similarly, he sought government approval for his activities. His contacts with the Iranian monarchy also added a transnational dimension to the constitution of his leadership through local patronage. The next chapter of Mahdi al-Hakim’s transnational history was his move to the UK in 1980. This was a time for a greater engagement in political activities against the Iraqi regime (Chapter 5), yet the institutions he established with Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulum attest to his parallel concern to uphold his role as a patronage provider. The Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre catered for the religious, educational and social needs of the growing number of Iraqi refugees and migrants living in London. The local community found a much-needed place to attend prayers and celebrations on special occasions, in addition to other religious programmes. They also had the opportunity to obtain legal contracts for their marriage or divorce which were recognised by the British authorities. Children could enrol in a Saturday Islamic school. In the mid-1980s, the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre also launched an international humanitarian programme known as the Relief Committee for Iraqi Refugees which operated in Syria and Iran, as well as in southern Iraq after 1991. Mahdi al-Hakim and Muhammad Bahr  ?>— %    }          khums they collected and were allowed to spend on behalf of several maraji‘.30 The Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre closed its doors in 2003 when Bahr al‘Ulum returned to Iraq. London’s Pakistani community gave it a second life by reopening it in 2007.31 Al-Hakim also established the UK-registered charity WABIL to improve        > }  }*     } 

& independent of governments and relied mainly on donations from wealthy contributors in Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and India, as well as from Lebanese Shi‘a in West Africa. Its projects entailed the building of mosques and husayniyyat, the training of preachers, the establishment of cultural and religious centres, the publication of books on Islam, the construction of clinics, houses and roads, and the distribution of material assistance to the 81

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Guardians of Shi‘ism poor and refugees. Conferences for businessmen were also organised to motivate these better-off Shi‘a to assume a leading role in the enhancement of their local communities. Moreover, WABIL worked for the social and political advancement of the Shi‘a who were discriminated against by lobbying the states hosting them and the international community at large.32

Charity for Political Loyalty and Recognition in Exile The intertwining of Muslim charity and Islamist politics is a complex issue which remains under-studied in the case of Shi‘i political groups, with the exception of the Lebanese Hizbullah and its unparalleled social and developmental network.33 To broaden our understanding, the charitable function of the opposition movement led by Muhammad Baqir alHakim in Iran allows for an exploration of this topic in a situation where Shi‘i politics are conducted away from home. A useful lens through which to do so is Yossi Shain’s conceptualisation

; 

  %  & &   * & & support for the exiles’ claim to power by the national community.34 Given that various ‘recruiting incentives’ can generate loyalty, a case could be made that charitable services are used precisely as material incentives. Political exiles and their organisations can derive legitimacy by responding to the basic needs of their constituencies, especially when the latter are refugees who live in precarious conditions. Thinking about charity in %   %  &  |  

 [ }*' %  ing potential encompasses a more intangible dimension for the construction of collective solidarity in exile. I argue that the materiality of social services embedded in the reality of the ‘here’ in exile can be combined with the creation of emotional attachment to the ‘there’ back home. An illustration of this is the philanthropic projects that were designed by SCIRI and their use as a channel for the distribution of ideological and symbolic patronage. Symbols referring to the Iraqi Shi‘i heritage were produced and put on display to engender loyalty for the organisation’s dual, Islamic and revolutionary, mission. „   [&>            for power’,35 is the other perspective by which to analyse the charity–exile politics nexus. This approach invites closer scrutiny of the relationship  }  ?             *      attitude of the country hosting political exiles. SCIRI easily obtained recognition from the Islamic Republic of Iran, thereby becoming its privileged point of contact for all affairs concerning the welfare of Iraqis in the country. Nonetheless, this advantage became a disadvantage whenever the 82

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Leadership in Patronage Iranian authorities adopted policies that made the life of refugees more  * [ & } % %  

   exiles to gain international recognition more widely. They seek to stir up world opinion with humanitarian issues, collaborate with the governments and international organisations willing to engage in relief work, and gain support for their cause against the home regime. All in all, this framework helps explain how SCIRI undertook its charitable mission to position itself in front of its popular constituency, its host state and the international community at large. In the process, the organisation assumed the roles of a provider for the Iraqi people, a mediator with the Iranian authorities and a legitimate partner of international actors. SCIRI’s charitable engagement remained undiminished in the post-2003 '_  ; [ %     &  %   loyalty and recognition through charity once exile politics become home politics. BETWEEN ACTION AND SYMBOLS IN THE MAKING OF LOYALTY Like most political exiles, the Iraqi opposition had an easier access to a popular base established outside, rather than inside, the home country. For those groups based in Iran, physical proximity to Iraqi refugees and prisoners-of-war (POWs) could be capitalised upon through the distribution of charity. The size of this potential constituency was not negligible. After coming to power in 1968, the Iraqi Ba‘th regime launched a twostage campaign of deportations of Iraqis of Iranian origin and Fayli Kurds, the latter being also predominantly Shi‘a; by 1971, an estimated 40,000– 50,000 people had left the country. A second campaign of expulsion started in April 1980 with about 350,000 people settling in Iran throughout the decade.36 The Gulf War of 1991, and more importantly the subsequent popular uprising and its repression by the Iraqi regime, led to the massive exodus of Shi‘a and Kurds to Iran. Many of the Kurdish refugees returned home when a safe haven was established in northern Iraq but post-1991 Shi‘i refugees in Iran were still estimated at 70,000 in 1999, with thousands parked on the Iraqi side of the border.37 The number of POWs captured by '  | } '_  &%   %  #~~[~~~{ thousands chose not to return home when offered repatriation. The practice of charity by the Iran-based Iraqi opposition had a dual orientation towards the home and the host country. On the one hand, services were provided to create a suitable living environment in Iran where Iraqi refugees and released POWs could envisage staying until the time of regime change in Baghdad. It was important that they did not leave if 83

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Guardians of Shi‘ism the opposition wanted to maintain direct access to its popular base. On the other hand, the distribution of patronage was a channel for keeping the idea of Iraq alive in exile. In addition to disseminating a revolutionary message through educational and cultural activities, an organisation like SCIRI also used its charitable role to publicise symbols referring to the recent Iraqi Shi‘i heritage. Such referents included Muhsin al-Hakim’s marja‘iyya, the religio-political legacy of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and             ' % % % *  less tangible dimension of charity aimed to develop emotional solidarity among the Iraqi community as well as popular yearning for regime change back home. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim started to cater for the needs of Iraqi refugees as soon as he settled in Iran. He sponsored the creation of a large patronage network consisting of social, religious and educational projects he supervised independently from SCIRI, and others established as part of it. The Mu’assasat al-Shahid al-Sadr (Martyr al-Sadr Foundation) and SCIRI’s Unit of Social Services provided welfare [ %     %& ? &        [         dreds of families, and to the construction of accommodation units in refugee-populated Iranian cities.38 After the Gulf War, SCIRI’s newly established Committee for the Relief of the Iraqi People and the Relief Committee for the al-Hakim Martyrs also distributed humanitarian aid to refugees in southern (and northern) Iraq.39 With regard to health, `%%_ ?ŒX% %     support of the independent work of an Iraqi paediatrician, Sahib alHariri, who set up clinics in and around the Iranian capital, as well as other philanthropic projects.40 '    }      } }criminatory against the refugees who did not support the Islamic opposi  *   } }         &      for Iraq and Islam. SCIRI’s Unit of Social Services provided special  %   %      @    who had relatives detained in Saddam Hussein’s jails. The Section for the Martyrs also gave monthly emoluments to the families of those killed in the struggle.41 These rewards were, to some extent, a means for SCIRI to compete with the Ba‘th regime over the distribution of compensation honouring the name of Iraqi martyrs. Indeed, Baghdad ran a system of 

    % }   %%      as a result of the bombing of Iraqi cities during the Iran–Iraq War (1980– 8).42 By showing that it was no less a provider to the families of its own 84

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Leadership in Patronage martyrs than the Iraqi regime, SCIRI used ‘countersymbols of authority    @[   @ %

&*43 More generally, SCIRI and the Martyr al-Sadr Foundation also catered for the educational needs of the younger generation of Iraqis who could not easily join government schools because of an entry examination they had to take in Persian, a language most of them did not know. In a sense, Iran’s strict requirements when granting access to the state educational system allowed these organisations to promote their name by providing for the education of Iraqi pupils. As explained by a refugee, The education of my daughters was ruined by deportation. They had almost completed their secondary studies . . . When we were deported to Iran, they entered the Iraqi school established by the Martyr al-Sadr Foundation. I think that it is the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution which administers it.44

By the mid-1990s, SCIRI supervised 18 schools with 4,175 pupils and 180 teachers.45 It had also negotiated the recognition of the Iraqi baccalaureate with several Iranian universities to give Iraqi youths the chance to pursue their higher education.46 The organisation of religious and cultural activities was another important aspect of the Islamic opposition’s work among Iraqi refugees +‡*_   '__   to engage in tabligh, as well as in political propaganda. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was quick to set up a madrasa in Qum for that purpose.  &[  %    Ž  ?ŒX% 

 X  

 established by the late Muhsin al-Hakim in Najaf in the 1960s, thereby inscribing his educational mission in continuity with the sacred legacy of his father’s marja‘iyya. Many of the students attending the new madrasa }   %'„'@  [} `%% Baqir al-Hakim also taught bahth al-kharij classes for the most advanced ones. SCIRI’s Bureau of Preachers Affairs was established in 1987 with the cleric Sadr al-Din al-Qabanji at its head.47 Aiming to ‘create a collective     

  &@[    conferences, seminars and workshops for students and scholars in the hawza, and published the weekly al-Muballigh al-Risali (The Preacher of the Message) which reported the activities organised for or undertaken by preachers.48 SCIRI also opened Al-Ma‘had al-Zahra li-l-Dirasat al-Islamiyya (Al-Zahra Institute for Islamic Studies) in which prospective female preachers followed a three-year curriculum.49 By the mid-1990s, SCIRI’s propaganda infrastructure included about 200 preachers, 17 mosques and husayniyyat, as well as 25 cultural 85

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Guardians of Shi‘ism committees in several Iranian cities and in most refugee camps.50 Activities were multifaceted and targeted all layers of Iraqis in Iran: special religious programmes during Ramadan and Muharram, workshops dedicated to the poetry about Imam Husayn, contests for the reciting of the Qur’an during which the candidate representing Iraq in Iran’s yearly international Qur’anic competition was selected, and seminars for university students.51 These tabligh activities, while quite traditional in outlook, were occasions  '„' |    ?

  

  &%%  its constituency.52 The network of primary and secondary schools run by the Iraqi Islamic opposition was another platform for propagation of the message among the younger generation. To be prepared ‘culturally and politically’ for their job, teachers were required to attend monthly lectures and a yearly workshop on politics, culture and morals.53 A text written by an Iraqi pupil shows the sort of ideological guidance dispensed by teachers in their classrooms: As Imam Khomeini said: The problem of the Iraqui [sic] and other peoples is their governments . . . The poeple [sic] themselves are the solution. Our people have moved from darkness to light, from fear to courage, from silence  ž  X}      ***‡  } will conquer the tyrant Saddam under the leadership of Muhammad Bakir alHakeem.54

Additionally, SCIRI’s Bureau for POW Affairs received permission from the Iranian authorities to run cultural committees for captured Iraqis.55+

&[  %% }     recreation of prisoners. They taught the illiterate how to read and write, offered history and geography classes, and organised sports competitions, choral singing, theatre and painting.56— 

&[  %%  had a political agenda. It was crucial for SCIRI that all segments of the Iraqi population – those serving in the military included – embraced the cause against the Ba‘th regime. If the soldiers who had been misled by Saddam Hussein’s propaganda machine could learn about the real nature of his regime, they would join the opposition as tawwabin (penitents), a reference to the Muslims who had taken side against Imam Husayn in the battle of Karbala’ in 680 but then rapidly regretted it, switched sides and sought revenge for the ills done to the Imam.57 An account behind an assassination attempt against Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim during a visit to one of the POW camps is revealing. A group of prisoners loyal to the Ba‘th regime had planned to strangle the cleric by taking advantage of the excitement that usually occurred when he mingled with the crowd. They 86

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Leadership in Patronage did not go through with this plot, however, and later explained: ‘We felt confused when we saw his Excellency walking among us with such simplicity. Then we let our hands drop.’58 The power of al-Hakim’s charisma notwithstanding, moral and physical coercion was used on Iraqi captives.  %  %        %% >}   &  interrogate, beat, torture, deprive a POW of his right to send and receive messages, or order transfer of POWs to unknown camps’ in order to ‘encourage’ the most recalcitrant to ask for forgiveness.59 While providing its social, educational and recreational services, the opposition also distributed collective symbols of solidarity as a less tangible means of persuasion to rally popular support for its religio-political *%   } '%%    ahl al-bayt provided a readily accessible lexicon for SCIRI to name its welfare projects. This practice, also commonly used in the more traditional distribution of patronage in Shi‘ism, allowed this political organisation to emphasise its religious nature. The power of Muslim rituals was also capitalised upon, for example when special gifts were offered to refugees during the holy month of Ramadan. `  } &%

     '_

   % %  % &*%% &     who had fallen at the hands of Saddam Hussein was maintained through charity. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr received special visibility with his name given to several clinics and schools, as well as to a bank account set up in London to receive donations in support of SCIRI’s humanitarian work. The fame of al-Sadr was also symbolically conferred upon those projects inaugurated purposefully during the Martyr al-Sadr Week, a week organised every year to commemorate the execution of the Iraqi ayatullah.60 Similarly, the creation of the Bint al-Huda School was intended to honour the name of Al-Sadr’s sister,61 while the Martyr Mahdi al-Hakim School recognised the legacy of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim’s brother. SCIRI also paid tribute to the revolutionary spirit of the Iraqi people with the establishment of the Al-Intifada Schools, a reference to the landmark uprising of March 1991 against the Ba‘th regime.62 Whatever the symbol, putting it on display through charity allowed the opposition to make its revolutionary message part of the people’s daily lives. NEGOTIATING RECOGNITION Recognition is the other perspective by which to examine the charitable role of the Iraqi Islamic opposition in Iran. Obtaining support from the host state is of prime importance and in this regard SCIRI was successful. 87

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Guardians of Shi‘ism Among its counterparts in the country, it was this organisation that became the Islamic Republic’s main point of contact regarding Iraqi affairs. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and his colleagues frequently met with the %  %      @ living conditions and suggest ways of improvement. In so doing, they acted as intermediaries between the Iraqi people and their host state. Intercession led to some positive results. In 1987, the authorities    & %  |;        '_ }   outside a refugee camp, allowing them to have a member of SCIRI to act as their guarantor, in lieu of an Iranian citizen. The revised law enhanced the legitimacy of the Iraqi organisation because it had managed to solve a problem ranking high, according to ‘Ali Babakhan’s study, on the list of the refugees’ preoccupations.63 Another achievement concerned a law requiring any foreigner to get a number of legal documents from his/her embassy to marry an Iranian citizen. Since Baghdad had no diplomatic representation in Tehran, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and his Martyr al-Sadr Foundation asked for and received special permission in 1988 to issue the necessary documents.64 This was a timely achievement for the Iraqi opposition because it encouraged the POWs released after the Iran–Iraq War to take an Iranian wife and start a family instead of returning back home.65 SCIRI was also an intermediary for the distribution of Iranian humanitarian assistance to Iraqis. It collaborated with the Iranian Red Crescent Society and the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee to set up programmes in refugee camps.66 Moreover, the Iraqi organisation received Iranian money that it partially used for its welfare activities. For instance, the expenses of its Unit of Social Services in 1994 have been evaluated as being equal to the amount of the UN funds spent by Tehran on Iraqi refugees.67 By channelling its humanitarian assistance through SCIRI, the Iranian regime therefore helped the organisation gain visibility among Iraqis through the provision of charity. Never optimal, the living conditions of Iraqi refugees in Iran deteriorated from the mid-1990s as a result of several government policies adopted in response to the country’s dire economic situation. In 1996, refugees lost their health and education subsidies. Two years later, their capacity to earn a living through illegal work was in turn put at risk when labour regulations came to be enacted more strictly than before. The prosecution of illegal workers was accompanied by a policy of moving residency-card holders away from the cities back to the refugee camps. Deprived of their jobs, many were left without a source of income.68 Iraqi refugees denounced the opposition leaders for having ‘exploit[ed] 88

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Leadership in Patronage [them] when it was to their advantage to do so’, namely during the Iran–Iraq War, while they were ‘incapable of defending them in times of need’.69 This prompted Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and other clerics to send a letter of complaint to ‘Ali Khamana’i stating that he should intercede with the Ministry of Interior to let the refugees earn their living. The supreme leader agreed with them, putting the blame on the reformist government of President Muhammad Khatami.70 For the Ba‘th regime in Baghdad, Tehran’s anti-refugee campaign was a golden opportunity to enact a ‘counter-exile strategy’ aimed at cutting off the opposition from its popular base.71 In June 1999, it unexpectedly announced its readiness to issue passports to all refugees, except those of Iranian origin expelled in the early 1980s. Thousands applied for a passport with the intention of returning home, a victory for the Iraqi regime. Despite warnings by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees that the security of the returnees could not be guaranteed, a group of 2,577 left for Iraq in 1999 and another 1,360 in 2000. Passport applications drastically declined after refugees got wind of the execution of several who returned.72 In Iran, Khatami’s administration adopted additional measures in mid2001 to further reduce the number of refugees in the country. According to Islamic tradition, Muslims have a duty to rescue refugees from persecution and injustice, but not migrants. Tehran could therefore justify the ultimatum it gave to so-called immigrants to report to the police for repatriation. Many Iraqis, in particular those who had arrived after 1991, were affected by the decision because they possessed an Iranian green-card that featured not the word panahandah (refugee) but muhajir (immigrant).73 All in all, recognition from the host country was a mixed blessing for SCIRI. Its privileged relationship with the Iranian regime made it the main welfare provider among Iraqi refugees. The organisation was also able to mediate solutions to improve their living conditions, especially when the Iran–Iraq War was still raging. There is no doubt that the special arrangements allowing SCIRI and the Martyr al-Sadr Foundation to vouch for the Iraqis wishing to leave the refugee camps or to issue documents for their marriage with Iranian nationals boosted the position of these organisations as the legitimate representative of the Iraqi people. However, when state policies impacted negatively on the refugees, SCIRI was to blame precisely because of its close relationship with Tehran. Moreover, it could not risk displeasing its Iranian patron by voicing criticism. This explains why Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim did not express more than mild concern over the anti-refugee repatriation campaign of 2001, while other Iraqi religious }%    %*74 89

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Guardians of Shi‘ism '„'     ;                

[ however. To this end, it started to work with Western partners in the  &#$$~*  ;   

  > }`%%_ al-Hakim’s philosophy to help anybody or any organisation working to support Iraqi refugees’.75 The cleric’s humanitarian concerns notwithstanding, his organisation could earn valuable recognition from such partnerships. SCIRI’s cooperation with former British MP Emma Nicholson was %X  *‡  }         '_'[ ?ŒX%@ 

X of all the practical arrangements, including obtaining permission from the authorities. Nicholson split her time between meetings with Iraqi opposi     '  % [     '„'?   Documentation Centre for Human Rights in Iraq, inspection of several refugee camps and a two-day expedition to the marshes area across the Iranian border.76 Following her trip, Nicholson created the Amar Appeal, an NGO for Iraqi refugees and Marsh Arabs.77 She took SCIRI’s advice that Dr al-Hariri, the Iraqi paediatrician who had established several clinics for refugees with Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim’s patronage, should      ]‰+'{    } '„'[ }

'  [    %%*78 This arrangement probably explains why the Amar Appeal was one of the few Western organisations allowed to work for Iraqi refugees in Iran in the 1990s. In Why Does the West Forget?, Nicholson acknowledged the valuable help she received from the Iraqi opposition and dedicated her book to none other than Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim.79 Cooperation with Emma Nicholson probably gave SCIRI access to Western money for its own charitable activities. The Amar Appeal paid half the salary of the teachers employed in the refugee camps in the Iranian province of Khuzistan, probably those working in the schools run by the Iraqi opposition.80 That SCIRI’s newsletter Iraq Update regularly published calls for donations to the Amar Appeal also gives grounds to believe that at least some of the collected funds were transferred to the Iraqi organisation.81 More generally, engagement with Western partners on charitable grounds provided the opposition with a basis on which to earn wider recognition for its international political movement, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. THE LEGACY OF EXILED CHARITY After it was set up in Najaf in 2004, the Al-Hakim Foundation launched a range of religious and social services: the distribution of 90

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Leadership in Patronage material assistance to the poor and the displaced, the sponsorship of tens of thousands of orphans and widows, the establishment of a vast network of primary and secondary schools, the creation of developmental programmes for women, the training of preachers, the construction

% _           [  

 %}% [   [ electronic and televised media, and the organisation of arts exhibitions and literary events.82 Acting as SCIRI’s social wing, the Al-Hakim Foundation also made charity a channel for the dissemination of symbols in support of the organisation’s view of society and politics. These symbols can be analysed to assess the degree of continuity and change in their usage in the place of exile and at home. Those related to Islamic heritage remained important. The Al-Hakim Foundation borrowed the name of Imam ‘Ali for its dozens of schools, while the recently established Shaykh al-Tusi University, to }      [        hawza of Najaf. Similarly, charity continued to be used to promote symbolic narra % 

&   ?ŒX%% &*    legacy of Muhsin al-Hakim’s marja‘iyya was once again revived. The Dar al-Hikma School was rebuilt in its initial location in Najaf and branches opened elsewhere,83 while the Al-Hakim Library was extended to become one of the most important research institutions in the shrine city.84 The family’s history of martyrdom was also emphasised. The Al-Hakim Family Martyrs’ Cultural and Charitable Foundation (Mu’assasat @ †   ?ŒX%  ?_&&  ?™&&&^ }     serve this purpose.85 The Martyr Mahdi al-Hakim Institute acknowledged in particular the legacy of the emblematic family member after whom it was named. With a mission to offer capacity- and leadership-building programmes to Iraqi youth, this institute stressed not only Mahdi alHakim’s martyrdom at the hands of the Ba‘th regime, but also his role as a leader. Other projects received the name under which Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim became known as a martyr – shahid al-mihrab. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim did not die a martyr but his nickname ‘aziz al-‘iraq (the beloved of Iraq) was also used, for instance for an annual football championship launched in the year of his death in 2009.86 By way of contrast, a symbol which SCIRI used predominantly during the Iranian exile but did not bring back home was the praise of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s legacy. This break from past practice, combined with a clear preference to publicise the al-Hakim family name, stemmed from the high level of intra-Shi‘i competition in post-2003 Iraq 91

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Guardians of Shi‘ism (Chapter 5), in particular between the clerical families of Najaf. Muqtada al-Sadr, who emerged as a major actor after regime change, was building his leadership at the head of the movement known as the Sadrists in part on the legacy of his father Muhammad Sadiq (d. 1999) and his emblematic cousin and father-in-law Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. It became therefore less opportune for his competitors to continue capitalising on the symbolic       *       

   † ?ŒX% Foundation was to promote not only SCIRI’s political programme at large, but even more so the leadership role of the al-Hakim family. The Al-Hakim Foundation also found it important to establish itself in international fora. To this end it obtained special consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The New York

&Ž”> ?ŒX%    %%  and committees at the UN, in particular with regard to women’s issues.87  ‰            Œ% „    * The work of Amir Hashom, a layman who had already been involved in SCIRI’s human rights movement in the 1990s, mainly revolved around issues such as inter-faith dialogue, widows and orphans, unemployment and terrorist attacks, all in reference to Iraq.88 Against all expectations, however, the Al-Hakim Foundation did not build on SCIRI’s past experience of collaboration with international humanitarian partners to distribute its charity on the ground in Iraq, a few marginal joint projects notwithstanding. Rather, it was content to maintain an international presence through participation in discussions on social, developmental and human rights issues at the UN in New York and Geneva.

Conclusion The al-Hakim family has distributed charity among various communities for a mix of religious, social and political purposes. Muhsin al-Hakim was a recipient of khums 

  X%  marja‘ of reallocating it in the form of patronage. While this chapter has concentrated on his more organised and lasting patronage network on the Iraqi scene, one should note that he also relied on the work of his representatives and the personal initiatives of wealthy followers to distribute charity in more distant horizons. In the early years of his exile, Mahdi al-Hakim’s efforts to cater for the needs of the Shi‘a among whom he lived was characteristic of the work of a wakil in its local making. His charity became transnational with the creation of WABIL, while his Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre and the Relief Committee attached to it looked after Iraqi communities in London, Syria and Iran. Not surprisingly, the Iraqi opposition movement 92

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Leadership in Patronage led by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim limited its patronage to Iraqi refugees and POWs in Iran, without targeting other Shi‘i nationals.  ?ŒX%    %   &  &* %   ' % %   *     of places of worship, the training of aspiring ‘ulama’ and preachers, and          

&      %[ }  a renowned marja‘ X `  ?ŒX%   % &    Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Furthermore, the practice of charity reinforces the religious, social and political leadership roles assumed by clerical benefactors. Muhsin alHakim’s projects aimed to reassert the centrality of the religious establishment by re-socialising Iraqi Shi‘a through Islam and re-vitalising the hawza of Najaf. Mahdi al-Hakim found a role for himself in exile through his work for the religious and social advancement of the Shi‘a. The Islamic opposition led by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim distributed material and symbolic patronage among Iraqis in Iran to build collective solidarity in support of its political mission. Charity also has an effect on clerical leadership because it constitutes a sphere of engagement with the state. The support of Shaykh Rashid of Dubai was crucial to Mahdi al-Hakim’s efforts to organise the religious affairs of the Shi‘a in the emirate, while the cleric also sought to cooperate with the Iranian monarchy in his endeavour. Similarly, the collaboration between Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and Emma Nicholson helped give rise to international recognition for the charitable and political mission of the Iraqi opposition. The Islamic Republic of Iran also granted a special role to SCIRI as a caretaker of the Iraqi community in the country, but Iranian anti-refugee policies had a backlash effect on the stature of the organisation. |    %   _  and for all, but needs to be sustained and reinforced. The maintenance of projects and the distribution of more charity are tangible marks of the     %     

*'  [ &;  to respond to the needs of time and place. Philanthropic legacies are also made to survive symbolically. This is why the al-Hakim family relentlessly capitalised on the fame of Muhsin al-Hakim’s marja‘iyya as embodied in the Al-Hakim Library and the Dar al-Hikma School. 93

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The Priority of Charity 4

The Priority of Charity: a Global Brand of Philanthropy in its Local Making

Patronage is unarguably the most prominent facet of the al-Khu’i family’s leadership. Never before the time of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i had a source

 %          }* Œ    marja‘iyya coincided with the 1973 oil boom which brought great wealth to the Shi‘a    %       %    [    &     ‰    * ‡  

   ;   & ?    revenues to their source of emulation, the funds at al-Khu’i’s disposal mirrored the prosperity of this period. In redistributing these resources, the marja‘ provided patronage in support of learning in the Iraqi and Iranian seminaries. He also catered for the needs of communities facing  [}[          of the Shi‘i world. His charity touched upon many spheres of the people’s lives, entailing activities as diverse as the propagation of the faith and the promotion of education, the distribution of money, food and emergency relief material, the construction of clinics, orphanages, roads and irrigation systems, in addition to other projects. Because of the large geographical scope and the informality of the marja‘iyya’s system of patronage, it is impossible to provide a complete map of al-Khu’i’s charitable legacy. Its most visible projects, both those established by the ayatullah’s network of wukala’ and the Al-Khoei Foundation, are presented in this chapter as an %    }    * The marja‘iyya’s transnational charity reached into very different and sometimes highly politically loaded environments. Accordingly, attention                ;  of the time and place in which it was distributed. The situation in the Iraqi  '         [ }       } Khomeini and then the Islamic Republic responded to the development of patronage networks by Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i from the early 1970s and their maintenance until the present day. The chapter then moves on to        ;       & 94

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The Priority of Charity Lebanon, several Sunni-ruled states and two Muslim-minority countries. This multi-sited approach allows for a comparison of the causal effect of the internal religious make-up of the state on its response(s) to the expansion of Shi‘i networks within its borders. Finally, Shi‘i patronage in the West will be discussed. The growth of Shi‘i communities in Europe and North America led the Al-Khoei Foundation to institutionalise religion through a network of Islamic centres and schools. Through its different services and activities, it aimed to foster a sense of sacred attachment to the heartlands of Shi‘ism among co-religionists, while also helping them lead their lives in their places of residence. The foundation’s charitable mission in the West had therefore a dual geographical orientation.

Patronage and Clerical Politics in the Seminaries The development of patronage networks within the community of learning is an important part of social life in the Shi‘i seminaries. Because students and scholars in the religious sciences depend on high-ranking clerics for their livelihood, the capacity of the latter to cater for those needs can in turn earn them loyalty. The importance of this process for the constitution of the marja‘iyya should not be underestimated in that candidates to the position need a strong scholarly network ready to promote their name to the laity. As crudely explained by an Iranian cleric, It is possible that someone is very knowledgeable, but if he does not give stipends, he will not become known as marja‘ taqlid . . . In fact the people will give [their] blood on the order of anybody who gives money. Therefore, a link between the stipends and the marja‘iyya always exists.1

In addition to the distribution of stipends, the patronage of high-ranking scholars in the seminaries also entails the construction of colleges, student accommodation and libraries as visible marks of their notoriety.  % &  |[  %        } maraji‘ play games of power over the provision of patronage. The capacity of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i to develop patronage networks in the Iraqi and Iranian seminaries was not immune from such competition. In the 1970s, Khomeini was also consolidating his position among the community of learning during the years he was exiled in Najaf. The struggle for the marja‘iyya between the two ayatullahs provides the historical background against which to study how the Islamic Republic of Iran responded to al-Khu’i’s efforts at supporting religious learning in the seminaries of Qum and Mashhad in the post-revolutionary era. Because of the endurance of al-Khu’i’s philanthropic legacy, the 95

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Guardians of Shi‘ism topic has continued relevance to the present day, not only in the Iranian shrine cities but also in Najaf now that it is again on the ascendency as a centre of scholarship. Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i started to develop his patronage network in the hawza of Najaf with the distribution of stipends probably in the early 1960s, if not earlier. While it is common for several mujtahids to offer patronage to the community of learning, the amount of the stipends they   }     & [ other words, the number of believers giving them khums. A ranking order for the stipends is therefore naturally established. In 1967, al-Khu’i’s stipends in the Iraqi hawza were second only to Muhsin al-Hakim’s, being higher than those of Mahmud al-Shahrudi and Khomeini.2 The death of a prominent marja‘ generally creates much turmoil in the seminaries because of the opportunity it presents for new contenders to act      &  |%  the community of learning. There was anticipation of such when Muhsin  ?ŒX%  }&* †œ†™         %    leading ayatullahs of Qum intended to raise the amount of their monthly stipends in order to prevent al-Khu’i, who had by then started to give money to students in the Iranian seminaries, from increasing his.3 This concerted action failed, however, and al-Khu’i became the main provider in Qum.4 In Najaf, his stipends were also the highest after the death of his Arab colleague,5 %     &%primus inter pares. In 1975, Khomeini used the pretext of Mahmud al-Shahrudi’s death to initiate a drive towards stipend increase in competition with al-Khu’i. The race started with his stipends for students in Najaf rising from three '_ ?™@@ % [    and twelve dinars respectively, and so forth. In 1977, Khomeini ignored a request from al-Khu’i to stop the escalation. While the latter did not go &   &[ %  [}   & dinars in late 1978.6 What had been a typical rivalry between two maraji‘ became, after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a struggle between competing models of clerical authority. Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i did not support the idea of an Islamic state under clerical rule, believing that men of religion should not assume temporal power. His fame as the holder of traditional religious authority could therefore undermine Khomeini’s own claim to religio-political leadership. With a state apparatus behind him, the supreme leader had access to more institutionalised means than before the revolution to prevent his Najaf-based competitor from channelling his |    [   '*ƒ'X 96

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The Priority of Charity   [      }%          

 *'         >†  Khamana’i, moreover, he did not seek to put the Iranian seminaries under full state control and therefore showed some willingness to protect their traditional independence by allowing non-political maraji‘ to maintain a presence in the community of learning.8 Being able to operate again in Iran was of crucial importance for alKhu’i. With Najaf’s attractiveness in sharp decline because of increased repression by the Iraqi state after 1979, it was among the growing number of aspiring ‘ulama’ in the Iranian seminaries that he could develop his network of patronage. His son-in-law and main wakil in Iran, Jalal al-Din Faqih-Imani, did not wait long to start building religious institutions on his behalf. In 1981 he opened the Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful) Library and a publishing house in his hometown of Isfahan. The project was further developed with the construction of the Baqir al-‘Ulum (Revealer of Knowledge) School, a small madrasa training students at the preliminary and intermediate levels of the religious curriculum.9 Faqih-Imani also resumed the construction of a college in Qum which had been authorised towards the end of the monarchy but halted straight after the revolution. Madinat al-‘Ilm (The City of Knowledge) opened its doors in 1984. The complex included a mosque, a lecture hall and several classrooms, a madrasa for children, a large library and a smaller one for women, as well as accommodation units. In Mashhad, Faqih-Imani started the construction of the Madrasat Ayatullah al-‘Uzma al-Khu’i al-‘Ilmiyya (Grand Ayatullah al-Khu’i School) on a waqf established in al-Khu’i’s name just before the Iranian revolution. Opened in 1987, the project expanded over the years to become the largest college in the shrine city with an imposing mosque, 35 classrooms, a library, a hall of residence for about 300 students, apartments for the professorial corps, a refectory and other facilities. In 2006, 4,000 tullab studied at the sutuh and bahth al-kharij levels with several of al-Khu’i’s former students as teachers – an illustration of the endurance of the late ayatullah’s scholarly network in the Iranian hawza.10 Although the death of a marja‘ can be a critical time for the continuation of his educational and philanthropic legacy, al-Khu’i’s institutions of learning survived him. As the custodian (mutawalli) of the ayatullah’s 97

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Guardians of Shi‘ism awqaf in Iran, Jalal al-Din Faqih-Imani kept administering the projects he had established. He covered the maintenance costs with the revenues derived from investments previously made with al-Khu’i’s money. He also relied in part on the patronage of ‘Ali al-Sistani who moreover provided stipends, along with other maraji‘, to the students studying in the Grand Ayatullah al-Khu’i School in Mashhad.11 For years, the religious colleges built on al-Khu’i’s behalf kept a fair degree of independence from the Iranian state. They were not directly affected by ‘Ali Khamana’i’s relentless efforts, starting from the mid1990s, to place the seminaries under his control.12 However, the death of Jalal al-Din Faqih-Imani in 2008 provided the supreme leader with an opportunity to turn to his advantage a family dispute among al-Khu’i’s descendants. The matter of contention, between one of the ayatullah’s patrilineal grandsons and the sons of Faqih-Imani (i.e. al-Khu’i’s matrilineal grandsons), was essentially the question of who was entitled to oversee the Iranian endowments established by their grandfather. ‘Ali Khamana’i became involved and privileged the former party who indeed gained the upper hand over the Faqih-Imani family.13 In effect, Madinat al-‘Ilm in Qum started to decline, either because the new mutawalli lacked the necessary management skills or because he allowed it to fall under state control. While this college previously trained students up to the end of the bahth al-kharij level, it has now stopped offering classes. As of 2012, it has only served as a residence.14 To sum up Iran’s responses to the development of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s patronage network, we see that the Islamic Republic had the capacity to assert control over its territories, yet not necessarily the       *`     [     

&| opposition, at least not openly. As a result, the institutions of learning established in al-Khu’i’s name gave – and continue to give – visibility to the marja‘iyya of Najaf inside the Iranian seminaries. It is true that The City of Knowledge in Qum eventually fell victim to state interference, but the Grand Ayatullah al-Khu’i School in Mashhad did not. Today it is one of the few independent colleges in the country, and not a small one.15 If, for more than two decades, Najaf had lost its prominence to Qum as a centre of learning, regime change in Iraq in 2003 allowed it to thrive again. Religious institutions that had been closed or destroyed under Ba‘thist rule could be restored, and new ones built, in order to accommodate the needs of a growing scholarly community. A suitable infrastructure was also required so as to promote international religious pilgrimage to the ‘atabat. This was a time full of possibilities for clerical actors – the maraji‘, other high-ranking scholars, renowned clerical families, let alone 98

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The Priority of Charity the Islamic Republic of Iran – to gain or re-gain a visible presence in the Iraqi seminaries through patronage. In this context, the Al-Khoei Foundation made it its new ambition to restore the religious college which had been the emblem of Abu alQasim al-Khu’i’s marja‘iyya in the hawza of Najaf. Founded in 1970, the Madrasat Dar al-‘Ilm (House of Knowledge School) had several classrooms, a residence for about 200 students and a library with 38,000 books and 7,500 manuscripts. While it was one of the two Shi‘i madrasas not to be closed down by the Ba‘th regime during the 1980s, it did not survive the government crackdown against the country’s religious institutions in the aftermath of the 1991 popular uprising. Once rebuilt, the new Dar al-‘Ilm School will include two large lecture halls, a library, specialised research centres and accommodation units.16           %   

 &  ?   actors. Being the wakil of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i at a time of great need in this war-torn country allowed Fadlallah to emerge as an important 101

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Guardians of Shi‘ism provider of patronage. This role earned him social capital and can also be said to have contributed to his recognition as a marja‘ in the mid-1990s.23 In turn, Fadlallah’s philanthropic legacy has survived his death in 2010, with the Benevolent al-Mabarrat Association and his other institutions now ensuring legitimacy to his own family.24 THE EFFECT OF INTRA-MUSLIM TENSIONS IN PAKISTAN Being home to the largest Shi‘i community in the world after Iran, Pakistan received a good amount of patronage from Abu al-Qasim alKhu’i’s marja‘iyya. As in the other countries covered in this chapter, funds were allocated in priority for the promotion of religious education. Shi‘i communities scattered around the world, it was thought, sometimes practised ‘unorthodox’ Shi‘ism because of their limited knowledge about     *

    %}  X   channels to guide them: The inadequacy of the existent numbers of Islamic missionaries, especially in distant places to Islamic centres [i.e. the Iraqi and Iranian seminaries] and particularly in areas where there is no existence of Islamic centres, poses a large threat to the future generations of Islam.25

The solution was to establish schools for the recruitment and training of preachers who would in turn take care of the religious needs of Shi‘i believers. In Pakistan, institution-building in al-Khu’i’s name started in 1975 }`>†  ?] patronage when the state is adversarial. This centre opened its doors in 1989 and provided, with a Qum-educated cleric at its head, a place for the Shi‘a to perform their religious duties. It did not survive government pres[ }[}    } &   &*' spite of many attempts, the foundation never managed to reopen its branch in the country.35 The Malaysian experience ended in failure. More generally, there were Sunni-ruled countries where the Al-Khoei Foundation did not even try   [  %  > %% * &[ it stayed away from the Gulf monarchies whose regimes were likely to oppose the establishment of large and ambitious Shi‘i projects such as those the foundation liked to design. Instead, the representation of Abu alQasim al-Khu’i’s marja‘iyya was undertaken informally by his wukala’ in a traditional way, not in an institutionalised – visible – form. THE BENEFITS OF SHARED INTERESTS IN JORDAN The case of Jordan offers yet another illustration of how Sunni-ruled states might respond to the development of Shi‘i networks of patronage within their borders. Reference to this country might seem surprising, given the very small size of its native Shi‘i community. Nonetheless, the Al-Khoei Foundation found it useful to work on a project there. In 1992, it approached King Hussein with a proposal to restore a shrine in Karak where Ja‘far al-Tayyar, the brother of Imam ‘Ali, and other companions had been buried after they met their death during the battle of Mu’ta in 629. It was agreed that the foundation would prepare the blueprint for the construction and that the costs would be covered by the Jordanian crown. King Hussein and ‘Abd al-Majid al-Khu’i inaugurated the restored place of worship in 1995. There were also talks to establish a hawza in Karak as an alternative site both to the Iraqi seminaries, where pressure from the Ba‘th %  #$$#[  '   [} were not immune from state control. The eventuality that ‘Ali al-Sistani would move to Jordan was even discussed, but never came to pass.36 104

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The Priority of Charity The joint project of restoring the shrine illustrates a scenario where Shi‘i clerical actors and the state had converging interests in the distribution of patronage. Both parties earned legitimacy from their enterprise. By providing a new religious site for the Shi‘a, the Al-Khoei Foundation     }            

  marja‘iyya even after Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s recent demise. Moreover, collaborating with the Jordanian monarchy was an avenue by which to become Amman’s point of contact concerning the affairs of the Iraqi migrants and refugees who were coming en masse to Jordan after the Gulf War.37 If able to improve their living conditions, the foundation would be able to position itself as their protector, in particular of the Shi‘a who lacked access to preestablished networks, institutions and charities in the kingdom, in contrast to their Christian and Sunni counterparts.38 For example, Majid al-Khu’i   } ™Œ}    %  to pay after the expiration of their six-month visa. He pleaded that these            *%  }                & }     | } '_*†%  } €”     %    %  ;%  

  *39 The restoration of the shrine in Karak also served the interests of the Jordanian crown. Taking pride in his holy lineage as a descendant of Prophet Muhammad, King Hussein always looked for opportunities to enhance his religious legitimacy. With the growing popularity of Islamist parties in Jordan at the time, he particularly needed to show marks of his religiosity. The project was evidence of his concern with the preservation of Islamic heritage, while he also personally liked the idea of an association with Majid al-Khu’i, a cleric from a revered sayyid family whom he used to call ‘ibn ‘ammi’, ‘my cousin’ in Arabic. In addition to the legitimacy the Al-Khoei Foundation and the Jordanian monarchy could derive from the Karak project, their collaboration was also politically motivated. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the Gulf crisis of 1990–1 marked the politicisation of the London-based charity and encouraged its attempts to rally Arab and Muslim leaders against Saddam Hussein’s regime. At that time, Amman started gradually distancing itself from Baghdad and was keener than before on holding talks with Iraqi opposition groups, especially the moderate ones such as the Al-Khoei Foundation. Put bluntly, rebuilding the shrine of Ja‘far al-Tayyar was a means to formalise political ties under the guise of religion. As the story of the shrine suggests, shared interests – religious, social and political – between the Al-Khoei Foundation and the state ensured the successful implementation of the project. A third party, the Islamic 105

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Guardians of Shi‘ism Republic of Iran, also tried to get involved. After hearing about the plans for Karak, the Iranian regime approached its Jordanian counterpart with another proposal. It would build the new shrine and send an important contingent of Iranian pilgrims to visit it every year.40 The Islamic Republic liked to restore and promote Shi‘i religious sites outside its borders for a mix of religious and political interests,41 and it probably perceived the Al-Khoei Foundation’s involvement in Jordan as a threat to its own position as the guardian of Islamic heritage. Iran’s attempt to bypass the foundation failed, however, because Amman rebutted Tehran’s proposal. In other words, Iran’s transnational activity was curbed by another state, in this case Jordan. This allowed a non-state clerical network to keep the upper hand in the competition over legitimacy with the Islamic Republic. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS IN INDIA The worldwide map of Shi‘ism also includes non-Muslim majority countries in which Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s marja‘iyya was present. India was one of them. The many twists and turns of the story related to a project launched by Muhammad al-Musawi, the ayatullah’s wakil and later a trustee of the Al-Khoei Foundation, illustrate how the politics of a Hindumajority state affected the transnational distribution of Shi‘i patronage. Muhammad al-Musawi started his charitable work after he moved from Najaf to India in 1980. The political context of the time allowed him to institutionalise his religious, social and educational activities in the Imaan Foundation and Al-Imaan Charitable Trust which he set up in 1981 and 1987 respectively.42 At the end of the decade, the Al-Khoei Foundation also put Muhammad al-Musawi and his Imaan Foundation in charge of a large educational project to be established in greater Mumbai. The Imam Al-Khoei Cultural Complex was to include a mosque, primary and secondary schools, a religious college with a capacity of 10,000 tullab, a library, a technology centre, a clinic and an orphanage, as well as student and teacher accommodation units – a charitable-educational complex, to use Said Amir Arjomand’s terminology.43 The foundation stone of the building was laid on 3 March 1990 with the anticipation that the construction would be completed within four or &*44&”&#$$[   —›#!*"%

  &  %% &  * Finally, the Al-Khoei Foundation also faced competition from the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is what happened in New York after it established the Al-Iman School – the city’s only Shi‘i school at the time of its creation. The Iranian representation to the UN initially exerted pressure on the foundation to have it adopt a syllabus more in line with the Iranian curriculum: ‘They wanted more Islamic studies, more hijab [veil], and lessons on the Islamic Revolution!’ Because the foundation did not budge, the Iranian state moved to sponsor the establishment of a private school of its own in a neighbouring area. Competition followed, and the Iranian Razi School reportedly tried to attract teachers away from the Al-Iman School with better salaries.73 113

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Guardians of Shi‘ism CONNECTING BELIEVERS TO THE ‘THERE’ AND ‘HERE’ OF SHI‘ISM IN THE WEST Religious institutions help organise Muslim communities in the West. The † ?™ ƒ      

}     to reinforce the sense of ‘belonging’ of believers to the heartlands of Shi‘ism in spite of the actual distance they are away. Its Islamic centres and schools offer a place for the people to gather, practise their religious duties and also keep in touch with socio-political developments affecting co-religionists ‘at home’. These institutions are not solely directed at the ‘there’ but also the ‘here’ of Shi‘ism in the West. Their activities consciously take into account the environment in which their Muslim ben   *`  [ † ?™ ƒ     institutionalised bridge between the communities they serve and the state hosting them, assuming a role of dual representation of the former to the latter, and vice-versa, as well as interceding between the two.  [  &[     %   %      Shi‘ism in the non-Muslim West. The Al-Khoei Foundation has always been preoccupied with the challenge Western culture could pose for Muslim immigrant identity, in particular that of the younger generation.74 It has considered children and youths more vulnerable to the attraction of Western values than their elders, because most of them are the children of migrant parents and do not necessarily have a strong connection to their home culture.75 The rationale behind the creation of schools was that a proper Islamic education would make young Shi‘a embrace the moral principles and practices of their religion.76 To further maintain Muslim identity in the West, the Al-Khoei Islamic centres organise religious activities on a daily, weekly and seasonal basis, holding congregational and Friday prayers, readings of the Qur’an, and special programmes during the holy months of Ramadan, Muharram and Safar and for the commemoration of the birth and death of the Prophet, the Imams and other members of the ahl al-bayt. The organisation of seminars on topics about Islam offers further religious and educational guidance to the adult community. The centres have libraries to provide an intellectual source of reference for Muslims wishing to gain better knowl ' %   *† ?™ ƒ   @+   Information also publishes religious books and periodicals for diffusion among the Shi‘a in the West and in more distant countries.77  ' %               %%  practise their religion. Each has an ‘alim who answers legal enquiries according to the teachings of different maraji‘, provides counselling to 114

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The Priority of Charity solve family, marital and business disputes,78 executes religious contracts (marriage, divorce and wills)79 and holds funeral ceremonies. Believers might also choose to undertake the hajj via organised trips.80 Their payment of zakat and khums can be made to the foundation either in the traditional way or online.81 The Al-Khoei Foundation also encourages its communities to maintain their attachment to the heartlands of Shi‘ism by seeking donations for a mix of religious and humanitarian purposes. For instance, those unable to make the pilgrimage to Karbala’ for the arba‘in (the commemoration of the fortieth day after Imam Husayn’s martyrdom) can sponsor a local pilgrim with food, medicine and clothing to earn the reward of holy visitation, without the need to travel there physically.82 Donations for humanitarian causes also give an opportunity for West-based Muslims to show transnational solidarity with their brethren living under hardship. In the 1990s, the Al-Khoei Foundation’s fundraising activities were primarily concerned with the situation in Iraq. Philanthropic markets were organised in its Islamic centres to collect funds for Iraqi refugees and the Paris branch managed a sponsorship programme for orphans and the poor in Iraq.83 The Al-Kawthar Project is a more recent initiative launched in 2010 to raise funds in support of orphans and widows worldwide.84 Catering for the needs of Muslims in the West is not only a matter of preserving their religious and cultural heritage, but also of helping them lead a successful life in their chosen place of residence. The Al-Khoei Foundation’s regular schools in London, New York and Montreal sought and obtained government recognition as soon as they could. They teach the national curriculum and combine it with the study of Arabic, Islamic culture and religious sciences. On their website, the Al-Sadiq and Al-Zahra Schools in London pride themselves on the good results obtained by their pupils in the national STATS and GSCE exams, in comparison with other public and private schools.85 Similarly, the Islamic centre in London organises seminars to inform adults of their rights and responsibilities in the UK. It also offers classes in English and computing sciences. To attract women – the group most likely to remain on the margins of the host society – a nursery service is made available to the mothers coming to class. Bonat al-Mustaqbal, a programme for female youth launched in 2006, organises various activities to empower women and ensure that they acquire the necessary tools with which to lead life in the West.86 Finally, the Al-Khoei Foundation works to improve certain aspects of Shi‘i life in the West through intercessions with governments. A number of its achievements in the UK are illustrative. One concerns the control of halal (permissible) food standards. When, in the late 1990s, the Ministry 115

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Guardians of Shi‘ism of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food was preparing an amendment of its law on meat production techniques in compliance with EU regulations, the foundation was invited onto a working group to discuss the matter.87 In another domain, the foundation joined the UK’s National Council for the Welfare of Muslim Prisoners (NCWMP) in 2001. This allowed its imams to visit prisoners and made it possible for a representative of the foundation to participate in NCWMP delegations and inspect detention centres.88 The Al-Khoei Foundation also worked more than once with the Œ % +          & % X[ }      %    @   [    [    % Iraqi regime.89 All in all, the Al-Khoei Foundation’s good standing with the British authorities helps it to mediate with them on behalf of UK-based Shi‘a.

Conclusion The al-Khu’i name has developed over the past decades into a global brand of philanthropy, with the effect of reinforcing the family’s legitimacy as caretaker of the Shi‘a worldwide. At least three internal processes &} &          & * First, the ability of transnational benefactors to offer a timely response to local needs owes to the channels through which patronage is distributed. Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s representatives oversaw the implementation of projects for the Shi‘a they knew the best, that is, the communities in which they lived or from which they came. Their awareness of the socio-political conditions on the ground was an asset for their work, and this explains why the ayatullah rarely dispatched wukala’ to places with which they had no prior connection. In addition, the Al-Khoei Foundation partially institutionalised the system of traditional representation in order to max% &    &  marja‘iyya better. At the same time, its operational performance was enhanced precisely because it relied on a multi-ethnic and multinational board of trustees based on alKhu’i’s network of wukala’[ %     

     not become obsolete in the distribution of the marja‘iyya’s patronage after the foundation was established. Second, if good performance accords merit to the service providers, the effect of patronage on their religious authority also depends on the type of charity distributed. In the al-Khu’i case, but also more generally,                 

& 127

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Guardians of Shi‘ism gave legality to the killing of the Kurds. Al-Hakim reacted with an edict of his own declaring attacks on Iraqi Kurds to be unlawful.20 State–clergy relations deteriorated with the coming to power of the Ba‘th Party in 1968. New policies put the traditional semi-autonomy of the religious establishment at risk. The ‘atabat and all awqaf were placed under the administration of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. The tullab could no longer be exempted from military service, and therefore training in the hawza became less attractive to the youth. Prospective stu     &         & school, the madrasas included. Strict censorship was imposed on religious    [    %'_ &[     

} legalised in the holy cities.21 `  [    > %        the diplomatic dispute between Baghdad and Tehran over the Shatt al‘Arab issue. When Iran unilaterally abrogated the 1937 border treaty in April 1969, President Ahmad al-Bakr made a surprise visit to Muhsin al-Hakim to request his mediation. According to one observer, this move was a ploy to weaken the marja‘iyya of the Iraqi ayatullah who would be perceived as an Iranian agent if he were to mediate with Muhammad Reza Shah.22 Al-Hakim refused to intervene. In retaliation, the Ba‘th regime     ;  ' %  % '_ €        massive wave of deportations of more than a hundred thousand so-called Shi‘a of Persian origin between 1969 and 1971. For seven years, Iranian pilgrims were also unable to visit the ‘atabat.23 A rupture had taken place. On 15 May 1969, Muhsin al-Hakim attended a popular gathering organised in the Imam ‘Ali Shrine during which his son Mahdi delivered a critique of Ba‘thist rule. Written by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the speech insisted that the shrine cities were the property of Muslims and no regime had the right to prevent pilgrims from visiting them; all aspiring tullab, regardless of their nationality, should be allowed to come and study there; the government had to stop intimidating its people; and Iraq should be ruled in accordance with Islamic laws.24 A couple of weeks later, Muhsin al-Hakim also made the highly symbolic move of travelling in a convoy to Baghdad in protest against the regime. The authorities reacted violently. Security forces broke into his residence in Kazimayn at night with an arrest warrant against his son Mahdi whom they accused of espionage for the CIA and Israel. They searched the house for four hours, even the room where the marja‘ was sleeping.25 Mahdi al-Hakim had  &  [ }[|   &  * After this episode, Muhsin al-Hakim chose to remain in self-imposed house arrest in Najaf. He shunned any form of contact with a regime 128

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A Family at the Forefront of Iraqi Politics  

 &   %  &   % } %*26 According to SAVAK reporting, he even refused to seek eye treatment in Baghdad, out of concern that a visit to the capital would appear as if he had been reconciled with the government.27 His health deteriorated in February 1970. After a trip to London for treatment, he did return to the Iraqi capital: he spent his last days in the Ibn Sina Hospital there and died on 1 June 1970. THE METHODS OF PROTEST This survey of Muhsin al-Hakim’s involvement in political affairs invites closer scrutiny of his methods of protest. Whatever the matter of concern, the marja‘ saw his role as an advisor to the state, not as a trouble-maker. †  &[   }&    %           with the authorities, even under the less-compromising Ba‘th regime. When addressing them, al-Hakim and those speaking in his name used a non-confrontational language. Occasionally, advice contained more or less covert threats: ‘He who gives advance warning, his actions are excused’, the ayatullah reportedly stated when he declared that he ‘would be obliged to take action’ if Baghdad were to launch a war in Kurdistan in the mid-1960s.28 If verbal advice was not enough, al-Hakim could make gestures consid 

   *Ž % }     } an act of protest. It was also a strategy to prevent the ruling elites from instrumentalising the notoriety of his marja‘iyya    } *'[ no matter how tense state–‘ulama’ relations were, the successive Iraqi presidents and their representatives were always keen on visiting Muhsin al-Hakim in Najaf in order to derive legitimacy for their rule. The marja‘ could also choose to boycott the Friday prayer or leave the shrine city to express his dissatisfaction more publicly. His decision to end his life in selfimposed house arrest can be considered a form of avoidance protest. Issuing a fatwa with a political content was another option for delivering a message more forcefully. That al-Hakim acted against communism with such an edict was not incidental. His aim was not only to thwart state 

       ;     }   |    ideologies among Iraqi Shi‘a. Because a fatwa is religiously binding for 

  [   }               etal level. In contrast, al-Hakim did not go as far as declaring socialism religiously illegal when he tried to oppose ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif’s nationalisation policies. Generally speaking, he kept the number of his political fatwas to a minimum. 129

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Guardians of Shi‘ism In 1964, the following incantation could be heard in Karbala’ during the arba‘in processions: If only Sayid Muhsin al-Hakim orders, We will remove this cheeky person [i.e. ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif], This state of affairs will not improve We must cut off his hands. His objectives are known.29

Clearly, Muhsin al-Hakim had the power to mobilise Iraqi Shi‘a against the state, if he wished. He preferred not to, however. The discussion he once had with Khomeini during the latter’s exile in Najaf shows that he }       [   &'} Khomeini was trying to push him to take action, but anywhere for that matter. The Iraqi marja‘ did not have much trust in the people: ‘If we took drastic measures people would not follow us. The people lie and follow their whims . . . They are in pursuit of their worldly desires.’ At any rate, he continued, ‘if we staged an uprising and people suffered there would be chaos and people would curse us.’30 This is not to say that the marja‘iyya’s involvement in state affairs was not demonstrated to the public. The American embassy in Baghdad and the consulate in Basra reported several instances during ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif’s presidency when Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim took the opportunity, at religious gatherings, to read the oral and written complaints his father and

      %       *31 Although one cannot speak of a concerted plan of action led directly by the marja‘iyya, but rather of individual initiatives, Shi‘i rituals also became increasingly politicised in those years, as attested by the arba‘in chant quoted above. Furthermore, with the emergence of Islamist groups in Iraq, Muhsin al-Hakim had to consider what stance to adopt vis-à-vis these more organised forms of Shi‘i politics. The answer was not self-evident. Observers generally agree that he endorsed the initiative of the clerics and laymen, including his sons Mahdi and Muhammad Baqir as well as Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who created the Hizb al-Da‘wa in the late 1950s.32 The new group was not unanimously accepted in the hawza, however, and too close an association with it contained several risks which Muhsin alHakim was not ready to take. Its organisational form was problematic in that a party is considered a Western invention lacking Islamic legitimacy, but also because it is exclusive in terms of membership in contrast to the all-inclusive marja‘iyya. Moreover, the dominant view in the seminaries held that activism should be limited to communal representation by the mujtahids, nothing more. Because he himself intervened in political 130

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A Family at the Forefront of Iraqi Politics affairs only occasionally, al-Hakim did not want to jeopardise his independence by associating his name with partisan politics.33 With these considerations in mind, he instructed his sons to leave the party in 1960. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was requested to do the same.34 The Hizb alDa‘wa grew under an increasingly lay leadership afterwards, but ties with the marja‘iyya of Najaf were not completely cut off. Many party members were Muhsin al-Hakim’s wukala’, while other activists were also involved in the educational projects established under his patronage. ‘Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim created a social environment for [political] change, but this context was lost after his death.’35 Although this quotation idealises the role the Iraqi marja‘ was willing to play in bringing about change, it encapsulates well the loss of momentum of clerical politics in Najaf after 1970. The new leader of the hawza was Abu al-Qasim alKhu’i. He opted for caution in the face of the Iraqi state, an attitude widely shared in the seminaries as well as among the al-Hakim bayt now led by Muhsin al-Hakim’s oldest son, Yusif. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr believed in an active marja‘iyya. However, out of respect for the higher leadership of al-Khu’i and also in order to consolidate his own position as a source of emulation, he did not go against the current.36 State repression against Shi‘i Islamists, among whom were his students in the Hizb al-Da‘wa, further explains his hesitant course of action in this period, as illustrated by his fatwa of 1974 forbidding clerics and students in the religious sciences to join political parties.37 While Najaf as a whole did not renounce its attitude of caution, al-Sadr was eventually emboldened at the end of the decade to defy the Iraqi regime more openly. Not only did he express support for the Iranian revolution but he also declared membership of the Ba‘th Party illegal. He did not back down under government pressure and it was while under house arrest, a few months before his execution, that he is said to have issued a verbal fatwa enjoining: every Muslim in Iraq and every Iraqi outside of Iraq to do whatever he can, even if it costs him his life, to continue the jihad and the struggle in order to remove this nightmare from the land of the beloved Iraq, liberate themselves from this inhuman gang and establish a righteous, respectable and honourable rule based on Islam.38

Al-Sadr’s uncompromising stance in the face of oppression made him a most enduring symbol of clerical opposition to the Ba‘th regime and the ayatullah’s deeds in life gave legitimacy to the radicalisation of those invoking his political legacy after his death – whom nothing short of regime change would stop. 131

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Guardians of Shi‘ism

Opposing Baghdad in Exile Along with its radicalisation, the Islamic opposition to the Iraqi regime had evolved by 1980 from a home-grown movement to a largely expatriate one. To be precise, its transnationalisation started as early as the coming to power of the Ba‘th Party in 1968, mainly because of the forced departure of clerical and lay activists from Iraq, until many more left a decade later to escape unparalleled state persecution. The exiles did not follow a single trajectory of relocation elsewhere. The transnational experience of al-Hakim family members, starting with Mahdi al-Hakim’s departure in 1969 and followed by that of his brothers Muhammad Baqir and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz in 1980, is representative of the opportunity structures of different times and places in which the Shi‘i opposition operated during the long years up to regime change in 2003. THE LIMITS OF EXILE POLITICS IN THE 1970S '#$![†œ†™ Ž   

}>&&` al-Hakim has the capacity of leadership and respect from all the Iraqi Shi‘i leaders . . . [who], until Sayyid Mahdi al-Hakim makes a sign, will . . . not be ready to take action.’39   |  ?ŒX%@ %}  poor political record in his early exile. No matter his aura among other Iraqi activists, the conditions for action against the Ba‘th regime were not ripe for most of the decade. This inaction owed in part to the lack of opportunities in his place of residence. In Dubai, the exiled cleric found a state ready to host him, yet he made a tacit agreement with Shaykh Rashid that he would not engage in oppositional activities against Baghdad from Emirati territory.40 Although the conservative ruling elites of the newly established UAE did not have good diplomatic relations with the radical Ba‘th-led republic, such a small and weak country could not afford to antagonise Iraq. Monarchical Iran was a more powerful regional actor with a motivation, in the context of its dispute with Baghdad over the Shatt al-‘Arab border issue, to engage the Iraqi opposition. Mahdi al-Hakim was in regular contact with the Iranian regime. Whenever he visited the country and met }   [ } `%%„% [   attention to the oppression of Iraqi Shi‘a.41 Although it is unclear what he expected in concrete terms, he was disheartened that ‘Iran [did] not help rescue Iraq’.42 Tehran might have been content to exploit its ties with al-Hakim to put pressure on Baghdad. This is at least what happened when 132

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A Family at the Forefront of Iraqi Politics the SAVAK advised publicising the news of one of his visits to Iran, in complete disregard of the cleric’s preference for keeping information about his whereabouts secret.43 The opportunity for a more solid plan of action arose in early 1974. Mahdi al-Hakim received information from a contact in Dubai that Jordan was ready to support a plot against the Ba‘th regime with Iraqi groups inside and outside the country – relations between Amman and Baghdad, which had started to sour after the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, were at a low point at that time.44 Al-Hakim travelled to Tehran to discuss the matter with the Iranian authorities before making his way to Jordan for a meeting with King Hussein. Muhammad Reza Shah, he was able to report, was inclined to cooperate; the next step should be a meeting in Tehran between the Iranian and Jordanian monarchs. Al-Hakim also ;    &   %   % X      †%%* Œ asked King Hussein to appoint another intermediary, saying that he would come back only when necessary.45 It is not clear what happened after this meeting. In any event, the plot was not carried out and, a year later, Iran signed the Algiers Agreement with Iraq, thereby renouncing interference, at least formally, in the internal affairs of its neighbour.  & ` ?ŒX%@ &}& %'_%    that his approach to exile politics took into consideration the states he   *  X 

 }

       of respect for the geopolitical priorities of Dubai, his host country. Instead of organising operations by the Iraqi opposition itself, moreover, he preferred to develop relations with the states seemingly willing to act against Baghdad. All in all, and because opportunities were limited, the early transnationalisation of the Iraqi Islamic movement did not result in much action against the Ba‘th regime. THE IRANIAN CONNECTION IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA The regional impact of the Iranian revolution, exacerbated by the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War, had important implications for the transnationalisation of the Iraqi Shi‘i movement. As a result of increased pressure from the Ba‘th regime, clerical and lay activists left the country en masse. Those already in exile, for instance in the Gulf monarchies, were often also forced to relocate. Iran was a top destination with several arguments in its favour. ' }%} %% [     

  &[ to seeing Saddam Hussein gone. More practically, no other country in the region, with the exception of Syria, was willing to host Iraqi opposition groups. Iran also allowed them to militarise, with its long border with Iraq 133

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Guardians of Shi‘ism being a strategic point of access for incursions into the Shi‘i-populated marshes area of the south. Equally important was the presence in the country of a large community of Iraqi refugees, and soon POWs, who could be mobilised in support of the opposition.46 Yet Iranian hospitality came with strings attached. Some Iraqi activists and their groups were willing to accept the risk of a relationship of dependence on the host state. Others, and increasingly so, sought to keep their distance, either physically or politically. The Iranian connection, or the lack thereof, was clearly an important variable shaping the evolution of Iraqi Islamist groups in the #$~#$$~[}      &* Mahdi al-Hakim typically represents those elements of the Shi‘i oppo    %    '|*† & February 1979, he made the trip to Tehran to congratulate Khomeini on the success of the revolution, yet he opted for London when he had to leave Dubai and search for a new place of residence. The distance he wished to maintain from the Islamic Republic had mainly to do with the way he envisioned the conduct of oppositional politics. He did not favour the scenario of an Islamic revolution under Khomeini’s leadership. Rather, he aspired to organising a movement that would include all political forces, not only the Islamists: ‘He was not an Islamic leader only; he was an Iraqi leader.’47 To advance the Iraqi cause, al-Hakim also wanted the opposition to talk to everybody, Western powers included. For the '[>}

 ?%@[% }     in the early 1980s were considered an ‘unforgivable sin’.48 Had he settled in Iran, the Islamic Republic would not have allowed him to conduct his political activities as he wished; this is at least what his former associate, Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulum, acknowledged implicitly when explaining that ‘in no other country than the UK was there so much freedom of action’.49 Moreover, the political system Mahdi al-Hakim envisioned for Iraq was not Khomeini’s model: From the Islamic perspective, governments have two aspects. One relates to the executive side, or rather the social structure of the government and the other relates to the shari‘a or Islamic law. Islam maintains that shari‘a law belongs to God and that He alone makes laws for [His] creations. As regards the executive side, this belongs to [the] people; therefore the government should be elected by them. Accordingly, the ideal government is one which is elected by the people and applies the laws of Allah [in] society.50

There is no mention in his explanation of a special position for the ‘ulama’, and   %  % %   ?ŒX%    134

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A Family at the Forefront of Iraqi Politics establishment in Iraq of an Islamic state under clerical rule. Rather, he insisted on two principles: popular freedom and respect for Islam (as well as the country’s other creeds).51 If the Iraqi cleric was keen on maintaining his political independence from Iran, the Islamic Republic also had its share of grievances against him. Al-Hakim’s past caught up with him when the newly established regime found the many SAVAK reports detailing his sustained contacts with the Iranian monarchy during the 1970s. While the cleric could probably have secured forgiveness for his need to enter this relationship out of expediency given the circumstances of his exile, there was little to argue in the face of irrefutable evidence of his anti-Khomeini stance in the prerevolutionary era.52 No ill-feeling was expressed publicly by the Islamic Republic, but one informant recalls that whenever Mahdi al-Hakim landed in Tehran, he was put through excessive checking at security on purpose.53 Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim sought to mend fences between his brother and Khomeini and he arranged, to this end, a reconciliatory meeting between the two men in 1987.54 One year later, Mahdi al-Hakim was assassinated by agents of the Iraqi regime in the Sudan and it was to Iran that his corpse was repatriated, for burial in the Fatima Masumah Shrine in Qum. Contrasting with Mahdi al-Hakim’s uneasy relationship with the Islamic Republic was the readiness of his brothers Muhammad Baqir and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz to place their opposition movement under Iranian patronage. The inclination of the Islamic Republic to support them needs to be  [ }*'[   %}  }  %  entry into Iran in 1980, one could not have easily foreseen that they would    }   }       *      &  was certainly not the result of a long-established amity. It is worth taking a look back at the pre-revolutionary era when Khomeini was spending his exile in Najaf. The al-Hakim family had not been his greatest admirers. As the head of the Iraqi hawza in the 1960s, Muhsin al-Hakim kept his Iranian colleague at a distance and his political activism in check. After the death of the family’s patriarch in 1970, the al-Hakim bayt were no more supportive of Khomeini. They did not recognise his claim to the marja‘iyya, preferring to endorse Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i. They were not interested either in his political leadership, and there is no evidence that even Muhammad _ ?ŒX%[ % &@%  

 

& [} touch with him.55 The lack of commitment the al-Hakim family had shown towards Khomeini’s religious and political leadership could have had negative implications in the longer term. It is therefore somewhat puzzling that, 135

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Guardians of Shi‘ism among the many Iraqi exiled ‘ulama’, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim came to exercise such a key role in the Iran-sponsored SCIRI. Khomeini, who is said to have supervised each appointment in the organisation, offered him the position of chairman at the time of its creation56 – yet, a differ  %  }           } & }  `% al-Hashimi acting as chairman and al-Hakim as spokesman. The reasons     *† ?ŒX%   of his family name to work in his favour. As the son of a former Iraqi marja‘ who incidentally had a political record against the Ba‘th regime,       %&   '„'*   }      }  any existing political group, moreover, he was perhaps expected to be more amenable to serving Iranian interests in his conduct of oppositional politics than his counterparts in the Al-Da‘wa Party and the Islamic Action Organisation. The Iranian regime was right to bet on Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. Under his leadership, SCIRI became the Iraqi opposition group most committed to the Iranian host, even when the Islamic Republic’s pursuit of its own political interests did nothing to help the struggle against the Ba‘th regime. The Iran–Iraq War, the Gulf crisis of 1990–1 and the subsequent decade up to regime change in Baghdad provide the background to understanding how this organisation handled its Iranian connection. The Islamic Republic had a strategic interest in sponsoring the creation of SCIRI in 1982. Recent developments on the war fronts, in particular the success of Iran’s July offensive in southern Iraq, required more than before     '_' %        ing Khomeini’s leadership. The objective was to be ready for the eventuality that a new government could be soon established in a liberated Basra. In the meantime, the Islamic Republic also needed support for its war effort. Criticism had been mounting among Iraqi groups against its decision to enter Iraqi lands after regaining its territories. In contrast, SCIRI readily backed its host: the Iranian army was only a liberating force, the  |  > } '_% % %  the one hand, and the Muslim people of Iraq and Iran on the other’.57 How could SCIRI nevertheless justify the suffering of the Iraqi people until the day of liberation? Its stance during the ‘war of the cities’ was remarkable. `%%_ ?ŒX%}    '

  & for not retaliating against the bombing of its cities.58 The situation changed in February 1984, however, when Tehran also launched attacks on Iraqi urban centres. Al-Hakim easily fell into line, stating that the ‘Iraqi people welcomed Iran’s decision for retaliatory measures’ and ‘believed that this action should continue until Saddam regime’s complete downfall’.59 136

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A Family at the Forefront of Iraqi Politics Unsurprisingly, SCIRI also supported the Islamic Republic on the diplomatic front. Iranian calls for the removal of the Iraqi regime as a necessary         }    &   }    } * Commenting on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 598 when it was issued in 1987, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim made sure to echo Tehran’s criticism that the text failed to name Iraq as the aggressor and condemn its use of chemical weapons. He was also inclined to ‘Iraqicise’ his discourse, adding that the Ba‘th regime did not represent the Iraqi Muslim people whose will was not taken into consideration in the resolution.60 Going beyond simple rhetoric, SCIRI offered military support to the Iranian war effort. To this end, it established the Badr Corps (Faylaq Badr), a name that recalled the battle fought by Prophet Muhammad and his companions in 624 against the unbelieving merchants of Mecca. Iraqi  }  ' 

    %  summer of 1983. They participated in regular military campaigns through     | [ }   }   

? &    inside Iraq also helped release pressure from the main fronts.61 Moreover, the Islamic Republic could use the Badr Corps as a psychological weapon to demoralise the Iraqi army and population, while boosting spirits at home. The end of the Iran–Iraq War dealt a severe blow to any hope of an imminent regime change in Baghdad. SCIRI did not publicly express its disappointment, however. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, who did not apparently get prior notice of Khomeini’s intention to accept UNSC „

  "$[   }      @[> % @ ‘resistance forces’. For a larger grassroots movement to take hold, and this was SCIRI’s privileged scenario for regime change, the international community only had to provide it with the protection it needed, in addition to possibly some logistical support. Eight years after the failed intifada of 1991, the repression of the popular unrests that followed the regime’s execution of the Iraqi ayatullah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr was yet another missed opportunity in this regard. As Hamid al-Bayati despaired, in a dis } †%     % What did the U.S. do? Instead of focusing on what was taking place in Iraq, they had given the green light to Saddam to brutally suppress these movements by setting down only four red lines not to be crossed: developing ‡`Ž[ X   [   ?|& [ Xing Kurdistan.120 145

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Guardians of Shi‘ism —            “~~ } } % &  —[ '„' relentlessly insisted on the role the Iraqi people could play against their regime. Advocacy also entailed the task for SCIRI to earn international recognition for itself as a political force to be reckoned with for both the overthrow of the Ba‘th regime and participation in a post-Saddam polity. As an organisation born in exile, proving that it enjoyed the loyalty of Iraqis was critical. Any article of Iraq Update reporting a visit by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim to a refugee camp or an opposition’s military base stressed how SCIRI’s leader was hailed and praised by the crowd. The roots of the reverence felt for his leadership – his status as a descendant of Prophet Muhammad, his family’s reputation, as well as his own religious   %&€};   ‡ *    were persuasive enough. The description President Bill Clinton made of SCIRI when naming it as one of the seven opposition groups eligible to receive American assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) of 1998 speaks for itself: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq is a mass movement with primarily Shia Arab – but also Sunni Arab and other – supporters. Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a spiritual guide for millions of Iraqis, is its elected leader . . . its position among the Shia of southern Iraq would make this list incomplete without it.121

Making reference to SCIRI’s views concerning a future political system in Iraq, Clinton added: ‘It espouses the creation of a democratic, constitutional government that respects the rule of law. It advocates free speech, a free press and equal rights for women and members of minority groups.’122 The Tehran-based organisation had clearly gone a long way since the time when Hamid al-Bayati had to face the candid question of his Western contacts about its political orientation: ‘Is it connected to the Iranian Islamic Revolution?’123 At the time of its creation, SCIRI had made no secret that Khomeini’s model of governance would be implemented in Iraq, arguing that, free to choose their preferred form of government, the Iraqi people, including the ‘Sunni brothers’, would want an Islamic one following the ‘line of the wilayat al-faqih’.124 As for the practicalities, Iraq would have its own executive and consultative assemblies, but would share the same faqih as Iran.125 A pamphlet, probably written by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim in the mid-1990s and analysed in more detail by Reidar Visser, reasserted the necessity of a sole leader, also recognising ‘Ali Khamana’i as the wali amr al-muslimin (Guardian of the Muslims).126 146

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A Family at the Forefront of Iraqi Politics SCIRI was nonetheless ready to downplay its adherence to the Iranian model. Because Hamid al-Bayati was in the front line of his organisation’s political movement in the West, he understood well the need to offer reassurance that the Islamic opposition did not seek to turn Iraq into another '*'}[ _ '„'@%&  

? &   %>' %„

  @*' 

&  isation kept its name until 2007, al-Bayati obtained permission to refer to it for his outreach activities as ‘The Supreme Council for the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’.127 More substantially, SCIRI started to advance a political programme for the future of Iraq that would be acceptable to the West. Terms such as free elections and liberal parliamentary democracy entered its vocabulary. In answer to those sceptical of the Islamists’ readiness to establish democracy, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim argued simply that the Shi‘a, who represented the majority in Iraq, had no reason to oppose it.128„      |   ' % Republic in the country. Its efforts to downplay its Iranian connection were also motivated by competition with its main political contender, the  * %  “~~!   }  * Muqtada al-Sadr, who had always disparaged the formerly exiled organisation of being Tehran’s puppet while advocating his own Iraqi nationalist credentials, had himself moved to Iran at the beginning of the year. The doubts his relocation was casting on his independence from the Iranian regime constituted an opportunity for SCIRI to assert its own distancing from its former host. All in all, SCIRI/ISCI’s ideological commitment to the Islamic Republic, or the self-representation the organisation made of it, proved to  &|; € %      & X 

& altogether.185|;  &[  %     &  cal public-relations campaign to win the hearts and minds of Iraqi Shi‘a, might have been transformative at a deeper level, not only at the surface. The question of the allegiance to Iran contributed, among other factors, to growing tensions within ISCI, which culminated in the 2012 split by the more Iran-oriented Badr Organisation. Dissention was already palpable in 2010 over the re-election of Nuri al-Maliki to the prime ministership: Hadi al-‘Amiri, the head of the Badr Organisation, supported it in line with Iranian preferences, while the al-Hakim faction opposed it.186 After the split, fewer Iranian funds, if any at all, were reportedly channelled to ISCI.187 In addition to the issue of SCIRI’s Iranian connection, its relationship with the US had the potential to taint its national loyalty. A major dilemma facing all societal and political forces in the post-Saddam Iraq was to decide what stance to take vis-à-vis the occupying power. Cooperation was a ticket for a place in the US-appointed governing institutions and     & | %X  }

 &*’ [

  an association with an ill-perceived foreign occupation could be costly in terms of popular opinion. Though SCIRI denounced the occupation and also endorsed peaceful resistance against it,188 it did not shun contact with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by Paul Bremer. ‘There is a difference between cooperation and demanding rights,’ it insisted.189 These rights entailed the quick handover of power to the Iraqis in the  %    % [     ?  [  % * „|   his organisation’s attempted negotiations with the CPA with regard to the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council (13 July 2003–28 June 2004) 157

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Guardians of Shi‘ism and the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG, 28 June 2004–3 May 2005), Hamid al-Bayati explained: In 2003, we had suggested that Paul Bremer and his team hold elections for the Governing Council . . ., but they refused. We next suggested organizing a conference in each province to elect representatives to a general conference in Baghdad that would choose the members of the Governing Council. Bremer again refused . . . In 2004 we suggested elections for the Iraqi government, which would receive sovereignty in June 2004. Bremer said it was not feasible to hold the elections . . .190

Clearly, SCIRI’s demands were not met. Nonetheless, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz alHakim readily joined the IGC, also acting as one of its rotating presidents. '„'  [}

%%     @   parties, later served on the IIG. More generally, SCIRI displayed a great ability to ‘anticipate the preferences of the hegemonic power’ in order to strengthen its position as the Americans’ favourite Shi‘i party.191 While the Al-Da‘wa Party also participated in the US-appointed Iraqi governments, the more ardently anti-American Muqtada al-Sadr used the opportunity of his exclusion from the IGC to stand out on a Shi‘i street increasingly resentful at the occupation. He was not shy to discredit the Iraqi council, calling it a toy at the hands of the US and its members ‘unbelievers’.192 The American connection continued to fuel heated rhetoric after an Iraqi government was elected in 2005. Illustrative is the war of words waged by the Sadrists and ISCI around ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim’s visit to Washington in November 2007. For the former, the visit was ‘the manifestation of submission to tyranny and injustice’.193 ‘Are not we supposed to go and express our views in order that these views push for the right decisions which serve all the Iraqis?’, ‘Ammar al-Hakim retorted in defence of his father, while also referring to the Qur’anic injunction that prophets and messengers talk to everybody.194 Presenting itself as the defender of Iraqis was SCIRI/ISCI’s line of argument to justify its political choices.       &  %   > 

    [   }    important for each contender to claim a direct connection to the people they sought to represent. In the view of the Sadrist quoted earlier, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim lacked such a connection for he had not shared the suffering endured by the Iraqis under Ba‘thist rule. Blaming those who had |   &   &  ;   &% back in 2003 was indeed a leitmotiv of the Sadrist movement. Muqtada al-Sadr could put forward his family’s persecution at the hands of the regime, starting with his cousin and father-in-law Muhammad Baqir and 158

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A Family at the Forefront of Iraqi Politics continuing with his father Muhammad Sadiq and other relatives. Not to be outdone, SCIRI/ISCI had at its disposal the al-Hakim family’s capital of victimhood. In this regard, the symbolic narratives produced in exile on the theme of persecution came in handy for reuse at home. Once he joined the long list of the family’s shuhada’, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, alias the Martyr of the Pulpit, became a new potent symbol to be exploited.  &[       >† ?>† ?ŒX% % &? X[     *195 The al-Hakim family’s history of martyrdom was given a symbolic meaning of Iraqiness in order to strengthen SCIRI/ISCI’s national credentials. The iconography produced around this theme would typically include an Iraq country shape. One such example was a poster showing the drawing of a tree on the branches of which hung the pictures of the dozens of martyred family members, a tree seemingly having its roots in the Iraq drawn at the bottom.196 In addition to the visual, other forms of symbolic medium were exploited too. For instance, the title ‘aziz al-‘iraq – a pun on >† ?>† ?ŒX%@ %%   '_€} conveniently used to refer to the deceased. Moreover, a practice already tested in exile was to emphasise the alHakim family’s common experience of suffering with the Iraqi people. The holding of the Iraqi Martyr Day served this purpose well. In 2012, a news brief posted on the website of ISCI’s chairman ‘Ammar al-Hakim declared: The commemoration of the Iraqi Martyr Day has passed by, the memory of the martyrdom of the Martyr of the Niche [Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim], and of the departure of Iraq’s Aziz [‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim], the day when we bring to memory all Iraq’s martyrs who fell prey to the former despotic dictatorial regime and the victims of terrorism . . .197

Because the al-Hakim family’s record of martyrdom did not end with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein but grew longer with the killing of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim in a bomb attack attributed to Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, SCIRI/ISCI was in a position to claim this symbolic connection to both the victims of the Ba‘th regime and of terrorist violence in the post-2003 era. As such, the capital of victimhood it could call upon even surpassed that of Muqtada al-Sadr’s whose relatives were martyred under the former regime. The competition between the two families’ sacred history of persecution also explains why, as already discussed in Chapter 3 when reviewing the dissemination of symbols through charity, SCIRI/ISCI stopped affording visibility to the martyred Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and this in sharp contrast to its massive reliance on this emblematic symbol during the years of exile. 159

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Guardians of Shi‘ism The mobilising potential of the martyrdom theme was also put to the test at the polls. In the 2009 provincial elections, ISCI formed and headed an electoral list named Shahid al-Mihrab, a tribute to Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim’s legacy. The experiment was a failure. An electoral platform promoting a strong Shi‘i identity reading of politics, which the use of religious symbols such as the ‘Martyr of the Pulpit’ only reinforced, did not engage the voters’ sympathy in an Iraq slowly coming out of an exhausting civil war. While the Sadrists managed to do well enough, the main winner of the very fragmented vote was Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki of the Al-Da‘wa Party who had, with his State of Law list, put emphasis on a more secular version of Iraqi nationalism and promoted a strong centralised state as the guarantor of security.198 As this suggests, intra-Shi‘i competition was no longer over purely religion-based credentials of legitimacy. Rather than Shi‘i Iraqiness, Iraqiness tout court seemed to have become the key to success. With a repertoire of Iraqi Shi‘i symbols rendered quite obsolete, ISCI had to reinvent its language of self-representation. The contrast between the names of its coalitions for the 2009 and 2013 provincial elections is remarkable in this regard. The idea of martyrdom encapsulated in the Shahid al-Mihrab list gave way to the notion of citizenship with the establishment of the I’tilaf al-Muwatin (Citizen’s Alliance). With an electoral platform framed around issues of good governance, and also without the Badr Organisation on its list, ISCI managed a comeback after its disastrous results in 2009. Electoral                     }

 }%    

 [  & %  least a capacity to downplay religious referents for more neutral ones when needed. Examined within the background of intra-Shi‘i competition, this selective review of SCIRI/ISCI’s politics of self-representation in post-2003 Iraq     &   % &;      % Iraqiness under strain because of a long-established relationship with Iran, cooperation with the American occupying power and many years out of touch with the people it hoped to represent. To do so, it emphasised ‘Ali al-Sistani’s leadership while downplaying problematic references to the ' %„ *' ; 

  *Ž  %'_ allowed them to escape state control and to operate with more freedom of action than at home. The risk of retaliation was also minimised even though, as Mahdi al-Hakim’s assassination reminds us, no one could ever be safe. On the other hand, the political practice of the al-Hakim brothers was highly dependent on the opportunity structures of their places of exile, with the effect of either enhancing or undermining their capacity to operate. They were able to organise the opposition, rally supporters and make the Iraqi cause known internationally, but only as long as      %    }  %  |  efforts. There are many illustrations of how the state factored in. Dubai hosted Mahdi al-Hakim for nine years, asking him however to keep a low political   *Ž%

}'_ [ ' %  [   political but not military activities against Baghdad from Syrian territories. Though SCIRI was able to establish contact with the Gulf monarchies    & #$$~[        %       161

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Guardians of Shi‘ism countries. London offered a free environment for the Iraqi opposition to operate in, yet Western circles ignored its advocacy movement for many years. The case of Iran deserves closer attention. In the context of the 1969–75 diplomatic crisis between Baghdad and Tehran, Mahdi al-Hakim developed political relations with Muhammad Reza Shah and even discussed the Jordanian joint plot against Iraq. Once established, the Islamic Republic offered capacities to the Iraqi Islamic opposition like no other country would have done. The common objective to see Saddam Hussein gone during the Iran–Iraq War allowed SCIRI to develop fully its political and military activities against the Ba‘th regime. In the aftermath of the war, however, the Iraqi organisation had to accommodate the national priorities of a more pragmatist Iran, let alone the resumption of diplomatic relations between Baghdad and Tehran. At the same time, though, it could   % %              %%nity in order to internationalise its political movement. Interactions with the state not only affected the political practice of  ;         |  }   } & %  government in a post-Saddam Iraq. Mahdi al-Hakim maintained his distance from the Islamic Republic of Iran because he did not envision the replication of its system of government '_*' %    ascertain whether the British environment in which he lived had anything to do with his emphasis on popular elections, human rights and respect for all religions. Some say it did: ‘A life in the West shaped his aspirations for freedom in a Muslim state.’199 Based in Iran, the SCIRI led by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim advocated Khomeini’s doctrine of wilayat alfaqih. Internationalisation in the West nonetheless brought about changes in its discourse. Even if its calls for the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in Iraq were motivated by political expediency and the option of wilayat al-faqih was never explicitly rejected, a process of hybridisation corresponding to the geography of SCIRI’s political movement was at work. This reminds us that Islamist doctrine is not developed independently of the time and place in which it is produced and that it evolves along with political practice. The issue of place in Shi‘i politics conducted outside Iraq also raises the question of the ability of Iraqi exiles to earn popular loyalty for % *„   

}    %}  because access to them was limited. The many (Shi‘i) Iraqis who took refuge abroad because of war or deportation could more easily be turned into a loyalty base. This motivated Mahdi and Muhammad Baqir alHakim to headquarter their organisations and to open branches in cities hosting high numbers of Iraqis, such as Tehran, Damascus and London. 162

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A Family at the Forefront of Iraqi Politics SCIRI expected the refugees and the POWs captured by Iran to participate in the political and military struggle. Its efforts to mobilise them entailed the production, dissemination and ritualisation of symbols of solidarity. In addition to other universal Shi‘i themes, the organisation capitalised on the attractiveness of themes borrowed from the contemporary history of Iraqi Shi‘ism which usefully stressed the leadership role of the ‘ulama’, not only religiously but politically,   *  & were transplanted from home, and sometimes reformulated in the process, these symbols were designed to keep the idea of Iraq alive in the place of exile so that the people would continue to support the struggle for regime change. Finally, SCIRI’s return to Iraq has allowed for an assessment of the legacy of exile, with Shi‘i politics then being about obtaining the greatest portion of the share of power the Shi‘a had secured for themselves in the   ?% 

 &* ' ?> &%   ;% cally in reference to the contest over self-representation of Iraqiness. As far as SCIRI was concerned, more than twenty years spent away from  %

 _       & &*† }  %% ment to the Iranian wali-yi faqih. The organisation failed to clarify fully where it stood in this regard. At the same time, it had no problem picturing Shi‘i clerical leadership in its plurality. Already during the years of exile, its symbolic production showcased the Iraqi marja‘iyya of Muhsin al-Hakim and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Though the veneration of these   &

    ' supreme leader of the time, SCIRI/ISCI’s later acknowledgement, and to some extent promotion, of a living marja‘, ‘Ali al-Sistani, added to the ambiguity. Second, past and ongoing collaboration with the US could also engender negative perceptions in an Iraq under occupation. Nonetheless, SCIRI opted for it. To justify this, it used the same argumentative line already tested during the 1990s when it established contact with Western governments, namely that collaboration best defended the interests of the Iraqi people. Third, and more generally, SCIRI/ISCI had to rectify perceptions that a life in exile had disconnected it from the reality in which Iraqis   > %*  [ %  made by the al-Hakim family for Iraq, also linking them to the personal suffering of the Iraqi people. It is clear that self-representation does not necessarily match actual perceptions. If electoral results are any indication of the support SCIRI/ ISCI found among the Shi‘i constituency, its performance at the polls did   % %    %&   % * While the organisation performed honourably in 2005 – though not as well 163

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Guardians of Shi‘ism |    } %    % €  lost considerable ground in the following round of provincial and national elections. Its small comeback in the 2013 provincial elections might indi   [ X       % %  ?' Organisation, the departure of American troops from Iraq and the appearance of a possible secularisation of its discourse on politics, ISCI will remain a force to be reckoned with in a political context in which neither   % *

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6

Quietist Activism: Calculated Responses to Political Turmoil

Dedicating a chapter to the political history of the al-Khu’i family may surprise the reader. Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s hagiographers prefer, and rightly so, to remember the marja‘ for his scholarly and philanthropic legacy rather than for his political role. At the doctrinal level, he held the traditional view that the authority of Shi‘i jurists was limited and did not, as contended by Khomeini, pertain to all societal and political matters. Similarly, he did not regard it the duty of the men of religion to establish an Islamic state in the absence of the Hidden Imam, let alone to head it. Clerical involvement in the affairs of state was likely to be detrimental to the religious establishment. The danger of making errors was too high, and the amount of expediency, compromise and manoeuvring required to engage in worldly politics was a source of corruption.1 In clarifying the political record of the al-Khu’i family, this chapter demonstrates that clerical views advocating caution towards politics by no means implies total aloofness in practice. The belief that the interference of religion in politics is valid when Islam and Muslims are in danger induced Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i to occasionally take calculated action in their defence. This basic motive of activism, commonly invoked in the political history of the marja‘iyya[       rights in Iraq and elsewhere. While it always refused the label of a political body, the foundation emerged under the leadership of ‘Abd al-Majid al-Khu’i as a major voice in the international arena from the early 1990s. The political activities of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i and the Al-Khoei Foundation shed precious light on the methods of clerical participation. In effect, the common denominator of their respective approach to the state was a preference not to enter into direct confrontation with it. Advice and mediation, occasionally accompanied by threats, as well as international  & &[}      | states’ behaviour. Conscious political aloofness was also sometimes required to avoid manipulation by governments. 165

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Guardians of Shi‘ism

A Marja‘ in the Midst of Iranian and Iraqi Politics The consolidation of Muhammad Reza Shah’s authoritarian rule, the accession of the Ba‘th regime to power in Baghdad in 1968, the coming of the Iranian revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic,   ?&  |   } '  '_[  }

   ‰   and its aftermath – the thirty years of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s marja‘iyya witnessed many political upheavals. In broad terms, al-Khu’i expressed concern about state policies in Iran and Iraq in the early 1960s, yet insisted on the ‘political neutralization’ of the hawza of Najaf in relation to Tehran and Baghdad in the 1970s and 1980s,2 while he engaged in political acts in the context of the Gulf crisis and the popular uprising of March 1991. A more detailed account will clarify that his approach to Iranian and Iraqi 

 }      %   X    political caution and activism. STATE–CLERGY RELATIONS AT A DISTANCE The Iranian revolution prompted scholars to explore the nature of state–clergy relations from the time Shi‘ism was declared state religion     &  #"~#* 

& }         &moon period between the Pahlavi monarchy and the religious establishment at the turn of the 1960s, the range of attitudes adopted by Iranian ‘ulama’ towards state policies has been well documented. Less known is the response of Najaf’s community of learning to developments in neighbouring Iran at the time.3 The stance of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i is 

  [    

   marja‘iyya coincided with what the Islamic Republic’s historiography has called the nahzat-i islami (Islamic movement) under Khomeini’s aegis. The discussion of his political attitude up to the revolution, which also includes some references to Muhsin al-Hakim’s stance in the 1960s, offers a transnational perspective on this important page of Iranian history. It also provides the background for a consideration of the relationship between al-Khu’i’s marja‘iyya and the Islamic Republic of Iran afterwards. The deterioration of state–clergy relations in Iran in the early 1960s took place against the backdrop of the monarchy’s modernisation policies. The White Revolution of the Shah and the People was a source of anxiety for the clerical establishment at large. The proposed reforms were not only considered un-Islamic, they also directly threatened the religious and social status of the ‘ulama’. Accordingly, the high-ranking scholars of Najaf were ready to express their dissatisfaction. In the autumn of 166

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Calculated Responses to Political Turmoil 1962, with Muhsin al-Hakim also following suit, Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i denounced a new law for the election of local councils that recognised equality between men and women on the one hand, and Muslims and nonMuslims on the other.4 After objecting to the holding of a referendum on the White Revolution’s programme in early 1963,5 his next political act was a religious edict declaring participation in the elections for the twenty  %  } *6 Al-Khu’i was also wary of what he called the Baha’i and Zionist domination of Iranian society and government, and he personally warned Muhammad Reza Shah against the enrolment of so many members of these communities in the state apparatus.7 The clerical establishment of Iraq did not remain indifferent to the two landmark events of 1963 once Khomeini started to radicalise the religious opposition to the Iranian monarchy. They denounced the regime’s bloody attack on Qum’s Fayziyya School which was perpetrated in March in response to the stance Khomeini had taken against the celebrations of the Iranian New Year. Muhsin al-Hakim also sent a telegram to the leading ayatullahs of Iran in which he advised them to travel – migrate – to Najaf so that he could pronounce his view.8 The meaning of his initiative is subject to opposing interpretations – confrontational and accommodationist. One says that it was evidence of al-Hakim’s opposition to the Iranian regime because clerical migration is a politically loaded act; the shah would be forced to accept the demands of the religious scholars if they all came to Iraq to take a concerted stance.9 The second interpretation holds that al-Hakim’s proposal suited the monarchy; proof of this was Tehran’s readiness to facilitate the ayatullahs’ journey to Najaf, were they to go.10 Khomeini probably held the latter view since he persuaded his colleagues to decline the offer.11 Similarly, in June, Khomeini’s arrest and the repression of the 15 Khurdad uprising that followed did not go unnoticed in Najaf. Muhsin al-Hakim expressed his ‘strong disapproval’ of the incident.12 At that time, rumours circulated on the Iranian streets that he would declare jihad against the monarchy or a general strike if Khomeini were not quickly set free.13 One should not read too much into these rumours. Al-Hakim did not seek to rebel against, but rather to advise, the Iranian monarchy. Whenever he felt the need to express his concern at its behaviour, he sent a telegram addressed to Ayatullah Ashtiyani in Tehran, knowing well that the SAVAK would read it. He purposely used non-confrontational lan[ X  }%     *14 Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i was also preoccupied by the situation, as attested by the many messages he sent to Iran, either directly to Muhammad Reza Shah and the prime minister, or to his colleagues in Qum.15 He denounced 167

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Guardians of Shi‘ism the events of March and June 1963, requested the release of Khomeini and other imprisoned ‘ulama’, and seemed ready to internationalise the cause: ‘We have agreed in this period to make the oppressed and injured voice of Iran resonate abroad; gradually the Islamic countries and the countries outside will know the truth about conditions in Iran.’16 His activism even apparently owed him a warning from the Iranian ambassador to Iraq that he should ‘lower his note’.17 Khomeini was exiled to Turkey the following year, a new development that also warranted a reaction from al-Khu’i, though not as strongly as before.18 Muhsin al-Hakim for his part wrote to Qum saying how unfortunate it was that the Iranian ayatullahs had not taken his earlier advice to come to Najaf.19 The concealed resentment transpiring from his missive indicates that he was not inclined to intercede on Khomeini’s behalf. Nonetheless, al-Hakim continued until the end of his life to mediate with the Iranian authorities and, for instance, obtained the release of several political prisoners.20 As this suggests, the high-ranking scholars of Iraq had their share of concern about the Iranian monarchy, which they expressed whenever necessary. Unlike Khomeini, however, they preferred to adopt a diplomatic approach to political activism through advice and mediation rather than overt confrontation with the state. If it were to fail, an opposition movement contained the risk of leading to more repression for which the clerical leadership would be blamed by the people. The future of Iran without Muhammad Reza Shah was another source of anxiety. A power vacuum, it was thought, would allow a communist takeover, a scenario that constituted a bigger threat to Islam than the monarchy’s modernisation policies.21]     } 

  |      *    % [}%   identify the channels it used to encourage international recognition. The foundation’s role in the political affairs of Iraq and other countries will then be considered. THE CHANNELS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM To establish its presence in the international arena, the Al-Khoei Foundation adopted the lobbying approach used by any other Western NGO. With its headquarters in London and a branch in New York, the foundation could capitalise on its physical proximity to the world’s centres of policy-making. It made contact through correspondence and face-to% }  †%  [}  %  Western, Arab and Muslim states to the UK and the UN, and with nongovernmental human rights organisations. In initiating contact with the international community, the foundation also resorted to the marja‘iyya’s informal mode of communication through its transnational network. It opted for this approach with the Jordanian monarchy. One of the members of its board of trustees, Mustafa Gokal, was an acquaintance of Princess Sarvath, Prince Hasan’s Pakistani wife. He contacted her, saying that Majid al-Khu’i was about to send a letter that required her husband’s full attention. She replied that Prince Hasan expected the cleric to bring it in person. Al-Khu’i and Gokal travelled to Jordan and, after preliminary discussions with the prince, they were granted an audience with King Hussein.80 The latter visited the Al-Khoei Foundation in London not long afterwards to pay his respects when Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i passed away.81 These meetings paved the way for a durable relationship between the foundation and the Jordanian monarchy which not only revolved around political issues but, as already discussed, also led to their joint project to restore the shrine of Karak. From the start, the international work of the Al-Khoei Foundation      X ‡     177

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Guardians of Shi‘ism the Shi‘a. In its view, the 1991 intifada in Iraq had failed to attract external support because world opinion associated Shi‘ism with fanaticism, violence and terrorism. If such perceptions were not to change, any attempt to gain recognition for Shi‘i issues would be frustrated. The international community should learn that moderate Shi‘i voices existed and that the Al-Khoei Foundation was one of them.82 It was precisely to serve this objective that the foundation ran two monthly magazines. Dialogue (in English and an abridged version in French) was ‘a platform for informed comments on various issues, a sort

 > X? X@* '     >       [ |  their aspirations and presented ideas about protecting them from oppressive governments. Its target audience was Western governments, Muslim embassies in the West, the media, international and non-governmen     [  ?     %*      started at 1,200 in 1991 and went up to 3,000 copies until the publication was stopped in 2005.83 The Arabic journal al-Nur was designed to act as a bridge between the Shi‘a and Arab nations, and also to provide a basis for intra-faith dialogue.84 In addition, the foundation hoped to shape Western public opinion through participation in the media. To this end, it regularly shared material with journalists and scrutinised every report on Iraq and the Shi‘a in order to raise attention to possible misinterpretations.85 To formalise its international role, the Al-Khoei Foundation also sought and obtained general consultative status with the UN ECOSOC.86 Its motivation was manifold: strengthen its credibility; learn about the modes of     ]‰+ %X } X%  {   the political priorities of different states; and give Shi‘i Muslims a nongovernmental, that is non-Iranian, voice in the UN.  † ?™  ƒ          ++  #$$ˆ[   without success. In anticipation of a second attempt for 1998, its Public „    +        &  %%       ]‰+ %%   &*'  [ } concern with China, Cuba and India. China was ideologically reluctant to see a religious NGO gain access to the UN. The problem for Cuba stemmed from its foreign policy preoccupations: Washington endorsed the foundation’s application, a strong enough motive for Havana to take the opposite stance. India claimed that the foundation did not repre  

 ` %     †  *        Nadim Kazmi, himself a Pakistani, counter-argued that they ran projects in South Asia while the foundation’s board of trustees also included Pakistanis. Several states also backed the Al-Khoei Foundation behind the scenes. The Egyptian and Jordanian missions to the UN in New York 178

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Calculated Responses to Political Turmoil lobbied on its behalf with their Arab and Muslim counterparts. Against 

 ['   &X 

&     the application. The calculation behind this intervention can be explained. The Islamic Republic was certainly not very keen on sharing its role as defender of the Shi‘a with the foundation established in Abu al-Qasim alKhu’i’s name, which moreover enjoyed Western support. Yet, the year of the vote at the ECOSOC coincided with the historic speech on Dialogue among Civilisations by President Muhammad Khatami to the UN General Assembly. At that time, promoting the access of a moderate Shi‘i voice to the international arena could serve Iranian interests. In obtaining its general consultative status, the Al-Khoei Foundation became the fourth ` %€  >€       tion for NGOs at the UN. The Centre for Academic Shi‘a Studies is a more recent initiative launched by the Al-Khoei Foundation in 2009.87 This centre works on promoting academically grounded public debates on current Shi‘i affairs |       [  } X  it has organised so far: ‘Contemporary Shi‘i Thought: Innovations, Challenges, and Future Prospects’, ‘The Shia and Modernity’, ‘The Shi‘a in the 20th & 21st Centuries’, ‘Shi‘a Perspectives’, ‘The Arab Spring: the Rise of Political Islam?’ and ‘Sectarianism in the Contemporary Islamic World’. In so doing, CASS ‘endeavours to establish itself as a consultative body that offers analytical frameworks’ for various governmental and non-governmental bodies. It also seeks to expose its Muslim audience, in particular the youth, to the thinking of academics and journalists in order to teach them how to communicate and lobby for Shi‘i issues in the West. Through these different avenues, the Al-Khoei Foundation succeeded in creating a space in which the Shi‘a could gain visibility in the international arena. Quite noteworthy is that it positioned itself as the people’s voice but without actually having them raise their own. Popular mobilisation, a channel of activism which is so central to the conduct of Shi‘i Islamist politics as discussed in the case of SCIRI, remained marginal to its advocacy movement. The explanation can be found in the Al-Khoei Foundation’s approach to the state. Rather than entering into confrontation with the governments oppressing the Shi‘a, it preferred to negotiate with them. Mass political activity, no matter how peaceful, was seen to be too visible a form of protest, let alone one often associated with so-perceived Iranian revolutionary fanaticism, so that popular mobilisation was feared to be detrimental to the foundation’s attempts at mediation. It was precisely because antagonism with the Ba‘th regime ran so high that the foundation exceptionally rallied the people on the street to 179

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Guardians of Shi‘ism denounce the situation in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Even then, the pretext of mobilisation was framed in religious, not overtly political, terms. This was due to the foundation’s need to preserve perceptions that it was apolitical, a consideration further explaining its preference to steer    

& | % 

 * † 

&  &   %% Muhammad al-Musawi in Mumbai during the 1991 Iraqi uprising aimed to ‘show the importance of the religious shrines and the importance of the marja‘iyya for the Shi‘a’.88 Moreover, when the Ba‘th regime blocked the holding of a public funeral in Iraq following the death of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, the Al-Khoei Foundation organised a procession on the streets of London as an act of protest disguised under the banner of religion. By appealing to the religious sentiments of a transnational community whose leadership was under threat in Iraq, it was able to target people more broadly than just the Iraqi Shi‘a. Afterwards, the yearly ceremony held on the anniversary of al-Khu’i’s death became the occasion to commemorate his martyred sons, Muhammad Taqi and, after 2003, ‘Abd al-Majid, as well as the thousands of victims who ended up in Saddam Hussein’s mass graves, including the ayatullah’s son Ibrahim al-Khu’i. This practice of     %%%     %   & '_ Shi‘ism into the traditional religious calendar is reminiscent of SCIRI’s approach. Regardless of the modes of activism privileged by the Al-Khoei Foundation, the development of its international movement was never unanimously accepted by the Shi‘i community.89 In response to those  }      | }

 † ?‘% ? Khu’i’s religious legacy, the London-based charity claimed to abide by the request of the late ayatullah that it should not enter politics, except to defend the rights of the Shi‘a. International lobbying, it was true, marked a departure from ‘a long held tradition by the Shi‘i clergy of Iraq of not visiting political and international institutions’.90 However, it was felt that ‘if political ties with governments are in the service of the people and the hawza and if they have humanitarian and Islamic goals, there is no problem. These ties cannot be called politics.’91 The humanitarian end,  [X  #$$ˆ}}   &*115 The Al-Khoei Foundation’s mediation took place in this context. To solve the crisis between the monarchy and its opposition diplomatically, Secretary-General Majid al-Khu’i made the most of his good relationship with both parties. On the one hand, he could capitalise on the history of friendship between the Bahraini ruling % & * &[† ?‘% ?™@  everlasting gratitude of Shaykh al-Khalifa when he supported Bahrain’s 184

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Calculated Responses to Political Turmoil independence over Iranian claims to the island in the 1960s. On the other hand, the Al-Khoei Foundation had a point of entry into the Bahraini oppo  *    %al-Nur was Majid al-‘Alawi, one of the exiled leaders of the London-based Bahrain Freedom Movement. Majid al-Khu’i’s initial achievement was a meeting he organised in the † ?™ ƒ   }   [%%       and Arab diplomats. Discussions were heated and did not result in much, &    }    %    %          %  *† ?™ ƒ   %  }  both sides. The annual sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva were the occasion for its delegates to meet with the opposition and Bahraini diplomats in order to convince them to engage in dialogue instead of attacking each other on the UN platform. Equally important was the private discussion that Majid al-Khu’i had with Shaykh ‘Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa during the funeral of King Hussein of Jordan in February 1999. He reassured the emir that the Bahraini people held no personal grudge against him; they just wanted their rights to be recognised. Al-Khu’i also sought the intercession of Prince Hasan of Jordan who was a good friend of Shaykh Hamid al-Khalifa, then Crown Prince of Bahrain.116   %   %    [&   ation in Bahrain rapidly improved when Shaykh Hamid al-Khalifa succeeded his father in March 1999. The new emir worked towards national      % &     [  

}ing the return of the exiles. He agreed to reform the country’s political system, and a referendum on a national charter providing for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy was held in February 2001. Municipal and legislative elections were organised the following year, but the main Shi‘i-dominated groups boycotted the latter after al-Khalifa unilaterally adopted a new constitution that fell short of incorporating the announced reforms.117 Majid al-‘Alawi from the Bahrain Freedom Movement nonetheless returned from his London exile to join the political process; he was appointed minister of labour in November 2002. Bahrain’s political liberalisation was limited, but the Al-Khoei Foundation chose to focus on the positive achievements and recognise them publicly as a way to encourage the al-Khalifa monarchy to carry on its efforts. A statement it delivered to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2001 described the attitude of the emir as ‘a sign that the reforms taking place would put an end to the long discrimination suffered by the Islamic opposition in the country’.118 Majid al-Khu’i also applauded the progress made in a newspaper interview and expressed the hope that the Bahraini experience would become an example for neighbouring Arab countries.119 185

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Guardians of Shi‘ism '    %

%}   } in the relationship between the ruling monarchy and its opposition, the situation deteriorated dramatically in early 2011. The Arab Spring 

%

     % % * Demonstrations started on 14 February, the day marking the ten-year anniversary of the referendum held on the national charter. Slogans were initially limited to demands for political reforms, not for the regime’s overthrow, until a section of the Shi‘i opposition radicalised the protests. Excessive use of force, sectarian propaganda and an anti-Shi‘i campaign were the response of a regime subjected to pressure from its Saudi patron and itself divided between moderate and hardline factions.120 The Al-Khoei Foundation took the Bahraini crisis to heart from the start. On the one hand, it again assumed its role of mediator through contacts with members of the ruling elite and Al-Wifaq, the country’s most powerful and moderate Shi‘i political group.121 On the other hand, the foundation became more vocal than in the past. Yusif al-Khu’i intervened in the British media to condemn the ‘general campaign against the Shia’,122 while Fadil al-Milani, the imam of the Imam Al-Khoei Islamic Centre, co-signed the ‘Statement from Scholars of Collective Islamic Centres in London to the Scholars of Al-Azhar Mosque’ denouncing the situation in Bahrain.123 The foundation also participated, though not in its own name, in the creation of Justice for Bahrain, a UK-based pressure group formed in March 2011.

Conclusion In clarifying the political record of the al-Khu’i family, this chapter has  %           >      %   terms of the basic dichotomy between quietism and activism is misleading. Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i advocated the non-interference of clerics in political affairs, yet his life was punctuated by several acts in response      *    

        &  political message, if one were to interpret his overall silence of the 1980s as a means to resist pressure from Tehran and Baghdad and foil their attempts to instrumentalise his fame. Moreover, the marja‘iyya can be quiet in one place, at the centre for instance, but vocal elsewhere through its transnational network. At the time when al-Khu’i endured harsh criticism by Iranian radicals for his neutral stance towards the Iran–Iraq War, Lebanese Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah took the opportunity of a trip to Qum to give a speech in defence of his former teacher.124 The ayatullah’s family and representatives outside Iraq were also instrumental in refuting 186

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Calculated Responses to Political Turmoil Ba‘thist propaganda claiming that Saddam Hussein had the support of the marja‘. The stance adopted by the Al-Khoei Foundation towards politics is     &} 

   %*† non-political entity in principle, this charitable organisation positioned itself as the advocacy voice of the Shi‘a of Iraq and elsewhere, a role which, it claimed, did not contradict the view on religion and politics

    * '    %} nessed a growth of new institutionalised forms for the exercise of clerical leadership, they do not seek to position themselves as an alternative to the traditional religious establishment but as a continuation of it. 197

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Guardians of Shi‘ism The other theme taken from the sacred histories of the al-Hakim and al-Khu’i families was a record of persecution. Mirroring the martyrdom

'%%Œ&      >%[ %&  families was a powerful symbol to be exploited. SCIRI initially used the tragic fate of the al-Hakim family to mobilise Iraqis in the struggle against the Ba‘th regime. Like most liberation movements in the Middle East and elsewhere, it turned its martyrs into national heroes and presented them as models to emulate. The irony was that, while the organisation insisted that the family members detained and executed in Iraq were apolitical, it turned them into a symbol with high political salience. Once the struggle was over, SCIRI/ISCI continued to rely on the al-Hakim family’s capital of victimhood, this time in order to attest to its Iraqiness. A practice already tested in exile was to emphasise that its leadership shared a common history of persecution and suffering with the Iraqi people by organising commemoration ceremonies in the memory of all. Though not as strongly as SCIRI, the Al-Khoei Foundation also tried to create a direct link between the persecution of the al-Khu’i family and that of Iraqi Shi‘a with a yearly event held in the memory of Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, his martyred sons and the thousands of victims who ended up in Iraqi mass graves. Overall, the thematic power of a family history based on the marja‘iyya and suffering serves clerical authority because of the temporal endurance, yet malleability, of historical narratives of sacredness. Al-Hakim and al-Khu’i family members worked at keeping alive the memory and legacy of their emblematic relatives in order to make the passage of time insig    } %    &*& %%%     of these personalities every year, published their biographies and named philanthropic projects after them. Family history is also made to travel across borders so that it can bestow its sacred meaning in the transnational sphere. This is why Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim found it important, in his Iranian exile, to revive the marja‘iyya of his father by naming the religious college he established in Qum after the Dar al-Hikma School built in Najaf on his father’s behalf in 1968. History eventually came full circle after 2003 when the Al-Hakim Foundation restored the original school in the Iraqi shrine city. The second feature of clerical authority has to do with its visibility. Marks of authority are often put on display, a common practice to sustain leadership claims across borders. Pictures, biographies, websites or Facebook pages, project naming and commemorations, all are means to promote and maintain fame. Given the importance of interpersonal ties for authority, those who derive their legitimacy from lineage to a 198

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Conclusion %   }}

    *' }    that SCIRI regularly published in its press pictures of the members of its central committee posing with their late mentor, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Acts from which authority is claimed are also made visible, such    ?ŒX%@     X            relentless efforts of his Organisation for Human Rights in Iraq in focusing public attention on the Ba‘th regime’s inhumane treatment of its people. In general terms, the practice of granting visibility to clerical leadership explains its increasingly widespread institutionalisation in religious, charitable and political organisations. Visibility can help clerics to secure mutually reinforcing recognition from both the community and the state. SCIRI’s ability to mobilise Iraqi refugees and POWs in its political demonstrations and military corps was evidence that the exile organisation enjoyed their support. It publicised signs of popular loyalty for the attention of the international community in order to attest to its credibility as a functional alternative to the Ba‘th regime. By the same token, SCIRI made its advocacy efforts on the inter   X }  '_   &  %   } X to heart the defence of their rights. Visibility can nonetheless be problematic. For the state, too open manifestations of Shi‘i transnational activity on its territory might be a cause of unease. The Al-Khoei Foundation, which liked to establish large projects that would not go unnoticed, knew well that the Sunni monarchies in the Gulf would not let it build its institutional presence in their countries. The Indian government also prevented it from completing the construction of the imposing Imam Al-Khoei Cultural Complex, but allowed the foundation’s less visible and one-off activities, such as relief operations in response to natural disasters. Visibility had, moreover, the disadvantage of rendering failures apparent to the community. Looking at the image

              % ;  `%        &[>}  } }& † ?™  Foundation let so much money go to waste.8 Third, Shi‘i clerics display a great capacity to adapt. This quality is of foremost importance given the multiplicity of places in which they evolve. For decades, the al-Hakim and al-Khu’i families had to work with – sometimes fast-changing – conditions on the ground, adapting accordingly in order to make the most out of them. It has been noted that persecution by the Ba‘th regime contributed to the transnationalisation of their networks. This situation could nonetheless be turned into an advantage if any opportunity available elsewhere were fully exploited. The al-Hakim brothers based their opposition movement in Iran and in London, respectively, for 199

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Guardians of Shi‘ism the sponsorship provided by the Islamic Republic and the free environ%   —™[[%   &[     cant population of Iraqis to whom they could reach out. State pressure in Iraq and the risk of state control in Iran did not make the traditional centres of learning a viable option for Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i to establish his philanthropic institution, yet the option of London allowed the Al-Khoei Foundation to play a precursory role in the institutionalisation of Shi‘ism in the West.       & _ |;       %%ties and states with which clerics interact in their multi-sited geography. Because charity must provide timely and appropriate answers to the people’s needs, providers of patronage are likely to have to rethink their priorities if circumstances evolve. With the start of the Lebanese civil war, Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i readily renounced his plans for the establishment of a religious college to have Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah build instead a much-needed orphanage. In Pakistan, the Al-Khoei Foundation relocated its cultural complex to Islamabad in anticipation that sectarian tensions in Karachi would put the project at risk. With regard to political practice, clerical attitudes were similarly dic   &     |;  &*   &[ %%    ?ŒX% and al-Khu’i families were more rational-pragmatic than ideological actors. Their capacity to adapt to any of the parties they interacted with was particularly remarkable. Mahdi, Muhammad Baqir and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim turned to human rights advocacy in the 1980s not only out of a sense of moral responsibility, but because this domain of activity was presumably the single point of entry to the international community. The Al-Khoei Foundation worked with international decision-making structures, using diplomacy, lobbying and public relations, not to mention consultative status at the UN ECOSOC, to develop its advocacy movement. Engagement with Western governments also prompted both the foundation and SCIRI to adopt a liberal democratic vocabulary that was acceptable to the expectations of this audience. In this regard, the capacity of the latter organisation to shift away, at least rhetorically, from the ' %     %   %    %%%   % % trumped ideological commitment. Finally, clerical authority, when exercised across borders, needs to be considered in reference to the meanings that notions of proximity and distance acquire in the process. Because transnational networks are situated in contextualised localities, the presence of clerical members in one  % ;% &     €    presenting advantages and obstacles for clerical authority – of that place. 200

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Conclusion At the same time, their presence in one location implies living at a distance from other places in which transnational authority could also be shaped by local circumstances. If location impacts on clerical authority, transnational relations are in turn a channel to compensate for disadvantages in one place with advantages in another. More importantly, they help reformulate and blur the distinction between notions of proximity and distance, with the larger effect of sustaining transnational authority. A marja‘ X  †& 

 al-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn al-Tabataba’i al-Hakim’. 75. Al-Bayati, From Dictatorship, p. 5. 76. Quoted in ‘Son Succeeds Late Father in Iraq’s Shiite Party’. 77. Walbridge, The Thread of Mu‘awiya, p. 40.

210

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Notes

Chapter 2 1. Al-Khoei Foundation (ed.), Yadnamah-yi Hazrat-i Ayatullah ‘Uzma Khu’i, pp. 56–7; al-Qazwini, Tarikh al-Qazwini, vol. 1, p. 296; Mansurah al-Khu’i, interview, Tehran, 9 November 2006. 2. Hamada, Al-Imam Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, p. 157; Al-Khoei Foundation (ed.), Yadnamah-yi Hazrat-i Ayatullah ‘Uzma Khu’i, pp. 64–5. Another account that al-Khu’i reached ijtihad when he was nineteen years old (Sachedina, ‘Translator’s Introduction: Al-Khu’i and the Twelver Shi‘ites’, p. 3) seems to be an exaggeration of his intellectual precocity. 3. Al-Jibouri, ‘In Memory of His Late Holiness Ayatullah al-Uzma Sayyid Abul-Qasim al-Khoei’. 4. Al-Khoei Foundation (ed.), Yadnamah-yi Hazrat-i Ayatullah ‘Uzma Khu’i, pp. 75–87. 5. Hamada, Al-Imam Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, pp. 146–7, 158. 6. Khatam Yazdi, Khatirat, pp. 99–100. 7. Corboz, ‘Khomeini in Najaf’. 8. Al-Qazwini, Tarikh al-Qazwini, vol. 4, pp. 43, 51. 9. Musa al-Khu’i, interview, Tehran, 11 November 2006. 10. Dialogue, August 1994, p. 8; Sadiqa al-Khu’i and Laya al-Bihishti, interview, London, 23 February 2007. 11. Al-Noor, September 1992, pp. 24–5. 12. Video, ‘Rare Footage of Grand Ayatullah Al-Khoei’. 13. Al-Khoei Foundation, Concept and Projects, 1991–1992, p. 11. 14. Bibi Khanum, interview, Mashhad, 28 November 2006. If there was &   &  †  ?‘%  ?™@@   %[   } %   &       €  >% }   } &@[   Mauriello’s phraseology (Mauriello, Descendants of the Family of the Prophet, pp. 142–3). The woman he married in 1917 when he was still a student was a widow of mature age. Her family was well off, at least her brother was, and he sponsored al-Khu’i’s studies in Najaf (‘Musahibah ba — †& 

Œ&Œ%\]†  ?]†  ?]’}% ? ?>'_ ?]Œ %+]}¦„ @* F22, ‘Letters of Support for those Requesting Asylum/Refugee Status (Europe, Middle East, America, World)’. [no number], ‘Dialogue: Letters Sent out (+ Faxes), 1994–95’. [no number], ‘Emma Nicholson & Amar Appeal, 1992’. [no number], ‘Al-Khoei Foundation, General, Abdul Majid Khu’i, Misc. 1988–2002’. [no number], ‘Al-Khoei Press Release, 1990–99’. [no number], ‘Letters Sent out from the Al-Khoei Foundation’. [no number], ‘NCWMP: Prisons’. [no number], ‘‘Uqud al-Zawaj’. 238

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Bibliography Organisation for Human Rights in Iraq, London, UK. Online records, www.alhakim.co.uk. Letters, reports and articles provided by Sahib al-Hakim. Documents provided by individuals. ‘Declaration of Trust Relating to the Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation’ (dated 15 August 1989) provided by the Al-Khoei Foundation, London, UK. Genealogical tree of the al-Hakim family provided by Salih al-Hakim, Beirut, Lebanon. Letters and private documents provided by Sahib al-Hariri, Tehran, Iran. Private letters provided by ‘Abd al-Sahib al-Khu’i, London, UK. Receipts for khums payment provided by Muhammad Faqih-Imani, Qum, Iran.

Interviews ‘Abdullah, Jihad, Beirut, 28 March 2008. Alali, Qays, Damascus, 16 September 2007. Al-Amin, ‘Abd al-Hasan, London, 21 February 2007. Anonymous, Dubai, 30 December 2008. Anonymous, 2012. Ansari, Hadi, Tehran, 13 November 2006. Al-‘Awadi, Basim, London, 21 February 2007. Bahr al-‘Ulum, Muhammad, London, 20 July 2007. Al-Bayati, Hamid, New York, 20 April 2007, 7 May 2007. Al-Bazzi, Maryam, Bint Jbeil, 30 March 2008. Bibi Khanum, Mashhad, 28 November 2006. Bilal, Salah, London, 21 February 2007. Bujnurdi, Hasan, Tehran, 14 November 2006, 24 November 2006. Bujnurdi, Kazim, Tehran, 1 November 2006. Director of the Mabarrat al-Imam al-Khu’i, Beirut, 22 March 2008. Fadlallah, Muhammad Baqir, Beirut, 29 March 2008. Faqih-Imani, Mahdi, Tehran, 7 November 2006. Faqih-Imani, Muhammad, Qum, 11 October 2006. Faqih-Imani, Muhammad, and Mujtaba Faqih-Imani, Qum, 24 February 2008. Faqih-Imani, Rasul, Isfahan, 6 March 2008. Hadi, Sharif, Bangkok, 30 July 2009. Al-Hakim, ‘Abd al-Amir, Dubai, 28 December 2008. Al-Hakim, ‘Abd al-Hadi, London, 23 February 2007. Al-Hakim, ‘Ali, Bint Jbeil, 30 March 2008. Al-Hakim, Ihsan, London, 25 March 2009. Al-Hakim, Ja‘far, New York, 20 September 2012, 13 May 2013. Al-Hakim, Muhammad Husayn, Qum, 12 December 2006. Al-Hakim, Muhammad Rida, Qum, 4 December 2006. 239

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Guardians of Shi‘ism Al-Hakim, Riyad, Qum, 13 March 2008. Al-Hakim, Sahib, London, 9 July 2007, 18 October 2007. Al-Hakim, Salih, Beirut, 23 March 2008, 26 March 2008. Al-Hariri, Sahib, Tehran, 15 March 2008. Hashom, Amir, Geneva, 4 September 2012. Al-Husayni al-Ishkiwari, Ahmad, Qum, 21 November 2006. Jawad, Ghanim, London, 7 February 2007, 21 February 2007, 26 June 2007, 20 July 2007, 18 October 2007, 21 November 2007, 22 November 2007, 13 December 2007, 5 September 2008, 5 February 2009, 25 March 2009, 10 January 2013. Kadhem, Fouad, London, 30 July 2012. Kazmi, Nadim, London, 7 February 2007, 3 September 2008. Al-Khalkhali, Muhsin, London, 5 September 2008, 24 March 2009, 27 July 2009, 16 May 2011, 26 April 2012 (telephone), 31 July 2012. Al-Khalkhali, Sa‘id, London, 31 July 2012. Al-Khu’i, ‘Abd al-Sahib, London, 27 July 2009. Al-Khu’i, Jawwad, Qum, 17 March 2008. Al-Khu’i, Mansurah, Tehran, 9 November 2006. Al-Khu’i, Musa, Tehran, 11 November 2006. Al-Khu’i, Sadiqa, and Laya al-Bihishti, London, 23 February 2007. Al-Khu’i, Yusif, London, 28 June 2006, 31 July 2012. Librarian at Madinat al-‘Ilm, Qum, 12 October 2006. Al-Milani, Fadil, London, 20 July 2007. Al-Musawi, Muhammad, London, 4 September 2008, 5 February 2009. Muvahidi, Muhammad, London, 5 February 2009. † ?]† [  [ƒ&“~~$* Razvi, Maysam, New York, 20 April 2007, 21 October 2011. Ridha, Maha, London, 21 February 2007, 5 February 2009. Al-Sadr, Rabab, Tyre, 1 April 2008. Al-Sahlani, Fadil, New York, 10 April 2007. Al-Sahlani, Layth, Damascus, 10 September 2007. Shahristani, Javad, Qum, 4 December 2006. Staff member at the Grand Ayatullah al-Khu’i School, Mashhad, 27 November 2006. Al-Tabataba’i, Khalil, telephone, 1 May 2009, 2 May 2009, 22 May 2009, 25 May 2009, 16 March 2012. Volunteer at the Association Culturelle Imam Al Khoei, Paris, 27 June 2012.

Websites of Selected Institutions and Individuals Unless another date is given, all websites were last accessed on 15 August 2013. Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre, www.thesaviour.org. The Amar Appeal, www.amarfoundation.org. Association Culturelle Imam Al Khoei, Paris, www.al-sadeq.org. 240

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Bibliography Benevolent al-Mabarrat Association, www.mabarrat.org.lb. Centre for Academic Shi‘a Studies, www.shiaresearch.com. Al-Fayyad, Ishaq, www.alfayadh.net. Al-Hakim Family Martyrs’ Cultural and Charitable Foundation, www.sh-alhakeem.com. Al-Hakim Foundation, http://alhakimf.com, www.alkhayriairaq.net, http://alhakimfd.org. Al-Hakim Martyr Foundation for Youth and Sport, www.amfys.iq. Al-Hakim, Sahib, www.alhakim.co.uk. Al-Hamudi, Humam, www.hamoudi.org. House of Knowledge School, www.darhikma.net. Al-Huda School, www.ecolealhouda.ca. Al-Imaan Charitable Trust, www.alimaan.org. Imam al-Hakim Library, www.alhakeemlib.org. Imam Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation, London headquarters, www.alkhoei.org. Imam Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation, Montreal branch, www.khoei.ca. Imam Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation, New York branch, www.al-khoei.org. Imam Al-Khoei Islamic Centre, Swansea, www.ummah.net/khoei (last accessed 2 December 2012); see also its Facebook page, www.facebook.com/alkhoe iswansea. Al-Iman School, www.al-imanschool.org. Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, www.isci-iraq.com (last accessed 1 September 2009). ' %%   '_€&+[}}}* %< * * Al-Kawthar Islamic University, www.alkauthar.edu.pk. Al-Kawthar Project for Widows & Orphans, www.alkawthar.org.uk. Al-Khu’i, Haydar, www.eyeraki.blogspot.com (last accessed 2 May 2013). Al-Milani, Fadil, www.almilani.com. Al-Qabanji, Sadr Al-Din, www.alqubanchi.com. Al-Sadiq and Al-Zahra Schools, www.al-sadiqal-zahraschools.co.uk. Al-Sistani, ‘Ali, www.sistani.org. Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, www.sciri.btinternet.co.uk (last accessed 1 September 2009). World Ahl al-Bayt Islamic League, www.wabil.com.

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‘atabat muqaddasa (shrine cities of Iraq), 1, 19, 24, 98, 124, 128; see also Najaf    & } X[    @  to, 19 authority, (transnational) clerical, 2, 202–3 competition over, 13, 15, 50, 95, 96, 99–100, 105–6, 117–18 domains pertaining to, 6–9, 189–92 four features of, 189, 196–202 fragmentation of, 65 in relation to communities and states, 10–13, 189–96 Awadh, State of, 3 Azerbaijan, Iranian, 15, 49, 190 Al-Azhar University, Cairo, 78 Babakhan, ‘Ali, 88 Babri Mosque, India, 107 Badr, battle of (624), 137 Badr Corps (Faylaq Badr), 38, 43, 44, 137, 149–50; see also Badr Organisation Badr Organisation, 44, 157, 160, 164 al-Badri, Sami, 38, 40 Baha’is, 167 Bahr al-‘Ulum family, 26, 56, 190 Bahr al-‘Ulum, ‘Ala’ al-Din, 52, 55 Bahr al-‘Ulum, Hasan, 61 Bahr al-‘Ulum, ‘Izz al-Din, 233n70 Bahr al-‘Ulum, Ja‘far, 26, 27, 233n70 Bahr al-‘Ulum, Muhammad Adwa’ ‘ala Qanun al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya al-‘Iraqi, 126 on freedom of action in the UK, 134 in Kuwait, 33 in London, 34 member of Muhsin al-Hakim’s bayt, 26, 27 member of the Iraqi National Congress, 34 philanthropy, 81 president of the Iraqi Governing Council, 34 role in the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre, 34, 81, 201 role in WABIL, 35 Bahr al-‘Ulum, Musa, 26, 27 Bahrain Arab Spring in, 3, 186 Al-Khoei Foundation mediation in, 184–6, 187, 228n154 Bahrain Freedom Movement, 185 bahth al-kharij (advanced level of study), 23, 49, 59, 85, 97, 98, 103, 211n15 Bakr, Ahmad, President of Iraq, 128, 174; see also Ba‘th regime Baqir al-‘Ulum School, Isfahan, 97

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Index Baqiri, Muhammad Riza, 59, 61 al-Barzani, Mustafa, 127 Ba‘th Party membership declared illegal by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, 131 rise to power, 14, 55, 128, 132, 166 Ba‘th regime     [“[!! ‘counter-exile strategy’, 89 departure of scholars during, 21, 29, 31–2, 55, 59, 104, 133, 193 deportations during, 83, 128, 173 fall of, 13, 124 state–clergy relations under, 17, 29, 55, 62–3, 65, 104, 128, 129, 131, 152, 161, 173–6, 180, 181, 186–7, 193, 194 weakening of, 145 al-Bayati, Hamid, 144, 146, 147–8, 210n70 quoted, 142, 145, 158 Bayt al-Fatat School, Tyre, 100 bayt al-‘ilm (family of knowledge), 13 bayt (entourage of a marja‘) Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i’s, 51, 52–3, 55, 71, 170–1, 173, 175, 212n23 Muhsin al-Hakim’s, 26, 27–8, 29, 33, 45, 53/55, 131, 135 role, 25–6, 70 al-Bazzi family, 25, 33, 190 al-Bazzi, ‘Ali, 32 al-Bazzi, Hasan, 25 Benevolent al-Mabarrat Association (Jam‘iyyat alMabarrat al-Khayriyya), Lebanon, 63, 101, 102 Bharatiya Janata Party, India, 107 Bhumibol Adulyadej, King of Thailand, 109 al-Bihishti, ‘Ali, 52, 56 Bint al-Huda, 77, 87 Bint al-Huda School, Iran, 87 Bint Jbeil, Lebanon, 23, 25 Birri, ‘Abd al-Latif, 112 Black Friday (8 September 1978), 170 Bremer, Paul, 157, 158 Buddhism, 108 Bureau of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Maktab li-l} ?' %&& ?>'_^[! Burujirdi, Muhammad Husayn, 14, 22, 24, 59, 110 al-Burujirdi, Murtada, 52, 55 Bush, George W. Junior, President of the US, 148 businessmen, 33, 54, 60, 61–2, 61, 63, 70–1, 77, 79–80, 81, 82, 215n26 Canada, 62, 111, 113, 115 Catholic Church, 6 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), US, 128 Centre for Academic Shi‘a Studies (CASS), London, 58, 179 Chalabi, Ahmad, 229n176 charity charity chain, 8, 73 and clerical authority, 8–9, 73–4 and clerical politics in the seminaries, 95–100 and exile politics, 75, 82–3, 84–7, 90–2, 197 priority of, 73, 191 purposes of, 73–4, 75, 93, 191–2 and the state, 74, 109–10, 117–18; in India, 106–8, 195, 199; in Iran, 87–8, 90, 93, 96–8; in Jordan, 104–6, 177; in Lebanon, 100–2, 200; in Malaysia, 103–4, 194; in Pakistan, 78–9,

102–3, 200; in Thailand, 108–9; in the United Arab Emirates, 79–80 see also individual institutions; individual philanthropists Charity Commission for England and Wales, 57, 58 China, 178, 184 Christianity, 6, 105 Citizen’s Alliance (I’tilaf al-Muwatin), Iraq, 160 citizenship, 144, 160, 182, 206n47 City of Knowledge School (Madinat al-‘Ilm), Qum, 97, 98, 99 clerics see ‘ulama’; mujtahids; marja‘; individual clerics Clinton, Bill, President of the US, 146, 183 Clinton administration, 147 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Iraq, 157–8 Cole, Juan, 3 communism, 76, 126–7, 129, 168, 223n33 competition, 13, 15, 50, 91–2, 95, 96, 99–100, 106, 112–13, 117–18, 124, 154–60, 163 Constitutional Monarchy Movement, Iraq, 148, 227n121 constitutionalism, 1, 49, 155, 184–5 Cuba, 178, 179 Cultural Centre of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bangkok, 109 al-Dabbas, Diya’, 210n70 Dar al-Hikma (House of Wisdom) School for Islamic Sciences, Najaf, 27, 78, 91, 93, 198 Dar al-Hikma School, Qum, 85, 198 Dar al-‘Ilm al-Ja‘fari School, Quetta, 102 Dar al-‘Ilm School, Bangkok, 108–9 Dar al-‘Ilm School, Najaf, 99–100, 109 Dar al-Zahra School, Patalong, Thailand, 109 Al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Call), 38, 40 Al-Da‘wa (Islamic Call) Party, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 123, 130–1, 136, 140, 155, 158, 160, 174, 223n33 Dialogue (newsletter), 66, 178, 182, 182–3, 183, 184, 187, 234n89 Diba, Fara, Queen of Iran, 170, 232n39 Documentation Centre for Human Rights in Iraq, 90, 153 Dubai, 34, 35, 77, 79–80, 81 Mahdi al-Hakim in, 33, 79–80, 132, 133, 134, 161, 195 Egypt, 3, 141, 178–9 European Union (EU) regulations, 116 exiles, strategies and politics, 22, 47, 75, 82–3, 83–4, 93, 120–1, 123–4, 132–3, 139, 161–3, 193–4, 197, 201– 2; see also individual political exiles; individual exiled institutions Faculty of Islamic Law (Kulliyat al-Fiqh), Najaf, 77 Faculty of Theology (Kulliyat Usul al-Din), Baghdad, 78 Fadlallah family, 102 Fadlallah, Muhammad Husayn background, 30, 101 connection with Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, 50, 54, 63, 101–2, 186 connection with Muhsin al-Hakim, 28, 30 legacy, 100, 102 as a marja‘, 50, 102 member of WABIL, 35 patronage in Lebanon, 101–2, 117, 200

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Guardians of Shi‘ism Fahd, King of Saudi Arabia, 141 Faist, Thomas, 11 family history, 14, 197–8 Faqih-Imani family, 63, 98 Faqih-Imani, Jalal al-Din, 54, 56, 63, 67, 68, 97–8 Faqih-Imani, Mujtaba, 67, 68 Fatima Masumah Shrine, Qum, 135 fatwas (religious edicts) calling Iraqis to vote in the 2005 elections, 156 forbidding membership of political parties, 126–7, 131 after the invasion of Kuwait (1990), 175, 176 during Iran’s Tobacco Protest, 9 during the Iraqi uprising (1991), 175, 176, 183 on the killing of Iraqi Kurds (1965), 127–8 as a method of protest, 129 against the policies of the Iranian monarchy, 167–8, 170 proclaiming the illegality of 1923 elections in Iraq, 124 Faysal II, King of Iraq, 125 al-Faysal, Sa‘ud, Foreign Minister/Prince of Saudi Arabia, 141 al-Faysal, Turki, Saudi Ambassador to the US, 184 al-Fayyad, Ishaq, 49, 52, 55, 69–70 Fayziyya School, Qum, 167 federalism, in Iraq, 155, 182 15 Khurdad uprising (1963), 167 France, 62, 111 Friday prayer, 5, 24, 29, 31, 67, 109, 129 ghayba (occultation), 5  ?‰&[>†

[~  ?‰&[` ?Ž[52, 55, 233n70 Gokal, Mustafa, 61, 61–2, 177 Grand Ayatullah al-Khu’i School (Madrasat Ayatullah al-‘Uzma al-Khu’i al-‘Ilmiyya), Mashhad, 97, 98, 99, 108 Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo, 10 Gulf crisis (1990–1), 83, 105, 136, 166 aftermath, 107, 141, 144, 153, 181 Gulf States, 63, 161–2; see also individual states al-Gulpaygani al-Hashimi, Jamal al-Din, 26 Gulpaygani family, 213n47 Gulpaygani, Muhammad Riza, 50, 64, 65, 66, 67, 170 al-Ha’iri, ‘Ali, 40 al-Ha’iri, Kazim, 38, 39, 41 hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), 29, 51, 115, 141, 156 al-Hakim family, 13–15, 16–17, 202–3 Amnesty International reports on killing of, 143 background, 13, 21 as a heritage symbol, 91–2, 151–2, 159, 163, 197, 198, 202 involvement with SCIRI/ISCI, 16–17, 21, 42–4, 191 marital strategies, 24–5, 26, 30, 33, 45, 46, 190 as martyrs, 91, 151–2, 159, 159–60, 198, 202 philanthropy, 75, 92–3, 191, 192 role in Iraqi politics, 123–4, 161–4 as sayyids, 21, 152, 196 al-Hakim, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz arrest, 174 exile, 21, 132, 135, 139 head of the Documentation Centre for Human Rights in Iraq, 152–3 as a heritage symbol, 91, 159 human rights advocacy, 143, 200

marital strategies, 46 member of the Iraqi Governing Council, 158 and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, 41 nicknamed ‘aziz al-‘iraq, 91, 159 on the persecution of the al-Hakim family, 152 political activism, 41, 135, 148, 158 role in SCIRI, 16, 21, 38, 40, 43 siblings, 24, 25 al-Hakim, ‘Abd al-Hadi, 25, 27, 29 al-Hakim, ‘Abd al-Sahib, 25, 27, 29 al-Hakim, Ahmad, 45, 46 al-Hakim, Akram Hadi, 37, 38, 40 al-Hakim, ‘Ala’ al-Din, 25, 27, 29, 30 al-Hakim, ‘Ali (ancestor), 21 al-Hakim, ‘Ali (son of Mahdi), 35, 46 al-Hakim, ‘Ammar as head of ISCI, 16, 21, 43–4, 158, 159 as head of the Al-Hakim Foundation, 44, 75 marital strategies, 45, 46 quoted, 159 al-Hakim, Hadi, 27, 30 al-Hakim, Ja‘far, 92 al-Hakim, Mahdi (son of Muhsin) association with the Al-Da‘wa Party, 33, 34, 130 death, 16, 31, 135, 151–2, 161, 194 exile, 16, 21, 29, 31–6, 128, 132; in Dubai, 33, 79, 132–3, 161, 195; in Iran, 32–3; in London, 16, 33–4, 81–2, 134; in Pakistan, 16, 32, 75, 78–9, 81 as a heritage symbol, 87, 91 human rights advocacy, 142–3, 200 international relations: with Iran, 79, 80–1, 93, 132–3, 134, 135, 162, 195; visits to Syria, 140 marital strategies, 45, 46 as a martyr, 91 philanthropy, 75, 78–82, 92 political activism, 93, 123–4, 130, 135, 193–4 role in father’s marja‘iyya, 27, 29, 33, 45, 76, 77, 78, 80, 92 role in the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Centre, London, 16, 32, 34, 36, 78, 81, 92, 201 role in WABIL, 35–6, 47, 81–2, 92 siblings, 24, 25 views: critique of Ba‘thist rule, 128; system envisioned for Iraq, 134–5, 162 al-Hakim, Mahdi (son of Salih), 23, 25 al-Hakim, Muhammad Baqir arrest, 174 assassination attempts against, 86–7, 202 association with the Al-Da‘wa Party, 41, 130 charisma, 87 criticism of, 153, 154, 158 death, 13, 43, 159 establishment of the Bureau of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, 37 exile, 132; collaboration with Emma Nicholson, 90, 93; contact with the US, 147; in Iran, 21, 135; links with Saudi Arabia, 141; in Syria, 139; visits to Kuwait, 140–1, 195 as a heritage symbol, 91, 159, 160 human rights advocacy, 142, 200 leadership of the Society of Militant Scholars in Iraq, 37 marital strategies, 26, 45, 46 as a martyr, 159, 160 meeting with ‘Abd al-Majid al-Khu’i, 183 and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, 39

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Index obituary, 13 philanthropy, 84, 85, 198 political activism, 130, 135, 152, 193–4, 199–200 role in father’s marja‘iyya, 27, 29, 45 role in SCIRI, 16, 21, 38, 40, 42–3, 82, 84–7, 87–90, 92–3, 123, 136–8, 162 role in the Martyr al-Sadr Foundation, 84, 85, 88, 89 siblings, 24, 25 support for, 138, 146 views: on democracy, 147; on Imam Husayn’s martyrdom, 150; on Jordanian–Iraqi confederation proposal, 141 writings, 146 al-Hakim, Muhammad Husayn (son of Muhsin), 25 al-Hakim, Muhammad Husayn (son of Sa‘id), 27, 29–30, 43, 194 al-Hakim, Muhammad Kazim, 25 al-Hakim, Muhammad Mahdi see al-Hakim, Mahdi (son of Muhsin) al-Hakim, Muhammad Rida, 24, 27, 29 al-Hakim, Muhammad Sadiq, 27, 30 al-Hakim, Muhammad Yusif see al-Hakim, Yusif al-Hakim, Muhsin (son of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz), 43 al-Hakim, Muhsin (son of Mahdi), Grand Ayatullah authority network, 25–30, 53/55, 161, 190, 197; bayt, 26, 27–8, 29, 33, 45, 53/55, 131, 135; representatives, 25–6, 27, 28, 30, 45, 47, 55, 92; see also individual bayt members and representatives birth and upbringing, 23 children, 24–5, 26, 29, 45, 53/55, 75, 161, 190; see also individual names death and aftermath, 30, 50, 129 descendants, 16 funeral, 31 as a heritage symbol, 84, 91–2, 93, 151, 163, 202 in Lebanon, 24–5 as a marja‘: importance, 21, 22; ranking order of stipends, 96; rise to the position, 14–15, 22–5; succession issues, 30–1, 65, 96 philanthropy, 75, 76–8, 92, 100, 191, 192 political stance: attitude towards the Al-Da‘wa Party, 123, 131; avoided 1961 invasion of Kuwait, 140; methods of protest, 125, 129–31, 151; recognition of political leadership, 130; with regard to Iranian affairs, 126, 135, 167, 168; with regard to Iraqi affairs, 123, 125–31, 151, 161; with regard to Muslim issues, 228n154; views on the role of clerics in politics, 125, 130 self-imposed house arrest, 128–9 as a teacher, 24 wives, 24–5, 30 writings, 23–4, 50 al-Hakim, Sahib, 34, 143, 199; see also Organisation for Human Rights in Iraq al-Hakim, Sa‘id (cousin of Muhsin), 27, 29–30 al-Hakim, Sa‘id (grandson of Muhsin), Grand Ayatullah, 31, 49 al-Hakim, Wahhab, 34 al-Hakim, Yusif, 24, 27, 29, 30–1, 131 Al-Hakim Family Martyrs’ Cultural and Charitable Foundation, 91 Al-Hakim Foundation (Mu’assasat Shahid al-Mihrab), 44, 75, 90–2, 198 Al-Hakim Library (Maktabat al-Hakim), 76–7, 91, 93 Halabja chemical attack, 154, 202 halal (permissible) food standards, 115–16

Halliday, Fred, 195–6 al-Hamudi, Humam, 40, 43 al-Hariri, Sahib, 84, 90 hasab (honour acquired through deeds), 14, 31, 197 Hasan, Prince of Jordan, 177, 185 Hasan (the second Imam), 21 al-Hashimi, Mahmud, 38, 39, 40, 41–2, 42, 136   al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa (co-author), 39 al-Hashimi, Muhammad Jawwad, 26, 27 Hashimi Shahrudi, Mahmud see al-Hashimi, Mahmud Hashom, Amir, 92 El Hassan, Sarvath, Princess of Jordan, 177 hawza (seminaries) ‘Ali Khamana’i’s attitude towards, 66, 97, 98   [! distribution of patronage in, 74, 77–8, 94, 95–100 of Mashhad, 1, 50, 59, 95, 97, 98, 170 of Najaf, 1–2, 3, 21–2, 23, 27, 29, 31, 36, 39, 40, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 62–3, 65, 66, 70, 76, 77, 78, 91, 93, 96, 97, 99–100, 101, 108, 124–5, 130, 131, 135, 166–7, 168, 169, 171, 173–4, 176, 181 of Qum, 65–6, 67, 85, 95, 96, 98, 104, 108, 167, 168, 169, 170 Qum–Najaf rivalry, 65–7, 98     [!€[$ of Samarra’, 49 of Sayyida Zaynab, Damascus, 59 SCIRI links with, 41, 42, 47, 85, 91, 180 as a source of social capital, 22–31, 47, 56 state repression of, 58, 62–3, 65, 66, 97, 99, 104, 128, 131, 166–7, 168, 173–4, 176, 181 al-Haydari, Muhammad, 38, 40, 41 Hazara, 235n113 Al-Hindi Mosque, Najaf, 24, 29, 31 Hinduism, 106, 107, 108 Hizb al-Da‘wa see Al-Da‘wa Party Hizbullah (of Lebanon), 3, 4, 82 Al-Huda School, Montreal, 111, 113, 115 human rights issues, 16, 90, 92, 142–5, 152–3, 162, 181–3, 184–6, 199, 200 Husayn (the third Shi‘i Imam), 48, 86, 115, 150, 198 al-Husayni, Muhsin, 40 Hussein, King of Jordan, 104, 105, 133, 177, 183, 185 Hussein, Saddam, President of Iraq calls for prosecution of, 144, 145, 182 dwindling support for, 145 fall of, 3, 63 Iran’s attitude towards, 133, 162 propaganda, 86 see also Ba‘th regime ijaza\% [  ^[![ˆ$[" ijazat al-wikala (permission of representation), 55 ijtihad (independent reasoning), 5, 23, 49, 65 ‘ilm (religious knowledge), 4, 5, 8, 23, 29, 191 Al-Imaan Charitable Trust, Mumbai, 106 Imaan Foundation, Mumbai, 106–7 Imam Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation (Mu’assasat al-Imam al-Khu’i al-Khayriyya) see Al-Khoei Foundation, London Imam Al-Khoei Cultural Complex, Mumbai, 106–7, 195, 199 Imam Al-Khoei Islamic Centre, London, 61, 110–11, 112, 113, 115, 186 Imam Al-Khoei Islamic Centre, New York, 1, 111, 184, 184–6

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Guardians of Shi‘ism Imam al-Khu’i Orphanage (Mabarrat al-Imam alKhu’i), Lebanon, 101, 117 Imam al-Sadr Foundation, Tyre, 101 Imam ‘Ali Foundation, London, 213n55 Imam ‘Ali Schools, Iraq, 91 Imam ‘Ali Shrine, Najaf, 24, 125, 128 Imam Baqir Secondary School, Hilla, 77 Imam Jawwad Schools, Baghdad, 77 Imam Kazim Schools, Kazimayn, 77 Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, 88 Imam, the Twelfth or Hidden, 5, 120, 165 Imams, the Twelve, 4–5, 7, 9, 87, 93, 114; see also individual Imams Al-Iman School, New York, 111, 113, 115 India, 35, 178 Al-Khoei Foundation in, 62, 106–8, 195, 199 Indonesia, 77 institutionalisation, 6, 15–16, 20, 21, 26, 36–47, 48, 79, 101, 110, 118, 190, 197, 199, 200 Al-Intifada Schools, Iran, 87 Iran diplomatic relations, 128, 132, 133, 138, 139, 141, 147–8, 162, 195 hegemonic ambitions, 3 history, 1, 5, 9 |'_[$€$[#"" relations of Iraqi Shi‘i exiles with, 16, 32–3, 79, 80–1, 87–90, 123, 133–8, 162, 195, 201 restoration of Shi‘i sites, 106, 194–5 revolution (of 1978–9), 169–70 state–clergy relations, 2, 5, 15, 65–6, 96, 96–7, 98, 99, 117–18, 119, 121, 124, 166–72 Iran–Iraq War (1980–8), 33, 84, 88, 89, 133, 136–7, 139, 149, 166, 171, 174–5, 186, 194, 195 Iranian Red Crescent Society, 88 Iraq diplomatic relations, 32, 105, 107, 128, 132, 133, 138, 139, 140, 141, 148, 162, 181, 182, 194, 195 history, 124 as an idea kept alive in exile, 17, 84, 163, 201–2 state–clergy relations, 65, 124–31, 153, 166, 173–6, 193 see also Ba‘th regime Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) (1998), US, 146, 147 Iraq Update (newsletter), 90, 145, 146 Iraqi Communist Party, 76, 126 al-‘Iraqi, Diya’ al-Din, 23 Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), 34, 157–8 Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), 158 Iraqi–Kuwaiti border issue, 140 Iraqi Martyr Day, 159 Iraqi National Accord (INA), 148, 227n121, 229n176 Iraqi National Alliance, 156 Iraqi National Congress (INC), 34, 147, 148, 227n121, 229n176 Iraqi Shi‘i Islamic movement, 14–15, 34, 37, 41, 123, 133–4 qiyada na’iba (vice leadership), 34, 41 see also Al-Da‘wa Party; Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) Iraqiness/Iraqicisation, 17, 137, 151, 154, 157, 159, 160, 163, 196, 198 al-Irawani, Muhammad Taqi, 53, 55 ISCI see Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq al-Isfahani, Abu al-Hasan, 22, 26 Islamic Action Organisation (Munazzamat al-‘Amal al-Islami), 38, 40, 136, 210n54

Islamic Center of America, Dearborn, 112 Islamic Centre of Hamburg, 110 Islamic conferences Amman (1967), 29 Mecca (1965), 29 Islamic Institute of Knowledge, Dearborn, 112 Islamic Legal Institute, Beirut, 101 Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, Iraq, 227n121 ' %   +[‘%[#!# Islamic Seminary, New York, 111, 112 Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) change of name from SCIRI to, 16, 147, 156 importance of, 16–17, 164 performance in elections, 44, 160, 164, 196 philanthropy, 75 politics of self-representation, 155–60, 163–4, 196 tensions within, 44, 157 see also Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) Islamophobia, 184 Israel, 29, 101, 128 istifta’ (request for a legal opinion), 19, 25, 51, 55, 109, 114, 156 Jabal ‘Amil, Lebanon, 25 Jabal ‘Amil Vocational School, Burj al-Shamali, 100 Ja‘far, Safdar, 35 Ja‘fari Awqaf Foundation in Dubai, 79–80 in Sharja, 80 al-Jalali, Muhammad Taqi, 27, 53, 55, 56, 174 Jawad, Ghanim, 183 al-Jawahiri, ‘Ali Baqir, 23 jihad (holy war), 5, 124, 131 Joint Action Committee (JAC), 141 Jones, Justin, 3 Jordan Al-Khoei Foundation and, 104–6, 177, 178–9, 185, 195 Mahdi al-Hakim in, 32 relations with Iraq, 105, 133 SCIRI contacts with, 141 Justice for Bahrain, 186 Karbala’, battle of (680), 86, 150 Kashif al-Ghita’, ‘Ali, 65 Kashif al-Ghita’, Ja‘far, 5 Al-Kawthar Islamic University, Islamabad, 103, 108 Kazmi, Nadim, 178, 183 Keohane, Robert, 11 Al-Khadra’ Mosque, Najaf, 67 al-Khalifa, Bahrain’s ruling family, 184, 185 al-Khalifa, Hamid, Emir/King of Bahrain, 185 al-Khalifa, ‘Isa bin Salman, Emir of Bahrain, 184–5 al-Khaliq, Isma‘il, 111 al-Khaliq, Murtada, 111 al-Khalisi, Mahdi, 124 al-Khalkhali family, 56, 71 al-Khalkhali, Muhammad Rida, 56, 71, 211n16, 212n23, 233n70 al-Khalkhali, Muhsin, 59, 71, 212n23 al-Khalkhali, Murtada, 52, 71 al-Khalkhali, Sa‘id, 71, 108, 213n55

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Index Khamana’i, ‘Ali, Supreme Leader of Iran attitude towards Iranian seminaries, 66, 97, 98 on condition of Iraqi refugees, 89 contenders for succession, 42 establishment of the World Ahl al-Bayt Assembly, 35 issues over religious authority, 65 SCIRI’s relationship with, 146, 155–6 as the wali amr al-muslimin (Guardian of the Muslims), 146, 156 al-Kharsan, Muhammad Rida, 233n70 al-Kharsan, Muhammad Salih ‘Abd al-Rasul, 233n70 Khatami, Muhammad, President of Iran, 89, 179 Al-Khoei Foundation, London, 15–16, 57–70, 116–18, 177–86 attitudes and policies: calls for prosecution of %Œ[#“{

  |[#"[ 177–80, 187, 192, 197; principles for a future without Saddam Hussein, 182; towards Iraqi politics, 180–3, 187; towards Muslim/Shi‘i issues, 184–6, 187, 195; towards refugees, 110, 192; towards religious authority, 66; towards the state, 179 board of trustees, 57–64, 60–1, 71, 191 branches and institutes: areas where did not operate, 62–3, 104, 199; India, 106–8, 199; Iraq, 99–100, 198; Jordan, 104–6, 177, 194–5; Malaysia, 104, 194; Pakistan, 102–3, 200; Thailand, 108–9; in the West, 110–16, 116–17, 179, 182, 192, 200 (London, 110–11, 112, 115, 177, 200; Montreal, 111, 113, 115; New York, 111, 112, 113, 115, 177; Paris, 111–12, 115; Swansea, 62, 111, 113) competition from Iran over projects, 105–6, 113 criticism of, 69, 180 Declaration of Trust (15 August 1989), 57, 58, 64, 66, 69, 71 establishment of, 15, 57, 201 human rights advocacy, 181–3, 184–6, 200 al-Khu’i family involvement with, 15, 57–8, 59, 69, 71, 107–8, 187; see also individual family members mission, 15–16, 71, 191, 192 patrons/presidency, 64–70, 71–2, 191 presence at the UN, 177, 178–9, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 200 publications, 178, 182, 182–3, 184, 185, 187, 202, 234n89 units and programmes: Bonat al-Mustaqbal, 115; Centre for Academic Shi‘a Studies (CASS), 58, 179; Culture and Human Rights Unit, 114; † ?™}  ]