Growth of Chinese Naval Power: Priorities, Goals, Missions, and Regional Implications 9789814377829

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PACIFIC STRATEGIC PAPERS

GROWTH OF CHINESE NAVAL POWER Priorities, Goals, Missions, and Regional Implications TAl MING CHEUNG

L5ER5

R~~on.al Stra t~ c Stud ..a P~ramme

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ST UDIES SlngapoN

Contents

Introduction I.

The Rationale for Mode rnization

II.

The Priorities and Goals of China's Naval Buildup

III . Naval Doctrine and Strategy IV.

Conclusions: The Regional Implications of Chinese Naval Power

Appendices l . Destroyer and Frigate Deployments

3 19 37

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57 58

2. Chi.nese Navy Organizational Chart, October 1990

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3. The Navy in the High Command Structure, October 1990

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4. The Chinese Navy Ord er of Battle: A Comparison between 1979 and 1989

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5. Major Na-...al Bases and Fleet Deployments

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Introduction

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLAI Navy is overcoming centuries of continentalist introspection to win recognition for its important role in defending th e Chinese state. Such acceptance is crucial as naval chiefs seek funds to turn the primarily coasta l force into a blue water navy. A buildup in capabiliti es is essential if the navy is to meet its increasing portfolio of missions. This includes defending territorial waters, backing up Beijing's claims to contested islands, guarding seaborne trade and sealines, and balancing naval developments elsewhere in the region . Naval action over the Paracel and Spratly Islands has shown that Beijing would readily employ the navy should national interests be seen to be threatened. This growth in Chinese naval strength and activities has raised concerns over Beijing's regional goals and aspirations. This paper examines the impetuses, priorities, missions, and external implications of the growth of Chinese naval power. What are the security, political. and economic rationales pushing for naval expansion? What are the obstacles to modernization? Where does the navy stand in overall military priorities, such as in the share of budgetary fundin g? What are the development plans for warships, submarines, armaments, marines, naval aviation, and nuclear forces? How does Beijing perceive the regional naval balance and possible rivals, including the Soviet Union , United States, India, Japan , Taiwan, the two Koreas, and other states in Southeast Asia? What is th e thinking behind naval doctrine today? How do naval considerations fit in with revised military thinking that emphasizes limited and local wars? What is the timetable and what are the goals of the naval buildup?

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I. The Rationale for Modernization

Chinese rulers have been historically ambivalent about the importance of the sea. The occasions when attention was paid to maritime matters, most notably in the 15th century, were rare exceptions to a narrow continentalist outlook .' The pre-occupation with internal matters and the navy 's neglect proved ultimately fatal when foreign powers began to open up the country by naval force , beginning with Britain's victory in the Opium War of 1839-42. Although an intensive naval modernization effort followed , it was too little and too late. The inability to stem foreign domination brought the collapse of the Chinese Imperial system. 2 Naval planners today refer to these historical events to underscore their call for a strong navy. "We will never forget that China was invaded seven times by imperialist troops from the sea. The nation's suffering due to a lack of sea defence still remains fresh in our minds, and history must not repeat itself, " said Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, the current navy chief.3 Nevertheless, it took another 50 years before policy-makers began to appreciate the importance of sea power. The civil war between the Communists and Nationalists and the anti-Japanese war from the late 1920s to 1949 only further reduced the relevance of the sea. Having fought a bitter guerrilla war deep in China's interior, it is not surprising that few Communist leaders had any appreciation of naval matters. Mao Zedong rarely referred to naval topics in his pre-1949 military writings• When the PLA navy was established in 1949, it was little more than the coastal appendix of the ground forces. A ragtag collection of warships left by the retreating Nationalist Chinese forces , it numbered 183 craft totalling little more than 43,000 tonss

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Growth of Chinese Naval Power

For the next three decades the navy continued to rank low in military priorities, although it did receive funds and Soviet assistance in the mid-1950s for a modest expansion . The overwhelming preoccupation among security planners in this period was with land conflicts. The Korean War between 1950 and 1953 threatened to spill into China. Disagreements over the delineation of the Sino-Indian border saw a major conflict in 1962. and an ideological rift between Beijing and Moscow at the end of the 1950s led to a massive Soviet military buildup along th eir common border. Even relations with Socialist neighbour Vietnam turned sour in the early 1970s, eventually deteriorating into a bord er war in 1979. By comparison . naval di sputes were secondary and small-scale. The most signifi cant naval operations were th e liberation of Hainan Island from Nationali st forces in 1950, the support of ground and air units during the confrontation against Nationalist and U.S. forces across the Taiwa n Straits in th e late 1950s, and the taking of the Paracel Islands from South Vie tnam in 1974. Despite the U.S. Seventh Fleet's menacing presence off the Chin ese coast throughout the 1950s, the main threat from the United States was nuclear. Chinese leaders did not seriou sly contemplate a U.S. invasion. The navy consequently suffered in the allocation of resources and confined itself exclusively to coastal defence duties. A numbe r of important df velopments saw a reappraisal of the navy's role from the mid -1970s. Strategically, the Soviet navy 's rapid growth from a regional into a fully-fl edged ocean-going force extended the Sino-Soviet bord er confrontation int o the maritime arena . The high priority accord ed to th e buildup of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the expansion of its activities down into Southeast Asia, in particular the establishment of port facilities at Ca m Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Vietnam , put the Soviet naval threat at the top of Beijing's security agenda . The takeover of the Paracel Islands in January 1974 also put the navy back in the limelight. Beijing's decision to take the Paracels was made in light of various domestic, diplomatic, and strategic developments. China's official explanation was to cite the South Vietnamese Government's decision in September 1973 to officially absorb the Spratlys into the country in order to allow foreign petroleum companies to explore for oil. This led to clashes between Chinese fishermen and South Vietnamese troops in the Paracels, and eventually to the Chinese naval intervention. China's prompt actions may also have been dictated by the knowledge that it would not risk a U.S. response, given the Sino-U.S. rapprochement at that time, as well as showing the Soviets

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that the Chinese navy was capable of defe nding its coastline.6 The recent introdu ction of new destroye rs and submarines boosted the navy's confide nce in its capabi lities. Deng Xiaoping's accession as paramount leader foUowing the verlhrow of th e radi ca l Gang of Fo ur in la te 1976 marked a watershed in the navy's fo rtunes. From the Cultural Revo lution's chaos, the emphasis was now on deve lopment. The immed iate aim was to repair much of the damage caused by the politi ca l uph eava ls a nd beg in the con· struction of a modern navy. Desp ite piecemea l improvements, the navy had been woefully neg lec ted during the Cultural Revolution and its professionalism was seriously co mpromised as se nior naval commanders became closely involved in the political intrigues and factional struggles. For the first time, the central leadership took interest in naval matters. This was no doubt helped by an emerging generation of senior, dedicated naval officers. In the past , most top naval commanders were army officers assigned to the fledging organization. As Chief of the PLA General Staff in 1974, Deng had personally overseen the Paracel Islands operations. In 1979, calling for "building up a powerful navy that has modern combat capabilities", 7 Deng redefined the navy's missions from primarily coastal defence duties to becoming a blue water navy. The need for naval modernization was further strengthened with the decision at the Third Plenum -of the Communist Party's 11th Central Committee in December 1978 to end China's international isolation and seek economic assistance from the West for the country's develop· ment. From an autarkic economy, China's national security regime was literally transformed overnight as trade, the main lifeblood of this external orientation and transported primarily by sea, made sealines of communication s strategically vital. Moreover, the coastal seaboard began to assume growi ng strategic significance at the expense of the inland hinterland . The coastal regions have been given a special priority in the co untry 's modernization . In 1980, a number of coastal special economic zones were created offering foreign investors attractive incentives to invest or set up pro· duction facilities in these areas. The success of these zones, which have registered the highest economic growth rat es in the country, led to similar privileges being extended to other coastal cities. By 1988 an open economic coastal belt with almost 300 cities stretched from Liaoning Province in the northeast to Guangdong Province in the south, and where more than 80 per cent of the country's foreign joint-venture enterprises are located.8 While the heavy industrial backbone of the

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Growth of Chinese Naval Power

economy is in northeast and central China, it is the coastal provinces in which modern technology and foreign investment are most concentrated, and where the centre of the country's economic gravity has been shifting. This has meant, naval strategists argue, that the maritime regime has become a central element in defence priorities. While the coastal regions are not at any direct risk from external threats at present, there is concern that offshore territorial or resource disputes could have an adverse impact on their development. Among various consequences, this could scare off foreign investors. Hainan Island , off the Guangdong coast, is a good example of how troubles in the surrounding South China Sea could wreck its development prospects. Hainan seeks to become a base for the exploration of potentially vast offshore oil resources, and to eventually become a major oil and petro-chemical production centre. However, because China and Vietnam contest sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly Islands between 150 and 1000 kilometres south of Hai nan, and where these oil grounds are concentrated , there seems little chance of full exploitation until the disputes are resolved. From minerals to oil and fishing stock , the enormous economic potential of offshore resources, coupled with competing historical claims, makes it almost inev itable that tensions in the region will escalate. As neith er Beijing nor Ha noi recogn ize eac h other's claims to the islands, the final outcome is likely to;be determined by the old-fashioned resort to arms. Chinese naval planners' thinking on the Spratlys offers insights into their rationalization of the importance of territorial disputes in justifying the naval buildup. As the most likely area of conflict in the immediate fu ture, the Spratlys provide navy chiefs with a powerful case to argue for a grea ter share of defence appropriations. It is undoubtedly made more persuasive when compared to the rapprochement taking place along China's land frontiers, in particular with the accelerating moves to reduce forces along the Sino-Soviet border. The Spratlys serve to highlight the navy 's lack of force projection capabiliti es. Although increasingly large-scale and long-range exercises are taking place, they are still limited in size, scope, and sophistication. A full-scale naval conflict in the Spratlys would be the largest and most difficult operation in the Chinese navy's relatively short history. It has no experience of fighting a major naval campaign. Even against a poorly equipped Vietnamese navy that on paper numbers seven rusting U.S. and Soviet Petya II frigates and some 40 fast patrol craft,9 the Chinese would be fully stretched to win. More worrisome to the Chinese is the Vietnamese air force, which has some 30

Th e Ratin11 ale ior Modernizat io11

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Soviet MiG-23 and 40 Su-20/-22 ground attack aircraft and 200 MiG-21 fighters. Although many are probably grounded given serious logistical problems that face the armed forces in general, 10 they would still be capable of inflicting heavy casualties against a Chinese fleet possessing limited and primitive anti-aircraft defences. And, although Chinese leaders have, in the past, traded success for heavy casualties in Korea and Vietnam, such a strategy would be disastrous for the navy. Chinese naval chiefs would prefer a major engagement over the Spratlys later than sooner so that some of the more serious gaps in capabilities can at least be adequately addressed. Meanwhile, the navy will be satisfied with making its presence felt by periodically deploying warships in the area to raise tensions. 11 Because of overriding political considerations, however, the navy could be ordered into action before it is fully prepared, as was the case with the army in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war. In the immediate aftermath of the military crackdown on demonstrators in Beijing in June 1989, defence planners around the region speculated that Beijing might initiate a crisis in the Spratlys or Taiwan to draw attention away from internal strife. The Tiananmen crackdown showed the Chinese leadership was ruthless, and Taiwan was concerned enough that its armed forces were put on alert . 12 Past Chinese regimes have used or engineered external crises for domestic political purposes, although of course it is difficult often to separate domestic and external causes of crises. 13 Given continued domestic troubles, the Chinese authorities may be tempted to deflect attention to external entanglements. With the development of Hainan Island a high priority, the recent tensions over the Spratlys, which picked up from late 1987 after a relative lull in the mid-1980s, may be connected with Beijing's desire to solve this destabilizing quarrel sooner rather than later.14 This would then allow for the exploitation of oil and other resources in the area. In August 1990, Chinese Premier Li Peng indicated that China was willing to see a peaceful resolution of the Spratlys by proposing joint development of the islands while putting the intractable issue of sovereignty aside. 15 Although the costs of building up the navy are high, naval chiefs contend that the burden is relatively small when measured against the economic gains in securing the Spratlys and other disputed territories. Even in the short term, the economic benefits of the sea are enormous. By the year 2000, it is estimated that the output value of marine exploitation will be more than 2 per cent of the country's gross national product. 16 These riches fall within the three million square kilometres of maritime territory that China claims. Chinese naval analysts, however,

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Growth o( Chinese Naval Power

Flexing Chinese naval might: a destroyer shows off its firepower during naval manceuvres.

Th e Ralinnale fo r Mnderni za linn

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claim about one million sq uare kilometres of this territory is occupied or bein g ill ega lly exploited by oth er countries.!? While the Spratl ys are currently the most visible offshore territorial confrontation, there is also another dormant dispute with Japan over the Diaoyudao or Senkakus Islands, some 120 miles northeast of Taiwan in the East China Sea. Japan has possession of the islands, although Beijing and Taipei claim sovereignty. The islands are important in delineating the ow nership of the continental shelf. and seismic surveys have indicated that th e maritime zone around th e islands is oil-rich. With the establishment of Sino-Japa nese diplomati c relations in 1974 both Beijing and Tokyo agreed to sh elve th e d ispute for, as Deng Xiaoping said, "the next generation" of leaders to ponder. 18 By ac knowledging this status quo, Beijing has all but tacitl y conceded its claims to the Diaoyudaos in return for closer re lations. Military plan ners. ac knowledging that they hold different views fro m their Foreign Ministry counterparts, say the dispute remain s un settled , and foresee naval tensions in the future , especially if Japan co ntinu es to build up its military capabilities. 19 The lack of any dip lomatic initiatives to solve the dispute over the Spratl ys, or even a conclusive settlement of the Diaoyudaos, contrasts with Beiji ng's current wi llingness to negotiate its boundary disputes with the Soviet Union and India. This difference in approaches may refl ect the specific dy namics of Sino-Soviet or Sino-lndian relations, but it also points to a greater rel uctance by Beijing in compromising over its maritime claims. The land and maritime disputes differ in two important respects. First, the Diaoyudaos and Spratlys hold major economic potential. w hile the disputed land boundaries are of marginal, if any, eco nomic value. Second, while the Soviets or Indians are comparably or significan tl y more powerful militarily than China, the Chinese hold the military advantage over Japan or Vietnam. Over the Spratlys, Beijing has stated adamantly that sovereignty is non-negotiable. Although the Spratlys is at present the most important naval priority, it is nevertheless of short-term importance. The longer-term priority is to establish China as a major regional sea power with an expanded sphere of influence. To effectively achieve this, it needs to deter competition from other aspiring naval powers, most significantly from India and Japan, as well as to better meet the challenges oi Soviet and U.S. sea power in the region. lt was the massive Soviet naval buildup in the 1960s and 1970s that prompted China's own naval expansion programme. The rapid growth of Soviet naval might in Asian waters brought home the realization of how vulnerable China was from a seaborne threat. Although a direct Soviet attack was considered increasingly unlikely in the 1980s, Chinese

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Growth o( Chinese Naval Power

naval policy-makers saw Soviet-U.S. strategic rivalry as one of the main sources of danger for Chi.na throughout this decade: 20 At prese nt , the Pacific region's position in world politics and economi cs has become increasingly pro min ent. Th e two superpowers are e ngaged in a n increasin gly inte nsive co ntention in the region in o rde r to expand th e ir respecti ve sphe res o f influence and to sec k hege mo ny. One uperpowe r foc uses its e fforts on building up it s strat egic strike str ngth a nd speed up th e mod e rnization of its navy a nd air force . AI th e sa me tim e. it takes Cam Ranh Bay and D

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Growth of Chinese Naval Power

build new ships. This included guided-missile destroyers and frigates, submarine chasers, conventional and nuclear submarines, and various logistics and communications vessels. By the early 1980s, the Chinese had completed construction of its first generation of indigenously developed warships.s 3 These warships were, however, rudimentary in capabilities. The priority was on laying down hulls rather than fitting out with state-of-the-art equipment. The focus in this fourth stage is, therefore, to upgrade ships with improved guns, missiles, torpedoes, anti-submarine hardware, more powerful engines, navigational equipment, co-ordinated radars, and ship-borne computers. A new generation of improved warships is gradually entering service, and earlier vessels are either being phased out or being refitted. The first guided missile destroyer, for example, a 3,500-tonne Luda class destroyer commissioned in 1971, was overhauled between 1982 and 1987 with new Haiying-2 ship-to-ship missiles, anti-submarine warfare equipment, a satellite navigation system, and a helicopter deck. 54 Fifteen Ludas are estimated to have been built. 55 A new class of larger destroyers is expected to enter service in the early 1990s. The first two 4,200-tonne destroyers are being built at the Jiaonan Shipyard in Shanghai. Powered by U.S. General Electric gas turbine engines, they will be able to sail further and faster than the Ludas. Other foreign equipment on the new destroyers include French IOOmm main guns. 56 The development of frigates, or escort ships as the Chinese term them, has also been rapid . The first models to enter service in the mid1950s, the Chengdu class, were Soviet Riga-class warships. This was followed by the slightly' m0dified jiangnan class in the mid-1960s. The first domestically designed frigate was the jianghu class, which took six years from drawing board to launch in 1974. The jianghu was designed primarily for operations in coastal waters, and 15-25 ships are estimated to have been commissioned . This is the navy's principal surface warship, and has also been sold to Egypt, Bangladesh, and Thailand. Its armaments include SY-1 ship-to-ship missiles and a lOOmm gun. One of its main weaknesses, however, is its anti-submarine and anti-aircraft capabilities. It is also relatively slow, with a top speed of 26 knots and 15 days maximum endurance. There have been four updated variants. To fill a gaping hole in air defence capabilities, design began in the early 1970s of a dedicated anti-aircraft frigate equipped with shipto-air missiles. This resulted in the jiangdong class escort ship which was launched in 1977. It is equipped with two twin Hongqi-61 missile launchers that are most effective in dealing with low to medium altitude targets. This class appears to have been a disappointment, however, as

Th e Priorities and Goals of Chi11a 's Nava l Buildup

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only three ships were produced. This may have been the vessel referred to by Chinese officials in highlighting the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the navy 's development: 57 During the Cultural Revolution .. . one type of missile vessel was not full y assessed . but was pressed into service with design and testing going on at the same time. The result was that the equipment quality was not up to standard . the development effort was extended for several years. and in th e end th ere was no choice but to abandon the project.

The latest fri gate to enter service is the Kai(eng class of fully-enclosed escorts. With improved power and electronics capabilities, this class represents a major improvement on earlier classes. It can operate under nuclear, biological, and chemical environments. Its weaponry boasts eight C-801 Yin.gji missiles. Its displacement of 1,700 tons and a top speed of around 30 knots is similar to its two predecessors.58 All these frigate types, including the Kai(eng , have been designed primarily for shallow water duties. This is partly because of severe technological limitations in the development of sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-submar ine armaments, w hich is essential for deep water operations. It also indicates though that for the time being naval chiefs are concentrating their efforts to the more modest goal of building up a strong navy that is most effective operating hundreds rather than thou sands of kilometres from home. Certainly, while a blue water navy is the ultimate goal , it is not a viable option when budgets are tight and the navy's main missions are in the seas around China. Another key priority is the building up of a major submarine force . One of the largest and most advanced arms of the service, there are an estimated 130 submarines. including one Xia class strategic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN). five Han class nuclear attack submarines (SSN). one improved Romeo cruise misoile conventional submarine (SSG) , 3-4 improved Ming and 84 Romeo submarines, as well as 30 mothballed Whiskey class submarines.59 The development of an SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missile) capability has been a lengthy and costly process. Research began in 1967, but was slowed down by the Cultural Revolution . It was put back on track following the Third Plenum in December 1978.& 0 The first launch of a booster rocket took place from a Go/( SSBN in October 1982. Based on Soviet blueprints provided before the Sino-Soviet rift , a Golf class SSBN was built by 1964, although it lacked sophisticated equipment or missiles. A relatively obsolete 1950s design, the Golf served primarily to provide initial experience in SSBN construction and SLBM operations.61 Major teething troubles with the Go/(include

Growth o( Chinese Naval Power

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broadening of the corps' f111SS10ns. For political and military reasons. this seems unlikely in the short term. A deployment to the East Fleet would rai. e concerns that Beijing might be preparing military action against Thiwan . And assigning marine forces to the North Sea Fleet would make tittle sense given that there are no territorial dispute within its area of operations. Nonetheless, the current emphasi on the development of rapid reaction and mobile forces in the PLA's gen ral modernization programme could see a bigger ro le for the marine corps in naval priorities in the future. While the marine corps is relatively mall. the navy's amphibious lift capabilities are more substantial. The navy is estimated to have more than 60 large landing craft' able to lift more than 30.000 troops and ~00 light ta nks over several hundred kilometres. This is further backed up by reserve forces numbering eight divi ions and some air-mobile army divi ion that make up the 15th irborne Army based in Thiyuan in hanxi Provin ce.9t As the deploymen t of the marine corps indicates, the South Sea Fleet is receivi ng a grow ing hare in the navy's distribution of resources. This is. of course. beca use of the di pules over th e Paracels and the Spratlys, but other important mi ssio ns include protecting the extensive offshore oil expl oration in th e region. With the relaxation of te nsions with the Soviet Unio n and across the Thiwan Straits in the last decade, NAF units and warships ha ve bee n transferred from other fl eets to the South Sea Fl eet. It is noteworthy. however, that mo t of the warships in the fleet, are re lati ve ly o ld . Of the dozen or so frigates known to be assigned to the fl eet. nin e are of the Chengdu , jiangnan . and j iangdong classes. This is beca use the Vietnamese na vy is considered less capable than other na vies the Chinese a re postured against . It may also be because navy ch iefs are reluctant to risk exposing their newe r warships, such as th e Jianghu and Ka i(eng clas es. to a limited conflict in the South China Sea . With headquart ers in Zhanjiang. the South Sea Fleet's area of operati ons extend s from th e Guangdong coastline to Vietnam and out to the Spratl ys. The fl eet has been active in showi ng off its capabilities and maintaining a highly visible presence around the Spratlys, in particular followi ng a clash with Vietnamese warships in March 1988. Major exerci e ha ve been regularly held every couple of months to test the fl eet's offensive capabilities. including the use of live ammunition .92 Notwithstanding this shift in priorities towards the south . the North Sea Fleet till sta nds at th e top in the navy 's order of battle. Head q uartered in Qingdao in handong Province. the North Sea Fleet's area of operations exte nds fro m the Korean Peninsu la to south of Lianyunggang in Jiangsu Province. Its main mission has been to guard against the threat

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