Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans: From the Indo-Pacific to the South Atlantic (Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security) 3031364759, 9783031364754

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN MARITIME POLITICS AND SECURITY

Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans From the Indo-Pacific to the South Atlantic a r i e l g on z á l e z l e vag gi

Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security

Series Editor Geoffrey F. Gresh, Springfield, VA, USA

The world’s oceans cover over 70% of the planet’s surface area. Global shipping carries at least 80% of the world’s traded goods. Offshore oil and gas account for more than one-third of world energy production. With the maritime domain so important and influential to the world’s history, politics, security, and the global political economy, this series endeavors to examine this essential and distinct saltwater perspective through an interdisciplinary lens, with a focus on understanding the ocean historically, politically, and from a security lens. Through a spectrum of engaging and unique topics, it will contribute to our understanding of the ocean, both historically and in a contemporary light, as source, avenue, and arena: a source of food and energy; an avenue for the flow of goods, people, and ideas; and an arena for struggle and warfare. The series will use an interdisciplinary approach—integrating diplomatic, environmental, geographic, and strategic perspectives—to explore the challenges presented by history and the contemporary maritime issues around the world.

Ariel González Levaggi

Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans From the Indo-Pacific to the South Atlantic

Ariel González Levaggi Political Science and International Relations Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires Argentina

ISSN 2730-7972 ISSN 2730-7980 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security ISBN 978-3-031-36475-4 ISBN 978-3-031-36476-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Nino Marcutti/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For my beloved family, Estefania and Gregorio, For my beloved fathers, Graciela and Ruben

Acknowledgments

The english version of the book is the result of the research project “Comparative Analysis of the Maritime Strategies of the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the Republic of India and their impact on the Southern Regional Maritime Security Orders” commissioned by the Center for Naval Research and Strategic Studies (SDIE/CEEPADE) of the Argentine Navy between 2019 and 2021. I would like to thank the support of the Academic Coordinator of the Center, Rear Admiral (R) Ricardo Alessandrini, the Administrative Coordinator, Rear Admiral (R) Eduardo Castro Rivas and the Head of the Academic Research Area, CN (R) Jorge Defensa for their support and accompaniment during the research task. I would especially like to thank Daiana D’Elia and Pilar Martínez Otero for their role as research assistant in different stages of the project. I would like to thank also to several researchers who have contributed and discuss this volume, particularly Andrés Serbin, Silvana Elizondo, Jorge Malena, Ryan Berg, Paulo Botta, Marcelo Valença, Patricio Giusto, Jorge Chediek, Juan Battaleme, Sebastián Vigliero, and Brendon Cannon, among many others. I would like to thank especially Aigul Kulnazarova for the encouragement to publish the book for the English-speaking public. Finally, I am very grateful to the Palgrave Macmillan team, especially Anca Pusca, and Saranya Siva, who provided the needed guidance and support to undertake the book.

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Praise for “Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans ”

“The profound analysis of book is highly relevant in the context of a changing global geopolitical situation, in which the challenge to the postwar hegemonic order imposes new strategic parameters on the great powers. An essential book for understanding these new realities and reflecting on possible responses.” —Jorge Chediek, Director of the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (2015–2021) “An essential book for understanding the maritime strategies of the great powers of the 21st century that links the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific and the South Atlantic in a pioneering analysis of the maritime actions of the major Eurasian actors.” —Andrés Serbin, President of the Regional Coordination for Economic and Social Research (CRIES) “This book could not be more timely. As the U.S., China, and Russia settle into an era of broad geopolitical competition, maritime influence will be a key component to each country’s grand strategy. This book is a must read for those wanting to know the most important issues at play in maritime competition, and to understand the strategies of rising powers such as India.” —Ryan Berg, Director, Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) ix

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PRAISE FOR “GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN THE …

“This is an essential work for anyone interested in regional security, great powers foreign policy and naval issues. Aimed at scholars of the subject, but also accessible to beginners, the book offers a rigorous analytical approach to central issues for international politics by looking at the disputes and interests of the great powers in the Indo-Pacific and South Atlantic regions. Herein lies the distinctiveness of this book: the analysis is made from a Global Southern perspective, filling an ontological and epistemological gap in a field dominated by North-based readings. This makes the book even more relevant and fundamental for analysts, policymakers and IR students.” —Marcelo Valença, Associate Professor at the Naval War College of Brazil

Contents

1

Introduction References

2

Between Threats and Capabilities: Maritime Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition 2.1 Great Power Competition: The Place of the Seas 2.2 From the Grand Strategy… 2.3 … To the Maritime Strategy 2.4 Threat Perception and Choice of a Maritime Strategy 2.5 Distant Maritime Projections: Effects on Regional Maritime Stability References

1 7 9 11 16 19 23 28 30

Part I Maritime Strategies of Great Powers in the 21st Century 3

United States: Naval Hegemony Faces the Eurasian Challenge 3.1 The City on the Hill: Domestic and International Bases of U.S. Hegemony 3.2 From Liberal Hegemony to a New Grand Strategy of Dual Containment 3.2.1 Facing the Eurasian Axis: A New Grand Strategy of Dual Containment

37 38 42 47

xi

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CONTENTS

3.3

The World According to the Pentagon 3.3.1 Debate and Trajectory Around the Defense Strategy 3.4 The Challenge of the Century: Maintaining Global Maritime Supremacy 3.4.1 Pillars of Global Maritime Supremacy 3.4.2 Naval Primacy in a Renewed Great-Power Competition References 4

5

People’s Republic of China: The ‘Blue’ Dream of a Maritime Challenger 4.1 ‘Democratic Centralism’: The Chinese Communist Party in the Age of Globalization 4.2 Grand Strategy in the Xi Jinping Era: From Pacific Development to the Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation 4.2.1 Moving Away from the Defense: A Changing Orientation 4.2.2 Concentric Objectives Around Territorial Integrity 4.2.3 Centralized Decision-Making, Multiple Instruments Available 4.3 The People’s Liberation Army and Active Defense: Defensive Strategy, Offensive Tactics 4.3.1 The Party, the Red Army, and the Organization of the Military Factor 4.3.2 Armed Forces Faces Regional and Rising Global Challenges 4.4 The ‘Blue’ Dream: Developing Capabilities for a ‘Distant Water’ Navy References Russia’s Maritime Strategy: Between Naval Modernization and Power Projection 5.1 Putin’s Grand Strategy in New Era of Uncertainty 5.1.1 From Pragmatism to Offensiveness as an Organizing Principle

50 52 55 55 57 61 65 66

72 73 77 78 79

80 81 86 95 101 102 103

CONTENTS

The Tripod: Global Status, Regional Primacy, and Deterring NATO 5.1.3 Instruments: Diplomacy, Soft Power, and (a Lot of) Coercion 5.2 Military Strategy: Hybrid Conflicts and Regional Priorities 5.3 Russian Navy: Between the Coast and the Global Seas References

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5.1.2

6

Republic of India: A Democratic Power with Maritime Aspirations 6.1 New Delhi in the World: International Strategy in a Complex Environment 6.1.1 Continentalism and Defensive Orientation 6.1.2 India’s Goals: Sovereignty, Stability, and Development 6.1.3 Indian Arrows: Between Attraction and Nuclear Power 6.1.4 The Challenge of a Rising Star: Between Minimalism and Maximalism 6.2 Indian Military Strategy: Rivalry with Pakistan and the China’s Challenge 6.3 India’s Maritime Strategy: Regional Priorities, Global Issues References

105 106 108 117 126 131 132 133 135 137 138 141 143 153

Part II Naval Competition in the Oceans of the Global South 7

Indo-Pacific: Clash of the Titans 7.1 A Multipolar Scenario: A Crossroads of Narratives and Geopolitical Stakes 7.1.1 A Complex Chessboard: Geopolitical Ambitions and Projects 7.2 Critical Instability: From Taiwan to the Gulf of Aden 7.2.1 Global Level: Towards the Thucydides Trap 7.2.2 Regional Level: Regional Rivalries and Maritime Tensions 7.2.3 Transnational Level: Bottlenecks and the Malacca Dilemma

159 163 164 167 168 169 171

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CONTENTS

7.3

New Wine in Old Wineskins: Institutions, Alliances, and Regional Challenges 7.3.1 The Geopolitical Containment Game: Between QUAD and AUKUS 7.3.2 The Geo-economic Dynamics Game: From BRI to RCEP 7.3.3 Convergences and Divergences in Maritime Cooperation References 8

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The South Atlantic and the Global Strategic Competition 8.1 The Peaceful Ocean? Trends in the South Atlantic Scenario 8.1.1 Extra-Regional Great Powers in the South Atlantic 8.2 Sustained Projection: United States 8.3 Increasing Projection: China 8.4 Selective Projection: Russian Federation 8.5 Limited Projection: India 8.6 The South Atlantic vis-à-vis the Eurasian Powers References Southern Oceans and Great Power Competition: A Call for Strategic Autonomy References

173 174 177 179 181 185 186 190 191 196 205 212 218 219 227 234

Bibliography

235

Index

263

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Grand strategy and maritime strategy

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Map 4.1

China’s first and second island chains (https://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Island_chain_strategy#/media/File:Geogra phic_Boundaries_of_the_First_and_Second_Island_Chains. png)

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 8.1 Table 8.2

Table 8.3

World hierarchy of great and regional power navies (adapted from Burilkov 2017: 59) Grand strategy and maritime strategy selection Stability/instability balance High-level visits (only President and PM) of the People’s Republic of China to Latin America (2000–2020) High-Level Visits of the Russian Federation to Latin America (1996–2023) (adapted and updated from Rouvinski 2020: 6) High-level visits of the Republic of India to Latin America (2000–2020)

21 27 30 199

209 215

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Two weeks before the start of the Russian Federation’s large-scale military intervention in Ukraine, a diplomatic incident occurred between Moscow and Washington over an alleged detection and pursuit of a Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine in Russian territorial waters of the Kuril Islands archipelago. The Russian Defense Ministry filed a note of protest with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, while the incident was denied by the Pentagon. Beyond the veracity of the incident, the sea remains a domain in which the dispute between the great naval powers is expressed. From a geopolitical point of view, the oceans are a central domain of the great power competition, as well as a vital point of reference for the strategic projection of the navies at the international level. The achievement of supremacy in the seas has traditionally been one of the main indicators of the existence of regional and global hegemonies. Geopolitics and geoeconomics are intertwined. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that around 80% of world trade is carried out by sea, while more than half of it is centered on the Asian continent. The increase in the transit of goods through the global maritime space in parallel with the shift of the geo-economic axis from the Atlantic to the Pacific with the epicenter in the rise of the People’s Republic of China has had a profound effect on the structure of the international system and can be considered the central © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. González Levaggi, Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1_1

1

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geopolitical change of the twenty-first century. In this sense, the international maritime order is rapidly transforming to reflect a multipolar world. This transformation is intimately related to global and regional geopolitical and geoeconomic developments in the regional maritime orders located in East and South Asia. Fundamental concepts in geopolitics and international security studies have focused primarily on the land dimension of great power competition. Classical geopolitics offers telluric concepts such as Halford Mackinder’s pivot or heartland area and the living space or lebensraum coined by Friedrich Ratzel and theorized by Karl Haushofer. However, one must also consider the maritime domain, a dimension of such importance whose modern theoretical tradition goes back to the classic naval geopolitical texts. Maritime concepts such as the naval supremacy of the Alfred Mahan, the Julian Corbett’s notion of maritime dominance and the naval projection strategy of the Soviet Admiral Sergey Gorshkov have been at the center of the naval geopolitical imagination. Despite emphasizing different spaces, these geopolitical thinkers approached the fundamentals from a dualistic point of view: they understood the importance of control of one element by the other, with greater or lesser emphasis. For example, in naval geopolitical thought there had been a permanent discussion on the reciprocal relationship between land and sea as key to the control of the sea. The Corbettian (or maritime) school emphasizes the limits of the maritime realm based on the differences between land and sea as a strategic space in which naval forces must support land forces. In the words of Corbett (2014), “since men live on the land and not on the sea, the great issues between warring nations have always been decided, except in the rarest cases, either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.” In that sense, maritime affairs matter but they depend on the land dynamics where men live. Also the author emphasized the multidimensionality of the marine environment, stressing the weight of both military and non-military factors in achieving dominance of the sea. In his seminal work, Mahan (2007) argued that control of the sea by maritime commerce and naval force leads to a central influence on world politics, e.g., the United Kingdom throughout the nineteenth century. The Mahanist (or navalist) school emphasizes the role of naval military power and calls for the supremacy of the oceans over land, given that

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INTRODUCTION

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control over maritime lines of communication makes it possible to acquire supremacy at sea and deny projection to the rival state. The twenty-first century is witnessing the struggle to maintain the naval and maritime supremacy of the United States over the last 30 years, and also the rise/return of powers traditionally of continentalist tradition but seeking to strengthen zones of influence in adjacent seas (and beyond) such as Russia, China and India. Faced with situations of naval hegemony, there have been multiple cases of challenges and confrontations for primacy on the seas. History presents us with multiple episodes of dispute for naval primacy. The Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom confronted each other in the sixteenth century until the Armada Invencible was defeated by the English Navy in 1588. Germany tried unsuccessfully to develop a naval force that would dethrone British naval hegemony in the years leading up to World War I. Beginning in the 1960s, the Soviet Union attempted to break the U.S. geostrategic encirclement of the “land rim” (or rimland) by building a global navy under the leadership of Admiral Gorshkov although cost overruns and Soviet implosion thwarted that effort. The twenty-first century is no exception to the hegemonic challenges to dominance of the seas. Supremacy in maritime spaces, control of sea lines of communication, projection over strategic enclaves and access to ocean resources continue to be high on the agendas of the world’s major power players. This book addresses the maritime strategies of the major global players of the twenty-first century and the development of naval dynamics in two broad maritime spaces of the Global South1 : the Indo-Pacific as the epicenter of current naval competition and the South Atlantic, a relatively geopolitical stable area with multiple challenges ahead, including the increasing presence of extra-regional great powers and the discussion over the future of Antarctica. The great powers selected for this essay are the United States, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of India. This choice may sound arbitrary but two

1 I use the term Global South to refer to countries that self-identify or are identified

as “developing” beyond their specific geographic location in contrast to the developed countries of the Global North. Even if geographically most of the Indo-Pacific’s countries are geographically in the Northern Hemisphere, they belong to the developing economies category and they participate in Global South-related multilateral initiatives such as the Group of 77 + China.

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specific criteria were used to define the great powers of the twenty-first century: economic power projected in the next three decades and actual military capabilities, emphasizing nuclear triad capabilities. According to a PwC report (2017), by mid-century China, India and the United States would rank among the top three in the global economy while Russia would occupy the sixth position after Indonesia and Brazil. In this context, the main European economies would drop several places, such as Germany (from 5 to 9th), the United Kingdom (9th–10th) and France (10th–12th). In about three decades, the shift of the economic axis from the Atlantic to the Pacific will continue the trajectory started early this century. In relation to military spending, according to SIPRI figures in constant (2021) USD, the first four countries with the highest military spending were the United States (USD 767 billion), the People’s Republic of China (USD 270 billion), the Republic of India (USD 73 billion) and the Russian Federation (USD 63 billion). All these countries have extensive military capabilities in the land, air and naval domains, in addition to the so-called nuclear triad, i.e. the ability to deploy nuclear weapons in the three classic components of the armed forces: land, air and naval.2 Knowledge about the maritime strategies of the great powers is central to understand and forecast changing scenarios in regional maritime spaces, especially in a context in which a greater degree of great power competition in Eurasia (Gresh 2020) and the Indo-Pacific (Rossiter and Cannon 2020; Cannon and Hakata 2022), in addition to the growing involvement of extra-regional powers in the Western Hemisphere (Ellis 2015a, b; Berg and Brands 2021) and the South Atlantic (Gonzalez Levaggi 2020). This book presents the maritime strategies of the United States, Russia, China and India to explain the regional dynamics both at the Indo-Pacific realm and the South Atlantic based on a conceptual framework grounded on a neoclassical realism perspective. The conceptual approach is complemented by strategic studies, neoclassical geopolitics and grand strategies literature that catch up on the relevance of

2 Given these criteria, countries with an important tradition in the naval area and presence in the Southern Oceans such as the United Kingdom and France are left out of the analysis although it is important to underline their membership in collective security mechanisms led by the USA such as NATO, or the case of AUKUS, a military alliance recently created between the USA, the United Kingdom and Australia.

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INTRODUCTION

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geographic spaces and natural resources in structuring global and regional dynamics (Kaplan 2018). Neoclassical realism incorporates domestic variables to broaden the range of explanations centered on systematic explanations such as the distribution of capabilities at the global level or cycles of hegemonic change (Rose 1998). In addition to global transformations with the rise of the relative economic and military power of the great powers, the perception of threats (global, regional and domestic) of the government or executive node is introduced as an intervening domestic variable in the context of a given ruling coalition. Both elements are fundamental to explain the process of change and transformation of national security and international affairs policies in the case studies (Lobell 2003). States often react in multiple ways to the perceived threat by planning, deciding, and implementing a grand strategy (or international strategy).3 Such a concept refers to the ‘intentional employment of all available instruments of power’ of a state actor (Gray 2011), and those sectoral-type strategies linked directly to the maritime and naval domains, especially in their global projection (Till 2007). Maritime strategies represent the expression of a much broader design that contains military and non-military elements, so it is necessary to understand both the broad context where such a strategy takes place and the various tools at a state’s disposal. Finally, the type of a selected maritime strategy—especially those who opt for power projection at the global scale—and the interaction of great powers in the maritime domain gives a particular character to regional maritime orders that can take on a confrontational character, such as the South China Sea, or a more cooperative one, such as the South Atlantic. The book explores the competition for maritime supremacy among major powers in the current international order. It begins by discussing the end of the unipolar era and the return of great-power competition in a multipolar world, with a focus on the role of the sea in this competition. The book adopts a neoclassical realist approach to analyze the maritime strategies of major powers. It discusses the concept of grand strategy and its expression in the maritime sphere, including the perception of external threats, capabilities, and the choice of maritime strategies. The essay then delves into the naval competition in the oceans of the Global South,

3 These concepts will be used interchangeably.

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focusing on four major powers: the United States, China, Russia, and India. It discusses the grand strategies of these powers, including their domestic and international bases of hegemony, military strategies, and maritime aspirations, while also examines the challenges and opportunities these powers face in maintaining or achieving maritime dominance, and how their grand strategies are reflected in their maritime strategies at the Southern Oceans, the Indo-Pacific realm and the South Atlantic. The book is organized into three sections. The first section presents an analytical reflection that allows us to evaluate the strategies of the maritime powers within an international order characterized in recent years by renewed strategic competition between great powers. The era of hegemonic stability following the end of the Cold War seems to have been left behind, while Beijing and Moscow introduce a series of direct and indirect challenges to the global security architecture built and led by the global leadership of the United States. In this framework, the Chapter 2 offers a conceptual framework that assembles great powers’ threat perceptions and the selection of a grand strategy with its maritime counterpart to explain regional and extra-regional naval deployments. The second section develops the maritime expression of the international strategies of the great powers. Each chapter devoted to the great powers identifies their main threats to national security and presents the main features of a strategy to meet the strategic challenges. In their actions, the rising Eurasian great powers have projected their interests beyond their surrounding region, tangentially including the South Atlantic, while the United States retains an extended presence with a global deployment that includes the entire Western Hemisphere. Chapter 3 assesses the trajectory of the United States’ post-Cold War maritime strategy of naval supremacy in the framework of a grand strategy of primacy, currently in crisis due to the rise of the Eurasian powers. Chapter 4 analyzes the emergence of the People’s Republic of China whose global economic presence augurs an extrarregional strategic projection, although for the time being regional conditions present it with a series of obstacles that hinder the development of a global blue water navy. Chapter 5 deals with the case of the Russian Federation in which a pragmatic and opportunistic approach centered on a continentalist geopolitical orientation has given way to an offensive strategy with a presence as a global actor given its status as the world’s second largest navy. Chapter 6 presents the case of the Republic of India, which presents a mixture of a desire for a global leading role vis-à-vis the Global South with major

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concerns with their rivals, Pakistan, and China, given its recent projection in the Indian Ocean, which end up limiting its maritime aspirations in the Indo-Pacific. The third section presents an analysis of the regional dynamics of two southern maritime scenarios: the Indo-Pacific and the South Atlantic. In the first case (Chapter 7), the region has become a space of geopolitical and geoeconomic confrontation that is expressed in the multiple narratives on maritime dominance. In relation to the South Atlantic (Chapter 8), the currently stable strategic scenario matches with the increasing role of the great powers, especially related to the geoeconomic projection of the People’s Republic of China, the geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation and a still timid presence of the Republic of India. Finally, the conclusion outlines a series of lessons to reflect on the evolution of maritime competition in the Oceans of the Global South.

References Berg, Ryan and Hal Brands (2021) The Return of Geopolitics: Latin America and the Caribbean in an Era of Strategic Competition. Florida: Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy. Cannon, Brendon and Hakata, Kei (eds) (2022) Indo-Pacific Strategies: Navigating Geopolitics at the Dawn of a New Age. New York: Routledge. Corbett, Julien (2014) Principles of Maritime Strategy. New York: Dover Publications. Ellis, Evan (2015a) “China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position,” U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. Ellis, Evan (2015b) “The Impact of China on the Security Environment of Latin America and the Caribbean,” in Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security, eds. Arie Kacowicz and David R. Mares. New York: Routledge. Gonzalez Levaggi, Ariel (2020) “Eurasia en el Atlántico Sur: evaluando la proyección marítima de China, Rusia e India,” Revista Defensa Nacional, 5, pp. 79–115. Gray, Colin (2011) The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gresh, Geoffrey (2020) To Rule Eurasian Waves: The New Great Power Competition at Sea. London: Yale University Press. Kaplan, Robert (2018) The Return of Marco Polo’s World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Random House. Lobell, Steve (2003) The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

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Mahan, Alfred (2007) Influencia del Poder Naval en la Historia. Ministerio de Defensa del Reino de España. PwC (2017) “The Long View: How Will the Global Economic Order Change by 2050?”, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/world-2050/assets/pwcthe-world-in-2050-full-report-feb-2017.pdf. Rose, Gideon (1998) “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 51 (1), pp. 144–172. Rossiter, Ash and Brendon Cannon (eds) (2020) Conflict and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: New Geopolitical Realities. New York: Routledge. Till, Geoffrey (2007) Poder Marítimo: una guía para el siglo XXI. Buenos Aires: Instituto de Publicaciones Navales.

CHAPTER 2

Between Threats and Capabilities: Maritime Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition

The discussion around the nature of international order is one of the most important topics for the discipline of international relations. Henry Kissinger (2016) states that an international order is the practical application of ideas about nature of just arrangements and the distribution of power thought to be applicable to a portion of the word. In recent years, debates around order have generally referred to the return of global geopolitical competition between great powers and a progressive detachment of Washington—especially during Donald Trump’s administration between 2016 and 2020—from the norms, rules and procedures that established the so-called ‘international liberal order’. This order that achieved greater universality after the end of the Cold War was organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity (Ikenberry 2018: 7). Despite having a primacy in the Atlantic and Western world, this order was not so liberal in its beginnings, and only limitedly global until the fall of the Soviet Union (Ferguson 2018), while the promoter of such an order did not hesitate to break multilateral principles to promote its agenda as the case of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Walt 2018). Beyond the criticisms, it is important to temporally segment the evolution of the international order into two periods. From the end of the Cold War until the international financial crisis of 2008/2009, the order © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. González Levaggi, Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1_2

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was characterized by a certain stability under US hegemony based on the strengthening of globalization and widespread economic growth in both the developed world and the Global South, positively impacting diverse regions such as Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe or Central America. In the maritime domain different types of countries strived to increase maritime security and effective maritime governance to generate better conditions for stability (Bekkevold and Till 2016: 6). Despite multilateral efforts in the framework of the G-20, the postG-20 crisis period has been characterized as a G-Zero whereby many countries are strong enough to prevent agreements, but none has the political and economic power to remake the status quo (Bremmer 2012). Another interpretation refers that the emerging order is a highly complex, decentered and interdependent multiplex world that possesses five central characteristics: absence of a global hegemony, proliferation of state and non-state actors, broad patterns of interdependence, a multi-level global governance architecture, and the existence of multiple modernities (Acharya 2018). However, the recent international trajectory exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis presents us with a scenario in which high politics issues have an increasingly prominent place on the international agenda, while those of the great powers have increasingly assertive and, in many cases, unilateral actions. Trump’s ‘America First’, Xi Jinping’s ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ and the repeated use of Russian military force in regional conflicts are clear examples. The international order not only presents itself with a greater number of state actors with power—that is, multipolar—but also with a greater fragmentation of regional blocs, as in the case of Brexit or the crisis of Latin American regionalism, and a progressive erosion of the norms and principles that have regulated the maintenance of international peace and security. The twenty-first century has begun. The military intervention of the Russian Federation in Ukraine is a revealing symptom of a process of transformation of world politics that has ended up shattering the very foundations of the stability of the international order. The international financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the dynamism of the emerging powers nucleated in the BRICS forum have facilitated the shift of geo-economic centrality from the Atlantic to the Pacific, as well as the geopolitical centrality of the Atlantic space towards Greater Eurasia, with ramifications in the main global mechanisms of domination and allocation of resources.

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BETWEEN THREATS AND CAPABILITIES: MARITIME …

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In the last two decades, the hegemony of the United States has diminished globally in the military, economic and technological spheres. At the same time, China has gaining ground as the great strategic competitor in the twenty-first century and Russia counters with assertive actions in the face of NATO enlargement, while trying to strengthen leadership in the Kremlin’s perceived zone of influence, as witnessed by the repeated use of force from Georgia to Ukraine. At the same time, the confluence between Russia and China seeks to establish a ‘new type of relations between world powers’ that recognizes their status in global politics as non-western great powers (Russia Presidency 2022). In general terms, both Washington’s relative weight and its influence and projection in non-Western regions— especially in the Eurasian space—has been on the decline, as has been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, while new challenges to the control of global common spaces appear, especially in the maritime, space and cyberspace spheres. This section presents the place of the maritime spaces in the new age of great power competition, while presents the main conceptual notions guiding the essay: grand strategy, threats perceptions, the role of capabilities and the choice of a maritime strategy with its impact overseas.

2.1

Great Power Competition: The Place of the Seas

International politics has a cooperative and a conflictive side. States do not always find themselves in situations of extreme tension, while the phenomenon of inter-state warfare is increasingly rare. At the same time, globalization and networks of economic interdependence have shaped an increasingly integrated world. In recent years, however, the liberal illusion of a more collaborative and peaceful world seems to be dimming as a new period of tensions between the great powers is taking hold, while the use of military power is once again being revalued. Russia’s actions in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s revisionism in the Greater Middle East are some examples of this. One of the concepts that have captured this moment and made it the central element of a narrative that permeates the corridors of power in the world’s major capitals is that of great-power competition. DiCicco and Onea (2023) defined it as a practice which remains as “a permanent, compulsory, comprehensive, and exclusive contest for supremacy in

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a region or domain among those states considered to be the major players in the international system” that “varies in intensity over time and space but remains a persistent aspect of the international system of sovereign states”. This term is very dear to the realist tradition since it indicates an expected dynamic in a system where there is a series of powers with great military capabilities that compete against each other. In a situation of relative parity of power, competition not only becomes more acute but also the system becomes more unstable. In line with Mearsheimer (2001: 33), states recognize that the “more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival”. Indeed, the best guarantee for survival is to become the most powerful state in the entire international system. Hal Brands (2017) identifies six propositions of the new international environment. First, this type of great power competition is more the norm than the exception in the history of international affairs. Second, frictions between great powers never completely disappeared. Third, competition has returned in a fuller and sharper form because of systemic conditions. Fourth, competition and revisionism are more acute today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Fifth, competition among the great powers will certainly lead to a more dangerous and disorderly international environment, but it will not necessarily lead to a major breakdown of the existing international system. Finally, as phenomena such as U.S. nationalism, populism and strategic retrenchment strengthen, it will be more difficult for the United States and its allies to meet the challenge of intensified great power competition. In this context, the world of great power competition has clear implications for maritime dominance. The current dilemma is that the United States finds itself with a frayed hegemony, while the progressive rapprochement between Russia and China in the Eurasian space further complicates its strategic outlook. The use of the great power competition in public discussion is relatively recent. The then candidate Barack Obama in 2006 and Richard Haass in 2008—President of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)—referred to great-power competition as part of the past in the face of advancing globalization and new transnational threats, while US academic Robert Kagan refuted this optimistic view as a moment of transition (Friedman 2019). The notion of great-power competition will only position itself as the main vector of global strategic discussions in Washington in the mid-2010s as a response to the Ukrainian crisis and strategic competition among emerging powers in Asia.

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In a presentation to the think tank Center for a New American Security (CNAS), then Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Obama and Trump administrations, Robert Work (2015) stated “unipolar world is starting to fade and we enter a more multipolar world, in which U.S. global leadership is likely to be increasingly challenged. So among the most significant challenges in this 25 years, and one in my view that promises to be the most stressing one, is the reemergence of great power competition.” The United States’ own recognition of the global transformations towards a multipolar world clearly had a correlate in Washington’s strategic vision of the world. The development of the concept will go in line with modifications in U.S. defense and security policy. In 2017, the National Security Strategy was reformulated taking global competition as the analytical framework for the development of the American country’s domestic and international actions, something that will be replicated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (DoD 2018). Specifically, the National Security Strategy notes that the “United States will respond to the growing political, economic, and military competitions we face around the world. China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity” while clarifying that competition “competition does not always mean hostility, nor does it inevitably lead to conflict” (White House 2017: 2– 3). It further identifies other actors that undermine Washington’s global interests such as Iran, North Korea, in addition to terrorist organizations. With the arrival of the Biden Administration the diplomatic tone moderated, although the “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” published in March 2021 continues to identify China and Russia as rivals, although in the case of Beijing it is seen as the main strategic competitor in the long term. This perspective prevailing in Washington also has its correlate in Moscow and Beijing. In the case of Russia, in diplomatic discourse and practice there is a permanent emphasis on its role as a great power and the existence of a post-hegemonic and multipolar world that the rest of the countries should recognize as such. In the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation document, it is recognized on the one hand that there is an increase in tensions due to “disparities in global development, the widening prosperity gap between States and growing competition for resources, access to markets and control over transport arteries. This competition involves not only human, research and technological capabilities, but has been increasingly gaining a civilizational

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dimension in the form of dueling values” while warning of systemic problems due to the “geopolitical expansion pursued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)” (Russian Presidency 2016). In the same vein, according to India’s National Security Strategy (2019), the global strategic scenario is characterized by a growing polarization between the major powers, China, Russia and the United States which is changing dramatically the post-WW2 structure of international relations. Finally, in the case of Beijing, the 2019 ‘China’s National Defense in a New Era’ document acknowledges the existence of a more balanced and multipolar world while “international strategic competition is on the rise” due to the actions of the major global powers. It specifically notes that: “The US has adjusted its national security and defense strategies, and adopted unilateral policies. It has provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability. NATO has continued its enlargement, stepped up military deployment in Central and Eastern Europe, and conducted frequent military exercises. Russia is strengthening its nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities for strategic containment, and striving to safeguard its strategic security space and interests. The European Union (EU) is accelerating its security and defense integration to be more independent in its own security” (State Council 2019). In summary, the main actors of the international order recognize a situation of strategic tension, although in the case of the United States it is proposed as an alternative narrative that allows modifying the axes of the grand strategy in a direction that has some similarity with the previous period of strategic competition, the Cold War. The node of great power competition lies between the vast Eurasian space and the Indo-Pacific region where the great powers of the present and future contest for allies, spheres of influence and presence in the maritime space. Just as international order reflects a certain type of resource distribution and the type of rules shared among great powers, international maritime order is presented as a consequence of “how states and the international community make use of the oceans both as a means of strategic dominance and maneuver, as a reserve resource and a means of transportation in an orderly, legal and sustainable manner” (Bekkevold and Till 2016: 307). As in world politics, the maritime dimension is

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shaped by the changing distribution of power and the rule-based governance. While the first dimension is characterized by named competition among great powers, the second has a wide range of arrangements which main expression is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adopted in 1982. The agreement offers a comprehensive set of norms and rules regarding the oceans and maritime zones governance which was ratified almost unanimously by 168 parties. Even if the United States did not ratify the treaty and extends the use of freedom of navigation with military warships, the bulk of the UNCLOS norms have been implemented from small to great powers. The global oceans are both an arena for global cooperation and development, but also for geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. Given that the naval factor is fundamental, three elements are key in addressing maritime competition: maritime geoeconomics, great power status and the security of vital sea lanes of communication. Geoeconomics—or the use of economic tools to achieve economic or political objectives—involves different dimensions such as trade policy, investment policy, and energy and natural resource policies (Gresh 2020: 10). To this end, it is essential to avoid obstacles to trade, financial and military flows, while at the same time it is critical to develop a system that secures the sea lines of communication, especially at choke points such as the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca or the Bosphorus. In terms of resources, transport or dominance, the maritime space has two key dimensions in which the international order is challenged. First, from a systemic view, the overall scenario is affected by structural changes in the distribution of global power, changes in threat perception, naval modernization, and changes in naval capabilities, along with changes in the interpretation and application of the difficult regulation of maritime rights laws. Second, there is a challenge from below through non-traditional threats such as drug trafficking, piracy, terrorism and indiscriminate illegal fishing (Bekkevold and Till 2016: 7–8). The more resources a country possesses, the more it needs to protect its assets. This becomes more pressing when countries aspire to (or have) great power status as the possession of a modern and sophisticated navy is taken for granted. The economic and commercial expansion of China and India are examples of the implications for the development of a fleet with progressive overseas capabilities, while the modernization of the Russian fleet has paralleled the military assertiveness that has had the Navy as a key

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player, especially in the Syrian theater of operations. Finally, the protection of vital sea lanes of communication requires the development of blue water naval capabilities, together with a policy of access and/or installation of bases that logistically allows to achieve the stated objectives. In the case of the United States this is evident given the network of bases and naval facilities globally. However, as Gresh (2020: 21) states “China, Russia, and India have begun to expand their maritime presence beyond their traditional regional seas, exhibiting intensifying blue-water naval capabilities. If the competition for superior resources and control over Eurasia’s sea lanes of communication continues, geoeconomic competition could morph into intensifying military and security friction. And if such trends prevail, this coming period may mark the beginning of a new Eurasian maritime century with the United States looking unprepared.” This is the new chessboard of naval competition.

2.2

From the Grand Strategy…

The concept of strategy has traditionally been linked to the phenomenon of war. One of the leading thinkers on war and strategy, Clausewitz (2007) understood strategy as the use of combat for the goals of war. However, in recent times the application has expanded into non-military areas, from political marketing to business development. The interpretation of ‘grand strategy’ has slowly become divorced from the military dimension. Leading strategists on the subject such as Collin Gray, John Gaddis or Paul Kennedy, together with authors of the realist school such as Barry Posen or Jeffrey Taliaferro have characterized grand strategy as a kind of common thread that articulates the relationship between means and ends so that the state can achieve its objectives, intimately linked to the national interest (Van Hooft 2017). According to Kennedy (1991: 5), a deep understanding of grand strategy must focus on politics understood as the conjugation of military and non-military elements for the preservation and projection of long-term interests. From a naval perspective, Corbett posited a distinction between major and minor strategy, in that the former deals with ulterior objectives such as the goals of an armed conflagration, while the latter focuses on primary objectives (Speller 2018: 38). Decades later, Liddell Hart will make a distinction between pure and grand strategy, whereby the former—also called tactics—represents the application of strategy at a low level, while

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grand strategy coordinates and directs all of the nation’s resources toward the achievement of the political object of war (Strachan 2006: 40). In any case, throughout the conceptual discussions on the Grand Strategy, multiple interpretations have been generated on the definition, scope and contents of a comprehensive approach in relation to the objectives of the State. A sector of realist authors, despite incorporating the non-military dimension of grand strategy, has emphasized military threats, coercive power and a part of the conceptual representations of grand strategy such as military doctrine (Kitcher 2010: 320–121). Gray (2011) defines grand strategy as the “The direction and use made of any or all among the total assets of a security community in support of its policy goals as decided by policy.” While Posen (1984: 13) understands it as a kind of “political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best “cause” security for itself.” Another more flexible approach has proposed a much more balanced view between military and non-military factors. Gaddis (2009) understands it as “the process by which a state relates long-term strategic ends to means under the rubric of an overarching and enduring vision to advance the national interest.” From neoclassical realism, its main referents interpret it in a similar vein as the “organizing principle or conceptual blueprint that animates all of a state’s relations with the outside world” to secure and maximize its interests” (Lobell et al. 2016: 15). Based on the latter definition, we highlight three elements of grand strategy: its organizing principle, objectives and dimensions. The first point refers to the set of assumptions that guide action in a logical and coordinated manner. To date, multiple typologies have been proposed, differentiating expansionist or status-quo oriented strategies (Luttwak 2001), expansive or declining (Kennedy 1992), coercive, deterrent and accommodative (Kupchan 1994), or, similarly, offensive, defensive or accommodative strategies (Johnson 1995: 112–113). According to Kitchen (2010: 138), adjustments in grand strategy have two levels, first or second order. In primary changes there is a modification of the organizing principle of the grand strategy due to the identification of a new threat, the alteration in the classification of threats or the change of a governing coalition that resignifies such threats. Second-order changes represent adjustments of the grand strategy within the same organizing principle. In line with Johnson’s (1995) typology, a defensive grand strategy prioritizes the achievement of internal border security by emphasizing

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internal over external balancing efforts, while promoting deterrence actions through area denial and selective intervention policies. At the same time, it tends to emphasize the use of non-coercive tools such as diplomacy, economic and commercial incentives as well as balancing and bandwagoning practices to achieve political objectives. In contrast, an offensive strategy relies on the potential use of force and places its focus on security beyond its borders, and therefore has a maximalist aspiration to defeat or neutralize the enemy, although this does not mean that such a grand strategy is necessarily imperialist. The third option represents an intermediate point and can be labeled as pragmatic or accommodationist since, although it has a general defensive posture, it can carry out aggressive actions from the tactical point of view. The ulterior objectives of a grand strategy are intimately linked to the very ends projected by a state, linked both to the very survival of the state entity or the extension of its influence in terms of its power, wealth, and/or prestige. Generally, these ends prefigure the type of organizing principle whose breadth incorporates the totality of the instruments and dimensions rooted in the state, including its maritime facet. In the face of certain tensions and crossed paths, Strachan (2006: 37) wonders why there is, on the one hand, a strategy and, on the other, sectoral strategies such as the naval one. While the definition of objectives may be modified in relation to the definition of vital interests and perceived threats at the global or regional level, the grand strategy articulates the totality of both military and non-military instruments, as well as shaping sectoral strategies in the different spaces that states occupy immediately: air, land and sea. In recent years, dimensions such as space and cybernetics have been added. Finally, the instrumental dimensions or tools of a grand strategy can be divided into four components—military doctrine, diplomacy, economic policy—which possess a high degree of interdependence, and an important degree of internal consistency on the basis of organizing principles. Military doctrine represents the set of general concepts and principles guiding the action of the Armed Forces, the arrangement of which is closely related to the type of guiding principle of the grand strategy. Diplomacy, both reserved and public, brings together the main tools of a state’s non-coercive projection, from the deployment of embassies to the provision of humanitarian aid. Finally, economic policy reflects a certain distribution of material resources in relation to a specific economic model

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whose variation may range from a centralized economy to the AngloSaxon version of capitalism. Furthermore, it is important to consider soft power as a complementary element that includes those instruments that attract and persuade a third actor with generally innocuous elements such as culture, language and development cooperation, among others.

2.3

… To the Maritime Strategy

The maritime strategy is that portion of the grand strategy that applies a series of principles to ensure the survival and project the interests of a state in the maritime space, understanding this from a multidimensional point of view that incorporates economic, commercial, political, military, environmental, scientific and technological facets. The same could be applied to the terrestrial or aerial sphere, although emphasizing that defense and national security issues are part of the scheme of a grand strategy (see Fig. 2.1). The sea is a three-dimensional space, so that interaction with other strategies is essential for the development of maritime power. Following Corbett’s perspective, maritime strategy goes beyond a naval strategy as the former must serve the political interests of the state, while the latter cannot be seen as dissociated from the terrestrial realm as they are interdependent (Till 2007: 76–77). Hattendorf (2013: 10) agrees with this perspective, presenting it as the comprehensive management of all aspects of national power aimed at achieving specific political objectives in a specific situation by exercising a certain degree of control at sea. Due to this dual dimension of maritime strategy, navies play an important but not decisive role given their limited role in certain maritime activities such as the exploitation of economic resources or the development of transportation, among others. The three-dimensionality of the maritime environment includes the surface of the sea, in addition to that which lies below and above it. In this sense, the maritime domain includes the oceans, seas, bays, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals (Speller 2018: 15). Throughout history, different maritime strategies have been intimately linked to the aspirations, capabilities, and institutional trajectory of states. In relation to aspirations, the organizing principle of grand strategy usually gives us a fairly clear guide to its strategic projection horizon, while a country’s place within the global naval hierarchy that can initially be distinguished between blue, green and brown water

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Grand Strategy

Defense and Security Strategy

Naval Strategy

Economic Development Strategy

Civil Assets

Air Strategy

Resources

Transportation

Terrestrial Strategy

Trade

Maritime Power Joint Operations

Fig. 2.1 Grand strategy and maritime strategy

navies according to the areas in which they operate. Blue waters refer to open oceans, green to coastal waters and ports, while brown to navigable rivers and estuaries (Speller 2018: 16). Burilkov (2017: 56) distinguishes four types of blue water navies to which he assigns defining capabilities and major naval instruments: regional projection, multi-regional projection, limited global reach, and global projection (Table 2.1). After a series of decades of economic and military growth, emerging naval powers such as India and Brazil are in the category of multi-regional projection with the capacity to project power in regions beyond their exclusive economic zone, in addition to fulfilling their task of defending their territorial integrity, while Russia and China have navies with power projection in extra-regional theaters. Finally, the institutional trajectory is linked to the degree of strength of the state

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in terms of its continuity and bureaucratic improvement in the maritime field. Just as grand strategies differ in their organizing principle, so do maritime strategies. Based on the previously adopted distinction to grand strategies, there are four types of maritime strategies extensively studied by the maritime and naval literature: coastal defense, sea denial, sea control and power projection. The first two reflect a defensive principle, the third a more pragmatic perspective, while the fourth clearly expresses an offensive orientation. In any case, it should be borne in mind that these strategies are not mutually exclusive, but that the most ambitious maritime strategies presuppose the incorporation of those of lesser scope. In other words, it is impossible to think of a naval projection strategy without having achieved the objectives of coastal defense. In the case of this strategy, the main missions of this type of strategy are the defense of the territorial integrity of the state against traditional statetype threats and the development of military operations linked to public security, typical of navies with limited scope or with functions extended Table 2.1 World hierarchy of great and regional power navies (adapted from Burilkov 2017: 59) Type

Inventory

Power projection with global reach

All types of vessels in large Multiple, regular and quantities sustained global power projection missions, in addition to national defense Aircraft carrier or related At least one global vessel, surface fleet, power projection nuclear submarine, logistic operation, in addition to vessels national defense Aircraft carriers or Power projection helicopter carriers, missions in regions submarines, surface fleet beyond its EEZ, in and logistic vessels addition to national defense Destroyers, frigates, No air fleet support submarines and logistic other than helicopters. vessels Limited power projection area of action

Power projection with limited global reach Multi-regional power projection

Regional power projection

Capabilities

Examples United States

China and Russia

India, United Kingdom and France

Brazil, Japan, Australia and Turkey

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to that area. The New Soviet School, faced with the weakness of the postrevolutionary navy in the 1920s and 1930s, proposed the defense of the Soviet Union’s coasts through the development of an integrated system of mines, coastal artillery, torpedo boats and submarines with a high degree of coordination and inter-force communication. Another complementary approach was proposed by the French Jeune École Française in the late nineteenth century with the idea of developing a small and fast navy supported by coastal defense lines (Speller 2018: 67). Second, for the sea denial strategy the objective is not to use the sea for its own purposes, but to prevent the enemy from doing so in two ways: as an alternative to sea control or as a complement or contribution to sea control albeit with a defensive approach (Till 2007: 205–206). Unlike the coastal defense strategy, “sea denial is tactically offensive, but strategically defensive, whose fundamental objective is to create a forbidden sea zone where the opponent does not dare or cannot advance” (Burilkov 2017: 66). Therefore, artillery and submarines alone are not enough, but rather an improvement in capabilities with the addition of intermediate range surface-to-air missiles, state-of-the-art detection technology, and the development of a naval air force is necessary. Among the contemporary approaches to sea denial, highlighted by the US Navy vis-à-vis China and Russia, is the notion of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) which involves the set of naval, land and air assets that can come to attack maritime forces hundreds of miles offshore, thus hindering access to maritime space and the application of the principle of freedom of the seas (Speller 2018: 99). The third strategy, sea control, is today the main enabler for most maritime operations and has replaced the notion of ‘command of the seas’ as the guiding axis of maritime projection. This strategy works in two ways. For those with an offensive orientation it offers the possibility of having a capability to operate with a high degree of freedom in order to gain ‘command of the sea’ as Corbett proposed. For those with a more defensive stance it underlines the need to defend sovereign spaces with varying levels of success. Given that in maritime space control is a relative term, it is important to stress that there are different degrees of control from sea dominance to absolute enemy control (Till 2007: 203). This is currently the strategy followed by most navies with global and multi-regional projection. One of the fundamental instruments for the development of this strategy is the possession of a carrier battle group, which is usually a

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complex and costly system to maintain, since it involves not only the aircraft carrier but also a protection scheme composed of destroyers, frigates and submarines, as well as state-of-the-art technology for the detection and interception of enemy fleets. Finally, the power projection strategy has a clearly offensive design and can take two forms from the operational point of view: (a) amphibious operations, (b) sea or shore-based naval air strikes by fighters, and (c) cruise/ballistic missiles launched from surface ships or submarines. This approach has been used extensively by the United States in the framework of punitive operations, recently the Russian Federation has opted to carry out such actions in the framework of the Syrian Civil War and China is building up a blue-waters navy which involves the development of carrier battlegroups. Within this scheme, it is fundamental the existence of an important naval aviation composed by a ‘Carrier Strike Group’ (CSG) or in its absence with a helicopter carrier in addition to an important capacity in terms of ballistic missiles, submarines with missile launching capability (SSB/SSBN), whether nuclear or conventional, and special naval forces with their respective means to carry out amphibious operations. In short, maritime strategy cannot be dissociated from grand strategy. On the contrary, understanding the maritime strategies of the Eurasian powers in the new multipolar scenario requires an understanding of their general approaches to world politics. In this line, the evaluation of their maritime strategies requires the analysis and evolution of the organizing principle of the grand strategy, the articulation between the different dimensions of the complex of national interests, in addition to paying attention to the further aspirations that are usually expressed, explicitly or implicitly, in the main official documents linked to the field of defense, national security and foreign policy.

2.4 Threat Perception and Choice of a Maritime Strategy In foreign policy and national security studies, systemic or domestic explanations have taken precedence over grand strategy analysis, generally reflecting approaches from both structural neorealism (Mastanduno 1997; Waltz 2000; Mearsheimer 2001) and Innenpolitik (Kupchan 1994; Johnson 1995; Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 2004). While the systemic approach argues that the evolution of the relative weight in the distribution of global capabilities has a direct impact on the type of external

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behavior of states, the opposite option explains grand strategy mainly on the basis of the internal characteristics of states, from the personality of leaders to economic policy models. However, within the realist research tradition, an alternative approach to understanding the foreign policy of nations, neoclassical realism, has been put forward. This approach does not deny the importance of external stimuli but argues that states “respond primarily to the constraints and opportunities of the international system when they pursue foreign and security policies, but those responses are conditioned by factors at the individual level of analysis, such as state-society relations, the nature of domestic political regimes, strategic culture, and leaders’ perceptions” (Ripsman 2011). For neoclassical realism, it is not only the relative position of states that matters, but also the type of domestic environment in which foreign policy decisions are made. Domestic factors such as leader images, the state-society relationship, strategic culture and domestic institutions act as intervening variables in the interaction between systemic stimuli and state behavior (Ripsman et al. 2016). In this sense, the analysis on a given grand strategy refers both to the evaluation of external stimuli and the mobilization of elements of national power to achieve its objectives in the international arena (Kitchen 2010: 121). The executive node of foreign policy—that is, the one institutionally in charge of carrying out the state’s relations with the rest of the world, such as the Presidency in Presidential Systems or the Prime Minister in Parliamentary Systems—is identified as the reference point in the process of establishing a grand strategy. Within a state, the executive will define national interests and conduct foreign policy based on an assessment of the relative power, threats and intentions of other states, in addition to domestic constraints, both institutional (other branches of government) and informal, such as pressure groups, for example, business, lobbyists or the press (Lobell et al. 2009; Kitchen 2010). The process of establishing a grand strategy goes through three stages that usually have a certain degree of differentiation: assessment, formulation, and implementation. In the first phase, the main security threats and national objectives are defined based on a series of external stimuli such as the global and regional geopolitical structure, the type of projection of extra-regional powers on the regional orders where the state in question is located, and the existence of both traditional and non-traditional threats. The second stage involves the definition of the organizing principle of the grand strategy together with the objectives and the determination of the

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appropriate means to deal with the threats, either using coercive and/or cooperative tools. Far from being automatic, this step is usually crossed by multiple and crossed interests within the executive node, fundamentally in relation to the type of governing coalition. Finally, the grand strategy is implemented both at the practical level with a series of concrete decisions to face the international scenario, and at the conceptual level through the discussion, development and publication of official documents related to the projection of the country’s foreign and security policy. These three steps are represented in the neoclassical realism model of foreign policy whereby there is a mediation between systemic inputs and state response by the leader’s perception, the decision-making process and subsequent policy implementation, all influenced by domestic factors. In relation to the external factor, the international scenario does not present a clear and imminent threat, so states have a fairly wide range to choose their grand strategy (Lobell 2003). In line with this approach, there is a fundamental factor: the threat(s) perceived by the executive node of the foreign policy agreed upon within the framework of the ruling domestic coalition. For neoclassical realism, threats generally have an external origin. The key mediator between the international arena and domestic interests is the executive node of foreign policy who acts as the recipient and evaluator of threats. Threats are defined by the size, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions of another state (Walt 1987). Their origin can be located in the great powers of the international order, in regional spheres whose dynamics are semi-autonomous but not independent of the global system, or even at the domestic level with non-traditional threats that can even threaten the territorial integrity of the state (Burilkov 2017: 82–85). The relevance of this point lies in the fact that, in the face of an imminent threat, its existence would not only aggravate the security dilemma in a regional order but—in the case of great powers—could generate mirror responses in regions under the influence of their competitor, as in the case of relations between the Russian Federation and the United States in Latin America and the post-Soviet space. The cohesion of domestic coalitions in relation to threats is a key element in formulating and implementing a grand strategy. The literature has generally stressed the distinction between nationalist and internationalist coalitions which possess differentiated domestic support (Solingen 1998; Gonzalez Levaggi 2020). The former aspires to a more autarkic

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economy and a more nationalist vision, while the latter promote a more open-minded and internationalist agenda. The link between the type of coalitions and the selection of a grand strategy is critical to this approach. Davidson (2006) articulates this by asserting that the fundamental orientation of a state as a defender of the status quo or as a revisionist actor is determined both by its systemic position and by the degree of influence that nationalists and the military have within the domestic political coalition. In all cases—despite changes or shifts in the more nationalist or internationalist governing coalitions—the degree of political consensus on the determination of threat consensus is the key intervening variable in the conceptual scheme. For example, the consensus of the Russian elite on NATO expansion in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space since the mid-1990s, Washington’s perception of the risks of Chinese technological expansion, the Indian leadership’s view of Pakistan’s nuclear threat or Mainland China’s call for national reunification over Taiwan are clear examples of consensus. In this sense, there are two elements to highlight that will operate as assumptions for the analysis of the great powers’ maritime strategies. First, their leadership has clearly defined the main threats, although the emphasis on them has mutated in relation to the external context and their own capabilities. For example, Obama administration pushed for a pivot policy towards Asia, while Trump declared a trade war against China. Secondly, the ruling coalitions of the Eurasian powers have progressively shifted towards a nationalist/statist line that can be clearly identified expressed in the leaderships of Vladimir Putin in Russia (since 2000), Narendra Modi in India (2014 onwards) and Xi Jinping in China (since 2012). In short, the United States, China, Russia and India have a high degree of domestic consensus regarding their regional and global threats, while at the same time their ruling coalition has been mutating from internationalism (like Russia in the 1990s and China and India until the 2000s) towards more nationalistic forms, with the late exception of the United States with the election of the leader of the Democratic Party, Joe Biden. Based on the above arguments, it is postulated that in the face of an immediate threat perception by the executive leadership with a significant degree of political consensus, a power will develop a maritime strategy with a significant degree of rationality in dealing with that threat.

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Conversely, without sufficient direct threat perception or internal cohesion, it will tend toward a less linear maritime strategy. In the case of the great naval powers, maritime strategies will have a high degree of predictability, given the existence of direct threats and a high degree of internal cohesion. What defines a particular maritime strategy within a grand strategy? Two variables are critical: the extent of the threat and the nation’s capabilities. In relation to the first, its geographical extent—regional or global—of the threat and the impact on the maritime level are fundamental. Securing maritime lines of communication in the face of a possible restriction by a commercial power represents an invitation to develop ocean waters policies. A territorial threat without maritime expression limits these incentives. Regarding the second variable, the economic and military capabilities of that power are critical. In the case of China, Russia and India, their emergence in international politics was not only linked to a will, but to increasing resources invested in multiple dimensions, especially in the naval dimension (Table 2.2). Neither grand strategies nor their maritime component is static. In relation to the factors that influence their alterations, we should consider the external stimuli—changes in the distribution of power at the global and regional level—and modifications in the threat perceptions of the executive node in which internal consensus plays a primary role. Maritime strategies require operationalization and measurement standards. In relation to the former we identify three dimensions: substance, orientation, and scope (Shively 2016). The first element is similar to the notion of the ordering principle explained above, orientation involves the articulation of the dimensions or means of a state, defined in terms of the level of forces and specific security strategies, while scope refers to the geographic extent, in addition to the identification of allies and adversaries. Table 2.2 Grand strategy and maritime strategy selection Threat/capabilities

Great power

Regional

Extensive

Power projection Sea denial Sea control Sea denial Sea control

Coastal defense Sea denial

Restricted

Coastal defense

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From a methodological point of view, the measurement of a grand strategy and its maritime expression has always been an issue of complex resolution. However, following Friedman Lissner (2018), three indicators have some methodological relevance to define an international strategy with its maritime expression: the principles enunciated by the executive node such as Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ or the notion of the Russian Navy’s ‘second world navy’; the publication of strategic plans in the format of official documents such as the US National Security Strategy or India’s Maritime Strategy; and finally, the major strategic and naval actions of the powers expressed both in the use of coercive power and soft power or soft power.

2.5 Distant Maritime Projections: Effects on Regional Maritime Stability Great extra-regional power’s distant engagements are a central channel of external transformation of regional maritime orders. Neoclassical realism presents a series of conceptual tools that help us understand the dynamics of change and continuity in the selection of a great strategy. The interaction between great powers and regions has been explored over the last three decades with two main approaches differentiated in relation to the membership of an extra-regional power in a given regional security order. In a first perspective, assessing the Cold War experience, Buzan and Wæver (2003) argue that there can be either overlapping or penetration between a global power and a region based on the degree of security involvement: “overlay is when great power interests transcend mere penetration, and come to dominate a region so heavily that the local pattern of security relations virtually ceases to operate” (2003: 61). Along these lines, great powers are assumed to be part of regional power hierarchies (Lemke 2002; Lake 2009). A second perspective presents the extra-regional power as an external actor that penetrates the region with differential effects in relation to the type of actions developed, ranging from development cooperation to military intervention. However, it rejects the idea that this power can be a member of a regional order as such (Lake and Morgan 1997). Miller (2007: 62–63) presents four types of great power involvement in regional orders: competition, cooperation, domination and withdrawal. The first refers to balance of power games whereby one power tries to displace the other, while in the second the great powers agree on common goals in

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the region. With respect to domination, it reflects a hegemonic structure with a dominant involvement of an extra-regional power in the region. Finally, withdrawal expresses an abandonment of diplomatic, economic and military commitments in a given region. In line with the second approach to regional security orders, it is important to determine which elements determine the type of strategic involvement of a great power in the periphery, that is, beyond its immediate zone of influence. In his analysis of coercive interventions, Taliaferro (2004: 7–18) presents three options: the exchange of favours theory in which the degree of ‘capitalist’ or ‘militarist’ cartelization of foreign policy favours interventionism; the offensive realist theory in which the relative capabilities and opportunities of the international arena promote such decisions; and, finally, the risk-balance theory which emphasizes the importance of both relative power and the ruling elite’s calculations of losses and gains. Beyond their analytical usefulness, these approaches are incomplete in two ways. On the one hand, while the definition of great power intervention is multidimensional, it focuses primarily on the question of the risks of military intervention to the neglect of the rest. On the other hand, it neglects threat perceptions and responses at the global and regional levels. While threats often have an expression in their geographical proximity, their response, expressed in terms of a grand strategy with a particular maritime expression, does not necessarily. In this context, a stability/instability balance is central to understand how the selection of a type of maritime strategy by a great power affects a particular maritime regional space. Regional balance is the result of the interaction between the regional and global levels, in which there is a correlation between the existence of conflicts within a regional order and the international role of the great powers. In concrete terms, the balance will lean towards greater instability if a conflict is militarized and the great powers project themselves assertively on the regional order, while stability would be strengthened in the regional environment if conflicts are demilitarized together with a low level of strategic activism on the part of the great extra-regional powers. The interaction between the existence of conflicts and the degree of intervention by a great extra-regional power allows us to establish a categorization of the different ‘balances’ (Table 2.3). External inputs neither determine the evolution of states’ foreign policies nor alone prescribe the dynamics of regional orders. Nevertheless, they influence important aspects of their trajectory, especially if part of these systemic alterations involves a declining hegemon, power transitions, the rise of new powers to the zenith of world politics, or crises

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Table 2.3 Stability/instability balance Regional demilitarized conflicts

Regional militarized conflicts

Limited external intervention

Robust stability

Extended external intervention

Fragile stability

Restricted instability Critical instability

in the norms of international order, as is the case in the contemporary international arena. In this case, the Eurasian naval projection reflects this situation. However, to understand the changes in the regional dynamics, it is necessary not only to visualise changes in the international order, but also to analyse how these emerging powers develop their grand strategies in the face of a changing international order. Given their ascendant structural position, they present a disruptive potential in the face of a generally status-quo oriented position on the part of the established powers, especially those with important strategic and military capabilities such as Russia, India or China. In this sense, the perceptions of threat by the executive node—in a context of internal cohesion—act as intervening variables between the great power competition and the regional maritime stability, for which the following two central arguments are proposed. First, the implementation of a power projection maritime strategy generates incentives for a potential negative impact on the regional maritime stability/instability balance. Second, the implementation of a non-power projection maritime strategy by an emerging power provides incentives for a potential positive impact on the stability/instability beyond its proximate zone of influence. Based on these two arguments, the following chapters presents maritime strategy’s choices of the United States, China, Russia, India and then turn to the maritime regional orders of the Indo-Pacific realm and the South Atlantic.

References Acharya, Amitav (2018) The End of American World Order. Cambridge: Polity. Bekkevold, Jo and Geoffrey Till (eds) (2016) International Order at Sea: How It Is Challenged. HOW It Is Maintained. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Brands, Hal (2017) “Six Propositions about Great-Power Competition and Revisionism in the 21st Century,” The Future of the Global Order Colloquium, University of Pennsylvania, https://global.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/gosix-propositions-brands.original.pdf. Bremmer, Ian (2012) Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World. London: Penguin Books. Burilkov, Alexandr (2017) “The Maritime Strategy of Regional Powers: China, India, Iran, and Brazil from 2001 to 2015,” Ph.D. Dissertation. Hamburg: Universität Hamburg. Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver (2003) Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Clausewitz, Carl Von (2007) On War. New York: Oxford University Press. Davidson, Jason (2006) Revisionist and Status Quo States. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. DiCicco, Jonathan and Tudor Onea (2023) Great-Power Competition, International Studies: Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Oxford University Press. DoD (2018) National Defense Strategy. Washington, DC. Ferguson, Niall (2018) “The Myth of the Liberal International Order,” Global Times, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1084413.shtml. Finnemore, Martha (2004) The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Friedman, Uri (2019) “The New Concept Everyone in Washington Is Talking About,” The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/ 08/what-genesis-great-power-competition/595405/. Friedman Lissner, Rebecca (2018) “What Is Grand Strategy? Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” Texas National Security Review 2 (1). Gaddis, Lewis (2009) “What Is Grand Strategy?” Conference on American Grand Strategy After War, Triangle Institute for Security Studies and Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy. Durham: Duke University. Gonzalez Levaggi, Ariel (2020b) Confrontational and Cooperative Regional Orders: Managing Regional Security in World Politics. London: Routledge. Gray, Colin (2011) The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gresh, Geoffrey (2020) To Rule Eurasian Waves: The New Great Power Competition at Sea. London: Yale University Press. Hattendorf, John (2013) “What Is a Maritime Strategy?” Soundings Paper, Canberra, No. 1. Hooda, D. S. (2019) India’s National Security Strategy. New Delhi: Indian National Congress. Ikenberry, John (2018) “The End of Liberal International Order?” International. Affairs, 94 (1), pp. 7–23.

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Johnson, Ian (1995) Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Katzenstein, Peter (1996) The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity, and World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Kennedy, Paul (1991) “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition”, in Grand Strategies in War and Peace, eds. Paul M. Kennedy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Kennedy, Paul (1992) “Grand Strategies and Less-Than-Grand Strategies: A Twentieth Century Critique,” in War, Strategy, and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard, eds. Michael Howard et al. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kissinger, Henry (2016) Orden Mundial. Buenos Aires: Debate. Kitchen, Nicholas (2010) “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation,” Review of International Studies, 36 (1), pp. 117–143. Kupchan, Charles (1994) The Vulnerability of Empire. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Lake, David (2009) “Relational Authority and Legitimacy in International Relations,” American Behavioral Scientist, 53 (3), pp. 331–353. Lake, David and Morgan, Patrick (1997) Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Lemke, Douglas (2002) Regions of War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lobell, Steve (2003) The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Lobell, Steve, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro (2016) Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lobell, Steve, Jeffrey Taliaferro, and Norrin Ripsman (eds) (2009) Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Luttwak, Edward (2001) Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Mastanduno, Michael (1997) “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” International Security, 22, pp. 49–88. Mearsheimer, John (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Miller, Benjamin (2007) State, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Posen, Barry (1984) The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Ripsman, Norman (2011) Neoclassical Realism, International Studies: Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Oxford University Press, https://oxfordre.com/int ernationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acr efore-9780190846626-e-36?rskey=JtJNsl&result=4. Ripsman, Norrin M., Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell (2016) Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics Russian Presidency (2008) The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Kremlin. Russian Presidency (2022) Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development. Shively, Jacob (2016) Hope, Change, Pragmatism: Analyzing Obama’s Grand Strategy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Solingen, Etel (1998) Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Speller, Ian (2018) Understanding Naval Warfare. Nueva York: Routledge. State Council (2019) China’s National Defense in the New Era. Information Office of the State Council. Strachan, Hew (2006) “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” Survival, 47 (3), pp. 33– 54. Taliaferro, Jeffrey (2004) Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Till, Geoffrey (2007) Poder Marítimo: una guía para el siglo XXI. Buenos Aires: Instituto de Publicaciones Navales. Van Hooft, Paul (2017) Grand Strategy. Oxford Bibliographies: International Relations, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-978 0199743292/obo-9780199743292-0218.xml. Walt, Stephen (1987) The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Walt, Stephen (2018) “Why I Didn’t Sign Up to Defend the International Order,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/01/whyi-didnt-sign-up-to-defend-the-international-order/. Waltz, Kenneth (2000) “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, 18 (2), pp. 44–79. White House (2017) National Security Strategy. Work, Robert (2015) “Remarks by Defense Deputy Secretary Robert Work at the CNAS Inaugural National Security Forum,” CNAS, https://www. cnas.org/publications/transcript/remarks-by-defense-deputy-secretary-rob ert-work-at-the-cnas-inaugural-national-security-forum.

PART I

Maritime Strategies of Great Powers in the 21st Century

CHAPTER 3

United States: Naval Hegemony Faces the Eurasian Challenge

Nearly eight decades after the end of World War II, the U.S. military and naval global presence remains overwhelming. Today, its Armed Forces possess more than 500 installations in 45 countries, while the largest number of posts are concentrated in Germany (194), Japan (121), and South Korea (DoD 2018a: 7). Besides, Washington maintains the core of a network of allies built during the Cold War whose main multilateral expression has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States remains at the top of the global hierarchy given the remarkable weight of its economy, the capacity for technological innovation that has driven the latest productive revolution, and its extensive military capabilities. However, recently, its hegemony and leadership have been progressively questioned for different reasons. From the failure of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 until the abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the 2008/09 financial crisis as well as the ups and downs in relations with China, Russia, Iran, and the Latin American region itself, have given rise to questions about the stability and predictability of Washington’s international strategy. Despite different implementation modalities, there have been a common logic throughout the White House administrations, the maintenance of global supremacy, in which the maritime

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. González Levaggi, Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1_3

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domain plays a critical role. This chapter presents the main elements of the US grand strategy and then analyzes how it is expressed in the maritime dimension.

3.1 The City on the Hill: Domestic and International Bases of U.S. Hegemony Throughout the twentieth century, the United States attained three great successes that reorganized the international order. In a context of economic and military strengthening and after militarily supporting the triumph of the Entente Cordiale in the First World War, Woodrow Wilson proposed the creation of a universal organization of countries, the League of Nations. Despite the voluntarism of the President, the U.S. Congress vetoed the possibility of participation and the country remained relatively distant from the problems of European realpolitik that would once again concern the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration in the second half of the 1930s. The Second World War was the principal test that the U.S. had to face to establish itself as the main Western power in the face of the French debacle and the definitive decline of the United Kingdom. The victories against the Empire of Japan and the Nazi Germany, together with the development of nuclear technology—whose first military use was carried out in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945—probed its power. The new international order created from a series of conferences by the Allies led by Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt (later replaced by Harry Truman after his death), gave rise to the making of the Organization of the United Nations and established the division of the zones of influence between the US-led Western alliance and its rival, the Soviet Union and the Warsow Pact nations. The U.S. position in the second post-war period was enviable: the war had not affected its territory and its economy represented 50% of the world GDP, while its armed forces had defeated the Axis powers and had a foothold on every continent. In this context, only the Soviet presence appeared to the decision-makers in Washington as an ideological and military threat on the European continent, while Stalin viewed with suspicion the technological and nuclear superiority of his Pacific neighbor. By the time Churchill stated that “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has fallen over the continent” in 1946, the Cold War had already begun and the United States had asserted its political, economic, and military hegemony in the West.

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In this context, a grand strategy of containment of the Soviet Union began to be designed, which would be developed throughout the Cold War, but whose first systematic outline was proposed by George Kennan. In his famous ‘long telegram’—later published anonymously by Foreign Affairs—he stated that the United States should carry out a “policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world” (X 1947: 581). The triumph of this international strategy in the face of the Soviet implosion in 1991 will give rise to a unipolar world whose podium will be dominated by US hegemony, at least for two decades. The bases of U.S. hegemony at the global level are its values and institutions, in addition to the evolution of its capabilities, which, towards the end of the bipolar struggle, achieved hegemony over the common global spaces. With a presidential system and a federal scheme, the U.S. political system is structured on the division of powers in which both the Executive and Legislative Branches have prerogatives related to national security and international affairs. Among the powers assigned to the presidential figure are: heading the Armed Forces as Commander in Chief, ability to sign treaties with other nations, acting as head of state, enforcing laws passed by Congress through the Cabinet and federal agencies under his direction, and authorizing military actions (without the approval of Congress). Within the organization of the executive, several key officials are in the leadership of so-called ‘executive departments’—equivalent to Ministries—which are appointed by the President but require confirmation by the Senate. Among the most relevant agencies involved in defense and international security issues are the Department of Defense, which is responsible for coordinating the efforts of the armed forces; the Department of State, which leads the development and implementation of foreign policy; the Department of Homeland Security, which has the primary function of protecting the country from external and internal threats, with various agencies at its disposal, such as the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), among others. Following the reforms carried out with the National Security Act of 1947, the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) was established as the presidential principal advisory council in matters of domestic, foreign, and military policies related to the area, whose head will be the

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so-called National Security Advisor, a position held by figures of U.S. strategies such as Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Colin Powell, among others. Despite the centrality of the Oval Office, Congress has a prominent role, especially in matters of authorizations, resource allocation, and policy and budget oversight, as well as actively participating in the decision-making process in different committees such as Armed Services, Intelligence, Homeland Security and Foreign Relations in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. However, as regards war declarations, Congress has been losing weight. While the legislative branch declared war 11 times during five separate conflicts, the last time it did so was during World War II, since then the used so-called “authorizations for the use of military force abroad” (AUMF), which—according to the War Powers Act of 1973—the president must notify Congress within 48 hours of the actions and prohibits the armed forces from remaining for more than 60 days without its authorization, has been done 132 times between 1973 and 2011 (Grimmett 2012: 14). The institutional expression of national security policies is expressed in the publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS), a guiding document that responds to a requirement of the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which was initially published annually, but in general, the last two decades administrations have chosen to publish one for each period. As Battaleme (2015) states, “they usually provide the rationale covering at least the entire duration of that administration and a view about how that strategy dovetails with the nation’s long-term goals.” Based on the NSS, sectoral strategies are published periodically, such as the National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy, among others. Also, reports on a particular issue, such as the National Space Security Strategy and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, among others, are published. The National Security Strategy usually identifies the main threats and highlights the central objectives at the global level and the responses to these challenges. Both the National Security Strategy of the Trump Administration and the one released by the Biden administration in 2022 have emphasized the strategic competition between great powers as central for the US global challenges, focusing on China and Russia. At the same time, they have been emphasizing three common objectives such as the protection of the American people, the promotion of economic prosperity and the defense of values, although at this point

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positions differ between more nationalist (Trump) and more globalist (Biden) approaches. The issue of identity and values is not secondary, but central to understanding the differences in approaches between Republican and Democratic administrations, especially during the last few years where political polarization has deepened enough to put political stability at risk as seen in the ‘storming of the Capitol’ on January 6, 2021, where right-wing extremists attempted to sabotage the certification process for the presidential election in late 2020. Three foundational myths form part of the ‘foundational creed’ of how the United States sees itself and the world—the country’s exemplarity visà-vis the rest, its exceptionalism and its permanent expansion towards new frontiers—that end up influencing the country’s international strategies (Dombroswski and Reich 2019: 25). Beyond these common elements and a series of relatively similar visions concerning the international scenario, the gap in positions between Democratic and Republican sectors—especially the most radicalized ones—has been growing as polarization has captured a large part of public discussions, from Obamacare to the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program. The increased divergence of views has disrupted some continuity in security and foreign relations policies, as well as affected the image of the United States, especially during the Republican presidencies of George W. Bush (Jr.) and Donald Trump. Beyond political ups and downs, the power structure on which Washington has built its primacy in international affairs continues to be superlative. According to IMF (2023), the United States continues to lead in terms of GDP measured in nominal terms with 24% of the world total, followed by China and the European Union, each with 18%, while in purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP measurements it appears in second place after China. In terms of military spending, there is no doubt. The North American country spent 38% of global military spending in 2021 reaching USD 778 billion, more than three times Beijing’s spending. The Global Firepower ranking places it in first place, while in terms of nuclear capabilities, it ranks after the Russian Federation with 5600 nuclear warheads of which almost a third are unleashed, according to information estimated by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS 2021). The strategic nuclear weapons operated by U.S. STRATCOM can be launched from the three main components of the armed forces distributed in intercontinental missiles (ICBM Minuteman III), submarines (Ohio Class SLBM with Trident system), and long-range strategic bombers (B-2 and B-52). On the other hand, 65% of non-strategic nuclear weapons (about

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150) are located outside the country at bases in allied countries such as Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey, and the Netherlands (Robles 2020). The US military presence is global: military personnel is deployed in more than 160 countries that are added to the more than 500 installations in 45 countries. Certain installations are located in strategic areas such as the Diego Garcia Base in the formally British Indian Ocean Territory, the Ascension Island Air Base which shares tasks with the British Royal Force in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, the Bezmer Base in Bulgaria which allows projection over the Black Sea and the bases of Incirlik in Turkey and Al Udeid in Qatar which allows it to maintain an advanced presence in the Middle East, among many others. Last but not least, the power of attraction of the United States permeates all cultural, economic, and social spheres. Global Americanization has succeeded in enthroning the ‘American way of life’ as an ideal sustained among other issues in the adoption of massive consumption patterns such as the use of jeans or mobile technology, the incorporation of the English language as the lingua franca, and the emulation of behaviors in the political sphere, from those inspired by the system of balance of powers and institutional balances to the adoption of popular conservative forms emulating the figure of Donald Trump as the case of Bolsonaro in Brazil.

3.2 From Liberal Hegemony to a New Grand Strategy of Dual Containment The final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—after a period of détente and reforms initiated by the General Secretary of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s—launched an era of undisputed US hegemony in global affairs. This role had already materialized in the Second Gulf War (1990/1), when the George Bush Administration led a punitive action with the endorsement of the international community—including the USSR—against the Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Debates on the international system and the role of the United States in the postCold War era have had two central components: the question of polarity in terms of its stability and its effects, and the response of the United States to an environment marked by a supremacy of capabilities vis-à-vis the other powers. Regarding the first debate, the new international system was generally presented as unipolar (Krauthammer 1990/1) where soft power prevailed (Nye 1990). In general, there was a widespread consensus among experts

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on the great power differential between the United States and the rest, a power gap rarely seen historically. The Soviet Union was gone, and the unipolar era had begun. However, discussions about the effects of this new, unequal distribution of power and how the United States should respond were not long in coming. As Krauthammer (1990/1) announces the unipolar world, he admits that “multipolarity will undoubtedly come in time” while calling for a task of sustaining international stability in the face of isolationist temptations. Even more optimistically, Wohlforth (1999: 8) asserted that unipolarity has a peaceful and durable character given that candidates for great power status “are not very fortunate” since “efforts on their part to increase their power or ally with other dissatisfied states are likely to trigger local counterweights long before they can create a global balance to U.S. power.” Liberals will go beyond these arguments and posit that the United States is the mainstay of international liberal order. A series of structures, institutions, and practices intertwined with shared security commitments, the absence of absolute sovereignty, the existence of a pervasive hegemony given the role of multilateral organizations such as NATO or the G7, and economic openness allow for the long-term stability of the international system led by the United States with strong support from its traditional allies (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999). In line with the democratic peace thesis, stability would be reinforced by the expansion of democracy, economic interdependence, and participation in international institutions (Russett 1993). In this sense, U.S. hegemony was not only sustained by its strength but also by the expansion of a liberal international order sustained by shared responsibilities with its allies and partners. On the other hand, an important sector of realists had a more critical view and argued that international politics are returning to the past. Economic rivalries, security dilemmas, arms races, nationalism, and the return of alliances will take place in a progressively multipolar world. The unipolar moment is a historical hiatus (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993). A second core of discussions about the type of grand strategy Washington should pursue has divided scholars and experts between those who seek greater moderation as a “retrenchment strategy” from an “offshore balance” or even a return to isolationism, and those who perceive liberal hegemony as positive such as deep engagement, liberal internationalism, or primacy (Lissner 2018; Avey et al. 2018).

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In the first group, the different authors call for limiting the scope and objectives of U.S. international policy, avoiding over-extension, and carrying out specific balancing actions to maintain international security in key areas such as the Middle East and the Eurasian space (Layne 1997; Posen 2007; Walt and Mearsheimer 2016). This position criticizes that, throughout the three decades of the post-Cold War period, the White House pursued an international strategy that reflects a liberal and hegemonic posture, a proposal of an offensive nature that has sought to spread the values, institutions, and alliances sustained by the foreign and security policy of the United States, even over the interests of other regional powers. According to Walt (2018), the responsibility for the adoption of such a strategy lies with the “foreign policy community” (or what Porter calls ‘the bubble’ or ‘the blob’)1 that “believes spreading liberal values is both essential for the security of the United States and easy to do” while they “convinced ordinary citizens to support this ambitious agenda by exaggerating international dangers, overstating the benefits that liberal hegemony would produce, and concealing the true costs”. The second group includes different expressions, some more normative and others more coercive. The deep engagement argues that hegemony inhibits the balance of power policies and, therefore, maintaining this situation has more benefits than costs. In that sense, the stability of the U.S. order is key, especially in those spaces where hegemony is expressed, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Internationalist liberalism also argues that hegemony is beneficial, although, for its maintenance, the legitimacy of norms and rules by the rest of the members of the international order is fundamental, in addition to requiring a leadership role on the part of the United States to effectively promote an environment based on a dense and institutionalized network. Such an approach promotes the promotion of democracy, the expansion of Atlantic institutions, and the intervention in situations of human rights violations in a systematic manner. Finally, primacy involves various conservative expressions that ideally could be called a ‘better nationalism’, as opposed to Donald Trump’s ‘American First’ and the isolationist conception of a self-enclosed “Fortress America” (Brands 2018). The primacy perspective posits the strong United States 1 A species moniker popularized by former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Benjamin Rhodes, “Blob” includes those officials, pundits, and commentators “who worry incessantly about the collapse of the U.S. security order” (Porter 2018: 11).

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as the underpinning of the international order based on liberal principles enabling the promotion of democracy, capitalism, and free trade, while the main objective is to prevent the rise of a rival great power with illiberal characteristics something that is currently happening (Avey et al. 2018). United States has been at the center of the international stage during the post-Cold War period and even if the external choices show different approaches, primacy was at the center of every administration from George H. W. Bush to Joseph Biden. In the 1990s, Washington intervened in multiple international security crises, including humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Liberia, democracy restoration operations in Haiti, and punitive operations in Iraq throughout the decade, as well as large-scale military actions alongside NATO in different stages of the Balkan conflict, from the Bosnian War (1994–1995) to the Kosovo conflict (1998–1999). However, 9/11 changed priorities. The attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon came as a shock to American society and had a profound impact on national security policies. After declaring the ‘war on terrorism’, the Bush Administration decided to intervene with multilateral support in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime— which had protected Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network—and subsequently invaded Iraq, under the pretext of the possession of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein’s regime, in addition to carrying out multiple actions to counter the terrorist threat. The international image and diplomatic ties costs of the invasion were high. Russia, China, France, and Germany opposed unilateral action, while the results of the rapid conquest of Baghdad were inauspicious. To the debacle of the political organization of the Bath and the elimination of the Iraqi armed and security forces, some extremist organizations organized an insurgency against US troops—and against Iraqis themselves—that will have as a correlate the death of almost 134,000 civilians, 4490 US troops and an economic cost of 1.7 billion dollars (Trotta 2013). Although the Bush (Jr.) administration had arranged for the progressive withdrawal of troops from Iraq starting in 2008, this did not become effective until the end of 2011 with the arrival of Barack Obama to the White House. With a critical view of the previous administration, Obama modified the excessive involvement in international conflicts— except for the involvement in the Libyan conflict—and began a slow but progressive withdrawal from the main conflict zones in the Greater Middle East, especially after the announcement of Operation Neptune Spear that ended the life of Osama Bin Laden. Beyond devoting efforts

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to defeat the Islamic State in the framework of a multinational alliance, both the Obama and Trump administrations avoided direct involvement in the internal Syrian conflict despite domestic and allied pressures. In this sense, the Trump administration agreed directly with the Taliban to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, and this was abruptly implemented by the Biden administration in the face of the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021. The strategic withdrawal from the Middle East was part of a global reorganization of priorities by Washington which, since the last years of the Obama era, began to focus its attention on the Indo-Pacific space given the rise of Beijing as the main Asian economy, its accelerated military modernization, the Sino-Russian rapprochement and the development of geo-economic initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In this context, relations with China and Russia deteriorated as these countries presented clear regional challenges to US hegemony. On the one hand, in the case of Moscow, resistance to NATO expansion and the development of “democratic (or color) revolutions” in the post-Soviet space clashed with Washington’s Atlanticist interests in expanding the Atlantic community to new countries in the area. The Russian invasion of Ukraine raised tensions to a situation only seen in Cold War times where the United States and key Atlantic Alliance partners have decided to support Ukrainian leader Volodymir Zelensky against the Russian military advance with an arsenal of measures from strong economic sanctions on Moscow to the provision of heavy weaponry to Kyiv troops. On the other hand, Chinese technological developments concerning 5G and artificial intelligence, along with commercial and financial expansion in the Indo-Pacific in parallel with the construction of a blue-water navy began to generate an alarm in the foreign policy community. The unipolar era was—from a historical point of view—brief and entailed a series of responses by regional powers such as China and the new Russia, which gradually mutated their behavior from an uneasy acquiescence in the 1990s to actions of soft balancing after the Iraq War, to return once again to policies of the balance of power in the international context of competition between great powers. In recent years, a grand strategy has been sketched out to face the challenge of the rise of China as a long-term strategic competitor and the rivalry with the Russian Federation in the Euro-Atlantic space. The liberal international order will no longer be what it used to be and U.S. diplomacy has adopted a much tougher tone towards its rivals and adversaries.

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Facing the Eurasian Axis: A New Grand Strategy of Dual Containment

The new international environment of strategic competition between great powers has forced decision-makers in Washington to change how they approach their international ties. There is an explicit recognition of a scenario that is moving toward a multipolar world. According to the U.S. National Intelligence Council report, “No single state is likely to be positioned to dominate across all regions or domains, opening the door for a broader range of actors to advance their interests” while “The United States and China will have the greatest influence on global dynamics, supporting competing visions of the international system and governance,” so that such “rivalry will affect most domains, straining and in some cases reshaping existing alliances, international organizations, and the norms and rules that have underpinned the international order” (NIC 2020: 94). It also identifies Russia as the main disruptive power in the international order, while including the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, and India as relevant actors in the geopolitics of the coming decades. In President Biden’s first institutional visit to the U.S. State Department in early February 2021, he emphasized in his opening remarks that “American leadership must meet this new moment of advancing authoritarianism, including the growing ambitions of China to rival the United States and the determination of Russia to damage and disrupt our democracy,” while recognizing that alliances are the greatest diplomatic asset, so it is critical to lead with key allies and partners, especially democratic countries (White House 2021). Thus, the United States has recently adopted a more pragmatic Indo-Pacific strategy, drawing on its capabilities, institutions, and partners to contain China’s advance in the Indo-Pacific and prevent the rebuilding of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe. U.S. foreign policy has suffered criticism in multiple ways, but a central one has been the overextension of international commitments (Pethiyagoda 2016; Walt 2019), especially after the War on Terror and the large military deployments in the Greater Middle East from drone strikes on the Afghan-Pakistani border to the CIA’s use of the secret Temara Detention Center in Morocco. Since the early Obama’s years started a retrenchment phase from conflict scenarios. The rollback of forward military presence had several expressions. In the period 2011–2021, the US

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withdrew the bulk of its troops from Iraq (2011) while a contingent of 2500 troops remained; it avoided carrying out a large-scale conflict with Syria (2013) although it established the International Coalition Against Islamic State (2014) through which about 900 troops remain in the northwest of the Arab country and hastily left Afghanistan after negotiations with the Taliban (2021). However, the US did not withdraw at all since it maintains a forward presence in the Middle East with its strategic alliance with Israel and a set of military installations in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf, in addition to carried out counterterrorism operations from the Sahel to Pakistan. In this sense, the strategic retreat has not been linear. On the contrary, it has gone through ups and downs but has ultimately expressed a shift in the priorities of the American global security agenda. The first indicator of a profound shift in geographic orientation was the “Pivot to Asia” policy during the Obama era and whose agenda will identify the Asia–Pacific as the key driver of global policy. This policy deployed—according to then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—a diplomacy of “forward deployment” with six objectives: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening relations with emerging powers, including China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; establishing a comprehensive military presence; and promoting democracy and human rights (Clinton 2011). In the face of Chinese mega-announcements of investments in the land and sea routes of the One Belt and One Road Initiative and the establishment of the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), the Obama administration responded with a proposal to form a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam, deliberately excluding China in a clear example of containment, albeit at the geo-economic level.2 The TPP initiative was rejected by Trump who withdrew from the agreement, which was followed by a more aggressive turn to his trade policy with the declaration of a ‘trade war’ and a greater strategic depth with the pursuit of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”. While the main outline

2 China took the opportunity to successfully push forward an initiative raised within the ASEAN framework between 2011 and 2012, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership whose final agreement was signed by fifteen countries in November 2020— including Australia, New Zealand, China, and Indonesia, among others—and came into effect on January 1, 2022.

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document was made public with the State Department’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Advancing a Common Vision” (DoS 2019), the decision to move forward with a regional framework for action was underwritten by the White House in February 2018. In the declassified document ‘U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific”, the first challenge is posed as maintain strategic primacy in the region and promoting a liberal economic order while preventing the establishment of new, illiberal spheres of influence by China (ABC News 2018). In concrete terms, the Trump administration devoted more economic and diplomatic resources to the region, while strengthening alliances with regional partners. For example, USD 4.5 billion in foreign assistance was disbursed between 2017 and 2019, up 25% compared to the last three years of the Obama era (Pant and Parpiani 2020). The Biden administration will further advance the vision for the Indo-Pacific with several key actions. First, a push for the Quad mechanism—in Spanish translated as Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—which brings together the United States, India, Japan, and Australia and whose first high-level meeting was held in March 2021. Secondly, he promoted the creation of the AUKUS military alliance with the United Kingdom and Australia, whose first objective is to provide nuclear-powered attack submarines to the Canberra Navy. Thirdly, it published the “U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy” in February 2022 which identifies the Indo-Pacific as vital to its security and prosperity while aiming to counter regional challenges especially from the People’s Republic of China from “from the economic coercion of Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbors in the East and South China Seas” (White House 2022). In this sense, the strategic objective of the new grand strategy of containment aims at preventing the consolidation of China as the leading great power in Asia or the formation of an antiU.S. Eurasian axis. This last point raises growing concerns in Washington, both because of the trajectory of convergence between the two powers and because of the explicit resistance to US global policies. An indicator of this ‘marriage of convenience’ is expressed in the joint statement signed between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on February 4, 2022, on “International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”. This document identifies the promotion of ‘democratic standards’ of “certain states” and the establishment of institutions and alliances based on those criteria as hegemonic actions that

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produce “serious threats to global and regional peace and stability and undermine the stability of the world order” (Presidency of Russia 2022). One of the biggest questions of the global order in the coming years concerns the relationship between Russia and China. Although a classic military alliance is difficult to achieve, it is undeniable that the rapprochement between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in recent years has allowed progress in the construction of a great Eurasian partnership with a broad agenda ranging from a common vision in favor of a multipolar world to joint naval exercises in the Pacific, as well as including Iran in naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. In this regard, although the major Eurasian powers have built a progressive strategic convergence after the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, elements of mistrust between them remain. As Simon Saradzhyan and Ali Wyne (2018) argue: “China and Russia sleep in the same bed but have different dreams”. Faced with the Eurasian challenge, the United States has reacted by strengthening alliances and establishing new mechanisms in the IndoPacific domain, while continuing to rely on NATO as the main institution to contain Russia in the Euro-Atlantic space, while continuing to support a rules-based international order, the strengthening of democracy, the promotion of capitalism and free trade. In this context, the White House has at its disposal a varied arsenal of tools to carry out these objectives, from cultural promotion to the use of force, including the implementation of economic sanctions and the provision of military aid, among others. Hard and soft power remain two effective sides of a complex imperial machine that still maintains an edge in multiple domains, especially in the maritime domain.

3.3

The World According to the Pentagon

From a geographical point of view, the United States has an enviable position since it is located far from the major centers of global instability—such as Eastern Europe or the Middle East—which gives it a clear geostrategic advantage. At the same time, the regional hegemony achieved since the first half of the twentieth century has not faced major counter-hegemonic challenges from the middle powers of the Americas, except for the Venezuela’s failed Bolivarian in the Chavez years. Despite this, in recent years there have been increasing discussion about the possibility of a hegemonic challenge within the Western Hemisphere by Beijing

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with future implications for the hemispheric defense and security arena (Paz 2012; Ellis 2018). Continuing with the argument of geographical distance, Mearsheimer (2021) posits that the position of possessing a status of regional hegemony has allowed the country to play the role of external balancer on four occasions: Germany in World War I, Imperial Japan as Nazi Germany in World War II, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This natural position—also held by Brazil, Canada, and Argentina— was complemented by great economic development and a willingness to develop and use an armed force that would allow it to be the arbiter of the great conflicts of the twentieth century. After the Allied victory in the Second World War, the military presence expanded to the four corners of the world, placing itself at the head of the Western alliance during the Cold War by promoting regional alliances—NATO in Western Europe, CENTO in the Middle East and ANZUS in Oceania—and establishing installations and troops on all continents in response to the strategy of encirclement against the Soviet Union, from intervention in the Korean peninsula to support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan. After thirty years of active global outreach from Bosnia to Afghanistan, the United States is the third largest force in terms of manpower with 1.34 million, a third of the late Cold War standing army and only 40% of the active personnel on active duty during the height of the Vietnam War. In relation to the Armed Forces, the Department of Defense (or Pentagon) is the politically responsible for coordinating the efforts of the armed forces consisting of six armed services and continues to have the largest defense budget in the world, stabilizing in recent years between 3.3 and 3.5% of GDP. In the post-Cold War period, the total budget accounted between 40 and 50% of the world total, while between 2019 and 2022 it exceeded USD 700 billion per year.3 From the point of view of its distribution, almost two-thirds of the budget is spent between operations and maintenance (41%), military personnel (23%), and construction for military and families (1%), while only 14% is oriented to R&D and 20% to purchase of material, taking data from the year 2020 (PGPF 2021).

3 Until 2022, ‘Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)—an important part of spending on large-scale military operations such as as Afghanistan or Iraq—were not accounted for so that submerged military spending was as much as 30% of what was allocated to the Department of Defense.

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In terms of armed services, the budget is relatively even for the three traditional forces (25.7% Army, 23.3% Air Force, and 22.5% Navy), while the Marines receive—via the Navy—6.5% of the total (Eaglen 2022). The United States continues to be the main military power both for having the largest nuclear arsenal—together with Russia—and possessing all the nuclear triad vectors, as well as for its large air and naval deployment supported by a network of military installations and bases, the backbone of control over global assets. The end of the Cold War did not alter the presence of the ‘enduring empire’ (Immerwahr 2019) beyond the lesser weight of the nuclear factor or the end of the great Soviet enemy, although it forced to reformulate the way of deploying its military means and the way of carrying out military operations. In short, a power of the highest order. 3.3.1

Debate and Trajectory Around the Defense Strategy

A key problem for the national defense strategy of the United States in the post-cold war was the disappearance of its main source of threat, the Soviet Union. The situation in Eastern Europe was mutating towards an accelerated process of democratization that enhanced US influence, while the post-Soviet space was facing a process of strong internal instability due to structural transformations and the occurrence of inter-state armed conflicts such as the first Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and internal ones such as the Tajik civil war. From the institutional point of view, around 1989 the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell initiates the ‘Force Basis’ review process that proposed cuts of 10% in the budget, 20% of troops, and 25% reduction in the force structure concerning the situation in 1990, while the focus of military activity changed from participation in a major land war in Europe against the Soviets to expeditionary operations where there are situations that affect the vital interests of the country (Cohen 2018: 12). By 1993 a second process is going to take place with the ‘Bottom-Up Review’ (BUR) driven by then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. The official posed two basic questions: How do we structure the armed forces of the United States for the future? How much defense is enough in the post-cold war era? In that sense, the reform process recommended further reduction in both budget and force structure under the assumption of maintaining sufficient military power to win in two major regional conflicts occurring simultaneously.

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For example, the maritime strategy implemented by the Ronald Reagan administration called for building a 600-ship navy, while the new review reduced the number to almost 350 ships, down from 450 in the ‘Force Base’ review. At the direction of Congress to the Pentagon, a periodic review process called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) began in 1996 and included an analysis of defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and other aspects of defense policy. The first edition in 1997 posited that the country should deter aggression of magnitude in two distant theaters of operations, preferably with regional allies (DoD 1997: 12), although reductions in force structure continued (Cohen 2018: 18). In this context, the main debates of experts and academics also revolved around the identification of the scenarios of action and the composition of the force structure. After Operation Desert Storm in Iraq (1990/1) and in the framework of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RAM), the previously mentioned debates on grand strategy had their correlation in the area of defense. In the view of the neo-isolationists and moderates, a more limited force structure was proposed, especially with the number of ships and combat aircraft, while the neo-isolationists proposed a minimal use of force, and the promoters of selective engagement proposed involvement in two simultaneous regional scenarios. On the other hand, the deep engagement perspective (also called cooperative security) would require maintaining a capability to deploy in several theaters of operations with air superiority in the so-called ‘reconnaissance strike complex’ to carry out multilateral actions ranging from regional threats to humanitarian interventions. Finally, the primacy posture called for a force structure similar to the ‘Force Base’ giving superlative importance to the possession of attack submarines, Marine divisions, and active military aviation units, while seeking to perpetuate the disparity of capabilities by outperforming—at the very least—the next two strongest combined navies in the world (Posen and Ross 1996: 39). 9/11 ended an important part of the discussions because of the clarity of the perceived threat, global terrorism. The United States was to respond to the challenge by advancing defense in the areas where this scourge had its epicenter. Following the attacks, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review changed both its focus—from threat-based to capabilitybased planning—and its perspective by emphasizing a series of missions that replaced scenarios. In addition to proposing an ambitious force structure with a greater role for the Air Force, the 2001 report laid out

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four missions: defend the nation; deter aggression and coercion in critical regions such as Europe, North, and East Asia, and the Middle East; fight in overlapping theaters of operations with the possibility of conducting occupation or regime change; and deal with minor contingency operations (DoD 2001: 17). The intervention in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq, in addition to multiple counterterrorism operations, boosted defense spending, while the focus on counterterrorism allowed emerging powers greater freedom of action. The 2005 National Defense Strategy laid out a series of strategic objectives in which the first was to secure the United States from direct attack, while deterrence comes last and without directly accusing any state (DoD 2005). Three years later, the new edition of the strategy identified China as having a “potential to compete with the United States,” while assessing that Russia was “exploring the renewed influence and seeking a greater international role” (DoD 2008: 3–4). While the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Reviews also included references to the importance of deterring adversaries, it is only with the ‘2012 Defense Strategic Guidance’—after the withdrawal of the bulk of troops from Iraq—that the importance of rebalancing priorities from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia–Pacific will be raised (Cohen 2018: 37). Despite the tensions in Ukraine, the new 2014 Review will continue with the ‘pivot to Asia’ perspective that will focus its concerns on China and the threat coming from the development of anti-access and area denial systems. Finally, the 2018 National Defense Strategy presents multiple objectives but clarifies that the Pentagon’s top priorities are long-term strategic competition with China and Russia, as well as stressing the importance of developing a “more lethal force”. This includes modernizing key capabilities such as nuclear forces, developing space and cyberspace as combat domains, upgrading missile systems, and developing autonomous combat systems, among others (DoD 2018b: 6– 7). In the same vein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s National Military Strategy of the same year stresses the importance of maintaining military advantage in all domains and, to that end, introduces the notion of ‘joint combined arms’ (JCS) as the way to conduct operations through the integration of joint capabilities in all domains, from terrestrial to cyberspace (JCS 2018: 2). Beyond the official documents, the capabilities of action of the United States are above any other great power, especially in the global projection of its forces whose military expression is expressed in its ten Nimitzclass aircraft carriers and the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier, both

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nuclear-powered with their respective attack groups, more than 50 attack submarines counting 16 Virginia class nuclear attack submarines and more than 100 air squadrons between strategic, combat and attack units (CBO 2021: 120–121). In addition to these conventional capabilities, the nuclear triad, its facilities around the world, the spatial space surveillance mechanisms and the network of alliances sustained since the Cold War era makes the US the great power to be challenged. In this regard, the strategic and military rival to sustain primacy in the twenty-first century is China, while the competition has the major test in the Indo-Pacific maritime realm.

3.4 The Challenge of the Century: Maintaining Global Maritime Supremacy The United States is the major naval power operating throughout the world. Since the end of World War II, its primary mission has been the defense of a global order that allows for the free flow of commerce, in addition to protecting the global commons—in line with the tradition of the British Imperial Navy (Kaplan 2018: 57)—as well as defending its allies. Since the first half of the twentieth century, the United States has possessed a blue-water navy capable of conducting expeditionary missions around the world sustained with nearly 300 ships, a global network of naval bases, and institutionalized security commitments from the traditional Atlantic alliance with NATO countries to the novel AUKUS agreement with the United Kingdom and Australia. 3.4.1

Pillars of Global Maritime Supremacy

Historical experience has marked the trajectory of Washington’s use of naval power. Beyond the U.S. Navy’s participation in the SpanishAmerican War (1898) and World War I (1917–1918), the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, generated a solid response that made it possible to achieve superiority in maritime dominance—after the battles of Midway, Marianas, Philippines, and Leyte Gulf—and laid the future foundations for naval hegemony in the Pacific. During the Cold War, naval power projection was present in support of land operations in major armed conflicts on the Asian continent such as the Korean War (1950– 1953) and the Vietnam War (1964–1975). Maritime superiority would not be questioned until the 1970s when it would be challenged with the

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global navy project of Admiral Sergey Gorshkov of the Soviet Union, to which the Reagan administration would respond with its initiative for a 600-ship navy. After the end of the Soviet threat, the Navy faced a serious reduction of its means while incorporating advances of the Revolution in Military Affairs, from the use of cruise missiles for its surface ships to the use of drones in carrier strike groups. Since then, the U.S. maritime strategy focuses on power projection and its main objective has been the maintenance of naval primacy. One of the key elements of U.S. maritime strategy has been the superiority of its capabilities, in parallel with the readiness and global deployment of naval assets. On the one hand, the U.S. Navy can position itself in the different theaters of operations thanks to the network of naval bases globally. From the facilities in Hawaii—where the Navy’s Pacific Fleet Command and the Marines operate—to the Rota Naval Base in Spain, the Navy covers a wide spectrum of the ‘arc of instability’ such as the Middle East—with a major naval facility in Bahrain—, the Indian Ocean with a presence on Diego Garcia Island and Southeast Asia with a strategic agreement with Singapore. Within the Department of Defense, the US Navy is the second largest area in terms of military personnel and budget. From the standpoint of operational organization, the Navy’s highest-ranking officer holds the position of Chief of Naval Operations (NOC) and is in charge of many commands that are assigned areas of responsibility and operate under one of the geographic Unified Combatant Commands. In addition, each of the Navy’s commands is designated an active fleet: 2nd Fleet in the Western North Atlantic, 3rd Fleet in the Eastern Pacific, 4th Fleet from southern Mexico to Antarctica in both the Atlantic and Pacific, 5th Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, 6th Fleet in the eastern North and South Atlantic and the Southern Indian Ocean, and 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific. By the beginning of 2022, the Navy had 296 ships at its disposal, divided between 11 aircraft carriers, 117 surface ships, 67 submarines, 31 amphibious warfare ships, and the rest, largely support ships. In addition, the air capabilities of fighter and attack aircraft in the Carrier air wings of the carrier strike groups must be taken into account. The United States has the largest fleet of aircraft carriers in the world (11 active CVNs and 2 under construction). Aircraft carriers are not only the centerpiece of the naval forces but also allow them to have a constant presence in the main maritime spaces to control the sea, and conduct attacks from the sea and from the air, in addition to possessing capabilities to act in the electromagnetic and cyberspace

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spectrum. The combat capabilities of the aircraft carriers and their strike group are reflected in multiple actions such as projecting power in various littorals of the world—from Iraq to the Gulf of Aden—, performing naval diplomacy tasks, and moving quickly in the event of crises in other regions. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2016: 45), the current fleet of 11 aircraft carriers—nuclear-powered—allows 5 of the carrier strike groups to have availability to act within 30 days in the face of a crisis and 7 within 90 days, while the rest would be in scheduled maintenance or another situation that would not allow them to go into action. However, the Navy’s vision has not always been correct. Faced with the possibility of low and medium-intensity conflict scenarios, the Navy paid attention to the development of means to support land operations and developed the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the Zumwalt Class Destroyer (DDG 1000) projects, which were negatively evaluated by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) both for the deficiencies of the models and for the excessive cost of the units. These developments diverted attention from the U.S. response to the modernization of the Chinese Navy. 3.4.2

Naval Primacy in a Renewed Great-Power Competition

The White House’s ‘U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy’ issued in February 2022 lays out a broad, multidimensional agenda that posits five desirable characteristics for the region: free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. Related to the fourth item is a series of key objectives to deter China, including deepening cooperation and enhancing interoperability with allies and partners, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, strengthening extended deterrence and coordination with Korea and Japan, deepening the AUKUS agreement, and expanding Coast Guard presence and cooperation. The main expression of the change in the global strategy of the United States in recent years is expressed in the shift toward the Indo-Pacific as the main theater of operations. The novel US posture in the IndoPacific seeks to contain China’s growing influence, while at the same time, the maritime space is presented as the main domain of that dispute both because of the importance of the maritime lines of communication that connect Beijing with the world and its need to expand its port presence in route to the Western markets. For the US perspective, Chinese ambitions

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and recent Xi’s naval assertiveness represent an obstacle to the U.S. vision of a stable maritime order, so the expansion of Chinese naval capabilities is perceived as revisionist and destabilizing. As a product of the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, the Pentagon published in June 2019 the “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region” where it identifies Russia as a “revitalized malign actor” and China as a “revisionist power” that seeks “seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and, ultimately global preeminence in the long-term.” The US narrative perceives a frontal challenge to the hardwon global supremacy. In military terms he notes that Beijing “broad range of military programs and weapons, including those designed to improve power projection; modernize its nuclear forces; and conduct increasingly complex operations in domains such as cyberspace, space, and electronic warfare operations. China is also developing a wide array of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which could be used to prevent countries from operating in areas near China’s periphery, including the maritime and air domains that are open to use by all countries” (DoD 2019: 8). The maritime strategy of maintaining primacy in the global oceans is reflected in the new stage of an international scenario marked by increased competition and conflict. The Department of the Navy documents expresses the transformation of the U.S. geostrategic orientation. The 2007 U.S. maritime strategy—the first since the end of the Cold War—published under the title ‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ posited an international context marked by transnational threats with significant degrees of international cooperation without naming China or Russia (DoN 2007). At the same time, it underlined the role of U.S. naval power characterized by its global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility to meet a series of strategic imperatives including limiting regional conflicts, deterring armed conflicts between great powers, and winning wars that require the participation of the naval services, among others. A subsequent strategy was published in 2015 under the same title posited a changing geopolitical scenario with Russian assertiveness vis-à-vis Ukraine and Chinese naval expansion in the Indian and Pacific Oceans due to its bullying behavior with its neighbors “along with a lack of transparency in its military intentions, contributes to tension and instability, potentially leading to miscalculation or even

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escalation” (DoN 2015: 4). Both strategies identified forward presence as a key capability for sustaining the U.S. role and shaping the global security context. Finally, the 2020 strategy “Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power” accounts for the new context of great power competition by identifying—from the prologue—China and Russia as adversaries, while there is an emphasis on the use of naval force to protect the U.S. sealift system, preserve a stable and free global maritime environment for commerce, defend allies, expand cooperation with allies and partners to strengthen the favorable balance of maritime power, in addition to deterring rivals or, in the event of a conflict, denying their objectives and defeating them (DoN 2020: 9). In this document, the role of forward presence is again emphasized while the priority is focused on the Indo-Pacific space in the face of China’s revisionist strategy characterized by a large concentration of forces and integration between its Navy, Coast Guard Force, and Maritime Militia. The proposed response to this is the integration of naval power in the various services and domains, which “multiplies the traditional influence of sea power to produce a more competitive and lethal total force” (DoN 2020: 7). To address the China’s challenge, a series of projects—with a corresponding financial allocation—have been carried out, such as the 2018 Asia Reassurance Initiative and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative included in the budget for the fiscal year 2021. On the one hand, the first initiative underscores policy objectives and interests in that region in security, economic and human rights, priorities are absorbed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). On the other hand, the Pacific Deterrence Initiative expresses a complementary effort by the Department of Defense to assist regional allies and strengthen capabilities such as missile defense at U.S. bases, increased deployment of combat forces in the region, and development of longrange strike capabilities in the face of Chinese innovations (Inhofe and Reed 2020). In 2021, USD 2.2 billion was allocated to this program, while in 2022 it was expanded to more than USD 5 billion. In any case, U.S. Congress authorizes for the Pentagon’s Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) more than USD 11 billion in 2023 to maintain maritime superiority at the Indo-Pacific realm (CRS 2023). Regarding maritime interests, this initiative places particular emphasis on generating a military assistance plan to enhance Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, while identifying several key investments such as the acquisition of new Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs),

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Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, as well as continuing the Next Generation Guided Missile Destroyer program (DDG-X) and enhancing shipbuilding capabilities, a major headache due to vested interests between officials and contractors. Another activity stemming from the new guidance is the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) designed to strengthen the security of littoral states in the South China Sea area, more specifically assistance and training for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. The Indo-Pacific realm was not the only priority of the naval strategy. Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regained strategic relevance as in the Cold War times. After a year of the conflict, the USS Nitze paid a visit to the Black Sea in February 2023, but the US failed to stage a NATO permanent base in the area due to the resistances not only by Moscow, but also by Turkey which is a key actor since managed the Bosphorus strait according to the Montreux Convention (1936) and has been reluctant to provoke Russia. While the balance of power in the Black Sea have been increasingly favorable to Moscow after the Crimea annexation, the core of the US naval contention strategy laid in the Mediterranean. Under the U.S. 6th Fleet’s area of responsibility, the U.S. Navy is the backbone of the NATO Standing Naval Forces which are the maritime component of the NATO Response Force. Additional actions include Operation Active Endeavour for maritime security missions and multiple naval exercises in the Alliance’s Southern Flank. Power projection remained at the core of the Washington’s maritime strategy. United States has not modified the central objective of its maritime strategy—naval superiority at the global level—nor its main mode of action—forward presence—although its threat perception has been altered by the assertiveness of Putin’s Russia and the emergence of the People’s Republic of China in parallel with the search for regional hegemony and the expansion of its fleet. Despite presenting itself with a status-quo position, the perception of the rest of the Eurasian naval powers differs on the role of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, as they consider that its presence in the area affects regional stability and has the pretensions of maintaining an artificial hegemony. The Eurasian challenge is clearly expressed in the maritime space.

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DoN (2007) Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Department of Navy, Department of Defense, Washington DC. DoN (2015) Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Department of Navy, Department of Defense, Washington DC. DoN (2020) Advantage at Sea. Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, Department of Navy, Department of Defense, Washington DC. DoS (2019) “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Visión,” https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-OpenIndo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf. Eaglen, Mackenzie (2022) The US defense budget’s latest casualty is readiness, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/05/ 23/the-us-defense-budgets-latest-casualty-is-readiness/. Ellis, Evans (2018) “It’s Time to Think Strategically about Countering Chinese Advances in Latin America,” Global Americans, https://theglobalamericans. org/2018/02/time-think-strategically-countering-chinese-advances-latin-ame rica/. FAS (2021) “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/. Friedman Lissner, Rebecca (2018) “What Is Grand Strategy? Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” Texas National Security Review 2 (1). Grimmett, Richard (2012) “War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance,” Congressional Research Service, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/RL33532. pdf. IMF (2023) “World Economic Outlook,” International Monetary Fund, https:/ /www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/WEO. Immerwahr, Daniel (2019) How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States, Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Inhofe, Jim and Jack Reed (2020) “The Pacific Deterrence Initiative: Peace Through Strength in the Indo-Pacific,” War on the Rocks, https://war ontherocks.com/2020/05/the-pacific-deterrence-initiative-peace-through-str ength-in-the-indo-pacific/. JCS (2018), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNC LASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf. Kaplan, Robert (2018) The Return of Marco Polo’s World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Random House. Krauthammer, Charles (1990/91) “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, 70 (1), pp. 23–33. Layne, Christopher (1993) “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security, 17 (3), pp. 5–51. Layne, Christopher (1997) “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, 22 (1), pp. 86–124.

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Mearsheimer, John (1990) “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15 (1), pp. 5–56. Mearsheimer, John (2021) “The Inevitable Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs, 100 (6), pp. 48–58. NIC (2020) “Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World,” National Intelligence Council, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ GlobalTrends_2040.pdf. Nye, Joseph (1990) “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, 80, pp. 153–171. Pant, Harsh and Kashish Parpiani (2020) “US Engagement in the Indo-Pacific: An Assessment of the Trump Era,” ORF Occasional Paper, https://www.orfonline.org/research/us-engagement-in-the-indo-pac ific-an-assessment-of-the-trump-era/. Paz, Gonzalo (2012) “China, United States and Hegemonic Challenge in Latin America: An Overview and Some Lessons from Previous Instances of Hegemonic Challenge in the Region,” The China Quarterly, 209, pp. 18–34. Pethiyagoda, Kadira (2016) “A Restrained Foreign Policy is Becoming More Popular in Washington,” The National Interest, https://nationalinterest. org/feature/restrained-foreign-policy-becoming-more-popular-washington39962. PGPF (2021) https://www.pgpf.org/budget-basics/budget-explainer-nationaldefense. Porter, Patrick (2018) Why America’s Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment. International Security, 42 (4), pp. 9–46. Posen, Barry (2007) “The Case for Restraint,” The American Interest, 3 (2), pp. 7–32. Posen, Barry and Andrew Ross (1996) “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, 21 (3), pp. 5–53. Presidency of Russia (2022) Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development, http://en.kremlin.ru/supple ment/5770. Robles, Miguel (2020) “Las fuerzas nucleares de Estados Unidos,” Global Strategy, https://global-strategy.org/las-fuerzas-nucleares-de-estadosunidos/. Russett, Bruce (1993) Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Saradzhyan, Simon and Ali Wyne (2018, June) China-Russia Relations: Same Bed, Different Dreams? Why Converging Interests Are Unlikely to Lead to a Full-Fledged Alliance. Cambridge, MA: Russia Matters Project.

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CHAPTER 4

People’s Republic of China: The ‘Blue’ Dream of a Maritime Challenger

The emergence of Beijing on the global stage due to its accelerated economic, technological, and military growth has transformed the nature of the post-Cold War international system where the People’s Republic of China is emerging as the major global competitor of the United States in the coming decades (Xuetong 2011). China combines the autocratic political centralism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a great commercial dynamism together with a growing technological autonomy in the so-called 4th Industrial Revolution, in addition to making a significant investment in capabilities across the entire spectrum of modern warfare. China is currently a great power with emergent global interests, although still in a transitional phase toward a consummate global power. China’s rise over the last three decades has generated a series of global discussions, among how the nature and effects of its political regime, the decision-making process within the party-state-armed forces triad, its development strategy, the impact of its opening up to economic globalization and, finally, the consequences of its global emergence for the international system will stand out. Although these topics are the subject of extensive discussion, in this section we will point out the main elements

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. González Levaggi, Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1_4

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that will allow us to introduce the political, economic, and international specificity of Beijing. This chapter presents the main elements that makeup China’s grand strategy at both the regional and global levels and then analyzes its reflection in the military and maritime spheres.

4.1 ‘Democratic Centralism’: The Chinese Communist Party in the Age of Globalization China is not a democratic country in the liberal Western sense. To date, China is an authoritarian state whose power is concentrated in the CCP that functions in practice as a single party (Shambaugh 2016). According to China’s Constitution, China defines itself as a socialist state of people’s democratic dictatorship that applies in its governing organs the principle of democratic centralism (PRCh 1982/2004). From 1949 to date the system has essentially not changed although the different leadership styles by its main referents who have traditionally occupied—except Deng Xiaoping—the General Secretary of the Party. Control over the structures of the CCP is the key to successful leadership. The most powerful figure in the CPP is the General Secretary of the Party. Currently, this figure is Xi Jinping, who was re-elected for the second time at the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022, an unprecedented event since Mao’s times. State management is subordinated to the leadership of the CCP. Among the main state institutional structures are the National People’s Congress, the President, and the government administration headed by the Prime Minister. According to constitutional rules, the National People’s Congress meets once a year at the request of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, which is composed of a select group of members of the National People’s Congress of the CCP. The Assembly elects the President, who, although a constitutionally symbolic figure, since Jiang Zemin has been the head of the General Secretariat of the CCP. Likewise, the Assembly consents to the election of the Premier of the State Council at the proposal of the President of the People’s Republic of China, in addition to electing the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and deciding on the appointment of the rest of its members at the proposal of its Chairman. Unlike the great emerging powers of the new multipolar order, China has a distinctive feature, a cultural and historical continuity that begins with the territorial unification by the King of Qin in 221 B.C. after the

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period of the ‘Warring States’ although the social and political foundations of Chinese civilization can be traced back even more centuries ago. Chinese self-perception of history is characterized by imperial greatness, colonial humiliation, and pacific rise in the region marking the Sinocentric narrative on the international order (Elizondo 2020:333). For centuries, Chinese civilization occupied a privileged place in multiple areas of human knowledge and technology with advances in the fields of public administration, warfare, and navigation, far surpassing European peoples until the sixteenth century, even in the beginnings of the age of exploration. However, the unity of the Chinese world was often a longing due to the recurrent cycles of rise and decline of dynasties whose end was often traumatic enough to witness the dispute between the central power and local resistances as well as bloody civil wars led by warlords. The transition to modernity in the Chinese world was traumatic. During the ‘century of humiliation’, the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) and the Republic of China founded by Sun Zhongshan (1912–1949) suffered from Western and Japanese imperialism between the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. In the latter period, the Chinese territory also witnessed an intermittent civil war between the Kuomintang and CCP forces from 1927 to 1949 when finally the People’s Liberation Army led by Mao Zedong seized power establishing the People’s Republic of China while the national leader Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan where he established the Republic of China based in Taipei. Under Mao’s leadership as General Secretary of the CCP from 1949 until his death in 1976, the new communist power went through a series of domestic and international processes that would finally assert the Party’s control over any aspect of the country’s cultural, social, or political life. At the local level, Mao launched a series of major campaigns that affirmed his leadership despite dramatic economic and social consequences. Initially, Mao attempted intellectual liberalization with the ‘Hundred Flowers Campaign’ (1956) but such expressions of openness were censored with the ‘Anti-Rightist Campaign’ (1957). Later Mao implemented the ‘Great Leap Forward’ (1958–1961) with the aim of accelerated industrialization and modernization of the rural sector. However, the latter campaign was a failure in the rural areas where most of the population lived, resulting in great famines that killed more than 30 million people. Finally, to purge ‘counter-revolutionary’ elements within

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the society and the party that were against communism, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969) by which he would pursue on a large scale the elimination of the ‘four old ones’ (traditions, culture, habits, and ideas). The violence took such magnitude with the ‘Red Guards’—a paramilitary militia formed mostly by students—that Mao decided to suppress the organization by assigning the People’s Liberation Army the responsibility of restoring order a year after the beginning of the Revolution. From the end of the Cultural Revolution until the rise of Deng Xiaoping as the most powerful figure in the CCP, two factions—a revolutionary one represented by the ‘Gang of Four’ and a reformist one headed by Premier Zhou Enlai—disputed the General Secretary’s approval and subsequent political succession. The situation would not be normalized till the arrest of the members of the radical ‘Gang of Four’ group—led by Jiang Qing, Mao’s last wife—who were detained after Mao’s death in 1976. Deng Xiaoping, persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, would become the Party’s strongman despite not holding the formal position of General Secretary and would push forward a reformist agenda whose traces remain to this day. Reformism had its origin in the words of Premier Zhou Enlai in 1963 on the need to modernize four sectors: agriculture, industry, national defense, science, and technology. This agenda—with a much more openminded profile towards market forces—would be resisted and even fought by the more ideological Maoist sector, but it would re-emerge with the speech on the ‘Four Modernizations’ presented by Zhou himself in 1975. Three years later, during the third plenary session of the XI Central Committee, the slogan of the ‘Four Modernizations’ was officially adopted under the slogan of ‘Reform and Opening Up’. Deng was particularly concerned about the country’s backwardness, especially in the education sector and technological development. Thus China’s integration into the world economic system was not only a way to modernize its economy but also to incorporate the necessary know-how to develop national capabilities. In terms of economic policy, the economic reforms yielded extraordinary results. The Asian country grew at rates of 9% on average between 1979 and 1990, 10.4% between 1990 and 2010, and 7.4% between 2011 and 2019 (World Bank 2020). In addition, exports grew at a level of 16% between 1979 and 2010 (Lin 2016:128), although then declined at rates

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of less than 9% per year in the 2011–2019 period (Yifu Lin 2016:128; WITS 2020). The triumph of the pragmatic line with Deng in the leadership of the CCP opened the door to a series of gradualist reforms focused primarily on the rural sector and foreign trade. After a serious crisis within the CCP Central Committee due to the causes of the 1989 protests and the debacle of the Soviet system, the Party takes a more conservative line that will be altered by a new round of openness reforms after the famous “tour of the south” of Deng Xiaoping in 1992 in which he encouraged the leaders of cities benefited by the first wave of reforms—Guangdong, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai—to continue the deepening of the measures. The same year the Party pledged to develop a ‘socialist market economy’ replacing the ‘socialist planned economy’ (Gilley 2014:133). From his rise as General Secretary of the CCP after the Tiananmen crisis and the progressive retirement of Deng, Jiang Zemin will affirm his political leadership in the Party, adding his position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (1989–2004). Zemin implemented one of the fundamental measures for the success of the ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ model, the extension of privatization to state-owned enterprises starting with small and medium-sized enterprises in 1994 and then deepening in 1997 with 100 large-scale state-owned enterprises. Beijing will receive a boom in foreign investment during the 1990s. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the last step towards its definitive integration into global markets. The globalist trajectory will continue under the leadership of Hu Jintao, who will promote the internationalization of companies or an ‘outward’ policy in which the state encouraged the purchase and investment in foreign companies, the formation of joint ventures in foreign countries, the purchase of oil zones, mines or other sources of raw materials, as well as the acquisition of technologies to accelerate autonomous economic growth. The global financial crisis of 2008 changed the internationalist perspective and—despite continued global integration—greater attention began to be paid to the domestic market, autonomous technological development, and national security concerns. The major expression of this new alteration of the economic project has generated two parallel strategies. First, the ‘One Belt, One Road’ or Belt and Road initiative (BRI)— also known as the New Silk Road—which links China’s production

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centers with major Eurasian consumer markets in terms of infrastructure and transportation and helped to externalize Chinese private and public capital accumulation. Second, the ‘Made in China 2025’ programpushed by Xi Jinping’s leadership—aimed at generating innovation-driven development for building an industrial superpower with emphasis on ten priority sectors such as next-generation information technology; advanced machine control and robotics; aerospace technology, including aircraft engines and airborne equipment; and bio-pharmaceuticals and high-performance medical equipment, among others (Kania 2019). In structural terms, economic growth reflects China’s rise as a major world power. By 2013, China surpassed the United States in terms of the gross domestic product measured by purchasing power parity (GDP/ PPP) although it is still far behind in terms of the gross domestic product measured in nominal terms (2nd globally) and even more so in terms of GDP per capita (World Bank 2020). This growth has generated a greater demand for primary products, especially those for which China is the main consumer, such as copper, platinum, steel, iron, cement, tin, and oil. At the same time, China’s projection as a ‘trading state’ has generated the global expansion of economic interests from securing the flow of imports and exports to guarding external investments both financially and politically, and progressively militarily. The growth of economic and political capacity has impacted the trajectory of China’s foreign policy. Doctrinally, China adheres to an ‘independent foreign policy’ and the so-called ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’—mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non- interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence1 -in addition to “upholding world peace and promoting the cause of human progress” (PRCh 1982/2004). In practical terms, Beijing faced a series of situations arising from its Civil War, such as the establishment of the Republic of China (RoC) in Taiwan led by Chiang Kai Shek, the conflict over the Korean peninsula, as well as the consequences of the establishment of newly independent countries—along with conflicting land and sea borders—with decolonization. China was involved in three armed conflicts—Korea between 1950 and 1953, India in 1962, and Vietnam 1 The five principles of peaceful coexistence were established in 1954 by China, India and Burma (now Myanmar) in an agreement establishing a series of principles for the conduct of their regional relations.

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in 1979—as well as multiple militarized crises both with bordering countries (e.g. with the Soviet Union over the Zhenbao Island Incident in 1969) and disputed maritime zones (e.g. with Vietnam over control of the Paracels, 1974). The early years of Mao’s China witnessed a doctrinal approach to its international actions in which—similarly to the Soviet Union—it faced a dilemma between permanent revolution and regional and international stability that would eventually end up favoring the second objective over ideological aspirations (Kissinger 2012:118). During the Cold War period, China had to face borderline situations with the two superpowers that it would address through the implementation of triangular diplomacy which instrumentalized the interests of the superpowers to limit threats to its national security. In the first stage, Beijing joined an alliance with the Soviet Union until 1963 when tensions began and ended in the 1969 Sino-Soviet schism that would continue until the mid-1980s and would include border crises, as well as competing interests concerning various trouble spots in the Asian continent from Vietnam to India. Sino-U.S. relations had not been very prosperous. After the 1949 Revolution and the creation of the People’s Republic of China, the United States did not recognize it as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people since Taiwan held that representation along with the coveted seat on the United Nations Security Council. The Korean War (1950–1953) along with the development of two armed crises in Taiwan (1954–1955 and 1958)—both with the intervention of the US 7th Fleet—directly confronted both powers. However, tensions with the Soviet Union would lead to an unexpected turn of convergence with the United States in the early 1970s with the famous visits of Kissinger and Nixon to China with the stated goal of ‘enlist the United States as a counterweight to the “polar bear” by means of an explicit strategic design’ (Kissinger 2012:293). Finally, the United States recognized Mainland China in 1979, while the last decade of the Cold War tensions eased as China focused on its internal reforms. The post-Cold War period allowed a peaceful development with isolated crises, especially in the maritime sphere, such as the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995, the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands or the recurring tensions with the countries bordering the South China Sea concerning Beijing’s sovereignty claims regarding the delimitation of

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its maritime border based on the ‘nine-dash line’.2 In addition, Chinese interests multiplied globally, projecting their commercial and financial potential to non-traditional regions such as the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.

4.2 Grand Strategy in the Xi Jinping Era: From Pacific Development to the Chinese Dream of the Great Rejuvenation In recent years, the growth of China’s influence and power along with its increasing activism in the global arena has generated discussions about China’s behavior in terms of great power development. By 2022 the Chinese economy is 2nd in nominal terms and 1st measured at purchasing power parity (PPP) values of gross domestic product (GDP), according to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite possessing limited capabilities in nuclear terms, its military spending increased more than tenfold from $22.3 to $249 billion in the period 2000–2018 (SIPRI 2019). The International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance (IISS 2022) put the budget at USD 332 billion (measured by PPP). Since 2008, China is the second highest defense spending globally but still does not yet reach half of the U.S. Pentagon budget. Beyond these indicators, history and geography have a fundamental weight in the way in which China has interrelated with the world. According to Malena (2010:46–47), its historical experience influences four key elements of its worldview: China’s centrality in the world order, the need to preserve the cultural essence, the consequences of the century of national humiliation, and national pride. Likewise, its complex geography includes borders with 14 countries whose land and sea lengths exceed 22,000 and 18,000 km respectively. Concerning its neighbors, historically its environment has not been particularly peaceful. Added to this is the traumatic experience of the emergence of European imperialist powers and later the United States in East Asia. In this sense, China has historically had several recurring concerns regarding foreign boundaries and peoples that impacted its strategic culture: “(the) protection of the Chinese heartland through

2 The ‘nine-dash line’ delimits Beijing’s claim to the South China Sea in the form of Uy is based on historical rights that arose with the creation of China.

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control of the periphery, whose geographic boundaries were diffuse and did not remain unchanging; (the) limited use of force against external enemies to control the periphery and protect the heartland; (the) expansion and contraction of the periphery as a result of swings in state capacity; and (the) reliance on nonviolent strategies to pacify the periphery” (Malena 2010:70–71). 4.2.1

Moving Away from the Defense: A Changing Orientation

The change in Chinese narrative in recent years has given rise to a discussion among both Chinese and foreign scholars about the existence (or not) of a Chinese grand strategy ranging from pragmatic opportunism to long-term projects. Beijing’s official discourse—key to understanding the Chinese worldview—also underwent a series of alterations from the implementation of ‘Reform and Opening Up’ to Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’. The growth of Beijing’s relative weight in the global economy and international dynamism has been accompanied by greater self-confidence in official rhetoric and greater activism in its objectives, projects, and actions both regionally and globally. Lately the self-confidence furthered aggressiveness, even in the Beijing’s public diplomatic. According to Danner (2018:207), there are four approaches to the existence (or not) of a Chinese grand strategy. The first argument— pessimistic—expresses that China does not have a grand strategy since is still looking for one or is simply acting pragmatically (Jisi 2011; Zhu 2012; Zhang 2012). The second—skeptical—states that China has a grand strategy albeit with many internal contradictions (Buzan 2014; Roy 2014). The third—culturalist—asserts that Chinese culture has a practical approach to situations in the international environment (Qin 2014). Finally, an optimistic approach recognizes both the existence of a grand strategy and also an explicit trajectory from the mid-1990s to the present that is changing according to incentives from the international environment and domestic conditions (Goldstein 2005; Xuetong 2014; Erickson 2019). In line with the last argument, China has possessed an important means-ends rationality since the last quarter of the twentieth century that lends an important degree of coherence to its international policy guidelines. Thus, there are clear indicators of the presence of an accommodative grand strategy. Beijing has been in transition from a defensive orientation to a mixed conception given the growing regional and global

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commitments stemming from exponential economic growth, as well as the intensification of threat perceptions in the maritime realm over the terrestrial one. Tensions in the South China Sea, the U.S. presence in East Asia, and the insecurity of sea lines of communication present concrete challenges to leadership. In this sense, the main characteristic of China’s orientation since the financial crisis of 2008/2009—accentuated in the Xi era—has been the duality between a defensive and offensive posture, and the ambivalence between the terrestrial and the maritime as the axis of geostrategic action. The defensive posture was clear during the Mao era, while Deng emphasized a ‘peaceful and self-reliant foreign policy’ following the principle of non-alignment about the bipolar contest (Zhang 2012:322). Subsequently, given the Tiananmen shock in which China again found itself isolated from the world, Deng personally urged to follow a formula based on 24 characters that would later be added to a 12-character ideographic one: “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” (...) “Enemy troops are outside the walls. They are stronger than we. We should be mainly on the defensive”. (Kissinger 2012: 367–169)

Although the political leader’s recommendations expressed the continuity of Sino-centric passivity concerning the international order, they also collaborated with the development of actions to build trusting relations with its neighbors through low-profile diplomacy. Jiang Zemin will continue with this approach. On the one hand, he will develop good neighborly relations with neighboring countries, especially with the ASEAN member countries along with South Korea, Australia, and the Russian Federation. On the other hand, the future Secretary General would promote a ‘new security concept’ expressed in the document “China’s National Defense” (State Council 1998) in which he broadens the notion of national security and incorporates the possibility of “peacekeeping operations, security dialogues and consultations, mutual confidence-building measures, and security agreements based on the pursuit of mutual benefit” (Malena 2010:97). This passive and friendly perspective will begin to be affected by the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo

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war in 1999. Since the incident, the leadership carried on a discussion between ‘peace and development’ whose axis was the continuity of Deng’s formula. This was reconfirmed, but at the same time, a series of reforms were insisted upon, especially in the relationship with the US. Beijing would begin to develop a more active foreign policy regionally and globally (Zhang 2012:328). With the arrival of Hu Jintao to the General Secretariat such trend is going to be deepened with the concept of ‘China’s peaceful rise’3 developed by Zheng Bijian—Hu’s senior foreign policy advisor—and officially presented by Premier Wen Jiabao. China would be presented as a ‘responsible partner’ of the international order whose rise did not represent a threat either to a country or to the system as a whole. It will later be adapted by Hu Jintao under the concept of ‘peaceful development’ of China within the framework of a ‘harmonious society’ to avoid ambiguities regarding the meaning of the rise (Malena 2018:16). Along these lines, the government published two white papers on the ‘Pacific Development Road’ (State Council 2005) and ‘China’s Pacific Development’ (State Council 2011) that emphasize peaceful intentions and the quest to contribute to global peace through its development. Beijing’s continued economic and international growth together with its strong position in the face of the 2008/9 financial crisis-whose epicenter was the United States- strengthened China’s global status. In the post-crisis period, Beijing clearly outlined a proactive international strategy (“Go Out policy”) supporting the internationalization of Chinese companies and state interests at the global level, in addition to advance a reform agenda of of international financial institutions in order to provide greater relative participation, voice and votes sharing for emerging powers, and, perhaps most notably, the promotion of new regional and global institutions and projects such as the BRI, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS global forum together with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa. The election of Xi Jinping highlighted the novel proactivity, incorporating the concept of ‘major country diplomacy’ (Hu 2019). Xi’s

3 The issue of peaceful rise/development will be discussed in academia as the ‘Chinese rise debate’ in which a number of authors—especially Chinese—claimed that China’s rise to great power status had a peaceful character (Bijian 2005) versus a number of authors positing the ‘Chinese threat theory’ whereby the incentives of Beijing’s rise would unfailingly lead to a more confrontational system (Mearsheimer 2006; Allison 2015).

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projection acquired high visibility both in rhetorical terms and in the demonstration of acquired capabilities, progressively abandoning the lowprofile approach recommended by Deng Xiaoping. One of the most prominent expressions has been the introduction of the proposal of the ‘Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation’ communicated in 2012 by Xi as part of his strategic program in front of his first term as General Secretary of the Party. Xi’s ‘Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation’ involves building a ‘moderately affluent society’ by 2035 and an ‘affluent society’ by 2049, both the ‘goals of the century’ (Malena 2018:18). In his first re-election speech at the 19th CPC National Congress, Xi expressed the main outlines of such a project: In the first stage from 2020 to 2035, China will build on the foundation created by the moderately prosperous society with a further 15 years of hard work to see that socialist modernization is basically realized. In the second stage from 2035 to the middle of the 21st century, China will, building on having basically achieved modernization, work hard for a further 15 years and develop China into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful. (Xi 2017)

This new perspective includes—by mid-century—the transformation of the People’s Liberation Army into global class forces, the expectation of reunification with Taiwan, and the positioning as a global power (Erickson 2019:75). Another relevant innovation of the Xi Jinping era is the socalled “New Model of Great Power Relationship” that aims to sustain a relationship of symmetry with the United States, whose position has become increasingly assertive about Beijing, especially under the Trump presidency and the accusations about the origins of COVID19. Such a Chinese perspective towards a more proactive stance was clearly expressed both in the new Taiwan crisis with the visit of Nancy Pelosi, the then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, and at the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2022 where Xi Jinping criticized the cold war mentality and hegemonism while presenting the option of a Global Security Initiative with a perspective focused on multilateralism, building lasting peace and mutual learning among nations for the development of an open and inclusive world, as opposed to the U.S. coercive diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific.

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Concentric Objectives Around Territorial Integrity

China pays particular attention to national security issues which lie in the first ring of a series of four concentric circles (Nathan and Scobell 2012:3–6). In the primary ring, the internal political stability of the CCP leadership itself is the primary objective, along with territorial integrity on the maritime (Taiwan and sovereign claims in the South and East China Seas) and land (Tibet and Xinjiang issues). Then come concerns about neighboring countries including the presence of the U.S. as a maritime power in the Pacific (second ring), the interactions of the complex regional orders surrounding it (third ring), and, finally, Beijing’s interests in the rest of the world. In short, the priorities are intermestic, especially in those ‘hot spots’ where China claims to have its interests regarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity addressed. Regarding the operationalization of the grand strategy’s goals, Xi Jinping control the CCP affairs, oversight of the government bureaucracy, and play a central role in military affairs (Erickson 2019:83). In formal terms the grand strategy has a partial expression in a series of official documents and statements that express both orientation and objectives albeit with a high degree of indeterminacy due to the characteristic of Chinese diplomatic rhetoric. Among the central documents are the speeches of successive CCP General Secretaries to the National People’s Congress, documents adopted at plenary sessions of the CCP Central Committee, and the ‘white papers’ issued by China’s State Council in the areas of foreign policy and national defense. However, it is more important to look how these written concepts match with concrete actions concerning several areas in which certain changes are expressed. For example, on the Taiwan issue and China’s maritime and island claims, Beijing has demonstrated a consistent line in both its claims and actions, although lately is showing less risk aversion in both tense situations with the U.S. regarding military exercises in around Taiwan and the construction of man-made facilities and the use of the Coast Guard and Maritime Militias in the South China Sea (Stashwick 2019). Apart from that, there is evidence of a strategic rapprochement with the Russian Federation at the same time that relations with the United States begin to be observed from the perspective of competition between great powers with the implementation of economic and strategic containment mechanisms by Washington and the consequent reaction of Beijing (Colby and Mitchell 2020).

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Centralized Decision-Making, Multiple Instruments Available

Finally, China’s grand strategy has a high degree of coherence that is expressed in military doctrine, diplomatic networks, and its economic policy due to the centralization of decision-making and the bureaucratic apparatus that implements it. In this sense it is important to incorporate a concept widely used by Chinese officials and academic institutions is that of ‘integral national power’ which includes elements such as natural resources, economic and technological capacity, sociocultural development, military, governmental, and diplomatic capacity. The concept initially developed by Colonel Huang Shuo Feng in 1992 and later revised by Chinese scholars often presents counterintuitive results concerning Western perceptions of China’s relative power. For example, in Li Shenming and Wang Yizhou’s 2010 report on ‘comprehensive national power’, China ranks seventh, slipping back one place from the 2006 report (Haixia 2017:21). Three initiatives are particularly interesting for their regional and global projection. First, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiative presented by Xi Jinping in 2013 during his trip to Kazakhstan in which he projects the development of connectivity in terms of critical infrastructure for land and sea transport of products from China to its western markets with final destination Europe. Authors such as Jisi (2011) and Erickson (2019) argue that the BRI is projected as an external manifestation of China’s grand strategy although reactive about the Obama administration’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy. Secondly, with a focus on regional security cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the clear articulation of Eurasian interests between Moscow and Beijing, with the key participation of Central Asian countries. The CCP’s leadership concerns regarding Uyghur separatism as well as the risk of religious terrorism make it a critical forum for advancing the regional counter-terrorism agenda. Finally, participation in the BRICS group expresses China’s vision of a posthegemonic and multipolar international order in which emerging powers have a greater voice and vote in international affairs, in addition to developing a platform for their interests at the multilateral level, as well as identifying members as strategic partners for their economic development (Niu 2013).

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4.3 The People’s Liberation Army and Active Defense: Defensive Strategy, Offensive Tactics China is the country with the largest number of neighboring countries in the world (14) and the longest land borders, in addition to having extensive coastlines that exceed 14,000 km. Its contemporary history and geographical location on the Asian continent highlight the importance of the military factor, both to ensure its territorial integrity and to deter regional and extra-regional powers in conventional and non-conventional ways. In addition to the ‘One China’ issue with Taiwan, there are several land and maritime boundaries which still in dispute with Japan (Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands), Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines, and Malaysia in the South China Sea (Spratly Islands, Paracels Islands, Maccles Bank, and Scarborough Reef, among others), India (Aksai Chin region and Arunachal Pradesh, among other territories) and Bhutan (Doklam, Kula Kangri and other enclaves). Many of these disputes triggered conflicts and militarized crises, especially during China’s first decades such as the SinoIndian war (1962) or the Chinese occupation of the South Johnson Reef disputed by Vietnam (1988).4 In addition to the persistence of border disputes, since China’s economic expansion, trade has gradually become dependent on maritime lines of communication and the security of the ‘choke points ’. On the one hand, from the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca—located between Malaysia and Indonesia—a critical amount of hydrocarbon resources key to economic production are transported. Apart from that, passages such as the Bab-el-Mandeb Passage and the Suez Canal are relevant to the sustainability of Chinese trade logistics. Given the threat to its maritime interests, the Chinese People’s Army Navy (hereafter PLA) decided to send a series of ‘Task Forces’ to conduct anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden from 2009 to later announce its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2016, marking a historic counterpoint to the military strategy and doctrine limited entirely to its immediate neighborhood.

4 For complementary literature devoted to China’s border tensions and conflicts see Fraver, Taylor (2008) Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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4.3.1

The Party, the Red Army, and the Organization of the Military Factor

The role of the military factor is key to understanding not only the rise of China but also the historical trajectory of the People’s Liberation Army (hereafter PLA)—created in 1927 as the party militia—as the armed wing of the CCP and the People’s Republic. Political loyalty is considered the main guide for action by the CCP concerning the armed forces (Blasko 2006:6). Mao’s reflections presented the Red Army as an indispensable force both in the pursuit of personal political power and in the strengthening of the party (Wei 2002:246). They also pointed out a clear subordination of military power to political power, which caused tensions at different moments in contemporary Chinese history, such as the outcome of Mao’s succession or the Tiananmen crisis. The Red Army has respected the principle of subordination to political power. Within the decision-making system of the CCP, the place of the PLA is relevant but not decisive. According to the 1982 CCP Constitution—and maintained throughout subsequent reforms—the highest decision-making body related to military affairs is the Central Military Commission (hereafter CMC) which is directly subordinate to the CCP Politburo and its CPP. Moreover, the CMC has an identical structure under the State Council, although the locus of decisions remains in the hands of the CCP, while relations with the Council are one of coordination, not subordination. Throughout the past two decades, the military has had limited political representation. Although almost 10% of the members of the CCP National Congress belong to the PLA, since 1997—after the retirement of Admiral Liu Huaqing—there are no military representatives in the highest decision-making body (CPP), while in the Politburo there are only two representatives as Vice-Chairmen of the CMC (Blasko 2006:8).5 The CMC is traditionally headed by the General Secretary of the CPC, who also has responsibility for military affairs within the CPP. Since his ascension to the position of General Secretary, Xi Jinping has also assumed the role of Chairman of the CMC. Interestingly, the CMC has become increasingly depoliticized especially after the resolution of the

5 For example, in the period of the 19thno Politburo are Xu Qiliang, former Commander of the Air Force, and Zhang Youxia, former director of the PLA General Armaments Department.

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post-Tiannamen tensions in the first half of the 1990s, although it is only since 2004 that service commanders have been part of the CMC (Miller 2015:91). The CMC directs the armed forces of the entire country and determines its main strategic guidelines, in addition to determining national defense policies including the size and composition of the armed forces, priorities in military planning, and the allocation of resources for material purchases, among others (Blasko 2006:27; Miller 2015:93; Fravel 2019:28). While the CMC structure has undergone modifications, the 2016 reform established a particularly centralized scheme. The organization strengthened the decision-making power of the Central Office by de-emphasizing the traditional four departments (General Affairs, Policy, Logistics, and Armaments), in addition to dividing the country into five ‘Theaters of Operations’: West, Northeast, Central (Beijing), East, and Southeast (Finkelstein 2016). The strategic priority is focused on the Eastern sector due to its maritime proximity to the Taiwan Strait. 4.3.2

Armed Forces Faces Regional and Rising Global Challenges

China has three key tools to deal with threats to its national security: a huge armed forces, a large military budget, and the nuclear triad. Beijing has the largest army in the world. According to China’s constitution, the main mission of the Red Army is “to strengthen national defense, resist aggression, defend the motherland, protect the peaceful work of the people, participate in national reconstruction and serve the people with fervor” (PRCh 1982/2004:29). Its structure has five forces—the Army (975,000 troops), the Navy (250,000), the Air Force (395,000), the Missile Force (145,000) and the Strategic Support Force—and an additional support service, the Joint Logistics Support Force, in addition to two paramilitary structures: the people’s militia and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) that includes the Coast Guard. In the last decades, there has been a process of reduction in the number of personnel in the PLA, which has generated protests among retirees. In 1985 the Red Army had six million active troops while after a series of

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modernization reforms, today it totals 2 million active troops in addition to a reserve of more than 500,000 men.6 The objectives and scope of the PLA have changed throughout the trajectory of contemporary China. In the beginning, the PLA was indispensable for strengthening the CCP, as well as ensuring unity against internal and external enemies, for example in the period of the civil war with the Kuomintang or during the Korean War. However, with the ‘Reform and Opening-up’ process, the PLA changed its profile to a more modern force, while seeking a better balance between professional and ideological commitments, especially after the Tiananmen crisis. However, only in the last two decades that the Red Army has demonstrated a level of modernization in equipment, doctrine, and training similar to the world’s leading armed forces. Looking ahead, the CCP leadership envisions the establishment of world-class armed forces by 2049 as part of the Chinese nation’s great dream of rejuvenation. In the Xi’s speech to 20th CCP Congress underlines that the urgency to “quickly elevating our people’s armed forces to world-class standards are strategic tasks for building a modern socialist country in all respects. To this end, we must apply the thinking on strengthening the military for the new era, implement the military strategy for the new era, and maintain the Party’s absolute leadership over the people’s armed forces” (Xi 2022). Nowadays China has the largest defense budget in Asia and the second largest globally after the United States. Despite the personal downsizing, the military sector budget has grown constantly in the last two decades. While spending as a percentage has remained around 2% of GDP over the past 20 years (according to CSIS China Power Project data),7 reaching USD 332 billion (measured by PPP) (IISS 2022). While there are various ways of measuring Chinese military spending everyone reflects an unprecedented leap for any country in the post-Cold War era. Finally, China is a nuclear power. While it was the last of the Security Council members to achieve the atomic bomb, it is currently in third place with 350 nuclear devices after Russia and the United States (FAS 2021) although progressively the size of its stockpile would double by 6 The official Chinese publicly available documents do not specify the number of personnel so the information is taken from IISS (2020) The Military Balance 2020, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: IISS, p. 259. 7 According to China’s latest Defense White Paper the percentage of spending is only 1.3% of GDP (State Council 2019).

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2030 along with the modernization of its nuclear triad with the local development of a nuclear-capable strategic bomber (Ashley 2019). Beijing’s ambitious plans on a global scale are novel. The relevance of the military factor in China’s grand strategy has undergone a series of modifications related to changes in the external environment and the progressive growth of the country’s potential. After the beginning of Deng’s reforms, the modernization of the military instrument was subordinated to the ‘Reform and Opening Up’ program until the end of the 1990s. Thereafter, the modernization of the armed forces was presented in terms of coordinating military power with economic development. Finally, in Xi’s later period, the increasing importance of military power in securing economic development and its major regional and global interests is expressed (Maizland 2020). The arrow has reversed its trajectory. Military strategy has reflected changes in two areas: equipment modernization and combat mode. During an enlarged CMC meeting in 1995, Jiang Zemin announced the ‘two fundamental transformations’ of the PLA whose central thrusts remain to this day (Finkelstein 1999:135– 138). On the one hand, the General Secretary proposed to modify the enormous size of technologically backward forces for a quantitatively smaller, qualitatively better, and technologically advanced army. On the other hand, he proposed to change the type of conflict China would face. Previously, a major defensive conflagration—with the Soviet Union or the United States—was the main hypothesis of conflict. In this sense, a second transformation proposes the preparation to “fight and succeed in a local conflict in or near the Chinese periphery” (Blasko 2006:12). However, strategic innovation did not begin with Jiang’s speech; rather, the shift of Chinese military strategy in that direction began in 1980. According to Fravel (2019), the Military Strategic Guideline formulated by senior officers and implemented by the CMC has been the guiding document for military strategy. Another key document for understanding military strategy has been the Defense White Paper whose latest publication was made in 2019.8

8 In a second step of importance—given that they do not reflect the official vision although they do reflect the main concepts used by PLA strategists—is the document ‘Science of Military Strategy’, a compilation made by researchers of the Academy of Military Sciences and which reports directly to the CMC. Other publications or research by Chinese and foreign institutions or academics is of marginal relevance such as the case

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The evolution of Chinese9 military strategy can be divided into two periods: People’s War (1949–1980) and Active Defense (1980–present). Both concepts were inspired by Mao’s writings during the pre-republican era, although it is important to consider that the interpretations of these concepts have changed in light of changes in the international regional environment, as well as the prevailing mode of military combat. The people’s war consisted of confronting a more powerful enemy through the combination of guerrilla actions and conventional confrontations with the mobilization and support of the masses. After the victory in the Civil War, the concept was maintained as the strategic guidance of the PLA both in times of external conflicts and internal reforms, given the strong ideological character of Mao’s ideas. After his death and after the transition to Deng, the PLA was one of the key areas to modernize the CCP leadership. The defensive military strategy was not to be modified, although the type and manner of dealing with threats were to be changed. By 1980, the CMC approved a new military strategic guideline known as ‘active defense’. Mao referred to the former strategy as offensive defense or defense by decisive fighting that aims to move to the counteroffensive and offensive after a tactical retreat (Mao 1968:224). However, the interpretation did not refer to the original situation of the Japanese invasion, but to a forward defense based on positional warfare and supplemented by low-scale mobile forces to meet the Soviet threat on the northern frontier (Fravel 2019:141). In the face of the progressive rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing in the Gorbachev era—during a CMC meeting in 1984—Deng declared that a major, nuclear and rapid conflagration was not so likely and that, instead, China had to face a new kind of threat of local and limited conflicts (Blasko 2006:5). A new military strategic guideline in 1988 not only gave credence to this reorientation on the mode of warfare but stressed the importance of the southern border and the South China

of the famous book ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ written by Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui (Mattis 2019). 9 An interesting element to take into account in studies on military strategy are the sources of historical inspiration in which the Seven Military Classics (including Sun Tzu’s famous Art of War), Luo Guanzhong’s Romance of the Three Kingdoms and the anonymous text of the Thirty-Six Stratagems, among others, are rescued.

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Sea at the same time of the situation in the north no longer presented the same urgency (Fravel 2019:179). The PLA leadership was taking note of the evolving international environment and especially modes of combat involving major powers such as the case of the Falklands War (1982) and particularly the Second Gulf War (1990/1) (Yoshihara and Holmes 2018). Given the impact of the intensive use of technology in Operation ‘Desert Storm’ and after settling divisions in the post-Tiananmen CCP leadership, there was a new major shift in military strategy that emphasized contesting local wars with the use of advanced technological material. In 1993 a new military strategy was approved under the title ‘Local Wars under Modern High-Tech Conditions’. The strategic guideline emphasized the importance of the rest of the forces over the army and presented Taiwan and the southern periphery of China as the primary strategic direction. That guidance and course of action would be updated with the 2004 strategic directive that stressed the importance of conducting ‘integrated joint operations’ and changed the name of the strategy to ‘Winning Local Wars under Computerized Conditions’ while retaining the strategic direction and forms of combat (Fravel 2019:183–185, 218–219). In a context of a growing military budget and a renewed interest of the leadership to face new situations in the maritime periphery, the PLAN began to modify the axis of its geostrategic action by projecting itself beyond its coasts. In a speech in late 2004, Hu Jintao introduced a series of ‘new missions’ involving a broadening of the armed forces’ scope of action. The new tasks involved “(1) providing an important guarantee of strength for the Party to consolidate its ruling position, (2) providing a strong security guarantee to safeguard the important period of strategic opportunity for national development, (3) providing powerful strategic support to safeguard national interests, and (4) playing an important role in protecting world peace and promoting common development” (Mulvenon 2009). Among the most prominent tools of the PLAN for its extra-regional projection are naval diplomacy, the rescue of Chinese citizens in conflict situations such as Yemen and Libya, the conduct of naval exercises together with China and South Africa, the deployment of naval antipiracy task forces in the Horn of Africa and the establishment of the first overseas naval base in Djibouti, among other actions of international impact (Henry 2016). While the military strategy has had a relatively

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stable trajectory since then, the international environment and China’s rise raise several questions about possible changes shortly. On the one hand, experts (Erickson 2019) and official U.S. institutions (DoD 2019; DIA 2019) posit that China is seeking primacy as a preeminent actor in its surrounding region, althobugh they disbelieve a projection of global military power. On the other hand, China’s Military Strategy (State Council 2015) and National Defense White Paper (State Council 2019) state that there is growing strategic competition both regionally and globally although they still envision a period of ‘strategic opportunity’. However, the perception of the Chinese leadership is not entirely optimistic as they still have to cope with ‘two major gaps’, the insufficient degree of PLAN modernization to safeguard their national security and the significant gap vis-à-vis their global peers (Blasko 2019). A crucial test for Beijing’s strategic and naval aspirations is the Taiwan issue. Since Mao came to power there have been different crises in the Taiwan Strait (1954–55, 1958, and 1995–96) but in 2022 a Chinese military escalation started after the visit of US Representative Nancy Pelosi who joined President Biden’s statements supporting the defense of Taiwan in case of a Chinese attack and the sale of advanced technological military weaponry to Taipei. As a response, Xi Jinping ordered a military deployment to carry out military and naval exercises around the island to deter any decision to potentially break the ‘One China’ principle and the quest for a blue water maritime projection beyond the first chain of islands.

4.4 The ‘Blue’ Dream: Developing Capabilities for a ‘Distant Water’ Navy In mid-2005, the Chinese government commemorated the 600th anniversary of the first journey of Zheng He—a merchant and navigator under the orders of Emperor Zhu Di of the Ming dynasty—who led one of the longest expeditions in history with a message of ‘harmony’. Hu Jintao himself would claim during a visit to South Africa that the journey carried the desire for peace and royal friendship as opposed to armed diplomacy, plunder, and slavery (Federl 2018:69). The figure of Zheng He has been rescued as the symbol of the return of the maritime dimension to Chinese grand strategy.

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Conceptually, China’s naval rise and its maritime strategy have been interpreted in multiple ways including geostrategic realism, naval nationalism, Mahanian geopolitics, and the conceptual framework provided by official discourse (Yves-Heng 2014:3–6). The first argument focuses on the Chinese goal of achieving regional hegemony in East Asia both by resolving the Taiwan issue and by negating the technological capabilities of the United States and Japan (Nathan and Scobell 2012; Yves-Heng 2014). The second approach emphasizes the role of nationalism in developing a ‘prestige strategy’ to increase its domestic legitimacy (Ross 2009). The third explains the Chinese naval phenomenon from the regional geopolitical situation and the impact of the economic model that requires control of maritime lines of communication and thus the development of a blue water naval force (Nohara 2017; Yoshihara and Holmes 2018). Finally, from the official analytical framework, the logic of peaceful rise and the development of a ‘harmonious ocean’ in which China is presented as a co-responsible actor in international maritime security cooperation is emphasized (People’s Daily 2009). Despite its continentalist tradition affirmed in Mao’s teachings and the lessons of Chinese history, Beijing’s maritime strategy made a major change in the last two decades. Beijing shifted from its traditional continentalist approach of coastal defense towards a strategy of offshore defense (‘offshore water defense’) and open water protection (‘open seas protection’ ) in line with the transformation of military strategy towards active defense and modernization of the military instrument (State Council 2019; DoD 2019). According to the latest White Paper, under the current transition from defense tasks in the near seas to protection missions in the far seas, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is assigned to carry out actions of “strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuver operations, maritime joint operations, comprehensive defense, and integrated support, so as to build a strong and modernized naval force” (State Council 2019). In this sense, China’s maritime strategy already expresses a clear determination to project power beyond its immediate zone of influence. China’s maritime vision can be initially guessed from official documents, both in civilian development plans and in defense white papers

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and military strategy.10 As regards the civilian sphere, China has published a series of documents and strategies that were eventually incorporated into the Outline Development Plan for a National Maritime Initiative approved by the State Council in 2008, and subsequently incorporated into the Five-Year Plans 12do and 13ro . In the latter plan, the construction of strategic maritime nodes within the framework of the New Maritime Silk Road is emphasized along with the expansion of the ocean economy. At the same time, four maritime projects are highlighted as being in full swing for the 2016–2020 period: environmental improvement, marine exploration focused on deep-sea space research, polar exploration in both the Arctic and Antarctica, and the development of a global ocean observation network (CCCPCh 2016). Defense white papers have paid increasing attention to the maritime phase of defense. In 2006, the paper called for a gradual extension of strategic depth for defense operations on the high seas and an enhancement of its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counter-attacks. The development of counter-piracy operations, by 2010 highlighted the importance of the Navy in carrying out different types of missions: nuclear deterrence, conventional combat, and low-intensity military operations in distant waters. However, the 2013 White Paper posed a critical modification in the country’s strategic identity considering China as a continental and maritime power. According to this document, “the seas and oceans provide immense space and abundant resources for China’s sustainable development, and thus are of vital importance to the people’s wellbeing and China’s future. It is an essential national development strategy to exploit, utilize and protect the seas and oceans, and build China into a maritime power. It is an important duty for the PLAN to resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests” (State Council 2013). The 2015 Military Strategy and the 2019 White Paper reaffirm the importance of the maritime dimension, especially concerning safeguarding maritime rights and interests. From the formal point of view, the Chinese Navy is the main tool of maritime strategy. As one of the services

10 One of the most popular concepts in Western military and naval literature as applied to China is the development of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, but one that is rarely used by Chinese officials and academics. However, this does not detract from the fact that China develops concrete actions to limit U.S. naval and aerospace capabilities in the areas surrounding China even though the Chinese phraseology is different.

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under the Central Military Commission, the PLAN is organized based on three fleets whose area of responsibility overlaps with the definition of the Theaters of Operations. Operationally, PLAN has the largest number of ships in the world with a total number of 355 ships and submarines (DoD 2021). In terms of specific responsibilities, the Eastern Fleet has as its priority the Taiwan scenario along with area denial actions in maritime boundary delimitation conflicts such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands case. The Southern Fleet is responsible for responding to conflicts in the South China Sea, in addition to protecting choke points, which are key to the continuity of sea lines of communication (SLOC). In this sense, it is the main fleet designated for oceanic protection tasks beyond the seas surrounding China. Finally, the Northern Fleet has the responsibility to protect any projection into the Central Theater of Operations, in addition to dealing with any destabilizing situation around the Yellow Sea such as a potential conflict around the Korean peninsula. The bulk of the nuclear submarine forces—both attack and ballistic missile—and the two aircraft carriers are distributed between the Northern and Southern Fleets, while a larger number of frigates (FFG) missile launchers and corvettes (FS) are in the Eastern Fleet. PLAN is organized into five services: Submarine Forces, Surface Forces, Naval Aviation, Marine Corps, and the Coastal Defense Force. In terms of capabilities, the first two forces have benefited extensively from military budget growth (DoD 2019:28). At the same time the Marine Corps benefits from an increasing budget but still lacks proper means to develop long-range deployments. In addition to the PLA’s oceanic role, China’s maritime strategy is underpinned by a tripod of public security, paramilitary, and civilian institutions: the Coast Guard, the Chinese Maritime Militia, and the State Oceanic Administration, respectively. After a series of administrative modifications, the Coast Guard (GCCh) is now under the control of the People’s Armed Police under the CMC, thus forming part of a single command from a political and strategic point of view. Among the functions of the GCCh are maritime patrol, anti-piracy operations, coastal security, search and rescue, and protection of Chinese vessels. The importance of the GCCh as China’s secondlargest maritime force is expressed in its relative weight as it is “ largest Coast Guard by number of ships, with the world’s largest Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) ships by size. By 2017, following an historically unprecedented two-decade buildup, China’s 17,000-plus CCG personnel

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crewed 225 ships of over 500 tons capable of operating offshore, and at least another 1050 vessels confined to closer waters, for a total of over 1275—more hulls than the Coast Guards of all its regional neighbors combined. Five years later, fleet size has stabilized at approximately this level” (Erickson 2022:54). As part of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Militias, the third force is the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), a paramilitary organization composed primarily of seafarers who work in the civilian economy but are trained to defend and promote China’s maritime territorial claims, protect “maritime rights and interests,” and support the PLAN in times of war (Kennedy and Erickson 2017:2). While the Militias are part of a separate PLAN system, they are under the PLAN’s local military command. Their peacetime missions include fishing, natural disaster response, search and rescue missions in collaboration with the Coast Guard, and presence missions in conflict waters. Finally, the State Oceanic Administration is part of the Ministry of Land and Resources with various functions. First, it is in charge of drafting regulations on the use of marine areas, including environmental protection, scientific research, and protection of islands in areas under Chinese sovereignty (State Council 2020). It also establishes the guidelines for the economic development policy in the maritime field and works as an articulator between different state institutions related to the development of maritime interests, from the Polar Expeditions Office to the main oceanographic, environmental, and satellite application research institutes, among others. The maritime strategy has several tools, although the PLAN remains the central one. From an equipment standpoint, the PLAN has evolved from a ‘mosquito navy’ to the largest naval force in East Asia with sufficent capability to displace the US in a regional conventional engagement. Moreover, China is well on its way to becoming a premier naval power in the select club that includes the United States and the Russian Federation (Nohara 2017:210; Maizland 2020). In this vein, in his capacity as CMC Director, Xi Jinping stated that “powerful and modern navy is necessary for the realization of the Chinese Dream and the dream of a strong military. Building a powerful navy is an important symbol of building a world-class military, a strategic pivot for building the national into a great maritime power, and an important component of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (MoD China: 2017).

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This should not be understood as empty rhetoric. On the contrary, PLAN modernization has led to a pace of growth unseen since the deployment of the Soviet navy under Admiral Gorshkov. China has made a great qualitative and technological leap in the last decade. To highlight some of its achievements, PLAN added two aircraft carriers (Type 001 Liaoning and Type 002 Shandong) with conventional propulsion and a horizontally deployable STOBAR (short take-off with arresting recovery) system. In addition, the Jiangnan shipyard is building a third Type 003 aircraft carrier with CATOBAR (catapult-assisted take-off) and conventional propulsion. At the same time, the Navy received the latest deliveries of Type 094 (Jin Class) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) and Type 095 (Shang Class) nuclear-powered attack submersibles (SSN), along with Type 052D (Luyang II Class) missile destroyers (DDG) and Type 055 (Renhai Class) advanced stealth destroyers. In both cases, they can be integrated into carrier groups or conduct operations beyond China’s near seas. Looking ahead, the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence anticipated an expansion of the Chinese Navy between 2020 and 2030 by about 18%, which would double the submarine force and increase by almost 50% the main platforms of its surface force (CRS 2020). Some comparisons may be useful to illustrate the dizzying growth of the Chinese navy. According to CSIS, between 2014 and 2018 Beijing launched more ships (accounting for submarines, amphibious warfare craft, and auxiliaries) than the total number of ships owned by the individual navies of Germany, India, Spain, and the United Kingdom together (China Power 2019). Moreover, in the 2015–2019 period, Chinese shipyard production equaled in tonnage the entire UK Navy or the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (Harper 2020). Finally, the U.S. Congressional Research Service assessed that Beijing had a 52-ship differential in 2021 over the U.S. Navy in 2019, even though Washington had the lead until 2014 (CRS 2022). However, the Chinese Navy still has a limited number of nuclear-powered ballistic submarines (SSBNs) and nuclearpowered attack submarines (SSNs), has not developed nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and destroyers still fall short of the tonnage of its rivals. According to Malena (2011:5), “China has finally adopted a military maritime vocation, the result of the confluence of economic, security and diplomatic factors”. Following the transformations of the logic of military strategy in terms of strategic direction and forms of combat, naval strategy has gone through two main stages: coastal defense (1949–1979) and

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active offshore defense (1980–2010) (Li 2011:109). However, since the mid-2010s, open-water protection has been incorporated as an additional element to active offshore defense. The modern PLAN was born a year after the establishment of the People’s Republic with a small number of ships used in the Civil War by the Red Army and some ships captured from the Kuomintang. For the first three decades, the maritime vision was largely influenced by the Soviet New School and ideological adherence to the ‘People’s War’ strategy (Cole 2010:171–173). In its early days, the naval strategy was not only subservient to the military strategy of the ‘People’s War’, but the naval instrument was considered an extension of the land force both in terms of its manpower—for decades the leadership of the PLAN was provided by army officers—but also by the orientation in platform investment. In this sense, the strategy would be defined in terms of ‘coastal defense’ whereby naval forces would support land forces to repel a large-scale invasion of the Chinese mainland by the United States and later the USSR (Malena 2011). Faced with a shortage of material and human resources, the PLAN invested in building a low-tonnage navy with the development of small ships armed with anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, coastal missile artillery, and the development of a significant submarine force that would be the backbone for most of the Cold War (Burilkov 2017:106). Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new consensus began to emerge to abandon the coastal defense strategy and start projecting toward oceanic waters. One of the referents of this transformation was Admiral Liu Huaqing who—given his position as Commander of the PLAN in the period 1982–1987 and then a member of the CPP between 1992 and 1997—managed to instrumentalize his vision of projecting beyond coastal defense by redefining the term ‘offshore defense’ after the approval of the new strategic guideline of 1985. Regarded as the Chinese ‘Mahan’ or ‘Gorshkov’ (Li 2011:123), Liu’s vision and ideas11 have permeated Chinese maritime strategy in both the 11 An interesting element raised by Liu in his memoir is the fundamental strategic tasks of the PLAN: “In peacetime, the navy should (1) defend the nation’s unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and maritime rights and interests; (2) develop naval diplomacy; (3) deter attacks from the sea; (4) deal with local conflicts at sea; and (5) facilitate national development. In wartime, the PLAN should (1) counter enemy attacks from the sea, acting independently or jointly with the other services; (2) protect the nation’s sea lanes; and (3) execute strategic nuclear retaliatory strikes if ordered by the CCP’s top leadership” (Liu 2004:438 in Yoshihara and Holmes 2018).

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civilian and military domains. Liu specified the meaning of offshore in broad terms including two ‘island chains’ (Map 4.1). In specific terms, the ‘first island chain’ includes the Aleutian Islands, Ryukyus, Kuriles, the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan, the Philippine archipelago, and the Great Sound Islands, while the ‘second island chain’ extends to the Bonins Islands, the Marianas, Guam and Palau (Huang 1994:18). In Liu’s vision, China’s projection into the oceans was to be gradual and with a series of clear objectives. In the first phase by 2020, the

Map 4.1 China’s first and second island chains (https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Island_chain_strategy#/media/File:Geographic_Boundaries_of_the_First_ and_Second_Island_Chains.png)

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Chinese Navy should be able to exercise control over the maritime territory within the ‘first chain’, i.e. the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. By 2020, control should be extended to the ‘second chain’, while the PLAN should be transformed into a global navy by 2050 (Cole 2010:176; Hartnett 2014). Liu projected that the moment the navy was able to operate independently and effectively in the ‘second chain’ and beyond, it would become a regional blue water navy (Liu 2004:437 in Li 2011:129). Indeed, the capabilities developed by the PLAN have achieved that goal, in addition to shifting the regional balance in its favor and raising the costs of U.S. presence in the region. In this sense, Liu’s stated goal toward 2050 to build a global navy is akin to Xi’s aspiration to constitute ‘first-rate armed forces by 2049. According to Burilkov, “the PLAN strategy has adopted some modest components of ‘sea control,’ probably as part of a longterm project to move away from being simply a green-water navy, and instead become a fully developed blue-water navy capable of sustained global power projection” (2017:109). Outside observers argue that China’s naval strategy has undergone three almost simultaneous transformations that make it complex to understand. First, the extension of sea denial actions from the ‘first’ to the ‘second’ island chain surrounding the East and South China Seas through the development of ballistic missiles and cruisers, in addition to the modernization of the nuclear attack submarine fleet. Second, the development of sea control actions in the ‘first island chain’ with ‘gray zone’ strategies. Finally, the development of the range of naval operations, exercises, and visits in extra-regional seas along the lines of ‘protecting the seas’ (Cole 2010:176; Li 2011:116–130; Sheldon-Duplaix 2016; Wu 2019). In this sense, the construction of artificial islands and the development of military infrastructure on reefs, the construction of aircraft carriers, and the expansion of a surface fleet with increasing tonnage make sense within a maritime strategy that articulates coastal defense with projection into distant waters. Despite the ambitions of the Chinese Navy’s ‘blue’ dream, there are still several doubts about its future. First, despite the growing emphasis on the development of naval exercises and deployment in anti-piracy operations, conventional combat experience is minimal. Second, oceanic projection has key challenges in geostrategic terms that are difficult to resolve, from the Taiwan issue to the fragility of sea lines of communication to maritime tensions in the South China Sea. Third, China is

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not characterized by having allies in its region. On the contrary, many of them have latent conflict situations with Beijing or are key allies of the United States such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan. However, in recent years the Chinese Navy has managed to carry out three rounds of joint exercises with the Russian and Iranian navies in a clear message to the naval initiatives led by the U.S. with its Asian allies. Finally, the mode of action of maritime strategy is the least ‘defensive’ within the spectrum of Chinese grand strategy and the most ‘offensive’ within the tactics implemented. The construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, the assertive operations of the Maritime Militias, India’s opposition to the deployment of bases in the Indian Ocean, and incidents with US vessels present drawbacks to the effective implementation of the naval strategy. The evolution of PLAN’s maritime strategy and naval platform development has mutated from a limited force with limited autonomy and firepower to a present blue water expansion. Despite presenting a great defensive strategy, the Chinese fleet is embarked on an accelerated growth process to develop a blue water navy with global projection. While modernizing its fleet, Beijing is adding dozens of ships to its surface, submarine, and amphibious services with first-rate technology in almost the entire spectrum of naval warfare, in addition to developing new maritime technologies on par with the United States and the Russian Federation.

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CHAPTER 5

Russia’s Maritime Strategy: Between Naval Modernization and Power Projection

In Moscow’s official international policy narrative, the world is presented as a polycentric world centered on three blocs: Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, and Asia–Pacific led respectively by the United States, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China (Russian Presidency 2008, 2013, 2016). In this sense, the international order is not hegemonic but multipolar, increasingly democratic, and post-Western. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, Russia has combined the centralization of executive authority with economic stabilization based on the energy sector, allowing him to lay the foundations for a return to the forefront of the international stage both in terms of its diplomatic role and a renewed quest for regional hegemony in the post-Soviet space and the maintenance of Russian influence and status as a global power. Despite being considered an eminently land-based power, Russia’s maritime phase is key to considering its role as a great power but the slow pace of modernization, the emphasis on telluric geopolitical scenarios and the weak results in the naval phase of the Russo-Ukraine war present several doubts to secure its position as the second most important navy.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. González Levaggi, Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1_5

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5.1 Putin’s Grand Strategy in New Era of Uncertainty Towards the end of 1991, the Russian Federation rose from the ashes of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), inheriting both its past glories and the failure of the communist political and economic model. One of the critical elements of the end of the Cold War was the disappearance of Russia as a pole of the international system. When the Russian Federation was established as a sovereign entity on 25 December 1991, it lost 23.8% of its territories, almost half of the population, and 41% of the GDP that belonged to the USSR. Moscow suffered a loss of its relative weight in the international order, in addition to the progressive erosion of state capabilities on multiple levels. The decline deepened during the 1990s. In the period 1992–1999, its GDP fell by almost 50 percent while military spending fell sharply from $48.6 billion to $18 billion. Despite generally friendly relations with Washington and major European countries, Russia went through a vicious cycle of crisis and decline. With Putin’s rise to power in 2000 and after two decades of political and economic stability, Russia regained some of its relevance in the international system. By 2018, the economy ranked 11th in nominal terms and 6th in purchasing power parity (PPP) values of gross domestic product (GDP), according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition to maintaining large amounts of strategic material—primarily intercontinental missiles and the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons—military spending jumped from USD 9 billion to USD 62.2 billion in the period 2000–2021, although at purchasing power parity (PPP) values it would rise to USD 178 billion. Russia is in the top 5 with an average spending of 3.9% of its GDP on defense, although this measure does consider other expenditures that would add more than one percentage point of additional GDP (Kofman 2019). Throughout the Putin era, Russia has regained its role in the current international order with both light and shadow. While Russia is a middling power economically and its military budget is not on par with its Soviet past, it has been selective enough for its limited assets to achieve efficient results such as the neutralization of Georgia as an Atlanticist proxy in the Caucasus, the recovery of the Crimean Peninsula in the Black Sea and the overseas intervention in the Syrian Civil War, along with the military intervention in Ukraine in February 2022.

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From Pragmatism to Offensiveness as an Organizing Principle

Despite Russia’s new activism in international affairs, discussions of Russia’s post-Cold War grand strategy have been scarce. One of the main discussions on grand strategy in the Putin era focuses precisely on its nature. Tsygankov (2011: 29–30) divides analytical perspectives on Russian international strategy into skeptics and alarmists. For the former, the current Kremlin administration lacks a strategic project due to internal factors that impede the development of state policies such as the informality of the ‘system’, bickering between bloc leaders, and political arbitrariness (Monaghan 2014: 2–3). In this perspective, Russia is perceived as an actor that continues to be weakened by competition from rival clans within the Kremlin and the political class at large (Tsygankov 2011: 29). Russia acts as a tactical and opportunistic actor that has no clear guide to action and thus develops a ‘less than grand strategy’ (Wallander 2007). In contrast, alarmists emphasize the existence of a grand strategy in the form of an anti-Western threat and characterize Putin as a leader with a ‘master plan’ that seeks the restoration of global influence by dividing the West (Schoen and Smith 2016). In this vein, Russia has a growing capacity to formulate a coherent grand strategy, but such a strategy is antidemocratic and anti-Western in its main orientations (Tsygankov 2011: 30). He was right. In general, this perspective has taken root in an important sector of conservative academia and think tanks in the West,1 and it is one of the elements rescued by the ‘New Cold War’ narrative.2 However,

1 In the current official Russian vision expressed in its Foreign Policy Concept (2016) and National Security Strategy (2015a) documents, the West is geographically defined by the Euro-Atlantic region that includes members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). In this context, the concept of ‘traditional Western powers’ is underlined, identifying the US and its allies as the main node. One of the richest academic debates on Russian identity concerns the changing definitions of Russia’s relationship with the West in civilizational, political, economic, and international terms. For example, Neumann, Iver. Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Study in Identity and International Relations. New York: Routledge, 1996; Tsygankov, Andrei. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 2 Among the main references for this thesis are Lucas Edward. The New Cold War: The Future of Russia and the Threat to the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Legvold, Robert. Return to Cold War. London: Polity, 2016; Cohen, Stephen. Why

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such interpretations lose the capacity to develop other types of general strategies with a less offensive approach, something that some analysts argued before the escalation and subsequent armed conflict with Kyiv. According to Kofman (2018), Russian leadership may not have something that satisfies the Western academic community as a grand strategy in the classical sense, but it does possess a strategic perspective. In this sense, Moscow maintains a series of guidelines that can be seen as part of an overall strategy. In the specialized spheres of discussion, there is a dilemma between those who perceive Moscow as an actor with a defensive disposition or an offensive disposition, with a particular focus on its relationship with the West. For those who subscribe to the first approach, they understand the Kremlin’s policy to be ‘focused on securing geographical borders, improving political and economic conditions, and gaining international recognition as a power with a relevant voice in international affairs’ (Tsygankov 2011: 30), while the alternative explanation sees an ‘expansionist impulse in which Vladimir Putin seeks to restore Russian greatness and revise the premises of European security’ (Monaghan 2014: 3). A third view argues for an intermediate or mixed approach given the implementation of pragmatic practices with a set of clearly defined objectives (Trenin 2018). Overall, Russia’s international strategy has a relatively high degree of coherence that is reflected in its main official documents. This is in addition to key statements and concepts made by the Kremlin’s top leadership, in particular President Vladimir Putin. The design and implementation of such a strategy require prior consensus implemented by the political leadership. In this regard, it is important to underline two elements. On the one hand, the strong centralization of decision-making in the competitive authoritarian regime centered on Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, the capacity of the bureaucratic system to establish consensus or points of convergence which is expressed in official documents. Until 2014, Russia had a largely pragmatic and opportunistic strategy, although it has progressively taken a series of offensive attitudes that

Cold War Again? How America Lost Post-Soviet Russia. London: I.B. Tauris, 2017. Several authors do not agree with this denomination and, among other concepts, propose characterizing US-Russian relations as a ‘Cold Peace’ (Sakwa, Richard. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, London: I.B. Tauris, 2015, p. 5) or ‘Hot Peace’ (McFaul, Michael. From Cold War to Hot Peace. An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018).

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ended in the military invasion of Ukraine. Lately Moscow has shifted from a pragmatic grand strategy to a more offensive posture to preserve its status as a global power, achieve primacy in the post-Soviet space and deter NATO expansion in which the naval dimension is a secondary one. 5.1.2

The Tripod: Global Status, Regional Primacy, and Deterring NATO

Several official documents express important inter-agency coordination between the main agencies involved in the analysis, design, and implementation of Russia’s strategy.3 These documents present both perceptions of the external environment at a particular point in time as well as objectives, the hierarchy of priorities, and lines of action in a general sense. Key documents include the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2016 in its latest version), the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015a), the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014), and the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2015b). In this sense, the approach to the main challenges reflects an effort at internal balancing, such as the development of traditional and nontraditional state capabilities, as well as limiting external constraints. Many elements recur in the documents, such as the existence of a polycentric world, the opposition of Washington and its Western allies to Russian interests, the important role of the military factor in world politics, the increasing multiplication of regional conflicts, and the challenges presented by NATO’s expansion of military infrastructure. In the case of Russia’s national interests, the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation primarily identifies the achievement of protect the sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity; maintain strategic stability; protect the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Russian citizens; preserve the Russian nation and promote traditional Russian moral and spiritual values, among others. National interests are secured—according to this strategy—by a series of national strategic priorities: counter anti-Russian activities carried out by foreign states, establish good neighbourly relations with contiguous states, provide assistance to 3 These documents range from the National Security Council to State Corporations linked to strategic issues such as Rostec (defense industry) or Rosatom (nuclear industry), as well as key ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Defense and Development of the Russian Far East, and the Arctic, among others.

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Russian allies and partners, consolidate its position in the world economy and ensure Russia’s interests in the world’s oceans, space and airspace, among others (Russian Presidency 2023). The guidelines set out in its main official documents and the external practice of its strategic affairs support a pragmatic approach whose trajectory adapts to changes in the regional and global environment. Having elucidated the orientation—or broad outlines for action—it is crucial to emphasize the strategy’s objectives. Broadly speaking, Russia has set out three permanent objectives over the past two decades: securing Russian primacy in the post-Soviet space, preserving great power status in a polycentric world, and deterring the threat posed by NATO’s expansion into its sphere of influence. In Vladimir Putin’s famous speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 he said: “I think it is obvious that NATO’s expansion has nothing to do with modernizing the Alliance itself or ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion aimed?” (Putin 2007). Although the orientation is not clearly defined given that it operates in a context of great external uncertainty to sustain its role as a Eurasian power, Moscow proposed a multipolar narrative favorable to its interests. Mentioned narrative of a polycentric world is centered on three blocs: Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, and Asia–Pacific led respectively by the US, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China. This narrative is underpinned by great military potential. 5.1.3

Instruments: Diplomacy, Soft Power, and (a Lot of) Coercion

In line with its primarily geopolitical objectives, Russia’s grand strategy is characterized by a lack of apprehension in the use of coercion through the use of diplomatic threats, the strategic instrumentalization of energy resources, electoral interference, or even the direct application of the military factor. In this context, three elements are crucial to the implementation of its international strategy: traditional diplomacy, soft power with incisive elements, and the use of force. With a highly professional and experienced corps, Russian diplomacy has a global outreach. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 242 diplomatic posts around the world. With these capabilities, Russia ranks fourth in the Lowy Institute’s Global Diplomacy Index and seventh in the Elcano Global Presence Index with a preponderance of military over economic

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and ‘soft’ factors. Complementarily, Russia has developed a series of institutions that allow it to develop non-traditional strategies projection beyond its traditional instruments, the Military and Security Forces together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Russian soft power complex ranges from the promotion of Russian culture, scholarship, and language by the Federal Agency for Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the Russkiy Mir Foundation to the development of a global information platform with the RT audiovisual channel and the Sputnik news agency. In the case of media tools, the strong connection between Russia’s global media and the Kremlin’s official message blurs the lines between information and propaganda. Even though media tools had been allowing the development of global information reach, their effectiveness—measured in terms of audience and message reception—is far from optimal. Moreover, incisive actions take place in a grey zone between the informative and the coercive. In a critique of Russia’s and China’s international conduct, Walker (2018: 11–12) incorporates the concept of sharp power- through it—the implementation of information manipulation actions undermines the integrity of democratic institutions, for example, in the case of elections. While Moscow has denied any interference in electoral processes and the reach of its tools would appear to be less effective in Western environments, such an approach is more influential in its neighborhood where it has networks rooted in a cultural, political, and economic legacy. Finally, Moscow possesses military superiority in the Eurasian space both in terms of its capabilities and the export of war material. In doctrinal terms, Russia abandoned the model of nuclear deterrence and conventional warfare in favor of a hybrid confrontation in which the boundaries between military and non-military instruments are blurred, as is the distinction between situations of armed conflict and peace. Moreover, after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the Armed Forces implemented a modernization program with a State Armament Programme focused on the incorporation of advanced equipment for the different services. The air force added Su-30SM, Su-35, and Su-34 fighter jets and Mi-28N, Mi-35, and Ka-52 helicopters, the army upgraded its main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, while the navy modernized its submarine fleet and transformed the profile of its surface

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fleet with the addition of multipurpose ships with anti-surface and landattack capabilities with the addition of cruise missiles. Other interesting developments were in air defense systems (S-400), communication units, guided munitions, and electronic warfare systems, among others (Kofman 2016: 4–7). Overall, the results have been quite promising with the ‘nonlinear’ operations in Crimea in 2014 and strategic projection in the Syrian conflict from 2015, although less auspicious in the conventional conflict with Ukraine in 2022.

5.2 Military Strategy: Hybrid Conflicts and Regional Priorities In one of the classic sayings of Russian military history, Tsar Alexander III stated that Russia has only two allies: its army and its navy (TASS 2015). Russia’s territorial size of over 17 million km2 which has led to recurrent threats on its extensive borders—it currently borders 16 countries—and its limited access to warm waters in the harsh Northern Hemisphere winter, determined the classical geopolitical orientation towards territorial defense, especially on its western and south-western borders. The dramatic historical experiences of the Napoleonic Invasions, the multiple confrontations with the Ottoman Empire—one of which resulted in the defeat of the Crimean War—and the Nazi Invasion during World War II shaped Russian strategic and military culture to the present day (Monagan 2018: 11). More recently, the collapse of the Soviet Union presented—in the words of the Russian president—as ‘the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century’ has critically influenced strategic lessons (Putin 2005). The Soviet legacy had one of the most important doctrinal repositories in the national security complex, especially the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Despite regional and global geopolitical changes, military strategic conception was extensively influenced by Soviet theoretical developments, especially in the fields of nuclear deterrence, the role of naval and strategic forces, the development of irregular measures in asymmetric scenarios, and the evolution of operations in the face of technological changes (Gorshkov 1979; Svechin 1991; Kokoshin 1998). Strategy, in Russian military thinking, involves the ‘preparation, planning and achievement of political and military objectives through the employment of forces and resources’ (Thomas 2015: 80). Russia has been mutating its military strategy and doctrine concerning the difficulties and

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setbacks with NATO, which its identified as its main source of threat. While Russia’s overall strategic and military objectives have remained more or less stable, perceptions of the external environment and the use of tools have not. The most relevant change in the post-Cold War period was generated by the transformation from the model of nuclear deterrence and conventional warfare to a hybrid confrontation in which the boundaries between military and non-military instruments are blurred, as is the distinction between situations of armed conflict and peace. The most obvious case has been the crisis in Ukraine since 2014. In line with the defensive orientation of its grand strategy, Russia’s mode of warfare includes the defense of its economic and demographic centers through a layered defense to trigger a subsequent reaction to an invasion; the development of deterrent capabilities with extended-range defensive and offensive systems to avoid decisive confrontation: the implementation of indirect action strategies along with asymmetric responses in multiple domains against similar opponents; the use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons as a last resort reassurance against escalation; contingency preparedness and achievement of objectives in relatively short timeframes; conventional and non-conventional modes of warfare in potential conflict scenarios, among others (Boston and Massicot 2017: 2). The main elements of this evolution in the Putin era can be found mainly in official documents approved by the Russian Presidency, statements and presentations by high-ranking military officials, the type of military reform implemented, and Russia’s operational involvement in Eurasian conflicts. Among the main documents related to the Military Strategy are the National Security Strategy (2015a) and the Military Doctrine (2014). In the first case—as presented above—national interests and strategic priorities are set out, as well as the assignment of roles in National Defense. In this sense, defense—placed first as a national security priority—has to be consolidated through “strategic deterrence and prevention of armed conflict, improving the military organization of the state and the ways and methods of deploying the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, formations, and military agencies, increasing the mobilization readiness of the Russian Federation and civil defense forces and resources readiness” (Russian Presidency 2015a).

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As regards the measures implemented to ensure the objectives of ‘strategic deterrence’ and ‘conflict prevention’, the use of both military and non-military tools is proposed, including political, diplomatic, economic, and informational actions, among others. If deterrence is primarily aimed at the great powers in general and the United States in particular, the second objective includes a central role in stability not only regionally (post-Soviet space) but also extra-regionally (Middle East), including both traditional and non-traditional armed conflicts such as the case of the ‘color revolutions’. The core of Russian ‘hybridity’ lies not so much in the objectives of military strategy as in the use of the means to achieve them. Regarding threats, the Russian Military Doctrine (2014) recognizes traditional and non-traditional external phenomena. Considering the former, it identifies the deployment of military contingents of foreign states (or groups of states), attempts to destabilize individual countries or regions such as the color revolutions, NATO’s global aspirations with the placement of military infrastructure on Russia’s borders, the creation and development of strategic missile defense systems as it violates the balance of forces in the missile-nuclear sphere, as well as the intention to place weapons in space and the development of non-nuclear strategic precision weapons systems. Non-traditional threats include growing global extremism, cyber-attacks, ethnic and religious tensions, and the development of transnational crime networks. The document also indicates the priority missions of the Armed Forces, which include strategic warning, stability and nuclear deterrence maintenance, force readiness, capabilities maintenance, territorial integrity protection, terrorism, and piracy combat, aerospace defense, space projection, protection of Russian citizens abroad, and peacekeeping in missions of the United Nations or the Commonwealth of Independent States (Russian Presidency 2014). In terms of conventional forces’ role changes, Russia altered the principle of nuclear deterrence by applying it not only to the use of nuclear weapons but also in response to the use of conventional weapons, a principle that remains one of the foundations of its strategic deterrence. In sum, both the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine recognize the West as the main target of its threats, while projecting a pessimistic image of current international security dynamics. One of the most contentious issues in Russian military strategy is the identification of hybrid warfare as the main operational line of action.

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While the term ‘Hybrid War’ (Gibridnaya Voina) is not strictly Russian,4 similar concepts such as nelineynoi voine (‘non-linear warfare’); setovaya voina (‘network warfare’) and neopredelonaya voina (‘ambiguous warfare’) have been said by high-level Russian officials and defense analysts (Milosevich 2016: 14). The most common concept is ‘non-linear warfare’. Introduced by Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov, it is presented as the main characteristic of contemporary warfare marked by the importance of ‘indirect and asymmetric’ methods. This expression of conflict has two fundamental elements. On the one hand, the ratio of non-military to military measures is 4:1, many of which are not identified as segments of a war for the West but are for Russia. For example, the case of NGOs promoting regional democratization processes or disseminating sensitive information on corruption in the Russian state (Bartles 2016: 33–35). On the other hand, each conflict has its distinctive logic, so each confrontation has a character that is unique to it. The character of warfare in pursuit of political objectives has transformed new forms and methods that include the initiation of military operations by small operational groups, non-contact combat operations with high maneuverability, the use of autonomous systems and highprecision weaponry, simultaneous warfare operations in all domains, and the unification of informational space for command and control of forces and assets (Gerasimov 2016: 25, 29). Since Soviet times, conceptual development has paid attention to two central elements in military doctrine, the correlation of forces (sootnosheniye sil ) at the regional and international level and the future of war expressed in terms of forecasting the future (foresight/predvidenie) as well as trend analysis (forecasting/predskazanie). Concerning these concepts, the non-linear projection of war and the asymmetric nature of the global and regional order (vis-à-vis the US and NATO) create incentives for the development of a defensive military strategy with a strong

4 The concept of hybrid warfare was originally developed in the United States. It was first proposed in his thesis at the Monterey Naval Postgraduate School by William Nemeth, who posited the existence of hybrid military forces characterized by the existence of modern and pre-modern elements by analyzing the case of the Chechen insurgency (Nemeth 2002). This was further developed by James Mattis and Frank Hoffman (2005). However, the concept most widely used in Russia is ‘non-linear warfare’, incorporated by Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov as the main characteristic of contemporary warfare marked by the importance of ’indirect and asymmetric’ methods (Bartles 2016).

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reliance on a dynamic force design with high mobility and state-of-the-art conventional and non-conventional means. Strategy and doctrine will be reflected in a series of interventions in areas that suffered from the implosion of the USSR: the Caucasus, Ukraine, and its main ally in the Middle East, Syria. After the fateful 1990s, which saw several inter-state and internal wars in the post-Soviet space, a second wave of regional tensions was experienced in the South Caucasus, particularly with the Republic of Georgia. Following the ‘Rose Revolution’ in 2003—interpreted from Moscow as a Colour Revolution against its local allies—and the subsequent rise to power of President Mikheil Saakashvili a year later, Georgia deepened its ties with the US and NATO. One of the first actions was the dispatch of a 2000-strong contingent to Iraq, in addition to close cooperation in training and arms supply as well as in Georgian aspirations to be part of NATO’s expansion agenda. Such aspirations carried a high risk. Post-Soviet Georgia was not exempt from serious problems such as the internal conflicts in South Ossetia (1988–1992) and Abkhazia (1992–1993), whose resolution had not been definitively achieved beyond the ceasefire agreements established between 1992 and 1993. The existence of ‘frozen conflicts’ and NATO-Russia tensions, together with the Kosovo precedent, hinted at the possibility of a rapid deterioration of regional stability (De Waal 2010: 203–210). Following a series of incidents on the Georgian-South Ossetian border and a series of abortive negotiations—including a statement by Saakashvili announcing a ceasefire—Georgian armed forces attacked South Ossetia on a large scale to ‘restore constitutional order throughout the region’ on 7 August (De Waal 2010: 212). Russia retaliated and began an operation involving land, air, and sea elements, mobilizing troops from the 58th Corps belonging to the Southern Military District of the Armed Forces under the command of General Anatoly Khrulyov along with Airborne Troops, ‘Spetsnaz’ Special Troops of Military Intelligence (GRU), the 4to Air Force Corps based in Rostov-on-Don and the Black Sea Fleet, among others. The Georgian front in South Ossetia was easily defeated in four days, while the front in Abkhazia—initiated by Russian-Abkhaz troops on 8 August— took only three days when Russian troops reached Gori and threatened to continue to Tbilisi, the capital. On 12 August, under the auspices of French President Sarkozy, a ceasefire was signed. Despite their affinities, neither the US nor NATO threatened to support Georgia with the use of

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force, although they did provide political and diplomatic support, as well as blocking UN resolutions given Russia’s insistence on including a paragraph on Georgia’s use of violence. In practice, while Russia won quickly, it prompted a rethink on the effectiveness of the use of force by the armed forces—especially the army—as their performance was suboptimal in conditions of clear superiority. The ‘August War’ will have clear geopolitical and military consequences with an immediate post-conflict correlation. First, Russia demonstrated the limits it tolerates on Western activities in its ‘backyard’ to both NATO countries and local governments. Second, Moscow made a U-turn on the protection of those pro-Moscow communities that are harassed by anti-Moscow governments, such as the international recognition of the ‘sovereignty’ of the Republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, supported only by Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and rejected by most of the international community. Thirdly, Russia regained its hierarchy as the actor that imposes the rules either by force or by its mediating role concerning the (in)stability of regional security in the South Caucasus. Finally, the assertive action ended up altering the calculations of competition between NATO and Russia, so that the Atlanticist alliance will begin to take a much more cautious approach to membership enlargement beyond its existing institutional commitments. Within the military strategy, following the poor results of the operations and combat conducted by Russian forces in the Georgian conflict, a reform process began in October 2008 under Minister Anatoly Serdyuko aimed at strengthening combat capabilities, followed by a modernization of the Armed Forces in 2011, implemented for the most part by the current Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu since he took office in 2012. The reform phase focused on consolidation and reorganization, abandoned the Soviet model of mobilization, progressively ratio reduced of conscripts to standing forces, and promoted improved enlistment in military districts, as well as mobility within the Federation (Kofman 2016: 7). Likewise, it was decided to unite the country into four military districts or joint strategic commands (Eastern, Southeastern, Central, and Eastern) by transferring operational control of most units from the Central Command to the Regional Commanders and reducing the system of strategic command levels from four to two, focusing on the role of brigades and eliminating divisions. According to Serdyuko, the reforms

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aimed to develop ‘an actionable, mobile and armed army and navy ready to engage in at least three regional and local conflicts’ (Nichol 2011: 5).5 The second stage of the reforms, starting in 2011, was carried out mainly through the development of a new State Armament Programme focused on upgrading and modernizing advanced equipment for the various forces. The air force added Su-30SM, Su-35, and Su-34 fighter jets and Mi-28N, Mi-35, and Ka-52 helicopters, the army upgraded its main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, while the navy modernized its submarine fleet and transformed the profile of its surface fleet adding multi-role ships with anti-surface and land-attack capabilities with cruise missiles. Other interesting developments were in air defense systems (S-400), communication units, guided munitions, and electronic warfare systems, among others (Kofman 2016: 4–7). Overall, and within the budgetary constraints to which the Russian economy has been subject since the late 2000s, the results have been quite promising, a fact that will be confirmed in the ‘non-linear’ operations in Crimea in 2014 and the strategic projection in the Syrian conflict from 2015 onwards. The second scenario of regional fractures had its epicenter in Ukraine. As a ‘hinge state’ (Tanrisever 2014), Kyiv has been a classic recipient of tensions between the Atlanticist bloc and Russia without being able to adequately resolve a balance between Moscow and the West. The roots of the tensions run deep in the history of Russia’s development as a great power and its cultural-religious identity, but the triggers for the fragile Ukrainian geopolitical situation came in the face of advanced compromises between Ukraine and the EU for the signing of the Association Agreement, with Yanukovych’s subsequent retraction and the start of the Euromaidan protests in November 2013. In the face of accusations against the West, Russia’s response to the revolution that ousted Yanukovych from power on 22 February was compelling: annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and support for irregular groups in Donetsk and Luhansk Provinces, in both cases with the backing of the population that

5 According to Russian military doctrine, conflicts are classified into local (two or more states with limited objectives and border clashes), regional (two or more states with important but limited politico-military objectives and use of conventional and/or nuclear weapons), and large-scale (armed conflict between great powers with radical politicomilitary objectives).

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had the highest levels of affinity with Moscow compared to other regions of Ukraine. Unlike the Caucasus conflict, the annexation of Crimea produced a real breakdown in relations between Russia and the West on multiple levels. While Obama had imposed a series of limited sanctions in 2012 on low-ranking Russian officials because of the death of accountant Sergei Magnitsky, the Ukrainian issue generated the systematic implementation of sanctions by both the US and its European and extra-European allies— such as Australia—against high-ranking Kremlin individuals, as well as affecting strategic sectors of the Russian economy. The long-running conflict in the Donbass region will be the trigger for a new armed conflict in February 2022 with the full-scale invasion of Russian forces to force a neutralization of Ukraine (vis-à-vis the West) and secure the ‘independence’ of the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. From a strategic-military point of view, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 had military and naval consequences. Firstly, the recovery of Russian hegemony in the Black Sea has allowed the empowerment of the legendary Black Sea Fleet, neutralizing both Turkey and NATO’s plans to establish a permanent base in that maritime space. As Botta (2022) argues, this naval pre-eminence has allowed Russia to strengthen its projection capabilities into the Mediterranean Sea. Secondly, Russia began to bet on its Asian vector, promoting rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China, and building a Euro-Asian axis on a pragmatic agenda of strategic complementarity with countries in tense relations with the West—particularly Turkey and Iran—with whom it will also coordinate joint actions to limit the Syrian conflict through the establishment of the Astana Process. Finally, the Ministry of Defense began to systematically implement a doctrine focused on ‘indirect’ and ‘asymmetric’ methods to confront the ‘hybrid war’ promoted from ‘the West’, in which war represents a range of both military and non-military actions, for example, economic sanctions, the severing of diplomatic relations, diplomatic pressure and (dis)information operations (Bartles 2016). One of the great novelties of Russia’s military strategy has been its intervention in the Syrian conflict, an atypical case of extensive involvement in an extra-regional scenario. Since the 1970s, the Al-Assad family regime was one of the bulwarks of the Soviet Union’s regional strategy in the region, in addition to being one of the main recipients of global military cooperation and providing access to the Tartous port facilities on

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the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Despite the Soviet debacle, the close linkage continued and had a major test with the ‘Syrian Revolution’ that led to a civil war between forces sympathetic to President Bashir Al-Assad and a motley resistance made up of diverse social, political, and religious groups. In addition to criticisms of the West mounted on the narrative of ‘regime change’, Moscow continued to support AlAssad gradually by pushing to avoid Western intervention over the use of chemical weapons on civilians, supporting the fight against Russian and Central Asian Islamic militants and increasing its presence of military advisors until the decision to intervene with the authorization of the Syrian presidency. The reasons for intervention have been extensively discussed (Allcock 2016), although there are three relevant elements to highlight. First, the Islamic fundamentalist connection has been an obsession for Russian security services since the First Chechen War (1994–1996), so the Syrian conflict—in articulation with the ascendant Islamic State in Iraq—created a space for large-scale co-optation of Islamists from the Russian Caucasus and Russian allies in Central Asia (especially in the cases of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) into the Syrian jihad. Secondly, the US withdrawal from the Middle East with the consequent reluctance to intervene with large numbers of troops on the ground and the situation of widespread instability created a window of opportunity to regain positions both for Russian diplomacy and for its military projection that would allow it to strengthen the connection between its interests in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Finally, Russia’s support for a traditional ally in the region at a critical moment when the regime was close to collapse sent a clear signal to sustain its global influence, while avoiding the mistake made with Gaddafi’s Libya in 2011 when thenPresident Mevdelev nodded to a NATO-led multinational operation. In military terms, the Russian advance in Syria was relevant in terms of air deployment. According to the Ministry of Defense, during the peak of military actions—between 2015 and 2018—more than 63,000 Russian military personnel participated in different types of operations with over 39,000 flights conducted by the Air Force and 231 types of weaponry were ‘tested’ on the ground, most notably fighters, surface-to-air defense system, and cruise missiles (BBC 2018). In short, Russia’s military strategy presents a response based fundamentally on the use of the military instrument facing an uncertain and

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threatening external context, especially in areas of geopolitical tension with the West, those items that affect Russia’s vital interests in the Caucasus or the Black Sea.

5.3 Russian Navy: Between the Coast and the Global Seas Both because of the force’s historical legacy and perceptions in the Kremlin, the Navy is seen as a key element for the country’s image as a great power, especially for the projection of Russian interests beyond its zone of influence (Kofman 2016). The Russian Navy currently plays a key role in coastal defense, strategic nuclear deterrence, and the projection of power and prestige. Despite its primarily continentalist orientation, Moscow has demonstrated naval activism in two recent stages of its history, Admiral Gorskov’s development of a blue water navy that climaxed in the 1970s and the Russian Navy’s maritime projection into the Mediterranean from the Black Sea after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. After World War II, the Soviet Union had only coastal defense capabilities with serious structural limitations. The naval doctrine that had prevailed in the early decades of the Soviet Union was linked to the ‘Young Soviet School’ which proposed the navy as a protector of the maritime flank of the army and therefore the focus of its activities should be coastal defense with a ‘small war’ navy centered on the use of submarines and light surface ships in conjunction with aviation and land-based artillery. In contrast to the Mahanian-inspired Russian ‘Old School’, it was proposed to implement the Leninist conception of the unity of forces through an integrated approach in which marine forces were to concentrate their actions on coastal defense (Till 2007: 96–97). The ideas of the Mahanian ‘old guard’ would return thanks to the vision and planning carried forward by Admiral Sergey Georgyevich Gorshkov (Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Fleet in the period 1956–1985). The legendary leader of the Russian Navy envisaged the importance of having a blue-water fleet to project Russian naval power globally. This vision was progressively implemented due, among other things, to growing overseas interests in the Third World and Gorshkov’s increasing weight in the Politburo. By the late 1960s, the USSR already had a blue-water navy with global reach and projection, supporting

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both the USSR’s nuclear deterrence strategy and its global geopolitical project in the Third World. Its main assets included missile-capable nuclear submarines, large surface ships, and helicopter carriers, with the first aircraft carriers being commissioned only in the 1970s. The declassified CIA document “Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs throught the 1990s” from 1982 stated that the main tasks of the Soviet Navy were the deployment and protection of ballistic missile submarines for the preparation and conduct of tactical and strategic nuclear strikes, together with the defense of the Soviet Union and its allies from the enemy carrier and submarine-borne ballistic missile attacks. Such a naval strategy was projected for 10 to 15 years (CIA 1982: 5). The projection was not realized. The implosion of the Soviet Union overturned these plans and its successor, the Russian Federation, transformed not only the scope but also the role of naval strategy within the new strategy of international insertion in the Yeltsin era. According to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov (2002–2005),6 the Federation had in 2002 only a quarter of the Soviet fleet while the section of the defense budget allocated to the Navy fell by half in the period 1993–2001 (Tsypkin 2003: 162–167). As rapprochement with the West was interrupted in late 2000s, Russia returned to the big leagues of great power competition with a pragmatic grand strategy focused on its regional priorities. Moscow has primarily privileged its character as a land power in the Eurasian space, leaving the maritime factor in the background. However, this does not mean that the maritime element has been sidelined. On the contrary, it is relevant both for its status as a great power and the development of its global projection plans, in addition to fulfilling its primary objective of defense in three areas considered key, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Arctic, as well as specific interests in the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov. NATO has sought—unsuccessfully due to Russian and Turkish opposition—to establish a permanent Black Sea task force along the lines of the ‘Active Endeavour’ operations in the Mediterranean Sea with the ‘Standing NATO Maritime Group’ immediate reaction force. In the case of the Baltic Sea, the confrontation with NATO is more frontal as 6 Admiral Kuroyedov will be instrumental in putting forward the idea of a ‘balanced’ navy to meet global challenges in his doctoral thesis, which will remain at the core of Russian naval doctrine. To date, Kuroyedov is shaping up as one of Defense Minister Shoigu’s top naval advisors.

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the region has witnessed a progressive militarization of the Kaliningrad Oblast, as well as being the epicenter of significant anti-access and area denial capabilities and disinformation campaigns against Baltic neighbors Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Finally, the Arctic is presented as Russia’s last frontier because of the important energy deposits, as well as the possibility of developing a new trade channel via the so-called ‘Northern Sea Route’ that would position Russia as an intermediate point between Asian and European markets. Turning to the military, the Russian Ministry of Defense is formally responsible for five forces: Land, Airborne, Naval, Aerospace, and Missile, as well as controlling the Office for Deep Sea Research, also known as Military Unit 40,056 or the underwater intelligence service. Specifically, the Russian Navy is composed of four services: Submarine Forces, Surface Forces, Naval Aviation, and Coastal Defense Forces including Marine Infantry and Missile Forces and Coastal Artillery, the latter with a high degree of coordination with security forces of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), Intelligence (FSB) and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia). The Naval High Command, in coordination with the General Staff and the Commanders of the Four Strategic Commands, controls the four services and has responsibility for education (naval academies and training centers), the auxiliary fleet, the naval air search and rescue service, the hydrographic service, units of the naval construction troops, among others. The fleet consists of four fleets (Baltic, Black Sea, Pacific, and Baltic) and one flotilla (Black Sea) headquartered in the Admiralty Building in St. Petersburg since 2012 after the move from Moscow was approved. Beyond the military instrument, given the need to improve coordination between the elements that make up the network of maritime interests, the creation of a Maritime Board was promoted in 2012 under the Government of the Russian Federation under the leadership of the future Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. Its members include the Russian Navy, various government agencies such as the Federal Customs Service, the Federal Maritime Transport Agency, and various agencies such as Transport, Interior, and Agriculture, as well as representatives of the regions, the scientific community, energy companies, and shipyards, among others. The incorporation of state and private actors beyond the navy is not new at the official level but was made explicit in a series of official documents that were published after Putin arrived at the top of the Kremlin.

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The first two documents, “Basic Policies of the Russian Federation in the Area of Naval Activities towards 2010” and the “Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020” (Russian Presidency 2001) were published in March 2000 and June 2001 respectively, assigning the Russian Navy three main roles: “the first role is to deter aggression or threats of aggression in sea theaters against Russia and its allies, and repel aggression if it actually occurs. The second is to defend Russia’s maritime borders. The third is to protect its territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf as well as Russia’s economic activities and its interests in the World Ocean” (Sakaguchi 2014: 52). Subsequently, the ‘Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation’ (Russian Presidency 2015b), the ‘Fundamentals of the State Policies of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the period until 2030’ (Russian Presidency 2017) and, finally, the Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (Russian Presidency 2023) were published.7 The first document highlights four main areas of interest, namely maritime transport activities, development and conservation of world ocean resources, scientific maritime research, and specifically naval activities, with the latter being the highest priority for the state (Russian Presidency 2015b: 17). While there is no explicit pivotal concept around maritime doctrine, deterrence of external threats as well as immediate coastal space interest prioritization are key to understand Russia’s naval strategy. In addition, the regional priority areas are listed, with the Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific being the most relevant. In the case of the Atlantic area, it highlights the permanence of ‘sufficient naval presence’ in a scenario marked by NATO’s presence, while boosting the improvement of the Black Sea fleet’s capabilities and promoting ‘sufficient naval presence’ in the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, it highlights the expansion of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in Southwest Africa, which would open up a line of projection towards the South Atlantic. Regarding the Arctic, both the reduction of threats to national security in the area 7 Other relevant documents—in addition to those mentioned above—on national security strategy, foreign policy, and defense include the ‘Fundamentals of the Russian Federation’s State Policy on the Arctic for 2020 and the Long Term’ (2008) and the ‘Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security until 2020’ (2013). One of the critical projects for the geo-economic strategy in the Arctic is the development of the so-called ‘Northern Sea Route’ which—due to the melting of the Arctic ice—could be economically exploited by the country as an alternative route to connect the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic (Putin 2019).

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and the promotion of economic and energy potential in the region are relevant. Finally, concerning the Pacific, it highlights the ‘friendly’ relations with China, while recognizing the difficult conditions in the ‘Far East’ in terms of demographics and economic development, presenting additional challenges for the development of naval power. As regards the document on Naval Operations, several elements are interesting to highlight. Firstly, the global maritime scenario is characterized as increasingly unstable and in geopolitical competition for access to oceanic natural resources, political-economic instability, and the actions of transnational terrorist groups. Likewise, the document recognizes three main threats to its national security: the aspiration of the United States to dominate the World Ocean, the existence of territorial claims of foreign countries to the Federation in coastal areas and adjacent waters, and the rise of countries with navies with large combat capabilities (Russian Presidency 2017: 5). Secondly, Russia presented itself as a “great maritime power” that possesses “a maritime potential that underpins the implementation and defense of its national interests in any area of the World Ocean, is an important factor of international stability and strategic deterrence, and enables the pursuit of an independent national maritime policy as an equal participant in international maritime activities” (Russian Presidency 2017: 3). It is argued that the Russian Navy must secure its position as the second most important navy in the world in terms of combat capability to achieve its strategic objectives in both peacetime and wartime. In this context, deterrence is the key concept—in both conventional and nuclear terms—for understanding the navy’s role in the Russian maritime scheme. Another recurring tension lies in the interplay between the defense of coastal zones and the preservation of Russia’s global interests. Overall, both grand strategy and its military and maritime expressions tip the balance in favor of the former despite the experience of the Syrian conflict. While the Russian Navy (with over 210 surface ships, 70 submarines, and 130,000 men) can conduct operations across the entire spectrum of combat operations (DIA 2017: 66–70), the new naval doctrine and its claim to present itself as a ‘great maritime power’—repeated on several occasions by the Russian leadership—have been criticized for their lack of realism. Among the main factors are the lack of accessibility of funds to finance long-term projects, the slow pace of shipbuilding, and the lack of supplies due to Western sanctions (Gorenburg 2017).

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Third, the new doctrine proposes a ‘balanced structure’ for the Russian Navy, which means maintaining the combat potential of strategic nuclear naval forces and establishing a conventional naval force with modern equipment. This is a recurrent discussion among naval analysts about the nature of naval forces, criticizing the lack of speed in modernization and development of new projects, the reliance on an aging fleet, and the divergence between models inherited from the Soviet era and newly commissioned ships, resulting in a dual fleet (Bosbotinis 2010; Connolly 2017; Gorenburg 2017). The Russian fleet has a dual character due to the combination of large legacy ships from the Soviet era and small modern ships with long-range missiles that might be sufficient for the key strategic missions assigned to the navy (Connolly and Boulègue 2018). Among the priorities for fleet modernization are ballistic nuclear submarines (SSBNs), nuclear-powered multi-purpose attack submarines (SSGNs), and medium/small multi-purpose combat ships, along with the addition of hypersonic missiles and autonomous unmanned submarines. One of the dilemmas presented by duality is the navy’s scope. Force design in the late Soviet era envisaged a blue-water navy but post-Cold War adjustments have upended the navy’s strategy and scope. In terms of capability acquisition, the Russian Navy today lives a duality between ‘green water’ and ‘blue water’, prioritizing the former over the latter. Despite official intentions and documents, state procurement programs over the last fifteen years do not incorporate key elements to sustain global projection, such as the construction of a new aircraft carrier or the development of large surface ships, but rather promote the construction of light vessels such as the Steregushchiy Class corvettes or the Admiral Gorshkov Class frigates, both flexible vessels with medium-long range Kalibr missile launch capabilities that have managed to increase the Navy’s capabilities considerably (Connolly 2019). In the case of the Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates, Minister of Defense Shoigu stated that the Navy’s main combat ships will be these multipurpose ship types equipped with high-precision long-range weapons (Kabanenko 2017), signaling the future ‘kalibrisation’ of the fleet and a sure transition to a ‘green-water’ navy (Kofman and Edmonds 2017). In the same vein, Kofman (2016) argues that such a transformation is centered on sea denial and coastal defense in identified priority areas. Although new media developments present a ‘gnat’ type of navy (Connolly and Boulègue 2018), this does not mean that Russia is neglecting its global capabilities or aspirations for three main reasons.

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Firstly, strategic deterrence capability and naval projection are provided by the submarine fleet which, despite slow modernization, still maintains similar capabilities to the United States. Secondly, new surface vessels can be used for blue water missions as shown by the Syrian conflict or the case of the first global circumnavigation of a Russian combat unit (RFS 454 Admiral Gorshkov, Gorshkov Class frigate) since the end of the Cold War. Thirdly, legacy surface ships from the Soviet era but recently modernized, such as the Kirov and Slav-class cruisers together with the Sovremennyi and Udaloy-class destroyers provide sufficient capabilities for global projection, albeit with serious limitations in terms of long-range missions. The ‘turquoise’ character—a mix of Blue and Green Water capabilities—of the Russian Navy presents many challenges to sustaining the goals set out in official documents. First, the Russian economy has been in virtual stagnation for a decade while the weight of the defense sector has grown from 3.5% (2010) to 3.9% (2018) in gross domestic product (SIPRI 2019). In this context, the funding of means for the Navy has been hampered by the lack of additional revenue generation and bureaucratic disputes within the Ministry of Defense that has hampered the distribution of funds for the latest procurement program. The State Armaments Procurement Program until 2027 (GPV-2027) received a total of 19.3 trillion roubles, almost the same amount as its predecessor GPV-2020 with a currency devalued by more than 50%. At the same time, the navy will receive almost 50% less (2.6 trillion roubles) than in the previous program (4.7 trillion roubles). Major acquisitions in surface ships and submarines affirm the logic of the ‘balanced’ and ‘dual’ navy with a mix of modernization and upgrading (Kirov-class cruisers, Sovremennyi-class destroyers, Admiral Kuznetsov-class aircraft carriers, Shchuka-B-class SSN submarines) along with the acquisition of new elements (Gremyashchiy-class corvette, Grigorovich- and Gorshkovclass frigates, SSN Yasen-M submarines, SSBN Borei and SSK Kalina). Another problem in naval planning is linked to the various construction constraints that the shipbuilding industry has experienced in recent years. Russia’s power projection ambitions seem to be reinforced with the 2022 new Maritime Doctrine in which continue to define itself as a “great maritime power”. The document prioritizes the Artic and the Pacific over the (North) Atlantic calling for strengthened capabilities for the Northern and Pacific fleets (Childs 2022). This is particularly challenging since it seems there is a geographical axis shift while the Russian

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Navy is actively engaged in the ‘special military operation’ in the Black Sea. Besides the general orientation, the document identifies as central challenges “confrontation with the United States and its allies (including NATO members), which are striving to dominate the World Ocean, their desire to limit Russia’s access to the resources of the World Ocean and vital maritime transport routes, and the territorial claims against Russia which have been made by a number of states relating to some of its coastal and insular territories” (Tebin 2022). When the official documents meet reality, the situation varies. Gorenburg (2015: 3) argued that several sustained problems in the shipbuilding process would not allow for significant expeditionary capacity until 2030, including, “long-term decline in naval research and development; an inability to modernize the shipbuilding industry, which is considered to be particularly outdated and poorly structured as compared to other sectors of the Russian defense industry (and has suffered more than other sectors due to Western sanctions); and pre-existing budgetary constraints that have been exacerbated in recent years by Russia’s economic downturn”. Lately, the Russian Navy—only compared with the U.S. Navy—has had the opportunity to conduct open combat operations in three theatres of war—Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine—in addition to make sea denial and sea control operations in the Black Sea. In the case of Georgia, the Black Sea Fleet based in Sebastopol moved into Georgian waters during the 2008 August war and had an engagement near Ochamchire where one Georgian missile boat was sunk and another seriously damaged. The fleet then moved to Poti where it destroyed the rest of the Georgian coast guard vessels. On Syria, operations had a higher degree of complexity with two important elements to highlight, the deployment of the largest expeditionary group to the Mediterranean Sea in August 2018 since the end of the Cold War and the launch of Kalibr-M cruise missiles from the Mediterranean Sea (surface ships and submarines) and the Caspian Sea (surface ships only) to the Syrian theatre of operations. According to Delanoe (2019: 25), “three types of ships have been involved in these actions: small missile ships (Project 21631), frigates (Project 11661K, Project 11356M) and diesel submarines (Project 0636.3). From March 2019, 8 launches of 37 cruise missiles were carried out”. Russia has also strengthened its presence in the Mediterranean through the expansion of its historical access in Syria (naval facilities in Tartus and Latakia), as well as bilateral agreements with Cyprus and Malta.

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Finally, in the case of the Ukrainian crisis, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 seems to improve the relative position of Russia in the Black Sea, especially after improving defensive anti-access capabilities by adding new small and medium-sized ships, surface-to-air missiles, and coastal antiship batteries. Broadly speaking, Moscow has three types of interests in the Black Sea: historical related to the projection into the Mediterranean Sea, commercial mainly through the marketing of crude oil, and security related. As regards the latter, it shares with Turkey the maintenance of the Montreux Convention regulating the movement of warships through the Turkish Strait, thus preventing the establishment of an extra-regional military fleet (Sanders 2014: 78). Back to the military affairs, Iskander ballistic missiles and TU-22M bombers were incorporated to the Peninsula, and the port of Novorossiysk was expanded to increase logistical capacity. Additionally, naval forces were used to blockade the Kerch Strait, as well as the southern and western parts of the Crimean Peninsula, in addition to providing support for land operations. However, the Russo-Ukrainian was a bitter test. Around the dawn of 24 February during the start of operations, the Black Sea Fleet did not encounter any resistance until 13 April, when the sinking of the Fleet’s flagship, the cruiser Moskva, was reportedly hit by two Neptune anti-ship missiles. Until then, the Russian Navy had operated with great freedom, albeit with limited action. For example, eight days into the conflict the Pentagon claimed that only 10 of the 480 missiles launched into Ukraine were launched from the Black Sea. Additionally, amphibious actions were non-existent. While the Black Sea Fleet has not been at the center of the invasion, it plays an important role in “protecting the rear and southern flank of the campaign”. Apart from its defensive role, “Maritime superiority gives Russia flexibility, and the opportunity to stretch Ukraine’s forces through the threat or actual conduct of amphibious landings to seize key ports and to prevent the Ukrainian navy or any other navies from interfering in the land campaign” (Sanders 2022). Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov after the Crimea annexation that “several years ago the Russian fleet’s combat capabilities were in stark contrast with that of the Turkish Navy. Some even said that Turkey was in full command of the Black Sea. Now it’s different” (TASS 2016). Since then, the balance of power in the Black Sea favors Russia, but the Ukrainian conflict shows that naval superiority is not enough to achieve total sea control. Russia’s naval and maritime strategy is in line with a changing and increasingly offensive orientation that seeks to ensure the

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defense of territorial integrity without neglecting the influence of a great Russian maritime power in the ‘world ocean’. However, naval power projection and the blue-waters expeditionary deployments are limited geographically due to the priorities of the maritime strategy and capabilities constraints. The. Russian ‘balanced’ navy presents a mix of capabilities between large, modernized vessels inherited from the Soviet era and the construction of modern, smaller ships with the incorporation of cuttingedge missile and detection technology, while it hopes in the coming years to incorporate hypersonic weapons and unmanned submarine vessels. It is enough to be at the ‘great maritime power’, but not to become a global naval power.

References Allcock, Simon (2016) “Explaining Russia’s Intervention in Syria in September 2015,” E-International Relations Students, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/ 28/explaining-russias-intervention-in-syria-in-september-2015/. Bartles, Charles (2016) “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review, January– February 2016. BBC (2018) “Russia Says 63,000 Troops Have Seen Combat in Syria,” BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45284121. Bosbotinis, James (2010) The Russian Federation Navy: An Assessment of Its Strategic Setting, Doctrine and Prospects. Shrivenham: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. Boston, Scott and Dara Massicot (2017) The Russian Way of Warfare: A Primer. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Childs, Nick (2022) “Russia’s New Maritime Doctrine: Adrift from Reality?” Military Balance Blog, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis//military-bal ance/2022/09/russias-new-maritime-doctrine-adrift-from-reality. CIA (1982) “Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990s,” National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-15-82/D. Connolly, Richard (2017) “Towards a Dual Fleet? The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the Modernisation of Russian Naval Capabilities,” NDC Russian Studies, 02/17. Connolly, Richard (2019) “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Activities for the Period Until 2030. Document Review,” NDC Russian Studies, 02/19. Connolly, Richard and Boulègue, Mathieu (2018) Russia’s New State Armament Programme: Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027. London: Chatham House.

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Nichol, Jim (2011) Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Putin, Vladimir (2005) Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Kremlin. Putin, Vladimir (2007) Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. Munich: Kremlin. Putin, Vladimir (2019) “Transcript: ‘All This Fuss about Spies ... It Is Not Worth Serious Interstate Relations’,” Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/ content/878d2344-98f0-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36. Russian Presidency (2001) The Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020. Moscow: Kremlin. Russian Presidency (2008) The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Kremlin. Russian Presidency (2013) The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Kremlin. Russian Presidency (2014) Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Kremlin. Russian Presidency (2015a) Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy. Moscow: Kremlin. Russian Presidency (2015b) Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Kremlin. Russian Presidency (2016) The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Kremlin. Russian Presidency (2017) Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the period Until 2030. Moscow: Kremlin. Russian Presidency (2023) The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Kremlin. Sakaguchi, Yoshiaki (2014) “Russia’s Policy on Strengthening the Navy and the Defense Industry,” NIDS Security Studies, 16 (2), pp. 51–67. Sanders, Deborah (2014) Maritime Power in the Black Sea, Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Sanders, Deborah (2022) “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: What Are the Maritime Implications in the Black Sea?” King’s College, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/rus sias-invasion-of-ukraine-maritime-implications-in-the-black-sea. Schoen, Douglas and Evan Smith (2016) Putin’s Master Plan: To Destroy Europe, Divide NATO, and Restore Russian Power and Global Influence. New York: Encounter Books. SIPRI (2019) SIPRI Yearbook 2019. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://sipri.org/yearbook/2019. Svechin, Aleksandr (1991) Strategy, Minnesota: East View Information Services.

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Tanrisever, Oktay (2014) “Ukraine as a Cusp State: Politics of Reform in the Borderlands Between the EU and Russia,” in The Role, Position and Agency of Cusp States in International Relations, eds. Marc Herzog and Philip Robins. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 60–79. TASS (2015) “Putin Agrees with Emperor That Russia’s Only Allies Are Army and Navy,” TASS Russian News Agency, http://tass.com/russia/789866. TASS (2016) “General Staff: Russia-Turkey Balance of Force in Black Sea Has Changed Over Years,” https://tass.com/defense/899730. Tebin, Prokhor (2022) “The New Naval Doctrine of Russia,” Valdai Club, https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-new-naval-doctrine-of-russia/. Thomas, Timothy (2015) Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office. Till, Geoffrey (2007) Poder Marítimo: una guía para el siglo XXI. Buenos Aires: Instituto de Publicaciones Navales. Trenin, Dmitry (2018) “Vladimir Putin’s Fourth Vector, Russia in Global Affairs,” https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Vladimir-Putins-Fou rth-Vector-19441. Tsygankov, Andrei (2011) “Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russia’s Grand Strategy,” Problems of Post-Communism, 58 (2), pp. 28–44. Tsypkin, Mikhail (2003) ”Rudderless in the Storm: The Russian Navy, 1992– 2002” in A.C. Aldis and R.N. McDermott (Eds.) Russian Military Reform 1992–2002, Abingdon & New York, Routledge. Walker, Christopher (2018, July) “What Is ‘Sharp Power’?”. Journal of Democracy, 29 (3), pp. 9–23. Wallander, Celeste (2007) “Russia: The Domestic Sources of a Less-than-a-Grand Strategy,” in Strategic Asia 2007–2008: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills. Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research.

CHAPTER 6

Republic of India: A Democratic Power with Maritime Aspirations

Over the past two decades, India has enjoyed vibrant economic growth, while the dynamism of its global presence and the strength of its democratic institutions have enhanced the country’s international prestige and status. By 1991, future Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao implemented a series of economic reforms that led to the ‘Indian miracle’ that developed in parallel with the continuation of a powerful nuclear and missile technology development. Despite its superlative weight in South Asia, the complex regional scenario in both its continental—due to the ongoing conflict with Pakistan—and maritime dimensions—confronting the Chinese-led ‘string of pearls’—presents several challenges for India’s leadership in the Indian Ocean and the broader Indo-Pacific realm. In this context, New Delhi has sought to strengthen its maritime presence and play a greater role in maritime spaces by developing a proactive maritime strategy. This chapter explores the main elements of India’s international strategy and then develops a sketch of its military and maritime dimensions at both the regional and global levels.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. González Levaggi, Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1_6

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6.1

New Delhi in the World: International Strategy in a Complex Environment

Located in South Asia and with a millennia-long history, the Republic of India covers an area of over 3 million km2 , is home to a population of 1.3 billion people, and is one of the most religiously, ethnically, and linguistically diverse countries in the world. Even more relevant for contemporary IR, India is an emerging power. It was the fastest growing of the major economies, achieving 9.5% growth in 2021 and ranks 6th in nominal terms and 3rd in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) of gross domestic product (GDP), according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is also among the top 10 recipients of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) overpassing USD 40 billion yearly since 2015. Domestic characteristics and its place in the world have given a privileged position in international affairs, especially as a leading voice in the Global South. Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) scholar Varun Sahni (2013) identifies its main assets: “India is an emerging power on a global scale and a regional power based on the Eurasian landmass. It is a nucleararmed state with border disputes, heavy dependence on arms imports, and a recurrent victim of terrorism. It is a rapidly globalizing developing economy, increasingly technology-driven, but with many shortcomings in its energy needs. It is a liberal democracy that has flourished in a pluralistic and multicultural social environment. It is an ancient civilization, but also maintains a high degree of internal violence and division. It is a country that has given rise to a large, varied, and extensive diaspora, which also impacts the global ecosystem”. New Delhi is a rising star in many dimensions. In military matters, it is the seventh largest nuclear power—after Pakistan—and possesses a diverse range of vectors that that recently could accomplish the nuclear triad. While the percentage of military expenditure over GDP has declined from 2.9 to 2.5% in the period 2009–2018, in nominal terms expenditure grew from $14.1 billion to $72.9 billion in the period 2001–2021 with almost uninterrupted growth, ranking third after the United States and the People’s Republic of China (SIPRI 2022). The democratic institutional context is key to understand India’s international position. Since May 2014, Narendra Modi has become the Prime Minister elected by popular vote, belonging to the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The coming to power of Modi and the BJP opened the door for a less timid behavior in projecting Indian interests at the

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international level in which nationalist visions prevail over more liberal or critical ones. In terms of domestic discussions of India’s international visions, the BJP has traditionally presented itself as a radicalized segment of Indian nationalism, while the Indian National Congress Party includes ‘Nehrudian’ and ‘Gandhian’ visions with an emphasis on southsouth solidarity, democratic consolidation, and economic growth (Ollapally and Rajagopalan 2012: 84). Within the new policy context, Modi has strengthened relations with Asian countries with the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy that pays greater attention to ‘peripheral’ neighbors. In general, this approach means strengthening regional ties, building connectivity, and expanding cooperation in the immediate neighborhood to reinforce its own position and counter both the Pakistani threat and China’s String of Pearls strategy. 6.1.1

Continentalism and Defensive Orientation

Is there an international strategy to guide Indian leaders? India has not developed a comprehensive document that articulates the vision, directions, and priorities of its foreign and national security policy. The lack of a formal grand strategy document has fueled growing discussions on the need for such a document, as manifested in the presentation of the ‘India’s National Security Strategy’ report signed by Lt Gen (R) Hooda to the Indian National Congress Party in 2019. However, several features indicate the existence of a grand strategy even if it is not entirely public or explicit. In early post-Cold War discussions, from a culturalist perspective, Tanham (1992: 50) argued that Indian decision-makers have always shown an “absence of strategic thinking” stemming from their historical and cultural development, particularly related to the India’s lack of historical unity and the Hindu concept of time and life rationality. Lately there are relatively two positions on the strategic logic of India’s behavior. On the one hand, those who believe that the country does not have a coherent strategy. Following a series of anonymous surveys of Indian government officials, Miller (2013) revealed that in the decision-making process, foreign policy decisions are often individualistic. Consequently, this view argues that New Delhi’s foreign policy establishment rarely engages in long-term thinking about its foreign policy objectives, so it makes it difficult to delineate its role in global affairs.

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On the other hand, some argue that New Delhi has a strategy, albeit an implicit one. Bajpai (2014) identifies three main schools of thought on Indian grand strategy: followers of Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision, neoliberals, and hyperrealists, each with different perspectives on New Delhi’s mode of action. In this vein, Jaishankar (2017: 277) argues that India would not have remained unified, achieved military victories, or emerged as a nuclear-armed power without some kind of strategy. So, while the image of a ‘non-strategic’ India is deeply entrenched -because India does not have a national strategic document- Indian strategic culture has been guided more by words than by writing. The absence of an explicit strategy is often inferred to ad hoc implementation, and this is where India’s weakness is highlighted. The Indian elite seems to have a ‘lowest common denominator’ in a defensive realist orientation akin to a combination of a Nehruvian perspective—focusing on the importance of international institutions and norms to mitigate conflict—and a neoliberal one—the primacy of economic over military issues—although in recent years a certain realist turn beyond institutional and economic conditionalities is discernible (Fair 2019: 182). Beyond the explicitness of strategy, two things are relevant to assessing Indian action on the foreign affairs. Firstly, international relations are guided by a ‘moral realism’ approach, i.e. a drive towards maximizing power primarily for structural reasons, including the use of force when necessary under a moral figure. Secondly, in contexts of weakness (e.g., in the immediate post-independence period), it has used morality as a realpolitik tool to exert more influence than its capabilities allowed (Pardesi 2005). Despite its defensive position, India has aspired to be a place of primacy in South Asia since it has sought both to ensure that smaller independent subcontinental states do not pursue policies—security, economic, diplomatic—that are hostile to its interests and to have regional advantages in the conflict with Pakistan. India has also resisted and sought to minimize the influence of extra-regional powers within the country and the region as a whole. Likewise, India tries to safeguard the geopolitical unity of the subcontinent while opposing the meddling of other states, particularly Pakistan and China. These continuities in India’s independent foreign policy developed in parallel with the struggle against anti-colonialism and solidarity with the peoples of the Afro-Asian world within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement and other instances of multilateral cooperation. Finally, in the last two decades, India has adopted geographically

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sectionalize strategies such as ‘neighborhood first’, ‘acting east’, an ‘Africa focus plan’, ‘linking west’, and a vision for the Indo-Pacific to circumvent these threats and strengthen its regional and global agenda. 6.1.2

India’s Goals: Sovereignty, Stability, and Development

India has historically developed a predominantly defensive and continentalist strategic orientation. Defending national sovereignty facing global, regional, and domestic challenges are India’s strategic core objectives, while the foreign and defense policy aims to create a peaceful and conducive environment that enables our nation to achieve transformative growth and development. (Ministry of Defence of India 2019: 2). India has four interconnected security challenges: nuclear deterrence, unstable borders, arms import dependence, and terrorism (Sahni 2013). From another point of view, the main security challenges can be seen in terms of geographical concentric circles from the national to the systemic to the regional and continental (Asian) levels. At the national level, security is constantly threatened by insurgencies, separatist violence, and terrorism, among others. At the regional level, the biggest threats are China and Pakistan; both nuclear, conventional, and non-conventional. China’s rise is a concern, as the Asian giant positions itself as a major power, not only at the regional level. At the level of the international system, India must watch how China and the U.S. will strive to manage a great power competition that suits their interests to prevent this from adversely affecting its security. The main threats to India’s security from external sources are in its neighborhood: Pakistan and China, both in terms of military capabilities and a long history of aggression and war. India and Pakistan have had multiple clashes since independence. In 1947 and 1965 there were direct clashes, while Bangladesh’s independence process ended in a third inter-state conflict in 1971. Thereafter, the occurrence of direct warfare disputes between Pakistan and India decreased. Even in 1973, a peace agreement was signed in Simla. However, the nuclear arms race and the gestation of an Islamic insurgency against the Indian government in Kashmir in 1989 marred efforts to achieve a lasting peace. As regards the Kashmir conflict, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front initiated a systematic wave of violence, including the explosion of three bombs in Indian government buildings in Srinagar. Pakistan covertly collaborated

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with the JLF by providing sanctuaries, training, and weapons (Dorronsoro 2002: 77–78). The Pakistani provocation reached a dangerous point with the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. The Indian government had to mobilize additional troops along the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border to prevent further infiltration of terrorists into India. Intermittently, the conflict remains active. Regarding Continental China, the 1952 border war in eastern India, which ended in a Chinese victory with control of the Aksai Chin region, has been an area of tension that has included a series of skirmishes in recent years. At the same time, threat perceptions have grown in New Delhi in parallel with Beijing’s growing geo-economic influence over the Indian Ocean and the accelerated modernization of its armed forces, especially in the naval domain. Internally, the country faces a series of low-intensity conflicts characterized by tribal, ethnic, and leftist movements and ideologies, as well as drug trafficking and the proliferation of small arms. However, the main internal security challenge currently highlighted by the Indian government is related to terrorism or insurgency, which has four main scenarios: domestic terrorism, cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, insurgency in the northeast of the country, and extremism in certain states by both leftists and Hindu ultra-nationalists. Regarding terrorism within the country, the Indian government has stressed that the situation is under control, although it accuses Pakistan of fomenting these phenomena. According to the Ministry of Defense’s 2018 annual report, Pakistan continues to expand its military forces, especially nuclear and missile capabilities despite its financial crisis (MoD India 2019: 8). The region is one of the epicenters of ethno-regional conflicts, while the conflict space has expanded from tribal areas on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to its hinterland where religious extremism has increased despite increased security measures by Islamabad’s armed and security forces. Concerns about cross-border terrorism focus on insurgent groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) infiltrating into India across the Line of Control,1 in Jammu and Kashmir and other areas. The response is often 1 Hereafter LC. This term is used to refer to the military border established between India and Pakistan in the territory of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir. Another armistice line separates the Indian side, Jammu and Kashmir, from the Chinese side, called the Aksai Chin or Line of Actual Control.

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forceful. For example, between 1 January 2018 and 31 March 2019, Indian security forces neutralized around 300 militants. However, it could not prevent the Pulwama terror attack in February 2019, where at least 44 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) officers were killed in Kashmir, the deadliest attack in decades. Retaliation by the Indian government included a pre-emptive counter-terrorism airstrike on JeM’s largest training camp in Balakot, Pakistan (MoD India 2019: 4). According to the Ministry of Defense’s 2018/2019 annual report, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir has remained volatile. Deployment of forces throughout the LC and the interior has facilitated containment of terrorist operations, yet the violence continues throughout the LC. The south area of the Pir Panjal Ranges has frequent ceasefire violations, while in the north area of Pir Panjal, infiltration attempts have not diminished and remain constant. In the interior, Pulwama, Shopian, Anantnag and Kulgam districts continue to be the focus of terrorist activities. Concerning security in the northeastern states, has improved substantially since 2013. In fact, in the period 2007–2018 terrorist incidents declined by 18% and civilian and security force deaths by 25% (MoD India 2019: 8). Considering the threats identified from the early years of independence to the present day, the reasons behind the choice of a defensive orientation in the face of a complex threat environment at home and regionally become clearer. 6.1.3

Indian Arrows: Between Attraction and Nuclear Power

The Indian leadership has sought to protect the territorial integrity and independence of its foreign policy. India presents a combination of hard and soft power. In recent years, New Delhi has led cooperation processes in a broad sense to strengthen political and economic ties around the world (Shah 2012: 181). On the one hand, it has established strategic partnerships with the United States, China, Japan, Russia, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. On the other, it has developed defense relations with several countries and promoted military understanding and cooperation. On the other hand, India’s vocation towards the Global South has pushed it to seek partners in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. India is also seeking to build stronger ties with all its neighbors through regional initiatives and areas of trust building, including with Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China. Institutionally, India has

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invested heavily in the participation and creation of regional and multilateral forums such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), as well as a partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), among others. In diplomatic terms, such activism provides the basis for regional integration and cooperation, offering joint work on security, conflict resolution, and economic projects. Concerning military power, India has favored defense procurement policies to facilitate greater diversification in sources of supply, while embarking on a process of indigenization aimed at positioning itself as a builder rather than a buyer, which has so far not yielded the expected results. However, the regional environment obliges the government to secure arms supplies for its combat forces and to acquire expensive and sophisticated foreign systems to maintain military modernization. The nuclear doctrine functions in support of this. In this regard, India—like Pakistan—is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, or the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), India possesses between 160 nuclear warheads, all of them in reserve status. The Indian Ministry of Defense has indicated that they can deliver nuclear weapons from land-based launch sites, submarines, and aircraft— the “nuclear triad”, while the nuclear doctrine is based on the principle of minimum or defensive deterrence. 6.1.4

The Challenge of a Rising Star: Between Minimalism and Maximalism

In the early 1980s, a distinction emerged between a minimalist political strategy based on the traditional Sino-Pakistani threat perspective and a maximalist strategic policy based on an extended strategic perspective that would encompass the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia (Babbage and Gordon 1992: 41–43). The latter perspective is underpinned by strategic issues throughout the 1970s that included: the arms build-up among the oil-rich states of the Middle East after the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, especially because of the military links of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates with Pakistan; the sailing of superpower navies into the Indian Ocean after the withdrawal of British forces east of the Suez, especially since the experience of 1971,

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in which the nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier Enterprise entered the Bay of Bengal in a show of force against India during the Indo-Pakistani war; and the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979, where China exercised its power in a clear show of force by engaging in a border war in defiance of neighboring military powers. These issues generated the need to look at the broader strategic environment (maximalist perspective) although without much certainty on how to implement it from the strategic planning and acquisition of military capabilities. This is because the broader perspective also implied a shift from a primarily defensive posture to a conventional and nuclear deterrence posture, added to the development of capabilities to deal with security problems regionally confined to the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia, at least insofar as they might directly or indirectly affect Indian security. India’s interest in energy resources in the Middle East is no small matter. Around 65% of India’s energy requirements-crude oil, petroleum among other energy sources-are supplied by this region. Following the sanctions imposed on Iran in 2019, Saudi Arabia has become the largest supplier of oil to India. However, such a trajectory is not new. In January 2006, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia paid a visit to India, along with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and signed an agreement to forge a strategic energy partnership called the ‘Delhi Declaration’, which provides for a ‘reliable, stable and increased volume of crude oil supplies to India through long-term contracts’, and agreed to develop oil and natural gas in the public and private sectors, including a commitment to cooperate on counter-terrorism (BBC 2006). Besides, in 2014 the two countries signed a defense cooperation agreement. However, the Middle East remains a highly volatile region, forcing India to look beyond its regional boundaries for energy security. Both Africa and Central Asia have become important regions where many countries, including the US and China, have shown great interest, especially since their emergence as major oil-producing regions (Pant 2008: 157). Two elements are quite illustrative of the difficulties in projecting its strategy in Central Asia. First, the failed attempt to establish itself at the Ayni air base in Tajikistan. This base was abandoned after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the Indian government contributed technical assistance and 70 million dollars to renovate it between 2004 and 2010. India extended the main runway, built a control tower, and constructed three hangars capable of housing squadrons of MiG-29

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bombers used by the Indian Air Force. In September 2010, a spokesman for the Tajik Ministry of Defense also confirmed that the Ayni air base has state-of-the-art navigation and defense technology and a 3200-meter runway capable of accommodating all types of aircraft. The base’s main function is to transport Indian relief and reconstruction supplies to Afghanistan (Tanchum 2013: 68), although its session never materialized due to Russian opposition. Second, the lack of presence in Afghanistan, is particularly relevant, not only in the fight against terrorism but also in the opening of markets in Central Asia and its regional projection. Overall, India’s foreign and security policy is geared towards providing a peaceful environment for growth and development, guided by the principles of strategic autonomy and mutually beneficial cooperation. India’s grand strategy presents a defensive posture in the face of threats, guided by tools such as diplomacy, and the pursuit of engagement with partners at bilateral, regional, and global levels which gave it an increasingly pragmatic orientation. However, India is unlikely to become entangled in political or military alliances that limit its strategic space, as it will do so only if they advance its national interests. Nor is it likely to tolerate foreign interference in its internal affairs and extra-regional influence elsewhere in South Asia. In short, while India’s strategic orientation has been “defensive” against extra-regional powers, and within the subcontinent, in recent years we can underline a greater weight of a maximalist vision for which the range of actions and instruments to strengthen India’s regional weight vis-à-vis Pakistan and China are widening. Moreover, India’s security behavior has always shown slow and gradual adaptability to emerging political and military trends. However, due to constant migrations and invasions, Indian society is remarkably open to foreign influences and has been (and arguably still is) an expert in adapting them to its subcontinental environments (Pardesi 2005: 49). India aspires to become a regional leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, including strengthening its protagonism in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. This not only projects India as a regional leader- with great power on an Asian scale- but also as a global leader. Even though New Delhi has had a progressive rapprochement with Washington over the past decade, it has sought to remain equidistant from Sino-US tensions by practicing a new version of a non-alignment policy, while taking advantage of geopolitical opportunities to procure energy products at below-market prices following Venezuela’s 2019 institutional crisis

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and the Russian-Ukrainian war that began in February 2022. However, its success will depend on its economic performance over the decades, its political and social stability, military effectiveness, and its balancing act between the U.S. and China in the Indo-Pacific.

6.2 Indian Military Strategy: Rivalry with Pakistan and the China’s Challenge Military strategy and doctrine are both related to the nation’s foreign policy objectives, the perceived nature of external threats, and the military capabilities of potential adversaries. India has vast experience in this area, as it had defended its sovereignty and national integrity several times in its history. It has also maintained a constant focus on security concerns in the South Asian region, which has led it to maintain a high level of vigilance and defense to deal with any security challenges, mainly from terrorists and fundamentalist forces. India has experienced conventional wars and militarized border crises with Pakistan and China, in addition to the ongoing tension around the perennial Kashmir conflict, and various expressions of both insurgency and terrorism. The response to these threats and challenges has always been limited according to its defensive perspective. Concerning its military instrument, India incorporated the institutions left behind by the British Raj, including the Armed Forces as primarily responsible for ensuring the territorial integrity of the nation under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry provides a policy framework and means for the Armed Forces to discharge their responsibility in the context of the country’s defense and has five departments: Defense, Defense Production, Defense Development and Research, Veterans, and Military Affairs. The first is responsible for coordinating the activities of the other four departments in the ministry and carrying out the defense policy itself. The Department of Defense Production (DDP) has extensive production facilities for various defense equipment through Ordnance Factories, Defense Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), and the private defense industry. The department encourages the promotion of innovation and the creation of intellectual property for the country’s defense and aerospace industry. The Department of Defense Research and Development (DRDO), on the other hand, plays a critical role in the development of sensors and weapon systems and collaborates with other science and

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technology organizations such as the Department of Space (DoS), the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) for common requirements and applications. India is one of the world’s largest arms importers, while the armed forces have struggled to develop some degree of capability. However, this policy of “indigenization” faces difficulties. The effort is monopolized by the Department of Research and Development (DRDO), the Ministry of Defense (MoD) is unable to make major procurement deals, partly because of a lack of defense professionals and because it expects overseas suppliers to license and/or share technology, which many countries are unwilling to negotiate. On 1 February 2020, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman allocated around USD 67 billion for the Ministry of Defense, stating that national security is one of the government’s top priorities (Behera 2020: 1). Within the budget distribution, the Indian military continues to be the largest player. It is also important to note that the armed forces are amid a major modernization drive. For example, in 2019, the MoD signed several contracts including T-90 tanks, anti-submarine warships, and missile systems. However, severe resource constraints regularly affect procurement. The Indian Navy—the least benefited from the budget distribution—has decreased investment in anti-mine ships, early warning helicopters, amphibious transport ships (LPD), and maritime reconnaissance aircraft due to budgetary constraints, deepened by the coronavirus crisis. The military instrument is key to dealing with a range of internal and external threats. In recent years, the Modi government has pursued a policy of ‘disproportionate response’ to border provocations. However, since the Manipur incident of June 2015,2 it has given its troops greater operational autonomy to act aggressively in response to Pakistani ceasefire violations. This considerably increases the costs of Pakistan’s escalation tactics, as India has now authorized massive, targeted attacks on Pakistani ranger posts along the border (Pant 2015: 100).

2 Tribal guerrillas killed 20 soldiers and injured several others in an ambush as an Indian military convoy travelled to the capital state of Imphal from the city of Motul in the eastern province of Manipur. India has struggled to contain unrest in so-called ‘disturbed areas’ under the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) (Pant 2015: 99).

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Apart from that, the Pakistan Armed Forces maintain their rigid control over national security policies and continue to pursue a policy of confrontation with India. Pakistan’s intelligence support through likeminded organizations in Jammu and Kashmir continues. As if that were not enough, it is also worth mentioning the close relationship with China on defense and military assistance, including Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile program, which has a significant impact on India’s national security environment. Likewise, under the rubric of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China has become the main supplier of military equipment, techno-economic funding, and diplomatic support to Pakistan. China, therefore, positions itself as India’s other contentious neighbor not only because of its ties with Pakistan, its military modernization, its nuclear and missile arsenals, and its border conflict, and the rising maritime aspirations. In recent years, there have been recurrent crises on the border of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. In strategic terms, the Indian government’s constant concern is linked to the possibility of its cities being hit by Chinese missiles. The asymmetry in terms of nuclear forces favors China and is likely to go even further. Likewise, China’s military build-up and modernization continue to remind India of the unexpected 1962 war and the need to keep its nuclear weapons option open. Hence, much of India’s military strategy and planned force deployment continues to rely on threat analysis based on Sino-Pakistani military capabilities. Another crucial area for understanding Indian responses to the Chinese challenge will be in the maritime domain.

6.3 India’s Maritime Strategy: Regional Priorities, Global Issues India’s desire for a much more proactive maritime role is rooted both in China’s economic and naval expansion and in the need for a sustained maritime presence in the face of the country’s increased interdependence with the global economy (Gupta 2018: 172). Emerging India is highly dependent on external trade flows, and the sea has become one of its highest priorities. Maritime trade constitutes a substantial part of India’s GDP (about 42%) and its growth possibility is even higher in the future, in this regard India aims to maintain a secure maritime environment, so that it can seek new markets around the world and retain its activities essential for the country’s economic development and security.

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The dependence on its maritime environment has been on the rise, especially in the last decade, in parallel to advance global interests beyond the Indian Ocean Region. The oceans are the key enabler in its journey as a global power. India’s maritime economic activities have expanded around energy security, fisheries, trade, commerce, shipping, commercial investments, and the security of Indian citizens abroad. India has the second largest diaspora in the world, with nearly 28.5 million people spread across 206 nations/territories. This includes nearly 11.5 million non-resident Indians who are Indian citizens and another 17 million people of Indian origin who have maintained close ties with India. Even more critically, India’s energy needs include imports of crude and liquefied hydrocarbons, exports of refined products, offshore development, and economic partnerships around the world. India’s commercial and energy security, the development of its deep sea mining areas, and support for its scientific research stations in Antarctica all depend on its maritime lines of communication. India’s maritime priority areas include its coastal areas and maritime zones, the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman Sea and its littoral regions, the Persian Gulf and its coastline, the choke points that are leading to, from, and across the Indian Ocean, such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and Lombok, the Mozambique Channel, and Cape of Good Hope, the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea and the South West Indian Ocean, including the Indian Island countries and nations of the East Coast of Africa. The expression of its interests at sea and maritime strategy are summarized in two official Indian Navy documents: “Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy” (2007) and its update “Ensuring Safe Seas: India’s Maritime Security Strategy” (2015). On the one hand, the 2007 maritime strategy3 placed particular emphasis on the growing importance of the maritime environment and the centrality of maritime security to national development. It also provided a rationale and justification for the re-emergence of Indian maritime power and postulated a strategy underpinned by the freedom to use the seas for Indian national purposes, in all circumstances, where the Indian Navy could serve as a catalyst for peace, security, and stability in the Indic Ocean Region (IOR) 3 In this Indian maritime military strategy, the message may be seen as a warning to Indian decision-makers about China’s creeping influence and power projection in the Indian Ocean (Pant and Joshi 2015: 10).

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(Indian Navy 2007). On the other hand, in the 2015 strategic update, the focus was on safeguarding India’s national maritime interests. Maritime security objectives further include: deterring conflict and coercion against India; conducting maritime military operations in a manner that enables early termination of conflict on terms favorable to India; forming a favorable and positive maritime environment, to enhance net security in India’s areas of maritime interest; protecting India’s coastal and maritime assets against attacks and threats emanating from or at sea; and developing the necessary maritime force levels and maintaining the capability to meet India’s maritime security requirements (Indian Navy 2015). The review has given greater emphasis to the security of maritime trade and energy routes, especially in the IOR, considering its effect on global economies and India’s national interests. It also emphasizes the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and strengthening the international legal regime at sea for the general benefit, as well as the importance of cooperation and coordination between different navies to counter common threats at sea. The decision to modify the maritime strategy was prompted primarily by the ‘26/11’ terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008. Since this event, the Indian Navy assumed additional responsibility for overall maritime security, including coastal and offshore, while emphasis was placed on strengthening mechanisms for inter-agency coordination and cooperation. The Indian Navy operates in concert with the Indian Coast Guard, other security forces, and the various Union/State agencies that have a role and responsibility for the various elements of maritime security. India’s perceived threats, as noted above, come from both traditional and non-traditional sources. The former refers to states with organized military capabilities and resources that harbor adverse postures and hostile intentions towards India, representing a higher level of threat to national security interests. In the case of non-traditional threats, maritime terrorism, piracy, armed robbery, and unregulated activities stand out. In the case of maritime terrorism, an expansion has been observed in recent years, taking on new forms and means, posing a continuous threat, with the potential of becoming asymmetric and hybrid warfare, and incorporating traditional challenges. Piracy and armed robbery at sea have increased over the last decade, positioning themselves as a major threat to international shipping and people at sea. Unregulated activities such as trafficking and/or smuggling; illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)

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fishing; and the proliferation of private armed security, present themselves as an ongoing threat to the security and economy of the state. Based on this mission, India has repositioned naval assets along critical sea lanes of communications and choke points. For example, since October 2008, a fleet vessel has been continuously deployed in the Gulf of Aden region for anti-piracy operations and provides secure escorts to merchant vessels of Indian and foreign nationalities. Additionally, maritime authorities highlight the growth of natural disasters and regional instabilities in the last decade, which increased the deployment of the Indian Navy for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and non-combatant evacuation operations. The Indian Navy was the first responder in humanitarian crises after Cyclone IDAI hit Mozambique on 15 March 2019. Under Operation Sahayata, three Indian ships, INS Sujata, ICGS Sarathi, and INS Shardul undertook Humanitarian Disaster Relief in coordination with local authorities. As a geographical space, the Indian Ocean is the central maritime priority and, in this regard, New Delhi is building carefully targeted military partnerships with regional states, such as the so-called Vanilla Islands nations (Seychelles, Madagascar, Réunion, Mauritius, Comoros, and Mayotte), and with important strategic military actors such as France and the United States4 (Sharma and Finaud 2020: 5). A significant percentage of India’s trade (including oil) passes through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, making the security and uninterrupted continuity of maritime trade through this route a priority. In this context, the concern is directed at Pakistan and China’s presence but also demonstrates some discomfort with the British and US presence in the area. According to Baruah and Joshi (2020: 14), the emerging power faces the “dilemma of its renewed engagements and support toward Island States to minimise Chinese influence and the importance of Diego Garcia for favourable Indian Ocean dynamics. On one hand, India’s principles 4 In 2020, France appointed a liaison officer in the IFC-IOR. France and India intend to coordinate their activities through the IORA and, together with interested states, undertake a joint project to strengthen assets designed to combat piracy and all types of illegal maritime trafficking in the southern Indian Ocean. India signed a logistics exchange memorandum of agreement with the US in August 2016, which facilitates each country’s access to the other’s military facilities for resupply and refueling purposes. The agreement is expected to include the US naval base at Diego Garcia, although so far no Indian vessel has used the facility. In addition, the US also has a drone operations facility on Victoria Island in Seychelles (Sharma and Finaud 2020).

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on decolonization combined with its bilateral ties with Mauritius make it difficult for Delhi to question or challenge Port Louis’ sovereignty claims. India is wary of upsetting Mauritius and giving an advantage to Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the need for continued US presence in the Indian Ocean and India’s capacity constraints underscores the strategic importance of Diego Garcia in the region.” The focus on the maritime domain has become another important feature of India’s policy, to which must be added the aforementioned ‘Neighbours First’ policy and the ‘Look East’ policy, in which the Indian Navy was a key instrument in diplomatic outreach to the countries of East and Southeast Asia, particularly the ASEAN members. The latter has transformed the ‘Act East’ policy to expand India’s engagement and relations eastwards across the Indo-Pacific, emphasizing economic and security cooperation. India also launched Project Mausam in 2014 to renew cultural ties and contact between IOR countries. In this line, India has regularly participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) events to promote maritime cooperation initiatives and organized the 3a Conference on Maritime Security and Cooperation in Orissa on June 8–9, 2018. Likewise, it is part of other multilateral institutions actively deliberating on maritime security issues in the region, including the ADMM Plus,5 the Regional Cooperative Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and the Enhanced ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). Besides, the continuation of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)6 reflects India’s strategic intent in the region; its ambition to proactively engage and lead geopolitical forces.

5 The ADMM-Plus has become an effective platform for practical cooperation between the defence establishments of participating (ASEAN) countries. The ADMM-Plus currently focuses on seven areas of practical cooperation, namely maritime security, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster management, peacekeeping operations, military medicine, humanitarian demining and cyber security. 6 A inclusive and voluntary initiative of 24 member countries and eight observers in the Indian Ocean Region founded by India in 2008. The Symposium consists of a series of biennial meetings between littoral states in the region, provides a forum to enhance cooperation on maritime security, discuss maritime issues in the region and promote friendly relations between member nations.

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In the framework of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), a Maritime Safety and Security (MSS) Working Group has been established in 2018, where a plan developed by India itself was discussed. The country’s strategic intention is to influence IORA member states to support its maritime security agenda (Sharma and Finaud 2020: 5). Among the Indian Ocean littoral countries, nine are in Africa and more than a third of IORA’s members are from Africa as well. India has already formalized defense cooperation frameworks with South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar. In March 2020, India has been approved as an observer state of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).7 The decision to join the IOC marks the government’s impetus for greater relevance across the IOR. It also launched the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in December 2018, which aims to secure the commons for a peaceful, stable, and prosperous region for the well-being of all. In this regard, the Centre conducts exercises and maritime information gathering and sharing training. It is also aimed at expanding regional maritime awareness; creating a common operating procedure for processing radar and sensor data collected by participating countries; and facilitating the dissemination of such data to IORA’s member partners. Under this Centre, India is developing 32 coastal surveillance radar stations in Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Maldives to send data to the IFC-IOR. Each radar station has a range of 50 km and can operate 24 hours a day in all weather conditions. India is also developing two strategic island assets as part of its maritime security strategy: one in Seychelles (Assumption Island) and one in Mauritius (Agalega). These initiatives reflect India’s strong desire to extend its military influence and presence in the IOR both to the west and the south (Sharma and Finaud 2020: 6). This claim to enhance its maritime influence is also reflected in multilateral events such as the multilateral naval exercise MILAN, which was scheduled to take place in March 2020 but was eventually canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. MILAN aims to enhance professional interaction between friendly foreign navies and learn from each other’s strengths

7 The Commission—comprising the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion (France) and the Seychelles—is an important regional institution in the Western Indian Ocean, providing strategic contact with the African coastline and the Mozambique Channel.

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and best practices in the maritime domain.8 This event was to be the largest naval exercise in the history of the Indian Navy, as well as the IOR’s largest multilateral naval exercise, with more than 40 countries invited, including Russia, Iran, and the United States. As expected, China and Pakistan were excluded from the event (Herrera Pilar 2020: 7). India’s concerns about China’s growing influence in the Indian littoral states and its expanding naval capabilities, along with its close ties with Pakistan, cannot be ignored. In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced China’s new connectivity strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative, which has a clear Western orientation. From the Indian perception, there is fear of China’s presence, expressed in the development of a ‘String of Pearls’, a network of ports along the Indian Ocean (particularly in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka), the construction of the China– Pakistan Economic Corridor as part of the overland route of the New Silk Road and the growing presence of the People’s Liberation Army Navy with expeditionary operations in the Gulf of Aden (Brewster 2014). As a counterbalance, India relies on regional maritime cooperation and agreements with other nations. Regarding regional maritime cooperation, the Indian Navy has partnered with several states in Southeast Asia and Oceania. It has conducted SIMBEX exercises, involving the Republic of Singapore Navy, which are conducted annually and cover the entire Indo-Pacific, including the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. Indian warships have also regularly visited ports in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Australia. However, the biggest development has been the maritime cooperation between the Indian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force. Since 2007, the two services have been interacting in trilateral and multilateral forums. In 2012, they decided to conduct direct bilateral maritime exercises to enhance maritime security in the Asia–Pacific region. In 2014, they signed the Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the field of defense, intending to institutionalize the growing military cooperation between the two navies. This indicates that the Japan-India strategic relationship is one of the important indicators of the extent to which US allies and partners in Asia are prepared to align more closely with each other to maintain a favorable strategic

8 The MILAN biennial series, which began in 1995, was held in the Andaman and Nicobar Command until 2018. MILAN 2020: Synergy in the Seas, was the title of the suspended event.

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balance in the region as the future of Chinese power grows relative to the US (Pant and Joshi 2015: 58–59). Finally, the Indian Navy has engaged with several friendly foreign navies to conclude and sign agreements for the exchange of white shipping information,9 to enhance maritime domain awareness in their areas of interest. Until 2017, white shipping agreements were signed with 13 countries; in 2018, they were signed with Nigeria, Qatar, Kenya, Seychelles, and Thailand; and in the last year, these agreements have been implemented with Brazil, France, Israel, Kenya, Spain and the United Kingdom and the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre (V-RMTC, Italy). With the United States, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), which allows the two countries to share secure communications and exchange information on approved equipment during bilateral and multinational exercises and training operations, was signed in September 2018. The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which allows for the exchange of unclassified and controlled geospatial products, topographic, nautical, and aeronautical data, and aeronautical products and services, is expected to be signed. The Republic of India is trying to counter China’s naval projection, especially in the Indian Ocean. To this end, it is using diplomatic and economic initiatives to strengthen its ties with its neighbors, and at the same time has incorporated countries such as Australia, South Korea, the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom into its friendly and cooperative relations. While India’s grand strategy is generally defensive in character, maritime strategy has taken a different direction, both to assist the growing containment effort vis-à-vis China and to diversify India’s commercial interests around the world. The central actor in India’s maritime strategy is undoubtedly its navy. The trajectory of the naval arm of the armed forces has led to a slow but steady transformation from a green-water navy focused on coastal defense

9 It establishes an information network protocol that allows navies to exchange information on ships in their ocean territories. Ships would be classified as white (commercial vessels), grey (military vessels), and black (illegal vessels). The White Shipping agreement allows India and the countries with which it has signed up to enable a better response to threats, faster decisions, and clearance of different vessels.

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to a force developing blue-water capabilities with sea control. As Gupta (2018: 176–177) states, the Navy “maritime capability that permits bluewater power projection, a denial of Indian maritime space to potential adversaries, and the ability, through blockades, to compel neighboring states as well as attrit their war-fighting capabilities. All this requires a comprehensive force of aircraft carriers, submarines, an integrated air arm of both carriers based and shore-based aircraft, and a range of blue-water and coastal vessels.” The Indian Navy’s core concept is sea control, while aircraft carriers are the backbone for projecting naval capabilities in multiple domains (Indian Navy 2009: 125). At the same time, naval forces play a key role in the strategy of nuclear deterrence with ‘second-strike’ capability thanks to the development—with Russian collaboration—of Arihant-class nuclearpowered intercontinental ballistic submarines capable of launching K-4 ballistic missiles with a maximum range of 3500 kilometers. In addition, in recent years it has seen a strengthening of naval capabilities with the development of the first Indian-built aircraft carrier INS Vikrant at a cost of over USD 3 billion and the signing of an agreement with the Naval Group for the construction of six Scorpene diesel attack submarines. Delivery of these submarines will be completed by 2023, while the Ministry of Defense plans to build a new generation of diesel submarines—Project-75—to realize the Indian Navy’s long-term plan for 18 conventional and 6 nuclear submarines (IISS 2020: 227). Historically, independent India’s first maritime vision is summarised in the 1948 Naval Plans Document. At that time, its navy consisted of cruisers and destroyers, structured around small aircraft carriers to protect India’s Sea Lines of Communication, including the defense of trade and shipping. Maritime threats came from aircraft and submarines of unknown origin, deployed in a maritime denial role (Indian Navy 2007: 15). Territorial disputes, especially with Pakistan, occupied much of India’s national thinking on land-based defense. However, the Navy felt that a country as large and diverse as India should take into account its maritime interests, and in this sense, Indian maritime thinking was taking its place and expanding its knowledge networks. Maritime interests grew as the Navy modernized and expanded. By 1971, the Indian Navy already possessed 30,000 men, a refurbished aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and three destroyers, all obtained from the UK after World War II, plus nine destroyer escorts (including five Soviet Petya-class ships), four Soviet Foxtrot-class submarines, some five Soviet

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Osa-class missile boats, along with several other smaller vessels such as patrol boats, minesweepers, sea defense, and landing craft. By 1990, the Indian Navy had expanded to 47,000 military personnel organized under three Naval Commands based in the ports of Bombay (west), Fort Cochin (south), and Vishakapat-nam (east). The Navy included two carriers, five destroyers, twenty-one frigates, seventeen submarines, including one nuclear-powered one, and 34 other patrol and coastal combat vessels (Babbage and Gordon 1992: 49–50). In 2001, a new Command was included at Port Blair in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, comprising all three armed forces, to safeguard India’s strategic interests in Southeast Asia and the Straits of Malacca by increasing the rapid deployment of military assets in the region. At the same time, this Command provides logistical and administrative support to warships deployed to East Asia and the Pacific Ocean.10 In 2019, compared to previous years, the Indian Navy increased its active personnel to over 67,000 men. Also, over the last few decades, it has evolved from a primarily buying navy to a building navy, with the active participation of the Indian industry in ship and submarine design, construction materials, machinery, equipment, and systems integration. To date, more than 132 different warships have been built in Indian shipyards, including destroyers, frigates, and submarines. The Navy has found it necessary to develop a long-term strategy for the identification of technologies required for the coming years, to achieve self-sufficiency and mastery of cutting-edge defense technologies. The latest Indigenisation Plan 2015–2030 proposes that, in these years, the equipment and machinery installed on board ships in the three categories of floating, movement, and combat, have been indigenized by 90%, 60%, and 30% respectively. Concerning costs, this has demonstrated a significant degree of self-sufficiency in the first category ( flotation), medium performance in the second (movement ), and a large deficit in the last ( fighting ). It is clear from the above analysis that a large part of high-value systems such as main propulsion, electrical power generation, fire control radars, gunnery equipment, missiles, and torpedoes 10 The territorial capital of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Port Blair is home to a large naval base and India’s first tri-service command. The Andaman and Nicobar Command was established in 2001 as part of the ‘Look East’ policy. In July 2012, the Indian armed forces built a naval air station INS Baaz (“hawk”) under the Andaman and Nicobar Command. Located at India’s southernmost point on Great Nicobar Island, INS Baaz is 90 km from the Indonesian island of Sumatra and overlooks the six-degree channel, an important access route to the Strait of Malacca (Tanchum 2013: 71).

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are still sourced from abroad. Most of the shipbuilding costs go towards importing naval equipment and systems (MoD India 2014: 6). The longterm production strategy focused on indigenization not only seeks to lower import costs in naval equipment and technology but also seeks to reassert its presence in the IOR. Although India is striving to develop its naval capabilities, progress is too slow, possibly due to the Navy’s meager allocation (15%) of the total Defense Budget by 2020–2021, compared to the Army (56%) or the Air Force (23%) (Behera 2020: 5). A key challenge ahead for the Indian Navy will be to achieve not only technological autonomy, but a sustainable model for high-advance ship development and building. India’s maritime neighborhood is characterized as dynamic and unstable, due to ethnic conflicts; the increasing military capabilities of its main adversaries; the presence of extra-regional forces; and a wide range of security challenges from a combination of conventional and non-conventional threats emanating from India, as well as from the seas. Looking ahead, India needs a more proactive maritime policy to a more proactive maritime policy is necessary “to increase its trade, ensure energy supplies, maintain coastal security, and to help in the long term with countering China” (Gupta 2018: 187). The maritime strategy of sea control is a clear response to the challenges presented by China’s growing influence and the conventional Pakistani and non-conventional threats to maritime security.

References Babbage, Ross and Sandy Gordon (eds) (1992) India’s Strategic Future: Regional State or Global Power? London: Palgrave Macmillan. Bajpai, Kanti (2014) “Indian Grand Strategy: Six Schools of Thought,” in India’s Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases, eds. Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, and V. Krishnappa. London: Routledge. Baruah, Darshana and Yogesh Joshi (2020) “India’s Policy on Diego Garcia and Its Quest for Security in the Indian Ocean,” Australian Journal of International Affairs. BBC (2006) “‘New Era’ for Saudi-Indian Ties,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ south_asia/4655268.stm. Behera, Laxman (2020) India’s Defense Budget. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

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Brewster, David (2014), “Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’: Is There Really a SinoIndian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?” Journal of the India Ocean Region, 10 (2), pp. 133–149. Dorronsoro, Nicolás (2002) “Cachemira: la obstinación de la identidad,” Papeles de Cuestiones Internacionales, 78, pp. 73–80. Fair, C. (2019) “Pivotal Powers: India,” in Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases, eds. T. Balzacq, P. Dombrowski and S. Reich. Oxford University Press. Gupta, Amit (2018) “India’s Maritime Strategy: Aspirations and reality,” in Naval Powers in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, eds. Hensel Howard and Amit Gupta. New York: Routledge. Herrera Pilar, Mikel (2020) ¿El fin de la ambigüedad estratégica india? Documento de Opinión Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Vol. 67. http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2020/DIEEEO67_ 2020MIKHER_India.pdf. Indian Navy (2009) Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009, https://www.indian navy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12F eb16.pdf. IISS (2020) The Military Balance 2020, The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: IISS. Indian Navy (2007) Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy. New Delhi. Indian Navy (2015) Ensuring Safe Seas: India’s Maritime Security Strategy. New Delhi. Jaishankar, Dhruva (2017) “Indian Strategy in a Non-Strategic Age,” in India Now And in Transition, ed. Atul K. Thakur, Niyogi Books. Miller, M. C (2013) India’s Feeble Foreign Policy: A Would-Be Great Power Resists Its Own Rise. Foreign Affairs, 92 (3), pp. 14–19. MoD India (2014) Indian Naval Indigenisation Plan (INIP) (2015–2030). New Delhi: Ministerio de Defensa de India. MoD India (2019) Informe Anual 2018–2019. Nueva Delhi: Ministerio de Defensa. Ollapally, Deepa and Rajesh Rajagopalan (2012) “India: Foreign Policy Perspectives of an Ambiguous Power,” in Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia, eds. Henry Nau and Deepa Ollapally. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 73–113. Pant, Harsh (2008) Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates Its Rise in the International System. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Pant, Harsh (2015) “Is India Developing a Strategy for Power?” The Washington Quarterly, 38 (4), pp. 99–113.

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Pant, Harsh and Yogesh Joshi (2015) “The American ‘Pivot’ and the Indian Navy,” Naval War College Review, 68 (1), pp. 47–70. Pardesi, M. S. (2005) Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives. Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore. Sahni, Varun (2013) “India: a pesar de sus limitaciones, una potencia emergente,” Nueva Sociedad, https://nuso.org/articulo/india-a-pesar-de-sus-lim itaciones-una-potencia-emergente/. Shah, A. (2012) “Economic Policy Dimensions of India’s International Strategy,” in Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond, eds. V. Krishnappa and G. Princy. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses. Sharma, G. and M. Finaud (2020) “India’s Strategic Intent and Military Partnerships in the Indian Ocean Region,” Strategic Security Analysis, Geneva Centre of Security Policy, 10. SIPRI (2022) SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. Tanchum, M. (2013) “India’s Not-So-Splendid Isolation in Central Asia: The Impact of Strategic Autonomy in the Emerging Asian Regional Architecture,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, 15 (¾), pp. 66–72. Tanham, George (1992) Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay. Santa Monica: RAND.

PART II

Naval Competition in the Oceans of the Global South

CHAPTER 7

Indo-Pacific: Clash of the Titans

At the end of 2021, the Brandenburg-class frigate Bayern entered the South China Sea, marking the first German deployment in the area after two decades. This ship had joined the ANNUALEX 2021, joint exercises organized by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) together with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), and U.S. Navy. This example of forward deployment in the Indo-Pacific by European countries and NATO partners is a clear expression of the importance of this maritime domain, as well as the priority of the United States and its allies to take actions to signal the strength of their ties in the face of the rise of Beijing. Geography is the basis for strategy and geopolitics, as Kaplan (2012: 92) states. The Indo-Pacific refers to a geographical notion that articulates the maritime spaces of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, in addition to their adjacent seas. It is home to more than 50% of the world’s population, 60% of the world’s GDP, and two-thirds of global economic growth, and contains 65% of the world’s oceans. Moreover, the Indo-Pacific is loaded with multiple strategic and geopolitical meanings. As Serbin (2021a: 13) states, “the Indo-Pacific region, as a developing construct, has been shaping up as an undisputed geopolitical, geoeconomic, and strategic reality.”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. González Levaggi, Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1_7

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Until recently, the idea of the Indo-Pacific was marginal in comparison to the mainstream Asia–Pacific interpretation.1 From a strictly geographical point of view, this mega-region involves a subset of areas of great geopolitical importance within a mega-region. In its western portion, regional maritime powers such as India, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are engaged both in regional competition and in a complex game of matryoshkas where strategies of extra-regional global powers such as the United States and China coexist with non-traditional threats and nonstate actors. In the Eastern space, China’s rise as the leading regional and maritime power has not only changed the strategic calculus of neighboring countries but has also raised concerns about its maritime security aspirations in the Indian Ocean due to explicit actions to protect sea lines of communications and the transit of goods and supplies to and from China. The Indo-Pacific is a polysemic concept, but geopolitically driven. Today its definition reflects the geostrategic interests of the powers involved in the region. Besides being used in marine biology, ichthyology, and related disciplines, the origins of the concept lie in the developments made by one of the most important—and controversial—German geopoliticians, Karl Haushofer. The geographer articulated a geopolitical conception between the 1920s and 1930s that proposed the unity of the Indian and Pacific maritime spaces (Indopazifischen Raum) to “forge an anticolonial vision in British, American, and Western European colonies in South East, and Southeast Asia, and thus undermine the Western rivals of interwar Germany” (Li 2021: 1). Subsequently, the U.S. Pacific Command incorporated the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical concept in the face of the Soviet advance in the Indian Ocean (Serbin 2019: 30). The return of geopolitical interpretation had to await a series of structural transformations in Asia. Only recently, the Indo-Pacific has been challenging the idea of Asia–Pacific which was developed during the Cold War by the United States as one of the expressions of its strategic narrative that provided the framework for the development of regional institutional expressions such as the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and

1 The main macro-concept that agglutinated the different maritime spaces between Eastern Africa and the Americas East Coast was Asia–Pacific. According to the Google Ngram Viewer—which shows data on the frequency of word usage in published books— Asia Pacific was used 5–10 times more than Indo-Pacific between 2000 and 2020.

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the deepening institutionalization of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)2 (Serbin 2021b: 12; Sahd et al. 2022). According to Pautasso and Cepik (2022: 46), the use of the IndoPacific in the field of international studies was developed in three ‘discursive waves’. First, in 2007, when the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe expounded on the ‘confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans’ during his presentation in front of the Indian parliament, which will later justify the creation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. Later, regional countries began to incorporate the concept in their official documents and declarations in 2011 and 2013. Finally, during his first Asian tour in 2017, Trump officially endorsed the Japanese idea of the ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific at the Asian leaders’ meeting in November 2017. Prime Minister Abe’s keynote speech introduced the Indo-Pacific perspective at the 6th Tokyo International Conference on African Development in 2016 and then presented the ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific strategy as a new foreign policy strategy. In Washington’s case, it has a primarily geopolitical and military character. According to the U.S. State Department’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, this region is the most relevant theater of operations because of the strategic competition with China, which develop “leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage” while the United States proposes the framework of a “free and open Indo-Pacific region provides prosperity and security for all” (DoS 2019). While that vision has been nuanced with a broader vision with the Biden Administration’s first Indo-Pacific strategy, it continues to view the Indo-Pacific as the core region of the coming decades in terms of security, emphasizes the importance of continuing deterrence against Washington’s competitors, in addition to its allies and partners, while stressing the importance of strengthening freedom in its various expressions, democratic institutions, and the fight against corruption. In the Japanese conception the ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific has a more geo-economic vision involving aspects such as promoting

2 The widening and deepening of the regional organization created in 1967 was expressed both in terms of the expansion of strategic partnerships with countries such as India, Australia, China, and New Zealand and the creation of regional security arenas such as the Asia Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ meetings, and the ASEAN Maritime Forum.

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freedom of navigation and free trade, pursuing economic prosperity, and strengthening commitment to peace and stability (MoFA Japón 2017). Australia—a ‘five eyes ally’—has presented a Indo-Pacific perspective akin to the U.S. and Japanese approaches. Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper (DFAT 2017) posited a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific, although to do so it posits the importance of investing in its national power, specifically in a more capable Australian Defense Force, developing active diplomacy, and deepening the strategic alliance with the United States that lies at the core of Australian strategic and defense planning. In the case of India, Prime Minister Modi 2018 outlined his perspective on the Indo-Pacific at the Shangri-La Dialogue organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. The premier summit on strategic and defense issues is held annually in Asia. With a much more flexible and positive outlook, the Premier pointed out that inclusiveness and openness, as well as the centrality and unity of ASEAN, are at the core of the region. At the same time, he rejects the Indo-Pacific perspective—in clear distinction from the Japanese and US perspectives—as a strategic, a limited club of friends, a group seeking to dominate the rest, or being directed against a third country (MFA India 2018). This approach is particularly interesting since it seems to provide a ground to interpret the Indo-Pacific from a Global South perspective. For non-western developing countries, symmetric and multilateral cooperation, solidarity, mutual respect and benefits—among other principles and practices—seems to be at odds with the Indo Pacific’s strategic-driven conceptions but not with those more pragmatic and neutral approaches as the Indian one. These three perspectives—in addition to the China’s rejection of the term—exemplify the diverse geostrategic narratives of key countries in the region. However, they are not the only ones. As Serbin (2021b: 11) states, the concept “is assumed, with nuances of its own, by European actors such as France, Great Britain and more recently Germany; it is reformulated and adapted by ASEAN member states and is rejected by China and, more ambiguously, by Russia.” No one wants to be left out of a central notion that expresses the tensions of the great powers in a competitive and multipolar scenario.

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7.1 A Multipolar Scenario: A Crossroads of Narratives and Geopolitical Stakes The emergence of the Indo-Pacific presents itself as the key geopolitical space of the twenty-first century as it contains alternative projects of the major global economic and military powers. In geopolitical terms, since the 2010s, the overall situation in the Indo-Pacific has been under an increasing geopolitical competition with growing tensions between Beijing and Washington, although with some signs of strategic stability. However, regional dynamics such as Sino-Russian rapprochement, ChinaIndia border disputes, and defense rapprochement among the various US partners in the region made the scenario progressively complex, thus presenting a potential for instability in the coming years as well as reducing the room for maneuver for the middle powers. Throughout history, whether by geographical position or strategic decision, great powers have prioritized continental areas (Imperial/Nazi Germany, the Russian Empire/Soviet Union, and China from 1949 until recently) or the maritime domain such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States to achieve hegemony. However, as Lord Carver (1989: 69) argues, the choice between a maritime or continental strategy has never been more than a delicate judgment about how to allocate scarce resources between the two. For example, India and China seems to have transformed their traditional continentalist position towards a mixed orientations due to the importance of the sea as a commercial transit space, the growing threat perceptions of the seas, and the increasing resources allocated to maritime capabilities. However, not only these two giant Asians shifted their strategic vision to a more nuanced perspective that gives a greater role to maritime strategy. A group of middle powers, from Australia to Indonesia, have been developing strategies and capabilities to enhance their maritime strength while watching with suspicion Beijing’s long-term aims and supporting a more active and assertive U.S. presence in the region. The pursuit of power projection by regional and extra-regional powers in the disputed Indo-Pacific has generated incentives for greater regional competition, thus fostering negative security interdependence as well as growing distrust of their maritime policies. For example, China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti and concerns over the development of a ‘String of Pearls’ or ‘nodes’ of influence in the Indian Ocean have been perceived by other regional and global powers as a cause of security imbalance (Khurana 2008: 3).

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7.1.1

A Complex Chessboard: Geopolitical Ambitions and Projects

At the Indo-Pacific, three structural aspects have marked the recent geopolitical dynamics: China’s quest for regional hegemony coupled with its growing cooperation with Moscow, the rise of India, and, no less important, the US reaction to check Beijing’s rise. While the region continues to have a multipolar character, there is a greater regional balance between China and the United States that has generated multiple regional transformations and reactions. While Washington maintains its status as a naval primus inter pares both in terms of deployment capabilities, and its network of allies and military facilities, its projection has been challenged in two ways. First, strategically, Beijing’s promotion of regional mega-projects such as the New Silk Road. Second, operationally, either by the development of area denial capabilities—for example, the development of anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the Dong-Feng 21 or “carrier killer”—or maritime projection with the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea. Beijing’s greater capacity for action in the Indo-Pacific has allowed it to expand its interests beyond its traditional zone of influence, in addition to multiplying multiple channels of association and establishing novel regional initiatives. An interesting case of vocation toward the Indian Ocean has been the maritime route of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Xi Jinping’s diplomacy in the area has demonstrated greater assertiveness in the maritime route to the West. The 2017 ‘Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative’ document posits three ‘blue economic passages’: China—Indian Ocean—Africa—Mediterranean Sea, China—Oceania—South Pacific, and, finally, China—Europe via the new Arctic route. The first route is the one that has generated the most controversy due to accusations of wanting to establish naval bases throughout the Indian Ocean—something that bothers Indian decision makers—and the issue of the ‘debt trap’ (debt trap) whereby in the face of non-payment of debts by a state, China would use that to make strategic profits. One of the most interesting (and controversial) cases has been the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka which was 80% leased for USD 1.12 billion for 99 years in 2017 to the Chinese company China Merchants Port Holdings (CMPort) due to the government’s difficulty in repaying the loans. However, neither the Hambantota base nor other bases in the region with significant Chinese involvement such as Gwadar in Pakistan

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or Kyaukpyu in Myanmar have been transformed into a Chinese navy platform. Parallel to the strategic games and traditional maritime security threats, the Indo-Pacific is well known for the variety of non-traditional threats emanating from the geopolitical threat of closing maritime choke points closures such as the Straits of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb or Malacca to piracy in the Gulf of Yemen and attacks on tankers in and around the Persian Gulf. Faced with these challenges, Beijing decided to deploy a permanent task force in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters in late 2008 following some piracy incidents involving Chinese merchant ships. Apart from that, the operation of the PLAN Djibouti Support Base -the first overseas facility in a country that hosts military bases of other countries such as Germany, Spain, Italy, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia—began in 2017. From the Chinese perspective, the location of such an overseas base is to sustain anti-piracy efforts, in addition to establishing an intermediate point in the connection of its maritime route. In 2023, the Chinese navy is the largest in terms of both tonnage and number of ships in Asia. Almost two decades before, General Secretary Hu Jintao introduced the PLAN’s ‘New Historic Missions’, while China’s strategy reorientation explicitly shifted from a primarily landbased approach to one informed by its strategic interests in the South and East China Seas (Erickson 2019: 75). Beijing’s 2015 military strategy called for abandoning the traditional mindset that land outweighs sea, in addition to stressing the importance of protecting maritime rights and interests and transforming the naval strategy from ‘off-shore waters defense’ to combining ‘off-shore waters defense’ with ‘protection in the open sea’ (State Council 2015). This new task—complemented with the incorporation of massive naval vessels—a power projecting strategy in the making. The convergence between Russia and China around the idea of Greater Eurasia involves a series of projects in the framework of a bilateral and multilateral dialogue but, at the same time reflects a “growing deepening of a condominium between the two powers, particularly in the framework of Eurasia, under a common perception of a Western threat at the extremes of the Eurasian continent” (Serbin 2019: 71). In May 2014, following Western sanctions over the Crimea issue, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, initiating a new ‘pivot to Asia’ policy by strengthening the energy cooperation

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agenda, as well as calling China as a “reliable friend of Russia” (BBC 2014). Almost 8 years later, during serious tensions between Russia and NATO over the Donbass issue in Eastern Ukraine, both countries sign a high-level declaration declaring the inauguration of a ‘new era’ in international relations (Russian Presidency 2022). Three weeks later, Moscow recognized the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics as independent, while beginning a large-scale military intervention against Ukraine aimed at neutralizing the country from Western interests. It is nothing new that the convergence between the two powers generates unease in the main circles of power in the West. Facing China’s rise, the United States plays a crucial role as it is not only the leading global naval power but also plays a leading role vis-àvis its allies seeking to balance China’s role in the region. To contain China’s growing maritime ambitions, the Trump administration proposed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy with the intention of garnering support from allies, partners, and regional institutions and implementing a shared vision. In this context, the U.S. State Department encouraged the relaunch of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or QUAD), created in 2007 with its strategic partners Australia, India, and Japan. Beyond the growing domestic polarization, the concern in the IndoPacific marks a continuation of its international agenda. After coming to power, the Biden administration made its position on Beijing’s challenge explicit in the ‘Interim National Security Strategy Guidance’ document and in the publication of the first Indo-Pacific strategy, in addition to the establishment of the AUKUS defense pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States and the White House leader’s statements of support for Taiwan in the face of potential aggression from the People’s Republic of China. However, Washington’s position is not just declarative. In 2018, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (U.S. INDOPACOM) replaced the historic Hawaii-based Pacific Command, in addition to pushing the expansion of Malabar exercises—originally bilateral between the United States and India—to the rest of the QUAD members and conducting multiple freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. Likewise, the United States maintains the ‘forward presence’ in Taiwan and in recent years has sought to approach and strengthen the military and naval capabilities of countries with maritime delimitation conflicts with Beijing such as Vietnam or the Philippines.

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Parallel to China’s naval rise, India’s dependence on its maritime environment has been increasing. For New Delhi, the oceans are not an obstacle, but a key enabler on its path as a power with global projection. The Indian Navy has seen the need to develop a long-term strategy to identify both the partners and technologies required to achieve capabilities and status, especially in the Indo-West Pacific. The latest naval strategy identifies the seas as the primary way to expand connectivity with the Indian Ocean region and the world (Indian Navy 2015: I). At the same time, India has rapidly enhanced its naval capabilities by commissioning homemade aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates. India is developing a blue-water navy to conduct surveillance and long-range operations from the Gulf of Aden to the Strait of Malacca and even southward toward the Mozambique Channel. In addition, recent tensions with China over the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh had naval consequences as the Eastern and Western Naval Commands deployed most of their surface and submarine forces eastward (Makichuk 2020). The presence of a rising power such as India, intermediate naval powers such as Australia, Japan, and Vietnam, in addition to extra-regional powers such as France and the United Kingdom, transform the maritime scenario into a complex mosaic. In strictly naval terms, the United States still holds supremacy over the rest in Asia based on three factors. First, the extensive network of military bases located from Bahrain to Nagasaki. Second, the superior technological capabilities on the horizon and the deployment of strike groups for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (Nimitz class) and nuclear attack submarines (Virginia class). Third, the existence of long-term alliances both multilaterally (Quad) and bilaterally with regional naval middle powers such as Australia, Japan, and Korea. Although China and India are investing heavily in naval assets, they still have years to go. At the same time, they lack a reliable maritime logistics system to project power beyond the region and their diplomatic agenda has more regional enemies than friends, especially in the Beijing’s case.

7.2 Critical Instability: From Taiwan to the Gulf of Aden The Indo-Pacific realm includes a subset of geopolitical spaces. On the western side, regional powers such as India, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia participate in a regional competition in which global strategies of extra-regional powers such as the United States, France, the United

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Kingdom, and Russia coexist with non-traditional threats and non-state actors that are used as tools in proxy or proxy conflicts, although at times these actors such as Somali pirates or Houthi rebels in Yemen have other motivations than global geopolitical games. On the eastern side, China’s entry as a maritime actor and power in the region has not only changed the strategic calculus but has raised concerns about its security objectives in the Indian Ocean due to explicit actions to protect sea lines of communications and goods and supplies to and from China. While India, Australia, and Japan are increasingly aligned with Washington’s regional security agenda, a significant portion of middle and small powers in East Asia and Southeast Asia from Indonesia to Sri Lanka seek to pursue balancing positions in the face of cross-pressures. Moreover, the IndoPacific can be metaphorically represented as a matryoshka characterized by three levels: global, regional, and transnational. We will now address each of them. 7.2.1

Global Level: Towards the Thucydides Trap

In 2015, the influential Harvard scholar Graham Allison published the article “The Thucydides Trap: Are the United States and China headed for war?” where he raised the possibility of a conflict between the two powers by putting as empirical evidence a series of cases in which hegemonic challenges ended in a military conflagration. In that context, President Xi Jinping himself had expressed that such a trap did not exist but that if “major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves” (Allison 2015). Since the mid-2010s, Sino-US rivalry has been openly raised, while official documents of both countries directly or indirectly identify the other as their competitor. On the one hand, aggressive rhetoric marked the official agenda in recent years, especially during the Trump administration in the White House. In both capitals, there is a growing perception of a strategic rivalry that is expressed in the debates of experts and academics on the subject. Michael Pillsbury, Director of the China Strategy Center at the Hudson Institute in Washington, published the book “The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace the United States as the World’s Superpower” in 2015, whose main thesis is that there is a master plan in Beijing to replace Washington as the central power in 2049. On the Chinese side, Yan Xuetong (2011), Dean

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of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, has posited that China’s rise to “great power status entitles it to a new role in world affairs — one that cannot be reconciled with unquestioned US dominance.” Among the most conflicting aspects of the agenda is technological competition in the framework of the fourth industrial revolution in sectors such as artificial intelligence, big data, patents, and supercomputers, as well as a race around innovations in the military field such as hypersonic missiles and land-sea ballistic missiles and the renewed space race. Rivalry is also expressed—as we have previously pointed out—in regional strategic projects’ opposition such as the case of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific versus the One Belt and One Road Initiative. Finally, two hot scenarios could generate a military escalation and be scenarios of conventional and unconventional conflicts: Taiwan and the South China Sea. In the case of Taiwan, President Biden publicly expressed in October 2021 that he would defend Taiwan in case of a Chinese attack which would represent a traditional strategic ambiguity shift towards the island. At the same time, the United States continues to support Taipei’s international activism, for example by extending an invitation to the Democracy Summit held that same year. In the case of the maritime scenario, the United States has not hesitated to conduct multiple ‘Freedom of the Seas Operations’ in the area to challenge territorial claims in the area and evidence support for its allies, while Beijing responds with diplomatic toughness, as well as expanding its naval presence in the area. As tensions continue unabated, China’s global aspirations and fear of losing preeminence in Washington continue to fuel the trap. 7.2.2

Regional Level: Regional Rivalries and Maritime Tensions

Across the Indo-Pacific, there are four focal points of regional geopolitical tensions: the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry in the Persian Gulf, the North Korean issue, and the dispute between India and China and the Indian-Pakistan rivalry. In the Gulf, conflict dynamics can be traced back to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s. However, the tense relations between Iranians and Saudis worsened after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003; the progress of Iran’s nuclear program; and the growing threat perception of Sunni countries—especially Saudi Arabia—regarding the action of Shiite groups in the so-called “Shiite

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Crescent” that would allow the construction of a geopolitical corridor from the Khozaran to the Eastern Mediterranean. One of the most important consequences of this dispute is the growing maritime insecurity surrounding maritime traffic in parallel with the ever-present threat of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by the Iranian authorities. However, in terms of regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, the place of the Persian Gulf is not only a secondary issue but has its dynamics linked to the processes of change and transformation in the Middle East. The same applies to North Korea. Pyongyang possesses nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles powerful enough to reach several neighboring countries. This makes it a regional and global threat. Despite being at the center of regional tensions due to its nuclear revisionist stance in East Asia, North Korean isolationism is often compartmentalized from the regional dynamics we have been describing in the Indo-Pacific. The Kim Jong-Un regime’s relations with its neighboring countries, especially South Korea, are not easy. At the same time, the closed political and economic system, together with the excessive militarism of its agenda limits ties, even with closer countries such as the People’s Republic of China. The central focus of the Indo-Pacific regional dynamics is expressed in the relations between China and India. The border between the two countries extends for almost 3500 km, of which China has possession of approximately 38,000 km2 of territory claimed by India in the Aksai Chin area and another 90,000 km2 in the Eastern Sector. As if that were not enough, in 1963, Pakistan ceded to the Asian giant the Shaksgam Valley in northern Kashmir, also claimed by India. Territorial disputes generate tensions, and if active, incidents. Between June and August 2017, China and India engaged in a military confrontation in the Doklam Plateau region, an area claimed by Bhutan and China. The conflict started when Chinese soldiers were discovered building a road in the disputed area. India also has a treaty of friendship with Bhutan, Article 2 of which stipulates that both countries shall cooperate in matters relating to their national interests and “neither government shall permit the use of its territory for activities prejudicial to the national security and interest of the other.” According to the Indian government, the country decided to send troops to the disputed area and stop the construction of the road because the government of Bhutan had asked for help in the spirit of the agreement (Kalyanaraman and Ribeiro 2017: 57).

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After 72 days of fighting, China and India agreed on a mutual withdrawal plan, the troops of both sides were distributed away from their respective positions near the siege and reduced. However, the Chinese government left room for the resumption of its activities in the area. As a result, the Indian Army continuously monitors Chinese activities in the area and is adequately prepared to respond to any contingency. Despite that, tensions with China have been able to normalize through diplomatic channels. Following the 2017 border crisis, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping held a bilateral meeting in Wuhan in April 2018 that led to an easing of tensions. The visit of China’s State Councilor and Minister of National Defense to India in August 2018 and the Annual Defense and Security Dialogue meeting in Beijing in November 2018 laid the groundwork for continued bilateral defense engagements and exchanges. A similar situation was experienced between May and June 2020 in Sikkim and Eastern Ladakh which led to a series of diplomatic and military consultations without concrete results, further aggravated by new clashes at the end of 2022. Another chapter of the tensions between both actors has occurred in the maritime space where India fears China’s strategy of gaining presence in a series of ports in the Indian Ocean as it could build a ‘string of pearls’ from the Strait of Malacca to the Red Sea that would condition India’s projection in its maritime sphere of influence. Finally, the strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan is characterized by the long-standing Kashmir dispute, a nuclear arms race, and mixed accusations of terrorism. While the Kashmir conflict remains unresolved, both countries are immersed in a nuclear arms race where they developed nuclear arsenals and conducted nuclear tests, which has heightened concerns about the potential for a nuclear conflict in the region. Despite the mutual perception of threat, Pakistan and India have shared instances of regional and global articulation such as the incorporation of New Delhi into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization along with Pakistan in 2017, while China and India also share membership in the framework of the BRICS group that has facilitated high-level Sino-Indian dialogue. 7.2.3

Transnational Level: Bottlenecks and the Malacca Dilemma

Choke points are compact maritime channels connecting two maritime flows that are often of superlative commercial and logistical importance. Three main nodes stand out in the Indo-Pacific area: the Strait of Malacca,

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the Strait of Hormuz, and Bab El-Mandeb. From the point of view of energy transit, 20% of the world’s crude oil is transported daily through Hormuz, approximately 16% through Malacca, and around 5% through the node connecting the Red Sea with the Indian Sea, according to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). In terms of trade, Malacca accounts for 25% of the world’s maritime traffic, while the South China Sea region accounts for about 40% of China’s trade. In logistical terms, navigation through Malacca is the shortest and cheapest way to connect the Pacific and Indian Oceans compared to the Sunda and Lombok Straits, so any disruption of transit in that area would lead to higher costs, and even to a disruption of global goods supply routes. In terms of energy, China’s dependence is even more dramatic as by 2016 almost 80% of its imports pass through the zone (China Power 2022). Around 2003, then President Hu Jintao referred to the “Malacca Dilemma” whereby Beijing would face potential disruption from “certain great powers” seeking to control the strait. To circumvent this choke point, Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative allows for a “modification of the strategic geography of South Asia by directly connecting China’s inland provinces to the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the imperative of protecting its vital trade routes is demanding from China the deployment of its increasingly capable naval forces in a vast and relatively distant oceanic realm” (García-Sanz 2020: 70). At the same time as the U.S. 7th Fleet operates in the area based in Singapore, and India tries to prevent the formation of a Chinese port connection scheme along the Indian Ocean, it is also important to highlight the role of transnational threats in the straits. The main threat is piracy. While not a novel phenomenon, according to the definition of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it refers to illegal acts of violence committed on the high seas, although it also often extends to the Exclusive Economic Zone. According to the annual report of the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), recent years have seen a marked decline in piracy incidents from 445 in 2003 to 132 in 2021. However, nearly 40% of those incidents in 2021 occurred in the Southeast Asian area, particularly in the Singapore Strait which connects the south of the South China Sea and west of the Strait of Malacca to the Pacific Ocean. The occurrence of attempted boardings and attacks in the Horn of Africa area carried out by Somali pirates has almost disappeared throughout the 2020s.

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One of the main reasons for the neutralization of this threat has been the extensive international cooperation against piracy in which both Western powers and major Asian naval powers have participated. In addition to the permanent presence of the Chinese Navy with the Support Base in Djibouti and the deployment of a permanent task force, Japan also maintains a base in Djibouti, and its Maritime Self-Defense Force has participated in various opportunities for multinational anti-piracy missions. In the case of India, since 2019 the Navy has carried out various missions with a humanitarian profile including disaster assistance in Mozambique (2019) and Madagascar (2020), dispatch of supplies linked to the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020 (Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros, and Seychelles) and food aid in the face of drought in the Horn of Africa in Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, and Eritrea. New Delhi has also initialed the “Mutual Logistics Services Pact” with Tokyo which allows it access to the Japanese base in Djibouti in return for Japanese access to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands located in route to the Strait of Malacca. India also agreed to build a military base with the Republic of Seychelles off East Africa and reached an agreement with Oman for access to the Muscat base, although such moves have more to do with geostrategic calculations about China than with combating piracy per se. However, anti-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa are not absent; rather, anti-piracy patrols were initiated in the Gulf of Aden in October 2008 with a permanent deployment in the area that allowed escorting of more than 3000 vessels with 73 ships between 2008 and 2019 (Peri 2019). The protection of sea lines of communication to secure maritime interests and address conventional and non-traditional threats is a key aspect to understand the maritime dynamics in the Indo-Pacific.

7.3

New Wine in Old Wineskins: Institutions, Alliances, and Regional Challenges

The existence of diverse global and regional initiatives and competing narratives in the Indo-Pacific have blocked any possibility of developing a common maritime vision while promoting normative and institutional fragmentation. Moreover, institutional fragmentation is primarily a natural by-product of the interaction between three continents—Africa, Asia, and Oceania—multiple regions and sub-regions from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea and competing regional projects. Each

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regional and global actor has different and simultaneous approaches to strategic partnerships in the area, a kind of archipelagic regionalism that resembles Bhagwati’s ‘spaghetti bowl’3 (1995) but in strategic terms. Multiple institutions, cross-alliances, and geo-economic and geopolitical initiatives driven by regional and extra-regional actors interact in an environment of increasing strategic competition. In addition, the growing presence of the United States as an external balancer and its more assertive involvement in economic, diplomatic, and military terms present a challenge to regional stability both in terms of capabilities and concerning the determination of norms and rules considered legitimate at the regional level. This structural situation is not very different from the past, but the greater density of geopolitical tensions gives it a different face. 7.3.1

The Geopolitical Containment Game: Between QUAD and AUKUS

The abbreviation Quad refers to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a forum comprising the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. The parties had their first iteration in 2004 when they formed a core group in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster that occurred that same year. This provided the basis for future formalized cooperation between the countries. They resumed contact in 2007 under a proposal by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to form a formal security dialogue reflecting a partnership of Asian democracies, although at this early-stage progress would be limited and the initiative was soon frozen. This view has deepened as Japan has experienced an increase in gray zone strategies by the Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels around the Senkaku Islands, a similar strategy used in the South China Sea. However, China’s economic and military growth led to increasing convergence among the foreign policies of the four Quad members, incorporating a focus on promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific and coordinating joint actions on maritime security. Updating dialogues among partners at the ministerial level and expanding traditionally bilateral naval exercises into “mini-lateral” actions. In this context, the Quad was reactivated at Japan’s request starting at the 2017 ASEAN Summit in 3 In international political economy studies, the notion of a ‘plate of spaghetti’ is used to refer to the complications in the application of different rules of origin in free trade agreements.

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Manila and subsequently, a series of meetings were held in India, Singapore, and New York, both at and below the ministerial level, in addition to a virtual meeting in a Quad Plus format inviting New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam in March 2020. In parallel, it was decided to incorporate the Australian Navy into the Malabar naval exercises that, starting in 2020, will be conducted with the four navies of the Quad countries. Despite the effervescence surrounding the relaunch of the Quad, there is still debate as to its main strategic objectives. The main discussions about the Quar are expressed in the degree of commitment to the objectives. Madan and Jaishankar (2021) posit that “as its members increasingly find themselves at loggerheads with Beijing, the group has become a test case for a new kind of flexible multilateral partnership designed to shape the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, offer alternatives, and alter China’s calculations.” In September 2021, the first Quad-level meeting of heads of state and government was held in Washington, DC. The joint statement issued expresses the pursuit and promotion of “promoting the free, open, rulesbased order, rooted in international law and undaunted by coercion, to bolster security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.” Even though it makes no express mention of what (or who), specifically, might be the sources of coercion, it does refer to the East and South China Seas, calling for overcoming the challenges posed by the rules governing the global maritime order. The approach adopted at this Quad summit has similarities with its original ideological foundations, embodied in then Prime Minister Abe’s 2007 speech on his doctrine of the “Confluence of the Two Seas.” However, the Quad does not formally constitute an alliance as it does not offer a security guarantee, something that AUKUS might be a more appropriate response in terms of military security. Nor could it “contain” China due to the limited tools available to this informal forum. While there is no unanimous consensus on the objectives and scope of the Quad vis-à-vis China, a clear tendency can be observed to emphasize the issue of maritime freedom and the promotion of democratic values in an increasingly competitive environment, while presenting itself as a soft, multilateral approach inspired by a broad White House containment strategy vis-à-vis mainland China. Another compelling initiative by the Biden Administration has been the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Prosperity Framework in May 2022 which brings together fourteen countries in the region (except the United States, none from

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the Western Hemisphere), including India, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, and Australia focused on ‘soft’ issues fair trade, resilient supply chains; infrastructure and clean energy and anti-corruption, but which at its core seeks to present an alternative narrative to Chinese activism in the region. Concerning the AUKUS military alliance, it is necessary to understand the situation in Australia, which in recent years has been shaken by revelations that several politicians in that country accepted money from organizations and individuals related to the Chinese Communist Party. This circumstance led to the adoption of the Anti-Foreign Interference Act in 2018 and a progressive deterioration of relations under the government of Scott Morrison—belonging to the Liberal Party—who issued critical stances on human rights issues, excluded Chinese companies from participating in the 5G telecommunications market, in addition to experiencing a series of naval incidents including the laser attack on Australian aircraft from Chinese ships. Within a process of modernization of its submarine fleet to strengthen its naval deterrence scheme, the oceanic country reached an agreement with the French group Naval in 2019 for more than USD 60 billion to replace the conventional Collins class submarines with twelve nuclear-powered submarines. However, two years later the Canberra government decided to scrap the multi-billion-dollar contract and opted for an Anglo-U.S. bid that was announced in parallel with the establishment of a trilateral defense agreement. The agreement to provide nuclear submarines would make Australia the seventh country to possess nuclear submarines along with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and India. According to the document issued by the White House, this alliance allows for strengthening ties to “sustain peace and stability in the IndoPacific region” while “deepen diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, including by working with partners, to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century” (White House 2021). While the AUKUS is not connected to the Quad, their goals are the same as both desire regional stability but at the same time oppose Chinese assertiveness (Lamba 2022: 255). Along these lines, AUKUS expresses a willingness to pursue broad defense cooperation to contain Beijing’s strategic growth, as well as possessing a “significant impact on the balance of power and alignments of different Asian actors vis-à-vis China” (Serbin 2021a: 40). In this line, AUKUS has become the geopolitical center of gravity of the new deterrence strategy, while generating an airy reaction

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from the Asian country that accused member countries of undermining regional peace and stability (Peyronnet 2021). The great geopolitical game in the Indo-Pacific is still open. 7.3.2

The Geo-economic Dynamics Game: From BRI to RCEP

The Indo-Pacific has been a space of great initiatives and agreements in the economic sphere. As we have previously cited, Beijing has implemented the One Belt, One Road (BRI) initiative. According to Maçães (2018: 5), the BRI is the central instrument of a Chinese grand strategy to transform the current international order built and led by the United States. The Initiative has two fundamental elements, a land ‘route’ with six corridors and a maritime route. The land dimension involves the New Eurasian Land Bridge; the China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor, the China-Pakistan Corridor, the Bangladesh-China-Myanmar Corridor, the China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, and the China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor. While the maritime side starts in the main coastal cities of the East China Sea towards the South China Sea, and then crosses the Strait of Malacca and continues through various ports of the Indian Ocean to East Africa and the European continent via the Suez Canal. The BRI project has promoted cooperation in five areas: infrastructure connectivity, trade promotion, facilitation of financial flows, coordination of national policies, and increased cultural exchanges.4 The development of such corridors has interconnected the Eurasian space through the construction and modernization of “extensive logistics, transport, and production networks whose goal is to deepen economic links between China, Central Asia, Mongolia, Russia, and Europe, and between China, East, South, and Southeast Asia” (Dirmoser 2017: 28). According to data from the Green Finance & Development Center, from inception to 2020, the total stock of Chinese investments in the initiative was over USD 770 billion. At the same time, the average investment between 2013 and 2019 was over USD 100 billion, which would represent an annual GDP of a country like Ecuador or Kenya. Among the most benefited sectors are energy (almost 40%) and transportation (25%), while the bulk of investments went to East Asia (27%), West 4 The projects are carried out with both Chinese financing—especially from the Export– Import Bank of China (Exim Bank) and the China Development Bank (CBD)—and mixed financing, after evaluation and review by the Chinese authorities.

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Asia (22%), and Sub-Saharan Africa (21%). In line with official priorities, the main investors have been state-owned enterprises such as China State Construction (CSCEC) and the China Petroleum and Chemicals Corporation (SINOPEC). The magnitude of the Chinese action produced the reaction of the Obama Administration’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ with a markedly geo-economic bias with the proposal to constitute a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) through an economic cooperation agreement excluding China, but the Trump Administration decided to stop its advance. At the same time, China’s progressive rapprochement with ASEAN made it possible to react to this context with the signing of the treaty establishing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2020 which has become the largest free trade zone in the world as of its implementation on January 1, 2022. The RCEP has its origins in discussions on the expansion of the ASEAN+6 agreement, comprising the ten RCEP countries plus India, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, although New Delhi is not part of the RCEP. However, several TPP countries continued their partnership and came together in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP11), which integrates 11 countries (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Japan, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam) to strengthen trade and investment ties, although with the notable absence of the United States. Countering Chinese activism, India has been forging economic and strategic ties with other Indo-Pacific partners, especially Japan. Both countries pushed for a common approach within the ‘Asia-Africa Growth Corridor’ (AAGC), a non-traditional cooperation initiative involving several African countries with international cooperation and funding agencies from India and Japan. This initiative seemed to tackle the BRI and was announced in 2017 by Modi at a high-level meeting of the African Development Bank (ADB), just after the 1st Silk Road Forum held in Beijing. Despite ambitious goals that sought to develop an alternative pathway to connect markets in East Africa, India, Oceania, and Japan, the AAGC did not prosper. In this context, India has also encouraged greater regional interdependence through the “Look East” policy introduced by Prime Minister Modi in 2014 to address rivalry with China. Framed in its multilateral and non-alignment tradition, India has sought to promote and involve regional states in its regional insertion scheme. This includes New Delhi’s active participation in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the

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South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) initiatives. In the maritime domain, for example, it has been the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative proclaimed in 2015 by Prime Minister Modi. In the early 2020s, Beijing’s activism and resources in the Indo-Pacific seem to be flourishing in the geo-economic field, where the various initiatives to counter its influence have not prospered. 7.3.3

Convergences and Divergences in Maritime Cooperation

At this stage, there are no doubts that there is no shared understanding in the Indo-Pacific area both at the institutional level and on how to manage regional security and inter-state conflicts. However, there are state or regional initiatives whose main objective is to enhance maritime security cooperation and develop confidence-building measures. In India’s view, maritime security cooperation is central to the development of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous region (Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul and Kate Sullivan de Estrada 2018: 185), while the ASEAN Regional Forum defines maritime security as fundamental to the stability and prosperity of the wider region. Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced the Indo-Pacific Initiative in 2018 at the Shangri-La Dialogue as an example of a new framework that the region should adopt. This idea is not new. India has a long tradition of principles and approaches towards regional stability sharing the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision in 2015 whose aim is to establish an atmosphere of trust and transparency, which encompasses; respect for international maritime rules by all countries; sensitivity to each other’s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime issues; and enhanced maritime cooperation in security and peace, especially with its maritime neighbors and island states. India has also participated as an observer in the French-led Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and has actively participated in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Within this framework, the creation of a Maritime Safety and Security Working Group within IORA, the development of the Indian Ocean Dialogue (IOD) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and the conduct of MILAN, multilateral naval exercises sponsored by the Indian Navy with the participation of more than 15 Indo-Pacific navies in its latest editions, have been promoted.

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Growing maritime security challenges and Chinese presence move India toward a narrative of its own. However, the Indian perspective has had limited success due to regional tensions with Pakistan—which limits the depth of cooperation or forbids it as in the case of IORA—and limited resources and strong regional commitment to the national sovereignty paradigm. Indian leadership is constrained by regional tensions themselves, while ambitious rhetoric is not contrasted with an adequate willingness of Indian leadership to provide regional public goods. In the end, institutional frameworks help India, and the rest of the countries in the region, to promote their interests but are not sufficient to enforce a common regional vision. Another example of policy development in the field of maritime security has been the efforts of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to provide a principled understanding of managing maritime security and addressing common threats. As the premier multilateral forum for security cooperation, it is composed of 27 members, including major powers in the Indo-Pacific realm, such as the United States, China, and India. The ARF has shown itself to be an attempt to limit U.S. military engagement in Asia while tactically promoting cooperative relations with China, at the same time pushing for a holistic understanding of regional security while promoting ASEAN’s form of dialogue and consultation. Despite projects such as the ARF Work Plan for Maritime Security, it seems that the effect on geopolitical competition is at least dubious, particularly in dealing with maritime conflicts such as the South China Sea problem. Within the Indo-Pacific, national geopolitical visions are strong enough to block any delegation based on a common set of regional norms, especially on issues related to their security agenda. However, the archipelagic type of regionalism that prevails in the region provides room for both ‘free-raiders ’ and the development of common positions, which sometimes happens simultaneously. For example, Beijing’s regional narrative emphasizes China-led transnational cooperation based on the BRI’s connectivity and infrastructure assets that help connect Eastern and Western markets, but increasingly assertive Chinese bilateralism still has greater influence than Asia-centered multilateralism. Against this, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) case with the United States and Japan presents an alternative framework to China’s growing interest, while enhancing its regional presence by articulating joint efforts. Multilateral efforts have been complemented by increased bilateral ties with several Southeast Asian states and Oceania, especially by the Indian Navy, which

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regularly visits ports in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Australia and conducts multiple naval exercises such as SIMBEX exercises with Singapore (since 2005), INDRA with Russia (since 2003), JIMEX with Japan JIMEX (since 2011) MALABAR bilateral with the United States (since 2007) and trilateral with Japan and the American country since 2007. In the case of the strategic relationship between Japan and India, it is clear the degree to which U.S. allies are committed to aligning more closely with each other to maintain a favorable strategic balance in the region as China rises (Pant and Joshi 2015: 319). A similar argument can be made for Australia’s regional role. Canberra has not only moved closer to the US Indo-Pacific agenda but has also strengthened maritime ties with Japan, Singapore, and India. The proposal for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, the Quad forum, and the AUKUS alliance seem to sit well with the U.S. and its partners, although there are still limits to advancing a comprehensive regional agenda. On the one hand, regional and middle naval actors are reluctant to move too far away from Beijing. On the other hand, they prefer not to fully subordinate their maritime security policies to the United States, thus affecting the depth of Washington-led formal and informal regional multilateralism. In this context of increasing competition and multiple pressures, the new US containment strategy here plays a key role in generating the right incentives to strengthen its relationship with its partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific.

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Pautasso, Diego y Cepik, Marco (2022) Indo-Pacífico: entre la estrategia estadounidense e a resposta chinesa, Pensamiento Propio, 54, pp. 45–69. Peri, Dinakar (2019) “Indian Navy Steps Up Anti-Piracy Patrol,” The Hindu Times, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-navy-deploys-p8i-from-oman-on-anti-piracy-patrols-in-gulf-of-aden/article27406710.ece. Peyronnet, Arnaud (2021) “The AUKUS Security Pact: Aligning Australia’s Strategy with America’s Geopolitical Vision,” Fondation Méditerranéenne d’Etudes Stratégiques, https://fmes-france.org/the-aukus-security-pact-ali gning-australias-strategy-with-americas-geopolitical-vision/. Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul and Kate Sullivan de Estrada (2018) “India, the IndoPacific and the Quad,” Survival, 60 (3), pp. 181–194. Russian Presidency (2022) Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development, http://en.kremlin.ru/supple ment/5770. Sahd, Jorge, Nicolás Albertoni, and Rojas Diego (2022) América Latina y su proyección en el Asia-Pacífico. Santiago de Chile: Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEIUC)/Fundación Konrad Adenauer. Serbin, Andrés (2019) Eurasia y América Latina en un Mundo Multipolar. Buenos Aires: CRIES/Editorial Icaria. Serbin, Andrés (2021a) “El Indo-Pacífico y América Latina en el marco de la disputa geoestratégica entre Estados Unidos y China,” Pensamiento Propio, 54, pp. 10–37. Serbin, Andrés (2021b) “Post scriptum necesario: Eurasia y el Indo-Pacífico: de Kabul al AUKUS,” Pensamiento Propio, 54, pp. 38–44. State Council (2015) China’s Military Strategy. Information Office of the State Council. White House (2021) Background Press Call on AUKUS. Xuetong, Yan (2011) “How China Can Defeat America,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/opinion/how-china-can-defeat-america.html.

CHAPTER 8

The South Atlantic and the Global Strategic Competition

What are the structural geostrategic factors that give its importance to the South Atlantic? The Brazilian geopolitician Carlos De Meira Mattos (1990: 222) highlighted three elements: as a transportation route, as an area of military power projection and as a source of resources. In relation to the first point, Cape Horn is presented as a vital artery of communications given its alternative role in the transport of oil from the Persian Gulf to European markets, especially in the event of limitations in transport through the Suez Canal. The same would apply to the Strait of Magellan in case the Panama Canal suffers any serious inconvenience. Secondly, the strategic dominance of the United Kingdom in both the island triangle of St. Helena, Ascension (also used by the United States) and Tristan da Cunha and the complex of the Malvinas/Falklands Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands claimed by Argentina, but under the colonial control of the United Kingdom. In addition, ‘Fortress Malvinas/ Falklands’ is projected as an alternative gateway to the Antarctic territories outside the South American continent. In terms of resources, the exploitation of living resources—fishing, krill and whales—and non-living resources—hydrocarbons and polymetallic nodules—were an additional element of interest not only for the Soviets, but also for the main naval powers in the region.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. González Levaggi, Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1_8

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From a geopolitical point of view, the South Atlantic remains the vital reference point for the strategic projection of the Argentine Republic (Storni 2009; Fraga 1983), in addition to regional powers such as South Africa and Brazil (Saraiva 1997; Pereira 2014; Duarte 2016) and extraregional powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Over the last decades, the South Atlantic has been interpreted in multiple ways from a scenario characterized by turbulence and uncertainty (CoutauBégarie 1988; Kelly and Child 1990; Dodds 2012) to a zone of peace and cooperation (Abdenur et al. 2016; Medeiros 2002). Until the mid 1970s, the South Atlantic was a relatively stable space beyond Argentina’s permanent sovereignty claim over the Malvinas/ Falklands, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, partially disconnected from the main global geostrategic dynamics and characterized by a low degree of interaction both in economic and commercial terms. However, the decolonization process in Lusophone Africa and the Malvinas/ Falklands Islands War changed the profile and forced Western powers to pay greater attention to a strategically neglected space. The end of the Cold War eased the perception of systemic threat, while negotiations for the normalization of bilateral relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom facilitated the return to a certain stability. However, the lack of resolution of the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas/Falklands Islands, the new role of China and Russia, and the growing presence of extraregional powers in the Antarctic present a series of worrying challenges for the future South Atlantic. Of all these elements, the projection of Eurasian naval powers presents a major challenge to stability in the South Atlantic.

8.1 The Peaceful Ocean? Trends in the South Atlantic Scenario Admiral Eduardo Bacellar Leal Ferreira, Commander in Chief of the Brazilian Navy between 2015 and 2019, commented in an interview that “there is no ocean more peaceful than the South Atlantic” as it is the “only ocean where the great powers do not have (wars) ships and does not present insolvable problems” despite the ‘problems’ in Malvinas/ Falklands or the Gulf of Guinea (El País 2015). However, the presence of British ships in the Atlantic Patrol Tasking South around the territory of the Malvinas/Falklands Islands with a permanent deployment of a frigate, a patrol vessel and a support ship, in parallel with the growing

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global competition in the seas, still call into question the arguments of the Brazilian naval officer. With the end of the Cold War and the abrupt Soviet withdrawal from the Third World, the hegemony of the Atlantist bloc in the South Atlantic was solidified, partially returning to the situation of stability prior to the Malvinas/Falklands conflict. However, such stability would be forced by the conditions imposed after the British military victory over the Argentine Republic, which would generate a situation of disagreement both in Argentina and in its regional partners. After the war, a de facto normative situation would be imposed with a clear divergence between a satisfied or statusquoist position—the United Kingdom—and an unsatisfied or revisionist one—Argentina—, in addition to a clear discomfort of regional countries such as Uruguay, Chile and Brazil which, although supporting Argentina’s diplomatic position, continued to cooperate with the UK in military matters. In this context, Argentina is subject to a great strategic restriction that limits both its Atlantic projection and the principle of territorial integrity in the maritime and insular zones, in addition to suffering restrictions that—in the case of strategic military equipment and technology—are still in place. After the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands conflict, the quadrant around the Malvinas/Falklands would be definitively militarized. In addition to the British naval task force, the UK has deployed a land component with more than 1200 troops and an air squadron made up of four Eurofighter Typhoons. On the other hand, the difference of positions in relation to the sovereignty dispute together with the war background will be the main conflictive factor in the stability of the Southwest Atlantic, although its evolution has been subject to the political times in Buenos Aires. In the case of the United Kingdom, the intensity of tensions has depended on political changes within Argentina as well as the regional diplomatic capacity of Buenos Aires to limit British actions. With an internationalist conception, President Carlos Menem (1989–1999) promoted an Argentine-British rapprochement due to both the need to diplomatically channel the conflict and the change of orientation of Argentine domestic and foreign policy close to the Western bloc. In the strategic conception after the end of the Cold War, the country had to avoid costly decisions towards the developed powers and therefore unnecessary political confrontations with the great powers should be limited (Escudé 1992). According to the ‘peripheral realist’ perspective during the Menem’s years, the confrontation with the UK due to the Malvinas/

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Falklands Islands was perceived as detrimental to Argentina’s national interests even though the sovereignty claim was never renounced. In that context, Argentina looked for an extended rapprochement and cooperation policy with London, including in the South Atlantic. Such policy would be repeated in a nuanced way during the administration of Mauricio Macri (2015–2019) and would be criticized and modified both in the governments of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner (2003–2015) and the administration of Alberto Fernandez (2019–2023). Throughout the first decade of the post-Cold War period, the South Atlantic witnessed a progressive normalization of ties between Argentina and the United Kingdom because of the Madrid Agreements, which resulted in the full restoration of diplomatic relations. Among the main measures agreed in the Madrid II Agreements was the cessation of the Protected Zone established around the Malvinas/Falklands Islands and the implementation of mutual confidence measures to avoid incidents in the military field, in addition to promoting multiple issues of cooperation in fisheries, search and rescue, consular and diplomatic matters, placing an ‘umbrella’ to the issue of sovereignty. This means that the agreements signed did not mean: “(a) a change in the position of the Argentine Republic on the sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the Malvinas/Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas; (b) a change in the position of the United Kingdom on the sovereignty or jurisdiction over the Islands (….) and the surrounding areas; c) a recognition or support by the Argentine Republic or the United Kingdom of the sovereignty or maritime territorial jurisdiction over the Malvinas/Falklands Islands (…) and surrounding maritime areas” (Mántaras 2019: 222). The rapprochement between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom provided greater stability in the South Atlantic, placing Buenos Aires in a position close to British status quoism, despite the current sovereignty claim. Despite the presence of an extra-regional power with naval projection and deployment along the axis from Ascension Island to the Malvinas/Falklands, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, the diplomatic rapprochement reduced the degree of conflict in the main source of regional conflict. At the same time, since the United Kingdom never finished disarming its ‘Fortress Malvinas/Falklands’, instability continued in the southwest quadrant. Malvinas/Falklands remains a latent and frozen conflict.

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Moreover, the Atlantic space has been characterized to a greater extent by security challenges of a transnational nature than by traditional interstate conflicts. Piracy in Southeast Atlantic waters is growing, increasingly violent and better organized, with a new danger zone located in the Gulf of Guinea. The impact of piracy has transcended the regional level, as it also involves disruption of international trade routes. Another growing problem is drug trafficking, as cartels are exploiting local weaknesses (insufficient port controls, poor inspection equipment, porous land and maritime borders, as well as endemic corruption) to use these waters as transit routes to European markets (Ayuso and Viilup 2013: 22). To the traditional conventional instability, we must add this element of uncertainty posed by the new maritime threats to the regional order. In any case, despite their growing weight, the new threats did not transform the restricted unstable nature of the South Atlantic but added one more issue of concern to the littoral countries, especially in its African dimension. In structural terms, the South Atlantic has progressively mutated since the 1980s from a system of balance between the main maritime powers—Brazil and South Africa—and secondary powers—Argentina and Angola—with great penetration of extra-regional powers towards a scheme of growing intra-regional asymmetry. Angola will be affected by the continuation of the Civil War until 2002, while in Argentina there will be a slow but inexorable disarmament due to the lack of investment in the renewal of capabilities both in the naval field and in the rest of the Armed Forces. In any case, both asymmetries did not lead to tensions but, on the contrary, facilitated cooperation, although not necessarily related to the power differential but to domestic issues. Both Brazil and South Africa will have significant economic development that will go hand in hand with the development of naval capabilities. In line with the growth of its gross product, Brazil expanded its military expenditures by more than 300% in the period 2003–2018. Moreover, the Brazilian neo-developmentalist coalition led by Fernando H. Cardozo and later by President Lula found a diagonal of economic and international projection in South American regionalism. Initially, Brazil promotes the establishment of the South American Community of Nations (CSN) as a high-level dialogue instance, which will later become the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR). In that framework, Brazil will support the establishment of the South American Defense Council although political changes since the mid-2010s have reoriented its projection from regionalism towards a marked bilateralism in strategic terms centered on

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the reconstitution of a preferential relationship with the United States. The Bolsonaro administration is a clear example of Trump’s preferential relations with the United States. At the same time, political cooperation at the multilateral level strengthened Brazilian support for the Argentine position regarding the Malvinas/Falklands Islands in global or regional forums such as UNASUR or CELAC. In addition, different instances were developed, such as the dialogue between Mercosur and the Southern African Development Community, interregional platforms such as the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), the South AmericaAfrica (ASA), South America-Arab Countries (ASPA) summits or, in the maritime sphere, the South Atlantic Maritime Coordination Area (CAMAS), which have the potential to structure a South Atlantic community but which, however, currently still lack the necessary degree of ownership by all of its members (Ayuso and Viilup 2013: 13). Finally, cooperation has not only run up against economic and political constraints, but also against the affinity of certain countries in the region with the United Kingdom. For example, the Chilean Navy has four of its ten frigates of British origin, while the backbone of the Brazilian Navy’s surface ships (Niteroi and Broadsword class frigates) together with the flagship PHM A-140 Atlantic helicopter carrier are of British manufacture. In this sense, the incidence of the United Kingdom as an extra-regional naval power and the reaction and/or accommodation of regional powers in the South Atlantic has been the main point of (in)stability in the regional maritime order. 8.1.1

Extra-Regional Great Powers in the South Atlantic

Given the remote position of the South Atlantic in relation to the main commercial and logistic centers, together with its significant geographical distance from the Eurasian powers, the countries analyzed tend to place the region as the last locus of their international strategy and agenda. In order to evaluate the presence of the great powers in the South Atlantic, it is important to present a series of indicators that reflect the extent, intensity and depth of their maritime interests and actions. Basil Germond (2015: 51–64, 72) presents the concept of security projection as an element in both wartime and peacetime and proposes a series of indicators in terms of maritime projection operations. The author divides

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them between preventive actions, peacetime operations and wartime operations. In the specifically naval case, security projection is realized through two avenues: through maritime means, which can involve direct actions against land-based targets using naval assets, or, activities conducted at sea with the aim of influencing the situation onshore. Following this framework, we underline two elements. Firstly, the division between preventive actions and peace operations is usually quite blurred so we will simply distinguish between actions in peaceful times and in conflict contexts. On the other hand, the South Atlantic is far from being a space of threats for the great naval powers so there are practically no observed indicators related to war operations, beyond the routine military exercises carried out by the United Kingdom in the Malvinas/ Falklands Islands. With this exception, the Atlantic projection of the great powers operates fundamentally in an environment they consider peaceful and with actions that avoid the use of force against third state actors. In this sense, among the indicators considered to assess the degree of involvement of the Great Powers in the South Atlantic are, among others, advanced deployment with the dispatch of both warships and scientific vessels as well as the existence of facilities and strategic weaponry, port visits either as part of logistical needs or naval diplomacy, naval agreements for access to ports that reflect key maritime partnerships in the region, joint exercises with South Atlantic countries and/or international partners, reaction to piracy incidents in the South Atlantic centered mostly in the Gulf of Guinea, sale of naval and military systems, fleet of flagged fishing vessels, strategic economic interests from control of commercial ports to exploitation of economic resources and, finally, humanitarian aid. The rest of the chapter analyzes how the great powers of the twenty-first century have been projecting themselves into the South Atlantic in the last two decades.

8.2

Sustained Projection: United States

In mid-April 2021, Admiral Craig Faller, Commander of U.S. SOUTHCOM (Southern Command) of the United States made a visit to Argentina where he paid a surprise visit to the town of Ushuaia in the face of rumors of possible Chinese funding for a new joint naval base, while announcing a series of donations to combat the COVID-19 pandemic for USD 3.5 million. In line with the Biden Administration’s 2021 ‘Interim National Security Strategic Guidance’ which recognized a

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‘growing rivalry with China, Russia and other authoritarian states’, Latin America has become one of the arenas in which this strategic dispute plays out. However, on the global map of priorities, Latin America remains geostrategically secondary for Washington compared to regional hotspots in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific (White House 2021). The United States has historically posited a strategy of strategic denial to extra-regional competitors, from European colonialist powers in the nineteenth century to Russia during the Cold War (Berg and Brands 2021). Over the last decade, there has been a discussion about the role of China and Russia in the region. The main question concerns whether there is (or is not) a hegemonic challenge from these great powers. Although there are several signs that would suggest that Latin America is undergoing a transition towards it, the intensity of the challenge is still low. At least the challenge does not seem to be frontal or military, but rather geoeconomic. In any case, China’s growing geo-economic presence throughout the continent can be seen as the introduction of a series of chapters as global dynamics intensify, while Russian assertiveness in the region generates concern. This type of behavior generates fear in Washington in the past because such “potential hegemons not only because they might grow powerful enough to roam into the Western Hemisphere but also because that would make it harder for Washington to project power globally” (Mearsheimer 2021). There is no doubt that the United States is a major global player in the South Atlantic. On the Atlantic side, it is the main foreign investor and the second largest trading partner after China, in addition to having a very broad cooperation agenda ranging from the educational field with the Fulbright scholarships to the technological field with joint projects in the space field with Argentina and Brazil. Finally, it is important to note that both Argentina and Brazil are extra-NATO allies since 1997 and 2019, respectively. Although Washington has no facilities in the maritime area— beyond the logistical use of the Ascension Island facilities—, the South Atlantic is perceived as important for maintaining hemispheric stability. In this context, the Pentagon concentrates its efforts on the military and naval dimension, which plays an increasingly important role in the regional vision of the United States (Tokatlian 2008). In that sense, the Southern Command, one of the eleven commands of the Department of Defense, plays a fundamental role. The Southern Command has its origins in 1903 when Marines were deployed to protect

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the construction of the Panama Canal, where it was headquartered until 1999 when it moved to Miami. The current structure derives from a resolution taken in 1947 in which it was named “Caribbean Command”. The current name dates back to 1963 and it has undergone several reforms throughout its history. One of the most important was in 1997—implemented in 1999—when its scope of action was extended to the sea and the Caribbean islands, increasing its role in the fight against drugs in the maritime domain. The Southern Command has 3 AORs (areas of responsibility): (a) the territory of all of Latin America except Mexico; (b) waters adjacent to Central and South America1 ; and (c) Caribbean Sea. In this context, it includes the portion of the Southwest Atlantic Ocean, while the Southeast sector corresponds to another of the combatant commands, AFRICOM. In general terms, the mission of the Southern Command is to conduct military operations and promote security cooperation to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. This command is comprised of a number of components and units. The 6th U.S. Army, 12th Air Forces Southern, Naval Forces Command South (or 4th Fleet), Marine Corps Forces South and Special Operations Command South. It also has three specialized task forces: Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-Bravo), Joint Task Force Guantanamo—based in Guantanamo, Cuba—(JTF-Guantanamo) and Interagency Task Force South whose main task is to identify, detect and monitor illicit drug trafficking in the air and maritime domains. Despite being under the orbit of the Pentagon, the Command’s agenda has been focused on areas related to training, horizontal cooperation, and direct military participation in the fight against new threats. The central mission of the Southern Command is to protect the country, ensuring a forward defense from threats emanating from the South.2 Despite its growing importance, SOUTHCOM is relatively small 1 Since the US does not recognize the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it does not accept the 200 miles, let alone the last extension of 350 miles of the littoral countries. Thus, the U.S. defends the principle of freedom of navigation and arrogates to itself the right to conduct freedom of navigation in EEZs of the states in the region, such as the cases of the operations carried out in Mar Argentino in 2014 and 2015. 2 The strategic goals are linked to preserving security, promoting stability, enabling prosperity and transforming SOUTHCOM itself to be a joint interagency organization (USSOUTHCOM Strategy 2016). The security concept goes hand in hand with protecting the region from “multidimensional” threats and radical populist regimes that

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in terms of both personnel and budget allocation compared to the Pentagon machine (Cook 2004: 139). In budgetary terms SOUTHCOM has received a budget that has varied between USD 185 and 200 million between 2011 and 2019, while it has had less resource allocation than the average of the rest of the geographic combatant commands (Mijares 2020: 18). However, it is the agency that has the most employees working on Latin America compared to the various Departments in Washington (State, Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury and Defense), with around 1200 civilian and military personnel, a figure that has remained constant over the last two decades (Tokatlian 2004: 9; SOUTHCOM 2021). From the point of view of surveillance and presence capabilities, it has a prominent place. According to Battaglino (2009: 36), the command has “17 radar installations (mainly in Colombia and Peru), three Cooperative Security Facilities (or CSLs in Aruba, Curaçau and Comalapa, El Salvador) and two Military Bases (Guantánamo, Cuba and Soto Cano, Honduras)”. None of them in the South Atlantic. Another fact to consider is that, although in recent years emphasis has been placed on the growing presence of China, Russia and Iran in the region as the main threats, its operational agenda has been focused primarily on the fight against drug trafficking and interdiction operations against drug shipments according to the SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral Faller’s testimony (2021: 14–19) before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2021. Southern Command’s role includes a broad regional presence including “defense cooperation offices, defense representation offices, military defense advisory groups, defense coordination offices” in parallel with the implementation of “75 of the 107 global military assistance programs operating in Latin America” (Tokatlian 2018). Regarding the naval section, the US Navy Southern Command (USNAVSO) was founded in 2000 with headquarters in Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, and later moved in 2004 to Mayport Naval Station, Florida. Its tasks since then have included military exercises, port visits, protocol events and humanitarian aid. However, a key change occurred on April 24, 2008 when the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, announced the re-commissioning of the IV Fleet as of July 1 under Admiral Joseph D. Kernan. interfere with the spread of republican values and introduce serious inconveniences to the democratic life of “freedom-friendly” countries.

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The IV Fleet was born in March 1943 with the idea of avoiding the German presence in the South Atlantic and to combat threats to the free circulation of hemispheric commerce. One of the air control bases was located in Natal (Brazil), due to the alliance they forged during World War II. The closure of the IV Fleet in 1950 was due to the end of regional tensions along with an increased role of the Second Fleet which eventually took over responsibility for the area. According to the Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, announcement of the reestablishment of the IV Fleet was made under the justification that this decision is a result of the “enormous importance of maritime security in the southern region of the Western Hemisphere and indicates our interest in and support for civil and military maritime services in Central and South America (…) our maritime strategy elevates the importance of collaboration with international partners such as foundation of global maritime security. This shift increases our focus in the region to use navies to build trust between countries through collective maritime security initiatives that focus on common threats and mutual interests” (SOUTHCOM 2008). As soon as its implementation was announced, the commander of the Southern Command’s naval forces, then Rear Admiral James Stevenson, said that it served to send a message to the entire region and not only to Venezuela. Another of the circumstances that prompted the rebirth of the IV Fleet was the need to include a specific force for practical issues that were being developed by the USNAVSO, such as the UNITAS exercises, Teamwork South (with Chile), Silent Force Exercise (biannually with Peru), UNITAS (annual within the framework of TIAR), New Horizons (humanitarian) and the Panamax programs (to avoid threats in the Panama Canal), support in humanitarian matters and training operations and the fight against drug trafficking. More than a decade after the creation of the IV Fleet, the greatest innovation of the U.S. Atlantic projection has been the U.S. Coast Guard approach to the region within the framework of the fight against IUU fishing focused on the role of the Chinese global fleet fishing vessels. Coast Guard vessel Stone conducted Operation Southern Cross in which it visited Guyana, Brazil and Uruguay in early 2021, while canceling the visit to Argentina due to disagreements with local authorities. A month later, Buenos Aires protested the collaboration of the nuclear attack submarine USS Greeneville with a British aircraft in the South Atlantic, thus presenting a challenge to the “peace zone” of the South Atlantic.

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Beyond the sustained presence and its hemispheric vocation, the Southwest South Atlantic does not seem to be the central priority for the Southern Command apart from monitoring the actions of extra-regional powers, the surveillance of non-traditional threats and the relations of littoral countries with competitors external to the United States such as China and Russia or states considered a threat to U.S. security agencies such as Iran. In the southeastern space, the U.S. presence has been increasing following the creation of the AFRICOM geographic command. The primary cooperative program in the maritime domain has been the Africa Partnership Station which seeks to enhance capabilities with partner naval forces to improve the maritime security environment. This program consists of a series of ship visits to African ports with multiple objectives such as search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and maritime training. Other relevant programs are the Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) focused on transnational maritime threats, joint exercises such as Obangame Express, Saharan Express or Operation Guinex—with the participation of Brazil— conducted in the vicinity of the Gulf of Guinea with participation of local and extra-regional partners, or cooperation against terrorism, especially in the Sahel area (Seabra 2013: 209–210). Finally, a recent concern is the possibility of China establishing a naval base in West Africa. In late 2021 an alleged Chinese quest to establish a naval facility in Equatorial Guinea was publicized, which would be the first permanent base in the South Atlantic by an extra-regional power since the Soviet presence in the Cold War. The agreement was denied by the African country’s authorities, while in February 2022 a high-level U.S. delegation visited President Teodoro Obiang Nguema. According to the Department of Defense’s annual tracking document on Chinese military activities, Angola would be another location where the PLAN would seek to generate an access agreement for its naval forces (DoD 2021: 131).

8.3

Increasing Projection: China

Beijing is not just an Asian regional power but a global player with growing overseas maritime interests, including the South Atlantic (Abdenur and Neto 2013; Duarte and Ferreira Pereira 2023). The expansion of its international trade and foreign direct investments in Africa and Latin America requires the protection of increasingly distant (and

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dangerous) sea lines of communication, while its oceanic fishing fleet expands around the world with a logistical capacity superior to that of PLAN. The irruption of state and non-state actions of Chinese interests in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa has generated multiple reactions on the multidimensional scope of a growing interaction. Among experts on Sino-Latin American relations, there is a consensus that the Chinese emergence in Latin America was driven by the growth of its economy and its impact on commodity prices and quantities (Gallagher 2016; Gil and Aguilera Castillo 2017). However, in the face of China’s rise, three overlapping perceptions have developed in Latin America and the Caribbean that consider the Asian country “1) as an economic partner, with disparate perceptions, among which risk perceptions predominate; 2) as a state model of development and economic and social modernization, particularly based on the initial attunement between the Chinese government and the left and center-left governments of the region, and 3) as an eventual pillar in the construction of a new multipolar and non-hegemonic world order that, in essence, has made part of the autonomic narrative associated with postliberal regionalism” (Serbin 2016: 46). In addition, there are divergences on the consequences of Beijing’s economic and political expansion, which in certain pessimistic interpretations foresee the risk of the creation of an alternative zone of influence to that of the United States (Roett and Paz 2008), a narrative that has been gaining space among the most conservative sectors in Washington. In statistical terms, the growth of economic ties between Latin America and China has been exponential. Trade grew from almost USD 16 billion in 2001 to more than USD 450,000 in 2021, positioning it as the second trading partner in Latin America after the United States and surpassing the European Union by mid-decade (Xinhua 2019), in addition to being the first partner in South America. In the Southern Cone, the Asian country became Brazil’s main trading partner since 2009 and remains Argentina’s second partner. In terms of investments in Latin America, the accumulated stock exceeds USD 100 billion in the period 2005–2018, reaching an average of USD 17.6 billion annually in the period 2016–2018. More than 50% of stock is concentrated in Brazil, while Peru and Argentina received about 20% and 10% respectively (Timini and Sanchez-Albornoz 2019: 4). Due to the Chinese economy’s need for primary resources, the main investments were oriented towards the hydrocarbon and mineral sectors, with

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SINOPEC, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinochem Group, China Three Gorges Corporation and MMG Limited being the five companies that concentrated almost 30% of the investment stock between 2001 and 2016 (Fariza 2017). In addition to the important investments in the energy field—which in Brazil absorb 70% of the stock (Motta Veiga and Polónia Rios 2019)—, Chinese companies have tried—with different results—to develop infrastructure ventures that allow lowering commercial costs especially in terms of ports and waterways. In the Southern Cone, each of the countries can tell a similar story. In 2019, during the annual BRICS meeting, Xi Jinping announced one of the most important port investments in Brazil’s history, the modernization of the Port of São Luís in Maranhão by China Communications Construction Company and the Brazilian WPR—São Luís Gestão de Portos e Terminais —for a total of USD 1 billion. The same company—which in the past developed the Fourth Bridge over the Panama Canal, modernized the Port of Veracruz in Mendoza, the South Port in Brazil and the Port of Santiago in Cuba—and intended to participate in the dredging of the Paraná River waterway. In addition, the firm Shandong BaoMa together with the Uruguayan company CSI Ingenieros contemplated developing a port facility in Punta Yeguas including a free trade zone with port, shipyard and fish processing and freezing plant, which was finally cancelled in the midst of the COVID19 crisis. Economic ties were mirrored by political ties. High-level visits have flourished at all levels. Top Chinese leaders—Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping—have visited Latin America, as have top Latin American political leaders. As an example of the growing relationship, the China-CELAC Ministerial Forum was established, while several countries in the region participated in the “Silk Road Economic Belt” forum in 2017 and are non-regional members or candidates to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In the case of Argentina, there are more than 30 high-level visits that reflect a sustained political dialogue and good harmony, while Latin American received an increasing number of visits in the last two decades (Table 8.1). This is expressed, for example, in the Chinese diplomatic position in favor of Argentina’s claim over the Malvinas/Falklands and the South Atlantic Islands and the resumption of negotiations between Great Britain and Argentina. In relation to strategic and defense issues, ties are still timid but growing. Brazil held 29 high-level meetings with Chinese defense and

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Table 8.1 High-level visits (only President and PM) of the People’s Republic of China to Latin America (2000–2020) Year

Visit

Countries

2001 2003 2004 2008 2010 2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018 2019

Jiang Zemin Zhu Rongji (PM) Hu Jintao Hu Jintao Hu Jintao Wen Jiabao (PM) Hu Jintao Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Li Keqiang (PM) Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Xi Jinping

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay, Venezuela Mexico Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba Costa Rica, Cuba, Peru Brazil Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay Mexico Costa Rica, México and Trinidad, Tobago Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru Chile, Ecuador, Peru Argentina Brazil

military officials and conducted three joint exercises receiving three visits from the Chinese Navy, while Argentina had high-level meetings 21 times between 2003 and 2016 (Allen, Saunders and Chen 2017: 63–64). Years earlier both countries were the subject of visits by the Naval Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in 1996 (Zhang Lianzhong) and 2002 (Shi Yunsheng). One of the overt expressions of Chinese influence in the region has been its increasingly regular appearances. As Abdenur and Neto (2013: 184–185) state, “at times, its soft power units are linked to military initiatives”. For example, China sent the Chinese hospital ship Daishan Dao (also called the ‘Peace Ark’) in 2011 “on a ‘goodwill visit’ to the Caribbean, docking in the ports of Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Costa Rica, where the crew provided free medical assistance and collaborated with local medical personnel.” On other occasions, the presence involved not only humanitarian aid but ‘flag demonstration’ actions. In 2013, three ships of the PLAN South Sea Fleet—Missile Destroyer Lanzhou, Missile Frigate Liuzhou, and the logistics ship Poyanghu—crossed the Strait of Magellan visiting Chile, Argentina and Brazil for the first time (Allen 2016). During their passage through the port of Buenos Aires, the visit was characterized as ‘protocolary’, while Rear Admiral Li Xiaoyan (Deputy Chief of Staff of China’s South Sea Fleet) was received by the Argentine Minister of Defense,

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Agustin Rossi (La Nacion 2013). On its arrival in Rio de Janeiro, the Chinese contingent conducted joint exercises with the Brazilian Navy. Two years later, the hydroceanographic vessel Zhu Kezhen (872) visited the Port of Salvador (Marinha do Brasil 2015). Last—and not least— China chose Argentina as the country to place a Far Space Station in the town of Bajada del Agrio, Neuquén as part of a space cooperation program, which generated an important political discussion between Cristina Kirchner’s government and the opposition due to the scope of the program. However, the government of the Cambiemos coalition led by Mauricio Macri only incorporated a clause to the agreement clarifying the non-military use. Years later, in a presentation to the U.S. Congress, Southern Command Chief Craig Faller stated that, “Beijing may be violating the terms of its agreement with Argentina that it will conduct (at the lunar base) civilian activities and may have the capability to potentially monitor and target U.S. targets, its allies and partners in space activities” (Niebieskikwiat 2019). Along these lines, in recent years a new recurring concern has begun to appear regarding perceptions of strategic risk and the potential hegemonic challenge to the United States. On the one hand, Gonzalo Paz (2012) states that China considers the region to be an area of U.S. influence, which is why certain sensitive issues in the region are often part of informal conversations with U.S. officials. With a more critical view, Evan Ellis (2018) presents the Chinese strategy in the region as one of the pieces of the ‘soft’ hegemonic challenge to the United States in which there are a series of direct and indirect effects on hemispheric security. Among them are changes in port and transportation infrastructure, the expansion of trans-Pacific criminal activity, the participation of Chinese-owned companies as local actors, the expansion of conflict situations within Chinese overseas communities, changes in the distribution of incentives in intra-Latin American relations, the extension of the life of ‘populist’ regimes, the arrival of a new actor for arms sales, the growth of military cooperation in education and training. Finally, a potential expansion of military presence in the region with the establishment of military bases or the establishment of political alliances with an anti-U.S. character would derive in a clear signal of threat towards the United States (Ellis 2015b). As stated by Mearsheimer, a potential establishment of a large Chinese naval base in Argentina could be an eventual target in an armed conflict (Dario 2020).

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Given China’s growing global interests, the South Atlantic is no stranger to its economic expansion, especially on the African flank. If China has advanced considerably in Latin America, its status in Africa is— at least—similar to the great powers that have traditionally been involved in the dynamics of the African continent. From a trade point of view, China is the main trading partner with an approximate value of USD 254 billion in 2021, its main partners being South Africa, Nigeria and Angola. Investments have exceeded USD 2 billion annually since 2010, surpassing USD 5 billion in 2018. The main recipients have been South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Zambia and Ethiopia, and the areas of interest replicate the Latin American case (energy and minerals), in addition to large infrastructure works from sports stadiums to dams (China Africa Initiative 2020). Despite growing criticism of the extractivism, relations with African leaders tend to be optimal both bilaterally and multilaterally. In the latter case, the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation was established in 2000 and usually brings together the Heads of State and Government of almost all African countries with Chinese leadership. Military cooperation is also growing. Africa accounts for about 11% of total Chinese military diplomacy actions, compared to almost 8% for South America. Major West Coast partners include South Africa (with 32 interactions including 5 port visits and 2 joint exercises), Namibia (14 high-level visits, one port visit and one joint exercise), Angola (10 meetings, 2 military exercises and one naval visit) and Nigeria (two exercises and one maritime visit) (Allen, Saunders and Chen 2017: 46). China is also a major player in peacekeeping operations in the region. If in 2000 the number of men deployed did not reach 100, by the end of 2019 that figure reached 2500 troops. Among the main missions in which Beijing has participated in Africa are the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Sudan, in addition to sending troops to Cambodia and Lebanon. Its commitments to sustain regional stability and security have gone hand in hand with a growth in its sales of military equipment, especially to major oil-producing countries. During the 2000s, Chinese defense products began to reach the continent. According to Volman (2009: 10) until 2010 “Sudan has received F-6 and F-7 fighter aircraft, T-62 light tanks, anti-aircraft systems, trucks, and other weapons. Zimbabwe has received at least nine J-7 fighter aircraft, six K-8 trainer aircraft, 10T-69 tanks, 30T-59 tanks, and as many

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as 100T-63 armored transport vehicles. Angola has ordered eight Su77 fighter aircraft. China sold over $1 billion worth of sophisticated weaponry to Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000—including Su-77 fighter aircraft for Ethiopia—in violation of the U.N. arms embargo imposed during the bloody border war between the two countries. China has also supplied military equipment to Algeria, Zambia, Namibia, and Mauritania, including C-802 ship-to-ship missiles for Algeria as well as K8 trainer aircraft for Zambia (which received eight) and Namibia (which received four).” The trend continued into the second decade of the twenty-first century, adding new customers such as Cameroon, Cote d’Ivore, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Senegal. In the case of Namibia, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivore, Ghana and Sierra Leone, China sold different types of patrol vessels (mainly Type 62 and Type 37) (SIPRI 2020). Within defense interests, the maritime factor appears to be key given the extent of commercial and logistical interests. Although so far, the PLAN does not have a leased naval facility in West Africa as it does in Djibouti, it has generally used foreign ports in countries with good bilateral relations to develop its operations in the South Atlantic. It has generally used foreign ports of countries with good bilateral relations to develop its operations in the South Atlantic, especially the South African port of Cape Town (South Africa) which in period 2014–2018 was visited six times (Martinson 2019a: 23). An interesting element—unlike the rest of the powers—is that Chinese naval diplomacy does not usually establish formal agreements to carry out visits, although such behavior is likely to be modified in view of the need to affirm alliances and carry out joint anti-piracy actions. Beijing’s maritime interests in West Africa are striking, both for the number of investments in the port sector and the presence of a massive fleet of fishing vessels, as well as for the growing deployment of naval means. On the one hand, according to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Chinese companies have a presence in 46 African ports either through their financing, construction or operational management. Of that number, 28 are on the Atlantic coast of which Chinese companies operate six in ports in the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria, Togo, Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone (Devermont 2019). In addition, China (along with Taiwan) is the largest fleet in the South Atlantic, followed by Japan, South Korea and Spain according to a study

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by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on the use of the Automatic Indentification System ( AIS)3 (Taconet et al. 2019: 36). The same report clarifies that in the Southwest Atlantic, China and Taiwan have the largest fleet of squid jigger fishing vessels4 in the region and the second in the use of AIS, after Argentina. In addition to poteros, the Chinese fleet includes drifting longlines5 and fishing trawler6 accounting for more than 300 fishing vessels using AIS (Taconet et al. 2019: 204). In the case of West Africa, the figures are contradictory. China extracts most of its production from that area, but it does not appear as one of the most important fishing fleets. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, not all vessels tend to use AIS as they tend to be less sophisticated than those fishing in the South Atlantic. Secondly, China uses a system of fishing cooperatives with African countries that allows them local logistical support and therefore they have less need to use AIS. The state-owned China National Fisheries Corporation (CNFC) is the main operator of the distant water fleet. Chinese catches in such waters would have already reached 2 million tons in 2016, accounting for 13% of total fishery production (Huihui and Shuolin 2021: 28). By 2017, the Chinese fishing fleet had nearly one million vessels totaling an annual catch of almost 10 million tons in external waters according to the Sea Around Us database (2020). Of this huge figure, the offshore fishing fleet would count around 3000 vessels. The fishing fleet seems to be more than five times larger with 16,966 vessels identified in FishSpektrum Krakken, the world’s largest database on fishing vessels (Gutiérrez and Jobbins 2020). On the other hand, by analyzing the presence of Chinese fishing vessels globally and information on the annual catch by vessel type, the unofficial catch of the global fleet is estimated at 4.6 million tons, of which 2.9 million would correspond to West Africa and only 0.18 million to South and Central America (Pauly et al. 2014).

3 This system is mostly used on motorized vessels and generally larger than 12 meters in size. 4 Vessels with strong lighting to attract schools of squid (squid) that are then caught with lines that have a kind of hook called potera. 5 Vessel with hook lines that are connected to the main line generally used to catch tuna. 6 Fishing vessel with trawl net.

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Undoubtedly, the economic component of China’s expansion in West Africa has more complex ramifications involving Chinese naval projection. The large presence of Chinese fishing vessels in West Africa and especially in the Gulf of Guinea has had two unintended consequences. First, the existence of frictions with some of the neighboring countries for illegal fishing. In one of the most resonant cases, in 2017 eight Chinese fishing vessels were detained by inspectors from Guinea, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bisseau with support from Greenpeace, who also fined the companies and arrested the sailors (Africa News 2017). Not only neighboring countries, but also European countries and non-governmental organizations have raised their voices about the intensive use of the saiko fishing mode7 among other accusations of IUU fishing (China House 2019). This type of incidents also happened on the Argentine coast where Prefectura Nacional sank a vessel in 2016 that was carrying out illegal fishing and in 2020 detained a vessel of Chinese origin. Second, incidents of piracy against Chinese assets and citizens have increased in recent years. The response has been two-pronged. On the one hand, China has deepened maritime security cooperation ties with countries in the Gulf of Guinea region by implementing multiple mechanisms from high-level meetings to cooperation aimed at training anti-piracy capabilities. Beijing has expressed its concern over the Gulf of Guinea piracy issue both in multilateral fora and in bilateral meetings with African countries. On the other hand, the Chinese Navy has progressively begun to deploy its assets to participate in Djibouti-based counter-piracy operations from the Horn of Africa to West Africa, in addition to conducting expressions of naval diplomacy. Between 2014 and 2018, on four occasions the PLAN Escort Task Force (16ta , 22da , 27ma , and 28va ) sailed the waters off the West African coast, in addition to visiting multiple local ports. On two occasions—Task Force 174 (2017) and 171 (2018)—counter-piracy and counter-terrorism drills were conducted (Martinson 2019a: 20–22). In the case of Task Force 174, it additionally conducted missile strike exercises at an unspecified Atlantic Ocean location (Martinson 2019b). A year before the first exercise, Major General Qian Lihua had announced at an international forum, China’s willingness to join the international effort against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea by assisting littoral states in the 7 This modality refers to an illegal practice in Ghana whereby industrial trawlers transfer unwanted fish to small-scale fishermen, limiting the sale to local communities for profit.

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region to improve their infrastructure (Jianing 2016). Other examples include the visit of the Oceanographic Vessel ‘Zhu Kezhen’ to the port of Salvador (Brazil) and Cape Town (South Africa) as part of a research mission around the world; the voyage of the hospital ship ‘Daishan Dao’ (Ark of Peace) that would later visit the Caribbean Sea and Latin American ports in the Pacific Ocean (Martinson 2019a: 20); and China’s participation took part in Naval Exercise Mosi together with the Russian Federation and South Africa, the first trilateral exercise between these powers in the South Atlantic Ocean. Undoubtedly, since the Xi Jinping’s arrival to power in 2013, there has been an acceleration of the Chinese presence in the South Atlantic, especially in its naval aspect. The Chinese Navy, year after year, has deployed means in the African coast for various reasons, although it is clearly an expression of the strategic growth towards distant waters. In the case of the Southwest Atlantic the presence is less intense, but no less relevant given the importance in terms of fishing resources both in Western Africa and close to the mile 200 of the Argentine Sea.

8.4

Selective Projection: Russian Federation

Within the design of Russian foreign policy, both Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa are presented as secondary and peripheral regions, although they are important for measuring their degree of global influence. For example, within the section on ‘Regional Foreign Policy Priorities’ of the latest Foreign Policy Concept document (2016), Latin America ranks second to last followed only by the African continent. That document highlights the growing role of the Latin American region in global affairs, the importance of strengthening bilateral and multilateral ties with the entire spectrum of regional organizations. In the case of Africa, it adds Russia’s contribution to the prevention of regional conflicts and crisis situations, as well as the promotion of partnership ties with the African Union. Perceptions of the two regions diverge. In relation to Latin America, geographical distance, limited trade links and the hemispheric hegemony of the United States are presented as the main obstacles. In any case, despite the low place on its agenda, Russia is still one of the main extraregional actors in Latin America both because of its links inherited from the Soviet legacy and because of the activism developed in the Putin era. In the African case, given that there is no regional hegemon, Russia’s

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main concerns are linked to the search for reliable partners and regional stability in an environment of competition with traditional powers— France, England and the United States—and emerging ones, especially China, India and Brazil. Historically, preferential access to Angolan ports and fishing agreements with Argentina during the 1980s marked the peak of an active USSR presence in the South Atlantic, which was followed by a retraction in the early 1990s after the demise of the Soviet Union. Following the withdrawal of economic support to its main communist-era partners—Angola, Cuba and Nicaragua—the return of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa to the Russian radar came timidly in the second half of the 1990s under then Foreign Minister Evgeni Primakov and his multipolar vision. The Chancellor saw the region as a potential ally in the struggle for a multipolar world, while Russia’s status as a great power gave it a natural projection with all regions of the world (Blank 2009: 8). Subsequently, the critical position of the Rio Group in the 1999 Kosovo crisis that was well received in the Kremlin (Jeifets 2015: 92), the arrival of the Putin administration with a new activism in international affairs and the opposing position of most Latin American and sub-Saharan countries to the US invasion of Iraq impacted positively on diplomatic ties both at the bilateral and multilateral levels. In general terms, the Putin era was characterized by promoting a cooperation agenda based on pragmatism with most of the countries of the Atlantic coast. To this end, two approaches were pursued. On the one hand, Moscow strove to repair historical relations with Soviet-era partners by updating the agenda focused on economic issues. On the other hand, it expanded its diplomatic, trade and investment presence in countries traditionally reluctant to establish close ties with Moscow given their preferential relationship with the United States, such as Brazil and South Africa. With Putin’s arrival, three elements intrinsic to the region contributed to Moscow’s growing interest in the region. First, the position of the main countries in the region against the invasion of Iraq, which signaled a degree of relational autonomy with respect to the United States. Secondly, a certain ideological affinity based on anti-Americanism with the countries of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) led by Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and seconded by leaders such as Rafael Correa in Ecuador or Evo Morales in Bolivia. Finally, as Rouvinski (2017: 3) states,

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the expectation of achieving “tangible mutual political benefits and some economic benefits for both Russia and its Latin American partners.” Despite pragmatism, Moscow did not leave aside the strategic equation involving a game of tic-tac-toe with the United States, especially in circumstances of heightened global tensions, frequent since the RussianGeorgian crisis of August 2008 (González Levaggi 2019). The bulk of the effort was focused north of the South Atlantic, particularly in the Caribbean Sea. Unlike China, Russian interests in the second decade of Putinist political hegemony did not privilege the agenda of trade cooperation but have focused their concerns on high political issues related to geopolitical dynamics with the West and the sale of war material, thus weakening the initial pragmatism. The clear case of the choice of a strategic-military partner is Venezuela. In the 2005–2010 period alone, Moscow and Caracas signed more than 40 arms deals totaling about USD 11 billion, one of the largest sums in the region since the end of the Cold War. Among the main purchases, the license to produce 100,000 AK-103 assault rifles—whose production was held up for more than a decade—, 24 Su-30MK2 multipurpose fighter jets, S-300VM, Pantsir-C1 and S-125-2M anti-aircraft defense system, in addition to dozens of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and multiple models of attack, transport and multipurpose helicopters stand out (Barabanov 2008: 22–23). In the Southwest Atlantic, Russia has lost weight in recent years especially due to the special Brazilian-US relationship which ended up affecting the sale of sophisticated Pantsir-C1 anti-aircraft defense systems, although for a decade it achieved agreements that allowed it to sell Mi-35, Mi-171 and Ka-62 transport helicopters, in addition to Igla-S short-range anti-aircraft missiles and anti-tank missiles (Ionescu 2018). In the case of Argentina, in view of the fire of the icebreaker ARA Irizar, it was decided to lease for a series of seasons the Golvin Antarctic Vessel, in addition to purchasing MI-171E heavy multipurpose helicopters for the Antarctic campaign. On the African side, the presence of Rosoboronexport8 has been felt since 2010 with contracts for the sale of the Su-30SM multirole fighter to Angola; transport helicopters to Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal; Mi-35M combat helicopters to Nigeria and Cameroon (together with Mi-17) for the fight against 8 Official agency of the Russian Federation in charge of export and import of defenserelated products, technologies and services.

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terrorism, in addition to the sale of the Kondor-E reconnaissance satellite to South Africa, among others (SIPRI 2020). Despite the wide range of products purchased, Russia has not placed significant sales in the maritime area either in Sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America. Another key element in understanding Russia’s overseas projection is its strategic deployment in an area close to the South Atlantic, the Caribbean Sea. In November 2008, a squadron of Russian ships was sent to the Western Hemisphere. These vessels participated in joint exercises with Venezuela and two Russian Tu-160 strategic bombers landed in Venezuela. In this regard “These activities were significant for at least three reasons: for the first time since the end of the Cold War, Russian bombers had landed in the western hemisphere, it was the first time the Russian navy had taken part in surface operations in the region and it was the first time since the Second World War that a Russian warship had sailed through the Panama Canal. Similar activities took place in April 2013 during a ‘friendly visit’ to Nicaragua. Since 2008, Russian ships have regularly called in to Havana” (Jeifets et al. 2018: 16). Tu-160s revisited Venezuela in 2013 (where it was also deployed to Nicaragua) and 2018, while naval visits were repeated in 2014 and 2018 with the visit to Cuba of the intelligence vessel Viktor Leonov, in addition to the arrival in the region of the circumnavigation of the Russian frigate Admiral Gorshkov—the first by a military vessel since the end of the Cold War—together with the multifunctional logistics ship Elbrus, the oil tanker Kama and the heavy ocean-going tug Nikolay Chiker that visited Ecuador’s Bolivar Port and the Port of Havana. Finally, in view of the growing tensions between the United States and Venezuela, rumors arose of a possible Russian military base on the island of La Orchila, something that was later denied by the Russian ambassador in Venezuela, Vladimir Zaemskiy given that the Venezuelan Constitution forbids it (Informe21 2019). The great catalyst for strategic ties between Russia and the region will be the geopolitical tensions in Eurasia, the 2008 Georgian conflict and the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Latin America is presented as a space in which Russia disputes spaces with the US—as Washington implements in the post-Soviet space—in which various tools are used to increase influence in the US ‘backyard’ (Blank 2009: 5–6). Russia has implemented a ‘mirror game’ with Washington by trying to discomfit US and NATO policies in the post-Soviet area with more assertive political and military actions in the Western Hemisphere. Since Latin America is perceived in Moscow as

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the ‘near abroad’ of the US and in view of the measures implemented by the US in its zone of influence, Russia began to deepen its ties. The decision was expressed in a series of high-level visits (Table 8.2), the expansion of military cooperation with the development of military exercises and the expansion of multilateral cooperation both within the framework of the United Nations and the BRICS. Table 8.2 High-Level Visits of the Russian Federation to Latin America (1996– 2023) (adapted and updated from Rouvinski 2020: 6) Year

Visit

Countries

1996

Yevgeny Primakov (MFA) Yevgeny Primakov (MFA) Igor Ivanov (MFA) Vladimir Putin (P) Igor Ivanov (MFA)

Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela

1997 1999 2000

2004 2005 2007 2008 2010

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018 2019

2020 2023

Vladimir Putin (P) Sergei Lavrov (MFA) Sergei Lavrov (MFA) Vladimir Putin (P) Dmitri Medvedev (P) Sergei Lavrov (MFA) Dmitri Medvedev (P) Vladimir Putin (PM) Sergei Lavrov (MFA) Sergei Lavrov (MFA) Vladimir Putin (P) Sergei Lavrov (MFA) Vladimir Putin (P) Sergei Lavrov (MFA) Sergei Lavrov (MFA) Vladimir Putin (P) Vladimir Putin (P) Vladimir Putin (P) Sergei Lavrov (MFA) Dmitri Medvedev (PM) Sergei Lavrov (MFA) Sergei Lavrov (MFA)

Colombia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Brazil Cuba Cuba Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela Mexico, Chile Chile Mexico Guatemala Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba Colombia, Peru Argentina, Brazil Venezuela Mexico, Nicaragua, Cuba, Guatemala Venezuela Mexico Venezuela Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil Cuba, Nicaragua, Chile, Peru Cuba, Colombia, Nicaragua, Guatemala Peru Argentina Brazil Cuba, Brazil, Suriname Cuba Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua

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Since the mid-2010s, Russian regional influence has declined in the region due to changes in the three factors that had made the region attractive. Latin America shifted towards liberal governments with greater affinity to US interests and Venezuela entered a process of socio-economic collapse and authoritarian drift, while expectations of economic and political benefits were diluted. Russia continued with a pragmatic approach, although the weight of priority partners—Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba—detracted from its regional agency. Russian interests in Latin America and the Caribbean found themselves in a cycle of difficulties due to the extensive involvement in the Venezuelan crisis. The witness case of the limits of the Russian regional agency was the Venezuelan institutional crisis. In the face of the Trump administration’s surprise recognition of Juan Guaidó as president-in-charge of Venezuela, Russia continued to sustain support for the government of Nicolás Maduro. Putin not only directly criticized Guaidó for his actions, but also facilitated a Maduro’s state visit to Moscow in September 2019, continued with the business plan of Russian companies in the energy area and sent military advisors to put into operation the S-300 anti-aircraft missile defense systems, among other actions. In view of such actions, the countries of the region take into consideration the active Russian policy in Caracas, generally limiting their interactions so as not to affect their relations with the U.S. Finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has generated a strong loss of influence by Moscow in political, economic, and communicational terms, although movements tending to strengthen its military presence in the region in the near future cannot be ruled out as Russian-U.S. tensions continue at the highest levels since the end of the Cold War. Facing the War in Ukraine, most of the Latin American since countries condemned the Russian invasion at multilateral organizations although neither sided with Western sanctions against Moscow nor they interrupted their relations with Putin’s Russia (González Levaggi 2022). Only year after the conflict the MFA Lavrov undertook a trip to the region to contain regional uneasiness with Moscow. While there were no visits of such caliber in the South Atlantic as in the Caribbean Sea, there were in the African sector. In this regard, the Russian Navy has made visits to Angola, Equatorial Guinea and South Africa, a country with which it shares membership in the BRICS and has carried out together with China a naval exercise in waters near Cape Town (Panda 2019).

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In addition to 19 military agreements with African countries signed between 2014 and 2018—most notably Angola and Nigeria—, Russia has pushed for joint exercises with foreign naval powers as well as local partners in the Gulf of Guinea to combat piracy in the region where there have been serious incidents involving Russian nationals. In addition, Moscow signed an agreement with the government of Equatorial Guinea in 2018 to conduct joint naval visits and exercises, concretizing a visit to the capital Malabo in 2019 with the Slava Marshal Ustinov-class Missile Cruiser en route to joint exercises in South Africa. In the general framework of the South Atlantic, most of its maritime projection is in the eastern sector, due to concerns about piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as historical relations with Angola, which to this day are maintained with the sale of military equipment and investment in hydrocarbon resources. Russian companies—many of them stateowned—have large investments exceeding the stock of USD 10 billion, among which Gazprom’s investments in the energy sector in Angola, Nigeria and Namibia stand out, in addition to Rosatom—with active projects in South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana—and Sintez, among others. Exploration and production of precious metals from diamonds and gold to platinum in southern Africa is complemented by investment projects in strategic materials such as uranium, chromium and nickel (Ger˝ ocs 2019: 13). Russia has investments in the western sector of the Atlantic, albeit on a smaller scale. Among the most important cases of Russian investments in Argentina are Energomachexport (turbines and hydroelectric dams) Transmashholding (Railways) and Techmashexport (anti-hail), while investments in the energy (Gazprom) and atomic (Rosatom) areas are still pending (Caruso 2010). In the case of Brazil, despite being its main trading partner in Latin America, there are no major investments. However, in recent years, the technological-spatial linkage has flourished with the installation of ground stations of the Russian GLONASS global positioning system administered by the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos), which by 2020 already had five units of non-request measuring stations located in Recife, Santa Maria, Rio de Janeiro (2) and Belem. Other GLONASS ground bases in the region are located in Cuba and Nicaragua. Finally, it is important to take into consideration Russia’s SouthAtlantic projection which directly refers to Argentine interests. In general terms, Moscow’s strategic calculation of U.S. hegemony and the prudence

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of Argentine decision-makers in relation to assuming excessive commitments with extra-regional powers structurally limits Moscow’s actions. However, there are a number of worthwhile exceptions. First, Russia has a favorable position on the sovereign claim of the Argentine Republic over the Malvinas/Falklands and Atlantic Islands and support for direct negotiations between Great Britain and Argentina. The position has been reflected in bilateral meetings such as in the state visit of President Vladimir Putin to Argentina in July 2014, both in the framework of the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization and in the G77 + China, among other international forums. Secondly, in the face of the disappearance of the ARA San Juan, the Kremlin chose to offer its cooperation with the search and rescue operations for the submarine. In a high-level conversation held between Vladimir Putin and Mauricio Macri, the Russian President offered collaboration. The help was accepted, and Russia sent the research vessel Yantar, which ended up being the vessel with the longest stay during the search for the ARA San Juan.

8.5

Limited Projection: India

Unlike Russia and China, India is not a major extra-regional player in the South Atlantic, although its presence has grown in both Latin America and Africa as expressed in the development of its regional policy initiatives, high-level visits, and the establishment of quasi-regional forums. Both its aspirations to position itself as a global actor and a reference for the non-Western world and the Global South and its ambition to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council fostered an active diplomacy from New Delhi since the mid-2000s towards two key countries of the South Atlantic, Brazil and South Africa. The obvious example of this global vision has been the support for the creation of the IBSA Dialogue Forum in 2003 following the ‘Brasilia Declaration’ signed by Foreign Ministers Yashwant Sinha (India), Celso Amorim (Brazil) and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (South Africa) as an instance of high-level diplomatic dialogue. The causes of India’s strategy towards the IBSA triangle can be explained both by the need to maintain a flexible position with new partners in the post-Cold War world under hegemony and the importance of generating alliances for the construction of a multipolar world (Beri 2008: 811). Such an articulated vision to foster a more balanced world order will be shared—as we saw in the

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respective chapters—by China and Russia, in addition to their partners in the IBSA forum. The common interest in fostering an alter-hegemonic vision will later be condensed in the establishment of the BRICS group in 2009 and the subsequent entry of South Africa in 2010. The BRICS have contributed to the creation of new flexible coalitions of rising powers through institutional strategies especially at the multilateral level, proposing a kind of flexible multilateralism to achieve a greater voice and weight in global discussions (Abdenur and Neto 2013; Stuenkel 2015). With a distributive strategy that combines positions refractory to following the dictates of the great powers and bloc coalition proposals with narratives based on moral principles (Narlikar 2013: 608), both institutions present themselves as suitable platforms to globally project Indian interests, in addition to expressly stipulating preferential partners. Except for the case of its relations with China, all other countries have traditionally been receptive to Indian diplomacy. As players in the Global South, India is not far behind in terms of development compared to Latin American countries. On the contrary, both have a “long way to go to reach stages reached by other emerging and developed economies” (Caro Vargas 2014: 37). Although the links between the two were traditionally based on the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, from the 1990s onwards New Delhi began to look with greater interest at the region as a space for economic and trade opportunities. In this context, the Ministry of Commerce launched the FOCUS LAC program in 1997 that was extended until 2019 and through which multiple trade negotiations were promoted that concluded with trade preference agreements with MERCOSUR (operational since 2009) and Chile (signed in 2006) (Badri-Maharaj 2017: 31). In addition, India of raising common visions in new instances of multilateral cooperation such as the IBSA group, BRICS and the NAMA 11 Group within the framework of the World Trade Organization. Another element to take into account is the special relationship that New Delhi has with Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago due to the existence of communities of Indian origin as a result of forced migratory displacement in the era of colonialism, which has facilitated exchange at all levels. Two elements have been particularly important in the political linkage between India and the South American littoral countries. Firstly, India supports the resumption of negotiations to find a solution to the

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sovereignty dispute relating to the Malvinas/Falklands Islands Question in accordance with the resolutions of the UNGA and the Special Committee on Decolonization. Secondly, it has a position in line with Brasilia in relation to the reform of the UN Security Council where it aspires to obtain a permanent seat together with Brazil, Germany and Japan. Turning to economic concerns, one issue of concern to India that conditions its development is linked to energy resources, “diversification of import sources is at the heart of India’s energy diplomacy” (Krishnappa and Princy 2012: 287). The energy issue has prompted India to build new alliances or, alternatively, to re-establish old connections, as is the case with Russia and some African countries, such as South Africa. Likewise, Indian concerns about energy and food security have fostered relations with Latin American countries such as Brazil, especially in the import of biofuels such as ethanol. In general terms, the results of the India-Latin America linkage have been more than positive. In terms of trade, Latin America accounts for almost 4% of exports and 6% of imports, while total trade grew from USD 1.6 to almost 40 billion in the period 2001–2015 (MCI India 2020). In terms of investments with the Atlantic countries, the bulk is focused on the IT sector with major projects in Argentina and Uruguay, while Indian entrepreneurs have invested more than USD 1.5 billion in Brazil, while Brazilian entrepreneurs have USD 600 million (Heine and Viswanathan 2011). India’s relationship with Brazil is close and multifaceted, sharing common positions at the global level, as well as democratic values and a commitment to foster development. In defense matters, both countries signed an agreement in 2003 for cooperation in defense related matters, especially in the field of Research and Development, procurement and logistic support, military training and joint exercises. An institutionalized mechanism for defense cooperation is the Joint Defense Committee (JDC), so far six meetings have been held between the two sides, the last one, was held in February 2019 in Brasilia, where it was agreed to promote engagement between defense industries, training centers and military facilities of both countries (MoD India 2019). Despite these advances, the results in the defense industry have not been very auspicious. Except for the Indian purchase of three Embraer EMB-145s and the sale of Mahindra 4 × 4s to Argentina, there are no overly successful examples with the exception of the space area (BadriMaharaj 2017: 49) and a light weapons manufacturing deal. Regarding

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the latter, Brazilian firearms company Taurus Armas SA signed a contract with Jindal Defense (part of the OP Jindal Group) in January 2020 to produce and sell small arms in India. With an initial investment of USD 5 million, the agreement proposes to establish a plant in Hisar, India (Krishna 2020). With respect to space cooperation, New Delhi and Brasilia reached an agreement in July 2020 whereby the Indian Space Research Organization will launch the first Brazilian observation satellite Amazonia-1, in addition to agreeing to build a ground station to receive data from Indian satellites, something that has been going on for almost two decades with the existing infrastructure in Alcantara and Cuiaba (Siddiqui 2020). One area in which there have been difficulties is the multilateral articulation between India and Latin America. Despite attempts to establish an India-Latin America and Caribbean Dialogue Mechanism with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)—similar to the India-Africa Forum Summit—it failed after a couple of meetings (Chand 2014) (Table 8.3). In the case of Africa, greater geographical proximity, close historical ties and a higher density of interests have marked an extensive presence, especially on its southeastern coast. In the last two decades, India has gained space on the African continent. For example, New Delhi is the third largest trading partner after China and the United States, has 47 embassies (out of total 54 countries) of which 18 were approved for Table 8.3 High-level visits of the Republic of India to Latin America (2000–2020)

Year

Visit

Countries

2006 2008

PM Manmohan Singh President Pratibha Patil

2009

PM Manmohan Singh

2010 2012 2014 2016 2019

PM Manmohan Singh PM Manmohan Singh PM Narendra Modi PM Narendra Modi President Ram Kovind

2018 2019 2019

PM Narendra Modi PM Narendra Modi President Ram Kovind

Brazil Brazil, Mexico and Chile Trinidad and Tobago Brazil Brazil Brazil Mexico Suriname and Cuba Argentina Brazil Bolivia and Chile

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opening in 2019 and a cumulative investment stock overpassing USD 10 billion (Kurzydlowski 2020). The rapprochement with the continent was expressed in the organization of the India-Africa Summit Meeting organized three times (2008, 2011 and 2015). During a tour of Africa in 2018, Modi presented before the Ugandan Parliament ten guiding principles of the Indo-African partnership that include a priority commitment to Africa, associated development in trade, agriculture and technology, the fight against terrorism, in addition to “keeping the oceans open and free for the benefit of all nations”, among others (Viswanathan and Mishra 2019). In military matters, military diplomacy has followed an incremental logic by concentrating its relations with Nigeria and South Africa (Singh 2015: 210). While the strategic preference is on the East African shores, India has had a strategic partnership with South Africa since 1997 that is expressed in multiple fields, including naval. To begin with, a large community of Indian origin has been living in South Africa for more than a century, constituting about 3% of the total population (about 1.6 million) (MFA India 2019a). After the end of Apartheid, relations multiplied to every area of the agenda from a diversified investment portfolio reaching USD 4 billion—mainly in areas such as healthcare and pharmaceuticals, IT, automobile industry and finance—to bilateral naval cooperation in “keeping the sea lanes secure against illegal actors, will ensure unhindered passage for trade and continued prosperity of the entire Indian Ocean Region” (MFA India 2019b). In relation to military cooperation, this was formalized through a Memorandum of Defense Cooperation signed in 2000 that updated a first defense agreement from 1996. From these agreements, an India-South Africa Joint Defense Committee (JDC) co-chaired by the Secretaries of Defense of the two countries was established. At the eighth meeting of the committee in December 2017, both countries emphasized strengthening defense cooperation and intensifying engagement. In the same year, the bilateral Defense Industry Conference was held in New Delhi which was also attended by a South African industry delegation, which held meetings with the Indian Department of Research and Development to identify areas of bilateral cooperation (MoD India 2019). In naval matters, “after the SAN purchased the new Type 209 submarines from Germany, new crews had to be trained in order to meet ‘representivity’ challenges and expand the submarine branch in order to

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man all three boats. As the Indian Navy operates similar submarines, 11 SAN combat officers completed a submarine course at INS Satavahan during 2005” (Potgieter 2011: 68). In addition, Indian ships often visit South African ports such as the case of the yacht INSV Tarini or the participation of the IN Tarkash and Kolkata ships in the IBSAMAR maritime exercises. Also the South African Navy participated in the Multinational Training Exercise for African Nations organized by the Indian Navy in May 2019 (Ministry of External Affairs 2019a). South Africa also participates as a full member in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, where in 2012, the meeting was held in Cape Town. Finally, India often uses the port of that city as a launching point for Antarctic campaigns along with the Indian port of Goa. India has had a presence on the Antarctic continent since 1981 and currently has two bases located south of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans respectively. These represent valuable sources of information and research on climate and weather patterns. In addition, India has established an Arctic research station, Himadri, in 2008, which also conducts research in various fields with emphasis on climate change. Since both India and South Africa consider Brazil as a relevant ally, the trilateral cooperation in IBSA was diversifying into other fields, including defense and maritime affairs with the creation of a Working Group on Defense and the development of the joint naval exercises IBSAMAR considered as the ‘strategic benchmark’ of the Indian maritime vocation (Singh 2015: 211). These exercises—six of them conducted in South African waters and one in Indian waters—aims to strengthen the joint deployments of the navies involved, in addition to sharing South Atlantic professional experiences and enhancing naval cooperation (Medeiros and Moreira 2017: 299). The regularity of naval contacts was reflected in the participation of the second edition of the Indian naval exercise ‘International Fleet Review’, where the Brazilian Navy sent an Amazonas Class OPV and South Africa sent the SAS Frigate Spioenkop. According to the Indian Navy, Latin American countries such as Argentina and Chile also participated as observers (Indian Navy 2016). As an exception to the limited naval links with Argentina, the frigate Libertad—training ship of the Argentine Navy—visited the Port of Bombay on its 39th training voyage in 2008. Beyond high-level meetings, visits and joint exercises with South Africa, India does not seem interested in venturing too far beyond Cape Agulhas. An exception to this policy was the visit of the Talwar Class

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Frigate INS Tarkash to ports in Nigeria, Senegal, Angola, Namibia and South Africa in 2017 as part of an overseas voyage for the development of ‘bridges of friendship’ from the Western Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean. The same ship had participated in one of the Indian Navy’s most challenging assignments, the evacuation of Indian nationals from armed conflict in Yemen in 2015 (New Era 2017). Another exception of a deployment beyond South Africa occurred with the visit of the sailing ship INSV Tarini in Port Stanley (Stanley) between late January and early February 2018 (Indian Navy 2018). Despite its limited Atlantic projection, India has systematically developed its maritime interests in a westerly direction. For example, in the case of the West African coast: “India is the largest investor in Ghana and has 23 regional projects in place. New Delhi has been focusing on intensifying its relations with the Regional Economic Communities in Africa and has accordingly expanded its interaction with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to direct its engagement with developmental programmes” (Singh 2015: 208). Like China, increased economic interdependence presents significant overseas challenges. A series of piracy incidents against Indian nationals occurring between 2018 and 2019 began to pressure the government to act. In a first instance the Indian Government’s Directorate General of Shipping issued a restraining order in June 2019 banning Indian seafarers from boarding vessels in the Gulf of Guinea. But the cases continued which has generated criticism from the private sector and the press for the government to take more assertive action. Surprisingly, India has not demonstrated concern beyond rhetoric regarding the maritime insecurity situation in the Gulf of Guinea, even though cooperation and anti-piracy actions are a crucial part of its regional agenda in the Western Indian Ocean (Ukeje 2015). In this sense, it is foreseeable that the Indian Navy will aim to strengthen ties with local navies or even progressively begin to develop a more regular on-site presence.

8.6 The South Atlantic vis-à-vis the Eurasian Powers The implementation of a power-projection maritime strategy in the South Atlantic presents a series of challenges for regional stability, given the potential hegemonic challenge to the United States. On the contrary, limited maritime strategies would not affect too much the stability/

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instability balance of an overseas maritime space since the naval power’s priorities would be focused on its neighboring maritime zone. The case of the People’s Republic of China would respond to the first thesis given its growing activism in the region, although the center of its maritime and naval activities for now would be concentrated in the African sector of the South Atlantic, mainly around the Gulf of Guinea and surrounding areas. Beijing has deployed a projection on both coasts of the Atlantic, especially due to the intensity of its economic commitments, its extensive fishing fleet, assertiveness in the fight against piracy and naval diplomacy, both in port visits and in the development of joint exercises. In the case of the Republic of India, it responds to the second thesis since its concerns are centered in its adjacent geographical area, having a scarce projection apart from its links with South Africa and Brazil, which are expressed in the realization of joint exercises and high-level military visits on a regular basis. The Russian case is presented as a sui-generis case since, although its presence in the South Atlantic is limited, it is worth highlighting its recurrent projection towards the Caribbean Sea supported by the Cuba-Venezuela axis, in addition to a growing interest on the part of high Russian officials in developing a more active presence in the Gulf of Guinea. However, a common element to the Eurasian naval powers is that in the last decade they have all expanded their interests and actions to neighboring maritime security orders such as the Mediterranean Sea for Russia, a projection towards the south and east of the Indo-Pacific by India and the Indian Ocean in the case of Beijing, although without affecting the deep tendencies of the South Atlantic observed since the end of the Cold War. In this sense, Beijing’s presence in the South Atlantic, especially on the African side, surpasses the rest of the Eurasian powers, which have a limited projection in the case of India and a selective one in the case of Russia.

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CHAPTER 9

Southern Oceans and Great Power Competition: A Call for Strategic Autonomy

Great power competition in a multipolar world is transforming the international order into a more conflictual scenario. As the United States seeks to sustain its maritime supremacy in the Indo-Pacific, Russia is trying to assert its hegemony in the post-Soviet space, China seeks to affirm a zone of influence in East and Southeast Asia, and India has begun to make a maritime leap centered in the Indian Ocean. At the Indo-Pacific realm, the United States has developed multiple bilateral and regional initiatives to counter the Chinese rising, while Beijing is responding with greater and greater assertiveness, especially in the ‘first island chain’. In parallel with their Eurasian “no-limits friendship” backed by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in early 2022, Russia’s geopolitical and China’s geo-economic presence has taken a considerable jump in the Southern Oceans due to its growing power projection and the littoral countries’ interest in gaining both autonomy with non-alignment position and commercial, financial, and technological resources, especially from the Asian economic giant. The rise of non-Western powers has begun to have a slow but incremental impact on the maritime dimension of the South Atlantic, but a full-flag effect at the Indo-Pacific. To this structural change should be added a series of parallel global trends such as the search for natural resources in peripheral areas, growing awareness of the marine environment with the development of marine protected areas, increasing © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. González Levaggi, Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1_9

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cooperation on maritime security and a renewed interest in the fight against IUU fishing, competition for common goods on the high seas, in addition to the traditional competition over maritime jurisdictions. In line with these external constraints, both littoral countries and traditional and non-traditional extra-regional powers maintain positions that range from convergence to competition, generating alterations in the way regional security is managed in the maritime order. The book presented the maritime strategies of the US, China, Russia and India and their respective impact on the Indo-Pacific and South Atlantic. At this point, while the priorities of the Eurasian powers are primarily focused on their geographically proximate zone, there is a progressive projection to overseas scenarios including the South Atlantic. At the same time, the United States maintains its global deployment with a state-of-the-art fleet and a consolidated network of allies from the North Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, while seeking to keep the Western Hemisphere away from Eurasian influences. The Indo-Pacific is the central arena for geopolitical competition in the twenty-first century. It offers an archetypical example of a conflictive maritime regional order with a large potential for regional instability. Competing ideological narratives and persuasive tools are matched with the contrasting geopolitical interests and goals of extra-regional, great regional powers and middle powers. A stronger China, a returning US, a rising India and a group of influential middle powers are trying to advance their interests without a consensual normative or institutional framework. In the last years, there has been a growing potential geopolitical difficulty, especially around the western and eastern choke points such as the Malacca Strait and the entrance to the Red Sea. An additional layer of complexity lies in the great power competition between the US and China, which is splitting the region about geopolitical narratives and concrete strategic interests, thus narrowing the space for middle powers’ maneuvering. South Atlantic offers an example of a stable, but mixed order with elements of cooperation and conflict. Although the existence of a normative duality presents challenge for further cooperation and institutionalization, regional security stability is not at stake. Until a decade ago, in the South Atlantic, the United States developed a maritime strategy of cooperative relations with the countries of the region centered on two fundamental elements: the control of maritime traffic and the monitoring of illicit activities, particularly global terrorism and drug trafficking.

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However, the Russian presence in the Caribbean and—even more relevant—Chinese activism in the maritime region has altered US interests and commitments on both coasts of the Atlantic with a particular focus on the development of logistical platforms and access to natural resources. In addition to extra-regional engagement, local tensions remain. The Argentina–UK dispute over the sovereignty of the Malvinas/Falklands may be an uncomfortable issue not only bilateral dynamics, but maintains a potential for regional disruption, especially if the trajectory Sino-Argentinean ties facilitate China or Russia’s maritime access to Antarctica. An unexplored topic for the future of Great Power Competition, Antarctica laid at the center of the upcoming territorialization of the global commons. While countries claim sovereignty over their lands, there is still a consensus in the member countries of the Antarctic Treaty about the commitments signed more than six decades ago. However, there are increasing concerns about the militarization attitudes or territorialization attempts by Eurasian great powers. As Boulègue (2022) argues, “Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are no longer exceptional in terms of ‘low tension’ governance and consensus-based decisions”. China has been upgrading its presence in Antarctica which are creating tensions with the Five-Eyes nations, especially Australia over the employ of dual-use technologies for military purposes. China’s first base (‘Great Wall’) was established on King George Island (in the South Shetland Islands) in 1985. Two facts are quite expressive of Beijing’s new Antarctic vocation. On the one hand, from 2009 to 2020 the Asian country has established two new Antarctic bases, while it is in the process of building a fifth one on Inexpressible Island located in the Ross Sea, in addition to increasing the number of naval means at its disposal (Liu 2018). On the other hand, the State Oceanic Administration published the white paper on Chinese Antarctic activities that falls within the general canons established by the Antarctic Treaty positioning itself as a status-quo country. These facts express a multidimensional interest of a polar power that seeks “to ensure access to mineral and fishing resources, freedom of navigation in its seas, the entry of its scientists, and participation in the bodies that generate norms related to polar governance” (Malena 2020: 39). On the other hand, Russia celebrated the 200th anniversary of its first Antarctic expedition in 2020. As a member of the Antarctic Treaty that entered—together with the United States—reservations against sovereign claims, it remains a major player both for its historical trajectory and

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for the number of bases (6), among them the Bellingshausen Station located on King George Island belonging to the South Shetland Islands. Although there is a sustained bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the littoral countries of the Southwest Atlantic, a strategic alliance with Russia seems to be far from being envisaged in view of a possible thawing of the Antarctic Treaty in 2048. Even if Russia is still among the countries defending the Antarctic status-quo, unlike its revisionist position on the Arctic, there are a some elements that can signal potential intention to challenge the status quo: scientific research including maritime exploration and deployment of strategic facilities related to space development, the emphasis on historical legacy, the use of the religious factor linked to the Russian Orthodox Church and the articulation of common positions with Latin American partners (Sukhankin 2020). … Why the Eurasian naval powers expanded their range of action beyond their own region? Can the maritime strategies of these powers further generate instability at the Indo-Pacific and the South Atlantic? How does this impact on the Global South nations? In relation to the first question, the cases diverge. China has growing global economic and commercial interests that have broadened the range of perceived threats, especially those that disrupt the normal functioning of the flow of goods and services to and from China. While threats have traditionally centered on the Taiwan issue and delimitation disputes over the South and East China Seas, the Chinese leadership has serious concerns about disruption of maritime flows or attack on assets and citizens around the world. In this regard, the Chinese Navy is undergoing a transformation in both its capabilities and missions to address ‘distant waters’ responsibilities that sooner rather than later include the South Atlantic, as is evident in China’s naval activism in West Africa. Citizens of India and Russia have suffered incidents of piracy, but their reaction has been more passive, while prioritizing their strategic interests in their geographical area, the Indian Ocean Region in the case of India and the multiple spaces into which the Russian Navy projects itself from the Pacific to the Arctic, from the North Sea to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Undoubtedly, China’s maritime strategy of global power projection, albeit

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for defensive reasons, will be the fundamental element altering the trajectory of the global ocean in the twenty-first century, including the South Atlantic. There is a clear distinction between the incentives driving these three powers. In the case of Beijing, its accelerated economic growth presents a series of challenges that were unthinkable three decades ago. The presence of public and private companies in overseas markets, as well as the globalisation of its international trade, oblige the state not only to provide political and diplomatic support, but also to provide security in distant territories. Even if major threats are local and regional, Chinese global maritime interests matters. A prime example was the PLA’s evacuation of citizens in Yemen in 2015, which subsequently inspired the film ‘Operation Red Sea’. China’s maritime strategy reflects a reaction to a systemic stimulus while a Mahanian vocation to establish a global navy with bases scattered around the world is still not fully seen. If the new geoeconomics shapes China’s trajectory, in relation to Moscow the stimuli are eminently geopolitical in nature. Tensions with the West since the 2008 have heightened the perceived threat to NATO, and the Kremlin is using the maritime instrument as another factor to take advantage of strategic opportunities, whether in its immediate sphere of influence such as the Black Sea or in distant geographies such as the South Atlantic. Finally, India’s maritime actions reflect a geo-economic stimulus although it is less able to react to a scenario of greater commercial interdependence. Clearly its maritime strategy has the least assertive posture vis-à-vis China or Russia, which is reflected in the limited interactions in the South Atlantic. Answering the second question, an empirical assessment over the last decade points to a negative answer regarding potential instability in the Southern Oceans. The emergence of the People’s Republic of China and the strategic competition with the United States has generated a multiplier effect on tensions in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s assertiveness with ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ since the arrival of President Xi Jinping and the different modes of action of the new international strategy of US containment are beginning to shape a region with conflicting traits, despite the great economic interdependence that still exists in the region. India’s preoccupation with the rise of China has modified its traditional position of non-alignment, which can be seen in the progressive rapprochement in security terms with the United States, a behavior that has been imitated by many of the regional middle powers,

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mainly Australia and Japan. The diverse strategic perspectives in the IndoPacific are shaping a complex scenario where narratives, positions, norms, and institutions express a progressive divergence. The growing Sino-US competition only deepens these three-way differences between those who support Washington’s containment strategy to limit Beijing’s regional actions, those who prefer to remain non-aligned and on the sidelines of a securitized competition, and those who view China’s new role in the region positively. The Indo-Pacific will be the center of attention in international politics in the coming decades and the rearrangement of global and regional actors on this chessboard will define the degree of cooperation or conflict in the international (dis)order. On the Atlantic side, by the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century, apart from piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, the major naval powers did not consider threats from the wider Atlantic space among their main concerns. The US role continues to be constructive despite circumstantial tensions with littoral governments, while the increased Sino-Russian presence in the South Atlantic African littoral has not yet resulted in further destabilisation of regional security dynamics. The involvement of Eurasian naval powers has taken place in a context marked by recognition of US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, acquiescence over the British naval presence in the Atlantic ridge, and the promotion of a cooperative dynamic with West African littoral countries in the face of common challenges. However, this stability may be altered if China or Russia would succeed in establishing a naval base or an access port in the region. Moreover, while these countries have not been involved in regional balance of power dynamics, nor in active regional conflicts such as the Malvinas/Falkland, Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, or in revisionist positions on disputed spaces such as Antarctica, a global escalation of tensions would sooner or later reach the region. Regional instability in the South Atlantic may continue in a restricted mode, although the potential for future transformation into critical instability must be underlined in three specific cases: the aggravation of Sino– US and/or Russo–US tensions; the escalation of three non-conventional issues such as fisheries, resources and piracy; and finally, the de facto termination of the Antarctic treaty. In the first case, a parallel could be drawn with the Cold War where the need to secure client regimes in the maritime region requires the strategic projection of naval forces, as was the case with the global expansion of the Russian fleet during the bipolar period. In the Russian case, activism in the Caribbean Sea can be joined

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by actions in the Gulf of Guinea, while Beijing could easily formalise its military and naval ties with countries along the West African coast to establish a naval base. In the second case, incidents between littoral countries with distant water fishing fleet assets of Chinese origin, in addition to intensifying piracy incidents, could accelerate Beijing’s presence as well as that of Moscow and New Delhi. This situation could also generate both a global multinational initiative and competition between emerging and traditional actors in the South Atlantic, as in the case of the simultaneous operations of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and Chinese deployments in the Gulf of Aden. Finally, a change in Antarctic territorial status could accelerate a territorial race to secure sovereign spaces between regional and extra-regional actors, among which Russia, China and India will be actors and not mere spectators. In any case, in relation to a future projection it is important to consider the trajectory of recent years in which China’s presence outstrips that of Russia and India. Regarding the third question, changes in the global power structure and the new dynamics of the globalisation process following the COVID19 pandemic present a series of complex challenges both for the Global South. Developing nations started dealing with a more complex global scenario where they are trying to avoid getting trapped in the great power rivalry. On the one side, they are trying to circumvent increasing pressures from major powers and to adopt excessive strategic commitments with them. On the other hand, it seems that developing nations are returning to a non-alignment agenda, for example not to picking sides in the war in Ukraine or not joining the Western sanctions against Moscow. From a normative perspective, Jorge Heine et al. (2023) catch the moment, where they call the Latin American countries not to automatically accept the positions of any of the Great Powers involved in a conflict, not succumb to pressures from dominant or hegemonic powers and act based on their own national interests. The Global South faces a more complex global environment with more limited tools due to their weakened economic, technological, and military capabilities. Even if this essay is not focused on the agency of the local and regional powers in the Southern Oceans, the return of nonalignment makes the reception of the great power competition harder for the deployment of facilities and critical military infrastructure by the major poles of the international system. The Global South can be a space for clashes, but it can also lessen the intensity by making the strategic projection more difficult. A key approach to strengthening its position

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vis-à-vis great power competition is developing strategic autonomy which means the ability or capacity to act their own national interest without committing excessively with regional or extra-regional great powers, especially in the military/strategic realm. A strategy of that nature will require reinforce their own economic and military capabilities, diversifies their relations beyond the trap of major power competition and develop or strengthen regional and multilateral initiatives and organizations, in addition to territorial denegation and soft balancing actions to limit the regional effects of great power competition. The Global South faces a difficult challenge due to its heterogeneity and multiples domestic and global perspectives, but strategic cooperation among the countries of the South is essential for a more cooperative and less competitive global arena.

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Index

A Abe doctrine, 175 Active Defense, 84, 87 Afghanistan, 11, 37, 45, 46, 48, 51, 54, 136, 139, 140 Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP), 196 African Development Bank (ADB), 178 Africa-South American Summit (ASA), 190 AFRICOM, 193, 196 Al-Assad, Bashar, 115, 116 Amorim, Celso, 212 Andaman Sea, 144 Angola, 189, 196, 201, 202, 206, 207, 210, 211, 218 Antarctica, 3, 56, 88, 144, 229, 232 Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), 22, 88 Anti-piracy operations, 79, 89, 94, 146 Arabian Sea, 144

Arab-South American Summit (ASPA, 190 Arctic, 88, 105, 118–120, 164, 217, 230 Argentina, 51, 185–189, 191, 192, 195, 197–200, 203, 206, 207, 209, 211, 212, 214, 215, 217 Ark of Peace, 205 Ascension Island, 188, 192 Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), 178 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 46, 48, 75, 198 Asia Pacific, 160 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 48, 74, 138, 147, 161, 162, 174, 178–180 Atlantic Patrol Tasking South, 186 AUKUS, 4, 49, 55, 57, 166, 175, 176, 181 Australia, 4, 21, 48, 49, 55, 74, 115, 149, 150, 161–163, 166–168, 174, 176, 178, 181, 229, 232

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. González Levaggi, Great Power Competition in the Southern Oceans, Palgrave Studies in Maritime Politics and Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36476-1

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264

INDEX

Authoritarian, 66, 104, 192, 210 Automatic Identification System (AIS), 203

B Bab el-Mandeb, 165, 172 Baltic Sea, 118 Bay of Bengal, 139, 144 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), 179 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 46, 69, 75, 78, 149, 164, 172, 177, 178, 180 Biden, Joe, 26, 40, 41, 46, 47, 49, 86, 161, 166, 169 Bin Laden, Osama, 45 Black Sea, 42, 60, 102, 115–120, 124, 125, 230, 231 blue water navy, 6, 94, 95, 117 Bosphorus, 15, 60 Brazil, 4, 20, 21, 42, 51, 75, 150, 186, 187, 189, 192, 195–199, 205, 206, 209, 211, 212, 214, 215, 217, 219 BRICS, 10, 75, 78, 171, 198, 209, 210, 213 British Indian Ocean Territory, 42 Bush, George W., 41, 42, 45

C Cape of Good Hope, 144 carrier battle/strike group, 22, 56 Caspian Sea, 118, 124 Chavez, Hugo, 50, 206 Chile, 48, 178, 187, 195, 199, 200, 209, 213, 215, 217 China National Fisheries Corporation (CNFC), 203

China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), 198 China Petroleum and Chemicals Corporation (SINOPEC), 178, 198 China’s Go Out policy, 75 China’s Maritime Silk Road, 88 China’s Peaceful rise, 75 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 65–69, 77, 78, 80, 82, 84, 85, 176 Chinese Dream, 28, 73 choke points, 15, 79, 89, 144, 146, 165, 171, 172, 228 coastal defense, 21, 22, 27, 87, 91, 92, 94, 117, 122, 150 Cold War, 6, 9, 12, 14, 28, 37–39, 46, 51, 52, 55, 58, 60, 71, 76, 92, 102, 103, 123, 124, 160, 186, 187, 192, 196, 207, 208, 210, 212, 219, 232 color revolutions, 110 command of the seas, 22 Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), 190, 198, 215 Congressional Research Service, 91 Contention, 60 Corbett, Julian, 2, 16, 19, 22 COVID-19, 10, 148, 173, 191 Crimea, 60, 108, 114, 115, 125, 165 Cuba, 193, 194, 198, 199, 206, 208–211, 215

D Decolonization, 70, 147, 186 deep engagement, 43, 44, 53 Deng, Xiaoping, 66, 68, 69, 76 Diego Garcia Island, 56 Djibouti, 79, 85, 163, 173, 202, 204 domestic coalitions, 25

INDEX

E East Africa, 173, 177, 178 East Asia, 54, 72, 74, 87, 90, 152, 168, 170, 177 East China Sea, 77, 94, 165, 177, 230 Equatorial Guinea, 196, 207, 210, 211 Erdo˘gan, Recep Tayyip, 11 Eurasia, 4, 10, 16, 165, 208 European Union (EU), 41, 47, 103, 137, 197 executive node, 5, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30

F Fisheries, 144, 188, 232 Five-Eyes, 229 Forum for China-Africa Cooperation, 201 Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, 48, 166, 169, 174, 181

G 5G, 46, 176 Gazprom, 211 Georgia, 11, 102, 112, 113, 124, 232 Georgias Islands, 186, 188 Gerasimov, Valery, 111, 125 global deployment, 6, 56, 228 Global Security Initiative, 76 Global South, 3, 5–7, 10, 132, 137, 162, 212, 213, 230, 233, 234 Gorshkov, Sergey, 2, 56, 91, 92, 108, 122, 123, 208 Grand strategy, 5, 6, 11, 14, 16–19, 23–29, 38, 39, 43, 46, 49, 53, 66, 73, 77, 78, 83, 86, 95, 103–106, 109, 118, 121, 133, 134, 140, 150, 177

265

Great power competition, 1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 14, 30, 59, 118, 135, 227–229, 233, 234 Gulf of Aden, 57, 79, 144, 146, 149, 165, 167, 173, 233 Gulf of Guinea, 120, 186, 189, 191, 196, 204, 211, 218, 219, 232, 233 Gulf of Oman, 144 Gwadar Port, Pakistan, 164 H Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka, 164 Hegemony, 3, 6, 10–12, 37–39, 42–44, 46, 50, 51, 55, 60, 87, 101, 115, 163, 164, 187, 205, 207, 211, 212, 227, 232 Horn of Africa, 85, 172, 173, 204 Hu, Jintao, 69, 75, 85, 86, 165, 172, 198, 199 I IBSA, 212, 213, 217 IBSAMAR, 217 Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUU), 145, 195, 204, 228 Indian Ocean, 7, 50, 56, 95, 131, 136, 138, 139, 144, 146–150, 159, 160, 163, 164, 167, 168, 171, 172, 174, 177, 219, 227 Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), 148, 179 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), 147, 179, 217 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), 138, 146, 148, 178–180 India’s Act East policy, 147 Indo-Pacific, 3, 4, 6, 7, 14, 30, 46, 47, 49, 50, 55, 57, 59, 60, 76, 131, 135, 141, 147, 149,

266

INDEX

159–171, 173, 175–181, 192, 219, 227, 228, 230–232 Interdependence, 10, 11, 18, 43, 143, 163, 178, 218, 231 International maritime order, 2, 14 International order, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 15, 25, 30, 38, 43–47, 50, 67, 74, 75, 78, 101, 102, 177, 227 Iran, 13, 37, 50, 115, 139, 149, 160, 167, 169, 194, 196 Iraq, 9, 11, 37, 45, 48, 51, 53, 54, 57, 112, 116, 169, 206 Islamic State, 46, 116 island chains strategy, 93 Islas Malvinas (Falklands Islands), 185, 186, 188, 190, 191, 214

J Japan, 21, 37, 47–49, 51, 57, 71, 79, 87, 95, 137, 150, 161–163, 166–168, 173, 174, 176, 178, 180, 181, 202, 214, 232

K Kennan, George, 39 Kerch Strait, 125 Kirchner, Cristina, 188, 200 Kyaukpyu Port, Myanmar, 165

L Latin America, 72, 137, 192–194, 196–198, 201, 205, 206, 208, 210–212, 214, 215 Lavrov, Sergei, 209, 210 Liu, Huaqing, 80, 92 Lula Da Silva, 189

M Macri, Mauricio, 188, 200, 212

Made in China 2025, 70 Madrid Agreements, 188 Mahan, Alfred, 2 Malacca, 15, 144, 152, 165, 167, 172 Malacca Dilemma, 172 Mao, Zedong, 67 maritime dominance, 2, 6, 7, 12, 55 maritime governance, 10 Maritime strategies, 3–6, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27, 218, 228, 230 Mediterranean Sea, 115, 116, 118, 120, 124, 125, 164, 219 Medvedev, Dmitri, 209 Menem, Carlos, 187 MERCOSUR, 190, 213 Military exercises, 77, 191, 194, 201, 209 Modi, Narendra, 26, 132, 133, 142, 162, 171, 178, 179, 215, 216 Mozambique Channel, 144, 148, 167 Multipolar/Multipolarity, 2, 5, 10, 13, 14, 23, 43, 47, 50, 66, 78, 101, 106, 162, 164, 197, 206, 212, 227

N Naval Exercise Mosi, 205 Neoclassical realism, 4, 5, 17, 24, 25, 28 New Soviet School, 22 Non-alignment, 74, 140, 178, 227, 231, 233 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 4, 11, 14, 26, 37, 43, 45, 46, 50, 51, 55, 60, 74, 103, 105, 106, 109–113, 115, 118, 120, 124, 159, 166, 208, 231, 233 Northern Sea Route, 119, 120 Nuclear triad, 4, 52, 55, 81, 83, 132, 138

INDEX

O Obama, Barack, 12, 13, 26, 45–49, 78, 115, 178 offshore balance, 43 offshore defense, 87, 92 Oil and natural gas, 139 open water protection, 87

P Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), 59 Pacific Ocean, 58, 120, 152, 159, 161, 172, 205 Pakistan, 7, 26, 48, 131, 132, 134–138, 140–143, 146, 149, 151, 160, 167, 169–171, 180 Panama Canal, 185, 193, 195, 198, 208 Paracels Islands, 79 peaceful coexistence, 70 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), 85–92, 94, 95, 165, 196, 197, 199, 202, 204 People’s Republic of China, 199 People’s War, 84, 92 Persian Gulf, 48, 56, 79, 144, 165, 169, 170, 173, 185 Peru, 48, 178, 194, 195, 197, 199, 209 Philippines, 55, 60, 79, 95, 166 Piracy, 15, 110, 120, 145, 146, 165, 172, 173, 189, 191, 204, 211, 218, 219, 230, 232, 233 power projection, 5, 20, 21, 23, 27, 30, 55, 56, 60, 123, 126, 144, 163, 185, 227, 230 Putin, Vladimir, 26, 49, 50, 60, 101–104, 106, 108, 109, 119, 120, 165, 205, 206, 209, 210, 212, 227

267

Q Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), 49, 161, 166, 174, 180 R Red Sea, 144, 171, 172, 228 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 48, 178 regional maritime order, 2, 5, 28, 190 Rosatom, 105, 211 Roscosmos, 211 Rosoboronexport, 207 Royal Navy, 86 Russian Federation, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 23, 25, 41, 46, 74, 77, 90, 95, 102, 105, 106, 108, 109, 118–120, 205, 207, 209 Russo-Georgian War, 107 Russo-Ukrainian War, 60 S sea control, 21, 22, 27, 94, 124, 125, 151, 153 sea denial, 21, 22, 27, 94, 122, 124 Sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), 15, 16, 146 Sea of Azov, 118 Sea power, 59 Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), 179 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 71, 79, 89, 174 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 78, 171 Singapore, 48, 56, 144, 172, 175, 178, 181 Sino-Indian war, 79 South Africa, 75, 85, 86, 148, 186, 189, 201, 202, 205, 206, 208, 210–214, 216–219

268

INDEX

South American Union of Nations (UNASUR), 189, 190 South Asia, 2, 131, 132, 134, 140 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 138, 179 South Atlantic, 3–7, 30, 56, 120, 185–192, 194–196, 198, 201–203, 205–208, 210–212, 217–219, 227, 228, 230–233 South Atlantic Maritime Coordination Area (CAMAS), 190 South China Sea, 5, 11, 60, 71, 74, 77, 79, 85, 89, 94, 95, 149, 159, 164, 166, 169, 172–175, 177, 180 SOUTHCOM, 191, 193–195 Southern Oceans, 4, 6, 227, 231, 233 South Korea, 37, 74, 95, 150, 170, 175, 176, 178, 202 South Sandwich Islands, 185, 186, 188, 232 Spratly Islands, 79 Stability/instability balance, 29, 30, 219 St. Helena, 185 Strait of Magellan, 185, 199 Straits of Hormuz, 15, 165 STRATCOM, 41 String of Pearls strategy, 133 Suez Canal, 79, 177, 185 T Taiwan, 26, 57, 59, 67, 70, 71, 76, 77, 79, 85–87, 89, 93, 94, 166, 169, 202, 203, 230 Taiwan Strait Crisis, 71 threat perception, 6, 15, 26, 27, 29, 60, 74, 136, 163, 169 Tibet, 77 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 48, 178 Tristan da Cunha, 185

Trump, Donald, 9, 10, 13, 26, 41, 42, 44, 46, 48, 49, 76, 161, 166, 168, 178, 190, 210 Turkey, 21, 42, 60, 115, 125 U Ukraine, 1, 10, 11, 46, 54, 58, 102, 105, 108, 109, 112, 114, 115, 124, 125, 166, 208, 210, 233 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR/Soviet Union), 3, 9, 22, 38, 39, 42, 43, 51, 52, 56, 71, 83, 92, 102, 108, 112, 115, 117, 118, 163, 206 Unipolar/Unipolarity, 5, 39, 42, 43, 46 United Kingdom, 2–4, 21, 38, 47, 49, 55, 91, 150, 163, 165–168, 185–188, 190, 191 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 15, 172, 193 United Nations Security Council, 71, 176, 212 United States, 3, 4, 6, 11–16, 21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 37–39, 41–47, 49–57, 60, 65, 70–72, 75–77, 82, 83, 87, 90, 92, 95, 101, 110, 111, 121, 123, 124, 132, 137, 146, 149, 150, 159–169, 174, 175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 185, 186, 190–192, 196, 197, 200, 205–208, 215, 218, 227–229, 231 U.S. 6th Fleet, 60 Ushuaia, 191 U.S. Navy, 55, 56, 60, 91, 124, 159 U.S. Navy 7th Fleet, 71, 172 US Navy Southern Command (USNAVSO), 194, 195

INDEX

Uyghur, 78

V Vanilla Islands nations, 146 Venezuela, 50, 113, 140, 195, 199, 206–210 Vietnam, 48, 60, 70, 71, 79, 149, 166, 167, 175, 176, 178, 181

W Wen, Jiabao, 75, 199 Western Hemisphere, 4, 6, 50, 176, 208, 228, 232 Wolf warrior diplomacy, 10, 231

269

X Xi, Jinping, 10, 26, 28, 49, 50, 66, 70, 73, 75–78, 80, 86, 90, 149, 164, 165, 168, 171, 198, 199, 205, 227, 231 Xinjiang, 77 Y Yantar (oceanographic research vessel), 212 Yellow Sea, 89, 94 Yemen, 85, 165, 168, 218, 231 Z Zelensky, Volodymir, 46