Great Ideas Today, 1981 0852293852

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The Great Ideas

Today 1981

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. Chicago

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Geneva

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London

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Manila

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Paris

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Rome

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Seoul

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Sydney

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Tokyo

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Toronto

mma

Angel

Family

Animal

Fate

Aristocracy

Form

Art

Astronomy

God Good and

Beauty

Government

Being

Habit

Cause

Happiness

Chance

History

Change

Honor

Citizen

Hypothesis

Constitution

Idea

Courage

Immortality

Custom and Convention

Induction

Definition

Infinity

Democracy

Judgment

Desire

Justice

Dialectic

Knowledge

Duty

Labor

Education

Language

Element

Law

Emotion

Liberty

Eternity

Life and

Evolution

Logic

Experience

Love

Evil

Death

Man

Reasoning

Mathematics

Relation

Matter

Religion

Mechanics

Revolution

Medicine

Rhetoric

Memory and

Imagination

Same and Other

Metaphysics

Science

Mind

Sense

Monarchy

Sign and Symbol

Nature

Sin

Necessity and Contingency

Slavery

Oligarchy

Soul

One and Many

Space

Opinion

State

Opposition

Temperance

Philosophy

Theology

Physics

Time

Pleasure and Pain

Truth

Poetry

Tyranny

Principle

Universal and Particular

Progress

Virtue and Vice

Prophecy

War and

Prudence

Wealth

Punishment

Will

Quality

Wisdom

Quantity

World

Peace

Rome: The Arch

of Titus, painting by Canaletto signed

Translated, the inscription reads: "(from) The Roman Senate To the Divine Titus, (son of the Divine Vespasian), Emperor"

and dated 1742.

and People,

©

1981 by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.

Copyright under International Copyright Union. All rights reserved under Pan American and Universal Copyright Conventions by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.

No part

of this work, may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

from Volume II of The Works ofLucian ofSamosata, and F. G. Fowler (4 volumes, 1905). Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Oxford University Press.

"The True

History,"

translated by H. W. Fowler

Number: 61-65561 Book Number: 0-85229-385-2 Standard Serial Number: 0072-7288

Printed in the U.S.A. Library of Congress Catalog International Standard International

EDITOR

IN

Mortimer

CHIEF

J.

Adler

EXECUTIVE EDITOR John Van Doren Consulting Editor Editorial Assistant

Otto Bird

Anne Wagner

ART DIRECTOR Cynthia Peterson Picture Editor

Layout

Artist

Illustrator

Art Staff

Kathryn Creech Richard Batchelor

Ron

Villani

Jeannine Deubel John L. Draves Paul Rios

COPY DIRECTOR J.

Thomas Beatty

DEPUTY DIRECTOR Laurie A. Braun

Copy

Staff

Elizabeth A. Blowers JuanitaL. Murphy Mary Ann Roccaforte

Barbara Whitney

EDITORIAL TYPESETTING

MANAGER

Melvin Stagner

Typesetting Staff

Duangnetra Debhavalya Dora Jeffers Judith Kobylecky John Krom, Jr. Ronald Laugeman

Thomas Arnell

Mulligan

Reed

ENCYCLOP/EDIABRITANNICA, Chairman

of the

Board

President Vice-President/Editorial

INC.

Robert P. Gwinn Charles E. Swanson Charles Van Doren

Contents

Preface

PART ONE

Current Developments Theatre

in

in

the Arts and Sciences

the Twentieth Century

Houghton The Emergence of Post-Modern Science Stephen Toulmin Norris

PART TWO

of a Great Book Edward Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman

Hugh Trevor-Roper

116

The Contemporary Status

of a Great Idea a Permissive Society: The Controversy Regarding the Objectivity of Moral Values

Ethics

in

Otto Bird

PART FOUR

160

Reviews of Recent Books Hans KCing: Does God Exist? Mortimer J. Adler and Wayne

—

PART FIVE

68

The Reconsideration Empire

PART THREE

4

F.

Moquin

188

Morris Kline: Mathematics The Loss of Certainty Charles Van Doren

204

Ashley Montagu (ed.): Sociobiology Examined John Van Doren

219

Additions to the Great Books Library The True History Lucian An Essay on Criticism Alexander Pope The Autobiography of Edward Gibbon Candid e Voltaire "The Great Instauration" Francis Bacon "On the Aims and Instruments of Scientific Thought" William Kingdon Clifford

236 256 276 368 436 454

A NOTE ON REFERENCE STYLE

In the following pages, passages in Great Books of the Western

World

are referred to by the initials

'GBWW,'

page number, and page section. Thus, refers to is

page 210 in

Volume 39

'b' 'a'

Adam

Smith's

Books

of the

in Great

followed by volume,

'GBWW,

The Wealth

Vol. 39, p. 210b'

of Nations,

which

Western World. The small

letter

indicates the page section. In books printed in single column,

and

'b'

refer to the

upper and lower halves of the page. In books

printed in double column, halves of the left column,

'a'

V

and

and

'b'

'd'

refer to the

to the

upper and lower

upper and lower halves

of the right column. For example, 'Vol. 53, p. 210b' refers to the

lower half of page 210, since chology,

is

p. 210b' refers to the lower

Plato's Dialogues,

Gateway

Volume

printed in single column.

to the

is

left

53, James's Principles of Psy-

On

the other hand, 'Vol.

quarter of the page, since

Great Books

is

The Great

is

James's essay,

Ideas Today

is

Volume

10 of

"The Will

10,

Gateway

pp. 39to the

to Believe."

referred to by the initials 'GIT,'

lowed by the year and page number. Thus 'GIT 1968, to

7,

referred to by the initials 'GGB,'

pages 39 through 57 of

Great Books, which

7,

printed in double column.

followed by volume and page number. Thus, 'GGB, Vol. 57' refers to

Volume

fol-

p. 210' refers

page 210 of the 1968 edition of The Great Ideas Today.

Preface

issue of The Great Ideas Today is different from those that have appeared over the past decade or so. The difference is in our substitution for the usual symposium of a group of book reviews written by members of the editorial staff and others. In so doing, we have carried out a plan announced two years ago of offering critiques of recent books that raise issues of interest to our readers. At that time our contributing editor, William Gorman, was available to offer such critiques, as he did, but as he

This year's

could not do the year following because of

worthwhile to try the experiment on a larger it

by eliminating, at

least temporarily,

illness.

scale,

Now

and

to

has seemed

it

make room

for

our usual featured symposium in

which recognized authorities discuss a topic of current interest. These reviews take up Part IV of the present volume. The books

dis-

cussed there are Does God Exist? by Hans Kung, the distinguished Catholic theologian; Mathematics— The Loss of Certainty, by Morris Kline, a noted math-

ematician;

and

Sociobiology Examined, a collection of essays written

different scientists representing various fields

by fifteen

and edited by Ashley Mon-

an anthropologist. by two of these books are indicated by their titles. In the case of the first of them, it is the existence of God. A critique of this is offered by two reviewers: Mortimer J. Adler, editor in chief of The Great Ideas Today, who writes on the philosophical aspects of the subject, and Wayne F. Moquin, who discusses the theological ones. The question of certainty in tagu, himself

The

issues raised

mathematics, the issue raised by Morris Kline,

Doren,

is

taken up by Charles

Van

Research and who will be re-

assistant director of the Institute for Philosophical

vice-president/editorial of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., called by

some

of

our readers

as the

author of a two-part discussion of the

idea of freedom that appeared in our issues for 1972-1973. Professor

Montagu's collection of sentatives of the

new

articles,

challenging as

it

does the claims of repre-

science of sociobiology, raises the questions about the

human freedom, both of which are considered by John Van Doren, executive editor of The Great Ideas nature of man, and particularly the question of Today.

In the rest of the volume are,

One

of these

is

Houghton, who

first,

two essays on the

arts

and

sciences.

a discussion of the twentieth-century theatre by Norris is

equally well

known

theatre productions, as a teacher,

and

for his achievements as a director of as a writer.

The

other

is

by Stephen

Toulmin, who has appeared in these pages before {see "The Year's Developments in the Physical Sciences" in our issue of 1967), and who here writes of the profound changes he perceives as having overtaken the scientific enterprise in our time. Following these is an essay on Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire by Hugh Trevor-Roper that is interesting not only as praise by one distinguished historian for another, but that at the same time proves to be a rigorous analysis of Gibbon's aims in writing his great work.

There

is

also in this

volume an essay by Otto Bird, our consulting editor, on ethics and treats them as expressions of

that discusses recent writings

a permissive society. Mr. Bird,

who was

executive editor of The Great Ideas

Today from 1964 to 1970, has appeared before in

its

pages, notably as the

author of "The Idea of Justice" in 1974.

Along with these

and reviews,

essays

this issue

presents "Additions to the

Great Books Library," as follows: Lucian's True History, a

madcap

tall tale

by a first-century Syrian of

whom

known, but who was apparently the author of a number of works that have survived, among them this forerunner of Gulliver's Travels and the stories of Baron Munchausen; An Essay on Criticism, by Alexander Pope, which describes the rules of literature that were accepted by the Augustan age, of which Pope was the supreme poet, and who writes here in rhymed couplets of dazzling brilliance and variety; The Autobiography of Edward Gibbon, in which the author of the Decline and Fall applies to his own life the ironic style of thought and expression that on a grander scale is found in his history; Candide, by Voltaire— the best-known and best-liked tale of one of the great spirits of the eighteenth century, who incidentally pokes a good deal

very

little is

of scornful fun at great books;

"The Great Instauration," by Francis Bacon, which sets forth the plan of new philosophy that its author hoped to undertake, of which he finished only The Novum Organum (see GBWW, vol. 30); "On the Aims and Instruments of Scientific Thought," by William Kingdon Clifford, an essay on the limits of scientific exactitude and certainty that is of particular interest in the light of Stephen Toulmin's essay and the discussion of Morris Kline's book on mathematics by Charles Van Doren. the

PART ONE

Current Developments in the

Arts and Sciences

Theatre

the Twentieth Century

in

Norris

Norris

Houghton

shortly after

is

well

known as a man

he graduated from Princeton

stage-managed Broadway productions

of the theatre. in

Houghton

Beginning

1931, he directed or

for twenty-five years. In

1953 he

founded the off-Broadway Phoenix Theatre, where he directed some

He has been

seventy-five productions over the succeeding decade.

president of both the American Theatre Conference (1969-71) and the

American Council Mr.

for the Arts in

Education (1973-75).

Houghton has had a distinguished academic career as

began

in

1941 when he was a lecturer

in

drama

well. This

Princeton and has

at

brought him to Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Vassar as professor of

drama and

literature.

He spent

thirteen years as

dean

New York, at New York

Arts department at the State University of

and

is

now

visiting

The author

of a

professor of English

number

of

books,

among which

of the Theatre

Purchase, N.Y., University.

are

Advance from

Broadway, But Not Forgotten, and The Exploding Stage, Mr. Houghton has also published articles in The New Yorker, the Saturday Review,

and the American Scholar, among other magazines. A signal contribution to the understanding of

modern

theatre

is

post-revolutionary Russian theatre which he explores entitled

Moscow

written after

his in

study of

two works

Rehearsals (1936) and Return Engagement (1962),

numerous

trips to the

Soviet Union.

Forerunners

Astwo

came

and the century's other Anton Chekhov, were still alive, but two of them were failing fast. Ibsen was recovering from erysipelas and about to suffer the first of three strokes (the last one fatal); Chekhov was spitting blood in a race for time against tuberculosis. It seems unlikely that they were very merry on the New Year's Eve of 1900. Had the three of them looked back at their accomplishment, they would have perceived the end of the Romantic movement, which they had replaced with Realism. To have been able to look ahead would have been to foresee a century in which the theatre would become as fragmented as a piece of porcelain dropped on tiles. Realism would be assaulted by Symbolists, Expressionists, Surrealists, Constructivists, Marxists, Existentialists, Absurdists, vigorously pulling the stage first one way and then another— all within less than one hundred years. (In fact, Ibsen and Strindberg had already made some anti-Realistic moves themselves!) The spectacle of fragmentation would have been unfamiliar. In past centuries the stage had come through each of them much in one piece. There had been the Classical age, then the Renaissance which did look two ways — one toward the Court, the other toward the street corner and innyard; then in their own century Neo-classicism had been pushed aside by the Romantics whom they themselves in turn displaced. These were orderly transitions, however, compared to what was to come. the nineteenth century

to a close, Ibsen

great dramatists, August Strindberg and

Probably

it

could not be otherwise.

The

stage's age-old obligation has

been to reflect the world about it. Certainly the century ahead would be fragmented as never before: by two world wars of unparalleled ferocity, by the arrival of the Atomic Age, by great political upheavals— the Bolshevik and Chinese Communist revolutions— by readjustments to be made to the revelations of Darwin and Freud that would cause some people even to begin to re-think the very existence of God. Fragmentation is an apt word to describe it. But there is a better one which has entered common usage only in our own era — fission. The dictionary points out that this can be used to mean more than just a "cleaving into parts" — it adds the idea of "the release of large amounts of energy." That makes it a better word to describe the twentieth-century theatre, in which great energy is manifest. The question arises: for good or ill? Has it

Theatre

in the

Twentieth Century

improved on Ibsen, Strindberg, and Chekhov, or not? That has been the challenge for our generation.

The new Realism

those three dramatists introduced, like most "isms" in

do with substance. Such a term describes the way the playwrights projected their ideas, the kind of mirror they held up to nature. The more important question to ask is: what do they have to say? Later, though, we must examine how they say it and explore the matter of style. What Ibsen, Strindberg, and Chekhov had to say to twentieth-century man was very much what he would find he had to say to himself. They foresaw many of his problems and anxieties. If these three masters dramatized these more effectively than most of their successors, it was because art,

had

little

to

they were greater playwrights.

Although Ibsen, the earliest of the three, never wrote a line of dialogue he anticipated our modern desire to explore the contradictions and frailties of our society as well as in ourselves, to search for causes behind effects, to assail hypocrisy and compromise, to put a finger on pretense and prejudice, to focus a spotlight on corrupting relationships within the family and between the sexes, to embark on the search for one's identity, to point out the dangers that accompany lies and illusions and the equal danger to those fragile spirits whose self-delusions are forcibly stripped from them in the name of facing reality. This list of preoccupations seems incredibly long, but Ibsen did indeed address himself to all the items it contains in one or another of his mature works, often to more than one at a time. The author of A Doll's House has been traditionally thought of, for instance, as a heralding proponent of "equal opportunity," the emancipation of women. (This conclusion has been reached without regard for Ibsen's own statement delivered in response to a toast at a testimonial dinner given by the Norwegian League for Women's Rights in 1898. He said: "Whatever I have written has been without any conscious thought of making propaganda. I have been more the poet and less the social philosopher than has been generally believed I must disclaim the honor of having consciously worked for the women's rights movement. I am not even quite clear as to just what this women's rights movement really is!") But such remarks do not alter the fact that, as James Huneker once remarked, when writing about the ending of A DoWs House, "that slammed door reverberated across the roof of the world." And the twentieth century can find other reverberations beyond the one Huneker intended. Before the door slammed after Nora as she walked out on her home and family, she had established some truths and struck down some falsehoods about marriage that troubled the nineteenth century, but today we recognize that it was not that she walked out, nor what she walked out on, but what she walked into that counted: a quest for self, claming the right of the individual to find her own freedom. "I shall never get to know myself," says Nora to her husband, "I shall never learn in the 1900s,

to face reality

— unless

I

stand alone. ...

I

believe that before

all

else

I

am

Norris

Houghton

being, just as you are — or at least I should try and become one. must think things out for myself." Earlier, Ibsen had described a young man's search for self-realization in his picaresque fantasy, Peer Gynt. That play described a journey that took its protagonist round about from Scandinavia to Africa through a lifetime of deception and self-deception, of hypocrisy and compromise, but brought him home at the end to find salvation in love— a more conventional conclusion, certainly, than Nora's departure from home to find truth in herself. Ibsen thus forecast twenty years before the end of his century a theme that has gripped the stage with ever increasing strength in our own era: the a

human

... I

search for identity. Ibsen's The Wild

Duck

is

likewise astonishing in

insistent confrontation in twentieth-century

its

drama

contemporaneity. will

An

be that between

on modern men and women to "face the with a frequently overwhelming urge to avoid those very things and take refuge in the reassurance of dreams and illusions. Ibsen had already established that Nora and her husband had lived in their "doll's house" of illusion, a house she realized she must leave. The Wild Duck takes its title from the symbol of the wild fowl which, when wounded, "dives to the bottom and bites itself fast in the undergrowth." To Gregers Werle this image epitomizes the Ekdal family, whose members he feels impelled like a dog to pull out of the water of their deceptions. The parallel, of course, breaks down, for the family, unlike the bird, are not drowned, nor do they need resuscitation. It is only that the husband is ignorant of the fact that his wife has given him a daughter by another man. Granted their relationship is based on falsehood, yet — Ibsen contends— lies reality

and

facts," to

illusion:

"be

the pressure

realistic," colliding

can often be more comforting than truth, indeed truth does not in every circumstance set "Illusion

is

man

free.

As Dr.

Relling, the play's raisonneur, observes:

the stimulating principle."

conclusion a half-century

later;

Eugene

O'Neill

so have other dramatists

came to the same done in our time.

Even more striking are August Strindberg's excursions into the Freudian realm of the subconscious and of dreams. His extraordinary A Dream Play was written in 1902, only two years after the publication of Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams. It seems less important to try to make a direct connection than to note that as far back as 1888 Strindberg had written in his Preface to Miss Julie concerning his creation of characters: "My souls are conglomerations of past and present civilizations, bits from books and newspapers, scraps of humanity, rags and tatters of fine clothing, patched together as is the human soul." And in the Preface to A Dream Play he announced that he sought to reproduce the disconnected but apparently logical form of a

dream; .... on a slight groundwork of reality, imagination spins and weaves new patterns made up of memories, experiences, unfettered fantasies, absurdities

and improvisations. The characters are split, crystallize, scatter and converge.

double and multiply; they evaporate,

August Strindberg, lithograph by Edvard Munch, 1896.

But a single consciousness holds sway over them dreamer.

all

that

is

the

modern research

into the

psyche, and properly so, for Strindberg was himself what could be

dubbed

These words reveal sophisticated knowledge

of

and one who was aware of his own illness. In 1894 he had entered what has come to be known as his "inferno," a spiritual and mental crisis of two years duration. Because he was one of the most subjective of writers, his own agonies find voice in his greatest plays. These masochistic torments grew into paranoia that was fed by sex, by doubt of his sanity, of God, of his own soul— by, in sum, all the tortures of the damned. These doubts burst forth in play after play: The Father, Miss Julie, The Dance of Death, Comrades, even The Ghost Sonata, each providing a battleground on which the duel between the sexes is bloodily waged, now naturaa psychopathological case,

listically,

now

symbolically.

Maurice Valency, in his book about Ibsen and Strindberg, The Flower and the Castle, proposes an arresting likeness between the latter and Vincent Van Gogh. Strindberg had no more interest in representing nature as it appeared to others than did the Dutch painter. Both saw life "in unusual shapes and colors, peopled with strange beings, ruled by occult forces, vibrant with such terrors as most people never feel." Valency notes that

Theatre

in the

Twentieth Century

both reported not only what they saw but what they felt, dreamed, surmised, and imagined, without bothering to distinguish between external and internal life. Both, it is true, were propelled by tensions we recognize,

which when repressed lead toward madness. Anton Chekhov was far from being a madman; he was, in fact, a physician. His interest was in diagnosing the ills of others, not in using his own ills as his raw material. Like Ibsen and Strindberg he saw life with a poet's vision, but no three poets ever presented more diverse images.

Of the

three,

Chekhov evoked

condition," because he

made

the greatest sympathy for the

"human

the fewest value judgments; indeed, he had

few to make, for he backed no causes and aired no prejudices (unlike Ibmen with clear and judicious eyes (unlike

sen) but looked at his fellow

Strindberg).

Chekhov prefigured our

century's battle

between

illusion

and

The Cherry Orchard as accurately as did Ibsen in The Wild Duck.

penned of

in his masterpieces a

boredom— the want

Hedda

Gabler. If

of

dozen

an object

Chekhov did

reality in

He

portraits of the disintegrating in

life

— as

also

power

accurately as did Ibsen in

not, like Strindberg, depict the

world

as a fiery

battleground between the sexes, he nonetheless understood the tensions, frustrations, the terrors and the joys, of unrequited and requited love. Whereas Ibsen used the stage often didactically to present man's role in society and to assert his notions of truth, Chekhov worked obliquely to mirror accurately a rather limited group of his fellow men and women. Mirror may be the wrong verb: Chekhov X-rayed his characters, revealing unexpected truths hidden beneath familiar facades. The Russian playwright had extraordinary insights into the psychological motivations of human actions and an uncanny capacity to catch the inner throb of the

human

heart.

Chekhov was aware, as Ibsen was, but as Strindberg was not, of disruptive external pressures on the family, which he regarded as the basic unit of our With Ibsen, he seems to have recognized that the family was but a microcosm of the social structure, but he did not have Ibsen's revolutionary fervor. Indeed, whether or not Chekhov had ever read Marx, certainly he was no socialist. But his plays were full of an awareness that Russia was on the brink of an upheaval. Character after character speaks eloquently of the future, of better days to come. The sale of the cherry orchard, the departure of its owners and all their household save the ancient retainer, Firs — himself as much a metaphor as the axes outside — provide vivid and poignant stage images of social evolution. Ibsen thought change would come if man put his house in order or, better still, tore it down and rebuilt it on firmer foundations of truth. For Chekhov, whether man worked at it or not, change was inevitable and, as such, had both its poignant and its hopeful society.

aspects.

Chekhov's attitude was affectionately captured by his fellow-dramatist, in Reminiscences of Tolstoy, Chekhov and Andreyev:

Maksim Gorky, 10

Norn's

...

he looked

at all these

dreary inhabitants of

his country,

Houghton

and, with a

sad smile, with a tone of gentle but deep reproach, with anguish in his face and in his heart, in a beautiful and sincere voice, he said "You live badly, my friends. It is shameful to live like that."

Bernard Shaw: one

foot in

to them:

each century

George Bernard Shaw was far from was forty-four years old and feeling

ailing

on New Year's Eve

in top form.

He

would, in

of 1900.

He

fact, live to

be ninety-four, thus nearly straddling two centuries. His first play had not been produced until 1892, but since then he had delivered himself of ten masterpieces. to echo Chekhov's "You live badly, my was no "gentle but deep reproach," no "anguish" in his voice when he tackled his fellow Britons. "My conscience is the genuine pulpit article," he announced. "If you don't like my preaching you must

Shaw may have been prepared

friends," but there

lump

it."

He

was prepared to out-Ibsen Ibsen

if

he could. In an encyclopaeis reputed to have written

dia entry, the author of The Quintessence of Ibsenism

about himself: "Mr. Bernard Shaw substituted the theatre for the platform as his chief means of propaganda."

To be sure, Ibsen, as you recall, had had been "more the poet and less the generally believed." Shaw, too,

is

told his audience of ladies that social

he

philosopher than has been

quite ready in his next breath to say,

"My

no more economic treatises than Shakespear's." Ibsen may appear today as less the social reformer than his contemporaries — outstandingly, Shaw himself —thought him, and more eager to fathom the modern enigma of personality. Shaw's ideas, his "social philosophy proper," may seem to the present generation as having "always been confused and uncertain" (the position that Edmund Wilson took, adding, "The real Shaw has thus never been the single-minded crusader that people at one time used to think him"). Nonetheless, both dramatists acquired fame by at any rate appearing to espouse causes, often unpopular ones. Eric Bentley has made the point that "no one will ever be able to say how many minds Shaw changed in the generation growing up in the early years of this century, how many young men and women under his spell began to question marriage, the family, science, religion, and above all, capitalism." One cannot gainsay that Shaw employed his comedic genius to debunk the glamour of war (in Arms and the Man), to twit the medical profession (in The Doctor's Dilemma) and the Irish question {John Bulls Other Island), to challenge the cliche that "poverty is no crime" (Major Barbara), to discuss sex, love, and marriage in unorthodox terms (in a number of plays culminating in Man and Superman), and to write a "fantasia in the Russian manner" {Heartbreak House) in order to expose the scintillating but fatuous aimlessness of "cultured leisured Europe before the War." Out of this broad range of themes, a central one does emerge, binding many of them together. Shaw's principal objective was to show that most of plays are

11

Theatre

in the

Twentieth Century

mores and many

the

cherished

contemporaries were based on young men and women of whom

of the thoughts of his

those

sets of illusions; that

Bentley spoke must toss away their comforting self-deceptions in order to modern world— at least in the World According to

take their places in the

Shaw.

But reassessment, whether by the writer himself or by a later critic, does not alter the fact that both Ibsen and Shaw were primarily concerned with the interaction of man to man, of how we can live together fruitfully and truthfully. Shaw's talk about "the Life Force" may echo Ibsen's "claim of the Ideal" in

its

rhetorical flourish, but their plays continue to vibrate with

life,

not because of such sententious philosophical catch phrases or even because of

what they imply, but because the plays are inhabited by fascinating

characters involved in interesting relationships: Eilert Lovborg with

Hedda

Gabler, Solness with Hilda Wangel, Rebecca West and her Rosmer, Mrs.

Alving and Pastor Manders; Dick Dudgeon, John Tanner, Hesione Hushand such historical figures as Caesar and Cleopatra,

abye, Eliza Doolittle,

Saint Joan, Napoleon.

What

it

comes down

to

is

that both Ibsen

and Shaw were

first

and

foremost dramatists, and only secondly thinkers or philosophers. Ibsen took the "well-made play" he inherited from Eugene Scribe, with sis it

on

plot

a thesis.

and situation; he then enriched Shaw did it backwards; he saw

tance, used his

own

language.

To

its

empha-

with character and applied to

Ibsen's theses as of

first

impor-

worked it out in with an intoxicating

idea as his point of departure and

terms of characters, situations, and gift for

it

recall that

plot, creating plays

Ibsen wrote something

like tragedies (not,

be sure, of the Greek sort) and Shaw comedies (save for Saint Joan) is only to point out the difference in means, not in ends. For great playwrights

to

"the play's the thing," selves

and

no matter how

their publics that

it is

effectively they

the idea

— the

may persuade them-

moral, economic or social

philosophy — that counts. Shaw himself seemed to agree. (He was always

"Would any one but a buffleheaded idiot of a university professor infer that all my plays were written as economic essays and not as plays of life, character and human destiny like contradicting himself, as everyone knows).

those of Shakespear or Euripides?"

The

twentieth century: preoccupations

and fragmentations

Twentieth-century drama

is built upon the cornerstones laid by these three master-builders and their iconoclastic junior partner. It inherits their social agenda, the intensifying preoccupation with materialism that went forward

apace after the Industrial Revolution with readjustments to newly evolving

poor became a confrontation between and the "bourgeoisie" while science and technology ac-

class lines, until the rich against the

the "proletariat"

quired ever increasing momentum. Twentieth-century drama inherits

also,

and perhaps more

the mental and spiritual traumas which haunted the 12

last

significantly,

couple of decades

"

in Ibsen's Hedda Gabler, 1904. "Mrs. Fiske, who had become a legend in our theatre, was an intelligent and talented performer who won considerable distinction by introducing Ibsen to America.

Minnie Maddern Fiske with George Arliss

.

.

.

of the 1800s. It is those which have been especially noted in the paragraphs devoted to Ibsen, Strindberg, Chekhov, with words about reality and illusion, the search for identity, the

subconscious and sexuality

be

it

(all

acknowledgement

of the

power Shaw

subjects not exactly ignored by

of the either,

Read or reread A Doll's House, The Wild Duck, Ghosts, Hedda The Master Builder; The Father, The Dance of Death, A Dream Play, To

noted).

Gabler,

Damascus; The Seagull, The Three

Sisters,

Uncle Vanya, The Cherry Orchard. This

staggeringly rich output of the last quarter of the last century draws us straight into the heart of

meaning

to

life,

its

modern drama

with

its

quest for reality and for

search for the realization of

self

and the means

of

protecting the self against an increasingly mechanistic, technological world.

Modern drama pushes

constantly toward the unmasking of each man's true and the establishment of his individual responsibility. It does so with mounting anxiety as it portrays a fragmenting culture with its crises of faith — in God, in the relevance or even existence of moral absolutes, in the self itself. Eugene O'Neill testified to this, summing up his own agenda and establishing his own priorities in a letter to his friend, the critic George identity

Jean Nathan:

The as

playwright of today must dig at the roots of the sickness of today

he

feels

it

— the

death of the old

God and

the failure of science

and 13

Theatre

in the

Twentieth Century

new one for the surviving primitive meaning for life in and to comfort its fears me that anyone trying to do big work

materialism to give any satisfactory religious instinct to find a

death with. It seems to nowadays must have this big subject behind all the little subjects of plays or novels, or he is scribbling around the surface of things. of

These more or

less

his

metaphysical and psychogenic preoccupations,

al-

when our century began, soon become overpowering. And

ready manifest why not? Twentieth-century

thundering assertion that unveiling a hitherto

technology were in

man arrived on the scene just as Nietzsche's God is dead was still reverberating, as Freud was

unfathomed world full

of the subconscious, as science

gallop carrying us, hats askew

and

and

veils flying,

breathlessly toward the nuclear age.

How

How

sound track ought to be a just and lively image of human nature." The chronicler of our century's drama can hope only to arrest that "just image," to keep his eye on man, a reeling figure buffeted by world wars, by political and social revolutions, by challenges to his mind and imagination, who sees and hears sights and sounds in the ether such as have never been experienced before. The ten or a dozen twentieth-century dramatists who kept their eyes fixed most clearly on human nature in these terms, and who thus serve as prime interpreters of our century are Shaw (already on the scene), Pirandello, Gorky, Synge, O'Casey, O'Neill, Brecht, Williams, Miller, Sartre, and Beckett. There have been others, of course, but these will suffice to mention. Of them, four are Irishmen, three Americans, one is an Italian, one a Russian, one a Frenchman, and one a German. All across the West, then, voices of dramatists have been raised to sound again the alarms concerning the human condition that were heard on the stages of Ibsen, Strindberg, and Chekhov. could the stage mirror the confusion?

pierce through the cacophony?

Pirandello: philosopher of "being

John Dryden once

philosopher in

its

and seeming"

Luigi Pirandello provides another as a

could

said that a "play

his lifetime,

example

of a dramatist

who was

hailed

but whose contribution on review has been,

upgrade his dramaturgy and downgrade his At the time the ideas were admittedly echoes of already familiar

like Shaw's, revised so as to

ideas.

themes, but with

new

variations.

was in the waning days of World War I and the decade which followed that Pirandello, by then already past fifty, began to be taken seriously by It

the cognoscenti.

popularity

(It

of, say,

would be incorrect Shaw.)

He

himself

he ever enjoyed the broad to be treated with gravity. an Author, he introduced himself

to say that

demanded

In the Preface to Six Characters in Search

of

an author to whom "it was never enough to present a man or a woman and what is special and characteristic about them simply for the pleasure of presenting them." Rather he felt a kinship with writers who "feel a more

as

14

Norris

Houghton

These are, more precisely, philosophical writprofound spiritual need. ers. I have the misfortune to belong to these last." In Right You Are (If You Think So) Pirandello had begun his dramatic studies of the enigma surrounding reality and illusion — not just the use men and women make of these phenomena but the meaning of the words themselves: what is reality? what is illusion? May they be the same thing, or perhaps interchangeable? Or variable, not fixed? The Ibsen-Strindberg-Chekhov triumvirate, and Shaw too, had frequently pondered the roles reality and illusion play in individual personalities, making some people face and others evade their responsibilities to society or in their most intimate personal relationships. Pirandello was not concerned with these matters; he was pondering what is truth. It is an important question, but one that might have seemed intractable to dramat.

ic

.

.

treatment. Pirandello proved

it

otherwise. Creating almost melodramatic situations,

and invented characters who dramatized those very Signora Ponza in Right You Are? Her husband claims she questions. Who is is his second wife, his first having died. The wife's mother claims Ponza is deluded: her daughter still lives, is still married to him. Who is the deluded one— mother-in-law or husband? We never find out. Is the title character in Henry IV mad, as everyone in the play assumes, or rational, as the audience is led by the writer to conclude? Have the Six Characters possibly a more fixed reality than the actors who impersonate them in the play within the play? Or have they no reality at all except in their author's he constructed

plots

Is Cia, the focal character in As You Desire Me, a wife who disappeared from her home during the war and is rediscovered? Or is she some other woman altogether? All these questions are posed with extraordinary ambiguity and evoke powerful suspense. Truth, Pirandello seems to

imagination?

argue over and over, eye of the beholder.

is

what you believe

No wonder

it

to be. Like beauty,

it is

in the

these plays have been called "dramas of

being and seeming." This

Italian,

who won

the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1934, two years

before his death, was undoubtedly an intellectual, but a rare one. himself once pointed out that "one of the novelties

I

He

have given to the

modern drama consists in converting the intellect into passion." The statement is somewhat ambiguous. Exciting as is his action, paradoxical as are his

dilemmas, and evasive as are

his

denouements,

his plays

seem saturated

by a sort of "ironical realism"; the dramatist himself remains uncommitted. Is

it,

then, his

own

intellect that

is

converted into passion,

is it

of his characters, or does the process occur in the audience? in brief,

is

the intellect

Toward

what,

the passion directed?

Pirandello spoke for the thoughtful in the generation of the 1920s, not only in his

own country but throughout

seriously affected by Freud,

personality in the

modern

the West, the

one beginning

context.

A

first

generation to be

enigma of we return to his

to re-evaluate the

half-century later

15

Theatre

in the

Twentieth Century

more because they are engrossing and original than because truth is be found there with a capital T. Today we are less impressed by what

plays to

he made of

his

own

to be simply, "It

Dramas

of the

questions: what

is

reality? illusion? for the

answer seems

depends."

all

Common Man:

Synge,

'Casey, the Soviets, Brecht

"The sixteenth century is the Century of the Common Man," observes the one-man Chorus in Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons. After a pause he adds dryly, "Like all the other centuries." For us viewing the twentieth, it is possible to rephrase Bolt's line: ours is the Century of the Common Man. We say it without his irony and with a conviction born of witnessing the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the establishment of the "dictatorships of the proletariat" in Eastern tion that

began

Europe

after 1945, the

Chinese Communist revolu-

in 1949.

Prior to 1900,

drama was

written

and

first

to

mirror

its

aristocratic audience,

middle class; still later, as we have noted especially in Ibsen, Chekhov, and Shaw, it served to attack that middle class's cultural and social prejudices and values. (Continuing middle class domination of the theatre is in large measure also responsible for the survival of Realism as the form most congenial to the taste of the then to cater to the

tastes

sensibilities of a rising

twentieth-century public.) earliest infancy when authentic common men came from the eastern, then from the western perimeters Europe — Russia and Ireland. In 1902 Maksim Gorky, urged by Chekhov apply his considerable talent toward writing for the stage, presented the

Our century was into view onstage, of to

in

its

first

world with a masterpiece, The Lower Depths. The

play's characters

—a

lock-

smith and his dying wife, a hat-maker, a vendor of meat pies, a couple of

longshoremen, a policeman, a shoemaker, a thief, an alcoholic former man about whom nothing is known, and

actor, a seedy "Baron," a pilgrim, a

the couple

who run

the flophouse where this group

intense realism the underside of society, which thority of

who

is

is

lodged— depict with

portrayed with the au-

one who has known that world and with the sympathy

cares deeply about

its

man

of a

inhabitants.

Gorky was a revolutionist. In fact, he wrote one of his plays in prison while By 1906 he had to flee abroad, becoming a political exile for the next eight years. But The Lower Depths is not properly a political play. It is, in fact, one of the major dramas to deal with the familiar theme of reality and illusion. Although one of its most affecting and elo-

serving a political sentence.

quent characters (Luka, the pilgrim) encourages derelicts, his voice

the

shadowy

masters,"

past,

who

position for a

is

who

says,

illusions

among

not the author's. That belongs to Satine, the believes that "lying

"Truth

champion

is

is

with

the religion of slaves and

the god of the free man."

of the proletariat.

these

man

Dreamers do not

It

is

act;

a proper

Gorky's

is

a veiled call to action: "Arise, ye prisoners of starvation!"

And 16

as

Chekhov urged Gorky

to write for the theatre, so William Butler

Konstantin Stanislavsky

in

Maksim Gorky's The Lower Depths, 1902.

Theatre

in the

Twentieth Century

Yeats at about the same time was counseling John Millington Synge. "Go West, young man!" cried Yeats. Synge obeyed, journeyed to the bleak Aran Islands and the green cloudswept West Country of his native land, and produced a handful of plays which contain some of the most beautiful lines written in our language. His subject? The fisherfolk and peasants of Ireland. Synge himself was no more interested in proletarian political and social upheavals than were the characters who inhabited his cottages and pubs — Pegeen Mike and Christy Mahon, the Widow Quinn, Maurya who lost five sons to the sea, her daughters Nora and Cathleen. Life is hard for these folk, but it is lived joyously and freely in The Playboy of the Western World, stoically and with fortitude in Riders to the Sea, Synge's two masterpieces. His people may sleep in ditches or haylofts, run races on the sands, drink "poteen" by the fire— some industrious, some lazing away their days in fine talk— but they possess, as their creator wrote, "a popular imagination that is fiery and magnificent, and tender." The common man never had a more lyrical portraitist

than the Irish prose-poet.

Synge's characters peopled the countryside; those of his compatriot,

young Sean O'Casey, dwelt in the Dublin slums. The latter more resemble what we think of as the twentieth-century proletariat, doubtless because our world is also less dominantly agrarian, and because O'Casey's folk are engaged in revolution and urban barricades: the snipers and their grenades provide more recognizably modern street sights and sounds. However, one must remember that "a play ought to be a just and lively image of

human

nature." So the Easter Rebellion, which was a poignant reality to O'Casey himself and claimed the blood of so many of his characters, provides only the background for an elbowing crowd of raffish, roguish, laughing, weeping common people— Joxer and Captain Boyle in Juno and the Paycock, Fluther and The Covey and Bessie Burgess in The Plough and the Stars, Minnie and Daveron in The Shadow of a Gunman.

To

dramas celebrating the common man, we must add the not work that has all but engulfed the stage in those parts of the world where a Communist government has taken power in the name of the people, where there exists what is usually called proletarian drama. It may seem surprising that the Soviet portion of this has gone all but unnoticed in the outside world between 1917 and the present. Certainly it has not been for lack of output. Dozens of Russian playwrights have turned out hundreds of plays in the past sixty-odd years, but only the most determined American playgoer has seen more than a half-dozen of them on our stages during as many decades. Quality has not kept up with quantity. No first-rate dramatist has appeared since Gorky died in 1936. Vladimir Mayakovsky, a talented futurist poet with a gift for satire, had a meteoric success during the first dozen years after the Revolution, but he committed suicide in 1930. Mikhail Bulgakov and Yevgenny Shvarts, both also now dead, had considerable talent. The former's The Days of the Turbins and Moliere added to the literary fame these

inconsiderable body of

18

Norn's

he acquired through

his novel,

Houghton

The Master and Margarita. Shvarts's reputa-

on a series of dramatized fairy stories, mostly adapted from Andersen and the Grimms (notably The Naked King, The Shadow, The Dragon), ostensibly written for children but which were in fact fashioned into sharply critical satires of Soviet life and values. The reason these two dramatists caused tremors outside Russia was because they found metaphors through which to express with eloquent conviction their faith in the freedom of the tion rests

human

spirit.

The main body U.S.S.R.

because

it

of proletarian

drama has been disregarded

has been picturing a

unsympathetic to Western eyes. For at

life-style

least

outside the

and values irrelevant or

two generations

it

toed the

Party line too closely for Western taste. Neither early Soviet plays about collective

farming and hydroelectric plants nor

later

ones depicting the

new

heroes' and heroines' struggles (which they inevitably won) against so-called anti-revolutionary forces aroused

much enthusiasm

in parts of the world than cosmic. But the real trouble lay in the depiction of a sterile world where man was not free to question, to think, to fulfill himself. Not until the 1970s did a Soviet generation begin to feel less constraint in subject matter and at long last try to create "a just and lively image of human nature." "The theatre entered the province of the philosopher — at any rate, the sort of philosopher who wanted not only to explain the world but also to change it. Hence the theatre philosophized; hence it instructed." So wrote Bertold Brecht shortly before his death in 1956. Brecht was himself a

where these preoccupations seemed

less

change the world. He was also a more than a touch of the polemicist. He was a man of paradoxes: committed yet alienated, active yet passive, pessimistic yet hopeful. In his contradictions Brecht comes closer than most playwrights to epitomizing the plight of the artist in this fractured, fragmented world of the twentieth century. The concluding verse of his St. Joan of the Stockyards addresses his confused generation of whatever political hue and simultaneously reveals his own ambivalence: philosophical dramatist

who wanted

to

poet, a Marxist, a cynic, a nihilist, a moralist with

Humanity! two souls abide Within thy breast!

Do To

not set either one aside: live

with both

is

best!

Be torn apart with constant care! Be two in one! Be here, be there! Hold the low one, hold the high one — Hold the straight one, hold the sly one — Hold the pair!

Whatever the extent of his Marxist commitment (and the Russian Communists have been slow to hail him as a true comrade), Brecht became a

champion

of the

common man and an

ardent opponent of capitalism. His 19

Setting for a

scene

in

Mother Courage and Her Children {Mutter Courage und ihre 1949 production by the Berliner Ensemble.

Kinder), staged by Bertolt Brecht for the

early plays, epitomized by In the Jungle of the

Cities,

assert that in the

modern

world dominated by each man's greed, society resembles nothing so much as a pack of wolves preying on itself. We are all beasts, he seems to say, and there is no health in us. Such pessimism is, of course, alien to the Marxist, who purports to have faith in the perfectibility of both the individual and society. Brecht demanded that the world be changed, but materialistic

even as he uttered the challenge, he questioned the possibility of its fulfillment. This paradox set him apart from his Communist brethren. For them it was obvious that if capitalism is "The Great Satan," saving grace can be found only in its demolition and replacement by socialism. The basic sociopolitical conflict of our century has revolved around the confrontation and partial accommodation of these two systems. But, like many others, Brecht could not quite choose his side. The indignity of the human condition he felt was attributable in part to frailties and pressures within and without the social and economic structure, but man's own waywardness played a part. Furthermore, there was no saving grace to be expected from heaven. Even in The Good Woman of Setzuan, his Chinese gods, saying farewell to Shen Te, the "good woman," depart on their pink cloud mouthing ironic and ambiguous platitudes: "Should the world be changed? How? By whom? No! Everything is in order. Just be good and everything will turn out well!" .

20

.

.

Norris

Houghton

In play after play Brecht pursued his paradoxes. The Threepenny Opera, probably his most warmly received work, written with composer Kurt Weill, draws upon the black world of whores, pimps, and robbers who mouth obscenities

and

practice cynical betrayals of each other

the double-cross as the leit-motif." All this

accompaniment

of

one of

Weill's

is

and the world, "with

contrapuntally set to the

most hauntingly sweet scores — "a lark

singing above battlefield corpses."

Mother Courage and Her Children, Caucasian Chalk

Circle,

Galileo,

The Good Woman

of Setzuan,

Brecht's four major dramas, provide

little

The

light to

guide us through the dark streets of the poet's imagination. Whether he

War, as in Mother Courage, or the Inquisition muzzle Galileo, the man of science, or offers us ironic Chinese

writes of the Thirty Years' setting out to

drawn into intolerable situations, and cynicism (as in Mother Courage) or as the victim of others' ignorance and reactionary pigheadedness (as in Galileo), hypocrisy and rapacity (as in The Good Woman). For Brecht, the twentieth century is not a happy or a hopeful time to live. parables, his characters are repeatedly

either through their

own

American drama comes

of age:

The

cupidity

O'Neill— Williams— Miller

twentieth century was not a happy or a hopeful time for

Eugene

bore no relationship to the class struggle. "Who wants to see life as it is if they can help it?" cries Edmund Tyrone in Long Day's Journey into Night. For "Edmund" we read "Eugene," for the O'Neill, either, although his despair

Eugene

O'Neill.

Theatre

in

the Twentieth Century

is about the author's family, and the younger son is himself. To look of America's only Nobel Prize-winning dramatist, taken photograph at a during the last decade of his life — the decade during which that line was penned — is to see the face of a sensitive, pain-ridden, brooding human being. The pain could be attributable to the Parkinson's Disease which was slowly eroding his body and mind; the sensitivity and brooding had been his throughout most of his life, and they were bred of the spirit. In the same play the same character continues his agonizing self-analysis:

play

It

was a great mistake,

more

my

being born a man.

successful as a seagull or a

fish.

As

it

is.

I I

would have been much will

always be a

who never feels at home, who does not really want and wanted, who can never belong. %sho must always be a little

stranger

is

really

in

not

love with death.

American dramatists whose work increased grew older. His last great quartet, Long Day's The Iceman Cometh. A Moon for the Misbegotten, A Touch of the

O'Neill was one of the few in

power and

Journey Poet,

stature as he

into Night,

provided the world with arresting insights into the spiritual malaise of

our century. They are not couched in glowing poetrv or trenchant wit (or even very fine prose). They are at odds with America's widely held optimism, even its humor. They are oblivious to political, social, or economic theories. They rise from the dark night of the soul when a man ponders his role in the cosmic scheme. In his initial full-length play. Beyond the Horizon, which won for him his first Pulitzer Prize in 1921, O'Neill revealed how seriously he took the theatre as a vehicle for his brooding, and how somber was to be his palette. Two or three themes are present. (He returned to them time and again.) First, there is the haunting question that keeps being asked by modern dramatists: what shall a man live by. the dream or the fact? The playwright indicates at once his position: "In Beyond the Horizon there are three acts of

two scenes each. One scene is out of doors, showing the horizon, suggesting the man's desire and dream. The other is indoors, the horizon gonesuggesting what has come between him and his dreams." Life is too painful to be dealt with head-on. One must try to find some protection. In The Iceman Cometh and

A Moon

for the Misbegotten

"pipe dream": in Long Day's Journey

drink for the others.

And

fog.

it is

alcohol seems to sustain the

morphine

for at least

one character,

In play after play, O'Neill, a great lover of

the sea, uses fog as his symbol for illusion. "I really love fog.

It hides you from the world and the world from you." says Mary Tyrone, and her younger son echoes her: "Fog is where I wanted to be. Everything looked and sounded unreal." A second theme asserts itself in Beyond the Horizon: the conflicting aims and values of the materialist and the artist. More than one American dramatist of this century has been attracted to the problem of reconciling the two. George S. Kaufman and Marc Connelly wrote a satiric fantasy on .

22

.

.

Norn's

Houghton

and S. N. amusing ideas concerning the clash in such plays as Holiday, High Tor, The Second Man. Abroad, Jean Anouilh made it a major theme of his work. But no one more insistently probed it than O'Neill, in Marco Millions, The Great God Brown, Dynamo, Days without End. One could say the subject, Beggar on Horseback; Philip Barry, Maxwell Anderson,

Behrman had

that this

is

refreshingly

merely a restatement of the

reality/illusion motif, with the

materialist-businessman cast in the role of

realist,

the poet-artist as the

dreamer. However you look at it, the conflict is between basic values, whether consciously pursued or unconsciously induced. A balanced culture requires both, but America has not become aware of this, O'Neill seems to say, and continues to weigh the scale in favor of the materialist. A sense of "belonging," or, more correctly, of not belonging (another way of saying "alienation"), also absorbed O'Neill in his first play. Two brothers, whose conflict of interest sparks the action, are drawn by circumstance to exchange roles, with near-tragic consequences for both as the dreamer tries to adapt to the reality of running a farm and the doer is destined to wander aimlessly. The search for one's place in life also underlies The Hairy Ape, where Yank, a maladjusted stoker on an ocean liner, finds his only fulfill-

ment

in the fatal

To these

embrace

of a gorilla at the zoo.

three themes can be added a fourth: psychosexual relationships

within the family. In O'Neill's two closest approximations to tragedy, Desire

Under

the

Elms and Mourning Becomes

Electra,

he turns

to father-son,

mother-

son, father-daughter relationships to dramatize the destructive drives that

have disrupted nature and invited calamity from the Greeks to our own embraces these twin basic urges of man — to

day. Desire Under the Elms also

possess his

own

of these desires,

and to pass it on to his offspring. The denial combined with the sexual complications between son and

piece of land

stepmother, could well have led to tragedy, but the play

falls

short of that

because the characters lack grandeur of soul and their creator lacks the

language to compensate.

As O'Neill recognized, his version of the Oresteia, Mourning Becomes Electra, component. Aeschylus explored the relationship of man to God — the divine conundrum— and of justice clashing with mercy. The twentieth-century playwright, having lost touch with God, falls back on Freud as a surrogate Athene, and the result is less than satisfactory. It has been said of Ibsen, Shaw, and Pirandello that the judgments of their contemporaries have been overturned by time, that their excellences may be judged as deriving more from their technical prowess as playwrights than from the power of their ideas. I suspect that O'Neill will experience also lacks a critical

the reverse: his

skill as

a dramatist will be recognized as inferior to the

profundity of his subject matter. Even

works with growing consternation

upon

his situations

and the ineptitude

later plays a substantial

now one

at the

rereads most of his early

he places one finds in his meaningful problems and dilem-

melodramatic

strains

of his language, but

grasp of the truly

mas faced by twentieth-century man. 23

Laurette Taylor,

right,

playing the part of the mother,

Glass Menagerie, 1945, makes a dress long enough Laura

(Julie

Haydon). "The

women

young Prozorov women

in

in

Williams's The

to hide the limp of

daughter

ofThe Glass Menagerie are stranded, their

memory', much like the unresolved Chekhov's The Three Sisters."

lives unresolved, in Williams's 'play of

the

Amanda,

lives of

Norn's

Houghton

one to confront such themes. The guns of World were scarcely stilled when America's two most thoughtful dramatic interpreters of our postwar world took center stage. Tennessee Williams was thirty-four, Arthur Miller twenty-nine. During the following decade they hopscotched through the theatrical seasons. Williams turned out first The Glass Menagerie in 1944, then A Streetcar Named Desire in 1947, The Rose Tattoo in 1950, Cat on a Hot Tin Roof in 1955; Miller produced All My Sons in 1947, then Death of a Salesman in 1949, The Crucible in 1953, A View from the Bridge in 1955. With those eight plays the two dramatists vied to inherit the mantle of O'Neill. In the end, they tore it down the middle. Their first major works defined their lineages and their differences. Williams sprang from Chekhov, Miller from Ibsen. Williams staked his claim to the psychological understanding, poetic insight, and felicity of expression of the Russian, Miller to the sense of social responsibility and cry of conscience that animated the Norwegian. Williams used indirection and an amalgam of laughter and tears to win sympathy for his harrowed humans. Miller roused passion blended with indignation to hold his audiences transfixed. He hoped, as he put it, that "by the route of passion may be opened up new relationships between a man and men, and between men and Man." This he accomplished. Both playwrights inherited from their spiritual progenitors one common concern— the ongoing conflict between reality and self-delusion which had attracted Ibsen in The Wild Duck and Chekhov in The Cherry Orchard. In both The Glass Menagerie and A Streetcar Named Desire, Williams, like Chekhov, painted portraits of women who, reminscent of Madame Ranevsky, cannot bear to face the harsh facts of changing life. Amanda Wingfield takes refuge in a "magnolia-scented past," her daughter, Laura, in her collection of old phonograph records and glass animals. Blanche Du Bois in Streetcar is haunted in her dreams by strains of the Varsoviana and pursuing admirers O'Neill was not the only

War

II

who never

materialize.

The women

of The Glass Menagerie are stranded,

memory," much like the young Prozorov women in Chekhov's The Three

their lives unresolved, in Williams's "play of

unresolved Sisters.

lives of

Blanche's

the

life

ends in the confinement of a lunatic asylum. In from reality may sometimes be essential to retain

Williams's view, escape one's sanity.

In Death his

of

a Salesman, Willy

unconscious effort to

for the

wreckage of

all

Loman's self-delusion

instill

three

it

in his sons

lives.

is

is

in large

deeply ingrained and

measure responsible

In Miller's earlier play, All

My

Sons,

another father deludes himself that he can avoid responsibility for past crimes by formally refusing to admit guilt, but the author sternly allows his protagonist no way out but suicide. Conscience, along with the acceptance of social responsibility for one's actions,

would seem

to

be for Miller twin

imperatives of moral behavior. Their assumption leads John Proctor, the protagonist of The Crucible, to choose death rather than deny his conscience

25

Theatre

and

Twentieth Century

in the

tion with his It

also

Eddie Carbone, the leading character

his responsibility;

may be

sexual in origin.

guilt.

Certainly in Miller's

The

is

his servant girl, Abigail Williams,

and

resolution as

is

The

illusion,

is

Biff,

that his father

over his adulterous liaison with subsequent rejection of her leads

The

Crucible.

Again, the unwilling

of his incestuous desire for his niece moti-

expiation of guilt

fidelity to

a Salesman

of

Carbone

and

guilt his

directly to the central catastrophe of

recognition by Eddie

necessarily

guilts, regularly

responsible for the growing alienation be-

tween the two. So, too, John Proctor's

vates his suicide.

work the two

stems from private

discovery by Willy Loman's son,

has had extra-marital affairs

and

from

life.

constantly interact. Public conscience

Death

A View

a truism to observe that characters plagued by conscience are

anguished with

reality

in

recognizes that to have denied those forces requires expia-

the Bridge, finally

is

as necessary to these

dramas'

conscience.

concerned, however, with more than the themes of

conscience and

guilt. It

focuses with equal force

disastrous consequences of lives dedicated to false values. Willy

on the

Loman

is

persuaded that material success transcends all else. He is prepared to cheat and lie and to encourage his sons to do likewise, on the theory that the end justifies the means. He never realizes that the end is unworthy. He believes that with a smile and a shoeshine he can conquer the world, not only liked but well-liked, unaware that integrity, maintained at higher cost, pays better dividends. Be on guard, warns Miller, lest the American dream, wrongly interpreted, lead only to bankruptcy of the spirit. Salesman is redeemed finally

by love, by the author's posthumous reprieve for his hero:

graveside Willy's best friend reminds his sons that "a salesman

dream, boy.

It

comes with the

territory."

What

counts

is

at his

is

got to

the kind of

dream

it is.

Tennessee Williams also understands that a man or woman "is got to dream." He understands, too, something of the desperation that is felt by those

who

suffer

their fellows.

from

loneliness,

He understands

ters are not always explicitly

Chekhov

from the

inability to

communicate with

sexual hunger and deprivation. These mat-

expounded; they are dealt with much as and condemn his more did Chekhov. Like the latter, Williams

did, by indirection. Williams does not judge

characters as Miller does.

No

sympathizes with them, laughs at their foibles, but never sentimentalizes.

John Mason Brown, an eminent critic of the time, recognized Williams's resemblance to Chekhov. Writing of Blanche in his review of Streetcar, Brown said: "Mr. Williams understands and would have us understand what has brought about her decline. He passes no moral judgment. He does not condemn her. He allows her to destroy herself and invites us to watch her

in the process."

Chekhov, Williams writes prose that is warmly lyrical. This bathes even the most sordid of his scenes (and one cannot deny that there is much that is sordid and perverse) in an incandescent glow. He has Finally, like

gift

26

Houghton

Norn's

a sharp ear for the

common

speech, especially of his native South, and he

has the knack of being able to reproduce until

it

takes

on the condition

of poetry,

it;

but more, he can heighten

much

as

it

Synge and O'Casey could

do.

To what extent are these two American dramatists of the 1940s and 1950s What have they contributed to better understanding of the preoccupations of their fellow men through their work true interpreters of their time?

in the theatre of the twentieth century? It

one's contemporaries their best

work

when both

to date

are

still

is

difficult to pass

alive

and

judgment on

writing. Nonetheless,

was done almost a quarter-century ago, so some

perspective should be possible.

Unexpectedly, both writers seem oblivious to the aftermath of the world's greatest convulsion,

protagonist

is

World War

II.

True, in

My

Miller's All

Sons, the

involved in a wartime scandal concerning the manufacture

of faulty airplane parts sold to the

government; but

this

is

really only a

man is an Loman's career in selling is in no way affected by the war or postwar reaction. It comes to an end because Willy can no longer deliver the goods. His sons Biff and Happy grow up in a world unclouded by impending war or by the preceding Depression years. The world of Tennessee Williams is equally insulated. Only a few lines spoken by the son in the prologue and epilogue to The Glass Menagerie establish any connection with the world outside. Says Tom: timely device to illustrate the author's principal point that "no island."

I

turn back time ... to that quaint period, the

thirties,

when

the huge

middle class of America was matriculating in a school for the blind. In Spain there was revolution. Here there was only shouting and confusion. In Spain there was Guernica. of labor,

sometimes pretty

Chicago, Cleveland,

And

St.

.

.

.

Here there were disturbances

violent, in otherwise peaceful cities

such as

Louis.

"Nowadays the world is lit by lightning! Blow out your Nothing about A Streetcar Named Desire or The Rose Tattoo or Cat on a Hot Tin Roof or any other Williams or Miller play written between 1947 and 1952 bears any relation to America's contemporary social, political, or economic concerns or to its mental or spiritual traumas deriving therefrom. Just as one would not know that Chekhov's world was on the at the end;

candles,

Laura

"

brink of the Russian Revolution of 1905, so Williams's works could have as

been written ten years earlier or ten years later than they were. It seems merely a matter of the author's personal maturation. The thundering exception is Miller's The Crucible. If there had been no

well

House Un-American Activities Committee, no Senator Joseph McCarthy, there would have been no Crucible. Those black and hypocritical days fired Miller to fury and from that white heat emerged this one superb drama.

The

Salem witch-trials to the blacklists and the personal betrayals that occurred under political

parallel of the seventeenth-century

of the early 1950s

27

Theatre

in the

Twentieth Century

pressure seems so apt once Miller has hit upon it that one can only assent which he arrived there.

to the leap of imagination by

For Williams and Miller, man is and must always be the subject of drama. Not scientific progress, not political revolution or social evolution, not wars and rumors of wars, but man — how he conducts himself, how he grows or shrivels, how he faces life and death. They are seeking Dryden's "just and lively image of human nature." and

Sartre

Beckett: philosopher-playwrights of existentialism

The American

theatre has not been hospitable to philosophers, at any rate

not as some European theatres have. Americans have

fairly successfully

kept their eyes on man, but they have not assigned him a role in the divine comedy; they have spent little time or energy seeking to define him or relate

him to God. To see that, we must turn to France, especially during these same early postwar Williams-Miller years. France and America experienced very different wars. We never felt ours arose from any paralysis of national will. We were never invaded and occupied. We had few collaborators, needed no Resistance. How otherwise it was for the French, among them Jean-Paul Sartre, who began writing for the theatre in 1943 after serving in a German prison camp, and in whom the war evoked profound reactions which he shared with his disillusioned French compatriots. In their humiliation he and they found existentialism a congenial philosophy. surely unnecessary here to attempt its definition. Suffice it to say that denying the existence of God, of any fixed standards of conduct or verifiable moral codes, "the just image of human nature" takes on new meaning. Without values external to him, and with no given human nature, It is

in

man must

create his

own

values, the existentialists said.

own

choices

man

has the necessity, Sartre wrote in Forgers

and accept

responsibility for them.

As a

He must make

his

totally "free" being,

of Myths (1946), an essay on drama, "of having to work and die, of being hurled into a life already complete which yet is his own enterprise and in which he can never have a second chance; where he must play his cards and take risks no matter what the cost." For Sartre, the stage was the ideal medium through which to disseminate this philosophy: the very nature of the dramatic form lent itself to the spectacle of man's existential situation, of the necessity to act. In No Exit and in his next play, The Flies, a reworking of the Electra-Orestes-Clytemnestra legend, this philosopher-playwright accomplished the extraordinary feat of dramatizing his philosophical position far more explicitly than had Piran-

existential

dello. In

No

Exit,

Sartre presents us with three persons locked in a

room

from which there is no escape. They are dead and in hell, condemned to re-live together through eternity the choices made during their lifetimes. By the final curtain, hope has been eliminated.

28

Norn's

Houghton

The Flies also possesses its own symbolistic system. The plague of flies with which Argos is afflicted (a Sartrean invention) is the plague of guilts which, Sartre felt, were sucking the life blood of France at that time, even as they had done in the ancient kingdom. The land can be saved only if these guilts— avenging furies— can be exorcised. It is this action that Orestes takes upon himself, one vastly more significant than avenging his father's death by killing his mother. He both succeeds and fails in his self-appointed mission: he finds freedom for himself, but ironically at the cost of banishment by his fellow countrymen and disavowal by his sister. Both plays are grim, pessimistic readings of the

To many American lo's,

seems

drama

condition.

alien: to start with a philosophical

to explicate

and

illustrate

it.

concept and then invent a

The American

writer

is

much happier

drawing a picture and then looking to see it illustrates anything beyond itself —whether, keeping the intellect it, his subconscious may have endowed the work with more than he

working whether out of

human

dramatists, Sartre's use of the theatre, like Pirandel-

in reverse fashion,

was aware. Sartre

and Pirandello are now both dead. The twentieth-century theatre there are no other dramatists of the next generation who

feels their loss, for

have chosen to

try to

mar Bergman comes

dramatize metaphysics. Perhaps the filmmaker Ingcloser to doing that than any writer for the stage. Samuel

Beckett, 1965.

Theatre

Twentieth Century

in the

Samuel Beckett, however,

is still

tion he belongs, certainly, in the

there

is

alive

and while not

company

of the next genera-

But have

of philosophical dramatists.

a distinction. Sartre's plays have a polemical ring; they

seem

to

persuade the spectator to accept Sartre's philosophical man and transfer it to the idea of man. Beckett simply dramatizes the human condition, finding metaphors for what he feels its state to be. This may be why Beckett's work has acquired more universal favor than Sartre's, even though his conclusion is equally

been written position.

to

They

take the focus off

bleak.

Born

and writing

in French, Beckett first astonwhich appeared in 1953. It had an original run of four hundred performances (in an admittedly tiny theatre), and has been translated into more than twenty languages. During the five years after its premiere, more than a million people, it has been claimed, succumbed to its peculiar appeal, and goodness knows how many more in Dublin, living in Paris

ished the world with Waiting

for Godot,

have done so since then. Many interpretations have been offered of this ambiguous drama. For Peter Brook, the English stage director, the play is a symbol "in an exact sense of the word." Pursuing his point he continues: "When we say 'symbolic' is

is,

we often mean something drearily obscure: a true symbol is specific; it Brook is right. The whole work indeed, a symbol: the waiting of Estragon and Vladimir is as much a

the only form a certain truth can take."

symbol

as the Godot for

whom they wait, or the tree beneath which their vigil

takes place, or the couple,

So

it is

Lucky and Pozzo, who interrupt their dialogue.

in all Beckett's work.

blindness of

Hamm,

its

The

parents in the dustbins of Endgame, the

protagonist; the emptiness of

symbolic and together create a total symbol

its

landscape, are

all

— for the emptiness of existence.

So does the lady buried to her waist in the sand in Happy Days, as do the tape and the

man

in Krapp's Last Tape.

Harold Hobson, the distinguished critic of The Times of London, some years ago wrote, "The feeling which Mr. Beckett expresses on the stage is a note heard nowhere else in contemporary drama. ... He is without hope and without faith." I disagree. Hobson overlooked, in the first place, the much more nihilistic dramas of Sartre and Albert Camus. In Waiting for Godot, the fact is that man does not give up his vigil, he does put off suicide until tomorrow, he continues to wait, offering meanwhile loyalty, kindness, and concern for his fellow man. "We have kept our appointment," says Vladimir. "We are not saints, but we have kept our appointment." Beckett is

not without

faith,

not without hope.

Reflections on the state of tragedy

When

Dickens wrote

Tale of

Two

Cities,

the worst of times

and comedy

his oft-quoted

paradoxical opening paragraph to A

remarking that not only was

—

was the spring of hope;

it

"the best of times;

it

was

was the winter of despair," he might well have been summarizing the pages that have preceded, except 30

It

it

Norn's

been

that there has "best,"

on

significantly

incredulity, darkness,

and hope. That being the possible, a

Comedy

more emphasis on the "worst" than the and despair rather than on belief, light, worthwhile looking again to see,

if

the inverse of tragedy, laughter the antidote for tears. So

it

more balanced is

Houghton

case,

it

is

picture.

has always been said. But in twentieth-century dramatic writing

we

find a

breakdown of these formerly accepted categories. That is why Dickens's paradoxes are relevant: it has been both the best and worst of times, simultaneously a season of light and of darkness. Chekhov was saying that when he called his serious The Seagull and The Cherry Orchard "comedies"; so was Beckett when he filled his bleak Waiting for Godot with ancient slapstick comic devices and turned his no-man's land into a haven for Charlie Chaplins. Even as O'Casey was recording tribulation and death in Dublin's back streets, he was evoking wild Irish mirth in the doings and sayings of his collection of drunks and scalliwags. And then, of course, there was Shaw, treating with his coruscating wit many of the most serious subjects bedeviling the age.

There are those who say

had already disappeared before the men and moral absolutes. But with the denial

that tragedy

nineteenth century. Certainly, by the end of that hundred years

women had abandoned of

good and

evil,

their faith in

there was no longer a frame of reference by which to judge

men's actions. Black and white were mixed in a wave of gray. Gray

may

cannot induce exaltation. From the days of Aeschylus and Sophocles to our own, without exaltation there has rarely been tragedy.

avoid despair;

it

would argue that Ibsen never wrote a tragedy (although some claim comes close); Miss Julie and The Father are not tragedies; and in our own century neither is Saint Joan, nor Mourning Becomes Electra, nor A Streetcar Named Desire. Death of a Salesman may be an exception because of the sense of the universality it evokes. The admirers of Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons can make an excellent case for that play. Surely the spectacle of Sir Thomas More preferring death to the sacrifice of his own integrity reminds us once again of that greatness of spirit through which pain can be transmuted into glory. But the dramas of Brecht, Sartre, and Beckett by no means fulfill the properly rigorous requirements: serious, troubled, despairing even, but tragic— no. As Edith Hamilton puts it in her deceptively simple little book, The Greek Way, "When humanity is seen as devoid of dignity and significance, trivial, mean and sunk in dreary hopelessness, then I

Ghosts

the spirit of tragedy departs." So, whether one likes it or not, one is bound to conclude that in the past hundred years tragedy has all but slipped away, to be replaced by serious dramas, problem plays, and a few philosophical works that have often

portrayed

man

as helpless,

Poetry has also the periods of

days of

le

its

but seldom as heroic.

but disappeared from the stage in this century. During greatness — Greece, Elizabethan England, France in the

all

roi soleil— dramatists

turned

instinctively to poetry as their

mode 31

Theatre

the Twentieth Century

in

For more than a hundred and fifty years now our stages have reverbrated to no "mighty line," no lyrical outpourings. Pushkin and Goethe were the last major poets to assay the drama with any success and both of them, like T. S. Eliot and Yeats a century later, were better poets than playwrights. "It is inescapable," Maxwell Anderson pointed out in his The Essence of Tragedy, "that prose is the language of information, poetry the language of emotion." From the moment that our dramatists became absorbed in facts as a substitute for truth, Realism as the most accurate expression of reality, science as the new god, wonder and mystery disappeared. "To be or not to be? That is the question," muses Hamlet. "My way of life has fallen into the sere, the yellow leaf," sighs Macbeth. "Ah'm tired of livin' and feared of of expression.

dyin'," sings Joe in Showboat. plicitly,

stating a fact;

The

twentieth-century songwriter speaks ex-

Shakespeare turns the same world-weariness into

poetry.

Something ence has

else has

lost its

tions revolution,

and

happened

hearing.

by

this

The is

to

push poetry

twentieth

meant

is

off

the stage. Today's audi-

the century of the communica-

principally the invention of the mass

meant, in turn, the replacement of the and television bear considerable blame for robbing our stage of its poetry, and that may be one reason it lacks the emotional power required for great tragedy. What of comedy? Tragedy may have disappeared or suffered a seachange, but surely comedy is still at home on our twentieth-century stages? The difficulty with this is that comedy presupposes a fixed society with media,

films,

word by the

television;

visual image.

certain accepted

norms

by

this

Motion

is

pictures

of behavior.

It

is

deviations

from the norm

of

custom and conduct, whether they be those of Alceste or Harpagon, Sir Politick Would-Be or Sir Andrew Aguecheek, Khlestakov, the fake Inspector General or Fancourt Babberly, Charley's fake aunt from Brazil, that evoke our laughter. But society in our century has been nothing if not fluid. Its frames of reference with regard to accepted behavior have changed with incredible speed. What seemed funny in the 1880s draws yawns in the 1980s; comedies and musicals of the 1920s are revived only for their quaintness. H.M.S. Pinafore charms today because of its Sullivan score and the intricacy of Gilbert's verse-patterns, not

because of the fun

it

pokes

at the

Royal Navy:

enough Navy left to laugh at. As comedy is supposed to reflect the state of society, and as the mores of Moscow and Monte Carlo have little in common, those Russians who laughed at Katayev's Squaring the Circle in the 1930s would almost certainly have found little to roll in the aisles over at Coward's Private Lives, produced in the same decade. So, place works against comedy as well as time does. So does the social order. Admittedly, one can learn more from Restoration comedy about the high life of late seventeenth-century London than can be culled from the history books, but the Wits offer us in their mirrors no there

32

isn't

Norris

Houghton

own; we get no images of Midland farmers, say, or Cornish fishermen in 1690. To be sure, certain comedies defy time, place, and custom. They exist reflections but their

independently in an

artificial

climate that parodies real

Oscar Wilde's The Importance

Being Earnest

life

but does not

the classic example.

reflect

it.

Then

there are

Italian

Straw Hat (Le Chapeau de Paille dTtalie). Again, there are comedies

some

farces of

of

is

Feydeau and Pinero, and Labiche's The

founded on

basically ludicrous situations, such as mistaken identity or some presumption. Plautus's Menaechmi becomes Shakespeare's The Comedy of Errors, then turns into Rodgers's and Hart's The Boys from Syracuse.

fatuous

The Roman

Miles Gloriosus

becomes

first Sir

John

Falstaff,

century Aubrey Piper in George Kelly's The Show-Off.

The

then twentieth-

point

is

that these

comedies are based on sure-fire laugh-provoking complications or human caricatures; they are nearer to farce than comedy in that they mock our society but

do not illuminate it. and "social" comedy would not

So, then, satire

alter serious

drama's

conclusions concerning the stage's interpretation of the century. Most of

our comedians under cover of laughter would lead us to equally bleak we have become familiar with an appellation that seems to fit: "black comedy." Was not Louis Kronenberger correct when he announced that comedy is not to be confused with optimism? That it is "much more reasonably associated with pessimism?" After all, who in the present generation would say with Robert Browning's Pippa (he did not conclusions. In recent times

say

it

himself) that "God's in His

Heaven/

All's right

with the world."

The interpreters "The play's the thing/ Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the But the idea did not occur to him until the Players appeared. Thus far, Ibsen and some of his successor playwrights down to Beckett have held our attention. Now it is time for the players, and with them all the other Said Hamlet, king."

contributors to the event.

There

is

only so

much

course, what he does

nowadays a

is

a dramatist— even

basic;

director's guiding

Ibsen— can do on

his

own. Of

but without playhouses and players, without

hand and designers

of setting, lighting,

not theatre— and theatre

and

is

our

with the great dramatists of the

last

costumes, his creation remains literary,

it is

subject.

Having begun

this retrospective

twenty years of the 1800s, the spotlight

now swings back

to refocus

on those

same two decades, but this time on the theatrical styles that prevailed. There is always an organic relationship between form and content in any art, or there should be. In the performing arts we find that save for composers and dramatists, artists are interpreters, rarely creators. Thus, in the

33

John Barrymore, 1922

(left,

above), Alexander Moissi, 1925

Gielgud, during the 1930s (above), use their "truth to

Shakespeare's Hamlet.

life"

(left),

and John

interpretations of

"

David Garrick, costumed

for the role of

Richard

III;

engraving by William Hogarth,

1746. "More than a hundred years earlier David Garrick

audiences by his

true-to-life style

had astounded English

of acting.

theatre, the only necessity for actors, directors, to express the intent of the dramatists, to

and designers

adapt their

exploring the most effective means for giving

life

is

skills to

to the play

to find ways

the task of

and enhancing

the style of the playwright. Realism rules the stage

Unquestionably the new

and grandiloquence

style of

of the

the 1880s was Realism. After the fustian

Romantic

into the chilling waters of "truth to

it was refreshing to plunge wherever that current might draw

afflatus,

life,"

had asserted, in the Preface to his dramatization of Therese no longer be any school, no more formulas, no standards of any sort; there is only life itself We must delve into the living drama of the two-fold life of the character and its environment, bereft of every nursery tale, historical trapping and the usual conventional stupidities." In the same place he said that "the experimental and scientific spirit of the century will enter the domain of the drama and ... in it lies its only one. In 1873 Zola

Raquin, that "there should

possible salvation."

"Truth

It assumes there is comwhat "truth" is, as to what is meant by "life." For the nineteenth-century Realists— and their nephews, the Naturalists — truth was regularly thought to be based on acceptance of the outwardly observa-

to life"

mon agreement

36

is

a perilously simplistic phrase.

as to

Norris

Houghton

new "scientific spirit" revealed; "life" for them was still mankind, but now living in and conditioned by an environment that encompassed "new" concepts of moral, social, and political order whose influences must be understood and taken into account. I have long been attracted to the notion that in those ages when things of the spirit are held most precious (as in the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance), art turns away from the depiction of life's externals. It seeks to find symbols and abstractions to express the unseen and a language — poetry, to be precise — that can lift us out of the give-and-take of daily life. On the other hand, at those times when materialism dominates — the days, say, of the later Roman Empire, the Jacobean and Restoration ages in England, and much of the West after the Industrial Revolution — the most congenial artistic attitude is Realism, of which prose seems the appropriate ble facts that the

expression. it goes a long way toward explaining why Realism embraced with such enthusiasm in the last decades of the nineteenth century and which it has had such difficulty letting go in our own time. It helps to explain, too, why both Ibsen's "social" plays and

If this

was the

notion

is

valid,

style the theatre

Chekhov's "scenes of country life" found their natural expression in prose; why Strindberg cast off Realism and Naturalism in favor of Symbolism and Expressionism when the subconscious or mystical experience took over in A Dream Play, The Ghost Sonata, To Damascus. Arthur Miller has his own favorite notion to account for the hold Realism has had since Ibsen. "I have come to wonder whether the force or pressure

equally,

that

makes

for Realism, that

even requires

family relationship within the play," he says.

The

it, is

I

the magnetic force of the

confess

I

have some

difficulty

been with us since the House of Atreus, but Aeschylus had his mind less on family relationships than on the Almighty, and Shakespeare was more concerned with the nature of evil and man's capacity to become "habituated to sin" than in the domestic ties of Macbeth with

this.

family has

to his lady-wife.

Nevertheless,

it is

true that Ibsen, Strindberg,

Chekhov (and Shaw much

of the time) did develop their theses in terms of the family: Ibsen's Alvings

and Ekdals, Chekhov's Prozorovs and Ranevskys, Shaw's Morells and Undershafts. So today do O'Neill, Williams, and Miller himself. But when Ibsen wants to present "a

man

seen alone," Miller continues, "confronting nonand forces," he sends Peer Gynt out of

familial openly social relationships

room and into a world of poetic fantasy. Not only does the form language change from prose to poetry; so does the style of the whole And when O'Neill, Brecht, Sartre, and Beckett take as their subject not in familial but in broadly social or philosophical terms, Realism

the living of the play.

man

does not seem to

satisfy

them

either,

and new forms must be explored. And must also change. Realistic

as the intent of dramatists alters, acting styles

drama with

requires realistic performances.

idealized

kings

When

the concern ceases to be

and queens, and warriors and courtesans are 37

Eleonora Duse, 1896.

possessed!"

".

.

.

what inner radiance and

spirituality this Italian artist

Norris

Houghton

replaced by middle -class parents and their offspring, by salesmen and

and farmers, the very timbre of the voice The same is true of the environment. The palace becomes a parlor, a bedroom, and a bath, the battlefield a bench schoolteachers, by day laborers

changes, the body moves differently. in a public park. It

was not easy for nineteenth-century actors, accustomed to roles of demand, to scale their performances

heroic proportions and a great vocal

down

to

life size.

actor to find a

The

way

and the aside required the unspoken feelings and thoughts

abolition of the soliloquy

of expressing his inner

without recourse to the convention of direct address to the audience. For designers schooled by the Bibienas, those masters of Baroque scene design, it

was equally

difficult to

become reconciled to representations new Realism offered no

or garrets; but the requirements of the "Truth

to life":

of kitchens alternative.

Stanislavsky, Saxe-Meiningen, Antoine, the Americans

A few actors had prepared the way for the transition. More than a hundred years earlier David Garrick to-life style

of acting.

had astounded English audiences by his truea contemporary critic: "Garrick's imagi-

Commented

nation was so strong and powerful that he transformed himself into the

man

he represented." Another observed that he performed his roles "so ." In succeeding Truth they are not perform'd at all. generations Salvini in Italy, Schroder in Germany, Shchepkin in Russia, and Sarah Bernhardt in France mesmerized the public by the truth of their acting. (It is possible to wonder, rather churlishly, as one reads eyewitness accounts of their performances, how true to actual behavior their technique would seem to a late twentieth-century audience.) But the transition from romantic excess to realistic spareness was long and difficult. It took quite altered technique to bring acting into step with modern realistic stage naturally as that in

.

.

behavior.

Out

of time stood Eleanora Duse. In 1900 she was already in her forties,

whose technique appeared (like Garrick's?) to doing nothing. But, according to those who saw her, what inner

a figure of infinite mystery consist in

radiance and spirituality

was her simplicity.

It

this Italian artist possessed!

derived from

total

immersion

And how in

deceptive

her role and the

winnow out everything

that was extraneous to the realization of have ever seen in this country who shared that precious gift was Laurette Taylor, and even she had not Duse's courage to abandon the artifice of the rouge-pot and perform without the aid of any

capacity to truth.

The

only performer

I

makeup whatever! Aside from the clowns— Chaplin and W. C. Fields in America, Jouvet in Italy, Beatrice Lillie in England— who in any case must

France, Petrolini in

be judged as performers rather than as actors, only a handful can be recalled life"

was

Moskvin

who

lifted their art to the

fully

achieved.

Among

in Russia, Moissi in

highest level of realism where "truth to

these would certainly be Kachalov

Germany, Barrault

and

in France, Edith Evans,

39

(left), one of the founders of the Moscow Art Theatre, an and "towering stage personality," posed with his wife, Lilina an actress in the theatre, and playwright Maksim Gorky in 1900. (See page

Konstantin Stanislavsky influential theorist (right),

17 for a photograph of Stanislavsky

in

Gorky's Lower Depths.)

Norris

Olivier,

and Gielgud

in

Houghton

England, John Barrymore and a few others subse-

quently in America.

one of the towering stage personalities of the past hundred countryman, Chekhov. He was both theorist and practitioner (as director and actor). In the present context he appears as a theorist with "Truth to life" his battle cry. Stanislavsky formulated and formalized a system through the mastery of which actors could attain a close approximation of that objective. He based his system on acceptance of the idea that truth to life could only be attained Stanislavsky

is

years, as influential a figure in this account as his fellow

by discovering the "true" psychological motivations of action. Consequently, he demanded that the actor reach into his inner depths of psychic experience, fortifying in

which

it

with his creative imagination and producing a stage image

he— and

his

audience— could

totally believe.

An

elaborate set of

exercises was devised to assist the actor in the discovery of this inner truth.

Stanislavsky was the right

man

at the right time.

The

Realistic plays of

Moscow Art Theatre that Stanislavsky was himself to create, would come works by Tolstoy, Gorky, and Chekhov. As the late nineteenth-century Realistic playwrights were succeeded by those of the twentieth, so the system of Stanislavsky, altered in various ways by various interpreters and disciples, Ibsen were already the talk of Europe. Soon, by way of the

became the cornerstone

The Russian

of twentieth-century acting.

would work not only to enhance performance of the contemporary drama but would be equally appropriate to the interpretation of all drama. Insisting on so broad an application of his theories, he lost some disciples. Their contention was that, while psychological truth might be valuable as a key to unlock the door to the new Realism, it was a well-nigh useless tool to apply to non-Realistic plays. It worked perfectly for Chekhov and well for Ibsen; it would be equally useful when applied later to Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller and other Realistic dramatists; but it could annihilate the theatre-theatrical, the theatre of the Symbolists and Expressionists, the exaggerations of farce, and for that matter the fantasy of A Midsummer Night's Dream or The Tempest. As the century moved forward, the number of those who became aware of these limitations would increase. One might conclude, nonetheless, that Realistic plays came to dominate our century's stage as much because of Stanislavsky's discovery of a way to perform them as because of playwrights' believed, however, that his system

conversion to the

slice-of-life style.

Stanislavsky was a triple-threat

but a director and an actor

man

of the theatre

— not only

a theorist,

he must be considered next. (Incidentally, only in the past hundred years has the need to appraise the director's contribution arisen, for the profession, as as well. It

such, did not exist before then. director,

almost

and

But

this

close to the top of the

common

is

in his role as director that

has

list

become the century

of the stage

of great figures of that kind, by

consent, would stand the

name

He had Denmark once gave

of Stanislavsky.)

only one forerunner in that capacity. (The Prince of

41

"

Scene from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, as performed by the Meininger Company, 1881; founded by a German prince named George grand duke II,

Saxe-Meiningen, "The Meininger with

no great

might

actors. Instead,

become

it

Company became

provided the

—a new look at scenery,

first

intensifying verisimilitude.

inkling of

a fresh approach

stage properties, an unexpected emphasis on

mob

of

a sensation throughout Europe

what

to

scenes,

"total theatre"

costumes, all

illumination,

directed toward

Norris

but he was,

Houghton

turned out, a fictitious character. way actors read their lines.) The forerunner was a German prince named George II, grand duke of SaxeMeiningen. He was Stanislavsky's direct predecessor and (in absentia) his mentor. In his autobiography, My Life in Art, the Russian pays deserved tribute to the German grand duke, whose touring troupe, under the direction of one Ludwig Chronegk, visited Moscow in the late 1880s. (Stanislavsky was still in his twenties). By a happy coincidence, during the decade when Ibsen was writing Ghosts, An Enemy of the People, The Wild Duck, Rosmersholm, and Hedda Gabler, the ducal producer and his director in Germany were prepara

famous lesson

in acting,

it

Besides, he was really only interested in the

ing the stage to receive the

Norwegian dramatist's

plays. Realistic acting

and

staging were as basic to their artistic credo as Realistic writing was to his.

The Meininger Players were an ensemble with no stars. If there had been no other deviation from nineteenth century stage traditions, that fact alone would have established the Players as avant-garde. For the nineteenth century continued the practice of the eighteenth (and fortunately had the talents available) in building the performance around a star. For almost two hundred years, luminous and talented personalities followed one another across the stages of Europe. No need for a director or ensemble playing when all eyes were fixed on Garrick or Mrs. Siddons, the Kembles, Macready and Kean, Miles Dumesnil, Clairon, Rachel, Mme Vestris. The Meininger Company became a sensation throughout Europe with no great actors. Instead, it provided the first inkling of what "total theatre" might become— a new look at scenery, a fresh approach to costumes, illumination, stage properties, an unexpected emphasis on mob scenes, all directed toward intensifying verisimilitude. Beyond that, there was the very conscious intention of welding everything into an artistic whole. Today, it is hard to realize that this conception of staging was revolutionary. But when young Stanislavsky first beheld it, he was electrified. He recognized at once that a single guiding hand was essential. that the illusion of reality possessed a power,

when

He

perceived

single-mindedly under-

taken, which not only satisfied spectators heretofore accustomed to the self-conscious

bravura performance of a

star

but provided a new experi-

ence deriving from recognition and identification.

He began

to think too

about "orchestration" and from there to the contribution of the conductor. Late in life Stanislavsky was to say that the director exists only to serve the actors. Examination of his own prompt books and stenographic transcripts of his rehearsals belie his claim. Unquestionably he appreciated the importance of the individual's training, the sensitivity and imagination each actor brought to the realization of his character.

forgot that the production was his tion, that the excellence of the

own

But Stanislavsky never

conception, his unique interpreta-

orchestra depended greatly on the talent of

the conductor.

43

"Andre Antoine

.

.

.

established his Theatre Libre

throughout western Europe. "

as produced

at the

Shown above

Theatre Libre.

is

in

1887; his influence spread

a scene from Ibsen's The Wild

Duck

Houghton

Norris

To

company

the

Germany

that

went forth from that

little

grand duchy

in Eastern

the twentieth century owes a profound debt. Stanislavsky was not

young artist whom it inspired. In France there was Andre Antoine, clerk in the Paris Gas Company, who had been satisfying his obscure an craving for the stage by appearing in amateur theatricals and by "renting the only

manual strength

his

wittily

put

it;

that

to the

he was

is,

Comedie

member

Francaise," as

John Mason Brown

company's

of that

Thus, by

claque.

constant watchful attendance, he gained familiarity with the workings of the

foremost theatrical establishment of his day and acquired an awareness of what artistic overhaul was needed. The example of the Meininger Players showed him how that overhaul might be brought to pass. Antoine's is one of the great success stories of the modern theatre. From the tiny hall situated on a back passage somewhere in the labyrinth of Montmartre, where the erstwhile gas company clerk established his Theatre Libre in 1887, his influence spread throughout western Europe. Fiercely dedicated to the

new

Naturalism, to the abolition of the star

tranche-de-vie

system, to the verisimilitude of the scenic environment, to the

new

play-

do in real theatre synonymous with the "New Movement." He

wrights whose works required actors to behave exactly as people life,

Antoine made

Memories

The

his

summed up

himself

the artistic principles behind that

movement

in his

of the Theatre Libre:

characters are people like ourselves, not living in vast

size of cathedrals,

rooms the

but in interiors such as our own, by their

firesides,

beneath their lamps, around their tables; their voices are like our own and their language of our everyday life, with its elisions and familiarities and nothing of the rhetoric and noble style of our Classics. .

... In these

and

modern

.

.

plays, written in a truthful

and natural movement

which the theory of the environment and the influence of external things plays so important a part, is not the setting the in

indispensable complement of the work? ...

It is

certainly never

completely naturalistic, since there must always be in the theatre

one

will

effort to

— no

deny it — a minimum of convention, but why not make an reduce this minimum? .

.

.

In the eight subsequent seasons before Antoine dissolved the Theatre

he presented for the first time in Paris Ghosts and The Wild Duck, Miss and Tolstoy's The Power of Darkness, not to mention first performances of plays by Porto-Riche, Edmond de Goncourt, Brieux, Becque. Without Antoine the Realistic movement might never have got off the ground. What avails it to write plays that do not get produced? What point is there in being produced unless there is an understanding interpreter?

Libre, Julie,

From Paris the new "Free Theatre" movement spread first to Berlin, then to London, and shortly thereafter to Dublin. In Berlin, Otto Brahm and

associates created the Freie Bilhne,

was

Ghosts.

whose opening presentation

The Independent Theatre opened

in

London

in 1891;

in

its

1889

initial

45

"

"David Belasco was a flamboyant practitioner of Realism, especially

Shown above

is

his setting

production was Shaw's

first

Ghosts.

from the

New York

in

scenic effects.

production of Tiger Rose, 1917.

The next season it would present the premiere of The movement spread then to Dublin

play, Widowers' Houses.

where William Butler Yeats, Lady Gregory, and their colleagues formed the Irish Literary Theatre to provide a hearing for the new generation of dramatists, among them John Millington Synge and later Sean O'Casey. So it was that the new drama of Realism found stages and producers sympathetic to its aesthetic aims. It must be remembered that all of these theatres were tiny (the Independent in London, for instance, never had more than seventy-five subscribers), and they were considered very avant-garde in the last If

years of the nineteenth century.

one were

at the

to single out

two Americans who embodied the new Realism

turn of the century, one would be the actress, Minnie

Maddern

Fiske,

the other the producer-director-playwright, David Belasco. Mrs. Fiske,

who

had become a legend in our theatre by the time of her death in 1932, was an intelligent and talented performer who won considerable distinction by introducing Ibsen to America. Scarcely a man is now alive who remembers her original presentations of A Doll's House, Hedda Gabler, Rosmersholm, Pillars of Society, Ghosts. But some of us still cherish memories of her revivals of

My own recollection is of her Mrs. Alving the year before she died. She was a tiny lady with bright eyes, a husky voice and great stage presence. She underplayed, but with great intensity and unerring believability.

them.

46

Stage design by Jo Mielziner 1949, a unit setting

in

which

for

a scene

in

Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman,

different parts of a

house are

visible at the

same

time.

Belasco was a flamboyant practitioner of Realism, especially in scenic effects.

Some readers

will

doubtless recall growing

productions: The Easiest Way, for which

we are

up on

stories of Belasco

producer purchased the contents of a boarding house, including the wallpaper, and transferred it to his stage; The Governor's Lady, wherein a Child's Restaurant was reproduced on stage, with the smell of Child's famous griddle cakes wafted across the footlights. The succession of sunsets, dawns, and moonlit nights which Belasco and his electrician concocted was eye-boggling. Here was a man who loved to reproduce "life" on stage, but whose understanding of the word was limited largely to

From

its

Belasco's day to

told the

externals.

our own, Realism has continued to be the domi-

the American theatre in playwriting, acting, directing, scenery, and costuming. Sometimes the plays have been travesties of any serious search for the meaning of life; the acting has often been stereotyped and only skin-deep, the directing mechanical, the physical production over-

nant

style of

lighting,

ly literal.

But there have been magnificent exceptions. Three outstanding dramaand one or two actors have been mentioned. In an effort to provide an overview of a whole century of theatre, we dare not lose altitude by dropping down too close in order to identify all the practitioners deserving of mention. But one or two artists must be singled out: Robert Edmond Jones and Arthur Hopkins, who in the 1920s designed and directed John Barrymore's great Hamlet and his brother Lionel's Macbeth; Elia Kazan and Jo Mielziner, who respectively directed and designed Death of a Salesman and tists

47

Two designs by

Robert

Edmond Jones

for Arthur

Hopkins's production of Hamlet with

John Barrymore. Act HI, Scene 3. Hamlet:

Now

might

And now And so am

I

A

Streetcar

ness, lifted

do

it

do't.

I'll I

pat, now he is praying; And so he goes to heaven;

revenged.

Named Desire in the 1940s. All of them, with apparent effortlessBroadway for a moment above its usual Realism and infused it

with poetry. Russian

foes of realism:

Meyer hold

—

Vakhtangov

stylistic inheritance from the our own because the materialism that engendered it and the scientific age that justified it as an art form are still asserting their primacy. So long as in both East and West power is generated by wealth, and progress is measured by scientific and technological breakthroughs, Realism will continue to dominate our stages. The theatre, however, is an art. It has much more on its mind than material and scientific matters: life and death, for example. And while it may talk about life and death in "realistic" terms in realistically minded ages, it has also talked about them in non-Realistic ones and perhaps then

Realism was the twentieth century's great

nineteenth.

We

with greater artists

who

have

made

it

power — witness Everyman. Today the theatre possesses great

are not interested in photographing

To

life

or in fashioning repro-

be sure, in the past hundred years they have been in the minority, but there comes a time when even the Realists themselves become ductions of

48

it.

Act

V,

Scene

2.

Let your captains

Fortinbras:

Bear Hamlet,

like

a soldier,

to the stage.

disenchanted with their images of "real so

much more As

to

it

life,"

when

they sense that there

is

than meets the eye; then they become Symbolists.

certainly as Stanislavsky

became the champion

of Realism, so did

another Russian, a contemporary and sometime colleague, Vsevolod

Meyerhold, become the standard-bearer of the opposition. An original of the Moscow Art Theatre in 1898, he quickly concluded that its creative path would lead in precisely the opposite direction from the way he wanted to go. He left Stanislavsky, went to St. Petersburg in 1902, and in the years immediately preceding and following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 carved out a place for himself as the most brilliant exponent of the theatre-theatrical in Europe. Meyerhold started by saying, in effect, that one goes to the theatre to engage in a special experience, not to be asked to forget one is there (a state of mind which Stanislavsky encouraged). What one sees on the stage must not be imitation of life but a transmutation of life through the use of an artistic vocabulary and visual images so composed and juxtaposed that they do not explicitly reproduce the comfortably recognizable. "Truth to life" is,

member

in fact, impossible to attain in the theatre.

Trompe

Voeil is

Nor

is

it

desirable.

acceptable accomplishment in painting, but

principally because of the technical virtuosity exhibited. insights.

It

Impressionism, Expressionism, Surrealism, indeed

modern and post-modern

art rest

on the principle

it

attracts us

provides no all

new

the "isms" of

that the function of

49

Theatre

in the

Twentieth Century

painting and sculpture, as perceived today, is to translate nature, not reproduce it, to react to it, not explain it, to discover the true meaning of reality through art. This seems easier to accomplish in the visual and plastic arts than in the theatre, and the reason is obvious. The theatre's principal material is living human beings, not immobile paint and canvas, not marble, metal, or wood. Arbitrary selection of forms brought together to create an artistic composition, whether in dance or theatre, must always be conditioned by that living human factor, the performer, who is never fixed, who can never be any-

thing but It is

like a

human.

much

easier to

man, than

to

make

a

man

look like a man, sound like a man, act

turn him into a symbol or an abstraction. That

the anti-Realistic, nonrepresentational theatre

is

is

why

quite as difficult as "Truth

(perhaps both are finally impossible). But it is the challenge Meyerhold accepted. It meant creating a new kind of actor who moved and responded in new ways to new stimuli, a new approach to scenery, costume, and lighting, a new relationship with the spectator, a new organization of theatrical space. For thirty years Meyerhold worked toward the realization of these objectives. When he started, it seemed as though he, like Stanislavsky, was the right man at the right time. But history betrayed him. The to life" theatre

Soviet

Communist

some unknown day

The

He was confinement on

party could not tolerate Meyerhold's revolution.

"liquidated" artistically in 1938 at

and subsequently died

some unknown

in

place.

twentieth-century theatre was never the same after him. Even the

staunchest Realists had to rewrite their credos. Theatre could try to be

"True to life," but it could not evade the fact that it was not life, it was theatre. If Meyerhold accomplished nothing else, he established that incontrovertibly.

Meyerhold

insisted that his aesthetic

was built on the

past.

From

the

Greeks, for example, he derived a conviction that the proscenium arch was inhibiting, that a semicircle of spectators

gathered around a performance The Greeks used

space was preferable to their being seated in parallel rows.

masks and high-platformed shoes to make their heroes seem larger than life; they employed a chorus which interrupted the story with song and dance. Of course, none of this was true to life, but the early Greeks did not write Realistic plays, so the matter was irrelevant. From the commedia deWarte of the Italian Renaissance, Meyerhold seized the notion that actors must be able to tumble, jump, sing, strut, and improvise. They must be prepared to respond to interruptions and sallies from their street-corner audience. They must be comfortable in masks and traditionally unrealistic garb (think of Harlequin's patchwork pajamas). These accoutrements were intended to convey the idea by a sort of visual shorthand that characters were types, not individuals. Pantalone was always Pantalone, the archetypal old man, no matter what actor might be wearing his costume and mask in any dramatic situation. The play was not the thing; 50

Norris

indeed it scarcely existed; so there was nothing to interpret. ance was the whole creation.

Houghton

The perform-

In the oriental theatre Meyerhold also found masks and stylized makeand sound as an almost constant accompaniment to

ups, a use of music action.

All these his

borrowings the Russian

regisseur

employed

in

one or another of

productions. Each stressed the fact that the theatre was art, not

least not

life

as

we are accustomed

to see

it

and

live

life

— at

it.

Meyerhold's pre-revolutionary heyday coincided with the short-lived Expressionist-Constructivist-Surrealist attempts to capture the stage.

hold

made

Expressionism,

Kodak

Meyer-

frequent use of Constructivism, and his work came close to if

by the term

is

meant a

style that

eschewed,

as

X-ray camera in order to take a look

it

were,

what behind externals. This latter "ism" came up with but a handful of good dramatists, notably Hasenclever and Kaiser prior to World War I, Toller and Mayakovsky after it. But Meyerhold was not dependent on new plays. Reinterpretation of the classics was an even greater challenge to him and provided better opportunity to illustrate his special brand of theatricality. So his productions of Pushkin's The Queen of Spades and Boris Godunov, Lermontov's Masquerade, Gogol's Inspector General, Dumas's Camille, and Chekhov's short "vaudevilles" have become textbook examples of the theatre-theatrical. Whether they were Romantic poetic dramas like those of Pushkin, Lermontov, and Dumas, or Realistic satires like Gogol's and Chekhov's mattered little to Meyerhold. He repossessed them, made them his own. It seemed almost by chance that the Romantic pieces became epitomes of the Romantic, the satires funnier than they had ever the

in favor of the

at

lay

seemed before. There was a third great Russian

stage creator in our century who led subsequent generations down their most satisfyingly productive avenue. Named Yevgenny Vakhtangov, he died in 1922 before he was forty. His like Meyerhold, he could not totally subscribe was drawn to Meyerhold's aesthetic position but

master was Stanislavsky but, to the tenets of Realism.

He

could not bring himself to

full

acceptance of anti-Realism either. His com-

promise was to build on the core of Stanislavsky's psychological truth in characterization a complex of light, airy jeux de theatre. He had it both ways, varying the proportion of ingredients from play to play.

Most contemporary stage directors, designers, and actors are unaware of owe to Vakhtangov, whose definitive production of The Dybbuk for the Habima Theatre in Israel (still in its repertoire) is the only work of his they may have seen. But there are few of our contemporary artists, although certainly all the best, whose performances, settings, or mises-enscenes have not benefited by embracing some part of the Vakhtangov compromise. On the stages of London, Paris, New York, and throughout America — and, yes, in Moscow, too — nineteenth-century Realism has been tempered and modified by a coating of theatrical sparkle. "Selective Realthe debt they

51

«

Anti-Realistic stage of

Vsevolod Meyerhold designed

{The Inspector Genera!) by Gogol, Moscow, 1926.

for his

production of Revizor

Theatre

the Twentieth Century

in

ism" we term the result in America. it

Western

It is

our

common

we owe

coinage, and

young Vakhtangov.

to the

foes of realism:

from Maeterlinck

to

Brook

Again we must return to the 1890s, once more retracing our steps to Paris. There we encounter a precocious seventeen-year-old named Paul Fort. It is exactly 1890, and he has just founded his Theatre d'Art. He is what might be called a neo-romanticist, alienated by the Theatre Libre and its grubby naturalistic kitchen sinks.

no major

He

longs for poetry in the theatre. Unfortunately,

talents are available. Instead,

longings into providing his stage with

he finds he can channel his poetic visual effects. He has persuaded

new

several of the major Impressionists to contribute their talents to design

costumes, programs, posters, for never-mind-what plays: Tou-

settings,

louse-Lautrec, Vuillard, Bonnard, Denis, Redon, ties

the theatre (at least his Theatre d'Art) to the

painting

—a

and

others. In so doing

new movement

in

he

modern

not inconsiderable feat for a teenager.

Theodore Komisarjevsky has

recalled that "the scenery at the Theatre

independent of anything concrete. It one function only — to complete the aesthetic illusion created by the poetry of the play. Sometimes the scenery of the Symbolists was 'independent' to such an extent that the stagehands were in the habit of setting it up upside down." Fort's theatre existed for only two years, a casualty of its own preciosity. But the campaign against Antoine and his Realists and Naturalists was picked up and carried on by another Parisian, Lugne-Poe, whose Theatre VOeuvre, dedicated to Symbolism, took over where Fort's left off. There Ibsen's The Lady from the Sea, Maurice Maeterlinck's Pelleas and Melisande, and later Alfred Jarry's Ubu Roi, major milestones in the break with realism, were presented. Maeterlinck and Jarry were minor dramatists, but they brilliantly articulated and illustrated the line of the anti-Realists. The former attacked the theatre of the establishment in a famous passage in his Le Tragique d'Art

had

was a pure ornamental

to

fiction,

fulfill

.

.

.

Quotidien:

When I go to a theatre I feel as though I were spending a few hours with my ancestors, who conceived life as something that was primitive, arid and brutal ... I am shown a deceived husband killing his wife, a woman poisoning her lover, a son avenging his father murdered .

kings, ravished virgins,

imprisoned

citizens

— in

a word,

.

.

all

the

how superficial and material. ... I was strange moments of a higher life that flit

sublimity of tradition, but alas,

yearning for one of the

unperceived through all

that

length,

I

why he was

To oppose 54

my

dreariest hours; whereas, almost invariably,

beheld was but a jealous,

man who would

tell

me

at

wearisome

why he poisoned or why he

killed.

the theatre of action, Maeterlinck proposed a "static" theatre:

Houghton

Norris

I

have grown to believe that an old

waiting patiently, with his all

man

seated in his armchair,

lamp beside him; giving unconscious ear

to

the eternal laws that reign about his house, interpreting, without

comprehending, the

silence of

doors and windows and the quivering

head to the presence of his soul destiny— an old man, who conceives not that all the powers of this world, like so many heedful servants, are mingling and keeping vigil in his room, who suspects not that the very sun itself is supporting in space that table against which he leans, or that every star in heaven voice of light, submitting with bent

and

his

and every fibre of his soul are directly concerned in the movement of an eyelid that closes, or a thought that springs to birth — I have grown to believe that he, motionless as he is, does yet live in reality a deeper, more human, and more universal life than the lover who strangles his mistress, the captain who conquers in battle, or the husband who avenges

his

honor.

Maeterlinck proceeded to put his theory to the plays,

The

addition to Pelleas

The Blue in

them

Bird.

test in a series of

short

The Blind, and several full-length ones in and Melisande: The Death of Tintagiles, The Seven Princesses, The

Intruder,

Interior,

These are odd somnambulistic dramas;

as speech.

Was Maeterlinck

silence

is

as

important

prefiguring the so-called "non-verbal"

Such language as he used was evocative of invisible action— the so-called "Maeterlinckean Beyond," as it was dubbed by his contemporaries. Debussy's score for the operatic version of Pelleas and Meliplays of a later day?

sande captures exactly the quality of Maeterlinck's work. Jarry's

Ubu

Roi,

by contrast,

lion of adolescence

— not

is

noisy, shocking, funny, irreverent, a rebel-

surprising, since Jarry was but fifteen years old

when he conceived the idea. The play tells of a stupid amoral man, Ubu, who installs himself as King of Poland and holds onto his throne by the simple expedient of killing and torturing

driven from the land

all

opposition until he

is

finally

—a

preposterous but terrifying nightmare of a play, and with prophetic overtones of later dictators. (Interestingly enough, it

had

Dramatic historians point out produced (1896), by the 1920s he was belatedly hailed as a prophet of the "Theatre of the Absurd." His may be a name to forget, but not the impulses he engendered. These two dramatists should possibly have been dealt with along with other writers. They were passed over then because their significance lies not in their writing but in their influence in effecting a changing form of a successful revival in postwar Poland.)

that although Jarry's impact was slight at the time the play was

theatre.

Throughout the Western world, all contemporary stage designers actheir debt to Adolphe Appia and Gordon Craig. To most laymen these names are probably no better known than Jarry, Vakhtangov, or even, I fear, Meyerhold. Both men taught by precept rather than example. Appia was born in Switzerland in 1 862; Craig was born ten years later, the knowledge

55

Design

for the

forum scene

in

Shakespeare's Julius Caesar by Edward Gordon

Craig, 1922.

"Most behind

of his

much

life

was devoted

to

a 'theatre of the

future',

and theory

clearly

of today's theatre practice

pioneering work" (from Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1981).

and the inspiration stems from Craig's

Norris

Houghton

son of the great English actress, Ellen Terry. He and Appia were never collaborators, but the similarity of their views about the theatre was striking. principal burden on the actor. Symbolism, indeed depended on the director and designer to evoke the appropriate mood. Appia came to the stage by way of Richard Wagner. His first book, in fact, was The Staging of the Wagnerian Drama in 1895, and in his famous drawings for Tristan and Isolde and the Ring cycle it became evident that he could evoke mood solely by form and light, composed in harmony with the quality of the music. Appia, however, was disturbed by something more fundamental: how to

Realism had placed

its

anti-Realism in general,

reconcile the three-dimensional actor to his two-dimensional environment,

the painted scenery of the day. Appia's answer was, like ies,

disarmingly simple:

make

all

major discover-

the environment three-dimensional. In the

theatre he envisioned, the painter would be

thrown

out, to

be replaced by

the sculptor, or rather, the fashioner of three-dimensional architectonic

forms that would occupy stage space

vertically, horizontally,

and

in

depth —

ramps, cubes, platforms. Let color be provided by light rather than pigment. Craig came to many of the same conclusions which he stated in his first book, On the Art of the Theatre, and also in issues of The Mask, a periodical for steps,

which he began to write in 1908. In them he echoed Appia's conclusion that "artistic unity requires that one person control all the elements of produc-

Thus, the two of them strengthened the role of the director, that newcomer to the stage. Craig, however, went further than Appia: eventually, he argued, the dramatist could be dispensed with! "When he [the director] will have mastered the uses of actions, words, line, colour, and rhythm then ... we shall no longer need the assistance of the playwright— for our art will then be self-reliant." He went still further: "The actor must go," he declared, "and in his place must come the inanimate figure — the ubermarionette we may well call him, until he has won for himself a better name." Craig's proposals were never put to the test, of course, but by his and Appia's arguments at least a unified conception of a production under the guidance of a single creator was given new credence. (To be sure, SaxeMeiningen had paved the way.) Moreover, their drawings, especially Craig's — many of them unrealized in the theatre, alas — have served as inspiration to stage designers throughout the century. When Craig died at the age of tion."

twentieth-century

ninety-four in 1966, he could take satisfaction in the way the look of the stage

had altered

in his lifetime, thanks to himself

Two Germans working

and

to Appia.

together from the early 1920s until the rise of

Hitler, Bertold Brecht and Erwin Piscator, were even more closely bound than Craig and Appia; their relationship more resembled that of Chekhov to Stanislavsky. Piscator

was an underrated genius of a stage director;

we know, was essentially a playwright and theatrical theorist. The two of them, who became the outstanding theatrical spokesmen of the hour, Brecht, as

57

"

for Wagner's Die Walkure, 1892 (top), and Tristan and Isolde, 1896 (bottom). "In the theatre he envisioned, the painter would be thrown out, to be replaced by the sculptor, or rather, the fashioner of three-dimensional architectonic forms that would occupy stage space vertically, horizontally, and in depth— steps, ramps, cubes, platforms. Let color be provided by light rather than pigment.

Sketches by Adolphe Appia

Norris

devoted their stage

first

to attacking capitalism,

Houghton

then to offering their

alter-

native.

way they approached their propaganda objechad sought to persuade men and women to rebuild society by depicting it principally in terms of family crises. His dramas evoked a deep emotional and empathic response. Shaw's sermons had been couched in the comic vein; whether talking in family terms or working on a broader social canvas, laughter had been his weapon. Brecht and Piscator wanted to eliminate emotion from their theatre, and since they had no great comedic gifts, they did not seek laughter either. They demanded that their audience be made to think, to learn, to have

The

tive.

difference lay in the

Ibsen, you recall,

^

complacence challenged intellectually — not to feel. To change the world requires clear heads. So the public must listen and be stimulated by what it sees and hears without experiencing any Aristotelian purgation their old

of the emotions.

This objective would be accomplished, announced Brecht the Theorist, by imposing a sense of "alienation" on both spectator and performer.

The

former must never forget he is in the theatre, never cross the fine line into empathic or sympathetic response to characters or situation. The actor too must never imagine that he is the character he impersonates; he must at all times stand outside it, reacting objectively. To keep the spectator aware of his whereabouts and prevent his "engagement," Piscator employed means that Meyerhold had used to the same end with tremendous effect: photographic slides, film clips, interpolated songs accompanied by an orchestra visible on the stage, direct address to the audience, no effort to conceal the stage mechanics — a bare back wall, lighting equipment in full view (such scenery as there was changed before the spectator's eyes). Clear white light was used, for color, it was claimed, evokes moods and stimulates emotions; it plays on the senses and distracts the mind. And it was the mind, I repeat, that these two theorists were out to capture. At Piscator's theatre in Berlin, the Volksbuhne, and after the war in the playhouse of the company assembled by Brecht in East Berlin, the Berliner Ensemble, their theories came to life. The debt owed to Meyerhold is apparent, and the stylistic debt our contemporary stage owes to these Germans is equally apparent. The only postscript that need be written is to record that Brecht's theory of alienation does not always work: it is impossible to see Mother Courage or Galileo in East Berlin (or elsewhere) without being profoundly moved. That may be because forty years have passed. Or, more probably, it is because Brecht was a poet, and poets cannot help speaking to the heart, whether they will or not. One more theorist of the twentieth-century theatre remains to be considered— Antonin Artaud, exponent of the "Theatre of Cruelty." Martin Esslin

most extraordinary men of his age, actor, madman— and a great poet — Arimagination may have outrun his practical achievement in the

has said of him:

"One

of the

director, prophet, blasphemer, saint, taud's

59

George Grosz, provide

some

the

German

of the

most

director Erwin Piscator to

Hasek's The

Good

artist

vitriolic

who brought new

intensities to caricature

social criticism of his time,

"use the stage as a drawing board"

Soldier Schweik, 1928.

and painting

was commissioned by for the

production of

to

Norris

But

magic beauty and mythical power one of the most active leavens in the theatre." Frenchman, born just before the turn of the century, Artaud's impor-

theatre.

remains, to

A

Houghton

his vision of a stage of

this day,

on

tance to this review rests

Son Double (an ambiguous

his

title),

authorship of a single book, Le Theatre et which was published in 1938 and which

Robert Brustein has properly called "one of the most influential, as well as one of the most inflammatory documents of our time." There are too few rebels in our era — rebels, that is, who truly turn the tide of artistic history. A half dozen dramatists who have done it have been under our scrutiny, along with another half dozen prophets and practitioners. For the true rebel is a "nay-sayer," as Brecht, himself one, once phrased it. But, to turn the tide, he must also be a "yea-sayer." Artaud was certain he knew what must be destroyed; he also had a clear vision of what must replace it. Alongside his platform those of Brecht, Craig, Meyerhold, Strindberg— the cream of the rebel crop— seem almost innocuous. What Artaud really wanted was to throw out the theatre of the day and start over again. Not Ibsen, Stanislavsky, or O'Neill wanted to go that far. Artaud repudiated the past, even Moliere and Shakespeare, because he asserted they were "culturally ineffective" in today's world. He turned equally against highbrows and middle-brows because, in directing its attention to them, the theatre, he claimed, had alienated itself from the "general public," by which he meant "the masses." Without them, no renewal of culture would be possible. Instead, "the great public looks to the movies, the music hall or the circus for violent satisfactions." The theatre must find a way to bring the masses back to itself, Artaud insisted:

Our

long habit of seeking diversion has

serious theatre, which

images and

acts

upon

.

.

.

extreme

action,

us forget the idea of a

us like a spiritual therapeutic

never be forgotten. Everything that of

made

inspires us with the fiery

pushed beyond

acts

a cruelty.

is

all limits,

magnetism of its whose touch can It is

that theatre

upon

this

idea

must be

rebuilt.

Becoming somewhat more The

theatre

will

never find

specific itself

he added:

again

.

.

.

except by furnishing the

spectator with the truthful precipitate of dreams, in which his taste for

crime, his erotic obsessions, his savagery, his chimeras, his Utopian sense of

life

counterfeit

None

and matter, even his cannibalism pour out on and illusory but interior.

of these fevered

in 1948),

and not

dreams did Artaud

a level not

realize in his lifetime (he died

a great deal of attention was paid to his

little

book when

appeared. But twenty years later in France, heralds of the new "Theatre of the Absurd" (notably Jean Genet) hailed it as their inspiration; it

first

American theatre of the 1960s, Beck and Judith Malina, whose Living Theatre productions of Para-

so did leaders of the avant-garde in the

Julian

61

"

was a dramatist, poet, actor, theoretician, and author of a Le Theatre et Son Double, "which was published in 1938 and which Robert Brustein has properly called 'one of the most influential, as well as one of the most inflammatory documents of our time'.

Antonin Artaud, 1948. He

book

entitled

Norn's

Houghton

Now, Antigone, and Frankenstein received their inspiration from some of fiery injunctions. Richard Schechner's Performance Group's Dionysus in '69 and Joseph Chaikin's Open Theatre were other responses. In Poland, Jerzy Grotowski owed an enormous debt to Artaud; so did Peter Weiss in Germany when he wrote The Persecution and Assassination of JeanPaul Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade (nicknamed Marat/Sade). Peter Brook, who staged the Weiss drama in London and New York and for motion pictures, understood Artaud's dream better than most. In his book, The Empty Space, Brook articulated the Frenchman's intent:

dise

Artaud's

He wanted a theatre who would

directors

.

.

.

served by a band of dedicated actors and

create out of their

own

natures an unending

succession of violent stage images, bringing about such powerful

immediate explosions of

human

revert to a theatre of anecdote

contain

all

that normally

is

audience that would drop

matter that no one would ever again

and

talk.

He wanted

the theatre to

reserved for crime and war. all its

He wanted an

defenses, that would allow

itself to

perforated, shocked, startled, and raped, so that at the same time

could be

filled

with a powerful

new

charge.

Brook himself must be among the

whom

something

is

He

creative theatrical personalities about

said here. In the second half of

of this English director has

be

it

summed up

our century the career

the journey of a whole generation.

has served as artistic director of the Royal Shakespeare

Company

of

Great Britain, has brought to the stage distinguished revivals of ten or more of Shakespeare's plays — finding, for example, with the help of Jan Kott, a fresh interpretation of King Lear in a production that starred Paul Scofield in

1962,

and a controversial and unforgettable anti-Realistic MidWhen the next year Brook left England to

summer Night's Dream in 1970.

form a multilingual, multinational troupe in Paris, Le Centre International de Creations Theatrales, with which he could explore new paths into the future, it seemed the beckoning ghost of Artaud who led him on. Brook, in turn, beckons the upcoming generation to make new experiments, dream new dreams. Ensembles follow the

stars

In contradistinction to the star system, which dominated the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries, the

"New Movement"

in the

European

theatre, as

we

have seen, began with companies dedicated to reducing the individual actor's importance in favor of the ensemble. In the past few generations this tendency toward collective creation has significantly increased. The Saxe-Meiningen troupe was the first step in that direction since the Renaissance. In sixteenth-century London The Lord Admiral's Men, The Lord Chamberlain's Men, The Queen's Men occupied the Swan, the Globe, and other Elizabethan playhouses. The Comedie Francaise came into being in

63

Theatre

in the

Twentieth Century

Paris in the following century. These were, of course, the companies for which Shakespeare and Marlowe, Moliere and Racine wrote. They had their leading performers, to be sure, but beyond that, they developed collective personalities through the interaction of players and playwrights. The French company, as the world knows, still survives; the London ones collapsed even before Cromwell's Commonwealth darkened all British stages.

The

— Moscow alone has more than — but significant ones also exist in the West: the

Russians are in the vanguard today

twenty repertory companies

Royal Shakespeare

Company and

the National Theatre in Great Britain, a

America and in Canada, collectives headed by Jerzy Grotowski in Poland and Peter Brook in Paris, Peter Stein at the Schaubiihne in West Berlin, as well as the Berliner Ensemble in East spate of resident regional groups across

Berlin. It is

not a coincidence that

this revival

occurred simultaneously with the

on the scene. Not much is known about the acting company that performed at the Theatre Libre in Paris, but we know a great deal about the Moscow Art Theatre ensemble that worked with Stanislavsky and his co-founder, Nemirovich-Danchenko. We also know that out of the Irish Literary Theatre emerged the Abbey Theatre's acting company — Sara Allgood, Barry Fitzgerald, and others. Meyerhold trained his company in a new acting method he called "bio-mechanics," which set it apart from all others; Vakhtangov left a group of disciples who carried on his work after his untimely death; Brecht's Berliner Ensemble, headed by his widow, Helene Weigel, has preserved the principles of arrival of the stage director

"epic" theatre.

In the United States the Group Theatre, formed in 1931 by Harold Clurman, Lee Strasberg, and Cheryl Crawford, imported the artistic principles of the Moscow Art Theatre and fused them with the strong social consciousness which ran high in that American decade to produce the most significant theatrical collective our theatre has known. The Group Theatre came to an end in 1941, but its artistic principles have been perpetuated in the training offered by Strasberg's Actors' Studio, a remarkably successful training ground for young talent. The interaction between director and ensemble has, then, supplanted that between stars and supporting casts. Indeed, a majority of the creative leadership of our century owes its eminence to the companies those artists established. It has not been enough for a group of actors, no matter how talented, to wish simply to band themselves into a collective. There has been, and always must be, a powerfully creative leader with his own clearly defined aesthetic objectives, a person of vision and dedication who can hold the troops in line for sufficient time to weld

done, the stage can come close to realizing

proved

64

it.

them

its

into a unit.

When

this

is

highest potential. History has

Norn's

Houghton

Theatre in the age of media

Architects are not artists of the theatre, but the art they serve

bound

to

it.

intimately

is

Since 1900 an evolution has taken place in the physical, architec-

environment of the Western theatre. years ago the theatre was rigidly corseted into playhouses inherited from the eighteenth century. We know what they looked like, those proscenium theatres, for they are still all around us. The spatial relationships between stage and auditorium have remained much the same throughout these two centuries, and they have served very well for the peep-show "slice-of-life" Realistic plays of Ibsen, Chekhov, Shaw, and their followers, housed in so-called box sets. As Realism gradually loosened its grip, however, new spatial relationtural

One hundred

ground plans. By mid-century the "arena" stage, which placed the performers in the center of a space with audience surrounding them, began to be encountered more frequently. "Thrust" stages appeared, contemporary adaptations of the ground plan of playhouses from the Greeks to the Elizabethans. Experiments were undertaken in "open space" arrangements — large areas resembling lofts or warehouses — that had no fixed performance space at all but could be altered from play to play, the audience being forced to adjust to a different perspective with each new presentation. The Russians and Germans led the way in these experiments, aimed principally at breaking down the rigidity of the spectator-performer relationship. The revolt against illusion in the theatre has not, however, been the only reason for altering the shapes of our playhouses, possibly not even the ships required different

principal one.

theatre

It is

artists,

my

some

more creative and some unconsciously, have been

conjecture that today's

consciously,

medium

far-seeing facing the

world increasingly dominated by films and television. They have been asking themselves what the living stage possesses that these media do not. Unless they could identify that and capitalize on it, cease borrowing "cinematic techniques," it would be hard for them to hold their own— just as Artaud foresaw. As the great American stage designer, Robert Edmond Jones, once remarked, "Nothing is so photographic as a photograph." The Realists in necessity of redefining their

in a

their anxiety to be "true to life" have, in effect,

photographers

drama

um

in

critic

at their

own game, paying

Walter Kerr that

"it is

can do

best;

terms of what

it

little

been trying

to beat the

attention to the warning of

never wise to battle a competing mediit is much shrewder to offer, by way of

do best." do best, what

competition, what you can

What

the theatre can

television

is, is

its

childishly obvious: only in

it

uniqueness

and performer

vis-a-vis film

do— and can— the

at the same time in the same place. True can never be established with an electronic or filmic image. Only in

and the spectator come together rapport

65

Theatre

in the

Twentieth Century

"communion" between actors and public Meyerhold and his talented disciple, Nikolai Okhlopkov, used to talk about fifty years ago in Moscow. That is why those Russians began then to lead the way toward demolishing the proscenium arch, the

the living theatre can the kind of

be accomplished that

orchestra

pit,

footlights— all physical deterrents that separated the stage

from the spectators. There are still dramatists, as everyone knows, who write scenes that can be transposed unharmed from stage to screen; not infrequently the closeup can, for example, even add impact. Few who saw A Streetcar Named Desire, both in the theatre and as a film, would claim that the latter did not stand up satisfactorily to the original. But, on the other hand, no one who saw Our Town in both media could assert that Thornton Wilder's play, depending so profoundly on establishing direct communication between characters and spectators, really worked as a movie. It is

necessary, then, for writers, directors, designers, architects of play-

houses, and theatre audiences consciously to join hands to insure that as the

century comes toward

its

close, there

is still

a theatre that

is

uniquely

itself,

worth passing on to future generations, a theatre the movies and TV can never replace, one vastly more complex than that which we inherited from the nineteenth century, as well as drama equally insightful in recording the

human

condition.

Conclusion

This overview of the theatre in the twentieth century has resembled a landscape observed from high altitude: some bright peaks, some dark valleys, a

of

patchwork of

homogeneous

fields

and

forests

— in other words, no clear spectacle

terrain. Early in this essay

it

was remarked that the most

apt words to characterize our century's theatre might well be "fragmentation"

and

"fission."

To remark on course

is

These

still

seem appropriate.

the acceleration of speed with which our civilization alters

doubtless

trite.

But it is not the less true. Never have the arts as and then cast aside one mode of expression after

a whole so rapidly grasped

another as in the past eighty to a hundred years. And the stage has kept pace with the rest. If any discernible line has emerged, it has been in the direction moving away from the Realism that was the principal heritage of the nineteenth century. Verisimilitude as the instrument chosen to pierce the illusion of reality has been gradually blunted, partly by over-use, partly by a growing realization that indeed it might well be the wrong instrument to employ. By the end of the conviction. It

forced

much

first

third of the century, this was growing into a widely held

may have been one of the

West

materialism and science, release

What

66

to

result of the

to reorganize

its

Great Depression, which

priorities, reassess

its

faith in

from the preoccupation with "things." replace Realism with became the problem. At this point the itself

Norris

fragmentation

set in.

There were numerous

Houghton

directions in which to turn;

paths had already been cleared during the preceding decades.

The

theatre

explored several of these. Fifty years later, however, although the main thrust of Realism has been dissipated, no single clearly discernible successor to it— no one "ism"— has emerged triumphant. An eclectic theatre may-

no one standard of no credo dominates.

reflect the eclectic spirit of the times:

definitive

What

No

norm

of behavior exists,

the theatre seems to be undergoing, then,

is

taste governs,

no

a period of transition.

sure battle plan exists to win a war against the electronics that threaten

it up. No conviction has taken hold that language is the best weapon, or that, contrariwise, "non-verbal" stress on physical action is the way to go. It is not settled that abstractions, properly selected, can reveal

to swallow

reality. first

What

legacy the twentieth-century theatre will leave to the twenty-

remains today uncertain.

It is not quite the same with the drama. Our century's playwrights inherited a number of preoccupations and problems with which the nineteenthcentury dramatists had wrestled. Ibsen and his generation found no sure answers. In many cases there were no answers. So they passed the questions on to their descendants, down to Beckett's generation: questions about God, reality and illusion, the realization of self, family relations, social and moral

responsibility, conscience, the

Drama's terrain may seem

good

theatre's, as ideas clash with ideas,

continuity with the past

life.

at first glance

but

it

no more homogeneous than the does possess a greater sense of

and within the present. John Dryden's advice

seventeenth-century playwrights holds for today:

human

and

lively

still

aspire to obey that advice.

image

of

"A

Our best dramatists, They will continue to do

nature."

to

play ought to be a just I

am

persuaded,

so.

67

The Emergence

of

Post-Modern Science Stephen Toulmin

Stephen Toulmin

is

first article, titled

"The Physical Sciences," appeared

a previous contributor

The Great Ideas Today. His

to

the issue for

in

1967. Mr. Toulmin in

was born

in

London

in

He received

1922.

his doctorate

philosophy, after studying under Ludwig Wittgenstein, from

Cambridge

University

where he was a Fellow

he became a University Lecturer University

and continued there

in

until

of King's College.

1949

In

the Philosophy of Science at Oxford

1955.

He then became Professor

of

Philosophy and head of the philosophy department at the University of

Leeds where he remained

until

1959. From 1960 to 1965 he

was

the

Director of the Unit of the History of Ideas for the Nuffield Foundation,

and

for the following eight

University of

philosophy.

Columbia,

From 1966

years he taught

and the University

University,

at Brandeis,

of California at

Chicago appointed him professor

He has taught

New York to

in

1975 he was counsellor

efforts with his wife, Dr.

In

1973 the

of social thought

and

the capacity of visiting professor at

University, Dartmouth,

Mr. Toulmin has written

Michigan State

Santa Cruz.

and Hebrew

for the

many books, some

University.

Smithsonian. of

which are collaborative

June Goodfield. Since he

last

appeared

in

these

Human

Understanding (1972), Knowing and Acting (1976), and co-authored with Allen Janik Wittgenstein's Vienna pages, he has published

(1973). His latest book, Introduction to Reasoning, which he wrote with Allen Janik

and Richard Rieke, was published

in

1979.

1.

Introduction

does the science of the middle and How profoundly and from that

late twentieth

significantly

century differ most

of earlier periods:

e.g.,

the late

seventeenth or mid-nineteenth centuries? If

asked that question, we can answer in one or another of two superficial

On the

one hand, we may be tempted to emphasize the sheer quantity work that has been done over the years since 1945. After all, the scale of the contemporary scientific enterprise is justly impressive; and the late Robert Oppenheimer underlined it by quoting Derek J. deSolla ways.

of scientific

Price's striking

"90%

observation that

lived are alive today."

Yet

this reply

is

of

all

who have

the scientists

a superficial one, because

it

ever

overlooks

the crucial point of the analysis by which Price established his conclusion.

The

from the year 1700 on, the novel enterprise of "modern and began to display the statistical peculiarities shared by all activities of that kind. As a result, the "90%" conclusion has been true ever since the early eighteenth century: it was true in a.d. 1750 as it was in a.d. 1950 that 90% of all the scientists who had ever lived were alive thenl What is peculiar about the scale of the contemporary point

is

that,

science" was a freely growing activity

scientific enterprise,

correct.

Modern

indeed,

supplies, both of people

and

also of

On the made

that this

who

"90%" doctrine

is

ceasing to

be

are capable of doing serious scientific work

revenues to support

scientific activities

scientific

is

industrial societies are at last beginning to exhaust their

it.

At

least in those societies, the level of

has begun to reach saturation.

other hand, we

may be tempted to emphasize the quality of recent more of the spectacular local advances

work: picking on one or

within particular branches of science, during the

last seventy-five

years, as being the crucial change, or changes, that characterize twentieth-

century science. Has

this

not been the century of relativity and

mechanics; of nuclear energy and computers; of

quantum

DNA and antibiotics, brain

physiology and neurosurgery; of psychoanalysis, behavior therapy, and the first

steps

toward a true science of

human

nature? Yet

reply also runs the risk of superficiality, because

it

this

second kind of

concentrates on individu-

scientific discoveries and innovations, while overlooking the deeper, more general and far-reaching changes within the larger enterprise ofscience. Many of those discoveries and innovations have played noteworthy al

69

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

development of our contemporary stock of scientific ideas, and no virtue in downplaying their importance for science. But, if we reflect for a moment on the sources of their significance, the further question must surely present itself: "What is it that makes these novelties so important? Do not other, profounder changes within the scientific enterprise underlie, and lend significance to, all these individual changes, in fundamental physics and biochemistry, in neurophysiology, medicine, and parts in the

there

is

psychology?"

The purpose

of this essay

is

to look

behind the everyday

activities of

twentieth-century science, and to dig below the specific novelties characterof particular branches of science, in the hope of bringing to light some fundamental changes that have modified the guiding aims of the whole

istic

the year 1900, I shall argue, the natural and been redirected toward some fundamentally new goals, and their methods of thought and investigation have been modified to accommodate that change of direction. In one way or another, the resulting reorientation has affected all the different branches and disciplines of science, and it has involved a real break with the whole tradition scientific enterprise. Since

human

that

sciences have

we have come

to

know by

intellectual enterprise that

the

name

of

"modern

science"

—

i.e.,

the

was conceived and launched in the course of the

seventeenth century, by such philosophically and theologically minded

and Newton. argument is sound, we are rapidly moving into a quite novel phase in the historical development of science, whose characteristic features warrant a correspondingly new name. So, following Frederick Ferre, I shall speak of the scientific goals and methods characteristic of this new phase as belonging to post-modern science. The "modern" science that developed during the 250 years from a.d. 1650 on has begun, in the course of the twentieth century, to be superseded by "post-modern" science; and in certain crucial respects, as a result, scientists have broken through bounds and restrictions that were placed on the scientific enterprise by its original founders. Initially, as we shall see, those restrictions facilitated the rapid advance of physics, chemistry, and physiology, at least during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But in our own time, as our interests have expanded to include also such sciences as psychology and ecology, those restrictions have become more of a hindrance than a help; and they now have to be outgrown in order that scientists can freely expand their inquiries and speculations into new areas of thought. scientists as Galileo, Descartes, If

that

What was

the character of those

scientists of the

initial restrictions?

At

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

ematical and experimental philosophers," as they called plified their intellectual tasks

stance. This stance quickly

first,

the

modern

— the

"new maththemselves— sim-

by adopting one very particular theoretical

came

to dominate the inquiries both of eighteenth-century "classical" Newtonian physicists and of the chemists and

70

Stephen Toulmin

physiologists

who subsequently modeled their investigations on those The stance in question involved a particular conception

classical physics.

the scientist's situation

vis-a-vis his objects of

study as

being— at

of of

least in

principle— a detached and external one. For the purposes of scientific investigation and theorizing, it was the scientist's duty to place himself and

world of nature that was

his rational speculations outside the

his subject

matter. This requirement shaped the basic character of a truly "scientific" attitude to nature

and determined the

modern scientists

aspired. Correspondingly, the scientific world picture that

was gradually built up, by adopting

ideals of scientific objectivity to

this attitude

which

and procedure, depicted

nature as a self-contained, deterministic mechanism, from the influence of

whose processes and forces humanity was somehow excluded or exempted. During the twentieth century, the momentum of scientific change has at last obliged scientists to change their intellectual stance, together with their associated attitudes, methods, and criteria of objectivity. Even in point of theory

(it

turns out),

human

world of nature and view

its

beings can place themselves "outside" the

processes and forces from the standpoint of

detached onlookers, only to a strictly limited extent; and, to the extent that they do so, they unavoidably narrow down the range of topics and activities that can be brought within the scope of science. If those limitations are to be overcome, and the scope of scientific understanding is to reach beyond them, scientists must learn to view their situation vis-a-vis the world of

new way. They must see themselves not just as spectators looking world of nature from outside but also as participants with roles to play from within that world. The scientific world picture that is in the course of being developed, as a result, will be correspondingly less mechanistic and deterministic. This picture will reintegrate humanity with nature — the human observer, as agent, with the natural processes that he both studies and influences. Correspondingly, the rational imagination and activities, both of scientists and other human beings, will themselves have to nature in a

on

at the

be recognized as active elements within the operations of nature. This dual change, in the basic theoretical stance of scientists and in the associated scientific world picture,

is

the fundamental underlying feature

that differentiates the "post-modern" science of the late twentieth century

from the "modern" science

of earlier years. It

is

this difference that lends

a basic philosophical significance to the theoretical innovations of twentieth-

century physics, opens up the possibility of bringing

harmony with

human psychology into

the theories of the other natural sciences,

and has helped

to

diminish the gap between science and technology that was so characteristic of the classical, or "modern" period. And it is this transition, from the

modern

to the

post-modern phases

in the historical

development

of science

— the emergence of "post-modern science" from the "modern science" that preceded it— that

I

shall

be attempting to

map and

analyze in the sections

that follow.

71

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

Theory and practice

2.

in

the classical scientific tradition

what point science has reached in our own time, some precision where that science has been coming from. The leading features of post-modern science can best be explained by setting them against the background of the classical, or "modern," scientific tradition out of which they were grown. We can usefully begin by considering four characteristic features, all of which played major parts in shaping the program and results of classical science, but all of which have also had to be reappraised during the last seventy-five years. They are: If

we are

it is

(a)

first

to

understand

just

necessary to recognize with

the traditional separation of scientific thought

from technological prac-

tice,

(b) the philosophical

foundations of the

modern

scientific tradition, as

Rene Descartes and his successors, the assumed link between scientific objectivity and "value and established by

(c)

(d) the professional

oped Each so as to

neutrality,"

organization of scientific work, especially as

it

devel-

in the course of the nineteenth century.

of those features needs to be discussed

show how

it

and defined with some care

contributed to the dissociation of the

scientific

observer

from the natural processes and mechanisms he observed. This observation was at the heart of the classical program for the advancement of scientific understanding. a.

Technological practice

and

To most American ears,

scientific theory

and natural science and separate enterprises — not to say that they must be so treated — has never sounded at all attractive or convincing. The goals and methods of scientific investigation have always been thought of in more practical or pragmatic terms on the American side of the Atlantic than on the European side: so much so that, in the United States, the public mind has rarely distinguished science from technology. In the eighteenth-century American colonies, for example, the prototypical scientist of everyday imagination was not the severely aloof and intellectual Isaac Newton, but the jolly and practical minded Benjamin Franklin; and the American Philosophical Society was established in colonial Philadelphia with the declared purpose of promoting "useful knowledge" quite as much as "natural philosophy." From the beginning (that is to say), American science was fueled and inspired by the technological promises of Francis Bacon, quite as much as it was by the philosophical maxims of Rene Descartes or the theological dreams of Isaac Newton. (To this day, indeed, Americans tend to speak of the engineering problems of interplanetary travel and communications as being the concern of "space science.") So it will the suggestion that technology

either can be or should be treated as quite distinct

72

Stephen Toulmin

be necessary to remind ourselves

methods

modern

how

early

pursued

and deeply the program and

Europe, became

allied with the preoccupations of theology and philosophy, rather than with the practical concerns of technology. At the outset, around the year 1650, it was not at all certain which way

of

science, as

in

intellectual

the development of science would take scientists

ment

it.

Francis

Bacon had provided

with a highly attractive manifesto, according to which the advance-

of scientific learning could be expected to yield

"fruit"— both improved intellectual understanding technical

of

both

"light"

and

nature and improved

command over nature; and the "new philosophers" were

not above

appealing to these Baconian promises in their dealings with potential pa-

Some early support for the Royal Society of London was obtained King Charles II, in return for an understanding that the Fellows of from

trons.

new Society would, among other things, attack the unsolved practical problems of transoceanic navigation, particularly the problem of determining longitude in a reliable manner. But these technological prophecies were quickly found to be overoptimistic. Once Newton had published his great Principia*, it soon became evident that, among the central problems of science, the most tractable ones were by no means those that had direct technological implications for human life and society. So, from 1690 on, the Royal Society became progressively less concerned with practical issues, and the

more and more with

abstract questions of "natural philosophy."

By the

was found necessary to establish in London a parallel institution, called the Royal Society of Arts, with the duty and the financial resources 1740s,

it

promote and reward industrial innovations. (In the event, the full "techfrom better natural science that Francis Bacon had promised around a.d. 1600 began to be fully realized only after some 300 years, during our own twentieth century.) In England and Europe, accordingly, eighteenth-century natural science put down its deepest roots in theology and metaphysics, rather than in engineering and the other practical arts. In Newton's own eyes, the theories of planetary astronomy, which were the core of his Principia and provided to

nological spin-off"

the chief corroboration for his force,

and

gravitation,

were

more general

significant

above

ideas about the laws of motion, all

because they demonstrated

and foremost, the and gravitation were evidence of God's Plan for the Creation: any practical advantages that might be gained by putting our understanding of those laws to use, in the service of engineering or the like, were incidental and uncovenanted. Scientists could not afford to base decisions about the relative priorities of their inquiries on considerations of technological relevance or value. The agenda of the natural sciences must be decided by allowing the theoretical problems of (e.g.) physics to develop out the rationality of the Divine Design for Nature. First "laws" of motion

one another

of

*

GBWW,

in their

own

way.

Any attempt

to force the pace of science

Vol. 34.

73

777e

Emergence of Post-Modern Science

by emphasizing problems of direct human concern would be in vain— as much as when King Canute put his flattering courtiers to shame by sitting edge, and ordering the tide to recede before the natural time

at the sea's

had come

for

it

to

do

so.

In the end, what was generally true of European science became largely true of natural science in the United States as well. For

all its initial

declara-

American Philosophical Society soon became, almost European counterparts, a center for the discussion of

tions of purpose, the as

much

as

its

theoretical problems, rather than for the pursuit of technological innova-

own experimental investigations into electricity, for inwere motivated almost entirely by intellectual curiosity rather than

tions. Franklin's

stance,

by any prophetic vision of electric light or motors, to say nothing of electronics

and other such "useful

arts."

Despite the continued wish of Ameri-

cans to find practical applications for scientific knowledge, the sciences

achieved actual intellectual progress in the United States only by following

along the same abstract, theoretical paths that had already been marked out in Europe. In his role as Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, Joseph Henry might work for (say) the establishment of lighthouses and

other navigational aids; but, as in his parallel role as a

scientific

student of

he could follow no other road than that taken in Europe by Priestley and Faraday, Ampere and Poisson. Similarly, when Louis Agassiz and Asa Gray debated the problems of geological change and the theory of organic evolution, they had its cosmological rather than its practical implications in mind. How far did the evidence about the Earth's crust testify to the Divine Plan and confirm "the veracity of Moses as an historian?" Was Evolution compatible with Creation or with Design? For those protagonists, as for their Bostonian listeners up on Beacon Hill, the immediate consequences of that debate were not technical or practical but electricity,

philosophical and theological. So, for

made

some 200 years

after

Newton's major work, the natural sciences

progress independently and on their own, by abstracting themselves

from the demands

of practical techniques

and following out

their

own

sequences of intellectual problems. Questions about the planetary orbits, to questions about gravitation, and these in turn gave about other "central forces," such as those involved in magnetic attraction and molecular bonding. Questions about chemical combination, likewise, led on to questions about atomic weight and structure, and these in turn gave rise to questions about the nature of heat and

for instance, led

on

rise to questions

the kinetic theory of matter. In scientists

all

the natural sciences,

it

seemed

as

if

simply had to follow up the available clues and problems and see

Only after the year 1870 or thereabouts did the new picture as an outcome of two centuries of scientific investigation, become sufficiently precise and detailed to yield any substantial harvest of

where they

led.

of nature, built

technological It is

74

up

fruit.

only from the mid-nineteenth century

— first,

with the electric tele-

Stephen Toulmin

graph, subsequently with the development of

artificial dyestuffs and other chemicals— that we can recognize the beginnings of the alliance between science and technology which by now many people have come to take for granted, and which is frequently (though mistakenly) viewed as a permanent feature of both enterprises. Throughout the crucial two centuries from 1670 on, during which "modern science" was finding its proper mission and taking on its basic character, the central topics for scientific investigation and speculation remained the academic ones known traditionally—and significantly— by the name of "natural philosophy."

industrial

b.

and

Scientific theory

What were ral

the rational spectator

the fundamental themes and presuppositions of this

philosophy"?

How

new

"natu-

did these theories and presuppositions shape the

working methodology of modern science, or the world picture in terms of which the physicists and biologists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries framed their inquiries? Those are the questions to which we must now pay closer attention. To begin with, the separation between technology and scientific theory that appeared during the late seventeenth century represented not just the general victory of a philosophical program for science over a more pragmatic one. Rather, it was the outcome of one quite specific constellation of philosophical views. In particular, the philosophical foundation of the modern scientific movement was a set of doctrines and distinctions that justified the new mathematical and experimental philosophers in abstracting, for separate investigation and discussion, the concepts, questions, and relation-

As formulated by

ships appropriate to the science of mechanics.

Galileo,

Kepler, and Descartes in the early years of the seventeenth century and

brought to fulfillment by Newton in his Principia, the central tasks and problems of physics involved the ideas of "force," "mass," and "motion"; and a scientific conception of nature could claim to be philosophically sound, in their eyes, only if it was constructed around a mechanical account of all the chief processes of Nature.

So conceived, Descartes's novel program for developing a mechanistic picture of nature was not just an epistemologist's fantasy thought spirit of

pure inquiry.

It

was intended quite

ideal of scientific explanation,

one that was

as

to

much

up

in the

to justify a particular

dominate theoretical debate (it appears) saw as his

in seventeenth-century physics. Descartes himself

magnum opus— the crowning point in his own philosophical output— not the shorter Meditations and Discourse on Method* to which students of philosophy turn

first

today, but the four-volume Principles of Philosophy in which he

worked out

in a

comprehensive manner

workings of the physical world. In

and

Latin, Descartes set out to

*GBWW,

his

this vast

own

mechanistic analysis of the

work, published in both French

expand the

scientific insights of his early

Vol. 31.

75

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

and cosmology. can be quite misleading to discuss the arguments of

hero, Galileo, so as to generate a complete system of physics

With

this in

mind,

it

Rene Descartes, the epistemologist and metaphysician,

as

though they

could be isolated from the explanatory procedures of Rene Descartes, the physicist.

The

general program of seventeenth-century philosophy, which

Descartes analyzed and

expounded most

fully

and

explicitly,

was a program

designed to make sense, at one and the same time, both of the "outer" processes and mechanisms of Nature and also of the "inner" activities of

Mind, through which alone human beings could come to a knowledge of Nature. In the long run, an account of epistemology could thus be satisfactory, only if it warranted a scientific methodology that proved fruitful in

and

physics

biology.

Bearing in mind

this close alliance between seventeenth-century mechanand epistemology, we can usefully look next at two specific features of the new program for "natural philosophy." The first of these had to do with

ics

the essentially theoretical character which the

from

Aristotle

more

and the other philosophers

new philosophy inherited The second had to

of Antiquity.

methodology of famous (or notorious) dichotomy between the "two substances," Mind and Matter.

do,

dualism:

To

particularly, with the implications for scientific

of Descartes's

i.e.,

begin with Aristotle, we already find the philosophers of

classical

Athens taking it as self-evident that human beings are capable of adopting an entirely detached attitude toward the world in which they find themselves, and engaging in abstract speculation about that world without intervening in

its

processes or otherwise influencing

Aristotle chose for this particular

mode

or "contemplation," and he even presented a as his ideal

of

Greek word

of the

some

mode

human life. theoria,

and

it.

The key word

that

of philosophical thought was theoria, life

devoted to contemplation

In this connection, the etymological origins of

its

Latin counterpart contemplatio, are of

interest. Historically speaking, a theoros was, in the first place, a dele-

gate sent

was a

from a

the-oros,

quently, the

games

(e.g.,

city to

the Oracle to consult the Sibyl: as such, the delegate

or "divicure,"

one who "had a care for the god." Subse-

i.e.,

same word was used for the city's delegates to the the Olympic Games), who observed the proceedings

intercity officially

without themselves participating in the athletic action. Finally, the word

came to be used as a quite general word for a spectator or onlooker; became the corresponding abstract noun, meaning "spectating" or "looking on." By a somewhat similar transformation in Latin, a contemplator was originally the surveyor who marked out the area of a shrine (or

theoros

and

theoria

templum) in preparation for a religious ceremony, as contrasted with the augur,

who conducted

contemplator

those

and

the actual ceremony; and, subsequently, the terms

contemplatio

who merely observed

became generalized to cover the activities of the mysteries and reflected on them, without

directly affecting their course. In rist"

76

or "contemplative" was one

both languages, accordingly, a true "theoto withdraw from the world and

who chose

Stephen Toulmin

devote his reflection,

life to theoria or contemplatio, i.e., a life given over to prayer and without attempting to exert any direct influence on the things

taking place in the world.

had taken it for granted that the option of theoria is, in fact, open For Descartes, by contrast, the availability of this option became a genuinely problematic issue. How can the mental operations of any human observer give him reliable knowledge about the physical world, without being caught up in the deterministic network of nature, or reacting back on the processes of that world, and so altering them? Aristotle's program for natural philosophy assumed a one-way interaction between the human observer and the observed phenomenon: the scientist's thoughts and perceptions were thought to be occasioned by the phenomena of nature, on which it was not supposed that they exerted any counter-influence. The question for Descartes was, how the existence of any such one-way interaction could be squared with the rest of his scientific and philosophical conAristotle

to us.

ceptions. It is at this

point that Descartes's dualism of

scientific significance.

On

the one hand,

all

mind and matter

displays

the processes going

on

its

in the

"outer" (or physical) world were presumably causal, mechanical processes, conforming to rigorous, deterministic mathematical principles and relations: on the other hand, the intellectual procedures characteristic of a human observer's "inner" (or mental) world were presumably rational, and so exempt from mechanical causality. Whereas the phenomena of physical nature were linked together in one single, vast, material, and mechanical world system, the free mental activities of rational beings apparently went on "outside" that system. The sphere of causality was matter; the sphere of rationality was mind; and the possibility of theoria depended on the possibility of separating these two distinct realms, or "substances." So, for Descartes, the mind-matter dualism appeared necessary, not simply as the outcome of epistemological analysis, but also as a precondition for the development of any effective natural philosophy, in which the causal processes of a mechanistic Nature can become known to rational human beings. In the course of separating mind from matter and setting one against the other, rational thought became separated from causal process, and by extension, so was the world of humanity— the realm of rationality and mind — from the world of nature, which was the realm of causality and matter. The only point of union between these two realms lay in the depths of the brain, where the "material" processes bringing signals from the outer world, along the nerves of the human frame, finally (though in an intrinsically mysterious way) reached the "mental" territory of the inner sensorium. This epistemological image of the human mind as making contact with the physical world of matter and mechanism only internally, within the

inner cerebral theatre of the sensorium, rapidly

among most

of the

"new philosophers." In

this

won

respect

general acceptance (it

seems) Descartes

was simply articulating openly notions that were already implicit in the 11

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

procedures and epistemological assumptions of his distinguished The image in question is clearly to be found in the writings of Isaac Newton. In the closing paragraph of the General Scholium that Newton added to the second edition of the Principia, we find him speaking of "the organs of sense" being carried up the afferent, scientific

predecessors, such as Galileo and Kepler.

sensory nerves in the form of "electric and elastic" influences, to meet the

mind ("that which in us perceives and thinks") in the depths of the brain, and of the "command of the will" being carried back by similar mechanisms down the efferent, motor nerves, to stimulate the motions of the muscles. The same general model also played a central part in the philosophical arguments of John Locke and the other British empiricist philosophers, right up to the time of Kant; and its philosophical influence is not exhausted even today. From John Stuart Mill and Thomas Henry Huxley, up through Bertrand Russell to Sir John Eccles and other contemporary neurophysiologists, we can trace its continuing influence in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century epistemological debate.

How

make

did this model, or image,

and methods

itself influential in

of physical science? In the first place,

it

the actual

gave

work

scientists the

assurance they needed that they could achieve a genuine objectivity in their

The earlier alchemists (for instance) had always been exposed to the fear that their own spiritual state, of purity or defilement, might affect the success of their procedures; but the new scientists of the seventeenth century now seemed to have a guarantee that, by using appropriate mathematical and experimental methods, they could arrive at knowledge of the laws and principles of the natural world of a kind that would be quite unaffected by their own subjective mental states and operations. studies of nature.

In

this

way, they could fully achieve the status of rational spectators: looking

on at the phenomena of the underlying

of nature, and drawing inferences about the workings world system, without affecting those phenomena or

workings in the process. So, within the

program

new

of the

rational scientific objectivity

came

natural philosophy, the notion of

to take a very particular form. Instead of

the term "objective" implying merely an absence of bias, prejudice, or other distortions of judgment,

it

came

to

denote one special kind of knowledge:

an onlooker, who observes his objects knowledge from a position of detachment — "clinically," to use another metaphor — and formulates judgments about them on the basis of such detached observation, not otherwise interacting with them. And this notion of "objectivity" eventually became an ideal to which scientists in other new fields of work might aspire. (Much of the attraction of behaviorism to academic psychologists, for instance, has lain in its declared intention of namely, that which

is

available only to

of

introducing just

human

this

kind of spectator's "objectivity" into the analysis of

and responses.) Eventually, the Cartesian model of rational natural philosophy culminated in the work of Pierre Simon, Marquis de Laplace, whose exhaustive 78

actions

Stephen Toulmin

mathematical analysis of astronomical theory completed and corrected the mechanical account of the planetary system first developed by Newton in the Principia. In a famous declaration about the deterministic implications of Descartes's world picture, Laplace spelled out clearly the connection between the methodology of Newtonian physics and the philosophical demand that the scientist should aim at placing himself outside the world which is his object of study. Let us imagine (he proposed) an observer possessed of a calculating mind of unlimited power, who looks on at the entire universe from outside it — what we may call an Omniscient Calculator. If this Calculator were simply presented with data telling him the position and velocities of every atom in the universe at the moment of the Creation, then by a straightforward application of Newton's laws of motion and gravitation (Laplace argued) he would understand the mechanical operations of the world system completely and could in principle foretell the entire subsequent history of the universe. Laplace did not, of course, suggest that actual human scientists would ever be able to achieve the position of Omniscient Calculator. But he did imply both that this is the ideal to which all scientists should be aspiring, and also that whatever objective scientific knowledge they do in fact achieve will be of the same general kind as the Calculator's knowledge: i.e., a more or less complete knowledge, on the one hand, of the unchanging "laws" of the Creation and, on the other hand, of the specific variables and boundary conditions relevant to any particular physical system. Newton had been the first to succeed in this task, even approximately. His analysis of the structure

of the planetary

system— together with

his

formulation of the "inverse

square" law of gravitation— had enabled him to forecast the movements of the planets, with justified confidence, for thousands of years ahead.

Now,

Newton's successors should apply the same procedure to other more complex systems and so extend their

own powers

of prediction in the direction

of the imaginary Calculator's omniscience.

Laplace's expression of the Cartesian ideal underlying the methods of Newtonian physics has been immensely influential. At the same time, it was subject from the start to certain restrictions and qualifications which were

not at

first

properly appreciated.

cal sciences,

because

it

It

was directly influential within the physi-

reinforced the physicists' conviction that their work

was proceeding along the right

lines

and

that they could press

ahead with

It was because the interests of Laplace himself extended far beyond astronomy, into the newly emerging human and social sciences. For more than a cen-

every expectation of continued successes.

indirectly influential, also,

and social theorists vied with one another to and historical change, to bring social phenomena within the scope of calculation and prediction and thus to become the Newton of the human sciences. Along with Condorcet and Saint-Simon, Laplace himself was one of the major figures in French social and political theory at the close of the eighteenth century, and his Philosophical Essay on

tury, as a result, sociologists

discover the "laws" of social

79

The Emergence of Post-Modern Science

was one of the great founding documents of statistical theory. first conceived of as the science of the "state," i.e., the science phenomena involving the overall behavior of human beings in very

Probabilities*

("Statistics"

of social

was

large numbers.)

image was profoundly influential within philosophy. It first, on the metaphysical level. The entire intellectual system of determinism and mechanical materialism that mid-nineteenthcentury thinkers found so enticing (or threatening) depended on taking Laplace's image, not as the expression of an explanatory ideal, but rather as a statement about the actual character of the natural world. So understood, it appeared as though Newton had "proved" that Descartes in fact was right, and that the whole physical world of matter and forces is indeed a single comprehensive "machine" grinding out future events in an ineluctably predetermined manner. (Physical determinism thus took over the role previously played among, e.g., Calvinist theologians, by God's foreknowledge as an excuse for fatalism.) Even when philosophers had become more skeptical about the credentials of this metaphysical scheme, Laplace's view Finally, Laplace's

exerted that influence,

retained

influence over the epistemological debate, especially in the

its

philosophy of science; and right up to the 1950s, the "axiomatic" and the "hypothetico-deductive" analyses of scientific explanation given by the logi-

and others perpetuated Laplace's conviction that Newton had discovered not just one but the only proper method for explaining natural phenomena. From the beginning, however, a more careful and effective reading of Laplace's position would have brought its limitations to light. For those restrictions lay at the heart of the argument and were self-imposed. The Omniscient Calculator studied the historical development of the universe from outside it, and without himself being a part of it. Like a classical Greek theoros, he obtained the data he needed for predicting the course of its development wihout participating in its activities or influencing its processes. Thus, inevitably, his success as a Cosmic Forecaster depended entirely on the possibility of interacting with his objects of study in this one-way manner. When Newton "broke the code" of the Solar System, he was of cal empiricists

course in that position: neither the astronomical observations to which he

appealed in explaining the facts of planetary motion, nor the theoretical which he himself performed, could have had any effect on this motion. To that extent, Newton's method of explaining phenomena mathematically, and from outside, was well adapted to his particular problem. What few people before the twentieth century paused to inquire explicitly was whether the same stance was appropriate to scientific problems of all calculations

kinds and in

all fields.

That

is

a question which the subsequent

of the natural sciences, especially

us to face.

*

80

GGB,

Vol.

9.

from the 1920s on, has

development compelled

at last

Stephen Toulmin

c.

Scientific objectivity

and value

neutrality

radical separation of the human observer from observed nature that was central to the methodology of classical, or "modern," science had one further important consequence. Once the world of nature had been set apart from the world of human affairs and interests as an object for de-

The

tached study by "rational spectators,"

up

it

could be treated as a world

of morally indifferent or neutral "facts."

Human

made

thoughts and feelings,

wishes and regrets, ceased to be elements within nature: instead, they

became

proper understanding of nature's laws. ("Things are and their consequences will be what they will be," said Bishop Butler, "Why, then, should we seek to be deceived?") As a result, the ideal of scientific objectivity current during the reign of "modern" science was not merely that of a spectator's knowledge; it was a kind of knowledge that confined itself to "the facts" and ignored all questions about human values and preferences. To employ a phrase that in due course became a byword obstacles to a

as they are,

among

who sought to emulate the rigor own work— it was the modern scientist's duty to aim at "value neutrality." The true scientist should not allow his concern with the relationships involved, either in natural or in human —especially

those social scientists

of the physical sciences in their

affairs, to

be deflected by any value commitments or other prejudices from

reporting those "objective"

demand

facts

with unvarnished precision.

two separate roles in the one hand, it required the modern scientist to approach all the intellectual problems that properly fell within the scope of his methods with a clear head and a cool heart. On the other hand, it served to demarcate those issues that were properly the subjects for "scientific" investigation and discussion from those that were, rather, matters of human taste, choice, or decision. To begin with, these two aspects were not always distinguished in people's minds. As a result, for a long time the limited scope of this demand was no more fully appreciated than were the intrinsic limitations This

sciences.

for value neutrality played

On the

of Laplacean determinism.

The

first

lem whose of

modern

aspect was, of course, scarcely

open

to challenge.

Given a probmethods under a clear

status as a topic for scientific inquiry according to the

science

is

not in serious doubt, the scientist

obligation to attack that

problem

is

in a disinterested (or impartial) way, as

from a detached standpoint. In studying or speculating about the movements of the planets around the sun or of blood corpuscles through

well as

the capillaries, the course of chemical reactions or physiological processes,

and the

historical transformation of the earth's crust or the populations of organisms inhabiting it— all of which are in themselves unresponsive to, and uninfluenced by, the scientist's attentions— it will do no good to let one's scientific ideas be influenced by a wish for one result rather than another.

In those cases, evidently enough, act as "prejudices"

human

feelings

and so come between the

and

scientist

can indeed proper goal.

interests

and

his

81

The Emergence of Post-Modern Science

To

one of the standard ways of criticizing any piece of scientific all of physics and most of biology, is to argue that the investigator concerned brought prior preconceptions to his investigations and approached his subject matter in a prejudiced manner, so that his mind was not truly open or impartial and his view of the facts was correspondingthis day,

work, throughout

ly

subject to distortion.

However,

extreme kind

this

of disinterest (or "value neutrality")

remains

unquestionably appropriate only for so long as we confine our attention to natural objects, systems, and processes that lend themselves to such purely "objective"

(i.e.,

detached) study. At

first, it

was not recognized

how

far this

placed significant limits on the range of subject matter that scientists could

hope

to bring

under the wing

of

"modern science." The and the history of

the chemical processes of oxidation,

proper objects of

scientific

flow of the blood,

the earth

may be

study just because they involve those passive

unresponsive "objects" of kinds that are almost entirely fluenced by our observation of them.

To

that extent,

unmoved and we do

unin-

well to study

them from a purely detached, factual standpoint, in the passionless clinical manner associated with the classical ideal of "value neutrality." But it is not so clear that the same methods and maxims hold good in all cases, particularly in the case of human beings. Whether we study the behavior of our fellow humans individually or in groups, it is far from obvious that we can do so fruitfully and effectively — if at all — by viewing them from a purely detached viewpoint, confining our attention to what we can discover about them on a one-way basis, without their even knowing that we are studying them. In short, it is not at all certain that our fellow humans do usefully lend themselves to

scientific

study as simple "objects," without our also consider-

ing their capacity to interact with us investigations as "subjects" in their

Consequently,

it is

not at

all

on a two-way

own

basis, to

respond

to

our

right.

certain that the

demand

for value neutrality,

which may be appropriate enough in astronomy or organic chemistry, can be carried over to psychology and the social sciences. There, the methods of investigation that were developed around the year 1700, in the heyday of Newtonian physics, and were subsequently applied to other kinds of research, may run up against their natural limits and cease to provide the uniquely "scientific" way of approaching our investigations. We should once again note that the demand for "value neutrality" brought with it certain inescapable restrictions on the proper scope of science. If rational, scientific objectivity, unclouded by human wishes and prejudices, was to be achieved only by refusing to attend to anything but "cold, hard facts," that alone had the effect of setting bounds to the scope of "scientific" investigation— at least, so long as "science" was understood to classical,

Cartesian, or Newtonian

mean

science undertaken in the

spirit.

For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, of course, the equation of impartiality with detached disinterest embodied in the classical conception of "scientific objectivity" remained unchallenged. The general 82

Stephen Toulmin

sense of this conception has by

now entered

the vocabulary of colloquial

one character looking at another with a "scientific" eye, we immediately understand what he means: a "scientific" attitude toward other people, like its fellow-stereotype, a "clinical" speech.

If,

for instance, a novelist speaks of

interest in their welfare or their affairs,

is popularly taken to involve the concern for, or any genuinely personal interest in, the people who are its object. For the sake of knowledge (it is implied), the true scientist should be prepared to experiment on his own mother as coolly as he would experiment on a guinea pig. By taking Mind out of the world of Nature (it seemed) Descartes had denied the scientific "reality" or significance of the passions, except, of course, as objects to be studied in turn by the physiological psychologists. So, an ideal of "rationality" was put into circulation which denied any possibility that the passions themselves could be a source of knowledge or rational understanding; and when David Hume put forth his famous epigram in reaction against this exaggeration — "The Reason both is, and ought to be, a Slave of the Passions"— that declaration was brushed aside lightly, as a piece of mischievous fun intended only to shock respectable opinion. It was another hundred years, at least, before Hume's successors began to take with any real seriousness his realization that all thought and action, even the most ideally "rational" and "objective," have some basis in the affective part of our human nature.

deliberate suppression of

d.

Professionalism

and

all

scientific

affective

detachment

Before long, the philosophical arguments for suppressing our ests

and

human inter-

affective responses, in the interest of achieving rational, scientific

were reinforced by other developments of a more sociological By the end of the eighteenth century, the level of scientific activity had grown to a point at which science could no longer remain what it had predominantly been since the mid-seventeenth century; namely, an occupation for individual gentlemen of leisure and curiosity, or for physicians and objectivity,

kind.

clergymen with plenty of spare time. From the year 1800 on, the enterprise of modern science began to develop its own particular institutions, and these institutions — whether colleges of pharmacy, physiological laboratories, centers of chemical research, or whatever— soon followed the path of all institutions. They specialized and differentiated. Adam Smith had been right (it turned out) in science quite as much as in manufacture. Intellectual productivity, quite as much as industrial productivity, was promoted by the division of labor.

This specialization and differentiation of science was not a sociological alone. Even as a matter of method, the new experimental and

phenomenon

mathematical philosophers quickly found that the

first

step toward discov-

ering intelligible general mechanisms in nature was to recognize and abstract natural processes of particular varieties,

variety separately.

Some

and

to concentrate

on each

natural processes obeyed purely mechanical prin83

The Emergence of Post-Modern Science

ciples;

others involved gravitational forces; others again were electrical or

magnetic, chemical or physiological; and no purpose was served by trying

about all these different kinds of processes before they had been studied and understood one at a time. So, there came into existence that profusion of scientific disciplines and subdisciplines with which we are familiar in the twentieth century. Initially, at least, it was most effective to study electrical phenomena, optical phenomena, physiological phenomena, and the rest separately and independently, as the subject matters of distinct disciplines; and, as time went on, this increasingly came to mean also that they could be most effectively studied by becoming the concerns of different groups of people. In this way, the specialization of scientific disciplines and ideas brought in its train a corresponding differentiation of scientific professions, journals, and institutions. Each discipline was perceived as defining, and as defined by, its own distinct research agenda, and the tasks on that agenda became the professional concern of an equally specialized group of scientists. Notice that word, "scientists." The invention and rapid acceptance of this term serves as a good historical index of the moment at which the specialization and professionalization of the natural sciences became unmistakable. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the word "scientist" was unknown. Half a dozen other terms were used in referring to those people whose curiosity led them to investigate the structure and workings of the natural world. Some of these terms were naturalized into English from other languages, e.g., French (savant) and Italian (virtuoso). Others to generalize first

carried over into the of earlier times,

e.g.,

new era

modern

of

science the scholastic terminology

the widely used phrase "natural philosopher." But,

once their concern with science began to be recognized not merely as a or an attitude of mind, but also as an occupation, even as a "job," such

taste,

usages became inadequate. As William Whewell argued in his Presidential

Address

Advancement of Science for the new word was needed which would register this change in the scientific investigation: a term that would mark off original scien-

to the British Association for the

year 1840, a status of tific

discoveries as the products of a specific kind of professional

individual, in the "artist"

marks

same way

that the

off original artistic

of professional

work and

much more

work and

ancient and accepted term

creations as the products of a specific kind

individual.

And

it

was in

fact

Whewell who,

in that

1840 lecture, deliberately coined and launched the neologism "scientist," using the term "artist" as his model. Thus, it was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that the different natural sciences

began

to

be recognized

at all generally as defining

Once the drive toward disciplinary and professional fragmentation was well under way, however, it quickly gathered speed: with "physicists" doing specialized work in physics, "biologists" in biology, and eventually even, in our own day, magnetohydrodynamicists particular professional roles.

84

Stephen Toulmin

magnetohydrodynamics. Furthermore, this separation of groups only strengthened the tendency to define the tasks of science in "objective" terms, by encouraging scientists to divide up and classify the kinds of objects and processes available for detached observation, study, and reflective theorizing in a taxonomy of "natural kinds." Nature provided the scientific onlooker with a spectacle comprising a dozen quite different kinds of processes and objects; and what distinguished physicists from biologists, or physicists of different sorts from one another, was the particular aspects of nature on which they respectively chose to concentrate their detached rational scrutiny. Just as there were several different sorts of engineers and other practitioners, whose professional task was to develop improved techniques for controlling and changing their respective aspects of nature, so now there were different sorts of scientists, whose professional task was to develop improved ways of understanding them; and in addition— at any rate, in Europe— a certain lingering assumption that science was a more genteel occupation than engineering helped to sharpen the contrast between those whose mastery was merely practical (i.e., who had useful techniques) and those whose mastery was fully intellectual (i.e., who had correct ideas). Manipulating the world of nature for practical purposes was a mechanic's province; a gentleman's concern was to contemplate the works and wonders of nature from a more theoretical and supposedly "higher" standpoint. So, Aristotle's conception of theoria (or philosophical contemplation) as the highest mode of human life and activity had social implications in the world of modern science. Considerations of these four features of "modern" science— its distinction between theory and application, the dualism formulated by Descartes, the assumption of a link between objectivity and "value neutrality," and the specializing in

scientific inquiries into distinct

professional (and academic) organization of scientific

endeavor— worked

together to establish and confirm the central methodological feature of or "modern" natural science that was launched by Descartes and Newton and remained dominant in Western thought about nature until the early years of the twentieth century. Above all, this "modern" science aspired, so far as was practicable, to achieve the theoretical ideals that the new philosophers of the seventeenth century had inherited from their Athenian "classical"

forerunners. Their account of nature was to be a spectator's account, which reported and analyzed the operations of nature "from outside," i.e., without influencing or altering them. No doubt, the extent to which this could be

done

in fact

was limited by the coarseness of our instruments and proceundermine the theoretical ideal. It was not

dures, but that did nothing to

Western Europe and North America seriously faced the possibility that this central intellectual ambition might be unrealizable, not, or not merely, because it was out

until well into the twentieth century that the scientists of

of

human

reach for practical reasons, but also because

it

was misconceived

in

principle.

85

The Emergence of Post-Modern Science

3.

If

The it

crisis of objectivity in the

had not been

development

of

modern science

for the disciplinary fragmentation of the natural sciences,

the challenges to the "classical" ideal of scientific objectivity might have been

recognized and faced earlier on.

From

the very beginning, as Karl Popper

has recently pointed out, there were fundamental reasons for questioning

whether the basic program of modern science could be fully carried through. But, so long as the intellectual agenda of science as a whole was simply thought of as the sum of the agendas of all the different subdisciplines (or "special sciences"), there was no way in which these limitations could force themselves on the attention of scientists, unless and until their consequences made themselves apparent to people working on the particular problems of one or another special science. Given the accepted division of labor involved in "doing science," criticisms of the program that were stated only in general philosophical terms could be ignored, or at least shelved, in the absence of more specific problems and difficulties — preferably,

ones with empirical implications.

In retrospect (Popper has argued)

we can

see that the

program

of

Descartes and Newton, particularly as generalized by Laplace, had funda-

mental restrictions

These show up soon enough if we consider would eventually the particular problems that arise when we attempt

built into

it.

either (1) the general kinds of subject matter scientists

have to deal with, or (2) to bring the activities of

human

beings

— including

scientists

themselves

—

within the scope of science.

As

to (1):

it

was no accident that the basic subject matter of seventeenth-

century physical theory In

itself,

— notably, Newton's mechanics— was "inert Matter."

Descartes had argued, matter was incapable of self-movement.

The

outcome of all merely physical processes could do no more than transfer between different material bodies some part of the total quantity of motion that God had conferred on the entire Universe at the time of its Creation: they could, in themselves, create no new motion. This passive view of matter was preserved in the theories of Newton and most of his successors. (That made the problem of Life as intractable an issue for philosophical biologists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the problem of Mind had been to Descartes himself.) Beginning with the movements of the planets and freely falling objects, and going on to embrace mechanical systems of progressively more complex varieties, classical science was able for many years to go on expanding in scope and power without coming up against its

own

natural boundaries.

initially presented thempromising topics for study comprised insensate objects, systems, and processes. The planets, for example, presumably continued on their elliptical paths around the sun in just the same ways regardless of whether human astronomers were observing them or not. Because they were insensate, they were quite unaware of being

In

brief: all the varieties of subject

selves to classical

86

Newtonian

matter that

scientists as

Stephen Toulmin

observed; because they were so enormous, they were quite uninfluenced by the scientists' procedures and observations; legitimate to

and for both reasons it was assume that the behavior they presented to the eye of a

detached spectator was typical of their behavior generally. In this theoria was a reliable posture from which to acquire a well-founded knowledge of nature. The same was seemingly true through a great range of cases. Even in the case of the human frame, many rational,

paradigmatic case, accordingly,

(e.g., those involved in the flow of the blood through the and veins) could apparently be studied in the same detached and "objective" manner: there was no reason at all, for instance, to suppose that the valves in the circulatory system began opening and closing in significantly different ways the moment their operation came under the scientist's

bodily processes arteries

scrutiny.

With respect

to (2),

some

human

operations of the

teenth-century chemist

J.

scientists might feel residual doubts about the nervous system, which the great Swedish nineJ. Berzelius expected to remain forever opaque

to scientific investigation. But,

by the beginning of the twentieth century,

it

had begun to appear to Charles Sherrington and others that, given sufficient care and delicacy, neurological processes, too, could be brought within the purview of the classical scientific concepts and theories. In themselves, after all, the electrical impulses in human nerves are no more sensate, and so no more aware of being subjects of scientific observation and theorizing, than the planets are. All that remained was to devise practical methods of studying neural processes without modifying them in untended and unaccountable respects.

As Descartes had foreseen, the

limitations to the theoretical analysis of

phenomena in terms of "inert Matter" began to make themselves seriously felt only when scientists began to study human perception, experinatural

and thought. At that point, the problems were grave and remained and only their general dissatisfaction with the peculiar consequences of Descartes's dualistic theory of matter and mind excused classical scientists in the Newtonian tradition for ignoring Newton's reservations and assuming that the classical world picture could indeed embrace all natural ence,

so;

phenomena whatever place's

in

within

its

scope. For,

however

slight a way, so that the

human

acquire evidence that their behavior has

then

liable to

human

let

us simply suppose that La-

Omniscient Calculator influences the universe that he

happen?

beings

human

his scrutiny: what is even more simply, that

come under the happen in that event? and thoughtful, the humans who are under that their behavior has

scientists:

Either way, being sensate

observing

come under

Alternatively, let us suppose,

become aware

scrutiny of other

is

beings within that universe

what

is

liable to

observation have the option of acting in a perverse, counter-suggestible

manner and may seek er that observer

At

is

least in the case

to frustrate the expectations of that

observer (wheth-

human or cosmic makes no difference in this respect). of human behavior — as Karl Popper has rightly argued 87

The Emergence of Post-Modern Science

— it is no longer clear that the goal of complete predictability and determinism was ever really open to us, even during the heyday of classical Newtonian science; and, strictly speaking, the most that could ever have been hoped for from any comprehensive natural philosophy based on the methods and principles of classical physics was an account of the mechanical, and so insensate, part of the universe

— leaving

aside

all

those processes that

implicated the consciousness and thought of sensate, rational agents.

worth sharpening up further. On the one hand, Omniscient Calculator is a true expression of the intellectual goals laid down for classical science by Descartes and Newton. On the other hand, the relevance of this image of the actual tasks of classical science depended on the Calculator's interacting with the world whose Karl Popper's point

Laplace's

image

is

of the

history he sought to account for in a strictly unidirectional way. In a phrase,

there had to be a purely one-way "coupling" between the cosmic observer

and the observed world. purposes of physics,

this

It

was an axiom of Cartesian theory

condition could be satisfied: the

planets influenced the observations

and thoughts

that, for the

movements

of the

of the astronomer, with-

out his thoughts and observations influencing the planets in return. But two questions could legitimately be raised. First, one might inquire whether that

Cartesian

maxim

accuracy within

Or might

all

could be relied on to continue holding with complete future scientific theories, even for the purposes of physics.

on a sufficiently refined level, physical processes would themselves turn out to be observable only in ways that involved a two-way coupling? And, second, one might question whether it had ever been possible to enlarge the scope of Cartesian and Newtonian physical science into a comprehensive natural philosophy, including intelligent human behavior alongside the phenomena of planetary movement, the circulation of the blood and the rest. Is not our knowledge of intelligent human behavior inevitably the product of an inquiry based on somewhat different methods and maxims? From time to time, both these questions were debated in general terms by the philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Pursuing arguments begun by Ruggero Giuseppe Boscovich, a noted Jesuit philosopher from Ragusa (now Dubrovnik) in Dalmatia, Joseph Priestley claimed in the 1770s that the initial assumption on which the world picture of classical science had been based — the assumption that matter is intrinsically inert— was unfounded. On the contrary, Priestley argued, every individual material particle presents an active point-source of power and influence. In this way, he hinted at an alternative approach to theoretical physics, based on a theory of fields of interaction, which was to be developed in detail and at full length only with the appearance of quantum mechanics in the 1920s; and he tried to use the same argument to undercut Descartes's philosophical dichotomy of mind and matter, also. To be consistent, Priestley argued, Descartes should have been prepared to bring the mental and material aspects of nature within a single system. But Priestley's theoretical proposals 88

it

well be that,

Stephen Toulmin

were ignored for at least forty years, until they were taken up by Michael Faraday with his theory of electrical fields. As for Priestley's philosophical criticisms: these were generally attacked as involving an impious Epicureanism and materialism, much to the theological embarrassment of the Reverend R. G. Boscovich himself. A few years later, Immanuel Kant was openly criticizing all attempts to

expand the mechanistic theories

of classical science with the

ing the higher mental activities of

human

aim

of explain-

beings in the same terms as the

motions and properties of material objects: It was impossible in principle (he claimed) to turn psychology into a natural science. We would at once qualify this statement of Kant's position, if only to forestall cries of anguish

from those

late

twentieth-century psychologists

who would

respectability for their professional enterprises.

claim "scientific"

As Kant used the phrase,

the words "natural science" referred to a discipline that was capable of

being organized in the form of a coherent mathematical system— his own favorite examples were Euclidean geometry and Newtonian dynamics

—

and he found

it

imperative to deny only the possibility that one might

human thinkers and same kind of exact formal theories as Newton had developed to account for the movements of planets and other insensate material things. In taking this stand, Kant was certainly not denying that human thought and conduct were explicable in any terms whatever. He was concerned "calculate" the intelligent behavior of sensate, rational

agents using the

only that psychological explanations should be given in terms appropriate

to

and problems; and for this purpose (he saw) the standard model of Newtonian mechanics had nothing to offer. In seeking to understand the trains of thought and action of our fellow human beings, we do not approach them in the purely detached posture of astronomers seeking to account for the movements of the planets. Rather, we have to place ourselves on their level, put ourselves in their places, and decipher the "reasons" motivating their lives in the same terms we use in their specific subject matter

the case of our own.

So long as the natural scientists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuconfined their investigations narrowly enough, they could insist on remaining in the posture of rational spectators and stand by the particular ries

criteria of objectivity

sors tried to

appropriate to that posture. As soon as their succes-

expand the application

of the spectator's posture

beyond the

study of insensate or unresponsive systems, however, they entered a field, in

which the appropriateness of employing the

new

classical criteria of

became questionable; and, the moment they presented scientific method as universal in scope, they laid themselves and their arguments open to damaging criticism. The methods and criteria of "modern science" had been developed in the course of studying sticks and stones, planets and plants, and for the purpose of such investigations their power and value were unquestioned. When extrapolated without limit and applied to the behavior of human beings — to say scientific objectivity

this limited

conception of

89

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

nothing of the Universe as a mained unproved.

Even

whole— their

merits were dubious and re-

so, until well after 1900, the significance of these qualifications

was

and philosophical: they did not affect the practical operascientists performed on their experimental subject matter, but

largely speculative tions that

manner

in which they conceived of their relations with Considered in practical terms, the limitations on the classical view made little difference to the actual conduct of scientific work. By the most natural and legitimate sequence in the world, scientists in the classical, Newtonian tradition began by focusing their attentions on the simplest cases of force and motion, and then, bit by bit, expanded their inquiries outward from that base to include also energy and electricity, molecular structures, chemical reactions, and elementary physiological functions. In this way, while consolidating their understanding of the basic processes of physics and chemistry, they succeeded in keeping the truly problematic issues at arm's length; and, if necessary, they were ready to distract attention from those more difficult areas by dismissing cosmological

only the theoretical

that subject matter.

speculations as theological,

To

this day,

and psychological phenomena

as subjective.

there are large areas of the physical sciences in which the

classical

method remains,

as ever.

In the greater part of

for

all

practical purposes, as effective

this

and

fruitful

work, physicists, chemists, and physiolo-

assume that the processes they study are not significantly our observation of them. Yet, by now, it is also clear that the assumption of a one-way coupling rests on a simplification of the true situation, which may be useful for certain purposes, but is valid only within limits. The moment one seeks to move across those limits, the theoretical basis of that assumption has to be reconsidered. And those scientific enthusiasts in the late nineteenth century who went full steam ahead, without a second thought, were evidently creating the conditions for a crisis in the historical development of science. By claiming unlimited power and unrestricted application for methods of investigation that had been tested and proved in only a limited range of cases, nineteenth-century scientists placed themselves at risk. For in doing so they begged the answers to two questions which, at the time, had never been thoroughly or critically appraised: (1) Was there reason to believe that the methods of investigation that had proved fruitful in the case of insensate, unresponsive objects and processes would continue to be effective in the case of sensate and responsive beings? Or were Kant's strictures on all attempts to produce a "mechanics of the mind" a proper warning against such an extrapolation? (2) Was there even reason to believe that, in their dealings with insensate, unresponsive beings, scientists would always be able to preserve a purely gists

can

still

freely

affected by, or responsive to,

Laplacean "one-way interaction" with their subject matter, by continuing to reduce their causal influence on the systems they studied, without ever reaching any natural limit? Or would a point be reached, in due course, 90

Stephen Toulmin

beyond which even

physicists

and astronomers could no longer claim

serving as pure onlookers whose investigations produced

no

ple)

significant

to be

(at least in princi-

changes in the behavior of the system they were observ-

ing? If all

other things had been equal— in particular,

1830s and 1840s had been as reflective and

if

the scientists of the

self-critical

about their philo-

had been, some one hundred years earlier— those issues might already have

sophical presuppositions as their precursors

or one hundred and

fifty

been confronted before the middle of the nineteenth century. Certainly, there was nothing substantive in the intellectual content of nineteenth-

century science that compelled scientists to claim unrestricted application for

its

theoretical posture

As things turned

and methods.

out, the division of labor associated with the profession-

alization of scientific

work

led to these questions being sidetracked.

The

and biological sciences achieved in turn, each in its own field, gave the spokesmen of science the idea that they had hit on an intellectual method of unlimited fruitfulness. Whatever the subject of investigation might be — from the minutest of atoms to the entire cosmos, from the simplest physical collision to the subtlest of mental experiences— the maxims of scientific method, the criteria of scientific objectivity, and the demands of a truly scientific attitude should (they assumed) be the same. extraordinary successes that

The

all

of the various physical

"modern science," accordingly, fell into the and self-deception that gave rise to "scientism," not out of any kind of self-interest or other such ulterior motive, but from sheer uncritical extrapolation. As a result, the intellectual crisis whose sources were built into the "classical" conception of scientific detachment and objectivity was postponed until after 1900. Instead of being precipitated and overcome in the lifetime of the Newtonian world picture (as we shall see), it was faced only during the years from 1905 on, when the adequacy of enthusiastic advocates of

habits of exaggeration

Newton's

own

theories was at last called in question, even within the heart-

lands of physics

4.

itself.

The transformation

How

of the sciences during the twentieth century

our twentieth-century ways of thinking about unforeseen onset, explicit recognition, and eventual resolution—what I am here calling the transition from modern to post-modern science— have occupied some sixty or seventy tumultuous and productive has this

the world?

crisis affected

Its

had happened with the critique of earlier his successors, some three or four hundred years earlier, the first steps in this transition acted like the movement of a single pebble that precipitates an avalanche. Beginning from

years of intellectual history. As scientific theories of

Copernicus and

certain apparently localized difficulties within the formulation of theoretical

91

The Emergence of Post-Modern Science

have spread out and ramified, until they have and character of contemporary science at many points and on many levels. For the purposes of this essay, we may divide up these changes and consider them under three subheadings: a. Changes in the character and conception of "theory" in science, by which the earlier conception of the scientist, as a rational onlooker detached from his objects of study, has been progressively displaced by a newer conception of the scientist, as a participant involved in the very processes physics, the resulting changes

transformed the

intellectual status

about which he theorizes; b. Associated changes in the character and conception of technology, arising from the fact that the earlier habit of manipulating and utilizing the seemingly unlimited resources of nature has run up against the limits of those resources, together with the fact that quite consciously

and

it

has become necessary to allow

explicitly for the role of

human

actions within the

natural processes that are being put to individual or industrial use; c.

The consequent abandonment

duct of the

scientific enterprise,

of "value neutrality" in the actual con-

together with a novel recognition that the

pursuit of science imposes not merely intellectual but also ethical

on a.

its

The

demands

practitioners. theorist as participant

We may

take as our starting point Albert Einstein's dissatisfaction with late

nineteenth-century attempts to link Isaac Newton's system of mechanics with James Clerk Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism, so as to achieve a complete synthesis of physics. It was this critique of Einstein's that acted as the loose pebble which,

first,

prompted the creation more comprehensive

and, not long after, led to the

of relativity physics

critique by

Werner

Heisenberg and Niels Bohr of the physical relationship between the "observer" and the "observed." relativity

— the

By

itself, it is

true, Einstein's initial theory of

so-called "special" theory of relativity, dating

1905— did not require one

from the year

to reject the earlier picture of the scientist as

an onlooker viewing nature from a detached position. Even so, it did introduce one important change to that picture, the long-term intellectual consequences of which were to be momentous. Hitherto, scientists had not merely taken it for granted that they could, at least in principle, observe and describe the world of nature with progressively increasing precision, without influencing its operations in any theoretically significant way; they had also assumed that all of their observations could be compared and correlated in a perfectly straightforward manner, regardless of the actual location in the universe from which those observations were made. According to Newton's theory of mechanics, there existed one or more privileged "frames of reference" (the so-called "inertial" frames) in relation to which mechanical processes of all kinds could be described using especially simple mathematical forms. It was natural enough, therefore, to think of Laplace's

92

Stephen Toulmin

Omniscient Calculator tial"

contemplating the world from

as

just

such an "iner-

viewpoint.

The immediate consequence of the new relativity theory was to put that second assumption in doubt. By putting the mathematical system of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory at the heart of physics, in place of Newton's mechanics, Einstein was able to show that— theoretically speaking— all frames of reference were on a par with one another. As he saw things, there was nothing in nature to mark off descriptions given from the standpoint of "inertial" frames of reference as either simpler or otherwise "better" than those given from any other viewpoint. For the purposes of physics, any one viewpoint was as good as any other, and no physical tests could ever serve to pick out any one frame of reference (whether associated with

Laplace's ideal observer, or with "absolute space," or with the hypothetical

"ether") as defining the ideal standpoint for a detached scientific contemplation of the Universe.

The

scientist

describing nature without affecting

its

might

still

dream

and do so only

of observing

operations; but he could

by employing physical agencies (e.g., light rays) — there was no longer any way in which these observations could be made entirely "from outside" the

world of nature

itself.

To

put the matter bluntly, the

relativistic principle

implied that any frame of reference was physically as good as any other,

i.e.,

must be understood as being given "relative to" some arbitrarily chosen frame of reference within the physical world; and this step paved the way for a radical reappraisal of the traditionthat any physical description of nature

al

picture of the scientist as observer.

critique was forced on physicists only when they turned away from astronomy— the physics of the largest scale processes open to human study— and looked instead at the physics of phenomena on the smallest scale available for scientific investigation. The crucial arguments were those associated with the introduction, by Erwin Schrodinger and Werner Heisenberg, of wave mechanics and quantum mechanics. These new theories were required in order to account for the

That deeper

their attention

puzzling properties of the electrons within the newly discovered substruc-

and for the processes by which material atoms absorb and emit light and other forms of electromagnetic radiation. (Here, the names of Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr, and Louis de Broglie come particularly to mind.) By the late 1930s, as the outcome of a vigorous debate in which Heisenberg and Bohr took the most promiture of individual atoms,

were found

to

nent parts, one fundamental conclusion had been established and had

On the

won

subatomic particles, at least, no physical procedures were available by which one could measure all of the specific variables needed for the purposes of perfect Laplacean prediction, without in the process changing the actual values of those variables to an unknowable extent. Roughly speaking, on the subatomic level Nature permitted the general acceptance.

physicist to

level of

probe her workings only with blunt

fingers: the

more

precisely

93

-e

:~f;f-^

"

= zs:-V:ze'" Sz e-zs

he attempted to discover and describe those workings, the more seriously he was doomed to intervene in them, and so to change them. As time went on. it became clear that the resulting principle— viz.. that the exact and simultaneous values of all physical variables were inescapably "indeterminable" — was of

much more general application. Although it had on the subatomic scale, where its consequences were inescapable, there was even, reason to suppose that it held good on all other levels of physical magnitude, as well, even where it had no practical consequences of any sort. So. as soon as quantum mechanics had taken its place as one of the foundation stones of the new physics, the old dream of drawing a sharp, precise line between the "observer" and the "observed" — of a one-way interaction between the onlooking scientist and the natural processes of which he was a spectator — had apparently to be abandoned. As a matter of quite basic principle, no such sharp line could be drawn. Even for the purposes of the most fundamental parts of theoretical physics, scientists were now obliged to think of themselves not as spectators looking on nature but as participants involved wkkm nature. Whether on the largest, astronomical scale or on the smallest, subatomic scale, their own procedures for observing, measuring, and describing nature would from now on form an essential, unelimmable part of their objects of study. Physicists could no longer retreat to an intellectual "hide" and observe nature been recognized

first

.:;

like bird-watchers.

to influence:

No

such "hide" was any longer available.

and even the most

To

observe

si

delicate of observations involved a two-way

interaction with nature.

Once the

earlier

assumption

of a

one-way interaction between the on-

looker and his natural objects of study had to be abandoned even in

fundamental physical theory, the other limitations on the ideas and methods of "classical" science became easier to recognize. Ever since Descartes, the mathematical exactitude of physical theory

had given

it

a prestige,

and

also a philosophical centrality. that other sciences apparently lacked. So. in

from Descartes on. the fact that psychology had so much less hope of achieving the kind of theoretical detachment to which physicists could realistically aspire only underlined the impossibility of turning psychology into a truly "exact" science. As a result of Heisenberg's critique, however, this philosophical dichotomy between physics and psychology — between the natural sciences and the human sciences — also came up for reconsideration. There might still be some force in Wilhelm Dilthey's arguments for distinguishing between the explanatory sciences of "causality" e.g.. physics and the interpretative sciences of "meaning" or "intentionalitv" 'e.g.. anthropology and psychology): but the older arguments for considering the ideas of physics as the essential key to all "natural philosophy" no longer held good. The inescapable limitations on absolute the eves of most philosophers 1

sav

i

1

exactness of scientific observation created by the two-way interaction be-

tween the psycholgist and his subjects now turned out to affect all of the natural sciences, even the most basic. So. there was no longer the same r-

Stephen Toulmin

reason to view psychology, philosophically, as a secondary or "inferior" branch of science, destined eventually to be taken over by — or "reduced to" — the more exact and fundamental science of physics. Even on a theoretical level, twentieth-century changes in science have had a fruitful and liberating effect on the development of psychology. True,

among

all

the schools of psychology, there are

earlier theoretical ideal

Newtonian kind strictest

to

some

still

dream

research

objects

er's theories,

of "objectivity" in their studies of

human

to explain their

behavior in terms of exact, onlookscientific psychologists

fact that, in psychological

research, a two-way interaction between the observer quite unavoidable,

and even

fruitful.

Indeed,

to limit themselves to the kinds of observations of

be

The

without resorting to any dubious, interpretive categories such

"meaning." Behaviorism apart, however, most

is

behavior.

prefer to think of their research subjects as

still

and seek

today are prepared to recognize and accept the study

that stand by the

of achieving the older,

advocates of "radical behaviorism" as the proper method for psy-

chology, for instance,

as

and continue

if

and

his subjects of

psychologists were

human behavior

made by pure spectators, disdaining all two-way

interactions

and

that can attribu-

"meaning" to that behavior, they would be robbing themselves of their most important sources of insight into the character, significance, and purposes of human conduct. Far from its being a deplorable concession to intellectual prejudice and frailty for the psychologist to intervene in, and interpret the meaning of, the human conduct that he investigates, these are necessary and legitimate procedures for improving his understanding of that behavior. They are necessary procedures, because — for the technical purposes of psychiatry and psychotherapy, above all— discovering how human agents respond in the context of two-way relationships is a necessary step in coming to understand their states of mind; and they are legitimate procedures, because the tions of

on a conception of "scienno longer accepted even within physics. If we think seriously for a moment about the methods employed in such enterprises as psychiatry, for instance, we may well ask ourselves how there could ever earlier objections to such standards rested solely tific

objectivity"

which

is

human conduct without two-way interchanges between the observing psychiatrist and the observed patient. Whether in everyday life or in more clinical contexts, the kind of knowledge and understanding that we have about our fellow human beings is precisely the personal knowledge and understanding that two individuals build up be any significant "understanding" of

course of developing a two-way relationship: the knowledge that rests, not on objective record-keeping and detached prediction, but on personal familiarity and reciprocal expectations; not on unilateral expectations, but in the

on mutual understandings. Does this mean that the conditions

down

in the study of

human

the quest for "objectivity?"

for truly "scientific" observation break

behavior and that psychologists must abandon

That conclusion

is

forced

upon

us only

if

we

cling

95

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

an outdated conception of scientific "objectivity" which is by its very nature ill-adapted to the goals and methods of psychology. Certainly, psy-

to

chiatrists, psychoanalysts,

them

strive to avoid or

prejudice,

and

and psychologists

of

many other

can

stripes

all

of

counteract the effects on their investigations of bias,

similar distorting influences;

and they

will, if

they are wise,

delay drawing any confident theoretical inferences, or presenting any firm

have taken care to

practical conclusions, until they

of such distortions. in training are effects of

(It is

encouraged

to recognize,

"countertransference,"

i.e.,

If till

the goals

on the

possibility

and make allowances

the influences that their

reactions within the analytic situation

an analysand's

reflect

for this very reason, indeed, that psychoanalysts

may have on

for, the

own emotional

their interpretation of

state of mind.)

and methods

of

the early twentieth century,

"modern"

science, as

made the detached

developed from 1650

objectivity of the rational

onlooker the proper ideal for any science, accordingly, the goals and methods of "post-modern" science now rest on a recognition that, to a greater or lesser degree,

all scientific

understanding whatever involves uneliminahe is seeking to

ble intervention by the scientist in the processes that

understand. Instead of seeking to stand "outside" those processes, scientists have now learned to accept their new status as participants within the very situations they are studying.

The effects of this change on science have already been broad and deep. By choosing to concentrate here on the quantum revolution within physics, at one extreme, and on the rise of psychiatry and other psychological sciences, at the other, we have marked only the two end points of a spectrum.

It is at

these extremes, of course, that the limitations of the classical

approach make themselves most obviously apparent. Yet, to a greater or lesser degree, the same transition from "modern" to "post-modern" can be illustrated all the way across the sciences: in physiology (say) as much as in psychology, and in cybernetics as much as in chemistry. It is not just the sciences that lie close to the central philosophical debate whose ideas and methods have been transformed during the last thirty or forty years. Released from the arbitrary constraints imposed on science by the presuppositions of Cartesian and Newtonian "natural philosophy," all of the sciences — human and natural alike— have been free to rethink their assumptions and procedures, so as to allow for the scientist's own presence in, and involvement with, the world of natural phenomena and processes. In that sense, the whole range of theoretical sciences has, by now, begun to develop in the new, "post-modern" direction. b.

Technology and nature

If

during the

last fifty

years our most basic scientific theories have been

new account of our human role within nature, something very similar is also true of our industrial and technological practices, and of the scientific ideas that underlie them. Once again, we can redirected in ways that take

96

Stephen Toulmin

conveniently illustrate the effects of the transition in two contrasted enter-

and areas of experience: ecology, on the one hand, and heavy induson the other. Ecology serves as an especially good example of "post-modern" science,

prises try,

for a number of different reasons. To begin with, it is a field of study in which theory and practice are unusually close; then again, it has a method

that focuses attention scale

and are

on natural processes

of kinds in

volved; finally,

it

is

which

human

a science that has

it

may

been able

maturity and independence only during the that

that take place

agents

last

on the human

quite typically be in-

to achieve intellectual

few decades.

To the

extent

requires us, quite specifically, to study and report on the reciprocal

interactions

between the conduct of

human

agents and other elements of

human ecology might even be it is probably no accident that human ecology has only recently become a serious field of the natural environment, the subdiscipline of

held up as the prototypically "post-modern" science, and scientific study.

By the standards

of earlier times, ecology

was scarcely a "science"

at

all.

Instead of emulating the analytical methods of the physical sciences, by

bringing to light the minute constituents and processes within individual bodies or systems, considered in abstraction from their natural contexts, the ecologist views naturally occurring systems as

complex wholes and

is

interested in the patterns of interaction that link the parts of such systems

together in actual situations. Food chains, predator-prey relationships,

population balances between coexisting species, the reciprocal influences of

and soil, and so on: these are the patterns and elements terms of which an ecological account of the natural world is to be formulated. Given the character of such preoccupations, the ecologist will

climate, vegetation, in

hard to set himself, and his viewpoint, wholly apart from his objects Not only do human actions and artifacts play a significant, in some situations even a controlling, part in the processes under investigation in ecology: in addition, any ecological experiment is necessarily an intervention in those processes. How critical an influence does the level of a particular insect population have on the interspecific relationships in the given environment? In order to investigate this question experimentally, we might (e.g.) introduce a large number of sterile male insects, so cutting down the rate of reproduction of the particular species, and study the find

it

of study.

consequential changes in the populations of other species. But, clearly

enough, such an "experiment" would be successful only to the extent that it did involve a modification of the processes that we seek to understand. Is this to say that ecology is more of a clinical science, like medicine, than

Not at all. Regarded as a science, concerned not with the practical management of the environment but with its underlying laws and mechanisms. However, just as physiology and medicine borrow each other's methods and learn from each other's experience, so scientific ecology learns from the practical experience it is

a theoretical science, like physiology?

ecology

is

97

The Emergence of Post-Modern Science

of those

whose

task

it is

to

monitor and manage

fish

and

wildlife,

contributing methods and ideas to those practical enterprises. is

or the

or the water quality of rivers and lakes, while at the same time

forests,

No

doubt,

it

quite possible to study ecological theory without having any particular

concern for environmental

policy: equally,

it is

quite possible to play a part

management, or to engage actively in the politics of the ecology movement, while remaining somewhat indifferent to the theoretical analyses arrived at in scientific ecology. But such one-sided preoccupations as these are much less easy and natural to maintain in the ecological field than they are in the case of (say) physical science and practice, where an intellectual fascination with atomic structure and fundamental-particles theory can very easily be dissociated from any concern with the politics of nuclear engineering, and vice-versa. in wildlife

The

theoretical preoccupations that direct the attention of scientific

have had parallels in other areas of science,

ecologists

too.

In recent years

there has been a vigorous debate about the respective virtues of "holism"

and "reductionism"

in the biological sciences, notably in physiology.

times, this controversy has

metaphysical

level,

with analytically

cates of holism for

minded

been discussed

at a

minded biochemists

attacking the advo-

surrendering to "vitalism" and the more

physiologists

criticizing

the

At

somewhat elevated and

biochemists

for

holistically

thinking in

too

"mechanistic" a way. But the discussion has also had genuinely practical implications for physiological method. For example, physiologists have increasingly

come

to organize their theories of organic functioning

around

the analysis of entire "systems"— the vasomotor system, the respiratory system, the central nervous system, etc.— rather than focusing exclusively

on the biochemical reactions occurring locally at some given point in the By so doing, they have followed the example set originally in the 1860s by Claude Bernard, treating the body's organisms as

physiological frame.

providing internal environments that have their

own

inner microecology

and microecological systems— that are, as the term is, in homeostasis. So much for the one extreme. Meanwhile, at the other, the actual practice of modern industry has also had to pay fresh attention to the ways in which human actions and natural processes are reciprocally connected. From early medieval times until well into the twentieth century, the resources of

nature had seemed practically inexhaustible. During the High Middle Ages,

was a regular part of Christian doctrine that God had given to man a "dominion" over all of the "lesser Creation," i.e., over the world of nature; and the belief that all minerals, plants, and animals alike were there for human beings to take and use freely was carried over into the modern era by Francis Bacon and the other prophets of modern science and technoloit

gy. It

is

true that, in parallel with the biblical exhortation to "be fruitful and

went a more moderate doctrine, according to which man's dominion was to be exercised as a "stewardship." Thus, the idea that multiply," there also

the exploitation of nature was to be undertaken circumspectly

98

and advised-

Stephen Toulmin

was not wholly foreign to the traditions of the Church. Still, it would have been hard for the people of medieval Europe— who were still scratching a living from the soil in settlements carved out from the forests or mountains of the Mediterranean region, or harvesting arable land newly won from the swamps of the northern countries— to conceive of a future time when their countries would be afflicted with the problems of overpopulation and exly

cess

consumption.

In the course of the second millennium

a.d.,

there took place those three

great expansions which, taken together, were to bring about a great trans-

human

These were the two sharp increases in agriculone following the Black Death, the other in the eighteenth century, which displaced so many rural laborers, prompting urbanization and later industrialization; and, finally, from the late eighteenth century on, the harnessing of iron, coal, and steel that was associated formation in

affairs.

tural productivity, the

with the creation of the factory system of industrial production. In retrospect,

it is

teristic of

clear that the attitudes of robust self-confidence that

the

men whose

were charac-

enterprise initiated the expansions were scarcely

compatible with any great measure of self-restraint. Everywhere,

it

seemed,

there was territory to be "discovered" and "opened up" to agriculture and

commerce: first, the deep soils of England, Holland, and the North European Plain, later the rediscovered wonders of India and China, together with the gold and silver mines of Central and South America, and eventually also the fertile plains of the Mississippi Basin, the Rio de la Plata in Argentina, and the Australian outback, as the other continents were "colonized" in turn. For the time being, all the riches of the earth were netted, harvested, tilled, mined, and processed without fear or limitation.

How

unnecessary

humanity

it

is

faces today! In

to belabor the contrast with the position that

little

more than twenty years, the need to consider all major new urban and industrial develop-

the "environmental impact" of

ments, instead of being seen as a bee in the bonnets of a few cranks

— a John

Carson— has become a central issue of politics. The nineteenth-century industri-

Muir, an Aldo Leopold, a Rachel national policy alist

and international

could watch smoke belching from his factory chimneys and drifting

off

moment's anxiety about where it was going thereafter, and he might reflect to himself that a little grime was a small price to pay for prosperity. (Recall the old Yorkshire saying, "Where there's muck, there's brass.") But, in the 1980s, a manufacturer (at least in the United States or Western Europe) whose plant does not have "scrubbers" to clean the emissions from the chimneys will be continually looking over his shoulder at the local government agency responsible for environmental protection, and worrying about the bad publicity that will ensue if it proves that his particular fumes and wastes are helping to increase the cancer rate in the immediate neighborhood, or even returning to earth to poison the fish in lakes a thousand miles away. On every level, the style and character of twentieth-century industrial into the sky without a

99

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

new questions into the political arena. Some last few manufacturers and trade unionists may still brush environmental issues aside, as a preoccupation of upper middle-class eggheads who do not have to learn a living with their hands. ("The professor's petunias are wilting.") But, by now, this is at best a rearguard action, covering an inevitable retreat. Meanwhile, the complaints continue to flow in. At one end of an economic scale, the Swedish government points an accusing finger at the factories of northern England and the Ruhr, as damaging the natural resources of Scandinavia; Canadians put the increasing acidity of their remotest lakes down to rain adulterated by fumes from the midwestern United States; technology have forced

while the growing populations of northern and southern California, the states and British Columbia compete for limited water supAt the other end, the savannahs and fringes of arable soil around the Sahara are dying back, under the impact of overgrazing and exhaustion,

intermountain plies.

leaving the infertile sands to take over; the last great forest areas of the

world are being encroached on and eroded away by the search for minerals, new settlements, and even newsprint; while the very fish, whales, and crustaceae of the oceans can no longer hold their own unaided against the trawls, nets, and harpoon guns of the world's fishing fleets. Where in earlier centuries "the bounty of nature" was a watchword for the supposedly unbounded and self-renewing riches of the earth, during the last half-century human beings have at last begun to learn— both as individuals and as nations— to live like misers, measuring their actions in terms of their impact on a finite store of resources. An ever-increasing gross national product is

no longer seen as an unmixed political good; now, weighed against the limits to growth.

What this means for

human

is

that in technology as in science,

it

it is

has always to be

no longer

possible

beings to think of themselves as operating from outside the

world of nature. We can no longer view nature, as scientists, from the detached standpoint of Laplacean onlookers; and we can no longer use nature, as manufacturers, with the carefree assurance of divinely authorized Dominion. In both theoretical and practical terms, we must now accept our rediscovered position as a part of the very nature that we have been viewing and using. To some extent, however slight, all our scientific

we observe; and to some exour technological exploitations of nature involve using up "natural goods" which can no longer be guaranteed to replace themselves. So, we must stop behaving as though we were ourselves the invisible part of nature; the detached mind and sovereign hands that can have no significant impact on the overall state of nature and can do no significant harm to it. The survival of that very nature which we both observe critically and rely on practically will from now on depend on our capacity to learn measure and restraint in our interactions with it. The old Greek motto Meden Agan— "Nothing in excess"— has thus acquired a new meaning and observations of nature modify the processes

tent, often great, all

relevance for us

100

all.

Stephen Toulmin

c.

The

ethics of the research enterprise

The consequences

of these transformations have had an impact, not merely on the intellectual and practical effects of the scientific enterprise, but also on its internal conduct. They are compelling scientists at the present time to engage in a critical reappraisal of their whole enterprise from the standpoint of ethics. A hundred years ago (as we saw) it was still possible to claim that the sciences were "value free." The scientist's methods of inquiry were commendable just because they were dispassionate and free of all selfinterest. If science had its own special ethical concerns, these had to do only with matters of integrity and truthtelling: the worst sin a scientist could commit was to falsify his observations and so mislead his colleagues. The phrase "value free" may always have involved some element of exaggeration; but, at most, the values of nineteenth-century science were seen as intellectual values. On a deeper level, the scientist's posture of detachment and abstraction seemingly set him outside the scope of any genuinely moral critique. Since the pure onlooker could minimize the effects of his observations on nature, his activities presumably did, in themselves, neither good nor harm in the world. His single-valued pursuit of truth insured that he was, ethically speaking, out of the line of fire. Adopted as a mode of life, theoria divorced from praxis could still be acclaimed as Aristotle had taught that it should, both as the highest occupation and as a wholly self-validating

one.

Here again, the contrast between science then and science now scarcely needs underlining. Since the mid-1960s, the whole enterprise of science has been subjected to a series of ethical challenges, and the claims of complete Wertfreiheit

("value-freedom") have been

left in tatters.

Some

of those chal-

have themselves been open to objections, as uninformed or ill-motivated. The high romantic rhetoric of the "anti-science" movement, based on the counterculture of the late 1960s and early 1970s, echoed themes from the spokesmen of an earlier romantic era, such as Schiller and lenges,

Blake;

it is

true,

and many

owed more to an power of a serious

of the resulting criticisms of science

enthusiastic political radicalism than they did to the historical analysis. Scientists

conspirators" with capitalists

were damned for lending themselves as "coand imperialists, and their method of intellec-

detachment was caricatured as entailing a posture of callous indifFor some four or five years, even the most scrupulous and high-minded scientists were thrown onto the defensive, and the calm meetings of scientific academies were liable to be disrupted by invasions from slogan-chanting protestors. (Watching the resulting confrontations from outside was like seeing the unworldly Albert Einstein mobbed by a crowd tual

ference.

of infuriated antivivisectionists.)

case react with proper

on

shrill

The

composure

denunciations of their

scientists

themselves did not in every

some of them fell back and took refuge in the outdated

to these attacks:

critics

slogans of an earlier age. Did not the First

Amendment

give scientists carte

101

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

blanche to

their

do whatever research

their intellects could conceive?

own disinterested motives be

sufficient protection

from the

Should not indignities

of such politically motivated criticism?

Behind these wild and irrelevant disorders, however, a more serious beginning to take shape. Its first significant outcome had to do with the morality of human experimentation: the conduct of scientific investigation that used human beings — whether medical patients or normal volunteers— as their objects of study, and that in some cases exposed those human beings to more or less risky procedures, which were capable of ethical critique was

doing them harm without any countervailing expectation of medical therapy or other comparable benefit. The issue was not, of course, a new one. The testing of new medical agents and procedures had always involved an element of risk, as when Walter Reed used Cuban subjects in his work on the development of a yellow-fever vaccine. But hitherto the task of deciding how far such risks could acceptably be carried had generally been left to the conscience and discretion of the physicians and research scientists themselves. If worst came to worst, the relatives of a deceased research subject could always bring a civil action for tort against the experimenters; no larger public interest was apparently involved. During the years following the Second World War, however, there was an essential change in the situation. The shameful experience of wartime experiments conducted in German concentration camps brought physicians, research scientists, and governments together in the effort to formulate an internationally recognized code for the conduct of human experiments. From being the private concern of scientific investigators in hospitals, universities, and pharmaceutical companies, medical research involving human subjects rapidly became a matter of public polity, for the reason that the costs of that research were increasingly met out of public tax funds, and because government agencies, such as the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) were required to check and validate the substances and devices which were the outcome of that research. How could the electorate be content to stand by and see its taxes spent to pay

whose methods were morally questionable? saw the rapid emergence of biomedical ethics as an active field for both theoretical discussion and practical policy. On the one hand, a vigorous public debate sprang up about moral issues in medical practice and research, both in the press and in more sober academic journals and forums; and this debate led to the establishment of several highly influential new periodicals and institutions, such as the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences at Hastings-on-Hudson, outside New York City, with its widely circulated monthly, the Hastings Report. From being in the late 1940s and '50s the subject of a handful of books and articles at most— and those concerned chiefly with the excesses of the Nazi era— by the 1970s "bioethics" had become an academic and literary industry. On the other hand, within the United States government, the for research

The

102

late

1960s, accordingly,

Stephen Toulmin

Public Health Service,

whose National

or provided financial support for search,

began

to

demand

that

all

much

Institutes

of Health

conducted

of the country's biomedical re-

university hospitals

of medical research establish procedures capable

and other

institutions

of assuring that

all

and methods were planned so as to be free of morally objectionable procedures. There came into being a vast network of "institutional review boards" which were responsible to the P.H.S. for conducting prior reviews of— and, if need be, for recommending prior restraint their research projects

over— all research

involving

human experimental subjects in the institution

concerned.

For a while, it looked as though the ethical debate about medical experimentation might have even more drastic consequences. The passionate controversy that followed the

Supreme Court

ruling

on abortion

spilled

over into science and, spurred on by horrifying press reports about experi-

ments supposedly conducted in Finland or Sweden, the United States Conmaking the use of any human fetus in scientific research a criminal offense. However, faced with the prospect of catastrophic restraint on gynecology and pediatrics, cooler heads prevailed; a National Commission was set up to consider and analyze the conditions on which the use in medical and behavioral research of vulnerable human subjects — whether unborn children, or prisoners, or juveniles, or the insane— should be regarded as either acceptable or inadmissible. In this way, a revived kind of "casuistry" grew up, by which all the possible varieties of human experimentation were submitted to a kind of taxonomic analysis, and a common pattern of case law was established against which research proposals were to be measured in advance. Before long, this debate about the ethics of scientific research expanded to embrace wider issues, also. The most striking episode in this story was the debate in the mid-1970s about the ethics of research on recombinant DNA. The most noteworthy aspect of this particular controversy was the fact that it originated in an ethical initiative by the research scientists themselves. Previously, the general pattern had been for outside critics to raise cries of alarm, indignation, or anxiety about the supposed ethical implications of scientific research projects which, in the eyes of the scientists themselves, either posed no ethical difficulties at all or were even totally "value free." Now, with the development of new procedures by which the actual structures of the key macromolecules in living cells could be manipulated and modified, molecular biochemists in California and elsewhere found themselves wondering whether the widespread use of such procedures for genetic engineering and other kinds of biotechnology might not expose the public at large to risks of an unpredictable scale and gravity. A first meeting of scientists, lawyers, and journalists at Asilomar, outside Monterey in California, led to a public declaration of self-restraint on behalf of the research community, and was followed by a broader, more public debate, whose outcome was the adoption by the National Institutes of Health of a set gress seriously considered

103

The Emergence of Post-Modern Science

of guidelines for research in this area. (Britain in

recombinant

DNA

research soon followed

and other countries engaged suit.)

In this case, again, the temper of the public discussion threatened at times

become overheated. Political radicals denounced recombinant DNA redream of pharmaceutical multimillionaires egged on by fascist-imperialist politicians. The more conservative scientists, in reply, tore their hair and bewailed unjustifiable political interference in the innocent tasks of natural science. But, when the dust had settled, it was clear that a middle way had emerged, by which legitimate claims for the protection of the larger public against possible new forms of harm were respected, withto

search as a wild

out the scientists themselves being subjected to unreasonable or excessive restraints.

By the

early 1980s, the use of

technological ends was beginning to

handicapped by conforming

to the

recombinant

DNA techniques

move ahead without being

for

seriously

NIH guidelines; and, for alt except a few

produce biochemical agents and even to create custom-designed forms of those agents with highly discriminating medical uses, began to weigh heavily in favor of the recombinant techniques. Finally, going beyond all ethical debates about the actual conduct and immediate hazards of scientific research itself, some wider ethical questions have recently been raised about the political rights and social responsibilities of scientists, within the larger societies of which they are members. So long as science could be thought of as an isolated (if professional) pursuit having no significant impact on the welfare of the larger community, such issues were inconsequential. It was presumably up to each individual scientist to decide for himself in what direction his curiosity drew his intellect and imagination; and, since his activities were free of cost or harm to his fellows, there was no basis for a moral challenge, and so no ethical case for him to answer. Some, indeed, have even argued that this freedom from ethical accountability was, in earlier times, one of the main charms of traditional scientific work. Certainly, most classical scientists took some care to avoid putting themselves in a position from which they might be obliged to justify their activities publicly. Right up until the Second World War, most irreconcilables, the prospect of being able to

like insulin

academic

and interferon

scientists

industrially,

ruled out

all

thought of seeking financial support for

from either government or industry. For the most part, they chose to work on rather small-scale projects, the expense for which could be met out of a university's normal budget. (In some cases, the scientists themselves were expected to pay for the cost of any research they did— e.g., the wages of a glassblower— out of their own pockets.) Accepting outside subsidies was widely regarded as compromising the integrity of research: science belonged, not to any single nation or industry, but to an essentially supranational community of rational thinkers, and it should avoid giving even the slightest appearance of being for sale to industrialists and politicians. So when, in January 1939, J. D. Bernal published a striking new book, The Social Function of Science, in which he argued strongly for developing a their research

104

Stephen Toulmin

system of governmental finance for science, his proposals were denounced by Michael Polanyi and others as threatening the essential freedoms of science.

In the subsequent forty years, Bernal's speculative proposals have

become the actualities of contemporary politics. From holding government and industry at arm's length before the Second World War, academic scientists have moved into a position in which they are largely dependent on such outside support for the costs of their research. The thing that made a crucial difference to their attitudes, in this respect, was their experience

from 1939

on. In their

wartime work on radar, sonar, nuclear physics, and

the rest, they discovered that they could operate within the other institutions of their societies

and

states,

without compromising their intellectual

standards or their freedom of judgment; and they were (to

happy enough

tell

the truth)

to learn that lesson, given the vastly higher scale of financial

resources available in a government research establishment, as contrasted with the private university. With the return to peacetime

work from 1945 were ready enough to contrive ways of interesting government, not just in the development of new weapons, but in helping them to pursue their academic research topics also. So, alongside glassblowing and statistics, "grantsmanship" rapidly took its place as an essential addition to the compleat scientist's quiver of skills. And, from around 1950 on, the different agencies of the United States government began to provide some very substantial sums of money to support academic science in American universities. This support has continued to the present day, notably through the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health; though, over the years, the NIH's funds for biomedical research have grown more steadily and reliably than those for other basic sciences. With rewards, however, there came also responsibilities. The expenditure of public tax money has always to be accounted for, not just in the narrower accountant's sense of that phrase, but also in terms of specific performances and achievements. In line with this, the scientist had to show the government funding agency that he had in fact carried out the scientific work for which a grant had originally been made; and, in due course, larger questions began to be raised about the procedures by which it was decided what projects should be supported at all. Was it sufficient to allow the scientists in any given field to decide by consensus— by what came to be known as "peer review"— which proposals in their field showed most intellectual promise, and so most deserved support? Or should the public's own representatives have an opportunity, either through the Congress or in other ways, of bringing some wider system of social priorities to bear on such funding decisions? Are scientists equipped to decide by themselves and on their own how their research efforts can best benefit the larger community? Or should their fellow citizens have an independent chance to indicate their own preferences, as between (say) environmental medicine and biochemistry, space travel and metallurgy? on, as a result, scientists

105

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

This debate has only recently begun to play a large part in the

politics

hard questions: about ways in which the general public might educate itself so as to be capable of expressing informed preferences rather than naive daydreams or prejudices, about the role of Congress and its committees, about the desirability of local initiatives (like the committee of concerned citizens organized at Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the course of the recombinant DNA dispute), and so on. As a result, it is not yet clear whether all the institutions are yet in place for dealing effectively with the social responsibilities of science, or whether new channels of discussion, education, and accountability will be required. But, at least in the United States, a significant dialogue has begun between the scientists and their fellow citizens about the novel social responsibilities that the scientists have had to assume within the new world of publicly financed, post-modern science. of science.

It

raises all kinds of

The new agenda and

5.

responsibilities of science

Once we recognize and accept our novel position, as people for whom the older simplicities of Cartesian and Newtonian science are no longer a genuine option, what future trains of thought and lines of development will open up for us? Evidently enough, the kind of science that we can do, from our new standpoint as participants within nature, will warrant us in retaining neither the same ideals of cool, detached objectivity, nor the same fragmentation of the

same

scientific issues into

Wertfreiheit—i.e.,

completely separate disciplines, nor

freedom from moral

issues

and

social account-

ability—that characterized the natural sciences from the late seventeenth

century to the early or mid twentieth century. Instead, we shall have to work

toward newer ideas of objectivity, (b) toward a reintegration of scientific broader world view, and (c) toward a novel conception of the scientist's role within the larger society. All of these interlinked changes are forced upon us as necessary consequences of recovering for humanity its proper place within the world of nature. (a)

issues within a

a.

Objectivity

To

and

justice

begin with the most basic characteristic of a

"scientific" attitude, viz.,

its

claim to objectivity: the objectivity of any participant within a larger transaction,

who

manner, er,

who

is

deals with his fellow participants in an equitable, unbiased

inevitably different

sets

from the

objectivity of the

detached observ-

himself quite apart from the transactions that he studies and

them (as it were) from behind a screen. Throughout the two hundred and fifty to three hundred years' history of modern science, the pursuit of objectivity became equated with the claims of Wertfreiheit. The same intellectual stance that allowed earlier scientists to eschew all questions about values and preferences also helped to preserve them against the bireports on

106

Stephen Toulmin

own

Indeed, for them the best way of assuring involvements with their subject matter. By remaining detached, they avoided the chief threat to the free exercise of an objective judgment. ases of their

subjectivities.

objectivity was, simply, to avoid all ethically tinged

The moment that this posture of detachment is no longer open to us, the problem of objectivity arises in a quite new way. Some people have reacted to the change by suggesting that our position as participants within nature makes true scientific objectivity impossible for us any longer. But this reaction is certainly extreme. Rather, we have to find alternative ways of identifying and counteracting the influence of our own biases on our scientific judgment, which are compatible with acknowledging that we are inescapably involved with the objects and systems that we study. To put the point in a sentence, we have to set aside the "value-free" conception of scientific objectivity as detachment, in favor of a "value-laden"

Our

conception of

scientific

post-modern scientists is no longer to abstract ourselves in thought from our subject matter and speak about it from outside. Instead, it is to find ways to treating, and thinking about, the other persons, objects, and processes of nature in a fair and equitable manner, without giving undue attention or favor, either to our own personal situation and interests, or even to specifically human situations and objectivity as justice.

human

We

interests at

task as

all.

and standpoint

saw, earlier, what this change of posture

psychology.

To

those

who sought

entails for

to carry over the traditional conception

human

behavior and mental prohave a special, undeniable appeal. For behaviorists set out, quite explicitly, to devise experiments that would avoid all direct influence by the experimenter on his experimental object. By putting their subjects into carefully designed and rigorously controlled situations, which unfold according to preset schedules, behaviorist experimenters attempt to observe and record their subjects' reof scientific objectivity into the study of

cesses, the goals

and methods

sponses in as detached a

of behaviorism

manner

as

any ornithologist who observes and

records the nesting and mating behavior of finches from a perfectly protectfelt able to confine themand methods and, as a result, they have had to learn ways of recognizing and making allowances for their own influence on the course of the transactions in which they and their research

ed hide. Other psychologists, however, have not selves within the limitations of these goals

subjects are jointly involved: recall,

e.g.,

the concept of "countertransfer-

ence" in the practice of psychoanalysis.

The corresponding problems in such sciences as ecology have been remarked on less frequently. Suppose, for instance, that we set out to understand all the food chains, predator-prey relationships, climatic cycles, and other ecological phenomena in which we are involved, by virtue of our situation within the world of nature: we shall end by building up pictures of

all

those processes in which

human

beings,

and human agents,

coexist

alongside bees and mosquitoes, cultivated grain plants and wilderness for107

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

ests, pesticides

our own

and dams, domesticated animals and river fish. Just because and our own interests as human beings, are bound up

situations,

with all those other elements within nature, it is out of the question to imagine that we can take a totally detached view about fellow participants in those processes, or of the processes themselves. So, in that case, the only relevant kind of objectivity consists in seeing and describing our role in the

processes of nature fairly, without giving our own concerns an undue emphasis or an unjust protection, at the expense of all the other elements. This is easier said than done. In ecology and related areas of science, the full demands of scientific objectivity have not yet been faced in all their complexity. To spell out these problems concisely: it is not even easy to describe the ecological processes in which we find ourselves, as human beings, in terms that give equal time and equal protection to all the other species

and influences involved, far less to devise ecological policies for the management of those processes that pay just and equitable respect to all those other fellow participants whose habitat we share. On the contrary, we are subject to a standing temptation to build ecological analyses around human technological projects, instead of vice versa. Seen from that point of view, the problem becomes one of seeing how all other elements in the current ecological situation are liable to affect or be affected by the

and so

human

projects

hinder their fulfillment; and, whatever else we may say about that formulation of the problem, it cannot be regarded, by any standard, as "objective." At the present time, there are some unresolved basic ambiguities in the in question,

to facilitate or

attitudes that different people bring to the practical

and the environment: not

just as

between

problems of ecology

industrialists for

whom

environ-

mental concerns threaten extra expense, and conservationists for whom industrial development is itself the threat, but even among conservationists themselves. On the other hand, there are those people who see incautious development now, in the service of certain current human desires, as being liable to restrict or prevent the subsequent achievement of other, later human desires, and who challenge such hasty development solely on that account. For these people, the basic problem of environmental protection is simply an anthropocentric, utilitarian problem of intelligent resource management in the long-term human interest— aimed at maximizing the

number and

variety of different

human

satisfactions achievable with given

resources in given situations, and taking special care to

make due

provision

for nonmaterial satisfactions, like the beauty of a view or the taste of fresh

springwater.

On

the other hand, there are those people

who

seek to widen

the discussion and put such anthropocentric concerns into a larger frame-

work. For those other people, it is important to recognize trees, and birds, and other species of organisms as having requirements that need serving and protecting, alongside the requirements of human beings: in their eyes, thinking about the environment in a merely anthropocentric way is plainly

108

Stephen Toulmin

inequitable

and offends against the

wider sense of

basic

demands

of objectivity, in the

justice.

These ambiguities affect our thinking about ecology on both the theoretiand the practical planes, i.e., from the standpoint both of ecological scientists and of environmental policymakers. Within ecological science, they leave us without any clear procedure for developing a fully impartial and justly proportioned analysis of the habitat— in which due weight is given to the roles of all the species and agents involved — as contrasted with an analysis directed by, and toward, the protection of our own human concerns. Meanwhile, within the realm of ecological policy, it is left correspondingly unclear whether the environmental impact statements that are administratively required in the case of all large-scale development projects must be framed in terms that respect the inherent requirements of, say, a redwood forest, or whether it is sufficient to recognize the investment that human beings themselves have in the survival of such a forest— as a potential source of future lumber and newsprint, of spiritual refreshment, or even of mere peace and quiet. cal

b.

If

Cosmology and

we have

accident.

the larger world view

difficulty in resolving these

For the task of placing

ambiguities today, that fact

relative priorities

on the

agents and participants in a conflict-of-interest situation sort of

problem that could not

arise within the

program

is

no

rights of different is,

precisely, the

of so-called

mod-

ern (or Cartesian) science. To be more exact: the division of labor that led to the fragmentation of classical science into distinct disciplines had two complementary outcomes. In the first place, it allowed natural scientists to abstract particular aspects of nature and investigate them separately, apart from the overall complexities of the situations concerned. But at the same time, it bought this advantage at the price of cutting all these different aspects of nature off from one another, so that the complex overall interactions between these distinct aspects, within any situation, belonged to the scientific agenda of no single science and so became, scientifically speaking, nobody's business. The future agenda of post-modern science will unavoidably differ from that of classical science in this second respect, also. If we are to view nature from within — from a position as participants in the processes of nature — we can no longer afford to chop up our understanding of nature into separate fragments, or confine our attention to one scientific discipline at a time. Instead,

we

shall

need

to find

ways of

fitting

these disciplinary aspects back

together again, within a broader conception of nature, and of the place of

human

beings within

it.

From now

on,

we

shall

no longer be able

to

regard

nature merely as an object for detached study and description, from which we are to that extent separated, and even alienated. Instead, we shall also be

having to consider the world of nature

as

our home. (Interestingly enough,

109

The Emergence of Post-Modern Science

when John Wheeler, the physical cosmologist from Princeton University, gave an address in Washington to celebrate the five-hundredth anniversary he chose

of Copernicus's birth,

home"

within nature,

we can

"The Universe

as his title

Man.") And, faced with the question of

scarcely continue to study only

nary aspect of our place in nature at a time. There in

which we could be

"at

as a

home"

Home

how we humans can be is,

for

truly "at

one

for example,

discipli-

no way

in nature gravitationally speaking, but not

electromagnetically speaking; physiologically speaking, but not neurologically

speaking; endocrinologically speaking, but not psychotherapeutically

speaking. Either is

we are

"at

home"

in

a comprehensive judgment, to be

tion.

As a

result,

we need

our actual habitat, or we are not— that with an eye to our overall situa-

made

to transcend the fragmentation of classical science

into self-contained disciplines, each with

some more comprehensive point

its

own distinct standpoint, in

favor

and so build up for ourselves a larger picture of the world, whose merits go beyond the requirements and discoveries of any one science. This change in the agenda of science, as it moves into its post-modern phase, has some unexpected consequences. In the eyes of its founders, it was one of the greatest merits of modern or Cartesian-Newtonian science that its agenda permitted scientists to set aside— as lying entirely outside science —all general disputes about matters of philosophy and religion and concentrate on narrower topics about which some method of rational investigation and agreement could more easily be achieved. If the broader concerns of philosophy and religion became sidetracked in the process, that was a of

of view,

comparatively small price to pay for progress; and, despite the personal interest that

Newton

himself, for one, displayed in the philosophical

and up our

theological implications of the scientific enterprise, the task of building

a cosmological vision of the world, adapted to our religious as well as intellectual concerns, It

took a back place in the plans of

had not always been

so.

During some

modern

science.

earlier stages in the historical

evolution of ideas about nature, the place of humanity within the overall

scheme

had been a central topic for debate. In late antiquity, for Epicurean philosophers taught that it was desirable for us to detach ourselves from the aggravations of a life in nature and cultivate the imperturbable attitude of mere onlookers; but the Stoic philosophers emphasized, rather, the importance of integrating our human thoughts and activities into the natural world, and harmonizing our lives with the processes of nature. Considered against this background, the contrast between modern and post-modern science is significantly like the contrast between the Epicurean and Stoic points of view; indeed, in some places, Descartes of things

instance, the

himself discussed the ethical implications of "the passions" in positively

Epicurean terms, claiming for "the rational mind" the power to separate

from all the turmoil of the senses and the emotions, and to achieve same kind of imperturbability that Epicurus had valued. So understood, the program of "post-modern" science involves the reviv-

itself

the

110

Stephen Toulmin

al of

certain older, Stoic attitudes.

The

rationality of

human

thought and

action cannot be shown, or judged, in isolation, solely in terms of their local

problems. They must fit in and respect the overall harmony of, the larger scheme of nature. To sharpen up the point: The agenda of post-modern science requires us to take seriously, once again, the conception that nature in fact has— or even is— a larger scheme, rather than an assemblage of separate aspects. One thing about that conception is not yet clear: viz., how, and on what conditions, such notions as harmony and integration are to be given a truly efficacy in dealing with single, self-contained

with,

scientific interpretation.

After three centuries of scientific investigation that

has been devoted predominantly to the analytical study of separate groups of

phenomena

or aspects of nature, scientists are only

now beginning

to

recognize and redevelop the intellectual procedures needed for thinking

about and dealing with large integrated systems. It will certainly take some time before it is possible to reestablish an effective dialogue between scientists, philosophers, and theologians, about the overall scheme of nature, and

about the place of humanity within that scheme. c.

The

accountability of scientists

Finally, given the place that the

new

enterprise of post-modern science

occupies within the larger framework of

human

society

and

culture, scien-

can no longer claim that their investigations are value free. Instead, they now have to confront all those social, political, and moral issues that tists

were sidetracked during the heyday of "modern" science and accept a new kind of accountability for their work, their ideas, and, above all, their intellectual priorities.

To

the extent that the basic theoretical attitudes of

were those of detached, rational spectators, rather than those of participants, they set humanity apart from nature; but to the extent that they were also the polite attitudes of gentlemen, rather than practical attitudes of craftsmen or engineers, they set the same scientists apart from their fellow humans as well. Conversely, the transformaton of modern science into post-modern science has had the effect, not only of reinserting humanity into its proper position in the natural world, but in addition of relocating scientists into their proper position within the larger social and political world— which, to be sure, does not always seem eager to make classical science

room

for them.

as the new knowledge built up by natural scientists could still be thought of as entirely pure — i.e., as devoid of immediate technological value or application— scientists could pursue new knowledge in an entirely single-

So long

minded, single-valued spirit. Indeed, the English physicist John Ziman has pointed out striking resemblances between the frame of mind that young scientific apprentices have brought to their work in the twentieth century

and

that of young novices in the medieval monastic orders. Just as talented new Brothers obtained their deepest satisfaction from committing themselves wholly to a life of devotion and service to a priestly Order, and hoped

111

The Emergence of Post-Modem Science

only to win a reputation

bright

new research

among

their colleagues for their sanctity, so too

scientists in the twentieth

century have obtained their

from committing themselves to a life in devoted service to their Science, and have hoped only to win a professional reputation for their intellectual insight. After Hiroshima, however, monastic attitudes toward the work of science have become increasingly difficult to sustain. Since the 1940s, the professional activities of science have become caught up in the satisfaction

many ways that the walls of the scientific crumbled. those problems about the ethics of the scientific enterprise

larger activities of society in so

monastery have

finally

Hence arise all we looked at briefly earlier in this essay. From now on, the professional agenda of the sciences will include paying proper attention to the larger social and cultural, economic, and political significance of the new theories and techniques that are being developed in each field. This is not to imply that

that dramatic political episodes,

about recombinant sciences also; but it

comparable

to the recent controversy

DNA research, are liable to turn up very often in other

is to imply that scientists in all fields would do well to same sense of public responsibility in thinking about their own fields of work that the molecular biochemists displayed when they organized the initial moratorium on recombinant DNA research. They will do well to do so, not just out of a distinterested concern for the public welfare, but also from motives of self-defense. Although the wave of hostility toward

cultivate the

science associated with the "counterculture"

may have passed

public at large retains a lingering suspicion of science is

and

its

peak, the

scientists

which

waiting to be reactivated by future horror stories about reckless develop-

ment and

The

proliferation of risky

up new

new

discoveries.

and channels of communication, can make their proper contributions to the political debate, must be expected to continue. Furthermore, the increasingly complex character of the technical decisions on which the prosperity of modern task of building

institutions

by which

scientists

industries

and nations depends

er-operated machine will

only

through

make

this

scientific

tools, of

task the

in

an age of microprocessors and comput-

novel weapons systems and energy sources,

more

urgent.

Whether

in legislatures or

academies, whether at public inquiries or before over-

sight committees, scientists are learning to explain their tives of the larger electorate,

and

work

to representa-

to discuss with those representatives the

economic consequences, and moral constraints that determine the political strengths and weaknesses of the scientific enterprise, and hedge around the fields for fruitful, publicly financed research. This is a prospect that Michael Polanyi and his colleagues in the Society for Freedom in Science dreaded, as a threat to the very health and vigor of science; but it is a prospect that needs to be faced with maturity and intelligence, rather than flatly denied or refused. By playing an active part in devising the special channels through which they can responsibly collaborate with other political institutions, both nationally and internationally, social priorities,

112

Stephen Toulmin

scientists will

be doing themselves,

good turn. An community has

as well as the rest of us, a

excellent illustration of the contribution that the scientific

make in that direction can be found in the history of the Pugwash conferences. These meetings were organized largely on the initiative of physical scientists who were concerned about the nuclear arms race, and they played a significant part in laying the political groundwork for the nuclear nonproliferation treaties of the early 1960s. Held under the sponsorship of Cyrus Eaton at his summer home in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, they brought together scientists and political figures from the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other countries, to discuss nuclear weapons, disarmament, and the like, and they succeeded in establishing a dialogue between the American and Russian governments about the technical problems of contemporary policymaking and weapons development that has helped to strengthen the fragile foundations of world peace at a dangerous time in history. already begun to

It is

time to bring

this essay to a conclusion. Since

the time of Aristotle,

and even that of Newton, science has come a long way; the transformation that it has been undergoing in the course of the twentieth century is only the culmination of that long journey.

transformation (we have seen)

work being done today, nor

lies

The

heart of that twentienth-century

not in the sheer quantity of

scientific

in the intellectual quality of particular discover-

much

as in the increasingly rich and varied ways in which science and influences our lives outside the purely intellectual world of concepts and theories. Even on the intellectual level, the deepest significance of our new twentieth-century theories lies in the contribution they can make to the new "post-modern" image of science as an enterprise that goes on essentially within nature, not outside it. The Aristotelian image of the ies,

so

enters into

natural philosopher as a purely detached theorist, which continued to

dominate the underlying aims and

ideals of

modern

science until well into

been superseded. Like the heroes in a Tom Stoppard drama, scientists have found themselves drawn, willy-nilly, out of their seats in the stands and into the dust and action of the actual the twentieth century, has finally

arena.

This transformation has come, in some respects, as a shock and a surand not all scientists are yet fully reconciled to the resulting changes

prise;

methods, and their mode of life. But these changes have been both deep and broad, and they will not easily be undone. They cover the whole spectrum of science, from relativity and quantum mechanics at one extreme to ecology and psychoanalysis at the other, and they have had the effect of discrediting the very philosophical foundation of "modin their status, their

ern" science

— the

foundation which Descartes laid

down

for the rational

investigation of the physical world in the early seventeenth century,

and

which Newton and his successors built upon so successfully from the 1680s on. As a result, we may expect scientists— and the sciences themselves — to become, both theoretically and practically, even more deeply involved in the world that they study in the years and centuries to come. The age of 113

The Emergence of Post-Modern Science

one-way interactions with nature

is

over, probably for good.

both the theories of the sciences and the practical to take into

The

absolute detachment and self-sufficiency of

Mind, and Laplace's Omniscient Calcharming dream; but it proves to have been a

Aristotle's theoros, Descartes's rational

dream

114

on,

have

account the two-way character of their interactions both with

nature and with society. culator

From now

lives of scientists will

may have been nonetheless.

a

PART

TWO

The Reconsideration of a Great Book

Edward Gibbon's Decline and

Roman Empire

the

Fall of

Hugh Trevor-Roper

Hugh Trevor-Roper was born under the Cheviot

village

hills,

in

1914,

in

Glanton, Northumberland, a

and educated

at

Charterhouse School

and Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied classics and wrote

his first

book, a biography of Charles

I's

Laud, as a Research Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. in

1940.

In

the

Second World War he served

(Secret Intelligence).

1945 he carried out an

In

the disappearance of Adolf Intelligence

Days of

Committee

in

in

Hitler.

Berlin

He

history.

minister Archbishop It

was published

the Intelligence Corps official

investigation into

His report to the Four-Power

was

the basis of his

book The Last

which has been translated into twenty languages. war he returned to Oxford and taught modern history at Christ Church. He was appointed Regius Professor of Modern History at Hitler (1947),

After the

Oxford

in

1957.

In

1980 he was elected Master

of Peterhouse,

Cambridge. His published works include The Rise of Christian Europe (1965), The PhiIby Affair (1968), Religion, The Reformation

Change (1976).

(1968), Princes

He has

and

Artists (1976),

and Social

and Hermit of Peking

also edited Hitlers Table Talk (1953), Hitler's

Directives (1964),

and The Goebbels

has contributed regularly

and other periodicals,

to the

Sunday

writing mainly

War

Diaries, Last Entries (1978).

Times, the

New

He

York Times,

on history and foreign

affairs.

He

Academy, a corresponding member of the of Times Newspapers Ltd. He was made Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur in 1975 and created Lord Dacre of Glanton in 1979. He is married to Lady Alexandra Haig,

a Fellow of the British

American Academy, and Director

daughter of Field Marshal Earl Haig.

is

I.

Genesis of the work

Edward

Gibbon That

historian.

is,

in

an important

is,

he

is

the

first

respect, the

not merely for pleasure but for instruction.

and Fall

modern European whose work is read volume of his Decline

first

historian of the past

The

first

Roman Empire appeared in 1776, the last in 1788. It was the time and has always aroused opposition in some quarters;

of the

challenged at

but no criticism has ever been able to sink

it.

Its intellectual

content remains

and any discussion of the course and causes of the decline of Rome is still dominated by it. Of no other historian writing before 1830 can this be said. Both as a historical scholar in his mastery and judgment and use of the evidence, and as a historical interpreter in his examination of causes and effects, Gibbon is unique in his time. Of course there are still earlier historians whom we still read and enjoy — Froissart, Commines, Clarendon, St. Simon. But these were chroniclers of their own time, and their value lies largely in the fact that they were contemporary with the events they chronicled. They were irreplaceable eye- or ear-witnesses. But Gibbon did not write contemporary history. The durability of his work owes nothing to the easy advantage, or accident, of direct observation. In looking back on the Roman Empire he enjoyed no technical or adventitious advantage over us. Indeed, we may say, he enjoyed less than we do, for the intervening two centuries have vastly increased the

valid today,

evidence for such study. Nevertheless,

driven Gibbon, as out of the tators

field.

it

this increase of

evidence has not

has driven every other eighteenth-century historian,

He remains modern,

may supplement

surprisingly

modern. Later commen-

or modify the detail of his work, but they very

seldom detect an error. They cannot improve on the style, and they generally endorse the judgment. Gibbon's whole life was, effectively, devoted to this great work, and this work supplies the unity of his life. His first and last ambition, as he himself tells us, was to be an historian. His early writings, in themselves unimportant, interest us solely as

phy.

evidence of the formation of his historical philoso-

When he had chosen the subject of his life's work, he set out consciously

to solve the greatest historical

problem

of his time.

Having solved

it,

he

never contemplated another major work. His memoirs, left unfinished at his death, are closely related to his great work. They are a strictly intellectu117

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

al

Fall of the

Roman Empire

autobiography: the biography not, except incidentally, of Edward Gib-

bon, but of the author of The Decline and Fall a

of the

Roman

Empire. Since he

own previous life as a preparation for this task, we must begin with brief summary of his early years. Edward Gibbon was born in Putney near London in 1737. His father was

saw

his

somewhat straitened means, "warm and social" temper, and Tory politics. He had a family estate in Hampshire and represented his neighbors in Parliament. Gibbon was the only surviving child and grew up in solitude. "A puny child, neglected by

a country gentleman of independent though

my mother,

starved by

my

nurse, and of whose being very

little

care or

up by a devoted aunt, to whom he would afterward pay a moving tribute. His mother died when he was ten years old, and although his father remarried (and Gibbon became very attached to his stepmother), this did not occur till Gibbon was already grown up. Of formal education, owing to his constant illness, he had very little, and that little was broken by continual change. Finally, out of "perexpectation was entertained," he was brought

plexity rather than prudence," his father, "without preparation or delay,

me to Oxford, and I was matriculated in the university, as a gentleman commoner of Magdalen college, before I had accomplished the fifteenth year of my age." Gibbon's career at Oxford was disastrous. He has himself given a brilliant,

carried

and famous, account

memoirs. Oxford university was not, at that and Gibbon, feeling neither encouragement nor discipline, sought to find his own way through "the dangerous mazes" of religious controversy. The result was that "at the age of sixteen, I bewildered myself in the errors of the Church of Rome." This, of course, in 1753, was a fate worse than death. If he should persevere in such a course, Gibbon would be socially ostracized and excluded from the parliamentary life in which it was intended that he should succeed. His horrified father quickly removed him from Oxford, carried him abroad, and deposited him with a Protestant tutor in Lausanne. The tutor was M. Pavilliard, a Swiss pastor, whose function was to keep the young Gibbon under firm discipline, to reclaim him for sound religion, and to give him the formal education of a gentleman. Pavilliard did all this; but he also did much more. He introduced Gibbon to the intellectual life of Lausanne. And Lausanne, as it happened, was the center of a recent revolution in historical of

it

in his

time, distinguished for teaching or learning,

philosophy.

Long afterward Gibbon looked back

removal from Oxford and his life. "Whatsoever have been the fruits of my education," he wrote in his memoirs, "they must be ascribed to the fortunate banishment which placed me in Lausanne ... If to his

years at Lausanne as the formative experience of his

my

childish revolt against the religion of

in time of

proved

my academic gown,

in the studies

and conversation

steeped in port and prejudice 118

my

country had not stripped

me

the five important years, so liberally imof

Lausanne, would have been of Oxford. Had the fatigue

among the monks

Hugh Trevor-Roper

compelled

me

would not have been should have grown to manhood ignorant of the life and language of Europe, and my knowledge of the world would have been confined to an English cloister." For Gibbon of idleness

to read, the path of learning

enlightened by a ray of philosophic knowledge.

I

that, intellectually, he owed nothing to England, or at least England of his early years. Intellectually, it was Lausanne, not England, that had formed him. "Such as I am, in genius or learning or manners, I owe my creation to Lausanne: it was in that school that the statue was found in the block of marble." Without the experience of Lausanne there would have been no Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Why was Lausanne so important in the 1750s, and so particularly important to an Englishman? To answer this question we must look at the study of history before Gibbon, both in England and in Europe: to its stagnation in England and to its renaissance in Europe. Since the Renaissance, European writers had sought to discover general causes in history to replace the theological determinism of the Middle Ages, and the theologians had invariably resisted these attempts. The pioneers were the great Florentines, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, in the early sixteenth century. Machiavelli, in particular, had assumed that there were secular causes in history which, if understood aright, could be seized, controlled, and made to work for a particular political purpose: they could even triumph over the accidents of "fortune" and restore a state and society which had been corrupted or defeated. This presupposed that the citizens of such a society (or, if the corruption had gone too far, a Prince) should possess virtu, or public spirit combined with a resolute determination to

was convinced

to the

apply the

new

science according to

its

own

rules, or

"reason of

state." It

followed that the function of the historian was to discover these rules and define this reason of state.

condemned Maand the old theological determinism was restored to authority, reinforced, on the Catholic side, by an insistence on continuous Church history and, on the Protestant side, by belief in Providence and millenarian speculations. A few bold spirits challenged this renewed orthodoxy, particularly at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Such were Jacques-Auguste de Thou, the French historian of sixteenth-century Europe, and Paolo Sarpi, known in England as Fra Paolo or Father Paul, the Venetian historian of the Council of Trent. Both de Thou and Sarpi were Catholics, but both were condemned by the Catholic Church. In England, the same secular attitude was shown by the Elizabethan historian William Camden, who enjoyed a European reputation and founded a chair of "civil history" — i.e., secular history, detached from theological interpretation— at Oxford. However, this critical spirit was soon quenched; Camden's chair at Oxford quickly became a sinecure; and "providential history" was strengthened by the struggle of the Thirty Years War, as it had previously been by the Wars After the Reformation, both Catholics and Protestants

chiavelli,

of Religion after the Reformation. In France, in the later seventeenth cen-

119

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

Bishop Bossuet would write a "universal history" on a theological base, and in England the most popular historians, from Sir Walter Raleigh to Bishop Burnet, based their historical interpretation on Providence. This tury,

interpretation lasted well into the eighteenth century.

Unable

to challenge the theological interpretation at

its

base, the "civil

from the beginning, adopted the device of distinguishing between "first" and "second causes." They allowed that the Providence of God was the first and main cause of historical events; but they argued that, in historians,"

order to achieve its ends, Divine Providence allowed the operation of "second" or "secondary" causes which were purely secular and could properly be studied and judged by unaided human reason. The clergy did not like this distinction, which they regarded as a mere face-saving device by "infidels" and skeptics. They particularly disliked it when it was applied to the history of the Christian Church: a history which was regarded as the

and beyond the reach of secular explaThey therefore eyed it vigilantly, ready to pounce on the first sign of open heresy. The secular explanation of history being unpopular in the seventeenth

direct expression of divine purpose, nation.

century, conventional historians took refuge in the accumulation of indisputable,

and therefore

ideologically safe, facts. This was a great century of

who published massive comdocuments, inscriptions, and other evidence, and the erudition of organized societies, like the Benedictines of the Abbey of St. Germain des

erudition: the erudition of individual scholars, pilations of

Pres in Paris (the Maurists) and the Jesuit society of Bollandists in Flanders.

This scholarly accumulation was not necessarily disinterested. Often

it

was

intended to supply ammunition for ideological controversy. However, in the end,

its

effect

cilable evidence,

driven back into tainable

was

was different. Repelled by the sheer mass of often irrecon-

and wearied by the continuous controversy, scholars were skepticism. They concluded that historical truth was unat-

and a consistent interpretation therefore impossible. This doctrine fashionable by the emigre French Huguenot Pierre Bayle, whose

made

Dictionnaire Historique

et critique,

"disorderly erudition" (as

philosophy.

It

was known

called

it),

is

a vast miscellany of

undirected by any positive

"Pyrrhonism," from Pyrrho Greek philosophers.

as

of the skeptical school of

published in 1695-97,

Gibbon

of Elis, the

founder

For the greater part of the eighteenth century, while "Providential" remained orthodox, Pyrrhonism was the reigning historical philosophy among the intellectuals of Europe. Voltaire ended by accepting it — at least when he could not use history as propaganda. In Pyrrhonisme de Vhistoire and other works, he argued that nothing was certain and that the only safe guide in history was le bon sens. Le bon sens, for instance, proved that ritual prostitution could never have occurred (similarly in the sixteenth century, le bon sens had proved, to Bodin, the reality of witchcraft). In England the essence of Pyrrhonism was stated by Dr. Johnson. In 1751, in an article in The Rambler, he dwelt on the ease of the historian's task who had "no other history

120

Hugh Trevor-Roper

labour than to arrange and display the material already put into his hands." It never occurred to him that intellectual power was required to interpret

such material. The only question which he asked was why, even in so unexacting a profession, so few have excelled, and, in particular, why there

had been no great English historians; for it was, as Gibbon would write, an "old reproach that no British altars had been raised to the Muse of History," and David Hume, a few years later, would describe Camden as the last great English historian. Johnson's answer was that the English neglected the study of history because so effortless a task was beneath them: and he too had to look back to the reign of Elizabeth before he could find a reputable English historian. There he found Richard Knolles, whose History of the Turks, he said, was unread only because the subject was so dull. Twenty-four years later, at the Club in London, Johnson would hold forth on the same subject. "We must consider," he said, "how very little history there is; I mean real authentic history. That certain kings reigned, and certain battles were fought, we can depend upon as true; but all the colouring, all the philosophy of history

is

conjecture."

On

this

occasion Boswell maliciously notes that

Gibbon was present but remained silent. Later, in the Decline and Fall, Gibbon would take his revenge. Quoting Johnson's praise of Knolles, Gibbon would comment drily that a modern reader of history looked not for "1400 folio pages of speeches and battles" but "some tincture of criticism and philosophy." Johnson's England was the England in which Gibbon was brought up until his removal from Oxford. It was an England of peculiar intellectual sterility. The greatest of English scholars, Richard Bentley, had died in 1742, the great antiquary Bishop Gibson in 1748. After them a "frivolous and superficial age" of scholarship was dominated by two clergymen: the swashbuckling bully William Warburton and his toady Richard Hurd. Gibbon, as he tells us, from his early youth, knew that he "aspired to the character of a historian," but in England he had no models, no preceptors.

He

read, but in that era of fashionable Pyrrhonism, his reading was "vague

and multifarious." He devoured "crude lumps" of history "like so many novels." Before he was sixteen he "had exhausted all that could be learned in English of the Arabs and the Persians, the Tartars and the Turks." At Oxford he wished, but was not allowed, to learn Arabic. Then, on his fall from grace, he carried this "indigested chaos" of historical matter to Lausanne and there discovered, what he had hitherto lacked, an articulating cord.

For while England had been "an intellectual backwater," historical studon the Continent had undergone a revolution. The revolution had begun in Naples, and its most important product (since Vico remained virtually unnoticed till the nineteenth century) was Pietro Giannone, a lawyer, whose Civil History of Naples had been published in 1723. Giannone's work had shown how the power of the Church, having been rooted and institutionalized in the medieval Kingdom of Naples, had become a conies

121

Edward Gibbon's Decline and

stant social force,

Fall of the

Roman Empire

determining the

later political history of the

Kingdom.

The work caused an immediate sensation. While it pleased the lay rulers who were seeking to break the stranglehold of the Church, it enraged the Catholic hierarchy. In the end, the hierarchy proved more powerful. Excommunicated, driven from city to city, Giannone finally took refuge in Calvinist Geneva, where he planned to publish, in Lausanne, a new and more devastating work. His ally was a Calvinist pastor, Jacob Vernet. Giannone did not succeed in his object. Lured into Savoyard territory, he was kidnapped by agents of the Duke of Savoy, who sought to please the Pope by this coup de main. He spent the rest of his life in a Savoyard prison; he was forced to recant his heresy; and his unpublished works were suppressed.

In the following generation, Giannone's ideas were adopted and extended by an even more important writer, the President de Montesquieu. Montesquieu was a philosopher of history who explicitly rejected the Pyrrhonism of Bayle and, like Giannone, looked for a social explanation of historical change. About 1730 he wrote in his notebook that he would like to write a "civil history of France" comparable with Giannone's Civil History of Naples. He never did this, but he made an intensive study of the civil history of mankind. He distilled his observations, in somewhat miscellaneous aphoristic form, into his greatest work, de VEsprit des Lois, which he published in Geneva in 1748. He too used the services of Giannone's friend, Jacob Vernet, and he too found his work condemned by the Catholic Church. Montesquieu's de VEsprit des Lois is the beginning of modern sociology. It revolutionized historical study by giving a new "social" dimension to the secular historical philosophy of Machiavelli. Thereby, it ended the defeatist Pyrrhonism of the previous half-century and invited scholars to look for historical explanation not merely in political decisions or ideological slogans but in the complex of forces which together could be described as the "spirit of the laws": that is, the structure and organization of society which conditioned both decisions and events. Men, Montesquieu wrote, are governed not merely by political power nor, a fortiori, by divine providence but "by many things: climate, customs, manners; from all which is derived a general spirit"; and his great work was a congeries of general and particular illustrations of this spirit

and

its

differing manifestations.

The effect of Montesquieu's work was immediate and profound. One of those who felt it was Voltaire, who was at this time working on a "universal history" designed to rescue that subject of Bossuet and, at the

mistress,

Madame du

same

time, to

from the theological interpretation

make

Chatelet. Voltaire's

it

palatable to the taste of his

work was

his Essai sur

les

Moeurs,

which he revised to incorporate some of Montesquieu's ideas, and which he published at Geneva in 1756. At this time Voltaire was living in Switzerland, first in Geneva, then in Lausanne. Voltaire too made use of the services of Jacob Vernet.

122

Hugh Trevor-Roper

Thus Geneva and Lausanne, the French cities on Lac Leman, were, in new historical revolution, and Calvinist pastors like Vernet were active agents of the scholars and philosophers who resorted thither to publish their books without interference from French or Italian censors. Little did Edward Gibbon senior realize how much he was doing for his erring son when he carried him off from Oxford and deposited him with a Calvinist pastor in Lausanne. There, better than anywhere else in Europe, the young Gibbon could discover a philosophy to organize his vast, undigested historical reading. Gibbon himself soon these years, the very center of the

it. It was in Lausanne that he read Giannone's Civil History of which he would afterward single out as one of the distant tributaries of his own work. It was there that he visited Voltaire, "the most extraordinary man of the age," and attended the private theatre in which Voltaire himself acted in his own plays and declaimed his own poems. But above all it was there that he found "delight in the frequent perusal of Montesquieu, whose energy of style and boldness of hypothesis were powerful to awaken and stimulate the genius of the age." At the close of his five-year period in Lausanne, Gibbon began his first book. It was a short book, written while he was still, as he admitted, completely under the influence of Montesquieu. Originally, he had designed it as an offering to Suzanne Curchod, to whom he had been engaged in Geneva, but his father obliged him to break off the engagement, and the essay was not published until 1761. By this time he had been in England for three years and had recently been called up for service in the Hampshire militia. He now dedicated it to his father, who had urged him to publish it in the hope that it would recommend the writer for a career in politics. It was written in French and entitled Essai sur I'Etude de la Litterature. Gibbon's juvenile Essai is of interest to us solely because it is by him and

discovered

Naples,

is

the

first

("alas"

expression of his historical philosophy. Condensed and aphoristic

he afterward exclaimed, "how

quieu!"),

it is

fatal

has been the imitation of Montes-

ostensibly a protest against the decline of classical studies into

and pedantry, and the consequent contempt in which the fashionable "modern" philosophers in France. As a devotee of ancient literature, Gibbon wished to restore classical studies to the respect which they had enjoyed in the sixteenth century, when the great scholars had sought not merely to conjure with the ancient texts but to understand the whole society which they reflected. Throughout his essay, Gibbon expressed his veneration for the old standards of scholarship and demanded respect for all facts, however small: for who knows? "a Montesquieu, from the meanest of them, will deduce consequences undreamed by

decorative

triviality

they had fallen

among

ordinary men."

However, while refusing to despise facts, like the French avant-garde Gibbon insists that they must be controlled by "philosophy"; and he

writers,

then expresses his own philosophy of history. He rejects the "useful but also dangerous Pyrrhonism of our age." He sees "philosophy" as a means of 123

Edward Gibbon's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

understanding and so perhaps controlling the apparently arbitrary course of history. "History, to a philosopher, is what gambling was to the Marquis de Dangeau: he saw a system, relations, consequences, where others saw only the caprice of fortune." Gibbon's ideal of a philosophic historian is Tacitus; for only Tacitus, he says, shows the close connection between insti-

between the laws and the destiny of the Roman Repubnow been philosophically illustrated by Montesquieu. "In the hands of a Montesquieu, the theory of general causes would be a philosophic history of mankind. He would make us see those general causes regulating the rise and fall of empires; assuming successively tutions lic.

This

and is

events,

the connection which has

the guise of fortune, prudence, courage, weakness; acting without the assis-

and sometimes even triumphing over them." ." empires Already we are moving toward the great and fall of "The rise work. Or are we? We cannot be certain that this was yet in Gibbon's mind. What we can say is that it had been in Montesquieu's mind, for he had himself written on that subject. In 1734, fourteen years before de VEsprit des Lois, he had published a book of Considerations on the Romans, their Greatness arid Decline. Indeed, we can go further: we can say that this problem— the problem of the decline of Rome — was on the mind of all the historians of the eighteenth century, and that it was because they were all haunted by it that Montesquieu had himself devised the science which, ultimately, not he but Gibbon would apply to its solution. tance of particular causes,

.

.

Why were the men of the eighteenth century so exercised by the decline Roman Empire? Their interest arose naturally out of the new, opti-

of the

mistic philosophy of the

progress. Hitherto

Enlightenment and,

in particular,

its

doctrine of

men had seen history as a record of decline: decline from

primitive innocency, said the theologians; decline

from the unforgettable

age of the apostles, said the Church historians; decline from the

and

literary greatness of classical Antiquity, said the humanists.

men

political

Ambitious

might hope to recover the innocence of man, or the apostolic purity Church, or the science and arts of Antiquity, but no more. However,

of the

in the later

seventeenth century,

Ancients had been challenged.

dence

this

conviction of the superiority of the

The "Moderns" had

in themselves: they believed that they

by then gained confi-

had not only caught up with

had surpassed them. By the eighteenth century, past wore a new look. After the fall of the Roman Empire there had indeed been a Dark Age of gothic barbarism and superstition. But with "the Revival of Letters" Europe had recovered its vitality, and since then there had been a general "Progress." Thanks to this progress, it was now possible to look critically upon the past— even upon Classical Antiquity and the Early Church — and hopefully to the future. Progress, once secured, was the "Ancients" but history

irreversible.

So yet,

at least said the

it

Rome "2-

ideologues and idealists of the Enlightenment.

could be asked, was

it

And

so certain? Might not a philosopher in imperial

have said the same? But he would have been wrong.

Who could

then

Hugh Trevor-Roper

have foreseen that the civilization of Antiquity would disappear, destroyed by despised barbarians? Who could then have imagined a Dark Age of a thousand years? And if that could happen once, who could guarantee that it would not happen again? The civilization of the moderns might seem both solid and brilliant; it might be self-confident. But was it proof against the secret disease which had somehow undermined the equally solid, brilliant

and

Might it all happen again? more thoughtful philosophers of

self-confident civilization of Antiquity?

This was the problem that haunted the

It was a problem which only historians could answer, and they could answer it only by analyzing the causes of the decline of Rome. All of them, to a greater or lesser extent, addressed themselves to the problem; if we think of it as Gibbon's subject, that is only because he eclipsed his predecessors. Giannone in particular had been exercised by it. His study of Roman law, he wrote, had inspired him to consider the great problem of the "origin and changes of the Roman Empire, and how, from its ruins, there arose so many new rulers, laws, customs, kingdoms and republics in Europe." Montesquieu himself wrote on it — but Montesquieu was not an historian and his work, though rich in ideas, lacks historical substance. All the disciples of Montesquieu, even though they did not write formally on the subject, had it on their minds. As one of them wrote, "it was

the Enlightenment.

indeed a subject worthy of their genius; for in the whole history of human affairs, no spectacle occurs so wonderful in itself, or so momentous in its effects, as the growth of that system which took its rise from the conquests of the barbarians"; for those conquests, though they spread over the West-

ern world "a thick night of superstition and ignorance which lasted nearly a thousand years," in the end laid the foundation of a state of society uniquely favorable "to the general and permanent happiness of the human race."

The disciples of Montesquieu were to be found, above all, in Scotland. Englishmen— unless, like Gibbon, they went to Switzerland— were too complacent to heed his lessons: their history remained either Pyrrhonist or providential. But in Scotland, a poor and backward country now eager for "improvement," these lessons on the social machinery of progress were eagerly followed. Montesquieu's de VEsprit des Lois was bought, immediately publication, by David Hume, then on a diplomatic mission to Turin. brought it back to Scotland, where it was quickly and often reprinted, in both French and English. Hume's friend, William Robertson, became a disciple; and the ideas of Montesquieu yielded their first historical fruit in Hume's History of England (1754-62), and in Robertson's History of Scotland (1759) and History of Charles V (1769), whose first chapter, or rather book, is a long essay on the changes in European society from the Roman Empire after

its

Hume

to the Renaissance.

When

he returned to England from Lausanne, full of the ideas of MonGibbon read the works of both Hume and Robertson and was enchanted by them. "The perfect composition, the nervous language, the tesquieu,

125

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

me to the ambicalm philosophy,

well-turned periods of Dr. Robertson," he wrote, "inflamed tious

hope

that

I

might one day tread

in his footsteps; the

and rival, often forced me to volume with a mixed sensation of delight and despair." Gibbon's veneration for Hume and Robertson never wavered, and he was always the careless inimitable beauties of his friend

close the

closer, intellectually, to the

literati

of Scotland, fellow disciples of Montes-

quieu, than to the literary establishment of London, dominated by Dr.

Johnson and that egregious pair— the poor man's Johnson and Boswell — Warburton and Hurd. Having stated his philosophy in his Essai, Gibbon now looked around for an historical subject. A committed classical scholar, deeply in love with Latin, and then Greek, literature, he continued to study the ancient world, but, like Hume and Robertson, he at first thought of writing on modern history. Various modern subjects occurred to him— the history of Sir Walter Raleigh, the French invasion of Italy, Medicean Florence, the history of the liberty of the Swiss — but none had been seriously taken up when the end of the war with France, and the disbandment of the militia, enabled him to exact from his father the fulfillment of an old promise and make— as every English gentleman of means and culture must make— a Grand Tour to Italy. He left England, on a boat crowded with English aristocrats panting for foreign travel, in January 1763. Gibbon's Grand Tour lasted two and one-half years. It fell into three stages. First he spent over three months in Paris. His Essai had been well received in France, and he had introductions to the salons and met the philosophers and men of letters of the time. He also visited the "Benedictine workshop" of the Maurist abbey of St. Germain des Pres, for whose learned industry he always expressed admiration. From Paris he moved on to Switzerland. As he afterward put it, "between the expensive style of Paris and of Italy, it was prudent to interpose some months of tranquil simplicity." So he returned to Lausanne. There his old tutor, M. Pavilliard, greeted him warmly but, having moved to a smaller house, could not give him lodgings. This was convenient, as he remembered Mme Pavilliard's "uncleanly avarice." Instead Gibbon stayed for a whole year in a country chateau whose impoverished owner had turned it into a fashionable boarding house for English visitors. There he made two friends of his own age who were to be important in his life. One was a regular officer, Captain John Baker Holfirst earl of Sheffield, who was to become Gibbon's lifelong and most intimate friend. The other was William Guise, whom he would choose to be his companion on the third stage of his tour: the journey to Rome. Gibbon kept a diary of his Grand Tour which is full and informative for the whole period until his arrival in Rome. He and Guise were carried over the Alps to Turin and then took the route through Milan, Pavia, Genoa, Parma, Modena, Bologna, Florence. Everywhere they were received by the great, visited the antiquities, the picture-galleries, the theatres; and always

royd, afterward

126

Hugh Trevor-Roper writing. For his own contribution to historical he was still thinking of the liberty of the Swiss, but his present reading was largely about Italy and the Roman Empire. He carried with

Gibbon was reading and writing,

him, for relaxation, the Latin poets and, for systematic study, the works of the Roman topographers and the great Renaissance and modern compilers

and commentators: Bergier's monumental work on Roman roads, D'Anmodern geography of the Roman empire, Ezekiel Spanheim's collection of Roman coins and medals. He also wrote several technical essays to clear his own mind: essays on Roman weights and measures, Roman coinville's

age,

Roman population, the route taken by Hannibal over the Alps, etc., etc.

Clearly the liberty of the Swiss was not in the forefront of his

now competing

time. Italy was

mother from Florence,

have never

"I

the foundations of at Lausanne,

mind

at this

with Switzerland. As he wrote to his step-

and

I

lost sight of

the undertaking

do not despair

I

laid

one day which may

of being able

to produce something by way of a description of ancient Italy be of some use to the public and of some credit to myself." The climax of the tour was of course the visit to Rome, which Gibbon and Guise reached on October 6, 1764. In his Memoirs, long afterward, Gibbon recalled the excitement of his arrival there:

my temper

not very susceptible of enthusiasm, and the enthusiam

is

do not

which

I

time

can neither forget nor express the strong emotions which

I

agitated

feel I

my mind

as

have ever scorned to I first

After a sleepless night,

I

But

affect.

at the distance of

approached and entered the

eternal

trod, with lofty step, the ruins of the

city.

Forum;

each memorable spot where Romulus stood, or Tully spoke, or Caesar fell, was at once present to my eye; and several days of intoxication

were

or enjoyed before

lost

investigation

.

.

I

could descend to a cool and minute

.

Then, nine days after the first arrival, came the moment which in one of the most famous passages of the Memoirs: it

was

at

Rome, on the 15th

of

October 1764,

as

I

sat

is

recorded

musing amidst

the ruins of the Capitol, while the barefooted friars were singing

vespers in the

and

fall

Temple

of the city

first

of Jupiter, that the idea of writing the decline

started to

my

mind.

been cast on the reality of Gibbon's revelation in the which he explicitly refers for confirmation, is not available for the period after his arrival in Rome, and the brief entries in the diary of his companion Guise, though they mention visits to the Capitol on six of the eight days between October 6 and 13, state only, on the fifteenth, that it "being wet weather this morning," they visited an English painter. However, Gibbon was a veracious and accurate writer, and if he cited a diary, the diary presumably existed even if it has since been lost. He Recently, doubt has

Capitol. His

may

own

diary, to

of course have misread the date

— or

Guise

may have confused

dates

127

Edward Gibbon's Decline and

(diaries are not always

that the

morning was

Fall of the

Roman Empire

immediately written). In any case, Guise only

Capitol was at "vespers," in

no evidence incompatible with Gibbon's statement, which belief.

In any case, Gibbon's "enthusiasm" at the

Rome

ments of ancient

is

first

amply borne out by the

to his father three days after arrival. "If

or Mrs. Gibbon any account of what really

states

Gibbon clearly states that the visit to the "the gloom of the evening." There is therefore

wet, whereas

it

was

saw,

I

is

entitled to

sight of the

monu-

which he wrote before to give you

letters

difficult

impossible here. ...

it is

may have

almost in a dream. Whatever ideas books

I

am

given us of the

greatness of that people, their accounts of the most flourishing state of

Rome

fall

infinitely

short of the picture of

its

there never, never existed such a nation, and

mankind

ruins. I

hope

I

am

convinced that

for the happiness of

that there never will again."

Gibbon's original idea, inspired by the ruins of ancient

Roman grandeur,

was to write a history of the decline and fall of the city: its gradual destruction or deformation by time, the barbarians and the Christians, from the days of the pagan empire to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This

was a subject to which

his close

journey had prepared him.

study of

Roman

topographers during

his

was a subject which he would ultimately treat in the last chapter of the Decline and Fall. But at present it was only an idea — and one idea among many which competed for his interest. He may have suspended, but he had not yet given up, the idea of Medicean Florence It

or the liberty of the Swiss.

Meanwhile, he and Guise pursued their journey to Naples and then returned to Rome. On arrival in Rome he was disagreeably surprised. His banker there showed him a letter from his father suddenly stopping all credit, and he was obliged to cut short his travels. Humiliated by this affront, he began the return journey with Guise, via Venice and Lyon. At Lyon he received a peremptory letter requiring his return for a meeting of the Hampshire militia. Leaving Guise in Lyon, he returned alone to England.

Thus on

his

return to England in 1765 Gibbon had not yet decided to Roman Empire. So vast a program could hardly

write the Decline and Fall of the

be envisaged on the basis of his present studies, wide though they were. So far, he had acquired a philosophy of interpretation, and a solid understanding of the Roman world, and he had taken particular soundings at various positions in a vast general reading. What he owed to his Italian journey was the addition of a

although

at

new idea— but an

present limited,

it

idea of great potential growth: for

could ultimately expand and absorb

all

the

competed. The process of absorption took three years. Gibbon's favored project, in the years immediately after his return, was still the History of the Liberty of the Swiss. In this project he was encouraged by his Swiss friend Georges Deyverdun, who was prepared to collaborate by translating the German documents; for Gibbon was not prepared to learn the "barbarous dialect" of German Switzerland. Deyverdun, whose friendship dated from Gibbon's

varied interests with which, at present,

128

it

Hugh Trevor-Roper first stay in Lausanne, had now come to England in search of employment, and 1767 he and Gibbon collaborated in publishing a literary review, Memoires Litteraires de la Grande Bretagne. The review ran for two years and contained notices of new books: one of them being the Essay on the History of Civil Society by Adam Ferguson, one of the Scottish disciples of Montesquieu. The language of the review, though published in London, was French. Meanwhile, Gibbon wrote, also in French, the first section of his book on the liberty of the Swiss and submitted it, by the hands of Deyverdun, to the judge whom he most admired, David Hume. Hume wrote an appreciative judgment of it but urged Gibbon to write not in French but in English. French, he admitted, was the universal language of the polite world, but would its supremacy last? Hume had himself recently been employed in negotiating the treaty of Paris, which ended the Seven Years' War and incorporated Canada in the British Empire, and he foresaw the ultimate prevalence of the English language. "Our solid and increasing establishments in America," he wrote, "promise a superior stability and endurance to the English language." It is curious to think that, but for this intervention by Hume, Gibbon might have written the Decline and Fall in French and thus deprived English literature of a great monument. For in spite of Hume's approbation, Gibbon did not persevere with the liberty of the Swiss. Other critics were less flattering, and in 1768 he decided to abandon that subject for good and return to classical themes. In 1770, following Hume's advice, he used English, not French, for a new work. This was an attack on the absurd pretensions of the now aged dictator of scholarship, Warburton. In the same year, the death of Gibbon's father made him

financially

independent.

He

gradually got rid of the family estate in

Hamp-

and in 1773 established himself at 7 Bentinck Street in London. There he began to work on the subject which had now replaced the Liberty of the Swiss and all other modern topics. He had settled at last for the decline and fall, not now of the city, but of the whole empire of Rome. With this subject he would not only introduce to England the new constructive historical method suggested by Montesquieu. He would also seek to answer the great historical question which haunted the "enlightened" philosophers of the eighteenth century: why did the civilization of Antiquity fail? and, could it all happen again? shire

II.

The Decline and

The

first

volume

Fall (1)

The Western Empire

of the History of the Decline and Fall of the

published on February

16, 1776.

The

Roman Empire was

publishers were Strahan and Cadell,

Gibbon's previous publisher having declined the book. At

first Strahan 750 copies; then he retreated to 500. But when he saw the finished text, he was so impressed by it that he doubled that figure. Even so, he soon found that he had underestimated the success of the book. It

agreed

to print

129

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

he afterward reported, like a threepenny pamphlet on current affairs. had gone in a fortnight, and a second edition of 1500 copies was immediately printed. This too was sold out by the end of the year. Early next year a third edition of 1000 copies was published. Meanwhile a pirated edition had been printed in Dublin. The instant success of the book surprised and delighted Gibbon, who heard, at first, nothing but praise of it. The praise was the more enthusiastic because no one had expected so remarkable a work. Gibbon himself was by this time well known in London, in literature, politics, and society. He had social tastes. He was a member of fashionable clubs. He was also a member of "the Club," the famous literary society, founded by Sir Joshua Reynolds, dominated by Johnson, and immortalized by Bos well. And he was a member, though a silent member, of Parliament, sitting, since 1774, as member for Liskeard in Cornwall, a "nomination borough" controlled by his cousin, Edward Eliot of Port Eliot. His friends knew that he had been working on a Roman history; but the brilliance of the book, when published, took them all by surprise. "Lo, there is just appeared a truly classic work," Horace Walpole wrote to a friend, adding, of Gibbon, that he "is a member of Parliament and called a whimsical because he votes variously, as his opinion leads him. I know him a little, never suspected the extent of his talents: he is perfectly modest." Lord Camden, the great Lord Chief Justice, wrote to Garrick "in a transport" about the book: "such depth— such perspicuity— such language, force, variety and what not!" The immediate reviews were also uniformly favorable, and the world of fashion was united in its admiration with the world of literature sold,

The

entire edition

and

politics.

More important ship.

He was

to

Gibbon was the approbation

of the world of scholar-

delighted by letters from the Scottish

literati

who

alone, per-

haps, being themselves disciples of Montesquieu, could measure his pur-

Hume

and Robertson— the Tacitus and the Livy of them — both wrote glowing letters. So did Adam Ferguson. To Ferguson, Gibbon wrote back that "your approbation and that of your literary friends in Edinburgh" had given him the greatest pleasure, for "I have always looked up with the most sincere respect towards the northern part of our island, whither taste and philosophy seem to have retired from the smoke and hurry of this immense capital." Of Hume's letter — one of the last letters that Hume wrote — Gibbon would afterwards remark that it "overpaid the labour of ten years." In this letter to Gibbon, Hume contrasted the brillance of his work with pose and achievement. Scotland, as

Gibbon

called

life in the middle eighteenth he wrote, "but as it seems to me that your countrymen, for almost a whole generation, have given themselves up to barbarous and absurd faction" — he was referring to the internecine politics of the Whig oligarchy — "I no longer expected any valuable production to come from them," he added. But with his praise, he

the general sterility of English intellectual century.

130

"You may smile

at this sentiment,"

Hugh Trevor-Roper

mingled a note of foreboding. "When I first heard of your undertaking ... I own I was a little curious to know how you would extricate yourself from your last two chapters. I think you have observed a very prudent temperament; but it was impossible to treat the subject so as not to give

grounds of suspicion against you, and you may expect that a clamour will Hume's foreboding was perfectly correct. Gibbon's last two chapters were the famous fifteenth and sixteenth chapters of his work, on the rise and establishment of Christianity in the Roman Empire during the period covered by the first volume, from Trajan to Constantine; and they did indeed cause a dreadful clamor. From the preceding account, it will be apparent what Gibbon's attitude to ecclesiastical history must be. He was a "philosophical historian," a "civil historian," in the semi-heretical tradition which went back through Montesquieu and Giannone to Machiavelli. He himself, in a footnote, would afterward explicitly state his intellectual pedigree: "Guicciardini and Machiavelli," he wrote, "with their worthy successors Fra Paolo and Davila, were justly esteemed the first historians of modern languages till, in the present age, arise."

Scotland arose to dispute the prize with Italy herself." Neither those Italian

nor these Scottish historians had regarded religious truth as a determining force in history. The Italians had seen religion as an engine of state; the Scots, following Montesquieu, had seen it as a social force, the "spirit" of a particular form of society. In consequence of these views, some of these historians (or at least those who lived in Catholic societies) had been regarded, and even condemned, as heretical. However, this was not by their wish. None of them had sought to pick a quarrel or challenge the established Church: rather, they had conformed with it and hoped to preserve its good will by distinguishing, in history, between "first" and "second" causes. Of course, if they wrote explicitly on the relations of Church and State, they exposed themselves to trouble, especially in strongly Catholic countries. This had been experienced, even in the eighteenth century, by Giannone in Italy. But so long as they avoided such a frontal attack, they could hope to escape unscathed, at least in Protestant countries. However, even there, caution was needed. The clergy, by now, might no longer be able to persecute, but they could

make

uncomfortable.

life

Hume

and his Scottish friends, who had had some trouble with the bigots of the Scottish church. Consequently they had trodden very warily. Hume's own skill had been remarkable and had produced remarkable results. Though his History of England had been savagely All this

was well known to

attacked by political partisans,

it

ops of Canterbury and Dublin,

was positively

who

commended

by the archbish-

relished his support for the established

Church more than they disliked his "infidelity." Robertson even contrived combine "philosophical" views, and an expressed admiration for Voltaire, with the position of a Presbyterian minister and Moderator of the Church of Scotland. He could perform this elegant balancing act because

to

he steered clear of

ecclesiastical history. His historical

philosophy was clear 131

Edward Gibbon's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

—John Wesley bitterly attacked him for saying nothing of the Providence God as the true motor of history — but it was implicit, not stated. Gibbon's

of

intellectual position

was precisely the same as that of

but he was more vulnerable because,

more sensitive topic. The Empire could not, like the

like

Hume and

Robertson,

Giannone, he had chosen a

"philosophical historian" of the later

far

Roman

historian of England or Charles V, evade the

issue of the rise of Christianity. It was central to his subject. It

and faced frontally. Gibbon trod at first delicately

had

to be

faced,

own skepticism could

into this heavily

mined

area.

Although

his

not be concealed, he was careful never to express any

from the opinions of the established Church. Indeed, in an early emphasized that the philosophers of Antiquity, Socrates, Epicurus, Cicero, and Plutarch, "had always inculcated decent reverence for the religion of their own country, and of mankind"— and clearly he

dissent

footnote, he

intended to identify himself with them. Similarly, in all matters of theologihe avoided any personal commitment: "the duty of an

cal interpretation,

historian,"

he wrote, when he approached the vexed question of the early

call upon him to interpose his private judgand important controversy"; and he would gravely reproach Conyers Middleton, whose famous Free Enquiry of 1749 had com-

Christian miracles, "does not

ment

in this nice

pletely destroyed the credibility of those miracles, for his bold criticism

which "approaches the precipice of

infidelity."

And

of course, like his seven-

teenth-century predecessors, he took care to distinguish between

"first"

and

"second" causes.

At the very beginning of the two famous chapters, Gibbon ceremoniously By what means, he asked, did the "pure and humble" Christian faith gradually insinuate itself into the minds of men and insinuate itself so successfully that it not only prevailed over contempt and persecution but "finally erected the triumphant banner of the Cross on the ruins of the Capitol?" The obvious answer, he readily admitted, was "that it was owing to the convincing evidence of the doctrine itself, and to the ruling Providence of its great Author." That, of course, was the First Cause. But, he went on, "as truth and reason seldom find so favourable a reception in the world, and as the wisdom of Providence frequently condescends to use the passions of the human heart, and the general circumstances of mankind, as instruments to execute its purpose, we may still be permitted, though with becoming submission, to ask, not indeed what were the first, but what were the secondary causes of the rapid growth of the Christian Church." With these careful phrases he supposed that he had disarmed the critics. "I had flattered myself," he afterward wrote, "that an age of light and liberty would receive without scandal an inquiry into the human causes of the progress and establishment of Chrisrolled out the conventional formula.

tianity."

Thus reassured, Gibbon strode forward

132

into the

most controversial era

Hugh Trevor-Roper

With massive scholarship, magnificently organized and but also with polished irony and sometimes devastating wit, he traced the transformation of Christianity from a heretical Jewish sect into a Gentile mystery religion with universal claims; its division into opposof

Church

history.

brilliantly set out,

ing sects

armed with

incorporation into

increasingly fanciful doctrinal slogans; the gradual

of extraneous but politically useful doctrines;

it

forcement by miraculous claims and formidable virginity; the

men which

emergence

discipline;

its

its

rein-

novel cult of

of a distinct class of clergy, "a celebrated order of

has furnished the most important, though not always the most

modern history"; the growth of monasticism; and the changing policy of the imperial establishment toward this most persistent of the competing new Oriental superstitions. As Gibbon broached topic after topic in this account of a revolutionary ideology on the way to the capture of power, his ceremonious lip-service to the Providence of God edifying subjects for

became ever more transparent, and and, to some, painful

The

first

of these

his

own

views

emerged with sparkling

clarity.

two famous chapters ends with a splendid exercise of

sustained irony: Gibbon's grave reproach to the "supine inattention of the

pagan and philosophic world" which altogether dous miracles of the early Church.

failed to notice the stupen-

The lame walked, the blind saw, the sick were healed, the dead were raised, demons were expelled, and the laws of Nature were frequently suspended for the benefit of the Church. But the sages of Greece and Rome turned aside from the awful spectacle, and, pursuing the ordinary occupations of life and study, appeared unconscious of any alterations in the moral or physical government of the world. Under the reign of Tiberius, the whole earth, or at least a celebrated province of the Roman empire, was involved in a preternatural darkness of three hours. Even this miraculous event, which ought to have excited the wonder, the curiosity and the devotion of mankind, passed without notice in an age of science and history. It happened during the lifetime of Seneca and the elder Pliny. Each of these philosophers, in a laborious work, has recorded all the great phenomena of Nature, earthquakes, meteors, comets, and eclipses, which his indefatigable curiosity could collect. Both the one and the other have omitted to mention the greatest phenomenon to which the mortal eye has been .

.

.

witness since the creation of the globe.

.

.

.

chapter, after an account of the Roman persecution of the whose self-imposed penances and deliberately courted martyr-

The second Christians,

doms were described

with

more

psychological

with "a melancholy truth which obtrudes

acumen than sympathy, ends

itself

on the reluctant mind,"

viz.:

that

even admitting, without hesitation or inquiry, all that history has recorded, or devotion has feigned, on the subject of martyrdoms,

it

133

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

must

still

Fall of the

Roman Empire

be acknowledged that the Christians, in the course of their have inflicted far greater severities on each other

intestine dissensions,

than they had experienced from the zeal of

infidels.

To the philosophical world of the eighteenth century, these statements were unexceptionable, and the style in which they were expressed was irresistible. But even in the eighteenth century there were readers who would be — or would pretend to be — outraged by them; and of course they were even more outraged by the impossibility either of refuting Gibbon's statements, which were all impeccably documented, or of convicting him of the unorthodoxy which he was so careful to disown. By the time the eager readers of the first volume had reached chapter fifteen, their initial harmony had dissolved and the previous chorus of unanimous approval was disturbed by a swelling

murmur

of dissent.

"I have the satishe wrote to his stepmother on March 26, "that my book has been very well received, by men of letters, men of the world, and even by fine feathered ladies; in short, by every set of people, except perhaps by the clergy, who seem (I know not why) to show their teeth on the occasion." Five weeks later he wrote to Deyverdun reporting the success of the book but adding that there was "another side to the coin";

Gibbon's

letters at the

time reveal the gradual change.

faction of telling you,"

would you suppose, my dear

Sir, that

anyone would have carried my faith? A cry has been

injustice so far as to attack the purity of

raised against

me

by bishops, and by a

number

of ladies respectable

both for years and enlightenment. They have presumed to maintain that the last

two chapters of

my

so-called history are nothing less than

a satire against the Christian religion: a satire

because

it is

all

the

more dangerous

disguised by a veil of moderation and impartiality; and

that the emissary of Satan, having long beguiled the reader by a very

agreeable narrative, insensibly leads his footsteps into an infernal snare.

you

You

will

the face of

The

will

appreciate, Monsieur, the

understand that

my

I

shall

horror of

all this,

and

enemies.

tone of the ensuing debate had been set by "the Great

English letters, Dr. Johnson.

We

old Pyrrhonist view of history.

had been as

an

comprehend

infidel,

Cham"

of

have seen that Johnson was wedded to the

Born

in the reign of

Queen Anne,

fixed by the middle of the eighteenth century,

ing to receive or

Hume

full

maintain only a respectful silence in

the

new

his ideas

and he was

ideas of Montesquieu.

He

unwill-

detested

despised Robertson as a Presbyterian, and was preju-

diced against both as Scots. Both he and Boswell disliked Gibbon personally.

They could not see what he was seeking to do and could only see his "infidelity." On March 20, 1776, a month after the publication of Gibbon's volume, Johnson and Boswell were at Oxford where, as they admitted, their orthodoxy was always rekindled by the sight of those venerable talked," says Boswell,

134

spires.

"We

Hugh Trevor-Roper

work much

in vogue at that time, written in a very mellifluous but which, under pretext of another subject, contained much artful infidelity. I said it was not fair to attack us unexpectedly: he

of a

style,

should have warned us of our danger before we entered his garden of flowery eloquence, by advertising 'spring-guns and man-traps set here'.

The author had been Oxonian, and was remembered

there for having he had changed several times — from the Church of England to the Church of Rome, from the Church of 'turned papist'.

Rome

I

observed that

to infidelity

—I

did not despair yet of seeing him a methodist

preacher. Johnson (laughing) extensive,

and

Unwary

said that his range has been more been Mahometan. However, now that he will probably persist in it'.

'It is

that he has once

he has published

of flowery

as

his infidelity,

footsteps insensibly beguiled into

eloquence secretly

filled

an infernal snare

...

a garden

with spring-guns and man-traps

.

.

.

these

were the regular charges made against Gibbon. Soon they would appear in print. Already, in June, Gibbon reported that the archbishop of Canterbury's chaplain was "sharpening his goose-quill," and in the autumn the pamphlets started appearing. For some time Gibbon maintained his "respectful silence," but finally, in 1778, he was stung into action by a particularly impertinent attack both on his scholarship and on his honesty. The author was H. E. Davies, a young man of Balliol College, and he too accused

Gibbon

of

seducing "those readers

who may

heedlessly stray in the flowery

paths of his diction without perceiving the poisonous snake that lurks in the grass."

At this point Gibbon decided to strike back. Suspending work on his second volume, he wrote his Vindication of Some Passages in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Chapters of the History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. It was directed against

all

the

critics

who had

so far attacked

him and was pub-

lished in January 1779.

Gibbon's Vindication

is

a devastating work.

He

wrote

unwillingly:

it

he

and he was conscious that his enemies were not worth his powder and shot. Victory over such opponents, he said, was humiliation enough. But once he had deresented the interruption to his work which

it

entailed,

cided to counterattack, he decided also to annihilate.

And he

did anni-

hilate.

Abandoning, for once, his customary "grave and temperate irony,"

he

himself go, and, as

let

Dean Milman afterward put

it,

"with a single

discharge from his ponderous artillery of learning and sarcasm, laid prostrate cleared, he

the

whole

had no wish

asked that "as soon as

would forget it

my

disorderly to

my

squadron."

commemorate

When

readers are convinced of

Vindication."

the

the battle or set

my

up

smoke

had

a trophy.

He

innocence, they

In order to help them to do so, he had caused it could not be bound up with his History,

to be printed in octavo, so that

which was in quarto. In fact, though his adversaries were forgotten, the battle was not: it had been too spectacular, too decisive. Nor was the Vindication: it contained too many magnificent Gibbonian phrases. It has often 135

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

been reprinted, though Gibbon's scholarship no longer needs its defense. In spite of the Vindication, attacks on Gibbon continued. No year passed without some book or pamphlet against him, and nearly sixty books and as many articles against him were published in his lifetime. But from now on, he absolutely refused to notice any of them, and all are now forgotten. One of them, however, raised, and finally settled, a controversy which had long been suppressed by the established Churches. This was the controversy over "the Three Heavenly Witnesses" who are cited in the first epistle of St. John (V. 7). This text is important, for it is the only biblical text which can be cited in support (rather indirect support

at best) of the doctrine of

the Trinity.

The

authenticity of this vital verse was

observed that

it

did not occur in any

script of the Bible.

He

questioned by Erasmus,

first

known Greek

therefore dismissed

it

or early Latin

who

manu-

as a later interpolation

and

excluded it from his edition of the New Testament. Afterward, however, he yielded to orthodox pressure and restored the verse, not because he was convinced, but "to remove any pretext for calumny." After this victory for orthodoxy, to reject the verse was to incur the charge of unitarianism or worse, and scholars, in general, concealed their doubts or expressed in learned privacy.

Gibbon

openly and emphatically as

cast aside

such caution.

condemned "by

He

them

rejected the verse

the universal silence of the

orthodox Fathers, ancient versions and authentic manuscripts." It was, he said, an interpolation, perhaps from a marginal note, of the fifth century, perpetuated in the manuscript tradition. "After the invention of printing, the editors of the Greek Testament yielded to their own prejudices, or those of the times; and the pious fraud, which was embraced with equal zeal at Rome and at Geneva, has been infinitely multiplied in every country and every language of Europe." Such a statement inevitably roused the orthodox, and George Travis, archdeacon of Chester, devoted a whole book to the defense of the injured verse. His "brutal insolence" was answered, and refuted, in seven devastating letters by the Greek scholar Richard Porson. Gibbon sat quietly in the wings while "the wretched Travis still smarts under the lash of the merciless Porson." After that, the verse never recovered its authority. It was abandoned by Protestants at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and even by Catholics, at the end.

When the dust had settled, Gibbon, in his Memoirs, expressed regret for having provoked the battle which he had so easily won. "Had I believed," he wrote, "that the majority of English readers were so fondly attached even to the

name and shadow

of Christianity;

timid and the prudent would

had

I

foreseen that the pious, the

feel, with such exquisite might perhaps have softened the two invidious chapters, which would create many enemies and conciliate few friends." This statement of regret can be believed. It is very likely that Gibbon, with his foreign education, had misjudged the attitude of his countrymen: that living among

sensibility,

136

I

feel,

or affect to

Hugh Trevor-Roper "philosophers," men of letters, and men of the world, he had not appreciated the bigotry which slumbered beneath the smooth, rational surface of English intellectual life. Hume had been aware of this and had warned Gibbon against it; but it was too late for Gibbon to heed the warning. As he put it, "the shaft was shot, the alarm was sounded, and I could only rejoice that if the voice of our priests was clamorous and bitter, their hands were disarmed from the powers of persecution." Gibbon also had another reason to regret the controversy. The provocation of the famous fifteenth and sixteenth chapters had not only involved him in a time-consuming controversy: it had also, to a large extent, distorted his achievement. Gibbon was not, after all, simply a skeptical or an anticlerical writer. If he had been, he would have been forgotten long ago. He positively repudiated the historical skepticism of Bayle and, like Hume, he supported (though from outside) the established Church. What he had set out to write was something which far transcended the content of those two chapters. His book was to be both a great work of modern scholarship and a "philosophical" interpretation of the most important turning point in European history. To such an enterprise, an examination of the social and political function of Christianity was essential, and Gibbon was bound to consider it in those terms. He saw it not as true or false, but as the ideology of a new world order. But ideology was not the only force which had to be considered. There was also the objective condition of the society within which it worked, and which it transformed: secular institutions, economic movements, questions of population, defense, culture and the arts. Gibbon considered all these, systematically, using modern, comparative methods of interpretation. He was particularly interested in laws as the expression of a social system — in Montesquieu's "spirit of the laws"— and made great use of the Theodosian Code, the series of enactments by which the Emperors from Constantine onward had effected the gradual transformation of a pagan into a Christian state. He used the great edition of Jacques Godefroy, a Huguenot scholar of the seventeenth century. Giannone had also used this "stupendous work" as a key to the understanding of social change. "I used it," says Gibbon, "(and much I used it) as a work of history rather than of jurisprudence; but in every light it may be considered as a full and capacious repository of the political state of the empire in the 4th and 5th centuries." Gibbon's study of the Roman economy, population, and defense shows an astonishing mastery of recondite and scattered sources; and his range extended far beyond the political frontiers of the empire. But all this was ignored by his clerical critics. Exasperated by his treatment of Christianity, they swarmed angrily around him, buzzing feebly about minor details. Gibbon no doubt supposed that, in turning aside to swat them, he was disposing of a marginal nuisance and clearing the way for an objective assessment of his work. But if so, he was mistaken. Although he vindicated his scholarship, he never secured recognition of his real achievement. Even his admirers failed to appreciate it. They praised him

137

Edward Gibbon's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

power, his psychological penetration, his he had undertaken a radical reinterpretation

for his literary style, his narrative wit.

They

failed to see that

whole process of European history. did see it was the greatest of Montesquieu's Scottish disciples, Adam Smith. Smith came to London in 1775 to see to the publication of The Wealth of Nations, and his close friendship with Gibbon dated from that visit. They went regularly together to Dr. Hunter's anatomy lectures, and Smith was made a member of the Club, probably on Gibbon's proposal. This did not please Johnson, and it positively enraged Boswell, who now worked himself into hysteria at the mere thought of Gibbon and his "infidelity." Indeed Boswell responded to Smith's election by contemplating secession and the formation of a new Club: it was bad enough to have Gibbon, he observed, but "Smith too is now of our Club. It has lost its select merit." Johnson contented himself with saying that Smith was as dull a dog as any he had met, and that his wine bubbled in his mouth. Smith and Gibbon were close friends till Smith's death. Gibbon regularly gave the highest praise to The Wealth of Nations, while Smith regarded the Decline and Fall as putting Gibbon "at the very head of the whole literary tribe at present existing in Europe." Smith and Gibbon can hardly have influenced each other's work, as they both published in the same year and only met in that year. But they tackled the same general problem from separate positions, one as a historian and the other as a "political economist"; and they both descended, intellectually, from the same progenitor. As another Scottish "political economist," John Millar, later wrote: "the great Montesquieu showed the way: he was the Lord Bacon in this branch of science. Dr. Smith is the Newton." It will be convenient to discuss Gibbon's "philosophical" interpretation of the decline of Rome later. At present we may complete the discussion of Gibbon's battle with the clergy by asking, what was Gibbon's personal attitude to religion. Was he, as his enemies maintained, an "infidel"? The answer is that, strictly speaking, he was not. Like so many men of the Enlightenment — like Voltaire and Benjamin Franklin — he was a deist. To the orthodox this hardly constituted a difference. They regarded deism and infidelity as indistinguishable. But the difference was considerable, and the confusion was greatly resented by the deists themselves. Infidelity was atheism, materialism. Deism was belief in a divine force or "deity" whose existence and qualities were demonstrated by the regularity and complexity of Nature, and neither needed nor would accept any support or definition from Revelation. Voltaire waged a long war against the infidels d'Holbach and La Mettrie, and Gibbon deeply resented the charge of infidelity brought against him, and rudely thrust at him, by the unitarian scientist Joseph Priestley. In general, Gibbon did not express his religious beliefs: "on religion she was rational, that is, silent," he reported, after a visit from his devout aunt, "the holy hermit of Northamptonshire." The most that he would say about them, in his Memoirs, is that, after his reconversion from of the

One man who

138

Hugh Trevor-Roper Catholicism, "I suspended belief, in the tenets

of Catholics cal

and

my

religious inquiries, acquiescing, with implicit

and mysteries which are adopted by the general consent

Protestants."

The

position thus described

is

almost identi-

with that professed by Benjamin Franklin in his autobiography.

amounts

to

It

outward conformity with any Christian Church: the envelope

for deism.

Gibbon's deism, though never formally expressed, his observations.

Thus,

in his early Essai,

is

implicit in

many

he describes Lucretius, the

of

Roman

poet of uncompromising materialism, as having, "in spite of himself, proved

up the phenomena of Nature to general own arguments prove not atheism, as he

the existence of the deity by tracing laws"; in other

words, Lucretius's

Gibbon expresses the same general view. "The God of Nature," he writes, "has written his existence on all his works, and his law in the heart of man"; and again, "the unity of God is an idea most congenial to Nature and Reason"; and of Genghis Khan he remarks that "the Catholic inquisitors of Europe, who defended nonsense by cruelty, might have been confounded by the example of a barbarian, who anticipated the lessons of philosophy, and established by his laws a system of pure theism and perfect toleration. His first and only article of faith was the existence of one God, the author of all good, who fills by his presence the heavens and earth, which he has created by his power." Within this general deism, Gibbon, like all good deists, rejected sectarian differences. As a conformist, he conformed to the established Church, which he anyway preferred, for the same reason as Hume, viz.: that establishment ensured a higher degree of lay control. This made him a Protestant in England. He anyway preferred Protestantism as being, in his time, more rational and more tolerant than established Catholicism. But he recognized that it was not necessarily or always so. Churches, to him, were himself supposed, but deism. In the Decline and Fall

to

be judged exclusively by their

Luther, and Calvin were

named

social function. If

he allowed that Zwingli,

"with gratitude, as the deliverers of na-

he would also point out that they enforced, as "the absolute and terms of salvation," doctrines which had been prepared by the Catholic Schoolmen, "and many a sober Christian would rather admit that a wafer is God than that God is a cruel and capricious tyrant." And he admitted that "the Catholic superstition, which is always the enemy of reason, is often the parent of the arts." It was partly on these grounds — his insistence on conformity and tolerance—that Gibbon so disliked his fellow-deist Voltaire. Recalling his early visits at Lausanne, he refers to Voltaire "whom I then rated above his real tions,"

essential

magnitude." Gibbon had since become disillusioned with Voltaire, partly because of Voltaire's Pyrrhonist philosophy of history, partly because of his superficial scholarship,

of his intolerance.

He

and

his disrespect for erudition',

but largely because

noticed that Voltaire always, regardless of the issue,

took the side of the anti-Christians; that he needlessly "insulted the religion of nations";

and

that he subordinated his scholarly

judgment

to his anti-

139

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

Christian prejudices.

Fall of the

The

Roman Empire

footnotes to the Decline and Fall frequently cite

and almost always to expose his lack either of scholarship or of objectivity. They point to his "generous" bestowal of the Canary Islands on the Roman Empire; his "excessive" and "ridiculous" partisanship for the Muslims whenever they are opposed to the Christians; and his insistence that the Nestorian inscription in China, which Gibbon rightly declared genuine, was "a Jesuit fraud." On one occasion Gibbon exploded that in some matters "Voltaire was a bigot, an intolerant bigot." The subtlety, and the tolerance, of Gibbon's religious views were not appreciated by the enraged clergymen who assailed the first volume of the Decline and Fall; but after dispatching them with his Vindication, Gibbon could afford to ignore them and resume his work. There were other interruptions—an extended visit to Paris, constant attendance in Parliament, political office as Lord Commissioner of Trade, the composition of a memorandum in French to justify the government's foreign policy — but Gibbon did not lose much by these digressions. He worked steadily and methodically. He always rose early and wrote only in the morning. Social and parliamentary distractions positively stimulated him: "I never found my mind Voltaire

my composition more happy, than in the winter hurry and parliament." By 1780 he had completed two more volumes, and they were published in 1781, followed, a few months later, by a fourth edition of volume I. As frontispiece, they carried an engraving of a portrait of Gibbon painted by his fellow member of the Club, Sir Joshua Reynolds. With the completion of his third volume Gibbon had now fulfilled his original plan. He had carried the history of the Roman Empire from its greatest extent, in the time of Trajan, to its dissolution in the West in a.d. 476. In the course of those three volumes, he had described, in a narrative of masterly power and lucidity, the whole political history of the Empire — more

vigorous, nor

of society

the foundering of the Principate in the disasters of the third century, the

incursions of the Goths

and

later barbarians, the

despotism, the establishment of a civil

emergence

new devolved empire by

wars in which that new system almost foundered,

its

of a military

Diocletian, the

restoration by the

victory of Constantine, Constantine's foundation of Constantinople as the

new

capital in the east, his

patronage of Christianity, the invasions of the

barbarians and the revived Persian monarchy, the attempted pagan restoration

under

century, the

Julian, the

renewed civil wars and usurpations of the fourth of Theodosius the Great, the establishment of

new dynasty

Christianity as the only religion of state, the

new

assaults of the barbarians,

and the final abolition of the hopelessly shrunken and enfeebled imperial power. But he had not confined himself to political history, or even to the history of "Rome." He had studied the changing institutions of government, the structure of society, the currents of thought. He had traced the religious changes not merely on the level of doctrine but in their legal and social aspects, seeing the Christianization of the empire not as the victory of an idea but as a profound revolution in society, transforming (and weakening) 140

Hugh Trevor-Roper the very basis of the empire: a change which could not be separated from

and the weakening of its culture under the impact of events; and he had studied the origins, the social organization and the character of the various groups of barbarians to whom the Empire had at last succumbed. Finally, in an epilogue entitled "General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West," he had given his answer to the two general questions which haunted the men of the Enlightenment: why had that great reversal of civilization happened? and, could such a thing happen again? To this last question Gibbon gave a cheerful answer. But as this answer depends on his total philosophy, we shall postpone consideration of the process by which he reached it. It is enough, here, to quote its "pleasing the parallel bureaucratization of that empire defenses.

He had observed

the alterations in

Roman

conclusion," so acceptable to the hopes, so comforting to the doubts, of the

eighteenth century, that a second decline and

fall need no longer be apprehended, "that every age of the world has increased and still increases the real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge, and perhaps the virtue, of

the

III.

human

race."

The Decline and

Fall (2)

The Byzantine Empire

With the conclusion of his third volume Gibbon could say that he had fulfilled his "first engagement with the public." The work that he had designed was finished, and the "General Observations" were its epilogue, its summing-up. Many reasons now tempted him to rest on the fame which he had already acquired and indulge his private tastes. He had a modest private fortune; but he needed an additional income if he were to live in London maintaining his house in Bentinck Street, his coach and servants. He enjoyed society and had, as he wrote, an "invincible love of reading, which I would not exchange for the treasures of India." This being so, his natural inclination was to stay in politics. He enjoyed parliamentary life, and his unexacting political office as a "Lord of Trade" provided him with the necessary income while leaving him leisure for society and study. At first, he yielded to this temptation. For a whole year after the publication of his third volume, he ceased writing and read, for pleasure, the Greek classics. However, as he put it, "in the luxury of freedom I began to wish for the daily task, the active pursuit, which gave a value to every book, and an object to every inquiry." So, at the end of this delicious year with Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aristophanes, the tragedians and the philosophers, he resolved to resume his work. In the preface to the fifth edition of his first volume, he announced his decision. This meant, in effect, moving forward from Roman to Byzantine history. In his last volume Gibbon had left himself this option. At the end of his narrative, he had not taken a formal farewell of his readers. Instead, he had 141

Edward Gibbon's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

remarked that though the Roman Empire was now extinct, "the history of the Greek emperors may still afford a long series of instructive lessons and interesting revolutions." So he now undertook to set out those lessons, to describe those revolutions: to narrate the whole history of the Byzantine

Empire from the

Roman

fifth

century,

when

it

was

left as

the sole inheritor of

Turks in 1453. The announcement was dated March 1, 1782. On the very same day he noted in his commonplace-book that the fourth volume of his History had been begun. Before that volume was completed there had been a revolution in Gibbon's way of life. It was caused by the rapid political changes precipitated in England by the American Revolution. In 1781 Parliament had been dissolved, and at the general election which followed, he was not returned for his cousin's pocket borough of Liskeard. As he himself put it, Mr. Eliot had changed his politics, "and the electors of Liskeard are commonly of the same opinion as Mr. Eliot.'* Thanks to government support, he obtained another seat; but soon afterward the government of Lord North fell, and the new administration, as a measure of economy, abolished the Board of Trade. Gibbon's office as a "Lord of Trade" was thus automatically extinguished. He remained in Parliament, but without salary or any hope of office under the new administration of Lord Shelburne. However, in February 1783 the Shelburne administration was overthrown on a vote, and Lord North returned to power in a coalition with his former enemy Charles James Fox. This reversal gave Gibbon some hope, but he was disappointed. "My vote was counted in the day of battle," he observes, "but I was overtradition, to the

preface in which he

fall

made

of Constantinople to the

this

looked in the division of the

spoil."

He

obtained neither the Commissioner-

Embassy in Paris. Gibbon could not afford to live in London in the manner to which he had become accustomed, and he had already decided on the only alternative: he must withdraw himself "into a kind of philosophical exile in Switzerland." Providentially, at this moment, his Swiss friend Deyverdun offered a solution. Deyverdun had inherited a large and elegant house, la Grotte, at Lausanne and needed a tenant to share its expenses. He therefore proposed to divide the house with Gibbon. Gibbon accepted the proposal and, to the dismay of his friends, announced his "irrevocable" ship of the Excise nor the Secretaryship to the

Without

political office,

decision to emigrate to Lausanne.

Gibbon's friends predicted that he would be miserable in Lausanne.

Having enjoyed the best content with

life

society of

in a provincial city?

London and Paris, how could he be But Gibbon knew his own mind and

moment" regretted his decision. La Grotte, he discovered, was "a Paradise." Once established there, he lived in great comfort and had no further interest in political office. "I have health, friends, an amusing "never for one

and perfect freedom," he wrote to Lord Sheffield: "a commissioner The idea makes me sick." In 1789, when Deyverdun died, he bought a life interest in La Grotte and became "the free master of one of society,

of the Excise!

142

Hugh Trevor-Roper the most delicious spots on the globe." La Grotte remained his the rest of his

home

for

life.

Lausanne cost Gibbon a year's interruption of his had arrived, he resumed work and soon finished volume IV. This volume related the history of the Gothic Kingdom

The migration

to

writing, but once his library

of Italy, and, in the East, the long reign of Justinian, with his empress, the

famous ex-courtesan Theodora; the misfortunes of Justinian's successors; and the restoration of the Byzantine state by Heraclius. It ended with the death of Heraclius in

a.d. 641.

At this point Gibbon decided to change his plan and his pace. The change was imposed by the vast range and complexity of the events which he had now undertaken to narrate. So far, he had covered five centuries of history in four volumes. During the greater part of these centuries, the Roman world had extended from the borders of Persia to the Atlantic and from the Cheviots, the Rhine, and the Danube to the desert of Africa. This huge area, whether it was governed from Rome, Milan, Trier, Nicomedia, or Byzantium, had remained essentially a unit, and its unity had been supplied by its internal lake, the Mediterranean Sea. The fifth century had seen the disintegration of the Western Empire as the barbarians overran Gaul, Spain, and North Africa, and Britain was abandoned, soon to be invaded by the Anglo-Saxons. A little later, the Goths had set up their kingdom in Italy. But, even now, the idea of unity was not lost; the new rulers of the West acknowledged it in theory and sought to preserve Roman institutions in their barbarian kingdoms; and in the sixth century Justinian attempted to restore its reality. For a time he succeeded. Imperial authority was reestablished and secured by Roman fortresses, in Italy, North Africa, and Spain; Roman law was formulated in the greatest of all its codifications; and although the spoken language of Byzantium was Greek, Latin remained the language of imperial government. However, although Justinian's laws and buildings endured, his conquests did not. The Western Mediterranean had been regained only to be re-lost, and after the Emperor's death in 565 the Eastern Empire itself was threatened. The Lombards invaded Italy; the Avars poured into the Balkan provinces and, in Gibbon's phrase, "alternately bathed their horses in the Euxine and the Adriatic"; and the Persians returned to the attack in Asia Minor, penetrated to the Bosphorus, and laid siege to the capital. The besiegers were finally driven off by the new emperor Heraclius, but the whole structure of the empire had been shaken by these attacks, and it would never be the same. In retrospect, the age of Justinian appears as the Indian summer of the historic Roman Empire, and modern historians see the reign of Heraclius as the beginning of a new "Byzantine" age. This great historical revolution was emphasized, and made permanent, by events in the East. It was in the reign of Heraclius that Mohammed created a new power in Arabia and that the immediate successors of Mohammed began those lightning conquests which would totally change the 143

Edward Gibbon's Decline and

Fall of the

age-old political balance of

Roman Empire

Rome and

Persia.

Within a few years, Muslim

armies destroyed altogether the Persian Empire, severed Syria. Palestine.

Maghreb from Christendom, and

left Western Europe to under its barbarian kings. From now on both Rome and Byzantium changed their character. Rome became the spiritual capital of the Western barbarians. Byzantium the last outpost of Greek Christian civilization in the face of successive invaders from North and East. Having reached this great turning point and observed the vast new panorama before him. Gibbon conceived and announced a new plan. With Byzantine civilization after Heraclius he had little sympathy and would, he said, "have abandoned without regret the Greek slaves and their servile historians." But he reflected "that the fate of the Byzantine monarchv is passively connected with the most splendid and important revolutions which have changed the state of the world." He therefore decided, while preserving Byzantine history as the central thread of his work, to examine the history of the various barbarian kingdoms which rose on the ruins of Rome and ultimately built up the modern civilization of Europe; for it is "in their origin and conquests, in their religion and government, that we must explore the causes and effects of the decline and fall of the Eastern Empire." In other words, whereas, in his previous volumes. Gibbon had analyzed the

Egypt, and the

evolve a

new

"feudal*" organization

causes of the decline of the

Roman Empire, he now

shifted his interest, or

sympathy, and set out to discover the causes of the rise of modern Europe. Rome and Byzantium, the twin capitals of ancient culture, would still provide his work with its unity: but his enquiring spirit would at least his

reach out to embrace the successive barbarians — pagan. Muslim, or Chris-

tian—who had threatened or conquered them, and of their

dynamism, the

to explain the springs

"spirit" of their laws. So. while giving a

continuous

narrative of Byzantine history, he would introduce, in turn, the Franks, the

Arabs, the Bulgarians, the Hungarians, the Russians, the Normans, the Latin crusaders, the Mongols, the Seljuk. final

and then the Ottoman Turks. The

capture of Bvzantium would lead to "the restoration of learning in the

Western world." and so Gibbon would "return from the captivity of the new to the ruins of ancient Rome: and the venerable name, the interesting theme, will shed a ray of glory on the conclusion of my labours." It was an ambitious plan and demanded a vast range of knowledge. It also required a quickening of pace. Gibbon's first four volumes had covered five centuries: now eight centuries had to be compressed into the two volumes which were all that he allowed himself for the completion of his work. Nevertheless, that work was punctually completed, according to plan. Never did Gibbon show the sheer power of his mind better than in this extraordinary feat of organization, compression, narrative, and analysis. The sources were now less accessible, more widely scattered: the path, often, less trodden. Whereas the Roman Empire in the West had attracted learned scholars in Europe, the history of the East and of the barbarians was often 144

Hugh Trevor-Roper

undocumented, and Gibbon had to rely on arcane and imperfect sources, and on his own judgment. Fortunately, that judgment was seldom at fault. In medieval history, since the archives were as yet hardly opened, it was inevitable that he would make errors; but his errors of fact are still remarkably few, his critical spirit was never dulled, and his narrative is still wonderfully readable. Some of the most brilliant passages of his History are in these last two volumes: his account of Mohammed and the rise of Islam; his description of the degradation of the Papacy in the ninth century; his narrative of the Crusades; his excursions into the history of the Mongols

and the Turks;

his

marvelous

final

chapters on the siege and capture of

Constantinople and the history of medieval Rome.

Throughout this history of the Dark and Middle Ages, Gibbon continued same method which he had used in his first volumes: that is, the method inspired by Montesquieu. Just as he had formerly used the Theodosian Code not as a mere compilation of laws but as a means of understanding the social structure of the Constantinian empire, and thus appreciating the the

social revolution

Code and

caused by the adoption of Christianity, so he

now used

the

and the Basilics of the "Macedonian" emperors, as means of understanding sixth- and tenth-century Byzantium. He deduced the character of the Visigothic and Lombard societies from their laws, wrote to England to secure the Institutes of the Tartar conqueror Timur, or Tamerlane, and plunged into the thicket of the jus publicum of the Pandects of Justinian,

feudal Europe. So also, in studying the barbarian societies, he constantly asked the questions which a modern social historian would ask: questions

economy, family structure. Perhaps the most striking example of

of diet,

this

is

Gibbon's examination of the

and motivation of the nomadic society of the steppes: the Huns in the fifth century and the Tartars or Mongols in the thirteenth century. Here he drew on a wide variety of sources — Greek and Roman writers from Herodotus onward, medieval travelers like the Franciscan friars who visited the courts of the great Mongol Khans, the writings of the Jesuits in Peking, and the French translations of Manchu and Chinese documents available in his time. These works he read critically, looking for evidence not merely of political events but of social causation, and he often (as he once wrote in another context) "deduced my own consequences, beyond the holy circle of the author." The result is an extraordinarily modern interpretation. Indeed, the greatest modern authority on the Mongols begins an essay on the social history of Mongol Nomadism with a detailed examination of Gibbon's enquiry into the subject, explaining that "Gibbon is worth quoting at this length because he sets out so many of the facts, and raises so many of the questions, that must still be considered by the social historian who structure

deals with such a people as the Mongols."

1

Owen Lattimore, "The Social History of Mongol Nomadism," in Historians of China and Japan, ed. W. G. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 328-31. 1

145

Edward Gibbon's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

is indeed one of the most interestfrom his Memoirs that he had always been interested in it: that as a boy he had read all that he could find of the Oriental peoples, and that at Oxford he had tried to learn Arabic. Dr. Johnson's boutode that he had once been a Mohammedan is no doubt a

Gibbon's treatment of Eastern history

ing aspects of his work.

recollection of that

We know

fact.

He

was also a friend of the greatest of English

William Jones, who was a fellow member of the Club and a declared disciple of Montesquieu. Gibbon showed both his knowledge and orientalists, Sir

his

sure judgment in Oriental history

when he

insisted, against the prevail-

ing view of the French philosophes, that the Nestorian inscription of Si-ngan Fu. or Sian. was genuine,

and he was

Eastern and Western history. As a

"From

well

aware of the interrelation of

modern Chinese

historian has written,

Gibbon could each other, and co-relate in a causal

the Pisgah-height of his universal historical learning,

clearly see

how the

East

and West

affect

nexus events apparently unrelated." 2 This being so, Gibbon was particularly interested in the most dramatic and important collision of East and West before the final conquest of Constantinople: the Crusades. This was a topic which exercised all the "philosophic historians" of the Enlightenment. In general, these writers had reacted against their theologically minded predecessors, who had seen the Crusades as wars for the true faith, by declaring them to be wild enterprises, the expression of fanaticism, barbarism, and delusion; but they also saw them as economically progressive in one sense, since they enriched the Italian cities by the commerce of the East. This view had been expressed summarily by Voltaire and Robertson, and, more recently, by Adam Smith, who saw '"the most destructive frenzy that ever befell the European nations" as "a

source of opulence" to the Italian republics.

Gibbon did not agree. To him the Crusades were almost entirely harmful. Even when seen from a parochial Western viewpoint, they "checked rather than forwarded the maturity of Europe." The lives and labors which were buried in the East could have been "more profitably employed in the improvement of their native country"; industry, thus created, "would have overflowed in navigation and trade; and the Latins would have been enriched and enlightened by a friendly correspondence with the climates of the East."

Only

one accidental respect did Gibbon see the Crusades as beneficial in producing a benefit as in removing an evil": they undermined the "Gothic edifice" of feudalism. The strong language that Gibbon uses shows how much he detested the "oppressive system of feudalism," which was supported by "the arts of the clergy and swords of the barons," while "the larger portion of the inhabitants of Europe was chained to the

"not so

-

C.

S.

in

much

Ch'ien, "China in the English Literature of the 18th century." in Historians

and Japan,

146

p. 316.

of

China

Hugh Trevor-Roper

without freedom, or property or knowledge." He allowed that the authority of the clergy operated "as a salutary antidote: they prevented the

soil,

total extinction of letters,

mitigated the fierceness of the times, sheltered the

poor and the defenceless, and preserved or revived the peace and order of civil society." But to the feudal lords he would allow no value whatever. Their "iron weight" oppressed the people and crushed "every hope of industry and improvement." However, he argued, the Crusades, if they achieved nothing else, at least weakened the power of this "martial aristocracy":

The

estates of the

barons were dissipated, and their race was often

extinguished, in these costly and perilous expeditions. Their poverty

extorted from their pride those charters of freedom which unlocked

and the shop and gradually restored a substance and a soul to the most numerous and useful part of the community. The conflagration which destroyed the tall and barren trees of the forest gave air and scope to the vegetation of the smaller and nutritive plants of the soil. the fetters of the slave, secured the farm of the peasant of the artificer,

Gibbon's chapters on the Crusades express a deeply felt hatred of foreign conquest and of social immobility. It was "contrary to nature and reason,"

he wrote, "for any power to dominate distant societies against their will"; mercantile progress was to be obtained not by the forcible seizure of monopolies but by "the overflowing" of industrial wealth in navigation and trade; and it is in a tone almost of satisfaction that he records the ultimate failure of that whole imperialist adventure: after two centuries of heroism and barbarity, the Muslims recovered control of Syria and Palestine and "a mournful and solitary silence prevailed along the coast which had so long resounded with the World's Debate." The Crusades may have been an imperialist or a commercial adventure, but they could not have been launched without the force of religious fanaticism. Throughout his work, Gibbon never spares religious fanaticism. His enemies, of course, attacked him for his irreligion and accused him of consistent hostility to Christianity. But this is unfair. The passage which I have just quoted shows that Gibbon recognized that the medieval Church performed a positive social function; and whenever he could detect that function, he would praise the institution. Many instances of this could be given. Gibbon's criterion is always social or humanitarian or intellectual: it is never doctrinal. Thus, when the Church champions the poor, defends human dignity, encourages learning, dispenses charity, or opposes cruelty (e.g., in protesting against gladiatorial contests),

Gibbon always supports

believers, or

stifles

it.

When

it

persecutes heretics or un-

free thought, or inspires fanaticism, or divides society,

he castigates it. Where it preaches nonsense, he lukewarm, rational, or worldly, he is indulgent to it.

is

ironical.

It is

Where

it

is

sometimes said that

147

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

Fall of the

work

Roman Empire

is not true. Gibbon stamp out Christianity by force and exulting in the destruction of its writings, whereas, as he remarks, "it is unworthy of a philosopher to wish that any opinions and arguments the most repugnant to his own should be concealed from the knowledge of mankind." To Julian, Gibbon perhaps preferred that agreeable Christian cleric Synesius, the fifth-century bishop of Ptolemais, who accepted his bishopric on the clear understanding that "he loved profane studies and profane sports; he was incapable of supporting a life of celibacy; he disbelieved the resurrection; and he refused to preach fables to the people, unless he might be permitted to philosophise at home." For, in general and essentially, Gibbon is critical of theocratic power, which is never so damaging as when it is exercised by convinced and single-minded priests. He refers to "the austere and dangerous virtues" of the greatest of medieval popes; and after a splendid account of the vices of the less austere popes of the ninth century, culminating in John XII, whose "rapes of virgins and widows had deterred the female pilgrims from visiting the tomb of St. Peter lest, in the devout act, they should be violated by his successor," he adds the general comment that "to a philosophic eye, the vices of the clergy are far less dangerous than their virtues." "Fanatics who torment themselves," he says, when describing the self-imposed penances of St. Simeon Stylites, cannot be presumed "susceptible of any lively affection for the rest of mankind. A cruel, unfeeling temper has distinguished the monks of every age and country"; and it was the "merciless zeal" of the monastic orders which, in the Middle Ages, "strenuously administered" the

the hero of Gibbon's

Julian the Apostate. This

is

disliked Julian for seeking to

Roman

Inquisition.

last chapter, Gibbon summarizes the story of his whole work as "the triumph of barbarism and religion." Overtly, the barbarians of the West destroyed Rome, and the barbarians of the East, a thousand years later, destroyed Byzantium. But in fact, Gibbon insists, in each case, the fatal blows did not come from without. "If all the barbarian conquerors had been annihilated in the same hour," he writes, when dealing with fourth-century Rome, "their total destruction would not have restored the Empire of the West"; and he would have said as much of medieval Byzantium. Both Roman and Byzantine civilization, he believed, had perished inwardly before they were overpowered by their external enemies. Even the cities themselves were destroyed from within. It was not the barbarians who had reduced Rome to ruins. When they captured the city, they had neither the time, nor the strength, nor the will to destroy its monuments. "Their moments were indeed precious. The Goths evacuated Rome on the sixth, the Vandals on the fifteenth day Their hasty assault would have made a slight impression on the solid piles of Antiquity From these innocent barbarians the reproach may be transferred to the Catholics of Rome" — to "those barbarians who alone had time and inclination to execute such laborious

In his

.

.

.

.

148

.

.

Hugh Trevor-Roper

destruction."

The

final

destruction was by the upstart popes of the Renais-

was they who, to build their new palaces, used the Colosseum as their quarry and enabled Gibbon to muse on the long decline of the city

sance:

it

and in "the ruins of the Capitol." This indeed was Gibbon's "The triumph of barbarism and religion" considered judgment. "I believed, and I still believe," he would write in his memoirs, "that the propagation of the Gospel and the triumph of the Church, are inseparably connected with the decline of the Roman monarchy." How they were connected becomes clear in the course of the great work, as we shall shortly see. Meanwhile, we may return to the external history of that work, which Gibbon completed in Lausanne in the summer of 1787. He had worked regularly, day after day, for three years, quickening his pace at the end by overtime in the evenings. His description of its .

completion

is

.

.

famous, but the temptation to quote

it is

irresistible:

I have presumed to mark the moment of conception: I shall now commemorate the hour of my final deliverance. It was on the day, or

rather night, of the 27th of June, 1787, between the hours of eleven and twelve, that I wrote the last lines of the last page, in a summer-house in my garden. After laying down my pen, I took several turns in a berceau, or covered walk of acacias, which

commands a The air was

prospect of the country, the lake, and the mountains.

temperate, the sky was serene, the silver orb of the

moon

was reflected

from the waters, and all nature was silent. I will not dissemble the first emotions of joy on recovery of my freedom, and, perhaps, the establishment of my fame. But my pride was soon humbled, and a sober melancholy was spread over my mind, by the idea that I had taken an everlasting leave of an old and agreeable companion, and that whatsoever might be the future date of my History, the life of the historian must be short and precarious.

Having completed spent the

autumn

in Sussex, polishing

May

8,

his

work, Gibbon took

it

to

England

to

be printed.

He

with Lord Sheffield at his country house, Sheffield Place it

on and the publisher celebrated the which a commendatory ode was read by the poet

for the press. It was published in three volumes,

1788, Gibbon's 51st birthday,

occasion by a dinner at

William Hayley. Gibbon's fame was by

now

well-established.

The

clergy continued their

and indeed extended them: for they now found a new front against which to direct them. This was what even Gibbon's defender, Richard Porson, described as his "rage for indecency": an indecency which Gibbon generally relegated to the footnotes and protected by "the obscurity of a learned language." The most famous of such notes concerned the striptease act of the Empress Theodora in her unreformed days as a prostitute on the stage. Gibbon leaves the quotation in the original Greek of the Byzantine historian Procopius. The clergy were perhaps particularly irritatattacks,

149

Edward Gibbon's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

ed by his comment, "I have heard that a learned prelate, now deceased, was fond of quoting this passage in conversation." The prelate is said to have been Warburton. The bishop of Norwich was so shocked that he went carefully through the whole of Gibbon's work extracting such passages, in order to hold them up to execration; but he was forestalled by The Gentleman's Magazine which published such a list, without comment, and was duly reproached by a correspondent for printing "filthy extracts from a silly book."

Gibbon, as usual, ignored all attacks, and steadfastly resisted all attempts tempt or bully him into controversy. He returned to Lausanne, where he enjoyed his celebrity and was accepted, according to Maria Holroyd, Lord Sheffield's daughter, who visited him there with her parents, as "King to

of the place."

There he toyed with various

literary projects.

The most

ambitious was a scheme to publish a collection of the English medieval chronicles, which

were

to

be edited by the Scottish antiquary John PinkerThe most valuable was his Memoirs which he

ton, with prefaces by Gibbon.

had nearly completed when an event occurred which a second

visit,

to

The event was

called

him back,

for

England.

sudden death of Lady Sheffield in 1793. In order to at this time, Gibbon hurried across France, between the opposing armies of the French Revolution and the European coalition against it, and spent the summer of 1793 at Sheffield Place. He then visited friends and moved to London during the winter. There he was taken ill and died after two operations on January 16, 1794. His proposed edition of the English chronicles, of which he had just written the prospectus, died with him— though it was resumed, on a larger scale, in the Roll Series in the next century. Lord Sheffield, as his executor, caused his body to be buried in his own family mausoleum in the parish church of Fletching, next to Sheffield Place, and himself edited and published his Memoirs and other miscellaneous writings. Gibbon's manuscripts remained in the hands of Lord Sheffield's descendants until 1896, when, on the death of the last Lord Sheffield, they were bought by Lord Rosebery and by him presented to the the

be with Lord Sheffield

British

IV.

A

Museum.

The philosophy

of

The Decline and

Fall

great work of "philosophic history" does not set out its philosophy in crude schematic form. A historical work which is written within a doctrinal orthodoxy may do so: history is then determined and corrected by the ideology which it is written to illustrate and support. But a historical philosophy which is genuinely empirical must be seen to emerge from the historical facts, and its emergence must be gradual. What then, we ask, is the philosophy which ultimately emerges from the Decline and Fall, and why

150

Hugh Trevor-Roper did Gibbon deduce from

it

that his

own

civilization

was in no danger of

another Dark Age?

An

important point

is

made

ing the organization of the

early in the

first

Roman Empire

book. There, after describ-

zenith, in the "age of the Antonines" — or rather, in the whole period extending from a.d. 98 to 180 — Gibbon states that "if a man were called to fix the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was most happy at

its

and prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that which elapsed from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus." But Gibbon does not, it should be noticed, necessarily endorse this view, which had been expressed by earlier writers — e.g., by Francis Bacon in the Advancement of Learning— and which he represents as a truism of the time. Indeed, from the beginning, his praise of the Antonine age is qualified: for he sees, even in that age, in the very structure of the imperial system, the seeds of

decay. For the centralized

Roman

empire, by

its

its

very definition, excluded

That princiwhat Machiavelli had called virtii. "That public virtue," writes Gibbon, "which among the ancients was denominated patriotism, is derived from a strong sense of our own interest in the preservation and prosperity of the free government of which we are members. Such a sentiment, which had rendered the legions of the Republic almost invincible, could make but a very feeble impression on the mercenary servants of a despotic prince." This animating principle of "public a certain vitalizing principle necessary to the health of society.

ple was public spirit,

virtue," expressed in active participation in public

great contribution of classical Antiquity,

and

its

life, is

to

Gibbon the

extinction, in imperial

transfer (as Machiavelli would say) to the "barbarian" successorWestern Europe, is a major theme in his work. "In the last moments of her decay," he writes later, "Constantinople was doubtless more opulent and populous than Athens at her most flourishing era" when a far lesser wealth was divided among far fewer citizens. But each Athenian citizen was a freeman who dared to assert the liberty of his thoughts, words, and actions — whose person and property were guarded by equal law; and who exercised his independent vote in the government of the Republic. Against this, "the subjects of the Byzantine empire, who dishonour the names both of Greeks and Romans, present a dead uniformity of abject vices which are neither softened by the weakness of humanity nor animated by the vigour of memorable crimes." It was on this account that Gibbon quickened his pace when dealing with Byzantine history. In Byzantium he could find no evidence of public virtue, or even of Machiavelli's virtu, and so he transferred his interest to the barbarians who had in their societies times,

its

states in

those seeds of growth.

How is

this virtue born, how nourished, how stifled and killed? Essentialdepends upon the discovery, cultivation, and systematic teaching of the natural dignity and equal rights of man. But as man is conditioned by his

ly, it

151

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

Roman Empire

Fall of the

environment, and the "spirit" of his institutions, there is always a danger that such ideas, which are not native everywhere, and are often inconvenient to rulers, will be suppressed and extinguished by orthodoxy and interested power. For even

if

power

is

exercised by liberal rulers, there

is

always

A

Marcus Aurelius may be followed by a Commodus. For this reason, Gibbon, though he may praise the virtuous emperors, cannot praise the system; and he adds that, under the "Antonine" emperors, excellent rulers though they were, the inherent vices of the system were positively aggravated by "two peculiar circumstances" which exposed the subjects of the Roman empire to a condition "more completely wretched than the victims of tyranny in any other age or country." These two circumstances were the memory of past freedom and the universality of imperial power. "The division of Europe into a number of independent states ... is productive of the most beneficial consequences to the liberty of mankind." The heretic, the nonconformist, could always find a base, and so ideas and experiments unpopular to present power could not be completely stifled. But the monopoly of the Roman emperors was absolute. They ruled effectively over the entire civilized world. "Wherever you are," said Cicero to the exiled Marcellus, "remember that you are equally within the power of the conqueror." Virtue therefore depends for assured survival, not only on a continuing tradition of freedom, but also on a plural society, on the division of power between separate authorities. Ideally, it requires independent, competing states, preferably with different political systems; independent authorities within particular states; economic and intellectual competition. In the Roman empire these conditions did not obtain. There the emperor exercised a complete monopoly of power, and this monopoly, by stifling freedom, inevitably stifled all forms of progress. At one moment, Gibbon tells us, in the decline of the Western Empire, the emperor Honorius sought to devolve power in Gaul to provincial assemblies. "If such an institution, which gave the people an interest in their own government, had been universally established by Trajan or the Antonines, the seeds of public wisdom and virtue might have been cherished and propagated in the empire of Rome," might then which "under the mild and generous influence of liberty" "have remained invincible and immortal." But the Antonines had granted no such devolution of powers, and now it was too late. The over-centralization of the Empire had already stifled the spirit of freedom which alone could have revived it, and "the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure the danger of illiberal successors.

.

of

its own weight." To Gibbon, virtue,

possession, enabling a It is

essentially

dom, and

an

thus defined,

is

not, as to the Stoics,

.

.

merely a private

man to bear with

active principle. It

creates freedom.

It

equanimity all the blows of fortune. depends on freedom, demands free-

expresses

itself in

public

life. It

also, since

it

nourishes science, forwards material progress. Conversely, monopoly of

152

Hugh Trevor-Roper is its enemy: monopoly of power, monopoly of wealth, monopoly knowledge or of alleged access to truth. The centralized power of the imperial bureaucracy was one such impediment to virtue: by its mere structure "the empire of the Caesars undoubtedly checked the activity and

any kind of

human

progress of the

mind."

The

vast hereditary estates of the

Roman

landlords were another. So was the immobility of labor— the hereditary

Roman middle

much

serfdom forms of immobilization: mortmain of land, thesaurization of wealth, tied labor. So he would rejoice when the Crusades incidentally broke up baronial wealth and power and would record without pain the sacrilegious dispersal of clerical wealth, "most wickedly converted to the service of mankind." An amusing obligation of the

of the early medieval peasant.

class as

Gibbon hated

as the hereditary

all

instance of this strong conviction occurred in his Sheffield suggested that

life.

His friend Lord

his library to

him, so

could be preserved as Bibliotheca Gibboniana at Sheffield Place. Gib-

that

it

bon

refused. "I

am

a friend to the circulation of property of every kind," he had built up his library for his own use out of the relof others, so he wished his own to be broken up and to serve scholars

he wrote, and ics

own

Gibbon should bequeath

in the

as

same way.

Public spirit, public service— this, to Gibbon, was the of progress;

and

it

was nourished, in

his view,

human motive

force

by the kind of society which,

It had created Rome; and from those city-states and that Republic — not from the Roman Empire— the ideas had been born which were the intellectual means of its preservation. The centralization, the immobility, the monopoly of the Roman Empire had gradually destroyed that pluralism, stifled those ideas, and so progress had been retarded, public virtue had declined, and in the end an inert, top-heavy political structure had fallen to external blows which a healthier organism could

in turn,

it

created and preserved: a plural, mobile society.

the city-states of Greece, the republic of

have survived. Fortunately,

countries

— but,

modern Europe was not comparable

with the

Roman Em-

could indeed be seen as a single cultural unit— all the Western

pire. It

had reached "almost the same

level of politeness

and

cultivation"

was internally not a single monarchy: it was a "great republic" in which healthy competition would lead to continuous improvement; for no barbarians, except a few Calmucks and Uzbeks, were now left to threaten it, and scientific discovery, once made, could not be reversed. So, for the future, Gibbon could only see a prospect of continuing progress. A second decline and fall was not in sight. It is within this general context that Gibbon's attitude to Christianity and the Church must be seen. Gibbon was not interested in religious doctrine, though he amused himself with its speculative refinements. He had his own thanks to

its

national divisions,

belief— deism— and regarded religion

all

it

metaphysical ideas as a waste of time. But

and Churches, he would admit, are a

social

and psychological

153

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

necessity,

Fall of the

Roman Empire

and the particular forms which they take are important,

for they

can influence the progress or decline of civilization. Therefore the historical question he asked was, did the ideas of Christianity and the organization of the Church, as adapted to the Roman Empire, generate or stifle public spirit,

freedom, and a plural society?

His answer was that they lished in

independent

assumed

a different

communes land. cal

it.

If

more

fact of

its

support to that power,

and

first

it

it

been estabwould have

eventually did in the

successfully, in the Protestant cities of Switzer-

establishment by imperial power, as an ideologi-

made

it

subservient to a centralized, monopolist

system whose organization and absolutism, in imitated

had

Christianity

those of Greece, perhaps

and more useful form— as

of Italy and,

But the very

stifled

city-states like

its

own

formative period,

it

sustained.

Of course there were exceptions. Occasionally, the organized Church of find itself the champion of freedom, and its clergy would show, or elicit, signal examples of public spirit. Thus Gibbon would pay a notable tribute to Pope Gregory the Great, whose antique Roman patriotism recreated the virtue of ancient Rome and gave to his city, deserted by its distant Byzantine overlords, a new lease of life. "Like Thebes or Babylon or Carthage," he writes, "the name of Rome might have been erased from the earth, if the city had not been animated by a vital principle, which again restored her to honour and dominion"; and later he praises the popes of

Rome would

the eighth century, thanks to

power

of the

popes

"is

whom

he can say

now confirmed by

that,

although the temporal

the reverence of a thousand

title is the free choice of a people whom they had redeemed from slavery." However, in general, Gibbon believed that the Church was opposed to progress. By its very structure — by its adaptation to the centralized, hierarchical system of the Constantinian Empire — it undermined the social basis of public virtue. In particular, as a cause and symptom of corruption, Gibbon singled out monasticism. Some of his most brilliant chapters, and his most sustained

years," "their noblest

irony, are reserved for the spread of this Egyptian plague, as

over the Nile"

Roman

empire: for "the swarms of monks

and "overspread and darkened the

who

he called

it,

arose from the

face of the Christian world."

Monasticism, he wrote roundly, had, in a later age, "counterbalanced

all

the

temporal advantages of Christianity." For monasticism, he believed, was parasitic not only on society but also on the Church, whose "temporal advantages"— i.e., whose constructive social function — he would admit. It withdrew the resources of society, both human and economic, from that free and useful circulation on which progress depended. It condemned men to idleness, immobilized wealth, kept land in mortmain. And it posi-

undermined the very idea of civic virtue. Of course there were exceptions here too. Gibbon would always allow the exceptions: he would never forget the learned monks of St. Germain des tively

154

Hugh Trevor-Roper Pres. But in general he was always a Protestant in respect of monasticism, from the time when, in Switzerland, he had seen the newly rebuilt abbey

of Einsiedeln flaunting

its

rococo splendor "in the poorest corner of

Europe" and described it in his diary as "le comble de la superstition, le chef d'oeuvre de la politiqui ecclesiastique et la honte de l'humanite." Another Swiss abbey, which he had also visited, elicted from him a more summary exposition of his general philosophy. "Within the walls of Vindonissa," he wrote in a footnote to The Decline and Fall, "the castle of Hapsburg, the abbey of Konigsfeld, and the town of Bruck have successively arisen. The philosophic traveller may compare the monuments of Roman conquest, of feudal or Austrian tyranny, of monkish superstition, and of industrious freedom. If he be truly a philospher, he will applaud the merit and happiness of his

own

time!"

Gibbon deplored the permanent social character of monasticism, he was even more opposed to the morality which it preached in its first centuIf

For that morality was a complete denial of "public" virtue. Instead participation, the early Church preached, and the early monks practiced, positive withdrawal from public life. Such withdrawal was not then justified by any alternative activity, for the monks were not learned, they did not teach, they fulfilled no social function, they founded no industry, they tilled no land, they cleared no waste. Their retreat from activity was absolute, and to Gibbon it was contemptible and disgusting: a degradation of the human spirit, a denial of social duty, a refusal to face ries.

of

active

the challenge of the time.

than in

his thirty -seventh

the monastic

life"

Nowhere

is

Gibbon's irony

more withering

chapter on the "origin, progress, and

which prepares the reader for the

effects of

final collapse of

the

Western Empire. In particular, he pours his scorn on the "Anchorites," those "unhappy exiles from social life," "the monastic saints who excite only the contempt and pity of a philospher," not only by their credulity, their superstition, their "horrid and disgusting" aspect and absurd penances, but because they preached a doctrine destructive of human dignity and, in its consequences, fatal to the progress of society. At a time when the fate of civilization hung in the balance, the Christian clergy "successfully preached the doctrines of patience and pusillanimity; the active virtues of society were discouraged; and the last remains of the military spirit were buried in the cloister." The successors of the barbarians who destroyed the empire might use even the cloister as a means to preserve, through a dark age, the relics of ancient literature; but the monks of the fourth century had no such redeeming virtue. After his splendid account of St. Simeon Stylites, who spent thirty years reiterating his mechanical devotions on a pillar sixty feet high in the Syrian desert, Gibbon concludes: "if it be possible to measure the interval between the philosophic writings of Cicero and the sacred legend of Theodoret, between the character of Cato and that of Simeon, we may

155

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

appreciate the

man Empire Such

is

Fall of the

Roman Empire

memorable revolution which was accomplished hundred years." coherence and

it its

underlying belief that sophisticates

is

irreversible,

and

its

that

unity.

like

is

is

also

another

undertow

is

always aware that the

not conditioned by science but by men, and that

human

"virtue,"

Theoretically, progress

create interruptions,

is

is

that

if

structure favorable to continuous progress, he

course of history

But there

presentation: a kind of

Gibbon is confident that scientific modern Europe has acquired a political

For

pulls in the opposite direction.

wisdom,

Ro-

the central philosophy of Gibbon's Decline and Fall: the positive

philosophy which gives

advance

in the

within a period of five

human

often at the mercy of unpredictable events.

continuous, but in fact

human

folly,

or crime, can

and these interruptions can sometimes be

disastrous.

After the Mongol devastation of Persia "five centuries have not been

enough

to repair the ravages of four years";

a society, as in Byzantium,

hard

once "active virtue"

is

lost in

perhaps impossible without radical social change; and the survival of nations may sometimes depend on the life of one man. When we look back into history, we recall the great ages of humanity, the ages in which "virtue" was generated and generalized. But how brief are those ages? The great age of Athens barely exceeded the span of a single human life. The means of progress may always be at hand, but can we assume that they will always be exploited? Is history, generally speaking, more than the register of the crimes, folly, and misfortunes of it is

to recover,

mankind? This melancholy undercurrent

is always present in Gibbon's work, givdepth and maturity, and preventing his confidence in the possibility of progress from degenerating into complacency. Gibbon's heroes, the real martyrs of his church, are those upholders of ancient, classical "virtue" who are overwhelmed by the blind forces of bigotry, barbarism, or corrupted power: men like the senator Boethius, "the last of the Romans whom Cato or Tully could have acknowledged for their countryman." It was because paganism, even in its decline, still professed that ancient virtue, and Christianity, being still raw and radical, attacked it, that his sympathies, in general, were with the former. As he would put it, later, in a letter to Lord Sheffield in which he expressed his horror at the excesses of the French Revolution, "the primitive Church, which I have myself treated with some freedom, was itself at that time an innovation, and I was attached to the old Pagan establishment." For that pagan establishment was the last protection

ing

it

of the old classical virtue. I

have suggested that Gibbon's

preciated in his time.

The

historical philosophy

clerical critics seized

on

was not

fully

ap-

his "infidelity" (or his

indecency) and discredited themselves by attacking his scholarship. Concriticism never moved from this narrow base, and so Gibbon's philosophy was not effectively discussed. Thus Horace Walpole,

temporary total

156

Hugh Trevor-Roper

though he admired Gibbon's was nothing in

stance: there

work

it,

style,

declared his work unoriginal in sub-

he wrote, which could not be found

in the

of the bigoted Jansenist scholar of the seventeenth century, Tillemont.

Coleridge carried philosophical obtuseness even further.

He condemned

do not remember a single philosophical attempt made throughout the work to fathom the ultimate causes of the decline and fall Gibbon was a man of immense reading, but he had no of that empire ."; and Carlyle, whose early historical philosophy — the "Proviphilosophy dential" philosophy of a Scotch Presbyterian household— was shattered by it, declared the whole work lacking in "virtue," the style affected and the notes "beastly." What enabled Gibbon to survive that period of eclipse which normally follows the death of an author who has been a classic in his the

work

in toto: "I

.

.

.

.

.

own time was

not his philosophy, which was completely misunderstood, but remarkable accuracy as a scholar, his compelling narrative power and irresistible style, and particularly his brilliant characterization, which

his his

brings the figures of the past to

life.

On his scholarship, it is

perhaps enough to quote the remark of the ablest modern historian of classical scholarship, who, as a Roman Catholic, would hardly be predisposed in his favor. The Decline and Fall, says Rudolf Pfeiffer, 3 is "one of the most impressive books ever written on the ancient world." Gibbon's narrative power received a reluctant tribute even from Carlyle, who saw The Decline and Fall as a solitary bridge linking Antiquity with the modern world, "and how gorgeously does it swing across the tumultuary chasm of those dark centuries!" Carlyle incidentally paid a just tribute to the sheer

minded

power

of Gibbon's writing

history of one's mind."

Roman

when he

of historians," the perusal of

Of

called him "the most strongwhose work "forms an epoch in the

his characterization, the best witness

is

another

Catholic writer whose philosophy was very different from his, Car-

Newman. "The character of St. Athanasium," wrote Newman, "stands more grandly in the pages of Gibbon than in those of the orthodox Church historians," and he admitted, with reluctance, that "the chief, perhaps the only English writer who has any claim to be considered an ec-

dinal

out

clesiastical historian

more

is

the unbeliever Gibbon."

from a very different point "Not long ago," writes Bertrand Russell, recently

A

similar tribute was paid

of view by a

modern philosopher.

was reading about Zenobia in the Cambridge Ancient History, but I regret to say that she appeared completely uninteresting. I remembered somewhat dimly a much more lively account in Gibbon. I looked it up, and at once the masterful lady came alive "I

Gibbon conveys an extraordinarily vivid sense of the march of events throughout the centuries with which he deals." 4 .

.

.

3

R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship

1300-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University

Press,

1976), p. 162. 4

Bertrand

Russell, Portraits from

Memory and

Other Essays

(New York: Touchstone Books,

1969), p. 185.

157

Edward Gibbon 's Decline and

Fall of the

Roman Empire

Whether Gibbon's philosophy, which historical thought,

is

is

his

most original contribution

true or not can, of course, be questioned.

No

to

historical

philosophy has been, or ever can be, proved "true": the most that can be

claimed for any such philosophy it

is

still,

is

that

it

has not been proved

false:

that

after a sufficient test of time, debatable. Gibbon's interpretation

remains permanently debatable. In spite of another two centuries of historical study, scholars still do not agree about the basic cause of the decline of classical civilization in

that great

and his

158

all

discussion of

work.

Roman Empire in particular. To no answer which was not suggested by Gibbon, still, implicitly if not explicitly, a commentary on

general and of the

problem there it is

is

PART THREE

The Contemporary

Status

of a Great Idea

Ethics

in

a Permissive Society:

The Controversy Regarding the

Objectivity

of Moral

Values

Otto Bird

Born and raised

in

Ann

Arbor, Michigan, Otto Bird attended the

university there, graduating

added a master's degree

He took

his doctorate in

Toronto

in

in

in

1935 with honors

comparative

philosophy and

in

English, to which he

literature the following year. literature at the University of

1939.

From 1947 to 1950 he served as associate editor of the Syntopicon, Great Books of the Western World, working with Mortimer Adler. In the latter year he joined the faculty at the University of Notre Dame, where he was director of the General Program of Liberal Studies until 1963. He was executive editor of The Great Ideas Today from 1964 to 1970, when he was appointed university professor of arts and letters at Notre Dame, from which he retired in 1980. He has written four books, The Canzone d'Amore of Guido Cavalcanti with the Commentary of Dino del Garbo (1942), Syllogistic Logic and Its Extensions (1964), The Idea of Justice (1967), and Cultures in Conflict (1976), besides articles on the history and theory of the liberal arts. In

for

was a major

addition he

Knowledge,

contributor to the Propaedia, or Outline of

of the current (fifteenth) edition of the

Encyclopaedia

Britannica.

Mr. Bird

has

built

be active

now spends much

of the year

in

Shoals, Indiana, where he

a house and grows grapes for making wine. in editorial

remains consulting editor present contributor.

He continues

projects of Encyclopaedia Britannica, of

The Great Ideas Today,

to

Inc.,

to

and

which he

is

a

between ideas and society is a complicated one. At times, formed society, as when they led to the establishment of the great religions, or when they shaped our modern, secular societies, whose very names incorporate the ideas — of freedom, equality, democracy —that brought them into being. Yet, at other times, ideas and the elabora-

The

relation

ideas have clearly

seem rather the reflection than the source of the which they occur. Such is the case today in the field of moral philosophy and the theory of values. The permissive society has begotten tion that they receive society in

a permissive theory of ethics.

To

be permissive

is

and not to forbid or word in this sense and, significantly, lists as some of the very traits that are perceived

to permit, to allow, to let go,

prohibit. Shakespeare uses the characteristic of such a society

today:

And

liberty plucks justice by the nose;

The baby Goes

beats the nurse,

and quite athwart

decorum.

all

—Measure Liberty plucking justice by the nose

may be

for

Measure,

said to be

I. iii.

29-31

what happens when

do injury to the innocent. Children who the government of parents or schools that have

terrorists, acting as they please,

turn upon and violate

allowed them to act as they like are beating their nurse.

The widespread

abandonment of any standard of the decent, proper, and right in speech, dress, and behavior clearly attests that decorum has "gone athwart." Such a state of affairs, Shakespeare goes on to say, is one in which .

.

.

evil

The

deeds have their permissive

pass. (ibid. 38)

claim implicit in this statement that such deeds are evil in themselves,

objectively,

and not

just in the

opinion of the speaker,

is

contrary to a

permissive ethics. Permissiveness as an ethics should be distinguished from permissiveness as a method. In the latter sense with a general objective morality in that

it

it

may

well be compatible

advocates allowing an individual

way of discovery as opposed to explicit instruction from another method of moral training. As an ethics, however, permissiveness is characterized by the claim that there is no objective right or wrong. Such

to follow a as a

161

Ethics in a Permissive Society

notions as right and wrong, good and bad, are held to be of man's making,

having no root in the nature of things. Ethics, as proclaimed in the subtitle of a recent book, consists in "Inventing Right and Wrong." This book*, by

J.

L.

Mackie, an Australian and at present a professor at

the University of Oxford, merits analyzing in

some

detail.

Besides providing

we will see later on, the author is by no means entirely "permissive"), the book raises a larger issue regarding the fundamental basis of moral values and argues for their

ammunition

for a permissive ethics (although as

subjectivity. It

is

thus opposed to other recent writings that argue for the

objectivity of those values. Representative of

such writings

is

Six Great Ideas,

by Mortimer Adler (New York, 1981), which argues for the objectivity not only of the idea of the good but also for that of truth and of beauty. (The

remaining three great ideas that Adler discusses are

liberty, equality,

and

justice.)

From these works summary statement

of

Mackie and Adler

it is

books and identifying the points

and By comparing the two

possible to obtain a clear

of the issue that divides them.

which they disagree, one can isolate we can then consider each of these issues in greater detail, reviewing for that purpose some other recent contributions to the controversy; in particular, The Nature of Morality (New York, 1977) by Gilbert Harman of Princeton and Justice and the Human Good (Chicago, 1980) by William A. Galston, professor at the at

further issues in the controversy as a whole. Having done that,

University of Texas.

The issue

What

precisely

is

at issue

when

it

is

claimed that there are no objective

book? Or, to make the our values are only subjective? The question, it should be emphasized, is about the status of values, not about their content: about good and bad, right and wrong, as they exist in the world — not about what things or actions are good or bad, are right or wrong. All of us make judgments and statements about good and bad, right and wrong, about what one should do or should not do. To ask whether such judgments are objective or subjective is to ask about their basis and validation: whether they are based on and validated by something in the objective nature of things apart from the way we think about them, or whether their basis and validity lies merely in the feelings, attitudes, and policies that we choose and adopt. The question, in short, is whether good and bad, right and wrong, value and disvalue, are to be discovered and identified, or whether they can be — and have been — invented and made? To understand the issue it is necessary to distinguish between descriptive values, as

Mackie does

same claim

in the opposite term, that

* Ethics: Inventing Right

162

in the first sentence of his

and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 1977).

Otto Bird

and prescriptive judgments. In its simplest form a descriptive statement is one that describes how something is as in ascribing color to an object: "My cat, Yum-Yum, is grey." But it is also possible to make descriptive statements

To make descriptive judgcommon practice. Thus, as Mackie

by using evaluative instead of descriptive terms.

ments with evaluative terms is, in points out, we have no difficulty

fact,

a

in distinguishing

between a kind and a

cruel action or in describing the difference between the action of a brave

man and

Judgments about such matters are descriptive meant by kindness and cruelty, bravery and cowardice, can be true or false. The prescriptive judgment enters in when we go beyond this to evaluate the actions and claim that kindness and bravery are good and ought to be pursued, whereas cruelty and cowardice are bad and that of a coward.

and, given what

is

ought to be avoided. It is only with respect to the latter, the prescriptive judgment, that the issue arises regarding the objectivity or subjectivity of values.

Another way of formulating the issue is in terms of truth and falsity: the is whether prescriptive judgments can be true or false. To claim that they can is to maintain the objectivity of values. To deny that they can is to claim that those values are merely subjective. But again, it is important to note, as Mackie does, that it is the objectivity of the norm or standard that is at stake, and not the judgment made in accordance with the standard. Given the positive law as a standard, a court's decision on a criminal case is a true judgment provided the decision is in accord with the relevant law and the facts of the case. Here the issue concerns the action in question, i.e., the facts of the case, the relevant law, and whether or not the law has been broken and a crime committed. And although both the action and the law and its application are subject to argument and interpretation, the question is objectively answerable and the corresponding judgment true or false. The issue regarding the objectivity of values arises only when we go on to address the law itself: is the law just, and is there any other basis for justice than the choice and policy of men expressed in the positive law? Also, the same question can be asked of justice as of kindness and bravery: why should or ought one to act justly and do the just thing? Is there any objective basis for that "should" and "ought," or is it only a matter for human decision and policy? question

The case

for the subjectivity of

moral values

Moral subjectivism can take both a positive and negative form. Its positive form is found in the account known as the emotive theory of value, the is Charles L. Stevenson's Ethics and Language According to this theory, the normative and prescriptive character of distinctively moral terms and judgments is no more than an expression of the speaker's feelings of approval and a desire to evoke

classic

expression of which

(New Haven,

1944).

163

Ethics in a Permissive Society

the approval of others. subjectivism inasmuch as

The theory amounts it

moral terms and judgments. Since

of

to a positive

form

claims to provide an explanation of the it

of

moral

meaning

reduces that meaning to the feelings

form that denies any objective form the theory is compatible with the most extreme permissiveness — which is not to say all proponents of the theory of the subject,

basis to

it

them. In

also implies the negative

this positive

actually subscribe to that doctrine.

form implies the negative, the reverse does not Mackie acknowledges that in our ordinary and common use we make claims to their objectivity, which he regards as false and erroneous. He maintains, however, that moral subjectivism by no means implies the abandonment of morality, and, in arguing the case for being moral as well as in specifying its content, he considerably restricts the ground for mere permissiveness. But before turning to these topics, we will look at his arguments for moral subjectivism. Mackie offers three main arguments for the claim that moral values have no objective basis, based on (1) the relativity of moral codes such as appears from their variability over time and place, (2) the "queerness" of objective values, if such things existed, both in their status in the world and in our knowledge of them, and (3) the possibility of explaining why values are commonly thought to have some objective basis. The argument from relativity rests on the fact that moral codes are found to vary widely from one time or place to another— a fact that Mackie takes to be so widely known that he makes no effort to document it. Indeed, he is so struck by the effects of technological change upon human desires and purposes that he declares: "The human race is no longer something determinate whose members have fairly fixed interests in terms of whose satisfaction welfare might be measured and decisions thus morally assessed." With this in mind he tends to dismiss the significance for ethics of such notions as the good for man or basic goods and primary purposes. The argument from queerness is both more complex and more difficult. It is complex in that Mackie finds both a metaphysical and an epistemologiAlthough the

positive

hold. In denying objectivity to values,

queerness in his subject. He claims that if objective values did exist, they "would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe." But he says nothing more about the contents of the universe, and one might almost forget that there cal

are

many

with

its

strange things in

it,

especially in the universe of

modern

quarks, black holes, and so forth. But another queerness

is

science said to

our knowledge of objective moral values — the difficulty of understanding the connection between an act and its wrongness, e.g., between the act of causing pain just for fun and its wrongness, and the additional difficulty (as Mackie claims) of understanding how we can "see" the two together — the act and its moral "consequentiality." Before such "queernesses," Mackie finds it much simpler to identify the "moral quality" with a "subjective response" that has been found socially undesirable. lie

164

in

Otto Bird

The

argument rests on the claim that it is easy to understand (hence why and how people come to believe in the objectivity of values through a process of "objectification." But again the argument is a complex one since, according to Mackie, this phenomenon has more than less

third

"queer"?)

one source. The phenomenon and its

direction between desire it

is

good

because

in question object.

at satisfying the desire,

it is

good.

We

is

described as a reversal of

We desire an object and then, seeing

we mistakenly think

that

we

desire

it

thus get "the notion of something's being objectively

good, or having intrinsic value," and hence as something that ought to be when conditions are suitable, "by reversing the direction of de-

desired,

pendence here."

We are encouraged in this confusion, Mackie declares, not

only by the tendency of the

mind

to project

attributing foulness to a fungus because

we

its

feelings

upon

feel disgust for

it,

objects, as in

but even more

need to "internalize" the pressures and demands that society upon us. If society is to exist, certain patterns of behavior are incumbent upon all its members, and, since the sources of these demands are "indeterminate and diffuse," we tend to attribute an intrinsic prescriptive quality to the demands themselves. Hence, Mackie says, ethics might be so by the

exerts

considered "a system of law from which the legislator has been removed,"

and even, given the religious sources of in something like divine law when the

society, "the persistence of a belief

belief in the divine legislator has

faded out."

The

between morality and society is a topic that calls for further we can conclude our review of the case for moral subjectivism as set forth in this book. In brief, Mackie's argument reduces to the claim that it is easier and simpler to explain moral values with their normative and prescriptive force if we consider them to consist in human feelings, attitudes, and policies rather than in anything objective to which such feelings, attitudes, and policies are a response. relation

consideration. But here

The conventionality

of

morals

Although Mackie holds that values are subjective and that morality is something that men themselves make, yet he also maintains that the "whole content of morality" cannot and must not be left to the determination of each individual agent. Much of it apparently can, and to this extent he sides with permissiveness. But where morality cannot be left to the individual conscience is in the social arena and the way an individual behaves toward his fellow human beings. Thus Mackie asks us to distinguish between morality in a broad sense, as consisting in the whole code of behavior that an individual follows, and morality in a narrow sense as "a system of a particular sort of constraints on conduct — one whose central task is to protect the interests of persons other than the agent." Mackie dismisses as of no significance the question of which sense is "more correct," yet his main concern 165

Ethics in a Permissive Society

is

with morality in the narrow sense. In other words, for him, morality

primarily a social matter and a social need that cannot be al

left

up

is

to individu-

choice.

The reason it cannot lies in both of society. The human situation resources, information,

and

the is

human situation and

everywhere a

intelligence are

all

finite

the constitution

one: our goods,

in limited supply; but,

more

importantly, according to Mackie, our sympathies toward our fellow

are so limited that one person not only endeavors to obtain

another but

Hobbes

will

that

if

even

malevolence to do

act with

individuals were

left to

their

so.

own

man

more than

Mackie thus agrees with devices the competition

among them would amount to a war of all against all, and society would be impossible. The need in such a situation is for some "device to counteract the limitation of men's sympathies,"

and

it

is

precisely the function of

morality, according to Mackie, to provide such a device.

Where does what he takes also finds in

this

to

morality

come from?

Just as Mackie finds in

be an accurate description of the

human

Hobbes

situation, so

Hobbes's account of a social compact the main

lines of

he an

answer and a solution. Since the situation is that of violent competition, the main need is to put some limit on that competition. This is accomplished by an agreement to limit the claims against one another and provide a way of enforcing them, namely by the establishment of a sovereign state. Individuals then have a double reason for keeping their bargain: to avoid punishment for breaking it, to obtain benefit by keeping it. Mackie thus interprets Hobbes's "laws of nature" as the fundamental principles of morality. Some of the many "laws" that Hobbes enumerates may call for change with changes in the world and society, but the law that men perform the covenants they have made is declared to be "an eternal and immutable fragment of morality." Agreement, contract, compact, covenant is thus made the foundation stone of society and morality. The contract need not be thought of as explicit historical occurrence; rather it is "implicit in

human

societies."

is thus claimed to have an external an objective condition and requirement for the existence of human society. Yet this fact of itself, Mackie would argue, does not provide any objective prescriptive moral value. Why should or ought one keep one's word? Only in order to avoid punishment or to obtain the benefits of life in society. The only "ought" here is hypothetical and no way categorical as imposing a moral obligation in and by itself.

It is

important to note that morality

and nonarbitrary source:

The case

it is

for the objectivity of

moral values

Mackie maintains that the argument he advances holds for all values, although in his book on ethics he deals in fact only with moral values. Morti-

166

Otto Bird

mer

Adler, however, in Six Great Ideas deals with truth and beauty as well goodness and presents reasons for believing that all three have an objective basis. In his treatment of goodness and of justice Adler thus provides as

the material for stating the case for the objectivity of moral values.

This case, as

made

by Adler,

in the answers that

lies

seem

to

him

be

to

required by the following questions:

Can

1.

a true

judgment be made about what

just individuals?

for

all

Or

is

good

for

all

men, and not

are there any objects that are really objectively good

men?

an object regarded as good simply because it is in fact desired, or something that ought to be desired because it is in fact good? 3. How can a prescriptive judgment be true or false when no number of factual truths can ever lead to a prescriptive conclusion? 4. How can there be more than one kind of truth, i.e., a truth different from that found in descriptive statements? As is evident from the way the questions have been formulated, the argument makes use of the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive judgments, but it goes beyond anything we have discussed in two significant 2. Is

is it

respects: First,

for

all

it

men — i.e.,

asserts that there are descriptive statements that are true facts

prescriptive truth,

about mankind. Second,

and

that truth therefore

is

it

claims that there exists a

not something that belongs

exclusively to descriptive statements. If

we

it

will

can be shown that there truly are objects that are good for

have taken the

first

step

toward overcoming the claim that

men, moral

all

all

values are subjective. For to assert that they are entirely subjective

to

is

equate them with desires, and desires are the properties of individuals and vary from one individual to another. As dependent thus

made

desire. it

Hence,

if

there

is

good

upon desires, values are

an object of an individual's an object that can be shown to be good for all men,

relative to the individual: the

cannot be truly asserted that

all

good

is

is

relative to the individual.

Adler accepts the identification of the good with the desirable: we desire what appears to us to be good, so the good is an object that we see as desirable. But Adler denies that this equivalence thereby makes the good relative to the desire of an individual. He bases this denial upon the distinction that can be drawn between natural and acquired desires — the former of which are "needs," the latter "wants." The needs are "inherent in human nature, as

all

truly specific properties are,"

and are accordingly "present

in

human beings, just as human facial characteristics, human skeletal structure, or human blood types are." Furthermore, these needs "are always

all

operative tendentially or appetitively (that

is,

seek fulfillment), whether or not at a given

they always tend toward or

moment we

are conscious of

such tendencies or drives." In

all

three respects wants differ from needs.

natural; they differ

from individual

They are acquired, not

to individual, since, as acquired, they

167

Ethics in a Permissive Society

depend upon the individual temperaments, experiences, and circumstances; and, third, wants are conscious desires at the time they exert their

motivating power. Adler's

argument requires that these common words be understood in meaning. That they must be taken so becomes plain as he a fourth way in which needs differ from wants. Needs, he claims,

their precise

notes

still

can never be misguided or excessive, whereas wants obviously can be. This

him to distinguish between "right and wrong desires." A one that is truly in accord with a human need. A wrong desire is one that mistakes what is required by a human need; it consists in a want for an object, looked upon as good, which in fact will not satisfy the need it seems to serve— as when we think to meet our bodily requirements with what is called "junk food." It might appear in using such morally charged terms as "right" and "wrong," Adler has departed from the realm of descriptive fact. Yet from the example he adduces, it is clear that he is claiming to be still at the descriptive factual level of the way things are. Thus it is a fact about human nature that knowledge is a need for man: he has an innate capacity for knowing that naturally tends toward fulfillment, and it is a need common to all men. Evidence of this is the fact that all men, with the exception of the handicapped, learn to speak a language. The efforts of a child learning to speak also show how he actively wants to acquire that ability. When this occurs, it is a case of a natural need being met through right desire — "right" in the sense that what it seeks will, in fact, meet the need it seems to serve. The distinction between needs and wants thus makes it possible to distinguish real from apparent goods: real goods are those that really satisfy natural needs, whereas apparent goods consist of those that are objects of desire, and good in that sense, but that, while perhaps harmless and certainly pleasant, do not correspond to natural needs. We may and often do want the wrong food and drink, or too much or too little of it, for the good of our health. So far, in identifying natural desires and needs, and even in distinguishing right and wrong desires, and real and apparent goods, we remain at the factual level, have made no prescriptive statement that we claim is true or false. Any statement we might make in a given instance about a need and a right desire is a descriptive statement and is true or false according to the feature enables

right desire

is

kind of truth appropriate to such statements.

an object that if

that

is

is

The

in fact capable of fulfilling the

desire

need

the case, the corresponding statement of

it is

is

right

if it is

for

for a real good, and,

a true one; but,

if

we

are mistaken about either what we take to be a need or the capacity of the

given object to basis for

satisfy

making

it,

the statement

is

false.

a prescriptive statement that

However, we is

still

have no

true.

We have that, according to Adler, only when we see that "we ought to want and seek that which is really good for us (i.e., that which by nature we need)." And we see this, Adler maintains, and also see that it is true, as 168

Otto Bird

soon

as

in that

we understand the meanings it is

which things are in 'ought to desire' good,' just as less

is

fact really

we know

anything other than

terms.

It is

a "self-evident truth"

good or bad for us, we do know at once that its meaning from the meaning of 'really

at It

once that the parts of a physical whole are always is categorical in that it does not depend upon

itself,

and "upon

this

one categorical prescription," we can validate concerning

asserts, "rest all the prescriptive truths

the real goods that

The

its

inseparable in

than the whole."

Adler

of

impossible to think the opposite: "Without knowing in advance

we ought

to seek."

truth of prescriptive judgments thus has a double basis: the prescrip-

is self-evidently true combined with knowledge of the goods that are truly real as satisfying needs of human nature, which is a matter that ultimately has to be determined by factual investigation of that nature. The objectivity of moral values accordingly also rests on a double basis: the existence of real goods which is a matter of objective fact combined with the general prescriptive injunction which is also objectively true in being self-evident and not merely a subjective desire. Little more can or need be said about the prescriptive injunction. But to complete the case for moral objectivity, more remains to be said about real goods. For unless these goods can be identified as goods needed by all men and not something to be left to be determined by individual wants, the case against the subjectivity of moral values has not been made. But this task, Adler maintains, is readily accomplished. He identifies six real goods, as

tive injunction that

freedom and knowledge and skill in all their forms. About these goods, Adler holds, we know enough to be sure beyond reasonable doubt that they correspond to natural human needs and are common to all human beings. With this understanding of need and real good, Adler adopts as his own Aristotle's definition of the truth of practical judgments as consisting in conformity with right desire. The statement that one ought to want and seek knowledge is a true practical judgment. It is practical as being regulative of human action in declaring what ought to be done, and it is objectively true in that it calls for an action motivated by a desire for a real good that satisfies a natural need of every human being. Thus, in the human order of desire and action of what ought to be done, objective truth is to be found quite as much as it is in the descriptive order of the way things are. But it follows: wealth, health, pleasure, friends or loved ones, liberty or

of action,

is

a different kind of truth in that

it

consists in conformity with right desire

rather than in conformity with the way things are.

The points

From even

at issue

so

summary an account

of just these

two participants in the

controversy concerning the objectivity of moral values

and

identify the

major points

at issue.

Among

it is

possible to locate

these are four that arouse

169

Ethics in a Permissive Society

the deepest and most basic disagreement: (1) the nature of objectivity and whether there is a real and genuine issue posed by the question: is the basis of morality objective or merely subjective? (2) the test of objectivity: what would count as an adequate way of determining whether values are objective or not? (3) the moral import of human nature: do the common features of human existence provide a suitable basis for making objective moral judgments? (4) the basic problem and primary purpose of moral philosophy: is it concerned with what constitutes the human good and how the individual can achieve it, or, instead, is it concerned with how men can live together

and enjoy the

benefits of political society?

On each of these

four questions Mackie and Adler take opposite positions

and present arguments

in

support of them. In

unique, but representative of others

this,

however, they are not

who have taken part

in the controversy

by arguing either for or against the objectivity of moral values. This

will

become clear as we turn now to consider in greater detail each of these issues and the arguments about them. In doing so, we will have occasion to review the work of some other recent writers on the subject.

Objectivity: a

genuine issue?

an issue inasmuch as there are differing and opposed positions regarding what it is, what is to count as an objective moral value, and how objectivity is to be distinguished from subjectivity. On this, the most radical position is that which claims that there is no real genuine issue at stake when it is asked whether moral values are objective or not. Such is the position taken by the British philosopher R. M. Hare, who, in the article "Nothing matters," published in his Applications of Moral Philosophy (London, 1972), and quoted by Mackie, claims that no real difference can be detected between an objectivist and a subjectivist when they happen to agree on a particular moral judgment. It must be admitted that the two might well agree that a certain course of action is wrong. If so, and Objectivity itself constitutes

is a real one, it should be possible to detect some Hare argues; but, he declares, none is to be found: "Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built; and think of another in which those values have been annihilated. And remember that in both worlds the people in them go on being concerned about the same things — there is no difference in the 'subjective' concern which people

if

the question of objectivity

difference between them,

have for things, only their 'objective' value. Now I ask, 'What is the difference between the states of affairs in these two worlds'?"; and he then adds, "Can any answer be given except 'None whatever'?" With this he concludes that there is no genuine issue between the objectivist and subjectivist posi-

170

Otto Bird

tion; the only difference

names

for the

same

between the two

is

verbal

— they

are different

thing.

German

would also dismiss this issue, alfrom those of Hare. He maintains that the issue is wrongly posed in that the distinction between subject and object as it is applied in moral matters is a mistaken one. True and valid thinking Heidegger, the

though

existentialist,

for very different reasons

about such matters is prior to such a distinction: "Such thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It occurs before such a differentiation."

Adler and Mackie in common with other objectivists and subjectivists maintain not only that a valid distinction can be drawn between subject and object but also that as applied to morals such a distinction gives rise to a genuine issue on which there can be real and serious disagreement. The distinction between subject and object and their corresponding judgments seem clear, indeed obvious, when it is made in Adler's terms of want and desire. The statement that I want x is subjective inasmuch as it is a statement about the subject's condition, namely that I as a person feel a certain desire which I am seeking, or will seek, to satisfy. But the statement that I need x is objective in that it states an exigency or requisite of human nature that is quite separate from subjective desire; in fact, I might well have a need for x without actually wanting or desiring it. So far, however, neither statement is distinctly moral and does not become so until there is the added note of prescriptivity, namely that I ought or ought not to seek to obtain x. And whether there is a genuine issue regarding moral objectivity depends upon whether there is a real difference between

claiming that this latter judgment has an objective basis apart from the subject or does not. is no doubt that in the practical order of human action an objectimight well agree with a subjectivist in recommending or condemning a certain course of action. Human beings do not have to share identical moral philosophies in order to pursue a common course of action. But that is not the question here. As Mackie points out, in arguing against Hare, the difference that is crucial for showing that there is a real issue is not at the first order level but rather at the second order. The question at issue is whether there is anything in the nature of things apart from individual

There

vist

wantings that provides a basis and justification for the recommendation or

condemnation. Mackie argues that Hare oversimplifies the situation and so mutes the difference by imagining only the case in which both the subjectivist and the objectivist are agreed upon a particular action. The difference between them becomes more evident when a change in a given policy is being argued. For, as Mackie writes, "if there were something in the fabric of the world that validated certain kinds of concern, then it would be possible to acquire these merely by finding something out, by letting one's thinking be controlled by how things were. But in the world in which objective values for

171

Ethics in a Permissive Society

have been annihilated the acquiring of some new subjective concern means the development of something new on the emotive side by the person who acquires

it."

That there is a difference and that it is significant appears also from the fact that it makes a difference for general philosophy as well as morals if values have an objective basis. As we have already seen from Adler's analysis of the truth of prescriptive judgments, to maintain the objectivity of values

one must is

also

more than one kind of truth, that truth this we are leaving the area and entering upon the discussion of the second.

admit that there

is

not limited to descriptive judgments. But with

of

our

The

first

issue

test of objectivity

Among those who hold that the question of objectivity does indeed pose a genuine issue, there arises at the very start an issue over which there is deep disagreement. That is the question of what is to count as an adequate test of objectivity so that, once successfully concluded, it will serve to confirm that a moral judgment has an objective basis. In other words, what is to count as evidence of moral objectivity? On this matter the sharpest disagreement concerns whether or not the ultimate test has to consist in something like an empirically established observable fact, one that will provide the ground for making a true descriptive judgment, or at least something similar to that. The subjectivist argues that nothing less than such a test is sufficient to validate moral objectivity. The objectivist argues, to the contrary, that no such test as this is needed, since there are other ways, indeed ways more suitable to moral philosophy, that provide all the evidence that is needed. For the subjectivist case, Mackie again provides a good starting point. He points out that the objectivity of values is sometimes confused with other notions which are not only not the same but which also do not provide a test. Among these the most important are those of intersubjectivity and universalizability.

Many

individuals

may

in fact share the

same

or bad, right or wrong, but that does not objective basis,

nor does

it

beliefs

mean

about what

is

good

these values have an

provide any evidence that they do. As shared,

the values are intersubjective, but they are not for that reason objective. So, too, those sharing

such beliefs might well universalize them and claim that

persons in the relevant circumstances should hold them and act accord-

all

But this is no more than to advance a claim on the part of those making it and does not entail that those values are objective. Mackie admits, however, that the converse does hold: "If there were objective values they would presumably belong to kinds of things or actions or states of affairs, so that the judgments that reported them would be universalizable." What then for Mackie would count as a test of the objectivity of values? ingly.

172

Otto Bird

On this subject, he is not as clear as one might wish. He declares that they would have to be "part of the fabric of the world," and also "perhaps something like Plato's Forms"— those eternally subsistent immaterial Ideas. Also, as we have noted earlier, Mackie emphasizes that they would be very "queer" entities. Presumably by this he means that they would be different from the observable entities of the natural world. And, as we have seen, because of this alleged "queerness" he argues that values cannot be objective.

Whereas the test of observability is only implicit in Mackie's work, it is explicit and indeed the very keystone of objectivity in another recent book by Princeton professor Gilbert Harman, entitled The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York, 1977). In the first sentence of his first chapter on "Ethics and Observation," Harman asks: "Can moral principles be tested and confirmed in the way scientific principles can?" Since scientific principles are tested by observation, the question is whether moral principles are likewise tested by observation. Harman allows that we do make moral as well as nonmoral observations, where by observation he understands an immediate perceptual judgment made without any conscious reasoning. As an example he cites the case of children drenching a cat with gasoline and igniting it; a person observing it could both "see" the action and "see" that it is wrong. Here the first seeing is a nonmoral observation,

made

the second a moral one.

The

question at issue

is

whether such moral

observations provide a test of the objectivity of moral principles or values.

Harman between

answers in the negative and offers as support a comparison

this situation

in scientific practice.

and

A

that which holds

between observation and theory

physicist, testing a micro-particle theory, observes a

and judges immediately that it is a proton. Again there are two vapor trail and that of the proton, and these supposedcorrespond to the two in the moral example. It should also be noted that

vapor

trail

"seeings," that of the ly

in

both cases the second "observation"

the all

first.

Harman

himself does not

is

make

not as immediately perceived as

this point, since

he maintains that

observations are "theory laden" as presupposing concepts, hypotheses,

human construction. Yet clearly the wrongness

of the act and and hence not perceived in the same way as the children's action and the vapor trail. However, this is not the difference that is Harman's concern. He is concerned to point out that there is a real relation (though this is not his term) between the proton and the vapor trail, whereas there is no such relation between the children's act and its wrongness. There "really was a proton" in the cloud chamber, it is a "physical fact" that causes the vapor trail and has a real effect upon the physicist's "perceptual apparatus," given the particle theory and the other assumptions under which he is operating. In the moral example, however, there is no such connection between the wrongness and the children's act. The wrongness is not a "moral fact" corresponding to the proton as a "physical fact." Even if the children were

theories,

all

of

the proton are not perceptible

173

Ethics in a Permissive Society

perversely acting as they did because they thought only reveals something about their beliefs and

wrongness of the tific

act" as

it

was wrong,

this

motive

not evidence of the "actual

is

something objective apart from their

belief. Scien-

observation provides "evidence not only about the observer but also

about the physical facts," whereas "a particular moral observation does not seem to be evidence about moral facts, only evidence about you and your moral sensibility." Hence, Harman concludes, "there does not seem to be observational evidence, even indirectly, for basic moral principles." .

To the extent, then, the subjectivist case

that

moral values must meet the

.

.

test of observability,

buttressed by the failure to find any observational

is

evidence for the existence of moral values. To this argument the objectivist can reply at once that, so phrased, the conclusion is scarcely surprising, since the wrong test is being applied: in short, that objectivity is not exclusively dependent upon observability. For this claim we need look no further

than to the argument that Adler makes for objectivity

as

summarized

above. His argument, as

about

human

we have

needs rooted

injunction that the real ty

is

on

good ought

It is this

be considered later

a double basis:

nature of to

man

be sought.

accordingly double: the facts about

categorical injunction. will

seen, rests in the

human

second one that

when we come

first,

a factual

one

and, second, a categorical

The evidence

for objectivi-

nature and the truth of the

is

our concern here; the first regarding the

to discuss the issue

import of human nature for moral judgments. What evidence is there that the categorical injunction is true? Adler claims, as we have already noted, that its truth is self-evident in that it is impossible to think the opposite. Once the meaning of its terms is understood, that is, of real good and that it ought to be desired, its truth is seen immediately. It thus contains in itself all the evidence that is needed to show its truth. Even without knowing what things are really good, we know that they ought to be desired and that we should not desire what is really bad. There is more that can be said about self-evident truths, and Adler does so in the chapters of his book that deal with truth and knowledge. Selfevident truths, he claims, constitute the strongest, the most certain, and the most incorrigible knowledge that we have. They thus provide evidence in the strongest sense of that term. Examples of such truths, in addition to the categorical injunction, are the following: nothing can both exist and not exist at the same time, or at that time both have and not have a certain characteristic; the whole of any physical body is greater than any of its parts; no triangle has any diagonals. Although all of these are self-evident, they differ in important ways, and to see how they do enables us to understand better how they are evident and also why they need no other evidence for their truth.

Take

first

the mathematical example.

diagonal appears at once as soon as

it

The is

truth that no triangle has a understood that a triangle is a

three-sided plane figure, whereas a diagonal

174

is

a straight line

drawn

be-

Otto Bird

tween two nonadjacent angles, for a triangle in being three-sided has no nonadjacent angles. Although this truth depends upon the definition of the terms in that one must know what is meant by a triangle and a diagonal, the proposition is not a mere tautology and a matter merely of words. In this it differs from such a proposition as all triangles have three sides, which is true but tells us no more than the definition of a triangle. The proposition about the diagonal about triangles.

More

is

instructive in that

it

notes a further characteristic

our purposes here, however, are those self-evident example, is the proposition that no part is greater than the whole. We cannot understand what a part is without reference to whole, and vice versa; yet, as soon as we do understand, we see at once that in the case of any finite whole, without any further reasoning or any other evidence, the whole is greater than any of its parts. The self-evident truths about existence and the moral good resemble this latter proposition rather than the mathematical example. Both are concerned with terms that are indefinable and yet also stand in no need to be defined. For as soon as we come to understand what is meant by existence and the real good, we also see that the same thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time and that the real good ought to be desired. We see that they are true and that their opposite cannot be and cannot be significant for

truths that involve terms that are themselves indefinable. Such, for

thought.

With these principles, then, we have reached an ultimate and can go no But there is no need to. For they are first principles and underlie all our thinking about existence and morality. And as Aristotle pointed out, it is impossible to define and prove everything; one must ultimately reach an indefinable and unprovable— an ultimate evidence. But at this point we reach an impasse. For what Aristotle and the objectivists take to be an evidence, the subjectivists deny, claiming that at most it is only a postulate and gains what force it has only from the agreement further.

granted to

example,

it

by those

who

its use as a principle. Thus Mackie, for any categorical imperative is objectively valid

accept

explicitly denies that

and claims that to think so is just an error; the only basis is human agreement or convention. With this we come to another issue in the controversy over objectivity. It bears closely upon the question of evidence that we have just been considering. Indeed, as we have just seen from Adler's argument, the evidence for moral objectivity does not rest solely upon the categorical injunction that the real good ought to be sought. It depends also upon the factual nature of human needs. Here the question at issue concerns the import of such needs for moral judgment. Consideration of this issue will also help to prepare the way for facing the question whether morality is ultimately only a matter of human agreement and convention, as the subjectivist holds.

175

Ethics in a Permissive Society

Human On

this issue

The its

nature as a basis for moral judgment is no doubt that the two positions are clearly at odds. doubts and denies that any facts about human nature and

there

subjectivist

needs provide a sound basis for moral judgment about what

to do.

The

facts, of

prescription that

men ought

course, by and of themselves provide no basis for the

human

needs ought to be

satisfied; the

"ought" here,

smuggled in to pose as an objectively based injunction. The objectivist position, as we have seen from Adler's argument, would agree that the facts of themselves provide no prescriptive "ought." That derives from the self-evident truth of the first principle of the moral order that we have just been considering. But the two positions are also at odds over the relevance for moral judgment of any facts about human nature. The objectivist thinks they are of the greatest importance and relevance, whereas the subjectivist tends to dismiss them as of little or no importance. Mackie, for example, asserts as a warning against the objectivist that "there may well be more diversity even of fundamental purposes, more variation in what different human beings will find ultimately satisfying, than the terminology of 'the good for man' would suggest." Indeed, he attaches so much importance to the diversity of the ways in which men satisfy their needs that he tends to deny that they are of any help in establishing the objectivity of moral judgment; in short, he reiterates that the argument from the relativity of morals and mores still holds. according to Mackie,

is

a subjective preference

Adler, in arguing the objectivist case, admits the diversity in

behavior but denies that

human

it

is

so great as to destroy entirely

needs which provide the basis for objective values.

To

all

human

invariant

think that

it

does, he argues, comes from the failure to differentiate between "a basic

human need and what is needed to implement the satisfaction of that need." Thus, such things as mechanical means of transportation, protection against environmental pollution, and extended school systems are all facts that are new to our contemporary technological society; and they are real goods. This is so, Adler says, not because they satisfy needs that are new, but only because in present circumstances they are required as implements for satisfying invariant needs rooted in

human

nature:

Wealth, health, and knowledge are always and everywhere real

human life may be. But means of transportation, environmental protection against pollution, and the institution of school systems are not, under all circumstances, required to implement the satisfaction of the basic human needs for

goods, no matter what the circumstances of

the real goods just mentioned.

Strong support for the objectivist case on William A. Galston in his book

Justice

In this work Galston claims that there

176

and is

the

this issue

is

Human Good

also supplied by

(Chicago, 1980).

an intimate relation between the

Otto Bird

good

of

human

argues for

is

nature and the moral virtue of

justice.

The

position he

in inspiration Aristotelian (or "quasi-Aristotelian," as the au-

thor prefers) in claiming that "although our ruling ideas are anything but Aristotelian,

many

of

our

experiences

tance for our purposes, Galston

is

and

intuitions are."

especially

Of further importo argue at some

concerned

length against the conventionalist and contractarian theory of justice so

prevalent today, largely because of the acclaim accorded to

A

Theory of

by John Rawls (Cambridge, 1971). As we have seen from reviewing Mackie's position, he has adopted a version of this theory as a basis for the

Justice

subjectivist position. Galston, in

arguing for a natural as opposed to a

more

contractarian basis, provides support for the objectivist position. But of that later

when we come

to consider the relation

between morality and

society.

Against the charge that the concept of

human nature

is

so indeterminate

be philosophically useless, Galston argues persuasively that not only does it have a determinate content, it provides an actually existing unity that underlies the diversity among human beings. As the most obvious and as to

important

—a

traits that

share in

common, Galston

lists

distinctive kind of consciousness, self-awareness, that

introspection

—a —a

men

and the knowledge

distinctive

produces both

of mortality;

comprehension,

distinctive kind of

the following:

rationality;

kind of communicative competence;

—complex and differentiated passions; —the interpenetration of reason, passion, and

desire that constitutes

the moral realm;

—unique kinds

—a

of activities, such as artistic expression;

form of association that we call "political" containing enormously complex conventions; —and, finally, what we may with Rousseau think of as instinctual distinctive

underdetermination.

seem to be excessively bold in declaring that seems reasonable to assert that something like this ensemble of fundamental characteristics is what we mean by human nature." Galston argues that these characteristics also provide a basis for determining what constitutes the human good. And this good is not one of subjective desire that varies from one individual to another. There is no Certainly, Galston does not

"it

"simple and direct equating of individual benefit and individual prefer-

means by "benefit" a real good that satisfies in Adler's terms a "need," whereas a "preference" corresponds to an individual "want." Thus Galston, like Adler, finds in human nature, which all human

ence." Here, Galston

beings share in objectivity:

in

common, short,

the

the

ground on which

overthrow the argument for

to base the claim for

moral

human good suffices to moral subjectivism. To this end, Galston

intersubjectivity

of

quotes with approval the followings words of Isaiah Berlin: 177

Ethics in a Permissive Society

We

seem

degree

common

from objective appraisal by the which the central values conveyed are those which are

to distinguish subjective

to

to

human

beings as such, that

the great majority of

men

moral judgment seems of constancy in

human

to

is,

for practical purposes, to

most places and times. Objectivity of depend on (almost to consist in) the degree in

.

.

.

responses.

Galston claims that there are four elements that are constitutive of the

human

good. They are "ends,

own

states, qualities,

and

activities that

human

he uses, there are principles of worth. There are four such: the worth of existence, the worth of developed existence, the worth of happiness, and the worth of reason. For each of these, Galston provides an analysis and a justification to the extent that a justification is possible, usually by meeting objections raised against them as constituting real goods or as achievable. There is no need in such a brief review as this to say any more about the first, the value of human life. That a human being is endowed with certain capacities and that it is good that these capacities be developed is equally beings value for their

sake." In the terminology

obvious. Galston points out that there are

higher than others, and not

by

all

individuals.

But

it is

all

many

some same degree

different capacities,

equally shared or at least to the

possible to arrive at a principle of choice that

is

objective yet also sensitive to the needs of different individuals, namely:

"Develop one or more of the highest capacities within your power, subject to the constraints of unity, coherence, and balance between these capacities and those in other classes." By happiness Galston understands the fulfillment of desire so as to equate it with "the presence of the totality of what appears to be good." (In this he differs from Adler, for whom happiness consists in the totality of real

— not

apparent— goods

that satisfy natural

needs.)

The

fourth principle, the worth of reason,

is

of a different sort

and

deserves closer consideration because of the important claims that Galston

makes

than that "morality rests" on it. on which morality is said to rest is formulated thus: "Take or do only what you are entitled to. To be entitled to x is to have a warranted claim on x; to have a warranted claim is to be able to advance a satisfactory reason to have or to do x." Since Galston is concerned in this book to propound a theory of justice, it is understandable that he should emphasize the importance of this principle. However, it is by no means obvious that all morality rests upon it. Galston points out the advantages of adopting such a principle: its help in securing agreement, resolving difficulties, and explaining our actions to one another so that we have greater insight to ourselves. Ultimately he allows that it implies "the

The

for

it,

nothing

less

principle of rational action

choice of a particular way of life— a of mutually giving

178

life

of self-understanding

and receiving explanations,

of striving for

and -control, moral knowl-

Otto Bird

edge and for human community based on that knowledge." But except for claiming widespread acceptance for it, Galston does not provide any basis for such a choice's having a categorical prescriptive force: for its being a categorical and not merely a hypothetical "ought." Here it looks as though Mackie could say that objectivity is being confused with intersubjectivity. Yet for this principle, as for the other three, Galston makes strong claims to objectivity.

He

asserts that all four principles are not

"an arbitrary axi-

and simplicity." They are said to be widely acknowledged and to be presupposed by our deeds and judgments. More important, they are said to be ultimate, not only in that they need no further defence, but are themselves "constitutive of the moral sphere," as having their own evidence. Unfortunately, it would not seem that this can be so unless it is also understood that the real good ought to be sought. And about this self-evident principle of the moral order I do not find that omatization, justified only by clarity

Galston has anything to

say.

Morality and society

may

seem entirely wide of But the reason that he alleges is not the only one — namely, whether human nature provides an adequate basis for ethical choice. An even more basic issue concerns the primary purpose of morality and hence too of moral philosophy. Is it the determination of the human good, and how the individual can achieve that; or is it rather a question of how men can live together and enjoy the benefits Mackie remarks that

the

mark

his

approach

to ethics

well

to those in the Aristotelian tradition.

of society?

On tion.

we have already

this issue, as

Following Hobbes and

society

and holds

seen, Mackie opts for the second posi-

Hume, he adopts

that morality

is

a contractual view of

human

the conventional cement that holds

it

importance for him in that he claims that it provides a nonarbitrary basis for morality. Although Galston makes no mention of Mackie's work, he does argue explicitly against the social and moral theories of Hobbes and Hume. In doing so, he makes telling arguments against the subjectivist case as it is presented by Mackie. Since Galston's argument here is somewhat complex, it may be helpful at the start to indicate its salient points. First, there is the question whether the political community is entirely produced by choice and agreement among human beings in the way that a contract is made. This raises the together. This view

is

of especial

question whether agreement association. Third,

tion for morality?

is

is

the basic

and only

justification for that

goods and resources the primary motivadoes social need provide a nonarbitrary basis

scarcity of

And

finally,

for morality?

The answers given

to these questions

depend upon the understanding

179

Ethics in a Permissive Society

between the individual and the community. On all of them Galston presents arguments that seriously undercut the force of the subjectivist case. Political association has always contained a conventional element arising from human institution and agreement. This is no less true of the ancient city-state than it is of the modern technological nation with its enormous complexities of man-made components. The question is whether convention constitutes the only basis of ethics and whether the convention should be conceived as the kind of agreement found in a business contract. that one has of the relation that holds political

To do

that

is

seriously to misconstrue, Galston argues, the relation be-

tween the individual and the state, and this remains so whether the contract is viewed as a theoretical construction, historical happening, or a practical requirement. "Contract theories," Galston writes, see free, independent, fully

formed individuals deliberating about the

kinds of mutual connections and limitations to which they should severally agree.

Each individual, considering personal

interest in the

context of a general understanding of the empirical requirements of

and material we call

physical

sort of society

happen political

be different, community.

to

comes to regard as advantageous the But if these empirical requirements there is no reason to agree to enter into the

security, political.

Such theories are defective in that they misunderstand the nature of both man and the state and the relation between them. Galston agrees with Aristotle that there

tion

is

needed

is

a natural

state. The political associahuman development. Also, human beings

component to the

for the actuation of

as separate existences are related in

important ways to one another even common life through

before they engage using their minds to construct a

consciously entering the political community. In short, contract does not

provide a good model of

political society.

men is the only way of justifying As Galston notes, "we do not seek answers to mathematical puzzles by asking what various individuals would assent to. Rather, the independently determined answer serves as the criterion of rational assent." So too, principles of justice are agreed to because they are seen to establish what is just and are not as such established by that agreement. Indeed, "many kinds of moral principles rest on noncontractarian grounds" inasmuch as they are seen to be constitutive of, or ancillary to the achievement of, the human good. The contractarian theory of Hume, to which Mackie also subscribes, rests on the assumption that principles of justice are required only in a situation of scarcity where the selfishness of men has to be obviated in order to prevent the disruption of society. Mackie extends this argument beyond Nor

is it

true that agreement willed by

basic principles.

justice to include all of morality.

According 180

to

Hume,

with respect to questions of justice there are three

Otto Bird

different cases that

every

member

must be distinguished:

of the society

is

first,

that of such

abundance that

able to obtain the goods that he desires;

second, the situation at the other extreme where the scarcity of goods

some must

and

so

is

be miserable; third, the case in between these two in which goods are sufficient to enable some, but not all, to obtain what they want. Given the difference between these three situations Hume

great that

die

all

then goes on to claim that any question about justice disappears whenever first or second condition prevails. The rules of justice are not needed

the

abundance provides all that everyone wants, or if the scarcity is so extreme that every individual seeks his own self-preservation before anything if

else.

argument Galston maintains that the dependence of justice since it can be shown that rules of justice still hold even the two extreme situations. Take the case of abundance. Hume assumes

Against

upon in

this

scarcity

that justice

is

falls,

concerned only with external goods

that, at least potentially,

are transferable from one person to another. But, Galston points out, such

an assumption is contrary to the facts. Cases arise in which injustice is done even though no individual is deprived of the good in question and when that good cannot be transferred to another. Such is the case of a teacher who conscientiously grades all but one of his students impartially and, with that one exception, gives each the grade he earned except for his favorite to whom he awards a higher one. Further, there are some goods which are intrinsically scarce, so that even in a time of

abundance

of material goods, questions of justice

may

arise with

regard to the possession of political power, positions of authority, and the priority among ends to be pursued: "whether we ought to do something that we have the power to do." So too in the case of extreme necessity, one course of action may be better, more just, than another even though one member

may have

to sacrifice himself. Galston cites the case of

that can support only one,

when one

is

two

men on

a raft

healthy and the other terminally

ill,

which "the appropriate outcome is at least inclined in a particular direction." If there is no relevant difference, then it is just to determine the outcome by lot or chance. It would or one

is

eighty

and the other twenty— situations

in

"be right to use force only to enforce the correct outcome

if

the other party

resists."

From such counter-examples

as these, Galston thinks it is clear that even extreme abundance or of need, principles of justice hold and are needed, even though their application may differ from that made in

in situations of

times of relative sufficiency.

We come now to

the fourth question on the issue regarding the relation

between morality and

society:

whether the need of

society for morality

is

provide a nonarbitrary basis for morality. An affirmative anessential for Mackie's position, since otherwise his morality becomes

sufficient to

swer is completely permissive and he loses even that "eternal and immutable fragment of morality" that promises should be kept. To make morality entirely 181

Ethics in a Permissive Society

a function of society

human good and

is

to divorce

it

from any concern

for the individual

thus leaves the latter without any other basis than in-

dividual preference. But even with respect to the political

community

itself,

the principle seems a highly dubious one for reasons that are both factual

and moral.

On

is plenty of evidence that societies continue to widespread disregard for truthfulness and the keeping of promises. The moral argument is even more telling. If morality consists entirely of rules imposed by society for its preservation, there is no ground for judging the society itself to be good or bad. But, as Galston remarks, "one can hardly maintain that the continued existence of every

the factual side there

survive even

when

there

institution, or political

The argument

fails

is

regime, or form of

in that

and the moral good:

society

it is

that

is

and how they should be

cause

so not because it is

it is

preferable to

its

collapse."

not the needs of society that determines

the moral good, but rather the moral society

life is

mistakes the direction of the relation between

it

good

that determines the needs of

satisfied. If

personal integrity

is

a good,

indispensable for the existence of society but "be-

essential for a desirable

and large count on each other ments seriously."

way

of

which individuals can by and to take their commit-

in

life

to act sincerely

Conclusion Disagreements are disagreeable, and one of the ways out of the disagreeability

frequently

is

to try to

show

that there

is

no

real

ground

for disagree-

ment, that what seems to be a cause for it is just a mistake. Such would appear to be the ploy of those who attempt to dismiss the controversy over it has been something of the fad of the therapeutic school of philosophers to attempt to solve philosophical problems by dissolving them. Something of a royal predecessor for such a procedure is supplied by Kant's dismissal of metaphysics. Kant got rid of a disagreeable problem, namely that of metaphysical questions over which there had long been serious disagreement, not by claiming that the issues were false and not genuine, but by asserting that they were not solvable by human reason which, he claimed, was incapable of transcending the limits of experience. And just as Kant's attempt at dismissing metaphysics has proved to be a mistake, so too has the attempt

the objectivity of moral values as a mistake. In recent years

to get rid of the question of the objectivity of values. Metaphysical contro-

versy has continued long after Kant thought he

had got

rid of

it;

the

question about objectivity likewise continues to excite real and solid philosophical dispute. In

fact, all

the evidence that

is

needed

to

show

that the

we have is founded on a genuine issue is found over the other three questions at issue we have identified in the controversy. These differences are real enough and, indeed, at least in the dispute

182

supplied by the differences

Otto Bird

case of one of

On

able.

clearly

them

so serious that

the other two,

on the

it is

difficult to see

the weight of the

all

side of the objectivist case.

how

they are resolv-

argument would seem

The

unresolvable question, concerns the nature of

difficult,

first

to be perhaps even the

principles

and how they

are grasped.

Take the question regarding the evidence for objectivity of moral values and the kind of test that would show that it is so or not. The case for subjectivism as encountered in the review of it here seems to rest on the claim that nothing

is

objective unless

it is

observable, or at least capable of

one had the sight to perceive it (e.g., of the microparticle, the proton). It sounds as though values could be accounted as objective, or as having an objective basis, only if they were shown to be something like dogs or men or, even, protons. Yet such a demand is to make a huge assumption of great epistemological and indeed metaphysical consequences. It is to assume that the only valid knowledge that we have is of the kind that experimental science has with its ultimate dependence upon being observable

if

and

sensible observation,

also that the only kind of truth that there

is

consists in descriptive statements characterizing the contents of the physical

world.

As that

Aristotle pointed out long ago,

all

we would be mistaken

kinds of truth are the same, or that

all

to expect to find

kinds have the same degree

of exactness. Moral matters cannot be as precise or as exact in the knowledge of which we can have of them as can mathematics, nor is the truth of either of these disciplines dependent ultimately upon experimental and observational evidence. Mathematical truths have practical applications, but then so do moral truths, and both of them can have practical consequences that can be observable. But neither of them in their principles rest upon observables such as chairs, dogs, or men, or even upon protons, if indeed

these are observables.

Mathematics depends upon such a principle as the notion of number, which is not an observable; metaphysics depends upon the notion of being, and that x cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect; morality

depends upon the notion

of the good.

None

of these

observable as a singular physical entity that we encounter in our walk the street. Yet, this

is

no reason

is

down

for claiming that they are not objective, but

own making that have no kind independence from an individual's human contrivance. Granted that, on the foundations of mathematics and metaphysics as well as of morals, there are fundamental differences and profound disagreements. None of these can operate at all without allowing something more than the mere observonly desires, or wishes, or postulates of our of

ables of the physical world.

In short, to claim that the only test of objectivity of moral values observability

is

is

to mistake the nature of the thing being investigated, to cast

a net either too small or too big for the kind of fish

Suppose we agree, however, that observability

we

seek.

in the sense just discussed

183

Ethics in a Permissive Society

is

mistaken, there

still

remains a serious question. This concerns the status

and how they are grasped. Suppose we claim that the first principles of the moral as well as of the metaphysical order are self-evident, i.e., as soon as one comes to the understanding of the terms in which they are expressed, one will "see" that they are true. As soon as we say this, a subjectivist like Mackie will jump upon that "see" and claim that we are having recourse to an "intuition," which he claims at once drops us into the subjectivist camp. For the truth of the proposition depends upon our "seeing" its truth. And that he can claim is because we will, wish, or want it to of first principles

be

so.

With regard

to

such

first

principles then,

one side

evidences that can be seen; the other, denying

this,

asserts that they are

claims that they are

one reason or another. What kind of Aristotle met it with Heracleitus: everything changes, nothing remains, everything both is and is not; so what can one do? Speech becomes impossible, Aristotle reported, though one might hold up his finger. But speech nevertheless continues, though fingers may not be up — which brings us to our next point at issue. The case for the objectivity of moral values rests also upon the claim that it is possible to identify the components of what constitutes the real good postulates that

resolution

is

we

there

freely accept for

when one reaches such an impasse?

for all men at all times. Or, to qualify this formulation of it, that there are goods that are really good for all men as satisfying their natural needs in order to become all that they are capable of becoming. It is also claimed that this is a factual matter. And such it does appear to be. Indeed, it is hard to see why, in general (and in moral philosophy as here we remain at a very general level), such things as life, health, pleasure, friends and loved ones, freedom of action, knowledge, skill, and aesthetic satisfaction are not real goods that do contribute to making a good human life. It also seems on the face of it that such things were goods for the ancient Greeks and Barbarians as they are still for all human beings on the earth today. What then do the subjectivists mean when they claim that human nature is so changeable that the nature itself provides no basis for making moral judgments? Since these are goods as satisfying needs as matters of fact, they must mean that they can be satisfied in different ways. But so what? For health, one needs a nutritious diet, and there are many different foods that provide an equally nutritious diet. No objectivist need claim that everybody must eat Post Toasties or pasta or steak and potatoes in order to be healthy; he claims only that health is necessary for a good human life and that nutritious food is needed for this purpose, not that one is a complete failure if he does not become and remain a healthy person. That there are real goods answering to natural needs is a factual matter. About them, mistakes may therefore occur, and even among objectivists, disagreements may arise regarding whether a given item is in fact a real good. For example, John Finnis, in his book Natural Law and Natural Rights, offers a list of basic goods for all human beings that includes religion along

184

Otto Bird

with

life,

play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness,

and knowledge. Yet neither Adler nor Galston, as far as I can find, make any mention of religion, at least as a practice, although they would readily accept the others as real goods. But disagreement over real goods in particular cases does not thereby destroy the case for the objectivity of moral values. For the fact remains that there are many goods that dearly and unmistakenly

satisfy

natural needs.

Part of the disagreement in the overall controversy concerning the objectivity

of values

undoubtedly concerns the malleability

only in extent, but also in desirability.

The

of

subjectivist

human

beings, not

sometimes

talks as

though there were no limits at all to the extent to which human beings can be molded and remade, and as if the lack of such limits is all to the good. The objectivist not only sees grave dangers in attempting such remolding but is also much more dubious of the extent to which it is even possible. The final issue that we have considered in the controversy over the objectivity of moral values concerns the relation between morality and society. On this point it looks as though the disagreement turns about morals and mores: the subjectivist tends to reduce all morals to the condition of mores that are relative in that they vary from one culture and from one time to another, whereas the objectivist claims that at bottom there are certain moral standards not subject to such variation. The mores in the sense of the customs, habits, traditions, conventional ways of behavior un-

doubtedly depend upon agreement and the ways and customs that have to be accepted within a given community; and these do indeed differ

come

from one community ing

all

what is

is

to another.

one good and what ought

of such societies

murder

not good; that

is

But the

objectivist maintains that underly-

will still find that

there are

common

ideas of

be done: that killing one another at random therefore wrong, though there may well be

to

what constitutes a murder; that sexual practices, especially as they result in offspring, need some regulation; that, at least within one's own community, one ought to render to each his own. With changes in conditions and circumstances, it is not such principles that change; it is their application. Patriotism, for example, does not cease to be a virtue, an admirable excellence of character; what changes is the conception of one's differences about

country

— for

Socrates, Athens; for the

man

of the twenty-first century,

perhaps the world. In summary, we can conclude as follows. Within the context of the four leading questions

we have

identified as being at the center of the controver-

sy:

The

issue

issue. It

is

concerning the objectivity of moral values

difference in the answer that basis to

and genuine make no there is an objective

is

a real

not a false issue founded on a question that would

moral judgments

is

given to

finally

is

it;

to claim that

different

from claiming

that the basis

is

merely subjective.

On

two of the remaining three points

at issue, the

arguments

of the

185

Ethics in a Permissive Society

objectivist clearly

outweigh those of the

relevance of

human

good good

human

nature,

for satisfying natural for

all

it is

subjectivist. First, with

regard to the

possible to identify goods that are in fact

human

needs and that to

beings. Second, the

extent are indeed

this

human good

is

determinative of

morality and not the needs of society, since, at the simplest level, a society

can be judged the

good

of

as

its

good or bad according

members

to the extent to

as well as of the

whole

which

it

achieves

society.

This leaves as the fourth question at issue, that of prescriptivity, the source of the ought.

Is it

only a postulate, willed by men, taken for their

purposes, whatever they are, whether to preserve society or for some men's

conception of the

human

good.

Or

is

it

self-evident, such that

its

truth

is

we do reach an impasse: indeed, the most impassable of all the four issues. But this is scarcely surprising, since with this issue we come to the question of first principles. open

186

to

anyone

to see?

With

this

PART FOUR

Reviews of Recent Books

Hans Kung: Does God Exist?

Mortimer

Wayne

Adler

J.

Mortimer Adler has devoted a

F.

Moquin

lifetime to the

teaching and practice of

philosophy, which he regards not as an academic specialty but as

everybody's business, and to the cause of education through the study of great books.

Among numerous books

about God: A Guide

endeavors

to set forth

of

is

How

to

Think

which he

in

what can be said about God by the mind without

the aid of revelation. For

Chicago

he has written

20th-century Pagan (1980),

for the

many years an

associate at the University of

Robert Maynard Hutchins, with

whom

he edited Great Books

of the Western World, he has since 1952 been director of the Institute for Philosophical

Board

Great Ideas,

we

Research

in

act upon.

Wayne

F.

Chicago, and, since 1974, chairman of the

in

Encyclopaedia Britannica,

of Editors of

Inc.

which he distinguishes the ideas

He

editor

is

in

chief of

Moquin was born

in

book

His latest

we judge

is

Six

by from those

The Great Ideas Today.

Chicago. He attended Luther

Theological Seminary (1957) and Chicago Lutheran Theological

Seminary. He spent four years

become education In

writer for

1964 he returned

Institute for

to

in

the parish ministry, then

Sacred Design Associates

Chicago

to

work

Philosophical Research.

for

in

left

Mortimer Adler

He has been

involved

to

Minneapolis. at the in

numerous

publishing ventures, including: Annals of America (associate editor);

Makers of America, Documentary History of Mexican in American Indian History, Documentary History of Italian Americans, and The American Way of Crime; and editor of

Americans, Great Documents

associate editor of Great Treasury of Western Thought.

on the

staff of

Encyclopaedia Britannica,

Compton 's Encyclopedia.

Inc.,

He

is

currently

as associate editor of

I.

Exposition of the book

Kung's Does God Exist? is a formidable exercise in apologetics, that branch of theology which seeks to defend and assert the message of the churches in the face of contemporary ideologies. Apologetics differs from theological squabbles among the churches, in that, while all the Christian churches share the message of the New Testament, with ideologies of the twentieth century, they do not necessarily have common ground. Kung's premise in writing this book is that there is in our time a multiplicity of world views, of which some are ideological and some not, but which taken together deny, doubt, or derogate the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, of Moses and the prophets, the God whom the churches see fully and finally revealed in the Jesus of the New Testament. The aim of the book is simple: to affirm "by a clear, convinced Yes, justifiable at the bar of critical reason" that God exists. But the journey of more than 700 pages to get to this affirmation is far from simple and involves some serious problems for philosophy and theology. Although Does God Exist? is divided into seven sections, A through G, the book is basically in two parts. The first part, sections A through D, traces the course of modern philosophical/scientific thought from the rationalism of the Enlightenment to the

Hans

nihilism of Nietzsche, with several detours into the twentieth century.

It is

here that all the cases against belief in God are made. The second part, sections E through G, is developed thematically rather than ical,

historically,

theological,

although quite a few historical summaries of philosoph-

and

scientific positions

the second part begins with an

are outlined.

argument

for

The

presentation in

an affirmation of

reality (in

response to Nietzsche) and proceeds to an affirmation of belief in sections F and G.

God

in

Kung "looks back over the dramatic history of reason and modern times, which led to the elimination of God from politics and science." The two thinkers primarily at issue are Descartes and Pascal. It was Descartes who found in reason the basis on which to measure and quantify the whole of empirical reality. Beyond this, he was able to derive the idea of God from the certainty of this same reason. In section A,

faith in

Pascal, also

devoted to reason and

faith,

rendered an opposite conclusion. 189

Hans Kung: Does God

Exist?

man in the universe, "out of which no Creator's He impugns the certainty of reason yet denies that fundamental uncertainty is inevitable. He challenges man "to take the risk

His focus was, however, on voice can be heard.'*

For

of believing in God."

becomes the foundation on which

Pascal, faith

reason can operate, for purely rational self-certainty (Descartes's Cogito, ergo sum) cannot serve as a basis on which all other certainty can be built. Section

A

Kung's book then goes on to describe the divergence of

of

The blame

theology from natural science since the Enlightenment.

divergence

is

guard action

laid

for this

mostly at the doors of the churches, which, in one rear-

after another,

attempted

to

preserve the ancient medieval

world view.

As Paul Tillich has noted: the churches "tried to discover gaps in our and historical knowledge in order to find a place for God and his actions within an otherwise completely calculable and 'immanent' world. Whenever our knowledge advanced, another defense position had to be scientific

given up." But. in the face of ecclesiastical dogmatizing, natural science its

own

God

as

fought back, asserting tion, to the

end

that

claims by virtue of experiment

explanation of anything became

and observaless and less

necessary. This, at

first

in Section B.

possible,

only implicit, denial of

With

he notes,

a

new

scientific

God

receives

its

corrective by

view of the world,

to stick "to a philosophically obsolete

the Newtonian world,

God became

Kung

was no longer

it

image

the machine-maker, the

of

God." In

God who made

and put it in operation according to its own natural laws. With Spinoza comes a departure from this deism to pantheism: God "the one and only divine substance." of which the individual self and all finite things are only modifications. In Spinoza and those influenced by him, there took place a "restoration of the divinity of nature" which had been neglected by the Enlightenment. This led. perhaps inevitably, to a subjectivizing of God. For Fichte. God became "an immediate, original certainty that is rooted in feeling." When the objectifying of God out of the world by wav of deism is set alongside the subjectifying of God into the "inwardness of emotion, of feeling." one the world

may ask