Great books of the Western world, vol. 7 [7]

Citation preview

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

\

.

5&^iH2H2&?&?&7&r2i

12.

LUCRETIUS PPirTFTTIS

Intrpduct

l.The 2.

The

3.

The

082 GRE

art

I

000

I

«

DATE DUE

>n «..»»»»
j—>i_—:A^A-=

rj -rJ-.

~

-

(

8'*U

° reat books of th * Western

g*H3

.World

GA 11.

;

082 GRE

EU AR AP NI

5^J

i>


,v» ,t£ ;v

ESTERN WORLD

41.

GILBERT (.A LI LEO

__

mmm

•

******>**

--^^

^v^f^H^i

-^-^.

^^^

Digitized by the Internet Archive in

2011

http://www.archive.org/details/greatbooksofwest7hutc

ROBERT VICKLROY

The Dialogues of

PLATO 7 R

INSl ITED BY

\|

HI

\

The Seventh 7

R.lXSL.tri-D

l!\

I.

\1

1

\

low

I

I

1

Letter

HARWARD

William Bextox, Publr

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, CHICAGO- LOS DOS

•

INC.

TOROSTO GENEVA* SYDNEY-TOKYO •

-J- -J-

of Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, is reprinted arrangement with Ozfoid University Press

The Dialogues b>

The Seventh by

J.

Epistle

is

reprinted from

The

Platonic Epistles, translated

Harward, by arrangement with Cambridge University Press

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO The Great Books is

published with the editorial advice of the faculties of

The University of Chicago

© 1952 by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.

copyricht under international copyright

l nion t

All Rights Reserved under Pan American and Universal Copyright Conventions by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Library of Congress Catalog Card

Inc.

Number: 55-10317

BI< K ,u

\n

in

NOTE

\i

Plato, Pi \i' ion o( in

|

|fj

triston .\nA Perictionc, i

one

"i tlu-

ton

is

s.iul

CodrUS

tO

...

.

I

lis

\v

.»

^

born

ftmil) u.is, 00 DOth MRAS Ml S

CRATYLl PHAEDRI

TIMAEUS

*8

OKI

I

S

us

'1

EUTHYPHRO APOLOGY

Mil

III

I

S

US

149

SOPHIS1 STA SMAN

»74

PHILEBUS

14a

SYMPOSIUM Ml NO

\S

1

l'AKMl \!!)l

s

[ON

I

1

51a 551

l

LAWS

BOOK BOOK II CRITO 213 BOOK III P11AEDO 220 BOOK IV GORGIAS 252 BOOK V THE REPUBLIC 295 VI BOOK BOOK ^95 BOOK VII BOOK II 310 BOOK VIII BOOK III 3^4 BOOK IX BOOK IV 34^ BOOK X BOOK V 356 BOOK XI BOOK VI 373 BOOK XII BOOK VII THE SEVENTH LETTER, 800 200

I

I

vu

553 1

686 697 7'3

743

77'

784

CHARMIDES, or Temperance ONS

mi DlALOGUI

Ol

Cstrn as, n.

v >

RATI*,

The Polscstt

'.•,

*

•-

who ,

\\ tn bdai evening

nem

I

(hi

Porch

ol thi

K

i

*

I returned From the having been a good while away, thought that should like to go and look at my old haunts. So went into the palaestra ot Taurcas. which is over against the temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon. and there Found a number ot' persons, $ ot w horn I knew, hut not all. My \ sit was unexpected, and no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all sides; and Chacrephon. who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me, seizing my hand, and saving. How did vou escape, Socra-(I should explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we came away, of which the news had only just reached Athens.) i

arm)

IS the

which

beauty, or both. Critias, glancing

// 5^/ invited

my

were coming

in.

rr*

11

attention to tome youth

and talking

other, followed bv a crowd.

Socrates, he said,

I

DOisilj

t would enquire into ihe nature uciuust pursue the enquir) into health

I

i

4

and not into w hai

.inc.

extra m

ii

\ ri

tic.

And he who ju physician as

a

wl

v

i

fudge of the whal relati

\

li

IM

icTM C

II

I"

htly will

physician

in

v

t!er and ter

;

••

I

Are not these, mv friend, the n vantages which are to Ik- gained from And are not we looking aod seekin] something more than is to Ik- found ifl That is very likely, he That is very likely, 1 said; and vcr] we have been enquiring to no purp insight?

Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, science oi science, M\d ot the absence

who

will

u.ils.

would seem, excepl the phy sician cm have this knowledge; and therefore noi the wise man; he would have to he a physician as well as a wise man. at all,

ledge

ih.it

cause, in addition to the

.1

rannot.

one

know

ot

this

were supposing

is

wisdom?

at hrst, the

If,

wise

discernment in others, there would certainly have been a great advantage in being wise for then we should never have made a mistake, but have passed through life the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who are under us; and we should not have attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have found out those who knew, and have handed the business over to them and trusted in them nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which they were not likely to do well ulty of

;

and they would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowledge; and the house or state which was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of

'•'•

l

led to inter, because

I

observe that

if

thil

dom. some strange consequences would Let us, it you please, assume the p

follow.

iences, and further ado was originally suggested, thai w is the knowledge ot whal we know and know. Assuming all this, still, upon further

allow, as

consideration,

am

I

doubtful.

nether

I

wisdom, such as this, would do us much For we were wrong. think, in suppov we were saying just now, that such v. ordering the government of house M would be a great benefit. I

How

so: he said.

Why,

I

said,

we were

far too

the great benefits which

ready to admit

mankind would

ob-

from their severally doing the things which they knew, and committing the things ot which they are ignorant to those who were better acquainted with them.

tain

Were we not I

right in

making thatadmission 3

think not. very strange, Socrates'

How Bv

the

vou; and

dog of was thinking I 1

d,

there

as

I

much

agree with iust

now

1)1

12

A LOG LIES

consequences would we were on the wrong track; tor however ready we may be to admit that this is wisdom, [ij$] I certainly cannot make out what good this sort of thing docs to us. What do you mean he said; wish that you could make me understand what you mean.

when

I

follow,

said that strange

and

thai

I

v.as a! raid

OF PLATO happy; but I think that you mean to confine happiness to particular individuals who live according to knowledge, 1 174] such for example future.

one

:

I

dare say that what

1

am

saying

is

nonsense.

and yet it a man has any teeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought which comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined. replied;

like that, he said. Hear, then, I said, my own dream; whether coming through the horn or the ivory gate, I cannot tell. The dream is this: Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us; then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or general, or any one else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant, will deceive or elude us; our health will be improved; our safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured; our coats and shoes, and all other instruments and implements will be skilfully made, because the workmen will be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy, which is the knowledge of the future, will be under the conI

trol of

and

wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers

set

up

the true prophets in their place as

the revealers of the future.

Now

I

quite agree

mankind, thus provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us. But whether by acting according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear this is a point which we have not yet Critias, that

—

been able to determine. Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge, you will hardly find the crown of happiness in anything else. But of what is this knowledge? I said. Just

answer me that small question. knowledge of shoemaking?

Do

you mean

a

God forbid. Or of working

in brass?

Or

in wool, or wood, or anythingof thatsort? No, I do not. Then, I said, we are giving up the doctrine

who

according to knowledge is according to knowledge, and yet they are not allowed by you to be lives

happy, for these

of

it

live

as

him you

mean him,

I

I

was saying, knows the some

are speaking or of

but there are others as well.

some one who knows the past and present as well as the future, and is ignoYes,

said,

I

rant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a person, and if there is. you will allow that he is the most knowing of all living men. Certainly he is. Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him

happy? Not all equally, he replied. But which most tends to make him ha ppy the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the

game

of draughts?

Nonsense about the game of draughts.

Or

of computation?

No.

Or

of health

That

And

is

3

nearer the truth, he said.

knowledge which is nearest of all, knowledge of what' The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil. Monster! I said; you have been carrying me round in a circle, and all this time hiding from I

said,

me

that

is

the

the fact that the

life

according to knowl-

makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if knowledge include edge all

is

not that which

the sciences, but one science only, that of

good and

evil.

For,

let

me

ask you, Critias,

you take away this, medicine will not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce shoes, and the art of the weaver whether the art of the pilot will not clothes? equally save our lives at sea, and the art of the general in war? Quite so. And yet, my dear Critias, none of these whether,

if

—

things will be well or beneficially done, science of the

Certainly not.

that he

Is

else.'

Yes,

I

I

who,

as the prophet,

if

the

good be wanting.

True. But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human advantage; not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good and evil: and if this be of use, then wisdom or temperance will not be of use. And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For, however

much we assume

that wis-

I

tloii

\i

i

A

\v

i\ she a ill have good undei lui

och< I.

•..

ii

uii> c ol

An.

w

I

wisdom do

1

1

u- %

il«»

only

the effct

the

ranee, 1

hat

is

K

an)

«>t

them

mid

I

i

not

«!«>

theit

othei arts,

the

ol

is

good friend;

not he the produCCI

«•!

(

tor that

we have

just

mv

now

.nt.

true.

can

wisdom

be advantageous,

giving no advantage? Th.u, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable.

was not far in fearing that could have no sound was quite right in tie notion about wisdom; awxiating myself; tor that which is admitted to be the best ot" all things would never have seemed to us useless, it had been good tor anything at an enquiry. But now have been utterly defeated, and have tailed to discover what that is to which the imposcr ol names gave this name ot temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions were made by us than could then. Critias. th.u

I

I

I

I

I

be burly granted: tor

we admitted

that there

was a science ot science, although the argument said No, and protested against us: and

We admitted

hid en

h.ipp\

VVht

it.

w hethei you have th!«»

Miir that WJU must

quite

a\\cA

i

\

I.

I

tlir

ol

\c\i>\\c.

hut

lippothales,

said; uli.it

1

realU [H-tlr^t lo\r \oti \\a\c tound'

wh

II

noble ind

.»

wish

I

th.it

would hrvoui me with thr exhibition which you haw been making to thr rest t the company, and then shall be able to ju whether you know wh.it a lovei OUght tO (20$ sbout his love, either to the youth him you

ow

\otir

ii

hoiio

ful lovi

to you,

and ma)

I

;

or to others.

sclt.

you surely do not

\.i\. Socrates, he said;

tach any importance to what he

is

at-

you disown the love ot the person whom he s.ivs th.it you but deny thai make verses or address compositions to him. le is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus; he is talking nonsense, and is stark mad. c ) lippothales, I said, it you have ever made any verses or songs m honour ot vour favourite, I Jo not want to hear them; but want to know the purport ot them, that I may he able to judge ot vour mode oi approaching vour lair one. :^pus will Ik able to tell you, he said; tor it, as he avers, the sound of my words is always dinning in his ears, he must have a very accurate knowledge and recollection of them. I

*o

you mean,

said, that

I

!

I

I

1

1

I

i

es,

indeed, said Ctesippus;

I

know

only too

and very ridiculous the tale is: for though he is a lover, and very devotedly

well;

love, he has

nothing particular

his beloved

which

is

a child

not that ridiculous?

to talk

might not

He can only

al-

in

about to

say.

Now

speak of the

wealth of Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses,

and

games, and at the Isthmus, and at Xemea with four horses and single horses these are the tales which he composes and repeats. And there is greater twaddle still. Only the day before yesterday he made a poem in which he described the entertainment of Heracles, who was a connexion of their victory at the Pythian

—

the family, setting forth

how

in virtue of this

was hospitably received by an Lysis; this ancestor was himself be-

relationship he

ancestor of

gotten of Zeus by the daughter of the founder of the deme. And these are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and recites to us,

and we are obliged

When

I

heard

to listen to

this,

I

said:

O

him. ridiculous Hip-

•

hone-

conquered and won

mi. h

u be »lij*

»

you, the more you h thr more iidu ul( i.iiu

this t.urrst

and

best

ol

I

dents.

nil

are I

tilled

)o

more I

with the

;

spirit ot

you not agree with

And

he said. the more

difficult

!*•

ii

hi

'I

when any one

tair.

him,

I

1i

I

.in

.i

f

',iin,

1

we

s.imr as the good, «.

>i 1

.is

1

\

u

ill

hr unjust will

be the

;

i

vi

m

Ik-

1

1

1 .

1 1

I

w ith

tlir

i

en. •rni.

ol

1 1

is

n.

I

True. position ol ouri which, Bui thai too was you w '1! remember, has been already refuted

We

anything

is

to be

done?

men who argue meats: nor the

to be

done? Oi

1

is

there

can only, like the wise

I

in courts,

sum up

tin

neither the beloved, not the lover, like, nor the unlike, nor the good, nor

there were tucfa

.i

cannot remember all—

ot

whom we

number it

none

d

ipoke

them

that

ot these ait

I

lair

.it

\

I

pany. I

said,

ho

parting: Menexenui and lous ih.it vnu two boj and
ui

would think nu\ seem to I

If..: I..

.

lie. ir

.1

in.

.mi

I

In-

hacei ol d

m

.1

.1

discoursing 1

union and to oth

bad; and

diai

lover,

thai

ol

true

whi •

virtue, 01

and

theme,

quite

man and worth)

I

li>M

such an one

I

deem to be the true mud harmony than thai ol

lusions.

•

the

will be

the lyre, or an) pleasant instrument ol music;

tion

he has in his own life words and deeds arranged, not or in the Phrygian mode, nor yei

been our

tor truly

a

harmonj

ol

in the

Ionian,

in the

Lydian,

mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such m\ one makes me merry with the sound ot his voice; ami when bul in the true

him

hear

coui

Hut

I

\

[ellenic

am thought to be a lover of disam in drinking in his words.

;er

a

I

man whose

words

actions do not agree with his

m\ annoyance

me; and the better he speaks the more I hate him, and then seem to be a hater ot discourse. As to Socrates, have no knowledge ot his words, but of old, as would seem, have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments are natural to [ iSg] him. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him, and is

to

I

I

I

shall be delighted to be interrogated

such as he

having

and

to learn of

Solon, "that

many

is,

I

him:

would

by a

man

not be annoyed at

shall

for

fain

I

too agree with

grow

old, learning

must be allowed to add "ot the good only." Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the things." But

I

—

is younger, or not as yet in repute anything of that sort is of no account with me. And

teacher

therefore, Socrates,

I

give you notice that you

and confute me as much as ever you and also learn of me anything which I know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and ^.we

may

teach

like,

your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the dirTerence of our ages.

a proof of

tl

I

I

Ami

\\ ill

I

on the pi u ill listen,

cian, attuned to 1 Eairej

I

I

i

lira

d

am delighted beyond measure: compare the man and his words, and note the harmonj and correspondence t them.

ol Ins

'

I

(shall

ing,

no harm which w.is firsi ii

and

other

own

whom

mode

pr
.

ol Ins ii

h.i\r

i

mm

-K, lir said; but triil. i\

until yes

even

lot the \t the Mine tnur he w» klr bed, ind mi down .»t my feet, tnd then hr 1

c-1

1

1

1

him

sun

ill '

Oenoc whithei

turn from

had gone

I

nn runaway

ptu

in

ilavc Satyrus, .»s meant same othei mattei had not come in the- w .iv; on my return, when a had done nipper and were about to retire to rest, ins brotnej said to me: Protagoras is come. w.is going to Mm .u once, and then thought that the night was fai spent But the moment sleep left me aftei mv fatigue, got up and came bithei dsrei t. I. who knew the \eiv COUXageOUJ madness of the man, said: What is the matter? Has Proi>t

have told you,

to

I

I

I

tagoras robbed you oi anything? lie replied, laughing:

Yes, indeed

has,

In-

wisdom which he keeps from

the

:i

I

ii

r

C

wh) ever) one ii 10 and the laws; suppose, I

and

thr s.unr ir.ulinrss

l»r

intn

intereti

in

ii

say, thai tdrrr

pU

I..

teaching one another Bute playing, do you ites, thai the sons ol good flute would be nunc likeh to be than think not. Would not the sons ol bad ones? ihcit sons grow up to be distinguished or un distinguished according to their own natural >

*.

i

>
positcs have some qualities in common; e\en the parts of the Eace which, as we were saying 1

I

I

1

and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar. and one ot them is like another ot them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another; and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike. And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small before, arc distinct

degree of likeness? Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your view. [$32] Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the

examples which you mentioned instead. you admit the existence of folly? I

1(

1

thai p Km h is dot done sw iftly, and th.u w h nes dowly .

le

I

I

win, h

And

|llst.

replied;

th.it

thai

rence between them, Bui what matti please; and lei us assume, il you you pic-. isc will, th.it justice is holy, and thai holiness is

I

!•

is

rid

1

P.irJon me.

thai

cannot limply

proposition thai justice

holiness

I'

I

And

ilh mc*. I

fool

trmp
u would u m. i\ be permitted to give th behalt, .uul whether \ou would

like justice;

u hethei w

I

Do

.isscnted

And

.1.

is done in the same done by the same; and th.u win, h .111 Opposite in. inner 1>\ the OppOf

which

th.u

m

is

agreed.

I

le

(

tace more,

I

said,

is

there anything

I

ful-

Yrs.

To which There

And

the only opposite

the ugly?

is

the evil

there anyth::

is

There is. To which the only opposite There is no other.

And

is

no other.

is

there

is

;

the acute in sound'

True.

To which the only opposite is tl. There is no other, he s.nd. Inn that. Then

every Opposite has one opposite only

and no more? I

le

assented.

Then now,

I

said, let us recapiti:

missions. First of

all

we admitted

that every-

thing has one opposite and not more than one? We du!

And we

admitted also that what was done

opposite ways was done by Yes.

And

that

which was done

foolishly, as

further admitted, was done in the opposite to that

which was done

in

o;

we way

tern.

do.

And

is

not

is

true,

wisdom

the verv opposite of

folly

That

he

foolishly

said.

And when men

act

And that which was done temperate! done by temperance, and that which was done

rightly

and advanta-

geously they seem to you to be temperate: Yes, he said. And temperance makes them temperate?

I

ed.

And done bv Yes.

that

which

opposite:,

:

is

done

in opposite

ways

is

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

50

And

one thing

is

done by temperance, and

be said;

in opposite

yet unjust

And good

therefore by opposites:

— then

folly

is

is

good sense 1

(i

Clearly.

li

And do you remember

that lolly has already

sense

is

good counsel

doing

in-

ceed

ran ted. they succeed.

said, or

I

1

wisdom?

And you would admit

1

if

they do not suc-

;

been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of

the\ succeed.

the

existence

of

goods 2

assented.

And we

in

just:

the opposite of temperance?

He

;

that be admitted.

Yes.

ways?

Certainly.

And

let

And temperance

Yes.

And

and

are temperate,

quite another thing by follv?

said that everything has only

one

Yes.

And

opposite?

is

the

good

that

which

is

expedient for

man?

Yes.

[333] Then, Protagoras, which of the two we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they assertions shall

Yes, indeed, he said: and there are

things which

may

some

be inexpedient, and

are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in

them good. thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded mv

themselves and in their functions, like the parts

business,

Which

two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord

of a face.

can they be said to agree

if

assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two opposites wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?

He

assented, but with great reluctance. are the same,

and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. as before justice

man

you think that an unjust

can be tem-

perate in his injustice? I

should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to

acknowledge may be found

And

shall

I

this

which nevertheless many

to assert.

argue with them or with you?

I

replied. I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you will. Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opin-

ion or not.

My

object

is

to test the validity of

and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our trial. Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouragthe argument;

ing; at length, he consented to answer.

Now

[334]

then,

I

said,

begin

at the

and answer me. You think

that

beginning

some men

and gently

When you

said: say, Protagoras, that things

inexpedient are good, do you ent for

man

and do you of

many

mean

inexpedi-

only, or inexpedient altogether?

call

the latter good'

Certainly not the

is

Then temperance and wisdom

Do

I

of these

how

or agree: for

everything

call

things

last,

he replied; for

I

know

— meats, drinks, medicines, and

which arc inexpediman, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses: and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit), that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians ten thousand other things, ent for

always forbid their patients the use of

oil

in

their food, except in very small quantities, just

enough

to extinguish the disagreeable sensa-

tion of smell in meats

When

and

sauces.

he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long speech to me I never remember

PR( what he

\s thru,

talking aboul

is

il

I

»

I

\(.
i

had U

you uric going you would have had t.. r.o-.c youi m>\N hav ing ni< li a bad memoi \ will '

;:i>!

.

,

tocul youi answers ihorter,

mr w

il

I

hkr

!

ir

i

you would take partun

tth JTOU.

W'lut do son mean? hr said: bow am to shoiten m\ answi .hall ike thru) too

id mi red

I

I

not.

•a.i'.lv

I

.Hid lo,

Hut the truth

laid.

-hurt rtU'i

ask

insH er u hat appears tO tnr to In- short enough, or what appears to you to he short 1

quest I

you can speak and

said, thai

A

otTi iboui the same things ai such length thai wordi nevei tcrnifd to tail, or with nich brevity thai no one could vise fewer

Beach

them. Phase therefore. [$$$] it \ou talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method. oi

item, I

he replied,

fought, ami tation

it

hail

I

which

many

mv

words followed the method a battle of

adversaries desired, as

you want me to o\o. should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere. saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and sidcred that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; so I said: ProtagoI

I

do not w ish to force the conversation upon vou if you had rather not, but when you are ras.

I

me

such a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of you by others and as you willing to argue with

in

sav oi yourself, are able to

have discussions

in

shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for

master of wisdom; but I cannot manI I only wish that could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another place), I will depart; although I should have liked to have heard you.

you are

when

1

enou] have heard,

have

that

is

|

is |

lid.

!

Shall

!*-!!

a

these long speeches:

Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the right hand, and in his left

hand caught hold

of this old cloak

said: We cannot let you go, Socyou leave us there will be an end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to

|

should repU

|

same

in

ili.it

ot in\

,

I

hut

won!,!

thq

ply. tad t) and me in the same stadium, you must bid him sl.u ken his speed to mine, fol quickly, and he can run tad in like I

manjM discoursing, you must ask

him

to shorten bis

answers, and keep to the tirst; it not, how can there l>e anv For discussion is one thing, ami oration

is

quite another, in

But you

he did

at

di

mak

mv hum.

sec. Socr.r

d Pro claim to sj>eak in h way, jual as vou claim to s|>eak in \ours. lerc Alcibiades interposed, and Callias, is not a true statement ot the our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make a speech in this he yields the palm to Pi ras: but I should be greatly surprised it he

may

fairly

1

a

—

yielded to any living

man

in the

ing and apprehendir. oras will

confess that he

make is

power of hold-

j.imcnt.

N

a similar admission,

and

inferior

mentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, not, when a qui let him ask and answer

—

is

away from answering, making

asked, slipping

the point, and in-

a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue not that Socrates is likely

stead of

(

—

I

although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory ). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the than Protagoras; that is my view, ami man ought to say what he thinks. When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one Critias. I believe went on to say: C ) Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be get

I

will be

—

bound

for that,

—

of mine.

He

a partisan of Protagoras:

rates, for

if

des,

who

side.

But we should not be partisans either of

and

this led Alcibia-

loves opposition, to take the other

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

52

Socrates or of Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up the discussion.

[337 J Prodicus added: That, to

me

to be well said, for those

Critias,

who

seems

are pres-

an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or overseer or president: he will keep watch over your words and will prescribe their proper

ent at such discussions ought to be impartial

length.

hearers of both the speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as

This proposal was received by the company with universal approval: Callias said that he

equality, for both sides should be impartially

heard, and yet an equal

meed should

not be

assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise.

And

I

as well as Critias

would beg

you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of goodwill, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight. Thus spoke

many of the company applauded words. Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are Prodicus, and

his

against nature.

grace then,

if

How we,

great

would be the

who know

dis-

the nature of

and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and met together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this height things,

as such are

of dignity, but should only quarrel with

one

another like the meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peacemakers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, [338] but loosen and let go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and more becoming to you. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into

would not

let

me

ofT,

choose an arbiter. But

and they begged me

to

said that to choose

an

I

umpire of discourse would be unseemK was inferior, then the interior or worse ought not to preside over the better: or if he was equal, neither would that be well: for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him.1 And it you say, "Let us have a better then," to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him: not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire. If Prois not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavour to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have answered as many the person chosen

—

questions as he likes to ask,

manner answer me; and

let

him

in like

he seems to be not answering the precise question if

very ready at asked of him, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. arbiter

—

all

And of

this

you

will

require no special

shall be arbiters.

This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows: I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the principal part of education; [339] ano this I conceive to be the power of ^

knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which you and 1 have been discussing to the domain of poetry; we will speak as before of virtue, but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to

PRO! iron

(lie

poem

01

I

kiu>\\

to you w hole i

the

I

\
Mtu>n be

And

in

a contradiction,

good

No, not

I

as

not agree with the ot a

m

\

M

becomii

lid not

Simonid*

icw. diat

"I lardl)

I

replied.

\

fir*

1

in

1

man

.1

contradiction? he asked.

.1

And

same

word

ol

you

do

s.i\. "I

Pittacua, albeii the

wise man: Hardl) can

a

man

will observe th.»t this

he

is

said

two

s.i\-

poet.

know it. And Ao you 1

.ire

think,

consistent

lie

said, tluit the

:

I

I

little

I

either in his

first

I

had received

I

blow from the hand of an expert boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really was. So 1 turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. [ $40] I must appeal to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when bea

leaguered by Achilles, aid him, saying: Brother dear,

let

hut

tor

trom himself.

summons

the Swnois to

us both together stay the force of

not

something

sa\m;*,

diflei

Pitta< us

does not say; oni des s.ns, th.u bardl) can man become go hut hardly can a man he good: and our Jricnd Prodicus would maintain that being, l'r.1

ras,

not the

is

same

with himself.

sistent

becoming;

as

Simomdes

.ind

thc\

1!

not in

is

dare- say that

I

and many others would

Prodicttl

say, S

On the one hand hardly For the gods hope nude virtu But on the other hand u

•

,

become g

.

height,

Then,

to retain virtue, h

I

sit ion. is

Prodicus heard and approved; but P:

Your

ras said:

correction. Sckt.i-

greater error than

which you are

or his second assertion.

Many of the audiencecheered and applauded this. And felt at first giddy and faint, as if

us.

1'itt.u 11s,

imagines, tor repeating thai which be

himself,

turther on in the poem, forgetting,

and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree with him, when he says, "Hardly can a man be .!." which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be

the hero.

or. is

then he blatnrs

are not the same, then

said, think so (at the same time Yes, could not help tearing that there might he .something in what he said). And you think otherwise? Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both : First of all. premising as hisown thought, "I lardly can a man become truly good"; and

wrong

•

Quite right, said Prodk

utterance

then a

wish

I

\..i the

I

ingi

.ill

\rm, w hu h is irn sui h

»:

1

1

J

part

on is

•

.is

m wh.it follows he meant t» ar.;ue

il

.1

litth

:

|

.1

diiiu ulty in

bo

"ii

:

liblc tor a tiiiie,.ind onl\ fol

become good, and

t^W. wish Protagoras either to ask or an ;

:

I

iwct .is he is inclined; but would rathei hive done with pocmssndodes, it hedoes not objo t. and come back to the question about which w .is asking you at first, Protagoras, and by your help make an end d that The talk about the I

but

I'i.'

would do allies, snd

In(

me

commonplace inter vulgar company have re-

like a

tainment to which a who, because they are not able to verse or amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound ot their own vo and conversation, by reason d their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the market, hiring course;

i

tor a great

their

sum

the voiee ot a flute instead ot

own breath, to among them:

course

are real gentlemen

no

he the

medium

but where the

will or

will not 1sunt.11/

\\r

see

the argument

we ma)

th.u

a

rates rlsr.

and men of education, you

the

medium, and which they

anil in

own

pany

voices are

carry on by turns

w uh one another.

to talk

think

like this of ours,

And

and men such

a

com-

as

we

do not require the help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they profess to be,

are saying; people

some

who

cite

them

that

!

ashamed by then

when

tii

were superadded, d

that

s.u.l

I

i

answer.

So I

I

haw

s.tid:

I

)o not

imagine, asking qui .inn.; up ,\

1

is

to ask. *

that

to sa)

thai he docs e>

is

evil

which

when near, and lessei will gram thai also.

become greater and smaller, and more and iewer.and differ in degree? For if any one sa\ s: "Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and pain" To that I should reply: And do they ditier in anything but in pleasure and pain.' There can be no other measure of them. And do you, like a

—

weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which skilful

outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more

numb

VI

Ik

at

11

'

consist in

d

not doing or in avoiding the

be the

ta,\

ing prim ipte

:•

Would

Inn:

oi

an ol measuring be tl or would the power oi

the

not

ciple;

not the latter that deceiving art whicfl us Wander Up and down and take the things

one tune ot which in our actions and

at

both

great a\m\ small

:

v.

I

our

in

But the

ait

I

would do away with the and. showing the truth, won 1

h the

soul at last to find rest in the truth,

thus

our

N.i\e

life.

Would

acknowledge

orally

plishes this result

is

Yes, he said, the

and

not

that tin

art

the art ot measureo

an

turement.

1

human

Sup,

depend on the choice oi od on the knowledge ot when a man to

choose the greater or less, either Ives or to each otlu-

there of the relations of pleasure to pain other

than excess and defect, which means that they

lux

.1.

thickness and arc in then

oi

at a

knowledge

a

tk>n

one

is

:

Would

and

when

delect,

and

number, when the question and e\en The world will assent, :

:

not

ot

1

not ki

of measuring,

ot excess

life

and

id whether would be the

distance: what

principle of our li\es

—

in

:i.

the

a

I

is

1

will

they

:

Protagoras himself thought that thev W

Well then,

my mends.

that the salvation ot

ny

I

human

to consist in the right choice

pains,

—

in the

to

them:

lit; 1

res

and

choice of

and the and remoter, must not

er,

this

measurm:

be a con-

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

62 sideration of their excess ity in

and delect and equal-

relation to each other

This

is

;

undeniably true.

to introduce

names, whether he

to say pleasurable, delightful, joyful.

And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art ami sciem They will agree, he said. The nature ot that art or

you said that pleasure olten got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we reiused to allow this, and you rejoined: C) Pro-

what

is

disposed

However,

by whatever name he preiers to call them, 1 will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in

my science will be a

matter of future consideration; but the existence of such a science lurnishes a demonstrate answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, it you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and then

tagoras and Socrates,

would beg my tnend Prodicus not his distinction of

is

the

meaning

—

of

sense oi the words. Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the

others.

Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant' The honourable work is also usclul and good? This was admitted. Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the belter.

And

this inferiority of a

man

to himselt

merely ignorance, as the superiority of a

is

man

wisdom.

tell us being overcome by pleasure if not this? what you call such a state: if we had immediately and at the time answered "Ignorance,"

to himself

you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in

ion

and being deceived about important mat-

ters

?

—

and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure; ignorance, and that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare their choice of pleasures

—

that they are the physicians of ignorance; but

you,

who

are under the mistaken impression

that ignorance

of

not the cause, and that the art speaking cannot be taught, nei-

is

which I am go yourselves, nor send your children, to

ther

the Sophists,

who

are the teachers of these

—you take care of your money and give them none; and the that you are the worse public and private both —Let things

result

off

is,

in

life:

us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general:

And now

I

should like to ask you,

[358] Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not? They all thought that what

I

said

was en-

And

To

agree,

I

said, that the pleasant is

the good, and the painful evil.

And

here

I

all

is

assented.

not ignorance the having a false opin-

is

unanimously assented. no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have the less. this also they

Then,

said,

I

All of us agreed to every

Well,

said, there

I

fear or terror; ticularly

and

like

agree with

me

expectation of

is

word

of this.

a certain thing called

here, Prodicus,

I

should par-

to

know whether you would

in

defining this fear or terror as

evil.

Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and not terror. I said; but let me ask our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he is not compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to be

Never mind, Prodicus,

whether,

if

evil ?

[359] That also was universally admitted. Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I would beg Protagoras to explain to us

he said

tirely true.

Then you

They

at first.

I

how

he can be right in what in what he said

do not mean

quite at first, for his first statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five

\(

I

ttol

i

cm

.

none

Uir

ii

V

thrin

tii

i»t

lliciu

them had

oi

\\

Wai

like »t\) «'ihrt

which heaiterwaidi made ii

the

ili.u

bui

-in

•

w ere

in to

ik

I)

And

the others.

pro

follow ing

iv


i \ And » ill show yoil VI li-it COCK ir.c t«. U llir n.itu: the task, ind w li.u ion ol discourse 1

n

this,

»>i

the •

I

I

i

in

lic-.u

;

and

if I

do

ridiculous manner,

onl) venture to

I

chit to a ver) inartistic *!*»

laugh

i>.»t

impm\

and

me.

ai

foi

I

before you

isc

am

cagei to heaj youi wisdom: and must ihereiorc ask you and youi disciples to refrain son oJ Vxio hua, from laughing. And now, (

let

mc

ol

those

)

to .i^L

idiculous questions which

t

am

I

There

does not. Well, then,

is

said, since

next question. Shall

wc

we

not be

happy

is it

We

not

solemn sage

ma) be

that wealth

required to

is

easily is

wc esteem good? No us

tell

which

this,

answered; for every one a good.

will say

are not health

and beauty goods, and

there be any doubt that

power, and honours goods 3

He

good

birth,

own

in one's

and

land, are

other goods are there

3

I

said.

and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods: For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?

They

are goods, said Cleinias.

Very

well,

I

said;

and where

tind a place for

in the

wisdom

company-

— among the

think whether we have left out any considerable goods. I do not think that we have, said Cleinias. I

Cleinias,

th.it

said,

Upon recollection, I said, indeed am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all. I

to

am

Z4

I

him

I

Bute-players

fortunate ami successful in

I

I

.>

.

assented.

le

are not the

Writing and reading (

scnU

And

one

rtun.itr

the dangers ol

it

tl.

the •

d in war, in V

you W

rather take the risk

general, or with

— in

I

3

With

a

wise one.

you were

it

ill,

whom

would you

have as a companion in a dangerous wise physician, or an ignorant one? :sc

You

man

is

le

lllnc

one.

think,

sank thai

I

more fortunate than

rant one I

in

let:-

ertainly.

Amid

to act

with an

if]

3

assented.

[280] Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for b) wisdom no man would e\cr err, and therefore he must act rightK and SUCO or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer. agree

the goods.

And now,

!

flute?

We

goods or not?

Among

know,

say of temperance, justice, cour-

age: do you not verily

we

ing his SUI

\

And

assented.

And what What do you

.

th.it.

company would you company with a wise

other personal g He agreed.

Can

what was the meat isdom is

more fortunate on None, certainly.

Certainly, he said.

And

a

he simple minded south was

I

Ami

things do

list

may know

child

obsei

assented.

the

.iskcd

1
o not .ill nun desire happiness? Ami yet, perhaps, tins is one put

do you

\\'h\

I

contrived in a

I

general conclusion, that he

who

wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, said, our making tb sion that we should be happy and tormany good things were present with us I

.

3

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

70

He assented. And should we

be happy by reason of the

presence of good things, ; if they profited us

if

they profited us not,

they profited us, he said. they profit us,

if we only had them and did not use them? For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink, and did not drink,

And would

should we be profited? Certainly not, he said.

Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them.' For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked? Certainly not, he said.

And

if a person had wealth and all the goods which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?

of

No

indeed, Socrates.

as the possession of

if you have the use as well good things, is that suffi-

my opinion. And may a person use them Yes, in

That

is

of a thing

one

an

is

nor an

He

quite true, is

far

said.

And

the

wrong

use

worse than the non-use; for the

and the other is neither a good [281] You admit that?

evil,

evil.

assented.

Now

in the working and use of wood, is not which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter? Nothing else, he said. And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?

spoke is

in the use of the

at first

goods of which

we

—wealth and health and beauty,

not knowledge that which directs us to the

right use of them,

and regulates our

practice

about them?

He thing,

and every use of a which gives a man not

in every possession

knowledge

A A A A A

poor man.

weak man or weak man. noble

man

man?

a strong

or a

mean man?

mean man.

And

a

coward would do

geous and temperate

man

less

than a coura-

;

And an indolent man less than an active man? He assented. And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones? All this I

was mutually allowed by said, Cleinias, the

sum

us.

of the mat-

appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are

more

able to minister to the evil principle

which

them; and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves they are nothing? That, he replied, is obvious. What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result

are indifferent,

is

that

—that other things

and that wisdom

is

the only

good, and ignorance the only evil? assented.

[282] Let us consider

a further point,

I

said:

Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, life, and the and good fortune in the use the inference of them, is given by knowledge, is that everybody ought by all means to try and

and

a right use, of the things of

right use of them,

assented.

Then

man?

He

agreed.

And

—

rich

rules

that

He

I

ter

either rightly or

rightly. I

me,

he not make fewer mistakes.? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable? Certainly, he said. And who would do least a poor man or a

Then,

cient to confer happiness?

wrongly? He must use them

tell

Yes.

Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them? True. Well, Cleinias, but

said, O tell me, what do posman, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom.' Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would

And

sessions profit a

or

If

only good-fortune but success? He again assented.

make

—

himself as wise as he can?

II

M

II, l.i

I

;

a lien i.uu tins

tic

iu-i

01

|

man

think-, tint

iMiir. t.u

guardian

i

oi

lie

.

money, from

tli. »n

iiiuir

friend oi

i

i

u hethei iii.tu oi it range d and praya to them thai il>r\ would imparl c

i

to

.'in

you,

is

mm

.ii

i

dishonourable,

.ill

Clcinias; ooi in .m\ one to be blamed foi d an) honourable aervice oi ministration to ani

whether

in. in,

gel

w isdom.

v

1

I lovei

k>

you

01

not,

i

Ins .inn

il

||

led by

us to h.isr

thnn

and play, and [wait

jest

t0

laid.

I

aid, I quite agree, and

m

re

think that you

tti

I

profoun

said:

.•.hi.

said, Cleiniaa,

I

it

wisdom can

only

be

and does not come to man ipontanc ously; for this is i point which h.is still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon bj you and me •it.

But

think, Socrates, thai

I

wisdom can be

taught, he said.

you sa) having saved

hi

lid;

I

and

I

shall

i

words. Well. -t\:

ell,

not

C

7*

linn

all

1

H thcii

(

U then r\:striu

thru nor

"i

oi

(

in.

we

I

i

which

If-iin

i

I

!

1

.

.1

Ami w

in K\

I

nam

just

that proved, 11 you ma) remembi could affirm negative; foi no one could affirm

(hat

>

l

tesippus,

I


e sure. And now suppose

Her.

he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural iks

we do

whefl we name cannot

Her. other,

failure.

natures?

Her. Soc. tor in

I

as things

quite agree with you.

And

naming a part giving names men speak. is

Her. That Soc.

And

not

3

is

is

a sort of action

not

naming

and

also a sort

2

And we saw

that actions were not relabut had a special nature of

own-

Then

I

the

we name with

)o

we

not give intormatior.

|

to their

the threads of the V

of distn

Her.

And

Soc.

the shuttle

which has

with something

And

Then

Soc. well

— and

is

the instrument of the

to be cut has

3

that

which has

will

woven

or

means

use

the

like a teacher

like

.

name

:

well

— and

the well

3

Her. Yes. Soc. And when the weaver uses the whose work will he be using well.3 Her. That of the carpenter.

And

is

every

man

shuttle,

a carpenter, or the

3

Her. Only the Soc.

to be

the weaver will use the shuttle

well

skilled onlv

Her. Yes. Soc.

}

Her. Certainly we do. Then a name is an instrument of teaching and ot distinguishing natures, as the shut-

Soc.

success.

agree.

Soc. But again, that to be cut

I

Soc.

means

argument would lend us to inSoc. fer that names ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other shall

.i

and distinguish things according

teacher

Her. Precisely.

Her.

ask

;

tive to ourselves,

way

I

wca\cr Her. Assuredly.

Her. True. Soc.

that

\*-

|

I

tle is

speaking

has a relation to acts, of action

of speaking

true.

is

if

on n.

question about names: will \ou BOI I Regarding the name as an instrument.

ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument 3 Anv other mode of speaking will result in error and of speaking,

•'•'

.»

kind of action?

a

the

tr

some

Hennogenes, there is Orestes the man of the mountains who appean to be rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness sin,

)

nature.

Her, That

>

.

N .

And

very likely, Socrates.

his father's

name

is

also according

into

).

antalus; and int

1

ident ot tr.idit

1

I

he nan

father,

Hem

/

meaning, although hard

to he ui

sentence, which some call him and use the one half, and others who use the other halt call him tifl Am r. t! 'her signify the nature ot the tod, and the business :>rrss the name, as we were savin nature. Pot there is none who is more the thor of life to us and to all, ih;m the

cause re.ilU like into

two

.1

1

parts, tor

I

king of

Her, Clearly. .

.u

it


!\ iii

'i

comphshmeni the

being now

.a

.i

and these

word

my

the top oi

bent,

1

1

mg

1

understand, hut ttuda is transparent, ami agrees with the principles which preceded, tor all thingsbeingin aflui ioviw), k.im.i is a io\ (going badly); and this evil motion when existing in the soul has the general name oi as yet

i

kojoo, or vice, specially appropriated to ot tuuc&s

icfrai

may

The

it.

Ik turther

trated by the use or heJda (cowardice),

which

to

I

(

presses the greatest soul;

and

and strongest bond

curopta (difficulty)

same nature (from a

not,

an

is

and

go), like anything else which

is

ot the

evil ot the

-n-optvaTHai to

an impediment

motion and movement. Then the word Rojrta appears to mean *a/c) will be the opposite

or this sort

or" it,

signify-

ing in the first place ease of motion, then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever flowing without let

or hindrance, and

or,

more

1

is

therefore called

t«> stagnation he gave the n.une

hindered the

this

dow beaten together

is

rrocn

«»:

sorts.

.iii

and

fiui

into

•

Her. Hut what do yoU Soc.

Thai

is

more obscure;

onl) due to the quantity,

by altering or into

Her. .

He

r.

-\\^l

\et

the b

has been

o.

What do yotl mean This name appears to denote mind. :

\

lo"

me ask vou what is the cause wh\ anything has a name; is not the principle which imposes the name the c.i Her. Certainly. Ami must not this be the mi: Soc. Let

or ol

men. or

Her. Soc.

oi

both

:

\

Is

not

mind

that

which

things by their names, and

caller

not

is

•

mind

the

:

xaAoi Her. That is evident. Soc. And arc not the work* ot intelligence

beautiful

(

I

and mind worthv ol praise, and are not other works worthy of blame? Her, Certainly. Soc. Phvsic does the

work

of a physician,

carpentering docs the works ot

He

r.

.Iptr?/,

Soc.

and

works

correctly, aeiptiri) (ever-rlowing),

Iliad, vi. 265.

enemy

whuh

illus-

have come alter dpSpcio, but was torgotten, ami. as tear, is not the only word which has been passed over. AoA/.i signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain Secrpo?), lor Atar means strength, and theretore SuXia ex-

ought

:ig

•

great hence-

I>r

it.

on!\

should like

meaning ol the two words (virtue) and Muc(a (vice); &peTJj do not

meaning

am

koAAi

Bowing), and this is in accordance with former derivations. For the name gi

,

consider the

to

i

ami oi m was s.i\ ing,

\\\o, pajKo%

pupfwnfr. But, as

;

I

mean

has the

irr right;

li

ionale

sign oi great ac

for fiijKo*

ing oi greatness,

make up

be

too

also.

you

likelj

.

I

word

this

t

will

1-

a

and

carpenter'

\actlv.

And

the principle of beauty does the

of beauty?

Her. Of course.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

102

And

Soc.

principle

that

we

affirm

to

be

mind'

Soc.

Her. Vcr\ true. Soc.

lie

Then mind

is

rightly called beauty be-

cause she does the works which and speak of as the beautiful:

Her. That

is

we

recognize

their opposites.

[417]

The meaning of avfxfyipov (expedient) I that you may discover for yourself by the

light of the previous examples,

—

for

it is

a

sis-

meaning just the motion (i

and

(eW|«o«) or hinderei m\ d brother

n>i

8I01

is

hat

oi

.1

whn

h rnlrrs into lh
not see th.it we could do anything I

We

could not: tor by bodily imitation only can the body eves express anything. Her. Vers, true. N And when we want to express ourscb cs, either with the voice, or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that .

n b.

Then

Sac.

name

a

is

vocal imitation ot that

a

which the vocal imitator names or imitates? Her.

I

think

Soc. \a\\ that

I;

in (

we have

Why

Her.

so.

my

I

am

disposed to think

not reached the truth as yet.

stre.im

not?

it we have we shall he obliged admit that the people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they

to

them

is

a

I

have been right

in

what

I

opinion, no. But wish that you me, Socrates, what sort of an imitaI

n.m

-

to re

asking;

h.is

.in.:

grasped thr n.iturc

and s\Hab!cs

:n

such

.1

ot

uunnrr

Her. Very good. Bui are these the oni\ prnn.irv names, or are there otl

Her. There must be others. should expect. But how shall wc further analyse them, ami wl the imitator begin? Imitation 01 the rtaenrc ism syllables and letters; ought WC not. tl,: I

hrst to separate the letters, just as those

who

.ire

beginning rhythm first distinguish the of elementary, and then oi compound sounds, and when they have done so. but not ; they proceed to the consideration ot rh\thms I

He

r.

Yes.

Must WC

not begin in the

sam

separating the vowels, and then the

consonants ami mutes, into

«.'

which are neither vowels, nor

mutes; and distinguishing into classes the An when we have pervowels themselves yet

i

should reply, not a musical imitation, although that is also vocal; nor, again, an imitation or. what music imitates; these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter as follows: All objects have sound and figure, and many have colour: Her. Certainly.

But the

the semivowels,

:

:

Soc. In the

Sbc.

'

tl

the

to the received distinctions 01 the learned: also

my

name

think

as to imitate the CSSCnCC or not.

letters; first

was saying?

tion

tu

in letters

Soc.

tell

in

about which fOM wc whether the ii.ni nr

imitate.

Her. In

),

I

to

;

Soc. Because

would

True, then

is

1

friend,

Her. Quite true. Soc. Then could

tin',

condition

a

Soc. So

I

nam

or

n. liner,

.

which we want to express. Her. It must he so, think.

hi

\\

.

horse, or any other

gestures

and the

1

animal,

.

W

/•/-'•

should mut. itc the natun the thine; the elevation ol our hands to hea> en n

first place,

art of

I

naming appears

fected the classification of things, their

sec

whether, as

we

sh.>

in the case of

which the and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in the letters; and when we have well considered all this, we shall know letters,

be

all

1

not to be

names, and

Cf.

there are any classes to

referred;

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

106

how

to apply

them

what they resemble

to

—

ters to the expression of objects, either single letters

when

Gods waiting

plexity have their

whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting, the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other colour,and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them; and so, too. we shall apply letrequired, or several letters; and so

we shall form syllables, as they are called, [425] and from syllables make nouns and verbs; and thus, at last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large and fair and whole; and as the painter made a figure, even

must

in the air; an*

get out of our difficulty in like fashion, b

saying that "the

Gods gave

the

names, ant

first

therefore they arc right." This will be the bes contrivance, or perhaps that other notion ma'

•

be even better still, of deriving them from souk barbarous people, for the barbarians are oldei than we arc; / 426] or we may say that antiq uity has cast a veil o\cr

them, which

is

the same

sort of excuse as the last; for all these are noi

reasons but only ingenious excuses for hawn^. no reasons concerning the truth of words, yet

any

ignorance of

sort of

first

names involves an ignorance

or primitive

secondary

of

I

words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of languages should be able to give a \erv lucid explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true ;

was carried away meaning to say that this wis the way in which not we but) the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject; and we must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are rightly giv-

names are though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have. Her. Fear not; I will do my best.

so shall

we make

speech by the art of the

or the rhetorician, or by that

I

am

literally

some other

namer Not

art.

speaking of ourselves, but

—

(

en or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work,

and

in the

wrong

certain that

Her.

I

them

in this

way?

for

I

am

should not.

Much less am Shall we leave

men

say,

we must do

likely to

as well as

we

can.

What

do you think 2 Her. I very much approve. Soc. That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be avoided there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like the tragic poets, who in any per-

—

first

and

Soc. In the

me the

notions of original

ridiculous,

first

place, the letter p appears to

to be the general (/ci'i^ais).

meaning

among same

of this

the ancients, is

And

letters.

77 was not in use only employed e; and

letter

who

nor, which

as Uvat.

correctly given as

ern

instrument expressing all I have not yet explained latter word, which is just

But

(going); for the

iccris

the root

be able. them, then? or shall we Soc. seek to discover, if we can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of preface, as I said before of the Gods, that of the truth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human notions of them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to any good purpose must follow; but under the circumstances, as I

My

truly wild

motion

direction.

Her. That, Socrates, I can quite believe. Soc. Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse

tier. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc.

is

the old Teens-

Assuming

in

a foreign form, the

word

ku'7/o-k will be corresponding mod-

this foreign root

*

change of the 77 and the insertion of the v,we have nvnym*, which should have been wueunjim or cicris-; and arda^ is the negative of iemi (or cutis-), and has been improved into o-ruais. Now the letter p. as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an

and allowing

for the

excellent instrument for the expression of tion:

and he frequently uses the

mo-

letter for this

example, in the actual words he represents motion by p\ also in the words rpofios (trembling), Tpa\v>; (rugged); and again, in words such as Kportiv purpose;

for

ptw and

porj

(strike),

Opaveiv

(crush),

ipcLKeiv

(bruise),

BpvTTTtLv (break), KeppaTi^ecv (crumble), pvp.-

(Sdv (whirl); of

all

these sorts of

movements

he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he

RATYLI

(

*>

I

l>\

.in

letter

he-

I

menti whk

,l

hr uses the

.ill

lettei

subtle rlr

ir

i

through

pass

h

uhv

is

.

hr

i

you

tl

imitati

.!••

i

snothci ol

m

;

uhilr

th

i

h the pronun*

In.

iation is a< ompanicd xpenditui breath; these are used in the imitation ol iu< h

the

notions

Uotkr.l out. .Hid

t

.

i

I

•

when

to

Ik-

ihivei in

i

\

shaken

.

|hO( k

|

introduced In the givei

i\s

what ii have thought thai the ind pressure oi the tongue in the uttei .'i and r wai expressive »>t binding .m.l rest in a place: he hirtnei observed the liquid movement oi a, in the pronunciation t which the tongue slips, and in this In- found the ea pression oi smoothness, .is m ,\

He teems

(windy),

s.

glutinous

clammy

yAiKis-. yAota»8(s-.

1

he

he observed

i

have a notion of inwardness; hence he duced the sound in iv&ov and t\r.*

What

How

rates?

I

be

bed the wall come

Phaedr.

lx-

was staving with Fpicrates, the house of Morvehus; that house

at

x

I

rca


OUfltl

117

\.

liki

guide

dunk

in llir

1

kj

trol lui

•

you

thai

in

ii

In iend; .*««! hope uw when \ou hr.r I

yOU will ruihr

th.it

whuh

le.ison, e,

tint

IS,

I

.mi

.i

and the men who dwell

lowt

ol

ki

M

•

in thectt) are

m\

and not the trees qi tin- country, do indeed l>clir\c tli.it \oii found spell with which to draw me out «>t the into the country, like hungr) cov< l>< whom a bough or a bunch ol trim is \\.i\ol. oni) hold up before me in like mann book, and n»hi ma) lead mo .ill round r\ti ami mrr the Wide World. Ami DOW h.i\m rived, intend to he down, and do you choose any posture in which you can read Inst. Begin.

from; but

not

ill

I

il

hers,

Though

;

1

.i

friendship

It

publu

i

.i

I

i

You know how

isten,

m. liters

with me; and how, ai conceit may arranged for the advantage ol both ol us. Ami maintain that ought not •! in ni| suit, because am not your lover: tor lovers repent of the kindnesses which the) have shown when their passion CCasCS, hut to the non-lovers who are tree ami not under any compulsion, no tune ot repentance ever comes; tor they confer their benefits according to tinst.unl

I

W

this affair

I

I

I

i

measure of their ability, most conducive to their

way which is own interest. Then

in the

how

by reason of their love they have neglected their own concerns and rendered service to others: ami when to these benefits conferred they add on the troubles which they have endured, they think that they have long ago made to the beloved a very ample return. But the non-lover has no such i.

!o\ers consider

tormenting recollections; he has never neglected his atlairs or quarrelled with his relations; he has no troubles to add up or excuse to invent; and being well rid of all these evils, why should he not freely do what will gratify the beloved

:

— that, fer

if

men,

true,

i|

and ot

il!

n

he

his heart;

his laboUl has riot is

mon

u.mh been

m.istrr.

good, and Again.

not

the

ol

lost

:

but

tl

SI

opinio

Mis is following the eupation ), and whenever the. 1

his

exchange tm o p ordt about some affair ot love i

temptation; but when nc asks the reason w h\ bo .nisr .

IIO

pi

ople

know

one th.it

talking to another is natural, whether ship or mere pleasure be the moti

Once more,

it

\ou

te.ir

friendship, consider that

m

the

tk klcr M

anv other

a mutual calamity; but now, given up what is

quarrel might be

when you have tore,

m

oser, and there you will be you will have more reason in

to you,

1

t

of the lover, for his vexations

.ire

mam.

.\w\ he

always fancying that every one is against him. Wherefore also he debars his be loved from society; he will not have vou intimate with the wealthy, lest they should exceed him in wealth, or with men of education, lest they should be his superiors m understanding; is

|t pains; and me ostentatiously toexuli trom w

.-I

i |K*.in

.!

Imw

well he

to

>..tilil

the

%.i\

1

1

\i

dim

i

in

il

same thing

in i^«>

ui tin

U

ll.lt

s. I

v

:

.is

cspo

the

merii oi oi \\ liuh the iubje
uld

t

you

si

I

I

I

along w

\«'u.

itli

\n

ckni sages, men and women, w ho have ami written ol these things, would mm- up in judgment against me, it out oi complaisance I

to \OU.

,1

Who arc they, and where did you anything better than thii .mi sure thai must have heard; bui .it this moment Ao not remember From whom; perhaps from Sappho the lair, or An.u rcon the I

!

I

or, possibly, ,

is

beech

Why,

:

M

s.i\

I

t

nil,

good

.is

bom

a prose- writer.

because

and

that

I

Whj

perceive thai

I

COuld

do

my

make .mother

as that ol Lysias,

and

Now am certain that this is not my own. who am well aware

kill

wanting airs.''

trom

know

grand:

is

who was my

— but

better oration, equal in

length and entirely new, on the same subject; I. like the nine Archons. will promise to

and set

up :,

a

golden image

at

Delphi, not only

but ot you, and as large as

or"

lite.

You are a dear golden ass it you suppose me to mean that Lysias has altogether missed the mark, and that can make a speech trom

I

I

his art and

1

re let

indeed,

there

how

know

I

matters Band; and

fc»

won!

the

Then don't say

that

will; and Phaedr. Yes, but be an oath. "I say. or rati I

god

u:

is

it.

m\

be witness

will

swear, that unless you rep discourse here in the t.ueot this \erv plane-tree, plane-tree

I

will

I

never

tell

you another; ne\cr

his

tricks

arguments are to be excluded. something which is to the point. Who, tor example, [236] could speak on this thesis ot yours without praising the discretion of the non-lover and blaming the indiscretion of the lover.- These are the commonplaces of the subject which must come in (for what else is there to be said? ) and must be allowed and excused; the only merit is in the arrangement of them, for there can be none in the invention; but when you leave the commonplaces, then there may be some originality. Phaedr. I admit that there is reason in what all

to

ot authors will say

I

which

ot

word ot another''' Soc Villain! am conquered; ot discourse has no more dr. Then why arc you

Soc.

The worst

Phaedruj

succ-t

DM

tore per]

compete With extern; h He is a master in am an untaught man.

mind

earnest desire. Only, as you say, promise

make another and

nn

would he

that be a mystery not to be divulged even at

my to

s;

am

I

Phaedr, You sec never

where you heard the discourse or from whom; let

and

alone,

not uni

stir

ot the

:

i'.ut. it

informant.

That

we

this place

boson,

younger than \u: Where do not compel me to use

I

I

dr.

K.itl

I

stupidity

1

invention

that

I

my

compel

'"1

all

nothing, and therefore can only inter that have been rilled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the waters ot another, though have actually forgotten in

or

different.

>\n

I

ot

and you up

I

let

you have

the poor lover

tl

still

al

:

Soc. I am not going to play trick you have taken the oath, tor cannot allow myI

self to

be starved.

Phaedr. Proceed.

[2^ J

Soc. Shall

Phaedr. Soc.

I

I

tell

vou what

I

will

do :

What?

will veil

my

face

the discourse as fast as

I

and gallop

can, for

if

I

tl

see

you

I

ashamed and not know what to say. Phaedr. Only go on and you may do anything else which you please. shall feel

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

120

Come,

Soc. are

called,

O

ye Muses, melodious, as ye

whether you have received

this

name from the character of your strains, or because the Melians are a musical race, help,

O

me in desires me

the tale

help

which

my

good triend here

to rehearse, in order that his iriend

whom

he always deemed wise may seem to him to he wiser than ever. Once upon a time there was a fair boy, or, more properly speaking, a youth; he was very

and had a great many lovers; and there was one special cunning one, who had perfair

suaded the youth that he did not love him, but he really loved him all the same; and one day when he was paying his addresses to him, he used this very argument that he ought to accept the non-lover rather than the lover; his

—

words were as follows: "All good counsel begins in the same way; a man should know what he is advising about, or his counsel will all come to nought. But people imagine that they know about the nature of

when they having come

things,

don't

know about them, and,

not to an understanding at first because they think that they know, they end, as might be expected, in contradicting one another and themselves. Now you and I must not be guilty of this fundamental error which we

condemn

in others; but as our question is whether the lover or non-lover is to be pre-

ferred, let us first of all agree in defining the

nature and power of love, and then, keeping our eyes upon the definition and to this appealing, let us further enquire whether love brings advantage or disadvantage. "Every one sees that love is a desire, and we

know

also that non-lovers desire the beautiful

and good.

Now

in

what way

is

the lover to be

distinguished from the non-lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one

is

is

pleasure, that

power

of misrule

is

called excess.

Now

excess has

bers,

and many forms, and any of these forms very marked gives a name, neither hon-

when

possessed by

many names, and many mem-

ourable nor creditable, to the bearer of the name. The desire of eating, for example, which

is

it is

desire of drink,

called gluttony,

called a glutton; the tyrannical

which

inclines the possessor of

name which

the desire to drink, has a

too obvious, and there can be as

only

is

doubt by what name any other appetite of the same family would be called; of that

now

my

I

which happens

—

little

will be the

it

dominant.

to be

name And

think that sou will perceive the drift of

word

discourse; but as every spoken

manner

is

in a

had better say further that the irrational desire which overcomes the tendency of opinion towards right, and is led away to the enjoyment of beauty, and especially of personal beauty, by the desires which are her own kindred that supreme desire, I say, which by leading conquers and by the force of passion is reinforced, from this very force, receiving a name, is plainer than the unspoken,

1

—

called love

(

tppoj^xei '«k epojc

description

and certainly not the terror of his enemies; which nobody can deny. And now let us tell what advantage or disadvantage the beloved will receive from the guardianship and society of his lover in the the next point to

him. But w

':

ot

is

'

time? Must he not nel the extn mitj when he

the anxiety ot his friends and also ot his lover,

matter of his property; this

in

then:.

himself,

and

v

intolerable

when

the

m

and, besides being inl over the world in all their indcluacy and someness when he is drunk.

And not only while his love is he mischievous and unpleasant, but when his love !

he becomes a {xrrtidious enemy of him on whom he showered his oaths ami and promises, [241 1 and yet could hard vail upon him to tolerate the tedium companv even trom motives ot irr hour of payment arrives, and now he is the servant of another master; instead of love and infatu. lom and temperance arc his 1

bosom

it

the beloved has not discov-

ered the change which has taken place in when he asks for a return and recalls to his

and doings; he bespeaking to the same person, and the other, not having the courage to recollection former sayings lieves himself to be

confess the truth, and not fil

die oaths and promises

know ing how which he made

to ful-

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

122

under the dominion of folly, and having now grown wise and temperate, docs not want to do as he did or to be as he was before. And so he runs away and is constrained to be a dethe oyster-shell

faulter;

1

has fallen with the

— he changes pursuit into

other side uppermost

while the other is compelled to follow him with passion and imprecation not knowing that he ought never Irom the first to have accepted a demented lover instead of a sensible non-lover; and that in making such a choice he was giving himself up to a faithless, morose, envious, disagreeable being, hurtful to his esflight,

tate,

hurtful to his bodily health,

and

still

more

hurttul to the cultivation of his mind, than

which there neither is nor ever will be anything more honoured in the eyes both of gods and men. Consider this, fair youth, and know that in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness; he has an appetite and wants to feed

upon you:

As wolves love lambs

so lovers love their loves.

you so, I am speaking in verse, and had better make an end; enough. Phaedr. I thought that you were only halfway and were going to make a similar speech But

I

told

therefore

I

about

all

lover.

Why do you not proceed?

Soc.

the advantages of accepting the non-

Does not your

I

add the praises of the non-lover, what become of me? Do you not perceive that I

to

will

already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me? And therefore I will only add that the non-lover has all the advantages in which the lover is accused of being deficient. And now I will say no more; there has been enough of both of them. Leaving the tale to its fate, [242] I will cross the river and make the best of my way home, lest a worse thing be inflicted upon me by you. Phaedr. Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon? there is the midday sun

am

standing still, as people say, in the meridian. Let us rather stay and talk over what has been said, and then return in the cool. Soc. Your love of discourse, Phaedrus, is superhuman, simply marvellous, and I do not believe that there is any one of your contempo1

game

which two

parties fled

or pursued according as an oyster-shell

which was

In allusion to a

thrown into the uppermost.

air fell

in

number

of speeches. I would except Simmias Theban, but all the rest arc tar behind \ou. And now I do verily believe that you ha\c been

the

the cause of another.

Phaedr. That

is

good news. But what do you

mean? Soc.

I

mean

to say that as

the stream the usual sign

was about to cross was given to me, I

which always iorbids, but never bids, do anything which I am going to do; and I thought that I heard a voice saying in my ear that I had been guilty of impiety, and that I must not go away until I had made an atonement. Now I am a diviner, though not a \crv good one, but I have enough religion tor mv own use, as you might say of a bad writer his writing is good enough for him; and am beginning to see that I was in error. O my friend, how prophetic is the human soul! At the time I had a sort ot misgiving, and, like Ib\cus.'*l was troubled; I feared that I might be buying honour from men at the price of sinning against that sign

me

to

—

I

Now

the gods."

What

Phaedr. Soc.

That was

I

recognize

my

error.

error? a dreadful speech

brought with you, and you made

which you utter one

me

as bad.

simplicity observe that

have got out of dithyrambics into heroics, when only uttering a censure on the lover? And if I

am

rancs who has either made or in one wav or another has compelled others to make an equal

with the dark or light side

How

Phaedr. Soc.

It

was

so?

foolish,

I

say,

—

to a certain ex-

impious; can anything be more dreadful? Phaedr. Nothing, if the speech was really such as you describe. Soc. Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphro-

tent,

dite,

and

a

god

3

Phaedr. So men say. Soc. But that was not acknowledged by Lysias in his speech, nor by you in that other speech which you by a charm drew from my lips. For if love be, as he surely is, a divinity, he cannot be evil. Yet this was the error of both the speeches. There was also a simplicity about them which was refreshing; [243] having no truth or honesty in them, nevertheless they pretended to be something, hoping to succeed in deceiving the manikins of earth and gain celebrity among them. Wherefore I must have a purgation. And I bethink me of an ancient purgation of mythological error which was devised, not by Homer, for he never had the wit to discover why he was blind, but by Stesichorus, who was a philosopher and knew the reason why; and therefore, when he lost his eyes, for that was the penalty which was inflicted upon him for reviling the lovely Helen, he at

»

r

1

\

1

i

i

once purged himself \nd the intation, vt hi< h began thus

m

and when

lie

had completed

his

poem, which

ii

called "the recanution," iminediatel) hi

No*

returned to him.

culirt Stesichorus 01

make m\

i

before

veiled

U>M and

intation

Ik-

in thai

I

M>ur.

i

re> ilin

foi

on ould be more agreeable to

1

.1

own. when we

of

tell

the-

1

—

aare say not, Socrates.

Soc. Therefore, because 1 blush

and

Love himself,

I

of

my

cars

also because

.it

I

the thought

am

afraid

or'

wash the brine out with water from the spring; and desire to

s.irnc name, 1! they madness to be I must have thought that there madness which was a noble t! words, parrot)} and p and the letter r is only a modern

insertion.

and

and therefore

tion,

Know

then, fair youth, that the former

was the word of Phaedrus, [244] the son of Vain Man. who dwells in the city of Myrrhina (Myrrhinusius). And this which I

is

is

it

An

faculty

1

the

other signs-

.

rational in\ese

-this, tor as

which supplies from

art

mind

1

1

trik

)

two

confirmed by the

I

ot birds or ot

ly

Soc.

this

:i

termed

discourse

And

which was given by them to the of futurity, whether

Phaedr. Be assured that he shall. You shall speak the praises of the lover, and Lysias shall be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same theme. Soc. You will be true to your nature in that, believe you.

and

both by the

rather than the non-lover.

I

;

with madness

to

Phaedr. Speak, and fear not. Soc. But where is the fair youth whom I was addressing before, and who ought to listen now; lest, if he hear me not, he should accept a non-lover before he knows what he is doing 3 Phaedr. He is close at hand, and always at your service.

•

In-

b
\\

when go move up ih< 1

1

*

«-

to

\

banquet

the vault

c*l

heaven

1

.«n«l 1

ifim the)

il,

will

jealous) hai no place in th

foi

tul choir. Bui

i»i

man) ^

:

the top

he chariots ol

it •

• 1

h-\

but

others labour,

the-

re

foi ilir

tpidly

I

\

i
|

tangible essence, visible onl) to mind, the pilot ot the soul. The divine intelligence, being nur-

tured upon

d

which

receiving the food proper to

it.

is

capable

rejoices at

and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution ot the worlds brings her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge lute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knov absolute in existence absolute: and beholding the other true existences in like manner, and feasting upon them, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home; and there the charioteer putting up his ho: the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar reality,

to drink.

[24S] Such is the life of the gods; but ot other souls, that which follows God best and is likest to him lifts the head of the charioteer into the outer world,

and

is

carried round in the

revolution, troubled indeed bv the steeds,

with I

:

difficulty

other only

and

beholding true being; while an-

rises

and

falls,

and

sees,

and

ag.iin

by reason of the unruhness ot the steeds. The rest of the souls are also longing tails to see

after the

ll. is

n. nu-

seen truth in the second degree shall be

mind and pure knowledge, and

the intelligence ol every soul

beholding

some musical and loving

upper world and they

not being strong

enough they

all

follow, but

are carried round

below the surface, plunging, treading on one

'uel; the

which

ot

is

the third class

s

:

or economist, or trader: the fourth shall

lover ot gymnastic

shall lead the lite ot a

prophet or

the sixth the character 01

.1

pod

him or

s-

:

imitative artist will be assigned; to the

the

lite

I

I

st vcutli

of an artisan or husfaandmai

eighth that ot

a sophist or

—

ninth that of a tyrant; probation, in which he

improves, and he

who

demaj

al!

the

I

who doc docs unr:

de-

teriorates his lot.

years must elapse before the one can return to t! whence she came. [249] tor she camber wings in less; onl\ the soul ot a guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not devoid of philosophy.

Ten thousand

soul ot each

mm

•

1

in the third of the

recurring jKncxls

ol

sand years; he is distinguished from the nary good man who gains wings in three t: sand years:— and thev who choose this lite _ three times in succession have wing them, and go away at the end of three t! sand years. But the others receive judgment when they have completed their first life, and 1

after the

judgment they

go,

some

the houses ot correction which

of

them

to

the

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

126

and are punished; others to some place heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they please. The

amazement; but they

earth,

in

in

this rapture

soul of a

man may

pass into the

life

of a beast,

or from the beast return again into the

man.

But the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form. For a man must have intelligence of universals, and be able to proceed from the many particulars of sense to one conception of reason; this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being. And there-

—

—

mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in fore the

recollection to those things in

which God

abides,

beholding which He is what He is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired. Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore thought to be mad. And I have

and

in

shown

what

are ignorant of

means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light of justice or temperance or any of the higher ideas which are precious to souls in the earthly copies of

them: they are seen through

a glass dimly;

and

there are few who, going to the images, behold

them the realities, and these only with diffiThere was a time when with the rest of the happy band they saw beauty shining in in

culty.

brightness,

— we philosophers following

gods; and then

in the

company with other

train of Zeus, others in

we beheld

the beatific vision

mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining inpure light, pureourselves and not vet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the bod\, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger over the memory of scenes which have passed away. But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her there shining in company with the celestial forms; and coming to earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the clearest

and were

initiated into a

aperture of sense. For sight

is the most piercing though not by that is wisdom seen; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her, and the other ideas, if they had visible counterparts, would be equally lovely. But this is the

of our bodily senses;

privilege of beauty, that being the loveliest she

most palpable

is

also the

is

not newly initiated or

to sight.

who

Now

he

who

has become cor-

rupted, does not easily rise out of this world

this of all inspirations to be the noblest

to the sight of true beauty in the other; he looks

and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, and that he who

only at her earthly namesake, and instead of being awed at the sight of her, he is given over to pleasure, and like a brutish beast he rushes on to enjoy and beget; [251] he consorts with

loves the beautiful

is

called a lover because he

For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her

partakes of

it.

passing into the form of man. But

all

souls

do

not easily recall the things of the other world;

may have seen them or they may have been

[250] they time only,

for a short

unfortunate and, having had their hearts turned to unrighteousness through some corrupting influence, they may have lost the in their earthly lot,

memory

of the holy things which once they saw. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them; and they, when they behold here any image of that other world, are rapt

wantonness, and is not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nature. But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been the spectator of is

many glories in

amazed when he

like face or form,

sees

the other world,

any one having a god-

which

is

the expression of

a shudder runs through him, and again the old awe steals over him; then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god; then while he gazes on him

divine beauty; and at

first

I'll \l lion,

an.

DIM

S

tlir

I

in unusual beat and the receives the effluence ol beaut) thro the eyes, the wing moistens and h< Vnd

ity,

warms, the parti out ol which tlir .uul \s lm h had been hith< .uul bad prevented tlir w ing from

..111:

es into i

i

us

\\c

a

,

;

.

ma)

I*-

•.•

m.l

i

wlu.

Il

ti

Forth, are melted, .uul .is nourithi ims uym\ him, the lowei end ol the w

iwell .uul grow from the i"«»t up and the growth extendi undei ilir uholr soul foi once the whole \\.»s \s in hiring tins process the w lu.lt- soul ii all in a state ol ebullition .uul effervescence, which ma) be compared to the irritation .uul uneasi is

to

wards;

may

1

iuss in

tlu-

mum m

bubbles up, .uul hai is

a feeling ol

uneasiness .uul

but

beloved meets •

blc

|

K-r eye

warm motion

.uul

ot

she

which flow emotion

towards her, therefore called

is refreshed .uul warmed by them, and then she ceases trom her pain with joy. But when she is parted trom her beloved and her

tails,

then the orifices of the pass. me wing shoots dry up ami

out ot which the

.

and intercept the germ ot' the wing; which, being shut up with the emotion, throbbing as with the pulsations ot' an artery, pricks the aperture which is nearest, until at length the entire soul is pierced and maddened and pained, and at the recollection ot beaut \ is again delighted. And from both ot' them together the soul is oppressed at the strangeness ot her condition, and is in a great strait and excitement, and in her madness can neither sleep by night nor abide in her place by day. And

wherever she thinks that she

will behold the

beautiful one, thither in her desire she runs.

And when

she has seen him, and bathed herself in the waters of beauty, her constraint is loosened, and she is refreshed, and has no more

pangs and pains; and

this

is

the sweetest of

all

SlU h

.is

I

\>ct

lov
l.i

ill

i

i\

ihr

,

in.

d upon. I

s

h.r

htrdly,

!

ffld

them

Mir.

I

men ind

one another, lie u ill rc.isoiiN oi his arrangement, and show whj one soul is persuaded bj particuUu form ol inrni, and anothei not \ ou lit\ c hit upon vei j good w a) s thai in the true and only \ nibjtt ^.m be ki forth 01 treated b) n rules ol .ut. whether in speak writing. Hut the writers oi the present day, ai who* (eel you have sat, craftily conceal the nature ol the iouI which they know quite well, Nor, until tlu\ adopt our method ol reading and writing, gas we admit th.it they write by rules ol an /'•• Wh.u is our method : Soc, cannot give you the exact details; but I should hkc to tell you generally, .is Ear as is in m\ power, how man ought to proceed accord ing to rules ol art i

!

:

thru km-! •

to

IN

in.

;

I

.1

.

tins

m

;

..

.

•

.

lux)

i

t

it

.i

||

then

u Would \ .uid k have heard from Lysiai thing whi< h in Phacdr. It tr\ t

but

the

.11

r

moment

Cf.

I

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

138

Phaedr. Certainly, he does. believe that he has a clever and inI genious case of this sort: He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other; he is brought into court, and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies: the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other should prove that they were alone, and should argue thus: "How could a weak man " like me have assaulted a strong man like him: The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in I not right, Phaedrus? the system. Phaedr. Certainly. Soc. Bless me, what a wonderfully mysterious art is this which Tisias or some other gentleman, in whatever name or country he rejoices, has discovered. Shall we say a word to him or not? Phaedr. What shall we say to him? Soc. Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I were saying that the probability of which he speaks was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth, and we had just been affirming that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything else to say about the art of speaking we should like to hear him; but if not, we are satisfied with our own view, that unless a man estimates Soc.

—

5

Am

the various characters of his hearers and to divide all things into classes

hend them under

and

is

able

to compre-

single ideas, he will never be

a skilful rhetorician even within the limits of

human power. And this skill he will not attain without a great deal of trouble, which a good man ought to undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to God and always to act acceptably to Him as far as in

wiser

him

men

lies;

[274]

for there

than ourselves, that a

is

a saying of

man

of sense

should not try to please his fellow-servants (at least this should not be his first object) but his good and noble masters; and therefore if the way is long and circuitous, marvel not at this, for, where the end is great, there we may take the longer road, but not for lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may say, Tisias, that if you do not mind going so far, rhetoric has a fair beginning here.

Phaedr. I think, Socrates, that this is admiif only practicable. Soc But c\cn to tail in an honourable object is honourable. Phaedr. True.

rable,

Enough appears

Soc.

of a true

and

to

false art of

have been said by us speaking.

Phaedr. Certainly. Soc. But there is something \et to be said of proprietv and impropriety of writing. Phaedr. Yes. Soc. Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to

God?

Phaedr. No, indeed. Do you.' Soc. I have heard a tradition of the ancients, whether true or not they only know; although if we had found the truth ourselves, do vou think that we should care much about the opinions of men? Phaedr. Your question needs no answer; but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard. Soc. At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which

is

called the Ibis

is

sacred

him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but to

his great discovery

was the use

of letters.

Now

days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. It would in those

take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts.

to

But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the

memory and

for the wit.

Thamus

re-

O

most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge plied:

of the utility or inutility of his to the users of

stance,

you

who

them. [275]

own And

inventions in this in-

are the father of letters,

from a

own

children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will paternal love of your

create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, be-

1

l'i

w

the)

-

:ll

ate

not

I

\

will trust to the external written chai

remember of themselves

not

you have dis overed

ii

k

hut

not

in lid not

which

mci

t

on!)

but

truth,

the

Mlriit

the)

they

ling;

having

the

will

s!n>w

be

thi

k

comp

tiresome

wisdom without

oJ

tl>r

x

ites,

Egypt, or

\ihi

.in

^

easily invent

any other country. s is tradition in the temple ot Ion. th.it o.iks lust gave prophetU utter inces. The menoi old, unlike in their simpli< ity .'.

i

1

I

oi

.1

young philosophy, deemed th.it the) heard the truth even from "oak or rock," wasenough lor them; where. is \ou seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not true, hut who the speaker is and trom what country the tale it

it

.l!'.

husb

.1

t.ikr the

w

;

1

them

plant

"hiring the

!

'•

i

t.'

Iw~

I

.

aid

.

•:

:

S

I

fu

I

w ill be hearen »>i many ind w ill have leai ned noth to he omnis< ieni and w ill generally uth;

rc.ilit\

DKI

rem in

to

ciplrs ti

I

memoi

iIh-ii

them sake

-

amusement and pastime

ot

m

is

in

he WOUld

le.ot

at

e.irnest

he iOWl in

I

lit'

uses husbandry, and months the seeds whkh he

I

in

if


ut

hersell

«hr

fcrphdl


m any one whodoes sen ice to .mother un-

oi

But

w ho

the

is

er

this

h

is .is

ti

ommoi

1

m\

contribution as could m

good

I'.uis.mi.is

1

in

I

,

1

.1;

wha h have been wise to speak; and AriatooV turn ot Aristophanes anced way

in

I

1

1

the

••

had eaten too miM h, or fron he bad the hiccough,and wasoblij turns with r\ xim.u husthe 1

;

reclining on the COUch

bdow

him.

I

he said, you ought enl. COUgh, or to s(K-.ik in mv turn until

:

.

us,

':.

I

oil.

the one capable of

do lx»th. said Eiyiimai your turn, and do J and while am speaking let you to hold your breath, and 1! after JTOU done so tor some time the hicCOUgh is no better, then gargle with a little water; and it it still continues, tickle your nose with something and sneeze; and it you sue; the most violent hiccough is surwill do as you prescribe,

virtue, the other seeking to acquire

get on.

each ot them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any service which he t.in to his gracious loving one; and the other that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him who is making him wise and good;

communicating wisdom and them with a view to education and wisdom; when the two laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one then, and then only, may the beloved yield with hon-

—

our to the lover. Nor when love is of this disinterested sort is there any disgrace in being deceived, but in every other case there is equal disgrace in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to his lover under the impression that he is rich, [185] and is disappointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor, is disgraced all the same: for he has done

show that he would give himself up to any one's "uses base" for the sake of money; but this is not honourable. And on the his best to

will

I

I

s[K-.ik in

.

I

1 1

I

Eryximachui spoke as follows: Seeing that Pausamas made a fair Ixrginmng. [l86j and but a lame ending, must endeavour I I

think that he has rightl\ tinguished two kinds of love. Hut my art further informs me that the double love is merely an affection of the soul of mar: his deficiency.

I

-

the

tair.

or towards anything, but

in the bodies of all

of the earth, is

and

the conclusion

from

how

my own

I

animals and

may

which

art of

say in I

seem

in

all

to

found

to be

productions that

have gathered

medicine, whence

great and wonderful

deity of love,

is

I

learn

and universal is the whose empire extends over all

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

156

human. And from medicine I will begin that I may do honour to my art. There are in the human body these two kinds of love, which are confessedly different and unlike, and being unlike, they have loves and desires which are unlike; and the desire of things, divine as well as

the healthy

is

one, and the desire of the diseased

another; and as Pausanias was just now saying that to indulge good men is honourable, is

—

and bad men dishonourable: so too in the body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the bad elements and the elements of disease are not to be indulged, but discouraged. And this is what the physician has to do, and in this the art of medicine consists: for medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the body, and how to satisfy them or not; and the best he

who

able to separate fair love

making love grow up among them; and thus

these other cases, music implants,

and unison

to

music, too,

is

concerned with the principles of

application to harmonv and rhythm. Again, in the essential nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in discerning love which has not yet become double. But when you want to use them in actual life. either in the composition of songs or in the cor rect performance of airs or metres composed already, which latter is called education, then the difficulty begins, and the good artist is needed. Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the duty of accepting the temperate, and those who are as yet intemperate only that they may become temperate, and love

in

their

—

of preserving their love;

gar Polyhymnia,

and again, of the

vul-

who must

friendship and accord in these elements, was

be used with circumspection that the pleasure be enjoyed, but may not generate licentiousness; just as in my own art it is a great matter so to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may gratify his tastes without the attendant evil of disease. Whence I infer that in music, in medicine, in all other things human as well as divine, both loves ought to be noted as far as may be, [18S] for they are both present. The course of the seasons is also full of both

the creator of our art, as our friends the poets

these principles;

physician

is

is

from foul, or to convert one into the other; and he who knows how to eradicate and how to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the most hostile elements in the conand make them loving friends, is a Now the most hostile are the most opposite, such as hot and cold, bitter and sweet, moist and dry, and the like. And my stitution

skilful practitioner.

ancestor, Asclepius,

here

tell us,

and

knowing how

believe

I

to

implant

them; and not only

medicine in every branch, but the arts of gymand husbandry are under his dominion. [ i8y] Any one who pays the least attention to the subject will also perceive that in music nastic

same reconciliation of opposites;and this must have been the meaning Heracleitus, although his words are not ac-

there I

is

the

suppose that

of

The One is united by harmony of the bow and the

curate; for he says that

disunion, like the lyre.

Now

harmony

there

is

is

an absurdity in saying that

discord or

is

composed

of elements

But what he probably meant was, that harmony is composed of differing notes of higher or lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by the art of music; for if the higher and lower notes still disagreed, there could be no harmony clearly not. For harmony is a symphony, and symphony is an agreement; but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree there cannot be; you cannot harmonize

which are

still

in a state of discord.

—

that is

which

disagrees. In like

compounded

and long, once and now in accord; which accordance, the former instance, medicine, so in all

differing as in

manner rhythm

of elements short

and when,

as

I

was saying, the

elements of hot and cold, moist and dry. attain the harmonious love of one another and blend in temperance and harmony, they bring to men. animals, and plants health and plenty, and do them no harm; whereas the wanton love, getting the upper hand and affecting the seasons of the year, is very destructive and injurious, being the source of pestilence, and bringing many other kinds of diseases on animals and plants; for hoar-frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love, which to know in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the sea-

sons of the year

more

all

is

sacrifices

termed astronomy. Furtherand the whole province of

which is the art of communion between gods and men these, I say, are concerned only with the preservation of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all manner of impiety is likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honouring and reverencing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honours the other love, whether in his feelings towards gods or parents, towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of divination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination divination,

—

M tlu-

i%

peacemakei

M

i

ItWr

«

t

li

IN

godi uml men,

•!

•

knowledge ol th< h exist len< ics w

l>\

i

•..

i

human

in

lo

t!

force oi

ind the lo ted w nli

love

ially,

u Km

ind which

ii

l»

i

company with

perfected in

tern

W lull' men, h.is ihe greatest power, and in the source out happiness and harmony, and m us h icndj with the gods w ho are above un. and u :ih one another. dare vi\ thai w hu h might be said in niNlu

pel iik e .ind

e,

i

I

I

i

and he u ith set en t

round

.»

. but this w.in not intentional,

you, Aristophanes, ike

some

ma) now lupplj the amis lmr ol commendation;

othei

perceive that you

I

rid oi the

.in-

d,

I

I

.1

1

I

1

1

I

You I

are quite right, said Aristophanes, laughwill

unsay

my

words; DUl do you please

Hot to watch me. as

I

tear that in the speech

I am about to make, instead ol others laughing with mc, which is to the manner horn or" our muse and would he all the better, shall only he laughed at by them. Ho you expect to shoot your holt and es Aristophanes? Well, perhaps it you are very careful and bear in mind that you will Ik- called to account, I may be induced to let you off. Aristophanes professed to open another \ein o! discourse; he had a mind to praise Love in another way, unlike that either ot Pausanias or Eryximachus. Mankind, he said, judging by their neglect of him. have never, as think, at ail understood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely have built noble temples and altars, and oilered solemn sacrifices in his honour; but this is not done, and most certainly ought to be done:

which

1

I

is the best friend of men, and the healer of the ills which are the great impediment to the happiness of the race. will try to describe his power to you. and you shall teach the rest of the world what I am

since of

all

the gods he

the helper

I

teaching you. In the the nature of

first

place, let

man and what

now

I

d Aj istophanes, w ho Followed, the hiccough is gone; not, however, until plied tin wonder whethei ihr \\ and harmony ol tlu- body has love ol such noises and ticklings, tor no sooner applied the sru ing than was cured. ryximachus said: Beware, friend Aristoph« gfa you are going to speak, you .ire making fun oi me; and shall have to watch and see whether cannot have a laugh at your expense, when you might speak m pe ing.

i

mm

mc

treat of

has happened to

do.

i

and hr

. turning foUf

Icet.

right in

and over

v.

when

v.

hr

ith

were thrre. and 1>
SI

dances, hr

is

(

.ur

:

i

lord

kindness evci and nevci gives unkind good, the wondei oi the the amazement o( the gods; desired by those who have no part in him, and pro to those who baVC the Inner part in him; es

in.iniiri

kliru the

!

||

should spc.ik Well ilitrritlon u

Ii. ili;'

V,

ness; the friend oi the

hun

.

parent of delicacy, luxury, desire,

Fondness,

[ardful ol the good, regard

softness,

utc to

comrade, helper; glor) ol gods and men, leader best and brightest: in whose

whk h

footsteps

let

ever)

man

follow, sweetl) singing

honour and joining in thai sweet strain with which love (."harms the souls ol gods and men. Such is the speech, Phaedrus, hah playful, yet having a certain measure oi serious: in his

my

which, according to the god.

ability.

I

dedicate to

t\ t

an

imagu

gathered

l>c

a:, '

that

"he is all this." and ':' Milking hun ap|>car the

who knou hun upon those who know h:m

ot all to those

not un|H)se

I

noble and solemn In hearsed. But as

mn

pn

ot

misund

I

when

the praise

I

nature ot

-

said that

'

;

.'

I

had clone speaking, was a general eheer; the young man was thought to have spoken in a manner worthy of himself, ami of the g And Socrates, looking at Kryximachus, said: Tell me. son ot Acumen us, was there not reason in my tears.- and was not a true prophet when said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that should be in a strait. The part of the prophecy which concerns Agathon, replied Kryximachus, appears to me to be true; but not the other part that you

Phaedrus, whether you would have the truth about love, spoken in am and in any order which may happen to into my mind at the time. Will that Ix

will be in a strait.

able to you?

\:

Stodemus

saicl

that there

1

I

:

I

—

Why. my

dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak attcr he has heard such a rich and varied discoui am especially struck with the lx*auty of the concluding words who could listen to them I

—

wuhout amazement

2

When

I

reflected

on the

immeasurable inferiority of my own powers. I Was ready to run away for shame, if there had been a possibility of escape. For was reminded of Gorgias, and at the cm} of his speech fancied that Agathon was shaking at me the Gorginian or Gorgonian head of the great master I

I

my

would take

I

must beg t»» be absolved from ise which made in ig Euripides would say was a promise of the and not ot the mind do not praise ill strain: tor deed, cannot. But it you like t hr.tr di turn,

When Agathon

I:

vou should reall) should ap[>car to prai

the evil: in every word, work, wish, Eear

ol

sa> tour, pilot,

or

I

)

lips

:

:

I

;

I

about love,

am

I

manner, though

I

ready

tie the easiest way, and

...

to the wise

shall take

w

in

bai

is

"I ben

b
t:

L

i»i

"What "

;

tal

th
t

foolish

beaut] in every form

is

to

one

ii

and the samel Ami when he perceives tins be will abate Ins violent love oi the one, which he will despise and deem a sm.ill thing, and will

me

a lover oi

next stage the

lu-

all

beautiful forms; in the

will consider thai the beauty

mind

oi the

is more honourable than the beauty outward form. So that it a virtuous soul

have but

a little

comeliness, he will be content

and tend him, ami

and brim: to the birth thoughts which may improve the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and see the beauty oi institutions and laws, and to understand that the beauty oi them all one family, ami that personal beauty is a trifle; and alter laws and institutions he will go on to love

will search out

i

to the sciences, that he

may

see their beauty,

being not like a servant in love with the beauty oi one youth or man or institution, himselt a slave

mean ami narrow-minded,

hut drawing

towards dnd contemplating the beauty, he will create

many

tair

is

and noble

revealed to

him

which is the science of beauty everywhere. To this I will proceed; please to give me your very best attention: of a single science,

"He who

has been instructed thus far in the who has learned to see the

things ot love, and

due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, [21 1 J Socrates, is the final cause of all our former toils) a nature which in the tirst place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or beautiful in

—

waxing and waning; secondly, not

fair in

dtmtmii

I

•

out

tint tin

niiliK in r

thai beauty,

(..

the

oi is

11.

true .t

II

fai

from the

1

1

u

beauties «»t earth and moui vikc oi that otha beaui only,

thr

and from out

two

in

t.ur

prai bees,

forms, and fi and from fair pi notions, until from t.ur notion'. the notion oi absolute beauty, and what the essence oi beauty is. Ins. ius." nid the stra th.it hie above all others which man should fail

ill

I

one

point of view and foul in another, or at one

live,

the

contemplatioo «>t beauty absoluti beauty which ii you once beheld, nu wi in

see

not to DC after the incisure ot gold.

garments, ami

.

and youths, w b enCC now entrain es -I \u and D a one would be content to live seeing them and conversing with them without drink, it that were possible look .it them and to Ik- with them. But wh.it if man had eyes to see the true beauty the diwnc mean, pure .\m\ clear and U1 beauty, fair boys

I

—

I

not clogged with the [Pollutions of

vast

thoughts and notions in boundless love oi a dom; until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the vision

but lasting, whii

ami

all

the colours ami

— thither

\

.unties ol

:

human

life

looking, ami holding converse with

the true beauty simple

member how

in that

and divine ;

communion

/

21 2 j

only,

I

Ixrl.

ing beauty with the eve oi the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not imagi but realities! for he has hold not ot an image but oi a reality ). and ortfa and nour ing true virtue to become the friend and be immortal, it mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble lil Such. PhaedlUS and I speak not on!\ were the a you, but to all of you I

—

—

am

persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment ot this end hutima; anil

man

I

nature will not

:id

a helper better

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

168

And therefore, also, man ought to honour him as

than love.

I

say that e

myself honour him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit I

of love according to the measure of

my

ability

now and ever. The words which I have spoken, you, Phaedrus, may call an encomium of love, or anything else which you please. When Socrates had done speaking, the com-

pany applauded, and Aristophanes was beginning to say something in answer to the allusion which Socrates had made to his own speech, when suddenly there was a great knocking at the door of the house, as of revellers, and the sound of a flute-girl was heard. Agathon told the attendants to go and see who were the intruders. "If they are friends of ours,'* he said, 1

them in, but if not, say that the drinking is over." A little while afterwards they heard the voice of Alcibiades resounding in the court; he was in a great state of intoxication, and kept roaring and shouting "Where is Aga"invite

thon? Lead me to Agathon," and at length, supported by the flute-girl and some of his attendants, he found his way to them. "Hail, friends," he said, appearing at the door crowned with a massive garland of ivy and violets, his head flowing with ribands. "Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your

Or

crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away? For I was unable to come yesterday, and therefore I am here to-day, carrying on my head these ribands, that taking them from my own head, I may crown the head of this fairest and wisest of men, as I may be allowed to call him. Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? Yet I revels?

know /

shall

I

very well that

I

am

speaking the truth,

may laugh. But first tell shall we have the understand-

21 3] although you

me;

if I

come

ing of which or not?"

I

in

spoke?

2

The company were

Will you drink with

me

vociferous in begging

would take his place among them, and Agathon specially invited him. Thereupon he was led in by the people who were with him; and as he was being led, intending to crown Agathon, he took the ribands from his own head and held them in front of his eyes; he was thus prevented from seeing Socrates, who made way for him, and Alcibiades took the vacant place between Agathon and Socrates, 3

Cf. 205.

Supra, 212: "Will you have a very drunken

man?"

etc.

couch.

By all means: but ner in our revels?

who makes said

the third part-

Alcibiades, turning

round and Socrates.

here

and

starting up as he caught By Heracles, he said, what

sight of is

this

'

Socrates always lying in wait lor me. always, as his way is, coming out at all is

sorts of unsuspected places: and now, what have you to say for yourself, and wh\ ;ire you lying here, where perceive that you have con1

trived to find a place, not by a joker or lover of jokes, like Aristophanes, but by the fairest

of the

company?

Socrates turned to

Agathon and

said:

I

must

ask you to protect me, Agathon; for the passion of this man has grown quite a serious matter to me. Since I became his admirer I have never been allowed to speak to any other one, or so much as to look at them. If I do, he goes wild with envy and jealousy, and not onlv abuses me but can hardly keep his hands me, and at this moment he may do me some

harm. Please to see to this, and either reconcile me to him, or, if he attempts violence, protect me, as I am in bodily fear of his mad and passionate attempts.

There can never be reconciliation between you and me, said Alcibiades; but for the present I will defer your chastisement. And 1 must you, Agathon, to give me back some of the ribands that I may crown the marvellous head of this universal despot I would not have him complain of me for crowning you, and neglecting him, who in conversation is the conqueror of all mankind; and this not only once, as you were the day before yesterday, but alw; Whereupon, taking some of the ribands, he crowned Socrates, and again reclined.

—

Then he sober,

that he

1

and in taking the place he embraced Agathon and crowned him. Take of! his sandals, said Agathon, and let him make a third on the same

my

friends, to be

a thing «ot to be

endured: you

said:

which

is

—

You

seem,

must drink lor that was the agreement under which I was admitted and I elect myself master of the feast until you are well drunk. Let us have a large goblet, Agathon, or rather, he said,

—

addressing the attendant, bring

me

that

wine-cooler. The wine-cooler his eye

was

quarts

—

serve,

my

a vessel

he filled bade the attendant fill this

which had caught holding more than two and emptied, [214] and it again for Socrates. Ob-

friends, said Alcibiades, that this in-

genious trick of mine will have no effect on Socrates, for he can drink any quantity of wine and not be at all nearer being drunk. Socrates

1

M

I

the

J|

I

I

N

m

*

Mlll.U

the attendant

ulti.lt

W

litis N.U.I

hive neith
^>£y^*ys>g>^g>^>£>^£>^^>^*>^£.

[jo] Meno. Can you

tell

me, Socrates, whether

acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other virtue

way?

O

Meno, there was a time when famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend AristipSocrates.

the Thessalians were

pus.

And

this

is

Gorgias' doing; for

when he

came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians,

fell

in love

am

as

poor as the

rest

virtue

you

is.'

And am

with his

of the world;

say further that

I

I

the "quale"?

How,

if I

knew

much

alike.

body who had. Men. There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the

man

—he should know how to ad-

state,

and

in the administration of

to benefit his friends

himself.

174

have.

for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying that I have never found any-

and he must

can I know nothing at all of

my

Men. Very true. Soc. Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is;

minister the

how

this report of

I

suspect that you and he think

know

the "quid" of anything

back

Men. And did you not think that he knew? Soc. I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for

virtue of a

confess with

to carry

dear boy, but you have never known of any one else who did, in my judgment. Men. Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?

may

it

I

I

Thessaly? Soc. Not only that,

shame that I know literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not

and

I

to

Soc. Yes,

wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot my dear Meno. [yi] Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: "Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not." And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty,

tell if he was fair, or the opposite and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could? Men. No, Indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what

Meno, could

of fair; rich

is

A

and harm

his enemies;

also be careful not to suffer

woman's

virtue,

if

harm

you wish

to

"

|

Ml kn.'W iboul tut)

mi)

ilt.it,

tO "I.!.

in

ilio be caul)

hn

I

hoUSC,

.ni.l

den ribed ».r,|.

175 the

\\ I,., I

indoors, and obej bei husbaj

in

condition

;

triu. lie. Ik. in!

oi

Of

t>i

numbei

definitions oi them;

t»'i

and

each

actions

tin-

01

ol

VII

t

irtucs

\

young

life,

(ft

.u;rs ol

and no

less,

virtue

is

ol us in

l.u

k

relatn .ill

\

hi

virti

thai

imc mi) be said i>i Iov« fortunate am, Menol Win S you fai one virtue, you present mr with 1 iwarm oi them, which are in N*>tn keeping. Suppose that v.m \ on the figure ol the iwarm, and ask oi you, What ii the nature »»t the b and you answer that there arc man) kinds oi bees, and repl) Bui ^l*' bees diftei .is bees, be cause there are many and different kinds ol them; or arc they not rather to be distinguished In some other quality, .is for example beauty, low would you answer me? size, or ahape? Men. should answer that bees do not differ From one another, as bees. tad it went on to s.iv: That is what I desire to know, Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike; would you Ik* able tO answer .

I

1

••

thu

without

Met

I

1

trm and

Men,

!

i»ist

U.ih men and women good men and women, '

to

1

rrt.ii'

i

Ik-

1

•

S.ill.

ue.

1

I

I

—

one

Men. They

I

should.

And

Men.

so of the virtues,

understand? I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish. Soc. When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to

Men.

size,

would you say the same of health, and strength? Or is the nature of

health always the same, whether in

man

or

Men. They would Then now that

should say that health

is

the same,

man and woman. Soc. And is not this true of size and strength If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reaboth in

:

son of the same form and of the same strer subsisting in her which there is in the man.

the- sameness of all virtue and remcmlxr what and Gorgiai say that wrtuc is. Men. Will you ha\c one definition of them

has been proven,

mean

to say that strength, as strength,

man

ference

Men.

or

woman,

2

That

Soc.

the same.

Is

is

know

them

all,

tue

the |>owcr

is

clude

and

I

And

virtue?

all

And

in a slave,

who governed

whether

there any dif-

Cf. Tfuractctus, 146.

1260*-

dclini'

not what to sav. but that

Is

same

virtue the

Meno? Can Ix:

in a

child

the child govern his

any longer a

and would he s\..

Men. think not. Socrates. No, indeed; there v« I

will not virtue, as virtue, be 13.

seeking.

ha\e one

Setc.

Yet once more, fair friend: according is "the power of governing"; but

in that.

to you, virtue

Men. i.

am

to

father, or the slave his master;

think not.

Cf. Aristotle, Politics,

I

ning mankind. does this definition ol \irtuc in-

do vou not add I

what

you want

I:

I

:

[j$] Soc. a

is

tr\

all

.

of

not.

Soc.

Soc. I

temperate and

1:

woman? Men.

Ik-

Yes.

hen all men are good in the and by participation in the same virtui 11. Stub is the And they surely would not bjVC good in the same way, Unless their virtue had been the same?

Do you

and

un-

I

however many .\n

(

the time w h< n

l

to

be

Icd^c by putt in

imisi

ul

this .is

.«t

man, which only need

»

nto U»

lit

him, both

Kts in

:

h.i

he

foi

v

.ilu

t

i\

.

.ilu.iss citJ

•

>b\ h'lislv.

\nJ

thai

the truth ol

ii

thingi .ilw.iss

.ill

is imn Wherefore be ol good cheer, and u\ to fed m hal you do not know, or rather what you do not remembei like what you feel, aomehow, thai

existed in the loul, then the s.ml

I

arc- s.a

I

is

m»t

\ml

Meno, like what am laying. have said ol which am not altogether confident Bui thai we shall be better I,

things

1

1

I

ami braver and Less helpless u we think thai we ought to enquire, than we should have hern it

',.

indulged in the idle fancy thai thei no knowing and no use m seeking to know what we di> not know; that is a theme upon which am ready to right, in word and deed, to the utmost oi my power. There again, Socrates, your words

membt

or rather,

alone

n.

me

.ire.iureeJth.it a

man

I

gether into the nature

ot virtue

2

Men. By all means. Socrates. Ami \ct would much rather return to my original question. Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we I

should regard

it

as a thing to DC taught, or as

a gift ot nature, or as

other

way

Soc.

to

men

in

some

:

Had

ot myself,

coming

I

the

Meno,

command I

ot

you

{

should

enquire about that which lie does not know, shall you And make An effort to enquire to-

as well as

would not have enquired

whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained "what it is." But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself, such being your notion of freedom, must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of i thing of which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question "Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way." to be argued upon hypothesis? [Sj] As the geometriiamwhen he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable of being inscribed in a certain circle, I

it

taught; and

lx-

Men.

Then, aswe

irtue

\

is

knowli

Yrtainly.

(

this question:

excel lent.

Soc.

it

;

Then now we have

I

.

d
'i

llol I).

!.

.

i

l'\

m

(who

recently

h.is

4

made himaeu

Polycrates), but h\ his

,i\

w\

.1

Anthcmion, who

i

;

m ho

I

in

insolent,

not p

ei

.

well condition

.1

'

•

in

\

,

htm

to

arc the t

\

whom

inn

«-i

.

Ins h

edu< ition, as the Athenian pci ban to think. tor the) choose

from

i

and indua

ikill

01

ifns son oi

.

own

\ou

.ire

hkels

ri

to learn !

the

fill i

in

der

I

thus:

matter

tin-

we

It

to be a

them;

In

i |

Or

v

we wanted htm to we not send him to

il

Uer, should .

tl.

What, A

Certainly.

.

tor

rupting influent

to the physicians? I

w

ot milir, 'lie

good physi< ian, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him

ranted Meoo

|>c,

whether w ho they

\:i\tus. to help me and youi answering our question, Who arc

tc.ulu

thr

.irr

men

arc. Plc.isc-.

Mctn>

thrsr

th.it

be a '^n^\ cob

do you me. in

the cobl

who

to

DOt only

corrupt those

/

An J

Soc.

so forth:

in

s.i\

who

these arc

tli.it

do them

••

n
metm. fOU aware t}. ami other politicians have doubts wheti. tue can Ik- taught or not. but ti. Qjfl the

And

.ire t

.ire

same thi: Men. Where does he SO) In these elegiac va

poet sa\s the very

.

make with \ou

Do

hU

I

to thi

1 will lose

t'.

I

thr imteUig

..

you observe

that virtue

I

v

.1!!

tins

:

when

But

ii

place, the) havi

and, in

th>-

>•n
r

indeed, Scm

listen to

ill

will

Hi.it

tlir

unjust, and hateful n> the gods.

is

i

w

I

nut no qui< k ol apprehension ai the jud

tor tQ art

snd

\n\

inakr thr

am

that

appro> ing

in

ilu\ do,

h w

'I

m

and

would you ihou

low

and

.III

Ins fathei

ist 1

him, dies ihmumK

nil

i

ates; ai

least

il

they

me.

^

.it

i.

r

s

Bui they will be sure to listen it they find thai jrou are good speaker. There was notion thai came into my mind while you w

th.it

ting;

said to myself: "Well,

1

Euthyphro does prove

me

to

thai

and whai til

it

1

:

may

be hateful to the gods,

still

piety

and im

piety are not adequately defined In these dis tiiutions. tor that

which

is

hateful to the gods

h.is been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, do not .isk you to prove this; I will suppose, it you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such will amend the definition so an action. Bui tar .is to say that what all the gods hair is impious, and what they love pious or holy; ami I

I

what some

of

them

love

and others hate

is

and impiety? 3

Soc.

I

am conwhy not.

no reason But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider. Euth. Yes. I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which cerned. Euthyphro, there

they

is

Ought we

enquire into the truth of this. Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others

to

What do you

2

Euth.

We

say

;

We

should enquire; and

shall

in a little while.

wish holy

I

believe that

know better, my good friend. The point which I should hrst

understand is whether the pious or beloved by the gods because it is holy.

to is

DOf

is

is

vrr-n

not

tint)- led

..

now

I

|-

;

k- intelligible; and statr tu.ii

,

in

s

tl.

bi

tb

think, Euthyphro, thai

ting will

m\ meaning

thai

:>.

action or passion implies pre

t

or pa ssion.

dcst

is

must all

instructed

..

fair

that to

which the

given : As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they not? Euth. True.

men

in re

ligion.

And spe.ik the truth. Socrates. me then, oh tell mc — what I

Soc. Tell

not attention always designed

good or benent of is

should. in, there

As there

would be

your meaning, Euthyphro? Euth. Yes.

attention

all

ing of a ship.

is

Soc. In like

And

i

the art of attending to hors

art of attending to the

Soc.

is

to the ship-builder

Euth. True. And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to Euth. Yes. Soc. As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen? Euth. Very true.

for the

inc

view would you

.

Yes,

Nor

which

ser\ ice, ba> ing in

every one qualified to attend to but only the huntsman.:

Soc.

I

to the:;

;

is

h

still

I

(

manship

hk

nisi

work which

the gods

is

thai

do by the help

ministrations? •;. Many and which they do. [14] Soc. W'\

fair,

Socrates, arc the

nd, and I

But the chief of them

Would you chief

1

not sa\ thai

is

rar

is

the

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

198

Euth. Certainly. Soc.

Many and

Euth. That

fair, too,

works of the

are the

husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his work is the production of food from the

chief

earth

?

Euth. Exactly. Soc. And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal one 5 Euth. I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very

tiresome. Let

me simply say that how to please the

piety or holi-

gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety ness

is

learning

and states, just as which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction. Soc. I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me clearly not: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you is

the salvation of families

the impious,

—

by this time the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and

what

piety?

is

Do

sort of science of

Euth. Yes, Soc.

And

and prayer

I

you mean

that they are a

praying and sacrificing?

do.

is giving to the gods, asking of the gods?

sacrificing is

Euth. Yes, Socrates. Soc.

Upon

of asking

Euth.

this view, then, piety

is

a science

and giving?

my

capitally, Socrates.

friend; the reason

is

that

I

am

and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them? a votary of your science,

Euth. Yes, I do. Soc. Is not the right of

way

of asking to ask

the right

of giving

is

to give

them in return what they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he does not want. Euth. Very true, Socrates. Soc. Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one to

another ?

have no particular liking for anywish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; [15] for there is no good thing which they do not give; but how we can any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an allair of business in which wc have very greatly the advantage of them. Euth. And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts 3 Soc. But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the gods? Euth. What else, but tributes of honour; and, I

thing but the truth.

I

.

as

I

was

just

now

what pleases them.' pleasing to the gods, but

saying,

Soc. Piety, then,

is

not beneficial or dear to them

Euth.

I

?

should say that nothing could be

dearer.

Soc. Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods' Euth. Certainly. Soc. And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the argument,

comes round to the same not saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods? Have you forgotten? Euth. I quite remember. Soc. And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is not this the

as

you

same

will perceive,

Were we

what

as

is

dear to them

—do you

see?

Euth. True.

Sor.Then

either if

we were wrong in our formwe were right then, we are

wrong now. Soc.

way

may

One of the two must be true. Then we must begin again and

Euth.

Euth. Certainly.

And

an expression which you

is

like.

er assertion; or,

them what we want? Soc.

if

point.

You understand me

Soc. Yes,

you Soc. But

use.

What

ask.

That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident is

piety?

.

i

,

would ncvei

i>u

.

«-ti

U

i

i

I

i

run

mi. h

«•'

in the sighi |

im

Mm IN

.

therefore, ih

iliul

J Jo

i

n

1!

n.>l

hurry,

md

I

"i

\

must go now

I

.mi

i

in

I'll

i

APOLOGY -^%N*>%.^>

[iyj

How

fected by

vou,

O

that they almost so persuasively

made me

forget

who

I

not l>e good; but think only of the truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly. And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers, and then I will go on

was

did they speak; and yet they

have hardly uttered

many

Never mind the manner, which may or may

Athenians, have hecn afbut I know

my accusers, I cannot tell; word

a

of truth. But of the

was one which quite amazed me; I mean when they said that you should be upon your guard and falsehoods told by them, there

—

For of old I have had many who have accused me falsely to you during many years; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are the others, who Ix to the later ones.

accusers,

not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force my eloquence. To say this, when they were

of

certain to be detected as soon as

and proved myself

I

opened

my

anything but a great speaker, did indeed appear to me most shameless unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth; for if such is their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at all; but from me you shall hear the whole truth: not, however, delivered after their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No, by heaven! but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the lips

to be

when you were

—

moment;

my

for

cause: at

am confident in the justice my time of life I ought not to I

appearing before you,

O men of Athens,

me

it

of

me.

a favour:

And

—

If I

I

—

defend myself in

my

children,

minds with

and took possession

their falsehoods, telling of

one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause.

The

cusers

whom

disseminators of this tale are the acI dread; for their hearers are apt

fancy that such enquirers do not believe in And they are many, and their charges against me areof ancient date, to

the existence of the gods.

and they were made by them in the days when you were more impressible than you are now in childhood, or it may have been in youth and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to answer. And hardest of all, I do not know and cannot tell the names of my

of

be

in the

let no one exmust beg of you to grant

character of a juvenile orator pect

of your

accusers; unless in the chance case of a

accus-

tomed manner, and you hear me using the words which I have been in the habit of using

poet. All

Comic

who from

suaded you

—

envy and malice have persome of them having first con-

—

men

in the agora, at the tables of the

vinced themselves

anywhere else, I surprised, and not to interrupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time in a court quite a stranger to the language

with; for I cannot have them up here, and cross-examine them, and therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defence, and argue when there is no one who answers. I will ask you then to

and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, [ 18] whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country: Am I making an unfair request of you?

assume widi me, as I was saying, that my opponents are of two kinds; one recent, the other ancient: and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for these accusations you heard long

money-changers, would ask you not to be

or

of law,

I

am

of the place;

—

most

200

all

this class of

are

difficult to deal

.

and mu


hi


ihc- -..iinr

pound

i

i

11

in I*

i

u

I

i

f

11

l«.

ihr

(.:•

i

«h. ilr.

ii.

pro

il

true

I

lul ike glad if probe the argument furthet feat that when dren, you are haunted with

01

the soul leaves the body, the wind ma) really blow bet away and icattei her; especiall) ii man ihould happen to die in great itorm and m>t w hen the iky ii aim.

the)

c

I

anythi

lia

.1

them alwayt w

of

Ii

.i>

i

Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must irgue us cut t>i out (ears and yet, strictly speaking, they .ire not our tens, but there is a child within us to whom death is son oi hobgoblin: him too we must persuade .1

when

not to be afraid

In- is

alone

in the

dark.

Soc rates said: -ft the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you have charmed away the I

fear. /

Ami where shall we find a good charmer when you are gone?

jSj

of our fears, Socrates, 1

he replied,

[ellas,

is

a

rous races not a tew: seek tor

I

should

it

you

please, let us return to

argument

at

which we

or

!

!> j

Ii

r

1

or quite the reverse? M.i\ the) not rather bt ICribed as almost alwayi changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with

one another

The

:

Cebes; the) are always

latter, replied

a state- ot

And

/?>t Ins lusts, the- iouI, mean, accustomed to hate and feai i bodily

1)(

probable. An«!

bod)

ilir

I

I

ihe bod) ind

!>\

led to believe thai the truth onl)

form, which

.t

diftv uli

them

pi.

here

Some

is

not, be said.

arc happiei than others;

and the hap

themselves and in the pis whu h they go arc these m bo have pra< tised thr civil and social virtues which are < ailed ten both

pseat

anoe and

in

and are acquired by habit and and mind/ they the happ

justice,

attention without philosophy

Why

.ire

Bei auac they

may

be

a into

1

some gentle .i\\A social kind whuh is Like thnr own, such .is bees or w.isps or ants, or b.u k again into the form oi man, and ]ust and mod

men may be supposed to spring lrotn them. Very likely. \o one who has not studied philosophy and who is not entirely pure at the time of his departure is allowed to enter the company of the

erate

knowledge only. And Simmias and febei, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshy lusts, and hold out against them ami renot befuse to give themselves up to them, Clods, but the lover of this

is

the reason,

(

—

cause they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, likcthelovers ol money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or

disgrace of evil deeds.

No,

Socrates, that

would not become them,

said Cebes.

No

indeed, he replied; and therefore they

own souls, and do moulding and fashioning the body, say farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and who have any

care of their

not merely live

fT.:

lust.

By unchaste loo^s, loose gestures, and foul taIJ{, Bf.t most by lewd and lavish act of sin, Lets in defilement to the inward parts, The soul grows clotted by contagion, Imbodies, and imbrutcs, till she quite lose,

The

.

and propensii 1

ti we-.

this corporeal

finally in

.ill

depart pure and unalloyed?

continual association and constant care body have wrought into bei nature.

Ven Ami

there

to

by the corporeal, which 'hr

pan

il

Ami

Impossible, be replied. Slu-

will

ih iiM h natui

doyousu]

attained on)) b) philosophy;

I

which to and can be

mtcHritti.il principle,

tin-

the bodily eye

t
eyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, [ioj] and our souls will truly exist in another world' am convinced. Socrates, said Ccbcs, and have nothing more to object; but if my friend Simiinas. or any one else, has any lurther objection to make, he had better speak out. and do not know to what not keep silence, since other season he can deter the discussion, h there is anything which he wants to say or to

ot the

"But although the odd the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place ot the odd?" Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; tor this has not been acknowledged, but it this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure; and the same argument would have held good of lire and heat and any other thing. Very true. And the same may be said of the immortal: the immortal is also imperishable, then the it soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; Yet

will not

if

True.

imperishable,

attacking the

and unmeltcd— tor it could ne\cr have pcrnor could it have remained and admitted the heat

soul,

Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die. but the immortal

must not three he imperishable?

mow, must

Most

sa\ that this

course.

•

must not the

also impensh.i

Yes. he said.

ishable,

OF PLATO

true;

will

not mistaken, as well as

ney thither.

For

after death, as they say, the genius of

I'll \l tndi\ idu.il. to uln'iii hr

,

Kim

leads

if

I

ertatn plat

>

iiri

has been given

i

Ki

\ou

you mean mall that youj art producci tlir

mom

you

>»>

mrii and nut

l)|

II.

What

I

A

rned

ideccivin] Willi

1

the

Now

I

same way;

want

—

is

to

know

about rhetoric

rhetoric the only art

in

which

brings persuasion, or do other arts have the

same

effect

3 I

mean

say

to

teaches anything persuade

— Does

men

who

he

of that

which

he teaches or not 3 Gor. He persuades, Socrates, there can be no mistake about that. Soc. Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now ipeaking: do not arithmetic

—

—

and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of

number

3

Gor. Certainly. Soc.

And

therefore persuade us of

them

3

Gor. Yes. Soc.

Then

artificer of

arithmetic as well as rhetoric

persuasion

Gor. Clearlv.

3 .

is

an

OF PLATO

DIALOGl

256 Soc.

And

any one asks us what sort of per-

if

—

and about what, wc shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantit\ ot odd and r\cn; 1 454 J and wc shall he able to show that all the other arts ot which wc were just now speaking arc art nicer so! persuasion, and of what suasion,

Then

.

rhetoric

not the only artificer of

is

Gor. True. then,

that

works by persuasion, but

m

same, as

the

case- ot

mscn which persuasion

what?

—

is

is

not only

rhetoric

that other arts

do the

the painter, a question

a very lair

way

Of what and about

one:

rhetoric the artificer,

not that a lair

is

of putting the

5

".

think

I

you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer? answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the Gor. art ot persuasion in courts ot law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about Soc.

'I

"hen,

if

I

And

that,

I was suswould not have

Gorgias, was what

pecting to be your notion; yet

I

\ou wonder if by-and-by am found repeating seemingly plain question; tor I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and I

:.

that

we may

not get the habit of anticipating

and suspecting the meaning of one another's words; I would have you develop your own views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.

Gor. Soc.

I

think that you arequite right, Socrates. let me raise another question;

Then

is such a thing as "ha\ ing learned" Gor. Yes. Soc. And there is also "having believed"? Gor* Yes. Soc. And is the "having learned" the same as "having believed," and are learning and belief

there

the

same things?

Gor. In the same. Soc.

my

Then

would appear, is the persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them? rhetoric, as

artificer of a

Gor. True. Soc.

And

the rhetorician does not instruct the

just and unjust, but he creates belief about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters

time 3 Gor. Certainly not.

in a short

Come, then, and let us see what we realmean about rhetoric; for do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly Soc.

ly

I

meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a proposition

ascertain in

what do you

your judgment is right, as you may this way: If a person were to say

—

to you, "Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well

— you would reply,

taken, that there

is.

Gor. Yes. Soc. Well, but

is

Gor. No.

say,

Gorgias?

Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a

judgment, Socrates, they are not

well as a true?

and not

taken, then the military will advise the rhetoricians: er of rhetoricians,

I

if I

there a false

am

not mis-

knowledge

as

me assure as well as

from you.

And

here

let

have your interest in view own. For likely enough some one

you that

my

mak-

cannot do better than learn

the nature of your art

And

as a true.'"

we

—one

courts of law or other assemblies about things

and unjust.

the just

Just so.

gives belief. Soc.

so.

well 3

then assume two sorts of perwhich is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge 3 Gor. By all means. Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge? [455] Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only

question.(

Gor.

suasion,

jxrrsuasion?

Seeing,

And yet those who have learned as who ha\c believed are persuaded

Soc.

as those

Soc. Shall

and about what. d'jr. Vary true.

sort,

Sot

Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief ditfer. Gor. Very true.

I

young men present might desire become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. "What is the use of coming to or other of the to

GORG1 "

Not:

tlirv

I

will

what

.ul

will \..n tan h in i" ich iie

t

l»r-

i

I

and

trs,

will

1

nature

sjfcpss lir.iril,

thr Athenians

lh.it

(

.n

:

thr

to. in

iri|

,

it \

tlir

have

the din ks and thr walls

and the plan

oi thr

«i|

drlrn, r Mot

III

\rrtrd thru iiiMnu

harbcan

accordance with the counsels, partly i>i Themista Irs. and partly ol Peru les, and n«>t .u tinon ol the builders. Sum h is thr tradition, Got shout Themistot les; and myaeli heard the ipeo h ot Pericles when he advised vis about the (raddle devised

|

lion

rhcti

«>t

think,

1

oi

w .i\ oi leading ui on, endeiVOUl t.» ir\r.»l to \

!:kr youi

ij"

hit

•

friends.

\"U .in\uri tlinu

ill

I

ti.

t-nl

alio which Socrates has juit mentioned

low W


r and not so strong as others ol not, being wiser, be also bettei than we are, and

m

u>i

in tins

mattej

mean

w

n

be will

obbli

who understand

but also

aliani

\

and the

u«>t

able

men

the adminii

not on!

e I

t«»

bum from

••

soul.

In reason ot his authority, bui he will noi ex

pend or uuikr use

own

oi

person, or

it

then on he will be pun

large] share ol

.1

ished- his ihare will

lie

noes,

ex*. tt-J

thai

»>t

than th.u ot others, and w e.ikest ot all. he being the best ot less

the smallest share ot right,

Cal.

all,

my friend? You talk about

it

tome, and he In- the

all

will h.i\ e

Callicles:---am

I

not

am

1

not speak-

Answer " Yes"

or

is

Soc.

And ought

Cal.

not the better to have a larger

Not

of meats

and drinks.

but with ah* rq vim with nevei saj in e about t! things, lor at onr time \ou wrrr defining the 1

I

.

-

tnd the superior to be the stronger, then

and now von bring t new notion: the snprrior .111. the DCD now dec lared by you to be the agaifl as the Wiser, a

1

wish, my good Eriend, th.u you me, once tor all. whom you atlirm to l>c the lx-t ter ami superior, and in wh.it they are ln-ttrr' Cal. have already told vmi that meanthosrwho are wise and courageous in the adminis Lration ot a state they ought to l>c the rulers ot their states, and justice consists in their hai I

ing

more than

their subjects.

or will they not have

I

Then

the skilfullest

and

best in

making

my

walk about

in

and have the greatest number them? Cal. Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are

the largest shoes,

Cal.

not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds,

own

if

this

is

and have land

How

as

much

seed as possible for

2

you go on, always talking

in the

same way, Socrates! [491] Soc. Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things. Cal. Yes, by the Gods, you are literally alwavs talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argu-

What do you mean? mean that every man

I

is

but perhaps you think that there for

him

to rule himself;

rule others

Cal.

he

is

his is

own

ruler;

no necessity

only required to

:

What do you mean

by his "ruling over

himself".?

A

simple thing enough; just what is said, that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own Soc.

commonly

Cal.

What

innocence! you

— the temperate?

whv

will

you not

tell

me

in

what a

mean

those fools

—

any one may know that to meaning. Cal. Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything' On the contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence [492] to minister to them and to Soc. Certainly:

be

my

And

this

natural justice and nobility.

To

satisfy all his longings.

ment. Soc. But

more than themselves,

?

pleasures and passions.

you talking 2 Soc. Or,

Eriend

Soc.

shoes ought to have the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should

Cal.

th.it

1

Soc. But whether rulers or subjects will they

understand: then, perhaps, of coats the skilfullest weaver ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about clothed in the best and finest of them? Cal. Fudge about coats! Soc.

trom

I

me

:

Soc.

1

—

"No."

Cal. Yes.

share

111 \

I

Soc. Well, hut l\o you admit that the wiser the better.'

:it

u hu h you bring against

I

meats and drinks and

physicians and other nonsense; ing of them,

his

politicians

1

tratioi

and

he will have a largei share rod Junks, because he ii better, U.wc the distribution ol .ill ol then

the me. us

of

i-.«-

In ihf

told \-»i

not

l>\

Either, then,

S

ol

be

i!ir.,,l\ 1

ol toi

:l.unlv.

his

'

us,

»>i

some-

dui supri

275 !.

•.u.:.;r

d


who

..

I

llld Still

the truth?

the-

ill

iii

of

And what

Foxton, say

does our friend Socrates, he assent to this, or

—does

not? Soc. cles.

He

does not assent; neither will Callisees himself trulv. You will ad-

when he

DIALOG UE S OF PLATO

278 run.

I

suppose, that good and evil fortune are

opposed

And

if

in the

sentence which you have just

word

"thirstv" implies pain

man

cannot have them both, or be

Cal. Yes.

ophthalmia

called

/-/«/'/ Cal.

To

and sound

Soc.

Soc.

the

Soc.

And when

Sue.

same eyes

he has got rid or his ophthalot his eyes too?

them both

Cal. Certainly not.

That would

surely be marvellous

and

?

Cal. Very.

Soc.

gets rid ot

them

in

is

Soc.

And

turns?

)r

(

When

you are thirsty?

in

pain?

—

he

may have

strength and weak-

same way, bv his? swiftness

Cal.

It is.

You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time? Cal. Yes did. / 49j] Soc. But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?

J

and slowness?

Cal. Clearly.

Cal. Certainly.

Soc.

And

does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and Soc.

pleasure in drinking?

Soc.

Cal. Yes.

Soc.

is

Soc. Do you see the inference: that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when vou sav that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not afreet at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the bod> which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this

affected by them, and

Cal. Yes.

ness in the

?

true ?

suppose that he

I

want

Cal. Yes.

the final result, that he gets rid ot

absurd

There

And

Sot

together? Soc.

expressive of

Cal. Yes.

same time?

mia, has he got rid of the health Is

is

ot the satisfaction of the

Cal. Certainly.

Cal. Certainly not.

Soc.

the word "drinking"

and

?

Cal. Yes.

be sure.

at

And

pleasure,

:

Soc. Hut he surely cannot have the

well

admit that

pleasant?

And

disease, they exclude

—

is

is

uttered, the

and

without them both, at the same time? Cal. What do you mean? SOi Take the case ot any bodily alieciion: a nun may have the complaint in his eyes

which

are thirsty,

one

they arc opposed to each other,

then, like health

another: a

And you would

when vou

Cal. Yes.

Cal. Yes.

Soc.

Very good.

Soc.

to drink,

each other?

to

misery, in a similar alternation?

'

Then

pleasure

fortune, or pain the

therefore the

good

is

is

not the same as good

same

as evil fortune,

and

not the same as the pleas-

ant?

Cal. Certainly he has.

Cal.

I

wish

I

knew,

Socrates,

what your quib-

then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil do we agree? Please

bling means.

not to answer without consideration.

Cal. Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in

Soc.

If

—

Cal.

—

I

entirely agree.

Go back now to our former admissions. you say that to hunger, I mean the mere ot hunger, was pleasant or painful?

Soc. 1

)id

stale

said painful, but that to eat when you hungry is pleasant. know; but still the actual hunger is Soc.

Cal.

I

are

1

painful:

am

I

not right?

And

You know,

Callicles,

your admonition of me. Soc.

from

Does not

a

man

cease

from

his thirst

and

drinking at the same time? Cal. I do not understand what you are saying. Gor. Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes; we should like to hear the argument his pleasure in

—

Cal. Yes, Gorgias, but thirst, too,

but you affect not

know.

out.

Cal. Yes.

Soc,

Soc. to

painful?

I

must complain of

Need adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are

is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. Gor. What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his

painful?

own

is

Cal. Yes, very. I

Cal.

1

agree,

and therefore you need not ad-

duce any more instances. 1

Cf. Republic,

iv. 4 ^6.

the habitual trifling of Socrates; he

fashion.

you shall ask these peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them. Cal. Well, then, Socrates,

little

—

Vs,

were

i

:

S

pleasure

.\

man

i

ease

"i

pleasure

i

roni

drinking

lm

(

at

1

v l

tin-

;d «lc-

is

the s.ime 1

tpproai h

ir.iscN

from pain and pleasure

^t

i,

adhere to what you mid? do; but what

1

win, my mend,

is

the infereo

the inierencc

thai

I

I

I

with them.' Cal. Yes. 3

the courageous and the wise are the good

would you not

say so?

Cal. Certainly.

did you never see a foolish child

re-

:

joicing.

man

too?

Cal. Yes, certainly: but

what

a foolish

Nothing

[498] Soc.

is

your drift 5 if you will

particular,

I

And

have.

man

re-

sorrowing

Which They

rejoice

are

and sorrow most

— the

3

much upon

1

battel pleased

.«t

thr

il.ii'

I

ben arc thr foolish and the w the brave all pleased and pained, .is vou Wt re laying, m nr.irlv cd and evil? 1. e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]

bad

in a nearlv

[

do not know what you mean.

Cal.

I

Soc.

Why, do you

really

not

remember saying

that

good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils remember. Cal. Yea, Soc. And are not these pleasures or goods 3 present to those who rejoice if they do rejoice the

—

Soc.

be sure.

those

who

rejoice are

And

those

who

good when

are in pain have evil or

sorrow present with them

I

think, in

Soc. evil

3

see a

coward

And would you

still

say that the evil are

by reason of the presence of

Cal.

Soc.

in battle?

Then

goods are present with them.3

Cal. Yes. a par,

Enough: And did you ever

To

;

Cal. Yes.

that respect.

Cal.

\nd arc they not enemy'i departure

Soc.

did you ever see a sensible

wise or the foolish

Soc.

ihrv ripi.ilK

Cal. Certainly.

Cal. Yes.

Cal.

r

I

only answer.

Soc.

thr brs

3

have.

I

And

joicing or

.11

should imagine that more- p. uned.

Soc.

And do vou call the tools and cowards good men For you were saying |ust now that

Cal. Yes,

ire

Cal. Yes.

Soc.

Soc.

I

I

.

Col, ii

good is not the tame as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation ot pleasure anil pain at the same moment: hut not ot good ami evil, tor they are different, low then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as e\ il ? Ami would have vou look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, think, have been considered bv vou when you identified them: Are not the uood good because they have g

I

.

I

their will

?

[510/ Cal. ( iranted, Socrates, it you will only have clone. Soc. Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice.'

Cal. Certainly.

like

than this greatestof

lous

u tint thei

the doing injustice

Soc.

And what

art will protect us

from

suffer-

ing injustice.it not wholly, yet as far as possible

3

to know whether you agree with me; tor think that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power. I

want

I

Cal.

serve

Well

how

said, Socrates;

ready

I

am

and please to obyou when you

to praise

talk sense.

Soc. Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who like to like, as ancient is most like to him sages say: Would you not agree to thiv

—

:

Cal.

I

should.

Soc. But

when

the tvrant

is

rude and unedu-

DIALOGUES OF PLATO cated, he is

one

to fear .nn

ma\ be expected

and

his superior in wrtue,

who

will never be able

any one

oi

.

greatly his interior, lor the tyrant will

despise him,

and

will nc\ cr seriously

regard

him

:r:end.

Cal. '1'hat again .

:

Cul.

No. indeed.

Soc.

And

Then

be nibjed anil subscr\ ient to him; he is the will have power in the state, and no

man who one

which saves men in courts ot law, and which you advise me to cultivate Cal. Yes, truly, and very good advice too. Soc. Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of any great pretensions.:

true.

is

the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will he one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to S..

yet, In

o

1 1 * .» t

-»ll

ol i^

U

en profcuion i>

..ihct

«»•

he would hi you despise linn •

-.

I

.in.l

and ineeringly call him in engine maker, you will not allow your daughters to marr)

.lit.

.unl

on

youi ion to Ins

Mi.it iv

00,01

N»>nt

what

prin< iple,

\m.I

J.i

1

1

1

•.

1

was

amc

thai

you u

Bui

it

tlu-

ill

*'|

s.i\,

bettei

consists only in

.i

.un better*

and

what

I

Please, then,

I

bettei born."

viv,

whatever may In- his character, then youi cen oi the engine maker, and oi the phj su ian, and ot the other .ins oi salvation, is ridi< ulous. o im Friend want you to sec ih.it tin* nofatc and the good may possibly be something differ ent from saving and being saved: -May not he who is truly a man ceaSC to care about living a certain time?' he knows, as women sav. that no man can escape late, and therefore he is not fond ot lite; he leaves all that with Cod, arul I

I

—

considers in what way he can best spend his pointed term whether by assimilating him-

—

self to

the constitution under

which he

1

.u you at this moment have to consider J how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, you mean to be in their •>-/

it

good graces, and to have power whereas want you to think and I

this

is

in the state;

see

is

whether

—

would dearest on the

tor the interest ot either of us

not have us risk that which

I

acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian

down the own perany man will

enchantresses, who, as they say, bring

moon from heaven

at the risk of their

you suppose that becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles; for he dition.

But

if

show you the

art of

1

who would

deserve to be the true natural

friend of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pynlampes* darling who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only.

He, then, who

will

them, will make you

as

make vou most

you

I

in the

ail;

w

iih a

\

things,

iii>

In. In

.

i

icv.

ire,

like

desire, a statesman

and orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet

indulge but tun

Very

I

si\t

r
«~

us

Ins

whu

ix

h

had pleasure

ii

a \ul.

|iist

other oi our

CaL Be

i

OfM lusioris

And

-

-.will

h

-

hai

the other had in

icw

\

|

improvement ot that which was ministered whether body or soul' Quite true. And must wr not have the tame vm\ view in the treatment ot our cit\ and cit

to,

C.iii.

SOC.

Must we not

m

and make them

try

5/7/ For we have already dis< that there is no use hi imparting to them am other good, unless the mind of those who arcto have the good, whether money, or otficc, or possible

1

/

any other Shall

we

1

power, be gentle am:

sort ot

say that

:

if you like. you .\\u\ I, Callicles, were intending to set about some public business, anil were advising one another to undertake buildings, such as walls, docks or temples ot the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, hrst. as to whether we know or do not

Cal. Yes, certainly,

Soc. Well, then,

know

it

who

the art of building, and

— would

taught us-

not that be necessary, Callicles

1

CaL True. Soc. In the second place,

consider whether

we had

we

should have to

ever constructed any-

private house, either of our

own

or for our

and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and it upon consideration We found that we had had good and eminent masters. And had been successful in constructing friends,

many

fine buildings, not only with their assist-

ance, but without them, by our 1

Cf.

Symposium.

216.

own unaided

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

288

—

in thatcase prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the construction ol pub-

Have we

lic works. But it we had no master to show. and only a number of worthless buildings or ROOC at all, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?

if you will not answer must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think that thev were good citizens.

skill

Cal. Certainly.

And

docs not the same hold in all other you and were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent Soc.

cases.; It

I

pnuiisc as state -physicians, should I not ask about you, and would you not ask about

that such

lme

I

quiries about you.

And

if

we

arrived at the con-

Cal.

1

skill of either

leaven, Callicles,

that

we

or any

up

as to set

what an absurdity

human

to think being should be so silly

do the same, without having

practised in private, whether successfully

or not, and acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar

when you is

are learning the potter's art;

which

thing?

a foolish

[515] Cal. True. And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer.' Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer? Soc.

Cal.

You

Soc.

Nay,

are contentious. Socrates. I

ask you, not from a love of con-

want

know

tention, but because

I

what way you think

that affairs should be ad-

ministered

among us

to

in

— whether, whenyoucome

to the administration of

er

really

them, you have any oth-

aim but the improvement

of the citizens?

they were good, then clear! the citizens better in-

it

Cal. Yes.

And, therefore, when

Pericles first

began

speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last? to

CaL Very likely. Soc. for

if

Nay, my friend, "likely" is not the word; he was a good citizen, the inference is

certain.

CaL And what difference does that make.' None; only I should like further to know

and advise others

as state-physicians

like ourselves to first

of us, then, by

do.

them must have made

Soc.

no one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better medical

I

I

stead of worse?

clusion that for the

surely said so; for

Soc. But of

many times over man? Nay, we

the duty of a public

is

for yourself

to

me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or should make the same enfreeman 3 And

not already admitted

Soc.

whether the Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk and money. Cal. You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising

set

who

Soc. But

bruise their ears.

what

I

am

going to

not mere hearsay, but well

tell

known

you now is both to you

at first, Pericles was glorious and unimpeached by any verdict of the [516] Athenians this was during the time when they were not so good yet afterwards, when they had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a malefac-

and me: that his character

—

—

tor.

Cal. Well, but badness?

how

does that prove Pericles'

Soc. Why, surely you would say that he was bad manager of asses or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you

a

say Cal.

I

Soc.

And

do

the fa

will

vou also do

1

or saving

me

ves.

the favour ot

»R(;i \s u hrthri

.

in.ili is .ui

M.lMlU

I I

mil

them

M

llC

\

.1

hepherdoi men?

.

thnii

and Vnd

S

iiu

hou will not answer. Cal. And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to answer ; Soc. I suppose that can; just now, at am '

I

rate, the

speeches which

enough because you I

adjure you by the god

sir,

do

me whether

tell

I

am making

are long

answer me. Hut friendship, my good

refuse to ot

there does not appear to

you to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, and then blaming him tor being bad: Cal. Yes, it appears so to me. [520] Soc. Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this inconsistent manner

;

Cal. Yes. but

why

talk ot

men who

are

good

talk of

men

for nothing?

Soc.

who

I

would rather

say,

why

and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of tiie city, and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city: do you think that there is any difference between one and theother? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised: whereas the truth is, that sophprotess to be rulers,

—

much

superior to rhetoric as legisla-

istry

is

as

tion

is

to the practice of law, or

medicine.

The

orators

and

gymnastic to

sophists, as

inclined to think, are the only class

who

I

am can-

not complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact? Cal. Certainly it is. Soc. If they were right in saying that they make men better, then they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them. Where-

G IAS .1% it it,

man has been benefited

ft

in

an) othei

example, hr Kai been taught

fat

trainer, hr mi]

pay,

it

htm

you

"i

nil

ti.unri let! thr ni.itln in hitn, .uid

he-

t

run

to I

no ftgroement with htm that he fthould receive money fti won is hr had given him h o( njktiI do men act unjustly, l>ui b)

\n ill

nevet be brou

hkrlv

in.iilr

t

i

.Ml.

hen

I

it

dl< tin c, a uu.l the r.u iii.ui will remain i.m and to on; and ilir dead man, who in life had fancy to have \:i.| it hr l\.i\r tlow in,; h.ui Aon in. wrai marked with the whip end had the printi he- vim: wounds in him when hr oi see thr s.imr in llir dr. id w.is \ r. yOU might unl ii his hull's urn broken oi misshap remain

ill

he

i

Ik

•

mm

tin:

.ill

ihrni, ai

.

.»

i

t

.il

in

found A»i hrlau andai

when

he w.is ah\c.

llir

s.unr ap|x

from

oi

the soul ire laid

to

who is lil

t

.hit ihr\ have

th
e few there .ire w ho .itt.un to this. Sm h gl SSS there m.i\ .irise ge*>d

ot

all

I

.1

1

true

men, however, there ai Athens and

be again,

h.i\e been, in

and

other states,

will

who

have fulfilled their trust righteousl] and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, ;

Ansteides, the son eral, great

As

men

e)t

Lysimai.hus. But,

are also bad,

my

in

gen-

friend.

was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he the bad kind, knows nothing

I

gets a soul ot

about him, neither ents are; he a villain;

who

knows only

and seeing

he

is,

nor

who

I

that he has got hold ot

this,

he stamps him I him awa\ toTarta

able or incurable, and sends

whither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or. again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say, Calliclcs, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled him self with the doingsof othcrmen in his lifetime;

rus,

him Rhadamanthus sends

to the Islands of the

Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on. as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him: Blessed.

Holding a sceptre thr d

Now :

Cf.

I,

Calliclcs,

Rep

of gold

am

persuaded of the truth of

15.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

294 these things,

and

1

consider

how

1

shall present

my soul whole and undented before the judge in that da\. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims,

and

I

desire only to

to live as well as

die as well as

power,

And,

1

in

I

exhort

to the

men

I

utmost

oi

my

do the same. your exhortation ot me, I

other

return lor

know the truth, when die, to

can, and,

And,

can. all

I

exhort you also to take part

in

to

the great combat,

which is the COmhat ot life, and greater than every other earthly conflict. And I retort your reproach ol me. and s.iy, that you will not he

when

able to help yourself

the

clay ot trial

and

judgment, of which was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the indge, / $2j ] the son ot Aegina, and. when he has got \ou in his grip and is earn mg you ofl. >ou will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the courts ot this world, and \ery likely some one will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort ot insult. Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wite's tale, which you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, it by searching we could find out anything better or truer: hut now you see that you And Polus and (Jorgias, who are the three wisest of the ( .reeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to sutler Injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to I

be followed above

things, as well in public

all

that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished: also that he should avoid all flatas in private life;

and

tery ot himself as well as ot others, ot the lew

many: and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all hisactions should be done always, with a view to justice. or of the

Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in lite and after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind: let him strike \ou, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm m the practise of virtue, it you are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue together,

we

will apply ourselves to politics,

it

seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds; so utterly stupid arc wel Let us, then, take the argument as our that

guide, which has revealed to us that the best

way

of

tue in

life is to life

in this exhort all to

practise justice

and death. This way

which you

men

trust

let

vir-

us go; and

to follow, not in the

and

to follow you; for that

ing worth.

and every

in

which you exhort

way,

Callicles,

is

me

noth-

THE REPUBLIC mi

Pi RSONI 0]

Pdl

t

s«

\Kv

•••.

in

C

|]

Thi

u 001

)i

I

i

i-n

U.US]

s

SOGftATBS,

!

J.

I

HI

UYMACHI

in the

"

Wl

'

CUUI

L

.-phiilu\

thi

ill

^#- ^

BOOK I

\vi.\r

down

a

nameita

•-

-^

/r Id me tell \«'u, thai a hen man thinks himjdi to be

below and

-

il

1

f.hiitr correct

m

oi

would

nr

\.i\

:

reus wealth >iu-. he v.nJ.

\u mi

I*

thr truth M. our M

:

\

•

ealth.

iiur. but in. iv

What do

question r

and

in

thai

.i\

uc, be vnil.

thai

11.. I

.

hould

I

a

1

1

i

ii

\\c

I

nir

nli

mm

tn them and -ill men \n.l hence th< \n\ bid company, foi the] in talk about

hat

im a

.1

hni

1,.

1

iend n hen in

ii

.i

r

.11

la is

mon

I

thai

\\

ihr s.ikr dI usr llld profit

i

\...j

this

t..

ion

poemi

ii

thru children, besides that natural

tor

at a

l

I

r\rn

i

resemblin

t>w n,

thcii

.in.!

love

till

ion oi

t

REPUBLK

I

luvc inherited thru

I

2

Certainly not.

When a debt

Simonides said that the repayment of justice, he did not mean to include

was

that case

3

Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend

ought always

to

do good

to a friend

and never

evil.

You mean gold which

two ment of ine him

the

that the return of a deposit of

is

to the injury of the receiver,

parties are friends, a

debt

—that

is

is

if

not the repay-

what you would imag-

to say?

Yes.

And owe

to

are enemies also to receive

them

;

what we

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

298

To

be sure, he laid, thej arc eo receive

what

wc QWC them, ami an enemy, as take it, outs to an enemy thai which is due or proper to him that if to say, evil. Simomdcs. then, after the manner of poets, I

And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use. :

—

would seem

meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a dcht. That must have Inrcn his meaning, he said. By heaven! I replied; and il wc asked him what due or proper thing is given DV medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to US? lie would surely reply that medicine gr.es drugs and meat and drink to human bodies. And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what/ that

which

justice gives,

and

to

whom.' It. Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is

to

which gives good

the art

to friends

and

I

think

and

best able to

is

enemies

in

do good

what

harm

;

Then

man

in

what

in playing the

In a

money

result

the just

harp the harp-player

is

certainly

man?

partnership.

Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale ol a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not ; Certainly.

Then what

But when is

pilot

is

to buy a ship, the would be better?

ship-

that joint use of silver or gold

which the just man is to be preferred? When you want a deposit to be kept safely.

You mean when money

a voyage, amid the perils

sort of actions or

is

the just

with a view

man most

enemy and good

chus, there

able to

do

in

a

man

is

well,

That is

is

not wanted, but

lie

mak-

is

to say, justice

is

useful

when money

useless?

That

to his friend?

war against the one and

is

the inference.

And when you want

to

keep

a

pruning-hook

then justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser? safe,

my

dear Polemar-

no need of a phvsician?

NC.

Clearly.

And

he

who

is

not on a voyage has no need

of a pilot?

And when you want

to keep a shield or a them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musi-

lyre,

No.

Then

time of peace justice will be of no

in

use?

and not

to use

cian?

am

very Ear from thinking so.

Certainly.

And

[333] You. think that justice may be of use peace as well as in war:

useful

Yes.

they are useful?

Like

husbandry

for

the

acquisition

of

corn?

so of all the other things

when

That

Then

Yes.

Or

is

than the harp-player, as

a better partner than the just

in

ing alliances with the other.

shoes

sort of partnership

a better partner

Precisely.

what

to his

of

Quite the reverse.

allowed to

In going to

1

game

skilful player.

the builder

pilot.

in

or the skilful pla\cr a

better partner at a

And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than

to his friends

time of sickness?

of the sea?

in

The

wright or the True.

so.

The physician. Or when they are on

And

and

And when you want

evil to his

The

man

the just

is

usetul

draughts ?

evil

meaning then?

his

is

And who

to

But

more

enemies.

That

partnerships?

its.

filing to lood. is

mean

by contracts you

aly.

have spoken darkly of the na-

to

ture of justice; tor he really

And what

And

like

justice

is

when

the inference.

justice

is

not good for much. But let Is not he who

us consider this further point;

shoemaking for the acquisition of is what you mean?

— that

Yes.

is

—

they are useless, and useless

can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a

blow?

f

:

i

1

1

k

1

i

r

t

r.

,K

i

i

I

who

\ii.l \\c

from

.in.,

is

most

.«

d

skilful in prevent

I

hai in to

uir

I

\iul l«rst

human

«.i

it

\\r

is

thr

vu.u.I ol

l»rst

steal

ii»

who n em

,

but,

ilir

i»i

it

that win, h wi

i.ini|i

.i

march upon

.1

ili.it

them; and hr lus

hr ought to benefit

able

rutin

in

ihr meat

and Ik

:t.lllllv.

who

tun hr

1

is

Ih.it,

good

Thai

is

Then

after

he

.i

thief.

m.m

implied .ill

And

tins

is

iking oi at

Autolycua,

t>i

the-

who

her oi Odysseus,

l>


ft

;

/

;

hr

th.it

m»t good, only an

Ik- and is same ma) be s.ml. Von would argue thai thr good friends and the bad our enca

to

r

yy5/ and

i.

.ire

our

Vet,

Ami

so,

you and

agreed that justice

is

an

harm

oi

enemies*'

in

and Simonides

art oi tlu-tt; to

however "tor the good

tised

the

tomes:

I

W prat

and Eor was what you

oi friends

— that

were saying? No, certainly not that, though do not now know what I Jul say; but still stand hy the latter words. Well, there is another question: By Eriends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming Surely, he said, a man may he expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil. Vc\ but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to I

I

be

and conversely That is true. Then to them the good

will be

enemies and

And good

in that case they will be right in

to the evil

and

evil to the

doing

good?

But the good are

just

and would not do an

injustice?

Then according

to

your argument

it

is

just

who do no wrong?

Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral. Then I suppose that we ought to do good the just and harm to the unjust? like that better.

at

just

are evil? Yes, thai appears to

Hut ought the

me

to

the truth.

Ik-

just to injure

any one

at all

3

Undoubtedly he ought to injure thosewho arc both wicked and his enemies.

When

horses

.ire

injured, arc they

improved

or deteriorated?

The

latter.

Deteriorated, that ities

is

to say, in the

good qual-

of horses, not of dogs?

Yes. of horses.

dogs arc deteriorated

of dogs,

man

in the

good qual-

and not of horses?

Of course. And will not men who is

are injured be deteri-

the proper virtue of

:

And that human virtue is justice? To be sure. Then men who are injured are of made

True.

I

is

Certainly.

Clearly.

to injure those

it

orated in that which

True.

did

todogood to our ir lends and harm to our enemies, we should lurther It is just to do good to our triends when they good and harm to our enemies when they

ities

the evil will be their friends?

instead oi laying sirn;

that

first,

And

2

so,

And

That is the result. But can the musician by unmusical

to

necessity

unjust? his art

make men

:

Certainly not.

Or the horseman by horsemen?

his art

make them bad

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

MO

folly, Socrates,

Impossible.

by justice make men unor speaking generally, can the good by

And just,

can the

just

make them bad? Assuredly not. more than heat can produce cold

virtue

Am

:

Or drought moisture (

?

cannot.

It

Hearty not.

Nor can

harm any one?

the just

is

the good?

rtainly.

Then is

else is

man, but of the opposite,

the un)USt?

1

think that what you say

I

quite true.

is

Sen rates.

Then

a

it

man

says that justice consists in

the repayment of debts,

debt which a sa\ this

man owes

and

not wise; for

is

Ixrcn clearly

good is the and evil enemies to

that

to his friends,

which he owes

the debt

to his

it is

not true,

—

if,

as has

shown, the injuring of another

can be in no case just. agree with you, said Polemarchus. Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus. or any other I

man or am quite

wise I

seer.'

ready to do battle

at

your

side,

he

we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious are

do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.

to

said.

[336] Shall

I

tell

you whose

I

believe the

saying to be?

'Whose? I

do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only but answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy. was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him. I should have been struck dumb: but when saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was theretore able to reply to him. Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were "knocking under to one another," and so losing our chance of finding it. And why. when I

any one

to injure a friend or

not the act ol a just

who

has taken possession of you all?

sillybilhes,

I

the good

Impossible.

And

And why,

believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xer-

Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is "doing good to your friends and harm to xes or Ismenias the

your enemies." Most true, he Yes,

I

tice also

said;

[iff] How characteristic of Socrates! he rewith a bitter laugh that's your ironical have I not already told style! Did I not foresee you, that whatever he w as asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answerplied,

—

—

r

ing?

You

said.

but

if

this

definition of jus-

breaks down, what other can be of-

fered

Se\cral times in the course of the discussion

Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who ft anted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and had done speaking and there was a pause, I

he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panicroared out to the whole company:

are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I reand well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering plied,

twice

six,

or three times four, or six times two.

or four times three, "for this sort of nonsense

—

do for me" then obviously, if that your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort, "Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one? is that your meaning?" How would you answer him? will not

is

—

stricken at the sight of him.

He

so,

What

—

1

I

1

slikl

.iil

it

RKPUHLK

I

'

I

Ik

W

h\ ihoilld lln\

ii

iin-\

|h

i

s(

.u

m w

iii.l

l>.

replied;

I

hi> is

he thinks,

\\

you and

mj w hat bid him nK apj

dun

1

now

(

c

rt.unly.

AnJ

the different

forms oi governmem make

laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and tl laws, which arc made hv them tor their own in

which the\ deliver to •hem and him who tra; they punish as a breaker ot the law and uniust. Anil that is what I mean when say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest ot the government; a\v\ as the government must Ik* supposed to are the justice

terests.

their subjects,

.

I

I

power, I 339] the only reasonable conclusion is. that everywhere there is one principle of jus

which

tice,

Now

I

is

the interest ot the stronger.

understand you,

I

said;

you are right or not will try let me remark, that in defining I

and whether

to discover.

But

vou have yourself used the word "interest" which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words "ot the stronger" arc added. A small addition, you must allow, he said. Great or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you are saying

the truth.

is

justice

is

Now we

interest of

some

to say "of the stronger"; I

am

justice

arc both agreed that sort,

but you go on

about

this addition

not so sure, and must therefore consider

further.

Proceed.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

302

and

will;

I is

first tell

)ust lor subjects to

me )o you admit that 1 obey their rulers

it

1

Hut arc the rulers ol states absolutely ble, or arc they sometimes liable to cir be sure,

lie

replied, they are liable to err.

be his interest to do;

they

make them

rightly, they

to their interest;

them agreeably

when

make

;

Ws laws which they

the

obeyed by their subjects

make must

— and that

is

be

what you

call justice?

toubtless.

Then

justice,

according to your argument,

not only obedience to the interest of the ;

stronger but the re\ersc

What

\ou arc saying? he asked. am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. Hut let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about is

that

1

own

their

interest in

also that to

what they command, and

obey them

is

Has not

justice?

that

been admitted? Yes.

Then you must

also

have acknowledged

jus-

not to be for the interest of the stronger,

tice

when

the

rulers

things to be done jury.

For

it,

as

you

to

command their own in-

is

the obedience

unintentionally

which are say, justice

which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, () wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is tor the injury of the stronger? Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus. Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if / jjo you are allowed to be his witness. Hut there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself ac-

knowledges mand what

that rulers is

may sometimes com-

not for their

own

Never mind,

interest,

and

them is justice. Thrasymachus said

—

lor

is

is

I

now

says that

replied,

if

he

us accept his statement. Tell

physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact

is

that neither the

grammarian

nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill tails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopt the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerring, [341] and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest;

his

and the subject

commands; and

and now

is

required to execute

therefore, as

repeat, justice

is

I

said at

first

the interest of the

stronger. I

pear to you to argue like an informer

really ap:

Certainly, he replied.

And do you

both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command ting

weaker who

let

about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the

just.

Yes, Qeitophon, but he also said that justice the interest ol the stronger, and, while admit-

the

Polemar-

Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do

Polemarchus that subjects to do what wascommanded by their

i't s.

his words, rejoined

me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not? Certainly not. he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken? Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken. You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken they arc.

that for subjects to obey

rulers

this was what the weaker had was affirmed by him to be jus-

chus.

they are

mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit

is

—

this

Those were not

When

Ami

and

tice.

True.

1

whence follows that asmuch as the interest

interest;

est of the stronger

Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not?

thai

own

the injury quite

But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interwhat the stronger thought to

infalli-

:

To

is

of the stronger.

do.

I

not for his justice

arc his subjects to

do what

is

tions with

suppose that I ask these quesany design of injuring you in the

argument ; "suppose" is not the word but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.

Nay, he

I

know

it;

replied,

1

I

Imt

i.'

do

\

sjH-.ik

.11

.

KM

Ik-

.

m

rulei

tn

Oi tlir

t

ind

And do you

madman !

i»l

pl.»\ .it

oi

m

\\

I

ilh..

die Uriel

Mii-.cs.

.ill

Iir

the informal

youi hands

sou

it

Why, he

imagine,

,

in;

Bui jrou nevei

said, th.it

I

I

,nn mi. h

.i

rhrasymaehus?

and cheat

either b\

1

I

other. the\

h.i

!er

.

.

I

.

minute

.i

th.it

1

ids in your

you made the attempt

ihr

then Mih|f mi. if pine .ind l.niltlrss while rem. lining true d uninip w Kile 1)

a lion

ihavc

said,

thnn.

\n.|

s.ii.l

ot

ai to tt\

as well

might

fault

«••

require anothei iup|

•

l

lv ible, ne\er

ill

h
i

ti.iv

l>\

ue Mid detoniiils.

\

WJU

i;i\rn to

In-rii

non

bill

admitted

l>n ir. n'.r.l

.itt

i

lid

\n.!

ihutr

the

.ill

\\r \\

ipi
the unjust

i|iiali(ies

tributed by in before to the

iust.

which w


t

u

lh
c

sible;

1

1

lerc feeling perplexed

have

that

we

— My

began

to think o\er said,

no

are in a perplexity; for

Wt

image which we had

be-

what had preceded

wonder

1

lost sight of the

friend,

I

fore us.

What do you mean: that mean to ..;.

I

he sa:d. there

do

exist

natures

gifted with those opposite qualities.

And where do you find them? Many animals, replied, furnish examples I

them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and of

know.

1

Then

there

is

Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may be expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end How do justiceand injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit what is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length. Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us. Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even Certainly not.

the reverse to strangers. Yes,

safely affirm. is

nothing impossible or out of

Come

who

tion of our heroes.

Would

not he

By

who

is

fitted to

be a guardian,

long.

and let us pass a leisure hour in and our story shall be the educa-

story-telling,

has a similar combination of qualities?

somewhat

then,

the order of nature in our finding a guardian

Certainly not.

if

means.

all

And what

shall be their

education?

Can we

besides the spirited nature, need to have the

find a better than the traditional sort?

qualities of a philosopher?

this has

do not apprehend your meaning. The trait of which I am speaking, jj6] /

and music

1

may

replied,

remarkable

What Why,

be also seen in the dog, and

I is

trait?

whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious? The matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of your remark.

And

a dog,

surely this instinct of the

— your dog

Why? Why,

is

dog

is

very

a true philosopher.

because he distinguishes the face of a

—and

divisions, gymnastic for the body,

for the soul.

True.

we

begin education with music, and gymnastic afterwards? By all means. And when you speak of music, do you inShall

go on

in the animal.

charming

two

to

clude literature or not? I

do.

And

literature

may

be either true or false?

Yes.

[377] And the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false? I do not understand your meaning, he said. You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly des-

main fictitious; and them when they are not

titute of truth, are in the

and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an

of an age to learn gymnastics.

animal be a lover of learning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

Very true. That was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.

friend

these stories are told

Most assuredly.

Quite right, he

And

You know

not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy? is

said.

also that the

most important part

beginning

is

the

of any work, especially in

I

I

l\\r in

.isr

,

..I

time

ilu-

.it

ind ir.idtU

in,

the

tin

v

.i

1.

is

1

in

curcleul) allow children

w

tales

persons, .m>l

casual

ulr.is foi

liu

to

the most

ll

m.i\

b
\ similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination

which ma\

arise in his

And

instead ol

and do the

shame

like.

or self-control, he will

mind

having any be always whin-

what ought argument has just proved to psooi we must abide until it is

1

not to be, as the

tell

sailors.

Most

true, he said.

then, the ruler catches

It,

Any

State

Most

believe.

Then persons of worth, even if only mortal men. must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed. / ]8()J Still less of the gods, as you say, he Then we

shall not sufTer such an expression used about the gods as that of Homer

when he

-

certainly, he said,

if

our idea of the

In the next place our youth

must be temper-

ate

ever carried out.

is

3

Certainly.

and

self-control in sensual pleasures

of

Then we shall approve such language Diomede in Homer, Friend

,

sit still

and obey my word,

as that

1

and the verses which follow,

The Greeks marched breathing proucss? awe of their leaders?

how

describes

2

True.

replied.

to be

he be priest or ph\

Are not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to commanders

lolcnt reaction. I

r

3 ,

he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and destructive of

ought not 10 be. Wither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a tit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a So

whethc

of the craftsmen,

ship or State.

\

anybody beside

himself lying in the State,

us; ami bv that disproved by a better. It

not to

the captain what is happening about and the rest ot the crew, and howthings arc going with himself or his fellow

not to

sieian or earpcntei

Yes. he said, that is most true. Vs. replied; but that surely is

gymnasium

the ship

to say

ing And lamenting on (light occasions.

1

patient or the pupil of a

speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for a sailor

.... in silent Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus bustling about

(

your views,

)n

On my me;

we must

n,

we were

views,

truth should be highly valued; saying, a

lie is

if,

useless to the gods,

cians; private individuals

men, then the use

have no business with

them. Clearly not, he said.

any one

have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this privilege, for a private

deemed 1

2

man a

at all is to

to lie to them in return more heinous fault than

Ibid, xvi. 433. Ibid, i. 599.

is

heavy with wine,

who

hast the eyes of a

dog and

the heart of a stag,"

as

and

of such medicines should be restricted to physi-

if

of this line,

if

useful only as a medicine to

Then

shall.

What

not admit them.

you like to father them on we must not admit them is certain.

that

and other sentiments of the same kind.

We

mansion*

the

to be

for the

and of the words which follow? [390] Would you say that these, or any similar impertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken ?

They are ill spoken. They may very possibly

afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to temperance.

And

men

—you

Odyssey,

xvii.

383

Iliad

412.

there ?

Yes. 3 *

5 8 7

harm to would agree with me

therefore they are likely to do

our young

,

iv.

Odyssey, Ibid,

iv.

Ibid,

i.

iii.

431.

225.

8.

ff.

nil r ihr

thai

s.i\

nothing

in nil

opinion

u

iteti

RKPUBLIl ••!

men

M

\. lullri luii:

mon

ii

than

hm

w

that

liirnl

hr

li».

I

t

•

hr

sentiments w hn h

is

tit

man

01

i

ondiM

to heai

iu
\ ha mankind two ifti uiswei ing to thi m Mil) iiiiliin tl\ to the v>ul .in.l IhkU ion

Ki< al,

hi

I

ami thr ochei the

ipirited

he-

t

cur

rUtion;

haVC

set

t

said, the vriHin

meaning

the

ol

unwill;

the

learn.

r about their hunting and coursing, gymnastic and equestrian contests? Foi these .ill follow the general principle, and has ing found ih.it, we shall have no difficulty in

Why, said, do you not see that men .ue unwillingly deprived ol good, and willing evil? Is not to have lost the truth .m evil, and to possess the truth .i u would

discovering tlK-m. dare say mat there will he no difficulty. Very uooil, said; then what is the next

conceive thin. |M>sc idected, and he who fails in ; the trial is to be rejected. That will be the wa\ !s,

And

and which they give lurthcr proof of the same

rhcrc should also be toils and pains

conflicts prescribed will be

made

to

lor

them,

in

light,

even be made probable, if it did. your words seem to hesitate on your I low lips'

You will not wonder, I replied, when you have heard.

he replied.

I

—

—

act n
m- .in admixtui 10m or itlver in them ire rai* d u> honour, and •Mir guardians or luxili u u lr M man ol brass m Iron guards the State, it will Ik- destroyed Sucn ii the tale; imposition must in>t

ii

1

1

1

1

«

i

ol

ink

i

.

pitiful

Ik-

i

.

I

1

1

i

.t

I

i

am Mm,

I

and

to be, in. in

civilize

*

I »

* t

1

1

rtain

i

have thr

will

Ik-,

more

h

and humanise them

in

thru relations

;

tion

.i

is

there in) poatibilit) ol

believe in

N

the preseni

may

sens

ol

made

Ik-

to believe

the difficulty, tor the

roch itv


i the two i»ir\, what is the titiili: SUv« we neither have noi ire permitted i \e conveyed to our gnardiai our at) be accounted neither large nor hut one and self sufficing.

new

1

order which v.c impose upon them. the other, said

of

1.

1

which we were

—

mean the 1 speaking before is lighter still rading the offspring oi the guardi.

hen interior. And oi elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring oi the lower

when ally,

naturally su|>erior.

'I

"he intention

the case of the citizens gener-

that,

in

each

individual

should be put to the

which nature intended him, one to one work, and then e\ery man would do his own business, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many. he said; that

I,

is

not so difficult.

we

regulations which

are prescribing,

danger

quite believe

to the

So

him

whole

Damon

—he

and me. and

State,

tells

says that

when

of music change, the fundamental laws

modes

change with them. Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon's and \our own. Then. I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music? Yes, he said: the lawlessness of which you

of the State always aid

speak too easily

r

The

of the poet; for any musical inno\a-

full of

is

hf to be prohibited.

>e\crc

And

may be praising, not new kind of song; and this

afraid that he

not to be praised, or conceived to be the

meaning tion

l>e

songs, but a

1

and

steals in.

replied, in the

at first sight

Why, yes, he

form of amusement:

appears harmless.

it

and there is no harm: ucre by little this spirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between man it

not that

said,

little

od Adeimantus, are not. as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of a thing, however, which the one great thing I would rather call, not great, but sufficient for

and man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights.

our purpose.

and nurture; If our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all is well as other matters which omit;

That is my belief, he replied. Then, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter system, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths themselves become lawless, [425] they can never grow up into well-conducted and vir-

such, for example, as marriage, [424] the possession of women and the procreation of chil-

tuous citizens. Very true, he

—

What may Education,

that be I

;

he asked.

said,

I

dren, which will that friends

all

have

follow the general principle

all

things in

common,

as the

proverb says.

That

will be the best

way

of settling them.

once started well, moves with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good !

-aid. the State, if

constitutions,

and these good constitutions

ing root in a good education improve

tak-

more and

more, and this improvement aifects the breed

man

in

as in other animals.

Very possibly, he

Then above

to

all,

directed

sum

the point to which,

the attention of our rulers should be that music and gymnastic be pre-

—

made. They must do

them intact. And mankind most regard

tain

utmost to mainwhen any one says that their

The newest song which 1 1

/..

that true.'

And when

I

said.

said.

made a good beginning and by the help of music have gained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, they have

in play,

in a

manner how unlike the lawless play of the accompany them in all their actions

others! will

and be

a principle of

growth

to them,

and

if

there be any fallen places in the State will raise

them up again.

Wry

true,

he

said.

Thus educated, any

they will invent for themwhich their predecessors

lesser rules

have altogether neglected. is

served in their original form, and no innovation

Is

selves

said.

up: This

pri\ate as well as public.

the singers

hate?

What do you mean? mean such things

I

young

as

these:

—when

are to be silent before their elders:

the

how

show respect to them by standing and making them sit; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with they are to

me

:

«

THE REPUBLH

I

v

ind idlu

\

wisdom

think, sm.ill But there iv bout inch mitten I

.ur .ins

trm Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to Ik- doing the "-

business ot

a

cobbler, or a cobblcrot

.1

carpenter;

and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever Ik- the change; do you think that any great harm

would result Not much.

to the State

:

But when the cobbler or any other man nature designed to be a lifted

up by wealth

of his

whom

ha\ ing his heart

trailer,

or strength or the

number

followers, or any like advantage,

at-

tempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either other; or

law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and

which

is

a just

is

implements or the duties of the

to take the

ot necessity.

which of these four qualities by its presence contributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the If

that

Which

Then on

it.

man

a

th.it

.uiv

neither Like wh.il

.im right Of not:

I,

if]

ttainly.

Well then,

ia

tr.

the rulers

tx.t

those to

ordium.

1

»hr

wh.it w.is I

1

rice

in

in

petition

glow impatieni

diih

j

who

we missed Ikt. What do \ »n mean mean to lay thai in realit) t.-t i long time talking ol justice, and have nan we have I

-

I*

ch

•.

noth

whai the) have in tliru wa} with in pre looked

the distance; and therefore,

i

when one man

and warrior agree with

and

this

all

me

in one, in

is

then

trader, legislator, I

think you will

saying that this interchange

meddling of one with another

is

the

ruin of the State.

Most

true.

Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be

DlALOGU

350 :stly

termed evil-doing:

And the greatest degree of e\ -doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice? il

Mainly.

This then

is

injustice;

and

oil

the other

hand

the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, ami will make the city just.

when

ree

We

on

if,

trial,

said, be overpositive as yet;

1

conception of justice be

this

individual as well as in the Stale, there will be no longer any room tor doubt; if it Ik* not verified, we must have a fresh enquiry. First let us complete the old in

the

we began,

investigation, 9 Inch

under the impression

you remem-

as

that,

if

we could

previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example ap-

we conknowing

peared to be the State, and accordingly

structed as good a one as we could, well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be

now applied to the we shall be satisfied the individual,

in

individual ;

or,

we

if

—

if

they agree,

there be a difference

will

And have another

Stale

come back

trial

to the

of the theory.

1 435] The friction of the two when rubbed together mav possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is

then revealed we will fix in our souls. That will be in regular course; let us do as

you

proceeded to ask:

When two things,

a great-

by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the

and

less, are called

same.'

Like, he replied.

The

just

man

then,

if

we

regard the idea of

justice only, will be like the just State?

He will. And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain

same

other affections and

qualities

of these

classes?

True, he

And

An

3

easy question! Nay. rather, Socrates, the

proverb holds that hard Very true. said; and

is

the good.

do not think method which we are employing is at 1

I

that the all

ade-

quate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one.

we may

arrive at a solution not below the previous enquiry. May we not be satisfied with that 3 he said under the circumstances. I am quite content. I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satis-

level of the

—

fied.

Then he

pursuing the speculation,

faint not in

said.

Must we not acknowledge,

I

said, that

in

each of us there are the same principles and

which there arc in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State 3 how else can they come there 3 Takethe quality would be ridiculous of passion or spirit it to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who habits

—

—

are supposed to possess

it,

e. g.

the Thracians,

Scvthians, and in general the northern nations;

and the same may be edge, which

is

said of the love of

knowl-

the special characteristic of our

part of the world, [436] or of the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attrib-

uted to the Phoenicians and Egyptians. Exactly so, he said.

There

is

no

difficulty in

understanding

this.

None whatever.

say.

I

er

—

soul has these three principles or not

Still

with you.

will not.

verified

ber,

more then. O my friend, we ha\e upon an easy question whether the

ice

alighted

Pre.

but

OF PLATO

said.

we mav assume same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner so ol the individual;

that he has the

3

Certainly, he said.

But the question is not quite so easy when proceed to ask whether these principles are

we

three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action to determine that is the difficulty. Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty. Then let us now try and determine whether

—

they are the same or different.

How

can we? he asked.

The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways: and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different. I

replied as follows:

Good. For example,

I

said,

can the same thing be

1

I

id

motion

III

llir

al

s

line

11

REP

l

Uinr

h

II

I

V

I

1

the

111

same |

llll|Hiss;',>

Still,

trims,

ol

:

ultrj.l\ let

said,

I

us have

mi we should hcrcattci

list

tall

thai

thai

i

I

.1

1

w wants anything

moment

tut

ti>

Ii

i

mode

ol

i|

should object, and should rathei s.i\ thai p.m i»t lum is in motion while anothei

\

(

and

true.

\

Ami mppoac ther,

and

to

tlu-

draw

objectoj to refine

tur-

si ill

the nice distinction that not

I

I

I

the circumferenoc goes round.

desire

it.

while

revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or

forwards or backwards, then view can they be at rest.

left,

point oi

That

is

the correct

mode

ot

in

no

describing them,

he replied.

Then Bone

us to believe that the same riling the same time, [4^ / in the same part or in

relation to the

upon

same thing, can

act or be acted

in contrarv

ways. Certainly not, according to

examine

desire; should

thi

rtainly.

Admitting

this to

Ik-

us suppose a p.trtu

let

irur of desire generally,

ul.ir

|

out Oi these we will srln hunger M\^\ \\. as they arc termed, which arc the most obvit

oi

them

Let us

The

;

(Ac

that

1

lass,

object oi one

is

he said.

mod, and

ol

the

drink? Yes.

And

here comes the point: is not thirst the which the soul has oi drink, and \

t)Ul

length the d

.it

R

I

r

In-

UD

l.lll

of

him;

«

m>ii.

w

ill

iplr-v

i

h

in>

!.

W

il

is

oh

.•

ova

r.l

,:

bctioni

in

thai ingei

is,

though

.in

»t

man) oth Inn a in. ins

«\

.1

which

I

is

desires violently

like the struggle ot

out

i.

n

the

.ilso

auxili

1

different

any one else?

Certainly not. Sup|x>sc that a

man

spirit

simOSl

•

easil)

p.

young

in

-

s.M.n

.is

them

|

hildren

equally

to another, the nobler he

he to fed indignant

n

at

is

the less able

roy suffering, such

.1^

I

True, he said.

when he thinks that he is the sufferer wrong, then he boils and chates, rod is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he sutlers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be But

or the

quelled until he either slays or

is

in. iv

loiner,

is,

ot

uth

ti

enough*

:

w

h.it

is

further

«

you

once more appeal to the words of h h.i\e been .ilre.idv quoted by us,

whu

(mate

his breast,

for in this verSC

and thus rrbukrd

his

'.

rea-

The

illustration is perfect, he replied; and our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds. I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a further point which I wish you to consider. in

:

I

power which

loiner h.is clearly SU|

about the Ixrt' worse to be dillerent lrom the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by it. Very true, he said. And so. alter much tossing, we have r land, and are fairly agreed that the s.unc printhe

ciples

re.isns

which exist in the Si and that they are three

in

in

individualj

the

numl>cr.

Exactly,

Must we not then infer that the individual is in the same way, and in Virtue ol the same quality which makes the State wisc\ wise

:

slain; or until

he hears the voice of the shepherd, that son, bidding his dog bark no more.

l.itr-

-i

hunger, or col J, or any other pain which the these Injured person may inflict upon him ems to be just, and, as say, his anger reEuses to he excited by them.

What point You remember

we

the

of

Iirrr.r.

brute animals, which

in ;

Full

i

ind you

//(•

done

th.it

l!

.is

on, .ind most ol thrui

I

th inks he haf

i

to It difl

Bui 'hit

sninr ot

si«!

which has already from

passion,

it

I**

t be put into the

Are

form

r.ik

mI'Ic

begin

>,

• I

oi

this

ion w

in.:

the

',

.it

on*

State



r I

replied,

.ill

oi

CI

\

ni.ittrr

the

laid.

conceive, fond ol fine cones and

l

ours and forms and

who


l the nine il ,-i mi. \nd iu.i\ not thr iu.m\ w hu h .irr doubles be dotibles, that in. ol one thing.

1

1 1

•

tmbi

1

knowledge, the

..•

nn iiiU

M ho listened

t

il

halves

.in.l

«'t

Ami

and

they .ur termed, will net Ik- denoted by these .nn more than by hc much esteemed by those of the opte faction; not that the greatest and most lasting uiiury

but by her of

whom

'

done

to her

by her opponents,

professing followers, the same

you suppose the accuser to

the greater

and the agre

is

own

number

best are

sav. that

them are arrant rogues, useless; in which opinion I of

Yes.

Ami

the reason

why

the

good are

useless has

now been explained' True.

Then

shall

we proceed

ruption ol the majority

is

to

show

that the cor-

also unavoidable,

and

not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other: that this

By

is

means.

all

And

us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. [490] Truth, as you will rememlet

whom

ber,

was

and

in all things; tailing in this,

postor,

his leader,

and had no part or

he tollowed always he was an imlot in

true philoso-

phy. Yes, that was said. Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of

him?

Certainly, he said.

And have we

not a right to say in his defence,

that the true lover of

—

knowledge

is

always

striv-

ing after being that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is

;

S.n to him, that, in

to

rs.

Precisely so, he said.

irec

their plot tor getting the ship out ol the cap-

.ot

thc\

and

with the stores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed 00 their \o\age in such a manner as might be expelled ol them. Him

make

mankind are of a different stamp; ma\ be justK compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and Starernors 01

—

an appearance only, but will go on the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail. Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him. And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?

I

I

I

H MM

I

K

I

I'l

I

i;

I

\

i

I

of thingi

will.

\nJ w hen ii nth lUtDCd M] evil

in

the

>

the

«'l

u

aptain,

I

1

1

ffeci

i

hand which

tic

I

tiii.lt

-a

i

nid

.

Inii

ihould like

I

i

p the

Impossible. ct and health ol mind will beoi the com pany, and temperance ^ill follov uc, he replied*

I

;ri

is

will n longi

their

n set in array

i

.ui\

kmmhi

\\Ii\

he philosopher'i virtu

I

wordj and look

.it

t.uts, the

who

personi

tome oi them manifi uscU-ss. and the greatei numbei utterly de prated; we were then led to enquire into the unds oi these- accusations, and hate nom ai .uc thus described are

the point

asking

rived

.»t

joritj

bad, which question

i>t

oi

us bach to the examination

why

arc the

ma

necessity brought

and definition

oi

Exactly.

Ami we

have next

do

consider thecorruptions

whv

the philosophic nature,

so

—

many

.ire

sorewescapc spoiling lam speakmg oi those who were said to be useless but not wicked and, [jgi J when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philoso led and

—

manner

phv, what

of

men

are they

who

aspire

which is above them and of which thev arc unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation or which we speak. alter a protession

What

are these corruptions? he said.

will see it I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a nature having in perfecI

tion all the qualities

philosopher, seen

is

which we required in a which is seldom

a rare plant

among men.

causes?

In the hrst place there are their their courage, temperance,

and the

own

virtues,

rest of

them,

every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys

and is

distracts

from philosophy the soul which

the possessor of them.

That

Then

is

very singular, he replied.

there are

all

the ordinary goods of

life

—beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections the State — you understand the in

III

»u

iti

to

I

>

1

i

.

\Ci\ true,

There

ii

reason

more injury than 11. 1st (

is

in

when under

natures,

the-

supposing thai thr

finest

alien condition

be ause

the con*

Adeimantus,

that the

inferior,

greater.

eriamly.

we

ni.i\

not say,

most gifted minds, when the) are ill edu< ated, bo ome pre eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit ot pure evil spring out ot a fulness o! nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, when as weak, naturi scarcclv capable o! any very great good or very ;

great evil

There think that you are right. [492] And our philosopher follows the same I

analogy

— he

er nurture,

into

all

is

like a plant

must

which, having prop-

grow and mature sown and planted in an

necessarily

virtue, but,

if

soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often sa\, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists. or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the

alien

who say these things the greatest of all And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts? When is this accomplished? he said. When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a public

Rare indeed. And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures!

What

":. i;lt\

Whv, s.ii.l, u r know thai .1" w hethci -a animal, when the) fail Do meet with propci nutriment od

oi

nrm

rxjpular

he he carried awa\ bv the

I

not have the notion*

which he is speaking, but calls honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them

or passions ot

man's heart, as i: *p Within him any private training enable him to stand

oi

this

i

and ewl which the public in general have— he will do as thc\ do, and as thc\ arc, SUCO will he

>t that the iust and noble are the necessary, having never himself, seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either, or the diifercnce between them, which is immense. By heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator? Indeed he would. And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the temjKrs and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in paint;

rates; necessity will

And cessity,

\et.

said, there

I

which has not

is

l>ccn

a

compel him. still

greater ne-

mentioned.

What iv The gentle ;

EofCC oi attainder or confiscation or death, which, as yOU are aware, these new Sophist! and educators, who arc the public, apply

words are powerless. and in right good earnest. what opinion oi any other Sophist, or

when

their

>;

Now come

can be expected to o\er-

;>ri\ate person,

.

m

such an unequal contest? he replied. Milred, said, even to make the attempt oi tolly, there neither is, nor has

c.

1

been, nor

is

of character

what

duce whatever they

in

is

more than human, as the proverb would not have \uu I

ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved bv the power ol ( Jod, [493] as we may trul\ I

quite assent, he replied. let me crave your assent also to a fur-

Then

ther observation.

What Why,

whom deem

are vou going to say? that all those

the

many

call

mercenary individuals,

Sophists and

whom

to be their adversaries, do, in fact,

they teach

nothing but the opinion of the many, that is to Say, the opinions of their assemblies; and this is

might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse. and what is the meaning ot his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or intunated; ami vou may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this.hecallshisknowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion ot what he means by the principles their

when he is not obliged, the so-called Diomedc will oblige him to pro-

which has had no other training

not included: lor

if

his judges

necessity of

—

sa\s.

man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them

a

ever likely to be, any different type

virtue but that which :s supplied by public opinion 1 speak, my friend, of human virtue

only;

ing or music, or, finally, in politics, differ from whom I have been describing? For when

him

wisdom.

I

—

praise.

are utterly ludicrous

firmation of their

And

yet the reasons

which they give

own

in con-

notions about the hon-

ourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?

No, nor

You

am

I

likely to hear.

recognise the truth of

Then

what

I

have been

me

ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather saying?

let

than of the many beautiful, [494] or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind? Certainly not.

Then

the world cannot possibly be a philos-

opher? Impossible.

And fall

therefore philosophers must inevitably under the censure of the world?

They must.

And

of individuals

who consort with

the

and seek to please them? That is evident. Then, do you see any way in which the

mob

philos-

opher can be preserved in his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence these were admitted bv us to be the true philosopher's gifts.

—

Yes.

Will not such an one from his early child-

hood be

in all things first

among

all,

especially

I

irnts

his hod-'

like

.ire

R

II

I

it

I

I

I

us mental

ours

I

1

as he gets ol.lv

mn

theii

foi

i

\


r

persons

th.it

Ver

hut also

be iffirn

1

have.

would be

!*-

.

d
ipend the greatei pari oi their time- with one .mother in the hea\enlv .itc

i

on them .lie just; there Can be no doubt th.it every one oi them will take office as ttero necessity, .mil not alter the fashion t our pics .i

than night

my

i,

And i

i

I.

the true dai " hi
c

i

11

I

tion will gain most.

Yes, that will be the best way.

how,

if

And

I

think,

you have very well described ever, such a constitution might come in-

Socrates,

that

to being.

Enough then

and of the no difficulty

of the perfect State,

man who

bears

in seeing

how we

its

image

— there

shall describe

is

him.

There is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that nothing more need be said.

ing also at politics and ruling lor the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty;

BOOK

VIII

and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then

[543] And so. (ilaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and that all edu-

they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public

cation

memorials and

and the bravest warriors are

sacrifices

and honour them,

the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but not, as in any case blessed and divine.

You

are a sculptor, Socrates,

statues of

our governors

if if

and have made

faultless in beauty.

and the pursuits of war and peace are common, and the best philosophers

also to be

to be their kings? That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.

Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when appointed

DIALOG UES OF PLATO themselves, will take their soldier* and place thnn in houses such as \vc were describing,

common

and contain nothing and al>out their propremember what we agrccd remember that no one was to have any oi the ordinary possession! of mankind; they were to l>c warrior athletes ami guardians, rewhich

are

to all,

private, or individual;

;

1

ceiving from the other citizens, in lieu .

whole

nt, only their maintenance,

i

and they

themselves and

care ol

t.tkc

to

ot

the

democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and tamous. which ditlers from them all, and is the tourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know, do your of any other constitution which can be said to have a dis-

There arc lordships and prinarc bought and sold, and some other intermediate tonus ot go\crnmcnt. But these arc nondescripts and may be found tinct character.

ami now that aided,

which we digressed,

let

that

this division of

us find the point at

we may

return into

path.

'.I

you imyou had finished the d( icription of the State: you said that such a ami that the mar. was good State v.

There

no

is

1

lellencsand

Yes. he replied,

laid;

1

among

Squall)

Slate.

True,

which

cipalities

difficulty in returning;

now,

plied, then as

that

:

who answered

it, although, / $jj] as now morcexcellent things to relate

to

U hail

and man. And you said further, was the true iorm. then the others 'lie lalse lorms, vou said, as remember, that there were tour principal Ones, and that their defects, and the delects of the individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining. When we had seen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was the best ami who was the worst of them, we were to consider whether the best was not also the happiest, and the worst the most asked you what were the four forms miserable. oi government ot which you spoke, and then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; ami you began again, and have found your way to the point at which we have now lx>th of Suite

this

I

I

;

grow out Then it the

they

human

of

then. 1

the dispositions ot individual

be

I

will,

I

what were four constitutions of which you were speakshall particularly

1

the

wish

to hear

in-.

'That question, said, is easily answered: the tour governments of which I spoke, so far I

as the) ot

have

distinct

names,

are, first, those

Crete and Sparta, which are generally ap-

plauded; what is termed oligarchy comes next; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with evils: thirdly,

live.

will also

ii\

I

we

to aristocracy, and whom and good. [5J5] we have

who answers

lim

rightly call just

already described.

We

have.

Then

let

now

us

proceed to describe the inbeing the contentious and answer to the Spartan polity:

ferior sort of natures,

ambitious,

who

also the oligarchical, democratical. nical.

and

tyran-

Let us place the most just by the side of

and when we see them wc compare the relative happiness

the most unjust,

him who leads a life of pure pure injustice. The enquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions justice or

argument

to prefer justice.

Shall

we

we must do

you

say.

follow our old plan, which

we

Certainly, he replied,

said.

minds

Certainly.

of the

can,

characters.

constitutions of States arc

or unhappiness of

il

main

1

Your recollection, I said, is most exact. 'Hun, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same position; and let me ask the same questions, aw^\ do vou give me the- same answer which you were about to .

barbarians.

forms of government which exist among them. )o you know, I said, that governments \ar\ as the dispositions ot men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are ol the other For we cannot suppose that States are made ot "oak and rock," and not out ot the human natures which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale and draw other things alter them.1 Yes, he said, the States are as the men are;

shall be able to

me

among

certainly hear of

curious

arrived.

give

we

adopted with

as

view to clearness, of taking the State hrst and then proceeding to the individual, and begin with the government of honour? I know of no name for such a government other than t imocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with this the like character a

—

in the individual; and, after that, consider oli-

garchical

man; and then again we will turn to democracy and the democrat-

our attention

/

1

MM REPUBLK man; ind

k.i! i

ir\

we

lastly,

tvill

go ind view the

tyranny, ind once more take

.'i

ind

the iyrant*i soul,

t

r \

srrrve

t.«

h-'k into

.1

11

1

VIII

not! added (4) w hen I

lati

1

w.i\

li.H

mattei w

ill

of

I

and

iin;

urr

honoui vernmenl ol tip

lent ol

)

ai ises

hut

•

out

overning power, government united, howevci imall, cannot be

the ii

mo> way, then,

In wli.u

will

our

city

mi

•

?

1

it

.1

e to he vein, mak low would they address qs?

V'er

this

last

And

plants that

animals that

and

which

is

.1

yours will not

tility

(

tl

).

than the prr

ludes the fractioi

pn

fa

k |uares

t

and

:

I

.1

ol

ii

r.u

constitution such .is tor ever, hut will in time he

this

.1

is

the

dissolution:

— In

grow in the earth, as well as in move on the earth's surface, fer-

sterility of soul

and body occur when

oi

1

which

birth

is

comprehended

in a

number

by involution and evolution [or squared and cubed] obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and waning numbers, make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one hrst increments

iquarc

dtamet

bii

••'

h

1

50

five

50=

|

thi

ol

MOW

this nuiii-

.1

when your guardians

int

ai

I

r

the law

ol

and mute bride and bridegroom out

ol

births,

ot

season, the children will not he goodly

fortunate.

And though

only the best

he appointed hv their

unworthy

>>r

them

ol

rs.

still

to hold their fathers

1

places, .ind when they come into power as guardians, they will soon he found to fail in taking care- ot us, the Muses. Iirst by u: valuing music; which neglect will soon extend

gymnastic: and hence thcyoung

to

men

of your

State will he less cultivated. In the succeeding

generation rulers will be appointed lost

the guardian

power

who

have

of testing the metal

of your dilTerent races, which, like Hesiod's,

And

human

is

j

geometru al 6gure n h h control over the good and evil ol births.

are ot gold

1

ir.

ional

which hundred ubes

represents

completed, which in short-lived existences pass over a short space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human fecundity .md sterility all the wisdom and education oi your rulers will not attain; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number, but the period in

tions

in.

the circumferences of the circles of each are

of

.1.

inn:.

ich of thci

one

\

•

they will be city

'

I

will

?

hardly be shaken; hut, everything which has beginning

has also an end, even solved.

earnesl

cm

thus constituted th.it

manner:— A

in

hui

•

diai

w

iliaries

seeing

rational tr

be moved,

li.it manner will the two J.isscs ol tux and rulers disagree among themselves th one .mother Shall we, after the man* nej ol lomer, pra) the Muses to tell us "how discord first arose?*' Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery, to play and jest With us .is we were children, and to address us m lofty

and

11

iniiidrr d

iquarc the side

true, he said.

I

h

1

equal

!e is a mixture of good and evil. Why. there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen it of contention and ambition; and these

due

to the prevalence of the passionate or

Assuredly, he said. is the origin and such the character of lie. which has been described in outline

Such

more

was not reenough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly unjust; and to go through all the States and all the characters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labour. Very true, he replied. Now what man answers to this form of government how did he come into bein what is he like.' only; the

perfect execution

quired, for a sketch

is

—

I

True, Hut in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no longer to be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed

ot

they arc miserly because they have no

spirited element.

has been made,

some

is

And

are

aristocra

Ver\ true.

Such

That

\

think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit

of contention

which characterises him. he

unlike our friend Glaucon. Perhaps. I said, he may be like

him

is

not

in that

one point; but there are other respects in which he is very different. In what respects ; He should have more of self-assertion and be

and yet a friend of culture; [549] and he should be a good listener, but no speaker. Such a person is apt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is too proud for that; and he will also be courteous to freemen. and remarkably obedient to authority; he is a lover of power and a lover of honour; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the less cultivated,

chase.

Yes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy. Such an one will despise riches only when he

.

and more Mtnu h d i\ .ii

1

m,

ihr

1 »

IOUI ii.itiue

iv

minded towardi

w

\\r

I

I

l

I

\|e at war with himself; he will be two men. and not one: but. m general, his better desires will l>c round to prevail monly has to

.

ova

Yet, often.

exist in

sjk-ikI

And

still they remain in the city; there they ready to sting and fully armed, and some ot them owe money, some ha\e forfeited their citizenship; a third (.lass arc in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those

who have got their pro]

his inferior ones.

body

True. these reasons llich An one will be more ;>lc; \ct the true vir-

That ( ):i

.

unanimous and harmonious soul iy and nc.cr come near him.

i

1

mid

sh

surelv,

the miser

an ignoble competitor

will be

•

indi\idually

in a State lor

any

:hcr object ot honourable end his money in the

awakening and inviting them to

so afraid

contest

help and join

in the

is

he

ot

Struggle; in true oligarchi-

fashion he rights with a small part only ot ad the result commonly is that

cal

CS the

prize and sa\ cs his

money,

cal State

;

There can be no doubt. comes democracy; of •

this the

originand

nature have still to be considered by us: And then we will enquire into the ways of the democratic man, and bring him up for judgment.

That, he laid, is our method. Well. saiil. and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise? Is it not on this

men

of business,

sting

their

— that

is,

— into

money

their

one else who is not on his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family of children; and so they

make drone and pauper

to

abound

in

the Stale. certain.

is

he

'1

them

said, there arc plenty ot

[556/ Yes. he

— that

up

evil blazes

not extinguish

own

it,

like a tire;

and

the

either by restrict, ng a

man's

property, or by another remedy:

What other? One which is

the next best, and has the advantage ot compelling the citizens to look to their characters: Let there be a general rule that every one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of which we were speaking will be greatly

—

lessened in the State.

Yes, they will be greatly lessened.

Wh.it then?

At present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, treat their sublets badly: while they and their adherents, especially the young men of the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness both of body and mind: they do nothing, and

The

are

I

wise?—The good to

true.

is

,e

ry true.

ser

iost every-

are eager lor revolution.

the other hand, the

use of his

we am longer doubt, then, that the miand money-maker answers to the oligarchi-

and

Stooping as they walk, and pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert

I

And

/ 55 5 /

will

else,

become

at

which such

aims

is

which

is

a State

as rich as possible, a desire

ible?

being aware that their power law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gam by their ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates And thus increase their own wealth and importance: rulers,

upon

rests

To

their wealth, refuse to curtail by

incapable of resisting either pleasure or

pain.

Very

true.

They themselves ey,

and are

care only for

as indifferent as the

be sure.

Yes, quite as indifferent.

on

garded.

or fellow-sailors; aye

And

is

tolerably dear.

in oligarchic

from the general spread ot carelessness and extravagance, men d family ha\e often been reduced to ary?

to the

cultivation of virtue.

There can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation cannot exist together in citizens ot the same State to anv considerable extent; one or the other will be disre-

That

making monpauper

Such

is

the state of affairs

which

prevails

among them. And often rulers and their subjects may come in one another's way, whether pilgrimage or a march, as fellow-soldiers and they may observe the behaviour of each other in the very moment of a

danger

—

for

where danger

is.

there

is

no

that the poor will be despised by the rich

very likely the wiry sunburnt poor

placed in battle

at

fear

—and

man may be who

the side of a wealthy one

'

i

II

i

unci

has

.[Hilt his

complexion

puffing ami tii

tu.

ich

Kii

11

i

lusion

i

one has

only rich because no \

lc

tli.»t

when

I

men like the com

lid,

Ik tlrr

w hu h to

in

bin

in

tin quit

thai

tins

is

.»

ttiofl 1

in

in

the

i

ommotion may

ti

tame way wherevei there

IMSS in the State their

is

isew ii

md

allies,

falls lit k, sod is ai war with and may be at times distracted, even when there is do external cause.

then the State

hers

Yes,

mi

Ami

then democracy comes into being aftconquered their opponents,

the poor have

er,

I

t

Clearly, he said.

and is not freedom and frankness a man do what he likes ;

In the first place, are they not tree;

—

the city full of

may '

say -\nd

Tis said

so,

he replied.

And where freedom

is,

individual

the

is

his

in.id.-

'

|

,iiii;

&

Ins

lc will

nut

l>'* which the) pri,ri\r I" l>e void »«t .ill accomplishment! and fail purtuiti and nuc words, which make thcii abode in thr minds ol men who are dcai to the gods, and are

At

\oiiu.;

VIII mi.

KHil,

livt

'•

none

them

< Rn tti them w ill lie rccju

AihI the .

i

the

ith

lc\

accord,

.aid -.mils

1

I

Ik

\\

ii

n

more drones,

low Jo you mean?

He

will rob the citizens ol their slaves; he then set them tree and enrol them in his guard. I'o be sure Ik- said; .nul he will be able to

will

What

theii

out

n putation

i

i

to

th(

u

1

maintain

will

oi

son and from evei \ land. ^ ea, he said, there .nc lUu will he not desire to gel them on the

them

mon

th
t

mrd being drawn towardi thr painful and ihmk thr pain which th

iiilcf

thr

pleasure

is

in

t!

thr

compariaoo «»i what in painful, comparison ol uli.it in pleasant; tcntaiions, when used l»s the

t

•mi and

and not

Far purer, he replied, is the being of that is concerned with the invariable. And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of

which

essence? Yes, of

And

knowledge

of truth in the

in the same degree. same degree 5

Yes.

And, conversely, will also

have

that

less of

which has

less of truth

essence?

Necessarily.

Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

424 the service of the soul

3

envious and ambitious, or violent and conand discontented, if he be seeking to attain honour and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or is

tentious, or angry

less.

nor the body

h.is

itself less

and

of truth

essence than the tool?

3

sense

with more more real existence, is more really than that which is filled with less real

What

is

filled

actually has a lilled

HCC and (

)f

is

less real

3

if

there he a pleasure in being tilled with

which is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true pit whereas that which participates in less real being will he less truly and surclv satisfied, and will participate in an illusory and less real 3

questionably.

Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with gluttony and sensuality. gO down and up again as lar as the mean; and in this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they e\er find their way, neither are they truly lilled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining table, they fatten and feed and breed, mu\, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust.

For they

not

substantial,

which they

fill

fill

themselves with that which is and the part of themselves is

also unsubstantial

and

Exactly.

But when either of the two other principles prevails,

you describe

life ol the many like an oracle. Their pleasures are mixed with pains how can they be otherwise 3 For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by contrast, which exaggerates both light mu\ shade, and so they implant in the minds of

—

tools insane desires ot themselves;

and they are

fought about as Steskhorus says that the Greeks ought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth. I

ot

that

not

the

must

sort

inevitably

happen.

And must

fails in

attaining

its

own

pleasure,

own? True.

And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure. 3

Yes.

And at

is

not that farthest from reason which

the greatest distance

is

from law and order 3

Clearly.

in-

the

Something

it

and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a shadow only and which is not their

And

Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon,

like

happen with the

spirited or passionate element of the soul p. i-

they seek

under the guidance and in the company oi reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him.3 Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural. And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, [587] and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable.3

continent.

not the

money and honour, when

their pleasures

that

pleasure

spirited

lovers of

course.

And

he said, the same will happen with the element also. Then may we not confidently assert that the

And

real existence.

\\.\n

who

3

Will

carries his pas-

sion into action, be in the like case,

whether he

as

we

the lustful and tyrannical desires are, saw, at the greatest distance.3

Yes.

And

the royal and orderly desires are near-

est?

Yes.

Then

the tyrant

wii-1 live at

the greatest dis-

tance from true or natural pleasure, and the

king

at the least?

Certainly.

But antly,

if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasand the king most pleasantly?

Inevitably.

Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them? Will you tell me? There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now the transgression

I

1

I

R

I

I'

I

111

I

I

poini beyond the in the tyrant reaches oui; he hai run away trom the region nl la*

oi

I

I

the

.1

which brought us

Is

and taken up Ins abode with ind w hu h an

.m.l reason,

injustu

1!

hit!

1

tain \\a\c pleasures

the

measure

!

I

h>u do

can onl)

his inferiority

oi

bi

quality

JTOll inr.i

.issiimr,

n

s.iul. ih.»t

1

the tyrant

oligarch; the

the-

is

in

demo*

the third

rai

was

on

little

is

have there

it

truth in wh.n

is-

h.is

v.

ith

!

his

1

1

like

.in

image

thrice

of the

pre

wedded loan image ol pleasure whii h removed as to truth From the- pleasure

nl, like thi

He will. since

we count

\ es,

he

is

.is

tures

third

is

by

the space oi

is

removed trom true pleas number which is three

.i

Manifestly.

plane figure. Certainly.

the

is

power ami make

raise the

plane a solid, there ted

or

more

difl

are said to have been SUi h unions.

main

ot he. ids ot all is

r

and

multi a

md

I

able to generate

.1

1

ring wild,

.

at will,

The shadow then ot tyrantiie.il pleasure determined by the number oi length will b

you

two

tn :;r«>w into one.

Then do you now model the or: of tudinous, many beaded monster, having which he

times thre

if

others in which

iui

and then

us.

r

t

the t\r.ini

And

S^ vll.i

1

truth, and can doall things because he light-

U touches on part

.111

1

small part ol them, and that

image. For example:

A

painter will

paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist,

though he knows nothing I

artist,

he

may

oi their arts;

and, 1! deceive children or

simple persons, when he shows them his picture ol a carpenter Erom a distance, and they ancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.

And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and things else that anybody knows, and every

single thing with a higher degree ot accuracy

—

than any other man whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-know ing, because he himselt was unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.

Most

true.

And

so,

when we

hear persons saying that

and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them;

the tragedians,

•' 1

m

it ion,

i" the

he

iih,

man

said,

should by

n«'u

make

suppose that

the

v, and could >ut ni\ km. v.

the

I

i

I

•

works

1

ben about the imitatoi would likr w hat about he- patnl t.> know whethei he ma) be thought to imitate tli.K which original!) exist! in natun 01 onl) I

I

!

-

we

1.

;ht to

know

respecting mili-

tary tactics, politics, education, chiefest

and noblest subjects

which are the and

of his poems,

WC may fairly ask him about them. "Friend Homer," then we say to him, "if you are only in remove from truth in what you say and not in the third not an image maker or imitator and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help 3 The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been the second

of virtue,

—

—

similarly benefited by others; but

who

says that

you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about your" Is there any city which he might name 3 think not. said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he was a legisI

lator.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

450

[boo] Well, hut is there anv war on record which was carried on successfully by him, or aided h\ his counsels, when he was al: (

)r is

there an\ invention of his, applicable to human life, such as Thales the

the arts or to

Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other OUl men have conceived, which is attributed to

There

is

him? absolutely nothing of the kind. never did any public service, :

privately a

he

with him. an

guide or teacheroi an)

who loved to ami who handed down to

In his lifetime friends

I

lomerk waj

b\ Pythagoras

ot life,

f

1

lad

associate posterity

such as was established

who was

so greatly beloved tor

md

whose followers are to this day mute celebrated tor the order which was named after him? Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For rcophylus, the companion of Slirely, Socrates, [omer, that child ot tlesh, whose name always makes us la Ugh, might be more justly ridiculed lor his stupidity, if, as is said, I lomer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive sdom,

(

I

;

es. replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, ( rlaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator—can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved by them? Protagoras ot Abdera. and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others, have only to whisper to their contempo1

raries:

I

"You

will never be able to

manage

ei-

own

house or your own State until \ou appoint us to be your ministers of educaand this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on ther your

And

their shoulders.

conceivable that the lomer, or again of Hesiod, is it

like.

poet

[6oi] but the truth they never reach ? The is like a painter who, as we have already

observed, will

speaks very well

been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with them? ( >r. it the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education

enough? its. Socrates, that.

Then must we

I

think,

not infer that

is

quite true.

all

these poetical

individuals, beginning with Homer, are only imitators. th< copj images of virtue and the J

is

the sweet influence

which were never really and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them : are like faces

beautiful, but only blooming;

Exactly.

Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence: he knows appearances only. Am I not ris^ht Yes.

Then

let

us have a clear understanding, and

not be satisfied with half an explanation.

Proceed.

Of

the painter

and he

we

say that he will

pamt

reins,

will paint a bit?

Yes.

And

the

worker

in leather

and brass

will

make them? Certainly.

But does the painter know the right form of and reins 3 Nay, hardly even the workers in brass and leather who make them: only the horseman who knows how to use them he

knows

thev not have

— such

Yes, he said.

They

make mankind

Would

likeness of a cobbler

prose.

the bit

:

a

which melody and rhythm by nature have. And think that you must have observed again I and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in simple

contemporaries ot 1 would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, it they had really been able to virtuous

make

though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colours and hgures. Quite so. In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on the colours of the ral arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them: and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he

—

Most

their right form. true.

And may we What

not say the same of

all

things?

2

That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them 3 Yes.

And

the excellence or beauty or truth of every

structure,

action of

animate or inanimate, and of even is relative to the use for which

man,

1

1

111!

I'll

|:l

1

What

the irtist Imn intended ih

ii.iiiur ot

431

I

01

d
r

i|ti.tlities

I

w hu

to llir

make which i

i»>

ol

I

his flutes

.

therefore speaks* ithau

thorit) about the goodness and

while the other, confiding he in told In him?

in

badness o! flutes, him, w ill do n hat

the water,

>

and this he will gain from him who knows. In talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to whereas the user will have know lev. tain to I correct belief;

True. Bui will the imitator have either? Will heknow- from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate w ith .in:

who knows and

gives

him

instructions

about what be should draw?

o

the illusion sboui

Neither.

hewill no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?

suppose not. imitative artist will be in a brilliant state

of intelligence about his

much

Nay, very

own

creations?

the reverse.

he will go on imitating without a thing good or bad, and Day be expected therefore to imitate onlv that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude? still

knowing what makes

liable,

is

I

ii|>on us like ui.igu

t

«

I

*

i

«.

I»

I

.

.

I

And the .iris ot u.isurmg .md numbering and weighing on c to the resCUC »kr

lu\

he

II

tl

and we are

ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetrv which ought to be admitted into

our State. For

if

you go beyond

this

and allow

DIALOG

434

to enter, either in epic or

muse

the honeyed

OF PLATO

I

m and the reason ot mankind, which by

deemed

m

rulers '1

content ha\c c\cr been and pain will be the

common

best, but pleasure

bat

is

inosi true, he said.

we nave

since

all

reverted to the sub-

our defence sen e to show the reasonableness ol our former judgment in lending awa) out ot our State an art having the tendencies which we have described: lor reason constrained us. Hut that she may not impute to us anv harshness or want oi politeness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quaroctrv,

|

rel

this

let

between philosophy and poetry;

there are

ot

which

main proofs, such as the saying bound howling at her lord," or

'ping

tight} in the vain talk ol tools."

mob

sages circumventing Zeus,"

ot

who

"subtle thinkers

mutation, that

ii

she will only prove her shall

—

I

dare say, Glaucon, that you

much charmed by

her as I am, especially lomer? Yes. Indeed, am greatly charmed. Shall propose, then, that she be allowed to return trom exile, but upon this condition only

when

she appears in

I

I

I

— that she make

a

defence of herself in lyrical

some other metre?

or

on her them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this poets the permission to speak in prose let

can be proved I

mean,

it

which

is

within him. should

her seductions and

:ist

on

l>e

his

we

there

is

be the gainers a use in poetry as well as a

shall surely

delight

we shall be the gainers. her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are enamoured of someCertainly, he said,

Ii

thing, but puts restraint

upon themselves when

they think their desires are opposed to their inteiesiv, so too must we after the manner of lovers give her up,

guard

make our words

his

law. .

Yes,

he said.

I

my

said,

I

quite agree with you. dear ( ilaucon. ior great

is

the

whether a what will any

issue at stake, greater than appears,

tue

is

to be

good or bad. And

;

Yes, he said;

argument, have been.

And

as

I

I

have been convinced by the one else would

believe that any

no mention has been made of the and rewards which await virtue. What. are there any greater still : If there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness. Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period ot three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison yet

greatest prizes

with eternity? Say rather "nothing," he replied. And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the the whole, certainly. But why do you ask Are you not aware, I said, that the soul or man is immortal and imperishable? He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really prepared to

Of

And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not :

and he who

listens to her, tearing 'or the safety of the city

whole?

Certainly.

behalf

not to be regarded

man

be we arc \ery conscious delighted to receive her ot her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth.

is

one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and vir-

and "the and the

we

described

seriously as attaining to the truth;

of

are beggars after all";

well ordered State

title to exist in a

wc have

such as

of

and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity l>etween them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet triend and the sister arts oi

we may not

fall away into the childwhich captivates the many. At events we arc well aware that poetry being

strains: that

ish love ot her

our Slate.

And now

unable to make good her defence, this arguot ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her is

ment

though not without

a strugule.

We too are inspired bv that love of poetry which the education oi noble States has implanted in us, [6oS j and theretore we would have her ap-

pear at her best and truest; but so long as she

:

maintain this? Yes, is

no

I

said,

I

ought to be, and you too proving it.

—there

difficulty in

I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you

make

so light.

Listen then. I

am

attending.

There is a thing which you other which you call evil?

call

good and an-

Yes, he replied.

Would you

agree with me in thinking that and destroying element is evil, and the saving and improving element the

the corrupting

good ? [6o 9 ] Yes.

1

II

I

\i.ti

r\n

iditnl th.it

\

hthulmia

.

R

I

!

in

i

he-

e\

il

nt. as the

wh

ii

fifth,

w

hi


if

Tim. Certainly, and we

will

do

all

that

we

can; having been handsomely entertained by

you yesterda y, those of us who remain should be only too glad to return your hospitality.

Tim. Certainly. And what did we

you remember what were the points required you to speak of which Tim. We remember some of them, and you will be here to remind us of anything which we irgotten: or rather, if we are not troubling you, will you briefly recapitulate the whole, and then the particulars will be more firmly fixed in our memories?

Soc. And being thus trained they were not to consider gold or silver or anything else to be their own private property; they were to be like

my

hired troops, receiving pay for keeping guard

how conyesterday's discourse was the State stituted and of what citizens composed it would

from those who were protected by them the pay was to be no more than would suffice for men of simple life; and they were to spend in

I

)o

'

I

To

be sure

I

will; the chief

theme of

—

seem likely to be most perfect. Tim. Yes. Socrates; and what you said of was very much to our mind. 1

we

fenders of the State.:

Anil

when we had given

to each

one that

particular art

which

was suited to his nature, we spoke of those who were intended to be our warriors, and said that they were to be guardians oi the city against attacks

—

common, and

fromw

to live together in the continual

which was

ithin as well as

from without 442

to be their sole

pursuit.

Tim. That was

whom we

employment .md

3

were proper for them? Tim. Very true.

also said.

Soc. Neither did

Fin:.

say of their education

Were they not to be trained in gymnastic, and music, and all other sorts of knowledge which

practice of virtue,

not begin by separating the husand the artisans from the class of de-

)id

bandmen

it

Soc.

we

torget the

women;

of

declared, that their natures should

be assimilated and brought into those of the men, and that

harmony with

common

pursuits

should be assigned to them both in time of war and in their ordinary life. Tim. That, again, was as you say. Soc. And what about the procreation of chil-

TIMA1 ili>

n?Oi

l.ii

to

rathei

«

ai in

thr pro)

»i

•

and

I

hil

common, to tlir intern thai no know hit own child, but thr\

in

to be in

ihould evei to imagine thai the) were

w

thin

1..

and

to be brothers eldci

those ol

a

5 \

WJU

.is

»>nc hunil)

ill

.

listers,

those

and the proposal

who were c4

in

mem-

ii

s.iY.

tad do you alto remember how, with a

.

u v

as far !

thai the

.is

u

c

could the beat

chid magistrates, male

and female, should contrive

secretly,

by the use

ertain lots. so toarrange the nuptial meeting,

bad oi either sex and the ^hh\ oi either might pair with their like; ami theft WBI to be m> quarrelling on this account, tor they would imagine that the union was a men ;t. and was to be attributed to the lot? remember. thai the

sr\

.

5

.

I

Aiul

children ed,/

ot"

youremember how we said thai the good parents were to

ro/andthechildrenoi the

In-

the

educat-

hail teeretlycha*

persed among the interior citizens; ami while thev were all growing up the rulers were to be

on the look-out, and

to

bring up from below in

who were worthy, and those among themselves who were unworthy were to take the places ot those who came op? their turn those

Tim. True. Then have I now given you all the heads ot our yesterday's discussion : Or is there anything more, my dear Timaeus, which has been Soc.

,

omitted? Tim. Nothing, Socrates; it was just as you have said. Soc. I should like, before proceeding further, to tell you how I feel about the State which we have described. I might compare myself to a person who. on beholding beautiful animals either created by the painter's art, or, better still, alive but at rest, is seized with a desire of seeing them in motion or engaged in gle or eontiict to

which

their

ii"

arc

some strug-

forms appear

suit-

thrni

,

thr

th.it

.

and

I

;

thai

nr\ond it

Ivrrn

litr in

while th.U

broughi up;

education he finds hard tocarrj out

in action,

and

m

haroV

stil!

thin thr

in Ian-

Sophi nty ot brave wordsand fair conceits, but I am afraid th.u being onrj wanderers rrotn one u\ to anI

i

I

i

other,

and

h.r.

ei

had babttationsol their

own, thc\ may fail in theirconception c4 philosophen and statesmen, and may no< know w hat they .ire they do and s.i\ m tinv i

fighting or holding paiie) with their cnerrriea,

And

thus people-

who

remaining

\om

o!

are fitted

i

la-.s

In-

ate thr on U

Of

nature and ed

and Timaeus, 1 20 J ol Locris in Italy, a city which lias admirable laws>and who is himself in wealth and rank the equal oi of his fellow citizens; he has held the most important and honourable offices in his own state. tion to t.ike part at onCC both 10 politic*

philosophy.

and, as

I

I

lere

is

believe, has scaled the heights of all

philosophy; and here is Critias, whom e Athenian knows to be no novice in the matters of which we are speaking; and as to I lermocI am assured by many witnesses that his genius and education quality him to take part in any speculation of the kind. And therefore saw that you wanted me to yesterday when describe the formation of the State, I readily assented, being very well aware, that, il you on-

rates,

I

would, none were better qualified to cam when you had engaged our city in a suitable war, you of all ly

the discussion further, and that

men

living could best exhibit her playing a

ting part.

When

I

had completed

return imposed this other task

my

task,

fitI

in

upon you. You

conferred together and agreed to entertain me to-day, as I had entertained you, with a feast ot

|

is my feeling about the State which we have been describing. There are conflicts which all cities undergo, and I should like to hear some one tell of our own city carrying on a struggle against her neighbours, and how she went out to war in a becoming manner, and when at war showed by the greatness of her

ed: this

and the magnanimity of her words in dealing with other cities a result worthy of her training and education. Now I, Critias and Heractions

discourse.

man

Here am

I

in festive array,

and no

can be more ready for the promised ban-

quet.

Her.

And we

too, Socrates, as

wanting

Timaeus

says,

enthusiasm; and there is no excuse for not complying with your request. As soon as we arrived yesterday at the guest-chamber of Critias, with whom we are staying, or rather on our way thither, we talked the matter over, and he told us an ancient trawill not be

in

DIALOQ UE3 OF PLATO

444 dition,

which

I

w

ish, Critias, that

\ou would

rc-

may

help us to judge whether it will satisfy his requirements or not. will, if Timacus, who is our other ;. Socrates, so that he

jnrat to

most famous, but, through the lapse ot time and the destruction of the actors, it has not come

down

how and from whom

partner, approves. I quite approve. .:.

Then

listen. Socrates, to a talc

which,

though strange, iscertainlj true, having been attested, by Solon, who was the wisest oi the le was a relative and a dear triend oi m\ great-grandfather* Dropides, as he him* many passages o( his poems; ami he 1

.

i

mv

grandfather,

who

remembered and repeated it to us. There were oi old, he said, great and marvellous actions of the Athenian city, j 21 ] which ha\e passed mlivioo t' rough lapse oi time and the destruction oi mankind, and one in particular, greater than hearse.

It

all

we will now remonument of our hymn ot praise true and

the rest. This

will be a fitting

gratitude to you. and a worths oi the goddess, on this her day ol

lesti-

raL So*

Wry

.

good.

And what

this ancient fa-

is

action ol the Athenians,

mous

which

Critias

declared, on the authority oi Solon, to be not a

mere legend, but an actual

iaci

:

..'. I will tell an old-world story which I heard Erom an aged man; iorCritias,at the time '

oi telling
«i.-iil»i thai when !iu turn comes a little while hence, he will make the vuiic request which you have mad< In «'i 'i

I

may provide himscll with

dcr, then, thai he

and not the

tame

that the

lx-

compelli

.mi, let

thinj

indulgence

is

.1

i"

>l

him understand

And now, friend Critiaa, \ull you the judgment ol the theatre, opinion thai the last performei wonderfully successful, and thai you will leal oi indulgent e bciore you w ill

w.is

.ikt-

Ins place.

rhe warning, S«k rates, which you have addressed to him, must ,i!m> take to myself* Bui remember, Critias, thai [aim bean nevej yet raised a trophy; and therefore you must go and attack the argument likeman. invoke Apollo and the Musts, and then let us bear you sound the praises and show Eorth the \ irtues oi your ancient citizens, I

.1

1

.

Friend

I

[ermocrates, you,

who

arc sta-

and have .mother in trout oi you, have not lost bean as yet; the gravity oi the situation will soon be revealed to you; meanwhile accept your exhoitationsandencouragements. But besides the gods and goddesses whom you have mentioned, would specially invoke Mnemosyne; tor all the important part ot my discourse is dependent on her favour, and it i

names which

said that the pr.

war mentioned most of

arc recorded prior to the time

Theseus, nich as


£y^£ -%. e

We

to

favour of you.

What may

that her he said. w ant you to tell me the name of your halfbrother, which I have forgotten; he was a mere I

when

last came hither from Clazomewas a long time ago; his father's name, if remember rightly, was Pyrilampes? Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask? Let mc introduce some countrymen of mine, said; they are lovers of philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was intimate with a certain Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno, and remembers a conversation which took place between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides many years

child

*.

c

[ I2j] Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. When he had done with the smith, his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to Athens, as he said, at the great Panathenaea; the former was, at the time of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favoured. Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, tall and fair to look upon; in the days of his youth he was reported to have been beloved by Parmenides. He said that they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them, and many others with him; they wanted to hear the writings of Zeno, which had been brought to Athens for the first time on the occasion of their visit. These Zeno himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides, and had very nearly finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles who was afterwards one of the Thirty, and heard the little that remained of the dialogue. Pythodorus had heard

had come from our home at ClaAthens, and met Adcimantus and in the Agora. Welcome, Cephalus, said Adcimantus, taking me hy the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens? Yes; that is why I am here; I wish to ask a [126]

sup

hare been narrated in his presence by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus

and Glaucon,

zomenae Glaucon

is

I

nae, but that I

I

ago, Pythodorus having often recited

it to him. Quite true. And could we hear it? I asked. Nothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful study of the piece; at present his thoughts run in another direction; like his grandfather Antiphon he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near, and he has only just left us to go

Zeno repeat them

When

home.

requested that the

486

before.

the recitation

was completed, Socrates

first thesis

of the

first

argu-

PAR Ml NIDI mcnt might be read ovei

kgain,

and

I

it

must

Imtli like-

Ik-

impoatible,

t»>r

tt\r, h..\\

ihi

been done* he said ^ hai ii youi k> you maintain thai it being

and unlike, and

is

thai tins

ii

th. u

in

von

have you any otnei pur c\v ept to disprove the being ol the man) and is not eachdh isionoi \rnir treatise intended to Furnish i acparate prooi oi this, there being .is many proofs oi the not being ol the ill many as you nave composed arguments? Isth.u your meaning, or have misunderstood you? No, said Zeno; you have oos ret dy un/ ij^ vi\

?

I

derstood

my

see.

make

telling us

something which is new. For you, in your poems, The All is one, and of this you adduce exUTJ cellent proofs; and he on the other band UVS There is no many; and on behalf of this he offain

believe that be

is

overwhelming evidence. Vou

affirm unity,

he denies plurality. And so you deceive the world into believing that you are saving different things

when

same. This

most of

is

really

vou are saying much the beyond the reach of

a strain of art

But although you in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine; for what you speak of was an accident; there was no pretence of a great purpose: nor any serious intention 5fes,

"in

Socrates, said Zeno.

of deceiving the world.

••>

r

•.Mini,

omit

i

Bui

tell

thru

me,

lurthrr think

th.it

itselt,

and anochei

w Im

j i

h

r.

.'l\c

t

numb*

things thai have

.ill

come

t«>

first

mi., being; but

.ill

the middle,

an)

1..

Ik

I

om

came into being first mutl be have come into being prioi to the •
the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other ihn: True, Wh.it would you say oi .mother question? Can the one have come into being contrary to o\\

n nature, or

i.s

impossible?

th.it

Impossible.

Ami

yet, surely, the

and ami end? parts;

it

one was shown

parts, then

.1

have beginning, middle to

ill

.1

and

atter the beginning, the others follow, unyou reach the end?

Certainly.

And

all

we

these others

shall affirm to

be

whole and of the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one? Yes; that is what we shall say. But the end comes last, and the one is of such parts of the

a nature as to come into being with the last; and, since the one cannot come into being except in accordance with its own nature, its nait should come into being atter the others, simultaneously with the end.

ture will require that

Clearly.

Then

the one

is

younger than the others and

the others older than the one.

That

also

is

clear in

my

judgment, beginning or any other

Well, and must not a part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?

nature,

it

w

itself ill

does noi

be neitru

thr

ontra

1

•

1

rtainly.

1

Alter lh;s

come. Bui

iii.iiiner

then dlC OfM

If

-\ni

when

others

the

one would be

otl

qui ition.

!

end, ea< h Kparate partit

to itsell

! *

Terpsion. No, I came some time ago: and I have been in the Agora looking for you, and

wondering

and the dialogue

set

1/

the country. Terpsion

SockATE^: Thi tODOftus; Theaetetus. Euclid and Terpsion

:

—

greatly like to rest.

Euc.

I

too shall be very glad of a rest, for

I

went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum. Let us go in, then, and, while we are reposing, the servant shall read to us. Ti rp. Very good. Euc. Here is the roll, Terpsion; I may observe that I have introduced Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the persons whom he mentioned these were. Theodorus the geometrician (of Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words "I said," "I remarked," which he used when he spoke of himself, and again, "he agreed," or "dis-

—

512

'

1

Mil

iu lid.

I

boy, fou

,

take

th
«»

knowledge is, h.is oi makinj

know no knowledge iu»r

ol thr lint

\

m\

othei

No kn lOM

or

man

a

asked wh.it icn< e give in answei the- name

tn

in.

v

01

All

icik r

is

is

is, "What is know "A knowledge oi tins

question plies,

-..

i

i.lu LlloUS;

!

«

»

not

ill

or that.*'

son

wh.ti

is

dor us

is

is

it

in a recent discussion.

Is

Theaeti rheodorus was writing out tor us something about roots, such as the ro< three or five, showing that they are incommensurable by the unit: he selected other examples up to seventeen there he stopped. Now as

Soc.

kn

And

—

are

curred to

innumerable roots, the notion us ot attempting to include them

oc-

.

Theact. to

I

think that

we

did; but

I

should like

have your opinion. Soc. Let

me

Theact.

We

hear.

divided

all

those which are

numbers

made up

into

two

of equal fac-

multiplying into ne another, which we compared to square figures and called squ ire tors

s otherwise should think not. [150) Theaet. S Certainly not; but midwives are respectTheaet,

Soc.

.

And Ao you

:

I

.

able

women who

It

is

anything from me; the

many

fine discoveries

to

m

let

own.

ha\ c a character to lose,

and

I

see

them, to be great fools. Aristeides, the son is one of them, [151] and there

of Lysimachus, are

many

others.

The

truants often return to

-

r 1

I

mr,

md

Uv. id

th.it

thru,

.ilu.i\%

t

he-

I

v

thfflB

00

dim

.isr,

I

1

m\

who

I

I

ind

receive them, re

.nr the

WllO \\r

v

\

I

aod da) the) are which ii eveo the women. So much foi

and

travail

I

I

I

I

I

I

Ami

will ask vmi.

it

1

Ilich

I

the

enemy

of

man

— that was not within the

range of their ideas; neither am I their enemy in all this, but it would be wrong for me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once more, then, Theaetetus,

"What

I

repeat

—

my

old question,

ami do not say that is knowledge?" you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be able to tell. Theaet. At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he knows, and, as far as I can see at present, knowledge is perception. Soc. Bravely said, boy; that

is

the

way

in

which you should express your opinion. And now, let us examine together this conception of yours, and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind-egg: You say that knowledge is

—

:

perception.

Theaet. Yes.

you have delivered yourself of a important doctrine about knowledge; [152] it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, Soc. Well,

very

th.it

-md in tnr you .md

Mil h

.in

•

!

Hon

to talk

\

us try to understand him: thr blow ing, ami yd one ol us ma) !* cold •


.i\ them int*» marrying lome our, ^.m generally tell od and by the- gn who in likely to *lo them good. Many ol them have given away t«> Prodicus, and man) to other inspired tell you this long story, suspect, .is indeed Friend Theaetetua, because \ou teem to think yourself, that you are in la hour greal with aome conception. Come then to me, who am i widwife'i son and myself i midwife, and ^\o your best to answer the questions

>!7

I

in

n n» oJ

1

familial illowt, whii h

able tO ITOUJB Ittd tO ilUy Id thl COntOrt With mr, piNt like thr pangs

.ui

tull

\l

1

would COMOTt With

m\

it

1

is

always of existence,

knowledge

is

unerring.;

Theaet. Clearly. Soc. In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras must have been! le spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but told the truth, I

own disciples. What do you mean, Socrates am about to speak of a high argument, 1

his Truth, in secret to his

1

Theaet. Soc.

I

which

in

all

things are said to be relative; you

anything by any name, such heavy or light, for the great there is no will be small and the heavy light single thing or quality, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which "becoming"' is by us incorrecdy called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one alter another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this. In allusion to a book of Protagoras' which bore

cannot rightly

call

as great or small,

—

—

1

this title.

OF PLATO

DIALOGI

518

Summon

the great masters of either kind of

poetry—Epicharmus, and

Homer

of

the prince oi

Tragedy; when the

Comedy,

latter sings

!krn like an "la,

I

my

r

:,.i

in ipj

I

IIKcd, but

tlIK,.|l\

I

ie

Mill

Hill

w

ill

VS ill

I

lr,

thrir .or

Ik-

with

can

all lh.it

j

known

Ik-

i\ I

iiiinJ, .in.

lie-

I

rcgulai spai ing mat< h have had nits ukJ would have knocked th hc-r finely. Bui you and I. who hive do i.il .inns, only desire to ice w hal is he mutual relation oi these prirx iplrs wheth .ur consiitem with each othei 01 not. .1

thr Irrlmg of ::is 111 \\

it

QUI oi thr luperfluity oi thru wits.

Id

you u nr

lid thai

about

t

i

th.it

would be my

the

lnld oi

i

\mi inn;> linCC this is out led and there is plent) oi time, n hy ihould we m>t calmly and patiently review our own thou ad thoroughly examine and what those- appearance! in us really arc I

am .is

not mistaken, they will be described by follows:—-first, thai nothing can become either in

-.

number

while remaining equal to agree

plcMty

or magnitude,

itsell

— you

would

oil

\\\l!l

ills

no

this

i

|

V

is

all

OUI

:

in sup;

difficult)

I

tlth, -Hid

ussion M

ilisv

hei in

dream; ind w \\m

.1

in

.»

doubt about the

easily raised, lint t tht re

is

3

ulu.lr

ma)

doubt whethet we ire iw ike 01 In i .is ouj time is equally dn ided sleeping md waking, in eithei the s»»ul eontendi that the thoughts minds .»t the time ire lern to

•Iv, that

•

the) ire unlike.

i

i

An!

\:ui

i

*

»

1

1

and during one hall

true; tin-

»

oi

oui lives

we

half, oi the other;

.

i. lies

tad WOUld

ilei

Soil IK'

and are equally confident

should.

I

ol

true.

at

ordingl) as he

(

(

/.

.,

\nd

who

\ml m. iv not the tame lv said oi ni. i.l ind other disorders-' tin difference is only

v\

th.it

the tunes are not equal.

ferent in each oi the

cri.unlv.

1

Ami

s

is

truth or falsehood to

1h-

deter

ridicu-

cm

you certainly determine by other means which ot these opinions is art,

do not think

I

that

I

is made by the They would say, as

argument, which

side of the

champions

oi appearance.

—

imagine Can that which is wholly other I than something, have the same quality as that from which it differs? and observe, Theaetetus.

word "other" means not "partially/' but "wholly other." Theart. Certainly, putting the question as you do, that which is wholly other canthat the

,

not cither potentially or in any other

way be

the same.

And must

Soc.

therefore be admitted to be

:

Theaet, True. Soc.

If,

then, anything happens to

like or unlike itself or another,

—

become

when itbecomes

we call it the same when unlike, other. The act. Certainly. Soc. Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many like

;

infinite?

Theaet. Yes. Soc.

And

me

ill.

I

agent,

'. .md th.it produce something dif-

.im th

\\ ill

two

a

also that different

The wine which

drink

when am to me? I

combinations

in

True

Theaet. .

1

and pleasant

For, as has been already

acknowledged,

the patient .\nd agent meet together and produce- sweetness and a perception oi sweet:. are

m

simultaneous motion, and the per-

ception which comes from the patient

can.

Listen, then, to a statement of the other

S

unlike

.

which

true?

and

Sot

Sot

But

is

health, appears sweet

lous.

.lin

h

well or

Theaet. Certainly.

mined by duration oi time? ./. '1'h.it would he in many ways s

hit

is

cou

)t

ness

5

1

wak

.Hi.l

mention Theaet. Sot rates,

he

ping

affirm

both. I'

inly.

V»,

the one, and, during the o

troth oi

unlike, th

il

makes

and the quality ot sv. DCS* which arises out of ami is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to

the tongue percipient,

appear sweet to the healthy tongue. 'I head. Certainly; that has been already

ac-

knowledged. Soc. But

when

upon another

I

am

sick, the

.ind a different

wine

really acts

person?

Theaet. Yes. Soc.

The combination

of

the

draught

ot

wine, and the Socrates who is sick, produces quite another result: which is the sensatio bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in and about the v which becomes not bitterness but something bitter; as I myself become not perception but percipient?

Theaet. True. Soc.

There

is

no other object of which

I

shall

ever have the same perception, / 160J for another object would give another perception,

.md would make the percipient other and different: nor can that object which affects me, meeting another subject, produce the same, or

DIALOG

ES

produce an-

similar, for that too will

become

l

other result from another subject, and become different.

Theaet. True. Neither can

Sot

by myself, have this sen-

I

.

sation,

nor the object by

Theaet.

itself, this

I

1

to

—

no one.

The .id. Certainly

Then

Soc.

not.

the inference

is,

we

that

[the agent

and patient) are or become in relation to one another; there is a law which binds us one to the other, but not to any other existence, nor each of us to himself; and therefore we can only be bound to one another; so that whether a person says that a thing is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to or of or in relation to something else; but he must not say or allow any one else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely: such is our conclusion. Theaet. Very true, Socrates. Soc. 1. nen, if that which acts upon me has and no other relation to me and to no other,

—

I

am

the percipient of

it?

T heart. Of course. Soc.

Then my

perception

is

my own myself am

ing inseparable from

Protagoras says, to is

and what Theaet. Soc.

nc\ er

t

suppose

I

rips in I

true to me, be-

being; and, as

judge of what

not to me.

is

Wow then, if

ing, can

ceive

I

of

I

knowing

that

which

I

per-

:

You cannot. Then you were quite

Theaet. Soc.

right in affirming

knowledge is only perception; and the meaning turns out to be the same, whether with lomer and leracleitus, and all that company, you say that all is motion and flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure

that

1

1

ot

all

things; or with Theaetetus, that, given

these premises, perception

is

not right, Theaetetus. and

is

knowledge.

Am

I

newhave delivered you? not this your

born child, of which I What say you? Theaet. cannot but agree, Socrates. I

Soc.

Then

this

is

the hearth

whether he is worth rearing, or is only a wind-egg and a sham. Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed' or will you bear to see him reacted, and not get into a passion it take away your hrst-born Theod. Theaetetus will not be angry, for he is very good-natured. Hut tell me, Socrates, in heaven's name, is this, alter all, not the truth : S(h You, Theodorus. arc a lover ot theories, and now you innocently fancy that am a full ot them, and cm easily pull one out which will overthrow its predecessor. But you do not see that in reality none of these theories come from me; they all come from him who talks with me. only know just enough to extract them Irom the wisdom ot another, and to rcsec

.

1

I

ceive

them

in a spirit ot

tairncss.

And now

1

nothing myself, but shall endeavour to elicit something from our young friend. Theod. Do as you say, Socrates; you are quite shall say

right. I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes your acquaintance Protagoras 1 Theod. What is it ? Soc. I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom he was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his fellow-men would not this have produced an overpowering effect ; For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why, my friend, should Protagoras

Soc. Shall

me

in

—

so.

never err, and if my mind the conception of being or becom-

fail

we must run round

with him, and

I

When perceive must become percipisomething there can be po such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing; the object, whether it become sweet, bitter, or ot any other quality, must have relation to a percipient; nothing cm become sweet which is sweet Soc.

ent of

born, [i(ji]

:

quality.

'ertainly not.

(

OF PLATO

the child,

however he may

turn out, which you and

I

brought into the world.

And now

have with

difficulty

that he

is

be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruc-

and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? Must he not be talking ad captandum in all this? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed; for the attempt to supervise or tion,

refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly, [162] if to each man his own are right; and this must be the case if Protagoras' Truth is the real truth,

-

.

juv!

i

philosopher

he-

nmu

merely

not

m

himsell b

thr \lu

ol

\l

III

1

is

1

I

.

I

must look

\\r

th.it

lh
un til you had come to an understanding about the sum to be paid tor your release. Well, you .isk, and how will Protagoras reinforce his posi lorn,

I

tion? Shall x 1

answer tor him? By .til means. repeat

.ill

those things which

we

have been urging on his behalf, / r66 ] and then he will dose with us in disdain, and say: The worthy Socrates asked a little boy, whether the Same man could remember and not know the same thing, and the boy said No, because he was frightened, and could not see what was COmklg, and then Socrates made fun ol poor me. The truth is. O slatternly v that when you ask questions about any assertion ot' mine, and the person asked is found tripping, should have answered, if he has answered as then I am refuted, but if he answers something else, then he is refuted and not I. For do you really suppose that any one would admit the memory which a man has of an impression which has passed away to be the same with that which he experienced at the time? Assuredly not. Or would he hesitate to acknowledge

—

I

same man may know and not know the same thing? Or, if he is atraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him? I speak

that the

by the card in order to avoid entanglements of words. But, my good sir, he will say, come

O

to the

argument in if you

either show,

a

more generous

spirit;

and

can, that our sensations are

I

h

i

i

me Mini ma)

I*-

thot

.
t

the

H

bard ind

lighi

and iweet,

t

TheaeL It cannot. [ow about sounds and colours: placeyou would admit that they both

thai these, tin

is.

hut

mind.

b\

hei o\l n.

:

univeraali in

all

•

th.it

I

in the

them same with

cither of

.iml the

is

not

heodoru is

him

Ami a

betides being beautiful, you have doiv kindness in releasing

m

discussion,

and

I

In herself

wanted

Theaet,

I

\u

.in

I

should

Soc.

unlike,

mv own ith

am quite clear. And to which

opinion,

me,

class

would you

this, ol all

our

say, to that class

know

•

others through the

w.is

th.it

being or ess< iue; tor : the most universal Theaet.

I

•

.

is

thai the loul

you are clear

it

some things

different

itself?

llir

ontcmj

thin

n-rs the beautiful

re-

not:

which the

ot herself.

And would you

say this also ot

Liki

same and Other?

Theaet. Yes.

lertainly.

\iul that

is

soul aspires to

that

From the other,

ugly,

exist?

Yes.

I

notion

..ni\

fer

1

Ami

m\

bodilj org. ins. lor

arse not.

you have any thought about both ol them, this common perception cannot come to you, either through the one or the other organ? It

.'.

i .

-

not lUSpeCl the simple truth to

who

he

thai

lx-

le.irls

(

us. either in the

ind not being.

i

Mas WC

S

whi. h

nothin

someth

i

I

om

no

thinking that

we remove the question knowing or nol knowing,

thai

S

ol

:

Then

i

thinks

I

ii

I

eluded. n

who

1

opinion unknovt n,thei

dei this alternative,

out

is

Hun'.

t.iKr

do opinion which ii nol comprehended un and 10 false opinion

Ix-

h

1

isir.uis.

V

S

x

hi

.in

,

thinks, think

Soc. I see, Thcaetetus, that your fear has disappeared, and that you are beginning to despise

me.

T heart. What makes Soc.

You

think,

if

I

you say so?

am

not mistaken, that

from censure, and that I shall never ask whether there can be a swift which is slow, or a heavy which is light, or any other self-contradictory thing, which your "truly false"

is

safe

works, not according to its own nature, but according to that of its opposite. But I will not insist upon this, for I do not wish needlessly to discourage you. And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of

something Theact. Soc. the

else? I

It

is

mind

to

am. possible then upon your view for conceive of one thing as another?

Theact. True.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

538

Soc. But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, have a concep; tion either of both objects or of one ot thcm The Jet. Certainly.

Soc.

I

the soul

holds with herself in considering of anything. scarcely understand; [190] 1 speak oi what but the soul when thinking appears to me to 1

talking

JUS!

— asking

questions of herself

and answering them, affirming and denying.

And when

she has arrived

gradually or bj

1

decision, either

1

say, then, that to

is

at

torm an opin-

to speak,

is

Theaet. Sot

U

I

agree.

Then when any one

.

.mother, he

thing

is

is

thinks of one thing

saying to himself that one

is

to

certainly base, or the

—

have you ever attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another? Nay, not even in sleep, did you ever 111

1

list

1

just; or, best of all

venture to say to yourself that odd

is

even, or

an\ thing ot the kind?

Theaet. Never.

And do you

suppose that any other man, them, ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a horse, or that two are one? Theaet. Certainly not. Soc. But il thinking is talking to oneself, no one speaking and thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both in his soul, will say and think that the one is the other of them, and must add, that even you, lover of dispute as you are, had better let the word "other" alone [i.e., not insist that "one" and "other" are the 3 same]. I mean to say, that no one thinks the noble to be base, or anything of the kind. Soc.

either in his senses or out of

I

up the word "other," Socrates; and I agree to what you say. Soc. If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot think that the one of them Theaet.

is

I

Soc

.

at all.

Then no one who

has either both or

mind can think that the one is the other. And therefore, he who maintains that lalse opinion is heien doxy is talking nonsense; lor neither in this, any more than in the previous way. can lalse opinion exist in us. Theaet. No. Soc. But if. Theaetetus, this is not admitted, we shall be driven into many absurdities. Theaet.

What

will give

the other? 1

Both words in Greek arc called erepov. menides, \.\~: Euthydemus, 301.

cf.

l\v-

arc they?

you

until I have endeavmatter irom every point of view. / igi j For I should be ashamed of us it we were driven in our perplexity to admit the absurd consequences ot which I speak. But

Soc.

oured

if

we

I

will not

tell

to consider the

find the solution,

and

get

away from

them, we may regard them only as the dithcuito us.

do you ever remember saying

yourself that the noble

thoughts

ties of others,

another?

Theaet. Yes. Soc. But

True; lor we should have to suppose apprehends that which is not in his

that he

called

and opinion is a word spoken, mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud to another: What think you?

ion

or

at a

sudden impulse, and has

agreed, and does not doubt, this

her opinion.

—

a

the other.'

is

only one ot the two objects in his

Theaet.

last

one

he has one of them only in the other, can he think that

'Theaet.

Theaet. Very good. Soc. And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean?

What is that? mean the conversation which

if

mind and not

his

Either together or in succession.'

.

DC

Theaet. True. Soc. Neither,

On

and the

ridicule will not attach

the other hand,

ii

we

utterly fail,

I

we must

be humble, and allow the argument to trample us under foot, as the sea-sick passenger is trampled upon by the

suppose that

and to do anything to us. Listen, then, while I tell you how I hope to hnd a way out of our difficulty. Theaet. Let me hear. Soc. I think that we were wrong in denying that a man could think what he knew to be what he did not know; and that there is a wa\ in which such a deception is possible. Theaet. You mean to say. as I suspected at sailor,

may know Socrates, and at a some one who is unknown to me, mistake for him then the decep-

the time, that

distance see

and

whom

I

I

—

tion will occur?

Soc. But has not that position been relinquished by us, because involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things

which we know? Theaet. True.

make the assertion in another form, which may or may not have a favourable issue; but as we are in a great strait, every argument should be turned over and tested. Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know.Theaet. Certainly you may. Soc. Let us

III

1

\l

II

I

I

the

would have you imagine, then, mind «>t man i blot k «>i

I

whu

li

different

in

IS

harder, moister, and having

mme

our thin mother, ind mediate qua!

porit) in intei

thai

01

M tin M

t

in

know

the Muses,

and embei anything w

ol

hi
e what he knows, ami sometimes to wen- wrong be what he does not know. S

.

We

before

in

denying the \rul

how would you amend

1

a

the

list

which must be excluded. one can think one thing to be another

of the impossible eases (

1

No

)

not perceive either of them, but

has the memorial or seal oi both of them in his mind; nor can any mistaking of one thing for

another occur, when he only knows one. and does not know, and has no impression of the other: nor can he think that one thing which he does not know is another thing which he

know, or that what he does not know is what he knows; nor( 2) that one thing which he perceives is another thing which he perceives, or that something which he perceives is something which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something which he perceives; nor again 3) can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the S

h hr .1

tlmi^

l»

In

11

Im

;

not

•

I

iin,

a

ll

.ii:

suppose

in l»r

1

tli.it

know and

thing which he dors nut

mothei thing whu h

know;

not

m-t

ktmw and whk h he

thing

utterly 1. ilst-

main, arc

tin-

l»c

or thai 1 thing whii h he

dors not dues

;

i:

and absolutely exclude the

opinion.

The

onlj

possibilii

any,

whk

following.

Thcact. W'h.u are tl u tell me, may perhaps understand yOU better; but .it pr< am unable to iollow von. Soc. A person m.iv think that some things

not

(

impression coinciding with sense;

—

this

I

which he knows, or which he perceives and does not know, are some- other things which he knows and perceives; or that some things which he knows and perceives, .ire other tli which he knows and perceives. Thcact. understand you less than ever now. I

last

—

me once more, then: I, knowing Theodorus. and remembering in my own mind what sort of person he is, and also what sort ot person Theaetetus is. at one time see them, and at another time do not sec them, and sometouch them, and at another time not, times or at one time I may hear them or pen them in some other way, and at another timeremember them, not perceive them, but still and know them in my own mind. Thcact. Very true. Soc. Then, tirst of all, I want you to underSoc.

possibility of this.

Former statement? Sor. should begin by making

when he does

th.tt a

I

good. s

i:

think

•

thai

we have Ken, or he. ml, or thought in oui \\ n minds, we hold thc of nature? Theaet. Certainly; he who so manifests his

or water.

I

this

thought, Soc.

dumb

is

And is

laid to explain bin:

every one

who

is

not born

de.it'

able sooner or later to manifest

or

what

he thinks of anything; and it so. all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor will right opinion be

anywhere found

to exist apart

from knowl-

edge.

ters.

Theaet. Certainly not;

h

ipinion

1

si^ht

l\r

must not. Well, and what is the meaning

syllables

:

in lint

|

t

kimwlc

oi

lint

.1111

whu 'n remember,

n

i

,

\l

I

we may

if

trust the

argument.

Theaet. True. Soc. Let us not, therefore, hastily charge

him

Soc. Well, but will you not be equally in-

who gave

when you rememown experience in learning to read? Theaet. What experience Soc. Whv, that in learning you were kept

intended to say. that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, / 2oy / he should be able to answer his questioner

clined to disagree with him.

ber your

2

trying to distinguish the separate letters both

by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written. you might not be confused by their position. Theaet. Very true. Soc. And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music :

Theaet. Exactly.

Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and Soc.

thisaccount of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only

I

ing the elements of the thing. Theaet. As for example, Socrates Soc. As, for example,

:on

Now,

is

made up

neither you nor

; .

when Hesiod of a

.

.

says that

hundred planks.

could describe all of them individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke. Theaet. Certainly.

And

I

our opponent will probably laugh he would if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical acSoc.

at us, just as

DIALOG

548

I

1

count of the name of Theactctus. and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your Dame—that would l>c true opinion, and not

know

knowledge,

r

as

has been already

remarked, U OOt attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enu meration ot the it of which anything is composed

same general way, we might

the

In

Soe.

he ah... have true opinion about a waggon; but wh.. can describe its essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explana-

and instead

opinion has art and knowledge of the nature oi a w gon, in that he attains to the whole through the

tion to true opinion,

ot

S

OF PLATO order of the letters and can write them out cor.. he has right opinion? 'The act. Clearly.

Soc. But although

opinion, he will Theaet. Yes.

The act. And do you not agree

view,

in that

we admit

that he has right

be without knowledge?

Soe. Ami \et he will have explanations, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of

when he wrote; and

the letters

this

we admit

to be explanation.

Theaet. True.

my friend, there is such a thing opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the Soc.

Then,

as right

exactness of knowledge.

Theaet.

elements.

still

Soc.

It

would seem

And what we

definition of

so.

fancied to be a perfect

knowledge

is

a

dream

only. Hut

!

you do, my friend; but f want to know first, whether you admit the resolution oi all things into their elements to be a rational I:

them, and the consideration of or larger combinations of be irrational— is this your VICW?

explanation

them them

in

to

ot

syllables

Theaet. Precisely. Well, and do you conceive that a .

who

man

one time affirms and at another time denies that element o! something, or thinks that the same thing is has knowledge

composed

an\ element

ot

different

ot

at

elements at different

times'

Theaet, Assuredly not.

And do you

Soc.

and

in th.;t of

not

remember

that in

your

others this often occurred in

the process of learning to read?

You mean

Theaet.

and misspelt the

To

Theaet.

and

am

1

who

that

I

I

mistook the

writes

letters

perfectly

remember,

very far from supposing that they

are in this condition have

Soc.

When

a

person

name

the

at

knowledge.

the time of learning

of Theaetetus,

[208] and

thinks that he ought to write and does write 77;

and

name

of

but, again,

c;

meaning

to write the

Thcodorus, thinks that he ought to

—

write and does write T and e can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two

nan. t.

a

We

one has not v 1

.

And

have already admitted that such knowledge.

vet attained

in like

manner be may enumerate

without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables ot youx name?

And

in that case,

better not say so as yet, for

were there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will not prefer this but the third. Theaet. You are quite right; there is still one remaining. The first was the image or expression of the

mind

in speech; the second,

has just been mentioned,

is

a

way

which

of reaching

whole by an enumeration of the elements. But what is the third definition? Soc. There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which

the

distinguishes the thing in question

from

all

Theaet. Can you give me any example of such a definition? Soc. As, for example, in the case of the sun, think that you would be contented with I the statement that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth.

Theaet. Certainly. Soc. just

when he knows

the

—

Understand why: the reason is, as I was saying, that if you get at the difference

now

and distinguishing

characteristic of each thing, persons affirm, you will get at the definition or explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of thecommon and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs. Theaet. I understand you, and your account

then, as

many

of definition

is

Soc. But he,

77;.

Soc.

we had

others.

syllables?

be sure;

perhaps

in

my judgment

who having

correct.

right opinion about

anything, can find out the difference which dis-

I'llKAETETUS uiihei oi

m

1 1

1

ii

from othei thing! w ill k \\r had onl) m ire maintaining et; thai ii w hal «

U before

^

^

ertheless, \

u\\ .

hnd

I

.

ion

i

thin

>

if,

iu\srll ^iiilr

w Km h

i

.11

"ii

and

i

.Ii

pi


I

When not

^

w

little

lull

I

shut,

•

ontradk

i

afta

fashion.

.1

introduced the word

I

t

1

what

said be

I

did

"is,"

I

I"

m "i

lung ipeak

heme

oi iu>t

.is

one

I

noi

.ill;

;

:

1

erlamly. th.u. strictl) speaking,

Quite true.

dm

:

\

.is

always,

do not look

to

I

am

unequal

Str.

Make

to the

a noble effort, as

let

either existence or unity or plurality.

Str. is

him

(

:

Certainly not

And you mean

Then Yes. And the

ininv

1

in?

by true that which really

not true

is

that

which

Thcact. Exactly. A resemblance, then,

Str.

as

you say, not true? Thcact. Nay, but it

You mean

Thcact. Yes;

is

is

is

not real!)

the op-

it is

in reality only

Then what we

:

in a cer-

to say, not in a true

call

An

an image

really unreal.

be got out of his hole.

his reciprocation of opposites. the

Thcact. Most true.

to be

.mother true thing, but

Say no more of ourselves; but until we find some one or other who can speak of notbeing without number, we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not

art of

the like-

posite of the true?

Str.

say to

in

:.

Str.

thus discomfited. Str.

in

und

:

Str.

we

.1

only a resemblance.

would be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the task when I see you

if

tho

1

The jet.

It

And

.is

Str. And do you mean this something some other true thing, or what d
t not being .is indc scribable and unspeakable and unutterable, in using each oi these words in the singular, did not refer to not being .is one I

•»!

and inn mi

ii.

hr will lay th.it hr ict. Wh.it can

V es,

\iul yet

he will

.

you

i

\inl in using the singular verb, did

S

hi

'«'

«»i

unutterable, unspeakable, ind
us in rad

•

do noi

•

cqi

sti. mi.

* horn the) one there were three principles, and thai uvc

had been< hildren,

eai h his t.w n

it( .1

laid thai

mythui

n>

o

u .11 Ixiw owe time n oi them; and then again there w ai peat e, and \uir married and begai children, and hro them up; and another ipoke ol two pi in< iples, moist and a dry, oi hoi and a cold, and made them marts and cohabit. The Menus, however, in otn pan of the world, saj thai all things are many in name, but in nature one; this is their mythus, which goes back to Xe nophanes, and is even older. Then there are it

|»crp

.

h

determine the numbei ind

to

I

I

1

.i

•>

Ionian, and in

who have the

two

more

arrived

ai

principles

recent times Sicilian

m

the conclusion that to unite is

safer,

and

to say

thai be-

one and many, and that these are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as the severer Muses assert, while the gentler ones do not insist on the perpetual Strife m^\ peace, / 2jjJ but admit a relaxation and alternation of them; peace and unity sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again plurality and war, b\ reason of a principle oi strife. Whether any of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine; besides, antiquity and famous men should have reverence, and not be liable to accusations so serious. Yet one thing may be said of them withing

is

out orTence

What thing? That they went on their several ways disdaining to notice people like ourselves; they did not care whether they took us with them, or left us behind them. Theact. How do you mean? Thc\nt.

Sir,

Str.

I

mean

it.

to say, that

when

they talk of one,

two, or more elements, which are or have beoorneor arc becoming, or again of heat mingling with cold, assuming in some other part of their

—

works separations and mixtures, tell mc.Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by these expressions- When I was a younger man. I used to fancy that I understood quite well what was meant by the term "not-being." which is our present subject of dispute; and now you see

h

ei

bettei

I

•

i

sprain and leadei

i

t

i"

tl

I

lv

we

think thai

mean

pie

in

iiii.si

st

Ir.ir

ii

the w ord "\u\

l»\

allow

*

lose ai ui\ hi

the right method,

I

.

will

Ik-

to

i

all

into our pretence the dualistii philosophei to inter n

who

and cold

affirm thai hot

principles arc the universe,

which you apply \on

inc. in

them word

'are*? 'are'?

thai there

to

both of

when \ou I

s.i\

Upon your is

th.it

low are we

or

an) othi

•

what is tins term them, and wfc to

both .ind »-.. understand the

vievi

a third principle o

two— three in all. and not two you cannot s.iv thai one Ol die two principles is being, and yet attribute being equally to both of them; for, if vou did, whichever ol the two is identified with being, will comprehend the other; and so they will be one and not

the other irly

two."

The

Jet.

Very

true.

But perhaps you mean to give the 1 of "being" to both of them together Theact. Quite like

name

[244: Str. "Then, friends." we shall reply to them, "the answer is plainly that the two will be resolved into one." Theact. Most true.

still

Str.

to

"Since then,

tell

us

we

are in a difficulty, please

what you mean, when you speak

being; for there can be no doubt that you

of al-

ways trom the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once thought that we understood you, but

now we

are in a great strait.

Please to begin by explaining this matter to us,

we understand misunderstand There will be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of the and

you.

let

us no longer fancy that

when we

entirely

dualists or of the pluralists?

I

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

566

T

heart. Certainly not.

—

must wc not endeavour to as.ill from them what they mean l>> "being"?

ness ol the certain

means.

Thi

Then

Str*

One.

about the assertory of the one-

And what

Str.

them answer this question: is "Yea," thq will reply.

let

;

-nc

\.

True.

net.

And

n something which you

there

call

And

being the same as one, and do you applv tWO names to the s.unc thing VVin/r/.What will be their answer. Stranger.p It is dear, Theaeletus, that he who asis

'

serts the unity oi

this or

answering

Wh)

'The jet.

being Will find a difficulty in am other question.

Theaet.

ol two names, and to affirm nothing but unity, is surely ridicu-

is

(

Ami

Str.

name

is

To

1

ertainl)

.

equally irrational to admit that a

low so?

name from

the thing,

yet

he

who

identifies the

name with it

is

the

hesays that it is the name ol something, even then the name will only be the name oi a name, and ot nothing else. nothing, or

it

Theart.

True. Str. And the one will turn out to be only one one, and being absolute unity, will represent

Theart. Certainly. Ami would

The Jet. s.l\

they say that the whole

same with To be sure they would, and they

way

is,

or the

is

it?

ac-

so.

Str.li being lif^e

bemg

is

is

one and a whole,

is

a

true; lor being,

be the same as one, and the

all is

theretorc

Str.

And

yet

if

being be not

through

a yvhole,

thing ol its own nature.' Thejet. Certainly.

Upon

this view, again, being,

defect ot being, will

haying

a

become not-being?

True.

And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the yvhole will each have their separate nature.

Theaet. Yes. Str.

Hut

if

the yvhole does not exist at

all, all

the previous difficulties remain the same,

and

there will be the further difficulty, that besides

haying no being, being can never have come into being.

so?

Because that yvhich comes into being always comes into being as a yvhole, so that he yvho does not give yvhole a place among beings, cannot speak either of essence or generation as

a

whole, as Parmcnides sings,

unto the fullness of j well-rounded

Theaet. Yes, that certainly appears to be true. Again; hoyv can that yvhich is not a

Str.

yvhole have any quantity? For that

then being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also have parts.

points, each of

—

.

True.

which has

the attribute of unity in

and

a

all

whole,

Theaet. Certainly.

parts

the parts,

may

may have

and

be one?

in this

must

which

is

of

necessarily be the yvhole

of that quantity.

Theaet. Exactly. Str.

And

him who

there will be innumerable other

them causing

says that being

The

is

infinite trouble to

either one or two.

which are dayvning one objection connects with another, and they are ahvays involving what has preceded in a greater and worse perTheaet.

/2J-5/ Str. Yet that

all

more

T heart. Yes.

a certain quantity

being

shall

not a whole at all'

existing. is

tpki

he jet.

Or

ot unity.'

hard alternate c to oiler. haying in a certain sense the attribute ot one, is \ct proyed not to

Most

Evenly balanced from the- centre- on every side, And must needs he neither greater nor less in jny uj\ Wither on this side nor on that

y\.i\

that

Str.

other than the one that tually

Thejet. That

Str.

T heart. Why

mere name. Str.

that being

-i\

Theart.

the thing will be compelled to say that ol

v

we say

has the attribute

it

Str.

Theaet. Yes.

And

we

Str.

distinguish the

implies duality. Str.

because

ha\ ing the attribute oi unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks some-

anything?

Thcjct. Str.

1

many-

oi

than one.

so?

To admit

Str.

that there

Tt cry

Hut this indivisible, il made up w ill contradict reason. Thcjct. understand.

parts,

I

Sir.

a

Thejet. Certainly.

Str, Shall

Yes."

ot

solutely indivisible.

Str.

"ben;.

name

Str. Hut that oi which this is tahe condition cannot be absolute unity? The jet. Why not? Str. Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one must be affirmed to be ab-

upon us prove

plexity.

difficulties

this; for

.

II llic

il

ind not

i

1 1

I

I

ind proceed ciscl)

;

.tn J

ll.lHl!

till

prehend

|

n> viev«

we

those

who

ihall find is the

ipe >k

reiuh

.iirim,

l
t

grasp

in

these- they la)

hold,

and

«>!>

maintain, thai the things only which can he touched oi handled have being sc w ho

nst. ehhet as

th.ii

s.i\

the

whole

many tonus: and those who assert uni

nnk) or

them.

at

in

-.

is

who WOuld

moveable and immoveable

ing in his in

.

in h

I

s

definition oi

then,

When

v •

then,

.

t'air

notion

a

M.is,

now

have gained

.i

be

ol \

l

methinks

dial

we

the enquiry into the nature

oi

arc

.

here, indeed

lor th.it

which

both

these-

W'h.u do you mean? my r-.end, do you not sec thai nothing can exceed oof ignorance, and yet we fancy th.it we are saying something good? tet. I certainly thought that we were; and do not at all understand how we never found out our desperate case. .-.

i

is

iu-

i

is

c

I

ui

k

is

mast

o

p!..

lasses. Is this possible: ly

Theaet,

!t them other than being, and no non existent; and therefore oi .ill ol them, in like manner, we ma) trul) n.i\ that the) .ire not; and again, inasmuch .»n they partake ot being, tint the) are and are existent.

Str.

tir

e it

luii in

l>

\

innoi admit thai the her

\\\

ochei

n\ us to be one among many classes diffused over all of the

:

il

Theaet. True.

Ami .'.

.

1

Mr

1(>\\

1

speech are possible, for to think or to say what is falsehood, which thus arises in the is not

—

region ol thought and in speech.

Theaet. That

there

is

falsehood surely there

l>

\

be able to assert dil

consequcn

-ill

hive

ihould tin-

I

region the Sophist, as

his escape, and,

when

we

said,

he had got there,

denied the very possibility of falsehood: no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any way partake of being. Theaet. True. Str. And now, not-being has been shown to partake of being, and therefore he will not continue fighting in this direction, but he will probably say that some ideas partake of notbeing, and some not, and that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class: and he will still fight to the death against the existence of the image-making and phantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say, opinion and language do not partake of not-being, and unless this participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And,

in order that we may have clearer grounds for determining, whether not-being has a;: cern with them, or whether they arc both al-

ways

true,

and neither of them eve* take.

Theaet. True. Str.

Then, now,

let

us speak ot names, as be-

fore

we were speaking

that

is

of ideas

and

letters; for

the direction in which the answer

ma)

be expected.

Theaet. And what is the question at issue about names? Sir. The question at issue is whether all names may be connected with one another, or none, or only some of them.

Theaet. Clearly the Str.

I

last

understand you

is

true.

to say that

words which

sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning when in sequence cannot be connected 1 Theaet. What are you say:: Sir. What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent; for there are two sorts of

have a meaning when

in

DIALOGUES OF PLATO hich are givco by the

tntii

T heart. What \

'

icy -

ci

them

is

a subicct.

called nouns,

and the

oth-

them. That W inch denotes action wc

And must be of Theaet. Certainly.

!>c

call

True.

set

A

succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of verbs without nouns.

do nor understand you, when you gave your assent you had something else in your mind. Hut what I i

that

intended to say was, thai

nouns or

verbs

oi

Theaet.

is

a

mere succession of

What do you mean?

words like "walks," "runs," words which denote action, however many oi them \ ou string together, do not make discoui low can they? .n that

or any other

1

>r,

again,

when you

say "lion," "stag,"

"horse, or any other words

which denote agents neither in this wa\ ot Stringing words together do you attain to discourse; lor there is no

—

expr< ssion of action or inaction, or of the existoi

existence or non-existence indicated by

mingled with nouns; then the words fit, and the smallest combination of them forms language, and is the simplest and least form ot discourse. 2 Tlu lin 1 ask. What do you mean Str. When any one says "A man learns," should you not call this the simplest and least

the sounds, until verbs are

:

sentence-

oi a

now

arrives at the point of

an intimation about something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be. And he not onl) names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with nouns; and therefore we s.iv that he discourses, and to this connection of

words we give the name

ot discourse.

263]

my

will, to the best of

1

Str.

"Theaetetus

sits"

power.

— not

a very

long

sentence.

Theaet. Not \erv.

who

whom

Of

Str.

the subject

is

Of me;

Theaet.

Or

does the sentence speak, and 3 that is what you have to tell.

am

I

the subject.

again Theaet. What sentence 2 Str. "Theaetetus, with whom ing,

this sentence,

I

am now speak-

flyin

is

T/naet. That also

a sentence

is

which

will be

admitted by every one to speak of me, and to apply to me. Str. We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain quality. Theaet. Yes.

And what two sentences? Str.

The

Theaet.

is

the quality of each of these

one, as

I

imagine,

is

false,

and

the other true. Str.

The

true says

what

is

true about you?

Theaet. Yes.

And

Str.

what

the false says

is

other than

true?

Theaet. Yes.

And

Str.

therefore speaks of things

they were

if

which

2

as there are

Str.

And

says that thingsarerealofyou

are not; for, as

we were

each thing or person, there

much

that

is

which

saying, in regard to is

much

that

is

and

not.

Theaet. Quite true. The second of the two sentences which

Str.

you was first of all an example of the form consistent with our definition. Theaet. Yes, this was implied in our recent

related to

Theaet. True.

And

/

Theaet. True.

he

gi\ ing

Str.

are about.

SO.

the sentence speaks.

are not as

Theaet. Yes. Str. Yes, for

mind what we

will repeat a sentence to you in which and an action are combined, by the help noun and a verb: and you shall tell me of

Str.

not discourse.

us

let

must do

I

Theaet.

Quite true.

shortest

some things which

one another, and other things which do not

fit fit,

some vocal signs which do, and others which do not. combine and form disso there are

course.

Theaet. Quite true. There is another small matter. .

Wc

a certain quality.

a thing

whom

noun.

ot

And now

Str.

which is an articulate on those w ho do the actions, we call a other,

iht-

.

ence

Str.

Theaet.

rb.

Str.

Theaet. True. Str.

verbs.

mark

is it'

sentence must and cannot help having

admission. Str.

And,

subject

in the

second place,

it

related to a

2

Theaet. Yes. Str.

else?

Who

must be you, and can be nobody

-

III 7"A.

Ollld

IS

it

|

no -.mini.

l

il

mi;

I

it

.ill

i!

let

I

true

'Mill-

1

n othet ir,

l>r

no lubjei t, for, II ll.lS nO IUbje
! therefore

S

I

lui

I

\

'

agination are now proved to exist inoui mindi K>th .in true and false.

.ind

more w

lien

il

I

led thai

I

. | |

'.

You

•

5

know

know

will

\

better

hat thej are,

'

\*>u first

il

and

in

be

h

ii.

thin

.1

what thr\

From one another.

me

Give

would w

the

knowledge which you

not

\

be

h

I

this exception, that

condition

I

s

is

audible

is

called

we have

th.it

there

exists

m

What

!

we know

it.

the affirmation or denial takes

and in the mind only, have you any other name by which to call it but opinion? Theaet. There can be no other name. s Vnd when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of sense, would you not it

imagination

3

And

seeing that language

him

his true nature.

in

true

and

and that thought is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of thinking, and imagination or phantasy is the union of sense and opinion, the inference is that some of them, since they are akin to language. should have an element of falsehood as well as

Theaet. \

3

—

complished. set.

I

his

I

ithibit

and

r

spirits.

\

that

.

uisi-

tive.

And

was flitt subdh merchandise, and

the Sophist

hunt-

the acquisitive class, in the ing, contests,

Tin

I

I

rue.

But now that the imitative irt closed him, it is clear that we must begin by Str.

dividing the art of creation; for imitation kind of creation of images, however, as we

—

ami not of

af-

real things.

Quite true.

Do

Then

his

ill

divided by us into creative

in. illy

firm,

you perceive, then, that false opinion and speech have been discovered sooner than we expected? For just now we seemed to be undertaking a task which would never be ac-

Str.

1

mi may remember

Theaet. Certainly. Str.

1

then to kindred dialectical

Str. is

false,

of truth

stripped

properties.

Theaet. Yes.

Theaet. Cert linly. Str.

we have

[26$] an difference or peculiar. Then w

place in silence

call

us, tin n, n

et

Common

.

When

i

making

dividing any class, al a t to the right, holding list to that which holds the Sophist, until

exist

s

Affirmation. Theaet. Yes. 1 2()j

th.it

the di\ lsions oi the likeness

!

we know

already admitt the Sophist w.is lurking

77,.

sj

..

.

Theaet.

ol

'rut*.

\:\!

h

and

mind an an

the

i

h!r.

preceded,

Quite true. But the stream of thought which flows the- lips

false opinioi

,.

Sir. An.)

through

and

im"

to gain.

thought and speech the same, w hat is ailed thought the unuttered conversation ol the soul with s

with is

me

ish

In the hrst place, there are

two kinds of

creation.

Them t. What are they One of them is human and :

Str.

the other di-

vine.

perceive. let

us not be discouraged about the

I do not follow. Every power, as you

Theaet. Str.

may remember our

DIALOG UES OF PLATO basing originally, which causes things to exist, was dcimcd b\ us as

not previously existing, creative.

Theart.

remember. Str. Looking, DOW, at the world and all the annuals and plants, at things which grow upon rth lrom seeds and roots, as well as at inanimate substances which arc formed within the earth, fusilc or non fusile, shall we say that the) come into existence— not having existed 1

— by the creation

pre\ iousl)

with

\

(

rod, or shall

ulgar opinion about

What

V 'hi act.

oi

we

them?

is it?

The opinion that nature brings them into being from some spontaneous and unintelligent cause.

)r

(

we

shall

ated b\ a divine reason

from

conies

(

say that they are cre-

and

Str. I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements out of which things are made are known by us to lire, water, and the like be each and all the creation and work ot Cod.

Theart. Str.

Theart. dare sa\ that, owing to my >outh, ma) oltcn waver in my view, but now when I look at you and see that you incline to refer them to ( rod, defer to your authority. Str. \'obl\ said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you W< re one oi those who would hereafter change your mind, I would have gently argued with you, and forced you to assent; but as perceive that you will come of yourself and without any argument of mine, to that belief

these are also the creation of a

I

1

say, attracts you,

work

the

of time. Let

me

I

will not fore-

suppose, then,

which are said to be made by nature workot divineart,and that things which

that things

are the

made by man out man art. And so there

are

ot these are

work

of hu-

two kinds of making one human and the other

and production, the

are

which is produced when the light in bright and smooth objects meets on their suriace with an external light, and creates a perception the opposite of our ordinary sight.

1heart.

make

two

a sort of

are

awake

mean

I

is concerned. Theaet. Now I begin to understand, and am ready to acknowledge that there are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the lateral division there is both a divine and a hu-

tion

man ties

production; in the vertical there are

and

Theart.

a lateral one.

have done so. Then, now, there are in all four parts or segments two of them have reference to us and are human, and two of them have reference to the gods and are divine. 1

Str.

True.

Ami, again,

supposed

to be

number

in the division in the

us not forget that of the imita-

one part was

to

have been likeness-

which was

other way, one part

in each subdivision is the making of the things themselves, but the two remaining parts may be called the making ot likenesses; and so the productive art is again divided into two parts. Theaet. Tell me the divisions once more.

this

appeared

now, without

to be the case;

hesitation,

we

and shall

the different kinds as two.

Theaet. True.

[267]

Str.

Then, now,

let

us again divide the

phantastic art.

Theaet. \\ nere shall

we make

the division?

one kind which is produced by an instrument, and another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the instrument. Theaet. What do you mean? Str. When any one makes himself appear like another in his figure or his voice, imitation Str.

made

let

And

therefore

Str.

art.

And

Theaet. Yes.

of production or in-

made

reali-

a creation of a kind of similitudes.

making, and the other phantastic, if it could be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to

you should

to say that

a vertical division

2

Theaet. Quite true. Str. And other products of human creation are also twotold and go in pairs; there is the thing, with which the art of making the thing is concerned, and the image, with which imita-

the class of real being.

I

Str.

vention, as you ha\ e already

Str.

and another by the art of drawing, which dream created by man for those who

ing, is

shall we say of human art? make one house by the art of build-

not

tive class the

which we have already. low do you mean?

1 2(>()J

Yes; and the images as well as the work of a divine hand.

And what

Str.

Do we

Str.

Theaet. True. Then, now, subdivide each of the

Theaet.

skill.

Str. spring up of themselves in sleep or by day, such as a shadowwhen darkness arises in a hre, or the reflection

divine.

sections

wonderful

What are they? The appearances which

Theaet.

1

which, as you

there are images of them, which are

creation are equally the

tod?

I

stall

True.

And

not them, but which correspond to them; and

knowledge which

a

—

—

is

the

There

name

is

for this part of the phantastic art.

!

.

II




.1

is

I

S

me

et

I

u

.

do as you one and leave the othei

to the

foi

n

the

U|

tlt.it

tus,

named

tins th(

.iii.I

othci

he

then, be

this,

i

some who imitate, knowing and some who do noi know.

line arc

I

hat the) imitate,

A nil whai

whu

hiiii.i'

an be no greater. not the son oi imitation here

I

Was

know you and

oi

or oi virtue in genera]

tertained by them, by expressing

word and deed

Theaet. Yes, that

is

very

\ml do they always

thought

just,

:

when

it,

.is

i.ir

Theaet.

The

Such

an imitator

common.

er, as

who

he

they are not?

Or

is

among

is

find a suitable clearly

name

for each of

not an easy task; for

was some contusion which prevented them from attempt-

no great abundance

the sake of distinctness,

the imitation

is the m.iker oi the longer he the statesman or the p

Theaet. Str.

The

latter.

And what

shall

wc

the other

call

: I

I

;

The

philosopher he cannot b is ignorant: but since imitator of the wise he will have a name which

upon our view he

1

formed by an adaptation ot the won: shall we name him? am pretty sure that cannot be mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist. Str. Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain from one end of his geneis

I

I

ing to divide genera into species; wherefore there

Is

What

the ancients there

of ideas,

who

And who

Theaet.

very opposite.

Theaet. True. is

me

the philosopher or the Sophist

should be described as to be distinguished from the othis ignorant is distinguished from

Can we

-It.

consideration, then, th< t" be two; there is the dissembler,

•

not

:

Str.

An v.

orator?

him who knows.

them? This

furthi

harangues a multitude in public in a long spcci h, and the dissembler, who m pn\ ai in short speeches compels the person conversing with him to contradict himself. Thai!. What you s.iy is most 'rue.

their attempt

a one. then,

—

Theaet.

speeches?

fail in

we

shall

lass as h.i\ in

.is

:

the very opposite true?

Str.

i

to

the figure or

s.iv oi

Arc we aware that many, having no know! edge oi cither, but only a sort oi opinion, do their best to show that this opinion is really en-

to be

-

n

not well

the) can, in

\nd

which

Naturally. oi justice

miiij'

the othci as the di

youi figure?

\ml what would \ou

.

h

i

we spoke just now the imitation oi those who know? For he who would inmate you would

s

lilt

thr

from knowledg

form

M

h you

tatoi

surely

that

oi

lineoi distinction can there possibly

be greatej than thai which divides ignorance

s

mi

:

hear,

which

I

of

will

alogy to the othcr : Theaet. By all means.

names. Yet, for

make

bold to

call

coexists with opinion, the

—

imitation of appearance that which coexists with science, a scientific or learned imitation. Theaet. C Granted. Str. The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed with imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge.

Theaet. Very true. Str. Let us, then, examine our imitator of ap-

Str. art as

He, then, who traces the pedigree of his who, belonging to the conscious

follows

—

or dissembling section of the art of causi:

contradiction,

is

an imitator of appearance, and

is

separated from the class of phant^stic which

is

a

branch of image-making into that further

division of creation, the juggling of words, a

creation

human, and

not divine

— any one who

affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood

lineage will say the very truth.

Theaet. Undoubtedlv.

and

STATESMAN 01

The

Vol

The

Tin Dialogue: Thbodorus; Socrates;

Ml

K So
\c-.
\ others ha\ ing similar authority

True. But what would you say. if he came back sooner than he had intended, and. owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other celestial influences, something else happened to be y. >oc.

Str.

— would he not venture

better for

them

gest this

new remedy, although

to sug-

not contem-

think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and to prescribe generally the regimen

2 Would he observing the original law. neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the patient daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea that this course only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and heterodox ; Viewed in the light of science and true art. would not all such enactments be

which

utterlv ridiculous

:

plated in his former prescription

persist in

V. Sot

v.

1

.

2 bat do you rcicr.

he training-masters donot issueminute rules for individuals, or gi\c every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution: they 1

will benefit the majority.

1

y. Soc. Utterly. pi equal amounts them all; they send them forth together, and let them rest together from their running, wrestling, or whatever the form of oi

exerusc

to

bodik ever, ist may V. Sue. True. Str.

who

lator

be.

And now

observe that the

legis-

has to preside over the herd, and to

enforce justice in their dealings with one another, will not be able, in enacting tor the general

good, to provide exactly what

is

suitable

tch particular case.

cannot be expected to do so. ie will lay down laws in a general form lor the majority, roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will deliver in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last will be traditional customs of the V. Sot

.

1

le

I

country. V. Soc.

Ie will

I

how

can he

sit

at

every man's side all through his life, prescribing lor him the exact particulars of his duty?

Who,

Socrates, would be equal to such a task 3 one who really had the royal science, if he had been able to do this, would have imposed

No

upon himself the restriction of a written law. Y.S f. Sol should infer from what has now said.

Str.

going

( )r

rather,

my good

friend,

from what

is

to be said.

y. Soc. Anil

what

is

that?

us put to ourselves

taSe case of a phyabout to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long time pom his patients— thinking that his inet

sician, or trainer,

who

is

remembered unless they down, he w ill leave notes of them

structions will not be

are written lor the ik

who

gave laws, written or un-

what was good or bad,

Str.

if

he

honourable or dishonourable, the tribes of

men who

just or unjust, to

flock together in their

several cities, and are governed in accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were suddenly to come again, [296] or another like to him, is he to be prohibited from changing them.1 would not this prohibition be in reality

—

quite as ridiculous as the other

:

y. Soc. Certainly. Str. Do you know a plausible saying common people which is in point

of the

what you mean

at the

:

Y. Soc.

I

do not

moment. Str. They

recall

if any one knows how the may be improved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and then he may legislate, but not otherwise. Y. Soc. And are they not right.

say that

ancient laws

:

be right.

Str. Yes, quite right; for

been

And

written, determining

mpils or patients.

dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle violence for their good, what is this violence to be called ? Or rather, before you answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our previous instances. Y. Soc. What do you mean.' Str. Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of whatever sex or age. whom he comStr.

I

pels against his will to do something for his good which is contrary to the written rules; what is this compulsion to be called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the : art, or a breach of the laws of health. Nothing

could be more unjust than for the patient to whom such violence is applied, to charge the physician who practises the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his disease. Y. Soc. Most true. Str. In the political art error is not called dis-

i

1

\

!

1

I

n uc w hen iw md ustom, is ompell ind bctiei and noblei than he did befon tlir l.i si and moil absurd thing which he could )

S

(.>;nii-

.

I

i

t

v

.

about tuch \

\

iol(

il

01

nee inju

ipelled )

S

s

u e

i

.ii

the

handi

u.

should

we

say thai the

\

iolence,

in. in, is just,

Ma)

ii

.i

.

ll

\

(

nov I

the pilot,

over the interests not in

oi

t

and

the ship

rules, but

preserves

.i

Ins

tub by wat< hing continu-

down

laying

law fellow sailors, even bag Ins .in

the-

»>t

•

so, and in the sell

'

i

.in

Ins

same way, created

I

who

"is

>'.

Sot

one great ru distributing justice to the citizens with intelligence mu\ skill, are able to preserve them, .md, as t.ir as m.iy be, to make them better from being worse.

one

cm

deny what has been non-

Neither,

can anv one

\o\\ consider,

it

deny the other statement.

What was

:

it

for the better

and some

for the worse.

What do you mean?

cannot have understood your previous remark about imitaV. Soc.

I

tions.

And

mere suggestion which I highly important, even if we leave the question where it is, and do nor seek by the discussion of it to expose the error Str.

yet the

threw out

hastily

which prevails y. Soc.

is

is

in this matter.

What do you mean

The

which has

1

grasped by us not easy or familiar; but we may attempt to Str.

express

it

Wh.it

.

sort ot .in un.

Well, siuh

StT.

.is

tl:

will reflect th.it he suiiers strange things

whom

the

.it

them: the physician saw sany he wishes to s.ive. and any whom he

hands ol both

ot

wishes to maltreat

he maitreats

cutting or

same time requiring them to bring him payments, which ot tribute, o! which little or nothing is t\ upon the sick man. and the greater part is ion SUmed by him and his domestics: and the finale is that he receives money from the relai the sick man or trom some enerm of his. burning them, and

at

the

.

We said that

no great number of persons, whoever they may be, can attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the true government is to be found in a small body, or in an individual, and that other States are but imitations of this, as we said a little while ago,

some

1

r

.

So

said.

V. Soc,

i

.

worth many anofJu man similitude t these let us endeavour t>oc So percej Str. There remain, however, natures still more troublesome, because they are more nearh akin \

rs.

at last

I

.

to the king, and more difficult to discern: the examination of them may be compared to the process ol rehning gold. : Y. Soc. What is your meaning. Str. The workmen begin by sifting a v. earth and stones and the like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to

gold,

—

which can only be separated by tire copand other precious metals: these are

per, silver, at last

gold

away by

refined

is left

is

evil;

in every re-

either

any great

when compared with

the others, because the offices are too minutely

subdivided and too many hold them. And this is the worst of all lawful governments,

the use of tests, until the

quite pure.

Y. Soc. Yes, that

of law will bisect V. Soc.

Str. And so our satyric drama has been played out: and the troop of Centaurs and Sat-

is

the

way

Str. In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred nature has been left: there remain the nobler arts of the general and the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal art, [304] and persuades men to do justice, and How can assists in guiding the helm of States: we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek alone and unalloyed : Y. Soc. That is obviously what has in some

—

way

attempted. attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be brought to light; and I think to be

Str. If the

music may

therefore

that the illustration of

and the best oi .ill lawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy is the form in which to live is best; if they are well ordered, then this is the last which you should choose, as royalty, the first form, is the best,

hibiting him. Please to answer

with the exception of the seventh, for that excels

them

all,

and

among men. V. Soc. You

is

among

are quite right,

choose that above

of

the exception ot the one

ma\ be

set

what God

is

and we should

all.

The members

Sir,

States

all

these States, with

which has knowledge,

aside as being not Statesmen but par-

tisans—upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols; and. being the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the greatest ot

Sophists.

/.The name ot Sophist after many windings in the argument appears to have been most justly tixed upon the politicians, as they are termed.

which these

in

things are said to be done.

me

assist in ex-

a question.

What

question: such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in general: Y. Soc.

Str.

There

is

Y. Soc. There Str.

And

is

is.

there any higher art or science,

having power to decide which of these arts are and are not to be learned; what do you Y. Soc. I should answer that there is. Str. And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the others:

—

Y. Soc. Yes. Str.

And ought

the other sciences to be su-

perior to this, or no single science to any oth-

Or ought this science to be the overseer and governor of all the others:

er.'

The latter. You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought to learn or not, must Y. Soc.

Str.

be superior to the science

which teaches?

which

is

learned or

)

5

hdetl

i

Km

to the

U>

sign

in pei

in .il»lr

Ii

w

li.it

rhat power,

s

1

I

made Clio

multitu

i

pleasing caU- and not b>

.:

irn,

..

tl

w hrth

iiimr-.

not, inn

tca< h irly

i

be

I

pox'.

pei suasion

n) one,

i

i" re

«>t

1

-f

o\c In

MS

N

\

.uis oi speec

l||C

thofC W

r I.

now w

h |nd wh

.i.

t

ihr

the

,

portun

and persuasion.

Ii

Which,

it

am

I

mistaken, will

not

Ik-

polii \

.

n

r\

|

good.

seems

Rrw oric

be

to nsj

yet

ministering to

V. S(h

quickly distin different

.1

i

it.

Yes.

.

But what would you think of another

power

sort hi

science

oi

:

What science? The science which

Y. 5

y. Sot

has to do with mili

operatioiks against our

enemies

—

is

that to

V. Soc.

1

Vnd

how

low can generalship and military

be regarded as other than

i

.

is

to advise

make

the art

peace, the

V. Soc.

It

which

when we

we

same

is

arc to

able and

go

to

are to be consistent,

knows

5

Sir.

Sir.

No

The

and terrible can we imagine any truly royal

is

only ministerial,

political?

let

us consider the nature of

the righteous judge;

y. Soc. Very good.

them

common

all,

matti

trul)

.ill

describe nndrra

;n a

in-

nam

nature, most truly

y. So

.

I

red the

State/ shall

I

analyst

which weaving supplied' th.it \ou wi

the pattern

greatly wish

Then must describe the nature of the web, and show how the various threads are woven into one piece. Sir.

I

A

Str.

though y.

s

.(

:

appears

linly the

to

Ik-

To assume

that one part of virtue differs kind from another, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who appeal to popular opinion. Y. Soc. I do not understand. Str. Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would consider courage to be in

a part of virtue

own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or by

part of virtue:

ings of

—

which alneed attempt must be made.

task has to be accomplished,

difficult,

Does he do anything but decide the dealmen with one another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he receives from the king and legislator showing Sir.

his

all

t

royal

Sir.

art of the general

Once more

i,and

Then, now that we ter

:

y. Soc. Exactly. Str.

lav*

call pol

various classes

great

other.

and therefore not

t

the

Y. Soc. Clearly.

how

whole art of war is, which is superior to it but the

the

•

of

y. Soc. Kx.u •:!-.

we must

And we must also suppose that it we are not to give up

the

we Would

[jot

our Former notion? V. Soc. True. Sir. And. considering

Y. Soc.

it

Sir,

say different.

this rules the other,

agn

acteristic of their

war, or to

as this or different?

I

acting the State, and

we may

a

.

and has charge to one.

be regarded as a science or not?

.

And

Sir.

.

Sir. t.iry

the) nave no autl themone anothei but cerned with some special m lion oi nave, .is the) ought to have, spa ial nam responding to their several a< tions. selves oi

•:

Y.

Soc

Sir.

I

should.

And you would

different 1

;

Certainly

think temperance to be from courage: and likewise to be a

Cf. 287-90, 303-5.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

606 True.

V. Soc. Str.

theory about them. ;

What

)c.

is it

two principles which thoroughly hate one another and arc antagonistic J

hat thejf arc

throughout V. Sot

I

.

Yes

great part oi nature.

a

lor all the parts

said to he friendly to

oi'

\

er this

one another.

Str.

these us carefully investigate wheth-

let

me how we

V. Soc. Tell

shall consider that

question. Str.

We must

extend our enquiry to

all

those

things which we consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes. V. Soc

.

Explain; what arc they?

Acutcness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the movement oi sound, and the imitations oi them which painting and music supply, you must have praised yourself beStr.

now, or been present when others praised diem. V. Soc. Certainly.

And do you remember the

terms in which

do

Y. Soc. In

1

I

V..

to

you

in

my

You

rel

arise

The

Str.

fancy that this

is all

so easy: Well,

is

when

liness or courage.

ing their

Y.Soc.

How?

We

speak of an action as energetic and and manly, and vigorous too; and apply the name of which I speak as

brave, quick

when we

common

attribute of

all

these natures,

we

certainly praise them.

[joy] V'Soc. True. And do we not often praise the quiet

strain of action also?

To be sure. And do we not

V. Soc.

what we .

Soc.

then say the opposite of

said of the other? 1

low

iAo

you mean?

all

Y. Soc.

difference between the

two

classes

disorders the most hateful.

To what do you

refer?

To nothing short of the whole regulaof human life. For the orderly class are al-

Str.

tion

ways ready

to lead a peaceful life, quietly do-

own

business; this

is

their

manner

of

behaving with all men at home, and they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the peace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for peace, which is often out of season vails,

Str.

^

— and

occasions of quar-

aflecting really important matters, be-

comes of

Str.

I

often a trivial concern; but in a state, anil

under which they tail. When we praise quickness and energy and acutcness, whether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality which we admire by one word, and that one word is manthe opposite classes oi action

the

to those of the opposite party

many quarrels and among them.

out of this

W. Why not?

Str.

which

Y. Soc. True.

us consider these notions with reference to

let

respect?

mentioned, and very likely of many others. According to their respective affinities to either class of actions they distribute praise and blame praise to the actions which are akin to their

mind. Str.

what

Str. In respect of all the qualities

own, blame

not.

wonder whether can explain words the thought which is passing

Str. in

I

hard-

termed violence or madness: too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part these qualities, and the temperance and manliness of the opposite characters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that men who have these different qualities of mind differ from one another. is

—

thej are praised? V. Soc,

Soc How so? Too great sharpnessorquicknessor

V.

iorc

Str.

out of place, the names of either are into terms of censure.

Str.

ness

in sonic respect.

is

changed

not parts of virtue

kindred

indicative oi order.

Very true. Hut when, on the other hand, either of

!

OUI in*

ii

*

i

«ii

i»-it

in

m

\

i

« h

OJ

h ip|

II

t

\

mu nit

I

I

llic-

l

go

!>>

i" w

the mill!

•

|

Up enein in.

either

I

Soc.l

)

again,

iii'.

linn llieu

Utter!)

land 01 enslave ind lubjei is

t

it

ti.it

t


\.>u mr.ui.

Protarchus,

I.

s

plain

and hr u ho ami mi

tioni;

hu h

he principle which hai

l

li

v\

i;i

ill

-

cak S

iboill

difficulty, -ui>l M'liir

.1

i

am

u hen

b) nature

prison

.1

one and

wr had

&fl

.iU>-

many,

beti I

I

1

where

wc

shall

1

"me* into man) "m and even opposing them as .crr.it and imall, tight and heavy, and in ten thousand othei ways? Yotan hns. arc the common and j acknowledged paradoxes aboui the one .in>l many, which ma) vi\ tint everybody has by this tunc- agreed to dismiss .is childish and ob vious and iU-trinu-iU.il to the- true (.curse of thought; and no more Favour is shewn to thai ether puzzle, in which a person proves the members and part s oi anything to be divided, and then confessing thai they are .ill one. s.i\s 1

1

1

\

tiling

the single

;

I

laughingly here

is

.1

in disprool of his

miracle, the one

and the many

.ire

is

own words: Why, many and infinite,

only one.

Pro. Bui what, Socrates, are those other marvels

connected with

this subject

imply, have not yet become

which,

you

as

common and

ac-

knowledged? [15] Soc.

When, my

those cases, and

horn and perish,

which we were

when

unity

is

gi> ing, lor in

of this concrete

was saying, a universal conis. as no refutation is needed; hut when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good one, then the interest which attaches to these and similar unities and the attempt which is made to divide nature, there

I

m

b.ittlr,

•.•

varioui /'•

identified

thought, and thai run about together,

l>\

past, the)

word which is union ot them u ill n

ever)

in

and

uttered,

tl

beginning, but is. .is b< thought itself, which n

ishng

I

quality ol old.

Any young man, when

he hrst

i

delighted, and Eaiu m i thai he has Found a treasure ot wisdom; in the iirsi enthusubtleties,

siasm

is

ot his joy

he

thought unturned,

les

now

rolling

her no up the many

into the one, and kneading thei r, now unfolding and dividing them-, he puzzles himself first and above all, and then he prod puzzle his neighbours, whether the\ ar

or younger,

hoy, the one Joes not belong

to the class of things that are as in the instances

mil multifarioui

/

16

'

or ol

hisown

.\j,r

-that

makes

no difference; neither lather nor mother does he spare; no human being wh< from him. hardly even his dog. and a bai would have no char tping him. interpreter could only

lx-

found.

Pro. Considering. Socrates,

sent that

how many wc

individual unity, being always the same, and

and that all of us are young men. is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set upon you, if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is there no charm by which wc may dispel all this contusion, no more excellent way of arriving at thetruth 3 If there is. we hope that you will guide us into that way, and wc will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in which we are engaged, Socrates, is not unim-

incapable either of generation or of destruction,

portant.

but retaining a permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied

as

them

gives birth to a controversy.

Of what

Pro.

Soc. In the

nature

first

3

place, as to

whether these

unities have a rcalexistence:and then

how

each

world of generation, or as still entire and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be at the same time in one and in manyin the infinity of the

things

3

ficulties,

These, Protarchus, are the

and

this

is

the one

and many

real

to

dif-

which

are,

Soc.

The

Philebus

reverse of unimportant, nr. calls

you, and there neither

ever will be a better than

my own

is

nor

favourite

way, which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me helpless in the hour of need. Pro. Tell us what that Soc.

but

is

One which may

is.

be easily pointed out,

by no means easy of application;

it is

the

DIALOG

612 parent oi Pro.

I

a

the discoveries in the arts.

all

what

us

oil

OF PLATO

L

it

Pro.

heaven, which,

Sot. ted

among men

as

grammar

hao

too ought in every enquiry to begin by laydown one idea ol that which is the subject

c

in-

we shall find in everyoi enquiry; thing. Having found it, we may next proceed this unity

to look lor

tWO,

il

there he two, or,

not. then

ll

ther number, subdividing three oi each ol these units, until at last the unity with which we began is seen not only to be one and i'i,

r

infinite, but also a definite

many and

the infinite

many

the

must not be Suffered

until the entire

number

to

number; approach

oi the species

intermediate between unity and infinity has been discovered then, and not till then, we may rest Erom division, and without iurther

—

troubling ourselves about the endless individuals may allow them to drop lntoinimity. This, as was saying, is the way ot considering and 1

learning and teaching one another, which the gods have handed down to us. / ij ] But the

wise men oi our time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. lavI

one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at onceto infinity; the intermediate steps never occur to them. And this. repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art oi disputation and true ing no method, they

make

their

I

think that partly understand you, Socrates, but should like to have a clearer notion oi what yen are saying. Pro.

I

I

I

may

!

were made Pro.

illustrate

my meaning

the alphabet, Protarchus,

ters ol

How

by the

let-

which you

to learn as a child.

do they ailord an

The sound which

2

passes through the oi all

men

is

yet not by knowing either that one or that sound is infinite are we

knowledge sounds is what

perfect in the art of speech, but the ot

the

makes

number and nature a

man

a

of

grammarian.

so

And

the

know ledge which makes

(

one

is

in

music

as well as in

?

Certainly.

And

and

there

a higher note and a lower equal pitch: may we affirm

is

a note oi

—

much'

would not be a real musician \ou knew; though if you did not know this you would know almost Soc. But you

it'

this

was

all

that

nothing oi music. Pro. Nothing. Soc. But when you have learned what sounds arc high and what low. and the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or proportions, and the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers discovered, and have handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of harmonies; and the affections corresponding to them in the movements oi the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be called rhythms and measures; and they tell us that the same principle should be applied to every one and many; -when, I say. you have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and you may be said to understand am other subject, when you have a similar grasp of it. But the infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is in each of them, when not classified, creates in every one of us a state of infinite ignorance; and he who never looks for number in anything, will not himself be looked for in

—

the

number

Phi.

is I

of

famous men.

think that what Socrates is now excellent, Philebus. think so too, but how do his words

fiSJ Pro.

I

bear upon us and upon the argument 1 Soc. Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus.

and you must answer him. you must let me make one little remark first about these matters: I was saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and now say conversely, that he who has to begin with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look Pro. Indeed he I

is,

will; but

about for some number representing a certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And now let us return for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters.

Pro* Very true. iSoc,

note,

.

same kind.

:

so

I

And is

Soi

Soc.

illustration

whether ot an individual or one M\d yet infinite. Pro. Very true.

lips

Sound

Pro.

saying

dialectic.

of the

is

Mow

Sound

conceive,

I

by the

Prometheus, and therewith a blaze oJ our betters light; and the ancients, who were and nearer the gods than we are, handed clown the tradition, that whatevei things arc said to he arc composed of cue and main, and have tic unite and infinite implanted in them: seeing, then, that lUcb is the order of the world. v.

musician

is.

Pro, a

man

Soc.

What do you mean: Some god or divine man, who

in the

I

I

Ic^md

g\ plt.Ul

mg

\

lust

distinguished

the

tli.it

Vlli!

IN

oUsCI

tO

hum in

Il

r.

I

ol ihnii,

i

•

iii.l

ilitwlr,

'

tins

infinity

t

numbi und, bin

scum

«>w ell

)

.

\\

ere not

these

like

,

to»> exiii

:

in

nd lastly he distinguished w hu li w c now .ill muti .

.1

third

1

.iiul

w ithoul sound, and

«.

i 1

ided these, and

%

I

ikr

and Mini vowels, into the individual sounds, and told the h and .ill oi number Dt them, an them the name ot letters; and observii -I leai n an) one oi them and none not learn diem .ill. and in consideration o( this common bond w huh in mannei united them, single .in. and this he he assigned to them .ill n

-

.1

.1

Vh:.

mc

ui

hut

I

grammar

the .ut oi

!

r

illustration, Protarch us, has a understanding the original statement,

the defect oi

teel

which

\v

him

I

jusi

Pol W lull and delighl and the

hie:

1

K reminding VCI

.

properls

\

I

I

low

;

Mated

.is

Soc.

And we

.\nr .1

1

home

the question

until

and you agreed, and placed our disposal. And now. as children s.iv.

9

given cannot be taken 03

has been fairly

IS1

us in this

v.

.In what v

[20] Phi. any

which the an answer is, how

mind and knowii .in.

settled:

maintain that they are each of

the precise question to

I

understanding and

I

ing questions

And

;

pursuit, are

allov

v

Ph,. True. Soc.

superior :

Phi. Certainly.

them one?

order thai

in 1

at

Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibilityoi pleasure and wisdom? Soc.

and

1

.

amine and ompare Is, whu h m your opina

this h.is to

Phi.

I'hii'

1

now

you going to .isk. Philebus, what Jo with the argument? \ cs, th.it is a question which Prolan bus and have been long asking. issuredly you h.ive already arri the answer to the question which, .is you s.i\. you have been so long asking? \

th

us in dct
.

li

\

and

.

«

l»i pain and noi t bad al the time when be is suffei pain, c\a\ though he be the ben •»! nun;

he

pleasure

1

if.

th
•

htm

be laid b) ii\

i

in

in

t«>

be only ii.uui il

.i

And

heralds, bin everlasting.

il

the Cretan legislatoi public,

.in

vie* to war;

in

;

\»>n

who

the m>ml things

.ill

hands

into the

in .11

1>\

nthri

that there


nl\ man who in free!) and genuinely good l>\ like to hcai

.itt.i*

I

llv

the

i

ii\

nir inspiration oi hit

own

inured

manufactured. Thei

not

iball

I

ikr to he.u \oti

s.i\

nature,

wh.iti

\(

t

and thai

I

dren'i

JfOU h.i\e to

hood he w ill w ith me thus

Stranj

s.

ei

;and

when you have heard

youi thoughts. me ipeak, remind you >>t tie which unitei you to u must have heard hire the story ol the pr»>p!u-t Epimenides, who was oi m\ fams.i\

•

•

,

bold))

what

..

in

ii

.1

the

ine came to Athens ten ycMrt before the dan war, in accordance with the response oi Oracle, and offered certain sacrifices which

the

God commanded. The Athenians were

\\

•.

th.it In-

time

laid

and

m

ot the

when

at

Persian invasion; and

would not come, would go

tor ten ve.irs they

th.it

th.it

dread

they came, they

.'.

again without accomplishing any ot their objects, and would sutler more evil than they in-

At that time mv forefathers formed ties :alit\ with you; thus ancient is the And my parents have had friendship which

flicted.

1

tor you.

Ath. listen;

and

I

You seem

am

to

also readv to

lie

quite ready to

perform

as

much

can oi an almost impossible task, which I will nevertheless attempt. At the outset of the discussion, let me define the nature and power as

I

is the way by which our iment must travel onwards to the God Dionysus.

ot

education; tor this

Clc. Let us proceed,

if

you

please.

Ath. Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education, will you consider whether they satisfy you

:

ing, or

some other

.

(

exercise, for

amusement, and

the teacher should endeavour to direct the chil-

I.e.

»

hild Ml his th

r o|

|OTl ol

.t

tan

'1

///;.

t

Certainly.

edui ation

hen

us not le.ivr the

let

ambiguous

m

when we sped,

or

•

defined At pn

ill

terms

oi

praise or

bl

about the bringing up oi eai h pei .ill one m. m educated and anothei uneducated, although the uneducated man may be lomei ret.nl \er\ well educated for the calling \\

i^

t

And

Ifh.

.

that

r

I

01

ill

and why we should

lu.u

really

Cle. "I should," will be the

Ath.

"And you would

stone in

to states.

answer of every

one.

which there

is

rather have a touchno risk and no great

Cle. True. Ath. Does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important ways? What is there which so

danger than the reverse?"

and safety in war.' For two things which give victory confidence before enemies, and fear of disgrace be-

Ath. "And in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them amid these imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the af-

fore friends.

fection of fear was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and admonishing them; and also honouring them.

surely gives victory

there are

Cle.

Ath.

There

—

are.

Then each

of us should be fearless

and

Cle. In that proposition every

one may

safely

agree.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

652

but dishonouring any one who will not be persuaded by you to be in all respect! such as you command him; and if he underwent the trial well and mantully, you would let him go unscathed; but if ill, you would inflict a punishment upon him? Or would you abstain lrom using the potion altogether, although you have " no reason for abstaining :

Cle.

He would

be certain, Stranger, to use

Meg. Certainly.

Now,

Ath.

be cultivated in the soul: first, the greatest courage; secondly, the greatest fear

Which you

Cle.

reverence,

Thank you

Ath.

as the habit of

amid

for reminding me. But now, courage and fearlessness is to be

trained

Ath. This would be a mode of testing and training which would be wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might

opposite quality

indeed to any number; and he would do well who provided himself with the potion only, rather than with any number of other things, whether he preferred to be by himself in solitude, and there contend with his fears, because he was ashamed to be seen by the eye of man

he was perfect; or trusting to the force of nature and habits, and believing that he had been already disciplined sufficiently, he did not hesitate to train himself in company with any number of others, and display his power in conquering the irresistible change efhis virtue being such, fected by the draught that he never in any instance fell into any great unseemliness, but was always himself, and left off before he arrived at the last cup, fearing that he, like all other men, might be overcome by the potion. Cle. Yes, Stranger, in that last case, too, he until

his

own

—

might equally show

his self-control.

Ath. Let us return to the lawgiver, and say to him: "Well, lawgiver, there is certainly no such fear-potion which man has either received from the Gods or himself discovered; for witchcraft has no place at our board. But is there any potion which might serve as a test of

—

/ 6-/97

overboldness and excessive and indiscreet boasting? Cle.

I

suppose that he will say, Yes is such a potion.

—mean-

ing that wine

Ath. site

Is

not the efTect of this quite the oppo-

of the effect of the other?

When

a

man

drinks wine he begins to be better pleased with

and the more he drinks the more he is brave hopes, and conceit of his power, and at last the string of his tongue is loosened, and fancying himself wise, he is brimming over with lawlessness, and has no more fear or respect, and is ready to do or say himself,

filled

full of

anything. Cle. I think that every one will admit the truth of your description.

said to be characteristic of not mistaken.

am

if I

the potion.

be applied to a single person, or to a few, or

we were two things which should

us remember, as

let

saying, that there are

fears, let us consider is

whether the

not also to be trained

among

opposites. Cle. That is probably the case. Ath. There are times and seasons at which we are by nature more than commonly valiant and bold; now we ought to train ourselves on

these occasions to be as free

from impudence and to be afraid

and shamelessness

as possible,

to say or suffer or

do anything that

is

base.

Cle. True.

Ath. Are not the moments in which

we

are

—

apt to be bold and shameless such as these 2 when we are under the influence of anger, love, pride, ignorance, avarice, cowardice? or

wealth, beauty, strength, and

ing workings of pleasure

all

when

the intoxicat-

madden

us?

What

is

better adapted than the festive use of wine, in

and in the second place man, if care be taken in the use of it? What is there cheaper, or more innocent? For do but consider which is the Would you rather test a man greater risk: of a morose and savage nature, which is the source of ten thousand acts of injustice, by the

first

place to

test,

to train the character of a

—

making bargains with him at a risk to yourself, [650] or by having him as a companion at the festival of Dionysus? Or would you, if you to apply a touchstone to a man who is prone to love, entrust your wife, or your sons, or daughters to him, perilling your dearest interests in order to have a view of the condition of his soul? I might mention numberless cases, in which the advantage would be manifest of getting to know a character in sport, and without paying dearly for experience. And I do not believe that either a Cretan, or any other man, will doubt that such a test is a fair test, and safer, cheaper, and speedier than any

wanted

other.

Cle.

That

Ath.

And

is

certainly true.

this

knowledge of the natures and

habits of men's souls will be of the greatest

use in that art which has the

them; and that

art, if I

politics.

Cle. Exactly so.

am

management

of

not mistaken,

is

.

LAW

BOOK

•

now w

!>

'

*

whethri

OI it

\\a\c

r

human

into

onl

the

in

rom W

thcit Iff

and mu< h

na i

1!

to be d •

t

01

I

opinion u

11

innot be quiet

in theii

1

n

in

theii

and cry


t

ii -it

the

against thai

I

tnnr

1

men

all

forwards,

sr.i

5

haeani remained ten \r.ns, and

md

settle.

them properly, and as they have done, and numerous deaths, murreceive

to

were the consequence. Tne exiles came again, under i new name, no longer Achaeans, but Dorians a name which they derived from Dorieus; tor it w.is he who gathders, exiles,

—

them together. The rest ol the story is told by you Lacedaemonians as part ol the history

ered

Thus,

digressing from the original subject of laws into music and drinking-bouts, the argument has, providentially, come back to .itter

point, and presents to us another hanFor we have reached the settlement of Lacedaemon; [68 3 J which, as you truly say, is in laws m\A in institutions the sister of Crete.

the

same

dle.

And we are all the better for the digression, bewe have gone through various govern-

cause

ments and settlements, and have been present foundation of a first, second, and third state, succeeding one another in infinite time. And now there appears on the horizon a fourth state or nation which was once in process of settlement and has continued settled to this day.

at the

If,

out of

well or

all this,

ill

we

settled,

are able to discern

what

and what laws are the

ii

I

•

Temenui w

phontes of]

m

edaemon.

\4

ily.

Ath.

made

as the

Messene,

ol

To

these kings

men

the

.ill

oath thai the) would

assist

ol th.it d.iy

them,

one subverted their kingdom. M( g. True. Ath. Bui an kingship be dest royed, any other form ol government ever *\>' ti by any but the rulers themselves? No u .1

(

In /.ens.

1

[ave

1

WC already

forgotten wh.it w.is

said a little while agi

—

Then

this subject

the longest day of the year

for the discussion. I

suppose that

2

Certainly.

we must

now

further confirm

;

discussion,

we

shall nut be

enquiring about an

empty theory, I684/ but about events which actually happened. The case was as follows: Three royal heroes made oath to three cities which were under a kingly government, and the cities to the kings, that both rulers and subjects should govern and be governed according to the laws which were common to all of them: the rulers promised that as time and the race went forward they would not make their rule more arbitrary; and the subjects said that, if the rulers observed these conditions, they would

—

this the fact?

Meg. Yes. Ath. And the three

some God. Stranger, would promise us that our new enquiry about legislation would be as good and full as the present, I would go a great way to hear such another, and would think that a day as long as this and we are was too short

not

never subvert or permit others to subvert those

If

now approaching

And may we

what was then mentioned For we have Come upon tacts which have brought us back to the same principle; so that, in resuming the

kingdoms; the kings were to assist kings and peoples when injured, and the peoples were to assist peoples and kings in like manner. Is not

vious discussion.

Meg.

thr

is

and what are the destruction of cities, and what changes would make a state happy. O Megillusand Cleinias.we may now begin again, unless we have some fault to find with the pre-

Ath.

legend

mtu

salva-

tion

Meg.

///;.

Ath.

mre. \th.

ai thr in\

Meg. No.

ol Sparta.

.

i

.if

rue.

I

during the !rn \e.us in wlmh the \ haeans were besieging Ilium, the- hornet ol the besiegers were railing into an evil plight. Their youth revolted; and when tin- soldiers returned to their own cities and Families, they \inl

ought

I

ided thru three il

daemon.

I

I

did not

llir

daemon and

r

.i>

I

r and thr re 11 \

us, the\ di\ \v

it

'

moment w Trii

ihtless

consider

states to

whom

these laws

were given, whether their kings or any others were the authors of them, had therefore the greatest security for the maintenance of their :

constitutions.

Meg. What security : Ath. That the other two states were always to come to the rescue against a rebellious third. Meg. True. Ath. Many persons sav that legislators ought

^.682.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

668 to

mass of the people is just as it one gymnastic masters or physi-

impose such laws

as the

will be ready to receive: but this

were

to

command

cians to treat or cure their pupils or patients in

an agreeable manner.

Meg. Exactly. Ath. Whereas the physician may often be too happy if he can restore health, and make the

body whole, without any very great

inflic-

tion of pain.

Meg. Certainly. Ath. There was sessed by the

men

also another

advantage pos-

of that day, which greatly

lightened the task of passing laws.

1

Meg. What advantage? Ath. The legislators of that day, when they equalized property, escaped the great accusation

which generally

arises in legislation,

if

a

person attempts to disturb the possession of land, or to abolish debts, because he sees that without this reform there can never be any real equality.

Now,

in general,

when

the legislator

attempts to make a new settlement of such matters, every one meets him with the cry, that

"he

is

—

not to disturb vested interests" declaris introducing

ing with imprecations that he

agrarian laws and cancelling of debts, until a man is at his wits' end; whereas no one could quarrel with the Dorians for distributing the land there was nothing to hinder them; and

—

as for debts, they

had none which were consid-

erable or of old standing.

Meg. Very

true.

Ath. But then,

my

good

friends,

why

did the

settlement and legislation of their country turn

out so badly?

[685] Meg. How do you mean; and why do you blame them? Ath. There were three kingdoms, and of these, two quickly corrupted their original constitution and laws, and the only one which remained was the Spartan. Meg. The question which you ask is not easily answered. Ath. And yet must be answered when we are enquiring about laws, this being our old man's sober game of play, whereby we beguile the way, as I was saying when we first set out on our journey.

2

Meg. Certainly; and we must this

find out

why

was.

What

laws are more worthy of our attention than those which have regulated such

Ath.

what settlements of or more famous? cities' or

'Cf.

v. 736.

2

Cf.

i.

states are greater

I know of none. Ath. Can we doubt that your ancestors intended these institutions not only for the protection ot Peloponnesus, but of all the Hellenes, in cave they WCTC attacked by the barbarian 1 For the inhabitants of the region about Ilium, when they pro\okcd by their insolence the Trojan war, relied upon the power of the Ai and the Empire of Ninus, which still existed and had a great prestige; the people of those da\s tearing the united Assyrian Empire just as we now tear the Great King. And the capture of Troy was a serious oiu them, because Troy was a portion of the Assyrian Empire. To meet the danger the single army was distributed between three cities by a fair dethe royal brothers, sons of Heracles vice, as it seemed, and a far better arrangement than the expedition against Troy. For, firstly, the people of that day had, as they thought, in the Heraclidae better leaders than the Pelopidae; in the next place, they considered that their army was superior in valour to that which went against Troy; for, although the latter conquered the Trojans, they were themselves conquered by the Heraclidae Achaeans by Dorians. May we not suppose that this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the constitutions of their

Meg.

—

—

states?

Meg. Quite

true.

[686] Ath. And would not men who had shared with one another many dangers, and were governed by a single race of royal brothers, and had taken the advice of oracles, and in particular of the Delphian Apollo, be likely to think that such states would be firmly and lastingly established?

Meg. Of course they would. Ath. Yet these institutions, of which such great expectations were entertained, seem to

have

rapidly vanished away: with the ex-

all

ception, as

them which

I

was

saying, of that small part of

existed in your land.

And

this third

never to this day ceased warring against the two others; whereas, if the original idea had been carried out, and they had agreed to be one, their power would have been invincible in war. Meg. No doubt. part has

Ath. But what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy? Here is a subject well worthy of consideration.

Meg.

Certainly, no one will ever find

more

striking instances of laws or governments be625.

ing the salvation or destruction of great and

— I.

.,

mc

than

\\cic

presented

\w S

/."':

l

.a

.1

hen now we •em to nave happil) ir.tl .nivl importani question* in

l:'-i

.

I

n

/.'/».

sa gr

Inrnd.

tli.it

.»

turn OUI alter

.ill

to be I

mistake,

and not aocording to nature, either in our own case or in any ottM l/eg. To what are you referring, and uh.it Jo \m\ mean? ••linking of mv own admiration of tlu- aforesaid Heracktd expedition, which w.is so noble, and might have had such woa> derful results tor the Hellenes,

it

only rightly

was iust laughing .it myself. Meg. Hut wen- you not right ami wise in speaking M you did. mu\ we in assenting to you? \:h. Perhaps; and yet I cannot help observing th.it any one who sees anything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling that

.

owner only knew how to use his great and noble |x>ssession, how happy would he be, and what great results would he achieve!" g. And would he not be justified? Reflect; in what point of view does this "It the

"•':.

appear

just: First, in reference to

the question in hand:

—

If

the then

command-

had known how to arrange their army properly, how would they have attained success? Would not this have been the way 2 They would have bound them all hrmly togetherand preserved them for ever, giving them freedom and dominion at pleasure, combined with the power of doing in the whole world, Hellenic and barbarian, whatever they and their deers

scendants desired.

What

other

aim would they

have had?

Meg. Very good. Ath. Suppose any one were

in the

same way

admiration at the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like, he would praise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all or the greater and chief part ot what he desires. Meg. He would. Ath. Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one common desire of all to express his

mankind? Meg. What

ih

is it?

l.l

And

///;.

r\ri\ tiinr

lu%

«»!

I

111

V.

h.i\

ing thii

life, in

tnd

d
:d roil

may

I

1

soul's dr-.nr.

.ill

things

HI

hii

t

1

rived

]

.

.

When

the son

is

young and

I

:

you me. in Ath. Yes; or when the

father, in the

of age or the heat of youth, having

right

and

justice,

•

no sense of

pra\s with tervour, under the

influence of feelings akin to those ot Theseus

when he

cursed the unfortunate HippolytUS,

do you imagine that the son, having a u right and justice, will join in his father's prayers?

Meg. I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or be in a hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at variance with his reason. Hut ever and every individual ought to pray and strive for

wisdom. [688

I remember, and you will remember, what said at first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view to wisdom; while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order all with a

Ath. Yes; and I

•

And

were four virtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of legislation; whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the leader of all the I mean wisdom and mind and opinion, rest having affection and desire in their train. And now the argument returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is full of danger, being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires. And if you would rather receive my words in earnest, I am willing that you should; and you will find, I suspect, as I have said already, that not cowardice war.

—

to this

I

replied that there

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

670

was the cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole design, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of the rulers or of their subjects; but their misfortunes were due to their general degeneracy, and especially to their ignorance of the most important human affairs. That was then, and is still, and always will be the case, as I will endeavour, if you will allow me, to make out and demonam able to you who are my strate as well as friends, in the course of the argument. compliments are Cle. Pray go on. Stranger; I

—

troublesome, but we will show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words, for we will give them our best attention; and that is

the

way

in

which

a

freeman best shows

his

approval or disapproval.

Meg. Excellent, Cleinias; let us do as you say. Cle. By all means, if Heaven wills. Go on. Ath. Well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought,

I

say that the greatest ignorance

was the ruin of the Dorian power, and that now, as then, ignorance is ruin. And if this be true, the legislator must endeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the

Cle. Yes,

and affirm

That

is

ly

now

the greatest ignorance.

consider I

what

is

should like to

real-

know

whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what I am about to say; for my opinion is

Cle.

What?

be good and noble, and loves and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil.

This disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst ignorance; and also the greatest, because affecting the great mass of

human

soul; for the principle

which

pleasure and pain in the individual

is

feels

like the

mass or populace in a state. And when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are her natural lords, that I call folly,

when the multitude refuses obey their rulers and the laws; or, again, in the individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather the reverse of good. All these cases I term the worst ignorance, whether in individuals or in states. You will understand, Stranger, that I am speaking of something which is very different from the ignorance of handicrafts-

just as in the state,

to

men.

who

does not

know

authority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant, even though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental dextents and the opposite are to be called wise, even although, in the words ot the proverb, they know neither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense, authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no har:

mony? There

is

none; but the noblest

ant:

harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason; whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house est of

and the very opposite of he

a saviour of the state:

wisdom. Let was saying, be laid down by us. Cle. Let it be so laid down. Ath. I suppose that there must be rulers and is

this,

utterly ignorant of political

then, as

I

subjects in states?

[690] Ath. And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in cities, whether : great or small: and similarly in families What are they, and how many in number? Is there not one claim of authority which is always just that of fathers and mothers and in general of

—

progenitors to rule over their offspring?

Ath. That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he nevertheless thinks to

the

that the citizen

Cle. Certainly.

evident.

[68g] Ath. Then

understand and agree.

us. then, in the first place declare

these things ought nc\er to have any kind of

utmost of his power. Cle.

my friend, we

Ath. Let

Cle.

There

is.

Ath. Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey r Cle. To be sure. Ath. And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters rule? Cle.

Of

course.

Ath. Fifthly,

if I

am

not mistaken, comes the

and the weaker be ruled? Cle. That is a rule not to be disobeyed. Ath. Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all creatures, and is according to

principle that the stronger shall rule,

nature, as the

Theban poet Pindar once

said;

and the greatest of all, is, that the wise should lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and yet, O thou most wise Pindar, as I should reply to and the

sixth principle,

him, this surely is not contrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law over willing subjects, and not a rule of compulsion. Cle.

Most

true.

\\v S

I

nr awarded

a sc\rnll\ kin.

is

and

b) lot,

deal

in

t*»ki n is

and

i ruler,

to

Eaili

whom

m

the lubja

and

Men

those

who

at

1

lightl)

.in

we

ia) playfull) to

any

undertake the making

l

tlu-

principles

iiuiiit.iinlu-.nl

must attend, And,

which

jrou

you

consider with un,

the kings o\ these our

Argos

how .unl

ot

seditions,

we

first,

to

will .iNk

.unl in whai re Measene violated

maxims, .unl ruined themselves .unl famous Hellenic power of the

Was h because they did not know wisely Hesiod spoke when he said that s half is often more than the whole? 1

u-ss. in

1

1

meaning was, that would lx* dangerous,and to he the sale and moderate course, then the modcrate or better was more than the immoderate or worse."

Ath. spirit to

than

true.

And may we he

more

fatal

when among

suppose

this

immoderate

when tound among kings is

that ignorance

will he a disorder especially prevalent

kings, because they lead a

among

proud and luxurious

life.

Ath. Is it not palpablethat the chief aimof the kings of that time was to get the better of the

and that they were not in harhad agreed to observe by word and oath? This want of harmony may have had the appearance of wisdom, but was really, as we assert, the greatest ignorance, and utterly overthrew the whole empire by dissonance and harsh discord. Clc. Yerv likely. Ath. Good; and what measures ought the established laws,

mony with

the principles which they

have then taken in order to avert ? Truly there is no great wisdom in knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil has happened; but to have foreseen the remedy at the time would have taken a much wiser head than ours. legislator to this

much

authority to 'he

1

to say, 111.111,

\.uis had joined the loldiers ol tndthii hands and netted the who) report, whethei well *»r ill founded, w.i% terri ill lellenes, and above .ill to the the Athenians, and thq dispatt bed embassies in .ill directions, hut no one was willing to come to their relief, with the exception oi tin a< edae tnonians; and they,eithei because the] w ere de tained b) the Messenian war, which was then on, i»r tor some other reason oJ whu h we .hc- not told, came day too late tor the battle or Marathon. After while, tlu- news arrived nt mighty preparations being made, and innumerable threats came From the king. Then, .is tunc went on, rumour reached us mat ).ir ins had died, and that his son. who was young and hot headed, 6*99 had come to tlu- throne and was persisting in his design. The Athenians were under the impression ih.it the whole expedition was directed against them, in consequence oi the battle oi Marathon; and hearthe bridge over the [ellespont, and the canal ot Athos, and the host ot ships, considering that there was no salvation tor them either by land or by sea, tor there was no one to help them, and remembering that in the first expe-

nor,

675

and a tthens thai

dition,

Ml

was the

that higher

which they had acquired by obedience to and which I have several

w ho have inhei ited tlu- irtu< ma) prop ol the ai da) \nd would with sou .in.: sidei w bethel m) wordi have not \

I

lation;

U

i«>i

the pleasure

ir

I

am

into

all

i.m\

:

freedom.

tor

pre\ ions

ir

thi

lark thai the

certain tense, the same;

people into UttCI

1

noi

talking, but

- \onng and have a good memory; let him Ik; qui learning, and oi i courageous and noble nai let him have thai quality which, at 1 lid before,

is

the inseparable

other paits

good

in

ol

\

irtue, /

m

companion

JioJ

it

there

is

all

the

to be

any

them."

suppose, Mcgillus, that this companion virtue of which the Stranger speaks, must be Cle.

I

temperance?

temperance in the vulgar which in the forced and exaggerated language ol some philosophers is called prudence, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, of whom some live continently and others incontinently, but when isolated, was as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods. 1 think that you must understand my meaning. .Ith. Yes, Cleinias,

sense; not that

1

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities, if the state is to acquire in the best manner and in the shortest time the form of government which is most conducive to happiness; for there neither is nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a polity than by a tyranny. Cle. By what possible arguments. Stranger, can any man persuade himself of such a monstrous doctrine? Ath. There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, what is in accordance with the order of nature? Cle. You would assume, as you say. a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning,

having a good memory, courageous, of

a noble

nature? Ath. Yes; and you must add fortunate; and

true.

Ath. In each case the

Cle.

believe thai

1

What

would thru only

but u the

thin.

Clc.

fortune, hr

"wh.it are the conditions which you rcquii

s.mic principle applies equally to

-:.

(

tin

it

thru spo

o

be to the purpose, there can be no barm.

I

l>\

milv. tad ill the

I

Clc

something deptfeaatory

this

'

lends im>:

mankind than

oi

;n\ ipeculationi

the-

Were granted

tioned,

10,

M

rightl) !

pi.i\

hand, the conflux might !>e

l

our

marvellously tyrannical; and some times n appears to me to be oi .ill cities the mosi

Ephors

and who can reasonably deny

We

thai

monar< bi which is held for life, and issaid byall mankind, and imt b) ourselves only, to be the most an cient oi .ill monarchies; and, therefore, when asked on Midden, cannot precisely say which Eorm oi government the Spartan is. am in the same difficulty, Megillus; lor Jo not feel confident that the polity of Cnosus it

.m arista rac)

is

.1

have also

a

I

I

I

is

.m\

you

The

reason

have

re.ill\

we were

is,

my

polities,

excellent friends, that

but the states of which are merely aggre-

now speaking men dwelling in

just

gations of

cities

who

are the

and servants of a part of their own state, lyi^l and each of them is named after the dominant power; they are not polities at all. But it states are to be named atter their rulers, the true state ought to be called by the name of the God who rules over wise men. subjects

And who is this God? May still make use of fable to some exin the hope that I may be better able to

Cle.

Ath. tent,

I

answer your question: Cle. By all means.

shall I?

Ath. In the primeval world, and a long while came into being whose settlements we have described, there is said to have been in the time of Cronos a blessed rule and

before the cities

life, is

which the best-ordered of existing

of

a copy. Cle.

It

ed OVCTUS

tin-

,t God; wisr iii.indiHii think,

I

in Ik-

QO dOttbt

«>l


.n k

m them

em it)

ol their

the e xt r

long he OUghl lif.ri to to have uttered, .m unl>e< omui;' word

\n,

Utter, ol

to

111

thirdly, in Ins soul, in return

stowed upon him

tli.it.

rhen wh.it liir is agreeable to rod, and becoming in nil Eoilowera One only, expressed iim

s

I

.ill

\\\;

[iff

them; for of light and

fleeting

words the pen-

most severe; Nemesis, the mesi justice, is appointed to wan h over -ill matters. When the) are angry and want to at istv their feelings Ml word or drril, he should give Way to them; tor a t.ithrr who thinks th.it he has been wronged bv his son m.iv In- reaSOfl ably expected to be very angry At their death,

alty

is

.

the most moderate funeral

is

best, neithei

Ceeding the customary expense, nor yet tailing short ot the honour which has been usually shown by the former generation to their parents. And let a man not torget to pay the yearly tribute ot respect to the dead,

honouring them

by omitting nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance of them, IjiHj and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead. Doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our reward from the Gods and those who are above us i.e., the demons ]; and we shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. And how a man ought to order what relates to his descendants and his kindred chiefly

[

and the rites of Heaven, and the intercourse which arises out of all these duties, with a view to the embellishment and orderly regu-

and friends and

fellow-citizens,

hospitality taught by

lation of his

own

life

—these things,

I

say, the

we

proceed with them, will accomplish, partly persuading, and partly when natures do not yield to the persuasion of custom, chastising them by might and right, and will thus render our state, if the Gods co-operate with us, prosperous and happy. But of what has to be

laws,as

said,

of

and must be

my way

said

by the legislator

of thinking,

and

yet,

if

who

is

said in the

—

form of law, would be out of place of this I think that he may give a sample for the instruction of himself and of those for whom he is legislating; and then when, as far as he is able, he has gone through all the preliminaries, he proceed to the work of legislation. Now, : will be the form of such prefaces. There may be a difficulty in including or describing them all under a single form, but I think that we may get some notion of them if we can guarantee one thing.

may

what

Cle.

What

is

that?

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

684

done in the way of conciliand is always worth having. no great inclination or readiness on

Take an example from been saying/ Of three kinds of funerals, there is one which is too extravagant, another is too niggardly, the third is a mean; and you choose and approve and order the last without qualification. But if I had an extremely rich wife, and she bade me bury her and describe her burial in a poem, I should praise the extravagant sort; and a poor miserly man, who had not much money to spend, would approve of the niggardly; and the man of moderate means, who was himself moderate, would

mankind to be made as good, or as quickly good, as possible. The case of the many proves the wisdom of Hesiod, who says that the road to wickedness is smooth and can be travelled without perspiring, because it is so very short:

moderate funeral. Now you in the camust not barely say "a moderate funeral," but you must define what moderation is, and how much; unless you are definite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language that can become law.

Ath. I should wish thecitizens to be as readily persuaded to virtue as possible; this will surely be the aim of the legislator in Cle. Certainly.

The

Ath.

all

his laws.

proposal appears to

me

to be of

some value; and think that a person will listen with more gentleness and good-will to the precepts addressed to him by the legislator, when I

his soul

is

not altogether unprepared to receive

them. Even a

little

ation gains his ear,

For there

is

the part of

thing, but one only.

what you have

just

praise a

pacity of legislator

Cle. Certainly not.

But before virtue the immortal Gods have placed the sweat of labour, and long and steep is the way thither, [jig] and rugged at first; but when you have reached the top, although difficult before, it is then easy. Cle. Yes; and he certainly speaks well. Ath. Very true: and now let me tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had

upon me. Cle. Proceed. Ath. Suppose that we have a little conversation with the legislator, and say to him "O,

—

legislator, speak;

to say

if

you know what we ought

and do, you can surely

tell."

Of

course he can. we not hear you just now saying, 1 that the legislator ought not to allow the poets Cle.

Ath. "Did

And

our legislator to have no preface Do this, avoid and then holding the penalty in terrorem, that to go on to another law; offering never a word of advice or exhortation to those for whom he Ath.

is

to his laws, but to say at once

—

is

legislating,

[720]

after the

doctors? For of doctors, as

I

manner

of

may remind

some you,

some have a gentler, others a ruder method of cure; and as children ask the doctor to be gentle with them, so we will ask the legislator to cure our disorders with the gentlest remedies. What I

mean

to say

that besides doctors there are

is,

doctors' servants,

who

are also styled doctors.

Cle.

Very

Ath.

And whether they are

makes no

true.

slaves or

freemen

difference; they acquire their knowl-

edge of medicine by obeying and observing

do what they liked? For that they would not know in which of their words they went against

their masters; empirically

the laws, to the hurt of the state."

freemen is, who have learned scientifically themselves the art which they impart scientifically to their pupils. You are aware that there are

to

Cle.

That

is

true.

Ath. May we not fairly make answer to him on behalf of the poets? Cle. What answer shall we make to him? Ath. That the poet, according to the tradition which has ever prevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on the tripod of the muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he allows to flow out freely whatever comes in, and his art being imitative, he is often compelled to represent men of opposite dispositions, and thus to contradict himself; neither can he tell whether there is more truth in one thing that he has said than in another. But this is not the case in a law; the legislator must give not two rules about the same 1

Cf.

the natural

these

656,

fl.

and not according

to

manner

of

of learning, as the

classes of doctors?

To be sure. Ath. And did you Cle.

two classes of men; and the

ever observe that there are

patients in states, slaves slave doctors run about

the slaves, or wait for

—practitioners of

them

and freeand cure

in the dispensaries

never talk to their patients individually, or let them talk about their own individual complaints? The slavedoctor prescribes what mere experience suggests, as if he had exact knowledge; and when he has given his orders, like a tyrant, he rushes of! with equal assurance to some other servant who is ill; and so he relieves the master of the 2

ii.

two

way

Cf. 7 i 7

.

this sort

LAWS But the other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and practises upon freemen; and he carries his enquiries far back, and goes into the nature of the disorder; he enters into discourse with the patient and with his friends, and is at once getting information from the sick man, and also instructing him as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe forhimuntil he has first convinced him; at last, when he has brought the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the road to health, he attempts to effect a cure. Now which is the better way of proceeding in a physician and in a trainer? Is he the better who accomplishes his ends in a double way, or he who works in one way, and house of the care of his invalid slaves.

and

that the ruder Cle.

way

is

I

inferior?

should say, Stranger, that the double

far better.

Ath. Should you like to see an example of the double

and

single

Cle. Certainly

[j2i] Ath.

I

method

in legislation?

should.

What

will be our first

law? Will

not the legislator, observing the order of nature, begin by making regulations for states about

IV

be

Very true. Ath. And, according

fine;

but he

who

when he

is

has

amount, in order that not imagine his celibacy to bring ease and profit to him; and he shall not share in the honours which the young men in the state give to the aged. Comparing now the two forms of the law, you will be able to arrive at a judgment about any other laws whether they should be double in length even when shortest, because they have to persuade as well as threaten, or whether they shall only threaten and be of half the length.

may

—

Meg. The shorter form, Stranger, would be more in accordance with Lacedaemonian custom; although, for my own part, if any one were to ask me which I myself prefer in the state, I should certainly determine in favour of the longer; [722] and I would have every law made after the same pattern, if I had to choose. But I think that Cleinias is the person to be consulted, for his is the state which is going to use these laws.

Thank

—

would run thus:

—A man

the ages of thirty

manner

and

the

shall

marry between

thirty-five,

human

considering

race naturally par-

which every man is by nature inclined to desire to the utmost; for the desire of every man that he may become famous, and not lie in the grave without a name, is only the love of continuance. Now mankind takes of immortality,

all

time,

be

many

you, Megillus.

or few,

best form,

and are ever following, and so

will ever follow, the course of time;

they are immortal, because they leave children's children behind them, and partake of immor-

unity of generation.

And for a man

voluntarily to deprive himself of this gift, as he deliberately does who will not have a wife or

the

is

a

v^ery foolish

and not the

proved; nor

to the true order, the laws relating to marriage should be those which are first determined in every state? Cle. Quite so. Ath. Then let me first give the law of marriage in a simple form; it may run as follows: A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, or, if he does not, he shall pay such and such a fine, or shall suffer the loss of such and such privileges. This would be the simple law about marriage. The double law

tality in the

pay no

shall

Ath. Whether, in the abstract, words are to

Cle.

are coeval with

and

yearly fine of a certain

he

Cle.

that in a

impiety. He who obeys the law shall

arrived at the age of thirty-five, shall pay a

He will.

Ath. In all states the birth of children goes back to the connection of marriage?

and

free,

is

disobedient, and does not marry,

births? Cle.

685

children,

is

length at

question; the

is to be apbe regarded. Of

shortest, all to

two forms of law which have been recited, is not only twice as good in practical

the one

usefulness as the other, but the case

of the

two kinds

of doctors,

which

is

I

like that

was

just

mentioning. And yet legislators never appear to have considered that they have two instruments which they might use in legislation persuasion and force; for in dealing with the rude and uneducated multitude, they use the one only as far as they can; they do not mingle persuasion with coercion, but employ force pure and simple. Moreover, there is a third point, sweet friends, which ought to be, and never is, regarded in our existing laws.

now

—

Cle.

Ath.

What

is it?

A point arising out of our previous dis-

cussion,

which comes

into

my mind

in

some

mysterious way. All this time, from early dawn until noon, have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat: now we are going to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only the prelude of them. Why do I menBecause all distion this? For this reason: courses and vocal exercises have preludes and overtures, which are a sort of artistic beginnings intended to help the strain which is to be per-

—

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

686

formed;

ond and

er kind

the principles which

lyric measures and music of every othhave preludes framed with wonderiul care. But of the truer and higher strain of law and politics, no one has ever yet uttered any

composed or published any, as though there was no such thing in nature. Whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there is; these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not exactly double, but they are in two parts, [723] the law and the prelude of the law. The arbitrary command, which was compared to the commands of doctors, whom we described as of the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple; and that which preceded, and was described by our prelude, or

—

friend here as being hortatory only, was,

al-

though in fact, an exhortation, likewise analogous to the preamble of a discourse. For I imagine that all this language of conciliation, which the legislator has been uttering in the preface of the law, was intended to create good1

better beginning,

if

you

we have been

please,

laying

with

down,

which we never thought of regarding as a preamble before, but of which we may now make a preamble, and not merely consider them to be chance topics of discourse. Let us acknowledge, then, that we have a preamble. About the honour of the Gods and the respect of parents, enough has been already said; and we may proceed to the topics which follow next in order, until the preamble is deemed by you to be complete; and after that you shall go through the laws themselves. [724] Ath. I understand you to mean that we have made a sufficient preamble about Gods and demi-gods, and about parents living or dead; and now you would have us bring the rest of the subject into the light of day? Cle. Exactly.

Ath. After of us

all, I

this, as is

meet and

for the interest

the speaker, and you the listeners,

whom he addressed, in order that, by reason of this good-will, he might

will try to estimate all that relates to the souls

command, that is to say, the law. And therefore, in my way of speaking, this is more rightly described as the

gards both their occupations and amusements, and thus arrive, as far as in us lies, at the nature of education. These then are the topics which follow next in order. Cle. Very good.

will in the person

more

intelligently receive his

preamble than

as the matter of the law.

And

I

must further proceed to observe, that to all his laws, and to each separately, the legislator should prefix a preamble; he should remember

how

will certainly legislate in the

form which you

advise.

Ath. ias, in

I

think that you are quite right, Cleinall laws have preambles,

affirming that

and that throughout the whole of this work of legislation every single law should have a suitable preamble at the beginning; for that which is to follow is most important, and it makes all the difference whether we clearly remember the preambles or not. Yet we should be wrong in requiring that all laws, small and great alike, should have preambles of the same kind, any more than all songs or speeches; although they be natural to

all,

they are not always neces-

and whether they are

to be employed or not has in each case to be left to the judgment of the speaker or the musician, or, in the present instance, of the lawgiver. Cle. That I think is most true. And now, Stranger, without delay let us return to the argument, and, as people say in play, make a secsary,

1

Cf. 718.

of the citizens, as re-

BOOK V

great will be the difference between them,

according as they have, or have not, such preambles, as in the case already given. Cle. The lawgiver, if he asks my opinion,

may

and bodies and properties

[726] Athenian Stranger. Listen, all ye who have just now heard the laws about Gods, and about our dear forefathers: Of all the things which a man has, next to the Gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own. Now in every man there are two parts: the better and superior, which rules, and the worse and inferior, which serves; [727] and the ruling part of him is always to be preferred to the subject. Wherefore I am right in bidding every one next to the Gods, who are our masters, and

—

those

who

in

order follow them

[i.e.,

the de-

mons], to honour his own soul, which every one seems to honour, but no one honours as he ought; for honour is a divine good, and no evil thing is honourable; and he who thinks that he can honour the soul by word or gift, or any sort of compliance, without making her in any way better, seems to honour her, but honours her not at all. For example, every man, from his very boyhood, fancies that he is able to know everything, and thinks that he honours his soul by praising her, and he is very ready to let her do whatever she may like. But I mean to say that in acting thus he injures his soul, and is

LAWS V from honouring her; whereas, in our opinhe ought to honour her as second only to the Gods. Again, when a man thinks that others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which he has committed from time to time, and the many and great evils which befell him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be exempt and innocent, he is under the idea that he is honouring his soul; whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is really injuring her. And when, disregarding the word and approval of the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again he is far from honouring her; he only dishonours her, and fills her full of evil and remorse; or when he does not endure to the end the labours and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator approves, but gives way before them, then, by yielding, he does not honour the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be dishonourable; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, does he honour her, but yet once more he dishonours her; for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil, he yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her that, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods befar

ion,

low, instead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods. Again, when any one prefers beau-

what is this but the real and utter dishonour of the soul? For such a preference implies that the body is more honourable than the soul; and this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more honourable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise of the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful possession; [J28] nor, again, when a person is willing, or not unwilling, to acquire dishonest gains, does he then honour his soul with gifts far otherwise; he sells her glory and honour for a small piece of gold; but all the gold which is under or upon the earth is not enough to give in exchange for virtue. In a word, I may say that he who does not estimate the base and evil, the good and noble, according to the standard of the legislator, and abstain in every possible way from the one and practise the other to the utmost of his power, does not know that in all these respects he is most foully and disgracefully abusing his ty to virtue,

—

soul,

which

one, as

I

is

may

the divinest part of

man; for no which is

say, ever considers that

declared to be the greatest penalty of evil-doing

— namely, to grow into the likeness of bad men, and growing

them to fly from the converand be cut off from them, and follow after the company of

like

sation of the good,

and cleave

to

687

And he who is joined to them must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another a suffering which is not justice but retribution; for justice and the just are noble, whereas retribution is the suffering which waits upon injustice; and whether a man escape or endure this, he is miserable in the former case, because he is not cured; while in the bad.

—

—

the latter, he perishes in order that the rest of

mankind may be

saved.

Speaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and improve the inferior, which is susceptible of improvement, as far as this is possible.

And

of

all

human

possessions, the soul

is

by nature most inclined to avoid the evil, and track out and find the chief good; which when a man has found, he should take up his abode with it during the remainder of his life. Wherefore the soul also is second [or next to God] in honour; and third, as every one will perceive, comes the honour of the body in natural order. Having determined this, we have next to conis a natural honour of the body, honours some are true and some are

sider that there

and that

of

counterfeit.

To

decide which are which

business of the legislator; and he,

would intimate

I

is

the

suspect,

—

that they are as follows: Honnot to be given to the fair body, or to the strong or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy body (although many may think otherwise), any more than to their opposites; but the mean

our

is

states of all these habits are by far the safest and most moderate; for the one extreme makes the soul braggart and insolent, and the other, illiberal and base; and money, and property, and distinction all go to the same tune. The excess of any of these things is apt to be a source of hatreds and divisions [72g] among states and individuals; and the defect of them is commonly a cause of slavery. And, therefore, I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. The condition of youth which is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of the necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, bequeath to their children not a heap of

We, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present style of admonition, riches, but the spirit of reverence.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

688

which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears one of themselves doing or saying anything disgraceful; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence.

The

best

way

of

young is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but to be

training the

always carrying out your

He who

own

admonitions

in

and reveres those who share in the same Gods and are of the same blood and family, may fairly practice.

honours

his kindred,

expect that the Gods who preside over generation will be propitious to him, and will quicken

he who deems the services which and acquaintances do for him, greater and more important than they themselves deem them, and his own favours to them less his seed.

And

his friends

than theirs to him, will have their good-will in the intercourse of tions to the state

life.

and

And

surely in his rela-

his fellow-citizens, he

is

by far the best, who rather than the Olympic or any other victory of peace or war, desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country, and who, of all mankind, is the person reputed to have obeyed them best through life. In his relations to strangers, a man should con-

most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of God, than wrongs done to citizens; for the stranger, having no kindred and friends, is more to be pitied by Godsand men. Wherefore, also, he who is most able to avenge him is most zealous in his cause; and he who is most able is the genius and the god of the stranger, [j^o] who follow in the train of Zeus, the god of sider that a contract

is

a

And for this reason, he who has a spark of caution in him, will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stran-

strangers.

ger. And of offences

committed, whether against

strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against

suppliants

is

the greatest. For the God

who

wit-

made with the supspecial manner the guard-

nessed to the agreement pliant,

becomes

in a

and he will certainly not unavenged. Thus we have fairly described the manner in which a man is to act about his parents, and himself, and his own affairs; and in relation to the state, and his friends, and kindred, both in what concerns his own countrymen, and in ian of the sufferer;

suffer

what concerns the stranger. We will now consider what manner of man he must be who

would best pass through life in respect of those other things which are not matters of law, but and blame only; in which praise and blame educate a man, and make him more tractable and amenable to the laws which are about

of praise

to be

imposed.

Truth

is the beginning of every good thing, both to Gods and men; and he who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condition is enviable, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on the wane:

so that, whether his children or friends are alive

—

is equally solitary. Worthy of honour is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honour, if he not only does no injustice himself, but hinders others from doin^ any; the first may count as one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs the

or not, he

rulers of the injustice of others.

And

yet

more

highly to be esteemed is he who co-operates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as

he can

—he

shall be

perfect citizen,

The same

proclaimed the great and

and bear away the palm of

may

vir-

be given about temperance and wisdom, and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a man for himself; he who imparts them shall be honoured as the man of men, and he who is willing, [731] yet is not able, may be allowed the second place; but he who is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame: the good, however, which he has, is not to be undervalued by us because it is possessed by him, but must be acquired by us also to the utmost of our power. Let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be no envy. For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states he himself contends in the race, blasting the fair fame of no man; but the envious, who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. And so he makes the whole city to enter the arena untrained in the practice of virtue, and diminishes her glory as far as in him lies. Now every man should be valiant, but he should also be gende. From the tue.

praise

—

LAWS V cruel, or hardly curable, or altogether incurable

done

acts of injustice

to

him by

man

others, a

can only escape by fighting and defending himself and conquering, and by never ceasing to punish them; and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish this. As to the ac-

who do

tions of those

evil,

but whose

curable, in the first place, let us

man is not unjust For no man of his own

evil is

remember

that

own

free

the unjust

of his

will.

free will

would and least

choose to possess the greatest of evils, all in the most honourable part of himself.

of

And

we said, is of a truth deemed the most honourable. In the soul, then, which is the most honourable part of him, no one, if he could help, would admit, or allow

by

the soul, as

all

men

1

continue the greatest of evils. The unrighteous and vicious are always to be pitied in any case; and one can afford to forgive as well as to

pity

him who

curable,

is

and refrain and calm

one's anger, not getting into a passion, like a

woman, and nursing

who evil,

ill-feeling.

But upon him

incapable of reformation and wholly the vials of our wrath should be poured is

out; wherefore

good men ought, when be both gentle and pas-

say that

I

occasion demands, to sionate.

Of

all evils

souls of

the greatest

most men

is

innate,

is

one which in the

and which a

man

always excusing in himself and never correcting; I mean, what is expressed in the saying that "Every man by nature is and ought to be is

his

own

friend."

self is in reality

Whereas the

excessive love of

the source to each

offences; for the lover

is

loved, so that he judges

man

of

all

blinded about the be-

wrongly of the

just,

[732] the good, and the honourable, and thinks that he ought always to prefer himself to the truth. But he who would be a great man ought to regard, not himself or his interests, but what is just, whether the just act be his own or that of another.

Through

a similar error

induced to fancy that their

own

men

are

ignorance

wisdom, and thus we who may be truly

is

said to

know

nothing, think that we know all things; and because we will not let others act for us in

what we do not know, we are compelled to act amiss ourselves. Wherefore let every man avoid excess of self-love, and condescend to follow a better man than himself, not allowing any false shame to stand in the way. There are also minor precepts which are often repeated, and are quite as useful; a

man should

recollect

them

and remind himself of them. For when a stream is

flowing out, there should be water flowing 1

Cf. Republic,

ii.

382.

689

in too; is

and

recollection flows in while

departing. Therefore

refrain

from excess

and should exhort

I

say that a

wisdom

man

should

either of laughter or tears,

neighbour to do the immoderate sorrow or joy, and seek to behave with propriety, whether the genius of his good fortune remains with him, or whether at the crisis of his fate, when he seems to be mounting high and steep places, the Gods oppose him in some of his enterprises. Still he may ever hope, in the case of good men, that whatever afflictions are to befall them in the future God will lessen, and that present evils he will change for the better; and as to the goods which are the opposite of these evils, he will not doubt that they will be added to them, and that they will be fortunate. Such should be men's hopes, and such should be the exhortations with which they admonish one another, never losing an opportunity, but on every occasion distinctly reminding themselves and others of all these things, both in jest and same; he should

his

veil his

earnest.

Enough has now been said of divine matters, both as touching the practices which men ought to follow, and as to the sort of persons who they ought severally to be. But of human things we have not as yet spoken, and we must; for to men we are discoursing and not to Gods. Pleasures and pains and desires are a part of human nature, and on them every mortal being must of necessity hang and depend with the most eager interest. And therefore we must praise the noblest life, not only as the fairest in appearance, but as being one which, if a man will only taste, and not, while still in his youth, desert for another, [733] he will find to surpass also in the very thing which we all of us desire

—

I

mean

ure and

And

in

having a greater amount of pleaspain during the whole of life.

less of

this will

be plain,

if

a

man

has a true taste

and clearly seen. But what is a true taste ? That we have to learn from the argument the point being what is according to nature, and what is not according to nature. One life must be compared with another, the more pleasurable with the more painful, after this manner: We desire to have of them, as will be quickly

—

—

we neither desire nor choose pain; and the neutral state we are ready to take in exchange, not for pleasure but for pain; and we pleasure, but

pain and greater pleasure, but we do not wish for; and an equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert that we should desire. And all these differ or do not differ severally in number also

wish for

less

pleasure and greater pain

less

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

690

and magnitude and

intensity

in the opposites of these

and equality, and

when regarded

jects of choice, in relation to desire.

as ob-

And

being the necessary order of things,

such

we wish

which there are many great and and pain, and in which the pleasures are in excess, and do not wish for that in which the opposites exceed; nor, again, do we wish for that in which the elements of either are small and few and feeble, and the pains exceed. And when, as I said before, there is a balance of pleasure and pain for that

life in

intense elements of pleasure

is to be regarded by us as the balwhile other lives are preferred by us because they exceed in what we like, or are rejected by us because they exceed in what we dislike. All the lives of men may be regarded by us as bound up in these, and we must also consider what sort of lives we by nature desire.

in life, this

anced

And

life;

if

we wish

for any others,

I

say that

we

them only through some ignorance and inexperience of the lives which actually exist. Now, what lives are they, and how many in which, having searched out and beheld the objects of will and desire and their opposites. and making of them a law, choosing, I say, the dear and the pleasant and the best and noblest, a man may live in the happiest way possible? Let desire

us say that the temperate life is one kind of life, and the rational another, and the courageous another, and the healthful another; and to these four let us oppose four other lives the fool-

—

ish,

the cowardly, the intemperate, the diseased.

He who knows

the temperate

life will

describe

it as in all things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures, and placid desires and loves not insane; [J34] whereas the intemperate life is impetuous in all things, and has violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and stinging desires, and loves utterly insane; and

in the

temperate

life

the pleasures exceed the

pains, but in the intemperate life the pains ex-

ceed the pleasures in greatness and number and frequency. Hence one of the two lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other more painful, and he who would live pleasandy cannot possibly choose to live intemperately. And if this is true, the inference clearly is that no man is voluntarily intemperate; but that the whole multitude of men lack temperance in their lives, either from ignorance, or

from want of self-control, or both. And the same holds of the diseased and healthy life; they both have pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasure exceeds the pain, and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure.

Now

our inten-

tion in choosing the lives

is

not that the pain-

should exceed, but the life in which pain is exceeded by pleasure we have determined to be the more pleasant life. And we should say that the temperate life has the elements both 01 pleasure and pain fewer and smaller and less frequent than the intemperate, and the wise life than the foolish life, and the life of courage than the life of cowardice; one of each pair exceeding in pleasure and the other in pain, the courageous surpassing the cowardly, and the wise exceeding the foolish. And so the one class of lives exceeds the other class in pleasure; the temperate and courageous and wise and healthy exceed the cowardly and foolish and intemperful

and diseased lives; and generally speaking, which has any virtue, whether of body or soul, is pleasanter than the vicious life, and far superior in beauty and rectitude and excellence and reputation, and causes him who lives acate

that

cordingly to be infinitely happier than the opposite.

Enough of the preamble; and now the laws should follow; or, to speak more correctly, an oudine of them. As, then, in the case of a web or any other tissue, the warp and the woof cannot be made of the same materials, ["35] but the warp is necessarily superior as being stronger, and having a certain character of firmness, whereas the woof is softer and has a proper de1

gree of elasticity;

who

—

in a similar

manner

those

are to hold great offices in states, should be

distinguished truly in each case from those who have been but slenderly proven by education.

Let us suppose that there are two parts in the constitution of a state

—one the creation

fices,

the other the laws

them

to administer.

of of-

which are assigned

to

comes the following conshepherd or herdsman, or breeder of horses or the like, when he has received his animals will not begin to train them until he has first purified them in a manner which befits a community of animals; he will But, before

sideration:

all this,

— The

divide the healthy and unhealthy, and the good

breed and the bad breed, and will send away and badly bred to other herds, and tend the rest, reflecting that his labours will be vain and have no effect, either on the souls or bodies of those whom nature and ill nurture have corrupted, and that they will involve in destruction the pure and healthy nature and being of every other animal, if he should neglect to purify them. Now the case of other animals is not so important they are only worth 1 Cf Statesman, 309. the unhealthy

—

.

—

—

LAWS V for the sake of illustration; but

introducing

what

man

relates to

of the highest impor-

is

and the legislator should makeenquiries, and indicate what is proper for each one in the way of purification and of any other procedure. Take, for example, the purification of a city there are many kinds of purification, some easier and others more difficult; and some of them, and the best and most difficult of them, tance;

able to effect;

he be also a despot, may be but the legislator, who, not being

a despot, sets

up

the legislator,

even

if

a

new government and

laws,

he attempt the mildest of purgations, may think himself happy if he can complete his work. The best kind of purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving righteous punishment and inflicting death or exile if

For

in the last resort.

in this

dispose of great sinners

who

way we commonly are incurable,

are the greatest injury of the

form

the milder

whole

of purification

is

state.

and But

as follows:

when men who have

nothing, and are in want of food, show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the rich these,

[736]

state, are sent

who

are the natural plague of the

away by

the legislator in a friend-

he is able; and this dismissal euphemistically termed a colony. And every legislator should contrive to do this at once. Our present case, however, is peculiar. ly spirit as far as

of

them

is

For there

no need to devise any colony or purifying separation under the circumstances in which we are placed. But as, when many streams flow together from many sources, whether springs or mountain torrents, into a single lake, we ought to attend and take care that the confluent waters should be perfectly clear, and in order to effect this, should pump and draw off and divert impurities, so in every political arrangement there may be trouble and danger. is

we

now

691

en by necessity to legislate upon such matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor yet venture to alter them. We must have recourse to prayers, so to speak, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously effected in a length of time. And such a change can be accomplished by those who have abundance of land,

and having

also

many

debtors, are will-

with those who and sometimes giving, holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to be the increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his property. For this is the great beginning of ing, in a kindly spirit, to share

are in want, sometimes remitting

salvation to a state,

and upon

this lasting basis

may

be erected afterwards whatever political order is suitable under the circumstances; but if the change be based upon an unsound principle, the future administration of the country will be full of difficulties. [737] That is a danger which, as I am saying, is escaped by us, and yet

we had better say how, if we had not escaped, we might have escaped; and we may venture now to assert that no other way of escape, whether narrow or broad, can be devised but freedom from avarice and a sense of justice upon this rock our city shall be built; for there ought to be no disputes among citizens about property. If there are quarrels of long standing

among them, no

legislator of any degree of sense will proceed a step in the arrangement of the state until they are settled. But that they to

whom God

has given, as he has to us, to be the founders of a new state as yet free from enmity that they should create themselves enmities by their mode of distributing lands and houses, would be superhuman folly and wickedness. How then can we righdy order the distribution of the land ? In the first place, the number of the citizens has to be determined, and also

—

acting, let our selection be supposed to

number and size of the divisions into which they will have to be formed; and the land and

be completed, and the desired purity attained.

the houses will then have to be apportioned by

But, seeing that

and not

Touching

evil

are

men, who want

citizens of our state, after

by every time,

we

the good

only discoursing

to join

we have

and be

tested

them

and for a sufficient them from coming; but

sort of persuasion

will prevent

we

the

us as fairly as

we

can.

The number

of citizens

can only be estimated satisfactorily in relation to the territory and the neighbouring states. The territory must be sufficient to maintain a

number of inhabitants in a moderate more than this is not required; and the number of citizens should be sufficient

utmost of our ability open arms. Another piece of good fortune must not be 1 forgotten, which, as we were saying, the Heraclid colony had, and which is also ours that we have escaped division of land and the aboli-

certain

tion of debts; for these are always a source of

bours when they are wronged. After having taken a survey of theirs and their neighbours' territory, we will determine the limits of them

will to the

receive as friends with

—

dangerous contention, and a 1 Cf iii. 684. .

city

which

is

driv-

way to

of life

—

defend themselves against the injustice of

their neighbours,

power

and

also to give

them

the

of rendering efficient aid to their neigh-

692

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

in fact as well as in theory.

And now,

let

us

proceed to legislate with a view to perfecting the form and outline of our state. The number this will be a of our citizens shall be 5040 convenient number; and these shall be owners of the land and protectors of the allotment. The houses and the land will be divided in the same way, so that every man may correspond to a lot. Let the whole number be first divided into two parts, and then into three; and the number is further capable of being divided into

—

number

four or five parts, or any to ten.

Every

legislator

ought

to

of parts

know

so

up

much

what number is [738] and we are going to take that number which contains the greatest and most regular and unbroken series of divisions. The whole of number has every possible division, and the number arithmetic as to be able to most likely to be useful to

tell

all cities;

5040 can be divided by exactly fifty-nine diviand ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten: this will furnish numbers for sors,

war and

peace,

and

ings, including taxes

all contracts and dealand divisions of the land.

for

These properties of number should be tained at leisure by those to

know them;

who

for they are

ascer-

bound by law true, and should are

be proclaimed at the foundation of the

city,

with a view to use. Whether the legislator is establishing a new state or restoring an old and decayed one, in respect of Gods and temples the temples which are to be built in each city, and the Gods or demi-gods after whom they are to be called

—

if

oracle of Delphi, or

man of sense, he anything which the

he be a

make no change

will

in

Dodona, or the God

Am-

nion, or any ancient tradition has sanctioned in

whatever manner, whether by apparitions or reputed inspiration of Heaven, in obedience to which mankind have established sacrifices in connection with mystic rites, either originating on the spot, or derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus or some other place, and on the strength of which traditions they have consecrated oracles and images, and altars and temples, and portioned out a sacred domain for each of them. The least part of all these ought not to be disturbed by the legislator; but he should assign to the several districts some God, or demi-god, should give to these

and

all

their chosen

domain

things fitting, that the inhabitants of

the several districts

and

first

soil,

that they

may

may meet

at fixed times,

readily supply their various

wants, and entertain one another with sacriand become friends and acquaintances;

fices,

is

in a state

known

to

and then leave the selection to the settlement. Following this method ent instance,

let

ruler of the in the pres-

us speak of the states which arc

first, second, and third in exceland then we will leave the choice to Cleinias now, or to any one else who may here-

respectively lence,

after

have

to

make

a similar choice

among con-

and may desire to give to his state some feature which is congenial to him and which he approves in his own country. The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that "Friends have all things in common." Whether there is anywhere now, or will ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and whatever laws there are unite the city to the whether all this is possible or not, I utmost say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which will be stitutions,

!

or hero, and, in the distribution of the

no greater good

than that one another. When not light but darkness and ignorance of each other's characters prevails among them, no one will receive the honour of which he is deserving, or the power or the justice to which he is fairly entided: wherefore, in every state, above all things, every man should take heed that he have no deceit in him. but that he be always true and simple; and that no deceitful person take any advantage of him. 1 7 39] The next move in our pastime of legislation, like the withdrawal of the stone from the holy line in the game of draughts, being an unusual one. will probably excite wonder when mentioned for the first time. And yet, if a man will only reflect and weigh the matter with care, he will see that our city is ordered in a manner which, if not the best, is the second best. Perhaps also some one may not approve this form, because he thinks that such a constitution is ill adapted to a legislator who has not despotic power. The truth is, that there are three forms of government, the best, the second and the third best, which we may just mention, for there

the citizens should be

—

truer or better or

more

exalted in virtue. Wheth-

governed by Gods or sons of Gods, one, or more than one, happy are the er such a state 1

is

Cf. Republic, v. 462,

ff.

LAWS V men who, living after tnis manner, dwell there; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and to seek with all our might for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when

created, will be nearest to immortality

and the only one which takes the second place; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second. Let the citizens

at

once distribute their land

and houses, and not till the land in common, [740] since a community of goods goes beyond their proposed origin, and nurture, and education. But in making the distribution, let the several possessors feel that their particular lots also belong to the whole city; and seeing that the earth

more

is

their parent, let

carefully than children

For she

is

a goddess

and

are her mortal subjects.

do

them tend her their mother.

their queen,

Such

and they

also are the feel-

ings which they ought to entertain to the Gods and demi-gods of the country. And in order that the distribution

ought

may

always remain, they

to consider further that the present

num-

ber of families should be always retained, neither increased nor diminished. This

and

may

be

secured for the whole city in the following manner: Let the possessor of a lot leave the one of his children who is his best beloved, and

—

one only,

to be the heir of his dwelling,

and

his

successor in the duty of ministering to the Gods, the state

and the family,

members

of

it

as those

who

as well

the living

are departed

when

he comes into the inheritance; but of his other children, if he have more than one, he shall give the females in marriage according to the 1 law to be hereafter enacted, and the males he shall distribute as sons to those citizens

who

have no children, and are disposed to receive them; or if there should be none such, and particular individuals have too many children, male or female, or too few, as in the case of bar-

—

renness in all these cases let the highest and most honourable magistracy created by us judge and determine what is to be done with the redundant or deficient, and devise a means that the number of 5040 houses shall always remain the same. There are many ways of regulating numbers; for they in whom generation is afflu2 ent may be made to refrain, and, on the other

hand, special care

number

we may meet 1

2

Cf.

may

be taken to increase the

of births by rewards

xi.

and stigmas, or

the evil by the elder

men

giving

923-926.

Cf. Aristotle, Politics, vii. 16, 1335

b

20-27.

693

advice and administering rebuke to the younger

—

if

in this

after

all

way

may

the object

be attained. And

there be very great difficulty about

the equal preservation of the 5040 houses, and there be an excess of citizens, owing to the too

great love of those

who

live together,

are at our wits' end, there

is still

and we

the old device

often mentioned by us of sending out a colony,

which will part friends with us, and be composed of suitable persons. [741] If, on the other hand, there come a wave bearing a deluge of disease, or a plague of war, and the inhabitants become much fewer than the appointed number by reason of bereavement, we ought not to introduce citizens of spurious birth and education, if this can be avoided; but even God is said not to be able to fight against necessity. Wherefore let us suppose this "high argument" of ours to address us in the following terms: Best of men, cease not to honour according to nature similarity and equality and sameness and agreement, as regards number and every good and noble quality. And, above all, observe the aforesaid number 5040 throughout life; in the second place, do not disparage the small and modest proportions of the inheri-

—

which you received in the distribution, by buying and selling them to one another. For then neither will the God who gave you the lot be your friend, nor will the legislator; and indeed the law declares to the disobedient that these are the terms upon which he may or may tances

not take the

he

is

lot.

informed

is

In the first place, the earth as sacred to the Gods; and in the

next place, priests and priestesses will offer up prayers over a first, and second, and even a third sacrifice, that he who buys or sells the houses or lands which he has received, may suffer the punishment which he deserves; and these their prayers they shall write down in the temples, on tablets of cypress-wood, for the instruction of posterity. Moreover they will set a watch over all these things, that they may be observed; the magistracy which has the sharpest eyes shall keep watch that any infringement of these commands may be discovered and punished as offences both against the law and the God. How great is the benefit of such an ordinance to all those cities, which obey and are administered accordingly, no bad man can ever know, as the old proverb says; but only a man of experience and good habits. For in such an order of things there will not be much opportunity for making money; no man either ought, or indeed will be allowed, to exercise any ignoble occupation, of which the vulgarity is a mat-

—

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

694 ter of

want

reproach to a freeman, and should never by any such means.

to acquire riches

[742] Further, the law enjoins that no vate

man

shall be

pri-

allowed to possess gold and

but only coin for daily use, which is almost necessary in dealing with artisans, and for payment of hirelings, whether slaves or imsilver,

migrants, by

those persons

all

who

require the

use of them. Wherefore our citizens, as

we

say,

should have a coin passing current among themselves, but not accepted among the rest of mankind; with a view, however, to expeditions and journeys to other lands for embassies, or

—

any other occasion which may arise of sending out a herald, the state must also possess a common Hellenic currency. If a private person is ever obliged to go abroad, let him have the consent of the magistrates and go; and if when he returns he has any foreign money remaining, let him give the surplus back to the treasfor

ury,

and receive

a corresponding

sum

in the

And if he is discovered to approbe confiscated, and let him who knows and does not inform be subject to curse and dishonour equally with him who brought the money, and also to a fine not less in amount than the foreign money which has been brought local currency.

priate

it,

let

it

mean by

"the rich" the few who have the most valuable possessions, although the owner of them may quite well be a rogue. And if this is

can never assent to the doctrine that the will be happy he must be good as well as rich. And good in a high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time, he cannot be. Some one will ask, why not' And we shall answer Because acquisitions which come true,

I

—

man

rich

—

from sources which are ferently, are

just

and unjust

more than double

indif-

those which

come from

just sources only; and the sums which are expended neither honourably nor

disgracefully, are only half as great as those

which

are expended honourably and on honourable purposes. Thus, if the one acquires double and spends half, the other who is in the opposite case and is a good man cannot possibly be wealthier than he. The first I am speaking

—

of the saver and not of the spender

—

is

not

al-

ways bad; he may indeed in some cases be utterly bad, but, as I was saying, a good man he never is. For he who receives money unjustly as well as justly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, will be a rich

On

man

if

he be also

the other hand, the utterly bad

is

thrifty.

in general

and therefore very poor; while he spends on noble objects, and acquires wealth by just means only, can hardly be remarkable for riches, any more than he can be profligate,

back. In marrying and giving in marriage, no

who

one shall give or receive any dowry at all; and no one shall deposit money with another whom he does not trust as a friend, nor shall he lend money upon interest; and the borrower should be under no obligation to repay either capital or interest. That these principles are best, any one may see who compares them with the first

very poor. Our statement, then, is true, that the very rich are not good, and, if they are not good, they are not happy. But the intention of

principle tion, as

and intention of

we

The

inten-

affirm, of a reasonable statesman,

not what the

good

a state.

many

is

declare to be the object of

namely, that the state for the is advising should be as great and as rich as possible, and should possess gold and silver, and have the greatest empire by sea and land; this they imagine to be the real object of legislation, at the same time adding, inconsistently, that the true legislator desires to have the city the best and happiest possible. But they do not see that some of these things are possible, and some of them are impossible; and he who orders the state will desire what is possible, and will not indulge in vain wishes or attempts to accomplish that which is impossible. The citizen must indeed be happy and good, and the legislator will seek to make him so; but very rich and very good at the same time he cannot be, not, at least, in the sense in which the many speak of riches. [743] For they

a

legislator,

true interests of

which he

—

our laws was that the citizens should be as

happy as may be, and as friendly as possible to one another. And men who are always at law with one another, and amongst whom there are many wrongs done, can never be friends to one another, but only those

among whom

crimes

and lawsuits are few and slight. Therefore we say that gold and silver ought not to be allowed in the city,

which

is

nor

much

carried

of the vulgar sort of trade

on by lending money, or

rear-

ing the meaner kinds of live stock; but only the produce of agriculture, and only so much of this as will not compel us in pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist mean, soul and body, which without gymnastics, and without education, will never be worth anything; and therefore, as we have said not once but many times, the care of riches should have the last place in our thoughts. For there are in all three things about which every man has an interest; and the interest about money, when rightly regarded, is the third and lowest of them: midway comes the interest of the

—

LAWS V

695

and the state which we are describing will have been rightly constituted if it ordains honours according to this scale. [744] But if, in any of the laws which have been ordained, health has been preferred to temperance, or wealth to health and temperate habits, that law must clearly be wrong. Wherefore, also, the legislator ought often to impress upon himself the question 'What do I want?" and "Do I attain my aim, or do I miss the mark?" In this way, and in this way only, he may acquit himself and free others from the work of legisla-

measure, and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple, or as much 2 as four times the amount of this. But if a person have yet greater riches, whether he has found them, or they have been given to him, or he has made them in business, or has acquired by any stroke of fortune that which is in excess of the measure, [745] if he give back

tion.

excess,

body; and,

first

of

all,

that of the soul;

—

then hold his lot upon the 1 conditions which we have mentioned. It would be well that every man should come to the colony having all things equal; but seeing that this is not possible, and one man will have greater possessions than another, for many reasons and in particular in order to

Let the

allottee

preserve equality in special crises of the state,

must be unequal, in and contributions and distri-

qualifications of property

order that offices butions may be proportioned to the value of each person's wealth, and not solely to the virtue of his ancestors or himself, nor yet to the strength and beauty of his person, but also to the measure of his wealth or poverty; and so by a law of inequality, which will be in proportion to his wealth, he will receive honours and offices as equally as possible, and there will be no quarrels and disputes. To which end there should be four different standards appointed according to the amount of property: there should be a first and a second and a third and a fourth class, in which the citizens will be placed, and they will be called by these or similar names: they may continue in the same rank, or pass into another in any individual case, on becoming richer from being poorer, or poorer from being richer. The form of law which I should propose as the natural sequel would be as follows:

—In

a state

which

ing saved from the greatest of

is

desirous of be-

—

plagues not should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty, nor, again, excess of wealth, for both are productive of both these evils. Now the legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth. Let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preall

faction, but rather distraction

served,

and no

ruler,

—there

nor any one

else

who

aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow

the lot to be impaired in any case. This the leg'Cf. 740,741.

islator gives as a

the surplus to the state, and to the Gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation; but if he disobeys

our law, any one

this

against

him and

who

may inform

likes

receive half the value of the

and the delinquent shall pay a sum equal to the excess out of his own property, and the other half of the excess shall belong to the Gods. And let every possession of every man, with the exception of the lot, be publicly registered before the magistrates whom the law appoints, so that all suits about money may be easy

and quite simple.

The

next thing to be noted is, that the city should be placed as nearly as possible in the centre of the country; we should choose a place

which possesses what is suitable for a city, and may easily be imagined and described.

this

Then we

will divide the city into twelve por-

founding temples to Hestia, to Zeus Athene, in a spot which we will call the Acropolis, and surround with a circular wall, making the division of the entire city and country radiate from this point. The twelve portions shall be equalized by the provision that those which are of good land shall be smaller, while those of inferior quality shall be larger. The number of the lots shall be 5040, and each of them shall be divided into two, and every allotment shall be composed of two such sections; one of land near the city, the other of 3 land which is at a distance. This arrangement shall be carried out in the following manner: The section which is near the city shall be tions, first

and

to

added to that which is on the borders, and form one lot, and the portion which is next nearest

added to the portion which is next farand so of the rest. Moreover, in the two sections of the lots the same principle of equalization of the soil ought to be maintained; the badness and goodness shall be compensated by more and less. And the legislator shall divide the citizens into twelve parts, and arrange the shall be

thest;

rest of their property, as far as possible, so as

parts; and there shall be After this they shall assign

form twelve equal

to

a registration of 2 3

all.

Cf. Aristotle, Politics, Ibid., vii. 10,

1324

b

ii.

6,

10-15.

1265

b

18-25.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

696

twelve Gods, and call them by their names, and dedicate to each God their twelve

lots to

and

several portions,

And

call

the tribes after them.

they shall distribute the twelve divisions

same way

of the city in the 1

two

habitations, one in

try,

and the other

the

manner

which they

in

vided the country; and every

man

di-

have the centre of the counshall

Enough

extremity.

at the

of

of settlement.

by all means to consider that there can never be such a happy concurrence of circumstances as we have described; neither can all things coincide as they are wanted. [746] Men who will not take offence at such

mode

and will endure long to have their property fixed

of living together,

their life

all

at

moderate limit, and to beget children in accordance with our ordinances, and will allow themselves to be deprived of gold and other things which the legislator, as is evident from these enactments, will certainly forbid them; and will endure, further, the situation of the land with the city in the middle and dwellings roundabout; all this is as if the legislator were telling his dreams, or making a city and citizens of wax. There is truth in these objections, and therefore every one should take to heart what I am going to say. Once more, then, the "O legislator shall appear and address us: my friends," he will say to us, "do not suppose a

—

—

me

ignorant that there

is

truth in your words; but in matters

who

he

which

I

a certain

am

degree of

of opinion that,

are not present but future,

exhibits a pattern of that at

aims, should in nothing

and that

fall

which he

short of the fair-

he finds any part of this work impossible of execution he should avoid and not execute it, but he should contrive to carry out that which is nearest and most akin to it; you must allow the legislator to per-

est

and

truest;

fect his design,

if

and when

and demes and

it

is

perfected,

you

villages,

and

also military

ranks and movements, as well as coins and measures, dry and liquid, and weights, so a:> to be commensurable and agreeable to one another. Nor should we fear the appearance of minuteness, if the law commands that all the vessels which a man possesses should have a common measure, when we consider generally that the divisions

Now we ought

a

tries

and variations of [jjj] num-

bers have a use in respect of

all

the variations

which they are susceptible, both in themselves and as measures of height and depth, and in all sounds, and in motions, as well those which proceed in a straight direction, upwards or downwards, as in those which go round and

of

The

round.

legislator

is

to consider all these

things and to bid the citizens, as far as possible, not to lose sight of numerical order; for no single instrument of youthful education has such

mighty power, both as regards domestic econpolitics, and in the arts, as the study

omy and

Above all, arithmetic stirs up him who is by nature sleepy and dull, and makes him quick to learn, retentive, shrewd, and aided by art divine he makes progress quite

of arithmetic.

beyond his natural powers." All such things, if only the legislator, by other laws and institutions, can banish meanness and covetousness from the souls of men, so that they can use them properly and to their own good, will be excellent and suitable instruments of education. But if he cannot, he will unintentionally

wisdom, the habit of which evil tendency may be observed in the Egyptiansand Phoenicians, and many other create in them, instead of craft,

races,

through the general vulgarity of their

pursuits and acquisitions, whether

worthy

legislator of theirs has

some impediment

or

we must

not

fail

of chance or nature. For

to observe,

Cleinias, that there

some un-

been the cause,

is

O

Megillus and

a difference in places,

in considering what part expedient and what will

and that some beget better men and others worse; and we must legislate accordingly. Some

arouse opposition; for surely the artist who is to be deemed worthy of any regard at all, ought always to make his work self-consistent." Having determined that there is to be a dis-

places are subject to strangeand fatal influences

him

should join with of his legislation

is

tribution into twelve parts, let us

now

see in

what way this may be accomplished. There is no difficulty in perceiving that the twelve parts admit of the greatest number of divisions of that which they include, or in seeing the other numbers which are consequent upon them, and are produced out of them up to 5040; wherefore the law ought to order phra'Cf.

I bid.,

ii.

6,

1265" 18-25.

by reason of diverse winds and violent heats, some by reason of waters; or, again, from the character of the food given by the earth, which not only affects the bodies of men for good or but produces similar results in their souls. And in all such qualities those spots excel in which there is a divine inspiration, and in

evil,

which the demi-gods have their appointed lots, and are propitious, not adverse, to the settlers in them. To all these matters the legislator, if he have any sense in him, will attend as far as 1

Cf. Republic,

vii.

526.

— LAWS and frame his laws accordingly. And what you, Cleinias, must do, and to matof this kind you must turn your mind since

man this ters

can,

is

to colonize a new country. Your words, Athenian Stranger,

you are going Cleinias.

are excellent,

and

I

will

do

as

BOOK

say.

VI

[751] Athenian Stranger.

made an end

you

And now

of the preliminaries

we

having

will pro-

ceed to the appointment of magistracies. Cleinias.

first,

the

number

state there are

of the magistracies,

two and

mode of establishing them; and, secondly, when they have been established, laws again

the

will

have

to be

able in nature

provided for each of them,

suit-

and number. But before electing let us stop a little and say a

the magistrates

word

them. have you got to say? Ath. This is what I have to say; every one can see, that although the work of legislation is a most important matter, yet if a well-ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable offices, not only will there be no use in having the good laws not only will they be ridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and evil will accrue from them. in season about the election of

Cle.

What

—

—

Cle.

Ath.

what

Of course. Then now, my happen

will

intended

state.

knowledge

In the

that those

to magisterial

friend, let us observe

in the constitution of our first

who

place,

you

will ac-

are duly appointed

power, and their families, should

severally have given satisfactory proof of

they are, from youth

upward

what

until the time of

election; in the next place, those

who

are to

should have been trained in habits of law, and be well educated, that they may have a right judgment, and may be able to select or reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of either. But how can we imagine that those who are brought together for the first time, and are strangers to one another, and also uneducated, will avoid making mistakes in the choice of magistrates?

elect

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. The matter not serve the turn.

is I

and excuses will what do, since you, as you tell

serious,

will tell you, then,

you and I will have to me, with nine others, have offered to settle the new state on behalf of the people of Crete, [752] and I am to help you by the invention of the present romance. I certainly should not like

697

to leave the tale

without a head; a hideous thing.

wandering

—

all

a headless

over the world is such

monster

Cle. Excellent, Stranger.

Ath. Yes; and I will be as good as my word. Cle. Let us by all means do as you propose. Ath. That we will, by the grace of God, if old age will only permit us. Cle. But God will be gracious. Ath. Yes; and under his guidance let us consider a further point. Cle.

Very good.

Ath. In the ordering of a parts:

VI

What

is it?

Ath. Let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation this our city is. Cle. What had you in your mind when you said that?

Ath. I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws. Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first imposition. But if we could anyhow wait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public elections of the state; I say, if this could be accomplished, and rightly accomplished by any way or contrivance then, I think that there would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a state thus trained not being permanent. Cle. A reasonable supposition. Ath. Then let us consider if we can find any way out of the difficulty; for I maintain, Cleinias, that the Cnosians, above all the other Cretans, should not be satisfied with barely discharging their duty to the colony, but they ought to take the utmost pains to establish the offices which are first created by them in the best

and

surest

manner. Above

all,

this applies

guardians of the law, who must be chosen first of all, and with the greatest care; the others are of less importance. Cle. What method can we devise of electing

to the selection of the

them ?

—

Ath. This will be the method: Sons of the I shall say to them, inasmuch as the Cnosians have precedence over the other states, they should, in common with those who join this settlement, choose a body of thirty-seven in all, nineteen of them being taken from the settlers, [753] and the remainder from the citizens of Cnosus. Of those latter the Cnosians shall make a present to your colony, and you yourself shall be one of the eighteen, and shall Cretans,

become

a citizen of the

new

state;

and

if

you

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

698

and they cannot be persuaded sians

may

make

Cno-

to go, the

fairly use a little violence in

order to

which, under our circumstances,

you.

But why, Stranger, do not you and Megillus take a part in our new city? Ath. O, Cleinias, Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both a long way off. But you and likewise the other colonists are conveniently situated as you describe. I have been speaking of the way in which the new citizens may be best managed under present circumstances; Cle.

but in after-ages, if the city continues to exist, the election be on this wise. All who are horse or foot soldiers, or have seen military service at the proper ages when they were severally fitted for it, shall share in the election of magistrates; and the election shall be held in let

1

whatever temple the state deems most venerable, and every one shall carry his vote to the altar of the God, writing down on a tablet the name of the person for whom he votes, and his father's name, and his tribe, and ward; and at the side he shall write his own name in like manner. Any one who pleases may take away any tablet which he does not think properly filled up, and exhibit it in the Agora for a period of not less than thirty days. The tablets which are judged to be first, to the number of 300, shall be shown by the magistrates to the whole city, and the citizens shall in like manner select from these the candidates whom they prefer; and this second selection, to the number of 100, shall be again exhibited to the citizens; in the third, lect

whom

let

any one

who

pleases se-

he pleases out of the 100, walking

through the parts of victims, and

let

them

choose for magistrates and proclaim the sevenand-thirty who have the greatest number of votes. But who, Cleinias and Megillus, will order for us in the colony all this matter of the magistrates, reflect,

we

and the

them? If we which are in ours must have

scrutinies of

shall see that cities

process of construction like

some such persons, who cannot

possibly be

and some way, and they

elected before there are any magistrates; yet they

must be

elected in

men, but the best possible. good beginning is half the business"; and "to have begun well" is praised by all, and in my opinion is a great deal more than half the business, [^$4] and has never been praised by any one enough. Cle. That is very true. Ath. Then let us recognize the difficulty, and make clear to our own minds how the beginare not to be inferior

For

1

as the

is to be accomplished. There is only one proposal which I have to oiler, and that is one

ning

proverb

says, "a

Cf. Aristotle, Politics,

ii.

6,

1265

b

26-33.

sary

is

both neces-

and expedient.

What

Cle.

is

it?

maintain that this colony of ours has a father and mother, who are no other than the colonizing state. Well I know that many colonies have been, and will be, at enmity with their parents. But in early days the child, as in a family, loves and is beloved; even if there come a time later when the tic is broken, still, while he is in want of education, he naturally loves his parents and is beloved by them, and flies to Ath.

I

his relativesfor protection,

andfindsinthem

his

time of need; and this parental feeling already exists in the Cnosians, as is shown by their care of the new city; and only natural

there

is

allies

in

a similar feeling

on the part of the

young city towards Cnosus. And I repeat what was saying for there is no harm in repeating that the Cnosians should take a good thing a common interest in all these matters, and choose, as far as they can, the eldest and best of the colonists, to the number of not less than a hundred; and let there be another hundred of

— —

I

the Cnosians themselves. These,

I

say.

on

their

should have a joint care that the magistrates should be appointed according to law, and that when they are appointed they should undergo a scrutiny. When this has been effected, the Cnosians shall return home, and the new city do the best she can for her own preservation and happiness. I would have the seven* and-thirty now, and in all future time, chosen Let them, in to fulfil the following duties: the first place, be the guardians of the law; and, secondly, of the registers in which each one registers before the magistrate the amount of his property, excepting four minae which are allowed to citizens of the first class, three alarrival,

—

two

and a any one, despising the laws for the sake of gain, be found to possess anything more which has not been registered, let all that he has in excess be confislowed

to the second,

single

mina

to the fourth.

to the third,

And

if

and let him be liable to a suit which shall be the reverse of honourable or fortunate. And let any one who will, indict him on the charge of loving base gains, and proceed against him cated,

before the guardians of the law. [J55] And if he be cast, let him lose his share of the public possessions,

and when there

is

any public

dis-

him have nothing but his original lot; and let him be written down a condemned man as long as he lives, in some place in which tribution, let

— LAWS any one who pleases can read about his offences. The guardian of the law shall not hold office longer than twenty years, and shall not be less than fifty years of age when he is elected; or if he is elected when he is sixty years of age, he shall hold office for ten years only; and upon the same principle, he must not imagine that he will be permitted to hold such an important office as that of guardian of the laws after he is seventy years of age, if he live so long. These are the three first ordinances about the

VI

699

other candidates shall be arranged in the same way as in the case of the generals, and let the cavalry vote and the infantry look on at the

two who have the

election; the

The bers

council shall consist of 30 x 12

—360

we

in order to speak of the election of other

shall select candidates

offi-

and these again must have their ministers, commanders, and colonels of horse, and commanders of brigades of foot, who would be more rightly called to be elected,

by their popular name of brigadiers. The guardians of the law shall propose as generals men

who are natives of the city, and

a selection from

made by those have been of the age for military service. And if one who is not proposed is thought by somebody to be better than one who is, let him name whom he prefers in the place of whom, and make oath that he is better, and propose him; and whichever of them is approved by vote shall be admitted to the final selection; and the three who have the greatest number of votes shall be appointed generals, and superintendents of military affairs, after previously undergoing a scrutiny, like the the candidates proposed shall be

who

are or

guardians of the law.

And let

the generals thus

elected propose twelve brigadiers, one for each tribe;

and there

shall be a right of counter-

we

counsellors for each class. First,

all

carry shields

[i.e.,

the hoplites],

for the generals; but captains of light troops,

or archers, or any other division of the army, shall be appointed by the generals for themselves. There only remains the appointment of officers of cavalry: these shall

be proposed by

same persons who proposed the generals, and the election and the counter-proposal of the

they

—

a fine of triple the

see,

who

first class;

compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined. When the candidates have been selected, some one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day, candidates shall be selected from the second class in the same manner and under the same conditions as on the previous day; and on the third day a selection shall be made from the third class, at which every one may, if he likes, vote, and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote; but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day candidates shall be selected from the fourth and smallest class; they shall be selected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished; he who is of the second class shall pay

the guardians of the law shall convene the as-

[756 J Let the body of cavalry choose phylarchs

from the

get ninety

the citizens

shall be

at first,

those

divide the

into four parts of ninety each,

proposal as in the case of the generals, and the voting and decision shall take place in the same way. Until the prytanes and council are elected,

sembly in some holy spot which is suitable to the purpose, placing the hoplites by themselves, and the cavalry by themselves, and in a third division all the rest of the army. All are to vote for the generals [and for the colonels of horse], but the brigadiers are to be voted for only by

mem-

number for whole number

will be a convenient

sub-division. If

have

num-

tions shall decide.

guardians of the law; as the work of legislation progresses, each law in turn will assign to them their further duties. And now we may proceed cers; for generals

greatest

ber of votes shall be the leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice; but if the dispute be raised a third time, the officers who preside at the several elec-

ple.

the

On

amount which was exacted

and he who

is

of the

first class

quadru-

the fifth day the rulers shall bring out

names noted down, for all the citizens to and every man shall choose out of them,

under pain,

if

penalty; and

he do not, of suffering the first they have chosen 180 out

when

of each of the classes, they shall choose one-half

who shall undergo a scrutiny: form the council for the year. The mode of election which has been described is in a mean between monarchy and democracy, [j$j] and such a mean the state ought always to observe; for servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and bad, of

them by

These are

lot,

to

merely because they are declared to have equal privileges. For to unequals equals become unequal, if they are not harmonized by measure; and both by reason of equality, and by reason of inequality, cities are filled with seditions.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

700

The

makes friendhappy and also true; but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant. For there are two equalities which are called by the same name, but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another; one of them may be introduced withold saying, that "equality

ship,"

is

out difficulty, by any state or any legislator in the distribution of honours: this is the rule of measure, weight, and number, which regulates

and apportionsthem.Butthereisanother equality, of a better and higher kind, which is not so easily recognized. This is the judgment of Zeus;

among men

however,

is

it

avails but little; that

the source of the greatest

individuals and states. For

it

little,

good

to

gives to the greater

more, and to the inferior less and in proportion to the nature of each; and, above all, greater honour always to the greater virtue, and to the less less; and to either in proportion to their re-

measure of virtue and education. And and is ever the true principle of states, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule order the new city which is now being founded, and any other city which may be spective this

is

justice,

hereafter founded.

look

— not

or to the

To

power

ways; which, as

should one or more,

this thelegislator

to the interests of tyrants

of the people, but to justice

al-

was saying, is the distribution

I

of natural equality

among unequals

in each

But there are times at which every state is compelled to use the words, "just," "equal." in a secondary sense, in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions. For equity and indulgence are infractionsof the perfect and strict case.

rule of justice.

And

this

is

the reason

are obliged to use the equality of the

why we

lot, in

to avoid the discontent of the people;

and

order so

we

invoke God and fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will direct the lot with a view to supreme justice.

though we are compelled

And

therefore,

al-

both equalities, we should use that into which the element of chance enters as seldom as possible. [758]

O my

to use

and for the reasons which would endure and be saved. But as a ship sailing on the sea has to be watched night and day, in like manner a city also is sailing on a sea of politics, and is liable to all sorts of insidious assaults; and therefore from morning to night, and from night to morning, rulers must join hands with rulers, and watchers with watchers, receiving and giving up their trust in a perpetual sucThus,

friends,

given, should a state act

cession.

Now

duty of

this sort

a multitude can never fulfil a

with anything like energy.

Moreover, the greater number of the senators will have to be left during the greater part of the year to order their concerns at their own homes. They will therefore have to be arranged in twelve portions, answering to the twelve months, and furnish guardians of the state, each portion for a single month. Their business is to be at hand and receive any rorei^ner or citizen who comes to them, whether to give information, or to put one of those questions, to which, when asked by other cities, a city should give an answer, and to which, if she ask them herself, she should receive an answer; or again,

when

there

is

a likelihood of

commotions, which are always liable happen in some form or other, thev will, if

internal to

they can, prevent their occurring; or if they have already occurred, will lose no time in mak-

known to the city, and healing the Wherefore, also, this which is the presiding body of the state ought always to have the control of their assemblies, and of the dissolutions of them, ordinary as well asextraordniarv. All this is to be ordered by the twelfth part of the council, which is always to keep watch together with the other officers of the state during one portion of the year, and to rest during the remaining eleven portions. ing them

evil.

Thus

will the city be fairly ordered.

And

now, who is to have the superintendence of the country, and what shall be the arrangement 3 Seeing that the whole city and the entire country have been both of them divided into twelve portions, ought there not to be appointed superintendents of the streets of the city, and of the houses, and buildings, and harbours, and the agora, and fountains, and sacred domains, and temples, and the like? Cle.

To

be sure there ought.

[759] dth. Let us assume, then, that there ought to be servants of the temples, and priests and priestesses. There must also be superintendents of roads and buildings, who will have a care of men, that they may do no harm, and also of beasts, both within the enclosure and in the suburbs. Three kinds of officers will thus have to be appointed, in order that the city may be suitably provided according to her needs. Those who have the care of the city shall be called wardens of the city; and those who have the care of the agora shall be called wardens of the agora; and those who have the care of the temples shall be called priests. Those who hold hereditary offices as priests or priestesses, shall not be disturbed; but if there be few or none such, as

is

probable at the foundation of a

new

LAWS city, priests

and

to be servants of the ants.

Some

appointed have no serv-

priestesses shall be

Gods who

of our officers shall be elected,

others appointed by

those

lot,

who

and

are of the

people and those who are not of the people mingling in a friendly manner in every place and city, that the state may be as far as possible of one mind. The officers of the temples shall be appointed by lot; in this way their election will be committed to God, that he may do what is agreeable to him. And he who obtains a lot shall undergo a scrutiny, first, as to whether he is sound of body and of legitimate birth; and in the second place, in order to show that he is of a perfectly pure family, not stained with homicide or any similar impiety in his own person, and also that his father and mother have led a similar unstained life. Now the laws about all divine things should be brought from Delphi, and interpreters appointed, under whose direction they should be

The

tenure of the priesthood should aland no longer; and he who will duly execute the sacred office, according used.

ways be

for a year

to the laws of religion,

—

must be not

less

than

age the laws shall be the same about priestesses. As for the interpreters, they shall be appointed thus: let the twelve tribes be distributed into groups of four, and let each group select four, one out of each tribe within the group, three times; and let the three who have the greatest number of votes [out of the twelve appointed by each group], after undergoing a scrutiny, nine in all, be sent to Delphi, in order that the God may return one out of each triad; their age shall be the same as that of the priests, and the scrutiny of them shall be conducted in the same manner; let them be intersixty years of

—

preters for

and when any one select another from the life,

dies let the

four tribes tribe of the deceased. Moreover, besides priests and interpreters, there must be treasurers, who will take charge of the property of the several temples, and of the sacred domains, and shall have authority over the produce

them; and three of them

and the

letting of

be chosen from the highest classes for the greater [j6o] temples, and two for the lesser, and one for the least of

all;

the

scrutiny of

shall

manner of their election and the them shall be the same as that of the

1

generals. This shall be the order of the temples.

Let everything have a guard as far as possible. Let the defence of the city be committed to the generals, and taxiarchs, and hipparchs, and phylarchs, and prytanes, and the wardens of

'Cf.755-

VI

701

when been completed. The

the city, and of the agora,

the election of

them has defence of the country shall be provided for as follows: The entire land has been already distributed into twelve as nearly as possible equal parts, and let the tribe allotted to a division provide annually for it five wardens of the country and commanders of the watch; and let each body of five have the power of selecting twelve others out of the youth of their own tribe these shall be not less than twenty-five years of age, and not more than thirty. And let there be allotted to them severally every month the various districts, in order that they may all acquire knowledge and experience of the whole coun-

—

—

try.

The term

commanders and two years.

of service for

for watchers shall continue during

After having had their stations allotted to them, they will go from place to place in regular order,

making their round from left to right commanders direct them; (when I

as their

speak of going to the right, are to

ment

go

to the east).

And

I

mean

at the

that they

commence-

of the second year, in order that as

many

guards may not only get a knowledge of the country at any one season of the year, but may also have experience of the

as possible of the

manner

in

which

different places are affected

then commanders shall lead them again towards the left, from place to place in succession, until they at different seasons of the year, their

have completed the second year. In the third year other wardens of the country shall be chosen and commanders of the watch, five for each division, who are to be the superintendents of the bands of twelve. While on service at each station, their attention shall be directed to In the first place, they the following points: shall see that the country is well protected against enemies; they shall trench and dig wherever this is required, and, as far as they can, they shall by fortifications keep off the

—

them from

evil-disposed, in order to prevent

doing any harm to the country or the property; they shall use the beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot: these will be their instruments whom they will superintend, [j6i] taking them, as far as possible, at the times when they are not engaged in their regular business. They shall make every part of the country inaccessible to enemies, and as accessible as possible to friends;

man and

2

there shall be

burden and for cattle, and they shall take care to have them always as smooth as they can; and shall provide

ways

2

for

beasts of

Cf. Aristotle, Politics,

vii. 5,

1326

b

38.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

702 against the rains doing to the land,

mountains

when

they

harm instead of good come down from the

and shall keep in the overflow by the help of works and ditches, in order that the valleys, receiving and drinking up the rain from heaven, and providing fountains and streams in the fields and regions which lie underneath, may furnish even to the dry places plenty of good water. The fountains of water, whether of rivers or of springs, shall be ornamented with plantations and buildings for beauty; and let them bring tointo the hollow dells;

gether the streams in subterraneous channels, all things plenteous; and if there be a

and make

sacred grove or dedicated precinct in the neigh-

bourhood, they

shall

conduct the water to the Gods, and so beautify

actual temples of the

them

Everywhere in make gymnasia for

at all seasons of the year.

such places the youth shall themselves, and warm baths for the aged, placing by them abundance of dry wood, for the benefit of those labouring under disease there the weary frame of the rustic, worn with toil, will receive a kindly welcome, far better than he would at the hands of a not over-wise doctor. The building of these and the like works will be useful and ornamental; they will provide a pleasing amusement, but they will be a

—

to the decision of the villagers in the

hood; but

in suits of greater

case of lesser,

if

neighbour-

amount, or

in the they refuse to submit, trusting

monthly removal into another part country will enable them to escape in such cases the injured party may bring his suit in the common court, and if he obtain a verdict he may exact from the defendant, who reiused to submit, a double penalty. The wardens and the overseers of the country, while on their two years' service, shall have common meals at their several stations, and shall all live together; and he who is absent from the common meal, or sleeps out, if only for one day or night, unless by order of his commanders, or by reason of absolute necessity, that their

—

of the

if

the five

denounce him and inscribe his name having kept his guard,

in the agora as not

him be deemed

to have betrayed the city, as power, and let him be disgraced and beaten with impunity by any one who meets him and is willing to punish him. If anv of the commanders is guilty of such an irregulet

far as lay in his

the whole company of sixty shall see to and he who is cognizant of the offence, and

larity, it,

serious

does not bring the offender to trial, shall be amenable to the same laws as the younger offender himself, and shall pay a heavier fine, and be incapable of ever commanding the

will

young.

employment too; for the sixty wardens have to guard their several divisions, not only with a view to enemies, but also with an eye to professing friends. When a quarrel arises among neighbours or citizens, and any one,

whether slave or freeman wrongs another, let the five wardens decide small matters on their own authority; but where the charge against another relates to greater matters, the seventeen

composed

of the fives

and twelves,

determine any charges which one against another, not involving

man

shall

brings

more than

three

1

Every judge and magistrate shall be liable to give anaccount of hisconduct in office, except those who, like kings, have the final decision. Moreover, as regards the aforesaid wardens of the country, if they do any wrong to those of whom they have the care, whether by imposing upon them unequal tasks, [762] or by taking the produce of the soil or implements of husbandry without their consent; also if they receive anything in the way of a bribe, minae.

or decide suits unjusdy, or influences of flattery, let

they yield to the them be publicly disif

honoured; and in regard to any other wrong

which they do if

to the inhabitants of the country,

the question be of a mina, 1

Cf.

viii.

843.

let

them submit

The guardians

of the law are to be care-

ful inspectors of these matters,

and

prevent or punish offenders. Every

remember

shall either

man

the universal rule, that he

should

who

is

not a good servant will not be a good master; a man should pride himself more upon serving well than upon commanding well: first upon serving the laws, which is also the service of the Gods; in the second place, upon having served ancient and honourable men in the days

two years which any one is a warden of the country, his daily food ought to be of a simple and hum-

of his youth. Furthermore, during the in

When the twelve have been chosen, [763] let them and the five meet together, and determine that they will be their own servants, and, like servants, will not have other slaves and servants for their own use, neither will they use those of the villagers and husbandmen for ble kind.

their

private advantage, but for the public

and in general they should make minds to live independently by themselves, servants of each other and of themselves. Further, at all seasons of the year, summer and winter alike, let them be under arms and survey minutely the whole country; thus they will at once keep guard, and at the same service only;

up

their

I

LAWS time acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality. There can be no more important kind of information than the exact knowledge of a man's own country; and for this as well as for more general reasons of pleasure and advantage, hunting with dogs and other kinds of sports should be pursued by the young. The service to whom this is committed may be called the secret police * or wardens of the country; the name does not much signify, but every one who has the safety of the state at heart will use his utmost diligence in this service. After the wardens of the country, we have to speak of the election of wardens of the agora and of the city. The wardens of the country

were

try into the city,

be

the waters,

and of the buildings,

made according

all

to

law;

ne-

of the agora shall observe

the order appointed by law for the agora,

and

have the charge of the temples and foun-

shall

which are in the agora; and they shall see no one injures anything, and punish him who does, with stripes and bonds, if he be a tains

that

slave or stranger; but if he be a citizen who misbehaves in this way, they shall have the power themselves of inflicting a fine upon him to the amount of a hundred drachmae, or with the consent of the wardens of the city up to double

that

amount.

And

have

a similar

power

let

the wardens of the city

of imposing punishments

also of

cation, of the other, the superintendence of con-

and of the

different high roads which lead out of the coun-

may

The wardens

cessity.

that they

parts of the city into three; like the former,

they shall have care of the ways,

703

some urgent

fines in their own department; and let them impose fines by their own authority, up to a mina, or up to two minae with the consent of the wardens of the agora. In the next place, it will be proper to appoint directors of music and gymnastic, two kinds of each of the one kind the business will be edu-

number, and the wardens of the be three, and will divide the twelve

sixty in

city will

VI

be present, in consequence of

—

which the guardians of the supply

and

—

tests.

In speaking of education, the law means who have the care of order

preserve and convey to them, care being taken

to speak of those

may reach the fountains pure and abundant, and be both an ornament and a benefit to the city. These also should be men of in-

and instruction in gymnasia and schools, and of the going to school, and of school buildings for boys and girls; and in speaking of contests, the law refers to the judges of gymnastics and of music; these again are divided into two classes, the one having to do with music, the other with gymnastics; and the same who judge of the gymnastic contests of men, shall judge of horses; but in music there shall be one set of judges of solo singing, and of imitation mean of rhapsodists, players on the harp, the flute and the like, and another who shall judge of choral song. First of all, we must choose directors for the choruses of boys, and men, and maidens, whom they shall follow in the amusement of the dance, and for our other musical

that they

fluence,

and

at leisure to

take care of the public

Let every man propose as warden of the city any one whom he likes out of the highest class, and when the vote has been given on them, and the number is reduced to the six who have the greatest number of votes, let the electing officers choose by lot three out of the six, and when they have undergone a scrutiny let them hold office according to the laws laid down for them. Next, let the wardens of the agora be elected in like manner, out of the first and second class, five in number: ten are to be first elected, and out of the ten five are to be chosen by lot, as in the election of the wardens of the city: these when they have undergone a scrutiny are to be declared magistrates. Every one shall vote for every one, and he who will not vote, [764] if he be informed against before the magistrates, shall be fined fifty drachmae, and shall also be deemed a bad citizen. Let any one who likes go to the assembly and to the general council; it shall be compulsory to go on citizens of the first and second class, and they shall pay a fine of ten drachmae if they be found not answering to their names at the assembly. interest.

—

But the third and fourth

class shall be

under no

compulsion, and shall be let off without a fine, unless the magistrates have commanded all to 1 Cf i. 633. .

—

arrangements;

enough less

[765]

—one

for the choruses,

than forty years of age.

also be

director

will

be

and he should be not

One

director will

enough to introduce the solo singers, give judgment on the competitors, and

and to he ought not

to be less than thirty years of age.

The

and manager

of the choruses shall be elected after the following manner: Let any persons who commonly take an interest in such matters go to the meeting, and be fined if they do not go (the guardians of the law shall judge of their fault), but those who have no interest shall not be compelled. The elector shall propose as director some one who understands music, and he in the scrutiny may be challenged on the one part by those who say he has no skill,

director

—

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

704

and defended on the other hand by those who

Ten are to be elected by ten who is chosen by lot

say that he has.

vote,

shall and he of the undergo a scrutiny, and lead the choruses for

a year

And

according to law.

who wins

the competitor

in like

manner

the lot shall be leader

and he who is thus elected shall deliver the award to the judges. In the next place, we have to choose judges in the contests of horses and of men: these shall be selected from the third and also from the second class of citizens, and the three first classes shall be compelled to go to the of the solo

and concert music

election, but the lowest

punity; and

stay

away with im-

there be three elected by lot out

let

of the twenty

may

for that year;

who

have been chosen previoushave the vote and approval of the examiners. But if any one is rejected in the scrutiny at any ballot or decision, others shall be chosen in the same manner, and

and they must

ly,

also

undergo a similar scrutiny. There remains the minister of the education of youth, male and female; he too will rule according to law; one such minister will be sufficient, and he must be fifty years old, and have children lawfully begotten, both boys and girls by preference, at any rate, one or the other. He who is elected, and he who is the elector, should consider that of

the great offices of state this

all

the greatest; for the

is

if it

of

makes

good

shoot of any plant, towards the attainment

first

start

natural excellence, has the greatest effect

its

on

a

maturity: and this

its

not only true of

is

[~66] but of animals wild and tame, and also of men. Man, as we say, is a tame or

plants,

civilized animal: nevertheless, he requires prop-

and a fortunate nature, and then animals he becomes the most divine and

er instruction

of

all

most

1

civilized;

educated he

is

but

if

he be insufficiently or

ill

the most savage of earthly crea-

who have been his electors, with the exception of the guardians of the law shall hold office for five years: and in the sixth year let another be chosen in like manner to fill the magistrates

—

his office. If

any one dies while he is holding a public and more than thirty days before his

office,

term of

office expires, let

those

elect

to the suit.

Now may

the establishment of courts of justice

be regarded as a choice of magistrates, for

every magistrate must also be a judge of some things; and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, yet in certain respects is a very important magistrate

termining a

on the day on which he is deRegarding then the judges

suit.

tures. Wherefore the legislator ought not to allow the education of children to become a secondary or accidental matter. In the first place, he who would be rightly provident about them,

also as magistrates, let us say

should begin by taking care that he is elected, who of all the citizens is in every way best; him the legislator shall do his utmost to appoint guardian and superintendent. To thisend all the magistrates, with the exception of the council and prytanes, shall go to the temple of Apollo, and elect by ballot him of the guardians of the law whom they severally think will be the best superintendent of education. And he who has the greatest number of votes, after he has undergone a scrutiny at the hands of all

gants appoint in

1

Aristotle, Politics,

i.

2,

1253

"

29-38.

whose business

another to the office in the same manner as before. And if any one who is entrusted with orphans dies, let the relations both on the father's and mother's side, who are residing at home, includingcousins, appoint another guardian within ten days, or be fined a drachma a day for neglect to do so. A city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a city; and again, if a judge is silent and says no more in preliminary proceedings than the litigants, as is the case in arbitrations, he will never be able to decide justly; wherefore a multitude of judges will not easily judge well, nor a few if they are bad. The point in dispute between the parties should be made clear; and time, and deliberation, and repeated examination, greatly tend to clear up doubts. For this reason, he who goes to law with another, should go first of ail to his neighbours and friends who know best the questions at issue. And if he be unable to obtain from them a satisfactory decision, [j6jj let him have recourse to another court: and if the two courts cannot settle the matter, let a third put an end it is

who

are

fit

to

be

and of what they are to be judges, and how many of them are to judge in each suit. Let that be the supreme tribunal which the litijudges,

common for themselves, choosAnd let there

ing certain persons by agreement.

be two other tribunals: one for private causes, when a citizen accuses another of wronging him and wishes to get a decision; the other for public causes, in which some citizen is of opinion that the public has been dividual,

and

mon

interests.

tion

how

who

is

wronged by an

in-

willing to vindicate the com-

And we must

not forget to men-

the judges are to be qualified,

and

they are to be. In the first place, let there be a tribunal open to all private persons who

LAWS are trying causes one against another for the third time, and let this be composed as follows:

— All

the officers of state, as well annual as those holding office for a longer period, when

new year is about to commence, in the month following after the summer solstice, on the

VI

calling

God

to witness, shall

dedicate one judge from every magistracy to be their first-fruits, choosing in each office him who seems to them to be the best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the

and

best

holiest

manner.

And when

the elec-

completed, a scrutiny shall be held in the presence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejected another shall be chosen in tion

the

is

same manner. Those who have undergone

the scrutiny shall judge the causes of those

have declined the inferior courts, and their vote openly.

The

who have

magistrates

councillors

elected

them

who

shall give

and other shall be re-

quired to be hearers and spectators of the and any one else may be present who pleases. If one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong, let him go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation causes;

before them, and he

who

found guilty in pay damages to the injured is

such a case shall party equal to half the injury; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty, the judges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer, and how much more he ought to pay to the public treasury, and to the party who brought the suit. [j68] In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to participate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision. Such causes ought to originate with the people, and they ought also to have the final decision of them, but the trial of them shall take place before three of the highest magistrates, the plaintiff

and the defendant

upon

whom

shall agree;

and

they are not able to come to an agreement themselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed. And in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share; for he if

who

has no share in the administration of jusapt to imagine that he has no share in

tice, is

the state at

all.

And

for this reason there shall

be a court of law in every tribe, and the judges shall be chosen by lot; they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to

—

entreaties.

The

final

judgment

shall rest

with

maintain, has been

tablished in the most incorruptible

es-

form of

which human things admit:

this shall be the court established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of neighbours or of the tribes.

Thus much

the last day but one of the year, shall meet in

some temple, and

705

we

that court which, as

was

of the courts of law, which, as

I

saying, cannot be precisely defined either

as being or not being offices; a superficial sketch has been given of them, in which some things have been told and others omitted. For the right place of an exact statement of the laws respecting suits, under their several heads, will

be at the end of the body of legislation;

—

let us 1 then expect them at the end. Hitherto our legislation has been chiefly occupied with the appointment of offices. Perfect unity and exactness, extending to the whole and every particular of political administration, cannot be attained to the full, until the discussion shall have a beginning, middle, and end, and is complete in every part. At present we have reached the election of magistrates, and this may be regarded as a sufficient termination of what has preceded. And now there need no longer be any delay or hesitation in beginning the work

of legislation.

what you have said, Stranger; and manner of tacking on the beginning of your new discourse to the end Cle.

I

I

like

particularly like your

of the former one.

[769] Ath. Thus far, then, the old men's ragone off well. Cle. You mean, I suppose, their serious and

tional pastime has

noble pursuit? Ath. Perhaps; but

whether you and

I

should like to

I

know

are agreed about a certain

thing.

About what thing?

Cle.

You know

Ath.

painters expend

the endless labour

upon

their pictures

which

—they

are

always putting in or taking out colours, or whatever be the term which artists employ; they seem as if they would never cease touching up their works, which are always being

made

brighter and

Cle.

I

more

beautiful.

know something of these matters from

I have never had any great acquaintance with the art. Ath. No matter; we may make use of the Suppose that illustration notwithstanding: some one had a mind to paint a figure in the

report, although

—

most beautiful manner,

work as

instead of losing

time went on *Cf.

ix.

853,

in the

—do you not

ff.; xii.

hope that

his

would always improve

956.

ff.

see that

being a

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

706

some one to succeed which time may introduce, and be able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the artist, and who will further brighten up and improve the mortal, unless he leaves

him who

picture,

will correct the flaws

his great labour will last but a short

all

Cle.

True.

Ath.

And

—and is

not the aim of the legislator sim-

he desires that his laws should be written down with all possible exactness; in the second place, as time goes on and he has made an actual trial of his decrees, will he not find omissions? Do you imagine that there ilar? First,

ever was a legislator so foolish as not to

many

know

things are necessarily omitted, which

some one coming after him must correct, if the and the order of government is not to deteriorate, but to improve in the state which constitution

he has established? Cle. Assuredly, that is the sort of thing which every one would desire. Ath. And if any one possesses any means of accomplishing this by word or deed, or has any way great or small by which he can teach a person to understand how he can maintain and amend the laws, he should finish what he has to say, and not leave the work incomplete. Cle. By all means. [yyo] Ath. And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment? Cle. What have we to do? Ath. As we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of the law, and are ourselves in the evening of life, and they as compared with us are young men, we ought not only to legislate for them, but to endeavour to make them not only guardians of the law but legislators themselves, as far as this

Cle. Certainly;

Ath. At any Cle.

Ath.

There was one main point about which we were agreed that a man's whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man, whether this was to be gained by study, or habit, or some mode of acquisition, or desire, or opinion, or

time?

that

of the law ought to keep in view.

Of

if

rate,

we can. we must do our

is

possible.

best.

—

knowledge

men and women,

and young the aim of all should always have described; anything which I may be an impediment, the good man ought to old

be such as

show

that he utterly disregards.

necessity plainly compels

him

And

if

at last

an outlaw from his native land, rather than bow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors, and he has to fly, an exile he must be and endure all such trials, rather than accept another form of government, which is likely to make men worse. These are our original principles; and do you now, fixing your eyes upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to be, praise and blame the laws blame those which have not this power of making the citizen better, [j"i] but embrace those which have; and with gladness receive and live in them; bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at goods, as they are termed, to be

of a different kind.

Let us proceed to another class of laws, beginning with their foundation in religion. And

we must entire

first

—

number 5040 the many connumber of the tribes

return to the

number had, and

has, a great

venient divisions, and the which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly formed by 21 x 20 [5040 -f (21 x 20), i.e., 5040 -r- 420 =12], also has them. And not only is the whole number divisible by

number of each tribe is diby twelve. Now every portion should be regarded by us as a sacred gift of Heaven, corresponding to the months and to the revolution of the universe. Every city has a guiding and sacred principle given by nature, but in some the division or distribution has been more right than in others, and has been more sacred and fortunate. In our opinion, nothing can be more right than the selection of the number 5040, which may be divided by all numbers from one to twelve with the single exception of eleven, and that admits of a very easy correction; for if, turning to the dividend (5040), we deduct two families, the defect in the division is cured. And the truth of this may be easily proved when we have leisure. But for the prestwelve, but also the

visible

1

course.

We

will say to

them

—O friends and

down any law, which we shall omit, and this cannot be helped; at the same time, we will do our utmost to describe what is important, and will give an outline which you shall fill up. And I will explain on what principle you are to act. Megillus and Cleinias and I have often spoken to one another touching these matters, and we are of opinion that we have spoken well. And we hope that you will be of the same mind with us, and become our disciples, and keep in view the things which in our united opinion the legislator and guardian saviours of our laws, in laying there are

this applies equally to

many

particulars

ent, trusting to the 1

mere

Cf. Timaeus, 39, 47.

assertion of this prin-

LAWS and assigning to each portion some God or son of a God, let us give them altars and sacred rites, and at the ciple, let us divide the state;

hold assemblies for sacrifice twice twelve assemblies for the tribes, and twelve for the city, according to their dialtars let us

month

in the

—

visions; the first in

honour of the Gods and

divine things, and the second to promote friendship and "better acquaintance," as the phrase

good fellowship with one must be acquainted with whose families and whom they marry

and every

is,

sort of

another. For people those into

and with those

to

whom they give in marriage;

such matters, as far as possible, a man should deem it all important to avoid a mistake, and with this serious purpose let games be instix tuted in which youths and maidens shall dance together, [772] seeing one another and being seen naked, at a proper age, and on a suitable occasion, not transgressing the rules of modin

VI

707

mind, and suitable for the procreation of children, let him marry if he be still under the age of five-and-thirty years; but let him first hear how he ought to seek after 3 what is suitable and appropriate. For, as Clein4 ias says, every law should have a suitable prenection which

Cle. You recollect at the right moment, Stranger, and do not miss the opportunity which the argument affords of saying a word in season.

[773] Ath. I thank you. We will say to him is born of good parents O my son, you ought to make such a marriage as wise men would approve. Now they would advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially

—

who

to desire a rich one; but

intendents and regulators of these games, and

And

he

they, together with the guardians of the law,

strong,

directors of choruses will be the super-

will legislate in

any matters which we have 2

omitted; for, as we said, where there are numerous and minute details, the legislator must leave out something. And the annual officers who have experience, and know what is want-

other things are

if

and with form connections; this will be for the benefit of the city and of the families which are united; for the equable and symmetrical tends infinitely more to virtue than the unmixed.

equal, always to to

The

to his

lude.

them

esty.

is

who

honour

inferiors,

—

conscious of being too head-

is

and carried away more than is fitting in all his actions, ought to desire to become the relation of orderly parents; and he who is of the opposite temper ought to seek the opposite

cient;

Let there be one word concerning all Every man shall follow, not after the marriage which is most pleasing to himself, but after that which is most beneficial to the state. For somehow every one is by nature prone to that which is likest to himself, and in this way the whole city becomes unequal in property and in disposition; and hence there

the several officers shall refer the omissions

least desire to

which come under their notice to the guardians and correct them, until all is perfect; and from that time there shall be no more change, and they shall establish and use the new laws with the others which the legislator originally gave them, and of which they are never, if they can help, to change aught; or, if some necessity overtakes them, the magistrates must be called into counsel, and the whole people, and they must go to all the oracles of the Gods; and if they are all agreed, in that case they may

an express provision, not only that the rich man shall not marry into the rich family, nor the powerful into the family of the powerful, but that the slower natures shall be compelled to enter into marriage with the quicker, and the quicker with the slower, may awaken anger as well as laughter in the minds of many; for

must make arrangements and improvements year by year, until such enactments and

ed,

provisions are sufficiently determined. years' experience of sacrifices

tending to

all

A

and dances,

if

ten ex-

particulars, will be quite suffi-

and if the legislator be alive they shall communicate with him, but if he be dead then

of the law,

make the change, but if they are not agreed, by no manner of means, and any one who dissents shall prevail, as the law ordains. Whenever any one over twenty-five years of age, having seen and been seen by others, believes himself to have found a marriage con1

8

Cf. Republic, v. 459. Cf 770. .

alliance.

marriages:

arise in

there

is

ought the

—

most

states the very results

happen.

Now,

to

add

which we law

to the

a difficulty in perceiving that the city

to be well

mingled

maddening wine

is

which

like a cup, in

hot and

fiery,

but

when

chastened by a soberer God, receives a fair associate and becomes an excellent and temper5 ate drink. Yet in marriage no one is able to see that the same result occurs. Wherefore also the law must let alone such matters, but we should 3

Cf. a

1335 4

5

Cf.

721,

iv.

and

iv.

723.

Cf Statesman, 306, .

Aristotle,

27-31 ff.

Politics,

vii.

16,

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

708 try to

charm

the spirits of

men

into believing

the equability of their children's disposition to

be of more importance than equality in excessive fortune when they marry; and him who is too desirous of making a rich marriage we should endeavour to turn aside by reproaches,

however, by any compulsion of written

not,

law.

1

—

and alien among his fellow-citizens, and is unmarried at thirty-five years of age, let

still

money, as was said beunmarried that the treasurers of Here were to exact the money, or pay the exact the

fore about the

—

fine themselves.

The first

betrothal by a father shall be valid in the degree, that by a grandfather in the second

degree, and in the third degree, betrothal by

who have the same father; but if there none of these alive, the betrothal by a mother shall be valid in like manner; in cases of unexampled fatality, the next of kin and the brothers

Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, and let us remember what was said before that a man should cling to immortality, [jJ4] and leave behind him children's children to be the servants of God in his place for ever. All this and much more may be truly said by way of prelude about the duty of marriage. But if a man will not listen, and remains unsocial

Gods

of these

him pay

a yearly fine;

—he who

is

of the highest

are

guardians

shall

have authority.

What

are to be

the rites before marriages, or any other sacred acts, relating either to future, present,

or past marriages, /7757 shall be referred to the interpreters; and he who follows their advice may be satisfied. Touching the marriage festival,

they shall assemble not

more than

and hxe female friends of both

number of members

five

families,

male and a

pay a fine of a hundred drachmae, and he who is of the second class a fine of seventy drachmae; the third class shall pay sixty drachmae, and the fourth thirty drachmae, and let the money be sacred to Here; he

like

who

census of each decreases: all men shall praise him who is obedient to the law; but he who is disobedient shall be punished by the guardians

class shall

does not pay the fine annually shall

owe

which the treasurer of the goddess shall exact; and if he fails in doing so, let him be answerable and give an account of ten times the sum,

money

the

marry

show

refuses to

in money, and honour which the younglet no young man volun-

punished

shall be thus

also be deprived of

er

He who

at his audit.

all

to the elder;

obey him, and, if he attempt to punish any one, let every one come to the rescue and defend the injured person, and he who is present and does not come to the rescue, shall be pronounced by the law to be a coward and a bad citizen. Of the marriage portion I have already spoken;" and again I say for the instruction of poor men that he who neither gives nor receives a dowry on account of poverty, has a compensation; for the citizens of our state are provided with the necessaries of life, and wives tarily

and husbands them on account

will be less likely to be insolent, to be

mean and

of property.

subservient to

And

he

who obeys this law will do who will not obey, and

a noble action; but he

gives or receives

more than

fifty

drachmae

the price of the marriage garments

as

he be of the lowest, or more than a mina, or a minaand-a-half, if he be of the third or second classes, or two minae if he be of the highest class, shall

and

owe that

sacred to 1

if

to the public treasury a similar sum, which is given or received shall be Here and Zeus; and let the treasurers

Cf. iv. 721.

a

Cf. v. 742.

of the family of either

and no man shall spend more than his means will allow; he who is of the richest class may spend a mina he who is of the second, half a mina, and in the same proportion as the sex,

—

of the

law

as a

man wanting

in true taste,

and

uninstructed in the laws of bridal song. Drunkenness is always improper, except at the festivals of the God who gave wine; and peculiarly dangerous, when a man is engaged in the business of marriage; at such a crisis of their lives a bride

and bridegroom ought to have all their them they ought to take care that

—

wits about ings; for

them

may

be born of reasonable beon what day or night Heaven will give

their offspring

increase,

ought not

who

can say? Moreover, they

to be begetting children

when

their

bodies are dissipated by intoxication, but their offspring should be compact and solid, quiet

and compounded properly; whereas the drunkard is all abroad in all his actions, and beside himself both in body and soul. Wherefore, also, the drunken man is bad and unsteady in sowing the seed of increase, and is likely to beget who will be unstable and untrustworthy, and cannot be expected to walk straight

offspring

body or mind. Hence during the whole year and all his life long, and especially while he is begetting children, he ought to take care and not intentionally do what is injurious to health, or what involves insolence and wrong; for he cannot help leaving the impression of himself on the souls and bodies of his offspring, and he begets children in every way either in

LAWS And

on the day and night of marriage should a man abstain from such things. For the beginning, which is also a God inferior.

especially

dwelling in man, [776] preserves all things, if meet with proper respect from each individual. He who marries is further to consider that one of the two houses in the lot is the nest and nursery of his young, and there he is to marry and make a home for himself and bring up his

VI

709

sense ought to trust

them? And the wisest of

our poets, speaking of Zeus, says:

away half the understandthe day of slavery subdues.

Far-seeing Zeus takes

men whom

ing of

it

away from

and mother. For in friendships there must be some degree of desire, in order to cement and bind tochildren, going

his father

gether diversities of character; but excessive intercourse not having the desire which is created by time, insensibly dissolves friendships from a feeling of satiety;

wherefore a

man and

his

wife shall leave to his and her father and mother their own dwelling-places, and themselves go as to a colony and dwell there, and visit and be visited by their parents; and they shall beget and bring up children, handing on the torch of life from one generation to another, and worshipping the Gods according to law for ever. In the next place, we have to consider what sort of property will be most convenient. There

no

understanding or acquiring most kinds of property, but there is

is

difficulty either in

great difficulty in

what

relates to slaves.

And

we

speak about them in a way which is right and which is not right; for what we say about our slaves is consistent and also inconsistent with our practice about them. Megillus. I do not understand, Stranger, the reason

is

that

what you mean. Ath.

am

not surprised, Megillus, for the Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving I

state of the

and some condemning

it;

there

is

less

dispute

about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae. Looking at these and the like examples, what ought we to do concerning property in slaves? I made a remark, in passing, which naturally elicited a question about my meaning from you. It was this: We know that all would agree that we should have the best and most attached slaves whom we can get. For many a man has found his slaves better in every way than brethren or sons, and many times they have saved the lives and property of their masters and their whole house such tales are well known. Meg. To be sure. Ath. But may we not also say that the soul of

—

—

the slave

is

utterly corrupt,

and that no

man

[777] Different persons have got these two different notions of slaves in their minds some of them

—

utterly distrust their servants, and, as

they

—

country, Stranger, seeing that there are such differences in the treatment of slaves by their

owners ? Ath. Well, Cleinias, there can be no doubt man is a troublesome animal, and therefore he is not very manageable, nor likely to become so, when you attempt to introduce the necessary division of slave, and freeman, and that

master. Cle.

That

is

obvious.

Ath. He is a troublesome piece of goods, as has been often shown by the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which happen in states having many slaves who speak the same language, and the numerous

and lawless life of the Italian banthey are called. man who considers

robberies ditti, as all

this

A

is

fairly at a loss.

—

Two

remedies alone

remain to us not to have the slaves of the same country, nor if possible, speaking the same 1

language; in this way they will more easily be held in subjection: secondly, we should tend them carefully, not only out of regard to them, but yet more out of respect to ourselves. And the right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if possible, even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he who naturally and genuinely reverences justice, and hates injustice,

is

ered in his dealings with any class of

whom

he can easily be unjust.

And

he

discov-

men who

to in

regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best

sow

the seeds of virtue in them;

and

this

may

be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having authority in relation to his inferiors. Slaves ought to be punished as they deserve, and not admonished as if they were freemen, which will only make them conceited. [778] The language used to a servant 1

of

if

were wild beasts, chastise them with goads and whips, and make their souls three times, or rather many times, as slavish as they were before; and others do just the opposite. Meg. True. Cle. Then what are we to do in our own

Cf. Aristotle, Politics,

vii. 10,

1330

a

23-33.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

710

1

ought always to be that of a command, and we ought not to jest with them, whether they are males or females this is a foolish way which many people have of setting up their slaves, and making the life of servitude more disagreeable both for them and for their masters. Cle. True. Ath. Now that each of the citizens is provided, as far as possible, with a sufficient number of suitable slaves who can help him in what he

—

has to do,

we may

next proceed to describe

their dwellings.

The

city

being

new and

hitherto unin-

habited, care ought to be taken of

all

the build-

and the manner of building each of them, and also of the temples and walls. These, Cleinias, were matters which properly came before ings,

the marriages; but, as is

no objection

to

we

are only talking, there

changing the order.

ever, our plan of legislation

is

If,

how-

ever to take

ef-

then the house shall precede the marriage so will, and afterwards we will come to the regulations about marriage; but at present we are only describing these matters in a genfect, if

God

eral outline.

Cle. Quite true.

The temples

round on the 2 heights in a circle, for the sake of defence and Near the temples are to of purity. for the sake be placed buildings for the magistrates and the courts of law; in these plaintiff and defendant will receive their due, and the places will be regarded as most holy, pardy because they have to do with holy things, and partly because they are the dwelling-places of holy Gods: and in them will be held the courts in which cases of homicide and other trials of capital offenses may fitly take place. As to the walls, Megillus, I Ath.

the agora,

are to be placed

and the whole

city

all

built

agree with Sparta in thinking that they should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them; ' there is a poetical saying,

which

"walls ought to be of of earth"; besides,

finely expressed, that

is

steel

how

and

iron,

and not

ridiculous of us to be

sending out our young men annually into the country to dig and to trench, and to keep off the enemy by fortifications, under the idea that they are not to be allowed to set foot in our territory, and then, that we should surround ourselves with a wall, which, in the first place, is by no means conducive to the health of cities, 1 2

Cf. Aristotle, Politics,

Cf

•CL

i.

a

Ibid., vii. 12, 1331 Ibid., ii,

is

in the

also apt to

minds

produce

a certain effeminacy

of the inhabitants, inviting

men

run thither instead ot repelling their enemies, /77a/ and leading them to imagine that their safety is due not to their keeping guard day and night, but that when they are protected by walls and gates, then they may sleep in salety; as if they were not meant to labour, and to

know

did not

that true repose

comes from

la-

bour, and that disgrace! ul

indolence and a only the renewal of

temper of mind is But if men must have walls, the private houses ought to be so arranged from the first that the whole city may be one wall, having all the houses capable of defence by reason of their uniformity and equality towards the streets.* The form of the city being that of a single dwelling will have an agreeable aspect, and being easily guarded will be infinitely betcareless

trouble.

Very good.

Cle.

Ath.

and

b

1330

13,

1260

29-31.

3i-35-

b

2-8.

ter for security. Until the original building is completed, these should be the principal objects

of the inhabitants;

and the wardens of the

city

should superintend the work, and should impose a fine on him who is negligent; and in all that relates to the city they should have a care of cleanliness, and not allow a private person to encroach upon any public property either by buildings or excavations. Further, they ought to take care that the rains from heaven flow off easily, and of any other matters which may have to be administered either within or without the city. The guardians of the law shall pass any further enactments which their experience may show to be necessary, and supply any other points in which the law may be deficient.

And now

that these matters,

and the

buildings about the agora, and the gymnasia,

and places of instruction, and theatres, are all ready and waiting for scholars and spectators, let us proceed to the subjects which follow marriage in the order of legislation. Cle. By all means. Ath. Assuming that marriages exist already, Cleinias, the mode of life during the year after marriage, before children are born, will follow

next in order. In what

way

bride and bride-

which is to be matter not at all easy for us to determine. There have been many difficulties already, but this will be the greatest of them, and the most disagreeable to the many. Still I cannot but say what appears to me to be right and true, Cleinias.

groom ought

to live in a city

superior to other

cities, is a

[j8o] Cle. Certainly. Ath.

He who

imagines that he can give laws

'Ct.lbid., 11, 1330

b

21-27.

LAWS for the public conduct of states, while he leaves the private life of citizens wholly to take care of itself; who thinks that individuals may pass

the day as they please, necessity of order in

gives

up

all

and

that there

things; he,

I

no

is

say,

the control of their private lives,

who and

supposes that they will conform to law in their common and public life, is making a great mistake.

Why

have

I

made

this

remark? Why,

be-

cause I am going to enact that the bridegrooms should live at the common tables, just as they did before marriage. This was a singularity

when

enacted by the legislator in your parts of the world, Megillus and Cleinias, as I should suppose, on the occasion of some war or 1 other similar danger, which caused the passing of the law, and which would be likely to occur in thinly-peopled places, and in times of pressure. But when men had once tried and been accustomed to a common table, experience first

conduced to security; and in some such manner the custom of having common tables arose among you. Cle. Likely enough. Ath. I said that there may have been singularity and danger in imposing such a custom at first, but that now there is not the same difficulty. There is, however, another institution which is the natural sequel to this, and would be excellent, if it existed anywhere, but at present it does not. The institution of which I am

showed

that the institution greatly

about to speak

not easily described or exelike the legislator "combing wool into the fire," as people say, or performing any other impossible and useless feat. Cle. What is the cause, Stranger, of this excuted; and

is

would be

treme hesitation? Ath. You shall hear without any fruitless loss of time. That which has law and order in a state is the cause of every good, but that which disordered or ill-ordered is often the ruin of which is well-ordered; [j8i] and at this point the argument is now waiting. For with you, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables is

that

of

men

are, as

I

heaven-born and admiryou are mistaken in leavunregulated by law. They have said, a

able institution, but

ing the

women

no similar

institution of public tables in the

VI

711

have been far better, if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter,

2

but in proportion as woman's nature is inferior to that of men in capacity for virtue, in that degree the

consequence of such neglect as important.

The

more than twice

is

careful consideration of this

matter, and the arranging and ordering on a common principle of all our institutions relat-

ing both to

men and women,

greatly conduces

to the happiness of the state.

such

is

But at present, the unfortunate condition of mankind,

no man of sense will even venture to speak common tables in places and cities in which

that of

they have never been established at all; and how can any one avoid being utterly ridiculous,

who

attempts to compel women to show in how much they eat and drink? There is

public

which the sex is more likely to take For women are accustomed to creep into dark places, and when dragged out into the light they will exert their utmost powers of resistance, and be far too much for the legislator. And therefore, as I said before, in most places they will not endure to have the truth spoken without raising a tremendous outcry, but in this state perhaps they may. And if we may assume that our whole discussion about the state has not been mere idle talk, I should like to prove to you, if you will consent to listen, that this institution is good and proper; but if you had rather not, I will refrain. Cle. There is nothing which we should both of us like better, Stranger, than to hear what you have to say. Ath. Very good; and you must not be surprised if I go back a little, for we have plenty of leisure, and there is nothing to prevent us from considering in every point of view the nothing

at

offence.

subject of law. Cle. True.

Then let us return once more to what we were saying at first. Every man should understand that the human race either had no beAth.

ginning at all, and will never have an end, but always will be and has been; [782] or that it 3 began an immense while ago.

and just that part of the human which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness I mean

tions

the female sex

pursuits both orderly

light of day,

Cle. Certainly.

race

Ath. Well, and have there not been constitu-

—has been

tion by the legislator,

And,

—

left

which

is

without regulaa great mistake.

consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might in

'Cf.i.o^^.

and destructions of states, and all sorts of and disorderly, and diverse desires of meats and drinks always, and in all the world, and all sorts of changes of the 2

3

Aristotle, Politics,

C£.

iii.

676.

i.

13,

1260

b

8-24.

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

712

may be expected to have undergone innumerable transformations of themselves? seasons in which animals

Cle.

No

doubt.

And may we

Ath.

not suppose that vines ap-

peared, which had previously no existence, and also olives, and the gifts of Demeter and her

daughter, of which one Triptolemus was the minister, and that, before these existed, animals took to devouring each other as they do still? Cle. True.

Ath. Again, the practice of men sacrificing one another still exists among many nations; while, on the other hand, we hear of other human beings who did not even venture to taste the flesh of a cow and had no animal sacrifices, but only cakes and fruits dipped in honey, and similar pure offerings, but no flesh of animals; from these they abstained under the idea that they ought not to eat them, and might not stain the altars of the Gods with blood. For in those days men are said to have lived a sort of Orphic life, having the use of all lifeless things, but abstaining from all living things. Cle. Such has been the constant tradition, and is very likely true.

Some one might

Ath.

say to us,

What

is

the

drift of all this?

Cle.

A

ias, if I

very pertinent question, Stranger.

And

Ath.

therefore

can, to

draw

I

will

endeavour, Clein-

the natural inference.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath.

upon is

I

see that

among men

three wants

virtue,

opposite

if if

and

all

things depend

desires, of

which the end

they are rightly led by them, or the wrongly. Now these are eating and

drinking, which begin at birth

—every animal

has a natural desire for them, and is violently and rebels against him who says that

excited,

all his pleasures and appeand get rid of all the corresponding pains and the third and greatest and [78]] sharpest want and desire breaks out last, and is the fire of sexual lust, which kindles in men every species of wantonness and madness. And these three disorders we must endeavour to master by the three great principles of fear and law and right reason; turning them away from that which is called pleasantest to the best, using the Muses and the Gods who preside over contests to extinguish their increase and influx. But to return: After marriage let us speak of the birth of children, and after their birth of their nurture and education. In the course

he must not satisfy tites,

—

—

of discussion the several laws will be perfected,

and we

shall at last arrive at the

common

ta-

Whether such associations are to be conmen, or extended to women also, we shall see better when we approach and take a nearer view of them; and we may then determine what previous institutions are required and will have to precede them. As I said before, we shall see them more in detail, and shall be bles.

fined to

down

better able to lay

the laws

which

are

proper or suited to them. Cle.

Very

true.

Ath. Let us keep in mind the words which have now been spoken; for hereafter there may be need of them. Cle. What do you bid us keep in mind?

Ath. That which

words

the three

—

we comprehended under

first,

eating, secondly, drink-

ing, thirdly, the excitement of love.

Cle.

We shall be sure to remember, Stranger.

Ath. Very good. Then let us now proceed to marriage, and teach persons in what way they shall beget children, threatening them, if they disobey, with the terrors of the law. Cle.

Ath.

What do you mean? The bride and bridegroom

should con-

produce for the state the specimens of children which

sider that they are to best

and

fairest

they can.

Now

all

men who

are associated in

any action always succeed when they attend and give their mind to what they are doing, but when they do not give their mind or have no mind, they fail: wherefore let the bridegroom give his mind to the bride and to the begetting of children, and the bride in like manner give her mind to the bridegroom, and particularly at the time when their children are not yet born. [784] And let the women whom be the overseers of such mat-

we have chosen

them

in whatever number, large whatever time the magistrates may command, assemble every day in the temple of Eileithyla during a third part of the day, and being there assembled, let them inform one another of any one whom they see, whether ters,

and

or small,

man

or

let

and

at

woman,

of those

who

are begetting

children, disregarding the ordinances given at

when the nuptial sacrifices and ceremonies were performed. Let the begetting of children and the supervision of those who are begetting them continue ten years and no longer, during the time when marriage is fruitful. But if any continue without children up to this time, let them take counsel with their kindred and with the women holding the office of overseer and be divorced for their mutual benefit. If, however, any dispute arises about what is proper and for the interest of either party, they the time

LAWS shall choose ten of the guardians of the law and abide by their permission and appointment. The women who preside over these matters

houses of the young, and and partly by threats them give over their folly and error: if

shall enter into the

VII

713

military service, let the time of service be after she shall have brought forth children up to fifty years of age; and let regard be had to what is

possible

and suitable

partly by admonitions

make

women

go and tell the guardians of the law, and the guardians shall prevent them. But if they too cannot prevent them, they shall bring the matter before the people; and let them write up their names and make oath that they cannot reform such and such an one; and let him who is thus written up, if he cannot in a court of law convict those who have inscribed his name, be deprived of they persist,

let

the

to each.

BOOK

VII

And now, assuming

[j88]

sexes to have been born,

it

children of both

will be proper for us

to consider, in the next place, their nurture and education; this cannot be left altogether un-

noticed,

and

yet

may

be thought a subject fitted

rather for precept and admonition than for law.

the privileges o£ a citizen in the following re-

life there are many little things, not always apparent, arising out of the pleasures and pains and desires of individuals, which run counter to the intention of the legislator, and

let him not go to weddings nor to the spects: thanksgivings after the birth of children; and

dissimilar:

—

if he go, let any one who pleases strike him with impunity; and let the same regulations hold about women: let not a woman be allowed to appear abroad, or receive honour, or go to

nuptial and birthday festivals,

manner be written up

she in like

if

as acting disorderly

and

cannot obtain a verdict. And if, when they themselves have done begetting children according to the law, a man or woman have connection with another man or woman who are still begetting children, let the same penalties be inflicted upon them as upon those who are still having a family; and when the time for

procreation has passed

who and

the

let

man

or

woman

refrains in such matters be held in esteem,

those

let

who do

contrary of esteem

Now,

esteem.

if

not refrain be held in the

—that

is

to say,

[j8$]

the greater part of

dis-

mankind

behave modestly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber; but, if they are disorderly, the enactments having been passed, let them be carried into execution. To every man the first year is the beginning of life, and the time of birth ought to be written down in the temples

In private

make

the characters of the citizens various

—

this is

an

evil in states; for

and

by rea-

son of their smallness and frequent occurrence, would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in making them penal by law; and if made penal, they are the destruction of the written law because mankind get the habit of frequendy transgressing the law in small matters. The result is that you cannot legislate about them, and still less can you be silent. I speak somewhat darkly, but I shall endeavour also to bring my wares into the light of day, for there

I

acknowledge that

clearness in Cleinias.

at present there

what I am Very true.

is

a

want of

saying.

Am

I not right in mainAthenian Stranger. taining that a good education is that which tends most to the improvement of mind and body? Cle. Undoubtedly. Ath. And nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies are those which grow up from infancy in the best and straightest manner?

Cle. Certainly.

And do we not further observe that the shoot of every living thing is by far the

Ath. first

and

Many

even contend

of their fathers as the beginning of existence

greatest

whether boy or girl. Let every phratria have inscribed on a whited wall the names of the successive archons by whom the

that a

And near to them let the members of the phratria be inscribed, and when they depart life let them be erased. The limit of marriageable ages for a woman

Ath. Well, and is not rapid growth without proper and abundant exercise the source of end-

to every child,

years are reckoned. living

shall be

from

sixteen to twenty years at the

longest

for a

man, from

years;

a

man

—

and

let a

if

woman

at thirty years.

from twenty

thirty to thirty-five

hold office at forty, and Let a man go out to war

to sixty years,

there appear any need to

and

for a

make

woman,

use of her in

man

the height

fullest?

at twenty-five

will

does not reach twice

which he attained

at five.

Cle. True.

less evils in the

body?

Cle. Yes.

[j8g] Ath. And the body should have the most exercise when it receives most nourish-

ment ? Cle. But, Stranger, are

great fants?

amount

of exercise

we

to

impose

this

upon newly-born

in-

DIALOGUES OF PLATO

714

Ath. Nay, rather on the bodies of infants still unborn. Cle. What do you mean, my good sir? In the

Ath, Ridicule, and the difficulty of getting the feminine and servant-like dispositions of the nurses to comply.

process of gestation? Ath. Exactly. I am not at

of the matter at

you have never heard of

Cle. all

surprised that

which, although strange,

I

little

will

creatures,

endeavour

to

explain to you. Cle.

By

all

Ath.

this very peculiar sort

of gymnastic applied to such

means.

arrive at a true conviction that without

is to say, not their own health, but the health of the birds; whereby they prove to any intelligent person, that all bodies are

of health, that

benefited by shakings and movements,

moved without

when

weariness, whether the

motion proceeds from themselves, or is caused by a swing, or at sea, or on horseback, or by other bodies in whatever way moving, and that thus gaining the mastery over food and drink, they are able to impart beauty and health and strength. But admitting all this, what follows? Shall we make a ridiculous law that the pregnant woman shall walk about and fashion the

we

fashion

wax

before

it

hardens, and after birth swathe the infant for two years? Suppose that we compel nurses, under penalty of a legal fine, to be always carrying the children somewhere or other, either to the temples, or into the country, or to their relations' houses, until they are well able to stand, to take care that their

torted by leaning on

young

2

—they

limbs are not

them when they

dis-

are too

should continue to carry them until the infant has completed its third year; the nurses should be strong, and there should be more than one of them. Shall these be our rules, and shall we impose a penalty for the neglect of them? [790] No, no; the penalty of which we were speaking will fall upon our own heads more than enough. Cle. What penalty? 1 2

due

life in cities, stability

in

down of laws is hardly to be expected; and he who makes this reflection may himself adopt the laws just now mentioned, and, adopting them, may order his house and a

state well

Cf. Republic, v. 459. Cf. Aristotle, Politics,

and be happy. enough.

Cle. Likely

1

and

The reason is that masters and freemen when they hear of it. are very likely to

the laying

keeping quails and cocks, which they train to fight one another. And they are far from thinking that the contests in which they stir them up to fight with one another are sufficient exercise; for, in addition to this, they carry them about tucked beneath their armpits, holding the smaller birds in their hands, the larger under their arms, and go for a walk of a great many miles for the sake

as

there any need to speak

r

in states,

sons, are in the habit of

embryo within

all

regulation of private

Ath. The practice is more easy for us to understand than for you, by reason of certain amusements which are carried to excess by us at Athens. Not only boys, but often older per-

they are

Then why was

Ath.

And

therefore

legislation until

let

us proceed with our

we have determined

the exer-

which are suited to the souls of young children, in the same manner in which we have begun to go through the rules relating to their cises

bodies. Cle. By all means. Ath. Let us assume, then, as a first principle in relation both to the body and soul of very young creatures, that nursing and movingabout by day and night is good for them all, and that

the younger they are, the *

it;

if

infants should live,

if

more they that

were

will

need

possible, as

they were always rocking at sea. This

is

—

of this?

The reason is obvious. What Ath. The affection both of Ath. Cle.

3

the Bacchantes

and of the children is an emotion of fear, which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this [ygi] sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the children to sleep, and 3

vii. 17,

1336

*

8-15.

the

which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their resdess children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music. Cle. Well, Stranger, and what is the reason lesson

Cf. Republic, v. 449. *Cf. Aristotle, Politics,

vii.

17,

1336* 8-15.

— LAWS making

VII

715

and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their frenzy. And, to express what I mean in a word, there is a good

be pleased, but, when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate. Now the time which is thus spent is no less than three years, and is a very considerable portion of life to be passed

deal to be said in favour of this treatment.

ill

awake, the

the Bacchantes, although they remain

dance

to

Gods

to

with the help of they offer acceptable sacri-

to the pipe

whom

fices,

or well. Cle. True.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. But to infer

if

be

Ath. Does not the discontented and ungracious nature appear to you to be full of lamenta-

facts, that

from youth upward fears, will

power we ought

every soul which has been familiar with

fear has such a

from these

made more

1

every one will allow that this a habit of cowardice Cle.

No

and the way to form

liable to fear, is

and not of courage.

doubt.

Ath. And, on the other hand, the habit of overcoming, from our youth upwards, the fears

and

terrors

which

beset us,

may

be said to be

an exercise of courage. Cle. True. Ath. And we may say that the use of exercise and motion in the earliest years of life greatly contributes to create a part of virtue in the soul. Cle. Quite true. Ath. Further, a cheerful temper, or the reverse, may be regarded as having much to do with high spirit on the one hand, or with cow-

ardice Cle.

on the other.

To

be sure.

Then now we must endeavour to show how and to what extent we may, if we please, Ath.

without

difficulty

implant either character in

the young. Cle. Certainly.

Ath. There is a common opinion, that luxury makes the disposition of youth discontented and irascible and vehemently excited by

on the other hand excessive and savage servitude makes men mean and abject, and haters of their kind, and therefore makes them undesirable associates. Cle. But how must the state educate those who do not as yet understand the language of the country, and are therefore incapable of appreciating any sort of instruction? Ath. I will tell you how: Every animal that is born is wont to utter some cry, and this is especially the case with man, and he is also affected with the inclination to weep more than trifles;

that

—

any other animal. Cle. Quite true. Ath. Do not nurses, when they want to know what an infant desires, [J92] judge by these signs? when anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to

—

1

Cf. Republic,

iii.

386.

and sorrows more than

tions

a

good man ought

to be?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Well, but if during these three years every possible care were taken that our nursling should have as little of sorrow and fear, and in general of pain as was possible, might we not expect in early childhood to make his

more

2

and cheerful ? be sure, Stranger more especially if we could procure him a variety of pleasures. Ath. There I can no longer agree, Cleinias: you amaze me. To bring him up in such a way would be his utter ruin; for the beginning is always the most critical part of education. Let us see whether I am right. Cle. Proceed. Ath. The point about which you and I differ is of great importance, and I hope that you, Megillus, will help to decide between us. For I maintain that the true life should neither seek for pleasures, nor, on the other hand, entirely avoid pains, but should embrace the middle 3 state, which I just spoke of as gentle and benign, and is a state which we by some divine presage and inspiration rightly ascribe to God. soul

Now,

gentle

—

To

Cle.

I

say,

he

among men,

too,

divine ought to pursue after this

who would be mean habit

he should not rush headlong into pleasures, for he will not be free from pains; nor should we allow any one, young or old, male or female, to be thus given any more than ourselves, and least of all the newly-born infant, for in infancy more than at any other time the character is engrained by habit. Nay, more, if I were not afraid of appearing to be ridiculous, I would say that a woman during her year of pregnancy should of all women be most carefully tended, and kept from violent or excessive pleasures and pains, and should at that time cultivate gentleness and benevolence and kindness. [793] C/