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TH E

SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province Revised by Daniel J. Sullivan

VOLUME

I

William Benton, Publisher

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, CHICAGO LONDON TORONTO •

•

1923

INC.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Thomas Aquinas,

St.

At the end of 1224 or the beginning Thomas was born at Roccasccca, near

of 1225

in the ancestral castle of the counts of

Aquino.

He was fo,

Naples,

the seventh and youngest son of Landul-

received his baccalaureate and, on the recommendation of his master, was sent back to Pari.s to teach and to prepare for becoming a master in theology.

the head of one of the most illustrious fami-

nephew to Frederick Barbarossa. His mother, Countess Teodora Car-

lies

of Southern Italy and

was a dcscendcnt of the Normans who wrested Sicily from the Saracens. Landulfo and racciolo,

were closely involved

his sons

between Frederick

II

in

the struggle

and the pope, and

in

1229

they besieged and plundered the papal stronghold of

Monte

In connection with the

Cas.«;ino.

1225-1274

c.

In 1252

Thomas

life

and which was

Sentences of Peter Lombard. popularity as a teacher

sent to the

attacked

Monte

Cassino, and

Thomas

returned

To

founded

continue his education Thoma.s attended

the University of Naples, where he followed the

course in liberal arts. While there he became ac-

quainted with the Dominicans,

who had opened

One

He

enjoyed great

of his students later

a

new articles into new and clear method of

investigation and synthesis, and developed new proofs in his argumentation.” Although the university required that a master in

theology be at least thirty-four years old, as, after a

Thom-

papal di.spensation, was given his de-

gree in 1256, w’hen

and ap)pointed to

to his family.

every great

recorded that “he introduced

.scientific

wa.'^

hope that he would one day become its abbot. His stay there lasted for nine years, during which he received his preliminary ediKation. In 1239 the emperor again

in

the basic theological text-book of the day, the

who was

then in his fifth year,

him

upon the Scriptures and

bachelor, he lectured

his lectures,

as an oblate with the

to involve

intellectual conflict of the time. Beginning as a

peace settlement of the following year, Thomas,

Abbey

entered upon the teaching

career to w^hich he was to devote the rest of his

little

fill

more than

thirty-one,

one of the two chairs

al-

lowed the Dominicans at the university. Almost immediately after entering upon his university career, Thomas was called upon to defend the right of the new religious orders to

In 1244 Thomas, against the wishes of hi? family, took the habit of the Dominican^' and set out

at the university. Thomas and his friend Bonaventure became respectively the spokesmen for the Dominicans and the Franciscans

for Paris witli the master-general to study theol-

aguinstulJic charges

ogy. His father had recently died, and his moth-

of

a school of theology as part of the university.

er, in

an effort to alter Thomas’ decision, sent

atmy

her two elder sons from the imperial seize

him and hold him

prisoner.

He

did not

to both the

’ok^r accusations, Thomas showed

ol)-

all

the necessary qualifications.

nothing could shake his determination. his

theology at the Dominican convent. His master there was Albert the Great, w'ho

utation

own

pope and

Thomas began

the secular clerics

his

the emperor and his family had discovered that

Arriving in Paris in 1245,

made by

university. Besides providing written ref-

t}ie

to

tain his release until the following year alter the

Dominicans had appealed

teach

was beginning

to be known as the champion of Aristotle, who.se complete works, recovered from Arabic sources,

work

As part

hundred and fifty-three scholastic disputations which constitute his treatise Dc veritatc. It was also at this time that he began, perhaps at the

request of the famous missionary,

Penafort, the

In

12

Summa

Raymond

59, after three years of theological teach-

ing as a master at Paris,

He

Thomas returned

first at

then at the Dominican convent in

Thomas with him as his particular more of study, Thomas

Italy.

of

contra Gentiles.

a Dominican house of studies at Cologne in 1248, he took

of his

he held during the three academic years between 1256 and 1259 the two at this period

were coming into general use at the University of Paris. When Albert was appointed to organize

student. After four years

by

tca^iiig that the religious orders had

to

remained there nine years, residing

the papal curia at Anagni

and Orvieto, Rome, and

again with the pope at Viterbo. Offers to

make

him £\rchbishop of Naples or abbot of Monte

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Cassino were turned down so that he might continue his teaching. He commented on the Scriptures, lectured

on canon law, at the request of

the pope compiled the Catena Atirea of the glosses on the Gospels, and wrote a work aiming

Greek church with of the feast of Corpus

at the reconciliation of the

Rome, On Christi,

the institution

he was chosen to provide

for which he wrote the

office,

its

liturgical

hymns, Pange

lingua gloriosi corporis mysierii(m,Sacris solemniis juncta sint gaudia, and the Verhum super-

mm

prodiens. Also with papal encouragement Thomas then began his exposition of the works

At the papal curia he met his conWilliam of Moerbeke, who at the sugges-

of Aristotle. frere,

tion of

Thomas began

istotle direct

a

new

translation of Ar-

from the Greek. Aided by a good

text, free of the corruptions that characterized

the versions taken from the Arabic, ITiomas be-

tween 1265 and 1260 commented on ihePhysks, Metaphysics, On the Soul, Ethics, Politics, and the Posterior Analytics.

At the beginning of 1269 Thomas was suddenly called back to Paris, where the conflict over Aristotle was coming to a climax. His activity in large part consisted, on the one hand, in refuting the Latin Averroisls of the Faculty of Arts

who were

presenting an Aristotelianism

seemingly incompatible with Christianity, and, on the other, in combatting the Augustinians of

Scriptural commentaries, the many disputations at this time, and particularly the Summa

he held

Theologica, which he had begun in Italy in 1 267. Thomas was recalled to Italy by his superiors in 1272 and charged with reorganizing all the theological courses of his order. Allowed the choice of location for his work, he returned to Naples. There at the university he lectured on

commented on ArisHeavens and On Generation and Corruption, and worked on the third the Psalms and St. Paul,

totle’s

On

part of the

the

Summa. He

also continued to write

special treatises at the requests of his friends,

as he

had done throughout

his life.

At the very

beginning of his career he had written for his fellow students the De ente et essentia; for the king of Cyprus he composed the De regiminc

principum; in the Platonic tradition he had commented on treatises of Boethius and the Liber de caiisis, which he showed was not a W’ork of Aristotle; as his life drew to its close he compo.sed numerous minor works on theology, in-

Compendium theologiae. Thomas came suddenly to an end on December 6, 1273. While saying mass that morning a great change came over cluding the

The

waiting career of

him, and afterwards he ceased to write or dictate.

Urged by

Summa,

his

companion

to complete the

he replied: “I can do no more; such

things have been revealed to

me

written .seems as straw, and I

now

tion of the text of Aristotle.

have end of my life.” Early the following year he was appointed by Pope Gregory X to attend the General Council of Lyons. Overcome by illness .sh(jrtly after his departure from Naples, he retired to the Cistercian monastery of Fossanova. There he commented on the Song of Solomon at

an.swcr both Augustinians

the request of the monks, and died,

expounding his

1274.

the Theological Faculty

who tended

to look

with

disfavor upon the use of Aristotle in theology.

Against the Averroists, tises,

Thomas wTotc two

De acter?iitate vtiindi

lectiis,

to prove that their

philosophically.

He

trea-

and De. imitate intclwork was not sound

also continued his exposi-

He had occasion to and Averroists while theological doctrine through

that

all I

aw^ait the

March

7,

GENERAL CONTENTS,

VOL.

I

Prologue

i

FIRST PART I.

II.

III.

(Complete)

Treatise on God (QQ. 1-26) Treatise on the Trinity (QQ. 27-43) Treatise on the Creation (QQ. 44-49)

238 269

(QQ- 65-74)

339

on Man (QQ. 75-102) Treatise on the Divine Government

378

(QQ. 103-119)

528

VI. Treatise

VII.

iS3

on the Angels (QQ. 50-64) Treatise on the Work of the Six Days

IV. Treatise

V.

3

SECOND PART Part

I

of the Second Part (Complete)

Prologue I.

II.

609

Treatise on the Last Treatise on

End (QQ.

Human Acts

vii

1-5)

609

(QQ. 6-48)

644

1

CONTENTS, VOLUME

Biographical Note Bibliography of Principal Referfnces

v xiii

Prologue

43.

FIRST PART

page ^

The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine 3 10 2. The Existence oj God 14 3. Oj The Simplicity oj God 20 4. The Perjection oj God 23 5. The Good in General 28 6. The Goodness oj God 31 7. The Infinity oj God 8. The Being oj God in Things 34 The Imtnut ability oj God 38 40 10 The Eternity oj God 46 11 The Unity oj God 12. How God is Known By Vs 50 62 13 The Nama oj God 14. Oj God's Knowledge 75 0i

15 Concerning Ideas

19. 20. 21.

22.

Concerning Truth Oj Falsity

94 100

The Life oj God The Will oj God God* s Love The Justice and Mercy oj God The Providence oj God

104

to8

the First Principle

the Creatures

256

49 The Cause oj Evil

264

0 / What

Absolutely Considered

Oj 52 Oj 53 Of ^4 Of Oj 56 Oj

51

The Knowledge

33.

Oj the Person

34.

0/

God

oj the Divine Persons

oj the Father

Oj the Image 36 Oj the Person the the

Name Name

oj the

oj the

Holy Ghost Holy Ghost-^Love Holy Ghost as Gijt

Compared

157

Oj the Persons Notional Acts

Knowledge

the

Medium

the Angels*

280

oj the Angels

2S4

oj the Angelic Knowledge 288 Knowledge oj Immaterial

0/

291

the Angels*

Knowledge

oj Material

294

Mode

oj the Angelic

Knowledge

'

300 306 310

314

Oj the Perjection oj the Angels in the Order oj Grace and oj Glory 317 The Malice oj the Angels with Regard to Sin

325

64 The Punishment oj the

Treatise on the

167 O5.

175

190 197

200 202

to the

Relations or Properties 41.

the

278

oj the Angels

Order oj Natural Being 62.

153

185

the Persons in Relation to the Essence

the Persons

Movement

59 The Will oj the Angels 60 Oj the Love or Dilection oj the Angels 61. Oj the Production oj the Angels in the

189

oj the

the Local

Things

Demons

213

The Work

66.

of the Six

333

Days

oj Creation oj Corporeal

339

Of the Order oj Creation with Regard

to

Distinction

343

Work oj Distinction in Itselj Work oj the Second Day (i^.Oj the Work oj the Third Day Regards 70. Oj the Work oj Adornment, the Fourth Day 71. Oj the Work oj the Fijth Day 72. Oj the Work oj the Sixth Day 67 Oj the 68 Oj the .

73.

Oj the Things That Belong Seventh

in Rejerence to the

217

Work

Creatures

180

Son

35.

37.0/ 38. Oj 39. Oj 40. Oj

the Angels in Relation to Place

Things 57.

17

the Person oj the

269

Comparison With Bodies 275

161 in

God

32.

the Angels in

127

Belongs to the Unity or

Plurality in

Oj the Substance oj the Angels

58 Oj the

150

259

Treatise on the Angels 50.

63.

31.

250

47 Oj the Distinction oj Things in General 48. The Distinction oj Things in Particular

Treatise on the Trinity

The Divine Persons The Plurality oj Persons

241

124

141

238

46 Oj The Beginning oj the Duration oj

143

27. The Procession oj the Divine Persons 28. The Divine Relations

30.

230

The Procession oj Creatures jtom God, and oj the First Cauw oj All Beings 45 The Mode oj Emanation oj Things jront

H9 332

Oj Predestination 24. The Book oj Lije 25 The Power oj God 26. Oj the Divine Happiness 23.

29.

224

The Mission oj the Divine Persons

44.

1.

18

the

Treatise on the Creation

God

QUESTION

17

PAGE

Among

Divine Persons

(Complete)

Treatise on

16.

QUESTION 42. 0 / Equality and Likeness

i

9

I

74.

362

367 368

to the

Day

Oj All the Seven Days in

349 354 359

3^9

Common

373

1

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FOOTNOTE REFERENCES Abbreviations II., and Bannwart, C., EnchiriSymholonm Dcjmiiionum et Declaralionutn de Rrbus Fidei d Morum, lOlh-iylh

Leipsig, JQ01-1927.

DZ-“I)enzinger, dion

edition

by

MA— Mansi,

Socrorum Conciliorum Novo

I).,

Amplissima

Collection

Paris

vols.,

54

j P , Fatrolofiiae Cursus CompleluSt Scries Gnicca, 166 vols., Paris, 1857-1866.

PL— Mk.ne,

Uinberg, Freiburg, 1928.

J.

J.

PG— Mignf,

P,

j.

Pniroloj^iae

Cursus CompkiuSt

Series Latina, 217 vols. text, 4 vols. indices,

el

and

Paris, 1844-1855.

Sources Abelard, Openly PL

Ado

60 vols

Paris, ,

Pskudo-Amhrosk, Epistola

178.

Sonclorum, ed.

liollandus,

I

and others [PL],

1863-1870 and 6

vols., Jirusscls,

Ad

Aoatiio, Lpislola

Augustus ImpcratoreSy

]‘4)islola 111

38 vols

Romonoe

F.phtohi Agothonis ci

,

2

1

o,

O2 -084. 1

Great, Opera, cd A. Porgnet [PO],

PL

PL

Seutemiariim

.sii); CL IV, 13 (222*15).

*

See Q. XLVI, A.

*

it

first

movement,

whole. But time has a before and an after.

it

Philosopher^

3.

as said in the Physics,^

share in eternity

by the contemplation of God. Reply Obj. 2. The fire of hell

mode

Obj.

movement

therefore

eternities according as

only because

cording to substance.

in operation, like

still

it is

’PL 03, 858.

I,

Summa Theol., i, 65 (QR i,

Ans. 3i

S*

Aristotle, 12 (2 21 **28).

100).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

44

goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts; thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day, or of a year, which cannot be ap-

it

plied to eternity.

things

is

not

is

so.

Reply Obj. time, but

2.

The “now”

of time

differs in aspect

it

is

the

same

subject in the whole course of

its

able has the

same one subject

but and there; and movement. Likewise the in all time,

differs in aspect as being here

such alternation

is

“now”

flow of the

it

as time.

no before and

is

follows that in aitviternal

no difference between being,

And hence

eternity

ure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and

undergoes change,

it

recedes from eternity, and

subject to time. Therefore the being of things

corruptible, because

it

changeable,

is

is

not

measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable. Hence it not only measures movement, but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion. Article Time,

5.

The Dijjerence of

ALvitcrfiity

and

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. Obj. I. For Augustine says {Gen. ad. lity viii, “God moves

20, 22),^ that

ture through time.”

But

the spiritual crea-

aeviternity

is

said to be

the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore the 2

.

same

Further,

as aeviternity. it is

of the nature of time to

have before and after; but

it is

of the nature of

eternity to be simultaneously whole, as

shown above

in the first article.

not eternity, for

i), that eternal

it is

Wisdom is

PL 34, 388. aSg.

it is

im-

follows that it is impossible for them not to be in the future, which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing. Obj. 4. Further, since the duration of aeviterit

nal things

infinite as to

is

aeviternity

if

that

low's

which

is

is

subsequent duration,

simultaneou.sly whole,

some creature

is

it

fol-

actually infinite,

Therefore aeviternity does

impos.siblc.

not differ from time. Ofi the contrary, Boethius says {De. Consol. 9),^ “Who commandest time to separate out from aeviternity.” I answer that, ^viternity differs from time and from eternity as the mean between them both. This difference i^ explained by some^ to iii,

consist in the fact that eternity has neither be-

not the same as the “now” of time. Reply Obj. 3. As eternity is the proper measure of being itself, so time is the proper meas-

1

is

same

ginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no

is

is

there

the

there

same according

to both subject and aspect.

nity

if

as alternating in aspect, is

time. But eternity remains the

is

it is

Further,

after in aeviternity,

for since time

;

corresponds to movement, its “now” corresponds to what is movable, and the thing mov-

Obj.

and thus

having been, or going to be. Since then

as regards

time

3.

possible for aevitcrnal things not to have been,

difference,

Reply Obj. i. Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which time and eternity are the measure.

is

Obj.

these differences follow

that eternity

time

upon the esfrom the fact simultaneously whole, but that

not simultaneously whole but has before after;

and primary

Still

sential

is

and

Now

was

ieviter-

written (Ecclus.

end, and time both beginning and end. This difference, how'cver,

shown above even

preceding article, because

had always been, and some think,'* and even if

aeviiernal things

w'ould always be, as

they might sometimes sible to

God

which is poseven granted this, a^vibe distinguished from eterfail to be,

to allow',

would still and from time.

ternity nity,

Others’* assign the difference

between these no

three to consist in the fact that eternity has

before and after, but that time has both, to-

newness and oldness, and that and after without newness and oldness. This theory, however, involves a contradiction, which appe rs manifestly if newness and oldness be referred to the measure itself. For .since before and after of gether w'ith

iEviternity has before

duration cannot exist together,

before and

iter

receding of the

it

first

part of , i, Republic (478)* ^Metaph., iii, 3 (7Qr); Averroes, Vest, Vest., (IX,

is

not in some

Therefore one is not an addition to being. I answer that, One does not add any reality to being but, only the negation of division for one means undivided, being. From this very fact it is evident that one is convertible with being. Now every being is either simple or composite. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and potentially. But what is composite does not have being while its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in indivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being. Reply Obj. 1. Some, thinking that the one convertible with being is the same as the one which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato.^ seeing that the one convertible with being did not add any reality to being, but signified the substance of being as undivided, thought that the same applied to the one which is the principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that “numbers were the sub.stances of all things.” Avicenna,® however, on the contrary, considering that one which is the principle of number added a reality to the substance of being (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that the one convertible with being added a reality to the substance of beings, just as white adds to man. This, how1

a

ever,

is

addition to being, in the sense of limiting

* Cf.

Q.

di.sp.

m

though

may

it is

undivided accord-

be divided as regards what

is

outside the essence of the thing, as what

is

one

it

in subject

cause

and many

as to accidents; or be-

undivided actually, and divided powhat is one in the whole, and is in parts; in such a case a thing will be

it is

tentially, as

many

one absolutely, and many relatively. On the if it be undivided relatively, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in notion or in principle or cause, it will be many absolutely, and one relatively; as what are many in number and one in species, or one in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by one and by many, as it were by one absolutely, and by many relatively. For multitude itself would not be contained under being unless it were in some way contained under one. Thus Dionysius other hand,

says (Div, Nom., cap. ult.y that “there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one.

But what are many

in their parts, are one in and what are many in accidents are one in subject and what are many in number are one in species; and what are many in .species are one in genus and what are many in processions are one in principle.” Reply Obj. 3. It does not follow that it is futile to say being is one, since one adds some-

their whole;

;

;

thing to being according to reason.

Article 2. Whether One and Opposed?

Many

Are

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that one and many are not opposed. Objection i. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every multitude is *

Sect

2

(PG 3.

SVMMA THEOWGICA

48 in a certain

way

one, as appears from the pre-

ceding article. Therefore one

is

not opposed to

multitude.

01?j.

Further, no opposite thing

2.

stituted stituted

is

concon-

by its opposite. But multitude is by one. Therefore it is not opposed to

multitude. Further, one thing

3.

is

absolutely one

is

many, and con-

relatively

trariwise.

Reply Obj. 2. A whole is twofold. In one is homogeneous, it composed of like parts. In another sense it is heterogeneous, comsense

the contrary, Things which are opposed in

But

part has not the form of the multitude, the

idea are themselves opposed to each other.

the notion of one consists in indivisibility, and the

absolutely bad, or contrariwise; likewise, what

posed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole, as, for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous whole, however, every part lacks the form of the whole, as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of whole. Therefore since its

are not opposed.

On

solute being in the genus of substance, is nonbeing relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is

is

opposed to one thing. But few is opposed to many. Therefore one is not opposed to many. Obj. 4. Further, if one is opposed to multitude, it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided, and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous, because it would follow that one comes after multitude, and is defined by it, whereas, on the contrary, multitude is defined by one. Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition, which is inadmissible. Therefore one and many Obj.

(as being in potency) is nonbeing absolutely, that is, in act; or what is abrelative being

notion

multitude

of

Therefore one and

many

contains

division.

are opposed to each

is composed of unities, as a house composed of not houses; not, indeed, as

latter

is

if

unities constituted multitude so far as they are

way they

other.

undivided, in which

I answer that, One is opposed to many, but in various w'ays. The one which is the principle of number is opposed to multitude which is

multitude, but so far as they have being, as

number

that they arc not houses.

as the

measure

is

meas-

to the thing

ured. For “one has the nature of a primary

measure, and number one,” as

is

clear

is

multitude measured by

from the Metaphysics} But

the one which is convertible with being is opposed to multitude by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.

Reply Obj.

I.

No

away the being of negation in Philosopher.^

takes

the

privation entirely takes

a thing, since “privation

according

subject,”

every

Nevertheless

away some being; and

reason of

its

to

is

the

like.

which sense

in the first

is

it

as importing it

is

opposed to

some kind of

opposed

to

few.

sense two arc many, but not

:econd sense. Reply' Obj. 4. One

in the

is

opposed to

vatively, in so far as the notion of

many primany in-

volves division. Hence division must be prior to unity not absolutely, but acc' rding to the

And what

and

excess, in

way

taken in two ways:

scn.se

nature of our apprehension. For we apprehend

universality, the privation of be-

or of whiteness, and the

one, in another

is

the house by the fact

by

so in being,

its

to being applies also to one

Reply Obj. 3. Many and in that

ab.solutely,

Hence

make up

fact that they are beings, not

privation

foundation in being, which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight,

ing has

also the parts of a house

by the

are opposed to

applies

to good,

which

simple things by composite things; and hence

we

define a point to be,

are convertible wnth being, for the privation of

titude except

good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some onp thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing, and evil is some good thing, and nonbeing is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite, since one is absolute and the other is relative; for what is

to every part.

1 Aristotle, x, 1 (1052*^18); x, 6 (1057*3). ^Categories, 10 (i2'*26); Metaphysics, iv, 2 (1004*15).

“what has no part,” or

“the beginning of a line.” Multitude also, in idea, follows on one, becau.se we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of mul-

by the fact that we attribute unity Hence one is placed in the defini-

tion of multitude, but multitude

the definition

of one.

But

is

not placed in

division is undcr-

from the very negation of being, so what comes to the intellect is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion .stood first

of multitude.

FIRST FART Article

3.

ART

Q. 11.

Whether God Is One?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It seems that God is not one. Objection i. For it is written, For there he many gods and many lords (I Cor. 8. 5). 2.

Further, one, as the principle of

ber, cannot be predicated of tity is not predicated of

num-

God, since quan-

God;

likewise, neither

can one which is convertible with being be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one. On the contrary j It is wTitten, Hear, 0 Israel, the Lord our God is 07 i€ Lord (Deut. 6. 4). I answer that, It can be shown from three sources that

God

plicity. P'or it is

is

one. First

from His sim-

manifest that the reason

any singular thing

is

why

this particular thing is be-

it cannot be communicated to many; for by which Socrates is a man can be communicated to many, while what makes him this particular man is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to he this particular man, as there

cause that

many Socrates, so there could not in many men Now' this belongs to God alone, for God Himself is His own nature, cannot be that

way

be

was shown above (q. tit, a, ,3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God. and He is this God. It is impossible therefore that many Gods should exist. Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was showm above (q. iv, A. 2) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be

4

And

all

this

one. Since therefore what

perfect,

and

is

is

so per se and not

must be that the first which reone order should be only one. one is God.

accidentally,

duces

4

way

most

first is

Ohj.

^

are in some

it

into

i. Gods are called many by the some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: Our God is

Reply Obj.

error of

one, etc.

Reply Obj.

number

One which

2.

is

the principle of

not predicated of God, but only of things w'hich have being in matter. For one the principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematical things, which have being in matis

but are abstracted from matter according to

ter,

reason. But one which

is convertible with bemetaphysical entity, and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to

ing

a

is

us by w'ay only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal, and infinite. And in the same way it is said of God that He one.

is

as

absolutely perfect; but

them would be without for

many

gods to

exist.

if

a perfection, one of

it.

So

Hence

philosophers, constrained as itself,

when they

it

it

is

impossible

also the ancient

were by truth

asserted an infinite principle

asserted likewise that there

was only one such

principle.

Thirdly, this world. For

all

is

showm from the unity of the

things that exist are seen to be

ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not agree in one order unless they are ordered thereto by some

one being. For many things are reduced into one order by one better than by many, because one is the per se cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, in so far as they

Article

4.

Whether God

Is

Supremely One?

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It seems that God is not supremely one. Objection i. For one is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is not more one than other things which are called one. Obj. 2. Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point, and unity. But a thing is said to be more one according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more one than unity is one and a point is one. Obj. 3. Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore, what is essentially one is supremely one. But every being is essentially one, as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore every being is supremely one; and therefore God is not one more than any other being one.

is

On v):*

the contrary, Bernard says

“Among

of the Divine Trinity holds the / answer that, Since one ing, if

anything

(De Consid.

things called one, the unity

all

is

^

Metaphysics,

*

Chap. 8 (PL 182, 79g).

iv, 2

first

place.”

an undivided besupremely one it must be

(1003^32).

is

y

SUMMA TEEOWGICA

50

siipremely beings and supremely undivided, Now both of these belong to God. For He is

supremely being, since His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; for He is being itself, subsistent, undetermined in every way. But He is supremely undivided since He is divided neither actually nor potentially by any mode of division, for He is altogether simple, as was shown above (q. hi, A. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is one in the supreme degree. Reply Obj. i. Although privation considered not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to more and less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore, according as a thing is more divided or divisible, or less, or not at all, in that degree it is called more, or le.ss, or supremely, one. in itself is

Reply Obj.

2.

A

point and unity which

number

principle of

is

the

are not supremely being,

since they have being only in some subject. Hfence neither of them can be supremely one.

Whether the created inknows all at once what it sees in God? (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God? (12) Whether by

any

natural reason

it

of accident

and subject, so neither can an accident. Reply Obj. 3. Although every being is one by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of

some things

is

composed of many

things but others not.

How

QUESTION XII GOD IS KNOWN BY

US

(In Thirteen Articles)

Since up

He

is

to

now we have considered God we now go on to consider

in Himself,

what manner

how He

is

He

as in

knowledge, that is, known by creatures. Concerning this is

in our

Whethany created intellect can see the essence of God? (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created species? (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye? (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God? (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created there are thirteen points of inquiry, (i)

er

light in order to see the essence of God? (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another? (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God? (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God knows all things in it? (9) Whether what is there known is known by

we can know God

in this life?

(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?

Article i. Whether Any Created Intellect Can See the Essence of God?

We proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. Objection i. For Chrysostom (Horn, xiv, in JoanY commenting on John i. 18, No man hath seen God at any time^ says: “Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatablc?” Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i),^ speaking of God: “Neither is there sense, nor phantasm, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him.’’

For as a subject cannot be supremely one because of the difference within

likenesses? (lo)

tellect

Obj.

2.

Further, everything infinite, as such,

unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (q. vii, a. i). Therefore in Himself He is unknown. is

Obj. 3. Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now God is not something existing, but He is rather “super-existence,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)/"* Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect. Obj. 4. Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, .since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God, for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore the creaiod intellect cannot see the essence of God. On the contrary It is written: We shall see

Him

as

He

is

(I

John

3. 2).

I answer thaty Since everything

knowable

is

according as it is in act, God, Who without any admixture of potency,

is

pure act

is in

Him-

supremely know^able. But what is supremely knowable in itself, is not knowable to some other intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its exself

cess of light. *

FG so, 98.

*Sect.5(PG3, S93). »Sect.3(PG3,S93).

'

^

FIRST PART Therefore some^

who

considered this» held th^t no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, it not tenable. For as the ultimate happiness of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of the intellect, the created intellect could never see God, it would either never at-

would conbeside God, which is

tain to happiness or its happiness

sist in something else opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being, since a thing

perfect so far as

is

Further, the

know

attains to its principle.

same opinion

For there resides to

it

in

is

every

also against reason.

man

a natural desire

the cause of any effect which he sees,

and from

this

intellect

of

wonder

reach so far as to the

men. But

arises in

the rational first

if

the

could not cause of things, the

creature

natural desire would remain void.

Hence

it

must be absolutely granted that the

“He

ble.” etc.

is

know God. Article 2. Whether the Essence of God Is Seen by the Created Intellect Through Some Likeness?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that the essence of God is seen through some

when He

i.

shall

Obj.

2.

y

3.

Him

shall see

Further, Augustine says

“When we know God, some made in us.” Obj.

intellect.

For it is written: We know that appear we shall be like to Himy

and (Vulg., because) we is (I John 3. 2).

(De

God

is

the in-

is

But this comes about only in so far as informed with the likeness of the senthing, and the intellect with the likeness

in act.

sible

is

by the created intellect in act, that He is seen by some likeness.

universally to all incomprehensi-

xv),^

says this of the most certain

Trin.):^

likeness of

Further, the intellect in act

He

as

telligible in act, as sense in act is the sensible

seen

“He

by the created

likeness

Objection

i.

Chrysostom, likewise after the words

quoted, says:

ST

2

of the thing understood. Therefore,

Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehen.sion. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited,

ART.

the created intellect can be proportioned to

sense

blessed see the essence of God.

Reply Obj.

Q. 12.

On

when

the

is

must be

(De

the contraryy Augustine says

that

God

if it

Trin,

We

Apostle says,

see

through a glass and in an enigma (Douay,— in a dark manner), “by the terms ‘glass’ and

such a perfect

‘enigma’ certain likenesses are signified by him,

consideration and comprehension as the Father

which are accommodated to the understanding of God.” But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is not seen through "like-

vision of the Father, which

is

has of the Son,” Reply Obj. 2. The infinity of matter not made perfect by form is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; but the in-

form not limited by matter is in supremely known. God is Infinite in this w^ay, and not in the first way, as appears from what was said above (q. vn, a. t). Reply Obj. 3. God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists, since He is His own

and for intellectual vision ^name-ly, power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only

existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge, which means that He is not

seer, but only

finity of the

itself

comprehended. Reply Obj. 4. Proportion sense

it

means

twofold. In one

is

a certain relation of one quan-

equal are species of proportion.

and

In another

sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can

be a proportion of the creature to God, in so its 1

it

cause,

is

related to

and as potency

Amalric of Benes.

105) ;

cf.

Him

as the effect to

to act;

(Cf. Capelle,

Denifle, Chartuiarium, 1 2S

and

in this

way

Amaury de Bhie,

(1, 1

70}.

^

p.

Two

/ answer that,

things are required both

—

for sensible

when the seer.

thing seen

Now

is

in a certain

a stone

is

way

in the

in corporeal things it is clear that

the thing seen cannot be by

made

tity to another, according as double, treble,

far as

nesses.

by

its

likeness

in the eye,

its ;

essence in the

as the likeness of

by which the vision

actual, but the substance of the stone

not there. But

if

is is-

the principle of the visual

power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form by which it sees from that one same thing.

Now

it is

manifest both that

God

is

thor of the intellectual power, and that

be seen by the lectual * IX, II

intellect.

And

power of the creature (PL 42, 969).

is

the au-

He

can

since the intel-

not the essence

*Chap.9(PL42i

1069).

SUMMA TBEOLOGICA

52 of God,

it

follows that

ticipated likeness of tellect.

Hence

creature

is

it is

some kind of

Him who

the

is

also the intellectual

par-

first in-

power of the

called an intelligible light, as though

derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some likeness of God on the part of the seeing power whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be united to the .seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created likeness. First, because, as Dionysius says

Nom.

informed, and made in act, so is united to the created in-

tellect itself is

the divine essence

making the

self

Article 3. Whether the Essence of God Can Be Seen with the Bodily Eye?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It God can be seen by

.seems that the essence of

the corporeal eye.

Objection

my

In

For

i.

written (Job 19. 26):

is

it

God, and (ibid. 42. With the hearing of the ear I have heard

5),

flesh I shall see

my

Thee, but 7Low Obj.

.

.

.

eye seeth Thee.

Further, Augustine says^ “Those eyes

2.

“by the likenesses of the

in-

[namely of the

no

greater power of sight, not so

i),^

way be known”;

just as

by the species of a

body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known.

Much

can the essence of God be seen by any created species whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His less therefore

own very

being, as was shown above (q. in, a. which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the likeness

4),

representing the essence of

God

Thirdly, because the divine essence

to the seer.

uncircumscribed, and contains in itself supereminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created species; for every created form is determined according to 6ome aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing Hence to say that God is seen by some likeness, is to .say that the divine essence is not seen at all, which is eris

roneous. it

God

must be

there

is

required

some

likeness in

light

we

shall see light.

The

essence of

God, however, cannot be seen by any created likeness representing the divine essence itself

as

in itself.

it is

Reply Obj. likeness which Reply Obj.

i.

is

That authority speaks of the caused by participation of the

God

2.

Augustine speaks of the knowl-

here on earth.

own being are united to the by means of some being by which the

are not their

J

have a

to see

more

of the sight of serpents

by these creatures, they can see things) but to see even incorporeal things.” Now whoever can see incorporeal things can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God. posscs.sed

is

only

corporeal

Obj. 3. Further, God can be seen by through a vision of the imagination. For

saw the Lord

written: I

etc. (Isa. 6.

j

.sitting

by sense

man it is

upon a throne,

Hut an imaginary vision has

).

origin in sense, “for the imagination to act.” as

it is

the Soul’^ Therefore

is

stated in the

God can be

its

moved

book on

seen by a

vision of sense.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vid, Demn, Ep. cxlvii)': “No one has ever seen God

He

as

life,

is,

either in this

as visible things

life,

nor in the angelic by corporeal

are seen

/ answer that. It

Sect 3 (Hi 3.

588).

is

impossible for

to be

organ, as will be .shown later (p. Lxxviii, a. i). act is proportioned to that of which it is

Now

no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. I'or God is incorporeal, as was »hown above (p. in, a. i). Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, the act. Hcik

'

but only by the

intellect.

see

The words, In my flesh I shall God my Saviour, do not mean that God will

be

.seen

i.

with the eye of

existing in the

fle.sh

flesh,

see God. Likewise the words,

man

Now my eye seeth

®

City oj God, xxii, 29 (PL 41, 799).

’

Aristotle,

m,

but that

after the resurrection will

in-

in-

God

by the sense of sight, or by any other sen.se, or power of the sensitive par For every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal .seen

Reply Obj.

Reply Obj. 3. The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which tellect

much

or of eagle.s (for whatever acuteness of vision

light of glory.

edge of

some report

keenly, as

said that to see the es-

the seeing power, namely, the light of divine glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the Psalm (35. 10). In

Thy

glorifiedl will therefore

vision.”

Therefore sence of

it-

intellect in act.

ferior order of things, the superior can in

(Div.

by

tellect as the thing actually understood,

3 (429*1).

Chap. 11 (PL 33, 609).

FIRST PART Thee, are to be understood of the mind’s eye, as the Apostle says May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom ... in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart may be enlightened :

(Eph.

I.

17. 18).

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: ‘Therefore they will have an altogether different power [namely the

ART. 4

Q. 12.

S3

corporeal or intellectual sight. But the

tive

no such defect. Therefore, supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand

angelic intellect has

God

since

is

other

intelligible

power, Obj.

much more 3.

raised

up

which

is

by

things

own

his

natural

can he understand God. Further, corporeal sense cannot be

earth as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things,

to understand incorporeal sub.stance, above its nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above (a. t). Therefore it seems that it is

God

natural for a created intellect to see the divine

they shall see that incorporeal nature’’; and afterwards he explains this, saying: “It is very credible that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the glorified eyes], if

new

now

not as we

see the invisible things of

made, but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the functions of human life, we do as understood

by what

is

not believe they live, but see evident how the glorified eyes

now our is

eyes see the

life

it.”

Hence

it

is

God, as of another. But life will see

not seen with the corporeal eye, ns a thing in as the accidental object

itself visible, but

the sense; which indeed

is

not

known by

of

sense,

essence.

On the contrary, It is written: The grace of God is life everlasting (Rom. 6. 23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the divine essence, according to the words: This life,

that they

God,

etc.

sence of

may know Thee

(John

God

17. 3).

known by

own

—

in a vi.sion of the

imagination; but the imag-

some form

God

Therefore, to see the es-

and not by nature.

grace,

ated intellect to

of, and through, corporeal things, happens from two causes namely, from the clearness of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine brightness in the renewed body. Reply Obj 3. The essence of God is not seen

eternal

belongs to the created intellect by

but at once, together with sen.se, by some other knowing power. But that the divine presence is the intellect immediately on the sight

is

the only true

I answer that. It

is

.see

impossible for any cre-

the essence of

God by

its

natural power. For knowledge occurs ac-

cording as the thing

But the thing knowm

known

in the

is

knower.

knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is according to the mode of

its

own

is

in the

nature. If therefore the

thing’s being exceeds the

mode

mode

of any-

of the nature of

must

Article

result that the knowledge above the nature of the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For there are some things whose natures have being only in this one individual matter, as for instance, all bodies But there are others'

its

whose natures

ination produces

according to some

mode

repre.senting

of likeness, as in divine

Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by

means

of sensible things.

4. Whether Any Created Intellect by Natural Powers Can See the Divine Essence?

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article:

It

seems that a created intellect can sec the divine essence by its own natural power. Objection i. For Diony.sius says {Div, Nom. iv)^: An angel “is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God.” But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore, since an angel by his natural power understands him.self, it seems that by his own natural power he understands the divine essence.

Obj.

made 1

2.

Further, what

less visible to us

Sect. 22

(PG3,

724).

is

supremely

visible is

by reason of our defec-

(he knower,

it

of that thing

is

subsist of themselves, not resid-

ing in matter at their

own

all,

which, how^ever, are not

being, but receive

it;

and these are

the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to

God

alone does

si.stent

it

belong to be His

own

sub-

being.

Therefore, what has being only in individual matter we know naturally, since our soul, by which we know, is the form of some certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers. One is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter; hence sen.se knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive

power is

in the soul, called the intellect,

and

this

not the act of any corporeal organ. There-

SUMMA TSEDLOGICA

54

knows natures which individual matter; not how-

fore the intellect naturally

being

have being only

tellect is naturally

in

ever as they are in individual matter, but according as they are abstracted from it by the consideration of the intellect. Hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand things of this kind as universal, and this is be-

is

another. Since therefore the created in-

capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being by ab-

by way of a kind of resolution, it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsiststraction,

ing substance and separate subsisting being.

yond the power of sense. Now the angelic innaturally knows natures not existing in matter; but this is beyond the natural power

Article 5. Whether the Created Intellect Needs Any Created Light in order to See the

of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body.

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. Objection i. For what is of itself clear in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to

tellect

It

follows therefore that to

know

self-sub-

sistent being is natural to the divine intellect

alone, and that

beyond the natural power

it is

of any created intellect; for no creature

is its

own

being but rather has participated being. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of

God

God by His

unless

Himself to the created

made

intelligible to

Reply Obj.

i.

grace unites

an object

intellect, as

This

—

know

intelligible things.

Therefore Obj.

mode

of knowing

God

is

the essence of

God by

his

own

He

Reply Obj.

2.

The

angelic intellect

is

not de-

if defect be taken to mean privation, as were without anything which it ought to have. But if defect be taken negatively, in that

Now God is

intelligible light.

not seen by the means of any

Further,

2.

if

God

seen through a

is

medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light He is seen through a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.

Obj. ural to

of

God

Further, what

3.

some

ture;

is

created can be nat-

creature. Therefore,

if

the essence

seen through any created light, such

is

a light can be

power.

is

created light.

it.

namely, to know Him by natural to an angel His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God by any created likeness is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above (a. 2). Hence it does not follow that an angel can

Essence of God?

and

made

natural to

thus, that creature

some other creawould not need

fective

any other

if it

Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order

sense every creature is defective when compared with God, since it does not possess the excellence which is in God. Reply Obj. 3. The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to anything immaterial. But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, because it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its

to see the essence of

own nature to a higher level by grace. The mark of this is that sight cannot in any way know in the abstract what it knows in the concrete; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature, although our intellect is able to consider by abstraction

what it knows in the concrete. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these elements, and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although

it

separate that being by

knows

knows the

naturally

concrete being in any nature, its

that the thing itself

is

still it

is

able to

God, which

light to see

impossible.

God.

On the contrary^ It we shall see light (Ps.

is

written; In

Thy

light

35. 10).

I answer thaty Everything w'hich to w'hat exceeds its nature

by some

disposition

example,

if air is

above

is raised up must be prepared

nature;

its

fonn of

to receive the

as,

for

fire, it

must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of

God

itself be-

comes the iiitelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail 10 enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding should be increased further by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the

intellect, since it

illumination of the intellect, as

one thing, and

intelligible itself

its

is

we

by the name of

also call the

light or ilium-

FISST FART Aad

Ught spoken of in the Apocalypse (21. 2$), The glory of God hath en^ lightened it namely, the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made that is, like to God, according to the ‘^deiform*^ saying: When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg., becausel we shall see Him as He is (I John 3. 2). Reply Obj. i. The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is of itself ination.

this is the

— —

intelligible,

but in order to enable the intellect

same way as a habit makes same way corporeal

to understand in the

a power abler to act. In the

light is necessary as regards external sight, since it

makes the medium transparent, in act, so it may be moved by colour. Reply Obj. 2, This light is required to see the

Q. 12.

ART. 6

55

Further^ That anything be seen mote perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on

Obj.

3.

the part of the visual power of the seer.

part of the object, the object

may

it

received

is

On

the

happen because

so

more perfectly

in the

seer, that is, according to the greater perfection

of the likeness

but

;

does not apply to the is present to the in-

this

God

present question, for

tellect seeing Him not by way of a likeness, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is the higher will

see

Him

the

more

clearly,

and

this is incongru-

that

ous, since equality with angels

is

divine essence, not as a likeness in which

men in the state of happiness. On the contrary, Eternal life

consists in the

God

seen, but as a perfection of the intellect,

is

God, Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one under which He is seen and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God. Reply Obj. 3. The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to what has the form of fire. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature, w^iich is impossible. But by this strengthening

it

to see

;

vision of God, according to eternal

is

that they

life,

promised to

John

This

17. 3:

may know Thee

only true God, etc. Therefore,

the

saw the essence of God equally in eternal life, all would be equal the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: Star differs from star in glory if all

;

(I Cor. 15. 41).

1 answer that, Of those of God, one secs

who

Him more

see the essence

perfectly than an-

other. This, indeed, does not take place as if

sence of God,

one had a more perfect likeness of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any likeness; but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created

Another?

intellect naturally,

light the rational creature is is

made

deiform, as

said in this article.

Article

We

Whether of Those Who See the Es~ One Sees More Perfectly Than

6.

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It

seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than an-

Hence the

We

i.

shall see

For

Him

written (I John 3. 2): as He is. But He is only in it is

one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly

by another. Obj.

Trium

2.

Further, as Augustine says {Octog.

Quest., qu. xxxii)^ that one person can-

not understand one and the same thing more perfectly than another. But

sence of for

God

sense, as

of those

is

all

who

see the es-

the divine essence,

seen by the intellect and not by

was shown above

who

more PL 40, 22

not see 1

God understand

(a, 3),

Therefore,

see the divine essence, one does clearly than another.

is

given to

it

by the

light

said above in the preceding article.

other.

Objection

but

of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of deiformity, as appears from what is intellect

which participates more

of the light of glory will see fectly.

And he

will

have a

of the light of glory

cause where there

is

God

the

more

per-

fuller participation

who has more

charity, be-

the greater charity, there

is the more desire, and desire in a certain way makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the thing desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more happy. Reply Obj. 1. In the words, We shall see Him

as

He

mode

is, the conjunction *‘as'' determines the of vision on the part of the thing seen, so

Him to be as His being, which is His essence. But it does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing, as if the that the meaning

He

is,

because

we

is,

we

shall see

shall see

SUMMA THEOLOGICA Ining

was that the mode of

sieeing

God

the perfect

mode

of God’s

as perfect as

is

will

vine essence. Therefore

God

of

Him

see

all

who

see the essence

wholly. Therefore, they com-

prehend Him, fg.

On

Thus appears the answer to the Second Ob-

For when it is said that one intellect uJes not understand one and the same thing better than another, this would be true if rekion.

mode

ferred to the

of the thing understood, for

whoever understands

it

otherwise than

does not truly understand

is

ferred to the

mode

it,

it

really

but not

if re-

of understanding, for the

contrary,

the

is

comprehended

on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all namely, the es.sence of God; nor will it arise from the

is

perfectly

diverse participation of the object likenesses; but

it will

arise

by

different

on the part of the

diverse pow^r of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural power, but the glorified faculty as

have said

in the

body of the

we

article.

:

Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (I Cor. 9. 26) I ... so run, not as at an uncertainty. Therefore he comprehended. And in the same way others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: So run that you may compre:

Obj.

2.

Further, Augu.'^tine says

Dcum, Ep.

“That

cxlvii)

is

(De

Vid.

comprehended

which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.” But if God i.s .seen in Hi.s essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the .seer, since God is .simple. Therefore, whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him. Obj.

3.

Further,

if

we say

that

He

is

seen as

it may be contrarily urged that wholly refers either to the mode of

a whole, but not wholly, the seer, or to the

mode

of the thing

sei*^'

But

he who sees the essence of God, secs Him wholly if the mode of the thing .seen is considered, since he sees Him as He is as we have said (a. 6, Ans. i); also, likewise, he secs Him wholly if the mode of the seer be meant, since the intellect will with its full power see the di*

Chap. 9 (PL 33, 606).

0

most

is

perfectly known, and that

known which

is

known

so far as

it

can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probable proof, it is not

comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth. But if anyone acit

as a probable opinion because wise

men

men

he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is capable. But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the divine intellect of which it is capable. Which appears thus. Everything is knowable according as it is being in act. But God, whose being is infinite, as was .shown above (q. vii, a. i) is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows or mo.st

teach

the divine essence

portion as

hend.

:

Augustine says.^ In proof of this wc must consider that what

cepts

Article 7. Whether Those Who See the Essence of God Comprehend Him? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It seems that those who .see the essence of God comprehend Him. Objection i. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3. 12) But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend (Douay, dpprehend). But the

written

cannot be comprehended. I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet “for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great happiness,’* as

—

is

He

understanding of one is more perfect than the understanding of another. Reply Obj. 3. The diversity of seeing will not arise

It

mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought (Jer. 32. 18, 19). Therefore

it

it,

more

or less perfectly in pro-

receives a greater or lesser light of

glory. Since therefore the created light of glory

received into any created intellect cannot be it is imjio.ssible lor any created intellect

infinite,

to

know God

in

an infinite degree. Hence

it is

comprehend God. Reply Obj. i. Comprehension is tw'ofold. In one sense it is taken strictly and properly, ac-

impos.sible that

it

.should

cording as something is included in the one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended cither by intellect, or in any other way, since He is infinite and cannot be included in any finite being, so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this .sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense comprehension is taken more largely as opposed to non -attainment; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in *

Serm. ad Popul., cxvii, 3 (PL 38, 063).

y

FIRST PART God

comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, / held Am, and I will not let him go (Cant. 3. 4) in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the this sense

is

;

Apostle concerning comprehension.

way comprehension ments of the

soul,

And

one of the three endowcorresponding to hope, as

and

fruition cor-

responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, since things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither,

do we always enjoy what we possess; we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God, because they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him again,

either because

8

^

who

those

Obj.

what

see

not seen as perfectly as

He

is

when any demonknown by a probable

strable

proposition

reason only, it is

it

unknown,

is

does not follow that any part of either the subject, or the pred-

icate, or the composition, but that the

whole

is

not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine {loc. cit ), in his definition of comprehension, says the whole

prehended when

it

is

is

Obj.

God

ing

know

way that seer, or when

nothing of it is hidden from the its boundaries can be completely viewed or

traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end according to that mode of knowledge of it is attained. Reply Obj. 3. The word “wholly” denotes a

mode

of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode of the object is not the mode of the one

who knows.

Therefore, he wdio secs God’s es-

Him that He exists infinitely, and knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person can know with probability that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated. sence secs in

is

infinitely

Article 8 Whether Those .

sence of

God

Who

On

See the Es-

See All in God?

We proceed thtts to the Eighth Article: It setms that those who see the essence of God see all things in God.

Therefore,

all things.

does not

it

desire will not will

all

God as in

Further, the rational creature naturally

4.

desires to

re.st

know

satisfied

who

sees

if in

thus, in seeing

;

see-

things, its natural

all

not be fully happy, which

is

God knows

God

incongruous. all

things.

The angels see the essence of do not know all things. For, as

the contrary

God, and yet Dionysius says

(Ccel. Hier.

vii)''*

that the in-

from ignorance by

ferior angels are cleansed

the superior angels. Also they are ignorant of future contingent things and of secret thoughts,

God alone. Therewhosoever sees the essence of God, does

for this knowledge belongs to fore,

not know^

com-

seen in such a

But

actual a mir^ ror for He knows all things, in Himself. Therefore, whoever sees God, sees all the things that are, and all the things that can be. Obj. 3. Further, whoever understands the greater can understand the least, as is said in the book on the Soul.^ But all that God does, or can do, are less than His essence. Therefore, whoever understands God, can understand all that God does or can do.

Therefore, he

is

\

things.

all

reflected in the mirror.

is

Reply Obj. 2. God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen, but

He

see

or possible things shine forth in

it

because

God

Further, whoever sees a mirror

2.

as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.

capable of being seen; thus

Uy

Objection i. For Gregory says (Dialog, i|i. '‘What do they not see, who see Him Who all things?” But God sees all things. ThereM

in this

is

vision corresponds to faith,

ART.

Q.

,

all

I answer

things.

that.

The

created intellect, in seeing

the divine essence, does not see in

it

all,

that

God

does or can do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all

other things are in

power of seen in

Now

their cause.

God

it is

as an effect

more

of

as effects are in the

Therefore is

all

seen in

more

clear that the

seen, the

is

God

its effects

things are its

cause.

perfectly a cause

can be seen in

it.

For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one demonstrative principle is put before him gathers the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is be>'ond one of a weaker intellect, for

him all

he needs things to be explained to And so an intellect can know

sc[xirately.

the effects of a cause and the reasons for

itself, if it comprehends the cause w^holly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above (a. 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power;

those effects in the cause

1

Chap. 33 (FL

* Aristotle, *

77, 376).

ni, 4 (429**3). Sect. 3 (PG 3, 208).

,

SUMMA TBEOWGICA Mof whM God

does or can do, the more any ^«Bect knoWs than, the more perfectly it sees

Ob/

f /Reply

Gregory speaks as regards the

i,

who

“ibject being sufficient, namely, God,

ftmself

in

and shows forth JUI things; but it does not follow that whoever pees God knows all things, for he does not perffcctly comprehend Him. Reply Obj. 2. It is not necessary that whosufficiently contains

ever sees a mirror should see

all

that

in the

is

mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror.

Reply Obj.

Although

3,

than to see

all

thing to see

Him

it is

things else, so that

more

still it

to see

things are

all

God

a greater

is

known

than to see Him in such a way that not things, but fewer or more, are known in

Him

in all

Him. For the more

He

as

is

it

has been shown

seen

Reply Obj.

more or 4.

tional creature

is

The to

in this article that

known

things are

in

God

according

less perfectly.

natural desire of the ra-

know everything

that be-

longs to the perfection of the intellect, namely,

the species and

genera

of

and their

things

and these everyone who sees the divine essence will see in God. But to know other singular beings, their thoughts, and their deeds, does types,

not belong to the perfection of the created intellect

nor does

its

natural desire go out to

these things; neither, again, docs

it

desire to

know things that do not as yet exist, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were

Who is the fount and principle of all beand of all truth. He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely hapseen,

ing

py.

Hence Augustine

who knoweth

all

says^:

“Unhappy

these (that

is,

all

the

man

creatures)

and knoweth not Thee but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone.” !

sense in act becomes the actual sensible, in so far as it is informed by its likeness, as the eye by the likeness of colour. Therefore, if the intellect of one who sees the divine essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their likenesses. Obj. 2. Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit, xii, 28, 34),^ remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he said: I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter (II Cor. 12. 4). Therefore it must be said that certain likenesses of what he remembered remained in his mind; and in the same way, when he actually saw the essence of God he had certain likenesses or species of what he actually saw in it. On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one species. But all things

Therefore,

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the divine essence

is

seen by means of

some

likeness.

Objection 1. For every kind of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual thing understood, and the *

Confusions, v, 7 (PL 32, 708),

if

likeness but

things seen in

Him

seen by any likenesses or

species.

/ answer that. Those

who

see the divine es-

Cod not by any by the divine essence itself united to their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For since things which are like one and the same thing are like each other, the knowing power can be assimilated to any knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is directly intormed by its likeness, and then the object is knowm in itself. In another way when informed by a species which sence see what

they see in

species, but

re.sembles

the object;

knowledge

is

thing in

man him

Article 9. Whether What Is Seen in God by Those Who See the Divine Essence Is Seen Through Any Likeness?

God as in an intelligible mirror. God Himself is not seen by any by His own essence, neither are the

are seen in

its

and

in

not of the thing in likeness.

this

itself,

way

the

but of the

For the knowledge of a from the knowledge of

in himself difiers in his

know things thus by who knows is to know in their own nature; but

image. Hence to

their likeness in the one

them

in

themselves or

know them by their likenesses pre-existing in God is to see them in God. Now there is a dif-

to

ference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to the knowledge by which things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by

any other likenesses but by the divine essence alone present to the intellect, by which also God Himself *

PL 34.

is

seen.

478, 483; Epist. cXLVii, 13

(PL 33,

611),

FIRST PART Repty Obj.

t.

The created intellect of one who

God is assimilated to the things that are seen in God in so far as it is united to the divine which the likenesses of

essence, in

all

things

pre-exist.

Rtply Obj,

Some

2.

of the knowing powers

can form other species from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived species of a mountain and of gold can

form the species of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived species of genus and difference forms the notion of species; in like manner from the likeness of an image we can form in ourselves the likeness of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by the very vision of the divine essence can form in himself the

Q. i2«

AMT*

n

But OUT intellect cannot be actually infbrtrW by diverse species at the same time, so as to derstand by them, just as one body cannot beM different shapes simultaneously. Hence, whei^ many things can be understood by one species,! they are understood at the same time; as the ,

parts of a whole are understood successively>

and not

all at the same time, if each one is understood by its ow’n species; but if all are understood under the one species of the whole, they are understood .simultaneously. Now it

was shown above

(a. g) that things

are not seen singly

by

their

own

seen in

God

likenesses, but

are seen by the one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously and not succes-

all

sively.

Reply Obj.

i.

We

understand one thing only

likenesses of the things that are seen in the

when we understand by one

divine essence, which remained in Paul even

things understood

when he had ceased

stood simultaneously, as in the species of man we understand animal and rational, and in the

Still this

to see the essence of

kind of vision whereby things are

God. .seen

by this species conceived in tliis way is not the same as that by which things are seen in God.

Whether Those Who See the Essence of God See All They See In It at the Same Time? Article

io.

Wc proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the

species of house

species; but

many

by one species are under-

we understand

the wall and the

roof.

Reply Obj. 2. As regards their natural knowlby which they know things by various species infused in them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously, and thus they are moved, in understanding, according to time; but according as they see things in God, they see all at the same time. edge,

same time. Objection pher:^ ‘Tt

For, according to the Philoso-

i.

may happen

that

many

things are

known, but only one >s understood.” But what is seen in God, is under.'^lood, for God is seen by the intellect Therefore those who see God do not sec all in Him at the same time. Obj. 2. Further, Augu.stine says {Gen. ad lit. 2 2,

viii,

23),^

“God moves

—

the spiritual crea-

is, by understandBut the .spiritual creature is the angel, who secs God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively, for time means succession.

ture according to time”

that

ing and affection.

On

the contrary^ Augustine says {De Trin, XV, 16):^ “Our thoughts will not be unstable,

going to and fro from one thing to another, but

we

shall see all

we know

all

at once in

one

glance.”

/ answer that,

What

is

seen in the

Word

is

seen not successively but at the same time. In

proof of this we must consider that

we

ourselves

cannot know many things all at once, since we understand many things by various species. '

Topics, n, IO (ri4**34)-

*

PL 34, 388, iSg.

Article

PL 42,

1079,

Whether Anyone

in This Life

Can

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article: It seems that one can in this life see the divine essence.

Objection

i.

For Jacob said: I have seen God

face to face (Gen. 32. 30). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from

We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face (I Cor. 13. 12), Therefore God can be seen in this life in His esthe words:

sence.

Obj. 2. Further, the Lord said of Moses: f speak to him motith to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord (Num. 12. 8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life. Obj. 3. Further, that in which we know all other things, and by which we judge of other things is known in itself to us. But even now we know all things in God, for Augustine says:^ “If we both see that what you say is true, and

we both *

ii.

See the Essence of God?

*

see that

what

I say is true; where, I

CQnJcsHons, xii, 35 (PL 32, 840),

SVMMA THEOLOGICA we

do

see this? neither I in thee, nor thou

Mme;

God

see

in the sense that certain figures are

but both of us in the very incommutable itself above our minds.” He also says (De Kelig. xxx)^ that we judge of all things

formed in the senses or imagination, according to some likeness representing in part the divinity.” So when Jacob say.s, I have seen God face

f/according to the divine truth; and {De Trin. xii)* that, “it is the duty of reason to judge of

to face, this does not mean the divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imag-

®uth Wera

these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal types, which unless they were above the mind, could not be truly unchangeable.” Therefore even in this life

we

see

God

Himself. Obj. 4. Further, according to Augustine( Gen.

ad

24, 25),® those things that are in the their essence arc seen by intellectual

lit. xii,

soul

by

vision.

But

things, not

intellectual vision is of intelligible

by

likenesses, but

by

their

very

es-

sences, as he also says {ibid.). Therefore, since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows

He is seen by On the contrary

that

y

It is written,

Man shall

not

live

His own nature.” / answer that, God cannot be seen

itself of

sence by a mere

human

in

His es-

being, unless he be

separated from this mortal

life.

of prophecy.

We may also say

thus to designate

The reason

is,

because, as was said above (a. 4), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of

the knowing thing. But our soul, as long as

we

that Jacob spoke

some exalted

intellectual con-

templation, above the ordinary state.

Reply Obj.

2.

As God works miracles

in cor-

He does supernatural woncommon order, raising the minds

poreal things, so also ders above the

of

some

living in the flesh

sense, even

up

beyond the use of

to the vision of Plis

as Augustine says (Gen. ad

us in His essence.

(Exod. 33. 20), and a gloss upon this says:^ “In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the species

Mcj and

see

inary vision, as will later be explained (Part IIII., Q. cLXxiv, A. 3) in treating of the degrees

own

essence,

26, 27, 28)®

lit. xii,

of Moses, the teacher of the Jews,^ and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated fully in the question of ecstasy (Part II-

more

CLXXV, AA. 3, 4, 5, 6). Reply Obj. 3. All things are said to be seen in God, and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light we know and judge all things; for the light of natural II., Q.

reason

itself

is

light, as likewise

a participation of the divine

we

are said to see and judge of

sensible things in the sun, that

Hence Augustine says

is,

by

the sun’s

mat-

light.

ter;

hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known in this

“The

way. Now it is evident that the divine essence cannot be known through the natures of material things. P"or it was shown above (aa. 2, 9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created likeness is not the vision of His essence.

therefore in order to see something sensibly

live in this life, has its being in corporeal

Hence

it is

impossible for the soul of

man

in

(Soliloq.

not necessary to see the essence of God. Reply Obj. 4. Intellectual vision is of the things which arc in the soul by their essence, as

it is

capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and withdrawals from the bod-

and power.

senses divine revelations and foresight of

future events are perceived the

more

clearly. It

not possible, therefore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the uttermost is

of intelligible things, that

is,

to the divide es-

sence.

Reply Obj. Hier. iv),® “a

i.

According to Dionysius

man

is

»

PL 34.

*

Chap.

»

PL 34, 474; Chap. 31 (PL 34, 479)*

*

Glossa ordin.

Chap. 31 (PL 2

(PL

{Ccel,

said in the Scriptures to 34. 147)-

42, ggg).

(i,

203B),

®

Sect. 3

God way

is in is

He

i8o).

the souls of the blessed in

This

;

•.

And

thus

not in this

our soul, but by presence, essence,

12. Whether We Can Know God LiU by Natural Reason?

Article

in

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God

in this life.

Objection i. For Boethius says (De Consol. v)® that “reason does not grasp simple form.” But God is a supremely simple form, as was •

PL 34, 476-478.

^

Letter cxlvii, chap. 13 (PL 33* 610).

®PL32,

(PG 3,

it is

not necessary to sec the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see something intelligibly

intelligible things are in the intelle^

ily

8),®

were by their owm sun,” namely God. As

it

God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is this life to see the essence of

i,

lessons of instruction can only be seen as

» Sect.

877.

4 (PL 63, 847).

FIRST PART sliown above (q. hl a. 7). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.

Obj.

2.

Further, the soul understands nothing

by natural reason without phantasms as is said in the book on the Soul^ But there cannot be a phantasm of God in us, since He is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural

Q: 19

ART.

.

many who are that

have a common nature. But the knowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i)^ “This weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith.” Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.

It

the contrary, It

is

written

(Rom.

i.

19),

in them.

I answer that,

Our natural knowledge takes

beginning from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by senits

But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God, because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of scn.sible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God whether He exists, and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him as the first sible things.

cause of

all things,

exceeding

all

things caused

by Him. Hence we know of His relationship with creatures that He is the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, since He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all. Reply Obj. i. Reason cannot reach up to simple form so as to know what it is; but it can know whether it is. Reply Obj. 2. God is known by natural knowledge through the phantasms of His effects.

Reply Obj. 3. As the knowledge of God’s esis by grace, it belongs only to the good, but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says {Retract, i),® retracting what he sence

> Aristotle,

*

Chap.

3

m, 7

(PL 42, 832).

»1 ,

4 (PL 32 . 589).

truthd, '

13- Whether By Grace a Higher Knowl* God Can Be Obtained Than by Natural

Reason?

We

proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article: seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. Objection i. For Dionysius says {De Mystka Theol. i),'^ that whoever is the more united to God in this life is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses,

who

nevertheless obtained a certain excellence

by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while not knowing of Him “what He is,” comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason. Obj. 2. Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through phantasms, and the same applies to the

knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says {Cml. Bier. i)‘’ that “it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round about by the many coloured sacred veils.”

Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason. Obj. 3. Further, our intellect adheres to God by the grace of faith. But faith does not ;?eem to be knowledge;

Ev.y

xxvi, in

for Gregory says

{HomiL

that “things not seen are of faith,

and not of knowledge.” Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God by grace.

On the contrary, The Apostle says that God hath revealed to us by His Spirit, what none of the princes of this world knew (I Cor. 2. 10), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.® / answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which appears thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason requires two things: phantasms received from the sensible objects, and the natural intelligible light, by whose power we abstract from them intelligible concepts.

Now in both sisted ^

by the

SoHL,

» Sect.

(431*16).

know many

reason.

Article edge of

On

not pure can

by natural

is,

knowledge. Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, since they

That which is known of God, namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, is manifest

13

had said before:^ *T do not approve what 1 in prayer, 'God who wiliest that only the should know truth.’ For it can be answered th^;

7

3

1, 1

of these

human knowledge

is

as-

revelation of grace. For the intel-

(PL 32,

(PG 3,

870).

1001).

Bk. u (PL 76, 1302).

® Sect. 2

(PG 3,

121).

> Ghssa interl., (vi, 361).

:

SViiMA TBEOWGICA |es)-

12 (424^32).

Article

2.

Whether God Understands Him-

self?

Wc proceed thus to the Second Article: It seems that God does not understand Himself. Objection 1. For it is said by the Philosopher,^ “Every knower who know’s his own essence, returns completely to his

owm

essence.”

But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved in any way; thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore Fie does not know His own essence. Obj. 2. Further, to understand is in a certain way to suffer and to be moved, as the Philosopher says,*^ and knowdedge also is a kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by itself, nor,” as Hilary says {De Trin. iii),® “is a thing its owm likeness.” Therefore God does li.ot understand Himself. Obj. 3. Further, ^e are like God chiefly in our intellect, because wx are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says {Gen. ad. lit, vi).’ But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in the Soul.^ Therefore God does not understand Himself, unless perhaps by understanding other things. '

*

Lib. de Causis, 14

(BA 177.O). 43iV-

'^Soul, in. 4, 7 (429^*24; 2

Chap. 12 (PL 34, 347).

®

®

Chap. 23 (PL

10, 92).

Aristotle, in, 4 (430*2).

y

FIRST PART On

the contrary

The things

It is written:

that are of God no man knoweth^ but the Spirit of God (I Cor. 2. ii).

I answer that, God understands Himself through Himself. In proof of this it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external effect the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, is something outside the operator, nevertheless in operations that re-

main

in the operator, the object signified as the

term of operation, cording as

it is

Hence

actual.

sensible in act in act

in the operator;

is

the Philosopher says,^ that the

sense in act. and the intelligible

is

For the reason why we is because our inactually informed by the sen-

intellect in act.

is

actually feel or

know

tellect or sense is

a thing

sible or intelligible species.

only,

it

and ac-

in the operator, the operation is

And

because of this

follows that sense or intellect

from the sensible or both are

is

distinct

since

intelligible object,

in potency.

God has nothing

Since therefore

in

Him

of

Q,

ART,

14.

3

77

of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible thing, or self,

it. belongs to an intellect which sometimes in potency; because the fact that it is in potency makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it to it through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected by it, as potency is perfected by act. On the other hand the divine intellect, which is no way in potency, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated to it, but is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object. Reply Obj. 3. Natural being does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our

is

assimilated to

is

possible intellect has the

same

exercised concerning intelligible things only so

perfected by the intelligible species

pure act. His intellect and the thing understood are the same, so that He

of something; and in that

neither lacks the intelligible species, as

itself

potentiality, but

is

is

the

case with our intellect when it understands in potency; nor is the intelligible species other than the substance of the divine intellect, as happens in our intellect when it understands actually; but the inldligiblc species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God understands Himself through Himself. Reply Obj i. Return to its own essence

means only that in so

far as the

giving

it

it

;

and

being,

it

it

thing .subsists in itself. For form perfects the matter by

a

is

in a certain

way

diffused in

returns to itself in so far as

it

has be-

knowing powers which are not subsisting but aie the acts of organs, do not know' themselves, as is clear in each of the senses; but those knowing powers w'hich are self-subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said in De Causis^ that, “whoever ing in itself. Therefore lho.se

knows

Now

his essence returns to it.”

premely belongs to God to be

Hence according

su-

self-sub.sisting.

mode of His own

speaking,

to this

supremely returns to

it

essence,

knows Himself. Reply Obj. 2. To be moved and

He and

taken equivocally, according as to understand described as a kind of movement or passion,

is

as stated in the treatise in the Soul.^ For to un-

derstand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one thing to another, but it is an act, existing in the agent it‘

Soul, in,

2,

4 (426*16; 430*3).

far as

it is

by an

way

it

intelligible species as it

other things; for

it is

understands understands

manifest that by knowit understands also its

ing the intelligible object

own

knows

act of understanding, and by this act

the intellectual power. But

God is

a pure act in

the order of existing things as well as in the

order of intelligible things; therefore

He

under-

stands Himself through Himself.

Article

3.

Whether God Comprehends Him-

self?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. Objection i. For Augustine says {Octog. Tri. Quaist. xv)," that “whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself.” But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself. it be said that God is infinite to us Himself, it can be urged to the contrary that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself but

Obj.

and

2.

If

finite to

God

infinite to us, then infinite,

to suffer are

relation to intel-

primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potency as regards intelligible things just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our possible intellect can be ligible things as

which

is

is

again.sl

more

truly finite tlian

what was

laid

down

above (q vii, a. i). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (ibid.)f “Everything that understands itself comprehends itself.” But God understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself. (BA

*

Sect. 14

*

in, 4. 7 (43g**24; 43I*8)*

177.6). *

PL 40

i

IS*

SXfMMA TBEJOWGICA

7S

I an^er

God perfect^ comprehends

that,

Himself, which appears in this way.

A

thing

is

said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accom-

when

plished

is

it

knowable;

as,

proposition

is

for

known

as perfectly as

instance,

$

it is

demonstrable

comprehended when known by

demonstration, but not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly

He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own acas

tuality, since a thing is it is

in

not

potency, but in so far as

said in the Metaphysics

God

in

knowing

that

is

^

Now

great.

Obj.

3.

Further, every act of understanding

it is

in act, as

means understanding something. When

the

power of

fore

as great as His actuality in

God understands Himself,

understands that understands that

God

is

;

seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.*’ Reply Obj. 2. When it is said that God is finite to Himself, this is to be understood according to a certain likeness of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite. if it is

Article

4,

Whether the Act of God^s

Intellect

Is His Substance?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It seems that the act of God’s intellect is not His

*

substance.

Objection

1.

Aristotle, ix,

* Epist.^

For to understand

g ( 105 1*3 1)*

cXLvii, 9

(PL 33,

606).

is

an opera-

if

He

there-

Himself

not distinct from this act of understanding.

it is

and a). Hence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable, and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself. Reply Obj. i. The strict meaning of comprehension signifies that one thing holds and includes another, and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His intellect were something apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself for these ways of speaking are to be taken by way of negation. For just as God is said to be in Himself because He is not contained by anything outside of Himself, so He is said to be comprehended by Himself because nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says,* **The whole is comprehended when seen,

1

something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, but secondary and accessory. If there* fore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding, and thus God’s act of understanding will not be something

as

from the fact that He is all matter and potency, cognitive, as shown above (aa. i

because

Obj. 2. Further, When anyone understands himself to understand, this is to understand

and free from

existing, in act

known according

But an operation signifies something pro* ceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God*s intellect is not His substance.

lion.

so on to infinity. tellect is

On

He He

is

He He

understands, and that understands Himself, and Therefore the act of God’s in-

not His substance.

the contrary^ Augustine says

{De

Trin.

‘Tn God to be is the same as to be wise.” But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God’s being is His substance, as shown above (q. hi, a 4). Therefore the act of God’s intellect is His substance. I answer that, It must be said that the act of God’s intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says,'* in the Metaphysics, w'ould be the act and pervii),*

fection of the divine substance, to

which the

divine substance would be related as potency to act,

is

which

altogether impossible, be-

is

cause the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how this is. As was laid

down above

(a. 2), to

understand

passing to anything extrinsic; foi

is

not an act

it

remains in

the operator as his own act and perfection; as being is the perfection of the one existing. For

on the form, so in like on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His being, as shown above (q. Ill, A. 4). Hence as His essence itself is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His being. Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and what is understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence, when just as being follows

manner

*

Chap.

« Xil,

9

to understand follows

2

(PL 42, 927) Bk vi, chap 4 (PL 4?i

(io74‘’i8).

;

936)*

FIRST PART God i$

said to be understanding,

tiplicity Is

no kind of mul^

attached to His substance. i* To understand is not an opera-

Reply Obh

tion proceeding out of the operator, but remain-

ing in him.

Reply Obj, 2. When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something

fp

Qj,

the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effecting cause of all things, as is clear

from what we have said

(q.

God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the very being of the first efficient cau.se namely, God is His own act of u,

A.

3),

—

—

not great is understood, as when we understand our act of understanding; and so this

understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist

cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding, which is subsistent.

of understanding, and

Thus appears the Reply

to Obj. 3.

of divine understanding subsists in

For the act itself, and

its very self and is not another’s. need not proceed to infinity.

in

it

thing which the

mode

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It seems that God does not know things other than Himself.

Objection

i.

For

all

other things but

outside of God. But Augustine says Tri. Qnccst.f qu. xlvi)' that

God

arc

{Ociog.

‘^God does not see

anything out of Himself.” Therefore He does know things other than Himself. Obj. 2. Further, the thing understood is the

not

who

perfection of the one fore

God understands

understands. If there-

other things besides

Him-

something else will be the perfection of God. and will be nobler than He, which is imself,

possible.

Obj. self a.s is

3.

has

Further, the act of understanding

its

species

from the

every other act from so

intelligible object,

owm object. Hence much the nobler ac-

it.s

the intellectual act

is

cording as what

understood

God

is

is

it-

is

nobler.

But

His own act of understanding, as appears

from what was said before

(a.

4) If therefore

God understands anything other than Himself, specified by something cl.se then God Himself i.s

all

Now

is

in another, is in

of that in which

in

order to

known

is

other.

A

known by

thing

in

two ways:

is

known

written

:

All things are

anything can be perfectly known only by knowits power extends. Since therefore

ing to what 1

PL 40, 30.

in anis

it

when a man is seen mirror by the species in the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in the species of the whole, or in a

another.

So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but because

in Himself, becau.se

His essence contains the

likeness of things other than Himself.

Reply Obj. i. The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God sees nothing outside Himself is not to be taken in such a way aS if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He docs not see except in Himself, as above explained. Reply Obj. 2. The thing understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance. but by its species, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in the book on the Soulj^ for “a stone things which are other than

is

and

when

knowable object, as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the species of that which contains it, as w'hen a part is seen in the whole by

is

the contrary^ It

in itself,

in itself

the proper species adequate to the

self.

On

according to

it

it is.

know how God knows things we must consider that a

than Himself, which is impossible. Therefore He does not understand things other than Him-

naked and open to His eyes (Heb. 4. 13). I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His being would not be perfect, since His being is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of

must be in His act must be in Him mode; for every-

things

other than Himself, thing

Article 5. Whether God Knows Things Other Than Himself?

in the first cause,

according to an intelligible

belongs to

Hence

God, as

not in the soul, but

by God

its

species.”

God

Now

those

are understood

in so far as the essence of

God

contains

above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection of the their species as

divine intellect other than the divine essence.

Reply Obj. 3. The intellectual act is not specby what is understood in another, but by the principal thing understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object in so far as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual ified

operation, since every operation » Aristotle,

in, 8 (43i**29).

is

specified

by

,

SVMMA THEOLOGICA

8o the form which

is its

principle of operation, as

heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation

is

specified

makes the

by that

intelligible

intellect in act.

And

form which

this is the spe-

which

in

essence in which

all

cies of the principal thing understood,

God

is

nothing but His

own

Hence

species of things are comprehended.

it

does not follow that the divine act of understanding, or rather God Himself, is specified by

anything else than the divine essence

itself.

Article 6. Whether God Knows Things Other Than Himself by Proper Knowledge?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. Objection i. For, as was shown (a. 5), God knows things other than Himself according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal first cause, and arc known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge. Obj.

2.

F'urther, the created essence

is

as dis-

saying that self

God

just as

Him-

know^s things other than

only in general, that

knew

fire, if it

is,

only as beings.^ For the principle of

itself as

would know the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot, so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other heat,

things in so far as they are beings.

But

cannot be. For to know' a thing in is to have an imperfect knowledge of it. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potency to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it has a proper knowledge of them, as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from the Physics} If therethis

general and not in particular,

knowledge of God regarding things is only universal and not special, it would follow that His act of understanding would not be absolutely perfect therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above (q. iv, a. fore the

other than Himself

;

i).

We

must therefore hold that God knows

things other than Him.self with a proper knowl-

—

edge not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from

tant from the divine essence, as the divine es-

the other.

from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (q. xii, a. 2), Tliereforc neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence. so as to know “what it is,” which is to have proper knowledge of it. Obj. 3. Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper notion. But as God knows all things by His es.scnce, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper notion, for one thing cannot be the proper notion of many and diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper notion is to have only a general knowledge of them. On the contrary To have a proper knowledge of things is to know ihem not only in general, but as they are distinct from each othci Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joiftts also and the marrow, a 7id is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight (Heb. 4. 12, 13). 1 answer that, Some have erred on this point,

In proof of this we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by

sence

is

distant

y

one, bring forw’ard examples, as, for instance, that

if

the centre

lines that

knew

knew

itself, it

proceed from the

itself,

would know

it

would know'

all

centre'*; or if light all

Now'

colours.'*

these examples although they are similar in

])art,

namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colours is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it and likewise, the di;

caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be know'n in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general w'ay.

versity of the lines

In God, however,

is

shown above

fection exists in *

it

is

Unnamed in Averrocs. In St. Thomas wrongly

Averroes, Cf In Sent *

1

was

i,

d.

Meta., xii, comm. 51 (vjii, attributed this opinion to 0- 1, a. 3.

(i84‘‘2 2).

Cf. Alexander of Hales,

(QRi, ^

1.

it

whatever perany creature, wholly pre-exists

3.37A).

» Aristotle,

otherwise. For 2) that

(q. iv, a.

Summa

Theol., Pt.

i,

240).

Cf. Dionysius,

DeDiv. Nom.,

vii, 2

(PG 3,

870).

n.

166

— FIRST PART and

is

Now

God in an excelling manner. what is common to creatures

contained in

not only

—

namely being belongs to their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the nonintelligent. Likewise every form by which each thing

is

constituted in

perfection; and thus

its

not only as regards what also

as regards

own

species, is

things pre-exist in

all

is

common

to

all,

a

God but

what distinguishes one thing

from another. And therefore as God contains all is

perfections in Himself, the essence of

compared

common

God

to all essences of things not as the

to the proper, as unity is to

numbers,

or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines, but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal or six, a perfect numoer, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now* it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever know’s a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge, and w^hoever

knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge. As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the

perfection contained in the essence

of any other thing, and far more,

Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in fection.

of participation in the divine per-

Now God

could not be said to

know

Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His owm perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly unless being.

Hence

it is

He knew all modes of God knows all

manifest that

things with proper knowledge, in their distinc-

from each other. Reply Ohj. I. So to know’ a thing as it is in the know’cr, may be understood in two ways. In tion

one way this adverb “.so,” imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the thing known according to the being it has in the knower; for the eye does not know a stone according to the being has in the eye, but by the species of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according to its being outside the eye. And if any it

knower has a knowledge of the thing known cording to the being

it

ART.

81

7

knows a stone according

to the intelligible being

it

has in the

it

understands, while nevertheless

a stone

in its

is

knows that knows what however the

intellect, in so far as it

own

nature. If

it

adverb “so*' be understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the thing known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode

of knowledge.

We

must say therefore that God not only that things are in Himself, but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly the more perfectly each one is in Him. Reply Obj. 2. The essence of the creature is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect

knows

to the perfect act. Therefore the essence of the

creature cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowl-

edge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.

Reply Obj. 3. The same thing cannot be taken an equal manner as the notion of different things. But the divine essence excels all creain

tures.

Hence

it

can be taken as the proper no-

tion of each thing according to the diverse in

which diverse creatures participate

imitate

ways and

in,

it.

God can know

in

some degree

Q. 14.

ac-

has in the knower, the

knower nevertheless knows it according to its being outside the knower; thus the intellect

Article

Whether the Knowledge of God Is

7.

Discursive?

We

proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It knowledge of God is discursive. Objection i. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher says:* “The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time.” Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (aa. 2, 5), it seems that He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another. Obj. 2. Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows other things through Himself, as an effect through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive. Obj. 3. Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes, and thus we .seems that the

go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God. On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. *

Topics,

II,

10

(II4*'34)*

j

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

82 xv),^

“God

does not see

all

things in their

particularity or separately, as if

He

nately here and there; but

He saw

alter-

sees all things

together at once,”

I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no discursion, which appears as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion; one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything^ we turn ourselves to understand something else* while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one thing, which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively as we have held (a. 5), Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once. Secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed

from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown, and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term of discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as in their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.

Reply Obj.

I.

Although there

of understanding in

itself,

is

only one act

many

nevertheless

may be understood in some one thing, shown above. Reply Obj. 2. God does not know through the cause as though he knew the cause first and then previously unknown effects, but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown things

as

above.

Reply Obj.

3.

God

sees the effects of created

causes in the causes themselves

than

we

can, but

still

much

better

not in such a manner that

the knowledge of the effects

is

caused in

Him

by the knowledge of the created cau.ses, as the case with us; and hence His knowledge

Article 8. Whether the Knowledge of God Is the Cause of Things?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. Objection i. I^or Origen says, on

Whom He “A

thing will

as future, but because

»

Chap. X4 (PL 4a, 1077).

it is

future

it is

on that

eternal.

Obj.

3.

Further,

The

thing

known

is

prior to

knowledge, and is its measure, as the Philosopher says.^ But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause ol things. On the contrary Augustine says {De Trin. XV), “Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are.” / amwer that, The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures

what the knowledge of the armade by his art. Now the

tificer is to things

knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect tion, as

heat

is

must be the principle of operathe principle of heating. Never-

we must observe that a natural form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives being, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an theless,

effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there

added

the inclination to an effect, which through the will. For since the intelligible foim has a relation to opposite things (since the .same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says.® Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding, and so His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the is

to

inclination

it

is

is is

8. 30,

account known by God before it is made.^ Obj. 2. Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are

>Bk.

VII

(PG14, 1126).

Metaphysics, x,

not discursive.

Rom.

them He also justified, etc.: happen not because God knows it

called,

1

(tos3*33).

*

Chap. 13 (PL

*

Metaphysics, ix, 5 (io^*n).

42, X076); VI, 10

(PL 42, g3i).

.

FIRST PART God

knov^’ledge of

as the cause of things is

usually called the knowledge of approbation.

Reply Obj,

i.

Origen spoke

in reference to

ART.

14.

either of God Himself or of a creawhether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are

in the

of causality does not belong unless the will

ture,

joined to

it,

as

said above.

is

But when he says the reason why God fore-

knows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of being. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them, but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows

power

not.

Now

them.

Reply Obj.

2.

The knowledge

of

God

the

is

cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal. Reply Obj. 3. Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge, for

we

receive knowledge from natural

which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural things of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built. things, of

S3

are in act, while things which are not in act are

that aspect of knowledge to which the idea is

to

things that are noli absolutely should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which

a certain difference

to be noted in the

is

consideration of those things that are not ac-

For though .some of them may not be in still they were, or they will be, and

tual.

act now,

God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision; for since God’s act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity, and since eternity is without succescomprehending

sion,

of

all

God extends over

which

time, the present glance

all

time,

any time, as

exist in

and

to all things

to subjects present

to Him. But there are other things in God’s power, or the creature’s, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have the knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.

Reply Obj.

i.

Tliose things that are not ac-

tual are true in so far as they are in potency,

Article 9. Whether God Has Knowledge of Things That Are Not?

for it is true that they are in potency; and as such they are known by God.

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It seems that God has knowledge of beings only. Objection i. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But truth and being arc convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not

potency are known by God, although they are

of things that are not.

not in act.

Obj.

2.

the contrary,

The Apostle

says:

Who

.

.

calleth those things that are not as those that

are

(Rom.

4. 17).

God knows all things whatsoway are. Now it is possible that

/ answer that,

ever that in any

2.

Since .so

God is

far as

it

being

itself

far as

it

is

hot in so

participates in heat. So also, things in

Reply Obj.

3.

The knowledge

joined to His will

is

every-

participates in the

likeness of God, just as everything

Further, knowledge requires likeness

between the knower and the, thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is being itself. Therefore what is not cannot be known by God. Obj, 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not.

On

Reply Obj.

thing exists in

Hence

it

knows,

is,

is

is

of

God when

it

the cause of things.

not necessary that whatever

God

or was, or will be, but only w^hat

He

permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they are, but that they are possible. wills to be, or

Article

10.

Whether God Knows Evil Things?

We

proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It seems that God does not know evil things. Objection i. For the Philosopher says^ that the intellect which is not in potency does not know privation. But evil is “the privation of 1

Soul,

III,

6 (430*^23).

f

.

SUMMA TBEOWCICA

84

good/’ as Augustine says/ Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potency but is always

from the foregoing (a. 2), it seems that God does not know evil things. Obj. 2. Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not in act, as is clear

know

evil things.

Obj.

3.

by

Further, everything

known

is

known

by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing (aa. 2, either

5).

Now

its

likeness, or

the divine essence neither

is

the like-

nor is evil contrary to it, for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augus-

ness of

God

docs not

know

evil

potency; for were they actuwould not be known is thus that simple things are

privation. It

Obj. 4. Further, what is known through anand not through itself is imperfectly

other

evil is not known by God through because otherwise evil would be in God,

known. But

for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly, which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.

the contrary It

is

written (Prov. 15. ii).

Hell and destruction are before

God

(Vulg.,

the Lord)

I answer that, Whoever knows a thing per-

must know all that can happen to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may happen. Hence God would not know good things perfectly unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence, since this is the being of evil that it is the privation of good, by the very fact that God knows good things He knows evil things also, just as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Norn. fectly

therefore

but by the opposite good.

Reply Obj.

The knowledge

2.

the cause of evil, but

of

God

not

is

the cause of the good

is

by

which evil is known. Reply Obj. 3. Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil, it is opposed to the effects of God, which He know's by His essence; and knowing them.

He

know’s the opposite evils.

Reply Obj.

To know

4.

a thing by some-

thing else only belongs to imperfect knowledge that thing

if

is

of itself knowable; but evil

not

is

“God through Himself

means the privation of good. Therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good. evil

Article

ii.

Whether God Knows Singular

Things?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article: It seems that God docs not know singular things. Objection

F'or the divine intellect

i.

immaterial than the

human

human

know

singular thing.s, but as the Phi-

says,'^

“Reason has

Obj.

2.

Further, in us those powers alone

things arc in the highest degree abstracted from

Obj.

some

3.

®

Sect. 2 (PCi 3, 860).

(PL

688). 41, 3So)*

know

all knowledge is through But the likene.ss of singular

Further,

likeness.

things in so far as they are singular does not

God

Therefore

2

docs not

singular things.

Reply Obj. i. The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potency does not know privation by privation existing in it; ard this agrees with what he had said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not ac12 (PL

God

materiality. Therefore

all

only,

m,

God

know' the singular which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in God

except through light.”

ConJes^ioHi,,

do with univer-

docs not know’ singular things.

matte*', which, .since

City of God, xri.

to

sense wath singular things.” Therefore

sals,

to be in

J

the

immateriality

does not

ity

*

its

more

is

Now

losopher

seem

receives the vi-

intellect.

by reason of

intellect

sion of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness

vii)®:

God

separate substances.

know's evil not by privation existing in Himself,

of itself knowable, because the very notion of

things.

On

by

known by

evil,

tine says.^ Therefore

itself,

tually, but only in

ally in our intellect, they

is

On

is

all

God

it is

altogether unlike God,

God cannot know

ways of a man

1 answer that,

For

for the principle of singular-

the contrary, It

All the

in

;

is

being in potency

Who

is

pure

act.

singular things.

written (Prov. 16. 2),

are

open

God knows

to

His eyes.

singular things.

perfections found in creatures pre-exist in a higher

way, as

is

Now

clear

from the

fore-

know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know* singular things. Even the Philosogoing

(q.

IV,

pher considers ^Soul,

II,

A.

it

5 (4I7*>22).

2).

to

incongruous that anything

FIRST PART known by us should be unknown

God; and thus against Empedocles he argues^ that “God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord.”

Now

among

inferior beings exist simply

to

ART.

Q. 14,

12

8$

knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the

to the

form.

the perfections which are divided

Reply Ohj,

i.

Our

intellect abstracts the in-

from the individualizing

and unitedly in God; hence, although by one power we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple in-

hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles, and on that account our intellect

tellect.

species in the divine intellect, which

Now

some, wishing to show

God knows

how

this

can be,

by uniany singular thing that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all said that

versal causes. 2

singular things

For nothing

exists in

eclipses that are to come. This, however,

is

not

enough, for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is

telligible species

does not

is

the son of Sophroniscus,

would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the foregoing mode, God would not know singular things in their singuor because of something of that kind,

larity.

On

the other hand, others have said’ that

knows

singular things

God

by the application of

ciples

ciples

Reply Obj.

must be said otherwise, that, by His knowledge, as stated above (a. 8), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which arc the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Q. XLiv, A. 2), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Him.self by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply Therefore

since

*

2

God

is

it

the cause of things

I, s (4io\); Metaphysics, iil, 4 (iooo*»3). Cf. Averroes, Best. Best., disp. vi (ix,85F);

Although as regards the species

tr.

iii,

sent, s

(MK

71.16);

ination

and

sense, yet its

power extends

dso

6

(ix,

85M).

to both

immaterial and material things.

Reply Obj.

Although matter as regards its from likeness to God. yet, so far as it has being in this way. it re3.

potentiality recedes

even

in

tains a certain likeness to the divine being.

Article

12.

Whether God Can

Know

Infinite

Things?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article: It seems that God cannot know infinite things. Objection i. For the infinite, as such, is unsince the infinite

who measure

it,

is

that which,

“to

leaves always something

more

to be measured,” as the Philosopher says.* Moreover, Augustine says*^ that “whatever is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the comprehension of the knower.” Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God.

Obj.

2.

Further,

if

we say

that things infinite

God's knowledge, be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in the Physics.^ But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Physics? Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite. And so the infinite cannot be finite in God's knowledge, which is infinite. Obj. 3. Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to in

themselves are

against this

* * ®

na, Metaph., viir, 6 (loorb). Cf. Averroes, Be^t. Best,, disp.

cf.

Avicen-

no material

conditions like the species received in the imag-

it

finite

in

may

Sold,

Algazel, Metaph., ®

2.

in the divine intellect, its being has

tho.se

reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.

the es-

not only universal, but also singular things.

known;

application cannot be the

is

which enter into the composition of whether principles of the species or prinof the individual. Hence by it God knows

means nothing, because no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that .said

the singular. But the intelligible

things,

universal causes to particular effects. But this

thing; hence the

know

sence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction but of itself, being the principle of all the prin-

individualized

white, or because he

prin-

ciples;

Physics, HI, 6 (207»7). City of God, xii, 1 8 (PL 41, 368). Aristotle, in, 4 {204^3).

^ Aristotle, vi, 7

;

SUMMA TBEOIOGICA

86 the notion of the infinite that

Therefore God.

On

infinite things

it

be measured.

cannot be

known by

mode and

of the infinite

way

in this

is

to

know

part after part

the infinite cannot be known,

for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there ‘

the contrary j Augustine says,* 'Although

we cannot number

the infinite, nevertheless

it

can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds/’ / answer that, Since God knows not only things which are in act but also things in the power of Himself or created things, as shown above (a. cj), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which is only of things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say,^ (for we do not say that the world existed from eternity, nor that generation and movement wall go on for ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied),

will

God as

always remain something else outside. But does not know the infinite or infinite things

if

He

knows

enumerated part after

all

part, since

things simultaneously,

cessively, as said

above

nothing to prevent

Him

(a. 7).

He

and not suc-

Hence

from knowing

there

is

infinite

things.

Reply Obj.

2.

Transition imports a certain

succession of parts, and hence finite

it is

cannot be traversed by the

that the in-

finite,

nor by

the infinite. But equality suffices for compre-

even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be

is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence, it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as if it were traver.sable. Reply Obj. 3. The knowledge of God is the

multiplied to infinity as rational creatures en-

measure of

dure for ever. The reason of this

infinite

yet, if W'e consider

hold that

more

God knows

attentively, w’e

must

infinite things

is to be found in the fact knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible species in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our in-

that the

tellect is the likeness of the thing as regards the nature of the species, w’hich can be shared in by infinite particulars. Hence our intellect by the intelligible

knows

species of

men

man

a

in

certain

—not

way

however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is infinite

because the intelligible species of our intellect the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species, On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be,

is

not only as regards the

common

principles, but

also as regards the principles proper to each

one, as

shown above

(a. ii).

that the knowledge of

God

Hence

it

follows

extends to infinite

even as distinct from each other. Reply Obj. i. ‘The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity,” as the Philosopher says.^ But things,

hension, becau.se that

things, not quantitatively, for the does not have this kind of measure, but

it measures the essence and truth of For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God. as the thing made by art agrce.« with the art. (Granted, however, an actually iniinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held/ yet it is manifest that these w'ould have a determinate and finite being, because ^heir being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God.

because

things.

Article

Whether the Knowledge Co 7itingcnt Things?

13.

of Future

of

God

Is

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things.

For from a necessary cause proeffect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (a. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of conObjection

i.

ceeds a necessary

tingent things.

Obj.

2.

Further, every conditional proposi-

the idea of quantity implies the order of parts.

tion of which the antecedent

Therefore to know the

essary must have an absolutely necessary con-

infinite

according to the

sequent. For the antecedent i8 (PL 41, 368). Avicenna and Alcazcl; cf. above, q. vii, a, below, * Physics, i, 2 (1 85*33). Q. XLvi, A. 2, Repb obj. 8. *

*

City of God,

is

is

absolutely nec-

to the consequent

xiT.

Anaximenes and Diogenes; cf. Aristotle, Phystes, in, 4 {203^1$) ; Metaphysics, 1 3 (084*5).

Aristotle, Physics, vni, i {252^$$).

*

Metaphysics, v, $ (1015^*9).

*

Aristotle, Physics,

i,

*

Concessions, xii, 7

(PL 32,

7 (tgo^i).

828).

w Generation and Corruption, it, to « Idid. Cf. Plato. Phaedo, (96). ^*Cf. Gilson, Pegis, St.

VEsprit

(336*32)-

de la Phil. Mtd,,

Thomas and the Greeks,

pp. iox-104.

I,

240-242;

SUMMA THEOWGICA

040

according to all that belongs to their being in any way whatsoever. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of being.

Reply Obj,

i.

The Philosopher^

to form, either

here

we

—that

speaking

is

from form accidental or substantial. But

of becoming in particular

is,

are speaking of things according to

emanation from the universal principle of being, from which emanation matter itself is their

not excluded, although

it is

excluded from the

former mode of being made. Reply Obj. 2. Passion is an

Hence

it

effect of action.

reasonable that the

is

first

passive

and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above. Obj. 4. Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v.)^ that ^‘self»subsisting being

and before

consider that

principle, since every imperfect thing

an exemplar

caused principle must be

by one perfect. For the first most perfect, as Aristotle says.^ Reply Obj. 3. The reason advanced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is

not created without form; for although everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it

its

should be created,

being

is

if all

that belongs to

effect

may

if

for the production of anything

necessary,

is

it is

in order that the

receive a determinate form. For an

artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether

the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorly conceived in the mind. Now it

it is

manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This determination of forms is

must be reduced

wisdom wisdom devised

to the divine

principle, for divine

created.

life,

wisdom.” On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46),* are “the master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence.” Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God. / answer that^ God is the first exemplary cause of all things. In proof of which we must

principle should be the effect of the first active is

before self -subsisting

is

self-subsisting

as its first

the order

of the universe, which order consists in the va3. Whether the Exemplary Cause Is ny thing Beside God?

RTiCLE

We

proceed thus to the Third Article:

And therefore we must say that wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas that is, exemplary forms existing in the divine mind (q. riety of things. in the divine

It

—

would seem that the exemplary cause is something beside God. Objection 1. For the effect is like its exemplary cause. But creatures are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplary

ness to that essence can be shared in different

cause.

ways by by

XV,

A, I

And

).

these ideas, though multiplied by

their relations to things, in reality are not other

than the divine essence, according as the different things. In this

God Himself

manner

like-

there-

reduced to something self-existing, as a thing is reduced to fire, as stated above (a. i). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This ap-

exemplar of all things'. Moreover, in created things one thing may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of the likeness of one thing to another, either in species, or by the analf'gy of some kind

pears from the fact that in

of imitation.

Obj.

2.

Further, whatever

is

parti cipialion

is

ignited

all

sensible things

is

fore

Reply Obj.

found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as, for instance, a per se man, and a per se horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplary causes exist beside God. Obj. 3, Further sciences and defmitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as

matter, and so a

these are in particular things, because there

sible.

no science or

is

definition of particular things.

Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular things, ^Physics, ^

1,

7 (i90**i).

Metaphysics

t

xii, 7 {l0^2^2g),

I.

the

is

first

Although creatures do not

at-

God according to man begotten is like

tain to a natural likeness to

likeness of species, as a

the

man

begetting,

still

they do attain to like-

ness to Him, according as they represent the type known by God. as a material house is like the house in the architect’s mind.

Reply Obj.

2. It is

of a man’s nature to be in

man

without matter is imposTherefore although this man is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self -existing in the same species, but to a superior species, such as separate (PG

»

Sect. 5

*

PL 40, 30.

3,

820).

FEUST PART The same

substances.

applies, to other sensible

things.

Reply Obj.

3. Although every science and concerned only with beings, still it not necessary that a thing should have the

definition

is

ART.

Q. 45 ,

1

341

imperfect agents, and td these it pertains to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something.

Who

But

is

it does not pertain to the First Agent, agent only, to act for the acquisition of

and self-existing is named, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the

some end; He purposes only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness, while every creature endeavours to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things. Reply Obj. i. To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and thing acted upon. But this does not belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly free giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own

ancients asserted.

goodness.

is

same mode

in intellect as the being

derstanding. For

we

has in un-

abstract universal species

by the power of the agent particular conditions, but

intellect

from the

not necessary that the universals should subsist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars. Reply Obj. 4. As Dionysius says (Div, Nom.

by

6),^

xi,

is

it

“self -existing life

God Himself

wisdom’’ sometimes

Reply Obj.

Article

Whether God Is the Final Cause of

4.

All Things?

is

far as

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that God is not the final cause of things.

all

ated

i. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end. Obj. 2, Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical,''^ because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore

Objection

2.

The form

of the thing gener-

not the end of generation, except in so the likeness of the form of the gen-

it is

which endeavours to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, since the end is more noble than the means erator,

to the end.

But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the end

Reply Obj. 3. All things desire God as their end when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, that is, without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except according as it participates in the likeness to God. Reply Obj. 4. Since God is the efficient, the exemplary and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from con-

of all things.

sidering

He

is

not the final cause of

Obj.

Obj.

3.

4.

Further,

all

God

is

which

first

of

son,

The

another from the action of the agent, unless it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the thing acted upon considered as such is the same, but in a different way with respect to ea dples; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than

or that

its part,

subject, as appears

motion, for motion tency. Therefore to be

made out

is

it is

by the

is in

po-

impossible for anything

of nothing

by God.

made must some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time is becoming and has been made, because in Obj.

have

3.

Further, what has been

at

permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is; and so it would follow that something would be and not be at the same time. Therefore when anything is made its becoming precedes its having been made. But this is impossible unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained. Therefore

it is

impossible that anytliing should

be made from nothing. Obj.

4.

Further, infinite distance cannot be

crossed. But infinite distance exists

between beand nothing. Therefore it does not happen that something is made from nothing. On the contrary. It is said (Gen, 1. 1) In the bcf^hining God created heaven and earth, upon ing

:

wdiich a Gloss says* that to create

is

“to

make

something out of nothing.” I answer that^ Not only is it not impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created by God, as appears from what has been said (q. xliv, a. i). For w^hen anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action thus the craftsman

a

cause ef all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing.

Reply Obj.

1.

The

ancient philosophers, as is

said above (q. xliv, a, 2), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular

which necessarily presuppose something from this came their common opinion that nothing is made from nothing. But this has no place in the first emanation from the causes,

in their action;

universal principle of things.

Reply Obj.

definition of

the act of what

AMT

sal

affir-

mation and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from nothing, or create. Obj. 2. Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore creation is change. But every change occurs in

some

a. 4$:

2.

according to a

Creation

mode

is

not change, except

of understanding.

For

change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in motion according to quantity, quality and place,

but sometimes

the

it is

same being only

in

po-

tency, as in substantial change, the subject of

which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as “action and passion coincide in the substance of motion,” and differ only according to different relations.® it must follow that when motion is

taken away, only different relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of

understanding as was said above creation

is

signified

(q. xiii, a. t),

by mode of change;

'and

on

account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. And yet to make and this

made arje more suitable expressions here than to change and to be chang^, because to make and to be made imply a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imto be

ply change only as a consequence.

Reply Obj. 3. In things which are made without motion, to become and to he already made are simultaneous, whether such

making

is

the

;

worLs from natural things, as

wood

or brass,

which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but

presupposes matter. If therefore act from something presupposed,

God

did only

would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above (q. xliv, aa. I, 2), that

beings, unless 1

Ghssa ordin.,

it is (i,

it

nothing can be

from God,

among

Who is the univer-

23F) ; see note above

(a. i).

term of motion, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of motion, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not previously. tion,

the *

Hence

a thing

same

is

since creation

is

being created and

time,

Aristotle, Physics,

iii,

3 {202^20).

without mois

created at

;

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

4

And

4. This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being, which is plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing

happens, indeed, in the parsome beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the uni-

between two terms.

ment.

Reply Ohf.

existing.

this

ticular productions of

versal cause of all beings, which

God by

Now when movement

is

action and passion, only relation

Article

3.

Whether Creation

Is

Anything in

the Creature? .

thus to the Third Article: It is not anytliing in the

.We proceed

Objection is

i.

For as creation taken

in a pas-

attributed to the creature, so crea-

tion taken in an active sense

is

attributed to the

Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise it would

follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is

not anything in the creature. Obj, 2. Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the

since

it is

moveremoved from remains, as was

2, Ans. 2). Hence creation in the only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being even as in passion, which implies movement, is implied a reis

;

lation to the principle of motion.

creature. sive sense

God. Hence

said above (a.

creature

would seem that creation

is

creation produces things without

medium between them

not the Creator, as

it is

both,

not eternal

nor is it a creature, because in that case it w^ould be necessary for the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the crea-

Reply Obj.

means

Creation

i.

signified

the divine action, which

is

actively

God’s essence,

with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; but the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (q. xiii, a. 7) in treating of the divine names. Reply Obj. 2. Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (a. 2, Ans. 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover and the thing moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and

the creature. Nevertheless passive creation

the creature, and

is

a creature.

Nor

is

is

in

there

belonging to

need of a further creation in its creation; because relations, from the fact that they are relations, that is, are said of something else, are not referred by any other relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above (q. xlii,

ject.

A. 1, Ans. 4), in treating of the equality of the

ture.

Obj.

3.

Further,

if

creation

the created substance,

it

is

anything beside

mu.st be an accident

it. But every accident is in a subTherefore a thing created would be the

subject of creation, and so the same thing would

be the subject and also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the .subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident, while the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not

any

thing.

Persons.

Reply Obj.

3.

The

creature

is

the term of

creation as signifying a change, but

is

the sub-

ject of creation, taken as a real relation,

prior to

it

in being, as the subject

is

and

is

to the ac-

cident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of the object of

which

it

is

said,

which

On the contrary^ It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance than to be made according to its substantial or acci-

as long as the creature

dental form. But generation taken absolutely, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form, is

beginning.

the creature.

Nor

is

it

is tiie beginning of necessary to say that

is it is being created, because creation implies a relation of the creature to L.ie Creator, with a certain newmess or

something in the thing generated. Therefore is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in

Article 4. Whether To Be Created Belongs to Composite and Subsisting Things?

the thing created.

would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. Objection i. For in the book, De Causis (prop, iv),' it is said, “The first of creatures is being.” But the being of a thing created is not

much more

/ answer that, Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only, because what is created, is not made by move-

ment, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-

We

»

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It

BA 166.

FIRST PART Q subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things.

Further, whatever is created is from But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own com-

Obj.

2,

nothing.

ponent parts. Therefore composite things are not created. Obj, 3. Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first; as natural generation produces the natural

which is presupposed in the operation of But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is

thing, art.

the contrary, It

beginning

heaven things.

God

is

created heaven and earth. But

and earth

are

subsisting

Therefore creation

is

composite

proper to these

To be

created

is,

S

created so that

brought into being at the

;

matter.

Article

5.

Whether

It Pertains to

God Alone

To Create?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that it does not pertain to God Objection

Hence

is

manner,

made and to be created propwhatever being belongs; which,

to be

erly belong to

indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things,

whether they are simple things, as

But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can

ca.se

of material substances. For being belongs to

— that

to what subsists and accidents and the like are called beings not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them;

that which has being

own

is,

being. But forms

as whiteness

is

called a being, because its sub-

white by

it.

is

more properly

.said

be of a being than a being. Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather concrcated than created things; but, propto

speaking,

created

things

are

subsisting

own

fire

generates

substance can

make

a substance like to

create.

Obj,

2.

Further, the greater the resistance

is

on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But a contrary resists more than nothing. Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this.

maker

is

considered according to the measure of what

is

Obj.

3.

Further, the power of the

made. But created being is finite, as we proved above when treating of the infinity of God (Q. vn, aa. 2, 3, 4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.

beings.

In the propo.sition “the first of created things is being,” the word “being” does not refer to the created substance, but to the

Reply Obj.

On

i.

iii,

the contrary, Augustine says

create anything.”

other creatures.

because it is “this” being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as w'as said above (a. i). We use a similar way of speaking when we say that the

first

ing, not

thing

is

colour, although, strictly

speaking, the thing coloured Metaphysics,

vii, i (io28'*i8).

is

what

is

seen,

Q.

{Be

Trin,

bad angels can therefore can any

that “neither good nor

S)’*'

proper notion of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a be-

first visible

for

likeness,

But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can

Hence, according to the

accident

Philosopher^

their

and man begets man. Therefore an imma-

fire,

in the case of

separate substances, or composite, as in the

Because, according to the Philosperfect can make its OAvn like-

is

ness.

terial

thing.

made

in a

i.

opher, ^ what

itself.

to be

1

it is

all its principles.

Reply Obj. 3. This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation for creation is the production of the whole being, and not only of

(a. 2, Ans.2.).

made, as was .shown above

Now,

erly

art.

same time with

directed to the being of a

to be

is

.

make

/ answer that,

ject

is

said (Gen. i.i)\ In the

things.

in its

45

Reply Obj, 2, Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles, but it means that the composite

alone to create.

created.

On

.

Much

less

I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the glance, according to what precedes (a, i, XLiv, aa. I, 2), that to create can be the

God alone. For the more must be reduced to the more

proper action of

uni-

versal effects

uni-

versal *

and prior causes.

Soul,

*PL42,

Now among

all effects

4 (415*26) also Mfteorology, tv, 3 (380*14). 876.

ir,

;

;

jl

SUMMA TBEOLOGICA

46

the most universal is being itself, and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, and that

is

God. Hence also

it

And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus

it

requires in its

telligence nor the soul gives us being, except fn

some pre-existing thing which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very

so far as it works by divine operation. Now to produce being absolutely, not as this or that be-

notion of creation. Reply Obj. i. A perfect thing participating

{De

said

is

Causis, prop,

iii)^

that neither in

ing, belongs to the notion of creation.

manifest that creation

is

God

is

Hence

it

the proper act of

alone.

action

any nature, makes a likeness

by abby applying

to itself not

solutely producing that nature, but

to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of himself but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten, and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he is an

it

happens, however, that something may participate the proper action of another not by its It

own power, but

instrumentally, in so far as

it

by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the acts

proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause can create. And thus Avicenna assertedthat the first separate substance created by God created another after itself, and the substance of the world and its soul and that the substance

man

individual man. But as this

human

participates

nature, so every created being partici-

pates, so to speak, the nature of being; for

God

same manner the Master God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can create ministerially, not by its

His own being, as we have said above (q. vii, aa. I, 2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except in so far as it causes bein^ in this^ and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action by which it makes its own likeness. But in an immaterial sub.stance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this thing, because it is this thing by its form,

own power.

w'hcreby

;

of the world creates the matter of the inferior

And

bodies.

says (Sent,

But

in the

5)^ that

iv, d.

alone

is

it

has being, since

some added perfection;

the effect of the principal agent. If therefore

a

it

nothing according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose, nor would there be any need of certain instruments for certain aceffects

tions.

Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, by the property of its own form, form of a bench, which is the

which it does produces the proper effect proper effect supposed to

of the principal agent.

of all

absolute being

God

creating

other

is

effects,

Hence nothing

Now

the

what is preand that is else

can act

it

is

a

subsisting

form. Therefore an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial sub.stance like

cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause, except in so far as by something proper to itself it works to dispose this

itself as

regards

.superior

Dionysiu.s

way even

being, but only as regards

its

angel

says (Ccel in

as

we may

illuminates

Hier.

heaven there

is

as viii,

.say

that

inferior, 2).^

as

In this

paternity, as the

15): From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named. From

Apostle says (Eph.

3.

which

it evidently appears that no created can cause anything, unless something presupposed, which is again'^t the notion of

being is

creation.

Reply Obj.

2.

A

thing

is

made from

its

con-

trary accidentally,'’ but per se from the subject

And

dispositively

which

since creation

the agent because

own power,

matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the potency (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act and the more the potency

and instrumentally to this effect, is not from anything presupposed which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, cither by its or instrumentally

—that

is,

minis-

terially.

is in

potency.

so the contrary resists

impedes the potency from

it

the act to which the agent intends to reduce the matt-er, as fire intends to reduce the

;

1

BA 165.

*

Meta.,

(MK

ix, chap. 4 (i04vb): cf. Algazel, Meta., tr. v xiq); Averroes, Dest. Dest., disp. 3 (ix, 52E); cf. tr.

also Albert,

Summa

'

5 14 )-

•QRn,57S.

de Great,,

ii,

Q. 61, a. 2

(BO xxxv,

the

more power

is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a is

restrained,

much greater power * PG 3, 240. Aristotle, Physics,

l,

is

required in the agent

7 (iqo**27 ).

FIRST 'MET vfbm no potency appears tl^t

make a

to

it is

thing,

prUhexists.

Thws

iheisefore it

an act. of much greater power from nothing, than from its

4X7.6

Q. 45.

#47

tmtea belongs to the

cessions

06

and

relations.

Further,

3.

;’.

Persom according to prb.

if it

be said that the causa-

from some essential some one Person, this

contrary.

tion of the creature flows

Reply Obj. 3. The power of the maker is weighed not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made; for a greater heat heats not only

attribute appropriated to

more, but faster. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power, which appears from what has been

dom—and

said (Ans. 2). For

if

a greater power

is

required

in the agent in proportion tp the distance of the

potency from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potency is infinite, because there is no proportion betw'een no potency and the potency presupposed by the pow’er of a natural agent, as there is no proportion between non-being and being. And because no creature has absolutely an infinite power, any more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above (q. vu, a. 2), it follow^s that no creature

does not appear to be suflScient, because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute

thus does not pertain to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in creating according to relations

On ii)2

and processions. the contrary Dionysius says {Div. Norn, y

that

all

things

.

Whether To Create Is Proper

to

I answer that. To create is, properly speakcause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for

fire

generates

God

fore to create pertains to being, that

is.

fire.

His essence, which

Hence

any one Person, but

common

to the nature of their proce.ssion.

Person.

said above (Q. xiv,

For what comes first is the cause and what is perfect is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature, and is more perfect, because the diObjection is

1.

after,

vine Person proceeds in perfect likeness of its however proceeds in im-

principle; the creature

perfect likeness. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the processions of things,

and so to create

is

proper to a

Person.

Obj. 2. Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever differ-

ence

is

attributed to the divine Persons belongs

them according

to

tures

is

son.s;

and relaBut the causation of crea-

to the processions

tions of the Persons.

diversely attributed to the divine Per-

for in the Creed,^ to the Father is at-

tributed that

He

is

the “Creator of

all

things

and invisible,” to the Son is attributed that “by Him all things were made,” and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is “Lord and visible

Life-giver.” Therefore the causation of crea*

Nicaean Creed

(MA 11, 666; DZ 54)-

is

to

not proper

to the

whole

Nevertheless the divine Persons, according have a causal-

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It would seem that to create is proper to some

of what

there-

common

is

to create

is

And

according to His

Trinity.

of the Persons?

We

common

ing, to

to

Article 6

created are the

work of the whole Godhead.

the three Persons.

can create.

Any

—namely, by power, goodness, and wis-

ity respecting the creation of things. a.

For as was

8; q. xix, a. 4), wdien

treating of the knowdedge and will of God, is

the cause of things

by His

just as the craftsman

made by

his craft.

is

Now

intellect

and

God will,

cause of the '’things the craftsman works

through the word conceived in his intellect, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Flence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, w’hich is His Son, and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the types of the productions of creatures in so far as they include the essential attributes, which are knowledge, and will.

Reply Obj.

I.

The processions

of the divine

Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.

Reply Obj.

common them

2.

As the divine nature, although

to the three Persons,

still

belongs to

kind of order, since the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, so also likewise' the in a

power of

creation, whilst

common

to the three

Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order.

For the Son receives Sect. 3 (PG 3. 637).

it

from the Father, and the

SUMMA TEEOWGICA

348

not have the power of creation from another.

common nature and not to the rewhereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to

And

be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the

Holy Ghost from both. Henco is

to be the Creator

Him Who

attributed to the Father as to

of the Son

Him

said (John

it is

i.

things were made, since

all

same power, but from another;

does

Through

3),

He

has the

longs to th^

lations

unity of essence.

On

for this preposi-

the contrary, Augustine says

tion “through” usually denotes a mediate cause,

vi, 10), ‘

or a principle from a principle. But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is attributed that by His rule He governs and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the general notion of this appropriation may be taken from the appropria-

in creatures.”

tion of the essential attributes. For, as

stated

xxxix,

(q.

8), to the

a.

propriated power which

is

and therefore

it

creation,

Him

to be the Creator.

Father

chiefly is

To

above is

ap-

shown

attributed

the Son

—

for

life

consists

in

first

a

certain

mover

is

is

interior

the end and

proper notion; thus the order of

reduced to wisdom, and the justification of the sinner to mercy and goodness pouring itself out superabundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of things

is

a thing,

reduced to power.

is

Article

Whether

7.

in

Creatures Is Necessarily

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. Objection i. For anything can be discovered through its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be discovered from creatures, as w'as above stated (q. xxxii, a. i). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures. Further, whatever

2.

created. Therefore

found

if

is in

creatures

the trace of the Trinity

is

and

of the Trinity,

if

it

follows that

we can

find a

trace of the Trinity in each of these (properties),

and so on to

Obj.

own

3.

infinitude.

Further, the effect represents only its

cause.

form, as

fire

generated represents

fire

gen-

and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the representation of

erating,

image.

Now

the processions of the divine Persons

are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as

was said above (q. xxvti). For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect, and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect and w’ill, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, since there is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.

But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, since in every creature are found

some

things which are necessarily reduced to

the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a

it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the

as

principle from no principle. According as

a form and species,

But the causality of creatures be-

it

the form of the thing

represents the

made by

it

has

Word

as

from the conception of the craftsman. According

as

it

has order,

since

He

effect to

is

it

love,

something

art

is

Holy Ghost, order of the from the will of the

represents the becau.se else is

the

Creator.

And

is

according to some of their everything created has a trace

in creatures

properties,

smoke represents

Such a repre.sentation is called representation by trace; for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it is. Other effects

fire.

form, whereby it is determined to a .species, and has an order to something else. Therefore

Foufid a Trace oj the Trinity?

Obj.

effects represent only the causality of the

cause, but not its form; as

represent the cause as regards the likeness of

Reply Obj. 3. Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute to which it is connected its

some degree

cause, but in different ways. For

its

goodness.

through

its

in

Through Whom all things were made. And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings things to their due ends, and the giving of life

Trin.

to

appropriated wisdom, through which the agent acts through the intellect; and therefore it is said:

movement, and the

I answer that, Every effect in represents

some

{De

that “the trace of the Trinity appears

therefore Augustine says

loc. cit.) that

Trin. vi,

is found one indiformed by a spe-

every creature according as

in

{Dc

the trace of the Trinity it

is

and according as it is and according as it posses.ses order. And to these also are reduced those three, number, weight, and measure, mentioned in the Book of vidual, cies,

*

PL 42, 032.

FIRST FART Wisdom

(ri. 2I)-

For measure refers to the

substance of the thing limited by its principles, refers to the species, weight refers to

number

the order. And to these three are reduced the other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat, Boni, iii),* “mode, species, and order,” and

those he again mentions

also

iSy: “that which

qu.

thing persists by

substance,

its

form, and agrees by

its

lar expressions

persists;

Lxxxm,

that

that which agrees.’^

distinguished;

is

(qq.

is

which For a

distinct

by

may

Other simibe easily reduced to the

The

representation of the trace

its

order.

above.

Reply Obj.

1.

which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said (q. xxxii, a. i, Ans. i). Reply Obj. 2. A creature is properly a thing self-subsisting, and in such are the three abovementioned things to be found. Nor is it necessary that these three things should be found in to be referred to the appropriations, in

is

that exists in the creature, but only to a

all

subsisting being

is

the trace ascribed in regard

Q. 4S.

ART. 8

949

what

not created,

not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions* there were not creation, it would follow that Obj.

4.

Further,

is

is

nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.

On

the contrary, Augustine® distinguishes the

work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation. I answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said,^ do not begin by the action of nature, but previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concern-

and from not knowing how to disFor because forms pre-exist in matter in potency, they as-

ing matter,

tinguish between potency and act.

serted that they pre-existed absolutely. Others, however, said® that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation,

and accordingly, that

to each operation of na-

But this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which ture is joined creation.

thing

And

made

to those three things.

a

Reply Obj. 3. The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation, as appears from the above (a. 6),

and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown above (a. 4), it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be concreated. What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the composite, which is made from mat-

Article

Works

We

Whether Creation

8.

Is

Mingled with

of Nature and Art?

proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It

would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. Objection i. For in every operation of nature and art some form is produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every operation of nature and art there

Obj.

2.

than

ful

creation.

is

Further, the effect cause.

its

But

in

is

not more power-

natural things the only

the accidental form, which

is.

therefore, since to be

ter.

Hence

creation does not enter in the ^ works

of nature, but

it

presupposed to the work of

nature.

Reply Obj.

i.

Forms begin

to be in act

when

the composite things are made, not as though

they were made per se, but only accidentally. Reply Obj. 2. The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms, and therefore the natural agent not only produces its like according to quality, but according to spe-

is an active Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature. And therefore it must be produced by

cies.

creation.

w'hich they are assimilated, not in species, but

agent

or

is

a

Obj.

passive

3.

Further, in nature like begets like.

But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them, as is evident in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to other things.

Reply Obj.

form.

this is

according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent. However for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not

Dt Gen. ad Lit., v, 11,20 (PL 34. 330. 33S). ^Anaxagoras, in Aristotle, Physics, i, 4 (i87*2g); >

St.

»PL42, *

PL 40.

553* 15.

For the generation of imperagent suffices, and to be found in the celestial power to 3.

fect animals, a universal

»

Thomas, De

De Pot., q. m, a. 8, Averroes ascribed Plato— jTn Meta., vn, 31 (vni, i8oK).

Cf. St. Thoma.es.

bodies

vni, 4

(tv.

340K).

06;. 4. Further, a vacuum exists where there not a body, though there could be. But if the

world began to exist, there was first no body where the body of the world now is and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world there was a vacuum, which is impossible.® 06;. 5. Further, nothing begins anew to be ;

(In Three Articles)

Next must be

is unbegotten,'" and also^ that “the heaven unbegotten.” Therefore the universe did not begin to be.*

ter

is

moved moved

except through the

mover

or the thing

now than it was before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movebeing otherwise

ment there was a previous movement. Therefore movement always was and therefore also ;

the thing is

moved always

was, because

only

in

a thing moved.^

06;.

6.

Further, every

mover

is

movement either nat-

But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For nature always moves in the same manner; hence unle.ss some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, withural or voluntary.

out itself being changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do but this can be only by some im;

agined change, at least as regards time. Thus he who wills to make a house to-morrow, and not to-day, awaits something which will be to-mor-

row, but is not to-day, and at least awaits for to-day to pass, and for to-morrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because time is the measure of movement. Therefore it reremains that before every new movement, there was another movement. And so the same conclusion follows as before.®

06;. 7. Further, whatever is always in its beginning and always in its end cannot cease and

cannot begin, because what begins is not in its and what ceases is not in its beginning.

end,*,

•Aristotle, Heavens, i, 12 (281^18); Averroes, Calo, 1, 119 (iv, 340K). ® Physics, I, g (iq2'^28). •

Heavens,

•

Cf.

i,

In de

3 (270'‘i3).

Maimonides, Guide n, 13 (FR 173). Averroes, In De Colo, in, 2g (v, igoH). 7 Aristotle’s argument, according to Maimonides, Guide^ II, 14' (FR 174); cf. Averroes, In Phys., viii, 7 (iv, 342M), •Avicenna, Meta., ix, i (loara); Averroes, In Phys.^ vni, 8 (iv, 344E); 15 (v, 34QI); DestrucL DestrucL, t (ix, •

16A).

,

FMSTJPASr time ftlw^ys is in its b^mning aad ead, because there is no tune except n

God

wills it to

Aristotle, Physics,

Phys., vni,

comm,

vm,

i

be eternal, since the

(251*^19); cf. Averrocs,

In

ii (tv, 346c).

Avicenna, Meta., ix, i (loivab); cf. Averroes, Vest. Best., diap. i (ix, 27C). * Avicenna, Meta, ix, i (loivb); cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa Thcol., i, 64 (QR 1, 93): Bonaventurc. InSent.^n, *

d. I, pt. t, A. 1, Q. 2 *

(QRn,

20)4

Aristotle, Metaphysics, v, s (iois**9).

he proves’* that “heaven is ungenerated,” because it has no contrary from which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by generation, as some said,** es^

Physics, VIII,

®

Cf. Maimonicles, Guide, n, 15

i

^Vlll, I (250^*24;

(25o*’24).

(FR

176).

25147).

® I, •

10 (2794, 280*30). 1, 9 (104**! 6). Metaphysics, v, 12 (ioi9**i9). Heawns, i, 12 (28i48).

Topics,

“ ” Physics, 1, 9 **

Heavens,

M Cf.

(192*28).

3 (270*13). Aristotle, Heavens, i,

i,

so (270^13).

SUMMA THEOWGICA

^$2

But we say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above (p. xliv, a. 2). Reply Ohj. 4. The notion of a vacuum not only implies that in which nothing is, but also requires a space capable of holding a body and in which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle.* We hold however that before the world was there was no place or space. Reply Obj, 5. The first mover was always in the same state, but the first movable thing was

pecially about heaven.

not always so, because it began to be whereas before it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above (q. xlv, a. 2 Ans. 2).

Hence

it

evident that this reason, which

is

Aristotle gives, ^

is

valid against those

who

ad-

mitted the existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles.® But

we hold

moment movable movement also existed.

that from the

began to exist Reply Ohj.

6.

The

first

agent

is

things

Nor

is

it

necessary for some

change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we mu.st take into consideration the difference between a particular agent that presupposes something and produces

something else, and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the

form

And

due proportion into a suitable matter.

in

so

reasonable to say that

it is

it

introduces

the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different kinds of ter.

of

But

it

mat-

does not seem reasonable to say so

God Who produces form and matter

gether, whereas

say of

Him

that

it

He

to-

considered reasonable to

is

produces matter

the form and to the end.

Now,

agent presupposes time just as

fitting to

a particular

presupposes matter. Hence it is reasonably considered as acting in time after and not in lime before^ according to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal agent Who produces the thing and time also, is not consider d as acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time .succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect >

Physics, IV,

*Ibid., vni, •

1

i

it

(2o8*’26).

(251*25).

C£. Aristotle, Physics^ viii, i (250*’24).

to

has a cause, while this

is

not so manifest of

what always was. Reply Obj. 7. As

is stated,^ “before and after belong to time,” according as they are “in movement.” Hence beginning and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is neces-

moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement, which need not be if movement has a beginning. The same sary that any given

rea.son applies to the now of time. Thus it appears that the notion of the instant noWy as being always the beginning and end of time, pre-

supposes the eternity of time and movement. Aristotle brings forward this reason®

Hence

against those

a voluntary

agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect.

as and when He willed, and according what was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power if it was not always than if it had always been, since everything which was not always manifestly

much

as

who

asserted the eternity of time,

but denied the eternity of movement.

Reply Obj.

8.

God

priority of duration.

is

prior to the world

But the word prior

nifies priority not of time, but of eternity.

wc may say

that

it

signifies

by sig-

Or

the eternity of

imaginary time, and not of time really existing; just as when wc say that above heaven there is nothing, the word above signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.

Reply Obj 9. As the effect follows from the cause that acts naturally according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (q. xix, a. 4; Q. XLi, A. 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced by Him, except as preordained by His will that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare its author.

—

Rpply Obj.

10.

Given the

action, the effect

according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents acting by will, what is conceived and follcrws

preordained

is

taken as the form, which

principle of action. Therefore

is

the

from the eternal

God an eternal effect does not follow, but such an effect as God willed, an effect, that is, which has being after not being. action of

*

Aristotle, Physics, iv, 11 (210*17).

*Ihid,y VIII, X (25x^20).

FIRST PART Article 2. Whether It Is an Article of Faith That the World Began?

We

proceed thus to the Second Article: It it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. Objection i. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effecting cause of the world; indeed this is asserted by the more credible philosophers.^ Therefore that the it can be demonstratively proved world began.* Obj. 2. Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, is must therefore have been made from nothing, or from something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world, against which are the arguments of Aristotle, who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun to be.* Obj. 3. Further, everything “which works by intellect, works from some principle, as ap-

would seem that

pears in

all

craftsmen. But

God

acts

by

intel-

His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exii.t.*'^ Obj. 4. Further, it appears clearly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist. Obj. 5. Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been it would be equal to God in duration. Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.® Obj. 6. Further, if the world always was, infinite days have preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false,^ lect; therefore

1

See above,

q.

yi iv,

a. 2.

®The position of Alexander of Hales, Summa Theol., i, 64 (QR 1. 9s); and Bona venture, In Seni., n, d. i, a. 1, q. 2 (QR II, 22); cf. Albert, In Phys viii, 1, 13 (BO iii, 552); Summa Theol., Pt. ir, tr. i, o- 4 (hO xxxii, 108I. * Alexander of Flales, Summa Theol., i, 64 (QR i, 93).

Q. 46.

Aristotle, Physics,

^

Cf. Albert the Great,

4 (203“3i)* In Phys., viii,

Summa

i,

12

1,

64

(BO iii, 548). (QR x, 93).

«

Alexander of Hales,

7

Algaael, according to Averroes, Dest. Desi.,

di.sp. i (xx,

cf. Maimonides, Guide, i, 74 (FR 138); BonavenIn Sent., n, d. 1. Pt. 1, a. 1, Q. 2 (QR 11, 21).

18C); lure.

Theol.,

453

Further,

7.

if

physics.^

Obj. always

8.

Further,

were,

number

if

the world and generation

have been But man’s soul

there

of men.

an infinite immortal.

is

Therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible.

Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world began, and is held not only by faith.»®

On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things that appear not (Heb. ii. i). But that God is the Creator of the world; hence that the world began, is an article of faith, for we say, ‘T believe in one God," etc.^‘And again, Gregory says {Horn. i. in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying. In the beginning God created heaven and earth, in which words the newness of the world is conveyed. Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.

We hold by faith alone, and cannot be proved by demonstration, that the world did not always exist, as was said above / answer that,

it

of the mystery of the Trinity (q. xxxii, a. i).

The reason

of this is that the newness, of the world cannot be demonstrated from the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the

essence of a thing.

Now

everything according

from here and now; hence it is said that “universals are everywhere and always."^* Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone to the notion of its species abstracts

did not always exist.

Likewise neither can

it

be demonstrated on

the part of the efficient cause, which acts will.

For the

will of

God cannot be

by

investigated

by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity, and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (q. xix, a. 3). But the divine will can *

Aristotle, Physics,

•Aristotle,

ir,

ii,

3 (194^^0).

2 (994*^5); cf.

Averroes, Dest. Best., disp.

1 (ix, 2 oA),

“

iii,

2

the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son,® Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved in the Meta-

,

*

ART

Obj.

Algaxel, according to Averroes, Dest. Dest., disp.

2oA);

cf.

Maimonides, Guide,

i,

73

(FR

In Sent., 11, d. i, Pt. i, a i, 0. 2 (QR Nicaean Creed (MA n, 666; I)Z 54).

turc,

« PL 76, 786. “ Aristotle. Posterior Analytics, i, 31

131); it,

21).

(87'*33).

1 (ix,

Bonaven-

SUMMA TBEDLOGICA

aS4

be manifested to man by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration

find out

or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to

AA.

laugh, thinking that on such reasons

we

be-

lieve things that are of faith.

Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says* the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. ‘Tor they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was always made.” “And they try to explain their meaning thus” as Augustine says^: “for just as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker always existed.” To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts by

motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent must be the beginning of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration, as

appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say^ that it does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration, because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change, as was said above (q. xiv, A. 7).

Reply Obj. 2. Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing; not that it was made after nothing, according to what wc understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna.'* Reply Obj. 3. This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in the F*liysics).^ But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to (PL

>

City 0/ God, xr, 4

>

Ibid., X, 3£

*

Cf. Averroes, Best. Best.,

*

(PL

what should be done, which is like movement. Of such a character is the hijm^ intellect,

but not the divine intellect

(q. Xtv,

12).

7,

Those who hold the eternity of some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and vice versa^ and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, w'ere subject to an infinite variety of discovery and decay.® Hence Aristotle says^ that it is absurd from such particular changes to accept the opinion of the newness of the whole Reply Obj.

4.

the world hold that

world.

Reply Obj. always was,

Even supposing

5. it

that the world

would not be equal

eternity, as Boethius says

God

to

(De Consol,

in

v, 6),®

because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.

Reply Obj. 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever by-gone

day we choose, from

it

day there

to the present

number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea is

a finite

that, given

number

of

two extremes, there

mean

an

is

infinite

terms.

Reply Obj.

7. In efficient causes it is imposproceed to infinity per se thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by

—

sible to

;

the hand, and so on to infinity. But

it

is

not

impossible to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the

causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication

being accidental; as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other is broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another, and likewise to this particular

man

it is

accidental

as generator to be gen-

erated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all

men

generating

causes

hold one grade in

—namely, the grade of

efficient

a particular gen-

erator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an

41, 319). « Cf.

41, 311).

Meta., IX, 4 (io4va). •Aristotle, ni, 4 (203*3 1),

I

(ix, 27TI).

Augustine, City of God, xii, 10 (PL 41, 338); Arisi, 14 (351*19); AverroeS, In Meta., xn,

totle, Meteorology,

So

will actually deficient in so far

does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but it

fault

follows upon

it

from the

fact that the

with this defect. Reply Obj. 4. Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as was said above. will acts

*

Chap. 9 (PL 44, 672).

SUMMA THMOLOGJCA

^56

Article 2. Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil Objection i. For it is said (Isa. 45. 5, 7): / am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light and creating darkness, making peace,

and

And (Amos

creating evil.

3. 6),

Shall there

which the Lord hath not done? Ohj. 2. Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (a. i). be evil in a

city,

Therefore, since

God

was shown above

as

the cause of every good,

is

ii,

(q.

a. 3; q. vi, aa. i,

follows that also every evil

it

Obj.

3.

Further, as

is

is

4),

from God.

by the Philosopher,^

said

the cause of both safety and danger of the ship the same. But

is

of

God

the cause of the safety

is

He

things. Therefore

all

perdition and of

On the

is

the cause of all

all evil.

contrary, Augustine says (qo. lxxxiii, “God is not the author of evil,

qu. 21)* that,

He

and

to the order of the universe^

this tiequires

that penalty should be dealt out to sinners.

God is the author of

so

the evil which

but not of the evil which is said above.

is fault,

Reply Obj.

i.

These passages refer to the

God

the ship requires; but

docs not

fail in

being.*'

there

is

no parity.

I answer that, As appears from what was said (a. i), the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the

Article

But

agent.

God

in

there

no defect, but the shown above (q, iv,

is

Hence, the

A. i).

evil

of action, or which agent,

is

not reduced to

is

which consists

in defect

caused by defect of the

God

as to

its

cause.

But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause.

And

this

appears as regards both natural things

3.

Evil Which

all.

Whether There Be One Supreme the Cause of Every Evil?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil. Objection i. For contrary effects have contrary causes. But contrariety is found in things,

would seem

according to Ecclus. 33. 15: Good is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man. Therefore there are contrary principles, one of good, the other of evil.

the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above (q. xxii,

as the cause of every

some things

XLVin,

A. 2),

that can,

that there should be

and do sometimes,

fail.

And

thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to I killeth

Kings

2.

6:

The Lord

alive. But when we read that made death (Wis. i. 13), the God does not will death for its own

and maketh

Cod

hath not

sense

is

that

sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs *

Physics,

II,

3

(i 9S“3)-

*

PL 40.

16.

doing

Hence

/.t

and voluntary things. For it was said (a. i) that some agent, in so far as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of

A. 2 Ans. 2; Q.

evil

Reply Obj. 2. The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the moving power, whereas what is awry in it does not come from the moving power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action is reduced to God as the cause, whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause. Reply Obj. 3. The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of necessary for the safety of

highest perfection, as was

by reason

of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.

is

not the cause of tending to non-

is

And

penalty,

of what

what

because

is

Obj. so

is

2.

Further,

one contrary

if

is

in nature,

the other.® But the supreme good

is

in na-

and is the cause of eve^'y good, as was shown above (q. ii, a. 3 q. vi, aa. 2,4). Therefore, also, there is a .supreme evil opposed to it ture,

;

evil.

we find good and better and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what is Obj.

3.

things, so

best.

Further, as

we

find evil

Therefore

in relation to

Obj.

4.

evil

and worse are so considered

some supreme

evil.

Further, everything participated

is

re-

But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially, but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme evil, which is the cause of every evil. duced to what

Obj. •

S‘

is essential.

Further, whatever

is

Aristotle, Heavens, u, 3 (286*23).

accidental

is

re-

FIRST PART dttced to that which ia per se.

But good

ia

the

accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose some supreme evil which is the per se cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has no per se cause, but only an accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only in the few. Obj. 6. Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause, because the de-

comes from the deficient cause, as above (aa. i, 2). But we cannot pro-

ficient effect

was

said

ceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we first evil as the cause of every

must suppose one evil.

Q. 4^.

367

3

namely^ because they failed to consider tbe universal cause of all being, and considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they thought that the nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every thing has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above (q,

On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was shown above (q. n, A. 3 Q. VI, A. 4). Therefore there cannot be any

XLVII, A. 2 Ans. i).

principle opposed to

did not

;

as the cause of evils.

it

I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there

there

is

is

one

no one

first

First, indeed,

good

first

principle of good.

because the

essentially good, as

is

principle of evil, as

first

principle of

was shown above

(q.

3,4). But nothing can be essentially bad.

VI, AA.

was shown above that every being, as good (q. v, a. 3), and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject (q xlviii, a. 3). Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which contains beforehand in itself all goodness, as shown above (q. VI, A. 2). But there cannot be a supreme evil, because, as was shown above (q. XLvni, a. For

it

such,

is

4), although evil always lessens good, yet

it

never wholly consumes it; and thus, since good always remains, nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says* that “if the wholly evil could be, it would de-

who found two contrary partwo contrary particular effects

Likewise, those ticular causes of

know how

to reduce these contrary par-

ticular causes to the universal

common

necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; just as above the contrary qualities of the ele-

ments

exists the

likewise above

power of a heavenly body, and things that exist, in anyway

all

whatsoever there exists one first principle of was shown above (q. ii, a. 3).

being, as

Reply Obj. i. Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the aspect of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular causes, nevertheless we must come at last to

one

first

Reply Obj. urally to the

privation

above

is

2.

common

cause.

Privation and habit belong nat-

same subject. Now the subject of a being in potency, as was said Hence, since

privation of good, as appears from

evil), evil

because all good being destroyed need be for something to be wholly itself would be taken away, since its

subject

good.

that

stroy

itself,'’

(which

it

is

Thirdly, because the very notion of evil against the notion of a

first

is

principle; both be-

caused by good, as was shown and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause evil

above

is

(a. i),

cause, for “the accidental cause

is

subsequent

to the per se cause,” as appears in the Physics}

Those, however, who upheld two first prinone good and the other evil,® fell into this

ciples,

error

from the same source, from which also

arose other strange notions of the ancients, '

*

* Aristotle, 11, Ethics, IV, 5 (1126^12). 6 (198*8). Cf. Contra Gent., Ii, 41; cf. also Augustine. De Uaeres,

XXI, XLVi (PL 4a, 29, 37); 1.4(985*3).

cf.

also Aristotle, Metaphysics,

cause,

and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is

(q. xlviii, a.

3).

evil is

what was

above {ibid., aa. i, 2, 3), it is opposed to good which has some potency, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act. Reply Obj. 3. Increase in intensity is in pro-

said

portion to the nature of a thing.

form

And

as the

a perfection, so privation removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is

intensified by approach to the perfect term, but privation and evil by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse by reason of approach to the supreme evil, is

be good and better by reason of approach to the supreme good. Reply Obj. 4. No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any as, for instance, it is said to

essential evil.

SUMMA TEEOLOGICA

268

Reply Obj. 5 Evil can only have an acciden* tal cause, as was shown above (a. i). Hence reduction to any per se cause of evil is impossible. .

And

to say that evil

is

in the greater

number

is

simply false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the verse.

nature

And is

whole uni-

again, in every species the defect of

in the smaller

number. In

man

alone

does evil appear as in the greater number, because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man that is, in regard to reason, and more men follow the senses than the reason. Reply Obj. 6. In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity but reduce all evils to some

—

good cause, from which tally.

evil follows acciden-

;

t

ON THE ANGELS

TREATISE

Obj,

QUESTION L

3.

Of the substance of the angels

its

ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED

Further,

i,

angels; and,

spiritual creatures: first, the purely spir-

and

which

itual creature

in

Holy Scripture

lxv)

composite creature, corwhich is man (Q. lxxv).

poreal and spiritual,

Concerning the angels, wc consider

first

On

what

belongs to their wall (g. lix)

;

I answer that,

thirdly,

tended by

Their substance we consider absolutely, and

such,

is

we ask whether

it is

Of

We

must admit some incor-

creatures

in

is

principally in-

is

good, and this

God

accomplished when the

their immortality or incorruptibility.

Now, God produces

intellect

Hence

composed of

matter and form? (3) We ask concerning their number. (4) Of their difference from each other. (5)

is

heat.

spiritual creature,

altogether incorporeal? (2) Supposing that an

angel

God

Who

:

And

Himself.

effect

imitates the

duces the effect; as for instance, heat makes

there are five points of inquiry: (i)

any entirely

said (Ps. 103. 4)

cause according to that whereby the cause pro-

Concerning their substance absolutely conis

is

the perfect a.ssimilalion of an effect to a cause

in relation to corporeal things (Q. li).

Whether there

He

spirits.

con.sists in assimilation to

belongs to their creation (Q. xli).

sidered,

His

made; He commanded,

poreal creatures. For what

what fourthly, what

;

the contrary, It

makes His angels

belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect (Q. liv)

{verse 4),

corporeal.

thirdly, the

;

on

and they were created. Therefore angels are

angel; secondly, the creature purely corporeal (q.

all

For

ye the Lord,

2: Praise

farther

spoke, and they were

called

is

corporeal.

is

angels are God’s creatures, as appears

from Ps. 148. consider the distinction of corporeal

Spir,

7)

bodies. Therefore, every creature

Now

{In Five Articles)

Next we

Ambrose says {De

“Every creature is limited wdthin own nature.” But to be limited is proper to

Sanct.

and

by His

the creature

(q. xiv, a. 8; q. xix, a. 4).

will

the perfection of the universe requires

should

that

there

Now

intelligence

be

creatures.

intellectual

cannot be the action of a

body, nor of any corporeal powder, for every

body

limited to here and now.

is

Hence the

per-

fection of the universe requires the existence

Article

Whether an Angel

i.

Is Entirely In-

of an incorporeal creature.

corporeal?

We W’oulcl

The

proceed thus to the First Article:

seem that an angel

is

It

not entirely incor-

Objection

i.

For what

is

incorporeal only as

regards ourselves, and not in relation to God.

not absolutely incorporeal. But

is

tinguish between sense

and

{De Fid Orth,

ii)^

Damascene

that “an angel

is

said

what could

be apprehended by sense and imagination.^ because bodies alone

fall

“they supposed that no being existed except bodies,” as the Philosopher observes.®

who

The

of the Sadducees,

lutely.

sense shows reasonably that there are

Obj.

body, as the says

moved except a Philosopher says.^ But Damascene

Further, nothing

2.

{De

is

Fid. Orth, ii)^ that an angel

is

“an

ever movable intellectual substance.” Therefore

an angel

is

a corporeal substance.

1

Chap.

(PG

^

Physics

VI, 4 (234^10).

8

Chap. 3 (PG

And

under imagination,

and immaterial as regards us but compared to God it is corporeal and material.” Therefore it is not incorporeal abso-

to be incorporeal

thought

intellect,

that nothing existed in the world but

poreal.

says

ancients, however, not properly realizing

the force of intelligence, and failing to dis-

.said

there

was no

error spirit

(Acts 23. 8), also arose from this source.

But the very

fact

that

intellect

corporeal things comprehensible

is

by the

above

some

in-

intellect

alone.

Reply Obj. i. Incorporeal substances rank God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to between

^PLi6,

g4, 886).

753.

•Ci. Aristotle, Soul,

iir,

^PhysieSf rv, 6 (213*29).

94. 886).

269

3 (427*21).

SVMMA THEOLOGICA

fl7a

separate

the nature of

infinite as regards

is

not contracted to any being is finite as deter-

whiteness, because

it is

one subject, while

its

mined to some one special nature. Hence it is said^ that “intelligence is finite from above, as receiving its being from above itself, and is infinite from below, as not received in

any matter.”

ions with regard to the

number of the separate

substances. Plato contended® that the separate

substances arc the species of sensible things, if we were to maintain that human nature is

as

a separate substance of

view

this

itself.

And

according to

would have to be maintained that

it

the number of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible things.^ Aris-

however, rejects this view^ because matvery nature of the species of sensiV)lc things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplary species of these sensible things, but have their own natures, which are higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held*' that those

totle,

Article

3.

Whether the

Aji^els Exist in

Any

ter is of the

Great Number?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that the angels are not in great numbers. Objection i. For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown above (a. 1). Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number. Obj. 2. Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so

much

the less

is it

multiplied, as

is

evident in numbers. But among other created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since it

seems that there

is

God

is

supremely one,

the least possible

number

3.

Further, the proper effect of the sepa-

movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the movements of the heavenly bodies. rate substances seems to be the

Obj.

4.

Dionysius says {Div,

“all intelligible sist

and

Nom.

iv)‘^

that

intellectual substances sub-

because of the rays of the divine goodBut a ray is only multiplied according

ness.”

to the different things that receive

it.

Now

it

cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was shown above (a. 2). Therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to that is, of the requirements of the first bodies the heavenly bodies, so that in some way the outpouring of the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them. And hence, the same conclusion is to be drawn as before. On the contrary^ It is said (Dan. 7. 10): Thousands oj thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood

—

before

Him.

1 answer that, There have been various opin^Lib. de Causis, is (BA 178). *Sect. 1 (PG 3, 693).

first movements. But since this appears

the

to militate against the

teachings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi

Moses the

Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony, held' that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial .substances, are multiplied according to

number

the

heavenly

of

movement.s

or

bodies, as Aristotle held {loc. cit.)\ while he

in the angelic nature.

Obj.

more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things, as movers and ends; and therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to the number of

contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are styled angels;'* and again, even “the powers of natural things, which manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated as angels.

Hence it must be said that (he angels, even according as they arc immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all material

says

multitude. Uicr.

(CccY.

This

xiv):^®

blc.ssed armies of the

is

w^hat

Dionysius

“There are many

heavenly minds, surpass-

weak and limited reckoning of our manumbers.” The reason ior this is that be-

ing the terial

cause, since

that

God

things

much

it is

the perfection of the universe

chiefly

the

intends

in

more perfect some

the creation of things are, in so

greater profusion are they created

God. Now, as

by

such profusion is observed in regard to their magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their mulin bodies

3

Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics,

*

Ibid.,

^

Ibid., VIII,

I,

9

i,

6 (987^7).

(goo‘'6). 1

(i042®25).

^Metaphysics, xn, 8 (1073*33, 1074“ 20). Guide, II, 4 (FR 157). * Ibid., II,

Ubid.,

II,

w Sect.

1

(FR 160). (FR 161). (PG 3, 321). 0 0


G 94. 868. Translation of Chalcidius, Sect. 16 (DD-i69)-rt«iMms

•

Chap. 37 (PL

75. ii43).

angels obtain perfect immutability only 2,

by 8).

Reply Ob). 2. By the expres.sion “gods” Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements which are composite, and therefore dissoluble of their *

( 4 i)‘

is

understood from the object. But an intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of

The

unless

(a.

sign of this incorruptibility can be gath-

Further, according to Gregory (Moral, xvi),^ “all things would tend towards nothing, 3.

being,

was said above

their nature.

Ob).

com-

ered, from its intellectual operation; for since everything acts according as it is in act, the op-

my

angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible

is

cannot lo.se it.s being. Therefore, the animmateriality is the reason why it is in-

corruptible by

ible.

a being in act ac-

posed of matter and form ceases to be in act through the form being separated from the mat-

We

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that the angels are not incorrupt-

is

has form, but matter

it

act by the form. Consequently a subject

gel’s

Incorruptible?

“0 gods You are

if

shape. Now^ to be belongs to a form considered

2),

Ob)ection

substance

considered in

the

multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species.

angel, says

its

what belongs to anything can never be separated from

to be corruptible. For

way

Reply Ob). 3. The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be

$.

from what was said

impossible for

(a. 2), it is

that fire

less.

Article

corruption,

all

and generation.” / answer that, It must necessarily be main-

lectual nature. 2.

being free from

life,

Nam,

have un-

death, matter,

own

Reply Ob).

nature.

iv)* that “the intellectual substances

cies according to the diverse degrees of intel-

species not according as they are caused

own

the contrary, Dionysius says (Div.

(PG

Sect, I

*Bk

II,

3, 9.^)-

Chap. 13 (PL 4a. 768).

1

PJMSTPAMt own

nature; yet they are for ever preserved in being by the Divine will

Mepfy Obf.

3.

As was observed above

(Q.

2) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence Xiiv, A.

1, Alls.

not contradictory for a necessary or inits being on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said is

it

corruptible being to depend for

even the angels, would lapse by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption in the angels, but that the being of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to nonbeing, by withdrawing His act of preservation, but because it has some principle of corruption that

all

things,

into nothing unless preserved

within

itself,

or

some

contrariety, or at least

the potency of matter.

LI Of the angels in comparison with (In Three Articles)

We next inquire

about the angels in comparison with corporeal things; and in the first place

about their comparison with bodies; secondly, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places (q. lii) and, thirdly, of their comparison with local movement (q. liii). Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: (i) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them? (2) Whether they assume bodies? (3) Whether they exercise func;

assumed?

Article i. Whether the Angels Have Bodies Naturally United To Them? proceed thus to the First Article: It

would seem that angels have bodies naturally

i):^

“It

is

i.

For Origen says (Peri Archon

God’s attribute alone

—

that

is,

it

belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy

Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of cor-

poreal addition.” Bernard likewise says (Horn,

w. super Cant.):^ “Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every cre1

*

06

;'.

3.

Further,

life is

more perfect

Chap. 6 (PC II. 170). Serm., vi (PL 183, 803).

in the

angels than in souls. But the soul not only lives,

but gives life to the body. Therefore the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them. On the contrary Dionysius says (Div, iv)® that the angels “are understood to be ui**

I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to

any nature as an accident

is

not found uni-

have wings, because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (q. lxxv, a. 2), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as such, but it comes to some intellectual substance on account of something else, just as it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be explained later on (q. lxxxiv, a. 6; Q. Lxxxix, a. i). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are

united to them.

Objection

ated spirit needs corporeal assistance,’’ Augus* tine also says (Geu. ad Ul iii) ^‘The demons are called animals of the air because their ture is akin to that of aerial bodies.” But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them. 06;. 2. Further, Gregory (Horn. x. in Ev, )* calls an angel “a rational animal.” But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.

versally in that nature; thus, for instance, to

BODIES

We

ns

Q, 5x4 AIQT/

corporeal.”

QUESTION

tions of life in the bodies

f

some

perfectly intellectual substances, which do not

need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies, but some are quite separated

from bodies, and these we call angels. Peply Obj. I. As w^as said above (q. l, a. i), it was the opinion of some that every being is a body, and consequently some seem to have thought*^ that there were no incorporeal sub•

Chap. lo (PL

*PL •

76,

Sect. I

1 1

34, 2S4).

10.

(PG

3, 693).

•Origen, op. ciL; Alcher of Clairvaux, De Spir, of An., XVIII (PL 40, 793); Oennadius. De Eccf. Dojg., xi (PL 58, 984); c£. below, Q. uv, A. 5.

f

;

SVMMA TSEOLOGICA

276

stances except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that ‘‘God is the soul of

the world,’* as Augustine

tells us.^

As

this is con-

trary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that

exalted above

is

God

Psalm exalted beyond the

things, according to

all

2: Thy magnificence is heavens Origen,^ while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above opinion of 8.

others regarding the other substances, being de-

ceived here as he was also in

many

other points

by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard’s expression can be explained

that the created spirit needs

strument, which

some bodily

not naturally united to

is

init,

but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained (a. 2). Augustine speaks.^ not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists,

who maintained

that there are

some

which they termed demons. Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically, on account of the

aerial animals,

Reply Obj.

2.

likeness of the reason.

Reply Obj.

3.

To

give

a perbelongs to

life effectively is

fection absolutely speaking; hence

it

God, as is said (I Kings 2. 6) The Lord killeth, and maketh alive. But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself the full :

nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more per-

one which

fect than

united to a body.

is

Obj. 3. Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched nor again from air, because air is without shape or colour. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.

On the contrary, Augustine says^ that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies. I answer that, Some have maintained^ that the angels never assume bodies, but that all that we read happened

in Scripture of apparitions of angels in prophetic vision

But

to imagination.

2.

Whether Angels Assume Bodies?

We

— that

is,

according

contrary to the in-

tent of Scripture; for whatever

aginary vision

is

is seen in imonly in the beholder’s imagina-

tion, and consequently is not seen indifferently by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture from time

to time introduces angels so apparent as to be

seen

commonly by

just as the angels wdio

all;

appeared to Abraham wx*re seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it is clearly showm that such apparitions wxre ;

seen by bodily vision, whereby the object seen it, and can by such vision

exists outside the person beholding

accordingly be seen by

all.

Now

only a body can be seen. Con.scquently. since the angels are not bodies, nor have they bodies naturally united with them, as

what has been said Article

this is

(a.

i

;

from

clear

is

q. l, a. i), it

follows

that they sometimes assume bodies.

superfluous for the angels to assume bodies, be-

Reply Obj. i. Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on our account, that by conversing familiarly with men they may give evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies

cause an angel has no need for a body, since his

under the Old

own power

that the

proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. Objection i. For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of the kind in the work of nature. But it would be

exceeds

bodily power. Therefore

all

an angel does not assume a body. Obj. 2. Further, every assumption is terminated in some union, becau.se to assume implies a taking to oneself {ad se sumere). But a body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated (a. i),

while in so far as

as to a mover,

it

is

it is

united to the angel

not said to be assumed,

it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels are assumed by them Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.

otherwise

'

City of God, VTi, 6 (I)D 480).

(PL

41, ioq);

cf.

Varro,

De Lingua

Lat., V, 50

Peri Archon, i, 6 (PG ii, 170)*City of God, viri, 16; ix, 8 (PL 41, 241, 263). Cf. Apulcius. Lib. de Deo Socrahs (DD 135). ^

Word

body, because

Law was a figurative of God would take all

indication a

human

the appariiions in the Old

Testament were ordered to that one whereby the Son ol God appeared in the flesh. Reply Obj. 2. The body assumed is united to the angel not as its form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible, in the same w^ay by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of

an angel.

And

this is

what we mean by an angel assuming a body. *City of God, xvi, 2 q (PL 41, 508). * Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, 11,6 (FR 162).

FTRST PART Riply

Oftj. 3.

Although

air as long as

it is

in a

has neither shape nor it can both be shaped and coloured as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of air, condensing it by Divine power in so far as is needful for forming the assumed body. of rarefaction

state

yet

colour,

when condensed

3 Whether the Angels Exercise tions of Life in the Bodies Assumed?

Article

We

.

Func-

proceed thus to the Third Article:

It

would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. Objection i. For pretence of truth is unbecoming in angels. But it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions. Therefore the angels exercise

functions of

Ohj. there

is

nostrils,

life in

the assumed body.

Further, in the works of the angels

2.

nothing without a purpose. But eyes, and the other instruments of the senses

would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of life. Obj.

Further, to

3.

move by

the

movement

of

one of the functions of life, as the Philosopher says.^ But the angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it is said (Gen. 18. t 6) that Abraham walked with the angels, who had appeared to him, bringhig them on the way; and when Tobias said to the angel (Tob. 5. 7, 8; Knowest thou progression

is

way

that Icadeth to the city of the Medes? he an«;wered: I know it; and I have often

the

walked through

all

the

ways

thereof. Therefore

the angels often exercise functions of

sumed Obj.

life in as-

bodies. 4.

Further, speech

is

the function of a

produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth of an animal, as it is said in the book on the Soul!^ But it is evident from many passages of Sacred Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their assumed living subject, for

it is

bodies they exercise functions of

Obj.

Further, eating

5.

Hence the Lord

is

life.

a purely animal

Q. 51.

ART.

277

3

them as God (Gen.

viously adored

t8). There-

fore the angels exercise functions of life in as-

sumed

bodies.

Obj.

6.

Further, to beget offspring

is

a vital

But this has taken place with the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men^ and they brought forth children^ these are the mighty men of old, men of renown (Gen. 6, 4). act.

:

Consequently the angels exercised assumed bodies.

vital

func-

tions in their

On

The

the contrary,

angels have no

life,

as

bodies assumed by

was stated

in the previ-

ous article (Ans. 3). Therefore they cannot exercise functions of life through assumed bodies. I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in common with other operations, just as speech, which is the function of a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far as it is sound, and moving from here to there agrees with other

movements,

in so far as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels as to that which is

common which

is

in such operations, but not as to that proper to living subjects; because, ac-

cording to the Philosopher,® “that which has the

power has the a function of

action.” life

Hence nothing can have

except what has

life,

which

is

the potential principle of such action.

Reply Obj.

i.

As

it is

in

no way contrary to

truth for intelligible things to be set forth in

Scripture under sensible figures, since

it is

not

said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible

but

in

order that

may

be understood according to likeness through sensible figures, so it is not contrary to the truth of the properties of intelligible things

holy angels that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they really are not.

For the bodies are assumed mere-

ly for this purpose, that the spiritual properties

and works of the angels may be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men because the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels. Reply Obj. 2. Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it can in no way be said

after His Resurrec-

that the angels perceive through the organs of

tion ate with His disciples in proof of having

assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain, for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual

function.

(Luke 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food after having prere.sumed

life

^Soul, n, 2 *

(4i,3'*2.j).

Aristotle, n, 8 (420**$).

their

powers of the angels *

Sleep, I (4S4*8).

may

be

made

manifest;

}

SUMUA tHBOWGICA

^79

by tbe eye the power

just ss

;pf

the angel’s

pointed out, and other powers by the other members, as Dionysius teaches iCed. kao-Wledge

is

Sier.)}

Reply Obj. 3. Motion which is from a conmover is a proper function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet .

joined

the angels are moved accidentally when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as movers are in the moved; and they are here in

such a way as not to be elsewhere, which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God not

is

which

moved when

He exists,

angels are

the things are

since

moved

He is

moved

in

everywhere, yet the

accidentally according to the

movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to the motion of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the movers in the things moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the world’s substance,

now

is

in the east,

and now

in the west,

which but ac-

cording to a fixed quarter; because the moving energy is always in the east, as stated in the

Reply Obj. 6. As Augustine says:^ **Many persons affirm that they have had the experience, or have beard from such as have expert enced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the

common folk call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it seems folly to deny it. But God’s holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth,

4.

by the

;

of other things for other generating

’

purpo^,^‘‘'^‘\

Augustine says (De Trin. iii)®, so that the prison born is not the child of a demon, but of the

man from whom

the seed

is

QUESTION

Properly speaking, the angels do

while

be wondered at that giants should be born of them for they were not all giants, albeit there were many more before than after the deluge.” Still if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of such dem(^ nor from their assumed bodies, but seed of men taken for the purpose, as wh^ ^ demon assumes first the form of a woma afterwards of a man; just as they take

eighth book of the Physics}

Reply Obj.

who were good;

daughters of men the Scripture designates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to

taken.

LII

Of the angels in relation to place

not talk through their assumed bodies, yet there

{In Three Articles)

a semblance of speech, in so far as they

is

fashion sounds in the air like to

Reply Obj.

5.

human

voices.

Properly speaking, the angels

cannot be said to eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the substance of the eater. Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the substance of Christ’s body, but resolved into ad-

We

:

inquire into the place of the angels. this there are three subjects of in-

quiry: (i) Is the angel in a place? (2) Can he be in several places at once? (3) Can several angels be in the

same place?

Article,!. Whether an Aiigel Is In a Place?

We

joining (praejacens) matter, nevertheless Christ

had a body of such a true nature that food could be changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor >vas the body of such a nature that food could be changed into it. Consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This When I was is what the angel said to Tobias with you, / seemed indeed to eat and to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink (Tob. 12. 19). Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom, nevertheless, he venerated God, “as God is wont to be in the prophets,”

now

Touching

proceed thus to the First Article:

“The common opinion

of the le^irned

things incorporeal are not in

Chap.

IS, sect, s

(PG

3, 328).

*Cf. Aristotle, Heavtns, n, 2 (28s‘*i8). *CityoJ God, xvi, 29 (PL 41, 509).

is

that

a place.”

And

again, Aristotle observes^ that “it

not everybut only a movable body.” But an angel is not a body, as was shown above (q. l.). Therefore an angel is thing existing which

is

is

in a place,

not in ^ place. Obj. 2. Further, place

is

a quantity having

But everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a position cannot befit an angel, since his substance is devoid of position.

as Augustine says.® »

It

would seem that an angel is not in a place. Objection i. For Boethius says {De Held.)

*City of God, XV, 23 (PL 41* 468). •Chaps. 8, 0 (PL 42, 876, 878).

•PL ^

04, i3ti.

Fhysics, iv, 5 (2T2*»28),

•

ibe proper Imve a po$tUoru Timtifm

of

f$4o

m «^£e} k not in a

plaujc,

Obj. 3. Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher.^ But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a is more formal than the contained; as for example, air with regard to water.* Therefore an angel is not in a

place, because the container

place.

On

the contrary, It

is

said in the Collect:*

;

an equivocal sense. A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal in a place in

place by application of the angelic power in any

manner whatever

to

any

place.

Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the continuous, for this

according as

is

is

it

proper to a body in a place endowed with dimensive

quantity. In similar fashion

it is not necessary account for the angel to be contained by a place, because an incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact, and is not contained by it for the soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow containing it. And from this the answers to the objections

on

{»rts there are various places. Therefore the

angel

this

;

appear.

Article 2. Whether an Angel Can Be In Several Places At Once?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that an angel can be in several

is

at one time in various places.

Obj. 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fid, Orth.y that “where the angel operates, there

But occasionally he operates in several is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gen. 19. 25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.

he

is.”

places at one time, as

Thy

holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in peace.” / answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place yet an angel and a body are said to be

“Let

he essomes; and, eince the body he a$sumes is continuous, it would appear that he is in every part of it. But according to its various

On

the contrary,

Damascene says

(ibid,)^

that “while the angels are in heaven, they are

not on earth.” that. An angeFs power and nature whereas the Divine power and cs^ sence, which is the universal cause of all things, is infinite. Consequently God through His power touches all things, and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the angel’s power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one determined thing. For whatever is related to one power must be related to it as one determined thing. Consequently since all being is related as one thing to God’s universal power, so is one particular being related as one with the angelic power. Hence, since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in only one place. Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some^ who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point. But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something indivisible having position,

/ a 7 iswer

are

finite,

while the angel is indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation. Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation; any place which

is

either divisible or indivisible,

places at once.

great or small suffices, according as he volun-

Objection i. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But the soul is in several places at once, for it is “entirely in every part of the body,” as Augustine says {De Trin. vi).** Therefore an angel can be in several places

tarily applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the entire body to which he is applied

at once. *

^

Chap. 6 (PL 42,

Domimean

Breviary.

power, corresponds as one place to him. if

any angel moves the heavens,

is

necessary for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to what is

it

•

92()).

his

Neither,

*

Ihid.t 12 (22i*i8),

^Ibid„ 5 (2i3“2). * Prayer at Compline,

by

»

Bk I, Chap. 13 (PC 94, 853). Bk ri, Chap. 3 (PG 94* 869). Cf. Bonaventure, In Sent., ii, d.

(QR

ii,

ii,

Pt. 2, a. 2, Q.

81): cL below, Q. Lin, a. 3, obj. i.

$

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

3 {k> first

moved by him. Now

there is one part of the

heavens in which there is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east; hence the Philosopher^ attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers^ do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere. So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body, to an angel,

the same place ; and consequently for the same reason all other spiritual substances.

On

the contrary. There are not two souls in same body. Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place. / answer that, There are not two angels in the same place. The reason of this is because it

the

impossible for two complete causes to be the

is

causes immediately of one and the same thing.

This

evident in every genus of causes; for

is

nor definitely there, because He is everywhere. From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections, because the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied is considered as one place, even though it be

one proximate form of one thing, and one proximate mover, although there may be several remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one man’s strength is sufficient for moving the boat, while all together are as one mover, in so far as their united strengths all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said (a. i), there can be but one angel in one

continuous.

place.

and to God. For a body

in a place in

is

cumscribed fashion, since place. An angel, however,

it is

is

a

cir-

measured by the

not there in a

cir-

cumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in one place in such a manner that he is not in another.

But God

is

neither circumscriptive-

ly

Whether Several Angels Can Be the Same Time in the Same Place?

Article

3.

at

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that several angels can be at the same time

in the

same

place.

Objection i. For several bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place, because they fill the place. But angels do not fill a place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not a vacuum, as appears from the Philosopher.^ Therefore several angels can be in the one

there

is

there

is

Reply Obj. i. Several angels are not hindered from being in the same place because of their filling the place, but for another reason, as has been said. Reply Obj. 2. An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way. Hence the conclusion does not follow. Reply Obj. 3. Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of cau.se, since the soul

while the

demon

is

not.

is

its

form,

Hence the inference

does not follow.

place.

Ohj.

2.

Further, there

is

Ohj. 3. Further, “the soul is in every part of the body,” according to Augustine {De Trin. vi).® But demons, although they do not possess minds, do possess bodies occasionally, and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in ^ Cf. Heavens, n, 2 (28=j^i8) •Cf. Avicenna, Meta, tx,

QUESTION

a greater difference

between an angel and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body are at the one time in the one place, because there is no place which is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in the Physics.^ Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.

(i03vb); Averroes,

In

Meta., XII, 43 (viii, 326!); Aristotle, Metaphysics, xii, 8 (I073^32). * Physics, IV, 7 (2i3**33). ^Aristotle, iv. 8, g {21/^12; 216^23).

*Chap. 6 (PL 42, 929); De Immort. An., 16 1034); Contra Epist. Manick., 16 (PL 42, 185).

(PL

of the

ANGELS (In Three Articles)

We

must next consider the local movement of the angels, under which heading there are three

points of inquiry

moved

:

( i )

Whether an angel can be

(2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening lo ally?

spaco? (3) Whether the angel’s time or instantaneous?

Article 2

LIII

Of the local movement

i.

movement

is

in

Whether an Angel Can Be Moved

Locally?

We proceed thus to the First Article: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. Objection

i.

For, as the Philosopher proves,®

32, *

Physics, VI, 4 (234^10);

cf. vi,

10

(240^*8).

FIRST PART devoid of parts is moved”; because, while it is in the term from which, it is not moved; nor while it is in the term to which, for it is then already moved. Consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term from which and partly in the term to which. But an angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally. Obj. 2. Further, “motion is the act of an imperfect being,” as the Philosopher says.^ But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally. Obj. 3. Further, movement is only because of want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally. On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be ‘‘nothing

which

is

said that a blessed soul

cause

is

moved

locally, be-

an article of faith that Christ’s soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is

it

is

moved

locally.

A beatified angel can be moved however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise does local motion. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its demands. Hence it is that “the continuity of motion is according to the continuity of magnitude; and according to priority and posteriority in magnitude is the priority and posteriority of the local motion of bodies,” as the Philosopher says.^ But an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local motion of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom, but it is a non-continuous motion. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above (q. lii, a. i), it follows necessarily that the motion of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at once, because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above (q. lii, A. 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts. BeI answer that,

locally. As,

cause, as

was said above

(ibid., A. 2),

there

is

nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible ^Physics,

m,

2 (201^31).

^

Jlnd., iv, ii (2i9®i3).

Q. 53.

ART.

aSt

I

place to an angel according to virtual contact, just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by

Hence as a body sucand not all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and from this arises continuity in its local motion, so likewise an contact of magnitude. cessively,

angel can successively quit the divisible place

which he was before, and so his motion will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his motion will not be continuous. Reply Obj. i. This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle’s demonstration proceeds from what is indivisible according to quantity, to which in

corresponds a place necessarily indivisible. this cannot be said of an angel.

And

Secondly, because Aristotle’s demonstration deals with motion which

is

continuous. For if

the motion were not continuous, said that a thing

is

moved

while

it

might be

it

is in

the

term from which, and while it is in the term to which, because the very succession of wheres regarding the same thing, would be called motion; hence, in whichever of those wheres the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of motion prevents this, because nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved, but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the angel’s

motion

is

not continuous, Aristotle’s demonstra-

tion does not hold good.

motion

But according as the

held to be continuous,

it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in motion, he is partly in the term from which, and partly in the term to which (yet so that such “partlyness” be not referred to the angel’s substance,

angel’s

is

but to the place) because at the outset of his continuous motion the angel is in the whole di;

visible place

from which he begins

but while he

is

of the

first

to

be moved,

actually in motion, he

is in

part

place which he quits, and in part of

the second place which he occupies. This very fact that

he can occupy the parts of two places

appertains to the angel from this, that he can divisible place by applying his power, body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place that it is divisible according to magnitude, but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to something

occupy a as a

which

is divisible.

SUMMA THmiOGICA^

i8«

The motion

of that which is in potency is the act of that which is imperfect. But the motion which is by application of power Ritply 06/. 2

.

is

.

the act of one in act: because the power of a is according as it is in act.

thing

Reply Ohj.

3.

The motion

of that which

is

in

potency is on account of its own need, but the motion of w^hat is in act is not for any need of its own, but for another’s need. In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb, i. 14: They are all fVulg., Are they not all ?] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance .

.

.

of salvation.

Article 2. Whether an Angel Passes Through Intermediate Space?

riving at the last into which

it is

changed’^] for

continuous movement is according to the order of first and last in magnitude, as he says.® the order of

But

first

and

last in

an angel’s motion be not continuous, him to pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle, which h evident thus. Between the two extreme if

possible for

it is

there are infinite intermediate places,

limits

w^hether the places be taken as divisible or as indivisible.

This

is

clearly evident with regard

which are indivisible, because between every two points there are infinite intermediate points, since “no two points follow one another without a middle,” as is proved in the Physics} to places

And

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that an angel does not pass through

same must of necessity be said of diand this is shown from the continuous motion of a body. For a body is not moved from place to place except in time. But

intermediate space.

in the

Objection 1. For everything that passes through a middle space first travels along a place of

its

own

dimensions, before passing

the

visible places,

whole time which measures the motion of a body, there are not two nows in which the body moved is not in one place and in another; for

if

were

it

in one and the same place would follow that it would be

through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through

nows,

middle space, he must number infinite points in his movement, which is not po.ssible. 06 ;. 2. Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle; for I can

fore, since there are infinite

think of France and afterward.s of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle. On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then, when he is in the

term to which, he is not moved, but is changed. proce.ss of changing precedes every actual change. Consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he ^vas not moved so long as he was in the term from which. Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space, and so it was nece.ssary for him to pass through intervening space. / answer that, As was observed above in the preceding article, the local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous Tf it be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing through the mid-space, because, as is said by the Philosopher/ “The middle is that into which a thing which is continually changed comes, before ar-

But a

^

Physics, V, 3 (220^33).

it

in

two

at rest

there, since to be at rest is nothing else than to

be

in the

first

same place now and previously. Therenows between the

and the

last

now

of the time which meas-

ures the motion, there must be infinite places

between the first from which the motion beand the last wdicre the motion ceases. This again is made evident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm’s length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is evident that the first place from which the motion starts is that of the one palm, and the place wherein the motion 'ends is that of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second. According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the intermediate places gins,

multiplied, because every distinct point in the

magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divi.sible, and the points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potency, it follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places.

Now

a movable

body only exhausts the inby the con-

finity of the intermediate places

tinuity of its motion, because as the intermedi^ Ihii., IV, II

vi,

(219*16).

I {231*^9).

;

lite

pkic^ ace infinite ia imtancjf,: ep Ukeiidse must there be reckoned some infinitudes in motion which is continuous. Consequently, if the

of im angel moving Hmedi ekceeda beyond gU propottion tfie power wkick moves a body* Now the prq}prtion of vdocities is reckoned

motion be not continuous, then all the parts of the motion will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by continuous motion, it follows, either

according to the lessening of the time. But be^ tween one length of time and any other length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body be moved in time, an angel is moved in an in-

that

it

does not pass through

diate places, or else that infinite places,

which

it

all

the interme-

actually

not possible. Accord-

is

ingly, then, as the angel’s

motion

is

uous, he does not pass through

not contininterme-

all

diate places.

Now,

stant.

numbers

the actual passing from one extreme to

the other, without going through the mid-space, quite in keeping with an angel’s nature, but

Obj. ily

change

therefore

angel’s substance

is

not

Hence

is

under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through or without the intervening

above

it

as containing

it.

it is

place.

Reply Obj. i. The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power, and so the angel’s place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as

was

said above, but

they are consumed by the continuity of the motion, as is evident from the foregoing. Reply Obj. 2. While an angel is moved locally, his essence

is

applied to various places

but the soul’s essence

is

not applied to the

things thought of, but rather the things thought it. So there is no comparison. Reply Obj. 3. In continuous motion the

of are in

tual change

is

not a part of the motion, but

acits

term; hence motion must precede change. Accordingly such motion is through the mid-space. But in motion which is not continuous, the

change is a part, as a unit is a part of number; hence the succession of the various places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such motion.

effected in an instant, such as is

not

il-

il-

luminated successively, as it gets hot succesand because a ray does not reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more ous.

movement. But an

is

sively,

not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in subject to place as contained thereby, but

movement is some bod*

the angel’s

lumination; both because the subject

is

its

Further,

2.

simpler than any bodily change. But

is

the angel’s

movement

instantane-

an angel be moved from it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term to which; but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term from which; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the .other. But if he be partly in the one and partly in the other, it follows that he is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term from which. Therefore he rests there, since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said (a. 2). Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of Obj.

3.

Further,

if

place to place in time,

time.

On the contrary In every change there is a before and after. Now the before and after of y

movement

is reckoned by time. Consequently every movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and after in it. / answer tha^ Some have maintained^ that

the local motion of an angel

They

said that

when an

is

angel

instantaneous. is

moved from

place to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term from which, but in the last instant of

which.

Nor

is

such time he

is

in the

term to

medium no medium

there any need for a

be-

tween the terms, just as there is between time and the limit of time. But there is a mid-time between two nows of time hence they say that a last now cannot be assigned in which it was in the term from which, just as in illum;

Article

3.

Whether the Movement 0] an Angel

Is Instantaneous?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that an

angel’s

movement

is

in-

Objection i. For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist the mover,

more rapid

and

there

which the

stantaneous.

the

ination, fire,

is

the movement. But the power

*

Albert,

(BO 627).

is

air

In

in

the substantial generation of

no last instant to be assigned in was dark, or in which the matter

Sent.^

1.

d. 37, a. 23

(BO xxvx, 260); a. 24 1, 4, sg (BOxxxiv,

XXVI, 264); Sumnta de Creaiwr.,

SUMMA TBEOLOGICA

a 84

was under the privation of the form of

fire,

but

time can be assigned, sp that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so illuminaa

last

and substantial generation are called

tion

in-

stantaneous movements.^ But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise disposed in every

now than it was before, and therefore now of time which measures rest, the

subject reposing is in the same where in the the middle, and in the last now. On the

first, in

Other hand,

now now

it is

of the very nature of

moved

move-

be otherwise than it was before, and therefore in every of time which measures movement, the

ment

for the subject

movable subject hence

in the last

is

now

in it

to

various

dispositions;

must have a

different

had before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in

form from what

it

every instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term. But this is possible in movement, because to be moved in any whole time is not to be in the same dispo.sition in every instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement; just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of the local motion of the illuminating body. Now the local motion of an angel is not the term of any it in

other continuous movement, but

is

of itself, de-

pending upon no other movement. Consequentit is impossible to .say that he is in any place during the whole time, and that in the last he is in another place, but some fww must be as.signed in which he was last in the preceding

ly

mw

But where there are many 7iows succeeding one another, there is necessarily time, since time is nothing else than the numbering of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time if his movement be non-continuous; for, as was said (a. i), his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the con-

ures the motion of the heavens, and whereby

all

measured, which have changeableness from the motion of the heavens; because the angel’s motion does not depend upon the motion of the heavens. Reply Obj. i. If the time of the angel’s movement be not continuous, but a kind of succession of nows, it will have no proportion to the time which mea.sures the motion of corporeal things, which is continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not because of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. On that corporeal

things

are

account, the swiftness of the angel s movement is not measured by the quantity of his

power, but according to the determination of his wdll.

Reply Obj. 2. Illumination is the term of a movement, and is an alteration, not a local motion, as though the light were understood to be moved to what is near, before being moved

what

to

is local,

remote. But the angel’s movement it is not the term of move-

is

and, besides,

ment; hence there is no comparison. Reply Obj. 3. This objection is based on continuous time. But the time of an angel’s movement can be non-continuous. So an angel can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel’s movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which precedes

the last 710W, as was already ertheless he places,

is

power

is

and

shown

(a. 2).

Nev-

partly in one of the continuous

and partly

substance his

is

in another,

not because his

susceptible of parts, but because

applied to a part of the

to a part of the second, as

was

first

place

said above

(A. I).

place.

tinuity of

movement,

as the Philosopher says.*

But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the time which measi Cf. Averroes, In Phys., vi, 59 (iv, 284 ^Physics, IV, ii (axg^ia).

i).

QUESTION LIV Of the knowledge of the angels {In Five Articles)

After considering what belongs to the angel’s substance, we now proceed to his knowledge. This investigation

will

place inquiry must be

be fourfold. In the

made

into his

first

power of

knowledge; secondly, into his medium of knowledge (q. lv) thirdly, into the things known by him (q. lvi) and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them. (q. lviii). Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry: (i) Is the angel’s act of understand;

;

f

FIRST PART ing his substance? (2) Is his being his act of un* derstanding? (3) Is his substance his power of

understanding? (4) Is there in the angels an agent and a possible intellect? (5) Is there in them any other knowing power besides the intellect? i. Whether an Angel's Act of Understanding Is His Substance?

Article

We

proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that the angel’s act of understanding

is

aaj

a

Q. S4-

an angel's act of understanding substance, it would be necessary for it

Besides, if

were his to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one, just as an abstract thing that subsists can be but one. Consequently the substance of one angel would neither be distinguished from God’s substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting, nor from the substance of another angel. Also, if the angel were his

own

standing, there could then be

no degrees of un-

derstanding more or less perfectly;

his substance.

Objection i. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the agent intellect of a soul. But the

of the act of understanding.

substance of the agent intellect is its own action, as is evident from Aristotle^ and from his

to be its

Commentator.'-* Therefore gel’s

substance his action,

much more

— that

is

is

the an-

his act of un-

derstanding.

Obj,

“the action of the intellect living things to live

seems that

is

life is essence.

of the intellect

is

is life.”

But since “in

to be,” as he says,'*

it

Therefore the action

the essence of an angel

who

understands. Obj.

Further,

3.

if

the extremes be one, then

the middle does not differ from them, because

extreme

is

farther from extreme than the mid-

dle is. But in an angel the intellect and the thing understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with the sub-

stance of the angel

On

the contrary

who understands. The action of a thing

Reply Obj.

own

action accompanies

tions until after

Reply Obj.

nor of any other creature, is

is its

substance.

impossible for the action

of an angel, or of any other creature, to be

own

substance. For an action

is

properly the ac-

tuality of a power, just as being

is

of a substance, or of an essence. possible for anything which

is

its

'

Sml,

®

Comm.

5 (430^18). 19 (vi, 162c).

it

has been reduced to

The

II,

4

xii, 7 (io72**27),

(4i5*’i3)*

act.

does not follow,

if

relation

to live is to be, that life

essence. Although life

is

is

sometimes put for the

Augustine says {De Trin. x),® understanding and will are one essence, one life,” yet it is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher when he says that “the essence,

as

“Memory and

act of the intellect

something

3.

is life.”

The

action which passes to

extrinsic, is really a

medium between

the agent and the subject receiving the action.

The

action which remains within the agent

medium between it

is

the agent and the

object, but only according to the

manner of

ex-

really follows the union of the

object with the agent. For the act of under-

standing

is

brought about by the union of the who understands

thing understood with the one it,

as an effect which differs

Now

it

is

im-

not a pure act,

from both.

Article 2. Whether in the Angel's of Understanding Is His Being?

We

Act

proceed thus to the Second Article: It in the angel's act of understanding is his being. For “in living things to live is to be,” as the Philosopher says®. But to understand is in a sense to live.^ Therefore in the angel to understand is to be.

would seem that

III,

^Metaphysics, ^Soul,

2.

the actuality

but which has some admixture of potency, to be own actuality, because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His being and His action.

its

which cannot be no ac-

it,

between life and to live is not the same as that between essence and to be, but rather as that between a race and to run, one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it

pression; for

/ answer that^ It

said

said of the possible intellect, for this has

said above (q. hi, a. 4; q. vii, a. i, Ans. 3; q. XLiVjA. i). Therefore neither the action of an angel,

is

but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far a$ lies in

not really a

its

the agent intellect

sential,

substance than does its being. But no creature’s being is its substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was

more from

When

i.

action, such predication is not es-

Reply Obj. differs

for this

comes about through the diverse participation

itself,

Further, the Philosopher says® that

2.

act of under-

*Chap. II (PL ^Soul, ^

Ibid.,

II,

42, 983).

4 ( 41 S*»I 3 ).

II, 2

(413*23).

m

w

SUMMA TBBOmGICA

same relation to cause, as effect to effect. But the fonn where^ hy the angel exists is the sam^ as the form by Which he understands at least himself. ThereFurther, cause bears

Obj,

foie in the angel to understand is to be. On the contrary, The angel’s act of under-

standing

is

from DionyBut to be is not motion. the angel to be is not to under-

his motion, as is clear

sius {Div. Norn, iv).*

Therefore in stand.

/ answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his being. For as it is said* there is a twofold class of action:

one which passes out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting and another which does not pass to a thing outside, but which remains within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will. By such actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes

cannot understand overytUng by his essence. Consequently according to its proper notion as such an essence, it is compared to the being itself of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the notion of a more universal object, namely, truth or being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form it the same, yet it is not the principle of being and of understanding accor^ng to the same notion. On this account it does not follow that in the angel to be is the same as to understand.

Article

3.

Whether an AngeVs Knowing Power

Is His Essence?

;

place within the agent. It

is

first

own nature has infinity, either absolutely or relatively. As an example of infinity absolutely, we have the act to understand, of which the object is the true, and the act to will, of which the object is the good, each of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of sensation

is

relatively infinite, for

it

things visible.

Now

the being of every crea-

and species; God’s being alone is infinite absolutely, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div, Norn, v).* Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act ture

of

is

restricted to one in genus

Objection

Life

is

various grades of living things according to the various functions of life.

Reply Obj,

2.

The

essence itself of an angel

intellect express

many

pas-

sages of his writings, Dionysius^ styles angels “intellects

and minds.” Therefore the angel

own power

his

is

of understanding.

Obj. 2. Further, if the angel’s power of understanding be anything other than his essence, then it must be an accident; for that which is other than the essence of anything, we call its accident. But “a simple form cannot be a subject,” as Boethius states

(De

Trin.).^

Thus an

angel would not be a simple form, which trary to

what has been previously said

is

con-

(q. l,

A. 2).

Obj.

made while

3.

Further, Augustine says,® that

God

the angelic nature “nigh unto Himself,”

He made primary matter

ing”; from this

“nigh unto noth-

would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of understanding.

On

sometimes taken for the being itself of the living thing, sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live; for there he distinguishes the i.

mind and

For,

i.

the power of understanding. But in

will.

Reply Obj.

is

sence.

bears

relation to all sensible things; as sight does to all

proceed thus to the Third Article: It in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his es-

quite clear regard-

kind of action that it cannot be the agent’s very being, because the agent’s being is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its ing the

We

would seem that

xi)^

it

the contrary, Dionysius says {Ccel. Hier.

that “the

angels are

divided into sub-

and operation.” Therefore, substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in stance, power,

them. I answer that. Neither in an angel nor in any creature

same as

is

its

the power or operative faculty the essence.

Since every power

Which

is

is made evident thus. ordered to an act, then ac-

cording to the diversity of acts must be the di-

the reason of his entire being, but not the rea-

son of his whole act of understanding, since he

^

De

(?02); *

•

Sect, 8 (PG 3, 704). Metaphysics, ix, 8 (1050*23).

*Scct. 4

(PG

3,

817).

Ccel. Hier., ii, i

De

(PG 3, 137).; vi, (PG 3, 868).

Div. Nom., vii, 2

2. (PL 64, 1250). Confessions, xii, 7 (PL 32, 828). ^Sect. 2 (PG 3, 284).

®Chap.

•

i

(200); xn, 2

;

pimTmMT Mmity

m Oil tcmml

^

it is said

proper act mponds to its proper power* But in eveiy creature the essence differs from the being, and is related to it as potency is to act, as is evident from what has been already said (q. xliv, a. i). Now the act to which the operative power is related is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to be, nor is any other operation either in him, or in any other created thing. Hence the angeFs essence is not his power of understanding, nor is the essence of any creature its power tltat eaeii

of operation.

Reply Obj. i. An angel is called “intellect and mind” because all his knowledge is intellectual, whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive. Reply Obj. 2. A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is related to accident as potency is to act* God alone is such a form, and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own being, but is related to it as potency is to act, can be the subject of accident and especially of such accident as follows the species; but such accident belongs to the form, whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation.

And

such a simple

form is an angel. Reply Obj. 3. The power of matter

is a potenregard to substantial being itself, while the power of operation regards accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.

tiality in

im!t

is

in hilm an agent and

a possible

in^

tellect.

Oh

ike emtrary,

The

possible intellect in us

is

dictinction of agent

and

in relation to the phan-^

tasms. which are related to the possible intellect as colours to the sight are related, but to the agent intellect as colours to the light, as is clear

from the book on the

Sotd.^

the angel. Therefore there

But this is not So in no agent and pos-

is

sible intellect in the angel.

7 answer that, The necessity for admitting a is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potency, and not in act. Hence there must be some power, possible intellect in us

which, previous to the act of understanding,

is

potency to intelligible things, but which is brought into act in their regard when it knows them, and still more when it considers them. This is the power which is called the possible in^ tellect. The necessity for admitting an agent intellect is due to this, that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potency so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently in

it is

necessary that there should be

some power

capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible, and this power in us is called the agent intellect.

But each of these the angels.

They

necessities

is

absent from

are neither sometimes under-

standing only in potency with regard to such things as they naturally understand, nor, again, are their intelligibles intelligible in potency, but

they are actually such; for they

first

and prin-

cipally understand immaterial things, as will ap-

Article 4. Whether There Is A?i Agent and a Possible Intellect in an Angel?

whereas to en-

pear later (qq. lxxxiv, a. 7. and lxxxv, a. i). Therefore there cannot be an agent and a possible intellect in them, except equivocally. Reply Obj. 1. As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there happens to be generation or becoming. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is no need for admitting an agent and a possible intellect in them. Reply Obj. 2. It is the function of the agent intellect to enlighten not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potency, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually

lighten is the proper function of the agent in-

intelligible. It pertains to the possible intellect

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It is both an agent and a possible intellect in an angel. Objection i. The Philosopher says^ that, “in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make all things.” But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an agent and a possible intellect in

would seem that there

an angel. Obj.

2.

Further, the proper function of the

possible intellect

made

is

to receive,

book on the SouL^ But an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one. Tberetellect, as is

*

*

clear in the

Soul, in, 5 (430*14). III, 4, s (429*15; 430*t 4 ).

Aristotle,

to be in potency with regard to things which

are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to be put in act concerning them. Hence for one angel to enlighten another does not be• Aristotle,

m,

5, 7

(430*15; 43**i4)*

SUMMA THEOLOGICA long to the notion of an agent intellect neither does it belong to the notion of the possible intellect for the angel to be enlightened with re;

gard to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potency. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of agent and possible intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and we need not trouble

Article 5. Whether There Knowledge in the Angels?

Is

Only Intellectual

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It

would seem that the knowledge of the angels

is

not exclusively intellectual. Objection i. For Augustine says^ that in “the angels there is life which understands and feels.”

them

contrary objections. First,

it

may

be replied

that those authorities are speaking according to

the opinion of such men^ as contended that demons have bodies naturally united

angels and

to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in his books* although he does not mean

about names.

We

tirely intelligent^ and not in part, as is our soul. For this reason the angels are called “intellects and minds,” as was said above (a. 3, Ans. i). A twofold answer can be returned to the

Therefore there

is

a sensitive

power

in

to assert it; hence he says® that “.such an inquiry does not call for much labour.” Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood as by way of likeness. Because, since sense has a sure appre-

hension of its proper sensible, it is a common usage of speech, when we understand something for certain, to say that we sense it. And hence that

it is

as well.

we

use the

word sententia

(opinion,

Further, Isidore says^ that the angels have known many things by experience. But “experience comes of many remembrances,” as

sentiment). Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things

stated in the Metaphysics} Consequently they have likewise a power of memory.

power.

Obj.

2.

Obj.

3.

Further, Dionysius says (Div. Norn.

iv)^ that there

is

a “perverted phantasy” in

known, although not by likeness of the knowing We have experience when we know sin-

gle objects

know

wise

LVii, A.

the demons. But phantasy belongs to the imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the

memory

same

although

the demons; and for the

imagination

is in

reason

in the angels, since

it is

they are of the

same nature.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Horn. 29 in Ev.)} that “man senses in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels.” / answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations arc exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through bodily organs, as intellect and will, and these are not acts of any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been said already (0. li, a. i). Hence of the soul’s powers only intellect and will can belong to them.

The Commentator (Metaph. xii)® says the same thing, namely that the separated substances are divided into intellect and wiP And it is

in keeping with the order of the universe

for the highest intellectual creature to be en1

City oj God, vin, 6 (PL 41, 231L I, 10 (PL 83, 556). *1,

^Sent.,

(PG




Sect

in their

own

nature.”^

i.

the creature is fashioned is in the Word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists first in the

and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature.”

intellectual creature,

2. To go from one extreme to the necessary to pass through the middle. Now the being of a form in the imagination, which form is without matter but not without material conditions, stands midway between the

Reply Obj.

sible.”

cies

and then Reply Obj.

ture,

2

(PG

3, 868).

other

it is

being of a form which is in matter, and the being of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction 'from matter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful the intellect might be, it could not reduce material forms to intelligible being, except it were first to reduce them to the being of imagined forms, which is impossible, since the angel has no imagination, as was said above (q. liv, a 5). Even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he would not do so, because he would not need them, for he has connatural intelligible

angelic

species.

Reply Obj. 3. The angel’s knowledge is indifwhat is near or distant according to

ferent as to

place. Nevertheless his local

purposeless on

moved

that

movement

account,

for

he

is

is

not not

to a place for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.

•PL

34, 269.

)

AwPictu;

$.

Wh 0ih^ ike Bigher Angets

$mp m

tinder*

sttmd by More Universal Species Than ike Lower Angels?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that the higher angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower angels.

Objection

what

is

i.

For the universal,

seems,

it

is

abstracted from particulars. But angels

do not understand by species abstracted from it cannot be said that the

things. Therefore

species of the angelic intellect are

more or

less

is known in parknown than what is known universally because to know anything universally is, in a fashion, midway between

Obj.

a.

it

act. If, therefore, the higher an-

universal forms than the

follows that the higher have a

more is

Obj. 3. Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the higher angel uses one

form

for

knowing various

things.

Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each, which seems unbecoming. On the contrary Dionysius says {Ccel. Hier. xii)^ that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in De Causis^ it is said that “the higher angels have more universal forms.” / answer that,

Some

things are of a more exalt-

ed nature because they are nearer to and more like to the first, which is God. Now in God the whole fulness of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what God

knows by one, and by so many the more

ac-

cording as the intellect is lower. Thus the higher the angel is, by so

the

much

fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole universe of intelligible things. Therefore his forms must be more universal, each one of them, as it were, extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be observed in ourselves. For some people there are Sect. 2

Word

of God, or at least in the order of

in the

not befitting,

1

either according to the order

nature, as the universal ideas of things ate in the angelic intellect.

perfectly

imperfect knowledge than the lower, which

universal

;

Further, whatever

know by more

lower,

them

more

potency and gels

ing before

of causes, as the universal ideas of things are

universal.

ticular is

bite^ble truth vdm tahh % be explained to them ki every part and detaii; this comes of their weakness of intellect, ^hile there are others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few. Reply Obj. i. It happens to the universal to be abstracted from particulars in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will not be abstracted from things, but will be in a certain way exist-

(PG

3, 392).

•

Sect,

g

(BA

173),

Reply Obj. 2. To know anything univeraally can be taken in two senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less perfect, for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of a man who only knew him to be an animal: In another way, on the part of the medium of knowing. In this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the universal for the intellect which by one universal medium can know the singulars which are properly contained in it is more perfect than one which cannot. Reply Obj. 3. Tlie same cannot be the proper and adequate type of several things. But if it be superior, then it can be taken as the proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with respect to all the ;

acts of the virtues, which can be taken as the proper type and likeness of the particular prudence which in the lion leads to acts of magna-

nimity, and in the fox to acts of wariness, and

The Divine essence, on account of Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of the singulars contained therein ; hence each singular is likened to It according to its proper type. The same applies to the universal idea which is in the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge. so on of the rest.

QUESTION LVI Of the

angels’ knowledge of

IMMATERIAL THINGS (In Three Articles)

We

now

inquire into the knowledge of the an-

gels with regard to the things

known by them.

SUMMA TBEOLOGICA

$92

We

knowledge: first, of immaterial things, secondly of things material (Q. Lvii)* Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: (i) Does an angel know himself? (2) Does one angel know another? (3

shall treat of their

Does the

)

angel

know God by

his

own

nat-

ural powers?

Article

Whether an Angel Knows Himself?

i.

We

proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. i. For Dionysius says that “the ando not know their own powers.’’ {Ccel.

Objection gels

when the substance is known, known. Therefore an angel does not

Hier. vi).^ But,

the power

know

own

his

Obj.

is

2.

essence.

Further, an angel

is

a singular sub-

stance; otherwise he would not act, since acts

belong to singular subsistences. But no singular is intelligible. Therefore it cannot be understood. Therefore, since the angel possesses only

knowledge which

know

is

intellectual,

no angel can

himself.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect

is

moved by

intelligible thing, because, as stated in the

the

book

on the Soul,^ “to understand is in some way to be acted upon.” But nothing is moved by or is acted upon by itself, as appears in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.

On lit.

the contrary^ Augustine says {Gen. ad

ii)®

that “the angel

knew himself when he

was confirmed, that is, enlightened by truth.” / answer that, As is evident from what has been previously said (oQ- xiv, a. 2; liv, a. 2), the object is otherwise in an immanent, and in

species of the object exists sometimes only in potency in the knowing power, and then there is only knowledge in potency and in order that there may he actual knowledge, it is required that the knowing power be reduced to act by the species. But if it always actually possesses the species, it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the nature of kiiower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as knowing in potency. Now, for the form to be the principle of the action, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something else, or whether it be self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the less if it were self-subsisting than it does by inhering in something else. So therefore, if in the genus of intelligible beings there be any subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since an angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by his form, which is his substance. Reply Obj. I. That is the text of the old translation, which is amended in the new one, and runs thus: “furthermore they,” that is to say the angels, “knew their own powers,” instead of which the old translation read “ and furthermore they do not know their own powers.” Although even the letter of the old translation might be kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own power perfectly, according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine Wisdom, Which to the angels is incom;

—

prehensible.

Reply Obj.

2.

Wc

have no knowledge of

sin-

gulars corporeal not bccau.se of their singularity,

a transient, action. In a transient action the

but on afccount of the matter, which

is

their

object or matter into which the action passes

principle of individuation. Accordingly,

if

there

is

something separate from the agent, as the thing is from what gave it heat, and the building from the builder; but in an immanent action, for the action to proceed the object must be united with the agent, just as the sensible object must be in contact with sense in order

heated

ject

may

actually perceive. And the obunited to a powder bears the same to actions of this kind as does the

that sense

which

relation

is

form which

is

the ptinciple of action in other

agents; for, a$ heat

heating in the

fire,

so

is is

the formal prinr’^le of

‘

must, however, be borne

Sect.

1

(PG

* Aristotle,

3, 200).

in, 4 (429*14). • Chap. 8 (PL 34, 369).

Reply Obj.

3. It

belongs to the intellect, in so

moved and to be acted upon. Hence this does not happen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that he,understands himself. Besides the action far as

it is

in

of the intellect

potency, to be

is

not of the same nature as the

action found in corporeal things, which passes

out into some other matter.

the species of the thing

seen the formal principle of vision to the eye. It

be any singulars subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is nothing to prevent them from being actually irilclligible.

in

mind that

this

Article 2, Whether One Angel Knows Another?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that one angel does not know another.

FIRST PART For the Philosopher says* that, if the human intellect were to have in itself any one of the natures of sensible things, then such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending external things, as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were coloured with some Objection

i.

particular colour,

it

But as the human for

/ answer that, As Augustine says {Gm, ad Hi* ii),^ such things as pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him in two ways: first, into the angelic intellect; and sec-

could not see every colour.

un-

images of the things which

intellect is disposed for

understanding

the angelic

is

immaterial

things.

own

ondly, so as to subsist in their

They proceeded into the cause God impressed upon

derstanding corporeal things, so

mind

ART 2

Q.

own

natural being.

natures*

angelic intellect be-

the angelic

mind

the

He produced in their Now in the Word of God

from eternity there existed not only the ideas

Therefore, since the angelic intellect has within

of corporeal things, but likewise the ideas of

some one determinate nature from the number of such natures, it would seem that it

every intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and what is beneath it, in so far as it is its cause. But one angel is not the cause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another. Obj. 3. Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the essence of the one knowing, because all knowledge is effected by

every one of these both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God yet so that in every angel there was impressed the idea of his own species according to both its natural and its intelligible being, so that he should subsist in the nature of his species, and understand himself by it, while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed in him only according to their intelligible being, so that by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spirit-

way

ual creatures.

itself

cannot understand other natures. Obj.

2.

Further,

it is

stated in

De

Causis^ that

of a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the essence of the angel known, except generically, as is clear from what

has been said before (qq. l, a. 4; lv, a. i Ans. Hence, it follows that one angel would not have a proper knowledge of another, but only a 3).

manner it cannot be knows another by the essence of the angel known, because that whereby

general knowledge. In like said that one angel

something within the intellect, while the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind. Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species, because that species docs not differ from the angel understood, since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one angel can underthe intellect understands

is

stand another. Obj.

4.

creatures.

one angel did understand would be either by an innate if

species; and so it would follow that, if God were now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the existing angels; or else he would have to be known by a species drawm from things, and so it would follow that

the higher angels could not

know

the lower,

So

in

spiritual creatures, the ideas of all things,

;

Reply Obj.

The

i.

spiritual natures of the

angels are distinguished from one another in a certain order, as

was already observed

(q. l, a.

4, Ans. I, 2; Q. X, A. 6; q. xlvii, a. 2).

So the

nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower bear affinity to his nature, the only

difference being

according to their

various degrees of perfection.

Reply Obj. 2. The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel to know another, unless by reason of likeness, so far as cause and the thing caused are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the angels, this wall suffice for

Reply Obj.

Further,

another, this

all spiritual

one to know another.

One

3.

angel

knows another by

the species of such angel existing in his intellect, wffiich differs from the angel whose likeness

is

it

not according to material and im-

material being, but according to natural and intentional being. sisting

form

in the intellect of

there

it

The

angel

is

himself a sub-

in his natural being, but his species

another angel

not

is

so, for

possesses only an intelligible being.

As

from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way does it seem that one angel knows

the form of colour on the wall has a natural

another.

has only intentional being.

On the contrary^ We read in De Causis^ that “every intelligence knows the things which are not corrupted.”

portionate

*

•

Soul, in, 4 (42g*2o). Sect. 10 (BA 174).

*Sect. 7

(BA

170).

being, but, in the

Reply Obj.

mined

4.

God made every

carries

angels or

Chap. 8 (PL 34* 260).

it,

it

creature pro-

He

the universe which

to make. Therefore had

make more *

to

medium which

God

deter-

resolved to

more natures

of things,

—

f

:

m

SVMMA T$mmQI€4

He would have impressed more

intelligible spe-

the atigelic minds; just as a builder who, if he bad intended to build a larger house, would have made larger foundations. Hence, for God cies ia

to add a that

He

new

creature to the universe

would likewise add a new

means

intelligible

species to an angel.

drawn immediately from the thing known itbut from something else in which it is ma(b to appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror.

self,

To

We

is likened

God by which He

is

that knowl-

seen through His

essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural powers,

was said above

as

Article 3. Whether an Angel Knows God by Bis Own Natural Powers?

the first-named class

edge of

(q. xii,

a. 4).

The

third

comprises the knowledge whereby

class

know God

while

we

are on earth,

by His

wc like-

would seem that the angels cannot know God

ness reflected in creatures, according to Rom. I. 20: The invisible things of God are clearly

by

seen, being understood

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

their natural powers.

Objection. i.For Dionysius says (Div.

Nom.

God “by His

incomprehensible might heavenly minds.” Afterwards he adds that, “since He is above all substances. He is remote from all knowledge.” Obj. 2. Further, God is infinitely beyond the intellect of an angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural powers. Obj. 3. Further, it is written (I Cor. 13. 12) We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. From this it appears that there is a twofold knowledge of God: the one, whereby He is seen in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to face; the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of i)‘ is

that

placed above

all

creatures. As was already shown (q. xii, a. 4), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his natural powers. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God from sensible things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii).* Therefore the angels cannot know God by their

natural powers.

On

the contrary

The

angels are mightier in

knowledge than men. Yet men can know God through their natural powers, according to Rom. I, 19: what is known of God is manifest in them. Therefore much more so can the angels. I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge of God by their own natural powers. In evidence of this it must be borne in mind that a thing is known in three ways; first, by the presence of its essence in the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said that an angel knows himself (A. t.);

by the things that are made. Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge by which according to his natural powers the angel knows God, stands midway between these two, and is likened to that knowledge by which a thing is seen through the species received from it. For since God’s image is impressed on the very nature of the angel by His essence, the angel knows God in sofar as he is the likeness of God. Yet he does not see God’s essence, because no created likeness is sufficient to represent the Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the knowledge of reflection, because the angelic nature

when

the likeness of the object

»Sect. 4

•Sect

a

(PG (PG

3,

sw).

way God is not known by any created intellect. Reply Obj. 2. Since an angel’s intellect and essence are infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him nor can pressly state. In this

;

he see God’s essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all, because, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has of

Him. Reply Obj.

3, 868).

3.

naturally has of

is

not

The knowledge which an God is midway between

angel these

two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more to one of them, as was said above.

QUESTION LVII Of the angels’ knowledge of MATERIAL THINGS {In Five Articles)

—

known

a kind of mirror re-

Reply Obj. i. Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of comprehension, as his words ex-

secondly, by the presence of its likeness m the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye from its likeness being in the eye thirdly, ;

is itself

presenting the Divine likeness.

We

next investigate the material things which

are

known by

the angels.

Under

this

there are five points of inquiry: (i)

heading

Whether

the aAfds

ktiW the iiatutiies of tnaterial^i^^

know

all

mysteries of grace?

simply and less materially even than in tbem« selves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in God. Now whatever exists in any thing, is con^ tained in

Article

i.

Whether the Angels

Know

Material

Things?

m: the augels more

things

idl matrriltl

(i) ’^^hethar they k»ow smgular things? (3) Whether they know the future? (4) Whether they know secret thoughts? (5) Whether they

after the

it

nature. Therefore, as

We

manner of that

God knows material things

by His

terial things.

their intelligible species.

For the thing understood is the perfection of him who understands it. But macannot be the perfections of angels,

terial things

gels

do not know material

things.

is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in a gloss.^ But material things cannot enter by their essence into man’s soul, nor into the angel’s mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the likenesses of bodies are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which

Ohj,

2.

Further, intellectual vision

Now

essence, so

Reply Obj.

i.

since they are beneath them. Therefore the an-

thing understood

is

who understands by

the rea-

son of the intelligible species which he has in And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect. Reply Obj. 2. Sense does not apprehend the

essences of things, but only their outward acci-

manner neither does the imaginaapprehends only the likenesses of bodies. The intellect alone apprehends the esdents. In like tion, for

it

sence of things.

Hence it is said'* that “the obwhat a thing w," regard-

ject of the intellect is

ing which

it

regarding

its

is

The

his intellect.

nei-

there

i.

perfection of the one

ther imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels,

regards bodies in themselves.

own

do the angels know them, through the fact that they are in the angels by

proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that the angels do not know maObjection

But

thing.

the angels are intellectual beings of their

does not

err, as neither does sense proper sensible object. So there-

but only intellectual. Therefore the angels can-

fore the essences of material things are in the

not know material things. Obj. 3. Further, material things are not actu-

intellect of

but are knowable by apprehenand of imagination, which does angels. Therefore angels do not know

stood

is

in

man and

ally intelligible,

cording to

sion of sense

in

not exist in

ways of being and

material things.

On

an

angels as the thing under-

him who understands, and not actheir real being. But some things are

intellect or in the soul according to

in either case there

;

both

is intel-

lectual vision.

Whatever the lower power the higher can do likewise. But man’s

and for whatever is contained deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower

Reply Obj. 3. If an angel were, to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves, he would have to make them intelligible in act by abstracting them. But he does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things' themselves. He has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things, which species are connatural to him just as our intellect has, by species which

beings, to be contained in the higher eminently,

it

the contrary,

can do,

intellect,

which

in the order of nature is inferior

know material things. Theremuch more can the mind of an angel. I answer that, The establi.shed order of things

to the angel’s, can

fore

for higher beings to be

is

more perfect than

lower,

and

in

respect of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius

Nom.

But among other creaand resemmost hence they share more fully and

says {Div.

i).^

tures the angels are nearest to God, ble

intelligible

by abstraction.

a certain degree of fulness and simplicity.

Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in

Him

more

;

makes

;

Divine goodness, as Dionysius says (Ccel. Hier, iv).® Consequently, ^Glossa ordin.y on II Cor. 12.2 (vi, 76A); Glossa Lombardi, on II Cor. 12.2 (PL 192, So); cf. Aug., De Gen. ad perfectly

in

the

Article

2.

Whether an Angel Knows Singulars?

We

proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. Objection i. For the Philosopher says®: “The sense has for its object singulars, but reason, or thfe

intellect, universals.”

Now,

in the angels

no power of knowing except the intellectual power, as iS evident from what was said above (q. liv, a. 5). Consequently they do not there

is

know

singulars.

LtL, xn, 28 (PL 34. 478). »

Sect, s

» Sect. 2

(PG (PG

3,

592); V, 9 (82s)

3, 180).

erior #iew subjection due. Coosequeiitly the Skst ifo of the angel can be none other than pride.

Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for in them, since for the affection

envy also to be

to tend to the desire of something involves its

part resistance to anything contrary.

on

Now

man sorrows over the good posby another, because he considers his neighbour’s good to be a hindrance to his own. But another’s good could not be considered a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked

«0t laB twite under teire/ because tiite good which is apprehended moves the appetite» whether sensible^ rational, or ih-r tellectual, and sin consists only in such desire. But for any creature to be God’s equal does not fall under apprehension, because it implies a wfcat

appii^eiiaion, dpes

te

the envious

contradiction, for if the finite equals thef in-

sessed

then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God. Obj. 2. Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin. But to be likened to God is the end to which every creature natural^ tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by likeness, it wouM seem that he did not thereby sin. Obj. 3. Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom than man. But Uo man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal of an angel, still less of God, because choice regards only things which are possible* regarding which one takes deliberation. There-

angel except in so far as he coveted a singular

which would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel whereby he grieved over man’s good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the devil’s will God excellence,

makes use of man for the Divine glory. Reply Obj, i. The demons do not delight the obscenities of the sins of the flesh as

if

in

they

themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures; it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in

all

sorts of

human

sins, so far

as these

are hindrances to a man’s good.

Reply Obj. kind of

2.

sin, is

Avarice, considered as a special the immoderate desire of tem-

poral things which serve the use of

human

life,

and which can be estimated in value by money; to these things demons are not inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures. Consequently avarice propeily so called cannot be them. But if every immoderate greed of pos-

in

any created good be termed avarice, in avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons. But anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence. Consequently sessing this

way

they can only exist metaphorically

in the de-

mons. Acedia is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body, which does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons, yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another. Reply Obj. 3. Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them.

Article

3.

Whether the Devil Desired To Be

As God?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God.

finite,

fore

much

less did the angel sin

by

desiring to

be as God.

On the contrary^ It is said, in the person of the devil (Isa. 14. 13, 14), / wiXl ascend into heaven. . , / will be like the Most High, And ,

Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test., cxiii)^ says that being inflated with pride, ^‘he wished to be called God.” I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly, by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way, because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible, and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his knowing power, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing with regard to some particular, as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural desire, because there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving

its

own

which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no thing of a lower order can ever desire the grade of a higher nature, just as an ass does not desire to be a horse; for were it to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But here the being,

imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think that because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of natutCr to ^

Ambrosiaster (PL 35, ^d 4 i)*

SVMMA THKOWGICA

5*8 which he could

attain without ceasing to be.

surpasses the

Objection i. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine*: ‘There is a class of demons of

angels not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower

and the souls of the dead.” But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are natur-

Now

it is

ixot

quite evident that

God

degree to desire equality with a higher, and to covet equality with God.

still

more

To

desire to be as

God

according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way, as to that

whereby everything is made to be likened to God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin, provided likeness

that he desires such likeness in proper order,

may obtain it of God. were he to desire to be like God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of God’s power. In another way one may desire to be like God in some respect which is not natural to one, as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God, in which desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely, for so he would be desiring his own non-being, since no creature can be except by participating being under God. But he desired to be like God in this respect, by desiring, as his last end of Happiness that which he could attain by the power of his own nature^ turning his desire away from supernatural Happiness, which is attained by God’s grace. Or, if desiring as his last end that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature, and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm’s opinion, who says^ that he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast. These two views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have final happiness of his own power, whereas this that

is

to say, that he

But he would

sin

—

proper to

is

God

alone.

crafty nature, pretending that they are gods

ally wicked.

Obj. 2. Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But some men are naturally

wicked, of whom it is said (Wisd. 12, 10): Their malice was natural. Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked. Obj. 3. Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature; thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious, yet they are God’s creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God’s creatures, they may be naturally wicked. On the contrary^ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)®

that

demons

“the

are

not

I answer that, Everything which

is,

principle; because the effect always reverts to

Now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things. But with the universal good no evil can be connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is ordered towards its principle.

some some

particular good, evil;

not as

it

evil,

joined to some good. But

can tend naturally to but accidentally, as if

anything of

nature

Reply Obj. i. Augustine in the same place rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful saying that they are not so, but of their own will. Now the reason wliy Porphyry held that they are natu-

naturally

was

sensitive nature

Whether Any of

the

Devums Are

We

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It

wicked. 1

De casu diabolic chap.

is

he contended, demons

inclined towards

which

it

evil is joined to good. •

6 (PL 158, 337).

way, then,

tion to evil;

that, as

City of God, X, II

•Sect. 23

Now

the

some par-

evil may be joined. In can have a natural inclinayet only accidentally, in so far as

ticular good, to this

would seem that some demons are naturally

its

it

are animals with a sensitive nature. 4.

na-

cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature is ordered to the universal good, which it can appreheij(j and which is the object of the will. Hence, since the demons are intellectual sub.stances, they can in no way have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever. Consequently they cannot be natun.i’y evil.

own

rally deceitful

Article

its

ture be ordered to good in general, then of

jections.

Naturally Wicked?

so far as

and has some nature, tends naturally towards some good, since it comes from a good is

it

what exists of itself is the principle and cause of what exists of another, it follows also from this that he sought to have dominion over others, wherein he also perversely wished to be like God. From this we have the answer to all the obSince, then,

naturally

wicked.”

(PG3,

(PL 41,

724).

a8g),

FlItST Reply Obj,

2.

The malice

of

FAST

some men can

be called natural either because of custom is a second nature, or on account of the natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lust-

which

ful;

but not on the part of the intellectual na-

ture.

Reply Obj.

Brute beasts have a natural in-

3.

clination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, to

which certain evils are its food has a

joined; thus the fox in seeking

natural inclination to do so with a certain skill

coupled with deceit. Therefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him, as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes (De Div. Nom. iv).‘

Article

Whether the Devil Was Wicked by

5.

the Fault oj His

Own

Will in the First Instant

Q, 63.

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the will in the first instant of his

Objection

i.

For

He was

it is

said of the devil (John

a murderer from the begin-

ning.

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine {Gen. ad lit. i, 15),^ “the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time, but merely in order of nature.” Now according to him {ibtd. ii, S),*’’ the heaven, which is said to have been created in the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed; and when it is said that God said:

Be

light

made: and

light

was made, we

formation of the angel by turning to the Word. Consequently, the are to understand the

move upwards

in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have his opera-

tion in the first instant of his creation.

full

made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from darkness, whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in the

first

instant of

some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned, Obj. 3. Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature can merit in the first their creation

instant of

its

good

creation, as the soul of Christ, or angels. Therefore the

wise could sin in the

demons

like-

instant of their crea-

first

tion.

Obj.

4.

1

Sect. 25

®

PL 34, PL 34,

*

Now

was either ordered or inordinate. If ordered, then, since he had grace, he thereby merited Happiness. But with the angels the reward follows immediately upon merit, as was said above (q. lxii, a. 5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once, and sO would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by inordinate acthis operation

tion in their first instant.

On the contrary. It is WTitten (Gen. i. 31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. But among them were also demons were

the demons. Therefore the

at

some time good.

Some have maintained*

that

demons were wicked immediately in the first instant of their creation, not by their nathe

by the

ture, but

sin of their

own

will,

because,

tice,”

Further, the angelic nature

(PG3,

is

more

nature

Augustine says,® “if

evil

of itself.” Since this opinion,

is in

contradiction with the authority

—

for

said of the devil under

it is

the figure of the prince of Babylon (Isa. 14. 12); How art thou fallen ... 0 Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning! devil in the person of the 28. 13)

Thou wast

:

God

and it is said to the King of Tyre (Ezech.

in the pleasures of the para-

— consequently,

this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters® as erroneous.

dise of

,

Hence others have the

first

said^ that the angels, in

instant of their creation, could have

Yet this view also is reby some,® because, when two operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the same “now.” But it is clear that the angel’s sin was an act subsequent to his creation. But the term sinned, but did not.

jected

unnamed

theologians. Cf. Peter Lombard, chap. 4 (QK i, 319); Denifle, Chartularium, n. 130(1, 173); n. 278 (i, 316). ® City of God, XI, 13 (PL 41, 329)® At Paris. Cf. Denifle, Chartularium, n. 128 (i, 171). 7 Albertus Magnus discusses this opinion. In S^nL, it, ll, d. Ill, A. Z4 (BO xxvii, 86); cf- Bonaventure, i4). Ibid., u, 4 (415*25; *’23)-

body

three

we have

said

this is the generative

»

Sect. 3

*Soul,

(PG 3,

II,

872).

4 (4i6**24).

SUMMA THEOIOGICA

410 receives it once its nature and

its

quantity, ac-

either water or air, or the like.^ Others

is

ascribed

Reply Ohj. 4. As we have said above (a. i), the operation of the vegetative principle is per-

qualities, according as

it

have

to the various natures of the sensible

cording to the condition of the matter-

such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity.®

But none of these explanations

For

formed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to

the powers are not for the organs, but the or-

restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive is required, whereby the food is changed

various powers for the reason that there are vari-

power

into the substance of the body. This

is fitting.

gans for the powers. Therefore there are not

also nec-

ous organs, but nature has provided a variety

essary for the action of the growth and genera-

of organs so that they might be adapted to vari-

is

tive powers.

ous powers. In the same way nature provided mediums for the various senses, according to their fitness for the acts of the powers. And to know the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses but to the intellect. The reason of the number and distinction of various

Article 3. Whether the Five Exterior Senses Are Properly Distingtdshed?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem inaccurate to distinguish

five ex-

the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to

terior senses.

For sense can know accidents. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied ac-

that which belongs to the senses properly and per se. Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally changed by the exterior sensible. Therefore the exterior cause of such change is

cording to the number of the kinds of accidents. Obj. 2. Further, magnitude and shape, and

what

Objection

1.

other things which are called

common

sensibles,

them by the Philosopher.^

Now

the diversity of objects, as such, diversi-

the powers. Since, therefore, magnitude and shape are further from colour than sound is, it

per se perceived by the sense, and ac-

Now, change

are not sensibles by accident, but are contradistinguished from

is

cording to the diversity of that exterior cause the sensitive powers are diversified. is

of two kinds, one natural, the

other spiritual. Natural change takes place by the form of the thing which causes the change

seems that there

being received, according to its natural being, into the thing changed, as heat is received into the thing heated. But spiritual change takes

sensitive

place

fies

is much more need for another power that can grasp magnitude or

shape than for that which grasps colour or sound. Obj, 3. Further, one sense is related to one contrariety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contrarieties, such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and the like. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses. Obj. 4. Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it

by the form of the thing which causes the change being received according to a spiritual

mode

is

received into the pupil which

does not thereby become coloured. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual change is required,

whereby an intention of the sensible

form

effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise,

is

a natural change alone sufficed for the sense’s

if

action, all natural bodies

would

feel

when they

undergo alteration.

But

should not be classed as a distinct sense from

in

some senses we

find spiritual change

we find not only a spiritual but also a natural change, either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we only, as in sight, while in others

touch.

On

of being into the thing changed, as the

form of colour

the

contrary,

The Philosopher

says,*

“There is no other besides the five senses,” 1 answer that, The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as water, air or the like.® By others it has been assigned to me medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic, and

which is caused by

find natural change as to place in sound,

the object of hearing; for sound

percussion and commotion of the find natural

change by alteration,

the object of smelling

is

;

in

is

air.

And we

odour which

for in order to exhale

an odour a body must be

in a measure altered by heat. On the part of the organ, natural change

»

Soul,

»

Ibid., in, I (424^22).

*

Cf. Albert the Great,

A. 4

II,

6 (4i8'‘8).

(BO XXXV,

TheoL,

i-ii,

Summade Creatur.,

in, Q.

304). Cf. also Alexander of Hales,

3s6 (QR

ti,

432).

*

xxxrv,

Summa

*

3

See preceding note. Cf. Bonaventure, IttneraHum Mentis in Deum, chap.

(QR V,

300).

FIRST FART takes place in touch and taste; for the that touches something hot

becomes

hand

hot, yrhile

moistened by the humidity of the flavoured morsel But the organs of smelling and hearing are not changed in their respective operations by any natural change unless accidentally. Now. the sight, which is without natural change either in its organ or in its object, is the the tongue

most

is

and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural change on the part of the object; but local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves.* Touch and taste are the most material of all, of the distinction of which we shall speak later on (Ans. 3, 4). Hence it is that the spiritual, the

most

perfect,

Q. 78.

ART. 4

4ilt

dental sensibles, for they produce a certain riety in the change of the senses. For sense

changed

differently

by a

large and

is

by a small

surface, since whiteness itself

or small, and therefore its

is

is said to be great divided according to

proper subject.

Reply Obj.

3.

say,® the sense of

As the Philosopher seems to touch

is generically one, but is divided into several specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which

senses, however, are not separate from one another in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not

evident.

But taste, which perceives the sweet and

the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but

three other senses are not exercised through a

not in the whole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proxi-

medium united

mate genus, and

change

any natural happens as regards

to them, to obviate

their organ, as

in

these two senses.

Reply Obj. 1. Not every accident has in itself a power of change, but only qualities of the third species, according to which alteration takes Therefore only qualities of

place.

this

kind are

the objects of the senses; because “the senses

same

are affected by the

animate bodies are

things

whereby

in-

affected,’^ as stated in the

Physics.^

Reply Obj,

2.

Size, shape,

common

are called

and the

sensibles, are

like,

which

midway

be-

tween accidental sensibles and proper sensibles, which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, change the senses, since they are qualities that cause alteration. But the all

reducible to quantity.

to size

sensibles are

and number,

clear that they are species of quantity.

is

it

common As

Shape

is

a quality about quantity, since the no-

tion of shape consists in fixing the

bounds of

magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more

ways

magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of in the

local motion, or again, according as

some

in

sensible qualities, as in the

is,

Now

in

affected

movement

and thus to sense movement and a way, to sense one thing and many.

of alteration rest

it is

quantity

is

the proximate subject of the

colour. Therefore the

the senses

first

common sensibles do not and of their own nature,

but by reason of the sensible quality as the surface by reason of colour. Yet they are not acci;

*

Physics, viir, 7 (260*28).

* Aristotle,

notion. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed. Reply Obj. 4. The sense of taste, according to

a saying of the Philosopher,'* is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in genus, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on account of the common no-’ tion of its object, wc must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different notion of change. For touch involves a natural, and not only a spiritual, change in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily changed by a natural change according to the quality which is its proper object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet or bitter, but by reason of a preceding quality on which is based the flavour, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.

Article 4 Whether the Interior Senses Are Suitably Distinguished?

Wc

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It interior senses are not suit-

would seem that the ably distinguished.

Objection

;

qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of

move

all in a common genus, which the object of touch according to its common

is

vu,

2 (244**! 2).

i.

For the common

against the proper. Therefore the

is

not divided

common

sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers in addition to the proper exterior senses.

Further, there is no need to assign an power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the proper and

Obj.

2.

interior

*

Soul, n, II (422^17).

*Ibid.,ii, g (421*18); also

II,

ii

(

433 '‘i 7 )-

j

SUMMA TBEOLOGICA

4ta

exteriot senses suffice for us to judge of sensible

the sensitive soul as suffice for the

proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions, for since the action of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as being

any of these actions cannot be reduced to one principle, they must be assigned to different powers, since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the

things, for each sense judges of

its

nearer to it, than the colour; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior power, called the

common

sense.

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Philosopher^ the imagination and the memory are passions of the “first sensitive.** But passion is not divided against

its

subject. Therefore

memory and imag-

ination should not be assigned as powers distinct

from the Obj.

senses.

4.

Further, the intellect depends on the

power of the sensitive part. knows nothing but what it re-

life

of a per-

fect animal. If

soul’s operation.

Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent, the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things,

by them, but

when

it is

senses less than any

actually changed

But the intellect ceives from the senses; hence we read^ that

tain

“those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge.” Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power which they call the estimative power, for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive.

principles; for moist things are apt to receive,

Obj.

5.

Further, the action of the cogitative

power, which consists in comparing, uniting, and dividing,

and the action of the remini.scence.

which consists

in the use of a

for the sake of inquiry,

is

kind of syllogism

not less distant from

the actions of the estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is

from the action of the imagination. Therefore we must add the cogitative and reminiscing to the estimative and memorative powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination. Obj. 6. Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, either

namely, an action of the sense, .spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy, and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect.*’ Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect besides 24)^ describes “three kinds of vision

7,

corporeal, which

;

is

and preserve them.

Now

it

must

to receive

also re-

and

re-

reduced to diverse

tain are. in corporeal things,

but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Therefore, .since the sen.sitive

power

is

that the sensible wffiich

the act of a corporeal organ,

it

follows

power which receives the species of things must be distinct from the power

preserves them.

Again we must observe that

moved by

if

an animal were

pleasing and disagreeable things only

would be no need to power besides the apprehen.sion of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the as affecting the sense, there

.suppose that an animal has a

animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to tbe senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages; just as the sheep runs away when it sees an approaching wolf not on account of its colour or shape, but as a natural enemy; and ag;/'n a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they arc useful for

building

its

nest.

Animals, therefore, need to per-

ceive Sijch intentions, which the exterior sense

the imagination. assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely,

does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this, since the perception of

common

.sensible

On

the contrary Avicenna

(Dc Anima

sense, phantasy, imagination,

iv,

i)*

and the

which

estimative and memorative powers. 7 answer that,

As nature does noi

essary things, there must be as

fail in

many

nec-

actions of

is

forms comes by a sensible change, not the case with the perception of the

intentions spoken of.

Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the “proper sense” and the

^

Memory and

*

Aristotle, Posterior

»

PL 34, 458,

*

Reminiscence,

i

(450*10).

A nalyitcs, i,

459, 474(i7va);al30i, s (srb).

“common we

sense” are appointed, and of their distinction

18 (Si“58). .shall

speak further on (aus,

1

,

2 ).

But for the

re-

tention and preservation of these forms, the

,

FIRST PART phantasy or imagination is appointed, which is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the estimative power is appointed; and for the preservation of them, the memorative power, which is a storehouse of such intentions. A sign of this we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise And the very notion of the past, which memory considers, is to be reckoned

among these intentions. Now, we must observe forms there

is

that as to sensible

no difference between

man and

other animals; for they are similarly changed

by

the exterior sensible. But there

as to the

is

a difference

above intentions. For other animals

some natural but man perceives them by means of

perceive these intentions only by instinct,

a kind of comparing Therefore the pow’er which in other animals is called the natural estimative,

man

which by some and comparison discovers these intentions.^ Therefore it is also called “the particular reason,*' to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head,^ for it compares inin

is

called the cogitative,

sort of gathering together

Q. 79. the

ART,

I

common

413 sense, the imagination,

estimative and memorative powers.

Reply Obj, i. The interior sense is called not by predication, as if it were a ge»

common

common

nus, but as the

by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet, because what discerns between two things must know both. Therefore the discern* ing judgment must be assigned to the common

common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred, and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are sense, to which, as to a

when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is changed, in which change the action of sight is completed, and from which change follows another in the common sense which perperceived; as

ceives the act of vision.

Reply Obj 3. As one power arises from the by means of another, as we have seen above

soul

(q. LX.XV11, A. 7), so also the soul is the subject

of one

power through another. In

memory

of the “first sensitive.'*

by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however.^ assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms; as when from the imaginary form of gold, and the imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form ot a golden mountain, which we have never seen But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom for this purpose the imaginative power suffices. To man past

also does Averrocs attribute this action in his

book De sensu et sc 7 isibilihus} So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part namely,

—

Reply Obj.

ische

Abhandlungfn (Dl 122.5); Averrocs, CoUiget,

Avicenna, De An ,1, 5 (5rb): Averrocs, loc ett ander ol Males, op cii., i-ii, n. 35g (QR n, 435). .4 m.,

knows many

things which the senses cannot

manner does the estimative

manner. Reply Obj 5. The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part, but to a certain affinity and proximity to the univerpower, though

sal reason,

in a less perfect

which, so to .speak, overflows into

them Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.

Reply Obj.

6.

Augustine

calls

that

vision

bodies in

by the likenesses of the absence of bodies. Hence it is clear

that

common

spiritual \\hich

it is

is

effected

to all interior apprehensions.

QUESTION LXXIX

,

*

De

the

Although the operation of the

perceive. In like

ii,

Of the intellfxtual powers

20

(In Thirteen Articles)

(X, 30F).

^

way

thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect

CP. Alexander II,

4.

this

are called passions

intellect has its origin in the senses, yet, in the

of Hales, Summa Thcol i-n, n. JS7 434); Albert, In De An ni, 2, ig (BO v, 3O7). This doctrine is arabic in origin. Cf. Alfarabi, Phtlosoph^

(QR

principle of

stance,

son compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past, but also reminiscence, by syllogistiwere, seeking for a recollection of the

and

Reply Obj. 2. The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for in-

imagination and the

it

root

the exterior senses.

dividual intentions, just as the intellectual rea-

cally, as

and the

IV,

vr, 2 (16 i).

i

(i7va).

;

Alex-

The

next question

concerns the intellectual

powers, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry; (i)

Whether the

intellect is

y

SVMMA THEOUMSICA

414

a power of the soul, or its essence? (2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power? (3) If it is 4 passive power, whether there is an agent intellect? (4) Whether it is something in the soul? (5) Whether the agent intellect is one in all? (6) Whether memory is in the intellect? (7) Whether the memory is distinct from the intel-

Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect? (9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers? (10) Whether the intelligence is a power distinct from the intellect? (ii) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are different powers? (12) Whether synderesis is a power of the intellectual part? (13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part? lect? (8)

i)

necessary to say that the intellect is a soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, only it is

power of the

when operation is

Power of

i.

Whether the

Intellect Is a

not a power of the soul,

power

is

other intellectual creatures the intellect

is

a

power.

Reply Obj. i. Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which

is

the intellectual soul

is

sense.

essence

And

in like

manner

sometimes called intellect, chief power; and thus we read® that is

a substance.”

also Augustine says that the

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that the

so

its act,

very Being in God alone. Therefore in God alone is His intellect His essence, while in

“the intellect

the Soul?

for as

;

essence to being. But the act of understanding is His

as from its

Article

being

itself is its

related to operation as

(De

Trin.

And

mind

in this

is

sense a species or

ix, 2; xiv, 16).“^

but the essence of the soul. Objection i. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence, for Augustine says

Reply Obj. 2. The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul by reason of the different natures of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the

“Mind and spirit are not reladenominate the essence.’' There-

sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it; for appetite fol-

{De

intellect is

Trin. ix, 2)

tive things, but

fore the intellect

Obj.

2.

the essence of the soul

is

powers are not united

in

some one power, but

only in the essence of the soul.

Now

the appeti-

and the intellectual are different genera of the soul’s powers as the Philosopher says,^ but tive

they are united

in the

mind, for Augustine {De

Trin. x, ii)® places the intelligence

the mind. Therefore the

man of

mind and

and

will in

intellect of

the very essence of the soul and not one powers.

is

its

according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension ^xxix. in Ev.),^ “man understands with the angels ” But angels are Obj>

called

and

3. h'urther,

Minds and

intellect of

but the soul Obj.

4.

Intellects.

man

Therefore the mind

are not a

power of the

soul,

itself.

it is

material through that the soul

is

intellectual

immaterial. But the soul its

essence. Therefore

must be

intellectual

is

On

seems through its it

the contrary

PL 42, 062. » PL 42, 083.

in the reason.®

Reply Obj. 3. In the angels there is no other power than the intellect, and the will, which follow's the intellect.

called a

is

Mind

And for this reason an angel or an Intellect; because his

whole pow'er consists

in this. But the soul has other powers, .such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison

many fails:

Reply Obj. 4. The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect, but through its immateriality it has the power of understanding. Hence

it

follows not that the in-

tellect is the substance of the soul,

but that

it is

virtue and power.

Article Power?

We

2.

Whether the

Intellect Is a Passive

proceed thus to the Second Article: It intellect is not a passive

would seem that the

The

Philosopher, assigns the

power of the

soul.^

I answer thaty In accordance with what has been already shown (q. liv, a. 3; q. lxxvii, a. ’

way Augustine

by im-

essence.

intellect as a

in this

puts the will in the mind, and the Philosopher,

its

Further, a substance

the fact that

And

lows apprehension

Further, different genera of the soul’s

*

Soul,


5),

in-

FIRST PART Therefore it seems that the not a passive power.

telligent substance. intellect is

Obj.

Further, the intellectual power

2.

we have

corruptible, as

But

6).

“if the intellect is passive,

it is

corrupti-

Therefore the intellectual power

ble.”'

not

is

passive.

Obj,

Further, the “agent

3.

and

patient,” as Augustine^ all

nobler than the

is

Aristotle*' say.

But

the powers of the vegetative part are active;

yet they are the lowest

among

the powers of the

soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.

On

the contrary^

“to understand

/ answer that.

The Philosopher says^ way to be passive.”

that

in a

is

To be

three ways. First, in

passive

its

most

may

be taken in

strict sense,

when

from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination, as when w'ater loses coolness

by heating, and as when a man becomes sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing

is

ill

or

said to be

when something, whether suitable or unis taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, passive

suitable.

but also he that altered or

whatever w’ay he be

joyful, or

is

moved. Thirdly,

in a w’ide sense a

from the very fact that what is in potency to something receives that to w’hich it was in potency w^ithout being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever pa.elow, q. lxxxiv, a a. i, 4. " Cf. Metaphysics, iii, 4 (ggo'^iS); viii, 3 (io43'*ig). * Avempace, according to Averroes, In de An,, ii, 67 (VI, 2-84E). In de An., ii, comm. 67 (vi, 2-84E). “ Soul, HI, 5 (430*15): cf. Averroes, op. cit.

j

FIRST PART nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order to

understand them, the immaterial nature of the possible intellect would not suffice but for the

presence of the agent intellect, which makes

by way of abstrac-

things actually intelligible

Q. 70

ART. 4

.

417

would therefore follow that the agent intellect flows from the essence of the soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect, which is unsoul. It

fitting. Therefore the agent something in our soul.

intellect

is

not

On

the contrary The Philosopher says® that necessary for these differences, namely, the possible and agent intellect, to be in the soul.

tion.

it is

Article 4. Whether the Agent Intellect Is Somethhig in the Soul?

I answer that,

We

The agent

intellect, of

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the agent intellect is not some-

the Philosopher .speaks,

thing in the soul.

that above the intellectual soul of

Objection

i.

For the

effect of the agent intel-

purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul, according to John i.(),He was the true light that enlightcneth every man coming into this world. Therefore the agent intellect is not something in the soul.^ Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says^ of the agent intellect, “that is docs not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand.” But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, and sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the agent intellect is not something in our soul,® Obj. 3. Further, agent and patient suffice for lect is to give light for the

action.

which

therefore,

If, is

the

a passive power, is

possible

intellect,

something belong-

and also the agent intellect, which is an active power, it follows that man would always be able to understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the agent intellect is not something in our soul.** ing to the soul;

Obj.

Further, the Philosopher says^ that

4.

“the agent intellect

is

a substance in actual be-

But nothing can be in potency and in act with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the possible intellect, which is in potency to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the agent intellect to be also ing.”

something Obj.

5.

in

our soul.

Further,

thing in the soul,

if it

the agent intellect

is

some-

must be a power. For

it is

neither a passion nor a habit, since habits and

passions do not have the character of agents in

regard to the passivity of the soul, but rather passion

is

the very action of the passive power,

is something which results from acts. But every power flows from the essence of the ' An argument of William of Paris, De An., 7, 6 (11, 21 1).

while habit

See Gilson, *

Soul,

AHDLM

111, 5

(ig^O) p. 63.

(430*^22).

Cf. William of Paris, op. Cf.

William of Paris,

make

something

this evident,

suppose a superior

which

in the soul.

we must observe man we must

from which the soul

intellect,

acquires the power of understanding. For what

such by participation, and what is subject to is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such,

is

motion, and what

immovable and

perfect.

called intellectual

Now

the

by reason of

in intellectual power, a sign of

human

soul

is

a participation

which

is

that

it is

Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a kind of reasoning and movement.

not wholly intellectual but only

Again

it

because

has an imperfect understanding, both does not understand everything, and

it

because, in those things which stand,

it

it

does under-

passes from potency to act. Therefore

there must be the soul

in part.

is

some higher

intellect,

by which

helped to understand.

Therefore some held^ that this intellect, subis the agent intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate agent intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to stantially separate,

the

human

soul

some power

participating in that

superior intellect, by which power the soul

makes

human

things actually intelligible. Just as in

other perfect natural things, besides the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes; for the sun alone does not generate man,

man

is the power of begetting man, and manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Therefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up

but in

in like

the phantasms. *Ibid., (430‘i.^)-

Alexander of Aphrodisias, De intellcctu et Intcllecto (Til 76); Averrocs, In dc An., iii, 18 (vi, 161E); 19 (vi, JO2A); Aviccjitui, De An v, s (251!)); Meta., ^

,

* *

ciL, p. 64.

In order to

is

cil., 7,

op.

3

cil., 7,

eit. 206) Gilson, 4 (n, 208); Gilson, op. ^ Soul, III, 5 (430^18).

(ii,

;

For William of Paris, Roger Bacon, John Peckham, and others on this point, cf. Gilson, rx,

3

(i04rb).

AHDLM

(1926), p. 80.

;

svmma teeologica

4i8

And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible.

Now no action belongs

some principle forwe have said above of the

to anything except through

mally inherent

in

as

it,

potential intellect (q. lxxvi,

the power which

a.

Therefore

i).

the principle of this action

is

must be something

in the soul.

For

this reason

Aristotle compared^ the agent intellect to light,

which

is

something received into the

while

air,

Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his

commentary on the

third

But the separate

book of the Sold}

intellect,

teaching of our faith,

is

according to the

God Himself, Who

is

the soul’s Creator, and only happiness, as will be

shown

later

on

xc,

(q.

7). And so the

A.

a.

human

3; Part I.-IL, Q. m, soul derives its intel-

from Him, according to Ps. 4. 7, The light of Thy countenance, 0 Lord, is signed upon us. Reply Obj. i. That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained. Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher says those

actually immaterial, but it is in potency to determinate species of things. On the other hand, though, phantasms are actual likenesses of certain species, but are immaterial in patency. And so nothing prevents one and the same soul, in so far as it is actually immaterial, having one power

by which

it

makes

things actually immaterial

by

abstraction from the conditions of individual

matter, which power

is

called the agent intellect

and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the possible intellect by reason of

its

being in potency to such species.

Reply Obj.

5. Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect,

nothing prevents that power which

partici-

it

pates from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the es-

sence of the soul, in the same

way

as its other

powers.

lectual light

words not of the agent intellect, but of the intelwhich he had already said “Knowl-

lect in act, of

edge

in act is

:

the

same

as the thing.” Or.

if

we

words to the agent intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to the agent intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in

refer those

potency.

Reply Obj.

3. If

the relation of the agent in-

tellect to the possible intellect

visible in act to the sight,

the agent intellect

is

all

that

But the agent

it

would follow that

Intellect

Wc proceed thus to the Fifth Article:

It

would

one agent intellect in all. Objection i. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the number of bodies. But “the agent intellect is separate,” as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore it is not multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men. Obj. 2. Further, the agent intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many But that which is the cause of unity is still more itself one. Therefore the agent intellect is the same in that there

is

all.

Obj.

3.

Further,

all

men agree in

the

first intel-

But to these they assent by the Therefore all agree in one agent

lectual concepts.

agent intellect. intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says^ that “the agent intellect is as a light.” But light is not the same in the various hings enlightened. Therefore the same agent intellect is not in

all

things

intellect is not like

terms arc made propositions, and from

From

Whether the Agent

which makes

ence of the agent intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation, since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from first

prin-

view it matters not whether the agent inteilect is something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul. Reply Obj. 4. The intellectual soul is indeed ciples, conclusions.

5.

in All?

things instantly, since

an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act, for which, besides the pres-

in act.

One

seem

were that of the

active object to a power, as. for instance, of the

we could understand

Article Is

this point of

»

Soul, HI, 5 (430*1 s)-

*

CG V, 3-103.35; Republic (508).

various men. I aiiswer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have already said (a. 4). For if the agent intellect were not something beIcmging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one agent intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one agent intellect for all.^ But if the agent intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say ni, 5 (430*17). ^Ihid. (430*1 5 )• ®

See above,

a. 4.

FIRST FART that there are as

many

agent intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the

number

we have

of men, as

above (q. impossible that one same said

jLXXvr, A. 2).

For

power belong Reply Obj.

to various substances.

The Philosopher proves

i.

agent intellect

it is

that the

separate by the fact that the

is

is

separate;

says/ “the agent

is

more noble than the pa*

tient.”

Now

the possible intellect

separate because real organ.

And

it is

is

said to be

not the act of any corposame sense the agent in-

in the

tellect is also called separate;

but not as a sepa-

The agent

2.

intellect is the

of the universal, by abstracting

Obj.

3.

3.

cause

immaterial.

it is

which are of one spe-

All things

common

it

the action which accom-

panies the nature of the species, and consequent-

power which

ly the

is

the principle of such ac-

way that that power is identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species. And so all men must enjoy in common tion,

but not

in

such a

the power which

the principle of this action,

is

and this power is the agent intellect. But there no need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first is

principles proves the unity of the separate intellect,

which Plato compares to the sun, but not

the unity of the agent intellect, which Aristotle

compares to

light.

Article 6 Whether .

Memory

Is

In the

Intellectual Part of the Soul?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It would seem that memory

is

not in the intellectual part

of the soul.

Objection

1.

For Augustine says {De

Trin.

xii,

8)‘ that to the higher part of the soul belong

2,

common to man and common to man and

those things “which are not beast.”

But memory

is

2) that “beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the

beast, for he says (ibid.

body, and commit them to memory.” Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul. Obj. '

Saul

2. ,

III,

Further, in the

memory

are preserved

we

are not

actually thinking. But this cannot happen in the intellect,

by

because the intellect is reduced to act it is informed by the intelligible

the fact that

species.

Now

the intellect in act implies under-

Further,

memory

s (430* 1 8).

*

is

PL

of the past. 43.

009 1005, ,

But

which

ally understands all things of

memory

in

knows a thing

the species of those things of which

the agent intellect since

enjoy

therefore,

under a condition of a fixed time, which involves knowledge under the conditions of here and now. But this is not the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive part.

species.

Reply Obj.

419

Memory,

fixed time.

from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits

cies

6

said of something with regard to a

is

standing in act, and therefore the intellect actu-

rate substance.

Reply Obj.

ART.

the past

as he

possible intellect

because,

Q. 79,

Therefore the

memory

is

it

has the

not in the in-

tellectual part.

On

(De “memory, understanding, and

the contrary, Augustine says

ii)® that

one mind.” I answer

that, Since

it is

Trin. x, will

are

of the nature of the

to preserve the species of those things

which are not actually apprehended, we must of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect, because Avicenna held that this was impossible.^ For he admitted that this could happen in the first

.sensitive part, as to

some powers,

since they are

acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species

may

be preserved apart from actual apprehenBut in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. And so every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we must turn to the agent intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our possible intellect. And from the practice and sion.

habit of turning to the agent intellect there

is

formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the possible intellect for turning to the agent intellect, which aptitude he calls the habit of science. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not actually understood, and so it would not be possible to admit

memory in

the intellec-

tual part.

But

this

opinion

is

clearly

opposed to the

teaching of Aristotle. For he says® that, “when the possible intellect is identified with each thing *

PL 42, 983.

*

Soul HI, 4 (429^5). ,

*

De An .,

v,

6 (26rb).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA knowing it, it is “this happens when

as

said to be in act,^^

and that

is

not in

itself

a part of the object of the intel-

For the intellect understands man, as man; and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part

can operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potency, but not absolutely, as before learning and discovering.” Now, the possible intellect is said to be each thing inas-

lect.

much

receives the intelligible species of

may

To

well as in the senses. Because our souFs act of

as

it

each thing.

it

the fact, therefore, that

ceives the species of intelligible things

it

it

re-

owes its

being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be always operating; for even then is it in potency in a certain sense, though otherwise

—

than before the act of understanding ^namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowl-

potency to actual consideration. is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is reedge

is

in

The foregoing opinion

ceived according to the mode of the recipient. intellect is of a more stable nature, and

But the

more immovable than corporeal matter.

is

If,

of the act, the condition of past, even as such,

be understood to be in the

understanding

an individual

is

intellect, as

act, existing in

this or that time, according as a

man

memory,

which it something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more does the intellect receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it

pre.served in the intellect, according as

is in

if

in the notion of

memory we

include

its

object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive

For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual. Reply Obj. i. Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the senpart,

which apprehends individual

things.

sitive part of the soul only, but rather in the

body and soul united, since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, apart from the association of any corporeal organ. And so the Philosopher says^ that “the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect.” Reply Obj. 2. The condition of past may be referred to two things

—namely,

to the object

which is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are lound together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something irom the fact of its being changed by a pre.sent sensible; and so at the same lime an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is acidental, and ^

111,4(429*27)-

in as far as it

regards past events,

is

understands that it previously understood; but not in the sense that it understands the past as something here and now. it

Reply Obj. 3. The intelligible species are sometimes in the intellect only in potency, and then the intellect

said to be in potency.

is

times the intelligible species

is in

Some-

the intellect as

regards the ultimate completion of the act, and

the intellectual part.

But

said to

;

therefore,

corporeal matter holds the forms receives, not only while it actually does

is

understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature, for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect (q. lxxvt, A. i) and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual act. in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of

then

it

understands

intelligible species

is

in act. in a

And sometimes

middle

state,

the

between

potency and act, and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species even when it does not understand in act. 7. Whether the Power Distinct From

Memory

Article

Intellectual

Is a

the Intellect?

We

proceed thus to the Seventh Article:

It

would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. Objection i. For Augustin^ {De Trin x, ii)^ a.ssigns to the mind memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinc from the intellect. Obj.

among same

Further, the reason of distinction

2.

the powers in the sensitive part

is

the

But memory in from sense, as we

as in the intellectual part.

the sensitive part

have said

(q.

is

distinct

Lxxvin,

A. 4).

Therefore

in the intellectual part is distinct

memory

from the

intel-

lect.

Obj. 3 Further, according to Augustine Trin. x, ii xi, 7),^ memory, understanding, ;

PL 42. 983; cf. XIV, 7 » PL 43, 983, 993. *

(1043).

{De and

FIRST PART one another, and one arises from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power. On the contrary From its nature the memory will are equal to

y

the treasury or storehouse of species.

is

But the

Philosopher^ attributes this to the intellect, as

we have said memory is not

6 Ans. i). Therefore the another power from the intel-

(a.

As has been

/ answer that,

Lxxxvn,

A. 3),

jects, since

each power

to that thing to w'hich

directed and which

is

(0. lix, a.

4) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common aspect of the object, that

power

will

not be differen-

tiated according to the individual differences of

power of

that object; just as the

object under the

its

colour

Now,

object under the

common

the possible intellect

And

things.

sight,

common

which

re-

aspect of

not differentiated by differences of

is

black and white.

is

the intellect regards

its

aspect of being, since

that

which becomes

so the possible intellect

is

all

not dif-

by any difference of being, Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the agent intellect and of the possible intellect, because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object ferentiated

as a being in act

is

to a being in potency,

as the passive power, on the contrary,

whereis

com-

pared to its object as a being in potency is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of possible and agent. And so it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect, for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.

Reply Obj. i. Although it is said (3 Sent., d, memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meani) that

ing of Augustine, xiv)2 that “if

we

who take

says expressly

memory,

(De

Trin.

intelligence,

and

always present in the soul, whether we actually reflect upon them or not, they seem to

will as

pertain to the

mean *

Soul

will 1

mean

that love or

which unites the child and its parent.” it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers, but by memory he understands the soul’s habit of retention, by intelligence, the act of the intellect, and by will the act of the will. Reply Obj. 2. Past and present may differen-

From

this

tiate the sensitive powers,

but not the intellec-

,

that 111,

Chap.

7

memory

by which

4 (4Jy'‘27).

(PL 42,

1043).

only. w^e

Intelligence arises from memfrom habit and in this way it is but not as a power to a power.

Reply Obj.

3.

ory, just as act

equal to

it,

;

defined in reference

is

it is

has also been said above

its object. It

*

and by

affection

said above (q.

the powers of the soul are dis-

tinguished by the different aspects of their ob-

I

4a I

8

tually thinking ;

tual powers, for the reason given above.

lect.

gards

ARTy

Q. 79.

And by

Article 8 Whether the Reason .

Distinct

We

From

Is

a Power

the Intellect?

proceed thus to the Eighth Article: It

would seem that the rea.son is a power distinct from the intellect. Objection i. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima^ that “when we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intelTherefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, just as imagination is from sense. Obj. 2. Further, Boethius says (De Consol.

lect.”

iv, 6),^

that intellect

is

But

it

compared

to reason, as

does not pertain to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same eternity to time.

power. Obj. 3. Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, from

which he is called a rational animal, is a power from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel. Hence they are distinct

called intellectual.

On iii,

the contrary, Augustine says (Gen.

20)^ that “that in which

tional animals

is

man

ad

reason, or mind, or intelligence,

or whatever appropriate

Therefore reason, power.

name we

intellect,

like to give it.”

and mind are one

/ answer that, Reason and intellect in

cannot be distinct powers. this clearly if

lit.

excels irra-

we

We

shall

man

understand

consider their respective ac-

For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth, and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels tions.

intelligence

understand when ac-

»

Pscudo' Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux). Chap, ii

(PL 40,

780).

PL 63, 818. » PL 34, 292. «

—

SVUMA THmWGlCA who, according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another, but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discursion, as Dionysius says {Div.

Nom.

vii).*

But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another, and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession, of

which one belongs to the perfect, the

But the parts of the soul are

its

powers. There-

fore the higher and lower reason are

Obj.

Now, and

two powers.

Further, nothing arises from

2.

itself.

the lower reason arises from the higher,

by it. Therefore the another power from the lower. Further, the Philosopher says* that

ruled and directed

is

higher reason Obj.

3.

is

the scientific part of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, is another principle, and

another part from the opinionative and reasoning part by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this from the principle that “for

other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable and

those things which are generically different, gen-

human

erically different parts of the soul are ordained.”

ends

in

something at

rest,

hence

it is

that

by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood namely, the first principles and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movereasoning,

;

ment

are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things, since by the same nature a thing is moved to-

wards a certain

Much more,

place,

therefore,

and rests in that place. by the same power do we

understand and reason. And so

man

in

it is

clear that

reason and intellect are the same power.

Reply Obj.

i.

That enumeration

is

made

ac-

cording to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book

Reply Obj. 2. The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.

Reply Obj. 3. Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But

man

attains,

although

imperfectly,

to

it

as the perfect to the imperfect.

Article 9. Whether the Higher and Lower Reason Are Distinct Powers?

We

and incorruptible. Since, same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher calls the scientific part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine^ is intent on “the consideration and consultation of things eternal”; and that what the Philosopher calls the reasoning or opinionative part is the same as the lower therefore, necessary

proceed thus to the Ninth Article: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. Objection i. For Augustine says {De Trin. xii, 4),* that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. Sect. *

(PG

»

PL 42,

1000.

3, 868).

the

is

intent

on the disposal of temporal things. Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower.

Obj. Orth,

4.

ii)*

Damascene says (De

Further,

that “opinion rises

Fid.

from imagination;

of the opinion discerns the truth

(mind)

And

;

whence mens

derived from metiendo (measuring). therefore the intellect regards those things is

which are already subject to judgment and true decision.” Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may understand the higher reason.

On xii,

the contrary^ Augustine says

(De

Trin.

4)® that the higher and lower reason are only

distinct by their functions. 'T herefore they are not two powers. I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that the higher reason is “that which is intent oft

the contemplation

and consultation of things it sees them

eternal,”^ since in contemplation

and in consultation it takes its from them. But he calls the lower reason “that which is intent on the disposal of

in themselves,

rules of action

*

Ethics, VI,

*

De

* »

is

reason, which, according to Augustine,

the

knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the human reason, but is compared to

contingent and necessary are generically

then the mind by judging of the truth or error

not of great authority.

is

Now

different, as corruptible

I

(1130*6).

Trin., xii, 7 (PL 42. 1005). Chap. 22 (PG 04. 941)-

*PL42, '^Op.

1000.

cit.,

xn,

7

(PL

42, 1005;.

—

A

FIRST FART temparal things.”

Now these

two

—namely^

eter-

and temporal—are

related to our knowledge way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of

nal

in this

(Rom. i. 20), The invisible things are clearly seen^ being understood by

the Apostle

of

God

made; while by way

the things that are

of judg-

ment, from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to rules of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.

may happen

truth.

ART. Thus

10

it

423

perfectly

knows necessary

things,

which have perfect being in truth, since it penetrates to their very quiddity, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand,

it

knows contingent

things, but im-

have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and conseperfectly, just as they

quently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul namely, the scientific and the ratiocinative, not

medium and what

because they are two powers, but because thej

attained thereby belong to different habits,

are distinct according to a different aptitude for

But is

Q. 79,

it

that the

just as the first indemonstrable principles be-

receiving various habits, concerning the variety

long to the habit of intellect, whereas the con-

of which he inquires. For contingent and neces-

we draw from them belong to the And so it happens that from of geometry^ we draw a conclusion

clusions which

sary,

habit of science.

genera, nevertheless agree in the

the principles

of being, which the intellect considers, and to

in

another science

—

for example, perspective.

But both medium and term pertain to the same power of reason. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. And hence the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine^ they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits, for wis-

dom

is

attributed to the higher reason, science

to the lower.

Reply Obj. ever

way

We can speak of parts, in what-

T.

a thing

is

divided.

divided according to

is

And

common aspect

which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect. Reply Obj. 4. That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For opinion signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, though with fear of the other. But to judge or measure (mensurare) is an act of the intellect applying principles which are certain to examine propositions. From this is taken the word mens (mind). Lastly, to understand is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval.

so far as reason

various acts, the

its

though differing according to their proper

Article

10.

Whether Intelligence

From

Is a

higher and lower reason are called parts; but

Power

not because they are different powers.

proceed thus to the Tenth Article: It that the intelligence is another pow'er than the intellect. Objection i. For we read in De Spiritu et Animd^ that “when wc rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence.” But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intel-

ciples of the higher reason. 3.

The

scientific part, of

which the

Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason, for necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of which natural

and mathematics treat. And the opinionative and ratiocinative part is more limited

would seem

lect

it

regards only things

we say, without any power by which the intellect knows necessary things is distinct from a power by which it know^s contingent things, because it knows both under the same objective aspect namely, under the aspect of being and qualification, that a

—

*

Op.

cii.,

xii, 4,

I

(PL

42, 1000,

iooq ).

and intelligence are

Obj.

science

than the lower reason, for contingent. Neither must

Intellect?

We

Reply Obj 2. The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, in so far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the prinReply Obj.

Distinct

2.

distinct.

Further, Boethius says

V, 4)"* that

“sense considers

man

imagination in another, reason

in

(De Consol, in

one way,

another, in-

telligence in another.” But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, it seems, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense. »

Pseudo-Augustine. (Alcher of Clairvaux) chap. 11

(PL •

40, 780).

PL 63, 84c).

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

424

Ob], 3 Further /‘actions come before powers,” as the Philosopher says.^ But intelligence is an -

from others attributed to the inFor Damascene says (De Fid. Orth, ii)^

act separate tellect.

that “the

first

movement

is

but that intelligence which thing

called intention

is

;

called intelligence; is

about a certain

that which remains

and

It

is

in the

and thus

it

second

act,

which

to consider,

is

called intellect in act, or actual

is

intellect.

Reply Obj.

If this authority

i.

means the

telligence there

And

thus

it

is

accepted, in-

act of the intellect.

divided against intellect as act

is

against power.

conforms the soul to that which is understood is called cogitation, and cogitation when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis (that is, wisdom), and

Reply Obj. 2. Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which tran-

makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue.” Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special

intelligence alone belongs to

phronesis

dilated

if

The Philosopher

the contrary,

“intelligence

is

says*'’

(hat

of indivisible things in which

nothing false.” But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect Therefore the intelligence is not another power than the there

And

to

God

to understand

all

so he also says

human

race, as

God, for it belongs things without any in-

vestigation.

Reply Obj. 3. All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all apprehends something absolutely; and this act

—

power.

On

scends the act of the reason.

that rea.son alone belongs to the

is

intellect.

/ answer that, This

word

intelligence properly

the intellect’s very act, which

signifies

is

to

understand. However, in some works translated

from the Arabic, the separate substances^ which call angels are called Intelligences, and per-

we

haps for this reason, that such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek,'’ they are called Intellects or Minds. Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power, but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the ]3hiloso])hers For sometimes they as.sign four intellects namely, the

it directs what apprehends to the knowledge of something else, or to some operation; and this is called intention And W'hen it goes on in search of what

is

called intelligence. Secondly,

it

intends,

it

it

called cogitation.

is

erence to something

knowm

When, by

for certain,

ref-

it

ex-

amines what it has cogitated, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to phronesis or wisdom; for “it belongs to the wise man to

And w'hen once has obtained something for certain, as being

judge,” as the Philosopher says.” it

fully

examined,

it

making it known ing of interior

means of and this is the orderfrom which proceeds ex-

thinks about the

to others

.'-peei.h,

;

agent and possible intellects, the intellect in

For not every difference of acts what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as wt have said above (p. Lxxviii, a. 4).

habit, and the actual intellect. Of these four the agent and possible intellects arc different powers, just as in all things the active power is distinct

Practical Intellects Are Distinct Powers?

—

from the passive. But three of these are

ternal speech.

makes

the powers vary, but only

Article

We

dis-

11.

Whether the Speculative and

proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:

tinguished as three states of the possible in-

would seem that the specu’

tellect, which and thus it is

intellects are distinct powers.

sometimes

potency only, sometimes it is the first act, which is knowdedge, and thus is called intellect in habit; and sometimes

in it

is

*

Soul,

*

Chap. 22 (PG 94. 941)-

^

Soul,

*

Cf. Avicenna,

Destruct

II,

111,

,

in

4 (415'^! 8).

Meta

(io7va); Averroes, Destruct. 16 (i\, 122V). Also Maim ,'des, Guide, li, ,

x,

For the apprehensive and mov-

i.

ing are diflcrcnt kinds of powers, as

is

clear

from 'he book on the Soul.^ But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power, while the practical intellect is a moving power. There-

Obj

i

6(FRi6o). In Diony.sius. See above, (}. 1 iv. a. ?, Ans. i. ® Albert the Great. Summa de CteaJur., Pt ii, Q. 54, A. I (BO XXV, 449), attributes this division to Alsazel and Avicenna- Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Intellectu et InteUecto (Til 74); Alfarabi, De IntcUeitu et Intelkclo (G 1 117.82); Avicenna, DeAn., i, $ (svb); cf. Gilson, ••

AHDLM

(1929), p. 7;p. 53.

It

and practical

fore they are distinct powers.

6 (430*26).

(lisp.

Objection

called possible;

:tive

2.

Further, the different nature of the ob-

power But the object of is truth, and of the practical is good, which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are ject differentiates the

the speculative intellect

distinct powers. ’

Metaphysics,!,

*

Aristotle,

ii,

2

(982*18).

3 (414*31).

FIRST PART Obj.

3.

practical intellect

is

compared

as the estimative

tive,

power

to the specula-

to the imaginative

is

But the estimative from the imaginative as power from power, as we have said above (q. lxxviii, a. 4). Therefore also the speculative intellect

from the

differs

practical.

the contrary,

The

speculative intellect

by

extension becomes practical.^ But one power

is

not changed into another. Therefore the specula-

and

tive

practical

We

which

is

A. 3),

intellects

are not distinct

is

what

The

accidental to the nature of the

is

;

.sideralion of truth, while the practical intellect

what

apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says." that “the speculative differs from the practical in its end.” Hence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical that which directs

it

operative.

Reply Obj. 1. The practical intellect is a moving power not as executing movement, but as directing tow’ards it; and this belongs to it according to

its

mode

of apprehension.

2.

the object of the practical intellect

is

good directed to operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect know^s truth, just as the speculative, but

it

directs the

inclines to evil

pent, as

Many

ii,

.

7,

AnS.

2, Q.

Aristotle, Soul^

*Ibid.

LXXVII, A. 3, Ans. 4). rii,

is.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says {De Lib. Arb. 10)^ that in the natural powder of judgment

there are certain “rules and seeds of virtue, both true

and unchangeable.” And

what

this is

W'e call

synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules

which guide our judgment belong to the

rea.son as to its higher part, as

Augustine says

(De Trin. xii, 2,)*^ it seems that the same as reason. And thus it is

On

syndere.sis is

a power.

the contrary, According to the Philos-

opher^ “rational powers regard opposite things.”

But synderesis does not regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore synderesis is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since

not found in brute

it is

animals. I answer that, Synderesis

some

is

not a power but

held'* that it is

“a power

higher than reason,” while others said® that it is “reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature.” In order to make this clear we must observe that, as

we have

said

of reasoning, since

it

above is

(a. 8),

a kind of

man’s act

movement,

proceeds from the understanding of certain things namely, those w^hich are naturally known without any investigation on the part of

—

—

from an immovable principle, ^and ends also at the understanding, since by means reason, as

^Glossa ordin.,

differences differentiate

powers which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said above

'

it is signified by the serfrom Augustine {De Trin. xii,

hence

(iv,

210E). Jerome, In Ezech.

l,

on

1.6

(Pb2 5.2 2).

the sensitive (k

;

clear

12, 13).^ It seems, therefore, that synderesis is

*

3.

is

a pow’er just as sensuality

known

truth to operation.

Reply Obj.

2.

a habit, though

Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore jui»t as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for example, wdien some one desires to know the

Reply Obj.

which are powers. There-

a power. Further, opposite things are of the is

to be opposed to one another because synderesis always inclines to good, while sensuality always

it is accidental to a thing coloured be man, or to be great or small hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not, and it is according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the con-

is,

rational,

not distinct powers. The reason of we have said above (q. lxxvii,

that, as

to

.so

and the

fore synderesis

same genus. But synderesis and sensuality seem

power. For

truth,

divided against the irascible, the concupis-

cible,

speculative and practical

that,

object of a power does not differentiate that

— that

425

proceed thus to the Twelfth Article: It

Obj.

answer

intellects are

is

12

would seem that synderesis is a specialjjower, distinct from the others. Objection i. For those things which fall under one division seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. i. 6^ synderesis

powers. /

ART.

Article 12, Whether Synderesis Is a Special Power of the Soul Distinct From the Others?

in the sensitive part.

differs

On

Q. 79.

Further, in the intellectual part, the

^

PL 42, PL 32,

T007, 1009. 1

25O.

®

PL 42, Q99.

Metaphysics, ix, 2 (1046^5). ® Wm. of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, n, 12, r (fol. 65 vb), who is followed by Roland of Cremana and John of Rochelle. (See text cited by Lottln, RNP (1926) p. 446). ^

10 (433*14).

•

u,

Cf. Alexander of Hales,

493)— See Lottin,

Sum.

Theol., i-n, n.

RNP (1927) p. 265.

418

(QR

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

426

known we judge of which we have discovered by rea-

Obj.

of those principles naturally

those things soning.

Now

clear that, as the speculative

it is

reason reasons about speculative things, so the practical reason reasons about practical things. Therefore we must have bestowed on us by nature not only speculative principles, but also

Now

practical principles.

principles bestowed on us

the

first

by nature do not be-

ciples,” as the Philosopher explains.’

the

first

practical principles,

And so

also

bestowed on us by

nature, do not belong to a special power, but to

which we call synderesis. said to stir up to good, and

Further, conscience

fore conscience

On

speculative

long to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called “the understanding of prin-

3.

must of necessity

be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act, for thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit, for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Thereis

a power.

the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside.

But a power cannot be conscience

is

laid aside. Therefore

not a power.

I answer that, Properly speaking conscience not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which

is

in the

common way

of speaking are attributed

For conscience, according to the

a special natural habit,

to conscience

And so synderesis is murmur at evil, since through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we

very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something; for conscience may be resolved into cum alio scientia [that is, knowledge applied to an individual case] But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. And thus, from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act. The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said (0 witness, to bind, or stir up, and also to

to

have discovered. It is therefore clear that synderesis is not a power, but a natural habit. Reply Obj. i. The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of ac ts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can belong to one power. Reply Obj. 2. In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to synderesis is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of one genus.

Reply Obj. are

the

first

3.

Those unchangeable notions

practical

principles,

concerning

and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to synderesis as to a habit. And thus we judge naturally both by our reason and by syndere.sis. w^hich

no one

Article

We

13.

errs;

Whether Conscience

h

a Power?

proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article:

.

accuse, torment, or rebuke.

And

all

these follow

the application of knowledge or science to what

we do, which apf)lication is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something. Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken 7. 23), and according

to this,

conscience

way, so

others (Eccles.

is .said

to witness. In another

far as through the conscience

evil of

we judge

that

something should be done or not done, and in this sense, conscience is said to stir up or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well clone or ill done, and in this .sense conscience is said to

would seem that conscience is a power. 1. For Origen says'-^ that conscience is “a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by w'hich it is led away from evil and made to cling to good.” But in the soul, spirit either the mind itself, acdesignates a power cording to the text (Eph. 4. 13 ), Be ye renewed or the imagination, in the spirit of your mind from which imaginary vision is called “.spiritual,” as Augustine says (Oen. ad lit. vii, 7,

-namely, synderesis: thus Jerome calls synderesis conscience (Gloss. Ezech. i. 6);**

Therefore conscience is a power. 2. Further, nothing is a subject of sin except a power of the soul But conscience is a

Basil,’’ the “natural power of judgment,” and Damascene” says that it is the “law of our intellect.” For it is customary for causes and ef-

It

Objection

—

—

).®

24

Obj.

subject of sin; for

it is

mind and conscience Therefore

it

said of

some that

are defiled (Titus

i.

their

excuse, accuse, or torment.

it is

clear that

knowledge to what we do. "I berefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act. sometimes the

name conscience

is

given to the

first

natural

habit

one another. Conscience is called a

fects to be called after

Reply Obj.

15).

1.

spirit,

so

seem,s that conscience is a power. ^Glossa ordin.

1

Ethics, VI,

*

Commeniaty on Rom.,

»

PL 34. 45y» 474.

(1

Now,

these things follow the actual application of

all

(PL

(1141*7). 2.15

(PG

14, 892).

(iv,

210F); Jerome, In Ezcch.

25, 22).

In Frinc. Prov. (PG

*

Horn,

*

De Fide Orth.,

xir,

iv. 22

(PG

31, 404).

94, 1089).

1,

on 1.6

FIRST PART far as spirit

science

is

same

the

is

a certain pronouncement of the mind.

Reply Obj.

The

2,

Q. 80.

On

as mind, because con-

conscience

said to be

is

not as a subject, but as the thing known knowledge; in so far, that is, as someone knows he is defiled. Reply Obj. 3. Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first principle, the habit of first principles, which

ART,

Damascene guishes

in

powers.

called synderesis.

is

And

for this special reason,

sometimes called conscience, as we

this habit is

have said above.

The Philosopher

(De

also

Fid, Orth. U, 22)* distin-

appetitive

the

from

the

cognitive

I answer that, It

is necessary to assign an appower to the soul. To make this evident, w^e must observe that some inclination follows every form; for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to be more perfect in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing

petitive

only to

its

own

being

—that

is,

to the being

natural to each. Therefore this natural

QUESTION LXXX

followed by a natural inclination, which

Of the appetitive powers in general (In

Next we

Two

Articles)

consider the appetitive powers, con-

distin-

from the other powers.

guishes* the appetitive

defiled,

is

487

I

the contrary^

form is

is

called

the natural appetite. But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such

manner

a

that

it is

nevertheless receptive of the

cerning which there are four heads of considera-

species of other things; for example, sense re-

the appetitive powers in general;

and the and thus the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect. And thus those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God,

tion:

first,

second, sensuality (q. lxxxi); third, the will (g. Lxxxii); fourth, free choice (g. lxxxiii).

Under the first there are two points of inquiry, (i) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul? (2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct

ceives the species of all things sensible, intellect, of all things intelligible,

“in

Whom

all

things pre-exist,” as Dionysius

says (Div. Noni.

v).'*

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that

powers?

in a higher manner and above manner of natural forms, so must there be them an inclination surpassing the natural in-

have knowledge

Whether the Appetite Special Power oj the Soul? Article

i.

Is a

the in

We proceed thus to the First Article: It would seem that the appetite

is

not a special power of

Objection

i.

2.

animal

not only that to which

soul.

Further, powers are differentiated by

But wdiat we desire is the same as we know. Therefore the appetitive pow'cr

Obj. 3. Further, the

common

is

not divided

from the proper. But each power of the soul desires its

some

own

—namely,

particular desirable thing

suitable object. Therefore, with regard

to this object

which

is

we should not

assign

some

tinct

from the

others,

power. '

Etkics,

the desirable in general particular

called

power

dis-

the appetitive

is

tural form.

And

so

I (i09f*3)»

inclined by its nanecessary to assign an

it is

is

it

power to the soul. Reply Obj. 1. To desire is found in things which have knowledge above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to asappetitive

sign to the soul a particular power.

Reply Obj.

2.

What

is

same

desired are the

is

aspect; for a thing

is

apprehended and what

in subject, but differ in

apprehended as a sensible

or intelligible being, whereas suitable or good.

Now,

it is

it

is

desired as

diversity of aspect

and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers. Reply Obj. 3. Each power of the soul is a

in the objects,

*

Soul, u, 3 (414*31) 941*

;

*PG94, I,

belongs to the ap-

through which the able to desire what it apprehends, and soul,

to

not distinct from the apprehensive power.

is

power of the

be

their objects.

w'hat

called the natural appetite.

to

is

animate and to inanimate things. But to desire is common to animate and inanimate things, since “the good is what all desire” as the Philosopher says.^ Therefore the appetite is not a special

power of the

is

this superior inclination

common

For no power of the soul

assigned for those things which are

Obj.

And

petitive

the soul.

which

clination,

*

Sect, s

(PG 3. 820)-

cf.

also

III,

10 (433*9).

SUMMA TUEOLOGICA

428

form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Therefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to

Above

this natural appetite is the animal which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to the act of this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing, but as suitable

itself.

appetite,

be proportionate to the movable, and the active very nature from

its

by the

and what

intellect

what is apprehended is apprehended by

sense are generically different, consequently the intellectual appetite

is

Reply Ohj.

Whether the Sensitive and Appetites Are Distinct Powers?

lectual

Intel-

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.

For powers are not differentiated we have seen above (q. lxxvii, a. 3). But it is accidental to the desirable object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers. Obj. 2. Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals, and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things. But there is no place for this distinction in the apObjection

by

i.

accidental differences, as

petitive f)art, for since the appetite

ment of

move-

is a

the soul to individual things,

seems

it

i.

sensi-

not accidental to the thing

It is

by the sense

on the contrary,

intellect;

or the

this belongs

to

it

Per se, for the desirable thing does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended. And so differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the desirable thing.

And

so the appetitive powers are distinct ac-

cording to the distinction of the things apprehended, as according to their proper objects. Reply Obj. 2. The intellectual appetite,

though

tends to things which arc singular out-

it

side the soul, yet tends to

some universal thing because

aspect, as

it is

them according

when

to

desires some-

it

good. Flence the Philosopher

says^ that hatred can pertain to a universal, as

when “we hate every kind of thief ” In the .same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial good, which

that every act of the appetite regards an in-

by

dividual thing. Therefore the intellectual ap-

the like.

.sense,

not apprehended

is

such as knowledge, the virtues and

Reply Obj

from the sen-

petite should not be distinguished

from the

distinct

tive.

desired to be apprehended 2.

itself

relation to its active

its

principle. Therefore, since

absolutely to the animal.

Article

power

to the passive; indeed, the passive

has

3.

As the Philosopher

move

.says,*"

a uni-

except by means

sitive.

versal opinion does not

Ob;\ 3. Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the moving power. But the

of a particular opinion; and in like manner the higher appetite moves by means of the lower. And therefore there are not two distinct moving

moving power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the moving p)ower which

powers following the

reason, neither

is

there distinction in the appeti-

On

the

The Philosopher

contrary^

higher appetite

moves

I answer that,

We

and

{In Three Articles) distin-

says** that

the

the lower.

must say

that the intel-

from (he senFor the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended, “and thus the desirable thing apprehended is a mover which is not moved, lectual appetite

is

a distinct pow'cr

sitive appetite.

while the appetite

Philosopher says.®

is

a

Now

mover moved,” things passive

as the

tion of the corresponding active

‘

Styul, in,

moving

and moving must

principle

Ibid.,

9 (432*’5); alsoni, 10 (433*^23).

m, 10 (433*^16)

;

to consider sf isuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether .sensuality is only an appetitive power?

(2)

xii, 7

(

1072*26).

it is

divided into irascible and con-

irascible

powers? (3) Whether the and concupiscible powers obey reason?

Article

i.

Whether Sensuality

Is

Only

Appetitive?

We proceed thus to the First seem that sensuality

is

Article: It

would

not only appetitive, but

also cognitive.

Objection

*

Metaphysics,

Whether

cupiscible as distinct

xii,

*/Wdf.,in, II (434*12). *

Next we have

and mov-

able are differentiated according to the distincprinciples, because the

sense.

Of sensuality

tive part.

guishes* a twofold appetite,

and the

QUESTION LXXXI

animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like

in

intellect

^

i.

For Augustine says {De Trin.

12)® that “the sensual Rhetoric, n, 4 (1382*5). Soid III, II (434*16). ,

movement ®PL42,

of the soul

1007.

;

FIRST PART which to us

directed to the bodily senses

is

is

common

and beasts,” But the bodily senses belong

to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality

a cognitive power.

is

Obj.

(De

come under one one genus. But Augustine

Further, things which

2.

division

seem

Trin.

to be of loc.

xii,

cit.)

divides

knowledge. Therefore sensuality also is a cognitive power. Obj. 3. Further, in man's temptations sentain to

suality stands in the place of the serpent.

temptation of our

first

But

parents the ser-

pent presented himself as one giving information

and proposing

which belong to the cog-

sin,

nitive power. Therefore sensuality

is

a cognitive

power.

On

the contrary, Sensuality

is

defined as “the

appetite of things pertaining to the body.”^ I answer that.

The name

name

of a

for instance, sight

movement

sensuality seems (o

power is taken from its act; from seeing Now the sensual

an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehcn.sive

power

is

not so properly called a

is

movement

as

the act of the appetite, since the operation of

power is com[)leted the thing apprehended is

the apprehensive fact

that

in

the very

in

the one

that apprehends, while the operation of the ap-

power

is completed in the fart that he borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest, whereas the operation

petitive

who

desires

is

of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Therefore by sensual movement we

understand the operation of the appetitive power, ^0 that sensuality is the name of the sen-

movement senses,

By

of the soul

saying that is

the sen.sual

directed to the bodily

Augustine does not give us to understand

but rather that the

movement

of sensuality

is

a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since

desire things which are

the bodily senses.

And

moving power, as

is

appetite,

which appertains sensuality. Reply Obj. 3. The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of

by the

sin.

And

in this sensuality

is

signified

serpent.

Article 2. Whether the Sensitive Appetite Is Divided Into the Irascible and Concupiscible As Distmet Powers?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers.

Objection 1. For the same power of the soul regards “both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white,” according to the riiilosopher.’’

But suitable and harmful are con-

gards what

is

apprehended through

thus the bodily sen.ses

power

suitable, wdiile the irascible

is

re-

con-

cerned with what irascible

is harmful, it seems that and concupiscible are the same power

in the soul.

Obj.

Further, the sensitive appetite regards

2.

only what

is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite

differing

Obj. for

from the concupiscible.

3. P'urlher,

hatred

is

Jerome says on Matt.

in the irascible part

13. 33:'*

“Wc

ought

have the hatred of vice in the irascifile power.” But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible jiart. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible arc the same powers. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa fNemesius, De Natiira Homnasy and Damasceme {De Fid Orth, ii, 12)'' assign two powders to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the conto

cupiscible parts.

I answer that. t.

that the bodily senses are included in sensuality,

we

is a

to

sitive appetite.

Reply Obj.

439

2

traries. Since, then, the concupiscible

be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks {De Trin. xii, 12, 13),^ just as the

ART.

lower reason,

sensuality

against the higher and lower reason, which per-

in the

Q. 81.

The

generic pow’cr, and

is

sensitive appetite

is

one

called sensuality; but

it

divided info two pow’crs, which are species of the sensitive appetite the irascible and the*

is

—

concupiscible

In order to

make

this clear,

we

must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to (he acquisition of wdiat is suitable and to the avoiding of w'hat

is

harmful, but also to resistance against

appertain to sensuality as a kind of prelim-

corruptive and contrary agencies which are a

inary.

hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and arc jiroductive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination not only

Reply Obj. 2. Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement; for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and ^

Ci Peter Lombard, Sent.,

’

PL 42,

1007, 1009.

11,

d.

x\iv, 4

(QR i, 421).

^Soul,\i, II (422^23). ^ ^ ®

I (PL 26, 94). Chaps lO, 17 (PG

Bit

PG 94, 928.

40, 672, 676).

—

:

SUMMA TBEOLOGICA to rise

from a lower

which

position,

unsuit-

is

towards a higher position which suitable, but also to resist whatever de-

able to is

it,

stroys or hinders

its action.

Therefore, since

the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must be two appetitive powers in one through which the soul the sensitive part

—

what

and

the animal for self-defence;

this is the

irascible power.

Reply Obj. 3. Hatred belongs absolutely to the concupiscible appetite, but by reason of the strife

which

from hatred,

arises

may

it

pertain

to the irascible appetite.

Article

3.

Whether the Irascible and ConcuObey Reason?

piscible Appetites

suitable

W^c proceed thus to the Third Article: It

according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible; and

would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. Objection i. For irascible and concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason hence it is signified by the seqient,

inclined absolutely to seek

is

is

another by which an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable and inflict harm,

and

its

object

tendency

its

And so we say something arduous, because to overcome and rise above ob-

this is called the irascible.

that

is

is

these two are not to be reduced to one

Obj.

sometimes the soul busies

does not

principle, for

itself

with unpleasant things against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite,

Hence appetite seem

fight against obstacles.

it

may

also the passions

to go against the of the irascible passions of the concupiscible appetite, since concupiscence, on being roused, diminishes anger,

and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible, when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible

flies.

And

for this reason

all

the pas-

from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher .says.^ Reply Obj, i. The concupiscible powder regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible pow'er is to sions of the irascible appetite rise

resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.

Reply Obj.

2.

As

in the

apprehensive powers

of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, W'hich perceives those things which do not change the senses, as we hav> said above (q.

Lxxvm,

A.

2), so also in the sensitive ap-

petite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable not because it

pleases the senses, but because 1

{De

Trin.

xii,

12,

There-

13).“'^

and concupiscible appetites

fore the irascible

do not obey reason.

stacles.

Now

;

as Augustine says

History of Animals,

IX, I (608^19).

is

useful to

viii, i (589*2); cf. vii,

18 (S7i^S);

it

Further, what obeys a certain thing

2.

resist

But the

it.

irascible

and con-

cupiscible appetites resist reason: according to

the Apostle (Rom.

my members

23)

7.

/ see another law in

my

fighting against the law of

mind. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. Obj. 3. Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is

the sensitive power. But the sensitive part of

the soul does not obey reason, for

we

neither

hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible

and concupiscible,

obey reason.

On Orth,

the contrary. ii,

Damascene says (De

Fid.

that “the part of the soul which

I2)’'’

obedient and amenable to reason

is

is

divided into

concupiscence and anger.” Damwer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in

which are the first,

intellect or reason,

and the

They obey

the reason in theix

own

acts,

because

in other animals the sensitive appetite

turally

moved by

afraid. In

is

na-

the estimative power; for in-

stance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an is

will:

as to the reason, secondly as to the will.

man

enemy,

the estimative power, as

we

have said above (q. lxxviit, a. 4), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some the parlicular reason, because it compares individual intentions.'*

appetite

is

naturally

reason. But this turally guided

®PL42,

in man the sensitive moved by this particular

Thus

same

particular reason

T007, 1009.

>PG 94.92«.
\

thing according to

his free choice.”

counsels, exhortations,

it

it

ty belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause.

Therefore

from

not sufficient for this unless

Further, the Philosopher says,* “Ac-

quality or another, for this comes to us from nature.

is

own movement, because by his free choice man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessi-

cording as each one

him.” But

free choice

moved and helped by God.

has not free

to walk. Therefore

choice.

Obj.

not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free choice, but because the

(iii,

4oi£).

judgment of reawhich the lowcriappctite obeys, as we have (q. lxxxt, a. 3\ And so this is in no way

inclinations are subject to the son, .said

prejudicial to free ch||ce.

The qualities its

and

that

pa.'^sions,

c^e from without are hab-

by vfftue

of which a

man

clined to one thing rather than to another.

is

in-

And

3 Serm. ad Popul., cuv, 3 (PL 38, 834). Cf. Glossa interl., on Rom. 7.19 (vi, i7r); cf. also Glossa ofdin., on Rom.

7.23 (VI, 17F).

,

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

438

yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as

in our power either to acby causing them or dispos-

it is

quire them, whether

And so contrary to the

ing ourselves to them, or to reject them.

there

is

nothing in this that

is

freedom of choice.

respect to those things which

we

choice; for

come under

free

are naturally inclined to those

we have

things of which

natural habits

—

for in-

stance, to assent to first principles, while those

we are naturally inclined are not wx have said of the dehappiness (q. lxxxii, aa. 1,2). And so it

things to which

subject to free choice, as sire of

against the very notion of free choice that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non -natural habit is against its nature. Thereis

Article

Whether Free Choice

2.

Is a

Power?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that free choice is not a power. Objection i. For free choice is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an power. Therefore free choice

act, not a

is

not a

power. Further, free choice

2.

is

defined as “the

faculty of the will and reason.”^ But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free choice is a habit. Moreover Bernard says {Dc Gratia ei Lib. Arb. 1,2)*

that free choice

“the soul’s habit of disposing

is

of itself.” Therefore 3.

it is

not a power.

Further, no natural power

forfeited

sin. But free choice is forfeited through Augustine says^ that “man, by abusing free choice, loses both it and himself.” Therefore free choice is not a power. On the contrary, Nothing but a power, it seems, is the subject of a habit. But free choice

through

by

the subject of grace,

chooses what

is

the help of which

good. Therefore free choice

is

it

a

power. / answer that, Although free choice in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free choice that w'hich is the principle of the act

Now

by which man judges

freely.

both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual powder. Therefore free choice must be either a pow^er'^ or a habit,^ or a power with a habit.^ That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit,

all,

in us the principle of

an act

is

can be clearly proved in two w'ays. First of because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural

habit; for choice.

it

is

man to have a free no natural habit in us with

natural to

But there

is

Peter Lombard, SenL, ii, d.,24, ebap. s (QR 1-421). of Auxerre, St. Thomas (fk Ver g 24, a. 4, arg. i) and many others attributed tl^s definition to St. Aug*

Wm.

ustine. Cf. Lottin,

La

Theoric

*

A.

-\ccor(ling to Albert,

x\xv,

Summa

575). See Lottin,

La

dc Creat,,

Theoric

ii,

70, A. 2

(p. 110),

^According to Bonaventiire, In Sent 11, d. 25, pt. i, 1, Q. 4 (QR II, hoi) See Lottin, La Tiihrie (p, iig). * According to Alexander of Hales, .Summa TkeoL, J-ih

n. 300.

by reason of which we are well or disposed with regard to actions and pas-

fined as that ill

(QR

II,

480). See Lottin,

by temperance we are well-disposed and by intemperance and by knowledge we are well-dis-

as regards concupiscences, ill-disposed

;

po.sed to the act of the intellect

when we know

the truth, and by the contrary habit ill-disposed.

But

free choice

choice; hence

is

it is

indifferent to

good or

evil

impos.sible for free choice to it is

a power.

Reply Obj. i. It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free choice denominated an act, it would not always remain in man. Reply Obj. 2. Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty

is

used

in

the definition of free choice.

But Bernard takes habit not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit, for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or

ill.

Reply Obj. 3. Man is said to have lost free choice by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault a:;J unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work (Part l.-II. q.

Lxxxv

ff.; Q.

Article

cix).

Whether Free Choice

3.

Is

an

Appetitive Power?

We

proceed thus to the Third Article: It that free choice is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. Objection i. For Damascene {De Fid. Orth.

would seem

*PLi8j,ioo2. I* » Enchiridion, Chap. 24OL 30 (PL (IlO

clear because “habits are de-

is

be a habit. Therefore

is

sin, for

is

a habit.

is it

Secondly, this

sions”'; for

Obj.

Obj.

fore in no sense

La

Theoric (p. 80).

'’Ethics, 8

If,

5 (iio«;*=’25).

PrHc;x)sitinu.s,

Wm.

of .\uxerre,

held this doctrine Cf Lottin,

Roland

La Thhrk

of

Cremona

(p, 37, 51, 55).

Bonaventure, In Sent., u,

For the contrary doctrine, cf. I, A. I, Q. 0 (QRti, 605). Cf. Lottin

d. 25, Pt.

(p. 121).

FIRST FART 27)^ says that ‘^free choice straightway ac-

ii,

companies the rational nature.” But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free choice is a cognitive power, Obj.

Further, free choice

2.

is

so called as

though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free choice is a cognitive power. Obj.

3.

Further, the principal function of the

free choice

is

to choose.

But choice seems

to be-

long to knowledge, because

it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free choice is a cognitive power.

On choice us.”

the contrary, is

The Philosopher

says’ that

“the desire of those things which are in

But desire

is

ART. 4 and determines counsel. Now counsel is determined, first, by the judgment of reason, secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite; hence the Philosopher says® that, “having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel.” And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free choice takes its

name. Reply Obj.

This comparison which is imchoice belongs to the preceding counsel, w’hich is an act of reason. For plied in the

though the appetite does not make comparisons, it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to

yet since

another.

an act of the appetitive power.

is also. But free choice is that by which we choose. Therefore free choice is an

Therefore choice

Article

4.

Distinct

From

We

appetitive pow’er.

The proper act of free choice is election. For we .say that we have a free choice because we can take one thing while refusing another, and this is to choose. Therefore we 1 answer that,

must consider the nature of in choice:

by contwo things

free choice

Now

sidering the nature of choice.

come together

one on the part of the

cognitive power, the other on the part of the ap-

On

petitive power.

the part of the cognitive

by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another; and on the part of the appetitive power it is recjuired that the appetite should accept the judgment of counTherefore Aristotle^ leaves it in doubt sel. whether choice belongs principally to the appetipower, counsel

required,

is

tive or the cognitive

choice

is

power,

.since

he says that

Is a

Power

the Will?

proceed thus to the Fourth Article:

It

cause

fiovXrjcFLs

according to him,

as concerning an object

is

the will

by way of comparison

between two things. Therefore it seems that free is a distinct power from the will. Obj. 2. I^urther, powers are known by their acts. But election, which is the act of free choice, is distinct from the will, because “the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end.”^ Therefore free choice is a distinct power from the will. choice

Obj.

3.

Further, the will

is

the intellectual ap-

the nature of that good which

is

called use-

But on the part of the intellect there are two powers the agent and the possible. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite there must be another power besides the will. And it seems that this can only be free choice. Therefore free choice is a distinct power from

good, as such,

is

the object

the

But he

an intellectual appetite

inclines to its being

when he

describes choice

“a desire proceeding from counsel."^

reason of this choice is in

Whether Free Choice

would seem that free choice is a power distinct from the will.® Objection i. For Damascene says {De Fid. Orth, ii, 22)^ that is one thing and PovKri

Ibid., HI, 3 (42g^i).

it

make use is

of a

clear that for

the intellect to understand actually, not only

when

it

acquires fresh knowledge, but also

when

uses knowledge

already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the imaginait

tion

is

hindered by a lesion of the corporeal

organ, for instance, in a case of frenzy, or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case

of lethargy,

We

and the other powers be-

we

see that a

man

is

hindered from

a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand slmething, he forms certain phan-

tasms to serve llm by way of examples, in which it were he examines what he h striving to understand. It i%for this reason that when w’c wish to make sAaeonc understand something, we lay examples »fore him, from wffiich he can form phantasms f« the purpose of understandas

1 «

ing.

Now

the reason

this is that the pow'er of

propolioned to the thing known. Thus the proper obj«t of the angelic intellect, which is entirely seArate from a body, is an intelligible substanc* .separate from a body, and through such Jintelligible substances it knows material thin!*. On the other hand, the proper object* of tht^iuman intellect, which is united to a body, is ^^uiddity or nature existing in corporeal matjr, and through such natures of visible thin|| it rises even to some knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to elw in an individual, and knowledge

*

is

Ibid., ni, 7 (431*16).

SUMMA TRmWGJCA

4S0

caimot be apart from corporeal matter; for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in this stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in this horse, and so forth. And so the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except according this

it is known we apprehend

as

as existing in the individual.

Now

the individual through the senses

and the imagination. And,

therefore, for the in-

understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to examine the universal nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form, or if, as the

than the senses. Therefore, the the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. Obj. 2. Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in the book on Sleepy^ and yet lect is higher,

judgment

sometimes happens that we syllogize while judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses.

it

asleep. Therefore the

On

tellect to

Platonists say,^ the natures of sensible things

subsisted apart from the individual, there would

be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands.

Reply Obj,

i.

The

species preserved in the

possible intellect exist there habitually

when it we have

does not understand them actually, as a. 6). Hence in order for

of

the contrary.

What

a

man

does while

moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin, as Augustine says {Ge 7 i. ad ht. xii, 15).^ But this would not be the case if man, W'hile asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses. / answer that. As we have said above (a. 7 Q. XII, AA. 4, ii), our intellect’s proper and proasleep, against the

;

is the nature of a sensible a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains

portionate object thing.

Now

known;

that which

said above (q. lxxix,

to that thing is

us to understand actually, the fact that the species are preserved is not enough. We need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals. Reply Obj. 2. Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing; therefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of the individual, whereas the intellect does. Reply Obj. 3. Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there

not known. Now the Philosopher says^ that “as the end of a practical science is the work to be done, so

are phantasms. Thus we undf ’stand truth by considering a thing of which .^ve examine the truth; and God, as Dionysius '*ays (Div.

Nom

i),^

we know

as cause,

by wa^^^of excess and by

way of remotion. Other incQ^ioreal substances we know in the present state/a>f life only by way of remotion or by some conjt arison to corporeal we understand things. And, therefore, something about these thi^ is, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, «4though there are phantasms of the things Jiiemselves.

no

tellect Is

Whether the of the InHindered throng Suspension

8.

L

of the Senses?

We

proceed thus to E:e Eif^hth Article: It w’ould seem that the jul 'ment 01 the intellect is not hindered by su.spAision of the senses. Objection i. For the s^Derior does not depend on the inferior. But th^judgment of the intei‘

See above, aa.

*

Sect. 5

(PG

3.

i, 4.

0

.

if is

the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally through the senses” for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of the work to be done, in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; ;

and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse save for the purpose of knowing the natures of those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the that must be done, and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things unless he knows sensible things.

work

But in the present state of life whatever we understand we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequeni y it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things are

Reply Obj.

Article

especially

the term and end of judgment

is

1.

knowm

to us.

Although the

intellect is su-

manner from the .senses, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things. perior to the senses, nevertheless in a receives

it

And

therefore suspension of the senses necessanly involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect.

Reply Obj. *

Chap.

*

PL

»

Ueavensy

2.

The

I (4S4**i3)-

34. 466.

m,

7 (306*16).

senses are susp)ended in

f

FIRST FAST tbe sleeper through certain ievaporations and the escape of cortain exhalations, as we read in the book on Sleep} And, therefore, according

Q. 8$-

AST.

i

i. Whether Our Intellect Understtmds Corporeal and Material Things by Abstraction from Phantasms

Article

the disposition of such evaporation, the more or less suspended. For when the motion of the vapors is considerable, not only

seem

are the senses suspended, but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; and this

poreal and material things the phantasms.

to

We proceed thus to the First Article:

senses are

happens especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking copiously. If, however, the motion of the vapors be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without order; thus it happens in a case of fever. And if the motion be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a certain order; thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep, in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If the motion of the vapors i.s very not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed, so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning. as it were, between things and their likene.sses. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly suspended, and therefore, although slight,

some likenesses from

discriminates

it

the reality,

always deceived in some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination are free, so the judgment of his intellect is unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes up he invariably recyet

is

it

ognizes a flaw in

some

Objection,

i.

will

be

falsity in the

Ohj.

2.

Further, material things are natural

things which include matter in their definition.

But nothing can be understood apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle of individuation. Therefore material things cannot

be understood by abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm. Ohj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says* that “the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what colour is to the sight.’’ But seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from colour, but by colour impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of understanding take place

1

4.

Furtllr, the Philosopher says^ there

mode and

order

this

Whether our intellect nathe more universal?

(4) Whether our intellect can know many things the same time? (5) Whether our intellect

at

understands by composing and dividing? (6) Whether the intellect can err? (7) Whether one intellect can understand the same thing better than another? (8) Whether our intellect understands, the indivisible before the divisible?

—the pos-

the agent intellect.

sible intellect

turally first understands

Aristotle, 3 (456^*17).

we understand

arc two things irlthe intellectual soul

head there are eight points of inquiry: (i) whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms? (2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it

»

if

abstraction of the species

from the phantasm, there

does not pertain

(3)

by

^

(In Eight Articles)

understands?

it

intellect.

Obj,

Under

intellect is false if

the phantasms. Therefore,

material things

QUESTION LXXXV

to consider the

abstraction from

from the particular things whose likenesses are

Of the mode and order of

come now

For the

by

understands a thing other than it is. Now the forms of material things do not exist abstracted

intellect.

of understanding.

would

something from the phantasm, by abstraction but by the phimtasm impressing itself on the

respect.

UNDERSTANDING

We

It

that our intellect does not understand cor-

M the possible intellect

But

it

to ab-

stract the intelligic* species from the phantasm, but to receive the^ when abstracted. Neither does it seem to pemain to the agent intellect,

which

is

related to

je

phantasm, as

light

is

to

colour, since light t%es not abstract anything

from colour, but ratly flows into it. Therefore no way do we undeltand by abstraction from

in

phantasms.

f

Obj. 5. Further, l4 e Philosopher says^ that “the intellect under'^nds the species in the

phantasm,” and not,^erefore, by abstraction.

On

the contrary,

T«

Philo.sopher says® that

“thing.s are intclligiblcSn proportion as

they are

from matA.” Therefore material things must be understflLd according as they ate separable

*Ibid.,

IU, 7 (43i*i4). Ill, 7 (431^2).

'

Wjtlbid.,

iii,

Ml bid.,

Ili,

5 (430*14). (429**ai).

4

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

45?

abstracted from matter and from material like-

tion, for the intellect to abstract things

nesses, namely, phantasms.

are not really abstract

I answer that, As stated above

lxxxiv,

(q.

a.

7), the object of knowledgii is proportionate to

the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of knowing powers. For one knowing power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter.

And

since such matter

the prin-

is

ciple of individuality, therefore every

power

of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of knowing power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such

the angelic intellect,

is

the object of whose knowing power

therefore

is

a form subsisting apart from matter, for though angels know material things, yet they do not contemplate them save in something immathemselves or in God. middle place, for it is not the act of an organ, yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the terial,

namely, either

But the human

in

intellect holds a

body, as is clear from what we have said above (q. lxxvi, a. i). And therefore it is proper to it

to

know

a form existing individually in cor-

poreal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter.

But

to

know what

is

in in-

dividual matter, not as existing in such matter, is

to abstract the

which

is

form from individual matter

represented by the phantasms. Theremust say that our intellect understands

fore we material things by abstracting {’>om the phan-

and through material

ta.sms,

sidered

terial things,

know

j-j-

lings thus con-

we acquire some kno|fledge just as,

material things

of

imma-

on the^ contrary, angels throuf/^!^

the immaterial.

But Plato, considering onl^ the immateriality of the human intellect, butAbt the fact that it is in some way united toAne body, held that the objects of the intelle//are separate ideas,

and that we understand n/ by abstraction, but by participating thing.s ahp^rac t, as stated above '

(q.

LXXXIV,

A. i).

p!

Reply Obj. i. Abstract on may occur in two ways; First, by way of composition and division,

when we understand tlfit one thing does not some other, or tP-.t it is separate from it. Secondly, by way cJ/simpk and absolute consideration, as when vff understand one thing without considering the f iher. Thus for the inas

exist in

tellect

to

abstract

which are not

really

does, in the first

falsehood. But, in

onj/ from another things

a^tact from one

m^

another,

of abstraction, imply

scond

mode

of abstrac-

which

from one another does

not involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or said that colour is not in a coloured body, or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider colour and its properties, without reference to the apple which is coloured, or if we express in word what we thus understand, there is no error in such an opinion or assertion, because apple is not in the notion of colour, and therefore colour can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things which belong to the notion of the species of a material thing, such as a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual prinrii)les, which are represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is ;

said to be false

when

otherwise than as

it

is,

understands a thing

it

that

is so, if

the

word

^‘otherwise’' refers to the thing understood; for

the intellect

is

false

when

understands a thing

it

and so the

intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to understand the species not to be in matter, as Plato held.* But it is not so, if the word “otherwise” be taken as referring to the one who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of undei standing, in one who understands, is not the same as

otherwise than as

Sec above, q. i,xxxtv, a. 4*Averroes, In Meia., vn, 21 (viii, 171I): 34 (184D). CL St. Thomas, In Meta., vii, 9.

FIRST PART man from thi$ fiesk and these bones, which do not belong to the notion of the species, but to the individual and need not be the species of

considered in the species; the species of

man

however cannot be abstracted by the intellect from flesh and bones. Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter, though not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter

is

corporeal matter as sub-

ject to sensible qualities,

hot, hard or soft,

and the

such as being cold or while intelligible

like,

matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before sensible qualities are.

Hence

quantities,

such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible qualities, and this to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity, for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that substance, is

for that

is

to abstract

them from individual

in-

telligible matter.

But some things can be abstracted even from

4^

Q. 85. iijer. a

nummcally same form which

that the

presubsequently la

viously was in the phantasm is the possible intellect, in the way in which a body is taken from one place and transferred to another.

Reply Obj. 4. The phantasm, is both illuminated by the agent intellect and, beyond this, the intelligible species is abstracted from it by the power of the agent intellect. The agent intellect illuminates the phantasm because just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellect, so by the

power of the agent

phantasms are from them of intelligible intentions. Furthermore the agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, since by the power of the agent

made more

intellect

wc

intellect the

for the abstraction

fit

are able to take into our considera-

from individual conditions the natures of species, in accordance with whose liketion apart

nesses the possible intellect

Reply Obj. intelligible

far as

Our

informed.

is

both abstracts the species from the phantasms, in so 5.

intellect

considers the natures of things uni-

it

and nevertheless understands these natures in the phantasms, since it cannot understand the things of which it abstracts the species without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (q. lxxxiv, a. 7).

versally,

common

intelligible matter, such as being, unity, potency and act, and the like, which can be without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (Ans. i). he held that all those things which we have .stated to be abstracted by the intellect are

abstract in reality.^

Reply Obj.

3.

same mode

of exist-

ence as the power of .sight, and therefore they can impress their likeness on the sight. But phantasms, since they are likenesses of individuals

and

Intellect

exist in corporeal

mode

organs, have

of existence as the

human

intellect, as is clear from what we have said, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression on the possible intellect. This is done by the power of the agent intellect which by turning towards the phantasm pro-

Whether the Intelligible Species Ab* Phantasm Is Related to Our As Tfmt Which Is Understood? 2.

We proceet^hus to the Second Article: It would seem tlat the intelligible species abstracted from phantasm is related to our intellect as that vmich is understood.

A

Objection

Colours, as being in individual

corporeal matter, have the

not the same

Article

stracted from the

Obj.

2.

must be

sequently

is

thus that the intelligible species

1

from the phantasm, not

Aristotle, Metaphysics, vir, 10 (1035^28)

* See. Q.

Lxxxrv,

a. i

;

also Q. L, A. 2.

is

in

is

what is actually

is

actually understood

Somethi*; otherwise

it would be no| in the thing which is outside the soul, for, fence the thing which is outside the soul is mVerial, nothing therein can be what is actually o^wrstood. Therefore what

is

said to be abstracted

Further, v«at in

nothing. But

phantasm only so is

the understood in act

\

duces in the possible intellect a certain likeness it is the

the species. It

»r

species. Therefore tms species understood.

which represents the thing of which

far as regards the nature of

i.

who unAstands, since the understood in act is the inteAt itself in act. But nothing of what is undersAd is in the intellect actually understanding savA the abstracted intelligible the one

it is

actually understoo]|| it

is

in the intellect.

Con-

can be n^hing else than the above

mentioned intelligiblApecies. Obj.

3.

Further,

tlA Philosopher

“words are signs of tijlyjassions *

Inter pretaUon,

t (16*3).

says® that

in the soul,”

SVMMA TBEOWGWA

454 But words signify the things understood, for we express by word what wc understand. Therefore

There

these passions of the soul, namely, the

intelli-

stand, and another which passes into an ex-

gible species, are what is actually understood.

ternal thing, for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from, which an act

On

The

the contrary,

intelligible species is to

the intellect what the sensible image is to the But the sensible image is not what is

sense.

ceives. is

the heater is a likenehs of the thing heated, so the form from which an action remaining in the

intellectual

made on

agent proceeds

Some have asserted that our powers know only the impression

them,^ as, for example, that sense

is

cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect

understands only

its

own

impression, namely,

the intelligible species which

what

it

has received, so

understood. This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the things we underthat this species

is

is

and the objects of science are the Therefore if what we understand is

merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned with things outside the soul, but

Hence

the likeness of the object.

is

by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the that

thing understood, that the form

is

the intelligible species,

is,

by which the

intellect understands.

But since the intellect is turned back (refiectitur) upon itself, by the same reflection it understands both its own act of understanding and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily, but that which is primarily understood is the thing, of which the intelligible species

the likcne.ss.

is

This also appear.s from the opinion of the ancient philosophers/’

known by

who

said that “like

earth, according to Aristotle,^

i.s untrue because it would lead to the opinion of the philosophers of antiquity who maintained that “whatever seems, is true,’!* and that consequently contradictories arei true simulta-

ligible species.

neously. For

if

power knevvs

the

its

sion as such,

it

and so ever^judgment

true; for instance,

impression,

taste judges that

if

will

be

tasti ;perceived only

its

when anf me with a healthy honey is r /eet, he would judge

and likewise if ayifone with a corrupt honey fV’ bitter, this would be true, for each would judi according to the impression on his taste. Thul every opinion would truly;

taste judges that

be equally true;

in fact.fevery sort of appre-

hension.

Therefore

which 1

is it

it

must be

«

‘d

that ;be intelligible

related to thl' intellect as that

understands, yhich

Protagoras and Heraditi^,

IX. 3 (io47»6); IV, 3 IX, 3; Jv, 6 . * Cf. Q. Lxxxiv, AA.

•Cf. Aristotle,

cf.

by

proved thus.

Aristotle, Metaphysics,

Cf. St.

I

is

take the species of the earth instead of the who says that “a stone is not in the soul, but the likeness of the stone,” it follows that the soul knows the things which are outside of it, by means of its intel.

own im-

can judge oli-that only. Now a thing seems according to thef.mpression made on the knowing power. Cons^uently the knowing power will always judge^f its own imprespression only,

Reply Obj.

i.

The

thing understood

one who understands by in this sen.se that

is

tually understood

is

its

own

we say

is

likeness,

in the

and

it

that the thing ac-

the intellect in act, because

the likeness of the thing understood

is

the

form

of the intellect, just as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it

does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood, but rather that it is the likeness of it. Reply Obj. 2. In these words “the thing actually understood” there is a twofold meaning: the thing which is understood, and the fact that it is understood. In like manner the words “abstract universal” imply two things, the nature of a thing

and

its

abstraction or universality.

Therefore the nature itself to which it falls to be understood, or to be abstracted, or to bear the intention of universality is only in individ-

Thomas, In Meta.,

'

I,

Uetaph£

is

For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we like.”

only with the intelligible species within the thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood,^ Secondly, it soul;

species

the

Therefore the intelligible species is not understood, but that by which the in-

/ answer that,

own

is

likeness of the object of the action, as heat in

tellect understands.

stand same.

tending to something external proceeds

by which sense per-

perceived, but rather that

what

due which cepiains and to under-

a twofold

is

in the agent, for instance, to see

iv, 5 (loog^S).

I,

^

Metaphysics, ix, 8 (1050*23).

•

Empedocles and Plato, in Aristotle, Smd, *> • 5 w/, m, 8 (43i‘»29). ( 404 17 ).

2

i,

s (4og*»26);

FIRST PART uals; but that

understood, abstracted, or bears the intention of universality is in the intellect. We see something similar to this in the senses. For the sight sees the colour of the apple

ART.

Q,

5

apart from

the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition. But the more universal is part of the definition of the less uni^ versal, as animal is part of the definition of man. Therefore the universals are secondarily

where

known by

it i$

its smell. If therefore it be asked the colour which is seen apart from the smell, it is clear that the colour which is seen is only in the apple ; but that it is perceived apart from the smell is owing to the sight, since is

and not of smell is in the sight. In like manner the humanity which is understood is only in this or that man, but that humanity is apprehended without the individual conditions, that is, that it is abstracted and conseciuently considered as universal, happens to humanity according as it is perceived by the inthe likeness of colour

which there

tellect, in cific

is

a likeness of the spe-

nature, but not of the individual principles.

Reply Obj.

3.

the sensitive part.

There are two operations in One in regard to change only,

and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being changed by the sensible.

The other

is

formation, according as the imagi-

us.

Obj. 4. Further,

by

ciples ciples.

causes and prinBut universals arc prin-

Therefore universals

known by

On

we know

their effects.

are

secondarily

us.

the contrary,

“We must

proceed from the

universal to the singular.”^

/ answer that, In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. First, that intellectual in some degree arises from sensible knowledge. And, because sense has singular things for its object, and intellect has the universal for its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of potency to a state of act. But everything which proceeds from potency to act comes first to an incom-

knowledge

midway between potency and

nation forms for itself an image of an absent

plete act, which

even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For

before achieving the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the thing is distinctly and determinate^

thing, or

place there

in the first

sible intellect as

is

the passion of the pos-

informed by the

intelligible

and then the possible intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, which is expressed by a word. Thus the notion signified by a word is its definition, and a proposition signifies the intellect’s division or composition. Words do not therespecies;

fore signify the intelligible species themselves,

hut that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things.

Article

3.

Is First in

Whether the More Universal Our Intellectual Knowledge?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: It would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual knowledge. Objection 1. For what is first and more known in its own nature is secondarily and less known in come first first

is

relation to ourselves.

But universals

as regards their nature, because that

w'hich does not involve the existence of

Therefore the universals are as regards our intellect. Further, the composite precedes the

correlative.

Its

secondarily

known

Obj. 2. simple in relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known secondarily

Obj. *

by

3.

Physics,

us.

Further, the Philosopher says^ that I,

I (184’*!

iX

is

act,

known, whereas the incomplete act

is imperfect knowledge, when the thing is known indistinctly, and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known relatively in act and in some measure in potency, and hence the Philosopher saA,^ that “what is manifest and certain is knowrfto us at first confusedly; afterwards we know ilby distinguishing its principles and elements.” Jow it is evident that to know something that Emprises many things without proper knowledgj^f each thing contained in it is

to

know

that

th* confusedly.

In this

way we

can have knowledl not only of the universal whole, which contaEfc parts potentially, but also of the integral whA; for each whole can be known confusedly, vV'ithout its parts being

knowm. But to knom distinctly what is contained in the universaj^hole is to know the less common, as to knowjlnimal indistinctly is to know it as animal, wrfreas to know animal distinctly is to know it al rational or irrational animal, that

is,

to

know \man

or a lion; therefore

our intellect knows an^al before it knows man, and the same reason ’Aids in comparing anything more universal \Sth the less universal. Moreover, as sense,alike the intellect, proceeds from potency to^ct, the same order of *

Ibid.,

*

Ibid., (184*21).

( i

84“'23).

.

SUMMA TBEOWGICA

450 knowledge appears

we judge common,

more common before

of the

in reference to place,

the less

both to place and time;

in reference

off it is seen to

For by sense

in the senses.

when

a thing

be a body before

seen afar

is

it is

seen to

be an animal, and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it is seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time, for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from that, and therefore “children at first call all men fathers, and later on distinguish each one from the others.”^ The reason of this is clear, because he who

knows a thing

indistinctly

is

tency as regards knowing

its

in a state

of po-

principle of dis-

he who knows genus

is in a potency as regards knowing difference. Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potency and act. We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal, just as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge.

tinction, just as

state of

But

in

both sense and intellect the knowledge

more common precedes the knowledge of the less common. Reply Obj. i. The universal can be considered in two ways. First, the universal nature may be of the

considered together with the intention of universality. sality,

to

And

since the intention of univer-

namely, the relation of ojie and the same is due to intellectualPibstraction, the

many,

universal thus considered musffbe a secondary consideration.

Hence

versal animal

is

it

is

saifj that the “uni-

either nothing or something

secondary.” But according t^Tlato, that universals are .subsist

considered thus would be

who

held

the universal

prijf?f^

to the particular,

for the latter, according top/iim, are only participations of the subsist

y

i;

universals which

Secondly, the universal/ ^an be considered in

— for

iAilance,

animality or

humanity as existing in tAt* individual. And thus we must distinguish twoi irders of nature: one, by way of generation aifa time; and thus the imperfect and the potenfal come first. In this way the mor?* common *,mes first in the order of nature, as appears c|[arly in the generation

man and

of

animal

;

for

before man,” as the other order

is

^.he

animal

is

generated

hilosopher says.^

The

the ordet of perfection or of the

naturally prior to potency, and

is

the perfect to the imperfect

Physics,

I,

I

See above, q. *Oeneration of

(184^12). ^'Aristotle, Soul,

lxxxi^* Animat

i.

3 (736*^2)

i,

i

thus the Jess com-

of nature does not stop at the generation of animal, but goes on to the generation of man.

Reply Obj. 2 The more common universal be compared to the less common, as the whole and as the part. As the whole, considering that in the more universal is potentially con.

may

tained not only the less universal, but also other things, as in animal is contained not only man

but also horse. As part, considering that the less common contains in its notion not only the more common, but also other things as man contains not only animal but also rational. Therefore ani-

mal in itself comes into our knowledge before man, but man comes before animal considered as part of the same notion. Reply Obj. 3. A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely, considered in itself; and

known beknown before a

thus nothing prevents the parts being fore the whole, as stones are

house is known. Secondly, as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must know the whole before

its parts.

For we know a bouse

fused w'ay before

we know

its

in a con-

individual parts.

So likewise the elements of a lutely considered are

definition abso-

known before

the thing

known; otherwise the thing defined would not be made known by them. But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we know man in a confused way as man before we defined

is

know' how' to distinguish

all

that belongs to the

notion of man.

Reply Obj. 4. The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in that the intention of universality results from (he

understanding which is

is

by way

mode

of

of abstraction

a principle of ^-aiowledge

is

not of

necessity a principle of being, as Plato thought.^ since at times W’e fect,

know

a cause through

its ef-

and substance through accidents. There-

fore the universal thus considered, according to

the opinion of Aristotle, 'b^^ing,

we

if

is

neither a principle of

nor a substance, as he makes

clear.**

self as existing in the singular, thus in a

in the

nature of a formal principle

the singulars, for the singular

is

(402^7).

^Sec above,

0.

lxnmv,

a. 1.

Metaphysics, vn, 13 (i038*>8).

is

in

the

way

it-

it is

regard to re.sult

of

from the compared to the

matter, while the notion of species

«

But

consider the generic or specific nature

form. But the generic nature ^

*

;

mon comes naturally before the more common, as man comes before animal. For the intention

But what

he called ideas the nature itself

intention of nature. For instance, act considered

absolutely

is

FIRST PART specific nature rather after the fashion of a

ma-

terial principle, because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the notion of species is taken from that which is formal; thus the notion of animal is

taken from the sensitive part, while the notion man is taken from the intellectual part. Thus i( is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, nor to the of

genus, because the form

while matter is it

is

is

the end of generation,

for the sake of the form. Neither

necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of

any cause or principle should be secondary, since at times through sensible causes

come acquainted with unknown

we

be-

and

effects,

sometimes conversely.

Article

Many

We w^ould

Whether

4.

Things at the

same

Wc Can Understand Same Tme?

same

Further, there

stance, colour

is

and smell are

in the apple.

But

in-

telligible species are not oppo.sed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, and thus it can understand many

things at the

same

time.

Ohj. 3, Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore the intellect understand.^

same

many

things at the

time.

Obj. 4 Further, we cannot ence between two things unless

know the differwe know both at

and the same is to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the difference between one thing and another. the

same

time,‘

Therefore

knows many

it

things at the

same

On is

the contrary, It

is

said^ that “understand-

of one thing only, science

is

is

Now

all intelligible

belong to one genus, because they are

spiecies

al-

though the things of which they are the species belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same inlellcct to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to

w^hich

is

I.

The

understand different things. intellect is above that time

the measure of the

movement

of cor-

poreal things. But the multitude itself of intelligible .species

causes a certain change of intel-

ligible operations,

according as one operation

And

this

change

is

called time

by Augustine, 'who says {Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22), 3 that “God moves the .spiritual creatures through

time.*^*

Reply Obj. Not only is it impossible for opposite formsko exist at the .same time in the .same subject, bit neither can any forms belonging to the sameilenus, even though they are not

opposed to one wother, as is clear from the examples of coloul and shapes. Reply Obj. 3. warts can be understood in two w'ays. First, in a Anfused way, as existing in the whole, and thus t|^ are know^n through the one form of the wholotnd so are knowm together. In another way thAare known distinctly; thus each is known by itApecies, and so they are not

understood at the .sAe time. Reply Obj. 4. the intellect knows the difference or com pari An between one thing and

WI^

another,

it

know^s botwunder the aspect of their

difference or comparlpon; just as

it

knows the we have

said above (ad 3).

by one but not by many intelligiFor the mode of every action fol-

Article 5. Whether Intellect Understands by Composition and L^ision?

We

to say,

ble species. *

colours or different shapes.

of many.^^

/ answer that, The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many; that

is that it is impossible for one and same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different

the

parts under the aspeej of the whole, as

time.

ing

docs not understand at the same time. The

reason of this

succeeds another.

time.

2.

the intellect understands under different species, it

Reply Ohj.

nothing to prevent different forms not oi)posed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, for inObj,

;

time.

Objection i. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession, but at the

$

form which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the intellect can understand under one species it can understand at the same time hence it is that God sees all things at the same time, becau.se He sees all in one. that is, in His Essence. But whatever things

low^s the

(he perfections of one intellectual power;

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It seem that we can understand many

things at the

ART.

Q, 85,

Aristotle, Soul,

® Aristotle,

m,

Tol>ks,

2 (426**22).

it ,

io (114^34).

proceed thus

A

the Fifth Article:

It

would seem that our ^ellect does not understand by composition division. *

PL.

34, 388, 389.

y

SUMMA TEmWQICA

458

Objection t. For composition and division are only of many. But the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division.

Obj.

2.

Further, every composition and divi-

sion implies past, present, or future time.

But

the intellect abstracts from time, as also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and

made by

and comknows many things when it composes and divides, just as when it knows the difference and comparison of things. Reply Obj. 2. Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand acintellect are

paring.

Hence the

differentiating

intellect

tually without turning to the phantasms, as

we

lxxxiv, a. 7). And as. regards turning to the phantasms, composition

have said

(a. i,

and

q.

division.

and division of the intellect involve time. Reply Obj. 3. The likeness of a thing is

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect understands things by assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, for nothing is in

ceived into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, and not according to the mode of the thing. Therefore something on the part of

things but the thing signified

and the subject, which the composition

is

is

by the predicate

one and the same

true, for

man

if

what does not act by is

truly

re-

the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect, but

way

the same

it

in the intellect

does not exist in in the thing.

and

animal is. Therefore the intellect composition and division. On the contrary Words signify the concep-

For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which falls under the senses and the imagination. Now in a

tions of the intellect, as the Philo.sopher says.*

material thing there

words we find composition and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division. I answer thatj That human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division, For since the intellect passdfe from potency

First,

But

in

to act, erated,

it

has a likeness to things 'which are gen-

which do not attain to perfection

all at

once but acquire it by degrees, /nd likewise the human intellect does not acquirp perfect knowledge of the thing by the first ail^rehension but it first apprehends something jf bout the thing, such as its quiddity, and thifjis its first and proper object and then it undfetands the properties, accidents, and the variors relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily ^inpares one thing with another by compositi«‘^ or division and from one composition and ^.vision it proceeds to another, which is to rea» a. But the angelic and thefOivine intellect, like ;

;

;

all

incorruptible things,

ha vie

their perfection at

once from the beginning. Aicnce the angelic and the Divine intellect hav/ithe entire knowledge of a thing at once and pci lectly; and hence also

knowing the quiddity M>f a thing they know at once whatever we can Imow by composition, division, and reasoning./rherefore the human intellect knows by con#osition division, and reasoning. But the DiviJ:; and the angelic intellect know, indeed, confcosition, division, and reasoning, not by the pljcess itself, but by understanding the simple^ jiddity. Reply Obj. i. Comi/ ‘^ition and division of the

in

^Interpretation, i

there

is

is a twofold composition. the composition of form with

matter, and to this corresponds that composition of

the intellect

by which the universal

whole

predicated of

its

is

derived from

common

part; for the genus is

matter, while the differ^

ence that completes the species is derived from the form, and the particular from individual matter. The second composition is of accident with subject, and to this composition corresponds that composition of the intellect by which accident is predicated of subject, as when we say “the man is white.” Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of things; for in the latter the

components

are diverse, whereas composition of the intellect is

a sign of the identity of the components. For

tlie

composition of the

that

man

is

intellect

does not assert

whiteness, but the assertion, “the

is white, means that “the man is something: having whiteness,” and the subject, which is a man, is identified with a su:3ject having whiteness. It is the same with the composition of form and matter, for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has an intellettual nature man, that which has both and Socrates that which has all these things together

man

;

;

And according to this kind of identity our intellect composes one thing with another by the act of predication.

*wilh individual matter.

Article 6 Whether the .

Intellect

We

Can Be False?

proceed thus to the Sixth Article: It would seem that the intellect can be false. Objection i. For the Philosopher says^ that *

Metaphysics, vi, 4 (i027*»27).

f

j

FIRST PART “truth and falsehood are in the mind.” But the

mind and above

the same, as is shown Therefore falsehood is in the

intellect are

(q. lxxii).

ART

.

459

7

when, for instance, the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the definition of a circle applied to a triangle or when a ;

definition

intellect.

is

false in itself as involving the

com-

Further, opinion and reasoning belong

position of things incompatible, as, for instance,

But falsehood is found in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.

mal. Hence as regards simple things in whose

Obj.

2.

to the intellect.

Obj,

Further, sin

3.

is

in the intellectual part.

But sin involves falsehood, for those err that work evil (Prov. 14. 22). Therefore falsehood t

an be

On

the contrary Augustine says (qq.

who

is

Lxxxm,

deceived, does

not rightly understand that wherein he

And

ceived.” tellect

is

de-

the Philosopher says^ that “the in-

always true.”

is

to describe anything as a rational winged ani-

we cannot we understand noth-

definition composition does not enter,

be deceived unless, indeed,

ing whatever about them, as

said the

is

Meta-

physics.^

in the intellect.

qu. 32),^ that “everyone

The Philosopher* compares inwith sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in it.s proper object, as sight in regard / answer that^

tellect

Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the mind in regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to the second objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the third objection concerning the error of the sinner,

who

judgment of the object of

errs in the practical

desire.

But

in the ab-

solute consideration of the quiddity of a thing

through some hindrance occurring to the organ for example, the taste of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet

and of those things which are known thereby,

thing to be bitter, through his tongue being viti-

of the opposite conclusion.

to colour, save accidentally

ated by

ill

—

humours. Sense, however,

ceived as regards

common

when, for example,

figure;

may

sensibles, as size or

judges the sun to

it

concerning

deceived

when

it

size.

Much more

judges that vinegar

it

is

per se

quiddity of a thing; intellect is

not at fault concerning this quiddity. But

it

go a.stray as regards what surrounds the

essence or quiddity of the thing,

when

it

refers

one thing to another, or in composition or division, or also in reasoning. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, which are understood as soon as the meanings of their terms are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of principles

of truth,

from which

arises the infallibility

with regard to the certitude of scientific

conclusions.

The

intellect,

however,

may

be accidentally

deceived in the quiddity of composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the intellect

not a power

is

of •

the

PL

u.sing

composition

40, 22.

Ibid., Ill,

*

an organ, but on the part affecting

the

Sold, HI, 10 (433*26).

6 (430**2g).

praceedyhns

to the

Seventh Article:

It

one and the same thing better than another can. Objection i.%or Augustine says (qq. LXXxm,

and hence, properly speaking, the

first

We

honey by reason The reason of this

is

proper object, and things of this kind are always the same. Hence, so long as the power exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail. Now the proper ob-

may

Than Another €an? w'ould seem thlt one person cannot understand

its

ject of the intellect is the

never deceived. In this sense are

Article 7. Whether One Pcrso 7 t Can Understand One and the Same Thing Better

sense

sensibles,

evident; for every power, as such,

is

directed to

is

as

accidental

of the colour being the same.

is

the intellect

to be understood the authorities quoted in proof

be de-

be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality

exceeds the earth in

i

Q. 85

;

definition,

qu. 3 2), 5

“Whclver understands a

wise than as

Hence

it is

it jl

thing other-

does not understand

it

cleifi that there is a perfect

standing, than >^^ch none other

and therefore

tftlre

is

at

all.

under-

more perfect

are not infinite degrees of

understanding a^ing, nor can one person understand a thing l\tter than another can.” Obj. 2. Furfher^e intellect is true in its act of understanding. '‘Vut truth, being a certain

th^ght and thing, is not more or less^or a thing cannot be to be more or less eq^l. Therefore a thing not be more or less u^lerstood.

equality between ject to

Obj.

3.

Further,

most pertains

uj

intellect

to forj* in

is

subsaid

can-

that which

man. But

different

forms cause different|Kpecies. Therefore if one man understands bet®r than another, it would seem that they do ,^t belong to the same species.

On the contrary, Experience shows that some understand more deepkj than do others, as one who carries a conclusAV to its first principles and ultimate causes un(f wstands it more deeply *

Aristotle, rx, 10 (1052^1^

®

PL

40, 22.

SUMMA THEOWGJCA

46o

who

than the one

mate

reduces

only to

it

its

proxi-

causes.

/ answer that. To say that a thing is understood more by one than by another may be taken in two senses. First, so that the word more be taken as determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood; and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another, because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one would not understand it. as Augustine argues (loc. cit.). In another sense the w'ord more can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part of him who understands and so one may understand the same thing better than someone else, through having a greater power of understanding, just as a man may see a thing better with ;

whose powder is greater, and more perfect The same applies to

his bodily sight,

whose

sight is

.

the intellect in two ways. First, as regards the intellect itself,

which

more

is

perfect.

For

the better the soul allotted to in

which clearly

it,

things of different species.

And therea-

son for this is that act and form are received into matter according to matter’s cfipacity. Hence because some men have bodies o better disposition, their souls have a greater iower of under^

]

standing.

Thus

who have

delicate flesh are of

it is

said^ that

wt

see that those

mind. Secondly, this occurs in regard to thePbwer powers of which the intellect has needfch its operation,

whom

for those in

a/*’

the imagiJHtive, cogitative

and remembering powers are/tf better

dispiosi-

tion are better disposed to unftrstand.

The

reply to the

objer'ion

first

is

clear

from

the above; likewise the rcplwto the second, for the truth of the intellect co/

understanding a thing as

'ists

in the intellect

itAs.

Reply Obj. 3. The diffcif 4 ce of form which is due only to the different f .isposit ion of matter causes not a specific hurf’mly a numerical difference; for different ini^iduals have different ,

forms, diversified accori'ng to the difference of

V

matter.

Article

8.

Whether thAlntellect Understands

the Indivisible Before

f jf

'

Divisible?

We

proceed thus tc^hc Eiflfh Article: It would seem that the if cllect understands the indivisible before the dr/isible.

For

Philosopher says^ that

we understand and

from the knowledge

Objection

1

i.

Aristotle, Soul,

^Physics,

I,

I

II,

(i84®i£^>r

1*25).

the divisible. Obj. 2. Further, the definition of a thing contains

what

is

known previously,

proceeds from the

for a “definition

and more known,” as

first

said in the Topics.^

But the

indivisible

is

part of

is

the definition of the divisible, as a point comes into the definition of a line; for as Euclid

a line

is

says,**

length without breadth, the extremities

of which are points. Also unity comes into the definition of number, for “number is multitude

measured by one,” as physics}* Therefore

is

our

the Meta-

said in

intellect

understands

the indivisible before the divisible.

Obj.

3.

Further, Like

indivisible is

more

is

known by like. But

the

like to the intellect than is

the divisible, because “the intellect is simple.”® Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible.

On

it is

plain that the better the disposition of a body,

appears

of principles and elements. But principles are indivisible, and elements are of divisible things Therefore the indivisible is known to us before

the contrary, It

is

said^ that “the indivisi-

becomes known as a privation.” But priva-

ble

tion

is

known

secondarily. Therefore likewise

is

the indivisible. I answer that, its

present state

The object of our is

intellect in

the quiddity of a material

which it ab.stracts from the phanta.sms. above stated (q. lxxxiv. a 7). And .since that which is known first and of itself liy our knowing power is its proper object, we must thing,

as

consider its relationship to that quiddity to

discover in what

known.

Now

in

order

order the indivisible

the indivisible

said in the book on the Soul

^

is

threefold, as

is is

First, the continu-

ous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although potentially divisible; and this indivisible is known to us before its division, which is a division into parts, because confused knowledge is prior to di.stinct knowledge, as we have said above (a. 3). Secondly, the indivisible is called so in relation to species, as ihe essence of

man

is

something indivisible. This way, also, the indivisible is understood before its division into essential parts, as wc have said above (ibid.) and again before the intellect composes and divides by affirmation and negation The reason of this *.is that both the.se kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of it.self, as its proper object. The third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually or potentially. ;

• .Aristotle, vi, 4 (141*32). ^Geom.y trans. of Boethius,

1 (PL 63, 1307). •Aristotle, x, 6 (ios7*3). • Aristotle, Soul, in, 4 (429*18; *’23).

’ Ibid., Ill,

6 (430^'2i).

•

Aristotle,

m, 6

(430^6),

FIRST PART And

this

indivisible

through the privation of point

way

defined by

is

known

is

secondarily,

Hence a

divisibility.

of privation as “that

ART,

Q. 86.

Whether it knows singulars? (2) Whether it knows infinite things? (3) Whether it knows contingent things? (4) Whether it knows future things?

which has no parts,”^ and in like manner “the notion of one is that it is indivisible,” as stated in the Metaphysics} And the reason of this is

Article

that this indivisible has a certain opposition to

Sin^nlarsI

corporeal reality, which

is

the quiddity which

the intellect seizes primarily and per

But

our intellect understood by participaa.s the Platonists maintained,^ it would follow that an indivisible of this kind is understood primarily, for according to the Platonists what is first is if

tion of separate indivisible (forms),

participated by things.^ Reply Obj. 1. In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always first, for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in perfected knowledge, the knowledge of effects always depends on the knowledge of principles and elements; for as the Philosopher says in the same passage that we consider ourselves to know, when we can resolve principles first

2.

point

is

not included in the

definition of a line in general, for

it

is

manifest

Intellect

Knows

to the First Article: It

that our intellect

singular, Socrates.

Obj.

2.

to action.

Further, the practical intellect directs But actions are concerned with singu-

Therefore the intellect knows the

lar things.

singular.

Obj.

Further, our intellect understands

3.

it-

But in itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action, for actions pertain to self.

Therefore our intellect knows singu-

singulars lars.

Obj.

A

(i)

would knows singulars. Objection i. For whoever knows composition knows the terms of composition. But our intellect knows this composition; “Socrates is a man,” for it pertains to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this

into their causes.

Reply Obj

Whether Our

i.

We Proceed thus

seem

se.

46*

i

are four points of inquiry:

Further, a superior power can do

4.

whatever

is

knows the

done by an inferior power. But sense Much more, therefore, can

sinJular.

the intellect

klow

an infinite line and in a circular line there no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line, and therefore he places a

The Philosopher says® that “the universalis known by reason, and the sin-

point in the definition of a line as the limit in

gular

that in

is

the definition of that which

But unity is the measure of number. Therefore it is included in the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the definition of the is

3.

The

we

understand is the species of the known in the knower. Therefore a thing is known first, not on account of a natural likeness to the knowing power, but on account of a relation of agreement between the knowing power and the object;

otherwise sight would perceive hearing

QUESTION LXXXVI What our intellect knows

in

in

what our intellect Under this head there

to consider

material things.

intellect

cannot

rily.

The

reaso-lof this

know

the

and prima-

that the principle of

is

n%erial things

while our i™ellcct, as

is

individual mat-

we have

said above by abstracting the intelligible specic\from such matter. Now what is abstracted froiAn dividual matter is the universal. Hence oui^Vtellect knows directly the universal only. But^^directly, and as it were by (q

.

lxxxv,

A. j), understands

kind of turning

a

the singular, A.

bSk

(reflectio),

becausAas we have

7),

even

^er

it

said

can know

above

(q.

abstracting the intel-

which

in

it

understanjjs the species, as

is

said in

the book on the

(In Four Articles^

now have

Our

ligible species, the in^llect, in order to understand actually, needs,To turn to the phantasms

MATERIAL THINGS

knows

knownly sense.”

.singularity in

LXXXV,

rather than coiour.

We

is

.singular in majlrial things directly

ter,

likeness through which

it.

the conAarVy

/ answer ih(\

limited.

divisible, but rather conversely.

Reply Obj.

On

Therefore it understands the universal directl^ through the intelligible .species, and indirect ly^he singulars represented by the phantasms. An^Uhus it forms the proposition, “Socrates is a min.” From this the reply to the first objection isfWear.

1

Euclid, G^om., trans of BotHhjus, Bk,

*

Aristotle, V,

i

(PL

03, 1307).

1

LXXXIV, AA

®

Cf. Q.

*

Cf. Liber de Catius,

I, i

4

;

0 CXXXVII,

(B.A 163.3).

A. I,

to

Reply Obj. 2. The chl^Ve of a particular thing be done is, as it werq,^e conclusion of a syl-

®

Physics,

I,

5 (189*5).

'

Aristotle, in, 7 (43i“2)

SVMMA THEOLOGICA

4^4

Ignorant of things past; and things to cannot know by any messenger.

We

/ answer that.

come he

must apply the same

knowledge from the senses, the soul to

dis-

know

from the senses; rather does

tinction to the knowledge of future things, as

by

we

poreal causes.

applied above (a. 3) to the knowledge of contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflexion only, as stated

above (a. i). But the principles of future things may be universal and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the objects ;

of science. Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we must observe that

may

be known in two ways: either in cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone, to Whom even that is present which in the course of events is future, since from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time, as we have said above w'hen treating of God’s knowledge (q. XIV, A. 13'). But according as it exists in its cause, the future can be knowm by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with its future '^e.sult, then the future is known with scientific S^titude, just as the astronomer foresees the futiire eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as toiproduce a certain result more frequently thaw not, then the future can be known more or le# conjecturally, according as its cause is more o^*ess inclined to 1 produce the effect. Reply Ohj. i. This argumeqf^is true of that knowledge which is drawn front 'hniversal causal principles from these the futi^ may be known the future

or in

itself,

its

•

;

after the

manner

of the order

F.'

effects to their

/'

cause.

Reply Obj 2. As Augustin^'ays in the twelfth book of the Confessions,^ tl^^ioul has a certain power of forecasting, so thy *by its very nature it can know the future; h^/:e w'hen withdrawn from corporeal sense, anJi'as it were, turned back upon itself, it shay’, in the knowledge of the future. Such an opfHon would be reasonable if we were to aclmilf i^hat the soul receives knowledge by participafr'ig the ideas as the Platonists maintained,^ soul

by

its

b^ause in that case the know the universal

all effects, and jf ould only be impeded knowledge by the rody; and hence when withdrawn from the bfdily senses it would

causes of

the future.

But since

know ‘

Cf.

it

not natural for

when withdrawn

know

the future

the impression of superior spiritual and cor-

causes

By

the impression of spiritual

when by Divine power

lect is enlightened

the

human

intel-

through the ministry of an-

and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events or, by the influence

gels,

;

when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons, as explained above fq. lvii, a. 3). The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from of demons

the senses, as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions. The

same may also come from superior corporeal For it is clear that superior bodies influ-

causes.

ence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the sensitive powers being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain signs of some such events. The.se signs are perceived more at night and w^hile we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, because, as stated in Prophesying? “impressions made by day are evanescent.

The

night air

is

calmer,

when

silence reigns,

hence bodily impressions are made in

when than duce

sleep,

movements are felt more wakefulness, and such movements pro-

slight internal

in

in the imagination phantasms from which the future may be foreseen.” Reply Obj. 3. Brute animals have no power

above the imagination to regulate the phantasms, as man has his reason, and therefore their ifnagination follows entirely the influence of the

heavenly bodies. Thus from such animals’ movements some future thing.s, such as rain and the like, may be better known rather than from human movements directed by the coun.sel of reason. Hence the Philosopher .says^ that some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing for their intelligence is not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety, moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it. ;

nature Vfouli

in its

know

it is

the future

it is

ITSELF

ft

AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF {In Four Articles)

connajfiral to our intellect to

things not in this/^ay, but

De Gen. ad

QUESTION LXXXVII How THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS

lit.,

•C£. Q. LXXXIV, AA.


36);

cit., 1,

also Avicenna, De. .t«.. v, ^x A5va). 12*1

Phaedo

4.sb)‘. cf.

also

(67);

Aug-

Wm.

of Paris*

Phaedo

(65); cf.

SUMMA THJ$OWGlCA

474 !SOmI

requires

to understand

it

by turning

to the

phanta$m», it will seem, since the death of the body does not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand nothing, as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn.

To

we must

Hence

circle.

it is iiiat

sence understands

God.

by HiS own

intellectual substances understand

many more

bv

forms, which nevertheless are fewer and universal and bestow a deeper comprehen-

sion of things, because of the efficaciousness of

actual, the

the intellectual power of suCh natures. But the

of action in every agent follow's from its of being. Now the soul has one mode of

mferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of forms, which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension in pro-

as nothing acts except so far as

being when joined to when separated from

it is

the body, and another it,

its

nature remaining

always the same. But this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such a union belongs to it by reason of

its

nature, just as the nature of a light

portion as they recede from the intellectual

power of the higher

natures. If, therefore, the

inferior substances received forms in the

degree

of

universality

the

as

superior

standing, the knowledge which they

place,

rive through

is not changed whether it is in its proper which is natural to it, or outside its proper place, which is foreign to its nature. The soul,

therefore,

when united

ately to that

mode

to the body, appropri-

of existence

a

*jaas

mode

of

understanding by turning to cd^;poreal phantasms, which are in corporeal or^ns; but when scp)arated

to have a

from the body, ijys

mode

fitting to it

of understandirrV^by turning to

absolutely intelligible objects,

fv' is

other separate substances. Henqi^'t for the soul to understand

is

proper to as natural

by^rning

to the

phantasms as it is for it to befioined to the body. But to be separated from tic body is not accordance with its nature, jJfd likewise to understand without turning to tlw phantasms is not natural to it, and hence it if .united to the existence and body in order that it may have an operation suitable to its nclare. But here again a difficulty arises. For sinle a thing is always ordered to what is best, ai» since it is better to understand by turning tof bsolutely intelthe phantasms, ligible things than by turning God should have made the sof 's nature so that the nobler way of understafjing would have been natural to it, and it woifd not have needed in

the body for that purpose. In order to resolve thiJdifficulty

consider that while

it is

trm

that

by ^rning

it is

to understand

:

to

sub-

would dethem would be imperfect and of a

We can see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of general and confused nature.

weaker

intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things

are explained to them singly and in detail.

Now

human

souls

clear that in the natural order

it is

hold the lowest place among intellectual substances. Rut the perfection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore,

God had the

willed

same way

follow that

souls to understand in

human knowledge,

so far

it would from being

would be confused and general. There-

perfect,

fore to

human

as separate substances,

make

it

possible for

human

souls to pos-

and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive a proper knowledge of sensible things from the sensible sess perfect

things themselves; thus

uneducated

men

wc

sec in the case of

that they have to be taught

by

sensible examples. It

is

clear then that

was united stands by turning that

it

it

was for the

less

nobler in

body, and also to understand

it is

soul’s

good

body, and that it underto the nhantasms. Neverthepossible for it to exist apart from the to a

we must

something higher than to understanelby turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a In ode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual substance possesses the power of understanding by he influx of the Divine light, which is one^nd simple in its first principle, and the furthef off intellectual creatures are from the first/>rmciple so much the more is the light divi^w, and diversified, as is the case with lines ra(jfy/ ng from the centre of itself

same

stances, since they are not so strong in under-

object

it is

Es^

things, while the superior

all

consider that

solve this difficulty

mode mqde

a

in

another way.

Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher’s words carefully examined will show that he said this on the previous supposition^ that understanding

movement

is

body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We may a

of

also say that he

is

referring to the

way

of un-

derstanding by turning to phantasms. This also the meaning of the second objection.

is

Reply Obj. 3. The separated soul does not understand by way of innate species, nor by speI.

4(4oS»>6),

FIMST PARTXt. ^yART. cies abstracted in. that state,

nor

by

3

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the separated soul does not un-

it is united to the body the ^oul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually understanding by means of species abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above (q. lxxxvii, a. i). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to those things which are intelligible in themselves; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode of its substance, for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands, while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in

derstand separate substances. Objection i. For the soul

rated soul

^^^sgecies, and

onfer

,re-

this the objection proves;

in that state

understands by means

from the influx by the soul as by

of participated species arising of the Divine light, shared

other separate substances though, in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to the body, the soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowl-

God

edge unnatural, for

is

the author of the

and of the

influx both of the light of grace

light

of nature. 2. Whether the Separated Soul Understands Separate Substances?

Article

when joined

to

from

it,

and every part of

when

since

which

more perfect the body than when separated

ture,

it is

is

naturally a part of a whole

is

human na-

more

perfect

exists in that whole. But the soul joined body does not understand separate substances, as shown above (0. Lxxxvin, a. i). it

to the

Therefore

much

less is it able to

do so when sep-

arated from the body.

Obj.

2.

Further, whatever

is

known

is

known

presence or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the

either

by

that as long as

its

by means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple

soul; nor

the

same

is

of being of a sepa-r

irterior to that of

tki

as

mode

Ai|d the

it is.

an angel, but

is

of other separated souls. There-

fore the soul Ipart from the body has perfect knowledge of Ither separate ,souls, but it has an imperfect and »fective knowledge of the angejs so far as its Sltural knowledge is concerned. But the know|rlge of glory is otherwise. Reply Obj.^. The separated soul iS) indeed, lcf5S perfect clnsidering its nature in which it communicateflwith the nature of the body; but it has a great el freedom of understanding, since the weight an^ care of the body is a hindrance to the clearne’lof its understanding in the pres-

ent

J

life.

The separated

tlian a soul.

Reply Obj. the angels by

at

nesses, which, ^Lwever. fail to give perfect rep^

Therefore the separated soul cannot understand separate substances.

all

Ob

some philosophers

soul understands

i^ieans of divinely

impressed

like-

knowledge of separate substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone, which cannot reasonably be

Jem, since the nature of the soul of an angel. Reply Obj. 3.'^an’s ultimate happiness consists not in the klrowledgc of any separate substances whatsoev^, but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen t.Vly by grace. The knowledge

said.

of other separate

').

3.

Further,

the ultimate happiness of

On

man

said’ that

consists in the

Souls apart from the body

the

know other separated case of the rich

man

we see in the who saw Lazarus

souls, as in hell,

resentation of

is

inferior to

s J)stances if perfectly understood gives great ijppiness, though not final, and ultimate happiness. But the separated soul does not understan.| them perfectly, as w^as

and Abraham (Luke

shown above

I answer thaty As Augustine says {De Trin. “our mind acquires the knowledge of inthat is, by knowing corporeal things by itself”

All Natural

16. 23). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels.

ix, 3),*

—

Thcrefoie from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other

itself

(q.

lxxxviii,

separate things. \

See

*

PL

Q.

Now

LXXXVIII, A.

42, 963.

I.

a.

it

i,

Ans.

i).

was said above

(a. i),

t

th^

Article

We

3.

in this Irticle.

WhetheAthe Separated Soul Knows 1

kings?

proceed thus to the Third Article;

It

would seem that the separated soul knows

all

*

natural things.

Objection

i.

For

Jfce

things exist in separa

types of

all

natural

substances. Therefore,

as separated souls kry^V separate substances,

they also

know

all

nat *2^1 things.

SVMMA

45r6

Ob}.

5

Further, Whoever

.

TBEOLCXJtCA future things pre-eitist in their causes or are

understands the

much more

greater intelligible will be able

known by Divine

to

revelation.

But

w e are^.re

understand the lesser intelligible. But the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of

treating of the knowledge of natural

intelligibility.

less.

On

The

the contrary,

devils have a

more

Reply Obj. 4. Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of the separated soul is confused. Hence it does not follow that to study in order to learn is use-

vig-

Article

orous natural knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says.^ Therefore neither can

know

the separated soul

Further,

gained knowledge of

men

forts of

natural

all

the soul as soon

if

We know

Kings.

be

iiV

But

1 answer

know all natural tfengs. As stated aboV^j (A.

that,

light.

ture

inferior to an angel, to

is

Nevertheless,

of knowledge

body

is

Therefore the separated soul cannot

i), the

Obj.

by na-

this

lv',K)rn

peri cm

receive

lar is

knowledge of them. species

cause

know

all

that

all

Now

God

from the knowledge general and

Obj. 3. Further, if it knew the singulars other than by sense, by equal reason it w^ould know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars.

havcio the perfect

in

On

know

ail

/ ence

It

r.

Even an

follows

i/ tural things not

ai/fel

docs not under-

i/so

it

does not

God, and

low that the soul knows f i natural things because

neither does

substances,

things perfectly, but

it

it

know*

all

natural

knows them confusedly,

as explained above in this article.

Reply Obj.

3.

Isidore speaks of the knowledge

of future things which

rifeither angels, nor demons, nor separated soujpknow except so far as. >

Sent.,

a

PL

I,

lo (PL 83, ss*"'*

34, 2 (kj

.

‘

all,

in that w^ay

know

it is

possible for the intel-

For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual princilect to

fol-

it knows separate su\.stances. Reply Obj. 2. As the souf separated from the body does not perfectly Understand separate

/

)

stand all natural things ihrfugh his substance, but through certain speciciJas stated above (q. LV, A. i; Q. Lxxxvii, A

:

that,

gulars, but not

wnth a certain and proper kijfwJcdge. but in a general and confused niaiine.

Reply Obj.

in hell said

Separated souls know some sinnot even all present singulars, To understand this we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one 'by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this w'ay singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated The other w^ay of unabove (q. lxxxvi, a. i derstanding is by the infusion of species by

harheen produced the angelic iiUelligl.ice, as Auguslit. ii, S).'-'

it

the contrary,

have five I answer

has prudure(I,in the respec-

that separated souls

knows none. The rich man brethren (Luke 16. 2S).

Thercfoie

angclflihrough such

tine says (Gen. ad.

of the

gulars,

tive natures of natural

by Him

Further, the knowledge of the singu-

2.

more determinate than knowledge

universal.

rii)ngJ‘perfectly, be-

natural

sin-

But the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, and therefore much less can it know sin-

kind

through such species, but only 1 confused kind of knowledge. Se|arated souls, therefore, have the same rclaiifalthrough such species to imperfect and cnntiHciBicnowledge of natural things as the angels

know

gulars.

natural, the ^ouj^oart

not

does

soul

is

clear

influx of the

species received fr(an

Divine

For no knowing power besides

from what has been said above (Q. LXXXVII, A. 8). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (q. lxxxvi, a. i).

this

separated soul, like the angels, understands by

means of

i.

the intellect remains in the separated soul, as

cannot be admitted. Therefore |lhc separated soul does not

singulars.

Objection

as separated

vain.

Whether the Separated Soul

4.

Singulars?

proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It seem that the separated soul does not

w^ould

natural things, the ef-

all

know would

to

i

Knows

, *

singulars.

ples (q. xiv, a. 11; Q. Lvii, A. 2), so likewise

know singulars by spewhich are a kind of participated likeness of the Divine Essence. There is a difference, however, betw'cen angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things, whereas separated souls have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of the efficacy of their inseparate substances can cies

FIRST PART through these species know not only the specihc natures of things but also the singulars HmiMilriiin those species; but separated souls tellect,

ART,

Q. 89.

5

of knowledge tvhich will remain with us in

heaven.”

/ answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, cogitative, and remembering, and that the

by these species know only those singulars to which they are in a certain way determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposi-

intelligible species are

tion of the Divine order; because whatever

intellect.® If this

were

when the body

destroyed by death, knowledge

received into anything

cording to the

mode

is

determined in

it

is

ac-

of the receiver.

Reply Obj. i. The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul

know

it

thus, but as explained

above.

Reply Obj. soul

is

2.

The knowledge

of the separated

limited to those species or individuals to

which the soul has some kind of determinate rewe have said. Reply Obj. 3. The separated soul has not the

lation, as

same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some and another to others. Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.

is

not kept in the possible true,

it

would follow that

acquired here would also be entirely destroyed.* But, since knowledge resides in the intellect,

which is “the abode of species,” as the Philosopher sa>’s,® the habit of knowledge acquired in this life must be partly in the sensitive powers mentioned above, and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions

from which For habits arc

habit of science

,e

No

acquired.®

acquired.

is

ke the actions whereby they are

by

the actions of the intellect,

which science formed by th

acquired in this

life,

are per-

in the sensitiv

mind turning to the phantasms powers mentioned above. Hence

through such

ts

I

the possible intellect acquires

a certain facij|\^ in considering the species re-

Article 5 Whether the Habit of Knowledge Acquired in This Life Remains in the Separated Soul?

Wc

proceed thus to the Fifth Article: It would seem that the habit of knowledge (scientia) acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body. Objection i. For the Apostle says: Knowledge shall be destroyed (I Cor. 13. 8). Obj. 2. Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are better, which seems unfitting, Obj.

3.

Further, separated souls will possess

knowledge by an

Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that tw'o forms of the same species would coexist in the same subject, which is impossible. Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher says^ that “a habit is a quality hard to remove; yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the like.” But in this life there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by death. On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum),^ “Let us learn on earth that kind ^

Categories, 8

*

PL

22, 54Q.

influx of the

(8*'28).

and

ceived,

acquire a of the

above mentioned lower powers

trj;

cert^

a

sider the

\

applied to habit.

here fore, acquired in the pres-

Knowledge,' ent

remain

doc

life

chiefly

de.s

to

is

turns to them to conr

gible object.

intellect itseifj

dispositivcly

it

But as the inteland formally in the whilst it re.sides materially and the lower powers, the same dis-

inU

lectual act r(

tinction

aptitude in helping the action

when

intelle*

in the separated soul

powers; but as regards ‘^T'h04; also, chap. 16

40, 604.

*

Glossa

*

Dc Cura

*

Chap. IS (PL 40,

interl. (iv,

(PL

40, 607).

i.

Whether the

t>oul

Was Made,

or

0} God*s Substance?

We

through the souls

life,

*

himself. (2)

(q. xctii). (3)

proceed thus to the First Article:

It

Wv'Uld seem that the soul was not made, but w^as

of God’s substance.

Objection

For

it is written (Gen. 2. 7): of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man

i.

God formed man

was made a living soul. But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul,

by which man

lives, is of

the Divine sub-

stance. io2v) J

pro Mort.^ 6o(^

Obj. ’

2.

Further, as explained above (q. lxxv,

Chap. 12 (PL 40, 600).

‘

FIRST PART A. 5), the soul is

a simple form. But a form

is

an

th.^oul is of God’s substance. i^rther/^ings that exist and do not differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain differencill^nd thus would be composite. Therefore God an^ii^^u;

uoj.

3.

man mind are the same. On the contrary, Augustine {De

the opinion that

Orig.

“God made

the soul net

out of nothing, but from Himself.”

I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said q. lxxix, a. 2 q. lxxxiv, a. (q. lxxvii, a. 2 6j, the human soul is sometimes in a state of ;

as

were unable

;

is

of the substance of God.

i. The term “breathe” is not to be taken in the corporeal sense but as regards the act of God, to breatflfc(jp/rare), is the same as

Reply Obj.

;

to

make

a spirit. Moreover, even in the corpo-

man by breathing does not send forth anything of his mvn substance, but an extraneous thing. / Reply Obj. Although the soul is a simple form in its essmcc, yet it is not its own being, but is a bcinglby participation, as above exreal sense,

J

plained (q. lxJv, a. 5, Ans. 4). Therefore not a pure act Ike God.

in

Q. IX, A. i).

something,

opinions of the ancients. P'or those

who

first

be-

gan to observe the natures of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed ^ Therefore they said that God was a body,'*’ which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that

body which they regarded as the first principle, is stated in the book on the Soul,^ it followed that the soul was of the substance of God. According to this supposition, also, the Manicha^ans, thinking tliat God was a corporeal light, held that the soul w^as part of that light, bound up with the body.*’ Then a further step in advance was made, and some apprehended the being of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body,*’ so that Varro said, “God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason,” as Augustine relates.’^ So some supposed man’s

go so far as to distinguish the

according to the distinction of bodies. But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (q. iii, aa. i, 8; and q. lxxv, a. 1), and therefore it is evidently false that the

potency to the act of understanding, acquires its knowledge somehow from things, and has various powers; all of which are foreign to the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act. receiving nothing from any other, and admitting of no variety in itself, as we have proved (q. iii, aa. i, 7; This error seems to have originated from two

to

481 of the whole world; for they

different degrees of spiritual substance, except

soul

Animce iii. 15)* mentions certain opinions which he calls “exceedingly and evidently perverse, and epntrary to the Catholic Faith,” among which the first is

ART. 2 man is a part

Q. 90.

it is

Reply Obj.%. That which differs, properly speaking, difftJs by something; therefore we seek for diffcij|ice where blance. For

we

find also resem-

thnreason things which

some way

com pound, in

differ

must

since they differ in

something resemble each

other. In thislense, although

all

that differ are

diverse, yet allthings that are diverse do not differ, as is

state! in the Metaphysics.^ For simple

things differ

iimhcm selves and not by other

ferent things

For instance,

At

dif-

of which they are composed.

aman and a

horse differ by the dif-

wc cannot say that these again differ by some further difference of

raticrfial

and

irrational, but

ference.

as

soul to be part of that all-embracing 1

PL

®

Cf. Q. n, A.

®

Cf. Augustine,

44, 5^2.

=*

I, Aiib.

De

soul,**

just

Cf. Q. XLIV, A. 2.

2

(note).

Ilaera,,

•

(PL 34, 361). Cf. Q. XLlV, A. 2.

’

CUy of God,

^

Ari.stotlc, i, 2 (405^0xlvi (PL 42, 35); Gen. ad

Hit., VII, II

vii,

6

(PL

41, igg);

cf.

also iv, 31

(PL

41,

13S).

Macrobius, In Somn. Scip., i, 14 (DD 45b); Pluto, according to Albert the Great, in De Mot. An., i, i (BO “

IX, 258).

Article 2. Whether the Sotd Was Produced in Being by Credtion?

We proceed thus to the Second Article: It would seem that the soul was not produced in being by creation. Objection, i. For that w^hich has in itself something material ds produced from matter. But the soul has something material in itself, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter, and hence it was not created. Obj. 2. I'urther, every act of matter is drawn out of the potency of that matter; for since matter is in potency to act, any art pre-exists in matter potentially. But the sou! is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition.^*^ Therefore the soul is drawn out of the potency of matter.

Obj.

3.

Further, the soul

is

•Aristotle, V, 0 (IOl8“rI)^ . w Aristotle, Soul, u, i (412^7).

a form. Therefore,

SVMMA TBEOWGICA if j£hc

soul

by equal reason all other Thus no forms would come

forms are created. into being

matter, as

created,

is

by generation which ;

is

reason

we have seen

it is

not drawn

a. 2), far this

(o-

oiit

not true.

On the contrary It is written (Gen, i. 27): God created man to His own image. But man is

Reply Ob}. 3. As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other

y

forms. image of God in his soul. Therefore the was created. 3. Whether the Rational Soul / answer that, The rational soul can be made in, which is not true of other' other 'ts Produced by God Immediately? only by creation, in the

soul

,

We

The reason is because since to be made is way to being, a thujjj^^tfst be made in such way as is suitable to itimode of being. Now

forms. a

that properly subsisting as

said to be which itself has being,

is it

were

in its

o\^ being.

of the angels.

Therefore

Objection

only .sub.sfancos arc properly ar^ truly called be-

fan as a being.

The same

|non-subsistent

is

to be said of

all olhi

inferior spirits,

i.

The

Obj.

is it.s

end of

ing necessarily exists at the .soul’s

same time with

the form.

by the higher.”

The

.same reason holds

if

the soul

is

Obj.

3.

Further,

can produce

Aristotle, vii,

1

* C£. Q. L, A. 2; Q.

(io28“as).

LXXV,

A, 6.

“The

its like,”

into being

as

perfect is

is

which

that

stated in the fourth

book on Meteorology.^ But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal Therefore, since bodies

produce their

much more

species,

'

like in their

own

are angels able to produce

something specifically and such is the rational

inferior to themselves; soul.

On the contrary, It is written ( Gen 2. 7) that God Himself breathed into the face of man the breath of

life.

I answer that,

Some

hav*e held that angels,

acting by the power of God, produce rational souls.*'

But

this

quiic

is

first

»

come

through the higher, and souls by angels.

ter of a celestial body is not otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Therefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter. Reply Obj. 2. The drawing out of act from the potency of matter is nothing eke but something becoming actual that previously was in potency. But since the rational soul does not depend in its being on corporeal matter, but has subsLstent being, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal ;

back

as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.

against faith. For

to

of things from

i.'^sue

therefore also the lower

v);'*

be composed o*f some spiritual matter, as some maintain because that matter is not in potency to another form, just as the mat-

supposed

God is the beginning and

Therefore the

all.

to their end. But “lower things are brought back

the

essence, bccju.se being naturally follows

are

the

spirits,

their beginning corresponds to their going

soul’s siiyple es.sence is as

formal element, which participated be-

the

Further, the end c()rrespond.s to the

2.

beginning of things, for

it

the material clement, while it! participated being

of the superior, as Dio-

angels.

A

Reply Obj.

have more

Nom. iv).^ Therefore also who are the rational souls,

produced by means of the superior

would be a corporeal nature! nor spiritual, w^hich would involve the tr^ismutalion of one spiritual sukstance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.

spiritual things

means

are produced by

mg, it does not pertain to any non -existing fornf 0 be made, but they are said to be made throujfi^the compo.site substances being made. On the^.her hand, the rational soul is a subsist ent forim, as above explained (q. lxxv, a, 2). And so 1 properly pertains to it to be and to be madl. And since it cannot be made of pre-cxistiiff {prccjacens)

way

For

nysius says (Div.

forms. Therefore, properly spe;

matter, neither corporeal becauf, in this

i.

order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies

mgs. But an accident does not lave being, but it called a besomething is by it, and so far ing; for instance, whiteness is c !led a being because by it something is white. |lcnre it is said in the Metaphysics^ that an ac' ilent should be described as of a being rather

proceed thus to the Third Article: It

would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality

the

impossible,

has been proved

it

and

(a. 2

)

the rational soul cannot be produced except creation

Now, God alone can

is

that

by

create, for the

agent alone can act without presupposing

anything, while the second cause always presup-

poses .something derived from the

above explained ®Sect. 4 * «

(PC

(q.

lxv,

3, (n) 7 ).

a. 3).

first

cause, as

And every

Sect. 4

(PG

agent

3, 504).

Aristotle, 3 (38o'‘i4). Aviceuiui, Mctii i\, 4 (104 vb); ,

rocs, Dcsi. Dfst., 3 cf.

(i\.

AuKuslinc, I)c

cf. Algazcl, in Aver52K); Liher de Causii, 3 (BA Hacres., 50 (PL 42, 41). Albert

th" Great, in Simma de Creatur., attributes this jx>sition to Gundissalinus; d. Gundissalinus, De An., 5 (MJC 51. lo).

FIRST PART that presupposes somethiag to its act. acts

makings change by

in

creation. Since,

it.

Therefore everything else but God alone acts

Tm^fore,

the rational soul

cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced except hi|Hgdiately by God. '

Thus the

Q. 90t AIS'. 4

by

483

AugusUn^, however (Gen. ad says that the soul of the at the

same time

first

vii,

lit.

man was

24),*

created

as the angels, before the body,

for another reason. For he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced not actually, but only in their

causal principles; which cannot be said of the

soul, because neither was it made of any prcFor that bodies produce their like or somethiilg^S^xi sting corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could inferior to themselves, and that the higher it be produced from any created principle, things lead back the inferior, Therefore it secmr^^^jU the soul itself, during all these things are effected through a certain transmutation. the work of the six when all things were made, was created, together with the angels, and Article 4. Whether the Human Soul Was that afterwards, its own will, was joined to Produced Before the Body? the service of th^ody, But he does not say thi$

replies to the objections ar^^tSSw-.

—

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: It would seem that the human soul was made be-

says (loc. citjP

fore the body.

Scripture nor

Objection i. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above (q. lxvi, a. i; q. lxx, a. i). But the soul w^as produced in being by creation, whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment as was maintained above (q. lxxii). Therefore the soul of man was made before the body. Obj. 2. Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter, while the body of man was formed on the sLxth day, when also the animals were made. There-

on the

fore the soul of

man was

created before the

body. Obj. 3. Further, the end is proportioned to the beginning But in the end the soul outlasts the

body. Therefore in the beginning before the body. On the contrary,

it

was created

act

is

produced

the proper act of the body, the soul

was pro-

duced in the body. I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon, i)* held that not ordy the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies. For he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condilion,

and

differ

them—namely, bodies

main

—are Of

or of heavenly

it

2),

here.

Chaps.

1

ated.”

Now

this

cold be upheld by those who hold

that the soul

hrSof

nature, and thOlit

itself is

a complete species and

not united to the body as

form, but its ruler.** But if the soul is united to the ^dy as its form, and is naturally

its

^

P^i^t of

hum A

nature, this supposition

For

get her impossille. l-be first

it is

6, 8,

g

(PG

iz, i66, 178, sag).

is

alto-

God made

clear that

thingsln their perfect natural state, acof each required. Now the

cording as the

soul, as a part'Sf

human

nature, has

its

natural

perfection only^fs united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be

created without the body,

Therefore,

if

tuie about the

in the

we admit the opinion of Auguswork of the six days (q. lxxiv,

we may say that the human soul preceded work of the six days by a certain generic

it has intellectual nature in with the angels, but was itself created fbe same time as the body. According to other saints, both the body and soul of the first man

likeness, so far as

common

were produced in the work of the six days, Reply Obj. 1 If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created in itself, this reason would prove that the soul was created in itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was neces.

sarily created not separately but in the body, Oi*/. 2.

The same observation

second objection. For

from

we have already spoken and so we need say nothing

believe, if neither

if

*PL

34