Governments of the Universitates: Urban Communities of Sicily in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: 21 [1° ed.] 2503527574, 9782503527574

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

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SEUH 21 STUDIES IN EUROPEAN URBAN HISTORY (1100–1800)

SERIES EDITOR

MARC BOONE Ghent University

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES Urban Communities of Sicily in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries

FABRIZIO TITONE

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Regione Siciliana Assessorato dei Beni Culturali ed Ambientali e della Pubblica Istruzione Pubblicazione per iniziativa direttamente promossa dal Dipartimento Regionale per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali ed Educazione permanente Cover illustration: Francesco di Giorgio Martini, Architektonische Vedute (1490/1500) Source: Gemäldegalerie, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin © 2009, Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2009/0095/97 ISBN 978-2-503-52757-4 Printed in the E.U. on acid-free paper

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Explanatory Notes Units of measure Maps Introduction CHAPTER 1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARAGONESE RULE 1.1 Demographic estimates 1.2 The institutional realm from the time of Peter III to Frederick IV 1.3 Fiscal policy during the reigns of Frederick III and Frederick IV: an initial adaptation to the needs of the universitates 1.4 The universitates during the viceregal period: a suggested interpretation CHAPTER 2 CITIES FROM THE TIME OF MARTIN I TO ALPHONSO V: A POLYCENTRIC SYSTEM 2.1 Martin I and the re-establishment of an urban coalition 2.2 The electoral system: a long-term model with few variations 2.3 The town councils CHAPTER 3 URBAN MAGISTRACIES IN THE ALPHONSIAN PERIOD 3.1 Power relations in municipal administrations: the practice of shared governance 3.2 The office of the baiulus 3.3 Institutional differences in government organizational structures 3.4 A system safeguarding municipal prerogatives: the judicial sphere— the privilegium fori and appellate court, the royal commissioner, and the right to reply 3.5 Exgratia concessions and familiares et domestici regis CHAPTER 4 FINANCIAL AND FISCAL POLICY DURING THE REIGN OF ALPHONSO V 4.1 The urban tax system 4.2 Municipal deficit and direct taxation 4.3 Alienation of the captaincy 4.4 Alienation of the universitates

VII VII IX 1

15 17 34 41

49 62 77

93 103 109

113 126

131 140 148 162

V

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CHAPTER 5 SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL GROUPS AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION FROM THE TIME OF MARTIN I TO ALPHONSO V 5.1 Social Stratification 5.2 Conflicts over Access to Local Government Conclusions

169 184 215

Manuscript sources and abbreviations Printed sources and abbreviations Bibliography Appendix, Notes to the Appendix Tables Indexes

219 219 223 247 249 303

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EXPLANATORY NOTES

References to the archival sources of the Cancillería, the Real Cancelleria, the Protonotaro del Regno, and the Atti Bandi e Provviste of the town councils indicate the number of the volume—or cassetta (cass.) for Atti Bandi e Provviste—followed by the number of the folio and the indication of the recto or verso side. In contrast, for Gaudioso’s collections and the Atti dei Giurati of Catania, the volume number is given, the number of the quire, and the page number of the summarized document (regesto). In transcriptions from documentary sources, information which is assumed but still uncertain is enclosed in parentheses; square brackets are used for words missing from the original text, words added or omitted, or missing dates which can be ascertained on the basis of indirect references. Quotations in the vernacular have be translated. In the primary sources, the title and/or designation of notarius is frequently given as notarus. All references to a notarus have been consistently changed to notarius. Italianized forms of given names have been used and the original form has been included only for those cases where the correspondence between the different forms is less obvious. All surnames have been transcribed in their original form and variations of surnames are enclosed within parenthesis. Appellate judge is used to translate iudex primarum appelacionum, appellate notary refers to notarius primarum appelacionum, and the appellate court is the curia primarum appelacionum.

UNITS OF MEASURE The unit of currency in medieval Sicily was the onza which corresponded to 30 tarì. A tarì was worth 20 grani and a grano was equivalent to 6 denari. The cantaro was the most common unit of weight—equal to 79.35 kilograms— and was subdivided into 100 rotoli. Cereals, legumes, and other agricultural products were measured in salme. To the west of the Salso River, a salma equalled roughly 2.75 hectolitres but contained 20% more in the area east of the river.

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Source: S. R. EPSTEIN, Potere e Mercati in Sicilia. Secoli XIII–XVI, transl. by Alfredo Guaraldo, Torino, 1996, p. 39.

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Fairs, 1223–1499. Source: S. R. EPSTEIN, Potere e Mercati in Sicilia. Secoli XIII–XVI, transl. by Alfredo Guaraldo, Torino, 1996, p. 110.

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The main questions that arise when approaching a study of Sicilian cities in the late Middle Ages regard the origins and the articulation of the processes that gave urban communities such an important role in the balance of power in the kingdom that they were at times able to influence royal policies. The topic researched in this book regards the transformation of civic institutions in the 1300s and 1400s and an analysis of the seats of power, persons who wielded power and channels and mechanisms through which it was mediated. The research is the result of a wide-scale examination from which cities emerge as elements in an integrated political system retraceable through the use of common interpretive criteria. The objective is to reconstruct the framework of the pluralistic urban situation and the areas of autonomy available to municipal governments. The point of view used for the research is both central and peripheral, depending in part on the sources available. The documentation from local administrations is not plentiful while records produced by the central government constitute the fundamental point of reference for any study of the history of the universitates. From the latter, where the multitude of records vary greatly as to the types of acts promulgated, municipal strategies and requests can be uncovered. They are also partially discernible using the limited local sources. The nature and degree of diffusion of the kingdom’s documentary production furnishes evidence regarding power structures that underwent significant transformations recorded over the course of time.1 The Angevin monarchy had already registered a certain equilibrium between the concentration of centralized royal power and the development of urban autonomy, different from the balance of power in the NormanSwabian period. When the Aragonese dynasty arrived, however, a confrontation with the communities began which was completely new in many ways and, above all, progressively more severe. An early indication of such a change is to be found in the increased amount of documentation, attributable to two inter-related causes: first, the change in the balance of power, and second, the registration of acts and abundant production of documentation in the 1390s subsequent to administrative reforms that made the central

1 For a comparison, see ARMANDO PETRUCCI, Medioevo da leggere: Guida allo studio delle testimonianze scritte nel Medioevo italiano, Torino, 1992, Chapter 8; PAOLO CAMMAROSANO, Italia medievale: Struttura e geografia delle fonti scritte, Rome, 1991, pp. 113–125; and in particular JOHN G. A. POCOCK, Politica linguaggio e storia, prefazione a cura di Ettore A. Albertoni, Milan, 1990, on political language as the expression of a certain context generated by activity, practices and social dimensions. Also QUENTIN SKINNER, Dell’interpretazione, Bologna, 2001. On the importance of reconstructing the processes through which documents are produced, in order to outline the “genesis of the sources” and the relations between them, see ANGELO TORRE, “I luoghi dell’azione”, in Giochi di scala, pp. 301–314. Regarding transformations in written communication and the possible consequences on government policies, see JACK GOODY, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society, Cambridge, 1986; for the effects of writing on oral culture, see JACK GOODY, The Interface between the Written and the Oral, Cambridge, 1987, Chapters 2 and 5.

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administration more complex.2 In addition to the advantage of sheer quantity, this research relied mainly on central administrative sources because they provide evidence regarding a number of urban communities, and allow an examination from a wider point of view. The abundance of different types of documentation (concessions of privileges, petitions, mandates, etc.) allows for a comparison of institutional transformations and social changes in different communities. For example, through royal concessions and mandates (to cite just a few of the most diffuse acts) the interrelationships among civic institutions can be discerned, along with institutional deformity or elements common to all the universitates. Similarly, certain local sociographical aspects can be traced through petitions (capitula) and community complaints. A further reason has to do with the nature of the sources: the sovereign was a fundamental part of the process of state-building, in which communities had a primary role to play, so to reconstruct the development of the process it is necessary to look at royal authority. Late medieval Sicilian urban history can be divided into three periods. The first stretched from the Aragonese takeover (1282) through the first half of the 1300s during which the Crown re-established pre-existing municipal conditions within a different framework of power between the sovereign and his realm, and the cities began to play an active role in the dynamics of the kingdom. Then there followed a period of adjustment and persistence of the urban institutions which continued until the crisis of royal power and the assertion of control by the great magnates (1377–1392). Finally, there was a long span of time from the restoration of Martin I of Sicily (1392–1409) until at least the end of Alphonso’s reign (1416–1458) when the involvement of the cities was constantly central to the workings of the kingdom thanks to a broadening of the restraints to their autonomy. This chronological period is also generally recognized as being the time when cities in the royal demesne were at their height demographically.3 As is well known, Frederick IV’s reign (1355–1377) was followed by the period of the Vicars, or great magnates, when the four major aristocratic families came to power, a time when the number of recorded documents plummeted: a hypothetical damnatio memoriae in respect to the royal sources. Very few documents remain for the period of the magnates, quite plausibly because the records they produced were subject to the dispersion carried out during the restoration by Martin I. I do not believe, however, that the paucity of documents for the feudal dominions can be attributed solely to a possible strategy of repudiation, especially considering the fact that the documentation available from the Alphonsian period is limited even in communities where the Sovereign himself had

2 ADELAIDE BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione dell’ufficio del Conservatore del Real Patrimonio e gli organi finanziari del regno di Sicilia nel sec. XV (Contributo alla storia delle magistrature siciliane)”, in ADELAIDE BAVIERA ALBANESE, Scritti minori, Palermo, 1958, repr. Messina, 1992, pp. 3–107; PIETRO CORRAO, Governare un regno. Potere, società e istituzioni in Sicilia fra Trecento e Quattrocento, Naples, 1991. On the consequences of the political transformations in the documentation of the fifteenth century, see ISABELLA LAZZARINI, “La communication écrite et son rôle dans la société politique de l’Europe méridionale”, in Rome et l’État moderne européen: une comparison typologique: Colloque organisé par L’École Française de Rome et Laboratoire de médiévistique occidentale de Paris I –Sorbonne, Rome, 31 January-2 February 2002, ed. JEAN-PHILIPPE GENET, Rome, 2007, pp. 389–412 and for a comparison with the types of records in the principalities and the republics, see ISABELLA LAZZARINI, “La nomination des officiers dans les états italiens du bas Moyen Âge (Milan, Florence, Venice) : Pour un essai d’histoire documentaire des institutions”, in Bibliotèque de l’École des Chartes, 159, 2002, pp. 389–412. 3 HENRI BRESC, Un monde méditerranée. Économie et socièté en Sicile 1300–1450, 2 vols, Rome-Palermo, 1986, I, pp. 59–77; STEPHAN R. EPSTEIN, Potere e mercati in Sicilia: Secoli XIII-XVI, trans. by Alfredo Guaraldo, Turin, 1996, pp. 35–69.

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promoted their alienation from the royal demesne. For the years from 1377 to 1392 only a few examples are available, probably because what was produced was subject to dispersion, and because it is conceivable that the social interchanges dealing with the control of the feudal nobility took place “spesso sulla base della consuetudine orale, dell’arbitrio, comunque in maniere informali e non suscettibili di un riflesso scritto”.4 The period of the great magnate constitutes, among other things, a watershed in the type of royal documentation: because the power structures were different, there are numerous differences between what was produced after the Vespers up until the reign of Frederick IV and that which came after Martin I. The main evidence of this evolution is to be found in the municipal petitions (a few examples of which already existed in the first half of the 1300s) in which numerous clues can be found regarding the composition of society, the institutions, and the economic situation in the cities. It has been said that these documents represent the most important source of information about Sicilian society in the 1400s, permitting a reconstruction of the relationships between institutional transformations and economic changes.5 Moreover, receiving and monitoring the requests from the urban communities was seen as a filter for interpreting the local situation.6 Determining how typical a document is presents one of the greatest challenges in dealing with sources, and given the importance of the petitions it is a good idea to evaluate their value and limits. The collections of petitions are made up of two separate levels, the initial municipal petitions and the corresponding royal responses, distinct as well with regard to the type of language normally employed (vernacular or Latin). This double structure makes a sovereign’s possible distortion of the petition less likely. The sovereign could use the response to completely elude the plea, put off a reply, or not even answer at all, as was recorded to have occurred in various cases. These sources lead to the identification of political language and its diverse styles of reasoning within the history of political thought.7 Among other things, the formula of request and reply allows for an immediate comparison of the two linguistic worlds which, although distinct, seem in some instances to blend in a somewhat partial assimilation of the rhetoric of the interlocutor, especially the language of the governors by the governed.8

CAMMAROSANO, Italia, p. 124. This is not alway true however; see MANUEL SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, “Fiscalidad y finanzas de una villa senoñial catalana: Castellò d’Empùries, 1381–1382”, in Fiscalidad real y finanzas urbanas en la Cataluña medieval, ed. MANUEL SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, Barcelona, 1999, pp. 308–309. 5 STEPHAN R. EPSTEIN, “Governo centrale e comunità del demanio nel governo della Sicilia tardomedievale: le fonti capitolari”, in XIV Congresso, III, pp. 388–393; EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 18–19. RUGGERO MOSCATI, Per una storia della Sicilia nell’età dei Martini (Appunti e documenti: 1396–1408), Messina, 1954, pp. 71–80, was the first to underline the value of the petitions. PIETRO CORRAO, “Negoziare la politica: i «capitula impetrata» dalle comunità del regno siciliano nel XV secolo”, in Forme, pp. 125–134, recently pointed out some cases of royal concessions made following the presentation of petitions; it is still necessary to verify if what had been approved by the sovereign was actually put into practice and how it was eventually enacted. 6 ENNIO I. MINEO, “Norme cittadine, sviluppo istituzionale, dinamica sociale: sulla scritturazione consuetudinaria in Sicilia tra XIII e XIV secolo”, in Legislazione e prassi istituzionale nell’Europa medievale: Tradizione normative, ordinamenti, circolazione mercantile (secoli XI-XV), ed. GABRIELLA ROSSETTI, Naples, 2001, p. 380. 7 For a comparison, see SKINNER, Dell’interpretazione, Chapter 3. See JOHN G. A. POCOCK, “Concetti e discorsi politici: differenze di cultura? A proposito di un intervento di Melvin Richter”, in Filosofia Politica, 3, 1997, pp. 371–373, regarding the value of a historiography of one of the political languages. On this historiographic perspective whose objective is “la ricostruzione e ridescrizione delle convenzioni storiche o linguaggi in cui i testi politici sono creati e a partire dai quali vengono interpretati”, see MAURIZIO MERLO, “La forza nel discorso: Note su alcuni problemi metodologici della storiografia del discorso politico”, in Filosofia Politica, 1, 1990, pp. 37–56 (quote on p. 38). 8 For a comparison, see POCOCK, Politica, especially Chapters 3, 5 and 7. 4

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To describe the urban circumstances and the power relations with the sovereign based solely on the petitions produced would be limiting. The greatest risk would be the creation of an incomplete picture if it were not verified that a concession made by the Crown was actually put into effect: the approved petition could otherwise be taken as evidence of a delicate equilibrium with only short-term effects. The remaining documentation produced by the central government permits a verification in that sense. This is obviously an issue related to the type of negotiation passing between the sovereign and a community and the various results of the bargaining. For a comparison with other states of the Crown of Aragon, studies made by Belenguer Cebrià for the cities of Valencia and by Bernabé Gil for the Valencian city of Orihuela should be cited.9 These studies regard the reform brought about by the introduction of the insaculació to the electoral procedures and the criteria for representation. They also stress the necessity of contextualizing the reform in relation to the judicial-institutional organization of the urban community itself, the privileges held, and the relations with the king. Such a method is indispensable for understanding motives and results which can almost never be generalized. This methodological approach is without a doubt applicable to every new political strategy, especially when it results from negotiations between the Crown and the universitates, as was the case for what came about in Sicily through the municipal petitions.10 In the collections of petitions, it is important to note the marked reappearance of requests that had already received approval, irregardless of whether or not they had been implemented after the original concession: a characteristic that could be taken as evidence of the political inefficiency of these political practices.11 Such a conclusion can not always be supported though, for example, when the point of view changes, as is the case when only certain sectors of the community had desired the sovereign’s retraction of a preceding practice he had originally approved, or when a plea was resubmitted because it required further confirmation in order to oppose those who were working for its demise. In addition, a reiteration often lead to progress towards securing the concession. When considering the balance of power between Crown and city, it is a good idea to keep in mind that the contrasts therein should be interpreted in light of a

9 ERNEST BELENGUER CEBRIÀ, Valencia en la crisi del segle XV, Barcelona, 1962; GIL D. BERNABÉ, Monarquía y patriciado urbano en Orihuela, 1445–1707, Alicante, 1990. See also the considerations of GUIDO D’AGOSTINO, Poteri, istituzioni e società nel Mezzogiorno moderno e contemporaneo, Naples, 2003, pp. 3–8, regarding the need to intertwine “local” and “general”, and to identify timing and methods in the analysis of royal and aristocratic politics confronting and impacting the cities. Regarding the insaculació, see pp. 187–188. 10 Certain political strategies, at first glance, can appear to be highly contradictory but the contradiction often results from the analitical approach used. For some recent proposals regarding methodology, see MARCELLO VERGA, “Il Seicento e i paradigmi della storia italiana”, in Storica, 11, 1998, pp. 7–42, according to which it is necessary to isolate a single historiographic object in the period under examination, in order to understand the logic of it in its real context and manifestations. See also RENATA AGO, “Cambio di prospettiva: dagli attori alle azioni e viceversa”, in Giochi di scala, pp. 239–250. There is a partially different position in GIORGIO CHITTOLINI, “Un paese lontano”, in Società e Storia, 100–101, 2003, pp. 331–354, regarding the need to identify connections between different periods and the importance of a judgement which starts with contemporary categories to which “siamo inestricabilmente legati, e da esso soltanto nasce lo stimolo a guardare al passato”; ibidem, p. 350. 11 The inefficiency of another site of negotiations, Parliament, has been alleged for reasons that include the reiteration of requests for what had already been granted; BEATRICE PASCIUTA, Placet regie maiestati: Itinerari della normazione nel tardo medioevo siciliano, Torino, 2005, pp. 245–246.

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concentration of royal power that did not, however, exclude the vast participation of other political entities. And although it could also be inferred that the political vitality of the urban community was independent of the sovereign, a consideration of the role played by the Crown is crucial to comprehending the development of the universitates which all made continual references to the Crown as guarantor of their autonomy.12 The Crown’s role should not be overemphasized: local governments normally functioned autonomously in the running of the governmental affairs within their province. It is not by chance that royal approval of municipal petitions managed to stay in effect only for a very short period of time due to alterations in the local balance of power, and it can be noted that the Crown did not always participate in the re-establishment of a new equilibrium. Indeed, shifts in the power structure that had prompted royal approval of a petition submitted to him often brought about the automatic forfeiture of the privilege, without any royal involvement in the new dynamics. Political practices corresponded to precise relationships especially in the first half of the 1400s when the enormous financial needs of the Crown induced the sovereign to offer ample compensations in the form of privileges that exalted urban identity in exchange for financing, and to intervene in a decidedly sporadic manner. An examination and comparison of specific interactions between the Crown and the individual universitates was helpful in tracing these aspects and a significant plurality of urban systems emerged from the analysis.13 A criterion of pluralism is nevertheless unsatisfactory for interpreting the municipal situation which was simultaneously differentiated yet also highly integrated. The political dynamics of a single centre, rather than constituting an isolated case, represented for every other universitas the potential leeway for exercising power in relation to the Crown: the level of rights and privileges obtained served as standard against which the other cities compared themselves. Cities communicated with each other, and although variations existed among them, it is possible to identify common parameters. This also emphasizes the

12 For a redefinition of the concept of the state, where the attention is placed on judicial pluralism and political policies organized around negotiation and bargaining, and on overcoming the dichotomous concepts of categories of analysis because they are inadequate for interpreting the multiplicity and the interplay of the socio-institutional processes, see the important analysis by OSVALDO RAGGIO, “Visto dalla periferia: Formazioni politiche di antico regime e Stato moderno”, in Storia d’Europa, L’età moderno: Secoli XVI-XVIII, 5 vols, Torino, 1995, IV, pp. 483–527. See also PIETRO CORRAO, “Centri e periferie nelle monarchie meridionali del tardo medioevo: Note sul caso siciliano”, in Origini, pp. 187–206; ELENA FASANO GUARINI, “Centro e periferia, accentramento e particolarismi: dicotomia o sostanza degli Stati in età moderna?”, in Origini, pp. 147–176; ANDREA ZORZI, “Introduzione”, in Lo Stato territoriale, pp. 1–18; LUCA MANNORI, “Lo stato di Firenze e i suoi storici”, in Società e Storia, 76, 1997, pp. 411–415; LUCA MANNORI, “Genesi dello Stato e storia giuridica (a proposito di: AA. VV., Origini dello Stato: Processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo ed età moderna, a cura di G. Chittolini, A. Molho, P. Schiera, Bologna, 1994)”, in Quaderni Fiorentini, 24, 1995, pp. 485–505; ANGELO TORRE, “Società locale e società regionale: complementarietà o interdipendenza?”, in Società e Storia, 67, 1995, pp. 113–124; MARCO GENTILE, “Leviatano regionale o forma-stato composita? Sugli usi possibili di idee vecchie e nuove”, in Società e Storia, 88, 2000, pp. 561–573. 13 On the importance of a comparative analysis to identify the specifics of the different cases, with reference to the study of the fiscal situation in Italy in the period after the age of the communes, see MARIA GINATEMPO, “Spunti comparativi sulle trasformazioni della fiscalità nell’Italia post-comunale”, in Politiche finanziarie, pp. 126–127. For a further comparison, see the important research by CHRIS WICKHAM, Legge, pratiche e conflitti: Tribunali e risoluzione delle dispute nella Toscana del XII secolo, Rome, 2000, who, in examining the process of confronting and resolving private disputes in Tuscany in the twelfth century, points out how each community approached the law differently according to its own cultural choices and: “ovunque si instaurò una dialettica costante tra le pratiche sociali e il sapere giuridico formalizzato, che si influenzarono a vicenda”; ibidem, p. 26.

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impossibility of studying the urban situation with a single centre as the hub since regulatory processes and those defining autonomy were not always initiated by the Crown. The sources often record a marked reciprocal interaction between the sovereign and the communities in constructing urban framework, and shifts in power relations often originated from municipal petitions.14 The major interpretive risk that could proceed from this statement is a blurring of the limits of power, while at the same time it must be made clear that the formalization of a new equilibrium nevertheless depended on the Crown. In an instance, for example, where a shift in power relations was brought about autonomously by certain factions, the excluded parties could obtain a reversal from the sovereign. The best formula for defining Sicily’s monarchy in the 1300s and 1400s would seem to be a Crown that did not systematically promote the development of urban autonomy, but systematically guaranteed it. As mentioned earlier, reference was not only made to the documentation produced by the central government but also to the local sources which, although limited, made it possible to focus on the urban point of view with greater precision. This local documentation is made up of administrative acts and collections of privileges, the earliest of which are for the few centres of Palermo starting from the early 1300s, Malta from the 1430s, and Messina only from the end of the fifteenth century. In addition to the loss of documents due to natural calamities, this scarcity has been attributed to the modest development and absence of a formal organization of the urban structures before 1400: up to that time only metropolises like Palermo and Messina would have civil affairs arranged in a sufficiently structured manner that they could guarantee the documentation of the current administration.15 Given the role played by numerous communities throughout the 1300s, there is no reason to hypothesize an unformed, or even immature institutional apparatus prior to 1400. It seems more correct to think that for the first half of the 1300s, the very limited production of documents was due both to the lack of complexity in the institutional framework and the inevitable gap between the functioning of the institutional apparatus and the importance that was attributed to records.16 Minimal extant documentation can also be attributed to loss of some documentary heritage.17

14 On the interaction or interdependence between the local worlds and central powers, see EDOARDO GRENDI, Il Cervo e la repubblica: Il modello ligure di antico regime, Torino, 1993 e OSVALDO RAGGIO, Faide e parentele: La stato genovese visto dalla Fontanabuona, Torino, 1990. Regarding the capacity of strategies employed by local centres of power to penetrate the central government, see MARCO GENTILE, Terra e poteri: Parma e il parmense nel ducato visconteo all’inizio del Quattrocento, Milan, 2001, pp. 39–40. 15 EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 17–18. 16 For example, even though in Trapani in 1340 there was to be a custodian of the municipal acts (VITO LA MANTIA, Antiche consuetudini della città di Sicilia, Palermo, 1900, repr. Messina, 1994, p. XXXV), there are no archival documents remaining for that period. Likewise, for a later period in Agrigento (P. R. vol. 24, fol. 221v), there was an archive for the curia civilis in 1425, but for which no acts survive. 17 Consider, for instance, the entire Historical Archives of the city of Catania that perished in a fire. Of those records, the important registers compiled by Matteo Gaudioso remain, along with a series of references to the acts regarding food supply policies in ANTONIO PETINO, “Aspetti e momenti di politica granaria a Catania e in Sicilia nel Quattrocento”, in Studi di economia e statistica della facoltà di Economia e Commercio dell’Università di Catania, 2, 1952, pp. 5–83. Gaudioso’s registers (the earliest have to do with documents from 1414) furnish evidence of great importance, even if indirect, regarding the lost archives and consist mainly of town council ordinances, contracts awarded for taxes collection, lists of candidates for government offices, and grants of citizenship. EPSTEIN, Potere, p. 17, had already attributed the loss of evidence in part to natural or human disasters.

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Most of the municipal production comes from customaries which are usually named Liber rubeus and contain mainly concessions of privileges, but also include petitions, transactions in favour of the universitas or private citizens, minutes of council sessions, texts of customary law, etc.18 The Libri of Agrigento, Marsala, Noto, Piazza, Salemi, Sciacca, and Randazzo have been taken into consideration. For Piazza’s universitas, the customary bears the name of Consuetudines and opens with a confirmation by Frederick III (or rex Trinacriae, 1296–1337) in 1309 of the texts of customary law (norms of private law), but the rest is made up of royal concessions and petitions as well as references to council ordinances. The generic title of Consuetudines can be explained by the fact that juridical distinctions between all those acts which broadened the sphere of prerogatives for urban governments were not well defined. The aspect to be underlined with respect to these collections is that they constitute documentation coherent with and parallel to that of the central offices. The correlation between registrations by the cities and the Crown also constitutes clear evidence of the typicality of the petitions and privileges as recorded in the central chanceries. The council minutes serve as excellent informational supplements to the acts issued by the local administration and permitting a more detailed study of the dynamics of the cities. The systematic series pertaining to Palermo and Malta (organic series of records are missing for the other universitates) have been examined along with the rare minutes included in the Libri rubei. The civic council debates can only be fully contextualized when considered in relation to the broad general context of interpretation furnished by the royal documentation. Council minutes alone offer only a partial perspective of the practices that guided the ruling city officials and councillors in performing government activities. The councils only recorded motions voted on, and made no registration of the negotiations underlying or leading up to the voting. Instead, the importance of the analysis of this voting emerges once it is compared to the power relations between the sovereign and the universitates, and to the balance of power between elected and royal officials on one side and councillors on the other. As for the scope of this research and the studies on which it is based, this book presents a further stage in the gradual construction of a historiographical paradigm that has re-evaluated the particular Sicilian experience and, among other things, brought out the importance of urban participation in the workings of the realm. A pioneer study by Giuseppe Giarrizzo assigned to Sicily its proper collocation as a variation of European history.19 Before that, a dualistic theory had relegated the kingdom to a long historiographical fate as an area dependent on central and northern Italy from the time of the Middle Ages and attributed to the Sicilian cities a marginal role in comparison to the condition of cities in the centre and north.20 Prior to the consolidation of an opposing interpretation, there

18 There may be some notable exceptions including, in particular, some ecclesiastical archives, for example, underpinning the research of ILLUMINATO PERI, “Rinaldo di Giovanni Lombardo «habitator terre Policii»”, Palermo, 1956, in ILLUMINATO PERI, Villani e cavalieri nella Sicilia Medievale, Rome-Bari, 1993, pp. 143–195. 19 GIUSEPPE GIARRIZZO, “La Sicilia dal Cinquecento all’Unità d’Italia”, in Storia d’Italia, ed. GIUSEPPE GALASSO, 25 vols, Torino, 1992, XVI, pp. 120–783. 20 A summary of the exponents of the dualistic theory in EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 3–15; a broader survey of the debate in ENNIO I. MINEO, “Sicilia urbana”, in Rappresentazioni e immagini della Sicilia tra storia e storiografia, Atti del convegno di studi, dir. FRANCESCO BENIGNO & CLAUDIO TORRISI, Caltanissetta-Rome, 2003, pp. 19–39.

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were isolated cases of important studies that did not correspond to the generally accepted theory and revealed an economic dynamism and demographic increase with precise reflections on the articulation of society, even for non-metropolitan centres.21 Epstein’s important research on medieval Sicily made it possible to overcome once and for all an interpretation of the Sicilian context as a unique case while highlighting the central role played by cities.22 Numerous studies of local history ensued and contributed to centring the focus of research on this topic, even indicating new threads to be analysed in some cases.23 Epstein identified demographic values and economics as characteristics shared with the rest of Europe, but with respect to the universitates, issues remain unaddressed regarding which other aspects constitute points of convergence with other lines of interpretation in the historiography of coeval reigns. Numerous common elements can be identified by examining the consolidated historiographic tradition of the Crown of Aragon in which the municipality is one of the main themes. One can find support and consolidation for a new interpretative proposal by taking inspiration precisely from these historiographical guidelines that point toward unifying criteria for studies regarding institutional framework, taxation, relations with the Crown, and the articulation of urban society. The major interpretative issues regard the following: the necessity of a long-term analysis in order to capture institutional and societal continuity and distinctiveness, the central role of financial and fiscal policies in relations between the sovereign and local governments and in the process of defining the cities’ autonomy, and

I refer here to the research in 1956 by PERI, “Rinaldo”, pp. 143–195, for the universitas of Polizzi; also belonging to the group are later essays by LUCIA SORRENTI, “Le istituzioni comunali di Troina nell’età aragonese”, in Archivio Storico Siciliano, 4th. s. 4, 1978, pp. 111–167 for the universitas di Troina and ADELAIDE BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, in Acta, III, pp. XV-LXVIII for the universitas di Palermo. The summary in 1921 by LUIGI GENUARDI, Il Comune nel medio evo in Sicilia: Contributo alla storia del diritto amministrativo, Palermo, 1921, did not constitute an alternative treatment. Although offering numerous points worthy of reflection, it is a study that was not particularly successful, both because it did not find fertile ground for a debate at the time and because many of the arguments were very weak. Faced with a decidedly abundant supply of documentation available for the 1300 and 1400s, the author concentrates primarily on the functions and relationships of power among city officials for the preceding periods. In addition, even though all the documentation produced by the central government is examined, his research centres mainly on a small part of that documentation, specifically the city petitions, the interpretation of which remains unconnected to the rest of the data. Finally, the power relations among urban institutions, and between the institutions and the central government, are treated summarily, especially for the Aragonese period, with the result that the institutional structure seems highly static. The assumption of an exclusively centralized viewpoint underlies his failure to fully appreciate the reasons behind the communities’ incentives to define their role. The most noteworthy points are the indication of the 1200s as the initial phase in the formation of urban communities, the attention given to institutional deformity among the cities in the Aragonese period, and the claim of significant urban autonomy in financial matters. 22 EPSTEIN, Potere. 23 Regarding Palermo, see: VINCENZO D’ALESSANDRO, Terra, nobili e borghesi nella Sicilia medievale, Palermo, 1994, pp. 128–151; ANGELA TRIPOLI, Amministrazione cittadina e oligarchia urbana: Palermo nella prima metà del Quattrocento, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Palermo, 1995; BEATRICE PASCIUTA, “Gerarchie e policentrismo nel regno di Sicilia: L’esempio del tribunale Civile di Palermo (secolo XIV)”, in Quaderni Storici, 97, 1998, pp. 143–169; ENNIO I. MINEO, “Città e società urbana nell’età di Federico III: le élites e la sperimentazione istituzionale”, in Federico III d’Aragona re di Sicilia (1296–1377), convegno di studi Palermo 27–30 novembre 1996, dir. MASSIMO GANCI & VINCENZO D’ALESSANDRO & ROSETTA S. GUCCIONE, 4th. s. 23, 1997, Palermo, 1997, pp. 109–149. Regarding the community of Malta, see PIETRO CORRAO, “Assemblee municipali nella Sicilia tardo-medievale note sul caso maltese”, in Karissime Gotifride, ed. PAUL XUEREB, Malta, 1999, pp. 147–158. Further studies include GIACOMO PACE, Il governo dei gentiluomini: Ceti dirigenti e magistrature a Caltagirone tra medioevo ed età moderna, Rome, 1996, for Caltagirone, and CARMEN SALVO, Una realtà urbana nella Sicilia medievale: La società messinese dal Vespro ai Martini, Rome, 1997, for Messina. For an interpretation in opposition to the studies highlighting the cities’ pivotal role in the kingdom, see the survey in the notes of SALVATORE TRAMONTANA, Il Mezzogiorno medievale: Normanni, Svevi, Angioni, Aragonesi nei secoli XI-XV, Rome, 2000, pp. 123–126, 178–183, 194–197, who maintains that cities were subject to the interests of the feudal nobility, without a considerable degree of autonomy, and unable to pursue common strategies. 21

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the connection between institutions and socio-professional groups.24 A broader study encompassing the Kingdom of Castile, despite representing a somewhat different case, at once reveals urban elements similar to Sicily especially those related to economic and fiscal organization: strong evidence that regarding Sicily as a unique case would be inappropriate. The first overview was Josep M. Font Rius’s research on the Principality of Catalonia presented through a shrewd breakdown of urban circumstances in different periods over a long span of time. This Catalonian scholar focused on the jurisdiction exercised by the communities and on institutional deformities while identifying similar structures in the organization of major government institutions. His work also focused on widespread pressure for a broadened definition of the cities’ rights.25 This research provoked numerous studies regarding the relationships between urban conflict and representational distribution, as well as the composition of socio-professional groups and the depths of their ties to seats of government.26 In many cases these dynamics were traced through an analysis of electoral procedures and the effects of royal economic burdens on the development of financial and urban fiscal policy.27 They are predominantly monographic studies that, by taking into account a bountiful supply of documentation, both central and local, and including larger cities as well as medium-sized and less populous communities, revealed a complex institutional apparatus with important leeway for 24 Regarding the need for a very careful application of the term ‘socio-professional’, which delimits groups by virtue of criteria that do not necessarily correspond to the experience of the social actors, see SIMONA CERUTTI, “La construction des catégories sociales”, in Passés recomposes, ed. BOUTIER JEAN & JULIA DOMINIQUE, Paris, 1995, pp. 225–228. For the criteria adopted in identifying socio-professional groups, see Chapter 5. 25 JOSEP M. FONT RIUS, “Orígenes” del regimen municipal de Cataluña”, in Anuario de historia del derecho español, 16–17, 1946, pp. 5–504. 26 For the city of Barcelona there is the important work, CARME BATLLE GALLART, La crisis social y económica de Barcelona a mediados del siglo XV, 2 vols, Barcelona, 1973, on the socio-economic crisis in the mid-1400s and its repercussions in government entities. Regarding social projection and the composition of the various groups in government bodies in Barcelona, see the research by CHARLES-EMMANUEL DUFOURCQ, “Honrats, mercaders et autres dans le Conseil des Cent au XIVè siècle”, in La ciudad, II, pp. 1361–1395. Batlle Gallart e Dufourcq (also CARME BATLLE GALLART, “El Municipio de Barcelon en el siglo XIV”, in Cuadernos de Història, 8, 1977, pp. 203–212 and CARME BATLLE GALLART & JOAN J. BUSQUETA RIU, “Distribuciò social i formes de vida”, in Història de Barcelona: La ciutat consolidada, III, pp. 91–136) presented a sociographic analysis that examined the functioning of urban institutions and modes of participation; in this regard there is also MARIE GERBET, “Patriciat et noblesse à Barcelone à l’époque de Ferdinand le Catholique: Modalités et limites d’une fusion”, in Villes et sociétés urbaines au Moyen Âge: Hommage à M. le Professeur Jacques Heers (Cultures et civilisations médiévales XI), Paris, 1994, pp. 133–140. With reference to the institutions in Barcelona and its relations with the central government, see JAUME SOBREQUÉS CALLICÓ, “L’Estat català a la baixa Edat Mitjana: les Corts, la Generalitat, i el Consell de Cent”, in Formes i institucions del govern de Catalunya, Barcelona, 1983, pp. 61–79. Among the monographic studies dealing with other centres, for the Archbishopric of Tarragona in Catalonia, FRANCESC CORTIELLA ÒDENA, Una ciutat catalana a darreries de la Baixa Edat Mitjana: Tarragona, Tarragona, 1984, is worthy of note, especially for the information regarding the degree of cohesion among social groups in particular. See also the important investigation for the Catalan community by MAX TURULL RUBINAT, La configuracíó juridíca del municipi Baix-Medieval: Règim municipal i fiscalitat a Cervera entre 1182–1430, Barcelona, 1990. 27 With regard to social articulation, for the Aragonese community, see ESTEBAN SARASA SÁNCHEZ, “Concejos y ciudades medievales en el reino de Aragon. Hacia una tipologia socioeconomica ed los municipios aragoneses en la edad media: da la foralidad a la municipalidad”, in Concejos, pp. 73–106. For an analysis of the states of conflict related to representation in the government, see: ESTEBAN SARASA SÁNCHEZ, Sociedad y conflictos sociales en Aragón siglos XII-XV: Estructuras de poder y conflictos de clase, Madrid, 1981, pp. 179–204; ESTEBAN SARASA SÁNCHEZ, “Monarquía, cortes y ciudades en la Corona de Aragón: siglo XV”, in La Peninsula ibérica en la era de los descubrimientos 1391–1492: Actas III jornadas hispano-portuguesas de historia medieval, 2 vols, Sevilla, 1991, I, pp. 611–626. Again for the Aragonese community, with regard to the electoral system and the criteria for representation, see MARIA I. FALCÓN PÉREZ, Organización municipal de Zaragoza en el siglo XV, Zaragoza, 1978, pp. 19–40 and MARIA I. FALCÓN PÉREZ, “Origen y desarollo del municipio medieval en el reino de Aragón”, in Estudis Baleàrics, 31, 1989, pp. 88–89. For the Valencian community of Orihuela, JUAN A. BARRIO BARRIO, Gobierno municipal en Orihuela durante el reinado de Alfonso V, 1416–1458, Alicante, 1995, examines the institutional framework and electoral procedures. On the social structure of the city of Valencia, see RAFAEL NARBONA VIZCAÍNO, “Orígenes sociales de los tres estamentos ciudadanos en Valencia medieval”, in Estudis, 16, 1990, pp. 7–30. Regarding the spirit of urban identity, see AGUSTÍN RUBIO VELA, “Valencia: La conciencia de capitalidad y su expresión retórica en la prosa municipal quatrocientista”; in Anales de la historia de Alicante: Historia medieval, 13, 2000–2002, pp. 231–254.

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autonomy.28 The majority of these studies were highly analytical and rarely aimed at the identification of common parameters in government operations or social composition, either among the cities in the same state, or with reference to other states. The need to seek this type of information began to take shape with a series of studies on urban economic and fiscal policies in Castile and different contexts in the Crown of Aragon, excluding Sicily. I refer here, in particular, to the work coordinated by Denis Menjot and Manuel Sánchez Martínez and the line of research that followed.29 Max Turull Rubinat demonstrated that financial and fiscal policies are not mere functions of urban government but serve also as stimuli for the establishment of the city’s institutional apparatus.30 From this emerged the active role of the community in relation to the increasingly burdensome economic demands of the Crown and consequently, the ability of the universitas to muster an organization capable of withstanding such pressure.31 Among the studies with the most innovative results, research must be cited which deals with collection methods and political confrontations over the type of taxation to 28 Contrary to the circumstances of urban communities in the Crown of Aragon, communities in the Kingdom of Castile enjoyed a more limited degree of autonomy. For the situation in Castile, see JESÚS MARTÍNEZ MORO, “Partecipación en el gobierno de la Comunidad de Segovia de los differentes grupos sociales: La administración de la justicia. (1345–1500)”, in La ciudad, I, pp. 701–716, which treated the role of members of the distinct social groups in the municipal government and the aristocratic pressure in the urban context for the community of Segovia. More generally, regarding the articulation of Castilian society, see; PAULINO IRADIEL, “Formas del poder y de organización de la sociedad en las ciudades castellanas de la Baja Edad Media”, in Estructuras y formas del poder en la historia, eds. REYNA PASTOR and others, Salamanca, 1991, pp. 23–50; on the formation of family and party lineages, the ties between the two, and the exercise of urban power, see JOSE M. MONSALVO ANTÒN, “Parentesco y sistema concejeil observaciones sobre la funcionalidad politica de los linajes urbanos en Castilla y León”, in Hispania, 185, 1993, pp. 937–969. Royal interventionism sometimes limited the development of an autonomous urban policy in Castile: MARÍA DEL CARMEN CARLÉ, Del concejo medieval castellano-leonés, Buenos Aires, 1968; JULIO VALDEÓN BARUQUE, “Una ciudad castellana en la segunda mitad del siglo XIV: el ejemplo de Murcia”, in Cuadernos de Historia, 3, 1969, pp. 211–254; TEOFILO F. RUÍZ, “The Transformation of the Castilian Municipalities: The Case of Burgos 1248–1350”, in Past and Present, 77, 1977, pp. 3–32; TEOFILO F. RUÍZ, Crisis and Continuity: Land and Town in Late Medieval Castile, Philadelphia, 1994, pp. 180–195. Also HILARIO CASADO ALONSO, “Las relaciones poder real-ciudades en Castilla en la primera mitad del siglo XIV”, in Génesis medieval del Estado moderno: Castilla y Navarra (1250–1370), Valladolid, 1987, pp. 193–215. For a somewhat different position, see JOSE M. MONSALVO ANTÒN, El sistema politico concejil: El ejemplo del señorío de Alba de Tormes y su concejo de Villa y Tierra, Salamanca, 1988, especially pp. 148–151. 29 This refers specifically to DENIS MENJOT & MANUEL SANCHEZ MARTINEZ (eds.), La fiscalité des villes and DENIS MENJOT & MANUEL SANCHEZ MARTINEZ, (eds.), La fiscalité, as well as to the collection of essays in MANUEL SANCHEZ MARTINEZ & ANTONI FURIÓ, dir., Actes and the acts in DENIS MENJOT & ALBERT RIGAUDIÈRE & MANUEL SANCHEZ MARTINEZ, (eds.), L’impôt. In the last two collections mentioned, not only the Iberian context is treated. These studies trace the structuring of the financial organization in urban communities, the criteria and methods employed for tax collection, and the establishment of public debt. 30 TURULL RUBINAT, La configuracíó; MAX TURULL RUBINAT, “El naixement de la fiscalitat municipal a Lleida (1149–1289)”, in Actes, pp. 219–232. Turull Rubinat’s studies regard Catalan communities; for a comparison with communities in the Aragonese kingdom, see MARIA I. FALCÓN PERÉZ, “Finanzas y fiscalidad de ciudades, villas y comunidades de aldeas aragonesas”, in Finanzas, pp. 239–276. For the Kingdom of Valencia, see: JOSÉ HINOJOSA MONTALVO, “Finanzas y fiscalidad de las ciudades Valencianas”, in Finanzas, pp. 301–324. For the Kingdom of Castile, see MIGUEL A. LADERO QUESADA, Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla (1252–1369), Madrid, 1993; MIGUEL A. LADERO QUESADA, “Las haciendas concejiles en la Corona de Castilla”, in Finanzas, pp. 9–74; MIGUEL A. LADERO QUESADA, “Estructuras y políticas fiscales en la Baja Edad Media”, in Edad Media: Revista de Historia, Universidad de Valladolid, 1999, pp. 113–150 31 The entity responsible for collecting taxes, their distribution, and demographic values in the various urban centres have been traced with precision for Catalonia in particular, thanks partly to the existence of precious documentary sources of local legislation, specifically the “Llibres d’estimes, valies o manifestos”, which record the amount of taxation and who was taxed. With reference to these sources in particular, as well as the documentation of the Catalan municipal administrations in general, see JOSEP M. FONT RIUS, “Historiografia recent (1975–2000) sobre el municipi català medieval”, in La ciutat i les poders, pp. 257–260. More specifically, on the importance of the rosters of taxpayers as a basis for research, see MAX TURULL RUBINAT & JORDI MORELLÓ BAGET, “Estructura y tipología de las «estimes-manifests» en Cataluña (siglos XIV-XV)”, in Anuario de estudios medievales, 35/1, 2005, pp. 271–326. Local sources for the Aragonese territory are just as substantial; MARIA I. FALCÓN PÉREZ, “Historia de las ciudades y villas del reino de Aragón en la Edad Media: Evolución y desarollo de los estudios en los últimos veinticinco años”, in En la España Medieval, 23, 2000, p. 398 and p. 401. On the importance of reading the fiscal and administrative documentation of the Crown concurrently alongside that of the municipalities, see MANUEL SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, “Fiscalidad real y vilas en Cataluña: de la ordenación del subsidio a su liquidació (el ejemplo de la “questia”/subsidio del 1338 y la villa de Cervera)”, in La fiscalité, pp. 91–108.

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be adopted.32 An examination of the stages of conflict, often beginning with clashes over fiscal matters, highlighted the effects of these episodes of confrontation on the stability of representational distribution in the government.33 Lastly, a further line of research regarding states under the Crown of Aragon concerns the nature of political practices characterized by negotiation between sovereign and community: the rights and privileges belonging to each city, as well as those obtained from the kingdom, were of a contractual nature because they were agreed upon either in a parliament or between cities and other government bodies. In practice, this was not a political phenomenon peculiar to the Aragonese Crown: the tension in the late medieval period between monarchical policies oriented toward promoting centralized public power and a contractualistic theory underlying the acquisition of concessions represented a generalized European phenomenon.34 Under the Crown of Aragon, however, the political practice which bound the sovereign to respect concessions because they were the result of bargaining (pactism) was particularly widespread: in Parliament contributions were accorded in exchange for the approval of requests known as capitula. The pactist political system has solicited contrasting interpretations from those who believe it constrained royal power35 and those who sustain that the role of the sovereign was not in question because he retained the right of interpreting Regarding this topic, see the important study on Castile by ANTONIO COLLANTES DE TERÁN SÁNCHEZ & DENIS MENJOT, “Hacienda y fiscalidad concejiles en la Corona de Castilla en la Edad Media”, in Historia institucions documentos, 23, 1996, pp. 213–254; see also DENIS MENJOT, “Le consentement fiscal: impôt royal et forces politiques dans la Castille de la fin du Moyen Âge”, in L’impôt, III, pp. 203–220. For Catalonia, with reference to Cervera, see the detailed investigations by PERE VERDÉS PIJUAN, Administrar les pecúnias e béns de la universitat: Cervera 1387–1516, unpublished doctoral thesis, 2 vols, Universitat de Barcelona, 2004, II, pp. 866–936. 33 See the previously cited studies by BATLLE GALLART, La crisis, and SARASA SÁNCHEZ, Sociedad, pp. 179–204. With reference to power relations in other contexts, specifically for the city of Saint-Flour, in Auvergne, see ALBERT RIGAUDIÈRE, Saint-Flour ville d’Auvergne au bas Moyen Age: Etude d’histoire admnistrative et financière, 2 vols, Paris, 1982, which concentrates especially on fiscal policy and the state of conflict between representatives of the different occupational groupings and the government oligarchy. The same author returned to the topic, broadening the analysis with reference mainly to the methods of revenue collection, a theme underlying his reconstruction of the states of conflict; ALBERT RIGAUDIÈRE, Penser et costruire l’État dans la France du Moyen Âge (XIIIe-Xve siècle), Paris, 2003, pp. 621–660. Also ALBERT RIGAUDIÈRE, “Les origines médiévales de l’impôt sur la fortune”, in L’impôt, I, pp. 227–287. With regard to urban conflict, similar dynamics have been demonstrated for English cities: RODNEY HILTON, “Révoltes rurales et révoltes urbaines au Moyen Âge”, in Révolte et société, Actes du IVe colloqui d’histoire au present, Paris, mai 1988, dir. Fabienne Gambrelle & MICHEL Trebitsch, 2 vols, Paris, 1989, II, pp. 25–33; RODNEY HILTON, English and French Towns in Feudal Society: A comparative study, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 134–143; CHRISTIAN D. LIDDY, “Urban Conflict in Late Fourteenth-Century England: The Case of York in 1380–81”, in The English Historical Review, 475 (2003), pp. 1–32. 34 ANGELA DE BENEDICTIS, Repubblica per contratto. Bologna: una città europea nello Stato della Chiesa, Bologna, 1995, p. 73; PAOLO PRODI, Il sacramento del potere. Il giuramento politico nella storia costituzionale dell’Occidente, Bologna, 1992, pp. 200–206, especially p. 204. For the state of Milan, see MASSIMO DELLA MISERICORDIA “Per non privarci de nostra raxone, li samo stati desobidienti: Patto, giustizia e resistenza nella cultura politica della comunità alpine nello stato di Milano (XV secolo)”, in Forme, pp. 147–216, who argues that the common elements in a contractualistic conception for the different contexts should be downplayed; for each context a lexical patrimony is found that springs forth from political confrontation but does not correspond to concepts of continuity and agreement, ibidem, pp. 190–191. 35 See JAUME SOBREQUÉS CALLICÓ, El pactismo a Catalunya: Una praxi política en la història del país, Barcelona, 1982, who sustains that pactism (a practice present in Aragon, Valencia, and Navarra, besides Catalonia according to the author) is a juridic and doctrinal concept that constrained royal power. See also JUAN VALLET DE GOYTISOLO, “Valor jurìdico de las leyes paccionadas en el principato de Cataluña”, in El pactismo, pp. 75–110 and LUISA M. SÁNCHEZ ARAGONÉS, Cortes, monarquía y ciudades en Aragón, durante el reinado de Alfonso el Magnánimo (1416–1458), Zaragoza, 1994, pp. 20–31. JOSÉ L. MARTIN, Economía y sociedad en los reinos hispánicos de la Baja Edad Media, 2 vols, Barcelona, 1983, I, pp. 239–245, treats pactist constitutionalism as having originated during a phase of monarchical weakness and as limiting royal authority. For Sicily, FRANCESCO BENIGNO, “La questione della capitale: lotta politica e rappresentanza degli interessi nella Sicilia del Seicento”, in Società e Storia, XLVII, 1990, pp. 27–29, maintains that the sovereign was bound by the pacts and concessions granted See also MARIO CARAVALE, “Potestà regia e giurisdizione feudale nella dottrina giuridica siciliana tra ‘500 e ‘600”, in Annali dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per l’Età Moderna e Contemporanea, 29–30, 1977–1978, pp. 139–178. More generally, PRODI, Il sacramento, pp. 200–206, traces the series of petitions, or pacta, approved in Parliament, back to the coronation oath on which the justification of royal power and the king’s right to exercise it depended; the sovereign could act only within the limits of the stipulated agreements, ibidem, p. 204. 32

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privileges through his decisions.36 Sicily constitutes an especially interesting testing ground for evaluating these positions37 because its urban communities obtained systems of rights and liberties in the late Middle Ages that were particularly significant but might, at the same time, be at odds with the ever increasing fiscal pressure from the Crown. It was possible for the sovereign to act in a totally arbitrary manner, but such cases were limited and not expressions of royal policy where the sovereign was released tout court from the concessions granted. They constituted a point of reference, instead, in a relationship of constant tension between the central government and local administrations. Indeed, in cases where the sovereign did revoke a stipulated agreement, a favourable period usually followed for the universitates: in an effort to regain the citizenry’s favour, the Crown favoured a rapid re-establishment of the pre-existing equilibrium and often granted guarantees that were more significant then the preceding ones. In 1970, in an introduction to the historiography of fourteenth century Catalan institutions, Lalinde Abadía noted that studies of the 1300s alone were quite rare since chronological divisions are not easily adapted to institutions that are themselves characterized by being de tracto sucesivo.38 One of the points that must be emphasized is precisely this impossibility of identifying changes or phases in isolation and the importance of the links JOSE A. MARAVALL, Stato moderno e mentalità sociale, transl. by Ada Jachia Feliciani, Bologna, 1991, pp. 347–351, considered pactism to be an element of absolutism rather than one of its limits. Iglesia Ferreirós renders the case of Catalonia less specific and shows that the bargaining in the Cortes (Iberian parliaments) did not imply a renunciation of the relation of subordination to a central power which could revoke laws enacted in moments of weakness, just as it could promote legislation independent of the Cortes; AQUILINO IGLESIA FERREIRÓS, La creación del derecho: Una historia de la formación de un derecho estatal español, 2 vols, Madrid, 1996, II, pp. 67–130. He also points out how in Catalonia the principle according to which whatever the Cortes approved could be modified by later Cortes was only aknowledged in 1599; AQUILINO IGLESIA FERREIRÓS, “Del pactismo y de otra forma de escribir la historia”, in Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español: Homenaje a Francisco Tomás y Valiente, 67, 1997, pp. 643–659. For a reconstruction of the various elements which contributed to the political origins of the Cortes in the principality of Catalonia, see ESTHER MARTÍ SENTAÑES, Lleida a les Corts: Els síndics municipals a l’època d’Alfons el Magnànim, Lleida, 2006, pp. 22–25. At the end of a historiographic overview of the political nature of contractual acts, De Benedictis notes how any form of pactism accepted the sovranity of the prince in that he was the supreme expression of justice and did not negate the condition of subjugation; DE BENEDICTIS, Repubblica, p. 68. For Sicily, see VITTORIO SCIUTI RUSSI, Astrea in Sicilia: Il ministero togato nella società siciliana dei secoli XVI e XVII, Naples, 1983, pp. 70–72, according to whom the contracts stipulated by the sovereign in parliament were binding, but the development of this doctrine paralleled the consolidation of the absolute freedom of the royal will. Regarding points of friction between centralizing policies and a deeply ingrained system of privileges, for the Valencian city of Orihuela, see JUAN A. BARRIO BARRIO & JOSE V. CABEZUELO PLIEGO, “La defensa de los privilegios locales y la resistencia a la centralización política en la gubernación de Orihuela”, in Anales de la historia de Alicante: Historia medieval, 13, 2000–2002, pp. 9–42. 37 Regarding the Sicilian parliamentary institution in particular, see: VINCENZO D’ALESSANDRO, “Sulle assemblee parlamentari della Sicilia medievale”, in Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale, LXXX, (1984), pp. 5–17; ADELAIDE BAVIERA ALBANESE, “La Sicilia tra regime pattizio e assolutismo monarchico agli inizi del secolo XVI”, in Studi Senesi, 92, 1980, pp. 189–310; ENRICO MAZZARESE FARDELLA, “Osservazioni sulle leggi pazionate in Sicilia”, in Atti dell’Accademia di Scienze, Lettere e Arti di Palermo, 4rh. s. 16, 1955–1956, pp. 52–83; PASCIUTA, Placet; ENNIO I. MINEO, “Il problema della rappresentanza politica nei regni meridionali italiani del tardo medioevo”, in Rappresentanze e territori: Parlamento friulano e istituzioni rappresentative territoriali nell’Europa moderna, ed. LAURA CASELLA, Udine, 2003, pp. 313–327; SALVATORE FODALE, “Federico III d’Aragona e la genesi del Parlamento siciliano”, in “De curia semel in anno facienda”: L’esperienza parlamentare siciliana nel contesto europeo, Atti del convegno internazionale di studi, Palermo 4–6 febbraio 1999, ed. ANDREA ROMANO, Milan, 2002, pp. 61–71. 38 JESÚS LALINDE ABADÍA, “Las istituciones catalans en el siglo XIV (panorama historiográfico)”, in Anuario de Estudio Medievales, 7, 1970–1971, p. 623. For the history of the Sicilian kingdom, CORRAO, Governare, notes instead the discontinuity, and states that “il periodo compreso fra la restaurazione del potere monarchico in Sicilia operata dall’insediamento di re Martino, Infante d’Aragona e i primi anni del Magnanimo costituiscono un blocco cronologico unitario e autonomo, all’interno del quale si collocano le svolte fondamentali della storia siciliana del tardo medioevo”; ibidem, p. 27. Distinct discontinuity, although for a different period, is also maintained by PASCIUTA, Placet, pp. 246–250. For a comparison with other situations, specifically the urban one, see the considerations and the bibliographical references in WICKHAM, Legge, pp. 44–48, which points out how inexact it is to regard the consulate as a sign of the new urban identity which was, instead, the result of different causes over a long period of time, the most significant of which was the crisis of the State at a ‘national’ level. The author, among other things, comments on the slow development of the institutional identity of the cities; ibidem, p. 49. 36

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between the periods of domination by different rulers, especially in cases where common political strategies come to light, as in the case of Sicily in the 1300s and 1400s. It is necessary to reconstruct the preceding 1300s in order to explain how later developments were possible in tracing the urban world from the end of the fourteenth century through the first half of the fifteenth when cities were at their peak. At the same time, a broader analysis makes it possible to single out discordant elements in the various periods which must not be interpreted, however, as indicative of new phases. Given the aim of identifying long-term tendencies, this study is limited to outlining the main features of the municipal context in the 1300s with particular attention to the reigns of Martin I and Alphonso V because they are relatively well-documented. Some universitates were taken into consideration more thoroughly than others because of their geographical position (east or west, central or coastal), their demographic characteristics (large, medium or small centres) or their institutional circumstances (whether or not they were granted in fief ).39 In the first chapter, from the Vespers through the reign of Frederick III up to the period of the great magnates’ rule, information influencing the development of urban government in the following period is highlighted. This information includes the widened role in the community of certain officials, participation in the government by individuals other than the elected officials, and pressure from the bottom up to amplify the system of rights and privileges. In the second chapter, the institutional framework in the first half of the 1300s is compared to that under Martin I, underlining the redistribution of power among the different government offices as well as the increased complexity in the institutional structure of offices and government entities. In addition, an initial analysis of the more incisive role played in local politics by the various socio-professional groups emerges from an examination of the electoral process and an evaluation of the balance of power between the officials and individuals outside of the group of the those eligible for election to office. This is an aspect examined in greater detail when analysing the town councils. The major part of the study covers the reign of Alphonso (chapters III-V) and in part the reign of Martin I (chapter V). In the third chapter, through an analysis intertwining a level of synthesis with that of specific cases, the relative importance of different offices is pointed out. Within a framework of strong continuity with other periods, the way in which the Alphonsian period constituted the phase of maximum consolidation of the central role of cities in the state is stressed. The urban situation which emerges is characterized by several original aspects: first, there was a certain amount of institutional deformity due to the differing political contexts, and secondly, there were significant differences, especially in the judiciary, thanks to the broadening of privileges promoted by the communities themselves. The fourth chapter deals with economic and fiscal policies and an evaluation of the types of taxation and limitations of municipal

39 For val di Mazara, in the west central region: Agrigento, Corleone, Salemi, Sciacca, Termini, Trapani. For val di Noto in the east central region: Calascibetta, Castrogiovanni (now Enna), Catania, Noto, Piazza. For Val Demone, the northern mountainous region: Milazzo, Nicosia, Patti, Polizzi, Randazzo. The geographical division of the island into three valli with the Salso e Simeto rivers as boundries, dates back to the Muslims; see PIETRO CORRAO & VINCENZO D’ALESSANDRO, “Geografia amministrativa e potere sul territorio nella Sicilia tardomedievale (secoli XIII-XIV)”, in L’organizzazione del territorio in Italia e in Germania: secoli XIII-XIV, eds. GIORGIO CHITTOLINI & DIETMAR WILLOWET, Bologna, 1994, pp. 395–400.

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autonomy, whereby the causes and effects of the royal policies of alienation are considered. The fifth chapter concerns important figures involved in the institutions: the fundamental characteristics of the socio-professional groups are examined by comparing different documents. Following an analysis of the links between those groups and the officials, the relative weight of each of these factions in the government is outlined. The analysis results from an examination of the formulas for defining the social protagonists, their similarities and the reasons behind any contrasting positions among the various groups, as well as the relative percentage of officials present in the government.40 This is a chapter which constitutes the premise for a description of urban society definable especially through an examination of notarial sources, present from the 1300s until at least the end of the Alphonsian period only in some western Sicilian communities. These sources were not taken into consideration here because of the preference given to the importance of identifying individuals with roles in the government and due to the fact that they furnish no elements useful in delineating the framework of municipal institutions. There are many people who have helped me over the years. My thoughts go to Stephan Esptein who was the first to discuss the general outline of this research with me and afterwards provided important suggestions. Igor Mineo dedicated more of his time to me than anyone else. I consulted Vincenzo D’Alessandro and Piero Corrao. Heartfelt thanks for their critical reading goes to Giovanna Fiume, Isabella Lazzarini, Gian Luca Potestà, Andrea Gamberini, and Giovanni Ciccaglioni. In addition, I owe Gian Luca Potestà for his unfailing encouragement, even in difficult moments. In lengthy discussions with Manuel Sánchez Martínez, and Max Turull Rubinat in particular, I received precious pointers and was able to resolve innumerable doubts. Valuable suggestions also came from Carmen Batlle Gallart, Aquilino Iglesia Ferreirós, and Esther Martí Sentañes. I would not have been able to finish this book without long periods of research at the British Library and, more importantly, at the Departamento de Estudios Medievales del Concejo Superior de Investigacion Cientificas in Barcelona.

40 The prosopographic study dealt with a considerable number of officials, all together 7,681, both those elected in the span of time from the reign of Martin I to the reign of Alphonso V, and the Captains, the highest royal city officials, beginning with the reign of Ferdinand I (1412–1416). The data is displayed in the appendix, indicating for those elected the percentage of attendance, their titles and/or the names by which the officials were designated. Reference will be made to this table as “Appendix”. The deputies in the office of the captaincy are dealt with in Section 4.3. For the transcriptions of the annual lists of candidates in elections, see FABRIZIO TITONE, I magistrati cittadini. Gli ufficiali scrutinati in Sicilia da Martino I ad Alfonso V, Caltanissetta-Rome, 2008. The Italianized form of given names is used, but not the surnames which could vary from year to year in the elections: in such cases the citations were made with uniformity by choosing the version which appeared most often, or is most commonly used in historiographical debate, and the prefix – de – has also been omitted for those cases in which it was deleted over the years and are the vast majority.

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1.1

Demographic Estimates

Knowledge of demographic statistics is an indispensable premise for an analysis of the cities’ institutional frameworks because the organizational structures of governments reveal a greater complexity where the population is larger and share features with other centres that have similar rates of urbanization (calculated as a percentage of urban inhabitants in the total population). An analysis of demographic figures for the kingdom must necessarily begin with the royal hearth tax (colletta) levied in 1277 by Charles I of Anjou (1266–1282, and King of Naples until 1285) and the subsidium demanded in 1283 by Peter III of Aragon (1282–1285). The reason for examining this data from the end of the 1200s is that the estimates for this period are vastly different and, moreover, because they underlie contrasting interpretations of developments in the 1300s which are characterized according to some scholars by stability stretching from the 1200s through the following centuries and, for others, by an initial period of growth, then a demographic collapse due to the Black Death, and a final upswing. It is important to keep in mind that the significant limits of the sources available for reconstructing data for the Sicilian population were limits which, as has been pointed out,1 depended first of all on the fact that the figures were furnished for a specific reason. This means it is possible to establish a numerical quantification for some sectors of the population, but not to assign a numerical value to the hearths (households), nor to calculate the number of the exempted which could vary though the years and is not the same in each centre. There remains, therefore, an ample margin of uncertainty. Illuminato Peri proposed innovative calculations attributing an average of 3.5 to 4 persons per hearth with a quota of 2 tarí and 15.5 grani per hearth in 1276–77 and 3 tarí and 5.5 grani in 1278–79, and calculating for the island a population of 567,567/648,648 and 568,675/650,000 people respectively.2 FRANCESCO NATALE, “Problemi di una storia della popolazione siciliana medioevale”, [n. p.] 1957, in FRANCESCO NATALE, Fili Medievali, Messina, 1998, pp. 31–37. 2 The figures include those exempted, in a proportion of not over 10% of the total population. In addition, the quota per hearth is not known for Sicily but is inferred from the amount of taxes levied in other southern centres for the same period; ILLUMINATO PERI, Uomini, città e campagne dall’XI al XIII secolo, Rome-Bari, 1978, pp. 244–251, in particular pp. 246–247. Different estimates were made by CARMELO TRASSELLI, “Ricerche su la popolazione di Sicilia nel secolo XV”, in Atti dell’Accademia di Scienze Lettere e Arti di Palermo, s. IV, 15, 1954–55, pp. 213–271; CARMELO TRASSELLI, “Sulla popolazione di Palermo nei secoli XIII e XIV”, in Economia e Storia, 11, 1964, pp. 329–344, who maintained lower figures, especially for the 1200s, and a significant degree of stability from the end of the thirteenth century to the middle of the fifteenth. Regarding the number of households see LUCIO GAMBI, “La popolazione della Sicilia fra il 1374 e il 1376”, in Quaderni di geografia umana per la Sicilia e per la Calabria, 1, 1956, pp. 6–7, according to which the hearths could seldom be made up of more than four individuals. For a comparison of demographic values in other states in the Crown of Aragon see JOSÉ A. SESMA MUÑOZ, “La población urbana en la corona de Aragón (siglos XIV-XV)”, in Las sociedades urbanas en la España medieval, in XXIX Semana de estudios medievales Estella, 15–19 julio 2002, Pamplona, 2003, pp. 151–191 where he identifies a strong fluctuation in the second half of the 1300s and an increase in the early 1400s. 1

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Other later estimates have been made: Henri Bresc evaluated the population for the years 1270–80 at about 400,000, and Stephan Epstein estimated more than 850,000 individuals. They both reckon an average of 4 to 5 persons per hearth.3 Although relying on the same sources, they present highly divergent figures because Bresc starts from the premise of a sparsely populated Sicily and contemplates an average quota of 6 tarí per hearth, while Epstein holds to values for Sicily that are in line with the rest of the Western Europe (where the Black Death alone caused a 60% decline in the population) and assigns an average quota of 3 tarí.4 Conversely, the French scholar maintains that losses due to the Plague were not over 18%, thus positing his claim of demographic continuity between the 1300s and the low values of the late 1200s.5 Both authors, however, basically agree on estimates for the second half of the 1300s and for the 1400s, locating the phase of greatest decline at around 1400 and a slow upturn starting in 1439 with approximately a 20% increase in the population compared to 1374–76.6 The discrepancies are hardly significant: Bresc calculates 41,881 tax-paying hearths for 1434,7 whereas for 1439 Epstein calculates 58,000/78,000 households, therefore including the 3 Bresc does not actually specify the average number of members in a taxable household, however it is the same as for Epstein (namely 4–5 people) as can be deduced by comparing the estimates for the number of hearths to that of the total population. For example, for 1434–1439 he counts 500 hearths in Corleone for a population of 2,250–2,500; BRESC, Un monde, I, p. 64. For population estimates see also HENRI BRESC, “Un marché rural: Corleone en Sicile. 1375–1402”, in Anuario de Estudios Medievales, 24, 1994, p. 377 n. 15. In his remarks on Epstein’s book, Petralia (GIUSEPPE PETRALIA, “La nuova Sicilia tardomedievale: un commento al libro di Epstein”, in Revista d’Història Medieval, 5, 1994, pp. 137–172) makes an analytical evaluation of the demographical calculations and contrasts them to Bresc’s underlining how the deep contrasts between the estimates proposed by the two scholars are not only empirical, but can be traced back to the differing historigraphical periods. While stating that no new data concerning the thirteenth century population should be expected and implying that there is no valid evidence or alternatives to refer to either, Petralia (ibidem, p. 149) makes no mention of Peri’s research. 4 BRESC, Un monde, I, pp. 59–77, estimates the population at the end of the 1200s through the following indirect evidence: based on the 1277 hearth tax, the amounts disbursed by the universitates were multiples of six, with the exception of two taxes that were multiples of three or five. He discards the quota of five (on the basis of calculations by KARL J., BELOCH, La popolazione d’Italia nei secoli XVI, XVII e XVIII, transl. by Marco Nardi, Bologna, 1995, p. 92) because the amounts expressed in onze and tarí are not divisible by five. He chooses six over three (the most interesting reasoning he adopts, even though the statistics he examines are limited to a very few cases) based on the fact that there would be an excessive number of hearths for some areas where there are known population estimates for the time prior to 1277 when applying the option of 3 tarí: in 1240, that is prior to the expulsion of the Muslims, Malta and Gozo had 2,119 hearths, while in 1249 Sinagra had 98 hearths and the hamlets San Filippo and Santa Lucia had 118. In 1277, on the basis of the quota of 6 tarí, there would have been 1,750, 105, and 300 hearths respectively, numbers the author deems more likely. Conversely, he surmises that for a quota of three, the growth rate would be enormous and therefore unjustified. Indirect findings by EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 35–69: it is likely that the official average quota was the same in 1277 and 1283, and, on the basis of available documentation regarding other hearth tax under the Angevins, the annual tax per hearth was 3 tarí. He contends, furthermore, that the tax assessments in 1277 and 1283 were multiples of three. Next he puts forward some indirect findings based on the fiscal choices made later by Martin I and his successors, and, in consideration of the fact that there was no tax reform during the 1300s on up to the mid-1400s, claims the known quotas for these centuries correspond to those of the 1200s. The tax register of Martin I’s chancery shows the tax per hearth, which he reinstated in 1398, had been set by the previous sovereigns at 3.15 tarí, i.e., half an augustale. Lastly, in what seems to be the most debatable element in his reconstruction, he takes up the 1395 fodrum on production set at 5%, and since it is the only known fodrum after the one in 1282–3, he presumes that even the this last one was set at 5%. Then, for 1282–83, he calculates a production of enough seeds to feed a million people based on that 5% and the known estimates for salme of wheat or barley. 5 It has been estimated that approximately one third of the population in Europe disappeared due to the Plague; PAOLO MALANIMA, Economia preindustriale. Mille anni: dal IX al XVIII secolo, Milan, 1995, p. 12, pp. 32–34, and MASSIMO LIVI BACCI, Storia minima della popolazione del mondo, Bologna, 1998, pp. 61–68. 6 Similar estimates by Peri for the period following the Black Death and the 1400s: in 1374–76 he calculates 240,000–300,000 people; ILLUMINATO PERI, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro: Uomini, città e campagne. 1282/1376, Rome-Bari, 1990, pp. 235–246. He maintains the lowest point was registered in the 1420s (ILLUMINATO PERI, Restaurazione e pacifico stato in Sicilia 1377–1501, Rome-Bari, 1988, p. 65) and without giving figures for the individual centres in the first half of the 1400s (except for Palermo, ibidem, p. 78) he places the beginning of the comeback between 1434 and 1439; ibidem, pp. 66–69. For the years 1374–1376 see also GAMBI, “La popolazione”, pp. 3–10, who calculates 264,000 individuals, ibidem p. 8. 7 BRESC, Un monde, I, pp. 72–73. For Bresc the figures for 1439 correspond to those for 1434; ibidem, p. 75.

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exempt.8 After this phase, from 1440 onwards, there followed a marked and steady increase until a population density of 400,000 for Bresc, and 500,000 for Epstein, was reached. For both, the greatest population density consistently regarded centres in the royal demesne and, except for the previously mentioned issue of the 1200s, there are no important differences in the figures they suggest for the most populous communities. The communities that stand out include, in 1439, Palermo with 3,000 hearths and Messina with 2,800 to 3,000, followed by a group of about ten centres (of which only Geraci was feudal) that counted between 1,800 and 1,000 hearths.9 It should also be remembered that urban communities were classified either as civitates if they were episcopal seats, or terre; the inhabitants were cives and habitatores respectively. 1.2

The Institutional Realm from the Time of Peter III to Frederick IV

In light of the previously discussed guidelines, population figures reconstructed for a specific period must be linked to statistics from preceding eras. The methodological approach applied to demographic analysis is also indispensable in studying urban institutions. Correlations, which are in most cases fundamental ones, need to be established with other important moments in history in order to explain the remarkable power wielded by cities from the end of the 1300s through the first half of the 1400s. Indeed, from the time of Aragonese domination up to the reign of Alphonso V, the increasing involvement of urban communities in politics and the broadening of their rights and privileges are characterized by discontinuity, but also considerable uniformity. This section outlines the major characteristics of several aspects of different magistracies, as well as government affairs in general, during the first half of the fourteenth century. These elements appear to constitute a veritable premise in the process of institutionalization EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 56–57. Excluding the centres with fewer than 400 hearths which are not cited, most of the universitates were demesne communities or were feudal territories only at times (with the exceptions of the feudal communities of Caltabellotta, Cammarata, Collesano, and Geraci). According to EPSTEIN (Potere, pp. 35–69) there were between 1,800 and 1,200 hearths in Trapani, Sciacca, Catania, Geraci, Piazza, Noto, Castrogiovanni, Syracuse, Nicosia, Randazzo, and Polizzi; between 900 and 700 hearths in Agrigento, Corleone, Salemi, Licata, Naro, Caltabellotta Lentini, Castroreale, and Tortrici; and between 600 and 400 hearths in Monte San Giuliano, Marsala, Castronovo, Cammarata, Giuliana, Mazara, Caltanissetta, Alcamo, Mineo, Troina, Taormina, Petralia Soprana, Petralia Sottana, Castiglione, Gagliano, and Sortino. According to BRESC (Un monde, I, pp. 59–77) there were between 1,800 and 1,000 hearths in Catania, Nicosia, Trapani, Syracuse, Siracusa, Noto, Caltagirone, Piazza, and Malta; between 900 and 700 hearths in Randazzo (950), Castroreale, Salemi, Agrigento, and Lentini; between 600 and 400 hearths in Collesano, Mistretta, Tortorici, Traina, Monte San Giuliano, Marsala, Mazara, Caltabellotta, Licata, Caltanissetta, Cammarata, Corleone, Castronovo, and Mineo. For demographic values of other states in the Crown of Aragon, see SESMA MUÑOZ, “La población urbana”, pp. 151–191: between the 1300s and the 1400s the major cities with over 2,500 hearths were Barcelona, Valencia and Saragossa (Zaragoza). The known estimate for 1389 in Barcelona is 6,719 hearths and by assigning a value of 4 or 5 per hearth, the total number of inhabitants was 26,876 or 33,595. The lists of taxpayers for Valencia in 1361 exist, but in a fiscal form that gives a very sketchy panorama of the taxpayers and makes calculations with gross discrepancies unavoidable, with a population of between 17,000 and 25,000 inhabitants including the exempt. In the second half of the fourteenth century, the population was 40,000. For Saragossa in the second half of the 1300s, there were about 3,660 hearths and 2,969 in 1495. In the first half of the 1400s, Perpignano and Gerona had over 1,500 hearths, while Calatayud, Tortosa, Lerida, Orihuela and Morella had over 1,000. Eight centres had 800 hearths, and three never had fewer than 600. For the communities that had between 200 (below which the author feels it would be difficult to refer to an active urban nucleus) and 600 hearths, he counts six in the Kingdom of Valencia, nine in Aragon, and eleven in Catalonia. For urbanization rates in Europe in the Late Middle Ages see MALANIMA, Economia, pp. 18–21. And finally, see the contributions included in STEPHAN R. EPSTEIN (ed.), Town and country in Europe, 1300–1800, Cambridge, 2003, which, for the early modern period, highlight the importance of small communities (even those with under 5,000 inhabitants). The authors consider imprecise a definition of an urban context on the basis of population figures alone. They evaluate the commercial, manufacturing and administrative functions of the communities with respect to the regional economy instead, revealing the importance of even small cities. 8 9

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developing full-scale between the end of the 1300s and the first half of the 1400s. Furthermore, connections between the early 1300s and the period immediately preceding it become evident for certain offices and need to be considered in disclosing the main features of this long-term process.10 Only two aspects of the Angevin period will be explored: first, the significant localization of power and secondly, the community’s role in selecting certain officials and in certain areas of government policy. Charles I of Anjou, in 1270, made it legitimate for the universitas of the city of Palermo to “eligere magistros platee sive catapanos, magistros surterios, aliquem qui teneat mercum, alios minores officiales, prout hactenus consuetum”.11 Developments common to other centres underlie this reference to a specific locality. In 1278, the Sovereign issued a general order according to which “in singulis terris magistri iurati et iudices eligantur per universitatem”.12 In addition, from the end of the 1260s, records show municipal elections for some government officials were spreading to both metropolitan areas and smaller centres. In Patti, from as early as 1268, the judge’s position was already an elective office,13 whereas in Messina, the offices of judges and their assistants, the court recorders or notaries of the acts (notarii actorum), were elective from 1269.14 From the 1270s onwards, the communities’ role in elections increases and becomes more incisive.15 10 FRANCESCO CALASSO, La legislazione statuaria dell’Italia meridionale, Rome, 1929, brought about an important revision of the traditional interpretation, according to which the cities of the kingdom never exercised any deliberative power. This interpretation was upheld by CARLO CALISSE, Storia del diritto italiano, vols 3, Florence, 1891, I, p. 181, by NUNZIO F. FARAGLIA, Il comune nell’Italia meridionale (1100–1806), Naples, 1883, repr. Naples, 1984, p. 124, and by ENRICO BESTA, “Fonti”, in Storia del diritto italiano, ed. PASQUALE DEL GIUDICE, Milan, 1925, I, p. 654. In addition, CALASSO maintains that urban autonomy was restricted in the Norman-Swabian period, in contrast to what came about from the time of the Angevins onwards. This interpretation was critcized by MATTEO GAUDIOSO, Natura giuridica delle autonomie cittadine nel Regnum Siciliae», Catania, 1952, with particular reference to the notion of the rise of towns under the Angevins and the Aragonese, and by GIANCARLO VALLONE, Feudi e città: Studi di storia giuridica e istituzionale pugliese, Galatina, 1993, pp. 9–14, with reference to a potestas statuendi as broad as in northern cities. 11 La Mantia, Antiche, pp. 244–255; also GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 211. 12 Ibidem, p. 211. 13 Mineo, instead, on the basis of a royal decree dated 12 March 1268 (but which he dates 1267), maintained that since that time at least, the position of judge had been a royal appointment in val Demone and Milazzo; MINEO, “Città”, p. 121 n. 27, and the document is transcribed in GIOVAN C. SCIACCA, Patti e l’amministrazione del comune nel medioevo, Palermo, 1907, pp. 240–242. The widespread electiveness of judges can only be confirmed beginning in 1277. The 12 March 1268 act making reference to an order for the justiciars to appoint the judges for the centres of val Demone and Milazzo requires further evaluation. It was a measure contested by the bishop whose protest was sustained by the Crown based on a privilege stipulating that the choice of civic officials fell to the bishop. Because it is impossible to verify what the justiciar actually did, it is questionable to base a claim that there was royal involvement in this appointment on the formula “per curiam nondum fuerunt creati, iudices creari pro parte curie deberemus” (in reference to the instructions for the justiciar; MINEO, “Città”, p. 121 n. 27). The justiciar might have been required to formally acknowledge appointments made by the community. This hypothesis is corroborated by a document dated a few days earlier, 5 March 1268, concerning the same type of conflict in Patti between the episcopate and sovereign. The bishop denounced the interference of the justiciar who “universitati pactensi iniunxit ut infra certum tempus homines litteratos ex eadem universitate in iudices civitatis pactensis pro anno proximo futuro eligentes illos ad eumdem vicarium trasmittant prestituros ei pro huiumodi officio fidelitatis iuramentum”; SCIACCA, Patti, p. 243. In the protest it seems the bishop was complaining that his own right to confirm the results of the elections had been violated, and not the justiciar’s, while the electiveness of the judges was not in question. Judgeships, however, were not elective positions in all communities, as evidenced by the royal appointment of the judge in Nicosia in 1267; R. C. A., vol. I, p. 55. 14 The electiveness must already have been established since the sovereign, Charles I of Anjou, confirmed it as if it were customary; R. C. A., vol. VII, pp. 272–273. The judges and the notarius actorum in Messina were part of the curia of the stratigoti that had jurisdiction over civil and penal law ; from the Norman period onwards, the head of the curia was the stratigotus, a royally appointed official whose number could vary during the Swabian period; CARLO A. GARUFI, “Su la curia stratigoziale di Messina nel tempo normanno-svevo”, in Archivio storico messinese, 5, 1904, pp. 1–49. Also BEATRICE PASCIUTA, “Costruzione di una tradizione normativa: il privilegium fori dei cittadini di Palermo e la sua utilizzazione nel secolo XIV”, in Rivista di Storia del Diritto Italiano, LXVI, 1993, pp. 251–260. 15 For the community of Palermo, for example, the unauthorized election by the Palermitans of the ballivus or camerarius and the formulation of statutes regarding foodstuffs can be cited. The sovereign declared, instead, that they be annulled and the collection of royal revenues be reassigned to the secretus; R. C. A., vol. XI, pp. 232, 1274. The interesting thing to note here, is that the Palermitans not having been authorized to proceed with the election shows that it was normal procedure for the community to be involved in filling this office upon royal authorization.

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The known dates for Patti’s election make it possible to conclude that the principle of an administrative year for elected officials (annum indictionis) lasting from 1 September to 31 August, and which would remain unchanged even in subsequent centuries, was already in force during the Angevin period; the following year’s mandate to elect Patti’s judges was sent on 15 August.16 Records from the reign of the Angevins indicate the universitas had a role in government affairs which did not depend solely upon its officials. The involvement in government of individuals who were not officials will be considered from here onwards. Their contribution is an aspect analysable by taking into account the problem of representation in the period when “l’ambito politico si congiungeva con gli interessi della comunità”.17 It is a commonly held opinion that the word universitas designated the status of the community as a legal entity, but it is necessary to take into account the institutional connotations of the concept of universitas since it was far more than a mere abstraction considering the vast range of activities in which universitates were engaged.18 A step-by-step analysis is warranted, and because of the highly fragmented state of Sicilian documentary The bishop lamented the interference of the justiciars and cited the mandate that had been conferred on him dated “octavo decimo kalendas septembris”; SCIACCA, Patti, p. 243. This norm can be found several years later for other centres as well: FARAGLIA indicated two banns, one dated 30 September 1281 for the justiciar of Terra di Lavoro regarding the election of the judges, and the other for the Terra d’Otranto dated 12 September 1282 for the election of the judges and master jurats; FARAGLIA, Il comune, p. 58 n. 4. 17 FRANCESCO CALASSO, “La città dell’Italia meridionale durante l’età normanna”, in Archivio storico pugliese, XII, 1959, pp. 18–34, for the Norman period with particular reference to the centres in Apulia. Opinions on the term universitas are generally in agreement. CALASSO, “La città dell’Italia”, pp. 18–34, although maintaining that universitas as a concept is one of the “categorie logiche più astratte del mondo giuridico”, stresses how from a political point of view the municipalities were not simply abstract entities representing the sum of their single components. According to GENUARDI, Il comune, pp. 106–110, pp. 162–165, it indicates an acknowledgement, already on the part of the Norman sovereigns, of a legal status in private law; ibidem, p. 110. From the Angevin period onward, it retained the value of universitas as a legal entity, but to that status in private law, functions pertaining to public law were added such as sending syndics to parliament; ibidem, p. 162. According to BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, pp. LXI-LXVIII (which also recalls Gregorio’s position), in some cases the term can be equated to the citizenry, whereas other times the abstract sense of the concept renders it indefinable. She also notes how for both the Angevin and Aragonese periods, there often recurs in documents the formula universitati hominum “che fa senz’altro pensare a quelle assemblee generali di cittadini adunate per discutere affari generali”; ibidem, p. LXIII. The author’s opinion on this last point shifts for the early Aragonese period: in the petitions of James II and Frederick III the universitas refers to the entire citizenry in a collective sense, or sometimes as individuals, but it never indicates a councillor body or assembly. Although never explicitly stated, she equates it to a town council made up of officials and others. 18 The Catalan communities provide elements useful in making a comparison. See in particular what FONT RIUS, “Orígenes”, pp. 216–239, pp. 412–414, sustains regarding the process evolving between the mid-twelfth and mid-thirteenth centuries that brought the general assembly of the residents to form a municipality. This was acknowledged as a legal entity with its own governing body and magistracies and identified initially by the term consilium, and later on by universitas applied to the collective population when it acquired public legal status, that is, once it was equipped with government bodies; ibidem, pp. 412–414. The word specifically designated the representatives of the community, the probi homines (or prohombres), a term that, in the early phase of the establishment of Catalan municipalities (the end of the twelfth century and the first half of the thirteenth), indicated the members of the general assembly of all the inhabitants; ibidem, p. 429. For a verification of Font Rius’s conclusions, see TURULL RUBINAT, La configuracíó, pp. 119–127, which points out, for the Catalan community of Cervera, how the use of the word universitas in documentary records corresponds to a formalized institutional structure, in particular to the definitive appearance of the community’s representation. MAX TURULL RUBINAT & JAUME RIBALTA HARO, “De voluntate universitatis: La formació i l’expressió de la voluntat del municipi (Tàrrega, 1214–1250)”, in Anuario de estudios medievales, 21, 1991, pp. 143–231, in particular p. 158, identifies the council as the institutional body that gives the universitas a voice. For Valencia, NARBONA VIZCAÍNO, Orígenes, pp. 7–30, looks more closely at the connotations and transformations of probi homines even for periods following 1245 and the establishment of collective and autonomous government. AQUILINO IGLESIA FERREIRÓS, “Concejo y ciudades en Cataluña (Alta Edad Media)”, in Concejos, pp. 123–146 especially pp. 138–146, insists on the connection between legal status and autonomy, inspired by PIERRE MICHAUD QUANTIN, Universitas: Expression du mouvement communautaire dans la Moyen Âge latin, Paris, 1970, which should be seen for a more general analysis. Compare also, for the Auvergne region in the French Midi, ALBERT RIGAUDIÈRE, “Universitas, corpus, communitas et consulatus dans les chartes des villes et bourgs d’Auvergne aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles”, in Les origines des libertés urbaines. Actes du 16e congrès des historiens médiévistes de l’enseignement supérieur, Rouen 7–8 juin 1985 (Publications de l’Université de Rouen, n.°157), Rouen, 1990, pp. 281–309, pp. 281–309, which deems the concept indicative of a civic legal entity able to speak with one voice. For the term universitas, see also the previous note. 16

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records, other areas in southern Italy must be examined to provide a basis for comparison and clarify the role of individuals not included among the officials. Nearby regions, similar in many respects, afford a comparison even though opinions differ regarding the degree of institutional uniformity present in the kingdom’s outermost territories.19 Before considering the Angevin kingdom specifically, it is possible to observe the earliest phases of the development of an urban identity during the Norman period. For example, the populus refused to allow Norman dukes to build castles, or due to internal conflicts, the Normans were able to create alliances with the populus in an urban centre and obtain the consensus needed to carry out their will.20 Whether or not these were spontaneous events, it is important to note that the community’s role can be observed through operations of the consilium, which seems to have intervened frequently and in defence of local freedom and privileges. In 1113, to counter the aims of the Count of Conversano, the knights of Bari chose as their lord the archbishop who decided on how to resist the enemy together with “the council of the whole town”. Honorius II, to oppose Roger II, granted the residents of Troia a series of privileges in 1127 while appealing “to the saner portion of the council”.21 This last example provides evidence of one of the council’s activities, namely the reception and defence of privileges. An analogous situation can be found in the bishopric of Patti in Sicily where a consilium was functioning in the Norman period. Roger, the Great Count, intervened to mitigate a stand off between the cives and the bishop in 1133 over their rights to use common land. The bishop notified the Sovereign of his rights in order to clarify what was communis and what was not, and his defence was “vulgariter exposita pactense consilio”. In conflicts involving a bishop, it was always the universitas who adjudicated a solution to the controversy.22 19 Diversity of urban contexts has been sustained by MARIO CARAVALE, “La legislazione statuaria dell’Italia meridionale e della Sicilia”, in Gli Statuti Sassaresi: Economia, società, istituzioni a Sassari nel Medioevo e nell’Età Moderna, Atti del Convegno di Studi, Sassari, 12–14 maggio 1983, eds. by ANTONELLO MATTONE & MARCO TANGHERONI, Cagliari, 1986, p. 192; whereas for CALASSO, La legislazione and GAUDIOSO, Natura, it was by and large the same throughout the kingdom. 20 JEAN-MARIE MARTIN, La vita quotidiana nell’Italia meridionale al tempo dei Normanni, transl. by M. Grazia Meriggi, Milan, 1997, pp. 378–379, cites instances of numerous cities in Apulia. On cities in Apulia and Campania where the Norman monarchy did not extinguish ancient spirits of autonomy, see VERA VON FALKENHAUSEN, “I ceti dirigenti prenormanni al tempo della costituzione degli stati normanni nell’Italia meridionale e in Sicilia”, in Forme di potere e struttura sociale in Italia nel Medioevo, ed. GABRIELLA ROSSETTI, Bologna, 1977, pp. 321–378 and GIOVANNI VITOLO, Città e coscienza cittadina nel Mezzogiorno medievale (secc. IX-XIII), Salerno, 1990. In the Norman and Swabian kingdoms, local government was divided into local and higher levels; see BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione dell’ufficio”, pp. 34–37; ENRICO MAZZARESE FARDELLA, Aspetti dell’organizzazione amministrativa dello stato normanno e svevo, Milan, 1966; JEAN-MARIE MARTIN, “Le città demaniali”, in Federico II e le città italiane, eds. PIERRE TOUBERT & AGOSTINO PARAVICINI BAGLIANI, Palermo, 1974, pp. 188–194; JEAN-MARIE MARTIN, “L’organisation administrative et militare du territoire”, in Poteri, pp. 71–121; JEAN-MARIE MARTIN, “Fiscalité et économie étatique dans le Royaume angevin de Sicile à la fin du XIIIe siècle”, in L’état angevin: Pouvoir, culture et société entre XIIIe et XIVe siècle, Actes du colloque international, Rome-Naples, 7–11 novembre 1995, Rome, 1998, pp. 601–609; GINA FASOLI, “Organizzazione delle città ed economia urbana, in Poteri, società e popolo nell’età sveva (1220–1266)”, in Poteri, pp. 171–174; MARIO CARAVALE, Il regno normanno di Sicilia, Milan, 1991, pp. 219–284, pp. 325–382; MARIO CARAVALE, Ordinamenti giuridici dell’Europa medievale, Bologna, 1994, pp. 423–424; CORRAO & D’ALESSANDRO, “Geografia amministrativa”, pp. 411–425; VINCENZO D’ALESSANDRO, “Ceti dirigenti e forze sociali nel regno di Sicilia di Federico II”, in Medioevo, I, p. 274. 21 MARTIN, La vita, pp. 379–381. 22 SCIACCA, Patti, pp. 217–220. The intervention was also confirmed later: in 1191, those sent “ab universitate hominum Pactarum ad Curiam missi de comune consensu” signed a document resolving the dispute; ibidem, pp. 222–224. A similar procedure turns up again in the Angevin period, in 1277 when Patti’s cives made an appeal through the syndics and archbishop of Messina following a sentence excommunicating their own bishop; ibidem, pp. 248–252. On common land, see LUIGI GENUARDI, Terre comuni ed usi civici in Sicilia prima dell’abolizione della feudalità. Studi e documenti, Palermo, 1911, especially Chapters 2 and 3.

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An undertaking not attributable to the officials alone is also recorded for the Swabian period consisting in the right of the universitates to choose their own representatives to send to the general assemblies.23 Such practices find considerable corroboration in the Angevin reign when syndics based their representation on a community’s mandate, and without it the syndics’ institutional role was nullified.24 Undertakings involving not only the officials were frequent in negotiations with the sovereign. In 1257, the Centorbi universitas which was assembled on the plain of Santa Maria, requested of the Crown “una concordia una voce unoque consensu” with the judges and the terra’s notary to dismiss the person responsible for distributing terrarum casalinorum.25 In negotiations with the sovereign, the Palermitan universitas stands out for its 1274 petition to Charles I of Anjou asking for a confirmation of the privilege granted by Frederick II according to which the justiciars (to whom jurisdiction over criminal justice was assigned) could try Palermitans iure ordinario for certain crimes and carry out inquests.26 The “universi homines Panormi” upheld the validity of the Swabian privilege because it had been issued before the deposition of the Emperor, an argument which indeed appears to have been accepted by the Angevin king. The King, however, decreed that although he did not intend to revoke the concession, the Vicarius and the justiciars could only try these crimes after obtaining a special royal mandate.27 As for the civic officials, known references in documents from the Angevins’ reign record the widespread presence of judges with jurisdiction over low justice. They were entrusted with promulgating public acts and in charge of urban administration in general,

CARAVALE, Ordinamenti, pp. 424–425, and in particular, MARTIN, “Le città”, pp. 192–193. Furthermore, in 1231, Frederick II established the possibility of electing two officials responsible for the market, “per baiulum et curiam terre cum consilio proborum hominum”. This is an indication, albeit for restricted areas, of the participation of individuals other than the royal officials and whose selection, it must be underlined, did not depend solely on the officials: “in quolibet officio predictorum eligentur duo meliores, qui ordinabuntur per curiam terre et hoc significabunt domino imperatori per litteris, in quibus sigilla vel subscriptionis sint omnium, qui consilium dabunt cum Baiulo de hiis eligendis, ut si idonei videbuntur domino imperatori, sint in ipso officio; si non idonei fuerint, et alii substituantur eque sub eadem forma per baiulum et curiam terre cum consilio proborum hominum. Illi autem, qui in hiis prepositi fuerint, sacramenta prestabunt, quod omnia faciant fideliter fieri, ut est dictum, quod si super hiis de fraude vel neglicencia notabiles deprehenduntur, penis superioribus subiacebunt”. This text from the constitution is included in CARLO A. GARUFI, “La giurisdizione annonaria nei secoli XIII e XIV. L’acatapania e le mete”, in Archivio Storico Siciliano, n.s. 22, 1897, p. 142. With respect to shifting power relations between the Crown, aristocracy, and cities during the later Swabian period, see ERNESTO PONTIERI, Ricerche sulla crisi della monarchia siciliana nel secolo XIII, Naples, 1942, and ENRICO PISPISA, Il regno di Manfredi. Proposte di interpretazione, Messina, 1991. 24 In 1273, Charles I of Anjou revoked a series of concessions, regarding femmine ornaments and the institution of dowries, previously granted to the syndics of Messina because they had not received a mandate from the universitas; FARAGLIA, Il comune, p. 47 n. 1. On representation as a delegation of power in general, see JEANNINE QUILLET, “Community, Counsel and Representation”, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c.350-c.1450, ed. JAMES H. BURNS, Cambridge, 1998, 554–572. For a further comparison regarding the Kingdom of Valencia and the representational authority conferred by the community on the syndics in the Cortes, see MARÍA R. MUÑOZ & REGINA PINILLA, “Les municipalités et leur participation dans les Cortès valenciennes de l’epoque forale”, in Parliaments, Estates and Representation, 1, 1993, pp. 1–12. For Aragon, see PORFIRIO SANZ, “The Cities in the Aragonese Cortes in the Medieval and Early Modern Period”, in Parliaments, Estates and Representation, 2, 1994, pp. 95–108. 25 Pergamene, pp. 54–58. For an analysis of the Latin used at the time, see LAURA SCIASCIA, Il seme nero: Storia e memoria in Sicilia, Messina, 1996, pp. 15–25, pp. 158–161. 26 R. C. A., vol. XV, pp. 112–113.The justiciars were entrusted with jurisdiction over criminal affairs in two large districts covering the entire island and situated on either side of the river Salso; see PAOLO COLLIVA, Ricerche sul principio di legalità nell’amministrazione del Regno di Sicilia al tempo di Federico II: gli organi centrali e regionali, Milan, 1964, p. 153, and TOMMASO PEDIO, “I giustizierati provinciali nel regno di Sicilia in età federiciana”, in Atti delle IV giornate federiciane, Oria 29–30 ottobre 1977, Società per la Storia Patria della Puglia, Convegni X, Bari, 1980, pp. 163–179. The two secreti coordinated the tax collection in the same districts; BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione dell’ufficio”, p. 34, and MAZZARESE FARDELLA, Aspetti. 27 R. C. A., vol. XV, p. 113. 23

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but could also be responsible for civic finances.28 In contrast, references to jurats (iurati) or master jurats were decidedly sporadic and it is unclear what their functions were. Some preliminary information regarding the offices will suffice for now but the subject will be treated more extensively later.29 One theory regarding the origins of these officials maintained the positions were created by laws in 1222 and 1231 calling for elected officials among those charged with setting the mete (official food prices). These were the jurats who would have denounced fraudulent merchants and artisans.30 In light of their duties it was also held there was a definite link with the catapan’s office, or acatapanatum,31 an office of Byzantine origin whose function was to oversee the market in the Swabian period.32 In 1270, Charles I of Anjou established the electiveness of the catapans (acatapani) for the city of Palermo33 and this led Carlo Garufi to believe such electiveness applied to all the universitates. For the Swabian period, it was again Garufi who noted that Frederick II’s constitution referred to two elected officials responsible for food supplies whom Garufi believed to be the catapans.34 Although these examples do not firmly assign the magistracy’s creation to an exact period, they do reveal the Swabian Crown’s intention to assign responsibility for food supplies to designated officials. The magistracies under consideration during Aragonese domination were characterized by significant mutations due to the establishment an altered relationship between the sovereign and the country, open to the appeals of various political entities in the Aragonese pactist tradition.35 The transformations of royal power after the Vespers, along with the change in approach created between the sovereign and the country, may be traced by referring precisely to the functions of municipal offices and the means by which they came into existence. What gradually emerges after the Vespers, moving slowly toward a clear institutionalization during the reign of Frederick III, is a more precise separation of

28 In 1269 the stratigotus and the judges of Messina promulgated an act; R. C. A., vol. I, pp. 23–24. The baiuli and the judges of Marsala, Mazara, and Trapani officially announced “decimas victualium et quorundam proventuum”; R. C. A., vol. IV, p. 71 [1270]. In 1270 the sovereign addressed the “stratigoto, iudicibus, ceterisque officialibus” regarding the work of other officials; R. C. A., vol. IV, p. 167. Other cases of royal communications addressing the members of the curia of the stratigoti regarding administrative matters are noted by MINEO, “Città”, p. 119 n. 23. 29 During the Swabian period, in southern Italy rather than Sicily, a master jurat is present alongside the baiulus; MARTIN, “L’organisation administrative”, p. 100. Based on the one isolated reference in 1266, the author attributes judicial functions to the master jurat. As far as Sicily is concerned, this office appears in records beginning with the Angevin period: creacio of a master jurat in Catania, R. C. A., vol. VI, p. 190, 1271. The position was also activated in Trapani; R. C. A., vol. IV, p. 165, 1270. 30 GENUARDI, Il comune, pp. 94–96, refers to Frederick II’s 1222 order and the Constitutions of Melfi, Book I, 49. The same theory is put forward by CARLO A. GARUFI, Il comune di Palermo e il suo archivio nei secoli XIII a XV: Studi storicidiplomatici, Contributo alla storia dell’origine dei comuni in Sicilia, Palermo, 1901, pp. 19–21. On these topics, see also MINEO, “Città”, pp. 132–134. 31 GARUFI, Il comune, pp. 19–21 and GENUARDI, Il comune, pp. 94–95, sustains that, during the Swabian period, the jurats already held broad powers in judicial matters as well although documentary references are not really clear on the matter; ibidem, p. 96. 32 GARUFI, “La giurisdizione”, pp. 131–134. 33 La Mantia, Antiche, pp. 244–245.; also GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 211. 34 Garufi, “La giurisdizione”, pp. 141–142. The electiveness was also upheld by GENUARDI who connects the 1231 Constitutions to the earlier 1222 Constitution of Capua (even if electiveness can be properly referred to only in 1231), thus revealing an endeavour by these officials charged with control over the market as early as the 1220s. He also maintains that, in 1222, they were called jurats in Palermo, and then catapans; GENUARDI, Il comune, pp. 94–95. The catapans were already present in the community of Patti in Swabian and Angevin times; SCIACCA, Patti, p. 226, p. 245. 35 BENIGNO, “La questione della capitale”, pp. 27–64 and MINEO, “Città”, pp. 109–149, upheld the theory of a pactist model underlying the new configurations of power in the kingdom. See also MAZZARESE FARDELLA, “Osservazioni”, pp. 51–83; BAVIERA ALBANESE, “La Sicilia”, pp. 189–310.

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roles between the royally appointed officials—justiciar, secretus and baiulus—and the elected officials—judges, jurats, catapans, sciurterii, and notarii actorum. During the reign of Peter III, the justiciars (with jurisdiction, as stated earlier, over penal law) and the secreti (responsible for fiscal exactions) continued as high magistrates functioning above the local level. The former, however, operated in more restricted circumstances. Their duties no longer corresponded to a rigorously centralistic approach following the institution of justiciarates in both the eastern and the western parts of the island,36 and with justiciars who sometimes, albeit sporadically, took on civic duties, just as there were captains in charge of civic matters.37 For the secreti, these two separate districts for the areas on either side of the Salso River remained after the Vespers but, at the end of the 1200s, they were once again united as they had been in the mid-1200s.38 Certain measures by Peter III reveal the baiulus had jurisdiction over low justice and lead one to believe the office had lost district level responsibilities,39 whereas under James II (1286–1295),40 the office was still listed along with the justiciars and the secreti as a higher-level magistracy showing its final collocation had not yet been firmly established.41 With reference to other magistracies, a royal decree by Charles I of Anjou in 1277, regarding the electiveness of judges in the royal demesne and jurats in baronial lands, suggests that the iuratia (jurats’ office) did not operate in demesne centres, but there is no further confirmation to that effect.42 The differentiation between judges and jurats in Charles’s decree appears again in the 1282 decree from Peter III ordering the justiciar for the terra of Geraci to proceed with the election of the judges and other officials in the demesne and the master jurats in baronial lands.43 Such a distinction might mean the functions of the baronial iuratia coincided with those of the demesne judicature (iudicatum). Beginning in 1282, however, the master jurat became more prevalent than before even in demesne communities,44 but was not included alongside the highest civic officials, i.e., the baiulus and the judges. Hence, the royal order was not carried out and the lack of correspondence between the decree and its application demonstrates how the arrangement of the municipal organizational structures was still in fieri. Furthermore, the separation of duties is not always clearly discernable and a given royal measure could be addressed to different officials. Whereas in Augusta, Milazzo, and Syracuse, the baiuli A master justiciar, the highest ranking official of the central judiciary, remained at the royal curia however; see PERI, La Sicilia, p. 25. 37 Caro di Palmerio, Justiciar of Palermo; Natale Ansalone, Justiciar of the vallo di Castrogiovanni, Demone and Milazzo; Bonifacio Camarano, Justiciar of val di Noto; Ruggero Mastrangelo, Justiciar of the duchy of Geraci and the partes of Cefalù; Berardo Ferro, Justiciar of the vallo di Agrigento; Ugo Tallac, Justiciar of val di Mazara; De Rebus, I, pp. 128–129, 1282. There may also have been captains in Palermo (STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 130–131, 1282), in Messina (De Rebus, I, p. 321, I, 1283), and in Taormina (ibidem, p. 43, 1282). See also CORRAO & D’ALESSANDRO, “Geografia amministrativa”, pp. 418–419. 38 Regarding the secretus in the early Aragonese period, whose duties had not varied from the time of the Angevins, see BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione dell’ufficio”, pp. 37–40. 39 See pp. 24–25. The office of the baiulus was a civic position in the Swabian period: every city had a local civil curia made up of the baiulus and the judges, responsible among other things for penal and civil law; see FASOLI, “Organizzazione delle città”, pp. 171–174, and CARAVALE, Ordinamenti, pp. 423–424. 40 Alfonso III, King of Aragon, died in 1291 and was succeded by James II, who left his brother Frederick as regent in Sicily. 41 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum XVI, 1286, pp. 13–14. 42 MINEO, “Città”, p. 121 n. 27; document published in ROMUALDO TRIFONE, La legislazione angioina, Naples, 1921, pp. 60–62. 43 De Rebus, I, p. 58. 44 Ibidem, p. 151, 1282 (Cefalù); pp. 180–181, 1282 (Castrogiovanni and Demina probably corresponding to present-day San Marco D’Alunzio; see BRESC, Un monde, I, p. 8); De Rebus, I, p. 247, 1283 (Casale di Bolo near Randazzo; see BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 750). 36

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were required to ask sailors to appear before the sovereign, it was up to the master jurat in Catania, Aci, and the community of Patti.45 With the arrival of Peter III the iuratia was an ad personam position rather than a collective office and the title could vary— Grand Jurat,46 or more often, Master Jurat47—although it is also possible to come across Master Jurats.48 Electoral procedures were documented as early as 1282 and judges and alios officiales in general are regularly cited among “qui actenus eligi consueverunt”.49 Gradually other magistracies were also named; catapans, sciurteri or xurterii (whose functions will be discussed shortly), and notaries were frequently listed, besides judges and jurats. The more detailed decrees included judges, catapans and sciurterii,50 or master jurat, sciurterii and others in their lists of elective offices.51 For the position of notarius actorum (whose duty, of course, was to record the acts) there were numerous royal appointments.52 Correlations between the presence of certain magistracies in the Swabian-Norman and Angevin periods and their spread during the Aragonese reign, can mislead one to think all of the offices previously active were re-established after the Vespers. Instead the actual situation was more complicated and even royal orders themselves did not always point in that direction. A prime example is Peter III’s order to the secreti, magistri portulani, and procurators indicating the offices of “Master Jurat, Sciurterius, Merco and Erranti”53 would be taken over by the baiulus, a position granted by the royal court ad extalium (farmed out) or ad credenciam (administered directly).54 The main aspect to be underlined is the consolidation of what Frederick II had sanctioned in the Constitutions of Melfi regarding the grant of the “officia baiulacionum ad extalium o ad credenciam”.55 With Peter III’s decree, both the economic value of the office and its royal nature increased in grouping it with the other magistracies. In actual fact, not even this was destined to become the norm, or at least not entirely, given the electiveness of the positions of the jurat and sciurterius. The baiulus56 meanwhile, in certain localities ended up taking on some of the duties listed in the measure. Thus, even though not every aspect of the royal order was carried out, it does reveal an initial institutional diversification. In the first decades of Aragonese governing, much of city government was monopolized by the baiulus and judges who had jurisdiction over civil affairs and were supported,

De Rebus (Appendix), II, pp. 144–145, 1283. De Rebus, I, p. 151, 1282 (Cefalù), which includes the royal confirmation of the jurat’s election by the homines of the locality. 47 Ibidem, pp. 180–181, 1282 (Castrogiovanni and Demina); p. 247, 1283 (Casale di Bolo). 48 Ibidem, p. 518, 1283 (Agrigento). 49 Ibidem, p. 48, p. 71, 1282 50 Ibidem, p. 151, p. 164, 1282 (Polizzi, Petralia Soprana); 51 Ibidem, p. 181, 1282 (Castogiovanni). 52 Ibidem, p. 164, 1282 (Patti, San Marco), p. 179, 1282, (Palermo), p. 184, 1282 (Mazara), p. 185, 1282 (Bufera and Eraclea), and p. 207, 1282 (Monte San Giuliano, Butera, Caltagirone, Monte San Giuliano, and Girgenti). The title Notarius Actorum appears sporadically (ibidem, p. 253, 1283, Castrogiovanni), while Public Notary is more frequent; ibidem, p. 113, pp. 252–253, p. 300; De Rebus, II, p. 565, 1282–83 (Nicosia, Lipari, Randazzo, Messina, and Licata). 53 From the beginning of the 1300s (see Section 2.1, note 39) there was a fee called arrantaria for animals trespassing on someone’s land, and the offices of the merco and erranti cited by Peter III were probably a watch posted for cases of trespassing. 54 De Rebus, I, p. 191, 1282. 55 MARTIN, “Le città”, p. 189. 56 See Sections 2.1 and 3.2. 45 46

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in some cases, by others who were not government officials.57 They cooperated in administrative matters like forwarding the fodrum, as the royal privilege paid in kind was called,58 or in recruiting and dispatching archers with the justiciar.59 An identical pattern of authority recurs for financial affairs, but without the exclusion of the syndics.60 The same officials had the task of collecting and distributing victuals, at times in conjunction with the captain, although a call for collaboration with the rest of the community was more usual in this context.61 Records show it was not unusual for the sovereign to address the entire community, or its delegates, in addition to the officials. Royal formulas for addressing a universitas or the officials and homines of a locality are frequently encountered, especially for the payment of royal subventions62 and the collection of victuals,63 which indicate the group of decision-makers included others besides the actual office-holding officials. Reference to the universitas or universi homines is quite generic in some instances, but for certain matters, such as the selection of the syndics, there is clearly recorded government action carried out with the explicit participation of the homines universitatis.64 It ensues that the

57 “Baiulus, iudices et quamplures alii de eadem civitate Panormi” complained that the Knights Hospitaller of St. John of Jerusalem wrongfully held two royal mills; De Rebus, I, pp. 114–115, 1282. A royal order for the “baiulo, iudicibus et universis hominibus” in Eraclea not to oppose the Pisans with regard to the war subsidy; De Rebus (appendix), II, p. 142, 1283. Royal order for the baiulus and the judges of Eraclea and Licata to desist in prosecuting those in charge of tallying victuals passing through the port; De Rebus, II, pp. 568–569, p. 603, 1283. If the private individual responsible for royal victuals did not appear after being summoned by the baiulus, the latter was authorized to proceed against him; De Rebus, I, p. 265, 1283 (Syracuse). 58 Ibidem, p. 23, 1282 (the baiulus and judges of Salemi). 59 Ibidem, p. 331, 1283 (Palermo) in this case the royal order was also directed at the men of Palermo. In effect, the involvement of the justiciar seems to be an exception compared to the order for the baiulus and judges of various communities to send sailors; ibidem, pp. 459–460, 1283. 60 The syndics, the baiulus and the judges supervised the recovery of unpaid monies for the royal subvention; ibidem, pp. 229–231 (an order directed at various communities), p. 234, 1282 (Catania). Order for the “baiulis iudicibus ac universis personis terrarum et locorum Siciliae” to consign money promised as an aid “in generali colloquio” with the syndics of various localities; De Rebus, II, pp. 526–527, 1283. The syndics functioned on the basis of a community mandate. The sovereign, for example, in soliciting the payment of a war subsidy recalled how it had been guaranteed to him “per sindicos statutos olim per universitatem Cathanie”; De Rebus (appendix), II, pp. 46–50, 1282. Nevertheless, it was possible to find the secretus involved in financial matters: the royal secreti, in collaboration with the baiulus and the judges of Castrogiovanni, had to provide the castellans with victualia terragiorum to be used in defending the castles (De Rebus, I, p. 202, 1282). The secretus could be excluded, however, from similar measures: in 1283 the baiulus and the judges of Agrigento, after having returned possessions to a private individual as ordered by the sovereign, decided how much this person owed the royal curia; De Rebus (appendix), II, pp. 128–129, 1283. The castellan was the royal magistrate in charge of the prison; GENUARDI, Il comune, pp. 197–198. 61 Order for the baiulus, judges, and universae personae of Caltanissetta; De Rebus (appendix), II, pp. 83–84, 1283. Order for the captain, judges, and “universis hominibus civitatis Messane” to choose two syndics responsible for the victuals; De Rebus, I, p. 321, 1283. Officials might also be listed by themselves for the same function; there were precise orders, at different times, to the judges or to the captain of Taormina; ibidem, p. 43, 1282. Royal communications addressed the officials alone for other matters besides the distribution of foodstuffs. Consider, for example the request to the “universis hominibus civitatis Panormi” to pay homage to the new castellan, or the announcement of the victory in Calabria to the “baiulo iudicibus et universis hominibus” in various communities; De Rebus (appendix), II, p. 43 1282, and De Rebus, I, pp. 296–299, 1283 respectively. 62 Request to several communities to pay the royal subsidy; ibidem, p. 308, De Rebus, II, pp. 526–527, p. 576, 1283. 63 The sovereign received the nuncios and requested the universis hominibus send the fodrum; De Rebus, I, pp. 5–6, 1282 (Nicosia), p. 69, 1282 (Raccuja). For requests for victuals: ibidem, p. 321, 1283 (Messina), and De Rebus (Appendix), II, pp. 83–84, 1283 (Caltanissetta). The king could also address the “magistris iuratis, baiulis, iudicibus ac universis personis vallis Agrigenti” to acknowledge the grant of an official position; De Rebus, II, p. 518, 1283. An order for the “baiulo, iudicibus ac universis hominibus civitatis Panormi” confirming the justiciar’s position; De Rebus, I, p. 475, 1283. 64 The sovereign asked numerous communities to designate those who would be obliged by custom to pay him homage: “Petrus dei gracia rex Aragonum et Sicilie baiulo iudicibus et universis hominibus[ . . .] Ideoque fidelitati vestre firmiter et expresse mandamus quatenus confestim visis presentibus vos universi et singuli in unum more solito congregati duos de melioribus divicioribus et sufficiencioribus hominibus terre vestre predicte in sindicos mietere stadere debeatis coram conspectu nostro celsitudinis presentando”; ibidem, pp. 9–12, 1282.

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magistrates did not choose the syndics or conduct negotiations with the sovereign by themselves.65 The custom of assembling to elect the ambassadors was widespread throughout the island;66 the call for a community to proceed with the elections, or a reference to electoral procedures already employed implies an assembly.67 For example, the royal confirmation of the election of Nicosia’s notary can be cited: Petrus dei gracia etc. universis hominibus Nicosie fidelibus suis graciam et bonam voluntatem. Gualterius Scarfallitus de Nicosia in magna nostra Curia presentatus quoddam scriptum publicum presentavit per quod consistit quod eum in notarium publicum ispius terre Nicosie concorditer et uniter elegeritis nec non approbaveritis.68 A government role for persons other than the officials is also recorded in the Act of Confederation stipulated between the universitates of Corleone and Palermo in 1282. The Confederation was promoted by Palermo as an anti-Angevin measure after the Vespers. The years 1282–83 corresponded to a unique moment in politics caused by the new dynasty’s establishment, so certain institutional dynamics most likely reflected these unusual circumstances. Indeed, the confederation constituted an isolated episode without any subsequent occurrences.69 Nevertheless, as noted earlier, combined assemblies with both homines and officials participating were possible for certain sectors of government affairs based on long-standing precedents,70 and similar institutional arrangements recur in later years. The plan for confederation was examined by the four captains (an unusual number), the baiulus, the two judges, and the five councillors of Palermo.71 It was a broadranging plan that envisioned the creation of a common duty-free economic zone, the right to receive the same privileges as the cives in the other community, and finally, military support for Corleone which would consequently obtain help in destroying the castle of Calatamauro, a very real threat at the time.72 The decision to seal the treaty was signed “consensu dicti Comuni et dicti populi Panormi exinde requisito et expresse abito” by the officials, the councillors and the other probi viri assembled at the Church of San Cataldo.73 From these initial considerations, the baiulus, judges, and in some cases, individuals other than the magistrates, appear to be the major exponents of local government. The situation altered somewhat over the following years but remained unchanged in negotiations For example, following a plea from the universi homines of Malta and Gozo, the sovereign included them in the royal demesne; ibidem, pp. 422–423, 1283. 66 For example ibidem, pp. 9–12, 1282. 67 See ibidem, p. 48, 1282 (Syracuse), p. 71, 1282 (Raccuja), p. 73, 1282 (Messina). 68 Ibidem, pp. 113–114, 1282. 69 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 129–133. 70 See also, the 1280 act for Corleone which states that “sindici et procuratores universitatis” had received “plenariam potestatem et speciale mandatum a baiulo, iudicibus et universitate” to pledge 50 onze, corresponding to the tithe owed by Corleone, to the archbishop of Monreale; the baiulus, three judges and nine probi homines had reached this agreement and together with the officials had given a mandate to the syndics; ibidem, pp. 123–127. 71 “Nos vero supradicti Capitanei, Iudices et Consiliarii dicte Civitatis Panormi eadem peticionem, utpote iustam, toto populo dicte civitatis ibidem congregato ad hoc, cum deliberatione sollempni et cum eiusdem populi consensu espresso et exinde requisito et abito, admisimus; promictentes pro parte et nomine comunis civitatis Panormi, cum eodem consensu eiusdem populi, per sollempnem stipulationem predictis legatis predicte terre Corilionis, pro parte ipsius terre sollempniter stipulantibus, tractare et habere homines terre Corilionis universaliter, singulariter, coniunctim et divisim, et quemlibet eorum in civem et cives civitatis Panormi, et etiam promittimus per sollempnem stipulacionem pro parte dicti comunis Panormi predictis legatis terre Corilionis nomine ipsius terre sollempniter stipulantibus, predicte terre Corilionis et hominibus eiusdem, ad requisitionem eorum, dare auxilium, consilium et iuvamen cum armis, pecunia et personis ad tuicionem dicte terre Coriolonis et tenimenti terrarum, quas nunc dicta terra Corilionis possidet”. Ibidem, pp. 130–131. 72 Some references to this act of union in PERI, La Sicilia, pp. 5–6. 73 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 132. 65

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with the sovereign during the first decade of the 1300s. For example, in 1304 Frederick III asked the baiuli, the judges and all the other men of the universitates to elect syndics to send to his brother, James II of Aragon, to swear an oath at the signing of the pactes et convenciones.74 Frederick III had been elected King of Sicily by the Parliament of Catania in 1296, in opposition to the politics of James II in favour of the returning Sicily to the Angevins. Thus, in 1296, Sicily acquired a full autonomy which would be diminished with the election of Ferdinand I in 1412. The areas in which certain officials operated can be traced through documentary records for the decade following the arrival of the Aragonese. It would seem jurisdiction over civil cases during the reign of James II was, as before, the province of the baiuli, whereas criminal cases were the province of the justiciars. The Sovereign addressed these officials in 1286 concerning low and high justice: Calumniosas, et graves prorogationes, quae in audiendis, et terminandis causis civilibus, et criminalibus indebite comittuntur, unde nostris fidelibus tam in expensis, quam in personarum laboribus damna plurima irrogantur, ad vivanda ipsorum onera, et expensa abolire, praesenti commissione providimus, et mandamus, quod si per baiulos, secretos, iustitiarios, et alios officiales nostre curiae, de causis, quaestionibus, quae coram eis motae, et propositae fuerint, vel eis a superiore commissae, infra menses duos, numerandos a die motae questiones, vel causae, partibus in suis rationibus non satisfaciant, ut tenentur, et debent, nisi iusta, et rationabili causa terminum exigat longiorem, causas, et quaestiones ispas ad cognitionem, et iurisdicionem, et audientam magistri iustitiarii, et iudicum magnae curiae nostrae statim post lapsum ipsorum duorum mensium devolvi iubemus . . .75 The spheres of responsibility are not specified for the baiulus and justiciar, but it is logical to conclude that the former dealt with civil matters, and the latter with criminal justice, in light of the fact that later the baiulus was not to have jurisdiction over high justice. The role played by the secreti named in the same ordinance is not evident. This lack of definition confirms, on the one hand, how the duties of the various offices were still not clearly delineated, and on the other, leaves open the possibility of a joint undertaking with the secreti in cases involving crimes of a financial nature. The justiciarate system continued to exist—four in number according to what Frederick III stipulated in 1296, excluding the cities of Palermo and Messina. In actual fact the districts were more numerous and fragmentary than they had been under Peter III and, in some cases, even coincided with a demesne locality, institutionalized by the double title of Captain and Justiciar.76 Eventually, from the 1350s, the districts were reduced, corresponding ultimately to urban centres. Jurisdictional authority passed completely into the

74 Pergamene, pp. 124–135. Of these elections, instances are recorded for the universitates of Syracuse, Trapani, Palermo, and Messina, which share some common features including: the custom of assembling in a holy place (a parish, cathedral, or mother church), a reading of the royal order before the assembly, and the assembly’s election of the nuncii on whom to confer the mandate. At the same time, there are several differences that point out how each community could fulfil the royal request according to its own customs. In Syracuse the officials who participated in the council assembly were the baiulus and the judges, in Trapani a judge, and the judges in Messina, and also in Palermo where the baiulus was elected as nuncius. The number of participants constituted another difference: 15, 69, 24, and 19 respectively 75 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum XVI, p. 13. 76 Ibidem, Capitulum VII, p. 51, 1296. An even more fragmented situation hid behind the subdivision: Justiciar of Agrigento and the partes of Termini and Cefalù, Justiciar and Captain of Trapani (Acta, III, pp. 25–26, 1323; pp. 124–125, 1326).

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hands of captains whose sphere of activity naturally regarded the urban front despite the fact that the title of Justiciar might continue to be used.77 According to what James II decreed in 1288, anyone carrying forbidden weapons was denounced or turned over by the baiuli and magistri surtae (sciurterii) to the justiciars who, as already seen, dealt with criminal justice.78 The royal ordinance is partly misleading in that after a cursory reading it might seem that, for even such a small matter, no hierarchical distinction existed between the sciurterii and the baiulus. The hierarchy was actually quite precise, as borne out by Frederick III’s 1296 denunciation of abuses committed by baiuli who, in exchange for money, had exonerated the sciurterii from their duties and caused great harm to the community.79 The main duty of the sciurterii was the night watch which began post trinam pulsationem campane.80 Hence, they were the unit entrusted with performing the night watch while the baiulus coordinated the activity. This provides the key for interpreting the order by James II making both the magistracies accountable to the justiciars.81 Although it was an elective office in Palermo, for example, from as early as 132082, the electiveness of the sciurteii had not been established everywhere Frederick III’s 1296 decree exhorted the baiuli to select suitable people83 and, at the same time, instituted the most useful reform by making it into an annual position while leaving the universitas a free

77 Justiciar, or Justiciar and Captain in Palermo; Acta, VIII, p. 104, p. 357, 1349. In particular, see note 99 below. Frederick IV’s famous statement in 1363 that he felt it more important to be captain of a terra than justiciar of a province signals the final demise of the justiciarate system; see VINCENZO D’ALESSANDRO, Politica e società nella Sicilia aragonese, Palermo, 1963, p. 322. It was precisely the captaincy sought by leading exponents of the seigneurial faction, or members of their entourage, in their effort to gain control over the centre during the height of the crisis in royal power under Frederick IV; see ENRICO MAZZARESE FARDELLA, “L’aristocrazia siciliana nel secolo XIV e i suoi rapporti con le città demaniali: alla ricerca del potere”, in Aristocrazia cittadina e ceti popolari nel tardo Medioevo in Italia e in Germania, eds. REINHARD ELZE & GINA FASOLI, Bologna, 1984, pp. 186–189. With regard to the gradual positioning of aristocratic leaders over the cities from the second half of the fourteenth century, see also BRESC, Un monde, II, pp. 719–725, and CORRAO, Governare, pp. 46–54. 78 “Statuimus in super, et mandamus, quod nemini justitiatorum, et aliorum officialium nostrae curiae liceat per procuratorem curiae, vel aliam submissam personam, aliquas personas de spretis poenis, sive defensis, et armorum portationibus, extractionibus, et percussionibus inde factis facere accusari, nisi ad denunciationem, et instantiam partium denunciantium, coquerentium, seu passorum injuriam, partibus etiam ipsis insistentibus, et persistentibus in curia justitiatorum, officialium eorundem in persecutione denunciationum, vel accusationum ipsarum, vel de praedictorum armorum portationibus, ad relationem bajulorum, seu magistros surtae, ad quorum spectat officium scire, videre, intercipere, et praedictis justitiariis referre, seu assegnare singulos arma proibita deferentes”. TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum LVI, p. 33. 79 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum XLVIII, p. 71. 80 La Mantia, Antiche, cost. 60, pp. 197–198 (Palermo); pursuant to a complaint, King Ludovico asked to have the ancient custom of the tolling of the campane Surte re-established in Trapani in 1343, ibidem, p. XXXV. After the third toll of the bell in Corleone, it was only permissible to move about the terra with a light: “qui contrafecerit et inventus fuerit, solvat vice qualibet baiulo Augustale dimidium, ita quod dicti inventi sint dati per iuratos dictae terrae baiulo”; STARRABBA-TIRRITO, Assize 130, pp. 73–74. On the office of the sciurterii in Corleone, see also Assize 14 and Assizes 102 to 108; STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 9–10, pp. 59–63 respectively. In Palermo they had the power to place “in cippone uno die ad penam, i familiares, domesticos, servos et ancillas” who roamed the city without their lord’s knowledge. Finally, they also had the right to proceed “inter extraneos et meretrices a decem infra tarenis infra . . . procedant in predictis questionibus terminandis, a quorum sententia, quia minimam causam continet, pars condempnata ad pretorem Civitatis poterit appellare”; La Mantia, Antiche, cost. 60, pp. 197–198. On the title of Praetor, substitute for the baiulus in Palermo, see Chapter 2, note 84. There seems to be no mention of magistri sciurterii prior to the Angevin period; GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 203 n. 3. 81 Testa, Capitulum LVI, p. 33. 82 Acta, I, p. 209. 83 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum XLVIII, p. 71.

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choice.84 Frederick III’s decision to allow the universitas to decide on the nature of the office is evidence of the initial phases of a royal policy open to the community’s more incisive control of its own governance. This is a political policy that would become the norm over the course of the century and makes it possible to foresee how the scrutiny (scrutineum), i.e., the system for electing civic officials, will prevail during this very reign.85 The collections of customary law—compiled primarily during the Frederickian reign—are further testimony of new relationships instated between the Crown and cities. The customaries were drawn up in conjunction with the development of municipal autonomy.86 The co-occurrence of the profusion of customaries, and the even more important Frederickian royal policy which was in many ways innovative, is probably the result of a general ferment in the urban world capable of directing (or at any rate beginning to influence) the Sovereign’s political policy making. The affirmation of the jurats and power relations with the catapans during the reign of Frederick III still need to be examined. With the capitula iuratorum in 1309, the rex Trinacriae formally established the office, increasing its functions and making it, in effect, a pivotal magistracy in local government administration87 The hypothesis of an initial link between the jurats and the catapan’s office in the context of the annona has already been mentioned. The iuratia went on to occupy a central role because of the functions it had previously exercised and because its supposed earlier elective character represented the new institutional direction of the universitas better than other offices.88 Actually, the elements of affinity between the iuratia and the catapan’s office under the Swabians, and in part of the Aragonese period, are significant given that the persistence of

84 Ibidem, Capitulum XVII, pp. 55–56. Hence, the community also had the right to determine the number of officials based on its own needs, particularly the population density. Royal indications for the community‘s annual appointment of the sciurterii each September, the same as for all the elected officials, reveals how the Sovereign was oriented towards normalizing the electiveness of even this magistracy. The number of xurterii was not the same throughout the various communities. For example, see Assizes 102, 103 and Consuetudo XLI for the terra of Corleone, in which four magistri xurtae are set apart from the forty xurterii (later reduced to thirty-six), also elective and subordinate to the magistri xurtae in their custody of land; STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 59, p. 98. Because only the four magistri xurtae prove to be elected later on, the numerous vice sciurterii might have been residents summoned each time to give assistance. On the dating of the assizes, which go back to the early 1300s but were rewritten in 1439, see ibidem, pp. 1–2 n. 1. On this subject GENUARDI (Il comune, p. 236 n. 1) maintains that the assizes belong to statutes compiled by urban communities and furthermore assigns their codification to the early 1300s based on a number of clues: the augustalis in use, the style of writing, and the form of the official approval “confirmata est ut iacet” (this last theory is also expressed by STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 2 n. 1). 85 See Section 2.2 regarding this topic. 86 The first person to point out an adaptation to the prevailing reality in collecting and revising the customaries was PERI, La Sicilia, pp. 20–21. More specifically and elaborately, MINEO, “Norme”, pp. 383–399, explained how the customaries, although dealing mainly with rules of succession, provided “una definizione più efficace delle strategie patrimoniali dei nuovi soggetti in via di affermazione all’interno del campo politico locale, e, indirettamente, al loro dinamismo politico”; ibidem, p. 397. This explains the concomitance between written documentation and development of urban autonomy. Regarding the vitality of urban society during the reign of Frederick III see PERI, La Sicilia, pp. 19–20; GIUSEPPE PETRALIA, “Sui Toscani in Sicilia tra Due e Trecento: la penetrazione sociale e il radicamento nei ceti urbani”, in Commercio, finanza, funzione pubblica: Stranieri in Sicilia e Sardegna nei secoli XIII-XV, ed. MARCO TANGHERONI, Naples, 1989, pp. 136–185. 87 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVI, pp. 106–109. For the dating of the capitulum, see PIETRO GULOTTA, “In unum corpus et unam societatem: i capitula iuratorum del 1309 (Testa 1324) e l’assetto istituzionale della città di Palermo durante il regno di Federico III”, in Archivio Storico Siciliano, s. IV, 26, 2000, pp. 19–56. 88 As previously mentioned, the theory of a link between the jurats and the officials responsible for food supplies, as well as the previously elective nature of the iuratia, was put forth by GARUFI, Il comune, pp. 19–21, p. 25 and by GENUARDI, Il comune, pp. 94–96, pp. 186–87. It was also recently dealt with by MINEO, “Città”, pp. 132–134. Rather than uphold the creation of the jurats’ position through legal norms like the other authors cited, he underlines the early link with the catapans in explaining its opportune establishment.

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such a relationship is not documented during the Angevin period and it cannot be sustained that jurats held elective office. Even though pertinent information is decidedly limited, it appears to have been a royal appointment in demesne centres.89 There remains to be examined the reason behind the iuratia’s acquisition of a dominant role in the early 1300s, one in an explicitly hierarchical relationship with the catapan’s office, when the latter, with its earlier documented electiveness, would have been wellsuited to reflect the new institutional course of the universitates. The catapan’s office also played an amply defined role in the sphere of the annona: customaries of numerous communities record that it held wide powers in overseeing markets and controlling weights and measures.90 One way of analysing this situation involves examining the jurats’ role which was no longer limited to the confines of the annona in the Angevin period. Already in the 1200s, and most likely not as elected officials, the jurats exercised greater authority than the catapans, as exemplified by Trapani’s master jurat in charge of exempting non-propertyowning residents from the colletta.91 From the few extant references available, it would seem the jurats’ authority, which the sovereign most likely tended to enhance over the others, was superior to the catapans’.92 However within the general climate of areas opening up to selfgovernment, the iuratia would join the roll of elective offices. A vaster consideration must be entertained in order to justify such a significant broadening of the role: it was necessary to propose a clear legislative system to avoid an overlap of different officials’ functions in the administration. This might also explain Frederick III’s attempt to concentrate numerous tasks in the hands of a single office. The main duties of the jurats included summoning the town council, receiving the municipal revenue and deciding how it should be used, in addition to overseeing the observance of royal decrees, and imposing the mete.93 All the same, it is not possible to attribute this policy of amplifying the role to the Crown alone. In effect, pressure from the universitates themselves to define the functions of the jurats’ curia is evident in the same 1309 text that explicitly mentions the duties incumbent upon Messina’s jurats in relation to controversies regarding land boundaries and other property.94 Moreover, local pressure, already perceptible in the royal text, is borne out further by the reception in several communities of copies featuring exceptions—a result of

89 For Catania, the creacio of the master jurat is referred to (R. C. A., vol. VI, p. 190, 1271); in Trapani the master jurat excluded some inhabitants from the colletta (R. C. A., vol. IV, p. 165, 1270). 90 Information regarding Palermo’s catapans in Articles 61 and 82, for Noto in Article 32, for Syracuse in Article 48, for Corleone in Assizes 37, 39, 74, 98, 99, 131, and 141, and Consuetudo XXXVIII; La Mantia, Antiche. It can be noted that the subordination of catapans to jurats, as stipulated by Frederick III, might not always have been the case. For example, according to Article 61 of the Palermitan Constitutions, the catapans had to swear an oath before the praetor upon election, given that they would have had to turn over individuals violating regulations regarding weights and measures to the praetor and judges. Furthermore, the same article also makes it possible to further investigate the relationships between the catapan’s office and other offices, especially the town council. In fact, the catapans “cum consilio seniorum, mercatorum et prudentum hominum dicte urbis, statuant forum rerum venalium singularum ad utilitatem ementium et vendentium”, ibidem, p. 199. See ANDREA ROMANO, Prefazione in Vito La Mantia, Antiche, pp. LXVI-LXVIII, on compiling the customaries. 91 “Scriptum est Mag. Iurato [. . .] ac hominibus Trapani, quod, si Petrus Manganarii, Petrus de Lando de Salerno et Laurentius Gallus de Scala domus et possessiones aliquas non habeant in terra Trapani, illos ad contribuendum cum ipsis in collectis [. . .] non compellant”; R. C. A., vol. IV, p. 165, 1270. 92 Peter III requested the master jurats in Patti, Catania, and Aci order the sailors to appear before the Sovereign; De Rebus (appendix), II, pp. 144–145, 1283. 93 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVI, pp. 106–109. For the town council, see Section 2.3. 94 “Item, quod dicti iurati habeant videre, conoscere, decidere, et terminare omnes contentiones, et controversias, quas oriri contigerit inter cives civitatis Messane, super sepibus, seu finibus, limitibus, et divisis vinearum, domorum, et aliarum personarum, et his similimum”; TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVI, p. 108.

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adaptations to local circumstances—differentiating these versions of Frederick’s text from the original.95 It is important to underline that power relations with other officials did not disclose a clear-cut primacy of the jurats; indeed, they attested to a significant role played by both the judges and leaders of the universitas who were not officials. From the 1330s onwards, references to urban political confrontations involving not only the officials started becoming more specific. Royal concessions for Nicosia’s universitas, two from 1333 and one from 1335, illustrate this relative balance of power. The concessions regard the financing of a teacher “in scientia grammaticali perito [. . .] ad eruditionem adolescientium”, a new assessment of inhabitants’ wealth to replace an earlier one enumerating the deceased and individuals without property, an impoverished community’s exemption from payments for armed men during a period of war, and the possibility of levying a new tax.96 They followed specific requests presented by community assemblies (“universitas more et loco solitis congregata”)97, rather than the iuratia. Such assemblies were very likely presided over by the judges and jurats, as can be gleaned from the 1335 measure in which the Sovereign addresses both the judges and jurats acknowledging that the syndic appraised him of the request from the universitas. According to the 1309 text, the jurat’s office should have played a predominant role in formulating petitions; nevertheless, that role has not been corroborated for the community of Nicosia. In this regard, examining the significance of power relations between the sovereign and local governments will facilitate an evaluation of the importance attributable to royal measures. One of the functions Frederick III assigned to the jurats, for instance, was the duty of setting the mete that the catapans would enforce. The royal directive seems to indicate the jurats were the only officials responsible for the task, but in effect, this was a legal norm that would not be put into effect everywhere.98 The real situation showed a distribution of functions differing from the royal decree of 1309. This aspect should not be undervalued when analysing the institutions and urban communities.

Numerous communities received a series of capitula containing variations regarding the same magistracy: for Palermo in 1330, see DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 110–113; for Messina in 1331, see CAMILLO GIARDINA (ed.), Capitoli e privilegi di Messina, Palermo, 1937, pp. 97–102, 1331. An identical reference to the capitula iuratorum exists in Caltagirone but the year of the document’s issue is not known; PACE, Il governo, p. 160. In Salemi (see R.R. pp. 90–93) the undated capitula for the jurats also include regulations not present in the Frederickian capitula regarding the sale of tax farms, and since the regulations provide for overseeing the jurats’ operations and the participation of the council, the documents might have been drawn up during Alphonso’s reign when there were similar provisions in other localities. This refers in particular to Catania; G. G. pp. 145–146, 1433. Regarding transformations that might involve political institutions, and their vast degree of adaptability with respect to the areas where they might operate, see JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, Riscoprire le istituzioni: Le basi organizzative della politica, transl. by Roberto Cartocci, Bologna, 2000, Chapter 4. See also ALFREDO VIGGIANO, Governanti e governati: Legittimità del potere ed esercizio dell’autorità sovrana nello Stato veneto della prima età moderna, Treviso, 1993, Chapter 4 in particular. 96 ANGELO BARBATO, Per la storia di Nicosia nel medio evo. Documenti inediti (1267–1454), Nicosia, 1919, pp. 23–27. Barbato’s research concerns the city of Nicosia; hereafter, references to this work will not include a specific mention of the city. 97 Ibidem, p. 23. 98 In most cases the baiulus, the jurats and the town council decided on the application of the mete together; see the pertinent instances pointed out by GARUFI, “La giurisdizione”, pp. 154–162. In 1321, the jurats and the catapans in Palermo cooperated in the application of the mete; Acta, I, p. 241 (indicated by MINEO, “Città”, p. 133 n. 76). In Corleone the mete were set by the catapans, also called nadarii, in collaboration with the judges and the jurats: “idem nadarii similiter teneantur herbas hortorum, fructus locorum, iardinorum et vienarum nadarare, sive metam ponere, sub poena praedicta, de consilio iudicum et iuratorum”; STARRABBA-TIRRITO, Assize 131, p. 74. Their participation in this task became so customary as to establish an equivalency between the verbs nadarare and metam ponere. Finally, the text of the 1331 capitula for the jurats for the city of Messina prescribed that the mete were to be set by the catapans and not the jurats; GIARDINA (ed.), Capitoli, p. 100. See Chapter 5, n. 42, for instances of their application in the first half of the 1400s. 95

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Privileges, royal capitula, urban petitions, and such, are the result of negotiations that could rapidly become outdated when new dynamics set in. The sovereign, consistent with a non-directorial application of authority, did not oppose adjustments varying from what had been previously prescribed. Hence, it is important to see a royal concession as a reflection of a specific moment in time and verify its actual persistence against subsequent developments. Finally, a few observations are necessary concerning the functions of the other magistracies during the years following the reign of the rex Trinacriae when it became clear that the captain alone held jurisdiction over penal cases.99 Although instances of his intervention were rare in other sectors, they nevertheless revealed the application of a considerable amount of authority.100 Analysing instances of cooperation between the royal official and the elected officials does not furnish a clear picture of the situation since it is not rare to find records of undertakings in a given field which sometimes involved a number of magistracies, and at other times, only a few. Most of the collaboration between the different offices has to do with internal affairs, political conflict, and the execution of administrative measures.101 The jurisdiction over low justice remained with the civil court (curia civilis, made up of the baiulus and judges), often in collaboration with the jurats’ court (in both of these curiae one or more notaries might be present). This cooperation depended on the

99 The Crown made the captain’s position official when jurisdiction over high justice was granted. For some examples, see COSENTINO : p. 10, for Savoca, Caltanissetta, and Caltavuturo in 1355; p. 15, for Giuliana in 1355; p. 127, for Castiglione in 1356; p. 205, for Paternò in 1356; and p. 251, for Randazzzo in 1356. The assigning of jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases to the captain for the community of Mineo (ibidem, p. 119, 1356) lead Genuardi to maintain that the captain also judged civil cases in places where there was no baiulus; GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 194. Genuardi’s assumption is unsustainable, however, as demonstrated by examples of communities where there was no baiulus and the captain only held jurisdiction over high justice; for example COSENTINO, p. 237, for Castiglione in 1356; p. 239, for Randazzo in 1356; and p. 243 for Paternò in 1356. Just as the incident involving the community of Mineo could be considered an exceptional occurrence, the involvement of the civil court in affairs falling under the purview of the captain’s office could represent an isolated episode. Such is the case for the royal order for the baiulus and the judges of Francavilla to release a prisoner; ibidem, p. 37, 1355. 100 The captain and vice-captains of Caltanissetta and Calascibetta received orders to return to a private citizen assets which had been confiscated by his enemies; the captain of Castrogiovanni was charged with assembling the well-to-do from the terra to be sent off to war; ibidem, p. 11, 1355, pp. 126–127, 1356, respectively. It is worth noting the royal injunction requiring the men of Savoca to swear obedience to the new captain. The injunction reveals a captain and sovereign in full accord, an agreement that in the following years would be missing; ibidem, pp. 36–37, 1355. See Section 4.3 regarding the evolution of power relations between the sovereign and captain. 101 Royal letter to the captain, vice-captain, baiulus, judges and jurats of the island of Lipari calling for them to give assistance to the vice-admiral following the theft of a ship; royal order to the same officers, but for the communities of Randazzo, Troina e Cerami, for the custody of the solatii located in those localities; royal order for the captain and the universitas of Randazzo not to receive the Chiaromonte rebels, and later to send knights in defense of Catania threatened by Count Enrico Rosso and the Chiaromontes: COSENTINO, p. 14, 1355; p. 39, 1355, pp. 225–226, 1356; and pp. 249–250, 1356, respectively. Royal injunction for the jurats and treasurer of Radazzo to compensate a resident for lime taken from her by the universitas indicating that the captain would have had to intervene if the officials didn’t take care of the matter; ibidem, pp. 78–79, 1356. The case of Randazzo is attributable to a period of tension, otherwise, it does not seem that the captain’s participation was necessary. For example, the sovereign asked the baiulus, judges, and jurats of San Filippo di Argirò to assign a sum of money to a resident of Aidone for his services; ibidem, p. 4, 1355. It is worth noting that instances of cooperation could have a clear reason for being, such as to assure a more rapid execution of a measure. This was the case when the captain, judges, jurats and treasurer of Caltagirone collaborated in assembling the well-to-do to send off to war and in using the local indirect taxes were for the town walls; ibidem, pp. 187–188, 1356. It was up to the vice-captains, the baiuli, the judges and the jurats of Castrogiovanni to see to the payment of the royal subvention; ibidem, pp. 284–285, 1356. Federico IV, together with the captains, called on the vice-captains, bauli, judges, jurats and treasurers of Syracuse, Cefalù, Mazara, Trapani, Monte San Giuliano, Marsala, and Sciacca to assist the royal emissary in auditing the communities’ accounts; ibidem, pp. 157–158, 1356.

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fact that many cases had to do with an administrative matter where responsibilities were shared.102 The main figures involved in negotiations with the Crown were elected officials and other community leaders for both larger centres and smaller ones, as classified according to population. When the sovereign did not address the universitas103 directly, but referred to its representatives, they were usually the members of the civil curia and the jurats’ curia together with the universis hominibus.104 It became an established practice for the syndics not to be appointed by the officials alone.105 There were numerous requests forwarded by the syndics, including an appeal for an exemption from a royal subvention or a revision of the levy,106 and a request for the financing of a teacher.107 They were also entrusted with presenting an oath of fealty to the Crown.108 The wide range of undertakings requiring community representatives, and consequently necessitating a universitas to elect them, reveal just how many areas of government were not the province of officials alone. A significant number of magistracies existing prior to the Vespers were also active afterwards, indicating important connections between Aragonese domination and the previous period. Meanwhile, in actual fact, power relations between the sovereign and the country changed dramatically when the universitates took on a completely new role in many ways and progressively broadened limitations to self-government. Some of the most important elements documented for the first half of the 1300s include the progressive localization of spaces open to the officials’ participation and an increase in the prerogatives of the jurats’ curia which did not, however, permit it to dominate government activity. This is particularly demonstrated by the role of the civil curia as well as the captain’s, and the increasingly incisive participation of individuals not included in the category of the officials.

102 A royal order to the praetor and the judges of Palermo to convene the interested parties before the court; Acta, VIII,

pp. 295–296, 1349. The baiulus, judges and jurats of Trapani. testified to the citizenship of Riccardo Abate; Acta, IX, pp. 9–10, 1350. A royal letter authorizing the judges and the jurats to force the vicarius to pay the castellan should he initially refuse to do so; COSENTINO, p. 251, 1356 (Lipari). Royal order to the baiulus, the judges and the jurats of Asaro that Giovanni di Presbitero be allowed to live freely in Asaro and have his confiscated assets returned; ibidem, p. 268, 1356. Royal confirmation of the measure from the curia of the baiuli et iudicum in Nicosia that authorized the notary, Matteo de Alexio, to preserve the acts of the notary, Giordano Salomone and put them in official form; ibidem, pp. 334–335, 1357. 103 Royal letters to the “universitati terre Castellioni”; ibidem, p. 129, pp. 205–206, 1356. 104 “Scriptum est [. . .] baiulo, iudicibus et iuratis et universis hominibus terre Trapani”; ibidem, pp. 111–112, 1356 (Trapani). Additionally, the magistracies were not always specified, as happened, for example, in the orders to the “universis officialibus et personis aliiis terre Calatanixecte” to turn over revenue from the terra to Duchess Cesarea, baroness of the terra; ibidem, pp. 82–83, 1356. Futhermore, the sovereign could only address individuals who were not members of the ruling class: “Scriptum est universis hominibus civitatis Lypparis . . .syndicos in curia nostra presentes habere volumus pro prestazione huiusmodi iuramenti, fidelitati vestre mandamus, ut duos ex nostris fidelibus magis ydoneis dicte civitatis in vestros syndicos eligentes, eos electos et approbatos, cum decreto electionis huiusmodi et auctoritate plenaria prestandi dictum fidelitatis iuramentum, ad nostre maiestatis presenciam transmictatis”; ibidem, pp. 37–38, 1355. 105 See, for example, the mandate from Frederick IV to the community of Polizzi: “Scriptum est baiulo, iudicibus, iuratis et universis hominibus in hec verba. Paganus Guastalaqua et notarus Nicolaus de Magistro Andrea de predicta terra fideles nostri, quos in ipsius universitatis syndicos elegistis unanimiter et concorditer pro adimplendis pro parte eiusdem universitatis ea, que nostre coronationis felicissime requiruntur”; ibidem, pp. 4–5, 1355. 106 Ibidem, p. 129, 1356 (Castiglione); BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 23–24, 1333; pp. 26–27, 1335. 107 Ibidem, pp. 23–24, 1333. The syndics could also ask for the liberation of a prisoner; COSENTINO, p. 37, 1355 (Francavilla). Or they could ask to have the castellan investigated: following appeals by the syndics in Castiglione, the sovereign decreed that the miles, Gilio di Stabella, retain custody of the castles on condition that he swear homage and fealty; ibidem, pp. 205–206, 1356. The sovereign did not always indicate which petitions had been sent to him by the syndics; ibidem, pp. 153–154, 1356 (Trapani). 108 Numerous universitates swore their oath through the syndics; ibidem, pp. 4–5, pp. 8–9, pp. 37–8, 1355.

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1.3 Fiscal Policy during the Reigns of Frederick III and Frederick IV: An Initial Adaptation to the Needs of the ‘Universitates’ A more detailed analysis of the differing roles of civic officials can benefit from an examination of municipal fiscal policies. The financial system in the Aragonese period consisted mainly of indirect taxation through the gabelle, a method already in place during the Angevin reign109 when it seems there existed a distinction between royal and non-royal imposts110 in cases where the community’s autonomy in instituting taxation was limited.111 The gabella was equivalent to an indirect tax rather than another type of revenue.112 Under Aragonese rule, from as early as Frederick III’s reign, archival records show a distinction between the taxes levied by the Crown and those exacted by local governments. In 1328, Palermo’s universitas appealed to the sovereign: Cum, de vestre sacre regie maiestatis beneplacito, provisum fuerit et iniuncutm quod cabelle, tam vestre curie quam nostre universitatis, vendi debeant et locari pro anno proximo futuro duodecime indicionis, pro ulteriori pecunie quantitate qua melius poterunt in vestre curie comodum et augmentum, pro ipsius curie serviciis feliciter exequendis . . . .113 Peter II (1337–1342, co-regent from 1322) in 1336, in reply to a petition from Corleone’s universitatis hominum, granted the request to establish a series of taxes “per universitatem eamdem in terra ipsa pro habicione pecunie subvencionis eiusdem statui et ordinari electas et per nostram Curiam approbatas”. These were taxes over which the community would have had complete control in order to fulfil its obligation to pay the royal subvention.114 With regard to the distinction between royal and local revenues, it must be pointed out that a tax farm could undergo a change of administrators, and royal grants to 109 In Palermo for example, R. C. A., vol. I, p. 301, 1269; p. 304, 1269; in Messina, R. C. A., vol. VI, p. 192, [1270]; in Malta and in GAUDIOSO, R. C. A., vol. VI, p. 193 [1270]. On the extensive use of indirect taxation in various sectors, see MARTIN, “Fiscalité”, pp. 609–617; and for direct imposts in the form of collette or general annual subventions, see ibidem, p. 617. 110 For example, the sovereign calls the gabelle owed to the Crown cabellarum nostrarum, R. C. A., vol. VI, p. 192, 1271 (Messina); R. C. A., vol. XI, p. 232 (Palermo), while in an order for the bishop of Mazara, reference is made to “decimas proventuum doane et aliarum cabellarum civitatis Mazariensis et aliarum terrarum eiusdem diocesis”, R. C. A., vol. III, p. 60, 1269. In general, regarding the system of indirect taxation and the amount of the revenue collected in the Angevin period, see WILLIAM A. PERCY, The Revenues of the Kingdom of Sicily under CHARLES I of Anjou 1266–1285 and their Relationship to the Vespers, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Princeton, 1964, pp. 137–176. 111 “Provisio pro universitate hominum Malte et Gaudisii, de impositione cabelle herbagii”; R. C. A., vol. VI, p. 193, [1270]. The absence of extensive autonomy can be inferred from the royal rejection of the Palermitans’ unauthorized formulation of certain statutes concerning basic necessities, an action causing a loss of income to the Crown; R. C. A., vol. XI, p. 232, 1274. This seems to imply the community could deliberate certain imposts, subject to authorization. As demonstrated by MARTIN, “Fiscalité”, p. 631, though referring to direct taxation, the universitates could decide on levies for their own needs only if authorized by the sovereign. Among other things, on the subject of Angevin fiscal policy, Martin starts from the premise of a link to the Normans, and even more so to the Swabians. See also SERENA MORELLI, “Giustizieri e distretti fiscali nel regno di Sicilia durante la prima età angioina”, in Medioevo, I, p. 304. 112 For a comparison of the amounts of the gabella for Tuscan communes, see CHARLES-MARIE DE LA RONCIÈRE, “Indirect Taxes or ‘Gabelle’ at Florence in the Fourteenth Century: The Evolution of Tariffs and Problems of Collection”, in Florentine studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. NICOLAI RUBINSTEIN, Evanston, 1968, pp. 146–147; DAVID NICHOLAS, The Later Medieval City 1300–1500, London-New York, 1997, pp. 174–175; and MARIA GINATEMPO, Prima del debito:Finanziamento della spesa pubblica e gestione del deficit nelle grandi città toscane (1220–1350 ca.), Florence, 2000, pp. 87–97. For Turin, see ALESSANDRO BARBERO, Un’oligarchia urbana: Politica ed economia a Torino fra Tre e Quattrocento, Rome, 1995, pp. 222–226. More generally PATRIZIA MAINONI, “La gabella del sale nell’Italia del nord (secoli XIII-XIV)”, in Politiche finanziarie, pp. 39–86, who argues that the term gabella appears in northern Italy in the 1200s and rather than indicating indirect imposts, initially meant revenue organized directly by the government, not merely exacted as a toll; ibidem, p. 48. 113 Acta, IV, pp. 148–149. 114 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 161–163 (the quote on p. 161).

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communities for the right of exacting certain taxes115 which could later be re-appropriated by the sovereign should be interpreted in light of this fact. In 1329, for example, the sovereign addressed the praetor, the judges and the jurats of Palermo, in response to the town’s plea to provide funds for restoring the walls, and gave revenues he had previously decided to keep for himself back to the universitas. The universitas would have been able to exercise full rights over their farming: restituantur eidem universitati certae gabelle universitatis eiusdem, quorum proventus a pridie curia nostra pro expensis eius servitiis imminentibus occasione guerre presentis simul cum proventibus iurium aliarum gabellarum curiae spectantium ad officium secretiae, et cassiarum civitatis eiusdem, pro anno presenti tertiae decimae indictionis, locavit et ad gabellam vendidit pro certa quantitate pecuniae [. . .] restituantur eidem universitati a primo septembris proxime futuri, quarte decime indicitonis in antea, ad illas per ipsam universitatem locandas, et vendendas, ac ipsarum proventus, et redditus percipiendos, et habendos, convertendos in opere muro rum116 It could happen that a portion of the revenue from certain tariffs went to the community and a part to the sovereign. This is evident in the 1354 decree of King Ludovico (1342–135) which designated the leading figures charged with the farm of the gabelle and entrusted the task to Riccardo Abbate for the communities of Trapani and Monte San Giuliano. He would have maximized the receipts “ad necessaria et utilia dictorum locorum [. . .] restantem pecuniam eorumdem proventuum dictarum cabellarum ad necessaria et utilia nostre curie”.117 This farming of taxes, especially in the case of Palermo in 1329, points to one of the tax system’s main features, i.e., the lack of tight control over the revenue, a characteristic that would become the norm in later years. Still, even though a farm was for a limited period, the distinction over who was in control was well defined as confirmed in the very concessions of the farms.118 The separation between royal and municipal revenue becomes even more apparent during the reign of Frederick IV. It was a fundamental distinction underlying the system of farming the taxes, the continual updating of which could entail a differentiation between older gabelle and more recent ones,119 distinctions that recur in every economic ordinance. In 1371, the sovereign settled on an indemnity that Nicosia’s universitas owed Benuto Berardo for the destruction of his house. This would supposedly have been paid by the city alone, but in fact, a portion of the funds came from a municipal gabella and the remainder from revenue belonging to the office of the secretus.120 The preservation of this tax system was fundamental to harmonious relations between the Crown and the local elite. It is not This is the case in Federico III’s concession of gabelle to the universitas of Salemi; GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 248 n. 1. DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 99–102. COSENTINO, pp. 130–131. For example, the Crown could grant temporary farms to private individuals in exchange for a loan; SAVAGNONE, Capitoli, pp. 8–9, 1327 (Palermo). 119 For example, the royal concession to Pietruccio Lancia of Messina in 1356, following the death of his brother who had held title, “terciarium veterum cabellarum et iurium terrarum Nicosie et Licate . . . spectantes ad collacionem curie nostre”; the same provision was made for the cleric Nuchio Sallimpipi in 1357, but in this instance for the terziaria of Polizzi; COSENTINO, p. 162, 335 respectively. Concession of 12 onze on the “proventibus et redditibus cabellarum et iurium regis et reginalis curie civitatis [Messane]”; GIUSEPPE TRAVALI, I diplomi angioini dell’Archivio di Stato di Palermo (Documenti per servire alla storia di Sicilia s. I, VII), Palermo, 1885–1886, pp. 16–17, 1356. Examples of distinctions between ancient imposts and new ones, and royal concessions: R. C. vol. VIII, fols 140v-141r, 1375 (Piazza), and fol. 152v, 1375 (Nicosia). 120 BARBATO, Per la storia, p. 36. 115 116 117 118

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surprising that the reinstatement of earlier taxes was one of the first acts undertaken by the sovereign for communities reincorporated into the royal demesne after having been under the control of the rebel magnates.121 Even though it was up to the secretus to manage royal revenues, the implementation of decrees regarding Crown gabelle could also be the responsibility of the treasurer and the jurats who were charged with administering municipal finances. This is evident, for example, in the royal order of [1323] which specifically addressed Corleone’s vicesecretus, along with the secreti and master procurators of Sicily, indicating that the jurats and the treasurer, as well as the gabelloti (tax farmers) or the credencierii, should give the miles, Guglielmo Moncada, 120 onze owed annually to the Crown for the ancient royal assise baiulacionis tax.122 It should be remembered that the tax farms could be put up for auction (to gabelloti) or their management assigned directly to the credencierii. It was again Frederick III who asked the secretus of the city of Palermo, Manfredi de Boccadorzo, to hand over a part of the monies from the “pecunie Curie et proventuum gabellarum universitatis eiusdem” (hence, from both royal and municipal income) to the treasurer for the restoration of the walls in 1329.123 This last decree implies a sharing of responsibility between the Crown and universitas, rather than full control over the repair work being assigned to the secretus. The jurats and the treasurer are also shown to have cooperated in the ordinary management of city finances during the reign of Frederick IV, for instance, in paying out what was owed to the syndics, the auditor of accounts sent by the Crown, and the officials.124 The jurats together with the judges, and even the baiulus at times, were called in on affairs that were not ordinary administration; the treasurer, on the other hand, was not.125 This data reveals that the officials had executive duties more or less limited to the ordinary administration of municipal finances, however, it still must be established whether they also had operative powers in matters of local economic policy and if they acted autonomously, or in conjunction with other exponents of the universitas. Archival references for the first half of the 1300s are scarce and refer only to a few centres, thus preventing a full analysis of the balance of relationships in the power structure. Nevertheless, it is possible to 121 For a more thorough understanding of the dynamics existing under magnate rule, it is useful to look at the data having to do with the universitates during the phase in which they returned to royal control. In this regard, a particularly significant document concerns the community of Francavilla (R. C. vol. 8, fol. 86r, 1376): after Count Enrico Rosso had ended his rebellion, Francavilla was reincorporated into the demesne, and the sovereign’s first undertaking was to cancel a series of taxes he felt had been imposed in an arbitrary manner. There was an analogous occurrence sometime later in Agrigento; Memorie, pp. LXXXV-LXXXVII, 1392. 122 Pergamene, pp. 185–186. 123 DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 98–99. It could have been up to the universitas to order the treasurer to procede; GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 258 n. 1 (Palermo, 1351–52). 124 Royal order to the Polizzi and Nicosia’s jurats and treasurers to pay the syndics; COSENTINO, p. 5, p. 9, 1355. The jurats and the treasurers of the demesne communities had to give the royal auditor, based on racionibus universitatum, the money for his expenses; ibidem, pp. 63–65, 1356. Order for the jurats and the treasurer of Trapani to pay Riccardo Abate for the custody of the island of Favignana as provided for by King Ludovico; ibidem, pp. 149–150, 1356. Royal order for the jurats and the treasurer of Patti to repay Perrono di Stabile the loan made to the universitas; ibidem, p. 231, 1356. The sovereign notified the jurats and the treasurer of Paternò that the gabelloti had been given the equivalent of the amount lost; ibidem, p. 271, 1356. 125 Unusual cases were in fact often related to disputes; this is revealed, for example, in the royal order for the baiulus, the judges, and the jurats of San Filippo di Argirò, based on what King Ludovico had prescribed, to hand over the sum of the revenue from the terra to Ruggiero Pernichi as compensation for services rendered; ibidem, p. 4, 1355; for the community of Mascali the sovereign addresses the same officials to have property assigned to a private individual after they had been taken from her by followers of Count Enrico Rosso; ibidem, p. 249, 1356.

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advance some hypotheses. Records exist of officials implementing existing norms, discharging royal requests, and most importantly, carrying out mandates from the universitas It is worth citing the regulation in the 1309 capitula iuratorum requiring the involvement of caeteri homines alongside the officials in executing royal measures, in the event it was required by the “qualitas negotii in ipsis mandatis, seu litteris contentis exegerit”.126 The community of Caltagirone subsequently adapted these petitions to their own circumstances, specifying that the jurats among other things “should summon the council when anything of importance happens in order to consult the boni homini”.127 The sovereign thus called for the participation of other people besides officials in carrying out particularly important mandates. The Terra di Caltagirone accentuated the role of individuals not included among the category of the governing class in providing for the involvement of boni homini, even in decidedly local affairs. The law of 1309 was evidently far reaching even because its occurrence in Caltagirone was not an exception, reflecting a widespread practice in certain spheres, especially in a financial setting. Additionally, the officials acted on orders from the universitas when undertaking activities constituting an innovation in the city’s economic policy or merely modifying the distribution of the imposts. As the two documents regarding Agrigento and Palermo confirm, in cases of pactes et convenciones involving the lease of a tax farm, the parties in the contract were the l’universitas, which could delegate the actuation to its own officials, and the tax farmers.128 Requests from a universitas asking the Crown to intervene in situations involving municipal economic policy were quite frequent. In 1329 Palermo’s universitas received complaints nonnullorum mercatorum concivium who were subjected to unjust taxation and it was the universitas that appealed to the sovereign to take action on behalf of the merchants.129 Another case in point, although occurring in 1356, is the universitas terre Castellioni which asked, through its syndics, for a tax relief of 11 onze in order to meet the cost of sending armed men to the border.130 The Crown would likewise address a universitas in response to requests put forward by the residents and announce concessions benefiting the local economy.131 At this point, the areas in which local governments were free to act autonomously in matters of fiscal policy must be clarified. Existing taxes might prove to be insufficient in moments of greater civic need and in such instances, the universitas could impose new levies after receiving royal authorization. Regarding requests for indirect taxes, in 1317 the city of Palermo obtained the right for a period of one year to demand 1 tarí per onza of the tariff imposed on goods entering and leaving the caricatori (where grains were stored for shipment) in Palermo, Cefalù, Trapani, Termini, and Alcamo. The receipts were to be used for work on the walls.132 The value attached to the 126 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVI, p. 106. 127 These are undated petitions that refer back to the 1309 text; PACE, Il Governo, p. 160. 128 Acta, IV, pp. 174–175, 1328; Acta, V, 1329, pp. 225–227. According to a practice already implemented by their

predicessors, the praetor and the judges in Palermo “consueverint ab universitate dicte urbis recipere solidos anno quolibet” on the municipal oil and salt tax in 1322; Acta, VI, pp. 20–21. 129 Acta, V, pp. 101–102. 130 COSENTINO, p. 129. 131 Pergamene, p. 224, 1329 (Castroreale). 132 DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 70–71.

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city walls shows up particularly in periods of conflict, especially during the reign of Frederick IV who had to face the pressures from exponents of the seigneurial faction. It would seem from the 1356 royal request that the captain, judges, jurats and treasurer of Caltagirone use the municipal taxes for repairing the walls should be interpreted in light of this fact. The operation was possible because the Crown allowed all local revenue for that period to be diverted to the repairs and ordered a suspension of the community’s payments to its creditors.133 Furthermore, it was not unusual for the universitas to fall back on some form of direct taxation to meet unforeseen needs. In order to implement these measures, archival evidence exists of the community’s indications for such a tax, although it was up to the sovereign to specify the method of assessment, i.e., who to tax and the amount to demand. Indeed, the city’s independence in fiscal matters was still not complete. This sort of balanced interdependence underlies two decrees in favour of the communities of Nicosia and Mineo. In 1335, Syndic Giovanni Alexi notified Frederick III that the universitas of Nicosia would be able to pay neither the fifty soldiers sent to defend the city of Catania, nor the provisione[s] anuales to certain residents. The Syndic requested either the entire community be exempted, or at least a portion of the population, and permission be granted (evidently, in the event of a partial exemption) for a new levy. Having decreed a suspension of the annual payments for the duration of the conflict, the Sovereign decided to assess individual assets by sending: ydoneum virum mitti qui audiat examinet atque decidat raciones cuiuscumque cum eadem universitate computare debencium et si quos ex eis per examinationem et decisionem rationum ipsarum dicte universitatis in aliquibus pecunie quantitatibus teneri invenerit ipsos ad solutionem ipsarum pecunie quantitatum faciendam dicte universitati qua convenit coercizione compellat. The King determined the form of taxation: providentes quod propterea a numero uno usque in septem taxentur indifferenter inter fideles nostros terre ipsius gradatim secundum possibilitatem uniuscuiusque ipsorum viduis pupillis et miserabilibus tamen exclusis, quod pecunia huiusmodi taxacione habenda in soluzione solidorum et expensarum dictorum armigerorum sicut expediens fore dignoscitur convertatur, quod solutio faccenda hiis qui provsione annuales a dicta universitate recipiunt.134 Frederick III established a type of taxation which set up a graduated scale of seven different rates dependent on an individual’s ability to pay, and exempted the “wretched”, as well as widows and children. The Sovereign did so, however, in approval of a municipal request.135 In the same way, Frederick IV approved the proposal of Mineo’s universitas for a specialem taxacionem in 1356, but established the total amount and put a ceiling on the tax an individual could be asked to pay. Although not specified, there was presumably a schedule of rates based on wealth. The levy served to collect a maximum of 30 onze with which to pay the

133 COSENTINO, pp. 187–188. 134 BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 26–27. 135 For an overview of the wretched, who are the same as the poor, see MARIA S. MAZZI, “Gli inutili: miserabili e vagabondi”,

in La Storia. I Grandi problemi dal Medioevo all’età contemporanea, I, Il Medioevo: I quadri generali, Nicola Tranfaglia & MASSIMO FIRPO, Torino, 1988, pp. 275–296.

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cirurgicus an annual salary and provide for other needs. No resident was to be taxed more than 6 tarí.136 Between the 1330s and the 1350s, the recourse to taxation according to the citizens’ varying ability to pay was a consolidated practice so common that it could not be ignored when enacting direct taxation. This explains why the community of Nicosia, in 1347, refused to pay the 1 tarí and 10 grani indiferenter a pauperibus et divitibus requested by the clergy for burying the dead. The refusal was sustained by the Crown.137 The collette, in fact, were assessed according to the number of hearths and their economic potential, information which regularly comes to light for various communities. In 1333, a quaternum inquisitionis existed in Nicosia which registered the assets of all the people listed.138 Peter II acknowledged in 1336 that the community of Corleone paid the royal subvention “per solitam formam et modum particularis taxacionis foculariorum et facultatem eorum ad id per eadem Curia ordinatam, et presertim quod pauperes fideles nostri terre huiusmodi ex dicta forma non modicum agravantur”.139 Even later, the collette continued to be based on a subdivision of hearths corresponding to different levels of wealth. In Randazzo, in [1357], the levies were based on an assessment of foculariis, boniis et facultatibus,140 the same as in Castrogiovanni, present-day Enna, in 1358.141 Further references to subdivisions in society can be found in both the capitulary issued earlier throughout Sicily dealing with fees for the sale of slaves and a series of other goods, the 1347 Capitula gabellae caxiae de novo declarata, and in the [1368] tax petitions belonging to 136 The tax was to be implemented by the jurats with the participation of the captain, the baiulus and the judges; P. R. vol. 2,

fol. 161r-v. Taxation differentiated according to taxpayers’ wealth was recorded in the earlier Angevin period. Between 1278 and 1280, for the levy of extraordinary imposts, Charles I of Anjou called for an assessment of the taxpayers’ ability to pay: the universitates were to elect “due de maioribus et dictioribus, duo de mediocribus et duo de minoribus” charged with indicating individuals’ assets in order to proceed with the assessment; TRIFONE, La legislazione, p. CXXXIX. On the dating of the royal decree, see MORELLI, “Giustizieri”, I, pp. 309–310. GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 118, cites the same document although it is dated 1269. See also the royal petitions of 1272 regarding the justiciars’ office for the references to the assessment methods for the colletta which stipulated progressive rates based on individual ability to pay; R. C. A., vol. VIII, pp. 268–274 (particularly pp. 271–272). According to MORELLI, “Giustizieri”, I, p. 309, in the petitions of 1272, the sovereign was not interested in ascertaining the ability of his subjects to pay. In general, on the selection of the taxatores et collectores by the universitates, see Percy, The revenues, pp. 60–63. It is necessary to remember that a classification of communities as either populares or milites, to be taxed differently, was recurrent with the Angevins, but there were further distinctions: the populares in Monopoli could ask that the taxatores not be chosen only by the maiores et potentes, and the same request was made by the populares et pauperes in Aversa; MARTIN, “Fiscalité”, pp. 617–619. On the subject of the frequent division of society into categories, it is appropriate to mention Charles of Anjou’s 1290 privilege for the city of Salerno (noted by FARAGLIA, Il comune, pp. 92–94) with which he made provisions for the inclusion of tam nobiles quam mercatores et mediocres in the municipal administration in order to avoid scandala. 137 BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 29–30. 138 “Fridericus, dei gratia rex Sicilie, statuto per curiam super collectione pecunie subventionis in terra Nicosia fideli suo gratam suam et bonam voluntatem. Pro parte universitati hominum Nicosia nostrorum fidelium fuir nuper nostro culmini humiliter supplicatum quod cum in quaterno inquisitionis infra annum quintedecime inditionis nuper elapse per curiam nostram facto, de nominibus cognominibus, facultatibus nostrorum fidelium eiusdem, certi de terra ipsa qui successive sunt viam universe carni ingressi, certique alii ad certas facultatem victualium et bona que per eos possessa seu abita minime extiterunt, fuerint positi seu notati”; ibidem, pp. 24–25. During the years 1374–76 both the religious and lay inhabitants of Sicily paid the subsidium devotorum tithe demanded by Gregory XI. The prelate, Bertrand du Mazel, who was in charge of its collection, had great difficulty in the early stages due to protests over the demand of an across-the-board payment of one silver tarí from each person over 10 years of age. The sovereign then acted as mediator and obtained an act drafted by the moderatio regia legate allowing for a contribution based on household units, and proportionate to wealth. It was indicated that in each locality 1⁄4 of the population was made up of rich families (divites), 1⁄4 of mediocrium personarum, and 1⁄4 of inferiori. The first group probably gave 3 tarí, the second 2 tarí, and the third 1 tarí. The Israelites, non-Christian merchants from the East, and the poor (miserabiles) were exempted. See GAMBI, “La popolazione”, pp. 3–4. 139 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 161. On the considerations underlying distinctions among taxpayers, see considerations by Costa regarding citizenship analysed according to identity and rights; PIETRO COSTA, “Cittadinanza e comunità: Un programma di indagine storiografica fra medioevo e età moderna”, in Filosofia politica, 1, 1999, pp. 15–37. 140 R. C. vol. 8, fol. 24r. 141 COSENTINO, pp. 492–493. Compare to Frederick IV‘s 1357 letter to the “habitatores terre Castellionis in facultatibus habundantibus”, who owned arms and horses for the defence of the community; ibidem, pp. 325–326.

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the universitas of Alcamo. The former were regulations regarding dedicated taxes guaranteeing a series of revenue sources to be paid by “cuiscumque condicionis, status et nationis existat privilegiati et non privilegiati”.142 This 1347 text includes a reference, albeit vague, to a distinction between those who were privileged and others who were not, a vagueness explainable by the fact that the measure applied to the whole of Sicily. Instead, the Alcamo petitions explain what might constitute a privileged condition, naming the boni homini who owned the animals they took to pasture and, above all, the borgesi. The latter were the key figures in municipal commerce as buyers of imported goods, and the only ones exempt from payment of both the dohana (trade duties) and other fees on the purchase of certain commodities. They were owners of livestock and sellers of wine, most likely self-produced since they supplied to the community, as well as being producers of cheese sold to the potigari (shopkeepers).143 Documents record how indirect taxes constituted the main share of fiscal revenues from the early 1300s. From the third decade onwards, however, even though they were reserved for isolated and unusual circumstances, direct taxes were rather commonly employed by municipal governments. This fiscal configuration, wherein indirect imposts were the main form of taxation while direct taxation was normally reserved for extraordinary expenditures, and which registered the local governments’ growing independence in matters of fiscal policy, resembles the situation in the coeval states of the Crown of Aragon. A difference exists, however, in the formation of the municipal deficit, a difference mentioned briefly for the moment but to which more time will be dedicated when discussing the reign of Alphonso V.144 Whereas in Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia, the indebtedness resulted from the issuance of securities of differing duration and interest rates, censals and violaris, the purchase of which guaranteed revenue paid by the government through indirect imposts, the deficit in Sicily resulted from the sale of tax farms themselves without issuing securities. Furthermore, even though relevant data is not abundant, from the beginning of the second half of the 1300s there appears to be some limited independence within the sphere of municipal fiscal policy in relation to the management of ordinary taxation, a freedom of administration that becomes more evident by mid-century, just as it was for the other states of the Crown of Aragon in the mid-fourteenth century.145 Generally relying on 142 R.R., pp. 108–116. 143 Capitoli gabelle, p. 57, pp. 59–60, pp. 62–66; the borgesi imported wine without having to pay duty if it was for “his own

use and for his family”, just as they did not pay fees on the purchase of meat. 144 See Section 4.2. 145 The fiscal policy of the Catalan communities was based mainly on imposicions (indirect taxes) at the beginning of the 1300s.

It was then based on the issue of censals and violaris, the earliest examples of which have to do with Catalonia starting in 1340 but they only became a significant element in the second half of the fourteenth century. Finally the fiscal policy was based on the talla (a direct tax) which was present from the third decade of the 1300s but became an important constituent only at the beginning of the 1400s. For an early study, see JOSEP M. FONT RIUS, “La administración financiera en los municipios catalanes medievales”, Madrid, 1982, in JOSEP M. FONT RIUS, Estudis sobre els drets i institucions locals en la Catalunya medieval, Barcelona, 1985, pp. 611–637. TURULL RUBINAT, La configuracíó, pp. 119–127, pp. 436–511, among other things points out how the institutional framework of the community came into being, parallelling the economic demands of the monarch. A broad analysis of urban financial organization and its origins was made by MANUEL SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, El naixement de la fiscalitat d’Estat a Catalunya (segles XII-XIV), Girona, 1995; MANUEL SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, “Fiscalidad y finanzas municipales en las ciudades y villas reales de Cataluña”, in Finanzas, pp. 209–238, which draws special attention to two factors: the incessant royal demands at the root of the municipal fiscal sytem and the consolidation of the deficit as its distinguishing feature. From 1350, according to the author, it is possibile to refer to a municipal fiscal policy, a decisive factor in the consolidation and the continuity of a municipal fiscal system which was regular and permanent, and not dependent on the exigencies of warfare, with the perpetuation of the imposicions. With respect to the reliance on tax farming for administering indirect imposts and the reliance on direct taxes only in emergency situations when ordinary income was insufficient, see PERE VERDÉS PIJUAN, “La gestión de los impuestos indirectos municipales en las ciudades y villas de Cataluña: el caso de Cervera (s. XIV-XV)”, in La fiscalité, pp. 173–190. See also note 146 below.

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indirect exactions and on direct taxes solely for extraordinary situations mirrored characteristics of the fiscal system commonly use in other states in the Crown of Aragon.146 1.4 The ‘Universitates’ during the Viceregal Period: A Suggested Interpretation In 1377 Frederick IV died leaving the government in the hands of the master justiciar, Artale I Alagona, his highest official in charge of the judicial affairs of the kingdom. He became ‘Vicar’ (Vicarius) alongside Maria, Frederick’s daughter. Alagona decided to summon the other leading barons, Manfredi III Chiaromonte, Francesco II Ventimiglia, and Guglielmo Peralta to a meeting at Caltanissetta to divide up the power. This government harked back, as has been pointed out, to the spirit of Piazza and Castrogiovanni in 1362 when the magnates finally stipulated peace treaties ratified by the Sovereign who accepted that the demesne lands occupied by Chiaromonte, Ventimiglia, and Alagona continue to remain in their possession.147 The powerful influence of the aristocratic front in kingdom affairs antedating 1377 was only made official following Frederick IV’s death. The documentary output available for the viceregal period (or that of the great magnates) is represented by very few items. Despite the objective difficulty in attempting a reconstruction, an outline of the period’s urban situation is necessary in order to single out its distinguishing features and the elements of continuity shared with the monarchical period. The lack of sources, embracing all fifteen years of the reign, is by no means insignificant and needs to be accounted for. The possibility that documents may have been lost during the bloody conflicts at the end of the 1300s between Martin I of Sicily (or Martin I, or Martin) and the baronial coalitions cannot be excluded, especially the plausibility of a deliberate destruction of non-monarchical public archives. A further hypothesis can be put forward: taking into account relationships of power between dominus (overlord) and communities that differed from those existing within the royal demesne might better explain the modification in the amount of documents created. This would make the radical void, not easily ascribable solely to intentional destruction by the Sovereign, less unfathomable. The paucity of municipal petitions has been explained by two conflicting theories: a lack of ongoing communication between the great magnates and universitates which would have enjoyed great freedom or, conversely, a reluctance on the part of the former to concede any liberty to urban administrators subject to their strict control.148 Both of these interpretations could adequately explain how the de facto separateness of the two worlds might have caused the dearth of petitions generated. 146 For the Aragonese communities that began to exercise a degree of fiscal autonomy beginning in the first third of the fourteenth century, see FALCÓN PÉREZ, “Finanzas y fiscalidad”, pp. 239–276. For the Kingdom of Valencia, where in centres like Elche, Orihuela, and Alzira it is possible to refer to the formation of a local financial and fiscal policy beginning in 1370, the community of Valencia had one in place from 1306; see HINOJOSA MONTALVO, “Finanzas”, pp. 301–324. For the reign of Alphonso, in particular, see JUAN A. BARRIO BARRIO, Finanza municipales y mercado urbano en Orihuela durante el reinado de Alfonso V (1416–1458), Orihuela, 1998. As for the Kingdom of Castile instead, see COLLANTES DE TERÁN SÁNCHEZ & MENJOT, “Hacienda y fiscalidad”, p. 231, and MENJOT, “Le consentement fiscal”, pp. 203–220. More generally, for an important analysis of the development of the financial system in the Crown of Castile which highlights the elements of continuity and numerous aspects in common with other periods, see MIGUEL A. LADERO QUESADA, “Fiscalidad regia y génesis del Estado en la Corona de Castilla (1252–1504)”; in Espacio, tiempo y forma, 3rd. s. 4, 1991, pp. 95–136. On the fiscal dimension of urban government during the reign of the Catholic kings, see a detailed interpretation by REGINA POLO MARTÍN, El régimen municipal de la Corona de Castilla durante el reinado de los Reyes Católicos (organización, funcionamento y ámbito de actuación), Madrid, 1999. 147 D’ALESSANDRO, Politica, pp. 91–126; CORRAO, Governare, pp. 60–65. 148 EPSTEIN, “Governo centrale”, pp. 389–390.

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The fact that the dominus was not in a position to mediate divergent interests and foster municipal interaction with upper levels of administration is one aspect of the issue that could be underlined in an effort to explain the scanty output of petitions and documentary sources generally. The absence of a mediating central authority meant petitions were not produced as they had been during the monarchical period when the friction within the community, and between the community and the Crown, resulted in the creation of a vast accumulation of documents. This tension was possible only within a context of ever-increasing urban liberties. The information available for the dominions during the viceregal period, and even for the feudal communities in later periods, on the contrary, reveals, for example, an increase in seigneurial intervention responsible for both a decline in the practice of broadening the decision-making base to include individuals outside the ruling class and a reduction of the prerogatives accorded to officials. To corroborate these items, it is best to proceed one step at a time. The first of the hypotheses regarding urban communities in the period of the great magnates under discussion here concerns a continuation in the administrative structure of a substantial number of the offices already in place prior to 1377. The second is the impossibility of economically safeguarding the community within the vast expanse of territory, which led the dominus to pursue an economic policy counter to the earlier royal tax reductions on trade. Third, there was a notable degree of control over the gabelle by the lord who neither maintained the subdivisions nor continued the collaboration that had become the norm under Frederick IV. At this point in time, the only known documentary evidence from the viceregal government are Polizzi’s 1382 petitions, and the privileges granted to Calatafimi by the Counts of Peralta dated, however, one year after the viceregal period.149 In order to find meaningful references to the government of the grand magnates, the range of observation must be widened to include output from other periods, especially documents from Martin’s reign and from the years 1392 to 1400. Comparisons with centres alienated from the royal demesne during Alphonso’s reign can also be found. This furnishes a picture of the non–demesne universitates from the prospective of a later time frame and permits an attenuation of the uncertainty engendered by the rarity of references for the interregnum. The political situation was different for communities granted in fief, however. This is because of the continued role of the monarchy in the state generally, and more specifically, in the central position from which the sovereign transferred a part of his sovereignty, and also because the community could be redeemed from feudal dominion. Even so, feudal and viceregal centres prove to possess common elements within their institutional and economic frameworks that require highlighting.150 Data from late fifteenth century sources regarding feudal centres must also be taken into consideration for the same reasons. 149 ANTONINO FLANDINA (ed.), Statuti ordinamenti e capitoli della città di Polizzi (Documenti per servire alla storia di

Sicilia, s. II, I), Palermo, 1884, pp. 259–262, 1382 (several references to the text in MAZZARESE FARDELLA, “L’aristocrazia”, pp. 187–188) and ANDREA Guarneri, “Un diploma di grazie e privilegi municipali concessi nel 1393 dai magnifici conti di Peralta alla città di Calatafimi”, in Archivio storico siciliano, n. s. 14, 1889, pp. 304–305, respectively; the act is discussed in LUCIA SORRENTI, Il patrimonio fondiario in Sicilia: Gestione delle terre e contratti agrari nei secoli XII-XV, Milan, 1984, p. 25, pp. 29–31, pp. 100–103. 150 Additionally, urban settlements prevailed even in feudal dominions as demonstrated in the Earldom of Modica, although during the 1500s; DOMENICO LIGRESTI, “Gerarchie urbane e dinamica demografica nella Sicilia “spagnola”: le città della Contea di Modica (1505–1714)”, in Le città, pp. 153–188. The majority of the population, between 70 and 80%, lived in urban communities; ibidem, pp. 185–186.

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Martin I himself acknowledged that the great magnates had guaranteed a “tranquillo et quieto stato” (tranquil and calm state) through their consistent enforcement of the law.151 Because the organizational structures were already well developed when the viceregal government took control of the universitates, it is necessary to verify if the order alluded to by Martin resulted from the preservation of the established institutional apparatus as part of a deliberate seigneurial strategy. It can be contended that during the years between 1377 and 1392 there was a rather complex configuration of offices present in the organizational structures of the universitates and that power tended to be concentrated in the hands of the captain’s Curia. Information supporting this conclusion can be gleaned from the texts of petitions produced during the early years of the monarchy’s restoration. During this phase many communities proposed a readjustment of the power alignments that had earlier been partially modified. This included a division of authority between the captain’s Curia and the civil curia, or at least a limitation on interference by the Captain, and a request that the former be responsible for criminal justice and the latter for civil law as proposed, for example, by Trapani in 1399.152 In 1401 the Agrigento universitas notified Martin that they retained “privilegium a regalibus sancte recolendeque bone memorie precessoribus vestris quod nec iusticiarius nec capitaneus possunt nec debent intromictere de causis civilibus ecciam [sic] si de communi parcium voluntatem fuerit iurisdicio prorogata”. The captain’s request to have cognizance over low justice (which corresponded to civil law) was thus nullified.153 The universitas of Piazza, again in 1401, appealed against a use of power by the Captain that encroached on the rights of the other officials, especially the jurats.154 The universitas of Polizzi indicated, furthermore, in 1407 that civil cases (as had been granted per dominum regem Petrum) should not come before the captain’s Curia and remarked on the tension, stretching back to the time of Martin’s arrival, between iuratia and captaincy over the administration of low justice at the fairs.155 Although not stated explicitly that the overextension of the captain’s authority had come into being during the viceregal period, it is logical to presume reference was being made precisely to that period during the subsequent phase when privileges and customs were generally being reinstated. The complaints had to do with an exercise of jurisdictional authority based on earlier power alignments and had not been provided for by the law.156 The captain played a powerful role, but there was no lack of activity on the part of the civil curia which in truth continued to function despite undergoing considerable TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum LVII, p. 177, 1402. R. C. vol. 33, fols 120v-125v. G. G., p. 248. R. C. vol. 33, fol. 261r-v. FLANDINA (ed.), Statuti, pp. 263–264. Concerning the preponderant role of the captaincy among the magistracies, compare the case of the barony of Francofonte, where in the 1400s the Captain also presided over the council and always cast the first vote; MATTEO GAUDIOSO, Per la storia del territorio di Lentini nel secondo medioevo: Le baronie di Chadra e Francofonte, Catania, 1926, repr. Catania, 1992, pp. 184–185. 156 An analogous concentration of power during Alphonso’s reign, can be found in the feudal communities: In 1434, after having bought back its independence from the Master of the Order of Montesa, Romeo Corbera, the Sciacca universitas proposed that the captain not remain in office beyond the period of time that had been prescribed by the sovereign, and the Termini universitas, redeemed from the dominion of Beatrice de Urrea, asked in 1445 that the captaincy be conferred on a yearly basis; R. C. vol. 69, fol. 104r; C. vol. 2846, fols 227v-228v respectively. Regarding Corbera, see BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 849, 856. For feudal judicial structures compare, GIANCARLO VALLONE, Istituzioni feudali dell’Italia meridionale: Tra Medioevo ed Antico Regime l’area salentina, Rome, 1999, pp. 129–153. 151 152 153 154 155

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interference. In the petitions from the time of Martin’s reign mentioned previously, rather than a demand for the establishment or reinstatement of the Curia in charge of low justice, there was an appeal for a reconfiguration of the power of authority that had been in part wrested from them. As for the other offices in the organizational structure, numerous examples bear witness to only a few significant differences between the viceregal universitates and those of the royal demesne, as evidenced, for instance, by the “consuetudines, ordinaciones et statuta compilatas per homines universitatis terre Policii” in 1382, ratified by Francesco Ventimiglia, Count of Geraci and Collesano.157 In actual fact, the document was originally drawn up by the royal curia and presented to Queen Maria since Polizzi was still nominally a community in the royal demesne and Ventimiglia was merely the “Rector”. It is well known that the title of Rector or Captain was already the principal means during the reign of Frederick IV by which the leaders of the aristocratic factions hoped to gain control over urban communities in the royal demesne. This case also testifies to the Count’s gradual domination because once his power had been established, he had his name substituted for the Queen’s in the text of customary law, ordinances, and statutes, a fact indicative of an to attempt to maintain continuity with the regimen in the royal demesne.158 It is a complex document dealing mainly with civic administration that makes special reference to the roles of the jurats, catapans, and baiulus, as well as the rights and duties of the merchants. The detailed instructions for the jurats and catapans, indicating that the judicial Curia held a pivotal position in local administration and the catapans were subject to the iuratia in applying the mete, reveal how these officials were actually no different from their demesne community counterparts in the authority they administered. The jurats played a central role in the administration of feudal communities too. In Sciacca, following its alienation to Romeo Corbera in 1433, the jurats superintended the administration and auctioning of the tax farms.159 The baiulus, according to the Polizzi document, acted as night watchman or, at any rate, sanctioned anyone who had not retired by the final toll of the bell. There were numerous fines levied by the baiulus for violations of civil law. The catapans too, and especially the jurats, could levy fines for infractions in areas under their jurisdiction. Additionally, the jurats were responsible for determining the mete that the catapans applied. A civil curia was also operating, composed of judges and a notary along with the baiulus. One of the references to this Curia might imply an electoral system was being used

157 FLANDINA (ed.), Satuti, pp. 259–262. 158 MAZZARESE FARDELLA, “L’aristocrazia”, pp. 187–188. For a comparison, see RAFAEL SÁNCHEZ SAUS, “Dependencia

señorial y desarollo urbano en la Andalucía atlántica. Cádiz y Los Ponce de León en el siglo XV”, in Acta Mediaevalia, 26, 2005, pp. 903–927, which examines the case of the Castilian community of Cadiz in the second half of the 1400s under the dominion of the Ponce di León family who favoured a strengthening of civic institutions and economic growth. 159 After the terra had been redeemed, the new iuratia lamented the undervalued sale of the tax farms by their predecessors who had evidently guaranteed Corbera’s interests rather than the community’s; P. R. vol. 33, fol. 197v. Regarding procedures for auctioning the tax farms, although specifically for Syracuse, see FRANCESCA GALLO, “Le gabelle e le mete dell’università di Siracusa”, in Il governo, pp. 76–77. A corroboration of the notable continuity of the offices between the viceregal and monarchical periods is found at a rather advanced stage of Martin’s reign in a 1406 petition from the community of Patti which complained of the archbishop’s attempt, through one of his representatives, to control their jurisdiction over the fair of Tindari. The syndics, instead, pointed out how it was well-established practice for the captain, together with other men, to perform the task: “both at the time of the ancient sovereigns and when the barons ruled, it was observed, followed and practiced”; R. C. vol. 46, fols 183v-185v, 1406.

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since it specifies that officials took office annually. It is precisely this annual renewal that would appear to make the possibility of the Count’s appointment of officials more unlikely.160 A confirmation regarding this is found in privileges granted a decade later in 1393 by the Counts Guglielmo and Nicola Peralta to the community of Calatafimi: it was stipulated, among other things, that the nadarii (catapans) and the xurterii (sciurterii) were to be chosen by the universitas and approved by the Count.161 Instructions given to the royal commissioner for implementing elections in Syracuse for the year 1394–5 furnish indirect evidence confirming the existence of a judicature (iudicatum) and a iuratia in viceregal communities. The commissioner was to carry out the elections (scrutineum) together with the judges, jurats, and others (alios). The presence of these officials during the very first elections after Martin’s arrival (it is likely that a royal officer took part in the second election) means the procedure was already established.162 The existence of an electoral system even before Martin’s arrival is also suggested by the fact that no petitions were presented to the Sovereign requesting a clarification of election procedures, one more indication that this was indeed a familiar procedure.163 Examination of pertinent documentation, albeit from non-demesne centres and from another period, is useful for further investigation. For example, a reference in the corpus of petitions from the community of Sciacca in 1444 can be analysed, and though the time span makes the analogy less compelling, there are notable similarities that should be pointed out. The Sciacca universitas, having just redeemed its freedom from domination by the Marquis of Geraci, Giovanni Ventimiglia,164 asked that the elections be carried out by the chitatini principali (leading citizens) rather than the marquis’s officials. The proposal to limit this interference, “the Marquis’s officials shouldn’t be carrying out the scrutinem,” indicates how procedures for the scrutiny were not new to the feudal dominions. At the end of the 1400s, a balloting system also existed in the feudal community of Caltanissetta for the election of members of the jurats’ curia made up of four jurats, a judge, and a notary. The dominus, on the other hand, appointed the secretus and the captain’s curia made up of the captain, a judge, and a notary. Instances of a lord’s tampering with the eligibility of officials did, however, occur.165 This information cannot be construed, however, as grounds for an assumption that the scrutineum was common practice. Indeed, the judges and jurats in the feudal community of Francofonte seem to have been appointed by the baron in the 1400s.166 Having ascertained that the configuration of official positions remained, for the most part, remarkably similar, at least for the main magistracies and in as far as their institutional structure was concerned, it is necessary to examine which aspects of the viceregal dominion differed most notably from territories in the royal demesne. Several cases in point, Francavilla, Agrigento, Piazza, Sciacca, and Corleone, reveal, above all, an economic policy aimed at accruing short-term profits, the overlord’s narrow-sighted control over the territory, and very FLANDINA (ed.), Statuti, p. 262. The judges and the jurats were also operative at Calatafimi; Guarneri, “Un diploma di grazie”, pp. 304–305. R. C. vol. 18, fol. 69r-v. Both royal reproofs and municipal enquiries regarding election procedures for officials were rare during Martin’s reign, and certainly no more numerous during Alphonso’s; R. C. vol. 18, fol. 69r-v [1393], (Syracuse); P. R. vol. 5, fol. 352r-v, 1400 (Palermo); R. C. vol. 46, fol. 183v-185v, 1406 (Patti); R. C. vol. 46, fols 413v-415v, [1407], (Randazzo). 164 C. vol. 2843, fol. 181r, 1444. 165 ROSANNA ZAFFUTO ROVELLO, Universitas Calatanixette 1086–1516, Caltanissetta-Rome, 1991, p. 250, pp. 265–266. 166 GAUDIOSO, Per la storia, pp. 186–189, in addition the civil curia corresponded to the jurats’ curia at Francofonte since the judges were also jurats. 160 161 162 163

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little freedom in fiscal matters. The Francavilla incident took place a time when royal authority was already in crisis and preceded the rise to power of the great magnates by a few years. Enrico Rosso ended his rebellion in 1376 and renounced control over the community, whereupon the Sovereign rescinded a series of levies, on homes and the import and export of wine, which he deemed imposte inracionabiliter. The nature of these taxes attest to a strategy directed at immediate gains and the long-term impoverishment of the community. They were non-progressive taxes targeting one of the most important sources of revenue.167 Another noteworthy case is the 1392 corpus of petitions presented by the universitas of Agrigento to the Sovereigns, who reinstated the gratias, franchicias et immunitates which had been abolished by the Chiaromontes. In particular, the community was granted relief “quod dicta civitas liberetur” from the imposts recently levied by the Chiaromontes, including customs duties on the tratta (a tratta permitted the exportation of one salma of wheat) and export taxes in general.168 This situation is further substantiated by requests form other communities to restore previous taxation schemes annulled under viceregal rule, cut back excessively burdensome taxes to their original rates, and a return to the customary imposition of the collette.169 Furthermore, and this was probably the harshest aspect, the use of seigneurial power was aimed at systematically exploiting every resource, without allowing the universitas any but the smallest benefit from it. The dominus even could take control of municipal lands. This aspect of viceregal government can be traced through indirect evidence. The universitas of Termini obtained the right, in 1392, to recover possession municipal lands seized by the Chiaromontes so that the boni homini could go there as they had in the past.170 The case of Termini can be compared to concessions to Calatafimi by the Peraltas who granted residents the use of communal lands during certain periods of the year, except for times when they could be used by the baronial Curia for various reasons.171 Additionally, the Peraltas assured the universitas a series of revenues while significantly reducing the benefits by encumbering them with a number of conditions and guarantees in their own favour.172 The townspeople in demesne lands had a share in basic local revenue sources. This explains why the request made after Martin’s arrival in 1392 by the Captain of Nicosia, Bartolomeo Spatafora, to obtain the fief of Vaccara belonging to the universitas, raised such a protest from residents that the Sovereign was compelled to revoke the concession.173 In this perspective, a 1392 petition from the universitas of Agrigento asking for permission to make use once again of 100 onze annually “pro reparatione civitatis in rebus necessariis”, proves enlightening.174 Finally, the Piazza universitas requested local revenues remain within the community in 1396, in order to pay for the services of the guards. The other petitions from the same corpus should be interpreted in the same manner 167 R. C. vol. 8, fol. 86r. Compare this to the signeurial community of Castellò d’Empùries in Catalonia where there was a fiscal and financial organization similar to that of the royal cities; SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, Fiscalidad y finanzas de una villa, pp. 301–362. 168 Memorie, pp. LXXXV-LXXXVII. 169 R. C. vol. 20, fols 24r-25r, 1392 (Trapani); fols 38v-39r, 1392 (Nicosia); G. G., p. 246, [1398], (Gioiosa Guardia). 170 R. C. vol. 20, fol. 60v. 171 GUARNERI, “Un diploma di grazie”, p. 305. 172 Ibidem, p. 305. For a comparison with diversification of seigneurial taxes for Taranto in 1420, see MARIA A. VISCEGLIA, “Terra d’Otranto dagli Angioini all’Unità”, in Storia del Mezzogiorno, eds. GIUSEPPE GALASSO & ROSARIO Romeo, 15 vols, Naples, 1986, VII, pp. 358–359. 173 R. C. vol. 20, fols 38v-39r, 1392. 174 Memorie, p. LXXXVII.

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because a portion of income went to private individuals to maintain the existing power relations in communities that were highly self-governing.175 These considerations should not be construed as an indication that some of the tax revenue did not go to the feudal universitas, only that the margin for its administration and the number of income sources were reduced. The revenues administered by the community could not have been substantial and indirect confirmation of this is found in information regarding Alcamo. In 1398, Alcamo’s universitas drew up a corpus of petitions formalizing its definitive status as part of the royal demesne. The most important petitions have to do with the system of the gabelle. They requested that levies imposed by the baruni tiranni (tyrant barons) be abolished, and more specifically, that the universitas be free to decide the entity of local levies.176 The limited amount of freedom previously exercised in fiscal matters is obvious here. Another case to be considered concerns the barony of Francofonte where in the fifteenth century the universitas did not benefit from any of the numerous gabelle since they were all given over to the baron and administered by his secretus: to paraphrase Gaudioso, there was no administration of taxes other than the baron’s since he controlled it all.177 Non-demesne communities could nevertheless have control over certain taxes. In the baronial terra of San Pietro in 1440, the baron advanced the sum needed by the terra to pay the donativum (a tribute solicited by the sovereign in Parliament) and was reimbursed for the loan from tariff revenues that otherwise would have gone to the community.178 Viceregal rule constituted a constraint on urban economic growth because the power wielded by the dominus was projected over a limited territory. Several requests after the viceregal period are illuminating in this regard. They were made by Piazza, Alcamo, and Sciacca based on a privilege from Frederick IV, but from Frederick III for Alcamo, to regain exemptions from customs duties on trade.179 Such exemptions have been shown to be a reason behind the economic integration of the kingdom, especially in the first half of the 1400s,180 assuring significant economic advantages, although not in the short run. The petitions reveal a desire to participate in an economic arena from which the communities had in effect been excluded, illustrating furthermore how viceregal authority was of a circumscribed local nature. This seems to demonstrate that the dominus was unable to mediate and safeguard the universitas within a vast economic sphere. After the enfeoffment of Federico Ventimiglia during the reign of Alphonso, Corleone also proposed an abolishment of the dohana and lamented a delay in the acquisition of privileges already held by other communities.181 175 R. C. vol. 25, fols 23r-24r, 1396. 176 Capitoli gabelle, pp. 44–45. 177 GAUDIOSO, Per la storia, pp. 197–200. For a comparison, see ALESSANDRO BARBERO & GUIDO CASTELNUOVO, “Governare

un ducato: L’amministrazione sabauda nel tardo medioevo”, in Società e Storia, 57, 1992, pp. 481–486, for the seigneurial communities of Savoy where the official with executive power (the Podestà) coincided with the feudal lord who held title to the region, making it more difficult to safeguard the margins of autonomy guaranteed by the statutes. 178 GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 252. 179 R. C. vol. 25, fols 23r-24r, 1396 (Piazza); Capitoli gabelle, p. 47, 1398 (Alcamo); R. C. vol. 38, fol. 260v, 1401 (Sciacca). For the community of Piazza the privilege of 1374 is recorded in the Consuetudines, fol. 17r-v. Other requests for exemptions: G. G., p. 351, 1392 (Licata); petition from the terra of Augusta based on earlier privileges for which a confirmation or a reissuing was requested; G. G., p. 18 (prior to 1407). 180 EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 92–118. 181 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 209, 1447 (Corleone). The petitions from Corleone also reveal an imposition of economic restrictions by the feudal lord to the detriment of the most active exponents of local trade, the borgesi. Polizzi too, redeemed from the dominion of Raimondo Cabrera, was granted an exemption from the dohana; R. C. vol. 85, fols 445v-447v, 1442 (a privilege broadened in 1447 and reconfirmed in 1451).

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In conclusion, it is possible to put forward a hypothesis regarding the fact that the great magnates had no political strategy favouring urban autonomy. Such a lack of a policy was inevitable because it would have caused a shift in the power structure of all the other communities under his dominion, including those previously under his jurisdiction, had the dominus decided to maintain the system of rights and privileges enjoyed by the universitates in monarchical times. One facet, not to be underestimated, of the power struggles between the central authority and the outlying territory depended on a strategy of municipal emulation. A universitas holding certain privileges was considered a point of reference, having established a precedent to be equalled by other communities demanding similar concessions. This was a frequently recurring practice in demesne communities, even in the early years of the restoration enacted by Martin,182 and the possibility of its occurrence in seigneurial communities should not be excluded. A similar but later instance is known to have taken place in the feudal centre of Monreale. In 1516, Monreale requested certain privileges based on a concession that had been granted to Palermo.183 The concessions by Count Peralta noted earlier are also part of the policy of containment: they resulted from an autonomous decision by the Count and not a pact negotiated with the community.184 The limited margins for autonomy prevailing in centres that were feudal prior to 1377 are due instead to the impossibility of the dominus to safeguard the community with respect to a vast economic circuit, conditio sine qua non for true urban economic growth. Agreements on such matters could never have been reached given the strong tensions characterizing relations between the sovereign and the seigneurial dynasties. The great magnates’ domination of the universitates is not wholly ascribable to the authoritarian power exercised, but at the same time, in some ways it constituted a break with the phase of monarchical rule characterized by fast-growing urban autonomy. During the viceregal period, albeit partially, the vast system of rights and privileges based on relations between the Crown and local administrations seems to have been threatened. The preservation, however, of the most important prerogatives of the individual magistracy, even if through a redistribution of roles beneficial to certain offices, undeniably guaranteed space for self-government and did not nullify the spirit of municipal identity. Two diverse factors co-existed, seigneurial interventionism and the preservation of municipal identity; this interrelationship must be the starting point for an understanding of the swift restoration of the role of the cities in Martin’s reign.

182 For example, Trapani asked to have the same privileges as Messina and Syracuse for the wine trade; R. C. vol. 33, fols 120v-125r, 1399. Sciacca proposed institutional reforms like those in Catania; R. C. vol. 38, fol. 260v, 1401. Noto asked for the same inalienability, just as Palermo, Messina, and Catania had; C. vol. 2835, fols 104v-105r, 1409. For the Alphonsian period, Trapani referred to Messina’s privileges in order to forbid entry to the royal commissioner; P. R. vol. 25, fol. 165r, 1423. Sciacca called for the establishment of a appellate court because other cities had one (R. C. vol. 69, fol. 105r, 1434) and for the captain they sought the same prerogatives enjoyed by his counterpart in Trapani (C. vol. 2843, fol. 180v, 1444). 183 RAFFAELE STARRABBA, “Suppliche e capitoli dell’università di Monreale (anno 1516)”, in Archivio Storico Siciliano, n. s. 12, 1887, pp. 446–457. Monreale was part of a vast seigneural feud governed by the archbishop through a governor, the same as in lay seigneural domions. Regarding lay seigneural dominions, see GAUDIOSO, Per la storia, p. 196. 184 Guarneri, “Un diploma di grazie”, pp. 304–305.

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CITIES FROM THE TIME OF MARTIN I TO ALPHONSO V: A POLYCENTRIC SYSTEM

2.1

Martin I and the Re-establishment of an Urban Coalition

In 1392, the arrival on the island of Martin the Elder, Duke of Montblanc (son of Peter IV of Aragon), and his son, Martin the younger (King Martin I of Sicily) who was married to Queen Maria, initiated an unrelenting restoration of royal power that put an end to the viceregal regime. The communities’ swift requests for negotiations with the Crown and the drafting of well-organized petitions aimed at reviving each and every institution are impressive. The universitates expressed their resolve to reclaim a series of prerogatives, privileges, and exemptions retracted by the great magnates in the preceding decades. Urban communities were not able to systematically take advantage of the relationship with the sovereign immediately. Indeed, the initial phase of the royal takeover was marked by repeated aristocratic rebellions in which the universitates were dramatically involved.1 Only after the collapse of baronial opposition in 1396 was an uninterrupted channel of communications with the Crown re-established. It must be remembered that, with the exception of the earldom of Modica, the property of the counts was generally dismantled by the Sovereign. A veritable consolidation of demesne land began that year and underwent an important formalization at the Parliament of Syracuse in 1398.2 During Martin’s reign, the configuration of the documentary records in itself does not indicate incisive municipal participation until after the final defeat of the seigneurial front although a considerable modification in sources was already apparent in 1392.3 In order to trace the progressive reconstruction of urban circumstances, it is a good idea to start with the variation in documentation which reveals, precisely for the year 1392, a situation different from the end of the 1390s. It is useful to identify two separate phases for the role of the cities: the first from Martin’s accession up to 1395–1396, and the second for the following years. The focus in the first phase will be the main facet of its dynamics—negotiations with the Crown. In the tumultuous period after Martin I of Sicily’s arrival, the clarity of the requests put forward is striking, even though they were limited to just a few fundamental areas. Their main objectives can be summarized as follows: a return to the previous status in the

On these events, see MOSCATI, Per una storia; FRANCESCO GIUNTA, Aragonesi e catalani nel Mediterraneo, 2 vols, Palermo, 1953–56; D’ALESSANDRO, Politica; CORRAO, Governare. 2 MOSCATI, Per la storia, pp. 108–111; D’ALESSANDRO, “Sulle assemblee parlamentari”, pp. 7–10; CORRAO, Governare, p. 109. 3 On this topic, see EPSTEIN, “Governo centrale”, pp. 405–438, and in particular the final index from which periods with the greatest concentration of petitions can be discerned. 1

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royal demesne, the community’s distancing itself from what had been perpetrated by the “tyrants”,4 a reinstatement of the series of privileges existing before the viceregency, and a regeneration of the local fiscal structure. The communities’ desire, or sometimes that of the majority of the citizenry, to distance itself from what could be blamed on the great magnates, had an obvious political influence in affirming the demesne status.5 This approach could also take different forms and, in this regard, two seemingly antithetical petitions are cases in point: the universitas of Trapani begged to be pardoned while taking its distance from the Chiaromontes’ supporters, whereas the community of Nicosia asked to have the tower of Binalberga, which Enrico Chiaromonte had had built, torn down.6 Emphasizing the “tyrannical” violence of the barons always served as the basis for attempting to obtain a reinstatement of the corpus of privileges which in some cases, as mentioned above, had been formulated in the first half of the 1300s7 and were exemptions and customary laws suspended or reduced during the period of the great magnates. In addition to what persisted in local memory, some vestiges remained, at times constituting substantial remnants, thanks to the practice of recording and archiving. The most noteworthy cases—affording further proof of the existence of a local system for recording documents in the first half of the 1300s—concern the universitates of Piazza, Agrigento, and Caltagirone. The Consuetudines terre Platee opens with Frederick III’s 1309 confirmation of the cities’ customary rights and privileges, followed by a summary from 1341 of the division of the feudal estate of Cundrone between the communities of Piazza and Castrogiovanni, and the 1374 privileges of exemption from the posata or pusata (hospitality provided during a sovereign’s visit), the banci tax (paid on money changing), and the dohana.8 Agrigento obtained the same exemptions, as recorded in the “Green Book” for the years 1361 and 1366.9 A particularly interesting petition from the terra of Caltagirone clearly refers to abundant records of historical rights and safeguards whose recognition was again being sought.10 In 1392 Trapani also possessed a rollus of recorded privileges and as early as 1340 there were provisions for a custodian of the town’s documents.11 Finally, the corpus of petitions presented by the universitas of Alcamo to Martin in 1398 should be mentioned,

Tyranny is a frequently recurring theme in the documents; for some examples, see G. G., p. 351, 1392, (Licata); ibidem, p. 29, 1396–7 (Calascibetta). See also CORRAO, Governare, p. 35. Concerning despotism, see FRANCESCO BENIGNO, Specchi della rivoluzione. Conflitto e identità politiche nell’Europa medievale, Rome, 1999, concerning the connection with atypical types of government; while the observations by DIEGO QUAGLIONI, La sovranità, Rome-Bari, 2004, pp. 32–35, regard a form of unlawful power; also ENNIO CORTESE, Il diritto nella storia medievale: Il basso medioevo, Rome, 1995, pp. 285–287. For a different idea of tyranny and the right to resist, developed in the early modern period and coupled with a new theory of the State, see MERIO SCATTOLA, “Il concetto di tirannide nel pensiero politico tedesco della prima età moderna”, in Filosofia Politica, 3, 1996, pp. 391–420, and ROBERTO FARNETI, “Filosofia e tirannia: Hobbes e la trasformazione della politica”, in Filosofia Politica, 3, 1996, pp. 421–437 and Chapter 4, note 186. 5 R. C. vol. 20, fols 38v-39r, 1392 (Nicosia); R. C. vol. 20, fols 24r-25r, 1392 (Trapani); G. G., p. 41, 1392 (Caltagirone); ibidem, p. 82, 1392 (Castrogiovanni); ibidem, pp. 350–351, 1392 (Licata). 6 R. C. vol. 20, fols 24r-25r, 1392; R. C. vol. 20, fols 38v-39r, 1392, respectively. 7 R. C. vol. 20, fols 24r-25r, 1392 (Trapani); fols 38v-39r, 1392 (Nicosia); fols 81v-82v, 1392 (Salemi). 8 Consuetudines, fol. 12r-v. The sovereign said of the banci tax: “libertatem iuris cabelle banci adeo quod licitum sit cuicumque cambiare carlenos et quamlibet aliam monetam nullo iure sive dirictu nostre curie proterea exolvendo”; ibidem, p. 34 9 Memorie, pp. LXXVII-LXXVIII; in 1361 Frederick IV granted the general possibility of not offering hospitality to his officials and familiares. 10 G. G., p. 41, 1392. 11 Respectively: R. C. vol. 20, fols 24r-25r; La Mantia, Antiche, p. XXXV. 4

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especially because it contains specific references to Frederick III’s concessions of exemption from the colta (colletta) and the dohana.12 The absence of petitions concerning new concessions can be explained by the emergency conditions the universitates experienced in 1392, when the main problem was reacquiring their demesne status. Consequently, an initial reinstatement of the fundamental prerogatives of municipal self-government was held to be a conditio sine qua non. During this phase the communities asked for a revival of their own fiscal autonomy in matters of indirect taxation in order to take part once again in administering the indirect taxes (gabelle). During Martin’s reign, the policy of allowing communities to hold title to a portion of indirect taxation was restored, permitting a return to former conditions, a renewal of old fiscal resources and the abolition of imposts unjustly imposed by the “tyrants”.13 This aspect is linked to other requests for setting a limit to the sovereigns’ growing economic demands, such as the collette or the pusata.14 These initiatives were directed toward primary objectives and their fundamental nature characterized even the formal aspects of the texts of the petitions. The petitions were not marked by the ars retorica that would constitute a peculiarity of the texts of the petitions after 1396. It is also significant that neither the single petitions nor their intitulationes indicated who had drafted the requests. Later, instead, and with particular emphasis during the reign of Alphonso V, some or all of the petitions’ authors would be indicated. They were the same individuals who had the authority to represent the universitas in negotiations with the Crown. This did not occur in 1392, most likely because a group of leaders capable of guiding the community had not yet come into being. Between 1393 and 1395 numerous localities were involved bon gré mal gré in the uprisings fomented by some of the leading exponents of the aristocratic front. Before the final defeat of the baronial faction in 1395, some universitates had already begun negotiations with the Crown, but a network of loyal communities was rebuilt only between 1396 and 1398. Agrigento, Asaro, Calascibetta, Castiglione, Corleone, Piazza, and Randazzo stand out among those who obtained a pardon for the crime of high treason in this period.15 A definitive return of obedience to the Crown could entail serious problems of internal pacification. In instances where a large portion of the population had been rebellious, the city negotiated its full reintegration.16 In many cases internal wounds were so deep that the universitas exercised greater caution,17 taking into consideration, for example, the presence of refugees from other areas.18 As to the rebel’s recovery of their property, the situation varied in proportion to the gravity of their crimes: for example, while Castiglione

Capitoli gabelle, pp. 45–47, 95. R. C. vol. 20, fols 24r-25r, 1392 (Trapani); G. G., pp. 350–351, 1392 (Licata). G. G., p. 352, 1392, (Licata); ibidem, p. 82, 1392, (Castrogiovanni); ibidem, p. 41, 1392, (Caltagirone); R. C. vol. 20, fols 38v-39r, 1392, (Nicosia); see also BRESC, Un monde, II, pp. 634, 720, 890. 15 R. C. vol. 28, fols 210v-211r, 1397 (Agrigento); R. C. vol. 25, fols 23r-24r, 1396 (Piazza); STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 140–141, 1397; G. G., p. 78, 1396 (Castiglione); R. R. pp. 7–8, 1397 (Salemi); R. C. vol. 27, fol. 38r-v, 1396 (Randazzo); G. G., pp. 13–4, 1398 (Asaro); ibidem, pp. 23–24, 1397 (Calascibetta). 16 R. C. vol. 33, fols 120v-125v, 1399 (Trapani), G. G., pp. 14, 1398 (Asaro). 17 Ibidem, p. 25, 1397 (Calascibetta); later however, a full pardon and restitution of their property was requested for the exiled, ibidem, p. 29 [1396–7]. 18 Ibidem, p. 26, 1397 (Calascibetta). 12 13 14

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was granted complete restitution of goods and property,19 Catania set up a commission to compensate loyal individuals who had suffered war damages.20 In the second phase, after 1396, the presence of an urban coalition favourable to the Crown made the Parliament of Syracuse possible. There, with Martin’s unequivocal assumption of power, the real protagonists were precisely the cities, as has already been explained: “su di esse il re puntava ancora una volta nel suo sforzo di raggiungere una più radicale, completa restaurazione”.21 The encounter with the Crown revealed the existence of a more clearly defined urban front at that time and greater political maturity which is visible in the appeals and the style marking them. The aristocratic rebellion had brought about a suspension of royal concessions in many of these localities: the primary objective was therefore their restoration. Even so, new and important issues came to light that had not been dealt with during the royal takeover, the most noteworthy of which were the electiveness of officials and the duties of both elected and royally appointed ones. Input from the cities aimed at promoting well-defined urban regulations became more frequent and explicit, and would constitute a regular feature until the end of Alphonso’s reign. The progressive enhancement of these norms, although based on previously issued norms from the first half of the 1300s, was nonetheless different owing to its greater detail and, moreover, owing to the circumstances of its formulation dictated more appreciably by local-level activity better able to influence royal decrees.22 For example, with regard to elections by scrutiny, the universitates demanded, quite forcefully in some cases, that electiveness be respected and refused any royal interference, therefore claiming the privilege as a right the Crown was obliged to uphold.23 As already mentioned, even for the earliest elections, appeals concerning procedures to be followed in carrying out the scrutiny were rare, probably because it was a known procedure. Instead, for other areas, explicit requests were made, in primis regarding functions assigned to offices and hierarchical relationships between officials.24 There was a marked difference between the viceregal period and the reign of Martin I in the communities’ effort to contain the captain’s power. Additional information is necessary to address fundamental issues regarding what the institutional relationships were and who governed in the post-viceregal period. To shed light on these questions, it is necessary to consult Frederick IV’s royal mandates on election procedures, mandates based on historic precedents and revealing

Ibidem, p. 79, 1396. R. C. vol. 26, fol. 22v, 1396; R. C. vol. 46, fols 485v-486v, 1409. On the redistribution of the property, see PATRIZIA SARDINA, “Classi sociali e resistenza anticatalana a Catania alla fine del XIV secolo”, in Mediterraneo medievale scritti in onore di Francesco Giunta, 3 vols, Soveria Mannelli, 1989, III, pp. 1119–1170. 21 MOSCATI, Per una storia, p. 108, who also sees an anti-feudal insurgence of the cities in the predominance of the municipal element, a theory criticized by CORRAO, Governare, pp. 108–109. For an analysis of Moscati and Corrao’s differing positions, see FABRIZIO TITONE, “Istituzioni e società urbane in Sicilia, 1392–1409”, in Società e Storia, 105, 2004, p. 468 n. 26, which demonstrates the validity of Moscato’s theory. 22 For a comparison with cities in the southern Low Countries during the Late Middle Ages with regard to the role of cities in the production of legislation, see PHILIPPE GODDING, “Les ordonnances des autorités urbaines au Moyen Âge: Leur apport à la technique législative”, in Peasants, pp. 185–201. 23 G. G., pp. 248–249, 1401 (Agrigento); R. C. vol. 46, fols 296v-297r 1406 (Palermo); fols 183v-185v, 1406 (Patti). Electoral procedures of the scrutiny will be discussed in Section 2.2. 24 R. C. vol. 33, fols 120v-125v, 1399 (Trapani); R. C. vol. 38, fol. 260v, 1401 (Sciacca). 19 20

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an unmistakable organizational differentiation since not all the positions in civili were decided in elections by scrutiny. The directives for the royal functionary charged with carrying out the elections included a list of the offices for which there would be an election, namely: baiulos in illis ex eisdem civitatibus et terris ubi creari per modum scrutinii extitit hactenus consuetum, iudices licteratos si numerus licteratorum suffecerit, iuratos, acathapanos, notarios actorum, thesaurarios, notarios iuratorum, magistros xurte, quos vocant alicubi capixurte, de sufficientioribus et magis aptis fidelibus atque idoneis ad officia memorata25

Thus, in 1356, the baiulus was not chosen by in elections by scrutiny everywhere. This is not insignificant given that its not being an elective office was destined to become an established procedure. During the reign of Frederick IV, it was not elective in the following localities: Polizzi, Taormina, Sciacca, Castiglione, Francavilla, Randazzo, Paternò, San Pietro, Agira, Caltavuturo, and Nicosia.26 This list is long but incomplete, which makes it imperative to carefully consider the royal reference to details specified in instituting the office of the baiulus.27 A comparison between the typical organizational structures specified in royal directives and what actually emerged after elections during the reign of Frederick IV, reveals a frequent discrepancy in some communities, not only regarding the position of the baiulus, but also for other offices such as the magistri xurtae and notarii actorum.28 Even though these offices are missing from the lists of elected officials, it cannot be presumed they did not exist; they might have been active, at least in certain periods, but instituted locally using some other procedure.29 Even where the baiulus was not elected by scrutiny,

COSENTINO, p. 166, 1356. Respectively: ibidem, pp. 4–5, (1355), pp. 100–101, pp. 236–237, p. 239, p. 243 (1356), p. 309, p. 388, p. 394, p. 398 (1357); BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 59–60, 1374. 27 Documentary sources for the reign of Frederick IV do not furnish lists of elected officials for all the localities. For example, there is no way of knowing if the position of baiulus in Calascibetta was assigned by scrutiny, a position designated in this community to work alongside the judges in a royal order to the captain, baiulus, and judges to defend the land against enemy raids; COSENTINO, p. 522, 1360. For Calascibetta, the earliest lists for elections by scrutiny found by the author concern Martin’s reign and the baiulus is not shown to have been voted on: for example, P. R. vol. 10, fol. 61v, 1397–98; R. C. vol. 38, fol. 211v, 1401–02; P. R. vol. 21, fol. 28v, 1419–20; P. R. vol. 28, fol. 29v, 1425–26; R. C. vol. 74, fol. 64r, 1438–39; and R. C. vol. 84, fols 21v-22r, 1450–5. 28 The judges, jurats, catapans, notary of the civil curia, and the treasurer were all elected in the following universitates: Polizzi (COSENTINO, p. 4, 1355), while the elections there were only for the judges, jurats and catapans in 1357, ibidem, p. 388; Taormina (ibidem, p. 100, 1356); Castiglione (ibidem, p. 136, 1355); Francavilla (ibidem, p. 237) 1355); and in Randazzo, in 1356, but the magister xurtae was also elected the following year (ibidem, p. 239, pp. 399–400). In Paternò the magistri xurtae were also elected (ibidem, p. 243, 1356) and likewise for Agira, ibidem, p. 395, 1357. At Sciacca, however, the judges’ notary and the magistri xurtae were also elected (ibidem p. 101, 1356), but during Martin’s reign there is no record of the magistri xurtae’s election there, P. R. vol. 11, fol. 234v, 1398–99; R. C. vol. 39, fol. 219v, 1402–03; R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 75v, 1407–08. An additional four baiuli were elected in Caltagirone, ibidem, p. 10, 1355. At Caltavuturo only the judges, the jurats and a catapan were elected, ibidem, p. 402, 1356. At Caltagirone from 1347 four baiuli were elected but played an insignificant role, as can be deduced for example, from the royal order to the captain, judges, jurats, and treasurer, but not the baiuli, directing all men of substance to prepare the restoration of the walls; ibidem, pp. 187–188, 1356. The number four was probably based on the division into four districts, PACE, Il governo, p. 158. For a comparison, see FONT RIUS, Orígenes, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 in particular, which pointed out institutional differences for the Principality of Catalonia’s universitates in a long-range study. Variations have also been signalled for Castilian urban communities, MONSALVO ANTÒN, El sistema, p. 142. For a contrasting opinion, see Ruíz, Crisis, p. 187. 29 In 1356, Mineo’s universitas elected the public notary unanimiter et concorditer, and in 1357, Polizzi’s universitas assembled in unum chose the notary for the civil curia; COSENTINO, p. 185, p. 387, respectively. 25 26

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one nevertheless could have been functioning30 but only rarely with duties pertaining to civil matters.31 In Nicosia, as in Castrogiovanni and Calascibetta, Frederick IV addressed the baiulus, along with the judges and jurats although never with mandates treating affairs of legal jurisdiction.32 It should be noted that the sovereign could only address the judges and jurats.33 Furthermore, in localities where the baiulus, was not selected in an election by scrutiny, he is not reported to have taken part in negotiations with the Crown, although the main supporting evidence comes from Martin I’s reign. From this preliminary information it seems that the post of the baiulus in these communities could be part of the civil curia with only a marginal role to play. In other localities, instead, he regularly worked together with the judges or on his own, almost as if highlighting an eminent position in the forefront within the curia.34 The question to ask is whether the importance of the baiulus gradually diminished in relation to the other offices in localities where he was not elected by scrutiny. Since this cannot be evaluated for the reign of Frederick IV, pertinent developments in subsequent reigns must be considered. The first thing to investigate, for the time of Martin’s rule, is whether the reference to Frederickian election procedures not universally applied concerned only the baiulus or other positions as well and, moreover, if the deviations had only to do with instituting the office or with the functions exercised as well. Finally, broadening

30 For example, the sovereign addressed the baiulus of Polizzi and the judges and jurats, besides the universis hominibus, to acknowledge the confirmation of the elections of the syndics and the notary of the civil curia, ibidem, pp. 4–5, 1355; compare also, ibidem, p. 387, 1357. Royal letter to the captain, baiulus, judges, jurats and treasurer to assist the royal envoy in carrying out the elections by scrutiny; ibidem, p. 168, 1356 (in Sciacca and Syracuse, however, the baiulus was elected by scrutiny). The sovereign asked the captain, vice-captain, baiulus, judges and jurats in Randazzo to assist Luigi de Bonacolis of Messina with the surveillance of the solacii; ibidem, p. 39, p. 1355. The sovereign notified the baiulus, along with the captain, vice-captain, and judges at Sciacca of the request to the jurats and the treasurer to assist the royal envoy charged with auditing the accounts; ibidem, pp. 157–158, 1356. For the electiveness of the baiulus in Syracuse, whose title was altered to Senator in 1395, see some later cases, such as, R. C. vol. 36, fol. 55r, 1399–1400 and King Martin’s privilege (included in FRANCESCO M. EMANUELE E GAETANI, Della Sicilia nobile, 3 vols, Palermo, 1759, repr. Bologna, 1968, III, pp. 335–337) which specified in granting the solemn title of Senator that the official was to be elected by scrutiny. 31 This occurred at Francavilla in 1355: the sovereign requested that the baiulus and judges free a prisoner, COSENTINO, p. 37. The situation in Randazzo was different: a royal injunction in 1360 addressed the jurats and the judges alone to return to a private individual what they owed him; ibidem, COSENTINO p. 502. It should be noted, however, that a later royal mandate was directed to the baiulus as well as the captain and the judges in Randazzo, in order that the phisicus et cirurgicus, Giacomo Pactis, be paid for his services; R. C. vol. 9, fol. 37r, 1366. 32 A royal order to the baiulus, judges and jurats of Nicosia to turn over to the ostiario, Pietro Rebillotta, the 16 onze not yet paid; BARBATO, Per la storia, p. 34, 1371. Royal notification to the baiulus, judges, and jurats of Nicosia of the waiver of onze 50 owed for the sovereign’s marriage; ibidem, p. 49, 1373. Other examples include: the sovereign informed the baiulus, judges, and jurats of Castrogiovanni of the order given to the captain, Raimondo di Montesereno, and Teobaldo di Bubitello, that the well-off take up arms against the enemy, ibidem, pp. 126–127, 1356; a royal order to the captain, baiulus, judges, and jurats of Castrogiovanni to assign property to a private individual, ibidem, p. 269, 1356; the task of collecting money for the royal subvention was assigned to the baiulus, judges, and jurats of Calascibetta, ibidem, p. 510, 1360. The earliest lists of scrutinies uncovered for Castrogiovanni by the author are for Martin I’ reign and the baiulus does not appear among those included in the scrutiny; for example, P. R. vol. 11, fol. 234v, 1398–99; R. C. vol. 38, fol. 212r, 1401–02; R. C. vol. 46, fol. 197r, 1406–07. 33 Frederick III notified the judges and the jurats of Nicosia of the their right to impose a new tax; BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 26–27, 1335. Another royal order to the judges and jurats in Nicosia concerned an exemption of two onze for the colletta in favour of a private individual; ibidem, p. 55, 1374. 34 A royal request to the royal counsellor, baiulus, judges, jurats, and men of Trapani, not to desist in their struggle against the enemy; COSENTINO, pp. 111–112, 1356. A mandate from Frederick IV, in which he referred to a letter by Frederick III, to the patricius of Catania regarding a private individual’s being invested with property; ibidem, pp. 42–44, 1355. The prestige of the patricius did not preclude his being called on together with the judges in a royal address; for example, see the royal request that the patricius and judges of Catania provide for the restitution of property belonging to Martino Consulino, son of the miles, Giacomo; R. C. vol. 9, fol. 105v, 1366. Regarding the title of Patricius, see note 84 below.

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the viewpoint, the role played by the captain must be defined, and evidence provided showing on what terms hierarchical structures and relationships with the other local officials were consolidated.35 Relations between the civil curia and the jurats’ curia represented the most complex problems concerning relative balances of power in the institutional framework. It was not always certain that the functions of the civil curia were clearly separate from those of the jurats; the later might tend to extend their range of activity. An examination of this aspect best begins by analysing the circumstances of the baiulus’s position and prerogatives in several localities. According to the Rosario Gregorio’s point of view in 1805, an analysis recurring in subsequent historiographic debate, royal property administered by the secretus was no longer the province of the baiulus,36 an elective position from the time of Frederick III onwards. With the enhancement of the jurats’ duties, the baiulus would have lost a series of administrative functions while maintaining the task of overseeing the civil curia.37 This was indeed the result in various localities beginning in Martin’s reign, and from the early 1300s for Palermo and Messina. For others instead, it is necessary to examine mutations in the functions of the position. Where the baiulus’s office was not filled through an election by scrutiny, it could have been subordinated to another royal office, that of the secretus, and regain one of the original functions it possessed before the Aragonese period—collecting some of the revenues owed to the Crown. For Martin’s reign, some of the duties of the baiulus can be detected in certain communities by observing the activity of the secretus.38 It should be pointed out that a margin of uncertainty remains for some aspects of the functions of the baiulus owing to inconsistencies in some of the data, moreover, the documentary sources for Martin’s reign provide no clues as to how the office originated. In some urban communities where there is no record of the conversion of his position into an elective office, the baiulus was confined to a limited sphere of activity, performing the task of collecting fines for the trespass of errant animals (the arrantaria tax) or fines related to the night watch, for instance.39 The sum of such functions, falling under the name of baiulatio, could have been carried out in credencia

The level of government corresponding to a town council is dealt with specifically in Section 2.3. ROSARIO GREGORIO, “Considerazioni sopra la storia di Sicilia dai tempi normanni sino ai presenti”, in Opere rare edite e inedite riguardanti la Sicilia, 3 vols, Palermo, 1805, repr. Palermo, 1977, II, pp. 146–171 and in particular p. 153. See also BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, pp. XXXVII-XLI; PIETRO CORRAO, “Fra città e corte: Circolazione dei ceti dirigenti nel Regno di Sicilia fra Trecento e Quattrocento”, in Istituzioni politiche e giuridiche e strutture del potere politico ed economico nelle città dell’Europa mediterranea medievale e moderna: La Sicilia, ed. ANDREA ROMANO, Messina, 1992, pp. 13–28, MINEO, “Città”, pp. 118–121; and BEATRICE PASCIUTA, In Regia Curia civiliter convenire: Giustizia e città nella Sicilia tardomedievale, Torino, 2003, pp. 61–66. 37 According to Gregorio, the baiulus had the authority of an official; GREGORIO, “Considerazioni”, II, p. 167. 38 During Martin’s reign, the office of the secretus underwent a transformation, loosing its role as a central agency beginning in 1392, with the following distinction: in Palermo, Catania, Messina, and Syracuse, secreti not subordinate to the official magister secretus at Court were operative, unlike those in other localities where there the vicesecreti were responsible to the magister secretus. See BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione dell’ufficio”, pp. 40–42. 39 The baiulus held tight control over public order, and thus, over any related fines in places where he, along with others, took charge of the night watch, at Piazza and Sciacca for instance, R. C. vol. 22, fol. 87r, 1393, R. C. vol. 26, fol. 49r-v [1397]; R. C. vol. 43, fol. 186r, 1406. A customary norm can be cited regarding the baiulus of Aidone and fines for errant animals, and although the original date is unknown, it probably goes back to the early years of the fifteenth century; VINCENZO CORDOVA, Le origini della Città di Aidone e il suo statuto, Rome, 1890, p. 22. 35 36

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(administered directly on behalf the Crown) or farmed out by auction in the Swabian period.40 The overlap, found in some localities during Marin’s reign, between the baiulus and the gabellotus or cabellotus (administrator of the gabelle) leads one to believe that the baiulatio was administered as it had been in the Swabian period. This overlap and subordination to the secretus occurred in Nicosia, Piazza, Sciacca, and Troina,41 and the common factor in all these localities was precisely the fact that the baiulus was not elected.42 The baglia or baiulatio, therefore, seems to be a source of revenue for the secretia and the baiulus was a royal gabellotus responsible to the secretus. His task of farming out the gabelle might also encompass other revenue that did not normally fall under the purview of the baiulatio, such as the tax on wine in a Nicosia.43 No designations of a baiulus are to be found in these communities, precisely because appointments of gabelloti and credencierii were not normally recorded. A marginal role of the baiulus is implicit in such cases, as well as the significance of the royal stance in his regard, the sole scope of which was to guarantee the efficiency of a cabellotus regius, as happened in Sciacca.44 It must be said that such an overlap of baiulus and gabellotus might not always have occurred, even where he was charged with administering the baiulatio.45

40 This already held true in the Norman-Swabian period. Concerning these functions and the transformations which took place during the reign of Federico III, Gregorio stated: “Cambiò ancora quel re la forma di elezione del bajulo: se prima in qualità di ufficiale, deputato in ciascun luogo del demanio ad esigere la rendita regia, dipendeva dal camerario, che vel costituiva in credenza o in estaglio, dopo che il Baiulo divenne parte del corpo municipale, fu nello stesso tempo e nella guisa istesso eletto, che gli ufficiali del comune.” After the “reform”, the baiulus would no longer have had any say in the matter of royal revenues; GREGORIO, “Considerazioni”, II, p. 153. Compare also BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, pp. XXXVII-XXXVIII. 41 In Sciacca the sovereign referred to him as cabellotus noster, R. C. vol. 43, fol. 186r, 1406. In Nicosia the baiulus was called cabellotus, R. C. vol. 40, fol. 106r, 1403. At Troina (SORRENTI, Le istituzioni, pp. 137–138) a baiulus was not listed among the officials, neither the elected ones nor those appointed by the Crown, but a private contractor took over his functions. In Piazza the post of ballie et xurte charged with the night watch and daytime surveillance was membrum secretie; R. C. vol. 26, fol. 49r-v, [1397]. The same patterns of authority appear to have developed in other communities following Martin’s reign: at Castrogiovanni, where the baiulus was already not an elective office during Martin’s reign, the secretus worked una cum Baiulo, G. G., p. 88, 1425. For Caltagirone, according to Pace, the four baiuli were responsible to the secretus and the civil curia until the time they were first elected in 1347. It is unclear, nevertheless, exactly what type of subordination this was, especially with respect to the secretus, and how long it had actually been in force: the author cites a document from 1532 in support of this theory; PACE, Il governo, pp. 156–157 n. 14. 42 See the Appendix. For Troina, see SORRENTI, Le istituzioni, pp. 137–138. 43 The Sovereign addressed the viceseretus of Nicosia in defence of the gabellotus of the wine gabella which was part of the royal revenues. The gabellotus had accused the jurats of abuses of power; R. C. vol. 40, fol. 106r, 1403. The chancery’s note states “pro baiulo Terre Nicosie”, from which it can be deduced that the gabellotus coincided and baiulus were one and the same. In Nicosia on only one occasion, in April 1392, the baiulus was called on in conjunction with the judges, but this could probably be considered an exception attributable to the turbulent circumstances surrounding Martin I’s takeover. In fact, the baiulus does not appear in any subsequent royal orders; BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 72–73, 1392, pp. 81–82, 1393, pp. 86–87, 1393, pp. 93–96, 1399, pp. 108–109, 1406. 44 “Rex Sicilie etc. Familiares et fideles nostri visa noviter et inspecta per magnam nostram curiam officii racionum informacionem accusacionis facte contra Aloysium di Giracio baiulum terre Sacce et tandem per dictam magnam curia supra dictam noviter est provisum quod dictum baiulum nostrum nullatenus condempnatum pro ut de declaracione huiusmodi per dictam nostram magnam curiam fuimus plenius informati et propterea fidelitatis vestre percipimus et mandamus quatenus prefatum Aloysium vel alium nomine sui racione et ex causa pene ad (quem) ipsum condempnastis modo aliquo molestare nec molestari aut inquetari per causam predictam per quidque minime permictatis cum nostre intencionis propositum sit quod nonnullus officialium et cabellatorum nostrorum in exercicio et serviciis cabellarum nostre curie molestiam aliquam indebite paciatur, datum Cathanie die XV februari XIII indictionis Rex Martinus. Dirigitur eiusdem capitaneo et iuratis terre Sacce”; R. C. vol. 43, fol. 186r, 1406. 45 As seen during Alphonso’s reign; see Section 3.2.

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These examples, however, do not imply that the office had no role to play in the civil curia. The fact that it did, is demonstrated by instances in Sciacca, Agrigento,46 and Polizzi, where the baiulatio had jurisdiction together with the judges (but was named after the judges in royal formulas for addressing them) over low justice at the town fairs.47 Even in these cases, the civil curia does not appear to play a major role. It would seem limited to collecting Crown taxes and this could provide the key for interpreting Salemi’s 1402 petition asking that the baiulus substitute for the justiciar (or captain) in his absence, demonstrating that he was not a functionary with tasks unrelated to royal interests.48 The baiulus’s peripheral role in the civil curia was likely due to the very fact that he was assigned to collect levies connected with the baiulatio which, while pertinent to administrative affairs (regarding fees, for instance, for damages due to animal trespassing or the upkeep of municipal sanitation), did not constitute the main agenda of low justice. In other words, that in some localities the baiulus might be a gabellotus, just as in places where he was not called a gabellotus but performed the same duties as in communities which contracted out the baiulatio, demonstrates that he could not have had other than a secondary role in the civil curia. The baiulus was a broker in charge of farming out the imposts rather than an official appointed for his technical competency.49 Whereas it was possible in the universitates where he was elected by scrutiny, in effect, it is not generally plausible that he administered low justice tout court, even though he could function in this area, albeit in a much more limited capacity.50 Furthermore, where not elected by scrutiny, the baiulus was never part of ambassadorial delegations, a phenomenon which can be explained both by his close connection with royal interests (limited to matters of taxation), and his lack of authority. An official charged with collecting royal revenue functioning as part of the civil curia does not seem contradictory in light of the transitory nature of the imposts and especially because a given source of revenue could furnish both royal and local income.51 His presence in the curia, although irregular, leads to the assumption that he was an official appointed by the universitas rather than the King. Convincing evidence of this comes from the communities of Salemi and Nicosia, but in reference to Alphonso’s reign.52

46 For Sciacca, R. C. vol. 39, fol. 318v, 1401. The sovereign ruled in this case against the jurats’ interference, and in favour of the office of the civil curia and baiulus in defence of royal prerogatives. The sovereign intervened again years later for the same reason against the jurats: “we will not allow you and other officials to jeopardize the revenues from our gabelle”; R. C. vol. 43, fols 186v-187r, 1406. In Agrigento, too, during Alphonso’s reign, the baiulus was functioning as part of the civil curia nd the universitas asked for a time limit to be placed on his being able to “exigere eorum residua exequcionum contumaciarum sentenciarum et aliorum iurium”; G. G. p. 305, 1443. This petition was part of a corpus in which a guarantee in defence of some municipal revenues was requested; the temporary limit for the levies of the baiulus obviously concerned royal imposts. 47 FLANDINA (ed.), Statuti, p. 264, 1407. 48 R. C. vol. 39, fol. 272r-v, 1402. 49 For Taranto, ANNA AIRÒ, La scrittura delle regole: Politica e istituzioni a Taranto nel Quattrocento, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Florence, 2005, pp. 168–177, deals with the dual nature of the baiulus/gabellotus, superintendent of the bancum iusticie, which was both fiscal (pertaining to the feudal lord) and jurisdictional (pertaining to the legal administration of the universitas), due to the differing origins of the position which brought about the stabilization of an “institutional aggregate”; ibidem, p. 174, p. 176. The theory that the technical competence of the broker was guaranteed by “un meccanismo di selezione consolidato dalla logica sociale e dalla consuetudine” (a selection process established through social dynamics and tradition) does not appear convincing; ibidem, pp. 174–175. In general, for the auctions, it seems the criteria could not have been other than that of a selection based on the economic potential of the bidders. 50 In Taranto, on the contrary, there did not seem to be any limits to his activities; ibidem, p. 172. 51 See Section 4.1. 52 See Section 3.2.

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Finally, some uncertain issues regarding the magistracy remain, but it is precisely the grey area surrounding the institution of the office and its relationships to the community that expose its marginality. What stands out, however, is the pre-eminence among the elected officers of the judges and jurats as the main beneficiaries of royal decrees and frequent participants of ambassadorial delegations. In universitates where the position of the baiulus was filled through an election by scrutiny, the sovereign usually addressed the judges and/or the jurats in making his wishes known, but he might also address the universitas53 along with these officials, and in some cases the captain54. The prestige of these positions, for the community and the Crown itself, is affirmed by the composition of the delegations presenting petitions to the sovereign: in the most sensitive cases, members of the civil and jurats’ curia were often included among the ambassadors, and at times the ambassadorial delegation was made up entirely of jurats.55 The composition of the delegations is important considering that the envoys might represent, in political terms, only a portion of the community rather than the whole. Contrary to what would come about during Alphonso’s reign, and marking a fundamental difference between the two periods, the captain was consistently missing from these delegations. Municipal autonomy at the end of the 1300s was still being revitalized and its reconfiguration more often fell to elected officials than to a royal official who in many instances was not from the local area. The relative weight attributable to the judicature and the iuratia can be analysed by examining power relations with the captain. It must be noted that the need to limit the captaincy’s prerogatives was manifested in numerous universitates in two different ways. Some communities pushed for stricter monitoring of his activities by the Crown,56 others, royal intervention limiting a concentration of power in his favour.57 Additionally, for the first time, there were centres asking that a person from the local area be appointed to the post.58 It is important at this point to understand who promoted these initiatives. Although the identity of the advocates cannot always be ascertained, it can be easily demonstrated that those who took action were almost always elected officials of the local curiae. In fact, as noted previously, the need was often expressed to safeguard the prerogatives of the civil curia and at the same time confirm the policy of not also giving jurisdiction over low

Some examples of royal decrees include one to the jurats and the universitas of Polizzi in which the sovereign declared his willingness to furnish economic aid, R. C. vol. 22, fols 62v-63r, 1393; another to the jurats and the universitas of Polizzi for setting up the watch, R. C. vol. 22 fol. 87r, 1393; one to the captain, judges and the jurats in Randazzo concerning taxation to pay the colletta, R. C. vol. 27, fol. 28r, 1396; one to the captain, judges, and jurats in Piazza granting the post of xurterius to Ruggero Crapanzano for life, R. C. vol. 28, fols 56v-57r, 1397; one notifying the captain, judges, and jurats of a pardon for the homines of Agrigento, R. C. vol. 28, fols 210v-211r, 1397; another notifying the jurats and the universitas that he recognized the Vaccara feudal estate as belonging to the community, but requested that the castellan be paid, R. C. vol. 36, fol. 95r-v, 1399 (Nicosia); one granting the jurats permission to go ahead with taxation, R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 318r, 1408 (Nicosia). 54 R. C. vol. 27, fol. 28r, 1386 e R. C. vol. 39, fols 114v-115r, 1402 (Randazzo); R. C. vol. 28, fols 210v-211r, 1397 (Agrigento). 55 The praetor and a jurat, P. R. vol. 5, fol. 352r-v, 1400 (Palermo); a jurat, R. C. vol. 46, fol. 270r-v, 1407 (Corleone) along with a notarius, Matteo Cartoxio, and in the same year Rainerio Cartoxio was elected as judge and Bartolomeo Cartoxio as jurat, R. C. vol. 46, fol. 196v; only jurats, R. C. vol. 38, fol. 261r-v, 1401 (Piazza); a judge, R. C. vol. 46, fols 302v-304r, 1407 (Noto). 56 A request from Randazzo’s universitas via the legum doctor Giovanni Racchia and the familiaris, Giovanni Grasso; R. C. vol. 27, fol. 38r-v, 1396. For other cases, see Section 1.4. 57 Pursuant to petitions presented by the universitas, Castiglione was granted the assurance that the captaincy and the castellan’s office would not be assigned to the same person; G. G., p. 80, 1392. 58 R. C. vol. 33, fols 120v-125v, 1399 (Trapani); It was conceded to Piazza that all the royal officials would be from the local area, R. C. vol. 25, fols 23r-24r, 1396. 53

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justice to the captain, a diarchic regime accepted by the Crown.59 Opposition to the captain sometimes came not only from judges, but from jurats60 who, at Sciacca for example, tried to take over various functions including those of the captaincy.61 This preliminary data testifies to the presence of a group of officials, made up of captain, jurats, and judges, who dominated municipal government. The leading role of these magistrates in urban administration is borne out in the numerous royal decrees addressing them and corroborated by the pivotal functions they performed in negotiations with the Crown. Salemi and Agrigento constitute cases in point. Martin of Aragon (Martin the Elder who succeeded to the throne of Aragon in 1395 and was King of Sicily from 1409 to 1411) and, in 1397, Martin I announced to the judges and jurats in Salemi the abrogation of the grant of the castle to Count Antonio Moncada, thus confirming the demesne status of the universitas.62 In the same year, Martin I announced to the captaincy in Agrigento, and also the judicature and iuratia, his pardon of Enrico Chiaromonte’s supporters.63 In the first instance, the demesne status was meaningfully proclaimed only to the main elected officials; for Agrigento the captain was added, most likely to avoid persecution of anyone who had previously taken part in the rebellions. It is not easy to define the prerogatives of the jurats’ office. In spite of Martin’s adoption of Frederick III’s capitula iuratorum in 1402,64 the iuratia’s power often went beyond the established parameters. The younger Martin’s meticulously detailed reference to the 1309 ordinances indicates both the full immediate applicability of the Frederickian norms regarding the jurats’ central role in municipal government and his determination to keep in check any inclination they might have to operate beyond the confines of what was stipulated in the regulations. The Sovereign confirmed the authority of the curia and, in doing so, also specified its limits. The Sovereign had previously accentuated its importance in 1398 by assigning it jurisdiction, limited to querelas et questiones under the purview of the captaincy’s administration, over cases involving less than 1 onza, and since no distinction was made, over both low and high justice.65

59 R. C. vol. 33, fols 120v-125v, 1399 (Trapani); G. G., p. 248, 1401 (Agrigento). These requests were normally granted by the Crown and the only exception found in this study concerns the terra of Licata where the sovereign determined that in civil suits it was up to the interested party to decide whether to be tried by the captain or the baiulus since the baiulus would have obtained full authority; G. G., p. 355, 1402. 60 R. C. vol. 38, fol. 261r-v, 1401 (Piazza). 61 R. C. vol. 38, fol. 260v, 1401. 62 R. C. vol. 31, fols 69v-70v; R. R. p. 1–5. Other examples, some of which also reveal the work of the council, include a royal measure ordering the jurats and town council of Syracuse not to remove the royally appointed councillor; R. C. vol. 27, fol. 95r, 1397. The praetor and jurats of Palermo presented an appeal for authorization to proceed with the sale of the taxes; R. C. vol. 39, fol. 177r, 1402. Another communication begged that the jurats and the universitas of Noto to be pardoned; R. C. vol. 46, fol. 164r-v, 1406. 63 R. C. vol. 28, fols 210v-211r. For the role of the captain, consider also the royal notification sent to the captain of Randazzo regarding the restitution of goods and property to some residents (R. C. vol. 27, fol. 34v, 1396), and Martin I’s mandate to the captain and jurats of Noto about the timing of a tax to be applied that he had decreed (R. C. vol. 41, fol. 235r, 1404). 64 R. C. vol. 39, fols 88v-90v. 65 “Dicta regia Maiestas, cum concordi consilio dictarum duodecim personarum, ordinavit, et providit, quod XIV die Augusti cuiulisbet anni, quilibet Capitaneus, et eius assessor suspendantur ab officiis, et illis nullo modo utantur, sed statuatur in eisdem officiis per eundem, cum consilio officialium eiusdem terrae, unus Locumtenens eius, qui teneat dictum officium usque ad complementum anni: interim Iurati audiant querelas, et quaestiones cuiulisbet contra dictum Capitaneum, ab una uncia infra, usque ad conclusione inclusive; et faciant processum, et illum mittant ad magnam curiam terminandum; ab una uncia supra Iurati audiant querelas”; TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum VII, p. 142.

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The real weight of the jurats’ position can be evaluated in the context of a specific situation—Randazzo—by examining a lengthy and detailed document of [1407]: the “capitula noviter facta et ordinata ad opus beneficium et reparacionem universitatis terre Randaci ad informandum sacram regiam maiestatem super capitulis infrascriptis”.66 This is almost entirely a rapid-fire j’accuse against the jurats drafted by the so-called boni homini, i.e., the part of the citizenry in conflict with the iuratia made up, in this instance, mainly of magistri (artisans). The motives of the boni homini can be momentarily left aside while focusing on the way in which the functions of the jurats are described. The jurats took part in legal affairs under the jurisdiction of the municipal administration, overseeing public works and levying the taxes necessary to finance them, collecting local revenue, directing the defence of the territory through the capixurta (magistri xurtae), and finally, authorizing the catapans to impose the mete. They therefore constituted the highest level of municipal government, were assigned duties in jurisdictional affairs, held a supervisory position over the catapans and probably the xurterii too, and administered local finances. Equally broad prerogatives can be found in other communities too. In fiscal matters, for example, the jurats’ curia played a central role in numerous localities, although not always an exclusive one. In Nicosia, together with the universitas, they administered the profits from the feudal estate of Vaccara belonging to the universitas67 and levied the general tariffs on grain purchases.68 The jurats and the universitas of Polizzi were notified of the community’s fiscal exemption (for 90 onze super laboribus) and the enforcement of the meta fell to the jurats.69 In Agrigento the jurats and treasurer administered money to be used for restoration work on the walls and other repairs.70 The authority they wielded was often broad enough to create a dominant position for them in the organizational framework of the elective offices. In this regard, it is useful to compare Sciacca’s organization with Piazza’s, which was similar in this respect. In the first locality the baiulus performed the night watch with the sciurterii (or xurterii), who were not elected but chosen by the jurats.71 The pre-eminence of the jurats is confirmed by the complaint from the baiulus of Sciacca that the jurats did not send out men for the watch. During the early years of Martin’s reign, the jurats in Piazza played a role in the watch that was later withdrawn. As recompense, Martin granted Ruggero Crapanzano the posts of both baiulus and xurterius in [1397], appointing him Magister Xurterius for life, with responsibility for day and night watches.72 On the basis of these examples, the jurats had a major part to play in administrative R. C. vol. 46, fols 413v-415v. R. C. vol. 36, fol. 95r-v, 1399. R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 318r, 1408. R. C. vol. 22, fols 62v-63r, 1393; R. C. vol. 39, fol. 100r-v, 1402. R. C. vol. 43, fol. 137r, 1405. R. C. vol. 43, fol. 186r, 1406. In 1393, Martin the Elder, addressed the jurats and the universitas to have a watch implemented (R. C. vol. 22, fol. 87r). The tone of the request seems to suggest that the iuratia would supervise rather than perform the watch in first person. The fact that the xurterii were missing from among the elected officials probably meant the position was likely to have been created through royal measures. Martin I’s appointment of Crapanzano to the position for life is a case in point; R. C. vol. 28, fols 56v57r, 1397. Indeed, Crapanzano’s control continued and the sovereign intervened to mitigate some friction with the jurats in 1407. Martin I decreed that every year the city officials would have to find out who among the boni homini et habitaturi wanted to act as watchmen and their salary be collected through a tax. It would then be up to the King to appoint the men needed and assign them to the magister xurterius (capo xurta) although it is not stated how they were to be selected. Finally, and this point is quite unclear in what the document reports, the magister xurterius would elect the required individuals. It would seem, therefore, the Sovereign proposed initially an abundant list of names from which the coordinator of the night watch had the right to choose. The jurats would not have been able to interfere. This double system of appointment is validated by Martin’s comment: the men assigned to the magister xurterius would have to be accepted by him; Consuetudines, fols 29r-30v.

66 67 68 69 70 71 72

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matters, or at least could attempt interference, especially in places where other posts were not elective offices such as the Magistri Excumbiarum (sciurterii) in Sciacca and Piazza. More generally, some of the offices were not filled through election by scrutiny in every community during Martin’s reign: the sciurterii (throughout the entire reign in Agrigento, Nicosia, Piazza, Polizzi, and Sciacca, and for a few years in Patti); the treasurer (throughout the entire reign in Corleone, Patti, and Termini, and for a few years in Agrigento, Nicosia, Polizzi, Randazzo, and Salemi); the catapans (throughout the entire reign in Salemi).73 At Castroreale the institution of the post of treasurer was refused in 1409 because it was deemed superfluous and not cost-effective since the same duties were performed by the vicesecretus and the jurats.74 Furthermore, the gradual definition of prerogatives and, in some cases, the assumption of new ones, could alter the configuration of an office during the period of the two Martins.75 Government organizational structures, therefore, testify to a lack of institutional uniformity underlying the multifaceted configuration of cities in the royal demesne. Most of the data attests to a tendency to enhance the leading role of the jurats within a decidedly composite framework. The jurats’ pivotal position in the forefront of government confirms that their curia had not disappeared during the period of viceregal rule and that it was certainly reinforced in a political climate favourable to urban communities. The preponderant influence of the jurats, which increased under the Infante of Aragon (Martin I), was in fact coherent with the sovereign’s desire to encourage the spirit of autonomy in the universitates, thus favouring the officials who symbolized that spirit. Indeed, while the jurats, like the judges, could take advantage in many places of having “survived” through the period of the great magnates, the same phenomenon was not discernable for all the other elective offices. During Martin’s reign, in fact, their functions were not well-defined and in many cases they were not operative. In summation, it should be noted that when certain offices were not included in the rosters of positions filled through elections by scrutiny, they were not always activated, however, the fact that they were not posts filled through elections by scrutiny does not mean that they were inoperative, as substantiated by the instances of the sciurterii Sciacca and Piazza. There could actually have been different electoral systems, and the most significant instance concerns the universitas of Catania where the earliest lists of officials elected by scrutiny only date back to the year 1412–13. This does not, however, imply that the officials had not been chosen by the universitas prior to that time. The magistrates were previously elected locally by lot (but evidently not according to the procedures of the elections by scrutiny), as sustained by a municipal petition presented to the Sovereigns 1392: “item quod officiales predicte civitatis fiant per sortes prout moris fuit antiquitus, et non gratiose in civitate predicta. Placet dictis domini iure regio semper salvo”.76 Moreover, the existence of an elaborate organizational framework in Catania at that time is corroborated by

See the Appendix. G. G., p. 121. In 1393 the captain of Randazzo was charged with collecting the royal revenues, whereas in 1397, the same task was assigned to the vicesecretus; R. C. vol. 22, fol. 102v and R. C. vol. 31, fol. 186r. 76 MICHELE CATALANO TIRRITO, “I più antichi capitoli di Catania (1392)”, in Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale, II, 1909, p. 251. 73 74 75

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numerous references to various magistracies recorded in the “capituli et ordinationi di lu officiu di li acathapani di Catania” issued by Martin I in 1401.77 The assiduous requests for the reconfirmation of privileges that had been obtained in the first half of the 1300s, like the very rare petitions requesting clarification of voting procedures and the appeals for a more equal distribution of power, show that Martin’s reign did not constitute an isolated chunk of history but was closely tied to pre-existing circumstances. Under rule by the Infante of Aragon, an increasingly substantial participation of the universitates in defining the extent of their own autonomous functioning clearly emerges. This autonomy was characterized by the establishment of elaborate organizational structures for officials (based on historic precedents in this case as well) and the consolidation of procedures for appointing magistrates that varied according to location. 2.2

The Electoral System: A Long-Term Model with Few Variations

One of the most significant indications of municipal rights and privileges, which are quite apparent by now, was the right to elect the majority of municipal officials from the early fourteenth century onwards. What remains to be clarified is what exactly those electoral procedures were. It is important to point out that the records available today are royal documents for the most part. They address the final phase of the electoral process, in which the representative of the Crown participated without interfering or merely intervened with brief citations of pertinent passages regarding the composition of the electoral college. This having been stated, it is possible with a certain degree of certainty to formulate hypotheses based on a small number of petitions from the universitates as well as a number of fourteenth and fifteenth century declarations related to requests by citizens for clarification of voting procedures. I intend to argue two points. First of all, except in rare cases, the elections were presided over not only by outgoing officials, but also by the town council. The second point, which I shall examine here and treat in greater detail while examining the councils,78 deals with the indirect influence exerted on electors by socio-professional groups. This interplay among various groups became evident in the selection of different government representatives. My research addresses the following aspects of the electoral procedure: the people who were a part of the electoral college, the methods by which these members of the electoral college were chosen, and forms of interference from the royal curia during these procedures. My examination of this subject matter involves references to numerous communications, often closely interrelated, by several sovereigns during the period beginning with the reign of Peter III (1282–1285) through that of John II (1458–1479). Instructions for elections from Peter III to the universi homines of the universitas, and even to the captain in some cases, provide one of the first references to a participation of civic officials, although not as constituents of the electoral college. Consider, for example, the 1282 ratification of the catapans elected in Termini: Petrus dei gracia etc. universis hominibus Thermarum fidelibus suis etc. scire volumus fidelitatem vestram quod Rogerius de Mauro tam pro se quam Iohanne de Famiano de RINIERO ZENO, “Un capitolo di re Martino sull’acatapania catanese”, in Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale, 6, 1909, pp. 289–292. 78 See Section 2.3. 77

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eadem terra Termarum quos Rogerium et Iohannem in Acatapanos vestros pro anno presenti undecime indicionis ad mandatum culminis nostri pro inde vobis factum unanimiter et concorditer elegistis sicut in decreto electionis approbationis ipsorum inde facto per eos nostre curie presentato plenius continetur.79

Frederick III and Frederick IV implemented a more definitive reorganization of the procedures for acceding to governmental posts. The scrutineum or election by scrutiny,80 the annual election of officials that was the responsibility of the cities, became a formalized procedure during the 1320s. In 1311 the rex Trinacriae gave Palermo instructions for the electoral process that referred back to norms already established in Messina. This mandate did not specify which positions were involved. The positions are listed, however, in a royal concession of 1326, again for the city of Palermo,81 which confirmed the annual nature of the offices to be filled through a scrutiny: “item quod Pretor, Iudices, Notarii actorum [. . .] Iurati, Magistri Platee, Magistri Xurterii, ii qui tenunt mercum, et Notarii credencerii dohanarum [. . .] et quarucumque gabellarum curiae.”82 Note that among the Palermitan candidates “qui tenunt mercum, et Notarii credencerii dohanarum, quarucumque gabellarum curiae” are never included, not even the catapans (magistri platee or acatapani) in the earliest years, or the judex primarum appellacionis (hereafter referred to as appellate judge), even though the position already existed in previous years. This is probably due to the fact that in the first decades after the creation of the post, it had been up to the universitas to appoint a person to the office, although done on the basis of a procedure different from that used for other officials.83 Evidence indicating that the appellate judge was chosen by the community is found in a 1320 deliberation, an opinion presented by the praetor84 together with the judges and the proborum hominum, regarding the responsibilities of the appellate judge. Within the proclamation, there is a brief reference to the election for that office: provisum et ordinatum est per dominus Pretorem et iudices felicis urbis panormi cum cosciencia et noticia iuratorum et aliorum proborum eiusdem felicis urbis panormi 79 De Rebus, I, p. 148, 1282. The same orders for the notarium publicum of Nicosia; ibidem, pp. 113–114, 1282. Likewise for the generic approval of the civic officials, but in this case the sovereign also addresses the Captain: “Petrus dei gracia etc. capitaneo et universis hominibus civitatis Siracusie fidelibus suis graciam suam et bonam voluntatem. Quia eligendi iudices et officiales alios in predicta civitate Siracusie qui actenus eligi consueverunt ibidem pro presenti anno undecime indicionis tempus instat. Fidelitati vestre precipiendo mandamus quatenus iudices aliosque officiales in predicta civitate Siracusie qui officia ad eos spectancia pro eodem anno prestati [sic] ad honorem et fidelitatem nostri culminis exequantur prout actenus fieri consuevit de melioribus et sufficientibus vestrum receptis presentibus eligatis quos cum electionis decreto ad nostram excellenciam destinetis”; ibidem, pp. 48–49, 1282. Identical measures for several communities; ibidem, p. 49, pp. 71–72, 1282. The only exception is the royal formula in addressing the captain, the judges and the men of Messina; ibidem, p. 73, 1282. 80 For Palermo in the early 1300s, see the notes in BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, pp. XXVI-XXXVI; also MINEO, “Città”, pp. 126–134; PASCIUTA, In regia, pp. 115–122. For Noto, there is information regarding a later period in FRANCESCO BALSAMO, “Il sistema di elezione delle cariche pubbliche a Noto dai Martini alla fine della feudalità”, in Atti e Memorie dell’Istituto per lo Studio e la Valorizzazione di Noto Antica, 14–15, 1983–1984, pp. 117–178. 81 Acta, I, pp. 3–8. 82 DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 90–92. 83 Regarding the diffusion of appellate courts in other localities, see Section 3.4. 84 Concerning the title of Praetor, it must be remembered that the prestige of the baiulus is also indicated by the adoption of a more solemn title in some communities, such as Praetor in Palermo in 1311 and Patricius in Catania and Noto beginning in 1345, Senator in Syracuse in 1395 and, later on, Praefecti in Licata in 1457 and Trapani in 1478; see EMANUELE E GAETANI, Della Sicilia, III, pp. 335–337; GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 179; ANTONINO E. RISINO (ed.), Il regesto del libro rosso dell’università netina, Noto, 2003, pp. 89–90. On the prestige attached to the new title of “Baiulus”, see Queen Mary’s concession of privileges to the territory of Noto; ibidem, pp. 89–90.

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quod providus vir iudex Saladinus de Sergio concivis eorum electus et ordinatus per universitatem dicte urbis in iudices appellacionum primarum causarum tam civilium quam criminalium pro predicto anno IIII indictionis ex privilegio dicte universitati indulto per regiam maiestatem ex iusta causa possit et debeat postulare in quacumque curia dicte urbis.85

Due to a lack of documentation from other communities in the 1300s, it is difficult to ascertain precisely how long it took before the scrutiny became widespread but its general application has been documented from the mid-1300s, with the time span of the 1320s to the 1350s constituting the period of its affirmation.86 In 1311 Frederick III distinguished between a procedure in the scrutiny for the direct election of some officers by an electoral college, and one for a drawing “by lot” (per sortes) to choose others.87 In the first case, the jurats (iurati) and the judges designated four probi homes from every neighbourhood (Cassaro, Albergaria, Kalsa, Seralcadi, and Conceria) together with whom they elected six probi viri for each of the neighbourhoods. It was these probi viri who constituted the electoral college. Each elector proposed a list of candidates, and the person who presided over the election (and about whom nothing else is stipulated) gave each elector two lapilli (small stones), one white and one black, and indicated the names of two candidates at a time while the electors specified their preference in secret. The person with the most votes won the election. For judges and notaries, however, the system differed slightly because the positions were assigned per sortes, from among the limited number of members in the two categories. Their names were written on slips of paper and placed in a hood, while ten more slips were placed in another hood, five blank ones and five with the word electus written on them. A child extracted them and the names drawn together with the word electus won. 85 Acta, I, p. 231. The post of appellate judge was instituted in Palermo pursuant to a request by the universitas—the text of the petition in Acta, I, p. 92, 1312. After 1322–1323 the appellate judge was also elected in a scrutiny; Acta, III pp. 9–10. The praetor, judges, jurats, and xurterii were the only ones constantly elected in the first session; Acta, III, pp. 9–10, 1322–1323; Acta, IV, pp. 3–4, 1327–28; Acta, V, 1328–29, pp. 3–4. Both Palermo and Messina had a special institutional structure owing to the particular judicial status of cives with a privilegium fori (Palermo from the early 1300s and Messina from the end of the 1200s) which were not judged extra urbem. Concerning the privilegium fori see PASCIUTA, “Costruzione”, pp. 239–297. For the curia praetoris, see PASCIUTA, “Gerarchie e policentrismo”. As for the particular method of appointing the Palermitan appellate judge up to 1321, note that the institutionalized forms of elected offices could also vary in other urban contexts. In the Catalan community of Cervera, for instance, the fundamental posts were consell, paeria and juradia chosen by the community along with the batlle or justicia and veguer who were royal officials with judicial tasks. The earliest information regarding election procedures for officials dates back to 1311 and there is a mixture of co-optation and drawings and a system for electing the paeria that is different from the one for the juradia. TURULL RUBINAT, La configuracíó, pp. 127–132, 172–219. For further comparison, see GUIDUBALDO GUIDI, “I sistemi elettorali agli uffici della città-repubblica di Firenze nella prima metà del Trecento (1329–1349)”, in Archivio Storico Italiano, 493–494, 1977, pp. 373–424 for information regarding Florence in the years 1329–1349, for different electoral methods for officials (especially ibidem, pp. 374–378, pp. 401–404) and for an analysis of the balance of political power among the civic factions as reflected in the electoral process. For an earlier period, see GUIDUBALDO GUIDI, “I sistemi elettorali del Comune di Firenze nel primo Trecento: Il sorgere della elezione per squittinio (1300–1328)”, in Archivio Storico Italiano, 130, 1972, pp. 345–408. Again for Florence, but in the Medicean period, see NICOLAI RUBINSTEIN, Il governo di Firenze sotto i Medici (1434–1494), transl. By Michele Luzzati, Florence, 1997, p. 7, p. 45. For the general municipal context, see PATRICK GILLI, Ville set sociétés urbaines en Italie milieu XIIe-milieu XIVe siècle, Lassay-les-Châteaux, 2005, pp. 258–264, which highlights numerous variations in electoral proceedings, from co-optation to extremely complex procedures. Finally, see LAZZARINI, “La nomination”, pp. 389–412, for an examination of the sources regarding the appointment of officials in the mid-1400s (the Principalities of Milan, Ferrara, and Mantua and the Republics of Florence and Venice). 86 COSENTINO, Codice, p. 4, 1355–56 (Polizzi); p. 10, 1355–56 (Caltagirone); p. 100, 1355–56 (Taormina); p. 101, 1355–56 (Sciacca); p. 399, 1357–58 (Randazzo), p. 402, 1357–58 (Caltavuturo). Normally the documentation only refers to electoral proceedings in emergency situations; for Florence see GUIDI, “I sistemi elettorali agli uffici”, p. 374, p. 378. 87 Acta, I, pp. 3–8.

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A passage from the aforementioned decree of 1326 merits consideration: qui de cetero facto prius scrutinio per nostram curiam, vel eum cui ipsa curia nostra commiserit, de personis idoneis ad predicta officia concursuris per modum scarfiarum, iuxta ordinacionem ipsius nostre curie [. . .] eligantur in predicta tamen urbe [. . .] per Commissarium nostre curie infra mensem cuiuslibet anni ad hec specialiter trasmittendum.88

It has been asserted on the basis of this excerpt that, as the election was to be executed by the Regia Curia and performed per scarfias by a royal commissioner,89 there was a reduction of local autonomy. It is important to note that this is the first appearance of the word scarfia, a term often considered to be the equivalent of a slip of paper like a coupon, bill or ticket, but at other times, fortune or chance in a drawing by lot.90 I do not believe the ordinance of 1326 should be construed as a deliberate attempt at interference; a commissioner took part in the scrutiny, just as the President had in 1311. Likewise, the supposed participation of the royal administration should not be interpreted as if it were up to the Crown to take an active part in the scrutiny (for example, through an intervention regarding the electorate or during the voting) rather than to simply ratify the results. In fact, from the time of Peter II onwards (who confirmed in 1339 the procedure for Palermo’s scrutiny per scarfias without mentioning any further royal prerogatives)91 all of the royal decrees exclude any possible intervention, except for the presence of the commissioner presiding over the operations and ratifying the elected officers. Furthermore, it has been said that by the end of the fourteenth century, proceedings per scarfias had been replaced by the scrutiny, an electoral system that presented the sovereign with a list of candidates from which to make his choice.92 This is an assertion supported by the 1398 royal ratification of elected officers: “recepto noviter quodam scrutinio per sindicos vestros super creandis officialibus de novo pro anno presenti VII indicionis, tandem per magestatem nostram cum deliberacione nostri consilio pro dicto anno presenti infrascriptos officiales fuerunt et sunt electi.”93 I do not believe that a proceeding per scarfias is distinguishable from a scrutiny because the term per scarfias denoted a procedure that was part of the scrutiny from the time of Frederick III onwards. This statement warrants clarification. It is a good idea, first of all, to take a closer look at the difference between translating scarfia as either a slip of paper or as chance in a drawing by lot. In terms of the first meaning, the possibility of voting on names withdrawn is not foreclosed. In terms of the second, however, the names are chosen solely through a drawing. In the documentation pertaining to the reign of Frederick IV, there is a recurrence of the phrase mictas sortes

DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 91–92. BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, p. XXXIII, although it is prudent to add that the author does not know the content of the ordinatio to which the passage alludes. She concludes, however, that at the end of the 1300s the Crown would have prevailed over the autonomy of the elections, reassuming the power challenged by the feudal lords in the second half of the 14th century; in treating the matter she cites a comment by Testa; ibidem, pp. XXXIV-XXXV. A generic affirmation that is not confirmed in the documentation of the reigns of Martin I and Alphonso V; see Sections 3.5 and 5.2. 90 BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, p. XXXII n. 38. 91 DE VIO, Felicis, p. 152. 92 PASCIUTA, In regia, p. 122. 93 Acta, XI, pp. 43–44. The names and the titles of Martin of Aragon, Maria, and Martin of Sicily appear in the intitulatio, while it was signed by rex Martinus alone, probably Martin I of Sicily. On including the names of all the sovereigns in the intitulatio as a sign of Martin the Elder’s desire to unify the kingdom, see PIETRO BURGARELLA, Nozioni di diplomatica siciliana, Palermo, 1991, pp. 89–93. 88 89

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cedularum (drawing by lot).94 The term scarfia also appears when the documents specify that the official was chosen by the sovereign “ex gratia, absque scarfiarum inmissione”.95 These elements seem to indicate that both scarfia and chance were, in fact, integral parts of the electoral process during the drawing of the candidates names by chance. It would appear that an initial vote was held, followed by a drawing from among the names of those who had received the most votes. According to a 1392 petition, the only procedure available in Catania might have been a drawing, but because the reference is vague, it is only possible to ascertain that the officers were chosen by the universitas, “item quod officiales predicte civitatis fiant per sortes prout moris fuit antiquitus.” However, according to a royal concession for Piazza in 1392, there must have been a drawing by lot of candidates’ names after they had been voted on: “cum de antiqua consuetudine et observantia [. . .] quod omnes officiales [. . .] creandi in civili semper per sortes et scarfias ad ellectionem proborum virorum eliguntur.”96 Most of the information after that indicates the affirmation of a direct vote on the names of eligible candidates. During the reign of Alphonso V, for instance, it is often specified that whoever obtained the most voces/vocum (voices/votes) was elected and no indication is given of a subsequent drawing from among the names of those who obtained the most votes. At Castrogiovanni in 1420–1421, no one was able to obtain a position “nisi per scrutina et per voces”.97 In Agrigento in 1423, an unprecedented petition was presented to allow for the election of the councillors “per scarfi/per scrutineu”.98 In Malta, in 1439, a grievance was lodged against persons who had not received any votes, or an insufficient number of votes, in the scrutiny.99 The same concurrence of voice and vote occurred in 1443 in Gozo where it was possible to become an official only by obtaining more “votes in the scrutiny”.100 The following year in Catania, a longstanding privilege was recalled according to which the officials: “fiant per cedulas et scrutinea more solito, et eligantur habentes maiorem numerum vocum.” In the same universitas in 1446, the councillors voted on the official agenda by giving their vocem.101 Evidence of voting in an election is recorded in a request made by the universitas of Piazza to Alphonso V in 1448 that the person who obtained the most votes in the scrutiny be elected.102 In 1466, it was disclosed in Randazzo that, due to an oversight, those who obtained the most votes might not be elected, so that Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea was asked to proceed with a drawing. The names of the eligible candidates, as decided by the officials and the deputies, would be written on slips of paper and placed in a birritta (bag or sack), and the first names extracted would be those elected. The Viceroy did not consent to the petition.103 There are rare instances in which only the extraction of names occurred in the proceedings. At Castrogiovanni in 1456, during a period of grave economic crisis, the feudal COSENTINO, pp. 165–167, 1356; for other instances ibidem, p. 229, p. 288, 1356. Appointment of the baiulus of Patti, as well as the catapans of Castrogiovanni and Randazzo, “graciose absque scarfiarum inmissione”; ibidem, p. 27, 1355, p. 198, 1356, p. 396, 1357 respectively. 96 CATALANO TIRRITO, “I più antichi capitoli”, p. 251; Consuetudines, fol. 21v. 97 G. G. p. 86. 98 Ibidem, p. 263–264. 99 Ibidem, p. 333. 100 Ibidem, p. 333. 101 Ibidem, p. 172 and pp. 191–192, respectively. 102 Consuetudines, fol. 54r-v. Regarding the viceroy, the royal representative on the island, whose presence was established beginning in 1415, see CORRAO, Governare, pp. 179–200. 103 VITO LA MANTIA, Consuetudini di Randazzo, Palermo, 1903, pp. 1–2. 94 95

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estate of Chundro (Cundrone) was sold. It was envisioned that whoever guaranteed the loan to repurchase the property would be offered, in exchange, the possibility of holding an office. The names of the contenders would be written on slips of paper and placed in a bag and the persons whose names were extracted would become officials.104 Given the uniqueness of the circumstances, one cannot assert that this method of a drawing was standard, but along with its exceptional occurrence at Castrogiovanni, it is possible that the procedure might have been adopted for a period of time in Catania as well. In an effort to resolve moments of tension in executing the elections in Catania, John II approved some petitions in 1459 in which he established a separate list of candidates for each office and further specified that the election procedure was to be an extraction of names for each of the posts. No mention is made of counting votes at the end.105 Thus, the universitates of Castrogiovanni in 1456 and, even more importantly, Catania in 1459 held a simple drawing under particular conditions, whereas in other communities, the scrutiny appears to have been the equivalent of voting. The central government’s ratification tam ex votibus quam ex gratia of the catapan, Andrea Ferrario, in 1425–1426 in Trapani,106 should also be interpreted in this manner. At Castrogiovanni in 1456, the choice of a drawing without a vote was probably necessary, given the fact that its unique transaction required the rapid bestowal of an office in exchange for a loan. In the case of Catania, there was an on-going reform movement in 1459 to determine in advance the candidates’ eligibility for different offices.107 Hence, the number of contenders would already have been limited and this, I believe, could be the reason behind the procedure based on a simple drawing that reduced the potentially unlimited dimension of the election. With these distinctions outlined, I feel it safe to conclude that between the two procedures in the scrutiny, voting and drawing by lot, the former prevailed in the Alphonsian period.108 104 G. G., p. 111. 105 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVII, pp. 492–495. 106 P. R. vol. 28, fol. 28r. Other similar cases: the sciurterius, Paolo Messina, in Salemi in 1426–1427, P. R. vol. 29, fol. 24v;

the catapans, Paolo Traversa and Giovanni Tezu, and the sciurterius, Giovanni Calatagirono in Randazzo in 1426–27, P. R. vol. 29, fol. 25r. 107 A subject that will be dealt with in Section 5.2. 108 In communities of other states under the Crown of Aragon, councillors and officials could have been elected through procedures involving either appointment by officials or a drawing. At the same time the socio-professional groups (estamentosmans/mas) influenced the elections more or less intensely over the course of time. There was no uniformity among the electoral systems in different communities. For the Principality of Catalonia, according to the earliest orders, there was a direct system involving the entire citizenry or the probi homines (prohombres, members of the general assembly), and in some cases it was the up to the heads of families. One of the first innovations employed in the larger communities required outgoing officials to name their successors. More frequently in later years, however, the officials holding office, along with the consiliarii and/or the probi homines (sometimes only the latter), elected a commission of ten to twelve members who chose the authorities for the posts; FONT RIUS, “Orígenes”, pp. 420–421. For the Catalan community of Barcelona, where co-optations were more common, while respecting the divisions among the various groups to be represented, and for Cervera where along with co-optation for some posts there were also drawings, see note 139 below and note 85 above, respectively. For the Aragonese community of Saragossa where a drawing was the procedure in use, see note 112 below. Another noteworthy case is the bishopric of Tarragona in Catalonia where a system of co-optation was used for selecting councillors and consuls (the highest civic officials), although their election also depended on maintaining a balance of power between the various socio-professional groups estamentos (màs). The election, for both consuls and councillors, involves a system of self-reproduction/co-optation: the councillors voted for the consuls, who then elected the councillors, always taking into account distinctions of màs. CORTIELLA ÒDENA, Una ciutat, pp. 79–100. And finally, as far as the community of Orihuela in the Kingdom of Valencia is concerned, indirect co-optation constituted the electoral mechanism in the first half of the 1300s: the outgoing officials elected the electors. Alphonso V, however, enacted a series of modifications in 1417. He increased the number of electors to include all the inhabitants that had been consellers (members of the Consell, assembly with deliberative and consultative powers). The most important officials in office, the justicia criminal and the jurados, held a drawing along with the consellers to choose ten electors from among the former councillors not currently holding any office. This electoral body went ahead with the election of the higher officials while the justicia criminal and the jurados concerned themselves with the lesser officials directly electing forty consellers. BARRIO BARRIO, Gobierno, pp. 175–200.

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A further issue requires clarification, regarding the composition of the electoral college and how its members were chosen. As stated earlier, Frederick III stipulated in 1311 that the outgoing jurats and judges were to choose four probi homines per neighbourhood, and that the three groups together would in turn elect for each of the neighbourhoods six viros probos who were responsible for selecting the candidates.109 This Frederickian document reveals the manner in which the political organization of the cities was dealt with territorially.110 In Palermo what was prescribed corresponded directly to a differentiation of the electorate based on territorial boundaries.111 The case of Palermo, however, was not an isolated one. A similar differentiation occurred in Nicosia, even though it occurred later, beginning in Martin’s reign, between the two neighbourhoods of Santa Maria and San Nicola, as well as in Corleone between the capitanea superiore and the capitanea inferiore, and in Sutera between the neighbourhoods of Rabat (Rabato) and Giardinello.112 Nevertheless, a political organization for elections according to territorial boundaries, or for the collette as in Randazzo,113 did not imply that such distinctions were always applied to officials in the government. For example, in 1374–75 there is no indication of a territorial basis for the election in Nicosia,114 even though evidence of a subdivision into neighbourhoods existed there as early as the mid-1300s.115 The same is true for the other centres. Polizzi, since the 1200s, was divided into contrade and capitanee that shared their names with the churches of Santa Maria Maggiore, San Giorgio, San Blasio, San Pancrazio, Santa Maria Maddalena and San Nicolò. Messina was already divided into contrade, convicinia or

109 Acta, I, pp. 3–8. 110 The capitula iuratorum already provided for a convocation of councillors in each neighbourhood in 1309; TESTA,

Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVI, p. 106. For a comparison see, per Pisa, ALMA POLONI, Trasformazioni della società e mutamenti delle forme politiche in un Comune italiano: il Popolo a Pisa (1220–1330), Pisa, 2004, pp. 46–47, General Council representatives were recruited according to territorial divisions—at first based on a count of doors, then by neighbourhood. 111 Acta, I, 1311–12; p. 209, 1320–21. D’ALESSANDRO, Terra, pp. 148–151. 112 For Corleone there were territorial distinctions from 1402–03 (R. C. vol. 39, fol. 220r) and in Nicosia beginning in 1399–1400 (P. R. vol. 13, fol. 72r). The first list I found in Sutera with a differentiation by neighbourhood was from 1407–08 (R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 160r). A differentiation did not always appear in the years thereafter. For example, the distinction was missing in 1415–16: three judges, four jurats, two catapans, and one notarius actorum are indicated in the records without mentioning the pertinent local administration; R. C. vol. 50, fol. 160r. Further examples of officials elected for neighbourhoods in Sutera (which was was granted in fief in 1421 and redeemed in 1434; see BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 856): P. R. vol. 21, fol. 28v, 1419–20; R. C. vol. 73, fol. 70v, 1437–38; P. R. vol. 37, fol. 186r, 1445–46; P. R. vol. 43, fol. 59v, 1450–51. For a comparison, consider the community of Saragossa, where there was an electoral system that did not record any debarment from government offices from the first half of the Alphonsian reign onwards. The electoral system was of a territorial type based on parishes (reduced from fifteen to twelve by Ferdinand I in 1414) which were responsible for choosing the electoral body in a system that used a drawing and not indirect co-optation; FALCÓN PÉREZ, Organización, pp. 19–40; FALCÓN PÉREZ, “Origen y desarollo”, pp. 88–89. On the connections between neighbourhoods and officials, for the Castilian community of Toledo, see JEAN-PIERRE MOLÉNAT, “Quartiers et communautés à Tolède (XIIe-XVe siècles)”, in En la España medieval, 12, 1989, pp. 187–189. 113 P. R. vol. 34, fols 91v-92r, 1437. 114 BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 59–60. 115 I refer here to the peace agreement between the inhabitants of the Santa Maria and San Nicola neighbourhoods which resolved the existing state of conflict; MARIANO LA VIA, Rivalità e lotte fra Mariani e Nicoletti in Nicosia di Sicilia: A proposito di un contratto di pace del secolo XV, in Archivio Storico Siciliano, n. s. 23, 1898, pp. 478–515. The situation in Nicosia was not an isolated case, for example, in some Castilian cities the bandos (parties) corresponded to the topographical demarcations: Salamanca was divided in two and the bandos took their names from the parishes of San Tomè and San Benito, whereas in Alba the names came from the two churches of Santa Cruz and Sant Miguel; MONSALVO ANTÒN, El sistema, pp. 192–193. Contrasts did not always coincide with the territorial divisions. Such was the case for the territory of San Fratello which was divided into the neighbourhoods of Piano or Quartiere dei Greci, Rua dei Franchi, Monte Piloso or Quartiere dei Dieci Mila, Monte San Martino or Quartiere del Bando, but where the ab antiquo divisions between the Morroni and the Cucchiaroni extended beyond these topographical distinctions; LUIGI P. VASI, “Delle Origini e vicende di S. Fratello”, in Archivio Storico Siciliano, n. s. 6, 1881, pp. 267–268.

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quartieri in the 1320s, and Trapani into contrade and then into quartieri from the mid1300s. They were universitates where the elected officials did not correspond to the territorial boundaries.116 This would lead one to believe that, even if the officials did not correspond to the territorial boundaries, citizen life could still have been organized around the neighbourhood. This is demonstrated by the community of Randazzo where neighbourhoods could have served as symbols of identity for the citizens. Each neighbourhood, Santa Maria, San Martino, and San Nicola, had “una ecclesia parrochiali equali sive aliqua preheminencia” (a parish church with the same prerogatives). In 1439 a serious dispute erupted among the inhabitants of the various neighbourhoods following an attempt to establish Santa Maria as the most important parish. This episode highlights the central role of the sacred space of the parish deemed a “spazio fisico che traduce direttamente le asimmetri sociali e le polarizzazioni sovrane”.117 The universitas, in order to resolve friction among the residents, requested that no church be made the primary one and Viceroy Ruggero Paruta decreed local custom should be followed.118 Stability was achieved in the territory by maintaining equal status among the churches. Additionally, even though the deputies in charge and the officials of the electoral commission were from the neighbourhoods in Randazzo, elected offices in this universitas did not normally coincide with the neighbourhoods.119 Having elucidated these points, I return to the question of the elections. Frederick IV issued instructions for the elections several times, always the same, though differing from those of Frederick III: a notary from the prothonotary’s office summoned twelve people sufficientes et ydoneos et prosperi who, on slips of paper in abundanti numero (in considerable number), were to indicate the names of the candidates eligible for election to office. The notary then performed the drawing mictas sortes in the presence of the most prominent outgoing officials: the captain, baiulus, judges, jurats and the probi homines. It is not specified who chose the twelve electors and there are no indications that it was incumbent upon the

116 For Polizzi, see PERI, “Rinaldo”, p. 156, p. 159, p. 161, p. 176, p. 184. For Messina and Trapani, see GENUARDI, Il comune, pp. 132–133. For the community of Trapani, see also GIOVAN FRANCESCO PUGNATORE, Istoria di Trapani: Prima edizione dall’autografo del secolo XVI a cura di Salvatore Costanza, Trapani, 1984, pp. 110–111, which refers to an earlier subdivision into four quartieri, and then into five, without specifying the period (although Pugnatore writes at the end of the 1500s). For officials elected in Messina (judges at the curia stratigoti) see SALVO, Una realtà, pp. 215–300. Regarding the officials elected in Polizzi and Trapani, for example: P. R. vol. 8, fol. 127v, 1397–98 (Polizzi); P. R. vol. 13, fol. 72r, 1399–00 (Trapani); R. C. vol. 43, fol. 84r, 1405–06 (Polizzi); R. C. vol. 46, fol. 196v, 1406–07 (Trapani); R. C. vol. 53, fol. 67r, 1424–25 (Polizzi); R. C. vol. 75, fol. 66v, 1439–40 (Trapani); P. R. vol. 37, fol. 183r, 1445–46 (Polizzi). 117 See EDOARDO GRENDI, Lettere orbe: Anonimato e poteri nel Seicento genovese, Palermo, 1989, p. 151, for Genoa in the 1600s. Regarding the general importance of the parish as a symbol of a local world, see SUSAN REYNOLDS, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300, Oxford, 1997, pp. 79–100. On the topography of the sacred space, see especially TORRE, Il consumo di devozioni: Religione e comunità nelle campagne di Ancien Regime, Venice, 1995, for rural Piedmont in the 1600s and for Genoa see, GRENDI, Lettere, pp. 151–160. Regarding the role of the parishes in the civic administration, see for the city of Saragossa, JEAN-PIERRE BARRAQUÉ, Saragosse à la fin du Moyen Âge: Une ville sous influence, Paris-Montréal, 1998, pp. 136–144. 118 R. C. vol. 74, fols 391v-392r. Given the presence of the only domus magna, and the existence of a hospital there since 1470, the most prestigious neighbourhood in Randazzo must have been San Nicola; DOMENICO VENTURA, Randazzo e il suo territorio tra medioevo e prima età moderna, Caltanissetta-Rome, 1991, p. 158 119 Information from a 1466 petition regarding the deputies; La Mantia, Consuetudini, pp. 1–2. Separate Libri rossi exist for the Santa Maria, San Martino and San Nicola neighbourhoods, underscoring the fact that their identities were distinct even in the conservation of civic records; see FABRIZIO TITONE, “Identità cittadina e dominio territoriale: Il caso dell’universitas di Randazzo nel tardo Medioevo”, in Mélanges de l’Ecole Francaise de Rome, 120/1, 2008, pp. 173–188. Regarding the evidence of instances when officials and neighbourhoods coincide, two notarial acts from 1461 and 1464 record a catapan and a magister excumbiarum for each neighbourhood; VENTURA, Randazzo, p.61.

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Crown’s representative. It is quite likely, however, that with the exception of a few rare instances noted in notarial sources, the royal representative merely examined the names which had been chosen at the local level.120 The election, from which officials elected in the two previous annual sessions were excluded, was to be held in the presence of the outgoing officials and the probi homines (viros probos in 1311), whereby it can be deduced that the latter constituted the electoral college.121 This argument is validated in Randazzo by the petition of [1407] for the election by the universitas of eight boni homini to perform the scrutiny who did not belong to the category of officials to be elected. In the early 1400s, elections were held in Randazzo by the officiales et alios probos adiunctos.122 What needs to be determined is who was responsible for appointing the probi homines/adiunctos, (adjuncts who were the members of the electoral college). A 1407 Palermitan senate act seems to indicate that it was the officials’ duty: “adjuncts to prepare the zeduli [ballot papers] for the scrutiny and elected by the noble praetor, judges and jurats”.123 Because of the way in which the electoral college was constituted, this is a document that explicitly recalls what Frederick III had stipulated in 1311, namely, an operation performed solely by the outgoing officials. Unfortunately, this same information cannot be compared to Frederick IV’s instructions to the royal official in charge of overseeing the scrutiny because the instructions do not specify whether the officials alone participated in the selection of those responsible for the election. Regardless, according to the royal approval of Randazzo’s petition, the possibility cannot be rejected that the officials made their selections from a list prepared ahead of time. In order, however, to better ascertain the actual events, a further examination of subsequent documentation is necessary. En passant, it is interesting to note the use of the word zeduli in the act of 1407, which confirms the custom examined earlier of writing candidates’ names on slips of paper. For a more in-depth investigation of the matter, some later documents to take into consideration include a decree by Viceroy Nicola Speciale in 1423, and another by 120 COSENTINO sustains instead that the Crown’s representative chose the electors; COSENTINO, p. 227, p. 229, 1356. 121 “Scriptum est notario Nicola Cunicolo de Messana, in sua curia officii prothonotarius notario, familiari et fideli suo etc.

De fide sufficiencia et legalitate tuis nostra excellentia confidente, et ad facienda scrutinia de officialibus in civili civitatum Pactarum, Cephaludi et Mazarie ac terrarum Trapani, Montis Sancti Iuliani, Marsalie, Calataphimi, Licate et Thermarum, recepto prius a te fidelitatis et ipsorum scrutineorum bene legaliter et fideliter faciendorum corporali et debito ad sancta dei evangelia giuramento, duximus statuendum. Quare fidelitati tue commictimus et mandamus, ut ad civitates et terras predictas personaliter te conferens, duodecim viros fideles nostros de unaquaque civitatum et terrarum ipsarum sufficentes, ydoneos et prosperi status regni nostri ac rei puplice zelatores, non milites, non barones, non pheudatarios, non stipendiarios curie nostre, non familiares magnatum militum vel baronum, ad te clam et secreto facias auctoritate presencium accersiri, et sub religione prestanda per eos ad sancta dei evangelia iuramenti . . . singulos officiales eligi facias ad infrascripta officia in numero competenti, videlicet: Baiulos in illis ex eisdem civitatibus et terris ubi creari per modum scrutinii extitit hactenus consuetum, iudices licteratos si numerus licteratorum suffecerit, iuratos, acathapanos, notarios actorum, thesaurarios, notarios iuratorum, magistros xurte, quos vocant alicubi capixurte, de sufficientioribus et magis aptis fidelibus atque ydoneis ad officia memorata; militibus, baronibus, pheudatariis, stipendiariis nostre curie, atque familiaribus ut supra . . . iniungens electoribus ipsis quod ad suspectos et minus ydoneos per affecionem aliquam non declinent; cuius electionis scrutiniis cum cedulis eligencium singulorum per te habitus et receptis . . . convocatis et presentibus in loco ad id apto capitaneo, Baiulo, iudicibus et iuratis dicti anni proximo elapse octave indictionis, vel illis ex eis qui dicta officia nunc exercent, aliisque probis hominibus . . . mictas sortes . . . caves attente ne super aliquos ex hiis, qui fuerunt officiales eorumdem annorum septime et octave indicionum proximo preteritarum, mictas sortes, super nominatas”; COSENTINO, pp. 165–167, 1356 For other cases, ibidem, pp. 211–212, pp. 227–288, 1356. The duration of the mandate is not really clear, but an examination of the scrutinies during Frederick IV’s reign, would lead one to believe that the principle of the duration of the administrative year from 1 September to 31 August (an indiction), had been settled; ibidem, p. 10, November 1355 (Caltagirone); pp. 236–237, September 1356 (Castiglione, Francavilla); p. 239, September 1356 (Randazzo); p. 395, September 1357 (Agira). 122 R. C. vol. 46, fol. 415r. 123 Acta, XII, p. 164.

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Presidents of the Kingdom Pietro Felice and Adamo Asmundo in 1433,124 and a number of 1426 petitions from Catania, which are not recorded as having been received by the Crown.125 The 1423 decree, promulgated by the “magnificu signuri Viceré cum deliberacione regii consilio”, is a regula (regulation) rather than a simple confirmation of former practices.126 The text notes that the Viceroy was to order the commissioner, Antonio Guarino, to summon the judges, the jurats and the other officials assigned to perform the scrutinies. The officials would then declare how many “adjuncts (adiuncti) were needed in that city or terra”, and appoint a number of adiuncti equal to triple that of the officials responsible for the scrutiny. It is not specified that the officials were to elect these electors, so they might even have appointed them from a list drafted by others. Following this, the commissioner extracted names to select the required number of electors, and finally, the chosen electors carried out the scrutiny together with the officials according to the manner or custom of the city or territory where it was held. The royal representative was not to influence the election in any way.127 At first glance, an appointment of the adiuncti or aiunti (adjuncts) by the officials does not seem logical. If the officials chose the electors, it would not make sense that the officials did not just perform the elections themselves. And in any case, even if the election had been the responsibility of the officials alone, as recorded in Troina in 1511,128 the different phases in the process must be taken into account, i.e., first the officials’ choice from a substantial configuration of candidates, and then a drawing from among those names by the Commissioner. These are steps that reduce the direct control of the officials over the candidates, and may explain why only the officials appointed the adiuncti. This is a topic to which I shall return shortly. Finally, the reference to the possibility of carrying out the scrutiny “iuxta consuetudinem vel usum illius civitatis vel terre” indicates that election procedures could be decided, at least in part, on a local level. The Catanian petitions of 1426 regarding the selection of the city officials, reveal a different procedure for appointing the electoral commission from that which had been established by Viceroy Nicola Speciale.129 The first part of the petitions state that all the officials insembla (a term ordinarily used when referring to town councils) who were to elect the adiuncti. Note, additionally, the reference to the mastra, or list of those eligible for election, that the officials would have compiled.130 In the final petition, which summarizes the electoral method, the prescribed procedures reveal a more detailed process than the one that had been described in the first petition. It would seem, despite the confusing information, that the officials chose names along with the adiuncti for the election of yet other adiuncti, and all together they would have formed the final electoral commission. 124 The 1423 text was promulgated in light of the coming election in a number of centres; P. R. vol. 25, fols 168v-169r. The one in 1433 had to do only with the city of Trapani; P. R. vol. 33, fol. 112r. For Nicola Speciale, see ENNIO I. MINEO, “Gli Speciale: Nicola Viceré e l’affermazione politica della famiglia”, in Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale, 79, 1983, pp. 287–371. 125 GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 2, 3–4, p. 371. 126 P. R. vol. 25, fols 168v. 127 P. R. vol. 25, fol. 168v. 128 SORRENTI, Le istituzioni, p. 122 n. 48. 129 GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 2, 3–4, p. 371. 130 The mastre will be discussed in Section 5.2.

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The possibility of such a double commission has a precedent, which I have already examined in Frederick III’s 1311 decree, according to which the outgoing jurats and judges were to have chosen four probi homines per neighbourhood together with whom they would then have elected six viros probos, again per neighbourhood, who would have selected the candidates. Why the electoral commission was not made up of only the officials, or at least the officials along with the first adiuncti, is not evident in this case either. I think that, once again, the explanation lies in the fact that the breakdown into several successive phases was an attempt to avoid the direct control that might have occurred more easily if the officials had managed the composition of the electoral college during every step of the process. Even though some of the information offered by the Catanian petitions is unclear, persons other than the officials undoubtedly participated in the electoral commission.131 Of great interest is a 1433 intervention formulated by Presidents Pietro Felice and Adamo Asmundo in response to electoral fraud recorded in Trapani. The Presidents denounce the collusion between the officials and the aiunti (or adiuncti) prior to the elections regarding the eligibility of candidates. In the document, they also recall that the aiunti were elected, but without specifying by whom, and that they helped the officials to prepare the slips of paper with written names for the drawing. The solution determined by the Presidents called for the number of aiunti to be greater than the number of the officials, as well as the absolute prohibition of communication between the two groups during the scrutiny.132 At this point, given the authority of the 1433 presidential instructions, it is impossible to imagine that a solution to the problem could have been simply an increase in the number of adjuncts, while leaving intact the supposed right of the officials to choose the electors. It seems to me more likely that the prevention of fraud—by increasing the number of the electors and thus rendering the possibility of rapid collusion between the officials at the moment of the election more difficult—was possible precisely because the aiunti were not chosen by the officials, or at least not only by them. Indeed, there exists a request by Randazzo in 1407 for an election of the adiuncti by the universitas.133 As for the question of who chose the electors, one must first of all keep in mind that it was certainly possible to adapt the general procedures to the local customs and allow differences to exist among the various communities. For example, the documentation of the Alphonsian period exhibits elements that do not correspond completely to the 1407 Palermitan act in which there is a list of the “adjuncts needed in that city or terra”. In this act the selection of the adjuncts seems to be the sole responsibility of the officials and there is no reference to the appointment of other commissions. What was stipulated for Palermo cannot be applied universally, however, because in other communities it is recorded that the

131 It should be said that MATTEO GAUDIOSO, “Il Castello Ursino nella vita pubblica catanese del sec. XV”, in Bollettino

storico catanese, 3, 1940, pp. 212–213, holds (but not in reference to the text of the 1426 petition) that the method of a scrutiny was the result of a co-optation on the part of ten outgoing officials along with others elected by those officials. A partial modification was recorded in 1459 but the 1470 reform, which was of greater consequence, instituted a balance of representation among the electors: the civic council elected thirty gentilomini and thirty popolari who in turn would elect the persons charged with carrying out the scrutiny; ibidem, p. 216. 132 P. R. vol. 33, fol. 112r. For a confirmation of the fact the the cedolarii were not individuals belonging to the category of the officials, see the request by the jurats of Malta that Angaro Desguanes and Francesco Desguanes, who do not appear to have held any office, provide the cedole for the realization of the scrutiny; Acta iuratorum, p. 128, 1459. 133 R. C. vol. 46, fol. 415r.

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duties of the officials were sometimes discharged by others. In Catania, for example, the councillors acted as cedolarii (members of the electoral commission who prepared the slips of paper with the candidates’ names) and voted on the candidates (rendering it possible that there were councillors among the adiuncti cited in the 1426 capitoli for Catania).134 Additionally, the town council in Malta decided to prolong the mandate of the captain while waiting for the royal confirmation of election results and the selection of the cedolarii also fell to the Maltese council.135 In Caltagirone the council elected the cedolarii as well, but at a later stage, following 1483.136 Thus, even on the basis of the information examined earlier, it could be argued that the cedolarii and the adiuncti are one and the same. Moreover, an inclusion of persons other than those eligible for election by scrutiny to public office in the decision-making process within local politics has been recorded from the very beginning of the Aragonese dominion. Take, for instance, during Frederick IV’s reign, a 1352 Syracusan act regarding the role of the council alongside the judges and jurats “per omnia et singola ipsius universitatis negotia”.137 In this regard, it is a good idea to open a parenthesis in order to question whether or not to accept the council and electoral body as one and the same, given that each of the political entities had the same number of members at the time—twelve.138 The assertion that the Syracusan council and the electoral colleges were the same during the reign of Federico IV (and confirmed only once during the reign of Martin), based on an assumption that both were composed of an identical number of officials, is not plausible because it does not take into account the differing number of councillors in various urban centres, or the fact that Syracusan council had thirty members towards the mid-1300s. In the case discussed earlier of Catania in 1444, a portion of the councillors were cedolarii. I think, instead, that the selection of the adiuncti actually fell to the council, most likely in collaboration with the officials. Furthermore, during Alphonso’s

134 G. G., pp. 172–173, 1444 (Catania). Compare RISINO, Il regesto, pp. 224–227. 135 Acta iuratorum, pp. 180–181, 1461; pp. 445–446, 1472. 136 PACE, Il governo, p. 124. In 1542, during a political phase of exclusion from public office benefiting “gintilhomini et

figli [sons] di gintilhomini”, the system used in Piazza was instituted in Caltagirone whereby the outgoing officials and the jurats from the previous year acted as cedolarii. The 1542 reform is interesting because it is an innovation with respect to previous procedures involving the participation of the council. This reform was also adopted by the community of Noto a few years later, in 1547, after a complaint to Viceroy Giovanni de Vega from the Mayor and Ambassador of Noto regarding the execution of the scrutiny, carried out by the candidates for the posts themselves, with disastrous results. The Viceroy subsequently established that the system used in Piazza and Caltagirone be employed in Noto as well, with electoral colleges chosen by the officials. It goes without saying that the participation of the officials alone, given that the recorded fraud was a unique case, constituted an innovation in the electoral system. Additional confirmation of town council participation in selecting the electoral college comes from an intervention by the Viceroy in 157. After verifying the inefficiency of the electoral system assigned to the officials, he established a further reform in ordering them to assemble the council (congreghi il solito consiglio)—a phrase invoking past procedures. The council was to elect four virtuous persons who, together with the officials, were to execute the scrutiny. There is a brief mention of the procedures employed in Caltagirone in PACE, Il governo, pp. 124–125. For a transcription of the measures for Noto that recall the electoral systems in other communities, see RISINO, Il regesto, pp. 180–181, 224–227. 137 The document is published by GREGORIO, “Considerazioni”, II, pp. 170–171. In its description of the transformation of the council, the act gives evidence of council operations over the ten preceding years. It recalls the “laudabilem observantiam et consuetudine approbata . . . omnia et singola ipsius universitatis negotia de consilio duodecim proborum una cum iudicibus et iuratis civitatis eiusdem comuniter tractabantur et quicquid eosdem duodecim probos cum dictis officialibus concorditer, vel de maioris aut senioris partis assensu circa negotia supradicta contingebat terminari, debitam obtinebat roboris firmitatem”. The later reform increasing the number of councillors to over thirty proved detrimental to the functioning of the council, which led the Crown to re-establish the former composition of twelve members. 138 A theory put forth by Mineo in MINEO, “Città”, p. 127 n. 56. Gregorio had claimed that the electors were the same as the members of the town council; GREGORIO, “Considerazioni”, II, p. 173. The twelve electors stipulated in the measures by Martin I indicate an upper limit. The Royal Commissioner was to convene a duodecim infra, so there could have been even fewer; P. R. vol. 16, fol. 19r-v, 1404 (cities and terre of the Kingdom); Acta, XII, p. 151, 1407.

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reign, council legislation is abundant in the city of Palermo for the appointment of adiuncti to execute deliberations,139 although the adiuncti’s nomination is not documented for scrutinies. This lack of records referring to electoral commissions for Palermo’s scrutiny does not negate the plausibility of the idea as put forth thus far: in light of the fact that the commissions were convened only once a year, it is not surprising that there is no record of them. Nor should differences in the composition of the electoral colleges during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, or among the various communities, be ignored. This issue settled, John II’s 1459 directive, which established a new procedure with separate lists of candidates for the Catania universitas, is illuminating. He made references to past normative procedures, including the duty of the town council to elect “viri nobiles, graviores, idoneiores, et virtuosiores, maioris reputationis” to administer the scrutiny.140 From the time that scrutinies were enacted systematically, from the early 1400s, exclusion from elected government posts was never recorded by the universitates. It would have been more likely had the officials had complete control over the elections.141 In my opinion such debarment was not recorded for two reasons. For one, the level of indirect cooptation on the part of the officials was tightly controlled (for example, through the drawings for the adiuncti) and, more importantly, because the balance of power between the socio-professional groups remained unchanged from the beginning of the Alphonsian reign.142 With regard to the latter, it must first be remembered that the selection of representatives for the city government resulted from a complex interplay of pressures exerted by the different socio-professional sectors. Even in the event that the officials were the only people in the electoral commission, the possibility of preclusion was highly unlikely. From the end of Alphonso’s reign, the elected officials represented the different socio-professional groups, and these officials automatically formalized relationships of existing forces through their choices.143 This information seems to indicate that the duty of coordinating and performing the elections rested with both the councillors and the officials. It is still necessary, of course, to shed light on the relationships of power existing between the officials and councillors. Not directly related to the procedure of the scrutiny, it is an issue that will be taken into consideration later, during an analysis of the institutional balances between the councils and other levels of government.

139 For example: C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 57r-58v, 1449; fols 98r-100r, 1450. For a comparison, consider Barcelona where the regular council was distinct from a smaller one for special tasks, the same as in the other major cities of the Principality. As an outline for the administrative framework and electoral procedures in Barcelona, it should be remembered that after 1274 the basic structure of the municipal government was made up of five consiliarii (called jurados, consules, etc. in other centres) with directional functions, who collaborated with the vicarius and baiulus (royal officials veguer/batlle) in government affairs and held executive powers for measures enacted by the legislative body, the Consell de Cent. In addition, there was a small Consell (as for the other major cities) which was a restricted commission of the Consell de Cent for attending to urgent business. Election proceedings were as follows: the one hundred prohombres elected from among their numbers a twelve-member commission to appoint the consiliarii. The one hundred prohombres were then appointed, subject to the veguer and batlle’s approval, by the councillors in office that year. Gradually, during the mid-fifteenth century, a balance of representation developed in the Consell de Cent among the various socio-professional groups; Rius, Origenes, p. 385 and n. 871, p. 418, and p. 421; SOBREQUÉS CALLICÓ, “L’Estat”, pp. 70–72; CARME BATLLE GALLART, “El govern municipal a la Baixa Edat Mitjana”, in El govern de les ciutats catalanes, Barcelona, 1985, pp. 62–67; BATLLE GALLART, “El municipio”, pp. 203–211. 140 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVII, p. 492. 141 A hypothesis that will be argued in Section 5.2. 142 Information that will be discussed in Chapter 5. 143 An aspect that will be examined more thoroughly in Section, 2.3, regarding the town councils.

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Finally, a further aspect of the elections needs to be examined, one that concerns relationships of power between the sovereign and local governments in the event that a sovereign should intervene to make a selection from among those who had been chosen in an election. Such an intervention was not documented in the 1398 royal ratification of the elected officials,144 nor in the 1407 instructions to Consalvo de Sibila who was told “ad faciendum scrutineum officialium in civili”, in as much as the local electoral college was to choose the electors, and neither the sovereign nor his representative would have had any part to play in the selection of the names, only for their subsequent ratification.145 In any case, there exists some evidence indicating that the sovereign had the possibility of choosing from a shortlist of winners in a scrutiny, but this does not constitute proof of any significant royal influence, considering that the entire list of names corresponded to the will of the people. It is true, of course, that the sovereign could favour one faction over another through such a choice, but royal concessions were characterized by the appointment of individuals from a cross-section of all the various sectors of society.146 Moreover, the choice from a shortlist of names probably did not concern all offices, only certain positions determined through negotiated agreements. In the Catanian petitions of 1426, the Crown had the right, under extraordinary circumstances in wartime, to choose the elected official from among the candidates in the scrutiny, irregardless of the number of votes they received.147 In 1433, the Agrigento universitas requested the extraordinary privilege of electing the captain in a scrutiny by indicating several names for the sovereign to choose from.148 This is a reference to examine with caution. In fact, it is possible that the proposed method of indicating several candidates did not reflect a normal procedure in the scrutiny, but an attempt to find a point of compromise in the selection of an official that was traditionally appointed by the sovereign. Whereas in the same community, the notary in the civil curia was chosen: “solet singulis annis suffragiis sive scortinis civium agrigentorum eligi et ex tribus per eosdem electi et magnifico viceregi nostro in dicto regno Siciliae ulteriori propositis per eumdem viceregem unus confirmari solitus sit”.149 The Corleonese community indicated in 1434 that all the officials, meaning those traditionally elected, should be selected by scrutiny. In truth, the reference was specifically aimed towards the acatapanatum, since it was stipulated that the candidates be persons di abeni poviri et antique (persons poor in property and antique persons), a generalized phrase that is richly complex, seeming to indicate neither poor nor wealthy, but rather those individuals who were not marginal members of the community. The sovereign approved the request with one condition, that he be able to choose his desired candidate from among those who had been selected in the scrutiny.150 No reference was made to past instances of such a royal prerogative, nor was there any in Alphonso V’s placet of Piazza’s 1448 petition

144 “Recepto noviter quodam scrutinio per sindicos vestros super creandis officialibus de novo pro anno presenti VII indicionis, tandem per magestatem nostram cum deliberacione nostri consilio pro dicto anno presenti infrascriptos officiales fuerunt et sunt electi”; Acta, XI, pp. 43–44. 145 Acta, XII, pp. 150–151. 146 Regarding this issue, see Section 3.5. 147 GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 2, 3–4, p. 371. 148 G. G. p. 299. The meaning of Alphonso’s placet is not clear. He granted the post to the Agrigentans as requested, but refers only indirectly to the petition regarding the scrutiny in saying “concedatur civibus Agrigenti cui ex eis dicte maiestati placebit”; ibidem, p. 299. 149 R. C. vol. 89, fols 240v-241v. 1453. 150 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 179.

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cited earlier regarding the possibility of the sovereign’s choosing from among the elected: “placet regie mayestati cum moderatione quod id dicitur in presenti capitulo de quatuor vocibus reducatur ad tres hoc est quod tres voces habentes suo casu vicerex possit elligere seu acceptare”.151 That the sovereign’s selection might concern only certain posts agreed upon in negotiations with the local governments, finds confirmation in John II’s reply to the 1472 petition from Palermo’s universitas for the re-establishment of the elections per scarfias—elections that had not been held in recent years. The community recalled that they should reinitiate the scrutiny procedures, counting the votes and writing the names of those individuals who had received the highest number on slips of paper (polise) which would be put into a bag (birricta). Thereupon a child would extract the winner’s name. The sovereign, on the other hand, indicated that those selected in the scrutiny would in turn, elect three people whose names were to be written on the polise, placed in the bag and drawn by lot.152 Therefore, for the Palermitan officials, the Crown’s intervention was limited to deciding that three names be chosen from among those elected in the scrutiny, with one of those names to be chosen in a drawing by lot. In this case as well, John II does not make any reference to past normative procedures or customs. Since this royal right to intervene could vary according to the office involved, it is important to note that the privilege was, in effect, a mere formality. More critical was the Crown’s right to appoint officials ex gratia,153 vital during Martin I’s reign due to the large number of officials involved and the offices to be filled, but decidedly less so during the reign of Alphonso V, which affected fewer officers (usually a catapan and/or a magister xurtae) as well as the number of officers involved (normally only one a year).154 One could claim that such ex gratia positions were those decided by the sovereign between scrutinies. However, this conclusion is unsustainable, or not always valid, considering the fact that there exist numerous examples of ex gratia concessions granted before the execution of scrutinies. Even with regard to this royal privilege, it is not possible to posit significant royal interference because the concessions were quite limited, only as requested by the universitates. Furthermore, in most cases, they did not benefit persons outside the local sphere of power relations, and were often in response to requests by local leaders such as the familiares et domestici regis.155 To be sure, it is not possible to explicate every aspect of the electoral proceedings, but without question, the town council participated in the proceedings, and so did other people including those elected. The councillors’ participation indicates that the scrutiny’s proceedings were affected by indirect pressures arising from different socio-professional sectors.156 Indeed, the limited possibility of the Crown to choose officials reveals the value that the community placed on the right to elect their own officials and to preserve that right without limitations. 151 152 153 154 155 156

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Consuetudines, fol. 54r-v. DE VIO, Felicis, p. 387. An aspect that will be examined in Sections 3.5 and 5.2. See TITONE, I magistrati. On ex gratia concessions prior to a scrutiny, and on the participation of royal dignitaries, see Section 3.5. Regarding this aspect, see Section 2.3.

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2.3

The Town Councils

Even though it can be sustained that elements of continuity existed for government bodies in urban communities during periods under Crown rule and during the viceregal period, there was not complete uniformity throughout the various eras. Town council activity was evident from the earliest years of the Aragonese reign and up to 1377, in both large and small urban centres, as they took on an ever increasing frontline role in government affairs. During the viceregal period, on the other hand, it can be assumed that the great magnates operated aided only by their own limited entourage, which would explain why, in the early years of the Crown’s rentreé, the council system was rarely put into practice. An indirect confirmation of this theory comes from John II’s 1460 capitulum referring to the feudal vassals’ request to their lord for recourse to the council whose functioning was in fact directed by the dominus.157 The lord’s control is probably the reason feudal universitates appealed less frequently to this institution. Infrequent assemblies in the feudal centres of Petralia during the Middle Ages, for instance, and Castelvetrano and Marsala during the 1500s, seem to indicate council activity was not crucial to government policy. In Petralia there are no known minutes. In Castelvetrano throughout the entire sixteenth century only eighteen sessions were held, with the first in 1516 and three by order of Prince Charles of Aragon and Tagliavia. In Marsala there were about ten with the earliest session in 1520.158 These sporadic encounters, as well as a capitulum by John II, confirm what emerged during the viceregal period. Thus, rather than a complete absence of council activity in non-demesne cities, the activity was instead circumscribed due to strict seigneurial control.159 Council activity of little consequence during the rule of the great magnates is indirectly proven by the first petitions emanated during Martin’s reign reflecting precise institutional operations. These petitions were most probably the result of requests by the leading officials, or at least very restricted sectors of the community, and no mention is made of a council body. The single petitions, moreover, refer to general subjects and do not seem to result from any confrontation between

157 “Item supplicat universitas totius regni sacrae maiestati, quod vassalli Marchionum, Comitum, et Baronum dicti regni aliqua quacumque causa non possint, sine licentia, et consensu eorundem, se ipsos congregare, nec consilium facere, sub poena confiscationis bonorum omnium, applicandorum praedictis Marchionibus, Comitibus, et Baronibus: accidere enim solent multoties ex dictis congregationibus scandala praedictis terris: et quod casu, quo non voluerint obtinere licentiam a praedictis, possint recurrere ad dominus Viceregem. Placet regem maiestati, quod dicti vassalli sine consensu dominorum, non possint simul congregari universaliter, ut consilium faciant sine licentia regiae maiestatis, aut viceregis pro tempore existentis in regno. Verum, si Viceregi visum fuerit interesse concerni Baronis, non concedat licentiam, nisi prius audito Barone verbo”; TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum LXIV, p. 464. 158 FRANCESCO FIGLIA, Poteri e società in un comune feudale, Caltanissetta-Rome, 1990, pp. 197–221, the earliest documented session was in 1614; ibidem, p. 200; GIANNI DIECIDUE, “I consigli civici a Castelvetrano nei secoli XVIXVII: Elenco dei consigli e delle lettere viceregie di conferma”, in Archivio Storico Siciliano, 3rd. s. 16, 1965–1966, pp. 139–141; Libro Rosso, pp. 47–48, pp. 77–79, pp. 121–124, pp. 172–175, pp. 196, pp. 212–218, pp. 220–225, pp. 248–252, pp. 277–278. 159 The council was actually functioning, albeit with the differences pointed out above, and precious evidence of this exists concerning the earldom of Modica where in 1541–2, Governor Bernardo del Nero had the “statuta, capitula, ordinationes et pandecte totius comitatus Mohac” drawn up. It contains a specific reference to the council. Prior to 1541, it was established procedure for the universitas “when there is something important to decide [. . .] to summon lots of people to a general assembly”, but such a gathering did not guarantee orderliness. The Governor instituted a reform whereby the general council would elect twelve councillors who would take charge of the administration together with the jurats; Statuti e capitoli, p. 67.

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diverse factions. These are not characteristic of documents elaborated by a council. The great majority of council documents sought mediation, employed specific measures to distinguish between different appeals, or additionally expressed factional interests which left traces in the text of the petition itself. From the end of the 1390s the political picture gradually altered: the universitas completely reclaimed its privileges and customary rights, reactivated every level of government and, consistent with the broad autonomy it exercised, extended decisionmaking to the entire community precisely through the civic council. From time to time a conspicuous debate came to light between officials and individuals outside of the magistracies, which took place in the council, sponsor of petitions and body responsible for choosing the syndics. A useful means for retracing the full reinstatement of the council in its institutional context is the progressive development of municipal rhetoric in the texts of petitions which provides evidence of how the orientation in negotiations with the Crown during Martin I’s reign did not depend solely on the two major curiae.160 An analysis of the texts of the petitions in terms of their form and stylistic elements will be helpful, guided by the very language of the petitions. Beginning in the second half of the 1390s, this language is characterized by a significant mutation of two aspects of the style and form. The first is the presence of exordia (arenga) and the second is a reference in the headings to the cities’ assemblies as sponsors of the petitions. Furthermore, a comparison between municipal appeals in vernacular and royal requests in Latin reveals a gradual, albeit partial, assumption or imitation by the governed of the rhetorical styles of those who governed. This was achieved at times by employing a more studied use of the vernacular, and generally, by institutionalizing the terminology, without which the effectiveness of communication would otherwise have been greatly reduced.161 Such aspects are not only a matter of style: these distinctive characteristics in the documentation reflect new political-institutional balances created by the rehabilitation of the council’s full functional capacity. Frequently, although not systematically, the sponsors’ interest in correctly drafting the petition was evident. The form could draw attention to the petitions’ authors while extolling the figure of the sovereign through an emphasis on expressions of deference and the use of rhetorical devices—an ars retorica that in many cases exposes the cultural level of the authors. The introduction to the 1397 petitions of Calascibetta is noteworthy. It requested, among other things, a pardon for the community involved in the rebellion against the Crown. The universitas addressed the Sovereign as follows: Sacre regie maiestati post humilem et devotam recomandacionem et terre osculum ante pedes devoto corde et humili mente pro parte universitatis terre vestre Calaxibecte exponitur, quatenus dignetur predicta maiestas eandem universitatem in vestro gremio suscipere commendatam [. . .] Domine labia mea aperies et os meum annunciabit

160 For the early 1300s, Mineo emphasizes the absence of municipal rhetoric in the local customaries; MINEO, “Norme”,

pp. 394–395. 161 For a comparison, see Pocock, Politica, especially Chapters 3, 5, and 7.

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laudem tuam. Convenit ergo predicta laus maiestati prelibate ut aperiat aure set suscipiat preces filie vestre predicte universitatis, et non respiciat predicta maiestas ad errore set delicta predicte universitatis, quia fuerunt generalia et communia. Sed credit vestram maiestatem tanta clemencia habuntari, quod extinguet omnes errore set eius delicta, et de hoc plene confidit quia vestra serenitas non habet aculeum et ideo aperta voce clamat mansuetudinem vestram et dicit miserere mei domine filii David quia peccavi et ideo confidet in vestram serenitatem quia mansuetudinem David habetis iuxta illud [. . .] Et ideo flexibus genibus humiliter prelibati serenitati suplicat, quod tam in generali quam in speciali tandem universitatem restituatis in integrum et ita sibi viam aperiatis ut alie civitates et ville recipiunt exemplum de vestra benignitate per infrascripta capitula humiliter ipsa petit.162

This passage is unique in its profusion and the artifice of its metaphors, but a more stylistically restrained version recurred, nevertheless, in the texts of other petitions.163 The ars retorica was also evidence of a diplomatic strategy which normally introduced petitions of particular importance and initiated a lengthy process of negotiations with the Crown.164 It is reasonable to assume that petitions featuring a peculiar formality could only reinforce relations between the Crown and those who formulated the requests. The universitas Calaxibecte presented the petitions in the case under examination, but the question of who represented the abstract body of the universitas in drafting the entreaties remains to be established. A specification that the petitions were deliberated per universitatem, or by the assembled universitas, if present, appears to constitute a link to the town council. This is not to imply a tout court identification between the universitas and the council, but rather that in some matters, especially in negotiations with the Crown, in issuing petitions, and in appointing the syndics, phrases such as “universitas congregata; per universitatem; universitas hominum; capitula edita et tradita per universitatem”, lead one to imagine a citizens’ assembly meeting to debate and decide on behalf of the entire community. These are contexts in which the council’s operation

162 G. G., p. 23. 163 R. C. vol. 33, fol. 120v, 1399 (Trapani); G. G., p. 248, 1401 (Agrigento); within the context of the output of peti-

tions, a precedent dating back to 1392 must be pointed out, G. G., p. 41 (Caltagirone). Regarding examples of definite identification of the authors of petitions, see G. G., p. 339, 1401 (Lentini), and R. C. vol. 46, fol. 302v, 1407 (Noto). In comparison, see the data regarding a city’s self-celebration in municipal documents, in RUBIO VELA, “Valencia: La conciencia”, pp. 231–254. See GEOFFREY G. KOZIOL, “The Early History of Rites of Supplication”, in Suppliques, pp. 21–36, for an interpretation according to which the petitiones, from the Carolingian period up to the Renaissance, share a common language characterized by precise symbolism. The petitioners were not requesting a right, but aiming to secure royal grace, and the framing and presentation of the request, and the grant itself corresponded to this conception, referring from a rhetorical point of view to liturgical language—the medieval petition as a prayer to the sovereign-God. From the acts, Suppliques, see also CHARLES VULLIEZ, “L’ars dictaminis et sa place dans la préhistoire médiévale de la requête écrite” in Suppliques, pp. 89–102, on the ars dictaminis commonly found in requests for clemency characterized by a complex elaboration. Regarding writing as ritual, see also OLIVIER MATTÉONI, “Plaise au roi”, in Suppliques, pp. 281–296; the acts, FIANU KOUKY & J. GUTH DELLOYD, (eds.), “Écrit et pouvoir dans les chanchelleries médiévales: espace français, espace anglais”, in Actes du colloque international de Montréal, 7–9 septembre 1995, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1997, and PAOLA REPETTI, “Scrivere ai potenti: Suppliche e memoriali a Parma (secoli XVI-XVIII). Lo Stato, la giustizie, la supplica”, in Scrittura e Civiltà, 24, 2000, pp. 295–318. 164 On the importance of reconstructing the linguistic sphere in order to understand the history of political thought and to be treated as history of political language, see Pocock, Politica, Chapters 1, 5, and 7. For an interpretation of the relationship between rhetoric and history, see ANTONY HOSTEIN, “Histoire et rhétorique: Rappels historiographiques et état des lieux”, in Hypothèses 2002. Travaux de l’école doctorale d’histoire, Paris, 2003, pp. 221–234, which includes an extensive bibliography.

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might be specified.165 References are normally made in the documents to the role of the officials and the universitas but not the council. The activity of others besides the officials is mentioned, but no indication is made to the parts played by single components, i.e. the council, which acted on behalf of the community. In other words, government activity is ascribed to the universitas represented, and not to those who represented it, except for the annually elected officials.166 It will be shown, nevertheless, how in instances of documentation that went beyond generic rhetorical formulas to indicate more specifically the levels of government, the council was also mentioned. An analysis of the composition of delegations assigned to carry out negotiations with the Crown and those who chose them will provide useful insight into the role of the town council during the reigns of Martin I and Alphonso V. It was not always indicted who the representatives of the universitas were and this complicates the task of identifying the authors of the petitions. In this regard, consideration can be given to the appointment of the syndic who was not included among the officials elected by scrutiny but selected by the council to negotiate with the sovereign even during the reign Martin of Sicily. The role conferred on the syndic by the universitas was continually specified in the texts of petitions and, even when officials performed the mission, it was indicated that they spoke on behalf of the universitas. This delegation of authority would seem to attest to the expansion of the decision-making arena to include others beyond the category of the elected officials. While civic officials were often present among the envoys of the delegation, an encounter with the Crown might still involve others: individuals not part of the group of the officials. This is a supplementary piece of information which indirectly confirms the participation of a municipal assembly even though not explicitly stated. In 1401, Sciacca’s petitions were submitted not only by Giovanni Aropuli, whose position is unknown, but also by consoci sindici.167 In this case the “consoci sindici” were representatives of that portion of the assembly not associated with the officials (when the latter were present among the envoys, their names and /or positions were always recorded) and this lent 165 Petitions in the community of Noto were assigned to the syndics and their commission from the universitas received prominence in the headings: “capitula edita per la universitatem terre Nothi tradita et assegnata magistro Iohanni Dretta ordinis fratrum minorum Sacce teologie diserto ac nobili et egregio domino Vassallu di Landolina militi et Antonio Salonia sindici constitutis et debite ordinatis per eandem universitatem ad omnia et singula infrascripta deferenda tradendo et assignanda per eos . . .”; R. C. vol. 27, fol. 27r-v, [1396]. The petitions in Trapani speak of “supplicaciones edite per iuratos universitatis Trapani una cum consilio universitatis eiusdem”; R. C. vol. 38, fol. 105r-v, [1401]. The royal reply to Sciacca’s petitions were sent to the jurats and the universitas; R. C. vol. 38, fol. 260v, 1401. Piazza’s jurats addressed the sovereign on behalf of the universitas; R. C. vol. 38, fol. 261r-v, 1401. In Patti they spoke of capitula commissa to the syndics/ambassadors by universitas, but the sovereign addressed his replies to the jurats and judges alone, most likely due to a special understanding with these officials; R. C. vol. 46, fols 183v-185v, 1406. The role of the council in selecting the syndics could only have been alluded to. Compare, for instance, the confirmation of a royal privilege in favour of Corleone with the heading naming the previously presented petitions: the sovereign granted the privilege referring to the appeals presented “per syndicos dicte universitatis”, while the petitions only indicated that they were “peticiones et gracie petende per universitatem”; STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 140–141, 1397. For a comparison with a different situation, the community of Siena, see ANDREA BARLUCCHI, “Le “petizioni” inviate dalle comunità del contado al governo senese (secoli XIII-XV)”, in Suppliques, pp. 265–279. The author deems it evident, based on the wording of the requests, that the town council was the author; ibidem, p. 271. The syndic was elected by the town council in the Catalan cities of Cervera and Lerida; see TURULL RUBINAT, La configuracíó, p. 310; MAX TURULL RUBINAT, “Síndicos a Cortes: Perfil social e institucional de los representantes ciudadanos a Cortes y Parlamentos en Cataluña (1333–1393)”, in XVII Congresso di storia della Corona d’Aragona, 3 vols, Barcelona-Lleida, 2000, III, pp. 989–1012; ESTHER MARTÍ SENTAÑES, “Els memoriales o instruccions per als síndics a Corts de la ciutat de Lleida durant el Regnat d’Alfons el Magnànim”, in Actes del 53è Congrés de la comissió internacional per a l’estudi de la història de les institucions representatives i parlamentàries, 3–6 settembre 2003, 2 vols, Barcelona 2003, II, pp. 1633–1651; and, in particular, MARTÍ SENTAÑES, Lleida. 166 Concerning the term universitas, see Chapter 1, notes 17 and 18. 167 R. C. vol. 38, fol. 260v.

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greater political strength to the petition submitted owing to the importance derived from the composition of the group presenting it. An emblematic case, which testifies to the role of the council in drafting petitions, concerns the community of Noto in 1407 when the ambassadorial delegation was made up of officials and other non-elected individuals identified as components of the sanioris partis universitatis, namely, members of the council: Capitula edita et facta per universitatem hominum terre Nothi et de comuni consensu sanioris partis universitatis ipsius consulta deliberatione et debito consilio procedentibus tradita et assegnata super in possessione sigilli dicte universitatis nobilibus Prudenti Bellasay iudici Nicolai de Blianti, Renaldo de Notaro Bartholo et notaro Iacobo de Guiso sindicis et ambaxiatoribus per eamdem constitutis et ordinatis ad conferendum se universali nomine quo supra ad sacram regiam magestatem ad supplicandum sibi super subscriptis et destinatis capitulis modo et ordine subscripientibus.168

Further information confirms this balance of institutional relationships. The petitions themselves could result from a clash between different factions putting forward requests revealing factional interests or stem from outright institutional confrontations between the council itself and the officials. This is supported by a series of examples including one in Castroreale, in addition to the one already noted in Randazzo in 1407.169 In Castroreale in 1402, the participation of persons outside the ranks of the officials emerges from an assembly in which the judges, jurats and the universitas took part, and a circumscription of the functions of the jurats was sanctioned.170 Since the jurats themselves were among the sponsors of the petition, one can imagine the heated discussion that must have swept up the parties during the debate. The council meetings (and it would appear the instance in Castroreale implies an assembly) entailed not only voting on motions proposed by the officials but were also the institutional site for confrontations between groups of differing powers. The 1396 petitions of Piazza’s universitas promoted by gentilomini et populari are emblematic. Along with appeals intended for the community’s benefit, there are numerous requests in favour of individuals or groups—clear proof of compromises between differing factions.171 Precisely because it was a political venue reflecting prevailing balances of power, officials could monopolize the council. Furthermore, it is sometimes possible to discern a complete accord between the officials and the majority of the population. Cases in point, from the early Alphonsian period, include two separate sets of petitions sent to the Crown in 1425 and 1430 by the jurats in the community of Nicosia. The subjects of the appeals reveal an understanding between the majority of the citizens and the jurats. In the first instance, the iuratia was granted authorization to force wheat merchants to sell a salma at nine tarí. The wheat was to be warehoused “in magaseno pubblico in sussidiu dicte populi”, 168 R. C. vol. 46, fols 302v-304r. Regarding the prestige of the sanior pars, who could stand in for the majority owing to the

importance attached to it, see the entries Majorité and Sanior Pars in Dictionnaire du vote, eds. PASCAL PERRINEAU & DOMINIQUE REYNIÉ, Paris, 2001, pp. 602–611, pp. 821–822. For the recurring figures of the town “sage” and “wise” in the towns’ literary production, see POLONI, Trasformazioni, pp. 214–215, concerning Pisa. 169 R. C. vol. 46, fols 413v-415v. 170 The jurats would not have been allowed to “sell the produce of public lands”; G. G., pp. 116–118. 171 R. C. vol. 25, fols 23r-24r. As a comparison, consider the council minutes of the federal communities of Valtellina and Valcamonica throughout the 1400s in which genuine debate was the norm; see MASSIMO DELLA MISERICORDIA, Divenire comunità: Comuni rurali, poteri locali, identità sociali e territoriali in Valtellina e nella montagna lombarda nel tardo medioevo, Milan, 2006, pp. 698–714.

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then the jurats would sell it at the same price to the pauperes. In the second case, there were mainly requests for a limitation of the prerogatives of the captain’s curia and a reduction of the community’s fiscal obligations.172 The council’s participation is not always brought to light even in Alphonsian documentary sources. There is often, however, a generic reference to the universitas even for areas that in many cases have also been proven to be the province of the council, in primis the election of the syndics and the drafting of petitions.173 This is an aspect that can be investigated by examining once more the functions of the ambassador, or syndic, whose role as representative of the universitas is aptly described in a document: “the citizens or rather the universitas through the syndic who acts on behalf of the universitas”.174 The institutional confrontation which came about in Trapani in 1447 will provide useful insight regarding the council’s mandate to the ambassador. It should be noted that if a syndic were to act without a mandate from the council, or overstep his mandate, and obtain a royal placet for unauthorized petitions not agreed upon, such a breach of institutional protocol constituted grounds for the community to obtain a retraction of the placet from the sovereign and initiate a renewal of negotiations. Briefly, Guglielmo Crapanzano, Captain of Trapani, and the jurat, Giovanni Abrignano, presented the Sovereign a detailed set of petitions on behalf of the community. On 29 December, 1447, Alphonso V approved a series of petitions, some of which were particularly noteworthy regarding the tax on wine, trade relations with Gaeta, and access to the royal commissioner.175 The Sovereign, in approving the petitons, mentioned Crapanzano’s role while making no explicit reference to the council, naming, instead, the universitas: “per coram nobis per nobilem virum Guillelmum de Crapanzano regium iusticiarum et capitaneum civem sindacum et oratorem et ambassiatorem fidelissime terre nostre Drepani regni nostre sicilie ultra farum oratorio 172 P. R. vol. 28, fols 64v-65r and P. R. vol. 31 fols 22v-24r, respectively. 173 From the following examples, it is possible to construe the council’s role in drafting the texts of petitions and electing

the ambassadors to whom they would be entrusted. Salvatore Palmeri, Jurat spoke “nomine et pro parte civitatis Agrigenti”; G. G. p. 258, 1421. “Capitula presentanda magnifico et potenti domino Nicolao Speciali regni Sicilie viceregi pro parte universitatis civitatis Agrigenti per nobilem Iohannem Bandi et Nicolaum Crixencio ordinatos per eamdem universitatem”; G. G. p. 262, 1423. The group of petitions ftom Salemi’s universitas was presented by “sindicis electis et ordinatis per universitatem”; P. R. vol. 26, fol. 72v, 1423. “Certa capitula facta per ipsam universitatem cum toto consilio tendunt ad servicium sacre regie magestatis et bonum statum dicte universitatis utilitatem ut reparacionem murorum”; P. R. vol. 27, fol. 49r, 1426 (Salemi). “Capitula ordinata per universitatem terre Drepani in loco solito congregato de consilio universitatis eiusdem tradita per eamdem universitatem nobilibus Nicolao Naso Capitano terre eiusdem et Antonio Caro uni ex iuratis ambaxatoribus universitatis”; P. R. vol. 27, fol. 100r-v, 1426. “Capitula ordinata per universitatem terre Drepani more solito congregatam tradita nobilibus Petro dela Serra uni ex iuratis terre predicte et domino Andre de Mararanga militi sindicis terre eiusdem magnificis dominis regni Sicilie viceregibus et obtinenda a prefatis magnificis”; R. C. vol. 59, fols 39r-40v, 1427. “Capitula edita per universitatem terre Drepani more solitam congregatam in ecclesia Sancti Augustini ubi ipsius universitatis negocia solita sunt pertractari tradita nobilibus Iuliano de Sigalesi [elected in the scrutineum as Galefi, R. C. vol. 59, fol. 20r] alteri ex iuratis dicte terre Sindaco per eandem universitatem electo”; R. C. vol. 59, fol. 129r; 1428. “Capitula facta per universitatem terre Salem (habito) super hoc diligenti consilio cum deliberacione deliberata in matri [sic] ecclesia eiusdem terre Sancti Nicolai ubi dicta universitas hactenus et de presenti consilium regi consuevit concernencia honorem serenissimi domini nostri regis Alfonsi ac statum pacificum et utilitatem universitatis eiusdem”; R. C. vol. 59, fols 113v114r, 1429. Petitons ordained by the officials and the universitas: R. C. vol. 69, fol. 90v, 1434 (Patti); “Capitula facta et ordinata per universitatem”, R. C. vol. 69, fol. 102v, 1434 (Sciacca). Giovanni de Provina, Syndic and Smbassador of Noto, presented the petitions drafted by the noble captain, patricius, judges and jurats, petitions that the universitas had “in consilio consueto congregati et in possessione sigilli dicte universitatis tradita et consignata nobili Giovanni de Provina Sindaco et Ambasciatore per eamdem universitatem elicto et costituito”; R. C. vol. 75, fol. 177v, 1439 (Noto). The jurats of Piazza spoke on behalf of the universitas; R. C. vol. 74, fol. 379r, 1439. Election of the syndic by the Maltese council; Acta Iuratorum, pp. 65–66 [n.d., Alphonso’s reign]. 174 G. G. p. 156 (Catania). 175 C. vol. 2858, fols 152v-154r.

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et sindicario nomine et pro parte universitate et hominum dicte terre”. In actual practice, it was the council who drew up petitions. In fact, the following month, the Sovereign replied to a letter from the councillors of Trapani who repudiated Crapanzano’s mandate. The letter argued that they had never given him any authorization and, by virtue of this reasoning, they obtained a reinstatement of the conditions existing prior to the Captain’s mission.176 The intervention of Trapani’s councillors is evidence of the central role they played in negotiating with the Crown, a role that might not be explicitly indicated. Consequently, a reference to the community as a whole (universitas) could conceal the participation of the council which represented them.177 The question of whether the Crown intervened in government at the council level from a normative point of view needs to be determined. It has been maintained that during the early 1300s, there was an attempt to define the institutional profiles of elective positions in city government while an analogous formalization of town council framework was lacking.178 Asserting that the slow pace of this process of formalization was due to poorlydefined rules for participation (an uncertainty also existing into the first half of the 1400s) would not take into account certain characteristics of the institution that justify the absence of strict rules surrounding it. Furthermore, this does not mean that the council did not have a clear-cut institutional configuration: it worked regularly, in fact, on specific topics, contributing to the enhancement of urban autonomy and playing an increasingly incisive role in government relations. The hypothesis I intend to corroborate is that rules for participation were intentionally vague in order to assure the council’s efficient functioning. Despite the absence of regulations regarding participation by council members, the obligation to obey the summons for certain debates has been recorded. This is borne out by the systematic involvement of the council in debates on certain affairs even under Martin I and Alphonsian statutes had provided for it. Measures by Frederick III, as well as Martin I, specified that the council should meet to make decisions on affairs of a general nature: “si forte qualitas negotii in ipsi mandatis seu licteris contentis exegerit” (1309); circa rei publice et gubernationem (1398).179 Notwithstanding the vagueness of the Sovereign 1398 directives, during Martin’s reign, individuals not included in the category of officials worked regularly alongside officials on economic concerns and on maintaining the system of existing privileges, i.e issues affecting the citizenry as a whole. It is evident in the following examples that even though the council was not mentioned directly, there are explicit references to its operations. At Lentini, legislation dealing with the selling price of wine and a ban on wine imports was enacted in “petitions ordered by the officials and the entire universitas with everyone’s consensus”.180 In Calascibetta the ambassadors were entrusted with a memorandum to be presented to the sovereign on behalf 176 C. vol. 2860, fol. 92v, 29 January1449. There is a step in this reconstruction which is based on an assumption that the December 1448 petitions were those mentioned by the Sovereign in his reply to the councillors’ letter, inasmuch as Crapanzano figures in both the petitions and the letter. One detail, however, does not coincide because the petitions were also presented by a jurat named Abrignano who was not cited in the letter. The deduction is nevertheless plausible. In fact, in the Sovereign’s mention of the ambassadors, made in approving the petitions Crapanzano had greater authority than Abrignano whose position was not even specified; C. vol. 2858, fol. 152v. 177 For a comparison, MARTÍ SENTAÑES, “Els memoriales”, pp. 1073–1091, which for the Catalan city of Lerida analyses the instructions given by the local governments to the syndics representing them in the Cortes. 178 BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, pp. LXVI-LXVIII; MINEO, “Città”, pp. 126–127. 179 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVI, p. 106 and Capitulum XLV, p. 158, respectively. 180 G. G., p. 339, 1400.

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of the universitas which contained petitions regarding the town’s economy, the electiveness of officials, pardons for residents, etc.181 In Caltagirone, the “petitions ordered by the universitas and by the universitas entrusted to the syndics elected by the universitas” dealt with the fair, taxation, and so forth.182 Martin I, in 1401, made explicit reference to the town council’s activity in the capitoli regarding Catania’s catapans.183 Deeper analysis of these aspects requires widening the viewpoint to include the Alphonsian period when the council’s areas of competence were spelled out in greater detail: the normal farming out of the gabelle, the imposition of the mete (1434), the imposition of prices for vectigalia, and every type of extraordinary taxation (1446), but also, in more general terms, decisions in economic matters, official missions to the sovereign or other localities, and ardua negotia (1448).184 The council voted, according to the directives of the Alphonsian period, on ordinary and extraordinary economic measures, on affairs regarding municipal administration, and on relations with the Crown. It also supervised the electoral college. This government body played a pivotal role among municipal institutions and its main tasks, as during the reign of Martin I, included determining the city’s economic policy. Mention is appropriate here of an appeal from Piazza’s universitas which complained of the jurat’s having decided on taxation without the council’s consent.185 Communities had a certain degree of discretionary leeway in the council’s use of its power as, for example, in establishing which were the ardua negotia. The council constituted a level of government whose main prerogatives, even though specified by statutory norms, could be adapted to the relative socio-political situation in the individual universitas.186 The broad margins of autonomy enjoyed by the universitates during Alphonso V’s reign actually allowed the governments to reinitiate discussions and make proposals to the Crown, even on important issues like power relations between magistracies in which case an adjustment to the power configuration was often mediated through the council.187 Ibidem, p. 29–31, [1396–7]. Ibidem, pp. 40–42, 1392. ZENO, “Un capitolo di re Martino”, p. 292. Regarding measures dealing with the council during the reign of Alphonso V, see: G. G., pp. 263–264, 1423 (Agrigento), p. 286, 1431 (Agrigento); TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitula XLVI, XLVII, LV, LVII, pp. 221–222, p. 225, 1434; G. G., pp. 191–192, 1446 (Catania); Consuetudines, fols 46r-47r, 1448. The extensive documentation from Palermo on council activities allows the identification of three types of subjects most often under discussion: both regular and extraordinary financial measures, duties and power relations among the magistracies, and negotiations with the Crown; see FABRIZIO TITONE, “Note preliminari sul consilium civium di Palermo, 1448–1458”, in Dentro e fuori la Sicilia. Studi di storia per Vincenzo D’Alessandro, eds. PIETRO CORRAO & ENNIO I. Mineo, Rome, 2009, pp. 251–265. 185 C. vol. 2882, fols 107v-108v, 1452. 186 For a comparison consider the community of Reggio in the Visconti dominions: an absence of references to communal political bodies in the statures has been interpreted not as a lack of formalization at this level of government, but as a strategic decision intended to be grounded in uncodified procedure in order to be able to change without signeurial interference; ANDREA GAMBERINI, La città assediata: Poteri e identità politiche a Reggio in età viscontea, Rome, 2003, p. 77. 187 Numerous decisions made by the council and the officials concerned power relations among the officials, and even for the Alphonsian period, council activity can be affirmed not only when specifically indicated, but also when acts (especially those benefiting the community) were issued by the universitas. In the following examples of requests, council activity is specified, or construable, based on phrases such as universitas congregata, etc. Examples related to power relations among the officials or to their prerogatives include: duties of the jurats and appointment of the xurterii, P. R. vol. 26, fols 72v-73r, 1423 (Salemi); super officialibus, G. G., pp. 134–136, 1425 (Catania); responsibilities of the baiulus, P. R. vol. 28, fols 26r-26v, 1425 (Salemi); prerogatives of the xurterii and request that they be selected by scrutiny, P. R. vol. 24, fols 250v-252r, 1425 (Patti); responsibilities of the royal commissioner, R. C. vol. 59, fol. 39r-v, 1427 (Trapani); requirements for competitors for posts in the Corte pretoriana, P. R. vol. 31, fols 60r-61v, 1430 (Palermo); privilegium fori and the appellate court, R. C. vol. 69, fols 102v, 104v-105r, 1434 (Sciacca); responsibilities of the jurats and baiulus, institution ex gratia of the catapans and the baiulus, R. C. vol. 69, fols 90v-93r, 1434 (Patti); power relations between the jurats and sciurterii, C. vol. 2882, fol. 193r, 1453 (Agrigento); responsibilities of the royal commissioner, Acta iuratorum, pp. 143–146, p. 161, pp. 164–166, 1461. 181 182 183 184

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For the moment, a more detailed analysis of the sphere of activities that were the province of the council, especially those in the economic field, and an examination of power relations with other government bodies must be set aside in order to focus on criteria for participation and variations in the number of council members—a diversity attributable to the political nature of the council itself. These issues lead naturally to an analysis of the electoral college entrusted with the scrutiny (which, as already noted, also included councillors or their delegates and officials) in order to identify those responsible for the appointment of the councillors. The following premise is of fundamental importance: the council served as the cities’ political forum, its composition varied, and the distribution of power among competing factions shifted. Confirmation of this fact is to be found in the very lack of petitions aimed at specifying the rules for participation in an assembly whose composition was instead determined by the existing political equilibrium. This is a key factor in clarifying a political concept regarding power relations between municipal magistracies and the community. A useful means for interpreting the situation is provided by the 1398 ordinance of Martin I, the object of which was the election of councillors, in seeming contradiction to what has been heretofore outlined: quod per civitates, terras et loca nostri demanii tot ordinentur consiliarii circa rei publice et gubernationem quot fuerunt iurati in civitatibus terris et locis praenominatis, qui consiliari durent per annum, sicut iurati praelibati et ordinentur ipsi consiliarii anno quolibet per electionem et scarfias ut solent iurati semper ordinari.188 Since this provision for an election by scarfias was enacted neither during the reign of Martin I nor in the reign of Alphonso V, the reason for such an inconsistency must be explained.189 First, the absence of rigid criteria for participation and secondly, the frequent summoning of councils to discuss certain matters, suggest that the higher officials (as validated in 1398 by the parallel functions established for councillors and jurat) summoned the prominent part of the community to the assemblies as well as persons who had formerly held elective office and individuals, in particular, whose social or professional standing meant they had an interest in taking part in the debates.190 These distinguished citizens stood out from the rest and had the competence to participate in discussions, as well as the authority, as requested by Alphonso V in 1434, for making decisions regarding the agenda to be discussed. The imposition of food prices was assigned to the officials “cum interventu aliorum, in ea re 188 In TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum XLV, p. 158. 189 There are actually two exceptions. The universitas of Randazzo in 1466 asked for, and Viceroy Viceré Lope Ximen de

Urrea granted, the annual election of twenty people to collaborate with the officials in city government. This would have resolved the recurring problem of absenteeism in “parlamento” (another name for the municipal council); La Mantia, Consuetudini, pp. 2–3. In Piazza, a petition from 1515 refers to the annual election by the populus of forty people—of which a reduction of thirty was obtained as a solution to the problem of absenteeism—who would attend the consigli et parlamenti together with the genthilomini et curiali; Consuetudines, fol. 100r-v. The appointment of “quaranta” probably dated back to the later years of the Alphonsian period since such an election is cited in a memorandum (list of instructions) which, although bearing no date, can be attributed to the 1440s on the basis of a reference to the new institution of an appellate judge, ibidem, pp. 312–315; and the earliest mention of an appellate judge in Piazza concerns Antonio Crapanzano in reference to a privilege of 28 December 1446; C. vol. 2860, fols 20v-21r. The commission chosen by the populus does not seem to be a common practice, as can be inferred from the fact that it was not mentioned in relation to other groups. Instead, it resulted from the representational distribution of power among municipal groups and might have been sought either by the populus itself to avoid possible marginalization, or by opposing fronts to limit each other’s demands. 190 This was characteristic of the composition of council assemblies in Palermo during the Alphonsian reign; TITONE, “Note”, pp. 253–265.

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expertorum, in numero copioso”, while the macellatores were also included for the imposition of the “meta pro macellandis carnis”.191 After examining a number of sessions and both the social and political roles of the participants, it is possible to establish who was expected to attend, and in general it can be hypothesized that those who had the authority, given the current relative equilibrium, to represent and speak for the universitas were present.192 It would be reasonable to suppose that the failure to implement the election per scarfias might have been due to a deliberate decision by the community itself aimed at ensuring a margin of independence against initiatives of the officials since election procedures for councilmen so similar to the ones employed for filling municipal offices would have produced a replica of the power structures existing for groups already present in the government. This is especially true, because, in adopting an election per scarfias, council members, like the officials, would likely have remained in office for an entire year. This would have negated one of the most important aspects of the assembly’s make-up, namely the complete synchronization of its full correspondence to shifting socio-political configurations of power. Finally, as further evidence of the council’s conformation to the prevailing circumstances, it must be noted that the very number of the councillors could vary: the capitulum of the Infante of Aragon decreeing their number to be equal to the number of jurats does not appear to ever have been put into practice.193 The absence of tight supervision by the officials meant council members could vote on motions when officials were not present or when few were in attendance. A debate in [1407] held in Randazzo against the jurats in which no officials took part exemplifies just such a situation. While Martin I approved the ensuing petitions of the boni homini with many reservations, he expressed no doubt as to the formal validity of the assembly.194 The theory sustaining the absence of elections per scarfias during Martin’s reign is confirmed by decrees in the Alphonsian period negating such an electoral procedure. Agrigento’s universitas asked in 1423 and 1431, without making any reference to prevailing legislative norms, to be able to elect per scarfias twelve gentilomini who would constitute a council for ordinary affairs and collaborate with the jurats.195 The motivation behind the

191 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum LV and Capitulum LVII, p. 225. 192 Examples of councils representing certain groups: gentilomini et populari a Piazza, R. C. vol. 25, fols 23r-24r, 1396;

nobiles in Agrigento, G. G., p. 252, 1401; members of the sanior pars in Noto, R. C. vol. 46, fols 302v-304r, 1407; boni homini and magistri in Randazzo R. C. vol. 46, fols 413v-415v, [1407]; gentilomini in Sciacca, R. C. vol. 69, fols 105v-106r, 1434; borgesi in Randazzo, R. C. vol. 74, fol. 391r-v, 1439; borgesi in Palermo, DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 252–253, 1440; consoli delle arti in Catania, G. G. p. 190, 1446; consoli delle arti in Palermo, C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 73r-v, 1449; “gentilhomini, curiali, ministrali, borgesi” in Piazza, Consuetudines, fols 46r-47r, 1448. 193 For Malta, see CORRAO, “Assemblee municipali”, pp. 39–41; for Palermo, see TITONE, “Note”, pp. 251–265. 194 R. C. vol. 46, fols 413v-415v. For other instances of councils instituted in opposition to policies put into practice by officials, see Consuetudines, fols 46r-47v, 1448 (Piazza); C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 133r-136r, 137r-138v, 1450 (Palermo); and R. C. vol. 89, fols 253r-255r, 1453 (Noto). 195 G. G., pp. 263–264, p. 286 (Agrigento). I have found an exception in a petition of Calascibetta’s universitas, from which it appears that the system for appointing councillors was the same as the one for officials. It was requested that both the officials and the councillors be replaced: “Item supplikiriti a lu predictu signuri ki li placza in le lettera di li officiali fari mectiri illocu di Perri Stincuni ki era consiglieri Henricu di Roccu et in illocu di notarii Thomasii di Minellu ki era iudichi di lu chivili farritinchi mectiri Guillelmu Russu judichi di lu chivili in locu di lu dictu Guillelmu Russu ki era iurati, farinchi mectiri Nicola Cabita ki era notario di lu chivili farenchi mectiri Petru de Vigna. Fiat”; ibidem, p. 30, 1396–1397.

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request was the refusal of the summoned individuals to take part.196 The petitions did not receive approval from Viceroy Nicola Speciale, and not even later from Speciale and Viceroy Guglielmo Muntanyans, because up to that time the election of council members had never taken place in any city in the vice kingdom. These petitions from Agrigento may help to understand why the provisions decreed by the Infante of Aragon were never implemented. The request in Agrigento was clearly initiated by the iuratia: in the first instance, a jurat named Giovanni Bandi was among the sponsors of the petition,197 while subsequently it was requested that the jurats’ curia proceed with the election. The very wording of the petitions affirms an attempt by a sector of the elected officials to control the composition of the council in order to guarantee the election of savi et mature persons. It was obviously a move to elect a group of councillors politically close to the jurats: an eventual placet by the viceroy would have set a precedent in contrast with the political nature of the council. Moreover, when Alphonso V did later intervene in 1434 regarding a summons for individuals who were not elected officials, he made no reference to any electoral procedures.198 The unambiguous Alphonsian regulations concerning the absence of an election process confirms what has already been seen for Martin’s reign. On the basis of the Viceroys’ replies to the petitions from Agrigento, a procedure per scarfias can be ruled out, but that does not mean the officials might not have played a role in the selection of the councillors. Although the indications in documentary sources are limited and confusing in this regard, the officials’ involvement comes to light.199 This government function merits thorough investigation, because if proven, it would appear to go against what has heretofore emerged, namely the councillors’ independence from the officials.200 The main challenge, and the most decidedly controversial, is to define the role of the officials. In terms of the analysis of the procedures and activities of the council, the idea of the officials’ full control over convocations of the council seems improbable. Regarding this point in the context

196 Absenteeism of councillors was also a widespread phenomenon in other areas: SERGIO BERTELLI, Il potere oligarchico nello stato-città medievale, Florence, 1978, pp. 101–104, which furnishes examples from other localities; GAMBERINI, La città, p. 83, for Reggio. 197 P. R. vol. 25, fol. 38r. 198 “Quia res universitatum, tamquam communes, negligi solent; propterea, ut maiori cum diligentia, non ut hactenus, administrentur, providimus, quod iurati ante ordinariam gabellarum venditionem officiales alios universitatis convocent, quosdam etiam ex principalioribus civitatis, seu loci, ad minus decem, si plures commode habere non possunt, per quos, matura omnium, vel maioris partis deliberatione, quam in scripturam publicam redigi volumus, gabellarum vendendarum status rationabilis poni debeat; ceteris solemnitatibus pro universitatum utilitate debitis, et consuetis intervenientibus sub eo quidem statu publicari, ut moris est, et banniri debeant”. TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum XLVI, pp. 221–222. This royal measure, although urging a more punctual functioning of the council, actually confirmed a significant regularity of convocations that could have lead to the community’s lack of interest in ordinary agendas—those for deciding on how to meet municipal budget expenditures (such as the farming out of taxes not related to extraordinary subventions). In these non-emergency situations, the tax farming was conducted at such a fast pace that regular council activity for every transaction was very unlikely. 199 In Agrigento, it was up to the jurats and the other officials to riquedire (request or call for) the councillors, and the councillors in Gozo were chamati (summoned) but it is not specified by whom; G. G., p. 263, 1423 (Agrigento), p. 332, 1443 (Gozo). 200 Palermo is an emblematic case in point. The most interesting aspect of the debates in the council deal with confrontations among council members in which neither the longa manus of the praetor nor of the jurats can be detected. On the contrary, what emerges is a complete independence of the councillors who could even reject the political policies advocated by the highest officials. A further test of their autonomy comes from a prosopographic study of twenty-five sessions and a subsequent comparison of the results with the rosters of the elected civic officials. Based on percentages of attendance, no significant relationships among the councillors were uncovered, particularly in relation to the most often recurring names and elected officials; see TITONE, “Note”, pp. 260–261.

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of the Alphonsian period, I have been able to research the extensive documentation from the senate chancery in Palermo which is a unique instance corroborated, nevertheless, in other communities. In Palermo the consilium civium worked in collaboration with the praetor and the jurats, the only officials who presided over sessions but did not enter into debates or vote.201 Instances of summons for the exclusive participation of the praetor and the jurats are not plentiful. Assemblies of this type are limited in number,202 and constitute a total to which two other cases, with certain exceptions, can be added.203 On two occasions, the officials drew up a list of the individuals to be summoned; in other cases, a general reference is made to chitatini chamati (citizens called or summoned). It seems probable, however, that even in these sessions, the officials decided who to summon one by one, considering that the phrase chitatini chamati was highly unusual.204 The most interesting document contains a tavula drawn up by the officials with a list of 167 persons summoned.205 The minutes of the 5 March 1458 session concerned the recovery of 70 onze owed to the Sovereign through a tax on wine. This debate, which apparently did not justify such a large and unusual number of councillors, was part of a complicated dispute begun in August of 1457. The debate regarded a pending decision over whether to pay the Sovereign 4,000 florins in exchange for the offer of a galleon made by the community,206 or whether to first extinguish the numerous debts of the universitas.207 The 70 onze from the council in August were probably the final instalment of the 4,000 florins. The tormented iter to be followed in finding a solution to complex financial transactions, such as the royal subvention and payment for the ambassadorial mission to the king while the universitas was burdened with heavy municipal debt,208 might have induced the officials to try to force the council members, through a summons, to make a final decision. On the basis of these elements, officials indicated specific names mainly in order to unblock stalemates or in especially dramatic circumstances when conditions for normal

201 This emerges from a comparison of council minutes from the years 1448, 1449, 1450, 1452, and 1456 (C. C. 61–1, 63–3) and the list of the officials from the same years. The comparison reveals only two exceptions: Bartolomeo di Blanco voted in the session on 1 February 1450 (C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 96r-97r) and Antonio di Mastrantonio voted in the council meeting on 3 September 1456 (C.C. vol. 63–3, fols 179r-180v); in those years Bartolomeo Blanco was elected as judge and Antonio di Mastrantonio as praetor. For the prosopographic study of the magistrates in Palermo, the lists of election results were used, in part supplemented by the author, which appear in TRIPOLI, Amministrazione, (Appendix). 202 A., cass. XXV, fols 13v-14r, 1414; C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 211r-212v, 1458. 203 C. C. vol. 63–3, fol. 99r, [1456]; C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 149r-150v, [1457]. 204 An act of the praetor and the jurats from 1414, thus before the reign of Alphonso V the Magnanimus, established who was to participate in the election of the ambassadors to send to King Ferdinand I; A., cass. XXV, fols 13v-14r. Once contextualized, it is actually a document unsuitable for determining if this type of convocation was standard procedure. The situation in Palermo in those years was dramatic owing to clashes between the supporters of Ferdinand I and those of the reyna, Blanche who were proponents of autonomist measures (regarding these events, see CORRAO, Governare, pp. 133–179). The internal struggles had so exacerbated the climate that the officials asked per scriptura that only certain individuals take part in the council to avoid the risk of the debate’s degenerating into a fight. When other unexpected persons arrived at the assembly, the officials preferred not to continue the discussion on the selection of the ambassadors. 205 131 were absent, C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 211r-212v. 206 C. C. vol. 63–4, fols 167r-168v. For the value of the florin and its correlation over time to the onza, see Bresc, Un monde I, pp. 402–406. 207 C. C. vol. 63–3, fol. 178r, 1457; C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 179r-180v, 1457; C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 211r-212v, 1458. 208 C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 179r-180v, 1457.

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discussions were missing. It is likely that the officials’ convocations were made ad personam when it was otherwise impossible to convene an assembly. This is substantiated, for example, in a 1448 petition from the universitas of Syracuse.209 Indeed, it seems that the summons of the councillors was not ordinary administrative practice. Compare, for example, the instance in the community of Piazza when impeachment proceedings against Captains Bartolomeo Amoro and Ruggero Crapanzano—perpetrators of patronage in government activity—created a highly tense state of affairs. The community presented the Sovereign with a series of petitions including an accusation that the Captains had forbidden the town council to assemble. The most interesting parts of that petition, which was approved with a few modifications, demanded the following: a summons free from interference by the officials who were to convene the council upon indications from the community, a free debate open to the interested parties, and a majority vote. Alphonso V put his signature to the series of petitions on 23 September 1448, and as dictated by standard procedure, it was followed on 18 November by the royal writ of execution, in this case signed by Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea. The king’s representatives in Sicily, of course, needed to issue writs of execution for royal decrees to take effect.210 The Viceroy trimmed down some royal concessions here to further benefit the Crown, an option which reveals how a writ of execution was no mere formality: it could serve as a another phase in confrontations with the community. Further support for the theory that resorting to injunctions was not ordinary practice comes from a session in Palermo convened after a chamata (summons) of the cives, probably a summons ad personam.211 In this case the officials were responsible for the chamata together with the deputati. Palermo’s councillors, who it must be remembered, could elect commissions on a territorial basis whose members, called adiuncti or deputati, were charged with carrying out council decisions, usually in collaboration with the officials.212 The reason for the summons is not stated but those selected were probably interested in following the council deliberations and the presence of the deputati reveals how the eventual selection of names was not up to the officials alone. In this regard it is appropriate to mention another case in Malta where, in 1453, it was granted that the jurats be aided (presumably in their normal activity) by a limited number of councillors—

209 P. R. vol. 40, fols 244v-245r. 210 Consuetudines, fols 46r-47v, fol. 57r-v. 211 C. C. vol. 63–3, fol. 99r, [1456]. Another document concerns the “chamata per lu consiglu et parlamentu generale”

which is followed by a list of cives differentiated by district; C. vol. 63–3, fols 149r-150v, [1457]. 212 C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 67r-69r, 1449 and fol. 82r, 1449. Council meetings could also be held according to district: C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 149r-1450v [1457]; fols 209r-210v, 1458. In some cases the deputati received a mandate to refuse any conflicting instructions from the officials, just as it was up to the latter alone to implement resolutions because they had been delegated to do so by the assembly; C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 179r-v, 1451; C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 24r-25v, 1454; fols 179r-180v, 1457. It was possible, but only at this level and on the basis of the indications of the council, for the officials to vote together with the adiuncti on how to proceed; for example: C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 17r-v, 1448; fols 67r-69r, 1449; in another instance “li officiali et deputati su in votu” together for the imposition of a tax per owed to the sovereign, C. C. vol. 63–3, fol. 112r [n.d.]. For a comparison, consider the dual functioning of the council in Barcelona. Because the work of such a large body (in 1454 it went from 100 to 128 members) was so complicated, legislative power was assigned to a restricted commission of initially thirty, then thirty-two members, in collaboration with the consellers, after which the Consell de Cent approved what had been decided; FONT RIUS, “Orígenes”, pp. 490–495, particularly p. 494; BATLLE GALLART, “El govern”, pp. 65–67.

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twelve—who would be elected “per consiglu universali a li plui vuchi” rather than the officials.213 Although the mechanism for convening the council may not be clear, it is quite probable that some officials took part. Their participation could not have been decisive, however, since it was limited by concrete power ratios between the various socio-professional groups which indirectly determined the composition of the assembly. This is true for two reasons. First, the most frequent assemblies were for planning economic strategy related to food supplies and public works which required making swift decisions on fiscal exactions often concerning large sums.214 The need to obtain financing without upsetting the status quo forced officials to guarantee an equitable representation among the various groups with means to contribute and it drastically limited the officials’ freedom of choice even in indicating per scriptura who should participate.215 Randazzo, for example, in 1466 appealed for permission to elect regular council members in order to avoid the problem of absenteeism. Quite interestingly, a very specific formation of the council was requested and granted: twenty persons from each neighbourhood including “gentilomini, ministrali et popolani”.216 In addition, opportunities for interference were restricted because even when the officials were the ones convening the assembly, their options in selecting names appear equally limited considering that absenteeism by those summoned could often be a strategic move forcing the praetor and jurats to make successive chamate until they arrived at an assembly constituting a truly proportionate representation of the various groups.217 Likewise, it might happen that the councillors themselves rejected the formation of an assembly they deemed to be unsatisfactory and obtain the convocation of a new council.218 The new selection of names more likely depended on demands made by citizen groups than on the influence of the officials. The higher officials seemed to be responsible for the convening the council, then, but not to the extent that their involvement could be considered co-optation. The 213 G. G. p. 420. In Palermo, in 1449, there is an instance of an auction of a gabella on meat which the Sovereign had demanded because the city had not yet paid its share of the colletta. This auction exemplifies power relations between the officials and the community. Alphonso V granted the praetor and jurats authorization for the election of “quanti et quali chitatini habili” to administer the sale. The town council voted to proceed with the auction but specified that it should be carried out senza costringimentu (perceiving a constriction in the royal request to elect the buyers) and the decision was to be announced by the pubblicum preconem and the potential buyers would be awaited in curie preture. Given that the minimum sale price was to be 250 onze, the contract was sold for that amount; C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 78r-79r, 1449; T. R. P., vol. 37, fols 57v, 1449. 214 On these topics, see Section 5.1. 215 Conflicts among councillors who represented opposing interests were not rare occurrences. See the examples the following sessions: C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 81r-v, 1449; fols 57r-58v, 1449; fol. 81r-v, 1449; C. C. vol. 61–3, fols 12r-13r, 1452; fols 24r-25v, 1454. Only cives could vote, as manifested in Palermo: in 1450, Mianus de Ganchio who took part in the debate did not vote because he was not non civis (C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 86r-88v). On the connection between citizenship and community, see COSTA, “Cittadinanza e comunità”, pp. 15–37 and PIETRO COSTA, Civitas: Storia della cittadinanza in Europa. vol. 4, L’età delle rivoluzioni (1798–1848), Rome-Bari, 2000, II, p. VII. Regarding the notion of community as a collective entity that identifies each of its single components, see QUILLET, “Community”, pp. 520–545. Cerutti examines the condition of the citizen, one who enjoys full legal status and access to privliges, within the society of the Ancien Régime; SIMONA CERUTTI, Giustizia sommaria: Pratiche e ideali di giustizia in una società di Ancien Régime (Torino XVIII secolo), Torino, 2003, pp. 44–45. Ventura, instead, highlights how citizenship was not a discriminating factor in accessing resources and occupations in Naples during the 1500s and 1600s; PIERO VENTURA, “Le ambiguità di un privilegio: la cittadinanza napoletana tra Cinque e Seicento”, in Quaderni Storici, 89, 1995, pp. 395–400. 216 La Mantia, Consuetudini, pp. 2–3. 217 C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 188r-190r, 1451. A somewhat different but equally significant case in another session concerns a request to farm out the meat tax in order to pay the colletta which noted that a modification of this sort would only have been possible with a vaster convocation; C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 10r-11v, 1452 (a motion made by Antonio di Virgilio). 218 A single item on an agenda might require several different council meetings and a request to convene a new assembly for further discussion of the issue and a final vote might come from a group of councillors who deemed the current council unqualified to decide, for example: C. C., vol. 61–1, fols 15r-v, 1448; C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 167r-168v, 1457. In these sessions, see especially the motions made by the nobilis, Masio Crispo and the magnificus dominus, Pino de Berliono, respectively.

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system was too heavily conditioned by the socio-professional factions and the pressure they exerted, in particular, in their willingness to vote approval of financial manoeuvres. One final note on this government body’s procedural mechanisms. The council did not record its execution of decisions made by others but it was in the council that moments of tension as well as patterns of alliances between divergent factions emerged most dramatically in relation to certain matters, in primis economic policy. Nevertheless, a considerable efficiency of the institution’s operations is to be noted in most cases. This was achieved by virtue of the strict discipline regulating debates that lead to a simplification of proposed motions, for the most part, through one or the other of two main approaches. The council, as the entity guaranteeing stability of the government, needed to mediate between differing interests. This meant that, for both the community itself and the Crown, approval needed either to be by a vast majority vote or, as stated in the documents, the two sides needed to unite in a compromise on a single proposal. This information demonstrates how the assembly, rather than being a uniform body, gave voice to the configurations of power existing among the various factions. In this way, a wide majority was a political guarantee of genuine agreement. In 1434, for example, Alphonso V stipulated that a unanimous or majority vote was necessary for the sale of gabelle,219 a regulation which plainly testifies to the way in which the council’s composition reflected competing interests. The councillors did indeed follow the royal legal norms in voting and the widest possible consensus was required for all of the particularly important items on the council agenda. In this regard, Viceroy Nicola Speciale refused to approve petitions in 1426 presented by Trapani’s universitas concerning those persons who might participate in the administration: Quia dominus magnificus dominus Vicerex est informato quod supplicacio contenta in capitulo non processit ex consilio dicte universitatis ymmo pluribus discrepantibus et contradicentibus ideo predicta universitas iterum congreget consilium et deliberet ut decet super peticionem capituli supradicti et tunc dominus Vicerex super eadem peticione taliter providebit quod eadem universitas poterit merito contentari.220

Viceroy Ximen de Urrea in 1445, in refusing to approve a measure from Agrigento regarding the method of paying an extraordinary subvention, indirectly pointed out how the assembled council had expressed the interests of only one side of the issue whereas a discussion by two opposing parties was necessary. Only with a unanimous decision—si per duas partes dictorum civium fuerit concordatum—would he have approved the request.221 A consensus between “duabus partibus ex his consulentibus et in unum concordantibus” was claimed, instead, by the universitas of Palermo in 1441 dealing, as in the previous example, with an extraordinary tax.222 These facts reveal how relative political stability in municipal governments was maintained through the town council which, because it was able to change its composition, provided a forum for the various interest groups and configurations of power existing among the civic groups, thus assuring, generally, the pursuit of objectives in the interest of the majority. TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum XLVII, pp. 222. P. R. vol. 27, fol. 100r-v. G. G., pp. 306–307. The petition was rejected for other reasons; C. vol. 2838, fol. 128v. Thus, confrontations in the council were not always clear-cut and linear. Indeed, the council succeeded most times in reaching solutions negotiated through its complicated patterns of alliances; see TITONE, “Note”, pp. 257–265. 219 220 221 222

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3.1 Power Relations in Municipal Administrations: The Practice of Shared Governance Although anchored within a framework of strong continuity, institutional relationships during the reign of Alphonso V were influenced by numerous transformations resulting from a royal policy especially favourable to ample municipal autonomy which managed to become firmly established during Alphonso’s long reign. Indeed, Martin I had earlier guaranteed the cities’ long-standing rights and privileges and had promised new ones, but his was a short-termed government compared to that of the Magnanimus, moreover, the final downfall of the barons came about only in 1398. A useful method for evaluating the power relations among the different levels of municipal government is an analysis of the parts played by the iuratia and the town council—the municipal institutions with the widest ranging powers in the administration. The government spheres to be highlighted are mainly financial policy, negotiations with the Crown, and judicial activity with a focus on power relations between the civil curia, jurats’ curia, and the functions of the captain. A document from 1433 concerning the management of the municipal gabelle (indirect tax revenues) in Catania, i.e. the “capitula ordinaciones et pragmatice sanciones facte per magnificos dominos presidentes [Pietro Felice e Adamo Asmundo] pro utilitate et comodo universitatis civitatis Cathanie”, sheds light on the first point.1 The Presidents of the Kingdom decreed that imposts were to be sold and cited the historic precedent permitting the officials to proceed only in conjunction with a council of “aliorum dodecim proborum virorum”. The officials, moreover, were not permitted to take part in the purchase and, if necessary, they could go ahead with the sale by means of a loan only upon authorization deliberated jointly with the town council. This last point, notwithstanding the vagueness of the references in the directive, seems to imply that there was a restricted council functioning for the very frequent business of leasing imposts and a larger one (totum consilium universitatis) for less commonplace agendas such as proposals for tax farms involving loans, as in the aforementioned example.2 Then, after the vague reference to the officials, there was a more specific mention of the iuratia: if a tax farmer (cabellotus G. G. pp. 145–47. “Item quod officiales non possint ponere statum ad cabellas vendendas universitati absque consilio aliorum dodecim [sic] proborum virorum et posito statu gabellarum cum consilio illorum dodecim dicti officiales tantum dictas gabellas vendere libere possint, ut est solitum, ita quod nullorum eorum officialium scilicet indirecte vel directe, tacite vel expresse possint emere easdem gabellas seu partem ipsorum nec in eis partecipare modo aliquo per se vel alios pro eis [. . .] ita quod non possint vendere gabellas cum mutuo nisi urgente necessitate, que necessitas urgens debet examinari et concludi per dictos officiales et per totum consilium dicte universitatis”. G. G., pp. 145–146. 1 2

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or gabellotus) became a jurat, he was not to take part in decisions regarding farms in his possession. The momentous ascendancy of the jurats among the ranks of the officials in this sector comes unequivocally to light.3 The most significant piece of information gleaned from the presidential decree is that the officials could not go ahead with the sale of the imposts on their own—they could act only in collaboration with the council. At the same time, the regular presence of the jurats in every financial transaction placed them in a position different from that of the other officials, even allowing them to influence sales through patronage. Such an accusation was lodged by the consuli [of the artisans] et populi in Catania in 1450.4 The prominent role of the iuratia recurs in other communities as well. As early as 1420, the universitas of Caltagirone, for example, had requested that cabelloti not be eligible for election as jurats because when that happened, they didn’t “exigunt fructus cabellarum, quas dicti iurati habent in cabella”.5 The universitas of Calascibetta in 1431 noted that the vicesecretus and the jurats should not have jurisdiction over the gabelle.6 Antonio Riczu, a jurat in Termini, requested permission of the Crown in 1456 to carry on trade (fari mercanti) as he had before being elected, and permission was granted on the grounds that his affairs would not have to do with the gabelle of universitas.7 Actually, regulations did provide for a joint convocation of the jurats and town council in relation to municipal economic policy precisely as indicated in 1433, which presupposed participation of the officials in the assemblies.8 Such collaboration was widespread. In Malta decisions regarding municipal levies, the sale of tax farms, and their duration were the province of the council as long as the jurats and the captain voted in the sessions.9 For the purpose of repairing the walls of the city in 1434, the universitas of Sciacca requested to be allowed to levy an extraordinary tax set by the jurats together with a council of gentilomini.10 At Sciacca again, in the wake of certain crimes in 1445, the jurats and the council went ahead with the sale of taxes in order to scrape together the compositio (procedure by which the sovereign pardoned civil or criminal misdeeds upon payment of a sum of money to the treasury).11 In 1453 the council “de provisione nobilium iuratorum” in Piazza decided to farm some gabelle in order to pay what was owed to Bernardo Barresio, syndic and ambassador.12 While the council decided which financial strategies to adopt, it the responsibility of the iuratia to put the decisions into practice. Piazza’s universitas, in 1439, had levied a surtax (maldenaro) and ordered the tax collectors to carry it out, but later, following a municipal petition, the Crown instructed the jurats to intervene on behalf Ibidem, p. 146. Ibidem, p. 203. Ibidem, p. 46–47. Ibidem, p. 39. P. R. vol. 47, fol. 193v. In Palermo the jurats and praetor took part in the debates (C. C. vol. 61-1; C. C. vol. 63-3), in Malta the jurats and the captain (Acta iuratorum), in Agrigento the jurats (G. G. p. 286, 1431), and in Gozo the captain and his assessor (judge), the judges, jurats, and the four jurats from the preceding administrative year (annum indictionis) (ibidem, p. 332, 1443). The presence of other officials varied but not that of the jurats. The Maltese captain, a royal appointee, contrary to his other namesakes, functioned as a baiulus since he had jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters; CORRAO, “Assemblee municipali”, p. 38. 9 Acta iuratorum, pp. 82–83, 1453; pp. 104–05, 1454. 10 R. C. vol. 69, fols 105v-106r. 11 C. vol. 2849, fols 173r-181r. Regarding the compositio, see page 167 ss. 12 R. C. vol. 89, fols 111r-117r. 3 4 5 6 7 8

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of the universitas that had decreed the financial manoeuvre, to ask the tax collectors to disclose their accounts.13 Undertakings by the jurats alone were recorded following a resolution to that effect by the council. A case in point was a request in 1427 by Trapani’s universitas, more solito congregata, that the Crown grant authorization for the jurats to sell the indirect taxes of the eighth indiction (annum indictionis) because they had already been alienated in the sixth and seventh.14 This situation in Trapani can be compared to the circumstances in Sciacca where the jurats’ curia wielded authority on behalf of the universitas in controlling the gabelle: “vini buchirie salsumis centimulorum qui in posse iuratorum dicte terre nomine ipsius univeristatis erant et existebant”.15 As the officials most often participating in ambassadorial missions, the jurats’ often exclusive role in negotiations must be distinguished from the planning of political strategy in conjunction with the council whose participation, as already demonstrated, could be cited explicitly but was more often alluded to in a vague reference to the universitas.16 Delineating such information facilitates a reconstruction of the council’s participation in undertakings even when not explicitly indicated and brings into view an operation of shared governance: the jurats took part in negotiations because it was decreed by the council, not because they had authored such a decision. Furthermore, from documents such as royal mandates and petitions distinguishing the universitas from the officials, it seems possible to uncover how the role of the officials differs from that of the jurats.17 Countless examples of town council operations exist for every out-of-the-ordinary political undertaking, as well as some other more routine undertakings including, for instance, impositions of the mete through council measures in Palermo.18 It follows that the continual references to jurats in royal mandates, although not the only officials called upon, depended on the fact that they had taken part in the council deliberations of which they were often the executors and on their frequent presence in diplomatic missions. It is not possible to sustain, however, that the iuratia alone dictated government strategy since it was

R. C. vol. 74, fol. 379r. R. C. vol. 59, fol. 40r-v. R. C. vol. 35, fols 88r-89v, 1398. See Chapter 2, note 173. A royal concession to the jurats and universitas to withhold 100 onze from the tratte for eventual repairs to the castle; C. vol. 2816, fol. 65r, 1430 (Trapani). Compare this to the royal decree for the same measure (but for 150 onze) which cites only the jurats charged with performing the withdrawal; C. vol. 2817, fols 98v-99r. The jurats and universitas of Noto presented the Sovereign with the grant instituting consuls for the guilds; R. C. vol. 79, fols 82v-83v, 1443. A request from the the jurats and the universitas of Catania to extend the surtax; G. G. p. 220, 1457. Trapani’s envoys were “destinatos per iuratos et universitatem”; C. vol. 2819, fols 4v-5r, 1431. A royal concession to the judges, jurats, baiulus, and universitas for any early sale of the gabelle; C. vol. 2823, fol. 164r-v, 1434 (Trapani). A royal mandate to the judges and jurats confirming study grants decided by a general vote of the residents; C. vol. 2824, fol. 49r-v, 1434 (Piazza). In Malta the jurats’ dependence on a council mandate was established: “the jurats execute the decisions of the council”, G. G. p. 402, 1437. A royal order to Sciacca’s jurats to carry out the verdict of a trial because the universitas had failed to pay out money to Matteo Calandrino “pro substentacione sui studii” (C. vol. 2829, fol. 20r-v, 1437). A grant by the jurats and universitas of Agrigento of 8 onze to the dominus, Antonio Camarino, arcium et medicine doctor; C. vol. 2849, fols 57v-58v, 1444. 18 The council determined the imposition of the mete: C. C. vol. 61-1, fol. 66r, 1449; C. C. vol. 61-1, fol. 125r, 1450; C. C. vol. 63-3, fol. 18r, 1453. Instead, in Malta and Polizzi the decision fell to the jurats: Acta iuratorum, p. 58, 1450; p. 77, 1453–54; p. 287, 1467; R. C. vol. 39, fol. 100r-v, 1402 (Polizzi). The lack of uniformity regarding the magistracies concerned with this sector testifies once again to the adaptation of regulations to the cities’ differing circumstances. In 1402, when Martin I (R. C. vol. 39, fols 88v-90v) adopted as his own the Frederickian capitula regarding the jurats, one modification was made: unlike what had been stipulated by Frederick III (TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVI, p. 107), the catapans alone would be responsible for fixing the mete. 13 14 15 16 17

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the town council, in conjunction with the jurats, and in some cases, other officials,19 which determined financial strategy and the composition of the ambassadorial delegations. Consequently, in the documentary sources it is necessary to differentiate what could be considered the definitive transcription of an event, such as a magistracy which receives or decides on an order or presents petitions, from a sequence of adjournments which, after a reconstruction of the complete situation, reveal both that an office was only one of several levels of administrative decision-making and that a precise hierarchy existed among municipal institutions. Further confirmation of what has emerged thus far can be found by extending the range of observation to encompass other areas where the iuratia played a significant role. Undertakings by the jurats’ curia exhibit a greater degree of independence from other institutions in sectors where there were no budget decisions to be made and where the tax system was not under discussion. The Crown might make a request to the jurats alone to allow a private individual to export wheat when a sufficient quantity was present in the universitas and, likewise, those same officials might oversee grain transactions between private individuals to avoid theft and speculation.20 With the memorandum of 1425, previously cited, the jurats in Nicosia requested Viceroy Nicola Speciale’s authorization to be able to oblige those who possessed wheat to sell their surplus to be used in subsidiu populi.21 This independent undertaking was likely the result of a temporary upheaval in the status quo.22 Generally, however, it was not the responsibility of these officials to decide on purchases of wheat, as can be proved though a comparison of two significant examples from documentary sources, i.e. acts of the town council in Palermo which have been preserved as separate records starting from 1448, and the acts of the jurats of the Maltese council which date from 1434. The same configuration of power relations can be noted in both centres. In Palermo it was the responsibility of the council was to set up the purchases, in addition to choosing both the type of taxation and the method for distributing the burden.23 The council then delegated the task of carrying out the decisions to a subsidiary commission of which the officials might also be part.24 In Malta, too, the council made decisions regarding food supplies.25 In 1458 the Maltese universitas set a fine of 100 onze for the captain and jurats if they did not carry out the council’s orders exactly as See pp. 94–95 and note 8. Antonio Perdicaru of Palermo had purchased 100 salme of wheat at Cola di Sanctu Marcu di Corleone and planned on taking 40 salme of it to Palermo; R. C. vol. 49, fol. 172r, 1457 and C. vol. 2801, fol. 111r, 1417 (Termini), respectively. 21 P. R. vol. 28, fol. 65r. In 1455, the jurats in Malta issued a proclamation so that those who possessed surplus wheat would sell it to them; Acta iuratorum, p. 119. The jurats’ curia set the price of imported wheat; ibidem, p. 123, 1457. 22 Instances of decisions on matters that were not ordinary made by elected officials without the council’s involvement are very rare. Besides the case in Nicosia, the text of a corpus of petitions was drawn up solely by the praetor and judges of Palermo; C. vol. 2859, fols 170r-172r, 1448. It seems no coincidence that this was a text drafted by only a portion of the government‘s leaders since it expressed factional interests, as can be deduced from the grievance against the catapans deemed ignorant and guilty of abuses. 23 C. C. vol. 61-1: fol. 32r, 1448; fol. 34r-v, 1448; fols 37r-38r, 1448; fols 57r-58v, 1449; fol. 63r, 1449; 67r-69r, 1449; fols 98r-100r, 1450; fols 188r-190r, 1451. C. C. vol. 63-3: fol. 96r-v, 1456; fols 108r-109v, 1456. C. C. vol. 64-4, fols 24r-25r, 1462; fols 32r-36r, 1462. 24 Concerning this aspect, see TITONE, “Note”, pp. 258–259. 25 Acta iuratorum, pp. 48–49, 1450; pp. 59–60 [1450]; pp. 175–177, 1461; pp. 230–232, 1462; pp. 242–243, 1462; pp. 297–298, 1468. I Maltese jurats functioned individually in executing council deliberations: for example, the council decided on the sale of gabelle to redeem certain offices and the jurats collected the money from the sale of the farm (Acta iuratorum, pp. 99–101, 1454). Without the council’s involvement, they oversaw the sale of tax farms and audited the accounts (ibidem, p. 112, 1454; pp. 136–137, 1460; pp. 177–178, 1461). 19 20

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instructed.26 The same arrangements show up in other communities as well. Given the scarcity of wheat in Randazzo in 1437, the jurats and the universitas decided to levy an indirect tax (colletta) for its purchase. In 1449 the town council of Polizzi, made up of “the men and the inhabitants of the terra” in the presence of the captain, judges and jurats, decided to obtain provisions especially to aid “the poor so that they would not starve”.27 Abundant documentation demonstrates that the jurats’ curia was one of the principal municipal institutions in urban administration in both metropolitan and smaller communities, particularly in the financial sector. Furthermore, municipal stability was possible due the broadened decisional base encompassing the assembly, the main seat of economic policy in the government. Economic policy could only have been determined by the council, otherwise institutional conflict would have been very likely. In 1453, for example, Antonio di Quattro, Ambassador of Noto, brought action against the jurats guilty of having farmed a tax “di la iunta seu maldinaru”, in other words, a special levy without the participation of the council.28 The iuratia shared administrative responsibility for financial matters. They did not act alone. In the economic sphere, even for officials’ routine duties and activities based on council directives, details of the tasks entrusted to the iuratia, which normally involved the captain and the civil curia as well, can be gleaned from royal formulas of address to the civic officials, the only parts of those formulas being considered here. Magistracies were called on, for example, to authorize the import and export of wheat and subsequently to enact related decisions or negotiate on the matter with the Crown.29 Similar patterns also recur in other areas of financial policy, although the jurats might have a preponderant role among the officials.30

G. G. p. 435. P. R. vol. 34, fols 91v-92r and P. R. vol. 41, fol. 22r, respectively. R. C. vol. 89, fols 253r-255r. There are other examples of council votes on economic policy (the jurats’ participation was sometimes indicated). The sale or levy of indirect imposts, CARMELO TRASSELLI, Antonio Fardella Viceammiraglio di Trapani, Trapani, 1951, p. 20, 1422 (Trapani); P. R. vol. 24, fol. 251v, 1425 (Patti); R. C. vol. 59, fols 113v-114r, 1429 (Salemi); P. R. vol. 32, fol. 35r, 1431 (Trapani); C. vol. 2846, fols 227v-228v, 1445 (Termini). Payment of the collette: R. C. vol. 80, fols 273v-275v, 1443 (Polizzi); R. C. vol. 79, fol. 181r, 1444 (Patti); C. C. vol. 61-1, fol. 8r, 1448 (Palermo); C. C. VOL. 63-3, fol. 3r-4v, 1452 (Palermo); G. G., p. 315, 1453 (Agrigento); P. R. vol. 45, fol. 366r-v, 1454 (Piazza). Salaries paid to the master jurat, P. R. vol. 31, fol. 22v, 1430 (Nicosia); to the cirurgicus, R. C. vol. 69, fol. 92r, 1434 (Patti); and to the master jurat, R. C. vol. 74, fol. 390v, 1439 (Randazzo). Study grants: C. vol. 2849, fol. 13r-v, 1444 (Syracuse) and R. C. vol. 84, fols 271r272r, 1451 (Piazza). Taxation for the restoration of the walls: P. R. vol. 27, fol. 49r, 1426 (Salemi). 29 Some examples: “capitaneo iudicibus iuratis . . . ad quos spectabit”, P. R. vol. 41, fol. 22r, 1449 (Polizzi); “nobilibus capitaneo iudicibus et iuratis ceterisque officialibus”; P. R. vol. 47, fol. 112r-v, 1456 (Agrigento); “capitaneo iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus . . . et presertim portulanotis eiusdem terre”, P. R. vol. 47, fol. 133r, 1456 (Termini). For other examples, see notes 33, 34 and 47 below. 30 Authorization for the “pretori iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus ad quos spectet” to sell the gabelle ahead of time; R. C. vol. 54, fols 98v-99r, 1422 (Palermo). A mandate to the captain, judges, and jurats of Agrigento who “cogant seu cogi faciant” 15 tarí to be used by the notary of the civil curia for restoring the archives and the seat of the curia; P. R. vol. 24, fol. 221v, 1425. Permission granted to the jurats and universitas of Agrigento to levy a wine tax; P. R. vol. 24, fols 220v-221r, 1425. Appointment of the credencerius of the indirect taxes on vini et carnium in Noto announced to “vicesecreto et aliis officialibus terre Nothi predicte ceterisque ad quos spectet”; R. C. vol. 76, fol. 161v, 1440. Announcement sent to the “capitaneo patricio iudicibus iuratis ceterisque officialibus et universitati terre” confirming Rainaldo Xurtino’s ownership of the salt works, “La Ribecca”; R. C. vol. 79, fols 140r-142r, 1443 (Noto). Authorization for the captain, judges, jurats, and other officials of Polizzi to demand that the Denti family turn over funds they had collected beyond what was stipulated in the contract for the gabelle (C. vol. 2875, fols 89v-90r, 1454), subsequently, however, the formula of address refers only to the jurats of Randazzo (ordering that the municipal gabelle be used to pay the ambassador); P. R. vol. 47, fols 103r-104r, 1456. In this last document, the initial reference is to the jurats of Randazzo, then Piazza, but because the syndic was Simone Pullichinu, it clearly deals with the community of Randazzo where he served; cfr. P. R. vol. 47, fols 122r-125r, 1456. A request of the “capitaneo patricio iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus terre Nothi” not to have the “dilectu regiu Franchiscu Dedato de officio regie cancellerie” contribute to the colletta because he was a royal official; P. R. vol. 47, fols 198v-199r, 1457. 26 27 28

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Power relations among the various magistracies can be further analysed by examining the sales of royal offices to which Alphonso often resorted. Attention will shortly be directed at the political effects of this practice,31 but for the moment the focus will be on information relevant to relationships between local magistracies and those who were notified of the sale of a position by the central government and the ensuing alignment of new power relations in the government. When offices were granted or royal notification was given of the conferment of an office that previously had been alienated, it was not always clear to whom the sovereign or his representative were addressing the announcement of an alienation or new appointments. There was obviously no one specific local intermediary even when the references were general ones,32 as borne out by the numerous decrees in which officials are indicated in the royal formulas of address. The civil curia and the jurats were always named, often the captain, and in some cases, the rest of the community homines terre.33 When announcing the sale of an office, the central government (whereas in previous examples, the emphasis has been on administrative activity determined by the universitas) addressed the civil curia and the jurats’ curia as well as the royal official who would be ceding his post. In the formulas of address, the iuratia was listed after the other magistracies. The same patterns recur for royal announcements of royal positions granted and ex gratia appointments to office.34 These facts clearly indicate a distribution of power and not a concentration favouring one specific institution. The patterns of formulas of address for communities or municipal property granted in fief are somewhat different: the sovereign, or his representative, addresses the community as a whole,35 or possibly the homines of the locality might simply be listed.36 In this case, the exceptional nature of the event explains the involvement of the entire community. Similar distributions of prerogatives also concerned the civil curia: it was not the only institution charged with jurisdiction over low justice given the functions, although limited, claimed in this field by the iuratia. As noted earlier, Martin I decreed indiscriminately in 1398 that all cases involving amounts of less than 1 onza falling under the purview of the captaincy were incumbent upon the jurats and authorized the jurats’ curia to initiate legal proceedings, while for cases involving more than 1 onza, the jurats were to merely register the lawsuit.37 This regulation was truly innovative as it did not limit the role of the See Section 4.3. “Universis et singulis officialibus”; P. R. vol. 26, fols 123v-124r, 1424 (Termini). “Officialibus et universitati hominum”; R. C. vol. 76, fols 418v-419r, 1441 (Agrigento). “Universis et singulis officialibus”; P. R. vol. 38, fol. 58r-v, 1446 (Salemi). “Universis et singulis officialibus”; P. R. vol. 38, fols 111v-115r, 1446 (Sciacca). “Officialibus universitati ac habitatoribus”; P. R. vol. 38, fols 35r-41r, 1446 (Nicosia). 33 “Capitaneo iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus”; R. C. vol. 54, fol. 321v, 1423 (Randazzo); subsequently the baiulus also appears as: “capitaneo baiulo iudicibus curie civilis et aliis officialibus universitati et singulis personis”; P. R. vol. 40, fols 161r163v, 1448 (Randazzo). “Iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus ac habitatoribus”; R. C. vol. 69, fols 107r-108v, 1434 (Sciacca). “Patricio, iudicibus iuratis et universitati”; R. C. vol. 75, fols 173r-175r, 1439 (Noto). “Capitaneo baiulo iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus universitatis et singularibus personis terre Salem ceterisque ad quos spectet”; P. R. vol. 44, fols 335r-336r, 1452. 34 “Capitaneo iudicibus iuratis”; P. R. vol. 25, fol. 34r, 1422 (Agrigento). “Capitaneo et aliis officialibus”; P. R. vol. 25, fol. 34r-v, 1422 (Castrogiovanni). “Pretori iudicibus iuratis”; P. R. vol. 25, fol. 27v, 1422 (Palermo). “Pretori iudicibus iuratis ceterisque officialibus”; P. R. vol. 25, fol. 55r-v, 1422 (Palermo). “Universis et singulis officialibus”; P. R. vol. 28, fol. 25r, 1425 (Salemi). “Capitaneo iudicis et iuratis”; C. vol. 2823, fol. 134r-v, 1434 (Agrigento). “Capitaneo baiulo iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus”; R. C. vol. 84, fol. 252r-v, 1451 (Agrigento). “Capitaneo iudicibus iuratis secreto et ceteris officialibus”; P. R. vol. 47, fol. 149r, 1456 (Palermo). “Capitaneo iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus”, P. R. vol. 47, fol. 106r-v, 1456 (Termini). 35 “Capitaneo baiulo iudicibus et iuratis et aliis officialibus quibuscqumque incolis et habitatoribus”; P. R. vol. 24, fol. 110r, 1422 (Eraclia). “Universis et singulis officialibus incolis habitatoribus et personis aliis officialibus”; P. R. vol. 27, fols 40v-41r, 1426 (Nicosia). “Capitaneo secreto iudicibus iuratis et cunctis aliis officialibus”; P. R. vol. 33, fols 192v-195v, 1433 (Patti). 36 C. vol. 2846, fols 227v-228v, 1445 (Termini). 37 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum VII, p. 142. 31 32

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iuratia to the civil sphere. In an overall context of strengthening this magistracy, it would have long-lasting effects. Martin’s decrees appear again when the practice of monitoring the activities of the captain (an investigation called sindacatum which was generally carried out at the end of his year in office) was widespread and the limit of 1 onza was not always explicitly stated. In 1423, the universitas of Salemi asked on the basis of one of its observancia et consuetudo that the jurats be given jurisdiction over suits dealing with both inferior and superior amounts—a clear allusion to the limits set by Martin I. Viceroy Nicola Speciale, although refusing the request, implicitly confirmed that Martin’s prescript had been strengthened. The jurats were to continue operating as before in every case involving less than 1 onza, thus, not only in relation to affairs that were the province of the captain: Et primo specialiter ante omnia quod iurati terre Salem valeant et possint uti eorum iurisdicionem inter forenses et concives tam in causis maioris summe summe [sic] quam minoris pro ut solitum est fieri per antiquam observanciam et consuetudinem in dicta terra Salem longo tempore servatam. Respondetur quod actento quod iurati civitatum Panormi, Messane, Cathanie, Drepano et aliorum locorum regni non habent iurisdicionem nisi de minimis et eciam actento quod capitula ad olim edita per serenissimos principes reges huius regni expresse cavetur quod iurati iurisdicionem talem cognoscendi in summa maiori habere non debeant fuit per dominus viceregem mature provisum quod ad uncia una infra dum taxat iurati peticiones possent audire [. . .] et alia faciant que incubunt eorum officio.38

In 1426, the universitas di Calascibetta proposed that the jurats should monitor the captain’s activity without any limits set and Viceroy Nicola Speciale accepted the petition while recalling that provisions for such an operation already existed.39 In Randazzo in 1456, the duties of the jurats in monitoring the captain concerned low justice in general.40 This authority placed them in a strong position with the central government as demonstrated by Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea’s concession authorizing the iuratia in Randazzo to administer the captaincy until a new captain’s curia could be set up. The concession followed a request from the universitas regarding the matter which denounced the dishonest activities of the captain and his assessor. The community itself suggested that the management of the curia be assigned to the jurats. The supervisory authority attributed to the jurats in relation to civil suits was the same as that of the royal syndicator even to the point that, in order to avoid excessive costs to the populus (popolo), the jurats would have necessarily reached a verdict and no appeal would be allowed.41 The broad scope the jurats’ prerogatives, beyond those stipulated by Martin, is also sustained by the fact that the universitas did not ask that the civil curia be authorized to carry out the investigation. Therefore, for the community, the jurats represented the institutional level best suited to ask the Crown, albeit in an emergency situation, for an atypical role in judicial matters. What took place in 1442 in Polizzi is quite interesting in this regard. It was necessary to re-establish institutional order there after a period when the community had been P. R. vol. 26, fol. 72v. G. G. p. 35. The same prerogatives for the jurats in Caltagirone (G. G. p. 53, 1420 and p. 56, 1432) and the jurats in Castrogiovanni (G. G. p. 84, 1420–21). 40 P. R. vol. 47, fols 123v-124r. 41 P. R. vol. 47, fols 123v-124r. 38 39

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held in fief. The universitas proposed that the captain’s curia swear before the jurats’ curia to respect the privileges and customary statutes of the locality. The Sovereign approved their request to respect the privileges without making provisions for an oath.42 Later, in 1448, following the presentation of other petitions ensuing from the community’s difficult relations with the captaincy, the oath was formally sanctioned.43 The jurats’ pivotal status in the structural configuration of the civic officials’ positions in Polizzi’s universitas is pointed out by Simone Bologna President of the Kingdom’s decision, in 1453, to grant ad interim the captaincy to one of the jurats while the captain’s assessor was not available because Bologna needed to confer with the person who held the position.44 This decision was indicative of the relationships which existed among the higher officials: the choice, in fact, should have fallen to the civil curia since These facts help to explain the cooperation between the captain and jurats in imprisoning Geronimo Amato in Patti in 1457 without calling in the judges. Antonio Russo Spatafora, President of the Kingdom, addressed the captain and the jurats of Patti who had jointly ordered the incarceration45 and judging from this episode, Amato’s incarceration ensued from a normal collaboration between the captain and the jurats’ curia. It appears significant that the fine for lighting a fire in Patti without the iuratia’s permission was subdivided among the treasury, the captain, the jurats and the fund for repairing the walls.46 The instance in Patti, however, was not typical. Regular cooperation between the captain, the civil curia and the jurats’ curia confirmed the contribution of the jurats in judicial matters such as this yet in no way excluded the participation of the judicature.47 Its duties, with jurisdiction over civil affairs, were related to the captaincy’s. Outside of the few instances already cited, it was rare and inconsistent with legal statutes for the curia charged with jurisdiction over criminal matters to function in the civil sphere and, vice versa, for the civil curia to operate in the criminal sphere. It is particularly significant, therefore, in the sporadic instances in which such norms were breached, that the jurats should venture into the field of high justice. In Polizzi they were the authors of sentences for criminal offences and in 1457 lodged a complaint with Antonio Russo Spatafora, President of the Kingdom, which deemed as a legally inappropriate the demand by the royal representative, Pietro Pisano, a legum doctor, to view these acts during a inspection.48 The President’s reply in favour of the jurats confirmed the positive relations they had established with the Crown, as well as an extension of their judicial role in criminal matters.49 It is important to note that when authority was exercised in ways inconsistent C. vol. 2822, fol. 23v. P. R. vol. 39, fol. 205v. P. R. vol. 45, fol. 585v. P. R. vol. 49, fol.189r. C. vol. 2850, fol. 39r-v, 1445. For example, the following formulas of address appear in measures by the sovereign or his representatives pardoning private individuals: “universis et singulis officialibus”, P. R. vol. 21, fols 151r-152r, 1420 (Corleone); “capitaneo pretori iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus”, P. R. vol. 47, fols 132r-133r, 1456 (Palermo); “capitaneo baiulo iudicibus et iuratis”, P. R. vol. 41, fol. 80v, 1449 (Piazza). It might also happen that only the captain was informed; P. R. vol. 21, fol. 113r, 1420 (Castrogiovanni). Widening the viewpoint to include other cases, the “capitaneo pretori iudicibus et iuratis et aliis quibus officialibus et personis” were charged with the task of keeping prostitutes away from certain areas; P. R. vol. 38, fols 162v-163v, 1447 (Palermo). The “capitaneo iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus” were notified of a royal privilege that would allow certain men to serve aboard the galleon of Antonio Luna, Count of Caltabellotta; P. R. vol. 50, fols 261r-262r, 1458 (Sciacca). 48 P. R. vol. 47, fol. 362r. 49 P. R. vol. 47, fol. 362r. 42 43 44 45 46 47

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with the norms, it was many times merely the result of temporary municipal arrangements attempting to expand the authority of a given magistracy which might not have been the usual one. For example, in 1445 l’universitas di Randazzo requested through the syndics and ambassadors, Giovanni Basilico and Enrico Scalis Giurato,50 that the captain have jurisdiction over all criminal and civil suits which he might resolve by applying a compositio. Lope Ximen de Urrea’s placet regarded criminal proceedings and ignored the request for civil suits.51 Apart from these exceptions, the distinction between the two domains was clearly marked: civil matters were the province of the judges and jurats and criminal affairs were the domain of the captain. In this regard it is opportune to compare information from the reign of Martin I with that from Alphonso V. The eventful period of Martin’s restoration of the monarchy and the re-entry of the universitates in the royal demesne, although also marked by conflicting local pressure, was characterized by a definite interest on the part of the communities to govern all the spheres within their preserve and, therefore, to circumscribe the captain’s power. At the same time, local governments put forward petitions in an effort to clarify the areas of competence for the various magistracies and the application of a diarchic system was fully encouraged by the Crown. While the captain, at the end of the 1300s, could try to usurp prerogatives thanks to a substantial legacy of functions, the stand taken against such rare encroachment was very firm during the Alphonsian reign52 and attempts to “overstep” boundaries might even come from elected officials.53 By then it was accepted practice for the captain to operate only within the domain of criminal law, and while the opposite might have occurred, such incidences were only isolated episodes arising from moments of tension among the various magistracies. Requests were seldom made to distinguish between the areas of competence. In addition, the sporadic nature of the requests and, more importantly, the vast number of captains coming from the local area, imply that the requests were the result of internal political strife rather than an attempt at interference from the Crown.54 In contrast to the previous reigns, the network of control over urban administration and the civil judiciary by the elected officials meant that the captaincy could only exercise the authority stipulated by the regulations. A final note concerns the organizational structure of the royal offices which continued to be listed among the members of the captain’s curia during the Alphonsian

P. R. vol. 37, fol. 179r. P. R. vol. 37, fol. 89 r-v. The most interesting instance concerns the petition from Piazza’s universitas presented by the jurats, Motta Crapanzano and Bernardo Amoro to Viceroys Antonio Cardona, Ferdinando Velasti, and Martino de Turribus. They lamented the captain’s attempt, based on false information provided to the Crown, to oversee the activities of the jurats when this should have been the responsibility of the master jurat; P. R. vol. 21, fol. 109r-v, 1420. 53 This is the case previously noted of Salemi’s universitas which requested that the jurats be assigned civil and criminal jurisdiction; P. R. vol. 26, fol. 72v, 1423. Grievances were presented by the jurats of Nicosia revealing power relations not related to forms of subordination. Particularly noteworthy is the objection to the captain’s judge serving as his substitute when the captain was absent and especially the stand taken against the captain’s assistants (monterii); P. R. vol. 31, fol. 23r, 1430. 54 The universitas of Corleone asked, in 1434, that the areas of competence be differentiated by assigning criminal affairs to the captain and civil matters to the civil curia; STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 178. The same request was presented by Noto’s universitas in 1439; R. C. vol. 75, fol. 180v. Corleone consituted an exception to the rule because most of the captains there were not local persons; for example: P. R. vol. 22, fol. 263v, 1413–1415; R. C. vol. 51, fol. 251r, 1416–17; P. R. vol. 21, fol. 22v, 1419–20; P. R. vol. 25, fol. 78r, 1422–23; R. C. vol. 70, fol. 37v, 1435–36; P. R. vol. 34, fols 36r, 42r-v, 1437–38; P. R. vol. 47, fol. 112v, 1456–57. Regarding the extensive control of the captaincy at the local level, see Section 4.3. 50 51 52

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reign. This magistracy was made up, besides the captain, of the judge or assessor, notarius actorum, treasuror (erariatus officium curie capitanie), and monterii. The other royal officials were the secretus and the castellan (responsible for the prison).55 The position of Notarius Actorum was usually conferred for life and often per via emptionis56 and a single official (charged with recording the acts) might be responsible for managing the captain’s curia in more than one community.57 An officium erariatus was active in the captain’s court and, according to known information, it was a lifelong position and the designated official was probably assigned accounting tasks.58 The monterius merely carried out orders.59 There were also exceptions for royal offices. A case in point is the universitas of Palermo which, in November of 1422, rejected the Crown’s appointment of the captain’s judge, claiming to be able to select him by scrutiny according to privilege. Incidentally, the city’s grievance makes it possible to glimpse an especially revealing detail concerning the ambassador’s role which was not limited to conveying the request. Before the Sovereign, he argued the community’s case: “dubium motum et agitatum in regio consilio presente domino Nicola de Bononia”. The final decision called for the respect of the city’s rights in the future, albeit in general terms, but upheld the Crown’s appointment of the official to the position.60 Following this 1422 petition, and on the basis of the few complete listings of scrutinies, the captain’s judge does not appear among the elected officials even though two captain’s notaries were listed. This was probably due to contingent arrangements since, considering a later reference from 1472 regarding officials regularly chosen in a scrutiny which did include a captain’s judge,61 the practice of a municipal appointment would be formally established. The case in Palermo reveals a gradual broadening of administrative areas under municipal control, a policy fostered in other localities as well, but not always with the same results. In 1452, for example, Catania rejected the grant of the post of Captain’s Judge to Gualteri di Paternò who had purchased it for life and the universitas obtained a royal placet for annual appointments through a scrutiny.62 None of what was requested was actually put into practise: complaints lodged against successive royal lifetime grants, sometimes

GENUARDI, Il comune, pp. 197–198; Consuetudines, fol. 76r-v, 1455. P. R. vol. 26, fols 123v-124r, 1424 (Termini); R. C. vol. 75, fol. 210r-v, 1439 (Monte San Giuliano); P. R. vol. 38, fol. 152r-v, 1445 (Noto). 57 Based on an earlier concession, Giacomo Gravina was recorded in 1423 as being Notarius Actorum, for life, for the curiae of the terre of Corleone, Salemi, and Trapani. Then, in 1434, the position passed to his son, Carlo, miles of Catania, who sold the post in the curia di Salemi for 55 onze to Giovanni Nuchio, son of the magister, Nicola Nuchio, civis of Palermo, who would have to pay 50 onze in cash and 5 onze in ‘operum lignaminium construendorum per dictum magistrum Nicolaum patrem’; P. R. vol. 26, fols 78v-79r; P. R. vol. 48, fols 245r-248v; P. R. vol. 50, fols 276v-281r. For another example of the same official’s being granted the notary’s position in several communities, see C. vol. 2820, fols 66v-67v, 1433, but in this case the appointment also concerned the office of Notary of the Port. 58 R. C. vol. 79, fols 118v-119r; 1443 (Polizzi); R. C. vol. 90, fol. 128r-v, 1454 (Nicosia); P. R. vol. 48, fols 204v-205r, 1456 (Catania, Thomeo Maglaro purchased the lifetime office for 10 onze). The prerogatives are known for the same activity in the praetor’s curia; see p. 112. 59 See p. 113. 60 R. C. vol. 54, fols 103v-104r. Based on the scanty known data for earlier appointments, the captain’s judge was indeed elected by srutiny; R. C. vol. 38, fols 216v-217r, 1401–02; R. C. vol. 39, fol. 233r-v, 1402–03. 61 DE VIO, Felicis, p. 387. Some examples of scrutinies where the captain’s judge is not listed, except for the years 1401–02 and 1402–03, but the notaries of the captain’s curia always appear: R. C. vol. 38, fols 216v-217r, 1401–02; R. C. vol. 39, fol. 233r-v, 1402–03; P. R. vol. 37, fol. 180r-v, 1445–46; P. R. vol. 47, fols 176v-177r, 1456–57. In Corleone in 1429–30, the same official was elected by scrutiny to the civil curia as well as the captain’s curia; R. C. vol. 63, fol. 52r. 62 GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 13, 4 bis, p. 69. 55 56

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following the sale of the office, continued in the years to come.63 Finally, in an instance from the universitas of Termini where the captain’s judge was always appointed by the central government, the position appeared once among those in a scrutiny for the year 1456–57—an isolated episode.64 In summation, the most noteworthy aspect of the institutional relationships in the Alphonsian period concerns the absence of a sole level of government with a leading role, and, instead, a constant orchestration among various institutions resulting, among other things, in a reciprocal system of checks and balances among different officials in the performance their own duties. 3.2

The Office of the ‘Baiulus’

The historiographic reconstruction asserting a uniform institutional framework and two main municipal government bodies, i.e. the curia of the baiulus and the jurats’ curia,65is not corroborated by documentary sources which, among other things, testify to the pivotal position of the town council and in many cases the marginality of the baiulus. Significant peculiarities were already evident for the baiulus in certain communities during the reign Frederick IV, and even more so during the reign of Martin I. The focus will now be shifted to concentrate on the possible transformations or preservation of these characteristics during the Alphonsian period when in some universitates, especially those with low and medium population densities, the baiulus is shown to have played a secondary role, while in other centres, such as Palermo and Catania, he wielded considerable authority at the apex of the civil curia. Institutional configurations based on historical precedents confirm that where he was not chosen by scrutiny, or not always listed among those chosen by scrutiny, the baiulus held marginal responsibilities in the civil curia. Nevertheless, it cannot be maintained that where he were chosen by scrutiny, the baiulus always played a preponderant role in administering low justice. First of all, localities will be examined where a peculiarity in the functions or institution of the office emerges. In Sciacca, what had been recorded for Martin’s reign was reconfirmed thereafter: the baglia was a gabella made up of various sources of income, some of which concerned fines for civil offences, and others, municipal administration, but in both instances, the less important elements. This same information is recorded for the reign of Ferdinand I of the Castilian house of Trastàmara (1412–1416) in a 1414 decree by Viceregent Fernando de Vega. In order to quantify the income from the funds in the baglia (also called baiulia or baiulatio) before auctioning it, a list was made of the prerogatives of the baiulus while stipulating that in the event he did not fulfil his duties, he would be deprived of the administration of the baglia and required to give back what had been earned from the gabella. It was his duty to prohibit zara games (which were probably a form of gambling), make sure that waste was deposited in the proper places, and ban the bearing of arms

G. G. pp. 212–214, 1454, pp. 217–218, 1457, p. 228, 1457. R. C. vol. 104, fol. 84v. For the same year, 1456–57, a captain’s judge was appointed by the Crown in September (the scrutiny was carried out in October); P. R. vol. 47, fol. 107r. He had always been chosen previously by the Crown and would be in the years to follow; R. C. vol. 59, fol. 25r, 1427–28; R. C. vol. 73, fol. 67r-v, 1437–38; P. R. vol. 49, fol. 251r-v, 1457–58; P. R. vol. 50, fol. 481r, 1458–59. 65 CORRAO, “Fra città e corte”, pp. 13–26, MINEO, “Città”, pp. 120–121; PASCIUTA, In regia, pp. 61–66. 63 64

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at night.66 As is well known, the institutional framework in Sicily was transformed with the election of Fernando I in 1412 when the kingdom became a vice Kingdom under the aegis of the crown of Aragon: this explains the presence of Viceregent Fernando de Vega. As manifested in the capitula for the 1420 fair in Sciacca, the baiulus was also delegated functions within the civil curia,67 however, these duties must have been limited. Indeed, one of his tasks related to low justice seems to have been serving as a cabellotus in charge of collecting money from fines. This is affirmed in particular by Viceroy Nicola Speciale’s 1424 measure addressed to the vicesecretus to guarantee the revenue of the gabella baiulationis. It describes a cabellotus who played a peripheral role in the urban administration, as recorded in the 1414 decree, by enforcing the prohibition against carrying arms, enforcing the ban on the game of zara, and keeping the town clean. What was manifested in 1414 reflected established power relations that are partially corroborated by the customaries of Sciacca regarding the prerogatives of the baiulus’s office, namely: responsibilities related to urban sanitation, the night watch with the xurterii, and functions as a member of the civil curia limited to property damage caused by errant animals (these last items were not mentioned in the 1414 mandate): “item ad officium baiulationis spettat audire accusationes animaliorum quorucumque damna facientium, intrantium in vineis, jardinis, ortis, segetibus, cottoneriis et aliis rebus rusticis; nec non et audire accusationes personarum intrantium in eis”. A subordination to the judges also comes to light: “item durante officio baiulationis videlicet in illo anno baiulus non debeat expignorare aliquam personam propria auctoritate, nisi mandato judicum curie civilis”.68 The authority described here is not of the type attributable to the most powerful exponents of municipal government.69 Revenue derived from the baiulatio, according to the documents cited, was royal income. In 1414, the Viceroy intervened to defend the integrity of the income from the impost. On the basis of this instance it would be arbitrary to assume that the gabella baiulationis was inevitably a royal tax, but, as with every impost, the possibility of transitory possession of the revenue should not be excluded.70 In the case of Sciacca, it had belonged to the central government for a long period of time: in 1436 Viceroy Ruggero Paruta, pursuant to a request from the magistri racionales (the highest officials charged with monitoring and administering the financial sector), intervened to protect the income from the baiulus, called royal cabellotus, exhorting the captain and the jurats to see that he received half of each and every levy.71 66 R. C. vol. 48, fol. 252r-v. Regarding the succession of Martin of Aragon by Ferdinand I following the Compromise of Caspe, in general on the effects of the election, JOCELYN N. HILLGARTH, The Spanish Kingdoms 1250–1516, 2 vols, Oxford, II, 1976–1978, pp. 229–238. 67 In 1420 the universitas of Sciacca issued the capitula for the fair which were based on previous practice and confirmed by Alphonso. These petitions contain a reference to the baiulus among the administrators of justice in the civil curia; FRANCESCO La Mantia (ed.), Capitoli inediti della città di Sciacca del secolo XV, Sciacca, 1908, p. 7. 68 The text of the customaries in Il libro, p. 84; concerning the dating, see note 92 below. 69 In Sciacca in 1420, the syndic and jurat, Giovanni La Rocca, accused the baiulus of not fulfilling his responsibilities in performing the watch, and the Viceroys Antonio Cardona, Ferdinando Velasti, and Martino de Turribus, sternly demanded that the baiulus be read the part of the decree regarding his duty; P. R. vol. 21, fol. 89–90r. In Randazzo the baiulus rang the bell at two in the morning to allow those who were not already at home to return. Offenders would be fined 7 tarí and 10 grani; P. R. vol. 37, fol. 89r, 1445. In Randazzo, where the baiulus was not chosen by scrutiny, he was also charged with survellience of errant animals, even having to catch runaway slaves, and in 1446, there was a gabellotus for the cabelle baiulacionis (VENTURA, Randazzo, p. 130), a gabella which was already present previously (P. R. vol. 34, fols 90v-91r, 1437). 70 See Section 4.1. 71 R. C. vol. 71, fols 175v-176r. Regarding the magistri rationales, see BAVIERA ALBANESE, “L’istituzione dell’ufficio”, pp. 75–96.

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What has been affirmed for Sciacca can be further analysed by examining data from other communities. The most distinctive instance regards the universitas di Salemi where the town council and secretus drafted a corpus of petitions concerning the office of the baiulus on 17 September 1425.72 To focus on the role of the baiulus, these petitions will be taken into consideration as well as a decree issued two days earlier by the Viceroy which nevertheless referred precisely to the petitions which evidently were already known.73 The petitions defined the prerogatives of the office and qualifications for office holders. The most significant data related to the functions of the baiulus concern his judicial role which entailed basically the same functions as his namesake in Sciacca. This was a role in civil affairs where the baiulus alone was called in, without the judges, and did not tout court concern low justice but was limited to circumscribed cases where the fines involved were imposts of the baglia. He was charged with overseeing urban sanitation and would have heard offenders to be fined and, additionally, would have fined those who damaged others’ property.74 In Salemi the baiulus was responsible to the secretus with whom the town council had agreed upon the capitula. The low prestige of the office is revealed by the way in which the jurats would have replaced the baiulus in the event he did not fulfil his duties: the jurats and the council would have replaced him sans appell.75 Documentary sources also furnish a reference to the way in which the office was instituted. In Salemi, the office of the baiulus does not appear in the lists of offices assigned by scrutiny, nevertheless, after the petitions were issued, the baiulus was to be elected. One detail regarding the selection of the official is immediately revealed by the ensuing dispute: the post was not assigned during the regular elections by scrutiny.76 It was up to the “officiali et ceteri ad hoc vocem habentes” to carry out his election which was invalidated, however, because the chosen official had not reached the prescribed age indicated in the municipal petitions. The officials, therefore, went ahead with a second election but their decision to annul the first one and select a second individual was overturned by Viceroy Nicola Speciale because “cum hoc ad regium spectare officium et per consequens ad secretum”.77 The Viceroy then took it upon himself to appoint the baiulus P. R. vol. 28, fol. 26r-v. That the capitula resulted from an agreement with the secretus is confirmed in the act preceding the publication of the corpus of petitions: on 15 September, Viceroy Nicola Speciale intervened concerning the conflict over the election of the baiulus and referred to the corpus of petitions which were to be announced publicly the next day; P. R. vol. 28, fol. 25r. 74 P. R. vol. 28, fol. 26r-v. 75 P. R. vol. 28, fol. 26r-v. 76 The election of the baiulus had been carried out earlier on 15 September (P. R. vol. 28, fol. 25r) while the regular elections were on 17 September (P. R. vol. 28, fol. 30r). The date of the scrutinies in Salemi is not specified because it was the same as the only one recorded for the first community in the list of the universitates where the elections were held. 77 The Viceroy’s decree states: “Alfonsus etc. Vicerex etc. universis et singulis officialibus [. . .] percepimus quod vos officiales et ceteri ad hoc vocem habentes primo loco elegistis more solito ut decet dictum Maczioccam de Montealto et ex inde fuit in dubium revocatum propter etatem quia dubitabatur utrum esset annorum viginti quinque propter quedam capitula inter vos [. . .] dumque secretus eiusdem terre ab eodem Macziocta fideiussionem recepisset et dicto Macziocca baculum administracionis consignisset receptis informacionibus super etatem non advertentes quia certi ex vobis alios posuerunt maiore etate ad secundam electionem processistis et quod deterius est baculum administracionis dicti baiulatus officii a dicto Macziocca abstulistis et consignastis dicto Girardo ac servientem dicti Macziocce carcerastis que quantum sint derogantis regie preminencie ipsi aspicite quam facta prima eleccione eius revocacio ad vos spectare non debet nec antem revocacionem prime eleccionis debuistis ad secundam procedere nec debuistis a dicto Macziocca baculum administracionis auferre nec dicto Girardo tradere cum hoc ad regium spectare officium et per consequens ad secretum nec debuistis dicto Girardo antem prestitam fideiussionem conferre et alia sit volontarie agistis propter que cum matura deliberacione sacri regii consilio decrevimus vos pro hac vice tantum ab eleccionem dicti Baiuli fore privandos sicque de facto privamus vestra et capitula que superioris confirmacione non habent declaramus irrita et non valere [. . .]”. P. R. vol. 28, fol. 25r, 15 September, 1425. It is not always possible, however, to consider the role of a baiulus in Salemi to be marginal: in 1452 the Sovereign notified the captain, baiulus, judges, jurats and other officials that the captainship had been sold (P. R. vol. 44, fols 335r-336r, 1452). 72 73

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for the fourth indiction while indicating that a municipal appointment would not be negated in the future. These indications show that, at least in this period, the office of the was a position filled by the universitas over which the Crown maintained indirect control. A control of this type makes it appear that the community had obtained the magistracy after negotiation with the Crown which retained some rights based on the control it had exercised previously. The community’s role in selecting the official is related to the fact that the proceeds from the gabella in this period belonged, at least partially, to the universitas. In Nicosia, in another noteworthy instance, neither the baiulus nor the sciurterius were chosen by scrutiny, but in 1454 the universitas had the right to institute an election of magistri xurterii et baiulii, although the procedure to be used was not specified.78 This distinction in the institution of the magistracies gives the impression that, rather than holding office for the administrative year, the mandate for these officials was determined in each individual instance.79 The information from Salemi and Nicosia demonstrates that the institution of the magistracy, at least in certain periods, could be the province of the universitates. Another notable aspect which is generally characteristic of localities where the magistracy was not filled by scrutiny was the absence of rhetorical formulas used by the town council or Crown in referring to the office. Such a lack of prestige is already evident, in fact, in the duties most often ascribed to the baiulus, such as the night watch and urban sanitation. While some uncertainties remain regarding the functions of the baiulus in these communities, it is clear that he did not have a central role in the civil curia, that is, if he took part in it.80 Furthermore, it is possible to examine the link between this office and the secretia (i.e. the local royal revenues controlled by the secretus) with reference to possible arrangements that might have had to do with the gabelle of the baglia. In this regard, Corleone’s universitas merits attention. In Corleone, from the time when lists of scrutinies became regular during Martin’s reign (no lists were found for earlier years), the baiulus was not listed among those elected by scrutiny, his part in local government was of little consequence, and he never represented the universitas in negotiations with the central government. The situation changed in October 1434 when Alphonso V granted a concession pursuant to petitions presented by the notarius, Giacomo Carissima, Sindicus. Following negotiations between the Crown and the community, the concession withdrew royal possession of the post which had been ceded to the central government with a number of gabelle in exchange for 10 onze per annum. In 1434 this control ended and the position of

78 BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 220–221. Regarding the absence of these officials in the lists of scrutinies, see, for example: P. R. vol. 13, fol. 72r, 1399–00; R. C. vol. 46, fol. 195v, 1406–07; P. R. vol. 26, fol. 33r, 1423–24; P. R. vol. 31, fol. 42r, 1430–31; R. C. vol. 81, fol. 115r, 1443–44. 79 The baiulus of Nicosia is very rarely cited in the formulas of address. One of the few examples is a request in 1453 by Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea to the captain, baiulus, judges, jurats, secretus and other officials that Pietro Sabia might obtain the rights of doane et baiulie over his fiefs; BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 217–218. 80 This would seem to explain the presence of the baiulus, in some formulas of address regarding judicial activity, for example, a license addressed to “capitaneo eiusque assessoris baiulo iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus personis” to allow wheat exports and a request not to molest a resident; P. R. vol. 48, fol. 212r-v, 1456 (Sciacca). Concerning this subject, a mention must be made of the situation in Polizzi where the baiulus is not recorded as having been elected by scrutiny but an isolated reference shows that he participated in judicial affairs; P. R. vol. 33, fol. 94v (1433).

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baiulus returned to the universitas as an elective position.81 The transaction regarded the office as well as certain gabelle, so its value depended on the guaranteed income. In fact, the Crown had merged it with the secretia. The circumstances in Corleone did not represent an isolated incident. Some years earlier, in 1427, Agrigento had proposed a passage in the opposite direction by ceding the baiulia to the Sovereign.82 Even in some universitates where the position was filled by scrutiny, the baiulus might not have played a central role either in the civil curia or in relation to the other magistracies. In the universitas of Patti, the sovereign exercised an atypical control over the office due to the large number of ex gratia concessions granted while the jurats gradually eroded the spheres of influence that were the province of the baiulus. The petitions of 1434, drafted by the officials and the universitas of Patti and entrusted to Ambassador Pietro Vita, constitute a document that sheds light on the power relations within the civil curia and between the curia and the iuratia. The primary element to highlight is precisely the role of Vita who was a jurat the previous year (while the results of the elections by scrutiny in 1433–34 are not known). The text of the petitions, in fact, reveals a specific bias towards one political faction. From the main petition83 it is possible to construe that the baiulus was subordinate to the judges who were assigned a leading role in the civil judiciary84 and the activity of the baiulus seems to regard minor tasks like collecting tolls for the transit of animals. The main fact revealed in this reconstruction appears to be that the baiulus cannot be listed among the officials at the apex of the government for these universitates. This minor role emerges clearly in the judicial sphere, and in the administrative field as well, once the examples thus far examined are compared to the circumstances prevailing in Palermo and Catania. In these communities the magistracy had substantial influence STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 182–183. In those years there are no records of elections by scrutiny which only became regular occurrences beginning in 1436–37. The baiulus appears in the elections beginning in 1437–38; P. R. vol. 34, fol. 79v. The reference to the petitions presented by the notarius, Giacomo Carissima Sindicus in C. vol. 2826, fols 34v-36r. 82 G. G., p. 278. In this case there is no reference to the baiulus whose position does not appear to be elective either before or after the 1427 request. 83 C. vol. 69, fol. 91r-v. 84 In this regard, it should be pointed out that in the majority of the communities, judges assigned civil jurisdiction were not identified as Judges of the Baiulus in the lists of officials elected by scrutiny as they were in Palermo, Messina, Catania, and other localities where the Baiulus held a coordinating role. They were called either Judges’ or ‘Judges of the Civil Court’ (curti di lu civili or curti civile). The notaries of the curia were likewise identified as ‘Notaries of the Civil Curia’ or Notari Actorum. In this case the terminology seems to reflect the differing institutional character of the curia identified on the basis of the domain which was its province, rather than assigning the title the on the basis of the official at the head of the curia as occurred in other localities The use of the phrase curti civile was not constant, but certainly appeared frequently, 60% of the time on average; the absence of a reference to the office of the baiulus for the judges and notaries was systematic. This last information contrasts with cases where references to the office of the baiulus were widespread. In Catania the judges were often called judges ‘of the patricius’ (and the notaries always were), as in Palermo and Messina. For Catania, where the legum doctor, judge of the patricius could be distinguished from the other judges called ideoti who had not studied law, see the lists for the years 1421–22, 1427–28, 1432–33, 1445–46, 1447–48, 1451–52, 1457–58 in P. R. vol. 24, fol. 32v; R. C. vol. 59, fol. 22v; P. R. vol. 33, fols 28v-29r; P. R. vol.37, fol. 186v-187r; P. R. vol.39, fol. 199r; P. R. vol. 44, fol. 26r; P. R. vol. 51, fol. 27v, respectively. For Palermo where the judges of the praetor had the distinction of having studied law and were thus called ‘jurists’ or legum doctores, see, for example, the lists for the years 1401–02, 1402–03, 1456–57 (in this last instance they were called misseri); R. C. vol. 38, fols 216v-217r, R. C. vol. 39, fol. 233r-v, P. R. vol. 47, fols 176v-177r, respectively. For Messina, where a curia of the stratigotus was functioning, see SALVO, Una realtà, pp. 215–300. Beginning in Martin’s reign, scrutinies for the various universitates are systematically recorded in the registers of the Royal Chancery and the Prothonotary of the Kingdom, with the exception of Palermo for which no lists are to be found for a number of years. This can be explained by the existence of a municipal chancery, fully operative from the early 1300s, which probably made registration by the central chancery less imperative. Still, Palermo’s local administrative acts do not consistently record the lists of those elected, often noting only partial listings. This very likely occurred because the officials were so well-known in the community that it was not deemed necessary to record their names. 81

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with the Crown by whom it was constantly called on (in the formulas of address it was always the first office cited)85 and occupied a pivotal position in these communities in negotiations with the Crown,86 in collaborating with the town council, and because of its judicial activity within the civil curia.87 Such prestige is demonstrated by examples including the following: in 1432, the universitas of Palermo were granted authorization for the praetor and the judges to annul the royal orders and request a re-examination while Simone Bologna, President of the Kingdom, assigned the patricius in Catania, together with his assessor, jurisdiction from 1455 to 1456 over both civil and criminal suits involved in the conflict between Guglielmo Raimondo Moncada and Blasco Alagona who alternated as Captains.88 This central role in the civil curia does not seem to correspond to the situation in other universitates, such as Trapani for example, where although the baiulus was elected by scrutiny, he does not appear to occupy the top position in the curia.89 The pre-eminent role of the praetor in Palermo and patricius in Catania was the result of a consolidation of historical precedents based on the significant number of milites 85 Some examples for Palermo: a concession to the universitas of an authorization for an early sale of the gabelle announced to the “pretori iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus ad quos spectet” (R. C. vol. 54, fols 98v-99r, 1422); a concession of royal offices or ex gratia positions announced to the “pretori iudicibus iuratis” (P. R. vol. 25, fol. 27v, 1422); “pretori iudicibus iuratis ceterisque officialibus” (P. R. vol. 25, fol. 55r-v, 1422); a request to send away the prostitutes addressed to “capitaneo pretori iudicibus et iuratis et aliis quibus officialibus et personis” (P. R. vol. 38, fols 162v-163v, 1447). Some examples for Catania: a royal notice to the patricius and judges to carry out the sentence of the Magna Curia (C. vol. 2826, fol. 59v, 1434); a royal mandate to the patricius, judges and jurats to accept the treasurer chosen by Federico Rizzari who was to leave the position (C. vol. 2843, fol. 98r, 1442); a request from Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea to the patricius of Catania to make sure that the vassals of Blasco Barresio had sworn an oath to Barresio for the city and castrum of Militello (R. C. vol. 89, fols 126v127r, 1453); a request by Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea to the patricius to carry out the Magna Curia’s sentence revoking the captaincy of Guglielmo Raimondo Moncada (P. R. vol. 50, fol. 259r, 1458); the Sovereign notified the “capitaneo, patricio, iudicibus, iuratis et aliis officialibus” of the reply to the petitions artistarum et consolum (G. G. p. 190 ss, 1446); the same formula of address, this time from Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea in 1458 (ibidem, p. 232). 86 P. R. vol. 21, fols 222v-223v, 1420 (Palermo); R. C. vol. 72, fols 192v-194v, 1438 (Palermo). It is not generally specified for Catania who the ambassadors were and in the rare cases that they were named, it was the captain on one occasion (G. G. p. 199, 1447) and not an official in other instances (ibidem, p. 200, 1450; p. 206, 1454; p. 224, 1457). The role of the patricius, however, is recorded in the formulation of petitions: for example, in 1457 the patricius and the jurats entrusted the ambassador with the petitions for the Sovereign (ibidem, p. 215). Furthermore, the role of the patricius can be construed from the formulas of address included in note 85 above. 87 In Palermo the consilium civium functioned in collaboration with the praetor and the jurats who summoned them; C. C. vol. 61-1, v. 63-3. Regarding the role of the praetor in Palermo during the 1300s, see PASCIUTA, “Gerarchie e policentrismo”, pp. 143–169. The aggregation of officials in Catania’s councils was larger: ordinaciones enacted by the captain, patricius, judges, jurats and town council regarding pay for the hoers and other field workers; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 4, 10, p. 59, [1436]. The captain, patricius, judges, and jurats, with the council of all the gentili homini stipulated that the “mastri muraturi et intagliaturi et etiam li mastri di axa” (masons and woodworkers) should receive a salary of 1 tarí and 10 grani a day and li manuali (manual labourers) grana [grani] 10; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 4, 11, p. 196, 1435. The number of the officials might vary with only the jurats (and adiuncti) present; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 15, 2–3, pp. 72–73, 1458. The peace agreement between the bothers Giovanni and Fernando Platamone and Pietro Zappulla was signed on 2 March 1448 in the presence of the patricius, jurists judges (the judges of the curia of the patricius) and other nobiles; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 11, 8, p. 92. 88 R. C. vol. 69, fols 28v-29r, 1432 (Palermo). P. R. vol. 48, fols 38v-39r, 43r-v, fol. 81r-v (Catania), respectively. 89 The situation in Trapani was different where the role of the baiulus was less clearly defined in the royal formulas of address to “familiares et fideles nostri iurati iudices baiulus et universitas terre Drepani” authorizing an early sale of the gabelle; C. vol. 2823, fol. 164r-v, 1434 (Trapani). Moreover, the baiulus in Trapani is not recorded as having taken part in ambassadorial missions which were generally carried out by a jurat, and in some cases, the captain was also included. For example: P. R. vol. 25, fol. 164r, 1423; P. R. vol. 27, fol. 100r-v, 1426. R. C. vol. 59, fol. 39r, 1427; P. R. vol. 32, fol. 34v, 1431. In 1431, for the revenue in Trapani called baiulia, the jurats obtained an authorization: “libere valeant ac eis liceat luere redimere . . .baiuliam dicte terre seu ius quod in eadem baiulia habet seu habere pretendit Franciscus Syeri” (C. vol. 2819, fols 4v-5r). Francesco Sieri (Sigerio) claimed certain rights over the baiulia but did not hold the office of Baiulus—that year (1431–32) the official was Antonio Vicencio; P. R. vol. 32, f 21r. Sieri’s partial control over the baiulia did not imply his holding office. Having rights over funds in the baiulia was evidently quite different from occupying the post of Baiulus. The same distinction seems to exist in Syracuse between the office of Senator (concerning the title of Senator, see Chapter 2, note 30) and the baiulia belonging to the Crown which was administered by a cabellotus according to a decree in 1393 by Martin, Duke of Montblanc; P. R. vol. 7, fol. 139r.

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present in metropolitan centres beginning in the first half of the 1300s. Their prestige was formally established by the almost complete control they exercised over the office of the baiulus.90 This theory could also be applied, for the same reasons, to the stratigotus (a royally appointed official with civil and criminal jurisdiction) in Messina.91 The prestige characteristic of the milites might be one of the reasons underlying the increasing importance attributed to the offices they controlled. A further reason seems to lie in the high demographic concentration in Palermo and Messina beginning at the end of the 1200s leading inevitably to a more voluminous and complex administrative activity which meant that a coordinating figure was essential in the curia. This state of affairs would be consolidated over the course of the 1300s. 3.3

Institutional Differences in Government Organizational Structures

The differences in prerogatives of the baiulus and methods by which the position was instituted demonstrate, for the first half of the 1400s, marked institutional diversity which can be analysed by widening the viewpoint to include other offices. The ways in which the sciurterii were instituted and their relationships of subordination to the other magistracies, for example, can be examined. In Sciacca they were not elected by scrutiny, as they had not been during Martin’s reign, but were selected by the jurats or the captain: “curet attente baiulus cum sorteriis, sibi in competenti numero datis per iuratos seu capitaneum”92. They were not elected by scrutiny in Agrigento either, but that system changed following a municipal initiative in 1433 when the universitas was authorized to include individuals responsible for the watch among the ranks of the officials selected by scrutiny. The boni homini could no longer perform the duties of the xurta (office of the xurterius) because it created serious problems with their normal work in the fields.93 In approving the capitulum, the Sovereign revealed a clear difference not only in the way the office was filled, but also in the officials’ prerogatives. He marked the broad powers of the sciurterii in Palermo as an isolated case, but because there was no mention of the officials’ duties in the petition, the royal specification was intended to forestall potential emulation, and furthermore, make the individuals assigned to the watch subordinate to the captain.94 The role 90 Regarding the presence of milites in Palermo, see BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, pp. XX-XXIX. Abundant information concernine the presence of milites in Catania can be found in MATTEO GAUDIOSO, “Genesi e aspetti della ‘nobiltà civica’ in Catania nel secolo XV”, in Bollettino storico catanese, 6, 1941, pp. 29–67. The lists of officials are available for Palermo beginning with the early 1300s and for Catania, from the early 1400s. For those elected in Palermo, see D’ALESSANDRO, Terra, pp. 148–151 e TRIPOLI, Amministrazione (appendice). For Catania, see for example: P. R. vol. 21, fol. 27r, 1419–20; R. C. vol. 59, fol. 22v, 1427–28; R. C. vol. 74, fol. 62r, 1438–39; P. R. vol.39, fol. 199r, 1447–48; P. R. vol. 51, fol. 27v, 1457–58. Furthermore, regarding the general role of the milites, see ENNIO I. MINEO, Nobiltà di Stato: Famiglie e identità aristocratiche nel tardo medioevo, La Sicilia, Rome, 2001. 91 For the composition of the curia of the stratigotus in the 1300s, see SALVO, Una realtà, pp. 215–300. 92 Il libro, consuetudine XI, p. 84. It is not always possible to pinpoint the date of customaries which generally began to be drafted at the end of the thirteenth century (see ROMANO, Prefazione in Vito La Mantia, Antiche, pp. LXVII-LXXXIII), however, for Sciacca’s text of which the date is not known, the date is certainly later since it is modelled on those of other universitates; Vito La Mantia, “Notizie e documenti sulle consuetudini delle città di Sicilia”, in Archivio Storico Italiano, 14, 1884, pp. 307–308. 93 G. G. pp. 297–298. 94 In contrast to the power relations between the baiulus and sciurterii in Agrigento, which were equally divided in carrying out the watch, relations between the jurats and catapans in same community should be noted for the preponderant role of the former; ibidem, p. 304, 1443.

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assigned to the captain in Agrigento was actually put into effect as demonstrated by the fact that in 1453 it still existed.95 These circumstances in Sciacca and Agrigento recall those prevailing in Salemi where, in 1423, the sciurterii were elected by the captain, baiulus, judges, and jurats although these officials did not actually constitute the regular electoral college—it had previously been solely a function the iuratia.96 Later, in fact, after a series of fraudulent elections, Jurats Federico Palmerio and Giacomo Anfuso Sindaci proposed that only the iuratia be involved as had taken place in the past. The request was partially approved by Viceroy Nicola Speciale who stipulated that the elections would also be the captain’s responsibility.97 By broadening the range of observation to include localities in eastern Sicily, Patti’s universitas becomes noteworthy because of the jurisdiction it claimed over “homini et habitaturi di li casali di la Muntagna et di li Surrintinu” which enabled the community to impose the performance of the watch in the city on the inhabitants of the casali (rural villages).98 The availability of this resource probably explains why it was not necessary to continue choosing sciurterii; their election was recorded during Martin’s reign only until 1404–05.99 In 1425, when Viceroy Nicola Speciale deprived Patti of its jurisdiction over the rural villages, new means of selecting individuals responsible for the watch were required and the task became a joint function of the captain and the jurats.100 The fact that they did not carry out the night watch but performed the task of choosing the xurterii is shown by the 1444 request that outsiders be given a tax exemption in an effort to lure men who could be assigned the job into the city.101 In the universitas of Nicosia the sciurterii were not elected by scrutiny either. They were elected by the jurats and boni homini as recorded in a 1423 petition included in the “capitula et ordinationes terre Nicoxie” presented to Viceroy Nicola Speciale. These petitions also reveal the establishment in the community of a custom originally observed in only one neighbourhood, Santa Maria, where the officials were exempted from the tax for the watch.102 The sciurterii in the Alphonsian period, as well as during Martin’s reign, were not regularly elected by scrutiny in Calascibetta, Nicosia, Piazza, or Polizzi. But even where they were not elected by scrutiny they could be active, evidently appointed by some other means. In Polizzi they were probably functioning due to a gabella for the xurta managed by the jurats,103 a levy which also existed in Piazza.104 Agrigento’s decision that the individuals assigned to the watch be included among the ranks of officials elected by scrutiny was not an isolated case. Other communities

Ibidem, pp. 319–320. R. C. vol. 55, fols 186v-187r. R. C. vol. 55, fols 186v-187v, 1423. P. R. vol. 24, fol. 250v, 1425. Concerning other cases of control over the surrounding territory, districtus, see EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 118–126. Regarding the importance of the districtus from an economic point of view, especially in relation to wheat, see Randazzo’s 1466 municipal petitions included in La Mantia, Consuetudini, pp. 2–3. 99 R. C. vol. 42, fol. 116v. 100 P. R. vol. 24, fols 250v-252r. 101 The petition was not approved; R. C. vol. 79, fol. 181r. 102 BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 137–138. 103 C. vol. 2848, fols 153r-164r, 1445; P. R. vol. 45, fol. 421v, 1453. 104 C. vol. 2851, fols 52v-53r, 1446. 95 96 97 98

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expanded the framework of the offices filled by scrutiny to include magistracies such as the treasury. This occurred in Corleone beginning in 1425, in Patti in 1430, and in Catania— where it was previously a royal appointment normally bestowed for life—in 1444, but on a regular basis starting in 1453.105 Other universitates where the treasurer was not elected by scrutiny during Alphonso’s reign include Nicosia, Termini, Salemi, and Polizzi, but his presence in the government cannot be ruled out. A petition attesting to the fact that a treasurer was functioning in Nicosia recalled, among other positions occupied by notarii, this magistracy which was subordinate to the jurats, the same as in other localities.106 Nicosia was not a unique instance. In Salemi, for example, the catapans never appear among the lists of those chosen by scrutiny. They were active, nevertheless, as proven by the corpus of petitions regarding regulations for the control of weights and measures by these officials.107 The inconsistency in a magistracy’s institution might be the result of changing needs of society, as in Agrigento and Patti, which called its existence into question or, conversely, promoted its establishment. The information proffered does not purport to be exhaustive and, furthermore, not even the notaries ‘of the acts’ existed everywhere during the Alphonsian period (Milazzo), or only for one of the curiae (the civil curia in Polizzi, Randazzo, and Termini). Indications that magistracies not appearing in the annual lists of the scrutinies were nevertheless created at the local level are indeed plentiful but in most cases the means by which they were established is not known and, especially for the minor officials, the documentary sources from the central chancery only provides indirect references. For example, already in the 1320s in Palermo, Rationales responsible for controlling the activities of the treasurers

105 P. R. vol.36, fol. 30r-v, 1444–45; P. R. vol. 45, fol. 83v, 1453–54; P. R. vol. 51, fol. 27v, 1457–58. For Catania, Gregorio Mura was nominated Treasurer for the years 1422–23 (P. R. vol. 25, fol. 27r) and 1423–24 (P. R. vol. 26, fol. 36v). These concessions preceded the 1440 grant to Federico Rizzari who obtained the position for life in the event of Gregorio Mura’s death or if he were unable to fulfil his duties. Rizzari obtained the post in 1442; R. C. vol. 78, fols 203v-205r. For a comparison with another situation, the commune, and the intermittent presence of certain magistracies, and in general concerning institutional experimentation due to differing socio-political contexts within the pre-consular and consular periods, see: WALTER GOETZ, Le origini dei comuni italiani, Milan, 1965; HAGEN KELLER, “Gli inizi del comune in Lombardia: limiti della documentazione e metodi della ricerca”, in L’evoluzione delle città italiane nel secolo XI, eds. RENATO BORDONE & JÖRG JARNUT, Bologna, 1998; WICKHAM, Legge; GILLI, Villes, Chapter 2; GIULIANO MILANI, I comuni italiani: Secoli XII-XIV, Rome-Bari, 2007, Chapter 1. For the period of the podestàs, see: EMILIO CRISTIANI, “Le alternanze tra consoli e podestà e i podestà cittadini”, in I problemi della civiltà comunale: Atti del congresso internazionale per l’VIII centenario della prima lega lombarda, Bergamo 4–8 settembre 1967, dir. COSIMO D. FONSECA, Bergamo-Milan, 1971, pp. 47–51; JOHN KOENIG, Il «popolo» dell’Italia del Nord nel XIII secolo, Bologna, 1986; ENRICO ARTIFONI, “I podestà itineranti e l’area piemontese: Note su uno scambio ineguale”, in I podestà dell’Italia comunale, Parte I: reclutamento e circolazione degli ufficiali forestieri ( fine XII sec.-metà XIV sec.), ed. JEAN-CLAUDE MAIRE VIGUEUR, 2 vols, Rome, 2000, pp. 23–45. For the judicial system in the 1200s in Perugia, see JEAN-CLAUDE MAIRE VIGUEUR, “Justice et politique dans l’Italie communale de la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle: l’exemple de Pérouse”, in Académie des inscriptions & belles-lettres, Paris, 1986, pp. 312–328. On the transformations in the 1300s, see GIORGIO CHITTOLINI (ed.), La crisi degli ordinamenti comunali e lo Stato del Rinascimento, Bologna, 1979. 106 BARBATO, Per la storia, p. 136, 1423. It appears as an elective office only in the year 1406–07; R. C. vol. 46, fol. 195v. For information regarding power relations among the magistracies, see the memorandum drafted by the jurats in 1430 which reveals, among other information, the dominant role of the jurats over the treasurer; BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 152–157. A subordination of the treasurer to the jurats is affirmed, for example, in Sciacca (Il libro, p. 90) and in Milazzo (P. R. vol. 30, fol. 1573 [1429]). Concerning the purely executive role of the treasurer, see the Alphonaian Capitulum XLIX of 1434; TESTA, Capitula, I, p. 223. Capitulum LVI (ibidem, p. 225, 1434) stipulated that the jurats would to have received a salary “nisi per manus thesaurarii, cum mandato, mano iuratorum subscripto”. 107 This refers to the “capitula nadariae, seu cathapaniae terrae, seu universitatis Salem” (R.R. p. 89 [n.d.]), an undated text which seems ascribable to the mid-1400s since it is similar, in its use of the vernacular and the prerogatives assigned to the officials, to the 1439 corpus of petitions of Sciacca’s universitas—a confirmation of previous statutes—regarding the catapans; LA MANTIA (ed.), Capitoli, pp. 11–19.

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and municipal accounts in general were active, probably as a lifetime appointment.108 In the Alphonsian period, a Rationalis in Palermo proved to be operating still, but as part of the curia praetoris: in 1453 after the death of the notarius, Giacomo Chagio, the universitas, with an act signed by the praetor and jurats, decreed the “collactionem de officiis archivariatus rationalatus et erariatus curie pretorie” for the notarius, Nicola Apera, with a salary of 12 onze for life. Apera functioned strictly as an account as demonstrated by the act with which the universitas appointed him “in magistrum rationalem auditorem rationum nostrarum archivarum et erarium predicte nostre curie”.109 In Palermo, there was also a “magister mondiciae constitutus et ordinatus per universitatem” with a salary of 2 onze and, in this case as well, it was a magistracy with a lifetime appointment,110 while Catania had its Revisor Viarum in charge of urban sanitation.111 Later in Catania, a Magister Mondiciae, likewise charged with keeping the city clean, would be chosen annually by scrutiny.112 For the same community, the method is known for selecting the archivist of the acts for the curia of the patricius, which was composed of the patricius, three judges and a notary, all chosen by scrutiny.113 In 1425 the magistracy was created because it was deemed useful for the activities of the town council. The official was charged with the preservation of documents “tam antiquis quam presentibus” and the office was a lifetime appointment. The universitas elected four notarii from which the sovereign or the viceroy would make the final choice. The election procedure was that of the scrutiny as recorded in the Alphonsian confirmation of the concession in 1444.114 It must also be pointed out that in the main curiae there existed minor positions with strictly operational functions such as the servientis and monterius, for example, who were most likely officials operating in the same period in both the civil and the captain’s curiae. Pietro Panormo was appointed by Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea through the intercession of “familiares et domestici, in monterium curiarium capitanie civilis et iuratorum” of Piazza.115 Another example was the lifetime appointment of Nicola Aiuto of Sciacca as “servientis ordinarius curie civilis et aliarum curiarium et iurisdictionum dicte terre” whose duty it was to “citare requirere ceteraque alia facere prout ceteri servientes curiarum dicte terrae faciunt et exercent” by Simone Bologna, President of the Kingdom.116 In the first half of the 1300s, the

108 GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 263; BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, pp. LIX-LX; TRIPOLI, Amministrazione,

pp. 103–104. 109 P. R. vol. 45, fols 583r-584v; R. C. vol. 90, fols 78v-81r. 110 P. R. vol. 24, fols 181r-182r, 1425. Trapani also had an officium mondiciae belonging to the universitas; P. R. vol. 48,

fol. 20v, 1455. 111 This was a lifetime appointment: a royal concession to Matteo di San Giorgio through the intercession of familiares et

domestici regis; P. R. vol. 48, fols 130r-131r, 1455. 112 Operative since 1460; DOMENICO LIGRESTI, “Patriziati urbani di Sicilia: Catania nel Quattrocento”, in Il governo, p. 40. 113 P. R. vol. 21, fol. 27r, 1419–20; P. R. vol. 26, fol. 34v, 1423–24; dal 1438 (R. C. vol. 74, fol. 62r) The judges, which had previously been grouped together as ‘judges of the patricius regardless of whether they had studied law or not, appeared differentiated as ideoti, of which there were two, and a legum doctor, judge of the patricius, or iurista judge; R. C. vol. 76, fol. 69v, 1440–41. Such a differentiation would seem useful in emphasising the major role of the latter although even those without a degree were still considered members of the curia, as shown by the fact that they could all be called ‘Judges of the Patricius’; P. R. vol.37, fol. 186v-187r, 1445–46. 114 GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 2, 2, p. 331. An archivist was also present in Termini and another at the civil curia in Polizzi, both royal lifetime appointments; R. C. vol. 84, fols 332v-333r, 1451 and P. R. vol. 44, fol. 197r, 1452, respectively. 115 R. C. vol. 89, fols 117v-118v, 1453; the duration of the appointment was not specified. 116 P. R. vol. 45, fol. 585v, 1453. Appointment of a jurat of Trapani, Giovanni Amico, as Servientis of the Jurats’ Curia, a royal lifetime appointment; R. C. vol. 84, fol. 126r-v, 1450. The monterii and servientes probably had the same functions: Giacomo Sei served as monterius or servientis in all the curiae in Piazza; R. C. vol. 89, fol. 162v, 1453.

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servientes in the praetorian curia of Palermo were charged with actually carrying out court decisions and might also act as proxies for defendants absent during trials.117 The role of the monterius can be reconstructed based on extant information regarding the captain’s curia which reveals the widespread existence of the monterius in both metropolitan and rural centres with various units, probably armed, functioning as the captain’s backup unit.118 They were sometimes accused of excesses and misconduct: in Piazza in 1456 the royal commissioner was asked to investigate the violence perpetrated by Capitain Masi Renda and his monterii. That same year in Nicosia, following brutal oppression carried out by the monterii and servientes of the captain, Filippo Pinos, a resident of Nicosia, was appointed through the intercession of the King’s eldest son, Ferdinand of Aragon, as Comestabulus (a position instituted in Messina in that period as well) with civil and criminal jurisdiction over the accused.119 In 1456 the functions assigned to Pinos conformed to an unusual situation but in normal circumstances the position probably entailed security patrols and police activities. This is revealed by the Viceroy’s confirmation of Filippo Pinos “in antea durante nostro et regio beneplacito” in 1458 following the intercession of familiares et domestici regis. Regarding the functions of the office, Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea decreed: sitis et esse debeatis comestabulus in dicta terrae Nicosie cum cognicio et iurisdicione civili et criminali ac cum omnibus iuribus et emolumentis quod hactenus solita fuerunt per vos percepi et haberi nullo tamen propterea preiudicio generato magistris excumbiarum dicte terre qui noctis tempore onus habent custodie dicte terre.120

The group of officials elected by scrutiny, therefore, represents only a part of the magistrates chosen by the universitas, a fact sustained by the numerous magistracies not filled through scrutinies. Furthermore, the full autonomy enjoyed by the universitates in administering their local governments is affirmed by both their diverse ways of selecting officials and a widespread institutional experimentation. In both cases they acted independently of the Crown. 3.4 A System Safeguarding Municipal Prerogatives: The Judicial Sphere— the ‘Privilegium Fori’ and Appellate Court, the Royal Commissioner, and the Right To Reply The municipal situation in the royal demesne was not only characterized by institutional differences: during Alphonso’s reign there was also a converse, community-fostered trend toward greater uniformity, especially in judicial affairs. This process lead to an expansion of the system of safeguards through the acquisition of the privilegium fori which was usually followed by the institution of an appellate court—further indirect proof of the application of the privilege itself. These two resources formally established an ample jurisdiction of the universitas over its cives and habitatores in criminal and civil matters. Furthermore, 117 PASCIUTA, In regia, pp. 154–155. 118 P. R. vol. 30, fol. 23r, 1430 (Nicosia); P. R. vol. 34, fols 90v-91r, 1437 (Randazzo). 119 P. R. vol. 47, fols 269r-270r e P. R. vol. 48, fols 81v-82v, respectively. During the Norman period, the comestabulus had

military responsibilities; GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 62. 120 P. R. vol. 50, fol. 475v; Pinos had obtained the post from Alphonso V ad sui beneplacitum. See Chapter 5, note 63,

regarding Pinos.

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with very few exceptions, the judge and notary who made up this higher level curia were also among the ranks of the elected officials, thus, selected by the community, although the electoral procedures and the term of office might vary. This court provided a new political arena for the experts in law, legum doctores, who monopolized it. Interestingly, the increase in requests from communities to obtain an appellate court coincided directly with an unprecedented growth in the number of graduates with law degrees beginning during Martin’s reign. The complexity of the institutional framework was therefore a consequence of social transformation brought about by the presence of legal experts.121 This section will first examine the diffusion of the privilegium fori and appellate court, and then take up power relations between the Crown and the universitates while considering the role of the royal commissioner and the right of reply, as well as ex gratia concessions. Only Messina and Palermo enjoyed both the privilegium fori and the right to a higher level curia—from the end of the 1200s and the early 1300s, respectively122—but during the course of the fourteenth century, and especially in the late 1300s, other communities obtained the same concessions. Catania acquired the privilegium fori through a 1353 concession from King Ludovico.123 The appellate judge, on the basis of an earlier privilege of which the date is not known, was regularly elected by scrutiny beginning in 1423–24.124 In 1426, Alphonso V confirmed a previous concession by which he had granted Catania’s

121 Regarding the growing number of persons who received study grants from Sicilian universitates and earned their law degrees, mainly at Bologna, as well as the role of the jurists, see ANDREA ROMANO, «Legum doctores» e cultura giuridica nella Sicilia aragonese. Tendenze, opere, ruoli, Milan, 1984, and in a different vein, MANLIO BELLOMO, “Cultura giuridica nella Sicilia catalano-aragonese”, in Rivista Internazionale di Diritto Comune, 1, 1990, pp. 155–171. For a comparison of legal professionals, see for southern France, ANDRÉ GOURON, “Le rôle social des juristes dans les villes méridionales au Moyen Âge”, in Villes de l’europe méditerranéenne et de l’Europe occidentale du Moyen Âge au XIXe siècle: Actes du colloque de Nice 27–29 mars 1969, dir. MAURICE Bordes and others, (Annales de la faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de Nice, 9–10), Nice, 1969, pp. 55–67, which discusses the monopoly of jurists in the legal professions as arbitrators and counsellors for individuals and the community—an activity at the base of a significant enrichment which opened doors to municipal government on the one hand and to the nobility on the other. For Catalonia, where the correlation between legal experts and legal professions is confirmed, based on the rise of their presence in the community, a nueva profesionalizació de la justicia has been referred to in contrast with the situation in the Early Middle Ages when law was practiced indiscriminately by members of the community and rooted in customs the result of collective experience; TOMÀS DE MONTAGUT ESTRAGUÉS, “La jurisdicción municipal en Cataluña y los juristas de Barcelon en la baja edad media”, in “Faire bans, edictz et statuz: légiférer dans la ville médiévale. Sources, objets et acteurs de l’activité législative communale en occident, ca. 1200–1500”, Actes du colloque international tenu à Bruxelles les 17–20 novembre 1999, dir. JEAN-MARIE CAUCHIES & Éric BOUSMAR, Brussels, 2001, pp. 331–364. The jurists already had considerable influence in the first half of the 1300s but Martin of Aragon firmly established their role in Barcelona through royal statutes within the framework of which he instituted the corporation of the jurists. One for the abogados, a term encompassing the jurists, had been previously formed in 1333; ibidem, pp. 361–363. For the Kingdom of Castile, SALVADOR DE MOXÓ, “La promoción politica y social de los «letrados» en la Corte de Alphonso XI”, in Hispania, 12, 1975, pp. 5–29, discusses the creation of a group identity for jurists, beginning in the first half of the 1300s, as a function of the services they provided to the community; ibidem, p. 5. De Moxó points out a general phenomenon of the turnover of the ruling elite and emphasizes, in particular, the contribution to King Alphonso XI made by the letrados. This is a category which was understood to include not only the jurists, but more broadly, those who could claim a certain cultural background which the society of the time deemed useful for public office. By taking advantage of their assistance, the Sovereign was able to act more efficiently than he would have been able to with the help of others. Concerning the role of the jurists and the contribution of jurisprudence to state formation in the early modern period, see ALDO MAZZACANE, “Diritto e giuristi nella formazione dello Stato moderno in Italia”, in Origini, pp. 331–347, and THOMAS KUEHN, “Antropologia giuridica dello Stato”, in Origini, pp. 367–380; RODOLFO SAVELLI, “Tribunali «decisiones» e giuristi: una proposta di ritorno alle fonti”, pp. 397–421. 122 See Chapter 2, note 85. 123 GAUDIOSO, “Il Castello Ursino”, p. 202. In 1420, Catania’s consul in Messina was asked to see that a citizen of Catania need not appear before the Court of the stratigotus and would be consigned to the appropriate judge in Catania; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 1, 10, p. 310. 124 P. R. vol. 26, fol. 34v. Examples of elections: P. R. vol. 30, fol. 30v, 1428–29; P. R. vol. 33, fols 28v-29r, 1432–33; P. R. vol.36, fol. 30r-v; 1444–45. They were not elected in the years 1427–28 (R. C. vol. 59, fol. 22v) and 1430–31 (P. R. vol. 31, fol. 36v).

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curia the same privileges as Messina’s.125 A contrario, the notary’s office in Catania’s curia was a royal magistracy.126 It has not been possible so far to ascertain a date for the establishment of the appellate court in Trapani which was active, however, from the beginning of the reign of Martin I. In 1399 the universitas there lamented that, according to the prevailing concession, it should have been able to select the judge annually even though the Sovereign had granted the position as a lifetime concession at some point within the preceding three years.127 This magistracy, therefore, was definitely present in 1396 and appears regularly in the available lists of scrutinies starting in 1406–07 while the notary of the first appellate court, hereafter called the appellate notary, appears in the lists beginning in 1419–20. The privilegium fori appears to have been in force in Augusta before 1407 and in Patti from the arrival of Martin.128 Termini secured a confirmation of its privilegium fori in 1433, most likely as an extension of what had been granted by Peter II, but no instances of any elections for members of the appellate court have been found.129 Noto already enjoyed the privilegium fori for civil suits involving a maximum of 15 onze in 1423 and, by appealing to the examples of Messina, Catania, and Trapani in 1439, obtained the institution of an appellate judge through election by scrutiny for all lawsuits. He is shown, in fact, to have been elected by scrutiny together with the notary in 1440.130 Sciacca received the privilegium fori in 1434 for civil lawsuits up to 50 onze and for certain criminal cases131 and the judge and the appellate notary are recorded in elections by scrutiny beginning in 1436–37.132 In 1442, Polizzi also obtained the privilege for civil suits and, with some limitations, for criminal cases,133 but never attained the election of appellate court members by scrutiny. There is a record, however, of Viceroy Ximen de Urrea’s 125 C. vol. 2813, fol. 41r, 1426. According to GREGORIO, “Considerazioni”, II, p. 155, the appellate court was instituted in

1423. Some instances where the appellate notary was mentioned by the Crown: P. R. vol. 26, fol. 49r, for the year 1423–24; P. R. vol. 27, fols 152v-153v, for 1425–26 in antea. 126 C. vol. 2813, fol. 41r, 1426. 127 R. C. vol. 33, fol. 121r. He was regularly elected beginning in 1406–07 (R. C. vol. 46, fol. 196v). For other examples: P. R. vol. 21, fol. 29r, 1419–20; P. R. vol. 31, fol. 41r, 1430–31; R. C. vol. 77, fol. 68v, 1441–42. When not respected, the privilegium fori was quickly invoked by the citizens of Trapani; R. C. vol. 59, fol. 129r-v, 1428. 128 The concession is clearly stated for criminal cases but only vaguely for civil suits; G. G. p. 19. Augusta became feudal in 1417 and did not change that status, except for a very few years, until the end of Alphonso’s reign; see ibidem, p. 18. I have not located any lists of elections by scrutiny, except for those of the year [1413–14], in which the appellate court does not appear; R. C. vol. 49, fol. 111v. The privilegium fori regards both civil and criminal lawsuits in Patti; see LUCIANO CATALIOTO, “La questione dell’autonomia urbana a Patti tra pretese feudali e signoria vescovile (secoli XII-XV)”, in Città e vita cittadina nei paesi dell’area mediterranea: Secoli XI-XV, Atti del convegno internazionale in onore di Salvatore Tramontana, Adrano-BronteCatania-Palermo, 18–Si 22 Novembre 2003, dir. Biagio Saitta, Rome 2006, pp. 379–380. 129 C. vol. 2819, fol. 165r. 130 RISINO, Il Regesto, p. 101–102, 108; Interestingly, an archivist was attached to the appellate court in Noto and, on the basis of the only reference I have found, he was a royal appointee; R. C. vol. 75, fol. 392v, 1440. Nevertheless, the appellate notary was elected by scrutiny for the last time in 1448–49 (P. R. vol. 40, fol. 204r). On the intercession of familiares et domestici regis, in July 1449, Antonio Quadro was granted a royal lifetime appointment to the post of notary which was vacant at the time; P. R. vol. 41, fols 148v-149r. Then, in April 1454, after Quadro was stripped of the office for having committed crimes, the post was granted by the Crown upon payment of 20 onze, to Antonio Giacomo Speciale until the time that the money was returned; P. R. vol. 45, fol. 739r-v. 131 The Sovereign decreed: “quod habitatores terre Sacce pro causis civilibus in primo et secundo iudicio non possint extrahi a quinquaginta uncias citra in causis non criminalibus ubi venit imponenda pena mortis mutilacionis membri et deportacionis de quibus capitaneus terre Sacce non potest conoscere habitatores terre Sacce extrahantur pro dictis causis criminalibus quo non ad alias causas criminales de quibus capitaneus assuevit cognoscere videlicet ad relegacionem infra inclusive si delictum fuerit commissum in terra vel territorio Sacce habitatores ipsius terre non extrahantur idem si extra terram vel territorium delinquerit et non fuerit captus extra terram et territorium predictum si (videlicet) fuerit capti extra eamdem terram et territorium eiusdem eo casu possint puniri in loco delicti et extra terram Xacce”; R. C. vol. 69, fols 104r-105r. 132 For example: R. C. vol. 71, fol. 80v, 1436–37; P. R. vol. 39, fol. 195v, 1447–48; P. R. vol. 45, fol. 79r, 1453–54. 133 C. vol. 2822, fols 22r-24r (Polizzi).

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confirmation of the lifetime appointment of Goffredo Rizzari, Miles Legum Doctor, as appellate judge following a municipal election of the official: “universitas seu veru Franciscus et Andreas Denti veluti sindici et ambaxiatores ipsius cum voluntate consensu dicte universitatis vos eumdem Goffridum in iudicem dicte curie primarum appellacionum ad vite vestre decursum eligerunt propterea quod vos nobis humiliter supplicastis ut dictam eleccionem accettare dignaremur”.134 An appellate court for civil and criminal lawsuits was established in Caltagirone in 1442 but the judge was elected by scrutiny beginning only in 1451 and the notary in 1456.135 In 1444, Castrogiovanni obtained the privilege for civil suits of up to 50 onze and for all criminal cases except those for crimes of high treason, as well as an appellate court beginning with the eighth indiction (1444–45).136 The first appearance in the lists of elections by scrutiny dates to the eleventh indiction but only the notary is recorded in the lists. For John’s reign, however, neither the judge nor the notary is listed in the scrutinies.137 Evidently, election by scrutiny was not the means finally established for their selection. Finally, Corleone acquired the privilege for civil lawsuits of up to 50 ducats in 1447 and Piazza secured an appellate court in the same year.138 For the universitas of Piazza, however, the members of that curia were apparently never elected by scrutiny139 but it must be kept in mind that a universitas did not always put into practice what had been granted in a concession. The earliest information regarding the appellate court in Piazza dates from 1446–7 and is recorded in two royal concessions, to Antonio Crapanzano and the adiutor cammere regie, Ruggero Crapanzano, of royal lifetime grants of the positions of notary and appellate judge, respectively, with authorization to lease the offices.140 In November 1447, the universitas complained that the curia was being exploited for personal interests and managed to have Antonio Crapanzano prohibited from selling the office any longer because it dealt with justice and had only recently been established.141 In actual fact, even though the communities’ attempts to expand their prerogatives in the judicial field were widespread and found considerable favour with the Crown, a universitas did not always succeed in maintaining its privileges in a stable manner. Especially for the establishment of the appellate judge, the community had to guarantee that the position would be filled by legum doctores. A case in point is the 1439 request from the community of Noto for the establishment of the office which stipulated a limited vacatio of the office by the magistrate for fear that there might not be a sufficient number of legal experts available: Item praedictus ambaxiator supplicabit maiestati praedicte quod placeat suae maiestati concedere quod ipsa universitas habeat iudices primarum appellationum omnium causarum, quae causari debeant decidi et terminari per eumdem iudicem in terra Nothi, R. C. vol. 79, fols 193v-194r, 1444. The appellate court was functioning even later; R. C. vol. 98, fols 133r-134v, 1453. G. G. pp. 61–62. PACE, Il governo, p. 188. G. G. pp. 98–99. For example: R. C. vol. 109, fol. 52r, 1460–61; P. R. vol. 56, fol. 323r-v, 1461–62; P. R. vol. 57, fol. 231v, 1462–63; P. R. vol. 58, fol. 84r, 1476–77. 138 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 210 and P. R. vol. 39, fols 50v-53r, respectively. 139 For example: P. R. vol. 40, fol. 183r, 1448–49; P. R. vol. 45, fol. 79r, 1453–54. 140 The concessions of the judicature and the appellate notary were made on 28 December 1446 and 4 February 1447, respectively; P. R. vol. 39, fols 50v-53r. See also C. vol. 2860, fols 20v-21r. 141 C. vol. 2858, fol. 145r-v. 134 135 136 137

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sicut habent civitates Messanae, Cathaniae et terra Drepani; quem iudicem debeant eligere officiales terrae Nothi per scrutineum, qui sit doctor legum et duret per annum tantum et eo quia dicta universitas non habet copiam doctorum, vacando per annum possit concurrere; et nihilhominus si aliquo tempore in dicta terra erunt multi doctores, quod tunc dictus iudex fiat modo et forma quibus fiunt alii officiales civiles eiusdem terrae. Placet eidem maiestati ut petitur.142

In some instances the concession might not have been the result of a petition presented by the community, but could be bestowed as a favour to an individual. This was the case in Termini where the sovereign, while recalling a concession by Peter II, actually granted a broad privilegium fori in October 1433 to Giovanni Olzina who had become dominus of the town that June.143 In 1444, the community obtained a privilegium fori for criminal suits without any previous concessions being cited.144 Beyond these discrepancies between concession and application, which were indeed very limited, there was a considerable reduction in differences in the systems of rights and safeguards in the judicial sphere between the large and small centres, including minor rural communities, from the 1420s to the 1440s. The most significant aspect of this process lies in the fact that it was spearheaded by the universitates themselves,145 each one aspiring to reach the highest level of autonomy attained by the other communities. It was a generalized movement initiated at the ground-level and fully accepted by the Crown in concomitance with a relationship, open to the requests of the various political protagonists, between the sovereign and his realm. The next step is to ascertain whether or not the ferment sweeping through the universitates, a phenomenon perhaps best evidenced by the system of rights and privileges within the judicial sphere provided some of the most significant evidence, actually limited any potential interference from the Crown. It will shortly be shown how the sovereign’s liberal recourse to the alienation of the captaincy made the office an appanage of local leaders in the first half of the 1400s, and consequently, royal attempts at interference could no longer be easily accomplished through the captaincy.146 Through an examination of local conflicts involving the captaincy, it can be ascertained that the office might respond to municipal factions instead of royal control. There were still other openings for the sovereign’s interference, especially through the commissioner, a member of the central government’s organizational structure entrusted with intervention in both exceptional circumstances and routine activities. In terms of the commissioner’s role, it is necessary to determine if he exercised sufficient authority to actually constitute a valid channel through which central thrusts could be realized or if diverse municipal privileges could block royal tactics of a more invasive nature, especially in a fiscal context. It does not seem possible to decisively resolve this ambiguity because the Crown generally relied RISINO, Il regesto, p. 108. The appellate court judges in Caltagirone were doctores; PACE, Il governo, p. 188. C. vol. 2819, fol. 165r. C. 2846, fols 227v-228v. It has been shown that the reform measures for the kingdom of France in the 1300s were the results of requests from the nobility, the church and the cities, rather than being autonomous initiatives of the sovereign; see CLAUDE GAUVARD, “Ordonnance de réforme et pouvoir législatif en France au XIVe siècle (1303–1413)”, in Renaissance du pouvoir législatif et genèse de l’État, eds. ANDRÉ GOURON & ALBERT RIGAUDIÈRE, Montpellier, 1988, pp. 89–98. Regarding the role of the cities in legislative output for cities in the southern Low Countries during the Late Middle Ages, see GODDING, “Les ordonnances”, pp. 185–201. 146 See Section 4.3. 142 143 144 145

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on its official to maximize the identification of new sources of revenue rather than to impose a centralistic policy. Moreover, the municipal community managed to reduce the commissioner’s authority and frequently requested his assistance for its own needs. The institution of an almost ubiquitous network of appellate courts made the possibility of the Crown’s sending an official responsible for judicial matters more remote. Nevertheless, the presence of a royal magistrate from the mid-1430s was not sporadic and could be requested by the communities themselves.147 The intervention of the commissioner could indeed aid in the Crown’s quest for new sources of income which were guaranteed by the operations prescribed by the envoy, but the commissioner also followed up on complaints from municipal sectors against captains who, owing to the practice of alienation, were increasingly reflections of factional interests. Nevertheless, the presence of the royal commissioner was not always peacefully accepted by the universitates and, above all, the cities’ reactions as voiced by the town council merit clarification in incidents regarding alleged infringements of urban liberties.148 The reason for clashes between the universitates and the Crown concerned the confines of the commissioner’s authority which was restricted, according to the local governments, to ardue (difficult), ie. not ordinary, cases. Whereas the communities ascribed a very limited number of lawsuits to this category, the Crown tended to expand the scope of the royal official’s activity. This definitely included crimes of “lese maiestatis, heresis, nefandi” since no protests were advanced regarding these offences,149 still, limitations of this type were not in effect in every universitas. This was true for Trapani where the magistrate could intervene, as stated in municipal privileges, “in crimine lese maiestatis heresis in feudis quaternatis seu parte ipsorum et in causa appellacionis”. The community, however, complained that the judges of the Magna Curia (Grand Court, the highest court in the land) considered every crime that was punishable by banishment to be under the purview of the commissioner. The sovereign had evidently somewhat extended the commissioner’s authority in order to satisfy a temporary situation but, surprisingly, he forbade the commissioner to exercise authority in

147 R. C. vol. 59, fol. 39r-v, 1427 (Trapani); G. G. pp. 324–25, 1432 (Gozo); R. C. vol. 60, fol. 104r-v, 1434 (Sciacca): G. G. p. 160, p. 165, 1439 (Catania); G. G. pp. 407–408, 1439 (Malta); C. vol. 2838, fol. 127r-v, 1441 (Palermo); C. vol. 2822, fol. 23r-v, 1442 (Polizzi); G. G. pp. 171–172, 1444 (Catania); C. vol. 2843, fol. 180v, 1444 (Polizzi); C. vol. 2850, fol. 39r, 1445 (Patti); C. vol. 2858, fols 152v-153r, 1445 (Trapani); G. G. p. 100, 1446 (Castrogiovanni); P. R. vol. 37, fol. 105r, 1446 (Piazza). 148 For a comparison of the cities’ determination to engage the sovereign in the defence their privileges, some information referring to the Catalan community of Lerida can be found in FLOCEL SABATÉ CURULL, “Municipio y monarquía en la Cataluña bajomedieval”, in Anales de la historia de Alicante: Historia medieval, 13, 2000–2002, pp. 255–284. It was not likely, but possible, for the sovereign to send a commissioner to other communities in the Crown of Aragon. For an analysis of an episode of conflict between the Crown and urban community caused by a ‘centralizing’ policy, see, for the Valencian community of Orihuela, BARRIO BARRIO & CABEZUELO PLIEGO, “La defensa de los privilegios”, pp. 9–42. For a further comparison with other situations in the Estensi states, see MARCO FOLIN, Rinascimento estense. Politica, cultura, istituzioni di un antico Stato italiano, Rome-Bari, 2001, pp. 178–183, which singles out a function of the commissioner: “il compito precipuo di scavalcare gli intralci frapposti dalle consuetudini locali facendo valere le superiori ragioni dell’arbitrio signorile”; ibidem, pp. 179–180. See also FRANCA LEVEROTTI, “Gli officiali del ducato sforzesco”, in Gli officiali negli Stati italiani del Quattrocento: Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, 4rh. s. 1, 1997, pp. 34–36 (for the Sforza Duchy), and GIAN MARIA VARANINI, “Governi principeschi e modello cittadino di organizzazione del territorio nell’Italia del Quattrocento”, in Principi, pp. 117–119 (for the territories governed by the houses of Visconti-Sfroza and Este). Furthermore, for the Venetian state in the early modern period, see VIGGIANO, Governanti, for a thorough analysis which brings into view the manifold instances of coalescence and negotiation between the governed and their governors, detecting, from the mid-1400s, the prince’s inclination towards respecting various local rights and jurisdictions. 149 G. G. p. 160, p. 165, 1439 (Catania); C. vol. 2822, fol. 23r-v, 1442 (Polizzi). Crimen nefandi were punishable by death or mutilation—a sentence not within the competence of the captaincy; R. C. vol. 69, fols 104v-105r, 1434 (Sciacca); P. R. vol. 37, fol. 105r, 1446 (Piazza).

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cases of turmoil.150 In Trapani the commissioner had a chance to intervene in a second instance whereas it was conceded to Catania’s universitas, in 1439, that he would not be permitted to intervene either in ‘necessary’ cases, i.e. ordinary, or on appeal.151 As to possible derogations of the commissioner’s intervention, Viceroy Ruggero Paruta’s response is significant when, in approving Catania’s petitions, he limited the commissioner’s operations to three situations (“lese maiestatis, heresis, nefandi”) and reserved for himself the right to judge whether each case should be included in the category of difficult lawsuits.152 As already mentioned, concessions could not be considered permanent elements in the struggles between Crown and universitates because they were generally determined by municipal circumstances prevailing in that given moment in time or royal exigencies justifying authorization in that specific context. New dynamics could bring about a swift overturning of whatever had already been approved. The concession attained by the universitas in Catania in 1439, for example, was only valid for a limited time. In 1444 the community was already complaining that the royal magistrate demanded cognition of the ‘ordinary’ cases and had denied the possibility of appeal. Such a grievance testifies to a vastly expanded degree of authority in comparison to what had been previously stipulated. The sovereign settled on a compromise based on a 1433 royal capitulum and confirmed the official’s jurisdiction over “casum specialiter occurrentem quo facta est commissio”, given that his verdict could be appealed.153 In 1441, on the basis of a privilege existing in Messina, Palermo asked to have the commissioner’s visits limited to cases of high treason. The Sovereign did not approve the petition, however, because of abuses committed in Messina due to this privilege and reminded the community that, exigente necessitate, the magistrate could be sent to Palermo.154 It must be underlined that the power of the royal magistrate could by no means be restricted merely to exceptional cases because the sindacatum might well have been performed by municipal officials although it was normally incumbent on the sindacatore (a person appointed to the officium sindacatum), a royal official who was not a local citizen and might also function as commissioner in some instances.155 Petitions for restricting the commissioner’s authority generally arose out of moments of tension between the community itself and the magistrate, or, alternatively, in an effort to avoid establishing precedents that might introduce new power relations limiting urban autonomy. In attempting to secure privileges limiting possible interference, a universitas might refer to what had already been attained by other communities: Palermo pointed to Messina and Sciacca cited Polizzi.156 This fact confirms that municipal communities were part of an integrated network in which the systems of rights and safeguards in one locality were known to other urban centres.157

150 C. vol. 2858, fols 152v-153r, 1445. Compare this to the broad authority attributed to Bernardo Pinos, Judge of the Magna Curia and Commissioner and Sindacatore in Piazza, following unspecified crimes and offences; P. R. vol. 37, fol. 105r, 1446. 151 G. G. p. 160. 152 Ibidem, p. 160. 153 Ibidem, pp. 171–172. 154 C. vol. 2838, fol. 127r-v. 155 Melchiore de la Riba, Legum Doctor and Lawyer of the Magna Curia, and Sindacatore in Piazza and Nicosia (R. C. vol. 84, fols 94v-95r, 1450); Nobilis Bernardo Pinos, Legum Doctor, Commissioner, and Sindacatore in Noto and Randazzo, and in Randazzo, Commissioner Pietro Bonura of the Magna Curia was also Sindacatore; P. R. vol. 48, fols 25v-26r, 1455. 156 C. vol. 2838, fol. 127v, 1441, and C. vol. 2843, fol. 180v, 1444, respectively. 157 Some examples for the reign of Martin are included in Chapter 1, note 182.

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Among the most frequent reasons for a commissioner’s intervention was an intensification of royal intervention in special cases due to an increase in the Crown’s financial needs. It is no coincidence that the texts of petitions drafted to obtain a circumscription of the commissioner’s authority also contained requests for a limit to the initiatives of the fiscal procurator (royal official specifically assigned to tax matters) and requests that neither of the officials (commissioner or procurator) be involved in ordinary lawsuits.158 In Randazzo the commissioner and treasury representative both took part in the same cases which, of course, were not ordinary ones, and in Trapani, according to the Crown, cases of counterfeit coinage might also come under the cognizance of the commissioner.159 The most significant case of undifferentiated competence between the two magistrates was recorded in a 1446 petition of Castrogiovanni: item quod quia cives et habitatores eiusdem terre ad peticionem regii fisci vel alterius non possit fieri inquisicio nisi dumtaxat pro crimine lese maiestatis et heresis et quod Commissarius non possit accedere ad eamdem terram nisi pro ardua causa et quod procurator fiscalis non possit cives et habitatores predictos aliquo modo molestare nec in petere in civiliter nec criminaliter nisi primo loco fiat deliberacio per viceregem et sacrum consilium. Placet regie maiestati.160

The concurrence of the two undertakings, and the fact that the universitates pointed out that even the fiscal procurator could intervene only in difficult cases, again suggests that the rise in the amount of interference by the central government was, above all, motivated by economic reasons. In 1443 Giovanni Gallo, Captain of Agrigento was removed from office following a trial brought by the royal fiscal procurator, Bernardo Pinos, Commissioner and Sindacatore.161 The wide authority conferred on Commissioner Adamo Asmundo in the terra of Randazzo in 1438 was significant. As a result of accusations against municipal officials, he was to perform investigations, try the cases, and intervene in all fiscal lawsuits and appeals since he could settle them through an amercement (compositio).162 It is important to note the vast recourse during the reign of Alphonso V to the institution of the compositio which could have been administered by a royal official on the basis of authority conferred by the Crown. It is worth remembering that this amercement enabled anyone who committed civil or criminal offences to obtain the sovereign’s pardon upon payment of a sum of money to the treasury. Such a procedure (also widespread in Catalonia where it had been regulated by the Cortes of Barcelona in 1382)163

158 A prime example from this point of view is the request of the nobiles syndics, Pietro La Serra, Jurat, and Andrea Mararanga, Miles, to Viceroys Nicola Speciale and Guglielmo Muntanyans, that the suits being tried revert to the jurisdiction of the municipal judge once the Magna Curia left the city of Trapani. The interesting thing to note in the petition is that it was added, with specific reference to what was being tried by the Magna Curia, that the Viceroy had assigned fiscal lawsuits to Enrico Settesoldi, Legum Doctor and Commissioner for fiscal cases whereas it was requested that the cases remain under the purview of the captain’s curia; R. C. vol. 59, fol. 39r, 1427. 159 P. R. vol. 37, fol. 105r, 1446, and C. vol. 2858, fols 152v-153r, 1448, respectively. 160 G. G. p. 100. 161 Subsequently, Giovanni Gallo was reinstated to the position in consideration of his excellent reputation and services rendered; R. C. vol. 81, fol. 156r-v. 162 R. C. vol. 72, fols 26v-28r, 1438. 163 PRIM BERTRAN ROIGÉ, “Els llibres del Batlle de Cervera Galzeran Sacirera (1459–1460). Notes de vida quotidiana i conflictivitat urbana a Cervera, a darreries de l’edat mitjana”, in Acta Mediaevalia, 26, 2005, p. 878.

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obviously served the financial necessities of the Crown,164 but there is also another aspect to be emphasized. The compositio testifies to a non-invasive royal presence favouring a judicial tendency directed more toward controlling and regulating routine criminal proceedings than toward repressive measures and it actually resulted in reinforcing urban autonomy.165 Although certain trials were requested by the fiscal procurator, they might have been the product of a complex combination of various causes as, for example, what occurred at Sciacca between 1455 and 1456. Given the significance of the episode, the incident is worth recalling. Briefly, in October 1455 a wholesale resistance of the community developed against a request made by Giovanni Ventimiglia, Marquis of Geraci, and Antonio de Luna, Count of Caltabellotta, to export wheat.166 Simone Bologna, President of the Kingdom, ordered through Andrea Perollo, Syndic of Sciacca, that the officials opposed to its exportation allow the wheat to leave. Once the Syndic had informed the town council of the royal decision, an uprising began which mainly involved the populares who positioned themselves as guards at the warehouses where the wheat had been stored. The President of the Kindgom, having noted the hostile reaction despite his guarantee to Sciacca that they would receive wheat if they needed it, ordered the algozirius.167 Giovanni di Santo Clemente, to begin proceedings by having the gallows erected.168 The immediate reaction of the populus was expressed, first of all, by pulling down the gallows—a symbol of repression. The protest against the royal measures manifested itself against the very symbol, in this case the gallows, that extended central government control into the urban environment. The community’s choice of radical opposition took on special meaning as a token of

164 As pointed out by ALAN RYDER, “The incidence of crime in Sicily in the mid fifteenth century: the evidence from

composition records”, in Crime, Society and the Law in Renaissance Italy, eds. TREVOR DEAN & KATE J. P. LOWE, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 59–73. This English scholar’s conclusion that Sicily in the Late Middle Ages was characterized by homicide and violence seems extreme. It is exaggerated because the very type of sources Ryder uses risks overemphasizing the real incidence of such criminal acts. See BERNARD CHEVALIER, Les bonnes villes de France du XIVe au XVe siècle, Paris, 1982, pp. 287–288, for a comparison with the violence in French metropolitan centres. Regarding non-repressive policies—in Bretagna in the 1500s—see also, MICHEL NASSIET, “Une enquête en cours: les lettres de remission de la chancellerie de Bretagne au XVIe siècle”, in Économie et société dans la France de l’ouest atlantique su Moyen Âge aux temps modernes, eds. Guy Saupin & JEAN L. Sarrazin, Rennes, 2004, pp. 121–146, which points out the widespread use of letters of pardon from sovereigns and dukes. Regarding the use of royal pardons in conflict resolution, see for France, CLAUDE GAUVARD, “Le roi de France et le gouvernement par la grâce à la fin du Moyen Âge. Genèse et développement d’une politique judiciaire”, in Suppliques, pp. 371–404, which calculates between 200 and 250 letters of pardon annually between 1380 and 1420 and views the use of pardons, not as a sign of royal weakness but, on the contrary, as a means of engendering submission of the type which was justified by invoking God. Such a strategy also marked the reign of Henry V in England who in this way assured himself a network of trusted men and a rapid resolution of conflicts; EDWARD POWELL, Kingship, Law and Society: Criminal Justice in the Reign of Henry V, Oxford, 1989. 165 For a comparison regarding this topic, see ANDREA ZORZI, “I Fiorentini e gli uffici pubblici nel primo Quattrocento: concorrenza, abusi, illegalità”, in Quaderni Storici, 66, 1987, pp. 725–747, which finds the phase of passage, at the end of the 1420s, from the institution of the sindacato (an expression of a repressive statutory and judicial system) to the institution of the Conservatori delle Leggi (a particular judicial body that levelled only economic sanctions) to be a more efficient instrument for recognizing and evaluating the real extent of the phenomenon of the prosecution of crimes committed by government officials. Regarding the politics of social control and judicial repression during the communal period, see ANDREA ZORZI, “Contrôle social, ordre public et répression judiciarie à Florence à l’époque communale: éléments et problèmes”, in Annales. Économiés. Sociétés. Civilisations, 5, 1990, pp. 1169–1188. Regarding the impossibility of studying criminal activity by relying on the repressive activity of the judicial system alone, see MAIRE VIGUEUR, “Justice et politique”, pp. 323–324. 166 P. R. vol. 48, fols 46v-47r. 167 A royal official charged with financial negotiations between the sovereign and the outside world; CORRAO, Governare, pp. 317–319. 168 P. R. vol. 48 fol. 47r.

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the stand of the universitas against the royal will.169 A few months later, in January 1456, the Capitain of Sciacca and Lenmo de Bracco, Comissioner of the Magna Curia, tried “ad peticionem et instanciam Procuratoris regis fisci” those who had instigated “plebem et moltitudinem gencium”.170 These exceptional events demonstrate how there could be multiple causes, and not only economic ones, for the presence of a royal official, even the fiscal procurator himself, in the universitas. It should be remembered that a commissioner’s actions might reflect personal interests. In 1423 in Trapani, a certain Enrico Settesoldi from Trapani was among the syndics presenting a petition, which was refused, complaining of the commissioner’s indiscriminate access to all types of cases. In 1427, a subsequent municipal protest was raised against this very same commissioner.171 Undoubtedly, the most sensational incident regarded the legum doctor, Bernardo Pinos, Commissioner, particularly active in numerous communities including Piazza. In the wake of accusations by Piazza’s residents regarding complaints including illicit exactions for the colletta, Pinos was in turn subjected to an investigation undertaken by the Crown.172 The determination of the local governments to preserve their freedom in judicial and fiscal spheres might lead one to believe that the royal representative was viewed a priori with hostility. That was not always so: often certain factions solicited his presence because they no longer felt safeguarded by the officials. The undertaking of Magister Rationalis, Adamo Asmundo, as Lieutenent and Vicarius in Randazzo in 1449 which ensued from numerous complaints by residents has already been mentioned. Asmundo was assigned the task of investigating the accused.173 Indeed, investigations of officials by the commissioner became more numerous, especially in relation to the operations of the captain who was always less committed to the general welfare. Royal decrees frequently followed accusations by municipal factions or individuals against a captain guilty of meting out summary or partial justice. Likewise, whether or not a commissioner was sent, the Crown did not 169 P. R. vol. 48, fols 134r-v, 244r. The symbolic value of objects the Crown’s men brought with them while performing the normal duties of their offices was exaggerated during political strife. Consequently, the baton held by an algozirius might be broken as a sign of extreme rebellion: Antonio Starranu of Palermo was accused of assaulting the algozirius, Sans de la Maurella, with the official’s own baton; R. C. vol. 84, fols 108r-109r, 1450 (Palermo). For an interpretation of emotionallycharged acts as a valuable means of communication, see BARBARA H. ROSENWEIN, “Émotions en politique. Perspectives de médiéviste”, in Hypothèses 2001 : Travaux de l’école doctorale d’histoire, Paris, 2002, pp. 315–324. 170 P. R. vol. 48, fol. 134r-v. The sovereign subsequently pardoned some of the leaders of the uprising; P. R. vol. 48, fols 360v-361r. 171 P. R. vol. 25, fol. 156r, 1423; the universitas that drew up the petitions is not specified but on the basis of the names of the syndics, Enrico Settesoldi and Francesco Abrignano, Jurat (for the correlation between the offices and the lists of officials elected by scrutiny, see R. C. vol. 54, fol. 81v), it was obviously Trapani (R. C. vol. 59, fol. 39r-v, 1427). 172 C. vol. 2884, fols 126r-128v, 1455. The accusations brought against Pinos, for which the investigation began in May, were not an isolated case in this community: a few months earlier, in January, the universitas had obtained permission from the Sovereign to initiate proceedings against Pietro Bonacolta and his supporters. Bonacolta had held the positions of Commissioner and Sindacatore for the year 1453–54 committing numerous offences, sometimes extorting money, sometimes committing abuses of authority and practicing patronage while in office; Consuetudines, fols 64v-66r. For a comparison, see the observations of GUIDO CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali e gentiluomini: La società politica sabauda nel tardo medioevo, Milan, 1994, pp. 137–138, which highlights for the Savoy Duchy how the prince had to depend on loyal and competent officials in coordinating his administration so that it was imperative to unite service to the prince, social prestige, and political power, thus rooting officials in their territory. As a result, through close ties of personal interest and kinship and a sense of complicity, an official was increasingly entrenched in local circumstances. 173 P. R. vol. 41, fol. 60r-v. It was not explicitly stated that Asmundo was commissioner, but it was implied since, as already indicated, the royal envoy was a commissioner with judicial authority. The Sovereign’s choice of Asmundo was probably motivated by the latter’s earlier knowledge of the state of affairs in Randazzo where, in fact, he had already acted as a commissioner with wide powers in 1438 solicited by a memorandum from the universitas indicting the captain, judges, and other officials; R. C. vol. 72, fols 26v-28r.

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hesitate to take a stand against a captain’s mismanagement or to avoid a degeneration of political clashes between factions (parcialitates).174 The most significant element emerging from these confrontations between Crown and community over the functions of the commissioner is constituted by the efforts of the universitates to circumscribe areas open to Crown intervention and then declare illegitimate any actions not provided for by legal norms. The resulting requests are attributable to a precise municipal policy by which the universitates intended to safeguard areas of governance under their purview. Indeed, it was not always easy for the universitates to define the ambits of government that were within their province and their attempts to do this could result in misunderstandings or conflicting interpretations. For instance, during negotiations between the universitates and the central government, contradictions sometimes arose between what was proposed through the process of municipal petitions and what was stipulated in parliament— different channels of negotiation that had the potential and paradoxical consequence of counteracting what had been secured through the other channel. Circumstances of this type were revealed by petitions of Piazza’s universitas presented in 1447 and 1457 which constituted the basis for an indirect confrontation between local privileges acquired through municipal petitions and royal edicts issued in the capitula of the kingdom. According to the capitula regni, the sovereign had reserved for himself the right to carry out inquisitions and press charges in instances of “mutilacio membri, deportacio sive bonorum publicacio, crimen nefandi”, but in 1447, the universitas demanded and obtained the repeal of that capitulum while asking to be allowed to deal with such crimes as they had in the past.175 Interestingly, a decade later, the Sovereign granted the universitas that in the event their ambassadors in parliament accepted capitula conflicting with municipal privileges, the municipal petitions would not be considered abrogated.176 This was by no means a remote possibility since parliamentary debate involved many interlocutors and the ambassadors might have found themselves in a condition where they could no longer guarantee the interests of the community.

174 In the following examples, the appointment as commissioner is indicated when it was specified. One of the most significant instances of grievances regarding the captain’s activities took place in Piazza in 1455 where, at the same time, the community took a stand through the town council against the commissioner who had proceeded without respecting the limits of his mandate and was guilty of repeated abuses of power; R. C. vol. 97, fols 293v-306r. Alphonso V granted Nicola Paternione, civis Cathanie, the captaincy of Randazzo since Giovanni Basilico, Miles and Captain had been suspended “ob nonullos eis excessus noviter per dilectum consiliarum nostrum Anthonium de Compagna legum doctorem”; C. vol. 2825, fol. 63r-v (1434). This last instance can be compared to the Crown’s decision to send Alfonso Carioso, Master Notary of the Magna Curia, to Randazzo to try Pietro Russo, head of a parcialitati, since the captain had made no provisions to do so; P. R. vol. 50, fols 371r-372r, 1458. The nobilis, Federico Buondelmonte accused the captain’s court, judges and jurats in Sciacca of harassment (P. R. vol. 48, fol. 212v, 1456) while, at the same time, Buondelmonte was at the centre of a bitter conflict, together with the Amatos and the Lunas, against the Perolls (P. R. vol. 49, fols 212v-213v, 1457). In March 1453, the notarius, Giacomo Cathaguerra was sent to Trapani to replace the captain in a series of trials because “certas ob causas suspectus est”; R. C. vol. 89, fol. 244r-v. Antonio di Mantello, Legum Doctor, was assigned the task of trying “causam denunciationis iusticie denegata” based on accusations lodged by Magister Federico de Ianguzo against the captain of Noto; R. C. vol. 84, fol. 239v. The same accusations were brought against the captain of Patti and the Amato clan, and the Crown sent the notarius, Antonio de Trovato to try the case; R. C. vol. 89, fols 119v-120r, 1453. In Polizzi, the Denti clan denounced Presbyter Andolfo Aurifice, Giovanni Angelo, Berengario Haiuto, other residents, and the Captain for crimes including “monopoliu et commocione populi”. The Viceroy decided to send the royal councillor and legum doctor, Giovanni Apera, to investigate and try the case; R. C. vol. 84, fol. 325r-v, 1451. Because a commissioner’s investigations were meant to curb a captain’s eventual misdeeds, it is logical that friction could easily develop between the two royal officials: the miles, Raimondo Sigerio (or Sieri), Captain of Trapani, spontaneously resigned his post after having caused the commissioner, Giovanni Tirazona, to flee; R. C. vol. 79, fols 89v-90v, 1443. 175 C. vol. 2858, fol. 145v. 176 The sovereign approved the request with the exception of the capitula regarding the contribution for the payment of the colletta; R. C. vol. 102, fol. 95r.

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Petitions which requested a suspension of royal measures deemed damaging to municipal rights, in order to allow for consultation with the sovereign before the harmful decrees were carried out, provide evidence of the city’s most radical defence of its own spheres of autonomy. This right to reply brings to mind the contrafueros or greuges in other states of the Crown of Aragon.177 The most illustrative instances, actually going beyond the right of reply, regard the universitates of Corleone in 1437, Caltagirone in 1443, Polizzi in 1447, and Capizzi in 1448. They requested permission to put up resistance if the locality were to become a feudal territory, and, in that case, for the right to take up arms if necessary.178 The sovereign approved the petitions (except in the case of Caltagirone) because the universitates rejected measures in contradiction to previous royal privileges. Thus, an act of resistance sanctioned the defence of the integrity of the status quo and was confirmed by the Crown itself.179 These examples have been cited because Corleone’s universitas, besides requesting the right to resistere manu forti, proposed a more general strategy that would become common in many localities, namely, the right to suspend royal measures deemed infringements of municipal liberty in order to consult the sovereign semel bis et ter.180 The universitas of Messina in 1410, and the universitas of Palermo in 1422, had already requested the same right181 and numerous other communities, in order to confer with the Crown, proposed and received authorization not to comply with mandates or privileges deemed detrimental. This legitimated initiation of a new series of negotiations that would guarantee the administrations new opportunities for 177 In the Aragonese, Valencian and Catalan Cortes, the Cortes asked that the greuges or agravios, i.e. royal operations or activities of public officials in violation of the prevailing legal norms, be judged first of all and only when those actions thought to be illicit had been tried and settled, would parliamentary affairs be taken up. This was a way for the Cortes to induce the sovereign to approve their own proposals and make sure that subsidies would be voted in; LUÍS GARCIA DE VALDEAVELLANO, Curso de Historia de las Instituciones españolas: De los orígenes al final de la Edad Media, Madrid, 1968, pp. 480–481, pp. 571–579; SYLVIA ROMEU, Les Corts valencianes, Valencia, 1985, pp. 138–140; CORAL CUADRADA MAJÓ, “Els greuges dels Sagramental en les Corts Catalanes (segles XIV-XV)”, in Les Corts a Catalunya: Actes del congrés d’història institucional, 28–30 abril 1988, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 208–216; MARTÍ SENTAÑES, “Els memoriales”, pp. 1636–1637. Procedures were different in the Cortes of Leon-Castille where they first voted to approve the economic tributes solicited by the king, and only after the contribution had been made the sovereign would entertain petitions; MARTÍ SENTAÑES, Lleida, pp. 51–52. 178 For Corleone, STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 196, which can be compared, for the request of 1447, to ibidem, p. 208. Per Polizzi, C. vol. 2822, fol. 22r-v. See also Section 4.4. For Capizzi, G. G. pp. 72–73. In 1443, Caltagirone also requested the right to armi resistere in the event of alienation. The Sovereign approved the request of inalienability but made no reply regarding the armed resistance; G. G. p. 65. 179 This is a topic which will be treated in greater depth in Section 4.4 regarding the sale of communities. 180 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 196. 181 GIARDINA (ed.), Capitoli, pp. 182–183. In 1422, the town council in Palermo lamented the fact that royal mandates were not transmitted to the captain, praetor, or other officials, but to the secretus or persuni private who did not request a second royal mandate, even though the mandates undermined municipal privileges, R. C. vol. 54, fols 103r, 104r. Additionally, in 1441, a suspension of the royal orders invalidating the sentence of the praetor and judge was also requested but not granted; C. vol. 2838, fol. 127r-v. The instance in Palermo can be compared to the 1443 petition from Catania which pointed out that the universitas retained the privilegium fori and if it were not respected due to the negligence of public officials, it was not to be considered revoked; G. G. pp. 156–157. See also the Trapanese petition confirming all their privileges, even the earlier ones that had not been respected; C. vol. 2848, fol. 174r, 1445. In 1439, the universitas of Catania attained the right of bis replicare in the event that “quocienscumque inpetrantur litere a curia regia vel contra iuris disposicionem vel contra privilegia, statuta, observancias et consuetudines dicte civitatis”; G. G. p. 165. Lastly, in 1457, corpus of petitions was presented asking that Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea withdraw his convocation of the municipal judges ensuing from a request by the fiscal procurator to try them despite the privilegium fori. This entailed suspending the Viceroy’s undertaking, i.e., the “citatoria contra li iudichi” in breach of the privilegium fori, based on Catania’s right to consult the Viceroy and obtain an annulment of the mandate. The petitions pointed out that if the judges currently in office were summoned, the jurats, who did not hold law degrees (persuni idioti) would not have been able to consult the jurists. While the legal experts present in the city were not public officials and therefore, although unprofessional, they would not have provided counsel; ibidem, pp. 227–228. In 1434, Sciacca received authorization, in the event the commissioner infringed on their privileges, to defy him and consult the sovereign; R. C. vol. 69, fol. 104r-v. Several times during Alphonso’s reign, Messina’s universitas asked and obtained, through the stratigotus and jurats’ court, a suspension of mandates deemed detrimental to their privileges and statutes in order to confer with the Sovereign; GIARDINA (ed.), Capitoli, p. 182, 1410; pp. 119–200, 1422; p. 214, 1434, pp. 242–243, 1440.

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negotiations and a likely cancellation of the decree. As the ambassadors from Palermo pointed out in 1422, the capitula of the kingdom stipulated that a second decree might be requested if the first conflicted with the city’s privileges.182 Recourse to the right of armed resistance as well as the possibility of not enacting detrimental measures constitute the most significant features of a municipal policy apparently intended to influence the Crown’s decisions.183 In this vein, one request definitely stands out. The request was drafted in 1439 by the town council in Noto and, along with other concessions, obtained from the sovereign a counter-privilege, that is, the faculty to suspend new privileges not viewed favourably: Humiliter supplicabit quod universitas ipsa possit consultare et replicare maiestatem ipsam donec ipsa maiestas reducat ipsa mandata ad debitum statutum, ne forsitan universitas ipsa cohartetur, necnon aut obediendo ad ammictendum perdendum dictas gratias et privilegia, vel non obediendo, incidat in contemputm mandati, presertim quod dicta universitas super hoc habet speciale privilegium. Placet regiae maiestati quod si contingat per inadvertentiam vel importunitatem petentium aliqua privilegia seu rescripta concedi, quae clare appareant esse contra privilegia dictae terrae, eo casu possint officiales eiusdem terrae ipsum supersedere in executione predictorum, donec et quousque ipsa regia maiestas, consulta de veritate, rescribat.184

The instance in Noto clearly discloses a peculiarity in the request for a suspension of benefits deemed harmful. This petition reveals how certain concessions ensued from petitions presented only by certain sectors of the citizenry. To further contextualize this detail, communities usually did obtain a suspension of the execution of measures thought to undermine a city’s rights. This urban strategy was born of the need to counteract royal practices motivated by new financial needs—as was the case for alienations—and mandates resulting from negotiations between the Crown and certain officials and/or certain sectors which, therefore, were expressions of factional interests. It has been said that this right of suspension was an anomaly not found outside of Sicily, although really in reference to Messina only, which permitted municipal institutions to put the city in a position counter to the rest of the kingdom and the central government which had authored the rejected decrees.185 Actually, considering the tone of the petitions and the scrupulousness with which the placet (one granted with strict limitations) was requested before suspending the execution of the mandates, the full intention of legitimacy underlying the political defence of municipal freedom emerges. In relation to this right, it does not seem reasonable to speak of opposition between the universitates and central government because, there appears to be a desire to render highly unlikely the possibility that such opposition should ever really take shape.186 Concerning the right of resistance as part R. C. vol. 54, fol. 104r. For a comparison, see RAGGIO, “Visto”, pp. 483–527. RISINO, Il regesto, p. 106. MARINO Berengo, L’Europa delle città: Il volto della società urbana europea tra medioevo ed Età Moderna, Torino, 1999, p. 34. See DIEGO QUAGLIONI, La giustizia nel Medioevo e nella prima età moderna, Bologna, 2004, in particular pp. 23–42, which has called attention to the way in which the medieval juridical experience and political thought “ha nella conformità al principio di giustizia il primo e fondamentale criterio di ‘giustificazione’ del potere”; ibidem, p. 33. Likewise, the request of the Sicilian universitates for authorization to rebel against measures deemed detrimental to established privileges testifies to a desire to respect the law.

182 183 184 185 186

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of the autonomy of the ‘peripheries’, a basis of comparison exists in the federative movement among town councils—hermandades (agreements approved by the sovereign)—existing in the Kingdom of Castile between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries.187 The hermandades, usually formed in times of monarchical weakness, were established in order to cope with the absence of juridical authority in places where the state’s presence was missing and provide protection against seigneurial abuses. Nevertheless, the federations sometimes risked becoming instruments of manipulation against the very sovereigns who had granted the privilege and were forced to revoke it. A complete degeneration never actually ended up taking place since the federations were disbanded by the sovereign when faced with such risks. Additionally, a situation of this type this never came about in Sicily, where the right of suspension attests to the decision, approved by the Crown, to avoid confrontations, begin new negotiations, and reconfirm the system of rights and privileges momentarily violated. It is true that the Crown did not respect local privileges when that was the only means of securing its required financing.188 This royal policy revealed a centralizing strategy because it came about during a stage of rapid urban growth, but as will be become clear in examining political and economic policy,189 it was not the main government strategy under Alphonso V in relation to the universitates.190 3.5

‘Ex Gratia’ Concessions and ‘Familiares et Domestici Regis’

One further aspect of the power relations between the Crown and universitates regards the ex gratia royal concessions, usually entailing the positions of the catapan or sciurterius, in both large and small centres. These two magistracies, followed by that of the baiulus, were subject to the highest number of grants conferred during the reign of the Magnanimus. Instead, Martin’s concessions were more numerous because they also regarded the judicature (Nicosia, Piazza, Polizzi, and Randazzo) and the iuratia (Salemi, Sciacca, and Randazzo).191 The differing prestige of the offices granted during the

187 The interpretations do not always coincide regarding the hermandades, which over the course of time varied in type and scope, were not only stipulated between town councils, and there were also hermandades religiosas. See the classic, LUIS SUÁREZ FERNÁNDEZ, “Evolución histórica de las Hermandades castellanas”, in Cuadernos de historia de España, XVI, 1951, pp. 5–78, which, in referring to the league of 1282, points out that they were not established against someone but in defence of municipal privileges and fueros (collections of legal norms) against anyone who threatened them, the king, or the nobilty. ANTONIO ÁLVAREZ DE MORALES, Las hermandades, expresión del movimento comunitario en España, Valladolid, 1974, links the growth of such leagues to the general expansion of the right of association; in particular ibidem, pp. 9–11. Regarding the possibility that this federative movement might become a movement opposing the sovereign, see JUAN I. GUTIÉRREZ NIETO, “Semántica del término “comunidad” antes de 1520: las asociaciones juramentadas de defensa”, in Hispania, 37/136, 1977, p. 338, and BERENGO, L’Europa, p. 108. For a reconsideration of the phenomenon of the hermandades for which the diversification over the course of time is underlined, see CÉSAR GONZÁLEZ MÍNGUEZ, “Aproximación al estudio del ‘movimiento hermadino’ en Castilla y León”, in Medievalismo, 1, 1991, pp. 35–55, in Medievalismo, 2, 1992, pp. 29–65, and in particular pp. 44–55 (1, 1991). 188 This refers to instances in Corleone and Polizzi which will be examined in Section 4.4. 189 See Chapter 4. 190 For a comparison with other Catalan communities, with special reference to Girona, see CHRISTIAN GUILLERÉ, “Les élites urbaines catalanes à la fin du Moyen Âge: l’exemple géronais”, in Les élites urbaines, 1997, pp. 269–285, which starts from the premise that no form of urban emancipation was independent of royal power which was, instead, constantly at the centre of every process of municipal autonomy. 191 For example: R. C. vol. 38, fol. 212v, 1401–02 (Nicosia); R. C. vol. 42, fol. 116r, 1404–05 (Randazzo); R. C. vol. 43, fol. 84r, 1405–06 (Piazza); R. C. vol. 44–45, 1407–08 (Polizzi). R. C. vol. 46, fol. 195r, 1406–07 (Randazzo); R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 73v, 1407–08 (Salemi); R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 75v, 1407–08 (Sciacca).

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Alphonsian period testifies to the more limited nature of royal initiatives which, judging by the names of the beneficiaries, approved mainly municipal solicitations. It seems, in fact, that benefits were directed as a resource at a local level. Crown concessions were particularly abundant for the universitas of Patti. They regarded the position of a baiulus and, usually, one of the catapans’s positions, provoking frequent opposition from the community.192 Based on the lists of elections by scrutiny, there were seven instances of ex gratia appointments for the post of Baiulus during the reigns of Martin I and Alphonso V.193 The ex gratia concessions must actually have been more numerous. The names of individuals appointed by the Crown were usually recorded in the lists of those elected by scrutiny, however, royal concessions decreed before the scrutinies took place might not have been marked in the lists with the phrase ex gratia.194 Indeed, the ex gratia appointments sometimes concerned officials who had taken part in the electoral competition without receiving the necessary number of votes, as well as individuals who had not participated in the election, as demonstrated by the fact that they had been appointed before the scrutiny was carried out. In both cases, however, the official was listed among those who had participated in the scrutinies with the phrase ex gratia usually following his name, most likely because, by recording the name of the beneficiary among those who had been elected, the universitas highlighted both the municipal nature of the magistracy, which remained unaltered, and the exceptional nature of the royal concession. Furthermore, the post of Baiulus could also be sold by the Crown.195 Patti was not an isolated instance—royal annotations also appear for the positions of Patricius in Noto and Baiulus in Trapani. In Trapani, five Crown appointments have been identified that were made one or more fiscal years earlier than the year when scrutinies were instituted. Only once, however, did an official in the list of the scrutinies correspond to a previously appointed official.196 For Noto, instead, there were four cases of appointments of a patricius in the period before scrutinies were held, and for the three extant lists, there are two 192 P. R. vol. 33, fol. 55r, 1432; R. C. vol. 69, fol. 91r, 1434; R. C. vol. 81, fol. 487r, 1444. 193 In 1405–06 (R. C. vol. 43, fol. 85v), 1415–16 (P. R. vol. 19, fol. 144r), 1421–22 (P. R. vol. 24, fol. 33r), 1423–24 (P. R.

vol. 26, fol. 32r), 1427–28 (R. C. vol. 59, fol. 21v), 1432–33 (P. R. vol. 33, fol. 57r), and 1443–44 (R. C. vol. 81, fols 120v-121r). 194 This refers to concessions to Magister Facio Minutis for 1428–29, Geronimo Amato for 1430–31, and Magister Antonio Santo Matteo for 1438–39; R. C. vol. 59, fol. 83v, P. R. vol. 30, fol. 31v (in this instance the concession ensued from the supplication of the miles, Lancia Serio), and P. R. vol. 34, fol. 128v, respectively. They were all decreed before the institution of scrutinties. Because they were normally elective offices, they appear in the list of the scrutinies even when they were royal appointments and the names of the baiuli cited above were recorded in the corresponding lists but without the annotation ex gratia; P. R. vol. 30, fol. 30v; P. R. vol. 31, fol. 43r; R. C. vol. 74, fol. 61r. As for the titles, Facio Minutis was called magister in the royal concession, but this title was not used in the later scrutinies; on the contrary, the title of Magister appeared in the list of the scrutinies alongside the name of Antonio Santo Matteo, but not in the earlier royal concession. 195 It was sold for 10 onze to Geronimo Amato for the years 1439–40 and 1440–41 (R. C. vol. 75, fols 515r-516r; R. C. vol. 76, fol. 122v) but Amato only obtained the position for 1439–40 since the universitas redeemed it in October 1440 allowing the office to be filled by election. Pietro Russo was elected on 26 October for 1440–41 (R. C. vol. 76, fol. 69v), whereas the election for the other officials had been held earlier on 5 September (R. C. vol. 76, fol. 72v). 196 The baiuli appointed by the Crown included Andrea Garofalo for 1417–18 (C. vol. 2801, fol. 90v), Xardo Grasso in November 1437 appointed by the Sovereign for the year 1439–40 (R. C. vol. 74, fol. 67v), the notarius, Giacomo Cathaguerra, appointed in September 1439 for 1439–40 (R. C. vol. 75, fol. 77r), Giovanni de Cicero for 1441–42 (R. C. vol. 76, fol. 74r), Giacomo Caro for 1453–54 (P. R. vol. 45, fol. 432v), Giovanni Oriola for 1454–55 (R. C. vol. 89, fols 374r-375v), and Giovanni de la Rodonda for the year 1456–57 “nisi alteri prius per nos concessum” (P. R. vol. 47, fol. 133v). For these years, with the exception of 1417–18, all the lists of the scrutiny are extant and record as baiuli Pizutu [sic] for 1439–40 (R. C. vol. 75, fol. 66v), Giacomo Caruso for 1441–42 (R. C. vol. 77, fol. 68v), Antonio La Porta for 1453–54 (P. R. vol. 45, fol. 80r), Giacomo Caro for 1454–55 (P. R. vol. 46, fol. 94r, fol. 374v), and Blasio Benedicto for 1456–57 (P. R. vol. 47, fol. 147r).

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matches with an official recorded in the lists, but without an annotation of the phrase ex gratia.197 For the names which did not match, the least controversial interpretation would seem to be, not so much that two officials existed simultaneously, but, considering that the concession was often issued as much as a year or more earlier than the activation of the grant, that the conditions underlying the grant had been fulfilled and the earlier appointment was thus invalidated. In addition to the position of Baiulus, the central government appointed either a catapan or a sciurterius for most of the universitates every other year. It is not clear why the custom of granting concessions for these offices gradually became established practice. It could be hypothesized, in this regard, that the establishment of a royal ex gratia appointment for the office of Baiulus, conferred less often than the others, was justified because it was already a royal position, whereas for other magistracies, the Crown might have had more leeway in intervening because they were not among the most important magistracies in municipal organizational structures. It is likely, therefore, that a concentration of royal concessions on these offices was not as likely to cause resentment and was one way of fuelling the local system of patronage and stabilizing power relations in a municipal context rather than upsetting them. This can be shown by the fact that numerous concessions, including royal offices, followed the intercession of royal dignitaries of local extraction— the familiares et domestici regis.198 Their influence was not limited to royal offices. The Crown followed their recommendations, for example, in appointing a baiulus in Trapani and two to the officium patricii in Noto.199 Their extensive mediation could also have concealed factional interests. In 1444 Patti went so far as to request the exclusion from government office of persons who had received appointments on the intercession of dignitaries.200 Such intercessions, together with the fact that the names proposed by the Crown were usually familiar in the local power structures, show that the appointments normally corresponded to solicitations arriving from local communities and were not imposed from on high. Political policies which did originate at the uppermost levels, already visible in the 197 The appointments of the patricii were Chicco Cappello for 1440–41 (R. C. vol. 75, fol. 78v), Giovanni Oddo for 1445–46 (P. R. vol. 37, fol. 30v), the camerarius, Pietro Basiato for 1450–51 (P. R. vol. 42, fol. 74v), and Nicola Caruso for 1456–57 (P. R. vol. 48, fol. 137v). With the exception of 1450–51, for which the list of officials elected by scrutiny was not found, the elected patricii were Giovanni Cappello for 1440–41 (R. C. vol. 76, fol. 72r), Giovanni Oddo for 1445–46 (P. R. vol. 37, fol. 179r-v), and Nicola Caruso for 1456–57 (P. R. vol. 47, fol. 169r). 198 Examples of concessions (some following the demise of the person holding the office) on the intercession of familiares et domestici regis include: P. R. vol. 33, fols 139v-140r, 1433–34, Palermo (acatapanatum); P. R. vol. 34, fol. 111r, 1438–39, Palermo (notariatum of the praetor’s court); R. C. vol. 75, fols 158v-159r, 1439, Catania (portulanatum, a royal appointee); R. C. vol. 79, fol. 26r-v, 1443–44, Catania (acatapanatum); R. C. vol. 81, fol. 108r, 1443–44, Agrigento (xurta); R. C. vol. 81, fol. 108v, 1443–44, Agrigento (judicature of the civil curia); R. C. vol. 82, fols 85v-86r, 1444–45, Agrigento (captain’s judicature); P. R. vol. 37, fol. 115r, 1446–47, Polizzi (acatapanatum); P. R. vol. 40, fol. 164r-v, Agrigento (captain’s judicature); P. R. vol. 40, fols 163v-164r, 1448–49, Licata (captain’s judicature); P. R. vol. 40, fol. 153r, 1448–49, Termini (acatapanatum); R. C. vol. 89, fol. 234v, 1452–53, Randazzo (xurta); R. C. vol. 89, fol. 206v, 1452–54, Patti (captain’s judicature); P. R. vol. 45, fol. 98r, 1453–54, Catania (xurta); P. R. vol. 45, fol. 56r, 1454–55, Nicosia (acatapanatum); P. R. vol. 48, fol. 21r, 1455–56, Sciacca (captain’s judicature); P. R. vol. 49, fols 107v-108v, 1456, Catania (jurat’s notariatum for life); P. R. vol. 48, fols 484r-485r, 1456–57, Palermo (acatapanatum); P. R. vol. 49, fol. 82r-v, 1457, Nicosia (fiscal procurator’s office); P. R. vol. 50, fol. 481r, 1458–59, Termini (captain’s judicature). Some examples of intercessions for the captaincy: P. R. vol. 38, fols 102v-103v, 1446–47 (Termini); R. C. vol. 84, fol. 164v, 1451–52 (Trapani); R. C. vol. 90, fol. 214r, 1453–54 (Corleone); P. R. vol. 47, fol. 110r, 1456–57 (Sciacca). 199 P. R. vol. 47, fol. 133v (Giovanni de la Rodonda, Trapani); P. R. vol. 37, fol. 30v (Giovanni Oddo, Noto); P. R. vol. 48, fol. 137v (Nicola Caruso, Noto). 200 See Section 5.2.

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first half of the 1300s, became the norm during the period of Alphonso V, as further confirmed precisely by the increasingly pervasive and influential role of the familiares et domestici regis. This activity of the dignitaries makes it possible to glimpse another aspect of their functions—by directing the concessions, they permitted the Crown control over local power bases without making this royal activity seem invasive. The nature of the ‘dignity’ attributed to the familiares et domestici regis must be understood. Concessions of familiaritas, which were formalized by an appointment specifying the privileges granted, began to be commonplace during the reign of Martin I.201 An appointment conferred numerous fiscal and judicial rights on the familiares, the most important of which were the right to arm themselves and, above all, immunity from the jurisdiction of all courts except that of the siniscalcus or the judges of the domus regia for both civil and criminal suits—a prerogative underlining the direct link between the dignitaries and the Crown.202 The obvious political importance of the bestowal of ‘dignity’, i.e. the assurance of an ample network of trusted followers in urban environments, became fully evident in 1398 when this privilege was bestowed on all the exiles from Alcamo who had fought for the royal cause.203 Alphonso V made regular recourse to concessions of ‘dignity’. The beneficiaries were usually of local extraction, although for many it is impossible to retrace their origins, and represented a clear cross section of every social and political sector, in keeping with municipal circumstances which throughout his entire reign were not monopolized by a small minority.204 Within the vast entourage of those who made up the Court, the seat of supreme power,205 a distinction needs to be made between those who had a direct relationship with the sovereign, the high officials and members of the domus regia, known as familiares, and those who bore the same title and were included among the vast ranks of the royal followers but did not have the same direct relationship with the sovereign. The latter, it has been said, enjoyed the benefits, but not the power.206 A conclusion of this type is valid only with reference to the formulation of certain political decisions since the universitates constituted other sites for the exercise of authority. There, the Crown was obliged to build up and respond to an immense network of followers, or king’s affinity,207 who played a crucial role and often wielded a considerable amount of power. They enjoyed ample benefits, thus

201 R. C. vol. 18, fol. 46v, 1393; R. C. vol. 20, fol. 38r, 1392; R. C. vol. 25, fols 172v-173r, 1397; R. C. vol. 27, fol. 28v, 1396. 202 C. vol. 2806, fols 27v-30r, 1422; C. vol. 2806, fols 80v-81r, 1422; P. R. vol. 47, fols 149v-150v, 1456. Regarding the Siniscalcus, see PERI, La Sicilia, pp. 25–26 and CORRAO, Governare, p. 310. 203 Capitoli gabelle, p. 44, p. 48. 204 Some examples: the brothers Giovanni and Pietro Bonfilio, owners of a feudal estate in Noto from which they exported victuals and lumber (C. vol. 2806, fols 12v-13r 1422); the mercator, Thabia Campo, of Syracuse (P. R. vol. 30, fols 36r-37r 1428) originally from Pisa (GIUSEPPE PETRALIA, Banchieri e famiglie mercantili nel Mediterraneo aragonese, Pisa, 1989, p. 351); Benedetto Patrimone, Secretus in Catania (C. vol. 2814, fol. 93r, 1427); the magister Pino Salvo (P. R. vol. 26, fol. 122v, 1424), the magister, Pietro Turturichio, bombarderius (P. R. vol. 28, fols 37v-38r 1425), and the aurifice Giacomo Sanoguerra (P. R. vol. 51, fols 33r-34r 1457), all three from Palermo; the miles, Simonis Andree or Mastrantonio (see BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 911) P. R. vol. 47, fols 149r-150v, 1456 (Palermo). 205 TENENTI, ALBERTO, “La corte nella storia dell’Europa moderna (1300–1700”), in Le corti farnesiane di Parma e Piacenza (1545–1622), I, Potere e società nello stato farnesiano, ed. MARZIO A. ROMANI, Rome, 1978, pp. XIV-XV. 206 CORRAO, Governare, pp. 265–266, which maintains that the Infante John’s departure from Sicily in 1416 diminished the importance of local positions, leaving the staff of the central offices in charge of the government; ibidem, p. 322. 207 CHRIS GIVEN-WILSON, The Royal Household and the King’s Affinity: Service, Politics and Finance in England, 1360–1413, New Haven-London, 1986.

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forming an élite composed mainly of municipal leaders and were the preferred channel of the universitates in efforts at directing royal concessions. The Crown used this same channel to initiate negotiations or decide upon whom to confer offices and benefits.208 These were ex gratia bestowals, but were in accordance with local circumstances and demands.

208 The role of these royal dignitaries in Sicily in the Alphonsian period has been completely overlooked, even in environments where there negotiations were pivotal to power relations between the Crown and universitates, particularly in cases such as conflicts between cities or single criminal episodes. Their activities were not dealt with by RYDER, “The incidence”, pp. 59–73.

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4.1

The Urban Tax System

An examination of financial and fiscal policy will facilitate a further analysis of the prerogatives of urban governments and the constraints on their endeavours. This is an area of government in which conflicting policies—such as royal decisions in contrast with concessions granted—often surface, but the contradictions in these actions are undoubtedly attenuated by abandoning “categorie analitiche definite in funzione di una storia della modernizzazione delle forme politiche e statali tardo medioevali”.1 During the reign of Martin I, direct taxation was not the main source of income for the Crown, or for the universitates either, which is why Martin’s undertaking in Sardinia was mainly carried out with the backing of indirect imposts,2 a category of fiscal revenue that would also be of fundamental value during the Alphonsian period when the Magnanimous, for various motives, did not significantly pursue alternative strategies. The limits placed on direct taxation by James II in 1286 were confirmed by Martin in 1402 but Alphonso V repeatedly deviated from these norms.3 The real restriction on the collette, rather than stemming from having respected the four classic cases, was due to the fact that during the reigns of Martin and Alphonso, the Crown generally preferred to opt for lower contributions, i.e. imposts of no more than 5,000 onze.4 The new financial needs then, created by the conquest of Naples could not be met through limited direct taxation. Furthermore, the risk of rebellion, such as that of the Countess of Caltabellotta in 1421 whose example was followed by many other cities when requested to contribute to the grande amprisa (the conquest of Naples), was not a remote threat.5 This episode has been cited by Epstein as evidence of the GIUSEPPE PETRALIA, “Fiscalità, politico e dominio nella Toscana fiorentina alla fine del Medioevo”, in Lo Stato territoriale, p. 162. Regarding the importance of studying finances as a basis for an analysis of political and social life, see JEAN FAVIER, Finance et fiscalité au bas Moyen Âge, Paris, 1971, and JOSÉ A. SESMA MUÑOZ, “Las transformaciones de la fiscalidad real en la Baja Edad Media”, in XV Congresso di storia della corona d' Aragona, Jaca, 20–25 settembre 1993, 5 vols, Saragossa, 1996, I, pp. 233–291, which considers taxation to be a single system for the various spheres (aristocratic, ecclesiastic, etc.) “que encierra todas las manifestaciones en las que actúa el poder” (ibidem, p. 233). 2 BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 851. 3 Only in 1407 were the provisions not respected by Martin I; BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 852. 4 In 1286, James had set limits on requests for imposed aids (collette) for defending the kingdom from invasions or rebellions, for ransoming the king or one of his heirs, for the knighting of the king, his brothers or his heirs, and for marrying the king’s sister or his heirs. For the first two, 15,000 onze was the maximum exaction, and 5,000 onze for the other two; ANTONINO FLANDINA (ed.), Il codice Filangeri e il codice Speciale: privilegi inediti della città di Palermo (Documenti per servire alla storia di Sicilia, s. I, XIV), Palermo, 1891, pp. 66–67. In 1402 (TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum LIV, pp. 174–175), Martin I confirmed this disposition, but up to the end of the Alphonsian reign more than 5,000 onze were not usually exacted (BRESC, Un monde, II, pp. 852–853). 5 C. vol. 2811, fol. 95r; C. vol. 2888, fols 67v-69v, 70v, 72v-73r. There were other cases of resistence in 1423; P. R. vol. 24, fols 253v-254r, and LUIGI GENUARDI, Una raccolta di memoriali di re Alfonso il Magnanimo al viceré di Sicilia Nicola Speciale (1423–1428), in Ad Alessandro Luzio gli Archivi di Stato italiani: Miscellanea di studi storici, 2 vols, Florence, 1933, I, pp. 158–159. 1

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Crown’s difficulty in imposing its right to levy taxes on a regular basis—a difficulty ascribable to the lack of a solid parliamentary tradition in Sicily. In other states in the Crown of Aragon, however, the Sovereign was able to request regular contributions proportionate to his needs through the parliament which approved donativa, or economic gifts, in exchange for the approval of their appeals.6 This practice gave legitimacy to the contractual model of government relations (pactism).7 According to Epstein’s theory, Alphonso V managed to introduce this pattern of relations into Sicily beginning in 1446. Before that, such an exchange would not have been possible due to the community’s failure to acknowledge a contractual relationship of this type and because municipal elites had not yet come into being, therefore making it difficult for the Sovereign to exercise rights over taxation.8 Some elements of this reconstruction must be re-evaluated. Because direct taxation had already taken place under Martin I with nearly annual regularity, the Crown’s ability to impose EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 383–385. For the origins of parliamentary activity in Sicily, see D’ALESSANDRO, “Sulle assemblee parlamentari”, pp. 5–17, who traces it back to Martin’s reign, whereas FODALE, Federico III, pp. 61–71, attributes it the reign of Frederick III when the 1295 colloquium generale in Palermo, with the syndicos of all the universitates, proclaimed Frederick III dominus. For the importance of taxation as one of the factors leading to the development of institutions of representation in general, see WIM BLOCKMANS, “Representation (since the thirteenth century)”, in The New Cambridge Medieval History VII c. 1415-c. 1500, ed. CHRISTOPHER ALLMAND, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 29–64, in particular p. 52. 7 For Catalonia, see PETER RYCRAFT, “The role of the Catalan Corts in the later middle ages”, in The English Historical Review, 351, 1974, pp. 241–267, speaks of a parliamentary state. For an investigation into the origins and evolution of pactism in Catalonia, see SOBREQUÉS CALLICÓ, El pactismo, according to which royal power was limited by the three estates of Parliament (nobility, ecclesiastics, and royal cities), an aspect evident during the reign of Ferdinand I. Ferdinand the Catholic, instead, reconstructed the old pactist structure of the previous century through a policy that balanced a strengthening of typically Castilian royal prerogatives against traditional Catalan pactism and established a regime of monarquia preeminencial. This was a theory already put forward by JAUME VICENS VIVES, Ferran II i la ciutat de Barcelona, 3 vols, Barcelona, 1936–1937, in particular, II, pp. 413–415 and JAUME VICENS VIVES, Historia critica de la vida y reinado de Fernando II de Aragón, Zaragoza, 1962. Regarding pactism as a doctrine which limited royal power, see also JESÚS LALINDE ABADÍA, “El pactismo en los reinos de Aragón y de Valencia”, in El pactismo, pp. 113–139, which points out that this practice was also present in the kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia; compare also MARTIN, Economía, I, pp. 239–245. Opinion is divided on this political doctrine and a position vastly different from those cited above is put forward by IGLESIA FERREIRÓS, La creación, II, in particular pp. 68–118, in a wide-ranging reconstruction amply supported by documentary sources. The author examines the Catalan judicial tradition and the structure of power relations between the count and Cortes from which the count’s power emerges as early as the thirteenth century, just as for the sovereigns in the following centuries, not limited by the parliamentary estates. In particular, the way in which the count, independent of Parliament, could proceed to make laws by emanating pragmáticas-sanciónes is highlighted. Regarding the estates’ practice of obtaining the approval of the petitions exchange for a donativum, the author highlights how if forced against his will to accept the petitions for financial reasons, for example, the count would not convert them into constitutions (agreements expressed in first person by the count with the consensus of the estates; ibidem, p. 90); they would be retained as petitions which tied the period of their validity to the offering (as confirmed by Martin of Aragon in 1409, ibidem, p. 89 n. 97). For an analysis of urban autonomy in the royal communities which were the result of the sovereign’s ceding a portion of his potestas, see “De nuevo sobre el concepto de derecho municipal”, in La ciutat, pp. 85–88, by the same author. Lastly, see MARAVALL, Stato, pp. 347–351, according to whom pactism was a facet of the royal doctrine of absolutism: it was the sovereign who decided the conditions of the contract. 8 EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 383–385. PASCIUTA, Placet, pp. 246–250, linked the consolidation of parliamentary activity beginning in 1446 to an epoch-making change due to a new system of taxation administered entirely on a local basis: collection of the donativum was determined by deputies chosen by Parliament who were charged with apportioning the levy. Subsequently the body responsible for collecting the donativum was called the Deputazione del Regno; ibidem, pp. 247–249. Moreover, the methods of collection managed by the deputies hampered the imposition of any other levies or extraordinary imposts, ibidem, p. 252. Several considerations may be added to this analysis. The transition from an administration of taxation by central bodies to one administered by local bodies did not take place in the mid-1400s but dates back to the early years of the Alphonsian reign. The administration of taxation by the deputies did not mean that the royal treasury did not have recourse to other levies and extraordinary imposts: between 1446 and 1457 five collette were imposed on the kingdom in addition to the donativa (BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 853). On the other hand, the Crown did not cease to alienate municipal royal offices, for example, which further burdened the communities with expenses for their redemption; see BRESC, Un monde, II, pp. 857–858. See also Section 4.3. Regarding the transition from exaction entrusted initially to royal commissioners and then, from 1446, to deputies chosen by Parliament, see also LUIGI GENUARDI, Parlamento siciliano, Bologna, 1924, pp. CXCIX-CC. For the Deputazione del Regno charged with collecting the donativum beginning in the 1500s, see ibidem, p. CC, and GIUSEPPE SCICHILONE, “Origine e ordinamento della Deputazione del Regno di Sicilia”, in Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale, 4th. s. 4, 1951, pp. 83–114. In particular, see the notes of VITTORIO SCIUTI RUSSI, “L’idea pattizia del potere: il vicerè duca di Osuna e il Parlamento del 1612”, in De curia, pp. 78–79, pp. 89–90. 6

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direct taxes cannot be attributed solely to the consolidation of parliamentary activity. Moreover, even if one were to admit that, as far as Alphonso’s reign is concerned, fiscal decisions of a direct distributive nature were carried out regularly only from 1446 onwards, because only at that time was it possible to create a pactist model of contractual relations, this would not take into account the fact that such a model was already in place during the first half of Alphonso’s reign. Subsequent to a significant stabilization of power relations among the urban elites during the reign of the Infante of Aragon, there is ample evidence that, during Alphonso’s reign, the universitates presented the Crown with petitions which generally included provisions for the payment of a donativum that might not always have been made public.9 Finally, apart from some isolated cases in the 1420s, there is no evidence of widespread opposition to the royal requests for collette: despite a gradual increase in the intensity of direct taxation, exaction was regular and in some cases slightly higher than expected due to an increase in the population.10 It remains to be clarified why recourse to this type of taxation was so limited that it amounted to only 20% of state revenue.11 The main reason convincing the sovereign not to rely on this type of income was probably the fact that he could count on a vast royal demesne which, for the most part, in contrast with the other states of the Crown of Aragon, was not alienated.12 This allowed him to carry out wide-scale alienations which, in turn, involved mechanisms of redemption that could quickly be turned into cash and further benefit the royal coffers thanks to a fully-consolidated system of indirect taxation. While recourse to alienation made it possible to avoid heavy demands for collette, it was also one of the reasons which led the sovereign to allow the local governments to decide which type of taxation to levy. The great burden suffered by numerous communities from the sale of demense property—burdensome from a financial point of view but also threatening to their very urban identity—would probably have become unbearable if the decisions regarding the methods of taxation had been made by the central government. It would not be unjustified to say that the rising and incessant royal demands, especially in concomitance with the conquest of Naples, were without precedence. The intensification of fiscal demands, no doubt similar to situations found in other European countries during the same period,13 and the stabilization of local economy, already widespread in the first half of Alphonso’s reign, gave rise to a fiscal system that was novel in many 9 For example: C. vol. 2891, fol. 32r-v, 1432 (Palermo); C. vol. 2823, fol. 31r, 1433 (Agrigento); STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 186–187, 1437 (Corleone); GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 9, 3, p. 16, 1442; G. G. p. 103, 1446 (Castrogiovanni). CARLOS LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, “La estructura de los ingresos de la Tesorería General”, in XIV Congreso, III, pp. 573–593 maintains that there was an increase in loans and donativa in the Crown of Aragon beginning in 1432. 10 BRESC, Un monde, II, pp. 851–853. 11 EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 379–380. 12 In 1392 in Catalonia, only 13.43% of the territory with 22.17% of the total population belonged to the Crown; MARIA T. FERRER MALLOL, “El patrimoni reial i la recuperació del senyorius jurisdiccionals en els estats catalano-aragonesos a la fi del segle XIV”, in Anuario de Estudios Medievales, 7, 1970–1971, pp. 351–451, and SABATÉ CURULL, “Municipio y monarquía”, pp. 265–266. 13 The royal fiscal burden in Sicily was not greater than that which was registered in other kingdoms where the necessities of war led the Crown to significantly increase demands for contributions, generally as early as the second half of the 1300s. For the Principality of Catalonia, see CHARLES M. RADDING, “Royal Tax Revenues in Late Fourteenth Century France”, in Traditio, 32, 1976, pp. 361–368. For the Kingdom of Valencia, WINFRIED KÜCHLER, Les finances de la Corona d’Aragó al segle XV (regnats d’Alfons V i Joan II), transl. by Víctor Farías Zurita, Valencia, 1997, pp. 157–161, which highlights how all the donativa (contributions which the estates of the Cortes made for special purposes to the royal fisc as sunk costs), with the exception of one in 1403 and another in 1451, and the subventions (contributions in the form of material services such as the recruitment of mercenary forces) during the reigns of Alphonso V and John II—five and seven respectively—were allocated to military purposes. Indeed, no donativa were approved in the years stretching from 1446 to 1463 because this was a period of relative tranquillity.

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respects.14 Furthermore, one key concept must be elucidated. Reorganization of the royal demesne during the reign of Martin I was accompanied by pressing economic demands, mainly in the form of new imposts decreed by the Sovereign.15 Alphonso V, instead, although intensifying the financial burden, let local governments make decisions based on their own particular needs. Such decisions regarded whether to adopt direct or indirect imposts, and in the case of indirect levies, which items to tax, the schedule for carrying it out, the determination of taxable parties, the entity of any additional local taxes, and the advance sale of the gabelle. The fiscal freedom involved was coherent with a consolidated, non-centralized political relationship. As has been said of the European states in the fifteenth century, this policy of relations between a prince and his subjects was peculiar to the modern state and legitimated the tax system by means of negotiation made possible by the presence of representative institutions giving a voice to various political subjects.16 This mechanism reduced the risk of friction between the universitates and Crown which would, however, ratify the local fiscal manoeuvres to prove that they were actually the result of unanimous requests and retain the right to intervene and safeguard the balance

For a comparison, see Sánchez Martínez, El naixement, regarding Catalonia, according to which the territories of the Crown of Aragon passed from a feudal tax system to a state tax system with characteristics akin to those in Castile, France and England in the period between the mid-1200s and the middle of the 1300s. At first the fiscal system was determined and organized by the Cortes and applied generally. Later, it was a regular and permanent system that was not dependent on the demands of war. Assuming that the genesis of a municipal fiscal system was ascribable to royal needs concerning warfare for the most part, the author speaks, in fact, of the duality of war and taxes as a single concept. See also : PERE VERDÉS PIJUAN, “Evolution de dépenses de Cervera”, in La fiscalité des villes, pp. 113–126 ; PERE ORTI GOST, “La estructura del municipal en Barcelona (1360) y Sant Feliu de Guíxols (1361–62)”, in La fiscalité des villes, pp. 127–136 ; MAX TURULL RUBINAT, “La naissance d’une administration financière municipale (Catalogne, XIV-XVe siècles)”, in La fiscalité, pp. 11–24, who maintains that the birth of financial administration in Catalonia was deteremined by an increase in royal economic demands; CHRISTIAN GUILLERÉ, “Structures et pratiques de gesion financière et fiscale à Girone à la fin du Moyen Âge”, in La fiscalité, pp. 39–56. Fiscal autonomy was achieved in the Kingdom of Castile in a series of gradual steps that led sovereigns to cede control of royal imposts to local communities in order to reduce municipal opposition to the Crown’s economic demands; HILARIO CASADO ALONSO, “Villes et finances royales: Les stratégies politiques des dirigeants urbains de la Castille septentrionale (1450–1539)”, in Enjeux et expression de la politique municipale (XIIe-XXe siècles), Actes de la 3e table ronde internationale du Centre de Recherches Historiques sur la Ville, dir. DENIS MENJOT & JEAN-LUC PINOL, Paris-Montréal, 1997, pp. 61–79. Compare LADERO QUESADA, “Las haciendas”, pp. 9–12, and LADERO QUESADA, Fiscalidad y poder, which confirms the pattern in which the organization of a municipal fiscal system (at the end of the thirteenth century) was the result of military conflicts. For a further comparison, see ELENA FASANO GUARINI, “Gli Stati dell’Italia centro-settentrionale tra Quattro e Cinquecento: continuità e trasformazioni”, in Società e Storia, 21, 1983, pp. 636–637, which confirms the broad autonomy enjoyed by the communities in the Italian states that suffered, however, a reduction beginning in the 1500s with a strengthening of the ties between centre and periphery. Regarding the appearance of state taxation in general, see JEAN-PHILIPPE GENET & MICHEL LE MENÉ dir., Genèse. 15 R. C. vol. 41, fol. 235r, 1404 (Noto, a tax imposed by the sovereign); R. C. vol. 42, fol. 155r-v, 1404 (Patti, gabelle decreed by the king); R. C. vol. 46, fols 315v-316r, 1407 (Milazzo, municipal petitions requesting taxes and approved by the Sovereign). Even when the Crown did not impose new levies but relied on existing ones, in most cases it was not the community which decided how to realize the financial manoeuvre but the Sovereign who determined which municipal gabelle to employ; for example, R. C. vol. 35, fols 88r-89v, 1398 (Sciacca). It cannot be denied, however, that during Martin’s reign there existed a certain leeway of autonomy for local governments in this area, particularly when royal demands were involved. Since the revenues from the secretia in Nicosia were insufficient to maintain the castles, Martin decreed that the jurats be allowed to proceed freely in choosing which taxes would make up the sum needed; BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 112–113, 1408. Again in 1408 the Sovereign authorized Nicosia’s universitas to enact taxation to purchase wheat for which he indicated the amount and criteria to be followed; R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 318r. L’universitas di Palermo otteneva di vendere alcune gabelle; Acta, XII, pp. 137–139 [1406]. 16 JEAN-PHILIPPE GENET, “Politics: Theory and Practice”, in The New Cambridge Medieval History, pp. 3–28, in particular pp. 6–8. For the subjects involved in the negotiations, see BULST NEITHARD & GENET JEAN-PHILIPPE (eds.), La ville, la bourgeoisie et la genèse de l’état moderne (XIIe-XVIIIe siècles), Actes du colloque de Bielefeld, 29 novembre-1 décembre 1985, Paris, 1988, and PHILIPPE CONTAMINE (ed.), “L’État et les aristocracies (France, Angleterre, Ecosse), XIIe-XVIIe siècle”, Actes de table ronde, Maison française d’Oxford, 26 et 27 septembre 1986, organisé par le centre national de la recherche scientifique, Paris, 1989. For a general analysis of the politics of representation, see BLOCKMANS, “Representation”, pp. 29–64. 14

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of power relations between the social factions. Broad fiscal autonomy did not mean independence from royal assent when new fiscal policies or significant changes in the apportionment of the tax burden were proposed or, finally, when the main municipal expenditures were no longer covered. Furthermore, the presence of a secretus or vicesecretus in the universitates responsible for exacting the royal gabelle might seem to infer that he had a say in the selection and imposition of royal imposts but, in actual fact, he ensured full control over their lease or sale and it was not his duty to decide which goods to tax or if the tariffs were payable to the king or the city. These were elements determined by the town council, as has already been explained, through negotiations with the central government. At this point, it is important to examine how a fiscal policy of such broad and consistent proportions could be maintained throughout Alphonso’s reign. To clarify this aspect it will first be necessary to examine the municipal tax system with the understanding that local taxation was based on a limited number of fixed sources of revenue which had to provide for royal and municipal exigencies. When royal and municipal needs changed, the type of taxation in force sometimes proved inadequate. Thus, the fiscal system was not rigid and it was precisely this flexibility, in addition to the practice of patronage which it entailed, that explain its durability. The value of the imposts themselves was also subject to variations which led to modifications in the apportionment of levies.17 A fundamental point to clarify in this regard is the potentially transitory nature of the ownership (royal or municipal) of a gabella. Although in the Alphonsian period, especially during the early years, there was a differentiation between royal and local gabelle dating back in part to earlier reigns18 and the majority of them went to the Crown, this distinction was not, in fact, rigid. The indirect fiscal system was an element of the sphere of negotiations between the Crown and municipal governments which conferred on the system a flexible nature linked to the existing status of power relations. In analysing both the auctions of the gabelle and their direct management through credencerii, three different types of administration emerge: a distinction with no time limits between revenues that were either entirely royal or local; their temporary transfer from the Crown to the universitas, or vice versa, for unforeseen needs, and, especially in cases of additional excise taxes, the sharing of income from a given revenue source with a municipal quota and a royal quota but without percentages determined a priori. The stability of the fiscal system was based on the variability of the ownership of the gabelle and documentary sources reveal how the mechanism of the administration could be enmeshed in a vast system of patronage. The importance of the system of indirect taxation is demonstrated precisely by the vast patronage network involved in farming the taxes. Among other things, the Crown’s continual updating of its gabelle through privileges 17 The revenues from the gabella “novarum seu terri civitatis Syracusarum” increased when the obsedicionem populorum ended in Sicily; R. C. 18, fol. 128r-v, 1393. Provisions existed for increasing the taxes of Piazza’s universitas; R. C. vol. 61, fol. 95r, 1429. During Alphonso’s reign, the value of some of the gabelle in Palermo was increased on the basis of new financial needs; BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 794 n. 122. 18 R. C. vol. 22, fol. 102v, 1393 (Randazzo); R. C. vol. 35, fols 88r-89v, 1398 (Sciacca); R. C. vol. 48, fol. 113r-v, 1413 (Randazzo). Distinctions which allowed for eventual temporary transfers of imposts or portions of imposts: R. C. vol. 39, fol. 82v, 1402 (Corleone), and R. C. vol. 43, fol. 121r-v, 1405 (Patti). Martin I intervened against the jurats in Polizzi who were guilty of having fixed a meta on meat so low that it damaged the receipts from the royal gabella on the product; R. C. vol. 39, fol. 100r-v, 1409. Ferdinand I authorized the jurats and the other officials in Nicosia to utilize 20 onze of the income of the universitas to build a bridge over the Salso River; R. C. vol. 48, fols 240v-241r, 1414.

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and transactions with the universitas concerned numerous private individuals and particularly large concessions were spread over different items.19 An additional characteristic of this fiscal policy was the possibility of the ownership of the imposts being divided up—a situation which ensured rapid changes in the quotas owned and/or sold.20 Take, for example, the measures related to the gabella on meat (bucheria or bocheria) in Palermo. The officials in Palermo in 1423 obtained permission to farm the tax out because the proceeds were to be used for repairs to the walls and recourse to this particular impost was inevitable because the other revenues could not be exploited any further.21 It must be pointed out that the city did not have full control over the tax and, in fact, the Crown sold it with the gabella chantarum22 to Giovanni Caltagirone that same year.23 The mobility of this source of revenue is also exemplified by a case in 1427 when the Viceroys Nicola Speciale and Guglielmo Muntanyans consented that 200 onze per annum be deducted from the tax on meat for repairs to the walls—a privilege confirmed by Alphonso in 1430.24 In 1433, the community was again granted “pro uno duobus aut 19 These concessions were often based on privileges dating back to earlier periods: those to the Bosco family in Trapani began with Frederick IV and continued with a few modifications up to Alphonso V (C. vol. 2802, fols 103r-105r, 1417); likewise, the concessions to the Marino family in Noto dated back to Frederick IV and continued until the time of Alphonso V in 1451( P. R. vol. 24, fols 143r-144v; R. C. vol. 84, fols 185r-188r). Concessions were often modified and distributed across various sources of income on the basis of new royal needs: see the privileges bestowed on the Sigerio (Sieri) family in Trapani (P. R. vol. 45, fols 598r-599v, 1453), Giovanni Moncada in Catania (R. C. vol. 55 bis, fol. 46r-v, 1424), and Giovanni Caltagirone again in Catania (R. C. vol. 62, fol. 52r-v, 1428). The following is an example of concessions which regarded more than one tax assigned to single individuals: to the miles, Lancia Sigerio 150 onze annually from the gabella pili et cantarate in Palermo and this farm, but more likely later ones, resulted in the reapportionment in 1453 of another concession to Raimondo Rimbao made in 1418 and was then confirmed for his son Guglielmo in 1439 as 40 onze per annum on other taxes of the secretia in Palermo; R. C. vol. 71, fols 202r-203v, 1437, R. C. vol. 88, fols 95r-97r, 1453, and R. C. vol. 88, fols 172r173r, 1453. The pili (pixi) toll was levied on cotton, cheese, wool, leather, skins, butter, fat, honey, and tallow; Acta, II, pp. 104–105. For the gabella cantaro (chantarum), see note 22 below. The decision to spread the concessions over several gabelle was quite frequent and could involve imposts in different urban centres. The miles, Galcerando Corbera, received a salary of 100 onze as Magister Rationalis, 50 of which came from the iuribus supplementorum of Licata and Agrigento and the rest from the secretia of Palermo; C. vol. 2854, fols 18v-19v, 1454. Count Guglielmo Raimondo Moncada received a salary of 300 onze as Master Justiciar from the gabelle of Palermo and Noto; P. R. vol. 44, fols 337r-340r, 1452. In the same manner, i.e. by spreading the exaction over more than one community, the Crown could pay a city back money that had been loaned; R. C. vol. 57, fols 195v-196r, 1426 (Trapani). 20 For example, R. C. vol. 84, fols 271r-272v, 1451 (Piazza), and R. C. vol. 88, fols 208r-211v, 1453 (Randazzo). Of interest is the 1453 petition of Agrigento’s universitas which attests to a joint management of the same taxes by the Crown and the universitas, each with their own portion. The universitas had previously owned the “cabella buchiria, vino et salzome” (salzumi) and the proceeds were intended for the city walls. These gabelle were later transferred to the king with the stipulation that 20 onze would go in perpetuity to the universitas; G. G., pp. 316–317. The salzumi was a tax on retail sales of tallow, fat, meat, and fish; Acta, II, p. 125, and ORAZIO CANCILA, “Le gabelle dell’ ‘Università’ di Trapani”, in Nuovi quaderni del Meridione, 31–32, 1971, p. 266. In order to establish which goods were taxed by certain levies, I sometimes relied on documentary sources collected in Acta, II, and research by CANCILA, “Le gabelle”, and ORAZIO CANCILA, “Le gabelle della secrezia di Trapani”, in Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale, II-III, 1971, pp. 131–189. It must be noted that these studies concerned Palermo in the first half of the 1300s and Trapani in the early modern period, respectively. I nevertheless consider the correlation between the impost and taxable goods, even in different periods and different localities, to be generalizable because the goods taxed by a gabella did not usually change; the amount of the tax might vary but that was not an area which entered into my research. For the variations in taxation over a span of time and from one place to another, see GINATEMPO, “Spunti”, pp. 179–184, for a comparison with post-communal Italy. 21 R. C. vol. 54, fol. 105r-v. 22 The chantarum was a tax on goods that were weighed by the cantaro. 23 The sale amounted to 337 onze, 21 tarí, 6.5 grani and followed the economic aid from Giovanni Caltagirone which consisted “in solucione stipendiorum armigerum gencium ad nostram serviciam militiam”. The Sovereign stipulated that they could be leased or sold under the same conditions that were in force when they had been sold to Pietro Afflitto and Pietro Cardona, that is to say, not separately; R. C. vol. 54, fols 393r 395r, 1423. 24 C. vol. 2817, fols 68r-69r, 1430. Still in 1430, the universitas again asked to go ahead with the farm of a series of unspecified imposts in order to meet certain expenses and the Crown in approving the petition reminded them that they were to continue to allocate the revenue from the bucheria to the walls; P. R. vol. 31, fol. 61r-v.

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pluribus annis” permission to sell the bucheria.25 These transactions reveal that the impost’s divided ownership was consistently exploited in order to provide for both local needs and the needs of the Crown. The gabella on meat was one of the sources of revenue which guaranteed the greatest income. In 1442, the Crown granted the bucheria of Noto to the Salonia family in perpetuity in exchange for 700 onze26 and, in 1443, the town council of Messina’s universitas received royal assent authorizing the jurats to tax meat up to a total of 350 onze.27 The imposts were continually subject to transfers of ownership. In 1437, the Sovereign allowed the royal official, Leonardo Banquerio, to receive his annual entitlement from the bucheria of Palermo.28 The next year, the city of Palermo obtained the gabella on wine belonging to the central government through a trade of 200 onze per annum taken from the bucheria belonging to the universitas.29 It must be pointed out that the ownership might only involve a portion of an impost.30 A number of transactions involving the universitas of Corleone are also worth mentioning in regard to the possibility of transferring ownership. In 1434, during a period of economic hardship for the locality, the Sovereign granted an annual exemption of 60 onze by abolishing various sources of Crown income.31 That same year he returned several gabelle to the community in exchange for 10 onze per annum.32 These transactions allowed the municipal administration to increase its control over the city’s revenue and provided the Crown with immediate economic returns. In 1437, again on behalf of Corleone, the Sovereign annulled several imposts, which had been levied during the time of warfare with King Robert and later increased during the rule of the great magnates, for a total value of 50 onze per annum. The royal decree followed the town’s repayment of a loan of 400 onze.33

The sale was still for repairs to the walls; P. R. vol. 33, fols 155v-157v. A reconstruction of the sale to the Salonias began with a 1439 lifetime grant of only 15 onze annually from the community of Noto’s bucheria impost to Vassallo Landolina, owner of a slaughterhouse (R. C. vol. 74, fols 250v-252r; R. C. vol. 75, fol. 394r-v). This concession was subsequently changed over to other sources of income because the gabella bucheria had been sold to Antonio Salonia for an unknown sum; R. C. vol. 75, fols 397v-398r, 1440. In 1442, the bucheria was confirmed for the heirs Salonia to whom it had already been ceded in perpetuity for 500 onze following an additional payment of 200 onze since a new estimate had valued the impost at 700 onze; R. C. vol. 78, fols 250v-255r. In actual fact, the Salonia family did not have complete control over the gabella in light of the fact that Motta Pisano, “the first farmer of the tax”, could have leased it beginning with the sixth indiction (1443–44); R. C. vol. 75, fols 441v-442r, 1440. 27 C. vol. 2844, fol. 108v, 1443. 28 During the same period, the nobilis, Count de Castro also claimed rights over the tax; C. vol. 2829, fols 178v-179v, 1437. The concession to Leonardo Banquerio surfaced again in 1443 when, in reconfirming it, the Sovereign stipulated that upon Leonardo Banquerio‘s death it should go to one of his heirs; R. C. vol. 80, fols 155v-157r, 1443. 29 DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 218–241; C. vol. 2830, fols 215r-221r, 1438. The trade was still in force in 1440; DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 252–278. See also R. C. vol. 76, fols 175v-184v, where it is specified that the city acquired only two parts of the wine gabella. 30 The bucheria tax in Palermo was worth a quite a lot considering that in 1439 the Sovereign decreed other concessions on this tariff, namely, 150 onze to Giovanni Liria, Majordomo and Royal Counsellor, 100 onze to the miles, Garsia de Cabanegles, and 10 onze to Stefano de Quiros. He ordered, in addition, that for the third indiction which followed in 1439–40, given the malitiam temporum, the sale of the gabella with the provision that the only concession that would continue was the one to Liria (R. C. vol. 74, fols 445v-446v) who was to receive the income of de Quiros and Cabanegles (R. C. vol. 81, fols 91v93r; fols 94v-100v, 1443). Liria had such broad powers of administration over the gabella in 1447 that he could farm it out for two years; C. vol. 2851, fols 103v-104v. Worthy of note here is the royal provision stipulating that citizens exempted from payment of this impost continue to be so notwithstanding the concession to the majordomo—the privilege therefore remained valid alongside the other grants regarding the gabella; C. vol. 2865, fols116v- 117r, 1451. Liria’s share of the bucheria was returned to the royal coffers in 1456; P. R. vol. 47, fols 246v-247r. 31 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 175. 32 The transaction also concerned the separation of the royal secretia from the office of the baiulus and its inclusion among the elective magistracies; C. vol. 2826, fols 34v-35v; STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 182–184. 33 Ibidem, pp. 186–187. 25 26

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The Crown’s intervention should not be construed to imply that local fiscal autonomy was limited since royal assent was rarely denied as demonstrated by the broad municipal control over the wine tax in Catania. Worthy of note is the 1444 petition protesting interference of the secretus in Catania after which the community reacquired their full prerogatives over the sale of the wine gabella as well as those over other imposts.34 As to the details of the auction procedures, several cases are documented for the universitas of Catania: once the starting price had been decided, a minimum bid of one third or one half was established, then, when there were no higher bids, the last bidder was awarded the tax farm.35 Rules were most likely decided each time by the community. In Palermo, for example, in the early 1300s, if anyone made a higher bid within a given period of time after a previous bid had been made, he would be awarded a sum equal to one fifth of the difference between the two bidding prices.36 It must be specified, however, that the true amount of revenue generated by a tax cannot always be determined on the basis of its lease because the known value corresponds in many cases to the amount the tax farmer paid for the period concerned, hence, the sum stipulated in the contract.37 The sovereign made substantial economic returns in farming its gabelle which were often the object of transactions with high-level royal officials. This activity involved even the viceroys themselves, who were charged with procurement, or, in other words, assigned greater powers for the purpose of bringing in sums of money by exacting regalian rights and, most importantly, the power to alienate demesne property.38 The tax farmers were primarily members of the universitas or persons who had considerable vested interest in the universitas. Access to municipal economic potential and its redistribution remained within the community and this, I believe, was crucial to maintaining a fiscal balance between the Crown and community.39 34 G. G., pp. 173–174. Instead, royal control over the impost in Catania, both before and after this, must have been significant considering the concessions and the elections of royal credencerii: C. vol. 2812, fol. 95r, 1425; C. vol. 2821, fols 219v-220r, 1432; R. C. vol. 75, fol. 136r-v, 1439; R. C. vol. 76, fols 139v-140r, 1440; C. vol. 2834, fols 28r-29r, 1440; R. C. vol. 78, fol. 352r-v, 1442. Municipal petitions also provide indirect confirmation of the royal nature of the imposts on wine, a least during a certain period— in 1428: the Viceroy obtained information on the tariff from the secretus of the city; G. G., p. 137. The income destined for the Crown from the wine gabella came from both local sales of the product and its production on private land; C. vol. 2818, fol. 95r, 1425, and C. vol. 2821, fols 219v-220r, 1432. Tolls on production were less frequent but not inexistent; Gallo, instead, maintains that for Syracuse in the early modern period wine production was generally exempted; GALLO, “Le gabelle”, p. 83. 35 Auctions for the years 1418–19 (in this case, a minimum bid of one half or one third is not specified but evidenced by the bids themselves) and 1421–22; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 1, 6, [p. 166], and vol. 1, 14, p. 516. For a comparison of the system of auctions (regarding medieval western communities in general), see DENIS MENJOT & MANUEL SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, “Présentation”, in La fiscalité, pp. 5–8. The authors retain that auctions were advantageous because they ensured the community a resource of known value and were offered to those who had the available capital. 36 GENUARDI, Il comune, p. 254, Note 5. In Palermo, the person who won an auction was granted a twenty percent increase in revenue from the gabella. The fact that he obtained such an award allows one to hypothesize that the recipient of a gabella had the right to earn up to a certain amount based presumably on a percentage of the value of the impost as declared at auction. This must have been effected in an effort to avoid any form of speculation. See also C. vol. 2875, fols 89v-90r, 1454 (Polizzi). 37 For Turin, compare, BARBERO, Un’oligarchia, pp. 222–224. 38 Regarding procurement, see ANTONINO CALDARELLA, “Un viceré di Sicilia ignorato: Guglielmo Muntanyans”, in Atti dell’Accademia di Scienze Lettere e Arti di Palermo, 18, 1933, pp. 97–106, pp. 127–138. 39 Examples of sales of municipal gabelle to members of the community or individuals who operated within the community include the following. In 1438, the royal secretary, Giovanni Olzina, as the king’s procurator, sold Palermo’s pannorum (probably a tariff on cloth) for 10,000 florins to Ruggero Paruta as a property that was burgensaticum in perpetuo (C. vol. 2830, fols 180r190v); still in 1439, the King granted other concessions on the same gabella although they were of lesser value (R. C. vol. 74, fols 259r-260r). The treasurer, Antonio Sin, also as procurator, alienated Noto’s gabella on wine to Goffredo Rizzari for 100 onze in 1443 (R. C. vol. 81, fol. 150r); it returned to the royal demesne in 1451(P. R. vol. 44, fols 131r-135v). The secretia of the community of Traina was sold to Giovanni Romano for 300 onze; C. vol. 2849, fols 133v-134r, 1444. The Basilico family of Randazzo exercised considerable control over Randazzo’s imposts, for example: R. C. vol. 32, fol. 186r, 1398; C. vol. 2802, fols 150v-151r, 1417; P. R. vol. 34, fols 90v-91r, 1437. Lastly, the transactions involving the secretia of Patti alternately benefited the heirs of the Baron of San Marco, Francesco Filangeri, and the miles, Giovanni Romano; P. R. vol. 33, fols 192v-195v, 1433; C. vol. 2849, fol. 104r-v, 1444. The secreti themselves were mostly of local extraction; see BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 764 n. 393.

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Control by the universitates over taxable items entailed careful administration of their own revenues which the universitates relied on to meet ordinary and extraordinary expenses.40 The universitates often promoted a policy of economic austerity by lowering salaries, instituting sanctions for officials who did not fulfil their duties, and reducing exemptions for privileged persons. In 1423, the community of Salemi, in order to fund city wall repairs, levied a fine of 1 tarí upon sciurterii who failed to perform their duties.41 What was proposed for the baiulus in Salemi in 1425 was even worse: if he allowed any rubbish to be deposited within the universitas, he would have to pay 4 onze that would go toward the restoration of the town walls. In this case, Viceroy Nicola Speciale did not forget royal needs and stipulated that the fine would be divided three ways: one third for the walls, one third for the person who reported the infraction, and one third for the vicesecretus.42 From the same corpus of petitions, it is interesting to note the town council’s decision concerning the notarii who were asked to provide professional services without remuneration since they enjoyed numerous privileges.43 Agrigento’s universitas reduced the recompense owed to the master jurat in 1429 because the community could only count on an income of 20 onze.44 In 1434 in Trapani, they considered using a part of the officials’ salaries for repairs to the walls.45 For the same purpose and for the salary of the physician, Enrico Terrana, Agrigento’s universitas decided

40 For example, the robes for the officials of Catania for the coronation of the Sovereign, King of Aragon and Sicily, cost 10 onze for the captain, 5 onze for the patricius, 10 onze for each of the jurats, 5 onze for the treasurer, and 1 onza for the notary of the curia of the archivist; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 1, 1, p. 6, 1414. Officials’ salaries: P. R. vol. 24, fol. 251v, 1425 (Patti); P. R. vol. 30, fol. 70v (Agrigento); R. C. vol. 89, fols 111r-117r, 1453 (Piazza); P. R. vol. 47, fols 103r-104r, 1456 (Randazzo). The salary of the “surgeon”, Branca Minutis, GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 1, 9, p. 303, 1419; the salary of the cirurgicus maestro (master surgeon), Facius Condas, R. C. vol. 69, fol. 92r (Patti); the salary of the medicus missere, Enrico Terrana, G. G., p. 310, 1446, p. 312, 1447 (Agrigento), and C. C. vol. 63–3, fol. 52r-v, 1453 (Palermo). In 1429, Piazza’s universitas planned to hire a physician and use part of the income destined for the walls for his salary but the Crown refused to have that revenue used thus; P. R. vol. 30, fol. 102r-v, and R. C. vol. 61, fols 94v-95r. Public works and internal improvements: a fountain, and a seat for the town council meetings, arms and archives, R. C. vol. 69, fol. 92r-v, 1434 (Patti); for street repairs and improvements, C. vol. 2850, fol. 39v, 1445 (Piazza); the hospital of Sant’Antonio for lepers, P. R. vol. 47, fol. 163r, 1456 (Corleone); acquaducts and markets, R. C. vol. 102, fol. 99r, 1457 (Piazza). Study grants: the universitas of Catania guaranteed “sapienti viro Giovanni de Ansalone ad studium artis medicine accedere debenti” a salary of 3 onze, GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 1, 4, p. 71 (1415); the universitas of Sciacca granted the sum of 6 onze per annum to Matteo Calandrino “pro substentacione sui studi”, C. vol. 2829, fol. 20r-v, 1437; the universitas of Piazza financed Andrea Columba, Bartolomeo Turri, Giacomo Apatri, and the notarius, Antonio Dimisi, “ad studia litterarum” with 3 onze each (a lump sum, not an annual payment) taken from the revenues of the universitas and “ex salario horilogeii et Procuratoris demani”, C. vol. 2824, fol. 49r-v, 1434; Piazza’s universitas granted the sum of 6 onze a year for seven years to the nobilis, Thomeo Rubeo, “ad iudicalia generalia studendi in legibus”; later, Berengario Calascibetta was to make use of this award, R. C. vol. 84, fols 271r-272v, 1451. Other expenses: the purchase of wheat, C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 32r, 1448 (Palermo); insurance for the navili et fusti (boats) used to transport wheat, C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 53r-v, 1449 (Palermo); repayment to private individuals of loans made to pay the colletta, P. R. vol. 45, fol. 366r-v, 1454 (Piazza), and R. C. vol. 90, fols 141v142r, 1454 (Piazza). While it is reasonable to assume that the universitates probably declared figures to the central government that were lower than the true amounts, the following regards their annual income from gabelle (therefore without reference to property): 25 onze in Nicosia, P. R. vol. 21, fols 22v-24r, 1430; 50 onze in Randazzo R. C. vol. 74, fol. 390v, 1439; 20 onze in Agrigento (although the reference in the document is not clear), C. vol. 2849, fols 57v-58v, 1444; 50 onze in Piazza; Consuetudines, fol. 47v, 1448. 41 P. R. vol. 26, fol. 73r. 42 P. R. vol. 28, fol. 26r-v. 43 P. R. vol. 28, fol. 27r; in addition, an increase in the judges’ salaries that was excessively burdensome for the l’universitas was lamented. 44 G. G. p. 280. Regarding the master jurat, the royal official charged with the sindicatum of the city administration, see Epstein, Potere, p. 355. 45 C. vol. 2825, fols 54v-55r.

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to halve the salary of the magistri xurterii in 1446.46 Instead, Catania’s universitas gained approval to limit the right of exemption from the lenna gabella in 1447:47 no one could import more than one salma toll free.48 The universitas of Piazza in 1455 obtained authorization that privileged persons exempted from paying the royal colletta should contribute just like everyone else did.49 In 1456, the Sovereign sustained the complaint of Palermo’s universitas against the Baron of Misilmeri and all those who processed sugar cane in the trappeti (presses) on the plain of Ficarazzi and claimed to be exempt from the gabella lignorum because they were outside the territory of Palermo. Alphonso V agreed that the community had the right to demand payment of the tax in that territory too.50 The Crown for its part created a number of tax reductions, including the particularly significant ones concerning domestic trade,51 and this ensured a tributary system that was characterized by considerable pressure but did not suffocate urban finances and, thanks to the transitory nature of the tariffs, could rapidly respond to the needs of the cities.52 4.2

Municipal Deficit and Direct Taxation

Having established the mobile nature of taxes and their joint administration by government at both central and local levels, it is now necessary to assess the connections between the fiscal system, municipal deficit, and recourse to additional excise taxes. G. G., p. 310, p. 312, I have not been able to establish the exact nature of this tax which was probably levied when firewood was used for “industrial” purposes such as processing sugar cane. 48 G. G., p. 199. The lenna was a tax instituted in 1433 to finance the construction and maintenance of the walls (ibidem, p. 206–207) but proved to be insufficient. Indeed, the 1446 petitions included a request to be able to utilize the entire gabella pannorum which yielded between 30 and 40 onze. It had been instituted years earlier by the Infante, Pietro with the scope of repairing the walls and was still deemed necessary; ibidem, p. 194. 49 The exemption for the Baron de la Mastra was retained; Consuetudines, fol. 67v. 50 C. vol. 2885, fols 108v-109r. 51 This is an aspect clearly highlighted by Epstein who attributes particular importance to exemptions, especially those on duties and fairs, as a sign of economic and commercial expansion on a regional level; EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 92–118. The same author has recently considered in more detail the theory of economic growth, stemming from a reduction in the costs of transactions and an increase in innovation, common to the development of a number of European states and markets between the Late Middle Ages and the early modern period; STEPHAN R. EPSTEIN, Freedom and growth: The Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300–1750, London-New York, 2000. It must be said that the pioneering research on the subject was LADERO QUESADA, “Fiscalidad regia”, pp. 95–136, which, in reference to the Kingdom of Castile, correlated the development of a royal financial system based essentially on indirect taxation with economic growth promoted by the Crown through internal trade and fairs that stretched from the first half of the fourteenth century through the beginning of the fifteenth century. For Castile, see also PABLO SÁNCHEZ LEÓN, Town and country in Castile, 1400–1650, in Town and country in Europe, 1300–1800, ed. STEPHAN EPSTEIN, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 272–291, which discerns a number of regional areas with varying levels of urbanization and different phases of economic integration due to different forms of intervention by the Crown. It was a policy oriented towards reducing domestic tariffs demanded by local lords, which was also seen in Naples during the reign of Ferrante I (1458–94) as demonstrated by DAVID ABULAFIA, “The Crown and the Economy under Ferrante I of Naples (1485–94)”, in City and Countryside in Late Medieval and Reinassance Italy: Essays presented to Philip Jones, eds. TREVOR DEAN & CHRIS WICKHAM, London-Ronceverte, 1990, p. 134, which maintains that there was no such policy during the reign of Alphonso V. Regarding the importance of balancing the economic needs of the Crown and the taxpayers’ capabilities, for the stability of the system, see SESMA MUÑOZ, “Las transformaciones”, pp. 233–291. 52 Municipal financial policy cannot be studied by merely elucidating the correlations between the financial situation and meeting expenses; it is also necessary to take into consideration the wealth of private individuals on the one hand and policies of redistribution on the other, as well as the fact that the expenditures were not always mandatory and not always unproductive; see COLLANTES DE TERÁN SÁNCHEZ & MENJOT, “Hacienda y fiscalidad”, pp. 213–254. A methodological approach of this kind is also used in MONSALVO ANTÒN, “Parentesco y sistema”, pp. 937–969. 46 47

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Then, it is also necessary to attempt an examination of direct taxation as a further aspect of municipal finance. The Sicilian communities’ constitution of a deficit exhibits significant distinctive features as well as characteristics in common with the universitates of other states of the Crown of Aragon. In Sicily, the municipal economic policies underlying the creation of a municipal deficit depended largely on the sales of gabelle scheduled for the future which, consequently, lost a part of their value.53 The loss, termed interesse,54 increased in direct proportion to the length of time for which the debt was contracted when there was an urgent need to raise capital. This devaluation was an inevitable consequence of the high risks incurred by those investing in what were only potential revenues.55 The community determined the selling price of rights based on the amount of money the community required rather than the true value of the assets involved. This anticipated, from a certain point of view, the economic policy John II would be forced to pursue. During his reign, a practice was established which set a selling price at auction, not in relation to the projected revenues the auctioned rights were expected to generate, but but to reflect the amount owing to the creditors. In the long run, such a practice resulted in the transformation of royal revenues into income from creditors and, inevitably, in the rights being auctioned at discounted prices.56 This economic policy of an increasing deficit has some features in common with the other states of the Crown of Aragon which should be underscored. Owing to intense fiscal pressure, the local governments in Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia chose

The universitas of Palermo, in anticipation of the Sovereign’s arrival, obtained authorization to auction out the gabelle in 1420 for even longer than a year but with a limit of 80 onze per “construere pontem et fieri facere vexilla necessaria et palleum honorabilem”; P. R. vol. 21, fol. 222r. In Trapani, in September of 1434 (thirteenth indiction), the Sovereign allowed the jurats, judges, baiulus, and the universitas to sell the future wine and meat gabelle of the subsequent second and third indictions; C. vol. 2858, fol. 164r-v. In Trapani again, in November of 1427 (sixth indiction), in order overcome the financial straits of the universitas and undertake the restoration of the walls, they farmed out the gabelle of the eighth indiction since those of the sixth and seventh indictions had already been pledged for other purposes; R. C. vol. 59, fol. 40r-v, 1427. In 1431, having already sold the imposts for the current year, the decision was made to sell the tariffs for the following year in order to repair the walls; P. R. vol. 32, fol. 35r (Trapani). This fiscal policy inevitably led to uncontrolled municipal debt: in 1445 Trapani’s universitas asked to be exempted from the colette for the next six years since the walls were in ruins and the taxes for the entire period had already been sold; C. vol. 2848, fol. 173v. In 1431, the universitas of Piazza obtained permission to farm out the imposts for the following years to be able to repair the walls; P. R. vol. 31, fol. 35r. The universitas of Catania was authorized by the Crown to sell the gabelle and to levy new ones, without any time limits, in order to pay the donativum; G. G., p. 219, 1457. For a comparison of the level of public debt, often so high that the city could not cope using its own resources, see for Bruges; JEAN-PIERRE SOSSON, “Finances communales et dette publique: Le cas de Bruges à la fin du XIIIe siècle”, in Peasants, pp. 239–257. 54 I believe interesse to be equivalent to the term used to indicate the loss incurred over time. The universitas of Palermo, for example, was allowed in 1423 to sell the taxes on meat for the following year and the petition was approved with the provision that they be sold “cum minori interessi qui fieri poterit”; R. C. vol. 54, fols 98v 99r. In 1447, the universitas of Corleone requested that for their own imposts they be allowed to “sell them freely with or without interesse”; STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 211, 1447; P. R. vol. 25, fol. 81v. This was a procedure with historic precedents: the universitas of Palermo in [1406] was authorized to sell the gabelle for the following year, but “with the lowest interesse”; Acta, XII, p. 139. 55 It was common practice, for example in Tuscan communes, for tax farmers to request reduction for the years in which they had not been able to collect normal revenues due to adverse conditions; WILLIAM M. Bowsky, Le finanze del Comune di Siena 1287–1335, Florence, transl. by Katherine Isaacs and Gaetano Salinas, 1975, p. 182, and DE LA RONCIÈRE, “Indirect taxes”, pp. 177–178. 56 KÜCHLER, Les finances, pp. 86–90. 53

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to issue public debt securities (censals and violaris)57—an economic policy promoted by the Crown itself 58—and the authorities went on issuing more shares in order to pay the interest on those previously sold. In Sicily, the local administrations could not rely on traditional sources of income because they were insufficient or otherwise pledged already, so they continued to sell the rights to future gabelle. Both of these economic policies followed the same way evolutionary path of assuming additional burdens to provide relief from those already being borne. In Catalonia, the rate of interest on the securities issued—7.14% for censals and 14.28% for violaris—was substantial and it was not by chance that the authorities attempted to redeem the violaris in order to purchase less costly censals.59 In Sicily as well, attempts were made to minimize the loss of revenue from the discounted imposts, as demonstrated by the fact that only in exceptional cases did the authorities reach the point of selling securities for nearly six subsequent years. The average was for two to four years—a considerable time span all the same.60 It is possible to speak of a virtual consolidation of the public debt for some states of the Crown of Aragon, given the practice of resorting to the sale of securities. This contrasts with what occurred in Sicily where it was possible to avoid issuing securities (and therefore the payment of interest) most likely because of the particularly flexible system of the gabelle. Sicilian communities would sometimes turn to additional excise taxes when traditional taxation no longer sufficed. Recourse to a maldenaru—an additional excise tax, usually levied on basic necessities, which was particularly onerous and hated as the very name suggests— stemmed mainly from the gradual loss of income during the course of a year. This fiscal measure might also be enacted when excessively exorbitant royal demands required quick compliance.61 In actual fact, this was not always an unfair means

TURULL RUBINAT, La configuracíó, pp. 460–493; SÁNCHEZ MARTÍNEZ, “Fiscalidad y finanzas”, pp. 229–232, which lists royal demands in primis among the causes that led to the public debt along with public works and famine; also VERDÉS PIJUAN, “Evolution”, pp. 113–126. On public debt as a phenomenon characteristic of both large and small localities, see, for Barcelona and Sant Feliu de Guíxols, ORTI GOST, “La estructura”, pp. 127–136. Regarding credit as an integral part of the tax system, for Ghent comparé MARC BOONE, “Plus dueil que joie, Les ventes de rentes par la ville de Gand pendant la période bourguignonne: entre intérˆets privés et finances publiques”, in Bullettin trimestriel du Crédit Communal de Belgique, 176, 1991–1992), pp 3–25. 58 During the reigns of both Alphonso V and John II, in particular for the Principality of Catalonia but also for the Kingdom of Valencia, the Cortes opted to pay the donativa through the sale of public debt securities. Since the actual payment of the donation took time, one or more years on average, borrowing was deemed the only satisfactory way of getting round the delay. The monarch requested immediate payment of the donativum and repayment of the loan was tied to the donativum which the Cortes would subsequently approve. In order not to loose the economic advantage, as had sometimes happened with requests for loans made just a few months prior to the moment when a donativum was voted approval, Alphonso V decided to request credit at least one year prior to the voting. The money loaned to the monarch was deductible from the sum voted as a donation; KÜCHLER, Les finances, pp. 163–182. 59 TURULL RUBINAT, La configuracíó, pp. 460–462. The interest of the violaris could even reach 16.63%; VERDÉS PIJUAN, “Evolution”, p. 113. 60 See p. 141. The only way, in fact, to keep finances under control, was to rely on short-term loans such as in Chambery and Narbonne, for example, where the governments never allowed the debt to reach the point that further loans were needed to pay off those that had matured with an outstanding debt; CHRISTIAN GUILLERÉ, “Les dépenses de la ville de Chambéry à la fin du XIVe siècle”, in La fiscalité, pp. 137–146; GILBERT LARGUIER, “Les dépenses municipales à Narbonne au XVe siècle”, in La fiscalité, pp. 155–164. 61 Some instances of additional excise taxes: to redeem the community, C. vol. 2854, fol. 180r-v, 1444 (Sciacca) and STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 211, 1447; to pay off loans from private individuals, C. vol. 2875, fols 89v-90r, 1454 (Polizzi) and P. R. vol. 47, fol. 267r (Sciacca); to pay the compositio, C. vol. 2849, fols 173r-181r, 1445 (Sciacca); to pay for the mission of the syndics, P. R. vol. 39, fol. 206v, 1448 (Polizzi); to pay the colletta, P. R. vol. 45, fol. 366r-v, 1454 (Piazza); to redeem the captaincy, R. C. vol. 98, fols 102v-103v, 1455 (Agrigento). For other instances of maldenaru to pay direct imposts, see p. 144. 57

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of distributing the tax burden because opting for the maldenaru, with excise taxes spread over items considered more suitable and necessary at the time, lessened the need to farm out more future gabelle. The importance of maldenaru taxation should be evaluated by clarifying, in particular, the way it was carried out.62 First of all it should be noted that the choice of an excise tax testifies to a fiscal policy oriented toward indirect imposts.63 The extraordinary nature of these taxes entailed control by the Crown which would grant authorization and be advised of their duration.64 A number of measures regarding duties levied by the universitas of Agrigento provide useful information for further analysis. In 1425, the Crown authorized the jurats there to levy an excise tax on both retail (al minuto) and wholesale sales of wine “pro ipsius reparacione [universitatis] si contigerit”65 but retained ample royal control over the imposts.66 Despite this concession and the central government’s control over part of the duties, there was still leeway for further taxation benefiting the universitas. In 1433, Agrigento’s universitas decided on an additional excise tax of one denaro on every quarter of a litre of wine, two on meat, and one on salsumine (or salzumi)67 in order to put together the sum of 100 onze needed to redeem its captaincy.68

62 Recourse to additional excise taxes, especially those on consumption, was common practice even in other areas such as the Tuscan communes of Florence and Siena from as early as the end of the 1200s; DAVID HERLIHY, “Direct and Indirect Taxation in Tuscan Urban Finance, ca. 1200–1400”, in Finances et compatibilité urbaines du 13e au 16e siècles, Bruxelles, 1964, p. 398; DE LA RONCIÈRE, “Indirect Taxes”, pp. 157–172; BOWSKY, Le finanze, Chapter 6. For the various instruments employed in financing the public debt of Tuscan communes in situations that were quite different from those in Sicily, particularly in the consolidation of the public debt in a credit system that rested on a true securities market, see GINATEMPO, Prima del debito, Chapter 3. 63 For a comparison, see RIGAUDIÈRE, Saint-Flour, II, pp. 787–792, which maintains that recourse to indirect imposts on basic commodities was the best way of transferring the fiscal burden onto the majority of workers. It must be noted, however, that even for indirect levies, the choice of which goods to tax was a function of the relations between the various political groups; for Castile, see ANTONIO COLLANTES DE TERÁN SÁNCHEZ & DENIS MENJOT, “Hacienda y fiscalidad”, p. 217. Even in central and northern Italy, municipal aristrocracies favoured indirect imposts; GIORGIO CHITTOLINI, “La cité, le territoire, l’impôt quelques considérations sur la répartition des impositions directes dans le Duché de Milan (de 1450 aux environs de 1500)”, in L’impôt, pp. 311–312. 64 C. vol. 2820, fol. 46r, 1433 (Agrigento); C. vol. 2838, fol. 128v, 1441 (Palermo); G. G. p. 207, 1454 (Catania). 65 Initially, it was stipulated that 15 onze was to be paid to the Crown as interest on the gabelle levied but this was subsequently waived on account of services rendered by the universitas; P. R. vol. 24, fols 220v-221r, 1425. Al minuto or minuti was used for tariffs imposed on retail sales of basic commodities; ROSSELLA CANCILA, “La gestione della fiscalità in Sicilia nel XVI secolo”, in Le città, p. 196. 66 In providing for the elimination of the office of the Magister Secretus in 1431, the Sovereign also decided to reduce the salary of Gispert Desfar who managed it from 353 onze 24 tarí to 150 onze, subdivided into 110 onze from the wine tax in Agrigento, and 40 onze from the gabella of the baiulia in Salemi. Desfar, furthermore, who had been granted this as a lifetime concession for himself and his heirs, could farm or trade these revenues; C. vol. 2818, fols 25r-28r, 1431. The universitas of Salemi had been responsible for a larger sum for Desfar’s salary and when his salary reduction was decreed, the Sovereign granted Giovanni Vitellino, Secretary and Magister Rationalis, an annual sum of 25 onze from Salemi’s revenues; R. C. vol. 75, fols 314r-v, 340r-v, 340 (r bis), 1440. After having been Magister Secretus, Desfar became Magister Portulanus. The unique and brilliant career of Desfar, a mere uxer d’arms in 1418, began with his marriage in 1422 to Giovanna Del Carretto with which he obtained the barony of Racalmuto. He held the post of Magister Secretus from 1426 to 1435 and that of Magister Portulanus from 1436 to 1440. Desfar’s career has been highlighted by BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 765, p. 869, p. 880, p. 887, p. 902; also CORRAO, Governare, p. 258 n. 152. For the uxer d’arms, a mid-ranking official of the domus charged with external relations for the sovereign, see ibidem, pp. 317–319. 67 On salzumi, see note 20 above. 68 C. vol. 2820, fol. 46r, 1433. The decision to add excise taxes onto the three gabelle recurred in 1443, G. G., pp. 304–305. In Salemi, the town council also stipulated an additional consumption tax, for repairs to the walls in this instance (P. R. vol. 27, fol. 49r-v, 1426) and later to raise the level of one of the current imposts (R. C. vol. 59, fols 113v, 1429).

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Recourse to additional excise taxes was more frequently relied on to satisfy royal demands69 and the maldenaru could be farmed out the same as ordinary taxes and, therefore, be worth less. This took place in Catania in 1454, in order to contribute to the payment of the Queen’s colletta70 through a tariff which could have been farmed out like traditional imposts or entrusted to a credencerius.71 The earliest instance I have found of the auctioning of a maldenaru excise tax concerns the universitas of Nicosia in 1374.72 Sources rarely specify whether a maldenaru was added to a royal or municipal item because the extraordinary nature of the impost implied that it could concern both royal and local taxes. In the face of an urgent need to earn new income, a community’s sources of revenue might very likely not have been sufficient. This is confirmed, for example, in a 1453 petition presented, yet again, by Agrigento’s universitas and pointing out that in order to pay the royal collette they had always decided to apply a maldenaru on all existing duties in Agrigento, “on the royal gabelle as well as the gabelle granted to others by the sovereign”.73 This policy of indistinct taxation spread over all the imposts was deemed more acceptable because it took place gradually, unlike direct taxation.74 The subjective nature of this attitude is obvious considering that a system of proportional allotment of direct taxation had already been widely established in Sicily. It was, however, an allotment that was not as rigorous as it might have been and the

69 The universitas could reduce public indebtedness through a maldenaru and this was the solution adopted in Sciacca for the period of an indiction in order to repay the 95 onze borrowed from the mercatoris, Antonio Settimo, for a guaranteed loan to the sovereign; R. C. vol. 71, fols 166r-167r, 1436. A royal decree in 1443 addressing Catania’s secretus and master procurator, Antonio Castello, discloses the city’s economic potential. It was also addressed to the Camera Reginale (the city and territory of val di Noto, an appanage of the Queen). The conquest of Naples had just been concluded and a new subvention was therefore requested on 18 February which demanded exaction by the end of March—a very short period of time. Catania was called on to contribute 100 onze, the Jewish quarter and the bishop were to contribute 40 onze each, and the clergy 20 onze. The Sovereign, underlining the extraordinary nature of the request, authorized levies of maldenaru if the municipal gabelle proved insufficient. The contribution of 150 onze demanded of the city of Noto was substantial while only 2 onze were required of the city’s Jewish quarter; R. C. vol. 80 fols 131v-133v (the contributions of other localities are also recorded). For the Camera Reginale, see GIUSEPPE M. AGNELLO, Ufficiali e gentiluomini al servizio della Corona: Il governo di Siracusa dal Vespro all’abolizione della Camera reginale, Syracuse, 2005, pp. 21–22. In Palermo, the retail gabelle minuti (excise taxes on retail sales) had already been farmed out to pay creditors and provvisionati (salaried persons) in 1444, so a maldenaru had to be levied to repay the 300 onze loaned by mercatores for the colletta for the marriage of the King’s second daughter, Eleonora; C. vol. 2844, fol. 206r-v. In this case it was added that payment would not be requested of the exempted. Who the exempted persons were is indicated in another instance of a maldenaru: the Viceroy’s household, the archbishop, the big hospital, and, a number of high-level officials in accordance with royal indications. Finally, the Sovereign decreed that the officials were to allot the taxes on the basis of the status familie; C. vol. 2885, fols 109v-110r, 1456 (Palermo). In 1451, the universitas again resorted to a maldenaru to pay back the money loaned by private individuals to pay the colletta and to purchase wheat; C. vol. 2865, fol. 116r. Regarding the distinct division between taxpayers and the exempted, see the request from the President of the Kingdom, Antonio Russo Spatafora to the “capitaneo patricio iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus terre Nothi” on behalf of Francesco Dedato, an official in the Royal Chancery, who should have been exempted as one of the King’s officials; P. R. vol. 47, fols 198v-199r, 1456. In 1458, 55 onze were paid out of the municipal gabelle, particularly the maldenaru gabella to Tome de Gilberto for expenses incurred by in relation to the clock of Palermo’s universitas; P. R. vol. 50, fols 270v-271r. 70 G. G., p. 207. 71 R. C. vol. 74, fols 159v-160r, 1438 (Piazza). Regarding the sale of a maldenaru tax, a 1446 petition from Agrigento’s universitas is significant; G. G., pp. 309–310. Another instance of the sale of a madenaru tax concerns Polizzi’s universitas; C. vol. 2848, fols 153r-164r, 1442 and 1445. 72 BARBATO, Per la storia, p. 55 73 G. G., p. 315. 74 Ibidem, p. 315, 1453. In only one case, for Palermo in 1456, were proportional criteria applied to a maldenaru that the universitas requested permission to levy. The Sovereign granted the request stipulating that the tax was to be allotted according to the status familiae; C. vol. 2885, fol. 109v. In all likelihood, the Sovereign was implicitly giving his placet to a direct tax rather than the maldenaru.

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burden was certainly not distributed as uniformly as with indirect taxation.75 It is not by chance that the 1453 corpus of petitions was presented by Giovanni Lamantia and Graziano Gini who were members of the urban nobility, the most affluent socioprofessional group, and also promoters in that period of an oligarchic restriction of access to elective offices.76 Decisions regarding types of taxation actually resulted from intense confrontations between opposing groups and even though indirect taxation was more prevalent due to pressure levied by the wealthiest groups, in some cases (particularly emergency situations), local governments opted for direct proportional taxation. In contrast to what had occurred in 1453, an earlier petition from Agrigento’s universitas in 1445 can be taken into consideration with reference to the controversy over the positive and negative merits of indirect taxation. A decision was made through the town council to reconsider the choice of resorting to a maldenaru in order to collect the 150 onze required for work on the castle. In light of the “damage and interest” incurred for the additional excise taxes already in force, the universitas opted for direct taxation to which all the “cives according to their ability” would have contributed.77 An intensification of royal fiscal demands and the full autonomy of local administrations in deciding the types of taxation to levy undoubtedly contributed to bringing about a more recognizable distinction between the different status groups of taxpayers. One of the most interesting cases of proportional taxation, and one of the earliest to bear witness to clear social differentiation, comes from the universitas of Sciacca which asked, in 1434, to be able to levy a tax varying from a maximum of 1 tarí and 10 grani to a minimum of 5 grani for the purpose of repairing the town walls.78 The sovereign approved the petition stipulating that the miserabiles should be exempted and that three inhabitants, one representative each from the nobilium, burgesium, and ministalium, should implement the tax and thus decide who to tax and for how much: Placet serenissimo domino regi ita tamen quod a dicta imposicionne sint exempti miserabiles et taxa predicta fiet per tre habitatores ipsius terre unum scilicet di nobilibus dicte terre, alterum de burgensibus et tercium di ministalibus qui teneantur et debeant in posse officialium iurare de facendo taxam prefatam bene et fideliter iuxta eorum videre neminem agravando aut disgravando et pecunia ex in colligenda ex dicta taxa veniat in posse duorum proborum virorum eligendorum per officiales ipsius terre qui teneantur reddere calculum di pecuniis percipiendis et expendendis iuratis et officialibus terre Sacce et quod non 75 See Section 5.1. It is true, however, that a criterion of fair taxation was not regularly followed for indirect taxation. In Catania in 1434 for the coronation of King Alphonso, the hearths were indistinctly taxed 3 tarí each and the wealthy were to lend the entire amount in order to make the sum immediately available. Nevertheless, in consideration of possible resistance by the popolo to paying a direct tax—a fact which confirms the absence of a differentiation in the tax rate—an indirect tax was generally decided on; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 3, 5, pp. 83–84. 76 G. G. pp. 317–318. On competition for access to public office, see Section 5.2. 77 Ibidem, pp. 306–307. On recourse to direct taxation in the 1500s, see MAURICE AYMARD, “Il sistema delle gabelle nelle città siciliane fra Cinquecento e Seicento”, in Città e feudo nella Sicilia moderna, eds. FRANCESCO BENIGNO & CLAUDIO TORRISI, Caltanissetta- Rome, 1995, p. 22. See also GALLO, “Le gabelle”, p. 73, which maintains that for Syracuse recourse was never made to this sort of taxation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Catalonia, while indirect imposts were subject to royal assent, payments of the collette in the form of direct taxes (a procedure consolidated in the first half of the thirteenth century) were the result of a town council deliberation; MAX TURULL RUBINAT, “El impuesto directo en los municipios catalanes medievales”, in Finanzas, pp. 75–136. In the Catalan city of Lerida, municipal taxation, understood as a set of royal authorizations for the universitas to obtain money, was the determining factor in the establishment of the Consell, the government body created to efficiently carry out tax collection among members of the universitas; TURULL RUBINAT, El naixement, pp. 219–232. 78 R. C. vol. 69, fols 105v-106r.

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convertantur aliquo modo in alios usos et quod maramma fiat ad canna ad staglum et ne universitas in qualitate maramm(er)is decipiatur, magister marammerius ipsius universitatis teneatur omnidie stare super dicta maramma et morari et diligenter advertere ne aliquod fraus fieret in dicta maramma.79

If the differentiated taxation adopted in Sciacca testifies on one hand to a possible correlation between direct taxes and proportionality, on the other hand it reveals a lack of rigid correlation because the minimum and maximum levels were established without determining any intermediate levels, thus, partially reduced the possibility of equitably levying the tax. This undoubtedly benefited the wealthy and represents, I believe, the point of compromise reached between the more affluent groups, who were against proportional taxation, and the less well-off who favoured it, in order to go ahead with a proportional tax.80 As has been shown for Catalonia, taxes levied on the basis of macro distinctions among social groups did not satisfy any stringent criteria for proportionality.81 By way of comparison with the social universe of Sciacca, a slightly earlier measure can be cited which was enacted by Salemi’s town council in 1429 to finance repair work on the walls. It is a measure which refers to nobiles et privilegiati of the city as a sector distinct from the rest of the community: Ita quod omnes ille persone tam nobiles quam privilegiatae (minime) soliti sunt ad xurtam seu custodiam dicte terre accedere quod anno quolibet teneantur meniis dicte terre tarenum unum pro quolibet usque quo predicta menia fuerint expedita incipiendo a die quo dicta capitula fuerint confirmata a magnificis et potentibus dominis dominis [sic] viceregibus in antea.82 R. C. vol. 69, fols 105v-106r. For the payment of a redemption, the universitas of Polizzi obtained authorization to tax the inhabitants “according to their ability”; C. vol. 2822, fol. 21v, 1442. Another case of proportional taxation was decreed in Palermo for the colletta in 1442; ANTONINO GIUFFRIDA,”Lu quarteri di lu Cassaru: note sul quartiere del Cassaro a Palermo nella prima metà del secolo XV”, in Mélanges del l’Ecole française de Rome: Temps modernes, 83, 1971–72, pp. 439–448. In Catalonia, the miserabiles were the least well-off and the local administration requested that they be fully exempted from royal collette but their request never received approval from the Crown; JORDI MORELLÓ BAGET, Fiscalitat i deute públic en dues viles del camp de Tarragona. Reus i Valls, segles XIV-XV, Barcelona, 2001, pp. 248–251. The expression “pobres o miserables” was used in Mallorca; MARIA BARCELÓ CRESPÍ, “Els “miserables” de la ciutat de Mallorca a la baixa edat mitjana”, in Bolletí de la Societat Arqueològica Luliana, 41, 1985, pp. 131–141. 80 In other places, too, rigorous proportionality was not always applied in cases of direct taxation. On recourse to proportional taxation, which did not constantly guarantee rigorous fairness in exactions considering that, especially initially, methods favouring the wealthy could be adopted, see for Murcia, DENIS MENJOT, Fiscalidad y sociedad: Los murcianos y el impuesto en la Baja Edad Media, Madrid, 1986, pp. 205–214. See the important studies on France by RIGAUDIÈRE, “Les origines”, pp. 277–287, and on the Catalan community of Cervera by VERDÉS PUJAN, Administrar, II, pp. 866–936, especially pp. 884–904. For the conflicts between professional groups caused by an iniquitous fiscal system, for Auvergne see RIGAUDIÈRE, Saint-Flour, I, pp. 166–174, pp. 344–348 and RIGAUDIÈRE, Penser, pp. 621–660, regarding conflicts between representatives of the artisans who gradually gained a say in matters of taxation over the course of the fourteenth century and the consuls who were members of an oligarchy composed mainly of merchants and experts in law. On urban conflicts generated by a fiscal system favourable to the mercantile elite in English and French cities, see also HILTON, “Révoltes”, pp. 25–33 and HILTON, English, pp. 134–143, which highlight the political and social aspects of these episodes and subscribe to the theory of class conflict. For French cities, instead, CHEVALIER, Les bonnes, pp. 299–302, attributes an irrational nature devoid of planning, to the urban revolts of the less affluent groups. 81 In an important study of the Catalan ville of Reus and Valls carried out by MORELLÓ BAGET, Fiscalitat, pp. 361–374, the author distinguishes between three types of direct taxes: one where everyone paid the same amount (capitacions), one where minimum and maximum payments were set and taxpayers were normally divided into three groups (major, mitjana, menor) but further subdivisions were sometimes made on up to a total of twelve groups (talles per mans), and one with proportional rates based on an assessment of the taxable assets of each individual (talles proporcionals or per sou i per lliura). Regarding the distinction in Catalonia between ciudades (communities protected by a wall which included an episcopal see) and villas (communities which held some privileges and whose population was superior to that of the pueblos), see CARME BATLLE GALLART & Joan J. Busqueta Riu, “Príncipe y ciudades en la Corona de Aragón en el siglo XV”, in Principi, p. 335. 82 R. C. vol. 59, fol. 113v. 79

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Documentary sources offer no elements helpful in understanding how an individual’s wealth was established in direct taxation. The town council minutes for the city of Palermo, for example, furnish some information on the methods of collection but nothing on the methods used for estimating wealth.83 When voting approval for collette, it was decided which groups would contribute to its payment but it was rarely specified how much they were to contribute and no mention was made of assessments.84 It is evident that in deciding on exactions, the council relied on previous assessments which were quite detailed, as recorded for the neighbourhood of Cassaro for the 1442 colletta.85 In the case of Cassaro, an extant list of taxpaying households (fuochi) reveals that 50% paid between 2 and 3 tarí on up to a maximum of between 2 onze, for a minimum number of taxpayers, and a ceiling of 20 onze, in the case of only two families.86 Collections were carried out on a territorial basis. For purchasing wheat, for instance, a commission appointed by the town council, which was normally made up of several officials and representatives elected by the council for each of the neighbourhoods (or much less often of solely officials delegated by the council), collected the tax and distributed the wheat at the same time.87 A significant difference emerges in the criteria of proportionality adopted in the direct taxations of Sciacca in 1434 and Palermo in 1442. The criterion of proportionality was quite general for the community of Sciacca and once the maximum and minimum levels were set, they carried out the levy without further distinctions. In

Studies in this field are lacking for Sicily and there is little pertinent research even for other monarchical contexts in the same period but the common factor which emerges is that a taxpayer’s own declarations were the principal means of assessing wealth. See RIGAUDIÈRE, Saint-Flour, II, pp. 818–893; once the consuls and counsellors in the community of Auvergne knew the amount of the exaction, they apportioned it among the residents of each neighbourhood “secundum facultates ipsorum, secundum magis et minus” but it is not known how assets were actually assessed. Rigaudère contends that those who allotted the tax must have relied on taxpayers’ own declarations supplemented by questions put to their neighbours. In Périguex, for example, in the fourteenth century, they proceeded based on “juramento seu alio modo”; ibidem, p. 821, n. 180. He concludes by postulating that such a system was probably more feasible in a small place like Saint-Flour where everyone knew the taxpayers individually and there are extant rosters for the end of the 1300s with 819 names followed by a declaration of their assets. On this aspect, see VERDÉS PUJAN, Administrar, II, pp. 884–885 and the important study by MAX TURULL RUBINAT & JORDI MORELLÓ BAGET, “Estructura y tipología”, pp. 271–326, in particular, on the compilation of registers of estimes, manifests or vàlues/valies in Catalonia dating back to the mid-1300s, but significantly widespread from the early years of the 1400s. They constituted the basis for calculation of the allotments for proportional direct taxation by the municipal authorities; ibidem, p. 322. Assessment procedures evolved between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. They were originally the result of self-declarations but gradually local governments established commissions charged with confirming the declarations. These commissions were normally made up of members from each neighbourhood and status group. For this aspect, in relation to the Catalan communities of Reus and Valls, see also MORELLÓ BAGET, Fiscalitat, pp. 320–323. For a further comparison in a communal context where citizens also declared the value of their assets under oath for the formulation of the estimo of wealth, see the research for Bergamo by PATRIZIA MAINONI, Le radici della discordi: Ricerche sulla fiscalità a Bergamo tra XIII e XV secolo, Milan, 1997. With reference to cases of requests for levying direct taxation of a proportional nature which had not been decided by the community but imposed on them, it must be added that proportionality did not always guarantee that sufficient funds would be collected; for Tuscany, see ANTHONY MOLHO, Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaissance, 1400–1433, Cambridge (MA), 1971, p. 62; ELIO CONTI, L’imposta diretta a Firenze nel Quattrocento (1427–1494), Rome, 1984, p. 178; PETRALIA, “Fiscalità”, p. 178. 84 For these aspects, see FABRIZIO TITONE, “Il tumulto popularis del 1450: Conflitto politico e società urbana a Palermo”, in Archivio Storico Italiano, 603, 2005, pp. 50–53, pp. 59–61. 85 This refers to a quire entitled “Lu Cassaru” and subtitled “Payments maid by various people divided according to their respective neighbourhoods”; the quires for the other neighbourhoods (Albergheria, Seralcadi, Kalsa, and Conceria) are missing but an explicit reference is made to them on the last folio of the document; see GIUFFRIDA,”Lu quarteri”, pp. 439–462. 86 Ibidem, pp. 447–448. 87 C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 56r-57v, 1449; C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 66r-68r, 1449; C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 188r-190r, 1451. 83

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Palermo, in contrast, numerous differentiations of the exactions were possible on the basis of individual income. In Randazzo, too, exaction of the collette was the responsibility of deputati—one from each of the three neighbourhoods—most likely chosen by the town council. This happened in 1437 following an acute wheat shortage when the community needed to pay for a store of wheat they had purchased and the jurats and the universitas, having “obtained a loan from twenty people, decided to repay them by levying a colletta and charged three persons from each neighbourhood with the collection”.88 The neighbourhood, both a topographic and institutional entity,89 remained the basic unit of municipal organization, just as for electoral procedures. Exactions for each neighbourhood carried out by a resident was evidently a method of assuring that those who were in charge would have some knowledge of the wealth of those who were to contribute, thus reducing the risk of evasion. In summation, the creation of a municipal deficit based on the sales of future gabelle was possible because of a flexible system in which the ownership of the tariffs could change hands or a single source of revenue could be shared by more than one party. Recourse both to the sale of future revenues and to maldenaru excise taxes, which were generally adopted in order to minimize the loss of income, reveals a fiscal system heavily oriented towards indirect taxation. Municipal administrations did not eschew direct taxes, however, and under the impetus of socio-professional groups who saw proportionality as a safeguard not provided by indirect taxation (even though it was not always applied as a rigorous criterion), urban governments often turned to them, particularly for substantial financial manoeuvres. 4.3

Alienation of the Captaincy

Municipal revenues, although limited, were sufficient to meet the ordinary needs of the universitas as well as those of the Crown because the royal tax burden— placed directly on taxable goods—was limited. The sovereign was forced to find alternative solutions for other needs, such as ceding demesne property. In order to redeem the property, cities enacted substantial financial manoeuvres, obtaining a number of assurances regarding the redeemed property and, thus, a large return on their investment as well. The alienation of the captaincy figured among the major new economic resources identified by Alphonso V. Recourse to ceding the principal local royal office resulted in a dramatic attenuation of the diarchic nature of municipal administration established at the end of the 1200s with an official who was appointed by the Crown and had jurisdiction over criminal matters and was set apart from the elected officials. Communities were able, in fact, to exercise an increasingly greater control over the captainship and the amount of time an incumbent remained in office as a consequence of the frequent recourse Alphonso V made to selling the position to an individual, a group of buyers, or even an entire P. R. vol. 34, fols 91v-92r. For a comparison, see ROBERT DESCIMON & JEAN NAGLE, “Les quartiers de Paris du Moyen Âge au XVIIIe siècle: Évolution d’un espace plurifonctionnel”, in Annales: Économie, Sociétés, Civilisation, 5, 1979, pp. 956–983 (for Paris), and GUIDI, “I sistemi elettorali agli uffici”, pp. 390–398 (for Florence).

88 89

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community. This is the period when a process, leading eventually in the early 1500s to a ‘patrimonialization’ of the offices, was initiated.90 The subject has received little critical attention for the medieval period due to a paucity of documentary sources; for the early modern period, on the other hand, an abundance of sources has allowed scholars to develop numerous lines of inquiry.91 A granting of the captaincy had extremely important repercussions for municipal autonomy and the new balance of power relations it created within the universitas itself.92 The vast number of grants makes it possible to analyse the phenomenon from various points of view: from the connection between the financial needs of the central government and the additional room for local manoeuvre, to the moments of tension and negotiations in the municipal sphere which normally followed a sale. Then, a comparison of the sales in different communities reveals the sovereign’s limited desire to upset the status quo of urban power relations. For alienations, particularly with reference to the most significant cases, the Crown acted on the basis of local demands, often reformulating previous concessions in the light of new appeals and a political policy favourable to urban autonomy. It must be said that during Alphonso’s reign, because of the modalities, the conditions of the alienations procedures, and safeguards imposed by the urban communities regarding, for

The Kingdom of Castile constitutes an interesting basis for comparison. See, ANTONIO DOMINGUEZ ORTIZ, “La venta de cargos y oficios públicos en Castilla y sus consecuencia económicas y sociales”, in Anuario de historia económica y social, III, 1970, pp. 105–137, and MANUEL FRAGA IRIBARNE & Juan BENEYTO PÉREZ, “La enajenaciòn de oficios pùblicos en su perspectiva histórica y sociológica”, in Centenario de la Ley del notariato, 2 vols, Madrid, 1964, I, pp. 395–472, who insist on the practice of alienating magistracies as an inherent feature of the modern beaurocratic state. For Castile, beginning with the late medieval period, see FRANCISCO TOMÁS Y VALIENTE, “Origen bajomedieval de la patrimonialización y la enajenación de oficios públicos en Castilla”, in Actas del I symposium, pp. 125–159, which already foreshadows the process in the second half of the fourteenth century when sovereigns granted positions as a means of establishing a network of loyal followers without, however, taking economic advantage of such transactions. The Trastàmara rulers, in fact, did not resort to the sale of royal offices but the beneficiaries sometimes did—a practice opposed by the central government—and only in the seventeenth century did the Crown carry out alienations; ibidem, p. 129, pp. 132–133, p. 146. Also compare JOAQUÍN CERDÁ RUIZ FUNES, “Hombres Buenos, jurados y regidores en los municipios castellanos dela Baja Edad Media”, in Actas del I Symposium, pp. 163–206 and JULIO VALDEÓN BARUQUE, “Las oligarquias urbanas”, in Concejos, pp. 514–515. The latter connects the development of patrimonialism to the oligarchization of local political power. 91 For Sicily, VITTORIO SCIUTI RUSSI, “Aspetti della venalità degli uffici in Sicilia (secoli XVII-XVIII)”, in Rivista Storica Italiana, LXXXVIII, 1, 1976, pp. 342–355, and SCIUTI RUSSI, Astrea, pp. 214–15. For Naples, VITTOR IVO COMPARATO, Uffici e società a Napoli (1600–1647): Aspetti dell’ideologia del magistrato nell’età moderna, Florence, 1974, pp. 127–160. For France, ROLAND MOUSNIER, La vénalité des offices sous HENRI IV et Louis XI, Paris, 1971, and DAVID D. BIEN, “Les offices, les corps et le crédit d’état: l’utilisation des privilèges sous l’ancien regime”, in Annales: Économie, Sociétés, Civilisations, 2, 1988, pp. 379–404. For the Savoy dominion, CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali, especially pp. 137–147 and pp. 257–261, distinguishes between recourse to loans repaid through a grant of offices when “un sistematico mercato degli uffici considerati come proprietà immobile dell’ufficiale” (ibidem, p. 143) had not yet come into being during the 1400s, and what took place in the 1500s with an established tendency towards patrimonialism and the inheritance of administrative positions. Also for the Savoy dominion, see ALESSANDRO BARBERO, “Reclutamento dei funzionari e venalità degli uffici nello stato sabaudo: l’esempio del vicariato di Torino (1360–1356)”, in Studi Veneziani, n.s. 28, 1994, pp. 17–44, according to which the magistracies took on a purely economic function in the sixteenth century. More generally, JAUME VICENS VIVES, “La struttura amministrativa statale nei secoli XVI e XVII”, in Lo stato moderno, I: Dal medioevo all’età moderna, eds. ETTORE ROTELLI & PIERANGELO SCHIERA, Bologna, 1971, pp. 238–246 and WOLFGANG REINHARD, Storia del potere politico in Europa, Bologna, 2001, pp. 223–227. 92 Sales of other royal municipal offices sometimes involved the Captain’s judicature, although less frequently than the captaincy; for example: P. R. vol. 24, fols 203r-204v, 1425 (Randazzo); C. vol. 2882, fols 109v-110r, 1452 (Noto); R. C. vol. 89, fol. 235r-v, 1453 (Nicosia). I have not found, in contrast, any instances of a sale of the position of secretus (which, from the end of the 1300s, went to persons of local extraction; BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 764 n. 393) and any rare cases of sales regarded, rather than the titled position as such, the whole secretia, in other words the total sum of economic and fiscal rights; for example, C. vol. 2849, fols 133v-134r, 1444 (Traina). Given that only the secretia itself could be ceded, this was not a common occurrence since such a concession normally took place along with the concomitant alienation of an entire community. 90

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example, the length of the concessions themselves, there was no true public venality for which a position that could be obtained in perpetuum and passed on to one’s heirs acquired fundamental economic importance. Of all the institutions in the universitas, the captainship constituted one of the pivotal points in urban power relations and regularly alternating control over the office sometimes served to resolve latent conflicts. Clear evidence of this comes from a grant of the office in Palermo to the nobilis, Federico Ventimiglia, Miles, Magister Rationalis, and the nobilis Giovanni Villaragut, Miles. In 1427, Viceroys Nicola Speciale and Guglielmo Muntanyans confirmed the [1425] concession by Alphonso V which aimed at putting an end to a long-standing conflict.93 Alfonsus etc. Vicereges etc. [. . .] pretori iudicibus iuratis et aliis officialibus felicis urbis Panormi presentibus et futuris regiis consiliariis familiaribus et fidelibus salutem per nobilem Fridericum di Vigintimiliis militem unicum sociis magistrum rationalem tam proprio nomine quam nomine et pro parte nobilis Iohannis de Villaraguto militis fuit nobis exhibita et presentata quadam regia[m] licteram tenoris sequentem. Alfonsus [. . .] nobilibus et dilectis consiliario ac maiordomo Iohanni De Villaraguto ac Friderico Di Vingintimillis armorum uxerio nostris salutem et dileccionem exercicio et regimini capitanie felicis urbis Panormi quod vobis alternis annis et vicibus vita vestra et utriusque vestrum perdurante recolimus concessisse debite providere ac omnem altercacionem et discordie materiam quam inter vos pretextu dicti regiminis possit de facili exoriri evitari penitus cupientes vobis et utriusque vestrum dicimus et distincte percipiendo mandamus sibi obtentu nostre gracie et mercedis ac penam unciarum quincentarum numero si contra feceritis herario applicandarum (quatenus) transacto regimine et exercicio dicti offici quod finire debet anno quolibet ultima die augustis ille vestrum qui dictum officium anno ille exerceret et alter alteri viceversa anno quolibet vita vestra ut predicitur durante per tradicionem et restituconem [sic] baculi dictum officium et exercicium et administracionem eiusdem dimictatis et restituatis quocumque mandato seve exequtoria nostra aut viceregis nostri in dicto regno aut alia quacumque executoria minime expectata94.

An alternation of control over the office, according to the Viceroys, would provide a solution to the conflict. In Palermo, there are no records of sales of the magistracy but sales might have been off the record and the atypical character of the grant to Ventimiglia and Villaragut seems to indicate that an auction had occurred. In any case, since most of the sales were concentrated in towns with medium and low population densities (although

P. R. vol. 29, fol. 82v, as revealed by the Viceroy’s reference to the grant by Alphonso V, Ventimiglia was an uxer d’arms before becoming magister rationalis. For the majordomo, Giovanni Villaragut, see CORRAO, Governare, p. 191, p. 374. 94 This regime continued until 1430 when the Sovereign included Federico Abatellis in the rotation of the terms in office as payment for services rendered so that in 1430–31 it was held by Abatellis, in 1431–32 by Ventimiglia, in 1432–33 by Villaragut, and so on; C. vol. 2816, fol. 25r-v, 5 April 1430. Finally, in November 1432, following petitions by the syndics, Leonardo Bartolomeo, Prothonotary, Giovanni Abatellis, Baron of Cammarata, and Francesco Ventimiglia, the concession was revoked because municipal petitions stipulated that the Captaincy could be held for one year only, followed by a two year absence from the office (vacatio) before it could again be held; P. R. vol. 33, fol. 45v. The envisaged rotation did actually respect the provisions of the municipal petitions but the request was motivated by a rejection of the monopoly of those three precise captains. For the Abatellis family who were of Tuscan origin and whose wealth derived from trade, see FERDINANDO MAURICI, “Illi de domo et famiglia Abatellis”, I baroni di Cefalà: una famiglia dell’aristocrazia siciliana fra ‘400 e ‘500, Palermo, 1985. 93

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larger centres, such as Catania, were certainly not excluded), the case examined here demonstrates how control over the position could be at the base of the local government’s balance of power and how alienations had important implications for municipal power relations.95 A similar event occurred in Sciacca where a conflict was recorded between the Perollo family and the Amato and Buondelmonte families in the 1430s. The conflict which arose from a feud between the Luna and Perollo families, mainly over control of the barony of San Bartolomeo,96 would intensify by the end of Alphonso’s reign. It was resolved, albeit through a temporary solution, with their shared control over the captaincy according to a system in which the contending parties would alternate periods in office acquired per via emptionis. This regime seems to have been the result of an agreement reached between the two families party to the conflict.97 Several months later, the Sovereign decided to annul a series of trials involving some of the purchasers which had been initiated prior to granting the office;98 the King’s intervention followed the stipulation of a truce between the opposing parties. Having examined cases testifying to the pivotal role of the captaincy in the municipal balance of power, the main effects of the massive recourse to the sale of the office will now be considered. In localities where repeated alienations took place, the practice of resorting to officials unfamiliar with the dynamics of the community ceased due to the rapid adaptation of the royal appointments to municipal requests and, thus, to the local balance of power. This is a very important aspect of the new power relations between the central and local governments: per via emptionis grants often reveal the central government’s action in choosing an official which was limited to the number of potential buyers. In addition, the Crown had no more say in the matter for the duration of the concession once the position was sold and the incumbent captains could even re-sell the office to a third party. 95 The concession to Ventimiglia and Villaragut reveals how alienation could also involve metrepolitan centres. The theory put forward by Mineo (ENNIO I. MINEO, “Come leggere le comunità locali nella Sicilia del tardo medioevo: Alcune note sulla prima metà del Quattrocento”, in Mélanges de l’École française de Rome, 1, 2003, p. 604) of a distinction between the large urban localities such as Palermo and Messina, and small and medium-sized ones based on both the “impossibilità di fatto di ogni ipotesi di alienazione” and ex gratia appointments to elective positions only in small communities, does not take into consideration royal grants of elective positions in large centres too, making a clear-cut distinction between large and small centres impossible to establish. Some examples of ex gratia appointments in Palermo include: Enrico Gractaluxio, Catapan for the year 1427–28 (P. R. vol. 29, fols 56v-57r); Giacomo Ago, Sciurterius for the year 1429–30 (P. R. vol. 30, fol. 31r); Simone Formusa, Catapan on the intercession of the familiares et domestici regis for the year 1433–34 (P. R. vol. 33, fols 139v-140r), Notarius Nicola Marocto, Notary of the Praetorian Court for the year 1438–39 (P. R. vol. 34, fol. 111r); Enrico Aprea, Catapan, on the intercession of the familiares et domestici regis for the year 1444–45 (R. C. vol. 81, fol. 243v); Magister Giacomo Cultelino, Catapan, on the intercession of the familiares et domestici regis for the year 1456–57 (P. R. vol. 48, fols 484r-485r). 96 The barony of San Bartolomeo was definitively ceded to Antonio de Luna by Alphonso V in 1453; see ANTONINO MARRONE, Bivona città feudale, 2 vols, Caltanissetta-Rome, 1987, I, p. 88–89. For the connection between Luna, Buondelmone, and Amato, see; IGNAZIO SCATURRO, Storia della città di Sciacca e dei comuni della contrada saccense fra il Belice e il platani, 2 vols, ed. GIUSEPPE SACCO, Naples, 1924–26, I, p. 598–600, p. 655–656. See also CARMELO TRASSELLI, Mediterraneo e Sicilia all’inizio dell’epoca moderna, Cosenza, 1977, p. 283–288, which does not see political strife between the Luna and Perollo families, only between the other two and the Buondelmonte family. Instead, MARRONE, Bivona, I, p. 88–89, demonstrates a state of conflict between the Luna and Perollo families. 97 In Sciacca the alternating control over the captaincy seems to have arisen from an agreement between leading figures in the conflict. Tommaso Gilberto became Captain beginning in 1433–34 following a secured loan of 100 onze, however, in March 1434, Domenico Perollo an other relatives of his, Manente Buondelmonte, Orlando Amato, the miles, Giuseppe Amato and the miles, Bondelmunti Buondelmonte paid 100 onze to Tommaso Gilberto and obtained the right to hold the office every other year for eight years beginning in 1434–35; R. C. vol. 69, fols 107r-108v, 110r-v. 98 C. vol. 2823, fol. 111r-v, 26 July 1434.

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The formation of groups of purchasers was frequent and requests to buy the office often came from rival parcialitati (parties). Private individuals stipulated the first mortgages for the purpose of purchasing the magistracy in the mid-1420s,99 an indication that just a decade after the coronation of Alphonso V there were already citizens in a position to offer their services to the Crown as trustworthy intermediaries and, by the mid-1430s, evident correlations were emerging between individual incumbents and municipal parties. Existing conflicts between different socio-professional groups often came to a head over disagreements regarding the captain’s office. This was true, for example, of the protest by the smaller merchants in Agrigento against the Captains Antonio and Gaspare Monteaperto (the Monteapertos were wealthy merchants)100 and of the tension in Noto between the gentili homini (as the members of the group corresponding to the oligarchy were called) and the Captains Pietro Salvatore and Galcerando Salonia.101 Another notable conflict emerged from a complaint lodged against Captains Ruggero Crapanzano and Bartolomeo Amoro by Piazza’s town council made up of “ghintilomini curiali ministrali et populari”.102 Even royal concessions not made per via emptionis were often the result of shifts in the balance of power generated by previous alienations: in many cases, the central government failed to observe existing privileges, or rather certain aspects of the privileges, in selling the office and managed to appease municipal opposition by offering greater guarantees regarding the office, even for ordinary concessions, especially a rotation of control over the management of the office and assurances regarding the origin of future incumbents.103 A widespread control over the captaincy by local persons is demonstrated by the groups of purchasers who established control over an office for long periods of time (in Nicosia from 1440 to 1455 or in Salemi from 1446 to 1454),104 as well as by the sale of an office to third parties carried out by the captains themselves. The miles, Antonio Monteaperto, sold to the miles, Manente Buondelmonte and the nobilis, Guglielmo Perapertusa, frater dictis Manentis, the right to the captaincy of Agrigento he had purchased for 80 onze.105 Also worth highlighting is the royal sale of Salemi’s captaincy for 120 onze, with a contract stipulated on 24 November 1446, to 10 buyers who would have obtained: “annuatim secundum per sortem inter eos faciendam pervenerit ille talis sortitus capitaneus ipse

99 For example: P. R. vol. 26, fol. 43r, 1423 (Randazzo); P. R. vol. 24, fol. 174r, 1425 (Salemi); P. R. vol. 32, fols 75v-76r, 1431 (Trapani, a generic reference to a purchase is made in this instance, rather than to a mortgage). 100 The Monteapertos began to amass their fortune in the second half of the thirteenth century thanks, in part, to strategic marriages; ILLUMINATO PERI, “Per una storia della vita cittadina e del commercio nel medioevo: Girgenti porto del sale e del grano”, in Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, Milan, 1962, pp. 69–70 and MINEO, Nobiltà, p. 258. 101 G. G. pp. 298–299, 1433 (Agrigento); R. C. vol. 78, fols 262r-265r, 1442; C. vol. 2882, fol. 109v, 1452 (Noto). For socio-profesional groups, see Section 5.1. 102 P. R. vol. 45, fols 303v-304r, 1454. The ‘privatization’ of the office, as affirmed by its sale, could lead it to be seen “como plataforma politica desde la qual adoptar decisiones en beneficio exclusivo de los titulares”; MONSALVO ANTÒN, El sistema, p. 219. See also, FRANCISCO TOMAS Y VALIENTE, “Origen bajomedieval de la patrimonialización y la enajenación de oficios públicos en Castilla”, in Actas del I symposium, p. 132. EPSTEIN (Potere, pp. 355–366), is a pioneering work on the composition of municipal socio-professional groups and the period of their formation which assigns the orignins of the process to Alphonso’s reign. 103 P. R. vol. 32, fols 35v, 75v-76r, 1431 (Trapani); P. R. vol. 34, fols 97v-98v, 1437 (Nicosia); R. C. vol. 78, fols 262r-265r, 1442 (Noto). 104 P. R. vol. 38, fols 35r-41r (Nicosia); P. R. vol. 38, fol. 58r-v (Salemi); P. R. vol. 44, fols 335r-336r (Salemi); R. C. vol. 89, fol. 365r-v (Salemi). 105 R. C. vol. 81, fols 300v-301r, 1444.

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pro illo anno regere et exercere valeat tam diu quoscumque per regiam curiam de dictis pecuniis fuerit integrum satisfactum”.106 One of the captains, Giovanni Manueli, chosen by lot for 1451–52, had a daughter married to Giovanni Chalia to whom Manueli had promised as a dowry, according to the marriage contract on 9 Ottobre 1450, the 10 onze corresponding to the annual payment for the captaincy (the Sovereign acknowledged the fact that the office had changed hands) so Chalia became Captain for the year 1451–52. Such marked municipal control gave rise to political conflicts which often manifested into protests over the sale of the magistracy, the rejection of a captain of local extraction or insistence that the privilege of having one be respected, and especially, an explicit request to exclude cives of a given rank from the office, as well as accusations of clientelism in administering the office. An example that will shed light on these dynamics, and also serve as a useful point of comparison with other localities, comes from the universitas of Agrigento where, in December 1433, the syndics presented a series of petitions to the Sovereign. These mainly concerned the caricatore where grain was stored for shipment—one of the community’s major sources of revenue—and also certain offices.107 For the captaincy, they asked to redeem the office from the power of the brothers Misseri Antonio and Gaspare Monteaperto, who held it for life. At the same time, they proposed a number of countermeasures for future concessions: that the universitas be allowed to elect four cives and the Sovereign would then decide on which of them to confer the position, and finally, that the incumbent not be magnificho. Since the universitas had repaid the money to the Monteapertos, the Sovereign declared them deposed from office and decreed that for the following ten years he would grant the office to cives annually. He did not act on the two most important petitions, namely, that the magnifichi be excluded and the universitas be allowed to furnish the names. As for this last matter, a comparison between the request “that the universitas elect four citizens by scrutiny every year and the king will decide which of them to appoint as captain,” and the royal reply “per eandem maiestatem concedatur civibus Agrigenti cui ex eis dicte maiestati placebit”,108 leaves room to postulate that the community actually did draw up a short list of candidates.109 Indeed, this is one of the many examples of concessions that was not actually put into practice, as demonstrated the following year by the royal sale of the office to ten purchasers. The contract, nevertheless, attests to the central government’s decision ‘piloted’ by the periphery.110 A polarization of the conflict between the magnifichi (presumably wealthy merchants: a fact deducible in light of Monteaperto’s position) and persons linked to smallscale local trade emerges from the municipal petitions that were presented. Control over 106 The captains were Matteo Cavalieri, Onofrio Lancirocto, Nicola Aropuli, Enrico Luvechu, Antonio Lupresti, Matteo Gavarrecta, Notarius Giovanni Manueli, Gilberto Avilles, Bartolomeo Pizicula and Antonio Guchardo; P. R. vol. 44, fols 335r-336r. Another case of a sale to third parties involved Pietro Buondelmonte and Antonio Calandrino who purchased the captaincy of Sciacca from Giuseppe Amato, Federico Buondelmonte, Iannocco Marino, and Antonio Panormo for 100 onze in 1451. They presumably held the position for two years each but the length of their possession of the post is not entirely clear; P. R. vol. 44, fols 35v-36r. Such contracts stipulated between private individuals sometimes concerned other offices as well, such as the Captain’s Notary, R. C. vol. 75, fol. 179v, 1439 (Noto). 107 G. G., pp. 298–299. 108 Ibidem, p. 299. 109 MINEO, “Come leggere”, p. 604. 110 The camerarius, Dalmao Raiadell, held the office in 1433–34; R. C. vol. 69, fol. 58r-v. That same year it was granted per via emptionis to a group of ten buyers, of which only five managed to serve for one year each: Giovanni Cachatu (Chatatu), Enrico Terrana, Antonio Silosi, Nicola Terrana, and Missere Giovanni Mazara; R. C. vol. 76, fols 371r-372r.

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the captaincy was a fundamental element of the outcome of the conflict and merits further examination.111 The petitions also reveal considerable tension between institutional requirements and social practices. A specific connection between the proponents of the requests and the sector of small merchants can be sustained on the basis of a series of elements present in the petitions, some of which are particularly significant. The first of these regards the serious economic harm inflicted on the caricatore in Agrigento by the construction of others in nearby Montechiaro and Siculiana which, as explained in a tone of great distress, caused a great reduction in the number of persons who had provided income to the community.112 A request to verify the utilization of funds collected through a levy for the construction of an aqueduct leads to a supposition that the petition was requested by persons who felt heavily burdened by a fiscal system which was most often of an indirect type and, therefore, not proportional.113 Judging from the way reference is made to the merchants, who it was feared would abandon Agrigento because their wheat stores had been destroyed by the uncontrolled flow of water, it would seem that they were members of a group to which the drafters of the petition did not belong. A different tone is used for the requests in defence of the povira genti (poor people), bordonari (haulers), and boni homini who appear to belong to the same sector as those presenting the petitions as demonstrated by a number of elements. The catapans, who held their positions for life and were not elected by scrutiny, were accused of oppressing the povira genti. For the bordonari, their customary fee of 12 grani for each load of one salma was defended and the fact that the officials had reduced it was criticized instead. Furthermore, a request was made to apply the privilege of an exemption from the doana (dohana) trade duties which the would have benefited the very bordonari.114 Lastly, for the boni homini “who work in the fields by day”, a proposal was made to exempt them from the night watch so that they might rest.115 It would seem, therefore, that the advocates of the petition were exponents of municipal trade, and, particularly, retail trade for which they possessed full knowledge of its social and economic aspects. A reference to this context allows a glimpse of common customs and, at the same time, mistrust of the Jewish world. They maintained, for example, that Jews and Christians should be separated in butchering and selling meat because neither group had been able to sell their meat from the time this had no longer been possible.116 The Crown did not respect its placet, alienating the captaincy in 1433 and selling it again to the same Monteaperto family in 1441.117 The decision to disregard the requests 111 The names of the Syndics are not known; in the transcription by Giambruno and Genuardi (G. G. p. 290) a blank space follows the titles of the ambassadors and in the corresponding chancery volume (R. C. vol. 69, fol. 48r) the word civitatis can be made out with the aid of a Wood’s lamp. 112 G. G. p. 290. On the importance of examining language as a functional means of contextualizing a source, see ENRICO ARTIFONI & MARIA L. PESANTE (eds.) “Linguaggi politici” in Quaderni Storici, 102, 1999. 113 G. G., pp. 293–294. 114 Ibidem, pp. 296–297. The bordonari might also have been animal husbanders, see Genaurdi, Terre, pp. 29–30. 115 G. G. p. 297. The persons who carried out the night watch were normally from the lowest ranks of the community; anyone who lived a relatively comfortable life managed to avoid it: in Palermo, the mastri corbiserii (shoemakers) obtained a confirmation of the privilegi of exemption in 1414; TRIPOLI, Amministrazione, p. 62 n. 257. 116 G. G. pp. 301–302. For a comparison of relations between Christians and Jews, see PHILIP DAILEADER, True Citizens: Violence, Memory, and Identity in the Medieval Community of Perpignan, 1162–1397, Leiden-Boston-Cologne, 2000, pp. 115–154 and particularly pp. 135–136 and pp. 146–147 regarding their distinct separation in the sale of foodstuffs. In general, for an analysis of text as a product of the author’s social realm, see GABRIELLE M. SPIEGEL, “History, Historicism, and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages”, in Speculum, 65, 1990, pp. 59–86. 117 R. C. vol. 76, fols 371r-372r, 418v-419r.

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for the exclusion of the magnifichi reveals that the Sovereign did not intervene incisively, preferring that conflict in city government be resolved locally. Indeed, the concessions of 1433 and 1441 show a lack of exclusion and the persistence of open competition between the exponents of the various social-professional groups. The most interesting aspects of the circumstances in Agrigento concern the connection between the captainship and municipal factions, and moreover, the attempt of the universitas to present itself per via emptionis as owning the magistracy. A key element for understanding the model of power relations established between the Crown and urban communities during the reign of Alphonso V is the loosening of royal control over the captaincy at the same time that the community, posing as purchaser, managed to obtain the office and decide to whom it should then be assigned. Agrigento’s proposal did not represent isolated circumstances. The universitates of Polizzi and Castrogiovanni, for example, in 1443 and 1444 respectively, gained effective control over the captaincy which became an elective office managed locally.118 Polizzi acquired possession at the time it redeemed its territory from the domination of Raimondo Cabrera for 10,000 florins.119 In the case of Castrogiovanni, the Crown accepted the transaction following a payment of 250 onze and specified that the captain was to be elected by scrutiny. Viceroy Ximen de Urrea replied to the request for confirmation of the contract as follows: Placet magnifico et potenti domino viceregi quod ex quo constat de solucione pecuniarum capitaniam ex nunc pro tunc a primo septembris anni futuri in antea, reingredietur possessio dicti offici capitanei penes dictam universitatem et quod exinde fiat scrutineum de dicto officio capitaneatus eo modo quo fit de aliis officiis dicte terre et quolibet anno eligantur sex persone de quibus vicerex qui pro tempore fuerit, possit ex illis unum eligere ipsumque in capitaneum creare qui debeat habere terciam partem emolumentorum capitanie due vero partes universitati applicentur.120

Both universitates retained the privilege until 1448 when they decided, of their own accord, to renounce it, presenting a series of petitions requesting a guarantee that, from that time onwards, the captain would be an outsider with no links to the community.121 Such 118 This privilege was also held by the universitas of Piazza, as revealed by the protest presented against the royal grant of

the office to Ruggero Crapanzano for life in 1448; Consuetudines, fols 52r-53r. 119 R. C. vol. 80, fols 273v-275v; C. vol. 2822, fol. 21r-v. Cabrera was dominus of the city of Mazara at that time; BRESC,

Un monde, II, p. 735 n. 171. For the value of the florin and its correlation over time to the onza, see Bresc, Un monde I, pp. 402–406. 120 G. G. pp. 95–96. Actually, Castrogiovanni had already begun negotiations in 1431 to purchase the office but only obtained effective control over it in 1444 after payment had been made; ibidem, pp. 89–90. A confirmation of the community’s effective possession of the office is provided by universitas in September 1448 when they sold it at auction for 55 onze to Guglielmo La Monaca and Giacomo Terri of Castrogiovanni, who took over the office from the previous captain, incumbent medietatis capitaniam, with a payment of the same amount. The captains were to alternate as incumbents every three months but it is not stated how long this was to continue; P. R. vol. 40, fol. 193v. 121 On 13 June 1448, Polizzi’s universitas, through the syndics, Marino La Matina and Francesco Salamone, presented Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea a corpus of petitions regarding the captaincy which were all approved. The main provisions were requests that the captain no longer be a person from the local area, someone of local extraction, or a relative of local persons up to the second degree of kinship, but would always be an outsider and selected annually, that the office never be given “titulo alienationis” to knights or barons, or to their servants, and that the captain hold office personally; P. R. vol. 39, fols 205r-206r. A few months earlier, in February 1448, Lope Ximen de Urrea had granted the office for that year to the miles, Antonio Sicilia (P. R. v. 40 ff. 25v-26r): the termination of the privilege, which would be formalized in June, had evidently already been put into practice. Castrogiovanni also let go of its hold on the office, in May 1448 (see G. G. pp. 104–106), but the universitas again auctioned out the office in September 1448 (see the previous note).

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categorical requests for an outsider, in contrast to what had been previously attained, could only have been motivated by a partisan administration of the office. In support of this hypothesis, Agrigento can again be cited where, in 1455, the local captains were accused of corruption and divisiveness. The universitas et homines of Agrigento asked for and obtained a captain from outside the territory in 1455 in order to avoid corrupt and biased administration.122 Another petition approved by the Sovereign, from the universitas of Piazza, is equally significant because of the various provisions it contains as safeguards that the official would have no connections whatsoever with the urban environment—no kinship or indirect connection with any lay or religious persons.123 The main point to be highlighted here concerns precisely these urgent requests for a magistracy administered locally which might be followed by equally insistent petitions demanding exactly the opposite. Such demands stemmed from strictly local disputes which, within a context of broad autonomy for urban governments, made royal control over the captaincy appear increasingly distant. Noteworthy in this regard is the fact that Giovanni La Matina, a local personage, had already become Captain in Polizzi by 1452–53, notwithstanding privileges to the contrary, while one of the La Matina family, Marino, had been among the syndics requesting a foreign captaincy in 1448.124 Considering the radical nature of the requests themselves—that the captain be always an outsider, or that he be always a local person—such contradictory petitions reveal themselves to be products of internal conflict. In light of such measures, impartial governance cannot be associated with either a local captain or an outsider. Abuses of power were, without a doubt, frequent occurrences when there was no strict observance of a rotation of office holders, as happened, for example, with groups who purchased the position. Another important phenomenon can be noted in incidents involving Polizzi and Castrogiovanni. The universitates continued to be involved in the captaincy and managed to impose certain conditions for future concessions even when they chose not to retain possession of the office. It was an indirect form of control and the result of a gradual process, which precisely through the practice of alienation had, in most cases at least, consolidated an administration benefiting local persons. 122 C. vol. 2875; fols 102v-103r. An occurrence similar to that of Agrigento concerns the universitas of Patti. It was requested

that captains come from outside the area even though the post was held by an outsider because he, nonetheless, had close ties to local circumstances. The algozirius, Enrico Romano of Messina, had first held the captaincy for a two year period from 1438–39 to 1439–40 for a payment of 20 onze, then for two more years for 25 onze, presumably from 1442–43 to 1443–44, but the years are not specified; P. R. vol. 34, fol. 152r-v, and R. C. vol. 78 fols 287r-291v. Romano’s last term in office was not completed because the universitas redeemed the position in July 1444 with prominent citizens, the nobiles, Francesco Santo Honofrio and the notarius, Giovanni Trenta, serving as ambassadors. They also obtained royal assent for the request that future annual grants would be made only to outsiders who could hold the post again only after a four-year period of absence. Furthermore, no citizen, outsider who lived in the city, or resident of Patti would be permitted to compete for appointment to the office; R. C. vol. 79, fols 179v-180r, and C. vol. 2850, fol. 38r-v. Indeed, afterwards the captaincy was conferred on non-local persons (for example, P. R. vol. 37, fols 75v 76r, 1445–46, and P. R. vol. 38, fol. 89r, 1446–47) with the exception of Giovanni Amato on the intercession of the “familiares et domestici regis” for the year 1456–57; P. R. vol. 48, fol. 129v. 123 A vacatio of six years before a new grant could be awarded was also stipulated; Consuetudines, fols 45v-46r, 1448. 124 R. C. vol. 89, fols 295v-296v; 372v. Previously, in the year 1451–52, the camerarius, Orlando Amato, had received a lifetime grant of the captaincy “pro anno proximo futuro XV indictionis et de inde in antea vita vestra durante” and the Sovereign specified: “quibusius ordinacionibus privilegiis rescriptis et capitulis eadem terra policii concessis disponentibus ne dicta capitania ad vitam alici concedi valeat non obstantibus (illam) quibus per hac sola vice tantum certis bonis respectibus derogamus declarantes quod pro parte huiusmodi concessionem dictis privilegiis et capitulis nullum preiudicium generatum et trahi valeat ad consequenciam in futurum (quymmo) illa rimanere”; R. C. vol. 84, fols 258v-259r, and P. R. vol. 43, fols 201v-202r. The Amato case is interesting. He also held the office in 1455–56 and the concession specified that the king had granted it to him for life, but Amato refused the concession in observance of approved municipal petitions which were in conflict with his taking office. He obtained the position again following a decision of Polizzi’s town council: he could hold office as long as a majority of men and officials allowed it; P. R. vol. 48, fol. 431v.

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As previously indicated, royal initiatives in selecting the captain were conditioned to a large extent by local requests and the municipal balance of power. The Crown’s choice could reflect municipal indications, albeit in different ways, even in political disputes where the captain himself was implicated. Two episodes of conflict centred around the captaincy can be compared from this perspective. They took place in Catania and Piazza but developed in different ways and found different solutions. The reasons behind the conflict which took place in Catania between 1454 and 1457 are unknown. They concerned leading aristocratic exponents: the royal councillor, Guglielmo Raimondo Moncada, on one hand and the camerarius, Blasco Alagona, and Artale Alagona on the other. It is difficult to determine whether the captain was to take charge of the judicial system or whether he was, instead, responsible for subverting it.125 Moncada, Captain sub titulo oneroso for the year 1454–55, was removed from the post for murdering his wife and the position was bestowed on Maciocta Alagona.126 Moncada was reinstated the following year but relations with the Alagona family deteriorated immediately afterwards and, in September 1455, the Captain lodged a series of accusations against Blasco, Artale Alagona, and some of their followers. By order of Simone Bologna, President of the Kingdom, the accused were tried by the Court of the Patricius127 which, in November again, received orders from the President, this time to try Moncada.128 Moncada, “capitaneus quasi ad vitam”, was imprisoned for unknown reasons in July 1456, most likely for a brief period.129 Blasco Alagona seems to have come out victorious. As the Sovereign’s procurator, Alagona had orders to “redimere, luere et quietare” the office for a sum of 1,000 florins, the same price Moncada had paid for the post. Alagona was to take office in September 1456.130 In October 1456, the patricius of Catania again held jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases involving the main parties in the dispute. That the conflict was not yet resolved is shown by the royal order to remove Alagona—who had been assigned the task of redeeming the captaincy but had taken over the office instead—and return the magistracy to the royal demesne.131 In November 1457, Moncada was reappointed and this unequivocally decisive grant ended the polarized clash between the two 125 For Moncada, see BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 905 n. 194. For the Alagona family’s aristocratic lineage of Catalan origin, one of the most important in Sicily in the 1300s that had been established in Sicily at the time of the Vespers, see D’ALESSANDRO, Politica, pp. 25–26, pp. 91–126 and pp. 132–135. The Alagonas exercised vast influence and feudal powers over Catania and the surrounding area; GAUDIOSO, “Genesi e aspetti”, p. 37, and LIGRESTI, “Patriziati”, p. 30. 126 The uxoricide was confirmed in the trial but Moncada’s responsibility in the matter was mitigated by his wife’s behaviour; P. R. vol. 48, fols 21v-24v. 127 P. R. vol. 48, fols 38v-39r, 43r-v. It should not be excluded that certain misdeeds were also of a criminal nature, considering that it was specified in the ensuing trials that the patricius was to have jurisdiction over civil and criminal trials related to accusations made by the Moncada and Alagona families against each other. Impartiality was ensured by the patricius who was sometimes the key to institutional stability. 128 Following accusations “de gravibus excessibus insultibus et delictis” made by Alagona; P. R. vol. 48, fol. 81r-v. 129 P. R. vol. 48, fol. 504v. 130 P. R. vol. 48, fols 444v-446r, 2 August 1456; Moncada had obtained the position as his wife’s dowry through a privilegium impignoracionis from his father-in-law, Giovanni Vitellino. 131 P. R. vol. 51; fols 184r-185r. In June 1458, the captain had the same name, the magnificu Guglielmo Raimondo Moncada “minuri neputi [grandson] di messere” Guglielmo; P. R. vol. 50, fols 338v-339r. The state of conflict had dramatic repercussions throughout the entire municipal context in those years with recurrent crimes and disturbances (P. R. vol. 48, fols 459v-460r, 504v; P. R. vol. 49, fol. 97r-v; P. R. vol. 50, fols 307r-v, 348v-349r) which also involved people from outside the Moncada and Alagona families. In October 1456, for example, Viceroy Antonio Russo Spatafora asked the captain’s judge (whose name is not specified) to intervene since Blasco Alagona was an enemy of the fidelium regis, Giovanni Michele de Gisualdo and Nardo de Sisino, cives Catanie. The captain’s judge was to try the cases in which they were involved because “iniustum est coram iudice suspecto litigare”; P. R. vol. 47, fol. 183v.

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families. The conflict found its solution in the royal grant, on the basis of local indications, to one of the two contenders and the weight of the placet in favour of one name assured a resolution to the conflict. The role played by leading members of the community is more evident in the events in Piazza where the underlying state of conflict emerged dramatically in 1453–55 and was resolved precisely by the concession of the magistracy to persons different from those who had held it previously.132 The captains, Ruggero Crapanzano and Bartolomeo Amoro, and the jurats were opposed by a faction made up of persons from all sectors of the community. The captains had earlier been deprived of their posts for misdeeds and the universitas had redeemed the office at the same time.133 The reasons for this state of tension can be reconstructed by referring to a detailed privilege of 1448 bestowed on the community following the removal of Ruggero Crapanzano and Bartolomeo Amoro. They had held the office per via emptionis since 1444 and were accused of “demeriti colpe et defecti fraude et excessi”. More specifically, this meant clientelism in administering the office which had seriously damaged the general interests of the community.134 Crapanzano and Amoro, nevertheless, managed to be appointed again in 1453–54, provoking protests from citizens of every rank and profession, “gentil homini curiali ministrali borgesi” and others who identified a new candidate for the office and decided to summon the town council to draft a formal proposal to be presented to the Crown. Even though their efforts to assemble the council were blocked by the captains and jurats, the proponents of the new captain, Tommaso Renda of Patti, managed to have Crapanzano and Amoro dismissed by the Sovereign. What this reveals is the particular nature of the choice which reflected a precise phase in history: in power relations between the central and local governments, the latter could decide who should hold the royal office. The cases cited above testify to the role of the ‘periphery’ in selecting the magistrate assigned jurisdiction over criminal matters, not only under ordinary circumstances, but in emergency situations as well. Despite the frequent control over the position by municipal sectors, the Sovereign’s independent appointment of a captain cannot be excluded when there was a valid alternative to the local purchaser and, above all, in cases when the community was attempting to put a definitive end to the practice of alienation. The Sovereign’s role in choosing the official surfaced in defence of economic policy when royal economic advantages risked compromise, and not, therefore, in direct contrast to urban autonomy. Such elements come to light in Catania where a series of sales of the captaincy created great friction between the universitas and the purchaser, Enrico Romano. In April 1435, the captaincy was granted—not officially through a sale—to the Baron of Montalbano, Giovanni Romano, for that administrative year as

132 P. R. vol. 45, fols 303v-304; R. C. vol. 90, fol. 254r-v; R. C. vol. 97, fols 293v-306r; P. R. vol. 48, fols 272v-274r. 133 Regarding the behaviour of officials that did not correspond to the public interest, compare, for Milan and Florence:

GIORGIO CHITTOLINI, “L’onore dell’officiale”, in Florence and Milan: Comparisons and Relations, Acts of Two Conferences a Villa I Tatti in 1982–1984, dir. GIAN CARLO GARFAGNINI & CRAIG HUGH SMITH, Florence, 1989, pp. 101–133; ZORZI, “I Fiorentini e gli uffici”, pp. 725–751; ANDREA ZORZI, “Ordine pubblico e amministrazione della giustizia nelle formazioni politiche toscane fra Tre e Quattrocento”, in Italia, pp. 419–474. 134 The text of the privilege is included Consuetudines, fols 41v-57v. For political clientelism, which is based on informal personal relations entailing dependence and reciprocity, see the entry for Clientélisme in Dictionnaire du vote, pp. 197–200. See also VITTORIO E. PARSI, “La clientela: Per una tipologia dei legami personali in politica”, in Filosofia Politica, 2, 1988, pp. 411–434, which considers protection to be an essential, although not exclusive, feature of clientelism.

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well as for 1436–37.135 The concession was not actually limited to those two years and masked Romano’s purchase which emerged during the ensuing forceful opposition of the universitas. On 26 September 1437, Viceroy Ruggero Paruta specified that a dispute surrounding the captaincy had originated between the Baron of Montalbano’s eldest son, Giovanni, who had purchased the post, and the universitas which claimed the alienation contradicted its rights and privileges. The Viceroy then suspended Montalbano and assigned the office to the magister rationalis, Giovanni Vitellino.136 Indeed, following the previous sale of the office in 1435, the universitas had already obtained the privilege from Viceroy Guglielmo Muntanyans guaranteeing that the office could no longer be alienated.137 The concession to Giovanni Vitellino, miles and magister rationalis, which was to have resolved the dispute, also followed a payment, in this case 50 onze, as part of the 150 to be paid by Giovanni Romano, maior. Rather than taking into consideration the privilege forbidding alienation, the Crown merely proposed removing the baron from office. In light of this contract, Viceroy Ruggero Paruta granted the captaincy to Vitellino for the year 1438–39 and for alternate years until repayment to him was completed. “Ad sedandum nonnullas contenciones hinc inde exortas et obstacula per universitates ipsam apposite”, 18 November 1438, the Viceroy approved an agreement between Giovanni Romano, son, and the Magister Rationalis: the former gave Vitellino his money back, thus, re-acquiring the captaincy from that year onwards.138 Further municipal protest ensued139 but the Baron’s control did not end definitively until March 1440.140 Indeed, the 1435 privilege had been ignored and the Crown granted a number of concessions following grievances lodged precisely against the alienation of the office.141

135 R. C. vol. 70, fols 36r-37r. For the extent of land owned by the Romano family of Messina, see D’ALESSANDRO, Politica, p. 300. 136 P. R. vol. 34, fols 81v-82r. 137 The concession followed the redemption of the office by the community which paid an expensive guaranteed loan of 400 onze. The redemption did not come about immediately. In January 1438, Alphonso V, recalled the previous negotiations and transactions and definitively revoked the grant to Romano based on what Viceroy Guglielmo Muntanyans had agreed to earlier. Thus, Romano was no longer admitted to the office beginning in 1438. What had been paid by both the universitas and Romano was a mortgage to be paid back through the secretia of Catania. The Sovereign also specified that if the universitas were to hamper Romano in getting back his money, he would be reassigned the captaincy and, on 16 September 1438, the king demanded payment of the debts; R. C. vol. 74, fols 85r-86r. The city had actually paid more than Romano, who had only paid 150 onze, as shown by the following documents: R. C. vol. 74; fols 132r-133r; G. G., pp. 161–162. 138 R. C. vol. 74, fols 132r-133r. 139 A protest by the community on 15 April 1439 lamented the fact that even after they had redeemed the captaincy (for 150 onze it is said, but evidently only in reference to the money paid to Romano) and the Viceroy had stipulated a contract establishing that the office would no longer be sold, Romano had once again purchased the magistracy (for an unknown sum). Viceroy Paruta choose not to decide the issue and sent the universitas to seek a royal decision. Likewise, he allowed Vitellino or his substitute to remain in office, in consideration of the repayment due him, until the following 8 April, after which he would be replaced by Romano; G. G., pp. 161–162. 140 When the royal secretary, Giovanni Vitellino, and Tommaso Platamone, Magister Rationalis, redeemed the office from Giovanni Romano for 150 onze (presumably the second sale to which the universitas referred) they became captains beginning in 1440 and alternated every other year in office, most likely until the debt was repaid; R. C. vol. 75, fols 301r-304v, March/April, 1440. 141 A similar case took place in Salemi: Alphonso sold the castle, the land, the captaincy, and the secretia to the councillor, Bernardo Requesens, and his heirs in perpetuum cum strumento perpetue redimendi et quietandi gracie in 1437. A number of privileges obstructed the sale in 1437 but later, in 1440, Alphonso reconfirmed the sale to Requesens and his heirs specifying that it was to be carried out despite privileges to the contrary; C. vol. 2833, 167r-171r. On the time lag between enacting legal norms and carrying out the procedures, and a comparison with the position of castellan in the Savoy dominion, see, CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali, pp. 142–146, pp. 252–259, and pp. 325–326. The gap was in part the result of the progressive patrimonialism to which the office was inevitably subjected when: “la crescita esponenziale dei bisogni finanziari del principe e della sua amministrazione portava infine a usare le castellanie come valvole di sfogo del debito pubblico”; ibidem, pp. 328–329.

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The events indubitably reveal a more incisive form of intervention by the central government heedless of municipal requests when making a more suitable choice for increasing its own earnings. From this point of view, the policy adopted by the community of Noto appears much more pragmatic. They accepted the sale of the office for a long period of time (from 1439 to 1452) to the Salonia family, but managed to mitigate their monopoly by obtaining a guarantee of the privilege (which concerned all the offices, not only the captaincy) according to which the incumbent, after a year in office, would not be permitted to hold office again until two more years had passed: “omnes officiales illius tam civiles quam criminales et presertim capitaneus sint et esse debeant annuales et habitatores terre iamdicte saltem per biennium vacaturi”.142 The privilege followed several petitions containing particularly detailed requests. One of the most noteworthy points comes from the petition asking to have the ab antiquo custom reinstated whereby all of the community’s gentili homini could compete for the office. They had been denied the possibility since Pietro Salonia had taken office. Salonia was not regarded as not belonging to the group of gentili homini in this case. The protest regarded, instead, the fact that not all the members of this status group were allowed to hold the office as they had in the past. It is an item revealing the privileged relationship between the members of this group and the captain’s position in Noto, as confirmed by the royal reply: “contentatur regia maiestas redimere huiusmodi capitaniam ut supplicatur”.143 Continual recourse to alienation could easily generate tension, ofttimes serious, between municipal sectors and any incumbent who frequently held the office. The Sovereign proved sympathetic to appeals as long as his own interests were safeguarded. In 1439, the universitas of Piazza unsuccessfully refused Archinbau Barresi—who had already held the post per via emptionis in 1436–37—as Captain, claiming that he had been awarded no royal grant.144 In contrast, Nicosia’s protest was accepted because it allowed the Crown to respect municipal privileges while still proceeding with further

142 R. C. vol. 78, fols 262r-265r. The post had been purchased by Antonio Salonia in 1439 for 200 onze to which Pietro

Salvatore and Galcerando Salonia added 50 onze in 1442, and the universitas redeemed it in 1452; R. C. vol. 75, fols 173r175r, R. C. vol. 78, fols 262r-265r, and C. vol. 2882, fol. 109v. The Salonia family represented the new fifteenth century oligarchy, thanks, in part, to a number of substantial land acqsuiitions; PIETRO CORRAO, “Uomini e poteri sul territorio di Noto nel tardo medioevo”, in Contributi alla geografia storica dell’agro netino: Atti delle “Giornate di studio”, Noto 29–30–31 maggio 1998, Rosolini (RG), 2001, pp. 153–154. Antonio Desguanesch, Captain in Malta from 1429 to 1452, is rare example of a single individual holding office over a long period; BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 625, p. 764. 143 C. vol. 2882, fol. 109v. 144 Despite approved municipal petitions to the contrary, Alphonso granted the captaincy of Piazza to Habus Barresi for the year 1434–35, Bernardo Barresi for 1435–36, and Archinbau Barresi for 1436–37 in exchange for a secured loan of 100 onze in 1434; C. vol. 2824, fols 121r 122r. In July 1439, the universitas claimed, through the jurats, that Archinbau Barresi had appointed himself Captain without a royal concession (R. C. vol. 74, fols 595r-597r). Barresi, nevertheless, took over from Giovanni Liria pro certo precio in April 1440; R. C. vol. 75, fol. 293r. The community’s obstinance in protesting often convinced the Crown not to insist upon further alienations. In Patti, Manuele Guixeres, who had held the position for an extended period in previous years, was appointed Captain for the year 1431–32, presumably after having made a secured loan; P. R. vol. 31, fol. 157v. The jurats and the universitas then denounced the Captain’s mismanagement of the office and Alphonso V asked the Viceroy to investigate in September 1431; C. vol. 2817, fol. 189r. The tension of that period already produced a decisive impact the following year. In 1432–33, Antonio Bavera received the position of Captain for life, a concession which was revoked following a municipal protest demanding that he be removed because the official had always been appointed on a year-to-year basis in the past and the Sovereign replied by confirming Bavera’s appointment for that year alone; P. R. vol. 33, fol. 54v, 20 November 1432.

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alienations.145 The right of the alienee’s heirs over the office for the period of the purchase also emerges from these transactions.146 With reference to the monetary value of the position, the exact amount paid for the purchase cannot always be identified, both because the length of the concession was often not specified and because the payment cannot always be calculated on the basis of the cost of its redemption which was often higher than what the original purchaser had paid. Although margins of uncertainty remain, the purchase price ranged between 12 and 33 onze annually.147 This is partially confirmed by the salary of 10 onze received annually by the Captain of Nicosia,148 but the official in Castrogiovanni earned a much lower sum of 4 onze.149 It must also be remembered that office’s administration guaranteed, through financial penalties, other sources of revenue in addition to the salary.150 In summation, alienation of the captaincy brought about a significant evolution in power relationships between the central government and urban communities consisting of a substantial reduction of royal control over the magistracy. A change can already be noted in the fact that even though the choice of the official and the length of the term in office were indeed established by the Crown, this was done on the basis of local requests so that the appointment of the incumbent was actually ‘piloted’ locally. This development is borne out in particular by the instances of a community’s outright purchase the magistracy which ensured that the captaincy was included among the ranks of the elective offices. The central government sometimes reaffirmed its control over the office in cases in which the community attempted to put an end to the practice of alienation. No instances have been found, on the contrary, of an invasive royal undertaking favouring any one sector, not even during episodes of conflict. What emerges, rather, is the Crown’s decision to respect the relative power relations between local groups, leaving them to regulate their own affairs as a safeguard to the economic interests of the Crown. Management of the office could be subject to financial speculation and privatized administration but, up until at least the mid-1400s, these were not yet established practices 145 Ruggero Paruta and the miles and magister portulano, Gispert Desfar, in their capacity as Commissioners and Procurators of the Kingdom, sold the captaincy of Nicosia for two years to the miles, Giovanni di Santo Onorato for 50 onze; P. R. vol. 34, fol. 91r-v. According to the universitas: “dictam vendicionem cedere in preiudicium regiorum privilegiorum ipsius universitatis indultorum [. . .] quod nemo posset esse capitaneus in dicta terra nisi habitator ipsius et quod castellanus non valeret ad capitaniam concurrere”; P. R. vol. 34, fols 97v-98v. Giovanni, however, was Castellan and not habitator of Nicosia and was therefore deposed from the office which was sold to Giacomo Don Guida for 1437–38, to the miles, Pietro Sabia for 1438–39, and to Giovanni Caldarera for 1439–40, all inhabitants of Nicosia, for the sum of 50 onze. If one of them were to die, their heirs would have paid the money and inherited the magistracy. What transpired in Trapani is interesting: following appeals by the ambassadors, Giovanni Ferro and the legum doctor, Antonio Michilecto, Alphonso V conceded that Trapani’s customary privileges were to be respected whereby the captaincy could be ceded annually. This order had not been observed with the sale to Francesco Sieri (or Sigerio), thus, the office was redeemed; P. R. vol. 32, fols 35v, 75v-76r, 1431. 146 For example, P. R. vol. 34, fols 97v-98v, 1437 (Nicosia); C. vol. 2833, 167r-171r, 1440 (Salemi); R. C. vol. 78, fols 262r-265r, 1442 (Noto). 147 With a few exceptions, the price was generally about 12 onze: P. R. vol. 34, fol. 152r-v, 1438–40 (Patti); R. C. vol. 78, fols 287r-291v, 1442–44 (Patti); P. R. vol. 44, fols 335r-336r, 1446–52 (Salemi); R. C. vol. 69, fols 107r-108v, 110r-v, 1434–41 (Sciacca). It could also be 16–20 onze, BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 145–146, [1426–31], and P. R. vol. 34, fols 97v98v, 1437–39 (Nicosia), or 33 onze, C. vol. 2824, fols 121r-122r, 1434–37 (Piazza). 148 In the years 1433–34 and 1435–36; P. R. vol. 31, fols 159r-160r. 149 In 1431; G. G. p. 90. 150 For example: P. R. vol. 21, fol. 108v, 1420 (Piazza); BARBATO, Per la storia, p. 127, 1423; P. R. vol. 30, fol. 102r, 1429 (Piazza); C. vol. 2850, fol. 39r, 1445 (Patti). The documentation I have examined for these decades provides more information regarding the salaries of other royal municipal officials, i.e. the castellans and vicesecreti. The salary of the former was generally 18 onze (P. R. vol. 21, fol. 105v, 1420, Castronovo; R. C. vol. 53, fol. 83r-v, 1425, Monte San Giuliano; but 30 onze in Termini R. C. vol. 60, fol. 43v, 1427); and for the later, 12 onze (P. R. vol. 21, fols 33r-v, 1419 Piazza; P. R. vol. 21, fol. 52r-v, 1419, Salemi; but 30 onze in Catania P. R. vol. 25, fol. 132r, 1423).

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in Sicily. Emblematic here is the fact that frequently, and in conformity with the relative balance among the diverse socio-professional groups, communities denounced the official’s mismanagement of the office and obtained the Sovereign’s repeal of his appointment. Despite conflicting interests and disputes over control of the captaincy, attempts to establish a series of norms regulating periods of rotation in office and the origins of the incumbent, in an effort to guarantee impartial governance, often characterized municipal jurisdiction over criminal affairs which had previously been only a royal preserve. 4.4

Alienation of the ‘Universitates’

The alienation of the universitates guaranteed the Crown most of its income but also gave rise to important political and institutional repercussions in the vice kingdom’s state of affairs. As with the transactions involving the captain’s office, a number of salient elements emerge for communities sold as fiefs, namely, an enrichment of the system of urban rights and privileges and the existence of a pervasive stratification of society. The initial phase of these transfers paradoxically coincided with the period of maximum consolidation of urban autonomy and, therefore, with the spirit of municipal identity. The sovereign used extraordinary financial needs, normally related to warfare, as an excuse for selling the communities. Alienation procedures, however, testify to the persistence of royal pre-eminence which directly contrasted with both what had been sanctioned by Martin I at the Parliament of Syracuse in 1398 and the inalienability of the royal demesne granted by Alphonso V himself. The irreconcilability between this royal policy and urban autonomy, which at first glance seemed to be strongly compromised, was at least partially erased by the methods and consequences of redemption. The universitates were able to return to the royal demesne through a series of negotiations with the Crown that did not correspond to an authoritarian royal policy. I am referring here to the following elements: the sovereign’s immediate support of the redemption, an acquisition of privileges which placed the universitas in a more advanced condition with respect to the phase preceding the sale, and full urban autonomy in carrying out, often under advantageous conditions, the financial manoeuvre to redeem the community. The phase of redemption was beneficial to the universitas which, backed by the force of the imminent payment, could ask for substantial concessions. Having breached existing privileges in fostering the alienation, the Crown was determined to regain the goodwill of the community. It is this very effort to regain consensus that appears to explain why the greatest number of concessions were concentrated precisely during the period of redemption. During the negotiations that characterized this phase, the universitas presented petitions of an importance that were rarely equalled in times of ordinary politics.151 During Alphonso’s reign, alienations regarded roughly twenty-one communities, certainly a restricted number with respect to the size of the demesne and in many instances, moreover, these were smaller terre with a marginal role in the affairs of the vice kingdom (Aci, Capizzi, Mistretta, Mussomeli, Paternò, Naro, Sutera, Tripi, and Troina).152 Several instances of the alienation of larger universitates will be examined here instead. 151 In contrast, a crisis of demesne ideology took place during a period of impoverishment of the domestic market in the first half of the 1500s: a locality’s return to the royal demesne brought no benefits and, in some cases, communities preferred to return to the baron’s domination; GIARRIZZO, “La Sicilia”, pp. 178–180. 152 BRESC, Un monde, II, pp. 856–858.

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The sale of a universitas was not always an unexpected event but could develop out of a series of concessions of a community’s property and offices. This, for instance, is what was about to happen in 1426 in Nicosia where the nobilis, Giovanni Ferdinando Desfar (Isfar), a consiliarius regius, received the secretia and the castle of Nicosia from Alphonso. The city, sensing in such alienations the imminent threat of being granted in fief, took an immediate stand to ward off the danger.153 A similar concentration of power benefiting a single individual very likely led the universitas of Corleone to redeem alienated assets in 1437 and obtain assurance that they would not be sold. On 18 November 1437, the redemption of “castra credenciariam secretiam et cabellas”, which had been obtained from Viceroy Ruggero Paruta and the cives and habitatores of Palermo for 1,000 onze, was finalized; they were redeemed by the principales of Corleone for 500 onze, a sum that they would have recovered by retaining control over the captaincy until the debt was extinguished.154 On 17 November 1437, however, the Sovereign had sanctioned the inalienability of the terra and its assets: Toti universitati dicte terre Corilioni, presentibus videlicet et futuris, pro semper et in perpetuum, per graciam, privilegium, et prerogativam specialem, quod amodo nullo umquam tempore vos, vel dicta terra Corilioni eiusve castrum seu castra, capitania, secrecia, vel earum officia, iura [. . .] motu nostro proprio, vel ex libito voluntatis [. . .] possitis aut possint, seu valeatis aut valeant a nostro regio demanio [. . .] alienari, dividi.155.

The Sovereign had also granted the right to armed resistance in the case of an alienation: Hominibus et universitati plenam concedimus potestatem [. . .] possitis nos vel Curiam nostram regiam consultare semel, bis et ter, ac etiam pro conservatione dicte vestre possessionis ad id resistatis et resistere possitis remediis debitis et opportunis, et eis que in talibus fieri reequirantur, eciam si oportuerit manu forti, absque alicuius pene metu et incursu et inobediencie seu rebellionis macula sive nota.156

Redemption of the alienated assets was accomplished by granting control over the captaincy to the investors themselves so I do not believe that the spirit of the privilege was breached in this case because: it was an alienation in function of a reacquisition, it was for a limited period of time, and it was sold to local persons.157 The universitas was unable to avoid their alienation for 19,000 florins in August 1440 to Federico Ventimiglia158 under whose power they would remain until November 1447 when they managed to free themselves for the sum of 4,000 florins.159 The community 153 The transactions took place in January 1426 (P. R. vol. 27, fols 40v-41r) and the corpus of petitions against these sales and any future alienations of the locality were presented in May of the same year; BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 142–146. Compare the case of the universitas of Castrogiovanni; G. G. pp. 106, 1448. 154 C. vol. 2830, fols 45r-52r. 155 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 195 156 Ibidem, p. 196. 157 The redemption in November, 1437 did not involve the castles since Ruggero Paruta still held them in January 1438 when he sold the small one for 100 onze to Olivio Sottile; C. vol. 2830, fols 94v-95v. It may be that Paruta’s concessions were also for a limited time period and, because the holdings only concerned the castles, they posed no threat to the community’s integrity. It is also likely that he retained possession of the property so that the community might redeem assets for a lesser amount. 158 P. R. vol. 40, fols 28r-36r; in April, 1440 Corleone had been sold to Bernat Requesens for 12,494 ducats, which means that it was subcontracted to Ventimiglia; BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 857. 159 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 210.

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guaranteed payment within a year rather than five, as had been foreseen in an earlier period; half of the sum would be obtained through farming the gabelle and the rest through direct taxation.160 The leeway accorded for financial manoeuvring was decidedly broad. It was possible to decide without consulting the Crown, for example, which municipal tariffs to farm, which to levy ex novo and whether or not to resort to maldenaru taxation.161 The main privileges obtained by Corleone include a ban on alienation, exemption from the dohana, the privilegium fori, and the right to insurgere ad arma against any future purchasers including the viceroy himself should he have fostered the sale.162 Given the ineffectiveness of this last concession, in light of the fact that it had already been granted in 1437 without serving as a deterrent, its value was mostly symbolic. It also denoted the defensive position of the Crown which aimed at completely satisfying the community’s expectations of a full reintegration by heightening the spirit of community identity. In this regard, it is interesting to note the choice of the universitas, in view of their return to the royal demesne and in keeping with their strong sense of identity, to “erigere et apponere pennones regales” on “hospiciis domibus et possessionibus” as evidence of their affiliation.163 The procedures for alienation and redemption disclose unmistakable constant features, the main ones of which are the concrete opportunity for a community to obtain significant privileges and some precise references by urban officials to the socio-professional status groups who would bear the burden of the collette. Specific indications of the taxable sectors were normally made because the community communicated the financial measures and methods for implementing them which had been decided on the basis of the community’s economic potential. An instance in Corleone, where the habitatores were to contribute proportionately “according to their wealth”, is also significant and the most interesting point is that the individual inhabitants were to be taxed by four persons chosen from each of the groups of “curiali, burgisi, artisti et ultimu lu populu”.164 The town’s inhabitants, in other words, those who possessed real estate and were, therefore, residents, were to contribute to the levy.165 This four-part division reveals clear class divisions and it is to be noted how the populus ranked as last among the taxable groups. The universitas described society differentiated according to status groups in this case. It is worth investigating whether, by shifting the perspective to the central government’s point of view, it is possible to find the same type of description. With this in mind, it can be observed that the Sovereign decreed for the universitas of Sciacca that the exaction for the town walls would be carried out in 1434 by three representatives from the nobilium, burgesium, and ministalium, while the miserabiles were exempted.166 Thus, both the community and the central government referred to social 160 Ibidem, pp. 206–215, particularly pp. 210–211; P. R. vol. 40, fols 32r-36r. 161 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 211. The sale of the wine and bread gabelle to the Pisan merchant and banker, Pietro Gaetano,

guaranteed a loan of 800 onze, and the contract expired in 1460; RITA L. FOTI, “Tra regio demanio, politiche pubbliche e strategie private nella Sicilia moderna”, in Storie di un luogo: Quattro saggi su Corleone nel Seicento, eds. RITA L. FOTI & IDA FAZIO & GIOVANNA FIUME & LINA SCALISI, Palermo, 2003, p. 9. 162 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 207–210. 163 C. vol. 2859, fol. 6r-v, 28 September 1447. For a comparison, see AIRÒ, La scrittura, p. 182 regarding Taranto in 1463. 164 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 211. The Crown sold the secretia and the castles for the remainder of the amount needed for the redemption; BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 857 and FOTI, “Tra regio”, p. 10. 165 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, pp. 212–213. Likewise, the inhabitants as well as any foreigners who possessed property in the locality were the persons required to declare their assets in order for the authorities to determine the amount and proportional allotment of direct taxation in Catalonia; MAX TURULL RUBINAT & JORDI MORELLÓ BAGET, “Estructura y tipología”, pp. 296–298. 166 R. C. vol. 69, fols 105v-106r.

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classes. Distinctions of this type, although with slightly different details, also emerge in other large centres such as Palermo where direct levies in financial measures were allotted on the basis of distinctions per facultatem among the various groups of “gentilomini, mercatores, borgesi, magistri” and the imposts could be distributed on the basis of macro distinctions or sub-distinctions as previously indicated.167 The four-part division of the proportional taxes employed in Corleone was not the standard in either Sciacca or Palermo.168 Sciacca’s universitas was granted in fief to the Grand Master of the military Order of Santa Maria de Montesa, Romeo Corbera, from 1423 to 1432, but the amount of his payment is not known.169 Between August 1433 and March 1434, a brief period of time, the community presented two corpora of petitions. The jurats played a significant role in their formulation and were actually the sole authors of the 1433 petitions. The fact that the jurats alone took the initiative in 1433 was due to serious internal lacerations which led them to denounce conflicts between gentilomini and habitatores and take the defensive in begging for the respect owed to officials created by the King.170 The internal conflicts probably stemmed from the previous feudal government guilty, among other things, of financial mismanagement. The iuratia denounced the previous jurats’ curia and asked that the master jurat audit Romeo Corbera’s accounts.171 The petitions contain a request for elucidation on how to proceed based on privileges held by the community which reveals the community’s ineptitude in dealing with penal law.172 Such ineptitude might very likely have been due to the city’s not having been involved in judicial affairs during the feudal period. In particular, through the petitions of 1434 which were drawn up by a larger group of persons and not attributable to the iuratia alone, the universitas obtained substantial concessions, namely the institution of an appellate court, authorization to interrupt a royal commissioner if he breached municipal privileges, and the privilegium fori.173 In both of the corpora of petitions, a ban on future alienations received royal assent, but this was not honoured. In 1438, Marquise Geraci Giovanni Ventimiglia bought the terra for 18,816 florins and it was not redeemed until 1444.174 The most significant points of the 1444 redemption concern the complex and lengthy negotiations between the universitas and the central government about how to produce the large sum. The final agreements provided for complex financial measures by the community which would net 2000 onze, as well as a number of guarantees (with which a portion of the money would gradually be recovered) including an exemption from 167 See Section 4.2. 168 For a comparison, for the Catalan ville of Reus and Valls, see MORELLÓ BAGET, Fiscalitat, pp. 361–374. 169 I have found no date for the grant of the fief but the Master of Montesa is recorded as already being in possession in Jan-

uary 1424 (R. C. vol. 55, fols 289v-290r) and moreover, in consideration of the fact that the final list of elections by scrutiny is for the fifteenth indiction (1421–22), the community was probably granted in fief in 1423. 170 P. R. vol. 33, fol. 197r. The verb ‘create’ used in the document must not be misconstrued since it was used to indicate the ratification of elections carried out correctly, however, this reference to a royal undertaking served to draw attention to the institutional role of the officials. It was again specified in petitions related to a second redemption in 1444 that elections were to take place through scrutinies and that the viceroy would have ordered them. Even in this instance, royal intervention consisted in a confirmation and not in making appointments; C. vol. 2843, fol. 181r. 171 P. R. vol. 33, fol. 197r-v; R. C. vol. 69, fol. 103r-v. 172 P. R. vol. 33, fol. 198v. The community was referring to the optantes privilege which, according to the reply to the petition, was held by the community before it became a fief, and concerned limits and procedures in prosecuting cases; the universitas of Calascibetta also enjoyed the optantes privilege; G. G. p. 37, 1426. 173 R. C. vol. 69, fols 104r-105r. 174 R. C. vol. 83, fols 74r-78r; C. vol. 2843, fols 179v-182r.

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extraordinary royal imposts for three years and 4,000 duty-free tratte (it should be noted that a tratta made it possible to export one salma of wheat).175 In addition, to arrive at the sum needed for the payment, the Crown, “iuxta dictorum capitulorum formam” decided, together with the universitas,176 to proceed with the sale of the castle and secretia.177 One of the main points of concurrence during the course of negotiations stipulated that the officials would decide each aspect of the financial arrangements—dictated by the Crown only in broad general terms—along with a town council “of twenty to thirty citizens of every level” representing all the inhabitants.178 As evidence of the relative balance between urban autonomy and royal initiatives, the most significant of the other alienations is definitely the one concerning Polizzi. The locality was sold to the consiliarius et camerlengus, Raimondo Cabrera Miles,179 referred to by the universitas as magnifico missere, as recorded in the petitions of 4 October 1442 presented to the Sovereign for their return to the royal demesne.180 I have not found a date for the alienation but it can be retraced through the elections by scrutiny which recorded an interruption from the third indiction (1439–40) to the end of the sixth which were carried out on 28 July 1443.181 Raimondo Cabrera had purchased “terram et castrum Policii” for 10,000 florins and the universitas redeemed itself for the same amount accompanied by the payment of a donativum of “florenos mille quos regie maiestati dicta universitas dedit dono liberaliter”.182 The universitas managed to come up with the sum because, along with the sale of the secretia and several offices for a total of 7,000 florins,183 they also

175 After lengthy negotiations, the most important points were decided in January 1444 (C. vol. 2843, fols 179v-182r) and in September 1444 (R. C. vol. 83, fols 74r-78r). The universitas was to pay 2,000 onze but, besides the right to 4,000 free tratte from its port (in January only 600 tratte were stipulated), they would be exempted from extraordinary subventions for three indictions (the seventh, eighth and ninth), and lastly they would be allowed to levy additional excise taxes for the following five years. 176 R. C. vol. 83, fol. 78v. 177 In order to arrive at the sum needed for redemption, the Crown sold the castle and the secretia to Gispert Desfar mediante gracie reddimendi [sic] in September, 1444 (R. C. vol. 83, fol. 75r-v) with the provision that they would return to the royal demesne when they had completed the payment; R. C. vol. 82, fols 104v-105r; R. C. vol. 83, fols 78v-79r. 178 C. vol. 2843, fol. 181r. 179 R. C. vol. 76, fol. 486v. Raimondo Cabrera, dominus of the city of Mazara, was known for his violent government policies; BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 735 n. 171. I do not think that Cabrera’s policies should be considered typical of every seigneurial dominion; generalizations should be avoided. Compare the case of Castile; JULIO VALDEÓN BARUQUE, “Conflictos sociales en el mundo feudal hispánico”, in En torno al feudalesimo hispánico: I Congreso de estudios medievales, León 21–25 settembre 1987, Ávila, 1989, p. 48. Regarding, instead, the advantages to the community of inclusion in the royal demesne, for Catalonia, see the brief considerations by FLOCEL SABATÉ CURULL, “Discurs i estratèges del poder reial a Catalunya al segle XIV”, in Anuario de Estudios Medievales, 25/2, 1992, particularly p. 635. 180 C. vol. 2822, fol. 21r. 181 R. C. vol. 80, fol. 352r. 182 R. C. vol. 80, fol. 273v-275r, 18 June. Bresc cites a document of 7 December 1443 recording the fact that Cabrera made the Sovereign a loan of 21,000 florins including the 10,000 for the purchase of Polizzi. Considering that in July 1443 the universitas had already been redeemed, the document cited by Bresc evidently refers to a total including the amount of the loan and the previous sum paid to the King for the enfeoffment; BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 859, p. 904. 183 R. C. vol. 80, fols 273v-275v. The universitas claimed that they had already completed payment in June 1443 but this actually took place the following year; R. C. vol. 79, fols 114r-115v. In effect, the first large payment following the sale of the secretia, 7,400 florins, was made to Piero Cardona in October, 1442 by of the universitas; BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 857. During the same period the community managed to have the amount of their payment for the colletta, 80 onze, as well as the money Cabrera owed to the citizens of Polizzi, calculated as part of the sum to be paid for their redemption and the universitas also obtained an exemption from the ordinary and extraordinary gabelle in this phase; C. vol. 2822, fol. 21r-v. Polizzi, however, not having been able to put together the total amount and still owing 327 onze and 15 tarí, was authorized in February, 1444 to sell a number of offices and gabelle for the amount of 58 onze per annum to Federico Ventimiglia, dominus of Corleone, until the amount due was reached. The transaction was ratified by the Sovereign in February 1445; C. vol. 2848, fols 153r-164r.

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sold their gabelle and levied a number of taxes secundu facultati, i.e. according to each person’s assets.184 The most interesting aspect in the case of Polizzi are, again, the impressive privileges attained by the locality. This seems surprising given the fact that the community’s payment was not actually among the highest of those recorded. It is evident that the magnitude of the concessions stemmed from the long consolidated channel of negotiations with the central government stretching back to periods antedating the enfeoffment. The most noteworthy privileges include a ban on alienation, indications of drastic limitations on the royal commissioner’s activities, a very broad privilegium fori, the institution of an appellate court, the right to have royal and elected officials of local extraction, and an exemption from the dohana.185 The universitas, furthermore, obtained the right to put up armed resistance against the sale of the community (an event which never came about for Polizzi or for any of the other localities befitting from the same prerogative) and the petition was given royal assent with the provision that rebellion could be undertaken only “sub invocacione et vexillo regio”: In primis supplicat eadem universitas quod sacra regia maiestas nullo umquam tempore ipsam terram de cetero pignorare aut alienare dignetur nec gubernacionem alicui persone eciam si esset de stirpe regia vel cuiuscumque condicionis existeret vel concedere vel donare nec a demanio regio directe vel indirecte segregare neque dare seu impignorare castellaniam et capitaniam castri et terre predicte. Placet regie maiestati et quod fiat privilegium in amplissima et cautissima forma ad consilium sapientis eorum. Item petit eadem universitas quod si aliqua licencia regia provisiones gracie vel rescripta impetrarentur [...] ab eadem regia maiestate que tenderent in contrarium predictorum quod eadem universitas absque metu in obediencia illis nullatenus obedire teneatur et quod eciam contra cogentes eam ad talia eciam si esset vicerex possit se defendere et tueri manu armata absque motu incursus in crimen [sic] rebellionis seu lese maiestatis. Placet regie maiestati sub invocacione (tantum) sui nominis et sub eius vexillo.186

The merits of such a concession are to be found in the royal reply which was in seeming conflict with the power of the sovereign, the same as for Corleone’s universitas and also Noto’s which in 1439 obtained the right, in the event of an alienation, to resist “et

184 C. vol. 2822, fol. 21v. 185 C. vol. 2822, fols 22v-24r. The privilege of exemption from the dohana did not apply to the city of Palermo where the

inhabitants of Polizzi would attain the privilege only in 1451; R. C. vol. 85, fols 445v-447v. 186 C. vol. 2822, fol. 22r-v. For the right to resistance as a necessary defence against the abuses of a prince and a means of

pointing out the limits to the legitimacy of his power and, therefore, a reflection of the legal concept of an event subject to power exercised in accordance with legal norms, see ANGELA DE BENEDICTIS, “Identità comunitarie e diritto di resistere”, in Identità, pp. 265–294. For the state of Milan, see DELLA MISERICORDIA, “Per non . . .desobidienti”, pp. 147–216: communities felt authorized to disobey if the duke did not respect the pacts (ibidem, p. 170) given that “i sudditi fossero spesso più prudenti, più inclini al compromesso o disposti a seguire, per ottenere i propri scopi, la via della mediazione clientelare, piuttosto che quella del fermo richiamo del principe ai suoi doveri di giustizia e di lealtà” (ibidem, p. 212). On the phenomena of resistance and the theories underpinning a recourse to such a stratagem after the violation of rights by a sovereign who became a tyrant for this reason, see SILVANA COLLODO, “Governanti e governati: Aspetti dell’esperienza politica nelle città dell’Italia centro-settentrionale”, in Italia 1350–1450, pp. 77–111 and, with particular reference to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, REINHARD, Storia, pp. 267–284. For the early modern period, see also SCATTOLA, “Il concetto di tirannide”, pp. 391–420 and FARNETI, “Filosofia e tirannia”, pp. 421–437. On the cities’ reactions to monarchical policies contrary to municipal privileges in general, see the thoughts of D’AGOSTINO, Poteri, pp. 39–47. See also, FRANCESCO DE SANCTIS, “Resitenza (diritto di)”, in Enciclopedia del diritto, 46 vols, Milan, 1958–1993, XXXIX, pp. 994–1003.

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ex tali resistentia dicta universitas nulla pena incorrere”.187 Manu armata defence should not be considered a crime of high treason as it was an appeal to respect a royal grant guaranteeing the inalienability of the land and, therefore, was in defence of the town’s right to be subject to the king. Rather than high treason, it was a privilege reaffirming a municipality’s subordination to royal power. Contractual or pactist relations guaranteed ample room for the community to negotiate188 but it in no way implied that subordination to the sovereign was in question, even in instances when he was at variance with the legal norms.189 All the cases examined share common characteristics. First of all, the grant of a fief never guaranteed the dominus unquestionable control: the moment a universitas was able to redeem itself, it could proceed without interference. Indeed, for economic reasons, the demesne status of the alienated localities was suspended in light of their future return. The lengthy and complicated series of negotiations over their reinstatement reveal that a community often paid less than what had been paid by the feudal lord and reacquired part of what had been paid out, albeit at a later date. In addition, it is clear that the central government placed importance on a locality’s return to the royal demesne, not only for economic reasons, but so that the power of the seigneurial faction would not expand. Finally, the centralist policy of the alienations was significantly reduced by the development of the organs of government that decidedly increased urban autonomy, particularly for the jurisdictional sphere. In addition, an increase in generalized tax reduction with the abolition of the dohana which simultaneously liberalized and integrated trade within the vice kingdom and benefited local merchants. The diversified and substantial concessions which the communities obtained from the Crown, desirous of reacquiring a favourable consensus, effectively wiped out differences in the system of royal prerogatives for both jurisdictional and economic matters which, until the 1420s, had only benefited the largest localities.

187 RISINO, Il regesto, p. 105, 1439. 188 The establishment of the privilegium fori even in smaller localities was possible precisely through their redemption from

feudal power, as occurred in Termini in 1444 for criminal proceedings; C. vol. 2846, fols 227v-228v. 189 Of a completely different nature and resulting from contractual relations existing in the Visconti duchy, which for the

city of Reggio (but for these pages with reference to the Visconti dominion in general in the early 1400s), GAMBERINI, La città, pp. 255–258, deems it to be an ideological apparatus for theorizing an obligation of loyalty. This was not without drawbacks and could reach the point that subjects might even consider themselves free of the tie of loyalty. The radical difference between the relationship of subordination between sovereign and subjects and that which existed between dominus and subjects emerges, for example, in the impossibility for the Visconti to issue decrees limiting municipal liberties that had been established during the dominion of the Gonzaga; ANDREA GAMBERINI, Lo stato visconteo: Linguaggi politici e dinamiche istituzionali, Milan, 2005, pp. 137–152. In effect, such results in no way correspond to the royal sovereignty exercised, even in states where pactist practices for achieving a relative balance of power were widespread. Furthermore, Gamberini’s analysis indicates some distinctions regarding the nature of these power relations which greatly diminished any supposed leeway for the dominus to manoeuvre. The relationship, for example, between the Scotti family of Piacenza and the Visconti was regulated by pactist relations but is not to be interpreted as stemming from constitutional arrangements rather than having a contingent functional value; ibidem, pp. 243–244. For as far as any criminal responsibility on the part of the universitates is concerned, which from the twelfth century became admissible, see GIOVANNI CHIODI, “Delinquere ut universi: Scienza giuridica e responsabilità penale delle ‘universitates’ tra XII e XIII secolo”, in Studi di storia del diritto, 3 vols, Milan, 1999–2001, III, pp. 99–191, and DIEGO QUAGLIONI, “Universi consentiri non possunt: La punibilità dei corpi nella dottrina del diritto comune”, in Suppliche, pp. 409–425. Instead, for the correspondence between supplication (which involved negotiation along with the request; HARRIET RUDOLPH, “Rendersi degni della somma clemenza: Le suppliche della prima età moderna come strumento di interazione simbolica tra sudditi e autorità”, in Suppliche, p. 518) and act of protest, see ANGELA DE BENEDICTIS, “Supplicare, capitolare, resistere: Politica come comunicazione” in Suppliche, pp. 455–472.

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SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL GROUPS AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION FROM THE TIME OF MARTIN I TO ALPHONSO V

5.1

Social Stratification

The broad autonomy in the field of economic policy enjoyed by urban communities during the reign of Alphonso V has been pointed out. This contrasts with the 1300s and the reign of Martin I when urban communities were involved in the system of taxation but the fiscal system was not regularly determined at the local level. A full consolidation of the municipal financial administration began in the 1420s in concomitance with an increasing royal fiscal burden which forced the universitates to have more precise knowledge of the economic potential of their residents. It can be assumed that, as the result of a continuum of progress, information related to the details of urban society during the Alphonsian period help to provide a clearer description of society in the preceding period which, in many ways, was already in an advanced phase during the reign of Martin I. This section will examine the main characteristics of socio-professional groups in order to reconstruct their roles and hierarchical positions in urban society. For an analysis of the social context during the reign of Alphonso V— the most documented period—the reconstruction will opportunely begin with the reign of the Infante of Aragon. In any classification of society there is always a high risk of anachronisms and inadequate interpretation.1 Likewise, it should not be excluded that documentary sources might refer to certain groups, not because they were the only ones in existence, but because they were the only ones relevant to those specific sources. Furthermore, although important common characteristics may be identified for groups sharing the same designations in

For a comparison, see ELISABETH Crouzet-Pavan, “Les élites urbaines: aperçus problématiques (France, Angleterre, Italie)”, in Les élites urbaines, pp. 9–28 and CERUTTI, “La construction”, pp. 224–234, for an overview. For Provence, see GÉRARD GIORDANENGO, “Le élites internazionali in area provenzale: artisti, mercanti, uomini di legge (secoli XI-XV)”, in Sistema di rapporti ed élites economiche in Europa (secoli XII-XVII), ed. MARIO DEL TREPPO, Naples, 1994, pp. 179–198, which does not indicate what is meant by the term elites (ibidem, p. 180). Regarding attempts to define urban society, particularly the elite, the differing circumstances recorded in the documentary sources for each environment, and the inevitable uncertainty marking the descriptions by historians, see PHILIPPE BRAUNSTEIN, “Pour une histoire des élites urbaines: vocabulaire, réalités et représentations”, in Les élites urbaines, pp. 29–38. As has been pointed out for Provence (LUCIE LAROCHELLE, “Le vocabulaire social et les contours de la noblesse urbane provençale à la fin du Moyen Âge”, in Annales du Midi, 104, 1992, pp. 164–165), in order to organize a comprehensive glossary of society it is necessary to compare different documentary sources because certain sources, for example notarial records, may define certain professions with terminology not used in other documents. Regarding the use of the concept of elite and the inconsistency characterizing the notion, see the nice notes by FRÉDÉRIQUE LEFERME-FALGUIÈRES & VANESSA VAN RENTERGHEM, “Le concept d’élites. Approches historiographiques et métodologiques”, in Hypothèses 2000. Travaux de l’école doctorale d’Histoire, Paris, 2001, pp. 57–67. See also note 2 below. 1

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various communities, it is difficult to determine exactly what parallels there might be between them. As has been pointed out for Provence and is equally valid for Sicily, it is possible to deduce an individual’s hierarchical position in society based on the titles by which he was designated. There are normally two types of designations: one based on objective criteria indicating the professional group to which an individual belonged, and another corresponding to essentially arbitrary defining criteria.2 The uncertainties stemming from such vastly different designations can be overcome, in part, once the role of the group referred to by a certain appellative is identified through sources issued by the Crown and the community. A correlation between various documents should make it possible to resolve or reduce the uncertainty inherent in every social classification. As already affirmed, documentary output for the age of Martin I underwent a significant increase in the abundance of information regarding social stratification, although in most cases it was limited to highly generic instances which nevertheless revealed differences in social status. A case in point is the royal pardon of the community of Nicosia for the crime of high treason in [1396] which addressed “omnibus et singulis hominibus dicte terre utriusque sexus et cuiuscumque gradus aut condicionis existant”.3 In the same year, the ambassadors of Piazza appealed to the Sovereign in the name of “all the people gentilomini and populari alike”.4 In 1402, Randazzo was forbidden to adulterate wine intended for those of “cuiscumque condicionis vel gradus”.5 It is, however, possible to ascertain some elements that will facilitate a more precise outline of the composition of urban society at the end of the fourteenth century by referring in particular to the role of the magistri (artisans). It has been maintained that the development of manufacturing in Sicily between the end of the 1300s and the beginning of the 1400s increased the wealth of the artisans 2 LAROCHELLE, “Le vocabulaire social”, p. 165. Regarding the difficulty of establishing a precise correspondence between a name and a specific socio-professional group, see the important analysis for Barcelona by DUFOURCQ “Honrats”, pp. 1361–1395. Dufourcq starts from the generally accepted theory that there existed, in the population of fourteenth century Barcelona, a distinct category referred to as the ciutadans honrats from which urban leaders, as well as a high number of members of the Consell de Cent, were almost always recruited. From the end of the 1300s and throughout the 1400s, conflicts are recorded between the estates of the honrats and the mercaders. Dufourcq speculates that a division along such socio-professional lines might already have existed in the population during the fourteenth century and that such a division might have been reflected within the ruling classes of councillors and jurats. According to Dufourcq the word honrat had an imprecise connotation and the ciutadans honrats constituted neither a homogenous social grouping nor a social class and there is no reason to believe they were landowners. There were certainly notable personages but that does not mean they constituted a united oligarchy, indeed, in the early 1300s there were often conflicts among the honrats and exponents from a variety of professions such as changeur, drappier, legal experts, and merchants. Therefore, the term honrat was used as a formality and the councillors and jurats represented neither professions nor well-defined groups; ibidem, pp. 1361–1395. See also GERBET, “Patriciat et noblesse”, pp. 133–140, according to which the ciudadanos honrats were persons who had become rich through commerce but also experts in law and medicine. On this topic, see also JOSÉ M. PALACIO Y DE PALACIO, “Contribución al estudio de los burgueses y ciudadanos honrados de Cataluña”, in Hidalguía, 22, 1957, pp. 305–320, 24, 1976, pp. 661–700. Concerning the general structure of the society in Barcelona which was divided into categories of “ciutadans honrats, mercaders, artistes e menestrales” (the last two terms both indicate artisans but the artistes was the most important group including silversmiths and goldsmiths), see BATLLE GALLART & Busqueta Riu, “Distribuciò social”, pp. 91–136. For a further prosopographical analysis of the members of the Consell de Cent in the 1300s, see CARME BATLLE GALLART, “Vida i institucion polítiques (segles XIV i XV)”, in Història, pp. 278–298. Some information regarding the composition of nonmetropolitan communities in Catalonia and Aragon can be found in JOSÉ A. SESMA MUÑOZ, “Las ciudades de Aragón y Cataluña interior: población y flujos económicos”, in Le città del mediterraneo all’apogeo dello sviluppo medievale: aspetti economici e sociali, in Diciottesimo convegno internazionale di studi, Le città del mediterraneo all’apogeo dello sviluppo medievale: aspetti economici e sociali, Pistoia, 18–21 maggio 2001, Pistoia, 2003, pp. 424–433. 3 R. C. vol. 25, fols 132v-133v. 4 R. C. vol. 25, fol. 23r. 5 R. C. vol. 39, fols 114v-115r.

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but their political influence did not expand at the same rate through, for example, the right to organize and select their own representatives. Furthermore, the spread of this representation throughout metropolitan communities took place only towards the end of the 1430s, modelled on guilds formed in circumstances of strong opposition to the gentilomini in Catania in 1435 and which were possessed of the right to elect their own consuls.6 Lastly, guilds, which were particularly strong between the 1440s and 1450s, played a role in localities in eastern Sicily with the sole exception of Termini in the western part.7 Merely considering the development of the artisans’ independent political function as unique to end of the 1430s does not take into account pertinent information from the reign of the Infante. The sharp distinction between eastern and western Sicily also needs be attenuated: there was a widespread system of guilds during the Alphonsian period which was independent of the Catania context. For Martin’s reign, it is useful to recall the [1407] petitions of the community of Randazzo and, in particular, the following: “that for every colletta ordered four boni homini from each guild be called by the officials”. The royal reply, “placet regie maiestati quod observetur mos antiqua”, suggests that the presence of the magistri was a well-established custom.8 It was requested in the corpus of petitions, therefore, that members of four different professions be included in the commissions. The case in Randazzo was not an isolated instance. In 1407, Martin of Aragon confirmed a detailed petition concerning the speciarii (pharmacists ante litteram) “capitula et ordinaciones facte et ordinate per Rogerium de Camera arcium et medicine doctorem regni Siciliae prothomedicum auctoritate sui prothomedicatus officii de voluntate et espresso consensu serenissimi domini regis servande per speciarios et singulas personas omnium civitatum terrarum et locorum regni predicti”.9 Through the annual election of a consul, these petitions organized the speciarii who were already active politically in the cities and the towns of the kingdom, rigorously regulated their activities, and established a precise hierarchical order subordinate to the elected individual. The importance of the document might be discounted because it testifies to an organization imposed from above, but, in fact, royal ordinances, as previously demonstrated, were generally the result of an indication furnished by the community, as also shown in these 1407 capitula by specific references to different local variations. The most significant data undoubtedly regard the electoral body composed of doctors and the jurats who conferred the appointment for the administrative year: In primis quod in qualibet civitate terra sive loco ubi sint speciarii ultra duos quolibet anno de mense augusti speciarii una cum medicis et iuratis eligant inter eos unum de speciariis dicte civitatis terre sive loci qui eis videbitur magis ydoneus ad infrascriptum

EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 356–357. Ibidem, p. 357; BRESC, Un monde, I, p. 212,Table 29. See also FEDELE MARLETTA, “La costituzione e le prime vicende delle maestranze di Catania”, in Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale, 1, 1904, pp. 354–358, 2, 1905, pp. 88–103, 224–233; PINA D’ARRIGO, “Notizie sulle corporazioni degli argentieri in Catania”, in Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale, XIV-XV, 1936–1937, 1938, pp. 35–48. 8 R. C. vol. 46, fols 413v-415v. 9 R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 197r. For a reference in 1401 to the speciarii in Catania as well as the candilari (probably candle makers), see ZENO, “Un capitolo di re Martino”, p. 291. Speciarii, already at work in Catania in 1358, supplied the bishop with aromatum et confectionum; COSENTINO, p. 441. Regarding the Sicilian druggist, see DANIELA SANTORO, “Lo speziale siciliano tra continuità e innovazione: capitoli e costituzioni dal XIV al XVI secolo”, in Mediterranea, 8, 2006, pp. 465–484. 6 7

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officium exercendum et facta elecone [sic] inscriptis ipsam mictant ad prothomedicum qui electum confirmabit et talis vocabit caputmagister sive consul et dictus electus nullumode audeat nec possit dictum officium refutare sub pena uncias vigenti ni sit aliqua racionabili causa excusatur de qua excusacione iurati cognoscant, pro anno (tamen) presenti fiat electio eo ipso quod presencia capitula ad noticiam speciariorum devenerint et electus gaudeat officio per totum annum prime indicionis proxime venture.10

The reference to the electoral body is both meaningful and rare and necessitates further analysis through an examination of information from other communities. The jurats’ participation was unusual: according to Article VII in Sciacca’s customary of (whose date of issue is unknown) it was only incumbent on those who practised the profession: Omnes mercatores artifices exerceant artes mercantias et in mi(ni)sterio eorum habeant consules ad congnoscendum et terminandum eorum labores et opera, si lis aliqua ex artificio vel mercantia oriri contingat, qui quidem consules eligantur per homines artifici et professionis eorum, qui iurabunt ad sancta Dei evangelia bene et legaliter consulatus officium exercere et eorum terminationibus stetur omnino.11

In Caltagirone in 1443, the election was carried out by the artisans alone,12 and in 1444, Patti’s universitas, as a result of the exorbitant prices charged by corbiseri (shoemakers), asked that the iuratia be allowed to elected a consul every year who would set a limit on such excesses.13 It can be observed, as a further confirmation of the importance of the 1407 petitions, how a concession instituting a consul was of great political significance and was not, therefore, automatic. Faced with a request for the institution of a guild for the corbiseri in Patti the Viceroy referred the question to the Sovereign14 who did not grant them a consul but decreed that the officials should take action against the fraud committed.15 In Troina, the jurats were authorized at the end of the 1400s to elect the consuls of the corbiseri.16 In returning to the 1407 petitions, it should be observed that they also deal with the role of the caputmagister in the guild—a central role with full jurisdiction over the artisans: Item quod dictus caputmagister sive consul habeat super speciarios quoslibet illius civitatis terre sive loci quamlibet potestatem et iurisdicionem quam quilibet caputmagister sive consul speciariorium habere potest et debet sic hactenus solitus (et) habere in civitate terra sive loco predicto cum omnibus prerogativis et immunitatibus debitis et consuetis et omnibus hiis quo in presentibus continetur.17

R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 197r-v. Il libro, p. 81. See Chapter 3, note 92 regarding the dating of the document. For a comparison with other circumstances—Turin in the early modern period—see CERUTTI, Pratiche, pp. 99–109; the merchants chosen as consuls were chosen from a restricted group of candidates selected by the various entities; ibidem, p. 105. 12 G. G. pp. 62–63. 13 R. C. vol. 79, fol. 182r. 14 R. C. vol. 79, fol. 182r, 1444. The document does not bear the signature of the viceroy who was most probably Ximen de Urrea. Compare R. C. vol. 81, fols 485v-488v. 15 C. vol. 2850, fol. 38r, 1445. 16 SORRENTI, Le istituzioni, p. 153. 17 R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 197v. The rigid hierarchy is also confirmed in the following passage: “Item quod quilibet speciarius teneatur et debeat iurare in manibus caputmagistro quolibet anno ad requisicionem ipsius quod bene et fideliter exercebit artem suam”; R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 198v. The consuls from Noto held cognition of civil matters as a royal privilege; R. C. vol. 79, fols 82v-83v, 1443. 10 11

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The rest of the capitula naturally concerns the practice of the profession, the sale of medicines and the duties of the speciarii, however, there are elements regarding other professions: “item quod nullus speciarius vel alia quamvis persona audeat vel presumat alicui vendere vel donare venenum seu rem venenosam sive licencia medici approbata (ni) forte maniscalcis argentariis vel cirurgicis aliqua necessaria pro artibus eorum”.18 The capitula also mention members of the world of commerce: “item possent dicti speciarii et alie persone dictas res vendere ingrosso ipsum modo mercatorum”.19 The sector of the magistri, therefore, progressively increased its political influence during Martin’s reign—in Randazzo by obtaining a place in the commissions dealing with taxation and in the entire kingdom through the election of their own consul, at least for the speciarii. The 1407 reference to maniscalci, argentarii, and cirurgici (woodworkers, silversmiths and doctors) obviously did not prove that they were organized into an association with a consul, yet it testifies to a complex structuring of the environment of the artisans which in that period was already undergoing a significant amount of ferment. Further elements for the analysis of the 1407 petitions can be found in a special event providing the first public record of artisan solidarity which dates back to 1385 and the ordo cereorum for the feast of the Assumption in the universitas of Palermo. In the list of fifty-eight persons entitled to bear large candles in the procession, forty-four titles reflected artisan and professional activities.20 This evidence, given the nature of the event, does not appear to indicate an independent political function of the guilds,21 moreover, the list’s full authenticity has been questioned because the document is not the original and was published for the first time in 1616.22 While it is still difficult to shed full light on the document’s chronological credibility, evidence can be found that supports the probability of the 1385 date. The evidence is the actual existence at that time in Palermo of certain artisans listed in the ordo, although their participation in the ceremony did not mean they played an independent role in politics. In that regard, the most significant case is that of the sugar workers who were present with their own candle, but in 1399 were still awaiting the institution of the consul they had 18 R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 198r. For a comparison of the regulations providing for punishments in cases of non-fulfilment of duties which were elements of every corporation and contributed to their cohesion, see REYNOLDS, Kingdoms, pp. 67–69. 19 R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 198r. 20 FRANCESCO MAGGIORE PERNI, La popolazione di Sicilia e di Palermo dal X al XVIII secolo, Palermo, 1892, pp. 595–603; also SALVATORE LEONE, “Lineamenti di una storia delle corporazioni in Sicilia nei secoli XIV-XVII”, in Archivio Storico Siracusano, 2, 1956, pp. 82–95. The rite of the candles of 15 August had already been widely recorded in the early 1300s but there were no other records of the participation of associations similar to those of 1385. In 1329, the persons assigned the right to bear candles in the procession included the milites, iudices et licterati, notarii et scriptores curie; Acta, V, p. 128, 228. There was also a reference to a candle belonging to the milites in 1335; Acta, VI, p. 116. In contrast to the ordo cereorum, these are sources that make only indirect reference to the procession and do not contain detailed lists of the candle bearers. For the 1329 procession, in fact, “certis aliis pernis cereis [. . .] factis et assignatis predictis pretori et iudicibus” are also cited; Acta, V, p. 128. Regarding the role of the milites, see MINEO, Nobiltà, pp. 175–212. Regarding the iudices, the only officials in the 1300s who maintained their official titles after the term of office was finished as a sign of distiction, see D’ALESSANDRO, Terra, pp. 152–171, in particular p. 156. The keeping of their titles appears to reveal a uniformity of rank among the iudices; MINEO, “Città”, p. 131, p. 140 n. 100. Later, in the Alphonsian period, this uniformity was lost. For example, the town council minutes do not affirm the maintenance of the title; C. C. vol. 61–1, C. C. vol. 63–3. For a comparison with the processions in Palermo in a later period, see FRANCESCO M. EMANUELE E GAETANI, “Delle antiche processioni sacre e profane solite celebrarsi nella città di Palermo . . .”, in Nuove Effemeridi Siciliane, rd. 3 s. 3 (1876), pp. 85–96. For a comparison, instead, of the value of the title iudex in Tuscany in the Middle Ages, see ENNIO CORTESE, “Intorno agli antichi iudices toscani e ai caratteri di un ceto medievale”, in Scritti in memoria di Domenico Barillaro, Milan, 1982, pp. 5–38, according to which it indicated an ordo that saw “gradualmente esaltata la propria funzione nel prestigio che acquista la tecnica giuridica”; ibidem, p. 10. See also WICKHAM, Leggi, p. 51 n. 11, for which, at least sometimes, iudex indicates a formal title rather than a specific function in a court of law. 21 According to Epstein “esse erano probabilmente null’altro che uno strumento usato dai Chiaromonte per ostentare il consenso popolare.”; EPSTEIN, Potere, p. 356. 22 MINEO, “Città”, p. 139 n. 96.

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requested.23 Of the artisans cited in those 1407 petitions—maniscalci, argentarii, and cirurgici—the maniscalci were listed with the speciarii in 1385. The argentarii were missing24 but appear shortly afterwards in 1407, although without a representative of their own—a representative that was still missing in 1424 when the Viceroy granted the city the right to an expert (not a consul) who could regulate the alloy used in the work of the silversmiths.25 Other information that has been found for groups in Palermo concern the guilds of the corbiseri in 1414, the barbers in 1417, and lastly, the carpenters in 1451,26 but there is no evidence that they played a part in the city government. Instead, when the results of an examination of a number of other sources are compared to data already known, it is possible to re-evaluate the relative influence of the Palermitan magistri in the early 1400s. A detailed corpus of petitions concerning the officium argentarie, which was put forward by the argenteri of Palermo and approved by Alphonso V in 1447, is an especially significant document from a later period.27 The petitions reveal for the artisans a state of affairs that was already well structured. The innovations concerned a series of regulations for avoiding fraud in the work of the silversmiths and the election of the consuls. The consuls, for example, were required to guarantee a proper instruction in the profession and preside over the assemblies of the argenteri who had previously met without the participation of the consuls. The Sovereign granted that the argenteri would continue to take part in the procession for the feast of the Assumption of Maria with their own candle. Their traditional position in the procession had been between the carnificum et tabernarum (butchers and tavern owners) candles but with these petitions, they were authorized to process ahead of the cirum of the Kalsa quarter of the city. The acquisition of a more advanced position, and therefore, greater prestige than the Kalsa quarter, indicates how the role of the argenteri went beyond the territorial confines of the neighbourhood because it concerned the entire community. Even though this was an isolated case, the privilege seems to correlate with a fact verified in other localities, i.e. that the symbolism of the religious ritual reflected hierarchy and social stratification and validated the social weight of the participants on the basis of the different positions they occupied during the rite.28 23 Acta, XI, pp. 208–209. For a comparison with French universitates, with regard to the phenomenon of the different professional guilds, their institution at different times in various communities, and the artisans’ interest in their formation, see CHÉDEVILLE, ANDRÉ & LE GOFF, JACQUES & ROSSIAUD, JACQUES, La ville en France au Moyen Âge des Carolingiens à la Renaissance, Paris, 19982, pp. 273–284. 24 It was erroneously claimed (TITONE, “Il tumulto popularis”, p. 58) that the argentarii were listed in 1385. 25 A., cass. XXIX, fols 7r-8r. 26 BRESC, Un monde, I, p. 212, Table 29. 27 C. vol. 2847, fols 5r-7v. The text of their confirmation is dated 1467, but the petitions are cited by GIOACCHINO DI MARZO, I Gagini e la scultura in Sicilia nei secoli XV e XVI, 2 vols, Palermo, 1883–1884, II, pp. 317–322. 28 The ritual practice reinforced the level of identity of social groups and was a focal point in the construction of the social hierarchy; see: TORRE, Il consumo, in particular pp. 57–70 and pp. 291–312; also RONALD F. E. WEISSMAN, “From Brotherhood to Congregation: Confraternal Ritual between Renaissance and Catholic Reformation”, in Riti e rituali nelle società medievali, eds. JACQUES CHIFFOLEAU & LAURO MARTINES & AGOSTINO PARAVICINI BAGLIANI, Spoleto, 1994, pp. 77–96. Both in the cult of Corpus Cristi practiced in English cities in the Late Middle ages and in the Corpus Domini processions in rural Piedmont in the early 1700s, the participants followed a rigorous hierarchical order; MERVYN JAMES, “Ritual, Drama and Social Body in the Late Medieval English Town”, in Past and Present, 98, 1983, pp. 3–29, and TORRE, Il consumo, pp. 191–193, respectively. Likewise, for the Corpus Domini procession in Naples in the early modern period, a study of certain religious rituals over an extended period of time revealed how the successive configurations of the ritual represented differing images both of the political hierarchy and the relationships among sectors of society; MARIA A. VISCEGLIA, “Rituali religiosi e gerarchie politiche a Napoli in età moderna”, in Fra Storia e Storiografia: Scritti in onore di Pasquale Villani, eds. PAOLO Macry & ANGELO Massafra, Bologna, 1994, p. 589. For a further comparison with the city of Valencia, see RAFAEL NARBONA VIZCAÍNO, Memorias de la ciudad: Ceremonias, creencias y costumbres en la historia de Valencia, Valencia, 2003, which considers religious feasts and lay festivals to be moments of collective life through which society and the relative social prestige of each participant was represented.

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The organization of the silversmiths’ guild in Palermo during the reign of the Magnanimous was reflected in their participation in the city government along with the representatives of the other guilds. The minutes of Palermo’s town council are a useful guide for analysing the relative weight of the various groups in government politics. Minutes regarding financial manoeuvres make it possible to identify a relationship between what developed during council debates and the economic interests of the diverse factions, although a precise correlation between social groups and the parties confronting each other during council meetings cannot always be established. As previously indicated, municipal economic policy was based mainly on indirect taxation, however, particularly for unexpected circumstances (in primis famine and collette, but also public works), direct exactions were adopted when the measure was urgent and/or because it was considered more appropriate in certain instances. During council sessions, in fact, the measures adopted depended on each group’s capacity to contribute and the quotas allocated to them. It should be noted that the degree of cohesion of these groups was variable and, above all, so transitory for some of them that it is difficult to identify the distinctive features characterizing their membership. This is because it is not possible to identify any elements characteristic of a social class and in addition, “identità può però voler dire, anche, ciò che si tende a voler essere, piuttosto che ciò che si è”.29 Indeed, because the council was the forum for discussions of the city’s financial policy, it promoted the gradual recognition of the diverse interests and the distinctions among councillors with differing socio-professional roles. In fact, during the sessions dedicated to debates over direct tax measures, opposition usually emerged between those proposing an undifferentiated levy and those supporting an exaction particulariter or secundum facultatem;30 based on the status or profession of the main taxable groups (known as habili) whose members were termed “gentilomini, mercatores, borgesi, magistri”.31 It is important to keep in mind, however, that discrepancies between the categorizing references and the actual hierarchy—even considerable discrepancies—cannot be excluded.32 With reference to the artisans, the wealth of their professional associations is corroborated by a 1449 council session convened to put together funds pro supplendis. 29 PIERANGELO SCHIERA, “Dall’identità individuale all’identità collettiva: O piuttosto problemi di legittimazione”, in Identità, p. 198. For some possible analyses of identity based on philosophical-political and sociological approaches, see SIMONA CERUTTI (ed.), Identità e politica, Rome-Bari, 1996; see also notes 1 and 2 above. 30 For example: C. C. vol. 61–1: fols 57r-58v, 1449; fols 66r-68v, 1449 (compare this last instance with the session in which it was decided to sell wheat at a rather low fixed price of 13 tarí per salma, C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 65r-v, 1449); fol. 81r-v, 1449; fols 133r-136r, 1450; C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 24r-25v, 1455. This last instance, a debate over how to put together the money needed for repairs to the walls, was between those who proposed levying a tax only on the wealthy and those who preferred an indirect, and therefore undifferentiated, tax. 31 Regarding the political strategies pursued in council sessions by socio-professional groups, see TITONE, “Il tumulto popularis”, pp. 59–61. In the 1500s, “tutte le categorie cui si articolava la complessa società palermitana” also took part in the council; VALENTINA VIGIANO, L’esercizio della politica: La città di Palermo nel Cinquecento, Rome, 2004, pp. 157–168 (quote on p. 162). 32 Regarding both central and local administrators in the Duchy of Savoy, see CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali, pp. 345–349, which in examining the 1430 sumptuary laws notes an effort by legislators to distinguish broad social categories (although it must be noted that this is an instance of a merely theoretical classification decided by the apex of the duchy), together with a need to attenuate such distinctions that lead to the creation of overlapping categories. Regarding the fluctuating character of the elites (the financiers who become gentiluomini and the merchant who is also a jurist), which are tripartite in Provence (architects and artists, merchants and bankers, jurists and administrators), see GIORDANENGO, “Les élites”, pp. 181–185.

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Among the councillors, there were eleven representatives of diverse professions: “banqueri [bankers], drapperi [drapers], speciarii, argenteri, custureri [tailors], curbiseri [shoemakers], mastri axae [woodworkers], muraturi [stonemasons], barberi [barbers], spatri [sic, swordmakers], pillizeri [leather workers]”.33 The presence of the consuls of professional associations and their participation in administrative politics is also registered in 1449 in the composition of a group of cives, including “unusquisque consul in arte sua”, charged with the distribution of wheat.34 In the same period, an ars muratoria was active in Agrigento. In 1449, the jurats ordained Matteo Rappa a “prothomagister seu ut dicitur vulgarit [sic] capumastru” for life along with the magister, Novello de Anchello.35 This is an association (consolato) that must have been organized at least twenty years earlier, given that Rappa was assigned the office because it had been his father’s. In Castrogiovanni, in 1448, consuls were instituted for “pelliciaria, curbeseria et custoraria” (leatherworkers, shoemakers, and tailors).36 Randazzo had taken Catania as their model and in 1466 attained, “ad regium et viceregium beneplacitum”, the annual establishment of a consul for every guild (which were unspecified) and the artisans in Randazzo, which numbered fifteen different professions, were experiencing a particularly flourishing period in that very period.37 When the viewpoint is widened to include other socio-professional groups and areas other than the city of Palermo, the borgesi undoubtedly appear with great frequency in documentary sources. The borgesi constituted a rather broad category with a pivotal role in normal urban commerce linked to agricultural entrepreneurship, as already documented in the early 1400s. In 1401, the borgesi in Castronovo were butchers and owners of vineyards and orchards and enjoyed a privileged position in local commerce.38 In the same year in Catania, they were buyers and sellers of wine.39 During the Alphonsian period in Corleone, they were leading exponents of local

C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 73r-v. For information regarding the ‘arts’ in Palermo in the 1500s dati, see VIGIANO, L’esercizio, pp. 194–200. 34 C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 81r-82r. Concerning the role of the guilds in Sicily, see GABRIELLA LOMBARDO, “Tra politica ed economia: le corporazioni di mestiere nella Sicilia moderna”, in Le regole dei mestieri delle professioni. Secoli XV-XIX, eds. MARCO MERIGGI & ALESSANDRO PASTORE, Milan, 2000, pp. 326–345, which sustains that they were not important from a political point of view. She also holds the presence of the artisans in the city’s administration to be sporadic “dopo che in parlamento fu presentata e accettata una petizione perché non fossero più ammessi a cariche pubbliche i consoli e sindici artisani [. . .] li quali su personi idioti [ignorant]” (Ibidem, p. 334). This refers to the Alphonsian Capitulum CDXXVII in TESTA, Capitula, I, p. 367, 1451. Given that the petition only requested a negation of official positions to consuls and sindici that had been assigned to the artisans, it is worth pointing out that after royal approval, the artisans continued to play a significant role. For example, a review of the lists of elected officials in local governments reveals a significant hold of magistri on numerous administrations throughout the entire reign of Alphonso V. The royal approval sanctioning their disappearance from the scene was of a rather episodic nature, representing just one phase in the on-going conflicts between magistri and nobiles, which did not imply a lasting exclusion. Regarding the theory of the guilds’ uninfluential political role in Sicily which took hold in the mid-1900s, see FRANCESCO De Stefano, Storia della Sicilia dal XI al XIX secolo, Rome-Bari, 1948, repr. RomeBari, 1977, pp. 49–50; LEONE, “Lineamenti di una storia”, pp. 82–95. 35 An appointment confirmed by Simone Bologna, President of the Kingdom, in a mandate to the captain, baiulus, judges, jurats, and other officials; R. C. vol. 84, fol. 252r-v. 36 G. G. pp. 107–08. 37 La Mantia, Consuetudini, p. 2. VENTURA, Randazzo, p. 105–106, has found 2 carpenters, 4 tegularii (tile makers), 2 fabricatores, 2 pignatarii (terracotta pot makers), 2 calderarii (copper pot makers), 2 blacksmiths, 4 tanners, 3 cerdones (leatherworkers), 6 molendinarii (millers), 3 tailors, 6 apothecarii (shop owners), 4 fundacarii (inn owners), 2 barbers, and 4 rope makers, for which the years are not precisely stated but the period referred to is the mid-1400s. 38 Capitoli gabelle, pp. 138–154. 39 ZENO, “Un capitolo di re Martino”, pp. 291–292. 33

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commerce,40 and in Palermo they were accused of speculative activities for the purchase of enormous quantities of wheat.41 Beginning in the early 1420s, the Palermitan borgesi set the mete for meat together with the officials and macellatores (butchers).42 In Palermo in 1440, after a trade carried out by the royal secretary, Giovanni Olzina, no one could import wine into the city upon the severe penalty of having the gabella extinguished. The “officiales cum consilio civium et burgensium”, i.e. the exponents of the groups who were directly interested in the subject under discussion, assembled to circumvent the problem.43 They could evidently claim a leading role in these economic affairs since they were owners of land and animals in many communities.44 In Nicosia, the borgesi owned land and livestock and employed numerous salaried workers45 as recorded in a detailed text of petitions in 1423 concerning mainly the rights and obligations of diverse categories of agricultural labourers, including “bordonari, pasturi, mietituri, cuglituri, potaturi, zappaturi,” all employed by the borgesi.46 In the same community the professional affairs of the boni homini and the borgesi were related. The activities of the boni homini were less diversified and had more limited economic potential since it seemed that while they owned vineyards, gardens, and orchards, they did not employ workers.47 They were important members of the community: the boni homini and jurats could elect replacements for masters of the watch (magistri sciurterii) who did not fulfil their duties.48 The same designation could indicate different social groupings in different contexts and/or when it was employed by different persons. The appellative ‘boni homini’ could mean quite different things in different contexts: in Agrigento they were field

STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 209, 1447. C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 67r-69r, 1449. A., cass. XXIX, fol. 49r [1423]; the council specified the same individuals in 1436: “mete imposte et ordinate per officiales dicte urbis cum consilio multorum civium burgensium et macellatorum”, A. cass. XXXI, fol. 29r, 1436. There was no evidence of an earlier participation of the borgesi in municipal trade policy: DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 144–145, 1336; Acta, XII, p. 179 [1407]. It also happened that mete were set by the praetor and jurats alone (A. cass. XXIX, fol. 54r, 1422), although the town council usually was responsible; see note 57 below. In Polizzi in 1457, the borgesi et principali set the meta for wheat between farmers (massari) and merchants; P. R. vol. 47, fol. 362v. The massari probably produced the grain and the masseria, in fact, was pivotal for the organization of agricultural labour and the cultivation of arable land, especially the production of grain; D’ALESSANDRO, Terra, pp. 67–68. In Catania, the mete were set by the jurats and the council (GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 1, 6, p. 168, 1417–18 and PETINO, “Aspetti”, pp. 41–42) but more often they were set with the collaboration of other officials, for example, for the price of wheat: “iuratos et officiales una simul cum ceteribus nobilibus et probis viris universitate facientibus de comunicato consilio ut moris est”; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 1, 9, p. 292 [n.d.]; vol. 1, 11, p. 329, 1420 e p. 342, 1420. In Syracuse, they were set by the council and the jurats in the early modern period, (GALLO, “Le gabelle”, p. 77, p. 94, p. 98, p. 107). 43 R. C. vol. 76, fols 175v-184v. The council decreed, in accordance with the definitive proposal advanced, in fact, by the borgesi that wine could be imported for an amount of up to 8,000 florins during the third indiction, despite the earlier agreement with the Crown. 44 In Lentini, baruni (barons) and borgesi were listed among the landowners (G. G. p. 344, 1415) but only the borgesi in Sciacca (P. R. vol. 21, fol. 90r, 1420). Property ownership was considered an indication of prosperity: in Salemi in 1428, it was decreed that “omnes persone que habent possessiones” were to contribute 1 tarí anually for repairs to the town walls; R. C. vol. 59, fol. 114r. Borgesi were wine sellers in Piazza (P. R. vol. 27, fol. 59r, 1426) and in Malta, the borgesi, gintilhomini and merchinari (probably merchants) owned vineyards ( G. G. pp. 394–395, 1434). Borgesi were owners of livestock in Castrogiovanni and Randazzo; G. G. pp. 86–87, 1425, and R. C. vol. 74, fol. 391r-v, 1439, respectively. 45 BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 125–138, in particular pp. 126–127 and p. 132. 46 Ibidem, pp. 131–133. It is somewhat uncertain that the owners of the masserie coincided with the borgesi since the information in the petitions is not completely clear on the matter, but even if the two categories were distinct, it is certain that the workers were employed by both. 47 Ibidem, p. 136. 48 Ibidem, pp. 137–138 40 41 42

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workers.49 In the 1401 capitula regarding the catapan’s office in Catania, the Sovereign included the boni homini in the pre-eminent portion of the community, listing them (along with the jurists) among those with the capacity to furnish juridical opinions.50 In Piazza in 1407, Martin I cited the boni homini among those who could take part in the watch (xurta).51 Later, in 1455, the universitas of Piazza listed them among the preeminent sector of the community. In order to resolve the problem of damage caused by errant animals, it was decided that the owners of the animals would be fined and the town council was to elect several boni homini annually to administer the proceeds for repairs.52 In Troina, the term boni homini broadly indicated the status of a person who was considered qualified to compete for public office, i.e., candidates for offices and persons who had a consultative function in the government such as those in the town council who set the mete.53 Different meanings, therefore, that have one thing in common—the boni homini represented a productive segment of society. The borgesi and mercatores had many things in common, especially because both were linked to the world of agricultural entrepreneurship,54 but at the same time there was a significant difference. The extent of the economic interests of the borgesi were entirely confined to local circumstances while the affairs of the mercatores also concerned an arena outside the confines of the urban sphere. This is the reason why the councillors in Palermo asked that the mercatores be obliged to place the wheat in their possession on the urban market.55 The fact that their role was not limited to a local context is confirmed by the fair held in 1457 near Nicosia to which merchants from all over the country came and by the foreign merchants who purchased the great quantity of wine available in Patti in 1467.56 Another of the differences between the merchants and the borgesi was the former’s greater role in the wheat trade,57 because, as seen for Martin’s reign, they sold large quantities although their business was not limited exclusively to wheat.58 This does not mean that the borgesi did not deal in wheat: in defence of massari (farmers) and borgesi, the jurats protested a directive by the viceroy authorizing a sale of wheat in 1451 that did not benefit them,59 although the affairs of the borgesi were more often concerned with retail sales in a local context. With reference to the way in which their roles distinguished them from the merchants, an interesting case in point comes from Castrogiovanni’s universitas. As in omni bona chitati and for the benefit of the community, the borgesi received authorization to G. G. p. 297, 1433. ZENO, “Un capitolo di re Martino”, p. 292. Consuetudines, fols 29r-30v. Consuetudines, fols 76v-77v. SORRENTI, Le istituzioni, pp. 119–120 n. 38, which recalls the position of CAMILLO GIARDINA, “I boni homines in Italia: Contributo alla storia delle persone e della procedura civile e al problema dell’origine del consolato”, in Rivista di storia del diritto italiano, V, 1932, p. 15, according to which it was an expression denoting individuals of any social class. 54 Compare G. G. p. 261, 1421 (Agrigento). 55 C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 67r-69r, 1449. Regarding the dependence of town markets on the supplies from the merchants, see C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 164r-166r, 1450. 56 P. R. vol. 51, fols 53r-54v and SCIACCA, Patti, p. 320, respectively. 57 There are numerous cases of mete imposed by the Palermitan town council on the basis of the commercial interests of massarios et mercatores: C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 66r, 1449; C. C. vol. 63–3, fol. 33r, 1454; C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 122r-123r, 1456. In Termini, prices set by the massari and merchants were used as a standard of comparison in coping with an underpriced sale; P. R. vol. 47, fols 111v-112r, 1456. 58 “Item possent dicti speciarii et alie persone dictas res vendere ingrosso ipsum modo mercatorum”; R. C. vol. 44–45, fol. 198r, 1407. 59 PETINO, “Aspetti”, pp. 21–22. Regarding the massari, see note 42 above. 49 50 51 52 53

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butcher the meat from their own animals one day a week and on that day the merchants could not butcher the same meat. Obviously, the merchants’ prices were higher whereas the borgesi would have been able to meet the needs of the poor.60 Further analysis of the role of the large-scale merchants is possible through an examination of the ambit of the gentilomini, the socio-professional group to which they seem to belong in many localities. According to Palermitan town council minutes, the gentilomini (also called nobiles and, less often, magnifiki 61, facultosi, or richi 62 represented the municipal sector with the greatest economic potential and included the major landowners, large sugar producers, and those whose authority depended on close relations with the Crown.63 It was a composite group: in Catania it was said that “the gentilhomini were for the most part merchants and massari”.64 The economic potential of the gentilomini was considerable and an illustrative incident comes from the 1449 session of the town council in Palermo concerning the distribution of wheat and taxation necessary for its purchase. The councillor, Antonio Stariglu, in opposition to the civic nobility, proposed an exaction dividing the burden among all the groups but placing a heavier burden on owners of olive presses. Thus, the burden fell on only a part of the gentilomini. The owners of olive presses and the Jewish community would each have had to contribute the substantial sum of 100 onze.65 The suggestion probably did not cause any stir, given the obstinacy with which the nobiles defended their positions and the collective identity which was one of their distinguishing features as proven, for example, by the constant uniformity of their members’ voting. In this regard, two more G. G. pp. 91–92, 1431. For a comparison, consider the meaning of magnificho in Agrigento where it corresponded to wealthy merchants, see pagine 211 ss. 62 For a comparison of the different terms used in Flanders and Artois to designate members of the elite, see ALAIN DERVILLE, “Les élites urbaines en Fiandre et en Artois”, in Les élites urbaines, pp. 119–135 and, in particular, p. 121. 63 An example of councillors whose socio-professional status is linked to the group of the gentilomini concerns the nobilis dominus, Giovanni and the nobiles Masio and Federico, all sons of Enrico Crispo involved in the of sugar cane business who inherited the San Nicolò tuna fishery in Termini from their father in 1454; ANTONINA COSTA, “La recognitio dei feudi in Sicilia del 1453–1454”, in Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale, 83, 1987, p. 178. The nobilis, Giovanni Homodei, owned an olive press and rented several pieces of land where sugar cane was cultivated; CARMELO TRASSELLI, Storia dello zucchero siciliano, Caltanissetta-Rome, 1982, p. 134, p. 154. The nobilis, Ubertino Imperatore, a contractor who built the large aqueduct for the olive press of Ficarazzi with Pietro Speciale and Alosio di Campo; BRESC, Un monde, I, p. 235, pp. 241–242. The example of the nobilis dominus, Antonio Mastrantonio, who owned the feudal estate of Culcasa and was lord of Aci was quite significant; COSTA, “La recognitio dei feudi”, p. 178. In 1440, together with his brothers Tommaso, Bartolomeo, and Nicola, he bought the gabella on wine from the universitas for 900 onze; TRIPOLI, Amministrazione, p. 205. In 1446, he also held the ponnum gabella in Palermo, and obtained a reconfirmation in 1451; P. R. vol. 43, fols 185r-186r. Lastly, Bernardo Pinos, a Catalan jurist, received the citizenship first of Syracuse then of Palermo, was judge of the Magna Curia (the highest court of the kingdom) in 1444 (the year in which he moved from Syracuse to Palermo), and in 1450 was promotor negociorum of the affairs of the Crown; BRESC, Un monde, II, pp. 765–767, p. 771, and C. vol. 2852, fols 32r-33r. 64 PETINO, “Aspetti”, p. 54, which does not indicate the date of the document recorded in the now destroyed Liber Privilegiorum. 65 Given that there were 800 salme to be purchased, according to this motion, the olive press owners alone would have been responsible for buying 166.67 salme, thus contributing 20.75% of the purchase price, and since the Jewish community would have purchased the same amount, 468 salme would have remained, i.e. 58.5% of the total; C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 81r-v, 1449. For a comparison, the Catalan communities frequently recorded conflicts over the type of taxation to be levied: the leaders of the patriciate thought it should be indirect and undifferentiated, and the exponents of the other groups wanted it to be direct and proportional; see FLOCEL SABATÉ CURULL, “L’augment de l’exigència fiscal en els municipis catalans al segle xiv: elements de pressó i de resposta”, in Actes, pp. 423–465 and in particular pp. 448–455. For a further comparison, see PHILIPPE WOLFF, “Les luttes sociales dans les villes du Midi français XIIIe-XIVe siècles”, in Annales: Économie, Sociétés, Civilisations, 4, 1947, pp. 443–454, which, for the cities in the French Midi, linked the development of the first urban conflicts to the nature of the tax system, sometimes benefiting the maiores who favoured excise taxes rather than property taxes, other times benefiting the minores who demanded proportional property taxes. Concerning the system of taxation in French cities, see BERNARD CHEVALIER, “Fiscalité municipale et fiscalité d’État en France du XIVe a la fin du XVIe siècle: Deux systèmes liés et concurrents”, in Genèse, pp. 137–151. See also Chapter 4, note 63. 60 61

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council sessions in 1449 reveal the political strategy of the gentilomini in attempting to promote an undifferentiated exaction. In both instances, the debate concerned the purchase and distribution of wheat. During the first session, Giovanni Bologna and Giovanni Homodei opposed the idea of its importation, fearing that not everyone would pay what was owed, and while proposing a generalized allocation, they did not specify a differentiation in the quota to be paid. This intended course of action was affirmed in the second session when Ubertino Imperatore suggested an undifferentiated levy for “large and small” and received the support of Giovanni Homodei.66 Usually, when a tax was to be levied secundum facultatem, the group of facultosi was estimated by some of the councillors to number between one and two hundred individuals, thus, about 1% of the population,67 theoretically able to contribute collectively (at least one hundred of them) to a colletta of 400 onze through the sale of the impost.68 In other universitates, the wealth of the gentilomini and mercatores (in some cases the latter seem to be synonymous with the gentilomini and at other times different) was also considerable, enough so that they could provide loans to the sovereign or to the universitas itself. The nobiles in Agrigento in 1427 assured the Sovereign of a loan and, in 1431, certain gentilomini in Agrigento again loaned money the Sovereign for the conquest of Naples.69 In 1434, the facultosi of Catania advanced the amount that the community was required to contribute for the crowning of Alphonso V, the gentilomini of Patti came to the aid of the Crown with 150 onze in 1435, and Antonio Lulino, mercatoris in Trapani, loaned the Crown 70 onze in 1440.70 In 1444, in order to pay back their loan from the merchants, the universitas of Castrogiovanni demanded that those who had not yet paid do so and that all the gintilomini, officiali, and judei were to contribute.71 Catania’s universitas in 1457 presented an appeal to Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea for authorization of an early sale of 66 C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 57r-58v, 17 May 1449, and vol. 61–1, fol. 81r-v, 18 November 1449, respectively. Regarding the greater level of cohesion of the most prominent municipal socio-economic groups, compare the Catalan community of Tarragona where the mà major constituted a group closed to the members of other groups. Society in Tarragona was divided into three large groups (màs or estamets): major, which included the nobles, the high ecclesiastical offices and the urban patriciate made up of those who lived on unearned income and learned men of science; mitjana, made up of professionals, merchants, and artisans; menor, composed of salaried workers and peasants; CORTIELLA ÒDENA, Una ciutat, p. 79. An examination of those elected in 1407 (an analysis of a single instance which the author presents as representative) revealed that while all of those elected for the mà major belonged to the mà, those elected to the mitjana were four from the major and six from the mitjana, and in the case of the menor, there were seven from the metjana, nine from the menor, and one whose affiliation is unknown. It follows that the mà major were more compact, less numerous and influenced the other groups; ibidem, pp. 79–88. In general, regarding the fiscal strategies of the urban elites, see the collection of essays in JEAN-CLAUDE WAUQET & DENIS MENJOT (eds.), “Transazioni, strategie e razionalità fiscali nell’Europa medievale e moderna”, in Cherion, 24, 1996. 67 For example: C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 12r-13r, 1452; fols 24r-25v, 1454. The population in Palermo was between 3,000 and 4,000 hearths in 1439; EPSTEIN, Potere, p. 66. The estimate of BRESC, Un monde, I, pp. 73–76, of 3,000 hearths is slightly lower. GERBET, “Patriciat et noblesse”, p. 137, calculates that in Barcelona in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the social category of ciutadans honrats corresponded to a hundred or so families, about 5% of the population. For a further comparison, but with the Kingdom of Castile in Murcia at the end of the 1300s when there was a population of 12,000, there were estimated to be between 150 and 200 rich inhabitants, corresponding to 1.25% to 1.66% of the population; DENIS MENJOT, Murcie Castellane: Une ville au temps de la frontière (1243-milieu du XVe siècle), vol. 2, Madrid, 2002, I, pp. 341–345, pp. 365–366. DERVILLE, “Les élites”, in particular pp. 128–129, estimates for the city of Saint-Omer in Flanders in 1300, there were 40,000 inhabitants of which there were 300 wealthy heads of families (0.75%) who constituted a true elite and 2,500 bourgeois (0.25%) paying property taxes as house owners. In Besançon, 70% were small taxpayers and 5% were very rich; CHÉDEVILLE & LE GOFF & ROSSIAUD, La ville, p. 319. 68 C. C. vol. 63–3, fols 12r-13r, 1452. Regarding the organization of municipal finances in Palermo in the 1500s for which the system of farming the gabelle was a mainstay, see VIGIANO, L’esercizio, 81–104. 69 G. G. p. 279, and ibidem, p. 288, respectively. 70 GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 3, 5, pp. 83–84; SCIACCA, Patti; R. C. vol. 76, fols 138v-139r, respectively. 71 G. G. p. 96.

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the gabelle and new levies to pay the donativum (a tribute solicited by the sovereign in Parliament), but, if this were not sufficient, to be authorized to “force the wealthy to lend”.72 If necessary, the facultosi of Patti, in 1467, had to finance the repairs to the walls.73 The interest rate demanded by the lenders is not generally known, but it must have been high. The Parliament of the Kingdom, in 1460, obtained from King John II that, if municipal revenues were sold to finance extraordinary expenditures, they would not be required to pay interest of over 10% of the value of the ceded property.74 When documents refer to all municipal groups, the populus was always the last to be named. This is a constant that excludes any random factor and appears to affirm a precise social hierarchy. In delineating the composition of the populus, a good way to start is by noting some meanings of the term that can again be construed from the documents regarding the council in Palermo. The populus was not normally listed among the taxable groups (the habili) subject to direct imposts, or among the least affluent of the taxable groups designated as pichuli, (the small ones)75 and they neither correspond to the poviromini (the poor) nor the populares.76 Furthermore, it does not seem that there were any populares in the commissions established by the council.77 Speculative manoeuvres were never attributed to the popolo, on the contrary, they appear to have suffered from hunger more than any other group. Their hardship was taken into particular consideration during the council sessions debating ways to resolve the matter of a lack of bread for which the populus “murmured” and the populus “cried out for wheat”.78 This leads one to believe that the populus had a certain weight in the community, probably due to their numbers, and thus, were able to influence the decisions of the councillors. For other localities, a general rule for the exclusion or inclusion of the populus in government activity cannot be discerned, but the fact that they differed fromor at least did not completely correspond to, the populares or povirimoni was common to various universitates but cannot be generalized for all of them. In Agrigento in 1427, “viduis pupillis ecclesiasticis personis et miserabilus ac iudeis” would not have contributed to the payment of a transaction with the Crown.79 The presence of the Jewish community among those exempted reveals that this was a political decision resulting from contingent agreements: the status of the viduae, dei pupilli, the iudei, and the miserabiles could not possibly be equated. In Sciacca, the miserabiles had also been exempted from the municipal imposts by the Sovereign in 1434.80 In Corleone, however, in 1447, they were listed among the taxable as “lastly the popolo” and would seem to be different, therefore, from the miserabiles in

Ibidem, p. 219; see also PETINO, “Aspetti”, p. 37. SCIACCA, Patti, pp. 322–323. TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum LIII, pp. 459–460. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 81r-v, 1449. C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 57r-58v, 1449; C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 133r-136r, 1450. C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 67r-69r, 1449; fol. 82r, 1449; and for a comparison, see C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 57r-58, 1449; among the proponents of the institution of a commission of adiuncti (adjuncts), the councillor, Nardu di lu Cavare, maintained that the commission should include “gentilomini, notari, mercanti, ministrali et altra genti”. 78 C. C. vol. 61–1, fol. 63r, 1449, and C. C. vol. 61–1, fols 98r-100r, 1450, respectively. In Catania as well, in 1450; G. G. p. 201. As in Palermo and Catania, in Cremona the populus murmurat too, in 1198, and they murmured with such instance that the price of a new municipal canal was attributed entirely to the populares homines, and the canal was named mormora; MILANI, I comuni, p. 86. 79 G. G. p. 278. 80 R. C. vol. 69, fols 105v-106r. 72 73 74 75 76 77

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Agrigento and Scaccia.81 A plausible interpretation might be that the popolo was a composite grouping and, in certain communities, could also include the pauperes. In Nicosia in 1425, the jurats purchased wheat in sussidiu populi by forcing the owners of large quantities of wheat to sell it at 9 tarí a salma. The jurats would then sell it at the same price a pauperibus et egentibus.82 In Polizzi, instead, in 1449, the town council ordered whoever had wheat to bring it into town “to aid the poor and wretched people” and sell it at the agreed price.83 Both instances were emergency measures to aid the pauperes and miserabiles who would have bought the wheat, but at a fixed price to avoid speculation. The most likely interpretation applicable to many localities appears to be that the populus could include pauperes and miserabiles, designations applied to the poorest of the populares who found themselves in difficult circumstances. With this in mind, it is worth considering the emphatic nature of the connotation attributed to the poviri in the text of a 1437 petition of Malta’s universitas in which the poviri were those who were unable to contribute to the exactions but who did not correspond tout court to the populares.84 Briefly, the text of the 1437 petition is a denunciation of the repeated taxation harmful to the members of the populus which had been levied because of raids by the Ottoman Turks and, especially, following speculative manoeuvres in the sale of wheat. The popolo had participated in every payment, suffered more than any other group from the speculative measures, and were not able to tolerate any further economic burdens because, by that point, they were “incapable and almost destroyed”. The tenor of the text of the petition is, in fact, a defence of their rights not to be obliged to pay since they were no longer able to do so. Poverty was not their natural condition but a consequence of excessive contributions which was why the council met and decided that the jurats should defend those who did not want to contribute any more due to their poverty.85 The emphatic nature of the term poviri, which is missing from the designation of populares, is confirmed by the final passage which recalls how the jurats were “defenders of the poor and those who are incapable in accordance with what has been established by the council” in this grievance.86 Having explained the lack of an automatic equivalency with the poor, further information regarding the realm of the populus can be highlighted. As I have already demonstrated elsewhere, an examination of the role of the populares in the Palermitan uprising of 1450 reveals the polysemous nature of the word popolo which includes persons active in the working world, although not usually exempted from direct taxes, such as salaried workers, very small landowners, and those who worked as artisans on a level inferior to those in the

STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 211. P. R. vol. 28, fol. 65r. P. R. vol. 41, fol. 22r. G. G. pp. 400–407. In 1460 in Patti, they spoke of populani et minopopuli; SCIACCA, Patti, p. 307. For a different interpretation of the poor, due not to material privations but because they had lost a condition of privilege; see SIMONA CERUTTI, “Donne e miserabili: Le trasformazioni di un privilegio nel Piemonte dell’età moderna”, in Genesis, 1/2, 2002, p. 105. 85 G. G. p. 402. This information explains how a poviru homu (poor man), defended by the jurats, had rendered what was owned prior to his fall into disgrace; ibidem, pp. 402–403. The text of this Maltese petition establishes the possibility, even for those who were not part of the urban administration, to voice their needs through petitions. A contrasting opinion in CHARLES DALLI, “Capitoli: the Voice of an Elite”, in Proceedings of the History Week 1992 ⬍http://geocities.com/thierenswilliam/ proceedingsofhistoryweek1992⬎ [accessed 16 August 2003], pp. 1–18, retains that Maltese petitions only express the requests of the elites. 86 G. G. p. 406. In Patti in 1467, the poviri populari had to contribute their work rather than money to the repair of the walls; SCIACCA, Patti, pp. 322–323. 81 82 83 84

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guilds. The presence of small craftsmen explains the support the populares received from the magistri during the 1450 uprising.87 A connection between these two groups also emerges in Catania in 1450 where together they drew up a detailed corpus of petitions consisting mainly of complaints and requests for investigations of speculation (attributed to certain gentilomini and the jurats) in the farming of the gabelle and the sale of wheat.88 The last definition that must be examined is the designation of curialis, a term which is certainly encountered less frequently, especially in the larger cities. In this case it is definitely more complicated to delineate the socio-professional group to which it refers. The most important indications concern the universitates of Corleone and Piazza. In the first instance, an exaction decreed by the universitas in 1447 concerned “curiali, borgesi, artisti [artisans], populu”: the reference to the curiali indicates that they had a status of their own and the absence of the gentilomini leads one to suppose that they corresponded to curiales in wealth.89 In 1454, instead, in Piazza, the town council made up of “molti gentilomini curiali ministrali et populares” (the ministrali will be dealt with shortly) met in opposition to the captains who dispersed them.90 According to the composition of the council, the curiali were distinct from the gentilomini in this case. Data from other localities will make it possible to attempt to explain the meaning of this reference. The rare appearance of this appellative in the documentation may be due to the fact that, apart from the isolated instance in Corleone, curiales did not usually indicate the members of a group defined by affluence, but by professional and cultural status as legal periti, even though they were not included among professionals such as legum doctores. Indeed, the majority of the information makes it seem that it was an appellative that could be used to indicate persons who were not unfamiliar with the law (the curiales often bore the title of Notarius, as in Nicosia and Gozo),91 and also the main potential candidates for the offices of judge and captain. For example, the curiales in Randazzo in 1425 complained to the Crown that the sale of the captain’s judicature to Giovanni Russo for four years was in contradiction to the municipal petitions that provided for an annual rotation of the office.92 Polizzi’s universitas, however, asked in 1434 that only “gravosi homines ac regii servitores necnon curiales letterarum” be allowed to compete for positions in the magistracies. A general reference was made to all the offices but the position in question was the captain’s judge as revealed by the placet of Alphonso V.93 The universitas of Castrogiovanni in 1446 proposed that the office of the captain’s Regarding this aspect, see TITONE, “Il tumulto popularis”, pp. 73–86. Regarding salaried workers, for a comparison, see the considerations of FRANCO FRANCESCHI, “I salariati”, in Ceti, Pistoia 2001, pp. 175–202, according to which even those persons who did not have continuous employment (and not only those who had a recognized role in the guilds), and anyone who performed “hidden work” and for this reason was partially unaccounted for, were also considered salaried. Regarding this last topic in particular, see the monographic issue of “Médiévales”, 30, 1996. 88 G. G. pp. 200–206. The petitions were presented by the consuli et populi and in this case it is not specified that the former were the representatives of the artisans but it can be deduced both by the fact that one of the petitions concerned the participation in the council (ibidem, p. 202), a right that had been obtained by the magistri at that time, and because in other instances consuls are named only in reference to artisans; for example: ibidem, pp. 184–185, 1446; pp. 190–191, 1446; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 11, 1, p. 1, 1447; vol. 12, 2, p. 110, 1449. 89 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 211. 90 P. R. vol. 43, fols 303v-304r. For a reconstruction of the events, see the petitions drafted afterwards by the captains and jurats who opposed them; R. C. vol. 97, fols 293v-306r, 1455. 91 R. C. vol. 89, fols 235r-v, 1453, and G. G. p. 337, 1453, respectively. 92 P. R. vol. 24, fols 203r-204v, sold for 20 onze. 93 R. C. vol. 70, fol. 82r. 87

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assessor go to “curiales et persone merentes”94 but, in Castrogiovanni, the curiales were not excluded from the other magistracies.95 In Nicosia in the early 1450s, no longer denudata (deprived) of curiales as it had been in the past, but “oportune ornata et decorata”, the office of the captain’s judge was filled, beginning in April 1453, by the curiales: Guglielmo Don Guida,96 the notarius, Giovanni Lignovindi, Gabriele Salamone, Federico Lavia (La Via), Guglielmo Lombardo, the notarius, Nicola di Marlisio, the notarius, Nicola Lombardo, the notarius, Francesco Speciali, and Nicola Don Guida who had bought the office.97 A connection between the titles of curialis and notarius clearly emerges from this list of officials, therefore, curialis applied to persons who had some knowledge of the law. The universitas of Gozo, in 1453, put forward a petition to the Sovereign, which was approved, confirming the possible correspondence between curialis, the office of the captain’s judge, and the possible use of the title of notarius for the members of this group: On the island of Gozo we only have one curialis who is the notarius, Andrea di Bongeminu, a native of the island who by royal provision is Judge or Captain’s Assessor every other year, but when he does not hold the office the island suffers very much for the lack of an administrator of justice since there are no other curiali and none arrive from elsewhere [. . .] therefore it is requested that the notarius Andrea be allowed to hold the office continuously.98 The universitas of Noto complained to the Sovereign in 1452 that the captain’s judge, Ferdinando Sanpayo, was considered incompetent (idiota/ideota), and requested that he be replaced by persons curiali et idonei.99 The curiales in Noto enjoyed great prestige as borne out by a 1439 request of the universitas that they be exempted, along with the lawyers, from paying loans and collette.100 These elements explain the importance of the denunciation by Piazza’s universitas of the captains and the jurats guilty of having dispersed a council which had also included the curiales, therefore, even those who knew the law.101 Very likely, due to their guaranteed access to prestigious government positions, the curiales had great economic potential and for this reason they were listed in Corleone as the first of the taxable groups.102 5.2

Conflicts over Access to Local Government

Having examined the nature of different socio-professional groups, their influence at a government level should be considered in order to determine how power relations and coalitions interacted to control municipal offices. The requests to establish rolls listing the persons eligible for public office (mastre) have been considered evidence G. G. p. 102. Ibidem, p. 112, 1456. In the list of the elections by scrutiny for the year 1453–54, Guglielmo Don Guida, Legum Doctor, was recorded among the judges; P. R. vol. 45, fol. 80v. See also, Appendix. 97 They very likely held the office for one year each; R. C. vol. 89, fol. 235r-v. 98 G. G. p. 337. 99 C. vol. 2882, fols 109v-110r. 100 R. C. vol. 75, fol. 180r-v. 101 P. R. vol. 43, fols 303v-304r. 102 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 211. 94 95 96

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of attempts by certain groups to exclude their opponents which were presumably followed by an actual closure of the political arena.103 The first instance was recorded in 1443 in Caltagirone during the second half of Alphonso’s reign, then in Patti and Milazzo in 1444, in Agrigento in 1447, and in Catania in 1459.104 The literature to date has only assigned conflicts over access to public office to the second half of the reign of the Magnanimous and interpreted petitions regarding persons deemed eligible for election as uniform in cause and effect. I believe these conclusions should be at least partially re-evaluated. This section is divided into two parts. The first is a chronological survey examining moments of tension related to electoral competitions—moments that sometimes also led to requests for the exclusion of certain individuals or socio-professional groups. No confirmation is found of the theory sustaining a concentration of conflict beginning only at the end of the 1440s when power relations between the factions in government were fully mature and an attempt to exclude adversaries from government would therefore have been a natural consequence.105 During Martin’s reign, an initial phase in the formation of socioprofessional groups had already taken place and constituted the foundation of an evolution of later power relations marked by significant moments of friction, even during the first half of the reign of the Magnanimous. Every restrictive measure needs to be examined in order to exclude the possibility of attributing all attempts at restriction to the mastre alone. It is necessary, in fact, to evaluate all the proposals of exclusion, of both individuals and groups, both because oligarchic strategies could transpire without a formal request to institute a mastre and because the initial exclusion of a single individual could have had wider effects on the faction to which he belonged. After having clarified these points, I will move on to the heart of the argumentation, i.e. an assertion that no exclusion took place until at least the mid-1400s is unsustainable. Even where mastre were instituted, the existing power relations did not vary significantly. This is demonstrated vis-à-vis an examination of the results of the scrutinies and it is also affirmed by the fact that definitive rolls never existed. They were all transient because they were formulated annually and any individuals included or excluded were indicated in very general terms (apart from a partial exception in Agrigento in 1453).106 It is important to point out that all proposals for establishing rolls of qualified candidates for the elections cannot be evaluated in the same way because they differed depending on the magistracy to which they applied, the government body charged with drawing up the

103 The most extensive treatment of the phenomenon is by BRESC (Un monde, II, pp. 725–729, in particular

pp. 726–727) who maintains that there was a closure from the time the mastre were first instituted. His conclusions are fully supported by later studies including the research by LIGRESTI, “Patriziati”, pp. 48–57 specifically related to Catania, and by PACE, Il governo, pp. 130–133, for Caltagirone. EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 362–363 also reaches the same conclusions as Bresc. For the early modern period, analyses of the phenomenon are missing; the only studies are those by FRANCESCO SPADARO DI PASSANITELLO, Le “mastre nobili”: Ordinamenti municipali e classi sociali in Sicilia, Rome, 1938, which contains series of rosters of individuals eligible for election and GIOACCHINO GARGALLO, “Le mastre nobili siciliane”, in Archivio Storico Siciliano, III, 1974, pp. 29–67, which surveys the archival sources related to the lists for Syracuse. 104 R. C. vol. 79, fols 104v-108v (Caltagirone); R. C. vol. 81, fol. 487r (Patti); R. C. vol. 81, fols 266v-267r (Milazzo); G. G. p. 313 (Agrigento); GAUDIOSO, “Genesi e aspetti”, pp. 52–55 (Catania); LIGRESTI, “Patriziati”, pp. 48–49 (Catania). The theory of Bresc, according to which the first mastra in Catania dates to 1450, is discussed in note 213 below. 105 EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 353–365. 106 G. G. pp. 317–318.

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mastre, the solutions adopted, and the objectives pursued.107 In this regard, attention must be focused on another facet of the mastra which functioned as the normal roster where the names of candidates for office in an administrative year were noted. By widening the viewpoint to include an ample number of universitates—even those where mastre were not requested—the second part of this section presents the results of an examination of the rolls of officials elected by scrutiny from the time of Martin I to Alphonso V in order to demonstrate the continuation of a balanced electoral competition between the members of various socio-professional groups with only a few exceptions limited to short periods. The analysis of the documentation from the scrutinies consisted of a prosopographical examination of onomastic groups, that is groups of individuals who share a surname, if not necessarily a direct family connection. This made it possible to chart the frequency of occurrence and distribution of these names, the mobility of the elected officers within the various magistracies, and the presence of officials who can be assigned to certain socio-professional categories.108 The polarization

107 For a comparison, see the important work by BELENGUER CEBRIÀ, Valencia, which demonstrates that a given reform is not always attributable to a single political tactic. It recalls the theory of Vicens Vices regarding the establishment of the insaculació which must correctly be attributed to Alphonso the Magnanimous rather than Ferdinand the Catholic. The author asks why Ferdinand the Catholic, who granted the privilege to numerous communities, refused the request from Valencia in 1482. In Barcelona the municipal officials had maintained a level of autonomy and royal interventionism was somewhat strengthened by the insaculació: the cities had previously drawn up the lists themselves but afterwards the king formulated the list and, among other things, l’insaculació in Barcelona depoliticized the Consell. In Valencia instead, the election of the jurats depended entirely on the king and the privilege indicated minimal municipal autonomy. Regarding the electoral system in force in Valencia which was the result of co-optation and drawings until the close of the 1300s but, from the time of Martin of Aragon’s reign, was subject to royal control that had been absent earlier, see ERNEST BELENGUER CEBRIÀ, “Els trets institucionals”, in Història del país de Valencià, ed. ERNEST BELENGUER CEBRIÀ, 5 vols, Barcelona, 1989–1990, II, pp. 325–376, p. 355 and MUÑOZ & PINILLA, Les municipalités, pp. 3–4. Vicens Vives initially maintained that in Barcelona the insaculació had been instituted in 1498 (VICENS VIVES, Ferran, pp. 275–307) but later altered his opinion and attributed it to the reign of the Magnanimous ( JAUME VICENS VIVES, Els Trastàmares, Barcelona, 1956, pp. 37–38). 108 BRESC, Un monde, II, pp. 726–729, examined documentation from the scrutinies for the first time in an analysis concerning officials elected to certain magistracies for the first half of the 1400s in the communities in of Catania, Termini, Malta, Trapani, and Corleone (but in this last instance examining the lists from 1378). While generally sustaining that there was an establishment of aristocratic mastre for this period, he deserves credit for pointing out that it would not be possible to affirm the institution of a uniform restriction in all the universitates nor the existence of the same socioprofessional extraction for all the onomastic groups with a significant role in the government. He distinguishes between the circumstances in Catania, Malta, and Termini where a monopoly of just a few names for the positions of jurat is recorded (but for Termini’s universitas also he also examines the judicature) from the circumstances in Trapani for which he examines the judicature, iuratia, and the consuls (regarding the consuls, see note 235 below) and Corleone characterized by the presence of a larger number of elected officials and, therefore, by a more democratic government. The most debatable aspect of this interpretation is his having focused the investigation on only a few offices, mainly the jurats’ curia, without taking into account that officials could circulate among the different magistracies in different positions with different prerogatives. Other studies have analysed documentation from the scrutinies: for Catania, see LIGRESTI, “Patriziati”, pp. 17–70 (see also note 209 below) and for the universitas of Caltagirone, see PACE, Il governo, pp. 68–79, pp. 81–94, pp. 165–166, and pp. 174–183, which examines both the officials elected from the beginning of the 1300s in all the magistracies and those who held the captaincy (ibidem, pp. 79–81 and pp. 167–174). Regarding the socio-professional role of the officials, for which the constant presence of members of feudal clans (or those who were somehow tied to these clans) is highlighted but for which distinctive characteristics are not always clear, ibidem, pp. 56–68, pp. 253–280. The analysis of Pace also regards the early modern period; ibidem, pp. 95–117, pp. 136–140, pp. 198–241, pp. 280–286. For Messina, the list of the members of the curia of the stratigotus for the years 1282–1392 are included in SALVO, Una realtà, pp. 215–300, which briefly touches on both the social role of the onomastic groups, which he generically and categorically claims were exponents of the feudal class, and the number of recurrences of names for both judges and jurats; ibidem, pp. 91–94. For Palermo, a preliminary analysis of the number of recurrences and the circulation of the officials in the various offices can be found in TRIPOLI, Amministrazione, pp. 37–122, pp. 137–150, along with a transcription of the names of the officials elected in the scrutinies, with the exception of the sciurterii and the members of the captain’s curia from 1388 to 1463; ibidem, (Appendix).

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of conflicts between certain groups and the possibility of finding a connection in many instances between those groups and individuals elected in the scrutinies, as well as their re-election or departure from the political scene, allowed me to ascertain with some degree of certainty the prevalence of persons in government offices belonging to different social classes (even when the social status of the individuals elected was in many cases unknown) for the time period up to the end of Alphonso’s reign. Moreover, the systematic analysis of the names of those elected or appointed to the captaincy reveals, with few exceptions which include the Alagonas who were captains in Catania and probably the Letos elected in Calascibetta,109 an insignificant number of seigneurial exponents active in the urban arena. This fact confirms what has heretofore emerged from the unequivocal municipal policy choices to sever all its links with the domini once a city had been redeemed. The other states of the Crown of Aragon furnish a series of elements that constitute a basis of comparison for the situation in Sicily. No groups were formally excluded in Catalonia, Aragon, or Valencia until the 1440s; at the most, their participation was restricted. It is true, however, that from the end of Alphonso’s reign, with the exception of the Catalan community of Tarragona from the mid-1300s, the Valencian community of Jativa in 1427, and the Majorcan community of Menorca in 1429,110 the privilege of sac y sort (bags for the various categories of citizens from which the names of those elected were drawn), better known as insaculació, was becoming widespread. The privilege stemmed from an arbitrary royal judgement, for the most part solicited by the community, which was a means for resolving episodes of conflict over access to government office.111 The historiographical debate regarding this privilege and the questions of whether or not it was a useful device for royal intervention or initiated an oligarchic monopoly is characterized by certain common conclusions. The amount of leeway for intervention which the insaculació conferred upon the king was not significant everywhere, and although it especially favoured eminent groups for the most prestigious positions in certain localities, it by no means excluded the less powerful groups. Each community adopted the privilege in its own way, which meant that it did not have the same effect everywhere and the process of exclusion partially in effect at the time would only be fully realized in

109 See Section 4.3. The case of Leto Leto, who was elected several times as jurat in Calascibetta and on two occasions was designated as baron, must be noted as the only such situation among the 7,323 elected officials taken into consideration; see TITONE, I magistrati, pp.151–164. He was likely a member of the Leto family who held a barony in Capodarso; BRESC, Un monde, p. 911. 110 CORTIELLA ÒDENA, Una ciutat, p. 79, for Tarragona; MARTÍ SENTAÑES, Lleida, p. 38, for Jativa and Menorca. 111 Rius, Origenes, pp. 423–26 and see note 972; JOSÉ M. TORRAS RIBÉ, Els municipi catalans de l’antic règim (1453–1808), Barcelona, 1983, pp. 94–106. For an analysis of conflicts which were due to representation in the government and led to the regime of the insaculació in Aragon, see SARASA SÁNCHEZ, Sociedad, pp. 179–204. A basis for further comparison is furnished by circumstances in Apulia where, in the 1400s, the conflict between various status groups was resolved, or at least controlled, by providing for the inclusion of both the nobiles and popolari through a power-sharing arrangement in the government achieved by various means including ‘parallelism’ (the establishment of corresponding positions in the magistracies for the various social classes), alternation in the magistracies between the groups, and by not distinguishing between the members of the passive electorate; VALLONE, Feudi, pp. 16–21.

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most cases in the second half of the 1400s.112 Indeed, one of the reasons why a policy benefiting tout court aristocratic groups cannot be attributed to Alphonso V is that the events which took place in Barcelona in the 1440s when, during a period of affirmation of the insaculació, the popular party of the Busca managed to put together a balance of representation among all the factions in the government, even obtaining a role for wage-labourers.113 An analysis of electoral competition in Sicily is also closely tied to the subject of power relations between the Crown and universitates for two reasons: the existence of royal decrees regarding the eligibility of candidates for election from the reign of Frederick III up to the reign of Frederick IV and requests by the cities to preclude the Crown’s ex gratia concessions during the reign of Alphonso V.114 For a thorough analysis, the first evidence to examine is an attempt

112 Regarding the insaculació, which was established during reign of Ferdinand II, Batlle Gallart maintains that while promoting a series of reforms favouring the oligarchy, Ferdinand assured, through the concession of the insaculació, the representation of every group and avoided radical forms of oligarchic monopolization and the very struggles between factions; BATLLE GALLART, “El govern”, pp. 79–81; BATLLE GALLART, “Vida i institucion”, pp. 305–306. Until the first half of the 1400s, for the Aragonese community of Saragossa, there was a very open electoral system of which the characteristics were altered during the second half of Alphonso’s reign by a reform which restricted access to local government through the privilege of the insaculació. This reform became radicalized in favour of the oligarchy only during the reigns of John II and Ferdinand the Catholic; see FALCÓN PÉREZ, Organización, pp. 19–40 and Falcón Pérez, “Origen y desarollo”, pp. 88–89. In the Catalan località of Girona, the insaculació was established between 1440 and 1470; see GUILLERÉ, Les élites, pp. 269–285. SANZ, “The Cities in the Aragonese”, pp. 98–108, for the Aragonese cities, sees in the introduction of this system a useful device for guaranteeing an urban administration favourable to the king, thus, the support of the Cortes. In the Kingdom of Valencia, exclusion from access to local government was more widespread and normally occurred after Alphonso’s reign as part of a gradual process. For example, it began for the Valencian community of Orihuela when Queen Maria requested the procedure of the insaculació in 1445. This reform suffered a lapse in 1456 until Alphonso returned to the system of indirect co-optation. In 1459, John II issued new directives imposing the insaculació procedures and promoting a definitive stabilization which lasted for a hundred years; see GIL D. BERNABÉ, “Centralismo y autonomía municipal en Orihuela: De Fernando el Católico al viraje filippino”, in Estudis, 12, 1986, pp. 29–53, and BARRIO BARRIO, Gobierno, pp. 201–242. For measures after the reign of Alphonso V, see GIL D. BERNABÉ, Monarquía, pp. 9–38. Lastly, the case of the Valencian community of Alicante can be cited where the 1459 reform was the result of a coincidence between an increase in royal interventionism on the one hand, and an exclusion of others from the ruling oligarchy on the other, see ARMANDO ALBEROLA ROMÁ & JOSÉ HINOJOSA MONTALVO, “La instauración del sistema insaculatorio en los territorios meridionales del pais valenciano: Alicante, 1459”, in Lluís de Santàngel i el seu temps: Congrés Internacional, València, 5–8 octubre 1987, València, 1992, pp. 479–484. When the Monarch ratified the first rolls of eligible candidates for elections, he exercised more control than he had previously. The reform was borne of the need to avoid oligarchic restrictions but had the opposite effect by actually favouring oligarchic environments; ibidem, pp. 482–483. 113 It should be noted that that although all the different groups were represented in the local governments, the representation was not necessarily distributed equitably among the different estamentos, in contrast to what FONT RIUS tends to affirm for the Catalan communities in general; FONT RIUS, “Orígenes”, p. 423. In this regard, the most significant evidence of the gap between a thorough formal representation of the various social classes and the decidedly unbalanced real situation came to light in the conflict in the 1440s in Barcelona between the party of the Biga, made up of the urban aristocracy, wealthy capitalists and the most important merchants, and the popular party of the Busca made up of merchants, artisans, and wagelabourers. Once the party of the Busca managed to place the party of the Biga in a minority position in 1455, they obtained a reform so that even the humblest of the municipal sectors were represented in government and wage-labourers might be elected to the Consell de Cent. Thus, only in 1455 “se estableció una iguladad efectiva entre los estamentos y por lo tanto el equilibrio de las fuerzas sociales de la ciudad en el gobierno de la misma, como deseaban los artistas y menestrales desde hacía tantos años”; BATLLE GALLART, La crisis, I, pp. 311–321 (quote on p. 319). 114 For urban communities of the Kingdom of Castile, power relations, leeway for local autonomy, and relations with the sovereign were somewhat different than in the states of the Crown of Aragon. In Castile there was a considerable amount of royal interference and, when that was less incisive, there was a strong influence of seigneurial exponents from rural areas. The conclusions reached do not always agree regarding the time when royal power was consolidated and restricted urban autonomy: MONSALVO ANTÒN (El sistema, in particular pp. 146–154) sustains that some restriction of local freedom of action took place in the mid-fourteenth century. The measures instituted by Alphonso XI included royal representatives sent to the communities, the corregidores who were definitely symbols of strong royal control, in contrast to the regidores who made up the regimiento (restricted assembly of officials who administered the community and were usually appointed for life) because even though the regidores were selected by the Sovereign, his choice nevertheless regarded members of the local oligarchy. Regarding the consolidation of the regimiento, see CARLÉ, Del Concejo, which sees in the passage from concejos abiertos

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to gain control over candidates to government offices, namely, the famous 1296 measure by Frederick III prohibiting the barons and milites from taking part in electoral procedures115 and the latter from participating in government activities in general.116 The ban of the milites sanctioned by the rex Trinacrie found a more radical affirmation in the subsequent measures by Peter II for the city of Palermo in 1339117 and, moreover, by those of Frederick IV who, in concomitance with an enhancement of the role of seigneurial dynasties, on various occasions in the mid-1300s, reinstituted the prohibition which forbade “milites, barones, pheudatarios, familiares magnatum militum vel baronum” to compete for public office in all communities.118 It cannot be assumed that the instructions of Frederick III and Frederick IV shared a common objective. The measures of the rex Trinacrie, while anticipating the later decrees in certain ways, are much more circumscribed and appear to be the result of developments stemming from conflicting interests within municipal contexts. The proscription of twenty-six milites guilty of zizaniae et dissensions (creating conflicts) who were specifically barred from participating in government activities119 demonstrates that the strategy of Frederick III was part of an attempt to resolve conflicts between urban factions. Instead, the later mandates issued by Frederick IV during a period of grave royal weakness were part of a policy to counter the power of the magnates because the milites were emarginated as a group. Under Frederick III as well as his successors, the milites continued to wield considerable power in city governments such as Palermo where they consistently held the position of baiulus and later of praetor. This incongruence has been clearly explained: despite royal proscriptions, the presence of the milites in the post of baiulus is not a contradiction because the interdictions limited the interference of seigneurial dynasties and their supporters, while the royal dignity of the militia was not linked to any specifically identifiable social status and could be conferred on persons of different social abstractions without its bestowal giving rise to subsequent status of knighthood.120 Thus, the excluded milites to concejos cerrados a restriction of the areas open to political participation in favour of a restricted oligarchy; also CERDÁ RUIZ FUNES, Hombres, pp. 181–186. Instead, Ruíz does not believe that before the establishment of the regimiento it was possible to detect democratic aspects in urban governments; Ruíz, The trasformation, pp. 3–32, Ruíz, Crisis, pp. 180–195. According to CASADO ALONSO, “Las relaciones”, pp. 193–215, there was substantial continuity in royal policy from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. He does contend, however, that because of the establishment of the oligarchy, the communities retained some autonomy and leeway for negotiation with the sovereign in the Late Middle Ages; CASADO ALONSO, “Villes”, p. 66; of a different opinion is RAFAEL GIBERT, El concejo de Madrid, I: Su organización en los siglos XII al XV, Madrid, 1949, p. 123. Concerning representation in the government, see MARTÍNEZ MORO, “Partecipación”, I, pp. 701–716, which, regarding the appointment of the officials, alleges the presence of a majority of caballeros (who eventually correspond to the hidalgos, the lesser nobles) from the first half of the 1400s, to the detriment of the pecheros (non-privileged taxpayers; see MONSALVO ANTÒN, El sistema, pp. 241–43). Regarding the repeated oposition to seigeurial expansion by factions in urban and rural localities and the composition of these factions, see in particular, JULIO VALDEÓN BARUQUE, Los conflictos sociales en el reino de Castilla en los siglos XIV y XV, Madrid, 1975, p. 29, pp. 170–174, p. 212; VALDEÓN BARUQUE, “Conflictos sociales”, pp. 48–51. The same author (Valdeón Baruque, “Una ciudad castellana”, p. 222) argues that the destinction between the groups of hidalgos and caballeros was more nominal than socio-economic so that, beginning in the second half of the 1300s, they became equivalent. 115 “Mandamus, et volumus, quod Barones, et milites nullo modo se intromettere debeant de electione iudicum, et aliorum officialium, eligendorum per universitates terrarum, et locorum anno quolibet, nisi de hoc forte quando aliquibus specialiter nostra mandaverit celsitudo”; in TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum LVII, p. 75. On the issue, see BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, pp. XX-XXIX, CORRAO, Introduzione a Acta, V, pp. XXV-XXXV, D’ALESSANDRO, Terra, pp. 133–134; especially MINEO, “Città”, pp. 141–146; and more thoroughly, MINEO, Nobiltà, pp. 175–212. 116 DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 80–81, 1321. 117 For the officials in Palermo, Peter II decreed that “nullus vel miles vel burgensis cuiuscumque condicionis et gradus habens robbam a comitibus, militibus vel baronibus habeat aliquod officium in eadem urbe”; DE VIO, Felicis, p. 152. 118 COSENTINO, pp. 165–67, pp. 211–12, p. 227, p. 288, 1356. 119 DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 80–81, 1321. 120 MINEO, Nobiltà, pp. 175–212. On the milites, see also BAVIERA ALBANESE, “Studio introduttivo”, pp. XXI-XXIX.

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were allies of the great magnates (1377–1392). This interpretation, which takes into consideration royal tactics aimed at countering the power of the magnates, is valid if it is applied to the period following the reign of Frederick III when the Crown was undergoing a grave crisis. The situation was different, however, during the reign of the rex Trinacrie. Indeed, connections to seigneurial dynasties can be found for only three of the twenty-six milites banned from the town council.121 Given the impossibility of demonstrating a significant affiliation with the magnates for all twenty-six names in the list, it is not always plausible to identify a discrimen in the interdiction of the milites based on their relationship to the seigneurial environment because such a correlation cannot be regularly established. It is more realistic to sustain that the milites were actually the political category most easily suspected of relations with the seigneurial front, but at the same time it is also true that because of their pervasive presence, especially in the large cities, the measures regarding them might stem from conflicts within the community that were not dependent on their relationship with the grand magnates. Because of the suspension of documentation during the rule of the great magnates, the analysis must move ahead to the time of Martin I. At the end of the 1300s, the influence of the seigneurial front was considerably weakened and while attempts to exclude certain groups from government were not lacking, the leaders of the political conflicts changed. From the time of Martin’s arrival, most of the decrees were no longer directed against the grand magnates but were requests promoted by the communities or their members. The first episode, albeit generic, occurred during the reign of the Infante. The [1407] petitions of Randazzo’s universitas have already been noted. They included a request, presented to the Sovereign for authorization in order to avoid conflicts during the scrutiny, to elect eight boni homini (corresponding mainly to magistri at that time in Randazzo) who would not have been part of the government and would, in turn, have elected the fididigni (trustworthy).122 The community, moreover, denounced fraudulent outcomes that had resulted in positions being assigned to persons who had not taken part in the electoral competition.123 This last grievance in particular, dealing with events that were almost grotesque, testifies to moments of conflict converging in the scrutiny. This led the universitas to propose a solution which provided for the selection of a safeguarding electoral body charged with the selection of the individuals worthy of holding office, a selection that marginalized anyone not deemed suitable. The vague nature of the proposal—that only fididigni be elected—reveals itself to be a manifestation of distress rather than a solution to the problem while, at the same time, it furnishes early evidence of a proposal directed at the local level to gain control over who was eligible for election.

121 DE VIO, Felicis, pp. 80–81, 1321; connections with the magnates can be hypothesized for only a few of those excluded, namely, Simone de Esculo, Nicola di Pipitono, and Giovanni Calvelli. After the Vespers, Simone de Esculo was a royal financier and defended the city of Palermo against the Angevins along with Giovanni Chiaromonte in 1333; MINEO, Nobiltà, p. 110, p. 226. Nicola di Pipitono, Praetor in 1321–22, owned part of the feudal estates of Vicari and Cinisi; ibidem, pp. 148–150. Giovanni Calvelli, Praetor in 1333–34, was a member of a rich family and possessed feudal titles but no inhabited baronies; ibidem, p. 177, p. 217, and pp. 225–230. Furthermore, the incongruity of the elections of Calvelli and Pipitono as Praetor (see D’ALESSANDRO, Terra, p. 149), despite the royal decree explicitly prohibiting them from public office, emerges from this data. 122 R. C. vol. 46, fols 413v-415v. 123 R. C. vol. 46, fols 413v-415v.

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Instead, the appeal by the Nicosia’s universitas in May, 1423, was a precise tactic aimed at exclusion. It contested the notaries (notarii) who were deemed to be members of a distinct professional group and guilty of demanding excessive fees for registering wills and searching for acts and documents.124 The most significant petition proposed to ban the notaries from the iuratia—a realm which should have been reserved for the borgesi and boni homini since the notaries could already compete for six other offices. Viceroy Nicola Speciale approved the petition.125 Thus, judging from the rolls of elected officials, the request was motivated by the pervasive presence of the notaries, especially as judges and notarii actorum, especially in the civil curia although never in the iuratia during Alphonso’s reign before the time the petition was presented. They later attained positions in the iuratia in the years 1431–32, 1432–33, and 1442–43.126 A move was made to prevent them from assuming control over this magistracy which, according to the petition, should have remained under the control of the main exponents of local production and commerce—in Nicosia, the borgesi and boni homini. A few months later in July, the Viceroy returned to the subject and revoked the earlier measure precluding the notaries from the positions in the iuratia, the captain’s office, and other magistracies (but in the text of May only the iuratia was mentioned).127 He withdrew his approval with the excuse that the previous petition had been drafted without the knowledge of the notaries and any request made without the involvement of the group referred to in the petition was not acceptable.128 The situations examined are not exceptions because attempted exclusions already represented a leitmotif pervading the dynamics of urban government in the early years of Alphonso’s reign. The universitas of Salemi in 1425 precluded potential interference from the ecclesiastic community by obtaining the exclusion of clerics and deacons from government office, an exclusion that appears also to have been in force in Patti in the 1450s.129 Then, officially to resolve the problem of the excessive number of candidates at the scrutinies, in 1426, Trapani’s town council decided on a ban from government office of anyone holding a lifetime appointment, feudal lords, or beneficiaries of the Crown in general: Item quia magis congruum est quam plures ad officia universitatis concurrere quam eadem inter paucos dividi vestre donacioni eadem supplicat universitas concedere quod habentes officia regalia vel universitatis ad vitam pheudotarii ac habentes et possidentes provisiones a regia curia non possit concurrere ad officia annalia [sic] universitatis.130

The exclusion of individuals who enjoyed royal benefits and those who held lifetime appointments reveals the intention of blocking the risk of a monopoly of privileged groups, however, the simple designation of ‘feudal lords’ does not make it possible to clearly ascertain who was involved or whether this group included seigneurial exponents, BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 130–131. Ibidem, p. 136. P. R. vol. 32, fol. 22v; P. R. vol. 33, fol. 58r, and R. C. vol. 80, fol. 70r, respectively. BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 139–140. Ibidem, pp. 139–140. The Viceroy also modified the previous reduction of notarial fees for the registration of wills; ibidem, p. 140. 129 P. R. vol. 28, fol. 26r. The universitas of Patti held the privilege according to which no cleric could compete for royal offices. It is not specified whether this also applied to elective offices but it is possible because the President of the Kingdom, Antonio Russo Spatafora, revoked the ex gratia appointment to the catapan’s post on the basis of this right; P. R. vol. 47, fol. 214v, 1456. 130 P. R. vol. 27, fol. 100v. 124 125 126 127 128

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or more generally, members of a group whose interests did not coincide with those of the universitas. Once again Viceroy Nicola Speciale refused the request because it had not been presented by a full majority.131 The petition by Trapani’s council was probably motivated not only by an attempt to reduce the number of candidates in the electoral competition, but also by the fact that the categories of individuals named might have been sources of conflicts, as revealed by the subsequent decree of March, 1433 by the Presidents of the Kingdom, Pietro Felice e Adamo Asmundo in reference to Trapani.132 They intervened regarding the execution of the scrutiny (the date when it was held is not known)133 and in this instance the accusation is more explicit: they were to avoid patronage ensuing from an agreement between electors and candidates and also exclude feudal lords, knights, and wage-labourers from the competition. The obvious correlation with the 1426 requests, as well as the fact that the Presidents resolved a question regarding urban sanitation in the same decree, reveals that their action took into account local requests. Judging from the rolls of the eleventh indiction (1432–33) which probably preceded the petition, as well as the tenth,134 there emerges a substantial confirmation of the elected officials (with particular reference to the most important names that were not related to seigneurial dynasties) in the ensuing elections.135 It is likely, therefore, that the 1433 decree was a preventative measure. Moments of tension regarding access to government positions can be found in other localities although they were not motivated by the same factors. Among the ex gratia appointments, the universitas of Patti identified, in 1432, positions granted to persons who were not suitable.136 Furthermore, preiudicabili might also be selected in elections by scrutiny because even persons whose names did not appear on the slips of paper could be elected.137 While the reference to ex gratia concessions was generic, a reference to the catapan’s office is evident in the royal reply to another request: while approving the request, the sovereign reserved the right to choose a catapan and would have chosen “uno de illis non habentibus votem [sic] in scrutineo”, that is to say, someone who had run for election but had not received the necessary number of votes.138 The universitas was also referring to the baiulus as can be construed from the request that he be chosen only through an election by scrutiny.139 In this case as well, while the sovereign approved the petition, he conceded nothing by maintaining that things should be done as they had been in the past. The vagueness of the reply left the controversy unresolved. A confirmation that the posts in question were decidedly those of the catapan and the baiulus comes from a 1434 corpus of petitions which contained a denunciation of royal grants for these offices to persons who were not digni et idonei.140 The 1434 petitions are linked to a conflict between the jurats and the P. R. vol. 27, fol. 100v. P. R. vol. 33, fol. 112r. P. R. vol. 33, fol. 59v. P. R. vol. 32, f 21r, 1431–32; P. R. vol. 33, fol. 59v, 1432–33. The most important names confirmed even later on were: Vicencio, Sieri (Sigerio), Pace, Settesoldi, La Mannina, and Michilecto. The names which would not be among those most often elected had a negligible influence on the dynamics of the government: Alcamo, Bonura, Dacrulu, Lonafalta, Rubino, Sacca, and Siracusa. See the Appendix 136 P. R. vol. 33, fols 54v-55r. 137 P. R. vol. 33, fol. 55r. 138 P. R. vol. 33, fol. 55r. 139 P. R. vol. 33, fol. 55r. 140 R. C. vol. 69, fols 90v-91v. 131 132 133 134 135

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baiulus, the latter accused of a series of misdeeds and the former of a desire to re-establish their supremacy over the position of the baiulus based on an older privilege.141 With regard to the catapan’s position, one precise request to remove Motta Maczagluni is worth pointing out because, it stated, he was incompetent and of modest origins: very much a shop boy (garczuni) and “never held an office and is a barber (barbieri)”.142 The Sovereign did not remove the incumbents and did not specify any future provisions except for a reminder to the baiulus of his duties and authorizing the jurats to investigate his operations. The inconsistency has already been considered between the annotation of the phrase ex gratia in the scrutinies and the appointments made by the sovereign for the position of baiulus in Patti.143 Altogether, from the time of Martin’s reign to that of Alphonso V, ten baiuli were selected by the sovereign, to which the case of Giovanni Amato must be added who bought the post and held it for a year.144 Three of these concessions were granted after 1434. With reference to the catapan’s position, a comparison of the Crown concessions and the lists of officials elected by scrutiny reveals a full correlation due to the fact that the phrase ex gratia is always noted.145 During the reign of Alphonso V, even after the petition, one or two of the catapans were ex gratia appointments almost every year.146 In Patti, therefore, the gratiose royal appointments, especially for the catapan’s position, did not register significant variations in number or magistracy after the 1432 and 1434 corpus of petitions. Moreover, it appears that the protest against Maczagluni garczuni et barberi, besides revealing how royal concessions concerned a full cross-section of society, also demonstrates that the criticism of Crown appointments was not intended to denounce the fact that persons from other areas were imposed on the community because the royal concessions regarded local persons and, furthermore, the concessions as well as the denunciations were the result of local pressure. This is information that can be further explored by examining some petitions of 1444, again from the universitas of Patti. First, however, it will be useful to examine events in the universitas of Corleone, similar in several ways to those in Patti during the 1430s. In 1434, the community of Corleone indicated that all the traditionally elective offices should be assigned by scrutiny, with particular reference to the catapan’s position because it was proposed generically that individuals who were “persons with poor and very old possessions” could compete. The lists from the scrutinies in the years 1432–33 to 1435–36 are not extant, so it cannot be ascertained to which names reference was being made. The Sovereign approved the petitions while maintaining a certain degree of autonomy by reserving the right to make his choice from among those elected in the scrutiny.147 Both the reference to the catapan’s office

R. C. vol. 69, fol. 91r-v. R. C. vol. 69, fol. 90v. See Section 3.5. See Chapter 3, pp. 127–128. For example: Tommaso di Secardo, Catapan for the year 1425–26 (P. R. vol. 24, fol. 173r); Giuliano Santo Honofrio, Catapan for the year 1430–31 (P. R. vol. 30, fol. 157v.); Bartolomeo Migliorino, Catapan for the year 1431–32 (P. R. vol. 31, fol. 79r); Giuliano Falco, Catapan for the year 1453–54 (P. R. vol. 45, fol. 203v). The only instance of a Catapan appointed by the Crown is Manfredi Bonifacio, for the year 1456–57, but the name was not marked with the phrase ex gratia in the corresponding list; P. R. vol. 47, fol. 214v. For the corresponding lists of the officials elected by scrutiny, see: P. R. vol. 28, fol. 28v; P. R. vol. 31, fol. 43r; P. R. vol. 32, fol. 23v; P. R. vol. 45, fol. 81r; R. C. vol. 104, fol. 86r, respectively. 146 Except for the years 1437–38 (R. C. vol. 73, fol. 71v), 1438–39 (R. C. vol. 74, fol. 61r), 1447–48 (P. R. vol. 39, fol. 195v), 1450–51 (R. C. vol. 84, fol. 20r-v), 1455–56 (P. R. vol. 48, fol. 53v), 1456–57 (R. C. vol. 104, fol. 86r), and 1457–58 (P. R. vol. 51, fol. 29v). 147 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 179. 141 142 143 144 145

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and the royal reply lead to the hypothesis that the denunciation regarded the positions granted by the king which in Corleone were normally the offices of catapan and sciurterius. It must be pointed that out even after the 1434 petitions, ex gratia concessions were not discontinued.148 In the same corpus of petitions, moreover, the exclusion was proposed and approved of humble labourers (esercenti vili officii), i.e., small retail merchants, from the iuratia, judicature, and treasury. In this regard the Sovereign decreed: “placet quod tabernarii et apothecarii vendentes panem, foliam, tonicium, aut macellatores, non possint concurrere ad similia officia specificata”.149 These same individuals were also excluded from the catapan’s office, given the qualifications required of the those who held the position, and certainly from the post of notarius actorum as it necessitated a technical ability they did not possess. Thus, lesser merchants were excluded but the fact that lists are missing for the scrutinies in these years makes it impossible to check the names and confirm the application of the measure. The universitas of Patti asked for the institution of the mastra in July, 1444, through the nobiles, Francesco Santo Honofrio and Giovanni Trenta, notarius, referring, in effect, to the requests of 1432 and 1434. The decision to propose an exclusion followed concessions of the offices of the catapan and baiulus to persons considered unworthy which were based on intercessions of royal familiares et domestici: In addition, many persons in the city ask for the office of the baiulatum and the acatapanatum on the intercession of the royal familiares et domestici even though they are unworthy and incapable, and the univesitas begs that only those persons listed in a mastra drawn up by the officials and other gentihomini of the city be permitted to run for these offices and that if someone who is not listed in the mastra should be assigned as an official, his appointment be annulled and the city be allowed not to give him the office.150

In approving the petition, Viceroy Ximen de Urrea referred to the mastre in other communities: “placet eidem domini viceregi quod de cetero fiat mastra ut in aliquibus civitatibus regni fieri solet regia tamen dignitate et preheminencia semper salva”. This request, as revealed by the members of the ambassadorial delegation, was proposed by leading members of the local administration with particular reference to the Santo Honofrio onomastic group.151 In the list of the elected officials, it is not specified that the baiulus and catapans had been appointed on the intercession of familiares et domestici regis but the exclusion obviously concerned the baiulus, Giovanni di Bonifacio, and the catapan, Giovanni Migliorino, because their names are followed by the phrase ex gratia. The 148 For example, P. R. vol. 34, fol. 79v, 1437–38; R. C. vol. 75, fol. 68r, 1439–40; P. R. vol. 51, fol. 27r, 1457–58. 149 STARRABBA-TIRRITO, p. 180. 150 R. C. vol. 81, fol. 487r. In 1444, the royal familiares et domestici regis were indeed being indicted. Later, in [1463], the

universitas requested the exclusion of the familiares et domestici regis, and the cronies of the bishop of Patti from public office, even for positions filled through ex gratia appointments, motivating the petition with the fact that they were all persons from outside the local area who would have damaged the community. Viceroy Nicola Speciale, however, refused the proposal; SCIACCA, Patti, p. 309. For a comparison with another locality under the dominion of an archbishop, see the case of Tarragona in Catalonia analysed by CORTIELLA ÒDENA, Una ciutat. There was a double jurisdiction in the community set up at the end of the 1300s based on the principle that the king held the supreme power and granted privileges while the archbishop was responsible for the executive sector of government. Through the privileges obtained by making gifts of money (donativa), the community gradually gained a greater degree of freedom from the archbishop; ibidem, pp. 19–25. 151 The members of the Santo Honofrio group figured a total of 18 times in the scrutinies and Francesco Santo Honofrio was notary of the jurats in 1428–29, notary of the civil curia in 1430–31, and jurat in 1443–44; P. R. vol. 30, fol. 30v, P. R. vol. 31, fol. 43r, and R. C. vol. 81, fols 120v-121r, respectively.

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denunciation of the familiares et domestici regis connected the mastra to struggles within the community on the one hand and on the other brought about the exclusion both of onomastic groups of considerable importance152 and less influential names.153 Indeed, the information available regarding even later concessions of the magistracies in Patti granted on the intercession of royal dignitaries reveals their sponsorship of influential personages (Russo and Amato) as well as those of inferior rank including the garczuni et barberi, Motta Maczagluni, who was catapan again in 1454 thanks to the intercession of those royal dignitaries whose intervention had not ceased.154 These widely diversified concessions confirm the broad cross-section of society represented in local government which also emerges from the list of 1443–44 under discussion. It is important to note, moreover, that the relative distribution of power among those who held office did not change following the establishment of the mastra. A comparison between the names of the officials elected for the sixth and seventh indictions (the petition was presented in July of the seventh administrative year, but the scrutiny had already been held in November of that administrative year) and those in later elections reveals that the mastra was not enforced because there was a substantial reconfirmation of the earlier incumbents in later elections.155 The 1463 proposal, presented jointly by the gintilomini et popolares, that the treasurer be a “literate person” furnishes clear evidence that no actual exclusion of socio-professional groups existed in the community.156 This request had unanimous support because it was backed by different groups. The denunciation by Nicosia’s universitas of the numerous residents who had not paid their quota of the colletta in 1454 offers a comparison. Some persons had joined the Confraternity of San Giovanni

152 The Bonifacio name was among those appearing most often in the government: fifteen times in the scrutinies, five as baiuli, and seven as jurats. See the Appendix. 153 This is a reference to Catapan Giovanni Migliorino, Jurats’ Notary in 1442–3 (R. C. vol. 80, fol. 71r) and ex gratia Catapan in 1443–44 (R. C. vol. 81, fols 120v-121r). 154 Intercessions by familiares et domestici regis on behalf of persons holding public office in Patti have been found for the following individuals. In 1422, Matteo Russo of Patti became credencerius of the gabelle; C. vol. 2808, fol. 2v. Desio Amato, in 1443, was granted the right to leave his position as Notary of the Captain’s Curia to an heir, an office which he held for life beginning in 1440; C. vol. 2844, fol. 68r-v. The notarius, Antonio Ganata, was named Judge of the Captain’s Court for the year 1453–54 and again in 1456–57; R. C. vol. 89, fol. 206v and P. R. vol. 48, fol. 390v. In April, 1454, Motta Maczagluni, was appointed as catapan for the rest of the year following the dismissal of Giovanni Falco, guilty of homicide; P. R. vol. 45, fol. 203v. Giovanni Amato was Capitan for 1456–57; P. R. vol. 48, fol. 129v. Nardo Vicencio, in April, 1456, after the death of the jurat, Antonio de Domino Odone, was granted the position ex nunc in antea; P. R. vol. 48, fol. 330r. Ganata, Maczagluni, and Vicencio were names of minor influence in the government of Patti; see the Appendix. 155 Elected officials held office from 1 September to 31 August. Elections by scrutiny normally took place at the end of August or beginning of September but sometimes occurred at a later date. In the sixth indiction (R. C. vol. 80, fol. 71r), the officials elected were the baiulus, Vincenzo Biibal (the first and only time elected) and the catapan, Antonio Misser Odo, elected again as jurat in 1450–51 (R. C. vol. 84, fol. 20r-v), the catapan, Ludovico Buxu, the only one of these officials marked with the phrase ex gratia who was not elected again, contrary to other members of his onomastic group, namely, Aloisio as baiulus in 1455–56 and 1456–57 (P. R. vol. 48, fol. 53v; R. C. vol. 104, fol. 86r), Enrico as jurats’ notary in 1451–52 (P. R. vol. 44, fol. 28v), and Giovanni as catapan in 1457–58 (P. R. vol. 51, fol. 29v). In the seventh indiction (R. C. vol. 81, fols 120v-121r), those elected included the baiulus, Giovanni Bonifacio, who would be the incumbent again in 1444–45 (R. C. vol. 83, fol. 48v) and would maintain a front-line role in local government as a jurat in 1447–48 and 1455–56 (P. R. vol. 39, fol. 195v; P. R. vol. 48, fol. 53v). The catapans were Pietro Russo, who would not be elected again although other members of the Russo family—one of the most powerful groups in Patti—were represented in the administration by Federico as baiulus in 1445–46 (P. R. vol. 37, fol. 184r), and Magister Giovanni as catapan in 1455–56 (P. R. vol. 48, fol. 53v). The only name excluded from the elective offices was that of Giovanni Migliorino who was elected only twice during the reign of Alphonso: in 1442–43 as jurats’ notary and in 1443–44 as catapan (R. C. vol. 80, fol. 71r; R. C. vol. 81, fols 120v-121r). The obviously marginal role of Biibal and Migliorino in the dynamics of the government precludes the possibility that the request for the establishment of the mastra had to do with them. 156 SCIACCA, Patti, p. 299.

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to obtain an exemption and avoid paying. To show how the practice concerned the entire community, it was said that “a large part of the people, gentilomini and ministrali alike” were involved, thereby indicating the pervasiveness of the custom precisely by the fact that members of such diverse factions had joined the confraternity.157 Apart from the ones explicitly aimed at exclusion, other mastre functioned as ordinary lists of persons eligible for election to public office. In Catania in 1432, the slips of paper on which the names were written to carry out the scrutinies were known as cedulas seu magistras158 and in 1459, in reference to drawing up the lists of eligible persons for the elections in Catania, John II indicated the “listas seu mastras vulgariter loquendo”.159 Furthermore, in other communities the proposals to make a written declaration of who was eligible for election clearly reveals the effort to limit the not infrequent risks of falsification. Elections that did not respect legal norms and the election of persons who had not even taken part in the scrutiny were denounced in Randazzo, Patti, and Trapani (and in Trapani this was done by the Presidents of the Kingdom).160 The reply of Simone Bologna, President of the Kingdom, to the Nicosia officials’ denunciation of such a matter is an important document. On the basis of his stance it is possible to reconstruct the sense of the accusation, namely, the illegitimate creation of officials—an act which had evidently been lamented by certain members of the municipal government.161 Many types of electoral fraud could take place for a number of reasons but, in every instance, the electoral body needed to guarantee that the correct procedures would be followed during the election and the composition of the electoral body in turn had to be protected from illicit interference. These factors could lead one to believe that requests for a mastre might have been put forward for other reasons besides oligarchic restriction. Having made this distinction, the analysis of attempted exclusion continues with Caltagirone. In 1443, in a period of opposition between groups within the municipal oligarchy, the Landolina and Modica families, the establishment of a mastra was proposed. The Landolinas requested the drafting of a roll that would be consigned at the time of the election to those in charge.162 The selection of the names, then, fell to the town council which would have drawn up a roll of the electoral body. While the reform was formulated along oligarchic lines, Bartolomeo Landolina also proposed that the captaincy only be conferred on gentiluomini from outside the area, thus favouring his own candidacy163 and requested the institution of counsels for the artisans in the same petition in order to secure their support. The “pars nobilium et primariorum”, led by Modica, protested the measure. They asked the Sovereign to annul the petitions and ordered an investigation which was followed by a rebellion styled as “popolare” but was actually piloted by the Modicas who managed to involve members of the populus against the Landolinas.164 Alphonso V choose not to make

BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 222–223. P. R. vol. 33, fol. 29r. TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVII, p. 492. R. C. vol. 46, fols 413v-415r [1407], P. R. vol. 33, fol. 55r, 1432, and P. R. vol. 33, fol. 112r, 1433, respectively. P. R. vol. 45, fol. 96r-v, 9 October 1453. PACE, Il governo, p. 130. Ibidem, p. 132. For a reconstruction of these events, see ibidem, pp. 130–133. On the involvement of the populares by the jurat, Andolino Bonfante who was allied with the Modicas; ibidem, p. 132 n. 38. 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164

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a decision regarding the request for the annulment but to leave it to the different groups to find a solution to the conflict: “placet regie maiestati prout solitum est fieri”.165 The very characteristics of Caltagirone’s mastra reveal that the process of exclusion was still to be constructed: it was a provisional roster of the eligible to be decided annually, the composition of which would depend on power alignments within the town council (“the assembled universitas is to draw up the mastra”). This seems to be the reason behind the inclusiveness of the Landolinas’ scheme and explains why they sought the support of the magistri: because it was open to members of other socio-professional groups, this was an attempted exclusion sui generis. The failure of the 1443 request is also proven by the proposal of a new list in the mid1500s which was stable, not annual.166 The motivations were of a different sort when in 1444 Milazzo’s universitas requested that officials come from the local community while also citing a libro mastro (mastra) in Messina. In this way they opposed the increasing inclusion of citizens from Messina who were once habitatores of Milazzo, for whom exclusion from offices in the local government, including the captaincy, was requested because they were no longer interested in defending “the interests and the pre-eminence of their native city”. Viceroy Ximen de Urrea approved the petition but referred exclusively to the captaincy and did not mention the other magistracies. It must be specified that, contrary to what is generally asserted,167 the universitas did not propose the institution of a mastra.168 The peculiarity of the petition does not lie in precluding the captaincy to outsiders, which was quite normal and widespread, but in proposing to exclude them (because even though they came from Milazzo originally, they had become cives of Messina) from the other magistracies. In contrast, common practice dictated that the elective offices should be filled by members of the community. The fact that in Milazzo this did not occur is to be linked to the tight control that Messina held over this centre located in its districtus.169 An examination of the rosters of elected officials in the years preceding the request, for which the last six indictions beginning with 1438–39 have been taken into consideration, shows that six officials who were not even members of the same onomastic group were never re-elected.170 and that after the 1444 petition, six new names appeared instead.171 Governmental equilibrium shifts, albeit minor ones, are revealed but the nature of the changes require

Ibidem, p. 130. Ibidem, pp. 133–135. See BRESC, Un monde, II, pp. 726–727 and EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 362–363. Viceroy Ximen de Urrea replied: “placet magnifico domino viceregi quod dicte cives Messane ex privilegio facti nisi habitent et morentur in dicta civitate Messane pro maiori parte anni in qua habeant domicilium quod non possint concorrere ad capitaniam velut cives messanenses cum appareat hoc fieri in fraudem ut valeant ad dicta officia concorrere et per consequens veluti habitatonis [sic] Melacii possint conveniri per officiales dicte terre et straticotum in eadem et su per inadvertencia ponerentur in magistra et eligerentur et crearentur in capitaneos quod licitum sit officialibus terre predicte eos vel eum non recipere ad officia usque quo regia maiestas vel dominus vicerex qui tunc erit de eo consultatur providebit que consultacio fieri debit ad alcius infra dies XV”. R. C. vol. 81, fols 266v-267r. 169 On the boundaries of the districtus of Messina, see EPSTEIN, Potere, pp. 119–121. 170 The last year of their election is indicated: Giovanni Amato 1442–43, Thomeo Caldaruni 1441–42, Pietro Caro 1443–44, Giliberto Saciu 1443–44, Antonio Santa Maria 1442–43, and Guglocta Victu 1443–44 (R. C. vol. 77, fol. 69v, 1441–42, R. C. vol. 80, fol. 70r, 1442–43, and R. C. vol. 81, fol. 122v, 1443–44, respectively). 171 Onofrio Oliveti (but already a judge in 1443–44; R. C. vol. 81, fol. 122v), jurat in 1457–58 (P. R. vol. 51, fol. 29r) and Paolo Oliveti for the same position in 1453–54 (P. R. vol. 45, fol. 83r); Giuliano Alligruni, judge in 1453–54 (P. R. vol. 45, fol. 83r) and 1458–59 (P. R. vol. 52, fol. 45r); Giovanni Canchilleri, judge in 1451–52 and Pietro Pirrecta, judge in the same year (P. R. vol. 44, fol. 28r); Zullu Tarantello, treasurer in 1458–59 (P. R. vol. 52, fol. 45r). 165 166 167 168

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examination to ascertain whether or not they correspond to normal alternations among groups.172 In order to evaluate this issue, the consequences of the mastra proposed by Polizzi’s universitas will serve as a useful basis of comparison. Whereas Milazzo’s universitas favoured local persons in the captaincy, the community in Polizzi proposed in 1448 that it be an appanage of outsiders and, in addition, that a roster be established for the other offices, as in other communities, which would be drafted by the persons responsible for the scrutiny: Additionally, no citizen or resident or native-born person from the terra [. . .] of whatever condition or status may compete for the public offices of the terra if he has not been included in a mastra that must be drawn up by the officials and the adjuncts who are usually responsible for the cedole at the scrutinies, mastra which they will draft together as in other cities and terre. Placet magnifico domino viceregi [Lope Ximen de Urrea].173

In Polizzi, the selection of names was assigned to the electoral body for which the adiuncti were chosen by the town council as indicated previously, while in Caltagirone the town council formulated the lists of those eligible for election. In Polizzi, subsequent to the municipal petitions which did not specify the exclusion of any names or groups, four officials were not re-elected, and there were no members of the same onomastic groups (the last six indictions preceding the institution of the mastra, beginning, with 1442–43, have been taken into consideration).174 There were seven new names, the majority of which appeared sporadically.175 The most significant data appears to be the presence of newly elected officials playing marginal roles in the administration and to represent a natural turnover not dependent on the mastra. A rate of renewal such as this was completely normal as demonstrated by the fact that names disappeared from the rolls during periods unrelated to the previous dynamics leading up to the request for the establishment of the mastra.176 In addition, even after a 172 When the proposed reforms concerned the elected officials in general, such as in Milazzo, Polizzi and Agrigento, a greater number of lists were examined (before and after the proposed reforms) than when the requests dealt with only a few offices, such as in Patti. 173 P. R. vol. 39, fol. 206r. 174 The final year of office is indicated: Notarius Francesco Ianmino, judge in 1445–46 (first and only time elected, P. R. vol. 37, fol. 183r), Ribaldo Faxana, jurat in 1446–47 (P. R. vol. 38, fol. 205v), Maciotta Lu Iudici, jurat in 1447–48 (P. R. vol. 39, fol. 195v), and Antonio Paulillu, jurat in 1447–48 (P. R. vol. 39, fol. 195v). 175 Antonio Brachuliato, jurat in 1450–51 and judge in 1456–57 (R. C. vol. 84, fol. 21v; P. R. vol. 47, fol. 148r); Notarius Matteo Astasi, judge in 1457–58 (P. R. vol. 51, fol. 20v), Notarius Francesco Monte Bardalo, judge in 1450–51 (R. C. vol. 84, fol. 21v), Enrico Drepano, jurat in 1455–56 (P. R. vol. 48, fol. 53v), Filippo Odo, jurat in 1451–52 (P. R. vol. 44, fol. 25v), Magister Giacomo Pilliberiu, judge in -51 (R. C. vol. 84, fol. 21v); Raimondo Tudisco, notary of the civil curia in 1458–59 (P. R. vol. 51, fol. 20v). 176 In Milazzo, for example, an examination of election rolls up to the early 1430s, discloses seven names that no longer appear in the following years. Names which appeared only once or persons who had been elected during the reigns of Martin and Ferdinand but were not re-elected under Alphonso V were not taken into consideration. The final term of office is indicated for: Bucardo Staccaretica, judge in 1420–21 (P. R. vol. 23, fol. 29v), Antonio Perrono, jurat in 1422–23 (R. C. vol. 54, fol. 80v), Salvatore Grandia, judge in 1423–24 (P. R. vol. 26, fol. 32r), Nicola Sapuritu, jurat in 1430–31 (P. R. vol. 31, fol. 42v), Blasco Aliberto, jurat in 1431–32 (P. R. vol. 32, fol. 24r), and Antonio Avili, jurat in 1432–33 (P. R. vol. 33, fol. 57r). For Polizzi the same criteria was utilized in examining the rolls through the end of the 1430s, since the mastra was requested in 1448, and sixteen names appear most often among those elected. The final term of office is indicated for: Giovanni Guastalacqua, judge in 1419–20, Giovanni Maniscalco, judge in 1419–20, Notarius Nicola Marco, notary of the civil curia in 1419–20 (P. R. vol. 21, fol. 29v), Pietro Campisi, jurat in 1420–21 (P. R. vol. 23, fol. 29v), Antonio Cassaro, judge in 1421–22, Tommaso Renda, catapan in 1421–22 (P. R. vol. 24, fol. 33v), Giovanni Bertolo, catapan in 1425–26, Filippo Carbona, judge in 1425–26 (P. R. vol. 28, fol. 30r), Filippo Laurifithi, judge in 1426–27 (P. R. vol. 29, fol. 24r), Simone Chaulino, notary of the civil curia 1428–29 (P. R. vol. 30, fol. 29r), Simone Laxa, judge in 1430–31, Simone Milacio, judge in 1430–31 (P. R. vol. 31, fol. 41v), Giovanni Cavalieri, judge in 1436–37, Notarius Nicola Magru, judge in 1436–37, Giovanni Ventimiglia, catapan in 1436–37 (R. C. vol. 71, fol. 81v), and Chicco lu Pintu, judge in 1438–39 (R. C. vol. 74, fol. 63r).

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petition was instituted, notaries and magistri continued to be elected in the same proportion as in preceding years, and other appellatives designating persons elected in Polizzi are unknown.177 Likewise, notaries in Milazzo continued to be elected as they had been previously, in different ways for the judicature, iuratia, and treasury.178 In conclusion, the changes following the proposals for restrictive norms in Milazzo and Polizzi appear to correlate more closely to an ordinary turnover than to the formalization of an exclusion. In none of the proposals examined, moreover, was a reference made to fixed rolls which, therefore, could not have expanded. They were, instead, annual lists, thus definitively transitory, as demonstrated among other things by the fact that those responsible for their formulation could be different: the jurats and gentilomini in Patti, the council in Caltagirone, and the officials and the adiuncti in Polizzi.179 Further confirmation of these conclusions is provided by one of the most significant instances, i.e. Agrigento’s master, which was born of the strong opposition between gentilomini (or gintilomini) and the rest of the community, especially the magistri. In May, 1447, the ambassadors Filippo Leto, Antonio Aliberto, and Graziano Gini, requested and were granted the institution of a mastra, which was to have been drawn up by the officials and the adiuncti before the execution of the scrutiny, by Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea.180 This was also an instance of a temporary roll to be formulated annually. Furthermore, the terms of the request were decidedly vague and did not specify who was to be excluded from the electoral competition. For Agrigento, it is possible to affirm with certainty who was to be excluded by comparing the 1447 petition with a later one from 1453 that explicitly requested authorization to reserve certain magistracies for the gentilomini. Without a doubt, the first request was promoted by the gentilomini because Graziano Gini who had been one of the ambassadors presenting the first petition in 1447 was also among the promoters of the second mastra benefiting this group. First of all, the effects of the earlier proposal need to be determined. The fact that Antonio Aliberto and Graziano Gini were elected as jurats after the request is meaningful.181 Their election shows that their strategy was successful but it would be short-lived: neither they, nor anyone else from their onomastic group would be elected in future scrutinies. In order to ascertain if there was actually any modification in the election of officials in the years following the request, the rolls of the persons elected in the years between the two petitions (1446–47 to 1452–53) have been examined and compared to the names of the officials in the scrutinies for the six years preceding 1446–47 because they were most likely the officials that the advocates the mastra wanted to place in a minority position. While the roster for 1446–47 election is not extant, it is possible to begin with an interpretation of the 1447–48 list which at least partially reflected the intentions of those who endorsed the mastra because two of the ambassadors were elected as jurats. The comparison of the rolls of officials in the scrutinies from 1440–41 to 1445–46 and those from 1447–48 until 1452–53 has produced the following information.182 Some names no longer appeared in the scrutinies after 1445–46, but a 177 See the Appendix. 178 There are no other appellatives except for the case of Magister Antonio Opidu, judge in1404–05; R. C. vol. 42,

fol. 116r. R. C. vol. 81, fol. 487r, PACE, Il governo, p. 130, and P. R. vol. 39, fol. 206r, respectively. G. G. p. 313. P. R. vol. 39, fol. 197r, election held on 1 September 1447 for the year 1447–48. The list for 1445–46 precedes the request for the mastra, the list for 1447–48 is the first extant list for the period after the mastra had been instituted, and the list for 1452–53 precedes the second proposal for a closure. 179 180 181 182

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few distinctions must be made: for the officials whose final term in office was for 1440–41 or 1441–42, it is less likely that there existed a connection between their not being re-elected (as well as for the members of their onomastic group) and a mastra five years later.183 For subsequent years, it seems more likely that certain officials who were not re-elected, as well as other members of their same onomastic group for a total of 15 individuals, can be linked to the institution of the mastra.184 In order to establish that the groups of names no longer appearing in the scrutinies were a consequence of the exclusion elicited by the mastra, there needs to be evidence of a significant number of new officials elected. For those who had already been elected in the years preceding the mastra and were linked to its supporters, they should be evidence of their having been re-elected in numbers sufficient to maintain their solid position in the government. The analysis of the names for the years subsequent to the mastra, however, furnishes a different picture. In 1447–48 there was a group of newly-elected officials who, except for Angelo Vita (elected again in 1450–51)185 and Maciocta Vita (appearing again in the 1458–59 election),186 all concluded their careers very quickly.187 Of the officials present before the mastra was instituted, the aforementioned Antonio Aliberto and Graziano Gini, present in the government the year after the mastra was put into effect, were never re-elected. Similarly, Nardo Sicani, Catapan was not re-elected after 1447–48 either. In 1447–48, Antonio Monteleone was listed among the jurats, and because Monteleone was one of the most influential family names, his presence is significant when linked to that of Gaspare Monteleone, catapan for the year 1453–54. Just a few months earlier, however, the gentilomini had decided, together with the request for a second mastra, that the magistri et vili personi (artisans and other persons of humble origins) could not compete for the catapan’s post. The presence of the Monteleone family was an isolated incident and is not to be interpreted as the beginning of a new political direction since Gaspare Monteleone would not reappear in the catapan’s office. The relative balance of power among the various socio-political groups did not change with respect to the previous years as evidenced by the large group of names no longer appearing on the political scene which included both newly elected officials and previous incumbents as well as the persons already cited.188 183 The last election was in 1440–41 (R. C. vol. 76, fol. 70v) for Giovanni Egidi, judge, Giovanni Spataru, catapan, and Gregorio Aretlis/Areth, magister sciurterius. The last election was in 1441–42 (R. C. vol. 77, fol. 68r) for Mazullo Chilano, catapan, Chicco Polici, judge, and Nardo Cuchara, catapan. 184 1442–43 (R. C. vol. 80, fol. 68v) was the last year that Antonio lu Iacuno, judge, Manfredi Bartulino, magister Sciurterius and Manzullo Aperili, magister sciurterius, were elected. 1443–44 (R. C. vol. 81, fols 88v-89r) was the last year for Aliberto Piperno, treasurer (previously elected as treasurer in 1436–37 with the title of Magister, R. C. vol. 71, fol. 81r), Giovanni Gandolfo, catapan, and Manfredi Santo Martino, sciurterius. 1444–45 (R. C. vol. 83, fols 49v-50r) was the last year for Nardo Bayeri, judge, Nardo Sinisi (registered in the scrutinies that year as Silriri), catapan, Federico Paganello, catapan, the magister Marco Liocta, sciurterius, and Giuliano Santo Philippo, sciurterius. 1445–46 (P. R. vol. 37, fol. 178v) was the last year for Raniero Salamone, catapan, Francesco Milanasi, sciurterius, Gallo Gallo, notary of the civil curia, and Nicola Guercio, judge. 185 As jurats’ notary; R. C. vol. 84, fol. 20v. 186 As catapan; P. R. vol. 52, fol. 44r. 187 Antonio Aliberto, jurat, Nardo di Aydono, treasurer and Giovanni Naro, notary of the civil curia and Salvatore Culella, judge were elected for the first and only time in 1447–48; P. R. vol. 39, fol. 197r. 188 The following individuals concluded their careers in the local administration in 1448–49 (P. R. vol. 40, fol. 204v): Bennio Gambotta, judge, Masio Ripullinu, jurat, Salvo Manicu, catapan (the first and only time elected), Federico Salnam, judge (first and only time elected), and Guglielmo la Guardia, sciurterius (the first and only time elected), whereas Rainaldo Calafatu, sciurterius was elected that year for the first time but would reappear later in 1453–54 (P. R. vol. 45, fol. 84r) again as sciurterius. Those elected for the last time in 1450–51 (R. C. vol. 84, fol. 20v) were Matteo Monteaperto, judge, Domenico Marinello, judge (the first and only time elected), and Dactilo Maniscalco, sciurterius (the first and only time elected). The last time they held office in the local government was 1452–53 (R. C. vol. 89, fol. 21v) for Antonio Munferrara, jurat, Antonio Pancica, judge, Notarius Francesco Calandrino, judge, and Notarius Antonio Sciacca, jurats’ notary (the first and only time elected).

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The withdrawal of certain persons from the political scene and, thus, the possibility that their not being re-elected might have depended on their exclusion from the mastra, looses its political significance because the newly elected names, which might have signalled a change of direction in local politics, belonged to officials who held only marginal roles in the administration. The panorama which emerges is extremely varied. Certain onomastic groups dropped out of sight, new ones were included for a limited period, and magistri as well as gentilomini, such as members of the Monteaperto family who had monopolized control over the catapan’s office in earlier years provoking the protests of other municipal groups, disappeared from the scene. The resulting picture is one of fluidity in which, even with the constant and conspicuous presence of exponents of the civic nobility, in primis the Terrana and Lupo families, it is not possible to identify those who won or were excluded and one can only affirm that the competition was still open.189 In this regard, the most significant element testifying to the fact that the mastra was not enforced in 1447 is the request in October, 1453 for a second mastra favouring dei gentilomini for certain magistracies and the exclusion of magistri from the acatapanatum. The “nobilis et egregius vir dominus” Giovanni Lamantia and the nobilis, Graziano Gini, ambassadors, presented two petitions to the Sovereign regarding the electoral competition. The first asked that access to the catapan’s position be forbidden to ministrali and other vili persone because they were sponsored by gentilomini who considered them lackeys. The petition requested that the magistracy be reserved for “gintilomini and men of good behaviour” alone. The second request proposed that only “gintilomini et homini digni” be permitted access to the judicature, the iuratia and the office of the notarius actorum, given that the candidates needed to be included in the mastra.190 The scrutinies were held a few months later in February so the effects of the mastra can be verified vis-à-vis the names of those already elected in the second indiction. In the text of the petition it was noted that positions in the judicature, the iuratia and the office of the notarius actorum, according to municipal privileges, could not be lifetime concessions and in this case the Sovereign specified that he would not revoke concessions already granted. In effect, the royal concession of the position of notary for the civil curia to Bartolomeo Traversa for the second indiction and, then, ex gratia every other year for the rest of his life was an initial element revealing the gap between the ambassadors’ proposals and what actually ensued.191 The important role played by Traversa in the administration, mainly in the iuratia and as notary for the civil curia, not to mention the significant royal privilege that he had received, would lead one to suppose that the criticism of the concession was due to an internal conflict between the gentilomini themselves rather than the refusal to accept an individual from a different social class. 189 The type of mobility existing in Sicilian administrations, where the names normally appearing in major offices were also present in minor ones, and conversely, elected to minor offices while also present in the major ones, is not a common occurrence. It was frequent in Catalonia only as an upward movement of individuals piloted by influential names. For example, GUILLERÉ, Les élites, pp. 269–285, specifically analyses the jurats elected in the 1300s and 1400s in Girona based on distinctions between the three estaments, upper, middle, and lower, and underlines a widespread process of ‘aristocratization’ that facilitated members of the middle group’s being included among those of the major group. The members of the first estament were differentiated from the second according to wealth rather than profession and the upward movement of a political career was nevertheless piloted by members of the patriciate seeking alliances once their lineage had come to an end. 190 G. G. pp. 317–318. Previously, in May, 1443, the universitas had obtained that the jurats be authorized to judge the operations of the catapans; G. G. p. 304. 191 R. C. vol. 89, fols 240v-241v.

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In order to understand the results of this second attempted exclusion, one that was more specific than the former even though the names of the potential candidates were not yet specified, it must be noted that the magister, Giovanni Ortulena, a judge ideota (not competent or without a law degree), had been elected in 1452–53 and this probably alarmed the members of the civic nobility. The petition may have been an attempt to preserve a status quo threatened by new developments. The roster of officials elected for 1453–54192 shows that those elected for the final time were Orlando and Antonio Augeri (elected for the first time) as treasurer and judge ideota, respectively, Manfredi Adinolfu as sciurterius (elected for the first time), the notarius, Iorlando Rosa, as judge licteratus, and Rainaldo Calafatu as sciurterius (already elected to the same post in 1448–49).193 Maczullo Rappa, who had already been sciurterius in 1441–42 and 1445–46, was elected for the last time as judge ideota in 1453–54.194 These names do not appear to be connected to the civic nobility, even in light of the positions they previously held, yet, on the basis of the request for restricted access to positions in the local administration, they should have been. Even considering the results of the elections for the catapan’s office in 1453–54 still, it still cannot be maintained that there was an oligarchic restriction rather than a relative balance.195 In the following years, beginning with the fifth indiction (1455–56), judging from those elected to the catapan’s office, there is evidence of the civic nobility’s attempt to gain control signalled by the presence of the members of the Terrana and Lupo onomastic groups, important names in Agrigento’s administration due especially, if not only, to the role of the Lupos in the iuratia.196 It is undoubtedly significant that exponents of a group as influential as the Terranas were elected as catapans only following the 1453 corpus of petitions. The election of Bentio Lu Portu in 1456–57 must also be noted.197 The Lu Portu group did not fill a conspicuous number of elective positions, but for a long time controlled the secretia which administered royal income.198 Nevertheless, it cannot be affirmed that there was a complete restriction in light of the facts that among the newlyelected officials, only the members of the Lu Portu onomastic group would be re-elected,199 and one of the Chirco group, Francesco, was elected as catapan for the first time in 1455–56. The Chircos were also listed earlier in the treasury, with Giovanni appearing in 1441–42 and Manzulo in 1448–49.200 This magistracy, in contrast to the 1453 petition,

192 The scrutinies were held on 9 February 1454 (P. R. vol. 45, fol. 84r), while the mastra had been presented a few months earlier in October. 193 P. R. vol. 40, fol. 204v. 194 R. C. vol. 77, fol. 68r; P. R. vol. 37, fol. 178v. 195 Those elected included Antonio Luparellu (last election) on the intercession of familiares et domestici regis (R. C. vol. 89, fols 370v-371r) who had already been elected in 1442–43 (R. C. vol. 80, fol. 68v) as a jurat and held the title of magister. Gaspare Monteleone, a member of one of the most important names in Agrigento’s government, was also elected. The presence of the Monteleones as catapans was not a novelty as they had already been elected in 1405–06 1423–24, 1442–43, and 1450–51: R. C. vol. 43, fol. 86r, P. R. vol. 26, fol. 31v, R. C. vol. 80, fol. 68v, and R. C. vol. 84, fol. 20v, respectively. 196 The catapans who were part of the new civic nobility were Giovanni Salvatore Terrana in 1455–56, Bernardo Lupo in 1456–57, and Petrucio Terrana in 1457–58 (never before elected as catapan): P. R. vol. 48, fol. 55r, R. C. vol. 104, fol. 81v, and P. R. vol. 51, fol. 25v, respectively. 197 He lost his post for having committed murder and the position went in commenda to Giovanni di Sanchio; P. R. vol. 47, fol. 276v, 19 December 1456. 198 From the early 1430s, Matteo Lu Portu was made vicesecretus and on his death, the position passed to Garraffo Lu Portu for life beginning in 1451; P. R. vol. 32, fol. 152r-v, P. R. vol. 44, fols 101r-102v. 199 For example, in 1466–67, P. R. vol. 64, 266r and in 1475–76, P. R. vol. 76, fol. 3r. 200 R. C. vol. 77, fol. 68r, 1441–42; P. R. vol. 40, fol. 204v, 1448–49.

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did not constitute a preserve of the gentilomini but was a position to which artisans were also elected.201 In addition, there were also persons elected as catapans who do not appear to be linked to the category of the gentilomini such as Consalvo Mauro, catapan in 1458–59 and designated as magister in 1443–44. Even widening the scope of the analysis to include three more magistracies (judicature, iuratia, and the office of the notarius actorum) which were to be reserved for the gentilomini does not reveal a clear-cut exclusion of members of certain sectors, rather, there is also an inclusion of magistri 202 whose presence in the government is largely consistent with all the elections during the Alphonsian reign. Furthermore, the persons who were newly elected after the mastra was instituted do not constitute evidence of the establishment of new dynamics since their role in the government was so short-lived.203 Several years later, the composition of Agrigento’s town council which met in 1478 to debate a particularly important topic again confirmed that the exponents of the various social classes there maintained their own voice in the administration. Besides the officials, the artisans (magistri) and borgesi also took part in the council to set the amount of taxation to be levied in order to pay the royal imposts for the defence of the kingdom.204 Moreover, based especially on some of the examples examined (Nicosia, Trapani, and Caltagirone), it can be generally affirmed that the requests for mastre reveal a state of political weakness rather than the strength of those who needed to rely on a royal placet in order to carry out their strategies. On the contrary, had those requesting a mastre managed to set up a network allowing them to control municipal resources, it would have stimulated a patronage system strong enough to allow for the exclusion of any opposing faction even without requesting royal support which might not have been immediately necessary. At this point in the argumentation the viewpoint can be widened to encompass restrictive processes besides those concerning the offices filled through election by scrutiny. Circumstances in Catania constitute one of the most interesting situations and make it possible to explain how the exclusion of the artisans was not accomplished and electoral competition continued to remain open to the various socio-professional groups as well as how conflicts for access to the administration also led to attempted exclusions from the council. This could not have been otherwise because the town council selected a portion of the electoral body, not in all localities perhaps, but certainly in many. Beginning in the mid-1440s, during the course of a long and bitter conflict between gentilomini and magistri in Catania, the political survival of each group seemed to depend on reinforcing one’s own representation in the council to the detriment of the opposing 201 For example: R. C. vol. 71, fol. 81r, 1436–37; P. R. vol. 48, fol. 55r, 1455–56; P. R. vol. 51, fol. 25v, 1457–58. 202 Consalvo Mauro was a judge in 1457–58, but because he was unable to fulfil his duties, the office went to Antonio

Ortulena; P. R. vol. 51, fols 140v-141r, 22 Septembre 1457. Francesco Ortulena was a notary of the civil curia in 1457–58; P. R. vol. 51, fol. 25v. Another Ortulena, the magister, Giovanni, was a catapan in 1438–39 and judge in 1452–53; R. C. vol. 74, fol. 62v; R. C. vol. 89, fol. 21v. One of the Mauro onomastic group, Nicola, was a jurat in 1458–59; P. R. vol. 52, fol. 44r. Consalvo Mauro was again a judge in 1462–63; P. R. vol. 57, fol. 230v. Lastly, the magister. Gregorio Guaracho was a judge 1463–64; R. C. vol. 114r, fols 56v-57r and the mastru (magister), Giovanni Blasi, in 1485–86; R. C. vol. 157, fol. 20r. 203 They were Antonio Caermina, jurats’ notary in 1455–56 and Giovanni Luforti, sciurterius in 1455–56 (P. R. vol. 48, fol. 55r), and Bonario, Galvagno and the notarius, Masio, all jurats’ notaries, in 1456–57 (R. C. vol. 104, fol. 81v) and in 1475–8 (P. R. vol. 51, fol. 25v); Sanchio Biscarmu, catapan in 1457–58 (P. R. vol. 51, fol. 25v); the nobilis, Francesco Barra, judge in 1458–59; and Nicola Candillicha, treasurer in 1458–59 (P. R. vol. 52, fol. 44r). The Bonario onomastic group maintained a role, instead, even during the reign of John II: for example, Masio, jurats’ notary in 1462–63 and Galvano, notary of the civil curia in 1466–67 and 1470–71; P. R. vol. 57, fol. 230v, P. R. vol. 64, fol. 266r, and P. R. vol. 69, fol. 32r, respectively. 204 Memorie, pp. XCIX-C.

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factions. The gentilomini successfully lobbied Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea in April, 1446, to abolish the positions of the artisans’ consuls in the town council, or at least to limit their authority by allowing altogether not more than two consuls to take part.205 Another denunciation presented on 31 October accused the consuls of not respecting what had been stipulated in the petitions instituting the office of the consuls and of trying to “take over the city government”. Along with the grievance, an abolishment of the guilds was proposed but without positive results.206 There quickly ensued a strong reaction of ministrali et artisti (an appellative probably indicating a distinction within the domain of the artisans, as in Barcelona).207 On that same 31 October, the Sovereign granted them the right to return to a participation of two consuls for each guild, as had been originally provided for, rather than an overall total of only two consuls.208 The attempt to establish a restriction of access to local government undoubtedly began at that time but would not be accomplished until the end of Alphonso’s reign. The significant role played by the magistri is demonstrated by their domination of the council which they managed to attain, albeit for a limited period. It was an unexpected role through which they mainly controlled the elective offices of the sciurterii (xurterii),209 a fact which exalts the political value of every office. In Catania in 1459, John II responded to municipal requests for a guarantee of the proper execution of the electoral process and, very likely, with the scope of sanctioning closure to certain individuals. He specified the town council operations to be employed in selecting the electoral body that was to draw up the lists of eligible candidates for the elections.210 The Sovereign enacted a partial reform with the same petition by indicating who the eligible candidates were for each magistracy—a measure which modified the existing system. Although differentiated lists existed prior to that, there had been just one list for the jurats, judges ideoti, and catapans which had been split into separate lists for each office in 1459.211 It has been said that the 1459 reform “allontanò il pericolo di ulteriori contaminazioni”,212 but this was a supposed exclusion not attributable to the reign of Alphonso V as demonstrated, among other things, by the single mastra for jurats, judges ideoti, and catapans existing until 1459. Moreover, an analysis of the scrutinies based on the number of persons elected from the various socio-professional groups and their distribution in the different magistracies of elected individuals provided unequivocal evidence that Gaudioso’s reference to the mastra of the eligible candidates, for the year of the fourteenth indiction (1450–1) indicating the number of persons competing for the various offices, does not constitute an example of exclusion according to which the persons whose names were listed could compete for the given office even in later years. It was, instead, a simple

G. G. pp. 181–82. Ibidem, pp. 184–185. For Barcelona, see note 2 above. G. G., pp. 190–192. See the Appendix. The political influence guaranteed by the position of sciurterius in Catania demonstrates that it cannot be considered a marginal office in municipal government. Nevertheless, Ligresti, whose research falls within the theoretical revision concerning medieval Sicily, does not take into consideration the officials elected as notaries of the acts, catapans, sciurterii, and treasurers, thus, diminishing the importance of the role played by the magistri and exaggerating the influence of the civic nobility. See LIGRESTI, “Patriziati”, pp. 17–70. 210 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CXVII, p. 492. 211 GAUDIOSO, “Genesi e aspetti”, p. 53. 212 Ibidem, p. 53. 205 206 207 208 209

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list of the eligible individuals divided, as explained above, according to the offices for which they were competing in the current year.213 Even in the second half of the 1400s, no definitive oligarchic restriction was sanc214 tioned. For example, still with regard to the council, Catania’s universitas presented a series of petitions, in 1470, which defined the composition of the council and the electoral body: the general council would elect thirty gentilomini and thirty populares, and these sixty would elect twenty gentilomini as electors. The gradual restriction of the council commissions in favour of the civic nobility was in fact proposed, but the populari were not excluded from the selection of the commissions.215 It is likely, furthermore, that populares was a broad designation indicating all those who were not gentilomini, given that no other group is mentioned in this instance. Additionally, it was stipulated in 1459 that the office of the patricius should be an exclusive appanage of the milites,216 a measure which actually took a pre-existing condition into account.217 In actual fact, the first attempted restriction of a government office in favour of a specific socio-professional group in Catania had taken place previously. In 1444, the universitas intervened in relation to a royal concession that did not take into consideration municipal privileges regarding the position of xurterius while the community claimed “as a very old custom” a privilege authorizing only magistri to compete for the office. They obtained both the repeal of the concession and a confirmation of the privilege reserving the post of xurterius for “ministrali (magistri), head artisans of workshops in the city and not workers or other persons”.218 The magistri in 1444, and the milites in 1459, reasserted a long-standing custom and indicated, among other things, that the persons who could compete for government office were only those whose names appeared in the mastra which, in this instance as in 1426,219 appears to be the normal list of eligible individuals drawn up to carry out the scrutiny.220 Considering the differing prestige of the offices, the reciprocal control over these magistracies is evidence of a representational equilibrium.

213 GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 13, 3 (the page number is not indicated but the summarized document is inserted between pages

51 and 57); the list specified five candidates for the position of Patricius (one of the rare cases in which Gaudioso records the names of the candidates competing for the office of Patricius), four for the position of iudex iurista (judge who was a legal expert), five for the position of appellate judge, sixty-seven for positions as jurats, judges or catapans, twenty-two for positions as notarii, and eighty-four for positions as magistri excumbiarum. Bresc, who refers to a document bearing a date different from the one Gaudioso indicates but with exactly the same dates appearing in that roll, considers the list of those eligible for election in the year 1450–1 to be the first evidence of an aristocratic mastra for Sicilian universitates. The French scholar specifies that the mastre were revised every year, an affirmation which runs counter to the definitive nature attributed to the lists. However, for the case of Catania, he sustains a stable continuity for most of the names elected to the position of jurat which is evidence of the oligarchic character of the electoral competition; BRESC, Un monde, II, pp. 726–727. 214 LIGRESTI, “Patriziati”, p. 49; while sustaining the establishment of a process of restriction beginning in the 1430s, he notes that control was gained over the forces of the popolari only after numerous attempts during the course of the fourteenth century. 215 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum XCVIII, pp. 495–496. 216 Ibidem, Capitulum CXVIII, p. 492, 1459; GAUDIOSO, “Genesi e aspetti”, p. 53 n. 3. 217 See the Appendix. 218 G. G. p. 170, p. 173. 219 Catania’s 1426 corpus of petitions regarding the appointment of municipal officials contain a reference to the drafting of the mastra as a normal list of the candidates for offices in the local administration; GAUDIOSO, Atti, vol. 2, 3–4, p. 371. 220 “It is requested [. . .] on the basis of a petition granted to the city that only persons listed in a mastra for the municipal offices, i.e as judges, jurats, and catapans, be allowed to compete [for public office.] Confirmation is requested. Tenor decretacionis talis est: placet regie maiestati”; G. G. p. 174.

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At that time, the artisans in Palermo also managed not to be a excluded from government politics. From 1448 to 1450, strong opposition was recorded between the gentilomini on one hand and the magistri and populares on the other. One of the salient points of contention was the bestowal of the acatapanatum (catapan’s office). A brief account, limited to the most important events the struggle, begins in 1448 when Cristoforo de Benedictis, the lawyer of the royal fisc (advocatum fisci), put forward a corpus of petitions including a denunciation of the fact that the historic precedent of granting the acatapanatum to notabiles had been ignored when conferring the position upon homini comuni. It was also requested that the jurats be authorized both to deprive anyone of the office who had not carried out his functions properly and to bestow the office on others, thus, enacting a political strategy that could gradually have limited the access to the acatapanatum. That very restriction was called into question during the uprising of 1450, when the populares, supported by the artisans, presented Viceroy Lope Ximen de Urrea with a series of petitions indicting the privileged position of the catapans, thereby opposing what had been requested in 1448.221 Despite the harsh repression inflicted on the populus, the support provided by the magistri forced the Crown to approve some of the requests, as is also proven by the later royal concessions of the acatapanatum, all bestowed according to the indications of local personages and, the majority of which at least, did not concern gentilomini.222 The events in Palermo confirm what was observed in Catania for the xurta (office of the xurterius), i.e. the political importance of each office was such that that the nobiles also sought control of the catapanatum. As has already been clearly revealed, the different urban environments were not isolated from each other but in communication and they sometimes appeared to emulate the universitas with the most advanced institutional dimensions. Furthermore, this copycat effect which seemed to spread from one community to the others, also concerns the episodes of conflict. The Palermitan uprising ended between the months of May and August in 1450 and by June, 1451, more uprisings had already been already provoked in other localities. In this period, in the universitas of Polizzi, a bitter conflict over control of the gabelle was emergent between two sectors of the community. The Denti family, the legitimate owners of the imposts, claimed that the opposition had instigated the populus to imitate what had occurred in Palermo. He accused his opponents of having incited the populus and, in particular, of having stated that they “wanted to do the same as had been done during the uprising in Palermo”.223 The dialogical relationship among the universitates, which could take on different forms at different times and deal with vastly different matters, was possible for various reasons including, particularly during the Alphonsian

221 See TITONE, “Il tumulto popularis”, pp. 43–86, concerning these events. 222 Considering the known royal concessions, the catapans do not appear to belong to the group of the gentilomini: the sov-

ereign granted the post on the intercession of familiares et domestici regis, as always, to Narcisio Amores for the year 1451–2 and then, in the following years, beneplacito regio perdurante, to Giovanni Castronono for the year 1452–3, to Francesco Saladino for the year 1454–5, to the magister Giacomo Cultelino for the year 1456–7, and to the magister Andrea Pon for the year 1457–8; R. C. vol. 84, 315v-316v, R. C. vol. 89, fol. 90r-v, R. C. vol. 90, fol. 146r-v, and P. R. vol. 49, fol. 310v, respectively. For the year 1456–7, those elected as catapans were Pietro Amuri, Riccardo Iampixi, Andreotto Coppa, Ursu di Risu, Magister Bernardo Muleti, and Alfonso Saladino, P. R. vol. 47, fols 176v-177r. 223 R. C. vol. 84, fol. 325r-v.

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reign, on the one hand a liberalization of trade with the abolition of the dohana, and on the other, a circulation of the captains due to reiterated municipal requests to confer the captaincy on outsiders.224 The artisans’ debacle seems to have come about on 8 April, 1451 when, in Parliament, Alphonso approved the appeal for the abolition of the guilds’ consuls in all the cities and terre of the Kindgdom and also abolished the syndics of the artisans which implicitly requested their exclusion tout court from public office.225 The petition came about after a consolidation of the role played by artisans in municipal governments which was followed by lacerating conflicts (such as in Palermo). The royal placet did not alter, however, the existing configurations of power as proven by the fact that the Crown’s sanctions of certain appeals had only contingent value. Already at the end of April in 1451, in Palermo a consul for the carpenters of the Jews was instituted, while in May, two consuls for guilds in Messina were confirmed.226 In some localities, such as in Catania and Noto, a suspension was indeed achieved, but these were isolated episodes which were followed a few years later, in 1460 and 1464 respectively,227 by a reintroduction of the guilds. Numerous new guilds would be instituted beginning at the end of the 1460s.228 A generalization that the artisans were marginalized in local governments during Alphonso’s reign cannot be supported because they continued to occupy elective offices without interruption in all localities (including Catania and Noto)229 and to function in the councils (in Palermo, for example).230 On the basis of this information, it can be affirmed that the exclusions proposed from the time of the reign of Martin I through that of Alphonso V differ according to the office involved and the bodies responsible for having drafted the proposals, and in most cases, the ineligibility of individuals was indicated in a very vague way and no proposal of exclusion was actually put into force. They were all, furthermore, measures promoted by the communities. When royal concessions were the subject of indictments, the grievances protested concessions that had been piloted by municipal fronts and, even for the ex gratia concessions, the role of the Crown in the matter of eligibility appears to be marginal. Attempted exclusions are not only attributable to localities which requested mastre because such restrictive measures were also widespread in communities where no proposals were put forth to specify who could be elected. It should also be determined whether or not the municipal administrations in these centres were of an oligarchic nature. The results of the requisite prosopographic study, an examination of documentary sources from the scrutinies, are presented here and constitute an important resource for reconstructing the relative distribution of power among the onomastic groups, or persons with a common surname,

224 In Sections 2.1 and 4.3, concessions of the exemption from the dohana and appointments of captains who were not of local extraction are examined. The appointments were requested by the universitates as countermeasures against local captains following an alienation of the magistracy. 225 TESTA, Capitula, I, Capitulum CDXXVII, p. 367. 226 BRESC, Un monde, I, p. 212, Table 29. 227 EPSTEIN, Potere, p. 357 n. 188. 228 VIGIANO, L’esercizio, p. 195. 229 See the Appendix. 230 C. C. vol. 63–3.

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in the administration.231 Altogether, the study concerned 7,323 officials elected by scrutiny and roughly 358 assigned to the captaincy from the reign of Martin I to that of Alphonso V.232 The information culled from these documents form a reliable basis for the determination of the frequency with which individuals were elected to each magistracy and, sometimes, a reconstruction the socio-professional origins of a given official.233 The reconstruction is based on an assumption that officials bearing the same surname, in addition to any other documented relations of kinship, were related.234 Using this information, it was possible to ascertain the different roles of onomastic groups, the pervasive circulation of members of many onomastic groups among various magistracies, and in other cases, an almost constant correlation between onomastic groups and certain offices. An evident continuation of an open electoral competition until the end of Alphonso’s reign emerges. Even though the civic nobility had a greater influence in certain magistracies, this influence precluded neither the presence of the members of the various groups in other positions nor the movement of persons between positions of differing prestige or functions. The mobility by 231 On the relationship between biography and prosopography, see Netihard BULST, “Obget et méthode de la prosopogra-

phie”, in L’État moderne, pp. 475–476. Biography regards the individual and prosopography concerns collective aspects, with more importance attributed to one or the other aspect depending on the problem at hand. On prosopograghic methods, see the acts of the seminar La prosopografía, which include studies of urban society. In particular, see JOSÉ A. SESMA MUÑOZ & CARLOS LALIENA CORBERA & GERMÁN NAVARRO ESPINACH, “Prosopografía de las sociedades urbanas de Aragón durante los siglos XIV y XV: Un balance provisional”, in La prosopografía como método de investigación sobre la edad media, Seminario de historia medieval, Zaragoza, 2006, pp. 7–19, as an example of research on Aragonese urban society. It is the result of a group study which sometimes focused on wealth and at other times on political careers making it possible to outline “the ideal public careers”; ibidem, p. 13. On the importance of this method in studying the formation of the modern state, a method which is not limited to studies of the elites, see JEAN-PHILIPPE GENET, “Introduction” in L’État, pp. 9–16, and in particular PHILIPPE HAMON, “Le personnel financier subalterne sous François Ier: cœur ou marge de l’administration monarchique? Les apports de la prosopographie”, in L’État moderne, pp. 181–188, ARNOUD-JAN BIJSTERVELD, “L’analyse prosopographique d’un groupe professionnel ecclésiastique: Le cas des curés du Brabant du Nord (diocèse de Liège, les Pays-Bas actuels) 1400–1570”, in L’État, pp. 309–325, and CLAUDE GAUVARD, “La prosopographie des criminels en France à la fin du Moyen Age: Méthode et résultats”, in L’État, pp. 448–452. See also FRANÇOISE AUTRAND (ed.), Prosopographie et genése de l’Etat moderne: Actes de la table ronde organisée par le CNRS et l’ENS, Paris 22–23 October 1984, and above all FRANÇOISE AUTRAND, “Y-a-t-il une prosopographie de l’Etat medieval?” in dir. FRANÇOISE AUTRAND, Prosopographie et genèse, pp. 13–18. On the distinctions and complementarity between micro-history and prosopography, see CARLO GINZBURG & CARLO PONI, “La micro-histoire”, in “Le Débat”, 17 (1981), pp. 133–136; JOSEPH MORSEL, Histoire, in L’État moderne, pp. 145–148. 232 A precise indication of the number of captains cannot be provided because it is not always specified for how long persons held office when the office was sold; 358 is a conservative estimate. The lists of persons elected by scrutiny are transcribed in TITONE, I magistrati. 233 For a comparison with the early modern period, see ANTÓNIO M. HESPANHA, “Centro e periferia nas estruturas administrativas do Antigo Regime”, in Ler Historia, 8, 1986, pp. 35–60, pp. 35–60, which presents, for the first half of the 1600s in Portugal, the initial results of a study of political and administrative relations between the centre and periphery based on an analysis of the positions, the number of local and royal officials, and the distribution of magistrates in the comarcas. Hespanha maintains that the autonomy of local governments was preserved despite external requests for control. This analysis reveals how a study of local offices had to deal with distinct political-administrative domains and distinct social groups because, to paraphrase the author, only an idealistic deformation would assert that the administration could correspond to a unified coherent system when, instead, different models were established over time, each with its own way of governing; ibidem, p. 42 and p. 46. It highlights how a process of the rationalization of political administrative life resulted, although not uniformly throughout the entire country, in local professional positions assigned to notaries—evidence of a system of power in which written communication took on a central role. Finally, the existence of royal offices in local administration, corresponding to a total of 10%, contributed to the integration of the political administrative system; ibidem, p. 46, p. 55, and p. 57. The percentage of literate officials was not more than 10% in each community; ANTÓNIO M. HESPANHA, “Cities and the State in Portugal”, in Theory and Society, 18, 5, 1989, p. 717. For some data concerning the ratio of population to officials, see ibidem, pp. 710–711. 234 A reconstruction of this type is the main interpretative key and certainly a basis for analyses concerning significant recurrences or studies dealing with single localities. See CLAUDE Petillon, “Les élites politiques de Saint-Omer dans la première moitié du XVe siècle d’après l’enquête de 1446,” in Reveu du Nord, 329, 1999, in particular p. 85–92, which employed prosopographic methods to ascertain whether or not there was a renewal of the administrators in Saint-Omer, as well as researching the correlations among names to identify onomastic groupings.

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members of onomastic groups between positions and functions that were quite dissimilar in importance demonstrates that the electoral process was not closed to competition. While not characteristic of all names, these moves were often valid for a significant number of both imminent and less notable names. In addition, a pattern in the documents of the disappearance of certain names correlating with the appearance of new names indicates that individuals alternated period in office.235 This occurred in Agrigento, Castrogiovanni, Catania, Corleone, Milazzo, Nicosia, Patti, Piazza (but in Piazza a circulation between different offices for the most important names is missing), Polizzi (where intense mobility only emerges for certain names), Randazzo, Salemi, and Trapani. A less pervasive movement between offices is recorded, instead, for Calascibetta and Termini. The rates of recurrence generally reveal numerous names with a medium-high frequency of election, just as they disclose an ample group with a medium-low frequency—results which do not, in fact, provide evidence of significant differences (Agrigento, Catania, Calascibetta, Nicosia, Noto, Piazza, Polizzi, Randazzo, and Trapani). Some onomastic groups were indeed elected more consistently, but this was limited to just a few cases where the names concerned did not always appear every year and normally involved just one office, thereby making it impossible to maintain that they controlled the local administration. Captains often held elective offices (but never concurrently with the captainship), or they belonged to onomastic groups whose other members were elected mainly to the higher offices or, sometimes, to lesser positions such as notarius actorum or catapan.236

235 Movement between the magistracies is more evident for localities where there were more complex institutional

structures. For example, one of the most significant situations existed in Trapani due in part to the presence of the consulatum maris composed of three consuls and a notary, all of whom were elected; see the Appendix. This tribunal of the maritime consuls had jurisdiction over civil and criminal maritime lawsuits; see TRASSELLI, Antonio, pp. 16–17. 236 For the captains who were elected, the office or offices that were held before or after having held the captainship is indicated in parenthesis; when no other office is specified, they are captains who were nevertheless members of an onomastic group that had been elected by scrutiny to other offices. For val di Mazara, in Agrigento: Giovanni Cathati ( Jurat), Giovanni Gallo ( Jurat), Giovanni Mazara ( Jurat and Catapan), Enrico Terrana, and Nicola Terrana ( Jurat). In Corleone, there are no instances of captains or other members of their onomastic groups elected by scrutiny to other offices. In Salemi: Nicola Aropuli ( Jurat), Gilberto Avilles ( Jurat), Antonio Buchardo ( Jurats’ Notary), Matteo Cavalieri ( Judge), and Matteo Gavarrecta ( Jurat), Perruchio Chalia ( Jurats’ Notary and Jurat) and Giovanni Chalia ( Jurat), Antonio Cappasancta ( Jurat), Giovanni Cavaleri, and Pietro Graffeo, Giacomo Lancirocto ( Jurat and Jurats’ Notary), Andrea Lancirocto, Onofrio Lancirocto ( Jurat), Giacomo Pizicula and Bartolomeo Pizicula ( Jurat), Antonio Manueli ( Jurat), Giovanni Oria ( Jurat), Firuchio Palmerio ( Jurat), and Antonio Lupresti ( Jurat and Notary of the Civil Curia). In Sciacca: Orlando Amato, Giuseppe Amato, Manente Buondelmonte, Bondelmunti Buondelmonte, Federico Buondelmonte ( Jurat), Pietro Calandrino, Antonio Calandrino, Ferdinando Luchisio ( Jurat), Nicola Firraru, Giovanni Marino, Iannocco Marino ( Jurat), Domenico Perollo ( Jurat), and Pietro Zaffuti ( Jurat). In Termini: Nardo Cuctunaru ( Jurat), Arnaldo/Arnao Sanczo, and Arnaldo Salamone. In Trapani: Goctofrido Abrignano, Francesco Abrignano ( Jurat and Consul), Melchioni Carissima, Antonio Caro (Baiulus and Jurat), Giovanni Crapanzano ( Jurat), Guglielmo Crapanzano ( Jurat), Antonio Fardella (Treasurer, but listed in the scrutinies as Lantonio), Lanzonu Fardella ( Jurat), Giovanni Ferro (Baiulus and Jurat), Francesco Morano, Giorgio Santo Stefano ( Jurat), Francesco Sieri and Riccardo Sieri (both listed in concessions of the captaincy as Sigerio), and Tommaso/Thomeu Ventu ( Jurat). For val di Noto, in Catania: Blasco Alagona, Maciocta Alagona, Federico Bonifacio, Antonio Castello (Catapan and Jurat) Corrado Castello (Patricius), Vinchiguerra Paternò-Patrimone ( Jurat), Manfredi Pitrusu ( Jurat), Antonio Richuli ( Jurat, Judge, and Appellate Judge), Pietro Rizzari ( Jurat), Enrico Tudisco ( Jurat), and Francesco Ventimiglia ( Jurat). In Noto, the Landolinas held all the elective offices and the captainship with the Captains, Giovanni Landolina (Patricius), and Vassallo Landolina. In Piazza: Antonio Amoro ( Judge and Jurat), Bartolomeo Amoro, Ruggero Crapanzano (Catapan and Jurat), Arnaldo Fontana (but listed as Funtanals in the concession of the captaincy), Manfredi Modica, and Antonio Naso ( Judge). For val Demone, in Nicosia: Antonio Chiramidali (Capitain and Jurat, but listed in the concession of the captaincy as Charamidaro), Giacomo Don Guida, Nicola Sabia (Catapan), and Giacomo Xaxa ( Judge, Jurat and Catapan). In Patti: Giovanni Amato ( Jurat and listed as Amari in the concession of the captaincy), Manuele Guxeres ( Jurat), Francesco Santo Honofrio (Notarius Actorum for the two curiae and Jurat), and Andrea Russo ( Jurat). In Polizzi: Giovanni La Matina and Ruggero Salamone. In Randazzo: Giovanni Basilico ( Judge and Catapan), Blasco Lanza, Giorgio Lombardo, Antonio Spatafora, Guglielmo Spatafora, Giacomo Villanova, and Villanova Villanova. See the Appendix and Section 4.3.

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Furthermore, an examination of the names of individuals elected in the scrutinies and those appointed to the captaincy reveals the absence of seigneurial exponents in municipal administrations with only a few sporadic exceptions that do not alter the general picture. An additional confirmation of the continuation of an electoral competition open to the members of all sectors comes from Castrogiovanni where such conditions were safeguarded, even in extraordinary circumstances. When confronted with serious economic conditions in 1456, the universitas decided to offer the elective offices to persons who would provide a loan. As in a true election, names would be drawn from among the those willing to make the loan. It was specified that in order to avoid scandals, thus, in keeping with common practice, that citizens from the various socio-professional groups (gentilomini, curiali, ministrali, and borgesi) could have offered economic aid and competed for the positions in the magistracies.237 The populus was the only group not mentioned. The petition reflects the normal procedure in which all sectors of the community, with the exception of the populares, played a role in the administration. An analysis of the professional titles sometimes used to designate the elected officials provides a basis for further analysis. This facet of the research concerned those who took part in the government not less than three times and were designated with a title and/or appellation during at least one indiction. Titles and/or appellations were used to designate 12% of the municipal officials. It must be noted that officials marked with a given designation were sometimes elected repeatedly (Giovanni Pace, for example, was elected ten times as legum doctor in Trapani), and when taking into consideration the total number of elections in which these officials are indicated with a title, the percentage increases to 18.3% (although individuals who appear only once or twice are not marked in the Appendix). An examination of the rate of occurrences of officials bearing titles made it possible to ascertain if a correlation can be claimed between a given appellation and the position occupied and allowed for a comparison of the incidence of various professional roles within the government. A comparison of the same titles in different municipal contexts made it possible to establish a correlation with domains to which they belonged. It cannot always be presumed that a subject identified by a particular professional title actually exercised that profession. It can sometimes be verified, however, that a given title was attributed to someone who probably did practice the profession. This is particularly true for the legum doctores who bore the title because they had studied law.238 In communities where legum doctores (less often called decretorum doctores or doctores) practiced, with very few exceptions they were elected by scrutiny to positions in the judicature or appellate court (Agrigento, Catania, Sciacca, and Trapani).239 Such positions in the government attest to their roles at the highest levels of urban administration.240 The other professional designations and honorary titles are those of miles, notarius, iudex, magister, arcium et medicine doctor, licteratus, nobilis, and dominus. The role of the

237 G. G. p. 112. 238 See Chapter 3, note 121. 239 This contrasts with the situation in the Duchy of Savoy where “il continuo passaggio degli ufficiali da un incarico

all’altro fa pensare che a quest’embrionale specializzazione delle funzioni non si affiancasse un’analoga specializzazione dei funzionari”; CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali, pp. 125–126 as well as BARBERO & CASTELNUOVO, “Governare un ducato”, pp. 465–511. 240 For a comparison, see BARBERO, Un oligarchia, p. 171.

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milites and the social prestige which characterized them has already been explored. The situation in Catania has already been examined and a few milites were also present in Castrogiovanni (more than in any other locality except Catania),241 Noto, Salemi, and Piazza. Milites were elected in scrutinies as jurats, judges or patricii. An examination of the lists from the scrutinies reveals a constant element in the various universitates, namely, the prevalence of notarii and magistri, with the former more numerous. Out of moments of friction, which in some localities gave way to open political conflict, there emerges a group identity for the artisans characterized by shared socio-professional and, thus, economic characteristics which are factors corroborating the hypothesis of a correlation between the title magister and the practice of the profession. The magistri were most often elected to the Acatapanatum, xurta, and treasury almost everywhere and in some communities (Corleone, Nicosia, Noto, and Piazza) they were also present in the judicature and the iuratia. For the title of notarius, a study regarding Palermo from the years 1300 to 1377 shows that the actual practice of the titled profession could only be proven for less than one fifth of all the notarii included in the survey.242 This research also took into consideration individuals who were only registrars or witnesses for other registrations and therefore persons who held such marginal positions that they would not have produced any written documentation of their activity even though they practised their profession. Nevertheless, there is still a substantial difference between the total of 506 subjects identified as notarii and the 86 who practised their profession. These figures show that caution must be used in inferring a correlation between the title and the professional activity to which it referred. The source I employed cannot completely eliminate all margins of uncertainty but it nevertheless furnishes clarifications such as the following: while it cannot be sustained that the election of notarii to certain positions was uniform and invariable in all localities, the notarii who were definitely the most represented in the elections held offices for which technical competency was necessary, especially in the judicature wherever legum doctores were missing.243 Furthermore, a possible connection between an individual identified as a notarius and his concurrent or previous practice of the profession is also revealed by the affinity which has already been pointed out between curialis, notarius, and legal expertise. This is confirmed both by Nicosia’s measure protesting the access of the notarii to the iuratia in 1423244 and the instances of elected persons bearing the title of notarius who were members of family groups, such as the Blasco and Pittacolis families in Corleone whose exercise of the notarial profession has been proven.245 Generally, the notarii were most often elected as notarii actorum in the curiae and sometimes to the judicature as well 241 For Castrogiovanni, the other milites who were not recorded in the Appendix because they were not elected three times are Pino Grimaldo and Guglielmo Bonacolti, jurats in 1442–43, Lodovico Iuliano, catapan in 1442–43 (R. C. vol. 80, fol. 68v), and Panteo La Monaca, jurat in 1444–45 (R. C. vol. 83, fols 48v-49r) and in 1451–52 (P. R. vol. 44, fol. 25r). 242 BEATRICE PASCIUTA, I notai a Palermo nel XIV secolo: Uno studio prosopografico, Messina, 1995, p. 13. Within the municipal sphere there was a wide gap between the notaries who actually practiced their profession and those who did not even though they had passed the notarial exam; see ATTILIO BARTOLI LANGELI, “Il notaio“, in Ceti, p. 26. Regarding Sicilian notaries, besides the research of PASCIUTA, see: HENRI BRESC, “Il notariato nella società siciliana medievale”, in Per una storia, pp. 191–220; ALFONSO LEONE, “Sul notariato siciliano alla fine del Duecento”, in Per una storia, pp. 181–189; ALFONSO LEONE, “Il notaio nella società meridionale nel Quattrocento”, in Per una storia, pp. 222–297. 243 This was similar to the situation in the Savoy Duchy where the notaries, who corresponded to generic professionals, had a basic knowledge of law and accounting; see CASTELNUOVO, Ufficiali, p. 353. 244 BARBATO, Per la storia, pp. 130–131. 245 See the Appendix and BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 647, p. 729.

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as the appellate court but their presence is not to be excluded in other offices such as the iuratia (Castrogiovanni, Milazzo, and Nicosia). The sporadic use of the title iudex renders its definition difficult. In the first half of the 1300s, it was used as a sign of distinction for a person who had been a judge246 but it is unlikely that it was still used in that way since it always concerned someone elected to the judicature, to the appellate court or as a notary of the civil curia (with the exception of Paolo Miglia, Treasurer in Randazzo). In Trapani, Pino Castagnolo was designated once as iudex when appellate judge in 1415–16, and as notarius in certain later elections for notarius actorum of the civil curia, whereas Giacomo Vicencio, an appellate judge, was designated several times as iudex and never in any other way. Francesco Calandrino, who was elected to the judicature in Agrigento, always bore the title of notarius and once with the addition of iudex licteratus. Andrea Parisio, elected by scrutiny as a judge in Castrogiovanni, bears the title of notarius in one instance and iudex in another. These were the only examples for which the title appears. The alternating use of the title iudex with the designation of notarius, and the fact that it only concerned officials elected to certain positions, leads one to believe that it indicated, based also on its earlier use, someone who had been a judge but did not necessarily hold a law degree. The arcium et medicine doctores were not active everywhere, although they were in Agrigento, Catania, Noto, and Sciacca. They constituted a small percentage of all the elected officials and were elected to the iuratia, with the exception of Simone Avula, Patricius in Noto. Based on Enrico Terrana’s circumstances in Agrigento, it would seem that persons who had received a university degree in medicine were designated in this way.247 Very rarely, an official might be designated with different professional titles over the course of time and only for Guglielmo Maringo in Corleone, was there a marked passage from magister to notarius. Movement in all other instances was between more closely related professions.248 The titles of notarius, magister, and iudex usually precede names. On the contrary, legum doctor, arcium et medicine doctor, and miles follow the name, just as with the designations of iunior and senior. There is no general rule governing the conservation, or, vice versa, the loss of a designation over time; relevant data is quite contradictory. For example, there is normally a certain constancy for legum doctor (in Agrigento, Catania, Corleone, and Sciacca), for arcium et medicine doctor (in Catania and Agrigento), for magister (in Sciacca, but in Nicosia, Agrigento, and Corleone only in certain instances), and for notarius (in Agrigento, Piazza, Sciacca, and Termini, while in Corleone, Nicosia, Patti, and Polizzi this was only sometimes true). The designations of magister in Polizzi and notarius in Milazzo were used inconsistently. In the scrutinies, designations that seem to refer to generic conditions of prestige and/or renown, such as nobilis, dominus, and licteratus, are widespread but not frequent (Agrigento, Catania, Noto, Polizzi, Piazza, and Termini). These titles refer to persons elected to the judicature, iuratia, appellate court, and as notarius actorum in the curiae and sometimes serve to elevate a certain title, particularly in the case of licteratus and less often 246 Concerning the title of Iudex for the first half of the 1300s, see note 20 above. 247 Terrana held degrees in medicine and astrology; BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 649. 248 In Catania, Giovanni Guerreri was first indicated as notarius, then as legum doctor. In Castrogiovanni, Andrea Parisio

was first a notarius, then a iudex. In Sciacca, Giovanni Falco was first a iudex, then a legum doctor, and in Trapani, Pino Castagnolo was first a iudex, then a notarius. In Calascibetta, Ruggero Termini was only once designated as magister while all the other times, both earlier and later, he was called notarius. It should not be ruled out that this was the result of an error in its transcription and, moreover, the transcription of the list of the officials is not very clear; R. C. vol, fol. 49r. See the Appendix.

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in the case of nobilis. Where x corresponds to the name of the official, the formulas generally found are licteratus x notarius, licteratus x legum doctor, nobilis x legum doctor as well as notarius x licteratus, and licteratus notarius x.249 Additionally, the officials normally designated with the titles notarius, miles, legum doctor, and arcium et medicine doctor might be indicated with the single term domini or as nobiles, and less often as licterati. In such cases the designations refer to known roles and are substitutes for titles.250 This was not true for a few instances where the officials concerned had never been identified with a title referring to a professional qualification. In any case, all the subjects identified in this way came from different professional backgrounds but held prestigious roles in the community as landowners, bankers, merchants, medical practitioners or teachers.251 The names of officials assigned to the iuratia were not normally accompanied by a title or appellation, however, given the circumstances of the persons elected in certain communities, it can be argued that even though they did not all come from the same sector, they were usually linked to the complex and wealthy world of the manufacturers, merchants, and businessmen.252 249 In Agrigento, Francesco Calandrino; in Catania, Giovanni Guerreri, and Benedetto Paternò-Patrimone; in Nicosia, Guglielmo Don Guida; in Noto, Filippo Pullichino and Antonio Andrella; in Patti, Giovanni Calio and Baldo Maniscalco; in Piazza, Ottaviano Taurmina; in Randazzo, Matteo Currenti; in Salemi, Ruggero Furmusa; and in Sciacca, Matteo Calandrino. See the Appendix. 250 In Agrigento, Giovanni Crixencio; in Catania, Nicola Ansalone and Nicola Rizzari; in Polizzi, Leonardo Minardo and Antonio Miroldo; in Sciacca, Matteo Calandrino, and in Trapani Tommaso Ferrario. See the Appendix. 251 A few examples include the dominus licteratus, Giacomo Caro, a judge in Trapani in 1458–59 (a rare if not unique case where the term dominus is accompanied by another designation) and the dominus, Cristoforo Perino, a judge in Trapani for the same year; P. R. vol. 52, fol. 43v. Regarding the Caro and Perino onomastic groups, see the following note. The dominus, Leonardo Minardo, was a jurat in Polizzi in 1458–59; P. R. vol. 52, fol. 45r. In 1448, a Leonardo Minardo, teacher of philosophy who held a university degree was recorded; see BRESC, Un monde, II, p. 649. In royal and notarial documentation of the 1300s, two types of designations were prevalent: one which referred to the professional status of the individual and another which indicated renown and prestige but was less prevalent in royal documents. The designation of dominus was of mere rhetorical value and amplified the other titles; see MINEO, Nobiltà, pp. 196–202. See also JEAN-PHILIPPE GENET, “Le médiéviste: la naissance du discours politique et la statistique lexicale : quelques problèmes”, in L’écrit dans la société médiévale: Divers aspects de sa pratique du XIe au XVIe siècle, eds. CAROLINE BOURLET & ANNIE DUFOUR, Paris, 1991, pp. 289–298, which highlights how a semantic approach necessitates lexical statistics. 252 In Palermo, merchants and businessmen held a significant number of positions in the iuratia although it was not theirs exclusively and they were also elected to other positions; TRIPOLI, Amministrazione, pp. 167–211, in particular p. 189. In Troina, businessmen and landowners were mainly elected to the iuratia; SORRENTI, Le istituzioni, pp. 152–153. In Caltagirone, landowners and the exponents of the agricultural class in general were present in conspicuous numbers in various government offices, and certain names over the course of the 1400s were elected above all to the iuratia; PACE, Il governo, pp. 75–117. From this information it can be deduced that it is impossible to assert that there was a monopoly over the iurtatia by exponents of any one socio-professional group. The case of Trapani can be taken as an example. The list of family names most often appearing in the iuratia there included the Caro family, landowners and jurists (who according to Trasselli were members of the bourgeoisie, TRASSELLI, Antonio, p. 18), the Ventu family which included the extremely rich merchant, Francesco (ibidem, p. 12), the Perino family which included the wealthy banker, Benedetto (ibidem, p. 19), and the Sieri (Sigerio) family, milites in the 1200s and large owners of land and houses (ibidem, p. 7, p. 10). Not all of the wealthy merchants and bankers, however, held a solid position in Trapani’s iutatia. Such was the case for Giovanni Garofalo, for example, who was elected in the scrutinies only once as a jurat and twice as a judge, and no other persons with the same surname held any influential post in the government either. The situation was similar for Antonio Lulino who was never elected and Aloisio Lulino was present in the government only once as captain in 1452–53; P. R. vol. 44, fol. 107r-v. For Garofalo and Lulino, see TRASSELLI, Antonio, pp. 20–21. In Randazo, the Russu (Russo) family were landowners (Simone, in particular; see VENTURA, Randazzo, pp. 268–269, p. 277, p. 315) who played a significant role in the administration as jurats, but also in other positions. In Nicosia, the iuratia in the mid-1420 was monopolized by the exponents of manufacturing and local commerce. At that time, the names of La Via, La Fontana, and Xaxa were the leading families in the iuratia. The great economic potential of the La Via family is demonstrated by a royal privilege in a later period which granted the nobilis Federico authorization “edificandi domos hospicia et logias” for the fair near Nicosia in 1457. This would resolve the problem of the lack of housing for merchants and warehouses for their goods. Federico La Via and his heirs would keep these buildings perpetually in their possession as alodial property; P. R. vol. 51, fols 53r-54v, 1457. Regarding the presence of the officials cited in local government, see the Appendix. On the heterogeneity of the composition of the elites, see LEFERME FALGUIÈRES & VAN RENTERGHEM, “Le concept d’élites”, pp. 57–67.

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In summation, the considerable number of localities under consideration and the complexity of the urban political scene, especially during the reign of the Magnanimus, call for particular caution in asserting a generalized political outcome because a significant and enduring oligarchic closure of the political arena was lacking. Furthermore, there were particularly fortunate periods for the civic nobility in addition to the preponderance of members of this group in certain offices. It is possible, however, to affirm that the competition remained open on the basis of the following elements: the importance of all the elective offices; the widespread circulation of the officials among different magistracies; a distribution of power among the captaincy, the town council, and the positions in the magistracies filled through elections by scrutiny; the economic importance to the sovereign of all the different groups except the populus; the lack of any hereditary transmission of a position in the government; the need to alternate terms of office in managing the captaincy; and the impossibility of holding more than one office at a time. These different elements effectively explain the failures of the pervasive attempts by single factions to monopolize local government.

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This study demonstrates how the examination of a much vaster number of the available documents, for which emphasis is normally given more often to their scarcity rather than to the complexity of the component elements, makes it possible to sketch a well-defined outline of the urban sphere in the late Middle Ages and to overcome misinterpretations that have generally characterized research on Sicilian cities. Such a study can be undertaken once the importance of sources which were long-neglected or deemed to be of little value comes to light, making it possible to refer to a vast pool of rich and varied documentation. The perspicuous historiography reconstructed for the Crown of Aragon has induced a re-examination of Sicilian society and its institutional framework. One of the major stimuli emerging from the research—on Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia in particular—concerns the particular relationship between the sovereign and his subjects which also developed quite uniformly in Sicily. The consequences of this conception of non-centralized power manifest themselves, first of all, in the pivotal role of the kingdom’s urban communities. This aspect is confirmed by the complex interplay and numerous loci of state formation.1 It seems that a process of constructing urban institutional structures— or redefining pre-existing ones—promoted by the sovereign alone can only be glimpsed during the first years after the Aragonese conquest. From the time of the reign of Frederick III, relationships shifted and would remain so in the future: the universitates would, many times, influence royal political policies and, in general, the reforms they entailed. These developments are not consistent with the old image of the modern state as a monolithic entity, rather, they correspond to “uno Stato ordinamento, contenitore di una molteplicità di soggetti distinti e responsabile della loro mutua convivenza” and the existence of local governments in which “vi sono sempre state un’infinità di funzioni assolutamente non suscettibili di essere svolte dall’apparato statale”.2 There are numerous variations among the universitates, often not firmly grounded but nevertheless indicative of the adaptation of legal norms to a particular context and, therefore, in carrying out decrees at a local level even if the decrees were not solicited by local initiatives. Such differences might concern, for example, the offices filled through election by scrutiny, variations in the designations applied to officials, the functions assigned to offices and the relative distribution of power among them, the areas within the province of the town council, and the presence in the government of different socio-professional groups. The existence of numerous urban centres, often of strategic economic interest to the Crown, increases the number of results produced and variations generated by these centres in creating leeway for local government endeavours and acquiring concessions enjoyed by those charged with local administration.

1 2

See Introduction, n. 12. MANNORI, “Genesi”, pp. 485–505 (quotes on p. 503, p. 504, respectively).

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From this point of view, a peculiar Sicilian situation emerges stemming from the vastness of the royal demesne which I do not believe was analogous to anywhere else in the Crown of Aragon and certainly not to the Kingdom of Castile where the seigeurial dynasties played a greater role. A common thread running through such vastly different forms and outcomes is easily identifiable, however, by retracing the echo which reverberated through the various Sicilian communities in the emulative process that led them to demand equal “liberties”. These privileges were often substantial, the most significant of which included the privilegium fori and exemption from the dohana and were of such importance and common benefit that every city strove to attain them. A universitas viewed whichever other community had achieved the most advanced state of political maturity at the time as a reference point for its own growth—evidence, once again, of the formation of government structures through municipal initiatives. The information which emerges from this book—and allows for a definitive overthrow of traditional interpretations—concerns the ample freedom enjoyed by municipal administrations and their influence in the dynamics of the kingdom, as well as the role of seigneurial dynasties in the universitates of the royal demesne which was incisive only within the confines of feudal communities. The silence of the sources regarding the presence of the barons is confirmed by the total municipal opposition to attempted interference by the seigneurial dynasties whose sphere of activity remained outside the confines of communities in the royal demesne. Regarding, instead, the effects of local governments’ autonomous administration, there exists, for example, a consolidated arrangement between the Crown and universitates in economic policy wherein the sovereign allowed freedom for financial manoeuvring in exchange for guaranteed payments. This autonomous role constituted an important incentive for the communities to elaborate financial and fiscal policies that were often quite advanced. These policies included innovations such as rapid payment of the collette while the communities assured themselves a series of compensations through tax exemptions and/or tariff-free exports for the following years, and especially, the consolidation of a fiscal system that was flexible rather than static: transitory ownership of the gabelle was thought to be the best solution to an altered level of royal fiscal pressure. Diverse societal stratifications, as well as forms of government which varied as new needs arose or new power relationships developed, prevent the depiction of social institutions as operating within a single model. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, moreover, numerous occasions furnished new opportunities for experimentation in concomitance with the need to reassess the distribution of power among the magistracies and concessions benefiting different groups. The origin of these processes explains how a single reform, initiated with a single aim, could have completely different results because the localities promoting it, or to which it was applied, were different and since the content of reforms sometimes varied over the course of time. From this perspective, one of the most significant points of comparison with other areas of the Aragonese Crown concerns the electoral system which was adapted to local circumstances reflecting power relationships among socio-professional groups. Particularly when a relative political balance was missing or royal initiatives increased, electoral procedures were based on negotiations between the Crown and the universitates that were not the same everywhere. In addition, it is not possible to speak of a single electoral system for mandating urban officials. Many aspects of the electoral system might seem unclear or poorly defined, particularly procedures for 216

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constituting the electoral college, but it is quite misleading to ascribe the lack of clarifying information to a paucity of the sources. The indirect pressure exerted by municipal groups in determining the composition of an electoral college, and thus, representation in the government cannot be documented and was not recorded, at least not as a set of instructions. In this regard, it must be remembered that variations in power relations between rival factions sometimes occurred even over very short periods of time. One of the premises underlying this work regards the unsuitability of applying distinct chronological divisions to the realm of institutions which, although characterized by marked experimentation, reveal the evident continuity of their main features along the shared line of relations between the sovereign and his subjects. Sustaining a de tracto sucesivo historical process3 in the context of institutional development implies greatly diminishing distinctions in passing from one period to another and, therefore, overcoming interpretations that uphold the existence of distinct periods or epic transformations.4 This does not entail, however, negating any changes that might have taken place in different periods or even under the same sovereign. What I intended to highlight is how discrete periods cannot be distinguished for the urban realm. They were periods characterized, for example, by numerous positive outcomes of the policies of the universitates, such as the ones following the royal restoration in 1392 or starting after the conquest of Naples in 1435. Advancement in these periods was, in effect, significant and can be seen “come un seme che dà frutti solo quando cade su un terreno lavorato; altrimenti sterilisce e muore”.5 The fact that cities significantly impacted the formation of legal norms and government structures makes it possible to understand the reason behind complex negotiations that sometimes led up to a royal placet lasting for only a very short time or never being applied, or even yet, refused by municipal parties without consulting the sovereign. I believe this to be the most significant aspect of pactism in Sicily. In other words, the concession of a benefit cannot be seen as a final result, only as evidence of a precise political context. A royal placet might be short-lived, not because cities generally played a weak role, but because royal assent normally constituted the result of a phase of which the duration was directly proportional to the number of groups it benefited and/or the solidity of their political good fortune. This also explains how it was possible for a privilege to be considered null and void by the opposing parties without resorting to a royal formalization of the matter. The sovereign was almost a spectator in affairs that remained the province of the universitates, staying in the background until problems regarding economic resources surfaced. Indeed, the establishment of the cities’ pivotal role developed parallel to full royal discretionary power which was never threatened in any way by broadened urban autonomy. The king seemed to be far removed but could suddenly ignore what had been previously approved if that was the best way to obtain required financial revenue. In effect, any revocation of the systems of rights and guarantees bestowed, which took place mainly through alienation of a community, was a circumscribed episode rather than a definitive event, just one phase in an on-going process. The community was free to redeem itself from the control of the dominus as soon as it was able, at which point there followed a political period 3 4 5

LALINDE ABADÍA, “Las instituciones catalans”, p. 623. See the Introduction, n. 38, and Chapter 4, n. 8. Malanina, Economia, p. IX.

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particularly favourable to l’universitas since the sovereign needed to reacquire the consensus lost with the sale. In 1447, Corleone celebrated its return to the royal demesne by displaying pennones regales on the houses, thus, viewing Alphonso V as a source of hope and wellbeing—the very sovereign responsible for the sale.6 This reaction was only apparently contradictory: the Sovereign had not consented to a definitive separation of Corleone from the demesne but had been forced to go ahead with the sale for economic reasons, malgré lui. The most convincing bodies of research dealing with the composition of urban societies, including those in different contexts, share a common theme of the difficulty of defining the elites on the one hand, or determining the characteristics by which they defined themselves as such, and on the other, the impossibility of reconstructing a complete panorama of urban status groups. With reference to Sicily in particular, the composition of various socio-professional groups can be described through an analysis of political financial policies. This type of documentation, however, can only provide a partial picture. First of all, it ignores, or at most merely alludes to anyone who did not pay taxes, and secondly, it refers to composite groupings or social aggregates designated as suitable to contribute payments at a certain time rather than making precise reference to taxable sectors of society. Even though the social reconstruction I have proposed can only offer a partial cross-sections of urban society, a widespread and significant stratification clearly emerges. The documentary evidence provided by the scrutinies furnishes unequivocal evidence of the diverse socio-professional origins of elected public officials. They were members of the economically viable sectors of society and in effect, therefore, sources of revenue for the Crown. That is probably why access to public office was not restricted with the exception of the significant, if not systematic, exclusion of those who had no control over municipal resources. No formalized exclusion from public office, apart from sporadic episodes, ever took place. This fact is indirectly confirmed by two important observations. The first regards the politics of municipal finance which was characterized by constant tension between those who favoured indirect taxation and those who backed proportional levies and the absence of consistent, controlling sectors. The liveliness of the debate reveals involvement in the government of groups with divergent interests. The second observation concerns the general policy favouring a distribution of power through an increase in the prerogatives of the council and the reciprocal control the magistracies exerted over each other. The failure of both attempted exclusions by the town council and a concentration of functions in a single office reveals the conservation of a role in government of those who would have been subject to a policy of exclusion. This work presents an overview of the Sicilian universitates and has attempted to reconcile a single common model with differing urban circumstances. The model is based on the strivings of municipal administrations to achieve as much autonomy as possible in areas within the province of municipal government and in accordance with a non-centralistic relationship with the sovereign. The frequent discrepancies encountered between royal concessions and their application in cities demonstrate that urban institutional framework can only be reconstructed in light of what was so often responsible for promoting institutional development and always responsible for its implementation—the cities.

6

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A.: Atti, Bandi e Provviste. Archivio Comunale di Palermo. C. C.: Consigli Civici. Archivio Comunale di Palermo. Gaudioso, Atti: Matteo Gaudioso, Atti dei Giurati di Catania. Archivio Storico di Catania. C.: Cancillería, Registros. Archivo de la Corona de Aragón di Barcellona. R. C.: Real Cancelleria. Archivio di Stato di Palermo. P. R.: Protonotaro del Regno. Archivio di Stato di Palermo. T. R. P.: Tribunale del Real Patrimonio, Archivio di Stato di Palermo. Consuetudines: Consuetudines terre Platee. Biblioteca comunale di Piazza Armerina.

PRINTED SOURCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acta, I: POLLACI NUCCIO, FEDELE, & GNOFFO, DOMENICO, eds., Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi, Palermo, 1892, reprint Palermo, 1982. Acta, II: DENTICI BUCCELLATO, ROSA M., (ed.), Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi, Palermo, 1983, II. Acta, III: CITARDA, LIA, (ed.), Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi, Palermo, 1984, III. Acta, IV: LO FORTE SCIRPO, MARIA R., (ed.), Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi, Palermo, 1985, IV. Acta, V: CORRAO, PIETRO, (ed.), Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi, Palermo, 1986, V. Acta, VI: SCIASCIA, LAURA, (ed.), Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi, Palermo, 1987, VI. Acta, VIII: BILELLO, CECILIA, & MASSA, ANNA, (eds.), Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi, Palermo, 1993, VIII. Acta, IX: BILELLO, CECILIA, and others, (eds.), Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi, Palermo, 1990. Acta, XI: SARDINA, PATRIZIA, (ed.), Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi, Palermo, 1994, XI. Acta, XII: SARDINA, PATRIZIA, (ed.), Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi, Palermo, 1996, XII. Acta iuratorum: WETTINGER, GODFREY, (ed.), Acta iuratorum et consilio civitatis et insulae Maltae, Palermo, 1993. 219

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Capitoli gabelle: DI GIOVANNI, VINCENZO, (ed.), Capitoli gabelle e privilegi della città di Alcamo (Documenti per servire alla Storia di Sicilia, s. II, I), (Palermo: Società siciliana per la storia patria, 1876). COSENTINO: COSENTINO, GIUSEPPE, Codice diplomatico di Federico III d’Aragona re di Sicilia, Palermo, 1866. De Rebus: De Rebus Regni Siciliae. Documenti inediti estratti dall’Archivio della Corona d’Aragona, 2 vols, Palermo 1882, repr. Palermo, 1982. DE VIO, Felicis: DE VIO, MICHAEL, (ed.), Felicis et fidelissimae Urbis Panormitanae selecta aliquot privilegia, Panormi, 1760–68, repr. Palermo, 1990. G.G.: GIAMBRUNO, SALVATORE & GENUARDI, LUIGI, eds., Capitoli inediti delle città demaniali di Sicilia, Palermo, 1918. Il Libro: MORTILLARO, PELLEGRINO, (ed.), Il Libro Rosso della città di Sciacca, Sciacca, 2003. Libro Rosso: PROVENZANO, MARIA, (ed.), Libro Rosso, Marsala, 1992. Memorie: PICONE, GIUSEPPE, Memorie storiche agrigentine (Girgenti : Salvatore Montes, 1866). Pergamene: SCIASCIA, LAURA, (ed.), Pergamene siciliane dell’Archivio della Corona d’Aragona (1188-1347) (Documenti per servire alla storia di Sicilia, s. I, XXXIII), Palermo, 1994. R. C. A.: I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina, (Napoli: Accademia Pontaniana): vol. I, 1265–66, Napoli, 1950; vol. III 1269–1270, Napoli, 1951; vol. IV 1266–1270, Napoli, 1952; vol. VI 1270–1271, Napoli, 1954; vol. VII 1269–1272, Napoli 1970; vol. VIII 1271–1272, Napoli, 1957; vol. XI 1273–1277, Napoli, 1978; vol. XV 1266–1277, Napoli 1961. R.R.: CAMMARATA, PAOLO, (ed.), Rollus Rubeus offici spectabilium juratorum baronum regiarum secretiarum huius fidelis civitatis Salem, Palermo-Rome, 1998. SAVAGNONE: SAVAGNONE, FRANCESCO G., Capitoli inediti della città di Palermo, in Archivio Storico Siciliano, 2nd. 21, 1986, pp. 363–396. STARRABBA-TIRRITO: STARRABBA, RAFFAELE & TIRRITO, LUIGI, eds., Assise e consuetudini della terra di Corleone (Documenti per servire alla storia di Sicilia, s. II, II), Palermo, 1880. Statuti e capitoli: SIPIONE, ENZO, (ed.), Statuti e capitoli della contea di Modica (Documenti per servire alla storia di Sicilia s. II, XIV), Palermo, 1976. TESTA, Capitula: TESTA, FRANCESCO M., Capitula regni Siciliae, 2 vols, Panormi, 1741. BARBATO, ANGELO, Per la storia di Nicosia nel medio evo. Documenti inediti (1267–1454), Nicosia, 1919. CATALANO TIRRITO, MICHELE, “I più antichi capitoli di Catania (1392)”, in Archivio storico per la Sicilia orientale, II, 1909, pp. 243–255. CORDOVA, VINCENZO, Le origini della Città di Aidone e il suo statuto, Rome, 1890. EMANUELE E GAETANI, FRANCESCO M., Della Sicilia nobile, 3 vols, Palermo, 1759, repr. Bologna, 1968.

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TURULL RUBINAT, MAX, La configuracíó juridíca del municipi Baix-Medieval. Règim municipal i fiscalitat a Cervera entre 1182–1430, Barcelona, 1990. TURULL RUBINAT, MAX, “El impuesto directo en los municipios catalanes medievales”, in Finanzas, pp. 75–136. TURULL RUBINAT, MAX, “El naixement de la fiscalitat municipal a Lleida (1149–1289)”, in Actes, pp. 219–232. TURULL RUBINAT, MAX, “Síndicos a Cortes. Perfil social e institucional de los representantes ciudadanos a Cortes y Parlamentos en Cataluña (1333–1393)”, in XVII Congresso di storia della Corona d’Aragona, 3 vols, Barcelona-Lleida, 2000, III, pp. 989–1012. TURULL RUBINAT, MAX, “La naissance d’une administration financière municipale (Catalogne, XIV-XVe siècles)”, in La fiscalité, pp. 11–24. TURULL RUBINAT, MAX, & MORELLÓ BAGET, JORDI, “Estructura y tipología de las «estimes-manifests» en Cataluña (siglos XIV–XV)”, in Anuario de estudios medievales, 35/1, 2005, pp. 271–326. TURULL RUBINAT, MAX, & RIBALTA HARO, JAUME, “De voluntate universitatis. La formació i l’expressió de la voluntat del municipi (Tàrrega, 1214–1250)”, in Anuario de estudios medievales, 21, 1991, pp. 143–231. VALDEÓN BARUQUE, JULIO, “Una ciudad castellana en la segunda mitad del siglo XIV: el ejemplo de Murcia”, in Cuadernos de Historia, 3, 1969, pp. 211–254. VALDEÓN BARUQUE, JULIO, Los conflictos sociales en el reino de Castilla en los siglos XIV y XV, Madrid, 1975. VALDEÓN BARUQUE, JULIO, “Conflictos sociales en el mundo feudal hispánico”, in En torno al feudalesimo hispánico. I Congreso de estudios medievales, León 21–25 settembre 1987, Ávila, 1989, pp. 43–55. VALDEÓN BARUQUE, JULIO, “Las oligarquías urbanas”, in Concejos, pp. 507–521. VALLET DE GOYTISOLO, JUAN, “Valor jurídico de las leyes paccionadas en el principato de Cataluña”, in El pactismo, pp. 75–110. VALLONE, GIANCARLO, Feudi e città. Studi di storia giuridica e istituzionale pugliese, Galatina, 1993. VALLONE, GIANCARLO, Istituzioni feudali dell’Italia meridionale. Tra Medioevo ed Antico Regime l’area salentina, Rome, 1999. VARANINI, GIAN MARIA, “Governi principeschi e modello cittadino di organizzazione del territorio nell’Italia del Quattrocento”, in Principi, pp. 95–127. VASI, LUIGI P., “Delle Origini e vicende di S. Fratello”, in Archivio Storico Siciliano, n.s. 6, 1881, pp. 239–311. VENTURA, DOMENICO, Randazzo e il suo territorio tra medioevo e prima età moderna, Caltanissetta-Rome, 1991. VENTURA, PIERO, “Le ambiguità di un privilegio: la cittadinanza napoletana tra Cinque e Seicento”, in Quaderni Storici, 89, 1995, pp. 386–416. VERDÉS PIJUAN, PERE, “Evolution de dépenses de Cervera”, in La fiscalité des villes, pp. 113–126. VERDÉS PIJUAN, PERE, Administrar les pecúnias e béns de la universitat. Cervera 1387–1516, unpublished doctoral thesis, 2 vols, Universitat de Barcelona, 2004. VERDÉS PIJUAN, PERE, “La gestión de los impuestos indirectos municipales en las ciudades y villas de Cataluña: el caso de Cervera (s. XIV–XV)”, in La fiscalité, pp. 173–190. VERGA, MARCELLO, “Il Seicento e i paradigmi della storia italiana”, in Storica, 11, 1998, pp. 7–42. VICENS VIVES, JAUME, Ferran II i la ciutat de Barcelona, 3 vols, Barcelona, 1936–37.

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VICENS VIVES, JAUME, Els Trastàmares, Barcelona, 1956. VICENS VIVES, JAUME, Historia critica de la vida y reinado de Fernando II de Aragón, Zaragoza, 1962. VICENS VIVES, JAUME, “La struttura amministrativa statale nei secoli XVI e XVII”, in Lo stato moderno. I. Dal medioevo all’età moderna, eds. ETTORE ROTELLI & PIERANGELO SCHIERA, Bologna, 1971, pp. 221–246. VIGGIANO, ALFREDO, Governanti e governati. Legittimità del potere ed esercizio dell’autorità sovrana nello Stato veneto della prima età moderna, Treviso, 1993. VIGIANO, VALENTINA, L’esercizio della politica. La città di Palermo nel Cinquecento, Rome, 2004. VISCEGLIA, MARIA A., “Rituali religiosi e gerarchie politiche a Napoli in età moderna”, in Fra Storia e Storiografia. Scritti in onore di Pasquale Villani, eds. PAOLO MACRY & ANGELO MASSAFRA, Bologna, 1994, pp. 587–620. VISCEGLIA, MARIA A., “Terra d’Otranto dagli Angioini all’Unità”, in Storia del Mezzogiorno, eds. GIUSEPPE GALASSO & ROSARIO ROMEO, 15 vols, Naples, 1986, VII, pp. 335–468. VITOLO, GIOVANNI, Città e coscienza cittadina nel Mezzogiorno medievale (secc. IX–XIII), Salerno, 1990. VON FALKENHAUSEN, VERA, “I ceti dirigenti prenormanni al tempo della costituzione degli stati normanni nell’Italia meridionale e in Sicilia”, in Forme di potere e struttura sociale in Italia nel Medioevo, ed. GABRIELLA ROSSETTI, Bologna, 1977, pp. 321–378. VULLIEZ, CHARLES, “L’ars dictaminis et sa place dans la ‘préhistoire’ médiévale de la requête écrite”, in Suppliques, pp. 89–102. WAUQET, JEAN-CLAUDE & MENJOT, DENIS (eds.), “Transazioni, strategie e razionalità fiscali nell’Europa medievale e moderna”, in Cherion, 24, 1996. WEISSMAN, RONALD F. E., “From brotherhood to congregation: confraternal ritual between Renaissance and catholic reformation”, in Riti e rituali nelle società medievali, eds. JACQUES CHIFFOLEAU & LAURO MARTINES & AGOSTINO PARAVICINI BAGLIANI, Spoleto, 1994, pp. 77–96. WICKHAM, CHRIS, Legge, pratiche e conflitti. Tribunali e risoluzione delle dispute nella Toscana del XII secolo, Rome, 2000. WOLFF, PHILIPPE, “Les luttes sociales dans les villes du Midi français XIIIe-XIVe siècles”, in Annales : Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 4, 1947, pp. 443–454. ZAFFUTO ROVELLO, ROSANNA, Universitas Calatanixette 1086–1516, Caltanissetta-Rome, 1991. ZORZI, ANDREA, “I Fiorentini e gli uffici pubblici nel primo Quattrocento: concorrenza, abusi, illegalità”, in Quaderni Storici, 66, 1987, pp. 725–751. ZORZI, ANDREA, “Contrôle social, ordre public et répression judiciarie à Florence à l’époque communale: éléments et problèmes”, in Annales. Économies. Sociétés. Civilisations, 5, 1990, pp. 1169–1188. ZORZI, ANDREA, “Ordine pubblico e amministrazione della giustizia nelle formazioni politiche toscane fra Tre e Quattrocento”, in Italia, pp. 419–474. ZORZI, ANDREA, “Introduzione”, in Lo Stato territoriale, pp. 1–18.

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APPENDIX

Notes to the Appendix The presence of public officials in different offices of the universitates, and the officials’ designations (where x corresponds to the name of the official), are listed according to locality in one of three geographical groupings for val di Mazara, val di Noto, and val Demone. To facilitate a rapid search for elected officials in the tables of titles and/or appellatives, surnames are listed before any given names, even though given names precede surnames in the original lists from the scrutinies.1 In the lists of Officials Elected by Scrutiny, the offices held are indicated for officials belonging to an onomastic group or who were elected at least three times. Designations are included for persons who were elected at least three times and indicated by a title and/or designation at least once. In the Appendix, as in the text, the position of appellate judge and appellate notary correspond to the iudex primarum appellacionum and notarius primarum appellacionum.

1 For the criteria adopted in indicating surnames, see the Introduction, note 40. A list of urban localities, divided according to the valli in which they are located, appears in the Introduction, note 39.

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GROUP 1:

15

Leto

17

4

5

1

Gallo

16

9

6

Monteleone

13

2

5

Chirco

11

4

2

Crixencio

10

4

5

1

Lupo

10

9

1

Pancica

10

7

1

Traversa

10

Palmeri

9

1

6

Randazzo

9

4

4

Ripullinu

9

6

3

Calandrino

8

5

3

Gambotta

8

8

Gini

8

1

Mazara

8

1

Platia

8

2

Bayeri

7

3

Cuchara

7

4

3

Mauro

7

1

6

Ortulena

7

2

Aliberto

6

Baldo

6

Lu Portu

6

3

Munferrara

6

5

Petralia

6

1

Aiello

5

1

Anselmo

5

1

Bandi

5

Bonionno

5

2

5

Magister Excumbiarum

3

Catapan

20

Treasurer

Jurat

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Judge

Terrana

Name

Number of recurrences

Notary of the Civil Curia

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Agrigento

2 1

1

5 1 6

1

1

2

4

1

1 1

1

5

1

1

6

1

1

2

3

2

1 2

2

2

1

6 1

5 2

1 1

2

1

2

3 2

1 2

5 1

1

2

1

249

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Santo Philippo

5

2

2

Cagnacu

4

1

2

Cathati

4

Cosentino

4

Filesi

4

La Matina

4

3

1 1 1

4 2

1 3

4

Naro

4

Paganello

4

Pipi

4

1

Russu

4

2

Santo Martino

4

Blancu

3

Camarinu

3

1

1

3

La Piatisa

1 4 1

2

1 4

1

1 1

2

2

1

1

2

3

1

Charaulu

3

1

Chilano

3

Fachenti

3

Iudice

3

Lamantia

3

3

Monteaperto

3

2

Rappa

3

1

1

2

2

Cannizario

2 1

1

1

1

3 2

1

1 2

Saccio

3

Salamuni

3

1

2

Sicani

3

1

2

Spataru

3

Vinuto

3

Vita

3

3

2 1

Other 98 names appear only once or twice.

250

Magister Excumbiarum

1

Catapan

Treasurer

5

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Modica

Notary of the Civil Curia

Jurat

Judge

Number of recurrences

Name

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Agrigento

1

2 2

1

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Designations of Officials in Agrigento Ayello, Enrico

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1440–41 Magister Excumbiarum 1437–38 Judge 1443–44: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1445–6 Jurat 1453–54: notarius x Judge 1447–48: x notarius

Camarinu, Giovanni

Jurat 1402–03

Jurat 1405–06: magister x

Cosentino, Nicola

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1403–04 Catapan 1447–48

Judge 1419–20: notarius x Jurat 1450–51

Notary of the Civil Curia 1437–38 Judge 1431–32: x legum doctor Catapan 1428–29

Notary of the Civil Curia 1440–41: notarius x Judge 1436–37: x legum doctor Catapan 1438–39

Ortulena, Francesco

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1415–16

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1419–20

Petralia, Filippo

Notary of the Civil Curia 1402–03: notarius x Magister Excumbiarum 1447–48: magister x Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1439–40: notarius x Judge 1399–00: iudex x Jurat 1436–37: x arcium et medicine doctor

Notary of the Civil Curia 1407–08: notarius x Magister Excumbiarum 1450–51

Blancu, Matteo Calandrino, Francesco

Crixencio, Giovanni Gallo, Antonio

Gambotta, Manfredi Mauro Consalvo*

Piatisa, Nicola

Platia, Salvatore

Randazzo, Giacomo Terrana, Enrico**

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia1448– 49: notarius x Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1458–59 Judge 1452– 53: iudex licteratus notarius x Judge 1419–20 Judge 1425–26: notarius x Judge 1457– 58: x licteratus Notary of the Civil Curia 1444–45: notarius x Judge 1441– 42: x legum doctor Catapan 1422–23 Notary of the Civil Curia 1422–23: notarius x Judge 1420–21: notarius x Magister Excumbiarum 1455–56

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1442–43

Judge 1450–51: notarius x

Judge 1402– 03: iudex x Jurat 1445–46: x arcium et medicine doctor

Judge 1455–56 Jurat 1447–48: dominus x

Judge 1456–57: notarius x

Judge 1445–46: x legum doctor Catapan 1443–44: magister x Judge 1426–7

Judge 1457–58

Catapan 1458–59

Notary of the Civil Curia 1457–58

Magister Excumbiarum 1458–59

Notes: *Gundisalvo Mauro in 1428–29. **Giovanni, son of Enrico Terrana, elected as Jurat in 1452–53, was recorded as: “Iohannis filius domini Henrici”.

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

7

1

1

1

3

3

Blasco (Bracco)

28

6

10

4

2

Sarzana

28

8

10

2

1

2 1.

Calandrino

22

6

7

2

Diana

18

6

7

1

Brunu

15

4

5

Randazzo

14

Carissima

13

Chanchetta

13

Milacio

12

1

Maringo (Maringu)

11

1

Cartoxio

10

4

Filadello

10

5

1

3 4

6

2

2

4

3

2

1

1

2

3 1

1

10

5

3

1

Nazano

10

3

2

3

Castigliono (Castellino)

9

1

4

4

Marsala

9

1

5

1

Monte

9

Lu Vignu

8

6

Monteleone

8

1

Curtiniglia

7

Gambocta

7

1

3

2

Murra

7

2

3

1

Risico

7

1

Russu

7

Aqueo

6

Arena

6

Bitonti

6

Castellonovo (Castronovo)

6

2

2

Florencia

6

3

2

1

Lupresti

6

2

1

252

2

1 1

2

1 1

5

1 1

2

1

3 1 1 1 2

1

4 3

1

2

1 2

3 2

5

Gavaretta

5

1 2

1

3 4

1

3 3

5

2

1

2

5 7

3

4

1

3 1

1 6

5

1 2

3

Notary

Captain’s Notary

5

Baiuli

5

Magister Excumbiarum

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

9

Catapan

Notary of the Civil Curia

29

Treasurer

Jurat

Pittacolis

Judge

Number of recurrences

Name

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Corleone

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APPENDIX

5

Nicoloso

5

Rosa

5

Bondi

4

Bozu

4

Calabro

4

Faxillaro

4

Firrara

4

1

Garbigla

4

1

1

1

3

2

Captain’s Notary

Auribello

1

Baiuli

5

Magister Excumbiarum

Alto

Catapan

2

Treasurer

2

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Jurat

6

Notary of the Civil Curia

Judge

Rocca

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Corleone

4 4 1

1

1 1

2 4

1

1

1

1 4

3

1

1

1 2

1

1

Iacobi

4

Lombardo

4

2

Malpulto

4

Pumara

4

Simbardo

4

1

Vulcagio

4

3

Adragna

3

3

Asaro

3

3

Damiana

3

Gaglino

3

Pace

3

Pacti

3

1

2 2

2

2

2

3

1

2

1

3 1 2

2

1 2

Raia

3

Vetere

3

2

1

Vizini

3

1

1

1 1

1 1

1

Other 108 names appear only once or twice.

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Corleone Auribello, Andrea

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1425–26

Bitonti, Giacomo

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1413–14

Blasco, Nicola

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1407–08 Magister Excumbiarum 1447–48

Notary of the Civil Curia 1427–28: notarius x Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1422–23: notarius x Judge 1422–3: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1429–30: notarius x Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1424–25

Notary of the Civil Curia 1431–32: notarius x Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1426–27

Notary of the Civil Curia 1437–38 Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1429–30

Judge 1424–5: notarius x

Judge 1427–28: Judge 1430–1: notarius x notarius x

Judge 1451–52: Magister notarius x Excumbiarum 1453–54

Jurat 1454–55: notarius x

Magister Excumbiarum 1457–58

Notary of the Civil Curia 1405–06 Notary of the Civil Curia 1424–25

Notary of the Civil Curia 1426–7: notarius x Judge 1447–48: notarius x

Judge 1428–9: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1430–31: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1398–99: notarius x Judge 1398–99: Notary of the notarius x Civil Curia 1402–03: notarius x Jurat Jurat 1431–32 1436–37

Judge 1413–14: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1419–20: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1421–22

Notary of the Civil Curia 1406–07: notarius x Jurat 1447–48

Jurat 1450–01

Judge 1454–55: magister x

Catapan 1402–03

Catapan 1407–08: magister x

Catapan 1415–16

Catapan 1419–20

Judge 1405–06

Notary of the Civil Curia 1413–4: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1415–16

Notary of the Civil Curia 1420–01: notarius x

Giovanni

Judge 1428–29

Judge 1436–37 : notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1438–39: notarius x

Florencia, Antonio

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1419–20

Judge 1450–01:x legum doctor

Judge 1453–54: x legum doctor

Gambocta, Giovanni

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1436–37: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1451–52: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1454–55

Brunu, Dino*

Carissima, Giacomo

Cartoxio, Matteo

Castellonovo (Castronovo), Antonio Castigliono (Castellino), Andrea Castiglono (Castellino), Giovanni

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1402–03 Notary of the Civil Curia 1422–23: notarius x Judge 1438–39: notarius x

Filadello,

254

Notary of the Civil Curia 1439–00: notarius x Jurat 1402–03: notarius x

Judge 1437–8: notarius x

Judge 1419–20: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1437–38

Judge 1455–56: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1455–56

Judge 1423–24: notarius x

Judge 1425–26: notarius x

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Designations of Officials in Corleone Magister Excumbiarum 1398–99 Maringo, Guglielmo

Magister Excumbiarum 1405–06: magister x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1428–29

Notary of the Civil Curia 1438–39: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1450–1: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1453–54: notarius x

Judge 1457–58: notarius x licteratus

Milacio, Bartolomeo

Notary of the Civil Curia 1436–37

Notary of the Civil Curia 1439–40: notarius x

Jurat 1451–52: notarius x

Judge 1454–55: notarius x

Monte, Antonio

Jurat 1413–14: magister x

Jurat 1420–01: magister x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1424–25: magister x

Jurat 1426–27

Jurat 1429–30: magister x

Jurat 1439–40

Murra, Michele

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1405–06

Notary of the Civil Curia 1413–14: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1419–20

Notary of the Civil Curia 1425–26: notarius x

Judge 1429–30: notarius x

Judge 1439–0: notarius x

Nicoloso, Antonio

Notary of the Civil Curia 1425–26

Notary of the Civil Curia 1427–28: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia and Captain’s Notary 1429–00: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1431–02: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1399–00: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1402–03: notarius x

Magister Excumbiarum 1404–05

Notary of the Civil Curia 1405–06: notarius x

Jurat 1422–23

Jurat 1425–26

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1426–27: x iunior

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1427–28

Jurat 1429–30

Notary of the Civil Curia 1436–37

Jurat 1439–40

Jurat 1457–58

Pittacolis, Giacomo

Judge 1419–20: notarius x

Judge 1425–26: notarius x

Judge 1428–29: notarius x

Judge 1430–01: notarius x

Pumara, Antonio

Magister Excumbiarum 1430–31

Magister Excumbiarum 1438–39: magister x

Catapan 1457–58: magister x

Russu, Giacomo**

Notary of the Civil Curia 1447–48: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1450–01: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1454–55: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1457–58: notarius x

Sarzana, Andrea

Notary of the Civil Curia 1403–04: notarius x Jurat 1438–39

Notary of the Civil Curia 1407–08

Judge 1423–42: notarius x

Judge 1427–28: notarius x

Judge 1429–30: notarius x

Judge 1431–30: notarius x

Pittacolis, Enrico

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Corleone Sarzana, Filippo

Jurat 1428–29

Magister Excumbiarum 1429–30

Magister Excumbiarum 1431–32

Vignu, Minotta

Jurat 1419–20

Judge 1422–23

Judge 1425–26: magister x

Vulcagio, Tommaso

Judge 1398–99: notarius x

Jurat 1402–03: notarius x

Judge 1405–06

Judge 1438–39

Magister Excumbiarum 1439–40: magister x

Judge 1413–14: notarius x

Notes: The Blasco onomastic group included Guglielmo, a notarius, as well as another official of the same name. Both were elected in 1430–31 making it impossible to discern if it was the notarius who was elected the other times and whether he was elected three times or not. *Dino is considered to be the same person as Odino who was elected in 1405–06. **Iacio, which is considered to be short for Iacobus, in 1450–55

256

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APPENDIX

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 3

17

1

2

4

10

2

3

18

12

1

1

4

Bruno

16

5

7

1

1

Lu Vescu

13

6

3

2

2

Lupresti

11

1

8

2

Li Volti

10

6

2

2

4

Gavarrecta

24

12

12

Mercatante

22

2

Manueli

19

Guchardo

Name

28

Lancirocto

Grigoli

9

Buccaresi

8

2

Avilles

7

4

Bonanno

7

2

Florio

7

La Rocca

7

Pizicula

7

1

6

Amelia

6

1

5

Cappasancta

6

Lugactu

6

Treasurer

Notary of the Civil Curia 1

Judge

19

Number of recurrences

Jurat

Magister Excumbiarum

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Salemi

1

2

5

2

2

4

1

1

1

1

1

4

1

4

2

5 4

3

5

2

1

Palmerio

6

6

Chalia

5

3

Caro

4

2

1

1

Cavaleri (Cavalieri)

4

2

1

1

Furmusa

4

3

1

Milo

4

4

Pace

4

3

1

Trahina

4

3

1

Blasio

3

Canpanaru

3

3 3

Castagola

3

2

Firrerio

3

1

Lombardo

3

Placencia

3

2

1 2 3

1

1

Santo Clemente

3

3

Sturtu

3

1

Xilintanu

3

2

1

1 1

1

Other 97 names appear only once or twice.

257

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Salemi Avilles, Gilberto

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1424–25

Notary of the Civil Curia 1428–29

Judge 1440–41: notarius x

Judge 1443–44: notarius x

Judge 1447–48: notarius x

Bruno, Antonio

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1415–16

Notary of the Civil Curia 1419–20: notarius x

Judge 1423–24: notarius x

Buccaresi, Francesco/ Chicco

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1421–22

Notary of the Civil Curia 1422–23

Notary of the Civil Curia 1425–26

Furmusa, Ruggero

Judge 1429–30: notarius x

Judge 1439–40: notarius x

Judge 1456–57: licteratus notarius x

Grigoli, Antonio

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1420–21: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1424–25

Notary of the Civil Curia 1420–21: notarius x

Judge 1424–25: notarius x

Judge 1450–51: notarius x

Judge 1455–56: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1426–27

Notary of the Civil Curia 1430–31

Notary of the Civil Curia 1436–37

Notary of the Civil Curia 1439–40

Judge 1427–28: notarius x

Judge 1432–33: notarius x

Judge 1438–39: notarius x

Judge 1441–42: notarius x

Judge 1444–45: notarius x

Judge 1448–49: notarius x

La Rocca, Gerardo

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1423–24

Notary of the Civil Curia 1432–23

Notary of the Civil Curia 1438–39

Notary of the Civil Curia 1445–46: notarius x

Lu Vescu, Giacomo

Judge 1407–08

Judge 1420–21: x miles

Judge 1421–22: x miles

Judge 1423–24: x miles

Judge 1426–27: x miles

Judge 1429–30: x miles

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1425–26

Notary of the Civil Curia 1427–28

Judge 1437–38: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1440–41

Judge 1442–43: notarius x

Judge 1445–46: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1448–49

Judge 1453–54: notarius x

Milo, Francesco

Judge 1426–27: notarius x

Judge 1428–29: notarius x

Judge 1431–32: notarius x

Judge 1436–37: notarius x

Pace, Aldoino

Notary of the Civil Curia 1407–08: notarius x

Judge 1420–21: notarius x

Judge 1422–23: notarius x

Judge 1425–26: notarius x

Guchardo, Palmerio

Manueli, Giovanni

258

Judge 1451–52: notarius x

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APPENDIX

Liotta

11

2

Falco

10

5

4

Marsala

8

5

1

Amato

7

Argumento

7

3

Missere Peri

7

3

Altavilla

6

Anselmino

6

4

Bugio

6

1

Firraro

6

Tudisco

6

Agropoli

5

Missina

5

Perollo

5

Birecta

4

Chuppardu

4

Lacanna

4

Luchisio

4

Magistro Leonardo

4

Mercanti

4

Perrinchensu

4

Sciacca

4

Albergo

3

7

1 1

3

1 2 1

1

1

5 2

3

2

6 6 4

1

2

2

1

5 2

1

1 4

4 1

2

1 1

3

3 1

1 1

3 3

3

3

1

1

2

1

Cusineri

3

Insola

3 3

1

6

3

3

1

1

Aurifichi

Missere Chiccu

2

1

Ansalone

Iuffrida

Catapan

4

3

Treasurer

1

1

Appellate Notary

Appellate Judge

1

7

Notary of the Civil Curia

6

2

Jurat

8

15

Judge

20

La Rocca

Number of recurrences

Calandrino

Name

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Sciacca

1

3 2

1 2

1

2

1

Notaro Nicola

3

1

1

Vinchio

3

1

1

1 1

Other 89 names appear only once or twice.

259

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Sciacca Birecta, Antonio

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1437–38 Judge 1405–06: notarius x Judge 1444–45:x legum doctor

Notary of the Civil Curia 1444–45 Judge 1413–14: notarius x Appellate Judge 1448–49: dominus x

Falco, Giovanni

Judge 1399–00: iudex x

Judge 1402–03

Iuffrida, Antonio

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1451–52/ 1452–53: notarius x Notary of the Jurats’ Curia (Chicco) 1413–14

Appellate Notary 1453–54: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia (Francesco) 1420–21

Liotta, Andrea

Appellate Notary 1436–37: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1437–38

Liotta, Pietro

Notary of the Civil Curia 1413–14: notarius x Appellate Notary 1437–38: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1420–21: notarius x Appellate Notary 1451–52/ 1452–53: notarius x Judge 1415–6: notarius x

Calandrino, Gerardo Calandrino, Matteo

La Rocca, Francesco/ Chicco

Magistro, Leonardo

Mercanti, Benedetto

Missina, Amato

Tudisco, Enrico

260

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1399–00: notarius x Appellate Judge 1447–48: notarius x Catapan 1448–49: magister x

Judge 1451–52/ 1452–53: notarius x Catapan 1453–54: magister x

Judge 1448–49 Judge 1418–19: notarius x Appellate Judge1451– 52/1452– 53: x legum doctor Judge 1403–04

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia (Francesco) 1421–2: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1448–49: notarius x Judge 1447–48: notarius x

Judge 1455–6 :x legum doctor Judge 1420–21: notarius x Judge 1453–54: licteratus x

Judge 1404–5

Appellate Judge 1455–56: x legum doctor Judge 1436–37: x legum doctor

Notary of the Civil Curia (Francesco) 1432–33 Notary of the Civil Curia 1451–52/ 1452–53 : notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1455–46: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1457–58: notarius x Judge 1419–20: notarius x

Appellate Judge 1453–54: notarius x Catapan 1455–56

Judge 1421–22

Catapan 1457–8: magister x

Appellate Judge 1457–58: notarius x

Judge 1457–58: nobilis x legum doctor Appellate Judge 1437–38: x legum doctor

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APPENDIX

Notary of the Civil Curia

Catapan

10

12

6

5

Riczu

30

2

21

2

5

Salamone

15

13

2

Lu Vastu

12

6

5

1

Li Pulcelli

10

6

2

Felice

9

1

Cuctunaru

8

Farina

8

4

Palma

8

5

Bruno

6

4

2

Solitu

6

1

2

Chachu

5

3

2

Cosintino

5

3

2

Iuczulino

5

5

Luparello

5

4

2 8

7

1 1 4

3

1

1

5

Lu Denaru

4

Maccarrono

4

Patilloru

4

4

Porta

4

4

4

Thomasello

4

Balsamo

3

Cavaro

3

Manioni

3

Pintauro (also called de Annuza)

3

Pixi

3

Sanczo

3

1

2

Salvo

Speciali

2

Captain's Judge

Jurat

33

Magister Excumbiarum

Judge

Bonafide

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Termini

1

1 4 4

4 4 2

1 1

2

2 1

1 2

2

Sapuritu

3

Valencia

3

1

Xillufu

3

2

2

1

2

1 1 2 1

Other 53 names appear only once or twice.

261

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Termini Bonafide, Antonio

Bonafide, Giuliano

Cuctunaro, Nardo/ Leonardo

Felice, Giacomo

Palma, Antonio

262

Notary of the Civil Curia 1447–48: notarius x

Judge 1448–49: notarius x

Judge 1451–52: notarius x

Judge 1456–57: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1458–59: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1406–07: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1415–16: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1419–20

Judge 1422–23

Judge 1431–32: notarius x

Jurat 1444–45

Jurat 1448–49

Jurat 1453–54

Jurat 1458–59: dominus x

Catapan 1399–00: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1403–04: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1405–06: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1413–14: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1421–22

Notary of the Civil Curia 1422–23

Notary of the Civil Curia 1426–27: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1428–29: notarius x

Judge 1430–31: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1432–33: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1431–32

Judge 1444–45: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1448–49: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1451–52: notarius x

Judge 1447–48: notarius x

Judge 1458–59: notarius x

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APPENDIX

Pace

18

6

17

7

Settesoldi

16

7

La Mannina

15

5

Fardella

14

Orlandino (Orlando)

14

1

3

Caro

13

1

2

7

Michilecto

12

1

4

1

Pantana

12

Abrignano

11 11

2 3

Navarro

11

Stannatellu

11

Cathaguerra

10

Formica

10

Lancirocto

10

Perino

10

Saladino

10

Omodeo (Amodeo)

9

Terrachina

9

Ventu

9

Caruso

8

1

2

1

7

3

1

3

1

1

7

2 1

2

2

1

2

3 1

4

1 1

2 4

1

4

2

2

1

4

1

4

2 1 1 2

1 1 3

2 1

2

8

1

8

2

Zuccala

8

1

1

Gallo

7

3

1

Garofalo

7

1

2

3

Iohanne

7

1

1

3

1

3

8

Filecha

1

2

1

Ferrario

6

2

3

1

2

6

3

2

1

1

4

Carissima

2

1

3

Amari

1 1

6

1

2 1

5

2

2

1 1 1

3

2

2 2

1 3

1

1

3 6

1

6

1

1

7

7

11

3

2 1

1

Honesto

2

5

3

2

Finara

1

1 6

Bandino

4

Magister Excumbiarum

13

Catapan

6

Treasurer

2

5

Appellate Notary

22

1

Appellate Judge

9

Consul’s Notary

2

Consul

Jurat

4

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Judge

31

Sieri (Sigerio)

Notary of the Civil Curia

Baiulus

Vicencio

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Trapani

1 2

1

2 1

1

2

2

2 2

1

2

1 1 1

1 3

1

2

2

1

2

2 2

263

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Durduglia

6

Ferro

6

Incunbau

6

1

3

6 6

1

Marmusecta

6

1

Podio

6

1

Spinula

6

Vitali

6

Carbono

5

Cosentino

5 5 5

Giordano

5

Grasso

5

Grigoli

5

Mararanga

5

Naso

5

La Porta

5

1

1

1 2

Magister Excumbiarum

Catapan

Treasurer

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1 1 1

4 1

1

3

2

1

1

1

4 1

1

3 3

2

3

1 2

1

3

3

1

1 1

Appellate Notary

Appellate Judge

Consul’s Notary

Consul

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

2

5

Mango

Galesi

Notary of the Civil Curia 1

Lu Chichiru

Forniano

Jurat

Judge

Baiulus

Number of recurrences

Name

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Trapani

1 4

2

1 3

1

2 3

2

5 1

3

1

Puiada

5

Sirigno

5

2 1

2

1

Trenta

5

2

1

2

Truxellu

5

2

1

2

1

2

1

Barberi

4

4

Bruno

4

4

Buczoctu

4

Castagnolo

4

Crapanzano

4

Florentinu

4

Iannuni

4

Intagliata

4

Iusafa

4

Liotta

4

264

1

2 2

1 1

1

4 3

1 1

1

2 1

2

1 1

2 1

1

3

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APPENDIX

Liparotu

4

Milo

4

Mura

4

Magister Excumbiarum

Catapan

Treasurer

Appellate Notary

Appellate Judge

Consul’s Notary

Consul

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Notary of the Civil Curia

Jurat

Judge

Baiulus

Number of recurrences

Name

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Trapani

4 1

2 1

Corso

3

1

Iacobo

3

1

1

Ianca

3

Inbrunotto

3

La Serra

3

Lucca

3

1

Lu Sinaldu

3

1

Macaiuni

3

Mayda

3

3

Monteleone

3

2

Pizutu

3

Sancto Giorgio

3

1

3

1 1 1

1

1

1 1

1

1

2

1

1

1 1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1 3

Simone

3

Sturto

3

2

2

Vinchio

3

1

1

1 1

1

Other 166 names appear only once or twice.

265

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Trapani Carbono, Giacomo

Notary of the Civil Curia 1439–40

Appellate Notary 1440–41

Castagnolo, Pino

Treasurer 1423–24

Ferrario, Tommaso

Appellate Judge 1415–16: iudex x Appellate Notary 1425–26: notarius x Consul’s Notary 1453–54 Appellate Notary 1438–39: notarius x Consul’s Notary 1419–20: notarius x Treasurer 1430–31

Filecha, Antonio*

Catapan 1445–46

Cathaguerra, Giacomo

Durduglia, Durduglia

Ferrario, Nicola

Appellate Notary 1419–20 Finara, Berto/ Roberto

Formica, Francesco

Appellate Notary 1432–33: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1450–51

Formica, Giovanni

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1429–30

Forniano, Giovanni

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1442–43

266

Consul’s Notary x 1427–28: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1440–41: notarius x Treasurer 1422–03: notarius x Judge 1456–57: licteratus x legum doctor Appellate Notary 1453–54 Notary of the Civil Curia 1421–22: notarius x Appellate Notary 1436–7: notarius x Consul’s Notary 1451–52: notarius x Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1432–33: notarius x Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1445–46

Notary of the Civil Curia 1442–43: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1426–27: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1430–31

Appellate Notary 1443–44: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1431–32: notarius x Baiulus 1443–44: notarius x

Consul’s Notary 1454–55: notarius x Consul’s Notary 1431–02: notarius x Appellate Judge 1458–59: dominus x Notary of the Civil Curia 1456–57: notarius x Appellate Notary 1424–25

Consul’s Notary 1458–59: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1445–46: notarius x

Consul’s Notary 1445–46: notarius x

Consul’s Notary 1450–51: notarius x

Consul’s Notary 1425–26: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1427–28

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1430–31

Notary of the Civil Curia 1438–39: notarius x

Appellate Notary 1441–42: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1443–44: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1453–54

Notary of the Civil Curia 1457–58: notarius x

Judge 1441–42: notarius x Consul’s Notary 1456–57: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1436–37: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1446–47

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APPENDIX

Giordano, Giovanni

Lancirocto, Giacomo

Consul’s Notary 1400–01: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1420– 21: notarius x

Appellate Notary 1421–22: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1419–20: notarius x Magister Excumbiarum 1421–22

Notary of the Civil Curia 1432–33: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1421–22: notarius x Magister Excumbiarum 1425–26

Mango, Giacomo

Magister Excumbiarum 1426–27

Magister Excumbiarum 1430–31

Mayda, Francesco

Notary of the Civil Curia 1400–01: notarius x Appellate Judge 1427–28: x legum doctor

Notary of the Civil Curia 1406–07: notarius x Judge 1429–30: x legum doctor

Judge 1439–40: x legum doctor

Judge 1442–43: x legum doctor

Consul’s Notary 1438–39: notarius x Consul’s Notary 1421–22: notarius x Judge 1451–52: dominus x

Consul’s Notary 1440–41: notarius x Consul’s Notary 1424–25

La Porta, Ruggero

Liparotu, Nicola

Michilecto, Antonio

Milo, Francesco

Mura, Giovanni

Orlandino, (Orlando) Giacomo

Appellate Notary 1431–2: notarius x

Judge 1419–20: notarius x

Appellate Judge 1453–54: x legum doctor

Consul’s Notary 1428–29: notarius x Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1423–24

Consul’s Notary

Notary of the Civil Curia 1423–24

Appellate Notary 1426–27: notarius x

Magister Excumbiarum 1429–30: magister x Magister Excumbiarum 1443–44: magister x Notary of the Civil Curia 1415–6: notarius x Judge 1431–32: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1432–33: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1443–44: x legum doctor Judge 1445–46: notarius x

Appellate Judge 1446–47

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1427–28: notarius x Judge 1454–5: x legum doctor

Consul’s Notary 1429–30: notarius x Appellate Judge 1457–58: x doctor

1436–37 Notary of the Civil Curia1 425–6: notarius x

Consul’s Notary 1439–40: notarius x Appellate Notary 1427–28: notarius x

Appellate Judge 1436–37: x legum doctor

Notary of the Civil Curia 1429–30: notarius x

Appellate Judge 1438–39: x legum doctor

267

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Orlandino (Orlando), Giovanni

Pace, Giovanni

Pantana, Giovanni

Saladino, Giovanni

Settesoldi, Enrico

Notary of the Civil Curia 1419–20: notarius x

Appellate Notary 1420–21

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1421– 22: notarius x

Consul’s Notary 1422–23

Treasurer 1427–28

Baiulus 1430–31

Consul 1436–37

Consul 1438–39

Consul 1441–42

Judge 1453–54

Appellate Judge 1419–20: x decretorum doctor

Judge 1421–22: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1423–24: x legum doctor

Judge 1425–26: x legum doctor

Judge 1427–28: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1430–31: x legum doctor

Judge 1432–33: x legum doctor

Judge 1436–37: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1439–40: x legum doctor

Judge 1440–41

Appellate Judge 1441–42: x legum doctor

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1426–27

Notary of the Civil Curia 1431–32

Notary of theCivil Curia 1436–37: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1438–39: notarius x

Appellate Judge 1439–40: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1443–44: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1445–6: notarius x

Appellate Notary 1446–47

Notary of the Civil Curia 1450–51: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1457–8: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1422–23

Notary of the Civil Curia 1425–26

Notary of the Civil Curia 1438–9: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1441–42: notarius x

Consul’s Notary 1443–44: notarius x

Consul’s Notary 1446–47

Judge 1447–48

Judge 1450–51: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1406–07

Judge 1420–21: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1421–22: decretorum doctor

Judge 1422–23

Judge 1424–25

Appellate Judge 1425–26: x legum doctor

Judge 1426–27: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1428–29: x legum doctor

Judge 1430–31: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1431–32: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1440–41: x legum doctor

Judge 1441–42: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1442–43: x legum doctor

268

Notary of the Civil Curia 1441–42: notarius x

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APPENDIX

Stannatellu, Vanni

Notary of the Civil Curia 1420–21: notarius x

Consul’s Notary 1423–24

Consul’s Notary 1426–27: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1450–51: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1451–52: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1457–58: notarius x

Judge 1423–24: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1426–27: x legum doctor

Terrachina,

Notary of the Civil Curia 1428–29

Notary of the Civil Curia 1432–33: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1440–1: notarius x

Judge 1428–29: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1429–30: x legum doctor

Judge 1438–39: x legum doctor

Judge 1446–47: x legum doctor

Andrea

Appellate Judge 1450–51: x legum doctor

Trenta, Andrea

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1422–23

Notary of the Civil Curia 1428–29

Appellate Notary 1442–3 notarius x

Appellate Notary 1458–59

Truxellu, Benedetto

Notary of the Civil Curia 1439–40

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1440–41

Notary of the Civil Curia 1447–8: notarius x

Appellate Notary 1451–52: notarius x

Appellate Notary 1457–58

Judge 1400–01: iudex x

Appellate Judge 1407–08: iudex x

Judge 1415–16

Appellate Judge 1420–21

Appellate Judge 1422–23: iudex x

Consul’s Notary 1432–33: notarius x

Judge 1443–44: notarius x licteratus

Appellate Judge 1447–48: notarius x

Appellate Judge 1451–52: notarius x

Vicencio, Giacomo

Appellate Judge 1424–25

Treasurer 1457–58 Zuccala, Alamanno

Consul’s Notary 1420–21

Note: *Antonio di Nicolao Filecha in 1445–46.

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

GROUP 2:

Notary of the Civil Curia

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

6

11

1

1

Matraya (Matraxia)

21

5

14

Bellavista

16

10

Castilluzu

16

5

8

Russu (Rubeo)

13

5

7

Bellomo

12

1

4

3

Novello

12

1

6

3

1

Arena

11

1

6

Iandasaro

11

1

1

Ianrusso

11

9

1

1

Leto

11

1

9

1

Michera

11

Vita

11

9

Terrachina

10

7

Vegna

10

5

2

1

Ricza

9

2

4

1

2

Amato

8

1

4

1

9 2

4

3

Catapan

Jurat

28

Treasurer

Judge

Termini

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Calascibetta

1

1

1

2 1 3

1 1 4

4

3

1

1

4

1

3

2 3 2

2

Guarino

8

1

2

Stingono

8

1

4

Xabo

8

2

5

1

Comparino

7

5

1

1

Tinnirello

7

2

1

Vinuto

7

5

Abella

6

3

Gravina

6

Labruto

6

Aidono

5

Dallipani (Lipani)

5

1

4

Incuccu

5

3

2

Tavi

5

270

1

1 1

3

1

1

2

1

1

3 3

1

2

3

5 2

3

3

2

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1

3

Bonsignuri

4

3

1

Inserra

4

2

2

Catapan

4

Treasurer

Jurat

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Judge

Barberi

Name

Number of recurrences

Notary of the Civil Curia

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Calascibetta

Serra

4

2

2

Abrucio

3

2

1

Adamello

3

2

1

Comperato

3

Crivella

3

Frixellu

3

Galicia

3

Guardo

3

Guchardo

3

1

Ianbarberio

3

3

Paladino

3

2

Riccobono

3

2 1 2 1

1 2

1 2

2

1

2

1 3

Other 72 names appear only once or twice.

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Calascibetta Arena, Bartolomeo

Jurat 1420–21: notarius x

Jurat 1422–23

Jurat 1426–27

Jurat 1447–48: notarius x

Barberi Matteo*

Jurat 1406–07

Jurat 1415–16: magister x

Jurat 1419–20: magister x

Judge 1425–26: magister x

Bellavista, Nofrio (Onofrio)

Judge 1422–23

Judge 1423–24: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1428–29

Notary of the Civil Curia 1430–31: notarius x

Judge 1432–33

Bellavista, Stefano

Judge 1402–03: notarius x

Judge 1405–06: notarius x

Judge 1415–16: notarius x

Judge 1419–20: notarius x

Judge 1427–28: notarius x

Bellomo, Giovanni

Notary of the Civil Curia 1441–42

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1443–44

Treasurer 1450–51

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1453–54

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1456–57: notarius x

Comparino, Adamo

Catapan 1430–31

Judge 1439–40: notarius x

Judge 1440–41: notarius x

Judge 1443–44: notarius x

Judge 1445–46: notarius x

Judge 1457–58: notarius x

Gravina, Giacomo

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1438–39

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1439–40: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1441–42

Jurat 1445–46

Jurat 1453–54

Jurat 1457–58

Notary of the Civil Curia 1398–99: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1419–20

Notary of the Civil Curia 1421–22

Jurat 1426–27

Jurat 1428–29

Jurat 1430–31

Jurat 1422–3: notarius x Jurat 1440–41: notarius x

Judge 1425–26: notarius x Jurat 1442–43: notarius x

Jurat 1426–27 Jurat 1444–45: magister x

Jurat 1429–30: notarius x Jurat 1447–48: notarius x

Judge 1431–32: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1453–54

Novello, Giovanni

Judge 1451–52 : notarius x

Judge 1429–30: notarius x

Jurat 1432–33

Termini,

Judge 1420–21: notarius x Judge 1438–39: notarius x

Ruggero Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1457–58: notarius x

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Judge 1426–27: notarius x Terrachina, Giovanni

Tinnirello, Pietro

Vinuto,

Judge 1428–29

Judge 1430–31: notarius x

Judge 1436–37: notarius x

Judge 1442–43: notarius x

Treasurer 1405–06: magister x

Treasurer 1415–16

Catapan 1421–22

Jurat 1423–24

Judge 1438–39

Notary of the Civil Curia 1431–32

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1437–38:

Judge 1440–41: notarius x

Judge 1442–43

Judge 1444–45: notarius x

Judge 1447–48: notarius x senior

Judge 1455–56: notarius x

Andrea

Judge 1450–51

notarius x Judge 1453–54: notarius x

Note: *Matteo di Giovanni in 1419–20. Leto Leto was elected several times as jurat, twice with the title of baron. See Chapter 5, note 109.

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

19

9

8

Matraxia

19

5

10

Rubeo (Russo)

17

3

3

Treasurer

Appellate Notary

Appellate Judge

2 4

16

7

6

Debili

15

3

5

La Monaca

15

Parisio

15

8

1

Collutortu

12

2

2

3

Mancuso

11

3

1

2

Bonacolti

10

1

4

Bonvichino

9

3

3

Imperatore

9

6

Nida

9

1

Caruso

8

5

Matrona

8

4

1

2

1

Iampapa

7

Iuliano

7

4

Pampilona

7

2

2

Guercio

7

2

3

Boniohanne

6

Seminaturi

6

Cesaria

5

Demma

5

2

4

2

1

2

1

1

1

5

Terri

5

2

Abrucio

4

2

Alexio

4

2

Aurifice

4

Canchilleri

4

1

Cussino

4

3

2

1

4

2

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

2 2 2 1

1

2 1

1

1

5

1

2

5

2

1

1

5

2

1

2

1

Ricza (Riccio)

1

1

1

1

Raya

1

5

4

1

1

2

2

3

1

3 1

10

3

7 2

Perfecto

274

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

15

Magister Excumbiarum

23

Leto

Catapan

Grimaldo

Notary of the Civil Curia

Jurat

Judge

Number of recurrences

Name

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Castrogiovanni

2

1

1

2

1 1 2 1

1 1

2

2

1 2 1

2

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APPENDIX

4

Spina

4

Valenti

4

Cali

3

2

1

Magister Excumbiarum

Mucicato

Catapan

4

Treasurer

Montana

Appellate Notary

4

Appellate Judge

Modula

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

1

4

Notary of the Civil Curia

4

Giglo

Jurat

Judge

Gardo

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Castrogiovanni

3 1

4 1 1

2

1

1

1

1 4

1

2

1

2

Cappilleri

3

1

Carbunello

3

2

Coppera

3

3

Gentili

3

2

1 1

1 1

1

Iosep

3

1

2

Malgerio

3

1

2

Novello Amarissimo*

3

Putrella

3

1

Salamone

3

2

Salemi

3

1

2 2 1

2

1

Other 96 names appear only once or twice. Note: *Only the surname Novello is recorded for the position as Jurat.

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Castrogiovanni Caruso, Grichisio

Treasurer 1407–08

Jurat 1415–16

Jurat 1421–22

Jurat 1428–29

Collutortu, Giovanni

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1437–38

Notary of the Civil Curia 1441–42

Notary of the Civil Curia 1444–45

Judge 1453–54: notarius x

Collutortu, Matteo

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1429–30

Notary of the Civil Curia 1432–33

Jurat 1438–39

Judge 1445–46: notarius x

Gardo, Simone

Notary of the Civil Curia 1401–02

Notary of the Civil Curia 1406–07

Judge 1425–26: notarius x

Iampapa, Tommaso

Notary of the Civil Curia 1419–20

Judge 1425–26

Judge 1431–2: notarius x

Iuliano, Guglielmo

Jurat 1402–03: notarius x

Jurat 1406–07: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1439–40

Leto, Federico

Judge 1398–99

Judge 1401–02

Judge 1407–08

Leto, Giacomo

Judge 1402–03: notarius x

Judge 1406–07: notarius x

Jurat 1431–32: notarius x

Mancuso, Tommaso

Notary of the Civil Curia 1422–23

Judge 1439–40

Judge 1443–44: notarius x

Matraxia, Giuliano

Judge 1429–30: notarius x

Judge 1438–39: notarius x

Judge 1441–42: notarius x

Modula, Pietro

Judge 1398–99: iudex x

Judge 1401–02

Judge 1406–07

276

Jurat 1432–33

Judge 1437–38

Judge 1443–44: notarius x

Judge 1419–20

Notary of the Civil Curia 1443–44

Judge 1444–45: notarius x

Jurat 1436–3 7: x miles

Judge 1455–56: notarius x

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APPENDIX

Designations of Officials in Castrogiovanni Parisio, Andrea

Judge 1407–08: notarius x

Judge 1415–16: iudex x

Catapan 1437–38

Catapan 1440–41

Perfecto, Batolomeo

Judge 1420–21

Judge 1422–23: notarius x

Jurat 1425–26: notarius x

Judge 1437–38: notarius x

Perfecto, Francesco

Judge 1399–00

Judge 1402–03: notarius x

Judge 1405–06: notarius x

Catapan 1441–42

Seminaturi, Enrico

Notary of the Civil Curia 1436–37

Judge 1442–43: notarius x

Jurat 1444–45: notarius x

Judge 1440–41: notarius x

Note: The Nida onomastic group included Giovanni, a notarius as well as another Nida of the same name. Both were elected in 1450–51 making it impossible to discern if it was the notarius who was elected the other times and whether he was elected three times or not.

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Catapan

1

5

17

1

2

11

1

4

1

9

1

1

Munsuni

14

Richuli

14

2

9

Traversa

12

3

Ansalone

10

1

Rocca

10

Castello

9

Guerreri

9

1

3

Grifo

8

1

4

Canpixano

7

Santo Angelo

7

3

1

Tudisco

7

3

2

Iuveni

6

3

2

1

4

7

2

7

1

8 4

1

1 1

1

3 3

3

4 2

1 2

Mulia

6

2

1

3

Pitrusu

6

1

3

2

Prothopapa

6

2

2

Alexandrano

5

2

Gaitano

5

1

Medicu

5

Pixi

5

Massari

4

Stammacca

4

1

Vernagallu

4

2

Asmari

3

Blundo

3

Caripipi

3

1

Constancio

3

3

Cucuza

3

1

Cultelli

3

2

1

Denti

3

1

2

Guaglardu

3

278

1

1

2

1

3 1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1 3

1

1

1

4

3

Magister Excumbiarum

Treasurer

Appellate Notary

1

Appellate Judge

19

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Rizzari

Notary of the Patricius

1

Jurat

25

Judge

Patricius

Paternò (Patrimone)

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Catania

1 1

1 2 2

2 3 1

1

1

1

3

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APPENDIX

Maniscalco

3

Maniuni

3

Mauro

3

Mura

3

Pandolfo

3

Pissibus

3

Plantafava

3

Platamone

3

Scagnaru

3

Taranto

3

Triguna

3

Viperano

3

Magister Excumbiarum

Catapan

Treasurer

Appellate Notary

Appellate Judge

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Notary of the Patricius

Jurat

Judge

Patricius

Number of recurrences

Name

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Catania

3 2

1 1

2 3

1

2 2

1 3

2

1 3 2

1 1

1

1

1

2

Other 122 names appear only once or twice.

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Catania Ansalone, Nicola

Jurat 1427–28: x arcium et medicine doctor

Jurat 1450–51: x arcium et medicine doctor

Jurat 1457–8: nobilis x

Guerreri, Berengario

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1438–39: notarius x

Notary of the Patricius 1451–52: notarius x

Judge 1457–58: nobilis x legum doctor

Medicu, Pietro

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1432–33: notarius x

Notary of the Patricius 1438–39: notarius x

Notary of the Patricius 1447–48: notarius x

Paternò (Patrimone), Benedetto

Jurat 1419–20: x iunior

Jurat 1422–23: x minor

Appellate Judge 1457–58: nobilis x legum doctor

Richuli, Antonio

Jurat 1412–13/ 1413–14

Jurat 1421–22

Jurat 1427–28

Rizzari, Giovanni*

Judge 1428–29: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1432–33: x legum doctor

Judge 1444–45: x legum doctor

Rizzari, Nicola**

Catapan 1423–24

Jurat 1428–29

Jurat 1445–46

Jurat 1457–58: nobilis x

Santo Angelo, Blasco

Judge 1423–24: x legum doctor

Judge 1430–31: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1438–39

Appellate Judge 1440–41: x legum doctor

Notary of the Patricius 1453–54: notarius x

Judge 1450–51: x legum doctor

Appellate Judge 1456–57: x legum doctor

Judge 1445–46: x legum doctor

Notes: The Rocca onomastic group included Giovanni, a notarius, as well as another official of the same name. Both were elected in 1428–29 making it impossible to discern if it was the notarius who was elected the other times and whether he was elected three times or not. *In 1412–13 and 1413–14, Giovannuccio Rizzari was elected as Jurat and is not considered to be the same person as Giovanni. **In 1428–29, the jurat was Colo which is considered to be short for Nicola.

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APPENDIX

5

1

6

Carusu

11

1

Dato

11

1

6

1

Pullichino

11

5

1

Bellasai

10

5

3

Provina

10

1

5

Adinolfo

9

1

4

Carnilivari

8

Lulianti (Ulianti)

6

2

Maniscalco

6

2

Carubeni

5

Guastu

5

3

3

5

4

Oddo (Odo)

5

1

Ribaldo

5

Salonia

5

1

1

1 1

1

2

1

1 1

2

1

1

1

2

1 4

1

1

Barbilatu

4

1

2

Danieli

4

2

Guarino

4

1

Grechis

4

Liotta

4

Pipi

4

2 1

1

1

3 1

1

1

3 1

1 2

2

1 1 1

1

3 3

1

Burgisi

3

2

Chivellu

3

2

1 1

1

Andrella

1

1

2

Alfano

3

3

2

1

5

Genuisi

1

3

1

2

4

3

2

1

Avula

3

2

7

2

Ursone

Cursiccu

1

3

1 1

3

Landolina

Costancio

1

Magister Excumbiarum

14

1

Catapan

Speciale

Treasurer

11

Appellate Notary

1

Appellate Judge

Jurat

2

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Judge

18

Notary of the Civil Curia

Patricius

Cappello

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Noto

3

3 2 1 1 2 1 1

1 2

2

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Ligori

3

Longu

3

Maczono

3

Maiorana

3

3

Marino

3

1

Marrasi

3

Novello

3

Quadro

3

2

Vasto

3

1

1 1

1

Magister Excumbiarum

Catapan

Treasurer

Appellate Notary 1

1

1

1 2

1

2 2 1

Other 104 names appear only once or twice.

282

Appellate Judge

2

3

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Jurat

1

Iangucio

Notary of the Civil Curia

Judge

Patricius

Number of recurrences

Name

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Noto

1

1

1 1

1

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APPENDIX

Designations of Officials in Noto Andrella, Antonio

Notary of the Civil Curia 1443–44: notarius x

Notary of th Civil Curia 1447–8: notarius x

Judge 1454–55 : licteratus x notarius

Bellasai, Pruderince/ Prudesi/ Prudentis

Jurat 1401–02: notarius x

Treasurer 1442–43

Judge 1447–48

Judge 1399–00: notarius x

Jurat 1440–41

Jurat 1444–45

Cappello, Antonio/ Antonio di Friderico/ Antonio di Chicco

Jurat 1447–48

Jurat 1454–55

Appellate Judge 1457–58

Judge 1442–43: notarius x

Judge 1445–46

Judge 1457–58: notarius x licteratus

Jurat 1458–59 Danieli, Giovanni

Notary of the Civil Curia 1408–09

Judge 1441–42

Judge 1444–45: magister x

Dato, Nicola

Judge 1404–05: notarius x

Judge 1420–21: xnotarius x

Judge 1423–24: notarius x

Iangucio, Federico

Judge 1440–41: magister x

Jurat 1444–45

Jurat 1457–58: magister x

Landolina, Simone

Patricius 1405–06: x miles

Patricius 1408–09: x miles

Patricius 1415–16: x miles

Liotta, Pietro

Notary of the Civil Curia 1439–40: notarius x

Judge 1443–44: notarius x

Judge 1448–49: notarius x

Maioranna, Accardo

Judge 1401–02: notarius x

Judge 1405–06: notarius x

Judge 1408–09: notarius x

Pullichino, Filippo

Judge 1399–00

Jurat 1404–05

Appellate Notary 1440–41

Quadro, Antonio

Notary of the Civil Curia 1440–41: notarius x

Judge 1445–46: notarius x

Judge 1458–59: notarius xx

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Notary of the Civil Curia

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

12

7

4

4

Amoro

25

5

10

1

Crapanzano

24

2

9

4

Catapan

Jurat

29

Treasurer

Judge

Barbarino

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Piazza

2 9

1

8

3

1

Bisacza

19

5

5

3

Risignolo

15

2

6

3

Columba

15

5

8

1

Bruno

14

1

7

Taurmina

14

6

8

Fessina

12

3

7

Monteleone

12

4

3

Calascibetta

11

2

4

Riczo

11

7

1

1

2

La Turri

10

2

3

1

4

Libiano

10

Apatri

9

1

1

2

8

1

3

8

2

5

Scalisi

8

5

2

Bono Amico

7

1

4

Aidone

6

3

Carnilivari

6

1

Criximano

6

Gaita

6

1

4 3

1

1

1 1

1 1

1 4

4

1

1

1

1

2

1 1

3

Girachi

6

5

1

Naso

6

1

1

Pitrella

6

Grigorio

5

1

1

Iunta

5

1

4

Santo Giorgio

5

2

2

Serralonga

5

Bellacurtina

4

La Curte

4

284

2

1 1

Ridocco

4

1

3

Cagno

1

2

9 3

6

1

3

1

6 1

1

1

1 3

2

4 4

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APPENDIX

Macalda

4

2

Malecta

4

2

2 3

Mollo

4

1

Mucicato

4

3

1

Stilla

4

2

1

Bono

3

Cafaglono

3

Gallecta

3

Notaro Guido dicto di Giglo*

3

1

Fontana

3

3

Lo Papa

3

1

Nasellu

3

3

Catapan

2

Treasurer

2

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Jurat

4

Notary of the Civil Curia

Judge

La Greca

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Piazza

1

1

1 3 3

1 1

2 1

2

Russo

3

3

Sallimbeni

3

2

Santo Philippo

3

2

1 1

Other 113 names appear only once or twice. Note: * Once as “notaro Guido dicto di Giglo”, twice as “di Giglo”.

285

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Piazza Aidone, Bernardo*

Judge 1428–29: notarius x

Judge 1440–41

Judge 1453–54: notarius x

Amoro, Pietro

Notary of the Civil Curia 1404–05

Jurat 1407–08: notarius x

Judge 1420–21: notarius x

Judge 1424–25: notarius x

Apatri, Giovanni

Treasurer 1424–25

Judge 1429–30: magister x

Jurat 1432–33

Judge 1444–45

Bellacurtina, Antonio

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1428–29: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1440–41: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1448–49: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1454–55: notarius x

Cagno, Antonio

Notary of the Civil Curia 1421–22

Notary of the Civil Curia 1424–25

Judge 1431–32: notarius x

Carnilivari, Minotta

Treasurer 1439–40

Treasurer 1444–45

Catapan 1448– 49: magister x

Treasurer 1453–54

Columba, Giovanni**

Jurat 1401–02: notarius x

Jurat 1404–05: notarius x

Judge 1425–26: notarius x

Judge 1429–30: notarius x

Fontana, Gaspano

Judge 1402–03

Judge 1405–06: notarius x

Judge 1426–27

Girachi, Gerardo

Jurat 1398–99: notarius x

Judge 1401–02: notarius x

Judge 1404–05: notarius x

Malecta, Giovanni

Judge 1404–05: notarius x

Judge 1422–23: notarius x

Jurat 1454–55

Riczo, Giovanni

Judge 1424–25: notarius x maior

Judge 1427–28

Judge 1430–31

Judge 1453–54

Risignolo, Bernardo

Notary of the Civil Curia 1401–02

Judge 1427–28

Jurat 1430–31: notarius x

Risignolo, Severino/ Savario Sallimbeni, Bartolomeo

Notary of the Civil Curia 1403–04: notarius x Catapan 1425–26

Notary of the Civil Curia 1406–07: notarius x Jurat 1406–07: notarius x Jurat 1441– 42: x miles

Jurat 1445–46: dominus x

Taurmina, Ottaviano

Judge 1439–40: notarius x

Judge 1443– 44: notarius x licteratus

Judge 1450–51: notarius x licteratus

Catapan 1447–48

Judge 1432–33: notarius x

Catapan 1453–54

Catapan 1440–41

Jurat 1451–52

Judge 1407–08: notarius x

Jurat 1424–25: notarius x

Notes: *The 1453–54 list records, “Judge licteratus of the Civil Curia notarius Bernardo Aidono”, which is followed by the list of ideoti judges. **Giovanni Bernardo was Catapan in 1453–54. The Barbarino onomastic group included Giovanni, a notarius as well as another official of the same name. Both were elected in 1456–57 making it impossible to discern if it was the notarius who was elected the other times and whether he was elected three times or not.

286

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GRUPPO 3: Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Milazzo Name

Number of recurrences

Judge

Jurat

Treasurer

Marlisio

24

3

20

1

Pacti

20

5

13

2

Rao

16

8

6

2

Caristi

15

3

11

1

Liveri

15

1

12

2

Cambria

13

10

3

Cali

12

6

3

1

Tufulecta

12

4

6

2

Chircu

10

7

3

Amico

9

9

Milacio

7

7

Munforti

7

3

Bictu

6

6

3

1

Caro (Caio)

6

2

3

1

Maiulino

6

1

4

1

Agnello

5

1

Aliberto

5

Correnti

5

Sapuritu

5

Specie

5

Viniachitu

5

5

Clerico

4

1

Lucta

4

4

Avili

3

3

Bergamasco

3

Conforti

3

1

2

Fariuni

3

1

2 2

Notary of the Civil Curia

2

4 5

4

1 5 5

3

3

Oliveti

3

1

Perricholo

3

3

Salvastutu

3

1

Xilipodi

3

3

2

287

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Milazzo Agnello, Giovanni

Jurat 1427–28: notarius x

Jurat 1430–31 notarius x

Jurat 1439–40: notarius x

Judge 1447–48: notarius x

Jurat 1455–56

Notary of the Civil Curia 1412/13– 1413/14

Judge 1419–20

Judge 1425–26

Judge 1430–31

Jurat 1423–24

Judge 1441–42: notarius x

Treasurer 1443–44: notarius x

Judge 1445–46: notarius x

Liveri, Paolo

Jurat 1437–38

Treasurer 1439–40

Jurat 1441–42: notarius x

Treasurer 1451–52: notarius x

Lucta, Antonio

Judge 1421–22: notarius x

Judge 1428–29

Judge 1432–33

Judge 1436–37

Marlisio, Santoro

Jurat 1406–07

Jurat 1422–23: notarius x

Jurat 1425–26: notarius x

Jurat 1430–31

Cali, Giovanni

288

Treasurer 1436–37: notarius x

Jurat 1432–33

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APPENDIX

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Nicosia Name

Number of recurrences

Jurat

Judge

Speciali*

28

7

9

Alexi

25

7

10

La Via (Lavia)

24

13

2

Xaxa

21

10

7

Lombardo

20

4

Cesaria

16

Iamblundo

15

Notary of Notary of the the Civil Curia Jurats’ Curia

Treasurer

Catapan

3

9

1

3

4

1

2

6

1

3

6

2

3

5

7

4

2

5

2

5

Salamone

14

4

7

3

Sillico

14

8

5

1

Urso

14

7

3

Starfillicu

13

2

2

3

12

9

1

2

La Fontana

12

8

1

1

Fulco

12

1

2

1

Cammarana

10

4

5

Migne (Mignia)

8

2

Bavusu

7

5

1

1 1

7

1

2

7

4

1

Testa

7

2

Caterini

6

Maniavacca

6

Blasio

5

Maniuni

5

Russo

2

4

2 4

1

1

4

5

2 2

1

3

2

2

2

1

1

1

3

1

1

2

1

1

1

5

3

2

Xibona

5

5

Caldarera

4

2

Chiramidali

4

1

Don Guida

4

Gallina

4

Marco

4

4

Mercatanti

4

3

3

2

1 1

Sabia

1

4

Baldo

Carmixano

3

1

2 3 1 3

1

2 1

1

289

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Nicosia Name

Number of recurrences

Navarra

4

Jurat

Judge

2

1

1

1

4

4

4

1

Rugumeri

4

Theodato

4

2

Vaccaro

4

1

Capuanu

3

3

Cavafilichi

3

2

Furbica

3

1

3 3

4 2 3

1 2 3

3

Other 67 names appear only once or twice. Note: * A Miroldu has also been included in the tally as “Giovanni Speciali alias Miroldu” was Catapan in 1407–08.

290

Catapan

1

Notaro Paulo

Ravello

Treasurer

1

Orlando

Moncada

Notary of Notary of the the Civil Curia Jurats’ Curia

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APPENDIX

Designations of Officials in Nicosia Notary of the Civil Curia 1405–06

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1406–07

Judge 1413–14: notarius x

Judge 1420–21: notarius x

Catapan 1430–31: notarius x

Judge 1441–42 Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1421–22

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1423–24

Judge 1428–29

Jurat 1431–32: notarius x

Jurat 1442–43

Alexi, Lancia

Judge 1403–04: notarius x

Judge 1406–07: notarius x

Judge 1415–16: notarius x

Caterini, Giovanni

Notary of the Civil Curia 1399–00: notarius x

Judge 1407–08

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1420–21

Judge 1422–23

Notary of the Civil Curia 1426–27: notarius x

Don Guida, Guglielmo

Catapan 1431–32

Catapan 1441–42

Judge 1453–54: licteratus x legum doctor

La Via (Lavia), Aloisio/ Loisio

Catapan 1413–4

Notary of the Civil Curia 1423–24

Jurat 1430–31

Jurat 1431–32

Jurat 1436–37

Lombardo, Nicola

Judge 1431–32: notarius x

Jurat 1440–41

Judge 1443–44: notarius x

Judge 1447–48: notarius x

Judge 1456–57: notarius x

Lombardo Pietro

Jurat 1423–24

Catapan 1426–27

Catapan 1429–30

Catapan 1432–33: notarius x

Catapan 1440–41

Rugumeri, Giovanni

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1424–25

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1428–29

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1432–33: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1436–37

Salamone, Nicola

Judge 1405–06: notarius x

Judge 1407–08

Judge 1422–23: notarius x

Judge 1438–39: notarius x

Sillico, Antonio

Judge 1401–02: magister x

Jurat 1406–07: magister x

Judge 1419–20

Judge 1423–24: magister x

Speciale, Andrea

Judge 1419–20: notarius x*

Judge 1424–25: notarius x

Judge 1428–29

Judge 1432–33: notarius x

Alexi, Bartolomeo

Alexi, Giovanni

Judge 1437–38: notarius x

Jurat 1441–42: magister x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1457–58

Judge 1442–43: notarius x

Judge 1436–37: notarius x

Judge1439– 40: notarius x

291

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Nicosia Speciale, Francesco

Jurat 1438–39

Jurat 1443–44

Judge 1448–49: notarius x

Judge 1451–52: notarius x

Starfillicu, Bartolomeo

Notary of the Civil Curia 1420–21: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1428–29

Notary of the Civil Curia 1436–37

Judge 1439–40

Urso, Tommaso

Catapan 1419–20

Jurat 1422–23

Jurat 1426–27

Jurat 1432–33: magister x

Jurat 1437–38

Jurat 1445–46

Judge1403–04: notarius x

Judge 1406–07: notarius x

Judge 1413–14: notarius x

Jurat 1420–21

Judge 1423–24: notarius x

Judge 1426–27: notarius x

Jurat 1432–33: notarius x

Catapan 1457–58

Jurat 1401–02

Jurat 1405–06: magister x

Jurat 1413–14: magister x

Jurat 1419–20: magister x

Jurat 1423–24: magister x

Xaxa, Giacomo

Xibona, Andrea

Note: *Notarius Andrea Speciale dictum Bisgaga.

292

Judge 1455–56: notarius x

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APPENDIX

Catapan

Magister Excumbiarum

2

22

1

5

2

Amato

26

5

3

14

3

1

Riccardo

23

13

2

3

4

1

Storchagatta

22

9

9

1

Maniscalco

20

Lu Prothu

19

Santo Honofrio

18

Bonifacio

15

Guchardino

15

Turturito

13

Milisari

10

Seroddo

10

Vita

10

Barbaro

9

La Matina

9

Stabili

9

La Amendula (La Mendula)

8

1

7 2

1

2

4

3

1

2

4

2

1

2

6

3

6

7

1

6

1

9

1

2

7

1 1

1

1 2

5

5

5

Treasurer

Jurat

3

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Judge

35

Notary of the Civil Curia

Baiulus

Russu

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Patti

3

7

1 1

3 1

4

2

1

1 6

2

2

1 1

3

1

9 1

3

3

1

2

1

1

Virgilio

8

2

Bizolo

7

4

Ganata

6

1

Pisanu

6

Suppa

6

Arlotta

5

Bonfilio

5

3

Bonsignoro

5

3

Buxu

5

2

Domino Odone

5

2

Gallo

5

Ianlongo

5

1 4 6

3 3

2

3

3

3

1

2

4

1 1

1

1

1 1

2

1 3

Maczagluni

5

1

Manchino

5

1

Trenta

5

2 2

1

4

2

2

4

1

4

293

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Bagluni

4

Cachola

4

Calio

4

Chipiro

4

Francavilliti

4

Iannella

4

1

Renda

4

2

Sapiencia

4

Chipulla

3

Guxeres

3

Migliorino

3

Ruaso

3

Salvo

3

Tummino

3

Vicencio

3

1

2

2

Treasurer

1

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia

Notary of the Civil Curia

1

4 2

2 4

3

1 1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2 3 1

1

Other 47 names appear only once or twice.

294

Magister Excumbiarum

4

Catapan

Aragona

Jurat

Judge

Baiulus

Number of recurrences

Name

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Patti

1 1 1 3

2 1

1

1 1

1

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APPENDIX

Designations of Officials in Patti Amato, Antonio

Judge 1404–05: notarius x

Judge 1407–08: notarius x

Calio, Giovanni

Notary of the Civil Curia 1442–43

Judge 1447–48

Judge 1451–52: notarius x

Ganata, Antonio

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1439–40

Notary of the Civil Curia 1441–42: notarius x

Judge 1444–45: notarius x

Ganata, Branca

Notary of the Civil Curia 1436–37: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1437–38: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1439–40

Guchardino, Nardo/ Leonardo

Notary of the Civil Curia 1431–32

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1438–39: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1440–41

Notary of the Civil Curia 1445–46

Judge 1450–51

Notary of the Civil Curia 1455–56

Notary of the Civil Curia 1398–99

Notary of the Civil Curia 1404–05

Jurat 1407–08

Judge 1420–21

Judge 1423–24: notarius x

Judge 1425–26: notarius x

Judge 1427–28

Judge 1431–32: notarius x

Judge 1438–39: notarius x

Lu Prothu, Vinchio

Judge 1399–00: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1401–02: notarius x

Judge 1403–4: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1405–06

Maniscalco, Baldo

Notary of the Civil Curia 1438–39

Judge 1442–43: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1444–45

Notary of the Civil Curia 1447–48

Judge 1450–51: notarius x

Judge 1455–56: licteratus notarius x

Catapan 1427–28

Judge 1430–31

Judge 1437–38

Judge 1441–42: magister x

Judge 1445–46: magister x

Treasurer 1451–52

Notary of the Civil Curia 1426–27: notarius x

Judge 1432–33: notarius x

Judge 1436–37: notarius x

Guchardino, Vinchio

Maniscalco, Matteo

Renda, Giovanni

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1445–46 Judge 1457–58: notarius x licteratus

Treasurer 1457–58: magister x Notary of the Civil Curia 1419–20: notarius x

295

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Patti

Riccardo, Antonio

Riccardo, Francesco/ Chicco

Santo Honofrio, Chicco/ Francesco

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1403–04: notarius x

Judge 1405–06

Judge 1422–23: notarius x

Judge 1426–27: notarius x

Judge 1428–29: notarius x

Judge 1430–31: notarius x

Judge 1437–38: notarius x

Judge 1440–41: notarius x

Judge 1442–43

Jurat 1443–44: notarius x

Judge 1447–48: notarius x

Jurat 1453–54: notarius x

Judge 1455–56

Judge 1456–57: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1422–23

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1425–26

Notary of the Civil Curia 1427–28

Judge 1439–40: notarius x

Judge 1441–42: notarius x

Judge 1443–44: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1415–16

Notary of the Civil Curia 1423–24: notarius x

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1428–29

Notary of the Civil Curia 1430–31

Jurat 1437–38

Jurat 1443–44

Jurat 1456–57

Stabili, Antonio*

Notary of the Jurats’ Curia 1404–05

Judge 1405–06

Judge 1407–08

Judge 1421–22: notarius x

Trenta, Giovanni

Jurat 1438–39

Jurat 1441–42

Jurat 1444–45: notarius x

Jurat 1456–57

Note: *Antonio di Sexa dictu di Stabili in 1404–05.

296

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APPENDIX

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Polizzi Name

Number of recurrences

Judge

Jurat

Notary of the Civil Curia

Treasurer

Perdicaru Denti Salamone Faxana Guardabaxu Miroldo Galegra Ruffino Clara

27 25 20 16 16 13 12 11 10

11

10 9 15 15 5

5

1

Sponzello Paulillu Lu Chircu Farfaglia La Cuppera Lu ludici Minardo Notaro Bartolo Pigneri Bertulino Cavaleri Guastalacqua La Matina Benchivinni Baieri Ferrari Magru Milacio Calatanixecta Carbona Chaulino Laurifithi Lichavi Renda Testa Alferi Cassaro Laxa Liricu Maniscalco Pintu Trabugla

10 9 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

2

3 7 4 4 7

5 3 6 5 3 1 2 4 2 3 4 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1

4 5

16 5 1 4 3 1 2 2

4 3 3 1

3 9 8 3 1 2 1

5

4 1 2 1

7 1 4 4 6 1 5

Catapan

1 1

1 1

3 2 1 2

1 1

1 3 1 2 1 1 3 1

1

1 2 1

1 1

1 2 2 2

Other 58 names appear only once or twice.

297

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

Designations of Officials in Polizzi

Chaulino, Simone

Notary of the Civil Curia 1413–14: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1421–22

Judge 1423–24: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1428–29

Clara, Giovanni

Notary of the Civil Curia 1431–32: notarius x

Judge 1438–39: notarius x

Judge 1444–45

Judge 1446–47

Judge 1453–54

Judge 1455–56

Ferrari, Antonio

Notary of the Civil Curia 1422–23: notarius x

Judge 1425–26: notarius x

Judge 1444–45

Guardabaxu, Andrea

Notary of the Civil Curia 1427–28

Catapan 1429–30

Notary of the Civil Curia 1430–31: notarius x

Judge 1432–33

Notary of the Civil Curia 1436–37

Catapan 1442–43/ 1443–4

La Cuppera, Nicola

Jurat 1427–28

Judge 1429–30: magister x

Judge 1438–39

Magru, Nicola

Notary of the Civil Curia 1398–99

Notary of the Civil Curia 1407–08

Judge 1420–21: notarius x

Judge 1424–25

Judge 1436–37: notarius x

Maniscalco, Giovanni

Catapan 1397–98: magister x

Catapan 1405–06

Judge 1419–20

Minardo, Leonardo/ Nardo

Judge 1431–32

Judge 1437–38

Judge 1442–43/144 3–44

Judge 1447–48

Jurat 1458–59: dominus x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1425–26

Notary of the Civil Curia 1429–30

Judge 1432–33: notarius x

Judge 1437–38: notarius x

Judge 1447–48: notarius x

Judge 1422–23

Judge 1426–27: notarius x

Miroldo, Antonio

Judge 1458–59: x licteratus

Miroldo, Francesco

Notary of the Civil Curia 1437–38: notarius x

Judge 1442–43/14 43–44: notarius x

Notaro Bartolo, Francesco Perdicaru, Federico

Judge 1450–1: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1403–04: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1453–54 Judge 1419–20: notarius x

298

Judge 1457–58 Notary of the Civil Curia 1420–21: notarius x

Judge 1451–52

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APPENDIX

Number of recurrences

Judge

Jurat

Notary of the Civil Curia

Treasurer

Catapan

Tezu

33

2

20

1

2

8

Russu

25

5

9

1

1

7

Modica

22

5

10

19

4

9

3

Lombardu

16

7

2

1

Milia (Miglia)

16

7

6

Omodeo (Homodeo)

16

5

4

1

1

2

4

1

2 1

2

1 4

Cavallaru

14

2

5

1

6

Pellicano

13

4

2

2

4

Ravida

13

5

6

2

Basilico

12

1

7

3

La Scala

12

1

10

1

Traversa

12

2

5

5

Camarda

11

8

2

Santo Angelo

11 10

2

10

2

Grassu

10

Rustica

10

1

1

1

1

6

Firraru

2

7

Vitali

Calatagirono

Magister Excumbiarum

Name

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Randazzo

3

2

3

2

3

4

2

1

5

5

2

6

2

5

3

1

7

Panormo

9

Raisi

9

2

Stavello

9

2

2

3

2

Curbello

8

1

3

1

3

Lanza

8

1

Carduchu

7

7

Currenti

7

1

Manianti

7

5

Spatafora

7

Speciali

7

Incunbao

6

1

4

1

2

5

1

2 1

6

4

2

3

3

299

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GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITATES

4

Cathania

5

Gracia

1 1

1 5

5

1

Marotta

5

1

Miliotu

5

3

Nastasio

5

3

Pixi

5

Aurifichi

4

Caldararu

4

1

Camarano

4

4

4 4 2 1

1 1

2

2 4

3

Cita

4

1

Crisafi

4

2

Pasia

4

2

1

Vinuta

4

2

2

Castronovo

3

Chappata

3

Florencia

3

Malancio

3

1

Pichulu

3

1

Sinopuli

3

2

1 2

1

1

1

1

3 3

Other 82 names appear only once or twice.

300

Magister Excumbiarum

6

Catapan

Musarra

Treasurer

5

Notary of the Civil Curia

6

Jurat

Judge

Lu Malatinu

Name

Number of recurrences

Officials Elected by Scrutiny in Randazzo

1

1 2 3

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APPENDIX

Designations of Officials in Randazzo Aurifichi, Signorello

Magister Excumbiarum 1420–21

Camarda, Antonio

Judge 1405–06: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1426–27 Jurat 1456–57: notarius x

Camarda, Pino

Carduchu, Giovanni Currenti, Matteo Florencia, Enrico

Lombardu, Antonio

Lombardu, Theodaro/ Theodato Milia (Miglia), Paolo Modica, Bartolomeo Musarra, Pino Nastasio, Nicola Pellicano, Antonio Ravida, Vinchio/ Binchi

Magister Excumbiarum 1441–2: magister x Judge 1425–26: notarius x

Magister Excumbiarum 1444–45: magister x Judge 1445–46: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1429–30

Judge 1437–8: notarius x

Judge 1429–30: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1445–46 Notary of the Civil Curia 1419–20

Judge 1432–33: notarius x

Judge 1437–38

Notary of the Civil Curia 1450–51 Notary of the Civil Curia 1423–24: notarius x

Judge 1457–58: notarius x licteratus Notary of the Civil Curia 1441–42: notarius x

Judge 1408–09: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1424–25 Jurat 1451–52

Catapan 1413–14: notarius x Treasurer 1428–29: notarius x

Judge 1423–24: notarius x

Treasurer 1408–09: iudex x Judge 1403–04: notarius x Notary of the Civil Curia 1397–98 Judge 1408–09

Jurat 1455–56

Jurat 1458–59

Judge 1406–07: notarius x

Judge 1423–24

Judge 1405–6: notarius x

Judge 1415–16: notarius x

Judge 1420–21: notarius x

Jurat 1421–22: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1421–22 Judge 1413–14: notarius x

Notary of the Civil Curia 1425–26 Judge 1419–20

Judge 1432–33

Catapan 1432–33

Judge 1422–23: notarius x

Magister Excumbiarum 1447–48: magister x Judge 1448–49: notarius x Judge 1441–42: notarius x

Jurat 1447–48

Judge 1453–4: notarius x

Judge 1447–48: notarius x

Judge 1451–52: notarius x

Judge 1456–57: notarius x

Judge 1428–29: notarius x Judge 1436–37: notarius x

Judge 1431–32

Judge 1426–27: notarius x Judge 1430–31: notarius x Judge 1423–24: notarius x Judge 1444–45: notarius x Judge 1426–27: notarius x

Judge 1431–32

Judge 1439–40: notarius x

Judge 1445–46: notarius x

Treasurer 1444–45 Judge 1447–48: notarius x Judge 1429–20

Judge 1455–46: notarius x

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Russu, Giovanni* Sinopuli, Nicola

Speciali, Amico

Judge 1419–20: notarius x Magister Excumbiarum 1427–28

Jurat 1430–31

Catapan 1450–51

Magister Excumbiarum 1432–33

Magister Excumbiarum 1447–48: magister x

Jurat 1401–02: magister x

Jurat 1404–05: magister x

Judge 1408–09: magister x

Judge 1455–56

Jurat 1457–58

Jurat 1458–59

Note: *Giovannuccio Russu, elected in 1404–05, has not been counted. Giovanni Amici is the jurat’s name in 1457–58. Giovanni Russu filius Petri Russu is Judge in 1455–56.

302

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INDEXES

INDEX OF AUTHORS Abulafia, David, 140. Agnello, Giuseppe M., 144. Ago, Renata, 4. Airò, Anna, 57, 164. Alberola Romá, Armando, 188. Álvarez De Morales, Antonio, 126. Artifoni, Enrico, 111, 154. Autrand, Françoise, 208. Aymard, Maurice, 145. Balsamo, Francesco, 63. Barbato, Angelo, 31, 33, 35, 38–39, 53–54, 56, 68, 106, 110–111, 134, 144, 161, 169, 177, 191, 196, 211. Barbero, Alessandro, 34, 47, 138, 149, 210. Barceló Crespí, Maria, 146. Barlucchi, Andrea, 80. Barraqué, Jean-Pierre, 69. Barrio Barrio, Juan A., 9, 12, 41, 67, 118, 188. Bartoli Langeli, Attilio, 211. Batlle Gallart, Carme, 9, 11, 14, 74, 89, 146, 170, 188. Baviera Albanese, Adelaide, 2, 8, 12, 19–23, 55–56, 63, 65, 83, 104, 109, 112, 189. Belenguer Cebrià, Ernest, 4, 186. Bellomo, Manlio, 114. Beloch, Karl J., 16. Beneyto Pérez, Juan, 149. Benigno, Francesco, 7, 11, 22, 50, 145. Berengo, Marino, 125–126. Bernabé, Gil D., 4, 188. Bertelli, Sergio, 87. Bertran Roigé, Prim, 120. Besta, Enrico, 18. Bien, David D, 149. Bijsterveld, Arnoud-Jan, 208. Blockmans, Wim, 132, 134. Boone, Marc, 142. Bordone, Renato, 111.

Bourlet, Caroline, 213. Bousmar, Éric, 114. Boutier, Jean, 9. Bowsky, William M., 141, 143. Braunstein, Philippe, 169. Bresc, Henri, 2, 16, 17, 23, 28, 43, 51, 68, 88, 129, 131–133, 135, 138, 143, 149, 155, 157, 160, 162–164, 166, 171, 174, 179–180, 185–187, 197, 205, 207, 211–213. Bulst, Neithard, 134, 208. Burgarella, Pietro, 65. Busqueta Riu, Joan J., 9, 146, 170. Cabezuelo Pliego, Jose V., 12, 118. Calasso, Francesco, 18–20. Caldarella, Antonino, 138. Calisse, Carlo, 18. Cammarosano, Paolo, 1, 3. Cancila, Orazio, 136. Cancila, Rossella, 143. Caravale, Mario, 11, 20–21, 23. Carlé, María del Carmen, 10, 188. Casado Alonso, Hilario, 10, 134, 189. Castelnuovo, Guido, 47, 122, 149, 159, 175, 210, 211. Catalano Tirrito, Michele, 61, 66. Catalioto, Luciano, 115. Cauchies, Jean-Marie, 114. Cerdá Ruiz Funes, Joaquín, 149, 189. Cerutti, Simona, 9, 90, 169, 172, 175, 182. Chédeville, André, 174, 180. Chevalier, Bernard, 121, 146, 179. Chiffoleau, Jacques, 174. Chiodi, Giovanni, 168. Collantes de Terán Sánchez, Antonio, 11, 41, 140, 143. Colliva, Paolo, 21. Collodo, Silvana, 167. Comparato, Vittor Ivo, 149. Contamine, Philippe, 134. Conti, Elio, 147. 303

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Cordova, Vincenzo, 55. Corrao, Pietro, 2, 3, 5, 8, 12–14, 20, 23, 28, 41, 49–50, 52, 55, 66, 84, 86, 88, 94, 103–104, 121, 129, 143, 150, 160, 189. Cortese, Ennio, 50, 173. Cortiella Òdena, Francesc, 9, 67, 180, 187, 194. Cosentino, Giuseppe, 32–33, 35–39, 53–54, 64, 66, 70, 171, 189. Costa, Antonina, 179. Costa, Pietro, 39, 90. Cristiani, Emilio, 111. Crouzet Pavan, Elisabeth, 169. Cuadrada Majó, Coral, 124. Daileader, Philip, 154. Dalli, Charles, 182. Dean, Trevor, 121, 140. De Benedictis, Angela, 11–12, 167, 168. Della Misericordia, Massimo, 81, 167. De La Roncière, Charles-Marie, 34, 141, 143. De Montagut Estragués, Tomàs, 114. De Moxó, Salvador, 114. Derville, Alain, 179–180. De Sanctis, Francesco, 167. Descimon, Robert, 148. De Stefano, Francesco, 176. De Vio, Michael, 35–37, 63, 65, 76, 86, 102, 137, 177, 189–190. Del Treppo, Mario, 169. D’Agostino, Guido, 4, 167. D’Arrigo, Pina, 171. Diecidue, Gianni, 77. Di Marzo, Gioacchino, 174. Dominguez Ortiz, Antonio, 149. Dufour, Annie, 213. Dufourcq, Charles-Emmanuel, 9, 170. Elze, Reinhard, 28. Emanuele e Gaetani, Francesco M., 54, 63, 173. Epstein, Stephan R., 2, 3, 6–8, 16–17, 41, 47, 49, 110, 131–133, 139–140, 152, 171, 173, 180, 185, 197, 207. Falcón Pérez, Maria I., 9, 10, 41, 68, 188. Faraglia, Nunzio F., 18–19, 21, 39. 304

Farneti, Roberto, 50, 167. Fasano Guarini, Elena, 5, 134. Fasoli, Gina, 20, 23, 28. Favier, Jean, 131. Fazio, Ida, 164. Ferrer Mallol, Maria T., 133. Fianu, Kouky, 79. Figlia, Francesco, 77. Firpo, Massimo, 38. Fiume, Giovanna, 14, 164. Flandina, Antonino, 42–45, 57, 131. Fodale, Salvatore, 12, 132. Folin, Marco, 118. Fonseca, Cosimo D., 111. Font Rius, Josep M., 9–10, 19, 40, 53, 67, 89, 188. Foti, Rita L., 164. Fraga Iribarne, Manuel, 149. Franceschi, Franco, 183. Furió, Antoni, 10. Galasso, Giuseppe, 7, 46. Gallo, Francesca, 44, 138, 145, 177. Gamberini, Andrea, 14, 84, 87, 168. Gambi, Lucio, 15, 16, 39. Gambrelle, Fabienne, 11. Ganci, Massimo, 8. Garcia de Valdeavellano, Luís, 124. Garfagnini, Gian Carlo, 158. Gargallo, Gioacchino, 185. Garufi, Carlo A., 18, 21–22, 29, 31. Gaudioso, Matteo, VIII, 6, 18, 20, 34, 43, 45, 47–48, 71–72, 75, 102, 108–109, 112, 114, 133, 138–139, 145, 157, 177, 180, 183, 185, 204–205. Gauvard, Claude, 117, 121, 208. Genet, Jean-Philippe, 2, 134, 208, 213. Gentile, Marco, 5–6. Genuardi, Luigi, 8, 18–20, 22, 25, 28, 32, 35–36, 39, 47, 63, 69, 102, 112–113, 131–132, 138, 154. Gerbet, Marie, 9, 170, 180. Giambruno, Salvatore, 154. Giardina, Camillo, 31, 124, 178. Giarrizzo, Giuseppe, 7, 162. Gibert, Rafael, 142. Gilli, Patrick, 64, 111. Ginatempo, Maria, 5, 34, 136, 143. Ginzburg, Carlo, 208.

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Giordanengo, Gérard, 169, 175. Giunta, Francesco, 49, 52. Given-Wilson, Chris, 129. Godding, Philippe, 52, 117. Goetz, Walter, 111. González Mínguez, César, 126. Goody, Jack, 1. Gouron, André, 114, 117. Gregorio, Rosario, 19, 55–56, 73, 115. Grendi, Edoardo, 6, 69. Guarneri, Andrea, 42, 45–46, 48. Guccione, Rosetta S., 8. Guidi, Guidubaldo, 64, 148. Guilleré, Christian, 126, 134, 142, 188, 201. Gulotta, Pietro, 29. Gutiérrez Nieto, Juan I., 126. Guth, DeLloyd J., 79. Hamon, Philippe, 208. Herlihy, David, 143. Hespanha, António M., 208. Hillgarth, Jocelyn N., 104. Hilton, Rodney, 11, 146. Hinojosa Montalvo, José, 10, 41, 188. Hostein, Antony, 79. Hugh Smith, Craig, 158. Iglesia Ferreirós, Aquilino, 12, 14, 19, 132. Iradiel, Paulino, 10. James, Mervyn, 174. Jarnut, Jörg, 111. Julia, Dominique, 9. Keller, Hagen, 111. Koenig, John, 111. Küchler, Winfried, 133, 141, 142. Kuehn, Thomas, 114. Ladero Quesada, Miguel A., 10, 41, 134, 140. Laliena Corbera, Carlos, 208. Lalinde Abadía, Jesús, 12, 132, 217. La Mantia, Francesco, 104. La Mantia, Vito, 6, 18, 22, 28, 30, 50, 69, 85, 90, 109, 110, 176. Larguier, Gilbert, 142. Larochelle, Lucie, 169, 170.

La Via, Mariano, 68. Lazzarini, Isabella, 2, 14, 64. Leferme-Falguières, Frédérique, 169, 213. Le Goff, Jacques, 174, 180. Leone, Alfonso, 211. Leone, Salvatore, 173, 176. Leverotti, Franca, 118. Liddy, Christian D., 11. Ligresti, Domenico, 42, 112, 157, 185–186, 204, 205. Livi Bacci, Massimo, 16. Lombardo, Gabriella, 176. López Rodríguez, Carlos, 133. Macry, Paolo, 174. Maggiore Perni, Francesco, 173. Mainoni, Patrizia, 34, 147. Maire Vigueur, Jean-Claude, 111, 121. Malanima, Paolo, 16, 17. Mannori, Luca, 5, 215. Maravall, José A., 12, 132. March, James G., 31. Marletta, Fedele, 171. Marrone, Antonino, 151. Martí Sentañes, Esther, 12, 14, 80, 83, 124, 187. Martin, Jean-Marie, 20–22, 24, 34, 39. Martin, José L., 11, 132. Martines, Lauro, 174. Martínez Moro, Jesús, 10, 189. Massafra, Angelo, 174. Mattéoni, Olivier, 79. Mattone, Antonello, 20. Maurici, Ferdinando, 150. Mazzacane, Aldo, 114. Mazzarese Fardella, Enrico, 12, 20–22, 28, 42, 44. Mazzi, Maria S., 38. Menjot, Denis, 10–11, 41, 134, 138, 140, 143, 146, 180. Meriggi, Grazia M., 20. Meriggi, Marco, 176. Merlo, Maurizio, 3. Michaud Quantin, Pierre, 19. Milani, Giuliano, 111, 181. Mineo, Ennio I., 3, 7, 8, 12, 14, 18, 22–23, 29, 31, 55, 63, 71, 73, 78, 83, 84, 103, 109, 151–153, 173, 189, 190, 213. Molénat, Jean-Pierre, 68. 305

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Molho, Anthony, 5, 147. Monsalvo Antòn, Jose M., 10, 53, 68, 140, 152, 188, 189. Morelli, Serena, 34, 39. Morelló Baget, Jordi, 10, 146, 147, 164, 165. Morsel, Joseph, 208. Moscati, Ruggero, 3, 4, 9, 52. Mousnier, Roland, 149. Muñoz, María R., 21, 186. Nagle, Jean, 148. Narbona Vizcaíno, Rafael, 9, 19, 174. Nassiet, Michel, 121. Natale, Francesco, 15. Navarro Espinach, Germán, 208. Nicholas, David, 34. Olsen, Johan P., 31. Orti Gost, Pere, 134, 142. Pace, Giacomo, 81, 31, 37, 53, 56, 73, 116–117, 185–186, 196, 199, 213. Palacio y de Palacio, José M., 170. Paravicini Bagliani, Agostino, 20, 174. Parsi, Vittorio E., 158. Pasciuta, Beatrice, 4, 8, 12, 18, 55, 63–65, 103, 108, 113, 152, 211. Pastor, Reyna, 10. Pastore, Alessandro, 176. Pedio, Tommaso, 21. Percy, William A., 34, 39. Peri, Illuminato, 7, 8, 15–16, 26, 29, 69, 152. Perrineau, Pascal, 81. Pesante, Maria L., 154. Petillon, Claude, 208. Petino, Antonio, 6, 177–179, 181. Petralia, Giuseppe, 16, 29, 129, 131, 147. Petrucci, Armando, 1. Pinilla, Regina, 21, 186. Pinol, Jean-Luc, 134. Pispisa, Enrico, 21. Pocock, John G. A., 1, 3, 78, 79. Polo Martín, Regina, 41. Poloni, Alma, 68, 81. Poni, Carlo, 208. Pontieri, Ernesto, 21. Powell, Edward, 121. Prodi, Paolo, 11. Pugnatore, Giovan Francesco, 69. 306

Quaglioni, Diego, 50, 125, 168. Quillet, Jeannine, 21, 90. Radding, Charles M., 133. Raggio, Osvaldo, 5, 6, 125. Reinhard, Wolfgang, 28, 149, 167. Repetti, Paola, 79. Reynié, Dominique, 81. Reynolds, Susan, 69, 173. Ribalta Haro, Jaume, 19. Rigaudière, Albert, 10, 11, 19, 117, 143, 146, 147. Risino, Antonino E., 63, 73, 115, 117, 168. Romano, Andrea, 12, 30, 55, 109, 114. Romeo, Rosario, 46. Romeu, Sylvia, 124. Rosenwein, Barbara H., 122. Rossetti, Gabriella, 3, 20. Rossiaud, Jacques, 174, 180. Rotelli, Ettore, 149. Rubio Vela, Agustín, 9, 79. Rubinstein, Nicolai, 34, 64. Rudolph, Harriet, 168. Ruíz, Teofilo F., 10. Rycraft, Peter, 132. Ryder, Alan, 121, 130. Sabaté Curull, Flocel, 118, 133, 166, 179. Saitta, Biagio, 115. Salvo, Carmen, 8, 69, 107, 109, 186. Sánchez Aragonés, Luisa M., 11. Sánchez León, Pablo, 140. Sánchez Martínez, Manuel, 3, 10, 14, 46, 134, 138, 142. Sánchez Saus, Rafael, 44. Santoro, Daniela, 171. Sanz, Porfirio, 21, 188. Sarasa Sánchez, Esteban, 9, 11, 187. Sardina, Patrizia, 52. Sarrazin, Jean-Luc, 121. Saupin, Guy, 121. Savagnone, Francesco G., 35. Savelli, Rodolfo, 114. Scalisi, Lina, 164. Scattola, Merio, 50, 167. Scaturro, Ignazio, 151. Schiera, Pierangelo, 5, 149, 175. Sciacca, Giovan C., 18–20, 22, 178, 180–182, 194, 195.

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Sciascia, Laura, 21. Scichilone, Giuseppe, 132. Sciuti Russi, Vittorio, 12, 132, 149. Sesma Muñoz, José A., 15, 17, 131, 140, 170, 208. Skinner, Quentin, 1, 3. Sobrequés Callicó, Jaume, 9, 11, 74, 132. Sorrenti, Lucia, 8, 42, 56, 71, 172, 178, 213. Sosson, Jean-Pierre, 141. Spadaro di Passanitello, Francesco, 185. Spiegel, Gabrielle M., 154. Starrabba, Raffaele, 23, 26, 28–29, 31, 34, 47–48, 51, 75, 80, 101, 107, 116, 124, 133, 137, 141–142, 163–164, 177, 182–184, 193–194. Suárez Fernández, Luis, 126.

Vallone, Giancarlo, 18, 43, 187. Van Renterghem, Vanessa, 169, 213. Varanini, Gian Maria, 118. Vasi, Luigi P., 68. Ventura, Domenico, 69, 104, 176, 213. Ventura, Piero, 90. Verdés Pijuan, Père, 11, 40, 134, 142, 146–147. Verga, Marcello, 4. Vicens Vives, Jaume, 132, 149, 186. Viggiano, Alfredo, 31, 118. Vigiano, Valentina, 175–176, 180, 207. Visceglia, Maria A., 46, 174. Vitolo, Giovanni, 20. Von Falkenhausen, Vera, 20. Vulliez, Charles, 79.

Tangheroni Marco, 20, 29. Tenenti, Alberto, 129. Testa, Francesco M., 23, 27–30, 37, 43, 59, 67–68, 74, 77, 83–87, 91, 95, 98, 111, 131, 176, 181, 189, 196, 204–205, 207. Tirrito, Catalano, 61, 66. Tirrito, Luigi, 23, 26, 28–29, 31, 34, 47, 51, 75, 80, 101, 107, 116, 124, 133, 137, 141–142, 163–164, 177, 182–184, 193–194. Titone, Fabrizio, 14, 52, 69, 76, 84–87, 91, 96, 147, 174–175, 183, 187, 206, 208. Tomás y Valiente, Francisco, 149, 152. Torre, Angelo, 1, 5, 69, 174. Torras Ribé, José M., 187. Torrisi, Claudio, 7, 145. Toubert, Pierre, 20. Tramontana, Salvatore, 8. Tranfaglia, Nicola, 38. Trasselli, Carmelo, 15, 97, 151, 179, 209, 231. Travali, Giuseppe, 35. Trebitsch, Michel, 11. Trifone, Romualdo, 23, 39. Tripoli, Angela, 8, 88, 109, 112, 154, 178, 186, 213. Turull Rubinat, Max, 9–10, 14, 19, 40, 64, 80, 134, 142, 145, 147, 164.

Xuereb, Paul, 8.

Valdeón Baruque, Julio, 10, 149, 166, 189. Vallet de Goytisolo, Juan, 11.

Wauqet, Jean-Claude, 180. Weissman, Ronald F. E., 174. Wickham, Chris, 5, 12, 111, 140, 173. Willowet, Dietmar, 13. Wolff, Philippe, 179. Zaffuto, Rovello, 45. Zeno, Riniero, 62, 84, 171, 176, 178. Zorzi, Andrea, 5, 121, 158.

INDEX OF NAMES AND MAGISTRACIES The Index does not contain names included in the Appendix Abbate, Riccardo, 35. Abatellis, 150. Abatellis, Federico, 150. Abatellis, Giovanni, Baron of Cammarata, 150. Abrignano, Francesco, 122. 209. Abrignano, Giovanni, 82, 83. Abrignano, Goctofrido, 209. acatapanatum, 22, 75, 128, 194, 201, 206. acatapani, see catapans. Adinolfu, Manfredi, 202. adiutor cammere regie, 116. advocatum fisci, see lawyer of the royal fisc. Afflitto, Pietro, 136. 307

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Ago, Giacomo, 151. Aiuto, Nicola, 112. Alagona, 157, 187. Alagona, Artale, 157. Alagona, Artale I, 41. Alagona, Blasco, 108, 157, 209. Alagona, Maciocta, 157, 209. Alcamo, 192. Alexio, Matteo de, 33. algozirius, 121, 122, 156. Aliberto, Antonio, 199, 200. Aliberto, Blasco, 198. Alligruni, Giovanni, 197. Alphonso III, King of Aragon, 23. Alphonso V, King of Aragon and Sicily, 2, 13–14, 17, 31, 40–45, 47, 49, 51–52, 56–58, 65–67, 73–76, 80, 82, 84–85, 87–91, 93, 98, 101, 104, 106, 111, 113–115, 120, 123–124, 126–127, 129, 131–136, 140, 145, 148–152, 155, 159–163, 169, 174, 176, 180, 183, 185–186, 188, 193, 195–196, 198, 204, 207–208, 218. Alphonso XI, King of Castile, 114, 188. Amato, 123, 151, 195. Amato, Desio, 195. Amato, Geronimo, 100, 127. Amato (Amari), Giovanni, 156, 193, 195, 197, 209. Amato, Giuseppe, 151, 153, 209. Amato, Orlando, 151, 156, 209. Ambassadors, 26, 59, 73, 80, 82–83, 88, 94, 97, 101–102, 107–108, 123, 125, 154, 156, 161, 170, 199, 201. Amico, Giovanni, 112. Amores, Narcisio, 206. Amoro, Antonio, 209. Amoro, Bartolomeo, 89, 152, 158, 209. Amoro, Bernardo, 101. Amuri, Pietro, 206. Anchello, Novello de, 176. Andree (Mastrantonio), Simonis, 129. Andrella, Antonio, 213. Anfuso, Giacomo, 110. Ansalone, Giovanni de, 139. Ansalone, Natale, 23. Ansalone, Nicola, 213. Apatri, Giacomo, 139. Apera, Giovanni, 123. 308

Apera, Nicola, 112. Aperili, Manzullo, 200. Angelo, Giovanni, 123. appellate court, VIII, 63, 84, 113–118, 165, 167, 210, 212. appellate judge, VIII, 63, 64, 85, 114–116, 205, 209, 212, 247. Aprea, Enrico, 151. Aretlis/Areth, Gregorio, 200. Aropuli, Giovanni, 80. Aropuli, Nicola, 153, 209. Asmundo, Adamo, President, 71, 72, 93, 192. Asmundo Adamo, commissioner, magister rationalis, 120, 122. Astasi, Matteo, 198. Augeri, Antonio, 202. Augeri, Orlando, 202. Aurifice, Andolfo, 123. Avili, Antonio, 198. Avilles, Gilberto, 153, 209. Avula, Simone, 212. Aydono, Nardo, di, 200. baiulatum, 194. baiulus, 22–28, 31–33, 36, 39, 44, 53–57, 59–60, 63, 66, 69, 74, 84, 94–95, 98, 103–110, 126–128, 137, 139, 141, 189, 192–195, 209. ballivus, 18. Bandi, Giovanni (Iohannis), 82, 87. Banquerio, Leonardo, 137. Barra, Francesco, 203. Barresi, Archinbau, 160. Barresi, Habus, 160. Barresio (Barresi), Bernardo, 94, 160. Barresio, Blasco, 108. Bartolomeo, Leonardo, 150. Bartulino, Manfredi, 200. Basiato, Pietro, 128. Basilico, 138. Basilico, Giovanni, 101, 123, 209. Bavera, Antonio, 160. Bayeri, Nardo, 200. Bellasay, Prudentis, 81. Benedictis, Cristoforo de, 206. Benedicto, Blasio, 127. Berliono, Pino de, 90. Bertolo, Giovanni, 198.

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Biibal, Vincenzo, 195. Biscarmu, Sanchio, 203. Blanco, Bartolomeo di, 88. Blasi, Giovanni, 203. Blianti, Nicolaus de, 81. Bologna, Giovanni, 180. Bologna, Simone, President, 100, 108, 112, 121, 157, 176, 196. Bonacolta, Pietro, 122. Bonacolti, Guglielmo, 211. Bonario, Galvagno, 203. Bonario, Masio, 203. Bonfilio, Giovanni, 203. Bonfilio, Pietro, 203. Bongeminu, Andrea di, 184. Bonifacio, 195. Bonifacio, Federico, 209. Bonifacio, Giovanni, 194, 195. Bonifacio, Manfredi, 193. Bononia, Nicola de, 102. Bonura, 192. Bonura, Pietro, 119. Bosco, 136. Brachuliato, Antonio, 198. Bubitello, Teobaldo di, 54. Buchardo, Antonio, 209. Buondelmonte, 151. Buondelmonte, Bondelmunti, 151, 209. Buondelmonte, Federico, 123, 153, 209. Buondelmonte, Manente, 151–152, 209. Buondelmonte, Pietro, 153. Buxu, Ludovico, 195. Cabanegles, Garsia de, 137. cabellotus, 36, 56–57, 93–94, 104, 108. Cabrera, Raimondo, 47, 155, 166. Cachatu (Chatatu), Giovanni, 153. Caermina, Antonio, 203. Calafatu, Rainaldo, 200, 202. Calandrino, Antonio, 153, 209. Calandrino, Francesco, 200, 212–213. Calandrino, Matteo, 95, 139, 213. Calandrino, Pietro, 209. Calascibetta, Berengario, 139. Calatagirone, Giovanni, 136. Caldarera, Giovanni, 161. Caldaruni, Thomeo, 197. Calio, Giovanni, 213. Calvelli, Giovanni, 190.

Camarano, Bonifacio, 23. Camarino, Antonio, 95. camerarius, 18, 128, 153, 156–157. Camera, Rogerius de, 171. Campisi, Pietro, 198. Campo, Thabia, 129. Canchilleri, Giovanni, 197. Candillicha, Nicola, 203. capitaneus, see captain. Cappasancta, Antonio, 209. Cappello, Chicco, 128. Cappello, Giovanni, 128. captain, 14, 23–28, 32–33, 38–39, 43–46, 48, 52–55, 57–63, 69, 73, 75, 82–83, 89, 93–94, 96–99, 101–102, 104–106, 108–110, 115, 118, 120, 122–124, 139, 150–153, 155–161, 176, 183–184, 191, 207–209, 213. captaincy, 14, 28, 43, 58–59, 100–101, 108, 117–118, 154–163, 186–187, 196–198, 207–210, 214. captain’s curia, 43, 45, 82, 99–102, 112–113, 120, 123, 186, 195. captain’s judge or assessor, 100–103, 149, 157, 183–184. captain’s judicature, 128, 148, 183. caputmagistri, see sciurterii. captain’s notaries, 102, 153. Carbona, Filippo, 198. Cardona, Antonio, 101, 104. Cardona, Pietro, 136, 166. Carioso, Alfonso, 123. Carissima, Giacomo, 106–107. Carissima, Melchioni, 209. Caro, 213. Caro, Antonio, 82, 209. Caro, Giacomo, 127, 213. Caro, Perino, 197. Cartoxio, Bartolomeo, 58. Cartoxio, Matteo, 58. Cartoxio, Rainerio, 58. Caruso, Giacomo, 127. Caruso, Nicola, 128. Cassaro, Antonio, 198. Castagnolo, Pino, 212. castellan, 25, 33, 58, 102, 159, 161. Castello, Antonio, 144, 209. Castello, Corrado, 209. Castronono, Giovanni, 206. 309

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catapans, 18, 22–24, 29–31, 44–45, 53, 60–63, 66–69, 76, 84, 95–96, 109, 111, 126, 128, 151, 154, 178, 188, 191–195, 198, 200–206, 209, 211. Cathaguerra, Giacomo, 123, 127. Cavalieri (Cavaleri), Giovanni, 198, 209. Cavalieri (Cavaleri), Matteo, 153, 209. Cavare, Nardu di lu, 181. Chagio, Giacomo, 112. Chalia, Giovanni, 153, 209. Chalia, Perruchio, 209. Charles I of Anjou, King of Sicily, 15, 18, 21–23, 39. Charles, Prince of Aragon and Tagliavia, 77. Cathaguerra, Giacomo, 123, 127. Cathati, Giovanni, 209. Chaulino, Simone, 198. Chiaromonte, 32, 46, 50, 173. Chiaromonte, Enrico, 50, 59. Chiaromonte, Giovanni, 190. Chiaromonte, Manfredi III, 41. Chilano, Mazullo, 200. Chiramidali (Charamidaro), Antonio, 209. Chirco, Francesco, 202. Chirco, Giovanni, 202. Chirco, Manzulo, 202. Ciccaglioni, Giovanni, 14. Cicero, Giovanni de, 127. civil curia, 6, 23, 32–33, 43–45, 53–58, 75, 93, 97–104, 106–108, 111–112, 128, 192, 194, 198, 201, 203, 209, 212. Columba, Andrea, 139. comestabulus, 113. commisioner, 43, 48, 65, 71, 73, 82, 84, 113–114, 117–124, 132, 161, 165, 167. Compagna, Anthonius de, 123. Condas, Facius, 139. conservatori delle leggi, 121. consilium civium, see town council. consuls, consules, 67, 94–95, 114, 146–147, 171–174, 176, 183, 186, 204, 207, 209. Consell de Cent, 74, 89, 170, 188. consulatum maris, 209. Consulino, Martino, 54. Coppa, Andreotto, 206. Corbera, Galcerando, 136. Corbera, Romeo, 43–44, 165. 310

corregidores, 188. council, see town council. councillors, consiliarii, 7, 19, 26, 59, 66–68, 73–74, 76–77, 83, 85–91, 150, 170, 175–176, 179–181. Count of Conversano, 20. Crapanzano, Antonio, 85, 116. Crapanzano, Giovanni, 209. Crapanzano, Guglielmo, 82–83, 209. Crapanzano, Motta, 101. Crapanzano, Ruggero, 58, 60, 89, 116, 152, 155, 158, 209. credencerius, 63, 97, 135, 138, 144, 195. Crispo, Enrico, 179. Crispo, Federico, 179. Crispo, Giovanni, 179. Crispo, Masio, 90, 179. Crixencio, Giovanni, 213. Crixencio, Nicola, 82. Cuchara, Nardo, 200. Cucchiaroni, 68. Cuctunaru, Nardo, 209. Culella, Salvatore, 200. Cultelino, Giacomo, 151, 206. Cunicolo, Nicola de, 70. curia civilis, see civil curia. curia iuratorum, see jurats’ curia. curia of the stratigoti, 18. curia praetoris, see praetor’s court. curia primarum appellacionum, see appellate court. Currenti, Matteo, 213. Dacrulu, 192. Dedato, Francesco, 97, 144. Del Carretto, Giovanna, 143. Denti, 97, 123, 206. Denti, Andreas, 116. Denti, Franciscus, 116. Desfar (Isfar), Giovanni Ferdinando, 163. Desfar, Gispert, 143, 161, 166. Desguanes, Angaro, 72. Desguanes, Antonio, 160. Desguanes, Francesco, 160. Domino Odone, Antonio, de, 195. Don Guida, Giacomo, 161, 209. Don Guida, Guglielmo, 184, 213. Don Guida, Nicola, 184. Drepano, Enrico, 198.

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Dretta, Iohannis di, 80. Egidi, Giovanni, 200. Eleonora, Alphonse’s daughter, 144. erariatus officium curie capitanie, 102. erariatus curie pretorie, 112. erranti, 24. Esculo, Simone de, 190. Falco, Giovanni, 195, 212. Falco, Giuliano, 193. Famiano, Iohannis de, 62. Fardella, Antonio (Lantonio), 209. Fardella, Lanzonu, 209. Felice, Pietro, President, 71–72, 93, 192. Ferdinand I, King of Aragon and Sicily, 14, 27, 68, 88, 103–104, 135, 198. Ferdinand of Aragon, 113. Ferdinand the Catholic, King of Aragon and Castile, 132, 186, 188. Ferrario, Andrea, 67. Ferrario, Tommaso, 213. Ferro, Berardo, 23. Ferro, Giovanni, 161, 209. Filangeri, Francesco, Baron of San Marco, 134. Firraru, Nicola, 209. fiscal procurator, 120–122, 124, 128. Fontana (Funtanals), Arnaldo, 209. Frederick II, King of Sicily, and later, Emperor, 21–22, 24. Frederick III, King of Sicily, 7, 13, 19, 22–23, 27–31, 34, 36, 38–39, 41, 47, 50–51, 54–55, 59, 63–64, 68–70, 72, 83, 95, 132, 188–190, 215. Frederick IV, King of Sicily, 2–3, 17, 28, 33–34, 36, 38–39, 42, 44, 47, 50, 52–54, 63–64, 69–70, 73, 103, 136, 188–189. Formusa, Simone, 151. Furmusa, Ruggero, 213. Gaetano, Pietro, 164. gabellotus, see cabellotus. Galefi, see Sigalesi. Gallo, Gallo, 200. Gallo, Giovanni, 120, 209. Gambotta, Bennio, 200. Ganata, Antonio, 195. Ganchio, Mianus de, 90.

Gandolfo, Giovanni, 200. Garofalo, Andrea, 127. Garofalo, Giovanni, 213. Gavarrecta, Matteo, 153, 209. Gilberto, Tome de, 144. Gilberto, Tommaso, 151. Gini, Graziano, 145, 199, 200–201. Giracio, Aloysius di, 56. Gisualdo, Giovanni Michele de, 157. Gractaluxio, Enrico, 151. Graffeo, Pietro, 209. grand jurat, see master jurat. Grandia, Salvatore, 198. Gravina, Carlo, 102. Gravina, Giacomo, 102. Gregory XI, Pope, 39. Grimaldo, Pino, 211. Guaracho, Gregorio, 203. Guardia, Guglielmo la, 200. Guastalacqua, Giovanni, 198. Guastalaqua, Paganus, 33. Guchardo, Antonio, 153. Guercio, Nicola, 200. Guerreri, Giovanni, 212–213. Guiso, Iacobus de, 81. Guxeres, Manuele, 209. Haiuto, Berengario, 123. Homodei, Giovanni, 179–180. Iacuno, Antonio lu, 200. Iampixi, Riccardo, 206. Ianguzo, Federico de, 123. Ianmino, Francesco, 198. Imperatore, Ubertino, 179–180. Infant of Aragon, see Martin I of Sicily. Iuliano, Lodovico, 211. iuratia, see jurats’ curia. James II, king of Aragon and Sicily, 19, 23, 27, 28, 131. judges of the Magna Curia, 118, 119, 179. judges, iudices, 18–19, 21–27, 30–33, 35–39, 44–45, 53–54, 56–59, 61, 63–64, 68–70, 72–73, 80–82, 88, 94–98, 100–101, 104–108, 110, 112, 114–115, 117, 120, 122–124, 139, 141, 144, 150, 173, 176, 184, 186, 191, 197–205, 209–213. 311

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judges at the curia stratigoti, 69, 114. judex primarum appellacionis, see appelate judge. judicature, iudicatum, 23, 45, 58–59, 100, 116, 126, 128, 186, 194, 199, 201, 203, 210–212. jurats, iurati, 22–24, 29–33, 36–39, 43–45, 53–61, 64, 68–73, 77, 80–90, 94–101, 104–112, 120, 122–124, 134–135, 137, 139, 141, 143, 148, 158, 160, 165, 170–172, 176–178, 182–184, 186–187, 192–206, 209, 211, 213. jurats’ curia, 30, 32–33, 45, 55, 58, 60, 87, 93, 95–98, 100, 103, 112, 124, 165, 186. justiciars, 18–19, 21, 23, 25, 27–28, 39, 57. justicia criminal, 67. jurados, 67, 74. iudices, see judges. iudicatum, see judicature. iurati, see jurats. king’s procurator, 138. La Fontana, 213. La Mannina, 192. La Matina, 156. La Matina, Giovanni, 156, 209. La Matina, Marino, 155. La Monaca, Guglielmo, 155. La Monaca, Panteo, 211. La Porta, Antonio, 127. La Rocca, Giovanni, 104. La Serra, Pietro, 82, 120. Lamantia, Giovanni, 145, 201. Lancia, Pietruccio, 35. Lancirocto, Andrea, 209. Lancirocto, Giacomo, 209. Lancirocto, Onofrio, 153, 209. Lando, Petrus de, 30. Landolina, 196–197, 209. Landolina, Bartolomeo, 196. Landolina, Giovanni, 209. Landolina, Vassallu, 80, 137, 209. Lanza, Blasco, 209. Laurifithi, Filippo, 198. Lavia (La Via), 213. Lavia (La Via), Federico, 184, 213. 312

lawyer of the Magna Curia, 119. lawyer of the royal fisc, 206. Laxa, Simone, 198. Lenmo, Bracco de, 122. Leto, 187. Leto, Filippo, 199. Leto Leto, 187. Lignovindi, Giovanni, 184. Liocta, Marco, 200. Liria, Giovanni, 137, 160. Lonafalta, 192. Lombardo, Giorgio, 209. Lombardo, Guglielmo, 184. Lombardo, Nicola, 184. Lu Iudici, Maciotta, 198. Lu Portu, 202. Lu Portu, Bentio, 202. Lu Portu, Garraffo, 202. Lu Portu, Matteo, 202. Luchisio, Ferdinando, 209. Ludovico, King of Sicily, 28, 35–36, 114. Luforti, Giovanni, 203. Lulino, Aloisio, 213. Lulino, Antonio, 180, 213. Luna, 123, 151. Luna, Antonio de, Count of Caltabellotta, 100, 121, 151. Luparellu, Antonio, 202. Lupo, 201–202. Lupo, Bernardo, 202. Lupresti, Antonio, 153, 209. Luvechu, Enrico, 153. Magru, Nicola, 198. Maczagluni, Motta, 193, 195. magister mondiciae, 112. magistri platee, see catapans. magister portulanus, 24, 97, 143, 161. magister secretus, 55, 143. magistri racionales, 104, 122, 136, 143, 150, 159. magistri xurterii, magistri xurtae, see sciurterii. magistri iurati, 18. Magistro Andrea, Nicolaus de, 33. Magna Curia, 108, 118–120, 122–123, 179. majordomo, 137, 150. Manganarii, Petrus, 30. Manicu, Salvo, 200.

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Maniscalco, Baldo, 213. Maniscalco, Dactilo, 200. Maniscalco, Giovanni, 198. Mantello, Antonio di, 123. Manueli, Antonio, 209. Manueli, Giovanni, 153. Mararanga, Andreas, 82, 120. Marco, Nicola, 198. Maria, Queen of Sicily, 41, 44, 49, 65. Maria of Castilie, Queen of Aragon, 188. Marinello, Domenico, 200. Maringo, Guglielmo, 212. Marino, 136. Marino, Iannocco, 153, 209. Marino, Giovanni, 209. Marlisio, Nicola di, 184. Marocto, Nicola, 151. Martin of Aragon, Duke of Montblanch, and later, King of Aragon and Sicily, 49, 59–61, 65, 73, 104, 108, 119, 171, 186. Martin I of Sicily (or Martin I, or Martin), King of Sicily, 2, 12–14, 16, 41, 43–46, 48–62, 65, 68, 73, 76–78, 80, 83–87, 93, 95, 98–99, 101, 103, 106–107, 109–110, 114–115, 119, 126–127, 129, 131–132, 134–135, 162, 169–171, 173, 178, 185–186, 190, 193, 198, 207–208. master jurat, 19, 22–24, 30, 101, 139. master justiciar, 23, 41, 136. master notary of the Magna Curia, 123. Mastrangelo, Ruggero, 23. Mastrantonio, Antonio, 88, 179. Mastrantonio, Bartolomeo, 179. Mastrantonio, Nicola, 179. Mastrantonio, Tommaso, 179. Maurella, Sans de la, 122. Mauro, Consalvo, 203. Mauro, Nicola, 203. Mauro, Rogerius de, 62. Mazara, Giovanni, 153, 209. Mazel, Bertrand de, 39. Messina, Paolo, 67. merco, 24. Michilecto, 192. Michilecto, Antonio, 161. Migliorino, Bartolomeo, 193. Migliorino, Giovanni, 194–195.

Milacio, Simone, 198. Milanasi, Francesco, 200. Minardo, Leonardo, 213. Minutis, Branca, 139. Minutis, Facio, 127. Miroldo, Antonio, 213. Misser Odo, Antonio, 195. Modica, 196. Modica, Manfredi, 209. Moncada, 157. Moncada, Antonio di, Count, 59. Moncada, Giovanni, 136. Moncada, Guglielmo, 36. Moncada, Raimondo Guglielmo, 157. Moncada, Raimondo Guglielmo, Count, 136. Moncada, Raimondo Guglielmo, 108, 157. Montealto, Macziocca de, 105. Monteaperto, 152, 154, 201. Monteaperto, Antonio, 152–153. Monteaperto, Gaspare, 152–153. Monteaperto, Matteo, 200. Monte Bardalo, Francesco, 198. Monteleone, 200. Monteleone, Antonio, 200. Monteleone, Gaspare, 200, 202. monterii, 102, 112–113. Montesereno, Raimondo di, 54. Morano, Francesco, 209. Morroni, 68. Muleti, Bernardo, 206. Munferrara, Antonio, 200. Muntanyans, Guglielmo, Viceroy, 87, 120, 136, 138, 150, 159. Mura, Gregorio, 111. nadarii, see catapans. Naro, Giovanni, 200. Naso, Antonio, 209. Naso, Nicolaus, 82. Nero, Bernardo del, 77. notaries of the acts or Courts record, notarii actorum, 18, 23–24, 26, 32, 58, 63–64, 68–69, 86, 102, 107, 111, 194, 201, 209, 211–212. notarii curie civilis, see notaries of the acts. notarii iuratorum, see also notaries of the acts, 53, 70, 128, 191, 195, 200, 203, 205, 209. 313

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notary of the first appellate court, appellate notary, notarius primarum appellacionum, VIII, 115, 116, 247. notary of the curia of the archivist, 139. notary of the Port, 102. notaries (notariatum) of the pretor’s court, 128, 151. Notaro Bartholo, Renaldus de, 81. Nuchio, Giovanni, 102. Nuchio, Nicola, 102. Odo, Filippo, 198. Oddo, Giovanni, 128. Oliveti, Onofrio, 197. Oliveti, Paolo, 197. Olzina, Giovanni, 117, 138, 177. Opidu, Antonio, 199. Oria, Giovanni, 209. Oriola, Giovanni, 127. Ortulena, Antonio, 203. Ortulena, Francesco, 203. Ortulena, Giovanni, 202–203. Pace, 192. Pace, Giovanni, 210. Pactis, Giacomo, 54. Paganello, Federico, 200. Palmeri, Salvatore, 82. Palmerio, Caro di, 23. Palmerio, Federico, 110. Palmerio, Firuchio, 209. Pancica, Antonio, 200. Panormo, Antonio, 153. Panormo, Pietro, 112. Parisio, Andrea, 212. Paternione, Nicola, 123. Paternò (Patrimone), Benedetto, 129, 213. Paternò (Patrimone), Vinchiguerra, 209. Paternò, Gualteri di, 102. patricius, 54, 63, 82, 97–98, 107, 108, 112, 127–128, 139, 144, 157, 205, 209, 211–212. Paulillu, Antonio, 198. Peralta, Guglielmo, Count, 41, 45. Peralta, Nicola, Count, 45. Perapertusa, Guglielmo, 152. Perdicaru, Antonio, 96. Perino, 213. Perino, Benedetto, 213. 314

Perino, Cristoforo, 213. Pernichi, Ruggiero, 36. Perollo, 151. Perollo, Andrea, 121. Perollo, Domenico, 209. Perrono, Antonio, 198. Peter II, King of Sicily, 34, 39, 65, 115, 117, 189. Peter III, King of Aragon and Sicily, 15, 17, 23–24, 27, 30, 62. Pilliberiu, Giacomo, 198. Pinos, Bernardo, 119–120, 122, 179. Pinos, Filippo, 113. Pintu, Chicco, lu, 198. Pipitono, Nicola di, 190. Pirrecta, Pietro, 197. Pisano, Motta, 137. Pisano, Pietro, 100. Pitrusu, Manfredi, 209. Pittacolis, 211. Pizicula, Bartolomeo, 153, 209. Pizicula, Giacomo, 209. Pizutu, 127. Platamone, Fernando, 108. Platamone, Giovanni, 108. Platamone, Tommaso, 159. Polici, Chicco, 200. portulanatum, 128. Presbitero, Giovanni, di, 33. praetor (pretor), 28, 30, 33, 35, 37, 58, 59, 63–64, 70, 87–88, 90, 94, 96, 98, 100, 107–108, 124, 150, 173, 177, 189, 190. praetor’s court, praetorian curia, 64, 84, 97, 102, 112–113, 128, Provina, Giovanni, 82. Pullichinu, Filippo, 213. Pullichinu, Simone, 97. Quadro (Quattro), Antonio, di, 115. Quiros, Stefano de, 137. Raiadell, Dalmao, 153. Rappa, Maczullo, 202. Rappa, Matteo, 176. rationales, 111–112. rector see captain. regidores, 188. regimiento, 188–189.

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Regia Magna Curia, see Magna Curia. Renda, Tommaso (Masi), 113, 158, 198. Requesens, Bernardo, 159, 163. revisor viarum, 112. Riba, Melchiore de la, 119. Ribaldo, Faxana, 198. Richuli, Antonio, 209. Riczu, Antonio, 94. Rimbao, Guglielmo, 136. Rimbao, Raimondo, 136. Ripullinu, Masio, 200. Risu, Ursu di, 206. Rizzari, Federico, 108. Rizzari, Goffredo, 116, 138. Rizzari, Nicola, 213. Rizzari, Pietro, 209. Rodonda, Giovanni de la, 127–128. Roger II, King of Sicily, 20. Roger, the Great Count, 20. Romano, Enrico, 156, 158. Romano, Giovanni, Baron of Montalbano, 138, 158, 159. Romano, Giovanni, Baron’s son, 159. Rosa, Iorlando, 202. Rosso, Enrico, Count, 32, 36, 46. royal auditor, 36. royal counsellor, 54, 123, 137, 157. Rubeo, Thomeo, 139. Rubino, 192. Ruggero, Paruta, Viceroy, 69, 104, 119, 138, 159, 161, 163. Russo (from Patti), 195. Russo, Andrea, 209. Russo, Giovanni, 183. Russo, Matteo, 195. Russo, Pietro, 123, 127, 195. Russo Spatafora, Antonio, President, Viceroy, 100, 144, 157, 191. Russu (Russo, from Randazzo), 213. Russu, Guglielmo, 86. Sabia, Nicola, 209. Sabia, Pietro, 106, 161. Sacca, 192. Saciu, Giliberto, 197. Saladino, Alfonso, 206. Saladino, Francesco, 206. Salamone, Arnaldo, 209. Salamone, Francesco, 155.

Salamone, Gabriele, 184. Salamone, Raniero, 200. Salamone, Ruggero, 209. Sallimpipi, Nuchio, 35. Salnam, Federico, 200. Salomone, Giordano, 33. Salonia, 137, 160. Salonia, Antonio, 80, 137, 160. Salonia, Galcerando, 101. Salonia, Pietro Salvatore, 101, 160. Sanchio, Giovanni di, 202. Sanctu Marcu, Cola di, 96. Sanczo, Arnaldo (Arnao), 209. San Giorgio, Matteo, 112. Sanoguerra, Giacomo, 129. Sanpayo, Ferdinando, 184. Santa Maria, Antonio, 197. Santo Clemente, Giovanni di, 121. Santo Honofrio, 194. Santo Honofrio, Francesco, 156, 194, 209. Santo Honofrio, Giuliano, 193. Santo Martino, Manfredi, 200. Santo Matteo, Antonio, 127. Santo Onorato, Giovanni di, 161. Santo Philippo, Giuliano, 200. Santo Stefano, Giorgio, 209. Sapuritu, Nicola, 198. Scalis, Enrico, 101. Scarfallitus, Gualterius, 26. Sciacca, Antonio, 200. sciurterii, 18, 23–24, 28–29, 45, 58, 60–61, 63, 67, 84, 104, 106, 109–110, 126, 128, 139–140, 151, 177, 186, 194, 200, 202–205. Scotti, 168. Secardo, Tommaso, 193. secretia, 35, 56, 107, 134, 136–138, 149, 159, 163–164, 166, 202. secretus, 18, 21, 23–25, 27, 35–36, 45, 47, 55–56, 70, 98, 102, 105–106, 124, 129, 135, 138, 144, 149. Serio, Lancia, 127. Serra, Petrus, 82, 120. Settesoldi, 192. Settesoldi, Enrico, 120, 122. Settimo, Antonio, 144. servientes, 112–113. Sibila, Consalvo de, 75. Sicani, Nardo, 200. 315

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Sicilia, Antonio, 155. Sieri (Sigerio), 136, 192, 213. Sieri (Sigerio), Francesco, 108, 161, 209. Sieri (Sigerio), Raimondo, 123. Sieri (Sigerio), Riccardo, 209. Sigalesi, Iuliano de, 82. Sigerio, Lancia, 136. Silosi, Antonio, 153. sindacatore, 119–120, 122. sindici, see syndics. Sinisi (Silriri), Nardo, 200. Siracusa, 192. Sisino, Nardo de, 157. Sottile, Olivio, 163. Spatafora, Antonio, 209. Spatafora, Bartolomeo, 46. Spatafora, Guglielmo, 209. Spataru, Giovanni, 200. Speciali, Francesco, 184. Speciale, Nicola, Viceroy, 70–71, 82, 87, 91, 96, 99, 104, 110, 120, 136, 139, 150, 191–192, 194. Staccaretica, Bucardo, 198. Stariglu, Antonio, 179. Starranu, Antonio, 122. stratigotus, 18, 22, 107, 109, 128, 186. syndics, 19–21, 25–27, 33, 36–38, 44, 54, 65, 75, 79–84, 94, 97, 101, 104, 106–107, 116, 120–122, 132, 142, 150, 153–156, 176, 207. Tarantello, Zullu, 197. Taurmina, Ottaviano, 213. Termini, Ruggero, 212. Terrana, 201. Terrana, Enrico, 139, 153, 209, 212. Terrana, Giovanni Salvatore, 202. Terrana, Nicola, 153, 209. Terrana, Petrucio, 202. Terri, Giacomo, 155. Tezu, Giovanni, 67. Tirazona, Giovanni, 123. town council, VIII, 6–7, 13, 19–20, 27, 30–31, 37, 43, 55, 59, 62, 71–91, 93–97, 103, 105–106, 108, 112, 121, 123–126, 135, 137, 139, 143, 145–148, 152, 156, 158, 166, 173, 175, 177–184, 190–192, 197–199, 203–205, 207, 214–215, 218. 316

Traversa, Bartolomeo, 201. Traversa, Paolo, 67. treasurer, 32, 36, 38, 53–54, 60–61, 108, 111, 138–139, 195, 197, 200, 202–204, 209, 212. Trenta, Giovanni, 156, 194. Trovato, Antonio de, 123. Tudisco, Enrico, 209. Tudisco, Raimondo, 198. Turri, Bartolomeo, 139. Turribus, Martino de, 101, 104. Turturichio, Pietro, 129. Urrea, Beatrice de, 43. Urrea, Ximen, Lope de, Viceroy, 66, 85, 89, 91, 98, 101, 106, 108, 112–113, 115, 124, 155, 180, 198–199, 204, 206. Urrea, Ximen de, Viceroy, 155, 172, 194, 197. uxer d’arms, 143, 150. Vega, Fernando de, Viceregent, 103–104. Vega, Giovanni de, Viceroy, 73. Velasti, Ferdinando, 101, 104. Ventimiglia, Federico, 47, 150, 163, 166. Ventimiglia, Francesco II, Count of Geraci and Collesano, 41, 44. Ventimiglia, Francesco, 150. Ventimiglia, Francesco, 209. Ventimiglia, Giovanni, Marquis of Geraci, 45, 121, 165. Ventimiglia, Giovanni, 198. Ventu, 213. Ventu, Tommaso/Thomeu, 209. vice-captain, 32, 54. Vicencio, 192. Vicencio, Antonio, 108. Vicencio, Giacomo, 212. Vicencio, Nardo, 195. vicesecretus, 36, 55, 61, 94, 97, 104, 106, 135, 139, 161, 202. Victu, Guglocta, 197. Villanova, Giacomo, 209. Villanova, Villanova, 209. Villaragut, Giovanni, 151. Virgilio, Antonio di, 90. Visconti, 84, 118, 168. Vita, Angelo, 200. Vita, Maciocta, 200.

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Vita, Pietro, 107. Vitellino, Giovanni, 143, 157, 159. Xaxa, 213. Xaxa, Giacomo, 209. xurta, 109–110, 128, 146, 178, 206, 211. xurterii, see sciurterii. Xurtino, Rainaldo, 97. Zaffuti, Pietro, 209.

INDEX OF PLACES Aci, 24, 162. Aidone, 32, 55. Agira, 53, 70. Agrigento, 6–7, 13, 17, 23–25, 36–37, 43, 45–46, 50–52, 57–61, 66, 75, 82, 84, 86–87, 91, 94–95, 7–98, 107, 109–111, 128, 133, 136, 139, 142–145, 152–156, 177–182, 185, 198–199, 202–203, 209–210, 212–213. Albergaria, 64. Alicante, 188. Alzira, 41. Apulia, 19–20, 187. Aragon, 9–11, 17, 21, 40, 67, 124, 132, 170, 187, 208, 215. Artois, 179. Asaro, 33, 51. Augusta, 23, 47, 115. Auvergne, 11, 19, 146–147. Aversa, 39. Barcelona, 9, 14, 17, 67, 74, 89, 114, 120, 142, 170, 180, 186, 188. Bergamo, 147. Calascibetta, 13, 32, 50–51, 53–54, 78–79, 83, 86, 94, 99, 110, 165, 187, 209, 212. Calatafimi, 42, 45–46, 70. Calatamauro, 26. Calatayud, 17. Caltabellotta, 17, 100, 121, 131. Caltavuturo, 32, 53, 64. Camera Reginale, 144. Cammarata, 17, 150.

Capizzi, 124, 162. Capodarso, 187. Casale di Bolo, 23, 24. Cassaro, 64, 147, 198. Castelvetrano, 77. Castelló d’Empúries, 46. Castiglione, 17, 32–33, 37, 39, 51, 53, 58, 70. Castile, 9–11, 41, 126, 134, 140, 143, 149, 166, 180, 188, 216. Castrogiovanni, 13, 17, 23–25, 32, 39, 41, 50–51, 54, 56, 66–67, 98–100, 116, 118, 120, 133, 155–156, 161, 163, 176–178, 180, 183–184, 209–212. Castronovo, 17, 161. Castroreale, 17, 37, 61, 81. Catalonia, 9–12, 17, 40, 46, 53, 67, 114, 120, 132–134, 141–142, 145–147, 164, 166, 170, 187, 194, 201, 204, 215. Catania, VIII, 6, 13, 17, 22, 24–25, 27, 30–32, 38, 48, 52, 54–56, 61–63, 66–67, 71, 73–74, 82, 84, 86, 93–95, 99, 102–103, 107–109, 111–112, 114–115, 117–119, 123–124, 128–129, 136, 138–145, 151, 157–159, 161, 171, 176–179, 181, 183, 185–187, 196, 203–207, 209–213. Cefalù, 23–24, 27, 32, 37, 70. Centorbi, 21. Cervera, 11, 19, 64, 67, 80, 146. Chambery, 142. Collesano, 17, 44. Conceria, 64, 147. Corleone, 13, 16–17, 26, 28–31, 34, 36, 45, 47, 51, 58, 61, 68, 75, 80, 96, 100–102, 106–107, 111, 116, 124, 126, 128, 133, 135, 137, 139, 141, 163, 164–167, 176, 181, 183–184, 186, 193–194, 209, 211–212, 218. Chundro (Cundrone), 67. Cremona, 181. Culcasa, 179. Demina, 23–24. Enna, see Castrogiovanni. Elche, 41. England, 121, 134. 317

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Favignana, 36. Ferrara, 64. Flanders, 179–180. Florence, 34, 64, 143, 148, 158. Francavilla, 32–33, 36, 45–46, 53–54, 70. France, 114, 121, 134, 149, 169. Francofonte, 43, 45, 47. Gagliano, 17. Gaudioso, 34. Genoa, 69. Geraci, 17, 23, 44–45, 121, 165. Gerona, 17. Giardinello, 68. Giuliana, 17, 32. Gozo, 16, 26, 66, 87, 94, 118, 183–184. Jativa, 187. Kalsa, 64, 147, 174. Lentini, 17, 79, 83, 177. Lerida, 17, 80, 83, 118, 145. Licata, 17, 24–25, 35, 47, 50–51, 59, 63, 128, 136. Lipari, 24, 32, 33. Lleida, 10, 80. Malta, 6, 8, 16–17, 26, 34, 66, 72–73, 82, 86, 89, 94–96, 118, 160, 177, 182, 186. Mantua, 64. Marsala, 7, 17, 22, 32, 70, 77. Mascali, 36. Mazara, 17, 22, 24, 32, 34, 155, 166. Mallorca, 146. Menorca, 187. Messina, 6, 8, 17–18, 20–27, 30–31, 34–35, 48, 54–55, 63–64, 68–69, 99, 107, 109, 113–115, 119, 124–125, 137, 151, 156, 159, 186, 197, 207. Milan, 2, 11, 64, 158, 167. Milazzo, 13, 18, 23, 111, 134, 185, 197–199, 209, 212. Militello, 108. Mineo, 17, 38. Mistretta, 17, 162. Modica, 42, 49, 77. 318

Monreale, 26, 48. Montechiaro, 154. Monte Piloso or Quartiere dei Dieci Mila, 68. Monte San Giuliano, 17, 24, 32, 35, 70, 102, 161. Monte San Martino or Quartiere del Bando, 68. Morella, 17. Murcia, 146, 180. Mussomeli, 162. Narbonne, 142. Naro, 17, 162. Nicosia, 13, 17–18, 24–26, 31, 33, 35–36, 38–39, 46, 50–51, 53–54, 56–58, 60–61, 68, 81, 96–98, 101, 102, 106, 110–111, 113, 119, 126, 128, 134–135, 139, 144, 149, 152, 160–161, 163, 170, 177–178, 182–184, 191, 195–196, 203, 209, 211–213. Noto, 7, 13, 17, 30, 48, 58–59, 63, 73, 79–82, 86, 95, 97–98, 101–102, 115–117, 119, 123, 125, 127–129, 134, 136–138, 144, 149, 152–153, 160–161, 167, 172, 184, 207, 209, 211–213. Orihuela, 4, 9, 12, 17, 41, 67, 118, 188. Palermo, 6, 7, 8, 16–18, 21–29, 31, 33–37, 45, 48, 52, 55, 58–59, 63–65, 68, 72, 74, 76, 84–91, 94–100, 102–103, 107–109, 111–113, 118–119, 122, 124–125, 128–129, 132–141, 143–144, 146–148, 150–151, 154, 163, 165, 167, 173–181, 186, 189, 190, 206–207, 211, 213. Paternò, 32, 36, 53, 162. Patti, 13, 18–20, 22, 24, 30, 36, 44–45, 52, 61, 66, 70, 80, 82, 84, 97–98, 100 107, 110–111, 115, 118, 123, 127–128, 134–135, 138–139, 156, 158, 160–161, 172, 180–182 185, 191–198, 209, 212–213. Périguex, 147.

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Perpignano, 17. Petralia Soprana, 17, 24, 77. Petralia Sottana, 17, 77. Piazza, 7, 13, 17, 35, 41, 43, 45–47, 50–51, 55–56, 58–61, 66, 73, 75, 80–82, 84–86, 88–89, 94–95, 97, 100–101, 110, 112–113, 116, 118–119, 122–123, 126, 135–136, 139–140, 142, 144, 152, 155–158, 160–161, 170, 177–178, 183–184, 209, 211–213. Piano or Quartiere dei Greci, 68. Piacenza, 168. Polizzi, 8, 13, 17, 24, 33, 35–36, 42–44, 47, 53–54, 57–58, 60–61, 64, 68–69, 95, 97, 99–100, 102, 106, 110–112, 115, 118–119, 123–124, 126, 128, 135, 142, 144, 146, 155–156, 166–167, 177, 182–183, 198–199, 206, 209, 212–213. Provence, 169, 170, 175. Rabat (Rabato), 68. Randazzo, 7, 13, 17, 23–24, 32, 39, 45, 51, 53–54, 58–61, 64, 66–70, 72, 81, 85–86, 90, 97–99, 101, 111, 113, 119–120, 122–123, 126, 128, 135–136, 138–139, 148–149, 152, 170–171, 173, 176–177, 183, 190, 196, 209, 212–213. Reggio, 84, 87, 168. Reus, 146–147, 165. Rua dei Franchi, 68. Saint Omer, 180, 208. Salemi, 7, 13, 17, 25, 31, 35, 50–51, 57, 59, 61, 67, 82, 84, 97–99, 101–102, 105–106, 110–111, 126, 139, 143, 146, 152, 159, 161, 177, 191, 209, 211, 213. Salso, 8, 13, 21, 23, 135. San Bartolomeo, 151. San Filippo, 16. San Filippo di Argirò, 32, 36. San Fratello, 68. San Marco D’Alunzio, 23. San Martino, 69. San Nicola, 69. San Nicola of Nicosia, 68–69.

San Pietro, 47, 53. Sant Feliu de Guíxols, 142. Santa Lucia, 16. Santa Maria, 69. Santa Maria of Nicosia, 68–69. Saragossa, 17, 67–69, 188. Sardinia, 131. Savoy, 47, 122, 149, 159, 175, 210–211. Seralcadi, 64, 147. Sciacca, 7, 13, 17, 32, 43- 45, 47–48, 52–61, 64, 80, 82, 84, 86, 94–95, 98, 100, 103–106, 109–112, 115, 118–119, 121–124, 126, 128, 134–135, 139, 142, 144–147, 151, 153, 161, 164–165, 172, 177, 181, 209–210, 212–213. Siculiana, 154. Siena, 80, 143. Simeto, 13. Syracuse, 17, 23–27, 30, 32, 44–45, 48–49, 52, 54–55, 59, 63, 73, 89, 97, 108, 135, 138, 145, 162, 177, 179, 185 192. Sortino, 17. Taormina, 17, 23, 25, 53, 64. Tarragona, 9, 67, 180, 187, 194. Termini, 13, 27, 37, 43, 46, 61, 94, 96–98, 102–103, 111–112, 115, 117, 128, 161, 168, 171, 178–179, 186, 209, 212. Terra di Lavoro, 19. Terra d’Otranto, 19. Tortorici, 17. Tortosa, 17. Trapani, 6, 13, 17, 22, 27–28, 30, 32–33, 35–37, 43, 46, 48, 50–52, 54, 58–59, 63, 67, 69–72, 79–80, 82–84, 91, 95, 97, 99, 102, 108, 112, 115, 117–120, 122–123, 127–128, 136, 139, 141, 152, 161, 180, 186, 191–192, 196, 203, 209–210, 212–213. Traina, 17, 138, 149. Tripi, 162. Troina, 8, 17, 32, 56, 71, 162, 172, 178, 213. Val Demone, 13, 18, 209. Val di Mazara, 13, 23, 209. 319

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Val di Noto, 13, 23. Valencia, 4, 9, 17, 19, 41, 174, 186. Valencia (Kingdom), 10–11, 21, 40–41, 67, 124, 132–133, 141–142, 187–188, 215. Valcamonica, 81.

320

Vals, 146–147, 165. Valtellina, 81. Venice, 2, 64. Zaragoza, see Saragossa.